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NEXT STEPS IN COTE D’IVOIRE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 19, 2011

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

FRANK G. LOWENSTEIN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

——————

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware, Chairman

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

Cooke, Jennifer, Director of Africa Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC ...................................................................... 28

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 30

Coons, Hon. Christopher A., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement . 1

Fitzgerald, William, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African 

Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ......................................... 7

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Christopher 

A. Coons ......................................................................................................... 52

Gilpin, Dr. Raymond, Director of the Center for Sustainable Economies, U.S. 

Institute of Peace, Washington, DC ................................................................... 36

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 37

Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from Oklahoma, opening statement ........ 3

Isakson, Hon. Johnny, U.S. Senator from Georgia, opening statement .............. 3

Lindborg, Hon. Nancy E., Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Democracy, 

Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID), Washington, DC ............................................................ 10

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Christopher 

A. Coons ......................................................................................................... 53

McGovern, Michael, Assistant Professor of Anthropology and Director of 

Graduate Studies of African Studies, Yale University, New Haven, CT ........ 23

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 25

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

April 29, 2011, Foreign Policy Magazine article, ‘‘What the World Got Wrong 

in Coˆte D’Ivoirre’’ submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe ............................... 49

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(1)

NEXT STEPS IN COTE D’IVOIRE 

THURSDAY, MAY 19, 2011

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:30 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher A. 

Coons (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Coons, Isakson, and Inhofe. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. COONS,

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE 

Senator COONS. I’m pleased to chair today’s Africa Subcommittee 

hearing entitled ‘‘Next Steps on Cote d’Ivoire.’’ I’d like to call the 

subcommittee to order. 

I am privileged to serve in this capacity with my good friend Senator Isakson. And I want to take the opportunity to thank him for 

his partnership in leading this subcommittee. 

Cote d’Ivoire, as we all know, is emerging from a severe political 

military crisis that followed historic elections held on November 28, 

2010. Just to underscore, these were, in many ways, the first truly 

national elections in Cote d’Ivoire’s history, with candidates representing every region in the country. And while President 

Ouattara’s victory was certified by the Ivoirian Independent 

Electoral Commission and the United Nations, Mr. Gbagbo, the 

former President, refused to recognize these results. The subsequent violence and conflict that emerged resulted in the tragic 

death of nearly 1,000 Ivoirians and the displacement of up to a million people. Fortunately, the armed conflict largely ended, days 

after Mr. Gbagbo’s arrest on April 11, and President Ouattara was 

sworn in, less than a month later, with a formal inauguration plan 

for next week. 

I am pleased that President Ouattara has recently reaffirmed his 

commitment to ensuring accountability for those implicated in the 

violence, including forces loyal to both him and former President 

Gbagbo. As President Ouattara asserted on his recent state visit to 

Senegal, ‘‘No one is above the law. All those who have committed 

crimes of blood will be punished.’’ Real political reconciliation, in 

addition to accountability and justice for all, are absolutely essential to promoting a stable and prosperous future, in my view, in 

Cote d’Ivoire. 

Political reconciliation will be a very real challenge for the nation 

and for President Ouattara, who has made it a top priority, along 

2

with restoring security, addressing some very real human rights 

abuses that have occurred, ensuring transitional justice, reviving 

the economy, and reforming the security sector. 

Today’s hearing will provide an opportunity to hear several perspectives on this recent history and the ambitious agenda for the 

nation, going forward, and to consider the role of the United States 

and the international community in supporting President Ouattara 

as he addresses governance issues and humanitarian concerns. 

Today’s hearing will also consider the role of multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, the African Union, and the Economic Community of West African States, known as ECOWAS, in 

response to the conflict, as well as regional implications of these 

difficult recent events. 

Cote d’Ivoire, as we all know, is an important economic hub in 

Africa; as well, the world’s largest cocoa producer and one of the 

largest U.S. trading partners in the region. We will, therefore, also 

today explore economic consequences of this recent crisis and steps 

forward toward economic recovery and growth. 

An additional goal of today’s hearing is to consider military sector reform, which has been a very real challenge since the Ivoirian 

civil war of 2002. We will hear recommendations for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process which President 

Ouattara has undertaken, and steps forward to create a unified 

military that could offer real protection to the Ivoirian people and 

serve as a source of stability in the region, if successful. 

I was deeply concerned about allegations of mass atrocities carried out by both sides in this conflict. And I am disturbed by reports of ongoing looting and violence in Abidjan. I also am acutely 

aware of the continuing humanitarian crisis, and look forward to 

hearing about the strategy for providing assistance to refugees, to 

those displaced persons, and Ivoirians facing ongoing security 

concerns. 

Beyond the immediate crisis, I look forward to hearing suggestions about how the international community can best support the 

new Ouattara government as it attempts to address the underlying, lasting causes of instability in Cote d’Ivoire. In my view, it’s 

essential to build upon lessons learned from this past election in 

order to build stronger institutions of governance going forward, 

especially as Cote d’Ivoire prepares for legislative elections. 

As President Obama said, in a speech delivered earlier just 

today, ‘‘We in America have a stake, not just in the stability of 

nations, but in the self-determination of individuals.’’ I agree with 

this statement, and believe it should serve as a guiding principle 

for our foreign policy. 

We will have two panels today, to speak to these challenging and 

current questions about Cote d’Ivoire and its future, composed of 

representatives from the State Department and USAID, and then 

the second panel consisting of nongovernmental experts on West 

Africa and, in particular, Cote d’Ivoire. 

First, we’ll be hearing from Bill Fitzgerald, Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of State for African Affairs, who will discuss the U.S. 

diplomatic priorities in Cote d’Ivoire and the administration’s plan 

for the country, going forward. We will next hear from Nancy 

Lindborg, assistant administrator for democracy, conflict, and 

3

humanitarian assistance at USAID, who will discuss the humanitarian efforts undertaken by USAID, and its plans for supporting 

this critical political reconciliation and economic recovery. 

On our second panel, we’ll hear from Dr. Michael McGovern, 

assistant professor of anthropology at Yale, who will discuss the 

prospects for this important political reconciliation and the challenges of demilitarization. Then, Jennifer Cooke, director of Africa 

Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, will 

discuss the role of the international community and regional implications of these events in Cote d’Ivoire. Finally, we will hear from 

Dr. Raymond Gilpin, director of the Center for Sustainable Economies at the U.S. Institute of Peace, who will discuss the economic 

causes and consequences of instability in Cote d’Ivoire and provide 

suggestions for how we can best support and sustain its economic 

health and growth, going forward. 

I’d like to, at the outset, thank all of our witnesses for being here 

today, and for contributing to this important hearing. And I look 

forward to your testimony. 

Senator Isakson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON,

U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s the custom of 

this subcommittee for opening statements to be reserved to the 

ranking member and the chair, with the chair going first, ranking 

member second. Out of deference to Senator Inhofe, who’s made a 

request to make an opening statement, I will yield my time to him, 

with the understanding I’ll have my say during the question and 

answer period, later on, if that’s OK with the Chair. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Isakson. I appreciate your 

courtesy to Senator Inhofe, and invite Senator Inhofe to make a 

brief opening statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE,

U.S. SENATOR FROM OKLAHOMA 

Senator INHOFE. Mr. Chairman, I also appreciate the fact that 

you have offered to give me time, and, in addition to that time, of 

course, that which has been yielded by Senator Isakson. 

As you know, Mr. Chairman, I spoke four times on the Senate 

floor in the last month on the tragic civil war that unfolded in Cote 

d’Ivoire and which ended with a full-scale attack upon the city of 

Abidjan by the rebel forces of Alassane Ouattara, the United 

Nations, and the French military. At the end of that military 

operation, President Gbagbo and his wife Simone were captured by 

the French military forces, acting with rebel forces loyal to 

Ouattara. Now, while I was thankful that both the President and 

the First Lady were taken alive, both were mutilated and brutalized. And I condemned the use of so-called peacekeeping forces, 

made up of the United Nations, and the French forces, which attacked the city of Abidjan and the Presidential palace that—it is 

these forces that have caused countless deaths. 

I happen to know—I’m very familiar with that area. I’ve been 

there many times. I’ve been to Cote d’Ivoire, to Abidjan, specifically, almost 15 times—maybe 15 times. That area, right there, is 

4

an area that was detonated—there are small—I have no idea—of 

knowing how many, in that particular picture of people, citizens of 

Abidjan, were burned to death. 

And I have to say that the African—it’s not a role of the United 

Nations, and I question why the French participated in this battle. 

The African Union, a supporter of ousting President Gbagbo, has 

since come out and condemned what it called foreign military intervention. In addition, President Museveni, of Uganda, has said, on 

November 11—on—I’m sorry, on April 11, 1 day prior to the capture of the Gbagbos—and I’m going to read this. This is a quote, 

now, from President Museveni, ‘‘I have not been happy with the 

way the United Nations and the international community, especially the French, have responded to the events of the post-election 

Ivory Coast. I’m not pleased with the way the international community can sanction a situation of bloodbath in the domestic affairs 

of African countries. I would prefer a peaceful intervention by an 

African Union committee that would investigate into the matter, 

give the parties a fair hearing, and come out with a workable recommendation that can promote peace and stability in the region.’’

Other Africans, Mr. Chairman—the current African Union Chairman Obiang also condemned this military intervention in Cote 

d’Ivoire by saying, ‘‘Africa does not need any external influence. 

Africa must manage its own affairs.’’

Kenyan President Odinga, was also quoted as saying that President Gbagbo ‘‘has been captured. And I say that he should not be 

hurt. I have actually already sent word to Mr. Ouattara saying 

that Gbagbo should not be hurt. If he wants to go out into exile, 

he should be allowed to go into exile. But, he needs to be treated 

humanely.’’ Remember the world ‘‘exile,’’ because we’re going to 

come back to that. 

And former South African President Mbeki has written an eloquent condemnation of the United Nations and the French-led civil 

war in the April 29 edition of Foreign Policy magazine. I strongly 

recommend that the members get this. And I’ll make sure they 

have copies of this. 

Mr. Chairman, I had warned the State Department and the 

United Nations and the French, on the Senate floor, in four separate times last month, that they would have blood on their hands 

if they continued supporting the rebel forces of Ouattara and continued the bombing the financial capital of Cote d’Ivoire, Abidjan, 

and did not agree to an immediate cease-fire. I said, on April 4, 

that ‘‘I think we can avert a real tragedy, something maybe comparable to what happened in the 1994 Rwanda genocide.’’ I called 

for a cease-fire and no one responded. 

Next day, April 5, I said, on the Senator floor, that, ‘‘Ouattara 

has tried to deny his involvement in the slaughter of up to 1,000 

innocent civilians, in the western town of Deukoue. His forces took 

out the town earlier last week’’—now, this is on April 5 that I made 

this statement—‘‘after the Gbagbo forces had gone.’’ Now, the 

Gbagbo forces weren’t there. 

What you’re looking at here—this is—these are hundreds—and 

I can’t tell you—quantify them—somewhere up to 1,000 people in 

the town of Deukoue that were murdered by the Ouattara forces. 

Look at them, down in the far left. The other pictures were actually 

5

in other communities around there. I can’t really identify that, but 

they’re in that vicinity. Those pictures down there were the ones 

that Ouattara’s forces came in and brutally murdered. 

I called, again, for a cease-fire, and with no response. That was 

on April the 7th. On April 7 and 8, I pointed out that the U.N. and 

French were bombing downtown Abidjan, near the Presidential palace, where hundreds of young supporters of President Gbagbo had 

encircled the Presidential palace in a human shield for the bombing. Who knows how many of them were killed. This is what they 

did. These were young kids—baseball bats, boards that were up 

there. There they are. That’s all of these young kids. You can’t see 

how young they are. You can, if you look up close. I invite you to 

come up and look. But, all of these are different places. That happens to be a garage. You can see that they’re working on there. 

And these are the kids that are crying and are—you can tell 

they’ve been abused. We don’t how many of them were killed during this process. 

Mr. Chairman, I pointed out, in April 8, that there were roving 

Ouattara death squads who were ‘‘disappearing’’—they use that 

word instead of ‘‘killing’’—disappearing supporters of President 

Gbagbo—meaning, killing them. I called again for immediate ceasefire. No one responded. That is the—and you can tell by what 

they’re wearing, those are the Ouattara death squad. Those are the 

individuals, let there be no doubt about that. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I also pointed out that I believe a massive 

voter fraud occurred in November 28, in 2010, in the Cote d’Ivoire 

Presidential election between President Laurent Gbagbo and the 

rebel leader Ouattara. I submitted evidence, in two letters, to the 

State Department that showed massive voter fraud and to steal the 

election. In one instance, it showed that the first round of the Presidential election—this is very significant—not quite yet—the first 

round was—they had, in the—what we would call the primary election, the President, President Gbagbo, got thousands and thousands of votes in the northern areas, the Muslim areas, the areas 

which were Ouattara’s areas. And yet, when they had the next 

election—we would call that, here in the United States, a runoff—

he got zero. That is a statistical impossibility. Everybody here 

knows it. 

In another case, the voter tabulation return sheet for one of the 

five regions in the rebel-held north showed that Ouattara received 

an extra 94,000 votes made up out of thin air. We don’t know 

where they came—just in the tabulation. Now, you can see very 

clearly—that’s the official tabulation. If you look to the results, on 

this side over here, the total of that would be 149,000 votes. However, they recorded, as you can see, 244,000 votes, an additional 

94,000 votes. Now, if you do your math and you figure out how 

many of these areas are up there—clearly, if this type of abuse 

went on in the rest of them, it was Gbagbo who won the election. 

The Department of State responded to this allegation, on April 

8, by claiming that this document appeared to be fraudulent, without offering any proof. And I’m going to ask these government witnesses today—and they know I’m going to ask, because I already 

sent a letter telling them I was going to ask—on the record, what, 

if any, investigation into the authenticity of this document was 

6

undertaken. I will also ask them, on the record, if that document 

is fraudulent. 

So, Mr. Chairman, despite my warnings, all that I predicted and 

warned against came to a pass. An orgy of bloodletting occurred 

during the Ouattaran offensive, which was joined by the United 

Nations and the French. They have left behind villages and streets 

filled with the stench of rotting bodies. 

And there you can see it, right there. That is in Abidjan. The bottom left, you can see that they are burning the bodies down there. 

You can see the—what the stench is. We have witnesses that said 

that there were hogs eating the remains of the charred bodies that 

were lying in the street. 

Down there, the next one to the right, in the lower right, he’s 

about to be executed. You can see the gun is to his head. 

And the top one, that happens to be the Interior Minister of 

President Gbagbo. He was shot in the face, just enough to leave 

him alive and let him die a very slow death. That’s the picture, 

right up there in the top right. 

Senator COONS. Senator——

Senator INHOFE. Interior Minister. 

I call, again, for an independent investigation into all atrocities 

committed by all military forces involved in the fighting in Cote 

d’Ivoire. And I call for the United Nations and the French and the 

Ouattaran forces to halt the immediate death squads, still roving—

it’s happening right now—around the streets in Abidjan, killing 

people out in the streets. 

You know, I have several friends who are hiding. I’ve had personal conversations—you can’t use their names, because they’re 

killing all of them that they can find—where they witness the 

deaths taking place out in the street, and they can’t even go out 

there, because they know that they would be considered to be a 

Gbagbo supporter, and they, too, would be——

Senator COONS. Senator, please conclude in 1 more minute, if 

you would. 

Senator INHOFE. Well, I’m—I will conclude; this is the last page. 

So, last, I’ll ask the witnesses if they have any information about 

the whereabouts and conditions of both President and Simone 

Gbagbo. Ouattara has decades-long political, and now militant, foes 

of the Gbagbos. I’ve read the books about it. We all know it goes 

back to the 1990s. And I fear that great harm will come to the 

Gbagbos now if they remain in separate secret locations under this 

control. I would like to know what our State Department is doing 

to ensure their safety. And I renew my demand for the United—

that the United States step in and examine the possibility of seeking a place of exile for the Gbagbos. 

I have already located one place in one of the major countries in 

sub-Sahara Africa. They’re willing to take him into exile. This is 

going to be my plea when I talk to the witnesses. 

Thank you for your tolerance, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COONS. You’re welcome, Senator. 

I’d like to now turn it over to our witnesses, our first panel, 

starting with Deputy Assistant Secretary Bill Fitzgerald, and then 

followed by Assistant Administrator Lindborg. If you would, please 

limit your comments to roughly 5 minutes. Your full testimony will 

7

be placed in the record, although, given the issues that have just 

been raised, feel free to keep your comments to about 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM FITZGERALD, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. FITZGERALD. Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Isakson, and members of the 

committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify before you 

today on Cote d’Ivoire. 

The post-election crisis in Cote d’Ivoire sharpened international 

focus on democracy and good governance in sub-Saharan Africa. 

The resolution of the crisis in favor of democracy sends a clear message to would-be dictators and antidemocrats across the continent 

that neither Africans nor the international community will stand 

for ignoring the peoples’ voice, as expressed through the ballot box. 

Democracy, of course, does not begin nor end at the ballot box, but 

it is an important step to building accountable governance. The 

United States and its international partners must now step forward to work with the newly elected government to rebuild Cote 

d’Ivoire for all Ivoirians. 

First, let me express our concern for the very real human tragedy 

that has befallen the Ivoirian people as a result of this political crisis. The road to democratic elections was a long and turbulent one. 

In fact, the fall 2010 Presidential elections were the culmination of 

nearly 10 years of international community engagement to broker 

peace in Cote d’Ivoire. The post-election political crisis involved 

gross abuses of human rights, crippled the country’s once-vibrant 

economy, exacerbated existing divisions among Ivoirians, and allowed armed groups to take advantage of weakened security institutions. The international community must remain engaged in Cote 

d’Ivoire to help as the Ivoirian Government takes on the challenge 

of rebuilding and reconciling a fractured nation. 

Moving forward, we will work with our international partners to 

support the Ivoirian Government as it addresses national reconciliation, economic recovery, and, above all, security sector reform, and 

as a response to the ongoing humanitarian crisis. 

President Ouattara has pledged to make national reconciliation 

a primary focus of this Presidency. He recently created a Dialogue, 

Truth, and Reconciliation Commission, and named former Prime 

Minister Charles Konan Banny as chairman. 

The Commission’s specific plan of action has not been finalized, 

but President Ouattara has indicated that the Commission will 

also include two religious leaders, one Christian and one Muslim. 

As a vehicle for national dialogue and reconciliation process, the 

Commission can shed light on the events in the post-election period 

and can also be a forum for Ivoirians to participate in a reconciliation process, again, after 10 years of instability and intermittent 

armed conflict. To achieve lasting results, reconciliation efforts, 

however, must be Ivoirian-led, with support from the international 

community, as needed. 

As we await details on how the Commission will operate, we are 

encouraging President Ouattara and his government to embrace 

good governance and transparency to create a wider culture of recVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:39 Apr 27, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011IS~1\051911-U.TXT BETTY
8

onciliation. Indeed, ensuring accountability for those who committed serious human rights abuses will be an important aspect of 

national reconciliation. 

The United State cosponsored a resolution, at the U.N. Human 

Right Council in Geneva, that created a Commission of Inquiry to 

investigate allegations of abuses and violations of human rights 

committed by both sides since November 28. Indeed, the Commission is currently in Cote d’Ivoire, carrying out its mandate to ‘‘investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegations 

in order to identify those responsible for such acts, and bring them 

to justice.’’

Again, President Ouattara has repeatedly promised to cooperate 

with the Commission of Inquiry’s findings, regardless of whether 

his forces or former President Gbagbo’s troops or militiamen were 

involved. We will hold him to that promise. We will ensure that 

there is no impunity for those who carried out these egregious 

human rights violations. 

Former President Gbagbo remains under house arrest in northern Cote d’Ivoire, under the joint protection of the U.N. force, 

UNOCI, as well as President Ouattara’s republican forces. President Ouattara’s government is currently investigating what, if any, 

charges can be brought against Mr. Gbagbo and his coterie, domestically. He has also said that he supports the International Criminal Court’s role in investigating alleged abuses since the crisis 

began. 

We remain concerned about abuses allegedly committed by 

Ouattara’s republican forces, and will press for full accountability 

for all human rights violators. Accountability and a meaningful reconciliation process will be essential not only for Cote d’Ivoire’s 

future, but for regional stability in the wake of the Ivoirian crisis. 

With some 200,000 Ivoirian refugees in Liberia, President Ouattara 

must create a stable and peaceful environment to allow them to return. Particularly in the west, I would say, it is absolutely essential 

for security forces to stand up. That includes members of the peacekeeping forces, because it is in the west where the bulk of the violence has been carried out. 

Now, I’m going to submit the rest, and I’ll cut to my close to 

allow as much time as possible for questions. 

But, I say, we remain committed to working with President 

Ouattara and the Ivoirian people to help reestablish Cote d’Ivoire 

as the beacon of stability and economic prosperity as it once was. 

A prosperous, peaceful Cote d’Ivoire is an asset to the region and 

to the continent. We look forward to playing a part in the hopeful 

future that lies ahead. 

Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to speak. 

And I’m looking forward to the ability and the chance to answer 

any questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fitzgerald follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM FITZGERALD

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Isakson, and members of the committee, thank 

you for this opportunity to testify before you today on Cote d’Ivoire. The post-election crisis in Cote d’Ivoire sharpened international focus on democracy and good 

governance in sub-Saharan Africa. The resolution of the crisis in favor of democracy 

9

sends a clear message to would-be dictators and antidemocrats across the continent 

that neither Africans, nor the international community, will stand for ignoring the 

people’s voice as expressed through the ballot box. Democracy does not begin or end 

at the ballot box, but it is an important step to building accountable governance. 

The United States and its international partners must now step forward to work 

with the newly elected government to rebuild a Cote d’Ivoire for all Ivoirians. 

First, let me express our concern for the very real human tragedy that has befallen the Ivoirian people as a result of the political crisis. The road to democratic 

elections was a long and turbulent one. The fall 2010 Presidential elections were 

the culmination of nearly 10 years of international community engagement to 

broker peace in Cote d’Ivoire. The post-electoral political crisis involved gross abuses 

of human rights, wounded the country’s once-vibrant economy, exacerbated existing 

divisions among Ivoirians, and allowed armed groups to take advantage of weakened security institutions. The international community must remain engaged in 

Cote d’Ivoire to help as the Ivoirian Government takes on the challenge of rebuilding and reconciling a fractured nation. Moving forward, we will work with our international partners to support the Ivoirian Government as it addresses national reconciliation, economic recovery, and security sector reform, and as it responds to the 

ongoing humanitarian crisis. 

President Ouattara has pledged to make national reconciliation a primary focus 

of his Presidency. He recently created a Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation Commission (DTRC), and named former Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny as chairman. The DTRC’s specific plan of action has not been finalized, but President 

Ouattara has indicated that the Commission will also include two religious leaders 

(a Christian and a Muslim.) As a vehicle for a national dialogue and reconciliation 

process, the DTRC can shed light on the events in the post-election period and also 

be a forum for Ivoirians to participate in a reconciliation process after a decade of 

instability and intermittent armed conflict. To achieve lasting results, reconciliation 

efforts must be Ivoirian-led, with support from the international community as 

needed. As we await details on how the DTRC will operate, we are encouraging 

President Ouattara and his government to embrace good governance and transparency to create a wider culture of reconciliation. 

Ensuring accountability for those who committed serious human rights abuses in 

the post-election period will be an important aspect of national reconciliation. The 

United States cosponsored a resolution at the U.N. Human Rights Council that created a Commission of Inquiry to investigate allegations of abuses and violations of 

human rights committed by both sides since November 28. The Commission is currently in Cote d’Ivoire, carrying out its mandate to ‘‘investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegations . . . in order to identify those responsible 

for such acts and bring them to justice.’’ President Ouattara has repeatedly promised to cooperate with the Commission of Inquiry’s findings, regardless of whether 

his forces or former President Gbagbo’s troops or militiamen were involved. We will 

hold him to that promise and ensure there will be no impunity. 

Former President Gbagbo remains under house arrest in northern Cote d’Ivoire 

under the joint protection of United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire and President Ouattara’s Republican Forces. President Ouattara’s government is currently investigating what, if any, charges can be brought against Mr. Gbagbo and his coterie 

domestically. Ouattara has also said that he supports the International Criminal 

Court’s role in investigating alleged abuses since the November elections. We remain concerned about abuses allegedly committed by Ouattara’s Republican Forces 

since the November elections, and will press for full accountability for all human 

rights violators. 

Accountability and a meaningful reconciliation process will be essential not only 

for Cote d’Ivoire’s future, but for regional stability in the wake of the Ivoirian crisis. 

With some 200,000 Ivoirian refugees in Liberia and other neighboring countries, 

President Ouattara must create a stable and peaceful environment to allow them 

to return. Restoring law and order to parts of the country where it has been absent 

for years will be central to this effort, and will not be easily achieved. Rebuilding 

trust between the Ivoirian people and the security sector—both military and police—will be challenging, particularly in the western regions where lawlessness and 

insecurity were commonplace even before the political crisis. 

Security sector reform is critical for Cote d’Ivoire’s long-term stability, and the 

success of other programs in the short term. Reestablishment of U.N. programs for 

disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of militia on both sides of the conflict will be an important factor in stabilizing the more volatile regions. The U.N. 

is completing a technical assessment mission to Cote d’Ivoire, which will provide 

recommendations to the U.N. and U.N. Security Council on how to best adjust 

UNOCI mission priorities to contribute to critical post-conflict tasks. Restoration of 

10

state authority and law and order throughout the country presents a very immediate challenge for the Ouattara government, and support from the U.N. and international community will be critical. Broad security sector reform, including reform 

of the military, police and gendarmeries, and professionalization writ large, will require intensive international community coordination and support. As President 

Ouattara outlines his vision for the security sector organization and structure, we 

will work with our partners in the international community to coordinate assistance 

efforts in line with that vision. 

Given Cote d’Ivoire’s regional importance and the negative impact of its instability 

on neighboring countries, there is a role for regional actors and institutions to play 

in helping Cote d’Ivoire achieve lasting stability and peace. The Ivoirian political crisis demonstrated the important role that regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union can 

play in building international consensus on difficult issues. These organizations 

must remain actively engaged in helping Cote d’Ivoire avoid a return to instability. 

ECOWAS has already pledged humanitarian assistance for Cote d’Ivoire, and the 

African Union has promised to remain engaged in coordination with the international community to promote peace and genuine national reconciliation among 

Ivoirians. 

Currently, U.S. assistance to Cote d’Ivoire is limited to humanitarian programs 

including disaster relief and the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief; many 

other programs are currently subject to foreign assistance restrictions that were 

triggered well before President Ouattara took office. We are exploring the process 

for lifting or waiving those restrictions, as appropriate, in order to broaden the types 

of assistance we can provide, and will consult with Congress in that effort. As we 

move through the process of addressing those foreign assistance restrictions, we 

have already begun careful coordination with our international partners to ensure 

that our efforts in supporting political reconciliation, economic recovery, and security sector reform are not duplicative. 

We remain committed to working with President Ouattara and the Ivoirian people 

to help reestablish Cote d’Ivoire as the beacon of stability and economic prosperity 

it once was. A prosperous and peaceful Cote d’Ivoire is an asset to the region and 

the continent, and we look forward to playing a part in the hopeful future that lies 

ahead. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak today, and I welcome any questions you 

may have.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Secretary Fitzgerald. 

Ms. Lindborg. 

STATEMENT OF HON. NANCY E. LINDBORG, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND 

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR 

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID), WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. LINDBORG. Good afternoon, Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, Senator Inhofe. Thank you for convening this hearing. 

And I welcome the opportunity to talk about the humanitarian assistance that we’ve provided to date in Cote d’Ivoire, and a brief 

look at the situation ahead. You have my full testimony, so let me 

just make a few reflections. 

As Mr. Fitzgerald has just indicated, Cote d’Ivoire has been—

after having been one of the most prosperous nations in West 

Africa, has been the victim of a decade of political instability, and 

it’s taken a heavy toll on both the population and the economy. 

Since the November 2010 elections, there’s been a spiral of violence, and both sides have committed brutalities and killings. The 

result has been nearly half a million Ivoirians have fled their 

homes, including 180,000 who have fled into Liberia. 

Despite the arrest of former President Gbagbo on April 11, the 

simmering and underlying conflicts remain: unresolved land tenure 

conflicts, longstanding tension over ethnicity, religion, national 

identity, and fear of potential retaliation by forces loyal to both 

11

sides. All of this contributes to continued insecurity in Cote 

d’Ivoire. And our reports from the field indicate that there has been 

widespread destruction and displacement, particularly in western 

Cote d’Ivoire, where the fighting was particularly intensive over 

these last few months. Whole villages have been burned and 

destroyed, and many stand virtually empty. 

In some villages, the destruction appears particularly targeted, 

perhaps based on increased ethnic and political tensions that were 

intensified since the elections. We’ve seen many hospitals that have 

been looted, and essential services are not provided. 

Many of the displaced are staying with host families instead of 

in camps. In Liberia, up to 90 to 95 percent of the refugees are 

staying with host families in, really, a remarkable spirit of generosity. And this is straining the resources of many of the host 

communities. U.S. Agency for International Development representatives met with one household in western Cote d’Ivoire that 

was hosting three families in one household, for a total of 51 people. This is potentially straining the resources of an already very 

poor population, on both sides of the border, in Cote d’Ivoire and 

Liberia. 

We know that people have been traumatized by the violence 

they’ve just witnessed and by the repeated losses, frankly, over the 

last decade, and a population that already had many displaced. We 

don’t know, as a result, when they will return. What we are told 

by those we speak to is that a return to security is paramount. 

Many of the refugees and host families in Liberia are already asking for seeds and tools for this May-to-October planting season, 

indicating to us that they don’t plan to return anytime soon. 

Since the crisis began, we’ve intensified our efforts, through the 

State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, to provide life-saving assistance to those who are affected by 

the conflict, both in Cote d’Ivoire and in neighboring Liberia. And 

our immediate priorities were to ensure that the conflict-affected 

populations had access to food, to water, and to adequate health 

care. We focus the majority of our assistance in western Cote 

d’Ivoire, in Abidjan, and across the border in Liberia. 

Through our office of Food for Peace, we provided $16.4 million 

of emergency food assistance that went primarily through the 

World Food Programme. And we provided that assistance both to 

those who were displaced and to the host families whose resources 

were being stretched. This provided aid to 80,000 internally displaced persons and 100,000 refugees in Liberia. Through the 

USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, we provided $5.4 

million in programs that provided water, sanitation, hygiene, working with communities to provide protection programs. Many of 

these people left their homes with virtually nothing. This is in 

addition to the $21.1 million provided by the State Department’s 

Bureau of Population, Refugee, and Migration that particularly 

focused on the refugee population in Liberia. 

We’ve responded generously to this crisis. We also know that our 

emergency assistance will not contribute to durable solutions 

unless we continue to work with the international community to 

address the larger underlying issues. Within USAID, the Bureau 

for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance has capaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:39 Apr 27, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011IS~1\051911-U.TXT BETTY
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bilities and surge teams that enable us both to provide humanitarian assistance, as well as to work with our colleagues at the 

State Department to move into a more effective transition. We’re 

currently in discussions, with the State Department and the Embassy, on how we can best respond to the needs for additional assistance and move into a post-conflict era. We’re developing a menu 

of response options that look at a range of programs tailored to 

meet the specific transition needs of Cote d’Ivoire and the postconflict requirements, building on what we’ve already done. We’re 

ready to deploy additional experts to do the assessment that’s so 

critical to identify what will be important to do next. And as Cote 

d’Ivoire looks to its future, we know that they need to address improved security, to rebuild its economy, and to rebuild the confidence of its people in its government through the reconciliation so 

critical to the future. We’ll continue to work alongside the international community to provide the assistance and the support so 

critically needed for this very important country. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lindborg follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NANCY E. LINDBORG

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Isakson, and members of the committee, thank 

you for this opportunity to testify before you today on Cote d’Ivoire. I will give you 

a brief update on the current situation in Cote d’Ivoire, the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) efforts in the aftermath of post-election violence, 

and what capabilities we have that might be brought to bear in the future. 

Cote d’Ivoire was once one of the most prosperous states in West Africa, but political instability in the past decade has taken a heavy toll on the population and the 

economy. In late November 2010, the country held the second round of the longawaited Presidential elections, which pitted incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo 

against former Prime Minister Alassane Dramane Ouattara in a runoff. 

The Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) declared Ouattara the winner, with 

54 percent of votes cast in his favor, and the U.N. Operation in Cote’Ivoire certified 

these results. The Ivoirian Constitutional Court, however, in a highly questionable 

move, annulled votes from several pro-Ouattara regions, and overturned the CEI’s 

ruling by declaring Gbagbo the winner with 51 percent of valid votes. Despite international community recognition that Ouattara was the duly elected President of 

Cote d’Ivoire, Gbagbo refused to step aside peacefully. 

Following the disputed Presidential election, increasingly intense fighting between 

forces loyal to the two sides caused at least 500,000 people to flee their homes, including some 180,000 who fled to neighboring Liberia. The number of deaths reported varies, but has been reported in the thousands. Brutal massacres and 

killings along ethnic and political lines appear to have been committed by both sides 

of the political divide. The number of deaths reported varies, but has been reported 

in the thousands. Brutal massacres and killings along ethnic and political lines appear to have been committed by both sides of the political divide. 

Despite former President Gbagbo’s arrest on April 11, unresolved land tenure conflicts, longstanding tensions over ethnicity and national identity, and fear of potential retaliation by forces loyal to either former President Gbagbo or President 

Ouattara all contribute to an uncertain security situation in Cote d’Ivoire. 

CURRENT HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

Our reports from the field indicate that destruction and displacement are widespread. In western Cote d’Ivoire, whole villages have been burned, destroyed, and 

stand virtually empty. In some villages, the destruction appears more targeted, 

which is likely based on the ethnic and political tensions that have intensified since 

2002. Hospitals have been looted and essential services are nonexistent. 

To help describe the magnitude of the displacement, let me provide an illustrative 

example. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reports that there 

is severe destruction in Cote d’Ivoire near the border with Liberia between Zouan 

Hounien—where the fighting began—to Toulepleu to Blolequin. Before the recent viVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:39 Apr 27, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011IS~1\051911-U.TXT BETTY
13

olence, the town of Toulepleu had a population between 40,000 to 50,000 people. 

ICRC reported in March that only about 3,000 people remained while the rest fled. 

Security in Cote d’Ivoire is gradually improving, allowing greater humanitarian 

access to affected areas. That said, armed combatants continue to cause random insecurity. Earlier this month, insecurity forced health officials to delay a polio vaccine campaign in Bas Sassandra, a southern region where at least three people have 

recently contracted polio. 

According to Human Rights Watch, sexual violence has been increasingly prevalent in Cote d’Ivoire over the past decade, and the United Nations reports that gender-based violence, especially rape, has increased in most areas since the recent conflict began. All who have lived through the conflict have witnessed horrific events, 

further deteriorating trust levels between ethnic groups and political rivals. 

In western Cote d’Ivoire and eastern Liberia, there are simultaneous displacements and returns, which are inhibiting efforts to determine the actual number of 

refugees and returnees. Fear of possible reprisal attacks and interethnic violence, 

coupled with ongoing insecurity, continue to prompt Ivoirians to flee into Liberia. 

Grand Gedeh and Maryland counties, along the border with Cote d’Ivoire, are receiving as many as 250 refugees per day. Most who fled their homes left with nothing but the clothes on their back, and they are in need of food, basic household and 

hygiene items, and health care. 

Most of the displaced, whether in Cote d’Ivoire or in Liberia, are not located in 

camps but are instead residing with host families. Between 90 and 95 percent of 

the refugees are staying with Liberian host families, depleting already scarce resources in host villages. Many host families are sheltering more than one displaced 

family, further stretching already scarce resources such as food and health supplies. 

USAID met with one household in far western Cote d’Ivoire that was hosting three 

families, for a total of 51 people in the household. 

While refugees have been welcomed into Liberian homes and villages, the situation must be closely monitored to assure that basic needs of refugees and host families are met so tensions do not rise. There are also reports of Liberian mercenaries 

and Ivoirian militias crossing the border into Liberia, which further heightens security concerns. The onset of the rainy season has prompted concerns that the poor 

condition of roads and bridges in southeastern Liberia will hamper food distributions in the coming months, further exacerbating the situation. 

In this current crisis, refugees and IDPs cite security as a major factor in deciding 

whether to return to areas of origin in Cote d’Ivoire. Nearly all refugees and some 

host families in Liberia continue to request seeds and tools for the current May to 

October farming season, suggesting that refugees plan to remain in the country for 

at least 6 months. Traumatized by the violence they have witnessed and the repeated losses during the current and previous conflicts, many of the displaced told 

USAID that they are waiting to see security restored before they return home. 

After the 2002 civil war in Cote d’Ivoire, upward of a million people were displaced. Insecurity, coupled with longstanding political and ethnic divides, hindered 

timely returns. By mid-2010, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

(UNHCR) estimated that some 519,000 Ivoirians remained internally displaced. 

That figure only accounts for people in the west and not from other areas of displacement so the number of Ivoirians who were displaced when this current crisis 

began is likely greater than 519,000. 

The needs are great, and the United States Government continues to find ways 

to provide assistance that is mindful of the fragile situation. 

CURRENT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Since the recent crisis began, the United States—primarily through USAID and 

the Department of State—has been working to provide life-saving humanitarian assistance to those affected by the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire, whether they remained in 

country, fled into Liberia, or are serving as a host family for those who fled. 

The immediate priorities for our humanitarian assistance are to assure that conflict-affected populations have access to food and adequate health care. We are also 

working to provide access to clean water and appropriate sanitation and hygiene, 

as well as assuring that vulnerable populations are adequately protected. 

Based on our recent assessments, USAID will focus the majority of our humanitarian assistance in Cote d’Ivoire in the west, where widespread destruction and the 

general lack of law and order and social cohesion will pose significant challenges 

to recovery. As a complement to the work of the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau 

for Population, Refugees and Migration (State/PRM), USAID will continue to provide support to the refugees as well as host families in Liberia. 

14

As you know, USAID does not have a Mission in Cote d’Ivoire. Our development 

assistance is managed primarily by the USAID West Africa Regional Mission in 

Accra, Ghana. USAID does maintain one staff member in Abidjan to oversee the 

daily management of the HIV/AIDS program as part of the larger President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). That individual, like many of his Embassy 

colleagues, is on Ordered Departure. In the face of the current situation in Cote 

d’Ivoire, PEPFAR partners have led heroic efforts to keep life-saving programs running by prioritizing programs that provide essential services such as antiretroviral 

drug distribution, HIV/AIDS treatment services for existing patients, and prevention 

of mother-to-child transmission programs. 

USAID’s Office of Food for Peace is currently providing approximately $16.4 million of emergency food assistance through the U.N. World Food Programme (WFP) 

to meet the needs of vulnerable groups inside Cote d’Ivoire and in Liberia. In Cote 

d’Ivoire, USAID is supporting WFP’s ‘‘Emergency Assistance to Displaced Populations in Response to the Political Crisis in Cote d’Ivoire’’ program which is designed to address the food needs of displaced persons and people in host families 

in the western, center, northern, and Abidjan regions. 

In Liberia, USAID is supporting WFP’s ‘‘Emergency Assistance to Ivoirian Refugees and Host Populations in North-Central and South-Eastern Liberia.’’ This program is designed to address the food needs of approximately 186,000 Ivoirian refugees and Liberian host community members in affected areas of Liberia. To date, 

WFP has provided life-saving support to over 80,000 IDPs and host community 

members in Cote d’Ivoire and to over 100,000 Ivoirian refugees and host community 

members in Liberia. 

USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance has provided more than $5.4 

million in emergency humanitarian programs that provide better health care, increase food security, promote economic recovery, protect vulnerable populations, provide clean water, and improve hygiene and sanitation. 

For example, one program in Cote d’Ivoire provides clean water, access to sanitation and hygiene education at IDP camps, as well as providing household water 

treatment, hygiene kits and sanitation promotion for 50,000 host families. In Liberia, USAID is providing medical supplies and medical staff to clinics that have been 

overstretched by the large refugee populations. 

To help survivors of sexual- and gender-based violence, USAID provides psychosocial support and access to health care. We have also worked with communities to 

encourage them to identify risks to their community members, discuss the causes 

and consequences, and seek ways in which they can work to prevent harm, abuse, 

and exploitation. 

In addition to the $21.8 million in USAID support, State/PRM has provided $21.1 

million to assist conflict-affected populations. In Cote d’Ivoire, PRM is supporting 

the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to provide camp coordination and protection programs for IDPs. PRM is also supporting the International Committee of the Red Cross, working to protect and assist victims of conflict, and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) which has provided 

emergency transport for people at risk. In Liberia and other neighboring states, 

PRM is helping UNHCR and partner agencies respond to the basic assistance and 

protection needs of Ivoirian refugees, including the provision of livelihoods support, 

medical care, clean water and sanitation, and family reunification. 

The United States has responded generously to this crisis, but we know that our 

emergency assistance will not be durable unless the much larger underlying issues 

are addressed. The future course of the political transition is now in the hands of 

the Ivoirians. President Ouattara faces significant and multiple challenges, particularly in reaching across the political divide and giving all Ivoirians confidence in the 

new government. 

LOOKING BEYOND EMERGENCY HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

USAID is currently in discussions with the U.S. Embassy in Abidjan about how 

we can best respond to the needs for additional humanitarian assistance as well as 

support post-conflict transition programs. We have developed a menu of response 

options in line with the State Department’s strategic framework. USAID is prepared 

to support a range of programming options that are tailored to address the specific 

transition and post-conflict requirements in Cote d’Ivoire, building upon the foundations provided by our humanitarian assistance activities. 

USAID stands ready to deploy experts for an in-country assessment of transitional needs including overall democracy and governance opportunities and challenges, as well as political reconciliation, transitional justice, and security sector 

reform. 

15

USAID assistance could also provide skills-building and training to help enable 

all key stakeholders—from ordinary citizens, to the media and civil society, to the 

highest echelons of executive government—to support and demand peaceful political 

transitions as a matter of status quo for the upcoming legislative elections and reform measures. Working together, USAID’s humanitarian and development experts 

can design highly effective programs based on assessment findings. 

Reconciliation is a daunting task in the wake of the recent violence and heated 

political discourse. The Ouattara government has pledged to establish a Truth and 

Reconciliation Commission, along with investigations of war crimes committed by 

both sides since the November election. Unless societal divisions and grievances are 

addressed, political divisions are reconciled, and perpetrators of violence are held accountable to their communities, our efforts will be ineffective. Ivoirians will need to 

build or restore mechanisms for peace and justice at both the national and community levels. USAID brings capabilities to analyze the dynamics of latent conflict, 

grievance, and social resilience to tailor assistance appropriately to the present context and political climate. 

Cote d’Ivoire is the world’s largest producer and exporter of cocoa beans and a 

significant producer/exporter of palm oil, coffee, and cashew nuts. Political instability since the end of the civil war in 2003 has continued to damage the economy, 

resulting in the loss of foreign investment and slowing economic growth. As Cote 

d’Ivoire gains stability, the revitalization of the economy and markets systems will 

be necessary to improve the long-term prospects for all Ivoirians. 

Though the United States has the capabilities to help meet priority needs in Cote 

d’Ivoire, we cannot do it alone. We will continue to work alongside the international 

community to assure that gaps are filled and needs are met as quickly and efficiently as possible. And when possible, we will seek opportunities to engage the private sector, which can bring to bear new resources, ideas, and technologies that 

could be key components to the recovery in Cote d’Ivoire. 

CONCLUSION

The hard work of governing a divided nation is just beginning for President 

Ouattara, and the humanitarian crisis is far from over. The United States stands 

by the Ivoirian people, and we appreciate the need to ensure our assistance is as 

long-lasting and sustainable as possible. 

Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Ms. Lindborg. 

Secretary Fitzgerald, if I might sort of begin our first round of 

questions with a question to each of you. The administration’s 

called on President Ouattara to govern on behalf of all Ivoirians, 

including those who supported former President Gbagbo. What 

steps, in your view, can President Ouattara take to encourage reconciliation, greater unity among the Ivoirian people, to address this 

enormous tragedy? And what do you think will be the most successful support we can provide to the Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation Commission? 

Mr. FITZGERALD. Absolutely. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that 

question, because it’s an important one, and one that we focus on 

every day since the crisis dropped down to a level where we can 

focus on what we’re going to do in the future. 

Political reconciliation is absolutely essential. I think that all 

people who were involved in human rights abuses need to be 

brought to trial. There needs to be accountability. The people, after 

10 years, have suffered long and hard, and they’re tired of insecurity. They’re tired of fighting. 

I think that President Ouattara has already indicated that he 

will take steps to include members of former President Gbagbo’s 

party in his Cabinet. And I think that’s an important step; perhaps 

two or three ministers. I think that it’s essential, for instance, to 

reach out to the people. He delivered an Easter address. And again, 

Mr. Ouattara is from the north. And again, he’s trying to show 

16

that, in fact, the religious divide, which traditionally has not been 

deep in Cote d’Ivoire—in fact, it’s a very diverse society; you have 

a lot of intermarriages—and I think he—first, accountability; second, I think he needs to move to legislative elections as quickly as 

possible so people in their home districts feel like they have some 

sort of representation. 

And I think, to be perfectly honest with you, he needs to stand 

up, along with the United Nations, a security force that guarantees 

the security and the protection of all people, which is, of course, the 

mandate that UNOCI has been carrying out, along with the 

French. This is particularly true in the west. I hate to say it—

I hate to bring bad news, but just yesterday—well, last week, the 

last of the fighting, in Abidjan ended in the Upegon Cartier, which 

is pro-Gbagbo—typically pro-Gbagbo. They were routed, the folks, 

in the mopping-up exercise, and they fled. And there were also 

approximately 50 to 100 Liberian mercenaries who were fighting 

for former President Gbagbo. 

On their way west, as they headed toward Liberia, they attacked 

at least three villages and killed 170 people. 

Senator COONS. The committee will be in order. 

Mr. FITZGERALD. And this is——

Senator COONS. Please continue. 

Mr. FITZGERALD. This is—information that——

Senator COONS. Please maintain order. 

Mr. FITZGERALD [continuing]. Has been published by well-known 

NGOs, as well as well-known newspapers and wire services and 

magazines. A hundred and seventy people are dead. The Commission of Inquiry is going to investigate that, as well. Security is key 

to political reconciliation. 

Thank you. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I mean, obviously, the 

passions of the people of Cote d’Ivoire, in response to many acts of 

violence and many humanitarian abuses, are going to be a very 

real challenge for reconciliation. 

Ms. Lindborg, I understand that extraordinary efforts were taken 

by USAID partners to continue to deliver life-saving drugs and 

treatments during this crisis, through the PEPFAR Program. Could 

you describe some of that in more detail, and then contrast them 

with some of the difficulties you’ve had in the western part of the 

country in continuing to deliver polio vaccines? And I’d just be 

interested in what I understand are some extraordinary efforts by 

USAID during this crisis. 

Ms. LINDBORG. Thank you. I really want to highlight how dedicated so many of our partners are to ensuring that life-saving programs continue even when security conditions really limit access. 

Many of the partners were able to ensure that programs continued, 

through working with community members, ensuring that food and 

supplies went forward when there were moments of security that 

enable transport to go forward. 

There does remain insecurity that still inhibits our ability to 

fully reach certain parts of the country. And, as Mr. Fitzgerald 

said, one of the critical requirements, going forward, is that security is returned to the country so that people are able to return to 

their lives to have restored confidence in a future, and also to 

17

ensure that we’re able to get critical food supplies, medical supplies, and access to clean water to go forward. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Ms. Lindborg. 

Mr. FITZGERALD. If I could add on to that, Mr. Chairman, the 

PEPFAR Program has been extremely successful in Cote d’Ivoire. 

And I think—I know I speak for Ms. Lindborg when I say that 

we’re extraordinarily proud of it. It’s carried out by indigenous nongovernmental organizations, as well as international nongovernmental organizations. Even before, years ago, it was really the lifeline between the north and the south. You know, the country has 

been split in two. Yet, the PEPFAR, these NGO’s, have been able 

to serve both the north and the south. And an essential part of reconciliation is for President Ouattara to show that he’s not favoring 

one region over the other, but is really trying to unify Cote d’Ivoire. 

Thank you. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Ms. 

Lindborg. 

Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Mr. Chairman, out of concern for the length 

that we may go here, I might suggest that we have one round of 

questions for the first panel and one round for the second panel, 

so we can hear from the second panel, as well. I think we’ll be talking about more of a way forward. Do you object to that? 

Senator COONS. No. There’s no objection. 

Senator ISAKSON. Hearing no objection, I’ll let you rule. [Laughter.] 

Mr. Fitzgerald, my experiences in Africa, particularly where 

there are places of conflict, such as Darfur and the Sudan, the African Union can play a critical role in ensuring some equitable handling of investigations of atrocities, crimes, et cetera. Your statement says, ‘‘The African Union can play a critical role in building 

an international consensus on difficult issues.’’ I wish the word 

‘‘can’’ was the word ‘‘will.’’ Do you think they will play? 

Mr. FITZGERALD. Yes, I think they will. And in fact, in the latter 

part of my testimony, I discuss that both ECOWAS, the West African organization, as well as the African Union, in fact, must play 

an important role. 

Now, I would thank you, Senator Isakson, for raising the discussion about the African Union, because the African Union was not 

as quick to recognize Alassane Ouattara’s victory in the polls and, 

in fact, sent a factfinding team, led by President Aziz of Mauretania—but, most importantly, with President Zuma from South 

Africa. Now, South Africa had very serious doubts about the 

validity of this election, so President Zuma’s participation was 

important. 

There were three other members: Blaise Compaore, from 

Burkina Faso; President Debi, from Chad; and President Choete, 

from Tanzania. And they traveled numerous times to Abidjan, met 

with all the people—they met with Ouattara; they met with 

Gbagbo; they met with the Independent Electoral Commission; 

they met with the Constitutional Council. President Zuma had 

said, before he made these trips, that there should be a recount or 

they should hold the elections over. He came away from that convinced, by the description by special representative of the Secretary 

18

General Choi, that, in fact, the election had been held properly, 

transparently, and fairly, and Alassane Ouattara won the election. 

The institutions worked. The institutions worked. And I think 

that’s very important, because we had a doubter at the beginning, 

in President Zuma, who, at the end of the day, the African Union, 

in totality, accepted the victory of Alassane Ouattara. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COONS. Mr. Secretary, just suspend for a moment, if you 

would. 

If we can’t maintain order in the course of this hearing, we will 

stand in recess and I will ask the Capitol Police to clear the room. 

So, please conduct yourselves in accordance with the rules of our 

Senate, which requires that we be able to hear our witnesses and 

conduct ourselves in accordance with the rules and decorum that’s 

expected in this body. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Fitzgerald, one other question for you. Charles Konan 

Banny—what is his history? Will he be able to lead a legitimate 

group of reconciliation? 

Mr. FITZGERALD. I think he will, Senator. Charles Konan Banny 

was a Prime Minister, under President Gbagbo. He is a member of 

former President Bedie’s political party. We’re not thrilled that he’s 

a member of a political party, yet it’s a political party that participated, but lost, in the election in the first round. The important 

thing, I think, is the fact that there will be participation by a 

Muslim and a Christian cleric. 

And I want to point out something. One of the first things that 

Alassane Ouattara did to begin this process is, he called on 

Desmond Tutu, famous for his Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, to come up and meet with him and discuss 

how to go about setting up a good Truth and Reconciliation Commission that will enable the country to identify those who’ve committed atrocities, to convict and prosecute those who’ve committed 

atrocities, to allow people to vent. Ten years is a long time in a 

state of insecurity. And I think it was absolutely critical. 

I would also—if I can answer one of Senator Inhofe’s earlier 

questions, we do know where Laurent Gbagbo and Simone Gbagbo 

are. They’re in the northern parts of the country, in separate 

places. Mr. Gbagbo received a group of the elders, including 

Desmond Tutu, very recently—Desmond Tutu, Mary Robinson, the 

former President of Ireland, and former Secretary General Kofi 

Annan. So, I think it’s fair to say that his treatment is—he’s in 

good condition, and that his treatment is fair, and they are gathering evidence for either a local trial or it will be in the ICC. 

Thank you. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you. 

Ms. Lindborg. I did some quick math in my head, which is 

always a very dangerous thing for me to do. But, on your map, as 

of May 5, it looks like, to me, there are about 450,000 either individually displaced persons or refugees now, after this conflict. Is 

that right? 

Ms. LINDBORG. A little bit more. Just a little more than that, yes. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, my math was close, then. [Laughter.] 

19

One of the big problems on the continent of Africa are refugees, 

and in bordering countries. We have the problem with Kenya having the Somalis. We have the problem of Darfur, between Chad 

and the Sudan. And from what your testimony said, they’re planning on staying for a while—I thought I heard you say that—the 

refugees. Is that correct? 

Ms. LINDBORG. We’re hearing, as of right now, from the surveys 

that we’ve done of the refugee population—and, you know, these 

are fluid numbers, because people move frequently. But, that, 

among many of those who are in Liberia, they don’t currently have 

intentions of returning. And clearly, we’re concerned that that not 

create undue burdens on the populations on the Liberia side. 

Senator ISAKSON. Are the individually displaced persons in 

camps within Cote d’Ivoire? 

Ms. LINDBORG. In Cote d’Ivoire, they’re both in camps. But, the 

majority, really on both sides of the border, are with host communities. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, that was the comment I wanted—

I thought I heard your comment say that. Based on my experience, 

that is a good sign for the way forward, because when these camps 

develop, they end up becoming enclaves in perpetuity. But, if they 

are housed with other people, there’s a good chance, if the stability 

comes to Cote d’Ivoire, they can come back. Am I correct? 

Ms. LINDBORG. You are exactly right. And camps always have 

the possibility of creating new sets of problems. And for that reason, we’re being very careful to ensure that the host families 

receive assistance, as well, so they don’t have their very scarce 

resources unduly strained by providing that hospitality to the refugees and the displaced. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thanks, to both of you, for your testimony. 

Senator COONS. Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me ask, first of 

all, if the two witnesses—are you—will you stay through the next 

line of—the next panel? Would both of you agree to do that? 

Senator COONS. Senator, our practice is to do one round, one 

panel——

Senator INHOFE. I understand that. 

Senator COONS [continuing]. And then another round. 

Senator INHOFE. I understand that. But, if they will stay, I want 

to respond to one of his questions. Secretary Fitzgerald talked 

about how good a treatment President Gbagbo is getting—and 

that’s not true. And I want to show you it’s not true. But, if you 

leave before I get a chance to show the other panel, I’ll be quite 

upset. 

You’ll be happy to stay. That’s——

Mr. FITZGERALD. I’d be happy to stay for as long as you’d like, 

sir. 

Senator INHOFE. All right. Let me ask you each a question. How 

many times have you been in Abidjan, Mr. Fitzgerald? 

Mr. FITZGERALD. Three times, sir. 

Senator INHOFE. How many times have you been, Ms. Lindborg? 

Ms. LINDBORG. I have not. 

20

Senator INHOFE. OK. First of all—let me just ask you two questions, Secretary Fitzgerald—first of all, you heard what I said 

about the election——

Mr. FITZGERALD. Yes, sir. 

Senator INHOFE [continuing]. In terms of the fact that we showed 

that 94,000, in just one region, was taken out, was intentionally 

miscalculated. That’s an official record. They said that it’s a fraudulent document. Now, I sent you a letter and told you to check that 

out. Tell me why it’s fraudulent. 

Mr. FITZGERALD. Sir, I can’t say whether it’s fraudulent or not. 

We based our——

Senator INHOFE. OK, that’s fine. 

Mr. FITZGERALD. We based our decision on accepting the results 

of the election because of the certification process by Secretary——

Senator INHOFE. That——

Mr. FITZGERALD [continuing]. General Choi. 

Senator INHOFE [continuing]. Isn’t the question. That isn’t the 

question. They said it——

Mr. FITZGERALD. Sorry? 

Senator INHOFE [continuing]. Was fraudulent, and we tried to get 

the——

Mr. FITZGERALD. No, I——

Senator INHOFE [continuing]. State Department to say why it 

was fraudulent. 

Mr. FITZGERALD. Excuse me, Senator. 

Senator INHOFE. You’re representing the State Department, and 

I’m asking you, Do you have any evidence that it’s fraudulent? Just 

yes or no is fine, because I don’t want to——

Mr. FITZGERALD. Senator, I can’t say whether it’s fraudulent or 

not. 

Senator INHOFE. OK. Several—put up that one picture there that 

shows—you talked about reconciliation and that Ouattara was 

going to be inviting some of the Cabinet and some of those individuals from Gbagbo’s administration to join in. Here’s one right here, 

the top right picture. That happens to be the Secretary of—Interior, is it?—Minister of Interior. They shot him, first, in the face. 

They—this is the Ouattara forces. They left him to die a slow, painful death. Is this being inclusive of putting their people into the 

Ouattara——

Mr. FITZGERALD. Senator, thank you. No, absolutely not. I share 

with you the same repulsion and revulsion toward any egregious 

human rights violations like that. However, it was a combat situation, I’m sure. It was conflict. It was wide open. It was very difficult. 

Senator INHOFE. No, this was after it was over. 

Mr. FITZGERALD. Sorry? 

Senator INHOFE. This was after it was over, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. FITZGERALD. Excuse me? I thought you said, sir, that, in fact, 

the conflict is still going on. 

Senator INHOFE. No. I was saying that this occurred after the—

after this conflict was over, in the area where they were gathering 

up their supporters. I have personally——

Mr. FITZGERALD. Sir——

21

Senator INHOFE [continuing]. I have—don’t interrupt me—I have 

personally talked to friends of Gbagbo, people who are on the Cabinet, and others, whose names I wouldn’t use, because they would 

be summarily executed, and you know that as well as I do. 

I want to ask Ms. Lindborg a question. We had three areas 

where very large numbers of people were killed, either by the 

Ouattara forces, such as in a town—put that one up first—of 

Deukoue. I would like to ask you, Do you have any idea of how 

many people were murdered in Deukoue? And this, I hasten to say, 

is after it was documented that the Gbagbo forces were gone. About 

how many people? Do you have any idea? I mean, it’s been—it’s 

been several weeks now. Do we have a number of how many people 

have been killed? 

Ms. LINDBORG. My understanding is that they’re still determining what are the exact numbers. And, as Mr. Fitzgerald indicated, holding people accountable will be a critical part of the healing process. 

Senator INHOFE. Well, the——

Ms. LINDBORG. And so, we’re looking——

Senator INHOFE [continuing]. Healing process is—the first thing 

you want to do is see how many of these people—well, let’s just 

skip, now, from there to the U.N. and the French bombing in 

Abidjan. 

Which one—do you have one of those—we have several on that. 

Yes, this area, here, as I said—and I know that you say you 

haven’t been there, and Secretary Fitzgerald has been there three 

times. I’ve been there 15 times. And I’ve been over every square 

inch of this area down there. I’ve walked through and seen, and 

even commented, Why could you—why would they have all these 

people moving into this area? If it ever blew up, there’d be hundreds, maybe thousands, of people that would go with it. There 

they are, right there. Do you have an accounting of how many people were killed during that bombing? And this was one that was—

the French and the United Nations—we have the pictures of the 

helicopters. Do you have any—do you have a round figure, within 

50,000 people, who—how many have been killed in that particular 

incident? 

I’m asking you, yes. 

Ms. LINDBORG. I don’t have an exact accounting. And we—as I 

just mentioned, I understand that they’re still looking at——

Senator INHOFE. OK. 

Ms. LINDBORG [continuing]. Determining that. And, you know, 

the really critical piece of looking forward, for a country that’s been 

gripped in conflict for the last decade, is determining how, through 

the various mechanisms—the Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation 

Commission, the ICC, the Commission of Inquiry——

Senator INHOFE. That——

Ms. LINDBORG [continuing]. How these mechanisms——

Senator INHOFE. That’s fine. 

Ms. LINDBORG [continuing]. Can enable us. 

Senator INHOFE. I don’t want to be rude, Ms. Lindborg, and 

you’re a very nice person, but let’s just don’t get into a different 

subject. I’m talking about what happened. Get the third group. I’m 

going to ask the question—simple yes or no——

22

Put up the one of the—all the kids. 

These are the human shields that were surrounding the palace. 

The kids didn’t have any armaments, other than some wood sticks 

and baseball bats. There they are. All four pictures are there. The 

question I would ask you, Do you have an accounting—this should 

be a lot easier—accounting of how many of these kids were killed? 

Ms. LINDBORG. Senator, we completely share your concern and 

your sense of outrage at what may have happened. And the—for 

us, the focus was on providing humanitarian assistance as quickly 

and as effectively as we could——

Senator INHOFE. Let me ask both of——

Ms. LINDBORG [continuing]. And going forward——

Senator INHOFE. My time is about to expire. Let me just—I know 

the assistance. You spent your opening remarks talking about assistance. That’s not the subject right here, at least with me. Would 

the two of you—when you—we are concerned. I think everyone in 

here should be concerned about reconciliation. Would you be willing, when you stop—I mean, consider the alternatives. One would 

be to turn them over to the International Court, which means it’s 

over, they’re gone forever. Then you’re going to have—you know 

what’s going to happen: they’ll be martyrs, and all kinds of things 

can happen. You’ve weighed these things. I think everyone in this 

room has. 

One of the most logical things, I would think, would be to allow 

them to go into exile. Would the two of you agree that that would 

be a act of reconciliation that is worth pursuing? 

Mr. FITZGERALD. I think there was a time for that, sir. Now is 

not the time. They’ve been captured. They’re drawing up charges. 

The Commission of Inquiry is investigating. The ICC apparently is 

poised to send a team down. If they are found guilty of crimes, they 

need to serve the time. That is the accountability that we were 

looking for, sir. 

Senator INHOFE. Well, that’s what I thought you would say. And, 

by the way, I have to add that this offer was made long before—

when you say ‘‘this wasn’t the time’’—this offer was made when the 

time is there. And I know I’m out of time on this panel, but I would 

only say that I believe in my heart, and after going there, that this 

would be the best solution. There have been offers from all around. 

And, Mr. Fitzgerald, when you talked about the African Union, you 

heard the quote that I had, that I gave, on President Obiang. You 

talked about the South African President Mbeki and his comment. 

I think the one thing that most of the Presidents that I have talked 

to—all of them I’ve personally talked to, and that’s quite a few of 

them, because I know most of them have all concluded one thing, 

and that is the way this was done—the outsiders coming in, the 

French coming in, the United Nations coming in and making this 

happen—was something that is very, very offensive, something 

that reverts back to the old colonial days, and they find it very 

offensive. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COONS. Senator. 

Ms. Lindborg, Secretary Fitzgerald, thank you so much for coming today, for your testimony, both prepared and delivered in 

response to questions. As is evident, this is a panel of Senators 

23

concerned about, and deeply interested in, the path forward for 

Cote d’Ivoire, which faces enormous challenges, in terms of reconciliation and being able to make progress. And I’m grateful for 

your determined work on behalf of the people of the United States, 

to represent us well in that challenge, going forward. So, thank you 

for appearing before us today. 

I’m going to invite our second panel to come forward, if I might. 

Our next panel includes the three members: Dr. Michael McGovern, of Yale; Ms. Jennifer Cooke, of the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies; and Dr. Gilpin, of the United States Institute of Peace. 

[Pause.] 

Senator COONS. Thank you for appearing before us today. 

Dr. McGovern, I invite you to begin. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL MCGOVERN, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR 

OF ANTHROPOLOGY AND DIRECTOR OF GRADUATE STUDIES 

OF AFRICAN STUDIES, YALE UNIVERSITY, NEW HAVEN, CT 

Dr. MCGOVERN. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and your 

colleagues for the invitation to join you today in a hearing on 

reconstruction and reconciliation in Cote d’Ivoire. 

The situation in Cote d’Ivoire has been worrying for over a decade. We’ve heard the phrase ‘‘a decade’’ over and over. But, I would 

actually date it back two or even three decades. Xenophobic policies 

have been promoted. A virulent and inflammatory press has added 

to the problems. And security forces have become more of a praetorian guard than a law-abiding neutral force that should protect the 

country and its citizens. 

Having identified these worrying factors, I’d also like to make a 

comparison. All these dynamics that I’ve just described, from arguments about citizenship rights to land disputes to the deleterious 

effects of polarized and irresponsible press, are considered to be 

among the causes of the Rwandan genocide. However, in Rwanda, 

in 3 months, nearly a million people were killed, while, in Cote 

d’Ivoire, over the 12 years of the conflict, the number of people 

killed directly in this conflict is probably a little bit on one side or 

the other of 10,000 people, several orders of magnitude smaller 

than what happened in Rwanda. To me, this suggests that Ivoirian 

society has significant resiliency and capacity to manage its conflicts internally. These capacities are not easily visible—for 

instance, through the images that we’ve already seen; they can’t be 

seen, easily, at first glance; and they have been placed under tremendous stress over the last months. But, I believe that the role 

of the United States Government, and its agencies, should be to 

find these areas of resiliency and strength, and to support them 

further. 

I’ll limit the rest of my comments to outlining three points that 

are developed in my written remarks. 

First, in the area of social and political reconciliation, as we’ve 

heard, President Ouattara has already established a Commission 

on Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation. From an anthropological 

perspective—that’s my own discipline—I would say that the deeper 

psychological and sociological processes of reconciliation will probably not be accomplished by this Commission. And it may be 

24

unhelpful to expect that they could be. That work is going to have 

to take place at very local levels in ways that may well be different 

from village to village and from block to block within cities like 

Abidjan. 

I’m somewhat skeptical of the idea that reconciliation can be engineered from above, whether at the national level or internationally. But, what makes politics and ordinary life in Cote d’Ivoire 

tick, I would say, is money. And the greatest possible boon to 

Ivoirian reconciliation, I would like to suggest, would be the creation of jobs. And, in that spirit, I’d like to urge this committee to 

insist that American economic assistance to Cote d’Ivoire be very 

much oriented toward job creation, first and foremost—not economic growth, because oftentimes policies that do lead to measurable economic growth in Africa don’t create that many jobs.

What Cote d’Ivoire really needs is jobs. I can come back to that in 

questions. 

My second point is that one of the challenges for creating jobs, 

and thus, social reconciliation, will be reinstating security. We’ve 

already heard this. And there are challenges and opportunities in 

the area of security sector reform. I’ll just suggest that there 

should be systematic vetting of all of those people who are being 

incorporated into the new security forces and might have been accused of abuses or war crimes from every side—the former Forces 

Nouvelles, the former Forces de Securite ́e, and so forth. 

Noncriminal elements, once they’ve been integrated from all 

sides of the conflict, should be incorporated, with clear plans to 

gradually draw down the size of what will certainly be a bloated 

military over a period of 10 to 15 years, on the basis of meritocratic 

evaluation. In this way, the military can serve a useful function as 

a kind of social sponge that would soak up some percentage of the 

most volatile young men who’ve experienced making a living with 

guns; but, at the same time, by establishing clear criteria for evaluation, review, promotion, and, ultimately, retention, security sector reform could help to begin the process of reprofessionalizing a 

military that has become overly politicized, abusive, and characterized by extremely weak command-and-control discipline. 

Third and finally, there are several key measures that should be 

taken to promote the functioning of the Ouattara government and 

the long-term peace and stability in Cote d’Ivoire. I’ll just mention 

two. 

One is that the legislative elections deserve U.S. Government 

support to ensure that they take place in a timely and credible 

manner. We’ve already heard that those who’ve lost out in the 

Presidential elections may find themselves winners, locally, when 

they elect their legislators. I don’t need to convince you of the 

importance of balance of powers. 

The other is judicial reform, and I would really urge that, in Cote 

d’Ivoire, this ought to be oriented toward improved systems of economic governance and financial accountability. The cocoa and coffee sector has been the historical slush fund of the government. 

But, over the last decade, actually, it’s the petroleum sector that 

has become the opaque focus of a lot of illicit and illegal economic 

activity. 

Thank you very much. 

25

[The prepared statement of Dr. McGovern follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL MCGOVERN

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and your colleagues for the invitation to join 

you in today’s hearing on ‘‘The Reconstruction and Reconciliation Process in Cote 

d’Ivoire.’’ My name is Mike McGovern, and I am an anthropology professor at Yale 

University. I was previously the West Africa Director of the International Crisis 

Group, where I conducted research in Cote d’Ivoire and neighboring countries. My 

book, ‘‘Making War in Cote d’Ivoire,’’ deals with the conflict we are discussing. 

The situation in Cote d’Ivoire has been worrying for over a decade. Xenophobic 

policies promoted by three successive governments began by attempting to exclude 

rival candidates, and ended by fueling interethnic massacres. A virulent and inflammatory press has used innuendo, lies, and ethnonationalist rhetoric to incite violence. President Gbagbo worked hard to take what had been an ethnically representative army, and to stock it with members of the relatively small number of 

ethnic groups that supported him. The security forces consequently became more of 

a praetorian guard than a law-abiding neutral force to protect the country and its 

citizens. On top of this, both the Gbagbo government and the former rebels in the 

north (who are now aligned with President Ouattara) have relied heavily on militias 

and on mercenary fighters, most infamously from Liberia. All sides have abused 

civilians, and have regularly done so with impunity. 

All of these factors fed into a pattern of dramatic spikes in violence, followed by 

equally quick de-escalations. The fighting in March and April of this year was the 

most significant such outbreak since the 2002 coup attempt turned civil war. These 

dynamics pose serious challenges to the reconstruction of Cote d’Ivoire’s social, economic, and political institutions, but I would also like to make a comparison. All 

of the dynamics I have described above—from arguments about citizenship rights, 

to land disputes, to the deleterious effects of a polarized and irresponsible press—

are considered to be among the causes of the Rwandan genocide. Indeed, people on 

both sides of the Ivorian conflict have regularly signaled the possibility that Cote 

d’Ivoire could melt down into Rwandan-style genocidal violence. And yet, while 

every death in Cote d’Ivoire is undoubtedly a tragedy, those killed in this conflict 

over the past 12 years can be counted around 8,000 to 10,000, not in the hundreds 

of thousands. 

Part of the credit for this goes to international actors including the U.N., West 

African body ECOWAS and even the United States, which have taken active steps 

to tamp down incipient violence. However, I think we must also credit Ivorian society with having significant capacity to manage conflict internally. These capacities 

are not easily visible at first glance, and they have been placed under tremendous 

stress in the last months. I believe the role of the U.S. Government and its agencies 

should be to find these areas of resiliency and strength, and to support them 

further. 

In the area of social and political reconciliation, President Ouattara has already 

established a Commission on Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation. The Head of this 

commission, Charles Konan Banny, is respected and is a relatively neutral figure. 

He is trained as an economist, is a former West African Central Bank head and was 

the Prime Minister proposed as an honest broker by international actors during the 

middle years of the Ivorian conflict (2005–07). The commission probably has the 

greatest chance of success if the parameters of its operations are kept modest. It 

could gather the many different versions of the events of the last decade, and recounting these events may or may not bring some solace to certain witnesses. However, researchers who have looked closely at Truth and Reconciliation Commissions 

around the world have become increasingly skeptical of the therapeutic value of 

such recounting of past violence and injustices for those who do the telling. In some 

cultural contexts (and West Africa may be one), there is a relative discomfort with 

verbally rehashing the painful events of the past, and little sense that such recounting is cathartic. What people may prefer is rather a situation in which the conditions of possibility are set in place for people to act properly, operating according 

to an implicit dictum that ‘‘actions speak louder than words.’’ One invaluable service 

such a commission can render is to give an exhaustive accounting of who did what 

to whom and when. This will serve as an important historical starting point for 

Ivorians as they decide to address these events over the coming decades. Neutrality 

and the appearance of neutrality are key here, and the U.S. Government could play 

a role as a relatively uninvolved actor that has been invited by all sides in the conflict to become more involved in helping to resolve the conflict. 

The deeper psychological and sociological processes of reconciliation will probably 

not be accomplished by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and it may be 

26

unhelpful to expect that it could. That work will have to take place at very local 

levels in ways that may well be different from village to village, or from block to 

block within the cities. I am not sure that such processes can be orchestrated at 

the national level, let alone from outside the country. However, I believe there is 

one area of crucial importance in this process that should be accomplished in the 

context of a countrywide conversation about the events of the past decade. Many 

Ivorians have taken a certain moral distance from the events in their country, even 

while they may have played a role, however small, in the process of polarization, 

vituperation, and violence that has led to the country’s slide into conflict. 

An excellent example of this is the way that many of the really gruesome massacres in the Ivorian conflict have systematically been blamed on Liberians, even 

while both sides in the conflict blame the other for having engaged the services of 

these ‘‘barbaric’’ mercenary fighters. What joins Ivorians who are otherwise opposed 

is their shared notion that no Ivorian could be capable of burning whole families 

alive in their houses, or of killing people with machetes. However, in many cases 

it has indeed been Ivorians who have undertaken this violence, Ivorian military who 

have benefited by shaking down civilians at roadblocks, Ivorian militias who have 

systematically raped their female compatriots, Ivorian villagers who have used the 

fog of war as an opportunity to murder those with whom they have contested ownership of land. There is a kind of playfulness surrounding the ‘‘game’’ of plausible 

deniability where everyone from leading politicians through the national press and 

down to ordinary people utilizes barely veiled code for xenophobic speech or uses 

the threat of violence to get what they want, and then claims they did not really 

mean what they said or did. This is a form of playing with fire that has gone too 

far in Cote d’Ivoire. Too many people have been burned by it, and Ivorians need 

to take stock of the fact that they bear primary responsibility for allowing this poisonous political culture to flourish in their country. 

Aside from this stocktaking, however, I am somewhat skeptical of the idea that 

reconciliation can be engineered from above. What makes politics and ordinary life 

in Cote d’Ivoire tick is money, and the greatest possible boon to Ivorian reconciliation would be the creation of new jobs. This will require reinstating security and 

stability, tamping down the criminality that has as often as not been perpetrated 

by actors claiming to work on behalf of the state, and it will require economic 

growth. However, I must emphasize that what Cote d’Ivoire needs is jobs, not 

growth per se. Many of the forms of ‘‘growth’’ measured by economists do not necessarily translate into jobs that pay a living wage for Ivorians, even if they result 

in economic activity. I hope that the activities of the U.S. Agency for International 

Development, and those of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, African 

Development Bank and other institutions that receive American government funds 

will take this distinction to heart. What was once called the Ivorian ‘‘miracle’’ has 

been tarnished by 30 years of economic decline, and if there is a single root cause 

to the xenophobia and intercommunal violence in the country, it is that this decline 

has led to the perception that one’s neighbor’s gain is one’s own loss. 

The winner-takes-all political culture that emerged over the last 20 years was 

driven by the reality that the economic pie was shrinking and that the only way 

to promise jobs to one’s base was to gut the civil service and the military upon taking power, and to fill those positions not with those who were best qualified, but 

with those who were perceived to be most loyal. A good example of this was the 

FESCI student union that turned into a criminal and quasi-military organization, 

and that gave us both Charles Ble Goude, the most inflammatory of Laurent 

Gbagbo’s youth supporters, and Guillaume Soro, who was head of the Forces 

Nouvelles rebels until he became Prime Minister first in Laurent Gbagbo’s and then 

in Alassane Ouattara’s governments. In order to quiet them after the December 

1999 coup d’etat, it was first putschiste Robert GueI who turned over the stock of 

university dormitory housing to the FESCI so that they could skim money off the 

top of every student’s rent, and dole out the best rooms to their members and favorites. The FESCI thus was not presenting student concerns about grading practices 

or complaints about food in the cafeteria but was transformed into a mafiaesque 

protection racket that provided the country with some of its most ruthless and violent young politicians. Returning to the issue of jobs, the reason this was possible 

was because everyone involved understood that this type of distribution of political 

and economic favor stood in for the possibility that hard-working students might 

make a decent living upon graduation. The many young people who refused the violent and cynical trajectory of the FESCI students sat for years, even decades, unemployed, and in some cases returned embittered to their villages only to contribute 

to tensions over land ownership, as they reclaimed land their parents or grandparents had sold to ‘‘strangers’’ who have now often lived in those villages for decades or even generations. 

27

I mentioned that one of the challenges for creating jobs and thus social reconciliation was reinstating security. There are both challenges and opportunities for the 

disarmament, professionalization and integration of the security forces in Cote 

d’Ivoire. The greatest challenges are first that the Ivorian security forces have come 

primarily to terrorize, rather than to protect the civilian population, and second that 

inclusion into the army, gendarmerie, and the multiple militias in the country has 

become the primary means of employing potentially volatile unemployed young men. 

Members of all the armed services and all the militias, from the north and the 

south, have been credibly accused of abuses including rape, extrajudicial killings 

and torture. There is a U.N. commission of inquiry in Cote d’Ivoire now, and it is 

the fourth such commission to have to undertake investigations of human rights 

abuses in Cote d’Ivoire since 2002. 

Security Sector reform in Cote d’Ivoire will be difficult given obvious pressures to 

integrate the members of all of the northern forces that ultimately contributed to 

putting Alassane Ouattara in power. Whether he asked them to or not, they defeated the ostensibly pro-Gbagbo army, and then fought their way through Abidjan 

against proGbagbo military units, militias, and mercenary forces. They expect to be 

compensated for the risks they took. Managing these expectations will be a delicate 

balancing act. On one hand, incorporating the Forces Nouvelles Zone Commanders 

and other fighters into the military will help to take pressure off of Ouattara’s civilian government. On the other hand, isolating the former Forces Nouvelles in the 

army could lead to an eventual coup. Either way, Ouattara will be far more beholden than he would like to Guillaume Soro and the other members of the ex-rebel 

forces that have now become the pro-Ouattara forces. The fact that these forces 

have been credibly accused of committing war crimes and atrocities both in Abidjan 

and in the interior introduces yet another complication. Ouattara needs to be seen 

to deal justly with these abusers at the same time that he deals with those from 

the Gbagbo side. Still, if he is too aggressive in pursuing Gbagbo and those close 

to him, he could plausibly find himself losing vital support in the country’s south. 

This could take place not only among those who voted for Gbagbo, but also among 

those ambivalent supporters (many of them from Henri Konan Bedies PDCI party 

who might have voted as much against Gbagbo as for Ouattara) who are most interested in restoring a functioning state rather than pursuing what some will see as 

a settling of political scores. 

The U.S. Government has growing experience in security sector reform in Africa. 

There are a variety of approaches to this challenge. At one end of the spectrum is 

the process undertaken in Liberia, where the army was drawn down to zero, and 

a new military was recruited, vetted for human rights abuses, and trained from 

scratch by contractors hired by the U.S. Government. At the other end is the strategy (or nonstrategy, perhaps) used in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where 

members of all the combatant groups were integrated into the national army, most 

of them being allowed to retain the inflated ranks they had been given (or had given 

themselves) in the bush while fighting. 

The strategy in Cote d’Ivoire will probably have to borrow elements of both these 

approaches, and may resemble the SSR process undertaken in Guinea, in which the 

United States is already involved. There should be vetting of accused human rights 

abusers and war criminals from all sides, but it is unrealistic to think that the army 

will be drawn down to zero. Instead, noncriminal elements from all sides of the conflict should be incorporated, with clear plans to gradually draw down the size of the 

military over 10 to 15 years on the basis of meritocratic evaluation. In this way, 

the military can serve a useful function as a temporary social ‘‘sponge,’’ soaking up 

some portion of the most volatile young men who have experience making a living 

with guns. At the same time, by establishing clear criteria for evaluation, review 

and promotion (and ultimately for retention in the security forces), SSR could help 

to begin the process of reprofessionalizing a military that has become overly politicized, abusive, and characterized by extremely weak command and control discipline. 

Finally, there are several key measures that should be taken to promote the functioning of the Ouattara government and long-term peace and stability in Cote 

d’Ivoire. My first recommendation is that the U.S. Government lend significant financial and technical support to ensuring that legislative elections take place in a 

timely and credible manner. This will begin the important process of supporting a 

balance of powers, and will give supporters of Gbagbo’s FPI party, Henri Konan 

Bedie’s PDCI party and the other political parties in the country a sense that they 

will have their voices heard in the governance of their country. These elections (like 

last year’s Presidential elections) are more than 5 years overdue, and the 2,000 legislative elections were badly flawed and characterized by high levels of violence. The 

U.S. Government should also support upcoming municipal elections. The 2002 muVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:39 Apr 27, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011IS~1\051911-U.TXT BETTY
28

nicipals are probably the most credible elections the country has known, and new 

municipal elections will help to reinstate the presence of a single government 

throughout the territory of Cote d’Ivoire. 

Far too often, foreign actors including the United States lend too much attention 

to Presidential elections and then walk away precisely at the moment that democratic practice is just getting a toehold in a country with limited democratic experience. Especially in the case of highly contested elections like the recent 

Presidentials in Cote d’Ivoire, it is vitally important for voters supporting all candidates to have the sense not that they are out in the cold for 5 or more years, but 

that they still have a role to play as voters and as citizens, and that their votes 

can lead toward the creation of a vibrant, balanced, and fair system. Most importantly, in such a system, their means of redress are not limited to taking up arms. 

Many African intellectuals are becoming increasingly cynical about the democratic 

mantra they sometimes portray as a Eurocentric import that is ill-suited to African 

realities. I disagree, but the single-minded obsession with Presidential elections in 

fact gives an antidemocratic message, and contributes in very direct ways to creating autocrats, not democrats. The U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives 

like legislatures in Europe, Japan, and the emerging BRIC countries all have a role 

to play by budgeting for electoral support for legislative elections. What might seem 

an exorbitant amount now will only be dwarfed by the cost of U.S. support to peacekeeping missions when those on the outside decide that insurgency warfare is their 

only chance of getting into power. 

In the same vein, judicial reform is essential. Cote d’Ivoire has many well-qualified lawyers and judges, but the judicial system has become tremendously polarized 

and politicized. One area where the Ivorian justice system should play a central role 

is in the creation of improved systems of economic governance and financial accountability. For decades, the cocoa and coffee marketing board served as a political and 

personal slush fund for the party in power, its elites, and even French politicians, 

who would receive money from this fund when they had election campaigns in 

France. To say that these practices created very deleterious patterns that further 

contributed to the perception of politics as an all-or-nothing competition is an understatement. Over the past decade, the petroleum sector has become more lucrative 

than cocoa and coffee, and is in much greater need of reform. Initiatives like the 

World Bank-sponsored Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative offer a valuable model, but such an undertaking should be driven by Ivorian actors. The Ivorian 

judiciary and the legislature, should play central roles in drafting, enacting, enforcing and adjudicating Ivorian laws that will hold Ivorians to account for managing 

the country’s wealth responsibly and honestly. Given the importance of Ivorian initiative and ownership of this process, this is an area where American support would 

be best undertaken in a spirit of advice and accompaniment, whereas in the area 

of security sector reform, the new government may welcome a more robust initiative 

by a U.S. Government that could be seen as a neutral third party. 

This third party role is not inconsequential. Especially given the French military 

role in ousting Laurent Gbagbo, President Ouattara will (or should) be keen to seek 

out less politically costly sources of support and advice. The United States has 

played this role in a number of other francophone African countries that have tense 

relations with France, such as Guinea and Rwanda. Provided that U.S. engagement 

remains truly neutral, such an engagement would be beneficial both to Cote d’Ivoire 

and to the United States, which has already invested heavily in helping Liberia, 

Guinea, and Cote d’Ivoire achieve peace and development.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Doctor. 

Ms. Cooke. 

STATEMENT OF JENNIFER COOKE, DIRECTOR OF AFRICA 

STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL 

STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. COOKE. Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, Senator 

Inhofe, I’d like to thank you for the opportunity to testify today on 

the challenges of reconstruction and reconciliation in Cote d’Ivoire. 

It’s important to keep in mind that the Ivoirian crisis did not 

begin with the recent election standoff, nor with Alassane Ouattara 

and Laurent Gbagbo. The country’s social, class, and political 

fissures have longstanding roots dating to the years when the country was considered an African success case. Malgovernance, cynical 

29

manipulation of social divisions, and ultimately, civil war, have 

deepened these fissures. The recent standoff and the atrocities committed make their resolution all the more fraught and complex. 

In my testimony, I’d like to emphasize three areas for U.S. 

engagement. 

First, security. In the short-term, the United States should give 

full support to the U.N. mission in Cote d’Ivoire in quickly launching a process of disarmament and reintegration, assistance to refugees and displaced persons, and the restoration of regular forces 

and administrative structures throughout the country. In the 

longer term, it should play a role in vetting and helping reestablish 

professional, accountable security forces in Cote d’Ivoire. Security 

sector reform should not fall by default to the French, who are 

viewed with deep resentment by many Ivoirians, nor to the U.N., 

which may lack the capacities. 

The U.N. must approach Ivoirian security in the context of the 

broader West African region. Renewed conflict in Cote d’Ivoire 

could reenergize regional warlords. We saw fighters from Liberia 

moving in during the standoff. Likewise, securing Cote d’Ivoire 

could push fighters out over the border, into neighboring states. 

We’ve already had reports of supporters of Gbagbo moving into 

Ghana, with some suspicions that they may attempt a counteroffensive there. The United States should leverage its strong diplomatic and security relationships with Cote d’Ivoire’s neighbors—

Ghana, Liberia, Burkina Faso, and Mali—to ensure a holistic 

regional security approach. 

Second, reconciliation efforts. In the short term, reconciliation on 

the national level will depend, to a large extent, on the choices 

Ivoirian leadership makes, very soon, in building a broad-based 

government and ensuring evenhandedness in investigating and 

prosecuting atrocities. Going forward, the United States should 

give special attention to efforts targeting local communities traumatized by violence, and to youth. I’d like to echo Mike McGovern—it should also give robust support to preparations for eventual 

national legislative elections and the restoration of credible, impartial judicial institutions. 

Third, economic recovery and job creation. I’ll keep this brief. 

But, again, transparency in the big contract areas—oil, electricity, 

customs—is a must, as is job creation. The United States might 

consider supporting a major public works project for the areas that 

were hardest hit in the conflict. 

Beyond the specific areas of U.S. engagement, I think how the 

United States engages will be almost equally important. The country is deeply divided. President Ouattara will be beset by multiple 

conflicting pressures that he needs to balance carefully to preserve 

stability and a fragile accord with former adversaries. He’s being 

portrayed by his hard-line opponents as a puppet of the West, and 

needs to shake off this perception if he’s to establish his authority. 

So, while the United States should avoid an uncritical embrace of 

the new leadership, it must be sensitive, in the short term, to the 

extremely difficult tradeoffs that must be made. 

Diplomatically, I’d like to say, the U.S. response to the standoff 

was exemplary—swift, intense, and sustained high-level diplomacy, 

with the personal support and engagement of President Obama. It 

30

was undertaken in close concert with the regional and international partners. It offered a balanced approach of gradually escalating pressures and incentives for peaceful resolution and a graceful exit for Mr. Gbagbo. That the crisis was ultimately ended 

through the use of force should not detract from the merits of that 

approach. Ultimately, it isolated Mr. Gbagbo, weakened his systems of support, and prevented what could have been a much 

longer and bloodier conflagration. 

The United States should build on this powerful model of regional diplomatic engagement, should commend the ECOWAS for 

their principled stance and encourage their continued commitment 

to the continental norms of what they have set out for themselves 

in democracy and good governance. 

The United States should encourage other regional bodies to step 

up in defense of rule of law in similar situations. In this regard, 

SADC and the protracted political debacle in Zimbabwe, which may 

come to a head fairly soon, come most immediately to mind. 

I’m going to end my remarks there, but I’m very happy to take 

questions during the Q&A. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Cooke follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JENNIFER COOKE

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, and distinguished members of the 

subcommittee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the 

challenges of reconstruction and reconciliation in Cote d’Ivoire, challenges that will 

have important repercussions throughout West Africa and the broader continent, 

but most important in meeting the needs and aspirations of Ivoirian citizens for 

peace and for a voice in their political affairs. 

Having lived in Cote d’Ivoire in the days when it was considered an ‘‘oasis of stability’’ in West Africa, I have followed developments there over many years with considerable personal interest—and sadness. Now as director of the Africa Program at 

the Center for Strategic and International Studies, I follow the country as an important test case for the consolidation of democratic norms in Africa, for concerted 

international engagement in preventive diplomacy and crisis response, and, going 

forward, for the long, hard slog of reconstruction and reconciliation. 

In my testimony I would like to emphasize three key areas for U.S. engagement 

over the longer term in Cote d’Ivoire: 

Security: In the short-term, the United States should give full support to the U.N. 

mission in Cote d’Ivoire in the process of disarmament and reintegration, the repatriation of refugees and displaced, and the restoration of regular forces and authorities throughout the country. In the longer term it should play a key role in assisting 

with the reestablishment of professional, accountable security forces in Cote d’Ivoire. 

It should also work capitalizing on his strong diplomatic and security relationships 

with neighboring West African countries—Ghana, Liberia, Burkina Faso, and 

Mali—to ensure a holistic, regional security approach. 

Reconciliation efforts: In the short-term, reconciliation on the national level will 

depend to a large extent on choices the Ivoirian leadership makes in building a 

broad-based government and in ensuring even-handedness in investigating and 

prosecuting atrocities committed against civilian populations. Going forward, the 

United States should give special attention to efforts targeting local communities 

traumatized by violence. It should also give robust support to preparations for eventual national legislative elections, the restoration of credible, impartial judicial institutions. 

Economic recovery and job creation: Job creation must be a priority for the 

Ivoirian Government, with an emphasis on labor-intensive sectors such as agriculture and construction. To jump-start a mass employment program, the United 

States might consider supporting a major public works program in those areas hardest hit by conflict, and longer term engagement in bolstering the agricultural sector 

in the North. 

31

As important as the areas of engagement with the new Ivoirian Government will 

be how the United States engages. The country is deeply divided, and mutual suspicions abound. President Ouattara will face multiple conflicting pressures that he 

will need to balance carefully to preserve stability and a fragile accord. He has been 

portrayed by his hard-line opponents as a puppet of the West and will need to shake 

off this perception to establish his authority. While the United States should avoid 

an uncritical embrace of the new leadership, it must also be sensitive to the precarious trade-offs that must be made in the short term. 

Finally, the United States should build on the powerful model of regional diplomatic engagement in the Ivoirian post-election crisis. It should commend African regional organizations and leaders for their principled stance and encourage their continued commitment to the continental norms of democracy and governance that they 

have set for themselves. 

UNDERSTANDING THE FRAGILITY OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT

The 5-month standoff in Cote d’Ivoire between President Alassane Ouattara and 

previous incumbent Laurent Gbagbo ended on April 11 as opposition forces, with 

support from U.N. peacekeepers and French troops, forcibly extracted the former 

President, in flak jacket and helmet, from the basement of his residence in Abidjan. 

Gbagbo’s refusal to relinquish power to President Ouattara, broadly recognized by 

the international community as the legitimate winner of the country’s November 28 

Presidential runoff election, precipitated a post-election stalemate that has left at 

least 3,000 Ivoirians dead and displaced over 1 million from their homes and livelihoods. 

The Ivoirian crisis did not begin with the recent election standoff nor with the 

persons of Alassane Ouattara and Laurent Gbagbo. Cote d’Ivoire’s social, class, and 

political fissures have longstanding roots, dating to the years when the country was 

considered an African ‘‘success case’’ and an economic ‘‘miracle’’ (see endnote). Fissures have deepened over time through years of economic decline, malgovernance, 

cynical manipulation of social divisions by political elites, and ultimately civil war. 

The standoff and post-election violence have served to deepen animosity, fear, and 

uncertainty in a society already deeply polarized and will make resolution of these 

issues all the more fraught and complex. 

The new government under President Ouattara will face a monumental task in 

addressing the interrelated challenges of restoring security, responding to demands 

for accountability and justice, galvanizing economic growth and employment, and 

setting the tone for a longer term process of local reconciliation and national unity. 

In undertaking these tasks, Ouattara will be beset by multiple competing pressures. The President will be pressed hard to respond to demands by supporters and 

allies—many of whom will have expectations of recompense for their role in helping 

bring him to office—and at the same time to be magnanimous in victory and take 

concrete steps to allay the suspicions and uncertainties of his opponents. He will be 

pressed by human rights advocates and the international community to mete out 

swift and impartial justice to those most responsible for the atrocities by armed actors committed over the last months and at the same time to maintain a fragile accord and avoid alienating powerful individuals and constituencies from among both 

his supporters and his political opponents. He will need the sustained assistance of 

the international community to rebuild and reintegrate the country, but will need 

to assert his own agency and that of his government and avoid the appearance of 

doing the bidding of external powers, an accusation used to powerful effect by his 

predecessor to discredit Ouattara in the eyes of pro-Gbagbo loyalists. 

In assisting Cote d’Ivoire to rebuild, the United States and broader international 

community should avoid an uncritical embrace of President Ouattara, a tendency 

that has bedeviled U.S. engagement with a number of post-conflict African leaders. 

Ouattara’s leadership skills, political will, and commitment to genuine conciliation 

are as yet untested in practice, and the United States will want to gauge progress 

objectively and calibrate engagement and support accordingly. Nonetheless, in the 

short term at least, international partners need to be acutely aware of the precarious balancing act that Ouattara must perform and the narrow parameters in which 

he can operate. International partners must give him the space he needs to assert 

his leadership and authority, particularly as he seeks to build and maintain a ruling 

coalition and reestablish order and the authority of regular forces and administrative structures. 

32

PRIORITY CHALLENGES AND AREAS FOR U.S. ENGAGEMENT

Security and security sector reform 

A first priority for the new Ivoirian Government must be to restore basic security 

to the country and rein in the various militias from all sides. Having marched 

southward in their campaign to topple Gbagbo, various factions of the Forces 

Republicaines de Cote d’Ivoire (FRCI, formerly the Forces Nouvelles) now occupy police offices, military headquarters, and neighborhoods in Abidjan, at times competing with one another to divide and control zones within the city. Populations in 

rural areas, particularly in the country’s West, deeply traumatized by the brutal violence of the past month, remain vulnerable and fearful of renewed violence and the 

return of militias or mercenary forces from across the border in Liberia. Guillaume 

Soro, currently Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, has for now the allegiance 

of the majority of FRCI commanders, but his authority and commitment to peace 

(and to Ouattara) will be tested in persuading these forces to quit the spoils of 

Abidjan and other towns and return northward. Soro is a key personality to engage. 

He is young and politically ambitious, with the leverage of the FRCI behind him. 

He is very likely expecting to remain in a senior position in Ouattara’s future Cabinet, and he may balk at serious investigations of atrocities committed by forces 

under his ostensible command. The role of Soro’s forces in neutralizing Ibrahim 

Coulibaly, his personal rival, in the aftermath of Gbagbo’s arrest, reveals a ruthless 

streak that does not bode well for reconciliatory tendencies. But there is also an opportunity for him to demonstrate magnanimity, restraint, and his potential as national statesman. The United States should encourage him in this regard. 

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of armed actors, as well 

as the integration of personnel into a professional national security force, will be 

somewhat less fraught than in the frozen uncertainty of the last 5 years, but it will 

nonetheless be a highly sensitive and difficult endeavor. In keeping with the 2007 

Ouagadougou Accord, a force of 80,000 (55,000 military and 17,000 police) is envisioned, including 5,000 integrated from among the FRCI. A renewed mandate by the 

U.N. mission in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) is likely to include DDR in its purview. The 

United States should provide the support required to ensure this process can go forward quickly and should push for coordination with the U.N. mission in Liberia, 

given the flow of arms and fighters across the two countries’ shared border. 

The task of longer term security sector reform (SSR) will best be undertaken by 

bilateral partners. Because French engagement has been so deeply polarizing in 

Cote d’Ivoire, the United States should consider stepping up in partnership with 

France and perhaps the United Kingdom, to support a more nationally credible and 

acceptable SSR process. The United States can build on experiences in SSR in Liberia, including vetting and training military forces, but also developing accountable 

and professional police services. 

Cote d’Ivoire’s security must be seen in the context of the broader West African 

region. Renewed conflict in Cote d’Ivoire could reenergize militia groups, regional 

warlords, and young men with few economic opportunities. In this recent standoff, 

we saw the reentry of Liberian mercenaries into Cote d’Ivoire’s Western region. 

Likewise, securing Cote d’Ivoire could push Ivoirian militias and warlords over the 

border into neighboring states to seek mercenary/profiteering opportunities elsewhere. Already, reports of Gbagbo’s rump forces fleeing into Ghana with apprehension mounting that they may seek to base there to mount a coup or destabilizing 

putsch. The United States should leverage its strong diplomatic and security relationships with Cote d’Ivoire’s neighbors to assist in monitoring and preempting any 

efforts to destabilize or reignite violent conflict. 

National and local reconciliation 

Reconciliation will be a long and arduous process, but the country’s leadership 

must take immediate steps to set the tone and translate promising rhetoric into action. At a national level, Ouattara’s follow-through on promises to form a broadbased, inclusive government will be closely scrutinized. Equally important will be 

his seriousness in investigating crimes committed by all sides during the conflict 

and bringing key perpetrators—of whatever political leaning—to account. Evenhandedness and regional balance in restoration of basic services, delivery of humanitarian assistance, and longer term investments in education, reconstruction, and 

employment generation are equally critical components of reconciliation. Free and 

credible legislative elections, slated to take place in the coming year, and empowerment of the legislature and an independent judiciary will be important in building 

a genuinely national government. U.S. assistance with electoral preparations and in 

strengthening judicial institutions should be a high priority, along with security sector reform. 

33

Equally—if not more—important will be reconciliation throughout the country at 

the local level. Much of the violence of the last 10 years, and of the last 5 months, 

was inflicted on local civilian populations by local militias with parochial rather 

than national objectives. As a first step, citizens need to be assured of their safety, 

their grievances must be heard and redressed, and investigations into the crimes 

committed must be robust and credible. Over the longer term, the United States and 

international community should support local initiatives on reconciliation through 

civil society actors, media and communication strategies, with a particular emphasis 

on youth, who have grown up in an increasingly divided country with national role 

models like militia leaders Ble Goude and Guillaume Soro. This is an area where 

the United States should consider supporting innovative uses of communication 

technology, which has been so transformative in neighboring Nigeria and further 

afield in building constituencies and national dialogue. 

Jump-starting the economy and generating economic opportunity 

The many tasks that confront the new government will be made easier in a climate of economic recovery and growth. Businesses suffered major losses during the 

standoff, and investor confidence was badly shaken. Financial flows and loans cut 

off during the standoff to increase pressure on an intransigent Gbagbo need to be 

quickly restored. Cocoa and the agro-industry can likely recuperate in reasonable 

time, although the government may wish to offer tax advantages or similar incentives to mitigate the damage inflicted during the crisis and accelerate recovery. The 

government should be pushed to ensure far greater transparency in the big-money 

public contract arena, such as oil, electricity, and customs—both to ensure efficiency 

and set a new standard for opening public accounts to public scrutiny. Over the 

longer term, job creation must be a priority with an emphasis on labor-intensive sectors such as agriculture and construction. This will be particularly important in the 

impoverished North where investments in traditional agricultural mainstays—cotton and cashew production—have languished and should be accelerated. The government might consider launching in the near term a major public works program 

to rebuild a decaying infrastructure, restore electrification, sanitation, and expand 

access to clean water. 

As an economist and former senior official in the International Monetary Fund, 

President Ouattara should be well-suited to map out a plan to restructure and revitalize the economy, but he will need considerable external support to implement 

such a plan in the short term. 

THE REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE IVOIRIAN CRISIS

Throughout the post-election standoff, the international community came together 

with remarkable resolve and consensus in seeking a diplomatic solution to the crisis. 

Its efforts were critical in averting what very easily could have been a much longer 

and more devastating humanitarian disaster. It should now seek to preserve that 

unity of purpose and resolve in assisting the country to rebuild, reconcile, and respond to the needs of its citizenry. 

Cote d’Ivoire has not generally been a top-tier issue in U.S. policy toward Africa, 

as it has traditionally been seen as more firmly within the French sphere of influence and engagement. But the post-election crisis brought home in a very stark way 

what was at stake for broader U.S. interests in Africa: in upholding the principles 

of democracy and supporting the aspirations of citizens to choose their leaders; in 

conflict prevention; in safeguarding investments in regional security; and in supporting regional organizations as they seek to entrench norms of good governance 

and respect for the rule of law. The U.S. response was exemplary: swift, intense, 

and sustained high-level diplomacy, with the personal support and engagement of 

President Obama. It was undertaken in close concert with regional and international partners, and offered a balanced approach of gradually escalating pressures, as well as incentives for peaceful resolution. That the crisis was ultimately 

ended through the use of force should not detract from the merits of the approach, 

which isolated Gbagbo, weakened his systems of support, and prevented what could 

have been a much bloodier conflagration. 

Perhaps the single most important factor in building international resolve was the 

early and relatively united response from the regional grouping ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States. That early commitment and voice helped 

catalyze a series of expanding circles of consensus that helped shape an international strategy remarkable in its unanimity. The United States should acknowledge and support that kind of principled, collective diplomatic approach by African 

regional players, and could encourage other regional bodies to step up in defense 

of rule of law in similar situations—the Southern African Development Community 

(SADC) and the protracted political debacle in Zimbabwe, which may come to head 

34

in the coming year, come most immediately to mind. The United States should commend the leadership role of ECOWAS chair President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria, who despite his engagement in electoral preparations of his own nonetheless 

gave heft and drive to the regional grouping’s response. In late March, Nigeria cosponsored with France a Security Council resolution condemning the use of heavy 

weapons against civilians by Gbagbo forces and mandating UNOCI to remove them. 

The early ECOWAS response brought the African Union initially on side. Both organizations recognized Alassane Ouattara as the legitimate electoral winner and 

suspended the country from membership as long as Gbagbo remained in office. 

Their voice was almost certainly critical in bringing China and Russia on board in 

the Security Council in recognizing Ouattara as the winner (although U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Susan Rice reportedly played an important role in doggedly persuading the initially reluctant Russians to agree) and in a generating a unanimous 

General Assembly vote recognizing Ouattara as Cote d’Ivoire’s legitimate leader. 

The concerted international response enabled a gradual layering on of sanctions—

suspension of World Bank assistance and funding from the West African Central 

Bank, travel bans against Gbagbo and his coterie by the United States and European Union, freezing of Gbagbo’s U.S. assets, a boycott of Ivoirian cocoa exports, 

withdrawal of Western banks, and ultimately a U.N. resolution giving greater powers to U.N. forces for civilian protection. As the crisis went on, fissures appeared 

within the African Union, with major powers Angola, South Africa, and Uganda persisting in support for Gbagbo, making an end-run around ECOWAS leadership. Ultimately a five-member panel of African heads of state, including South Africa’s Jacob 

Zuma, came on side with ECOWAS and the broader international community, an 

important signal to Gbagbo and his supporters of how isolated he had become. 

The international response to Cote d’Ivoire was an important rebuke to the precedent in which a Presidential incumbent, in the face of electoral defeat, need only 

cling to office and threaten force to maintain power, or at worst keep a seat at the 

table in a negotiated power-sharing deal. There were circumstances unique to Cote 

d’Ivoire that made concerted push-back possible, but the experience will nonetheless 

send an important signal to other African leaders who may wish to prolong their 

stay in office. 

But the crisis is not yet over, and the Cote d’Ivoire will remain fragile for many 

years to come. A return to civil conflict could have devastating regional consequences, with the possibility of destabilizing outflows of refugees and economic impacts on neighboring countries that rely on the country for goods, jobs, and access 

to the port in Abidjan. Cote d’Ivoire was a critical piece in the regional ‘‘conflict system’’ that engulfed Liberia and Sierra Leone from the mid-1990s, with arms, young 

men, and proxy militias moving fluidly across borders, with instability in one country metastasizing to broader regional insecurity. This conflict system, spearheaded 

by Liberia’s Charles Taylor, engulfed Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cote d’Ivoire; drew 

in proxy fighters from Guinea; was facilitated by Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso; 

and was fueled by financial and military support from Muammar Qaddafi of Libya. 

Both Sierra Leone and Liberia remain vulnerable, despite major international investments in U.N. peacekeeping missions and development assistance. Neighboring 

Guinea narrowly escaped a violent post-election meltdown just last summer. President Compaore is facing a sustained challenge to his rule both from elements of his 

military and his general public. 

ECOWAS was clearly attuned to the potential regional impacts of renewed crisis 

in Cote d’Ivoire, and going forward the United States should work with ECOWAS 

and the broader international community in a long-term regional security strategy. 

CONCLUSION

The United States has played a robust and positive diplomatic role in bringing 

the immediate crisis to a conclusion and reinforcing the evolving role of African regional bodies in upholding principles of democracy and good governance. It must 

now sustain its engagement as Cote d’Ivoire embarks on the long road to economic 

recovery, national reconciliation, and security sector reform. In this it should give 

robust support to President Ouattara’s efforts to rebuild the country and restore social cohesion, but it should condition longer term support on demonstrable commitment to conciliation and participatory governance. 

ENDNOTE: A (VERY) BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CRISIS

Cote d’Ivoire’s social, class, and political fissures have long-standing roots, dating 

to the years when the country was considered an African ‘‘success case’’ and an ‘‘economic miracle.’’ In the 1960s and 70s, Cote d’Ivoire was a major economic engine 

35

in West Africa, the world’s largest producer of cocoa, the third largest producer of 

coffee, rich in gold and timber resources, with a major port, good infrastructure, and 

an attractive investment climate. Among the reasons for the country’s economic 

growth was that the country’s first President, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, encouraged 

and welcomed workers from the north of the country and from northern neighbors 

Burkina Faso and Mali to work the lucrative plantations in Cote d’Ivoire’s West and 

South. In addition to providing labor in the plantations, these migrants and immigrants often took on jobs that southern Ivoirians considered menial and underpaid. 

Many migrants settled and had children and families, who have been there now for 

generations. An estimated 25–30 percent of the population is of immigrant stock. 

Although Houphouet brought considerable economic prosperity to Cote d’Ivoire, he 

did little to strengthen institutions and norms of participatory governance, political 

succession, or equitable economic growth. The country’s strong economic performance masked unresolved issues of national identity, land tenure, and social fissure. 

In the 1990s, Houphouet’s anointed successor, Henri Konan Bedie, presided over increasing levels of corruption and an economic decline brought on by global commodity price shocks and financial mismanagement. As his political support began 

to wane, Bedie popularized the concept of Ivoirite, or a ‘‘true’’ Ivoirian identity. 

Bedie’s xenophobic rhetoric resonated with many in the South who were seeing their 

fortunes decline and began to blame foreigners for taking jobs away. Burkinabe 

were the principal scape-goats, but northerners more generally came to be lumped 

in as well. Alassane Ouattara, despite having served as Prime Minister under 

Houphouet, was excluded from successive elections because of questions about his 

parentage and nationality. He became a rallying point for northern grievances and 

feelings of exclusion. 

A military coup in 1999 ousted Bedie, and elections in 2002 (also contested) 

brought Laurent Gbagbo to power. Ouattara was again excluded from those elections on the basis of his alleged nationality, intensifying northerners’ feeling of disenfranchisement and exclusion. In September 2002, members of the Ivoirian military (largely northern) mutinied and quickly seized control of key positions in the 

country’s north. These forces ultimately joined with other opposition militias to create the Forces Nouvelles. Conflict escalated and in 2003 a U.N. peacekeeping force 

was deployed, backed by French forces. The French deployment created a buffer 

zone between North and South, dividing the country in two and freezing it into a 

situation of neither peace nor war. Gbagbo’s 5-year term came to an end in 2005, 

but elections were postponed six times in 5 years, as progress on disarmament and 

resolving questions of identity and voter eligibility stalled. 

Elections were eventually held on October 31, 2010, and a runoff between 

Ouattara and Gbagbo was held on November 28. After the Independent Electoral 

Commission announced a 54.1 percent to 45.9 percent outcome in favor of Ouattara, 

the country’s Constitutional Council annulled results in select northern precincts, 

giving Gbagbo a 51 to 49 percent victory. ECOWAS and the U.N., which in successive agreements signed by Gbagbo in Pretoria and Ouagadougou were given an explicit role in ensuring the integrity of the election process, endorsed the Electoral 

Commission’s announced tally, recognizing Ouattara as the country’s chosen president. Gbagbo and Ouattara swore themselves in as President in separate ceremonies, precipitating the standoff that ultimately ended on April 11. 

It is important to note that in signing the AU-brokered Pretoria Accord in 2005 

and the ECOWAS-brokered Ouagadougou Accord of 2007, Gbagbo himself explicitly 

invited the U.N. and ECOWAS to engage in all phases of the electoral process to 

ensure free, fair, and transparent elections and to act as guarantors of the agreements. An amendment to the Ivoirian electoral code in 2008, by Gbagbo’s decree, 

gives the U.N. Special Representative in Cote d’Ivoire, as well as the ECOWAS 

facilitator (Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaore), a role in certifying the results. Security Council Resolution 1765, issued in 2007, with Gbagbo’s acquiescence, 

gives the U.N. Special Representative in Cote d’Ivoire the mandate of certifying the 

election processes and results. On the domestic front, the Ivoirian Constitutional 

Court, which has the power either to annul or endorse election results in their entirety; it is not empowered to simply cancel results in select precincts and thereby 

change the final tally.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Ms. Cooke. 

Dr. Gilpin. 

36

STATEMENT OF DR. RAYMOND GILPIN, DIRECTOR OF THE 

CENTER FOR SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES, UNITED STATES 

INSTITUTE OF PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. GILPIN. Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, Senator 

Inhofe, I am grateful for this opportunity to appear before this subcommittee to testify on the economic costs and consequences of the 

recent post-election crisis in Cote d’Ivoire. 

The views I’ll express are my own. However, they are informed 

by my work at the United States Institute of Peace, as well as firsthand knowledge of the Ivoirian domestic, economic, and political 

environment, having lived in Cote d’Ivoire from 1998 to 2000, during my tenure at the African Development Bank group. 

The structure of economic activity in Cote d’Ivoire has contributed to a climate of inequity and mistrust that fueled violent and 

protracted conflict and unrest in recent years. This is why economic 

reconstruction in Cote d’Ivoire must not be ‘‘business as usual.’’ 

The approach should be conflict-sensitive, with a keen focus on 

easing intergroup tensions, providing incentives for supporters

of the peace process, and laying the foundation for equity and 

sustainability. 

Empirical work at the IMF suggests that Cote d’Ivoire has lost as much as $8.7 billion in subregional trade alone over the past 

decade. In the months since the contested November 28 elections, 

the Ivoirian economy has experienced a number of setbacks. In the 

cocoa industry—and we know Cote d’Ivoire is the world’s most important exporter—unrest and uncertainty halted exports; a liquidity crunch in the financial system constrained buying; and a host 

of nontariff barriers and bottlenecks facilitated smuggling to neighboring countries. Consequently, the economy lost revenue; farmers 

received less than half of the regular market price for their 

produce; trade was diverted; and farming communities became increasingly indebted and destitute. 

Nonpayment on the 2.3 billion Eurobond coupon increased Cote 

d’Ivoire’s risk profile, especially since this Eurobond issue was the 

second time the country’s longstanding international debt has been 

restructured. This is bad news for an economy that relies on foreign direct investment for a significant chunk of capital inflows. 

The alternative would be other investors who are less likely to do 

business in a transparent and development-friendly manner. And 

this is particularly worrisome in view of Cote d’Ivoire’s fledgling oil 

and gas sector. 

Economic reconstruction efforts in Cote d’Ivoire should focus on 

establishing macroeconomic stability and structural reforms that 

promote two things: equity and growth. A conflict-sensitive 

approach to these issues should aim to do three things. First, it 

should transform the economic landscape and ensure access and 

equal opportunity for all. Second, it should carefully analyze incentive frameworks for key actors and groups. And third, it should 

prioritize the provision of appropriate and adequate safety nets for 

those who have borne a disproportionate share of the economic consequences of the recent conflict. 

In the weeks following the resolution of the recent crisis, the 

international community has responded by easing sanctions, pledging additional humanitarian assistance, and reinstating suspended 

37

development assistance projects. This is commendable, but there is 

still a lot that could be done. And I believe that careful attention 

should be paid to five key issues. 

First, mechanisms should be adopted to promote coordination, 

define leadership responsibilities, and ensure that all instruments 

of foreign policy such as security, economic development, rule of 

law and diplomacy should be balanced and collectively reinforcing. 

Second, steps should be taken to involve the local labor force and 

local firms in the provision of humanitarian assistance and in the 

repair of physical infrastructure. This will have the dual benefits 

of creating income-generating opportunities outside the public sector and garnering buy-in from affected communities. 

Third, partners should design quick-disbursing initiatives to 

address indebtedness and ease credit bottlenecks in farming communities. These projects should aim to strengthen, and not replace, 

existing social capital. 

Fourth, strategies should be designed to improve Cote d’Ivoire’s 

investment profile by addressing a host of issues, and also providing technical assistance to improve the management of Cote 

d’Ivoire’s external debt and international reserves. 

And, finally, stakeholders should establish a clear baseline of 

easily measurable benchmarks that will enable us to track progress 

and reduce the likelihood of misuse, abuse, and waste. 

I believe that these steps will help put Cote d’Ivoire on a path 

toward meaningful, sustained, and sustainable economic recovery. 

But, this is not achievable in isolation. It should be done in concert 

with reconciliation, security sector reform, governance, and rule of 

law. 

Thank you very much. And I will be happy to respond to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gilpin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. RAYMOND GILPIN

Mr Chairman, Ranking Member Lugar, members of the committee, I am honored 

to testify before the Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African 

Affairs on the economic costs and consequences of the recent post-election crisis in 

Cote d’Ivoire, which lasted from November 28, 2011, until the ouster of former 

President Laurent Gbagbo on April 10, 2011. 

The views expressed in this testimony are my own. They are informed by my work 

at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) which provides analysis, training, 

and tools to help prevent, manage, and end violent international conflicts, promote 

stability, and professionalize the field of peacebuilding. In directing the Sustainable 

Economies Center of Innovation at USIP, I lead research and field work on economic 

dimensions of peacebuilding in conflict-affected countries like Cote d’Ivoire. We 

leverage extensive partnerships in conflict zones to deepen our understanding of 

complex and evolving dynamics on the ground and sharpen our insights on remedial 

strategies that are both practical and effective. I also draw from first-hand knowledge of the Ivorian domestic economic and political environment, having lived in 

Cote d’Ivoire from 1998 to 2000 during my tenure as a senior macroeconomist at 

the African Development Bank Group. As a development economist, I have followed 

events in Cote d’Ivoire closely for over two decades. 

ECONOMIC ROOTS OF THE CRISIS

The evolution and structure of the Ivorian economy is central to understanding 

the current crisis. Since the 1940s, agricultural exports have been the mainstay of 

the economy. Pro-private sector policies adopted by the first President, Felix 

Houphouet Boigny, established a tradition of strong, export-led growth in the 1960s. 

Houphouet Boigny promoted investment, minimized price distortions, facilitated 

trade by improving vital infrastructure and provided credit/extension services for 

38

1Philippe Egoume-Bossogo and Ankouvi Nayo, ‘‘Feeling The Elephant’s Weight: The Impact 

of Cote d’Ivoire’s Crisis on WAEMU Trade,’’ International Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 

11/80, April 1, 2011. (www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=24784.0) 

farmers. Within a decade Cote d’Ivoire had become a world leader in cocoa exports, 

macroeconomic performance was robust and the Ivorian economy was a regional 

powerhouse. However, these gains masked growing regional inequalities. While the 

vast amount of manual labor required for cocoa plantations in the South was provided by migrant workers from the North (a significant proportion of whom were 

from neighboring countries), most of the farms and agro-businesses were owned by 

the relatively more prosperous Southerners. The main political party, the PDCI 

(Parti Democratique de Cote d’Ivoire; the democratic party of Cote d’Ivoire) had its 

base in the South and ensured that most government and private sector investment 

was concentrated in the South. 

By the mid-1970s the structural dynamics of the cocoa industry had effectively 

created a two-tier society based on an increasingly accentuated North-South divide. 

Infrastructure, services, and amenities were virtually nonexistent in the North. 

Health and education facilities were woefully deficient and economic opportunity 

was limited. The opposite was true in the South. Deep poverty and deprivation in 

the North were in stark contrast to the advancement and burgeoning wealth in the 

South. That Abidjan (the commercial capital in the South) earned the moniker 

‘‘Petit Paris’’ speaks to the vast disparities that existed. The discovery of oil and gas 

reserves in 1975 and Cote d’Ivoire’s ascendency as a regional financial hub in the 

1980s only served to widen the gap, as the structural arrangements established in 

the cocoa industry were replicated in the oil and gas sectors. Relatively little of the 

nation’s wealth made its way to the North. 

The oil shocks and commodity price downturn of the early 1980s delivered a double blow to the Ivorian economy. As export earnings fell and import bills rose, the 

government introduced a program of stringent austerity measures. This unpopular 

program coincided with increased calls for more meaningful political and economic 

participation by groups in the North. There was restlessness in the South as the 

impacts of the cuts began to deepen, assets lost value and Southern political dominance was threatened by calls from most Northerners for greater inclusion in the 

political process. There was also restlessness in the North as groups with ethnic ties 

to neighboring countries felt marginalized and were convinced that they were bearing a disproportionate share of the austerity measures (particularly unemployment 

and lower wages). The faultlines had an ethnoreligious element. The predominately 

Christian South is mainly comprised of members of the Baoule ethnic group, while 

the predominantly Muslim North is made up of a number of smaller ethnic groups. 

The economic and political turmoil of the 1980s and 1990s sowed the seeds of discord that led to the violence that typified the first decade of this century. Houphouet 

Boigny successor, Henri Konan Bedie, compensated for his relatively poor political 

and leadership skills by playing on the now openly fractious North-South divide. 

The overthrow of Bedie in 1999 and the subsequent de facto partition of the country 

in 2002 further accentuated the relative deprivation of the North. 

The 2010 elections were the first truly national elections in Cote d’Ivoire, with 

credible candidates fielded from all regions. The November 28 Presidential runoff 

pitted the incumbent Laurent Gbagbo of the Southern-based FPI (Front Populaire 

Ivoirien—Ivorian Popular Front) party against the Northern-based RDR (Rassemblement des Republicaines—Rally of Republicans) candidate Alassane Ouattara. 

Although regional and international observers adjudged Ouattara to have been the 

winner, Gbagbo contested the results. The country’s Constitutional Council nullified 

some 600,000 votes in the North and declared Gbagbo President. Both candidates 

held swearing-in ceremonies. This set the stage for a 5-month stalemate that ended 

with the forcible ousting and arrest of Gbagbo on April 10, 2011. 

ECONOMIC COSTS OF THE POST-2010 ELECTIONS STALEMATE

Even though the Ivorian economy had been reeling from almost a decade of violent conflict and political instability, the post-elections stalemate imposed additional 

economic costs. Analysts estimate that conflict over the past decade has cost Cote 

d’Ivoire some $8.7 billion in lost trade within West Africa; global estimates will be 

much higher.1 The full economic costs of the post-elections crisis are still being assessed. There is also some evidence of substantial trade diversion to neighboring 

countries as traders and investors vote with their feet. The combination of significant financial losses and potential structural changes in trading relationships could 

constrain Cote d’Ivoire’s recovery. 

39

2David Brough and Nick Edwards, ‘‘Cocoa Stores in Ivory Coast Still Useable,’’ Reuters, April 

6, 2011, (www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/06/us-cocoa-ivorycoast-idUSTRE7352PP20110406) 3Orla Ryan, ‘‘Ivory Coast Cocoa Farmers Get Taste Of Politics,’’ Financial Times, February 

14, 2011. (www.ft.com/cms/s/0/flee97b8-3864-11e0-959c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1MXmYe2C4) 4Loucoumane Coulibaly, ‘‘Ivory Coast Cocoa in Disarray from Crisis-Farmers,’’ Reuters, February 2, 2011. (af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFJOE7110GX20110202) 5The Ghanaian authorities attributed the increase to a bumper crop but analysts believe that 

that Ivorian cocoa accounted for some of the increase. 

The Ivorian economy became a post-elections battleground as Gbagbo sought to 

solidify his hold on power by controlling revenue streams from the cocoa industry, 

petroleum sector, and financial sector. Even though the economy had been weakened, it still held the prospects of significant current and future revenue streams, 

which Gbagbo needed to pay salaries, provide basic services and prosecute the ongoing civil war. For his part, Ouattara put in motion a series of events that sanctioned 

economic activity in a bid to prevent Gbagbo from controlling state economic assets. 

Both sets of action had serious economic costs. 

Costs to the Cocoa Industry 

Cote d’Ivoire is the world’s leading cocoa exporter. It contributes some $1.3 billion 

in annual revenues, making it a lucrative revenue source. The main 2010 harvest 

was almost over when the unrest started and most farms and storage facilities were 

neither damaged nor destroyed. An estimated half a million tonnes of cocoa were 

already in preshipment storage facilities. Gbagbo started to run out of financing options in early 2011 as financial sanctions imposed by the West African central bank, 

the BECAO (Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest; the central bank 

for francophone West Africa), the European Commission and the United States 

started to take effect. He attempted to wrest control of the industry after failing to 

convince major exporters to prepay taxes and otherwise support his cause. Outtara 

countered by successfully orchestrating a ban on cocoa exports and the three main 

exporters (Cargill and Archer Daniels Midland of the United States, and Swissbased Barry Callebaut AG) suspended exports. 

These developments imposed a number of costs. First, fears of a prolonged supply 

disruption put upward pressure on world cocoa prices, which hit a 32-year high of 

$3,775/tonne on March 4. The 7 million Ivoirians involved in the cocoa industry did 

not benefit from this price hike since exports were suspended. Second, on account 

of the sanctions an estimated 450,000 tonnes of cocoa was not exported and 

remained in warehouses for months.2 Although rotting was minimal (only about 10 

percent), many analysts believe that the quality could have deteriorated forcing exporters to accept much lower prices. Third, cocoa prices could also be dampened by 

the supply glut that will be created as the stockpile is released. The combined 

effects of these factors could run into tens of millions of dollars in losses. 

In addition to these macro level costs there are a number of farm-level costs that 

might be even more pernicious.3 Post-elections insecurity led to the displacement of 

roughly 1 million, while 150,000 fled to neighboring countries. Many of these were 

members of the industry’s large workforce—including those involved in buying and 

transportation. Farmers who had not transported their produce to the warehouses 

in the port city of San Pedro before the onset of the unrest faced serious difficulties. 

First, a liquidity crunch meant that buying agents did not have cash to pay farmers 

for their produce.4 Checks were not clearing and the Gbagbo administration imposed limits on withdrawals. Second, various militia ‘‘taxed’’ cargo on the highways. 

Third, most of the usual transporters and buyers had fled. And, fourth, warehouses 

were full and not accepting any new produce. Consequently, farmers sought alternative channels to sell their produce—most of which was smuggled via neighboring 

countries. During the first 4 months of 2011, the cocoa marketing agency in neighboring Ghana recorded a 50-percent increase in exports over the same period in 

2010.5 Smuggling cost the Ivorian economy millions in lost business and revenue. 

Farmers were also forced to accept significantly lower prices for their produce (at 

a time when prices were peaking at record highs). Without other viable options, the 

farmers had to sell to the few buyers with liquidity, who took advantage of the crisis 

to underpay for the cocoa beans. So, while Cote d’Ivoire’s farmers had to contend 

with much higher prices for food and fuel, they received only 50–60 percent of what 

that they would normally have been paid for their produce. This situation compounded their hardship, increased household debt burdens, and constrained their 

ability to invest and fully prepare for the coming season. 

Cote d’Ivoire’s cocoa marketing woes persisted even after the ousting of Gbagbo. 

Liquidity remains problematic, tax and tariff payments are complicated because customs officials do not accept checks and credit is still scarce. These constraints 

40

6 U.S. Energy Information Administration. ‘‘Cote d’Ivoire,’’ Country Analysis Brief, August 1, 

2010. (www.eia.doe.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=IV) 7 Edward Klump and Eduard Gismatullin, ‘‘Anadarko, Tullow Halt Ivory Coast Oil Exploration on Violence,’’ Bloomberg, February 24, 2011. (www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-24/

anadarko-tullow-halt-ivory-coast-oilexploration-on-violence.html) 8 Ange Aboa and Loucoumane Coulibaly, ‘‘Ivory Coast Cocoa Trade, Banking Poised to Restart,’’ Reuters, April 26, 2011. (af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE73POHX20110426) 9 Jane Byrne, ‘‘Ivory Coast Cocoa Trade Resumes but Credit Issues Remain, Analysts,’’ 

FoodNavigator.com, May 5, 2011. (www.foodnavigator.com/Financial-Industry/Ivory-Coast-cocoatrade-resumes-but-credit-issues-remain-analysts) 

require urgent action if the costs to the economy and cocoa farmers are to be 

minimized. 

Costs to the Petroleum Sector 

With production levels below 60,000 barrels per day and 100 million in proven oil 

reserves, Cote d’Ivoire is not a major oil producer.6 However, the sector accounts for 

roughly one-third of the country’s export. Cote d’Ivoire also has significant refining 

capacity that services both domestic and regional markets. Potential new oil and gas 

fields could boost output. For example, Block CI–112 off the western coast could 

hold over 2 billion barrels of crude reserves, while Block CI–40 along the southern 

coast could hold up to 200 million barrels. Insecurity will impact the likelihood (and 

quality) of investment. Promising exploration for new oil and gas fields were suspended because of the post-elections crisis. Texas-based Anadarko Petroleum Corporation and U.K.-based Tullow oil halted exploration in fields that analysts believe 

could have doubled Cote d’Ivoire’s output in a few years.7 One of the new fields 

could potentially add an estimated 550 million barrels to the proven reserves. 

Although not a major setback (as exploration is likely to resume shortly), the delay 

will result in increased costs and increased wariness by investors. 

Costs to the Financial Sector 

A major financial issue in the post-election crisis was the payment of the country’s 

$29 million coupon payment on $2.3 billion Eurobond issue. These dollar-denominated bonds were basically past-due Brady Bonds owed to commercial creditors that 

were rescheduled in April 2010. This is the second time this stock of debt has been 

rescheduled. In spite of a January 10, 2011, letter signed by then-Finance Minister, 

Desire Dallo, promising to make the coupon payment within the 30-day grace period 

(the payment was due on December 31, 2010), this obligation was not honored. This 

increases the country’s risk profile in the eyes of potential investors and could impact the cost of borrowing. 

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

The economic costs and consequences of the Ivorian crisis impact U.S. interests. 

First, because leading U.S. agro-business firms (Archer Daniels Midland and 

Cargill) are heavily invested in Cote d’Ivoire, continued instability, structural bottlenecks and weakened institutions in that country could affect their bottom line. The 

same is true of the lucrative chocolate industry in the United States. Opportunities 

for diversification are slim in the short to medium term. The windfall harvests (such 

as experienced in neighboring Ghana in 2010) and anticipated increases in export 

volumes in Indonesia (following an expected downward revision of export taxes later 

this year) are unlikely to cover the shortfall if Cote d’Ivoire’s cocoa industry does 

not recover expeditiously. 

Second, uncertainty in Cote d’Ivoire’s petroleum sector could further heighten concerns about the reliability of supply from West Africa, which accounts for about a 

fifth of U.S. oil imports. Some analysts believe that pending exploration could more 

than double output in that country over the medium term. Existing facilities also 

need to be upgraded to enhance efficiency. Prospective investors will be concerned 

about Cote d’Ivoire’s creditworthiness given recent defaults on bond payments. 

Third, continued weak economic performance would undermine efforts to build 

stable, reliable democratic governance in Cote d’Ivoire, which is a strategic objective 

of the United States. Furthermore, failure to address the plight of thousands of 

small-holder farmers would make IDPs and refugees less likely to return.89 There 

is evidence that economic conditions weigh heavily on the minds of the displaced. 

Large displaced and disaffected groups could compromise national and regional stability and make communities less stable and conflict more intractable. 

41

10Scott Stearns, ‘‘U.N. Expects Swift Economic Recovery in Ivory Coast,’’ Voice of America 

News, April 14, 2011. (www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/UN-Expects-Swift-Economic-Recovery-in-Ivory-Coast-119858994.html) 11See Beth Cole et al. (eds), ‘‘Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction,’’ United 

States Institute of Peace and U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, USIP 

Press, Washington DC. The conclusions in this manual are echoed in the World Bank’s 2001 

‘‘World Development Report: Conflict, Security and Development.’’ 12 I refer to economic transformation and not reconstruction because the preexisting economic 

structure is often part of the problem. Reconstruction could involve a reestablishment of the status quo; this is why transformation is a much better approach in conflict-affected countries. 13George Fominyen, ‘‘Returning Ivoirians Fret Over Lack Of Work, Security,’’ AlertNet, May 

12, 2011. (www.trust.org/alertnet/news/returning-ivorians-fret-over-lack-of-work-security/) 14 ‘‘Development Partners Discuss the Urgency of Recovery for Cote d’Ivoire,’’ World Bank, 

April 20, 2011. (http://go.worldbank.org/B6S8DK4HE0)

OPTIONS FOR ACTION

Some analysts anticipate a swift economic recovery for Cote d’Ivoire, given its resource endowment and middle income ranking.10 This is highly unlikely in view of 

the macro and micro challenges already outlined. Rebuilding conflict-affected states, 

like Cote d’Ivoire, is a complex undertaking. The comprehensive guidelines in 

USIP’s ‘‘Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction’’ are applicable in 

the Ivorian context.11 This publication emphasizes the collectively reinforcing nature 

of policy instruments that should be applied in such cases. These include sustainable economies, security, effective governance, the establishment of the rule of law 

and social well-being. This is the key to success in Cote d’Ivoire. 

Given the nature of economic factors that precipitated and sustained violent unrest in Cote d’Ivoire, efforts at economic transformation should be anchored on two 

Es: equity and employment.12 A history of stark regional and ethnoreligious schisms 

combined with deep distrust contributed to the violence and unrest of recent 

months. An important peace dividend would be the establishment of conditions that 

facilitate equal access and opportunity for all. Targeted programs to redress these 

imbalances could include expanding the provision of infrastructure and services, targeted ‘‘access to credit’’ programs and capacity building initiatives. These must be 

designed in a conflict-sensitive manner. By this I mean that care should be taken 

to avoid rewarding ‘‘spoilers’’ and it must not be presented a zero-sum solution (i.e., 

groups in the South should not feel punished or excluded, or vice versa). 

Cote d’Ivoire’s youthful population is a great asset but it could also be a potential 

powder keg. High rates of unemployment and underemployment could precipitate 

disquiet and unrest.13 This is particularly worrisome when a significant proportion 

of the unemployed have been involved in the violence and there is a proliferation 

of small arms and light weapons across the country. In addition to developing training and retraining programs, serious thought should be given to the development 

of labor-intensive infrastructure programs. In addition, close attention should be 

paid to initiatives that promote the development of small- and medium-scale businesses. Cote d’Ivoire is a middle-income country with a number of core economic activities (agriculture, minerals, finance, and services) around which a wide range of 

small businesses could thrive. Policymakers should resist the temptation to rely on 

the public sector (particularly security services) to absorb the bulk of the unemployed, directly or indirectly. 

Although the United States and other development partners already provide significant humanitarian and development assistance to support economic recovery, 

political stability and security in Cote d’Ivoire, the needs remain great and expectations are high.14 Consolidating the fragile peace necessitates proactive economic 

interventions by international partners in the following areas: 

• Address the immediate needs of the cocoa farmers and implement social safety 

net programs to mitigate the impact of indebtedness caused by recent events. 

• Invest in programs to improve cocoa yields, minimize post-harvest losses and 

improve the quality of the beans. 

• Ease bottlenecks by supporting the expansion of cocoa marketing networks, extensions services and credit facilities. 

• Technical assistance to improve external debt management and restore credibility in international financial markets. 

• Establish effective monitoring and evaluation programs that are both credible 

and consistent. 

• Create mechanisms to engage the private sector and civil society in the provision of humanitarian and development assistance. 

• Clearly connect short-term assistance (such as security, humanitarian and repair of physical infrastructure) with longer term initiatives (such as strengthVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:39 Apr 27, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011IS~1\051911-U.TXT BETTY
42

15 International Monetary Fund, ‘‘Cote d’Ivoire: Second Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility,’’ IMF Country Report No. 10/228, July 2010. 16 Nicolas Cook, ‘‘Cote d’Ivoire Post-Gbagbo: Crisis Recovery,’’ Congressional Research Service, 

April 20, 2011. (www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21989.pdf) 17 USAID. ‘‘Cote d’Ivoire—Complex Emergency,’’ Fact Sheet #6, May 14, 2011. Last modified 

May 13, 2011. (reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/FulllReportl639.pdf)

ening state institutions, fostering inclusive and participatory governance, and 

promoting market development). • Pay particular attention to small-scale farmers and marginalized groups who 

have borne a disproportionate share of the economic consequences of the recent 

unrest. 

CONCLUSION

In the months leading up to the 2010 elections Cote d’Ivoire benefited from a substantial rescheduling of its debt and millions in debt relief.15 It also stood to benefit 

from an economic reconstruction package worth over half a billion U.S. dollars. 

These programs will be reinstated relatively quickly. The World Bank announced 

that it will fast-track the release of some $100 million in humanitarian assistance 

and expedite the delivery of $3 billion in debt relief.16

The French government has pledged an additional $577 million, the European Commission $260 million and so far the United States has provided $33.7 million.17

However, care should be taken to avoid falling victim to a numbers game. Throwing 

money at the problem will probably worsen the situation. What is needed is a coordinated, comprehensive, and conflict-sensitive approach to economic recovery in 

Cote d’Ivoire. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Dr. Gilpin. 

I’d like to start with a question, if I might, to Dr. McGovern. All 

of you spoke about the critical need for economic growth, for reconciliation, and for stability. Dr. McGovern, you pointed to the critical need for both judicial and security reforms. We’ve had some 

success in other countries in the region, particularly in security 

reforms that required fundamentally restructuring, almost recreating, the national security forces. You also pointed, in your written testimony, to some of the very real challenges in getting a judicial system that could be a real partner in economic growth and 

could restore a sense of transparency and fairness. 

What do you think are the most critical steps for the new government to take? And how can the United States best support them 

in that work? 

Dr. MCGOVERN. The United States is involved, as you know, in 

Liberian security sector reform, and also, to some extent, in 

Guinea. They’ve been involved in Nigeria and a number of other 

African countries. The Liberian model is drawing the army down 

to zero and starting from scratch. That won’t happen in Cote 

d’Ivoire. That’s not really politically viable. But, the DR Congo sort 

of model, where you just throw everybody in a pot and let them 

keep whatever rank they gave themselves when they were fighting 

in the bush, is also not very helpful. So, I think what I suggested 

is that drawing on the West African expertise and also the American expertise, as Ms. Cooke already suggested, the United States 

can play an important role as a neutral party, as an honest broker, 

in a way that the French simply cannot do in Cote d’Ivoire anymore. 

And I think accompanying that process where—as I said, the 

most important thing, to my mind, in the security sector, is going 

to be reestablishing command and control. Officers, right now, can 

be slapped, they can be disobeyed by rank-and-file soldiers, with no 

consequences, as long as the rank-and-file soldier has some kind of 

43

political backer. And that’s a real problem. And that’s been characteristic in the north, as well as the south—people who are just 

sort of free actors and doing what they please. That has to end. 

And that ties into the judicial aspect, the prosecution of those 

who have, you know, committed crimes, is also going to contribute 

to that process. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Doctor. 

Ms. Cooke, you spoke about the importance of ECOWAS, the 

African Union, and the regional structures and continentwide 

structures that acted fairly quickly and effectively in finding a resolution to this crisis. What are the regional implications of the outcome of these events in Cote d’Ivoire? What should the United 

States be doing, given those regional implications? And I was interested—you mentioned Zimbabwe and SADC—what does this teach 

us about other regions of the continent and how we should be 

engaged there in creating multilateral structures? 

Ms. COOKE. Thank you, Chairman. Yes, I think, actually, 

ECOWAS has shown really tremendous progress, over the years, in 

upholding these principles of democratic governance and transparency and peer pressure on members of the group who fail to live 

up to those standards. It has intervened, preemptively, in several 

other West African crises as well that might have devolved to 

something much worse. I think that was important here. 

The response of ECOWAS cleared the way for the African Union 

and the U.N. to play a greater and more unified role. And I hope 

that the African Union and SADC will look to the ECOWAS model 

and recognize that consensus and action within a regional grouping 

can pull the international community behind it, with substantial 

support, if it takes that initial diplomatic step. 

So, I think it’s a very important model that we should encourage 

and acknowledge. I think we need to commend the leadership of 

Nigeria and President Goodluck Jonathan, who was going through 

his own election preparations at that time. And I think acknowledging that will encourage other regional bodies, and the African 

Union as a whole, to follow through on that example. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Ms. Cooke. 

Dr. Gilpin, your other two panel mates emphasize the centrality 

of economic growth, and, in particular, of jobs—of the possibility of 

infrastructure jobs or of other jobs. And some folks who are reviewing the situation in Cote d’Ivoire suggest the prospects for economic 

recovery are actually relatively good, coming out of a conflict of this 

intensity, because there was relatively little infrastructure damage. 

But, one of the real challenges, right now, as you mentioned, is 

liquidity and access to credit. 

The recent actions by the World Bank—are they sufficient? What 

else needs to be done in order to provide credit access? And what 

do you think are the most constructive or important steps the 

United States could take in addition to those already talked 

about—the security and judicial reforms—that could lead to sustained economic growth and job creation for the Ivoirian people? 

Dr. GILPIN. Thank you very much, Senator. I would echo comments that have already been made, that I believe the United 

States could not only play the role of an honest broker, but also 

provide strategic leadership. After over a decade of violent conflict, 

44

I think the most important thing that most people in Cote d’Ivoire 

are looking forward to is a tangible peace dividend—being able to 

earn, but also being able to build wealth. The international community, both bilateral and multilateral, have been very generous in 

their pledges. But, this needs to go beyond the usual development 

model. It is not enough to throw money at the problems. We need 

to take a closer look at some of the structural changes that have 

happened because of the conflict. 

And in terms of liquidity, it’s not just an issue of the commercial 

banks being able to make credit available to the buyers and traders, it is being able to ensure that all farmers have equal access. 

And for that to happen, we need to take a close look at how models 

of microfinance could be adapted at the village level, and so that, 

irrespective of political coloring, religion, or ethnicity, people who 

have the ability to contribute, whether it’s in the real economy—

agriculture—the manufacturing economy or the service economy—

would be able to do this. 

I think the key to their economic recovery is not so much what 

is going to happen in the macrolevel, in terms of foreign assistance, 

but is the ability of small- and medium-scale enterprises to restart 

and start contributing to sustainable economic growth. 

The United States could support a lot of NGOs and private organizations that are thinking about programs to ensure that they are 

coordinated in a manner that supports the most important players 

in the economy, who I think are the small- and medium-scale businesses and also the small-scale farmers. 

Senator COONS. Let me ask one last question, if I might, of the 

panel as a whole. I’m just about out of time. All three of you have 

mentioned that, in your view, the United States can play a constructive honest-broker role, and that there are some real challenges in either the French or the U.N. continuing to play those 

roles effectively. Given our very constrained financial situation, as 

a country, what do you view as the most critical investment the 

United States can make in the nation of Cote d’Ivoire to help 

advance reconciliation, economic stability, and regional integration? 

If you would, each. 

Dr. McGovern. 

Dr. MCGOVERN. Security sector reform. 

Ms. COOKE. I would agree with that, but I would also add diplomatic engagement—a sustained diplomatic engagement beyond the 

immediate crisis, which doesn’t cost a whole lot. 

Dr. GILPIN. I think the most important thing would be the ability 

to ensure that there is coordinated assistance. And there are many 

players in Cote d’Ivoire, both state and nonstate. Our ability to 

coordinate foreign assistance has challenged us in places like Haiti, 

Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Afghanistan. And we now 

have an opportunity, in a medium-income country, to press the 

restart button and have coordinated, consistent, and long-term, 

vision-oriented reconstruction. I believe the United States could 

play that role and perform that function. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

45

Well, first of all, I don’t find a lot of disagreement with anything 

that any of the members on this panel have said. They’re looking 

forward to—trying to look forward to seeing—that’s supposed to be 

the subject of this thing. But, I find a couple of things, Dr. McGovern that—to be interesting. 

For one thing, my granddaughter was just accepted into Yale, so 

you’ll see Maggie Inhofe walking around the halls. 

Senator COONS. That’s a suggestion to be particularly generous 

in your grading. [Laughter.] 

Senator INHOFE. And she needs financial assistance. [Laughter.] 

Dr. McGovern, I appreciate some of the things that you have 

said. And I agree with almost everything. I take issue with a couple of things. 

First of all, on the threat, I think you are approximating, maybe, 

in the range of 10,000 deaths, and I would only ask that—not that 

you respond now, but you look at some of these things that we 

have. We actually have the videos of going in there. And these are 

the U.N. helicopters—gunships—going in, destroying huge parts of 

the city. I’ve spent so much time in the very parts that I’ve seen 

destroyed. I can’t see that it’s even possible that it wouldn’t—it 

isn’t at least 10 times that number. Just keep that—I would like 

to have you just keep that open. 

Second, I appreciated you talking about that reconciliation will 

not be achieved by a commission. And I agree with that. 

Third, I would like to ask what you think about the comments 

that were made by President Museveni, President Mbeki, Obiang, 

the—Odinga—and you just have to take my word for it, there are 

many, many more that I’ve talked to personally, just—we don’t 

have their names or their permission to use them. 

This perhaps was—it was bungled, the way it was handled, and 

that there are so many out there that perceive this as a 

neocolonialism effort by the French—I’d like to have your thoughts 

on that. And then I have one last question to ask. 

Dr. MCGOVERN. Yes. I think that one thing that’s very important 

to remember is that the ball started rolling with ECOWAS. It was 

passed to the AU, and then it went from there outside of Africa. 

So, I personally find that it was, strategically, a very unfortunate 

decision to have French helicopters join in, in the attacks. I’m sure 

you’ve read the U.N. Security Council resolution. It was worded in 

an ambiguous way, which may well have given scope for the 

French to be involved. Other people think not. 

In any case, the U.N. mission did have chapter 7 ability and was 

specifically empowered by that resolution to take aggressive action 

against the Gbagbo government. Whether you agree with that or 

not, I think that’s clear. 

As far as whether or not it’s a neocolonial intervention, I think 

it’s important to remember that the reason Laurent Gbagbo—in my 

view, the reason he has been treated differently from, say, Robert 

Mugabe, has a lot to do with the fact that he burned his bridges 

not only with Europeans and with the U.N., but also with his peers 

in West Africa. Having people from his FPI party threaten the lives 

of other West Africans who were resident in Cote d’Ivoire—not 

once, but several times—was something that made Nigerians, 

Burkinabe ́s, others, very angry. And it ended up, over time—this 

46

is over 5 or 7 years—it ended up building a coalition of African 

leaders who actually outnumber the ones that you’ve listed. And I 

think that’s simply a fact. 

Thank you. 

Senator INHOFE. The other thing you had mentioned—and I 

thought it was significant, because, the first panel, in my opinion, 

by making several comments referring to the previous 10 years, 

were trying to say this was President Gbagbo. You are good enough 

to be honest about it and say that this goes three—it could be 

maybe two or three decades back. That would include the time 

when Ouattara was the Prime Minister, which was—1990 is when 

that began. So, I think we want to make sure that we don’t all say 

that this is all this administration. I think that’s very significant. 

And also I would like to ask, as a favor, that anyone, particularly 

my colleagues up here, read the article, ‘‘What the World Got 

Wrong in Cote d’Ivoire.’’ This was an article that was written in 

the—what was it?—the—which magazine?—Foreign Policy magazine. That’s a well-respected magazine. I pretty much agree with 

everything that’s in here. 

Last, I would just say this. Sure, I’ve given up with what I originally intended to do. I thought we had such incontrovertible evidence. There isn’t anyone on this panel, or anyone in this room, 

who will say that, if President Laurent Gbagbo—the first election—

got thousands and thousands of votes in those northern regions, 

which they call them, not precincts—and then turned around, in 

the runoff, and got zero—that can’t happen. We all know that. And 

all you have to do is do your math and you can see this election 

was up in the air. 

Well, there should have been a reelection, another election. I did 

everything I could to make that happen. It’s not going to happen 

now. I understand that. 

So, as we look at the things that are open, I would only suggest 

that the option of an effort to put the President and the First Lady, 

and a lot of the others, into an exile situation—maybe I’m not 

using the right word—but, to me, when I look at it, and I look at 

the repercussions, and I look at the number of people who I know 

and who live in Abidjan, in that part—in the southern part of Cote 

d’Ivoire—and I see the number of people who are watching and observing, as we’re sitting here today, the death squads going around 

and killing people in the streets today, right now, that this is something that’s going on, and it is something that is going to be—

you’re going to have to think of some way of reconciliation. To me, 

the best way would be to accept the invitation. And I would hope 

that there are those who are listening, with the State Department. 

I doubt it, but I hope that they are. 

The last thing I would do is, respond to something that Mr. Fitzgerald had referred to. You know, if I showed all the pictures that 

I had—you’ve already seen those—if you still come to the conclusion that there’s any level of fairness, that it wasn’t just sheer brutality, I don’t know where you could come from. But, the statement 

that President Gbagbo is being treated fair—I’m going to ask for—

let’s look at, first of all, the picture of the Laurent Gbagbo that I 

know, the one that I’ve known for many years—I’ve known even 

before he was President. There he is, a happy face, jovial man. A 

47

lot of people loved him. Let’s look at his picture today. As you can 

see, the side of his face is kicked in. That’s the Gbagbo of today. 

Then let’s go to Simone. I’ve gotten to know her very well over 

the years, back when she was a member of Parliament and not 

even married to Laurent Gbagbo—before that time. This is the 

beautiful lady. I don’t think anyone’s going to question how beautiful this lady is. Let’s look at Simone today. When they ravaged 

her, they pulled her hair out by the roots—danced in the streets. 

This is all Ouattara’s people. We know that. Nobody denies that. 

Then the one that is most revealing as to what’s happening 

today. There she is, folks. There’s Ouattara’s people. Use your 

imagination. Just—you know what happened. You know what’s 

happening now. And all I can say is, this is a travesty. It’s something that, in the 15 years that I been in Africa—I’ve visited—I’ve 

made 116 African country visits. I have a heart for Africa. This is 

the worst that I’ve seen. 

I’m going to make every effort to try to encourage people to examine very carefully the option of exile. I think that’s the reasonable thing to do. And I think it’s the best thing, in terms of going 

forward, in terms of how people are going to keep from being a 

martyr. And I think that, perhaps, is the best of a lot of not too 

pleasant options that are out there. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Isakson, we passed over you during this session, this 

round, so I’d defer to you, at this point, for a round of questions 

of the panel. 

Senator ISAKSON. I deserved being passed over, because I was 

running in and out, trying to handle another situation. So, I appreciated the courtesy. 

And I think I’m going to end with the right question for the 

future. And both Ms. Cooke and Dr. McGovern and Dr. Gilpin all, 

in one way or another, referred to it. First, Dr. McGovern talked 

about the genocide in Rwanda, in the post-Rwandan period of time. 

I think Ms. Cooke mentioned the numbers of killed in Rwanda, 

which was a million, and the numbers estimated that may have 

been killed in—was significantly less, although any death is significant. 

I’ve been to Rwanda, and what Kokome did there, I think, was 

somewhat remarkable, to go from a period of genocide between the 

Hutus and the Tutsis, to a country that, today—although there’ve 

been a few issues lately, I know—but, has been a remarkable reconciliation. And when I went there to—what struck me was how 

they finally got the Hutus and the Tutsis together. And they did 

it economically, by the way. I think, when you mentioned jobs, 

that—I’ve visited the National Basket Company of Rwanda and, in 

their employment, they require a Hutu and a Tutsi to sit side by 

side. They won’t let them get in groups. So, they had to work 

together. 

I don’t understand the Cote d’Ivoire complexity as much. I think 

it’s both tribal, as well as religious, to a certain extent, in terms 

of the conflict. At least, that’s what I believe from what I’ve read. 

But, that type of example, of what Kokome did in Rwanda, seems 

to me, hopefully, the best look forward for the country of Cote 

48

d’Ivoire, in terms of improving economics, first of all, for the people—providing jobs or getting jobs for the people—and then having 

the tribal and ethnic differences work together in those jobs to 

bring about a sense of stability. 

Is that possible? And I’d just ask each one of you to comment on 

that. 

Dr. MCGOVERN. I think it’s very possible. Ivoirians, for as long 

as Cote d’Ivoire has existed as nation, have lived together, been 

intermarried, been eating in maquis together, dancing together. It’s 

really—it’s not an issue. It is made an issue by politicians who 

cynically try to derive some benefit from dividing people. But, I 

think, at the level of the ordinary Ivoirian people, it’s not a problem. 

Thank you. 

Senator ISAKSON. Ms. Cooke. 

Ms. COOKE. I think economic growth and prosperity can do a lot, 

in terms of giving political leaders room for reconciliation. I think 

one of the cautions about the Rwandan example is that, unless economic prosperity is accompanied by truly national institutions, by 

participatory governance, by an open field for political competition—for peaceful political competition, that it can come unraveled 

very quickly. 

Senator ISAKSON. Understood. 

Ms. COOKE. You have to remember that Cote d’Ivoire was once 

an economic success case. Zimbabwe was once an economic success 

case. Rwanda was once considered an economic model, before the 

genocide. So, prosperity and jobs do give room. They are an important part of reconciliation, but not the sole one. 

Senator ISAKSON. Dr. Gilpin. 

Dr. GILPIN. I would agree with my fellow panelists. I think it is 

possible, but it is not an easy road. And there is a lot of work that 

goes on behind the scenes to ensure that reconciliation efforts are 

both effective and lasting. And the trick is to have successful reconciliation efforts moving in tandem with efforts to improve the 

rule of law, efforts to improve the regulatory and institutional 

frameworks, and efforts to improve income-generating opportunities for all, regardless of creed, regardless of religion, and regardless of ethnicity. 

The challenge in bringing this about is something I alluded to in 

my testimony. We have to find a way to ensure that the overlap 

of these important end states, whether it’s economic, governance, 

or security—the overlap is very well coordinated so it fits the Cote 

d’Ivoire situation and it enables not just the politics, but also socioeconomic factors, to move in a positive direction. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, I’d like to thank all of our panelists for 

their input today, and thank the Chairman for calling this important hearing. Thanks, to all of you. 

Senator INHOFE. Mr. Chairman, could I——

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Isakson. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE [continuing]. Ask unanimous consent that this 

article that I referred to, ‘‘What the World Got Wrong in Cote 

d’Ivoire,’’ be made a part of the record of this proceeding today? 

Senator COONS. Without objection. 

49

Senator COONS. I will also keep the record open, for Senators 

who wish to submit statements for the record, until the close of 

business tomorrow, May 20. 

I want to thank all of our participants today, all five of our witnesses, who brought forward some, in my view, very compelling 

and very important testimony for us to consider about the appropriate path forward. All of you have raised the very real prospect 

of the central role that the United States can play in trying to encourage reconciliation and trying to support accountability, transparency, and some positive economic growth for a nation that has 

long been a real model for the region. And it is my hope that, working together, we can find a peaceful and prosperous path forward 

for the Ivoirian people, who have suffered so long, and that we can 

move forward the reconciliation that is so desperately needed in 

this wonderful country that has so much promise for the future. 

Thank you very much. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

NEWSPAPER ARTICLE SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

[From Foreign Policy Magazine, Apr. 29, 2011] 

WHAT THE WORLD GOT WRONG IN COˆ TE D’IVOIRE

(By Thabo Mbeki) 

WHY IS THE UNITED NATIONS ENTRENCHING FORMER COLONIAL POWERS ON OUR CON- TINENT? AFRICANS CAN AND SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN RESOLVING THEIR OWN DIS- PUTES. 

The second round of the Nov. 28, 2010, presidential elections in Coˆte d’Ivoire pitted against each other two longstanding political opponents, Laurent Gbagbo and 

Alassane Ouattara. For this reason, and of strategic importance, it was inevitable 

that this electoral contest would decide the long-term future of the country. Everybody concerned should have probed very seriously the critical question: Would the 

2010 elections create the conditions that would establish the basis for the best possible future for the Ivorian people? 

This was not done. 

Rather, the international community insisted that what Coˆte d’Ivoire required to 

end its crisis was to hold democratic elections, even though the conditions did not 

exist to conduct such elections. Though they knew that this proposition was fundamentally wrong, the Ivorians could not withstand the international pressure to 

hold the elections. 

However, the objective reality is that the Ivorian presidential elections should not 

have been held when they were held. It was perfectly foreseeable that they would 

further entrench the very conflict it was suggested they would end. 

The 2002 rebellion in Coˆte d’Ivoire divided the country into two parts, with the 

north controlled by the rebel Forces Nouvelles, which supported Alassane Ouattara, 

and the south in the hands of the Gbagbo-led government. Since then, Coˆte d’Ivoire 

has had two governments, administrations, armies, and ‘‘national’’ leaders. 

Any elections held under these circumstances would inevitably entrench the divisions and animosities represented and exacerbated by the 2002 rebellion. 

The structural faults which lay at the base of the 2002 rebellion include such inflammable issues as trans-national tensions affecting especially Coˆte d’Ivoire and 

Burkina Faso, Ivorian ethnic and religious antagonisms, sharing of political power, 

and access to economic and social power and opportunities. 

In this regard, the international community has assiduously suppressed proper 

appreciation of various explosive allegations which, rightly or wrongly, have informed and will continue to inform the views of the Gbagbo-supporting population 

in southern Coˆte d’Ivoire—and much of Francophone Africa! 

50

These are that Ouattara is a foreigner born in Burkina Faso, that together with 

Burkinabe` President Blaise Compaore ́ he was responsible for the 2002 rebellion, 

that his accession to power would result in the takeover of the country especially 

by Burkinabe` foreigners, and that historically, to date, he has been ready to advance 

French interests in Coˆte d’Ivoire. 

Taking all this into account, the African Union understood that a lasting solution 

of the Ivorian crisis necessitated a negotiated agreement between the two belligerent Ivorian factions, focused on the interdependent issues of democracy, peace, national reconciliation and unity. 

In protracted negotiations from 2002, the Ivorians agreed that the presidential 

elections would not be held until various conditions had been met. These included 

the reunification of the country, the restoration of the national administration to all 

parts of the Ivorian territory, and the disarmament of the rebels and all militia and 

their integration in the national security machinery, with the latter process completed at least two months ahead of any presidential elections. Despite the fact that 

none of this was honoured, the presidential elections were allowed to proceed. 

In the end, Ouattara has been installed as president of Coˆte d’Ivoire. Gbagbo, and 

his wife Simone, have ended up as humiliated prisoners. Many Ivorians have died 

and have been displaced, much infrastructure has been destroyed, and historic animosities have been exacerbated in the lead up to this outcome. 

Many things have gone radically wrong along the road to this result. 

Agreements relating to what needed to be done to create conditions for free and 

fair elections were wilfully and contemptuously ignored. The Ivorian Constitutional 

Council (CC) is the only body constitutionally empowered to determine the winner 

in any presidential election and to install the president, with the Electoral Commission (IEC) mandated to forward its provisional results to the CC. However, the very 

people who insist on the sanctity of the rule of law as fundamental to all democratic 

practice, elected illegally to recognise the provisional result announced by the chairperson of the IEC on his own, as the authentic outcome of the presidential election. 

As provided by the law, Gbagbo contested the fairness of the elections in certain 

parts of the country, especially the north. The CC, rightly or wrongly, accepted the 

majority of the complaints made by Gbagbo, identified other ‘‘irregularities,’’ annulled the votes in some districts, and declared Gbagbo the victor. The chairperson 

of the IEC did not take these alleged irregularities into account and decided that 

Ouattara had won. 

The envoy of U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, his fellow South Korean, 

SRSG Young-jin Choi, also determined that Ouattara had won, but on the basis of 

fewer votes than those announced by the IEC, having determined that some of the 

complaints made by Gbagbo were legitimate. In terms of the votes cast for the two 

candidates, the IEC, the CC, and the U.N. SRSG made three different determinations. 

Gbagbo proposed that to resolve this matter, which bears on the important issue 

of the will of the Ivorian people, an international commission should be established 

to verify the election results, with the important pre-condition that both he and 

Ouattara should accept the determination of the commission. 

This proposal was rejected by the international community—despite the fact that 

it would have resolved the electoral dispute without resort to war, and despite the 

fact that some election observers questioned the fairness of the elections, especially 

in northern Coˆte d’Ivoire. 

For instance, reporting on the elections in the north, the election observer mission 

of the AU led by Joseph Kokou Kofigoh, former prime minister of Togo, the independent civil society Societe ́ Chile Africaine pour la Democratie et l’Assistance Electoral led by Seynabou Indieguene of Senegal, and the Coordination of African Election Experts (CAEE) from Cameroon, Senegal, Benin, Mali, Morocco, Gabon, and 

Togo led by Jean-Marie Ongjibangte of Cameroon, all sounded the alarm about the 

elections in the north. 

For instance, the CAEE said: ‘‘After sharing information with other national and 

international election observers, we hereby state that the second round of the presidential elections in Coˆte d’Ivoire was held amidst major problems in (various northern) regions . . . 

‘‘These problems were stealing of ballot boxes, arresting of candidates’ representatives, multiple voting, refusal to admit international observers to witness counting 

of ballots, and the murder of representatives of candidates. To that effect, we hereby 

declare that the second round of voting was not free, fair and transparent in these 

(northern) localities.’’

For its part, to this day, the ECOWAS election observer mission has not issued 

its report on the second round of the presidential election! Why? 

51

Clearly the independent international commission proposed by Laurent Gbagbo 

could have been established and empowered to make a definitive and binding determination about what had happened. Time will tell why this was not done! 

Further, the U.N. SRSG took the extraordinary decision to exceed his mandate 

by declaring who had won the presidential election, contrary to his tasks as detailed 

by the Security Council. This positioned the U.N. Mission in Coˆte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) 

as a partisan in the Ivorian conflict, rather than a neutral peacemaker, equidistant 

from the belligerent parties. 

From this point onwards, UNOCI had no choice but actively to work for the installation of Ouattara as president of the country and the removal of Gbagbo. Ultimately, this found expression in the blatant use of its military capacities to open 

the way for the Forces Nouvelles to defeat the Gbagbo forces and capture Gbagbo, 

under the shameless pretence that it was acting to protect civilians. 

While obliged to respect its peacekeeping mandate, which included keeping the 

belligerent forces apart, UNOCI did nothing to stop the advance of the Forces 

Nouvelles from the north to the south, including and up to Abidjan. Nor did UNOCI 

or the French Licorne forces, as mandated by the United Nations, act to protect civilians in the area of Duekoue ́, where, evidently, the most concentrated murder of 

civilians took place! This recalls the United Nations’s failure to end the more catastrophic murder and abuse of civilians in the eastern Democratic Republic of the 

Congo! 

The Ivorian reality points to a number of incontrovertible conclusions. 

The agreed conditions for the holding of democratic elections in Coˆte d’Ivoire were 

not created. Despite strong allegations of electoral fraud, the international community decided against conducting any verification of the process and the announced 

results. This left unanswered the vitally important question of who actually had 

won the elections, which Ouattara might have done. 

The United Nations elected to abandon its neutrality as a peacemaker, deciding 

to be a partisan belligerent in the Ivorian conflict. 

France used its privileged place in the Security Council to position itself to play 

an important role in determining the future of Coˆte d’Ivoire, its former colony in 

which, inter alia, it has significant economic interests. It joined the United Nations 

to ensure that Ouattara emerged as the victor in the Ivorian conflict. 

This addressed the national interests of France, consistent with its Franc ̨afrique

policies, which aim to perpetuate a particular relationship with its former African 

colonies. This is in keeping with remarks made by former French President Franc ̨ois 

Mitterand when he said, ‘‘Without Africa, France will have no history in the 21st 

century,’’ which former French foreign minister Jacques Godfrain confirmed when 

he said: ‘‘A little country [France], with a small amount of strength, we can move 

a planet because [of our] . . . relations with 15 or 20 African countries . . . ’’

The AU is also not without blame, as it failed to assert itself to persuade everybody to work to achieve reconciliation among the Ivorians, and therefore durable 

peace. Tragically, the outcome that has been achieved in Coˆte d’Ivoire further entrenches the endemic conflict in this country. This is because it has placed in the 

exclusive hands of the failed rebellion of 2002 the ability to determine the future 

of the country, whereas the objective situation dictated and dictates that the people 

of Coˆte d’Ivoire should engage one another as equals to determine their shared destiny. 

During the decade he served as president of Coˆte d’Ivoire, Gbagbo had no possibility to act on his own to reunify the country and achieve reconciliation among its 

diverse people, despite the existence of negotiated agreements in this regard. As he 

serves as president of the country, Ouattara will not succeed to realise these objectives, acting on his own, outside the context of honest agreement with the sections 

of the Ivorian population represented by Gbagbo. 

What was to come was foreseen by the then U.S. ambassador in Coˆte d’Ivoire, 

Wanda L. Nesbitt. In July 2009, she advised the U.S. government: 

‘‘It now appears that the Ouaga IV agreement, [the fourth agreement to the 

Ouagadougou Political Agreement which prescribed that disarmament should precede the elections], is fundamentally an agreement between Blaise Compaore [President of Burkina Faso] and Laurent Gbagbo to share control of the north until after 

the presidential election, despite the fact that the text calls for the Forces Nouvelles 

to return control of the north to the government and complete disarmament two 

months before the election . . . 

‘‘But the 5,000 Forces Nouvelles soldiers who are to be ‘‘disarmed’’ and regrouped 

into barracks in four key cities in the north and west until a new national army 

is created, represent a serious military capability that the FAFN [Forces Nouvelles] 

intends to keep well-trained and in reserve until after the election. The hand-over 

of administrative power from the FAFN to civilian government authorities is a preVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:39 Apr 27, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011IS~1\051911-U.TXT BETTY
52

requisite for elections but, as travelers to the north (including Embassy personnel) 

confirm: the FAFN retain de facto control of the region especially when it comes to 

finances.’’

The failure to address the ‘‘pre-requisite for elections’’ predetermined their outcome. The rebel ‘‘control’’ of the north, mentioned by Ambassador Nesbitt, prescribed 

the outcome of the 2010 presidential election. Similarly, it was the ‘‘military capability’’ of the rebellion, which Ambassador Nesbitt mentioned, that was used to ensure that Ouattara became president of Coˆte d’Ivoire. 

It is little wonder that as the post-election crisis deepened, Laurent Gbagbo would 

cry out: I was betrayed! At the end of it all, there are many casualties. 

One of these is the African Union. The tragic events in Coˆte d’Ivoire have confirmed the marginalization of the union in its ability to resolve the most important 

African challenges. 

Instead, the AU has asserted the ability of the major powers to intervene to resolve these challenges by using their various capacities to legitimize their actions 

by persuading the United Nations to authorise their self-serving interventions. 

The United Nations is yet another casualty. It has severely undermined its acceptability as a neutral force in the resolution of internal conflicts, such as the one 

in Coˆte d’Ivoire. It will now be difficult for the United Nations to convince Africa 

and the rest of the developing world that it is not a mere instrument in the hands 

of the world’s major powers. This has confirmed the urgency of the need to restructure the organisation, based on the view that as presently structured the United 

Nations has no ability to act as a truly democratic representative of its member 

states. 

Thus, in various ways, the events in Coˆte d’Ivoire could serve as a defining moment in terms of the urgent need to reengineer the system of international relations. They have exposed the reality of the balance and abuse of power in the postCold War era, and put paid to the fiction that the major powers respect the rule 

of law in the conduct of international relations, even as defined by the U.N. Charter, 

and that, as democrats, they respect the views of the peoples of the world. 

We can only hope that Laurent and Simone Gbagbo and the Ivorian people do not 

continue to suffer as abused and humiliated victims of a global system which, in 

its interests, while shouting loudly about universal human rights, only seeks to perpetuate the domination of the many by the few who dispose of preponderant political, economic, military and media power. 

The perverse and poisonous proceedings that have afflicted Coˆte d’Ivoire pose the 

urgent question: How many blatant abuses of power will Africa and the rest of the 

developing world experience before the vision of a democratic system of global governance is realised? 

RESPONSES OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY WILLIAM FITZGERALD TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER COONS

Question. You mentioned that the State Department is considering lifting restrictions on assistance to Cote d’Ivoire which have been in place since 1999. What additional forms of aid do you hope to provide to Cote d’Ivoire, and what legal restrictions stand in the way?

Answer. Currently, direct assistance to the Government of Cote d’Ivoire is limited 

due to restrictions under section 7008 of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (SFOAA.) These restrictions were 

imposed following a military coup in December 1999. When these restrictions are 

lifted, U.S. assistance in Cote d’Ivoire will focus on political reconciliation, economic 

recovery, and security sector reform initiatives as part of the international effort to 

support President Ouattara’s outlined plan for governing.

Question. As the State Department reviews its policies toward Cote d’Ivoire, what 

concrete benchmarks will you use to measure the commitment to good governance 

by the Ouattara government? What steps can President Ouattara take to meet such 

benchmarks, and how might the ongoing government formation and reconciliation 

process impact U.S. policy going forward?

Answer. An important benchmark for governance will be holding legislative elections in a timely manner, which will help ensure that the Ivoirian Government is 

representative and responsive. Additionally, following through on President 

Ouattara’s commitments to cooperate with impartial investigations into the alleged 

human rights abuses during the post-election period will be an important element 

of reconciliation and set the tone for good governance moving forward. This includes 

cooperation with the International Criminal Court’s investigation, as well as the 

53

consideration of any recommendations that may come from the United Nations 

Commission of Inquiry. We will continue to engage with President Ouattara to ensure that reconciliation and good governance remain top priorities as he makes key 

decisions about the makeup of his government and future policies.

Question. What do you envision as both the U.S. and broader international role 

in supporting the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process in 

Cote d’Ivoire? Are we currently providing any form of assistance to the Republican 

Forces of Cote d’Ivoire (FRCI) and is the State Department considering expanding 

such assistance in the future? To what degree are you consulting with DOD—especially AFRICOM—on this issue?

Answer. In the short term, U.S. and international efforts on DDR will likely be 

focused on support for the United Nations’ DDR programs. In the longer term, as 

President Ouattara outlines his plans for broad security sector reform, the United 

States and the international community will play an important role in supporting 

professionalization, training, and reform of the military, police, and gendarmes. Due 

to longstanding restrictions on assistance to the Government of Cote d’Ivoire, we are 

not currently providing any form of assistance to the FRCI. We are working closely 

with the Department of Defense and AFRICOM, as well as international partners, 

to explore options for supporting security sector reform should those restrictions be 

lifted.

Question. How do you assess the role of the U.N. Operation in Cote d’Ivoire 

(UNOCI) over the past 6 months, and what is its projected role going forward? Does 

it have sufficient financial, logistical, personnel means to fulfill its mandate, and 

what steps can the United States take to support its efforts?

Answer. The United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) played a very 

important role as a part of the wider international effort to end the conflict in Cote 

d’Ivoire and to ensure that the results of credible elections were respected. Following former President Gbagbo’s use of heavy weaponry against unarmed civilians, 

the U.N. Security Council called for the UNOCI and French military force Licorne 

to act under their mandates and take ‘‘all necessary measures’’ to protect civilians 

under imminent threat, including by neutralizing heavy weapons in and around 

Abidjan. These operations were critical in preventing further escalation of violence 

in Abidjan. 

UNOCI’s current mandate includes provision of logistical and technical support 

for the legislative elections, and contains a certification role for the Special Representative (SRSG). UNOCI’s support for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants from both sides of the conflict will also be an important 

factor in stabilizing the more volatile regions and creating a safe environment for 

legislative elections to proceed. 

We remain closely engaged with the SRSG in Abidjan and the U.N. Department 

of Peacekeeping Operations to ensure that UNOCI has the resources it needs to 

carry out its mandate, and as we consider options for further U.S. assistance in 

these areas we will ensure that our efforts complement, rather than duplicate, 

UNOCI’s work.

Question. Cote d’Ivoire has been on the Global Office of Trafficking in Persons (G/

TIP) Tier 2 Watch List for the past 2 years and there is an expectation that it may 

be downgraded to Tier 3. Understanding that the State Department may not be able 

to comment in advance of the release of the G/TIP report in June, what are State’s 

plans for reaching out to the Ouattara Ivoirian Government on this issue? Is it possible that prospective sanctions would interfere with U.S. aid for Cote d’Ivoire?

Answer. Trafficking in persons remains a key element of our overall engagement 

with the Government of Cote d’Ivoire, as it was under former President Gbagbo as 

well. We will press for trafficking in persons and other human rights concerns to 

be prioritized as the new government is formed and policies are announced. Should 

Cote d’Ivoire be ranked Tier 3 in the TIP Report, it would potentially be subject to 

sanctions under the TVPA, which could restrict some forms of U.S. assistance to the 

country. 

RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR NANCY LINDBORG TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER A. COONS

Question. In your testimony you state that U.S. assistance will be a temporary 

bandage unless Cote d’Ivoire gains stability and an effective governing structure. 

What steps must be taken by President Ouattara to improve governance to ensure 

the impact of humanitarian assistance is lasting and sustainable?

54

Answer. The challenges faced by the Ivoirian Government are many and multifaceted. The degree to which Cote d’Ivoire forms an effective and legitimate government will determine the sustainability of our humanitarian assistance. Key steps 

in this process will include creating the conditions for reconciliation, accountability, 

security sector reform, and economic opportunities. 

Ensuring the impact of our assistance will require the new government to avoid 

the exploitation of religion and ethnicity for political gain. Thus the Government of 

Cote d’Ivoire will need to promote reconciliation and restore the trust between the 

state and its citizens, working closely with the country’s vibrant business and civil 

society communities. Broad-based political participation will instill a sense of confidence in the Ivorian people and create the conditions for unity. The government 

has done a good job in promoting messages of reconciliation and should continue to 

build this foundation for peace and prosperity for which Cote d’Ivoire was once 

known. 

Likewise, accountability will play a key role moving Cote d’Ivoire beyond conflict. 

The nascent Truth and Reconciliation Commission is a forum to address past injustices and transition to an era of respect for human rights and democracy. Prosecution should be based on the extent of rights abuses and done regardless of political 

affiliation. Individuals that committed human rights abuses from both sides need 

to be held accountable and brought to justice. 

Many of the reported abuses have been committed by the country’s security sector. Reforming this sector will be one of the Ivorian Government’s greatest challenges and should be supported. The transformation of the security forces into a 

trusted institution will ensure long-term stability. Additionally, it will create confidence in the new government that it can provide essential services to regions 

plagued by violence and impunity. 

Cote d’Ivoire was once known as an African success story with a vibrant economy. 

Its people remain proud and eager to restore this reputation. The cocoa, cotton, and 

cashew industries have great potential and could again provide jobs for thousands 

of Ivoirians throughout the country. The ability of these sectors to create economic 

opportunities will reduce the need for further humanitarian assistance.

Question. Describe the challenges USAID faces in allocating funds in Cote 

d’Ivoire, especially without a mission on the ground. To what extent might 

reprogramming be necessary, and how will this impact the scope and amount of 

requested funds in the next fiscal year?

Answer. USAID’s FY 2011 and FY 2012 budget requests for Cote d’Ivoire were 

limited to health and humanitarian assistance activities, largely as a result of political turmoil and sanctions currently in place. USAID and the State Department are 

currently reviewing options for assistance and potential funding availability as we 

craft the FY 2011 operating year budget. Given limited resources, USAID and State 

will need to be selective in the types of activities initiated in Cote d’Ivoire to ensure 

that we are fully utilizing our comparative advantage and coordinating our work 

with other donors. 

In lieu of a bilateral mission, USAID programs in Cote d’Ivoire are managed from 

the West Africa Regional Mission in Accra, Ghana. One full-time Senior Heath Officer provides oversight for the portion of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS 

Relief (PEPFAR) program managed by USAID. Broader USAID engagement in Cote 

d’Ivoire will require a reevaluation of management structure and support. 

The Africa budget requests for FY 2013 will take into account the current situation in Cote d’Ivoire as well as USAID’s regional priorities in Africa.

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