No. 80-75 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1980 

IN THE MATTER OF R.P.S. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Yellowstone. 

Honorable Diane G. Barz, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Harold Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana 

Robert 5. Waller argued, Deputy County Attorney, 

Billings, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Olsen, Christensen and Gannett, Billings, Montana 

Damon L. Gannett argued, Billings, Montana 

Submitted: May 29, 1980 

Decided : &Jr\l 2 4 1989 

1 

Filed: jUN 2 4 19QD 
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

The State initiated this action on November 15, 1979, 

by filing a petition in Youth Court, Yellowstone County, 

alleging R.P.S. was a delinquent by having committed the 

crimes of deliberate homicide and sexual intercourse without 

consent. On November 26, 1979, counsel for R.P.S. filed a 

motion to suppress a confession made by R.P.S. and all 

physical evidence related to the confession. A hearing on 

the motion was held the next day. R.P.S. presented evidence 

in support of the motion including a psychological evaluation. The State was given time to present rebuttal testimony and was granted permission to have an independent 

examination of R.P.S. The State presented its rebuttal 

testimony on December 17, 1979. The testimony included a 

psychiatric evaluation of R.P.S. 

The Youth Court, the Honorable Diane G. Barz presiding, 

subsequently entered an order granting the motion to suppress the confession and all physical evidence derived as a 

result of the confession. The court found the evidence 

should be suppressed because R.P.S. was incapable of making 

a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional 

rights at the time of the confession and because law enforcement personnel had failed to comply with Montana's Youth 

Court Act by obtaining a waiver of rights from R.P.S.'s 

parents prior to the confession. The State brings this 

appeal from the order of the Youth Court. 

On November 14, 1979, R.P.S. went to the Yellowstone 

County sheriff's office at the request of a sheriff's officer. R.P.S. was 18 years old on that date, having turned 

18 on October 19, 1979. The alleged offenses contained in 
the petition filed in this case occurred on October 9, 1979, 

before R.P.S. was 18. 

R.P.S. arrived at the sheriff's office at about 7:OO 

p.m. Between 7:00 p.m. and approximately 11:30 p.m. that 

evening, R.P.S. was interviewed several times by sheriff's 

officers. He also took a polygraph examination. R.P.S. 

signed several waiver of rights forms and a consent form for 

the polygraph test during the evening. R.P.S. confessed to 

the crimes charged during the interview sessions. The 

following day he accompanied officers to the scene of the 

crimes and assisted them in locating several pieces of 

physical evidence connected with the crimes. 

At the direction of Yellowstone County attorney Harold 

Hanser, the sheriff's officers interviewing R.P.S. treated 

him as an adult. They did not, therefore, gain a waiver of 

rights form from his parents as required by the Montana 

Youth Court Act. See section 41-5-303, MCA. In fact, 

R.P.S.'s mother called the sheriff's office several times 

during the interview sessions. Each time officers told her 

she could not talk to R.P.S. 

Two expert witnesses testified at the suppression 

hearing concerning psychological evaluations they had performed of R.P.S. Dr. Ned Tranel testified that R.P.S. was 

schizophrenic. Dr. Tranel stated that because of his mental 

condition, there was a high probability that R.P.S. could 

not understand the abstract terms contained in the Miranda 

warnings or understand the consequences of making statements 

to the officers after being advised of his rights. Dr. 

Tranel was of the opinion that R.P.S. was incapable of 

making a knowing and intelligent waiver of his ~0n~tit~tioIlal 

rights at the time he allegedly did so. 
Dr. Bryce Hughett also testified as to the mental 

condition of R.P.S. Dr. Hughett found no evidence of thought 

disorder present. He stated that R.P.S. was capable of 

understanding the Miranda warnings and of making a knowing 

and intelligent waiver of his rights at the time the officers 

interviewed him. 

The State raises the following issues on appeal: 

1. Did the Youth Court err in finding that R.P.S. was 

incapable of voluntarily waiving his constitutional rights? 

2. Did theYouthCourt err in suppressing the confession and all evidence obtained as a result of the confession 

because law enforcement personnel did not treat R.P.S. as a 

youth and obtain a waiver of rights from his parents? 

Addressing the first issue, we note that the rules 

governing the review of a lower court's determination of the 

voluntariness of a confession are well established in Montana. 

The issue of voluntariness is largely a factual determination 

for the trial court. The trial court's judgment will not be 

Cisturbed on appeal unless it is clearly against the weight 

of the evidence. State v. Blakney (1979), - Mont. , 605 

P.2d 1093, 1096, 36 St.Rep. 2193, 2196; State v. Grimestad 

(1979) , - Mont. - , 598 P.2d 198, 202, 36 St.Rep. 1245, 

1251. As we stated in Grimestad: 

". . . the standard to be applied by the trial 

judge on a suppression question is 'preponderance 

of the evidence', but when the same question 

comes to us on appeal the credibility of the 

witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony is for the trial court's determination and 

our review is limited to determining whether 

there is substantial credible evidence supporting the District Court's findings." 598 P.2d at 

203, 36 St.Rep. at 1251. 

Under this standard, we must examine the record for 

substantial credible evidence to support the trial court's 
decision. The evidence that supports the decision is found 

mainly in the testimony of Dr. Tranel. Dr. Tranel testified 

that R.P.S. suffered from a severe emotional disturbance 

technically diagnosed as schizophrenic reaction, acute 

undifferentiated type. Dr. Tranel stated one consequence of 

R.P.S.'s emotional disturbance was a severely impaired 

ability to form logical conclusions, understand cause-effect 

relationships and concentrate. Dr. Tranel said this resulted 

in R.P.S.'s normal functioning being similar to that of a 

person in a dream. A second feature of R.P.S.'s emotional 

disturbance, according to Dr. Tranel, was a disconnection 

between his emotion and the idea associated with it. As an 

example of this feature of R.P.S.'s disorder, Dr. Tranel 

said R.P.S. may not have the unpleasant feeling normally 

associated with experiencing an unpleasant event. Beyond 

the schizophrenic condition, Dr. Tranel testified that 

R.P.S. had a low level of ego strength. The doctor said 

this meant that R.P.S. would "come apart quite easily" under 

stress. Based on this diagnosis, Dr. Tranel stated he did 

not think R.P.S. could have understood the Miranda warnings 

given to him, especially at the end of over four hours of 

interrogation. 

There is conflicting evidence on the record. Dr. 

Hughett testified that R.P.S. showed no signs of schizophrenia when he interviewed him. Dr. Hughett also stated 

that the results of one of the tests administered by Dr. 

Tranel indicated R.P.S. was consciously or unconsciously 

attempting to make his mental condition appear worse than it 

was. 

In resolving this conflict in the testimony, the trial 

court assessed the testimony of Dr. Hughett as follows: 
"~r. Hughett, through his testimony, failed to 

convince the Court that the youth in question 

was not suffering from any mental defect, which 

would have impaired his ability to make an intelligent, voluntary waiver of his rights." 

As pointed out above, the determination of the credibility 

of the witnesses is for the trial court. 

Thus, the f sllowing situation exists here. Two experts 

testified as to the mental condition of R.P.S. Their testimony conflicted. The trial court found the testimony of the 

expert who found R.P.S. capable of voluntarily waiving his 

rights unconvincing and based its decision on the testimony 

of Dr. Tranel set out above. We have reviewed Dr. Tranel's 

testimony. It i.s very thorough and definitely supports the 

conclusion that R.P.S. was incapable of voluntarily waiving 

his constitutional rights. Further, according to the trial 

court, Dr. Tranel's testimony is more credible than Dr. 

Hughett's testimony. Dr. Tranel's testimony, therefore, 

represents substantial credible evidence on the record to 

support the decision of the trial court. As such, we affirm 

the order of the trial court suppressing R.P.S.'s confession 

and all physical evidence obtained as a result of the confession because R.P.S. did not make a voluntary waiver of 

his rights. 

Having determined the evidence in question must be 

suppressed because R.P.S. did not voluntarily waive his 

constitutional rights, it is unnecessary to consider the 

second issue raised by the State. 

A£ firmed. 
We concur: 

Justices