IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

2022-NCCOA-205

No. COA21-357

Filed 5 April 2022

Property Tax Commission, Nos. 20 PTC 0239, 20 PTC 0240, 20 PTC 0241

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEALS OF: 

POP Capitol Towers, LP,

P&L Coliseum Residential Developer, LLC,

P&L Coliseum, LP.

Appeal by Taxpayers from orders of dismissal entered 28 January 2021 by the 

North Carolina Property Tax Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15

December 2021.

The Hillis Firm LLC, by Lindsey Walker Hillis, for Taxpayers-Appellants.

Ruff Bond Cobb Wade & Bethune, LLP, by Ronald L. Gibson and Robert S. 

Adden, Jr., for Appellee Mecklenburg County.

JACKSON, Judge.

¶ 1 POP Capitol Towers, LP (“POP”), P&L Coliseum Residential Developer, LLC

(“P&L Developer”), and P&L Coliseum, LP (“P&L”) (collectively “Taxpayers”) argue 

that their notices of appeal to the Property Tax Commission (the “Commission”) were 

timely because (1) the notices of decision were not properly mailed in compliance with

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-290(e), and (2) emergency COVID-19 orders issued by our 

Supreme Court and the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) extended the 
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filing deadlines for their notices of appeal. After careful review, we reject Taxpayers’

arguments and affirm the Commission’s orders of dismissal.

I. Background

¶ 2 This case deals with three property tax appeals from the Mecklenburg County 

Board of Equalization and Review (the “Board”) to the Commission. In 2019, 

Taxpayers each received property valuations from the Commission, which they 

disputed. Thereafter, Taxpayers appealed the valuations to the Board. 

¶ 3 On 28 February 2020, a Notice of Decision by the Board, dated 2 March 2020, 

was mailed to each Taxpayer at their respective addresses. The notices of decision 

were mailed by South Data, a private company contracted by the Mecklenburg 

County Assessor’s Office for mailing services. On 30 March 2020, Taxpayers mailed 

a Notice of Appeal and Application for Hearing for each property to the Commission, 

the Mecklenburg County Assessors’ Office, and the Mecklenburg County’s attorney. 

The notices of appeal were mailed through the United States Postal Service, but the 

envelopes containing the notices were not postmarked. The appeals were received 

and filed with the Commission on 6 April 2020.

¶ 4 On 8 April 2020, the Commission mailed an acknowledgment of the appeals to 

the Taxpayers, stating that the appeals were untimely and assigning the following 

case numbers: 20 PTC 239 for appellant POP, 20 PTC 240 for appellant P&L 

Developer, and 20 PTC 241 for appellant P&L. On 9 September 2020, Mecklenburg 
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County (the “County”) filed and served a Motion to Dismiss the Taxpayers’ appeals 

in each case. The motions to dismiss attached an affidavit of B. Mallard, Project 

Manager for South Data. 

¶ 5 In her affidavit, Ms. Mallard stated that (1) part of her job was to oversee 

mailings from the County, (2) she personally reviewed the files for mailing, including 

the Board’s notices of decision to the Taxpayers in these cases, and (3) the Board’s 

notices of decision dated 2 March 2020 were mailed on 28 February 2020. 

¶ 6 On 25 November 2020, Taxpayers filed responses in opposition to the County’s 

motions to dismiss. Taxpayers asserted, inter alia, that (1) the Board failed to 

properly mail the notices in compliance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-290(e), and (2) 

their appeals were timely filed under the emergency COVID-19 orders issued by the 

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

¶ 7 The motions were heard before the Commission on 9 December 2020. After 

receiving arguments from the parties’ counsel, the Commission granted the County’s 

motions to dismiss the appeals. On 28 January 2021, the Commission entered an 

Order of Dismissal for each appeal. 

¶ 8 The Commission made the following findings of fact for each Taxpayer:

2. . . . the Board mailed notice of its decision to the 

Appellant by letter dated March 2, 2020. The Appellant 

contends that the Board did not actually mail notice of its 

decision to the Appellant, because the Board contracted 

with a third party vendor to provide mailing services in 
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connection with its notice of decision. While we do not find 

this argument to be persuasive, we note that there is no 

dispute that the notice was actually received by the 

appellant, and we note further that the notice of appeal 

filed with the Commission is marked as signed by the 

Appellant’s attorney on March 30, 2020. Accordingly, we 

find that the Board’s notice of decision was mailed by letter 

dated March 2, 2020. 

3. April 1, 2020 is thirty days after March 2, 2020.

4. On April 6, 2020, the Property Tax Commission 

received a notice of appeal filed by the Appellant, appealing 

the Board’s decision. 

5. The Appellant’s notice of appeal was submitted to 

the Property Tax Commission by United States mail, but 

the envelope containing the notice was not postmarked. 

¶ 9 The Commission also made the following conclusions of law:

2. Because the Board mailed its notice of decision to the 

property owner by letter dated March 2, 2020, N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 105-290(e) requires a notice of appeal from said 

decision to have been filed with the Commission by April 1, 

2020. 

3. . . . While orders issuing from the Supreme Court and 

from the Chief Justice clearly apply to the various divisions 

of the General Court of Justice, the Commission is an 

administrative agency, and not a part of the State’s court 

system. Therefore, such orders are inapplicable to the 

deadlines created by the General Assembly for the 

administrative process of appeals before the Commission. 

. . .

5. . . . Even if we were to assume that the appeal was 

mailed on March 30, 2020, the statute defines the date of 

filing as the earlier of the date actually received or the date 
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postmarked by the United States Postal Service. Without

a postmark, the date of mailing is irrelevant. 

6. Because the notice of appeal was submitted by 

United States mail; was received in the office of the 

Commission on April 6, 2020; and did not bear a postmark 

stamped by the United States Postal Service, the appeal is 

considered filed on April 6, 2020. 

. . .

8. Because the Appellant did not perfect the appeal 

from the Board within the time required by the statute, the 

Commission has no jurisdiction to hear the Appellant’s 

appeal.

¶ 10 Taxpayers timely filed their notices of appeal to this Court in each case. 

Because the appeals are based on the same facts and issues of law, the parties have 

agreed to consolidate the three appeals before this Court.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

We review decisions of the Commission pursuant to 

N.C.G.S. § 105-345.2. Questions of law receive de novo

review, while issues such as sufficiency of the evidence to 

support the Commission’s decision are reviewed under the 

whole-record test. Under a de novo review, the court 

considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own 

judgment for that of the Commission.

In re Greens of Pine Glen LP, 356 N.C. 642, 646-47, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003) 

(citations omitted). Here, the issues advanced by Taxpayers are questions of law and 

therefore receive de novo review by this Court. 
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B. “Time Limit for Appeals” to the Board under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-290(e)

¶ 11 North Carolina General Statute § 105-290(e) requires a notice of appeal to be 

filed with the Commission “within 30 days after the date the board mailed a notice of 

its decision to the property owner.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-290(e) (2021). 

A notice of appeal submitted to the Property Tax 

Commission by United States mail is considered to be filed 

on the date shown on the postmark stamped by the United 

States Postal Service. If an appeal submitted by United 

States mail is not postmarked or the postmark does not 

show the date of mailing, the appeal is considered to be 

filed on the date it is received in the office of the 

Commission. A property owner who files an appeal with 

the Commission has the burden of proving that the appeal 

is timely.

Id. § 105-290(g). Here, it is undisputed that the Taxpayers’ notices of appeal were 

not postmarked by the United States Postal Service and were not delivered to the 

Commission until after the 30-day window had passed. 

¶ 12 We previously dealt with this postmarking issue in In re Appeal of Bass Income 

Fund, where we held that “a notice of appeal submitted to the Commission via the 

Postal Service, but which does not bear a postmark stamped by the Service, is 

considered filed only upon receipt by the Commission.” 115 N.C. App. 703, 705, 446 

S.E.2d 594, 596 (1994) (emphasis in original). This Court acknowledged that “it is 

our duty to apply legislation as written, whatever our opinion may be as to its efficacy 

or as to the hardship it may impose in individual cases.” Id. at 706, 246 S.E.2d at 
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596. See also In re Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E. 2d 30, 37 (1989) (“Where 

a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, 

a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been 

overturned by a higher court.”).

¶ 13 Here, it is undisputed that the Taxpayers received the Board’s notices of 

decision, which were mailed by letter dated 2 March 2020. Therefore, § 105-290(e) 

requires that Taxpayers must have filed notice of appeal by 1 April 2020, which is 30 

days after the notices of decision were mailed, for their appeals to be timely. Although 

the notices of appeal were apparently signed and mailed by Taxpayers on 30 March 

2020, the Commission did not actually receive the Taxpayers’ notices of appeal until 

6 April 2020. Because the notices of appeal were “not postmarked or the postmark 

does not show the date of mailing, the appeal is considered to be filed on the date it 

is received in the office of the Commission[,]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-290(g), which in 

this case is 6 April 2020, beyond the 30-day statutory window. 

¶ 14 Taxpayers, however, advance two arguments1 that their notices of appeals 

 

1 We note that Taxpayers also briefly argue that “there is no evidence the [Board] ever 

mailed the decision to the property owner[,]” and dispute the admission of Ms. Mallard’s 

affidavit, which they claim does not meet the business records exception for hearsay. Putting 

aside any information from the affidavit, it is undisputed that the Taxpayers actually 

received the Board’s notices of decision, which were dated 2 March 2020. Therefore, even 

assuming the affidavit was inadmissible, any error from the Commission here would be 

harmless given that the notices themselves, which are signed and acknowledged by 

Taxpayers’ attorney in their notices of appeal on 30 March 2020, prove the decisions were 

issued and received.
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were timely: (1) the Board’s notices of decision were not properly mailed in compliance 

with § 105-290(e); and (2) emergency COVID-19 orders issued by our Supreme Court 

and the OAH extended the filing deadlines for their notices of appeal. We carefully 

review and reject both arguments. 

C. Mailing the Notices of Decision under § 105-290(e)

¶ 15 Here, there is no dispute that the Taxpayers actually received the Board’s 

notices of decision, and that the Board actually issued the notices of decision. The 

only dispute is over the delivery method of the notices, specifically the Taxpayers’ 

argument that the Board is required to conduct its own mailings or specifically 

appoint mailing duties and then oversee the delivery of its notices. 

¶ 16 As previously mentioned, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-290(e) provides that “notice of 

appeal from an order of . . . a board of equalization and review shall be filed with the 

Property Tax Commission within 30 days after the date the board mailed a notice of 

its decision to the property owner.” Taxpayers argue that the Board’s notices of 

decision were not mailed in compliance with this statute, because the Board allowed 

the Mecklenburg Assessor’s Office to conduct its mailings, and the Assessor’s Office 

hired South Data, a private third-party, to mail the notices. Taxpayers interpret 

§ 105-290(e)’s language quite literally to mean that the Board, or presumably its 

members, must physically mail its notices of decision. We disagree and hold that the 

notices were mailed in accordance with the statute. 
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When engaging in statutory interpretation, our Supreme 

Court has explained the primary rule of statutory 

construction is that the intent of the legislature controls 

the interpretation of a statute. The foremost task in 

statutory interpretation is to determine legislative intent 

while giving the language of the statute its natural and 

ordinary meaning unless the context requires otherwise. 

Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, 

the Court does not engage in judicial construction but must 

apply the statute to give effect to the plain and definite 

meaning of the language.

Bryant v. Wake Forest Univ. Baptist Med. Ctr., 2022-NCCOA-89, ¶33 (citing Carolina 

Power & Light Co. v. City of Asheville, 358 N.C. 512, 518, 597 S.E.2d 717, 722 (2004))

(emphasis added, internal marks omitted). 

¶ 17 First, Taxpayers argue that we should strictly construe the language of the 

statute to mean that only the Board may mail the notices of decision because the 

language reads “the date the board mailed a notice of its decision.” N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§ 105-290(e) (2021). Taxpayers argue that the plain meaning of “the board mailed” 

is that the Board must do the physical mailing, and that we should attribute great 

weight to this precise wording, which could have otherwise read “the date the decision 

was mailed” or “the date the taxpayer was notified.” Taxpayers, however, ignore the 

context of the statutory language at issue.

¶ 18 While it is true, as in Bass Income Fund, that “it is our duty to apply legislation 

as written,” it is also equally true that in statutory interpretation the “foremost task 

. . . is to determine legislative intent[.]” Bryant, 2022-NCCOA-89, ¶33. If we were to 
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construe the language of § 105-290(e) to mean that only the Board or its members

may physically mail notices, as the Taxpayers contend, we would be ignoring the 

purpose behind of § 105-290(e) in favor of a potentially nonsensical interpretation. 

The language at issue must be examined in its context. Section 105-290 is titled 

“Appeals to Property Tax Commission” and subsection 105-290(e) is titled “Time 

Limits for Appeals.” Out of context, Taxpayers creatively argue that the language 

specifically requires the Board to mail the notices, but we do not believe our 

legislature intended to create such strict mailing procedures for the Board.

¶ 19 If our legislature intended for the Board to conduct its own mailings, as 

Taxpayers contend, this duty would have been specified under § 105-322(g) with the 

Board’s other statutory duties. Subsection 105-322(g), which designates the “Powers 

and Duties” of the Board, mentions the following about mailings under subdivision 

105-322(g)(2), “Duty to Hear Taxpayer Appeals”:

a. A request for a hearing under this subdivision (g)(2) 

shall be made in writing to or by personal appearance 

before the board prior to its adjournment. However, if the 

taxpayer requests review of a decision made by the board 

under the provisions of subdivision (g)(1), above, notice of 

which was mailed fewer than 15 days prior to the board’s 

adjournment, the request for a hearing thereon may be 

made within 15 days after the notice of the board’s decision

was mailed.

. . .

d. On the basis of its decision after any hearing 
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conducted under this subdivision (g)(2), the board shall 

adopt and have entered in its minutes an order reducing, 

increasing, or confirming the appraisal appealed or listing 

or removing from the tax lists the property whose omission 

or listing has been appealed. The board shall notify the 

appellant by mail as to the action taken on the taxpayer’s 

appeal not later than 30 days after the board’s 

adjournment.

Id. § 105-322(g)(2)(a), (d) (emphases added). The passive construction of “the board’s 

decision was mailed” and complementary phrase “shall notify the appellant by mail” 

characteristically omit the subject who must do the mailing. The statute makes clear

that the Board has the duty to notify the taxpayer and that such notification must be 

mailed, but the statute leaves flexible what procedure the Board must follow when 

conducting its mailings. 

¶ 20 Moreover, Taxpayers’ argument fails to consider the functionality of the Board 

from a practical standpoint. The Board is comprised of voluntary members. In a 

county such as Mecklenburg, one of the largest in the State, the Board likely issues 

thousands of notices to property owners every year. Surely our legislature did not 

intend when enacting § 105-290(e) that the entire Board, or even one of its voluntary 

members, must personally visit the United States Postal Service to drop off the 

thousands of notices of decision in order for those notices to be valid. 

¶ 21 Second, Taxpayers argue in their brief that “nothing in N.C.G.S. § 105-322 

grants the [Board] authority to delegate its duties to an off-site non-governmental 
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third-party to mail its decision to the property owner[,]” and that “[h]ad the 

Legislature intended to allow the ‘board’ to outsource that [mailing] responsibility to 

a third-party entity, the statute would have provided such an option.” However, 

Taxpayers later move away from this stance, conceding at oral argument that the 

Board may appoint third parties to conduct its mailings, but only if the Board still 

specifically oversees the mailings. Taxpayers then urge that the Board’s delivery 

method here exceeded its statutory authority, because there is no record evidence 

that the Board specifically appointed the Assessor’s Office or South Data to conduct 

its mailings and likewise no evidence exists that the Board oversaw the mailings in 

this case.

¶ 22 While the statute does not specify who must drop the Board’s mail off at the 

Post Office, the statute neither expressly nor impliedly prohibits the Board, or the 

assessor, from employing third-parties to assist in delivering its mail. The statute 

does, however, specifically appoint the assessor as clerk to the Board. N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§ 105-322(d) (“The assessor shall serve as clerk to the board of equalization and 

review[.]”). Additionally, in a provision about the assessor’s powers and duties, the 

statute provides that “[the county assessor] shall perform the duties imposed upon 

him by law, and he shall have and exercise all powers reasonably necessary in the 

performance of his duties not inconsistent with the Constitution or the laws of this 

State.” Id. § 105-296(a). We reject the argument that the Board needed to expressly 
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appoint the assessor to conduct its mailings when the statute clearly designates the 

assessor as the clerk to the Board. We also find no basis to hold that the Board must 

then supervise the assessor in mailing the notices in order for them to be valid. 

¶ 23 Because the notices of decision were valid and the Taxpayers’ appeals were not 

timely, the Commission correctly determined it did not have jurisdiction to hear the 

Taxpayers’ appeals. In re Appeal of La. Pac. Corp., 208 N.C. App. 457, 461-62, 703 

S.E.2d 190, 193 (2010) (holding that if the taxpayer fails to perfect its appeal under 

the statute, the Commission is deprived of jurisdiction). We therefore affirm the 

Commission’s decision to grant the County’s motions to dismiss. 

D. COVID-19 Emergency Orders

¶ 24 Taxpayers further argue that the deadline to file their notices of appeal was 

tolled by the emergency COVID-19 orders issued by the North Carolina Supreme 

Court (“NCSC Orders”), or alternatively, the emergency COVID-19 order issued by 

the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH Order”).

¶ 25 On 19 March 2020, former Chief Justice Cheri Beasley of our Supreme Court 

entered an emergency order stating,

I order that all pleadings, motions, notices, and other 

documents and papers that were or are due to be filed in 

any county of this state on or after 16 March 2020 and 

before the close of business on 17 April 2020 in civil actions, 

criminal actions, estates, and special proceedings shall be 

deemed to be timely filed if they are filed before the close 

of business on 17 April 2020.
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On 27 March 2020, our Supreme Court imposed another order extending all 

“[d]eadlines imposed by the Rules of Appellate Procedure that fall between 27 March

2020 and 30 April 2020” for 60 days. On 13 April 2020, our Supreme Court extended 

the 19 March Order and clarified that the order applied to “documents and papers 

due to be filed and acts due to be done in the trial courts.”

¶ 26 Taxpayers argue that the NCSC Orders tolled the deadline on their notices of 

appeal, because “[t]he Property Tax Commission is a trial court[.]” We disagree and 

hold that the Commission is an administrative agency, not a trial court. 

¶ 27 Article IV of our Constitution allows the General Assembly to confer 

reasonably necessary judicial powers to administrative agencies but does not allow 

the establishment of courts outside of this Article. Article IV reads, in part, as follows:

Section 1. Judicial power. The judicial power of the State 

shall, except as provided in Section 3 of this Article, be 

vested in a Court for the Trial of Impeachments and in a 

General Court of Justice. The General Assembly shall 

have no power to deprive the judicial department of any 

power or jurisdiction that rightfully pertains to it as a coordinate department of the government, nor shall it 

establish or authorize any courts other than as permitted 

by this Article.

Section 2. General Court of Justice. The General Court of 

Justice shall constitute a unified judicial system for 

purposes of jurisdiction, operation, and administration, 

and shall consist of an Appellate Division, a Superior Court 

Division, and a District Court Division.

Section 3. Judicial powers of administrative agencies. The 
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General Assembly may vest in administrative agencies 

established pursuant to law such judicial powers as may be 

reasonably necessary as an incident to the accomplishment 

of the purposes for which the agencies were created. 

Appeals from administrative agencies shall be to the 

General Court of Justice.

N.C. Const. art. IV, §§ 1-3. 

¶ 28 The conference of judicial power on an administrative agency is, therefore, not 

the establishment of a court, which our General Assembly is expressly not authorized 

to do outside of Article IV. For example, in State ex rel. N.C. Utilities Comm’n v. Old 

Fort Finishing Plant, our Supreme Court addressed whether it had jurisdiction to 

review decisions of the Utilities Commission on direct appeal. 264 N.C. 416, 417, 142 

S.E.2d 8, 9 (1965). In doing so, the Court remarked that the Utilities Commission, “a 

creature of the General Assembly, is an administrative agency of the State with such 

powers and duties as are given to it by statute. These powers and duties are of a dual 

nature—supervisory or regulatory and judicial.” Id. at 420, 142 S.E.2d at 11 (internal 

marks and citation omitted). The Court ultimately concluded that the General 

Assembly did not have authority under Article IV to allow direct appeals from 

“administrative agencies to the Supreme Court without prior appeal to and review by 

a lower court within the General Court of Justice.” Id. at 422, 142 S.E.2d at 13. But 

see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-29(b) (enacting that certain appeals from the Utilities 

Commission now go directly to our Supreme Court, modified after the decision in Old 
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Fort Finishing Plant). In doing so, the Court held that:

[a]dministrative agencies referred to in Section 3 of Article 

IV ex vi termini are distinguished from courts. They are 

not constituent parts of the General Court of Justice. 

Section 1 of Article IV provides expressly that the General 

Assembly shall have no power to establish or authorize any 

courts other than as permitted by this Article.

Id., at 422, 142 S.E.2d at 12 (internal marks omitted). 

¶ 29 Administrative agencies, even if quasi-judicial, are also not considered trial 

courts for purposes of limitations periods. See Ocean Hill Joint Venture v. N.C. Dep’t 

of Env’t, Health & Nat. Res., 333 N.C. 318, 321, 426 S.E.2d 274, 276 (1993). In Ocean 

Hill, the Department of Natural Resources and Community Development (the 

“Department”) sent a Notice of Violation to Ocean Hill for violations of the 

Sedimentation Pollution Control Act. Id. at 319, 426 S.E.2d at 275. After being 

assessed with a civil penalty, Ocean Hill filed a petition for a contested case hearing 

with the OAH. Id. at 319-20, 426 S.E.2d at 275. Our Supreme Court again relied on 

Article IV, Section 3 of our Constitution to hold that “the grant of limited judicial 

authority to an administrative agency does not transform the agency into a court for 

purposes of the statute of limitations.” Id. at 321, 426 S.E.2d at 276. The Court 

concluded that an administrative assessment of a civil penalty by the Department 

was “not the institution of an action or proceeding in a court[,]” and therefore the

limitations period under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-54 did not apply. Id. at 321, 324, 426 
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S.E.2d at 276, 278. 

¶ 30 In further applying Ocean Hill, our Supreme Court has suggested that the 

Property Tax Commission is an administrative agency, not a trial court. See In re 

Twin Cnty. Motorsports, Inc., 367 N.C. 613, 617, 766 S.E.2d 832, 835 (2014). In Twin 

County, the Court concluded that “an appearance by a nonattorney before an 

administrative hearing officer does not constitute the unauthorized practice of law[.]” 

Id. In doing so, the Court drew a parallel between appearing before an administrative 

hearing officer to appearing before the Property Tax Commission, remarking that its

conclusion . . . is in line with recent legislative action. The 

North Carolina General Assembly has recently provided 

that, in contested cases before the Office of Administrative 

Hearings (OAH) and in appeals to the Property Tax 

Commission, a business entity may represent itself using a 

nonattorney representative. While not directly governing 

the matter sub judice because the legislation applies to 

contested cases before the OAH and appeals to the 

Property Tax Commission . . . , the passage of this 

legislation is consistent with our conclusion that a 

nonattorney’s appearance before an administrative 

hearing officer does not constitute the unauthorized 

practice of law under N.C.G.S. § 84-4.

Id. (cleaned up). 

¶ 31 In describing the appeals process for property tax assessments, we have 

previously explained:

North Carolina law provides two avenues by which a 

taxpayer may seek relief from an unjust property tax 

assessment: administrative review followed by judicial 
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review in the Court of Appeals, and direct judicial review 

in Superior or District court. Administrative review begins 

in the County Board of Equalization and Review. . . . Any 

taxpayer who wishes to except to an order of the County 

Board shall appeal to the State Property Tax Commission. 

In turn, a taxpayer who is unsatisfied with the decision of 

the Property Tax Commission shall appeal to the North 

Carolina Court of Appeals, and then to the North Carolina 

Supreme Court.

Johnston v. Gaston County, 71 N.C. App. 707, 709, 323 S.E.2d 381, 382 (1984) 

(emphases added) (citations omitted). See also Brock v. N.C. Prop. Tax Comm’n, 290 

N.C. 731, 737, 228 S.E.2d 254, 258 (1976) (“As to the hearing before the county board 

of equalization and review: The administrative decisions of the Property Tax 

Commission, whether with respect to the schedule of values or the appraisal of 

property, are always subject to judicial review after administrative procedures have 

been exhausted.” (emphasis added)).

¶ 32 Our legislature has also referred to the Commission as an administrative 

agency when outlining the appeals process from Commission decisions. See N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 7A-29 (2021).

§ 7A-29. Appeals of right from certain administrative 

agencies.

(a) From any final order or decision of . . . the Property 

Tax Commission under G.S. 105-290 and G.S. 105-342, . . . 

appeal as of right lies directly to the Court of Appeals.

Id. § 7A-29(a). 

¶ 33 We hold that for purposes of the NCSC Orders, the Commission is not a trial 
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court but an administrative agency vested with judicial powers consistent with 

Article IV, Section 3 of our Constitution. Therefore, because the Commission is a 

“creature of the General Assembly,” the extensions granted by our Supreme Court for 

filings to “trial courts” do not apply to Taxpayers’ filings to the Commission. 

¶ 34 Taxpayers argue that, even if the Commission is an administrative agency, 

then the filing extensions issued by the Supreme Court would still apply, because 

they were expressly adopted in the OAH Order. We disagree.

¶ 35 On 27 May 2020, former Chief Administrative Law Judge Julian Mann III, 

ordered the following:

On May 2nd, 2020, The Honorable Roy Cooper, Governor 

of the State of North Carolina, signed Senate Bill 704 into 

law . . . [which] authorizes the Chief Administrative Law 

Judge, by order, to extend the time or period of limitation 

for the filing of a petition for a contested case, whether 

established by N.C.G.S. § 150B-23(f) or by another statute, 

“[w]hen the Chief Justice of the North Carolina Supreme 

Court determines and declares that catastrophic conditions 

exist or have existed in one or more counties of the State 

and issues an order pursuant to G.S. 7A-39(b).”

. . .

In light of the May 21st, 2020 order issued by the Chief 

Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court and by the 

authority granted to the Chief Administrative Law Judge 

under Session Law 2020-3, I now order that all petitions 

for a contested case, originating in any of North Carolina’s 

100 counties (or as may be otherwise authorized by law), 

that were or are due to be filed on or after March 19th, 

2020, and before the close of business on July 31st, 2020, 
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2022-NCCOA-205

Opinion of the Court

shall be deemed to be timely filed if they are filed in the 

Office of Administrative Hearings before the close of 

business on July 31st, 2020, notwithstanding the time or 

period of limitation established by N.C.G.S. § 150B-23(f) or 

by any other statute.

¶ 36 Because the OAH Order only extended filing deadlines for contested cases 

before the OAH, the order cannot be applied to extend the filing deadline for the 

Taxpayers’ appeals in this case. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B‐23(f) (granting the Chief 

Administrative Law Judge authority to issue an emergency extension, such as the 

OAH Order, only for the filing of contested cases). 

III. Conclusion

¶ 37 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Commission’s dismissal of the 

Taxpayers’ appeals because the notices of appeal were not timely filed, the 

Commission’s mailing procedure did not violate § 105-290(e), and the statutory 30-

day deadline for filing was not extended by the NCSC or OAH Orders.

AFFIRMED.

Judges DIETZ and COLLINS concur.