* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### AUG 11 1999 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

SCOTT H. WATKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 99-1181 MER, ARN, PER, INC., Defendant-Appellee. (D.C. No. 97-N-1834) (D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before ANDERSON, KELLY and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiff Scott H. Watkins appeals the district cou rt’s dismissal of his pro se complaint. We affirm. On February 2, 1994, Watkins was riding his bicycle in Denver, Colorado,-2-

when he was struck by a vehicle driven by Floyd Bac ker, an employee of HowBout-A-Pizza. Backer was acting in the course and scope of his employment when the accident occurred. Watkins filed suit in Colorado state court, but the case was settled. To effectuate the settlement, Watkins signed a release forever discharg[ing] Merle Quigley, Mer. Arn. Per. , Inc., d/b/a How ‘Bout a Pizza . . . of and from any and all liabili ty for any and all claims, demands, . . . rights and causes of action of whatsoever kind and nature, resulting from or in any way arising orgrowing out of . . . the injuries, damages and losses of any type sustained by me as a result of an incident which occurred on or about Fe bruary 2, 1994. Record, Document 7, Exh. B. Watkins twice attempte d to have the settlement set aside, but the state court denied both requests. On August 25, 1997, Watkins, proceeding pro se, fil ed this case in federal district court. The complaint asserted numerous “c laims for relief” but did not set forth in any detail the factual bases for those “cl aims.” Moreover, many of Watkins’ self-styled claims are not recognized caus es of action. The district court considered the essence of the complaint to be eithe r a request to enforce the state court judgment or an attempt to commence new litigation against Mer, Arn, Per, Inc., based on the February 2, 1994, incident. The court dismissed Watkins’ complaint on the grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, res judicata, expiration of Colorado’s three-year statute of limi tations, and failure to state a claim of fraud, the most likely claim asserted by W atkins in his complaint. On appeal, Watkins does not challenge specifically any of the bases for the-3-

district court’s dismissal. He does not direct ourattention to allegations in any pleading that would permit us to conclude diversityjurisdiction exists, that he has pleaded fraud with particularity as required by Fed eral Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), that the statute of limitations had not expir ed, or that he is not in fact attempting to prosecute a case against a party he h as released from liability. Our independent search of the record has not uncovered any such allegations or evidence. We are mindful of our obligation to construe the pl eadings of a pro se litigant liberally. See Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). This obligation, however, neither compels nor permits us to act as Watkins’ advocate, manufacture claims he has not presented, or excuse his failure to adhere to our procedural rules. See Barnett v. Hargett , 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith. Entered for the Court Mary Beck Briscoe Circuit Judge