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INSTITUTE

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THE ROLE OF SMALL STATES

IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA:

THE CASE OF BELARUS

Dmitry Shlapentokh

May 2012

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ii

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ISBN 1-58487-529-1
iii

FOREWORD

During the Cold War era, most states had gravitated to either one of the superpowers, the United States 

or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). 

There were, of course, states that tried to play the independent or semi-independent role. Still, they usually were not challenging to one of the superpowers. 

Upon the collapse of the USSR, the United States 

had enjoyed absolute predominance until approximately the end of the Bush era, when a multipolar 

world started to develop. At that point, several centers 

of power emerged, providing the flexibility for small 

powers to move from the orbit of one center of power 

to the other. Moreover, the small powers could on occasion even challenge the bigger centers of power. 

This is the case with Belarus, at least from 2006 to 

the present. Belarus officially became an ally of Russia 

and formed a “union” state. Still, since 2006, Minsk’s 

relationship with Moscow became extremely acrimonious, when Moscow abruptly increased the price of 

oil/gas delivered to Minsk. Minsk engaged in conflict 

with Moscow—a conflict that has been mixed with a 

peculiar detente and new tensions. The conflict with 

Russia coincided with the flirting by Belarus with the 

European Union (EU) and, even more so, with China 

and Iran. All of this indicated that Belarus would continue to exercise a “multi-vector” foreign policy, and 

this Belarusian policy reflects the general pattern of 

foreign policy in an emerging multipolar world. 

The absence of a single center of power or a few 

centers of power—as was the case during the Cold 

War—provides the opportunity even for small states, 

sandwiched between much stronger states, to move 

with comparative ease from one center to the other. 
iv

Even when small states become finally attached to one 

of these centers, their attachment is not absolute, and 

freedom of action is still preserved.

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute
v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

DMITRY SHLAPENTOKH is an Associated Professor in the Department of History, Indiana University-South Bend. He is the author of several books 

and more than 100 articles, the newest of which is 

titled Global Russia: Eurasianism, Putin and the New 

Right (Tauris, 2013, forthcoming). Dr. Shlapentokh 

holds master’s degrees from Moscow State University 

(Russia) and Michigan State University and a Ph.D. 

in Russian/European history from the University of 

Chicago.

vii

SUMMARY

The following conclusions are drawn from this 

analysis:

1. There is an emerging post-unipolar world. Now 

the United States is not the only global center, as it 

was during the first years of the post-Cold War era. 

Nor do just two superpowers—the United States and 

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—now define 

the course of global events. The new multipolarity 

implies the presence of several centers of power. This 

provides the opportunity for small states such as Belarus to move from one center of power to another or 

to engage in a sort of geopolitical gamesmanship.

2. During the last 10 years or so, Belarus moved 

from Russia to the European Union (EU) and back. At 

the same time, it engaged in relationships with Iran 

and China. While relationships with Russia and the 

EU have not been stable, this is not the case with China and Iran. Here, Belarus has always maintained a 

good relationship, especially in the case of China. This 

is demonstrated by the increasing role of Asia in the 

geopolitical arrangements of the present, and will be 

even more so in the future.

1

THE ROLE OF SMALL STATES

IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA:

THE CASE OF BELARUS

Those who study foreign policy usually focus 

their attention on the role of the great powers. If attention is paid to small states, it is primarily to provide the framework for particular aspects of great 

power rivalry or to give details to the conflict. It is also 

usually assumed that small powers have limited opportunities to maneuver in the gravitational space of 

big players and can change geopolitical patrons only 

once. Needless to say, the victory of a small state over 

a big one is explained as a result of the backing of another strong power. This notion is overly simplistic, 

even for a period like the Cold War when the great 

powers seemed absolutely predominant, and is even 

less applicable when U.S. decline has not yet led to a 

clear replacement. Even China, if we assume its rise 

will continue, cannot be the dominant global center 

in the near future. The emerging global multipolarity 

makes the geopolitical scenario increasingly volatile 

and complicated. 

In this environment, small states might well assume a new role. They might move freely in geopolitical space and change patrons comparatively easily 

or engage in flirtation with various partners—leading, 

on occasion—to a geopolitical gamesmanship. Their 

role in overall global policy could also be considerable. Finally, the role of small states in current geopolitical arrangements provides, retrospectively of 

course, a glimpse into the past and demonstrates that 

small states are not always just extensions of strong 

ones. They play an important role in shaping global 

policies even at a time of the seeming predominance 

of great powers. The study of small powers not only 
2

demonstrates the convoluted nature of geopolitical 

arrangements but also sheds light on the geopolitical posture of the various global players, which can 

be distinctly different. Belarus’s foreign policy in the 

post-Cold War era is a good example. 

The exploration presented here will deal with the 

following: First, it will trace Belarus’s emergence as 

a “free radical,” a small state without much attachment to any of the centers of power. This requires a 

detailed study of Belarus’s dealings with Russia—its 

major geopolitical partner—showing the complicated 

role of Belarus in Russia’s politics, both internal and 

external. Belarus is still formally a part of the “union 

state” formed by treaty in 1996. It actually broke with 

Russia by 2006, mostly due to the sharp increase in gas 

and oil prices, and has engaged in increasing flirtations with other partners, including those of the West. 

The break with Russia, however, was not formal. Belarus has not denounced the treaty, and even joined 

recently in a “custom union,” which includes Russia 

and Kazakhstan.

The Western direction of Belarusian foreign policy 

is the focus of the second section. The fact that Belarus 

engages in a sort of browsing between the West and 

Russia demonstrates, among other things, the major 

thesis of this work: that neither the West nor any particular part of the West has enough geopolitical gravitation to attach Minsk firmly. 

While neither Russia nor geopolitical segments 

of the West could make Belarus either a permanent 

foe nor a permanent friend, the story is different with 

Asia—notably Iran and China. It would be wrong to 

assume that Belarus’s relationships with China and 

Iran preclude relationships with other players. But its 

relationships with major Asian partners have never 
3

suffered drastic setbacks or reversals, as was the case 

with Russia and the West. This, among many other 

things, demonstrates the increasing power of Asia in 

geopolitical arrangements—which is the focus of the 

third section.

THE SMALL PLAYER AND THE COLD WAR

The importance of small players such as Belarus in 

an era of emerging multipolarity can be understood 

by looking at the past. Even during the Cold War, the 

small powers had considerable latitude in their actions, and not all their successes could be attributed 

to the backing of one of the superpowers. The prevailing image of the Cold War is that of two superpowers shaping global arrangements. The others, except 

possibly the biggest ones, such as China,1

 could be 

ignored for the overall picture. This was not the case. 

Even during the Cold War, not everything could be 

reduced to relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States. And 

not only China or France influenced the configuration 

of global politics. 

To start with, the role of superpowers in many Cold 

War events should be reconsidered. Consider the case 

of proxy wars. It is usually assumed that Washington 

and Moscow used small countries as tools in their 

global struggle. For example, in the Vietnam War, a 

common explanation for the resilience of the Vietcong 

was Soviet support.2 According to this interpretation, 

the Vietnam War was a classic proxy war between two 

superpowers. Thus, it was a victory not of Vietnam 

but of the USSR, with China playing some additional 

role.3

 Recent events might question this conclusion, 

or at least modify it. In Afghanistan, the Taliban has 
4

no superpower backing. There is possibly some support from neighbors such as Pakistan and Iran.4

 But, 

in contrast to the USSR’s support of North Vietnam, 

this support is indirect, and neither state can be compared with the USSR. Yet, the Taliban has continued 

for many years and may compel the United States to 

withdraw completely. Taking these events into consideration, one could infer that the North Vietnam 

victory was not so predicated on Soviet and Chinese 

support as assumed, or at least their role should not be 

overestimated. 

There was also a case when the superpowers were 

not able to stop a conflict. The Iran-Iraq war was not 

caused by superpower Cold War rivalry.5

 The USSR 

tried to stop the conflict, because it had a good relationship with Iraq and was trying to exploit Iran’s belligerent stand against the United States. Moscow pursued a policy of strict neutrality6

 and only later shifted 

support, not full commitment, toward Iraq. The war 

continued for 8 years. 

Small countries can also maintain a relationship 

with competing superpowers and use that conflict in 

their own interests with impunity. Romania, for example—part of the Warsaw Pact—saw Moscow use 

force against Pact members who tried to break with 

Moscow, or whom Moscow believed could create 

problems. All Soviet leaders employed force to deal 

with problems in the East European Empire, even 

Leonid Brezhnev, who clearly was in favor of detente.7

Romanian leader Nikolai Ceausescu knew he risked 

Moscow’s wrath by attempting an independent foreign policy, but he openly defied Moscow and visited 

China in 1978, praising its leaders.8

 The relationship 

developed in spite of an extremely tense relationship 

between Moscow and Beijing. Romania also main-
5

tained a relationship with Israel and demonstrated 

support to Zionism and Jewish culture in general—

a position unthinkable in the USSR. Indeed, in 1965, 

when Ceausescu became Party General Secretary, a 

new Jewish Center was created in a Romanian city. 

“The center, consisting of a synagogue, library, and 

club hall, became the gathering place for the whole 

community.”9

 These conspicuous demonstrations of 

pro-Zionist sympathies were made despite Moscow’s 

broken relationship with Israel and firm position on 

the side of Israel’s enemies. Thus, small powers played 

an important role even during the Cold War era. 

Their role has become even more important in 

the present. One of the most important reasons is the 

declining role of the United States. With the collapse 

of the USSR, the United States had absolute predominance and assumed it could deal with all global problems alone. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s 

doctrine of a general geopolitical post-Cold War order, and President George W. Bush’s policy, assumed 

that the United States could wage several local wars 

simultaneously and contain both China and Russia. In 

President Barack Obama’s foreign policy, by contrast, 

the emphasis is on sharing responsibilities with other 

countries—with the tacit admission that the United 

States cannot deal with all problems alone. The new 

policy and implicit limits can be easily seen in the 

2011 war in Libya. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the United 

States acted unilaterally, at least in the early stages, 

and engaged in ground operations. In Libya, Washington emphasized that the United States is just one of 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations involved, and no ground troops were sent. 

The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 (9/11), 

also underscored the ability of a small player to inflict a 

serious blow against a superpower. It is not surprising 
6

that there is increasing interest in the study of asymmetric warfare. Whereas barely five books on the topic 

were published in 1996-98, 120 books were published 

in 2009-11, according to WorldCat, the comprehensive 

electronic catalog.10

While global U.S. influence will most likely decline 

in the future,11 as demonstrated by financial problems 

and severe budget cuts, no one power can replace the 

United States soon. Even if China continues to rise and 

the center of world gravity moves to Asia, it will take 

time, and for a while no clear Cold War-style centers 

will exist. Global volatility will increase, and smaller 

powers will play more important roles. Belarus may 

be one of them. 

RUSSIAN DIRECTION: FROM “UNION STATE” 

TO CONFLICT

By the end of the Yeltsin era, Belarus had formed a 

“union state” with Russia. Both Boris Yeltsin and Alexander Lukashenko had different ideas in mind. For 

Yeltsin, the union with Belarus was a way of appeasing influential “Red to Brown” electorate nostalgia for 

the USSR. Lukashenko believed that union with Russia provided him a chance to replace Yeltsin. By the 

end of Vladimir Putin’s presidency—or, to be precise, 

his first presidency—for he will replace Dmitry Medvedev in 2012—Moscow has no need for Lukashenko. 

Moreover, Lukashenko was increasingly seen as a liability; by the beginning of Medvedev’s presidency, 

Moscow and Minsk had engaged in a sort of “Cold 

War,” regardless of the fact that both of them were 

part of a “union” state.
7

The Beginning of Medvedev’s Term and Russian/

Belarusian “Cold War.”

The beginning of Medvedev’s presidency saw 

intensifying Russian/Belarusian hostility. Conflicts 

flared on several fronts. First, and apparently most importantly, the two countries were engaged in protracted economic warfare. Moscow cut or reduced delivery 

of oil/gas to Belarus, accusing Minsk of not paying 

for the goods. Moscow also suspended loans, engaged 

in trade war, and attempted a hostile takeover of the 

commanding heights of the Belarusian economy. 

Minsk counterattacked, blocking delivery of Russian 

gas to Europe and engaging in a trade war of its own. 

Russia assumed the regime in Minsk was too weak to 

survive, much less retaliate, and would inevitably collapse under Russian pressure. Lukashenko believed, 

not without grounds, that Moscow was preparing to 

remove him through some sort of “orange revolution.” Second, on the military front, Minsk apparently 

had the upper hand. Lukashenko threatened to end 

military cooperation with Moscow, implying that he 

could actually let NATO emerge on Russia’s western border. Third, Lukashenko made a move with no 

tangible benefits, designed just to upset Moscow: he 

chose to deal with Georgia and refused to recognize 

Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which emerged as Russian protectorates after the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. 

Finally, there was a personal vendetta, in which Lukashenko and Putin/Medvedev presented each other 

in a very negative light.
8

The Economic War: Oil/Gas and Trade as Weapons.

The supply of Russian oil/gas was the major bone 

of contention during Putin’s presidency and continued to be so at the beginning of Medvedev’s. The 

conflict between Minsk and Moscow had intensified 

by 2010, as Lukashenko approached an election, and 

cheap oil/gas was a crucial election issue. Moscow 

had quite different plans: to get as much cash as possible by charging Minsk as much as it could—imposing 

customs duties for oil or oil products Minsk resold to 

the West and minimizing oil/gas transfer to the West. 

This quest for cash was the most important but not the 

only reason for Russia’s policy. The Kremlin believed 

that creating problems for Lukashenko would make 

him pliable or lead to his removal and replacement 

by someone who would better suit Moscow’s interests. Both sides used their usual weapons. Moscow 

threatened not to deliver oil/gas to Belarus; Minsk 

threatened not to let Moscow oil/gas get to Europe 

and pointed out it could live with or without the requested loans. 

Moscow also used trade war as punishment or, at 

least, to say it was displeased with the Minsk policy. 

Trade war was one of the weapons Moscow used to 

punish its neighbors from the former USSR. The economic mechanism that the former Soviet states inherited was designed to suit the needs of a single economic, and especially political, body. Even the economies 

of the East European satellites were designed for that 

purpose. Detachment from this single economic space 

was quite painful. Goods that were largely consumed 

inside the USSR had trouble finding customers in the 

West or elsewhere. Selling these goods was also hampered by trade and other restrictions, so Russia often 

continued to be the only customer. Moscow took ad-
9

vantage of this situation and, in conflicts with republics of the former USSR, used trade bans as punishment. The official justification was that products were 

not of good quality and selling them in Russia created 

a danger for consumers. 

Moscow also used trade bans to achieve important 

economic and geopolitical concessions, a policy related 

to the new imperialism that emerged in the Putin era. 

To be sure, it was no departure from the Yeltsin elite’s 

narrow pragmatism, with a drive for cash as the major 

motivation for all ventures. The Putin elite were even 

more pragmatic, with an important difference from 

the Yeltsin elite: They understood the importance of 

the state in achieving their interests. Symbiosis of state 

and business led to a new sort of imperialism, an arrangement with Old Yeltsin-era tycoons—those who 

accepted the role of gamustat bureaucracy, which in the 

Putin era became not just a willing tool of the tycoons, 

but a force in its own right. The tycoons and the new 

assertive Putin bureaucracy engaged in mutually beneficial symbiosis. The tycoons were to “share” profits 

with the state bureaucracy and sponsor various public 

projects the state regarded as important, for example, 

the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics. The state would 

help business promote its interests abroad, including 

buying command heights in the economies of foreign 

countries. In this arrangement, both business and the 

state benefit economically, and the state enhances its 

geopolitical influence. 

Lukashenko’s refusal to follow Moscow’s bidding 

and, of course, other transgressions, led to Moscow’s 

ire, and resumed hostility was evident soon after 

Medvedev became president. According to the Belarusian President, the conflict stemmed from Minsk’s 

reluctance to accept Russia’s terms for integration—

including Russian control of Belarusian production 
10

facilities—and Belarusian support of Kremlin foreign 

policy. Moscow immediately translated its displeasure into economic sanctions. “The conflict included 

Russia’s ban on importing Belarusian milk, refusal to 

provide a loan for Belarus, and that Belarus pay more 

for natural gas.”12 By the summer of 2009, Minsk and 

Moscow clearly were engaged in full-scale economic 

war along all fronts. While Moscow created problems 

for selling Belarusian goods in Russia, Minsk tried to 

create the same problems for Russian goods in Belarus.13

 The year 2010 had barely started, when a new conflict between the two states was in the air, and this 

bothered Europeans. Europeans were afraid the “Russia/Belarus disagreement on ‘oil export tariff’ could 

lead to a midwinter fuel shut-off on the Continent.”14

European fears were quite justifiable, because of Lukashenko’s problems with Moscow about oil.15 Lukashenko claimed that expensive Russian oil/gas had 

very negative implications for the Belarusian economy. Moscow claimed Minsk actually made money reselling cheap Russian oil to the West, and introduced 

custom duties on oil products to Belarus. Minsk protested.16

Russia also employed other economic means to 

compel Lukashenko to listen to its requests. In 2008, 

Russia promised Belarus a loan and provided part of 

it. In May 2010, Moscow said it might not give the next 

portion, because it was worried about Belarusian financial solvency.17 Under such pressure, Lukashenko 

seemed ready to compromise. According to the Russian newspaper Gazeta.Ru, he would give Russia the 

major Belarusian oil company, Beltransgaz, if Moscow 

would reduce the price of oil. Moscow rejected this 

proposal, but Putin hinted that after ratification of the 

agreement for a single economic space (edinoe ekonomicheskoe prostranstvo), Russia could change its position 
11

on the customs duties.18 By summer, the conflict was 

once again in full swing. In June, Belarus and Russia 

engaged in a gas war in which each claimed the other 

did not pay in full for gas or transit.19

In addition to oil/gas issues, there were other front 

line concerns. Russia started to create problems for 

Belarusian goods, especially dairy products, claiming 

they were of bad quality and dangerous to health. (This 

was hardly a new tactic: When the Russia/Georgia relationship soured, Moscow announced Georgian mineral water and alcoholic beverages were of bad quality and could not be sold in Russia.) Customs duties 

on oil continued to be high, at least in Minsk’s view. 

Belarus engaged in discussions with Russia about 

these duties and declared it would raise the price for 

transit of Russian oil through Belarus.20 Increasingly 

infuriated, Moscow apparently wanted not just to get 

cash from Minsk but to overthrow Lukashenko. It was 

clear Moscow assumed anyone would be better than 

Lukashenko; in pursuing this goal, Moscow ironically 

tried to employ the weapons it itself hated and feared 

most—so-called “orange revolutions.”

Russia as an Organizer of an “Orange Revolution.”

Most Russians believed that the “orange revolutions”—the revolutions that have swept through postSoviet space in the 2000s—were largely arranged by 

outside forces. Most Russian pundits believed that it 

was the United States that was behind the revolts—

the goal of which was to put in power pro-American 

regimes. The Kremlin believed that it could well do 

the same—organize “orange revolutions”—with the 

states that displease it. It was also assumed by many 

that Moscow played a considerable role in removing 

the Bakiyev regime in Kyrgyzstan.
12

The possibility that Moscow could do the same in 

Minsk was clearly in Lukashenko’s mind, and certainly 

provides an additional reason for hostility to Moscow. 

After the 2010 revolutions in Kyrgyzstan, Lukashenko 

not only provided asylum for Bakiyev, but stated that 

Russia, with tacit U.S. approval, wanted to incite the 

same type of upheaval in Belarus, and that he would 

suppress such a revolt mercilessly.21 In another interview, also in April 2010, after the Kyrgyz revolution, 

Lukashenko elaborated on plans to remove him. Responding to statements by some Russian observers 

that Belarus was moving to the Kyrgyz scenario because of Lukashenko’s policy, Lukashenko provided 

his own explanation of events. He stated that Russia, 

Kazakhstan, and the United States work in unison to 

overthrow governments they do not like, including 

the late Kyrgyz government. They would try to this in 

Belarus, but they would fail.22

In October 2010, as elections approached, Lukashenko openly proclaimed that Moscow wanted to overthrow him and was providing funds to his political 

enemies. He noted that if Moscow did not recognize 

his re-election, he would break any relationship with 

Russia.23 Lukashenko’s invectives toward Moscow 

were not groundless. According to some reports, Russia planned to suffocate Belarus through an economic 

blockade that would lead to mass uprisings, collapse 

of the regime, and absorption of Belarus as a Russian province.24 After the violent demonstrations in 

December 2010 following Lukashenko’s re-election, 

he proclaimed that Moscow worked together with 

the West to remove him and supported the opposition. The sense that Moscow wanted to see the collapse of the Belarusian economy and regime change 

in the American manner certainly provided Lukash-
13

enko with arguments that Russia was not an ally but 

an enemy, with whom military cooperation should be 

halted.

No Military Cooperation with Russia.

A major reason for Moscow to be engaged with 

Belarus, or at least the reason provided to the public, 

was Minsk’s importance as a military ally. It was the 

only ally on the Western border, where Russia faced 

NATO. Besides the Western border, Russia of course, 

has serious problems in the south, where jihadism 

and general instability in Central Asia increasingly 

bother the Kremlin. Belarus is far from this region, but 

Moscow hoped Minsk could play a role as part of the 

broad military alliance of post-Soviet states. Minsk 

understood it still had geopolitical/military value, at 

least in the eyes of some members of the Russian elite. 

Minsk started to act accordingly, making it increasingly clear that it might not be an ally any longer. Certainly Belarus would not engage in military ventures 

at Russia’s request. Moreover, Lukashenko sent the 

message that he could abandon the military alliance 

with Russia completely and drop all security arrangements in which Russia was involved. At its February 

2009 meeting, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO or Organizatsiia Dogovora o Kollektivnoi 

Bezopasnosti [ODKB]—the loose military alliance of 

former republics of the USSR—launched the Forces of 

Rapid Response (Kollektivnye suly operativnogo reagirovaniia). Belarus was formally part of the CSTO, but 

Lukashenko ignored the meeting.25

In an apparent response to the dairy ban, Lukashenka 

also refused to participate in the [CSTO] meeting . . . 
14

in Moscow on 14 June. Lukashenka’s step was particularly unexpected since he had repeatedly emphasized 

the importance of military cooperation with Russia 

and asserted that Belarus and Russia had never experienced any problems in this area.26

Lukashenko also noted that he could hardly explain to citizens a reason for serving and dying for 

Russia, which constantly increased economic pressure 

over Belarus.27 In an interview in Izvestiia, 

Lukashenko seemed to suggest that he opposed deeper 

integration into a military alliance whose seven members include four Central Asian states. ‘Why should 

my men fight in Kazakhstan? Mothers would ask me 

why I sent their sons to fight so far from Belarus. For 

what? For a unified energy market? That is not what 

lives depend on. No!’ he was quoted as saying.28

Lukashenko also made clear in the summer of 2009 

that his relationship with Russia was not a true alliance in which allies support each other regardless of 

consequences. He regarded it in purely pragmatic, 

mercenary terms. Belarus was defending Russia only 

because it was being paid, and could break any relationship if Russia did not pay or especially created 

problems for Belarus. In a summer 2009 interview, he 

discussed various areas of the Balarus/Russia relationship.

Lukashenka also admitted Belarus had agreed to form 

a joint air defense system with Russia under pressure 

from Moscow and indicated Russia should compensate Belarus for the protection of its western border, 

saying: ‘Do you think that the 10 million people (the 

population of Belarus) who stand as a shield before 

Moscow, that they are free of charge? This is priceless.’ 
15

He stated that after ‘pumping out of Belarus $10 billion due to higher gas prices . . . you gave me a $2 billion loan at an outrageous interest rate, while the IMF 

gave a loan that is three times more advantageous!’29

Nevertheless, after much procrastination, Lukashenko decided to follow Moscow’s requests. He signed 

the agreement to create the Forces of Rapid Response 

in October 2009,30 and a big Russian/Belarusian military maneuver took place at the same time. 

Yet Minsk made clear that it did not regard these 

maneuvers or the military alliance with Russia as important. “Belarusian TV networks made but passing 

mention of the largest Belarusian/Russian military 

exercise in 25 years.”31 Moscow also sent a signal that 

it regarded the maneuvers—in fact, the entire military 

cooperation with Minsk—as of no great importance 

and rejected Minsk’s request for a loan at the same 

time the maneuvers were taking place.32 Lukashenko 

was clearly upset, for he expected payment for loyalty, and he showed this in the winter of 2009. The upheaval in Kyrgyzstan provided additional chances to 

demonstrate both unwillingness to follow Moscow’s 

requests and the basic unworkability of all post-Soviet 

security arrangements in which Moscow had played 

the leading role. Lukashenko used the upheaval to 

demonstrate that integration of Commonwealth of 

Independent States (CIS, or Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimykh 

Gosudarstv [SNG] countries) is not plausible and that 

the CSTO does not work.33 Lukashenko’s message that 

it was not going to be Russia’s ally implied that in certain cases, it could be Russia’s enemy. 
16

Belarus and Georgia: The Way to Demonstrate the 

Feelings Toward Moscow.

Lukashenko’s foreign policy was, in most cases, 

quite pragmatic, with no motivation except economic 

benefits. In this respect, he was similar to the leaders 

in Moscow, for whom cash ruled supreme in most 

foreign policy decisions. But in a few cases, Lukashenko made a foreign policy step just to demonstrate 

bad feeling toward the Kremlin. His relationship with 

the Mikheil Saakashvili regime in Tbilisi, Georgia, is 

a good example. Moscow actually wanted to remove 

the regime in Tbilisi and expected some support 

among the states in post-Soviet space. None of them 

supported Moscow in this. Absolutely isolated, Moscow was anxious to get support. Indeed, it expected 

Minsk to support it, but Lukashenko did not. This was 

an unpleasant surprise for the Kremlin.34

Later, when Russia recognized Abkhazia and 

South Ossetia, Moscow made clear to Minsk that it 

regarded recognition of the two republics—now Russian protectorates—as an important prerequisite for a 

good relationship between the two countries. Minsk 

decided not to comply. 

Belarus also has not followed Russia’s lead in recognizing the independence of the Georgian breakaway 

regimes of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity said last week that he 

would like to join a union state formed in the 1990s 

between Russia and Belarus. Analysts said Thursday 

that Lukashenko would keep any bargaining chips to 

himself and that talk of the separatist regions joining 

the Russia-Belarus Union was premature.35
17

Lukashenko incorporated his reluctance to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the broad context of his relationship with Russia: “Belarus refused 

to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and 

Abkhazia and refused to attend the 15 June Collective 

Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) meeting,”36 and 

Lukashenko confirmed commentators’ earlier speculations “that the recent souring of relations stems from 

Russia’s demands that Belarus recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia and sell its dairy industry to Russian 

companies.”37 In November 2009, a Belarusian delegation visited Georgia as if to demonstrate Minsk’s 

defiance of Moscow.38 By the summer of 2010, when 

Minsk’s relationship with Moscow deteriorated even 

more, Lukashenko turned to Tbilisi to demonstrate his 

displeasure with the Kremlin. On July 15, Saakashvili 

made a presentation on Belarusian TV. He praised 

Belarus for not recognizing Abkhazia and Southern 

Ossetia, and pointed out that both Georgia and Belarus are victims of Russian imperial ambitions.39 The 

relationship between Lukashenko and the Kremlin 

was clearly increasingly hostile and has continued so 

to the present (the fall of 2011). Moscow recognized 

Lukashenko’s re-election and even provided loans for 

building a nuclear power plant, but soon returned to 

its usual model. The conflicts over oil/gas prices resumed. Moscow proclaimed that Lukashenko’s policy 

should be blamed for Belarus’s currency devaluation 

and sharp increase in prices. Russian TV invariably 

took the side of anti-Lukashenko demonstrators. Indeed, only Saakashvili has the same “honor.” 
18

The Conflict between Lukashenko and Medvedev.

The economic and geopolitical conflict between Belarus and Russia led to personal acrimonies. By 2009, 

the media of both countries were engaged in an information war. When the Medvedev/Putin team started 

a personal attack on Lukashenko, he reciprocated. 

Mutual accusations and trade restrictions appear to 

have triggered an unprecedented crisis in BelarusRussia relations, and contrary to the usual practice, 

the Belarusian and Russian leaders personally blamed 

one another for the souring of ties. In addition, the Belarusian Government paper editorially attacked Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin by name.40

Indeed:

Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenka undertook an unprecedented attack on the Kremlin in his 

interview with editors of several Russian newspapers. 

Contrary to his usual habit, Lukashenko assailed Putin personally and accused him of lying and denying 

he had given a verbal order prohibiting Russian governors from purchasing Belarusian equipment.41

Moscow reciprocated. On July 4, 2010, the Russian state TV channel showed the documentary movie 

Godfather Little Father (Krestnyi Bat’ko), which presented Belarus as a country in deep crisis and Lukashenko 

as plainly a criminal.42 The semi-official English language channel Russia Today presented a similar antiLukashenko movie, Outrageous Luka (Nevynosimyi 

Luka).43 In response, Respublika, the official newspaper 

of the Belarusian Council of Ministers, published the 

Boris Nemtsov report. (In 2009, Nemtsov, one of Russia’s leading liberal politicians, had published a highly 
19

critical report, according to which Russia’s economic 

and social disintegration continued unabated under 

Putin, and corruption had become an essential aspect 

of Russian life.44) 

By late summer/fall of 2010, the accusations were 

increasingly acrimonious. In August, the media controlled by the Kremlin published a report saying Lukashenko was mentally ill, and in October, Medvedev 

blasted him as dishonest and threatened economic and 

political sanctions.45 A month later, Medvedev repeated his critical remarks.46 Lukashenko, usually prompt 

in response to personal accusations, continued to reciprocate with invectives against the Kremlin. With 

approaching elections and intensifying conflict, Lukashenko became bitter. He stated in an interview that 

Medvedev and Putin behaved as dictators and could 

not stand independent people. Lukashenko claimed 

that they wanted to centralize power in their hands, 

which was the reason they had dismissed the leaders 

of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Kalmykia, and Yuri 

Luzhkov, Mayor of Moscow. They wanted to dismiss 

him and absorb Belarus as a powerless province. But 

it would never happen.47

The conflict between Lukashenko and the Putin/

Medvedev team did not make them sworn enemies 

forever or mean that cooperation between Minsk and 

Moscow would be excluded. Even at the heart of the 

conflict, Belarus and Russia were part of the military alliance and formally constituted “union state.” And recently Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan formed a “custom union.” Other scenarios are also possible. Moscow 

could finally, indeed, absorb Belarus, making it an independent protectorate like South Ossetia/Abkhazia. 

This would considerably increase Russia’s power in 

East Europe, not in the Eurasian/Soviet mode, but in 
20

the classic 19th century neo-imperial fashion. This scenario would not preclude Russia’s influence diminishing in other areas. China could increase its influence in 

the Far East and Siberia, and potentially chip off those 

regimes from Russia. There are even more bizarre scenarios. Lukashenko continued to be popular among 

scores of Russian radical nationalists and others who 

opposed the regime and believed that in a major crisis, 

Lukashenko could emerge as leader of both Belarus 

and Russia. The combinations were virtually endless. 

The most likely scenario, at least at present, is that Belarus with or without Lukashenko, will be firmly attached to Russia, at least in the foreseeable future. But 

the fact that Lukashenko has lost his belief in Russia 

as a major Belarusian patron and ally opens the gates 

for other possibilities. One of them could be called the 

“Western option.”

WESTERN DIRECTION: THE FIRST STEPS

Lukashenko, or whoever succeeds him, could well 

shift Belarus’s attention to the West, or more precisely, to certain segments of the West. One opportunity is possible rapprochement with the European 

Union (EU). A visible part of the Belarusian elite and 

masses see Belarus as part of the West, and in their 

vision of the past, Russia has been Belarus’s primordial enemy from the dawn of modern history.48 “‘The 

European Vector of Belarus’ Development [was well] 

articulated in the programs of the democratic opposition.”49 These pro-Western elite have not been silent. 

Still, even with Lukashenko in Minsk, rapprochement 

with the West is not excluded. Even when Lukashenko started his flirtation with Russia, he did not burn 

his bridges, and indicated that if his relationship with 
21

Russia went awry, he would always have an alternative—the West. This possibility emerged early, and 

flirtation with the West increased with Putin’s advent 

and the worsening of Russian/Belarusian relations. In 

the summer of 2002, Putin implied that Belarus could 

join Russia, but just as one of many provinces. Belarus 

could not be unified with Russia as an equal, because 

its economy is miniscule in comparison with Russia’s; 

indeed, Belarus survives only because of generous 

Russian subsidies. Lukashenko responded promptly. 

He asserted that Minsk could turn to the West. In July 

2002, Lukashenko retaliated with a proven tactic. At 

a Belarusian Security Council meeting, he invoked 

a “new architecture of international security” in Europe, with prospects of closer interaction with NATO. 

“He suggested Belarus would pursue a multi-vector 

foreign policy. He would not go against the tide, and 

considered it unacceptable to turn his country into a 

front-line state or even a buffer zone. He offered concrete actions, with a view to resuming cooperation in 

2002-03 in NATO’s Partnership Program in the following areas:

• Military research and technologies;

• Removal of land mines;

• Nonproliferation of nuclear, chemical, and 

bacteriological weapons; and,

• Improving small arms and light weapons 

control.”50 

Some authoritative Belarusian observers also believed Lukashenko could indeed turn to the West and 

that this could change the balance of power in Europe. 

“Dr. Shevtsov argued that under the circumstances, 

Belarus was likely to develop a closer relationship 
22

with the West, which would entail certain consequences that Russia would not like:

• Dismantlement of the radar stations near Baranovichi and Vileika;

• End of the close military cooperation with Russia and even letting some NATO structures in;

• Introduction of a guarded border with Russia 

as a precondition for the application for EU 

membership;

• Reorientation of trade and economic exchange 

from Russia to the EU; and,

• Growth of Western ideological influence—Catholicism, Protestantism, liberalism, etc.”51

Shvetsov made this pronouncement in early 2002, 

and in November the forecast seemed to materialize—Lukashenko said he was willing to personally 

head the Belarusian delegation to the NATO summit 

in Prague in late November: 

The Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that 

Minsk had submitted a request for an entry visa for 

Alexander Lukashenko. Quite surprised, NATO representatives responded by saying that although Lukashenko had never taken part in similar events and 

had been an adamant detractor of the North Atlantic 

structures in the past, Belarus was a formal member 

of the North Atlantic Partnership Organization, and 

therefore, there were no grounds to deny a visa to the 

Belarusian leader.52

The relationship with Moscow deteriorated sharply after Lukashenko made his intention to look toward 

the West. In a 2007 interview, he stated: 

We will now use every opportunity to promote relations with the West. Why should we squabble? At first, 

we supplied you with 85% of your Russian goods, and 
23

our exports to the West were many times smaller. 

Now we are giving you 36% of our products and sending 45% to the West. If they push us on oil, we will 

upgrade our refineries and will achieve even deeper 

conversion, although ours is already 50% deeper than 

in Russia. We will sell the product of conversion to the 

West in order to overcome the shortages which you 

are creating for us.53

In overtures toward the West, Lukashenko meant 

not just Europe—it is only Europe with which Belarus could really trade—but also the United States. 

He made a clear statement about an American option 

in case of continuous conflict with Russia and said 

America had already made overtures.54 The suggestion was that Belarus could even engage in military 

cooperation with the United States/NATO. 

Lukashenko hinted about the possibility of such 

an arrangement in several ways while engaging in the 

conflict with Russia. The Russian ambassador in Belarus stated that Russia could place nuclear weapons 

in Belarus.55 By not responding, Lukashenko sent the 

message that not only would he not allow this, but he 

could move in the opposite direction to provide places for Western bases if Russia increased its pressure. 

Elaborating on the possibility, Lukashenko in another 

interview said that Russia takes strategic cooperation 

with Belarus for granted and uses bases in Belarus for 

free; he implied that this could be changed.56 He has 

hinted that this arrangement could upgrade NATO’s 

position against Russia.57

Lukashenko’s flirtation with Europe is not opposed 

by many Belarusians. Indeed, the desire to join Europe seemed to be shared by a considerable segment 

of the Belarusian population early on. The chance to 

join the West—Western Europe, the United States, or 
24

both—was not necessarily predicated on a change of 

regime in Minsk. Already during the 2006-07 oil/gas 

crisis, members of the Western elite hinted that they 

understood Belarus’s predicament and were ready to 

embrace Lukashenko despite all the problems with 

Minsk. 

Lukashenko as an Ally of the West.

Pondering Minsk’s options, one could well assume 

that rapprochement with the West is not impossible. 

That the relationship was not stable indicated that no 

one should regard sudden cooling or warming as an 

irreversible decision; both sides, while contemplating 

a new step, could well ignore previous statements and 

actions. In the 1990s, the EU and the United States introduced sanctions against Belarus. This hostility was 

mostly caused by Lukashenko’s increasing gravitation toward Moscow and the corresponding cooling 

of the Russian-American/Western relationship. At 

the first signs of Belarusian friction with Russia, Brussels stretched Minsk an olive branch; in May 2004, Belarus was included by the EU in the program “Eastern 

Partnership.”58

After a few years, Lukashenko and many other Belarusian officials were declared persona non grata and 

could not enter EU countries. At that point, EU emphasis was on support of the Belarusian opposition.59

But these unfriendly actions toward Lukashenko coexisted with other quite opposite ones. In this context, 

Lukashenko emerged as a politician with whom the 

West could deal. 

Observing Lukashenko’s clash with Moscow in 

2006-07, some pundits suggested Belarus could be a 

Western ally, or at least could improve its relationship 
25

with the West considerably. For some observers, this 

would not require much from Minsk. Lukashenko 

should behave in a civilized way and not take gas 

destined for Europe, even when upset with Moscow. 

Europe could easily teach Minsk the basic etiquette of 

international engagement. Jan Maksymiuk suggested 

that “it might well be in Europe’s interest to enter a 

dialogue with the erratic Belarusian leader and try 

to persuade him that Belarus could remain a sovereign country without playing the role of bandit on the 

road.”60 Other observers were even clearer in support 

of Lukashenko. Indeed, even conservative Europeans 

admitted with satisfaction Lukashenko’s overtures toward the West: 

[R]ecent statements by the Belarusian president, Lukashenko, suggest a sudden turn to the West. His 

newfound interest in rapprochement and Russia’s 

tougher policy has left Lukashenko scrambling to expand his options. He has used the energy dispute itself 

as an opening, vowing “never to forget” the support 

and decency that both the USA and Europe showed at 

the height of the gas price standoff.61

Blessing from Washington.

Not only Europeans were ready to provide Lukashenko with a blessing. Quite a few people on Capitol Hill suddenly discovered positive features in the 

regime. The reason for this change of attitude was 

clear enough. By the end of Putin’s first term, which 

roughly coincided with the end of Bush’s term, the 

American relationship with Russia had reached a new 

low, and both countries were, if not in a new Cold 

War, at least in an extremely chilly peace. 

All this helps explain why, by the time of the 

Minsk/Moscow clashes, some people in Washing-
26

ton saw positive features in Lukashenko. Despite the 

shortcomings of his authoritarian nature,62 he was 

viewed as a positive individual because he protected 

Belarus from Russian imperialism. There were plenty 

of critics of Minsk. Still, the emphasis of most of those 

in editorial offices and apparently on Capitol Hill was 

to praise Lukashenko and blame Putin. A Washington 

Post editorial’s overtures toward Lukashenko were 

quite obvious: “Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko is widely known as Europe’s last dictator. 

What’s less well known is that he has been resisting pressure from Russia to annex his country.”63 The 

editorial stated that Putin’s imperial ambitions had become clear when he outlined conditions under which 

the two countries would merge: Belarus was to adopt 

the Russian ruble and turn over the gas pipeline. But 

Lukashenko, who once dreamed that the union would 

propel him toward becoming leader of both countries, 

changed his mind when he realized he was on his way 

to becoming a provincial governor. He has resisted 

yielding the pipeline or abandoning his country’s sovereignty. The editorial concluded: 

Mr. Lukashenko’s disillusionment with Russia might 

make him wish for better relations with the West. But 

as the European Union recently reiterated, that would 

require steps to democratize his country, something 

the strongman has shown no inclination to do. Still, 

Mr. Lukashenko’s assertion of Belarusian sovereignty 

and independence could open the way to reform. 64

Washington Post observers accused Moscow of “energy imperialism” and implicitly took the Belarusian 

side.65 Even the conservative Wall Street Journal found 

a kind word: “The West might not have wanted to 

stick up for ‘Europe’s Last Dictator,’ but leaving him 
27

out to dry only entrenches the Russians in Belarus. 

They will be far more difficult to expel from Minsk 

than Mr. Lukashenko ever could be.”66

BALTIC RESPONSE

While West and Central Europeans, and even 

Americans, in general, took Lukashenko’s side in his 

conflict with Moscow, it was even more the case with 

East Europeans, including those who had been part of 

the USSR in the not-so-distant past. 

In the eyes of some East Europeans, Belarus was 

a small country, harassed by powerful neighboring 

Russia. Moreover, some of Moscow’s policies also 

had a negative implication for those East European 

countries. Russia’s plan to build a pipeline along the 

bottom of the Baltic Sea that would bypass the Baltic 

states, Poland, and Belarus made all of them apprehensive. Lukashenko shared with these states a strong 

aversion to the pipeline plan. He called it a stupid idea 

and declared it could be easily blown up by explosive 

materials that remain on the sea bottom from World 

War II. And this implied that East Europeans, especially the Baltic states, should cooperate with Belarus, 

or at least avoid a directly aggressive policy toward it. 

At the beginning of the Moscow/Minsk split, Lukashenko was still associated with Russia. East Europeans, including people in the Baltic states, tried to 

demonstrate their loyalty to the West and harshness 

toward Minsk. Lithuania, for example, made Lukashenko a persona non grata.

67 But, along with Ukraine, 

Lithuania became pleased that, according to Russian 

commentators, the “Belarusian regime” was “becoming more and more anti-Russian.”68 Lithuania shared 

with Lukashenko concern over Russia’s use of oil to 
28

pressure them,69 and it seems that at least some were 

willing to accept Lukashenko’s overtures. In fact, Lithuania’s opposition to Lukashenko was not as strong as 

Moscow wished, and Minsk and Kiev were engaged 

in a search for alternatives to Russian gas and oil.70

All these common interests and feelings gave Belarus 

tacit, informal incorporation into the community of at 

least some East European nations. Moreover, the ties 

between Belarus and some of these states could well 

improve in the future. 

Thus, Lukashenko’s tacit acceptance into the European family was not absolutely impossible,71 even at 

the beginning of his conflict with Russia. Remember 

that Joseph Stalin became a benign “Uncle Joe,” and 

Mao Tse Tung was accepted by President Richard Nixon as a peer. Lukashenko—especially if he had made a 

conciliatory gesture toward the West and his relationship with Russia deteriorated farther—could easily 

have been accepted by the EU or the United States or 

both. While marriage—at least one of geopolitical convenience—between a unified West (or at least part of 

it) was not impossible in the years of Minsk’s conflict 

with Moscow (2006-07), it seemed even more plausible 

in the future when the Minsk–Moscow relationship 

deteriorated apparently to a point of no return. The 

Baltic states were especially eager to reach a hand to 

Minsk for several reasons. First, at least some of them 

regarded Belarus as a small state sandwiched between 

strong powers. Lukashenko, in that case, could easily 

be transformed from a dictator, to, if not the champion 

of democracy, at least a quite acceptable ruler.72 Lukashenko's apparent transition to that of a “prodigal 

son” to Europeans would be especially easy if he offered “something like a Gorbachevian perestroika.”73

But even if nothing changed, the Baltic states com-
29

pared Belarus’s situation with their own. Furthermore 

they saw Belarus as a partner in possible oil/gas deals.

Alliance of Gas and Oil: The Lithuanian Case.

Russia’s desire to build a “North Stream” to deliver Russian gas directly to Germany, and Germany’s 

acceptance of the offer despite Baltic state protests, solidified for their elite and masses, at least considerable 

segments of them, the view that the Western and EU 

partners are not much different from Moscow. That 

Moscow and Berlin struck the deal at the expense of 

East Europe, and the Baltic states in particular, undoubtedly awoke images from the past. The events of 

the late 1930s were no doubt called to mind not just 

for Poles, but for the Baltic people, the time when 

Nazi Germany and Stalinist USSR joined to absorb the 

small states of Eastern Europe and the Baltic into their 

totalitarian empires. In the context of this imagery, Belarus is also a victim of the great powers of the West 

and East. Not only did this make the Baltic states more 

predisposed to Minsk than to Washington and Brussels, but it gave them an incentive to cooperate with 

Minsk. Some did so even before the oil/gas problems. 

Lithuania engaged in collaboration with Minsk 

more actively than the others, even in the 1990s, when 

Belarus’s merging with Russia seemed almost a done 

deal. The relationship was probably approved by 

Brussels, which regarded Lithuania as a potential gobetween. In 2009, Lukashenko visited Lithuania—his 

first visit to a European country after isolation since 

199574—a visit implicitly approved by the EU. In 2009, 

President Dalia Grybauskaitė herself visited Belarus. 

In Vilnius, Lukashenko could discuss subjects such 

as transferring Venezuelan oil through Lithuanian 
30

ports.75 The relationship developed smoothly despite 

occasional problems. For example, Lithuania demanded that Belarus deport to Lithuania General Vladimir 

Ushkopchik , a former deputy to the Belarusian Minister of Defense. Lithuanian authorities accused him 

of involvement in a fight in Vilnius on January 13, 

1991, in which 14 men were killed. Belarus refused 

Vilnius’ request,76 but contact continued as if nothing had happened. Moreover, Belarus and Lithuania 

signed an agreement for military cooperation, the first 

Belarus had signed with a NATO country. President 

Grybauskaitė stated that Lithuania would defend Belarusian interests in the EU.77 The Lithuanian Minister 

of Defense noted that Belarusian military cooperation with Moscow still concerned Vilnius, and that it 

should cooperate with Minsk to be informed about 

military maneuvers near its borders—maneuvers that 

had a “very interesting scenario.”78

The close cooperation between the two countries 

predictably led to a positive assessment of Lukashenko’s rule by Lithuanian leadership. Grybauskaitė 

stated she believed Lukashenko was supported by 99 

percent of the population, but that Lukashenko would 

arrange only 75 percent of the vote to please the EU.79

The reason for such an appraisal was not so much for 

military or other cooperation, as for an oil/gas deal. 

Like other East Europeans, Lithuanians depended on 

gas from Moscow and desperately wanted to diversify their supply lines. Lithuania also does not have 

its own oil. Belarus has quite a good relationship with 

Iran and Venezuela with their rich oil/gas deposits. 

Iran and Venezuela are sworn enemies of the United 

States, and good relationships with them could hurt 

Lithuania’s relationship with the United States. Belarus could play the role of intermediary, so Lithuania 
31

was anxious to engage in an oil/gas deal with Belarus. 

By the fall of 2010, Belarus and Lithuania had set out 

to build a sea terminal for liquid gas, which could 

have profound implications for Gazprom—Russia’s 

main gas company. Belarus was among the three top 

customers for Russian gas. Moreover, demand for gas 

was declining in Europe.80

The Latvian Direction.

Lithuania was not the only Baltic member of NATO 

and the EU that was happy to flirt with Belarus, even 

when neither Brussels nor Washington was pleased 

with their actions. Again, their major reason for dealing with Minsk was the desire to cooperate on gas and 

oil. Washington’s and Brussels’s approach was controversial. They could well be displeased with Baltic 

states’ actions if these went against their own policies, 

and in this case, the actions of Baltic states’ elites could 

be considered a sort of geopolitical disobedience. But 

these states had a variety of reasons for not burning 

all the bridges with Minsk, and the same states could 

play the role of mediators if Washington or Brussels 

decided to test the waters with Minsk. Latvia was 

apparently chosen as a possible bridge. This was the 

reason neither Washington nor Brussels objected to a 

Belarus rapprochement with Latvia. 

Latvia’s reason was similar to that of the other 

Baltic states—Belarus was seen as important for oil/

gas deals. Latvia was anxious to use Belarusian connections to receive Venezuelan oil or at least benefit 

from its transfer to Belarus. During Lukashenko’s September 2009 visit, the subject was discussed in detail. 

By the end of September, Latvian ministers regarded 

cooperation with Belarus as quite a viable enterprise. 
32

According to Minister of Transport Kaspars Gerhards, 

Latvian companies were ready to cooperate with Belarus and offer their terms: “Our businessmen in the 

Ventspils and Riga ports are truly interested. Now 

they are preparing their capabilities for carrying out 

projects.” He added that it is up to Belarus to make 

the final decision: “We believe that Belarus can choose 

the best way to transport oil from Venezuela from 

the financial and technical points of view. We are 

ready for cooperation.” Speaking about oil transportation, Gerhards reminded his audience that Belarus 

transports oil from Venezuela, with transshipment to 

Ukraine, Lithuania, and Estonia. Transportation tariffs for Belarus are the same in Ukraine and Lithuania. 

“Now we are negotiating the possibility of Venezuelan oil transshipment via Ventspils and Riga. The 

decision depends on what tariffs we are offered. The 

oil will flow where the terms are most competitive.” 

The Minister added that there would be no problems 

transporting oil by railroad.81 Lukashenko was much 

encouraged by this sign of cooperation, and made the 

point clearly enough. Latvia not only could help Belarus get Venezuelan oil, but could also sell this oil to 

other Baltic states. Another interpretation of Lukashenko’s comments could be that Belarus itself could sell 

Venezualian oil to the Baltic states.82

Estonian Connection.

Estonia has less of a relationship with Belarus than 

do the other Baltic states. The reasons are manifold. 

Tallinn had the most uncompromised views of Moscow. Following the demise of the USSR, resentment 

was so high in Estonia that it might have been the 

only state in Eastern Europe not only to remove the 
33

monument of a Soviet soldier from its original place, 

but actually to transfer the physical remains of Red 

Army soldiers beneath the monument. Tallinn had 

conducted often bluntly discriminatory policy toward 

Russian-speaking—mostly ethnic Russian—Estonian 

residents. Estonia was also perhaps more anxious to 

be integrated into the EU than other Baltic states, and 

was the only one accepted into the Euro zone. Belarus, 

a Slavic state closely associated with Russia for a long 

time, was hardly a country that excited Tallinn. But 

the smell of oil/gas pushed Tallinn closer to Minsk, 

especially when Minsk’s relationship with Moscow 

soured and Estonia started to perceive Belarus—not 

as a Russian satellite, but—as a small European country bullied by a much bigger neighbor. Minsk did not 

discard the chance for cooperation with Tallinn, and 

Lukashenko stated that Belarus planned to transfer 

some Venezuelan oil through Estonia.83 The desire of 

some East European states to cooperate with Belarus 

did not diminish much even after the cooling of the 

EU/U.S. relationship with Minsk.

What is the implication of Minsk’s relationship 

with the West? First, it demonstrates the ease with 

which Minsk moved from one center of power (Moscow), so recently its geopolitical patron, to the West. 

Lukashenko not only planned to engage in close relationships with Western countries—Moscow itself was 

eager to do the same—but threatened to help NATO 

upgrade its military capabilities on Russia’s western 

borders. Such a threat would have been unthinkable 

in the Soviet era. Even Romania, with all its flirtations with the USSR’s enemies, never threatened to 

leave the Warsaw Pact, much less let a NATO military 

installation be built in its territory. The reason was 

simple: The Brezhnev doctrine would be immediately 

employed with Soviet troops invading Romania. 
34

Soviet-type actions in the era of bipolarity would 

also be quite decisive, but post-Soviet Moscow could 

not do much. It is possible that in the wake of the 2008 

Georgia/Russia War, Moscow thought to engage in 

regime change in Minsk. But the people in the Kremlin assumed these actions would be quite risky. The 

problem was not so much NATO’s response—most 

likely both Washington and Brussels would be acquiescent—but Belarus’s resistance. Lukashenko’s flirting 

with the West clearly demonstrated Moscow’s weakness, but also that the West could not be the absolute 

pole of gravity it was in the early post-Cold War era. 

Some segments of the Western establishment—in both 

Washington and Brussels—were clearly pleased by 

the tension between Minsk and Moscow, but they did 

not make Lukashenko a full-fledged ally. The popular explanation is that the West was concerned with 

Lukashenko’s authoritarianism. The role of his human 

rights transgressions should not, however, be overestimated. The West—Washington, for example—dealt 

with a variety of authoritarian/totalitarian rulers 

from Mao to the Shah of Iran, if geopolitical necessity 

required it. The West could overthrow legitimately 

elected leaders, such as President Salvador Allende 

in Chile by General Augusto Pinochet. Thus, human 

rights transgressions were hardly the major reason. 

The point was that in case of a complete break with 

Russia, Lukashenko would demand considerable economic help from the West to compensate for the final 

divorce. Neither Washington nor Brussels had enough 

spare cash to do this. Other problems prevented the 

West from detaching Minsk from Moscow completely. 

The West was divided, not only by friction between 

the United States and the EU, but in Europe itself. For 

example, quite a few people in the Baltic states and 
35

other East European countries became suspicious and 

often bitter, not only toward Russia but toward the 

great Western powers, to which they often attributed 

their misery. Many of them saw Belarus as a fellow 

small state squeezed between powerful nations; Belarus could understand the small East European states 

better than could the great powers of the East or West. 

The possible collapse of Lukashenko’s regime might 

bring pro-Western forces to power. Still, if this happened, it most likely would benefit not so much an 

abstract “West” as some segments of the West—most 

likely the small powers of East/Central Europe—unless of course, the EU, with Germany/France at the 

helm, had unmatchable economic clout. Absolute 

dominance of the West or any of its segments in Belarus is rather unlikely. The West would be competing 

with not just Russian, but also Asian, influences.

ASIAN DIRECTION

While Belarus’s troubled relationship with Brussels, Washington, and Moscow is much discussed in 

both the West and Russia, its relationship with Asia 

has fallen from the radar screen. One reason is that 

Russia and the Western powers are not fully cognizant 

of the geopolitical shift in which Asian powers became 

able not only to fend for themselves and stand against 

European—both West and East—and American pressure, but to engage in geopolitical maneuvers far from 

their traditional power base. The situation with the 

Westerners and Russians was analogous to the way 

the mighty Mogul emperors had watched the British. Asian rulers could not imagine that newcomers 

from such a distant land could challenge their power. 

Westerners and Russians could not be fully cognizant 
36

that Asia—which has absorbed the technological and 

scientific gadgets of the West—would emerge in a 

geopolitical space so far from their traditional power 

base. Yet, this had already happened, and Belarus’s 

relationship with Iran and China underscored it. Belarus’s relationship with Iran demonstrated that small 

countries ostracized by a major power (the United 

States) could engage in symbiotic and fruitful relationships. Belarus’s relationship with China demonstrated 

how a small European country could receive important support from an Asian power and also provide 

it a launch pad far from China’s traditional sphere of 

influence.

THE IRANIAN EQUATION

Belarus’s relationship with Iran is interesting and 

potentially quite important. It demonstrates the potential for small countries to engage in meaningful relationships, when both have an adversarial relationship 

with great powers. It also demonstrates the limits of 

the influence of great powers. Finally, Iran’s assertive 

policy demonstrates the rising power of Asia at a time 

of continuous, perhaps absolute, decline of the West.

The Early Rapprochement.

The Minsk/Teheran rapprochement started shortly after the collapse of the USSR. Belarus was soon 

led by Lukashenko, who until 2006 looked at Russia 

as practically Belarus’s only geopolitical patron. As 

for Iran, throughout the 1990s, “Eurasianism,” in its 

Aleksandr Dugin interpretation, became increasingly 

popular in Russia, and alliance with Iran was seen as a 

central element of geopolitical policy. It was Iran that, 
37

in Dugin’s view, would secure for Russia the status 

of a great power. The alliance would allow Moscow 

to build a multipolar world or even assure Russia/

Eurasia the global predominance it lost after collapse 

of the USSR. At that time, Minsk’s relationship with 

Teheran could be treated as an aside to major geopolitical activities. Moscow was the center or at least one 

center for Minsk, and in some ways for Teheran as 

well. 

Still, neither Minsk nor Teheran ignored the other. 

Iran and Belarus established diplomatic relations in 

March 1993.84 In 1995, the Belarusian-Iranian Commission for Economic Cooperation was created, and 

a treaty for cultural cooperation was signed. In December 1997, Belarus opened an embassy in Teheran. 

Leonid Rachkov was appointed ambassador and continues in this capacity to the present.85 In 1998, Lukashenko visited Iran.86 Still, according to Ras Suleimenov, 

throughout the 1990s, interactions between Iran and 

Belarus were rather limited. The relationship received 

a great boost a decade later, when the Putin administration proclaimed that Russia should assert itself as a 

great power and confront the United States—with Iran 

as its most important ally. The relationship between 

Minsk and Moscow was still strong at the beginning 

of Putin’s presidency. Thus, the improvement of Teheran/Minsk ties fit well into their relationship with 

Russia. Iran seemed to be most anxious to enhance its 

ties with Belarus, which people in Teheran regarded 

as the way to reinforce their relationship with Russia. 

In 2001, Iran opened its embassy in Minsk.87 In 2002, 

Iranian parliamentarians visited Belarus. By 2002, Belarus openly acknowledged that it had started to sell 

weapons to Iran (most likely with Moscow’s blessing). Indeed, by that time, Moscow had scrapped the 
38

1993 Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement and was selling weapons to Iran on its own. Cultural exchange 

between the two countries continued: In June 2002, 

a Day of Iranian Cinema took place in Belarus, and 

an exhibition of Iranian goods took place in Minsk.88

In 2003, Belarusian parliamentarians visited Iran, and 

Days of Belarusian Culture took place there as well. 

The same year, regular flights from Teheran via Kiev 

started. This helped increase student exchanges, and 

200 students from Iran studied in Belarus. 

Upgrading the Relationship.

The relationship between Belarus and Iran received additional support after the leadership change 

in Iran. President Mohammed Khatami was hailed 

in the West as a liberal—a sort of Iranian Mikhail 

Gorbachev—who would improve Iran’s relationship 

with the West. Khatami, of course, did not mind flirting with the West, but he understood that the West 

would not provide sophisticated weapons nor technological expertise to finish a project like the Bushehr 

nuclear plant. This could be done only by Moscow, so 

Khatami visited Moscow to solidify Russian-Iranian 

ties. Since Minsk was still seen as Moscow’s major 

ally, officially part of the union state, he assumed a 

good relationship with Belarus would not be bad for 

Iran’s relationship with Moscow; indeed, he probably 

believed it would strengthen the relationship. Consequently, in 2004, he visited Belarus. This was, according to a BelTA article, the most important event in the 

development of a Belarusian/Iranian relationship. 

The visit provided a boost to Iranian/Belarusian relations. There were increases in economic cooperation. 

Belarus participated in the 2004 Fourth International 
39

Car Exhibition in Teheran, and opened a car factory 

in Iran. Cultural/scientific contact also increased; in 

2005, Iran participated in the Twelfth Film Festival 

and Days of Iranian Culture in Belarus.

The Arrival of Ahmadinejad.

The arrival of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad led to 

clear changes in Iranian foreign policy. One should, 

of course, not overestimate the break with the past. 

A sort of continuity might be seen in Iranian foreign 

policy since the days of the last Shah. In this view, all 

Iranian rulers dreamed of recreating something like 

the grand Persian Empire of Achaemenides. Still, 

there was a clear difference between these Iranian rulers. The Shah definitely wanted to build a great Iran, 

with the help of the United States and the West in general. Khatami also may have regarded the West as a 

possible Iranian patron, or at least a possible source 

of technological knowhow and funds. The story with 

Ahmadinejad was altogether different. From the beginning, he had a confrontational stance toward the 

West. Teheran’s relationship with Moscow therefore 

became crucial, at least at the beginning. The relationship with Minsk also acquired importance because 

Minsk was still seen as a Moscow ally. Personal contact between Lukashenko and Ahmadinejad definitely 

helped strengthen the Belarus/Iran relationship. In 

2005, Lukashenko met Ahmadinejad in New York at 

the 60th General Session of the United Nations (UN), 

and the two leaders had a sort of mutual chemistry.89

There was also increasing economic cooperation between the two countries. In 2005, for example, an Iranian supermarket (torgovyi tsentr) opened in Belarus.90
40

These early encounters between Minsk and Teheran, while demonstrating the desire of both sides to 

develop a mutual relationship, did not acquire strategic importance as a substitute for their relationship 

with Russia. One could assume that in this early period, Moscow sent approving signals to both Teheran 

and Minsk. Belarus and Iran were part of a strategically important alliance—at least in the view of Eurasianists of Dugin’s type—which provided an opportunity for Russia to confront the United States. Russia 

was also the most important part of the geopolitical 

designs of both Belarus and Iran. By 2006, however, 

the situation started to change considerably.

Building a New Relationship between Teheran and 

Minsk in the Late Putin Era.

The late-Putin era was marked not only by a dramatic worsening of the Belarus/Russian relationship, 

but also a deterioration of Russia’s relationship with 

Iran. As noted, Duginian Eurasianism—which reflected the views of a considerable segment of the Russian elite—regarded the alliance with Iran as the very 

foundation of Russian foreign policy. It was seen as 

the way to make Russia/Eurasia a great power again 

and end American unipolarity. Dugin and the Russian elite whose views he represented believed Russia 

should not only fully support Iran, but sell it sophisticated weapons and even help Iran develop nuclear 

weapons. This Eurasianism apparently became part 

of the Putin elite ideology, and some of its aspects 

even seem to have been put into practice. The GoreChernomyrdia agreement was scrapped, and Moscow 

announced it would send Iran sophisticated weapons. Moscow also assured Teheran it would finish the 

Bushehr nuclear plant. 
41

Yet, by 2006-07, the end of Putin’s first term and 

the time when Russia’s relationship with Belarus 

soured, the Russian/Iranian relationship also started 

to demonstrate clear problems. While Moscow had 

signed an agreement to deliver S-300 missiles, it increasingly procrastinated and found reasons it could 

not deliver them. As for the Bushehr plant, Moscow 

endlessly emphasized that it would finish the project, 

while finding reasons it could not be finished on time. 

Iran accused Russia of “dragging its feet,” and Ahmadinejad apparently sent an unmistakable message of 

displeasure, proclaiming that Russia would collapse 

in the same way as the USSR. This statement was 

made, regardless of the fact that Putin had called the 

collapse of the USSR the greatest tragedy of the 20th 

century. 

Other developments made the Iranians even more 

skeptical about Russian intentions. By the end of the 

Bush presidency, the United States had announced its 

intentions to install anti-missile bases in East Europe, 

along with radar stations to monitor possible problems 

created by “rogue states.” Allegedly the plan was due 

to concern over a possible Iranian missile attack. But 

despite Bush’s assertion that the plan was not directed 

against Russia, Putin became extremely concerned and 

made a proposition to Washington: If the defense system was indeed designed to counter an Iranian threat, 

Russia would offer the United States use of its station 

in Azerbaijan. The proximity of the station to Iranian 

borders would make monitoring Iranian moves much 

easier than from Eastern Europe. Bush rejected Putin’s 

offer, but the proposal showed Iranians how little they 

could trust Russia in the long run. Thus, Russia could 

be seen as a very unreliable ally/supplier. Russia’s 

moves showed that Iran should think about a possible 
42

backup, and Belarus emerged as a valuable alternative. Iran’s desire to embrace Belarus had geopolitical 

and especially military-technological reasons. In fact, 

Iran could well regard Belarus as a country that could 

help Iran upgrade its military capabilities and possibly even develop its nuclear arsenal. 

While Iran had a variety of reasons to embrace 

Belarus, Belarus’s desire was more narrowly pragmatic—a quest for oil/gas. Since 2006, it had been 

clear to Lukashenko that Russia would not provide 

cheap oil/gas, so finding an alternative source was 

the most important goal of his foreign policy. The 

relationship with Iran acquired a new and quite important dimension. From this perspective, one could 

assume that Lukashenko’s visit to Iran in 2006 was 

quite significant. His intention to visit Iran most likely 

emerged as a result of his meeting with Ahmadinejad. 

Lukashenko had seen Ahmadinejad before, at the beginning of the Belarus/Iran rapprochement, and had 

met him again in September 2006 at a meeting of the 

Non-aligned Movement in Havana. The meeting definitely strengthened Belarusian/Iranian cooperation.91

It was most likely that Lukashenko and Ahmadinejad 

discussed their common concern and critical views of 

Moscow and decided Lukashenko should visit Iran to 

further discuss mutual concerns and how Belarus and 

Iran could cooperate more closely. 

The November 2006 visit was important because it 

upgraded the Iranian-Belarusian relationship to a new 

level. It was widely covered by the Belarusian, Russian, and Iranian press.92 The importance of the visit 

for Iran was underlined by the fact that Lukashenko 

was entertained not just by the Iranian president, but 

also by the Supreme Leader, who rarely saw foreign 

dignitaries in Teheran—especially those from non-
43

Muslim countries. It is not surprising that some Belarusian politicians saw the relationship with Iran as one 

of the most important directions in the development 

of Belarusian foreign policy.93 The sense of the significance of the visit was underscored by Lukashenko’s 

invitation to Ahmadinejad to visit Belarus.94 Some 

Russian pundits even claimed that a Teheran-Minsk 

axis was in the making.95

An immediate consequence of the visit was an 

agreement providing Belarusians opportunities to 

work in one of the Iranian oil fields. Belarus would get 

oil from the Iranian field and sell it, rather than buy 

that oil from Russia. As future development would 

show, the process moved rather slowly, but it seems 

to have materialized.96 Belarus and Iran also discussed 

production of electric energy97 and other types of economic cooperation. For example, an Iranian company 

engaged in building a transport-logistic complex in 

Minsk.98 In 2006, Iran also built a car plant in Belarus, 

which proceduced 5,000 cars per year, with the assumption that Europeans would be the major customers.99 Cooperation was not limited to the economy, but 

continued into defense and military matters. 

The increasing cooperation between Iran and Belarus displeased not just Washington but Moscow, 

because it made Belarus less dependent on Russian 

oil/gas.100 This feeling was expressed well by Georgii 

Bovt, a leading Russian journalist, who, while lambasting Belarus for parasitizing on Russian cheap gas, 

also sent a barb to Iran. He stated that “one particular 

characteristic of authoritarian or dictatorial regimes—

whether run by Iranian mullahs or by a former chairman of a Soviet collective farm like Lukashenko—is 

that they are unpredictable. They change the rules of 

the game according to their own whims and wishes, 

and without consultation.”101
44

Despite Russia’s objections, the Iranian parliament 

fully supported strengthening Belarusian/Iranian 

ties.102 The Belarusian parliament did the same.103 Despite the objections of Moscow and Washington, Belarus continues to strengthen its ties with Iran, and Ahmadinejad visited Belarus in May 2007.104 The nature 

of their conversation was not elaborated. One might 

assume a wide range of subjects were discussed, including the international positions of both countries. 

They certainly discussed the chance of a U.S. strike 

against Iran, and their worsening relationships with 

Russia, whom both had regarded as a staunch ally until recently. That foreign policy was a major topic could 

be seen by the follow-up of the meeting; in the fall of 

2007, the foreign ministers met, and Lukashenko and 

Ahmadinejad sent each other greetings in commemoration of the anniversary of the Iranian Revolution.105

Iranian-Belarusian Military Engagement.

The Iranian-Belarusian rapprochement also included military cooperation between the two countries.106 This cooperation was at a high level, and 

Belarusian Minister of Defense Leonid Mal’tsev visited Iran.107 He met with Ahmadinejad and discussed 

cooperation between the two countries. The Russian 

news agency Interfaks asked the Ministry of Defense 

to provide more information about the visit. The request was denied.108 Later Lukashenko also met with 

the Iranian minister of defense.109 Belarus also stated 

that its military cooperation with Iran did not violate 

international laws. But there was a potentially serious 

problem, at least from the point of view of the United 

States, other Western countries, and even Russia. Belarus might help Iran develop nuclear weapons. 
45

To start with, Lukashenko saw no problems in 

Iran’s nuclear ambitions. He made it clear that he 

saw no reason such different countries as Russia and 

Pakistan could have nuclear weapons, and Iran could 

not.110 The legitimacy of Iranian nuclear claims was 

emphasized by an article in the Belarusian press informing readers about American plans for imminent 

attack against Iran.111 It was implied that only nuclear 

weapons could save Iran from an American nuclear 

strike. Logically, Iran had the absolute right to have 

nuclear weapons, and Lukashenko implied Belarus 

could help Iran in the nuclear field. He had stated during his visit to Iran that “there is no subject” in which 

Iran and Belarus could not cooperate.112

While discussing Lukashenko’s directly or indirectly helping Iran in its nuclear ambitions, one should 

remember that he is hardly unique in his view of the 

Iranian nuclear program as harmless or actually justifiable. This belief is apparently shared not only by 

North Korea, with which Iran closely cooperates,113

but by some segments of the French elite, who are not 

averse to Iran as a nuclear power.114 Former French 

President Jacques Chirac stated that he saw no problem in Iran having a couple of nuclear bombs. Later, 

French officials said the President was misunderstood. 

But the statement could be a sort of Freudian slip; it 

indicates that some segments of the European elite 

see a nuclear Iran as a positive phenomenon, a way 

of counterbalancing the United States in the Middle 

East. Belarus helping Iran might not worsen Lukashenko’s standing among the European elites, public 

diplomatic demarches notwithstanding. Moreover, 

Belarus could emerge as an important helper of Iran’s 

nuclear program, replacing Russia, which was becoming more and more alienated from Iran.115 The ques-
46

tion, of course, would be whether Lukashenko could 

provide Iran with the needed expertise.

 One should not dismiss Minsk completely as 

having no expertise and technological prowess. Lukashenko’s Belarus can boast considerable economic 

success, recent economic problems notwithstanding. 

According to some Western reports, “small Belarus, 

the country with practically no natural resources, produces 70% of busses, 60% of tractors, 50% of television 

sets, and 25% of the footwear in the entire CIS.”116 In 

sharp contrast to the majority of countries of the former USSR and Eastern Europe, Belarus has preserved 

its industrial base and may well possess serious technological expertise. From this perspective, Belarus is 

quite different from Russia, where scientific potential 

declined despite improvement in the economy.117 The 

major problem with Russian science was the lack of 

funding; the problem stemmed from the assumption 

that everything should be privatized and bring direct 

economic benefits. Lukashenko preserved the Soviet 

principles of direct state involvement in economic life 

and heavy state subsidies for science. Belarus also, 

perhaps better than Russia, preserved the industrial 

base, without which, some pundits assert, development of hard science would be impossible. 

Thus, Belarus could well help Iran develop its defense industry, including its nuclear ambitions. As 

has been demonstrated, the two countries’ increasing 

gravitation to each other developed simultaneously 

with their tense and unstable relationship with the 

West and increasing isolation from their recent patron 

and ally, Russia. The transition from Putin to Medvedev did not improve the situation. The sense of geopolitical isolation pushed the two countries closer, or 

at least helped them maintain a cordial relationship.
47

The Minsk/Teheran Relationship during the 

Medvedev/Putin Era.

With the formal end of Putin’s first term as president, the relationship between Teheran and Moscow 

became increasingly tense. By 2010, Moscow had 

joined anti-Iranian sanctions. The Bushehr nuclear 

plant had not been launched until the fall of 2011. The 

tensions went along with those between Minsk and 

Moscow, at least until Lukashenko’s December 2010 

re-election. At that time, Minsk and Moscow pretended a return to a friendly relationship. But it was a 

temporary respite, and tension soon resumed. All this 

certainly created additional incentives for Iran and Belarus to increase ties and various types of cooperation. 

Oil/Gas Cooperation in the Medvedev Era.

Minsk’s search for an affordable source of oil/gas 

was the major motivation for maintaining close ties 

with Teheran. Belarus and Iran had entertained plans 

to work together on extracting oil in Iran some years 

earlier. By 2009, there were clear signs of expanding 

previous agreements, or at least visible steps in accomplishing ambitious plans. In May 2009, Ahmadinejad 

visited Belarus and provided new oil fields in Iran.118

The Iranian presidential visit and oil concessions coincided with Russia’s decision to build a new segment 

of the Baltic pipeline, which after completion would 

make it possible for Russia to send oil to Europe and 

bypass Belarus. All this made Minsk’s cooperation 

with Teheran in the oil/gas field especially important. 

Belarusian officials made clear that Belarus wanted to 

increase extraction of oil and gas in Iran.119 In 2009, the 

Iranian company Petroiran and the Belarus oil compa-
48

ny created a joint company, Belpars, for extracting oil 

from Iranian fields.120 It was announced in February 

2010 that the company expected to begin extraction in 

5 months.121

Iran/Belarus economic cooperation was not limited to oil and gas. In 2009, Belarusian and Iranian 

authorities discussed plans for expanding Iranian car 

production in Belarus, and production of Iranian cars 

near Minsk seemed to have increased by 2010.122 At the 

same time, Belarusian cars began to be produced in 

Iran.123 In an additional sign of increasing cooperation, 

Iran planned to open a trade/economic exhibition in 

Minsk, and Belarus participated in the 10th Teheran 

International Industrial Exhibition.124 Belarusian and 

Iranian isolation from their traditional enemy (the 

United States) and friend (Russia) also helped develop 

Minsk-Teheran cooperation. Increasing U.S. attempts 

to isolate Iran financially led to more cooperation 

between Belarus and Iranian banks. In 2008-09, two 

Iranian banks were opened in Belarus.125 In 2010, the 

United States imposed sanctions on several Iranian 

banks—two Iranian banks in Belarus among them. As 

a result, Iranian and Belarusian officials started to discuss using their national currencies in mutual trade.126

Iran has also emerged for Belarus as a market. In 

2009 the two countries increased cooperation in agriculture and other economic fields,127 which clearly 

became a launch pad for Belarus’s attempt to find an 

alternative agricultural market when it encountered 

problems with Moscow in 2010. Apparently, in response to Moscow’s attempts to create problems for 

Belarusian milk and milk products, Minsk delegations 

in Teheran discussed delivery of these products to 

Iran.128
49

Iranian Nuclear Program/Defense and Belarus.

Minsk/Teheran cooperation in defense matters—

as well as the nuclear program—seems to have started 

early on, but only began in earnest in 2006. Working 

together in this sensitive and potentially dangerous 

(for both sides) matter was a sign of increasing trust. It 

also reflected the fact that both countries felt increasingly isolated in relationship to Russia. One must remember that not all Iranian/Belarusian discussions 

on sensitive matters could be expected to lead to practical results. Some were quite possibly attempts to test 

the waters, so to speak, of the other’s commitment and 

trust. Some could be a propaganda show. The discussions around the nuclear plant could serve as an example. By 2010, Iran was increasingly frustrated with 

Russia’s unwillingness to finish the Bushehr project, 

and Iran was aware Belarus wanted to build a nuclear 

plant and was looking for a country to help. The Iranian ambassador noted that Iran would help Belarus 

build nuclear power stations. There was no official response from Minsk.129

The implication was not that it was Iran’s desire to 

help Belarus or even to make money, but to send a message to Russia that Iran was not totally dependent on 

Russian expertise and could finish the Bushehr plant 

itself if Moscow procrastinated longer. Moreover, Iran 

could build nuclear plants in other countries. Minsk 

understood the nature of Teheran’s proposal and so 

plainly ignored it. Yet, it would be wrong to assume 

that all discussions on nuclear/defense matters were 

just for show. There was genuine cooperation between 

Iran and Belarus in such affairs. One sign is the continuous contact between Iranian and Belarusian top military leaders and civil officials. On January 22, 2009, 
50

Belarusian Minister of Defense Leonid Mal’tsev visited Teheran.130 This was apparently his second visit, 

whose importance was highlighted by the increasing 

problems in the Iranian/Russian relationship.

S-300 missiles were crucial for Teheran as a shield 

against possible strikes. Russia and Iran had signed an 

agreement to deliver S-300s several years earlier, and 

Teheran, anxious to get missiles, provided Moscow 

substantial sums in advance. But even before Russia 

officially joined the embargo, it became clear to Teheran that Iran would not get the weapons at all. Belarus 

emerged as a possible substitute source. 

There was also a sign that Belarus regarded Iran 

as an important market for its defense industry. Suleimenov noted that the United States could hardly 

prevent Belarus from cooperating with Iran. Belarus 

already lived, like Iran, in isolation, so U.S. sanctions 

would not make much difference. There was a rumor 

that Belarus had indeed sent several S-300s to Iran, 

though Minsk denied it, and there was no way to confirm its validity. There was also no direct evidence 

that Belarus played a visible role in helping Iran develop a nuclear program, especially with military implications. But the possibility should not be excluded: 

Lukashenko implied he could use the nuclear card in 

certain circumstances. 

In April 2010, Lukashenko noted in a speech that 

Belarus still had hundreds of kilograms of highly enriched uranium. He also stated that the first Belarusian government had made a big mistake in giving up 

a nuclear weapon on Belarusian territory. A nuclear 

weapon is a great treasure, and he would have given 

it up only for a large payment.131 One might state here 

that Minsk could deliver nuclear materials, weapons, 

or any other equipment without outside control. In-
51

deed, in the winter of 2010, Iran and Belarus planned 

to open a direct Teheran-Minsk flight.132 Defense/nuclear issues may also be discussed in the future when 

Lukashenko visits Iran, as he said he expected to do.133

Iranian Connections and Other Countries in the 

Region.

For Belarus a good relationship with Iran became important not just as a goal in itself, but as a 

way to strengthen relationships with other countries 

in the area where Iran has influence. In 2010, Belarus engaged in negotiations with Qatar and Syria as 

potential sources of oil/gas.134 Syria was actually an 

Iranian proxy, and good relations with Teheran definitely helped Lukashenko forge ties with Damascus. 

Lukashenko had visited Turkey, where he discussed 

plans to deliver Iranian oil to Belarus. The oil would 

go to a Turkish port, to a Baltic port, and finally to 

Belarus.135 Iran had recently improved its relationship 

with Turkey as a part of Ankara’s overall strategy of 

drifting from the West, and one could assume that 

Minsk’s relationship with Teheran helped improve its 

relationship with Turkey. Iran’s relationship with Belarus has demonstrated that small countries can stand 

international isolation or even hostility of the major 

powers and successfully support each other economically and geopolitically. 

There is another important implication of the 

Belarus/Iran relationship. It demonstrates the increasing role of Asia in global arrangements. Asian 

powers were beginning to project influence even to 

different continents, as Europe had done with Asia 

centuries before. Elements of this new policy could 

be seen in Iran’s approach to Belarus—in some cases, 
52

Iran emerged not as a partner but as a sort of “older 

brother” geopolitical patron. This relationship could 

be seen most clearly in the China/Belarus interaction.

CHINA DIRECTIONS

Belarus’s relationship with China should be studied in the context of China’s general geopolitical situation. With a huge amount of cash and increasing 

global reach—something it has not experienced for 

centuries—China has engaged in diplomatic offensives far from the traditional sphere of influence of the 

“Middle Kingdom.” China is expanding its influence 

in Africa and Latin America, and economic assistance 

to Belarus would help it establish a foothold in Europe 

that could have important implications for global geopolitics. Indeed, China’s appearance in Belarus might 

in the future be seen akin to the British arriving in India during the 17th century and building Calcutta. At 

the time Calcutta was a small port in a Bengali swamp, 

barely noticeable by the local rulers who hardly saw 

the British as a potential danger, or imagined that this 

was part of the broad plans of strange people from far 

away. Nor did they imagine that in the course of time 

this strange foreign people would be the masters of India. We should not, of course, believe history will repeat itself exactly. Nor should we exclude the possibility that China may encounter problems in the future. 

A serious crisis in China is quite possible, and it is not 

accidental that an American observer called China a 

“fragile superpower.”136 But a continuous rise is also 

quite possible, and expansion of China’s influence in 

Europe—due to its economic clout and the problems 

with European and American economies—should not 

be excluded. China’s relationship with Belarus could 

well be seen as quite important, retrospectively.
53

China has been increasing its engagement with 

Belarus for a long time, with the aim of an economic 

and strategic foothold in Europe. Here, Medvedev 

noted, China employed the strategy it is using in Latin America and Africa, where investments have been 

made without expecting an immediate payoff. Peking 

“made a considerable investment in Asia and Africa 

to have the access to strategic resources in the region 

and receive the other geo-strategic benefits.”137 One 

might add here that this foreign policy was intimately 

related with Chinese socioeconomic arrangements. Its 

semi-totalitarian system and plain economy provided 

the opportunity to engage in generations-long projects 

that would bring tangible benefits only in the distant 

future.

China employed this strategy in Belarus, taking 

advantage of Minsk’s unstable relationship with Russia and the West. China would later play on Belarus’s 

problems with Russia, but that was not the way the 

relationship started. Chinese involvement in Belarus 

emerged early in the 1990s at the beginning of Putin’s 

tenure. Already the Belarusian elite stated that China 

could be an important backup for Belarus and that 

Minsk could develop a good relationship with both 

China and Russia. An official was quoted as saying 

he saw no problems with such a relationship, because 

China and Russia were moving closer to each other.138

The Belarusian elite has an additional reason for moving closer to China. While Lukashenko has a strong 

dislike of Putin’s Russia—actually, all of post-Soviet 

Russia—he has a strong sympathy for China. China 

fascinated him as an example to follow when he became President and most likely even before. He made 

this predisposition known in a 2006 interview with 

Vladislav Fonin of Rossiiskaia Gazeta. Lukashenko stat-
54

ed that he and the Belarusian elite were not dogmatic 

or concerned with the nature of ownership. Quite a 

few enterprises in Belarus were in private hands or 

had other forms of ownership. 

You simply do not know that here today, joint-stock 

companies produce, in my opinion, more than half 

of all products. But not even that is the point. Once 

upon a time, Deng Xiaoping said, ‘It makes no difference what color a cat is so long as it catches mice.’ And 

China has demonstrated this.139

Belarus, Lukashenko noted, had rejected the Western model of political democracy and capitalism and 

accepted the Chinese model. This was the reason for 

Belarus’s stupendous economic achievements. 

Lukashenko had a question for Russia: 

And what do you take pride in? In the fact that what 

ought to be controlled by the state has been placed in 

the hands of just a few persons? In the fact that the 

tastiest morsels of the economy have been given to 

five percent of the population of Russia, and they are 

growing fat today while 95% are impoverished? Maybe in the economy, as in certain other issues, you still 

will have to take your example from Belarus? And we 

will hand it to you, our experience, with pleasure.140

Lukashenko’s belief in the China model continues 

to the present (the fall of 2011). By then, Belarus had 

experienced a severe economic crisis, and quite a few 

of Lukashenko’s critics had lambasted his social and 

economic arrangements as leading to the current conditions. In the critics’ views, only a transformation of 

the economy along market lines could prevent a catastrophe or, if catastrophe was inevitable, cushion 

the blow. Lukashenko rejected this assumption. He 
55

stated that Chinese observers had approved his policies, and if he erred, it was not in giving too much 

power to the state but the contrary—leaning too much 

on market principles. He said he would fully embrace 

the Chinese model, with increasing emphasis on discipline and state control over all aspects of life. Belarus 

should also emphasize as much self-reliance as possible. Lukashenko’s critics mocked what they regarded as his obsession with China. They stated that Belarusians are not Chinese, and they would not accept 

the semi-starving existence and despotic rule of the 

Middle Kingdom. Moreover, Lukashenko’s stress on 

self-reliance, critics argued, resembles not so much the 

Chinese as the North Korean model; and attempts to 

recreate North Korea in Europe would certainly fail. 

Belarus had maintained a good relationship with 

China from the beginning of its existence as an independent state. As with Iran, this interest increased 

dramatically when Minsk’s relationship with Moscow 

soured in 2006. At that time, Beijing, along with Teheran, emerged as a plausible economic and geopolitical 

back-up. While Minsk’s interest in Beijing was quite 

pragmatic and directly related to Belarus’s economic 

predicament, those Belarusian intellectuals who supported Lukashenko provided a sort of political-philosophical spin for Minsk’s steps toward Beijing.

Russian Vladimir Vinnikov, in his contribution 

to Zavtra, a leading Russian nationalistic newspaper, 

noted that Belarusians stated that Russia’s 2006 raising 

of the price of gas delivered to Belarus was treachery 

toward the Belarusian people, who had always been 

faithful to Russia. Russia had played a dirty game. Belarus, Vinnikov stated, could have turned to the West 

and played the same game with Russia. Belarus could 

dissolve its union with Russia and provide territory 
56

for NATO military installations aimed against it. But, 

this would be betrayal of Belarus’s own essence, and 

Belarus would never copy Russia in crass, materialistic, treacherous ugliness. Belarus would not “sell 

its soul for thirty pieces of silver” of economic help, 

so it did not, and would not, turn to the West at the 

expense of Russia. At the same time, Vinnikov stated 

that Belarus was turning toward China. This geopolitical gravitation should not be regarded as treachery, he 

argued, for Belarus’s relationship with China would 

have no negative implications for Russia. It would reaffirm Belarus’s socialist kernel and reinforce Belarus 

both spiritually and economically.141

Beijing responded quite positively to Minsk’s requests. Indeed, China had already given Belarus a 

loan of $1 billion by 2007.142 The Chinese dimensions 

of Belarusian foreign policy were not missed by Russian nationalist observers who support Lukashenko. 

Prokhanov, editor of Zavtra, presented a picture of 

Lukashenko surrounded, the caption says, by “faithful friends“; Chinese leader Hu Jintao was among 

them.143 Loans moved Belarus closer to China and, in 

2007, China started to engage in economic cooperation in earnest.144 In 2008, China and Belarus signed an 

agreement to cooperate in nuclear energy, and some 

Chinese companies expressed interest in building a 

nuclear plant in Belarus.145

In 2009, China provided Belarus with needed 

funds when Russia refused to do so.146 As a matter of 

fact, Lukashenko used China as a trump card in his 

negotiations with Russia. In 2009, Minsk asked Moscow for a loan of $9 billion for a new Russian-built 

nuclear power plant in its western Grodno region. 

Belarus was now asking for $1.5 million of this to be 

paid immediately, Kommersant reported. If Medvedev 
57

does not respond positively, “Minsk was threatening 

to give the tender to another country, possibly China, 

the report said, citing an unidentified Russian government source. Prikhodko did not mention the threat, 

but said progress had been achieved on the nuclear 

project. ‘We are moving forward and [our] positions 

are drawing closer’,” he told reporters.147

Cooperation with China reinforced Lukashenko’s 

belief that the choice of China as an economic model 

made it possible for Belarus to be more successful 

than Russia. In a 2009 interview, he stated that the 

Belarusian economy worked better than the Russian 

economy, because he followed the Chinese model. 

Actually, he noted, the Belarusian model is a sort of 

perfected Chinese model. The Chinese themselves 

acknowledged that. Lukashenko noted that he had 

studied the Chinese model even before his election as 

President. Following that model not only ensured the 

growth of the Belarusian economy but made Belarus a 

predictable and reliable economic partner that would 

always repay its debts. It was not surprising, Lukashenko stated, that he got $3 billion from the Chinese.148

In January 2010:

Chinese Vice-Premier Xi Jinping visited Belarus and 

pledged $10 billion in Chinese investments in addition to a $5.7 billion credit line. The Chinese also bid 

for a stake in Belaruskali, the state potash producer. 

Developing a potash business with the Chinese would 

weaken Russia’s grip on Belarus. Lukashenko has to 

be careful, though, selling too big a stake would give 

the Chinese leverage to demand lower prices.149

In spite of the warnings of skeptics, including proWestern Belarusian intellectuals—hardly excited at 

moving closer to semi-totalitarian China—and Rus-
58

sian elites who had their own eyes on the most juicy 

morsels of the Belarus industrial pie, Minsk regarded 

this improved relationship with China as an economic 

and diplomatic breakthrough. Beijing also most likely 

regarded it as a potentially important advance, for it 

meant a possible geopolitical client in the middle of 

Europe. Economic considerations were probably not 

important. Regardless of motivation, China demonstrated its usual generosity, providing Minsk not 

only with investments, but with $8.8 million as a free 

grant.150

This visit would later serve as a sign of a new upgrading of the Chinese/Belarusian relationship.151

While clearly exploiting the Belarus/Russia split, 

China did not want to antagonize Russia. When the 

Chinese Vice-Premier visited Belarus, he also visited 

Russia, where several agreements were signed.152

While Beijing downplayed the importance of the 

Belarus/China relationship in China’s overall geopolitical posture, Minsk gave it great importance. The 

Chinese delegation’s emphasis was somewhat different from that of their counterparts. The delegation 

did not deny that China’s relationship with Belarus 

brought clear material benefits for Beijing. “The Chinese parliamentarian also drew attention to more 

headway made in the scientific, technical and financial 

cooperation. The two states have been strengthening 

their humanitarian and cultural relationship. Interparliamentary links are vital for bilateral relations in 

the aforesaid areas,” the parliamentarian concluded.153

But the emphasis was not on the economic, scientific, 

or even cultural/humanitarian reasons Beijing developed its relationship with Minsk; the reasons were 

diplomatic and geopolitical:
59

Jiany Shusheng expressed deep gratitude to Belarus 

for the support of the Chinese stance toward the most 

important issues such as state sovereignty, territorial 

integrity, human rights, as well as the issues concerning Taiwan, Tibet and XUAR [the Xinjiang Uyghur 

Autonomous Region]. He also thanked the Belarusian 

head of state for $1 million worth of humanitarian aid 

for China, in view of a devastating earthquake in the 

province of Qinghai.154

In October 2010, Lukashenko visited China, where 

he signed an important agreement. First, China promised to invest $3.5 billion in the Belarusian economy. 

Second, it provided $15 billion in credit, which could 

be repaid in 15-20 years. Lukashenko was clearly 

pleased by the results and the prospect of China’s 

help, and reciprocated in a goodwill gesture. He noted 

that Belarus was also ready to help China in economic 

development and was planning to build a car factory in China.155 Lukashenko understood, of course, 

that Belarus’s contribution to the Chinese economy 

was miniscule, that diplomatic/geopolitical considerations drove China in its relationship with Belarus. He 

proclaimed that economic ties were being reinforced 

by increasing cultural ties. There were 2,000 Chinese 

students in Belarus, and Lukashenko said he would 

like to see more of them, for they are carriers of “ancient culture.”156 Moreover, in clear opposition to the 

Kremlin, which regarded Chinese immigration as dangerous, creeping “China-inaction of Russia,” Lukashenko stated that he encouraged migrants from China 

to go to Belarus and “bring to Belarus their culture.”157

There were plans to build a Chinatown in Minsk.158

Lukashenko also made the Chinese yuan part 

of Belarusian hard-currency reserves.159 Similar to 

praising Chinese culture and encouraging Chinese 
60

immigration, praising the yuan had a geopolitical/

diplomatic implication. Actually, Belarus’s decision 

to use the yuan as hard currency would have a miniscule implication for China’s economy, as would its 

promise to build a car factory in China. The use of the 

yuan has symbolic value. It underscores that Lukashenko sees in it a legitimate rival to the dollar/euro, 

and acknowledges China’s rise to a position of global 

power to which Belarus would submit for economic 

benefits. In the fall of 2011, when Minsk’s economic 

predicament became quite serious, Beijing once again 

emerged as the major source of money for investments 

and loans. Some pundits regard this is a major shift 

in Belarusian foreign policy. Still, Belarusian foreign 

policy was actually flexible in Asia, and here Minsk 

could deal with countries that maintain good relationships with the West, as the case with Beijing shows.

CONCLUSION

Conclusions and especially predictions are complicated by the nature of the subject. As of the fall of 

2011, the situation in Belarus remains quite unstable, 

and by the time readers see this monograph, Lukashenko might not be in office and Belarus might be quite 

a different country. Russia could prevail, and Belarus 

could become “a kind of outsized ‘South Ossetia,’ 

totally dependent on Moscow.”160 Alternatively, Belarus, with a victory of the pro-West opposition, could 

be transformed to a country similar to the Baltic states. 

Or, in what is at this point the most likely scenario, 

Belarus would remain the contest ground of various 

centers of power. The outcome of this study is important in its own right and does not depend on the 

fluctuation of Belarusian internal and foreign policy, 

which could be abrupt and bizarre. 
61

Regardless of possible changes, the events of this 

study period—approximately 2006-11—demonstrates 

Belarus’s remarkable flexibility in foreign policy arrangements. It moved from sole dependence on Russia 

to flirtation with the West, mostly the Baltic states. On 

occasion, Lukashenko even proposed allowing NATO 

installations inside Belarus. Lukashenko’s vacillation 

between Russia and the West, or at least with different segments of the West, could still be similar to the 

pattern of the Cold War era. At that time, small states 

could, on occasion, maneuver between the Scylla and 

Charybdis of major global powers and try to take advantage of great power rivals. The success of the small 

states in dealing with superpowers, as Vietnam’s confrontation with the United States could be characterized, could not be attributed just to USSR backing; the 

role and significance of the backing of smaller states 

by the USSR and China during the Cold War was less 

than was often perceived.

Small players could have had a certain degree of 

flexibility and independence from the great powers 

even during the Cold War. Indeed, the Iran/Iraq War 

proceeded for 8 years despite the fact that neither the 

United States nor the USSR was firmly behind either 

side. But one could assume that the war would most 

likely have been over if both superpowers made strong 

efforts to stop it, and they would have most likely 

done this if they assumed there was a clear threat of 

global instability, or to be precise, instability not well 

controlled by the global powers. Indeed, controlled 

instability was likely one of the essential elements of 

the Cold War. 

The story of Lukashenko’s Belarus is quite different in this respect, for he clearly defied both Russia 

and the United States, and in a way Europe, in deal-
62

ing with Iran. Minsk was in conflict with both the 

United States and Russia, both of which had a serious 

problem with Iran. The United States regarded Iran as 

an implacable enemy, and Russia’s relationship also 

soured considerably toward the end of the Putin firstterm era. Both powers were not shy in using force, and 

Lukashenko, of course, took into consideration the regime change policy implemented by the United States 

in Afghanistan and Iraq and almost implemented by 

Russia in Georgia. But this did not deter Minsk from 

developing a cordial relationship with Teheran and 

helping upgrade its military capabilities. Lukashenko 

even said he saw no problem in Iran being a nuclear 

power—an idea not pleasing to the United States or 

even Russia—and hinted that it might help Iran do so. 

Thus, a major implication of this analysis is the demonstration of increasing disrespect of the great powers 

by smaller states. Small states increasingly pay little 

attention to the attitude of the great powers and their 

ability to use financial (“soft”) or military (“hard”) 

power in imposing their will. One might add that the 

U.S. departure from Afghanistan and Iraq, and its inability to dislodge Assad in Syria (at least as of May 

2012), could be perceived as a signs of weakness of the 

great powers. This would provide additional rationale 

for small players such as Belarus to act in defiance of 

the interests of the great powers.

Another outcome of this analysis is the potential 

implications of Belarusian policy on various centers 

of power. This influence can be manifold and often 

contradictory. In Russia, Belarus clearly played a considerable role in the solidification of the post-Soviet 

elite regime in its early, most vulnerable period. The 

creation of the union state with Lukashenko’s blessing 

helped the regime solidify its power by creating the 
63

illusion that the good Soviet era would be back. By 

transforming Belarus into a new edition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia would increase its power 

in East/Central Europe. On the other hand, the same 

Lukashenko continued to be praised by various segments of the Russian opposition as a leader Russia 

needed. His role in Russian political life in the event of 

a major crisis should not be discarded. Belarus attaching itself to the West would diminish Russia’s clout 

in Europe and improve the position of the smaller 

states of East/Central Europe. Belarus’s relationship 

with Iran helped Teheran avoid a sense of diplomatic 

isolation, improve its economy, and possibly upgrade 

its military capabilities, even its nuclear ambitions. 

Belarus could also be an important launch pad for 

spreading China’s influence far from its Asian home. 

One could, of course, state that there was nothing peculiar in these arrangements, and find similar 

phenomena in the past, in which a comparatively 

small country could change the balance in particular 

regions or plainly defy major powers. Nicolae Ceausescu could defy Moscow by keeping a warm relationship with China, and at that time be the USSR’s mortal threat. Still, if Ceausescu were to exit the Warsaw 

Pact, or worse, proclaim he would allow NATO or 

China to put a military base in Romania, Moscow’s 

response would be prompt: It would immediately 

send troops. Yet, post-Soviet Russia, which clearly 

entertained the thought of removing Lukashenko by 

force, did not dare do so. Belarus’s relationship with 

Iran also has specifics quite different from those of the 

comparatively small states in the Cold War and early 

post-Cold War eras. 

It goes without saying that small states have engaged in various relationships with each other, and 
64

the leaders of those states might claim that they could 

opt out of the superpower rivalry. That was the point 

of the non-alignment movement. But these states did 

not develop their relationship as a counterbalance to 

the great powers; Yugoslavia, for example, one of the 

leaders of the movement, plainly noted that it had no 

desire to engage in superpower rivalry and would like 

a good relationship with both. The Iran/Belarus relationship is quite different. The informal alliance of 

the two countries was built in a way as a counterbalance to both the United States and Russia—countries 

much stronger than Iran and Belarus. Moreover, small 

countries such as these can be an important source 

of know-how and scientific knowledge. This is also 

novel, at least in comparison with the Cold War era, 

when it was believed that only the superpowers could 

possess advanced technological knowledge. 

What was the reason for such an increasing role of 

small states in the global arrangement? For Belarus, 

this role could be understood by looking at the general geopolitical scenario. During the Cold War, the 

USSR and the United States dominated the global 

arena. In the immediate aftermath, the United States 

emerged as the unquestioned global leader. During 

this time, the superpowers also built a well-defined 

system of alliance and dependence, with clear systems 

of reward and punishment. It was also assumed that 

only superpowers/great powers could possess essential scientific/technological know-how. None of 

this exists at the present time. The USSR is gone, and 

the United States is losing its position as the global 

center. The emerging arrangements are not actually a 

multipolar world. Indeed, this notion implies that instead of an orderly geopolitical structure of one or two 

superpowers, there would be an orderly construction 
65

of several great powers. Some elements of this possible construction are emerging, but it is not the only 

one. There are signs of unbalance and instability, in 

which no clear, orderly arrangement is emerging. In 

this case, one could see the existence of such a state 

as Belarus, which is not firmly attached to any of 

these groups, acting as a sort of “free radical”—a free 

agent that moves from one geopolitical structure to 

the other. Since none of these constructions are strong 

enough to dispose of the others, this small country’s 

position and actions could have serious international 

implications. Such a scenario certainly requires a new 

approach to the prognosis for international relationships in the future. 

In the Cold War era, especially the Leonid Brezhnev 

era, predictions about the roles and capabilities of 

countries were comparatively easy, in the sense that 

in most cases they could be quantified. It was the job 

of demographers and economists to define the general 

capacity of the United States and gauge the USSR’s 

potential in the future. It would be wrong to assume 

that this approach is not applicable now; for example, 

demographic trends can be predicted with some accuracy for long periods of time. But there is much 

more uncertainty in general, and not everything can 

be translated into statistical data. It is impossible to 

provide quantitative descriptions of terrorist groups 

such as al-Qaeda and to gauge their potential impact 

before actual terrorist acts. The same could be said 

about small states, such as Belarus, whose impact, in 

present political conditions, could be quite serious. 

The presence of free radical agents does not preclude 

long-term planning and prediction. But it can make itthem much more difficult, and a variety of often quite 

bizarre scenarios must be taken into account.
66

ENDNOTES

1. On China’s role in the Cold War, see, for example, Alice 

Layman Miller and Richard Wich, Becoming Asia: Change and Continuity in Asian International Relations since World War II, Stanford, 

CA: Stanford University Press, 2011.

2. On Vietnam’s cooperation with the USSR, see Nicholas 

Khoo, Collateral Damage: Sino-Soviet Rivalry and the Termination 

of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, New York: Columbia University 

Press, 2011.

3. Qiang Zhai, China: The Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975, Chapel 

Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000; see also Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, ed., The Cold War in East Asia, 1945-1991, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, and Stanford, CA: 

Stanford University Press, 2011.

4. One could add that Iran’s support of the Taliban has been at 

best inconsistent; at some points in recent history, Iran was on the 

brink of war with the Taliban. See Iran: Foreign Policy and Government Guide, Washington, DC: International Business Publications, 

2009, p. 202.

5. Farhang Rajall, ed., The Iran-Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression, Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1997.

6. Mohiaddin Mesbahi, “The USSR and the Iran-Iraq War: 

From Brezhnev to Gorbachev,” in Ibid., p. 74.

7. During Brezhnev’s tenure, the notion that the USSR should 

intervene in case of danger for the USSR was codified in the 

“Brezhnev Doctrine.” See Matthew T. Ouimet, The Rise and Fall 

of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy, Chapel Hill, NC: 

University of North Carolina Press, 2003.

8. “General Secretary Nicolai Ceausescu’s Speech,” Peking Review, Vol. 21, 1978, p. 11.

9. Raphael Patai, ed., Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel, New 

York: Herzl Press, 1971, p. 837.
67

10. Max G. Manwaring, Gangs, Pseudo-Militaries, and Other 

Modern Mercenaries: New Dynamics in Uncomfortable Wars, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010; James H. Lebovic, The 

Limits of U.S. Military Capability: Lessons from Vietnam and Iraq, 

Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2010. Recent 

books on the subject include John Arguilla, Insurgents, Raiders and 

Bandits: How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World, 

Lanham, MD: Ivan R. Dee, 2011; Joshua L. Geils, Withdrawing 

Under Fire: Lessons Learned from Islamist Insurgencies, Washington, 

DC: Potomac Books, 2011; Christian Malis and Hew Strachan, La 

guerre irregulière, Paris, France: Economia, 2011; Robert Johnston, 

The Afghan Way of War: How and Why They Fight, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

11. The story of the U.S. decline is hardly new, and books continue to proliferate. See, for example, Jeffrey G. Madrick, Age of 

Greed: The Triumph of Finance and the Decline of America, 1970 to 

the Present, New York: Knopf, 2011; Peter J. Tanous and Jeff Cox, 

Debt, Deficits and the Demise of the American Economy, Hoboken, 

NJ: Wiley, 2011. There is obvious sensationalism in these works. 

At the same time, their views are increasingly supported by respected academics such as Niall Ferguson. 

12. “Analysis: Belarus-Russia-Mutual accusations, trade war 

cause new crisis,” OSC U.S. Open Source Center, quoted from 

Johnson’s Russia List, June 25, 2009. (Hereafter, “Analysis.”)

13. Anton Khodasevich and Igor’ Naumov, “Minsk gotovitsia 

k torgovoi voine,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, October 7, 2009.

14. Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia-Belarus Oil Dispute Threatens Europe’s Supply,” New York Times, January 4, 2010.

15. Anton Khodasevich, “Tamozhennyi soiuz opiat’ zatreshchal po shvam,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, February 18, 2010.

16. Aleksei Topalov, Gleb Kliment’ev, “Lukashenko poshel 

sudom na Rossiiu,” Gazeta.Ru, March 25, 2010.

17. Denis Lavnekevich and Rustem Faliakhov, “Lukashenko 

stavit na energonezavisimost,” Gazeta.Ru, August 26, 2010. 
68

18. Aleksei Topalov, “Bestkontrol’nyi paket,” and Tat’iana 

Zamakhina, “Oboshlis’ bez Belorussii,” Moskovskii Komsomolets, 

May 28, 2010. 

19. Denis Lavnikevich and Rustem Faliakhov, “Lukashenko 

stavit na energonezavisimost’,” Gazeta.Ru, August 26, 2010. 

20. “Pravitel’stvo Belarusiizuchaet predlozheniia RF po usloviiam otmeny neftinykh poshlin v ramkakh EEP,” October 28, 

2010, available from oilru.com; “Belorussia povyshaet stoimost’ 

tranzita rossiiskoi nefti,” November 23, 2010 available from oilru.

com. 

21. Mikhail Tishchenko, “Malo ne pokazhetsia,” April 16, 

2010, available from Lenta.Ru, “Iurii Baranchik: Belorussiia 

stremitel’no priblizhaetsia k ‘kirgizskoi cherte’,” April 16, 2010, 

available from Regnum.Ru.

22. Movsum Gadzhiev and Gennadii Sysoev, “Aleksandr 

Lukashenko govoril s podryvom v golose,” Kommersant, Vol. 70, 

March 21, 2010, p. 4370. 

23. “Zakliatyi brat,” Komersant Vlast’, Vol. 40, October 11, 

2010. 

24. “Izrail’skoe izdanie: Kreml’ razrabotal plan vkliucheniia 

Belorussii v sostav Rossi,” October 19, 2010, available from oilru.

com/print/news/208083.

25. “Lidery Rossii i Belorussii obsudiat ekonomicheskoe i 

voennoe storudnichestvo,” September 29, 2009, available from 

Izvestiia.Ru.

26. “Analysis,” p. 27.

27. “Aleksandr Lukashenko: Moi vybosy fyli fal’sifitsirovany,” 

August 26, 2009, available from Izvestiia.Ru.

28. Nikolaus Von Twickel, “Lukashenko Plays Coy With 

Kremlin,” Moscow Times, August 28, 2009; on Lukashenko’s reluctance for close military cooperation, see Viktor Litovkin, “Shchit 

Sodruzhestva dal treshchinu,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, June 19, 2009.
69

29. “Analysis,” p. 15.

30. “Minsk podpisal soglashenie KSOR ODKB teper’ slovoza 

Tashkentom,” Islam News, October 20, 2009.

31. Anton Khodasevich, “Lukashenko Turns West,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, October 1, 2009. 

32. Nikolai Kon’kov, “B’iut svoikh . . .,” Zavtra, Vol. 41, October 7, 2009, p. 829, quoted from Johnson List.

33. Ol’ga Tomashevskaia, “Tol’ko smert’ ostanovit menia,” 

Vremia Novostei, Vol. 69, April 22, 2010. 

34. Chelovek Sredy, “Bremia russkogo cheloveka,” Rosbalt, 

August 15, 2008; Alla Iaroshinskaia, “Rossiia v izoliatsii?,” Rosbalt, August 15, 2008.

35. Twickel.

36. “Analysis.”

37. Ibid.

38. Anton Khodasevich, “Kavkazskii indikator belorusskoi 

politiki,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, November 20, 2009.

39. Alena Garbuzniak, Denis Lavnikevich, and Aleksandr 

Artem’ev, “Skhvatka zubrov,” Gazeta.Ru, July 20, 2010.

40. “Analysis.”

41. Ibid.

42. Garbuzniak, Lavnikevich and Artem’ev.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid. 

45. Yelena Gamayun, “Batka has been written off,” Moskovskii 

Komsomolits, August 7, 2010, quoted from Johnson List; “Beloruss-
70

koie TV otvetilo na videobrashchenie Medvedeva svoim ‘odnako’,” Rosbalt.Ru, October 5, 2010.

46. Fred Meir, “Why Russia’s Medvedev is lashing out at Belarus’ Lukashenko,” Christian Science Monitor, October 6, 2010; 

Elena Kriviakina, “Lukashenko obidelsia na zhurnalistov,” Komsomolskaia Pravda, November 25, 2009.

47. “Plokhie dela s tandemom,” Gazeta.Ru, October 3, 2010. 

On Lukashenko’s remarks critical of people in the Kremlin, see 

also Genadii Sysoev and Vladimir Solov’ev,”Belorusskii president ne vyderzhal ukola,” Kommersant, November 25, 2009.

48. Nelly Bekus, Struggle over Identity: The Official and the Alternative: “Belarusianness,” New York: Central European University 

Press, 2010, p. 270.

49. Andrew Savchenko, Belarus: A Perpetual Borderland, 

Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2009, p. 181.

50. Alex Danilovich, Russian-Belarussian Integration, Farnham, 

UK: Ashgate Publishing, p. 129.

51. Ibid., p. 131.

52. Ibid., p. 132.

53. Aleksandr Lukashenko allies himself with Boris Yeltsin, 

RIANovosti, February 21, 2007, quoted from Johnson List.

54. “‘Mne bol’no . . . ia ishchu vykhod’: Prezident Respubliki 

Belarus’ Aleksandr Lukashenko beseduet s glavnym redaktorom 

‘Zavtra’ Aleksandrom Prokhanovym,” Zavtra, February 14, 2007.

55. “Russian envoy’s remarks on nuclear deployment in Belarus challenged,” BBC Monitoring, August 29, 2007.

56. “Lukashenko kommentiruet konflikt s Rossiei,” Contr-tv.

ru, January 18, 2007.

57. “Evgenii Rostikov “Na sviazi Minsk,” Zavtra, January 17, 

2007; Aleksandr Prokhanov “Belarus’, ty prava!’,” Zavtra, January 

17, 2007.
71

58. Ol’ga Tomashevskaia, “Most mezdu monstrami,” Vremia 

Novostei, No. 108, June 23, 2004.

59. “Berluskoni ‘rastormorzhil’ Lukashenko,” Izvestiia.Ru,

December 2, 2009.

60. Jan Maksymiuk, “Belarus: Whose Friend Now?” RFF/RL, 

January 30, 2007.

61. “Desperate, Belarus President Lukashenko May Be Turning to the EU for Help,” Economist Intelligence Unit, February 8, 

2007. On critical views of Russian energy policy, see also Oliver 

Morgan, “Kremlin Inc.? Ready to Take in the West,” The Observer, 

January 7, 2007.

62. “SShA nazvali vlast’ Belorusii gniloi sushchnost’iu,” Kavkaz Center, January 5, 2007.

63. Editorial, “The Squeeze on Belarus,” Washington Post, January 3, 2007.

64. Ibid.

65. Editorial, “Russian Extortion Continues,” Washington Post, 

January 9, 2006.

66. Editorial, “More Gas Blackmail,” Wall Street Journal, January 3, 2007.

67. “Lukashenko zapretili poseshchat’ Litvu,” Dni.Ru June 6, 

2007.

68. Valery Kalinovsky, “Belarus faces crisis as Russia cuts 

subsidies,” Associated Free Press, January 2, 2007.

69. Mikhail Kramov and Aleksei Topalov, “Zhit’ bez russkoi 

nefti,” Gazeta.ru, February 14, 2007.

70. No author given, “‘Lukashenko, Iushchenko gotoviat ‘neftianoi otvet’,” Izverstiia.Ru, February 22, 2007; Fedor Chaika, “Belorussiia ishchet al’ternativy rossiskoi nefti,” Izverstiia.Ru, January 24, 2007.
72

71. Aleksandr Bodunov, “Zhdem, kogda tsennik izmenitsia 

ne v nashu po’zu?,” Evrasia, September 4, 2007.

72. “Eksperty SShA predlagaiut Rossii vernut’ Kitaiu Primor’e 

i Pramure,” Kavkaz Center, January 15, 2007.

73. “Belarus leader blasts Moscow as relations plummet,” 

AFP, January 14, 2007.

74. “Lukashenko vstretitsia v Minske s Gribauskaite,” Regnum.Ru, October 18, 2010.

75. Anton Khodasevich, “Evropeiskaia logika na pol’zu Lukasheko,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, October 20, 2010.

76. “Prezident Litvy obsudit s Lukashenko postavki 

venesuel’skoi nefti,” Rosbalt, October 19, 2010.

77. “Belorussiia i Litva zakliuchili soglashenie o voennom 

sotrudnichestve,” Rosbalt, October 27, 2010.

78. “Litva dala svoiu otsenku partnerskim otnosheniiam Rossii i Belorussii,” Rosbalt, October 27, 2010.

79. “Lukashenko: Belorussiia ne nuzhdaetsia ni v priznanii 

Rossii, ni v ee nefti,” Infox.Ru, November 12, 2010.

80. “Belorusskoe SMI: Vo chto oboidetsia ‘Gaspromu’ poteria 

belorusskogo rynka?,” November 16, 2010, available from www.

oilru.com.

81. “Latvian ports eager to transship Venezuelan oil to Belarus,” BelTA, September 30, 2010.

82. “Lukashenko: V voprose tranzita nefti v Belarus’ Latviia predpochtitel’nei Litvy,” Rosbalt, October 21, 2010. On cooperation between Belarus and Latvia on Venezuelan oil, see also 

“V Latvii izuchat vozmozhnosti ispol’zovaniia nefteprovoda 

Polotsk—Ventspils dlia tranzita venesul’skoi nefti cherez Venspilsskii port v Belorussiiu,” Oil.ru, November 11, 2010.
73

83. “Estonskii port Muuga perepravil v Belorussiiu bole 500 

tys ton venesuel’skoi nefti,” Rosbalt, October 25, 2010; “Lukashenko: Belarus’ budet perevozit’ neft’ v vagonakh i zapolniat’ truby szhizhennym gazom, chtoby 12 izbavit’sia ot energeticheskoi 

zavisimosti ot Rossii,” October 1, 2010, available from www.OilNews.com.ua.

84. “K vizitu prezidenta Belarusi i v Iran,” BelTA, November 5, 2006; Ras Suleimenov, “Belorussko-Iranskie otnosheniia 

na sovremennom etape,” October 15, 2009, available from www.

meast.ru/article/belorussko-iranski-otnosheniia-na-sovremennom-etape.

85. Ibid.

86. “K vizitu prezidenta Belarusii v Iran.”

87. Ibid.; Suleimanov, “Belorussko-Iranskie otnosheniia na 

sovremennom etape.” 

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid.

90. “Iranskii torgovyi tsentr otkryt v Belorussii,” Iran News, 

November 26, 2005.

91. Suleimenov, “Belorussko-Iranskie otnosheniia.” 

92. “Aleksandr Lukashenko provedet 7 Noiabria ocherednoi 

i raund peregovorov s prezidentom Irana,” BelTA, November 6, 

2006; “Makhmud Akhmadinedzhad prinial v Tegerane Aleksandra Lukashenko,” NEWSru.it, November 2006; “Prezidenty Belarusii, Irana dogovorilsia uvelichit’ tovarooborot do milliarda dollarov,” Telegraf, November 6, 2006; “Belarus’ i Iran v blizhaishee 

vremia mogut dostignut’ v torgovle planki v milliard dollarovprezident,” BelTA, November 6, 2006; “Prezidenty Belarusi i Irana obsudili proekty sotrudnichestava v sfere energetiki,” BelTA, 

November 6, 2006; “A Lunkasheko obsudil s Ali Khamenei vozmozhnosti narashchivaniia torgovo-ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva,” BelTA, November 6, 2006.
74

93. “Sotrudnichestvo s Iranorn mozhet stat’ odnim iz vazhnykh napravlenii vneshnei politiki Belarusi—V. Rybakov,” BelTA, November 6, 2006.

94. “Aleksandr Lukashenko priglasil presidenta Irana posetit’ 

Belarus’s vizitom,” BelTA, November 6, 2006.

95. A. A. Rozov, “Itogi Irano-Belorusskogo sammita,” Iran 

News, November 9, 2006.

96. “Belorussiia uzhe v oktiabre mozhet pereiti na iranskuiu 

neft’,” Iran News, August 18, 2010; “Belarus’ peredala Iranu 

general’nyi plan razrabotki iranskogo mestorazhdeniia nefti,” 

Telegraf.bu, March 15, 2007; “Iran gotov rasshiriat’ ekonomicheskoe sotrudnichestvo s Belorussiei,” Iran News, August 8, 2007; 

“Iran vydelil Belarusi mestorozhdenie dlia dobychi nefti,” Iran 

News, May 21, 2007; “Pervyi zarubezhnyi proekt belorusskikh 

neftianikov,” Islam News, September 26, 2007.

97. “Belorussiia ochen’ zainteresovalas’ iranskim opytom 

stroitel’stva elektrostantsii,” Iran News, April 27, 2007.

98. “Belarus’ rashchityvaet na bole aktivnuiu realizatsiiu proekta po dobyche nefti i gaza na mestorozhdenii Dzhofeif,” Iran 

News, May 12, 2007.

99. “Iran i Belarus’ rasshiriaiut sotrudnichestvo v oblasti avtomobilestroeniia,” Iran News, October 13, 2009.

100. “Pesni partisan, bat’ka i turan,” Gazeta.Ru, May 29, 2007.

101. “Georgi Bovt, “The Endgame Moscow Should Have Expected,” Moscow Times, March 22, 2007. While official Moscow 

was apparently displeased with Lukashenko’s move toward 

Teheran, supporters of Lukashenko regarded these moves as a 

wise undertaking. See “Iran” comments on Vladimir Vinnikov 

“Osazhdernaia krepost’,” Zavtra, December 20, 2006.

102. “Medzhliso dobriaet politiku Pravitel’ stva IRI napravalenuiu na razvitie vsestoronnikh otnoshenii s Respublikoi Belarus’,” Iran News, May 21, 2007.
75

103. “Parlamentarii Belarusi i Irana otmechaiut vysokii uroven’ belorussko—iranskikh mezhparlamen skikh otnoshenii,” Embassybei, August 8, 2007.

104. “Prezident Irana Akhmadinezhad planiruet posetit’ Belarus,” Naviny.by, May 10, 2007; “Makhmud Akhmadinezhad i 

Aleksandr Lukashenko obsudili irano-belorusskie vzaimootnoshenia,” Iran News, May 21, 2007; “Akhmadinezhad nazyvaet Lukashenko odnim iz svoikh luchshikh druzei,” RIA Novosti, May 

21, 2007; “Belarus i Iran vsegda budut poderzhivat’ drug druga—

M Akhmadinezhad,” Belta.bu, May 28, 2007.

105. “Iran, Belorussiia obsudili puti dal’neishego razvtiia 

dvukhstoronnego sotrudnichestva,” Iran News, June 27, 2007; “A. 

Lukashenko pozdravil M. Akhmadinezhada s 28-oi godovshchinoi Islamskoi revoliutsii,” Islam News, November 11, 2007.

106. “Iran gotov razvivat’ vzaimodeistvia s Belorussiei vo 

vsekh sferakh,” RIA Vavasti, November 6, 2006; “Aleksandr Lukashenko priglasil prezidenta Irana posetit’ Belarus s vizitorn,” 

BelTA, November 6, 2006.

107. “Belorussiia nashla soiuznika,” Voiazh, February 1, 2007; 

“Ministry oborony Belorussi i Irana podpisali memorandum o 

vzaimoponimanii v sfere oboronno sotrudnichestva“, Vzgliad, 

January 24, 2007; “Ministry oborony Irana i Belarusii podpisali 

memorandum o sotrudnichestve“, Telegraf.by, January 22, 2007.

108. “Ministry oborony Irana i Belarusi podpisali memorandum o sotrudnichestva,” Iran News, January 22, 2007.

109. “Prezident Belorussii vstretilsia s ministrom oborony 

Irana,” Islam News, November 7, 2007.

110. “A. Lukashenko, ‘Akhmadinezhad tsivilizovannyi, 

gramotnyi, vmeniaemyi chelovek’,” Iran News, November 7, 2006.

111. “Amerikanskii general raskryl plan budshei voiny s 

Iranom,” Belarus Today, November 7, 2006.

112. “Prezident Belarusii vystupaet za usilenie ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichesta s Iranom,” BelTA, November 6, 2006.
76

113. Katrin Behnnhold, “Irana i Severnaia Koreia narashchivaiut kontakty,” MIG news, August 1, 2007.

114. “Chirac Strays from Assailing a Nuclear Iran,” New York 

Times, February 1, 2007.

115. “Iran, Belorussiia dogovarivaiutsia,” Newsru.com, May 

21, 2007.

116 . Bekus, p. 109.

117. “Rossiiskaia nauka podobralas’ k krizisnoi cherte: za neinebty’e,” Izvestiia.Ru, November 7, 2006. The general scientific decline does not mean that Russia has lost all its heirlooms from the 

Soviet era. Western expert Peter Felstead was quoted as saying, 

“Russia still has certain key technologies which we don’t have in 

the West.” Michael Stott, “Should the West Fear Russia’s Military 

Build-up?” Reuters, August 29, 2007. 

118. Suleimenov.

119. “Belarus’ rasshhityvaet na boliiu aktivnuiu realizatsiiu 

proekta po dobyche nefti i gaza na mestorozhdenii Dzhofeir,” 

Iran News, May 12, 2009.

120. Ibid.; “Iranskii torgovyi tsentr otkryt v Belorusii,” Iran 

News, November 25, 2010.

121. “Belarus k letu planiruet nachat’ promyshlennyiu dobychu nefti v Irane,” Iran News, February 21, 2010. On Belarus/Iran 

cooperation in the oil/gas field, see also “Minsk ishchet energopartnerstva s Iranom,” Islam News, February 18, 2010. 

122. “Belarus i Iran planiruiut rasshirit’ sotrudnichestvo v 

sfere avtomobilestroeniia,” Iran News, February 11, 2010; “Iran 

rassmatrivaet vozmozhnost’ sovmestnogo proizvodstva vidov 

dvukh automobilei,” Iran News, February 11, 2010.

123. “K vesne budushehego goda v Tebrize nachnetsia vypusk belorusskikh MAZov,” Iran News, October 7, 2010.
77

124. “Iranskuiu torgovo—ekonomicheskuiu vystavky 

planiruetsia provesti v iune v Minske,” Iran News, February 11, 

2010; “Belarus’ predstavit svoi razrabotki na Tegeranskoi mezhdunarodnoi promyshlennoi vystavke,” Iran News, October 4, 2010.

125. “V Belarusi otkryvaetsia sovmestnyi iranski bank,” August 19, 2009; “Vtoroi bank so 100-protsentnym iranskim kapitalom zaregistrirovan v Belarusii,” Iran News, October 20, 2009; “V 

Belorussii otkrylsia vtoroi iranskii bank,” Islam News, October 29, 

2009.

126. “Belarus’ i Iran mogut pereiti na raschety v natsvaliutakh,” Iran News, December 13, 2010.

127. “Iran i Belarus’ rasshiriaiut sotrudnichestvo v oblasti 

sel’skogo khoziastva,” Iran News, December 28, 2009.

128. “Belarus’ khochet postavliat’ moloko v Iran,” Iran News, 

June 24, 2010.

129. “Belarus’ i Iran v sootvetstvii s podpisannymi kontraktami budut realizovyvat’ proekty na summu okolo 3 mlrd.,” Iran 

News, February 1, 2010.

130. Suleimenov. 

131. “Aleksandr Lukashenko govoril s podryvom v golose,” 

Kommersant, No. 70/43701, April 21, 2010. See also Denis Kabanov 

and Irina Kozlik, “Aleksandr Lukashenko: Uran u nas est’, no 

bombu delat’ ne sobiraemsia . . .’, Komsomolskaia Pravda, April 15, 

2010; “Belarus has large amounts of weapons-grade uranium—

Lukashenko,”Interfax, April 15, 2010.

132. “Iranskaia storona nadeetsia na otkrytie priamogo aviareisa Tegeran-Minsk,” Iran News, February 11, 2010.

133. “Prezident Belarusi, vozmozhno, posetit Iran v tekushchem godu,” Iran News, February 11, 2010; “Iran i Belarus’ prodolzhaiut konsul’tasii po povodu ukrepleniia dvukhstoronnikh 

sviazei,” Iran News, May 26, 2010.
78

134. “Lukashenko Konsortsium dobyvaiushikh i tranzitnykh 

stran dlia oslableniia zavisimosti ot RF,” Rosbalt, October 7, 2010. 

135. “Lukashenko nastraivaet NATO protiv Rossii,” Dni.Ru,

October 6, 2010; Anton Khodasevich, “Lukashenko ishchet soiuznikov v NATO,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, October 6, 2010.

136. Susan Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, New York: Oxford 

University Press, 2007. 

137. Anatolii Medvedev, “Kitai kupit Belarus’,” ANSAR, 

March 27, 2010.

138. Valerii Suriaev, “Respublika Belarus’ v kontekste evraziiskoi teorii i praktiki,” Evraziia, Decemer 17, 2004.

139. Interview with President Aleksandr Lukashenko by 

Vladislav Fonin, Rosslyskaia Gazeta, January 5, 2006, in Johnson 

List.

140. Ibid.

141. Vladimir Vinnikov, “Osazhdennaia krepost’,” Zavtra, 

December 20, 2006. One might add that the propositions to move 

close to China and even allow Chinese immigration led to scornful comments by some readers. See, e.g., “File” comments.

142. Mikhail Khmelav, “Russia and Belarus on the brink of 

gas war,” RIA Novosti, August 2, 2007, from Johnson List.

143. “Bat’ka v krugu vernykh druzei,” Zavtra, February 7, 

2007.

144. Daniil Aizenshtadt, “Bratia v kredit,” Gazeta.Ru, March 

23, 2010.

145. “Belorussiia i Kitai vmeste voz’mutsia za mirnyi atom,” 

Rosbalt, December 18, 2008.

146. Medvedev, “Kitai kupit Belarus’.”

147. Twickel.
79

148. Vladimir Mamontov and Andrei Reut, “Belorussiia i Rossiia: kto kogo teriaet?,” Izvestiia.Ru, July 5, 2009.

149. Tatsyana Darashchonak, “Lukashenko says he is unafraid of Russia’s possible refusal to pipe gas via Belarus,” Naviny.

By, October 2, 2010. 

150. Medvedev, “Kitai kupit Belarus.” See also “Kitai vydelit 

Belorusii kredit v odin milliard dollarov,” Lenta Novostei, March 

24, 2010; “Kitai peredast Belorussii pomoshch v $7.5 mln.,” Izvestiia.Ru, March 24, 2010; “Belorussiia poluchit ot Kitaia milliard 

dollarov,” Rosbalt, March 25, 2010. 

151. Movsun Gadzhiev, “Aleksandr Lukashenko balansiruet 

v storonu Kitaia,” Kommersant, No. 188, October 11, 2010.

152. “Medvedev i Si Tsinpin otryli rossiisko-kitaiskii 

politicheskii dialog 2010,” Kp.ru, March 24, 2010.

153. Ibid. 

154. “Belarus, China make breakthrough in all-around cooperation,” BelTA, September 13, 2010. 

155. “Lukashenko prochet Kitaiu liderstvo v mirovoi ekonomike,” Rosbalt, October 10, 2010.

156. “Lukashenko khochet investitsii KNR, a vzamen sozdast 

kitaiskii kvartal,” Rosbalt, October 9, 2010.

157. Movsun Gadzhiev, “Aleksandr Lukashenko balansiruet 

v storonu Kitaia,” Kommersant, No. 188, October 11, 2010.

158. Anton Khodasevich, “Vsia nadezhda na Pekin,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, October 11, 2010.

159. Ibid.

160. Arkady Moshes, “Mapping an Alternative Future for Belarus,” Eurasian Policy Memo 160, PONARS Eurasia, July 2011, 

p. 1.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Gregg F. Martin

Commandant

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Director of Research

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Author

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