# FIL ED
NOV 4 2020 SUSAN M . SPRAUL, CLERK U. S. BKCY

. APP. PANEL O F T HE NI NT H CI RCUI T 

### NOT FOR PU BLICA TION
U NIT E D ST A T E S BA NK RU PT CYA PPE L L A T E PA N E L

OF T HE NINT H CIRCU IT In re: LEU C A DIAGRO U P, LLC,

Deb to r. C A LDA R ELLI HEJMA N O W SK I PA GE & LEER LLP, A p pellant, v. RO N A LD E. STADTMU ELLER , Trustee; U A S IN VESTMEN T S, LLC,

A p pellees. BA P N o . SC -20-1066-GFB Bk. N o . 3:16-b k-5474-C L A dv. N o . 3:18-ap-90169-C L

M E M ORA ND U M *

A ppeal fro m the United States Bankruptcy C o urt fo r the So uthern Distric t o f C alifo rnia C hristo pher B. Latham, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding Befo r e: GA N, FA RIS, and BRA N D, Bankruptcy Judges.

INT ROD U CT I ON A ppellant C aldarelli Hejm ano wski Page &Leer, LLC(“C HPL”)

*Thi s di sposi ti on i s not appr opr i ate for publi cati on. Although i t may be ci ted for whatev er per suasiv e v alue i t may hav e, seeFed. R. App. P. 32.1, i t has no pr ecedenti al v alue, see9th Ci r . BAP Rule 8024-1.appeals the b ankruptcy c o u rt’s o rder granting C hapter 7 1 trustee R o nald E.

Stadtmueller’s (“Trustee”) m o tio n fo r sum m a ry judgm ent and denying C HPL’s c ro ss-m o tio n fo r sum m ary judgm ent, and the b ankruptcy c o urt’s judgm ent disallo wing C HPL’s c laim . The b ankruptcy c o urt determ ined that C HPL’s c laim, which it ac quired fro mU A S Investm ents, LLC(“U A S”), was b a rred b y c laimprec lusio n. 2 In a prio rc ase in the Geo rgia state c o urt, U A S dism issed its c o ntrac tc laim s against deb to r Leuc a dia Gro up, LLC (“Deb to r”) with prejudic e. The b ankruptcy c o urt pro perly applied Geo rgia law in determ ining that the c laimwas b arred b y c laimprec lusio n. W e A FFIRM. FA CT S A . Prepetition E v e nts Deb to r is a C alifo rnia LLC, fo rm ed in 2013 b y R ob ert Miller (“Miller”) and Sean Frisb ee (“Frisb ee”) fo rthe purpo se o f ob taining
c o m m erc ial and go vernm ent c o ntrac t wo rk in aero spac e engineering. U ntil January 2015, Miller and Frisb ee were each 50% o w ners o f Deb to r, and Miller served as president.

1 Unless specifi ed other wi se, all chapterand secti on r efer ences ar e to the Bankr uptcy Code, 11 U.S

. C. §§ 101-1532, all “Rule” r efer ences ar e to the Feder a l Rules of Bankr uptcy Pr ocedur e, and all “Ci v i l Rule” r efer ences ar e to the Feder al Rules of Ci v i l Pr ocedur e.

2 For clar i ty, we r efer to “clai m pr eclusi on” r ather than “r es j u di cata.” See Taylor v. Sturgell , 553 U.S . 880, 892 n.5 (2008). 2A fter Deb to r was fo rm ed, Miller b egan discussio ns with Daryl

Mo o dy (“Mo o d y”) ab o ut o ppo rtunities to invest in Deb to r. In Dec emb er 2013, Deb to rentered into an agreem ent with Mo o dy’s c o m pany, Mast N ine, Inc . (“Mast N ine”), which gave Mast N ine the o ptio n to m ake a
c o nvertib le lo an o f up to $1,575,000, tob e secured b y Deb to r ’s assets (the “Lo an A greem ent”). Under the Lo an A greem ent, if Mast N ine lo aned the full $1,575,000, it c o uld c o nvert its deb t into a o ne-third o wnership interest. Mast N ine sub sequently assigned its rights under the Lo a n A greem ent to U A S, a newly fo rm ed affiliate c o ntro lled b y Mo o dy. Pursuant tothe Lo an A greem ent, U A S lo aned Deb to r a to tal o f $650,000. During 2014, disputes aro se b etween Miller, Frisb ee, and Mo o dy o ver Deb to r’s o peratio n. By the end o f 2014, Deb to r’s financ ial c o nditio n had deterio rated, and in January 2015, Miller info rm ed Frisb ee and Mo o dy that Deb to r did no t have the financ ial c apab ility to c o ntinue o perating. Miller then pro po s ed to U A S that he wo uld disso lve Deb to r unless U A S agreed to take either $50,000 o n its $650,000 lo an, o r an 8% interest in Deb to r . O n January 16, 2015, Frisb ee appo inted Mo o dy as a direc to r o f Deb to r, and to gether, they rem o ved Miller as president. That sam e day, U A S and Frisb ee filed a c o m plaint in Geo rgia state c o urt against Deb to r and Miller fo rb reach o f c o ntrac t and injunc tive relief (the “Geo rgia A c t io n”). U A S and Frisb ee asserted that Miller’s c o m m unic atio n to U A S was an unqualified repudiation o f the Lo an A greem ent and a b reach o f
3c o ntrac t.

Am o nth later, U A Sand Frisb ee filed an am ended c o m plaint,
rem o ving Deb t o rand asserting c laim s against o nly Miller. The affidavit o f the pro c ess server indic ated that the sum m o ns, c o m plaint, and am ended
c o m p laint were served o n Miller at his residenc e o n March 14, 2015. A ltho ugh Miller was purpo rtedly rem o ved as Deb to r’s president in January 2015, he was listed as the service agent fo r Deb to r with the C alifo rnia Sec retary o f State and rem ained so until May 7, 2015. Frisb ee later dism issed all his c laim s in the ac t io n witho ut prejudic e and was
rem o ved as a plaintiff. Miller then m o ved to d isqualify U A S’s c o unsel b ased o n asserted
c o nflic ts arising fro mits prio r representatio n o f Miller and its c o nc u rrent invo lvem ent in defending Deb to rin a separate C a lifo rnia suit. He argued that o m itting Deb to r fro mthe am ended c o m plaint was insuffic ient under Geo rgia law to rem o ve Deb to r as a defendant. In respo nse, U A S filed an uno ppo sed m o tio n to dism iss Deb to r pursuant toGa. C o d e § 9-11-41 and sub m itted a pro po sed o rder dism issing Deb to r with prejudic e. The state c o urt entered the o r der dism issing all
c laim s against Deb to r with prejudic e in May 2015. In O c t ob er 2017, the state c o urt granted partial sum m ary judgm ent in favo r o f Miller. U A S and Miller then entered into a settlem ent and dism issed the rem ainder o f the c ase with prejudic e in July 2018.
4B. T he Bankruptcy Cas e A nd A dv ers ary Proc eeding

While the Geo rgia A c t io n was pending, U A S filed an invo luntary
chapter 11 petitio n against Deb to r. The b ankruptcy c o u rt entered an o rder fo r relief and c o nverted the c ase to chapter 7 in March 2017. UA S filed a pro o f o f c laimfo r $716,010.61 b ased o n the Lo an A greem ent. 3 U A S later partially assigned its c laimto C HPL. In Septemb er 2018, Trustee filed an adversary c o m plaint against U A S and C HPL seeking disallo wanc e o f the c laim s arising fro mthe Lo an A greem ent. 4 Trustee asserted that Deb to r’s ob ligatio ns under the Lo an A greem ent were extinguished b ec ause U A S dism issed Deb to r with prejudic e in the Geo rgia A c tio n. C HPL filed an answer denying the allegatio ns. Trustee and UA S then entered into a stipulatio n whereb y U A S agreed to no t defend the ac tio n and to allo w entry o f a default and entry o f judgm ent c o nsistent with any eventual judgm ent against C HPL. C. T he Sum m ary Judgm ent M otions A nd T he Court’sRuling In N o vemb er 2018, Trustee filed a m o tio n fo r sum m ary judgm ent,

3 UAS asser ted that i ts clai m was secur ed in the amount of $696,010.61 and unsecur ed in the amount of $20,000.

4 Tr ustee also sought to av oi d UAS ’s UCC-1 financing statement under §§ 544 and 548, and a declar ati on that the secur i ty i nter est was unenfor ceable due to an insuffi ci ent collater al descr i pti on. Because the bankruptcy cour t di sallowed the enti r e clai m, i t di d not deter mine whetherany par t of the clai m was secur ed. 5asserting that U A S ’ s c laim was b a rred b y c laimprec lusio n. Trustee argued

that Deb to r’s liab ility under the Lo an A greem ent was at issue in the Geo rgia A c tio n b ec ause U A Streated the purpo rted repudiatio n as an im m ediate b reach o f c o ntrac t. Trustee alsoargued that dism issal with prejudic e o perated as an adjudic atio n o n the m erits and, under Geo rgia law, U A S was prec luded fro masserting c laim s against Deb to rb ased o n the Lo an A greem ent. C HPL o ppo s ed the m o tio n and filed a c ro ss m o tio n fo r sum m ary judgm ent. C HPL argued that c laimprec lusio n was inapplic ab le b ec ause Deb to r was no t served with the c o m p laint, never appeared in the Geo rgia A c t io n, and therefo re was no t a party. C HPL alsoargued that at the tim e o f dism issal no c laim s against Deb to r were pending b ec ause the c o m plaint had b een am ended, and b y effec tively rem o ving Miller and dro p ping its
c laim s against Deb to r, U A Sm a nifested an intent to c o ntinue perfo rm anc e under the Lo an A greem ent. Finally, C HPL argued that if U A S ’ s c laimwas b arred, the b ankruptcy c o urt sho uld dism iss the invo luntary b ankruptcy
c ase. The b ankruptcy c o urt issued a tentative ruling stating its intentio n to grant Trustee’s m o tio n. A t the hearing, the b ankruptcy c o urt fo cu sed o n whether Deb to r was a “party” in the Geo r gia A c tio n and whether the state
c o u rt had perso nal jurisdic tio n fo r purpo s es o f c laimprec lusio n. The c o urt determ ined that C H PL’s request todism iss the c ase sho uld b e filed in the
6m ain c ase, no t an adversary pro c eeding, and denied the request witho ut

prejudic e. The b ankruptcy c o urt then requested additio nal b riefing o n the issues o f whether Geo r gia law required perso nal jurisdic tio n fo r purpo ses
o f c laimprec lusio n and whether Deb to r was served with the summ o ns and
c o m p laint such that the state c o u rt had perso nal jurisdic tio n. A fter the parties sub m itted their b r iefs, the b ankruptcy c o urt entered
a c o m prehensive written o rder granting sum m ary judgm ent in favo ro f Trustee, and entered judgm ent disallo wing the c laimo f U A S and its assignee, C HPL. The c o urt determ ined that Miller was Deb to r’s registered agent and therefo re, under Geo rgia law, ac tual servic e o n Miller was suffic ient to c o nfer perso nal jurisdic tio n o ver Deb to r and m ake it a party to the c ase. C HPL tim ely appealed. JU RISD ICT ION The b ankruptcy c o urt had jurisdic tio n under 28 U .S.C . §§ 1334 and 157(b )(2)(B). W e have jurisdic tio n under 28 U .S.C . § 158(a). ISSU E Whether the b a nkruptcy c o urt erred b y granting Trustee’s summ ary judgm ent m o tio n. ST A ND A RD OF RE V I E W W e review the b a nkruptc y c o urt’s grant o f sum m ary judgm ent de
no vo . Lewis v. K

a elin (In re CrestaTech. Co rp.) , 583 B.R . 224, 227 (9th C ir. BA P 2018). W e also review the b a nkruptc y c o urt’s applic atio n o f c laim
7prec lusio n de no vo . A l o nso v. S um m erville (In re S um m erville) , 361 B.R . 133,

139 (9th C ir. BA P 2007). Under a de no vo review, we lo o k at the m atter anew, giving no deferenc e to the b ankruptcy c o urt’s determ inatio ns. In re C restaTech. Co rp. , 583 B.R . at 227. D ISCU SSION C ivil Rule 56(a), m a d e applic ab le b y Rule 7056, pro vides that
sum m ary judgm ent is appro priate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any m aterial fac t and the m o vant is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter o f law.” W e m u s t view the evidenc e in the light m o st favo rab le to the
no n-m o ving party and draw all justifiab le inferenc es in favo r o f the
no n-m o ving party. F resno Mo to rs, LLC v. Mercedes Benz

U S A, LLC

, 771 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th C ir. 2014) (c iting C ty. o f Tuo lum ne v. S o no raC m ty. H o sp. , 236 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2001); Anderso n v. Liberty Lo bby, Inc. , 477 U .S. 242, 255 (1986)). C HPL argues that the b ankruptcy c o urt erred b y granting sum m ary judgm ent in favo r o f Trustee and b y denying its m o tio n fo r sum m a ry judgm ent, b ec ause under Geo rgia law, U A S and C H PL were no t b arred b y
c laimprec lusio n fro m asserting their c laimagainst Deb to r. The Full Faith and C redit A c t, 28 U

. S.C

. § 1738, requires b ankruptcy
c o u rts to give the sam e prec lusive effec tto a state c o urt judgm ent that the judgm ent wo uld have in the c o urts o f the state in which it was rendered. Ma tsushitaElec. Indus. Co . v. Epstein , 516 U .S. 367, 369 (1996). Geo rgia law
8therefo r e determ ines the prec lusive effec t o f the dism issal in the Geo rgia

A c t io n. If Geo rgia law prec ludes UA S fro mfiling a sub sequent suit against Deb to r b ased o n the Lo an A greem ent, U A S’s c laimin the b ankruptcy c ase
m ust b e disallo wed. Under Geo rgia law, a vo luntary dism issal with prejudic e “o p erates as an adjudic atio n upo n the m erits and b ars the right to b ring ano ther ac tio n
o n the sam e c laim .” Fo wler v. V inya rd, 405 S.E.2d 678, 680 (Ga. 1991) (c itatio ns o m itted). A n o rder dism issing a defendant with prejudic e is no t a judgm ent, b ut it do es adjudic ate the “no n-liab ility o f that defendant to the plaintiff.” H

edquist v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, F enner &S m ith, Inc. , 528 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Ga. 2000). “A s far as the parties invo lved in the vo luntary dism issal with prejudic e are c o nc erned, the dism issal c o nstitutes a final dispo sitio n o f the
ac tio n so dism issed, and [c laimprec lusio n] will b ar any attem pt . . . to litigate the dism issed c laimagainst the dism issed party under ano ther guise.” Id. at 511. Dismissal with prejudic e b ars relitigatio n o f “all questio ns which m ight have b een litigated in the ac tio n and is a final dispo sitio n, b arring the right to b ring ano ther ac tio n o n the sam e c laim .” Hutcheso n Med. C tr. v. S c ea lf

, 422 S.E.2d 20, 22 (Ga. App. 1992). The rec o rd is c lear that U A S vo luntarily dism issed all c laim s against Deb to r with prejudic e. Tho se c laim s inc luded c o ntrac t c laim s b a sed o n the Lo an A greem ent. Therefo re it is b arred under Geo rgia law fro mrelitigating
9tho se c laim s.

C HPL argues that b ec ause vo luntary dism issals are no t required to b e m a de with prejudic e under Ga. C o de § 9-11-41, UA S ’s dism issal with prejudic e was a m istake. Ho wever, a vo luntary dism issal with prejudic e b ars relitigatio n o f c laim s even if the plaintiff c o uld have dism issed witho ut prejudic e. D ep’t o f Tra nsp. v. R evcoD isc. D rug C trs., Inc. , 746 S.E.2d 631, 634 (Ga. App. 2013) (“[A ] sim ple m istake b y a party as tothe . . . legal result o f an ac t which he perfo rm s, is nogro und fo r either defensive o r affirm ative relief.”) (c itatio n o m itted). A . T he D is m is s al Order In the Georgia A c tion Is Suffic ient For Purpos es of ClaimPrec lus ion Three elem ents m ust b e satisfied to apply c laim prec lusio n under Geo rgia law: (1) an identity o f the c ause o f ac tio n; (2) an identity o f the parties o r their privies; and (3) a previo us adjudic atio n o n the m erits b y a
c o u rt o f c o m petent jurisdic tio n. Co en v. C D C S o ftwa re Co r

p. , 816 S.E.2d 670, 675 (Ga. 2018). C HPL argues that Deb to r was no t served with the sum m o ns and
c o m p laint and did no tappear in the Geo rgia A c tio n, and therefo re, it was
no t a “party,” and the state c o urt was no t a “c o urt o f c o m petent jurisdic tio n” b ec ause it lac ked perso nal jurisdic tio n o ver Deb to r.

101. T he D is m is s al Order BarsU A S FromA s s erting Claim s A g ains t D ebtor Reg ardles s of Whether D ebtor W as Serv ed In the Georg ia A c tion C HPL argues that Geo rgia law requires servic e o n a defendant in
o rder fo ra judgm ent entered against that defendant to suppo rt c laim prec lusio n. But, b ec ause a dism issal with prejudic e b a r s the plaintiff and
no t the defendant, it is no t evident that Geo rgia law wo uld require the defendant to b e served o r m ake an appearanc e in o rder to m ake the dism issal effec tive against the plaintiff in a future ac tio n. Vo luntary dism issals are go verned b y Ga. C o d e § 9-11-41 and c an b e effec ted either thro ugh a no tic e o r stipulatio n filed b y the plaintiff, o r b y a
c o u rt o rder. Ga. C o de § 9-11-41(a)(1)-(2). A ltho ugh vo luntary dism issals under § 9-11-41 m ay b e with o r witho ut prejudic e, the filing o f a sec o nd
no tic e o f dism issal o perates as an adjudic atio n o n the m erits and is with prejudic e. Ga. C o d e § 9-11-41(a)(3). Regardless o f under which pro visio n o f § 9-11-41(a) the dism issal is m ade, “a dism issal ‘with prejudic e’ sho uld have the sam e effec t.” Fo wler , 405 S.E. 2d at 680. Under the “two -dism issal rule,” when a plaintiff files a sec o nd no tic e
o f dism issal, “the c o ntro lling fac to r is the [sec o nd] vo luntary dism issal o f the sam e c ause o f ac tio n rather than the nam ed party defendants.” W a lke r v. Mecca, 739 S.E.2d 450, 451 (Ga. Ap p . 2013) (quo t ing BelcoElec. v. Bush, 420 S.E. 2d 602 (Ga. App. 1992) (applying prio r versio n o f the statute)). A

11sec o nd no tic e o f dism issal b ars the plaintiff fro masserting the dism issed

c laim s regardless o f whether the defendant was served, whether the c o urt had perso nal jurisdic tio n o ver the defendant, o r even whether the defendant was nam ed in the c o m plaint. S ee id. at 451; H a rris v. S a m pso n , 290 S.E.2d 165, 167 (Ga. App. 1982) (“[I]t is the m ere filing o f the c o m p laint fo llo wed b y a vo luntary dism issal that b rings the statute into play, no t that a defendant m ust b e served and b e fo r c ed to answer o rsuffer default.”). The result sho uld b e no different where the dism issal with prejudic e is b y c o urt o rder o n plaintiff’s m o tio n rather than b y the two -dism issal rule. S ee Fo wler

, 405 S.E.2d at 680 (reasoning that a vo luntary dism issal with prejudic e o perates as res judic ata whether b y o r der o f the c o urt o r b y statute under the two -dism issal rule). But, even if Geo rgia law were to require servic e o n a defendant in
o rder to m ake the vo luntary dism issal with prejudic e b inding o n the plaintiff, im p r o per servic e and perso nal jurisdic tio n are affirm ative defenses which are waivab le b y the defendant. S ee Burch v. D ines , 600 S.E.2d 374, 377 n.5 (Ga. App. 2004) (lack o f perso nal jurisdic tio n b ased o n defec tive pro c ess and insuffic ient servic e m ay b e waived); Ga. C o d e § 9-11- 8(c ); (12)(1)(B). If Deb to r was no t served and did no t waive its affirm ative defenses, it retains tho se defenses and the ab ility to waive them

. Fo cus H ea lthca re Med. C tr., Inc. v. O ’N

ea l, 558 S.E.2d 818, 820 (Ga. App. 2002). Until such tim e as
12the c o urt rules o n an asserted affirm ative defense, the ac tio n m ay b e

vo idab le, b ut it is no t vo id. H edquist, 528 S.E.2d at 512; see a lso H a rris , 290 S.E.2d at 167 (“The mere fac t that a rec o very m ay no t have b een autho rized under the dism issed ac t io ns do es no t render the suit vo id where the trial
c o u rt had jurisdic tio n o f the c ause o f ac tio n.”). If Deb to r was no t served in the Geo rgia A c tio n as C HPL argues, then Deb to r, and no t C HPL, retains the right to assert— o r waive— the defenses
o f insuffic ient servic e and lac k o f perso nal jurisdic tio n. 2. Serv ic e W as E f fec tiv e On D ebtor and the State Court Had Juris dic tion A ltho ugh servic e o n Deb to r was unnec essary fo r the state c o urt to enter an o rder dism issing the c laim s with prejudic e, the b ankruptcy c o urt did no t err b y determ ining that Deb to r was served under Geo rgia law. C HPL argues that Deb to r was no t served b ec ause (1) servic e o n Miller did no t effec t servic e o n Deb to r under the ho ldings o f Chriso n v. H & H Interio rs, Inc. , 500 S.E.2d 41 (Ga. App. 1998) andAll R isk Insura nce Agency, Inc. v. R o ckbridge S a nita tio n Co . , 319 S.E.2d 527 (Ga. App. 1984); and (2) the
sum m o ns was no tdirec ted to Deb to r and Deb to r never rec eived no tic e o f servic e o f pro c ess. Under Geo rgia law, servic e o n a c o rpo ratio n c an b e m a de b y delivering a c o py o f the sum m o ns and c o m plaint to the registered agent o f the entity. Ga. C o de § 9-11-4(e)(1). The rec o rd is c lear that Miller was

13served at his perso nal address and at the tim e o f servic e, he was Deb to r’s

registered agent. Miller’s perso nal residenc e was the pro per address fo r serving Deb to r’s registered agent. N either Chriso n no r All R isk Insura ncerequired the b ankruptcy c o urt to determ ine that servic e was no t pro p er. In Chriso n , there was no listing with the Sec retary o f State and the sum m o ns was left with a regio nal
m anager at the entity’s plac e o f b usiness in Tennessee. 500 S.E.2d at 42. As a result, the c o urt fo und that the entity was no t served at all. Id. at 45 n.7. In All R isk Insura nce, the individual was served at his address in N o rth C aro lina, b u t b ec ause the servic e address fo r the c o rpo rate defendant’s agent was in Geo rgia, servic e o n the individual was no t effec tive as to the
c o r po ratio n. 319 S.E.2d at 528. The b ankruptcy c o urt alsopro perly determ ined that despite the fac t that the pro c ess server’s affidavit indic ated that o nly Miller and no t Deb to r was served, “it is the fac t o f servic e which c o nfers jurisdic tio n, and no t the return, and the latter m ay b e am ended to speak the truth.” Mo ntgo m ery v. U S S Agri-Chem . D iv. , 270 S.E.2d 362, 365 (Ga. App. 1980). If “the fac t o f servic e appears, and the o ffic er’s return is irregular o r inc o m plete, it sho uld
no t b e treated as no evidenc e, b ut rather as furnishing defec tive pro o f o f the fac to f servic e.” Id. at 364. The pro c ess server’s affidavit evidenc es the fac to f servic e o n Deb to r’s registered agent at the address listed with the Sec retary o f State. This is sufficient to c o nfer jurisdic tio n under Geo rgia law
14and to pro vide Deb to rwith no tic e o f the Geo rgia A c tio n.

B. T he Bankruptcy ClaimIs the Sam e Claimas the Georg ia A c tion C HPL argues that the b ankruptcy c laimis no t identic al to the c laim in the Geo rgia A c t io n b ec ause U A S am ended its c o m plaint to rem o ve Deb to r b efo r e serving it o n Miller. C H PL c o ntends that unlike a c laimin b ankruptcy, the Geo rgia A c tio n was b ased o n an antic ipato ry b reach which required an ab so lute and unqualified refusal toperfo rm . C H PL reaso ns that o nc e it b ec am e c lear to U A S that Frisb ee intended fo r Deb to r to perfo rmunder the Lo an A greem ent, U A S am ended the c o m plaint to dro p its c laim s against Deb to r. Fo r purpo ses o f c laimprec lusio n under Geo rgia law, a c a use o f ac tio n is “‘the entire set o f fac ts which give rise to an enfo rc eab le c laim,’ with spec ial attentio n given to the ‘wro ng’ alleged.” Co en , 816 S.E.2d at 675 (quo ting Mo rriso n v. Mo rriso n , 663 S.E.2d 714, 719 (Ga. 2008)). If the
o perative fac t s required tostate a c laim in the prio r c ase enc o m pass the
o perative fac t s required tostate a c laim in the sec o nd c ase, the c auses o f
ac tio n are identic a l. Id. In the Geo rgia A c t io n, U A S alleged that Deb to r and Miller b reached the Lo an A greem ent b y repudiating the c o ntrac t and b y failing to pay
ac c o r ding to its term s . Under Geo rgia law, repudiatio n o f a c o ntrac t gives the inno c ent party an elec tio n o f rem edies— either keep the c o ntrac t in fo rc e o r im m ediately sue fo rdam ages. S z a bo Asso cs. Inc. v. Pea ch tree15Piedm o nt Asso cs. , 234 S.E.2d 119, 120 (Ga. Ap p. 1977). UA S im m ediately

sued, thereb y elec ting to treat the repudiatio n as an antic ipato ry b reach o f
c o ntrac t. It is im m aterial that U A S am ended its c o m plaint b ec ause c laim prec lusio n prevents relitigatio n o f c laim s “which have already b een adjudic ated, o r which c o uld have b een adjudic ated” b etween the sam e parties. C ro we v. Elder

, 723 S.E.2d 428, 430 (Ga. 2012). The order dism issing Deb to r fro mthe Geo rgia A c tio n expressly stated that “all c laim s” against Deb to r were dism issed with prejudic e. The “wro ng” alleged b y U A S in the Geo rgia A c tio n was Deb to r’s failure to pay under the Lo an A greem ent. Deb to r’s ob ligatio n to pay under the Lo an A greem ent is prec isely what U A S asserted in its b ankruptcy
c laim . Bec ause the “entire set o f fac ts” giving rise to U A S’s c laimin the Geo rgia A c tio n enc o m passed Deb to r’s liab ility under the Lo a n A greem ent, the c auses o f ac tio n are identic al fo r purpo ses o f c laimprec lusio n. CONCL U SION Fo r the reaso ns set fo rth ab o ve, we A FFIRM the b ankruptcy c o urt’s
o rder granting Trustee’s m o tio n fo r sum m ary judgm ent and disallo wing C HPL’s c laim

.

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