[Cite as Wilson v. Beck Energy Corp., 2017-Ohio-734.]

STATE OF OHIO, MONROE COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

ROBERT C. WILSON ) CASE NO. 15 MO 0010 

) 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE ) 

) 

VS. ) OPINION AND 

) JUDGMENT ENTRY 

BECK ENERGY CORP., et al. ) 

) 

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS ) 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration 

under App.R. 26(A)(1). 

JUDGMENT: Motion Denied. 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee: Atty. Ethan Vessels 

Fields, Dehmlow & Vessels 

309 Second Street 

Marietta, Ohio 45750 

For Defendant-Appellant: Atty. Scott M. Zurakowski 

Atty. Joseph J. Pasquarella 

Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths 

 & Dougherty Co., L.P.A. 

4775 Munson Street NW 

P.O. Box 36963 

Canton, Ohio 44735-6963 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Cheryl L. Waite 

Hon. Gene Donofrio 

Hon. Carol Ann Robb 

Dated: February 27, 2017
[Cite as Wilson v. Beck Energy Corp., 2017-Ohio-734.]

PER CURIAM. 

{¶1} Appellant Beck Energy Corp., (“Beck”) requests reconsideration of our 

Opinion in Wilson v. Beck Energy Corp., 7th Dist. No. 15 MO 0010, 2016-Ohio-8564, 

pursuant to App.R. 26(A). Beck asserts that a mutual consent clause in the parties’ 

oil and gas lease allowed them to extend the primary term of the lease at issue. 

Beck argues that Appellee Robert C. Wilson (“Wilson”) continued to accept delay 

rental payments after the end of the primary term activating the mutual consent 

clause and extending the primary term for at least another year. The record does not 

support Beck’s contention. As Appellant’s motion is based on mere disagreement 

with our Opinion, and this does not provide appropriate grounds to support a motion 

for reconsideration, the motion is denied. 

{¶2} On August 2, 2008, Beck and Wilson entered into an oil and gas lease. 

The lease included a two-tiered habendum clause with a primary term and secondary 

term. A primary term provides a definite term-of-year period within which the lease is 

effective. A secondary term allows for drilling to continue past the primary term if 

certain requirements are met. Here, the parties originally agreed to a ten-year 

primary term but later modified this term to three years in a separate agreement 

(“2008 Agreement”). The 2008 Agreement also stated that the primary term could be 

extended by the mutual consent of both the Lessor and Lessee. However, the 

agreement did not provide for a definite term in the event that the mutual consent 

provision was activated. 

{¶3} The lease included a delay rental clause which allowed Beck to delay 

drilling within the primary term if yearly delay payments in the total amount of $41 
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were paid quarterly to Wilson. If Beck paid the delay rental payments, the primary 

term of the lease could continue without drilling. If not, the lease would automatically 

terminate and revert back to Wilson. Beck tendered delay rental payments to Wilson 

on a quarterly basis from August of 2008 until February of 2014. This period 

covered the three-year primary term and approximately two additional years after the 

end of the primary term. Wilson concedes that he received and cashed these 

payments. On March 13, 2014, Wilson filed a declaratory judgment action against 

Beck, Exxon, and XTO Energy, Inc. (“XTO”). Exxon and XTO were not part of the 

appeal. All parties filed respective motions for summary judgment. On April 9, 2015, 

the trial court granted Wilson’s motion for summary judgment and denied the 

remaining motions. 

{¶4} On appeal, Beck argued that once it sent delay rental payments and 

Wilson cashed those checks, the mutual consent clause was triggered and the 

primary term reverted back to the original ten-year term. Although we agreed that 

Wilson’s actions in cashing the checks after the primary term ended served to extend 

the lease, the parties had not specified a definite term in the event that the lease was 

as extended. Wilson at ¶ 21. As such, we held that the primary term had ended, and 

the lease terminated, once Wilson filed his declaratory judgement action. Id. at ¶ 22. 

{¶5} “The test generally applied upon the filing of a motion for 

reconsideration in the court of appeals is whether the motion calls to the attention of 

the court an obvious error in its decision, or raises an issue for consideration that was 

either not considered at all or was not fully considered by the court when it should 
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have been.” Columbus v. Hodge, 37 Ohio App.3d 68, 523 N.E.2d 515 (10th 

Dist.1987), paragraph one of the syllabus. 

{¶6} Here, Beck presents no obvious error in this Court’s decision. 

“Reconsideration motions are rarely considered when the movant simply disagrees 

with the logic used and conclusions reached by an appellate court.” State v. Himes, 

7th Dist. No. 08 MA 146, 2010-Ohio-332, ¶ 4, citing Victory White Metal Co. v. Motel 

Syst., 7th Dist. No. 04 MA 245, 2005-Ohio-3828; Hampton v. Ahmed, 7th Dist. No. 02 

BE 66, 2005-Ohio-1766. 

{¶7} Beck argues that the delay rental clause allowed it to delay drilling on a 

year-to-year basis. Beck takes issue with this Court’s reference to a month-to-month 

lease. However, this Court’s reference was merely an acknowledgment that, without 

a clearly defined term, Wilson could terminate the lease at any time. This is akin to a 

month-to-month lease. Regardless, Beck conceded that the last delay rental check 

that Wilson cashed covered November of 2013 to February of 2014. (Appellant’s 

Brf., p. 3.) As such, Beck has not reserved the right to delay drilling for an entire 

year. This record reflects that Beck only reserved the right to delay drilling during the 

time period for which it made delay rental payments, which ended in February of 

2014. It is apparent that Beck merely disagrees with the logic and conclusions 

reached by this Court. 

{¶8} In order to prevail on a motion for reconsideration, an appellant must 

demonstrate an obvious error in our decision or that an issue was raised that was 

either not dealt with or was not fully considered. Disagreement with this Court’s logic 
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and conclusions does not support a motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, Beck’s 

motion for reconsideration is denied. 

Waite, J., concurs. 

Donofrio, J., concurs. 

Robb, P.J., concurs.