1 

2024 IL App (5th) 231286-U 

NO. 5-23-1286 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the

 ) Circuit Court of

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Champaign County. 

 ) 

v. ) No. 23-CF-1475 

 ) 

JACE R. BRADLEY, ) Honorable 

 ) Brett N. Olmstead, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

PRESIDING JUSTICE VAUGHAN delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Welch and McHaney concurred in the judgment.

 

 ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court’s order granting the State’s petition to deny pretrial release is

affirmed where the trial court’s findings were not against the manifest weight of

the evidence and the order denying pretrial release was not an abuse of discretion. 

¶ 2 The defendant, Jace R. Bradley, appeals the trial court’s order denying him pretrial release 

pursuant to Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Safety, Accountability, 

Fairness and Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act (Act).

1 See Pub. Acts 101-652, § 10-255, 102-1104, 

§ 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023); Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting effective 

date as September 18, 2023).

1

The press and politicians have also sometimes referred to the Act as the Pretrial Fairness Act. 

Neither name is official, as neither appears in the Illinois Compiled Statutes or public act.

NOTICE

This order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1).

NOTICE

Decision filed 03/12/24. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Petition for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.
2 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On November 27, 2023, the defendant was charged, by information, with unlawful 

possession of a weapon by a felon in violation of section 24-1.1(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 

(720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2022)), a Class 2 felony. The same day, the State filed a petition to 

deny the defendant pretrial release, alleging the proof was evident and the presumption great that 

the defendant committed an offense listed in section 110-6.1(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 

of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a) (West 2022)) and the defendant posed a real and present threat to 

the safety of any person or persons or the community. 

¶ 5 The trial court conducted a hearing on the State’s petition on November 29, 2023. A pretrial 

investigation report revealed that the defendant was 28 years old and employed full-time. He had 

resided in Champaign for 10 years with his grandmother. He had two children, aged 10 and 2, as 

well as a fiancée and a lot of extended family members who lived in the Champaign area. He also 

had his own vehicle which would provide reliable transportation to court appearances if he were 

released from custody. The defendant reported that he had no history of drug abuse and no mental 

health diagnosis. He suffered from asthma. The defendant was currently serving 24 months of 

probation for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon in Champaign County case No. 21-CF-1142. 

He also had prior convictions for unlawful possession of cannabis in a motor vehicle, driving on a 

suspended license, and fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer. The defendant scored a 4 out 

of a possible 14 on the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument-Revised (VPRAI-R). 

¶ 6 The State proffered the following information regarding the current case. On November 

25, 2023, Champaign County deputies attempted to stop a vehicle, later determined to be driven 

by the defendant, for speeding. Once the vehicle came to a stop, the front passenger jumped out of 

the vehicle and fled. The defendant then drove off, causing deputies to follow in pursuit for some 
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time. The defendant eventually pulled over a second time and exited the vehicle. During an initial 

“pat down” search of the defendant, an officer found a knife and a bag of cannabis. The defendant 

stated that he picked up some people he did not know from a party. He did not know the identity 

of the passenger or why he ran. A “blunt” was found in the center console of the vehicle that 

smelled of burnt cannabis. In a search incident to arrest, a black pistol magazine with seven rounds 

of 9-millimeter ammunition was found in the defendant’s front right jean pocket. The defendant 

stated that he knew nothing about the ammunition. The State pointed out that the defendant was 

currently on probation for a charge of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. 

¶ 7 Defense counsel proffered that the defendant explained to officers that the short delay in 

the defendant’s stopping for the traffic stop was due to his waiting for a familiar area in which to 

stop the vehicle. Although the officer found ammunition on the defendant, no firearm was found. 

Defense counsel stated that the defendant had two children, ages 10 and 2, and resided with and 

took care of his 82-year-old grandmother. He had a really good job as a night shift manager and 

his incarceration would cause hardship on his employer to find a replacement for him.

¶ 8 The State argued that the defendant was on probation for a similar charge and should have 

known that he was prohibited from possessing “any type of weapon or magazine or ammo or 

anything to that effect.” It averred that if probation conditions could not prevent him from 

possessing a weapon, neither could other conditions. 

¶ 9 Defense counsel argued that the State failed to meet its burden “that the defendant is a real 

and present threat of safety to any person or the community.” She again noted that although 

ammunition was found, the defendant did not have a firearm. She further noted that there was no 

evidence of a high-speed chase that would have put law enforcement in danger. Counsel argued 
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that the defendant’s release was important to his family and financial well-being. She averred that 

the defendant would agree to any conditions that the court deemed necessary. 

¶ 10 The trial court stated it had “considered the facts presented, the pretrial investigation report, 

and arguments of counsel,” and was “making an individualized decision based on all relevant 

factors whether specifically mentioned or not,” and was “making all the findings reflected in the 

order whether specifically mentioned or not.” In finding the State proved, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that the proof was evident or presumption great that the defendant committed a 

detainable offense, the court stated, “It’s the ammunition. *** Now, he says that he doesn’t—he 

denied any knowledge of where it came from, but that just lacks credibility. *** It’s that very 

possession of the live ammunition that is the non-probationable Class 2 felony.” 

¶ 11 The trial court further found the State proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that no 

condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the real and present threat. It acknowledged 

the defendant appeared to have “stability and a stake in the community” in that he had two children, 

a stable residence with his grandmother of whom he took care, a “really good job,” and his absence 

from his employment would be a hardship. However, the court noted, “The problem is that he is 

currently on probation—conditions of probation on an order for an unlawful use of weapon felony 

charge.” The court found the defendant’s explanation regarding the traffic stop “lacks credibility 

for today’s purposes.” Regarding the magazine containing ammunition found on the defendant, 

the court stated, “It has one value only, and that’s to be stuck into a weapon and shot. Now the fact 

that he didn’t have the pistol on him doesn’t mean that it is not a crime that’s indicative of serious 

danger. That’s why it’s subject to the mandatory prison penalties that the legislature’s prescribed.” 

The court then granted the State’s petition, finding there was “no condition or combination of 
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conditions that the Court could impose here that could mitigate the real and present threat that [the 

defendant] poses to the safety of the community.”

¶ 12 The trial court summarized its findings in a written order as follows: 

“On November 25, 2023, police pulled over a vehicle driven by Defendant Mr. 

Bradley and, while arresting him for other offenses, located in his pocket a black 

pistol magazine loaded with seven 9mm rounds. Mr. Bradley has the felony 

conviction alleged and cannot lawfully possess the ammunition. Mr. Bradley 

denied knowledge of the magazine in his own pocket, which was not credible.”

In further summary, the court wrote:

“During this offense, Mr. Bradley already was on Probation for Aggravated 

Unlawful Use of a Weapon, as well as Conditional Discharge in a misdemeanor 

traffic matter. The stop on November 25, 2023, happened like this: Police tried to 

pull over Mr. Bradley for speeding, the vehicle stopped, the front seat passenger 

jumped out and fled, and Mr. Bradley fled in the vehicle. After a vehicle chase, Mr. 

Bradley stopped and officers found a knife and a bag of cannabis on him, and a 

blunt in the center console that smelled of burnt cannabis. During his arrest they 

found the loaded magazine. Mr. Bradley has two children who live with their 

mothers, a great job, and he lives with his grandmother who depends on him in part 

for care, but there is only one use for a loaded 9mm pistol magazine to be possessed 

by someone on felony probation for Agg. UUW, it is extremely dangerous, and the 

legislature recognized that danger in making the offense non-probationable. That 

Mr. Bradley would commit this dangerous offense while under a Probation order, 

and despite his family and employer who depend on him, demonstrates along with 
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all other circumstances here that no conditions of release can mitigate the threat he 

poses to community safety.” 

The trial court then committed the defendant to the custody of the sheriff for confinement in the 

county jail pending trial and advised him of his appeal rights. The defendant timely appealed. Ill. 

S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023).

¶ 13 The Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) was appointed to represent the 

defendant on appeal. On January 25, 2024, OSAD filed a memorandum in support of Rule 604(h) 

appeal on behalf of the defendant. On February 15, 2024, the State filed a memorandum in 

opposition to Rule 604(h) appeal.2

¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 15 Pretrial release is governed by article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 

(Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-1 et seq. (West 2022)). A defendant’s pretrial release may only be denied 

in certain statutorily limited situations. Id. §§ 110-2(a), 110-6.1. After filing a timely verified 

petition requesting denial of pretrial release, the State has the burden to prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that (1) the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has 

committed a qualifying offense; (2) the defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present threat 

to the safety of any person or the community or a flight risk; and (3) less restrictive conditions 

would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community and/or 

prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution. Id. § 110-6.1(e). The trial court may order 

a defendant detained pending trial if the defendant is charged with a qualifying offense, and the 

2

Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(5) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023), our decision in this case 

was due on or before March 4, 2024, absent a finding of good cause for extending the deadline. Based on 

the high volume of appeals under the Act currently under the court’s consideration, as well as the 

complexity of issues and the lack of precedential authority, we find there to be good cause for extending 

the deadline.
7 

trial court concludes the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the 

community (id. § 110-6.1(a)(1)-(7)) or there is a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid 

prosecution (id. § 110-6.1(a)(8)). If the trial court determines that the defendant should be denied 

pretrial release, the court is required to make written findings summarizing the reasons for denying 

pretrial release. Id. § 110-6.1(h)(1). 

¶ 16 The statute provides a nonexclusive list of factors that the trial court may consider in 

making a determination of “dangerousness,” i.e., that the defendant poses a real and present threat 

to any person or the community. Id. § 110-6.1(g). In making a determination of dangerousness, 

the court may consider evidence or testimony as to factors that include, but are not limited to, 

(1) the nature and circumstances of any offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime 

of violence involving a weapon or a sex offense; (2) the history and characteristics of the 

defendant3

; (3) the identity of any person to whom the defendant is believed to pose a threat and 

the nature of the threat; (4) any statements made by or attributed to the defendant, together with 

the circumstances surrounding the statements; (5) the age and physical condition of the defendant;

(6) the age and physical condition of the victim or complaining witness; (7) whether the defendant 

is known to possess or have access to a weapon; (8) whether at the time of the current offense or 

any other offense, the defendant was on probation, parole, or supervised release from custody; and 

(9) any other factors including those listed in section 110-5 of the Code (id. § 110-5). Id. § 110-

6.1(g). 

3

The defendant’s history and characteristics include: “the defendant’s character, physical and 

mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, 

community ties, past relating to drug or alcohol abuse, conduct, *** criminal history, and record concerning 

appearance at court proceedings,” as well as “whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the 

defendant was on probation, parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of 

sentence for an offense under federal law, or the law of this or any other state.” 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(3)(A), 

(B) (West 2022).
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¶ 17 To reverse a trial court’s finding that the State presented clear and convincing evidence 

showing that mandatory conditions of release would fail to protect any person or the community, 

and/or that defendant had a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution, the reviewing 

court must conclude that the trial court’s findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

See People v. Swan, 2023 IL App (5th) 230766, ¶ 12; see also In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 208 

(2001) (setting a similar standard of review for requirement of clear and convincing evidence by 

the State in juvenile proceedings). “ ‘A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only 

if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not 

based on the evidence presented.’ ” Swan, 2023 IL App (5th) 230766, ¶ 12 (quoting People v. 

Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008)). “Under the manifest weight standard, we give deference to 

the trial court as the finder of fact because it is in the best position to observe the conduct and 

demeanor of the parties and witnesses.” Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d at 332. The trial court’s ultimate 

decision to deny pretrial release is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. Vingara, 2023 IL 

App (5th) 230698, ¶ 10. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision of the circuit court is 

arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when no reasonable person would agree with the position 

adopted by the trial court.” Id.; see People v. Heineman, 2023 IL 127854, ¶ 59. “[I]n reviewing 

the circuit court’s ruling for abuse of discretion, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the 

circuit court, ‘merely because we would have balanced the appropriate factors differently.’ ” 

People v. Simmons, 2019 IL App (1st) 191253, ¶ 15 (quoting People v. Cox, 82 Ill. 2d 268, 280 

(1980)). 

¶ 18 Once the trial court finds the State proved a valid threat to the safety of a person or persons 

or the community and/or a defendant’s likely willful flight to avoid prosecution, then the court 

must determine what pretrial release conditions, “if any, will reasonably ensure the appearance of 
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a defendant as required or the safety of any other person or the community and the likelihood of 

compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release.” 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a) 

(West 2022). In its determination, the trial court must consider (1) the nature of the circumstances 

of the offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the defendant; (3) the history and 

characteristics of the defendant; (4) the nature and seriousness of the specific, real, and present 

threat to any person that would be posed by the defendant’s release; and (5) the nature and 

seriousness of the risk of obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process. Id. No 

singular factor is dispositive. See id. 

¶ 19 On appeal, defendant requests this court reverse the trial court’s order denying him pretrial 

release. In support, defendant “checked” three issues for consideration on appeal. OSAD’s Rule 

604(h)(2) memorandum only addresses one of the issues. However, we will consider all the issues 

raised on appeal. 

¶ 20 Defendant’s first issue claims the State failed to meet its burden by proving, by clear and 

convincing evidence, that the proof was evident or the presumption great that he committed the 

offense(s) charged. This issue was not addressed in OSAD’s memorandum. The defendant argues 

that “the State failed to provide a sufficient factual basis in its proffer” to meets its burden of proof 

and, thus, “Defendant cannot be denied pretrial release.” The State argues that it proffered evidence 

that (1) deputies attempted to stop a speeding vehicle; (2) the vehicle was driven by the defendant;

(3) when the vehicle initially stopped, the front passenger jumped out of the vehicle and fled;

(4) the vehicle took off again with the deputy in pursuit with lights and sirens activated; (5) once 

the vehicle stopped for the second time, the officer found a knife and a bag of cannabis during a 

pat down of the defendant; (6) during the search incident to arrest, “a black pistol magazine with 

seven rounds of nine-millimeter ammo was located” in the defendant’s “front right jean pocket”; 
10 

and (7) the defendant was on probation for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon at the time of the 

current offense. 

¶ 21 Upon our review of the record, we agree that the State’s proffer addressed the defendant’s 

possession of firearm ammunition and his prior felony conviction for the offense of aggravated 

unlawful use of a weapon for which he was serving a term of probation. Therefore, we find 

defendant’s initial argument has no merit and hold that the trial court’s finding that the State 

proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that the proof was evident or the presumption great that 

he committed the offense charged was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 22 Defendant’s second issue claims that the State failed to meet its burden of proving, by clear 

and convincing evidence, that the defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of any 

person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case. This issue 

is the sole contention addressed in OSAD’s memorandum. In his notice of appeal, the defendant 

argues that “the State did not meet its burden by failing to allege sufficient specific, articulable 

facts which would show Defendant as a threat as enumerated in the factors set forth in 725 ILCS 

5/110-6.1(g).” In its memorandum, OSAD argues the State “utterly failed to show” the defendant 

was a threat to safety. It opines that the defendant’s only felony conviction was for possessing a 

firearm without a firearm owner identification (FOID) card, which was “the result of failing to 

seek proper paperwork for protected Second Amendment conduct.” OSAD further argues that 

none of the defendant’s “misdemeanor convictions involved violence or a weapon” and that 

although the defendant was on probation at the time of the offense, “nothing about the facts of the 

offense—possession of ammunition without a gun, driving away from the police before stopping—

showed [the defendant] was a danger to anyone.” OSAD asserts that the trial court “rested its 

finding of dangerousness on the bare charge and speculation.” In support, OSAD argues that the 
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court erred by “suggesting that the only use of ammunition by a convicted felon is to harm 

someone.” OSAD then posits a number of possible scenarios of why a person in the defendant’s 

position might have ammunition, albeit all admittedly illegal, i.e., to give the ammunition to a 

friend, to use it in a weapon for target practice, or to use it in a gun for self-defense. Conversely, 

the State argues that although no firearm was found on the defendant, “a reasonable inference can 

be drawn that he had ready access to at least one 9mm handgun.” 

¶ 23 Here, the trial court found the defendant posed a threat to the community. It noted the 

circumstances of the traffic stop leading up to the defendant’s arrest in which the defendant’s first 

stop included the flight of his passenger and the final stop came only after a police pursuit. The 

court further noted that a knife and a bag of cannabis were found on the defendant, there was a 

“blunt” in the center console of the vehicle that smelled of burnt cannabis, and the defendant was 

found with the loaded 9-millimeter pistol magazine on his person despite his being on probation 

for a similar offense. Given the proffers submitted and the pretrial services investigative report, 

we cannot find the trial court’s finding that the State proved dangerousness, by clear and 

convincing evidence, was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 24 Defendant’s third issue alleged that the State failed to meet its burden of proving, by clear 

and convincing evidence, that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the real 

and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific, 

articulable facts of the case, or the defendant’s willful flight. This issue was not addressed in 

OSAD’s memorandum. The defendant argues that “the State failed to meet its burden because 

there are conditions as set for[th] in 725 ILCS 5/110-10(b) which would mitigate the threat and/or 

the willful flight risk.” However, no argument regarding any of those conditions was presented on 

appeal. 
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¶ 25 Here, the trial court made a number of important observations. It noted, inter alia, the 

defendant was on probation for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon at the time of the instant 

offense. It further noted the defendant had people in his life who relied on him—his children, his 

mother, and his employer in particular—when he committed the current offense. In short, the 

defendant committed the current offense in spite of his important obligations to others and the 

terms of his order of probation. Under these facts, we cannot hold that the court’s finding that the 

State proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that no condition, or combination of conditions, 

would mitigate against defendant’s dangerousness, was against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. 

¶ 26 Defendant’s fourth issue contended that the conditions of release were not necessary to 

ensure the defendant’s appearance in court, ensure the defendant does not commit any criminal 

offense, ensure that the defendant complies with all conditions of pretrial release, prevent the 

defendant’s unlawful interference with the orderly administration of justice, or ensure compliance 

with the rules and procedures of problem-solving courts. This issue was not addressed in OSAD’s 

memorandum. The defendant argues that the trial court “imposed additional conditions of release 

as set forth in the attached Conditions of Release Order.” It further argues that “[t]he additional 

conditions are not necessary to ensure defendant’s appearance in court, ensure that defendant does 

not commit any criminal offense, ensure compliance with pretrial conditions, prevent unlawful 

interference with the administration of justive [sic], or ensure compliance with the rules and 

procedures of courts. Furthermore, the additional conditions of release are not individualized or 

the lease [sic] restrictive means to accomplish the above goals.” We find this last argument 

perplexing due to the fact that the trial court did not issue a conditions of release order or otherwise 
13 

order conditions of release. As no such order was entered, we find this argument to be without 

merit. 

¶ 27 Here, none of the trial court’s findings related to the defendant’s commission of a 

qualifying offense, dangerousness, or a lack of condition, or combination of conditions, available 

to mitigate defendant’s dangerousness were against the manifest weight of the evidence. As such, 

we hold that the trial court’s ultimate disposition, denying pretrial release, was not an abuse of 

discretion. 

¶ 28 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 29 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order granting the State’s petition to 

deny the defendant pretrial release. 

 

¶ 30 Affirmed.