IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Lamont Saunders, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1221 C.D. 2016

: Submitted: April 13, 2017

Pennsylvania Department :

of Corrections, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE JULIA K. HEARTHWAY, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE BROBSON FILED: August 10, 2017

Lamont Saunders (Petitioner), acting pro se, petitions for review of a

Final Determination of the Office of Open Records (OOR), issued June 29, 2016, 

which found that no further action was required of the Pennsylvania Department of 

Corrections (Department) in regard to Petitioner’s request under Pennsylvania’s

Right-to-Know Law.1Petitioner does not dispute the determination of the 

Department or that of the OOR, but he instead seeks to challenge the legality of his

criminal confinement. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Petitioner is an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional 

Institution at Dallas (SCI-Dallas). Petitioner filed a Right-to-Know Law request 

with the Department’s Open Records Officer, seeking a copy of the “Written 

 

1 Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§ 67.101-.3104.
2

Judgment of Sentence Order” for case number CP-51-CR-0700051-2003. 

(Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 1.) Petitioner sought a copy of the sentencing order 

with the judge’s signature, the statute under which he was sentenced, and the 

“statutory authorization” to impose a life sentence without parole. (R.R. at 1.) The 

Open Records Officer denied Petitioner’s request on the grounds that “[t]he 

record(s) that [he] requested do[es] not currently exist in the possession of the 

Department.” (R.R. at 2.)

Petitioner appealed to the OOR. In response, the Department 

submitted an attestation signed by Diane Yale, the Corrections Records Supervisor 

at SCI-Dallas, stating, in pertinent part: 

If the specific records requested above were in the 

possession of this Institution, they would be retained as 

official records in files within my custody. After a 

reasonable search, no responsive records exist within my 

custody, possession or control.

(R.R. at 8.) The OOR subsequently issued a Final Determination on 

June 29, 2016, denying Petitioner’s appeal, finding that the Department “has 

established that no responsive records exist.” (R.R. at 9.) Petitioner thereafter 

petitioned this Court for review.

On appeal,2Petitioner makes clear that he does not appeal the Final 

Determination of the OOR. Rather, Petitioner seeks to challenge the legality of his 

detention and confinement, stating:

IT IS NOT AND WAS NOT THIS PETITIONER’S 

INTENTION OR AIM TO APPEAL THE FINDINGS 

 

2 On appeal from the OOR in a RTKL case, this Court’s standard of review is de novo,

and our scope of review is plenary. Bowling v. Office of Open Records, 75 A.3d 453, 477 

(Pa. 2013).
3

OF THE [DEPARTMENT] OR THE [OOR] STATING 

THAT THE WRITTEN JUDGMENT OF SENTENCE 

ORDER IS NOT IN THEIR POSSESSION[.] IT HAS 

ALWAYS BEEN HIS AIM TO CHALLENGE HIS 

DETENTION AND CONFINEMENT BEING 

UNCONSTITUTIONAL WITHOUT THIS LAWFUL 

DOCUMENT.

(Petitioner’s Br. at 28 (emphasis in original).) The essence of Petitioner’s 

argument is that if his sentencing order does not exist in the possession of the 

Department, his incarceration must be illegal.3(Id. at 9.) Petitioner, therefore, 

requests that this Court remand this matter to the Court of Common Pleas and 

allow Petitioner to file a Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Id. at 20.)

Petitioner is essentially attempting to use the Right-to-Know Law’s 

appeal process to challenge the constitutionality of his criminal sentence. The

Right-to-Know Law, however, is not a vehicle through which an individual can 

collaterally attack the legality of his criminal confinement. Foster v. Pa. Dep’t of 

Corr., 159 A.3d 1020, 1022 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017); see also Moore v. Office of Open 

Records, 992 A.2d 907, 910 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (“[A]n appeal from an OOR order 

denying Moore’s request for access to a public record is not the proper forum to 

challenge the constitutionality of his continued incarceration.”). The 

Right-to-Know Law does not contain any statutory provisions or procedures 

providing an individual with a right or avenue to declare his underlying judgment 

 

3

In support of this argument, Petitioner cites 34 Pa. Code § 91.3, which provides, in part: 

The Department will accept and confine those persons committed to it under 

lawful court orders which conform to 42 Pa. C.S. § 9762 (relating to sentencing 

proceeding; place of confinement) when information has been provided to the 

Department as required by 42 Pa. C.S. § 9764 (relating to information required 

upon commitment and subsequent disposition).
4

of sentence a legal nullity. Foster, 159 A.3d at 1022. Indeed, our Supreme Court 

has held that the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9541-9546, is the 

exclusive state law remedy for prisoners challenging sentences that are allegedly

illegal. Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136 A.3d 493, 499 (Pa. 2016).

Additionally, this Court addressed an argument that was essentially

identical to Petitioner’s in both Foster v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

and Morrison v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, ___ A.3d ___ (Pa. 

Cmwlth., No. 2002 C.D. 2016, filed May 23, 2017). In Foster, the incarcerated 

petitioner sought to challenge his incarceration on the basis that the state 

correctional institution where he was located did not have a copy of his sentencing 

order. Foster, 159 A.3d at 1022. We explained that the incarcerated petitioner 

could not use the Right-to-Know Law appeal process to collaterally attack the 

sentencing court’s judgment of sentence. Id. at 1022-23. Similarly, in Morrison, 

addressing another attempt to challenge confinement by a Right-to-Know Law 

request, this Court explained that “[b]ecause in this case [petitioner] does not 

challenge the OOR’s denial of his appeal, but rather seeks relief outside the 

[Right-to-Know Law], this Court must affirm the OOR’s Final Determination.” 

Morrison, ___ A.3d at ___, slip op. at 5.4

 

4

Likewise, we reached the same conclusion in Whitaker v. Pennsylvania Department of 

Corrections (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1781 C.D. 2012, filed March 8, 2013); Quarles v. Department of 

Corrections (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 901 C.D. 2014, filed November 10, 2014); Gates v. Pennsylvania 

Department of Corrections (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 441 C.D. 2014, filed July 9, 2014); Huntley v. 

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1202 C.D. 2016, filed 

March 2, 2017), petition for allowance of appeal pending, (Pa., No. 383 MAL 2017); Dozier v. 

Department of Corrections (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1613 C.D. 2016, filed March 16, 2017); Rhone v. 

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1690 C.D. 2016, filed 

June 14, 2017); Fortune v. Department of Corrections (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1765 C.D. 2016, filed 

June 27, 2017); Rogers v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (Pa. Cmwlth., 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
5

Here, like the petitioners in Foster and Morrison, Petitioner attempts 

to use his Right-to-Know Law appeal to collaterally attack his criminal

confinement. His request to remand to common pleas to challenge the legality of 

his incarceration is outside the scope of a Right-to-Know Law appeal. Because 

Petitioner does not challenge the denial of his Right-to-Know Law request but, 

rather, the legality of his detention and confinement, the appeal procedure under 

the Right-to-Know Law is not the appropriate avenue for his action. This Court 

has no basis upon which to reverse the OOR’s Final Determination. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

 

 P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

 

(continued...)

No. 2068 C.D. 2016, filed June 28, 2017); and most recently in Person v. Department of 

Corrections (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1763 C.D. 2016, filed June 29, 2017). We acknowledge that 

Whitaker, Quarles, Gates, Huntley, Dozier, Rhone, Fortune, Rogers, and Person, as unreported 

panel decisions of this Court, have persuasive value, but they do not constitute binding 

precedent. IOP § 414(a), 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a). 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Lamont Saunders, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1221 C.D. 2016

:

Pennsylvania Department :

of Corrections, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 10th day of August, 2017, the Final Determination of 

the Office of Open Records is AFFIRMED.

 

 P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge