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i 

58–102 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–123] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 23, 2010 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

SCOTT MURPHY, New York 

WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director 

MIKE CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

LYNN WILLIAMS, Professional Staff Member 

CATERINA DUTTO, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2010 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, February 23, 2010, Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization 

Act—Budget Request from the Department of the Air Force .......................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, February 23, 2010 ................................................................................... 45 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 2010 

FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT— 

BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Ranking 

Member, Committee on Armed Services ............................................................ 2 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Donley, Hon. Michael B., Secretary of the Air Force ............................................ 4 

Schwartz, Gen. Norton A., USAF, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force ........................ 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Skelton, Hon. Ike .............................................................................................. 49 

Donley, Hon. Michael B., joint with Gen. Norton A. Schwartz .................... 51 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Bishop ......................................................................................................... 73 

Mr. Conaway ..................................................................................................... 74 

Mrs. Davis ......................................................................................................... 73 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 74 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 73 

Mr. LoBiondo .................................................................................................... 73 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Bishop ......................................................................................................... 81 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 84 

Mr. Bright ......................................................................................................... 87 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 85 

Mrs. McMorris Rodgers .................................................................................... 83 

Mr. Miller .......................................................................................................... 77 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 82 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 80 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, February 23, 2010. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman 

of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. Today the House Armed Services 

Committee meets to receive testimony on the fiscal year 2011 budget request of the United States Air Force. Our witnesses today are 

the Honorable Michael Donley, Secretary of the Air Force, and 

General Norton Schwartz, Chief of Staff of the Air Force. 

Thank you both for appearing. And let me take this opportunity 

also to thank those you lead: the Active Duty, Reserves, the Air 

Guard personnel as well as the Air Force civilians. 

Every day, the Air Force flies in excess of 200 sorties a day in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, totaling over 570,000 sorties since September 11, 2001. 

In addition, about 29,000 personnel are currently deployed to 

Iraq and Afghanistan, including over 4,000 serving on the Joint Expeditionary Task billets; that is, in nontraditional billets often outside the wire. 

This continues to be an exceptionally busy Air Force and one 

that is contributing greatly to the current joint fight, and we are 

proud of them. To support this level of activity, the Administration 

has requested a $5.3 billion increase over last year’s base budget 

level. This would support a 1.4 percent across-the-board military 

and civilian pay raise and support the Air Force’s continued focus 

on providing support to military families. 

As someone who has often commented that if Mama ain’t happy, 

no one is happy, I strongly approve of the continued emphasis on 

personnel and family issues. 

Nonetheless, there are aspects of this budget request that cause 

me concern. For starters, I see we are back to square one on building a new bomber. Two years ago, Secretary Gates gave his blessing for the Air Force to begin a new, well-thought-out bomb program. As I understand the direction now is to reconsider where to 

go with this program, going back to first principles. I find this 

somewhat confusing as these issues were recently studied in-depth 
2 

over a five-year period, and I hope that our witnesses today will explain to us why redoing this study is a good use of our taxpayer 

dollars. 

Our national security will continue to require bombing capability, 

and the smart design engineering workforce, a national treasure, 

frankly, in my opinion, should not be lost. 

I also want to discuss the F–136 alternate engine issue. We have 

long funded the development of an alternate engine for the Joint 

Strike Fighter [JSF] as an insurance policy for our national security. Twenty-five years from now, the F–35 will comprise 95 percent of all U.S. fighter aircraft. It seems to me that relying simply 

on one engine means accepting a potential single source of failure. 

The Secretary of Defense promised us, starting February 1, that he 

would provide us the analysis on this year’s decision. We have still 

not received this analysis. We do remain deeply concerned about 

receiving it quickly. I would hope that you would see to that. 

I also have questions about the status of the F–35 program more 

generally. This is a critical program for us, as well as for our allies. 

The three recent reviews of the F–35 program have challenged the 

current development schedule, cost increases of the F–135 engine, 

the future production schedule given us. I would ask our witnesses 

to help us understand how we can stay on target for our 2013 initial operating capability and, in the absence of full testing, why the 

Air Force wants to buy 23 in 2011, an increase from 13 in 2010. 

Now, I might say there are many other issues that I hope we can 

get into during our questioning, including our strike fighter force 

structure requirements, cyberattacks, and defense future plans for 

light attack aircraft, to name a few. In addition I will say I am 

pleased that the OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] and the 

Air Force will soon be issuing the final request for proposal for our 

next tanker. We hope we can get that behind us. We must get a 

new tanker contract award and start replacing current planes just 

as soon as possible. 

I turn to my good friend the ranking gentleman from California, 

Mr. McKeon. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 49.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Donley, General Schwartz, it is good to have you with 

us here today. We appreciate all you do, and we are truly grateful 

that we have men with your leadership ability sitting where you 

are. 

Gentlemen, I want to take a minute to applaud both of you for 

your remarks at the recent Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 

[IFPA] conference. General Schwartz, at that event you acknowledged that the Air Force has had a short-term and somewhat narrow, focused, fix-it sort of perspective. I agree with you on that 

point, and I also agree that it is not good for the long-term health 

of the institution. 
3 

Secretary Donley, I believe you were also on the right track when 

you said that the Air Force needs to remain vigilant in tying your 

work to the National Security Strategy, the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review], and the larger national security community. I would 

caveat that by saying that your efforts will only prove successful 

if the National Security Strategy and the QDR provide appropriate 

guidance. 

As you all know, we recently had Secretary Gates, Admiral 

Mullen and Secretary Flournoy before this committee, and many of 

our members, Republican and Democrat alike, expressed concern 

that the 2010 QDR and the fiscal year 2011 budget are overly focused on the short-term and fail to adequately address strategic 

risks. 

I strongly believe that if we are to be successful in providing for 

a military that is ready and capable of responding to a broad array 

of challenges, we must take care that we don’t shape our forces for 

the counterinsurgency battles of Iraq and Afghanistan at the expense of conventional defense capabilities. We can only address 

both of these challenges to our national security with clear strategic guidance and commitment of appropriate resources. I am very 

concerned that the QDR and the 2011 budget request provide neither. 

The near-term focus of the QDR is very alarming when you consider the impact to the Air Force. Decisions to reduce fighter force 

structure, space systems, and missile defense capabilities cannot be 

easily undone. We can’t feasibly restart production of the F–22s, 

and we can’t field new satellites or missile defense systems the way 

we surged MRAPs [mine resistant ambush protected vehicles]. 

I would also like to take a moment to express my continued opposition to this year’s proposed retirement of 250 F–15s, F–16s, and 

A–10s. I recently visited with General Roger Brady, the commander of the U.S. Air Forces in Europe. He is very concerned 

about the impact of these force reductions on our ability to engage 

and build partnerships with our friends and allies in Europe. In his 

words, our basing and force structure is not aligned with our foreign policy. He strongly believes that if we take those fighters out 

of Europe, they will only be back to fight the war that they were 

there to deter. I would argue that the same holds true in the Pacific theater. As aptly noted in your IFPA remarks, Secretary 

Donley, ‘‘Presence is essential to successful engagement.’’ Our capabilities must be sufficiently robust and flexible to support a broad 

range of engagement needs. 

I also look forward to your addressing directly the President’s 

State of the Union call to repeal Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell. Before the 

President or special interests force a change in the policy or law, 

Congress deserves to see from the services concrete in-depth evidence that such a change would improve wartime military readiness in any measurable significant way. Many of us on this committee have serious concerns with putting our men and women in 

uniform through such a divisive debate while they are fighting two 

wars. Since today’s hearing focus limits the amount of time we can 

spend discussing Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, I have echoed Mrs. Davis’ 

request for you to appear at the Military Personnel Subcommittee 
4 

hearing on this issue March 3. I would hope that we could work 

that out. 

Gentlemen, I look forward to our discussion today and hearing 

more from you on your vision and strategic goals. I believe the Air 

Force is at a critical juncture, one that will prove to be historic. We 

must be wise in the path that we choose. And I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank my friend from California. 

Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL B. DONLEY, SECRETARY OF 

THE AIR FORCE 

Secretary DONLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. McKeon, 

members of the committee, it is indeed a pleasure to be here today 

representing almost 680,000 Active Duty, Guard and Reserves, and 

Air Force civilians. 

I am also honored to be here with my partner, General Norton 

Schwartz, who is a phenomenal teammate and a tireless public 

servant. 

Today I am pleased to report that America’s Air Force continues 

to make progress in strengthening our contributions as part of the 

joint team and the excellence that is the hallmark of our service. 

We are requesting $150.0 billion in our baseline budget and almost 

$21.0 billion in the overseas contingency operations [OCO] supplemental appropriation to support this work. 

In the past year in planning for the future, we have focused on 

balancing our resources and risk among four priority objectives outlined by Secretary Gates in the recently released QDR. 

First, we must prevail in today’s wars. Your Air Force understands the gravity of the situation in Afghanistan, and as we continue to responsibly draw down the forces in Iraq, we are committed to rapidly fielding needed capabilities for the joint team, 

such as surging ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] 

assets into theater and maximizing air mobility to accelerate the 

flow of forces into Afghanistan. 

Secondly, we must prevent and deter conflict across the spectrum 

of warfare. As we await the results of the Nuclear Posture Review 

[NPR] in the new START [Strategic Arms Reductions] Treaty, we 

continue concentrating on the safety, security, and sustainment of 

two legs of the Nation’s nuclear arsenal. Last year, we stood up Air 

Force Global Strike Command. We have now realigned our ICBM 

[intercontinental ballistic missile] and bomber wings under the control of a single commander. We also stood up the Nuclear Weapons 

Center to consolidate the management of all our nuclear weapons’ 

sustainment activities. And to increase our engagement across the 

world, we are building partner capacity in Afghanistan and Iraq, 

developing the training framework that emphasizes light attack 

and mobility that can benefit other nations. 

Third, we need to be prepared to defeat adversaries and succeed 

in a wide range of conflicts. We need to ensure that we are providing the right capabilities with our strategic airlift and ISR platforms and ensure our space-based assets continue to deliver needed 

capabilities for the future. 

In addition, the last two decades of sustained operations has 

strained our weapons systems. We continue to determine which 
5 

aircraft we will modernize and sustain and which we must retire 

and recapitalize. One of our primary efforts includes retiring and 

recapitalizing many of our legacy fighters and tankers, replacing 

them with F–35s and KC–Xs. These decisions require tough choices 

as well as the ability to quickly field systems that meet warfighter 

needs at an affordable price. Because acquisition underpins this effort, we are continuing to work to recapture excellence in this area. 

In the past year we have made great strides in reforming our internal processes. We have added more program executive officers and 

are growing our acquisition workforce by several thousand professionals over the over next five years. 

Finally, we must preserve and enhance the all-volunteer force. 

Airmen are our most valuable resource, and they have performed 

superbly in every mission and deployment they have undertaken. 

With the understanding that their families serve alongside them, 

in July of 2009, General Schwartz and I and Chief Master Sergeant 

Jim Roy began a year-long focus on our men and women and their 

families. This Year of the Air Force Family recognizes their sacrifices, and it looks to determine how we can better support, develop, house, and educate them. We are determining which programs are performing well and where we can do better. 

It is important to note that each of those areas prevailing today, 

preventing and deterring conflict, preparing for tomorrow, preserving the force, are continuing efforts. We know that each will require sustained commitment, and we are now developing and implementing proactive plans for future success. 

As I noted last year and would reaffirm again, the stewardship 

of the United States Air Force is a responsibility that General 

Schwartz and I take very seriously. We are very grateful for the 

committee’s continued support in this journey. And we look forward 

to discussing our proposed program and budget. 

Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you Mr. Secretary. 

General Schwartz, please. 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Donley and General 

Schwartz can be found in the Appendix on page 51.] 

STATEMENT OF GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF, CHIEF OF 

STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE 

General SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McKeon, 

members of the committee, I am proud to be here today representing your Air Force with Secretary Donley. 

Let me begin by reaffirming that the United States Air Force is 

fully committed to effective stewardship of the resources that are 

placed in our trust. 

Guided by integrity, service, and excellence, our core values, 

America’s airmen are serving courageously every day with precision and reliability on behalf of the American people. This budget 

request supports these airmen in our continuing efforts to rebalance the force, make difficult decisions on what and how we buy, 

and sustain our needed contributions to the joint team. 

Secretary Donley and I have established five priorities shortly 

after our taking office to ensure our entire force was focused on the 

right objectives. Most of our initial effort focused on renewing our 
6 

commitment to long-established standards of excellence. I am 

pleased to report to you today that our committed and talented airmen broadly understood our intent and delivered in meaningful 

fashion. Although these initial priorities were not designed to 

change from year to year, our progress with the nuclear enterprise 

is such that we can now shift our efforts to sustain the progress 

that we have made. Thus, our first priority is to continue to 

strengthen excellence in the nuclear enterprise. The rigor of our 

nuclear surety inspections demonstrates a new commitment to the 

highest levels of performance, but we must and we will do even 

more to ensure 100 percent precision and reliability in our nuclear 

operations and logistics 100 percent of the time. 

For our second priority, to partner with our joint and coalition 

team to win today’s fight, Secretary Donley mentioned several of 

the ways in which our airmen are providing critical air and space 

power for the joint and coalition team. Your airmen are also performing admirably wherever and whenever our joint teammates require, including providing battlefield medical support and evacuation, ordnance disposal, convoy security and much, much more. 

Our third priority remains to develop and care for our airmen 

and their families. As the Secretary indicated, we initiated the 

Year of the Family shortly after our testimony last year in recognition of the vital role that our families fulfill in mission accomplishment. Although their sacrifice is perhaps less conspicuous, contributions—their contributions—are no less substantial. 

Modernizing our inventories, organizations, and training, our 

fourth priority, is among the most difficult tasks that our service 

has undertaken in these last 18 months. In order to achieve the 

balance that Secretary Gates envisioned for our force, we were 

compelled to action and to decision. The budget reflects a continuation of that effort. We set forth on a plan last year to accelerate 

the retirement of some of our older fighter aircraft. This year we 

will not be retiring any additional fighters, but we are shifting 

away from some of our oldest and least capable C–130s and C–5s. 

Modernizing where we can and recapitalizing when we must will 

allow us to recapitalize our force scenarios where simple modernization is no longer cost-effective. KC–X is one such example. 

Awarding a new aerial refueling aircraft contract remains our top 

acquisition priority, and we hope to deliver an RFP within days to 

get the program underway. A similar imperative is the F–35. And 

I want to underscore Secretary Donley’s comments by noting that 

this weapons system will be the workhorse driving much of our Air 

Force and the joint force forward. 

Long-Range Strike is the last program that I number among our 

top initiatives. The Air Force fully supports the development of a 

family of systems, providing both penetrating and standoff capabilities for the next two to three decades as described in the QDR. 

Recapturing acquisition excellence, our final priority, is only now 

beginning to pay dividends with our acquisition improvement plan 

at the heart of the reform effort. While promising initial successes 

must continue for a number of years before we can declare victory 

on this front, we are fully aware that we must bring every bit of 

capability and value that we can from the systems that we procure, 
7 

and this will continue to require a sustained focus on acquisition 

excellence. 

Mr. Chairman, the Air Force will continue to provide our best 

military advice and stewardship, delivering global vigilance, reach, 

and power for the Nation. Thank you for your continuing support 

of the United States Air Force and that of the committee, and particularly for our airmen and their families. I look forward to your 

questions, sir. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Schwartz and Secretary 

Donley can be found in the Appendix on page 51.] 

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you very much. We are especially 

proud of what you have done, both you gentlemen, as well as the 

many young men and young women that wear the blue, and we 

hope that you will transmit our appreciation to them. 

In the past, I have asked how many non-Army, non-Marine personnel are deployed doing Army type of work in Iraq and Afghanistan. Can you enlighten us as to that number today from the Air 

Force? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, the number is about 4,700. 

The CHAIRMAN. That is down considerably, is it not? 

General SCHWARTZ. As Iraq has subsided in terms of strength, so 

too have our joint expeditionary taskings, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. How goes the recruiting for the Air Force? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, we have met our numbers, both recruiting and retention, with the singular exception of the medical specialty, and thus far this year we have—— 

The CHAIRMAN. And when you say ‘‘medical specialty,’’ are you 

talking about doctors, nurses? 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. The whole gamut? 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, particularly on the officer side. And that is why we have in the budget request this year about $135.0 million in requests for incentives and for bonuses with respect to making it more attractive for medical professionals to come on Active 

Duty and to remain on Active Duty. 

The CHAIRMAN. The F–35, as I mentioned in my opening statement, has continued to be a source of questions for me. It seems 

like every year the program is slipping and slipping, although you 

are asking for 23 this coming year. Where is this program? Why 

aren’t we ahead of the game on this? 

Secretary DONLEY. Well, sir, this program has had lots of scrutiny. It is the Department of Defense’s largest program. Within the 

Air Force, it is our largest single program and by itself accounts 

for 15 or 16 percent of all our investment dollars, not our total 

budget but our investment dollars. And we have had a close eye 

on this program, especially over the last couple of years, with independent cost estimates set in motion by Dr. Carter, Secretary 

Gates, and their predecessors, so the program is getting great scrutiny. We have identified potential slips from independent estimates 

done at the end of 2008, and you may recall that the Secretary 

made an adjustment in the F–35 program last year to add about 

a little over $400.0 million to development. And so we had a close 

eye on this last year, and we also set in motion new and independent estimates to be undertaken at the end of last year. And 
8 

when those were done, those independent estimates showed that 

we had not regained ground that had been projected to be regained, 

and we needed to recognize a slip in the program, and that is the 

source, really, of the restructuring that has been proposed in this 

budget. 

The CHAIRMAN. This committee last year successfully wrote a bill 

regarding acquisition reform, and what we wrote actually pretty 

much was what came out of conference with the Senate. Is that 

making any difference with the F–35 program? 

Secretary DONLEY. I think it has made a difference to the extent 

that the Department has made a strategic decision to accept the 

independent cost estimates that were reported to us at the end of 

the year, so we had to make a significant adjustment in the program as a result of that. So we have taken onboard what we think 

are probably the more realistic estimates. And I think that is a reflection of the same kind of emphasis that the committee put in its 

bill. 

The CHAIRMAN. I hope we can finally say, ‘‘Let’s get on with it.’’ 

Secretary DONLEY. Well, sir, this does represent a slip in the program. It will cost us more money to get where we need to go, but 

this is the right thing to do. This program had lots of concurrency 

built in between development and production, and the independent 

estimates showed us that that level of concurrency just got to an 

unsustainable level. So we have knocked down the production 

ramp. We have added dollars back into development to complete 

that work. We have taken other risk-reduction measures, consistent I think with the philosophy that the committee presented 

last year, and we are all about getting this program on track as 

quickly as possible. There is no diminution of the importance of 

this program or the emphasis that we are putting on its success 

going forward. 

The CHAIRMAN. One last question. As you know, there is a major 

Cyber Command that is in the offing. You have within the Air 

Force, do you not, a Cyber Command? This is my last question; 

then I will ask Mr. McKeon to carry on. But would you very briefly 

describe the Air Force Cyber Command and how it is working, 

please? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, we stood up the 24th Air Force, a numbered Air Force whose focus is the cyber mission. And there are 

two major components of that cyber mission based in San Antonio, 

along with other cyber activities that are in the area: The major 

mission will be to defend the Net—our Nets are no longer administrative entities, they in fact are operational and command-and-control entities—and secondly, to employ cyber in a way that reinforces the Air Force mission. So it is an Air Force-focused activity. 

It will be the component command, the Air Force component 

command to the unified or subunified Cyber Command when it is 

established. And it is led by a two-star general officer of some reputation. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you, gentlemen. Mr. McKeon. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you again 

for being here. In your personal and professional opinion, do you 

believe the current law prohibiting service by openly gay and lesbian personnel should be repealed? 
9 

General SCHWARTZ. Congressman McKeon, in this instance, my 

personal opinion is my professional opinion. The President has 

clearly articulated his intent, and should the law change, the Air 

Force will implement statute and policy faithfully. Nonetheless, I 

am concerned that there is little current scholarship on this issue 

and little current and reliable survey data of our airmen and their 

families. Secretary Gates’ study effort is therefore essential in my 

view to thoroughly understanding and properly evaluating the associated facts and circumstances, the potential implications, the potential complications. 

I have two strong convictions on this, sir. One is that this is not 

the time to perturb the force, that is at the moment stretched by 

demands in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere, without careful 

deliberation. And two, should the law change, our standards of conduct will continue to apply to all airmen. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you. Secretary Donley, what capabilities 

should the Air Force provide the Nation in the next two to three 

decades? 

Secretary DONLEY. Sir, I think we are on track to provide a full 

spectrum of Air Force-related capabilities that will be needed by 

the joint warfighter going forward. In the past couple of years, the 

Air Force has identified 12 core functions that are essential to the 

full scope of our responsibilities as your Air Force, and they range 

from mobility to space to cyber to ISR to command and control, precision attack, and several others. And our task going forward is to 

balance our investments and all those capabilities to ensure that 

we have provided the joint warfighters the maximum capability out 

of the resources made available to our Air Force. So I think we are 

on track to do that. 

We need to make adjustments along the way. We are not building the Air Force that was planned to be built 10 years ago. We 

are a different Air Force today. We will be a different Air Force in 

the future. We need to be—we will probably be a smaller fighter 

force structure, for example, but that will be a fifth-generation 

fighter force structure. So we need to get to the F–35 and get up 

that production ramp as soon as we can. 

We are going to have a modern tanker capability that will be 

more capable than the current KC–135 fleet. We are building command and control satellites that have much more bandwidths and 

offer much more throughput and security for the joint warfighter 

in command and control in ISR and other areas. So just the things 

that we do for the joint warfighter constitute—and all we do is for 

the joint warfighter, but our critical and enabling capabilities, for 

example, command and control, ISR, mobility, which all the joint 

community uses, is over 30 percent, it is over 34 percent of our resources, goes into that work. We need to get on with a long-range 

strike capability to replace the legacy bombers that we are operating today and to get ahead, stay ahead of evolving threats in that 

area. So these are examples of a full range of capabilities that we 

will need going forward. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you. I have been concerned in the time that 

I have been in Congress. I have seen us cut the B–2 from 130 down 

to 21, and now the F–22s from 750 down to 187. I remember a discussion I had with Chairman Dellums 16 years ago: ‘‘What would 
10 

be the next bomber?’’ And he said, ‘‘Well, we will come up with 

some new one.’’ Well, in the last year’s budget, we cut the work 

that was being done on the next generation long-range bomber, and 

now it looks like we are starting over from scratch. And I am wondering if we might have a 10- to 20-year lag somewhere in there 

in our capabilities. 

So you said we are doing the best we can within the budget, the 

resources that are made available to the Air Force. In your view, 

does the President’s budget request put us on track to get the capabilities? Could we use more top-line money? 

Secretary DONLEY. I think Secretary Gates has addressed this 

pretty effectively. We do have some growth in the defense budget. 

And there is modest growth depending on how you define ‘‘inflation’’ at this point in fiscal year 2011. Compared to the rest of the 

Federal Government, the national security community is getting 

the attention that it needs this year. Over the longer term, it would 

be best for our—my personnel professional view—it would be best 

for our national security community to have modest growth but 

sustained growth over time. Modest but sustained. 

In this business we are the victims, as you appreciate, sir, of 

boom-and-bust cycles. And over the long term, it is best to have 

some modest sustained growth that we can count on and that we 

can plan on for the future. 

Mr. MCKEON. I know in the budget it says we have a one percent 

growth this year in the proposed budget, but when you look at the 

numbers—and I look at all the numbers—it doesn’t look like we 

have a one percent. And I am not sure that one percent is a 

growth, so I do think that as our major responsibility is funding 

the defense of our Nation. I think that that is something that we 

definitely need to focus on, and I think we do need to have more 

top-line money. 

General Schwartz, as I noted in my opening remarks, I am very 

concerned about the force structure changes we are seeing in the 

Air Force. It is clear that you are taking a risk in an attempt to 

balance requirements with resources. It is important that this committee understand your calculus. Can you please quantify the level 

of risk you are taking in each of the service core functions, both in 

the near-term and the out-years? 

General SCHWARTZ. Congressman, I would characterize that as 

moderate, as moderate risk. That is true with respect to the reductions in fighter force structure, which will allow us to generate not 

only some additional resources for missions that are in their ascendancy right now, such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, but very importantly—and this is not well understood— 

generate the manpower in a fixed manpower pool to man these ascended missions. 

On the airlift side, we now have or will soon have the official Mobility Capability and Requirement Study 16, 2016, and it is clear 

that we have some excess capability on the big airplane airlift side. 

And we are proposing in the 2011 program to reduce 17 C–5s. I appeal to the committee for your serious consideration of those proposals. I understand the angst, but the reality is that we need to 

move forward. And part of moving forward to next-generation platforms is not hanging on too long to legacy force structure. Part of 
11 

retooling ourselves to be more relevant to the joint team is growing 

in some areas, shrinking modestly in others, which we consider to 

be a moderate risk, sir. 

Mr. MCKEON. Looking in the future what would be your biggest 

concern? 

General SCHWARTZ. I think the biggest concern—there are two 

parts to this. One is human capital. If I lose sleep at night, it is 

concern over our ability to recruit and retain the kind of people 

that America needs to do this work, and that is a continuing issue. 

And as you suggested earlier, certainly families are a major part 

of that. 

The second piece is that we have sufficient resources to sustain 

the existing inventory of machines and assets. And as you are 

aware, we have made that clear that we are currently sitting, in 

the base budget, at 62 percent of our sustainment requirement, 

with the overseas contingency supplemental that would bring it up 

to 84. That is lower than I would like to be, but again we have 

worked hard to try to manage risk across the entire proposal. But 

those are the two areas, human capital and weapons systems 

sustainment, that give me the most concern. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you Mr. McKeon. We are now under the 

five-minute rule. Mr. Ortiz. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary and General, thank you, good to see both of you and thank you for joining 

us today. And let me say that we are proud of the service that you 

render to our country. As we ramp our efforts in Afghanistan, the 

use of airmen to augment certain bombing requirements is not expected to go down and most certainly will increase in the coming 

months. And we are seeing how this war is advancing in Afghanistan. 

What impact does the augmented mission have on the Air Force, 

specifically on dwell time and training for other Air Force missions? And how do the readiness rates for deployment units compare to those in stateside? And what impact are those readiness 

rates having on your ability to train airmen when they are deployed? 

I was just wondering, I can remember the days when you joined 

the Air Force, you were Air Force. Or if you joined the Navy, you 

were Navy. But now they get a certain training in the Air Force 

or the Navy, but now you are seeing some of these Air Force and 

Navy people getting to do some of the groundwork as well. I was 

also worried about the training, if they are getting comparable 

training, but what is this doing to you and what are you doing to 

improve that? What impact is it having? Thank you. 

General SCHWARTZ. Congressman, I will answer at several levels. 

The reality is the country is at war. And if there is a demand, if 

there is a need for us to serve a wartime function, we will do so. 

And I must say, sir, that I don’t apologize for that here, or with 

our people, when we talk about this. The obligation that we have 

is to ensure that those folks who are doing nontraditional missions 

are properly trained. And I think that we have—we fulfill that obligation properly. 
12 

The numbers, as indicated earlier, have subsided in terms of the 

overall number of troops doing expeditionary taskings. Although we 

will plus-up in Afghanistan about 2,000 people, and, along with the 

30,000 folks that will surge through the late summer of this year, 

some of those will be nontraditional tasks. 

The key thing for us is that as the Army grows its pool to its 

final end-state, and likewise the Marines, we need to make sure 

that this does not become a habit, that as they establish their combat support and combat service support in greater numbers, that 

that relieves the Air Force and the Navy of these augmentation 

taskings. 

Last part about readiness. Typically, sir, our deployed units are 

more ready than are the garrison units. This is not a surprise. We 

devote our resources, spares, certainly dollars and attention, to 

those units that are in the area of operations. We do our best to 

maintain readiness in the rear. There is impact, I can’t deny that. 

We are not as ready across the board on all of our missions as we 

would be were this a peacetime setting. But the truth is that we 

are prepared to do the missions that we are on call to do now. We 

are training our youngsters both in traditional and nontraditional 

skills to execute as part of the joint team, and I think the evidence 

is—you have seen it yourself—is they are performing in quite a remarkable way. 

Mr. ORTIZ. And I just have one last question. 

My concern has been intelligence gathering. And I am just wondering—and I realize we are at war, and it is horrible. But what 

efforts—are you getting the right intelligence now? And I know it 

is not easy, especially to get human intelligence in that part of the 

world. Can you give us an idea as to what we are trying to do? And 

maybe you can’t say it in here, but maybe you can at least elaborate on the intelligence gathering. 

General SCHWARTZ. We have, I think, expanded our capacity to 

gather intelligence in a variety of ways, and perhaps the most visible way from the Air Force point of view is our remotely piloted aircraft. Our teammates on the ground, including our battlefield airmen, won’t go around a corner or through a window or a door without the situation awareness that our remotely piloted aircraft provide from above. That is intelligence. That is real-time intelligence. 

What you speak of in terms of understanding the terrain and the 

culture and so on and so forth, vital as well. That is more applicable, arguably, to the ground forces perhaps than it is to the Air 

Force, but we have found that our needs for intel support to the 

current fight are adequately filled. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you both for your service. Earlier this 

month, the Department of Defense [DOD] submitted a response to 

the congressionally-mandated aircraft investment plan, the Air 

Force inheriting the direct support mission. Can you explain to the 

committee how this new mission fits into your plan? The reason I 

ask is that I have not seen it referenced specifically, and I noted 

that the Joint Cargo Aircraft [JCA] isn’t referenced either as an 

asset of the Air Force, and yet the report identifies a target for procuring 63 more C–130Js by 2020. 
13 

A second question. In an environment such as Afghanistan, can 

the current fleet of C–130s meet the Army’s need for direct support? 

General SCHWARTZ. Congressman Bartlett, we ran a test program for direct support in Iraq, which concluded in December, for 

the Army division brigade that was there with two C–130 aircraft. 

They were dedicated to that and we ran this test and it was completed successfully. That is demonstrating that we have the command and control, the orientation, and the capacity to provide direct support should that be what the joint force commander requires. We did it in Iraq because General McChrystal did not want 

to run the test at the time in Afghanistan. 

So we have a concept of employment, a concept of operations for 

direct support. It will include the C–27 aircraft clearly, the purchase of which is 38 aircraft. And in this case, it demonstrated that 

the C–130 can do that mission as well. And what we will do is use 

the platform that is optimal for the particular requirement, whether it is a C–27 or C–130, and if there is a need to provide direct 

support to ground units, ground formations, the United States Air 

Force is prepared to do that. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Isn’t it true that we are currently spending about 

$8.0 million a month to lease 22 planes, T–35s, Metroliners, Colossus? The Sherpas can’t do the job in Afghanistan? Due to runway 

length and width limitations, the C–130s can’t even land. I know 

that the Joint Cargo Aircraft was not a program enthusiastically 

supported by the Air Force. They have little interest in it. It was 

primarily of interest to the Army for reasons that I am having 

trouble understanding. This whole program was given to the Air 

Force, and they stated they didn’t want the program. And now I 

am concerned that since it is primarily of interest to the Army, and 

we obviously can’t meet our direct support needs because we are 

leasing all these planes, and I don’t even see this referenced in the 

report, you can understand my concerns sir. 

General SCHWARTZ. I think the Army was intently interested in 

this because they weren’t sure their Air Force would be there with 

them when they needed direct support. That is a change. We have 

demonstrated to our Army brothers and sisters as well as others 

that we will be there. We can do this. We will do this if this is the 

task. And we will do it with a mix of platforms, in this case, 27s 

and 130s. 

But I should mention something, sir. Yes, there are some aircraft 

that are leased, and not by the Air Force but that are leased in Afghanistan. But the thing that we have done to minimize the need 

for that is air drop. Our air drop requirements have increased sevenfold, and that is how we are supporting outlying areas in Afghanistan now, is to do precision air drop of supplies: 50 percent 

is food, 35 percent is fuel, some 10 percent is building barrier materiel and such. That is the other aspect of this which is truly direct 

support that perhaps isn’t seen as such, the air drop. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Sir, are you comfortable with the Air Force’s responsibility for the Joint Cargo Aircraft, whose primary interest in 

it is supporting the Army? Are you comfortable with that relationship? 
14 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, I think not only am I comfortable, but 

I believe General Casey likewise is comfortable. And this is a matter of trust. And if you were to ask Ray Odierno today about how 

the test went in Iraq, I think he would tell you that we changed 

people’s minds. We are going to do this mission to the standard 

that our teammates expect, sir. 

Mr. BARTLETT. This is a good test of jointness. I trust it is going 

as well that you indicate to us that it is going. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Dr. Snyder. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being 

here, gentlemen. 

Two quick questions and then a third one. First of all, General 

Schwartz, we tried to give you some looser language to help you 

with the retirement of E models. I am not one of those who thought 

having old, non-flying hardware sitting on a tarmac somewhere is 

helpful to the Air Force. Has that helped you? Do you need additional language with regard to old E models? 

General SCHWARTZ. It has, sir. And I would again encourage the 

committee to allow us some latitude in managing the fleets. And 

this will be particularly true in 2011 with respect to C–130s as well 

as C–5s. 

Dr. SNYDER. Any specific language that you think would be helpful, particularly with regard to the 130, I would be interested in 

seeing. 

Are you satisfied, General Schwartz, that with regard to C–130s 

that the Aviation Modernization Program is on track, where you 

want to be? I know you had six or eight months of discussion, but 

it seems to be back on track. Is that your view? 

General SCHWARTZ. For 221 aircraft, I won’t kid you, we made 

a proposal not to pursue the Aviation Modernization Program for 

all the C–130s. The Department did accept that proposal, so 221 

aircraft is fully funded. 

Dr. SNYDER. I do want to make a comment. I know, Secretary 

Donley, that your Under Secretary is not with you. She is actually 

here in spirit. Erin is roaming around here somewhere, our staff 

director. I know that Senator Shelby has put a hold on her and apparently two other DOD nominations. My own view is she has a 

job here. We love her. We will treat her well. I would encourage 

you all to do what is in the best interest of the military and the 

Air Force and not succumb to any parochial threat just to get a 

nomination through. I think it is shameful that is going on. You 

don’t need to make a comment on that, Secretary Donley, and you 

probably would be wise not to. 

I want to get to a specific question with regard to Don’t Ask, 

Don’t Tell with a little different thought, and this is from a legal 

aspect of things. Secretary Donley, General Schwartz, has your 

legal team kept you up to speed on the fact that there is now a 

split of authority between the circuit court of appeals with regard 

to—it started with an Air Force case in the Ninth Circuit, the Witt 

case. Are you aware that we have different standards now in the 

different circuits of the country? 

Secretary DONLEY. Yes. 
15 

Dr. SNYDER. It seems to me that it is going to be a problem. Mr. 

McKeon began his comments—he questioned you, General 

Schwartz, by saying—your opinion about having openly gay or lesbian folks serving in the military. Under the language of the Witt 

case in the Ninth Circuit, which includes Oregon, Washington, 

California, and Idaho—and I have talked to some of the highest 

legal authorities within the military and the Air Force—you will 

have openly gay and lesbian members serving in the Air Force and 

the military in the Ninth Circuit. It is very clear from the language 

of that opinion and the analysis that has been done by military 

lawyers that because the opinion requires a factual analysis of each 

case, there will be people you will not be able to make the case are 

disruptive to good order and discipline. 

My question, and perhaps more in the spirit of a comment, is I 

don’t see how—we have put you in a very difficult position. I don’t 

see how it is workable that you can have somebody at some point, 

three months, six months, maybe right now, that the leadership at 

a base has concluded there is nothing—we can’t make a factual 

case that this person should be out of the military, but if we have 

them fly to Nashville or to Little Rock and they are in a different 

circuit—because we have the First Circuit case, the Cook case, saying, no, we defer to the military—that they can be kept there. I 

don’t see how that is workable. 

Now, the suggestion I want to make is, and I haven’t seen this 

written up, it may well be that as we are going through whatever 

transition we are in, that the military may want to consider making the venue for all these cases within the Ninth Circuit. Otherwise you are going to have a very difficult situation for the military 

leadership and for individual commanders who are trying to enforce this policy. And because the Ninth Circuit based their opinion 

on the Constitution, there is no legislative language that the Congress can pass and say, well, we are going to correct that language. 

This is a Constitutional right that came out of the Lawrence case 

out of Texas. 

So I don’t think you have to respond to that if you don’t want 

to, other than do you agree with me that you have a very difficult 

situation since you are going to have two legal treatments of perhaps the same person if they got moved from state to state? 

Secretary DONLEY. I will just say that the legal community is 

aware of the differences between the two circuits and is assessing 

all that very carefully. 

Dr. SNYDER. I think it is an example where you are inheriting 

this problem. It is a Congressional problem and a Constitutional 

problem. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. Very quickly, before we 

call Mr. Thornberry. In last year’s defense bill, we required a report on the C–27J basing strategy. What is the status of that required report? 

Secretary DONLEY. Sir, I believe the report is on track. I don’t 

think there are any—not off the top of my head in terms of when 

the report will be available to the committee, but we are proceeding 

with developing basing criteria for the remainder of the JCA fleet 

that has not yet been built out and that has not been already designated to particular locations. I believe we have 24 aircraft whose 
16 

bed-downs have already been announced, and we have 12 aircraft 

remaining, some yet to be built, that we need to find bases for. So 

we have a deliberate process underway to make those decisions 

going forward. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Schwartz, I want to ask about some kind of longer term 

trends that are affecting the traditional missions of the Air Force. 

One hears sometimes that with the increase in unmanned systems 

that we have too much pilot training capability and that the Air 

Force needs to shed some of that as we move towards more UAVs 

[Unmanned Aerial Vehicles] and whatnot. On the other hand, one 

also hears that flying training ranges are becoming more precious 

as time goes on, that we have closed or eliminated pilot training 

in the past and come to regret it and had to reconstitute it in the 

past. 

I was just wondering how you see this capacity the Air Force has 

for pilot training and whether that should go up, go down, stay the 

same, what is the trend there? 

General SCHWARTZ. First of all, Congressman, the notion that 

you have remotely piloted aircraft, your comment sort of implies 

that there is no or little training involved in qualifying those aviators. That certainly is not the case. Now we have run test cases, 

our so-called beta classes, to confirm whether they needed to be a 

full-up undergraduate pilot training and credentialed individual. 

And the evidence from the first two classes that are currently out 

at Creech is probably not. But there are adjustments that we need 

to make in the curriculum. 

That is why we did the test, to assure that we—where we need 

to do more, where perhaps we did too much. But there will still be 

a substantial requirement for manned cockpits in our Air Force, 

certainly for the next 25 years, perhaps 50 years. And I do not see 

a need, or I do not see a trend which would suggest that we will 

reduce our undergraduate pilot training output. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. On somewhat of a connected note, the information the staff has given us says that we currently have 6,800 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Most of them are the very small sorts of 

things. The Air Force has 600, it says, of the larger kind. But there 

has also been discussion before that somebody has got to be the 

traffic cop here as far as the acquisition and also the use of at least 

a portion of these UAVs. And the suggestion has been made that 

that is an appropriate role for the Air Force, but obviously you get 

pushback from other services. What is your view on this? 

General SCHWARTZ. I think we respond to what the joint team requires. And I must tell you that I don’t personally have a lot of 

time for theological debates over who should do what. The question 

is what is pragmatic, what is the least cost, the most effective way 

to perform a joint mission? And in most cases, this can be done 

through partnering. 

However, I will give you an example of what the Navy and the 

Air Force are doing with respect to Global Hawk. We are going to 

use the same depot. We are going to use the same ground control 

station. We are going to use the same training pipeline. So here is 

an example where Global Hawk for the Navy has a unique mari-
17 

time application. There are certain things that we have both in the 

intelligence and communications area on the Air Force side. We 

will do those things that make sense to again minimize cost and 

maximize effectiveness. But I do not think that we should overly 

focus on ownership. That doesn’t take us to the right place. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Is there something that needs to happen in the 

system to encourage those sorts of working relationships? 

General SCHWARTZ. Not having too much money. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay, thank you. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here and testifying and for your 

work on behalf of our country. 

I want to ask about the alternate engine for F–35, which is going 

to be a major bone of contention, apparently, between the DOD and 

Congress. I am newly now the chairman of the Air and Land Subcommittee. And, obviously, I have dealt with this issue before, but 

it has become vastly more important and more in my purview. 

I am just frankly puzzled, having poured over a lot of documents 

in the last few weeks. I am puzzled about the DOD position on 

this. I am puzzled that they have the position they have, and I am 

really puzzled that there would be a veto threat issued by the Secretary of Defense over this issue. You are well aware of the history. 

I won’t walk through it in great detail except to say for 10 years, 

I guess for 11 years inconclusive, DOD supported this program, 

funded it, and moved it forward. Then for the last four years, we 

in Congress have continued it after DOD backed off of it. 

But if you are going to get to the point where basically 95 percent of the Air Force’s fighter attack airplanes are F–35s, history 

shows us that relying on one engine puts you in a very, very bad 

spot. 

We have put 14 to 15 years into developing the alternative. It 

certainly is having no more problems than the main engine in its 

development. I am wondering if you can articulate for me the argument for why DOD is so adamantly opposed to that. 

One final point, the cost is debatable at this point given all of 

the money that we have put into it. I think the most objective way 

to look at it is it is pretty much a wash what it would cost to build 

it versus the benefits of competition. Worst case scenario, maybe it 

is an extra billion or so on top of this program, all of that for the 

major battle we are looking at, we have asked Secretary Gates, and 

to this point, I have not gotten a satisfactory answer that articulates why, why is that your position. 

I should ask, first of all, if it is your position. Certainly it is the 

DOD’s position. Could you give this committee some indication of 

what on earth the argument is for why you are so adamantly opposed to doing this? 

Secretary DONLEY. A couple of issues, Mr. Smith. 

First of all, we do support the Secretary’s view that the Department should not be pursuing the second engine. I will say up front, 

this has been one of the most difficult issues that we have wrestled 

with. So we have looked at the analysis on this from all sides for 
18 

many, many months. And in some respects it can be regarded as 

a close call. 

I think I would summarize it this way: It is a close enough call 

that we cannot see right now the benefits of a considerable, what 

we think is still a considerable remaining investment that would 

have to be made in a second engine, the logistics tail that goes with 

it, all of the preproduction work, the remaining development which 

may be understated in some quarters, the firm costs that are associated with those activities against the soft savings that might be 

out there in the future. We are just—it just looks too cloudy to us, 

and that is the basic rationale that I think we have come down on. 

We did receive in the Air Force the letter that you all sent to 

Secretary Gates on this subject. So the Department is gathering up 

all of the data and the analysis that we have had in front of us 

the last several months, and we are putting that back in a communication that will come back to the committee on that subject very 

soon. 

I would only add one other item on this. When we have challenges in the F–35 program and in making sure that program is 

adequately funded going forward, this is another rock on top of the 

F–35 program, an additional item. 

Mr. SMITH. Two quick points. 

I don’t think the savings are particularly soft. The DOD has 

made a very strong case in many other programs about the benefits 

of competition and the way it can motivate a contractor, without 

question. 

Second, just to be in a position, and we learned this with the F– 

15, if you have one engine and something goes wrong with that engine, you shut down the whole operation and 95 percent of our fleet 

is grounded because of one engine, that seems like a pretty compelling argument to me. 

My last point, I would love to see the analysis that you are relying on. That is another frustration for us. We have heard a lot 

about this analysis. The only report we have seen out there is a 

2008 report that comes down on the other side of this. If you have 

some independent study, some analysis, we would love to see it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being with us. 

Mr. Secretary, I listened to your comments, and this is going to 

lead to my question, I believe this is what you said from my notes: 

‘‘Must prevail in war; prepare to defeat adversaries present and future.’’ 

I look at this country which in so much financial trouble, and I 

realize that is why this budget situation is the way it is and that 

is not your doing but it is what you have inherited. And I look at 

the fact that we owe the Chinese. The Chinese maybe own America. I don’t know which now. I have the pleasure of having Seymour Johnson Air Force base in my district, and we are proud of 

the Marines and Air Force in our district. 

I have occasion over the last few years to ask for briefings, not 

classified. But I am very interested in the fact, as one of my col-
19 

leagues said earlier, we have a Constitutional responsibility that 

we have a strong military. This brings me to my question: The Chinese, I have been told, this was not from those meetings, I have 

read it, I think, that the Chinese are putting the largest percentage 

of their GDP [Gross Domestic Product] into military investments, 

especially Air Force and Navy. It is my understanding that the 

Chinese are buying one of the most sophisticated fighters being 

made by Russia. I think it is the SU series. 

At what point would you say to this committee, you or General 

Schwartz, that we are in a critical situation of losing our supremacy? That the Chinese are at a point where if we don’t acknowledge 

and make major investments, that their fighter force, not because 

of our manpower but because of our equipment, they will surpass 

what we have? 

Secretary DONLEY. Sir, we do track the developments of the Chinese military and other militaries around the world. I do think we 

have the appropriate balance in our current program to cover both 

near-term and long-term threats. 

As I indicated, just as one example, the F–35 is the largest program in the Department of Defense. The United States is, I think, 

well-positioned on fifth generation fighter capabilities in comparison to other militaries around the world. 

Are we the only ones that know something about low observable 

technologies? No, we are not the only ones. Are there other countries developing these technologies? Yes, there are. But I think, I 

am fairly confident in terms of where we stand technology-wise and 

fifth generation capabilities, and that is only one example of longer 

term, general force improvements that we are making that I think 

should help us address potential future threats. 

We still have the bulk of our resources in the Department of Defense, though we have much developed and much improved capabilities at the lower end of the conflict spectrum which you saw in 

Iraq, and you are seeing today in Afghanistan. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Secretary, I have about a minute left so let me 

interrupt. I want to ask General Schwartz, as we are sitting here 

today, if the budget situation continues and you are told you cannot 

have a one percent modest growth, five to ten years down the road, 

knowing what the Chinese are spending in their Air Force and 

what they are buying as it relates to their fighters, will we be in 

a situation, General Schwartz, where we are in a situation where 

we might not be where we need to be? 

General SCHWARTZ. It is my professional opinion, as we stated 

earlier, a sustained modest growth profile for the Department is essential, certainly with respect to that case and others. Clearly, the 

Department will need to be resourced to modernize and to recapitalize in order to have the right kind of force structure. 

My only caution to you, sir, is I don’t think we should look at binary sort of trades. In other words, fighter versus fighters, necessarily. I think one needs to look at this in a more holistic fashion. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. The gentlelady from California, Mrs. 

Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. General, you expressed concern in talking about recruiting and retention, that we are certain that we are able to re-
20 

cruit the most capable individuals, both men and women, to support the mission. And yet we know in this economy that our budget 

managers have reduced costs of recruiting and also that bonuses 

have been reduced. Are you able to reprogram that quickly if you 

find that there is a need to change that manpower strength in 

some specific areas? You mentioned particularly among medical 

professionals; but overall, how can we do that? We would love to 

see the economy improve, but it is in some ways helping the services. 

General SCHWARTZ. Ma’am, we have about $685.0 million in bonuses and retention incentives in the program for 2011. That is a 

substantial amount of money, to be sure. We are fairly agile in applying it to where it will produce the best effect. 

It is always difficult to reduce incentives and reduce bonuses, but 

we have to do that in order to be scrupulous about this. And so we 

review this on a continuing basis. If we see adverse trends developing, we either take it below threshold or come back up to you 

and ask for reprogramming authority to address the need. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Mr. Secretary, is there any one area that gives you 

the greatest concern? You mentioned the medical profession. 

Secretary DONLEY. As General Schwartz alluded to, we have a 

number of stressed career fields: contracting, explosive ordnance 

disposal, our terminal air controllers, specialized career fields that 

we do have to watch very carefully. 

I would say, as you alluded to, ma’am, the economy has actually 

been good for the military in the short-term and our immediate 

challenge actually is that we are carrying probably more airmen 

than we thought we would be carrying at this time last year. So 

we are actually over strength and are trying to manage that down 

in moderate numbers in the months ahead. But we may need to 

come back with a reprogramming to increase funding for military 

personnel because we are actually carrying a few more airmen 

than we thought that we would be. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. You mentioned the year of the family 

and how important that is. And yet there is a program that has 

been applauded out in the communities, certainly amongst spouses, 

‘‘My Career Advancement Account,’’ which NPR [National Public 

Radio] reported today that they basically put a hold, a freeze on 

that scholarship program. I don’t know if that is something that 

you have been apprised of. I think what is interesting to me is they 

have stopped it while they are doing an assessment whereas I 

think there are other programs that we have where we don’t necessarily do that. It may be very appropriate to do the assessment, 

but I don’t know if it is appropriate to freeze the program for those 

people who were anticipating that they could benefit from it. If that 

is not something that you are familiar with, I hope you can take 

a look at it. Any comment? 

General SCHWARTZ. Ma’am, it is as has been reported. If you will 

allow us to take that for the record, we will get back to you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 73.] 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

On Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell that has been brought up several times 

this morning, and I do know that we have a hearing on March 3. 
21 

The purpose of that is to examine the implementation process. 

That is, is the sense that is really where we want to try to enlist 

the help and the support of the services to try and help us better 

understand that process. Is that your understanding, that it is 

more about an implementation process than necessarily a debate 

on the issue itself? And how do you anticipate, what help and support would you be giving to try and make available the kinds of 

discussions that certainly will need to be ensuing within the Air 

Force, as well as the other services? 

General SCHWARTZ. Ma’am, I don’t know what the purpose of the 

hearing is. I don’t want to insert myself into that. That is clearly 

your reign. What I can assure you is that I personally will participate in the Secretary of Defense’s study effort thoroughly. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Can I just ask, is this the kind of deliberate discussion that you think is appropriate? 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, ma’am. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Wilson from South Carolina. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General and 

Secretary for being here today. I particularly appreciate the Air 

Force. My dad served in the Flying Tigers. I am the son of an Air 

Force veteran. I am a veteran myself, Army National Guard, and 

I have four sons serving in the military. But I am particularly 

grateful that I have a nephew who is serving in Iraq with the Air 

Force. So thank you from our family for your service. 

There have been many rumors associated with the noise impact 

of F–35 operations on local base communities. Mr. Secretary, I 

have been advised that the noise of the F–35 is in the same neighborhood as the aircraft that it replaces, such as the F–16, 18, and 

F–15E. With regard to the Joint Strike Fighter [JSF] program, how 

will encroachment and increased noise associated with the fighters 

impact the decision to base these aviation assets? This doesn’t 

apply to you, but I am particularly interested in F–35s being located at Buford Marine Air Station and the joint air base at McIntyre in South Carolina. 

Secretary DONLEY. Sir, noise has been an issue. But I think the 

more refined analysis represents the Department’s latest work on 

this is that the noise levels from F–35 are only slightly above the 

current aircraft. That is my understanding at this point. 

Mr. WILSON. And I do appreciate the sound of freedom. I have 

North Airfield in the district that I represent, and the people of 

that community really enjoy when you do your touch and gos. 

Secretary Donley, provisions of the fiscal year 2010 defense authorization bill prohibit the Department of Defense from retiring 

C–5A aircraft until 90 days after the Department conducts an operational assessment of the modification of the C–5A to the reliability 

enhancement and reengining program configuration, as well as providing a number of certifications concerning cost benefits and the 

risk of the C–5A retirement. Will the operational assessment required by law be completed and will you provide the required certifications to Congress in time for us to reconsider the retirement 

restrictions in our markup of this year’s defense authorization bill 

which is currently scheduled for May? 
22 

General SCHWARTZ. The OT&E, Operational Test and Evaluation 

on the C–5 reengining program is complete. The report will be 

available on or about the 15th of March. We intend to offer the appropriate certifications through the Secretary’s office that indicates 

that it is a viable, effective program and one that should allow us, 

as we spoke of earlier, to begin to act on retiring legacy A model 

aircraft that will not be modified. 

Mr. WILSON. I had the privilege of growing up near Charleston 

Air Force base. I remember when the first C–5A landed, and Chairman Mendel Rivers, Mr. Chairman, was there to welcome the aircraft. 

General Schwartz, the engine competitions for F–16 saved 

money, improved engine performance, reliability, and contractor responsiveness. Today the F–16 program continues to operate with 

two engines. Why wouldn’t a similar program be applicable to the 

F–35? 

General SCHWARTZ. Because we are 20 years, 30 years later in 

technological progress on engine design and production. Fundamentally, and just to, again, round out Secretary Donley’s answer earlier, there are a couple of issues with respect to alternate engine 

that I just offer for your consideration. One is if this result, if having more engines results in less F–35s, that is not a good scenario 

for the Air Force or the Department of Defense. 

Secondly, the reality is that the F–22 and the F/A–18E/F are single-engine airplanes, and there is no dispute about that. It is because we collectively in the defense community, I think, have become comfortable with the reliability and so on of those respective 

engines, one of which is the predecessor to the F–35. 

Lastly, a concern that I have is the reality is the alternate engine 

is not for anybody else but the Air Force. The Navy is not going 

to operate an alternate engine aboard ship. Our European partners 

are not going to operate two engines. You are talking about focusing this on your Air Force, which is problematic in my view. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Marshall. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You caught me by 

surprise. 

Thank you both for your service and your leadership. I think you 

do a great job for our Air Force. 

I was having dinner with former Under Secretary Ray DuBois a 

week or two ago, and he brought up the tanker and asked, ‘‘Why 

don’t we move forward with taking two bids, producing two tankers, do small, relatively small quantities of the two, they come online faster, and then we would see which one we liked the most and 

could make decisions concerning future buys based on that?’’ Could 

you quickly respond to Secretary DuBois’s thought? 

Secretary DONLEY. We have addressed this over a couple of years 

now. The Department’s conclusion is that this would be an expensive way to proceed. We would rather not have a split buy or dual 

buy in this circumstance. We do plan to award, currently our plan 

is to award the RFP [Request for Proposals] to the best offer after 

the evaluation is done. 

One concern with that approach which I will lay on the table is 

that the Department’s estimates are that we will be probably buy-
23 

ing 15 airplanes for over a decade actually to get to 179 aircraft 

from this buy. If we go forward with two lines, the minimum economic order for each line would probably be about 12 aircraft. It 

would be very inefficient to do that, and it would bump the annual 

buy from 15 to 24 aircraft and that is a big bump in our budget 

and it takes a big lump of dollars that we would have focused on 

other Air Force programs, puts it on the tanker. I understand the 

operational and sort of the business advantage of buying more, 

faster and get them cheaper, et cetera, but we have to manage this 

procurement in the context of all other things that the Air Force 

is doing and getting up to 24 airplanes each year for a number of 

years is a hard thing for us to do. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

The alternate engine, again, we are talking about split buy, basically, and I don’t think it is arguable there are significant risk 

avoidance advantages to doing that in the long run. History has 

shown us that the question is cost. The 2007 cost analysis improvement group estimated that there would be a $1.2 billion in cost on 

a present value basis, and $2.2 billion in savings on a then-year 

basis. What that typically means is, as you would expect, the costs 

are up front, the savings are toward the rear. 

That was done in 2007. We have spent more money, and that is 

current costs we have incurred. My assumption is, as we said in 

the letter, a good chance is that both those numbers are now positive based on the assumptions made by that 2007 study. It seems 

to me the only way that can change is if somebody changes the assumptions. So it would be very helpful to the committee if whenever you get your materials to us, you would say the 2007 group 

was making this assumption or that assumption, we have changed 

that assumption and that’s why we come up with different numbers because that is the only way that the numbers really change 

unless you conclude that they just made a math mistake. And that 

would be very helpful to us. We really are troubled by this threat 

of a veto over a program that we think benefits in the long-run national security and net, based on the evidence we have, is a savings 

to go ahead and do it, as opposed to a cost. 

Finally, Chief, in your response to Mr. McKeon on Don’t Ask, 

Don’t Tell, you said it is probably not something we should be considering now given our OPTEMPO [operational tempo]. I agree 

with that view. And you said assuming we do consider it and we 

make some changes, and your last statement was something to the 

effect that one standard of combat will continue to apply to all airmen. Could you please elaborate what you meant by that? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, I was just indicating that our standard 

of conduct will apply to all airmen. That is what I would expect, 

and I think that is what you should expect. So we will expect performance. Should the law change, we will expect performance and 

conduct consistent with our standards, and we will handle it accordingly. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Bishop. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I have good and bad. Let me do the good first. General, we spoke on the phone a while ago about the extended use 
24 

lease problems at Falcon Hill and you said you would fix it. I want 

to thank you for doing that. You did. You orchestrated a situation 

where the people went out there, they saw those particular problems for moving forward, and I just want to thank you very much 

for following through on that issue. I think it is very positive. And 

just keep the JAG [Judge Advocate General’s] attorneys away from 

the issue in the future. 

Now for the negative part, and it deals with the warm line 

sustainment program. Minuteman III now has to be maintained to 

2030. It is our only program of record. I noticed in the budget for 

fiscal year 2011, you have $44.0 million for the Minuteman III 

warm line, of which $5.0 million is dedicated to unspecified government costs and overhead, so you have $39 million to buy three 

motor sets. 

Next year in the 2012, it is down to $34 million, and in the 2013 

budget, there is nothing. I put that in contrast. I am not sure you 

can actually build three motor sets with that amount of money. But 

the Navy, for example, has 12 motor sets a year that they do to 

keep their warm line going for their D–5, and the industry has 

simply said they need six as a minimum to maintain it. 

Now last year when your superiors cancelled KEI [Kinetic Energy Interceptor] and stopped the ground base and had no followup 

on ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile], it made a major dent 

in the industrial base. And obviously AFMC [Air Force Materiel 

Command] has simply said there is no in-house capability to sustain these, so I have three questions. The first one is, quite frankly, 

how did you come up with three booster motors as the adequate 

element to sustain the military base? Is this simply another budget-driven exercise that does not face the reality coming from the industry? 

Number two, you sent over a Defense Department report to Congress on the solid-rocket motor industrial base in June of last year. 

I appreciate it. It was a good report. But it said delays in NASA’s 

[National Aeronautics and Space Administration] Ares program 

would have a significant negative impact on the industrial base, 

specifically materiel suppliers for the military. 

Now, in light of the decision to cancel Ares totally, if delay was 

bad, I am thinking canceling would have to be bad/bad. In light of 

that decision, are you going to rethink your program as to what 

you are putting in for the solid-rocket motor industrial base and 

the funding levels that would be there? 

And finally, my third one is why doesn’t the Air Force simply 

commit to a long-range Minuteman III sustainment program in the 

out-years, and isn’t such a commitment now even more necessary, 

especially with what may happen in the space exploration program 

as well? 

Secretary DONLEY. Mr. Bishop, what I would like to do is take 

the details of your question-for-the-record and so we can get back 

on each point. But I will say that we recognize the decisions made 

on Ares and on the constellation program in general in NASA, and 

we have a challenge on the solid-rocket motor industrial base and 

on the booster industrial base, period. 

So we recognize not just the Minuteman challenge going forward, 

but a broader industrial base issue which we are going to have to 
25 

wrestle with this year. So we do not, right now, have a long-term 

solution to that right now in hand. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 73.] 

Mr. BISHOP. I appreciate that. I think that is the substance to 

all three of those questions that were there. But obviously, three 

motor sets, I don’t think, fits the need and especially with the 

budget that is declining to nothing over the next three years, that 

is not a long-range solution. 

I would appreciate if you would rethink those and get back with 

me later. Thank you for your time and for being here. 

By the way, Hill doesn’t have a problem with sound encroachments for the F–35. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Courtney, please. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both your testimony this morning. 

I want to start off with aftermath of the F–22 decision last year 

which was regarding spare engines. It is my understanding that 

the Air Force has a formula for calculating how many spare engines would be needed for any program, and we are at a point 

where it appears there are more spares needed for the F–22 than 

available. And given the fact that this production line is coming to 

an end date, obviously there would be extra costs for restarting if 

we had to go that route. Can you comment on that? 

General SCHWARTZ. We currently have 54 spare engines in inventory, for a requirement of 54 that will grow to 65 as we round out 

production, and our intent is to go to 65. So there will be an additional 11 or so engines procured for the spare inventory. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. 

I want to again go back to the alternate engine discussion which 

has been going on. General, again, you made the point, which I 

think is sometimes overlooked, that sole source engines is not some 

unprecedented deviation from past practice. The F/A–18 is an example which you cited. We build Sikorsky helicopters in Connecticut, and thousands have been built without a hitch. So I guess 

in terms of going forward with the sole engine with the F–35, do 

you feel confident where we are right now with the engine that has 

been awarded that you will be able to control costs and provide 

again an adequate system for the needs? 

General SCHWARTZ. Based on what I know now and the analysis 

that I have seen to date, I think it is a manageable risk given the 

other demands we have, and again, my primary concern that we 

don’t get engine production out in front of airplane production. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Really, that is at some point in a tight budget 

the trade-off that we are going to be stuck with in terms of what 

the choices are that are involved. Secretary Gates again reiterated 

recommendation of a veto if we do not adopt cancellation of the alternate engine program. I think the flip side of that is we have to 

take from some other parts of your budget or the defense budget 

to continue going down that path. I look forward to your response 

to the letter which has been requested. 

Real quick on the C–27 program which the Air and National 

Guard in Connecticut is certainly watching closely. I wonder if you 
26 

can indicate whether the Air Force remains committed to the full 

buy of 38 C–27s over the next 5 years? 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, we are, sir, to 38. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Previous statements have said that the 38 would 

be looked upon as a floor and not the ceiling for the program. Is 

that still the general thinking? 

General SCHWARTZ. At the moment, we are not looking at going 

above 38. That was the assessment through this program build. So 

I think 38 is probably a good, comfortable number for all of us. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here and thank you for your 

service. 

I have three quick comments, and then a question about AFIT, 

the Air Force Institute of Technology, and then I would like to get 

your thoughts on the Airborne Laser [ABL]. 

The first three comments, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base is in 

my district. I will be submitting to you a question for the record 

concerning the 445th airlift wing. There had been a previous commitment that had been made to the base concerning the issue of 

the C–5s and the C–17s. I will be looking for you to reaffirm that 

earlier commitment that has been made to the base, and we will 

be sending it in your direction. 

General SCHWARTZ. May I say one thing, sir. 

One thing that Secretary Donley and I have tried hard to do is 

not make promises we can’t keep. So we might not respond immediately to that. If we say yes, we mean yes. 

Mr. TURNER. I appreciate that. Actually, I am looking for you to 

keep a promise that has been made, and I hope to have your evaluation and review of that promise. 

With respect to NASIC [National Air and Space Intelligence Center], we spoke about the correspondence that I sent to you. I am 

very concerned that there is a pending issue that could diminish 

our intelligence capability, and I look forward to your response 

there. 

Also with respect to the civilian conversion from contractor personnel issue that is ongoing in the Air Force, I am continuing to 

hear a number of complaints over the process of activities that appear to be inappropriate. We tried to address this in the committee 

with some report language in the last National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA]. 

I will be getting back to you with some specifics as we prepare 

for the next NDAA, and I would like to hear your thoughts on how 

other communities may be experiencing this. 

My two questions, we had a hearing here about the nuclear enterprise and the changes and concerns that we have there. We continue to look at issues such as cyber and computer science issues. 

The Air Force Institute of Technology [AFIT], as you know, happens to excel in the issue of nuclear enterprise and also cyber and 

war-gaming and computer science programs. I would be interested 

in your thoughts on the issue of how you see the Air Force Institute of Technology, AFIT, may be able to play a greater role as you 

look to your needs in that area. 
27 

The second is the Airborne Laser. We recently had a success I 

think we should all celebrate with respect to the February 11 test 

of the Airborne Laser test bed with the missile shoot-down. The air 

force research labs played a key role in the early technology development. This test which has been many years in the making demonstrated the viability of directed energy [DE] technology and the 

potential capability of an Airborne Laser missile defense system. 

Now we all know that funding for the Airborne Laser Test Bed 

has sharply declined with the Obama Administration’s shift in missile defense policy. I hope this successful test renews interest in directed energy technology. With increased DOD investment, there is 

great potential for further innovation, technology maturation, and 

development of a concrete strategy that transitions Airborne Laser 

Test Bed capabilities from the lab to the field. I would love your 

thoughts and your talk about the Air Force and its success here 

and the potential for future applications in our national defense. 

This is one that has taken much criticism but had quite a great 

success. I am looking forward to your thoughts there. 

General SCHWARTZ. I will talk about ABL. It was an achievement. It was a magnificent technical achievement. But the reality, 

Congressman Turner, is this does not reflect something that is 

operationally viable. 

Mr. TURNER. My question is about the next level of innovation. 

Obviously, this is an accomplishment. It is not can we replicate this 

over and over again. We are looking for some vision from the Air 

Force. 

General SCHWARTZ. And that is in the area of solid-state, not 

chemical-based lasers. That is the queen of the realm, sir. 

Secretary DONLEY. Just to amplify, the Air Force does have a directed energy program. It was pretty well-funded. I was briefed on 

it just a month ago. To foot-stomp this point, the Airborne Laser 

has been a tremendously successful program, but it is very expensive and it is not necessarily representative of the future of the 

technology. We are looking for lots of potential directed energy applications. So one of our tasks going forward is to figure out where 

the directed energy program is going at a strategic level, both in 

terms of the technology and the mission sets against which we intend to put resources. But we have a robust DE program in the Air 

Force. It’s a good one. 

Mr. TURNER. And AFIT, your thoughts on AFIT? 

Secretary DONLEY. Just quickly, AFIT is getting a lot of our attention in the growth of our acquisition workforce. The chief and 

I were briefed on the status of the improvements in our acquisition 

Air Force, the growth of the civilian and a little bit on the military 

side, just a couple of days ago. So we have increased the numbers 

of seats and courses available to that acquisition workforce that are 

sponsored by and taught through the AFIT system. So it is an important part of the fabric of our research and research community. 

The CHAIRMAN. Before I call on Ms. Giffords, you have on page 

17 of the prepared remarks the retirement of 17 C–5As. What is 

the status of that, and what is your request this year? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, what we will do is provide the required 

certifications of tests on the C–5M, the reengined aircraft that is 

required. The Secretary of Defense also needs to make certifi-
28 

cations that he believes it is acceptable to retire legacy A model 

aircraft. When that occurs, we intend to execute the 90-day waiting 

period and begin retirement of those aircraft. 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have sufficient C–17s as we speak? 

General SCHWARTZ. As you are aware, we are above the required 

number of aircraft by at least 20, probably more. And so it is our 

view to get down to the proper level, we are in good shape in that 

regard. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Giffords. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, and I am 

pleased to have you before us today. 

Normally in the past when given this opportunity, I have chosen 

to spend some time talking about the fighter gap issue and what 

that means to our strategic readiness. But instead, I would like to 

talk about some of the scoping hearings that are coming before us 

in southern Arizona. As you know, the 152nd International Fighter 

Wing has been put on the list as a potential site to host the new 

Joint Strike Fighter, the F–35. And we are willing and ready to accept as many as three training squadrons in Tucson. I am very excited about the prospect of having the F–35 in southern Arizona, 

but my constituents still have numerous questions specifically addressing noise levels and flight patterns. I was hoping to talk a little bit about that today. 

On February 2, I sent both of you a letter asking for a copy of 

some studies that were conducted at Edwards Air Force base to 

gauge the noise levels of the F–35, and I also asked for eight specific data sets that I believe must be released to the communities 

being considered around the country, not just in Arizona, these 

communities that are being considered as F–35 basing locations before any final decisions are made. 

I received back two sets of charts that I believe are conclusive, 

and I would like to put them up on the screen now. We have the 

first one. It is labeled ‘‘Measured Worst Case Aircraft Sounds Levels at 50 Feet.’’ I was hoping you could explain what this chart indicates both for aircraft at military power and at full afterburner? 

General SCHWARTZ. Ma’am, having not reviewed that chart, I 

would prefer to offer you a considered response rather than one off 

the cuff. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Okay. 

The second chart I was provided with is entitled Predicted Sound 

Levels at 1,000 Foot Level Flight, and I was hoping that we could 

also get some feedback which indicates for aircraft flying at minimum power and then at military power what this is going to mean 

for communities? 

General SCHWARTZ. Again, ma’am, I am disappointed if you 

didn’t get a narrative to go along with these charts. If we didn’t we 

failed you and allow us to remedy that situation. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. What we really need 

to do is get this data out to the communities and make sure our 

communities understand how these numbers compare to other real 

world factors. For example, according to the National Institutes of 

Health [NIH], a lawn mower creates about 90 decibels and an am-
29 

bulance siren creates 120 decibels, and so we need to make sure 

that the communities understand fully what the F–35 means to 

them. And again, I think also, particularly those of us in southern 

Arizona that have experience what the F–16 and the block 60 F– 

16s that have flown out of southern Arizona, and also the A–10 and 

we host Operation Snowbird as well at Davis Monmouth Air Force 

base, these are the noises that the community has experience with. 

We are looking forward to the opportunity of having the F–35 in 

southern Arizona, but as these hearings come before us, we want 

to make sure that the community, and rightfully so, has full access 

to the correct information. So thank you for your consideration. I 

look forward to hearing back from you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank both of 

our witnesses for being here today. 

As a backdrop, I am very unhappy with Secretary Gates and his 

decision to not to go forward with the Air Force’s selection of the 

tanker that Northrop Grumman and EADS came up with and you 

selected after a full, fair, and open competition. I think he did a 

disservice to the warfighter, and particularly to the Air Force who 

picked the tanker that they wanted. Having said that, some of my 

colleagues don’t have a dog in that fight, but I do since it was going 

to be built in Alabama. I want to talk a little about where we are 

with that. 

My recollection from the testimony here with the GAO [Government Accountability Office] of the protested areas of discontent by 

Boeing, only six merited GAO acknowledging those could have 

made a difference in the selection, but they couldn’t say that they 

did. Rather than going back and just remedying those six areas, 

tightening the language, I understand from what I have seen, the 

initial RFP for comment, and it completely is one-sided in my view, 

which is why I am very happy with what Senator Shelby is doing 

in the other Chamber. 

I understand there is the public comment period, and you are 

ready to come forward, do you see dramatic changes in the RFP 

from the one being offered for public comment? Because from what 

I understand, Northrop is not even going to bid if that is the case. 

Secretary DONLEY. Sir, we will be prepared actually tomorrow to 

roll out the RFP. I believe you have been invited, if you have not 

heard already, to a series of briefings tomorrow that are planned. 

The Deputy Secretary and Dr. Carter, the Under Secretary and 

myself, will be over here briefing Members on that. So I think I 

would withhold comment on KC–X today and let that be tomorrow’s issue, if that is okay. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you think in your opinion, I am not asking for 

Secretary Gates’ opinion, I am not really interested in his opinion, 

in your opinion, will this be a fair and open competition? Will the 

RFP, will it solicit competition? 

Secretary DONLEY. Absolutely. We believe both offerors have a 

chance to win the competition. We want a competition, and we disagree with the view that the draft RFP has been slanted in any 

particular direction. We do take issue with that. 
30 

Mr. ROGERS. If that is the case, why would you deviate from the 

initial RFP which was bid and you selected the airplane or the 

tanker you wanted, why would you change any more than just 

those areas of disagreement where the GAO acknowledged there 

was meritorious dispute? 

Secretary DONLEY. I believe the overall message from the GAO 

assessment was that yes, there were specific areas that they took 

issue with. But overall, I think the message was that there was too 

much imprecision and too much subjectivity that could not be conveyed to the offerors in terms of how the decisions and how the 

evaluation would be made. 

So we took away from that the need to tighten up our description 

of what the required capabilities were and how the evaluation 

would be conducted and to lock down those details, to be as open 

and transparent and as clear as we possibly could be. And that is 

the source really of the draft that has been on the street. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, my concern is the tightening down of that language has basically guaranteed Boeing to get this plane. 

Secretary DONLEY. We do take issue with that, sir, but I understand your view. 

Mr. ROGERS. You made the reference earlier in response to my 

colleague from Georgia’s question about the dual procurement. I 

understand you are operating on the assumption that the dual procurement would be more expensive. If it could be proven that it 

would not, would that be an avenue that you would pursue? 

Secretary DONLEY. Sir, I think we have analyzed this from several different sides over the last year. We are always open to suggestions and constructive comment on how we do our work. We 

think that we have addressed this and concluded that that would 

not be an effective and efficient way to proceed. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much for your responses. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Kissell. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. 

General, going to a narrow scope here, I am from North Carolina, 

and we had put language in the last Defense Authorization Act 

that you were supposed to get back to this committee within a certain amount of time discussing Pope Air Force base and its relationship with Fort Bragg. The growth at Fort Bragg, there will be 

34 flag officers on base. FORSCOM [U.S. Army Forces Command], 

the 18th Corps, their missions require the ability to get to places 

in a hurry, requiring an immense amount of planning. The language is along the lines, is there sufficient Air Force officer level 

to be able to communicate and be able to present the position of 

the Air Force effectively with all of the other officers that are there, 

and that report is due March 1. So we are looking forward to that 

information, sir. 

Mr. Secretary, one of the things that has come out of the discussion today, and nothing new in that regard, is concern about deployment of the F–35. You mentioned level of concurrency as a 

level of concern that has delayed the program. I wonder if you can 

elaborate on some examples of this issue and how it has affected 

the deployment of the F–35? 
31 

Secretary DONLEY. Well, the issue, sir, is not uncommon to any 

other aircraft or major production program of any kind. So once the 

production line has been facilitized and begins to build up to 

produce test assets, it is inefficient to stop the line while you wait 

for the results of the test because the test can take a year, the test 

can take two years, and if you do not support the production line 

with continued aircraft production, it goes cold and then you have 

to pay the cost of starting it up again. So this is a situation common to just about every production program of consequence that 

you might think of. 

In the case of the F–35, there was a lot of concurrency built in 

so development was intended to extend for a particular period of 

time while we started production. I think what has happened in 

this case is that concurrency was just unsustainable. The test program has been delayed, and the view was we just need to have 

more hours on the test program before we get to significant ramps 

in production. We are not eliminating concurrency in the restructured program. 

The proposal that you have in front of you is for 22 production 

aircraft in fiscal year 2011. We think that is prudent. It has been 

shaved from last year’s estimate of what we thought we were going 

to ask you for in 2011, so we have cut down that ramp but we do 

need to proceed with production, but we are adding money back 

into development program, to speed up, to add test aircraft to get 

further down the test program before we begin to ramp up production at truly significant levels. 

Mr. KISSELL. Beyond the engine, is there one or two areas of this 

development that are proportionately more challenging than others? 

Secretary DONLEY. Just a couple of points. This is the biggest 

and most complex procurement program the Department has ever 

undertaken. So we have the carrier variant and we have the short 

takeoff and landing variant, and the conventional all being developed at the same time. And we have our international partners and 

their needs completely integrated into the program from the very 

beginning. 

So we have truly a complex, very complex joint program and 

international program. So it has been a big challenge. Again with 

very advanced technology. So it is a huge and complex program. 

We should not lose sight of that. 

Mr. KISSELL. The proportion that you just mentioned of this program, how important it is that obviously brings about so much of 

the need to get it going, and I am just wondering what kind of time 

frame are we looking at to have deployable, meaningful numbers 

of planes in the air? 

General SCHWARTZ. For the Air Force, I can only speak for the 

Air Force, that will be late in calendar year 2015. We will have 

training aircraft in advance of that. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, sir. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Our Nation’s dependence on and demand for space assets have 

grown exponentially. At the same time our potential adversaries 
32 

demonstrate capabilities that make our space assets increasingly 

vulnerable. One example of this was China’s shootdown of its own 

satellite in January of 2007. With these factors in mind, our demand for and dependence on space and our adversaries’ asymmetric means to deny those capabilities, in view of that, why does 

the current budget cut the resourcing for operational response of 

space by 24 percent? And this follows a huge reduction in the previous fiscal year which equals a 2-year cut of 59 percent? Operational response of space is intended to be responsive to a joint 

force commander’s battlefield needs and surge capability and can 

also serve to replenish our space capabilities given natural events 

or attack. 

So to repeat, how, when demand is growing and our threats are 

expanding, can we justify a cut this year of 24 percent to this program? 

Secretary DONLEY. Sir, I would like to confirm the numbers for 

the record with you. But ORS [Operationally Responsive Space] remains a priority program for us. We are spending about nine percent of our Air Force resources on space. 

That is only exceeded by the mobility and the global precision 

strike missionaries. Mobility really reflects the KC–X investments 

we are making and the size of our mobility forces. The global precision attack represents the F–35, which is our biggest, among others, but it is our biggest program. But behind that we have a whole 

slew of space programs that are very important to our Air Force 

and to our joint warfighter. We do have priority funding on our 

ORS right now to get a capability that is in place by the end of 

this calendar year. 

So let me circle back with you on the details of ORS funding. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 74.] 

Mr. LAMBORN. General, do you have anything to add on that? 

General SCHWARTZ. Just two things. One is the ORS is one approach to providing resilience in space. Another approach, of 

course, is being able to discern whether our platforms on orbit are 

at risk, are being threatened; and if they are, by whom. And this 

is the other part of it, the space situational awareness initiatives 

which are appropriately funded, because it is my personal view 

that you cannot deter if you cannot attribute. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Mr. Secretary, I am glad to hear that you are saying this remains a priority, because when I look at the numbers, 

2009 it was 228 million, 2010 was 124, and then the projected 

budget for 2011 is 94. So from 228 to 94 causes me concern. 

Changing gears here, General, two years ago the Air Force predicted fighter and attack aircraft shortfalls beginning in fiscal year 

2017 and rising to an 800 aircraft shortfall by 2024. Is the Air 

Force still predicting shortfalls in its fighter and attack aircraft inventory? 

General SCHWARTZ. Certainly not at that level, and there are a 

couple of reasons for that. One is that the total number of aircraft 

that are required is somewhat less than what was the top line several years back; 2,200 is now 2,024. Secondly, that initial analysis 

was done based on a F–35 production rate of 48 aircraft vice 80, 

and we do believe that once we break out of the development phase 
33 

for the F–35 that we will make 80, and we will be trying to even 

push that higher. And a third aspect of this is that we have looked, 

and, as the Secretary suggested, that one thing that was not considered then was the ability to make modest renovations on aircraft to extend their service life until the F–35 becomes available 

in numbers. 

Mr. LAMBORN. You are able to keep going, although I can’t. 

The CHAIRMAN. You can complete the answer. 

General SCHWARTZ. And so the point is, sir, that at most, a socalled deficit is less than 200 aircraft, and again this is in my view 

within the realm of the manageable, depending on what we do to 

renovate existing airplanes. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Heinrich. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. I want to start off 

just by thanking Representative Lamborn and reiterating his concern over the ORS program. I think it is a game changer for us in 

many ways in terms of doing more with less. And I am not sure 

that the cuts in that program are going to serve us over the long 

run in terms of reducing or increasing our ability to do more with 

less financial resources. 

Changing gears, I know that we all know there have been some 

serious incidents in the past, particularly 2006 and 2007, regarding 

the mishandling of nuclear weapons materials. And I remember 

back in 2008, the Schlesinger task force found that there had been 

an ‘‘unambiguous, dramatic, and unacceptable decline in the Air 

Force’s commitment to perform the nuclear mission.’’ Since then 

you have made the reinvigoration of the Air Force nuclear enterprise your highest priority, and I want to commend you on those 

efforts. They are much appreciated. There are obviously still some 

challenges, but absolute perfection is the standard that you have 

articulated on numerous occasions when dealing with these highvalue assets. 

I want to ask you, can you please describe what steps are being 

taken to address the remaining deficiencies? And are there enough 

resources being allocated to Air Force nuclear security to meet the 

standards for perfection in maintenance and in storage? 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, they are. Some of the initial things we 

implemented were organizational; that is, standing up of a Nuclear 

Weapons Center, as you are well aware, standing up a Global 

Strike Command, moving the nuclear missiles and nuclear-capable 

bombers into the same organization rather than distribute it 

around our Air Force. These were all important initiatives. But in 

the end, this is also an issue about human capital. This is an issue 

of culture in which we, as Schlesinger indicated, had lost the edge. 

And this is not a short-term undertaking. This is recreating that 

culture of excellence, that non-acceptance of deviations in this particular area. And we continue to work on that. 

Our inspection results, as you are aware, have—and by the way, 

just to give you a quick insight, in 2005 through 2007, we had zero 

no-notice evaluations. And in the following year, 2008, we had 

three. In 2009 we had eight, and this year so far—and we are only 

a couple months in—we have eight so far this year. It gives you 

a sense that we are doing this no notice more frequently and more 
34 

invasively—not to make life hard for our kids, that is not it at all— 

but to ensure that we discover where we are not up to par. We 

kidded ourselves before. We can no longer do that. 

So part of it is institutional, sir. Part of it is culture. And we are 

working both angles. The cultural piece is longer-term. 

Mr. HEINRICH. But you feel that the resources are adequate to 

support that change in culture? 

General SCHWARTZ. Indeed. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Great. Wonderful. 

I also want to thank my colleague Mr. Turner from Ohio for 

bringing up the recent successful demonstration, the ABL project. 

I was hoping maybe you could articulate just a little more where 

you see directed energy going within the Air Force over the foreseeable future. 

General SCHWARTZ. The Secretary may choose to elaborate, but 

my view is that the sweet spot on this is solid-state, something 

which isn’t as big, isn’t as heavy, doesn’t require exotic chemicals 

to operate, and ideally can be miniaturized so that it can operate 

in a variety of aircraft, both large and small. That is the path that 

we need to proceed on. I have some indication from our SMART 

[System Metric and Reporting Tool] folks that this is within the 

realm of the technological possibilities. 

Secretary DONLEY. Just to elaborate a little bit further, part of 

the additional focus in this directed energy program will be where 

to put the mission emphasis on developing this kind of capability, 

at the tactical level or at the strategic missile level, for example. 

And there are some trade-offs to be made in that in terms of range 

and power. 

But just to come back to where we started, there is no question 

that the ABL program has made important strides for us and has 

done some groundbreaking work in acquisition, pointing and tracking, all kinds of scientific research that will support our program 

going forward. But whether or not the existing ABL program, as 

it exists today, is the right vehicle to take this research forward, 

is a separate question. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

A couple questions on the ISR assets. A recent GAO report indicates that the Air Force only has the capability to process one-half 

of the Predator signals intelligence collected. What are the Air 

Force plans to correct this shortfall? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, I would dispute the GAO characterization a bit. However, an example is we intend to add 702, roughly 

700 linguists to our processing enterprise in order to address the 

difficulties they suggested that we have. But at a higher level, I 

think it is important to appreciate that what we have been doing 

recently really is solving our problems with people power. We can’t 

continue to do this. We have added 4,700 folks to the ground processes system for video and signals. And we are continuing to grow 

the take. The real secret here is automated processing, and that is 

the path that we will have to go in order to do this well, not unlike 

the NSA [National Security Agency] model. 
35 

Mr. COFFMAN. General Schwartz, is lack of UAV data encryption 

and the possibility of terrorist and insurgent interception of the 

video or data signal an issue to the United States Air Force? 

General SCHWARTZ. I think it is a modest issue, if that. The reality is that we made a conscious decision to provide full-motion, 

real-time video to our folks on the ground, to our troopers on the 

ground. That was the priority, to give them situation awareness. 

The argument that others can see that video and make tactical use 

of it I think is a stretch. Nonetheless, we are encrypting that capability that will begin in 2011 and it will be completed by 2014. 

But what I would not want to do is to withdraw the value of that 

video from our Army and Marine Corps brothers and sisters on the 

ground because we have sort of, I think, excessive concern about 

others being able to see the take. 

Mr. COFFMAN. My final question is on your personnel system and 

your promotion system and an effort, I guess related to recruiting 

and retention. I think you have got a lot of great folks, and they 

want to make careers out of the United States Air Force. You have 

an up-and-out promotion system that seems to be a relic of the 

past, in a way. And I only say that because—what do they say— 

sometimes I think that the new 52 is the old 42 in terms of age. 

And I am wondering, have you thought about lengthening up 

those times for when an airmen or an officer comes up before the 

promotion board? It seems that the process is pretty fast right now, 

that we are focused on this 20-year window for a career—and 

where we have people that certainly want to stay in longer than 

that, that are capable of doing their job but may not be competitive 

given the highly competitive environment of your organization 

right now. 

General SCHWARTZ. Well, we currently have 1,600 more officers 

than our end strength permits, so we are keeping some on board 

perhaps longer than we should. I think that for a vital, physically 

active, aggressive force, which is what you want your Air Force to 

be, I think that the notion that you either compete or you move on, 

I think there is still merit in that basic philosophy. 

We do make exceptions, sir. And that is actually fairly common 

in those situations, or where someone is not promoted and they are 

continued in some cases to 24 years, in some cases to 28 years, depending on their specialty and the need. I think that should still 

be the primary factor of consideration: the need. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you 

very much for your appearance today and for your service to the 

country. 

I recently took over as—and had the privilege of chairing the 

Strategic Forces Subcommittee for the Armed Services Committee. 

And I know that obviously, as you are well aware, the Air Force 

has primary jurisdiction over, or at least control over personnel and 

equipment, including national programs involving your jurisdictions. 

I would like to go back to some of the questions that my colleagues have already brought up. 
36 

Let’s turn first back to ORS. Can you please describe the programs and the capabilities the Department is funding in the fiscal 

year 2011 request to improve spatial situational awareness, space 

control, and counterspace programs, first of all, and more specifically also how all these activities reduce the vulnerability of our 

space assets? And beyond that, can you also elaborate a little further on how have military operational plans and contingency plans 

changed to reflect the possibility that those satellites may be unavailable during times of crisis or war? 

Secretary DONLEY. Sir, a couple of points. We do have a spacebased surveillance system that is funded in this program. We do 

have a Joint Space Mission Operations Center space management 

system that we intend to install at 14th Air Force headquarters to 

improve space situational awareness, modernizing that situational 

awareness to provide us a better sense of what is happening in 

space, who is up there, and the precise location and characteristics 

of their satellites, for example, in their operations. Very important 

initiatives for us going forward. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. General, you had a comment? 

General SCHWARTZ. I would just extend on that. Part of this is 

knowing what the inventory of objects is above. Part of this is 

again being able to identify phenomenology that might be natural 

or it might be manmade and being able to differentiate between 

the two. Space-based surveillance systems should help us do that, 

the first launch of which is going to occur this year. 

I think that the key thing about this is that we need to be able— 

we need to drive toward a capability which will not only warn us 

of interference in whatever form it may take—physical, electronic, 

RF [radio frequency], so on—but attribute that, definitively to a 

source. When that occurs, then one can take action to protect your 

assets through any number of means. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Can you address more specifically about redundancy about how the military operations plan and contingency 

plans change to reflect the possibility that these capabilities may 

not—— 

General SCHWARTZ. I will give you an example—well, there are 

two. One is that we actually have war games where we have considered a day without space; in other words, intellectually trying to 

make sure that we understand what the puts and takes are, and 

what are the consequences of losing. Let’s say you did not have 

GPS [Global Positioning System], or it was jammed; are our air 

crews prepared to operate in a GPS degraded environment? And 

that is something that we are training to in larger measure. In 

other words, taking those things that we perhaps in the not-too-distant past have taken for granted, but understand that an adversary might degrade them, and can we fight through that degradation? 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Let me, if I could, also turn to the Space Posture 

Review [SPR]. It appears that the Congressionally-mandated Space 

Posture Review performed in partnership with the Director of National Intelligence [DNI] isn’t going to be completed until the summer. Can you tell us anything about how the war performed thus 

far on that review and the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] 
37 

have influenced modernization investment plans for national security space programs? That is one. 

And finally, before my time runs out, nuclear enterprise. I would 

like you to give a specific—could you provide information on inspections of our nuclear arsenal? I understand there were two failures 

recently. So on those two, as much time as the Chairman will 

allow. Then, if you can’t finish it, for the record. 

Secretary DONLEY. Just quickly on the SPR, I do expect that 

Congress will see the results of that this summer. To put a very 

broad summary on it, you will see I think some emphasis—while 

we have a lot of details to work through and some important policy 

decisions for senior leadership to make, I do think you will see 

more emphasis on striking the right balance between government 

and commercial use of space assets and how we leverage the work 

that is done in the commercial sector. For example, hosting payloads—commercial DOD-related payloads on commercial satellites 

is one aspect of that. And it also gets to the redundancy issues that 

you discussed before. 

Just a couple of words: Space is getting more congested and 

space is getting more contested I think are a couple of themes that 

you will hear in that review. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 73.] 

General SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman, 10 seconds. Kirtland did earn 

unsatisfactory grades in inspections but, interestingly, recently the 

377th Wing, also at Kirtland, retested to satisfactory. So again this 

is a process that we are in, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank both of 

you. Every time we have Armed Forces come before us I usually 

try to express gratitude to them. And, General Schwartz, I want to 

tell you that I think you are a credit to the Air Force and to this 

country. People like us up here talk about freedom all the time, 

and people like yourselves have carried it on your back your whole 

life. I am very grateful to you. That is just a little commercial 

there. 

General SCHWARTZ. There are 332,000, plus 70,000 Reserve and 

100,000 Guards, sir. 

Mr. FRANKS. And God bless every one of them. I bet every one 

would echo what I just said about you, sir. 

Secretary Donley, I know it is a challenging thing to be in your 

chair, so my first question is related to the resources needs of the 

Air Force, and so I ask you a two-part question. Number one, do 

you think you have the adequate latitude to speak with complete 

candor about the resource needs of the Air Force, and do you think 

that we are resourcing the Air Force adequately? 

Secretary DONLEY. Sir, I think given the national constraints in 

front of us, the DOD constraints in front of us, the Air Force is 

funded adequately to meet the needs it has today. The Department 

of Defense and the Department of the Air Force have challenges in 

the future in recapitalizing our forces, and I have been very up 

front with audiences of all types and with our leadership in making 

the case that the Air Force cannot afford to do as much we think 

needs to be done on the schedule that we would like to do it. We 
38 

don’t have all the resources; we don’t have all the programs in 

place. The programs in place that we do have are too expensive and 

they take too long to build, and we perpetuate that by not having 

the resources to put up front to make them go faster or to buy 

them more efficiently. And the tanker is a good example of that, 

where our buy is going to be extended for quite a while, in part 

because we don’t have all the resources we would like to do aviation, modernization, space modernization, build the cyber capabilities we need, build all the ISR, do all of those things that we would 

like to do as fast as we would like to do them. So we are—not unlike previous leadership or those that will follow us, we have to 

make those tough choices. 

General SCHWARTZ. If I may, may I just amplify that we have 

had an opportunity to engage directly with the Secretary of Defense on Long-Range Strike, for example. Certainly I have a routine opportunity to engage with the Chairman on these matters. 

Neither of us are too timid, and we have venues to present, sir. 

Mr. FRANKS. I appreciate that. Actually you have made some of 

the points that I was going to follow up with, to a degree, and I 

am grateful I didn’t have to pull any teeth or anything and I appreciate that. 

But I would follow up this way. Under the current plan, the Air 

Force is probably going to fly most of its KC–135 tanker fleet, 

much of it built in the Eisenhower Administration, into the 2020s 

and maybe into the 2030s, and will probably do the same thing 

with the remaining B–52s that we have. 

We are capping production of the C–17 when the C–5 has a mission-capable rate hovering around 50–60 percent. And we have essentially canceled the F–22 program, capping production of 187 aircraft, and I guess this is just as the Chinese and the Russians are 

gaining their own fifth-generation fighter capability. And it will 

take years—as I don’t have to tell you, I am trying to make some 

of the case here for you, Mr. Secretary—and billions of dollars to 

reconstruct and reconstitute that production capability if you or 

your successor belatedly finds out that 187 aircraft was not enough. 

And it seems to me, of course, it would be better to dissuade a potential adversary with overwhelming capability early on than having to respond to something where a perceived weakness was provocative. 

I guess I would say here at the end that the Air Force fleet is 

around 24 years, the average age of it, and that is probably double 

what it should be. And I just want you to know that there are a 

lot of us, and I hope you will join with us, that we want to try to 

make sure that the Air Force is adequately resourced, because 

there is nothing that any of us do that is more important than providing not only for security needs of this country but to hope that 

that liberty that we have can cast across the world. So help us to 

make that case. And I think you have done somewhat today. Thank 

you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. Gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. Secretary and General Schwartz, for being with us for a very long time 

today and for your service to our Nation. 
39 

A couple of things. Number one, a recent maritime publication 

spoke about the Stryker brigade being moved from the West Coast 

to Diego Garcia by ship and then flown the rest of the way, which 

saves us a substantial amount of money, half the way. 

I am just curious, what efforts are being made to find a port with 

an adjacent airfield or nearby airfield, closer than Diego Garcia, 

should the Afghan conflict drag on longer than any one of us want 

to. That would be a very smart thing for us to be looking into. 

Second thing is I know that the Air Force is in the process of 

moving from Manta, Ecuador to probably a place called Polancaro, 

Colombia. As someone who likes to think of himself as pretty good 

at pinching a nickel until it bleeds, I am disturbed that we spent 

a lot of money, first in Panama, only to leave it behind. Then in 

Manta Ecuador, only to leave it behind. 

What kind of arrangements are we making with the Colombian 

Government that, should we make substantial investments there, 

that we are there more than a decade and that we are not asked 

to leave, as we were in Ecuador? Again, you have done an excellent 

job of outlining your budget woes. That same dollar that was wasted in Manta could have gone towards building F–35s or replacement tankers. 

And so rather than continuing to make the same mistakes, what 

steps are we taking in Colombia that we don’t make the same mistakes that we made in Ecuador? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, I think we got ten years of use out of 

Manta, so that was a reasonable return on investment. But I take 

your point. 

Mr. TAYLOR. But, General, I remember, about the second year 

into this, the base commander at Manta telling me he felt like a 

second-class citizen on his own base. And I knew right then we had 

problems. So what steps are we going to take that we don’t keep 

making the same mistakes? 

General SCHWARTZ. I think the key thing is to have trusted allies 

and long-term allies and stable allies, because these relationships 

depend on sovereign nations. And to the extent that we can cultivate long-term stable relationships with nations in our hemisphere and elsewhere, that is the sweet spot on this. I think that 

is likely in the case of Colombia, even if there is a change in leadership there. There are obviously other nations where that continues to be true. 

There are occasions I think where we will have to go places that 

are expedient. I don’t think we can dismiss that. But your point to 

invest in those who are long-term friends is one that certainly we 

agree with, and I think there is a consensus in the Department on 

that. 

Mr. TAYLOR. What efforts, if any, are we making to find a port 

with a nearby airfield that is closer to Afghanistan? Again, I am 

told the burden cost of fuel, of getting 1 gallon of fuel into Afghanistan is $400. I realize we have to do everything we can for the 

warfighter, but the taxpayers are telling us there is only so much 

money out there. So what are we doing to work on that cost? 

General SCHWARTZ. That is really in General McNabb’s lane. But 

there are a couple of locations, one immediately outside the Gulf 

and one inside the Gulf, where that transload operation that you 
40 

referred to at Diego is viable, and that is working. I prefer to go 

offline with you to identify the specific location, but that is certainly what McNabb has in store and General Petraeus has in 

store. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Lastly, General, any evidence—the book Charlie 

Wilson’s War is out there, the movie Charlie Wilson’s War is out 

there. Obviously, the game changer there was the introduction of 

the Stinger missile. We are not the only people who make that type 

of missile. Any evidence of some sort of game-changing event, given 

our heavy dependence on air resupply in Afghanistan, with regard 

to surface-to-air vessels? 

General SCHWARTZ. Not yet. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Again, thank you for your service and thank you for 

being here today. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. LoBiondo. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank 

you for your service and for being here today. 

I would like to talk about an issue that I have brought up on numerous occasions for a couple of years now, the serious concerns 

that I have about the fighter gap issue and how it will negatively 

impact this Nation’s national and homeland defense, particularly 

as it pertains to the Air National Guard. 

As you know, beginning in 2015, 80 percent of the Air National 

Guard fighter fleet begins to run out of flying hours. Without aircraft, the Air National Guard will be unable to continue to perform 

the air sovereignty alert mission and unable to support the Air 

Force in overseas operations, which I think it has done magnificently up to this point. Many units will lose their flying missions 

altogether and will probably lose some very highly skilled pilots 

and technicians who simply will not be able to be replaced. 

My question is that while Congress is still waiting for the plan 

on how the force structure and capability gaps will be filled since 

the retirement of 254 legacy fighter aircraft was announced last 

May—we all know about the delays in the F–35—we repeatedly 

asked the question, and when will the underlying analysis be provided to this committee? And can you talk about why the delay in 

getting these answers? 

And the second question is, while we are on the topic of reports 

due to Congress, when can we expect to see the report on the 4.5- 

generation fighter gap procurement required by last year’s defense 

authorization bill, which we have heard nothing at all on? 

General SCHWARTZ. Congressman, with respect to the report on 

the fighter restructure, that will be delivered, as it was required 

by statute, not later than the first of April, and it will be delivered 

sooner than that. 

With respect to the 4.5, sir, I have to take that for the record to 

confirm the delivery, but when I reviewed this last, we were on 

time based on the expectations. So, Mr. Secretary. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 73.] 

Secretary DONLEY. Sir, I believe we owe you about three, maybe 

four, reports related to fighter force structure which we are tying 

up as part of our report on April 1. So we are bringing several 

pieces of this together back to you. 
41 

Mr. LOBIONDO. I appreciate that. I know we have been talking 

about it for a long time, and there is an increasing degree of frustration on at least the part of some of us and how we understand 

this bathtub fighter gap—choose the terminology you would like— 

will be filled. And for those of us who have a particular interest in 

the Air National Guard, this is a very serious concern, because as 

the clock ticks we get to a point where we think there is something 

that can be done now in the interim if the problem is identified and 

we can all agree on a consensus solution. But at a certain point in 

time, we run into a serious problem making it up, and we don’t 

want to see things go dark when we could have made a decision 

at a point in time not to have that happen. 

Secretary DONLEY. Sir, I think that chief has been to earlier address this issue with respect to what this so-called bathtub looks 

like. This is a different problem, a much smaller problem than it 

was a couple of years ago. The requirements have changed. The 

perception of what is required to do this work has been adjusted 

in the last few years. 

Having said that, we know we have aging platforms. Going forward, it is our intent to look at whether or not we need service life 

extensions for F–16s sometime later in this decade. And we are 

working through those issues right now. 

But it is not our intent to invest in new so-called 4.5-generation 

aircraft. We think there is probably—if we need to do slips, that 

is probably a better deal for the taxpayer going forward. And so 

that is how we are addressing that. 

We do not see right now a threat to the air sovereignty mission 

right out in front of us. This is a mission our Air Force is doing 

every day, about 18 sites, about 40 aircraft, at any given time, so 

we think this is covered. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Conaway, please. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you 

for being here. 

The issue I would like to talk about doesn’t have anywhere near 

the glamour or romance of second engines on F–35s or F–22s or 

those kinds of things. But I am the only CPA [Certified Public Accountant] on the committee. And the Air Force, the Department of 

the Air Force, cannot produce financial statements today that are 

auditable and would pass and have a clean audit. The ability to 

make good management decisions—and those structures reach 

across every single one of those procurement issues, soup to nuts. 

And so that won’t happen unless I can get the Secretary of the Air 

Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force to look me in the eye 

and say, among all the other nine zillion first priorities that you 

have, that you are committed to working with the Business Transformation Office and others to get us to a point that that can happen. There are benefits separate and apart just from that. But to 

encapsulate just the drill, let’s just call them the audited financial 

statements. 

So can you give me your thoughts on where that fits in the pecking order of things you guys think are important? 

Secretary DONLEY. Sir, I had the privilege of serving as the assistant secretary for financial management when this issue first 
42 

started in about, roughly, 1990. This is a long-term effort, and it 

continues to take longer than we would like. But the Department 

is focused on this problem. It is getting attention. 

The current assistant secretary for financial management is 

working on this issue with the DOD comptroller and the BTA 

[Business Transformation Agency] office. We have a number of 

modernized systems that are required to be in place to make this 

work—in personnel, logistics—and they all need to be interconnected. And we have not succeeded in fielding those large systems. We have not been successful. So we need to continue working 

it, and we know it is a challenge. We are committed to working the 

problem. 

Mr. CONAWAY. I don’t discount how hard it is. I do know how 

hard it is, but it is not impossible. And the value can’t be overstated. You have no clue what you are spending on all these legacy 

systems and all the workarounds that the folks behind you scramble. As soon as General Schwartz asks a particular question, somebody, somewhere, goes into panic mode because the system they 

are working with is not the best. I acknowledge it is hard. But if 

the voters in District 11 let me keep coming up here, I am going 

to continue to hammer away at this, because I don’t want to overstate it. 

Secretary DONLEY. Don’t stop. 

Mr. CONAWAY. From your lips to the voters’ ears in Texas. 

C–5s. I have asked this question of your predecessor, General 

Schwartz. If you ran a major airline who had planes that won’t fly, 

do you think they would go through all these hoops, the section 

137, 138 requirements, and 90 days’ notice and all this. For the 

record, I don’t have any C–5s in my district, or C–17s, but can you 

give us some sort of a sense of what it costs year in and year out 

to maintain planes that you say you don’t need, so that we can 

meet some requirement of the NDAA that is driven in no small 

part by the needs of the particular districts? 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 74.] 

General SCHWARTZ. It is in the multiple millions of dollars per 

platform. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Annually? 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes. But, again, I would just ask you to 

think that it is not just the money. There are maintenance personnel devoted to the aircraft. There are crews devoted to the aircraft that, you know, that are not as well utilized as they might 

otherwise be in another part of our Air Force or a similar mission 

in a different airplane. The bottom line is, this is a fleet management issue and we appeal to you to allow us as much latitude as 

you can to work out the legacy machines and to bring on the new. 

Mr. CONAWAY. I understand my colleagues who have those aircraft in their districts that are not capable of being able to pitch 

this issue. But those of us that don’t need to know the hard dollars 

and soft dollars and just the ideas as to what it does to your Air 

Force and our Air Force to force you to do things that good management wouldn’t do in any other spectrum of flying airplanes, 

help us to understand the costs that that is; because we can then 

say, all right, if F–35 engine costs X, and we are spending 20 times 
43 

this over a number of years, what could we have otherwise spent 

that money on? And you can pick a variety of alternative uses for 

dollars in a scarce environment. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back with three 

seconds left. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Platts. 

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Secretary, General 

Schwartz, I appreciate your patience here. And as the most junior 

member of the committee I think I get to be the wrap-up here. 

I want to first associate my comments with Congressman Conaway and the issue of financials. I had the privilege of chairing the 

Subcommittee on Financial Management and Oversight for four 

years, and getting to that bedrock and auditing your internal controls so that you can get after what the Congressman talked about 

is so important. By doing it you will ultimately be able to do better 

in providing your personnel what they need because of the dollars 

you are going to save. 

I apologize for not being here at the beginning of the hearing. I 

have two other committees I serve on that were meeting at the 

same time. 

I understand, General Schwartz, in response to Congressman 

McKeon on the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, that your statement was, 

given the OPTEMPO that we are currently experiencing, that this 

would not be a good time to go forward with that policy. 

One followup question, you may have addressed. Is that based on 

more of a general assessment of your almost 37 years of courageous 

and heroic service to our Nation, or a specific solicitation from your 

senior NCOs [noncommissioned officers], your captains, your majors who are out there on the front line and how this policy would 

impact them given the tempo we are experiencing? 

General SCHWARTZ. It is the former and not yet the latter. But 

we need to have real information in order to do due diligence here, 

sir. And a reality is that we do not have either that valid, statistically sound survey data or the kind of scholarship that one needs 

to sort of assess this properly. So, in my view this is not a good 

time because of the demands on the force. But the Secretary of Defense’s approach to have that study group produce this decision, actionable information—— 

Mr. PLATTS. So we have that concrete data. I share that assessment that we need to really know, bottom line, how is it going to 

work if we go forward and what consequences there could be. 

A followup. Congressman Coffman asked about the UAV issue 

and the 50 percent of what we are gathering not being able to be 

actually assessed. I appreciate your answer on the 700 additional 

linguists and the technology needs. 

Can you give a time frame both on the 700 personnel that you 

are committing and what you expect the time frame to be to get 

to more of the technological investment that will diminish the need 

for the personnel? 

General SCHWARTZ. I think it is within, you know, it is within 

the program period. So it is within the next four or five years we 

will deliver all of those airmen into those billets. And the technology is there, that is my sense, to process video-shoot. We have 

seen it repeated for us at the games that we are watching here 
44 

over the last few days at the Olympics. So we know that it is there. 

We just need to go get it and move out. So the personnel will plusup over the next couple of years. And I believe the technology is 

available now, and likewise we will deliver over that period. 

Mr. PLATTS. And my hope is that that remains a priority, given 

how certain we are the impact it has to those soldiers, marines on 

the ground, and being able to be successful and safe in their mission. So I appreciate that effort. 

And, again, to both of you, I appreciate your service to our Nation. And General Schwartz especially, with close to 37 years in 

uniform, we are blessed by you and all who wear the uniform, and 

your staff and all of our branches. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Secretary, General, 

we thank you for your excellent testimony this morning, and we 

will be using it undoubtedly when we put together our national defense bill. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 23, 2010 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 23, 2010 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

FEBRUARY 23, 2010 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO 

General SCHWARTZ. The report on procurement of ‘‘4.5 Generation Aircraft’’ will 

be delivered on or about 1 April. [See page 40.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP 

Secretary DONLEY. The current SRM Warm Line effort sustains skills required to 

reproduce 1960’s-era technology SRMs. In our FY11 budget documentation, we estimated we would be able to purchase three boosters with the $39.2M available. This 

is a conservative estimate and the actual number of boosters we can purchase will 

be based on price negotiations with the ATK. 

In addition to the SRM Warm Line, the AF’s Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle 

(EELV) program utilizes and contributes to the SRM industrial base through its use 

of solid rocket strap-on motors. The EELV Delta IV solid rocket motor is the GEM– 

60, produced by ATK. The EELV program is currently working through the inventory of existing motors. The next expected lot buy will be in 2012. 

The EELV Atlas V uses solid rocket motors produced by Aerojet. Aerojet delivers 

between 5–7 motors per year. The next lot buy will be in 2013. 

The AF has committed to a long-range Minuteman III (MM III) sustainment program to extend the life of the weapon system through 2030. The 526th ICBM Systems Group’s ICBM roadmap addresses both near-term and long-term issues to 

meet weapon system operational requirements. This roadmap highlights both critical test/support equipment replacement requirements and numerous other weapon 

system components that need to be replaced due to wear and obsolescence. The most 

time-critical test and support equipment replacement efforts are currently underway. Other top-priority near-term needs are addressed in the FY11 PB. 

The AF continues to view MM III sustainment as a top priority. The AF is evaluating options that would support an industrial base that can stand ready to resolve 

issues with the current fleet and also prepare to integrate modern technology for 

next-generation systems. [See page 25.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS 

General SCHWARTZ. The My Career Advancement Accounts (MyCAA) program is 

administered and monitored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Military Community and Family Policy (OSD/MC&FP) rather than the individual Services. The 

Air Force spouse employment point of contact was notified on 16 February by an 

OSD/MC&FP staff member of the ‘‘pause’’ in MyCAA operations. We were advised 

the reason for the pause was for a review of software applications, financial assistance documents and of the overall program. 

Air Force provided notification to all installation Airman & Family Readiness 

Centers immediately so they could field any questions from spouses and up-channel 

concerns that are subsequently being passed along to OSD/MC&FP. Air Force 

spouses are also being directed to other sources of financial assistance for education 

and training such as the Air Force Aid Society funded Spouse Tuition Assistance 

Program for those stationed overseas, the Hap Arnold Grants for stateside spouses 

and the Spouse Employment Program which can provide entry-level job training 

with a goal of finding immediate viable employment. [See page 20.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Secretary DONLEY. Prior to the 23 Feb, 2010 hearing, two Air Force bases (involving three units) received unsatisfactory ratings on a nuclear surety inspection. Details of those inspections follow: 

1) 2nd Bomb Wing (2BW), Barksdale AFB, LA 

Dates of inspection: 6 – 13 Jan, 2010 

Overall rating: Unsatisfactory (Re-inspected to Satisfactory, on-the-spot) 
74 

Reason(s) for failure: (Non-systemic) Munitions handling trailer and aircraft were 

improperly grounded. More specifically, the aircraft and munitions trailer were 

grounded to separate ground points. Inspection team ruled this critical deficiency 

violated a ‘‘warning’’ in the maintenance Technical Order. 

Corrective action(s): Load crew chief, and 2 crew members decertified by Wing 

Weapons Manager. Prior to inspection team departure, a re-inspection of the aircraft loading technical operation was accomplished with a different team and the 

load team performed in a flawless manner. 

Note: On-the-spot Re-inspection policy. When a unit is rated Unsatisfactory for a 

condition which can be corrected immediately, the Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection Chief Inspector may, at his or her discretion, and with the concurrence of 

the commander of the inspected unit or support unit, make an on-the-spot re-inspection and include the results in the original report. (Technical Order 11N- 25–1, DOD 

Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection System) 

2) 341st Missile Wing (341 MW) and 16th Munitions Sq (16 MUNS), Malmstrom 

AFB, MT (represents two MAJCOM inspection teams inspecting two separate units 

at the same location) 

Dates of inspection: 2–10 Feb, 2010 

Overall rating: Unsatisfactory 

Reason(s) for failure: 

(341 MW, AF Global Strike Command) (Systemic) Inspection did not reveal an unreliable weapon or an unsafe/insecure environment; however, the nature, severity, 

and number of deficiencies documented resulted in an unsatisfactory rating. Concerns were raised in areas of security, personnel reliability program, and logistics 

movement (i.e. transport). 

(16 MUNS, AF Materiel Command) (Systemic) Maintenance Team Chief failed to 

accomplish a step in the Technical Order. Inspection team ruled this a critical deficiency which could result in an unknown/unreliable weapon condition. 

Corrective action(s): Unit given time to put into place corrective actions. In accordance with DOD and AF Inspection policy, the MAJCOM inspection teams will conduct a re-inspection of deficient area(s) NLT 90 days from termination of the original inspection. (Technical Order 11N- 25–1, DOD Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection System, and Air Force Instruction 90–201, Inspector General Activities) 

Note: Multi-MAJCOM inspection. Due to the integrated AFGSC and AFMC mission at Malmstrom AFB, this NSI was conducted as a Multi-MAJCOM NSI in accordance with a memorandum of understanding between AFGSC/IG and AFMC/IG. 

Each MAJCOM/IG inspected applicable areas and produced a separate inspection 

report. [See page 37.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY 

General SCHWARTZ. In the case of the C–5As, the FY09 Operations and Support 

cost of a C–5A was $13.5M per aircraft, totaling $297M per year, to continue to operate the excess aircraft. In addition, the Maintenance and Operations manpower 

devoted to these excess aircraft can’t be utilized on other aircraft. [See page 42.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

Secretary DONLEY. There was approximately a $30M reduction in ORS funding 

from the FY10 President’s Budget (PB) to the FY11 PB for two reasons. First, the 

FY10 funding line contains approximately $18M for launch vehicle expenditures, 

which are not required in FY11. Second, the original FY10 request was increased 

by $12M for congressional adds (Micro-Satellite Serial Manufacturing, LEONIDAS, 

Rapid Small Satellite Development Test Facilities and Space Sensor Data Link 

Technology); these adds were not carried over into the FY11 budget. [See page 32.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 23, 2010 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MILLER 

Mr. MILLER. On March 26, 2008, then Secretary of the Air Force Mike Wynne 

issued a memorandum to the force indicating that the Air Force should endorse a 

‘‘beyond goals’’ approach to small business contracting. The term referred to the Air 

Force’s Small Business Programs office initiative to do just that. Is this initiative 

still in effect and do you support the desire of the former Secretary to increase small 

business participation, specifically for companies with less than 1500 employees, 

throughout the Air Force? 

Secretary DONLEY. Yes—the Air Force Small Business Programs office supports 

efforts to increase small business participation, specifically for companies with less 

than 1,500 employees. The Air Force Small Business Programs office supports the 

‘‘beyond goals’’ strategy and has developed an extensive outreach program to increase awareness and understanding of the impact small businesses have on the Air 

Force mission. 

‘‘Beyond goals’’ is a strategy to bring the innovation, agility and efficiency of small 

businesses to the mission of the Air Force: To fly, fight and win . . . in air, space, 

and cyberspace. Beyond goals considers numerical percentage goals and contracts as 

tools or a means to an end—but not the end itself. 

The Air Force Small Business community members are not advocates for small 

businesses—we are advocates for the mission, met with small business solutions. 

Mr. MILLER. Do you believe the Air Force should actively look to do business with 

emerging small businesses? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force feels that we should actively look to do business 

with emerging small businesses. Small businesses bring innovation, agility and efficiency to the Air Force mission. Emerging small businesses are important to the future of a healthy industrial base and an integral part of the Air Force mission. 

Small Businesses also have a proven track record to deliver solutions to the Air 

Force rapidly and effectively. 

The Air Force Small Business Programs office has initiatives that highlight small 

business opportunities to support the mission. The Air Force Mentor-Prote ́ge ́ Program assists small businesses (Prote ́ge ́s) competing for contract awards by 

partnering them with large companies (Mentors) under individual agreements. Also 

the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program encourages small business 

participation in Federal research and development in technology with both government and commercial applications. 

Mr. MILLER. Secretary Donley: Last year, the Secretary of Defense canceled the 

CSAR–X program stating that the Department was conducting a review of DODwide assets that could conduct the CSAR–X mission. What is the status of this review? Does the Air Force plan on restarting the CSAR–X program? 

Secretary DONLEY. Following cancellation of the CSAR–X program, the Air Force 

supported the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff in their 

review of rotary wing support to the CSAR mission. As a result of that review, OSD 

analysis supported the Air Force as having a vital role in Joint CSAR. 

The current plans for replacing the HH–60G fleet involve two efforts, HH–60G 

Operational Loss Replacement (OLR) and HH–60 Recapitalization. HH–60G OLR is 

the Air Force’s plan to replace HH–60G Pave Hawks lost in combat and other operational missions to sustain the current HH–60 fleet strength. HH–60 Recapitalization will be a long-term recapitalization effort to replace the entire fleet. 

The Air Force is working with OSD and Joint Staff to finalize requirements and 

an acquisition strategy that supports an HH–60 recapitalization program to replace 

the fleet of aging HH–60Gs. Initial program funding is contained in the FY11 President’s Budget. A Request for Information has been released to obtain industry’s ability to provide the Air Force with a CSAR platform. The Air Force will procure a 

CSAR platform that meets warfighter requirements. 

Mr. MILLER. In regard to the KC–X, you’ve both mentioned in various settings 

that the Air Force will move forward with a tanker selection regardless of the number of proposals it may receive. We’ve learned in the past that sole source contracts 

cost the American taxpayers a great deal of money while at the same time reducing 

and even impeding the military’s critical need for flexibility. Are we repeating past 
78 

mistakes by pressing forward with a one tanker option which will inevitably lead 

to sole sourcing? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. The USAF is currently in an open 

competition and plans to let the process run its course. The planned date for proposal submission is 10 May 2010. If only one proposal is received, the USAF will 

evaluate whether the proposal meets all mandatory requirements and will exercise 

a clause in the Request for Proposal that requires the offeror to provide certified 

cost and pricing data (see FAR 15.406–2). The certified cost or pricing data will be 

audited by the Defense Contract Auditing Agency and used by the USAF in negotiating contract price. Finally, the USAF retains the option to not award the contract 

if a satisfactory agreement cannot be reached in the best interest of both the 

warfighter and the taxpayer. The Department clearly prefers competition because 

it delivers weapon systems at a lower cost for the warfighter and taxpayer. 

Mr. MILLER. The Department seems to be dead set on a sole sourced tanker replacement. Do you think one single company will be able to provide a production 

rate fast enough to replace the current aging tanker fleet in a timely manner? How 

can we be sure that a sole source company doesn’t charge us unnecessary amounts 

of money for speed of production? If we need a tanker now, why not have two companies? Would that not decrease the amount of time it will take to replace the fleet? 

In addition, the longer it takes to replace the fleet, the longer we will need to sustain the current fleet which as I understand, is becoming more and more expensive. 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. At this time, two companies have expressed an intent to bid for the KC–X contract. The KC–X contract will allow the 

USAF to order up to 18 aircraft per year in full rate production, with a target quantity of 15 aircraft per year. This is a reasonable production rate for a single company 

and meets USAF tanker recapitalization requirements. If the USAF receives only 

one KC–X proposal, and if it meets the RFP requirements, we will then obtain certified cost and pricing data to negotiate and award a fair and reasonable contract 

for the American taxpayers. The USAF considered all options per Congressional direction, but ruled out dual award approaches based on budget affordability and fleet 

concerns including increased training, operations, maintenance, and support costs. 

The Department and the USAF are committed to awarding to a single company 

through a competitive strategy for a commercial derivative tanker as that strategy 

provides the best value for the warfighter and taxpayer. 

Mr. MILLER. In regard to in-sourcing, what criteria have been established for determining which functions should be in-sourced? What steps does the Air Force have 

in place to assist contractor employees whose functions may be in-sourced? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. In-sourcing guidance issued by the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense on 28 May 2009 outlines a systematic approach that 

helps ensure in-sourcing decisions are fiscally informed and analytically based. If 

contract workload is found to be inherently governmental, experiencing contract administration problems, providing unauthorized personal services, or otherwise exempt from contracting under DOD Instruction 1100.22, Guidance for Determining 

Workforce Mix, the function must be in-sourced regardless of cost. However, if the 

contract does not fit one of the mentioned criteria, a cost analysis is required to determine the most cost-effective means of performing the work. 

The Air Force must adhere to the legal requirements of Merit Systems Principles 

that call for open and fair competition. To single out contractors for special assistance programs may be considered inconsistent with Merit Systems Principles. The 

Air Force has implemented a number of enhancements that serve to streamline the 

recruitment process, including the development of an Enterprise Recruitment Function at the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) to address enterprise-wide recruitment needs with a strategic focus; use of social networking sites (e.g., Twitter) to 

augment recruiting to meet our most critical needs; creation of an Air Force Civil 

Service Career Portal that is more applicant-friendly, resulting in larger pools of 

well-qualified candidates; and data mining using commercial recruitment websites 

to steer applicants to Air Force vacancy announcements. More robust and improved 

recruitment processes will benefit all applicants, including those contractor employees whose functions may be in-sourced. 

Mr. MILLER. Over the years DOD has defined potentially hostile nations’ military 

capabilities in comparison to our own in terms of ‘‘peers’’ vs. ‘‘near-peers’’. For example, in regard to a blue water Navy or air dominance Air Force, the Department 

has maintained that the United States currently has no ‘‘near-peers.’’ With the advent of cyber warfare and the multitude of recent examples of cyber attacks, do you 

think it’s reasonable to say that the United States does indeed have ‘‘peers’’? I 

mean, at this point anyone, state actor or not, with internet connectivity and skilled 

in cyber operations has the ability to be a ‘‘peer’’ of the United States. With that 
79 

in mind, do you think the Department should be moving toward creating a combatant command as opposed to a sub-unified command? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. With low costs of entry and global 

interconnectivity, the U.S. does have ‘‘peers’’ and ‘‘near-peers’’ in the cyber domain. 

As a Service, the mission of the United States Air Force is to organize, train, equip, 

and provide forces to Joint Combatant Commands. The Department of Defense has 

determined that a sub-unified command is the best command structure for the 

Cyberspace mission. The Air Force is committed to providing support for cyber operations as a component of any joint command arrangement. 

Mr. MILLER. General Schwartz: The F100 and F110 engine competitions in the 

1980s and early 1990s for the F–16 saved money, and improved engine performance, 

reliability and contractor responsiveness. Today, the Air Force continues to execute 

the F–16 program with two engines. Why wouldn’t a similar program be applicable 

for the F–35? With fewer fighters today, and even fewer in the future, do you believe 

that the Air Force is taking significant risks by not including a program to develop 

and procure a competitive, alternate engine for the F–35? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force supports Secretary Gates’ conclusion to not 

pursue a competitive engine. While engine performance, reliability, and contractor 

responsiveness did improve during the F100 and F110 engine competition, there is 

no evidence that this was a direct result of competition. Historical experience shows 

that any costs and/or benefits arising from competition are highly unpredictable and 

also depend heavily on the strategic behavior of the companies involved. Maintaining two engine suppliers would result in increased development, production, and 

support costs in the near term. The Air Force maintains that the risks involved with 

a single engine supplier are acceptable, and savings associated with competition, 

which may be realized in the future, will not sufficiently offset the upfront development costs when competing against existing Department priorities. Recent experience with engine development for the F–22 and F/A–18E/F indicates that sole 

source risks are acceptable, especially considering the Pratt & Whitney engine continues to meet or exceed the stringent performance requirements associated with 

the F–35 propulsion system. 

Mr. MILLER. What is the current Air Force policy, directive or regulation governing the conversion of non-acquisition contractor personnel to government positions? 

General SCHWARTZ. The following are the policies, directives and regulations governing the conversion of non-acquisition contractor personnel to government positions: 

1. In-sourcing Contracted Services—Implementation Guidance from OUSD (P&R) 

dated 28 May 2009, outlines a systematic approach to identifying and evaluating potential in-sourcing candidates. These guidelines ensure in-sourcing decisions are fiscally informed and analytically based. 

2. Guidance and Documenting Civilian In-sourcing Positions from OUSD (P&R) 

dated 31 December 2009, provides guidance on tracking DOD civilian personnel actions associated with in-sourcing. 

3. Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 09–007, ‘‘Estimating and Comparing the 

Full Costs of Civilian and Military Manpower and Contract Support’’ from OSD 

(CAPE) dated 29 January 2010, establishes a DOD-wide cost estimating methodology in support of workforce decisions to include in-sourcing. 

Mr. MILLER. Is the Air Force policy different than that of other services? If so, 

why? 

General SCHWARTZ. No, the Air Force in-sourcing procedures comply with the 

same OSD policy guidance that applies to all Service components. Due to the organizational differences between the Air Force and the other Service components, the 

Air Force has taken a more decentralized approach to in-sourcing. The Air Force 

relies heavily on the Major Commands to review their contract inventories, identify 

candidates, conduct business case analyses, and implement the resulting decisions. 

The Air Force maintains centralized control by issuing policy, validating business 

cases, and monitoring the conversion process. 

Mr. MILLER. Has the Air Force conducted an analysis of non-acquisition contractor conversions as they relate to the service’s small business participation requirements? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force has not conducted an analysis of non-acquisition contractor conversions and the impact on small business goals. However, the 

Air Force does place strong emphasis on ensuring that we meet or exceed the federally mandated goals, and has instituted a ‘‘Beyond Goals’’ strategy to help ensure 

small businesses are provided maximum practicable opportunity to compete for Air 

Force requirements. 
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

Mr. WILSON. With regard to the Joint Strike Fighter program, how will encroachment and increased noise associated with the fighters impact the decision to base 

these aviation assets? 

Secretary DONLEY. With the announcement of the candidate basing locations, the 

formal environmental impact analysis process and development of environmental 

impacts statements (EISs) have begun. The EISs will analyze potential impacts of 

the alternative basing locations for both Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) training and 

operational basing candidate locations. 

At this point in time, we cannot specifically state how encroachment and noise 

may impact the Air Force’s final basing decision. Through the EISs, a full spectrum 

of issues will be evaluated, to include consideration of JSF noise and encroachment 

related impacts. When released, Congress, regulatory agencies, and local communities will be provided the opportunity to review and comment on these EISs 

through an iterative review process. 

After the draft EIS review, all comments provided to the Air Force will be considered and made a part of a Final EIS. This final EIS will support the Air Force’s 

operational and training basing decisions, which will be reflected in a signed Air 

Force Record of Decision (ROD). 

Air Force JSF basing decisions become final when the ROD is signed and issued. 

The Air Force expects to announce the F–35 EIS preferred alternatives in late 

Spring/Summer of 2010, release a draft EIS in late summer 2010, and issues its 

ROD in early 2011. 

Mr. WILSON. On February 3, Secretary Gates told this committee that a business 

case analysis had been conducted with regards to the alternate engine for the F– 

35. Are you aware of any business case analysis? If so, does the Air Force agree 

with the Secretary of Defense’s position not to develop and procure a competitive 

engine for the F–35? Lastly, would you be able to share any insights to this committee when we may be able to see the aforementioned business case analysis? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office 

performed a Cost/Benefit analysis in FY2007. Both the original study and the recent 

FY2010 ‘‘Quick Update’’ were provided to the HASC on February 23, 2010. 

The Air Force supports Secretary Gates’ conclusion to not pursue a competitive 

engine. Maintaining two engine suppliers will result in increased development, production, and support costs in the near term. The Air Force maintains that the risks 

involved with a single engine supplier are acceptable, and savings associated with 

competition, which may be realized in the future, will not sufficiently offset the upfront development costs when competing against existing Department priorities. Recent experience with engine development for the F–22 and F/A–18E/F indicates that 

sole source risks are modest and acceptable, especially considering the Pratt & 

Whitney engine continues to meet or exceed the stringent performance requirements 

associated with the F–35 propulsion system. 

Mr. WILSON. The engine competitions for the F–16 saved money, improved engine 

performance, reliability, and contractor responsiveness. Today, the F–16 program 

continues to operate with two engines. Why wouldn’t a similar program be applicable to the F–35? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force supports Secretary Gates’ conclusion to not 

pursue a competitive engine. While engine performance, reliability, and contractor 

responsiveness did improve during the F100 and F110 engine competition, there is 

no evidence that this was a direct result of competition. Historical experience shows 

that any costs and/or benefits arising from competition are highly unpredictable and 

also depend heavily on the strategic behavior of the companies involved. Maintaining two engine suppliers will result in increased development, production, and support costs in the near term. The Air Force maintains that the risks involved with 

a single engine supplier are acceptable, and savings associated with competition, 

which may be realized in the future, will not sufficiently offset the upfront development costs when competing against existing Department priorities. Recent experience with engine development for the F–22 and F/A–18E/F indicates that sole 

source risks are acceptable, especially considering the Pratt & Whitney engine continues to meet or exceed the stringent performance requirements associated with 

the F–35 propulsion system. 

Mr. WILSON. The Air Force will need to submit reports required by Sections 137 

and 138 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 before it can retire 

the 17 C–5As planned for FY2011. When will this committee be provided these reports? 

General SCHWARTZ. The report is being drafted at this time and is expected to 

be delivered by early July 2010. 
81 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP 

Mr. BISHOP. The proposed FY11 budget only allows for $44.2 million for Minute- man III warm line, of which $5 million is for unspecified government costs or overhead, leaving only about $39 million in this funding line which budget documents 

state are to produce only 3 motor sets. By contrast, the Navy funds a warm line 

effort for the D–5 missile which produces 12 motor sets a year. How did the Air 

Force determine that only 3 booster motors for Minuteman III annually was adequate to sustain a viable warm line effort for the MM III weapons system through 

2030? 

Secretary DONLEY. The number of booster motors identified in the Air Force budget documents is a conservative estimate. The final number will likely be more than 

three; but will not be defined until the contract negotiations are completed. Additionally, the Air Force is reevaluating the overall Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Warm 

Line concept in order to help sustain the SRM industrial base production skills. Unlike the Navy, there is currently no anticipated Air Force requirement to replace 

operational MM III missile motors. An interagency task force, that includes representation from DOD (the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army, Navy, Air 

Force and Missile Defense Agency) and NASA, has been formed to offer solid rocket 

motor industrial base sustainment recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for 

a subsequent report to Congress. The interim report to Congress is expected to be 

delivered in June 2010. 

Mr. BISHOP. The proposed FY11 budget only allows for $44.2 million for Minuteman III warm line, of which $5 million is for unspecified government costs or overhead, leaving only about $39 million in this funding line which budget documents 

state are to produce only 3 motor sets. By contrast, the Navy funds a warm line 

effort for the D–5 missile which produces 12 motor sets a year. Wasn’t the number 

of missile motor sets being placed at only 3 in FY11 by the Air Force based primarily upon budget considerations, and not actual program or industry requirements? 

Secretary DONLEY. The number of booster motors identified in the Air Force budget documents is a conservative estimate. The final number will likely be more than 

three; but will not be defined until the contract negotiations are completed. Unlike 

the Navy, there is currently no anticipated Air Force requirement to replace operational MM III missile motors. An interagency task force, that includes representation from DOD (the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force and 

Missile Defense Agency) and NASA, has been formed to offer solid rocket motor industrial base sustainment recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for a subsequent report to Congress. The interim report to Congress is expected to be delivered 

in June 2010. 

Mr. BISHOP. The proposed FY11 budget only allows for $44.2 million for Minuteman III warm line, of which $5 million is for unspecified government costs or overhead, leaving only about $39 million in this funding line which budget documents 

state are to produce only 3 motor sets. By contrast, the Navy funds a warm line 

effort for the D–5 missile which produces 12 motor sets a year. Was the private 

Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) industrial base consulted by the Air Force about the minimum number of MM III motor sets required annually to maintain a viable warm 

line during formulation of the FY11 budget recommendation, and if so, what was 

their response to the Air Force? 

Secretary DONLEY. Industry was consulted during the FY11 budget formulation 

process. Initially industry stated the need for 12 per year and then revised the number to six motor sets per year to maintain a fully qualified and certified workforce 

to produce MM III booster sets. 

The number of booster motors identified in the Air Force budget documents is a 

conservative estimate. The final number will likely be more than three; but will not 

be defined until the contract negotiations are completed. Unlike the Navy, there is 

currently no anticipated Air Force requirement to replace operational MM III missile motors. An interagency task force, that includes representation from DOD (the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force and Missile Defense Agency) and NASA, has been formed to offer solid rocket motor industrial base 

sustainment recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for a subsequent report 

to Congress. The interim report to Congress is expected to be delivered in June 

2010. 

Mr. BISHOP. The proposed FY11 budget only allows for $44.2 million for Minuteman III warm line, of which $5 million is for unspecified government costs or overhead, leaving only about $39 million in this funding line which budget documents 

state are to produce only 3 motor sets. By contrast, the Navy funds a warm line 

effort for the D–5 missile which produces 12 motor sets a year. What is the Air 
82 

Force contingency plan for ensuring a viable MM III weapons system through 2030 

(the program of record) if the private SRM industrial base capability for the MM 

III is shuttered and its contract obligations with the Air Force are not renewed? 

Secretary DONLEY. If the current MM III Solid Rocket Motor production capability 

is allowed to lapse, any requirement for follow-on MM III SRM production would 

include the time and costs required to reinstate a MM III SRM production capability. The Air Force, in coordination with industry, has determined what those costs 

and timelines would be and would include these factors in long-range planning efforts. Unlike the Navy, there is currently no anticipated Air Force requirement to 

replace operational MM III missile motors. An interagency task force, that includes 

representation from DOD (the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army, Navy, Air 

Force and Missile Defense Agency) and NASA, has been formed to offer solid rocket 

motor industrial base sustainment recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for 

a subsequent report to Congress. The interim report to Congress is expected to be 

delivered in June 2010. 

Mr. BISHOP. The proposed FY11 budget only allows for $44.2 million for Minuteman III warm line, of which $5 million is for unspecified government costs or overhead, leaving only about $39 million in this funding line which budget documents 

state are to produce only 3 motor sets. By contrast, the Navy funds a warm line 

effort for the D–5 missile which produces 12 motor sets a year. A Department of 

Defense Report to Congress on the Solid Rocket Motor Industrial Base, dated June 

2009, at page 47 stated that ‘‘Delays in the NASA Ares program could have a significant negative impact on the large SRM (Solid Rocket Motor) prime contractor industrial base and on some of the SRM subtier base, specifically material suppliers.’’ 

In light of NASA’s FY11 more drastic budget recommendation to completely cancel 

the Constellation program, along with the Ares 1 and Ares 5 boosters, should not 

the above-referenced study be revised and updated? 

Secretary DONLEY. Per direction in the National Defense Authorization Act for 

FY2010, the Secretary of Defense is to ‘‘establish a plan to sustain the solid rocket 

motor industrial base, including the ability to maintain and sustain currently deployed strategic and missile defense systems and to maintain an intellectual and engineering capacity to support next generation motors, as needed.’’ An interagency 

task force, that includes representation from DOD (the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force and Missile Defense Agency) and NASA, has been 

formed to offer solid rocket motor industrial base sustainment recommendations to 

the Secretary of Defense for a subsequent report to Congress. The interim report 

to Congress is expected to be delivered in June 2010. 

Mr. BISHOP. The proposed FY11 budget only allows for $44.2 million for Minuteman III warm line, of which $5 million is for unspecified government costs or overhead, leaving only about $39 million in this funding line which budget documents 

state are to produce only 3 motor sets. By contrast, the Navy funds a warm line 

effort for the D–5 missile which produces 12 motor sets a year. What are the impediments preventing the Air Force from committing to a long-term Minuteman III 

sustainment program in the out-years, and isn’t such a commitment more important 

than ever to sustain this vital strategic industrial base? 

Secretary DONLEY. The AF is fully committed to sustaining the MM III weapon 

system through 2030 and has budgeted over $1.3B of investments through the 

FYDP (FY10–FY15) to achieve that objective. Unlike the Navy, there is currently 

no anticipated Air Force requirement to replace operational MM III missile motors. 

An interagency task force, that includes representation from DOD (the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force and Missile Defense Agency) and 

NASA, has been formed to offer solid rocket motor industrial base sustainment recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for a subsequent report to Congress. The 

interim report to Congress is expected to be delivered in June 2010. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. The Pentagon put out a directive for the services to expand the acquisition corps by thousands of personnel. The Air Force appears to have aggressively executed this increase in acquisition professionals. Many organizations are 

converting contractor employees to government civilians. According to some observers, there may be a perception that some individuals are ‘‘being coerced’’ and pressured into leaving their contractor employers and switching to the civil service as 

government employees. Has the AF developed a plan for the conversion of 

transitioning contractor to government personnel? If policies have been codified, 

have procedures been developed on how to address contractors’ concerns of hiring 

away their personnel to Air Force civilian positions? 
83 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force has an overarching plan for transitioning certain functions or services currently performed by contractors to DOD civilian or 

military performance, or a combination thereof. The Air Force plan does not include 

specific policies or procedures to address contractor concerns regarding the hiring 

of contractor personnel. 

We acquire talent through open, fair, and competitive hiring processes, consistent 

with Merit Systems Principles. Because the Air Force has positioned itself as an employer of choice, engaged in a wide range of functions that represent desirable and 

meaningful work among jobseekers, we receive applications from a broad range of 

applicants, including employees of contractor companies. We are required to consider all applicants who meet the eligibility and qualification requirements for the 

positions we are seeking to fill, without regard to the organizations that employ 

them. 

We view our contractors as valued partners and greatly appreciate the talent and 

skill they bring to the mission. We respect the work relationship these companies 

have with their employees. 

Mr. TURNER. During the hearing, I mentioned I would be submitting a letter (attached) in which the Air Force Chief of Staff assured Mr. Hobson and the community that ‘‘If the Air Force receives funding to procure additional C–17s beyond the 

current 180, it is our intent to place C–17s at Wright-Patterson AFB to ensure a 

follow-on mission for the 445th Airlift Wing.’’ Can you reaffirm the Air Force commitment to ensuring the continuation of the important mobility mission by eventually placing C–17s at the 445k Airlift Wing? 

General SCHWARTZ. The review and evaluation of additional C–17 basing candidates is nearing completion. Once complete, the Air Force will make the appropriate Congressional notifications and announcements. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. MCMORRIS RODGERS 

Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS. As a Member who represents a KC–135 Air Refueling 

Tanker base, I see first hand the impacts the delayed tanker acquisition has on a 

community. The KC–135 represents a central piece of war plans to support the 

United States and its allies around the world. Like many, I want to see the new 

KC–X at the ramps at Fairchild Air Force Base sooner than later. I understand that 

we will finally be seeing the RFP come out this week. What type of timelines can 

we look forward to for this project? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force released the RFP on 24 February 2010 with 

proposals due to the government on 10 May 2010. Contract award is planned for 

the fall of FY2010. After an approximately four-year Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase, the USAF estimates the first seven production KC–X 

aircraft will be delivered in 2015. Final decisions regarding the basing of KC–X are 

part of a separate process that will take place at a later date. 

Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS. I proudly represent Fairchild Air Force Base and saw 

the surge of the operations tempo that has continued to be maintained at high levels. We are deploying our Airmen more frequently. The opts temp for our tanker 

crews right now is to deploy every 90 days. We also have Airmen participating in 

Joint Expeditionary Taskings in support of other services. Over the years, the Air 

Force end strengths have been reduced significantly. Are you confident that a mere 

.15% person increase in the Air Force is sufficient to support the overall missions 

now and in the foreseeable future? 

General SCHWARTZ. We believe the Air Force’s proposed 332,200 AD end strength 

in the FY11 budget achieves the right balance between providing capabilities for today’s commitments and posturing for future challenges, i.e. increasing demands for 

Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance operational capabilities; enhancing 

cyberspace, irregular warfare, command and control capabilities to win today’s Joint 

fight; recapturing Acquisition Excellence; continuing to strengthen the Nuclear Enterprise; and developing and caring for our Airmen and their families. 

Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS. As you both know, one of every ten Americans are out 

of work. We know that it is critical to focus our attention on creating new jobs in 

the United States. The KC–X tanker competition pits an American made airplane 

against a plane whose major assemblies will be manufactured in Europe. It seems 

we have a choice: creating tens of thousands of jobs here in the United States or 

sending those jobs overseas. When the President spoke of creating conditions necessary for business to expand and hire more workers, I think we all assumed he 

was referring to U.S. workers and U.S. jobs. If that is the case, why is this Administration considering sending the tens of thousands of tanker manufacturing jobs to 

Europe? 
84 

General SCHWARTZ. The USAF KC–X tanker solicitation is a full and open competition in the best interest of both the warfighter and taxpayer. Discussion of a 

KC–X contract award to any company is premature at this time. The Department 

will ensure the tanker solicitation remains wholly compliant with the current state 

of law, including the Buy America Act. 

Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS. Wouldn’t you agree that spouses relying on the Military Spouse Career Advancement Account (MyCAA) program to further their academic goals should have been notified prior to the temporary stay in order to make 

the necessary arrangements with their school. 

General SCHWARTZ. The MyCAA program is administered, and monitored by OSD 

rather than the Services. It is not an Air Force controlled program. When the Air 

Force was unexpectedly notified on 16 February by staff from OSD(MC&FP) of a 

‘‘pause’’ in the MyCAA spouse tuition assistance program, we provided notification 

to all installation Airman & Family Readiness Centers immediately. Air Force 

spouses were informed of other sources of financial assistance for education and 

training such as the Air Force Aid Society Spouse Tuition Assistance Program for 

those stationed overseas, the Hap Arnold Grants for stateside spouses and the 

Spouse Employment Program which can provide entry-level job training with a goal 

of finding immediate viable employment. We expect further guidance from OSD regarding program operations for spouses that are currently enrolled, as well as the 

long-term status of the program. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. My question is regarding the military humanitarian mission in 

Haiti. Can you comment as to whether or not the C–27, Joint Cargo Aircraft, have 

been used for the Haiti Humanitarian Relief Operations and in what capacity? If 

the aircraft has not been utilized, can you explain why this tactical asset has not 

been used to disperse needed supplies to regions outside the epicenter of Port-auPrince? Additionally, I understand the total buy for the C–27 program is 38 aircraft 

but that is the floor and not the ceiling. To that extent, and given the change in 

program leadership, what steps have been taken to work with the Army to develop 

a strategy on how to replace the Sherpa aircraft and to give missions to those units 

that have the Sherpa or who were previously slated to receive the C–27 aircraft in 

the Army? 

General SCHWARTZ. No Air Force C–27Js were used in Haiti relief operations. As 

of today, the Department of Defense has taken ownership of three aircraft. These 

aircraft are undergoing testing and development. The first operational deployment 

for the C–27J has not yet been finalized. The Air Force does not currently plan to 

increase the number of C–27Js beyond the current 38 program of record. 

The Air Force intent is to support the Direct Support mission utilizing our entire 

airlift fleet, as required, to best meet Army demand. The Air Force is not actively 

engaged with the Army in determining the way forward for the C–23 fleet or for 

Army National Guard units affected by the transfer of the Direct Support mission 

to the Air Force. 

Ms. BORDALLO. The recent QDR requires the Air Force to conduct a study on the 

Long Range Strike program and field a new long range strike bomber by 2018. However Secretary Gates stated in his recent testimony before the HASC that a new 

bomber might well be more than 15 years away. Can you explain what the Air Force 

is doing to ensure we execute an efficient and timely study in order to move forward 

with the fielding of a New Bomber. Additionally, when can we expect the study to 

be completed. Finally, when do you foresee procurement of the new generation 

bomber taking place? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) delayed the development 

of an Air Force follow-on bomber, which was directed in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), until the Department of Defense could better understand the 

need, requirement, and technology associated with the weapon system. Based upon 

the need for additional analysis, the SECDEF chartered a subsequent study to examine a broad array of long-range strike issues and options, including: the appropriate mix of long range strike capabilities, upgrades to legacy bombers, manned 

and unmanned force structure numbers, stand-off and penetrating platform ratio, 

stand-off cruise missile requirements, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

(ISR) demands and conventional Prompt Global Strike needs. The results of the 

study are scheduled to be completed in the fall of 2010. This study will inform subsequent Departmental decisions on new bomber procurement. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Our current strategic focus is on counter-insurgency operations 

that rely on precision strikes from aircraft on a daily basis, which require less of 
85 

a bomb payload. In a major regional conflict on the order of a Desert Storm or Allied 

Force or the initial phases of Iraqi Freedom we dropped a significant payload every 

day. Do you believe we have seen our last major regional conflict? If not, In your 

opinion, will we need the ability to do that in the future? Although the QDR tries 

to strike a balance across the spectrum of warfare, I’m deeply concerned that we’re 

too focused on the current counter insurgency conflict we’re fighting and not looking 

enough at the ways we can deter future regional conflicts that require a stealthy 

long range strike capability. Isn’t a next generation bomber needed to better address 

our deterrence capability in future conflicts? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force must be fully prepared to respond to our Combatant Commanders in support of operations that span the full spectrum of conflict 

from counter-insurgency to large scale conventional campaigns while still maintaining a credible nuclear deterrence posture. A long-range strike aircraft is one element 

of our future strike capability which also strengthens our strategic deterrence posture. While investments in our legacy bombers sustain our nuclear deterrence operations and conventional global precision attack capabilities into the future, the Air 

Force has also programmed research and development funds to accelerate development of an enhanced long-range strike capability to counter the anti-access and area 

denial strategies of our adversaries. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

Mr. LAMBORN. In your testimony, you stated that you would verify my numbers 

and get back to me on the funding for Operationally Responsive Space (ORS). The 

funding from FY09 to FY11 has undergone a 59% cut with the cut from FY10 to 

FY11 being 24% (FY09–228.5 million; FY10–124.3 million; FY11–94.0 million). This 

trend does not indicate that it is a top priority as you implied when speaking about 

the space budget in general. My question pertains directly to ORS and how in an 

era of ever increasing demand and looming enemy threat that we reduce a program 

by 59% that is intended to provide Joint Force Commanders with surge space capacity and the ability to replenish should our enemies attack our space assets. Please 

provide specifics on ORS initiatives and explain the specific cuts in funding. 

Secretary DONLEY. The Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) initiatives include 

completing and launching ORS–1, and continuing the critical payload, bus, launch, 

range, and command and control enablers necessary to make ORS successful. These 

enablers include the Modular Space Vehicle (MSV) and the Rapid Response Space 

Works (RRSW). The MSV effort supports the design and development of mission 

kits (modular payloads and buses) and the RRSW procurement develops the facilities, capability, and Concept of Operations for rapid assembly, integration, and testing of tailored ORS systems. 

The budget has been relatively stable for ORS funding. It is approximately $100M 

per fiscal year from FY09 to FY11 with some exceptions for launch vehicle expenditures, ORS–1 and congressional adds. The FY09 funding is $135M higher than 

FY11 due to three reasons. The Air Force reprogrammed $39M into ORS when 

ORS–1 was initiated as an urgent need in FY09. The FY09 funding line contains 

$9M for TacSat launch vehicle expenditures while FY11 doesn’t require any TacSat 

launch vehicle funding. Additionally, the original FY09 request was increased by 

$87M for congressional adds (Infrared Sensor Payload Development, Micro-Satellite 

Serial Manufacturing, LEONIDAS, Chip Scale Atomic Clock, and Missile Range 

Safety Technology). 

The ORS funding in FY10 is approximately $30M higher than FY11 due primarily 

to the FY10 funding line containing $18M for TacSat launch vehicle expenditures, 

while FY11 doesn’t require any TacSat launch vehicle funding. Additionally, the 

original FY10 request was increased by $12M for congressional adds (Micro-Satellite 

Serial Manufacturing, LEONIDAS, Rapid Small Satellite Development Test Facilities and Space Sensor Data Link Technology). 

Mr. LAMBORN. In your testimony, you stated that the requirement for fighters had 

changed from 2200 to 2024. What specific factors drove this lower number? Is the 

lower number based on the near term (5-year) or the longer (15–20 year) look? 

General SCHWARTZ. The lower number of approximately 2000 Total Active Inventory (TAI) reflects the most current Air Force assessment of the required fighter 

force structure to meet National Defense Strategy objectives through the mid 2020’s. 

The change in the fighter force structure shortfall was caused by three factors. 

First, the Air Force elected to accept a moderate level of warfighting risk. Second 

the F–35 planned procurement rate was increased from 48 to 80 aircraft per year, 

bringing 5th generation to the field sooner. Third, the approach to fighter service 

life computations was refined. 
86 

Mr. LAMBORN. In your testimony, you stated that the initial fighter gap numbers 

were based on a yearly production rate of 48 for the F–35, but now you anticipate 

a production rate of 80. With the program continuing to sup to the right, what specific change has moved us from the 48 number to 80? Why were we not looking at 

80 to start with? If the program continues to slip will we see a continuous rise in 

these production estimates to mask the fighter gap? When will slips become so critical that we cannot simply up annual production to close the fighter gap and what 

specific other actions are you taking to minimize risk should the annual number of 

80 prove unattainable? 

General SCHWARTZ. A yearly production rate of 48 F–35A was programmed in the 

FY08 PB based on to fiscal considerations. Production was increased from 48 to 80 

F–35A aircraft per year in the FY11 PB commensurate with an Independent Manufacturing Review Team (IMRT) review confirming the feasibility of increasing the 

production ramp-up to 80 F–35A a year. 

The Air Force is also closely monitoring fighter capability and capacity shortfalls; 

conducting full scale fatigue tests (FSFT) on the F–15C, and starting a FSFT on the 

F–16 Block 50 in FY11. These tests will increase the accuracy of determining the 

remaining service life of these aircraft, continue to inform service life extension programs (SLEP), and define when needed SLEP entails maintaining operational viability through capability and structural upgrades. This option for the F–16 Block 

40–52 aircraft provides essentially the same capability as new ‘‘4.5 Generation’’ 

fighters at 10 to 15 percent of the cost. SLEP programs for current fighters and aggressive F–35 program management will be essential to maintain fighter capability 

and will be reviewed as part of the FY12 budget process. 

Mr. LAMBORN. In your testimony, you stated that the initial fighter gap numbers 

were based on a yearly production rate of 48 for the F–35, but now you anticipate 

a production rate of 80. You also mentioned that given these new numbers, a ceiling 

lowering from 2200 to 2024 aircraft and 48/yr growing to 80/yr, that the total fighter 

gap would only be 200 aircraft which was ‘‘within the realm of the manageable depending on what we do to renovate existing airplanes.’’ What are your specific plans 

for renovating existing airplanes? Which aircraft are designated to receive service 

life extensions or other modernizations to help make sure that the fighter remains 

in the realm of the manageable? Is the money for these upgrades in the existing 

President’s Budget proposal? If so, how much by aircraft/upgrade? 

General SCHWARTZ. The AF will continue to modernize and sustain legacy fighter 

aircraft as part of an active force management plan. Modernization plans include 

upgrades to Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars, integration of advanced weapons, development of infrared search and track capability, and digital 

data links to support communications and navigation. Specifically for individual 

platforms: 

A–10 modernization programs include Precision Engagement which integrates 

smart weapons and advanced targeting pods; adds color displays, moving map, and 

Hands-on Throttle and Stick (HOTAS); improves mission effectiveness through 

rapid target acquisition and identification. Installations will complete in FY11 at a 

total program cost of $388M. Digital Data Link adds Situational Awareness Data 

Link radios across fleet. These installations will complete in FY10 at a total program cost of $55.1M. Mode S/5 will meet international Air Traffic Management 

standards and provide enhanced Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) capability. These 

installations will complete in FY13 at a total program cost of $40.1M. Extended Duration Covert Infrared Countermeasures System which automates identification of 

infrared surface-to-air threats and dispensing of countermeasures are funded within 

the FY11 OCO, with installations completing in FY12 at a total program cost of 

$63.7M. 

A–10 life extension programs include Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) 

which is scheduled after 8,000 flying hours and provides detailed structural evaluation and repair. It also includes Scheduled Structural Inspection (SSI) which follows 

SLEP at 2,000 flying-hour intervals as well as the Wing Replacement Program 

(WRP) that replaces 233 thin-skin wings with redesigned thick-skin wing incorporating a number of structural improvements. Thin-skin wings will be replaced 

during SLEP/SSI, starting in 4th Qtr FY10 with installations (funded with Operation and Maintenance dollars) complete in FY16 at a total program cost of $1.2B. 

F–16 modernization programs include integration of new precision weapons, advanced targeting pods, and improved avionics. It is included in the FY11 PB request 

at $84.5M (RDT&E). $31.7M for Falcon STAR (APAF) to bring life-limiting components to the planned service life of 8,000 equivalent flight hours and $20M (RDT&E) 

to initiate a full scale fatigue test to scope the additional modifications required to 

extend the life of the newer F–16s (Blocks 40–52) beyond their design life of 8,000 
87 

equivalent flight hours. Funding to complete the full scale fatigue test and to do 

other F-16 upgrades will be addressed in future budgets. 

The F–15 has funded upgrade programs to address both operational effectiveness 

and sustainment. Both F–15C/D and F–15E have existing programs that will replace legacy mechanically-scanned radars with Active Electronically Scanned Array 

(AESA) radars. AESA radars provide a significant improvement in reliability and 

maintainability while giving the aircraft a radar that has greater power, range and 

versatility. Also, both F–15C/D and F–15E are receiving an upgraded computer to 

allow the aircraft to use the full capabilities of the new radars. All four of these 

programs will extend past the Fiscal Year Defense Plan (FYDP), but the estimated 

costs are: F–15C/D AESA radar $1.5B, F–15C/D computer $180M, F–15E AESA 

radar $2.5B, and F–15E computer $165M. 

Other modernization upgrades include a new Infrared Search and Track (IRST) 

sensor, under development, for the F–15C/D to provide target tracking and engagement data to supplement the radar for an estimated $400M; satellite communications for both F–15 C/D and F–15E for an estimated $65M and $60M, respectively. 

Also new solid state data recorders are replacing old magnetic tape recorders for approximately $56M. 

Sustainment upgrades are critical, especially given the extended service life expected of the F–15. Each aircraft undergoes Programmed Depot Maintenance in 

which the aircraft are periodically fully inspected for wear-related damage. Additionally, the Air Force has just started a full scale teardown, and a full scale fatigue 

test of the F–15C. These tests will provide data needed to plan the sustainment of 

the aircraft in the future. The F–15E is scheduled to start these efforts as soon as 

they are completed on the F–15C/D. 

Mr. LAMBORN. In your testimony regarding Operational Responsive Space (ORS), 

you stated that another approach to space resilience is ‘‘being able to discern whether our platforms on orbit are at risk or are being threatened.’’ I am glad to see these 

Space Situational Awareness initiatives have received a plus up in funding, but at 

the same time our defensive and offensive programs to respond to these threats, our 

space control programs, received a 40% decrease from FY10 funding (206.1 million 

down to 124.0 million). My concern is that we will know we are being attacked, but 

due to these cuts, we will be unable to react. Were the cuts in the space control 

budget primarily to offensive or defensive capabilities? Which programs were cut 

and what was the reasoning behind the cuts? 

General SCHWARTZ. The space domain is becoming more congested and contested, 

which is why it is increasingly important to focus on developing a more capable 

Space Situational Awareness (SSA) capability with decision support tools, the foundation for all space control activities. These SSA and decision support capabilities 

will allow us to evaluate threats and take appropriate actions. Space control capabilities are a valuable element of our space portfolio. The reduction in funding from 

$92.1M in FY10 to $65.9M in FY11 was planned primarily due to the Rapid Attack 

Identification and Reporting System transitioning from development to the 

sustainment/enhancement phase and the Counter Communications System conducting a pre-planned product improvement incremental improvement vice a new 

development effort. 

Mr. LAMBORN. The Army’s procurement request includes $506.31 million to buy 

26 MQ–1 Predator UAVs. I understand the vital role UAVs play in the current fight 

and our national defense. I also know that the U.S. Army currently fields and flies 

many smaller UAVs, but the United States Air Force has been the DOD lead in 

Predator operations. Was the Air Force consulted in the Army’s Predator procurement plan? Will these Predators offset the number of CAPs the Air Force has been 

tasked to produce (50 in FY10 and 65 by FY11)? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force was generally aware of the Army’s plan to procure the MQ–1 to address their organic Service needs, but was not ‘‘consulted’’ directly. The Air Force program will not be offset by the Army procurement. The Air 

Force has been tasked and is on track to provide 50 MQ–1/9 CAPs by the end of 

FY11 and 65 by the end of FY13. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BRIGHT 

Mr. BRIGHT. Secretary Donley: Several years ago, the Air Force established the 

Application Software Assurance Center of Excellence (ASACoE) at Maxwell AFB— 

Gunter Annex in Montgomery, Alabama. I have toured the facility and been briefed 

on the Center’s activities. I greatly value the work they are doing to provide application-level security to protect us from cyber attacks. As such, I have several questions 

related to the Center’s mission, operation and funding. 1) Can you explain the goals 
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and objectives of the Center and how you plan to achieve those goals and objectives? 

2) My understanding is that a major focus of the Center’s mission has been to develop application-level security best practices that can be put in place Air Forcewide. Does this remain a primary focus? 3) What progress has been made towards 

reaching this objective? 4) As the Center has been in operation since 2007, can you 

tell me what are some of the more significant findings that have come from the 

work at the Center? 5) Can you also explain how the Center will be aligned within 

the structure of the new Cyber Security Command that was recently stood up? 6) 

What is the long term plan for providing manpower and funding to complete the 

Center’s mission? 7) Also with respect to funding, could you tell me how much funding is included in the FY2011 President’s Budget to operate the Center and conduct 

the evaluations? 8) Moreover, at this funding level, how many applications will you 

be able to evaluate? 9) Finally, if you had additional resources, would you be able 

to move faster in evaluating the applications? 

Secretary DONLEY. 1) The Application Software Assurance Center of Excellence 

(ASACoE) was established to help promote and assess software assurance (SwA) in 

the Air Force. The goals and objectives of ASACoE are to: partner with application 

development program offices to identify SwA issues and mitigations; foster SwA 

knowledge; support SwA as part of certification and accreditation; establish a framework to support the acquisition and development of assured software products and 

assist governing bodies with developing SwA policy. ASACoE has been evolving to 

achieve these goals and objectives over the last 2 years. Our current model utilizes 

SwA training and education, automated SwA tools and licensing, on-site SwA assessments, and follow-on support. 

2) Yes, the primary objective of the ASACoE remains to improve upon the assurance of combat and mission support applications and their underlying data. 

3) To date, ASACoE has partnered with over 120 separate program management 

offices (PMOs) providing SwA training and evaluation for over 500 applications. 

This resulted in identifying approx 3.5 million software vulnerabilities and gave the 

PMOs the training and tools needed to fix those current vulnerabilities and prevent 

future vulnerabilities. 

4) ASACoE focused on the most vulnerable systems and applications, which are 

web-based. Additionally, the ASACoE has, aided with the security of our more secure, critical systems, such as the embedded systems of our weapons arsenal and 

classified systems of our strategic and intelligence forces. The ASACoE found every 

application assessed has software vulnerabilities, with 99% of the applications assessed having what we categorize as critical vulnerabilities. A critical vulnerability 

is one that would allow a potential hacker to gain elevated access to the application 

and/or its data. The top three vulnerabilities found in Air Force applications are: 

cross-site scripting, SQL injection, and trust boundary violation (excessive privilege). 

The data suggests that the Department of Defense must focus on securing the work 

of the net (applications and data structures) in addition to the network itself. Our 

ASACoE effort was listed as an OSD best practice in the ‘‘Report on Trusted Defense Systems’’ prepared by USD(AT&L) and ASD(NII)/DOD CIO submitted to Congress in September 2009. 

5) Currently the ASACoE continues to be aligned under Air Force Materiel Command. Any future re-alignment has not been determined. 

6) Currently, the Air Force is evaluating the best way to provide SwA. This includes evaluating the most cost effective and qualitative way to ensure that SwA 

is performed on all existing and future applications. This includes evaluating whether to centrally perform SwA evaluation or require it to be performed by each application owner and developer. 

7) There is currently no FY2011 funding identified. ASACoE has been operating 

from unfunded requests. There are currently efforts being made to secure funding 

for ASACoE if it is the most cost effective and qualitative solution for SwA. 

8) No FY2011 funding is identified. The Air Force is evaluating the best way to 

provide SwA. 

9) The ASACoE is conducting market research to develop a streamlined concept 

of operations that would allow the Air Force to assess the approximately 3,000– 

5,000 web applications in existence today. In this revised concept, the team is reviewing the use/development of a web-based portal to upload source code to allow 

the completion of a rapid triage assessment for these applications within a 10–16 

month period. This could allow expansion to potentially enhance quick scan capabilities, improve prioritization for services, and improve the training curriculum. 

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