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HALTING THE DESCENT: U.S. POLICY TOWARD

A DETERIORATING SITUATION IN IRAQ

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 21, 2012

Serial No. 112–134

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

General Jack Keane, USA, Retired (former vice chief of staff of the United 

States Army) ......................................................................................................... 6

Lieutenant General James Dubik, USA, Retired, senior fellow, Institute for 

the Study of War .................................................................................................. 19

Kimberly Kagan, Ph.D., president, Institute for the Study of War ..................... 27

Colin H. Kahl, Ph.D., senior fellow, Center for a New American Security ........ 34

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

General Jack Keane, USA, Retired: Prepared statement .................................... 9

Lieutenant General James Dubik, USA, Retired: Prepared statement .............. 22

Kimberly Kagan, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................ 30

Colin H. Kahl, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................ 37

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 56

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 57

(1)

HALTING THE DESCENT: U.S. POLICY TOWARD A DETERIORATING SITUATION IN 

IRAQ 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 21, 2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:30 p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. CHABOT. The committee will come to order. 

I’d like to take just a moment, if I may, to comment on the decision by our esteemed ranking member, the gentleman from New 

York, Mr. Ackerman, who has announced that he will be retiring 

at the conclusion of this session of Congress. 

I’ve enjoyed working with the gentleman a great deal over the 

years, during his service as chairman and ranking member of this 

subcommittee and on the full committee as well, and other capacities in the Congress. He’s one of the more articulate members of 

this body, and has brought with him wisdom to our debates, as 

well as a healthy dose of sarcasm, I would say, when needed, sometimes maybe not necessarily needed, but usually it’s a very good 

thing. But, I’ve always enjoyed his contributions. 

I guess we have plenty of time over the next, approximately, a 

year, a number of months yet in this Congress, to pay tribute to 

Mr. Ackerman. In fact, I’m sure we’ll probably do nothing more 

than that for a long time, and that would not be enough, I’m sure, 

that the gentleman would probably think, before he walks off into 

the sunset. But, in the wake of his recent announcement, I thought 

it fitting to at least say something at least briefly now, and I know 

we all look forward to working with the gentleman for the rest of 

this Congress, and I know the rest of the members of the subcommittee and the full committee wish him well. So, we look forward to working with him in the balance of this Congress. 

Thank you very much. 

I want to thank the members who are here and the ones that 

will be coming, and the folks in the audience, and, especially, our 

distinguished panel here this afternoon. 

This hearing is being called to assess the current situation in 

Iraq and how U.S. policy should address it. Since the withdrawal 

of all U.S. Armed Forces from Iraq at the end of 2011, the situation 

on the ground has, in my view, degenerated significant, in no small 

part due to a sectarian political crisis which has been triggered by 

2

the actions of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Shortly after 

the last American convoy left Iraq, Maliki issued an arrest warrant 

for the Iraqi Vice President, Tareq al-Hashimi, currently the country’s most senior Sunni official. This was followed by another provocative and divisive decision by Maliki to remove Saleh Mutlaq, 

Iraq’s Sunni Deputy Prime Minister, without taking the appropriate constitutionally-mandated steps. 

Maliki’s actions have been widely interpreted as part of a brazen 

effort to consolidate his power by weakening Sunni politicians 

whom he considers to be threats. And these incidents, along with 

a recent uptick in violence, have set off a crisis which, if not 

checked, has the potential, in my view, to sink the entire country 

back into widespread sectarian conflict that so many of our best 

men and women spent years working to contain. Just this morning, 

al Qaeda in Iraq took responsibility for a recent wave of attacks 

that have claimed the lives of over 40 people, and that’s just recently. 

Any of these incidents viewed in isolation could perhaps be written off as happenstance. When viewed together, however, and when 

viewed in the context of the withdrawal of all U.S. military personnel, it is difficult to deny at least some causal link. For over 8 

years, U.S. servicemen and women have labored in Iraq and sacrificed beyond comprehension to achieve real tangible gains. 

Despite this, Iraq remains in a precarious position, and it seems 

painfully clear to me, and to many analysts, that Iraq requires a 

greater American investment than this administration appears 

willing to make. Although the Iraqi army has progressed remarkably from where it once was, it is plainly clear that Iraq is not yet 

prepared to defend itself from the threat posed by its nefarious 

neighbor to the east. And although Iraqi democratic institutions 

have certainly come a long way over the past years, the current political crisis makes it all to clear that the work is not yet finished. 

Many of us in Congress warned long before that last convoy left 

that country of what would likely come to pass, and yet the administration failed to heed any of the obvious warning signs. 

It is with these concerns in mind that the U.S. and Iraq labored 

to negotiate an agreement which would maintain a small U.S. 

troop presence into 2012. For months the administration had allayed Congressional concerns of potential backsliding by offering 

reassurance that the U.S. and Iraq would be able to resolve the 

outstanding differences. Unfortunately, these negotiations failed 

and it is my belief that they failed due to mismanagement by the 

White House. 

Amazingly, however, the White House is now trying to tout the 

lack of agreement as a success, insofar as it has met a promise 

President Obama made as a candidate while campaigning, and it 

is now trying to downplay the current crisis. Saying that Iraq is 

‘‘secure, stable and self reliant,’’ as Deputy National Security Advisor Denis McDonough recently did, does not make it so. And to borrow a quote from then-Senator Clinton, it requires ‘‘the willing suspension of disbelief’’ to believe that our strategic interests are advanced by withdrawing our forces from Iraq at a time when Iranian agents seek to harm at every turn our country and its allies. 

Although I understand that Iraq is a sovereign country, I believe 

3

there is much more we could have done to secure a larger troop 

presence beyond the end of this year. And as a result of our inaction, we are left with greatly diminished influence over a country 

that we all had once hoped would be a beacon of democracy for the 

Arab world and a stalwart against the repressive regimes which 

surround it. 

With Iran looming to the east and Syria collapsing to the west, 

Iraq sits in the middle of a dynamic, dangerous, and deteriorating 

region. Iraq is, however, a developing democracy and one which the 

U.S. has a profound interest in assisting. This is a time not for us 

to carelessly cast aside allies, but rather to consolidate gains in a 

region which is being shaken to its very foundations. I fear, however, that this White House places too high a priority on expediency and convenience, and, as a result, we may indeed snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. 

I would now like to yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New 

York, Mr. Ackerman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and, especially, thank you for those very kind words. I look forward to working with you under your guidance and the rest of the committee for 

the bulk of this year. I don’t know what I am going to do when I 

leave here, but one thing is for sure, I certainly will miss all of you. 

A strange narrative has taken root in some circles regarding 

Iraq. In this telling of events, the colossal failure and unmitigated 

disaster that was the war in Iraq was just about to turn out to be 

a huge win for America, until the terrorist-appeasing, freedomhating, socialist Muslim Barack Obama snatched bitter defeat from 

the jaws of victory. 

This tale is untrue. From first to last, it is a lie. Such a lie has 

to be admired for its audacity, but it remains untrue, not only in 

the fervid imaginations of the ideological zealots committed to defending the appalling wasteful, stupid tragedy that was America’s 

decade of misadventure in Iraq is any part of this perverse claim 

true. 

The very same hucksters of easy glory and empire on the cheap 

are now selling this bundle of lies to expunge their own responsibility and hang it instead around the neck of the President, who 

more wisely than many, including myself, opposed the misadventure in Iraq from the first place. 

For my part, I can only say that after 9/11, as a New York City 

Congressman, I was too ready to believe the Bush administration’s 

warning of an imminent and terrible threat. I was, to be blunt, not 

prepared to accept that the President and his principal advisors 

would lie, misrepresent, and deceitfully spin about an undertaking 

of such magnitude and consequence, but they did. 

And much worse than the decision to go to war was the tragic, 

unforgivable ineptitude of both the occupation and the initial 

counter insurgency effort. All the many warnings of danger from 

actual experts on Iraq, and post combat reconstruction, both in and 

out of government, that were blithely dismissed in the rush to war, 

came back to haunt us as one by one they came to disastrous fruition. 

We went to war deliberately ignorant and utterly unprepared for 

the aftermath, and thousands upon thousands of Iraqis have sufVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:43 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\032112\73457 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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fered the consequences of our foolish misadventure. Hundreds of 

thousands became refugees. Thousands were murdered by their 

own neighbors, and vicious ethnic cleansing thousands were internally displaced and thrust into bitter poverty. These tragedies, 

though unintended, lie on our Nation. We are responsible. 

Iraq, before the war, was an awful place, and SAddam Hussein 

was a vicious, bloody-handed tyrant, whose death should not be 

mourned by none. But, our decision to up end, and upon ourselves 

no less, the seething cauldron of Iraq’s sectarian animosity, religious zealotry, and ethnic separatism, has to rank as one of the 

stupidest decisions of American foreign policy. 

We sent 4,486 of our bravest men and women to their death in 

this farce. More than 32,000 have come home injured, crippled, or 

partially dismembered. The war in Iraq has cost us more than $800 

billion and the tab is still running with the President asking for 

some $2 billion in FY 13 to continue our efforts to help Iraq get 

back on its feet, as a unified, independent, minimally-functioning 

state. Our financial obligations to our veterans is also running in 

the billions, and will not be fully paid for six or seven decades to 

come. 

So, when I hear now the same cheerleaders for this immense and 

ruinous disaster, lamenting the failures of the Obama administration to firmly plant our military in Iraq’s bosom, when I hear then 

decrying this President’s so-called failure to understand Iraqi politics, and when I hear them expanding how our righteous powers 

of coercion could readily set things right in Iraq, without cost of 

complication, I know these ghastly lies for what they are. 

Iraq’s future is in great doubt, and the failure of Iraq’s sectarian 

leaders to forge a more balanced and more viable system for sharing power and resources, will continue to produce conflict and stagnation until resolved. I believe we can and should help them where 

appropriate, and consistent with our own national interest and constrained resources, but, ultimately, Iraq’s affairs are not ours to arrange, and they never rightfully were. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

I’d like to introduce our distinguished panel here now this afternoon. First, we have General Jack Keane, a Four-Star General, 

completed 37 years in public service in December, 2003, culminated 

as acting chief of staff and vice chief of staff of the U.S. Army. As 

the chief operating officer of the Army for 41⁄2 years, he directed 

1,500,000 soldiers and civilians in 120 countries, with an annual 

operating budget of $110 billion. 

General Keane played a key role in formulating the surge strategy in Iraq and continues to advise senior government officials on 

national security and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

General Keane is a career infantry paratrooper, a combat veteran of Vietnam, decorated for valor, who spent much of his military life in operational commands. He holds a bachelor of science 

degree from Fordham University, and a master of arts degree from 

Western Kentucky University, and we welcome you here this afternoon, General. 

And next will be General James Dubik, Lieutenant General 

James M. Dubik, a senior fellow at ISW, currently conducts reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:43 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\032112\73457 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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search, rights and briefs on behalf of the Institute. General Dubik 

assumed command of Multinational Security Transition CommandIraq on June 10, 2007. 

During this final command, he oversaw the generation and training of the Iraqi security forces. General Dubik has held numerous 

leadership and command positions with Airborne, Ranger and 

Light and Mechanized Infantry Units around the world. He holds 

a bachelor of arts degree from Gannon University, a master of arts 

degree from Johns Hopkins University, and a master of military 

arts and sciences degree from the United States Army Command 

and General Staff College. 

His awards include the Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, four awards of the Legion of Merit, five 

awards in the Meritorious Service Medal, and numerous Army 

commendation and achievement medals. 

And again, thank you, General, for being here. 

Next I’d like to introduce Dr. Kimberly Kagan, who is the founder and president of the Institute for the Study of War. She is a 

well-published military historian, who has taught at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Yale University, Georgetown University and American University. 

Dr. Kagan previously served as a member of General Stanley 

McChrystal’s Strategic Assessment during his campaign review in 

June and July, 2009. She conducted nine battlefield circulations of 

Iraq, and is a recipient of the Distinguished Public Service Award, 

the highest honor the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff can 

present to civilians, who do not work for the Department of Defense. 

Dr. Kagan held an Olin Postdoctoral Fellowship in Military History at Yale, and was a national security fellow in Harvard’s Olin 

Institute for Strategic Studies. She received her B.A. in classical 

civilization and her Ph.D. in history from Yale University. 

Thank you for being here, Doctor. 

And, our fourth and final witness will be Dr. Colin Kahl. Dr. 

Colin H. Kahl is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American 

Security, focusing on Middle East security and defense policy, and 

an associate professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. 

From February, 2009, through December, 2011, Dr. Kahl served 

as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East. 

In this capacity, he played a lead role in designing and overseeing 

the draw down and transition strategy in Iraq, and shaping the 

Pentagon’s efforts to counter Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions. 

In June, 2011, Dr. Kahl was awarded the Secretary of Defense 

Medal for Outstanding Public Service by Secretary Robert Gates. 

Dr. Kahl holds a Ph.D. from Columbia University and a B.A. from 

the University of Michigan. 

And, we welcome you here as well, Doctor. 

As I said, we have a very distinguished panel here this afternoon, and each witness will have 5 minutes. There will be a yellow 

light that should be displayed when you have 1 minute to wrap up. 

The red light will come on. We would appreciate it if you would 

complete your testimony by that time. 

And, General Keane, we will begin with you. 

6

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JACK KEANE, USA, RETIRED 

(FORMER VICE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE UNITED STATES 

ARMY) 

General KEANE. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Minority, congratulations, Mr. Ackerman, on your distinguished career, and members 

of the committee thank you for inviting me to testify today. 

It is always an honor to join you, as it is to be with my distinguished colleagues whom I greatly admire, General Retired Jim 

Dubik, a true American patriot, continues to serve so admirably, 

and Dr. Kim Kagan, who I spent many weeks with in Iraq conducting assessments for General Petraeus, and who provides truly 

outstanding leadership as President at ISW, directing their unique 

and significant contributions. I am also delighted to be here with 

Dr. Kahl, although I don’t have the pleasure of knowing him as 

well as I know my other two associates. 

My remarks today are intended to provide incite to the current 

state of play in Iraq, and what the implications are for the United 

States. 

First and foremost, Iraq is a country of strategic consequence, 

with an educated class of people, rich in oil reserves, and one of 

only two Arab/Muslim countries that elects its own government. 

It is a tragic foreign policy blunder that the United States forfeited our hard-earned influence in Iraq by not leaving a residual 

military force in place. The purpose of this force was to preserve 

and strengthen a fledgling democracy, to continue to assist the 

growth and development of the Iraq security forces, and most importantly to counter the Iranian influence. 

The precedent for such a residual force was successfully demonstrated in post conflict Germany, Italy, Japan and Korea. 

The origins of this blunder began with the arrival of our U.S. 

Ambassador, who succeeded Ambassador Ryan Crocker, who had 

just completed a 2-year successful assignment during the critical 

surge period from 2007 to 2009. Almost immediately, our envoy 

began to put the Maliki government at arms length, despite the 

fact that the Iraq Government the previous year initiated, and insisted on, a strategic framework agreement of what was, in fact, an 

enduring strategic partnership with the United States. 

The United States Government rhetoric, particularly, from the 

President of the United States, emphasized ending the war and 

pulling out the troops, despite a very successful, first ever, provincial election in January in 2009, where all previously appointed 

governors were defeated, overwhelmingly secular candidates were 

elected, and Iran surrogates suffered a stunning defeat. This major 

political achievement was largely ignored by U.S. policymakers. 

In time, Prime Minister Maliki, I am confident, came to recognize that his relationship with the United States Government had 

change dramatically from what was previously his experience 

under the Bush administration. This came to a head when General 

Lloyd Austin, the Commander of Multinational Force Iraq, recommended a residual force of 26,000, while the administration’s negotiating team, who came to Iraq, put a force of 10,000 on the 

table. 

Prime Minister Maliki, who was always a handful, and is a bit 

of a nefarious caricature, instinctively knew this was not a serious 

7

proposal with real capabilities and results, and we are painfully 

aware that no residual force remained. 

So, where are we now? Not surprising, the country with the most 

influence on Iraq’s leadership is no longer the United States. It is 

sadly Iran. Meanwhile, these are the major trends. Prime Minister 

Maliki has consolidated power and cracked down on his major opposition party, Iraqiya. Iraqiya is overwhelmingly Sunni. He does 

not want the Sunnis without some political influence, he just wants 

them to be the Sunnis he can manage and control. 

Prime Minister Maliki, while opposed to calls for federalism in 

principle, is not opposed to Sunni control of Anwar and Nineweh 

Provinces, but he is opposed, and will continue to block, any such 

movement in the Sunni/Shia provinces Diyala and Saladin. He 

knows full well this can spread to the southern Shia Provinces if 

he permitted them to get away with it. 

While Muqtada Al-Sadr was the critical support Maliki needed 

to form a government, they are, in fact, political enemies. Maliki 

sees him as a greatest long-term political threat, and, thus, is trying to modulize Sadr while encouraging other Shia factions. Sadr 

is pushing back by claiming the Maliki government is incompetent 

and threatening that he will pull out of the government. 

The Kurds are weakened politically, and any opportunity they 

may have to entertain to seize Kirkuk has past. They share 17 percent of the oil revenue and are dependent on Baghdad. 

While Maliki’s consolidation of power, and the purge of Sunni opposition leaders is the most significant internal development, the 

major external development is the influence of Iran, and the 

United States is incapable of challenging Iran’s political pressure. 

The Turks probably have more influence than the United States 

sadly. No Iraq politician can take a step against Iran. Their influence is on the rise, and Iraq and Iran’s foreign policy are aligned. 

Indeed, Iraq is supporting the Iranian pressure on toppling the 

Bahrain monarchy with the stated purpose of expelling the U.S. 

5th Fleet. 

The infamous Ahmed Chalabi is very outspoken in support of it. 

And, of course, most ironic is Iraq’s support of the Assad regime, 

who facilitated the al-Qaeda transportation networks through Syria 

into Iraq, and provided refuge for many of the Iraq Sunni insurgent 

leaders and financial backers. 

Iraq’s support is more than just political and financial, but provides Shia militia to assist the Iranian Quds force and the Lebanese Hezbollah to kill the Syrian people and fight against a free 

Syrian army. 

Security in Iraq has deteriorated and is estimated to be two to 

five times as high as reported. The reality is, the United States has 

lost much of the intelligence eyes and ears previously enjoyed. 

As a result of these trends, certainly the United States’ relationship has changed dramatically, and Prime Minister Maliki is playing a dangerous political game to enhance his power, to diminish 

Sunni and Kurd influence, while not totally disenfranchising the 

Sunnis, which could lead to a civil war. 

Moreover, he will clash at some point with Sadr, which could 

force a constitutional crisis, if Sadr pulls out of the Coalition and 

8

Maliki refuses to form a new government or step down, which is 

a likely outcome. 

Let’s face it. Maliki is manipulating the United States, and nothing was more evident than a number of months ago when he visited the United States and took a victory lap with our President 

on the war being waged and being ended, and then returns to Iraq 

and purges his political opponents. 

So, what are the implications for the United States? First and 

foremost, recognize that the character of the U.S. relationship with 

Iraq has changed, and, therefore, so must our means to influence. 

I believe we must move to much more of a hands on, conditionbased, and likely more confrontational relationship. 

For example, we just delivered the last M1 Abrams tank, No. 

140, and we completed another foreign military sale to provide 

F16s, despite the fact that Iraq is operating against U.S. interests 

in Syria, Bahrain, aligning itself with Iran, and deposing political 

opponents. 

While we, the United States, no longer enjoy the political clout 

a residential military force would provide, we are not without influence. Where is the public condemnation by the United States and 

the International Community, particularly, those who shared in the 

sacrifice to free and stabilize Iraq? Where is the condemnation and 

sanctions against Iraq for supporting the killing of innocent Syria 

citizens, and supporting the overthrow of the regime in Bahrain? 

If Iraq is now aligned with our number one strategic enemy in 

the region, Iran, our relationship must change despite the extraordinary support we provided in liberating Iraq in 2003, and stabilizing it against internal and external insurgency. Facing up to this 

harsh truth now is, and must be, our first priority. However, we 

must embrace Iraq on multiple levels beyond the government-togovernment relationship. Key to that is the civil society relationship, which is our private sector, non-government organizations, 

businesses, investment councils, cultural and education exchanges. 

Despite the fact the government, obviously, controls the military, 

we should foster a middle to middle relationship, which should include Iraq officers participating in education and training opportunities in the States. Training assistance visits to Iraq, and even opportunities for combined training exercises in Iraq, should be part 

of our plan. 

There is a next generation of officers who fought side by side 

with us, who will eventually be the Iraq senior leaders, and we 

should develop this relationship. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Keane follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, General. 

And, now we’ll hear from General Dubik. 

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES DUBIK, USA, 

RETIRED, SENIOR FELLOW, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF 

WAR 

General DUBIK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ackerman, and 

members of this distinguished committee. I’m very grateful for the 

opportunity to speak about Iraq, specifically, the Iraqi security 

forces. 

I believe that while the situation in Iraq is complex, the main 

issues with respect to the security forces are relatively straightforward, and the solutions are also relatively clear. 

My testimony derives from the fact that Iraq is an important 

country to the United States. Our security goals relative to Iraq are 

also important. As last stated by the administration, those goals 

are listed in my written testimony. 

The negative influence of Iran and the continue insurgence attacks, the porous borders, the enduring presence of al-Qaeda, all 

are threats to our interest, and to the Iraqi progress. 

U.S. strategic inattention is also a threat. Though the U.S. and 

Coalition part to the fighting is over, the war is not, ending the 

fighting and ending the war are two related but distinct activities. 

To end this war in a way to create a better peace, and to secure 

our Nation’s interest, we must remain involved in Iraq. 

Yes, in my view, a small U.S. footprint, low-cost approach, is correct, and I do not advocate returning to large numbers and large 

spending. But, a small footprint and low cost should not mean inadequate relative to our own national security objectives. 

This year the trend in violence is increasing, and the progression 

of attacks is even more disturbing, from isolated individual attacks 

to isolated small-scale coordinated attacks, to more frequent smallscale coordinated attacks, and now just yesterday to a large scale 

nation-wide coordinated attack. 

The next move along this continuum is sustained large-scale coordinated attacks. This is not good direction. These attacks are 

aimed at eroding Iraqi sovereignty, self-reliance, increasing instability, creating more distance between the U.S. and Iraq, and to 

prevent Iraqi economic growth. And, I think the case can be made 

that these attacks will move Iraq closer to Iran than to the United 

States. That is, these attacks are directly countered to our security 

goals. 

Granted that these are Iraq’s problems to solve, and the solutions are mostly political. Granted also, the Iraqi security forces, 

military and police, have performed better than many had predicted, but the Iraqi security forces still need our help, and there 

are gaps in our current strategy. 

The 150 plus members of the Office of Security Cooperation in 

Iraq, and the current Department of State’s approach to police 

training, are unlikely to secure our interest. Both need some modifications. 

In the military side of things, we cannot execute our current plan 

to use exercises in a rotational presence, without some form of strategic framework agreement or status of forces agreement. So, the 

20

first requirement is to be more aggressive in negotiating the proper 

set of agreements so that our security interests and the security interests of Iraq both be achieved. 

Even as this negotiation goes on, I believe there are five important areas where we can advanced in the meantime. First, intelligence. The U.S. should provide, in my view, in all the right ways 

to protect that which needs protection, direct support to the Iraqi 

police, military counterterrorist units. Intelligence-based operations 

are key in all forms of war, more important counterinsurgencies, 

and, perhaps, most important at the end are the 

counterinsurgencies. The recent nationwide coordinated attacks 

demonstrate that Iraqi intelligence is deficient. Our goals would be 

better served if we provided direct intelligence support. 

Second, border security. The Iraqi borders are too porous. A nation that cannot control its borders is less sovereign than one that 

can. Not only would better border security contribute to producing 

illicit trade and corruption, it would also decrease various nefarious 

actors from crossing into Iraq, and from Iraq into Syria. The Iraqis 

want to build this capability, and we should do all we can to accelerate their desires. 

Third, foreign military sales. The U.S. foreign military sales program is too lethargic, too bureaucratic, to serve our Nation’s interests in Iraq. Three improvements are necessary. First, during the 

surge period the Defense Department set up a special task force to 

accelerate processing of cases and delivery of equipment. This special task force should be resurrected and placed once again directly 

under the Secretary of Defense. Second, more case officers should 

be assigned to the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq to help expedite case development within the Ministries of Defense and Interior. And third, Iraq should be granted a special status that allows 

them to pay for their FMS cases, as those cases are executed. Right 

now, they are still required to place 100 percent of the cost of a 

case up front, even if this case is to be executed over a number of 

years. Granting them this special status would make purchase of 

U.S. equipment more attractive. 

Fourth, police development. A better police force is linked to each 

of the U.S. security interests. Yet, for whatever set of reasons that 

are opaque to me, any objective assessment of the current State 

Department plan to assist the Iraqi police must be called inadequate. The Iraqi police are brave and dedicated. True corruption 

remains too present, but we should remember that the Iraqi police 

have suffered 9,000 casualties, deaths, between 2003 and 2011, far 

more than any other professional group. They remain one of the 

main insurgent targets. The Iraqi police are trying desperately to 

make their country safer. They are well on their way, but they still 

need our help as well. 

When last I spoke to the Deputy Minister of Interior, Adnan AlAsadi, he acknowledged his police need help in many areas, and 

that he would like this help to come from the United States. But, 

as he said publicly, the current plans are too costly and deliver too 

little to what his police actually need. 

Number five, military professionalization and leader development. This is a generational challenge that has already started, 

with the expansion of the US./Iraqi relations that formed during 

21

the war. English language proficiency is a limiting factor in expanding Iraqi attendance at U.S. or NATO schools, but movement 

toward professionalization can be accelerated by expanding capacities of schools in Iraq. Senior Iraqi military officials would welcome this kind of acceleration. 

There are other areas in which the Iraqi security force capacity 

is deficient, and I’ve listed them in my testimony. But, the top five 

that I mentioned here are near-term security force capabilities that 

are both in our Nation’s interest and can be largely paid for by 

Iraq. 

We nearly lost this war once. Defeat was averted by combined efforts of U.S./Iraqi and coalition security forces, diplomats, U.S. and 

coalition Iraqi political leaders, and the Iraqi people themselves, 

turned against insurgency. Following the success of the surge period, we drew down our forces in a responsible way, and although 

the US. coalition fighting is over, our relationship should not end. 

Thank you very much. I look forward to questions and discussion. 

[The prepared statement of Lt. General James Dubik follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, General. 

Dr. Kagan, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF KIMBERLY KAGAN, PH.D., PRESIDENT, 

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR 

Ms. KAGAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member. 

Iraq is not heading in a good direction. Administration talking 

points attempt to deflect criticism by the President, by comparing 

conditions today with conditions at the height of violence and the 

height of the surge in 2007. 

Vice President Biden, National Security Advisor Tony Blinken, 

recently noted in a public speech that weekly security incidents 

have fallen from 1,600 in 2007 and 2008 to 100 today. He, and others, dismissed the notion that Iraq is heading toward insurgency, 

terrorism and civil war. Reality is different. 

The discussion about security incidence is, in fact, misleading. No 

one suggests that Iraq today is as bad as it was at the very height 

of violence. Neither is it true, however, that violence is continuing 

to fall. 

Dr. Mike Knights, the Lafer Fellow at the Washington Institute 

for Near East Policy, recently noted that according to an incidentbased database that he produces at the Washington Institute for 

Near East Policy, violence in February was nearly double that of 

what it was in November, November, 2011. 

Comparing violence today with violence in 2007 misses the point. 

The fact is that violence has been increasing since the Obama administration announced that it would be withdrawing completely 

from Iraq, and the trends are getting worse. 

These comparisons are also misleading, because they are not apples to apples comparisons. You can see in my written testimony 

for a fuller description of this problem, but the violence trends that 

we are seeing today are now almost all Iraqi-on-Iraqi violence, 

which is exactly the metric we need to be looking at in order to see 

indications of incipient civil war. 

And, we can see such indications in the locations in which violence is flaring. According to Dr. Knights, violence is increasing in 

the areas that were traditional sectarian flash points in Iraq, and 

bases for both al-Qaeda in Iraq and Baathist insurgents. Diyala 

Province is increasingly unstable, with violence in both Sunni and 

Shia areas. 

Historical AQI bases in Fallujah, Taji and Abu Ghraib, appear to 

be reactivating. Another traditional AQI base in Suwayrah in 

northern Wasit Province, has been reactivated and is being used to 

protect terrorism into the southern Shia heartland. And, in what 

used to be known as the Triangle of Death, we see, again, the reemergency of a flash point and a facilitation area for attacks into 

Baghdad. 

This activity suggests that what we had predicted would occur 

after the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces has, indeed, begun. AlQaeda in Iraq, in the Islamic State of Iraq, which had been badly 

damaged by Iraqi and Coalition operations during the surge, are 

reconstituting in their historical safe havens. We see a spectrum of 

violence, including ISI attacks, against collaborators, so-called, and 

28

former Sons of Iraq, ISI attacks against Iraqi Government and security officials, conflict with Muqtada Al-Sadr’s movement, and 

conflict along the Arab-Kurd seams, particularly, in the disputed 

territory. 

Three months after the withdrawal of American forces, it is far 

too soon to declare that civil war is not coming to Iraq, particularly, 

in light of the indications suggesting that it is. 

At least some of the instability is being driven by an increasingly 

sectarian political struggle in Baghdad. Prime Minister Maliki regained his premiership after failing to secure a plurality of the vote 

in the 2010 parliamentary election, by agreeing to a number of conditions that would ceded some real power to a wider cross sectarian 

and cross ethnic coalition, including the Iraqiya party, the party 

that did win the plurality of votes, and the Kurds. This concord, 

the agreement has been unilaterally stopped by Maliki, who has refused to abide by its conditions or implement its provisions, and is 

talking about a national dialogue or conference at some time to 

come, in which this issue will come back to the fore. 

More so, Maliki has accelerated a pattern of sectarian and political purging within the security forces, and within the highest level 

of the Iraqi Government. For example, the movement of the Baghdad brigade against Vice President—Sunni Vice President Tareq 

al-Hashemi, and his home causing the Vice President to lead into 

the Kurdish region, and right now Prime Minister Maliki is preparing to try Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi in absentia. 

He subsequently deposed Sunni Deputy Prime Minister Saleh 

Mutlaq, and banned him from participating in the Council of Ministers, even though he did not obtain a parliamentary vote of new 

confidence as the constitution requires. 

Maliki has promoted loyal Iraqi security force commanders by 

appointing them in acting positions, avoiding the requisite parliamentary approval, and at the same time he has fired or arrested 

hundreds of current and former security force personnel over alleged ties to Baathism or terrorism. 

The Sunni Arab population in Iraq is now under great pressure. 

Maliki disbanded the Awakening Councils and stopped the efforts 

to incorporate Sons of Iraq into the government and security forces, 

as U.S. forces were withdrawing. The elimination of Hashemi law 

from the government strips the more conservative and centrally located Sunnis of emblems of their government representation. Increasing ISI and Baathist activity have been met with increasing 

Iraqi security forces activities in Sunni areas, including widespread 

arrests, targeted strikes, sweeps, and the removal of local commanders in Anbar and elsewhere. 

Maliki has also attempted to weaken and fracture provincial 

councils in Dayl and Saladin, prompting them to declare their intention to seek Federal status, and Anbar has followed their lead. 

Maliki has denounced these attempts to exercise powers explicitly granted to the provinces by the constitution, and used force to 

prevent them from moving forward. In this context, it is not surprising that elements of the Sunni population may be feeling increasingly disenfranchised, vulnerable to violent groups, and more 

susceptible to the blandishments and intimidation of insurgents 

and terrorists. 

29

This is exactly the Iraq that the United States did not want to 

leave behind. Presidents Bush and Obama wanted an Iraq that 

was no longer a safe haven for terrorists, but the terrorists are returning. More still, AQI has begun projecting violence from Iraq 

into Syria, reversing the historical rat lines that its reported attacks against the U.S., and Iraqi forces in Iraq. 

The U.S. wanted an Iraq in which the Sunni minority felt that 

its stake in government was safe and effective, and in which elections mattered, and in which violence would not be used to revise 

political settlements. Instead, the U.S. has tolerated, and even encouraged, the overturning in electoral result, and has stood by 

Maliki and his government, as it has used force to revise political 

settlement it had agreed to. 

Tony Blinken, Vice President Biden’s National Security Advisor, 

said that Iraq today is less violent, more democratic, and more 

prosperous, and the U.S. more deeply engaged than at any time in 

recent history. The fact that Iraq is less violent, more prosperous, 

more democratic, and with more U.S. engagements than it was 

under Saddam Hussein is the result of the efforts of the previous 

administration, not this one. But, Iraq is more violent, less democratic, and the U.S. less engaged than it was 6 months ago, and 

it has poisoned the knife’s edge of a civil war. The United States 

has not achieved its core national security objective in Iraq. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Kimberly Kagan follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Doctor. 

Our final witness this afternoon will be Dr. Kahl. You are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF COLIN H. KAHL, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, 

CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY 

Mr. KAHL. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished members 

of the committee, thank you for inviting me to talk to you today, 

again, about the situation in Iraq. I was up here frequently in my 

previous post, and I should reinforce the point that I’m up here 

today in my individual capacity, obviously. 

Iraq is undeniably more stable, more sovereign, and more self-reliant than it was 3 years ago, when the Obama administration 

came into office. The country remains a highly-imperfect experiment in democracy, and the security and political environment remains turbulent. And, Iraqi leaders must address lingering political challenges in the years ahead to avoid back sliding toward 

greater instability. 

But, Iraq is not nearly as fragile as some of the other witnesses 

on this panel suggest. There has been a discernible uptake in highprofile attacks by al-Qaeda in Iraq since December. It is not yet 

clear whether this represents a short-term spike or a new steadystate reality in the face of diminished pressure against AQI networks. 

However, it is important to remember that these types of attacks 

occurred even when we had 150,000 troops in the country, or when 

we had 50,000 troops in the country, and likely would have continued to occur even if we had had 5,000, 10,000 or 20,000 troops left 

in the country after 2011. 

Moreover, although the attacks clearly demonstrate that AQI remains a deadly terrorist organization, they are not, as Dr. Kagan 

asserts, a nationwide insurgency. They hold no territory. They do 

not have widespread popular support among Sunni Arabs, and nor 

have AQI attacks sparked the type of militia mobilization or tit-fortat sectarian bloodshed so common in the 2006–2007 period. 

The Iraqi security forces continue to enjoy substantial overmatch, 

vis-a`-vis AQI and other Sunni militant groups. As such, it remains 

the assessment that these groups do not currently represent a strategic threat to the viability of the Iraqi state. 

The increase in AQI activity since December notwithstanding, 

open source reporting that’s used by the U.S. intelligence community suggests that overall levels of violence do not appear to have 

significantly increased, and remain at much lower levels than they 

did during the 2005–2007 period, contradicting the statistic that 

Dr. Kagan cites. 

In particular, Shia militant attacks are down substantially, in 

large part due to the withdrawal of U.S. forces. Levels of violence 

remain intolerable and unacceptable to the Iraqi populous, but Iraq 

is not on the cusp of falling back into civil war. 

Political tensions have also been running high in recent months. 

Since December, several moves by Prime Minister Maliki, noted by 

our witnesses and by the chairman, most notably accusations that 

Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi was running a death squad out 

35

of his office, haven’t seen its attempts to side line prominent Sunni 

members of the Iraqiya political block. 

However, with the active involvement of U.S. diplomats in Iraq, 

and the Vice President’s office, the political crisis has abated, with 

Iraqiya ending its boycott of the Council of Representatives and 

Council of Ministers, and with President Jalal Talabani putting in 

place a senior leader process that aims to address the broader set 

of power sharing arrangements animating crisis. This is good news. 

So long as Iraq’s major factions remain committed to the political 

process to resolve their disputes, political crises like these are unlikely to lead to Iraq’s unraveling. Still, these crises are symptoms 

of deeper political challenges that have to be overcome. 

Outstanding requirements for lasting stability include, reining in 

extra-constitutional powers accrued to the Office of Prime Minister, 

and fully implementing power sharing agreements, resolving lingering Arab/Kurd disputes, addressing endemic corruption and 

problems with essential services, and improving protections of 

human rights and the commitment to the Rule of Law. 

The United States must continue to help Iraqis find solutions to 

these challenges. Our Embassy in Baghdad is, and should remain, 

deeply involved in helping Iraqi leaders navigate their unresolved 

political challenges. 

Although we cannot dictate terms to the Iraqis, we should criticize abuses of power when they occur, and we should use of considerable relationships with all sides to act as a convener, facilitator, 

and honest broker, helping to identify and push political compromises. 

I now want to say a few things about Iranian influence. When 

U.S. forces departed in December, there was considerable anxiety 

in Washington, and, apparently, still on this panel, and in the region, that Iran would fill the void left by our forces. In actuality, 

that hasn’t happened. To be sure, Tehran enjoys considerable influence in Iraq, as we do, but the narrative of Iranian domination is 

widely exaggerated. 

A profound sense of Iraqi nationalism, lingering grievances from 

the Iran/Iraq war, and competition between the religious establishments in Najaf and Qom, as well as the desire among Iraqi leaders, 

including most Shia politicians, for strategic partnership with the 

United States and positive relations with other countries in the region, put fundamental limits on Baghdad’s willingness to do 

Tehran’s bidding. 

Signs of independence from Iran can be seen even in areas where 

Tehran has exerted extraordinary pressure. Last summer, Maliki’s 

government sent clear messages to Iran demanding that they curtail support for Shia militants attacking our troops. 

More recently, Syria, actually, provides an example of this as 

well. Iran has pressured Iraq to support Bashar al-Assad battle regime in Syria, but Iraq has come around to supporting the Arab 

League’s position calling for Assad to step down, and Maliki did not 

invite Syrian representatives to the upcoming Arab League Summit in Baghdad. 

According to media reports, Iraq has also asked Iran to stop 

using Iraqi air space to ship weapons to Assad’s regime, although 

Iraq has limited ability to enforce their air space violations. 

36

There will certainly continue to be times when Iraq cooperates 

with Iran in ways that we don’t like, but Iraq is not, and will not, 

be a puppet dangling at the end of Iran’s strings. Withdrawing of 

U.S. forces did not represent the end of our security relationship 

with Iraq. It represents instead a beginning of a new phase in that 

relationship. The Obama administration continues to be committed 

to a long-term security partnership with Iraq, and I urge Congress 

to be supportive of U.S. and Iraqi Government efforts to cement 

that relationship. 

Contrary to the assertions of some critics, the inability to reach 

a follow-on security agreement in 2011 is not due to administration 

political considerations and absence of U.S. political will or negligence. Indeed, at great political cost President Obama signaled 

his willingness to leave a modest training force in Iraq beyond 

2011, upon the request of the Iraqi Government, and the administration invested a lot of energy in that effort. 

The inability to reach an agreement stems from Iraqi domestic 

political concerns, not ours, and the unwillingness among all of 

Iraq’s factions to submit an agreement to the Council of Representatives to ensure binding legal protections for our forces, something 

that everybody in the administration, and I believe most Members 

of Congress, agreed with. 

Despite the absence of a follow-on accord, the administration has 

established a sizeable Office of Security Cooperation, to ensure a 

robust long-term security relationship. The Office of Security Cooperation oversees nearly $10 billion in foreign military sales, making iraq the fourth largest FMS customer in the region and the 9th 

largest in the world. And, this alone guarantees a close relationship 

with the U.S. military for decades to come. 

The OSCI and the U.S. Central Command are also committed to 

maintaining active engagement with the ISF, aimed at deepening 

security cooperation and addressing some of the gaps that General 

Dubik pointed to. 

U.S. forces may have departed Iraq, but the Obama administration remains thoroughly engaged and committed to helping Iraqis 

build a more peaceful and prosperous future. It is imperative that 

we, as a Nation, share this commitment. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Colin Kahl follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Doctor. 

We do have a series of votes on the floor for, my guess is we are 

looking at 40 minutes, 45 minutes, and we have to go over and 

vote. And then, we will be right back, and then the panel members 

will ask questions. 

So, we will be in recess here for a little bit. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. CHABOT. The committee will come back to order. I want to 

thank the witness panel and members of the audience for your patience. We are now finished with votes on the floor, and so we are 

back in session here. 

I’d like to address the first question to you, General Keane. I 

would welcome the comments from any of the other panel members 

to this question, too. 

In your testimony, you stated, and I quote,

‘‘It is a tragic foreign policy blunder that the U.S. forfeited our 

hard-earned influence in Iraq by not leaving a residual military force in place. The purpose of this force was to preserve 

and strengthen a fledgling democracy, to continue to assist the 

growth and development of the Iraq security forces, and most 

importantly to counter the Iranian influence.’’

As I mentioned in my opening remarks, this is a fear that I have 

had for a long time, and I am really amazed that anyone is surprised by the recent backsliding in Iraq, when you consider the fact 

that our troops are now out. 

Do you believe that the current crisis in Iraq could have been 

averted had the U.S. maintained a relatively small or whatever 

number, I don’t know if it was 20,000, or 10,000, or 30,000, but if 

we had maintained some troop presence do you believe that we 

could have averted some of the problems that we are seeing there 

now? 

General KEANE. Well, I honestly don’t know for sure, but this 

much I do know. We kept our forces post conflict, you know, in 

World War II and the Korean War, because we clearly wanted to 

maintain influence. And, that is what this was about. It was about 

maintaining influence. 

And, the influence we had with Prime Minister Maliki, as I said 

before, he always was a handful, and he has a dark side to him, 

to be sure. And, left to his own devices, that dark side manifests 

itself. 

But, we were all in with Maliki. Obviously, we had lots of forces 

there, and we had the extraordinary capacity of Ryan Crocker to 

shape and influence him. Maliki, by and large, was moving in the 

right direction, even though at times he would frustrate us. 

I think Maliki, because we stood apart from him very quickly 

when the new administration came in, he quickly realized that he 

had a different relationship with us. What was so astounding about 

that is, it was Maliki that insisted on the strategic framework 

agreement, not us. We began to negotiate over a status of forces 

agreement. It was Maliki that said, no, I want a long-term strategic partnership with the United States, that’s the first thing I 

will negotiate, not force levels. This was 2009, and we hammered 

out that agreement. I was there for part of those negotiations. So, 

43

that was extraordinary. It was a pleasant surprise that that’s what 

they wanted. 

But, certainly, in 2009—that was 2008, excuse me, 2009, that relationship deteriorated gradually over time, and it was accented 

when General Austin had requested the 26,000 forces to meet all 

the requirements he had, and the President’s negotiation team 

came in with 10,000. Maliki knew right then and there that this 

force would not have the capabilities that they needed, and that 

there was a different agenda on the table. 

Now, people want to blame the Iraqi Government and Maliki for 

us winding up with no force levels, and the degree of immunity 

surrounding our forces. I believe those are false issues. What really 

took place is a relationship that grew apart over a 2-year period, 

that’s so deteriorated that we wound up with no force levels at all. 

And, certainly, the activity that Maliki has been exercising since 

that level is dramatically different than what was taking place 

prior to 2009, when we did have that kind of influence over him. 

I believe we would have continued to have some influence to 

shape his geopolitical thinking, if we had a residual force. But, 

equally important, had an administration that was focused on the 

strategic partnership and it wanted to advance that partnership, 

was as important as the forces themselves. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

I’ve only got about 30 seconds left. 

Dr. Kagan, why don’t we go to you at this point. I have a short 

period of time. 

Ms. KAGAN. Thank you very much. 

Of course, we cannot tell how Iraq would have been different because that’s a counterfactual question. What is certain, and very 

important here, is that the United States has chosen not to use influence that it has, or had I should say, with the Iraqi Government 

over the course of 2009, and 2010, and 2011. And, as General 

Keane said, therefore, found itself with less leverage than it needed 

to have in negotiating a long-term presence of troops. 

Secondly, I think it is also important to note, and to ask, whether 

it is really technically necessary for a Council of Representatives of 

any country to approve immunities and set up force agreements between the United States and their countries. I am not aware that 

that is a standard that we hold all administrations, governments 

and regimes to, and, therefore, in a certain sense the constraints 

that the administration placed on itself exacerbated the crisis within Iraqi politics that, ultimately, caused the Iraqis to decide, and 

the administration to decide, to pull forces out. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. If I heard you right, I think, 

perhaps, it was used as an excuse rather than something legally 

that we were bound by. But, I am out of time, so I will yield for 

5 minutes to the gentleman from New York. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am somewhere in between the Beatles and Alice and Wonderland right now. I am hearing the rewriting of a song, and it seems 

to be coming out give war a chance, and I am viewing the whole 

thing through the looking glass, and everything is coming in back 

upside down and backwards. 

44

I just head two different things. One, ‘‘that is was always about 

exerting influence.’’ I remember voting to give the President the 

authority to go after terrorism, because of weapons of mass destruction. I did not vote to kill 4,300 or have killed 4,300 and 

change American men and women to exert influence. It was to protect the United States against an eminent threat of danger. 

I remember the President, President Bush, who I voted to give 

him the authority to do all this, landing on a ship, aircraft carrier, 

with the banners and the band, that the mission was accomplished. 

I do not know how this continues to go on, the band plays on. 

It is often attributed to President Obama, and I just heard it just 

again from the good Doctor, but it is really President Bush and his 

administration, under that administration, that, actually, negotiated the withdrawal of forces, under two separate treaties that 

were signed on November 17, 2008. It was not this administration. 

That strategic framework agreement specified Bush specified, 

President Bush specified, we signed it under his leadership, that 

the United States may not ‘‘seek or request permanent bases or 

permanent military presence in Iraq.’’ The security agreement established a deadline of withdrawal for all U.S. forces. That’s President Bush, not President Obama. They are pinning the tail on the 

wrong donkey. 

Maybe you can help us out on that, Dr. Kahl. 

Mr. KAHL. Well, I will defend the donkey that I rode on for 

three—the democratic donkey I guess in this case. 

You know, I took 16 trips to Iraq in the last 3 years. I sat where 

I met with all of our officials there, all the senior Iraqi officials involved in these negotiations. I sat in countless meetings in the situation room at the deputies and the principals level, and met with 

our senior military commanders on a weekly basis on this issue. 

So, I think I can speak with a fair amount of authority about what 

has been described up here. I just cannot agree with the reality as 

portrayed with the rest of the witnesses. 

It is true that General Austin proposed a range of options, the 

highest one being 23,000, not 26,000, but a range of options, including a number of options that were much lower. So, let us think that 

clear. 

It is also true that the larger options largely envisioned a very 

robust mission set in northern Iraq, which proved, actually, something that the government in Baghdad was not interested in. By 

July and August they were not interested in having that large of 

a mission up north, which I think belies or goes against the criticism that somehow if we had offered more troops it would have 

been easier for the Iraqi domestic political environment to accept 

them. 

Then the question becomes whether we, basically, set ourselves——

Mr. ACKERMAN. How many troops would they have accepted? 

What did they want? 

Mr. KAHL. It was not about troop numbers. At the end of the 

day, the fundamental issue was about our requirement for legal immunities for our troops that were put in Article 12. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Right, under the Status of Forces Agreement. 

Mr. KAHL. Correct. 

45

So, under the current security agreement, or under the security 

agreement that the Bush administration negotiated, that you made 

reference to, it called for our forces to be out by the end of 2011. 

Under Article 12 of that agreement, we had a certain level of 

protection for our forces, jurisdictional protection. All the Obama 

administration asked is, that if there was going to be a follow-on 

agreement it had the same article in it. That is it. It was not an 

unreasonable request. It was the same request of the Bush administration. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. President Obama was trying to protect the security of our troops. 

Mr. KAHL. And, in fact, had he done anything otherwise, this 

body and most of the folks on this panel, would have crucified him 

for doing it. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Did we or did we not have an obligation under 

international law for this administration to follow what the previous administration obligated us to? 

Mr. KAHL. Well, there is two things. Under Iraqi—there was a 

consensus in the U.S. Government’s interagency to include folks 

who were in the Bush administration before, that it was a legal requirement for protections to go through the Council of Representatives if they were going to be binding under Iraq’s constitution. 

That was our legal communities’ views, not the Pentagon, State 

Department, the White House, but also Prime Minister Maliki’s 

legal advisors’ views, and there was nobody in Iraq that contradicted it. 

And, the last agreement went through the Council of Representatives. So, contrary to Dr. Kagan’s point that there was no reason 

it had to go through the Council of Representatives, there was 

every reason that it had to go through the Council of Representatives, because the previous agreement did. 

So, the Obama administration did not manufacture some hurdle 

that was new and came out of no where, it simply said, if you want 

forces to remain in the country you have to give them the same 

protections you gave them before. And, that proved politically untenable for the Iraqis. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrbacher, is recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. ROHRBACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me see if I can poll the witnesses here on a yes or no, if possible. 

Given what we know now, and what has happened in Iraq, was 

the decision to send U.S. forces to liberate Iraq from the Saddam 

Hussein dictatorship, was it the right decision, with all that we 

know now? Just a yes or no, or if you cannot answer that is fine. 

General? Was it the right decision? 

General KEANE. Yes. 

Mr. ROHRBACHER. All right. 

General DUBIK. I would have to say for myself, I am ambiguous. 

Mr. ROHRBACHER. Ambiguous? Okay. 

Ms. KAGAN. I do not think that the question can be answered, 

because the decision makers at the time knew what they knew at 

the time. 

46

Mr. ROHRBACHER. No, no. I am asking you, knowing what you 

know now, was it worth it? 

Ms. KAGAN. I am not sure that that question can be answered. 

Mr. ROHRBACHER. Okay. So, we have, yes, and two ambiguous, 

and, Doctor? 

Mr. KAHL. Not based on the premises for which the war was originally justified, and probably not worth $1 trillion and 4,500 

American dead. 

Mr. ROHRBACHER. But, knowing what we know now, was it 

worth it going in with U.S. troops? 

Mr. KAHL. Not based on the premise for which the war was. 

Mr. ROHRBACHER. Okay. We have a no, yes, and two ambiguous. 

Let me just say that I have been around for a while, 24 years 

now here in Congress, and worked in the Reagan White House for 

7 years in Washington. A lot of these decisions had to be made, and 

I will say the worst decision, foreign policy decision, that I have 

seen in my 30 years of service at high levels in Washington, this 

was the worst decision. 

I am sorry, General. Over 4,500 American troops are dead, and tens of thousands wounded, $1 trillion of added debt to our country, and from what I can see the people of Iraq are not even appreciative of what we have done. 

I think that was, it is beyond, there is not even anything that 

comes close to how bad that is. And, for us not to be able to say 

that outright, and understand that the American people are so war 

weary now, that we will not be able to do other commitments that 

might be really important for our national security. 

Keeping Saddam Hussein in power might have been the best 

deal for our national security, considering that the mullah regime 

in Iran is the regime that we have to fear the most, in terms of 

our own national security interest in that part of the world. 

And, when you think of that, and then you think that we lost all 

of these lives, well, I think that we ought to do some soul searching, all of us Americans who are engaged in policy, and I went 

along with it. I mean, I did not listen to Gary Ackerman, I went 

along with it, and the President, it was after 9/11, and I was going 

to support our President in this war against radical Islam, and this 

had nothing to do with the war in radical Islam. It had everything 

to do with something, and I still do not know what it is, that drove 

us to say that we had to get rid of that dictatorship, because there 

are lots of dictators around the world. 

And, let us just note this other thing for the people on the other 

side of this issue. I am sick and tired of also hearing that all of 

these casualties that were caused by America’s intervention, Saddam Hussein murdered 100,000 of his own citizens prior to our liberation. There are mass graves that were found. 

Now, we do not have, there is no reason in the world we should 

be trading American lives to stop every dictator who is slaughtering his own people. But, those people who would like to suggest 

that the United States troops in some way were responsible for a 

higher level of killing of innocent civilians are wrong. They are 

wrong as well, and they are wrong because the killing that took 

place after we liberated that country from Saddam Hussein, most 

of it was done by interfaith Muslim-on-Muslim killing each other, 

47

not American troops going into neighborhoods and shooting up 

neighborhoods because we wanted to exert our influence. 

So, I find a little bit of an inability on both sides of this issue 

looking back, the ability on both the left and the right, to be able 

to look very honestly at this issue. And, I would implore my fellow 

Members of Congress, and those of you who testify before Congress, 

and are influenced—have influence here in Washington on decision 

makers, to do some soul searching on this. I am trying to be honest 

about it, and I think it behooves us to remember those 4,500 men 

who gave their lives, and all those tens of thousands whose lives 

are probably ruined because of this, and what we got out of it. It 

is not even close, that was not worth their lives. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. CHABOT. His time has expired. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. The gentleman invoked my name, if I could just 

interject for 30 seconds. 

Mr. CHABOT. All right. The gentleman is recognized for 30 seconds. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I just want to say to the gentleman, despite your 

years of experience that you’ve echoed my word sand sentiments 

exactly. I did mean culpa during my opening statement, following 

President Bush so blindly into this, and expressed the same sentiments, and almost the same words. I’ll share them with you later. 

I want to thank you for your honesty as always. 

Mr. CHABOT. We will go into a second round at this point, and 

I yield myself 5 minutes. 

Just commenting on the gentleman from California, who I have 

great respect for, and I have to agree a bit, but mostly disagree 

with his statement. I don’t know that it’s fair to say knowing what 

we know now would you have gone in, et cetera, you are free to 

ask that question. 

But, the answer to that question is complicated, I believe, by the 

fact that this administration pulled out American troops, all the 

troops out here, which was not anticipated or expected by our military or anybody, really, or the Iraqis or anybody else, until it actually happened. That was not expected. That’s not what we did in 

Korea. That’s not what we did in Bosnia. That’s not what we did 

in a whole range of other places where we had troops. 

The idea of they would be there to maintain the peace, to maintain our influence, to, actually, make sure that that blood and 

treasure that we expended did mean something. 

But, I would argue, by pulling those troops out, by, essentially, 

indicating to Maliki right at the end there that that’s what we 

were going to do, as the General said when we said 10,000, and 

then not 10,000 but zero, that sent the message out, the United 

States is getting the heck out. And so then, they had to scramble 

and do whatever they needed to do to survive. And, that’s where 

the Iranian influence is coming through in spades there at this 

point, I mean, huge influence. And, that’s about the last thing 

that’s in the best interest of our country, or the region, or the Iraqi 

people. 

48

I think they had a chance. Maybe they still do. I am not sure 

about that at this point. I don’t know if they are going to be able 

to make it with our folks, essentially, out of there. How in the 

world, you know, they turned over to the State Department, how 

are the State Department people supposed to be out there and 

dealing with folks, they can not leave the compound now because 

there is no military folks there to protect them. 

And then, we rail against Black Water or the folks that have followed in their footprints at this point. I mean, so we made it an 

impossible situation. I would argue this administration did that to 

maintain, to keep a campaign promise, and that was a terrible mistake in my view. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. CHABOT. I have two more things I have—okay, I yield, just 

briefly, because I have two questions I want to ask. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Just on that point. 

Mr. CHABOT. Yes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. This administration did not do that to keep a 

campaign promise, although it kept it. This administration did it 

to keep President Bush’s word, and the word of the United States, 

that by December 31, 2011, all, all, all, 100 percent, said President 

Bush and signed it, of our troops would be out. This should not 

come, as you said, a surprise to us. 

Mr. CHABOT. Reclaiming my time, I mean, it was understood, 

and the excuse given at the end was, we could not get the Iraqis 

permission for the indemnification of our troops. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. No, President Bush could not get it. 

Mr. CHABOT. I think it was a lackadaisical effort that was made 

in order to attain that permission of Iraq for our folks to be there 

without being prosecuted, et cetera. But, let me flip into two other 

quick questions here. 

One, Dr. Kagan, there is a bit of confusion here that I think Dr. 

Kahl raised here, relative to your statement about the security in 

Iraq, that it is deteriorating. Dr. Kahl raised some doubt about 

your data. How do we know what is actually occurring on the 

ground there? What level of confidence do we have that our information and our intelligence is good? And, what are the sources of 

your data? 

And then, one other quick point, and any of the members can do 

this, how does the PKK’s presence in northern Iraq affect our interests, and what are we doing about that? 

So, Dr. Kagan on the one, and then any of the other witnesses 

who would like to take the other one quickly. I’ve got not too long 

on either one. 

Ms. KAGAN. On the subject of our data, of course, when the U.S. 

military had a large presence within Iraq it had and created its 

own sources of data through its refined and granular knowledge of 

what was going on on the ground in Iraq, because it was disbursed 

throughout the country. 

As we pulled out our troops, we lost situational awareness, because every soldier is a sensor, and if you were a soldier you had 

less situational awareness. 

Right now, the data that I am using, as I said, is the data of Dr. 

Michael Knights, the Lafer Fellow at the Washington Institute for 

49

Near East Policy. He has retained and maintained a database for 

years, and his data is accrued from both Iraqi security forces and 

open sources, and sources throughout the country. 

What I think is, actually, interesting about his data that I think 

is probably not reflected in all of our data is that he has excellent 

sources in southern Iraq, and it is in southern Iraq where we do 

see Shia-on-Shia violence actually re-emerging. The re-emergency 

of Shia militant groups, likewise a clerical struggle in Najaf that 

really does put into doubt whether or not the Iraqis will be able 

to retain their religious independence from Iran. 

The point is that our situational awareness should come from 

competing data sources right now, rather than being reliant on a 

single assessment. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Could I have unanimous consent to yield myself an additional minute here, just—would anyone like to comment 

on the PKK question? 

Okay, if not, I will yield back that time, and Mr. Ackerman is 

recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I would ask Dr. Kahl to comment on that, but 

first I want to ask a question of General Keane, if I may. 

Try as he might, President Obama could not get an extension of 

the deal with the change to protect the American troops. Should he 

have left the American troops in Iraq, without being able to get the 

guarantee that we needed? 

General KEANE. In my judgment, no. Also, but I would like to 

correct something that you said. It is a fact that the Bush administration negotiated the Status of Forces Agreement, and that Status 

of Forces Agreement terminated our involvement with forces by the 

end of 2011. That is a fact. 

But, it is also a fact that no Iraqi politician could participate in 

that agreement who was facing an upcoming election, and the wink 

and the nod that was very well understood with the Iraqi Government, its highest officials, and our Ambassador and our senior military commanders, that after their election we would renegotiate 

what the size and capability of a force would be in Iraq. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Dr. Kahl? 

Mr. KAHL. Well, if there was a wink and a nod between the Bush 

administration and the Maliki government, nobody told either the 

Bush administration or the Maliki government, because, actually, 

the negotiations led up by the Obama administration were led by 

Ambassador Jeffrey, a Bush administration official, and Brett 

McGurk, a Bush administration official, negotiating with the same 

leaders that General Keane referenced, supposedly were in on this 

secret agreement to extend the troop presence beyond 2008. 

The reality is, the same political pressures that the Iraqi politicians faced in the fall of 2008, which required the time line for the 

departure of U.S. forces, also was the reason why on October 4th 

they were unanimous in not being willing to send a follow-on 

agreement to the Corps, with adequate legal protections, which 

General Keane admits, you know, was required for us to leave 

forces behind. 

And, by the way, it is a view that was shared by the chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Gates, Secretary Pannetta, 

and the President of the United States. 

50

All we were asking for was the same protections that they had 

under Article 12 of the existing agreement. It was not domestically 

possible for the Iraqis, so we are where we are. 

I want to say one thing about the data. All the data is suspect 

for some of the reasons that Kim points out, that Dr. Kagan points 

out, which is that we don’t have high visibility so we are relying 

on various open source materials, although that visibility of reduction was a result of us leaving largely the cities in the summer of 

2009 under the security agreement, not the departure of our forces 

from the country. 

I do think we can say a couple things about the data. One, there 

has been an uptick in AQI activity, nobody is disputing that. 

Second, there has been a decrease in violence in the south, in 

fact, the data that Dr. Kagan references shows that, and largely 

Shia militant activity has gone down. 

And lastly, overall our intelligence community looking at the 

Knights’ data that Dr. Kagan references, and comparing it with 

that data and other open source material, concludes that the overall levels of violence have not actually gone up since the departure 

of U.S. forces. 

So, I do not know which is right, although that strikes me as a 

more comprehensive assessment, and our intelligence community, 

you know, has, basically, concluded that overall level of violence 

has not gone up, even as AQI activity has ticked up. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. 

General, I am curious, was there anything else to this secret 

wink and nod agreement that the Bush administration had with 

the Iraqis? 

General KEANE. I mean, in terms of it being secret, I would not 

go that far. I mean, it was well documented in the media. I am confident, I do not want to speak for him, but Ryan Crocker was here 

he would flat tell you that we all knew that is what had been discussed. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Without the agreement, can you enforce a wink 

and a nod if somebody picked up American troops and decided to 

prosecute them, to say to the Iraqis, didn’t we have a wink and a 

nod agreement? 

General KEANE. No, no. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Or, would they rely on the written documents? 

General KEANE. What that—what the so-called other official 

agreement actually was, is that they would renegotiate a new Status of Forces Agreement that would permit a residual force to stay 

post 2011, to extend that document beyond what the current document did. That is all that—that is all that was intended to be. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. And, would it have——

General KEANE. It was a common understanding that the government wanted that force to stay, and so did we. 

Mr. ACKERMAN [continuing]. Would it have been under the terms 

that the Iraqis wanted it? 

General KEANE. Yes, absolutely they wanted it. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Not the terms that we wanted? 

General KEANE. We both wanted it. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Same terms? 

51

General KEANE. Well, the terms would have been negotiated. 

They both wanted a force. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. But, the negotiation up until that moment failed, 

that is why we did not have an agreement. 

General KEANE. The fact of the matter is, negotiations broke 

down, I think, as I tried to indicate, I think at some point the 

Maliki government realized it was in a totally different relationship 

with this administration. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. But, they had the same agreement that they had 

with the Bush administration. 

General KEANE. Certainly the Bush administration agreement, 

the SOFA——

Mr. ACKERMAN. That was a legal agreement. 

General KEANE [continuing]. That was a legal document that was 

in place at the time. It ended in 2011, correct. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. But, that was President Bush’s agreement. 

General KEANE. That is correct. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from California is recognized, Mr. Rohrbacher, 

who, by the way, is the chairman of the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight. 

Mr. ROHRBACHER. Let me just suggest that all of this, you know, 

back and forth on whether or not Maliki was going to allow us to 

leave our forces there or not, I found—frankly, I find it totally irrelevant. It is assuming that people—that it is in the interest of the 

American people to have our forces there. 

The bottom line is, once we had decided that the people of Iraq 

were going to defend themselves, the sooner we got out of there the 

better. And, if we lose 50 more, 100 more, or 200 more, or 500 more 

American lives, what for? 

Just, I mean, this is absurd. Oh, we are going to negotiate so we 

can keep our guys in jeopardy. Who is watching out for the American soldier, the Marine out there giving his life? We should be caring about him. That is who we should be caring about, and I was 

raised in a Marine family, and I remember going to breakfast with 

my Dad when I was 7 years old. And, we had two 19-year-old 

young Marines with us, and they both had no legs. They just got 

back from Korea. I often wondered what happened to those guys, 

whether or not they have families, whether or not they had a decent life, like they gave to all of us. 

I do not think that a lack of forces is what has driven a Shiite 

population, a majority Shiite population, toward a better relationship with the mullahs. I do not believe that that is what is driven 

there, and what we have seen is a fight in the Muslim world between two sects that are, you know, at a blood feud with one another. I do not see Maliki, and the Sunnis in his country, after we 

would leave no matter when that was, would not re-establish a 

closer relationship with the mullahs. 

And now that we have this pro-mullah regime, am I still hearing 

that you fellows think that we should be pouring more money into 

this? I mean, training, we are going to provide training, there is 

a proposal to spend $900 million dollars, to train the Iraqi police 

force. So, we are borrowing $900 million from China to train the 

52

police force of a country that is headed by people who were demonstrably anti American? Is that what we should do? I ask the panel, should we be spending $900 million training 

their police force? 

General DUBIK. I would be happy to answer that, Mr. Representative. The answer is no, as I said in my remarks. The current State 

Department plan for training police is not the plan we should follow. We do not need to spend that much money, but we do need 

to be involved with the development of the police department, and 

the police forces, as well as the security forces, for our interest. 

Mr. ROHRBACHER. Should we be giving them credit after $1 trillion that we have already borrowed from China? 

General DUBIK. We should be giving them lots of credit. 

Mr. ROHRBACHER. Okay. 

General DUBIK. You are talking about money credit, I am talking 

about credit for what they have achieved. 

Mr. ROHRBACHER. No, no, I am talking about budget credit here. 

I mean, we have borrowed, and we demonstrably have borrowed 1 

trillion extra dollars in order to deal with them, not to mention all 

the other sacrifices that we have made in blood. 

Should we be borrowing hundreds of millions of dollars more 

now? It is my understanding, my understanding, I went to Iraq 

and they kicked me out of the country, because I had the timidity 

to accept and suggest that maybe when the oil and gas money 

comes in they might start repaying us. And, there answer was, get 

the hell out of my country. And, Maliki gave me about, you know, 

11⁄2 hours to get out. Well, that is fine. I mean, he is in charge of 

his country. 

He is not in charge, he would not be in charge, except for all the 

American lives that have been lost getting him there and getting 

rid of Saddam Hussein. And again, no one should ever, and this is 

what really gets me mad about the left, is they are always talking 

about, yes, Americans came in and all these lives were lost. Saddam Hussein was a bloody, vicious dictator, and it is good that he 

was gone, and, actually, he was probably costing more Iraqi lives 

than during the liberation. But, that is not America’s business to 

be spending thousands and thousands of American lives and trillions of dollars of our wealth all over the world. 

As it has resulted, we now are less respected everywhere in the 

world. We, actually, when we took a step too far, we have ended 

up with less respect than had we not gone in in the first place. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

Whereas, the panel up here does not necessarily agree on all 

these things, I think one thing we do agree on is that there was 

tremendous sacrifice by the men and women from this country that 

went over there, some who lost their lives, some who lost limbs, 

and some are in hospitals around the country. We need to do everything humanly possible to take care of those people, and make sure 

that they have the best quality of lives that can possibly happen. 

That should be our number one concern, I think, at this point. I 

think we would all agree on that. 

I want to thank the distinguished panel here for their testimony 

this afternoon, thank the members that are here this afternoon, 

53

and with unanimous consent the members will have 5 days to supplement their statements, ask questions, and submit to the panel. 

If there is no further business to come before the committee, we 

are adjourned. 

Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 3:47 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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