1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KEVIN L. BURROWS, )

Plaintiff ) C.A. No. 09-314 Erie

)

vs. ) District Judge McLaughlin

) Magistrate Judge Baxter

JEFFREY BEARD, et al., )

Defendants. )

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

I. REPORT

It is respectfully recommended that this action be dismissed as legally frivolous in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. §1915(e).

II. RECOMMENDATION

A. Relevant Procedural History

Plaintiff Kevin L. Burrows, presently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at

Albion, Pennsylvania, brings this action pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Named as

Defendants are numerous state and municipal employees, including Jeffrey Beard, Secretary of

the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. Plaintiff alleges that he was wrongly convicted

based upon “contaminated evidence” that was obtained pursuant to an illegal search, and seized

without due process, in violation of his constitutional rights. In particular, Plaintiff alleges that a

search was conducted without a proper search warrant on November 23, 2007, and that he “was

not informed at the time of taking property” of the accusation against him. (Complaint at pp. 2-

3). As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, and release from custody. 

(Complaint at p. 4).

Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis on January 8, 2010, which was

unaccompanied by a certified inmate account statement. [Document # 4]. As a result, this Court

issued an Order requiring Plaintiff to submit the required account statement by February 1, 2010.

Case 1:09-cv-00314-SJM-SPB Document 10 Filed 01/22/10 Page 1 of 5
2

[Document # 7]. Plaintiff subsequently filed a second motion to proceed in forma pauperis with

an attached account statement, which remains pending before this Court. [Document # 8].

B. Standards of Review

1. PLRA

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (hereinafter, “PLRA”), Pub.L.No. 104-134, was

enacted to amend 28 U.S.C. §1915, which establishes the criteria for allowing an action to

proceed without payment of costs. Section 1915(e), as amended, states in relevant part: “[t]he

court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that -- ...(B) the action or appeal -

- (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted....” A

claim is frivolous if it: 1) is based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory and/or, 2) contains

factual contentions that are clearly baseless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). A

plaintiff has failed to allege a viable claim if the court is satisfied “that no relief could be granted

under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegation.” Hishon v. King &

Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). This Court has

discretion to dismiss frivolous or malicious in forma pauperis complaints under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e). Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 fd 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989). The U.S. Supreme Court has

instructed that section 1915(e) provides the Court with the authority “... to dismiss a claim based

on an indisputably meritless theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the

complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly

baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). In fact, the statute not only

empowers the Court to screen out frivolous cases before the complaint is served, it actually

encourages it. Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 195-96 (3d Cir. 1990).

2. Pro Se Pleadings

Pro se pleadings, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521(1972). If

the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail,

Case 1:09-cv-00314-SJM-SPB Document 10 Filed 01/22/10 Page 2 of 5
3

it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor

syntax and sentence construction, or litigant’s unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v.

MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552,

555 (3d Cir. 1969)(petition prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read

“with a measure of tolerance”); Freeman v. Department of Corrections, 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir.

1991). Under our liberal pleading rules, a district court should construe all allegations in a

complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir.1997). See, e.g.,

Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996)(discussing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard);

Markowitz v. Northeast Land Company, 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990)(same). Because

Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, this Court will consider facts and make inferences where it is

appropriate.

C. Discussion

Succinctly stated, Plaintiff claims that he has been falsely imprisoned as a result of an

improper conviction and, thus, he is entitled to receive monetary damages and release from

custody. In order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a

conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that “the conviction or sentence has

been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal

authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of

a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). “A claim for

damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is

not cognizable under § 1983.” 512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis in the original).

Plaintiff’s complaint clearly implicates the validity of his conviction; yet, Plaintiff has

made no showing that the conviction has been declared invalid. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims for

monetary damages against the Defendants should be dismissed.

Case 1:09-cv-00314-SJM-SPB Document 10 Filed 01/22/10 Page 3 of 5
1

This doctrine arises out of the decisions in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149 (1923) and

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303 (1983).

4

Moreover, under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, federal courts are prohibited “from 1

exercising ‘subject matter jurisdiction to review final adjudications of a state’s highest court or

to evaluate constitutional claims that are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s

[decision] in a judicial proceeding.’” Ernst v. Child and Youth Services of Chester County, 108

F.3d 486, 491 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 850, 118 S.Ct. 139 (1997)(quoting FOCUS

v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1996))(internal

citations omitted). For the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine to be applicable here this Court must

either “determine that the state court judgment was erroneously entered” or “take action that

would render that judgment ineffectual” in order to grant Plaintiff the relief he requests. Rooker 

v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 150 (1923). 

Plaintiff claims that his constitutional rights were violated during a suppression hearing

that was conducted by the trial court on July 1, 2008. Plaintiff is essentially asking this Court to

conduct a de novo review of all state court proceedings related to his conviction and sentence in

an effort to have the state court judgment vacated. In order to grant such relief, a determination

that the state court judgment was erroneous must occur, and in particular, such relief would

render the state court decision “ineffectual.” This he cannot do under the guise of a civil rights

claim.

Finally, to the extent Plaintiff’s Complaint may be construed as a petition for writ of

habeas corpus, it must be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his state court

remedies, and his claims are barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that this action be dismissed as

legally frivolous in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

Case 1:09-cv-00314-SJM-SPB Document 10 Filed 01/22/10 Page 4 of 5
5

In accordance with the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Fed.R.Civ.P.

72(b)(2), the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service to file written

objections to this report and recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have

fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to timely

file objections may constitute a waiver of some appellate rights. See Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d

187 (3d Cir. 2007).

/s/ Susan Paradise Baxter 

SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER

United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: January 22, 2010

cc: The Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin

United States District Judge 

Case 1:09-cv-00314-SJM-SPB Document 10 Filed 01/22/10 Page 5 of 5