Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1712-CR-2894 | May 24, 2018 Page 1 of 12

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

George P. Sherman

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

State of Indiana,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

Deana Lane Gaddy,

Appellee-Defendant.

May 24, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

10A01-1712-CR-2894

Appeal from the Clark Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Joseph P. Weber, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

10C03-1709-CM-1642

Brown, Judge.
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[1] The State appeals the trial court’s order granting a motion to suppress filed by 

Deana Lane Gaddy. The State raises one issue which we revise and restate as 

whether the trial court erred in granting Gaddy’s motion to suppress. We 

reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On September 7, 2017, the State charged Gaddy with: Count I, operating a 

vehicle while intoxicated as a class C misdemeanor; and Count II, operating a 

vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person as a class A misdemeanor. That 

same day, the trial court entered an order titled “FINDING OF PROBABLE 

CAUSE” which states:

An Information and Probable Cause Affidavit having been filed 

in this cause by the State of Indiana, the Court now finds and 

determines that there is probable cause to believe that the 

offense(s) set forth in the information have been committed by 

[Gaddy]. IT IS ORDERED that the defendant be brought before 

this Court for an Initial Hearing promptly and without 

unnecessary delay.

Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 13. 

[3] On September 14, 2017, Gaddy filed a Motion for Probable Cause Hearing. 

On September 18, 2017, the court entered an order scheduling a probable cause 

hearing for November 8, 2017. On November 8, 2017, the State filed a Request 

for Trial Date and Notice of Grounds for Objection to Defendant’s Motion for 

Probable Cause Hearing. The State argued in part that the court had already 

found probable cause, that the only relief available from a probable cause 
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hearing was the immediate release of a defendant, and that the probable cause 

hearing was moot because Gaddy was not in custody. The State asserted that it 

could “only surmise that [Gaddy] is seeking dismissal of this matter entirely 

through the assertion of a lack of probable cause.” Id. at 30. An entry in the 

chronological case summary dated November 8, 2017, states: “Hearing on 

Motion to Supress [sic] reset for 11/15/17 at 2:30 p.m.” Id. at 5. 

[4] On November 15, 2017, the court held a hearing, stated that its understanding 

was that the hearing was set on Gaddy’s motion to suppress, asked if that was 

correct, and Gaddy’s counsel answered affirmatively. 

[5] According to the testimony of Indiana State Trooper Morgan Evans, he was 

working in downtown Jeffersonville on September 3, 2017. Around 2:30 or 

3:00 a.m., Trooper Evans took a lunch break in the Jeff Boat parking area and 

was located two blocks from Slammers bar. When asked if there was anything 

particularly special about the neighborhood, Trooper Evans testified: “There is 

lots of narcotics sales people carrying narcotics through that neighborhood there 

is lots of drunk drivers, stolen vehicles uh over doses there is a decent amount 

of crime.” Transcript Volume 2 at 18. Trooper Morgan observed two vehicles 

travelling very slowly southbound on Penn Street and the vehicle in the rear

was following the vehicle in the front very closely. Trooper Morgan followed 

the two vehicles onto Market Street and observed the rear vehicle slow down 

while the front vehicle tried to “speed off.” Id. at 21. Trooper Morgan testified 

that his training indicated that the rear vehicle was attempting to distract him 

and draw his attention away from the front vehicle. Trooper Morgan passed 
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the rear vehicle, followed the lead vehicle, observed the vehicle fail to use a turn 

signal, and initiated a traffic stop on the vehicle driven by Gaddy. When asked 

how many minutes he followed the vehicle, Trooper Morgan answered: “No 

more than five minutes I’m not exactly sure.” Id. at 23. 

[6] Trooper Morgan testified that he identified himself, asked to see Gaddy’s 

driver’s license and registration, and told her that he stopped her because she 

did not use her turn signal. He testified that Gaddy stated: “no body uses their 

turn signal in this area.” Id. at 28. According to his testimony, another vehicle 

parked behind his vehicle, he told the driver to leave the scene, and the driver 

left the scene. When asked about his probable cause for stopping Gaddy’s 

vehicle, Trooper Morgan answered: “She failed to use her turn signal two 

hundred fee[t] prior to turning when she was driving less than fifty miles per 

hour she didn’t use her turn signal and didn’t turn it on so I initiated a traffic 

stop on her.” Id. at 31. Trooper Morgan also testified that the failure to use a 

turn signal is a violation of the Indiana Traffic Code. On cross-examination, 

Trooper Morgan testified that Gaddy slowed to make her turn, there were no 

oncoming cars, she stopped at all the stop signs, did not speed, made seven 

turns, and signaled at every turn except for the last turn. Trooper Morgan later 

stated that she failed to signal the last two turns. 

[7] After Gaddy’s counsel cross-examined Trooper Morgan, the following 

exchange occurred:

JUDGE: I got just a couple of things. I guess as I listen to this I 

heard testimony that you were following her and I didn’t really 
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understand why exactly you were following her but I think your 

testimony is you didn’t see any signs of impairment but you 

continued to follow her is that right?

TROOPER: Yes.

JUDGE: Any particular reason?

TROOPER: I was just following her.

JUDGE: How far were you going to follow her?

TROOPER: I’m not for sure I follow a lot of vehicles.

JUDGE: Two or three for [sic] miles?

TROOPER: Probably or so, probably so.

JUDGE: Why?

TROOPER: Trying to figure out if an indicator if she is uh 

gonna make an infraction or a reason to stop because she was it 

was a suspicious vehicle coming from a high crime area so I was 

trying to figure out for probable cause to stop.

JUDGE: See and that’s my problem with all of this what you are 

telling me is anybody that drives through that part of jeff is 

suspicious and you are gonna follow them until they commit a 

traffic infraction and then you’re going to pull them over. Is that 

right?

TROOPER: No sir.

JUDGE: Well that’s what it sounds like to me and I’m just 

trying I’m not trying to give you a hard time I’m trying to look 

for reasonable suspension [sic] and probable cause and like 

everybody I kinda put myself in and you may stand down be 

seated by the prosecutor if you would like. Here is my problem 

with this I drive through there all the time[.]

TROOPER: Yes sir.
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JUDGE: It just seems strange to me that just driving through 

there is reasonable suspicion to follow someone and then 

continue to follow them until they commit a traffic offense 

because sooner or later they are gonna commit a traffic infraction 

there is no doubt about it you drive, you drive five miles, ten 

miles, fifteen mile, fifteen feet sooner or later you’re gonna 

commit a traffic infraction. So you think that constitutes some 

reasonable suspicion?

TROOPER: Yes because I had reasonable suspicion this vehicle 

was coming from a high crime area there are houses we are 

watching where narcotics ect. [sic] so I had reasonable suspicion 

so I ended up getting probable cause to stop the vehicle.

JUDGE: So anybody who drives through downtown jeff is 

suspect?

TROOPER: Not downtown jeff but that area.

JUDGE: Market Street?

TROOPER: Penn Street, Cherry virgin alley, Graham those 

areas.

JUDGE: Ok you got anything else?

STATE: I have nothing else judge.

JUDGE: I think its pretextual stop what I got was testimony that 

you started to follow her and follow her for a long way and she 

committed no infraction and eventually she did. Granted if she 

didn’t signal that’s reason but I mean like I said anybody is 

eventually going to commit a traffic infraction if you follow them 

long enough. There has to be some reasonable suspicion why 

you continued to follow them otherwise you simply get to follow 

anybody around for no particular reason till you get the 

opportunity to pull them over. I don’t think that’s I don’t think 

that is I think that is a pretextual stop I think that’s coming up 

with a reason to stop somebody when there is, I think you were 
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gonna stop her you made the decision to stop her when you 

passed the other car. I think sooner or later you were gonna have 

a technical reason you could which was failing to signal after she 

signal half a dozen times I think it’s a protected stop. Certainly if 

you seen her fail to signal within a reasonable space where she 

was doing other things or she hadn’t signaled when she pulled 

out onto Market street, I’m all on board with that I really am but 

I don’t see any reason why you continued to follow her just 

because she drove through that part of downtown jeff. I didn’t 

hear any testimony that you were investigating any particular 

crime that she was driving a type of description of a car that was 

involved in a crime and so on and so forth. I just ya know I 

didn’t hear any of that I mean this notion that just driving 

through there makes you suspect is I don’t know if it meets the 

standard I think it’s a pretextual stop. Ok[.]

STATE: Ok so just so I’m clear on the rule you suppressed here 

inaudible.

JUDGE: I’m gonna suppress it I think it’s a protected stop I 

don’t think there was reasonable suspicion to continue to follow 

her uh and I think it was clear he was going to stop her and made 

a decision to stop her long before she failed to signal and I think 

its stop to see if she had been drinking basically because she had 

been coming down the street from a bar and I don’t think you 

can do that so I’m going to suppress the evidence thank you.

Id. at 65-68.

Discussion

[8] We first note that Gaddy did not file an appellee’s brief. In such a case, we 

apply a less stringent standard of review with respect to showings of reversible 

error. State v. Weyer, 831 N.E.2d 175, 177 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). We do not 

have the burden of controverting arguments advanced for reversal. Id. The 
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State only needs to establish prima facie error, which is error at first sight, on 

first appearance, or on the face of it. Id.

[9] The issue is whether the trial court erred in granting Gaddy’s motion to 

suppress. “In reviewing a trial court’s motion to suppress, we determine 

whether the record discloses ‘substantial evidence of probative value that 

supports the trial court’s decision.’” State v. Renzulli, 958 N.E.2d 1143, 1146 

(Ind. 2011) (quoting State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ind. 2006)). “We do 

not reweigh the evidence, but consider ‘conflicting evidence most favorably to 

the trial court’s ruling.’” Id. (quoting Quirk, 842 N.E.2d at 340). “When the 

State appeals from a negative judgment, as here, it ‘must show that the trial 

court’s ruling on the suppression motion was contrary to law.’” Id. (quoting 

State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200, 1203 (Ind. 2008), reh’g denied). “[T]he 

ultimate determination of the constitutionality of a search or seizure is a 

question of law that we consider de novo.” Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 

1001 (Ind. 2014).

[10] The State asserts that the trial court did not identify any statutory or 

constitutional basis for determining that the trooper was not permitted to follow 

a vehicle for several minutes. The State argues that there is no requirement that 

an officer have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot before 

following a vehicle. It contends that following a vehicle is not synonymous 

with stopping a vehicle and that, while an officer needs reasonable suspicion or 

probable cause for that latter, such is not required for the former. It points out 

that the United States Supreme Court has held: “A person travelling in an 
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automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 

his movements from one place to another.” Appellant’s Brief at 9 (quoting 

United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)). With respect to the trial 

court’s concern that the trooper had undertaken a pretextual stop, the State 

argues that the United States Supreme Court has made clear that a traffic stop 

based on a traffic violation is not unlawful merely because an officer has an 

ulterior motive for stopping the vehicle. Id. at 10 (citing Whren v. United States, 

517 U.S. 806, 810-813 (1996)). 

[11] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 

shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 

or things to be seized.

[12] There are three levels of police investigation, two of which implicate the Fourth 

Amendment and one of which does not. Powell v. State, 912 N.E.2d 853, 859 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2009). First, the Fourth Amendment requires that an arrest or 

detention that lasts for more than a short period of time must be justified by 

probable cause. Id. Second, pursuant to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the 

police may, without a warrant or probable cause, briefly detain an individual 

for investigatory purposes if, based upon specific and articulable facts, the 

officer has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has or is about to occur. 

Id. The third level of investigation occurs when a police officer makes a casual 
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and brief inquiry of a citizen, which involves neither an arrest nor a stop. Id.

This is a consensual encounter in which the Fourth Amendment is not 

implicated. Id.

[13] “‘Not every encounter between a police officer and a citizen amounts to a 

seizure requiring objective justification.’” Id. (quoting Overstreet v. State, 724 

N.E.2d 661, 663 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), reh’g denied, trans. denied). “A person is 

‘seized’ only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his or her 

freedom of movement is restrained.” Id. (quoting State v. Lefevers, 844 N.E.2d 

508, 513 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied). It is not the purpose of the Fourth 

Amendment to eliminate all contact between police and the citizenry. Id. at 

860.

[14] Trooper Evans did not stop, detain, or otherwise restrain Gaddy when he 

followed her. Gaddy did not file an appellee’s brief and accordingly cited no 

authority for the proposition that Trooper Evans violated her Fourth 

Amendment rights by following her. We conclude that the State has 

demonstrated a prima facie case of error. See Overstreet, 724 N.E.2d at 664 

(holding that the Fourth Amendment was not implicated when the officer 

followed the defendant to a gas station, approached him, asked about his 

action, and asked for his identification). 

[15] With respect to the stop, we observe that the Indiana Supreme Court has held: 

“It is unequivocal under our jurisprudence that even a minor traffic violation is 

sufficient to give an officer probable cause to stop the driver of a vehicle.” 
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Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1034 (Ind. 2013). See also Quirk, 842 N.E.2d at 

340 (holding that police officers “may stop a vehicle when they observe minor 

traffic violations” and “[a] traffic violation, however minor, creates probable 

cause to stop the driver of the vehicle”). In addressing whether Article 1, 

Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution prohibits pretextual stops, the Indiana 

Supreme Court has held:

We find nothing unreasonable in permitting an officer, who may 

have knowledge or suspicion of unrelated criminal activity by the 

motorist, to nevertheless respond to an observed traffic violation. 

It is likewise not unreasonable for a motorist who commits a 

traffic law violation to be subject to accountability for said 

violation even if the officer may have an ulterior motive of 

furthering an unrelated criminal investigation.

Mitchell v. State, 745 N.E.2d 775, 787 (Ind. 2001). The record reveals that 

Trooper Morgan testified that Gaddy failed to use her turn signal prior to 

turning. Moreover, the trial court found that Gaddy committed a traffic 

infraction. Specifically, the court stated that Gaddy initially “committed no 

infraction and eventually she did.” Transcript Volume 2 at 67. The State has 

demonstrated that the grant of Gaddy’s motion constituted a prima facie error.

Conclusion

[16] For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s grant of Gaddy’s motion 

and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

[17] Reversed and remanded.
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Bailey, J., and Crone, J., concur.