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i 

72–415 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–91] 

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS 

ACQUISITION AND MODERNIZATION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL 

AIR AND LAND FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

NOVEMBER 16, 2011 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland, Chairman 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

BILL OWENS, New York 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JESSE TOLLESON, Professional Staff Member 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

SCOTT BOUSUM, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, November 16, 2011, United States Marine Corps Acquisition 

and Modernization ............................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, November 16, 2011 ............................................................................. 21 

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 2011 

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS ACQUISITION AND MODERNIZATION 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland, Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ...................................................... 1 

Reyes, Hon. Silvestre, a Representative from Texas, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ...................................................... 8 

WITNESSES 

O’Donohue, BGen Daniel J., USMC, Director, Capabilities Development Directorate, Combat Development & Integration, U.S. Marine Corps; BGen 

Frank L. Kelley, USMC, Commander, Marine Corps Systems Command, 

U.S. Marine Corps; and William E. Taylor, Program Executive Officer Land 

Systems, U.S. Marine Corps ............................................................................... 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G. .................................................................................. 25 

O’Donohue, BGen Daniel J., joint with BGen Frank L. Kelley and William E. Taylor ............................................................................................... 30 

Reyes, Hon. Silvestre ....................................................................................... 28 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Bartlett ....................................................................................................... 41 

Mr. McIntyre ..................................................................................................... 41 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 41 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Bartlett ....................................................................................................... 45 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 49 

(1) 

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS ACQUISITION AND 

MODERNIZATION 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, November 16, 2011. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m. in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Roscoe G. Bartlett 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Mr. BARTLETT. Good afternoon. My colleagues are delayed, but 

we want to be respectful of your time. Your testimony will be part 

of the permanent record of course, but we want to begin. 

The Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee meets today to 

receive testimony on Marine Corps Ground Force Acquisition and 

Modernization Programs. We welcome our distinguished panel of 

witnesses, Brigadier General Frank Kelley, Commander of Marine 

Corps Systems Command; Brigadier General Daniel O’Donohue, 

Director, Capabilities Development Directorate, Combat Development and Integration; Mr. William Taylor, Program Executive Officer Land Systems, U.S. Marine Corps. 

Of the estimated 210,000 military service personnel deployed in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, approximately 130,000 are in Afghanistan, 

and out of this number 21,000 are marines. More than 6,200 Americans have given their lives, and more than 46,000 have been 

wounded, in Iraq and Afghanistan since September 11, 2001. 

This is the fourth in a series of hearings the subcommittee is 

holding for the purpose of updating our members on the budget request for fiscal year 2012 and to help better understand the potential impact of the Budget Control Act of 2011 on our military capability and deployed forces. The ultimate impact of the Budget Control Act on DOD funding next year and over the next 10 years remains a major concern of this subcommittee. 

As I have stated before, major reductions in the Federal budget 

need to be a major element of correcting the Federal deficit. The 

Department of Defense must share in a fair and balanced way in 

those reductions, and that process is already taking place under 

the Budget Control Act of 2011, with nearly $500 billion in cuts 

planned for DOD [Department of Defense] over the next 10 years. 

If the Administration had first reconsidered the national military 

strategy based on the likely resources to be available, the changes 

that are having to be made by DOD in acquisition programs could 
2 

be better justified, but it appears we will only have a new national 

military strategy after the fact. 

Under the sequestration provision of the Budget Control Act, up to a total of $1 trillion over 10 years could be possible under what 

Secretary Panetta has called the ‘‘doomsday mechanism.’’ As recently as this week, Secretary Panetta indicated that such a reduction would be, and I quote, ‘‘devastating for the Department.’’ Secretary Panetta has further indicated a $1 trillion reduction possible 

under the Budget Control Act sequestration provision would 

amount to 23 percent if the President exercised the authority to exempt military personnel. Under current law, the reduction would 

have to be applied equally to each major investment and construction program. And I am not sure how you build three-fourths of an 

aircraft carrier. 

Finally, the Secretary noted that between 2013, ‘‘Cuts under a maximum sequestration would equal about $100 billion a year compared with the fiscal year 2012 plan. We would have the smallest 

ground force since 1940, the smallest number of ships since 1915, 

and the smallest Air Force in history. The threat to our national 

security would not be reduced. We would have to formulate a new 

security strategy that accepted substantial risk of not meeting defense needs.’’ This ends his quote. 

Today, we will significantly address Marine Corps ground force 

acquisition and modernization programs. In order to perform their 

missions, whether home or abroad, these marines must be adequately equipped with the right gear to maximize their combat effectiveness and provide for their best protection possible. We cannot lose focus of this objective. The subcommittee expects to receive 

an update from the witnesses as to what changes may have to be 

made in their proposed acquisition programs in fiscal year 2012. 

We would like to know the views of our witnesses on what the potential impacts to Marine Corps capabilities are, particularly in 

light of the possible reductions in the Marine Corps procurement 

and R&D [Research and Development] budgets over the next 10 

years. We also hope to gain a better understanding from our witnesses on how potential funding reductions would be apportioned 

for their programs and how these funding reductions could potentially impact Marine Corps modernization programs and the approximately 21,000 marines currently serving in Afghanistan. 

One major concern is understanding the potential impact of 

budget changes on the affordability of the Marine Corps’ ground 

combat and tactical vehicle modernization strategy. The subcommittee expects to gain a better understanding of the processes 

used by the Marine Corps in determining what is good enough in 

terms of their combat and tactical vehicle portfolios given the austere fiscal environment projected for the next 10 years. What 

metrics are the Marines using to determine how much modernization is needed for the combat and tactical force fleets, and will the 

Marine Corps ultimately be able to afford its currently projected 

ground vehicle modernization strategy? 

I would like to now turn to my good friend on the Democrat side 

to see if he has an opening statement or comments. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bartlett can be found in the Appendix on page 25.] 
3 

Mr. CRITZ. Well, I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. No real opening comments. I don’t want to take up too much time. I want to 

get to the witnesses’ testimony. But you know, as we all sit here, 

obviously sequestration and what next year’s budgets and what we 

are going to be facing are certainly a top priority to us. And we are 

anxious to hear your testimony on the strategy going forward. We 

had a hearing with the Service chiefs a couple of weeks ago, and 

still talking about working through the cuts to the budget from the 

CR [Continuing Resolution] from earlier this year, without a plan 

for what is going to happen if we hit sequestration or certain budgets looking forward. 

So we have some major issues we have to face. But I appreciate 

the opportunity, and I yield back. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. I ask unanimous consent 

that non-subcommittee members, if any, be allowed to participate 

in today’s hearing after all subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask questions. Is there objection? Hearing none, nonsubcommittee members will be recognized at the appropriate time 

for 5 minutes. 

We will proceed with the panel’s testimony and then go to questions. Without objection, all witnesses’ prepared statements will be 

included in the hearing record. General O’Donohue, please proceed 

with your opening remarks. 

STATEMENT OF BGEN DANIEL J. O’DONOHUE, USMC, DIRECTOR, CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORATE, COMBAT 

DEVELOPMENT & INTEGRATION, U.S. MARINE CORPS; BGEN 

FRANK L. KELLEY, USMC, COMMANDER, MARINE CORPS SYSTEMS COMMAND, U.S. MARINE CORPS; AND WILLIAM E. TAYLOR, PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER LAND SYSTEMS, U.S. 

MARINE CORPS 

General O’DONOHUE. Thank you, sir. Chairman Bartlett, Congressman Critz, and distinguished members of the panel, it is an 

honor to be here. On behalf of all marines, their families, and this 

team before you, thank you for your extraordinary support. This 

will be the one opening statement for the team here, and then we 

will proceed to questions, sir. 

The Marine Corps is the Nation’s expeditionary force in readiness. As such, we are prepared for all manner of crises, ensure access for the joint force and the interagency, and by being ready, 

mitigate national risks during a period of fiscal retrenchment. 

Ten years ago today, under circumstances no one predicted, 4,400 

marines and six amphibious ships were assembling to strike Al 

Qaeda after the horrific acts of 9/11. On short notice they rapidly 

concentrated from globally dispersed forward engagement missions 

to attack hundreds of miles from the Arabian Sea to Kandahar, 

and on to Kabul. No other force had the required readiness, strategic mobility, and self-sustainment to respond so quickly and decisively. Their tactical mobility extended the operating area beyond 

the enemy’s capacity to cope. 

This dynamic ability, at a moment’s notice, to shape, deter, defeat, and deny our enemy sanctuary is emblematic of the crisis response capabilities that we continue to develop in the current and 

future force. Our unequivocal top priority is supporting our 21,000 
4 

marines and sailors fighting in Afghanistan, and 10,000 more that 

are forward deployed worldwide. With the continuing support of 

Congress and a rapid fielding process, our marines in combat are 

well equipped for the current fight even as the enemy adapts. 

At the same time, in stride we are transitioning to our role as 

the post-OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom] expeditionary force in 

readiness. In doing so, we will accept risks and extended ground 

operations, and reshape the Marine Corps for scalable crisis response missions such as counterterrorism, counterproliferation, disaster relief, rescuing Americans, prioritized security cooperation, 

and major contingency operations, and reinforcing our allies. While 

still globally responsive, we will rebalance our force posture back 

to the Pacific as we withdraw from OEF. 

Our judicious modernization strategy supports this force while 

recognizing fiscal constraints. Our spare budget focuses only on 

what is good enough and what is absolutely required. The Marine 

Corps’ entire budget, to include supporting Navy accounts, is only 

7.8 percent of DOD’s. Our modernization priorities are the Joint 

Strike Fighter and MV–22, and an affordable amphibious combat 

vehicle, a balanced ground combat and tactical vehicle portfolio, to 

include the JLTV [Joint Light Tactical Vehicle], and Navy amphibious ships. 

This testimony addresses ground force modernization, which is 

14 percent of our budget and just .6 percent of DOD’s. Our ground 

procurement account is approximately $2.0 billion a year. Fiscal 

constraints on the relatively small ground modernization can have 

a disproportionate impact. Our top ground priority is the amphibious combat vehicle. A JLTV addresses shortfalls for select light 

combat vehicles which perform our most demanding missions. 

For our entire portfolio, and especially the amphibious combat 

vehicle and JLTV, the Marine Corps, working with the Department 

of Navy, has taken an aggressive and innovative approach, distinguished by integrating mature technology, stressing affordability as 

a key performance parameter, conducting comprehensive system 

engineering and cost analysis, creating a transparent and open dialogue with industry, OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense], and 

Congress, employing a streamlined acquisition process, with an emphasis on competition, and most importantly, at inception creating 

an integrated requirements and acquisition team that makes costinformed trades in requirements. The acquisition requirements 

team testifying before you today works together daily and at every 

step. We are completely integrated, and we ensure best value for 

the Nation for essential capability. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. 

[The combined prepared statement of General O’Donohue, General Kelley, and Mr. Taylor can be found in the Appendix on page 

30.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, General. I understand that you have 

the only oral testimony, that all three of you are available for questions. Is that correct? 

General O’DONOHUE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. As is my usual practice, I will reserve 

questions until the other panel members, including our guest panelists, have had an opportunity to ask their questions, hoping that 
5 

my questions will have been asked by the other panel members. So 

I turn now to Mr. Critz. 

Mr. CRITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General O’Donohue, General Kelley, and Mr. Taylor, thank you so much for being here 

today. Thank you for your service to our country. I actually have 

just a couple of quick questions, and then I will allow other members to talk. 

I am heartened by the strategy that the Marine Corps is working 

with the Army on the JLTV program to try to move that quicker 

and come to a resolution. And it brings up an issue, is that the remote weapons station that sits on top of a lot of Army vehicles is 

something that the Marine Corps hasn’t really looked at in the 

same way. And I am just curious as to as you move forward, the 

CROWS [Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station] it is called 

on the Stryker vehicles, it is on the Humvees [High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle], and I am wondering because of all the 

technology advancements that have been made because of the 

Army’s use of it if the Marine Corps is looking at the CROWS as 

being part of any system as they go forward on their vehicles. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Excuse me, they have not provided us with the 

world’s best microphones. If you could hold those very close to your 

mouth, we will hear you better. Thank you. 

General O’DONOHUE. Sir, from the requirements perspective, 

particularly for the amphibious combat vehicle, we have a requirement for lethality. We have studies to look at the best way do it, 

to include remote weapons systems. So it is in the consideration of 

Marine Corps planning. We work closely with the Army on everything they do, to look at things that we can spiral into our programs in every aspect. We have the Army and Marine Corps Board 

that works at every level to make sure we are sharing what works 

between the two Services. So we certainly have a strong look at 

lethality, particularly for the amphibious combat vehicle and remote weapons stations. We do not have a decision yet on it though, 

sir. 

Mr. CRITZ. Okay. It won’t be on the amphibious vehicle. It is on 

the JLTV, it will be on Stryker and those types. So it is the landbased systems more so than underwater. 

General O’DONOHUE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CRITZ. And this is an issue that I am still trying to grasp, 

and the reason I bring up the CROWS is because of the IED [Improvised Explosive Device] issues that we have, and snipers. It certainly helps in the safety of our men and women. But one of the 

issues that I am still trying to grasp, and I can’t really get a hold 

on, is, you know, we are in a budgetary scenario now where everyone is looking to pinch pennies. And the move from the Humvee 

to the JLTV program, I am trying to understand what the Marine 

Corps’ plan is. As I look at your chart and you are going from approximately 25,000 now down to 12,500 in 2014, it looks like the 

JLTV starts to come online 2017, 2018. And, you know, I saw in 

some of the reporting as well that the recapping of the Humvee is 

about half the price of building new. So there is a financial benefit 

to this. So I just want to know what is the Marine Corps’ plan, and 

how is it that it is going to impact your budget, 14 percent of your 

budget being ground vehicles? What is the impact to your budget, 
6 

and where are we going to see—are we going to see some pinch 

points here? 

General O’DONOHUE. Sir, I will start and then we will pick it up 

on the acquisition side. From the requirements perspective, we 

have scrubbed our light combat vehicles. We started with a base 

of about 26,000. We have reduced that by 8,000. We have gone 

through and leveraged based on the force structure review, looking 

at the expeditionary force and readiness. We have cast a post-OEF 

Marine Corps which is not for extended campaigns ashore, but to 

be a crisis response force. And as we looked at the missions and 

as we come from a 202,000 Marine Corps to about 186,800 we took 

a corresponding look at vehicles. And the first step towards efficiencies was to remove that amount of the requirement. That 

amounted to about 8,000 vehicles. That left about 18,600 in the 

light category. These are vehicles that we can’t take off the FOB 

[Forward Operating Base] now. The MRAP [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle] was a substitute in a high IED threat, but 

isn’t applicable in places we might go otherwise. So we addressed 

that base of 18,600. We took a small subset of that, about 5,500 

vehicles, and these are the ones that shoot, move, and communicate forward. They have the most demanding mission profile. 

And these are the ones that we are looking for the JLTV. 

So we have looked at selective aspects of the portfolio. We are 

going to manage just those high priority ones for the JLTV, and 

then we are going to sustain the Humvee fleet. And we will look 

at a process of, for the remaining bulk of the majority of the fleet, 

those not modernized by the JLTV, and have a reduced mission 

profile, we will do a sequential modernization. We will buy up front 

those in the most need and most demanding profile, then we will 

hit our amphibious combat vehicle. And then at the back end of 

that, we are looking at the late 2020s, those vehicles we sustained 

over that period, the bulk of them, about 13,000 that you talked 

about, we would be looking at modernization in the late 2020s. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I will add that we have looked at the business case 

between the two programs. And I would respectfully disagree that 

Humvee recap would equate to about half the cost. Our best estimates of what it would take to overcome the engineering deficiencies in order to provide a durable Humvee range somewhere 

between 240 to 260 K. So at that cost you are bumping up against 

the cost of a new vehicle that would provide much more capability. 

We have also done some durability testing on the Humvee. And 

what we found is extreme engineering issues over their designed 

gross weight. These have led to cracks in everything from the suspension, to radiator mounts, to even the frame itself. And one of 

the inherent design features of the original Humvee, as designed, 

was to provide a torsional twisting in the frame. We lose that as 

we try to beef up the Humvee through rigid measures like capsules 

or anything like that. 

So my point here is that the procurement costs alone are bumping up against a new vehicle cost, yet we haven’t even begun to 

scratch the surface on what a Humvee recap might cost us ultimately in O&S [Operating and Support] costs. 

General O’DONOHUE. Sir, just to follow up on the requirements 

aspect of it, a Humvee recap does not meet the requirement that 
7 

the JLTV will. We have a requirement for a strategic transportability, mobility, protection, and payload. And while we can get any 

one of those elements in a lighter vehicle, we can’t get the full 

range of it. So a Humvee recap, which the Marine Corps is not pursuing, would not meet the requirement. 

Mr. CRITZ. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. Ms. Hartzler. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service. 

I just wanted to start off asking just general questions about the 

impacts of the budget. So how are the DOD and the Department 

of Navy’s implementation of the Budget Control Act of 2011 potentially impacting the Marine Corps acquisition and modernization 

programs? 

General O’DONOHUE. We have addressed the fiscal austerity with 

a current program that reflects the cuts proposed by the President. 

And what we have done is take sequential modernization. We have 

carefully timed an initial buy of JLTVs, a subsequent buy of ACV, 

the amphibious combat vehicle, which is our number one priority, 

and then we will follow with JLTV and modernization over a period 

of we are talking about 20 years. That becomes unhinged by delay 

for any reason. The continuing resolution, if we are not able to execute these accounts and we don’t get special authorization, or we 

get something as severe as sequestration, what we are going to do 

is create a bow wave of requirements at the back end that are difficult to handle. Again, we have a small account for modernization. 

There is a disproportionate impact if we have to absorb something 

bigger than already planned. And then I think larger and more 

strategically, we unhinge strategy and ways and means. And there 

probably will have to be a relook at the OSD level. And again, the 

Marine mission is to provide the insurance, be the kind of the 

ready force, which requires an O&M [Operations and Maintenance] 

expenditure, kind of keeping faith with people and having the force 

structure to allow us to do the job, and the judicious modernization 

to field that force to be a force in readiness. That strategy becomes 

unhinged if we take a blind proportional reduction. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Absolutely. I see in the chart that you provided 

that we are down to 850 MRAPs now compared to 2,225 in 2009. 

Is that correct? 

General O’DONOHUE. Ma’am, we have about 4,000 currently on 

the battlefield. We have a plan to reduce to something about 2,500. 

And of those, those are divided in two parts. We have an enduring 

mission for the MRAPs and the MATVs [Mine Resistant Ambush 

Protected All Terrain Vehicle] for about 1,100 or so vehicles. These 

are for engineers, it is for EOD [Explosive Ordnance Disposal], for 

those really at risk and can afford to be roadbound. We have for 

the remaining balance, these will be things that we preserve that 

could be used in case we were in the unusual circumstance that we 

need the MATV, either a counterinsurgency or where the mobility 

limitations of the MATV are suitable. So we don’t see it as a general purpose fleet vehicle. We see, one, that we have a selective 

group that we are able to equip a force if we had the special circumstances where the MATV is appropriate, ma’am. 
8 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. Thank you. As far as the warfighter, I am 

always concerned about their safety, the weight of their total gear 

that they carry, their body armor. And I just want to ask a couple 

questions about that first regarding them. The vehicle, the Stryker, 

I know the Army has been testing an improved version of the 

Stryker with a double-V hull for deployment to Afghanistan. I have 

seen something very similar at Fort Leonard Wood, which is in my 

district, and I know that has been helpful. So what is the Marine 

Corps doing to improve the survivability of its light armored vehicle fleet? 

Mr. TAYLOR. We are looking across the entire spectrum of technology that is available, to include what the Army is doing. This 

will be part of the development process of some of our new amphibious vehicles. So we are looking at the entire spectrum of what is 

available and mature. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. That is great. What about, what do you think is 

a reasonable weight for body armor? Can we achieve adequate protection with less weight? 

General KELLEY. Ma’am, I believe that we can. We continue to 

challenge industry to provide anywhere from a 10 to 20 percent reduction in body armor. One of the things that I do think that we 

have done as a Marine Corps proactively, and that is provided 

some options, alternatives for commanders out in the field for what 

type of body armor that they would like their marines to be wearing. So we have the improved modular tactical vest (IMTV) that is 

about a 33-pound vest, obviously provides more comprehensive protection. And that is about a 3-pound reduction in the modular tactical vest that we produced before that. We have also allowed commanders in the field to dictate what level of protection their marines will wear. And that is at the Lieutenant Colonel level and 

above for their battalions. So the real choice is not between the old 

vest and the new vest, but it is really between this scalable approach to body armor. I have already discussed about the IMTV, 

or the improved modular tactical vest. That is going to be, another 

option there is going to be the scalable plate carrier, which is about 

a 21-pound solution in terms of providing protection. Obviously, it 

has got less material, provides the ventilation that is one of the 

areas where we have discovered that that causes some fatigue. So 

we are talking about something that is about 33 pounds, or choosing to go down to, you know, about 21 pounds. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you very much. And thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. I would now like to turn to my good 

friend and ranking member, Mr. Reyes, who this afternoon was a 

victim of Washington traffic, which I understand may now have 

eclipsed Los Angeles traffic as the worst in the Nation. Mr. Reyes. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SILVESTRE REYES, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Mr. REYES. I can give you personal testimony that having been 

in L.A. [Los Angeles] this was as bad as it gets. I think part of it 

is the rain and the complications that it brings. So I wanted to 

apologize for being late and not being here for your opening state-
9 

ment. Oh, and Mr. Chairman, can I ask unanimous consent to 

enter my statement for the record? 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Reyes can be found in the Appendix on page 28.] 

Mr. REYES. Thank you. I did read your statement last night. And 

I wanted you to know that when you made reference to the 10 

years ago, the 2 Marine expeditionary units of 4,400 Marines going 

into Afghanistan and working with the Special Operations Forces 

that were there, I happened to have had the opportunity to go with 

one of our chairmen at the time, Chairman Hobson, we were actually in Tashkent because of discussions about the opening of the K2 

[Karshi Khanabad] facility, but we did get an opportunity to actually go and see some of those marines and the Special Operations 

folks there. And it made us all very proud the way that we were 

working with the Northern Alliance. So I wanted you to know that. 

And coincidentally, last week, having been in the district and 

going to several Veterans Day commemorations, one of the questions that I was asked, and this was by a marine who was—we 

were doing a Homes for Troops, where one of the marines, there 

was a home that was built specifically for him because he was a 

double amputee, so we were there, but one of the marines that was 

there for that ceremony was asking me if we had any plans—and 

this all goes back to everyone talking about the budget, and saving 

money, and concerned about their retirement and all these kinds 

of issues—so he was asking me, he says do we have any plans to 

integrate the uniforms? At one point the Army and the Marine 

Corps had the same uniforms. And he said today we have different 

uniforms than the Army does. This is him talking. He says it 

makes sense to us to save money by the Army going to the Marine 

uniform. I said, okay, that makes sense to have one uniform. I am 

not sure the Army would agree that it be the Marine uniform. But 

be that as it may, do we have any plans to do that any time in the 

future? Because I didn’t know the answer to that. And I haven’t 

had a chance to ask any of my colleagues here on the committee 

if we were even contemplating that. But I guess for 10 years now, 

according to him, we have had different uniforms. And they are 

similar, but not exactly alike. And are there uniqueness or unique 

things to the Marine uniform versus the Army or vice versa? 

General O’DONOHUE. Sir, when it comes to requirements, the 

Marine Corps and the Army, wherever their mission profiles converge, collaborate. In the case of the uniform, the Marine Corps has 

picked, as we do with the mobility for our vehicles, the places that 

we think we are going to be most likely deployed, and we created 

a uniform for that independently. And the Army has done its own 

mission analysis. And there are areas we converge, like the JLTV. 

There are other areas where the mission requirements are different. I don’t know of any move to have a similar—there have 

been discussions I think outside. But the Army and the Marines 

both look at their requirements. And in this one, they obviously 

came up with different solutions. There is nothing that prohibits a 

single uniform except, again, the mission profiles that we both 

have. In some areas they overlap, and others they are distinct. 

Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, that may be something we want to either look into or consider, which brought this question up. Have 
10 

the Marines participated in the network integration exercises with 

the Army? 

General O’DONOHUE. We are on the second one, which is right 

now. In fact, tonight I fly out there to observe both the Army and 

the Marines. So the first one that went off we were in observer status. This second one we are participating. And as we get units back 

from Afghanistan and have more depth, we will participate fully. 

There have been discussions at the Vice Chief, Assistant Commandant Marine Corps both saying this is an area of collaboration. 

So senior leadership is fully behind it. My responsibilities are in capabilities development. And I will be there tomorrow. 

Mr. REYES. Great. Well, thank you. Mr. Chairman, that is all I 

have for the moment. I yield back. Thank you all very much. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. Mr. Runyan. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you, Chairman. And gentlemen, thank you 

for your service. 

Just a quick question about the JLTV, learning our lessons from 

what we needed from the Humvee, what we need from the MRAP. 

And knowing that you guys aren’t talking about it, but, you know, 

up-armoring the old Humvees to make them more sustainable and 

be able to push that off. In the procurement process, are we putting 

in room to grow in the JLTV so we don’t run into this situation as 

soon in the future? 

General O’DONOHUE. Again, as I mentioned before, Humvee 

recap, and we have had a lot of experience with it, we have done 

a lot of experimentation and looked at that problem hard. A vehicle 

in the category of 16,500 pounds or so will not give us all the characteristics to include payload. And that is one of the key distinguishing characteristics between the JLTV and any Humvee recap. 

So the growth path in every respect is higher with the JLTV. So 

as we look at making an investment for a vehicle that we are going 

to have for decades, a growth path is one of the key considerations. 

And that is shown even in specific of reliability. There is an O&S 

cost associated with that. If you are at a vehicle at the very edge 

of its performance characteristics, it starts losing mobility, starts 

losing transportability, it starts having maintenance problems. And 

then you don’t have the payload to get the mission done. So a key 

distinguishing factor between the JLTV, and the reason we are 

going for it, is in fact payload and that growth for a vehicle that 

we are going to have to have for quite some time, sir. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Yes. And going back to MRAPs and MATVs, have 

you had any experience with parts and getting those actually out 

in the theater? 

General KELLEY. Sir, no, we haven’t. Actually, the MRAPs are 

being well supported. We certainly want to thank Congress for all 

the help and support that they have provided us there. As you 

know, on the MATV side of the house, while we continue to respond to the threat, we come up with fixes that will help provide 

safety on the MATV side of the house. And we are currently in the 

middle of installing what is called the UIK [Underbody Improvement Kit], which is an improvement package that will help, not 

only help with the overall vehicle safety but also the passengers inside the vehicle. And we are on path to continue with those up-
11 

grades. One issue is tires for all of our tactical vehicles, and industry is performing well in this regard with the larger R–2000 tires. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Going on to obviously what is going to be our largest medical issue of this combat, TBI [Traumatic Brain Injury], I 

know the Army has taken a program to actually in some cases 

have sensors in the helmet to predetermine that. Are you guys a 

part of that program and/or looking into it? 

General O’DONOHUE. In every respect. In every vehicle. We have 

ways of measuring blast, which is a key. The idea to protect mobility, both dismounted and mounted, is going to be a factor, obviously 

in this war and future ones. And how you measure that. And one 

of the most pernicious aspects of it is the mild TBI. The severe 

symptoms are ones that we are first on in collaboration with the 

Army. It is the ones that are very difficult to detect that sometime 

have the appearance of a concussion but have long-standing consequences. And that area is a particular focus. So in every way, 

from the Commandant on down this is the issue of this war. And 

it is one that we are working closely with the Army, sir. 

Mr. RUNYAN. I thank you for that, because it is—I also sit on the 

VA [Veterans’ Affairs] Committee. So it is going to be one that is 

going to be a challenge, as we are still dealing with Agent Orange 

from the Vietnam era also. So thank you for that. 

Also dealing with, you know, there has been complaints regarding the helmet pad suspension being too hard and it has had occasion to fall apart. Have we looked at ways to enhance that? I know 

myself, spending 14 years in the National Football League, that 

having uncomfortable head gear doesn’t make your job any easier. 

General KELLEY. Sir, I have not personally heard of anybody 

coming to me and complaining about the helmet mounting system. 

As you know, we have the Team Wendy suspension system in the 

helmets that we are currently fielding. And also that is the plan 

for the ECH, the enhanced combat helmet. We are working closely 

with the Army, Natick Soldier Systems Center, and also with PEO 

[Program Executive Office] Soldier to make sure that we are not 

making our marines, and soldiers for that matter, uncomfortable. 

And certainly I agree with you that being uncomfortable can be as 

big a detriment as, you know, not having a safe helmet at all to 

begin with. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. Now to our visiting member, Mr. Coffman, who is one of the hardest working members of 

our full committee. Thank you for joining us, sir. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 

your service to our country and your testimony today. I know the 

United States Marine Corps is trying to transition to become a 

lighter force. And so I wonder if you can, in respect to that statement, in what we are talking today, tell me about—drill down a little bit more in the transition of where you see us moving to. Because, you know, we have got a lot of heavy vehicles. You know, 

the United States Marine Corps is an amphibious force. It is an expeditionary force. It is supposed to be a lighter force. And yet it has 

become a very heavy force. And so I wonder if you can shed some 

light on that. 
12 

General O’DONOHUE. Yes, sir. I will start, and then pass it. Tied 

to our mission, obviously an expeditionary force and readiness, as 

we come out of a protracted counterinsurgency we have shed vehicles, as I talked about before, even just in numbers, as we look to 

be lighter. The Commandant has cast us, and it was confirmed by 

SECDEF [the Secretary of Defense], that we are the middle weight 

force. What that means in part is that we are strategically transportable. We can get there. We are optimized for one of the scarcest 

and dearest assets we have in terms of strategic mobility, whether 

it be amphibious shipping, prepositioning, or airlift. So light is in 

some ways a matter of degree. Much lighter, obviously, than the 

Army, heavier than SOF [Special Operations Forces] in terms of 

being scalable. And then we have a range of missions we have to 

accomplish, from theater security cooperation, crisis response, all 

the way to major at least initial entry force for an MCO [Major 

Combat Operation]. So our gear has to be able to span that range. 

And obviously with the fiscal constraints in terms of how we transition is also a factor. It is one the Commandant has charged us 

with. It could be as small as a countersniper device on a helmet 

that weighs four ounces. The Commandant is asking how much 

does it weigh. So we have made weight and strategic mobility a key 

performance parameter in the systems we have. And we are looking at from the individual to the squads and the entire MAGTF 

[Marine Amphibious Group Task Force] reducing it. And there are 

a number of initiatives, from R&D, to acquisitions, to just getting 

to a smaller profile in terms of number of vehicles that are part 

of that. So it is a wide-ranging campaign. 

And I know my partners here have some more on that, sir. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Maybe you can drill down on this. And that is let’s 

assume at some point we are out of Afghanistan. Let’s draw the 

scenario that we are no longer in Afghanistan, no longer in Iraq. 

General O’DONOHUE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COFFMAN. So the Marine Corps is not then engaging in an 

active counterinsurgency war. So what do you do with all these 

MRAPs in terms of where do they organizationally fit in terms of 

as far as the table of equipment goes? 

General O’DONOHUE. Yes, sir. We are under extensive review. 

And the MRAP is a perfect example. We do core missions that 

every Marine unit is equipped with as a force in readiness. And 

they are there as kind of core plus, they are above their standard 

mission set. The MRAP fits the category above the standard mission set. So we can reduce from a combination of MATVs and 

MRAPs of about 4,000 to a range of somewhere between 1,500 to 

about 2,500. Those are kept and preserved. There will be a limited 

amount for training. And then if we get into circumstances where 

they are required, that smaller equipment set, and we shed the 

burden of carrying a much larger force for tactical and counterinsurgency is available. 

Mr. COFFMAN. So they are not going to be, obviously, let’s say we 

are not—we go back to the Marine Corps prior to 9/11 more or less. 

I mean we have obviously learned some things we changed from 

that. So they are not going to be organic to an infantry battalion. 

Is there anybody that they would be organic to? 
13 

General O’DONOHUE. A few. EOD, engineers, a small category of 

those numbers. The other important point is our mission set is we 

focus on mobility, not just strategic, but also operational and tactical. So our vehicles have a weight limit, and we put a high premium on giving options to the commander. He can cover a lot of 

uncertain ground, he is not channelized to roads like the MRAP is. 

So part of being that light middle weight force is making sure we 

build in our vehicles and in our marines the ability to be mobile. 

And that is reflected in the entire equipment set. JLTV, rather 

than MRAP, our amphibious combat vehicle, the premium is on 

keeping it low weight and keeping it survivable, but also mobility 

gives you a survivability because you have many more choices for 

a commander, and the enemy can’t predict where you are going to 

be. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Wilson, do you have questions? 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to 

thank our witnesses for being here today. I am very grateful and 

honored to represent Parris Island. And my experiences there, Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, the Naval Hospital in Beaufort, it 

is just inspiring. Just last month, Chairman Jeff Miller of the Veterans’ Affairs Committee was one of the reviewing officials for 

graduation. And it just is such an awesome and wonderful reminder of the opportunity that young people have to serve who are 

serving in the Marine Corps. So thank you for your service. 

And General Kelley, you have stated your support for the joint 

light tactical vehicle, JLTV, program. I understand that there are 

some manufacturers who could provide vehicles in the same rapid 

timeline as the mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicle, MRAP. 

The current engineering and manufacturing development phase for 

the JLTV is scheduled to take 34 months. Would the Department 

consider revising the JLTV acquisition strategy to move into production more quickly along the lines of the MRAP? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Sir, I will take that. The JLTV actually falls under 

my portfolio. I will address it in this manner. Our best estimate 

right now is that the EMD [Engineering and Manufacturing Development] phase will take approximately 33 months. I am going to 

steal one of those months away from you. In addition to that, we 

are never satisfied with either cost or schedule. We are always 

looking for ways to drive those down. We had a meeting just this 

morning with the Commandant. And I can tell you with respect to 

requirements, we have done all we can. And General O’Donohue 

can elaborate on that. But we have done all we can early in the 

development effort in terms of cost-informed trades. So the requirements, there is no gold plating. The General expounded on that. 

But we are where we are with requirements. So about all that remains to focus on in terms of trying to reduce cost and schedule 

is schedule itself. So we would consider the potential for trading 

schedule for cost or vice versa. But we plan on continuing to look 

at ways within the Department to do that. 

There is risk in terms of industry’s side. We want to keep the 

competition field as broad as possible, because that benefits not 

only the government in terms of keeping the unit price down, but 

it also has benefits for the industrial base. So we want to keep the 
14 

competitive field as broad as possible. So there are potential risks 

to schedule if we compress that time frame too much in terms of 

keeping the large competitive field. 

So where we are really focusing our attention is inside the building, and what we can do in terms of documentation requirements, 

oversight requirements, testing, et cetera. So that is where our primary focus is right now, to see if we can free up additional schedule. 

General O’DONOHUE. Sir, just to pick up on that, there is a narrow window where the Marine Corps can afford to buy the JLTV 

as we sequentially modernize and phase the ACV. We have a very 

aggressive schedule that starts in December with a proposal for an 

RFP [Requests for Proposal]. So any delay, whether it is continuing 

resolution and we don’t get special authorization, or any other kind 

of actions, would kind of unhinge the strategy. So time for the Marine Corps and schedule is an imperative in every respect, sir. 

Mr. WILSON. And General O’Donohue, you have very interesting 

challenges as you are looking at different issues. One that is ahead 

is in regard to possibly the Marine Corps participating in the 

Army’s new infantry carbine program. Will you participate or not? 

General O’DONOHUE. Sir, we have looked hard at our infantry 

weapons. And there are several aspects of it. How do you train the 

marine? What ammunition do you use? And the weapon itself. We 

even considered our new IAR [Infantry Automatic Rifle], the automatic weapon that replaced the SAW [Squad Automatic Weapon] 

with more precision and less weight. We believe the most cost-effective means of meeting our profile right now is product improvement to the M16A4. We have a different mission profile. We are 

dismounted. We have got infantry. There is caseless ammunition, 

which is in the future, which we are doing a lot of research and 

development. Not ready yet. A threshold difference like that would 

cause us to reconsider our service rifle. Right now the most costeffective strategy is product improvement to the M16A4, sir. 

Mr. WILSON. And in line with that, do the Marines plan to procure a new carbine to replace the M4 or M16? What is the Marine 

Corps’ current and future strategy or plan for a new primary small 

arms weapon? 

General O’DONOHUE. Sir, there is no replacement for the carbine. 

In the small arms, sir, are you talking about the pistol or—— 

General KELLEY. Sir, I know that we have a close quarter battle 

pistol program that we are considering right now. And I can take 

that one for the record if you like, sir, to get you a little bit more 

detail on that. 

Mr. WILSON. That would be fine. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 41.] 

General KELLEY. About our infantry assault rifle, I don’t know 

if that was the point you were trying to make there, sir. 

Mr. WILSON. If you could go into that also. 

General KELLEY. Certainly, sir. The infantry assault rifle, you 

know, we should start—we have already fielded some in limited 

quantities out in Afghanistan to get our marines’ user assessment. 

It is performing exceptionally well. We should start fielding that 

weapon in February of 2012, so next year. And we should complete 
15 

that fielding of about 4,000-plus infantry assault rifles, that should 

finish up in about April of 2013, sir. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. And I also want to commend 

you on my visits to Parris Island to see the marksmanship training, to see the sighting. It is just so impressive and how capable 

these young people are. It just warms your heart. Thank you very 

much. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. In my opening comments I regretted 

the fact that we have not developed a new national strategy for 

how we will use our military in the future. About every 6 hours we 

have another billion dollar deficit, which means another billion dollars in debt. We spend almost as much on our military as all the 

rest of the world put together. And we spend more on our military 

than the next 11 countries in the world combined. And nine of 

those are allies of ours. 

The Ryan budget, which is a very tough budget, doesn’t balance 

for 25 years. With the reality of where we are budgetwise in our 

country, there are obviously going to be those who will say that we 

will never balance the budget, that our country will go bankrupt 

unless there are additional cuts to defense. There is no way of 

knowing where this dialogue will end. 

What I would like you to do for the record is to assume the sequester sets in and that the Congress has the wisdom to permit 

you to use that money as wisely as you can, rather than acrossthe-board cuts the way it is now structured, so that you can develop the best possible Marine Corps with the moneys that you 

have. This will be very useful in advising the development of a new 

national strategic strategy, new national strategy, whatever the 

amount of money available might be. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 41.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. I have a few questions I need to ask that were 

not asked by my colleagues. Most of them were. What is the status 

of the Marine Personnel Carrier program? Given the current budget environment, do you believe this program is affordable and justified? 

General O’DONOHUE. Sir, right now the MPC [Marine Personnel 

Carrier] is in research and development. It has a utility in multiple 

ways. It is a highly leveraged RDT&E [Research, Development, 

Test, and Evaluation] funding that is in the fiscal year 2012 budget, and it is in several respects, and I will describe those. The first 

is as we start looking at an amphibious combat vehicle, and we are 

in the process of doing analysis alternatives, having a connector 

with the wheeled vehicle, which would be the Marine Personnel 

Carrier, MPC, would be one of the options for it. This summer or 

in the early fall we will have a decision on that. 

Secondly, in our portfolio we are looking at mixed wheeled and 

tracked vehicles. We talked about earlier in the testimony the advantages of the Stryker. The survivability of wheeled vehicles is 

high, the mobility as well. And we are working in fact with a state 

of the art technology demonstrator that proves to us that we can 

get a commercial-off-the-shelf capability that is very effective. 

The other aspect, we are managing our three replacement programs for the EFV [Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle], the AAV– 
16 

SLEP [Amphibious Assault Vehicle–Service Life Extension Program], the ACV, and the MPC under one program manager. And 

we are using the money that is in the current budget to experiment 

with aspects that affect all of them. So the money is really in the 

category of experimentation. 

And then lastly, as we look at an LAV [Light Armored Vehicle] 

replacement, we are learning things from the RDT&E. Very highly 

leveraged. We are looking at fiscal year 2014, a decision point. If 

we have survivability in the ACV that makes it a common fleet vehicle, then we will shift from eight and four mix, eight battalions 

of the ACV and four battalions of MPC, we would be able to shift 

over maybe to a pure fleet. 

So the money we have right now doesn’t reflect a program decided. It reflects a judicious investment so we can learn and leverage and inform the different areas that I described, sir. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. What is the schedule for the enhanced combat helmet? When do you expect to begin fielding this 

helmet in Afghanistan? 

General KELLEY. Sir, I know I am probably not supposed do this, 

but thank you for asking that question. Based on a comment I 

made last March, the enhanced combat helmet program, we had 

noticed some anomalies last March, if you remember when I had 

a chance to talk to you the last time. Today, November 16, the enhanced combat helmet is going to enter into its First Article Test 

series number two. And we are really looking forward to that test. 

This has been probably one of the best collaborative ventures that 

I have seen between industry, director of operational test, our own 

Marine Corps operational test and evaluation activity, and our program manager at Marine Corps Systems Command. 

We think after having flushed out the test protocols rigorously 

this past summer that ECH is going to pass its First Article Test 

well. It will pass its full up system level testing immediately to follow that. There is a series of reports, as you well know, one that 

will have to come to the Congress, and also a Beyond LRIP [Low 

Rate Initial Production] report, and then we should start fielding 

in late spring, early summer of 2012, sir. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. In your opinion, are there opportunities to improve commonality and jointness between the Army and 

Marine Corps across the modernization account? For an instance, 

how do the Army and Marine Corps coordinate on the development 

and fielding of tactical wheeled vehicle solutions that address similar needs and requirements of both Services? 

General O’DONOHUE. Sir, the story of this war has been almost 

complete integration between Army and Marines, both tactically, 

where Marine battalions have worked for Army brigades, and 

Army brigades have worked for Marine divisions. Likewise, actually in the requirements and acquisition, we work very, very closely. We meet almost every other month, it is actually monthly at 

some level, every other month at the general officer level with the 

Army leadership to discuss opportunities like that. General Bo 

Dyess is my counterpart. We meet quarterly with our full staffs to 

do a staff review. So in every respect—in fact, the JLTV is a shining example of where we went through some knowledge points, 
17 

worked together as a Service, and were able to come up with a program that meets both Service needs, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Sir, I would also add that on the programmatic and 

development side we go to where the infrastructure exists. In fact, 

we have actually signed a memorandum of agreement with the 

Army’s TARDEC [Tank Automotive Research, Development, and 

Engineering Center], and we actually take advantage of their engineering infrastructure to work some of our joint engineering issues. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. Mr. McIntyre. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. I have no questions right now. Thank you, Mr. 

Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Let me ask the other members of our subcommittee, do you have additional comments or questions? 

Mr. REYES. I just wanted to follow up on a question that my colleague from Missouri asked, and maybe get a little more detail. 

When she was talking about the mandated cuts of the Budget Control Act, I think she asked how big a portion of those cuts would 

be made from the Marine Corps procurement accounts. But I am 

not sure I heard the answer. Can you tell us? Do you have that 

information? 

General O’DONOHUE. Sir, I don’t. I know the Commandant has 

talked about how we have three areas that we go at it. And that 

would assume how DOD would apply them based on strategy. 

Again, we have made the payroll, as the force and readiness, O&M 

is obviously key to that, that we would have to maintain to be 

ready. There is a personnel piece, keeping faith with the marines. 

Again, the Marine Corps has gone through a capabilities-based review. We start with a 202,000 Marine Corps. Based on strategy, 

based on the roles of force and readiness we have come with a 

186,800 force. It would require, to keep faith with the marines, a 

judicious drawdown. We are not doing RIFs [Reduction in Forces] 

to combat veterans and those things. So the timing of it is important in terms of degree, in terms of going after that. And then we 

have talked about how small the Marine Corps modernization account is on the ground side, about .6 percent of DOD. So a minor 

impact—or a minor cut has a large impact. Those things I think 

have to be sorted out at the OSD level in terms of prioritization 

rather than just a strict proportionality. If it were strictly a proportional cut it would be damaging to the Marine Corps, and we would 

have to reevaluate the strategy in terms of how we go about doing 

that. 

Mr. REYES. So based on that answer, at what point do you think 

you will be able to tell the committee, you know, the types of cuts 

that you would be forced to make as a result of this act? Because 

a number of us are concerned about not just these cuts, but any 

additional cuts that might be taken out of the Marine, the Army, 

and other budgets. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I can’t speak to specific impacts to specific programs, but I can talk in general themes. In terms of government 

programmatics, it will obviously become extremely difficult at best 

or near impossible at worst to launch new programs, and it will 

certainly be extremely difficult to keep existing programs stable in 

terms of funding and schedule. In fact, some of the detailed impli-
18 

cations are stretching out both development and procurement rates 

to field the ultimate capability. 

And then there is also implications for industry and there is a 

most recent example, very similar to what we are experiencing on 

the shipbuilding front, now on the ground vehicle side we are starting to see some contraction. Just recently it was announced that 

General Dynamics may procure FPI [Force Protection Incorporated]. We have also seen vendors who are not normally in the 

ground vehicle business. They are now trying to partner. They may 

not survive in certain scenarios. 

Some of the specific implications of that, perhaps a part of foreign pricing rate agreements that vendors must negotiate with 

DCAA [Defense Contract Audit Agency]. Part of that equation is 

assessing the current state of their business base and, in addition 

to that, another aspect of the equation is making predictions about 

their future business base. What this equates to to the government 

is probably a higher forward pricing rate agreement whether this 

comes to fruition or not. So we are probably already incurring risk 

as a result—very much like the markets, just reaction to the perception of risk will probably drive up labor rates. 

Mr. REYES. And that is very helpful because oftentimes we have 

to articulate those consequences, you know, internally as we debate 

how we move forward and—because the reality is that it is such 

a huge defense budget that there are knives at every level that are 

looking for chunks to cut out. So that is why we ask these questions. So I appreciate that answer, and I want to associate myself 

with the chairman, that we—it is important to have a national 

strategy, a cohesive understanding of how our military is going to 

move forward as we deal with these budget shortfalls. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. Now we return to Mr. McIntyre. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, given the 

constrained budget environment, what concerns do you have about 

the ability to maintain night vision goggle production capacity and 

technological capability? And specifically what planning, review or 

assessment are you undertaking to better understand these challenges so that we can sustain this critical program? 

General KELLEY. Currently, sir, we don’t have any further requirements for purchasing of night vision goggles. In our plan right 

now we are really just planning for replacement in the outyears. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Do you believe that strategy is going to be adequate given the demands of the theater? 

General KELLEY. Given the current demand right now, we feel 

that the budget is adequate, sir. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. With regard to vehicle protection, my understanding is there is research being done by the DOD, by the Army 

and the Marine Corps advancing both material and nonmaterial solutions to the constantly changing threat of IEDs. Are these various research efforts sufficiently coordinated to bring forth solutions in the most timely manner? Is there any coordination going 

on between these three aspects of research? 

Mr. TAYLOR. There is coordination at multiple levels, both in the 

S&T [Science and Technology] world, across numerous fronts and 

then also in the actual later development efforts, again as pre-
19 

viously mentioned, an MOA [Memorandum of Agreement] that we 

entered with the Army’s TARDEC. There is a joint center for 

ground vehicles and that is one of the themes that has been raised 

in numerous forms. So there is joint collaboration and communication on this front. But to the best of my knowledge there has been 

no new alloys discovered. So for the most part it comes down to 

things like composites or specialty metals, and certainly that becomes part of the discussion in cost in foreign trades in terms of 

the cost to provide these new technologies. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. So you mention composite and materials and alloys. So there is not other technology that we can anticipate that 

is about to emerge other than looking at the lightweightness of the 

armor, so to speak? 

Mr. TAYLOR. I didn’t mean to allude that those were the only 

areas. I wouldn’t consider myself a subject matter expert, but I am 

certain there are. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Does anybody else know on the panel? Okay. If 

you could check into that and get back to us. Mr. Chairman, I 

would ask if you would in 5 business days let us know what those 

other areas may be. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 41.] 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. Another element in the 

discussion as to how much money we will spend in the future on 

defense is the recognition that our robust defense spending in the 

past and our willingness to protect has encouraged many of our allies to be quite parsimonious in their defense spending. So much 

so that in this little operation in Libya, our NATO allies ran out 

of missiles, bombs and ammunition. Hopefully a new assessment of 

what is there in defense spending will create a foreign sales market 

that may help ease the challenge we have where about every 12 

hours there is another billion dollar trade deficit. 

When we have had a chance to review your testimony and the 

questions and answers, we may need to ask you additional questions for the record. We trust that you will be available to answer 

those. If there are no additional comments on part of my colleagues, I will thank you very much for your service and for being 

with us today, and our subcommittee now stands in adjournment. 

[Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

NOVEMBER 16, 2011 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

NOVEMBER 16, 2011 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

NOVEMBER 16, 2011 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT 

General O’DONOHUE, General KELLEY, and Mr. TAYLOR. The Marine Corps conducted a capabilities-based Force Structure Review (FSR) one year ago in order to 

evaluate and refine the organization, posture and capabilities required of America’s 

Expeditionary Force in Readiness in a post-OEF security environment. The Marine 

Corps employed a panel of senior officers (colonels) representing all elements of the 

Marine Corps. The panel received guidance from the Commandant, applied operational planning scenarios of the future, and developed a force structure that satisfied both from a capabilities perspective. In this way, the Marine Corps directly tied 

anticipated operational workload to planned reductions in manpower. The results of 

the FSR detailed a Marine Corps force that is specifically tailored in capability to 

anticipated workloads. Additionally, the Marine Corps is presently conducting a review of all civilian billets and service contracts. This three phase review began in 

July of 2011. We are also developing policies supporting the direction given by USD 

(P&R). These policies will be published in Marine Corps Orders which guide the development of our total force. 

Although the world is continuing to change and budgets continue to fluctuate, 

America’s requirement to maintain a forward based force-in-readiness remains. 

Physical presence matters. It shows our economic and our military commitment to 

a particular region. It deters potential adversaries, assures our friends, and permits 

response to crises in a timely manner. Our current combination of amphibious, air 

borne and, prepositioned forces provide the minimal capacity to realistically address 

this challenge. During these times of constrained resources, we remain committed 

to refining operations, identifying efficiencies, and reinvesting savings to conserve 

scarce public funds. [See page 15.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MCINTYRE 

Mr. TAYLOR. The Marine Corps is actively pursuing emerging technologies such 

as lightweight materials and ammunition, improved fire control systems, and an integrated approach to the next generation of small arms weapons, optics, enablers, 

and ammunition. Joint Service Combat Developers are leveraging recent capabilities 

based analysis to define the Joint Service Small Arms Modernization (JSAM) Initial 

Capabilities Document (ICD). [See page 19.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

General KELLEY. The Marine Corps currently has three pistols in operational use: 

the M9 9mm Service Pistol, the M9A1 9mm Pistol, and the M45 .45 Caliber Special 

Operations Pistol. The M9 is the service pistol issued to senior Marine Officers (O– 

6 to O–9), all Navy Officers, and senior Navy enlisted (E–6 to E–9). The M9A1 provides a rail to mount laser pointers and lights and is issued primarily to security 

forces and law enforcement personnel. The M45 is the .45 caliber pistol issued to 

reconnaissance and Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) personnel. 

We are currently in source selection for a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) materiel solution to replace the Quantico Weapons Training Battalion, Precision Weapons Section (PWS) hand-built M45. The new COTS pistol will be a modified 1911 

with Picatinny Rail and classified as the Close Quarters Battle Pistol (CQBP). The 

CQBP approved acquisition objective is approximately 4,000 pistols. 

Along with the U.S. Army, the Marine Corps is evaluating the service pistol requirement and M9 service life. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council has already approved a Modular Handgun System (MHS) Capabilities Production Document (CPD) that would provide the requirements foundation for the next generation 

Joint Service handgun. Marine Corps combat developers actively participated in 

MHS CPD development, which focused on ergonomics, lethality, interoperability and 

reliability. Based on the satisfactory performance of the M9, relatively limited distribution of the service pistol, the increasingly constrained fiscal environment, and 
42 

competing priorities for limited resources, the Marine Corps has not adopted the 

MHS requirement. The MHS remains an option to fill our service pistol requirement 

should the demand signal arise and resources become available. [See page 14.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

NOVEMBER 16, 2011 

(45) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT 

Mr. BARTLETT. If Budget Control Act automatic proportional cuts are required for 

procurement, RDT&E and O&M for the Marine Corps then what impact would that 

have on the Marine Corps’ ability to execute the National Military Strategy? Essentially, what is keeping you up at night? 

General O’DONOHUE, General KELLEY, and Mr. TAYLOR. Cuts at the level anticipated with sequestration will likely cause irreversible damage to the Marine Corps 

as well as our industrial base. It will hollow the Marine Corps and cause us to be 

out of balance in manpower, procurement and modernization. Summarily reducing 

procurement accounts will damage the industrial base, which may not recover. The 

result of such cuts would deny our nation the military superiority required in the 

current and future complex and challenging security environment. 

Sequestration would require the Department to completely revamp the National 

Security Strategy and reassess our ability to shape the global environment in order 

to protect national interests. The nation would incur an unacceptable level of strategic and operational risk, which may prove catastrophic the next time our nation 

is called upon to respond to a global crisis. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Please walk us through the Army and Marine Corps Requirements 

Board process: How often do you meet? What have been some of the major results 

of your meetings? Are joint requirements generated during these meetings? 

General O’DONOHUE, General KELLEY, and Mr. TAYLOR. The Army-Marine Corps 

Board (AMCB) is a 3-star level deliberative body co-chaired by the Service resource 

directors—the Army G–8 and Marine Corps Deputy Commandant, Programs and 

Resources (DC P&R). Regular members include 3-star or equivalent representatives 

from the operations and plans, requirements, doctrine, and acquisition communities. 

There are 4 steps involved in bringing topics before the AMCB: 

1. Issue Identification. Topics are normally high level Army/USMC focused issues, 

e.g., concepts, capabilities/requirements, programs. These issues may come from the 

previous POM cycle, OSD Program Reviews, or as a result of new initiatives. The 

topic list is ever-changing as issues emerge. 

2. Issue Development. The AMCB will assign issues to responsible subject matter 

expert (SME) teams and provide guidance concerning scope, timing and desired output. These SME teams, who are comprised of both Army and Marine members, will 

then develop assessments incorporating capabilities, Service approved requirements, 

and cost. 

3. Issue Review. AMCB issue briefings normally employ a two-step review process. First, a Council of Colonels will meet at least three weeks prior to convening 

the AMCB to refine the issue briefing. Next, a Flag/General Officer review (one/two 

star level) will convene two weeks prior to ensure the issue is sufficiently developed 

and merits three-star consideration. 

4. Issue Resolution. SME team leaders will brief the issues, analyzed courses of 

action (COA), and recommendations to the AMCB. The AMCB will either make a 

decision and assign actions to members; elevate the issue to the Chief of Staff, Army 

and Commandant of the Marine Corps for adjudication and resolution; or refer the 

issue to the SME team for further assessment and COA development. 

The AMCB meets approximately eight to ten times a year. 

AMCB accomplishments over the past four years include the following: 

• Agreement on Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle requirements 

and, more recently, MRAP All Terrain Vehicle (MATV) requirements. 

• Agreement on the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) requirements. 

• Continued collaboration on body armor and helmet requirements. 

• Continued collaboration on small arms requirements. 

• Convergence on Service ammunition requirements. 

• Continued collaboration on JLTV. 

Joint requirements are not generated by the AMCB. The AMCB serves as a forum 

for collaborating on and discussing Service and joint requirements that impact both 
46 

land components. Formal requirements are generated through the Joint Capabilities 

Integration Development System (JCIDS). 

Mr. BARTLETT. What impact is the continuing resolution (CR) having on modernization programs for equipping dismounted soldiers and marines? 

General O’DONOHUE, General KELLEY, and Mr. TAYLOR. While the Continuing 

Resolution (CR) that extends through December 16 does not pose significant challenges to the Marine Corps’ modernization programs, the impacts grow dramatically 

as the year continues. Under a CR, Department of Defense policy requires the Services to manage funds at the line item or program level vice at the appropriation 

level, thereby limiting flexibility to reallocate funds to higher priority requirements 

requested in the pending appropriations legislation. New starts and military construction cannot be initiated under a CR without specific approval; and individual 

projects must be specifically authorized and appropriated. 

A CR extended beyond the end of the calendar year would begin to create problems with modernization programs. The more significant problem created by an extended CR would be an unmanageable shortfall in the Marine Corps manpower account. Ultimately, a long term CR creates challenges for equipment levels, training 

readiness, and our Marines’ quality of life until there is a final appropriations bill. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Does the Marine Corps plan to pursue a new handgun? Does a 

validated requirement exist for a new handgun and if so, is a new handgun a high 

priority for the Marine Corps? 

General O’DONOHUE and General KELLEY. The Marine Corps currently has three 

pistols in operational use: the M9 9mm Service Pistol, the M9A1 9mm Pistol, and 

the M45 .45 Caliber Special Operations Pistol. The M9 is the service pistol issued 

to senior Marine Officers (O–6 to O–9), all Navy Officers, and senior Navy enlisted 

(E–6 to E–9). The M9A1 provides a rail to mount laser pointers and lights and is 

issued primarily to security forces and law enforcement personnel. The M45 is the 

.45 caliber pistol issued to reconnaissance and Marine Corps Special Operations 

Command (MARSOC) personnel. 

We are currently in source selection for a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) materiel solution to replace the Quantico Weapons Training Battalion, Precision Weapons Section (PWS) hand-built M45. The new COTS pistol will be a modified 1911 

with Picatinny Rail and classified as the Close Quarters Battle Pistol (CQBP). The 

CQBP approved acquisition objective is approximately 4,000 pistols. 

Along with the U.S. Army, the Marine Corps is evaluating the service pistol requirement and M9 service life. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council has already approved a Modular Handgun System (MHS) Capabilities Production Document (CPD) that would provide the requirements foundation for the next generation 

Joint Service handgun. Marine Corps combat developers actively participated in 

MHS CPD development, which focused on ergonomics, lethality, interoperability and 

reliability. Based on the satisfactory performance of the M9, relatively limited distribution of the service pistol, the increasingly constrained fiscal environment, and 

competing priorities for limited resources, the Marine Corps has not adopted the 

MHS requirement. The MHS remains an option to fill our service pistol requirement 

should the demand signal arise and resources become available. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Given limited industrial base for night vision goggles and the future constrained budget environment what concerns do you have about the ability 

to maintain Night Vision Goggle (NVG) production capacity and technological capability? 

General O’DONOHUE and General KELLEY. There are no planned procurements for 

Image Intensifier systems in FY2012 and only a limited quantity to replace losses 

in future years (planning figure of 300 per year). A 2010 Image Intensifier (I2) Tube 

Industrial Capability Assessment conducted by DCMA’s Industrial Analysis Center 

(IAC) concluded that, ‘‘[i]f DOD requirements decrease as projected, there is a 

strong possibility that one competitor will exit the market and the remaining producer will likely rationalize their current operations to meet the market demand.’’ 

This would ‘‘likely result in lack of competition, stagnation of future innovation and 

development, decreased surge capacity as well as the potential for increased unit 

cost.’’ DMCA IAC recommended ‘‘a periodic assessment of the financial viability of 

key companies engaged in I2 tube production.’’ The Marine Corps continues to engage with Industry and the Department of Defense to monitor I2 industrial base 

concerns. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I understand the Marine Corps plans to divest approximately 

10,000 vehicles from its tactical vehicle fleet and further the Marine Corps is in the 

process of revising many acquisition objectives across the combat and tactical vehicle fleets. Can you walk us through your ground combat and tactical vehicle strategy? How are you factoring in MRAP vehicles? 
47 

General KELLEY and Mr. TAYLOR. The Marine Corps requires the ability to maneuver and sustain combat power across the range of military operations and in 

various environments. The combat and tactical vehicles required to achieve this 

must provide appropriate force-level maneuver and sustainment capabilities that 

are both compatible with rotary-wing and surface assets and complementary to enhance tactical flexibility and minimize risk. The Ground Combat and Tactical Vehicle Strategy (GCTVS) has, since 2008, been the framework within which the Marine 

Corps manages the future inventory of heavy, medium, and light vehicle categories, 

which are further divided into combat and tactical vehicle types. Combat vehicles 

facilitate maneuver of combat teams, while tactical vehicles facilitate the distribution of sustainment material and services by logistics teams. The three combat vehicle and three tactical vehicle categories are correlated to the range of military operations and operating environments to meet performance, protection, payload, and 

transportability characteristics. The entire portfolio of vehicles will possess these 

characteristics, so as to: 

• Support rapid transition between concentration and dispersion of Marine Air 

Ground Task Force (MAGTF) combat power by fielding vehicles with modular 

and adaptable armor in multiple capability categories 

• Support strategic deployment concepts by closely managing transport weights 

and prepositioning objectives 

• Provide capacity to meet and sustain simultaneous Marine Corps commitments 

worldwide by maintaining operational availability and optimizing mix and distribution across the enterprise 

In 2010, the Marine Corps concluded that a 10,000 vehicle reduction is feasible 

as reconstitution occurs post-OEF. That reduction supports the Marine Corps’ re-orientation to its amphibious mission by reducing the ‘footprint’ of MAGTFs. That 

USMC vehicle inventory has also been sized to support MAGTFs that employ the 

concept of 2⁄3 of the Marines maneuvering by vehicle and 1⁄3 of the Marines maneuvering by foot or air. 

This 2010 vehicle reduction was directed during Phase II of the GCTVS, during 

one of the four pre-planned Decision Points that control execution of the strategy 

to meet the GCTVS objectives. Future decision points will guide planning to inform 

Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 14 and POM 16 decisions regarding ground 

mobility investments. The information supporting each decision point will provide 

cost, effectiveness and risk information on alternative courses of action relevant to 

the issues challenging successful fielding of the future fleet. 

As we factor use of MRAPs into our vehicle strategy, we start with the observation that a significant challenge presented by IED protection is its impact on vehicle 

dimensions. The MRAP–ATV and other MRAPs fit into the GCTVS as medium and 

heavy vehicles conducting light vehicle missions in most mission sets. Light vehicles 

are characterized as those that are rotary wing transportable, can be used on Class 

12 or lighter Route and Bridge networks, and exhibit good soft soil mobility. Light 

tactical vehicles carry less than three tons of cargo and provide services associated 

with small teams of two to five personnel. Light combat vehicles are characterized 

as those that maneuver combat and combat support teams of three to five personnel 

and carry mission essential equipment, usually less than two tons. 

A predominance of the 1,100 MRAP vehicles in the Active and Reserve force will 

be used by Engineer and EOD units to conduct Route Reconnaissance and Clearance missions (as conducted in theater), provide protected mobility to EOD teams, 

and provide protected mobility to combat engineers that are at times called upon 

to supplement our EOD forces for mine and obstacle clearance. 

The Marine Corps is evaluating the full cost of retaining an additional 1,400 

MRAPs to serve in both light tactical and some light combat mission roles in high 

IED, restricted maneuver environments as was the case in Iraq. The full cost of 

storing these vehicles in CONUS and forward positioned sites, when evaluated within the context of the projected future budgets, will determine the quantity and extent of the Marine Corps’ ability to retain these additional vehicles. 

The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle is specifically being developed to provide M–ATVlike protection within the light vehicle class. It will have the rotary wing lift, mobility, weight, height and payload values that characterize the light vehicle. This is 

important to the Marine Corps as it strives to maintain its expeditionary nature 

(deployable by L–Class vessels and USMC aircraft), while providing protected mobility to its forces that are deployed in environments with poor or damaged infrastructure or in environmental extremes. The JLTV will be complemented by the 

HMMWVs and MRAPs that remain in the inventory to provide a portfolio of vehicles, which in combination allow MAGTF Commanders to tailor equipment for the 

mission at hand. 
48 

Mr. BARTLETT. The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) acquisition strategy has 

been restructured to make the program more affordable and to streamline performance requirements. Can you provide more detail on this revised strategy and indicate to the committee whether the Marine Corps supports the JLTV program? 

General KELLEY and Mr. TAYLOR. The JLTV is the most cost-effective program 

to meet capability gaps for those light combat vehicles with the most demanding 

missions. The Marine Corps supports the JLTV program and is aligned with Army 

on requirements and affordability. We are working together as the program moves 

toward a Milestone B (MS B) decision in April 2012. The Vice Chief of Staff of the 

Army (VCSA) and Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (ACMC) have 

worked together to drive down cost and inform industry regarding JLTV requirements. The Capabilities Development Document (CDD) is presently in Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) staffing, and is on track for expedited approval. 

Informed by Technology Development phase, both Services have defined a JLTV 

program that: 

- is an affordable solution to essential capabilities including transportability, protection, mobility and payload, 

- is low risk, enabling a streamlined acquisition strategy. 

The streamlined acquisition strategy enables fielding of the JLTV meet the most 

critical light vehicle capabilities (gun trucks, SABRE/TOW, forward C2) prior to 

modernization of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle. Sequenced modernization of 

JLTV then ACV is key to affordably modernizing the two most critical shortfalls in 

the Marine Corps’ Ground Combat and Tactical Vehicle fleet. 

The revised Acquisition Strategy is a direct result of VCSA and ACMC engagement and cooperation between the Army and Marine Corps. The Engineering, Manufacturing, and Development (EMD) phase has been reduced from 48 months to 33 

months, reducing cost and schedule, resulting in expedited delivery of affordable 

JLTV capability to our warfighters. The EMD phase features the following: 

• Up to three vendors to participate in EMD with a down select to one in production. 

• Firm-fixed Price contract approach for both EMD and production; appropriate 

given the competitive nature of the program. 

• 12 months for competitors to deliver, test, and integrate vehicles in preparation 

for demanding 14 month government testing and evaluation period. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The Army is pursuing the Modernized Expanded Capacity Vehicle 

(MECV) program which competitively recapitalizes their Up-Armor HMMWV fleet. 

Are the Marines conducting a similar program? If yes, then how does it align with 

the Marine Corps light tactical vehicle strategy? 

General KELLEY and Mr. TAYLOR. The Marine Corps strategy for light vehicles is 

to procure 5,500 Joint Light Tactical Vehicles to meet light combat vehicle missions 

and to extend the service life of the remaining 13,000 HMMWVs serving in light 

tactical missions out to 2030. The HMMWV Modification effort was developed in 

early 2011 as a complementary effort to JLTV in order to extend the service life 

a significant number of the HMMWVs which will still make up the majority of the 

light tactical vehicle fleet. 

The Army and Marine Corps collaboratively developed JLTV and complementary 

HMMWV recapitalization requirements and programs during this period. 

However, Marine Corps requirements for a mobile, protected, durable light tactical vehicle cannot be met by the Army’s MECV requirement set. For light tactical 

missions, the Marine Corps needs a two-man vehicle that can distribute a 4,000 lb 

mission payload of support services and supplies and a limited number of four-man 

vehicles that can carry 2,300 lbs of mission payload, both of which must travel 70% 

off-road when armored. The Army does not intend to invest to meet this requirement. 

The Marine Corps approach for the HMMWV Modification effort is to explore the 

use of state-of-the-art automotive technologies to restore the current HMMWV platform to pre-armoring levels of performance in the areas of safety, durability, payload, mobility and reliability. These improvements will be incorporated into a kit or 

kits for installation at the Marine Corps Depots on the current rebuild lines or competed to industry based on best value to the Government. Phases one and two of 

the effort are planned to begin in FY 12 with the selection of modification kits, finalization of the design of the kits, and integration of the kits onto the HMMWV platforms. The production kit testing and technical drawing package development 

(Phases 3 and 4) will continue in FY 13. Proof of principle testing of the production 

kits will be conducted in FY14, with full rate production and integration of the kits 
49 

onto selected HMMWVs commencing in FY15. In addition to the HMMWV Modification R&D efforts, the Marine Corps program office will also continue to monitor 

Army Phase One Modernized Expanded Capability Vehicle (MECV) efforts that 

could be leveraged and incorporated to improve Marine Corps vehicles. 

Mr. BARTLETT. How does the MRAP–All Terrain Vehicle and other MRAP vehicles 

fit into the Marine Corps wheeled vehicle fleet along with HMMWVs and JLTVs? 

Why not just use the M–ATV and MRAPs which have proven to be combat effective? 

General KELLEY and Mr. TAYLOR. One of the significant challenges presented by 

IED protection is its impact on vehicle dimensions. The MRAP–ATV and other 

MRAPs fit into our Ground Combat and Tactical Vehicle Strategy (GCTVS) as medium and heavy vehicles conducting light vehicle missions in most mission sets. 

Light vehicles are characterized as those that are rotary wing transportable, can be 

used on Class 12 or lighter Route and Bridge networks, and exhibit good soft soil 

mobility. Light tactical vehicles carry less than three tons of cargo and provide services associated with small teams of two to five personnel. Light combat vehicles are 

characterized as those that maneuver combat and combat support teams of three 

to five personnel and carry mission essential equipment, usually less than two tons. 

A predominance of the MRAP vehicles in the Active and Reserve force will be 

used by Engineer and EOD units to conduct Route Reconnaissance and Clearance 

missions (as conducted in theater), providing protected mobility to EOD teams and 

providing protected mobility to combat engineers that are at times called upon to 

supplement our EOD forces for mine and obstacle clearance. 

The Marine Corps is evaluating the full cost of retaining an additional 1400 

MRAPs to serve in both light tactical and some light combat mission roles in high 

IED, restricted maneuver environments as was the case in Iraq. The full cost of 

storing these vehicles in CONUS and forward positioned sites, when evaluated within the context of the projected future budgets will determine the quantity and extent 

of the Marine Corps ability to retain these additional vehicles. 

The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle is specifically being developed to provide M–ATV 

like protection within the light vehicle class. It will have the rotary wing lift, mobility, weight, height and payload values that characterize the light vehicle. This is 

important to the Marine Corps as it strives to maintain its expeditionary nature 

(deployable by L–Class vessels and USMC aircraft), while providing protected mobility to its forces that are deployed in environments with poor or damaged infrastructure, in environmental extremes. The JLTV will be complemented by the HMMWVs 

and MRAPs that remain in the inventory to provide a portfolio of vehicles, which 

in combination allow MAGTF Commanders to tailor equipment for the mission at 

hand. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I understand MRAPs and MATVs are being outfitted with safety, 

survivability, and mobility upgrades, most notably the MATV underbody improvement kit (UIK). Can you walk us through some of these product improvement modifications and provide status updates on them, particularly the UIK program? What 

are the funding issues, if any, associated with them? 

General KELLEY. The premier safety and survivability enhancements that JPO 

MRAP is in the process of adding to the MRAP Family of Vehicles includes improved energy absorbing seats, the underbody improvement kit (UIK2) for M–ATV, 

blast attenuating floor mats, rocket propelled grenade nets, and the Universal Combat Lock Tool. There are no funding issues associated with the product improvement 

modifications. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

Mr. WILSON. In the wake of potential Department of Defense (DOD) budget cuts 

and protecting our warfighters, what is the DOD doing to ensure it does not do business with companies who are under serious investigation for fraud, corruption and 

questionable business practices that threaten a company’s financial stability? 

General O’DONOHUE, General KELLEY, and Mr. TAYLOR. We require all contracting officers to utilize the Excluded Parties List System to verify whether a prospective awardee has been suspended or debarred from receiving a government contract. Award will not be made if the contractor is on this list. Another line of defense to find fraudulent contractors is through the evaluation of past performance. 

Department of Defense (DOD) contracting officers are required to use past performance as a mandatory source selection evaluation factor. Additionally, our contracting 

officers must perform one further check on prospective awardees prior to execution 

of a contract. Specifically, DOD contracting officers must evaluate the contractor’s 

overall record to determine its responsibility. No award may be made unless the 

contracting officer makes an affirmative determination of responsibility for the con-
50 

tractor. As part of the process to determine responsibility, contracting officers must 

check and evaluate information contained in the Federal Awardee Performance and 

Integrity Information System. Contracting Officers are also responsible for analyzing the financial capability of potential contractors. A contracting officer’s decision on contractor responsibility must consider whether the offeror has adequate financial resources or the ability to obtain them to adequately perform the contract. 

These multiple steps provide the government with an increased ability to weed out 

fraudulent contractors. 

Æ