A Decade Later: A Call for TSA Reform

JOINT MAJORITY STAFF REPORT

112th Congress

November 16, 2011

1

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary..............................................................................2

II. Key Findings......................................................................................2

III. TSA‘s Diverted Mission.........................................................................5

A. TSA‘s Leadership Structure is Flawed....................................................6

B. TSA‘s Bloated Administration and Bureaucracy.......................................6

C. TSA‘s Personnel Failures..................................................................7

IV. TSA is Failing to Achieve Operational Success..............................................8

A. TSA Aviation Security Failures............................................................8

B. TSA Security Program Failures..........................................................10

C. TSA Technology Failures.................................................................16

V. Recommendations..............................................................................18
2

Executive Summary

In the wake of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush signed into law the Aviation and 

Transportation Security Act (ATSA; P.L. 107-71). Most notably, ATSA created the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA). TSA has a vital and important mission and is 

critical to the security of the traveling public. To fulfill its mission, TSA employs many hardworking, dedicated personnel. It is the government‘s responsibility, however, to direct the 

agency‘s mission and prevent a cumbersome bureaucracy from inhibiting TSA‘s ability to 

address and adapt to changing security needs. Almost all western countries have evolved their 

airport screening systems to meet current aviation threats through federal oversight of private 

contract screeners. The U.S. must also evolve to provide the most effective transportation 

security system at the most reasonable cost to the taxpayer.

This report is an examination and critical analysis of the development, evolution, and current 

status and performance of TSA ten years after its creation. Since its inception, TSA has lost its 

focus on transportation security. Instead, it has grown into an enormous, inflexible and 

distracted bureaucracy, more concerned with human resource management and consolidating 

power, and acting reactively instead of proactively. As discussed more fully in the 

Recommendations section on page 18, TSA must realign its responsibilities as a federal regulator 

and focus on analyzing intelligence, setting screening and security standards based on risk, 

auditing passenger and baggage screening operations, and ensuring compliance with national 

screening standards.

The purpose of this report is to offer constructive recommendations for the improvement of 

airport screening operations and transportation security. This review of TSA‘s performance and 

current mission has been conducted by Majority investigative staff of the House Committees on 

Transportation and Infrastructure and Oversight and Government Reform. Members of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure were responsible for authoring the organic

legislation that created TSA, and Members are currently preparing new legislation to reform 

TSA in accordance with the findings in this report.

Key Findings

I. TSA Lacks Administrative Competency and is Made Inefficient by its 

Massive Bureaucracy

 With 21 other agencies housed within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the 

status and mission of TSA have gradually eroded to make the agency a tangential and inert 

unit within DHS‘s massive structure.

 The turnover of five Administrators in less than a decade, with periods of long vacancy 

between appointments, has obstructed TSA‘s ability to carry out its mission.
3

 With more than 65,000 employees, TSA is larger than the Departments of Labor, Energy, 

Education, Housing and Urban Development, and State, combined. TSA is a top-heavy 

bureaucracy with 3,986 headquarters personnel and 9,656 administrative staff in the field.

 Since 2001, TSA staff has grown from 16,500 to over 65,000, a near-400% increase. In the 

same amount of time, total passenger enplanements in the U.S. have increased less than 12%.

 Since 2002, TSA procured six contracts to hire and train more than 137,000 staff, for a total 

of more than $2.4 billion, at a rate of more than $17,500 per hire. More employees have left 

TSA than are currently employed at the agency.

 Over the past ten years, TSA has spent nearly $57 billion to secure the U.S. transportation 

network, and TSA‘s classified performance results do not reflect a good return on this 

taxpayer investment.

 On average, there are 30 TSA administrative personnel—21 administrative field staff and 

nine headquarters staff—for each of the 457 airports where TSA operates.

 TSA‘s primary mission, transportation security, has been neglected due to the agency‘s 

constant focus on managing its enormous and unwieldy bureaucracy.

II. TSA is Failing to Effectively Carry out Agency Operations

 TSA has failed to develop an effective, comprehensive plan to evolve from a one-size-fits-all 

operation—treating all passengers as if they pose the same risk—into a highly intelligent,

risk-based operation that has the capacity to determine a traveler‘s level of risk and adjust the 

level of screening in response.

 TSA‘s operations are outdated—the primary threat is no longer hijacking, but explosives 

designed to take down an aircraft. Today, aircraft have hardened cockpit doors, armed 

Federal Air Marshalls and armed pilots. Additionally, passengers and crew offer our first 

and most effective line of defense. These factors have drastically lowered the risk of a 

terrorist hijacking using a gun or knife. Consequently, TSA should prioritize its security 

measures to address the current threat of explosives.

 TSA‘s passenger and checked baggage screening programs have been tested over the years,

and while the test results are classified, their performance outcomes have changed very little 

since the creation of TSA.

 As recently reported, more than 25,000 security breaches have occurred at U.S. airports in 

the last decade, despite a massive TSA presence.

 Even though most of the serious terrorist attempts against the U.S. in the last decade have 

originated overseas, the number of TSA personnel that oversee key international departure 

points with direct flights into the United States is limited.
4

 TSA‘s behavior detection program, Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques

(SPOT), costs a quarter of a billion dollars to operate annually, employing almost 3,000 

behavior detection officer full-time equivalents (FTEs). TSA has invested more than $800 

million in this program since 2007, and it will require more than $1.2 billion more over the 

next five years. In spite of this costly program, the Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) found that 17 known terrorists traveled on 24 different occasions through security at 

eight airports where TSA operated this program. In fact, GAO found that not one terrorist 

had been caught by the SPOT program, and the program has not been scientifically validated.

 TSA has tested numerous pilot programs for trusted travelers, including its current PreCheck 

program, but has failed to develop an expedited screening program that utilizes biometrics to 

positively identify participants.

 TSA has failed to follow congressional directives to establish biometric credentialing 

standards and biometric card reader standards. These standards are necessary for the Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA) to implement a congressionally-directed requirement for 

biometric pilot licenses.

 GAO found that TSA‘s implementation of the Transportation Worker Identification 

Credential (TWIC), which has cost over half-a-billion dollars, has been crippled by latent 

programmatic weaknesses. TSA still has not deployed TWIC card-readers to many of the 

Nation‘s ports.

 On January 28, 2011, TSA Administrator Pistole halted the expansion of the Screening 

Partnership Program (SPP), despite the following evidence:

o An independent consultant found that ―private screeners performed at a level that was 

equal to or greater than that of federal TSOs [Transportation Security Officers].‖

o GAO found that TSA analytics ignored critical data relating to costs.

o USA Today uncovered covert TSA test results in 2007 that showed significantly 

higher screener detection capabilities at an SPP airport than at an airport where

screening was provided by TSA.

III. TSA is Failing to Develop and Deploy Effective Technology

 The Nation‘s 35 largest airports account for nearly 75% of passenger traffic. TSA has failed

to prioritize the deployment of in-line explosive detection systems (EDS) at these locations 

which would ensure the best baggage screening operations for a large portion of air travelers. 

Less than half of these 35 airports have complete in-line EDS, with some systems only 

configured to detect at TSA‘s 1998 explosive detection standards. Additionally, TSA has 

failed to reimburse airports for design costs incurred in the installation of in-line EDS.

 TSA wasted $39 million to procure 207 Explosive Trace Detection Portals, but deployed

only 101 because the machines could not consistently detect explosives in an operational 
5

environment. After lengthy and costly storage, TSA recently paid the Department of 

Defense $600 per unit to dispose of the useless machines.

 TSA deployed 500 Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) devices in a haphazard and easilythwarted manner at a total cost of more than $122 million. By 2013, TSA estimates that the 

total cost to taxpayers for AIT deployment will reach almost half-a-billion dollars. In 2010, 

GAO examined the AIT devices and found that ―it remains unclear whether the AIT would 

have detected the weapon used in the December 2009 [Underwear Bomber] incident.‖ While 

TSA continues to use AIT machines, the effectiveness of these devices in detecting 

explosives is still under review and remains questionable.

 TSA warehouses are nearly at capacity, containing almost 2,800 pieces of screening 

equipment, including 650 state-of-the-art AT-2 carry-on baggage screening machines costing 

approximately $97 million. TSA‘s failure to deploy this cutting-edge technology in a timely 

manner is yet another example of the agency‘s flawed procurement and deployment program.

TSA’s Diverted Mission

Enacted on November 19, 2001, the Aviation and Transportation 

Security Act created the Transportation Security Administration 

and charged it with the responsibility of securing civil aviation.1 

The purpose of TSA, as originally intended by Congress, was to 

provide a coordinated security organization with the primary 

responsibility of analyzing and disseminating intelligence 

information and developing a structure to secure the critical 

interests of U.S. transportation.2 This structure would provide the 

agency with the capacity to connect the dots between intelligence 

analysis and security performance.

With regard to aviation security, TSA was directed to ―provide for 

the screening of all passengers and property...that will be carried 

aboard a passenger aircraft‖

3

(as opposed to ―providing the 

screening‖). For the first two years after enactment, screening at 

airports was to be carried out by federal employees. Congress, however, also directed TSA to 

establish two federal screening public-private partnership programs, the security screening pilot 

program (PP5) and the security screening opt-out program (Screening Partnership Program or 

SPP).4 Both of these federal screening programs allow qualified private screening companies, 

under contract with TSA and with strong federal oversight, to carry out security screening 

 

1 Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71 (2001).

2 Aviation and Transportation Security Act Conference Report, H.R. REP. NO. 107-296, at 2 (2001).

3

49 U.S.C. §44901(a) (emphasis added).

4

49 U.S.C. §44901(a); see also §§44919 and 44920.

The original purpose of 

TSA was to provide a 

coordinated security 

organization to analyze 

and disseminate 

intelligence 

information and 

develop a structure to 

secure the critical 

interests of U.S. 

transportation.
6

functions at airports that choose to participate in the programs. As stated in the Conference 

Report:

Two years after certification, airports can opt out of the 

federalization of the screener level of the federal workforce if the 

Secretary determines that these facilities would continue to provide 

an equal or higher level of security. Companies will be barred from 

providing screening if they violate federal standards, are found to 

allow repeated failures of the system, or prove to be a security 

risk.5

ATSA also required TSA to develop standards by which all travelers and their baggage would be 

screened.6 

TSA‘s mission is to establish screening security standards for all modes of transportation. When 

originally established in the Department of Transportation, TSA was given the broad leeway to 

complete that mission. In March of 2003, TSA was integrated, along with 21 other federal 

agencies, into the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS).7

With multiple agencies under DHS‘s administration, TSA‘s status and mission have gradually 

eroded as TSA became a tangential and inert unit within DHS‘s massive structure. Furthermore, 

TSA has lost focus on its security mission, instead of concentrating on setting and enforcing

security standards and protocols. Consequently, TSA is overwhelmed by the operation of its

massive personnel bureaucracy.

TSA‘s Leadership Structure is Flawed

TSA has struggled to maintain continuity of operations due to the turnover of five Administrators 

in less than a decade. This lack of steady leadership, combined with long periods of time 

between Administrator appointments, has often left the agency rudderless and floundering.

Despite TSA‘s absence of leadership, the current Administration failed to nominate a viable 

candidate for TSA Administrator until eight months into its first term. This ultimately led to a 

period of more than one year without a permanent TSA Administrator. This ever changing 

leadership negatively impacts the perception of the TSA Administrator within the agency and at 

DHS. Both the status of TSA and the position of TSA Administrator need to be significantly 

reformed and elevated.

TSA‘s Bloated Administration and Bureaucracy

Ten years after its creation, TSA‘s security mission has evolved from coordinating and 

disseminating intelligence information and establishing sound security standards and protocols to 

the full-time occupation of operating a massive bureaucracy. At more than 65,000 employees, 

 

5 Aviation and Transportation Security Act Conference Report, H.R. REP. NO. 107-296, at 64 (2001).

6

Id., at 19.

7 Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296.
7

TSA would rank as the 12th largest cabinet agency and is 

larger than the Departments of Labor, Energy, Education, 

Housing and Urban Development, and State, combined.8

Since 2001, TSA has spent nearly $57 billion to secure 

the U.S. transportation network,

9

and TSA staff has 

grown from approximately 16,500 in 2001, to over 

65,000 today, a near-400% increase.10 In the same 

amount of time, total passenger enplanements in the U.S. 

have increased less than 12%.11 TSA‘s massive 

Washington headquarters supports 3,986 administrative 

personnel earning on average $103,852 per year.

12 In addition, the agency continues to support 

an army of 9,656 administrative field staff, on top of the security officers who actually conduct 

the physical screening.13 TSA must get out of the human resources business and direct its energy 

and resources towards securing the American public.

TSA has struggled to manage its massive field staff in an effective and efficient manner. TSA 

has repeatedly relied on its National Deployment Force (NDF) to fill in the gaps and provide 

screening services where it cannot keep a sufficient number of staff on board. The NDF was 

originally created to ―support airport screening operations during emergencies, seasonal 

demands, or other circumstances requiring more staffing resources than are regularly 

available.‖14 In April of 2008, the Department of Homeland Security Office of the Inspector 

General (OIG) found that TSA is ―overly reliant on the deployment force to fill chronic staffing 

shortages at specific airports in lieu of more cost effective strategies and solutions to handle 

screening demands.‖15 When factoring in the government‘s obligation to pay salary and 

benefits, travel, lodging, per diem, and overtime, NDF managers say this program is nearly twoand-a-half times more expensive then locally-hired staff.16

 TSA has ignored the OIG‘s 

recommendations, which were designed to protect the taxpayer investment and to help the 

agency become a more effective regulator of transportation security.

TSA‘s Personnel Failures

TSA‘s personnel operations provide another example of the waste and mismanagement that is 

rife within the agency.

 

8 Data from U.S. Office of Personnel Management, June, 2011, available at http://www.fedscope.opm.gov/.

9

Fox News, 7 Ways Air Travel Changed After 9/11, available at 

http://www.foxnews.com/slideshow/travel/2011/09/05/7-ways-air-travel-changed-after-11.

10 Email from TSA Legislative Affairs to Simone Perez, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure (July 13, 

2011).

11 Enplanement data provided by the Department of Transportation Bureau of Transportation Statistics.

12 Email from TSA Legislative Affairs to Simone Perez, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure (July 13, 

2011).

13 Id.

14 DHS Office of Inspector General, The Transportation Security Administration’s National Deployment Force

(April 2008) (OIG-08-49), at 1.

15 Id.

16 Id.

Since its inception, TSA has 

spent nearly $57 billion, and 

TSA staff has grown from 

16,500 to over 65,000, a near400% increase. During this 

time, passenger enplanements 

in the U.S. have increased less 

than 12%.
8

 Training—Since 2002, TSA procured six contracts to hire and train its staff, for a total 

of more than $2.4 billion.17 This massive expense to the taxpayer was incurred to employ 

and train slightly more than 137,000 staff at a rate of more than $17,500 per hire.18

 Attrition—A 2008 investigation by the DHS OIG found that TSA suffers from low 

employee morale, resulting in a 17% voluntary attrition rate.19 TSA‘s inability to retain 

its workforce compounds its already astronomical training costs. Private screening 

contractors conduct security screening more efficiently and train their screeners to TSA 

standards at a lower cost.20 At San Francisco International Airport (SFO), the cost to 

train a private screener to TSA standards is $6,222, more than $11,000 less, per screener, 

than their federal counterparts.21

 Recruiting and Hiring—Despite TSA‘s claims that it operates as an intelligent riskbased organization, TSA advertised for employment at the Washington Reagan National 

Airport on pizza boxes and on advertisements above pumps at discount gas stations in the 

D.C. area.

22

 It has also been reported to the Committee on Transportation and 

Infrastructure on multiple occasions that TSA does not consistently conduct criminal and 

credit background checks on new and existing employees. The failure to implement an 

intelligent hiring strategy, combined with the lack of background investigations, has 

resulted in high termination rates and employee turnover.

TSA is Failing to Achieve Operational Success

"The ability of TSA screeners to stop prohibited items from being carried 

through the sterile areas of the airports fared no better than the performance 

of screeners prior to September 11, 2001."

Richard Skinner, Former DHS Inspector General, January 26, 2005

TSA Aviation Security Failures

Earlier this year, a TSA investigation into improper screening practices at Honolulu International 

Airport resulted in the firing of 28 personnel and the suspension of 15 others.23 At the request of 

 

17 House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, TSA Ignores More Cost-Effective Screening Model, 

Appendix 3, June 3, 2011, available at http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/Media/file/112th/Aviation/2011-

06-03-TSA_SPP_Report.pdf [hereinafter T&I SPP Report].

18 Email from TSA Legislative Affairs to Rachel Weaver, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure (May 23, 

2011).

19 DHS Office of Inspector General, Transportation Security Administration’s Efforts to Proactively Address 

Employee Concerns (May 2008) (OIG-08-62).

20 T&I SPP Report, Appendix 2.

21 Id.

22 Ed O‘Keefe, TSA Using Pizza Boxes to Recruit New Workers, Washington Post, July 14, 2010, available at 

http://voices.washingtonpost.com/federal-eye/2010/07/tsa_using_pizza_boxes_to_recru.html.

23 Shane Nelson, TSA fires 28, suspends 15 following Honolulu Airport Investigation, Sept. 26, 2011, available at
9

Congressional leaders,

24 the DHS OIG has agreed to investigate 

why such a significant number of the federal screener workforce 

at Honolulu International Airport failed in its performance of 

critical transportation security responsibilities.25

TSA‘s operations are out-moded—the primary threat is no longer 

hijacking, but explosives designed to take down an aircraft. The 

U.S. has avoided another successful terrorist attack primarily

through the actions of passengers and crew, foreign intelligence 

agencies, and Customs and Border Protection, along with good 

luck. Today, aircraft have hardened cockpit doors, on many 

flights there are armed Federal Air Marshalls and armed pilots, 

and most importantly, it is ingrained in the minds of passengers 

and crew that potential hijackers must be resisted. These factors have combined to drastically 

lower the risk of hijacking from a terrorist with a gun or knife. TSA should focus its resources 

on preventing terrorists from smuggling explosives onto an aircraft. Today, TSA‘s screening 

policies are based in theatrics. They are typical, bureaucratic responses to failed security policies

meant to assuage the concerns of the traveling public. 

There are almost daily reports of TSA failures, but even more alarming is TSA‘s inability to 

quickly analyze and take advantage of available intelligence, as well as TSA‘s poor use of the 

enormous resources provided to it since 9/11. Despite the fact that most of the terrorist attempts 

against the U.S. in the last 10 years have originated with foreign nationals or were developed by 

those located outside the United States, the number of TSA personnel that are working outside 

the U.S. with other governments and organizations is limited. The following are some of the 

high-profile attempted terrorist attacks since 9/11:

 Shoe Bomber—On December 22, 2001, on a flight from Paris to Miami, Richard Reid, a 

British citizen, attempted to blow up the aircraft by using an explosive concealed in his 

shoe. Passengers and flight attendants stopped Reid from carrying out his attack.26

 Underwear Bomber—On December 25, 2009, a Nigerian named Umar Farouk 

Abdulmutallab attempted to ignite plastic explosives in his underwear on board a 

Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit.27 Passengers and flight attendants 

took action to subdue Abdulmutallab before he could successfully detonate the bomb.

28

 

http://www.travelweekly.com/Hawaii-Travel/TSA-fires-28,-suspends-15-following-Honolulu-Airport-investigation.

24 Letter from John L. Mica, Chairman, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and Jason Chaffetz, 

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign Operations, Committee on 

Oversight and Government Reform, to Charles K. Edwards, Acting Inspector General, DHS (June 21, 2011).

25 Shane Nelson, TSA fires 28, suspends 15 following Honolulu Airport Investigation, Sept. 26, 2011, available at

http://www.travelweekly.com/Hawaii-Travel/TSA-fires-28,-suspends-15-following-Honolulu-Airport-investigation.

26 Timeline: The shoe bomber case, CNN, Jan. 7, 2002, available at 

http://edition.cnn.com/2002/US/01/07/reid.timeline.

27 Kevin Krolicki & Jeremy Pelofsky. Nigerian charged for trying to blow up U.S. airliner, Reuters, Dec. 26, 2009, 

available at http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFLDE5BP03M20091226.

28 Id.

The House Committee 

on Oversight and 

Government Reform 

reported that despite 

massive TSA presence, 

more than 25,000 

security breaches have 

occurred at U.S. airports 

since November, 2001.
10

 Times Square Bomber—On May 1, 2010, Pakistani-born Faisal Shahzad attempted to 

detonate a car bomb in Times Square. Officials placed Shahzad on the no-fly list on May 

3; however, he was still able to board an aircraft, even after paying cash for the ticket, 

and it was not until a post-boarding check that airline officials discovered that Shahzad 

was on the no-fly list.29

 Toner Cartridge Bomb Plot—On October 29, 2010, foreign officials found bombs, 

originating in Yemen, hidden in printer cartridges on cargo planes bound for the United 

States.30 Authorities were only able to locate the bombs because foreign intelligence 

provided tracking numbers for each package.31

TSA Security Program Failures

TSA‘s failure to develop a risk-based security plan has resulted in a one-size-fits-all method of 

screening. The implementation of a risk-based security plan will require fewer, better-trained, 

better-qualified personnel that are capable of differentiating between passengers based on risk.

TSA’s Failed Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) Program

Staff of the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the Committee on Science, Space,

and Technology assisted in the writing of this section.

The SPOT program trains TSA screeners known as Behavioral 

Detection Officers (BDOs) to identify persons who may pose a 

potential security risk in the air transportation system by using 

behavioral indicators such as stress, fear, or deception that 

travelers allegedly exhibit in response to the fear of being 

discovered.32 However, GAO recently reported that ―a 

scientific consensus does not exist on whether behavior 

detection principles can be reliably used for counterterrorism 

purposes, according to the National Research Council of the 

National Academy of Sciences.‖33 While the SPOT program 

was initially established to detect terrorist threats to the aviation 

transportation system, TSA has broadened the program‘s mission to include the identification of 

behaviors indicative of criminal activity.

34

 Critics of the program have argued that this 

 

29 Scott Shane, Lapses Allowed Suspect to Board Plane, New York Times, May 4, 2010, available at 

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/05/nyregion/05plane.html.

30 Gordon Rayner & Duncan Gardham, Parcel bomb plot ‘aimed at passenger jets‘, Telegraph, Nov. 3, 2010, 

available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/8100602/Parcel-bomb-plot-aimed-atpassenger-jets.html.

31 Frank Gardner, Dubai bomb was flown on passenger planes, BBC News, Oct. 31, 2010, available at 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11661496.

32 Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: Efforts to Validate TSA’s Passenger Screening Behavior 

Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Validation and Address Operational 

Challenges (May 2010) (GAO-10-763).

33 Id.

34 Department of Homeland Security, Congressional Budget Justification, Fiscal Year 2012, available at 

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-congressional-budget-justification-fy2012.pdf.

GAO reported that since 

the SPOT program‘s 

inception, at least 17 

known terrorists have 

flown on 24 different 

occasions, passing 

through security at eight 

SPOT airports.
11

expansion reflects the failure of the program to identify any terrorists, and as a result, program 

success could only be quantified by broadening the goals to include criminal activity, which has 

a higher rate of occurrence.

35

Since 2007, TSA has expended more than $800 million on the faulty program, and will require 

$1.2 billion more over the next five years.36 However, out of two billion airline passengers who 

passed through SPOT airports between May 2004 and August 2008, only 1,100 were arrested, 

and none were arrested on terrorism charges.37 Even more disconcerting is the fact that GAO 

reported that since the SPOT program‘s inception, at least 17 known terrorists have flown on 24 

different occasions, passing through security at eight SPOT airports.38 The Times Square 

Bomber, Faisal Shahzad, also passed undetected through a SPOT airport only days after his 

attempted bombing.39

Thus far, this program has been one of TSA‘s largest failures.40 According to GAO, TSA never 

scientifically validated the list of behaviors underpinning the program, never determined whether 

the techniques could be applied in an airport environment, and never conducted a cost-benefit 

analysis of the program.41 Instead, the review that DHS conducted was to ―determine whether 

SPOT is more effective at identifying passengers who may be threats to the aviation system than 

random screening.‖42

The inadequacy of the DHS review was articulately summed up by Dr. Philip Rubin, Chair of the 

National Academies Board on Behavioral, Cognitive, and Sensory Sciences, who, in response to 

questions from an April 6, 2011 hearing conducted by the House Science, Space, and 

Technology Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, stated, ―Politicians, policymakers 

and the lay public, will hear something like  ̳SPOT is significantly more effective than random 

screening‘ and may assume that this program is effective, useful, and has been adequately 

scientifically evaluated. To this point the effectiveness and usefulness have not been established. 

The scientific evaluation has been inadequate and has not been approached in a manner that 

would lead to greater knowledge regarding the program. Establishing scientific credibility has 

the potential to be helpful to programs of this sort, but that requires full, well thought out, 

independent, credible, and open scientific review.‖43

 

35 Sharon Weinberger, Intent to Deceive? Can the Science of Deception Detection Help to Catch Terrorists? Nature, 

Vol. 465127, May 26, 2010, available at http://www.nature.com/news/2010/100526/pdf/465412a.pdf.

36 Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: Efforts to Validate TSA’s Passenger Screening Behavior 

Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Validation and Address Operational 

Challenges (May 2010) (GAO-10-763).

37 Id.

38 Id.

39 Byron York, Amid Airport Anger, GOP Takes Aim at Screening, Washington Examiner, Nov. 15, 2010, available 

at http://washingtonexaminer.com/politics/2010/11/amid-airport-anger-gop-takes-aim-screening.

40 Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: Efforts to Validate TSA’s Passenger Screening Behavior 

Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Validation and Address Operational 

Challenges (May 2010) (GAO-10-763).

41 Id.

42 Id.

43 Behavioral Science and Security: Evaluating TSA‘s SPOT Program, hearing before the House Science, Space, 

and Technology Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, April 6, 2011.
12

Further, in GAO‘s written testimony submitted for the same April 6, 2011 hearing, the GAO 

witness stated, ―Congress may wish to consider limiting program funding pending receipt of an 

independent assessment of TSA‘s SPOT program. We identified potential budget savings of 

about $20 million per year if funding were frozen at current levels until validation efforts are 

complete. Specifically, in the near term, we reported that Congress could consider freezing 

appropriation levels for the SPOT program at the 2010 level until the validation effort is 

completed.‖44

In August 2011, TSA began its interactive behavior detection pilot, known as the ―Assessor‖ 

program. Unfortunately, rather than employing several highly-trained transportation security 

personnel to observe and question selected high-risk passengers, the demonstration project 

employed a large, bureaucratic ensemble of Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) who 

expended an unnecessarily lengthy time performing meaningless interviews with all passengers, 

regardless of risk level.

When questioned about the protocol for additional screening of individuals who may pose a risk, 

Committee investigators were informed that risk-identified travelers would be screened by a 

metal detector and baggage screener. However, TSA‘s most sophisticated screening equipment, 

an Advanced Imaging Technology detector, was not in operation because TSA lacked sufficient 

numbers of trained personnel on duty. While it is irresponsible that this demonstration is a costly 

and bureaucratic method of screening, it is unacceptable that an operational model cannot be 

deployed in a manner that utilizes existing advanced technology and resources. While some type 

of behavior detection is necessary to a risk-based security scheme, TSA‘s current 

implementation of SPOT is a failure by almost any standard and must change to incorporate an 

intelligent interactive component.

TSA is Ignoring Congressional Directives to Utilize Biometrics

Congress has repeatedly directed TSA and DHS to establish biometric 

standards for aviation security purposes. In 2001, Congress recognized 

the value of biometric credentials in ATSA, requiring TSA to work with 

airport operators to consider the deployment of biometric technology to 

positively identify individuals entering secure areas of airports.45

ATSA also required TSA to issue guidance for the use of biometric or 

other technology that positively verifies the identity of each employee 

and law enforcement officer who enters a secure area of an airport.46

In 2004, Congress directed TSA to establish comprehensive technical 

and operational system requirements and performance standards for the 

use of biometric identifier technology in airport access control systems 

 

44 Testimony of Stephen Lord, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office, 

before the House Science, Space, and Technology Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, April 6, 2011, 

available at 

http://science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/hearings/2011%2004%2004%20Lord

%20Testimony.pdf.

45 Aviation and Transportation Security Act § 106, 49 U.S.C. §44903.

46 Id.

TSA has failed to 

comply with 

congressional 

requirements that 

the agency work 

with airport 

operators and 

issue guidance on 

the use of 

biometrics for 

aviation security.
13

and best practices for incorporating biometric identifier technology into airport access control 

systems.47 Congress also required TSA, in consultation with the Attorney General, to establish a 

law enforcement travel credential that incorporates biometric identifier technology and is 

uniform across all federal and other government law enforcement agencies.48

In 2005, Congress directed DHS to utilize the Transportation Security Clearinghouse as the 

central identity management system for the deployment and operation of the registered traveler 

program and the Transportation Worker Identification Credential program for the purposes of 

collecting and aggregating biometric data necessary for background vetting.49

TSA will never be able to function as a truly risk-based organization until the agency can 

differentiate between passengers based on levels of risk. TSA must develop an expedited 

screening program using biometric credentials that would allow TSA to positively identify 

trusted passengers and crew members so that the agency can prioritize its screening resources on 

select individuals. 

TSA‘s first use of biometrics was the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC), 

which was designed to protect access to U.S. ports. According to a recent GAO study, latent 

programmatic weaknesses cripple its effectiveness to secure U.S. critical infrastructure, and TSA 

has not deployed TWIC card-readers at many of the Nation‘s ports.

50

 Furthermore, the TWIC 

program has cost nearly half-a-billion dollars and DHS estimated that the total cost would reach 

$3.2 billion over ten years.51 In developing a biometric credential for the aviation sector, TSA 

must comply with international standards and work with stakeholders in the government and the 

private sector in order to avoid a repeat of the problems with TWIC implementation.

Undermining the Screening Partnership 

Program (SPP)

ATSA authorized the development of two models 

for screening air travelers and their baggage. The 

first model provided all-federal screening operations 

at the Nation‘s airports. The second model, known 

as the Screening Partnership Program (SPP), was 

created to enable airport authorities to ―opt-out‖ of 

all-federal screening and instead use qualified 

private screening contractors under federal 

standards, supervision, and oversight.52 While one 

goal of the SPP is to reduce TSA screener 

workforce by utilizing the services of qualified

private contractors, TSA administrative staff levels 

 

47 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458 (2004). 

48 Id.

49 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-90 (2005).

50 Government Accountability Office, Transportation Worker Identification Credential: Internal Control 

Weaknesses Need to Be Corrected to Help Achieve Security Objectives (May 2011) (GAO-11-657), at 39.

51 Id., at 46.

52 Aviation and Transportation Security Act § 108, 49 U.S.C. §44920.

―I examined the contractor 

screening program and decided 

not to expand the program 

beyond the current 16 airports 

as I do not see any clear or 

substantial advantage to do so at 

this time.‖

TSA Administrator John Pistole, 

January 28, 2011
14

continue to increase despite the fact that 16 U.S. airports use private screening contractors.

TSA has continuously thwarted the adoption of the SPP and has a history of intimidating airport 

operators that express an interest in participating in the SPP. Throughout 2009 and 2010, TSA 

held hostage all SPP applications from the entire state of Montana, ultimately denying all four 

airports. Throughout this timeframe, multiple SPP applicant airports reported the use of scare

tactics by uniformed federal TSOs directed towards airport passengers.53 In one instance, TSOs 

repeatedly informed passengers that it would not be safe to fly under the SPP model, and lobbied 

the airport board, the press and local government officials to abolish the program.54

Then, in January 2011, TSA Administrator Pistole halted expansion of the SPP. This decision 

was made despite nine years of successful operations, clear direction from Congress in ATSA,

and the following findings:

 In December of 2007, Catapult Consultants issued a report to TSA that found ―private 

screeners performed at a level that was equal to or greater than that of federal TSOs.‖55

 Similarly, interviews with private sector screening companies and airport officials 

indicate that SPP airports have better screener detection capabilities and provide greater 

customer service, responsiveness, and flexibility at passenger checkpoints.56

 GAO found that TSA ignored critical data relating to costs.57 After TSA took GAO‘s 

factors into consideration, the revised study found that the cost to operate the SPP and allfederal screening to be nearly identical.

 The USA Today uncovered covert TSA test results in 2007 that showed significantlyhigher screener detection capabilities at San Francisco International, an SPP airport, than 

at Los Angeles International Airport, where screening is provided by TSA.58

In making this announcement, Administrator Pistole stated that he does not see ―any clear or 

substantial advantage‖ to expand the SPP.59 This ―clear or substantial advantage‖ standard is not 

present in ATSA, and Administrator Pistole‘s adoption of this standard is arbitrary and 

capricious and in contravention of the law.

Additionally, unions representing TSOs placed significant pressure on TSA officials to consider 

abolishing the SPP and preserve federal jobs. Contrary to claims by Administrator Pistole that 

 

53 T&I SPP Report, at 13-15.

54 Id.

55 Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: TSA’s Cost and Performance Study of Private-Sector 

Airport Screening (January 9, 2009) (GAO-09-27R), at 7.

56 T&I SPP Report, at 12.

57 Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: TSA’s Cost and Performance Study of Private-Sector 

Airport Screening (January 9, 2009) (GAO-09-27R).

58 Thomas Frank, Most Fake Bombs Missed by Screeners, USA Today, Oct. 22, 2007, available at 

http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-10-17-airport-security_N.htm.

59 E-mail from John S. Pistole, Administrator, TSA, to All TSA Employees, 100 – Screening Partnership Program

(Jan. 28, 2011).
15

there was no union involvement in his decision to stop the expansion of the SPP,60 investigative 

staff of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure discovered that a public history 

exists of union meetings and communications with DHS and TSA officials regarding the SPP.

In a May 6, 2010, newsletter, the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE)

reported that ―TSA has told AFGE that the agency will revisit the SPP and will place any 

contracting out plans on hold until a decision has been reached.‖61 In the same newsletter, Eric 

Wood, a Lead TSO, applauded the union‘s efforts: ―AFGE was 

able to get TSA management to stop moving forward on our 

airports application [sic] for SPP... now thanks to all the help 

from AFGE we were able to convince TSA that SPP was not a 

program that is good for the mission of TSA.‖62

On December 19, 2010, Cynthia Jenson, President of the AFGE

Local 1120 in Montana, sent an e-mail stating, ―I have some 

very good news. AFGE and TSA have agreed that the SPP 

program will be abolished. They just signed an agreement.‖

63

 

Jenson told Committee staff on May 19, 2011, that she 

―wholeheartedly believed‖ AFGE had a role in Administrator 

Pistole‘s January 28, 2011, decision not to expand the SPP.64

Federal oversight of qualified private contract screeners has shown to be effective all over the 

world. Almost all western countries operate civil aviation security through the use of federal 

oversight of private contract screeners. Other than Romania, Poland and Bulgaria, the United 

States has the only government in the western world that functions as the airport security 

operator, administrator, regulator, and auditor.65

Canadian airports utilize private contract screeners under federal oversight and demonstrate a 

highly successful private screener model, which contrasts TSA‘s bureaucratic operation of the 

SPP at airports in the United States. Just one example of Canada‘s highly efficient security 

model is at Quebec City Jean Lesage International Airport (YQB). In 2010, YQB handled 

approximately 1.2 million air travelers,

66 while its ratio of private contract screeners to federal 

administrative personnel was approximately 150-to-1.67 By comparison, in the U.S. under the 

SPP, at Sioux Falls Regional Airport (FSD), which handled approximately 700,000 air travelers 

 

60 Letter from John S. Pistole, Administrator, TSA, to John L. Mica, Chairman, Committee on Transportation and 

Infrastructure (Feb. 28, 2011).

61 AFL-CIO, What Happens in Montana May Not Stay in Montana, The TSO Voice, May 6, 2010, available at 

http://www.afge.org/index.cfm/2010_05_11_TSOVoiceMay6.pdf?fuse=document&documentid=2424.

62 Id.

63 E-mail from Cynthia Jenson, President, American Federal Government Employees (AFGE) Local 1120, to AFGE 

Members (Dec. 19, 2010).

64 Telephone conversation between Cynthia Jenson, President, AFGE Local 1120, and Rachel Weaver, Committee 

on Transportation and Infrastructure (May 19, 2010).

65 T&I SPP Report, Appendix 2.

66 Airports Council International—North America, Airport Traffic Reports, 2010, available at http://www.acina.org/sites/default/files/_rankings-2010nam_.xls.

67 Information provided by Security Director, Quebec City Jean Lesage International Airport, to Congressional 

Delegation (Oct. 22, 2011).

―I have some very good 

news. AFGE and TSA 

have agreed that the SPP 

program will be 

abolished. They just 

signed an agreement.‖

Cynthia Jenson, 

President of the AFGE 

Local 1120 in Montana
16

in 2010,

68 the ratio of private contract screeners to federal administrative personnel was 3-to-1.69

 

Private screening companies must maintain their own administrative and managerial staff at the 

SPP airports. Therefore, the extra layer of TSA bureaucracy at SPP airports is both unnecessary 

and costly. TSA must address its inefficiencies in operating the SPP by eliminating duplicative 

and unnecessary federal staff at SPP airports, thereby further improving the advantages to the 

taxpayer of the private contract screening model. 

Despite substantial evidence supporting the success and viability of the SPP, TSA still refuses to 

allow new airports to participate in the program and continues to refuse to provide an 

explanation of the criteria used to judge the merits of program applications. 

TSA Technology Failures

Since 2001, TSA has struggled to implement and deploy its technologies in a cost-effective 

manner. During that timeframe, TSA has obligated more than $8 billion for the enhancement of 

passenger and checked-baggage screening.70

In-Line Explosive Detection Systems (EDS)

TSA estimated that in-line explosive detection systems for 

checked baggage would reduce the number of required TSA 

baggage screeners by as much as 78 percent.71 However, despite 

the security, efficiency, and economic benefits of in-line 

baggage screening, GAO found that TSA is struggling to 

upgrade its deployed fleet of baggage-screening machines and 

that some of TSA‘s deployed machines are detecting explosives 

at standards from 1998.72

TSA also failed to deploy in-line EDS based upon risk and 

economies of scale. Investigators on the Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure found that less than half of the 

Nation‘s 35 largest airports, which handle 75% of all 

commercial passengers,

73 screen all checked baggage through inline systems. Of the remaining top-35 airports, six have zero 

 

68 Airports Council International—North America, Airport Traffic Reports, 2010, available at http://www.acina.org/sites/default/files/_rankings-2010nam_.xls.

69 Email from TSA Legislative Affairs to Rachel Weaver, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure (May 23, 

2011).

70 Government Accountability Office, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, 

Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue (March 2011) (GAO-11-318SP).

71 Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the Deployment 

of Checked Baggage Screening Systems (March 2005) (GAO-05-365).

72 Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: TSA Has Enhanced Its Explosives Detection Requirements 

for Checked Baggage, but Additional Screening Actions Are Needed (July 2011) (GAO-11-740).

73 Federal Aviation Administration, Aerospace Forecast: Fiscal Years 2011-2031, at 26, available at 

http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/apl/aviation_forecasts/aerospace_forecasts/2011-

2031/media/2011%20Forecast%20Doc.pdf.

Less than half of the 

Nation‘s 35 largest 

airports screen all 

baggage with in-line 

technology, and the 

Committee on 

Transportation and 

Infrastructure has 

received numerous 

reports that TSA has 

failed to reimburse 

airports for agreed-upon 

costs of installing these 

systems.
17

utilization of in-line EDS for baggage screening. Additionally, investigative staff of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure have received numerous reports of TSA‘s 

failure to reimburse millions of dollars to airports for agreed-upon costs related to the 

implementation of in-line EDS systems.

Explosive Trace Detection Portals (“Puffers”)

From 2004 to 2006, TSA ultimately spent more than $39 million to procure and deploy 

Explosive Trace Detection Portals, known as ―puffers,‖ as part of its passenger screening 

operations. While TSA procured 207 puffers, it only deployed 101 nationwide because TSA 

belatedly discovered that the puffers were unable to detect explosives in an operational 

environment. TSA rushed this untested product to deployment, ignoring internal procedures 

designed to prevent this type of waste.

GAO found that TSA‘s lack of a risk-based strategic development and deployment plan and 

inconsistent communication resulted in delayed and ineffective deployment of this checkpoint 

screening technology.

Advanced Imaging Technology Devices

Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) devices allow screeners to see beneath a passenger‘s 

clothing to identify ―abnormalities‖ requiring further screening.74 In early 2011, to replace the 

puffers, TSA began installing 500 AIT devices, at a total cost of more than $122 million.75 In 

September 2011, TSA purchased 300 additional AIT devices. In November 2011, TSA 

announced plans to complete deployment of 1,000 AITs by the end of 2011. By 2013, TSA 

estimates that the total cost to taxpayers for AIT deployment will reach approximately $500 

million.76 Despite TSA‘s great investment in AIT technology, GAO stated, ―it remains unclear 

whether the AIT would have detected the weapon used in the December 2009 [Underwear 

Bomber] incident.‖77 Additionally, Homeland Security Newswire reported in March 2011 that a 

TSA covert test of AIT machines at Dallas Ft. Worth International Airport resulted in the AIT 

machines‘ failure to detect a concealed firearm.78

Furthermore, TSA deployed the AIT devices in a haphazard and easily-thwarted manner. In 

many cases, TSA used AITs as a simple replacement for magnetometers as a means of primary 

screening. However, due to the limited number of AIT devices that TSA has deployed, 

 

74 AITs include both millimeter-wave technology as well as backscatter x-ray technology.

75 TSA Oversight Part II: Airport Perimeter Security, Hearing before the House Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign Operations, July 13, 

2011.

76 Id.

77 Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: TSA Is Increasing Procurement and Deployment of the 

Advanced Imaging Technology, but Challenges to This Effort and Other Areas of Aviation Security Remain (March 

2010) (GAO-10-484T).

78 Grant Stinchfield, TSA Source: Armed Agent Slips Past DFW Body Scanner, Lapses, MSNBC, Feb. 18, 2011, 

available at http://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/TSA-Agent-Slips-Through-DFW-Body-Scanner-With-a-Gun116497568.html.
18

passengers are easily able to bypass this technology by choosing a screening lane without these 

AIT machines in use.

Advanced Technology–2

TSA‘s failure to properly procure and deploy its screening technologies has led to thousands of 

pieces of equipment stuck in TSA warehouses. A recent Committee on Transportation and 

Infrastructure investigation learned that TSA warehouses are nearly at capacity, storing almost 

2,800 pieces of passenger and baggage screening equipment. This includes approximately 650

state-of-the-art Advanced Technology–2 (AT-2) carry-on baggage screening machines at a cost 

of nearly $97 million.

79

 TSA‘s failure to deploy this cutting-edge technology in a timely manner 

is yet another example of the agency‘s flawed procurement and deployment program.

TSA has wasted hundreds of millions of dollars in taxpayer funds on failed solutions to securing 

commercial aviation, ignoring internal protocols to prevent such waste and adopting technologies 

that have repeatedly failed TSA‘s own covert tests.

Recommendations

Since its inception, TSA has hired over 137,000 employees, grown into a mammoth bureaucracy 

of 65,000 employees, spent almost $57 billion, yet has failed to detect any major terrorist threat

since 9/11, including the Shoe Bomber, the Underwear Bomber, the Times Square Bomber, and 

the Toner Cartridge Bomb Plot. Congress created TSA to be a lean organization that would

analyze intelligence and set risk-based security standards for the U.S. transportation system. 

Today, TSA suffers from bureaucratic morass and mismanagement. The agency needs to 

properly refocus its resources on assessing threats and intelligence, instituting appropriate 

regulations, and auditing and adjusting security performance. TSA cannot do this effectively as 

a massive human resources agency.

Accordingly, the Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure and Oversight and 

Government Reform of the House of Representatives make the following recommendations:

1. TSA must act with greater independence from the DHS bureaucracy. Terrorists 

constantly evolve their methods, and TSA must have similar flexibility to respond 

quickly and appropriately to any intelligence it receives. Without this ability, TSA will 

continue to be a solely reactive and ineffective agency that cannot ensure the security of 

U.S. travelers.

2. The TSA Administrator’s stature must be elevated. The constant turnover and long 

vacancy of this vital position has caused great disruption at TSA. With each new 

Administrator, there have been repeated changes in vision and direction of the agency. In 

 

79 TSA Reform: Exploring Innovations in Technology Procurement to Stimulate Job Growth, Part III, Hearing 

before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation Security, November 3, 2011.
19

order for TSA to be an effective and successful agency, it must have stable leadership 

that can make both short- and long-term plans for improving the agency and providing 

effective and cost efficient aviation and transportation security. The TSA Administrator 

must be a priority appointment for the President, along with other agency heads and 

Cabinet-level Secretaries, and the length of the term of the TSA Administrator‘s 

appointment and compensation should be reexamined.

3. TSA must function as a federal regulator, analyzing intelligence, setting screening 

and security standards and protocols based on risk, auditing passenger and baggage 

screening operations, and enforcing national screening standards. TSA needs to 

evolve out of the human resources business and focus on analyzing and disseminating 

intelligence information, developing a regulatory structure to secure the critical interests 

of the U.S. transportation sector, and enforcing these regulations to maintain a 

standardized set of practices throughout the country.

4. TSA should expand and revise the Screening Partnership Program so that more

airport authorities can transition airport screening operations to private contractors 

under federal supervision. Instead of vesting all discretion with TSA to approve airport 

opt-out applications, the TSA Administrator should pre-qualify private screening 

companies that are capable of providing effective passenger and baggage screening 

services. Then, when an airport makes the decision to apply to the Screening Partnership 

Program, TSA can select from the pre-qualified contractors.

5. The TSA Administrator must set performance standards for passenger and baggage 

screening operations based on risk analysis and common sense. Detailed, specific, 

articulated metrics by which TSA will measure screening performance are critical to 

effective airport security operations. Without a clear list of standards, TSA will not be 

able to adequately measure and systematically improve screener performance.

6. The number of TSA administrative personnel must be dramatically reduced. TSA‘s 

massive bureaucracy must be streamlined so that TSA can focus on analyzing 

intelligence and setting risk-based security standards without being bogged down by 

managing its bloated administration.

7. The number of TSA personnel stationed abroad and the number of TSA personnel 

that oversee key international departure points with direct flights into the United 

States and are engaged with other governments and organizations must be adjusted

in order to effectively respond to the international threat to the U.S. transportation 

network. Most of the terrorist attempts against the U.S. in the last 10 years have 

originated with foreign nationals or were developed by those in other countries, and TSA 

must adapt to this threat and deploy its resources accordingly.

8. TSA should require that the screening of all passengers and baggage on in-bound 

flights is equivalent to U.S. domestic screening standards. Rescreening passengers 

after an international flight lands in the U.S. does not avert the risk to U.S. citizens, while 

en route to the U.S.
20

9. TSA must develop an expedited screening program using biometric credentials that 

would allow TSA to positively identify trusted passengers and crew members so that 

the agency can prioritize its screening resources based on risk. TSA will never be 

able to function as a truly risk-based organization until the agency can differentiate 

between passengers based on levels of risk.

10. TSA performance results should be made public after 24 months or when deemed 

appropriate for security purposes, so that passengers can know the level of security 

they receive. Public reporting of performance evaluations provides transparency and 

will incentivize TSA to operate at the highest standards.

11. A qualified outside organization must conduct a comprehensive, independent study 

of TSA’s management, operations, and technical capabilities, and make 

recommendations to increase TSA’s efficacy and its ability to better analyze 

intelligence and set risk-based, common sense security standards. In conducting the 

study, the organization should consult with Congress, the TSA Administrator, TSA 

employees, aviation passengers, airport operators, and other representatives of the 

transportation industry. Finally, the TSA Administrator should review the organization‘s 

report and implement the recommended reforms.

“After countless expensive detours, it is time for TSA to refocus its 

mission based on risk and develop common sense security protocols.”

John L. Mica, Chairman, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

Contacting the Committees

For general inquiries:

Committee on Transportation

and Infrastructure

Phone: (202) 225-9446

Fax: (202) 225-6782

http://transportation.house.gov/

Committee on Oversight and

Government Reform

Phone: (202) 225-5074

Fax: (202) 225-3974

http://oversight.house.gov/

For information regarding this report:

Sean McMaster

Oversight and Investigations

Committee on Transportation and 

Infrastructure

(202) 225-9446

Frederick R. Hill

Director of Communications

Committee on Oversight and

Government Reform

(202) 225-0037

For information regarding the SPOT section of this report:

Tom Hammond

Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight

Committee on Science, Space, and Technology

(202) 225-8772

Committee on Transportation 

and Infrastructure

John L. Mica, Chairman

2165 Rayburn House Office Building

Washington, D.C. 20515

Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform

Darrell E. Issa, Chairman

2157 Rayburn House Office Building

Washington, D.C. 20515