U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Office of Inspector General 

National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration 

Audit of the Joint Polar Satellite System: 

Challenges Must Be Met to Minimize 

Gaps in Polar Environmental Satellite Data 

Final Report No. OIG-11-034-A 

September 30, 2011 

FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

Office of Audit and Evaluation 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Office of Inspect or General 

Washington. D.C. 20 230 

September 30, 2011 

MEMORANDUM FOR: 	 Dr. Jane Lubchenco 

Under Secretary ofCommerce and Administrator 

:I~~~eC~:~:::I 0£2losp~ministration FROM: 

Assistant Inspector General for Systems Acquisition 

and IT Security 

SUBJECT: 	 Audit ofthe Joint Polar Satellite System: Challenges Must Be Met 

to Minimize Gaps in Polar Environmental Satellite Data 

Final Report No. OIG-11-034-A 

Attached is our final audit report on the ongoing development of the Joint Polar Satellite System 

(JPSS). Our objective for this audit was to assess the adequacy ofJPSS development and 

acquisition activities intended to maintain continuity ofweather and climate data obtained from 

polar orbit. To do so, we evaluated the completeness ofdevelopment and testing leading up to 

the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) Preparatory 

Project (NPP) launch, the impact of development modifications (such as changes to test 

schedules), and preparations for post-launch data production. We also examined activities at the 

JPSS programmatic level that had ramifications for the continuity of polar satellite coverage 

beyond NPP. 

We found that while NPP remains on track to launch in October 2011, there are still several risks 

to using NPP's data operationally. First, the availability of some data for operational use will be 

delayed. Second, the ground system supporting NPP is not as robust as a typical operational 

system. It is expected that there will be a gap in coverage between NPP and the first JPSS 

satellite (JPSS-1) and budget challenges have presented difficulties for the program. Under 

continued funding uncertainty, the program needs to do further work to define its operational 

baseline, prioritize requirements, and plan for tradeoffs when funding shortfalls occur. Efforts to 

mitigate the impact of a coverage gap should be coordinated across NOAA's line offices. Lastly, 

the program only recently completed the transition of the Advanced Technology Microwave 

Sounder to a NASA contract, but this and other instrument contracts must be finalized. 

We have received your response to our draft report. We modified this final report as needed to 

address your comments, summarized the comments in the report, and included the response as an 

appendix to the report. The report will be posted on OIG's website pursuant to section 8L ofthe 

Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. 

Under Department Administrative Order 2 13-5, you have 60 calendar days from the date ofthis 

memorandum to submit an audit action plan to us. The plan should outline the actions you 

propose to take to address each audit finding and recommendation. 
We would like to extend our thanks to NOAA for the courtesies shown our staff during our 

fieldwork. Please direct any inquiries regarding this report to me at (202) 482- I 855 or Fred 

Meny, Director, Satellites and Weather Systems, at (202) 482-1931. 

Attachment 

cc: Mary M. Glackin, Deputy Under Secretary for Operations, NOAA 

Mary E. Kicza, Assistant Administrator, National Environmental Satellite, Data, 

and Information Service, NOAA 

Mack Cato, Director, Office ofAudit and Information Management, NOAA 

Geovette E. Washington, Deputy General Counsel, Department ofCommerce 
 

Report In Brief Report In Brief 

U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General 

September 30, 2011 

 Why We Did This Review 

Background 

Our objective for this audit 

was to assess the adequacy 

of NOAA’s JPSS development and acquisition activities 

intended to maintain continuity 

of data obtained from polar orbit, including the completeness 

of pre-launch development and 

testing, the impact of development modifications (such as 

changes to test schedules), and 

preparations for post-launch 

data production. We also 

examined activities at the JPSS 

programmatic level that had 

ramifications for the long-term 

continuity of polar satellite 

coverage. 

NOAA’s environmental satellite operations and weather 

forecasting are designated 

primary mission-essential 

functions of the Department 

of Commerce because they 

directly support government 

functions the President has 

deemed necessary to lead and 

sustain the nation during a 

catastrophic emergency. But 

NOAA’s current constellation 

of polar and geostationary 

operational environmental 

satellites is aging, and its 

capabilities will degrade over 

time. As a result, the risk of 

gaps in critical satellite data is 

increasing. 

The JPSS program is the result 

of a 2010 restructuring of the 

NPOESS program, which had 

a long history of delays and 

cost overruns. As a result of 

these delays, the NPP satellite, which was originally 

intended to demonstrate new 

instruments, will now be used 

operationally to maintain data 

continuity. 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

Audit of the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS): 

Challenges Must Be Met to Minimize Gaps in Polar 

Environmental Satellite Data (OIG-11-034-A)

What We Found 

1. While the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 

(NPOESS) Preparatory Project (NPP) remains on track for an October 2011 launch, 

late development of the ground system (equipment for controlling the satellites and 

receiving and processing satellite data) has delayed the schedule for post-launch data 

production. In addition, NPP’s ground system is not as robust as a typical operational 

system, increasing the risk of data loss and disruptions to satellite control during severe 

weather events. 

2. Our examination of program-level activities confirms a coverage gap that NOAA 

expects to occur between NPP’s end of life and the operational date of the fi rst JPSS 

satellite. This gap will result in degraded weather forecasts and a break in the climate 

record. 

3. The process for defining JPSS’ operational baseline of capabilities, costs, and schedule 

has been prolonged, resulting in uncertain life-cycle cost estimates and budget requirements during a period when decision makers needed clarity in these areas. 

4. The transition of instrument contracts from the control of the NPOESS program to 

JPSS has just been completed, but delays in finalizing the contracts could lead to further cost increases and schedule degradation. 

What We Recommended 

1. NOAA should take steps to mitigate risks of using NPP data operationally by determining the availability of additional resources to support preparations for post-launch data 

production. Management should determine the feasibility of establishing an alternate 

mission management center and an additional station to which satellite data may be 

transmitted. 

2. NOAA should also adequately oversee planning and coordination between the JPSS 

program and external entities to ensure the adequacy of JPSS development activities. 

3. NOAA should coordinate efforts from across its line offices to minimize the degradation of weather and climate forecasting during gaps in satellite coverage. 

4. To more efficiently manage the JPSS program under continued budget uncertainty, 

NOAA should provide decision makers with data illustrating the consequences of limiting satellite observational capabilities. NOAA should prioritize all of JPSS’ requirements and develop a plan for making adjustments in response to funding shortfalls. 

5. To fully transition from NPOESS to JPSS, contracts with instrument vendors must be 

finalized. 
U.S. Department of Commerce Final Report 

Office of Inspector General September 30, 2011 

Contents 

Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 1
 

Findings and Recommendations ............................................................................................................ 4
 

I. NOAA Should Take Steps to Mitigate Risks of Using NPOESS Preparatory Project Data 

Operationally...................................................................................................................................... 4
 

A. Late Ground System Development, Communication and Coordination Challenges, and 

Staff Reductions Have Delayed Availability of Some NPP Data ..................................................4
 

B. NPP’s Ground System Lacks Some Features of Operational Satellite Systems ....................4
 

C. Ground System Issues Accumulated While Management Focused on Instrument Delays....5
 

D. NPP’s Schedule Compression Introduced Additional Risks ..................................................6
 

II. NOAA Must Act to Minimize Expected Gap Between NPP and JPSS-1..................................7
 

A. Current Gap Analysis Indicates Improvement in Satellite Coverage, but a Significant 

Expected Gap Between NPP and JPSS-1 Remains ........................................................................8
 

B. Funding Challenges Restricted Acquisition and Development, Delayed Satellite Launch 

Dates, and Created the Expected Gap ..........................................................................................10
 

C. JPSS Program’s Baseline Capabilities, Costs, and Schedule Need to Be Finalized.............11
 

III. JPSS Program Needs to Overcome NPOESS-to-JPSS Transition-Related Challenges .......12
 

A. Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder Contract Transition Was Delayed ..................12
 

B. Other Instrument Contracts Have Not Been Finalized .........................................................13
 

Summary of NOAA Comments and OIG Response............................................................................15
 

Appendix A: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology .............................................................................16
 

Appendix B: Response to OIG’s Draft Report ....................................................................................18
 
                                                           

U.S. Department of Commerce Final Report 

Office of Inspector General September 30, 2011 

Introduction 

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA’s) polar-orbiting operational 

environmental satellites1 provide critical data for civilian and military use by the United States 

and its international partners through global observations of conditions that affect weather and 

climate. The satellites also provide data on environmental indicators such as vegetation, active 

fires, and dust storms. In addition, NOAA’s current operational satellites include sensors that 

detect signals from emergency beacons and 

transmit them to search and rescue organizations. Figure 1. Polar-Orbiting Satellites 

With the earth rotating beneath, polar-orbiting 

satellites pass over the north and south poles 

while continuously circling the planet, viewing 

the entire earth’s surface twice a day over the 

course of approximately 14 orbits. Three polar 

operational environmental satellite constellations 

will collectively provide, for any location on the 

globe, observations that are generally refreshed at 

6-hour intervals (figure 1): Department of 

Defense satellites that cross the equator in the 

early morning, European satellites2

 that cross in 

the midmorning, and NOAA satellites that cross 

in the early afternoon (referred to as the earlymorning, mid-morning, and afternoon orbits). 

Polar-orbiting satellite sensors capture higher 

spatial resolution data than geostationary 

satellites due to a lower orbit, and are a 

significant part of the global observing system, a 

major component of numerical weather prediction. Observations from polar satellite sensors 

constitute the most important data for 3-day and longer forecasts of significant weather events— 

advance warnings that protect lives and property. 

NOAA’s current constellation of satellites is nearing its end of life, and replacement satellites are 

needed to maintain continuity of observations in the afternoon orbit. NOAA’s Joint Polar 

Satellite System (JPSS) program, for which the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA) is the systems integrator, will acquire and develop the next-generation polar satellite 

system for the afternoon orbit, including a common ground system3

 that will also operate 

Defense satellites and share data with international satellite programs. In February 2010, the 

1

 NOAA’s operational satellites are distinct from research satellites in that they make consistent contributions to
 

weather and climate prediction and NOAA launches new operational satellites as they reach the end of their design
 

lives. NASA’s research satellites demonstrate new technologies and attempt to advance scientific capabilities. 

Successfully demonstrated capabilities can be made part of operational satellites thereafter. 2

 European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT). 

3

 A ground system consists of equipment for controlling the satellites and for receiving and processing satellite data. 

The three orbits of polar operational environmental satellites. 

Source: OIG, adapted from NPOESS illustration 

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U.S. Department of Commerce Final Report 

Office of Inspector General September 30, 2011 

White House’s Office of Science and Technology Policy announced its decision4 to have 

NOAA, in partnership with NASA, establish the JPSS program as part of a restructuring of the 

National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), a tri-agency 

(Defense, NOAA, and NASA) program, which had a long history of cost overruns and schedule 

delays during its efforts to develop the next generation of satellites for all three orbits. 

As a result of NPOESS’ delays, the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) satellite, a NASA 

research and risk reduction satellite originally intended to demonstrate new instruments, will 

now be used operationally to maintain continuity of data from the afternoon orbit. NPP is 

scheduled to launch in late October 2011 and is designed to last 5 years, but whether its 

instruments will last as long as its design life is unclear. 

The first satellite developed under the JPSS program, JPSS-1, will be a near-clone of the NPP 

satellite, although it will be built to more rigorous engineering standards that reflect operational 

needs. It is currently targeted to launch in the first quarter of FY 2017 and will not be operational 

until after the end of NPP’s design life in November 2016. Therefore, NOAA is predicting a gap 

in the continuity of polar satellite data from the afternoon orbit. 

Effectively managing the development and acquisition of NOAA’s environmental satellite 

systems is one of the Department’s top management challenges.5

 In a June 10, 2011, 

memorandum to the NOAA Administrator, we detailed our preliminary observations, based on 

our fieldwork up to that point, in the following areas: funding challenges, NPOESS-to-JPSS 

transition delays, NPP launch and ground system status, and the program’s life-cycle cost 

estimate.6 We have further developed those observations, along with new information, into the 

findings and recommendations presented in this report. 

Our objective for this audit was to assess the adequacy of JPSS development and acquisition 

activities intended to maintain continuity of data obtained from polar orbit, including the 

completeness of development and testing leading up to the NPP launch, the impact of 

development modifications (such as changes to test schedules), and preparations for post-launch 

data production; our results in these areas are detailed in our first finding. We also examined 

activities at the JPSS programmatic level that had ramifications for the continuity of polar 

satellite coverage beyond NPP; the results of that work are captured in findings II and III. Our 

audit scope, objectives, and methodology are described in appendix A. 

As a result of our audit, we concluded that while NPP, as part of the JPSS program, remains on 

track for an October 2011 launch, schedule compression during development and acquisition 

activities has increased the risk that the continuity of data from the afternoon orbit cannot be 

maintained after the current operational satellite reaches its end of life. In addition, our 

examination of program-level activities confirmed an expected coverage gap between NPP and 

JPSS-1. The process for defining JPSS’ operational baseline of capabilities, costs, and schedule 

4

 The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, February 1, 2010. Restructuring the National Polarorbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (fact sheet). Washington, D.C.
 5

 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General, December 20, 2010. Top Management Challenges
 

Facing the Department of Commerce (OIG-11-015). Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce OIG.
 6

 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General, June 10, 2011. NOAA's Joint Polar Satellite System 

Audit Observations (OIG-11-029-M). Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce OIG.
 

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U.S. Department of Commerce Final Report 

Office of Inspector General September 30, 2011 

has been prolonged. And the transition of instrument contracts from the NPOESS program’s 

control to the JPSS program’s control has not been completed, which could lead to further cost 

and schedule degradation. 

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U.S. Department of Commerce Final Report 

Office of Inspector General September 30, 2011 

Findings and Recommendations 

I.	 NOAA Should Take Steps to Mitigate Risks of Using NPOESS Preparatory Project 

Data Operationally
 

Data from the NPP satellite, which was originally a research and risk reduction mission, will 

now be used operationally to maintain continuity of weather and climate data from the afternoon 

orbit. Recent efforts by NASA’s NPP team (including contractors) have put the satellite on track 

to launch in late October 2011. But late development of the ground system has compressed the 

mission schedule and delayed the schedule for post-launch data production. In addition, NPP’s 

ground system is not as robust as a typical operational system. 

A. Late Ground System Development, Communication and Coordination Challenges, and 

Staff Reductions Have Delayed Availability of Some NPP Data 

Delays in ground system development have postponed efforts to ensure that the ground system’s 

software matches science algorithms for creating data products. At a technical review in June 

2011, the ground system’s contractor, Raytheon, indicated that the ground system’s data 

processing segment will be able to support post-launch work to calibrate NPP instruments’ 

output and validate the scientific quality of key data records (a process called calibration and 

validation). A significant number of other data records, however, will not be supported until a 

ground system upgrade, which is planned for March 2012. 

In addition, JPSS’ communication and coordination challenges with NOAA’s National 

Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service (NESDIS) Center for Satellite 

Applications and Research (STAR), as well as inadequate staffing within STAR, have led to a 

longer post-launch schedule for activities needed to ensure data products will meet science 

objectives. STAR’s mission is to accelerate the transfer of satellite observations into operations. 

Yet its role, responsibility, accountability, and authority with respect to the JPSS program 

(including NPP) have not been agreed to. Further, STAR’s FY 2011 staffing level was lower 

than planned. As a result, initial calibration and validation is now projected to take 24 months 

post-launch—6 months longer than originally planned. Our review of the program’s schedule 

found that it could take even longer for some data records to be sufficiently validated for 

operational use. According to the schedule, some 24 products will take from 27 to 42 months 

post-launch to reach a stage where their accuracy has been established in a systematic and 

statistically robust way, representing global conditions. 

B. NPP’s Ground System Lacks Some Features of Operational Satellite Systems 

NPOESS-era delays in the deployment of an operational satellite system led the NPOESS 

executive committee in 2009—at the recommendation of an independent review team—to decide 

to use NPP data for operational purposes to maintain continuity of satellite data in the afternoon 

orbit. But no additional requirements were levied on NPP as a result. Unlike NOAA’s existing 

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U.S. Department of Commerce Final Report 

Office of Inspector General September 30, 2011 

operational satellite systems,7 NPP has only a single mission management center for controlling 

the satellite. Until a backup has been established, control of the satellite is at risk of severe events 

(for example, natural disasters, large-scale telecommunications outages, or equipment failures), 

however unlikely, that could disrupt the mission management center’s ability to control the 

satellite. Program officials told us they have commissioned studies to develop an alternate 

mission management center and hope to have one ready well in advance of the JPSS-1 launch. 

NPP’s ground station has the system’s only science data downlink (the means to transmit a 

signal from the satellite to the ground station). With only a single downlink, disruptions to the 

antenna and ground equipment could result in the loss of operational data. At NPP’s flight 

operations review, the independent review team noted that not receiving a single orbit’s worth of 

data could cascade into a data loss, adding that NASA’s Earth Observing System research 

satellites have missed several downlinks in successive orbits with a single ground station (the 

NPP satellite can store data from 3.5 orbits, approximately 6 hours’ worth, before it must be 

overwritten). JPSS program officials told us that the ground station has redundancy in terms of 

antennas and equipment. But while the ground station may be robust, the use of a single ground 

station in a single geographic location is not consistent with NOAA’s existing polar and 

geostationary operational environmental satellite systems, which use more than one location. 

Adding a second, geographically distinct science data downlink could improve NPP’s data 

timeliness (the time from observation by the satellite to when the data has been processed by the 

ground system) and increase its contribution to weather forecasting. 

C. Ground System Issues Accumulated While Management Focused on Instrument Delays 

During our audit survey work in 2010, we noted a growing number of unresolved problems with 

ground system development and testing. From our viewpoint, while NOAA leadership was 

aware of the ground system issues, its attention had previously been focused on resolving 

development delays of two key instruments, the Visible/Infrared Imager Radiometer Suite 

(VIIRS) and the Cross-track Infrared Sounder (CrIS). 

Due to both the instrument delays and significant software builds required to resolve the ground 

system problems, a key compatibility test of the ground system’s control and communication 

with the satellite was postponed from August 2010 to January 2011. A second compatibility test 

that focused on the flow of data through the system and the creation of data products was also 

postponed. We learned that the large software builds had been delayed, in part due to significant 

staffing cuts the program imposed on Raytheon in order to preserve the remaining available 

funds—reduced by monies reserved for NPOESS contract termination liability—through the end 

of fiscal year 2010. 

Given that the ground system must first support the NPP satellite, in the summer of 2010 we 

alerted Commerce and NOAA leadership to our concerns, including the potential delay of the 

NPP launch and a gap in data continuity. The program responded by adding resources and 

7

 For example, NOAA’s current polar operational environmental satellites are controlled from a satellite operations facility 

in Maryland, while command and data acquisition stations elsewhere in the country provide instructions to and receive 

data from the satellites; one of these stations also serves as the backup control center. Additionally, through an agreement 

with EUMETSAT, satellite data can be sent and received through antennas and ground support equipment at a site in 

Europe. NOAA’s geostationary operational environmental satellites have similar redundancies (multiple ground stations 

and a backup control center), and the next generation of geostationary satellites includes plans for the same. 

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U.S. Department of Commerce Final Report 

Office of Inspector General September 30, 2011 

program-level attention to ground system development. As we noted in our June 2011 

memorandum to the NOAA Administrator, delay in transitioning the ground system contract to 

NASA added communication and coordination challenges to the program’s oversight and 

direction of Raytheon’s work. With the contract transitioned in late September 2010, those 

impediments were removed. 

D. NPP’s Schedule Compression Introduced Additional Risks 

With the delays in ground system/satellite compatibility tests, the NPP team had little schedule 

margin for fixing critical or urgent issues that were identified during testing and that must be 

resolved before launch. In addition, the project team postponed analysis of test results in order to 

plan and prepare for successive ground system tests before the prelaunch freeze of the system’s 

configuration. In part due to fixes planned for post-launch software releases, some requirements’ 

verification will be postponed until after launch, potentially delaying the operational use of NPP 

data. 

Figure 2 depicts major ground system test schedule changes over the past 2 years. As illustrated 

in the chart, test events (in particular, NPP compatibility test [NCT] 3 parts 1 and 2, and NCT 4) 

moved closer to the launch readiness date and closer together over time. The primary causes of 

this schedule compression were delivery delays of instruments made under the NPOESS 

contract, an accumulation of ground system issues, and not enough contractor staffing for the 

large software build. 

Figure 2. Ground System Test Schedule Changes Over Previous 2 Years 

(Calendar Years Shown) 

Q2 

Schedule as of: 

October 2009 

November 2009 

August 2010 

March 2011 

August 2011(Current) 

2010 

Q1 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q4 

2011 

Q3 

GSIT NCT3 

GSIT 

GSIT 

GSIT 

GSIT 

NCT3.1 NCT3.2 

NCT3.1 

NCT3.1 

NCT3.1 

NCT3.2 

NCT3.2 

NCT3.2 

NCT4 

NCT4 

NCT4 

NCT4 

NCT4 

LRD 

LRD 

LRD 

LRD 

LRD 

TWDF

2009 

GSIT (Ground System Interface Test)
 Planned 

NCT (NPP Compatibility Test)
 

TWDF (2-week Data Flow Test)
 

LRD (Launch Readiness Date)
 Actual 

 Source: OIG adaptation of NPP’s recent ground system test schedule history 

Another factor that contributed to the schedule compression was the need to increase the duration 

of tests in order to adequately stress the ground system as data flows through it. At two 

comprehensive mission reviews in January and June 2011, NASA’s independent review team 

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U.S. Department of Commerce Final Report 

Office of Inspector General September 30, 2011 

recommended that the project put the ground system under stress with a minimum 2-week 

continuous data flow test, longer if possible. The intent was to determine how the various 

segments operated under load, where the system bottlenecks were, what conditions would trigger 

data loss, and if any mitigating steps could be taken to prevent problems. It was clear that the 

recommendation was focused on preparing to use NPP data operationally. 

Responding to this recommendation and the need to retest some requirements and fixes to system 

discrepancies that had not been fully tested, the project recently scheduled two additional tests 

late in the mission schedule, including a 14-day data flow test. In order to leave room in the 

schedule for a planned mission rehearsal, however, the test was scheduled for September 27 to 

October 10, to be completed just 15 days before launch. Any system fixes required to mitigate 

issues identified in these tests would accumulate with already scheduled post-launch ground 

system work requests, which could delay the work necessary for post-launch data production. 

Finally, NPP experienced test-readiness delays caused by the unpreparedness of certain external 

systems. These systems interface with the ground system, and their ability to ingest satellite data 

is part of NPP/JPSS mission requirements. Six weeks before NCT 3 part 2 occurred, the project 

team learned that operationally configured versions of NOAA’s Comprehensive Large Arraydata Stewardship System (CLASS, which will archive NPP/JPSS data) and the NPOESS Data 

Exploitation system (NDE, which will further process and distribute NPP/JPSS data to NOAA 

users) would not be ready in time for the test. NOAA and NASA had to determine the effects of 

using non-operationally configured versions of CLASS and NDE for NCT 3 part 2, as well as to 

coordinate schedules for further test activity. The project later postponed NCT 4 to ensure 

CLASS would have an operational version built in time to support that test. The postponement of 

NCT 4 further compressed the NPP schedule. 

During our field work, we observed that communications and coordination between NASA’s 

NPP systems integration and test team and NOAA’s external system owners improved as the 

stakeholders incorporated lessons learned from earlier tests into those that followed. Given the 

ground system’s longstanding requirements to interface with and provide data to the external 

systems, however, a broader, more inclusive systems engineering approach was needed at an 

earlier point in the mission schedule. This will continue to be a challenge for the JPSS program 

as the ground system evolves to support more satellites and include additional U.S. military and 

international partners. 

II. NOAA Must Act to Minimize Expected Gap Between NPP and JPSS-1 

NOAA is predicting a gap in the continuity of polar satellite data from the afternoon orbit 

between NPP and JPSS-1. Our analysis suggests the expected gap decreased after the program 

received additional funds through departmental reprogramming late in FY 2011 and the outlook 

for FY 2012 funding improved. The expected gap remains significant, however, and will result 

in degraded weather forecasts and a break in the climate record. NOAA’s process for 

establishing the program’s operational baseline8

 was prolonged, resulting in uncertain life-cycle 

8

 An operational baseline is an operationally significant performance level between the threshold and objective that 

is expected to be delivered by the program. Threshold refers to the minimally acceptable level of performance that 

must be achieved, while objective represents a level above the threshold that would better meet user needs and is 

realistically achievable with current technology. The system baseline refers to capabilities on contract. 

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U.S. Department of Commerce Final Report 

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cost estimates and budget requirements during a period when decision makers needed clarity in 

these areas. 

A. Current Gap Analysis Indicates Improvement in Satellite Coverage, but a Significant 

Expected Gap Between NPP and JPSS-1 Remains 

Based on the current FY 2011 funding level, NOAA expects a gap in weather and climate 

observations between NPP’s end of life and the operational date of JPSS-l. A gap will result in a 

lack of data, reducing the accuracy of weather forecasts and causing a break in data needed to 

maintain a continuous climate record. Since our June memo, the JPSS program reported a total 

of $109 million in additional FY 2011 funding. With increased funding also likely in FY 2012 

and the launch date fixed at February 2017, we expect a gap between 9 and 21 months in length 

(figure 3), an improvement over the expected 18-to-30-month gap we reported in our June 

memo. 

Figure 3. Potential Continuity Gaps in Afternoon Orbit 

Fiscal Year 

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027

Feb ‘09 

JPSS 2

Feb‘17 

Oct ‘11 

Fall‘21 

Satellite Launch Date 

(Note: Actual launch date shown for NOAA-19, planned launch date for NPP, estimated launch date for JPSS-1 and JPSS-2) 

Satellite Checkout Period - Planned time before all operational data available (6-18 month window) 

Satellite Operational Period - Expected period to receive operational data from satellite based on design life 

(Note: Some data is available during the satellite checkout period.) 

NOAA 19

NPP

Potential Continuity Gap - A gap in coverage could occur in the event of NOAA-19's early end-of-life, NPP launch delay, or an 

extended checkout period for NPP post-launch. Potential gap between NPP and JPSS-1 is a minimum of 9 months based on 3 months 

between end of NPP operations and JPSS-1 launch plus a 6 month checkout period 

JPSS 1

Maximum Continuity Gap - The gap between NPP and JPSS-1 would be 21 months if post-launch checkout extends to 18 months. 

Actual gap, if any, depends on actual life of satellites, how well instruments are operating, as well as other factors (such as checkout)

 Source: OIG analysis of NOAA data, as of August 22, 2011 

We used a launch date of February 2017—rather than the program's current projected launch 

date in the first quarter FY 2017—due to continued budget uncertainty in FY 2012 and beyond, 

which could delay acquisition and development activities. NOAA officials told us a 6-month 

post-launch checkout period was necessary to achieve an interim operational capability to 

produce the data records that are most important for numerical weather prediction. Other 

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U.S. Department of Commerce Final Report 

Office of Inspector General September 30, 2011 

important data records would not be available to users until JPSS-1 instruments were fully 

checked out, a process that could last considerably longer than 6 months. 

In our analysis, we used a checkout period ranging from 6 months up to a possible 18 months to 

achieve full operational capability. A checkout period of longer than 6 months is likely because 

JPSS-1 instruments will have manufacturing changes from the models flown on NPP and, in all 

probability, NPP will no longer be operational, leaving the JPSS-1 mission without a direct 

means for comparison. The actual length of the gap will depend on a number of factors, 

including the FY 2012 JPSS appropriation, how NOAA prioritizes user needs for national 

weather and climate data, and the actual life span of the NPP spacecraft and instruments. The 

NPP spacecraft was designed to last 5 years and carries enough fuel to last 7 years. However, 

most of the NPP instruments were managed and developed under the NPOESS contract with 

Northrop Grumman; the NPOESS program had limited government oversight and a history of 

technical issues. As a result, NASA lacked technical oversight during instrument development, 

manufacturing, and testing—creating uncertainty as to the instruments’ ability to operate as long 

as the spacecraft’s design life. 

We continue to identify a potential near-term gap between NOAA-19 (the current satellite) and 

NPP. Such a gap would occur if NOAA-19 experiences an early end of life or instrument sensor 

failure, the NPP launch is delayed, or the NPP satellite and instruments require an extended postlaunch checkout period before all data is operationally viable. 

To assess the impacts of a gap in polar satellite data from the afternoon orbit, we interviewed 

officials from the National Centers for Environmental Prediction (NCEP),9

 including its 

Director. NCEP has completed five studies of significant weather events in which forecasts with 

all available data were compared with forecasts that were denied data from afternoon orbit polar 

satellites. Two of the case studies concluded that weather forecasts at 5, 4, and 3 days before the 

event were significantly degraded without afternoon orbit data. At 2 and 1 days, other sources of 

data (such as weather balloons) had more positive contributions to the forecast, reducing the 

effects of the loss of afternoon orbit data. In the remaining three studies, the forecasts were 

largely unchanged as other data sources provided critical atmospheric signals for those weather 

events. NCEP officials concluded that the case studies, along with statistical studies of the 

relative importance of various data sources in forecasting, underscore the need for continuity of 

both afternoon and morning orbit polar satellite coverage. Forecasts at 3 days and beyond are 

particularly reliant on polar satellite data, and the accuracy of forecasts of significant weather 

events at these timeframes is crucial to protecting lives and property. 

Anticipating a gap in data from the afternoon orbit, NCEP officials told us they have been 

working with Defense to improve the data from its satellites in the early-morning orbit. 

Additionally, NCEP is working to use data from NOAA’s next generation geostationary satellite, 

which is currently scheduled to launch in October 2015; according to NOAA, however, the 

National Weather Service does not believe this data would mitigate the loss of polar satellite data 

from the afternoon orbit. Separately, NESDIS officials told us they were considering additional 

international sources that may provide some compensating data, but currently there are no 

alternative sources of afternoon orbit data beyond NPP. However, in our observations of 

9

 NCEP is an office within NOAA’s National Weather Service. 

9
 
                                                           

 

 

U.S. Department of Commerce Final Report 

Office of Inspector General September 30, 2011 

NOAA’s Program Management Council10 meetings, there was little evidence that these efforts 

were being tracked or coordinated across NOAA’s line offices. 

B. Funding Challenges Restricted Acquisition and Development, Delayed Satellite Launch 

Dates, and Created the Expected Gap 

When the transition from NPOESS to JPSS began in February 2010, the NPOESS contract, 

managed by the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center, was still funding the instruments 

and ground system. The Air Force was required to set aside $84 million (half from the Air Force 

and half from NOAA) in termination liability costs on the NPOESS contract for FY 2010. As a 

result, the remaining FY 2010 NPOESS funds of approximately $682 million were inadequate to 

support both the ongoing development work and necessary JPSS transition activities, which 

included establishing the majority of NASA contracts, transitioning physical property to NASA 

contracts, and fully staffing the JPSS program office as planned. 

In early FY 2011, the JPSS program had some success establishing contracts for most of the 

instruments, spacecraft, and ground system. But the series of continuing resolutions in FY 2011 

that were enacted before Congress passed a full-year appropriation reduced funding—to 

$382 million or 36 percent of the requested $1.061 billion—and persisted for most of the fiscal 

year, limiting program startup activities. For example, NASA was unable to adequately execute 

the newly established contracts, except for ground system development for NPP, because it 

lacked funding to hire sufficient technical staff or order long-lead items (engineering, 

development work, and parts needing a long lead time to be acquired or produced). 

By the spring of 2011, the program began to predict a gap in polar satellite coverage in the 

afternoon orbit stemming from projected delays in launch dates for JPSS-1 and JPSS-2 based on 

various funding scenarios at levels below and up to the President’s budget request. NOAA 

leadership communicated with Congress and the White House in an effort to restore funding and 

get the program on track to minimize any gaps.11 In the fourth quarter of FY 2011, Congress 

approved an $89 million request that allowed the transfer of funds from other NOAA and Census 

programs to JPSS. As of mid-August, the JPSS program reported a total of $109 million 

(including the $89 million) was available, allowing work on JPSS-1 to commence. 

The outlook for FY 2012 funding appears to have improved, with the report accompanying the 

House of Representatives appropriations bill recommending $901 million for the program (84 

percent of the request included in the President’s budget), although other NOAA programs will 

experience cuts.12 Despite the possible increase of JPSS funding, budget uncertainty is likely to 

continue. NOAA, in its communications with Congress, the White House, and the Department, 

should provide complete, objective and understandable data that illustrates the consequences of 

limiting satellite and other programs that contribute to weather and climate prediction and have 

national security and safety implications. 

10 Chaired by NOAA’s Deputy Under Secretary for Operations, the Program Management Council convenes 

monthly to assess programs’ and projects’ performance in terms of cost, schedule, and technical achievement. 11 The Inspector General also identified funding as a risk to JPSS and noted a potential gap in continuity of NOAA’s 

polar satellite program during testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations on February 9, 2011. 

12 The Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2012, H.R. 2596 112th Cong. 

(2011), overall provides NOAA with just over $4.5 billion—$55 million below the FY 2011 NOAA appropriation. 

H.R. REP. NO. 112-169 (2011) details recommended funding levels for several NOAA programs, including JPSS. 

10
 
U.S. Department of Commerce Final Report 

Office of Inspector General September 30, 2011 

C. JPSS Program’s Baseline Capabilities, Costs, and Schedule Need to Be Finalized 

Eighteen months after the decision to restructure NPOESS, NOAA had not formally approved 

JPSS’ high-level performance requirements. Given that JPSS requirements derive predominantly 

from legacy NPOESS requirements, the delay in defining an operational baseline for the system 

left life-cycle cost estimates and resulting budget requirements uncertain longer than necessary, 

at a time when decision makers needed certainty to address extraordinary fiscal challenges. 

Life-cycle cost estimates for major programs are based upon user needs reflected in a formally 

accepted requirements document. In order to be included in the FY 2011 President’s budget 

request, however, the JPSS budget estimate of $11.9 billion (pre-FY 2010 through FY 2026) had 

to be developed in a compressed timeframe without formally approved JPSS-specific 

requirements. 

In March 2010, NOAA formed a working group to establish JPSS requirements. But the process 

was delayed because the requirements were dependent, in part, on the Air Force’s definition of 

its polar satellite program, which did not take place until August 2010. Program officials told us 

that further delays were due to the fact that stakeholders felt they did not have sufficient input 

into the working group process; as a result, multiple iterations of the requirements document 

were necessary to gain concurrence. While Defense observed and provided input on the 

requirements, it was not a formal signatory to the high-level requirements document. NOAA 

officials indicated that the delay in finalizing program requirements was independent of the 

program’s funding shortfalls and budget uncertainty. 

In June 2011, a contractor completed the cost analysis requirements description (CARD) with 

near-final—but not formally approved—requirements. The CARD describes technical and 

programmatic features of the program and will be used to develop formal life-cycle cost 

estimates. According to program officials, aspects of JPSS omitted from the near-final version of 

the requirements—specifically, the program’s responsibilities for supporting NOAA’s archiving 

system—were nevertheless described in the CARD (typically, a program would have an 

approved requirements document prior to the development of a CARD). The CARD was 

supporting the development of an independent cost estimate and NOAA’s own estimate; the two 

estimates would then be reconciled. 

While formal life-cycle cost estimates were being developed, continued uncertainty over funding 

spurred the program to task NASA with considering contingencies that prioritized some of the 

most important requirements while maintaining a launch readiness date no later than February 

2017. But JPSS should formally prioritize all of its requirements, not just the subset in this 

contingency exercise, so that it can efficiently adjust the program’s performance capabilities or 

launch dates, if needed, in response to year-to-year funding variances. In what will likely be a 

prolonged period of budget uncertainty, fully prioritized requirements would allow decision 

makers to readily make tradeoffs. 

Further, the program should develop a plan to accommodate requirements that may have to be 

removed or relaxed when annual funding falls short of the program’s budget but that could be 

recouped in future appropriations. Officials told us that their general approach in response to 

funding shortages would be to preserve spacecraft and instrument work at the expense of ground 

system capability, which could later be restored with additional funding in future fiscal years. 

11
 
 

                                                           

U.S. Department of Commerce Final Report 

Office of Inspector General September 30, 2011 

Careful planning is necessary, however, to avoid a repeat of ground system delays in 2010 that 

threatened to delay NPP’s launch (described in finding I above) and could affect the critical path 

of future JPSS milestones. 

III. JPSS Program Needs to Overcome NPOESS-to-JPSS Transition-Related Challenges 

While new satellites will be acquired for JPSS-1 (an NPP near-clone) and JPSS-2 (to be 

competitively bid), with one exception the ground system and instruments that were already 

under development for NPOESS have been transitioned to the restructured program. The 

instruments will be delivered and integrated onto the new spacecraft, and the ground system will 

support both JPSS (beginning with the NPP satellite) and the next generation of Defense 

satellites. 

A. Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder Contract Transition Was Delayed 

While the instruments and ground system were under the NPOESS contract, the JPSS program 

had to work through a cumbersome process with the Air Force to direct development. The 

ground system, CrIS, and Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite (OMPS) contracts were transitioned 

in the fall of 2010 to NASA-awarded JPSS contracts, but the VIIRS transition was delayed until 

April 2011 and the Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder (ATMS) remained under the 

NPOESS contract, making NASA’s efforts to reduce these instruments’ residual risks from 

NPOESS development more difficult. 

As of mid-August, ATMS—built by Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems, a subsidiary of 

NPOESS’ contractor, Northrop Grumman—remained on the NPOESS contract. Urgent changes 

needed by the JPSS program had been submitted through the Air Force, but without a direct 

contractual relationship the program had limited access to the contractors’ boards, meetings, and 

data, and limited insight overall—problems that are reminiscent of those associated with 

NPOESS.13 

ATMS will provide critical data to enable accurate weather forecasts, but negotiations for 

transitioning the instrument had stalled. One factor complicating the transition was a dispute over 

claimed interests in intellectual property. The dispute has taken new form and may result in 

monetary relief being paid by the government. 

As an alternative to transferring ATMS to a NASA contract, JPSS prepared for the possibility of 

finishing and taking delivery of the instrument under the current NPOESS contract, if necessary. 

In that case, ATMS would have been built to fly with the NPOESS satellite and NASA would 

have then needed to modify the ATMS interface to fit JPSS-1. This approach would have 

entailed more risk, but may have been necessary to avoid JPSS-1 schedule delays. 

13 See for example, the following reports: U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General, May 2006, 

Poor Management Oversight and Ineffective Incentives Leave NPOESS Program Well Over Budget and Behind 

Schedule: OIG-17794; and United States Government Accountability Office, May 2010, Agencies Must Act Quickly 

to Address Risks That Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and Climate Data: GAO-10-558. 

12
 
 

                                                           

U.S. Department of Commerce Final Report 

Office of Inspector General September 30, 2011 

After we issued our draft report, NOAA reported that ATMS was transitioned to a NASA letter 

contract14 in September 2011. 

B. Other Instrument Contracts Have Not Been Finalized 

While NASA had transitioned most of the NPOESS instruments to NASA letter contracts, there 

were delays in agreeing on final contract terms. NASA has reported that contract negotiations for 

OMPS, VIIRS, and CrIS have taken longer than expected. Therefore, further changes needed for 

instruments to conform to NASA standards and reduce risks could be delayed, with 

consequences for the JPSS-1 mission. 

Recommendations 

To mitigate the risks of using NPP data operationally, we recommend that NESDIS’ Assistant 

Administrator 

1.	 Determine the availability of additional resources to support calibration and validation. 

2.	 Ensure sufficient management oversight of communication and coordination between 

JPSS and NESDIS STAR. 

3.	 Determine the feasibility of establishing an alternate mission management center and an 

additional science data downlink for NPP as soon as possible. 

To ensure the adequacy of JPSS development activities going forward, NOAA’s Deputy Under 

Secretary for Operations should 

4.	 Maintain adequate oversight and awareness of all segments that could adversely affect 

the critical path to launch and timelines for post-launch data production. In particular, the 

Program Management Council should keep sufficient focus on ground system 

development to ensure it does not jeopardize the mission schedule and operational needs. 

5.	 Ensure that the planning and coordination necessary to meet mission objectives occurs 

between JPSS and external entities. 

In order to sufficiently prepare for an expected gap in polar satellite data from the afternoon 

orbit, NOAA’s Deputy Under Secretary for Operations should 

6.	 Coordinate efforts from across its line offices to minimize the degradation of weather and 

climate forecasting during gaps in coverage. A NOAA-wide view will help senior 

management ensure the adequacy of efforts and facilitate improvements. 

In order to more efficiently manage the JPSS program under continued budget uncertainty, 

NESDIS’ Assistant Administrator should 

14 A letter contract is a written preliminary contract that authorizes the contractor to immediately begin 

manufacturing supplies or performing services. 

13
 
U.S. Department of Commerce Final Report 

Office of Inspector General September 30, 2011 

7.	 Develop a mechanism that provides executive and legislative decision makers, on a 

recurring basis, complete, objective and understandable data that illustrates the 

consequences of limiting satellite observational capabilities. 

8.	 Prioritize all JPSS requirements (beyond those already prioritized in NASA’s 

contingency exercise) and develop a plan for requirements that could be relaxed or 

removed due to near-term funding constraints and added back in future years if funding is 

restored. Such a plan should include steps to manage uncertainty with at-risk 

requirements, such as maintaining contractual relationships during shortfalls or avoiding 

termination liability through appropriate contractual safeguards. 

In order to complete the transition from NPOESS and move the JPSS program forward, NOAA’s 

Deputy Under Secretary for Operations should 

9.	 Ensure that the JPSS program finalizes contracts with instrument vendors. 

14
 
U.S. Department of Commerce Final Report 

Office of Inspector General September 30, 2011 

Summary of NOAA Comments and OIG Response 

In responding to our draft report, NOAA concurred with all of our recommendations. It also 

included editorial comments and suggested factual and technical changes in regards to certain 

aspects of our findings. See appendix B for the complete response. 

OIG Response 

We are pleased that NOAA concurred with all of our recommendations. 

With regard to NOAA’s editorial comments about NPP and the ground system, we understand 

the historical context of NPP as it relates to JPSS. While NPP was designed and built as a 

research mission, it will be the only polar satellite in the afternoon orbit that can provide critical 

observations for a significant period of time. So, in addition to its data, the NPP satellite and its 

ground system will be used operationally and, therefore, risk should be assessed accordingly. 

Further, our findings focus only on the most critical features the ground system lacks (an 

alternate mission management center and additional science data downlinks) and for which it 

would appear that mitigating action is appropriate. 

Our discussion of the issues with CLASS and NDE test readiness simply related the fact that 

coordination with these external entities is necessary to avoid negatively affecting the schedule 

for ground system development. NOAA concurred with our recommendation 5 in this regard and 

has established a monthly review of the development of the NESDIS enterprise required to 

support JPSS. 

We have reviewed all of NOAA’s recommended changes for factual and technical information 

and incorporated them into the final report where appropriate. We acknowledge NOAA’s point 

that the NPP spacecraft design life is a limiting factor but, as we describe in the report, so too are 

the instruments. As further evidence on this point, we note that NASA’s requirements for NPP 

call for only a subset of instruments to function for only 3 years and do not require long-term 

production of key data records for the mission to be considered fully successful. 

Regarding NOAA’s comments on our assessment of preparations for post-launch data 

production, we have a firm basis for this aspect of our finding. The NPP team’s status reports to 

management have reported STAR’s support for the JPSS ground system as an issue and indicate 

communication problems and the fact that there was no agreement on the role for STAR with 

respect to JPSS. We interviewed JPSS officials to confirm that communication and coordination 

between the two entities was an issue that was having consequences for calibration and 

validation preparations and needed management’s attention. NOAA agreed with our 

recommendation 2 in this regard. 

We have further substantiated our use of the February 2017 launch date for JPSS-1 under finding 

II. We have also updated finding III to reflect that ATMS has been transitioned from NPOESS to 

a NASA letter contract. The ATMS contract, like the other instrument contracts, will need to be 

finalized to completely resolve the transition issues. 

15
 
U.S. Department of Commerce Final Report 

Office of Inspector General September 30, 2011 

Appendix A: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

Our objective was to determine the adequacy of the Joint Polar Satellite System’s (JPSS’) 

development activities intended to maintain continuity of weather forecast and climate data 

obtained from polar orbit. As part of this objective, we determined the completeness of technical 

approaches used in developing and testing the flight and ground project segments; assessed the 

impacts of development modifications and project risks on JPSS’ cost, schedule, and technical 

performance; and determined the adequacy of preparations for post-launch data production. 

One focus of our fieldwork included those activities needed for the National Polar-orbiting 

Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) Preparatory Project (NPP) launch. In 

particular, we examined the ground system/satellite compatibility tests and the resolution of the 

ground system issues we initially identified in our audit survey work. Another focus was at the 

JPSS programmatic level, where transition- and funding-related challenges threatened to delay 

JPSS-1 and JPSS-2 satellites’ launch readiness dates and lead to gaps in polar satellite coverage. 

The audit scope necessarily included a review of NPOESS history, including its restructuring 

into separate civilian and defense programs that began in late 2009 and became official in 

February 2010. Even prior to our audit survey work, we regularly attended monthly Transition 

Team meetings, which began in February 2010 and continued through April 2011. 

Our fieldwork included attending various Department, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration (NOAA), JPSS program, and NPP project reviews, such as 

•	 Department of Commerce Quarterly Satellite Briefing and Joint Review Board; 

•	 NOAA Program Management Council; 

•	 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Goddard Space Flight Center 

monthly status reviews; 

•	 JPSS Transition Team and Requirements Working Group; 

•	 the JPSS program concept review; 

•	 monthly ground system program management reviews; 

•	 NPP test readiness reviews for NPP compatibility test (NCT) 3 parts 1 and 2, and NCT 4; 

•	 post-NCT after-action reviews; 

•	 an NPP flight operations review; and 

•	 an algorithm operability verification review. 

We closely observed NCT 3 parts 1 and 2, and attended preparation meetings for NCT 4. We 

reviewed daily and weekly status reports of NPP’s project team, including those pertaining to 

satellite environmental testing and discrepancy resolution. 

16
 
U.S. Department of Commerce Final Report 

Office of Inspector General September 30, 2011 

In addition, we interviewed various JPSS program officials and individuals from NASA’s NPP 

team. We also interviewed NOAA officials from the National Environmental Satellite, Data, and 

Information Service/NPOESS Data Exploitation and the National Centers for Environmental 

Prediction. We reviewed and analyzed program documentation, test plans and procedures, test 

reports, and system discrepancy reports. We determined the data was sufficiently reliable for 

purposes of this report. 

We conducted our fieldwork from November 2010 through August 2011. Locations we visited 

include NOAA headquarters in Silver Spring, Maryland; the JPSS program office in Lanham, 

Maryland; the NOAA Satellite Operations Facility, in Suitland, Maryland; Raytheon’s facility in 

Aurora, Colorado; Ball Aerospace Technology Corporation’s facility in Boulder, Colorado 

(where the NPP satellite was integrated and tested); and NCEP headquarters in Camp Springs, 

Maryland. 

We performed this audit under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, 

and Department Organization Order 10-13, dated August 31, 2006. We conducted this 

performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. 

17
 
 

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U.S. Department of Commerce Final Report 

Office of Inspector General September 30, 2011 

Appendix B: Response to OIG’s Draft Report 

18
 
Dcparlmt<JH or CODlDl~n:f: 

"•lional O"eank: •od Al ~pberk 1\dmJnlnntlon 

omn:w~ts on. th~: l>n.ft OJC KefM!rl l=:ntitJed 

~ udll oftbt Joint. Pol111rSatelllto: S))ttm: Challtoges Mu51 

Be Met lo 1\Unimin C•;Jl'l In Polar En,ir11nmental Sa.lellile Data.· 

([bart RC'fMlrl SqJI('mbcr 12, 20 I ') 

llu: D..:p.utmo:nlllf Commercc'l' N:Uionlll Oaanic and AlmoS)lhc:nc i\dmanistrotmn CNOA •\) 

lf'f'm:IIIICS the opJ'Ilr1llnll)' lo rc'\'IC\\ the Ol'fit'C oF Inspector (Jmc::rnt"..; jO lG) draft l"q!!rt Oil the 

J"mt Pul:tr !o>atdhtc S)'~t.:nt (Jf'SS). As "I11Ltxl in the: OIG n:pon. tb.: Nllion.d Pul~~r-urbitmg 

OperatN\J.I l-.nYmmlnf..-ntal S.J!dhte S)~ crn (NPOESS) l"rcp.vatory I'ro)cct {NrPJ r"'min on 

lrud; tu IJuoch m Octoba- 2UI I. bulthc::n: an: "til l! sn·cml n!lk~ ... -uh the rroJect n1c tindmgs 

pcrutning to JPSS and the: PP ,.~1on arc: l!crUJ'Blcl)' pon:mycd 1n thor wpaclly liiS a 'OAA 

llpl.!r.UII'IIIml In I s~ion lnd I NILI..iona.l Ac:roobuh..:s ..00 s~ AdnunlS(ruLiOfl {NASA} h 

mr-...ion. rcsp«:tiu:ly, Ho"'C\'Cf, the rtpt'rl (ocus.cs !il"'it on Lhc dC'-~Iop1ncnt o f th.c ground 

"'~;~nli•r NPP wul uffc:n. findmg,s dun p~ppcl!>ethc {!fOUnd s~'lil. cm1s an operal.lcMI s~"lc:m 

\\-lk:n. 1n lxl, 11 wa"' 0\,"\'o:t rlillln<ld tube. The ri!)JOI1-.bould describe the dtadopm.:nt of the 

gr<~und 5)~t."'ll 11.~ an ~q isitioo Jlt'"\"ICC'i.'\ ~-ht-.sc g. ...1 i a full> 11pcr11t•onlll syslcm ln ume for 

Jf"iS h~ fiKill rc:or ~FY) 2017. 

~cu mm~ndation I 'Dcu:nmn~ 1he B\IJI.ol-1lrty oflll.l<fJIJon.tl m:.14.1re'.CS to supporl t<~libnotion 

and 'lllidllllon ~ 

'\0.\•\ R~poD,<' NOAA C('['lal:rs with thi.s rc~ommcnd:nion. 'OAA will rc'\1CW cum::nt 

uhbrauon,.aJidlltlon plnn nnd ensure data rcquu~l lor Numcm:al \\'~1 Pt...Uict10n 1111\1 Kc} 

Pcrfomu.ncc: Paramt."lcn~ ~re \i!lrd!ltcd !Uf ope:rn!Jon:ll usc 411 a pnont~ . In ooditton. I'CSOOI'Cel. 

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(ldJ\ltn.'l>. 

Rl"CODinltmcbtlon 1- "'En,qun: :rufticrcnl m.1~gcmcnt O\crsight "fcommuni~:ttton and 

coordm311!'n bct'-•ecn J£'SS ;u-rd NI:::SDIS STAR."' 

.NOA \ Rr<ipOll,e: NOAA ..:oneu~ \' 1Lh tins n:c<~mme do mn. A '>igncd M.:mogt:mcnt C011trol 

l'l.m h..."w'-"-'11 NOAA mtd NASA w1ll lp to articulate mlc~ and m;l'\m~ibdit es b.;1"cen the ~o 

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,;I.Jlnmurucalmn, , Fil"t. an i\ll,"'nthm Transtuon PI:.Jn t!' IJcing develt•pOO to l'utline rulc:<t lllid 

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ond ~lib111tlon and \a.lid.JJJ''" wortc Sccood, 1 Jrss Coordin.Jilon Gruup, \lo11h n.:p :~.euwtton 

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fiKl hlllte mmmumcution.~ lltllflng the Vllno~ ~Wlc oldcn 

U.S. Department of Commerce Final Report 

Office of Inspector General September 30, 2011 

19
 
Rn-omnwndatlon .l ••l)dcnmnc lhc rcasthihty ofe"tnhliming an alternate mi~"IPn 

manallcment center and ~n ochhtionnl ~encr d;1ta dtt\\nhnl for 7-o~P ) as: c;oon :u r<'""ible." 

'10 \ ,\ Re1pon · f\OAA ~ncUTS with thil> recomml!lldahon. ~OAA tub :t.lmM!y M.t:rtcJ 1t1 

acldr~" lhcsc 1S.S.ue S~-cJfically, lwoconcuni!IIL eni.u1s arl! undcwuy to addr.:~ lllC' need for 

un aii(TTI~tc rrnssion management center as well as an alternate dam proc:c:s.<:mg !'llc. An 

•\ho.:mtlt>! Comnll,)n Grt.•tmd S;,'\lcn1 W(•rlung Gn•up oompri:o.mg NOAA A!'ld NASA 

r.:p~ttl.Jll\ e. h.I.S DcL'O L.,.l:thh~h ... '(llll Jdcnllty I h.; rtqulrL'mc:rtt.' J.Od plao for .m alt.:rruue 

pi\JCCSMng laclllt)' fQ.JUJrcd by ~1ST !IOO-S3 ln addJLion. JPSS has tundal tl1c N~SDIS C'IO's 

l>IV1"11ln lo anin:rte 11 study lo Identify tt .,Jie for 11 'lESDIS con.~hdmed bac.kup fact lit) to llddres!i 

nC\.'<ls for GOES·R. JPSS and current tlflmlllOns. 

Rec.-ommtndJition " ' ul\.Limuun ad""!U.JIC pvcr.ish• ond IIW<J.rmc:">S nf all !>I:'SITll!nl~ lhJl could 

lilht:noel) rlffcct lh..: l'ritu:al r.llh to launch ond llmdm~ fM po,t-launch data produ~·tt!ln . In 

pJJ'Ii..:ul.u .. tl-u~ l'rugrom 1\lan:t!).."t::Onl Couooil should k~'P suffictent tbcu.s on pound sysh .. m 

de"'citJrmctll 1~1 l:nl>We II d~ llol!CUJ'.ln.ll1.f~ lhe DllS!>JOn M:h.cdul~ Wld O~r"o.lhU!'I..IJ DCcJ!.." 

'JOAA Rro,pon'l:e; ~OAA CXIncurs wnll th1s rccommcnda11on. 

N«ommc:ndlltion 5: .. Ensure th:ltlhc pkmnm~ u.nJ ~:oordi .li on nc:ccss...rry to mc:ct rni!.:<;ion 

(lbJC\.'11\Cs uc;;uJll hdwl"<:ll Jr~~ 1md eottcmal m1111c-." 

)li0AA e~pon t . =--oAA amcurs \\ith lhi.!l recommend~! ion. 'lESDIS has c~tabli ttoo a 

mnnthl} '>lalw.r~:~l"""~ tblll w1l11L!\ 1.:w lhr de\ dupmcnt of the NESDIS cn1erpn:.c ri!LJUinl(llu 

~upp..111 JI'S!, ltncludmg the dt\'dUpmcnt of NDE:l Thi" mfonnatton I'> 11l<i0 pru' idcd lo tile 

NOAA Pm(.!l'am MEU1i.!gcmcnl {\;uncal '-'hich " til cun~do cll'«.1s onl.h.c NOAA cnlcqm~ 

Rtt'UhlDIHid .. rion 6; ''Crordm:atc cflono;; rr.lm iJCID~'> 11'1 line (lffit:C'l to mmtmizc the 

dt~raclulltln of wc-,,ihcr ond cJmmtc lon:c<~sting during gnps in oo"cro.gc. A N'OAl\-~ide '1cw 

\\-Ill hcJ p 'en tnT nl nagcll'M::nl ensure !.h.= adequacy ul' efforts a11d faci) i tale [mpro ~ emenl.s " 

NOAA Respon'!e; NOAA ooncurs \\ ith thl' recomnn:ndatJon. 

RMonmutndation. 7 ... Do.:\ dopa m~,..-ch:lJ1i~m thlll providt..~ ox.c:c;uti .. u wkl lcgi,latt"c dct.h1on 

nukero:, Orl4 1'\.'C\Imilg b:ts1s. complete. obji."CU\ c and Wlderst.a.ndable dau 11\llltllu..&nLte..-. lite 

t'OflstqucncC'i (lflimlllng ~~:~u:lhte •*'!it'l"\•al101l.II c:.upablhbl!$." 

NOAA R~o-sp.~ru~· NOAA l."'ncurs with th1!> rec\lmmcndauun NOAA alrl:ildy pnl\uJt.-,; 

mumhly nd ontuart.crb· hnclir~g,"'lo !he [kp.1rlrncnt ofC"Ilnlmerec, F~cc:u1r\c Office ftflhc 

Pre~1dcn1 office!~, ;md t.:ey CPngrc'lsiOMI oommillcc 'ltalfcrc on the o;tatuiS of itS :.atclhtcs 

Jmli,'rBm!O. Thc..c brictingll can be c~panded to include objed:i\e and unde1'St.i111dable d:ua 

llluMrutmg lhe o.:lmc;.cqumccs nfltmttmg :1lell lle obS(."''\'IIUOfllll C".tp:tbilillo J.n prepanhon ror 

thao; cffi>rt. N01\A has altc:uly <:~m1m1~'it>ned a ~tudy out uf tl'i Pn•a;r.rm. Pla1ming and 

lntcgrution llfl'ice to c\a.luale the ocollt'lml.: \;1lue of JPSS d.Jia_ 

U.S. Department of Commerce Final Report 

Office of Inspector General September 30, 2011 

20
 
Rtc'Omm4'ndation 8; "Prrontw: all JPSS rcJquarem~nb (OO>ond thn!oe already pnonti/.~ rn 

\lAS A·~ ~"<1111tn~~"nC:) c.ten:ise) and deo.dop a plm lur rc:quirements thai c•mlll bt: n:laxc:t.l n..­

ranovcd due fll n~:.tr-lcnTI furuhng con:o.lnunt!> 11nd added b.<ck 111 luture ye.JB rf 1\.rndmg 1s 

I'C"Wn:d Sucfl1 pl11n 'iMUld mdude ~tcp-. lo man:~gc uncertainty w1th nl-n"k n:qum:menl'l, .,uch 

a.~ m:tinuun•n~: (l('lflllliCfu.tl rc:lutton,.hlfrl during <ihonfull" or avoiding tcnmrmt1on hahihty 

lhrou ~ apprnpri ale c:ontroclual safeguard . " 

'10,\J\. R~po•ne NOAA coneurs \\ uh tht~ r~o nrnentl..tlion_ ~OAA l'l.l!l :llrG\dy rdct~hlied lhe 

need to n:c:rutl atldJliOn.:il .S)'~tml cngrntrnng !<tan to B~J:<.t 10 the: m<lnagcmcnlllfrt!- JI'SS 

r.·quirerru:nt-. \lOA A h;J~ I! ngo!Tiu~ prote'i~ fpr cnlh:cung and vllltdallng the 1uircmcnh 

llcrt'"" trn: 'OAA lim: olft~.;c,lc:d by the NOAA Ollice Tc:~:nnic11l Jllanmng unJ lnto.:grlllr<\n for 

Ob,crv<~llon (l?IO). NESDIS hu b.:gw; It\ enga~e Tf-'10 tv furt~r prmnliic the ~'tjmn.'mcrrL' 

ti.or JPSS 

Rm>mmr-nd•1ion 9 "Wt1rk:' \\ nh lhc Arr f(lrcc ~tnd other IJMIIIICS to e:<l'C'dmou~l)' rransfer lh.: 

\ TMS ctmtmct 1o NASA und NOA '\. Sltould th.e "fine h. nnd dell\-ef' option become necc<&ll'}', 

NOA \ '"'Program M.1.rugcmem rouncil should ensure th:lt on ad~lr.ll<: mk annly'il<~ ha'i bc:Q'I 

pL"ff"nm:d lo t:ru.w~o: mi'llJtlD 'itl.:ccs.~. 113 fcty, .and a.,.oil.l:anct- of 00~1 overruns·· 

:'IIOAA Ropoonu NOAA ~:.cmc ~ ·rth thi!> f\'COIDmenll..r.uon, lbc A TMS contrncl h.as ttl~..t.Jy 

hcc:n lmn,llioncd to • ASA c:on ~l. pUNiillll ru "n lntc:r.sgcncy A~nau b.:t"'c=m 'I:OAA 

3111.1 ~.\~A

Rt.-rommencbtlon 10: "Fuuhze cuntmru With ino,lrumcnt "cnd~\f'i." 

'lO \A. RnpiiD\c: ~OAA CODCUJ"i v.ilh thL'i l'"etOmmand:llion The errs. 0\fPS and JJlSS.I 

!<Jl'lcecratl contr8CL' ure .:xp;:cll."ll be liroli'cd by the end of~r anlxr The \'!IRS wntrac11~ 

L'1fl:C1cd tor J dnuln') :!0 ll. 

Pr1g(' ~ • .sn-onJ puraJfrapll 

The dc!iign hfc of' the f'\PP mslrUmcnl~ 1!<1 7 )~rs, but the s~raft ~dcs1gncd lt,r 5 years of 

upcl'lltiuns. whJch ,,. the hmau ng f!\\."tllr. Tbc rupon !ihnuld clearly sante t.hjs dttfererrce. 

l'tJI{f! . tlurJ f1<Utiflruph. tirsl .ff'tllt'nn." 

The: JP<iS-I1>p.~rafl w1ll he 11 "nt:;u-clv ~"of NPP In .sd.dihon lo more ngorous enll'inc:cnng 

"Liilnd.mJ.,, whrch Will ~tend 11 hfc: to '>C:\oen )t:a~. 1l wdlJll'lnet: ob!;olt~c: sub-5}'Slcm<; and 

mtrodua: additional commumcnnoo cap11bih1Jes ~ch 0!1 ~ Ko-booo downhnt 

Pug<' . llurJ P<Jftl!{l'aph . . f<'COIIJ ~t'111rttcc: 

The lbsuruf>IIIHl.~ hchrnd lhc rcport"o; .rsscrtron ofllle FebJ'llllry :!017 l.aunch date li>r JJlSS-J 

sllould ~ rdcnhficd. <>pccificlllly, the funuin~ ..... ,umptsuns, that NOAA mu,.t re~r\~ the: V 

.201.2 l'reildcnl'~ Bu.dgd Rcques1 funding lc'd forJI"SS v.rthin !he fiAt qu:mcr ofl 't 2012 to 

n~a nuu.u u lin.L qlt.l.l1rf fY 101 7 llllllldl readu1as duu~, a.-..'UCJiiiCll.l "itb the l11unch dl!ll:"i shnuld 

l-Ie h~tcd o£ loutnoto.L \lOA A 1\a:. not .!.el 1 "No-Lata-Th.m" datc. 

U.S. Department of Commerce Final Report 

Office of Inspector General September 30, 2011 

21
 
Ptlgt.' "· .\l"t'(lllll f"ll UJ<iilph. llu'tJ ,, -nf('PfCL' 

The sentence 1h111 'IIJtC.\. ''r\ sitrtilicJnf nUJn~-r uf 111hc:r d:na.1l:Wf\ ~. oowc\TT, w•ll not t.e 

~upPf>rtcJ unl tl n ground )'tcm uppc, which i planned fiu MllfCh 2012'' is mi~lcading ll 

!hould be rno.nlli,."'l !11 ·'Lo"'cr (monl.)' products v.iiJ hinc thctr known dcfkU .. TICIC:. ootl ~,,_oJ In 

the lir-.1 Up~rltl.lt: IOlhC !\fUUild ifo)'~tltlll. V.bU,:h 1!!. llOV. ph1nnlld for Jl.iw\.11 :!OJ 2." 

Pr.tRt' 4, rhu.lpt.trJJlf(lflh : 

~i'l AR r.:t:c" 1.-d 3Pflr\l'tmalcl) half ot' lhe fundmg requcstt.-d for J flSS l'be (<~hbrutton 11nd 

\ ahdatu.m (Cat/Val) fW'Og.rom requared uprraxim~el> $30 n1illion tu romph:h!. yc1 onl} re..-ei\·ed 

S D rrulht•n J\1 the end ofFY 201 I. 11n itddinonol $7 milltPn w~tsrecc:Jvc:d, bul only S4 tmlhon 

~·,uhJ be 11hh~ :d dill: lf1 th~ Lihl minute: receipt ofth.: funJ..,. Prior to FY :!011 fundm~ i 'I.IC'>, 

in1en. i\c r;tl\'t~J i'Pr all pmdu1,1' \HIS c,;pc:cu:d to lake 24 monlh prior. Cnttc.1l lunding 

rc:qum:d tu m.um.t.in !tcliedule wilL' nut r<K>ei\<t'tl imd lh~ 11moun1 of tim~ rtet!dc:d to fully \J.Iul.n~: 

no!\ extended p::~.st 2J ml'nlhs for low pnorit) [lroducts. The: addJtlonol funding rccc&\ cd in late 

F\' 201 I wns an-.utliocnl lll r«!o\er SGh.cd ulc. It thd nt1Wt"\~,11llo~~ lor STAR 10 =liPrc: 

pt:rSilnnd loward ratuestcJ FY 20 1 I levels to ass1st tn trans111on actl\1tlilS tn fall 201 1 rather 

lhan spnn~ :!01:! fnr hagh pnnrity Systcn Ddinitinn Rc\1~"" !cam" 

Stalcmcnt-, llc-.critling the: nl1c of STAR '"!thin the Jl'SS NPP proJ,'l':lm and the <;t~ppo~ 

.:,ammunicrnHin llnd ooonllnanon challenges nre not bas.ed on a dlorough asscssrocnL To our 

krl(.l\\ IC\.1~.:. nv STAR pa!>.On or r.:spnns1blc utlkc: .... ill> t:"cr ml~lc"Clll for i~ r.:port. 

f•u~. J, {irslf"JillJI,TIIpll 

The ..,pcofic ~'Uinemtllhties oflh~ JPSS croWld l>)'Slc.-m .should not be ubhci~i.!d. Openly ~ta1iog 

tlmtlhc: ll S. ~c:iltht."t futecil!l.ttng t:ap.tbllity t;lln be: s~wcn:ly dq;,ndal by oltudmg one: oflit"oc:rnl 

l'f'C\-,Iic fpCJiittcs IC<~ves the facilities open to compromise. The Depanmcnt ofDefen.~e treats 

mmtlnr mformahon rc:gardmg.lhdr .)"'lcm!lllT h~: hag.lw~llt:\'d ofdiL-...,ificauon. Rt.'l:.,mmcnd 

11141 Ill&~ topic b.! lrat.:d more ~:;cnencall) willloulthc mcnltOtl of . p;..'Cific facJitliC:. and their 

ltloCHI!Otl~ 

Pa.l!~ li,Jir.q pamgraph · Pagr. 11, scmnJ, 11t1rJ. }IIIII. <L\llt, aruJ rt•~c•nll• parugta(lltf; /J(}Kl' 14, 

f(<'rJIJd f'.U'Jik,faplt: 

Please ~ubstarute tho.: word "mm.o~iuon l{lr the word ""lrnn~ti:r'' whcnc\ ~:r rcfcrnng In the 

lramna«n ol ~'\Jt.cnnlmt:l'lln the: JPSS program fhc m trvrn~o.'lll .md IU'•un<l '>)Riem 

subcontntctor<~ "'ere R•" 'l.run$fem:d" frnm the NPOCS.."' cunlro~t The \\OTk w11.~ utmsatl<med to 

111.."~ Nt\SA letlc:r ~ntract' \1J .t h:nninalinn fuT con\ ~o.'lltcnc~: aa.:IJon. 

/'(}ge 7. lhirJ paragraph. lin~ J 

The \\Ord " Dille'' should be n.'tll.J.ced \\tlh the wonl"DIIIi.l." 

Paf{r .H. ltorond partl1{1"t1ph. scnmd .!irnlt:nc'C: 

T'he fll'\•gr.tm has re~:ncd St<9.7 m1 llmn m PddiiJonJI fY 201 1 fund~ no1 ()') million There 

~en: unc-~pc c.lw funds on the NrOESS contract which an: tJcins u....OO lo fund limited ncti~ il) 

\ tiltht lJ.S Atr Fo~e thi"' activit)' ts C)(poctcd lv e11d in FY 2012 

U.S. Department of Commerce Final Report 

Office of Inspector General September 30, 2011 

22
 
l'ag~ .'?. teamd pctmf(mph fourth vmft'ncr U11d rftroswhmll r.r{'flrt a~ nppmpritrlo'' 

The pro!!fll.m'" cum:nl plarb are lo launch JPSS.J in Qu:u1er 1 fY 2017. rotLhlll' tl1anlh~: F .. :hnM['} 

:!UJ 7 dale hSlOO ln !he l'l'JI(W1 . rhi..>re :'Ire <;C>cral lllhlT lc'K:Uhi!O>; In mi-. repc!lt Where lbe la.unch 

dole as mt"-"laH:d. When dull. change t!l made, the c~J)CI:tod gup ustng the OIG mC'Ioodology 

(tts~wmn!! NPP opcnt1e:o thruu!ll•tt.:.lhe-)ear de:s1gn hfe und a6-l R monlh C..t.l .Val pcrioJ li.lr 

JrSS-11 ~ould be 6al~ months.. r:ul'~o~.:r thun l.he 9-21 mCJntho; lhc repon 'llales 

Puec 8, ffl!w<' 3 

rn~ figun: 'h(luld ~hnw the launch Jatc of JPS -1 tL'< Qumcr I FY 2017 nnd mnkc: the H\!'II)Cillt~ 

changes w !be a.nalysis of the lcnf.rth of the !!BP· 

PUt((' i\. Flf{l<ft' J 

The .1u~tm~ P~e 8, F1gu:re 3 chmficallon should be replaced v.'!th the fo llo\\in~: 

The ~lc: of the ch11rt i'I)Oth<:lc:d as fi~al year and lho lrinnglt JtiUTICh dare~ nrc: placed oom:c;ly 

f,,r li'l4-al }'-:ar. but the J:.bds umll-mc.tth are li:sted m caknd.tr y~r Usi:ng tfle ti~c.~l ~c. r ,c;llc, 

l'\OAA· l <I lounch should be tdcniJiicd as "02 FY 2009." NrP should be "Q I FY 201:!," JPSS· I 

<~h11Uld l'k: "Ql FY .20 11: Jnd JPSS-2 )houiLIIJe "Ql rY .!022." 

I' rig<' V, lusr pamgnlph 

llle rqx.n implics lhall:co<ilation.ll) ~>atdli e dOJta could millgJie the 1mpao:t of 3 NrP-JPSS d;:rttt 

g;lll for global polar-orbiting datil~ Tile Notional \\eamer Scr.·ioe does not belie\c such 

Mlllgalu>nt~ rc:<1li\t11.: 

f'rl,l!<' I J, .~ ·rond p,1ragruph, R't:llrrJ St'tUl' 1fCY. 

It a::. llL'CUflll~ thul th\: FY 201 I buLI~d ho~d tv be de\--c!opcd 111 a wmprc~l.'d anlc·tram~ hu\\.c\>\.1'. 

11 wa~ nnl de\!cloped 1\llltOJJJ JPSS·specifi.e requirem.ents, 11 was d~eloped Without ha\1ng the 

tnnc to rrorerly C"Uma1e tlw linondalmtpacl ot JPSS""'pocilic roqu1remcnL<~ 

Pa~?"e II \ 1-'fth fX'"Of!fraplr. second l~fiiCIICC' • 

To dan f) I he ~trucmcni 11 !ooould n;ud "" pr~""l:f\C ~piletefllll 1111d 111\lrumtnl work at the: 

C\pc.t ~ or wuund S}~ eRl t'upubllay". NOAA apprecJalo the t:Uilent ~late of the ground sy~tem 

und \\all oot thn:alm tts further de' clopmcnt. 

f'•H!<" 12. S(!Cortd pan1Rruph tmd &x•t1on A and !>~l t'ralolht:c 5ct:Iwns thro11~haw I he rtj'Orl 

The '' 1 MS '""lnlmcnt has ]:)c(;n lnm~itl<lncd to ,...A$1\ - the n:port ~hould be LfJxlottcd to rdlccl 

lh nc~\ ~1'1111' 

F:d!toria! Cgmmen)1 

Page ! ,{t'COIIJ para1{rt.lplt, Puge 4. Fi;ulmJ: I tutJ fur the rcmt.JuJdcr of tile docunr.'111. 

NI'Jl \\all be !.lUnched h)· NASA a:o; :~NASA mi""lnn, milna.god hy1tH:: NASA \tndd~trd ~pace 

Fh.:hl C'cllleli', and willhucr he: transfcm:d Ill NOAA ior opcrallon from NOAA·~ S;Jtt:llnc 

OplTutinn~ Fncilily INSOF). NOAA intends toLL~ Nf'P's dam OJl'.ToltlonJ.lly for shoTt ond on~trrnn v.cnthcr fllf\X.aqung 11nd cn\•mnmc~ ntlll Rlutli1nnng NrP '' noi an operfttion.al -.ntellile n<~r 

is the sruuriJ :t)'!>ll.'m a!> bLJill for NPP. 

U.S. Department of Commerce Final Report 

Office of Inspector General September 30, 2011 

23
 
~s 1\PP \\ '> o. n~;;k-rcdu.ction mission nnd wnsistent with plans coordinated wnh the TPO. NDE 

and CLASS '-"t:re 11Clt M:bcduh:d lo llli\ c operational \'ersions of their systems in place prior to 

hn.uxh ll "'as lll~~·ny<~ plrumctlto have thc;:.<;c cup;sbihliC'i iru;tallcc.l after launch. The upgntdC'> co 

~vpport NC I tcstln~ were made tn respon..~ to requc. .. u from the 'PJ> prt1Jel:l 

G•vcn I he: ground system de,.clopment in prep::u·ahon for 1hc launclt of N 1111 does nol roqum: all 

of the elerncnlb uf an tlpcrallonal ground '>)Stem nor WI:Jl: there Jlhln'i lO tmplt:ment the .:lcncnb 

of an opcrnti1•n:~l GJ('und 'ly.tcm; \IESDIS rccommemls that all di~ocuss:ion ofimplementing 

clt.-ments u. '>Oei:u~ \\ ilh n opcralional ground S)'!lh.-m be deleted. 

Further discuS!>ion nbouJ the variouc; pht!!>~ uflcs.tmg ollhc: 'I.IPP ground s)-stcm (e.g.., 1\CD pm 

I) should j,e con!>.oliJatcd .md ~umn..ariT.c:d ti•r thh fqlllr'l. The finding SC:Cil'\ll, to he lt''>l II\ the: 

Uctall"' t1f this • ectiun arnl \\ ould be b.:U.:r l>CI'VCd if dCl.Cribc:d m lhc \.1!Jnl!.!'i.t of lh~: COmph:l( 

mult•-ycar rn~~ uf dt:veloping the t.;rQund b)' ·tem mQe.ld Qf lilC~ing on a •qtij!le year dunn!!! 

Ylhidl roth II tnmstllon of wort from the no\\ -defunct NPOESS rru~ L~lnctded \\ llh the 

tmplL-mentauon of n severely under-funded program 

When d1~u...._"'"~ lhl! ~ground ~ystcm," it would he helpful iflhc OlG report \\-OUid distmgui"h 

llctwccn the ..tala tran. .. mll;.siun. C<l(li.ll'lllitic:s nfthc ground ~)"'item and the .. att:llitc rrudue1 

cJ~h1htre:- Whtle both are n~. 'lal) in o;m ins~ hudget p~sun!' und implcmentarioo 

~trot~: •ic~ c:m 1mpact these two areas differently. 

U.S. Department of Commerce Final Report 

Office of Inspector General September 30, 2011 

(1200000-103) 

24