U.S. Ratification of the 

Chemical Weapons Convention

Jonathan B. Tucker

CASE STUDY SERIES 

Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

National Defense University

4
Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

National Defense University

DR. JOHN F. REICHART

Director

DR. W. SETH CARUS

Deputy Director, Distinguished Research Fellow

Since its inception in 1994, the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass 

Destruction (WMD Center) has been at the forefront of research on the 

implications of weapons of mass destruction for U.S. security. Originally 

focusing on threats to the military, the WMD Center now also applies its 

expertise and body of research to the challenges of homeland security. The 

center’s mandate includes research, education, and outreach. Research focuses 

on understanding the security challenges posed by WMD and on fashioning 

effective responses thereto. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has 

designated the center as the focal point for WMD education in the joint 

professional military education system. Education programs, including its 

courses on countering WMD and consequence management, enhance 

awareness in the next generation of military and civilian leaders of the WMD 

threat as it relates to defense and homeland security policy, programs, 

technology, and operations. As a part of its broad outreach efforts, the WMD 

Center hosts annual symposia on key issues bringing together leaders and 

experts from the government and private sectors. Visit the center online at 

www.ndu.edu/WMDCenter/. 

Cover: President Bill Clinton appeals for ratification of the Chemical 

Weapons Convention, with the support of Vice President Al Gore and former 

Senator Robert Dole, at the White House, April 23, 1997.

Photo courtesy of the Clinton Presidential Library/Herbert Ragan


U.S. Ratification of the 

Chemical Weapons Convention

Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Case Study 4

Case Study Series General Editor: Paul I. Bernstein

by Jonathan B. Tucker

U.S. Ratification of the 

Chemical Weapons Convention

National Defense University Press

Washington, D.C.

December 2011
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vii

Contents

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Policy Drift on the CWC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Senator Helms vs. the White House. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

The Administration Miscalculates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Negotiating Under Deadline. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Engaging the Republican Leadership. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

The Public-Relations Battle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Conclusion of the Senate–White House Negotiation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Unanimous Consent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

A Surprise Guest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Voting on the “Killer” Amendments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

About the Author. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

1

Introduction

On October 1, 1990, two months after Iraq’s surprise invasion and annexation of Kuwait 

had put the United States and other members of the international community on a collision 

course with the Saddam Hussein regime, President George H.W. Bush spoke to the United 

Nations (UN) General Assembly in New York. He described Iraq’s brutal aggression against its 

neighbor as “a throwback to another era, a dark relic from a dark time.” Noting that Saddam 

Hussein had waged a “genocidal poison gas war” against Iraq’s restive Kurdish minority during the 1980s, President Bush hinted that if it ultimately proved necessary to liberate Kuwait by 

force, the United States and its allies could face Iraqi attacks with chemical weapons—highly 

toxic chemicals designed to incapacitate or kill. 

This looming threat made it all the more important to conclude the Chemical Weapons 

Convention (CWC), a multilateral treaty banning the development, production, stockpiling, 

and use of chemical arms. Both as Vice President under Ronald Reagan and as President himself, Bush had played a leading role in the negotiation of the CWC, and he was now determined 

to make it a reality. A year earlier, in September 1989, Bush had come to the UN General Assembly to present new U.S. proposals designed to speed the conclusion of the treaty. Now the 

possibility of war with Iraq gave additional urgency to this goal. “The Gulf crisis,” President 

Bush told the General Assembly, “proves how important it is to act together, and to act now, to 

conclude an absolute, worldwide ban on these weapons.”

The CWC was the culmination of a 70-year effort to ban chemical arms, which are widely considered indiscriminate and inhumane. World War I was the first conflict to involve the large-scale 

use of toxic chemicals, including “choking agents,” such as chlorine and phosgene, which irritate the 

lungs and cause them to fill with fluid so that the victim asphyxiates; “blister agents,” such as mustard 

gas, which produce painful chemical burns and blisters on the skin; and “blood agents,” such as hydrogen cyanide, which starve the tissues of oxygen and cause rapid organ failure.

In 1925, in response to the horrors of industrialized chemical warfare during World War 

I, the League of Nations negotiated the Geneva Protocol banning the use of asphyxiating gases 

(as well as bacteriological agents) in interstate conflict. Even so, the Geneva Protocol permitted 

the continued development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons as a deterrent, and 

many countries that joined the treaty—including the United States—reserved the right to retaliate 

in kind if attacked first. Although mutual deterrence and other factors prevented the large-scale 

use of chemical weapons during World War II, German scientists secretly discovered and massproduced an extraordinarily lethal class of chemicals called “nerve agents,” including tabun and 
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WMD Center Case Study 4

sarin. Small quantities of these compounds disrupt the function of the nervous system and cause 

convulsions and death by respiratory paralysis. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and 

the Soviet Union pursued a chemical arms race that resulted in the stockpiling of vast quantities 

of nerve agents on both sides. 

In 1980 the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva began negotiating a treaty requiring the elimination of all existing stockpiles of chemical weapons and prohibiting their future 

development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use, to be accompanied by stringent international verification measures. Even as the CWC talks were taking place, however, the Iran-Iraq 

War (1980–1988) saw the first large-scale use of chemical weapons since World War I, including 

Iraqi attacks with nerve agents against Iranian troops and Kurdish civilians in northern Iraq. In 

September 1989, after more than a decade of arduous negotiations, President Bush offered his 

path-breaking proposals, ushering in the endgame of the talks. The CWC was finally concluded 

on September 3, 1992, and opened for signature at a ceremony in Paris on January 13, 1993. 

Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger signed the treaty on behalf of the United States in one 

of the last official acts of the Bush administration.

Although the United States was now one of the 130 original signatories to the CWC, it 

would not become a full party, subject to all the rights and obligations of the treaty, until the 

Senate gave its consent to ratification by a two-thirds majority vote. The requirement in the U.S. 

Constitution that the executive branch of government obtain the approval of the Senate to enter 

into treaty commitments gives the legislative branch a prominent role in the making of foreign 

policy. In addition to granting—or withholding—its consent, the Senate can provide advice in 

the form of legislation accompanying a treaty that interprets certain provisions and specifies 

how they should be implemented by the executive branch.

The fact that treaty ratification requires a supermajority of 67 votes in the Senate makes it 

one of the most challenging tasks facing a U.S. President, who often must devote considerable 

time and effort to achieving an objective that typically pays few immediate political dividends.

 In the case of the CWC, the task of shepherding the treaty through the ratification process fell 

to President Bush’s Democratic successor, William J. Clinton, who took office one week after the 

signing ceremony in Paris.1

 For various reasons, the CWC proved to be far more controversial 

than was originally anticipated, and it was not until 4 years later, in April 1997, that the Senate finally gave its advice and consent to ratification. This case study examines the ratification 

process in detail and addresses the following questions. How did the U.S. Senate finally come to 

ratify the CWC? Who were the key players and what positions did they seek to advance? How 

did the shifting political landscape shape the process and the outcome? 
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U.S. Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention

Policy Drift on the CWC

After President Clinton took office in January 1993, the submission of the CWC for Senate consideration was delayed for several months while the new administration prepared the 

detailed article-by-article analysis that customarily accompanies a treaty. Other factors also 

pushed the CWC to the back burner: President Clinton focused initially on domestic issues, 

such as reviving the weak U.S. economy, and his foreign policy agenda was dominated by crises 

he had inherited in Iraq, Haiti, and Somalia. The White House also faced delays in getting its 

senior political appointees confirmed by the Senate. 

As a result, it was not until November 23, 1993, that the President formally submitted the 

CWC to the Senate, which referred it to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC). Although the SFRC has the lead on arms control treaties and is responsible for drafting the resolution of ratification that accompanies a treaty when it comes up for a vote on the Senate floor, 

the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

have ancillary jurisdiction. Between March and July 1994, the SFRC and the SASC held several 

hearings on the CWC.

In addition to the fact that the Democratic majority in the Senate strongly supported 

the treaty, the prospects for ratification in the 103d

 Congress looked promising for a number of reasons. First, the CWC was not clearly associated with either party, having been 

negotiated during the Reagan administration, concluded and signed by the Bush administration, and submitted for ratification by President Clinton. Second, the CWC would not 

constrain U.S. military power: in 1984 Congress had ordered the Defense Department to 

start destroying its stocks of aging chemical weapons, and in 1990 the United States had 

signed a bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union halting the production of modern “binary” chemical munitions. As a result, the Pentagon was already reorienting its chemicalwarfare posture to a strictly defensive purpose. Third, the U.S. intelligence community 

believed that the CWC verification regime would detect militarily significant cheating and 

thereby help to deter states that, despite being treaty members, might seek to acquire or retain chemical arms.2

 Finally, representatives of the U.S. chemical industry had participated 

extensively in the CWC negotiations and were comfortable with the on-site inspection provisions of the treaty, which had been designed to safeguard trade secrets. Leading corporations such as DuPont, Dow, and Monsanto also supported CWC ratification to improve 

the public image of the chemical industry, which had been tarnished by the Agent Orange 

scandal and other high-profile incidents of the 1970s and 1980s.3
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WMD Center Case Study 4

In the rush to conclude the multilateral CWC negotiations, however, the Bush administration had put off efforts to reach agreement among U.S. Government agencies on a few key 

policy issues related to the treaty. The most contentious matter was the future military role of 

riot-control agents (RCAs), such as tear gas. Although the CWC permitted the use of RCAs for 

normal peacekeeping, humanitarian, and disaster relief operations, and counterterrorism and 

hostage-rescue situations outside of a war zone, it banned their use as a “method of warfare” 

because it was hard to distinguish between nonlethal and lethal chemicals on the battlefield, 

creating the risk of inadvertent escalation. The problem was that neither the CWC nor the formal negotiating record clearly defined “method of warfare.”

Although the European North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries felt strongly that any 

combat use of RCAs should be prohibited, some members of the U.S. military wanted to preserve the option to employ tear gas in certain wartime scenarios. Such use was permitted under 

Executive Order 11850, which President Gerald R. Ford had issued in April 1975 in conjunction 

with U.S. ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. This order listed four illustrative situations 

in which RCAs could be employed in a war zone with Presidential authorization “in defensive 

military modes to save lives”: to rescue flight crews downed behind enemy lines, reduce the 

need for lethal force when noncombatants were used to screen attacks, control rioting prisoners 

of war, and protect convoys in rear-echelon areas.4

 In testimony to the SFRC on May 13, 1994, 

Walter B. Slocombe, the Deputy Under Secretary for Policy in the Department of Defense, said, 

“How, if at all, the Convention’s prohibitions on RCA use as a method of warfare affect Executive Order 11850 is a matter still under review within the administration.”5

Five weeks later, however, General John Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff (JCS), endorsed the Clinton administration’s narrow legal interpretation of the CWC as 

banning any use of tear gas in situations where enemy combatants were present. On June 23, 

1994, the White House issued a statement from President Clinton to the Senate stating: “according to the current international understanding, the CWC’s prohibition on the use of RCAs as 

a ‘method of warfare’ also precludes the use of RCAs even for humanitarian purposes in situations where combatants and non-combatants are intermingled, such as the rescue of downed air 

crews, passengers, and escaping prisoners, and situations where civilians are being used to mask 

or screen attacks.”6

 In these situations, the administration argued, nonlethal weapons other than 

chemical agents could be employed that were fully consistent with the CWC. Even so, the administration’s decision to rule out any use of tear gas against enemy combatants, even for the 

purpose of helping to rescue downed air crews or to save civilian lives, sparked strong protests 

from the military Services. The fact that the U.S. Government was divided over the RCA issue 
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U.S. Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention

later proved to be an obstacle to CWC ratification. As often happens in Washington, the losers 

in the internal policy debate tried to keep the issue alive and fight another day by seeking out 

allies on Capitol Hill.

Throughout the summer of 1994, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Claiborne Pell (D–RI), put off action on the CWC while he awaited reports from 

the Armed Services Committee on the military implications of the treaty, and from the Intelligence Committee on the effectiveness of its verification mechanisms. The latter report would be 

based on a National Intelligence Estimate, a consensus product of the 16 U.S. intelligence agencies. Neither committee report had been completed by the time the 103d

 Congress adjourned. 

As a result, although the Democrats controlled both the White House and the Senate, 1994 

passed without action on the CWC.

Senator Pell planned to take up the treaty early in the next session of Congress, but the 

mid-term elections of November 1994 intervened. In a political landslide, the Republicans 

gained over 50 seats in the House of Representatives and 8 seats in the Senate, enabling them 

to gain majority control of both chambers. In the new Senate, ratification of the CWC would 

require the support of a larger number of Republicans to reach the required two-thirds majority. 

In addition, Senator Robert Dole (R–KS) replaced Senator Thomas Daschle (D–ND) as Majority Leader, and conservative Republicans took charge of the three Senate panels with jurisdiction over national security: the Foreign Relations Committee, Armed Services Committee, and 

Intelligence Committee.

Senator Helms vs. the White House 

The first challenge facing the Clinton administration in the 104th Congress was to persuade 

Senator Jesse Helms (R–NC), the new chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, to release 

the CWC for a vote on the Senate floor. Senator Helms personally opposed the CWC and also 

sought to use his hold on the treaty for leverage with the administration on other foreign policy 

issues. In January 1995, he proposed a reorganization of the U.S. foreign affairs bureaucracy that 

would fold three independent agencies into the State Department: the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), U.S. Information Agency (USIA), and U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID). The White House strongly opposed this proposal and soon found itself 

at loggerheads with the North Carolina senator.

On August 1, 1995, frustrated by his failure to obtain the 60 votes needed to end a 

Democratic filibuster of his reorganization bill, Senator Helms decided to close the SFRC for 

business until the Democrats relented. This strong-arm tactic brought the Senate’s foreign 
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WMD Center Case Study 4

policy machinery to a standstill, freezing 400 State Department ambassadorial appointments 

and promotions and blocking action on a dozen treaties and other international agreements.7

The standoff between Helms and the Clinton administration continued for the next 5 months. 

“These people are playing hardball and dirty pool at the same time and I’m not going to cave 

in,” Helms told the New York Times. “But all the President has got to do is say, ‘Senator, let’s 

talk,’ and we’ll talk. It’ll end on the day the President says we’ll make a deal and we bust up 

that little fairyland.”8

In an effort to break the impasse, Senator John Kerry (D–MA) tried to broker a compromise formula that would give Helms some of what he wanted in exchange for reopening 

the committee for business. After Senate Democrats agreed to work with Republicans on a 

bill to restructure the foreign affairs agencies that would be acceptable to both sides, Helms 

lifted his hold on 15 ambassadorial appointments and other nominees in September, but 

the impasse on the CWC continued for several more weeks.9

 Finally, on December 14, 1995, 

Helms and the White House agreed to a “unanimous consent agreement,” a procedural 

move that does not require a formal vote and can be blocked by a single senator. As part of 

the deal, Helms would report the CWC out of the Foreign Relations Committee by April 30, 

1996, after which Majority Leader Dole would schedule a floor vote within “a reasonable 

time period.”10

In addition to using his hold on the CWC for leverage on other foreign policy issues, 

Helms opposed the treaty on substantive grounds. Although the CWC had been negotiated by 

the Reagan and Bush administrations, Helms and other conservative Republicans believed that 

it was unverifiable, unenforceable, and would lull the Nation into a false sense of security. In 

March 1996, the SFRC held three hearings at which witnesses opposing the CWC far outnumbered supporters. The critics focused on the difficulty of verifying treaty compliance with a high 

degree of confidence, which would enable cheaters to evade detection; the fact that countries 

suspected of possessing chemical weapons (such as Iraq and Libya) were unlikely to join but 

would suffer few consequences for not doing so; the treaty’s lack of jurisdiction over nonstate 

actors such as terrorist groups; and the regulatory burdens it would impose on the U.S. chemical 

industry, including reporting requirements and intrusive on-site inspections.11

Proponents of the CWC countered that while the treaty was not a panacea, it would significantly reduce the threat of chemical warfare and enhance U.S. national security. The United 

States was already destroying its chemical weapons stockpile and the CWC would require all 

other member states to do the same. It would also subject chemical production facilities to routine and short-notice challenge inspections, sharply limiting the ability of members to cheat; 
7

U.S. Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention

and it would isolate and punish nonparties by restricting their ability to import or export treatycontrolled chemicals.

Although Senator Helms had agreed to report the CWC out of the Foreign Relations Committee by April 30, he worked hard to prevent the treaty from being ratified. The chairman’s 

draft resolution of ratification contained more than 20 conditions, some of which were widely 

viewed as “poison pills,” designed to block U.S. ratification or delay it indefinitely. For example, 

one condition would bar Washington from completing the ratification process until all countries with chemical weapons programs had signed and ratified—an eventuality that would not 

occur for years, if ever. 

Nevertheless, Helms’s approach did not prevail. Wendy Sherman, the Assistant Secretary 

of State for Legislative Affairs, worked closely with a bipartisan group of Senators—Richard 

Lugar (R–IN), Pell, Kerry, Joseph Biden, Jr. (D–DE), and Nancy Kassebaum (R–KS)—to craft 

an alternative resolution of ratification without the poison pill conditions. On April 25, several 

Republican senators joined Senator Lugar and all of the committee’s Democrats in voting 13 to 

5 against the chairman’s version. Senator Lugar then offered his substitute resolution, which was 

reported out of the committee on April 28 by a vote of 12 to 6.12

The Clinton administration’s surprising victory over Senator Helms proved to be short-lived, 

however. Although the CWC had now been released for a vote on the Senate floor, the political 

battle over the resolution of ratification had split the Republican Party into two camps, pragmatic 

“Bush Republicans” versus more ideological “Reagan Republicans.”13 Tough-minded internationalists within the party, such as Senators Lugar, John McCain (R–AZ), and Charles Hagel (R–NE), 

agreed with former President Bush that U.S. leadership in world affairs required the willingness to 

participate in international treaties and to work with other countries in multilateral bodies such as 

the UN. In contrast, a more conservative group of Republicans, including Senators Helms, Strom 

Thurmond (R–SC), and Jon Kyl (R–AZ), believed that U.S. interests were best pursued unilaterally, 

without the burdens and restraints of multilateralism.14 The retirement in 1996 of moderate Republican senators such as Kassebaum, Mark Hatfield (OR), and William Cohen (ME) had also left the 

Senate more partisan and polarized. According to one analyst, the CWC had become “a litmus test 

for the Republican Party in the post-Cold War era.”15 In this new political environment, treaty supporters were no longer confident of obtaining a two-thirds majority in the Senate.

The Administration Miscalculates 

Despite the bad omens, the White House decided to move forward with the CWC ratification process. Senate Majority Leader Dole had promised to schedule a floor vote on the treaty 
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WMD Center Case Study 4

“within a reasonable time” after it was reported out of committee, but he became preoccupied 

with his decision to run for the Republican Presidential nomination and never found time for 

the treaty on the Senate calendar.16 After Dole resigned from the Senate on June 11, 1996, Senator Trent Lott (R–MS) assumed the position of Majority Leader. With the CWC still in limbo, 

Minority Leader Daschle and other Democratic senators urged Lott to schedule a floor vote 

before the November 1996 elections. When Lott equivocated, Daschle threatened to filibuster 

the fiscal year 1997 Defense Authorization bill and prevent a vote on national missile defense, 

an election-year priority for Republicans.

The Democrats’ hard-nosed tactic proved effective, although it generated resentment on 

the Republican side of the aisle. On June 28, 1996, Daschle and Lott reached a unanimous consent agreement to schedule a vote on the CWC before September 14, 1996. The White House 

signed off on the deal, despite the fact that it included a troublesome provision allowing for 

unlimited amendment of the resolution of ratification on the Senate floor. Because it was clear 

that a vote on the CWC would be close, allowing an open amendment process would only make 

it harder for the treaty to get the 67 votes needed to pass.

Now that a floor vote had been scheduled, the struggle to win over undecided senators 

intensified. The most determined opposition to the CWC came from Frank Gaffney, a former 

mid-level Reagan administration appointee who had served in the Pentagon. Gaffney headed 

a small advocacy group called the Center for Security Policy, which showered Senate offices 

with faxes and press releases asserting that the treaty was fatally flawed. Analysts from other 

conservative think tanks, such as the Heritage Foundation and the libertarian CATO Institute, 

also weighed in against the CWC. During the summer of 1996, treaty opponents obtained support for their position from conservative columnists George Will and Charles Krauthammer, as 

well as from prominent former Republican officials such as Dick Cheney, William Clark, Jeanne 

Kirkpatrick, Edwin Meese, and Caspar Weinberger. Because the Clinton administration did not 

respond effectively to these attacks, by late 1996 the opponents of the CWC had set the terms 

of the debate.

On the night of September 11, 1996, Republican Presidential candidate Dole sent a letter to Senator Lott warning against “illusory” arms control agreements and urging the Senate 

to withhold its consent to CWC ratification until all potential U.S. adversaries had ratified the 

treaty and the U.S. intelligence community could guarantee its ability to detect even minor violations.17 The floor debate on the treaty had already begun, and a ratification vote was scheduled 

for September 14. On September 12, however, informal tallies indicated that in the charged 

partisan atmosphere immediately preceding the November election, the CWC would fail to get 
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U.S. Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention

the 67 votes needed to pass. With Dole trailing in the polls, Senate Republicans did not want 

to give President Clinton a foreign policy victory. In order to prevent an almost certain defeat, 

the President ordered Secretary of State Warren Christopher to call Senator Lott and request 

that the CWC be withdrawn from Senate floor consideration. The Majority Leader agreed to 

this request, and at the end of the 104th Congress, the CWC was re-referred back to the SFRC.

Meanwhile, on October 31, 1996, Hungary became the 65th country to ratify the CWC, 

triggering an automatic 180-day countdown to the entry into force of the treaty, with or without the United States. The Clinton administration now faced a firm deadline to complete the 

ratification process or suffer the consequences of not being an original party to the CWC. If 

Washington failed to ratify by April 29, 1997, it would not have a seat on the 41-country Executive Council that would oversee implementation of the treaty, U.S. citizens would be barred 

from serving in the Technical Secretariat and its international inspectorate, and U.S. chemical 

companies would lose sales to overseas competitors as mandatory trade restrictions on nonparties were gradually phased in.

Given the approaching deadline for entry into force of the CWC, executive branch officials 

began to discuss whether the President should recall the Senate after the election for a special 

lame-duck session to consider the treaty, but this idea was rejected. Instead, mid-level administration officials drew up a game plan for CWC ratification that was reviewed by the Deputies 

Committee, an interagency panel at the deputy secretary level. Approval of the game plan in 

December 1996 launched an executive branch-wide campaign for CWC ratification.18

Negotiating Under Deadline

After President Clinton’s re-election in November 1996, the renewed effort to obtain Senate 

ratification of the CWC became the first foreign policy challenge of his second term. Although 

ratifying the treaty in the few months remaining before the treaty entered into force would be an 

uphill battle, the President’s national security team recommended unanimously that he make the 

effort. Not only had Clinton staked his prestige on the CWC, but administration officials believed 

that failure to ratify the treaty would signal an American retreat from the world and undermine 

U.S. leadership in combating weapons proliferation, terrorism, and other transnational problems. 

Given the high stakes, the President concluded, “We cannot afford to fail.”19

After the long struggle the previous year to get the treaty reported out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the administration now found itself back at square one. This time, 

however, the White House decided to accord the CWC the high-level, focused attention that 

had been lacking over the previous 3 years.20 President Clinton committed to making a major 
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personal investment of time and effort, and he also mobilized his new Secretaries of State and 

Defense, Madeleine Albright and William Cohen, to lobby for the CWC. Albright made the 

treaty one of her top legislative priorities, and Cohen, a registered Republican and former U.S. 

senator, promoted the CWC as an example of the administration’s commitment to bipartisanship in foreign policy.

Three executive branch officials were also assigned to work full-time on CWC ratification: Robert Bell, the senior director for defense and arms control policy on the National 

Security Council (NSC) staff; Terri Lodge, the senior adviser for arms control and nonproliferation in the State Department’s Bureau of Legislative Affairs and chair of the interagency Treaty Ratification Working Group; and Lori Esposito Murray, who was seconded from 

ACDA to the White House to serve as special advisor to the President on CWC ratification. 

All three officials worked closely with SFRC staff director Edwin Hall and other members 

of the committee staff to obtain whatever information or decisions were needed from the 

executive branch.

Senator Helms, for his part, was in no hurry to take up the CWC. In a letter to Senator Lott 

on January 29, 1997, he recommended that the Senate consider the treaty only after addressing 

several “top Republican priorities,” such as reorganizing the State Department, reforming the 

United Nations, and deploying a national missile defense system.21 Helms also intended to make 

the Clinton administration pay for his humiliation in April 1996, when the Foreign Relations 

Committee had voted down his proposed resolution of ratification and passed an alternate version lacking poison pill provisions. In his letter to Lott, Helms wrote, “I believe that the starting 

point for any further discussions on the CWC must be the resolution of ratification which I 

presented to the Foreign Relations Committee on April 25, 1996.”22 The chairman was clearly 

preparing to refight the battles of the previous year.

With the April 1997 date for entry into force of the CWC rapidly approaching, the White 

House tried to persuade Senator Lott to overrule Helms and schedule the treaty for a vote on the 

Senate floor without a formal vote in the Foreign Relations Committee.23 The Majority Leader, 

however, had Presidential ambitions and found himself in a political bind. Although he did not 

want the Republican Party labeled as being in favor of chemical weapons, he also worried that 

bypassing Senator Helms would discredit him with the more conservative members of his own 

caucus. As a result, Lott chose not to challenge the chairman’s prerogatives or reveal his own 

position on the CWC.24 According to an analysis by John Parachini, “The longer Lott kept his 

views private, the more the partisan debate over the treaty continued, and the higher the political price the Clinton administration needed to pay for its eventual passage.”25
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U.S. Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention

Engaging the Republican Leadership

Finally coming to terms with the changed power balance in the Senate, the White House 

decided to shift from a policy of confronting Senator Helms to one of engaging him. The previous year, key Republican senators had been unwilling to hand Clinton a political victory before 

the Presidential election; now, with the election behind them, they might be more willing to 

consider the CWC on its merits.

The administration’s new strategy had two main elements. First, National Security Adviser Samuel (“Sandy”) Berger would negotiate with Senator Helms and Lott over understandings and conditions in the resolution of ratification that addressed their main concerns 

about the treaty. Although the text of the CWC explicitly precluded countries from making “reservations,” meaning unilateral amendments that alter or nullify specific provisions, 

Helms and other senators sought to impose conditions on how the executive branch would 

interpret and implement the treaty. Second, the White House would launch a grassroots campaign to persuade the American people—and, indirectly, their representatives in the Senate—that voting for the CWC was a responsible, politically centrist position. To this end, 

the administration would seek endorsements of the treaty from former Bush administration 

officials who had participated in the CWC negotiations and viewed it as part of their legacy, 

and from senior military commanders in order to counter the perception that the Democrats 

were weak on national security.26

As part of the effort to engage Helms, Secretary of State Albright sought to establish a 

respectful working relationship with the North Carolina senator by making clear that she 

took his views and the prerogatives of his committee seriously on a range of foreign policy 

issues, including his proposed reorganization of the foreign policy bureaucracy. Although 

Albright was believed to favor reorganization in some form, the plan had powerful opponents 

within the administration, including Vice President Al Gore.27 Albright’s political courtship 

of Helms ultimately bore fruit by persuading him to enter into negotiations with the administration. Aware that a majority of senators on the Foreign Relations Committee supported 

the treaty, Helms privately told his staff to bargain with the White House and extract as many 

concessions as they could in the resolution of ratification.28 He knew that the approaching 

deadline for the United States to become an original party to the CWC gave him considerable 

bargaining leverage.

To provide a sounding board for the talks with the White House and resolve substantive 

differences on the treaty, Majority Leader Lott established a CWC Task Force made up of nine 
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Republican senators and their senior staffs, including Senators Helms, Kyl, McCain, Richard 

Shelby (AL), Donald Nickles (OK), Theodore Stevens (AK), John Warner (VA), Paul Coverdell 

(GA), and Robert Smith (NH). Most of these senators were either opposed to or skeptical about 

the treaty, and Lott deliberately excluded the participation of Senator Lugar, the leading Republican advocate of the CWC. According to one analysis, creating the task force enabled the 

Majority Leader to appease the most conservative members of his caucus by allowing them to 

express their opposition to the treaty, while still ensuring that the Senate performed its constitutional functions in an orderly manner.29 Lott also made clear that to obtain a floor vote on 

the CWC, the Clinton administration would have to make concessions on other foreign policy 

issues of importance to Republicans.

The White House negotiations with the Majority Leader’s CWC task force began on January 29. National Security Adviser Berger formally represented the administration, but given 

his many other responsibilities, he asked Robert Bell of the NSC Staff to conduct most of the 

detailed negotiations with two senior members of the Senate staff: Marshall Billingslea, Senator Helms’s chief adviser on national security policy, and Randall (“Randy”) Scheunemann, 

Senator Lott’s principal national security aide. Before joining the Clinton administration, Bell 

had served for 4 years on the SFRC staff under a Republican chairman, Charles Percy (R–IL), 

followed by 8 years on the SASC staff under a Democratic chairman, Sam Nunn (D–GA), so he 

had credibility on both sides of the aisle.

To kick off the negotiations, Senator Helms and his staff prepared a list of more than 40 

concerns about the CWC. Bell took this list of issues and prepared a large briefing binder, with 

a tab for each item. On February 14, 1997, in an effort to create a positive atmosphere for the 

talks, he preemptively offered a dozen understandings, including a provision requiring the Pentagon to maintain an effective chemical defense capability and a pledge by the President to 

retaliate in an “overwhelming and devastating” manner against any enemy that used chemical 

weapons against American troops.30 Bell and Billingslea then went through the remaining list of 

conditions proposed by Helms, one by one. “It was a tall mountain to climb, so we started in on 

it,” Bell recalls. “The negotiating was done in good faith and there was mutual respect on both 

sides, but it was still tough going.”31

Berger and Bell held four negotiating sessions with the members of the Senate task force 

and four at the senior staff level, totaling about 30 hours of discussion. During the talks, it 

turned out that some of the supposed problems with the CWC did not actually exist, so it 

was possible to drop them. In other cases, Bell was able to satisfy Senator Helms’s concern directly or find an alternative solution that was close to what he had in mind. Sometimes Bell and 
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U.S. Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention

Billingslea went back and forth with various formulations until they found one that was acceptable to both sides. After each negotiating session at the staff level, Scheunemann reported 

to Lott and the nine senators on the task force to get their approval of the agreed conditions, 

while Bell consulted with Sandy Berger and the White House interagency policy group. Bell also 

briefed Senator Lugar privately on the results of each meeting. In this way, the list of agreed conditions to the resolution of ratification grew incrementally.32 Although Bell did the bulk of the 

actual negotiating, only Berger was in a position to assure the senators that President Clinton 

would accept the proposed terms. Nevertheless, the two sides remained deadlocked over a small 

number of poison pill conditions that would prevent or delay U.S. ratification.

On February 28, 1997, Senator Biden, who had become ranking minority member of the 

Foreign Relations Committee after the 1996 election, sent President Clinton a confidential 

memo stating that in order to get a floor vote on the CWC, the White House would have to 

provide Senators Lott and Helms with some quid pro quo, including concessions on unrelated 

issues that were high on the Republican political agenda.33 “I believe an essential part of any 

strategy is to provide Senator Lott with something he wants, and to provide Senator Helms with 

something he wants, while also achieving sound policy objectives,” Biden wrote. “These matters, 

I would emphasize, are not—and should not—be formally linked. Obviously, however, they are 

all interrelated and need to be addressed in a timely fashion.”34

By mid-March, 17 proposed conditions to the resolution of ratification had been accepted 

by all members of the task force except for Senator Helms, who agreed with only eight of them 

and refused to lift his hold on the treaty until the White House accepted additional conditions 

he considered essential. Helms also questioned the ability of the task force to “do anything of 

importance . . . [on] the really serious issues.”35 At this juncture, Senator Biden and his senior 

aides on the Foreign Relations Committee, including minority staff director Ed Hall and chief 

counsel Brian McKeon, began to negotiate directly with Senator Helms and his staff on a number of conditions in the resolution of ratification, along with the chairman’s other demands, 

such as the reorganization of the foreign affairs bureaucracy. 

The Helms-Biden talks ultimately totaled 28 hours of discussion over the course of 10 separate meetings. Although this second negotiating channel provided an opportunity to break the 

impasse, it increased the complexity of the process because Helms disagreed with the Senate task 

force on some issues, while Biden differed from the White House on others.36 Surprisingly, given 

their opposing political views, the two senators had good personal chemistry and managed to 

reach agreement on an additional half-dozen conditions. Biden also decided to put Helms to the 

test by offering major compromises on State Department reorganization and UN reform in ex-
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change for his agreement to release the CWC from the Foreign Relations Committee for a vote 

on the Senate floor. Although Biden did not have great confidence that the deal would hold, he 

instructed his staff to behave as though it would. Much to everyone’s surprise, it did.

The Public-Relations Battle

At the same time that the White House was negotiating with the Republican leadership in 

various forums, the administration launched a public relations campaign for the CWC designed 

to mobilize chemical industry and military support for the treaty and influence undecided Republican senators. To coordinate outreach efforts with nonprofit organizations and industry groups, 

the White House established a Working Group on the CWC whose major focus was rebutting 

arguments made by treaty opponents. Senator Lugar also sent out a series of Dear Colleague letters to his fellow senators explaining various aspects of the CWC and clarifying misconceptions.

Augmenting the official public relations campaign, a group of nongovernmental organizations 

established the Poison Gas Task Force, led by a Washington think tank called the Henry L. Stimson 

Center, to coordinate public outreach efforts on behalf of the CWC, including the placing of op-eds 

in newspapers around the country.37 In addition, a nonprofit group called Business Executives for 

National Security delivered high-level endorsements from senior military figures such as General 

Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander of coalition forces during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. 

The most important assets of the pro-CWC campaign were the support of military leaders, 

including several former Chairmen of the JCS, and the U.S. chemical industry. The Chemical 

Manufacturers Association (CMA), a trade group that represented large chemical companies 

such as Dow, DuPont, and Monsanto, was highly effective at contacting senators, putting out 

useful information, and providing compelling congressional testimony. For example, CMA representatives argued that if the Senate failed to ratify the CWC, the U.S. chemical industry would 

become subject to mandatory, phased-in restrictions on trade with non-member states in certain treaty-controlled chemicals. According to the association’s estimates, the trade restrictions 

resulting from a failure to ratify the CWC would cost the U.S. economy as much as $600 million 

a year in sales lost to foreign competitors, as well as many jobs.

In an attempt to offset the influence of the CMA, CWC opponents recruited another trade 

association, the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), a leading lobby for small 

businesses. After NFIB officials expressed concern that the CWC might impose regulatory burdens on small chemical companies, opponents of the treaty in the Senate claimed that the NFIB 

opposed ratification. An NFIB spokesman later told a reporter, however, that after speaking with 

Clinton administration officials, “It is now our belief our members are not going to be impacted.”38
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U.S. Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention

On April 4, President Clinton held what the New York Times called “a sun-soaked, flagfilled pep rally” for the CWC on the South Lawn of the White House. Attending was a bipartisan 

array of current and former political and military leaders, including prominent Republicans 

such as former Secretary of State James Baker III and former JCS Chairman General Colin Powell. During his presentation, Secretary Baker pointedly rejected the conservative Republican 

critique of the CWC as lulling the United States into a false sense of security. “Frankly,” he said, 

“the suggestion that George Bush and Ronald Reagan would negotiate a treaty detrimental to 

this nation’s security is outrageous.”39

In an effort to counter the political impact of the White House pep rally, Senator Helms 

held a series of hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee on April 8, 9, 15, and 17. Most of 

the witnesses were outspoken critics of the CWC, including former Secretaries of Defense Caspar 

Weinberger, James Schlesinger, and Donald Rumsfeld. They argued that the treaty would expose 

U.S. chemical companies to burdensome international inspections, while doing little to protect 

American troops from chemical attacks by countries that refused to join or comply. “Outside the 

Beltway, where people don’t worship at the altar of arms control, that’s what we call a bum deal,” 

Helms said.40 CWC opponents also attacked two specific provisions of the treaty: Article X, which 

called on member states to provide protective assistance if a state party is attacked or threatened 

with chemical weapons, and Article XI, which promoted trade among member states in chemicals 

and production technology for peaceful purposes. Senator Helms and other critics claimed that 

proliferators would exploit these provisions to defeat U.S. chemical defenses and to acquire materials and equipment for the illicit production of chemical weapons.

Concerned that the arguments of treaty opponents were gaining traction, Secretary of 

State Albright hastily arranged an appearance at the April 8 Foreign Relations Committee 

hearing. In her testimony, she observed that if the United States failed to ratify the CWC, 

it would end up associating itself with the small group of “rogue states” that remained outside the treaty regime, such as Iraq, Libya, Syria, and North Korea. “When it comes to the 

protection of Americans, the lowest common denominator is not good enough,” she said. 

“Those who abide by the law, not those who break it, must establish the rules by which all 

should be judged.”41

Conclusion of the Senate–White House Negotiation

In parallel with the public relations battle, negotiations between the White House and the 

Senate Republican leadership continued over the understandings and conditions in the resolution of ratification. The most difficult issues were addressed last, such as whether or not search 
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warrants should be required for involuntary “challenge” inspections of U.S. chemical plants, 

and whether the use of riot-control agents should be allowed in certain wartime scenarios. One 

lawmaker who felt particularly strongly about the RCA issue was Senator McCain, a former 

naval aviator who had been shot down behind enemy lines during the Vietnam War, attacked 

by a mob of hostile civilians, and held as a prisoner of war for 7 years under harsh conditions. 

McCain told Bell that his vote for the CWC was contingent on the administration’s willingness 

to retain the option of using tear gas to rescue downed U.S. military pilots, even if it meant violating the letter of the treaty.

Aware that Senator McCain enjoyed great credibility with his colleagues on defense issues and could sway enough Republican senators to block CWC ratification, Bell worked out 

an arrangement by which the 1975 Ford executive order on RCAs would remain in effect. This 

order permitted the combat use of tear gas with Presidential authorization in “defensive military 

modes to save lives,” including rescuing air crews downed behind enemy lines and reducing the 

need for lethal force when civilians were used to screen attacks.42 After negotiating the RCA 

deal with Senator McCain, Bell presented it to the executive branch agencies as a fait accompli. 

Although the State Department and ACDA were unhappy with this condition because it might 

empower a future President to use tear gas in a manner inconsistent with the CWC, they were 

unable to block it.

The RCA issue was only one example of how the NSC staff ’s negotiations with the Senate 

were generating tensions within the Clinton administration. State Department and ACDA officials, as well as arms control advocates on Capitol Hill, questioned some of the bargains that 

Bell had made with the Republicans, accusing him of being more concerned with getting the 

treaty through the Senate than with ensuring its effectiveness. For example, one of the conditions that Bell accepted would prevent international CWC inspectors from removing samples 

from chemical industry sites on U.S. territory for analysis in overseas reference laboratories. 

Critics of this concession argued that because other countries were likely to follow the U.S. 

lead and adopt the same unilateral restriction, there was a risk of significantly weakening the 

CWC verification regime.43 Given the political realities in the Senate, however, Bell believed 

that he had to meet the Republicans more than halfway if the treaty was to have any chance 

of passage.

During the final week of negotiations, Senators Helms and Kyl proposed a few more conditions to the resolution of ratification. Although the two sides could reach agreement on 28 of the 

conditions, such as maintaining strong chemical defenses, allowing the use of tear gas in a wide 

range of military and law enforcement situations, and requiring search warrants for involuntary 
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U.S. Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention

inspections of U.S. chemical plants, the Clinton administration and the Republican leadership 

remained deadlocked over five items:44

1. A condition preventing the United States from becoming a party to the CWC until 

China, Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and all countries designated by the State 

Department as state sponsors of international terrorism had ratified the treaty. (This 

condition would prevent Washington from joining the treaty for an indefinite period 

of time.)

2. A condition preventing U.S. ratification of the CWC from taking effect until Russia 

ratified. (This condition would prevent the United States from becoming an original 

party to the treaty.)

3. A condition requiring the United States to renegotiate Articles X and XI of the CWC to 

prevent their misuse by proliferators. (Because the multilateral negotiations had been 

concluded and the treaty opened for signature, it was impossible to renegotiate the two 

articles, so this condition would effectively preclude U.S. participation.)

4. A condition barring U.S. ratification of the CWC until the President certified the ability 

of the intelligence community to detect, with a high degree of confidence, any “militarily significant” violation, defined as involving as little as 1 ton of chemical agent. (The 

Director of Central Intelligence made clear that this standard of verification was unrealistic and that the United States would never be able to meet it.)

5. A condition unilaterally authorizing the United States to reject all international inspectors from countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism. (This condition was unnecessary because the CWC allows member states to reject individual inspectors on a 

case-by-case basis.)

Senator Helms declared that if all five of these conditions were included in the resolution of 

ratification, the CWC would at least “do no harm.” At a news conference on April 18, however, 

President Clinton stated that four of the conditions were “treaty killers” because they would either 

violate the CWC or prevent the United States from ratifying.45 Although the fifth condition on 

rejecting inspectors was not strictly a poison pill, the White House considered it “bad policy.”46

Administration officials stressed that they had bent over backwards to address Republican concerns about the treaty by accepting 28 of the proposed conditions. For this reason, senators who 

had hesitated to vote for the CWC in 1996 should now feel comfortable doing so in 1997.

Unanimous Consent

In early April, Senators Biden and Helms reached agreement on the set of unrelated foreign policy measures that were the chairman’s price for releasing his hold on the CWC. Reversing years of opposition, the White House accepted the Helms plan to abolish ACDA and fold 
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its functions into the State Department, along with those of USIA and USAID. The administration also agreed to certain Helms demands regarding the payment of U.S. arrears to the UN, 

UN reform, and the resubmission of two modified arms control treaties to the Senate for its 

advice and consent.47 Both sides denied an explicit linkage between the administration’s foreign policy concessions and Helms’s agreement to allow a floor vote on the CWC. As Rebecca 

Hersman observes, however, the timing of the deal “clearly improved the atmosphere for the 

treaty’s passage.”48

On April 17, Senators Daschle and Lott announced a unanimous consent agreement to 

schedule a vote on CWC ratification and set the terms of reference for the floor debate. Under the 

agreement, the Senate would first consider a bill called S. 495, the Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act of 1997, which had been introduced by Senators Kyl, Lott, and Nickles, 

the Deputy Majority Leader. This legislation established comprehensive criminal, civil, and other 

penalties for the acquisition, possession, transfer, or use of chemical or biological weapons, and 

required the U.S. Government to impose sanctions on countries that employed such arms.49 The 

decision to give S. 495 priority was a concession by CWC supporters, who worried that the bill 

could provide political cover for Republican senators intending to vote against the treaty. After the 

vote on S. 495, the CWC and the accompanying resolution of ratification would be reported out 

of the Foreign Relations Committee for consideration by the full Senate on April 24, only 5 days 

before the treaty was due to enter into force internationally.50

The resolution of ratification (Senate Resolution 75) contained 33 conditions and understandings, of which the 28 conditions already accepted by Senators Helms and Biden were not 

subject to change.51 The remaining five conditions on which the two sides still disagreed would 

be treated as separate amendments, with no substitutes or changes allowed. Senator Helms insisted that it was incumbent on the Democrats to strike the “killer” amendments from the resolution of ratification before it went up for a vote. On April 23 and 24, there would be 18 hours 

of floor debate, including 10 hours on the CWC, 2 hours in closed session for classified discussions, and 1 hour on each of the five amendments. After the floor debate, the Senate would 

take a voice vote on the 28 agreed conditions, followed by individual roll-call votes on the five 

amendments, and finally a roll-call vote on the resolution of ratification itself.

On the one hand, the fact that the most serious challenges to the CWC were in free-standing 

amendments meant that treaty supporters would need only a simple majority to defeat them; on 

the other hand, passage of any one of the “killer” amendments would sink the treaty. “If this was 

baseball, we had to bat five for five,” Bell recalls. “That was the procedural price we had to pay 

to get the unanimous consent resolution, which bounded the problem and assured us that we 
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U.S. Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention

wouldn’t get filibustered on the floor. Instead, the treaty would be dealt with in two days with no 

further amendments.”52 To strike the “killer” amendments from the resolution of ratification, the 

administration would have to get 50 votes five times in a row, meaning that at least five Republican senators would join all 45 Democrats. If the Senate split 50-50, then the Vice President, in his 

constitutional role as president pro tem of the Senate, could cast the tie-breaking vote.

On the afternoon of April 17, the Senate spent 90 minutes debating S. 495, which passed 

by a vote of 53 to 44. Senator Kyl claimed that this legislation demonstrated “American international leadership against chemical and biological weapons.” But Senator Lugar countered that 

S. 495 was binding only on the United States and therefore lacked the international reach of the 

CWC. During the final days before the start of the ratification debate on the Senate floor, supporters and opponents began an intensive final push.53 Although the administration tallied all 

45 Democratic senators and 9 Republicans as supporting the CWC, that figure was still 13 votes 

shy of the two-thirds majority needed for ratification.

In an effort to round up additional votes, President Clinton personally called between 

10 and 15 undecided Republican senators, most of whom said that they were still waiting to 

see how the Majority Leader intended to vote before making a final decision.54 Senator Lott, 

wishing to avoid angering the strong conservatives in his caucus, refused to disclose his own 

position on the CWC until after the ratification debate got under way. As a result, an unusually 

large number of Republican senators remained on the fence, making it difficult for the Clinton 

administration to reliably assess the treaty’s prospects.

Meanwhile, a Republican senator from Utah told Energy Secretary Bill Richardson that he 

had just met with former Senator Dole, who had mentioned that he had been favorably impressed 

by an April 16 White House briefing, carried live on C-SPAN, at which Bob Bell had described the 

28 agreed conditions in the resolution of ratification. Richardson informed Berger about Dole’s 

apparent change of heart on the CWC. With the President’s blessing, Berger called Dole and asked 

if he would be interested in receiving a private briefing on the resolution. Dole agreed, and on 

Sunday, April 20, Bell spent a few hours going through the list of 28 conditions and explaining how 

they addressed all of the concerns about the treaty that Dole had raised in his letter to Senator Lott 

6 months earlier. After the briefing, the former Majority Leader said, “That sounds convincing to 

me.” A few days later, he agreed to make a public statement in support of the treaty.

A Surprise Guest

The April 4 pep rally at the White House, which had been attended by retired generals, former secretaries of state, and other distinguished Republican leaders, had attracted considerable 
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media attention but had not produced the hoped-for increase in support for the CWC among 

Senate Republicans. As a result, the Clinton administration was still unsure whether or not the 

treaty had enough votes to pass. A senior official admitted, “Our view is that it’s very close. It 

could go either way.”55

Preoccupied with the impending vote, President Clinton believed that another White 

House event would be needed to push the CWC over the top. He therefore scheduled a press 

conference at 9:00 a.m. on April 23, the day the ratification debate was due to begin in the Senate. At about 8:00 that morning, Bell received a phone call from Sandy Berger, who said the 

President was concerned that all of the Republican officials who had agreed to attend the event 

had already publicly endorsed the CWC. Clinton feared that if no new headliner appeared, the 

skeptical White House press corps would conclude that the treaty was dead in the water. Berger 

asked Bell to call Dole and try to persuade him to attend. Bell asked, “You mean an hour from 

now?” Berger replied, “Yes, we really need him.”

Bell called Dole’s office and learned that the former Majority Leader was in his limousine, 

heading to an appointment at his office. The secretary agreed to patch Bell through to his car 

phone. When Dole answered, Bell said, “Senator Dole, the President would like very much for 

you to come to the White House right now and stand with him as he makes a final public appeal for the CWC. If you agree to attend, you will be the headliner: the President will introduce 

you, and you will speak first.” Dole was silent for about 15 seconds and then said, “Okay.” Bell 

overheard him telling the driver to turn around and head to the White House.

About 30 minutes later, Dole stood next to President Clinton as the press conference 

was covered on live television. Wearing a gray suit and speaking in his typical gruff manner, 

Dole urged his former Republican colleagues to vote for the CWC. “Is it perfect? No,” he said. 

“But I believe there are now adequate safeguards to protect American interests.”56 Dole’s unexpected appearance and his dramatic turn-around on the treaty stunned the normally jaded 

White House press corps. Recalls Bell, “The press assumed that this was brilliant choreography on the part of the administration—that we had kept our surprise guest secret until the 

last minute.”57

As Dole was speaking, the debate over CWC ratification was under way in the Senate. 

Senator McCain entered the well and asked Senator Biden, who was making a statement, to 

briefly yield the floor. He then shared the news that “Senator Dole, former Majority Leader, has 

just announced his support of the treaty with the changes that have been made, which the Senator from Delaware [Biden] was able to achieve in this agreement. I think this is a very important 

expression of support and one that I feel will be very much respected by our colleagues on both 
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U.S. Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention

sides of the aisle.”58 Senators Helms, Kyl, and other CWC opponents were shocked by this unexpected development, but they still believed they had the votes to defeat the treaty.

The next challenge facing the Clinton administration was to get the current Majority Leader, Senator Lott, to announce his position on the CWC. Because Lott was expected to swing six 

to eight Republican votes, his support was considered vital to ratification. On April 24, Lott 

told the press that the administration’s willingness to accept the 28 conditions had made CWC 

ratification a close matter for him, but he refused to make his position known until after voting 

began on the “killer” amendments.59 He also said that he needed assurances that Articles X and 

XI of the CWC would not require the United States to share chemical defense equipment and 

dual-use chemicals and production technology with “rogue states,” such as Cuba and Iran. To 

allay these concerns, President Clinton sent Senator Lott a letter stating that the export controls 

on dual-use chemicals coordinated by an informal forum of like-minded countries called the 

Australia Group were “compatible with the CWC,” and that the United States would provide 

chemical protective gear (beyond medical assistance) to member states on a strictly case-bycase basis.

The Clinton letter also pledged that if, despite these precautions, certain CWC member 

states managed to exploit Articles X and XI to acquire chemical weapons or to defeat U.S. 

chemical defenses, the President would “regard such actions as extraordinary events that have 

jeopardized the supreme interests of the United States and therefore, in consultation with the 

Congress, be prepared to withdraw from the treaty.”60 Although such withdrawal was already 

permitted by the text of the CWC, President Clinton’s personal commitment had a strong impact on Senator Lott. In a floor statement on April 24, the Majority Leader said that the President’s “ironclad commitment” to withdraw from the treaty if it harmed U.S. security had influenced his thinking, although he still would not disclose how he planned to vote.

Voting on the “Killer” Amendments

The Senate votes on the five free-standing amendments took place in the late afternoon 

of April 24, 1997. Although the Democrats believed that they had enough votes to defeat all 

five amendments, they could not be absolutely sure, and in a few cases the margin appeared 

uncomfortably close. Senators Biden and Lugar stood in the well of the Senate and urged their 

colleagues to vote against the amendments, while Senator Kyl lobbied in favor of them. By 

an unhappy coincidence, the votes on the amendments took place on the same day that Vice 

President Gore hosted an annual garden party with a few hundred guests at his residence in the 

Naval Observatory complex. When Bell told Gore about the impending votes and that he might 
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have to come to the Senate to break a tie, the Vice President replied, “Of course I’m here if you 

need me.” As each of the five amendments came up on the Senate floor, Bell tried to get a sense 

of how the vote was going and whether or not Gore’s presence would be necessary.

The first amendment, to delay U.S. ratification until countries such as North Korea, Iraq, 

and Syria had ratified, failed by a vote of 71 to 29. In a floor statement after the vote, Senator 

Lott finally announced that he would support the CWC when it came up later that night. “The 

United States is marginally better off with it than without it,” he said grudgingly.61 Now that 

endorsements by both the former and current Majority Leaders had made it politically safe for 

Republican senators to vote for the CWC, the White House was increasingly confident that it 

would win on ratification, but first it had to defeat the remaining “killer” amendments.

The Senate rejected the second amendment, to delay U.S. ratification until after Russia had 

done so, by a vote of 66 to 34. The third amendment, which required the President to certify 

that the United States could detect as little as 1 ton of poison gas, also failed by a vote of 66 to 

34.62 By the time the fourth amendment came up, however, the vote looked extremely close. A 

number of Republican senators were tired of voting consistently against Senator Helms and 

wanted to do him the courtesy of supporting at least one of his amendments. CWC supporters believed that the fourth amendment—authorizing the President to exclude international 

inspectors from any countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism—was unnecessary but 

not a true “treaty killer.” But the fifth amendment—to delay U.S. ratification until Articles X and 

XI of the CWC had been renegotiated—would effectively doom the treaty.

As the tension rose, Bell could finally stand it no longer. He picked up the phone and asked 

the Vice President to come to the Capitol in case he was needed to break a tie vote. Gore said 

that he was on his way. Voting on the fourth amendment began, and the tally went back and 

forth. At one point the vote was tied 40–40, yet the Vice President still had not arrived. Bell 

called the Secret Service detail riding with Gore’s motorcade and spoke with one of the agents, 

who reported that they were stuck in traffic on Massachusetts Avenue. “Do you want us to turn 

on the sirens and lights?” he asked. “Hell yes!” Bell shouted into the phone. “I need the Vice 

President here now, and I don’t care what it takes!” Several minutes later, Gore arrived at the 

Capitol. Just before he walked onto the Senate floor, however, a group of senators came in and 

voted against the fourth amendment, which failed by a comfortable margin of 56 to 44. The fifth 

“killer” amendment then went down by an even larger margin.

The moment of truth had now arrived: it was time to vote on the CWC and the accompanying resolution of ratification. Senators took their time voting and the tally rose slowly. The 

turning point came when Senators Lott and McCain both voted yes, causing several undecided 
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Republican senators to follow their lead. When the voting finally ended at 10:45 p.m., the Senate had given its consent to CWC ratification by a margin of 74 in favor to 26 opposed—7 more 

than the two-thirds majority required to pass. All 45 Democrats and 29 Republicans had voted 

for the treaty, and 26 Republicans had voted against.

At 10:51 p.m., President Clinton appeared in the White House briefing room and expressed 

his gratitude to the Senate, putting the best face on what had been a bruising political battle. 

“This vote is an example of America working as it should,” he said. “Democrats and Republicans 

working together, putting our country first—reaching across party lines, reaching for the common good.”63 The reality, of course, was that the ratification process had been highly contentious 

and had required the administration to make painful concessions on foreign policy. When Bell 

returned from Capitol Hill to the White House, he found President Clinton smoking a victory 

cigar in the Oval Office, much to the disapproval of the First Lady.64

Epilogue

After the Senate vote to approve the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Clinton administration moved quickly to complete the ratification process. On April 25, 1997, the United States 

deposited its instrument of ratification at the United Nations in New York, 4 days before the 

treaty entered into force. As one of the 87 original state parties to the CWC, the United States 

would now be able to participate in the decisionmaking organs of the international body that 

would oversee the treaty’s implementation, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 

Weapons in The Hague, the Netherlands. 

One final step remained to be accomplished. To implement the CWC domestically, both 

houses of Congress had to pass implementing legislation that made the provisions of the treaty 

legally binding on U.S. citizens and corporations at home and abroad, and imposed criminal 

sanctions for violations. Some contentious issues left over from the long struggle over CWC 

ratification resurfaced during the debate over the implementing legislation, leading to another round of negotiations between the Clinton administration and Republican members of the 

House and Senate. During the markup of the Senate bill, Senator Kyl inserted a provision authorizing a future President to block, on grounds of national security, an involuntary “challenge” 

inspection of any facility on U.S. territory, declared or undeclared, that another member state 

believed was engaged in prohibited activities. This condition was retained in the final version of 

the CWC implementing legislation that passed both houses of Congress in the fall of 1998. In the 

view of arms control advocates, Kyl’s provision was likely to be adopted by other CWC member 

states and would therefore weaken another key element of the treaty’s verification regime.
24 

WMD Center Case Study 4

In April 1999, pursuant to the White House deal with Senator Helms, the ACDA, which 

had been established in 1961 by President John F. Kennedy, was abolished as an independent 

agency and its functions merged into the State Department. For nearly four decades, ACDA 

had led the U.S. Government’s efforts to negotiate and implement treaties to control nuclear, 

biological, chemical, and conventional arms, including the CWC. Ironically, the Clinton administration had to sacrifice ACDA to help ensure the U.S. ratification of a treaty that the arms 

control agency had helped to create.

Notes

1 This account draws on four secondary sources: Rebecca K.C. Hersman, Friends and Foes: 

How Congress and the President Really Make Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 

Press, 2000), 85–104; Michael Krepon, Amy E. Smithson, and John Parachini, The Battle to Obtain U.S. 

Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Occasional Paper No. 35 (Washington, DC: Henry L. 

Stimson Center, July 1997); Sean P. Giovanello, “The Domestic Politics of Arms Control Treaty Ratification: The Case of the Chemical Weapons Convention,” Georgia Political Science Association, Conference 

Proceedings 2006, 1–35; and John V. Parachini, “U.S. Senate Ratification of the CWC: Lessons for the 

CTBT,” The Nonproliferation Review 5, no. 1 (Fall 1997), 62–72.

2 Michael R. Gordon, “C.I.A. Backs Arms Treaty on Chemicals,” The New York Times, June 24, 1994.

3 Karen Wiznowski, “Opting Out of the Iron Triangle: The US Chemical Industry and US 

Chemical Weapons Policy,” The Nonproliferation Review 18, no. 2 (July 2011), 331–347.

4 President Gerald R. Ford, “Executive Order 11850—Renunciation of Certain Uses in War of 

Chemical Herbicides and Riot-Control Agents,” April 8, 1975.

5 “Prepared Statement of Walter B. Slocombe,” Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Chemical Weapons Convention (Treaty Doc. 103-21), 102d

 Congress, 2d sess., May 13, 

1994 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 59.

6 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by President Clinton to the Senate of 

the United States,” June 23, 1994.

7 Barbara Crossette, “U.S. Politics Delays Treaty on Poison Gas,” The New York Times, August 

20, 1995.

8 Elaine Sciolino, “Awaiting Call, Helms Puts Foreign Policy on Hold,” The New York Times, 

September 24, 1995.

9 Elaine Sciolino, “In Deal with Clinton, Helms Agrees to Move Ahead on Envoys,” The New 

York Times, September 30, 1995.

10 Helen Dewar, “Senate Deal on Foreign Policy Agencies Ends Impasse on Envoys, Treaties,” 

The Washington Post, December 8, 1995, A20.

11 John Kyl, “A Treaty that Deserved to Die,” The New York Times, September 13, 1996.

12 Hersman, 91.

13 Carla Anne Robbins, “Chemical-Weapons Treaty Shapes Up as Messy Battle,” The Wall Street 

Journal, February 14, 1997, A16.
25

U.S. Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention

14 Michael Krepon, “The New Politics of Treaty Ratification,” in The Battle to Obtain U.S. Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 1–6.

15 Giovanello, 20.

16 Hersman, 91.

17 “Mr. Dole Bumps a Good Treaty,” The New York Times, September 15, 1996.

18 Parachini, “U.S. Senate Ratification of the CWC,” 65.

19 Alison Mitchell, “How the Votes Were Won: Clinton’s New G.O.P. Tactics,” April 25, 1997.

20 Alison Mitchell, “New Push for a U.S. Chemical-Arms-Pact Vote,” The New York Times, January 14, 1997.

21 Erik J. Leklem, “Administration, Senate Opposition Draw Battle Lines Over CWC,” Arms 

Control Today 26, no. 10 (January/February 1997), 19.

22 Thomas W. Lippman, “Helms to Delay Vote on Chemical Arms Pact; Panel Chairman Puts 

GOP ‘Priorities’ First,” The Washington Post, February 4, 1997, A01.

23 Clifford Krauss, “Clinton Asks G.O.P. to Help in Fight for Chemical Weapons Ban,” The New 

York Times, February 5, 1997.

24 Thomas L. Friedman, “The Big Deal of the Day,” The New York Times, March 27, 1997.

25 Parachini, “U.S. Senate Ratification of the CWC,” 65.

26 Mitchell, “How the Votes Were Won.”

27 Robbins, A16.

28 Hersman, 96.

29 Parachini, “U.S. Senate Ratification of the CWC,” 67.

30 David Stout, “White House Said to Be Trying to Sway Republicans on Treaty,” The New York 

Times, February 15, 1997.

31 Author’s telephone interview with Robert G. Bell, Secretary of Defense Representative in 

Europe and Defense Advisor for the U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Brussels, 

Belgium, May 19, 2011.

32 Ibid.

33 Parachini, “U.S. Senate Ratification of the CWC,” 67.

34 Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., “Memorandum for the President from Senator Joe Biden, Subject: Our Discussions on CWC and Matters Before the Foreign Relations Committee,” dated February 

28, 1997.

35 Amy E. Smithson, “Bungling a No-Brainer: How Washington Barely Ratified the Chemical 

Weapons Convention,” in The Battle to Obtain U.S. Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 17.

36 Ibid.

37 John Parachini, “NGOs: Force Multipliers in the CWC Ratification Debate,” The Battle to 

Obtain U.S. Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 35–57.

38 Robbins, A16.

39 Steven Lee Myers, “Clinton Mobilizes Bipartisan Effort on Chemical Arms,” The New York 

Times, April 5, 1997.

40 Steven Lee Myers, “Senate Vote is Now Likely on Chemical Arms Treaty,” The New York 

Times, April 9, 1997.
26 

WMD Center Case Study 4

41 Ibid.

42 Author’s telephone interview with Bell.

43 Author’s interview with a U.S. Senate staff member, Washington, DC, May 23, 2011.

44 Erik J. Leklem, “Majority Leader Emerges As Key to Fate of CWC in Senate,” Arms Control 

Today 27, no. 1 (March 1997), 22.

45 “In Clinton’s Words, a Stark Choice for the U.S.,” The New York Times, April 19, 1997.

46 Adam Clymer, “Some in the G.O.P. Move to Back Ban on Chemical Arms,” The New York 

Times, April 24, 1997.

47 The two treaties in question were the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and Conventional Armed 

Forces in Europe Treaty.

48 Hersman, 98.

49 U.S. Senate, Republican Policy Committee, Legislative Notice 9, “S. 495 Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act of 1997,” April 17, 1997.

50 U.S. Senate, Unanimous-Consent Agreement—S. 495 and the Chemical Weapons Convention,” 105th Congress, 1st sess., April 17, 1997.

51 “Summary of the Senate Resolution of Ratification,” Arms Control Today 27, no. 2 (April 

1997), 29–31.

52 Author’s telephone interview with Bell.

53 Steven Erlanger, “Clinton Pushes Pact Covering Chemical Arms,” The New York Times, April 

21, 1997.

54 James Bennet, “President Presses for Budget Deal and Arms Treaty,” The New York Times, 

April 19, 1997.

55 Alison Mitchell, “Clinton Makes Final Push on Chemical Arms Treaty,” The New York Times, 

April 23, 1997.

56 Peter Baker and Helen Dewar, “Clinton-Lott Connection Emerges in Treaty Fight,” The 

Washington Post, April 26, 1997, A12.

57 Author’s telephone interview with Bell.

58 “Executive Session, Chemical Weapons Convention,” Congressional Record, April 23, 1997, 

S3475.

59 Adam Clymer, “Some in the G.O.P. Move to Back Ban on Chemical Arms,” The New York 

Times, April 24, 1997.

60 “From Clinton to Lott, a Last-Minute Letter,” The New York Times, April 25, 1997, A11.

61 Adam Clymer, “Senate Approves Pact on Chemical Weapons After Lott Opens Way,” The 

New York Times, April 25, 1997.

62 Ibid.

63 Clymer, “Senate Approves Pact on Chemical Weapons.”

64 Author’s telephone interview with Bell.
27

U.S. Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention

About the Author

Jonathan B. Tucker, Ph.D. (1954–2011) was a policy analyst specializing in the nonproliferation and control of biological and chemical weapons. Most recently, he managed the Biosecurity Education Project at the Federation of American Scientists in Washington, DC. Previously, 

he worked for nearly 15 years in the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at 

the Monterey Institute of International Studies, initially as founding Director of the Chemical 

and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program and then as a Senior Fellow in the center’s 

Washington, DC, office. Before joining CNS, he worked at the Department of State, the congressional Office of Technology Assessment, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 

where he served on the U.S. delegation to the Chemical Weapons Convention preparatory commission in The Hague and as a member of a United Nations biological weapons inspection 

team in Baghdad, Iraq. In 2008, he was a professional staff member for the Commission on the 

Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, chaired by former 

Senators Bob Graham and Jim Talent.

Dr. Tucker earned a B.S. in biology from Yale University, an M.A. in international relations 

from the University of Pennsylvania, and a Ph.D. in political science from the Massachusetts 

Institute of Technology (MIT) with a concentration in defense and arms control studies. He was 

a visiting fellow in the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, the U.S. Institute of Peace, and 

the American Academy in Berlin, and a Fulbright Senior Scholar at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik). His books include Scourge: 

The Once and Future Threat of Smallpox (Grove/Atlantic, 2001), War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare from World War I to Al-Qaeda (Pantheon, 2006), and, as editor, Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (MIT Press, 2000) and Innovation and Security: 

Preventing the Misuse of New Biological and Chemical Technologies (MIT Press, forthcoming).

Dr. Tucker was a member of the board of directors of the Arms Control Association and a 

life member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Editor’s Note

Dr. Tucker passed away shortly after completing this case study. The WMD Center will 

remember Jonathan as a friend and as an outstanding collaborator who brought commitment, 

enthusiasm, and deep expertise to his work.

Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Case Study Series

Case Study 1

President Nixon’s Decision to Renounce the U.S. Offensive Biological Weapons Program 

by Jonathan B. Tucker and Erin R. Mahan

October 2009

Case Study 2

U.S. Withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty 

by Lynn F. Rusten

January 2010

Case Study 3

The Origins of Nunn-Lugar and Cooperative Threat Reduction

by Paul I. Bernstein and Jason D. Wood

April 2010

For additional information, including requests for publications and instructor’s notes, please 

contact the Center directly at WMDWebmaster@ndu.edu or (202) 685-4234 

or visit the Center Web site at www.ndu.edu/wmdcenter/index.cfm