IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-0947

Filed June 24, 2015

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

DALE ROBERT STICKLEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Andrea J.

Dryer, Judge.

Dale Stickley appeals following judgment and sentences imposed upon 

his two convictions of possession of precursors, ethyl ether and ephedrine, with 

intent to manufacture methamphetamine. AFFIRMED.

Jessica Maffitt of Benzoni Law Office, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney 

General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Brad P. Walz, Assistant 

County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Doyle, JJ.
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DANILSON, C.J.

The sole issue before us is whether there has been a violation of Dale 

Stickley’s right to be brought to trial within ninety days of the indictment being 

found. 

Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(b) provides:

If a defendant indicted for a public offense has not waived the 

defendant’s right to a speedy trial the defendant must be brought to 

trial within 90 days after indictment is found or the court must order 

the indictment to be dismissed unless good cause to the contrary 

be shown.

A trial information was approved on March 15, 2013. Stickley was served 

with copy of the trial information on March 25, 2013. On May 24, 2013, a written 

speedy-trial waiver was executed by Stickley. The waiver contained clear 

language explaining to Stickley the specific rights being waived. He himself 

referred to that waiver in his May 28, 2013 motion for extension of time to file 

pretrial motions, which he filed pro se. Stickley later moved to dismiss the 

charges for violation of his speedy-trial rights, contending he did not voluntarily or 

intelligently waive his speedy-trial rights. Following a hearing, the district court 

disagreed, finding Stickley to be “competent, . . . literate, has some familiarity 

with court procedures because of his prior convictions, and has demonstrated 

some capacity to file motions on his own.” The district court found Stickley’s 

claim that he was somehow duped or forced into signing the waiver was “at best, 

disingenuous.”

On appeal, Stickley contends the waiver of his right to a speedy trial was 

not voluntarily or intelligently entered. We review the denial of a motion to 
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dismiss for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Winters, 690 N.W.2d 903, 908 

(Iowa 2005).

Our supreme court has held that this rule means “a criminal charge must 

be dismissed if the trial does not commence within ninety days from the filing of 

the charging instrument ‘unless the State proves (1) defendant’s waiver of 

speedy trial, (2) delay attributable to the defendant, or (3) “good cause” for the 

delay.’” Id. (quoting State v. Nelson, 600 N.W.2d 598, 600 (Iowa 1999)). As the 

trial court below correctly concluded, Stickley both waived his speedy-trial rights 

and actively participated in the delays of his case. 

We acknowledge Stickley’s contention that his waiver was “due to a series 

of events outside Stickley’s control, involving two attorneys withdrawing from his 

representation due to ethical conflicts” and that he “did not receive effective 

representation regarding his waiver.” However, our record does not allow us to 

draw such conclusions. “Even a lawyer is entitled to his day in court, especially 

when his professional reputation is impugned.” State v. Bentley, 757 N.W.2d 

257, 264 (Iowa 2008). Because the record here is inadequate, the issue of 

whether trial counsel was ineffective is preserved for possible postconvictionrelief proceedings.

Upon the record before us, we can only conclude that no violation of rule 

2.33(2)(b) occurred and Stickley was not entitled to have the charges against him 

dismissed. We therefore affirm.

AFFIRMED.