OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Afghanistan’s High Office of Oversight Needs 

Significantly Strengthened Authority, Independence, 

and Donor Support to Become an Effective 

Anti-Corruption Institution

December 16, 2009

SIGAR Audit-10-2 High Office of Oversight
SIGAR Audit-10-2 High Office of Oversight Page i 

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

December 16, 2009

The Honorable Hillary R. Clinton

U.S. Secretary of State

The Honorable Karl W. Eikenberry

U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan

Alonzo L. Fulgham

Acting Administrator

U.S. Agency for International Development

William M. Frej

USAID Mission Director to Afghanistan

This report discusses the results of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction’s review of U.S. and other donor efforts to strengthen the capability of Afghanistan’s 

High Office of Oversight (HOO) to fight corruption. It includes five recommendations. This report is part 

of a series of audits of U.S. efforts to combat corruption and strengthen the rule of law in Afghanistan. 

A summary of our report is on page ii. This performance audit was conducted under the authority of 

Public Law No. 110-181 and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. When preparing the final 

report, we considered joint comments on a draft of this report from the U.S. Embassy Kabul and the U.S. 

Agency for International Development’s Mission in Afghanistan (USAID/Afghanistan). Those comments 

indicated concurrence with the findings and recommendations in this report. A copy of the comments is 

included as an appendix to this report. We also provided a draft of this report to the HOO, but it did not 

provide a written response. 

John Brummet

Assistant Inspector General for Audits

Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIGAR Audit-10-2 High Office of Oversight Page ii 

 Special inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

i

.

The High Office of Oversight (HOO) has been provided with approximately $1 million in 

assistance from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as well as about $7.3 

million from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) devoted to the institutional 

development of the HOO. To date, with this assistance, the HOO has undertaken certain anticorruption initiatives at varying degrees of progress, including a vehicle registration project and 

an asset declaration process for Afghan public officials. However, the HOO suffers from 

significant gaps in operational capacity. The HOO is greatly understaffed, and many of its 

employees are either inexperienced or lacking in basic skills, such as computer use, English, and 

information gathering techniques. The HOO’s enabling legislation does not invest it with 

sufficient authority or enforcement power and needs substantial revision. Furthermore, the 

HOO suffers from a lack of organizational, external and personal independence required from an 

oversight institution. Finally, although the international assistance provided thus far to the HOO 

has been greatly valued, the U.S. government has had no office or individual specifically 

designated to oversee or coordinate U.S. assistance to the HOO, and U.S. overall coordination 

and level of demonstrated commitment of support to the HOO needs improvement.

`

 

What SIGAR Reviewed 

The strengthening of institutions that implement anti-corruption measures in Afghanistan is a key operational principle of 

the U.S. Government’s draft Anti-Corruption Strategy. Afghanistan’s High Office of Oversight (HOO) was established by 

President Karzai in July 2008 to oversee and coordinate national efforts to combat corruption in accordance with 

Afghanistan’s own anti-corruption strategy under its Afghanistan National Development Strategy. During this audit, SIGAR

(1) reviewed the assistance provided by the United States and other donors to strengthen the institutional development of 

the HOO, (2) assessed the capabilities and performance of the HOO in fulfilling its mandate, and (3) assessed U.S. 

assistance to the HOO. This report is part of a series of audits addressing U.S. efforts to combat corruption and strengthen 

the rule of law in Afghanistan. SIGAR conducted this performance audit in Kabul, Afghanistan and Washington, D.C. from 

September to November 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

 

 

 SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

What SIGAR Found 

In addition to its own funds, the HOO has received about $1 million in assistance from the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) and is budgeted to receive a total of $7.3 million from the United Nations Development Programme

(UNDP). This assistance has been devoted to the institutional development of the HOO. With this assistance, the HOO has 

undertaken anti-corruption initiatives, with varying degrees of progress. These include a vehicle registration project and an 

asset declaration process for Afghan public officials. However, the HOO suffers from significant gaps in operational 

capacity. The HOO is greatly understaffed, and many of its employees are either inexperienced or lack basic skills, such as 

computer use and information gathering techniques. Moreover, the HOO’s enabling legislation does not invest it with 

sufficient authority or enforcement power and the legislation needs substantial revision. Furthermore, the HOO lacks the

organizational, external, and personal independence required by international standards for an oversight institution. 

Finally, although the international assistance provided thus far to the HOO has been greatly valued, the U.S. government 

has had no office or individual specifically designated to oversee or coordinate U.S. assistance to the HOO, and U.S. overall

coordination and level of demonstrated commitment of support to the HOO needs improvement. 

SIGAR Audit-10-2 December 2009

AFGHANISTAN’S HIGH OFFICE OF OVERSIGHT NEEDS 

SIGNIFICANTLY STRENGTHENED AUTHORITY, 

INDEPENDENCE, AND DONOR SUPPORT TO BECOME AN 

EFFECTIVE ANTI-CORRUPTION INSTITUTION

What SIGAR Recommends 

SIGAR recommends that the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan:

• Determine, in consultation with the HOO, USAID, and other donors, conditions on which to base future assistance,

including the enactment of mutually agreeable legislative reforms based on key principles to enhance HOO’s 

authority and independence, and the establishment by the HOO of measureable performance benchmarks;

• Urge, through appropriate diplomatic channels including the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, that the 

HOO Director General and Deputy Director General either resign from their presidential advisory positions or, 

alternatively, resign from their HOO positions to remedy an impairment of personal independence on the part of 

those HOO leaders;

• Designate an agency or individual to oversee U.S. assistance to the HOO, both in terms of institutional capacity 

building and legislative reform, in conjunction with international partners;

• Ensure that the designated agency oversee the appointment of high-level advisors, such as judges or anticorruption specialists, to be embedded at the HOO in order to provide sustained counsel, mentoring, and strategic 

advice to HOO leadership; and

• Engage the international community to reinvigorate international donor coordination efforts, perhaps under the 

auspices of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan.

For more information contact: SIGAR Public affairs at (703) 602-8742 or PublicAffairs@sigar.mil
SIGAR Audit-10-2 High Office of Oversight Page iii 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background 2 

International Support Has Enabled the HOO to Begin Several Anti-Corruption Efforts 4 

The HOO Has Significant Gaps in Its Operational Capacity 6 

The HOO Needs More Coordinated Support and Commitment from the United States 11

Conclusions 12

Recommendations 13

Comments 14

APPENDIX I: Scope and Methodology 15

APPENDIX II: Comments from the U.S. Embassy-Kabul and USAID/Afghanistan 16

TABLE

Table 1: Organization Chart of the High Office of Oversight 3 

ABBREVIATIONS

ACT UNDP’s Accountability and Transparency Project

ANDS Afghanistan National Development Strategy

ARTF Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund

DOJ Department of Justice

GAO Government Accountability Office

HOO High Office of Oversight

INTOSAI International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions

SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 

TAF The Asia Foundation 

UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNCAC United Nations Convention against Corruption

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

USAID U. S. Agency for International Development
SIGAR Audit-10-2 High Office of Oversight Page 1 

Afghanistan’s High Office of Oversight Needs Significantly Strengthened 

Authority, Independence, and Donor Support to Become an 

Effective Anti-Corruption Institution

Corruption is widely acknowledged to be a pervasive, entrenched, and systemic problem across 

Afghanistan that undermines security, development, and the very legitimacy of the Afghan government. 

Thirty years of conflict have weakened state institutions, while the sheer size of international security 

and development assistance has increased Afghanistan’s vulnerability to corruption. Afghanistan’s 

ranking in the 2009 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index was 179th out of 180 

countries, making it, by that standard, the second most corrupt country in the world. Since corruption 

is a cross-cutting issue, an institution was urgently needed to oversee and coordinate anti-corruption 

efforts in the country. In July 2008, Afghan President Karzai established Afghanistan’s High Office of 

Oversight (HOO) for that purpose.1

 The HOO has been mandated to coordinate and supervise the 

implementation of Afghanistan’s National Anti-Corruption Strategy, as well as administrative procedural 

reform. The creation of the HOO is also in line with a provision of the United Nations Convention 

against Corruption, ratified by Afghanistan in August 2008, which requires that each state party “ensure 

the existence of a body or bodies” that prevent corruption.2

Strengthening the capacity of the Afghan government to develop and implement expressed 

commitments to combat corruption is an operational principle of the draft U.S. Government AntiCorruption Strategy for Afghanistan. In order to fulfill its mandated requirements, the HOO must be of 

sufficient capacity to achieve its objectives based on a solid foundation of authority and independence. 

Various types of technical assistance provided by the United States and other members of the 

international community are currently being provided to strengthen the institutional development of 

the HOO. However, the HOO, as a relatively new institution, continues to face challenges in 

implementing the Afghan government’s anti-corruption strategy, which serves as a cross-cutting issues 

paper for the Afghan National Development Strategy.

 

This report is part of a series of audits by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction (SIGAR) to address U.S. efforts to combat corruption and strengthen the rule of law in 

Afghanistan. It (1) identifies the assistance provided by the United States and other donors to 

strengthen the HOO, (2) examines the capabilities and performance of that institution, and (3) assesses 

the effectiveness of U.S. assistance to the HOO. We reviewed relevant U.S., Afghan, and international 

laws, conventions, standards, and development strategies. We also interviewed HOO leadership, 

advisors and department heads, as well as representatives of U.S. and international agencies providing 

assistance to the HOO. We conducted our work in Kabul, Afghanistan and Washington, D.C. from 

 

1

The HOO has been alternatively known as the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption or the High Office for 

Oversight of the Implementation of the Anti-Corruption Strategy. 

2

United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), Article 6, Paragraph 1.
SIGAR Audit-10-2 High Office of Oversight Page 2 

September to November 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A 

discussion of our scope and methodology is in Appendix I.

BACKGROUND

Afghanistan’s expressed commitment to combat corruption is elaborated in the Afghanistan National 

Development Strategy (ANDS) both as part of its Governance, Rule of Law, and Human Rights pillar and 

as a cross-cutting theme toward the achievement of national development objectives. A National AntiCorruption Strategy3

The establishment of the HOO is in line with Article 6, Section 1, of the United Nations Convention 

against Corruption, ratified by Afghanistan in August 2008, calling for the establishment of an oversight 

body to prevent corruption. The HOO is also responsible for communicating key UNCAC benchmarks 

among government institutions and ensuring their compliance. 

was formulated as a cross-cutting issues paper for the ANDS and presented to

President Karzai in March 2008. In the Declaration of the International Conference in Support of 

Afghanistan held in Paris in June 2008, the Afghan government “reaffirmed its commitment to intensify 

actions to combat corruption and to take concrete steps to that effect.” Through enabling legislation, 

titled the Law on Overseeing the Implementation of the Anti-Corruption Strategy (to be referred to in 

this report as the HOO legislation), the HOO was created by Presidential Decree in July 2008 to oversee 

and coordinate the implementation of both the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and administrative 

procedural reform. 

According to a HOO strategy paper, “The overall approach of the High Office will be one of coordination, 

collaboration, and leadership. It will not seek to control and command.” In November 2008, high-level 

monthly meetings were established and chaired by the President to review progress in implementing 

the National Anti-Corruption Strategy. The HOO has not been invested with investigative or 

prosecutorial powers.4

Currently, HOO leadership consists of the Director General and one Deputy Director General. The 

Director General is appointed by the President. As shown in Table 1, the HOO has established units 

focused on achieving the tasks assigned to it by the HOO legislation, each with distinct but interrelated 

functions related to oversight, administrative reform, capacity development, and public awareness.

 Instead, the HOO is empowered to monitor the progress of legal cases related to 

corruption in the appropriate law enforcement agencies and to ensure that action is being taken by 

those institutions.

 

3 This strategy was prepared under the direction of Abdul Salam Azimi, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of 

Afghanistan.

4 Article 134 of the Afghan Constitution stipulates that discovery of crimes is the duty of the police and 

investigation and prosecution of crimes is the purview of the Attorney General’s Office.
SIGAR Audit-10-2 High Office of Oversight Page 3 

Table 1: Organization Chart of the High Office of Oversight

Source: High Office of Oversight 

Note: The position of Deputy Director General for Administration is currently vacant.

The following is a summary of these units and their respective functions:

• The Capacity Development and Training Department is responsible for developing the 

professional capacities of both HOO staff and government ministries to implement anticorruption measures.

• The Asset Registration Department, in accordance with Article 154 of the Afghan Constitution, is

mandated to collect declarations of personal assets from public officials of the Afghan 

government. Completion of the Asset Registration process is also a benchmark of the 

Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund.5

• The function of HOO’s Oversight Department is to monitor and verify the progress government 

institutions are making in implementing anti-corruption measures. This department assists 

government ministries in developing their anti-corruption action plans.

• The Strategy and Planning Department, as a core unit within the HOO, serves as a gathering 

point for information received from other HOO departments and government ministries. It 

conducts research and analysis on corruption issues; exchanges information with Afghan 

government and international institutions on corruption matters; and works closely with the 

Prevention and Oversight Departments to find gaps in procedures and develop 

recommendations.

 

5 The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund is administered by the World Bank. It was set up in May 2002 to help 

the Afghan government finance spending in such areas as infrastructure, rural development, and salaries for public 

employees.

Director General

Deputy Director General

Administration

Deputy Director General

Policy and Oversight

Capacity Development Asset Registration

Oversight Strategy and 

Planning

Prevention Complaints Case 

Tracking

Media & 

Public
SIGAR Audit-10-2 High Office of Oversight Page 4 

• The responsibilities of the Prevention Department include the simplification of bureaucratic 

procedures in government institutions, as well as the review of outdated laws, organizational 

structures, and civil service recruitment practices.

• The Complaints Management and Information Gathering Department serves as the “eyes and 

ears” of the HOO. It receives complaints from various sources and has limited information 

gathering capabilities. After obtaining additional information on complaints for background 

purposes, this department forwards complaints to appropriate government agencies. 

• The Case Tracking Department is responsible for reviewing and analyzing cases received either 

from the Complaints Management and Information Gathering Department or directly from the 

HOO Director General. If a case is warranted it is referred to the Attorney General’s Office for 

investigation. The department then follows cases through investigation, prosecution, and 

sentencing. 

• The Media and Public Outreach Department’s task is to support HOO’s mandate to promote 

public awareness of corruption and HOO anti-corruption initiatives.

The HOO is currently based in Kabul and has plans to expand to seven regional offices throughout the 

country. However, HOO leadership has informed SIGAR that they are being cautious about expanding 

outside of Kabul until they build sufficient capacity to support regional offices.

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT HAS ENABLED THE HOO TO BEGIN SEVERAL ANTI-CORRUPTION 

EFFORTS

Members of the international community and the HOO staff acknowledge that the HOO has needed 

substantial technical and capacity development assistance given the critical role it has to play in the fight 

against corruption. The HOO has received various types of technical and financial support from U.S. and 

international agencies to achieve its objectives.6

International Assistance to Strengthen the HOO

International donors have emphasized the importance 

of providing assistance gradually so as not to build up expectations beyond the capacity of HOO staff to 

deliver. 

The U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) implements its Support for Strategic Needs of 

the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Program through a cooperative agreement with 

the Asia Foundation (TAF). USAID funding, implemented through TAF, totaled approximately $1 million 

from October 2008-October 2009. It was used primarily for information technology support, staff 

training, office equipment, support for public outreach and media projects, and to provide eight Afghan 

national advisors and acting heads of the HOO’s various departments. The Asia Foundation prepared a 

budget forecast for additional funding of approximately $1.5 million through September 2010. 

The HOO is the main Afghan government counterpart for the United Nations Development Programme’s 

(UNDP) Accountability and Transparency (ACT) Project, which initially ran from January 2007 to March 

2009, at which point it was revised and is now scheduled to be completed in March 2012. The ACT 

 

6 In addition to this assistance from other donors, the Afghan government has provided approximately $1 million 

of its own funding for the HOO’s operating expenses.
SIGAR Audit-10-2 High Office of Oversight Page 5 

Project, designed to support the Afghan government to develop the necessary capacities to fight 

corruption, consists of four components. The first component of the project is designed to improve the

institutional and policy environment created to support the implementation of the national anticorruption strategy. Support to the HOO under UNDP’s ACT Project falls primarily under this 

component.

The total budget for the ACT Project is over $22.3 million, of which approximately $11.4 million has been 

allocated. Major contributors include the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development 

which has contributed approximately $8.6 million, the Government of Norway with approximately $1.3 

million, and the Government of Italy at nearly $400,000. Project funds budgeted for support to the HOO 

total about $7.3 million for the length of the project. Through the project, UNDP has provided support 

to the HOO for information technology, provision of equipment, rental of office space, security 

upgrades, the rental of vehicles, and both international and national consultants. UNDP has also begun 

the process of recruiting additional international and national advisors in various HOO departments. 

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is the agency responsible for the 

implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption. UNODC provided assistance to 

the HOO to coordinate Afghan government ministries’ responses to a self-assessment checklist to gauge 

progress in UNCAC implementation. UNODC assistance to the HOO also included the development of a 

database for the HOO’s Asset Registration Department. UNODC also brought in international experts to 

help analyze the HOO’s needs.

Officials from the U.S. Department of Justice, the United Kingdom, UNDP, and UNODC have also assisted 

in preparing draft revisions of the HOO legislation to provide the HOO with more authority. Proposed 

revisions were sent to the HOO for their suggested changes and the draft is still in the review process.

HOO is also receiving assistance from the World Bank’s Management Capacity Program in the form of 

western-level salaries to a small number of experienced experts hired by the HOO. At least one of the

HOO’s department heads has recently been hired through the Management Capacity Program. 

To eliminate the prospect of duplication of effort among the international donors, a coordination 

mechanism was initiated in the summer of 2009 through a HOO Working Group hosted by the United 

Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. However, with the departure of a UNAMA employee in 

September 2009, the meetings have been suspended. 

The HOO Has Undertaken Certain Initiatives with Varying Degrees of Progress

Staff members and leaders of the HOO, as well as members of the international community, have 

provided SIGAR with several examples of initiatives undertaken by the HOO with international support. 

Following are some examples: 

• In accordance with a specified benchmark of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) 

and an UNCAC provision requiring asset declaration of public officials, the HOO put in place an 

asset registration process and, as of September 30, 2009, had received required forms from 78 

percent of the individuals indentified as needing to file such forms. 

• Over a period of 7-8 months, HOO’s Prevention Department has engaged in a project with the 

Ministry of the Interior to simplify the vehicle registration process. Reforms reportedly included 

reducing the number of necessary steps from 51 to 5. 
SIGAR Audit-10-2 High Office of Oversight Page 6 

• The HOO has developed and produced a series of television and radio documentaries on general 

anti-corruption issues as well as its vehicle registration pilot program.

• The HOO has coordinated a self-assessment questionnaire in cooperation with UNODC in order 

to gauge Afghanistan’s progress in implementing the provisions of UNCAC.

• The HOO recently began a project, as an implementing partner, with the Afghan nonprofit 

organization Harakat to research and develop an action plan to reform the system for the 

issuance of construction permits in Kabul. 

• Five HOO departments have completed departmental action plans that are pending final review 

by the HOO leadership.

• The HOO has collected and is reviewing draft anti-corruption action plans from 30 Afghan 

government ministries.

• The HOO senior officials, with support from USAID, participated in a special anti-corruption 

training program in Singapore. In addition, the HOO Advisor for Asset Registration attended 

advanced anti-corruption training in Indonesia that focused on asset registration and 

declaration processes.

THE HOO HAS SIGNIFICANT GAPS IN ITS OPERATIONAL CAPACITY

The HOO suffers from a lack of independence, a weak legal framework, and a lack of commitment from 

donors--particularly from the U.S. Government. It remains operationally under-resourced and lacking in 

the necessary skills to make a measurable impact in fighting corruption in the near term, due, in part, to 

the fact that no measureable performance benchmarks have been established. Thus, while the HOO has 

made limited progress in some areas, it is unable to demonstrate that its efforts have made a significant 

impact on the overall level of corruption in Afghanistan. Contributing to this challenge is an insufficient 

pool of qualified recruits from which to obtain talent. Consequently, the HOO has fallen short in several 

of its responsibilities and is unable to measure progress in others. 

Lack of Independence

In its enabling legislation, the HOO is required to be independent in carrying out its duties. While the 

legislation does not define the term “independent,” as an oversight organization, the HOO, including its 

leadership and employees, should subscribe to and follow internationally-accepted independence 

standards as well as a code of ethics. Independence is a crucial standard governing the operation of any 

oversight institution and is enshrined in such guiding documents as the International Organization of 

Supreme Audit Institutions’ (INTOSAI) Code of Ethics and Government Auditing Standards produced by 

the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 

The Code of Ethics issued by INTOSAI, of which Afghanistan is a member, was written for auditors but 

could also be applied to organizations such as the HOO. The following INTOSAI requirements are 

noteworthy: 

• It is essential that auditors are independent and impartial, not only in fact but also in 

appearance.

• It is important to maintain both actual and perceived political neutrality. Therefore, it is 

important to maintain independence from political influence in order to discharge 

responsibilities in an impartial way.
SIGAR Audit-10-2 High Office of Oversight Page 7 

• Avoid all relationships with managers and staff in parties which may influence, compromise or 

threaten the ability to act and be seen to be acting independently.

Although generally accepted government auditing standards issued by the GAO were also written for 

auditors, they too could be applied to organizations providing governmental oversight, such as the HOO. 

The general independence standard from GAO states:

In all matters relating to the audit work, the audit organization and the individual 

auditor...must be free from personal, external, and organizational impairments to 

independence, and must avoid the appearance of such impairments of independence.

According to GAO, personal impairments might (1) limit the extent of oversight inquiries, (2) limit 

disclosure of offenses, or (3) weaken findings. GAO includes in its examples of personal impairments, 

“biases, including those resulting from political, ideological, or social convictions that result from 

membership or employment in, or loyalty to, a particular type of policy, group, organization, or level of 

government.” The International Federation of Accountants has issued similar independence standards 

for oversight organizations.

Contrary to generally-accepted standards and ethical codes for oversight organizations, both the 

Director General and the Deputy Director General hold, and receive remuneration for holding, advisory 

positions within the Office of the President outside their HOO appointments. In addition to their 

leadership positions with the HOO, the Director General and Deputy Director General are also employed 

as presidential advisors within the Office of the President with the titles, respectively, of Advisor to 

President on Administrative Affairs and Chief of the Presidential Programs. We believe that holding two 

government positions simultaneously can, and in this case does, create a conflict of interest.

According to USAID, which provides funding for a wide array of presidential advisors under its Support 

to the Center of Government program, the Director General and Deputy Director General of the HOO 

were employed as advisors to the Afghan President under that program prior to their presidential 

appointments to the HOO. This employment arrangement under USAID continued even after they were 

appointed to their HOO leadership positions despite criticism from a variety of stakeholders within the 

international community. For example, during an international donor group meeting in August 2009, 

concern was expressed over USAID’s provision of salary support to the Director General of HOO as an 

advisor to the President. The meeting was chaired by UNAMA and included representatives from UNDP, 

USAID and UNODC. During interviews with SIGAR, some of these same international donors expressed 

disapproval with the HOO Director General and Deputy Director General not giving up their former jobs 

as presidential advisors. 

As a result, the personal independence of both the Director General and the Deputy Director General of 

the HOO has been impaired, in appearance if not in actuality, because of their dual roles within the 

Afghan government. This impairment creates an inherent conflict of interest that could affect the 

HOO’s performance of its duties, including the limiting of oversight inquiries and reporting. For 

example, HOO leadership may have been distracted because of the 2009 election. One knowledgeable 

official noted that both the Director General and the Deputy Director General met frequently with the 

President prior to the election. Also, according to a USAID official, the Deputy Director General often 

acted as the President’s speechwriter. Concerns of this sort expressed by U.S. and international donor 

officials, regardless of their validity, indicate that there is a strong perception that HOO leaders are not 

independent.
SIGAR Audit-10-2 High Office of Oversight Page 8 

The HOO also has external impairments to its independence due to the way in which its operating 

budget is administered by the Afghan government. While the HOO legislation states that the HOO is an 

independent budgetary entity, and the HOO has its own line item in the national budget, the amount of 

the HOO’s government budget is decided by the Ministry of Finance, a line ministry that reports to the 

President. This means that the HOO has no control over the amount that goes into the budget line. In 

addition, the $1 million budget allocation to the HOO for this year is reportedly for operating expenses 

only, and not for project development, making the HOO dependent on international donor assistance to 

carry out projects. 

With regard to organizational independence, GAO’s Government Auditing Standards stipulates that 

government oversight organizations are generally presumed to be organizationally independent if the 

head of the organization is elected or directly appointed or confirmed by a legislative body, subject to 

removal by a legislative body, reports to a legislative body, and is accountable to a legislative body. The 

HOO legislation specifies that the Director General is appointed by and reports to the President. 

Consequently, there is no check and balance on the appointment or dismissal of the HOO Director 

General by the President of Afghanistan which makes the HOO organization dependent on the Executive 

Branch. 

Despite the declaration in the HOO legislation that the HOO “...shall be independent in carrying out its 

duties...,” the consensus opinion among members of the international community is that the HOO is not 

truly independent as an institution. However, on the subject of parliamentary oversight, the HOO 

leadership as well as several international representatives stated that being accountable to the entire 

Afghan Parliament for appointment or dismissal would render the Director General vulnerable to the 

demands made by numerous Members of Parliament. Moreover, the HOO is reportedly renting its 

current office space from the Office of the President, which raises additional questions regarding the 

perception of HOO independence. 

Weak Legislative Framework 

There is wide recognition both within the HOO and among international partners that the current HOO 

legislation is too weak. As acknowledged by a Senior Advisor for the U.S. Department of Justice (who 

had been providing advice to the HOO on revisions to its enabling legislation), Afghan legislation does

not currently provide the HOO with sufficient authority to be an effective oversight institution. 

Strengthening the HOO’s legislative framework is necessary. For example, the HOO has no investigative 

powers. Under Article 134 of the Afghan Constitution, discovery of crimes is the duty of the police while 

investigation and prosecution are entrusted to the Attorney General’s Office. As stated in a recent 

report by an international consultant, “Although ‘oversight’ is potentially a powerful tool in any area of 

activity, the public may perceive an oversight body without any power to detect or investigate 

corruption as being “toothless.” 

The current HOO legislation lacks a direct investigation role for the HOO. The HOO can collect 

information and determine whether a complaint warrants investigation by other government agencies, 

but cannot conduct the investigations, and thus is dependent on other entities to perform these 

functions. Similarly, the Case Tracking Department can track the progress of corruption cases through 

law enforcement agencies but has no investigative or prosecutorial authority. HOO’s Case Tracking 

Department informed SIGAR that it has referred 26 cases to the Attorney General’s Office, the Supreme 

Court, and the Ministry of Justice since the HOO’s inception. 
SIGAR Audit-10-2 High Office of Oversight Page 9 

The HOO legislation does not provide the HOO with adequate powers of enforcement. For example, the 

legislation does not contain criminal penalties for failure to submit asset declaration forms to the HOO 

or for lying on them. There is no provision in the legislation that formally obligates government agencies 

to report corruption to the HOO, nor are there any specified penalties for offices refusing to provide 

documents or information requested by the HOO, or for not complying with HOO advice or 

recommendations. 

International representatives have bemoaned the fact that the definition of corruption, as outlined in 

the current HOO law, does not mention nepotism. Nor is there anything in the existing Civil Service 

Code defining what constitutes conflicts of interest for civil servants or addressing the issue of making 

false claims.

There have been ongoing efforts conducted by the U.S. Department of State, the UNODC, UNDP and the 

U.K. Embassy to revise the HOO legislation to invest the HOO with greater authority and independence. 

A version of the draft revision is under consideration by the HOO at this time. However, there has been 

a growing concern that even the current revisions of the HOO legislation are insufficient to provide the 

HOO with sufficient tools to be an effective oversight institution, and that technical efforts at reforming 

the legislation must be accompanied by renewed engagement in a high level political process to ensure 

that reform is enacted. International partners representing HOO donors (the United States, the United 

Kingdom, and Norway) have recently determined that despite recent efforts in to draft a new law, the 

draft remains lacking in proper enforcement mechanisms for compliance, investigative powers, 

independence from the President, and a guaranteed budget. In addition, the draft revision lacks any 

obligation on the part of government institutions to report corruption. 

In light of fraud committed in the August 2009 presidential elections, as well as the current media 

attention directed toward the extent of corruption in Afghanistan, these international partners have 

indicated to SIGAR that the time is ripe to initiate a new and stronger process with the Afghan 

government for reform, not only of the HOO but for anti-corruption efforts in general. Establishing 

benchmarks as preconditions for international commitments of assistance could help lead to necessary 

reforms. 

Human Resource Challenges

In terms of human resources, the HOO’s organizational chart calls for a staff of approximately 500 

employees, including positions in the provinces which the HOO plans to fill in the future. However, the 

current number of employees is approximately 100, meaning that the HOO is only 20 percent staffed. 

Some 80 of the HOO’s current employees are holdovers from its predecessor organization, the General 

Independent Administration for Anti-Corruption,

7

 

7 According to a March 2009 USAID assessment, the General Independent Administration for Anti-Corruption was 

considered a failure and was eventually dissolved due to charges of corruption.

while the remaining 20 or so are made up of the new 

HOO leadership plus department managers and advisory staff. A clear example of the HOO’s lack of 

staffing is the Prevention Department, responsible for working with government ministries to simplify 

bureaucratic procedures, which only has two of its 26 authorized positions filled. An advisor for that 

department informed SIGAR that he often needed to borrow staff from other departments in order to 

perform the department’s tasks. Another example is the HOO Oversight Department which has filled 

only 10 out of its authorized 52 positions. Further, the Complaints Department did not have a database 

officer and the Strategy and Planning Department lacked a database developer to better enable 
SIGAR Audit-10-2 High Office of Oversight Page 10 

collection and processing of information (though the department advisor stated that they were in the 

process of recruiting one). As a result, work that would normally be accomplished via computers has 

been done manually for the past six months.

The discrepancies between authorized and actual numbers of positions are attributable to a number of 

factors. According to several HOO representatives, it is very difficult to recruit new staff with the 

requisite qualifications for positions because many salaries for positions in the Afghan Civil Service are 

not competitive. Also, some HOO managers indicated a disinclination to go too fast in the hiring process 

to help ensure that prospective employees first pass a vetting process and possess the necessary 

qualifications. Moreover, many of the HOO’s existing staff members had limited language and computer 

skills, and lacked capacity with respect to program monitoring and evaluation, and information 

gathering and interviewing techniques. Several department representatives informed SIGAR that some 

of their employees had only recently completed their education and may not be fully qualified. 

HOO management has been critical of the slowness of actions on the part of UNDP. For example, the 

HOO Deputy Director General informed SIGAR that recruitment for a UNDP advisor can take months and 

that there is a slow rate of delivery on procurement. 

To help mitigate some of these concerns, the HOO is currently working with the Afghan Civil Service 

Commission to implement a pay and grade system that would be merit-based and hopefully result in 

higher salaries including skills and performance-based pay increases. The HOO and UNDP are also 

considering a plan for a certain number of Afghan national positions to be funded by UNDP at higher 

salary rates than those of the Afghan Civil Service. In this case, the HOO would actually hire the 

candidates and the UNDP would have a say in candidate selection.

Operational Shortcomings

During the course of this audit, SIGAR noted a number of operational shortcomings on the part of the 

HOO. Following are some examples:

• Although the HOO has devised a strategy paper, it has not yet completed a concrete action plan 

with goals and measurable performance benchmarks. However, a HOO consultant has indicated 

that the HOO is in the process of completing its strategic plan. 

• Despite the fact that publishing annual reports of the HOO’s activities and making them 

available to the public is one of the prescribed duties in the HOO legislation, the HOO has not 

yet produced or published such a report. 

• Although HOO management indicates that, from the HOO’s inception to the present time it has 

submitted approximately 26 cases, along with evidence and documentation, to the Attorney 

General’s Office, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and various sections within the

Ministry of Justice, the Case Tracking Department was unable to provide SIGAR with information 

on whether those cases resulted in any prosecution, conviction, or sentencing. 

• Even HOO’s declared accomplishments suffer from gaps and limitations. For example, in 

accordance with the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund and UNCAC, the HOO has received 

approximately 78% of asset declaration forms requested from public officials. However, the 

HOO has not yet begun the process of verifying the assets to determine the accuracy of the 

declarations, having informed SIGAR that they are still trying to develop a strategy for asset 

verification. 
SIGAR Audit-10-2 High Office of Oversight Page 11 

• In addition, the HOO has not yet completed a written evaluation of the impact of its pilot project 

for vehicle registration reform. 

THE HOO NEEDS MORE COORDINATED SUPPORT AND COMMITMENT FROM THE UNITED 

STATES 

As a relatively new institution, the HOO faces considerable challenges in implementing the Afghan 

government’s anti-corruption strategy and is heavily dependent on the international community for 

assistance. According to its leadership, the HOO cannot perform its tasks alone and needs to 

collaborate with other institutions, especially U.S. organizations, since the United States is the largest 

contributor to reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. 

U.S. Government support for the HOO has been principally through USAID, which has budgeted just over 

$1 million through October 2009 to assist the HOO with start-up costs, computer support, training, 

equipment, media projects, and advisors. While other U.S. agencies have been involved in discussions 

concerning the HOO, they have offered little or no support in terms of funding or advice to the HOO. A 

notable exception has been a senior DoJ advisor who has provided advice and legal assistance with 

respect to drafting a revision to the HOO’s enabling legislation. However, that assistance has been on an 

ad hoc basis and narrowly focused. According to HOO leadership, the DoJ focuses primarily on the law 

enforcement side and needs to examine how to support an oversight and anti-corruption body like the 

HOO.

During an interview with SIGAR, the HOO Deputy Director General indicated that anti-corruption was 

not a big issue until this past year and that there was no clear U.S. Government strategy on how to be 

engaged in anti-corruption. With the increased attention given to corruption in Afghanistan by world 

leaders and the media, there has been more of a focus on the HOO, and its role in fighting corruption, 

within the U.S. Embassy community in Kabul. The first reported gathering by U.S. and international 

stakeholders to discuss matters related to the HOO and anti-corruption was held in May 2009 at the 

Norwegian Embassy, with a follow-on meeting in June 2009. However, despite this increased interest, 

no single agency or individual has been officially designated to lead or coordinate U.S. Government

efforts to build the HOO’s capacity to implement anti-corruption activities. 

The international community has demonstrated a significant interest in and commitment to the HOO. 

For example, the UNDP has committed $7.3 million over the next three years for HOO support through 

its ACT Project which provides the HOO with advisors, security, and rent for office space and vehicles. 

The ACT Project is supported by contributions from the United Kingdom, Norway, and Italy. 

Although international donors to the HOO made initial attempts to coordinate donor assistance by way 

of a HOO Working Group led by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, the departure of 

a key UNAMA staff member in September 2009 contributed to the Working Group’s demise after only a 

handful of meetings. The sessions were judged by participants (from USAID, UNODC, UNDP, and the 

Department of State) to be useful in preventing duplication of effort.

Members of HOO management have expressed the opinion that there has been insufficient leadership 

and coordination of donor assistance to the HOO, as well as no clear plan or demonstrated interest on 

the part of the U.S. government to support anti-corruption efforts. Their point of view is that donors are 
SIGAR Audit-10-2 High Office of Oversight Page 12 

not inviting the HOO to discuss needs or to make their intentions known. For example, the HOO Deputy 

Director General stated that USAID assistance provided to the HOO through the Asia Foundation, though 

instrumental for the start-up of the HOO, does not demonstrate a long term commitment. In addition, 

according to the Deputy Director General, USAID has not clearly indicated whether anti-corruption is a 

sector the agency is interested in supporting. He further stated that he would like for a U.S. government 

representative to provide dedicated anti-corruption support by actively engaging with the HOO, 

enabling a process whereby the HOO can articulate its needs and the U.S. government could then 

determine how best to support the HOO. Such determinations should be informed by a comprehensive 

report produced by a USAID contractor in March 2009 advising USAID on anti-corruption engagement in 

Afghanistan. 

Central leadership is a critical element that underpins the Government Performance and Results Act of 

1993 and a lead agency or coordinator can serve as a focal point for integrating multi-agency efforts and 

ensuring effective implementation. Without a designated leader or focal point for communicating with 

and coordinating U.S. Government assistance to the HOO, that assistance may not be as effective in 

achieving the anti-corruption goals desired by the Afghans, the U.S. Government, or the international 

community. Further, the Asia Foundation Project Advisor for assistance to the HOO expressed concern 

that some of the Afghan advisors hired by the foundation and seconded to the HOO (widely 

acknowledged to be a capable and talented group) might decide to seek employment elsewhere if they 

receive signals that donor assistance to the HOO will be discontinued.

One possible area in which the United States could provide meaningful and timely assistance might be 

the Provincial Committee for Redress (as a pilot project) that the HOO has discussed previously with U.S. 

officials. The concept for the project is to extend the complaints intake facility to the provinces, which 

would help provide credibility for the HOO outside of Kabul. HOO leadership would reportedly like to 

expand the concept into a proper plan and is looking for necessary resources and support. 

CONCLUSIONS

The HOO suffers from serious shortcomings as an institution both in terms of its operational capacity 

and the legislative framework on which it is based. Despite its efforts and limited progress to date, as 

well as some dedicated staff, the HOO faces great challenges in building its capacity to fulfill its 

ambitious mandate. The development of human and operational capacity of the HOO will amount to 

little unless it is coupled with substantial reform of the legislation meant to provide “teeth” to its 

mandate. The Afghan government has not invested the HOO with the appropriate authority or support 

to make it an effective oversight institution. An emerging body of opinion among some international 

partners is that the international community has not engaged the Afghan government in a political 

process to press for meaningful reform of the HOO. International efforts for capacity development of 

the HOO have indeed benefited the HOO in the first year of operations. However, the international 

community, and the U.S. government in particular, need to improve coordination of its efforts and to 

demonstrate a more focused commitment as well as a greater sense of urgency toward the HOO’s 

success. 

If the HOO is to succeed in its task to oversee and coordinate the National Anti-Corruption Strategy for 

Afghanistan, it must operate with clear and enhanced mechanisms of enforcement, investigation, and 

authority to support its daily responsibilities. It must benefit from organizational and external 
SIGAR Audit-10-2 High Office of Oversight Page 13 

(budgetary) independence and take steps to ensure personal independence. Finally, the HOO must 

develop and monitor the fulfillment of a clear set of performance benchmarks in conjunction with 

international partners.

RECOMMENDATIONS

SIGAR has developed the following five recommendations in order to address the issues identified in this

report. 

To help ensure the effective adoption and implementation of reform measures, SIGAR recommends that 

the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, in consultation with USAID, the HOO, and international partners: 

• Determine conditions on which to base future assistance, including the enactment of mutually 

agreeable legislative reforms based on key principles to enhance HOO’s authority and 

independence, and the establishment by the HOO of measureable performance benchmarks.

To remedy an impairment of personal independence on the part of HOO leadership, SIGAR recommends 

that the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, through appropriate diplomatic channels including the Joint 

Coordination and Monitoring Board: 

• Urge the HOO Director General and Deputy Director General to either resign from their 

presidential advisory positions or, alternatively, resign from their HOO positions.

To provide leadership to the U.S. Government assistance effort for the HOO, SIGAR recommends that 

the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan: 

• Designate an agency or individual to oversee assistance to the HOO, both in terms of 

institutional capacity building and legislative reform, in conjunction with international partners. 

To support the HOO in meeting performance benchmarks, SIGAR recommends that the U.S. Ambassador 

to Afghanistan: 

• Ensure that the designated agency or individual oversee the appointment of high-level advisors, 

such as judges or anti-corruption specialists, to be embedded at the HOO in order to provide 

sustained counsel, mentoring, and strategic advice to HOO leadership.

In order to improve coordination and avoid duplication of effort and assistance to the HOO among U.S. 

and international donors, SIGAR recommends that the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan: 

• Engage the international community to reinvigorate international donor coordination efforts, 

perhaps under the auspices of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. 
SIGAR Audit-10-2 High Office of Oversight Page 14 

COMMENTS 

The U.S. Embassy Kabul and the USAID Mission in Afghanistan provided joint written comments on a 

draft of this report. The comments are included in appendix II of this report. In their response, they

expressed joint concurrence with the report’s findings and recommendations. The U.S. Embassy Kabul 

and USAID Mission indicated their support for efforts to develop accountable and effective institutions 

across the Afghan government, as articulated in the draft anticorruption strategy currently under review 

in Washington. According to the Embassy’s Coordinating Director for Development and Economic 

Affairs and Acting USAID Mission Director, that strategy envisions a substantial transformation of the 

HOO along the lines recommended by the SIGAR report. In its written response, the U.S. Embassy Kabul

and USAID Mission indicated strong support for each of the recommendations in the draft report and 

outlined actions that it had already taken, or which it planned to take, in response to those 

recommendations. The U.S. Embassy Kabul and USAID Mission in Afghanistan also provided technical 

comments which SIGAR has incorporated into this report, as appropriate. 

SIGAR also provided a draft of this report to the HOO for review and comment, but the HOO did not 

provide any written comments. 
SIGAR Audit-10-2 High Office of Oversight Page 15 

APPENDIX I: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This report discusses the results of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction’s review of U.S. and other donor efforts to strengthen the capability of Afghanistan’s 

High Office of Oversight (HOO) to oversee the implementation of Afghanistan’s anti-corruption strategy. 

To identify assistance provided by the United States and other donors to strengthen the institutional 

development of the HOO, we reviewed documentation from and conducted interviews with responsible 

officials at the U.S. Embassy-Kabul, including officials from the U.S. Departments of State and Justice, as 

well as the U.S. Agency for International Development. We also interviewed international and nongovernmental providers and coordinators of assistance to the HOO, including the UN Office of Drugs and 

Crime, the UN Development Program, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, the Asia Foundation, 

the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, and the Government of Norway.

To assess the capabilities and performance of the HOO in fulfilling its mandate, we reviewed relevant 

U.S., Afghan, and international laws, conventions, standards, and development strategies. We 

conducted interviews with HOO leadership, management and advisory staff, including the Director 

General and Deputy Director General of the HOO, and advisors and heads of eight HOO departments 

and an international consultant embedded with the HOO. 

To assess the effectiveness of U.S. assistance to the HOO, we utilized information obtained through the 

documents and interviews described above and developed conclusions based on that evidence. After 

identifying gaps in the HOO’s legislative framework and operational shortcomings, we compared those 

findings with the provision of U.S. assistance to determine whether that assistance might effectively 

assist the HOO in filling those gaps and overcoming the shortcomings.

This report is part of a series of SIGAR audits addressing U.S. efforts to combat corruption and 

strengthen the rule of law. We conducted work in Kabul, Afghanistan, and Washington, D.C. from 

September to November 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

These standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence 

to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. The audit was conducted by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as 

amended. 
SIGAR Audit-10-2 High Office of Oversight Page 16 

APPENDIX II: COMMENTS FROM U.S. EMBASSY-KABUL AND USAID/AFGHANISTAN
SIGAR Audit-10-2 High Office of Oversight Page 17 
SIGAR Audit-10-2 High Office of Oversight Page 18 
SIGAR Audit-10-2 High Office of Oversight Page 19 

(This report was conducted under audit project code SIGAR-011A).
SIGAR Audit-10-2 High Office of Oversight Page 20 

_________________________________________________________________________________

SIGAR’s Mission The mission of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction is to enhance oversight of programs for the 

reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent and 

objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of 

taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to provide 

accurate and balanced information, evaluations, analysis, and 

recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, U.S. agencies, and 

other decision-makers to make informed oversight, policy, and 

funding decisions to:

• improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction strategy 

and its component programs;

• improve management and accountability over funds 

administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their 

contractors;

• improve contracting and contract management processes;

• prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and

• advance U.S. interests in reconstructing Afghanistan.

Obtaining Copies of SIGAR To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to 

Reports and Testimonies SIGAR’s Web site (www.sigar.mil). SIGAR posts all released 

 reports, testimonies, and correspondence on its Web site.

To Report Fraud, Waste, and To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

Abuse in Afghanistan allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and

Reconstruction Programs reprisal contact SIGAR’s hotline:

 

• Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud

• Email: hotline@sigar.mil

• Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700-10-7300

• Phone DSN Afghanistan 318-237-2575

• Phone International: +1-866-329-8893

• Phone DSN International: 312-664-0378

• U.S. fax: +1-703-604-0983

Public Affairs Public Affairs Officer

• Phone: 703-602-8742 

• Email: PublicAffairs@sigar.mil 

• Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs

400 Army Navy Drive

Arlington, VA 22202