J-S60027-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

STEVEN DOUGLAS HESS

Appellant No. 167 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered December 17, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County

Criminal Division at No: CP-21-CR-0000643-2012

BEFORE: OTT, STABILE, and JENKINS, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JANUARY 12, 2015

Appellant, Steven Douglas Hess, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed on December 17, 2013 in the Court of Common Pleas of 

Cumberland County following his convictions of involuntary deviate sexual 

intercourse (“IDSI”), sexual assault, and two counts of indecent assault.1 

Appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to sustain his IDSI conviction. 

Following review, we affirm. 

In its 1925(a) opinion, the trial court summarized the testimony and 

evidence presented at Appellant’s trial as follows:

[Victim], (hereinafter L.H.), testified that he met [Appellant] at 

Carlisle Cares, a local homeless shelter. At the shelter, they 

became friends but were not very close. L.H. is diagnosed with 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3123, 3124.1 and 3126, respectively.
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two different types of severe arthritis and walks with a cane. 

L.H. eventually acquired an apartment for himself at 45 Wolf’s 

Bridge Road, Middlesex Township in Cumberland County, 

Pennsylvania. It was an efficiency apartment that had its own 

entrance, living room, bathroom, and kitchen. L.H. had a futon 

set up in the living room for him to sleep on. 

On February 28, 2012, L.H. had beer and wine at his apartment 

and [Appellant] came over to help L.H. with painting. L.H. set 

up a sleeping bag for [Appellant] in the living room. L.H. stated 

that [Appellant] kept going in and out of his apartment to talk to 

the other neighbors, and never actually painted the apartment 

for him. Throughout the evening, L.H. became pretty 

intoxicated and he thought [Appellant] was also drinking. At 

some point, [Appellant] told L.H. he wanted to do something 

nice for him and “said something about a blow job.” At the time, 

L.H. just took this as vulgar talk. Sometime between 11:00 p.m. 

and 12:00 a.m., [Appellant] said he was leaving and would be 

back. L.H. informed him that if he was not back within an hour 

he would not let him back inside. After [Appellant] left, L.H. 

locked the door and passed out on the futon still wearing his 

jeans, boxers, shirt, belt, socks, and shoes.

The next thing L.H. remembers was seeing [Appellant] over him. 

L.H. described feeling his legs being pulled up and hitting the 

end of the futon. He then saw [Appellant] with his penis in his 

mouth. [Appellant] was also fondling and putting his fingers 

inside L.H.’s rectum. L.H. testified that he was unaware this was 

occurring when it began and at no point did he consent to 

[Appellant’s] actions.

As L.H. became more coherent, he started kicking and 

eventually was able to get up. L.H. remembers screaming and 

telling [Appellant] to get out of his house. He started hitting 

[Appellant] with his cane, but [Appellant] pushed him down. 

L.H. then remembers going into the kitchen where he grabbed a 

knife and told [Appellant] that if he didn’t leave he would kill 

him. [Appellant] came over and punched L.H. in the arm and 

L.H. slashed at [Appellant] to get him away. L.H. stated he 

probably made contact with [Appellant’s] arm. L.H. was able to 

push [Appellant] toward the door, and [Appellant] eventually 

took off. As he was leaving, L.H. testified that [Appellant] asked 

him not to call the police and told him they could work 

something out.
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L.H. had heard previously that [Appellant] carried a small gun 

and knifes [sic] with him. Although he never saw [Appellant] 

with a weapon that evening, L.H. stated [Appellant] kept going 

near his backpack, which made him nervous and ultimately led 

to L.H. getting the knife. L.H. stated that he really felt that 

[Appellant] would have killed him that night if he did not make 

his last cry and desperate attempt against him. In fact, L.H. 

recalled [Appellant] saying he was going to kill him that evening. 

L.H. called the police; and Officer Carver arrived at the scene, 

where L.H. provided him with a written statement. Officer 

Carver described L.H.’s demeanor when he arrived as 

“[d]isturbed, distraught” and “scared and angry at the same 

time.” L.H. was able to provide his assailant’s name as Steve, 

but was unable to provide a last name. Officer Carver took 

pictures of the scene and noted there was a “significant amount 

of blood” on the floor that he believed belonged to the assailant. 

L.H. was taken to the Carlisle Hospital that night where they 

took swabs from his genital area as part of a rape kit. The 

hospital report indicated that there was no trauma to L.H.’s 

genitals.

That night, Sergeant Patterson identified Steve as Steven Hess 

[Appellant] to Officer Carver. Officer Carver printed out an 

identification photo of [Appellant] and had it sitting on top of his 

laptop in the police vehicle. When he picked up L.H. at the 

hospital, L.H. saw the photo and pointed out that it was the 

person who sexually assaulted him.

Officer Carver arrested [Appellant] that night, informing him he 

was being charged with sexual assault. Officer Carver did not 

provide [Appellant] with any details about the assault or who the 

complaining victim was. [Appellant] told Officer Carver “I am 

not a freak,” “I don’t fucking suck dick.” [Appellant] also stated 

that L.H. was dreaming. Thus, [Appellant] made these 

statements to Officer Carver before the Officer had disclosed to 

[Appellant] that L.H. was the complaining victim. [Appellant] 

denied all the allegations. During another conversation on March 

14, 2012, [Appellant] told Officer Carver that “his pants might 

have been down,” referring to L.H.

Katherine Cross, a forensic biologist and DNA technical leader at 

Guardian Forensic Science testified at trial as an expert in 
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forensic biology, serology, and DNA analysis. As part of her 

duties, Ms. Cross examines evidence for body fluids, performs 

DNA analysis, and tries to determine who the DNA belongs to. 

Ms. Cross obtained and performed testing on the rape kit in this 

case. After Ms. Cross tested the general and dried secretion 

swabs, she was able to determine that an unknown individual 

was the major contributor of DNA while the minor contributor 

was consistent with L.H.’s DNA. She also concluded it was likely 

that the major contributor’s DNA was from saliva or from the 

cells on the inside of the mouth because of how much DNA was 

recovered from the sample. Ms. Cross was eventually provided 

with a sample of [Appellant’s] DNA and was able to state to a 

degree of scientific certainty that the unknown individual and 

major contributor was, in fact, [Appellant].

[Appellant] testified at trial and presented a somewhat different 

version of events. He agreed that he met L.H. at Carlisle Cares 

and went over to L.H.’s to help him paint his new apartment. 

[Appellant] testified that when he arrived to paint, L.H. asked 

him if he wanted to watch a pornographic movie, but [Appellant] 

passed it off. [Appellant] ran out to get more paint; and when 

he came back, L.H. had taken out alcohol. [Appellant] stated he 

had five or six shots of vodka. [Appellant] then explained that 

L.H. was the one that initiated the sexual contact and both of 

them performed oral sex on the other. [Appellant] maintained 

that L.H. at no time was unconscious and that he always knew 

what he was doing.

After the sexual contact, [Appellant] testified that L.H. accused 

him of stealing a key and they got into a fight. [Appellant] 

stated L.H. hit him with his cane, although [Appellant] described 

the cane as more of a wooden oak staff than a cane. [Appellant] 

was hit on the head with the cane and had to have three stiches 

[sic] on the inside and seven staples on the outside. [Appellant] 

was also injured on his elbow from the cane. As [Appellant] was 

putting his boots on to leave, [Appellant] stated L.H. came 

rushing at him with a knife and stabbed him in the hand. 

[Appellant] then left the apartment and testified that L.H. told 

him not to call the cops. When first questioned by the police, 

[Appellant] said that he never engaged in sexual contact with 

L.H. He testified he did not tell his side of the story to police 

because he did not think that L.H. would take the issue this far.
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Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 3/21/14, at 2-7 (references to Notes of 

Testimony omitted).

On September 10 2013, at the conclusion of a two-day trial, the jury 

found Appellant guilty of IDSI, sexual assault, indecent assault—unconscious 

or unaware victim, and indecent assault—lack of consent. The jury acquitted 

Appellant on a charge of simple assault. T.C.O. at 1. On December 17, 

2013, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of seven to 20 years’ 

imprisonment for IDSI and ordered Appellant to comply with lifetime 

reporting requirements under Megan’s Law. Sentencing Order, 12/17/13, at 

1. On the sexual assault conviction, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a 

term of five to ten years in prison and directed Appellant to comply with 

Megan’s Law reporting requirements. Id. The sexual assault sentence was 

to run concurrently with the IDSI sentence for a total period of incarceration 

of seven to 20 years. Id. The remaining convictions merged with the IDSI 

and sexual assault convictions for purposes of sentencing. Id. at 1-2.

Appellant filed a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal on December 26, 

2013. The trial court denied the motion on January 6, 2014 and this timely 

appeal followed.

In the sole issue raised in this appeal, Appellant argues that the 

evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was 

insufficient as a matter of law to convince a reasonable fact finder that 
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Appellant was guilty of IDSI. Appellant’s Brief at 8. Appellant is not 

challenging the remaining convictions. 

With respect to a sufficiency challenge, our Supreme Court has stated:

A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question 

of law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict 

when it establishes each material element of the crime charged 

and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Karkaria, 533 Pa. 412, 

625 A.2d 1167 (1993). Where the evidence offered to support 

the verdict is in contradiction to the physical facts, in 

contravention to human experience and the laws of nature, then 

the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law. Commonwealth 

v. Santana, 460 Pa. 482, 333 A.2d 876 (1975). When 

reviewing a sufficiency claim the court is required to view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner giving 

the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be 

drawn from the evidence. Commonwealth v. Chambers, 528 

Pa. 558, 599 A.2d 630 (1991).

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000). Further, as 

this Court has recognized:

We may not weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for 

that of the fact-finder. Additionally, the evidence at trial need 

not preclude every possibility of innocence, and the fact-finder is 

free to resolve any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt unless 

the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law 

no facts supporting a finding of guilt may be drawn. The factfinder, when evaluating the credibility and weight of the 

evidence, is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Oliver, 946 A.2d 1111, 1112 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 894 A.2d 759, 773 (Pa. Super. 

2006) (citations and quotations omitted)).

IDSI is defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123 and provides, in pertinent part, 

that “[a] person commits a felony of the first degree when the person 
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engages in deviate sexual intercourse with a complainant: (1) by forcible 

compulsion; [or] . . . (3) who is unconscious or where the person knows that 

the complainant is unaware that the sexual intercourse is occurring.” 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(a)(3). Deviate sexual intercourse is defined as “sexual 

intercourse per os or per anus between human beings.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 3101. “A person is unconscious for purposes of the statute when they 

lack the conscious awareness they would possess in the normal waking 

state.” Widmer, 744 A.2d at 753 (citations omitted). A person acts 

recklessly with respect to a victim’s unconsciousness by consciously 

disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the victim is 

unconscious. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(3). “The risk must be of such a 

nature and degree that, considering the nature and intent of the actor’s 

conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross 

deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would 

observe in the actor’s situation.” Id. “Furthermore, it is well-established 

that the uncorroborated testimony of the complaining witness is sufficient to 

convict a defendant of sexual offenses.” Commonwealth v. Castelhun, 

889 A.2d 1228, 1232 (Pa. Super. 2005) (internal quotations and citations 

omitted). 

With the above principles in mind, we turn to Appellant’s contention 

that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction 

for IDSI. In his brief, Appellant “adopts the Statement of Facts in the [trial 
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court’s] opinion . . . as if set forth in this brief in its entirety.” Appellant’s 

Brief at 9. Appellant then argues that L.H.’s testimony, i.e., “that he was 

fully dressed when he went to sleep and did not know what was going on 

until his belt was loosened, his pants were taken off, his underwear was 

lowered and the Appellant was having oral sex with him,” is incredible. 

Appellant’s Brief at 12. “Where the evidence offered to support the verdict 

is in contradiction to the physical facts, and contravention to human 

experience and laws of nature, then the evidence is insufficient as a matter 

of law.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Santana, 333 A.2d 876 (Pa. 

1975).2

The Commonwealth counters that Appellant’s argument is without 

merit because “the jury believed the victim and not [Appellant’s] 

inconsistent and self-serving statements. [Appellant] implies that a man 

cannot have his pants removed, be pinned down, and then be digitally 

violated and fellated while in an alcoholic stupor.” Appellee’s Brief at 10. 

Our review of the evidence presented at trial, as aptly summarized by 

the trial court in its opinion and viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict winner, leads us to conclude that the elements of 

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2 The Commonwealth challenges Appellant’s reliance on Santana as 

“disingenuous,” noting that Santana recognized that it is physically 

impossible to unlock a deadbolt lock from the outside without a key whereas 

here it is physically possible for one man to physically and sexually assault 

another man who is in an alcoholic stupor. Appellee’s Brief at 12-13. We 

agree and find Appellant’s reliance on Santana misplaced. 
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IDSI have been established beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence 

supports a finding that an act of deviate sexual intercourse was forcibly 

performed by Appellant on L.H. without his consent and while L.H. was 

unconscious and unaware that the sexual intercourse was occurring. 

As the trial court explained, there was no question that Appellant’s 

DNA was present on L.H.’s genitals. While Appellant contended that he and 

L.H. performed oral sex on each other, it was for the jury to decide which 

witness to believe, either Appellant or L.H. T.C.O. at 8. “As the fact-finder, 

the jury was free to observe the demeanor of both L.H. and [Appellant] and 

make credibility determinations. The jury found L.H. to be credible.” Id. at 

9. Further, “[Appellant’s] defense theory shifted from absolutely nothing 

happened to, yes, there was sexual activity but it was consensual. Clearly 

one of these statements was a lie. Accordingly, the jury could reasonably 

surmise that [Appellant] was capable of lying.” Id. at 10. 

The evidence of record was sufficient to prove the elements of IDSI

beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant’s assertions to the contrary fail for 

lack of arguable merit.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/12/2015