J-S38035-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

 Appellee 

 v.

ROBERT EDWARD KERR, 

 Appellant 

: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: No. 149 EDA 2014 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 14, 2011, 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County, 

Criminal Division, at No. CP-39-CR-0003147-2009. 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BOWES and SHOGAN, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JULY 30, 2014 

 Appellant, Robert Edward Kerr, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered after he pled guilty to robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery. 

We affirm. 

 The trial court set forth the facts of this case as follow: 

On June 2, 2009, at approximately 7:45 a.m., Todd Koch, 

the victim in this case, arrived at his business, Todd’s Island 

Seafood, located at 1234 MacArthur Road in Whitehall Township, 

Lehigh County. As Mr. Koch began opening the door to the 

business, three individuals rushed him. All three were wearing 

masks. One had a gun and pointed it at Mr. Koch. Another had 

a knife in his hand. The assailants put Mr. Koch on the floor of 

the store, duct taped him, and took a number of keys from him, 

including the key to his vehicle. 

At approximately 8:00 a.m., John Langer, a business 

associate of Mr. Koch, arrived for an appointment. When he got 

to the door, two of the individuals rushed him and the third ran 

around the back of the building. They forced Mr. Langer to the 
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ground at gunpoint, took his wristwatch, a cell phone, and 

$42.00 in U.S. currency. 

Whitehall Police were called after the assailants left. They 

began investigating the scene and reviewed surveillance footage. 

An all[-]points bulletin was issued for the three individuals in a 

blue Mitsubishi vehicle. 

At 9:00 a.m., Allentown police received a call for a robbery 

in progress at the Easy Cash, a check cashing store located at 

604 North 14th Street, Allentown, Pennsylvania. When police 

arrived, they found the store owner, Mr. Martinez, with a facial 

wound from being either punched or pistol whipped. Mr. 

Martinez reported the assailants held a gun to his side as he was 

opening the store and they attempted to rob him, but he fought 

them off. 

Rosina Arroyo, a female employee of Easy Cash, reported 

that the suspects left in a dark blue, sports-type vehicle with a 

wing on the back. She also indicated there was something red 

on the front license plate of the car. She followed the suspects 

before they fled in that vehicle. 

Detective Eric Wagner of the Allentown Police Department 

learned that patrolman Michael Mancini located a vehicle 

matching the description of the suspects’ vehicle provided by Ms.

Arroyo. The vehicle was registered to Appellant’s brother.

When the vehicle was located, other detectives saw a 

female at the vehicle entering it, placing items in a book bag, 

and walking away from it. She was stopped and asked for 

identification. She indicated her name was Paula Kerr. Ms. Kerr 

told police her sons, Appellant and one of the co[-]defendants in 

this case, were not home because they were in New York. Ms. 

Kerr consented to a search of the bag she was carrying. Inside, 

police found a stun gun, a BB gun, duct tape, and rubber gloves. 

Whitehall police later identified the book bag as the one carried 

by one of the robbery suspects from the Whitehall incidents. 

Shortly after the vehicle and bag were identified, Appellant 

was stopped by police. One of the witnesses from the Easy Cash 
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incident was brought to the scene and identified Appellant’s 

brother, Ronald. Appellant was taken into custody later that 

evening. Ronald was Mirandized and interviewed, at which time 

he admitted that he, Appellant, and a third male, Malcolm 

Jenkins, robbed Todd’s Island Seafood, a pedestrian in front of 

the seafood establishment, and the Easy Cash facility. Ronald 

admitted that he and Mr. Jenkins were in possession of weapons 

during the robberies, and he implicated Mr. Jenkins as being the 

individual who struck Mr. Martinez during the attack on him. 

Reichley Opinion, 1/30/14, at 1–3.1

 Appellant pled guilty to three counts of robbery and three counts of 

conspiracy to commit robbery on December 17, 2010. Pursuant to a 

negotiated plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Appellant on February 

14, 2011, to incarceration for an aggregate term of eight to thirty years. 

This was the same sentence his co-defendant brother, Ronald, received, but 

a greater sentence than the sentence imposed on co-defendant Malcolm 

Jenkins. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion on February 22, 2011, 

challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence. The trial court denied 

the motion on March 9, 2011. Thereafter: 

Appellant appealed, challenging the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence. On November 4, 2011, the Superior Court of

Pennsylvania entered an order and a Memorandum Opinion in 

which it concluded that Appellant had waived his appeal by 

virtue of raising different sentencing issues on appeal than those 

 

1

 The Honorable Lawrence J. Brenner presided over Appellant’s guilty plea 

and sentencing. He filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on May 2, 

2011 (“Brenner Opinion”). The Honorable Douglas C. Reichley presided over 

Appellant’s petition for collateral relief and appeal nunc pro tunc. He filed an 

opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on January 30, 2014 (“Reichley 

Opinion”).
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raised in his post-sentence motions. [Commonwealth v. Kerr, 

825 EDA 2011 (Pa. Super. November 4, 2011), unpublished 

memorandum at 2]. Appellant filed a Petition for Allowance of 

Appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on November 14, 

2011. The Supreme Court denied his allocator petition on July 2, 

2012. 

 On July 3, 2012, Appellant filed a pro se Motion for Post 

Conviction Collateral Relief. The Court appointed David N. 

Melman, Esq. to represent Appellant and gave Attorney Melman 

sixty (60) days to file an Amended PCRA Petition. An Amended 

PCRA Petition was timely filed on October 2, 2013. 

 On December 5, 2013, a PCRA hearing was scheduled 

before [the trial court]. At that time, the Commonwealth agreed 

to the reinstatement of Appellant’s appeal rights as relief under 

the PCRA and afford him the right to file a new Notice of Appeal 

nunc pro tunc. Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal on 

December 26, 2013. Appellant then filed a Concise Statement of 

[Errors] Complained of on Appeal on January 16, 2014. 

Reichley Opinion, 6/30/14, at 3–4.

 On appeal, Appellant presents the following questions for our review: 

1. IS THERE A SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION FOR WHICH THE 

SUPERIOR COURT SHOULD GRANT ALLOWANCE OF APPEAL 

FROM THE DISCRETIONARY ASPECTS OF THE SENTENCE? 

A. Whether the sentencing court failed to adhere to 

the fundamental norm underlying the sentencing 

process to provide sanctions proportionate to the 

severity of the crime and the severity of the 

offender’s prior conviction record, where a more 

culpable codefendant, who carried a gun and 

inflicted serious personal injury on a victim, was 

given a lighter sentence than that received by 

[Appellant], a less culpable defendant, who 

neither carried a weapon nor inflicted injury on 

any victims of the crimes, rendering the sentence 

given to [Appellant] manifestly unreasonable? 
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B. Whether [Appellant’s] claim of excessiveness 

respecting his aggregate sentence of not less than 

8 nor more than 30 years because of the 

consecutive nature of the two groups of sentences 

raises a substantial question whether, under the 

Sentencing Code, [Appellant’s] sentence was "so 

manifestly excessive as to constitute too severe a 

punishment”?

C. Whether, where the lower Court sentenced 

[Appellant], the less culpable defendant who did 

not carry a weapon or inflict injury to the victims 

of the crimes, to a much greater sentence than 

the more culpable co-defendant, who carried the 

weapon and inflicted the harm on the victim, the 

sentence of [Appellant] is by comparison harsh 

and manifestly excessive and therefore 

unreasonable and unjust? 

D. Whether, where the Court emphasized that the 

situation was made worse by the fact that 

[Appellant] and his brother went out in the 

morning and committed two robberies, and then 

went back in the afternoon to commit the third, 

whereas the record indicates that the robberies all 

occurred in the morning within an hour of each 

other, the Court’s error in this fact, which could 

have affected the Court’s decision to make the 

two groups of sentences consecutive to one 

another, creates a substantial question for review 

by the Superior Court? 

2. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING 

A SENTENCE WHICH WAS HARSH AND MANIFESTLY 

EXCESSIVE, AND THEREFORE UNJUST AND UNREASONABLE? 

Appellant’s Brief at 7–8.

At the crux of Appellant’s issues is a challenge to the discretionary 

aspects of his sentence. “A defendant who has pled guilty may challenge 
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the discretionary aspects of his sentence as long as the defendant did not 

agree to a negotiated sentence as part of a plea agreement.” 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 758 A.2d 1214, 1216 (Pa. Super. 2000). 

However: 

where a defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a plea agreement 

specifying particular penalties, the defendant may not seek a 

discretionary appeal relating to those agreed-upon penalties. 

Permitting a defendant to petition for such an appeal would 

undermine the integrity of the plea negotiation process and 

could ultimately deprive the Commonwealth of sentencing 

particulars for which it bargained. 

In some cases, there may be plea agreements specifying 

some but not all aspects of the sentence. For example, in 

[Commonwealth v. Dalberto, 648 A.2d 16, 20 (Pa. Super. 

1994)], the parties did not have an agreement as to the length 

of the defendant’s sentence, but they did agree that no more 

than two of the several charges to which the defendant pled 

guilty would result in consecutive prison terms. Id. at 18. After 

the defendant pled guilty, the court imposed various terms of 

imprisonment that were consecutive at two counts and 

concurrent at the remaining charges. Id. at 20. This Court later 

determined that, by pleading guilty pursuant to such an 

agreement, the defendant could not seek a discretionary appeal 

involving the agreed-upon terms (i.e., the consecutive nature of 

two of his sentences) but he could seek such an appeal with 

respect to the length of his sentences because that aspect of his 

penalty had not been negotiated. Id. at 21. 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 982 A.2d 1017, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2009); but 

see Dalberto, 648 A.2d at 20 (holding that defendant who pleads guilty 

without agreement as to sentence retains right to petition for allowance of 

appeal with respect to discretionary aspects of sentencing).
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The record before us reveals that the parties negotiated—and the 

sentencing judge accepted—the following sentencing terms: 

 the sentences for robbery counts 1 and 3 and conspiracy counts 2 

and 4 would run concurrently with one another (“Group I”);

2

 

 the sentences for robbery count 5 and conspiracy count 6 would run 

concurrently with one another (“Group II”);3 

 the sentencing judge would determine if Group I and Group II 

would be served concurrently or consecutively;4

 counts 7, 8, and 9 would be withdrawn; 

 the minimum sentence imposed for each charge would not exceed 

the standard range—thirty-nine to forty-one months for robbery 

and twenty-seven to thirty-nine months for conspiracy; 

 the five-year mandatory sentence would be waived; and

 the deadly weapon enhancement would be counted as “possessed” 

rather than as “used” in calculating the standard range sentence.

N.T., 2/14/11, at 2–3; Brenner Opinion, 5/2/11, at 2–3.

In sum, Appellant agreed to a minimum term on each count in the 

standard range. However, Appellant left to the sentencing court’s discretion 

the maximum term and whether Group I and Group II ran concurrently or 

consecutively. “We reject any suggestion that, by agreeing to leave the 

 

2

 The counts in Group I relate to the events at Todd’s Island Seafood. 

Brenner Opinion, 5/2/11, at 3 n.4. 

3

 The counts in Group II relate to the events at the Easy Cash. Brenner 

Opinion, 5/2/11, at 3 n.5. 

4

 The sentencing judge ordered that the sentences imposed for the Group 

II counts would run consecutively to the sentences imposed on the Group I 

counts. Brenner Opinion, 5/2/11, at 4. 
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maximum term within the court’s discretion, [Appellant] somehow agreed it 

would be acceptable if the court abused that discretion.” Brown, 982 A.2d 

at 1019. Consequently, we conclude that Appellant has not waived the right 

to seek an appeal challenging the sentencing court’s discretion in imposing a 

maximum term and in running Group I and Group II consecutively. 

As in Brown, we emphasize that permitting Appellant to petition this 

Court for allowance of appeal with respect to the exercise of the sentencing 

court’s discretion in setting Appellant’s maximum term and running the 

sentencing groups consecutively does not deprive the Commonwealth of 

terms to which it agreed and does not otherwise undermine the plea process 

in any way. If the Commonwealth wanted an agreement particularizing the 

maximum term of confinement and whether the two groups ran concurrently 

or consecutively, “the Commonwealth could have insisted upon such an 

agreement and thereby insulated such particulars from discretionary review. 

The Commonwealth did not do so.” Brown, 982 A.2d at 1019. Rather, the 

parties came to an agreement as to the minimum term while leaving other 

aspects of Appellant’s sentence to the discretion of the court. Accordingly, 

while Appellant cannot seek to appeal that part of his sentence set by the 

plea bargain, he can request permission to appeal the parts of his sentence 

left explicitly or implicitly to the court’s discretion. Brown, 982 A.2d at 

1019. 
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We have often repeated that there is no absolute right to appeal the 

discretionary aspects of a sentence. Commonwealth v. Hartle, 894 A.2d 

800, 805 (Pa. Super. 2006). Rather, such an appeal should be considered to 

be a petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. W.H.M., 932 

A.2d 155, 162 (Pa. Super. 2007). 

 As we observed in Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162 (Pa. 

Super. 2010): 

An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a 

four-part test: 

[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: 

(1) whether [the] appellant has filed a timely notice

of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether 

the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in 

a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see 

Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether [the] appellant’s 

brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and 

(4) whether there is a substantial question that the 

sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). 

Id. at 170 (citing Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528 (Pa. Super. 

2006)). Whether a particular issue constitutes a substantial question about 

the appropriateness of sentence is a question to be evaluated on a case-bycase basis. Commonwealth v. Kenner, 784 A.2d 808, 811 (Pa. Super. 

2001). As to what constitutes a substantial question, this Court does not 

accept bald assertions of sentencing errors. Commonwealth v. Malovich, 
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903 A.2d 1247, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2006). An appellant must articulate the 

reasons the sentencing court’s actions violated the sentencing code. Id. 

 Herein, the first three requirements of the four-part test are met, 

those being that Appellant brought an appropriate appeal, sufficiently 

preserved the issue through a post-sentence motion,5

 and included in his 

appellate brief the necessary separate concise statement of the reasons 

relied upon for allowance of appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). 

Therefore, we determine whether Appellant raises any substantial questions 

requiring us to review the discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed by 

the trial court. 

 In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Appellant raises several challenges to 

the discretionary aspects of his sentence. First, Appellant claims that “the 

sentencing judge’s actions were contrary to the fundamental norms which 

underlie the sentencing process” in that he sentenced “a more culpable 

defendant, who carried a gun and inflicted serious personal injury on a 

 

5

 Upon review of Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement and post-sentence 

motion, the trial court found that, “notwithstanding the difference in the 

specific reasoning behind the allegation that the sentence was excessive, 

. . . as a technical matter, Appellant did preserve his argument that the 

Court erred in sentencing him to a harsh and excessive sentence by raising 

that issue in both his Post Sentence Motion and in his Concise Statement.” 

Reichley Opinion, 1/30/14, at 7. We concur. 
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victim, to a substantially lesser sentence than that received by [Appellant6

], 

a less culpable defendant with a good background, who neither carried a 

weapon nor inflicted injury on any victims of the crimes.” Appellant’s Brief 

at 20. This claim raises a substantial question, thus requiring our review. 

See Commonwealth v. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d 581, 589 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(holding substantial question raised where appellant averred disparity 

between his sentence and that of his co-defendant). 

Our standard of review in appeals of sentencing is well settled: 

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. 

Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, 

that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, 

exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias 

or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision. 

Commonwealth v. Mann, 957 A.2d 746, 749 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

“The law is well settled that co-defendants are not required to receive 

identical sentences.” Mastromarino, 2 A.3d at 589. Moreover, a 

sentencing court need not specifically refer to the sentence of a codefendant. “Rather, it requires that when there is a disparity between codefendants’ sentences, a sentencing court must give reasons particular to 

 

6

 According to Appellant, his co-defendant, Malcolm Jenkins, received an 

aggregate sentence of sixty-two months to twenty years. Appellant’s Brief 

at 13. 
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each defendant explaining why they received their individual sentences.” 

Id. 

Here, the sentencing court provided ample reasons for Appellant’s 

particular sentence: 

The aggregate sentence here would be for a period of eight 

years to [thirty] years. The sentence is in accordance with the 

binding plea agreement and is in the standard range of 

sentencing. 

I have taken the presentence investigation into 

consideration in this sentencing. However, I cannot, cannot 

overlook the very substantial physical injury to Mr. Martinez, the 

victim, as well as the emotional impact upon him, as well as the 

impact upon the other two victims. 

The Court has got to consider the safety and protection of 

the community. 

* * * 

This was not just an aberration. You know, you went out 

once. It was done. But, you went back again. And we’re 

dealing with armed robberies here. 

* * * 

Let me say this to you: It’s not easy certainly to hear the 

sentence. It’s not easy for me, particularly, when I see two 

people who are really intelligent people. You had every 

opportunity. I heard your mother here. I saw the letters. I 

read what your sister sent. You know, it just shouldn’t have 

happened, but it did happen. And, you know, you have victims 

here who are going to live with this the rest of their life. As I 

indicated to you, I have got to protect the community. 

N.T., 2/14/11, at 38, 41, 44. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the sentencing 

court further explained its rationale as follows: 
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 [Appellant], with his cohorts, robbed and victimized three 

men at two different locations, brandishing a firearm and striking 

one of the victims in the face with the firearm. In fashioning an 

appropriate sentence, the Court considered the impact the 

crimes had on the victims. Ortelio Martinez, the individual who 

was victimized at the second robbery location, explained during 

his interview for [Appellant’s] PSI that he was hit twice with the 

gun, that he had a cracked bone near his nose, and that he still 

experiences vision problems from the injury. According to the 

PSI, Mr. Martinez “recommended that the defendants be 

sentenced to state incarceration for ‘as long a time as you can.’ 

He remarked that he does not []plan to attend sentencing, 

because he fears retaliation from them.” (PSA at 4)

* * * 

In addition to considering the impact on the victim and on the 

community, the Court also considered the fact that this was not 

[Appellant’s] first or only brush with the law. He had been on 

probation as a juvenile and was arrested twice and pled guilty 

both times to disorderly conduct – once as a juvenile (2004) and 

once as an adult (2007) – in addition to other minor offenses to 

which he pled guilty on other occasions in 2003 and 2007. 

Additionally, in the Court’s view, the crimes at issue here were 

not a single isolated incident confined to 1234 MacArthur Road, 

Whitehall; rather, [Appellant] and his cohorts traveled to another 

location, 604 North 14th Street, Allentown, and committed 

robbery against a senior citizen, harming him both physically 

and psychologically. 

The Court considered the Sentencing Guidelines, the PSI, 

and the testimony of [Appellant], his brother, and his mother. 

In imposing [Appellant’s] sentence, this Court considered “the 

protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to 

the impact on the victims and the community, [Appellant’s] 

rehabilitative needs, and the Sentencing Guidelines.” 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b); Commonwealth v. Feucht, 955 A.2d 377, 

383 (Pa. Super. 2008). Using its discretion, this Court imposed 

a sentence that was both within the standard range of the 

Sentencing Guidelines and within the law. 

Brenner Opinion, 5/2/11, at 6–7.
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 Additionally, Judge Reichley opined that Appellant’s sentence was 

appropriate: 

 In sum, Judge Brenner considered all of the relevant 

factors in imposing a sentence. Appellant and his co-defendants 

caused permanent physical and mental injuries to their victims. 

The circumstances of the robberies demonstrated a serious 

degree of planning and preparation, including bringing weapons 

and duct tape with them. Protecting the community from them 

is a priority. At the same time, Judge Brenner honored the plea 

agreement and sentenced Appellant within the standard range. 

The sentence in this case was appropriately structured to 

achieve the objectives and is neither excessive nor an abuse of 

discretion. 

Reichley Opinion, 6/30/14, at 9–10. 

Based on our review of the record, the relevant law, and the opinions 

of the two jurists, we conclude that the trial court sufficiently explained the 

reasons for Appellant’s particular sentence. Therefore, we discern no abuse 

of discretion. 

The next claim in Appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement is that the 

sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence that was 

“manifestly excessive as to constitute too severe a punishment” due to 

“the consecutive nature of the two groups of sentences.” Appellant’s Brief at 

20. In a related argument, Appellant asserts that the sentencing court relied 

on an unsupported fact about when the various incidents occurred, “which 

could have affected the Court’s decision to make the two groups of 

sentences consecutive to one another.” Id. at 21. 
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 In determining whether a sentence is manifestly excessive, 

the appellate court must give great weight to the sentencing 

court’s discretion, as he or she is in the best position to measure 

factors such as the nature of the crime, the defendant’s 

character, and the defendant’s display of remorse, defiance, or 

indifference. 

Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 828 A.2d 1126, 1128 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

“Generally, Pennsylvania law ‘affords the sentencing court discretion to 

impose its sentence concurrently or consecutively to other sentences being 

imposed at the same time or to sentences already imposed. Any challenge 

to the exercise of this discretion ordinarily does not raise a substantial 

question.’” Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 A.3d 526, 533 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Pass, 914 A.2d 442, 446–447 (Pa. Super. 

2006)); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721; see also Commonwealth v. Hoag, 665 A.2d 

1212, 1214 (Pa. Super. 1995) (stating appellant is not entitled to “volume 

discount” for his crimes by having all sentences run concurrently). But see 

Commonwealth v. Dodge, 957 A.2d 1198 (Pa. Super. 2008) (holding 

consecutive, standard range sentences on thirty-seven counts of petty theft 

offenses for aggregate sentence of fifty-eight and one-half to 124 years of 

imprisonment constituted virtual life sentence and was so manifestly 

excessive as to raise substantial question). “Thus, in our view, the key to 

resolving the preliminary substantial question inquiry is whether the decision 

to sentence consecutively raises the aggregate sentence to, what appears 

upon its face to be, an excessive level in light of the criminal conduct at 
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issue in the case.” Prisk, 13 A.3d at 533 (quoting Mastromarino, 2 A.3d 

at 587). See also Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798 (Pa. Super. 

2013) (holding that challenge to imposition of consecutive sentences, which 

yields extensive aggregate sentence, does not necessarily present 

substantial question as to discretionary aspects of sentencing, unless court’s 

exercise of discretion led to sentence that is grossly incongruent with 

criminal conduct at issue and patently unreasonable). 

Here, the sentencing court observed on the record that this case 

involved “three separate armed robberies. I have victims, one with 

permanent injury, and two others who are emotionally scarred by reason of 

this. . . . A lot of things have been built into this plea agreement, not only 

the sentence in the standard range, but the possession of a deadly weapon, 

but not used. If that were not there, and there’s a question in terms of that, 

and that was part of the plea agreement as well. . . .” N.T., 2/14/11, at 28, 

32. Moreover, the sentencing court honored the plea agreement in every 

respect. Id. at 35–38. 

Thus, upon review, although a substantial question appears to exist on 

the grounds alleged, we must emphasize that Appellant’s myriad convictions 

stem from three pre-planned daylight robberies all committed in one day. 

Appellant pled guilty to six separate offenses involving multiple victims. 

Further, as dictated by Appellant’s plea agreement, the sentencing court did 
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not impose consecutive sentences on every conviction. Rather, the 

sentencing court divided the sentences into two groups of concurrent 

sentences. In seeking review of his aggregate sentence, Appellant is not 

entitled to any further “volume discount” for his multiple offenses. Hoag, 

665 A.2d at 1214. Based upon the foregoing, we will not deem Appellant’s 

sentence excessive or unreasonable in light of the crimes committed and the 

sentencing court’s consideration of the individual circumstances of this case. 

Prisk, 13 A.3d at 533; Commonwealth v. McWilliams, 887 A.2d 784, 787 

(Pa. Super. 2005) (holding that standard range sentences were not 

excessive even though they ran consecutively for an aggregate sentence of 

forty-one to eighty-two years of imprisonment). Hence, we conclude that 

Appellant has not presented a substantial question for our review in this 

regard. 

The remaining claim in Appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement is that the 

sentencing court abused its discretion by failing to consider mitigating 

factors, such as the fact that Appellant “did not carry a weapon or commit a 

violent act, expressed sincere remorse, had a good background, and was 

experiencing serious family problems.” Appellant’s Brief at 20. “[T]his Court 

has held on numerous occasions that a claim of inadequate consideration of 

mitigating factors does not raise a substantial question for our review.” 

Commonwealth v. Disalvo, 70 A.3d 900, 903 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting 
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Commonwealth v. Downing, 990 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(citation omitted)). Accordingly, we conclude Appellant’s argument that the 

trial court failed to give adequate weight to mitigating factors does not 

present a substantial question appropriate for our review. 

For the reasons outlined above, Appellant’s sentencing challenges fail 

to raise a substantial question or lack merit. Accordingly, we affirm the 

judgment of sentence. 

 Judgment of sentenced affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 7/30/2014