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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. PATRICK S.

REDMOND

(AC 36831)

Gruendel, Prescott and Pellegrino, Js.

Argued September 10—officially released December 8, 2015

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Litchfield, Ginocchio, J.)

Rachel M. Baird, with whom, on the brief, was Mitchell Lake, for the appellant (Patrick C. Redmond).

James A. Killen, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, was David S. Shepack, state’s

attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

PELLEGRINO, J. Patrick C. Redmond (Redmond),

the father of the defendant, Patrick S. Redmond1

(defendant), appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion for the return of seized property. On

appeal, Redmond claims that the court improperly (1)

concluded that the seized property met the statutory

definition of contraband in General Statutes § 54-36a

and (2) disposed of the property without giving him

proper notice and an opportunity to be heard. We conclude that this court lacks jurisdiction to decide the

merits of the appeal because Redmond was not a party

to the underlying proceeding. Accordingly, we dismiss

the appeal.

The defendant entered a guilty plea to one count of

possession with intent to sell in violation of General

Statutes § 21a-277 (b) and an Alford plea2

to one count

of illegal transfer of a pistol or revolver in violation

of General Statutes § 29-33. A condition of the plea

agreement was that guns and ammunition seized during

the search of the defendant’s residence be forfeited to

the state and destroyed. Money seized during the search

was ordered forfeited to the state pursuant to an in rem

proceeding under General Statutes § 54-36h. State v.

$7,878.05 (Patrick Redmond), Superior Court, judicial

district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV-13-4013067-S

(December 10, 2013). After the defendant was sentenced pursuant to the plea agreement, Redmond filed

a ‘‘Motion for Stay of Order of Destruction and Return

of Seized Property’’ in the criminal action. Redmond

claimed to be the owner of the firearms and argued

that General Statutes § 54-33g gave him a right to notice

of any forfeiture proceeding concerning the firearms.

The trial court denied the motion for the return of the

property, but granted the motion to stay the destruction

of the sixteen firearms, one magazine, and ammunition

pending an appeal. This appeal followed.

On November 6, 2014, the state filed a motion to

dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. On February

18, 2015, this court denied the motion to dismiss without

articulation. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

Two cases are particularly relevant to our analysis:

State v. Salmon, 250 Conn. 147, 163, 735 A.2d 333 (1999),

and State v. One or More Persons over Whom the Court’s

Jurisdiction Has Not Yet Been Invoked, 107 Conn. App.

760, 946 A.2d 896, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 912, 957 A.2d

880 (2008). In Salmon, our Supreme Court articulated

a bright line test for an appellant to establish a right to

appellate review by direct appeal. The appellant must

establish: (1) it was a party to the underlying action;

(2) it was aggrieved by the trial court decision; and (3)

the appeal is from a final judgment. State v. Salmon,

supra, 163. The court noted that a bright line test will
‘‘aid litigants, who wish to challenge trial court orders

through the appellate process, to determine the proper

procedural method for such a challenge—an appeal, or

a writ of error.’’ Id., 164. The court defined ‘‘party’’ as

‘‘[one] by or against whom a legal suit is brought . . .

the party plaintiff or defendant . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 154. In Salmon, the appellant

was a bondsman who took issue with the trial court’s

denial of his motion for a rebate of the bond forfeiture

and a release from the bond. Id., 151. Our Supreme

Court held that the bondsman did not have a right

to appeal under General Statutes § 52-263 because the

bondsman was not a party to the underlying criminal

action. Id., 149.

This court addressed the question of party status in

State v. One or More Persons over Whom the Court’s

Jurisdiction Has Not Yet Been Invoked, supra, 107

Conn. App. 760. In that case, the plaintiff in error had

purchased a pair of andirons at a public auction. Id.,

761. The andirons were later seized by the police, who

claimed that they were stolen property. Id. The police

had initiated a criminal investigation into the theft of

the property, but no charges had been brought against

any person. Id., 766. The plaintiff filed a motion for the

return of the property, which the trial court denied. Id.,

763. When the plaintiff filed his motion, there was no

judicial proceeding of any nature underway. Id., 766.

Following the denial of his motion, the plaintiff filed a

writ of error challenging the judgment. Id., 763.

This court concluded that the plaintiff initiated a

judicial proceeding in the trial court when he filed his

motion forthe return of the property, and we referenced

this conclusion multiples times. Id., 766, 767, 768. We

stated that the fact the plaintiff was not a party to any

criminal proceeding relating to the property was of

no consequence to our analysis because there was no

underlying criminal proceeding. Id., 766–67 n.5. This

court held that the plaintiff could have sought appellate

review of the judgment by way of a direct appeal. Id.,

761. We therefore dismissed the writ of error as procedurally improper. Id., 768.

The present case is more analogous to Salmon than

it is to State v. One or More Persons over Whom the

Court’s Jurisdiction Has Not Yet Been Invoked, supra,

107 Conn. App. 760. Unlike the plaintiff in error in that

case, Redmond did not initiate a proceeding when he

filed his motion for the return of property. The underlying criminal case and the civil in rem proceeding were

already pending. Redmond, who was not a party to the

defendant’s criminal case, filed his motion forthe return

of the firearms under the docket number for the criminal case, which is analogous to what the bondsman did

in State v. Salmon, supra, 250 Conn. 151. Salmon makes

clear that under these circumstances, Redmond is not

considered a ‘‘party’’ to the underlying action for pur-
poses of filing an appeal in accordance with § 52-263.

Redmond also purports to appeal from the in rem

action for the seized money, as this docket number is

also listed on his appeal form. Redmond has never made

any claim that he is the rightful owner of the seized

money, other than unsubstantiated statements in his

brief that he may have some interest in the money, and

he was not a party to the in rem action. The in rem

action did not concern the firearms; thus, Redmond

was not aggrieved by the forfeiture at issue in that

matter. Therefore, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear

his appeal from that judgment.

Accordingly, we will not consider the other issues

raised by Redmond because we lack subject matter

jurisdiction.

The appeal is dismissed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Patrick S. Redmond is not a party to this appeal.

2 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d

162 (1970).