COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Coleman and Koontz*

PERRY SHAWN TURNER 

v. Record No. 1808-93-3 OPINION BY 

 JUDGE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA AUGUST 29, 1995 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKBRIDGE COUNTY 

George E. Honts, III, Judge 

 Thomas M. Simons for appellant. 

 Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney General (James S. 

Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Perry Shawn Turner (Turner) appeals his bench trial 

conviction under Code § 18.2-460(C) for attempting to obstruct a 

law-enforcement officer in the discharge of his duty relating to 

a criminal drug offense. Turner asserts that because the 

Commonwealth failed to prove the underlying felony as a predicate 

element of Code § 18.2-460(C), the Commonwealth could not convict 

him of obstructing a police officer who was executing an arrest 

warrant charging Turner with a violation of the underlying 

felony. Turner also asserts that the Commonwealth failed to 

disprove as a reasonable alternative hypothesis to guilt that 

when he pointed his gun at the arresting officer, he did so in an 

effort to turn the gun over to the officer rather than to 

obstruct him. For the following reasons, we affirm Turner's 

conviction. 

 

 *Justice Koontz prepared and the Court adopted the opinion 

in this case prior to his investiture as a Justice of the Supreme 

Court of Virginia. 
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 Several Virginia state troopers went to a motel in 

Rockbridge County to execute a warrant for the arrest of Perry 

Shawn Turner on a charge of violating Code § 18.2-248(A), selling 

a controlled substance, namely cocaine. Trooper Robert P. 

Chappell, Jr. (Chappell), wearing blue jeans and a white hooded 

sweatshirt, knocked on the door of the motel room Turner occupied 

while the other officers waited about twenty yards away. The 

door, which was chained, opened slightly. Chappell said his name 

was "Dirk" and asked for "Shawn." The male who answered the door 

said, "just a minute," and closed the door. About sixty seconds 

later, the door opened and the same male emerged. Chappell 

immediately recognized him as Turner. Holding his police badge 

in his left hand, Chappell identified himself as "State Police" 

and informed Turner that he had an arrest warrant for him on a 

charge of selling cocaine. 

 Standing about two feet away, Turner removed a handgun from 

his waistband and pointed it at Chappell's chest. Chappell 

pushed Turner's armed hand away and pinned Turner's body against 

the wall, telling Turner three times to drop his weapon. Turner 

pushed back against Chappell and did not release his gun. 

Another officer disarmed Turner while Chappell held him. Turner 

was arrested and charged with selling cocaine in violation of 

Code § 18.2-248(A) and obstructing justice in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-460(C). The Commonwealth subsequently elected not to 

proceed on the Code § 18.2-248(A) violation. 
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 Under familiar principles, penal statutes must be strictly 

construed against the Commonwealth. Stevenson v. City of Falls 

Church, 243 Va. 434, 436, 416 S.E.2d 435, 437 (1992). However, 

"we construe a statute to promote the end for which it was 

enacted, if such an interpretation can reasonably be made from 

the language used." Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 840, 

847, 447 S.E.2d 530, 533 (1994). 

 Code § 18.2-460(C) reads in pertinent part: 

If any person by threats of bodily harm or 

force knowingly attempts to intimidate or 

impede . . . any law-enforcement officer, 

lawfully engaged in the discharge of his duty 

. . . relating to a violation of or 

conspiracy to violate § 18.2-248 or 

§ 18.2-248.1(a)(3), (b) or (c) he shall be 

guilty of a Class 5 felony. 

 Turner contends that because the drug charge against him was 

not prosecuted, his conviction for obstructing justice is "based 

solely on an arrest warrant, not on a 'violation' of the drug 

statute" because "[t]he underlying felony no longer exists to 

trigger its collateral felony." Turner ignores, however, that 

§ 18.2-460(C) requires only that the law enforcement activity 

"relat[e] to a violation of . . . § 18.2-248." (Emphasis added.) 

 The attempt to thwart Trooper Chappell's execution of the arrest 

warrant, which specifically charged Turner with selling cocaine, 

was an effort by Turner to impede the lawful discharge of a 

police officer's duty "relating to a violation of . . . 

§ 18.2-248." (Emphasis added.) 

 We hold that in order to convict an accused of obstructing 
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justice under Code § 18.2-460(C) the Commonwealth need not prove 

the underlying offenses codified in Code §§ 18.2-248 or 

18.2-248.1(a)(3), (b) or (c). A conviction under Code 

§ 18.2-460(C) will be sustained where the Commonwealth proves 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused (1) intended to 

intimidate or impede by threats of bodily harm or force a 

law-enforcement officer in the lawful discharge of his or her 

duty, and (2) knew or should have known that the law-enforcement 

officer was engaged in lawful activity "relating to a violation 

of or conspiracy to violate § 18.2-248 or § 18.2-248.1(a)(3), (b) 

or (c)." 

 Turner's conviction for obstruction need not be based on 

proof that he committed the underlying felony. It is sufficient 

that the Commonwealth proved that the lawful activity of Trooper 

Chappell related to an offense specified in Code § 18.2-460(C). 

Holding otherwise would unduly restrict the intended purpose of 

Code § 18.2-460 of punishing those who interfere with the 

administration of justice and law enforcement. 

 Turner's view suggests that successful efforts to destroy 

evidence or intimidate witnesses in order to prevent a drug 

conviction also would eliminate the possibility of a conviction 

for obstructing justice. Providing incentive for someone to 

frustrate law-enforcement efforts and allowing someone who 

obstructs justice to go unpunished solely because the 

Commonwealth cannot prove the underlying drug offense, perhaps as 
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a consequence of the obstructor's endeavors, are absurd results 

that the legislature did not intend. See Shull v. Commonwealth, 

16 Va. App. 667, 669, 431 S.E.2d 924, 925 (1993)("Nor should a 

statute be construed so that it leads to absurd results.") 

(citation omitted), aff'd, 247 Va. 161, 440 S.E.2d 133 (1994). 

 Code §§ 18.2-460(A) and (B) apply to the obstruction of 

justice in civil as well as in criminal proceedings other than 

for the drug crimes specified in subsection (C). Thus, neither 

subsection (A) nor subsection (B) requires a conviction for an 

underlying offense as an element of the alleged obstruction of 

justice. We interpret subsection (C) as evincing legislative 

intent to make the punishment for obstructing justice as to 

certain drug offenses more severe than for obstructing justice 

generally. 

 "On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom." Martin v. Commonwealth, 

4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). The record 

shows that Turner drew a gun on an arresting officer and resisted 

efforts by police to disarm him. The trial court rejected 

Turner's explanation that he was attempting to turn over his gun 

rather than obstruct the officer. The evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth is sufficient to establish that 

Turner intended "to impede or intimidate" Trooper Chappell in the 

lawful discharge of his duty. The record also shows that Turner 
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knew that the charge specified in the warrant for his arrest was 

for selling cocaine. 

 Having proved Turner's intent to obstruct and his knowledge 

that the arrest "relat[ed] to a violation of . . . § 18.2-248," 

the Commonwealth satisfied its burden. Therefore, we affirm the 

conviction. 

 Affirmed.