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Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution. A Catchphrase in 

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Air University

AIR FORCE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Centralized Control and 

Decentralized Execution

A Catchphrase in Crisis?

Clint Hinote

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Research Paper 2009–1

Air Force Research Institute 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112–6026

March 2009
ii

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the 

author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air Force Research Institute, Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government 

agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

Air Force Research Institute (AFRI) papers and Air University Monographs are occasional studies written by 

Air Force researchers at large and military defense analysts assigned to the Air Force Research Institute at Air 

University and beyond. The purpose of the AFRI papers 

is to provide useful ideas and independent analysis of 

issues of current or potential importance to Air Force 

commanders and their staffs. This monograph and others in the series are also available electronically at the 

Air University Research Web site at https://research 

.maxwell.af.mil and the Air and Space Power Journal

Web site at http://www.airpower.au.af.mil.
iii

Contents

Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

CENTRALIZED CONTROL AND DECENTRALIZED 

EXECUTION: A CATCHPHRASE IN CRISIS? . . . . . . . . . 1

Salvaging the Master Tenet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Historical Context and an Age-Old Question . . . . . . 3

Breaking Down the Master Tenet and 

Understanding Fundamental Issues . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Answering the Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Centralization versus Decentralization 

in Air Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Illustrations interspersed throughout.

v

Foreword

Lt Col Clint Hinote looks at recent combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, interested particularly with the operational 

inter­section of air and ground forces. He discovered a continuing dialog about one of the Air Force’s major tenets—centralized control, decentralized execution. He suggests that all parties, both ground and air advocates, may need to reexamine 

the purpose and application of this doctrinal point. All services 

since World War II have been interested in this issue; everyone 

is seeking to make air/ground operations both effective and efficient. He points out that the issue between centralization and 

decentralization has an enduring quality, too, one that goes 

beyond air/ground operations, and he employs the famous 

theoretician, B. H. Liddell Hart, to suggest that centralization/

decentralization is always a compromise in combat. Hinote calls 

on Airmen specifically to examine this issue because they need 

to communicate better its application in operations.

Hinote’s primary premise is that Airmen need to understand 

that there is an inherent need for balance between centralization and decentralization. He again uses Hart to underline the 

message that there is a service proclivity to seek service points 

of view which preclude balance. Hinote takes it head-on. He 

examines the tenet, analyzing current criticisms in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, and recommends a three-step course: (1) evaluate 

the common language; (2) create doctrine to show Airmen the 

necessity for flexibility; and (3) apply the doctrine for a more 

flexible approach to command and control arrangements—moving execution away from dogma and back to sound doctrine.

JOHN A. SHAUD 

General, USAF Retired, PhD 

Director, Air Force Research Institute

vii

About the Author

Lt Col Clint “Q” Hinote is currently engaged in multiple projects dealing with airpower applications in irregular warfare at 

Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. His previous 

assignment was chief of the Strategy Division in the Central 

Command Air Forces Combined Air Operations Center, where 

he served as the lead air strategist and planner for Operations 

Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom from July 2006 to August 2007. Colonel Hinote is a graduate of the US Air Force 

Academy, Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, 

the USAF Weapons School, and the School of Advanced Air and 

Space Studies. He is a senior pilot with over 2,400 flying hours, 

including operational experience in the F-16 and the F-117.

ix

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Gen Steve Lorenz and Lt Gen Al Peck for 

their support for this project, especially in their previous jobs 

as the Air University commander and the Curtis E. Lemay Center commander. I would also like to thank my immediate supervisors at the Lemay Center, Col Russell Smith and Col John 

Gunnoe, for giving me the time needed to complete this work. 

The leaders at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies 

provided me a quiet office in the library, and the professors allowed me to bounce many ideas off of them. I am grateful for 

their support and friendship.

This project would not have been possible without the help 

and encouragement of the good folks at the Air Force Research 

Institute, especially Gen John Shaud, Col Mike Davis, Dr. Dan 

Mortensen, and Lt Col Paul Berg. I appreciate the help provided 

by the people at Air University Press in getting this manuscript 

ready for publishing. Finally, I would like to thank my two most 

important editors, Ren Hinote (my mother) and Myra Hinote (my 

wife), for their long hours of work correcting my many mistakes.



Centralized Control and 

Decentralized Execution

A Catchphrase in Crisis?

The Air Force’s master tenet of centralized control, decentralized execution is in danger of becoming dogma. Airmen have 

difficulty communicating the meaning of this phrase in a joint 

setting.1 This is partially due to our limited understanding of 

its history and the imprecise meaning of the words involved. 

Furthermore, the irregular conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq 

(and the ongoing service debates in the Pacific) have demonstrated the need for a deeper understanding of this master tenet to advocate effectively for airpower solutions. We must get 

this right, as it is critical to maximizing airpower’s potential. 

Getting it right, however, requires moving beyond sound bites 

and bumper stickers.

Airmen need to step back and examine the primary issues in 

play. The tension between centralization and decentralization 

is not new, nor is it limited to the command and control of airpower. Something about airpower (including space and cyberspace operations) alters the discussion, however. Indeed, that 

the debate between the centralization and decentralization of 

airpower has surfaced repeatedly in numerous cultures and 

contexts points to the enduring nature of the question. 

No simple answer abounds. We cannot say that air operations should always be centralized or decentralized, because 

any such assertion withers before logic and evidence. This issue is what B. H. Liddell Hart calls a duality: “Like a coin, it has 

two faces. Hence the need for a well-calculated compromise as 

a means to reconciliation.”2 In other words, there is a trade-off 

between centralization and decentralization in any military operation. As with any trade-off, we must appreciate the factors 

involved to achieve the proper balance (fig.1). Unfortunately, 

Liddell Hart warns us that achieving this balance is difficult: 

“The idea of preserving a broad and balanced point of view is 

anathema to the mass, who crave for a slogan and detest the 

complexities of independent thought.”3
Salvaging the Master Tenet

This monograph searches for the “broad and balanced point 

of view” behind the familiar, yet still controversial, slogan of 

centralized control and decentralized execution. It begins with 

the history behind this tenet, including both general military 

operations and specific air operations. Given this context, this 

monograph analyzes the tenet to determine what it really means. 

It proceeds to explain some traditional criticisms of the tenet, 

many of which have been made by airmen. It continues to examine the challenges to the master tenet that have arisen in 

the current operational environment, including ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

In response to these challenges, this monograph concludes 

with three recommendations that will help clarify the tenet and 

A deeper truth to which Foch and other disciples of 

Clausewitz did not penetrate fully is that in war every 

problem, and every principle, is a duality. Like a coin, 

it has two faces. Hence the need for a well-calculated 

compromise as a means to reconciliation.

B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy

Figure 1. A deeper truth. (Reprinted from Army Command and General 

Staff College Combined Arms Research Library at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/

carl/resources/csi/hart/hart.asp.)
reclaim its original intent. First, we should examine potential 

changes to the language we choose to summarize the tenet. 

Second, we should create doctrine that teaches airmen how to 

apply the tenet with the flexibility that is inherent in airpower 

itself. Third, we should apply this updated doctrine and adopt 

a more flexible approach to our command and control arrangements in ongoing operations. Not only will these improvements 

help to salvage the master tenet from sound-bite status, they 

also will be in keeping with the best practices established by one 

of our most successful air commanders—Gen George Kenney—

who served as Gen Douglas MacArthur’s primary air commander in the Pacific during World War II. We should follow 

General Kenney’s example and maintain his flexibility of intellect if we want to move centralized control and decentralized 

execution away from dogma and back to sound doctrine.

Historical Context and an Age-Old Question

Once military forces grew in diversity so that leaders could 

assign separate tasks to subordinate groups, commanders had 

to confront a tension between centralization and decentralization.4 Thoughtful commanders have recognized that this is not 

an either-or proposition as much as a question of balance. As 

Martin van Creveld writes, centralization and decentralization 

“are not so much opposed to each other as perversely interlocking.”5 When commanders exerted centralized control at higher 

levels, their subordinates’ options were restricted. This led to 

slower reactions and, at times, paralysis. Alternatively, preserving freedom of action at the lower levels reduced the options available to the overall commander.

A historic example helps to illustrate this point. In the US 

Civil War, an army commander could choose to keep his cavalry on a tight leash or give his subordinate commander considerable freedom of action. The tight leash had the advantage 

of allowing the overall commander to direct the cavalry’s efforts 

to suit his most pressing needs, yet it limited operational tempo 

and precluded opportunities to exploit success. The opposite 

was also true. Empowerment allowed for a higher tempo guided 

by broad mission-type orders, yet it greatly increased the risk 

that the cavalry would not be available at a critical place or time. 
Such was the case when Gen Robert E. Lee issued broad discretionary orders to his subordinate commander, J. E. B. Stuart, 

and then suffered through the absence of Stuart’s cavalry brigade in the critical opening stages of Gettysburg (fig. 2).

Figure 2. The absence of cavalry. (Reprinted from http://www.army.mil/ 

-images/1865/04/09/03508/ and http://www.msc.navy.mil/mpstwo/stuart.htm.)

The absence of the cavalry was 

most seriously felt by General Lee. 

He had directed General Stuart to 

use his discretion as to where and 

when to cross the river—that is he 

was to cross east of the mountains, or retire through the mountain passes into the valley and 

cross in the immediate rear of the 

infantry, and the movements of the 

enemy and his own judgment 

should determine....

Colonel Walter Herron Taylor 

Adjustant General, Army of Northern Virginia 

Four Years with General Lee

This tension between centralization and decentralization is 

not limited to land warfare. In his landmark work, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783, Alfred Thayer Mahan presents a remarkable discussion of this tension at sea. In 

this section, Mahan finds himself criticizing the great British 

admiral Horatio Nelson in his conduct during the Battle of Trafalgar (a fact that clearly makes him uncomfortable).6 Nelson 

chose to position his ship, the HMS Victory, in the lead of one 

of two columns, while his second in command, Adm Cuthbert 

Collingwood, led the other. Mahan observes that this decision 

had an irreversible consequence. Nelson would have to rely on 

decentralized execution by his subordinate captains once the 

battle began (fig. 3). As soon as the two columns smashed into 
the French line, Mahan explains that Nelson and Collingwood 

were “speedily obliterated, as admirals, in the smoke of the 

battle, leaving to those who came after them no guidance or 

control except the brilliancy of their courage and example.”7

Mahan proposes that it would have been better had Nelson 

and Collingwood been positioned with the reserve (essentially 

in the rear of the columns), as this would have given them the 

ability to adjust for the unexpected until “the latest possible 

moment.”8 In analyzing warfare at sea, Mahan observes that 

there are two “moments of greatest importance in a sea-fight”: 

the initial attack and the engagement of the reserve.9 The fundamental problem, notes Mahan, is the commander cannot be 

in two places at once, even though “you want the spirit of the 

leader at both extremities.” The commander must either lead 

the initial attack and trust that subordinates will do the right 

thing, or the commander must wait with the reserve and give 

up a measure of control in the initial stages of the battle. Most 

military commanders have experienced similar tensions between centralization and decentralization, and several authors 

Figure 3. The Battle of Trafalgar. (Reprinted from http://commons.wikimedia 

.org/wiki/image:TrafalgarBattle.jpg.)

Admiral Nelson 

and Vice Admiral 

Collingwood led 

their respective 

columns in the 

initial attack. As 

soon as the 

battle was 

joined, their 

ability to provide 

direction and 

adjust as the 

situation 

changed was 

lost, according 

to Mahan.

The Battle of Trafalgar
have addressed these tensions in informative works such as 

Martin van Creveld’s Command in War. The majority view agrees 

that decentralization deserves the benefit of the doubt. As an 

example of this view, van Creveld concludes his work with a 

resounding recommendation in favor of decentralization. “Returning now to the two basic ways of coping with uncertainty, 

centralization and decentralization,” writes van Creveld, “if 

twenty-five centuries of historical experience are any guide, the 

second way will be superior to the first.”10

Additionally, there is wide agreement in US military doctrine 

that decentralized operations are most effective in achieving 

the tempo required for success on the modern battlefield. For 

example, Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces 

of the United States, has this guidance for US commanders:

Unity of effort over complex operations is made possible through decentralized execution of centralized, overarching plans. Advances in information systems and communications may enhance the situational 

awareness (SA) and understanding of tactical CDRs [commanders], 

subordinate JFCs [joint force commanders], CCDRs [combatant commanders], and even the national leadership. These technological advances increase the potential for superiors, once focused solely on strategic and operational decision making, to assert themselves at the 

tactical level. While this will be their prerogative, decentralized execution 

remains a basic C2 [command and control] tenet of joint operations.11

Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, follows suit with 

this description of the concept of mission command:

The Army’s preferred method of exercising command and control is 

mission command. Mission command is the conduct of military 

operations through decentralized execution based on mission orders. Successful mission command demands that subordinate 

leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined initiative, acting aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission within the 

commander’s intent. Mission command gives subordinates the greatest possible freedom of action. Commanders focus their orders on the 

purpose of the operation rather than on the details of how to perform 

assigned tasks. They delegate most decisions to subordinates. This 

minimizes detailed control and empowers subordinates’ initiative. Mission command emphasizes timely decision making, understanding the 

higher commander’s intent, and clearly identifying the subordinates’ 

tasks necessary to achieve the desired end state. It improves subordinates’ ability to act effectively in fluid, chaotic situations.12 (emphasis in 

original)
These statements suggest that the Air Force’s master tenet 

of centralized control and decentralized execution may be 

out of step with the prevailing body of thought. There is more 

to the story, however. While the US military has firmly established a preference for decentralization, there appears to be 

something about the command and control of airpower—including space and cyberspace operations—that adds a new 

element to this discussion. Moreover, it may even tip the balance the opposite way. 

A Short History of the Master Tenet

The tension between centralization and decentralization in 

commanding air forces emerged as early as World War I. In the 

Great War, the airplane was an unfamiliar weapon, and air resources were often broken up into small groups to provide direct support for, and in some cases be subordinate to, ground 

commanders. Lee Kennett, author of The First Air War, writes 

that this seemed to make good sense, saying, “It quickly became apparent that the tasks of aerial observation and artillery 

spotting were more effectively done when air units were paired 

with ground elements on a stable and reasonably permanent 

basis. An artillery battery and an aerial observation team 

worked more smoothly and harmoniously as they made acquaintance and developed mutual confidence.”13

At other times, however, it became apparent that centralized 

control was more effective when dealing with large formations 

and relatively independent lines of operation. Such was the 

case when over 1,500 aircraft flew under the operational control of Brig Gen William “Billy” Mitchell in support of Gen John 

Pershing’s drive to Saint-Mihiel.14 In addition, friction quickly 

emerged between airmen and soldiers. Airmen grew frustrated 

with a lack of understanding of airpower employment considerations by ground commanders, and they desired autonomy.15

These tensions were never fully resolved during the war, and 

after the armistice, progress remained limited.

This lack of progress proved costly, as these same issues resurfaced during the Allies’ North Africa campaign in World War 

II. Initially, the Allies divided their air forces into multiple organizations with separate chains of command. This decreased 
airpower’s effectiveness against the German Luftwaffe and resulted in the loss of numerous Allied soldiers to aerial attack.16

This debacle led to the famous line about penny packets coined 

by Air Marshal Sir Arthur W. Tedder, who served as a senior 

Allied air commander in North Africa and argued that “if your 

organization is such that your air power is divided up into separate packets and there is no overall unity of command at the 

top, once again you will lose your powers of concentration. Airpower in penny packets is worse than useless. It fritters away 

and achieves nothing. The old fable of the bundle of faggots 

compared with the individual stick is abundantly true of airpower. Its strength lies in unity” (fig. 4).17 The calamity of North 

Africa also led to the first assertion in official US doctrine about 

centralized control of airpower, when this emphatic declaration 

appeared in FM 100-20, Command and Employment of Airpower, in July 1943:

CONTROL OF AVAILABLE AIR POWER MUST BE CENTRALIZED AND 

COMMAND MUST BE EXERCISED THROUGH THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER IF THIS INHERENT FLEXIBILITY AND ABILITY TO DELIVER 

A DECISVE BLOW ARE TO BE FULLY EXPLOITED. . . . THE SUPERIOR 

COMMANDER WILL NOT ATTACH ARMY AIR FORCES TO UNITS OF 

THE GROUND FORCES UNDER HIS COMMAND EXCEPT WHEN SUCH 

GROUND FORCE UNITS ARE OPERATING INDEPENDENTLY OR ARE 

ISOLATED BY DISTANCE OR LACK OF COMMUNICATION.18 [all caps 

in original]

There was no mention of the value of decentralization in this 

landmark document, but this would change after the Air Force 

attained independent status in 1947.

 In its first basic doctrine document, which was not released 

until 1953, the Air Force presented a more balanced view, reaffirming the value of centralization while promoting a degree of 

decentralization, and stated that “assignment of control of 

forces at any level other than that which is able to exploit fully 

their weapons is contrary to accepted military doctrine. The effective utilization of military forces requires that command systems be established which will guarantee both centralized overall direction and decentralized control of operations under 

appropriate subordinate commanders.”19

Note that, in this document, the Air Force changed the 

wording of its most basic belief about the command of air-
power from centralized control (FM 100-20) to a combination 

of centralized overall direction and decentralized control (Air 

Force Manual [AFMAN] 1-2, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine). This development hinted at the difficulty the Air Force 

would experience over the years in finding the right language 

to describe what it believed about the duality of centralization 

and decentralization. 

The Air Force continued to modify this language after Vietnam. Air Force leaders perceived the way that Pres. Lyndon B. 

Johnson delved into tactical details of air operations to be “centralized control run amuck”; so, it strengthened its language 

concerning decentralization.20 Consequently, the 1971 version 

of Air Force Basic Doctrine contained the guidance that “aerospace forces must be centrally allocated and directed at a level 

which permits exploitation of diverse capabilities in support of 

overall objectives. Concurrently, mission control and execution 

of specific tasks must be decentralized to a level which permits 

maximum responsiveness to local conditions and requirements. These complementary concepts—centralized allocation 

Figure 4. Divided airpower. (Reprinted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Arthur_Tedder,_1st_Baron_Tedder) 

. . . if your organization is such 

that your air power is divided 

up into separate packets and 

there is no overall unity of 

comand at the top, once 

again you will lose your powers 

of concentration. Air power in 

penny packets is worse than 

useless. It fritters away and 

achieves nothing. The old 

fable of the bundle of faggots 

compared with the individual 

stick is abundantly true of air 

power. Its strength lies in unity.

Air Marshal Sir Arthur W. Tedder 

“Air, Land, and Sea Warfare”
10

and direction and decentralized control and execution—are 

fundamental to the effective application of aerospace power.”21

Also note that control was still associated with the adjective 

decentralized. By 1975, however, the language evolved to something that currently looks quite familiar: “The basic principles 

of centralized control, decentralized execution, and coordinated 

effort are fundamental to the success of aerospace operations.”22

Although this wording has remained essentially unchanged 

since the 1975 document, Air Force doctrine writers have found 

it necessary to expound upon the meaning of centralized control and decentralized execution numerous times in the intervening years. The latest attempts to clarify the confusion surrounding these terms appear later.

One more aspect of the evolution of the phrase deserves mention. A major effort to encourage jointness among the services 

culminated in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. This law 

mandated the establishment of permanent regional commanders with authority to exercise command over all US military 

forces in their area of responsibility. The construct was put to 

a major test when, in 1990, Saddam Hussein initiated the Iraqi 

invasion of Kuwait that led to Operation Desert Storm in 1991. 

To the Air Force, the effectiveness of airpower in Desert Storm 

proved that the appropriate level of centralized control was the 

senior airman in-theater, also known as the joint forces air 

component commander (JFACC). Consequently, the 1992 version of AFMAN 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United 

States Air Force, contained this assertion:

Since 1943, the most vexing control issue has been the level at which 

control should be centralized, including the question as to whether all 

aerospace power (Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps) should fall 

under a single aerospace component commander. Too much or too little 

centralization has proven to be counterproductive, the former delaying 

responsiveness and the latter leading to dissipation of effort. Based on 

experience from World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Operation Desert 

Storm, the most effective and efficient scheme is control of all aerospace 

assets by a single Joint Force Air Component Commander responsible 

for integrating employment of all aerospace forces within a theater of 

operations.23

To Airmen, the theater level was the appropriate level to exercise centralized command and control of air operations, and 
11

the JFACC was assumed to be the senior airman in a theater 

capable of “integrating employment of all aerospace forces” 

within this theater. 

In addition, both Air Force and joint doctrine evolved to include the concepts of apportionment (the distribution of scarce 

resources for planning purposes) and allocation (the translation of apportionment plans to actual numbers for execution).24

In a joint force with air assets that can accomplish multiple 

missions, it is necessary to apportion air assets to different 

mission sets in the planning process. For example, such modern attack fighters as the F-16 can accomplish air superiority, 

suppression of enemy air defenses, close air support, interdiction, and strategic attack missions. In the planning process, 

someone has to decide between these various missions. Joint 

doctrine now makes the JFACC responsible for recommending 

a daily apportionment plan to the joint force commander for 

approval.25 This recommendation identifies air assets and the 

missions they will accomplish by “percentage, priority, weight 

of effort, or some other appropriate means.”26 The joint force 

commander then has the final say regarding what assigned assets will do (fig. 5).27 Once this decision has been made, the 

JFACC and his planning staff allocate air assets by translating 

the apportionment decisions into actual numbers of sorties.28

With this scenario in mind, the issue of command and control of air operations in a joint environment seemed to be resolved. Unfortunately, one problem remained. Communication 

technologies advanced at an astonishingly rapid pace in the 

1990s, and the Air Force integrated many of these technologies 

into the JFACC’s primary command and control node, the air 

operations center (AOC). With these advances in hand, it became possible—even easy—for the JFACC, a commander at the 

operational level of war, to become personally involved in tactical 

execution, even to the point of directing the actions of individual 

aircraft. Indeed, this became a reality in 1995 during Operation 

Deliberate Force in Bosnia, where a single JFACC directed air 

operations down to the tactical level.29 For many airmen, this 

was troublesome, and doctrine revisions through 2003 reflect 

an uneasiness concerning the degree of centralization made 

possible by a mature AOC enabled by modern communication 

technologies. 
12

This was the situation as the Air Force entered the conflict in 

Afghanistan in 2001. The service believed that it had struck the 

proper balance between centralization and decentralization and 

that it had found the right level of centralization in the senior 

airman in-theater—the JFACC. It had worked tirelessly to establish this concept firmly in joint doctrine. While some airmen 

worried that the JFACC would extend his reach into tactics, 

they also believed that was a small price to pay for the benefits 

of centralized command and control. Operations Enduring 

Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, however, would present new challenges to the Air Force and its belief in the master tenet. Before 

considering that story, however, it is useful to analyze the essential elements of centralized control and decentralized execution and present several traditional criticisms of the concept.

Figure 5. Effectiveness of airpower. (Reprinted from http://www.af.mil/photos/

index.asp?galleryID=5331&page=2 and http://hq.afnews.af.mil/hometown/

hometownlink%20photos/slides/caoc2.htm.)

To the Air Force, the effectiveness of 

airpower in DESERT STORM proved 

that the appropriate level of 

centralized control was the senior 

airman in-theater, also known as the 

Joint Forces Air Component 

Commander (JFACC).

Above: General Horner, 

JFACC for Operation 

DESERT STORM

Right: Combined Air 

Operations Center, 

Southwest Asia
13

Breaking Down the Master Tenet and 

Understanding Fundamental Issues

Two important aspects of centralized control and decentralized execution lie beneath the surface. The first aspect focuses 

on the relationship of centralization to the independence of airpower. As noted in the beginning of this monograph, the tension between centralization and decentralization is a recurring 

one in military operations, but the development of airpower 

added a new ingredient to the mix that changed the flavor of 

the debate. As traditional military officers learned to fly and 

command air formations, they grew to believe that airpower 

could change the nature of military operations. It could not 

reach its potential, however, when tightly controlled by ground 

commanders. This led them to conclude that considering airpower an adjunct to ground power would hinder its development in the same way that considering tanks as an arm of the 

infantry hindered the development of armored warfare.30 Such 

airpower advocates as Billy Mitchell concluded that independence was necessary for airpower to develop its potential as a 

coequal partner with ground and maritime power.31 As a result, 

the issue of centralization and decentralization could never be 

divorced from the issue of airpower’s independence. This explains why discussions in air doctrine have consistently asserted that control of air operations must be centralized under 

an airman. When the Goldwater-Nichols Act created a construct that centralized all control in a joint officer who would 

not necessarily be an airman, the Air Force quickly developed 

the concept of a JFACC and put great effort into equipping an 

AOC that would allow this air officer to centrally control air 

operations for the joint force commander.

The second aspect that is often absent from the discussion is 

economic—the demand for airpower is high in modern warfare, 

and the supply is relatively low. Were this not the case, there 

would be little need for the master tenet. With the availability 

of plentiful air assets, commanders could decentralize with little 

loss of effectiveness. Conceivably, each ground commander 

could be assigned discrete sets of air assets, and there is evidence to suggest that this would be quite effective, if somewhat 

inefficient. Alternatively, if demand for airpower were low, few 
14

would care how it is commanded and controlled. The high demand for airpower testifies to its perceived value.

Limited supply, on the other hand, is at least partially a result of choices made by Airmen. As modern airplanes became 

more capable—and more expensive—Air Force leaders generally chose quality over quantity. These choices led to limited 

numbers of capable aircraft, and there is solid evidence that 

this has been a winning formula in traditional conflicts. In the 

irregular conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan, however, it has led 

to tension between the Air Force and the Army, a situation discussed later. Before considering these modern conflicts, it is 

important to break down the master tenet into its four essential elements.

Essential Elements of the Master Tenet

First, centralized command and control promotes effectiveness and preserves flexibility at the strategic and operational 

levels of war. The first essential element of the master tenet is 

centralization. Airmen believe that airpower should be commanded centrally because elements of airpower—including 

those in air, space, and cyberspace—can be mixed to achieve 

greater effects than could be accomplished through multiple 

independent operations. Moreover, airpower can be shifted 

quickly across the operational environment to respond to 

changing conditions. Centralization, when combined with the 

principle of unity of command, requires airpower to be directed 

by an officer who enjoys a span of control that roughly matches 

the geographical range of the air assets available. Centralized 

command and control precludes the dilution and penny packeting of airpower that has limited its effectiveness. 

It is important to explain why we use the term command and 

control instead of simply control. As will be discussed later, the 

term control is confusing. In fact, this may be the primary criticism of the sound bite we use to describe the master tenet. A 

major reason for this is the continued influence of Martin van 

Creveld’s historical study, Command in War. In the opening 

paragraph of the book, van Creveld explains that he is writing 

about C3—command, control, and communications—and to 

streamline the book, he chooses to use the word command to 
15

summarize C3.

32 Van Creveld also makes it clear that, in discussing command, he is discussing everything a military force 

needs, both to exist and to operate.33 He writes that “The responsibilities of command are commonly divided into two parts. First, 

command must arrange and coordinate everything an army 

needs to exist—its food supply, its sanitary system, its system of 

military justice, and so on. Second, command enables the army 

to carry out its proper mission, . . . to this part of command belong, for example, the gathering of intelligence and the planning 

and monitoring of operations.”34 Our joint definition of command

follows this structure closely.35

One problem surfaced with van Creveld’s approach, however. 

Command in War was published in 1985, the year before Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 

Reorganization Act of 1986. While van Creveld included in command everything a force needed to exist—that is, what we call 

organizing, training, and equipping—together with the things a 

force needed to conduct operations, the US military was undergoing a fundamental reorganization that, in essence, separated 

these functions into two distinct chains of command. GoldwaterNichols mandated that the services organize, train, and equip 

their forces, but the combatant commanders would direct operations with these forces. This meant that in the US military 

the word command would become a term full of nuance and 

qualification, because Goldwater-Nichols split van Creveld’s 

concept in halves.

Because only the president and the secretary of defense exercised true command, usage of the term control increased exponentially. The joint definition of the term control is vague: 

“Authority that may be less than full command exercised by a 

commander over part of the activities of subordinate or other 

organizations.”36 The US military uses this malleable term to 

describe many functions and authorities, including administrative control, operational control, tactical control, and close 

control. The distinctions between these concepts are so large 

that our senior leaders often require refresher training before 

they attend joint leadership courses. Little wonder, then, that 

our Airmen have problems explaining centralized control in a 

joint setting.
16

Despite the vague use of both command and control as military terms, the common understanding of command and control for military operations is relatively clear. Command and 

control is “The exercise of authority and direction by a properly 

designated commander over assigned and attached forces in 

the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control 

functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, 

equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed 

by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the 

mission. Also called C2.”37

Command and control involves providing the things forces 

need to operate; that is, it is limited to the second half of van 

Creveld’s concept of command. Note that a commander does 

not have to be assigned forces to exercise command and control over them. These forces can be attached as well. This means 

a JFACC who is a US Air Force officer can command and control US Navy assets for as long as they are attached to the air 

component by the overall joint force commander (and a US 

Navy officer could exercise command and control of US Air 

Force assets, also). Note also the range of functions comprised 

within command and control, including “planning, directing, 

coordinating, and controlling.” Airmen believe that in airpower 

operations, these things should be accomplished centrally at 

certain times. Therefore, in our master tenet, the term command and control best answers the question, In air operations, 

what should be centralized?

For many forms of airpower, command and control at the 

theater level is appropriate, as almost all fixed-wing aircraft 

have a range of hundreds of miles (or more, if given access to 

air refueling). This explains why centralized command and control is so closely aligned with the JFACC concept. The JFACC, 

as the theater-level air commander, is the appropriate authority 

to exercise command and control of air operations because his focus generally matches the range of most fixed-wing air assets. 

Some forms of airpower, however, have a truly global reach, as 

do assets that operate in space and cyberspace. This shows 

why the US strategic and transportation commands exercise 

command and control of those assets.38
17

Theater and global areas of operation are generally associated with the operational and strategic levels of war, although 

the association can be problematic in some circumstances. It is 

easier to defend the proposition that elements of airpower, when 

centrally planned, directed, coordinated, and controlled, can 

work together to have effects that are operational and strategic 

in nature. Because of this relationship between centralization 

and the higher levels of war, the first essential element of the 

master tenet is more accurately worded as centralized command and control of airpower maximizes effectiveness and preserves flexibility at the strategic and operational levels of war. 

Second, an airman should command and control air operations. As explained earlier, Airmen believe that airpower should 

be commanded and controlled by an airman to maximize its 

contribution to joint operations. Like surface forces, air, space, 

and cyberspace forces have unique requirements reflected in 

doctrine, organization, training, and equipment. Furthermore, 

airpower is often most effective when employed in ways that distinguish it from other forms of military power. Therefore, Airmen 

generally believe that only other airmen (including air operators 

in the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy) have the necessary 

background and experience to get the most out of airpower. 

Airmen often write about these first two essential elements 

so that it becomes difficult to separate them. For example, Col 

Phillip Meilinger explains his eighth of 10 Propositions Regarding Airpower: 

Airpower’s unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by airmen. . . . Airmen fear that if surface commanders controlled airpower they would divide it to support their own operations to 

the detriment of the overall theater campaign. However, in a typical 

campaign operations ebb and flow; at times one sector is heavily engaged or maneuvering, while at other times it is static and quiescent—

and this status is often determined by the enemy. As a result, if airpower is parceled out it may be sitting idle in one location while flying 

continuously in another. Although this is also true of ground units, they 

generally have only a limited ability to assist their comrades on another 

part of the front. Airpower can quickly intervene over an entire theater, 

regardless of whether it is used for strategic or tactical purposes. To 

mete it out to different surface commanders would make it virtually 

impossible to shift airpower, rapidly and efficiently, from one area in the 

theater to another to maximize its effectiveness.39
18

Combining the first two elements of the master tenet makes it 

more accurate to say that airmen believe that centralized command and control of airpower by an airman maximizes effectiveness and preserves flexibility at the strategic and operational levels of war. 

Third, decentralized execution of air operations promotes effectiveness and preserves flexibility at the tactical level of war. 

The second half of the master tenet acknowledges that a degree 

of decentralization helps to maintain tactical flexibility and helps 

to increase the tempo of operations, making it more difficult for 

the enemy to keep pace. As such, this element of the master tenet reflects current thinking in joint doctrine and that of the 

other services, particularly the US Army and Marine Corps. All 

services believe in decentralized execution, defined as “delegation of execution authority to subordinate commanders.”40 Recognize that decentralized execution provides benefits primarily 

at the tactical level, as reaction time is most critical in tactical 

operations. Over time, however, the benefits of decentralization 

across many tactical events should produce effects that promote 

operational and strategic objectives. Given this discussion, it is 

most accurate to combine the four essential elements and word 

the master tenet in this way: centralized command and control of 

airpower by an airman promotes effectiveness and preserves 

flexibility at the strategic and operational levels of war, while 

decentralized execution of air operations promotes effectiveness 

and preserves flexibility at the tactical level (fig. 6).

Fourth, commanders must balance centralized command 

and control and decentralized execution as they connect tactical operations to operational and strategic objectives. This is 

the critical piece of the master tenet that remains unstated in 

our doctrine. Tactical operations cannot become an end unto 

themselves. They must be connected to operational and strategic objectives. All senior commanders must accomplish this 

balancing act. 

Traditional Criticisms of the Master Tenet

Centralized control and decentralized execution is controversial 

both among airmen and among those who have other perspectives (fig. 7). Airmen must understand these traditional criticisms. 
19

Critics of the master tenet have made the following assertions 

regarding centralized control and decentralized execution.

The first of these five criticisms shows how the master tenent 

uses vague terminology. This is a criticism of the inexact nature of the words control and execution. Specifically, many 

question the distinction between them. Officers from other services have expressed their bewilderment at these word choices. 

Figure 6. What we say. (Compiled by the author.)

WHAT WE SAY

Centralized Control & Decentralized Execution

WHAT WE BELIEVE

Centralized command and control of 

airpower by an airman promotes 

effectiveness and preserves flexibility at 

the strategic and operational levels of war, 

while decentralized execution of air 

operations promotes effectiveness and 

preserves flexibility at the tactical level.

Figure 7. Five traditional criticisms of the master tenet. (Compiled by the 

author.)

Five Traditional Criticisms 

of the Master Tenet

•Uses vague terminology

•Encourages commanders to meddle in tactics

•Violates the spirit of unity of command

•Precludes teamwork

•Hinders responsiveness to others
20

For example, US Army major Mark Davis argues that “from a 

joint perspective, centralized control and decentralized execution is illogical and cannot exist together because control is 

about execution and is inherent in command, as explained in 

Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.”41

Not only do the terms control and execution confuse outsiders, 

but they also confound airmen. It does not help that Air Force 

doctrine recommended both centralized control and decentralized control as they evolved. Nor does it help that control—defined in joint doctrine as “authority that may be less than full 

command exercised by a commander over part of the activities 

of subordinate or other organizations”—seems to carry with it 

the authority to execute.42 Are the two terms distinct, or is one 

inherent in the other? The lack of a clear answer remains a 

valid criticism of the master tenet.

The second criticism of the master tenent encourages commanders to meddle in tactics. Perhaps the most widespread 

criticism of centralized control and decentralized execution—

especially among Airmen in the US Air Force—is that, by emphasizing the primacy of the JFACC in controlling air operations, it opens the door for JFACCs to exercise control down to 

the lowest tactical levels. In fact, the most recent draft of Air 

Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 

addresses this tendency directly, stipulating that “some recent 

operations have highlighted an apparent disconnect regarding 

the Airman’s stated preference for decentralized execution. Airmen should not misconstrue a given situation with what we 

generally believe about decentralized execution. In some scenarios, a relatively low pace of activity may allow senior leaders 

to more closely monitor ongoing operations. Discipline demands 

that senior leaders resist the temptation to get involved with 

execution decisions that are normally best left to subordinate 

commanders and forward decision makers.”43 Despite this 

warning, future air commanders will likely be tempted to make 

decisions at the tactical level, and nothing in the master tenet 

specifically precludes them from doing so.

The third criticism of the master tenent violates the spirit of 

unity of command. While the master tenet promotes unity of 

effort from a functional perspective, some argue that it violates 

the spirit behind the principle of unity of command. Joint doc-
21

trine asserts that unity of command is related to objective, not 

to function. For example, JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operation,

states, “The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of 

effort under one responsible commander for every objective.”44

This implies that the commander responsible for the objective 

should exercise control over the resources required to achieve 

it. This assertion contradicts the master tenet’s call for unity of 

effort for the function of airpower. Indeed, a strict adherence to 

the concept of unity of command as stated in joint doctrine 

would encourage the dilution of airpower that Airmen passionately oppose. 

The fourth criticism of the master tenent precludes teamwork. In a related criticism, some hold that by advocating airpower operations that shift quickly—and sometimes without 

warning for all involved—the master tenet inhibits the development of close working relationships between airmen and members of other services. Ensuring flexibility at the operational 

level tends to preclude a predictable relationship at the tactical 

level, and this hinders the building of trust that results from 

working with the same people daily. Veteran officers understand that trust acts as the catalyst for teamwork in joint operations and is critical for success. Lt Gen Elwood “Pete” Quesada eloquently makes this point when reflecting on his 

experiences in World War II, saying, “Of all the lessons we 

learned about tactical air operations, perhaps the most important is that the air commander, his group, and squadron commanders must have a sincere desire to become part of the 

ground team. The Army must, of course, have the same dedication to reciprocate. This close liaison can only come from close 

day-to-day contact—especially at command levels; there must 

be almost instantaneous communication between ground and 

air and through all the chain of command.”45 Therefore, a negative consequence of centralized control of airpower can be a 

lack of daily contact that would come from assigning or attaching air assets to individual commanders on a semipermanent 

basis.

The fifth criticism of the master tenent hinders responsiveness to other commanders. Yet another criticism is that a 

JFACC who exercises centralized control through an AOC cannot be responsive enough to the ever-changing nature of tacti-
22

cal operations. It chafes ground commanders that they need to 

ask for airpower through an AOC that is often located hundreds of miles away. It really frustrates them when it takes a 

long time for their request to be processed and acted upon (and 

a few minutes is a long time when under enemy fire). It drives 

ground commanders nuts when they make the request and 

wait for an answer only to have the request denied while their 

soldiers remain in harm’s way. Some of this frustration arises 

from a lack of understanding of the tactical air control system 

and the priorities of the overall joint commander. It is real nevertheless, and it often expresses itself in an accusation that 

“the Air Force isn’t supporting us!” 

While these criticisms have surfaced in historical situations 

and contexts, they have also emerged in today’s environment. 

Even though there has been a great emphasis on joint warfare 

since the passage of Goldwater-Nicholls in the mid-1980s, 

many seams and disconnects exist between the services. This 

has been especially true in the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR), which contains ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan

The irregular conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have presented numerous challenges to centralized control and decentralized execution. Initially, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 

went well from an air perspective, and Airmen followed the 

master tenet faithfully. The combined forces air component 

commander (CFACC) controlled air operations from the AOC, 

and despite the expected fog and friction, airpower succeeded 

in helping to achieve the overall objectives.46 As the nature of 

operations changed from traditional to irregular, however, old 

tensions resurfaced and new ones arose. 

The following paragraphs discuss how the nature of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, when coupled with difficult command relationships and nondoctrinal apportionment processes, 

caused many within the Air Force to question whether the master tenet had been reduced to a stale catchphrase. Some outside the service grew to believe that it was flat wrong.
23

Difficult Command Relationships 

in US Central Command

A main contributor to these tensions was a confusing and 

contradictory set of command relationships between various 

war-fighting organizations. In keeping with the master tenet, 

Airmen insisted that airpower be centrally controlled throughout the theater by the CFACC. The commander of USCENTCOM agreed to this construct, but the commander needed to 

specify a command relationship between the CFACC and 

other war-fighting organizations that needed airpower, including the Multi­national Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) and the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan. The commander did this 

by directing a series of supported/supporting relationships 

where the CFACC would offer direct support to the others as 

needed. This scenario allowed the USCENTCOM commander 

to remain engaged at the strategic level of war while ensuring that subordinate commanders had access to airpower 

effects. It was an attempt to encourage increased flexibility 

by decentralizing operations.

According to this arrangement, the CFACC was expected to 

support conventional operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the 

Horn of Africa. The commander was also expected to support 

antiterrorism operations throughout the USCENTCOM AOR, 

including within Iraq and Afghanistan. These operations were 

usually conducted by special operations forces, and the support requests came through separate channels. Added to this 

difficulty, in that volatile area of the world, are always dangerous contingencies that occupy the minds of commanders and 

their planning staffs. So the CFACC constantly had to plan for 

contingencies, sometimes with short notice. Finally, the CFACC 

was also designated the commander of USCENTCOM Air Forces. 

In this role, the commander answered to the USCENTCOM 

commander for the important mission of theater engagement 

with our partners.47 This critical duty entailed many trips 

throughout the AOR to visit with officials and discuss numerous issues, including shared basing, equipment sales, and mutual training. 

From the CFACC’s perspective, these responsibilities must 

have made him feel like he or she was in the middle of a wheel 
24

with many spokes, each expecting to be supported. Certainly 

there was no shortage of demand. Every day, commanders 

throughout the AOR passed numerous requests for support to 

the AOC. The result was that far more requests arrived than 

could be fulfilled. The good news was that the CFACC enjoyed 

a measure of centralized authority to move assets to support 

the most pressing needs in the theater. The bad news was that, 

inevitably, someone did not get the requested air support.

This method led to frustrations between ground and air commanders. “The CFACC is not supporting me!” complained some 

ground commanders, while Airmen retorted, “The CFACC cannot 

support you if you don’t bring Airmen into the planning earlier.” When the intense arguments began, Airmen and soldiers 

talked past each other, with Airmen asserting that limited air 

assets could be used more efficiently if they were included in 

the operational planning. Ground commanders began lamenting that all they wanted was more support and that they did not 

care if it was efficient as long as it was effective. Some of these 

issues could have been overcome through personal relationships, and the AOC staff worked to build bridges to other staffs, 

including those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Several impediments 

hindered the development of close working relationships between air and ground staffs, however, including geographical 

separation and incongruent personnel rotation policies.48

Many airmen felt that the AOC had been relegated to a help 

desk for airpower, with each individual request representing a 

trouble ticket from a supported commander. Without involvement in the early stages of planning, it was almost impossible 

to put each of these tactical requests into an operational context. It seemed obvious to AOC planners that airpower could be 

used in more innovative ways, but there seemed to be little opportunity to inject air-planning expertise into scores of tactical 

headquarters strung out across the theater. Instead of proactively applying airpower to the joint force commander’s priorities, the AOC had become almost entirely reactive to the requests of numerous supported commanders—and the trouble 

tickets kept pouring in. 
25

Nondoctrinal Apportionment

A fundamental problem with this arrangement was that the 

CFACC received spotty guidance and direction from superiors 

regarding how to apportion his forces between the multiple 

supported commands. After major combat operations ended in 

Afghanistan and Iraq, the doctrinal apportionment process 

stopped—there was no daily apportionment recommendation 

by the CFACC or decision from the USCENTCOM commander. 

The process used to apportion intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR) assets was probably the closest to established doctrine. For this, the USCENTCOM Intelligence Joint 

Staff Directorate (J2) in Tampa, Florida, held a weekly joint collection management board to make an apportionment recommendation to the commander. Interestingly, these apportionment recommendations were made by system, not by percentage, 

priority, or weight of effort. For example, entire Predator aircraft 

communication lines were apportioned to Iraq or Afghanistan, 

even though the AOC was capable of switching the communication lines between the airborne Predator in both Iraq and 

Afghanistan several times a day to maximize coverage of priority 

areas. Additionally, systems like the E-8 Joint Surveillance 

Target Attack Radar System and the RC-135 RIVET JOINT were 

directed to fly exclusively in Iraq or Afghanistan. 

Other forms of airpower were apportioned in different ways. 

Airlift requests throughout the theater were collected and prioritized by the CENTCOM deployment distribution operations 

center (CDDOC) and transmitted to the AOC. The CFACC had 

no control over these priorities. The Mobility Division at the AOC 

simply would schedule as many of the requests as possible in 

priority order. Electronic warfare assets like the EC-130 were 

effectively apportioned according to their original deployment 

orders created at the Pentagon. These orders stated that they 

would fly in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Because of this, the 

CFACC was unable to move them from one area to another, 

even if it made sense to do so (because an airplane was broken, 

for example). 

The CFACC had greater control over fighters, bombers, and 

the tankers that provided them with air refueling. As one would 

expect, fighters based in Iraq or Afghanistan tended to fly in 
26

their local areas (although small detachments of fighters could 

deploy from one country to the other in extreme circumstances). 

The CFACC, however, enjoyed great flexibility in directing fighters and bombers based between Iraq and Afghanistan. This 

was true for the tankers also. These swing assets could range 

into either Iraq or Afghanistan on a given day. Moreover, due to 

the solid working relationship between the CFACC and the 

combined force maritime component commander and his staff, 

the CFACC had great influence over where the assets from the 

Carrier Strike Group(s) would fly. It was not unusual for the 

Combined Force Maritime Component Command’s (CFMCC) 

staff to call the AOC and ask, “Where should the carrier go next 

month?” While the CFACC enjoyed great latitude in directing 

where the swing assets would fly, due to the lack of an apportionment process, he or she received almost no guidance on the 

critical apportionment decision of prioritizing between Iraq and 

Afghanistan. In keeping with the spirit of centralized control, 

the CFACC and his staff would try their best to maximize the 

effectiveness of limited airpower assets. This required disciplined study and an appreciation of airpower’s contributions to 

ongoing irregular operations in the two countries. As the CFACC 

explained during an interview in late 2007, “The air campaigns 

in Iraq and Afghanistan are two completely different wars.”49

Afghanistan versus Iraq—An 

Airman’s Perspective

Many are surprised to learn that Afghanistan contains a significantly larger population and occupies almost 50 percent 

more territory than Iraq.50 Additionally, the terrain in Afghanistan is generally much more mountainous than Iraq (while Iraq 

does have mountainous areas, they are located mainly in the 

north, where few coalition troops are stationed). The transportation infrastructure in Iraq is much more developed than in 

Afghanistan, where several bases are resupplied routinely 

through air-drop operations. Added to this picture is that Afghanistan is landlocked and has only a few reliable lines of 

communication over land leading into it. Perhaps most importantly, far less friendly forces abound in Afghanistan than in 

Iraq. In contrast to Iraq, however, where traditional conflict (in 
27

the forms of direct ambushes and firefights with significant 

numbers of enemy forces) happens only rarely, soldiers in Afghanistan often confront enemy forces that have significant 

numbers of fighters, sometimes numbering in the hundreds. At 

times, US forces are even outnumbered locally. When this occurs, they fight with superior skill and bravery, and they call 

upon other resources at their disposal, including their asymmetric advantage of airpower. When planning, forces in Afghanistan sometimes will cancel or postpone operations when 

they are told that they will not receive the air support they requested. Before surge operations commenced in Iraq, this never 

happened there, and it only happened rarely after surge operations started in 2007. 

For these reasons, airpower seemingly met a greater need in 

Afghanistan than in Iraq (fig. 8). Stated in economic terms, the 

marginal utility of the next unit of airpower—the next sortie 

flown, area monitored, pallet delivered, or bomb dropped—

Figure 8. General analysis. (Compiled by the author.)

Iraq Afghanistan

437,072 km2 Size 647,500 km2

27,499,638 Population 31,889,923

Mostly flat to rolling 

(mountains north)

Terrain Very mountainous 

with some plains

Some flooding, but 

usually controlled

Natural Disasters Significant flooding, 

especially in spring

Modest, good in 

places

Transportation InfrastructureVery limited

~140,000 US / Coalition Forces ~53,000

Coalition, indirect 

fires, insurgents fade 

quickly, mostly urban, 

ground resupply, CAS 

rarely needed

Character of Conflict ISAF (NATO), 

insurgents mass, mix 

of fires, rural, aerial 

resupply, traditional 

CAS more common

General analysis: “swing” airpower could 

have a greater impact in Afghanistan.
28

seemed to be greater in Afghanistan than in Iraq.51 This was 

especially true as the world’s foremost alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), assumed responsibility for 

security operations in Afghanistan. Indeed, to many observers, 

it appeared that NATO’s air operations—controlled centrally by 

the CFACC and his deputy from the AOC according to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander’s priorities—were filling critical capability gaps, essentially keeping 

NATO in the fight despite a shortage of soldiers on the ground. 

As NATO’s ISAF began to confront the Taliban in the contested 

South region, the evidence seemed to agree.

NATO and Airpower: Operation Medusa

At times, operations in Afghanistan have relied heavily on 

NATO airpower to mitigate a lack of other forms of military 

power, specifically land forces. One vivid example of this took 

place during Operation Medusa, which occurred shortly after 

the ISAF assumed responsibility for Regional Command–South 

(RC-S) in the summer of 2006. This operation sought to clear 

the Panjwai valley near Kandahar of the many Taliban fighters 

there. This was key terrain for the Taliban, as it was an economic center due to the fertility of the land, and its many irrigation trenches and compounds surrounded by mud walls provided numerous defensible positions—one ISAF commander 

described it as “perfect defensive ground.”52 The valley also had 

emotional value for the Taliban, as it was the birthplace of its 

leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, and the area where the Taliban 

movement began.53 In addition, during the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, Panjwai was a stronghold for the Mujahedeen, 

and it had never fallen to Soviet control.54 The Taliban did not 

intend to cede this valley to ISAF either. 

Immediately after ISAF forces deployed to the area, Taliban 

fighters attacked them. ISAF officials soon realized that “the 

insurgent forces were clearly looking for a fight, and wanted to 

draw ISAF forces into battle.”55 “Their intent was to prove to the 

world and the Karzai government that they could take us on,” 

concluded Canadian brigadier general William Fraser, the ISAF’s 

commander for southern Afghanistan.56 Canadian battalion 

commander, Lt Col Omer Lavoie, agreed, saying, “So I think the 
29

Taliban decided that they would either test or show that NATO 

did not have the resolve to conduct combat operations to the 

extent that US forces did.”57

The general plan was to encircle the area with ISAF forces, 

allow civilians to leave, weaken the Taliban through air strikes 

and artillery barrages, and only then clear the area with ground 

troops.58 After delivering warnings for civilians to evacuate the 

area, decisive operations for Operation Medusa commenced on 

2 September with artillery and air strikes.59 For some reason, 

several key Taliban command-and-control targets were taken 

off the target list.60 On 3 September the ISAF commander decided to forgo further artillery and air strikes against the Taliban 

strongholds in the southern part of the valley, instead ordering 

one of his Canadian companies into the free-fire zone.61 This 

was exactly what the Taliban wanted. They executed an effective ambush, and in the three-and-a-half hour firefight that 

ensued, the company lost four soldiers and sustained many 

more wounded.62 The company then withdrew, and NATO airplanes pounded Taliban positions throughout the night.63 Unfortunately, a tragic accident occurred early the next morning. 

After providing air support for many hours, the pilot of an 

American A-10 aircraft mistakenly engaged this same Canadian company, rendering them ineffective.64 This led to a pause 

in ground operations in the south, while the ISAF continued to 

pound the Taliban defensive positions with air and artillery. 

“Essentially we just shot and bombed the crap out of those 

guys for the better part of four to five days while the battle 

group made their way in from the north,” remembered Canadian 

reconnaissance squadron commander, Maj Andrew Lussier. He 

continued, “You could tell that we were not letting these guys 

get any sleep whatsoever, they were getting no rest. We were 

bombing the crap out of them constantly. . . . We killed a lot of 

people, you know; we killed a lot of Taliban. And they’re just 

not set up to take a couple hundred casualties. They’re not set 

up to evacuate them. They’re not set up to look after those kind 

of wounded. So they just fell apart.”65

After stabilizing the situation with their firepower advantage, 

much of it in the form of airpower, NATO forces continued the 

operation, cleared the valley, and killed scores of Taliban fighters. During the operations, ISAF’s commander, UK Army general 
30

David Richards, summed up the contribution of airpower to 

NATO operations, observing that “in the heat of battle, the factor that makes the difference for ISAF is airpower. Time and 

time again, through hundreds and hundreds of missions, it is 

the skill of our aircrew that has saved our troops on the ground 

and paved the way to success.”66

Providing this level of airpower to Operation Medusa was not 

easy, however, and it required centralized command and control. In accordance with ISAF priorities, the AOC had allocated 

a significant portion of air assets to support the offensive, but 

no one anticipated that the need would grow so quickly after 

the initial attacks. Operation Medusa set new records for operational tempo of airpower in Afghanistan. During the most 

intense periods, some aircraft were expending their ordnance 

within minutes of reporting on the scene. As ground commanders discovered countless Taliban defensive positions, they requested more and more air support. 

Behind the scenes in the AOC, airmen scrambled to push air 

assets to the operation. Unfortunately, they could not concentrate solely on southern Afghanistan, as Operation Medusa 

was one of three major operations at the time. Operations Big 

North Wind and Mountain Thrust were being executed in eastern Afghanistan, and they had requirements for air also.67

Moreover, these operations were under US command and control, not NATO.68 The CFACC had to balance these competing 

requirements, and the AOC staff adjusted operations in real time 

to meet as much of the demand as possible. In addition, the 

CFACC asked the CFMCC to quickly position the USS Enterprise Carrier Strike Group off the Pakistan coast, allowing it to 

fly sorties into Afghanistan to help satisfy the increased need. 

These actions made it possible for all operations to continue 

with the necessary amount of airpower integration, and the 

CFACC needed centralized command and control to make it 

work. Once the pilots checked in with their ground controllers, 

however, operations became highly decentralized. The combination of centralized command and control at the operational 

level and decentralized execution at the tactical level allowed 

ISAF to be successful.

Added together, airpower’s contributions to Operation Medusa 

at the operational and tactical levels of war had a strategic im-
31

pact. If the losses suffered early in the operation had continued 

much longer, or if the Taliban had been able to maintain their 

defensive positions for an extended period, this would have created 

a crisis both within the alliance and between ISAF and the government of Afghanistan. ISAF had to succeed or face severe 

consequences. Lt Gen Michel Gauthier, commander of Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command, summarizes the strategic situation:

So you have this dynamic where clearly the Taliban are showing an 

intent to test ISAF. And this is all about credibility of ISAF in relation to 

Afghanistan and the Afghan government and so I would say there were 

all sorts of pressures on ISAF to demonstrate to the people of Afghanistan that ISAF and NATO were committed to Afghanistan and were 

committed to protecting the people of Afghanistan. And that’s not propaganda, that’s real. I mean, this was reality at a strategic level in the 

south of Afghanistan. There was very real pressure, real present danger 

from this Taliban force which was adopting a conventional posture in 

Panjwai and clearly demonstrating an intent to cut off Kandahar city 

and cut off Highway 1. None of which boded well, obviously, for the future of the south of Afghanistan. So, something had to be done in a 

couple of different respects both to gain the trust of the Afghan people, 

start to win their confidence, and to get those bad guys out of there so 

that the threat was removed.69

In addition, had ISAF failed this first major test, many believe 

there was a distinct possibility that one or more of the allies 

may have pulled out of ISAF.70 This would have weakened the 

alliance at a critical time, and the negative repercussions 

would have reverberated for years. Therefore, it is reasonable 

to conclude that NATO airpower helped to keep the alliance 

on track in Afghanistan. It took a skillful balance of centralization and decentralization—led by the CFACC and implemented 

through his command and control mechanisms—to make it 

happen (fig. 9). 

Airpower in Afghanistan—Extending 

the Commander’s Reach

In follow-on operations, airpower has helped NATO to make 

important gains in security and stability. While the vast majority 

of operations are decentralized in nature, with ground forces in 

the lead, some important operations are made possible by decentralization. For example, in late 2006 and 2007, the CFACC 
32

directed the commencement of Operation Open Road. In this 

operation, pilots flew repeatedly over the key lines of communication in Afghanistan, especially the all-important Highway 1

that connected many of the country’s population centers. The 

ISAF commander, General Richards, made opening these lines 

of communication a priority in late 2006 after insurgent fighters had been able to disrupt both military logistics and civilian 

commerce. In conjunction with numerous local ground operations designed to take back the roads, Open Road helped to deter and disrupt insurgent activity on Highway 1.

71 Airpower has 

supported ISAF in numerous operations designed to disrupt 

insurgent sanctuaries and movements in such places as the 

Helmand province in the south. In addition to this support, AOC 

planners designed other operations to disrupt insurgents in 

places the ISAF commanders could not reach with ground troops 

because of the lack of forces. In this way, NATO airpower helped 

to increase the operational reach of the ISAF’s commanders. 

Figure 9. Critical role of airpower. (Compiled by the author.)

US Air Force, Navy, and 

Army Air Power have kept 

us afloat for the last year 

of bitter fighting.

Gen Barry R. McCaffrey 

February 2007

Air has played an even 

more critical role (in 

Afghanistan) than in Iraq.

Anthony H. Cordesman 

March 2008
33

Denying Sanctuary in Tora Bora

The most successful disruption operations in Afghanistan, 

by far, have been those accomplished by a small number of 

highly trained ground forces integrated with airpower and information operations. Perhaps the best example of this was an 

operation that occurred almost a year after Operation Medusa, 

with little fanfare. For years, the mountainous region near the 

Pakistan border, known as Tora Bora, has served as a sanctuary 

for al-Qaeda and associated groups. In fact, the impenetrable 

terrain coupled with its proximity to a porous political border 

makes it a perfect hideout. By the summer of 2007, considerable evidence showed that al-Qaeda fighters were again using 

this area for refuge.72 The ISAF commander, Gen Dan McNeil, 

decided to use force to deny this sanctuary. The most effective 

way to do this was through highly capable special operations 

forces integrated with airpower effects, including a robust combination of ISR, tactical airlift, aerial resupply, airborne communications, and lethal effects delivered from numerous platforms. 

Because friendly forces could easily be outnumbered in Tora 

Bora, and the terrorists’ knowledge of the mountains gave them 

a distinct advantage, this operation was planned in great detail. 

In one of the finest examples of joint planning seen in-theater, 

the AOC staff worked closely with the supported headquarters 

in creating this plan, and both the senior ground commander 

and CFACC were personally involved. Through countless video 

teleconferences and mission rehearsals, the joint force developed a plan in which airpower would allow the ground force to 

safely ingress. Once on the ground, airmen would protect and 

sustain the soldiers while they were in the sanctuary, and airpower would ensure their safe egress when the ground commander decided it was time to leave. 

 One key aspect of this planning was unprecedented. The 

decisive phase would begin with a major attack by fighters and 

bombers against al-Qaeda defensive positions. The ingress 

would follow moments later, allowing the terrorists no time to 

recover before the ground force was upon them. This attack 

required numerous weapons and an intricate plan to get the 

bombs delivered in minimum time. Due to his ability to move 

certain assets around the theater, the CFACC directed the re-
34

positioning of bombs and airplanes—and even made preparations for a global power mission—to provide the effects requested. 

In addition, the CFACC took proactive steps throughout the 

theater to ensure that other operations would not go unsupported. The CFACC’s ability to centrally control the initial stages 

of attack through the AOC would allow for maximum firepower 

on target, and as soon as the ground forces began their ingress, 

the operation would assume a more decentralized nature, with 

airmen and soldiers working together directly. 

On the night of 14 August 2007, the operation kicked off 

with a heavy bombardment (fig. 10). One local resident noted 

that this bombing was heavier than it was during the famous 

2001 operation in the same area.73 The ground forces ingressed 

as planned, and over the next few days, they effectively took 

back the al-Qaeda sanctuary in Tora Bora. In this effort, they 

were aided by Pakistan, which moved forces across the border 

to block any escape.74 Numerous foreign fighters were killed or 

Figure 10. Fixed-wing sorties. (Reprinted from USAF Central Combined Air 

and Space Operations Center.)
35

captured. Their defensive positions were destroyed, and their 

hiding places were searched. More importantly, the operation 

set the stage for local Afghan forces to return and establish a 

more long-term presence.

Unfortunately, this major success in joint planning was the 

exception rather than the rule in Afghanistan. It has been extremely difficult to get airmen and soldiers on the same page. 

Airmen and soldiers have different perspectives and norms 

when it comes to planning, and this disconnect is not limited to 

Afghanistan. It is present in Iraq as well.

The Operational-Tactical Disconnect

While the air-support requests that flood into the AOC are 

almost always tactical in nature and sent through separate 

stovepiped processes, airmen are trained and organized to integrate airpower capabilities—from air to space to cyberspace—

to provide operational-level effects. Senior airmen and their 

staffs adopt this operational focus naturally, as they are used 

to command assets that can create effects over wide geographical areas. While they are certainly capable of thinking at 

the operational level, ground commanders naturally adopt a 

focus that is more limited in geography, as travel across a theater 

for ground forces is measured in days and weeks, not hours. 

This fundamental difference is especially evident in the way 

that air and ground commanders approach planning. Airmen 

believe in centralized planning at the operational level, and 

ground commanders believe in decentralized planning at the 

tactical level, especially in irregular warfare operations.75 The 

result is that much of the planning that is taking place in Iraq 

and Afghanistan is occurring at the lower echelons of the 

ground command structure, especially at the brigade and battalion levels. Unfortunately, much of this planning is conducted 

without air experts in the room, as air planners are not present 

when the ground maneuver plans are being conceptualized. 

Although elements of the theater air-control system—including the air support operations center (ASOC), tactical air parties (TACP), and joint terminal attack controllers (JTAC)—are 

meant to ensure tactical integration with the Army, they are 

not trained or organized to provide air-planning expertise on 
36

the scale required in irregular warfare. This capability resides 

at the AOC, but a single AOC staff is unable to integrate fully 

with scores of tactical operations centers—the brigade and battalion headquarters where the meaningful planning takes place. 

The AOC valiantly sends individual experts and planning teams 

out into the field when needed, and senior ground commanders 

have hailed this as extremely beneficial.76 This compromise 

never has completely bridged the gap, however.77 While this 

operational-tactical disconnect has impeded effective operations in Afghanistan, it has been especially prevalent in Iraq, 

and it has led to significant frictions between ground and air 

commanders, especially after the bombing of a key Shia mosque 

in Samarra.

After Samarra—A Period of Shared Frustration 

In retrospect, the bombing of the al-Askari mosque at Samarra by al-Qaeda in February 2006 was a turning point in 

Operation Iraqi Freedom. Although no one died in the original 

attack, the waves of ensuing violence—especially sectarian kidnappings and killings—contributed to a sharp upward trend in 

violent acts that lasted for well over a year.78 By the late summer and fall of 2006, the rash of sectarian violence was threatening to undo many gains made over previous years, including 

two landmark elections and a constitutional referendum.79 Officers involved in the operation experienced a growing sense of 

frustration, because they could not quell the violence.

Airmen, too, were frustrated. Through daily interactions with 

the Multi-National Corps-I (MNC-I) staff, they understood the 

situation was deteriorating, and like the ground commanders, 

they wanted to react. Unfortunately, several things seemed to 

be working against airpower effectiveness. The vast majority of 

ground operations were decentralized in nature, with the planning occurring at multiple subordinate headquarters, and airmen could not influence this planning. The AOC planners were 

not present, and the Airmen assigned to the units were not 

versed in air planning beyond the integration of close air support. Furthermore, the MNC-I staff responsible for prioritizing 

air support requests did not want air planners to talk directly 

with these units anyway, because they feared that the AOC 
37

planners would make promises to the individual units that 

were out of line with the overall MNC-I priorities.

In the one instance in which a large-scale operation was 

planned—Operation Together Forward, a neighborhood-byneighborhood clearing operation in Baghdad—the CFACC proposed that, instead of processing the multitude of air requests 

associated with the operation, the AOC would schedule and 

provide 24/7 coverage of the greater Baghdad area with fighter 

support. The division responsible for Baghdad could use these 

assets as it saw fit. In essence, the CFACC was providing the 

division with its own squadron of fighters for the duration of 

this important operation. Some argued that this was penny 

packeting, but two important distinctions were clear. First, the 

CFACC, working closely with MNC-I, retained the ability to 

move these assets in case of an emergency. Second, the operation was limited in time. When it was apparent that consistent 

presence was no longer needed, both MNC-I and the AOC would 

return to the normal system. Because strategists in Iraq and at 

the AOC believed that Together Forward could make or break 

the US mission in Iraq, it made sense to give a consistent supply of airpower to the division responsible for its success. This 

would promote both medium-term planning (including publishing common reference terms and maps) and the development of personal relationships that could improve air-ground 

coordination in this complex battlespace. 

This plan was instituted during the first few days of the operation, and while there were some points of friction, the AOC 

received positive feedback from the division about having airpower available consistently, especially when their plans 

changed. After these initial days, however, in one of the most 

unexpected exchanges of the war, the MNC-I made it clear that 

it did not want to take advantage of this concept, and it went 

back to having the individual units in Baghdad submit their air 

requests as before. This situation led to hard feelings between 

commanders and staffs, but the AOC staff saved the planning 

products, especially those produced by the Master Air Attack 

Plan (MAAP) cell. These products would help immensely in developing the plan for supporting the surge strategy in 2007.

Another development that contributed to frustration in Iraq 

between airmen and ground commanders was a rule of engage-
38

ment that forced local ground commanders to get permission 

from their division commander—normally a two-star general 

officer—before they could request lethal effects from an air asset. Wide agreement abounds among airmen and ground commanders that the joint force must be discriminating when it 

applies lethal effects, including the employment of bombs, missiles, rockets, and guns from airplanes. This is especially true in 

the counterinsurgency environment, where a single misapplication of force can have disproportionate consequences. Elevating 

the approval authority for air strikes to the level of division commander, however, effectively took this option off the table for 

subordinate commanders. Due to the pace of events, by the time 

that the request reached the division commander and his decision was relayed down the chain, it was likely that the effect was 

no longer needed. The result was that, in Iraq, air assets employed ordnance in only the most unique circumstances. To get 

some utility out of assets overhead, local ground commanders 

often requested shows of force (aimed at deterring bad actors) 

and shows of presence (aimed at reassuring the local population 

and friendly forces). Not surprisingly, however, these efforts lost 

their effect over time, as insurgents figured out that the airplanes were probably not going to attack them directly.80

More Frustration—Measuring 

Airpower’s Effectiveness

These restrictions contributed to problems with assessing 

airpower effectiveness, difficult in the best of circumstances, 

but seemingly impossible in the environment of Iraq. It is natural for commanders to want to assess their forces’ contributions to the overall mission objectives, and the CFACC was no 

longer the exception to this rule. Regular assessments were 

conducted at the AOC level, and the CFACC was an active participant. These assessments included measures of performance 

(data showing what the forces did, including sorties flown, tonnage moved, pictures taken, bombs dropped, and gas released). 

These assessments also included measures of effectiveness 

(data showing the effects of operations, including lives saved, 

targets destroyed, and systems disrupted), but these were difficult to identify and quantify. 
39

ISR effectiveness was difficult to measure, as all of the 

CFACC-controlled ISR was thrown into the joint pool to meet 

the local ground commanders’ requirements. Once the products were delivered, it was nearly impossible to determine how 

they contributed to success or failure of the requesting unit. 

ISR assets were delivering record numbers of hours of surveillance and intelligence products, but the effectiveness of this 

effort was always in question. It was easier to measure the effectiveness of air mobility forces, as the basic questions included the following concerns. 

1. Did units get the supplies they needed to conduct their 

missions?

2. Did unit personnel get to the right places within the acceptable time frame?

3. Did wounded personnel get to facilities where they could 

receive needed care?

Generally, air mobility forces fared well in the assessments. So 

did such space effects as precision navigation and timing, 

which were so reliable that commanders took them for granted. 

This was true for combat search and rescue forces also.

Much of the difficulty in assessing airpower effectiveness 

arose from the nature of the supporting/supported command 

relationship between the CFACC and the ground commanders. 

Specifically, since airmen were not involved in conceptualizing 

the way in which airpower would be employed in each individual operation (due to the operational-tactical disconnect 

mentioned above), the CFACC and the AOC staff had to answer 

a fundamental question: Should we measure how well we are 

answering the ground commanders’ tactical requests, or should 

we try to ascertain how airpower is contributing to operationallevel objectives? Of course, the AOC staff tried to do both, but 

in the latter half of 2006, the results were disconcerting. The 

CFACC was meeting as many requests as possible, and coalition airmen were doing everything in their power to squeeze as 

much as they could out of the resources at their disposal. Moreover, when asked for feedback, the ground commanders generally replied, “You guys are great, we just need more!” This answer added to the frustration, because for reasons mentioned 
40

earlier, the CFACC had little say regarding the amount of air 

forces available. 

The most frustrating thing about this situation, however, was 

that in the latter half of 2006, it was obvious that things were 

not going well on the ground: Operation Together Forward was 

not working, Baghdad was in chaos, sectarian violence was 

continuing, and influential officials in the United States were 

calling for withdrawal.81 At the AOC, the assessment of airpower was captured in this scenario: “Boss, the ground commanders say we’re doing great, but we’re losing!” In essence, 

air operations had been so decentralized that it was impossible 

to connect tactical success to operational objectives. This disconnect was most evident in assessing the fighter aircraft 

tasked to provide close air support (CAS), but in reality the effects they provided were much different from CAS.

The Problem of Armed Surveillance 

Perhaps the most frustrating effect to measure was the contribution made by these fighters. Pilots spent thousands of hours 

flying over Iraq, yet they almost never unleashed lethal effects on 

the enemy. It was not CAS in any traditional sense, as air assets 

only rarely engaged enemy forces.82 Most often, the effect was 

described as nontraditional ISR (NTISR). Unfortunately, this development only added to the confusion, because it referred to 

several distinct activities. NTISR began as a concept to use airborne sensors that normally were not used for ISR collection 

(hence, the nontraditional qualifier) to augment existing collection efforts.83 The purpose was to gather intelligence for future 

operations, and the information gathered was usually processed, 

exploited, and disseminated to appropriate agencies. As innovative airmen realized the potential of these sensors to give 

real-time information to ground units, however, NTISR evolved 

to include activities that provide situational awareness to commanders engaged in current operations.84 Information was gathered and disseminated immediately, but it was generally not 

processed, exploited, or even documented. For example, a USAF 

officer describes NTISR in this way: “The majority of the time 

NTISR crews communicate directly with ground units. . . . These 
41

aircraft can scout ahead of convoys, looking for possible ambush 

sites or any other threat.”85

To distinguish providing real-time situational awareness 

from augmenting the ISR collection effort, AOC staffers began 

to develop a new vocabulary. Armed overwatch became the 

term used to describe providing situational awareness during 

active ground operations.86 As will be discussed later, a wide 

agreement and ample anecdotal evidence that this was effective and beneficial became apparent. Armed surveillance was 

the term used to describe providing real-time information during inactive periods on the ground. In conducting armed surveillance, pilots would monitor various lines of communication, 

populated areas, and historical points of origin of insurgent 

mortar and rocket attacks for activity, then report to the local 

ground units on what they found. If they observed such suspicious activity as a disturbance of dirt near a road, they passed 

on that information and left it in the hands of the local ground 

commander (fig. 11).

Figure 11. Nontraditional ISR. (Compiled by the author.)

Nontraditional ISR

•Began as a way of augmenting collection against a 

set of operational requirements

–

Almost always processed, exploited, and 

disseminated (PED)

•

Changed when these assets were used to give realtime information to the ground commander (no PED)

•

Was called NTISR but is really a spectrum of effects:

ISR & 

TAC 

RECCE

ISR with ATPs 

augments 

traditional 

collection

(Armed) Surveillance 

ATP-capable aircraft 

provide real-time SA 

of battlespace during 

inactive periods

(Armed) Overwatch 

ATP-capable aircraft 

take up a position of 

observation, build 

awareness, & employ 

fires if necessary

All of this has been referred to as NTISR

ATP = Advanced Targeting Pods
42

Unfortunately, in late 2006 a large percentage of the air support requests asked for armed surveillance, but the information obtained in countless hours of this activity was acted upon 

only rarely by the local ground units. One assessment attempted to track pilot reports and their impact on follow-on 

operations. It found that these reports were actioned less than 

10 percent of the time, and of those reports that were investigated, only a small percentage turned out to be enemy activity. 

Other reports had slightly higher percentages, and some interesting anecdotes illustrated success. Nevertheless, the results 

of armed surveillance were disappointing from a numerical 

perspective. Some ground commanders defended air assets in 

this way by arguing that, while it was impossible to investigate 

all of the reports of suspicious activity, it was important for 

them to know when pilots did not observe suspicious activity. 

This allowed them to send their soldiers out the door with some 

assurance that they would not be surprised.

Indeed, this was probably a valid defense of armed surveillance, because it showed how ground commanders used it to 

manage risk to their mission and people. Missing from the 

equation, however, was the risk to future missions due to the 

overuse, and eventual loss, of air assets. Military equipment 

wears out faster in the harsh environment and high operations 

tempo of the Middle East. The heat, sand, and wind combine to 

create one of the harshest climates on earth, especially for 

high-tech equipment. Although maintainers have done an excellent job in keeping airplanes flying, the airplanes are exhibiting serious symptoms of chronic stress. It is common for Airmen to fly, and for soldiers and marines to trust their lives 

while flying airplanes with such known defects as cracks in the 

wings or risky imperfections in the engines. The problem of 

armed surveillance was that while it may have helped ground 

commanders to mitigate their tactical risk, it provided few 

quantifiable benefits. The cost, however, was quantifiable. Airmen watched as the United States’ strategic deterrent of airpower was literally being consumed in Iraq. “We’re burning 

these airplanes out,” observed the CFACC. “Our A-10s and our 

F-16s are rapidly becoming legacy systems.”87 With this realization, the CFACC was caught in the unenviable position of 

choosing between denying airpower to ground commanders or 
43

driving the fleet into the ground. Because operations were decentralized, and airpower was often added after the real plans 

were set, no one had a good appreciation for comparing the 

strategic and operational risks of the air component to the tactical risks for the ground units. Fortunately, much of this would 

change with a new approach in Iraq known as the surge. Before 

this took place, however, a bizarre event occurred.

An Unexpected Event—The Battle of an-Najaf

Early on Sunday morning, 28 January 2007, Iraqi forces reported that they were in a heavy firefight near the city of anNajaf with a militia group numbering several hundred fighters.88

This report was extremely unusual for Iraq, because unlike the 

Taliban in Afghanistan, insurgent fighters in Iraq never initiated 

attacks in large numbers. The Iraqi forces were outnumbered 

and vulnerable. Coalition units in the local area responded, and 

fortunately, two joint terminal attack controllers (JTAC) were with 

them.89 While these JTACs got into position, the air support 

operations center in Baghdad—backed up by the AOC—began 

to move airborne fighters to the scene. As the battle on the 

ground intensified and an AH-64 Apache helicopter was shot 

down, the ASOC directed a fire hose of airpower focused on the 

area, and multiple formations of fighters were moved to the 

scene as well as an additional JTAC.90 The AOC also launched 

several fighters standing by on alert. At one point, so many assets were airborne that the JTACs had trouble controlling them. 

One of the A-10 pilots, qualified as an airborne forward air controller, stepped in and helped to de-conflict assets in the area.91

The battle continued throughout the day, and numerous air 

assets, including US Army AH-64s, US Air Force F-16s, and A-10s, 

as well as Royal Air Force Tornado fighters, dropped tons of 

ordnance and shot thousands of bullets.92

At the end of the firefight, several hundred members of the 

Soldiers of Heaven cult lay dead, and many others were captured.93 Coalition airpower saved many American and Iraqi 

lives that day. This result helped to provide for increased cooperation between the Iraqis in the area and the coalition force 

stationed there. “The governor met me and was sobbing,” recalled Maj Gen Joseph F. Fil, Jr., commander of the 1st Calvary 
44

Division, “not out of sadness, not out of anger, but out of thankfulness.”94 As in Operation Medusa in Afghanistan, this was an 

instance where the tactical effects of airpower had an operational and strategic impact. Also, as in Operation Medusa, it 

took a skillful balance of centralization and decentralization to 

provide the right effects at the right time. Centralization was 

needed to pull air assets from their routine surveillance duties 

to the battle and to call in the reserve of alert fighters. Decentralization was also required, as the JTACs directed firepower 

where it was needed, and an A-10 pilot took local control of a 

chaotic situation in the air. This operation reinforced the lesson to airmen that airpower was the equivalent of an insurance 

policy for the unexpected events that could happen in Iraq. To 

paraphrase a common saying among soldiers, coalition airmen 

had to be ready to “fly to the sound of the guns” when necessary. This lesson was at the forefront of their minds as they 

prepared for the biggest challenge since the initial invasion of 

Iraq in 2003.

Supporting the Surge Strategy 

In January 2007 Pres. George W. Bush announced a new approach in Iraq. Instead of redeploying ground units back to the 

United States as many expected, he directed a major buildup of 

forces in Iraq. The objective was to use these forces to quell the 

violence and secure the population. This would allow space for 

political reconciliation and progress. At the tactical level, coalition ground forces, along with their Iraqi counterparts, were to 

leave their established operating bases and live among the 

people they were responsible for securing.95

In addition to increasing the US Army brigade combat teams 

(BCT) from 15 to 20, the other services contributed more forces 

to support this strategy. In the months following the president’s 

announcement, the Marine Corps fielded another Marine expeditionary unit, the Navy committed an additional carrier and 

support vessels to the region, and the Air Force sent additional 

fighter, electronic warfare, and ISR aircraft. It was important 

that the air component increase its resource pool, because everyone expected the tempo of operations to increase dramatically 

as new ground units arrived. Before that could happen, how-
45

ever, air mobility forces needed to surge, and they worked hard 

to handle the increase in demand in addition to the normal 

logistics requirements and personnel rotations.

As a new command team took the reins of the MNF-I and the 

MNC-I in early 2007, it was apparent that synchronization and 

planning at the operational level would be an important part of 

the new approach to Iraq. When the new MNF-I commander 

assumed command, planning commenced for a nationwide 

push to get the troops out and establish contact with the population. This operation, called Black Anvil, required centralized 

planning and direction as well as decentralized execution to 

succeed. The CFACC and his staff saw this operation as an 

important development, and they created a supporting plan to 

surge airpower presence throughout the country in a way that 

was similar to the previous elections in Iraq.96 To make this 

happen, the CFACC directed that aircraft usually tasked in Afghanistan be sent to Iraq. This included B-1 bombers that had 

not flown over Iraq since the invasion of 2003. The sight of B-1s 

flying over Baghdad created quite a stir in the population. Perhaps more importantly, it encouraged coalition forces on the 

ground.97 Again, the CFACC’s centralized control allowed additional resources to be brought to bear at the right place and 

time. Over the next several months, B-1 crews would become 

proficient in flying missions to both Iraq and Afghanistan. At 

the same time, ground commanders in Iraq, in conjunction 

with their attached air advisors, would increasingly request the 

heavy firepower and unique presence of the B-1s. In fact, demand for all forms of airpower continued to increase as new 

units arrived and prepared for a massive summer push. This 

effort would, in the words of Frederick and Kimberly Kagan, 

redefine operational art in a counterinsurgency.98

Baghdad Belt Operations—What Is the 

True Requirement for Airpower?

Baghdad is at the heart of Iraq, both physically and psychologically. Accordingly, it had always been identified as the primary focus of operations. As the new command team in Iraq 

evaluated the situation, it correctly determined that Baghdad 

never could be peaceful as long as accelerants of violence—
46

bomb-making materials, foreign fighters, etc.—continued to 

enjoy sanctuary in the surrounding villages and enter the city 

with little difficulty. During the past year, a system of berms, 

moats, and walls had been constructed around the capital, and 

this system was supposed to force people to enter and exit the 

city through established checkpoints. The Iraqi Air Force assumed the task of patrolling this barrier through the air. Unfortunately, they would report breeches daily. Senior leaders decided that if they were going to stop the flow of accelerants, 

they would have to extend the city’s defenses into the surrounding provinces—the Baghdad belts—that served as home base 

for many insurgents. Therefore, at the operational level, it was 

clear that Baghdad operations would continue, but the Baghdad belts would become a major focus as well.99

As the planning for summer surge operations in Baghdad 

and the Baghdad belts progressed under the name Operation 

Phantom Thunder, it became clear that soldiers in Iraq were 

going to require a combination of airpower’s lethal and nonlethal 

effects (fig. 12). By now, the new group of commanders had 

eased the restrictions on using airpower. While they still taught 

their subordinate commanders to use restraint when directing 

firepower, they lifted the requirement for air strikes to be approved at the division commander level. Additionally, a major 

increase in preplanned air strikes was used to protect coalition 

forces from deadly traps and to prepare the way for them to 

enter contested territory. Nonlethal effects were becoming increasingly important as well. Ground operations were highly 

active, and ground commanders grew to rely on the aerial perspective from ISR platforms and fighters that could transmit 

live video feeds to laptop computer screens on the ground. This 

real-time information allowed the local commanders to make 

better decisions. This was especially true in urban and semiurban areas where visibility was restricted due to the ubiquitous walls that are in Iraq. 

Taken together, the effect that airpower provides in this context is best described as armed overwatch.

100 Armed overwatch 

occurs when air assets take up a position of observation as 

ground units conduct maneuver operations. The air assets provide real-time information about friendly, enemy, and population movements. If ground forces make contact with the enemy 
47

and require firepower, the air assets quickly transition to CAS 

(this is the armed part of armed overwatch). In Iraq, ground 

commanders needed this specific combination of lethal and 

nonlethal effects, and it was apparent that they were using airpower as an element of their maneuver force only when they 

knew it would be available.

Unfortunately, it became impossible to assure this availability 

to everyone. The demand for airpower, in the form of the air 

support requests, was increasing at an unprecedented rate as 

the summer surge approached. Even with recent increases in 

assets, the CFACC did not control nearly enough resources to 

meet every request. In fact, if the trends were to continue, the 

AOC staff estimated that the CFACC might not be able to meet 

half of the requests. When the CFACC asked for more resources 

Figure 12. Operation Phantom Thunder. (Compiled by the author.) 

Through the heroic actions of Coalition forces integrated with 

airpower, the tide turned in Iraq. Operations in places like Baqubah in 

the north and Salman Pak in the south helped initiate a downward 

trend in violence that continues to this day.
48

to handle this increase in demand, the response came back 

loud and clear from his superiors: “You’ve got what you’ve got.” 

Everyone realized that something needed to be done, and a 

meeting was called between the MNC-I and the AOC staff (including the chiefs of strategy and combat plans) as well as the 

corps air liaison officer and the ASOC staff in Baghdad. They 

hoped to answer the fundamental question, What is the true 

requirement for airpower during the summer surge?

A requirement for airpower must be established, because air 

commanders needed to know what to shoot for, and ground 

commanders needed to know what to expect. This requirement 

could not simply be the sum of the support requests of the local 

commanders, as a military requirement is an established need, 

and it was not clear that all of the requests were required for 

mission accomplishment.101 In fact, the major breakthrough at 

the meeting occurred when a representative from the MNC-I 

Fires Cell explained that he read the incoming requests for air 

support to the headquarters and that it was his job to arrange 

them in priority order. In his experience, he judged that about 

two-thirds of them were valid requests in which airpower was 

truly needed. The remaining one-third tended to be armed surveillance missions where airpower support would be nice, but 

it was not required for mission accomplishment. This gave the 

staffs a starting point, and they started focusing on meeting 

the top two-thirds of requests on a typical day. 

The planners then broke down Iraq by region, and with the 

knowledge of what was anticipated during the Baghdad belt 

operations, they estimated the air requirement for a typical day 

in each region. Everyone agreed that the divisions assigned to 

Baghdad, as well as those responsible for the provinces just 

north and south of Baghdad, needed 24/7 access to assets 

conducting armed overwatch. Moreover, they needed to know 

that airpower would be available for planning purposes so they 

could incorporate it into their maneuver plans. This task took 

up the lion’s share of the air resources available. When other 

regions such as Basra in the south and Mosul in the north 

were added, the total ranged from 96 to 110 hours of air coverage per day to meet the requirement.102 This was the mark on 

the wall.
49

The AOC staff knew this would stretch the air component to 

its limits, but they took this number back to the CFACC for his 

approval. The CFACC then directed an air component-wide risk 

assessment, and the answer came back from the air commanders in theater that this goal was extremely challenging, but it 

was attainable with prior planning. AOC planners went to work 

building a master surge plan for the summer that involved 

moving assets around the theater (and the globe) to meet the 

new requirement. This would not have been possible without 

the CFACC’s ability to direct operations throughout the theater. 

Ground forces received more airpower because the CFACC controlled it, planned it, redirected it, and gave a greater amount 

to them. This was a major success story for the air component.

However, it was what the ground commanders did with the 

resources entrusted to them, including airpower, that was most 

impressive. Operations in the Baghdad belts kicked off during 

the summer of 2007, and by all accounts, they were successful. Through the heroic actions of coalition forces integrated 

with airpower, the tide turned in Iraq. The operations in such 

places as Baqubah in the north and Salman Pak in the south 

helped to initiate a downward trend in violence that continues 

to this day. Some coalition forces have been able to withdraw 

from Iraq, and more will do so in the near future. Although senior leaders warn that expectations must be kept in check, 

many are optimistic about Iraq’s future. Although airmen and 

soldiers shared many frustrations, they were able to work together at the right time to get the job done.

The Marine Corps had a large role to play in the Baghdad belt 

operations as well. It was assigned to the critical Multinational 

Force-West (MNF-W) area of operations—essentially Iraq’s Anbar 

Province—that ended at the western outskirts of Baghdad. During the summer, the MNC-I commander directed the MNF-W 

forces to close off the western and northwestern approaches to 

Baghdad. Interestingly, Marine aviators were present at the 

planning meeting in Baghdad described earlier. In short order, 

they made it clear that Marine Corps air assets would fly in 

support of marines during the surge period; then, they sat back 

and watched the proceedings quietly. This came as a surprise 

to no one in the room.
50

The Marine Corps and Route Package Anbar

One institution that effectively bridges the gap between air 

and ground is the US Marine Corps, but it has done so in a way 

that has exacerbated tensions with other services. The Marine 

Corps has always believed in centralized control and decentralized execution of airpower, but it fundamentally disagrees that 

the source of centralized control should be an airman. It believes that the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) commander should be the single commander in charge, and all 

Marine air should be at his disposal. As the conflict in Iraq 

morphed into counterinsurgency and the Marine Expeditionary Force assumed responsibility for western Iraq, they secured 

control over Marine tactical air assets to fly in direct support of 

Marine ground units. This ensured the CFACC had no tasking 

authority over Marine fighters and air-refueling assets. Essentially, this agreement created a route package inside of Iraq 

reminiscent of Vietnam air operations, where harmony between 

the Navy and Air Force was accomplished by dividing the country into artificial sectors so that the services did not have to 

coordinate with one another.103 To this day, Airmen consider 

the route package system of Vietnam another example of the 

penny packeting of airpower. As a result, they argued against 

this same mechanism in Iraq. 

Marines argue that this arrangement is consistent with joint 

doctrine, and they are right, to a degree. JP 1, Doctrine for the 

Armed Forces of the United States, contains this language:

The MAGTF [Marine air-ground task force] commander will retain OPCON 

(operational control) of organic air assets. The primary mission of the 

MAGTF aviation combat element is the support of the MAGTF ground 

combat element. During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets normally will be in support of the MAGTF mission. The MAGTF commander 

will make sorties available to the JFC, for tasking through the joint 

force air component commander (JFACC), for air defense, long-range 

interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance. Sorties in excess of MAGTF 

direct support requirements will be provided to the JFC for tasking 

through the JFACC for the support of other components of the joint 

force or the joint force as a whole.104

While neither JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, nor JP 3-30, 

Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, repeats this specific language, JP 3-30 does mention organic air assets not 
51

tasked by the JFACC and mandates that they appear on the air 

tasking order to avoid conflict.105

Marines had to stretch this language to apply to the situation 

in Iraq. The static conditions are different from what the MAGTF 

was organized, trained, and equipped to do. The MAGTF was 

created to conduct expeditionary operations from the sea, characterized by rapid maneuver and usually conducted over a limited 

time frame. Yet in Iraq, the Marines find themselves operating 

as a policing force garrisoned hundreds of miles from the sea 

over a long time period. The mission is different, and Marine 

leaders admit that it is changing the corps. The commandant of 

the Marine Corps, Gen James Conway, for example, has voiced 

his concerns about this evolution. “We’ve become in many ways 

a second land army. We now have a generation of officers who 

have never stepped aboard a ship, and that concerns us with 

our naval flavor and our ability to launch amphibious support.”106 The problem is that, even though they are a second 

land army in Iraq, they control their own airpower in a way that 

the other land army does not.

The Marine Corps deserves great credit for adapting itself to 

meet the nation’s call; in fact, one can make a solid argument 

that it has been the most successful service in doing so. Their 

tight grip on airpower, however, has created a curious seam in 

Iraq. For the most part, Marine aviators fly in support of Marines in Anbar, and coalition air forces support the rest of Iraq. 

Requests for airpower support are prioritized and filled separately, and generally many more unfilled requirements exist 

outside of Anbar. There is no way of knowing if the lowest filled 

priority in Anbar is of higher priority than the highest unfilled 

priority in the rest of Iraq. The perverse result is that ground 

commanders operating on one side of an artificial line have access to airpower in a way that those on the other side do not—

and many of the latter operate in greater Baghdad, the acknowledged center of gravity. Airmen have repeatedly made the 

argument that sometimes operations outside of Anbar are a 

higher priority. While Marine air assets should generally support Marine ground commanders because it makes sense, 

sometimes Marine air assets should be pooled with all other 

coalition air forces and allocated according to the overall priority. 

Recently, MNC-I leaders have expressed their wish for all air 
52

assets in Iraq to be distributed under the same system. Marines have vehemently disagreed, and this disconnect never has 

been resolved.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance— 

What Ground Commanders Covet Most

Another point of contention in Iraq is the command and control of ISR assets, especially those that belong to the air component. As described earlier, ISR apportionment is handled 

through the Joint Collection Management Board process led by 

the USCENTCOM J2. Apportionment is generally done by asset, with MQ-1 Predator orbits (essentially the discrete communication lines that allow Predator operations beyond lines of 

sight) being the most hotly contested at the board because fullmotion video—also called the unblinking eye—is the effect 

ground commanders covet most. After the apportionment decision is made by USCENTCOM, ground commanders and staffs 

in Iraq and Afghanistan develop collection requests and prioritize them (this is called collection requirements management). 

These requests flow into the AOC, and system experts in the 

ISR Division schedule ISR assets to cover as many of the requirements as possible while maintaining effectiveness (this is 

called collection operations management). 

Because the assets are largely apportioned by system, however, the line between collection requirements management 

and collection operations management is blurred. If there is 

one E-8 JSTARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System) sortie into Iraq on a given day, the collection managers 

know that if they prioritize certain requirements high enough, 

they are essentially scheduling the JSTARS to cover the requirements, with the ISR Division simply determining takeoff/

landing times and refueling needs. This is especially true if the 

collection managers write the requirements so that only one 

type of asset can meet them. This is not terrible if every­one 

agrees that the assets are being used effectively. At times, the 

collection managers and ISR Division disagree on the best use 

of ISR, and heated arguments have resulted. The ISR Division, 

therefore, can be a frustrating place to work. Despite the designation as ISR experts with collection operations management 
53

authority, the ISR Division is often treated as a help desk for 

ISR, not a partner on the joint team.

Contrast this perspective with that of the ground forces. After returning from Iraq as the MNC-I commander, Lt Gen 

Raymond Odierno coauthored an article detailing how ISR is 

managed by the MNC-I. Although he goes to great length to emphasize decentralization in the counterinsurgency environment, 

he describes a management system that mixes centralization 

and decentralization. In “ISR Evolution in the Iraqi Theater,” he 

explains this balance, saying, “The COIN [counterinsurgency] 

environment’s decentralized nature makes it imperative that 

ISR asset control, from tactical through theater level, be pushed 

to the lowest operational echelon, while it is simultaneously 

managed by the corps to maintain flexibility.”107 He proceeds to 

describe how the ISR assets are provided to lower-level commanders in one of two ways. The assets are either assigned to 

the subordinate commands semipermanently (these are called 

apportioned, although that use is not entirely consistent with the 

definition in joint doctrine), or they are given with the expectation that they can be pulled back by higher headquarters to 

meet higher-priority requirements that emerge (these are allocated, again not totally consistent with the doctrinal definition).108

The key point is that this system balances predictability through 

the apportioned assets while ensuring flexibility through the 

allocated assets.109 The article also makes it clear that this is 

possible because many more systems have been sent to Iraq. In 

economic terms, supply is up, and this allows for more of the 

demand to be met through decentralization. 

A final point of interest is that ground commanders appreciate the ISR expertise they have received in the form of ISR liaison officers sent from the AOC to various division headquarters 

in Iraq (fig. 13). “Providing these Air Force subject matter experts as advisors to division staff sections and as key members 

of the intelligence-operations team has been a combat multiplier,” writes General Odierno. It would be extremely helpful to 

have these experts at the BCT level to provide the CAOC (combat air operations center) and related organizations with insight into the operations they support.”110 It seems that the 

presence of these liaisons has been helpful in establishing relationships and common understanding between soldiers and 
54

Airmen. This is yet another example of how disconnects in the 

joint force can be eased through personal relationships.

Common Frustrations in the 

Counterinsurgency Environment

Unfortunately, disconnects between airmen and the ground 

services in both Iraq and Afghanistan are exacerbated by the 

typical frustrations of fighting a counterinsurgency campaign. 

Max Boot explains that these conflicts are inherently frustrating to military professionals since “the primary characteristic 

of small wars is that there is no obvious field of battle; there are 

only areas to be controlled, civilians to be protected, hidden 

foes to be subdued. . . . There is little satisfaction in winning 

such a war . . . but much grief if you lose.”111 Many interservice 

disagreements can be smoothed over when things are going 

well. As an example, interservice relationships have improved 

in Iraq as the outlook has grown more positive. Nevertheless, 

the maddening nature of counterinsurgency has aggravated 

Figure 13. ISR assets. (Compiled by the author.)

...These (ISR) assets are now as 

important as any combat asset in 

the corps, and they must be 

managed by commanders.

Lt Gen Raymond T. Odierno 

“ISR Evolution in the Iraqi Theater”

Images in public domain
55

many existing seams between the Air Force, Army, and Marine 

Corps, and the Air Force’s master tenet of centralized control 

and decentralized execution has been a lightning rod for emotional criticism and intellectual challenges. 

Answering the Challenges

Clearly, Airmen in the US Air Force must be able to articulate what they believe about the planning and execution of air 

operations. Unfortunately, Airmen are having difficulty explaining the master tenet of centralized control and decentralized 

execution to each other, sister services, and civilian leaders. 

Moreover, a lack of understanding of the history of the master 

tenet, including experiences in World Wars I and II as well as 

recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, has led us to resist 

modifications to our command and control mechanisms for 

fear that we will violate our fundamental beliefs. The perverse 

result is that we are violating the experience of the airmen who 

came before us, as they valued the flexibility of airpower above 

all else.

Can we do better? Yes, we can, if we take three steps. First, 

we should reevaluate the language we use to summarize the 

master tenet. Perhaps we can find a better way of describing 

what we believe. Second, we should write doctrine that teaches 

Airmen about the master tenet and acknowledges that there is 

no one-size-fits-all solution to commanding airpower. A mature 

doctrine will help us deal with the real-world complexity we 

encounter by abandoning dogged prescriptions and substituting important questions. The answers will help to determine 

how to structure command and control systems to fit the situation. Third, in the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, we 

should use these questions to guide us in implementing a more 

flexible command and control system that better integrates with 

other elements of the joint force and their varied missions. 

Finding Better Language to Describe 

the Master Tenet

We should begin by looking for better language to describe 

the master tenet. The fact is that centralized control and de-
56

centralized execution has devolved into a sound bite that means 

different things to different people. As explained earlier, the 

term control has significant problems, and the result is that 

Airmen have difficulty connecting the sound bite to convincing 

explanations. To get past this language barrier, we should go 

back to the first principles. Earlier in this monograph, we derived a more robust statement of the master tenet, which we 

summarized “as centralized command and control of airpower 

by an airman promotes effectiveness and preserves flexibility 

at the strategic and operational levels of war, while decentralized execution of air operations promotes effectiveness and 

preserves flexibility at the tactical level.” Unfortunately, this is 

a mouthful, and it may be useful to search for a shorter version. For the first section, many people have proposed alternative ways of describing exactly what should be centralized. In 

centralized control, control is vague and is associated with multiple concepts. Centralized apportionment is good, but does not 

allow for real-time adjustment. Centralized planning and direction are the same as above. In centralized command, the JFACC 

may not command all the forces he or she directs.

As discussed earlier, the adoption of centralized command 

and control most closely describes what Airmen believe. We 

also believe in decentralized execution, as do all of the other 

services. Most Airmen would have little difficulty connecting 

these concepts to increased effectiveness and flexibility, so the 

phrase “promotes effectiveness and preserves flexibility” could 

be deleted. Therefore, if we were to adopt centralized command 

and control and decentralized execution as our bumper sticker, 

it would be a marginal improvement over what we have now.

This would leave out the connection to the levels of war, and 

this connection is critical for our Airmen. We must be able to 

explain that our commitment to centralization is directly related to our belief that airpower can have operational and strategic effects when integrated and synchronized across the entire battlespace. Moreover, we believe that decentralization is 

the norm, not the exception, for tactical operations. In combining these two statements, we also believe that the only valid 

reason for senior commanders to exercise centralization over 

tactical operations is (1) they have operational- and strategiclevel consequences, and (2) there is no other way to mitigate 
57

mission risk (that is, communication of commander’s intent, 

pushing of real-time information to lower echelons, and training subordinate commanders to act appropriately).

The connection of centralization and decentralization to the 

levels of war constantly reminds Airmen that tactical operations must be connected to operational and strategic objectives. 

Dropping a bomb or shooting a missile is not an end in itself. 

Tactical commanders must do this well, and they usually function best when they are delegated the authority they need for 

mission accomplishment. The operational commander—usually 

the JFACC—must connect these tactical actions to higher 

goals. This is done through the centralized planning and direction that goes into the air tasking order. During execution, 

however, if the JFACC needs to make real-time adjustments to 

adhere to the operational and strategic objectives, the JFACC 

can and should do so. Just as importantly, the commander 

should take proactive steps to adjust his command and control 

system so that future tactical operations can remain decentralized to the maximum extent possible.

For these reasons, the best bumper sticker for the master 

tenet is centralized command and control at the strategic and 

operational levels of war, decentralized execution at the tactical 

level. This faithfully and concisely conveys what Airmen have 

learned regarding employing airpower in military operations. 

Beyond the Bumper Sticker—Doctrine 

that Deals with Complexity

We must go beyond the bumper sticker and teach our Airmen what we believe about airpower. This is where doctrine 

plays a critical role. Doctrine codifies our best practices and 

lessons learned. It also helps Airmen to verbalize and explain 

their fundamental beliefs. Something, however, about the current language in AFDD 1 (Draft), Air Force Basic Doctrine, and 

JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, gets in 

the way. The following is proposed language to include in AFDD 

1 (and summarized in JP 3-30). It is meant to explain the why

behind the master tenet. It helps to teach Airmen, and others 

in the joint community, how to deal with real-world complexity 
58

by clarifying the trade-offs between centralization and decentralization of airpower. 

Centralization versus Decentralization 

in Air Operations

Whenever airpower is included as an element of a military 

operation, one of the most important considerations—perhaps 

the most important consideration—is the degree of centralization versus decentralization in airpower command and control.112 Although many choices abound, no set answers exist, 

causing details of every situation to be different. From early 

experiments in World War I to irregular conflicts in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, airmen have learned that the question of centralization versus decentralization is what strategist B. H. Liddell Hart 

calls a duality in warfare. “Like a coin, it has two faces,” he 

writes, “hence the need for a well-calculated compromise as a 

means to reconciliation.”113 In other words, there is always a 

trade-off between the centralization and decentralization of air 

operations. Commanders, therefore, must use their best judgment when instituting the critical command relationships that 

drive the nature of air operations. In doing so, it is wise to consider the lessons of previous experiences. 

The trade-off of airpower centralization emerged in World 

War I, as decentralized operations were proven best for airplanes used in such tactical roles as artillery spotting and observation. On the other hand, the successful use of airpower in 

supporting Gen John Pershing’s operational objective of SaintMihiel depended upon the centralized direction of over 1,500 

aircraft by General Mitchell. The issue of centralization rose to 

the forefront, however, in World War II. The disastrous use of 

airpower in the early stages of the Allies’ North African Campaign led to a major shift in US doctrine. The core problem was 

that Allied commanders had divided airpower in a way that 

made it difficult to shift air assets in response to Luftwaffe attacks. Numerous separate air operations, famously described 

by British air chief marshal Sir Arthur Tedder as penny packets, diluted airpower so that it was ineffective. The US reaction 

was to codify the following statement in Field Manual 100-20, 
59

Command and Employment of Airpower: “Control of available 

air power must be centralized and command must be exercised 

through the air force commander if this inherent flexibility and 

ability to deliver a decisive blow are to be fully exploited. . . . 

The superior commander will not attach army air forces to 

units of the ground forces under his command except when 

such ground force units are operating independently or are isolated by distance or lack of communication.”114

While the Allies followed this guidance generally for the rest 

of the war, it also became apparent that a degree of decentralization allowed for both effectiveness and flexibility at the tactical 

level. While air forces were not attached to ground forces, they 

did develop habitual working relationships that aided in teamwork. General Quesada observed that “of all the lessons we 

learned about tactical air operations, perhaps the most important is that the air commander, his group, and squadron commanders must have a sincere desire to become part of the 

ground team. The Army must, of course, have the same dedication to reciprocate. This close liaison can only come from close 

day-to-day contact—especially at command levels; there must 

be almost instantaneous communication between ground and 

air and through all the chain of command.”115

Airmen in World War II dealt with the tension between centralization and decentralization by recognizing the trade-offs 

between the two and adopting solutions that fit their particular 

situations. Generally, when air operations were aimed at achieving operational and strategic effects, they were fairly centralized. 

Tactical operations, on the other hand, were decentralized. Air 

Force commanders followed suit in subsequent operations in 

places like Korea, Vietnam, Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. 

Their experience offers today’s Airmen important insights into 

the duality of centralization and decentralization. Yet, experiences 

in World War II, as well as numerous operations thereafter, 

have taught Airmen that the right balance of centralization and 

decentralization depends on answers to the following questions.

What Is the Nature of the Operation?

A careful assessment of the military situation is critical in 

determining the appropriate degree of centralization. Different 
60

situations will drive different balances. For example, a campaign employing strategic attack as a line of operation will require a high degree of centralization under an air commander. 

The air commander must have the authority to direct operations, 

including attack sequencing, and shift them as operations unfold. In contrast, tactical air operations in direct support of 

ground commanders, such as close air support and armed 

overwatch, are most effective when conducted with a high degree of decentralization. While the air commanders need to reserve the authority to shift assets, it is usually best for airpower 

to be allocated and distributed through tactical command and 

control nodes such as the ASOC and then to allow airmen to 

work directly with the ground commander to preserve tactical 

responsiveness. Furthermore, such missions as interdiction 

and counterair require a mix of centralization and decentralization, as centralized direction at the operational level of war is 

necessary to direct the overall priorities and weights of effort, 

but decentralized execution at the tactical level allows for a 

faster tempo of operations.

Where Should Flexibility Be Preserved?

A command and control structure designed to ensure flexibility at the operational and strategic levels of war almost always requires restrictions at the tactical level, and the opposite 

is true as well. It is important, therefore, that commanders decide the appropriate level to preserve flexibility. Nuclear operations, for example, are highly centralized—for good reason. They 

are designed to give the president flexibility at the strategic level, 

so they are highly restricted at the tactical level. Conversely, 

counterinsurgency operations tend to be highly decentralized, 

ensuring flexibility for the tactical commanders to increase legitimacy and influence within the population. Other military 

missions tend to fall somewhere between these two extremes.

Often, the appropriate degree of centralization and decentralization depends less on specific military actions and more 

on the political consequences of these actions. In Operation 

Deliberate Force, the JFACC employed a high degree of centralization, not because the military situation demanded it, but because the political situation was tenuous. “If we had committed 
61

one atrocity from the air,” he explained, “NATO would forever 

be blamed for crimes, and the military threat would be lessened.”116 The JFACC preserved the ability to conduct operations (strategic-operational level) by restricting what pilots 

could and could not do (tactical level). A little more than a decade later, however, things were much different. NATO air operations in Afghanistan could be conducted in a much more 

decentralized way, as the political environment had changed 

dramatically. Such decentralized operations promote effectiveness and preserve flexibility at the tactical level, and there is 

wide agreement among the services that decentralized execution is preferable whenever the situation allows.

How Many Assets Are Available?

Simply stated, if plenty of assets are available, air operations 

can be highly decentralized with a low risk of dilution. Unfortunately, this is almost never the case, because air assets are 

usually limited, and their capabilities are highly desired by the 

joint force. Fewer assets drive the need for more centralization—specifically centralized apportionment. Consider the example of space operations. US satellites are limited in number, 

yet their capabilities are in high demand. This is one of two 

main reasons space operations tend to be centrally controlled. 

The other is that they can create effects on a global scale, which 

leads to the next question.

What Is the Geographical Range of Effects?

Another key factor is the geographical range of airpower. Few 

benefits abound to centralizing command and control of assets 

with a limited range, such as some rotary-wing and unmanned 

systems, as it is difficult to shift them to other missions. Once 

the initial allocation decision is made, it is usually best to allow 

these to be decentralized. A great benefit, however, exists in 

centralizing control over assets that can range over a theater or 

more. Because they can readily shift from one specific objective 

to another, commanders should create command and control 

structures that allow this shifting in reaction to changing priorities. Air mobility assets, for example, can move people, supplies, and equipment across the globe, and the Air Force has 
62

generally chosen to centralize control of long-range airlifters. 

Likewise, the Air Force employs bombers that can conduct precision strikes anywhere on Earth, and these tend to be centrally controlled as well. As the Air Force continues to develop 

its perspective on cyberspace operations, it is likely that command and control will be centralized due to wide-ranging effects. 

In addition, commanders should consider interactions between airpower elements when determining command-andcontrol constructs. Creating synergy between assets that operate over long distances usually requires a greater degree of 

centralization. In Operation Enduring Freedom, the JFACC 

controlled a mixture of long-range bombers and fighters and 

ISR and air refueling assets. In addition, the JFACC coordinated support from numerous space capabilities. This created 

a potent synergy to support the operation’s overall objectives. 

Centralized command and control at the operational level was 

required for this, but decentralized execution at the tactical 

level was also a key factor, as bombers, fighters, and ISR assets 

worked directly with the ground commanders through joint 

terminal attack controllers to provide devastating fires as well 

as the invaluable situational awareness that comes with the 

above-ground perspective.

Who Has the Best Situational Awareness?

A final—and perhaps the most important—consideration is 

determining who in the command-and-control construct has 

the highest amount of situational awareness. Generally, the 

commander or operator with the best situational awareness 

should have the authority to make real-time decisions, as this 

helps to maintain a high tempo. During an air-to-air engagement, the pilots and air battle managers involved generally 

have the highest awareness of the tactical fight. Once the decision to engage is made by the appropriate authority (either 

through predetermined rules of engagement or a real-time decision), it is best for all higher commanders to allow the engagement to be run by the people involved in the fight. Alternatively, 

during time-sensitive targeting operations (which often support 

operational and strategic objectives), the node with the best 
63

situational awareness is often the AOC, and a high degree of 

centralization makes success more likely. 

In general, the most successful air operations have incorporated enough centralized command and control to promote effectiveness and preserve flexibility at the strategic and operational levels of war, while taking advantage of a high degree of 

decentralized execution, normally at the tactical level, to encourage high-tempo operations. Airmen are committed to centralization because airpower can have operational and strategic 

effects when synchronized across the entire battlespace. In 

contrast, decentralized execution is the norm, not the exception, for tactical operations. Senior leaders may need to exercise centralization over tactical operations when there are 

pressing operational and strategic consequences, and there is 

no other way to mitigate mission risk (that is, communication 

of commander’s intent, pushing of real-time information to 

lower echelons, and training subordinate commanders to act 

appropriately). In this way, the competing pulls of centralization and decentralization are closely connected with the higher 

and lower levels of war, and the master tenet of airpower can be 

summarized “as centralized command and control at the strategic and operational levels of war, decentralized execution at 

the tactical level.”

In all operations, centralized command and control should 

be conducted by an airman who ensures that tactical air operations are connected to operational and strategic objectives. 

That airman is usually the JFACC, who acts as both a functional expert and a subordinate commander of a functional 

component in a joint force. The JFACC commands and controls air operations on behalf of the JFC to attain joint operational and strategic objectives. This is done through the centralized planning and direction that goes into the air tasking 

order. During execution, however, if the JFACC needs to make 

real-time adjustments to adhere to the JFC’s operational and 

strategic objectives, he or she can and should do so. Just as 

importantly, he or she should take proactive steps to adjust 

the command and control system and communicate the commander’s intent to subordinate echelons so that future tactical operations can remain decentralized to the maximum extent possible. 
64

The JFACC’s command and control system, also called the 

tactical air control system (TACS), must be flexible. In certain 

stages and phases, the TACS must be highly centralized, with 

the AOC taking the lead in many activities. In other phases, 

especially during irregular warfare and stability operations, a 

highly decentralized TACS is more likely to be effective, and 

such subordinate elements of the TACS as the ASOC will have 

a large role to play. At all times, the JFACC maintains the ability 

to adjust operations if the strategic/operational environment 

changes. The art of airpower command and control is finding 

the right balance between centralization and decentralization 

in light of the specific situation. The questions presented above 

can help in achieving this balance.

Applying an Updated Doctrine to Current Challenges

If this doctrine were in place today, we might choose different 

command constructs and relationships to deal with the challenges we face. For example, in the USCENTCOM AOR, asking 

the five questions would lead to interesting answers.

1. What is the nature of the operation? In contrast to the 

initial phases of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi 

Freedom, military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are 

highly decentralized, with a great degree of authority, including planning and execution authorities, delegated to 

tactical commanders of relatively low rank. In addition, 

the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have different 

characters, and senior leaders in Kabul and Baghdad implement distinctly different campaign plans. These commanders are aided by their staffs, which are organized 

differently—in fact, they hardly resemble each other at 

all. Trying to integrate a single AOC into these separate 

and unique headquarters has been a difficult fit. Specifically, due to geographical separation and personnel rotation policies, it has been difficult to establish personal 

relationships between the staff.

2. Where should flexibility be preserved? In Iraq and Afghanistan, the ground commanders believe that flexibility must 

be preserved at the tactical level of war within the overall 
65

operational and strategic guidance. To airmen, this means 

that most military operations will be highly dynamic and 

require the ability to rapidly direct changes to the original 

plan. At the operational level, however, some degree of 

flexibility must be preserved to shift airpower to address 

such unexpected challenges as Operation Medusa or the 

incident in an-Najaf.

3. How many assets are available? Despite the commitment 

of numerous units and hundreds of air assets by the 

United States and coalition partners to the theater, demand for airpower in USCENTCOM greatly exceeds supply. This means that a degree of centralization at the operational level is required to ensure that all assets fly and 

none sit idle. The dramatic increase in ISR assets throughout the joint force, however, means that it is possible to 

assign some of these assets to engaged units on a semipermanent basis. 

4. What is the geographical range of effects? In USCENTCOM, 

some air assets have global reach (C-17s on aeromedical 

evacuation missions), some can range throughout the 

theater (B-1s providing CAS and overwatch in either Iraq 

or Afghanistan), and some are limited to one part of the 

theater (A-10s providing CAS in the middle of Iraq). While 

all assets can theoretically move around according to 

need, practical basing considerations and directives from 

senior commanders, including apportionment decisions 

by the USCENTCOM commander, prevent this in many 

cases. The result is that many assets are confined to one 

part of the theater. 

5. Who has the best situational awareness? The answer to 

this is that “it depends.” Generally, for operations within 

Iraq and Afghanistan, especially such tactical missions as 

overwatch, CAS, electronic warfare, and some ISR missions, the situational awareness grows with proximity to 

the tactical commanders. Alternatively, the CFACC’s AOC 

enjoys a high degree of situational awareness at the operational level that greatly aids in shifting assets between 
66

Iraq and Afghanistan as well as keeping track of ongoing 

developments in other parts of the AOR. 

In light of these answers, the senior airman in USCENTCOM 

might well conclude that he or she needs to keep a degree of 

centralized command and control for certain authorities and 

activities while decentralizing other operations to gain tactical 

effectiveness. In the specific case of Iraq and Afghanistan, the 

CFACC would probably conclude that the demands of the current campaign phases drive the need to delegate some degree 

of authority to airmen who are in face-to-face contact with the 

commanders there. Of course, there are relatively senior Airmen in the respective headquarters who represent the CFACC—

they are the directors of the air component coordination element (ACCE). Unfortunately, these Airmen have little planning or 

execution authority and are somewhat marginalized in the 

headquarters in which they sit. 

One option available to the CFACC is to delegate some degree 

of short-term planning and execution authority down to airmen in the forward headquarters, perhaps the ACCE directors, 

while keeping overall authority over air assets in the theater. In 

the current situation, it would make sense to delegate planning 

and execution authority for tactical ISR operations as well as 

overwatch and CAS. The CFACC would retain authority to 

swing directly such assets as long-range bombers/fighters, air 

refueling, and intratheater airlift assets. Generally, the CFACC 

would determine where the swing assets would go, and then he 

or she would delegate the planning and execution for these assets to airmen in the forward headquarters. If something were 

to change at the strategic/operational level, however, the CFACC 

would maintain the ability to adjust air operations accordingly.

Additionally, the CFACC could push planning expertise out 

of the AOC and down to lower echelons of the tactical air control system, specifically the ASOC and TACPs. Due to the high 

tempo of operations, the battlefield Airmen assigned to the 

TACPs rarely have time to plan missions; they are constantly 

involved in their execution. Furthermore, these Airmen are 

trained to provide expertise in CAS and armed overwatch. They 

do not have expertise in synchronizing and integrating ISR, 

electronic warfare, space, and other forms of airpower. In the 
67

current phases of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, it 

makes sense to augment the ASOC and TACPs with Airmen—

like the ISR liaison officers mentioned earlier—who can provide 

this planning expertise by direct interface with the ground commanders. To be credible, these Airmen must be skilled in airpower integration and sufficiently articulate to communicate the 

best uses for airpower to busy ground commanders. They must 

also be of sufficient rank to carry weight within the Army culture. While these planners would operate under their respective elements within the theater air-control system, they would 

also act as planning liaisons between the CAOC (especially the 

Strategy, Plans, and ISR Divisions) and the separate ground 

headquarters where the meaningful planning takes place. 

These steps would go a long way in bridging the operationaltactical disconnect that hinders airpower integration today.

One Last Lesson from History: 

Gen George C. Kenney and the 

Advanced Echelon

It is helpful for Airmen to understand that delegating planning and execution authority to forward commanders is not 

novel. Gen George C. Kenney, “perhaps the most effective air 

commander in World War II,” used a similar construct while 

serving as Gen Douglas MacArthur’s senior Airman in the Southwest Pacific.117 After surveying the situation there, Kenney decided that his proper place was in MacArthur’s headquarters, 

but he also needed to send an air commander forward to conduct daily operations.118 General Kenney maintained overall 

responsibility as the 5th Air Force commander, but he delegated a significant amount of authority forward to Brig Gen 

Ennis C. Whitehead at the 5th Advanced Echelon (abbreviated 

5th Advon).119 In his informative biography of Kenney titled 

MacArthur’s Airman, Col Thomas Griffith describes this move.

Forming this headquarters was an unusual step and had no precedent 

in prewar American air doctrine, yet Kenney made the move for a number of reasons. . . . In his role as the Allied Air Forces commander he 

had to stay in Brisbane to help plan and coordinate operations with 

MacArthur and the land and naval commanders. . . . He needed someone at Port Moresby whom he could trust to oversee operations and 

provide American control of the missions. “Fifth Advon” under Ennis 
68

Whitehead was the answer. . . . Whitehead had the authority to change 

previously assigned mission based on weather, new intelligence, or the 

number of aircraft available. Furthermore, since Whitehead worked directly with the ground commanders in New Guinea, he could send 

flights to support the ground forces on short notice. In short, Whitehead’s control over the day-to-day combat operations gave air units 

much needed flexibility to respond quickly to changing situations. The 

advanced headquarters also left Kenney free to concentrate on a myriad 

of other activities, such as finding ways to keep more aircraft flying and 

improving training and morale.120

General Kenney understood the art of command and control. 

His approach was practical, not dogmatic. Despite a lack of doctrine, he adopted a command and control system to fit the situation. Today’s Airmen can learn much from his example (fig. 14).

Conclusion

Over the course of airpower history, airmen have discovered 

that there are always trade-offs between centralization and deFigure 14. Control over day-to-day operations. (Compiled by the author.)

In short, Whitehead’s 

control over the day-to-day 

combat operations gave air 

units much needed 

flexibility to respond quickly 

to changing situations. The 

advanced headquarters also 

left Kenney free to 

concentrate on a myriad of 

other activities, such as 

finding ways to keep more 

aircaft flying and improving 

training and morale.

Thomas Griffith 

MacArthur’s Airman

Above: General George 

C. Kenney, Commander, 

5th Air Force and senior 

air adviser to General 

MacArthur in the Pacific

Right: Brigadier General 

Ennis Whitehead, 5th 

Advon Commander
69

centralization in airpower command and control. The art is 

finding the right balance, and that is where airmen have had 

great difficulty, especially in the years following Operation Desert Storm. Such operations as Deliberate Force and Allied Force 

led airmen to fear that advanced communication technologies 

were encouraging airpower leaders to overcentralize. The initial 

phases of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom 

seemed to restore balance, but the irregular conflicts that followed presented serious challenges to airmen and their belief 

in the master tenet.

We must face these challenges head on. A big reason others 

have challenged us is that we have not been able to explain the 

master tenet cogently. This is partially due to the words we 

have chosen for our bumper sticker, and it is partially because 

we do not understand the history and theory behind the doctrine. Instead, we have doggedly held on to comfortable commandand-control constructs that are less than effective in the current 

environment. When we justify this with the sound bite “centralized control and decentralized execution,” we risk diminishing 

our doctrine into dogma status. That is why this mantra is now 

a catchphrase in crisis.

When we return first to principles based on historical experience, however, we find that the master tenet is as relevant today as it was in previous conflicts. Whenever there are limited 

resources, there must be some degree of centralized command 

and control. This is especially true at the strategic and operational levels of warfare. At the same time, decentralized execution allows for major gains in flexibility and tempo at the tactical 

level. This is true for all forms of military power, but airpower’s 

characteristics, including speed and geographical range, mean 

that its command and control tends to be more centralized 

than for other forms. This is especially true when airpower is 

applied directly to achieve operational and strategic effects. In 

contrast, when airpower plays a largely tactical role, an emphasis on decentralized execution works best. Linking the degree of centralization to the levels of war helps Airmen to find 

the right balance.

Well-written doctrine also helps to achieve an effective balance. Specifically, our doctrine should teach airmen about the 

history of the master tenet, and instead of prescribing a set solu-
70

tion, it should help senior airmen deal with complexity by proposing questions for them to ask. The answers will help to determine the way they should set up their command and control 

system. This doctrine will discourage one-size-fits-all solutions 

to airpower command and control, instead giving commanders 

room to develop flexible constructs that best fit the situation.

Given the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan, adopting 

command-and-control constructs that emphasize decentralization is the right thing to do because airpower operations are 

largely tactical in nature. Instead of a command and control 

structure that is top-heavy at the AOC, a more decentralized 

structure that emphasizes the subordinate elements of the 

TACS is more likely to work, especially in light of historical lessons learned. Given the heavy emphasis on operations in Iraq 

and Afghanistan—two vastly different operations—it may even 

make sense to give authority for day-to-day operations to a senior airman acting as a forward commander. This would mimic 

the best practice of General Kenney, who found himself in a 

similar situation. Understand, however, that this may not be 

the answer for a modern conflict in the Pacific or elsewhere. 

When creating or adjusting their command-and-control constructs, all commanders, including air commanders, must understand no single way exists to balance centralization and decentralization. Trade-offs between the two will occur, and adopting 

the right approach requires a solid assessment of the situation 

as well as a judgment informed by theory, history, and personal experience. This is what the successful previous commanders were able to do. By making a few adjustments to the 

way we explain and teach our master tenet, we will enable future commanders to enjoy similar success. 

Notes

1. In this paper, I use the term airman (or airmen) in a generic sense, referring to someone who understands and appreciates the full range of air and 

space power capabilities and can employ or support some aspect of air and 

space power. I only capitalize airman (or airmen) when referring specifically to 

a member of the United States Air Force. 

2. B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2d ed. rev. (New York: Penguin Books, 

1991), 329.
71

3. B. H. Liddell Hart, Paris or the Future of War (London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1972), 12.

4. Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 6.

5. Ibid., 274.

6. Mahan expresses his ambivalence at critiquing Nelson and Collingwood: “An ordinary man rather shrinks from criticizing the action of officers 

of their eminence.” Alfred Thayer Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (New York: Dover Publication, Inc., 1987), 353.

7. Ibid., 354.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., 357.

10. Van Creveld, Command in War, 274.

11. Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United 

States, 14 May 2007, IV–15.

12. US Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, February 2008, 3–6. 

13. Lee Kennett, First Air War: 1914–1918 (New York: Free Press, 1991), 

87.

14. Mark A. Clodfelter, “Molding Airpower Convictions: Development and 

Legacy of William Mitchell’s Strategic Thought,” in The Paths of Heaven: Evolution of Airpower History, ed. Phillip Meilinger (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1997), 86.

15. Kennett, First Air War, 90–92.

16. David Syrett, “Northwest Africa, 1942–1943,” in Case Studies in the 

Achievement of Air Superiority, ed. Benjamin Franklin Cooling (Washington, 

DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1994), 227–33.

17. Lord Arthur W. Tedder, “Air, Land, and Sea Warfare,” Journal of the 

Royal United Services Institute, January 1946, 61.

18. War Department Field Manual 100-20, Command and Employment of 

Air Power, 21 July 1943, 2.

19. Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 1–2, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, 

March 1953, 5.

20. AFMAN 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, 

March 1992, 114.

21. Ibid., 28 September 1971, 2–1.

22. Ibid., 15 January 1975, 31.

23. Ibid., March 1992, 114.

24. See JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 

Terms, 12 April 2001, as amended through 4 March 2008, for the official 

definitions of apportionment and allocation.

25. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, 5 June 2003, 

II–2.

26. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1, Air Warfare, 22 January 

2000, 50.

27. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, II–1.

28. Ibid., III–18.
72

29. Lt Col Robert D. Pollock, “Roads Not Taken: Theoretical Approaches to 

Operation Deliberate Force,” in Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air 

Campaigning, ed. Col Robert C. Owen (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 

2000), 433–34.

30. See the discussion about tanks and their relationship to the infantry 

in David E. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. 

Army, 1917–1945 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

31. This follows an interesting argument articulated by Stephen Covey in 

the popular book, Seven Habits of Highly Effective People (New York: Simon 

and Schuster, 1989). Covey asserts that independence is a prerequisite for 

interdependence. Based on his work, it’s reasonable to assume that Covey 

would argue that airmen needed a degree of independence before they could 

assume an interdependent role. 

32. Van Creveld, Command in War, 1.

33. Ibid., 5.

34. Ibid., 6.

35. JP 1-02 defines command as “1. The authority that a commander in 

the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively 

using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, 

directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, 

morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.” JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as amended 

through 4 March 2008.

36. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 

Terms, 12 April 2001, as amended through 4 March 2008.

37. Ibid.

38. If not centrally commanded and controlled, the possibility exists that 

long-range bombers, intertheater airlifters, intelligence satellites, or networkattack assets could be assigned to support one mission in one theater, but 

the situation could change so that their effects would be greater if used for 

another mission in another theater. Centralized command allows for timely 

shifting of assets and the effects they create, even if it is across the globe. 

39. Col Phillip S. Meilinger, 10 Propositions Regarding Airpower (Air Force 

History and Museums Program, 1995), 49, 52–53. 

40. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 

2001, as amended through 4 March 2008. Regarding air operations, Lt Col 

Woody W. Parramore, USAF, retired, makes a cogent argument that this definition should be changed to read “delegation of execution authority to subordinate commanders or subordinate elements of a command and control 

system to accomplish their assigned tasks.” This correctly acknowledges that 

the JFACC does not delegate authority to wing, group, and squadron commanders. Instead, he or she delegates authority down to subordinate echelons in the theater air control system (TACS) such as joint terminal attack 

controllers, mission commanders, and flight leads. Lt Col Woody W. Parramore, USAF, retired, “Defining Decentralized Execution in Order to Recognize 
73

Centralized Execution,” Air and Space Power Journal, Fall 2004; available at 

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj04/fal04/parramore 

.html (accessed 12 June 2008).

41. Maj Mark G. Davis, “Centralized Control/Decentralized Execution in 

the Era of Global Reach,” Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 2003, 96.

42. For example, in his thesis at the School of Advanced Air and Space 

Power Studies, Maj Steven Ankerstar, USAF, laments, “The lack of a clear 

definition of centralized execution in Air Force Basic Doctrine leads to confusion and unfortunately leaves the term open to interpretation. Air Force doctrine refers to the dangers of centralized execution, but without defining it, 

the term has no real substance.” Maj Steven E. Ankerstar, “Beyond Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution” (master’s thesis, School of Advanced Air and Space Power Studies, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL, June 

2005), 7. In addition, Colonel Parramore writes, “Because the definition of 

decentralized execution is imprecise, Airmen cannot coherently define the 

concept or recognize centralized execution.” Woody W. Parramore, “Defining 

Decentralized Execution in Order to Recognize Centralized Execution,” Air 

and Space Power Journal, Fall 2004.

43. AFDD 1 (Draft), Air Force Basic Doctrine, Topline Coordination Draft, 

version 3, 19 June 2007, 31. 

44. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 December 2006, A–2.

45. Quoted in Col Charles M. Westenhoff, Military Airpower: A Revised 

Digest of Airpower Opinions and Thoughts (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University 

Press, 2007), 222–23.

46. In US standard usage, “the combined adjective replaces joint” when 

forces from more than one country are involved. 

47. When one combines the fact that the CFACC also acted as the commander of all Air Force forces (also called the COMAFFOR) in-theater as well 

as the commander of 9th Air Force back in the states, one can safely say that 

the CFACC had a lot on his plate! 

48. One issue that has arisen repeatedly is that of rotation policies. Army 

units have generally rotated in 12–15 month increments, while many Air 

Force positions—even those serving with the MNC-I staff—rotate every four 

months in accordance with the Air Expeditionary Force cycle. As one Army 

after-action report stated, this is an impediment to building close working 

relationships: “The Air Force rotation policy has caused a level of consternation with the MNC-I staff. The staff perspective is that this is a team fight 

and the whole team must be committed and fighting together for the entire 

period.”

49. Bruce Rolfsen, “USAF Aerial Ops in Iraq, Afghanistan Take Off in ’07,” 

Defense News, 3 December 2007.

50. See the online Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook for 

population, area, terrain, and other data at https://www.cia.gov/library/

publications/the-world-factbook/. 

51. Others came to this conclusion as well. In early 2007, in two separate 

reports written within weeks of each other, Gen Barry R. McCaffrey, US Army, 

retired, described the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the report on 
74

Afghanistan, he relayed how “US Air Force and Naval air power is the monster combat multiplier.” In contrast, airpower is mentioned only in passing. 

Gen Barry R. McCaffrey, US Army, retired, “After Action Report: VISIT AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, 16–23 February 2007,” 26 February 2007; and 

“After Action Report: VISIT IRAQ AND KUWAIT, 9–16 March 2007,” 26 March 

2007. 

52. Capt Edward Stewart, “Operation Medusa,” The Allied Rapid Reaction 

Corps (ARRC) Journal, Spring 2007, 28–31; available at http://www.arrc 

.nato.int/journal/spring07/index.htm (accessed 29 May 2008).

53. Adam Day, “Operation Medusa: The Battle for Panjwai (Part 1),” Legion 

Magazine, 1 September 2007; available at http://www.legionmagazine.com/

en/index.php/2007/09/operation-medusa-the-battle-for-panjwai/ (accessed 

29 May 2008).

54. Tim Albone, “Amid the Thud of Artillery, Soldiers Stormed into a Taleban Stronghold,” Times Online, 14 September 2006; available at http://www 

.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article1073949.ece (accessed 2 June 2008).

55. Stewart, “Operation Medusa,” 28–31.

56. Day, “Operation Medusa (Part 1).”

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Stewart, “Operation Medusa,” 28–31.

60. Canadian major Mathew Sprague, commander of the company that 

would pay a steep price for entering the Taliban-controlled valley, recalled, 

“In the original brigade instruction, once I had confirmed that there were no 

civilians present, a pre-arranged air strike using precision guided munitions 

was supposed to simultaneously hit between 10 and 20 known insurgent 

command and control nodes. For whatever reason, this didn’t happen and 

the strike was cancelled by the brigade.” Day, “Operation Medusa (Part 1).”

61. Ibid.

62. Mitch Potter, “The Story of C Company,” Toronto Star, 30 September 

2006.

63. Day, “Operation Medusa (Part 1).”

64. Murray Brewster, “Fatigue Possible Friendly-Fire Factor: Report,” Toronto Star, 8 April 2007.

65. Day, “Operation Medusa (Part 3),” Legion Magazine, 26 January 2008; 

available at http://www.legionmagazine.com/en/index.php/2008/01/operation

-medus-part-3-the-fall-of-objective-rugby/ (accessed 10 June 2008).

66. “Friendly Fire Incident in Southern Afghanistan,” ISAF Press Release 

2006–128, 4 September 2006.

67. “Soldier Killed as Mountain Fury, Other Ops Continue in Afghanistan,” 

American Forces Press Service, 17 September 2006.

68. When they learned of these operations being planned simultaneously 

in separate chains of command, the AOC Strategy Division expressed concerns to planners in Afghanistan that airpower would be stretched to the 

maximum (and possibly beyond) if the operations were executed at the same 

time. Despite this warning, commanders decided to press ahead with simultaneous operations. 
75

69. Day, “Operation Medusa, (Part 3).”

70. General McCaffrey, an astute observer of operations in Central Command, noted that this was still possible even after Medusa. After visiting Afghanistan in 2007, he documented this concern in his after-action report: “It 

is possible that the Taliban will try to knock one or more of these NATO nations out of the war. A major blow to the Italians, the Canadians, the Dutch, 

the Spanish, or the Germans might shatter their weak domestic political support.” Gen Barry R. McCaffrey, US Army, retired, “After Action Report: VISIT 

AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, 16–23 February 2007,” 26 February 2007.

71. In 2007 the AOC’s Strategy Division conducted an assessment that 

compared insurgent activity with the presence of airpower. There was a correlation between the presence of airpower and a lack of activity—insurgents 

did not want to risk detection by NATO airpower. 

72. Coghlan, “Taliban Fighters Back in Caves of Tora Bora,” UK Telegraph, 

19 June 2007; available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/

1554896/Taliban-fighters-back-in-caves-of-Tora-Bora.html (accessed 11

June 2008).

73. Coghlan, “Afghanistan: Return to the Lair of bin Laden,” UK Telegraph, 

24 August 2007; available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1567/Afghanistan-Return-to-the-lair-of-bin-Laden.html (accessed 11

June 2008).

74. “Tora Bora Offensive Continues against Taliban, al-Qaeda,” Radio Free 

Europe, 17 August 2007; available at http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/

2007/08/360B8D5B-24A8-48B0-8771-A803FA7E576C.html (accessed 11

June 2008).

75. US Army FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, states: “Effective COIN operations are decentralized, and higher commanders owe it to their subordinates 

to push as many capabilities as possible down to their level.” US Army FM 

3-24, Counterinsurgency, 15 December 2006, 1–26.

76. For example, Lt Gen Raymond Odierno writes this about ISR liaison 

officers sent by the air component to the divisions in Iraq: “Providing these 

Air Force subject matter experts as advisors to division staff sections and as 

key members of the intelligence-operations team has been a combat multiplier.” Raymond T. Odierno, Nichoel E. Brooks, and Francesco P. Mastracchio, 

“ISR Evolution in the Iraqi Theater,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 50, 3d Quarter 

2008; available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i50/ 

14.pdf (accessed 11 June 2008).

77. In an interesting historical note, this compromise mirrored the approach taken by Royal Air Force airmen during similar operations in Malaya. 

Group Captain K. R. C. Slater writes in Air Operations in Malaya, “The problem of reconciling decentralized control of ground operations with centralized 

control of air operations presented many difficulties. A number of experiments were tried out with the object of trying to decentralize a measure of 

control of air operations in parallel with the break-down of control of ground 

operations, but the fact that air effort is indivisible invariably undermined 

these arrangements in practice. Eventually, after a good deal of trial and error, a workable compromise was reached whereby the local State and District 
76

War executives were able to call upon the services of a mobile team of Air 

Staff planners, established on the Air Headquarters, whilst control of air operations remained centralized under the Air Officer Commanding.” Quoted in 

AFDD 2–3, Irregular Warfare, 1 August 2007, 67.

78. For an interesting discussion of the importance of the bombing, see 

Thomas E. Ricks, “Shrine Bombing as War’s Turning Point Debated,” Washington Post, 13 March 2007; available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/

wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/12/AR2007031201760_pf.html (accessed 

4 June 2008).

79. Michael R. Gordon, “Military Charts Movement of Conflict in Iraq toward Chaos,” New York Times, 1 November 2006; available at http://www 

.nytimes.com/2006/11/01/world/middleeast/01military.html?_r=1&oref

=slogin (accessed 4 June 2008).

80. The AOC Strategy Division collected many accounts where insurgents 

seemed to ignore the shows of force in areas where no ordnance had been 

employed for lengthy periods. 

81. The Iraq Study Group Report, published in December 2006, began 

with these pessimistic words: “There is no guarantee for success in Iraq. The 

situation in Baghdad and several provinces is dire. Saddam Hussein has been 

removed from power and the Iraqi people have a democratically elected government that is broadly representative of Iraq’s population, yet the government 

is not adequately advancing national reconciliation, providing basic security, or 

delivering essential services. The level of violence is high and growing. There 

is great suffering, and the daily lives of many Iraqis show little or no improvement. Pessimism is pervasive.” Iraq Study Group Report, 6 December 2006, 9; 

available at http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/

iraq_study_group_report.pdf (accessed 4 June 2008).

82. Joint doctrine defines close air support (CAS) as “air action by fixedand rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to 

friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air mission with 

the fire and movement of those forces.” JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 September 2006, GL-9. Technically, CAS begins when troops come into contact, and 

the commander decides to request airborne fires. It ends when these fires are 

no longer necessary. Conversely, the desired effect in question begins when 

the mission begins—as airborne platforms offer the ground commander situational awareness during active operations—and ends with mission completion. Another distinction occurs when an airborne platform has a weapons 

malfunction or goes “Winchester” (i.e., runs out of weapons). In CAS, it is 

standard practice for the asset to return to base. In COIN operations, however, the ground commander often asks the asset to remain on station, as access 

to the aerial perspective is more important than the ability to employ weapons. 

83. John A. Tirpak, “Eyes of the Fighter,” Air Force Magazine, January 

2006, 41; available at http://www.afa.org/magazine/jan2006/0106fighters.pdf 

(accessed 4 June 2008).

84. Ibid., 42; available at http://www.afa.org/magazine/jan2006/0106fighters

.pdf (accessed 4 June 2008).
77

85. SSgt Melissa Koskovich, “Targeting Pods Enhance Battlefield Awareness,” 

US Central Command Air Forces Public Affairs, 29 March 2006; available at 

http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123018059 (accessed 4 June 2008).

86. For a discussion of armed overwatch, see Lt Col Clint Hinote, “Armed 

Overwatch: Key to Successful COIN Operations in Urban Terrain,” Air Land 

Sea Application Center Bulletin 2008-1, 9–12; available at http://www.alsa 

.mil/documents/alsb/ALSB%202008-1.pdf (accessed 4 June 2008).

87. “ ‘Surge’ Taking Place in the Skies Too,” Associated Press, 14 July 

2007; available at MSNBC.com; and http://www.msnbc.msn.com/

id/19763898/ (accessed 4 June 2008).

88. Sgt Nicole Kojetin, “Reluctant Hero: Apache Pilot Receives Distinguished Flying Cross,” 1st Calvary Division Public Affairs, 30 January 2008; 

available at http://www.army.mil/-news/2008/01/30/7203-reluctant-hero

--apache-pilot-receives-distinguished-flying-cross/ (accessed 4 June 2008).

89. TSgt James Law, “Combat Controller Recounts Battle for AFA Audience,” Global Air Chiefs Conference Public Affairs, 25 September 2007; available 

at http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123069491 (accessed 4 June 

2008).

90. Ibid.

91. TSgt Jennifer Gregoire, “Air Force Combat Airpower Helps Turn Tide 

in Decisive Battle of an-Najaf,” 332d Air Expeditionary Wing Public Affairs, 4 

February 2007; available at http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID= 

123039922 (accessed 4 June 2008).

92. Law, “Combat Controller Recounts Battle for AFA Audience.” 

93. “Iraqi Cult Planned Attack on Top Shiite Clergy, Officials Say,” USA 

Today, 29 January 2007; available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/

world/iraq/2007-01-29-iraq-insurgents_x.htm (accessed 4 June 2008). 

94. Kojetin, “Reluctant Hero: Apache Pilot Receives Distinguished Flying 

Cross.” 

95. David Kilcullen, a key advisor to the top military commander in Iraq, 

Gen David H. Petraeus, writes, “The key element in the plan, as outlined in 

the President’s speech, is to concentrate security forces within Baghdad, to 

secure the local people where they live. Troops will operate in small, local 

groups closely partnered with Iraqi military and police units, with each unit 

permanently assigned to an area and working its beat. This is different from 

early strategies which were enemy-centric (focusing on killing insurgents), or 

the more recent approaches that relied on training and supporting Iraqi 

forces and expected them to secure the population.” David Kilcullen, “Don’t 

Confuse the ‘Surge’ with the Strategy,” Small Wars Journal (online), 19 January 2007; available at http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/01/

dont-confuse-the-surge-with-th/ (accessed 16 October 2007).

96. For a description of air operations in support of the elections, see 

Howard D. Belote, “Counterinsurgency Airpower: Air-Ground Integration for 

the Long War,” Air and Space Power Journal, Fall 2006; available at http://

www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj06/fal06/belote.html 

(accessed 11 July 2008). In preparation for the elections, Lt Gen Thomas 

Metz, MNC-I commander, made his intentions clear regarding airpower: “I 
78

want them low—I want them loud—I want them everywhere! I don’t completely understand it, but this population responds to airpower, both fixedand rotary-wing . . . so get the air out there.”

97. In response to the first day of B-1 operations over Baghdad, the command sergeant major of the US Army division assigned to Baghdad approached one of the battlefield airmen embedded in the division and gave him 

a huge hug, thanking him for encouraging his troops.

98. For a thoughtful description and analysis of MNC-I operations during 

this period, see Frederic W. and Kimberly Kagan, “The Patton of Counterinsurgency,” Weekly Standard, 10 March 2008; available at http://www 

.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/822vfpsz.asp 

(accessed 11 June 2008).

99. Ibid.

100. This term was originally introduced by US Army general William 

DePuy, and overwatch is a tactic codified in Army maneuver doctrine. The 

overwatch concept has two fundamental components. First, some part of the 

force is moving, and this element is somewhat vulnerable. Second, another 

portion of the force is available that can (1) observe the situation from a defensible position, and (2) provide supporting fires if necessary. While use of 

the overwatch technique can slow the tempo of the ground advance, it has 

proven to be an effective force-protection measure. When the overwatching 

element is airborne, it allows the ground operation to move at a faster tempo. 

Furthermore, overwatch in urban terrain is more effective when airborne 

platforms assume the observation role, as the airborne perspective allows the 

ground commander to see behind walls and around corners. For further discussion, see Lt Col Clint Hinote, “Armed Overwatch: Key to Successful COIN 

Operations in Urban Terrain,” Air Land Sea Application Center Bulletin 2008-1, 

9–12; available at http://www.alsa.mil/documents/alsb/ALSB%202008-1.pdf 

(accessed 4 June 2008).

101. A military requirement defined in joint doctrine as “an established 

need justifying the timely allocation of resources to achieve a capability to 

accomplish approved military objectives, missions, or tasks.” JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 

2001, as amended through 4 March 2008.

102. Some airmen, including several senior leaders in the CAOC, were 

initially uncomfortable with the idea of emphasizing hours of coverage. There 

were two major arguments for using hours as a primary metric, however. 

First, it was a practical measure that air planners could use to build their 

master plans. Second, when ground commanders were relying on airpower in 

much the same way that they would rely on their maneuver forces (that is, in 

the armed overwatch role), it is logical to conclude that simply “being there” 

is what is most important. 

103. It was common for air planners in the AOC to refer to the MNF-W 

area of operations as “Route Package Anbar.”

104. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 14 May 2007, 

V–4.

105. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, viii.
79

106. Jim Garamone, “Marine Commandant Worries about Losing ‘Expeditionary Flavor,’ ” American Forces Press Service, 16 October 2007; available at 

http://64.233.169.104/search?q=cache:pmzzjc7udzQJ; and www.defenselink

.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx%3Fid%3D47818+conway+expeditionary+flavor

&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us (accessed 19 November 2007).

107. Raymond T. Odierno, Nichoel E. Brooks, and Francesco P. Mastracchio, 

“ISR Evolution in the Iraqi Theater,” Joint Forces Quarterly 50, 3d Quarter 

2008, 52; available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/

i50/14.pdf (accessed 11 June 2008).

108. Ibid., 53.

109. Ibid.

110. Ibid., 55.

111. Max Boot, Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 282.

112. When this section refers to the command and control of airpower, it 

means the authority to plan, direct, synchronize, integrate, coordinate, and 

de-conflict operations on behalf of the overall joint force commander.

113. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 329.

114. War Department Field Manual 100-20, Command and Employment of 

Air Power, 21 July 1943, 2.

115. Quoted in Westenhoff, Military Airpower, 222–23.

116. Lt Col Bradley S. Davis, “The Planning Background,” in Deliberate 

Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning, ed. Col Robert C. Owen 

(Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 2000), 57.

117. Quote from Phillip S. Meilinger, former commandant of the USAF’s 

School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, commenting on Thomas E. 

Griffith, Jr., MacArthur’s Airman: General George C. Kenney and the War in 

the Southwest Pacific (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998).

118. Griffith, MacArthur’s Airman, 63–64.

119. Ibid.

120. Ibid.

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Title of Paper: Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution: A Catchphrase in Crisis?

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