J-S53001-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

N.G., : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

C.G., :

:

Appellee : No. 2205 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Order entered November 25, 2014,

Court of Common Pleas, Dauphin County,

Civil Division at No. 2011-CV-04775-CU

BEFORE: DONOHUE, OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 09, 2015

Appellant, N.G. (“Father”), appeals pro se from the order entered on 

November 25, 2014 in the Court of Common Pleas, Dauphin County, denying 

Father’s motion to modify custody and petition for contempt, and granting 

C.G.’s (“Mother”) motion to modify custody. For the reasons set forth 

herein, we affirm.

A summary of the factual and procedural history is as follows. Mother 

and Father married on July 22, 2007 and their daughter E.G. was born on 

September 15, 2010. Mother and Father separated on April 29, 2011, and 

on May 10, 2011, Father filed a complaint for custody of E.G.

On November 17, 2011, following a three-day custody hearing, the 

trial court entered a custody order (the “2011 Custody Order”). Pursuant to 

the 2011 Custody Order, Mother and Father shared legal custody of E.G. and 
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shared decision-making with regard to E.G.’s health, welfare, education, 

religious training and upbringing. The trial court awarded Mother primary 

physical custody of E.G. and partial physical custody to Father on alternating 

weekends from Thursday at 5:00 p.m. until Monday at 8:00 a.m. The 2011 

Custody Order prohibited either parent from relocating E.G. or from traveling 

outside the continental United States with E.G. without court order. 

On February 15, 2013, Mother filed a petition for modification of the 

2011 Custody Order, asserting that since May or June 2012, Father 

requested to exercise custody of E.G. on alternate weekends from Saturday 

until Sunday instead of Thursday until Monday. Mother requested the trial 

court to update the 2011 Custody Order to reflect this schedule. On April 

29, 2013, the trial court entered an order (the “Amended Custody Order”), 

amending the 2011 Custody Order to reflect that Father would have custody 

of E.G. on alternating weekends from Saturday at 9:00 a.m. to Sunday at 

5:00 p.m.

In October 2013, Father emailed Mother to inform her that he would 

not be able to take E.G. for his periods of custody and would let her know 

when he would next be able to exercise custody. After attempting to contact 

Father, and learning that his phone number was out of service, Mother 

contacted Father’s attorney, who informed her that he had traveled to India 
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for an indefinite period.1 Father’s attorney agreed to provide Mother with at 

least two weeks’ notice of Father’s return to the United States and intention 

to resume exercising custody.

On March 10, 2014, E.G. told Mother that Father visited her at 

daycare. The daycare confirmed that Father visited E.G. The next day, 

Father emailed Mother, informing her that he intended to pick E.G. up on 

Saturday for his weekend visit with her. Mother refused to exchange 

custody. 

On March 27, 2014, Mother filed a petition for modification and 

contempt of custody order. Mother’s petition alleged that Father “willfully 

disobeyed” the 2011 Custody Order and the Amended Custody Order by 

failing to exercise custody, to provide advance notice of his intention to 

move to India, to notify Mother of his medical health, and to notify Mother of 

his intention to visit E.G. at daycare. See Mother’s Petition for Modification 

and Contempt of Custody Order, 3/27/14, at 4-5. Mother requested that the 

trial court modify the 2011 Custody Order and the Amended Custody Order 

to give Father several dinner visits and to eliminate overnight visitation. Id.

at 5 ¶ 23. 

On March 31, 2014, Father filed a petition for contempt, alleging that 

Mother failed to show up for a custody exchange after he returned from 

 

1

 Mother later learned from Father’s parents that Father traveled to India to 

have a full knee replacement surgery. 
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India, that Mother rejected his phone calls, and that Mother did not reply to 

his emails regarding E.G.’s health and activities, in violation of the Amended 

Custody Order. 

Mother and Father appeared before the trial court on July 23, 2014, on 

their petitions for contempt and Mother’s petition for modification. At the 

hearing, counsel for Mother withdrew the request to eliminate Father’s 

overnight visitation, stating, “At this point, we are not requesting to change 

the visitation schedule. We are requesting sole legal custody2and some 

language to deal with the issue of [F]ather spontaneously traveling for long 

periods of time and giving -- requiring some notice to [Mother].” N.T., 

7/23/14, at 5. Meanwhile, Father requested that the trial court modify the 

2011 Custody to provide shared physical and legal custody of E.G. Id.

On August 5, 2014, E.G.’s school, the Goddard School Hershey, 

terminated its relationship with E.G. The school cited Father’s behavior as 

the reason behind their decision, claiming that Father argued with the 

school, reported the school to the Department of Public Welfare, threatened 

and harassed the owners of the school, and disrupted E.G.’s classroom and 

teacher by visiting E.G. at school several times a week. Mother 

subsequently found other childcare on short notice, but refused to tell Father 

what those arrangements were. 

 

2

 At the hearing on October 8, 2014, Mother modified her request to limit 

sole legal custody to matters concerning E.G.’s education and childcare. 

N.T., 10/8/14, at 47-48.
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Following several custody hearings, the trial court entered an order on 

November 25, 2014 (the “2014 Custody Order”) denying Father’s motion to

modify custody, dismissing Father’s petition for contempt, and granting 

Mother’s motion to modify custody. The trial court determined that Father 

“created an atmosphere wherein daycare facilities no longer wish to have 

[E.G.] enrolled.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/25/14, at 2. Furthermore, the trial 

court determined that Mother is more likely to encourage and permit 

continuing contact with Father; provides stability and continuity in E.G.’s 

education, family life, and community life; and is more likely to maintain a 

stable and consistent relationship with E.G.. Id. at 2-3. The 2014 Custody 

Order therefore granted Mother and Father shared legal custody and joint 

decision-making with regard to E.G.’s health, welfare, religious training and 

upbringing. The 2014 Custody Order, however, awarded Mother sole legal 

custody as to all decisions regarding E.G.’s education and/or daycare. All 

other aspects of the 2011 Custody Order remained in effect.3

On December 23, 2014, Father filed a timely notice of appeal and a 

concise statement of reasons relied on appeal pursuant to Rule 1925(b) of 

 

3

 The 2014 Custody Order also struck Paragraph 10 of the 2011 Custody 

Order, which provided instructions in the event E.G.’s daycare was closed or 

the child was unable to attend daycare on that day. This modification is not 

relevant for purposes of this appeal.
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the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.4 On appeal, Father raises 

the following issues for our review, which we have reordered:

1. Is it in the best interest of [E.G.] that [] [F]ather 

is not being allowed to be an equal parent in her life 

based on allegations of errors of the past made and 

not based on present fitness and the probabilities of 

the future? Trial court judge denied [F]ather shared 

custody indicating that he thought so.

2. Should a loving father not be allowed to be an 

equal parent to his daughter [E.G.] and not be 

granted shared custody just because [] [M]other 

dislikes [] [F]ather and is willing to say anything to 

disparage [] [F]ather [Transcript 9-23-11 pages 138-

39)? Is that in the best interest of [E.G.]? Trial court 

judge denied [F]ather shared custody indicating that 

he thought so.

3. Is it not conceivable that the judge was swayed 

by [M]other’s testimony because she is a woman, 

teacher, and mother represented by YWCA Legal 

Services who normally represent abused women? Is 

it not conceivable that this bias weighed heavily on 

the mind of Hon. Judge Evans and clouded his 

 

4

 We note that this case was delayed for panel listing because of delays by 

the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas. The trial court refused to 

complete the transcripts at the County’s expense, despite Father’s in forma 

pauperis status. On January 15, 2015, this Court entered an order requiring 

the trial court to complete the transcripts free of charge within twenty-one 

days. The trial court failed to comply with the twenty-one day deadline. On 

February 23, 2015, this Court’s Prothonotary issued a delinquent record 

notice. The trial court thereafter sent the certified record on February 27, 

2015, but the record did not contain an opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a) of 

the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. On March 13, 2015, this 

Court directed the trial court to file a Rule 1925(a) opinion and vacated the 

briefing schedule. The briefing schedule was reactivated on March 17, 2015, 

after the trial court provided a supplemental record with a statement in lieu 

of a Rule 1925(a) Opinion. This case was then further delayed for panel 

listing due to requests for extensions of time by the parties and a dispute 

between the parties regarding proper service. 
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judgment? Is that in the best interest of [E.G.]? 

Trial court judge ignored [F]ather’s testimony along 

with those of his friends Margaret Vincent, James 

LeValley, Matthew Campbell and Peter Kruia, father 

Suresh Goklaney, aunt Manju Rajagopalan, mother 

Reshma Goklaney, sister Nisha Chivukula indicating 

that we was a very good father and shared a loving 

bond with his daughter.

4. Is [] [F]ather’s testimony that he reads, prays, 

teaches, feeds, plays, bathes, changes diapers, and 

loves and comforts his daughter [E.G.] less credible 

than [] [M]other because [M]other is a school 

teacher whereas [F]ather is looking for employment? 

Trial court judge denied [F]ather shared custody 

indicating that he thought so.

5. Is it in [E.G.’s] best interest that she should not 

be allowed to travel to India to visit with her paternal 

grandparents and the rest of [] [F]ather’s family or is 

that more in the interest of satisfying [] [M]other’s 

unfounded fear that [E.G.] may not return? Is it fair 

to [E.G.] that she should be cut off from [] [F]ather’s 

family because of [] [M]other’s unfounded fear? 

Trial court ordered that [E.G.] should not leave the 

United States without court order and that no 

passport issue to her indicating that he thought so.

6. Is there an automatic presumption that all 

immigrant parents in a child custody situation from 

non[-]Hague [C]onvention countries will take their 

children to visit their country of birth never to 

return? Is it in [E.G.’s] best interest that she should 

not be able to see her paternal grandparents and 

family just because [] [F]ather was born and 

immigrated from India, a country that has not yet 

signed the Hague Convention? Trial court ordered 

that [E.G.] should not leave the United States 

without court order and that no passport issue to her 

indicating that he thought so.

Father’s Brief at 6-7.
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Our standard of review of a custody order is well settled. 

In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the 

broadest type and our standard is abuse of 

discretion. We must accept findings of the trial court 

that are supported by competent evidence of record, 

as our role does not include making independent 

factual determinations. In addition, with regard to 

issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we 

must defer to the presiding trial judge who viewed 

and assessed the witnesses first-hand. However, we 

are not bound by the trial court’s deductions or 

inferences from its factual findings. Ultimately, the 

test is whether the trial court’s conclusions are 

unreasonable as shown by the evidence of record. 

We may reject the conclusions of the trial court only 

if they involve an error of law, or are unreasonable in 

light of the sustainable findings of the trial court.

R.L.P. v. R.F.M., 110 A.3d 201, 207-08 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting C.R.F., 

III v. S.E.F., 45 A.3d 441, 443 (Pa. Super. 2012)).

The Child Custody Act provides that with any petition to modify a 

custody order, the trial court must determine if the modification serves the 

best interest of the child. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5338. When the modification 

entails a change to an award of custody, the trial court, in determining the 

best interest of the child, must consider seventeen factors as set forth at 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a). See M.O. v. J.T.R., 85 A.3d 1058, 1062 (Pa. Super. 

2014). As a general rule, mere consideration of the factors is insufficient as 

“[s]ection 5323(d) [of the Child Custody Act] provides that a trial court ‘shall 

delineate the reasons for its decision on the record in open court or in a 
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written opinion or order.’” A.V. v. S.T., 87 A.3d 818, 823 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citations omitted); 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5323(d).

In this case, both Mother and Father requested the trial court to 

modify the 2011 Custody Order. Mother sought a change to the award of 

legal custody, while Father sought a change to the award of physical and 

legal custody. Thus, because the modification entailed a change in custody, 

the trial court was required to consider the section 5328(a) factors and 

delineate its rationale with regard to the factors on the record or in its 

written opinion. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5323(d); M.O., 85 A.3d at 1062. The 

trial court did not do so in this instance. Rather, in its written opinion, the 

trial court only provided an analysis of five of the seventeen factors. 

Ordinarily this Court would be required to remand this case back to the trial 

court for an analysis of all factors. See S.W.D. v. S.A.R., 96 A.3d 396, 

406-07 (Pa. Super. 2014) (Holding that a trial court’s failure to address all of 

the § 5328(a) factors constitutes an abuse of discretion, and requires the 

case be remanded for an analysis of all factors.); see also J.R.M. v. J.E.A., 

33 A.3d 647, 652 (Pa. Super. 2011). Our review of the record, however, 

reveals that remanding the case to the trial court is unnecessary in this 

instance, as Father has waived all issues for review. 5

 

5

 It is well settled that 

[w]hile this [C]ourt is willing to liberally construe 

materials filed by a pro se litigant, we note that 
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For his first issue on appeal, Father claims that the trial court denied 

Father shared custody “based on allegations of errors of the past made and 

not based on present fitness and the probabilities of the future[.]” Father’s 

Brief at 6. Although Father does not specify what “allegations of errors” he 

is referring to, from what we can discern from Father’s brief, Father is 

claiming that the trial court improperly relied upon testimony regarding past 

abuse committed by Father against Mother in reaching its determination. 

See id. at 18-19. Father, however, did not raise this issue in his 1925(b) 

statement, and accordingly, it is waived. See Dietrich v. Dietrich, 923 

A.2d 461, 463 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“When an appellant files a Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) statement, any issues not raised in that statement are waived on 

appeal.”). 

For his next two issues on appeal, Father questions whether the trial 

court’s decision to deny shared custody was in the best interest of E.G. See

Father’s Brief at 6-7. Father specifically claims that the trial court denied 

Father shared custody because Mother dislikes Father and because the trial 

 

appellant is not entitled to any particular advantage 

because []he lacks legal training. Further, any 

layperson choosing to represent himself in a legal 

proceeding must, to some reasonable extent, 

assume the risk that his lack of expertise and legal 

training will prove his undoing. 

Rich v. Acrivos, 815 A.2d 1106, 1108 (Pa. Super. 2003) (quotations and 

citations omitted). 
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court was biased in favor of Mother since she is a woman, a teacher, and 

represented by the YWCA. Id. 

Upon review, we conclude that we need not address the merits of 

Father’s claims in this instance because Father failed to develop an 

argument in support of his claims in accordance with Rule 2119(a) of the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 2119(a) provides that 

“[t]he argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions 

to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part—in distinctive type or 

in type distinctively displayed—the particular point treated therein, followed 

by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.” 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). “Citations of authorities must set forth the principle for 

which they are cited.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b). “Appellate arguments which fail to 

adhere to these rules may be considered waived, and arguments which are 

not appropriately developed are waived. Arguments not appropriately 

developed include those where the party has failed to cite any authority in 

support of a contention.” Coulter v. Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080, 1088 (Pa. 

Super. 2014) (quoting Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 29-30 (Pa. Super. 

2006)). 

In this case, Father did not divide the argument portion of his brief 

into as many parts as there are questions to be argued. Although Father 

presented six issues on appeal, the argument portion of his brief only 

contains three distinct parts. Moreover, Father did not present any 
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argument, discussion, citation to authority, or analysis relative to issues two 

and three. Father’s failure to develop an argument for appeal precludes 

meaningful review by this Court, and as a result, we conclude that issues 

two and three are waived. 

For his fourth issue on appeal, Father contends that the trial court 

denied him shared custody because it found Father’s testimony that he cares 

for and loves E.G. less credible than Mother’s testimony. Father’s Brief at 6. 

Father’s brief, however, contains nothing more than a summary of the 

testimony at the 2011 custody hearings and asks this Court to find that the 

trial court improperly weighed the testimony in reaching its 2011 Custody 

Order. Id. at 20-21. 

Father is challenging the findings of fact made by the trial court in 

connection with the 2011 Custody Order. This he cannot now do, as he was 

required to challenge those rulings, if ever, within thirty days of the 2011 

Custody Order pursuant to Rule 903(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Appellate Procedure. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (“Except as otherwise prescribed 

by this rule, the notice of appeal required by Rule 902 (manner of taking 

appeal) shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order from which 

the appeal is taken.”). His attempts to do so are untimely and accordingly, 

Father’s fourth issue is waived.

Father has waived his fifth and sixth issues on appeal for the same 

reason. In these final two issues, Father challenges the trial court’s order 
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preventing E.G. from obtaining a passport or from traveling outside of the 

United States without court order. Father’s Brief at 21-22. Father contends 

that the trial court improperly presumed that he would abduct E.G. because 

India is not a party to the Hague Convention. Id. at 21. 

The 2014 Custody Order, however, made no corrections or additions to 

the portion of the 2011 Custody Order that originally prevented E.G. from 

obtaining a passport and from traveling outside of the United States. Father 

did not appeal that portion of the 2011 Custody Order, and any appeal now 

is untimely. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Furthermore, a review of the record 

reveals that Father did not present any new argument at the 2014 custody 

hearings or in his brief to alter the trial court’s 2011 findings of fact or to 

warrant a modification to the 2011 Custody Order. Father’s argument on 

appeal is limited to simply contesting the accuracy of Mother’s statements 

from a 2011 custody hearing. See id. at 21-22. As previously discussed, 

the 2011 Custody Order is not presently before this Court, and any attempt 

to appeal the trial court’s determination in that order is untimely. See

Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). We therefore conclude that Father has waived his fifth

and sixth issues for appeal.

Given our determination that Father has not preserved any issues for 

appeal, we need not remand this case to the trial court for an analysis of the 

remaining factors under section 5328(a).
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Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/9/2015