SPACE ACQUISITIONS

DOD Faces Challenges in 

Fully Realizing Benefits of 

Satellite Acquisition 

Improvements

Statement of Cristina T. Chaplain, Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Strategic 

Forces, Committee on Armed Services, 

U.S. Senate 

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 2:30 p.m. EDT

Wednesday, March 21, 2012

GAO-12-563T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-563T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, 

Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate 

March 21, 2012

SPACE ACQUISITIONS

DOD Faces Challenges in Fully Realizing Benefits of 

Satellite Acquisition Improvements

Why GAO Did This Study

Each year, the DOD spends billions on

large space acquisition programs, 

which have in the past experienced 

cost and schedule overruns and 

increased technical risk. At present, 

though, the worst of these problems 

may be over, and programs long 

troubled are finally being launched. 

Challenges persist, but they are less 

significant than they were. With today’s 

fiscal constraints, however, DOD must 

find ways to keep its new major space 

acquisitions on track, as operating in 

space is expensive and DOD is still 

replenishing legacy programs like 

missile warning, protected 

communications, and environmental 

monitoring. Significant barriers exist to 

ensuring such investments are 

optimized. 

To address the progress DOD has 

made this year, this testimony will 

focus on (1) the current status of space 

system acquisitions; (2) results of 

GAO’s space-related reviews this past 

year; (3) actions taken to address DOD 

space acquisition problems; and (4) 

remaining challenges that stand in the 

way of DOD fully realizing the benefits 

of satellite acquisition improvements. 

This testimony is based on previously 

issued GAO products as well as 

analysis of DOD funding estimates.

GAO does not make recommendations 

in this testimony. However, in previous 

reports GAO has generally 

recommended that DOD adopt best 

practices for developing space 

systems such as separating 

technology development from product 

development. DOD is in the process of 

implementing such practices.

What GAO Found

Last year, GAO testified that though acquisition problems still existed in many space 

programs, the Department of Defense (DOD) was beginning to launch satellites that 

had long been lagging behind schedule and it had taken positive actions to instill 

better practices and more focused leadership for space. Progress has continued. 

Over the past year, DOD launched the first Navy Mobile User Objective System

(MUOS) satellite; the first, after a nine-year delay, of six Space Based Infrared 

System (SBIRS) geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) satellites; and the first Advanced 

Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite—all of which will bring important 

capability to the warfighter. While these launches represent solid progress, there 

have also been some drawbacks. For instance, the second Global Positioning 

System (GPS) IIF satellite experienced technical problems that could shorten its 

operational lifetime. The cost of the first two GPS III satellites is at least18 percent 

higher than first estimated, up to $1.6 billion today. A 1-year delay is expected by 

SBIRS program officials on production of the 3rd and 4th GEO satellites along with a 

$438 million cost overrun. And, a termination of the Defense Weather Satellite 

System (DWSS) may result in a capability gap. Moreover, even though problems 

have been overcome, DOD must still contend with the effects of its previous 

difficulties on its investment portfolio.

Recent GAO reviews highlight other difficulties facing DOD space programs. GAO’s 

review of a new acquisition strategy for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle

program, for instance, identified a need for more knowledge about the industrial base 

as well as cost and pricing in order to optimize a sizable investment in launch 

vehicles. GAO’s review of parts quality problems in major DOD, Missile Defense 

Agency, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) programs

illustrated that acquisition reforms need to be buttressed with closer attention to the 

quality of piece parts as issues have vexed most major programs. GAO, however, 

credited the agencies with instituting collaborative efforts to address supplier quality.

Though it still faces an array of challenges, DOD continues to work to ensure its 

space programs are more executable and produce a better return on investment. For 

example, DOD intends to follow incremental or evolutionary acquisition processes

and it has acted to streamline management and oversight of the national security 

space enterprise. The agency has taken steps toward reforming the defense 

acquisition system to help its programs to meet planned cost and schedule 

objectives. Because DOD intends to address the root causes of problems, it will take 

time to determine if these actions are successful or need further actions on how best 

to lead, organize, and support space activities. 

Moreover, there are significant barriers to ensuring investments are optimized. 

These include fragmented leadership, the rising cost of launch, uncertainty about the 

future for technology advancements, and disconnects between the fielding of 

satellites with user equipment and ground systems needed to take advantage of 

expensive new capabilities. Addressing all of these challenges are needed to 

maintain space superiority in an era of fiscal austerity, but their resolution also 

requires the participation and cooperation of all the military services, the intelligence 

community, and agencies such as NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration. View GAO-12-563T. For more information, 

contact Cristina Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or 

chaplainc@gao.gov. 
 

Page 1 GAO-12-563T 

Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense’s 

(DOD) space acquisitions. Each year, billions of dollars are spent by DOD 

to acquire space-based capabilities that support military and other 

government operations—such as intelligence, reconnaissance and 

surveillance, and homeland security— and to enable transformation of the 

way DOD collects and disseminates information. The worst of DOD’s 

space acquisition problems may be behind the department, as programs 

long plagued by serious cost and schedule overruns are finally being 

launched. Though acquisition challenges persist, they are not as 

widespread and significant as they were several years ago, and to its 

credit, DOD has taken an array of actions to reduce risks. The challenge 

DOD now faces is how best to keep its major space systems acquisitions 

on track in light of fiscal constraints. Operating in space is expensive and 

DOD is still in the process of replenishing legacy capabilities, such as 

missile warning, protected communications, and environmental 

monitoring. While upgrading existing satellite constellations amid 

declining budgets is a daunting challenge, there are significant barriers to 

ensuring investments are optimized, including fragmented leadership, the 

rising cost of launch, uncertainty about the future for technology 

advancements, and disconnects between the fielding of satellites with 

user equipment and ground systems needed to take advantage of 

expensive new capabilities. In addition to discussing the progress DOD 

has made this year, my testimony will focus on these challenges as they 

stand in the way of DOD fully realizing the benefits of satellite acquisition 

improvements.

The objectives of this testimony are to address (1) the current status of 

space system acquisitions, (2) the results of GAO’s space-related reviews 

this past year, (3) actions being taken to address DOD space acquisition 

problems, and (4) remaining challenges. In preparing this testimony, we 

relied on previous GAO reports on (1) space programs and (2) weapon 

system acquisition best practices as well as ongoing work on satellite 

control networks.1

 

1 See GAO related reports at the end of this statement.

We also relied on work performed in support of our 

annual weapons system assessments, and analyzed DOD funding 

estimates to assess cost increases and investment trends for selected 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-563T 

major space system acquisition programs. We obtained updates on 

improvement actions from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Air 

Force. We also analyzed recent funding estimates for space programs.

More information on our scope and methodology is available in the issued 

reports. The work that supports this statement was performed in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The past decade has been troubling for defense space acquisitions.

Despite years of significant investment, most of the DOD large space 

acquisition programs collectively experienced billions of dollars in cost 

increases, stretched schedules, and increased technical risks. Significant 

schedule delays of as much as 9 years have resulted in potential 

capability gaps in missile warning, military communications, and weather 

monitoring. Unit costs for one of the most troubled programs, the Space 

Based Infrared System (SBIRS), for instance, have climbed about 231 

percent to over $3 billion per satellite. Moreover, the first satellite was 

launched about 9 years later than predicted. Similarly, by the end of fiscal 

year 2010, the U.S. government had spent 16 years and over $5 billion to 

develop the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 

System (NPOESS), but had not launched a single satellite. In February 

2010, citing the program’s cost overruns, schedule delays, and 

management problems, the White House announced that the NPOESS 

tri-agency structure would be eliminated and the program would be 

restructured by splitting procurements and responsibilities. Other 

programs, such as the Transformational Satellite Communications 

System, were canceled several years earlier because they were found to 

be too highly ambitious and not affordable at a time when the DOD was 

struggling to address critical acquisition problems elsewhere in the space 

portfolio.

Background 
 

Page 3 GAO-12-563T 

In 2011, we testified that though problems still existed on many programs, 

DOD was beginning to make progress by finally launching satellites that 

had been lagging behind schedule.2

Progress has continued since we testified last year. For instance:

These included the Missile Defense 

Agency’s (MDA) Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS), the 

Air Force’s first Global Positioning System (GPS) IIF satellite and the first 

Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite although AEHF 

had not yet reached its final planned orbit at the time we testified because 

of an anomaly with the satellite’s propulsion system. At the same time, 

however, several programs still in development were at risk of cost and

schedule growth, such as the Joint Space Operations Center Mission 

System (JMS).

• DOD launched the second GPS IIF satellite in July 2011, and the third 

is scheduled to launch in September 2012.

• DOD launched the first of the Navy’s Mobile User Objective System 

(MUOS) satellites in February 2012, and the second is scheduled for 

launch in July 2013.

• The first of six SBIRS geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) satellites 

successfully launched in May 2011, after a roughly 9 year delay. 3

• The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program continues 

to successfully launch DOD and National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA) satellites, and is planning 11 launches in 2012.

The 

second SBIRS satellite is planned for delivery in spring 2012 and may 

launch late this year or early 2013.

• The first AEHF satellite reached its intended orbit after having 

experienced propulsion trouble after launch. The second AEHF 

satellite is scheduled to launch in April 2012.

While these launches represent solid progress, there have been some 

drawbacks to the programs that have launched their first satellites. For 

instance, the second GPS IIF satellite experienced technical problems 

that could possibly shorten the satellite’s operational lifetime. Also, though 

a MUOS satellite has been launched, the DOD estimates that over 90 

percent of the first satellite’s on-orbit capabilities will likely be initially 

 

2 GAO, Space Acquisitions: DOD Delivering New Generations of Satellites, but Space 

System Acquisition Challenges Remain, GAO-11-590T (Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2011).

3

 Two highly elliptical orbit sensors have already been launched. 

The Current Status of 

Space System 

Acquisitions 
 

Page 4 GAO-12-563T 

underutilized because of delays in development of the compatible Joint 

Tactical Radio System (JTRS) terminals.

Moreover, other acquisition programs are experiencing cost and schedule 

growth, though not to the extent yet as those experienced in the last 

decades. For instance,

• The GPS III program is currently experiencing cost growth and the 

contractor is behind schedule. In November 2011, the contractor’s 

estimated cost at completion for the development and production of 

the first two satellites was over $1.4 billion or 18 percent greater than 

originally estimated; the program office estimated the cost to be about 

$1.6 billion. The GPS III program has cited multiple reasons for the 

projected cost increases including reductions in the program’s 

production rate; test equipment delays; and inefficiencies in the 

development of both the navigation and communication payload and 

satellite bus. The contractor is also behind in completing some tasks 

on schedule, but the program does not expect these delays to affect 

the launch of the first satellite.

• Though the first SBIRS satellite has launched, and the second is 

close to delivery, program officials are predicting a 1-year delay on 

production of the 3rd and 4th GEO satellites due in part to technical 

challenges, parts obsolescence and test failures. Along with the 

production delay, program officials are predicting a $438 million cost 

overrun for the 3rd and 4th GEO satellites.

• The Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS), which was the Air 

Force’s follow-on to the restructured NPOESS, was terminated in 

fiscal year 2012. The restructuring of NPOESS and the subsequent 

cancellation of DWSS have resulted in a potential capability gap for 

weather and environmental monitoring.

Table 1 describes the status of the space programs we have been 

tracking in more detail.
 

Page 5 GAO-12-563T 

Table 1: Status of Major Space Acquisition Efforts 

Programs still susceptible to cost and schedule overruns

GPS IIF

(positioning, navigation, and timing)

The second Global Positioning System (GPS) IIF satellite, designed to upgrade timing and 

navigation accuracy and add a new signal for civilian use, launched on July 16, 2011, and the 

third is expected to launch in September of 2012. Approximately one month after they were 

enabled, the second IIF satellite’s Cesium clock—one of three atomic frequency standard 

clocks onboard that provide GPS accuracy through redundancy—failed. An investigation 

identified design and manufacturing issues, and the GPS Directorate is exploring options, 

including replacing the Cesium clocks already installed on the remaining IIF satellites, 3 

through 7. The cost and schedule impacts are as yet undetermined. According to the GPS 

directorate, the cost of the GPS IIF program, as of April 2011, was at $2.6 billion—more than 

triple the original cost estimate of $729 million. The IIF satellites’ development challenges were 

mostly responsible for the 4 1/2-year delay in the launch of the first GPS IIF satellite to May 

2010.

AEHF 

(communications)

On August 14, 2010, the Air Force launched the first of six planned Advanced Extremely High 

Frequency (AEHF) satellites (AEHF-1) to replenish the existing Milstar system with increased 

strategic and tactical capabilities for warfighters. Employing a novel combination of chemical 

and electric propulsion in a two-phase orbit raising procedure, AEHF-1 was expected to reach 

its operational orbit in about three months. However, an anomaly with one of the spacecraft’s 

three propulsion systems delayed the arrival on orbit by about 13 months. The anomaly was 

detected when the spacecraft’s Liquid Apogee Engine (LAE)—a bi-propellant system designed 

to provide the thrust for the spacecraft’s initial orbit transfer maneuvers—faltered and was 

declared unusable. No longer able to use the more powerful LAE for the first phase of orbit 

raising as intended, the program office in conjunction with the contractor and user community, 

decided to achieve the intended orbit using AEHF-1’s two remaining, less powerful propulsion 

systems. The alternate propulsion was engaged and the spacecraft’s rate of ascent was 

calculated to conserve fuel and maintain its original 14-year operational life expectancy. 

AEHF-1 reached its intended orbit in late October 2011, and began undergoing what is 

expected to be about 100 days of testing. The problem with AEHF-1 was not identified on 

either AEHF-2, which has been delivered and is on schedule for an April 27, 2012 launch, or 

AEHF-3, which is currently in storage and expected to launch in the fall of 2013. The fourth 

satellite is under contract and scheduled to be available for launch in 2017. Plans to procure 

the last two AEHF satellites—tentatively expected to be available for launch in 2018 and 

2019— were announced following the 2009 cancellation of the Transformational Satellite 

Communications System—the planned follow-on to AEHF.

MUOS 

(communications) 

The first Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) communications satellite was launched on 

February 24, 2012, and is expected to begin on-orbit operations in May 2012—26 months later 

than planned at development start. While the delivery of the MUOS satellite’s ultra-high 

frequency (UHF) communication capabilities is predicted to help address the potential 

capability gap caused by the unexpected failure of two legacy satellites, there is a risk the 

satellite’s on-orbit capabilities will initially be significantly underutilized. Over 90 percent of 

MUOS’s planned capability—including increases in the amount of data that can be transmitted 

and the ability to transmit both voice and data—is enabled by compatible Joint Tactical Radio 

System (JTRS) terminals and by a new waveform. Operational testing of the JTRS terminals 

has been delayed until February 2014, leading the government to form an independent review 

team to assess potential options for completing development of the MUOS waveform. 

Following a 2009 Navy-initiated review, the program developed new cost and schedule 

baselines. However, the MUOS acquisition program baseline has been under revision since 

December 2009, and has not yet been approved.
 

Page 6 GAO-12-563T 

GPS III

(positioning, navigation, and timing)

GPS is a constellation of multiple generations of GPS satellites that provide global position, 

navigation and timing capability to both military and civil users worldwide. In 2008 the GPS 

directorate established a program to develop the next generation of GPS satellites named 

GPS III. GPS III satellites are designed to have the capabilities found on GPS IIF satellites 

plus increases in jam resistance, accuracy, and design life; a new civil signal compatible with 

the European Galileo system; and a satellite bus capable of supporting future satellite 

capability additions. The GPS III program is to use an acquisition strategy designed to reduce 

risk and to avoid or correct problems that plagued the GPS IIF program and caused a more 

than 4 year delay in the launch of the first IIF satellite. The GPS III program plans to maintain 

stable requirements; have rigorous contractor oversight; and employ a structured systems 

engineering approach which includes features such as trade studies, advanced component 

development and prototype, and incremental delivery of mature technologies. One of the 

program’s risk reduction efforts includes research on dual launch initiatives to support two 

satellites launching on one launch vehicle. The GPS program office attributes current cost 

growth issues to reductions in the program’s production rate, test equipment delays, and 

inefficiencies in the development of both the navigation and communication payload and 

satellite bus. The program office and contractor have estimated the cost to complete the 

development and production of the first two GPS III satellites at $1.6 billion and $1.4 billion 

respectively, which is 18 percent or more than originally estimated. The first GPS III satellite is 

expected to be ready for launch in May of 2014.

Development initiatives getting under way

JMS

(space situational awareness) 

Space Situational Awareness (SSA)—the knowledge and characterization of space objects 

and the environment on which space operations depend—is increasingly important to the 

protection of U.S. space forces from space weather effects, space debris, and attack. The 

Joint Space Operations Center Mission System (JMS) program is a key component of SSA 

and one of two major upcoming acquisition efforts (the other is Space Fence) expected to fill 

the growing need to replace SSA capability from fragmented legacy systems and to provide 

new, advanced SSA capability. The JMS program is designed to replace the Space Defense 

Operations Center (SPADOC) currently in use but nearing the end of its operational lifetime, 

and provide mission services to support and enable the command and control of space forces. 

In early 2011, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics commissioned an independent program assessment of the JMS program which, at 

that time, had plans to use immature technologies and to deliver key capabilities in a single, 

large increment, versus smaller and more manageable increments. In May 2011, in response 

to concerns raised by the assessment, the Air Force announced the transfer of JMS to the 

management group responsible for most of the service’s space-related acquisition and the 

implementation of a new tailored incremental information technology acquisition approach. 

According to officials at the new JMS program office, the revised approach is modeled on 

tenets from DOD’s 2007 Defense Acquisition Transformation Report to Congress and includes 

plans to maximize the use of commercial-off-the-shelf and government-off-the-shelf solutions, 

to leverage investment in existing government prototypes and industry applications, and to 

utilize personnel from other services or federal labs who have expertise in relevant 

technologies and systems.
 

Page 7 GAO-12-563T 

Space Fence

(space situational awareness)

Space Fence is being designed as a system of geographically dispersed ground-based 

radars. It is intended to replace and expand coverage currently provided by the aging Space 

Surveillance System by using higher radio frequencies that will allow it to detect and track 

smaller Earth-orbiting objects. Like JMS, Space Fence is a key program to help meet the 

nation’s SSA mission and represents the current largest investment in SSA at an estimated 

cost of about $3 billion to complete. Space Fence program officials have stated that Space 

Fence will be one of the largest phased array radars ever built. The size of the radar is 

expected to provide significant power for the transmission and reception of data but may also 

pose increased risk related to the affordable integration of technology components. To 

mitigate this risk, the Space Fence acquisition strategy includes maintaining competition 

through technology development and having two firms under contract doing parallel prototype 

development. This process allows program officials to evaluate contractor’s designs and 

associated costs while moving Space Fence’s four critical technologies and backup 

technologies toward maturity, before the program enters system development which is 

scheduled for later this year with the award of a single contract. Though earlier plans called for 

the first Space Fence site to achieve initial operational capability in 2015, estimates show that 

at current funding levels, this capability will not occur before 2017.

PTSS

(ballistic missile defense)

The Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS) is being developed as an operational 

component of the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) Ballistic Missile Defense System and, 

according to MDA, delays in fielding a PTSS constellation in fiscal year 2018 would 

significantly affect the implementation of the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to defend 

Europe and the United States against regional ballistic missile attacks. We have on-going 

MDA work and have initial concerns regarding schedule optimism, concurrency, and potential 

cost estimates. We plan to issue a report on the results of our review in April 2012. 

SBSS 

(space situational awareness)

On February 23, 2011, the Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) satellite began full 

operational duty. The satellite was launched in September 2010, to provide a follow-on 

capability to the Midcourse Space Experiment / Space Based Visible sensor satellite, which 

ended its mission in July 2008. According to program and contracting officials, SBSS’ 24-hour, 

all-weather, all-geography capability provides an increase in space situational awareness—the 

ability to search, detect, and track objects in space—by a factor of three compared to ground 

based tools. Air Force stated that the timing of the SBSS launch and the magnitude of initial 

cost estimates for the proposed SBSS follow-on led to the decision not to include funding for 

this effort in their fiscal year 2012 budget request. In fiscal year 2013 the Air Force plans to 

initiate acquisition strategy plans for the SBSS follow-on, including preparing for the 

competitive award of a fixed price contract meeting or exceeding SBSS Block 10 

requirements.
 

Page 8 GAO-12-563T 

NPOESS/DWSS/ WSF

(climate and weather monitoring)

The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) was 

planned to be a state-of-the-art, environment-monitoring satellite system that would replace 

two existing polar-orbiting environmental satellite systems—one managed by the Department 

of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the other by 

the Department of Defense (DOD)/U.S. Air Force. The NPOESS program was jointly managed 

by NOAA, DOD/ Air Force, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 

and considered critical to the nation’s weather forecasting and climate monitoring needs 

through the year 2026. In February 2010, the White House’s Office of Science and 

Technology Policy restructured the NPOESS program to address continuing cost, schedule, 

management, and technical challenges. Furthermore, DOD/Air Force and NOAA/NASA were 

directed to plan and acquire their own replacement satellite systems. The Air Force initiated 

preliminary efforts on the Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS) as its next-generation 

polar-orbiting environmental satellite system with primary earth coverage in the early morning. 

To reduce development risks and lower acquisition costs, the Air Force planned to leverage 

the billions of dollars invested in the NPOESS program. Furthermore, to ensure continued 

coverage, the Air Force had planned to have DWSS satellites available for launch in 2018 and 

2021. However, in fiscal year 2012, DWSS was terminated per Congressional direction, and 

DOD/Air Force budgeted for a new program called the Weather Satellite Follow-on (WSF). 

Planned program activities include a requirements analysis and an analysis of alternatives. 

Until the DOD/Air Force transitions from its current Defense Meteorological Satellite Program 

(DMSP) satellites to a follow-on system, DOD/Air Force plans to continue utilizing the 

remaining DMSP satellites to meet its weather requirements.

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data and previous GAO reports.

Even though DOD has finally overcome some technical and production 

difficulties and begun to launch high risk satellites such as SBIRS and 

AEHF, the department is still contending with the effects of their 

significant cost growth on its investment portfolio. Figure 1 compares 

original cost estimates to current cost estimates for the broader portfolio

of major space acquisitions for fiscal years 2011 through 2016.

Acquisition Challenges 

Have Reverberating 

Effects on Investment 

Portfolio 
 

Page 9 GAO-12-563T 

Figure 1: Comparison between Original Cost Estimates and Current Cost Estimates 

for Selected Major Space Acquisition Programs for Fiscal Years 2011 through 2016

Note: Includes Advanced Extremely High Frequency, Global Broadcast System, Global Positioning 

System II and III, Mobile User Objective System, Space Based Infrared System, and Wideband 

Global SATCOM. This chart does not include the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle, and planned 

new space acquisition efforts—such as Joint Space Operations Center Mission System, Space 

Based Space Surveillance Follow-on, the Weather Satellite Follow-on, or Space Fence—for which 

total cost data were unavailable.

A long-standing problem in DOD space acquisitions is that program and 

unit costs tend to go up significantly from initial cost estimates, and the 

gap between original and current estimates shows that DOD has fewer 

dollars available to invest in new programs or add to existing ones. In 

fact, estimated costs for the major space acquisition programs have 

increased by about $11.6 billion—321 percent—from initial estimates for 

fiscal years 2011 through 2016.4

 

4 Costs adjusted for inflation. 

It should also be noted that the declining 

investment in the later years is the result of mature programs that have 

planned lower out-year funding, cancellation of a major space acquisition 
 

Page 10 GAO-12-563T 

program and several development efforts, and the exclusion of several 

major space acquisition efforts for which total cost data were unavailable.

These include the Space Fence, Space Based Space Surveillance, and 

the Defense Weather Satellite effort.

Over the past year, we have reported on of the need for sound and 

sufficient information for the new DOD acquisition strategy for the EELV 

program; parts quality problems in major DOD, MDA, and NASA 

programs; and greater content and coordination in the space Science and 

Technology (S&T) strategy. We are also conducting a review of satellite 

operations and have briefed Defense authorization and appropriations 

committees on our findings. These reviews, discussed further below, 

highlight both the successes and challenges that have faced the DOD 

space community as it has completed or sought to complete problematic 

legacy efforts and deliver modernized capabilities.

DOD’s EELV program serves a vital mission of placing critical national 

security and civilian satellites into their required orbits. It is also on the 

brink of major changes. In 2009, the Air Force and the National 

Reconnaissance Office (NRO) determined that the current approach for 

acquiring EELV launch vehicles was likely not the best business model 

and decided that a new acquisition strategy needed to be developed. This 

strategy favors committing the government to a longer span of purchases 

and to more certainty in the number of vehicles acquired to help stabilize 

the industrial base. Such a change is significant as the DOD and the NRO 

plan to spend about $15 billion to acquire launch services from fiscal year 

2013 to 2017 and commercial companies other than the current provider, 

United Launch Alliance, would like to become launch service providers to 

the government. We were asked to review and assess whether DOD has 

the knowledge it needs to develop the new strategy, which has 

subsequently been released, and to identify issues that could benefit 

future launch acquisitions.

We found that DOD lacked critical knowledge needed to develop a new 

acquisition strategy.5

 

5 GAO, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Needs to Ensure New Acquisition 

Strategy Is Based on Sufficient Information,

For example, program officials, recent launch 

GAO-11-641 (Washington, D.C.: Sep 15, 

2011). 

GAO Space-Related 

Reviews over the Past 

Year 

Evolved Expendable 

Launch Vehicle Acquisition 

Strategy
 

Page 11 GAO-12-563T 

studies, and the prime contractor all cited a diminishing launch industrial 

base as a risk to the mission success of the program, but DOD analysis 

supporting this condition was minimal. Moreover, under the new 

acquisition strategy, contracting officials may have difficulty assessing fair 

and reasonable prices given limited availability of contractor and 

subcontractor cost or pricing data. Since the United Launch Alliance joint 

venture formed in 2006, financial and business systems needed to get 

insight into costs have been lacking. There was also considerable 

uncertainty about costs associated with mission assurance activities, 

even though there have been concerns about whether such activities are 

excessive. Moreover, we found that if the acquisition strategy commits the 

Air Force and the NRO to buy eight common booster cores per year for a 

five year period, which was anticipated at the time of our review, DOD 

may face an oversupply of vehicles. In addition to these findings, we have 

reported prior concerns about oversight for the EELV program, such as 

(1) a prior decision to designate the program as in the sustainment phase 

rather than in the development phase essentially lifted the need for 

oversight reporting on costs and major changes and (2) the DOD had not 

updated a life cycle cost estimate for the program despite significant 

changes being made to it.6

Among other actions, we recommended that DOD conduct an 

independent assessment of the health of the U.S. launch industrial base; 

reassess the block buy contract length given the additional knowledge 

DOD is gaining; not waive Federal Acquisition Regulations requirements 

for contractor and subcontractor certified cost and pricing data as DOD 

finalizes its strategy; and ensure launch mission assurance activities be 

sufficient and not excessive. The Congress reinforced these and other 

GAO recommendations in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 

by requiring that DOD redesignate the program as a major defense 

acquisition program (which would require the submission of certain kinds 

of data annually) and provide to Congressional defense committees a 

description of how its acquisition strategy will address the 

recommendations of our EELV report issued in 2011.7

 

6 GAO, Space Acquisitions: Uncertainties in the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle 

Program Pose Management and Oversight Challenges, 

The Act also 

requires us to submit an assessment of the information DOD provides, 

GAO-08-1039 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sep 26, 2008).

7 Pub. L. No. 112-81, §§ 838 & 839 (2011). 
 

Page 12 GAO-12-563T 

and additional findings or recommendations, as appropriate. The Air 

Force has taken actions to expand its knowledge about EELV since our 

2011 audit work was completed and we look forward to assessing this 

progress.

Quality is paramount to the success of U.S. space and missile defense 

programs due to their complexity, the environment they operate in, and 

the high degree of accuracy and precision needed for their operations.

Yet in recent years, many programs have experienced difficulties with 

quality workmanship and parts. Less visible problems have led to 

unnecessary repair, scrap, rework, and stoppage; long delays; and 

millions of dollars in cost growth. In some instances, entire missions have 

been endangered. As a result, we assessed the extent to which such 

problems affect related programs, their causes, and what initiatives have 

been undertaken in response.

We found that parts quality problems had affected all 21 programs we 

reviewed, in some cases contributing to significant cost overruns and 

schedule delays associated with electronic versus mechanical parts or 

materials.8

Recognition of these difficulties has spurred agencies to adopt new 

policies, but they were still in early stages of implementation at the time of 

our review. Post-policy programs are not yet mature enough for parts 

problems to be apparent. To address current and future problems, 

agencies and industry have begun to collect and share information, 

develop testing guidance and criteria, manage subcontractors, and 

We also found that if quality problems were discovered late in 

the development cycle they had more significant cost and schedule 

consequences: in one such case, an additional cost of at least $250 

million and a 2-year launch delay. We found several causes of these 

problems: poor workmanship, undocumented and untested manufacturing 

processes, poor control of those processes and materials and failure to 

prevent contamination, poor part design, design complexity, and an 

inattention to manufacturing risks. Ineffective supplier management also 

resulted in concerns about whether subcontractors and contractors met 

program requirements.

 

8 GAO, Space and Missile Defense Acquisitions: Periodic Assessment Needed to Correct 

Parts Quality Problems in Major Programs, GAO-11-404 (Washington, D.C.: Jun 24, 

2011).

Parts Quality for DOD, 

MDA, and NASA
 

Page 13 GAO-12-563T 

mitigate problems, although their impact has yet to be determined. In any 

event, significant barriers hinder such efforts, including broader 

acquisition management problems, workforce gaps, diffuse leadership in 

the national security space community, the government’s decreasing 

influence on the electronics parts market, and an increase in 

counterfeited parts. Our reports over the past decade have made 

recommendations for addressing these broader barriers, such as 

stabilizing requirements before beginning product development, 

separating technology development from product development, and 

strengthening leadership. The DOD is in the process of adopting these 

recommendations. Because space agencies and the Missile Defense 

Agency were undertaking additional actions to address parts quality 

problems and they had recently established a broad range of coordination 

mechanisms, we recommended that the community undertake periodic 

assessments of progress being made to address parts quality problems.

The agencies generally agreed with our recommendation.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 required 

DOD and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to jointly develop a 

space S&T strategy and it required us to assess the strategy submitted in 

April 2011.9 We reported that a strong foundation in space S&T should 

help DOD and the intelligence community address the most challenging 

national security problems, reduce risk in major acquisition programs, 

maintain technological superiority over adversaries, maintain a healthy 

industrial base and mitigate vulnerabilities in space systems.10

We found that the strategy largely met the requirements of the 

authorization act, but it was not a rigorous, comprehensive strategic plan.

Instead, it embraced the status quo without laying out a path for assuring 

effective and efficient progress. For instance, the strategy identified goals, 

but did not prioritize them. The strategy described existing reviews used 

to assess progress in space S&T but did not identify new metrics or 

performance measures to be used to assess achievement of the 

strategy’s newly established goals. Nor did the strategy address 

fundamental challenges facing the S&T community, such as human 

 

9

 Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 911(b) (2009).

10 GAO, Space Research: Content and Coordination of Space Science and Technology 

Strategy Need to Be More Robust, GAO-11-722 (Washington, D.C.: Jul 19, 2011).

Space S&T Strategy
 

Page 14 GAO-12-563T 

capital shortages, growing fiscal pressures, and the difficulty in 

transitioning space S&T to acquisition programs. We identified some 

strategic planning best practices such as identifying required human 

capital and required funding; prioritizing initiatives; and establishing ways 

to measure progress and processes for revising goals in the future.

Additionally, we found that organizations involved in developing the 

strategy were active in creating its long- and short-term goals, but their 

participation in other of its aspects was more limited. DOD and DNI 

officials did not believe they were required to do more than they did, and 

also did not include other agencies active in space S&T that were not 

included by law in the strategy. We recommended that DOD enhance its 

next version of the strategy by developing a detailed implementation plan 

for achieving goals, addressing funding prioritization and other 

challenges, and enhancing coordination with other agencies involved in 

space technology development. DOD concurred with these 

recommendations.

The Air Force and Navy operate separate satellite control networks within 

DOD through multiple operations centers, enabling their satellites to 

perform missions from launch to on-orbit operations and eventually 

through deactivation. Other federal government agencies, such as the 

NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 

and commercial companies also operate satellites using various networks 

and operations centers. Combined, these networks assist the nation’s 

communications, missile warning, navigation, meteorological, 

environmental, and scientific satellites or missions.

DOD has efforts underway to modernize various satellite operations 

centers using proprietary and interoperable network architectures using 

standard protocols. For example, since 2006, the Air Force has operated 

a multi-mission operations center that uses a standard interface and 

telemetry, tracking, and commanding system which allows expedited 

transition of research satellites to operational satellites. In addition, in 

2000, the Naval Research Laboratory initiated a web-based service 

concept designed to optimize software code reuse and allow faster 

delivery of mission capabilities, which could lower mission development 

costs and facilitate system maintenance. Considering the long-standing 

need to replace the Air Force’s aging and costly satellite control 

capabilities, and the importance associated with satellite operations, it is 

important that DOD not miss an opportunity to improve satellite 

operations and create greater efficiencies by leveraging commercial 

practices and other satellite networks and associated infrastructure.

DOD Satellite Operations
 

Page 15 GAO-12-563T 

In ongoing work, we assessed DOD’s satellite operations capabilities, 

specifically modernization efforts, compare DOD satellite operations 

concepts with those in other government entities and commercial 

industry; and, identify practices that could improve DOD satellite 

operations, consistent with mission requirements. We identified several 

challenges associated with DOD’s modernization efforts. For example, 

DOD’s ability to plan and implement upgrades may be limited by current 

budget uncertainties and plans to reallocate a portion of DOD’s spectrum 

may affect its satellite operations. In addition, we found indications that 

the potential for unnecessary overlap and fragmentation still exists within 

satellite operations and associated infrastructure, including potential 

duplication of facilities and hardware. For instance, there are multiple, 

completely separate government satellite control networks that exist that

depend on DOD’s Air Force satellite control network, including military 

and civil networks, but none are interoperable. Finally, we have thus far 

found that although research and development in government satellite 

operations has led to the use of practices that, according to agency 

officials, have improved efficiency, there are other commercial practices 

that could provide further improvements to DOD’s satellite network. For 

example, increased automation of routine satellite telemetry, tracking, and 

commanding functions could increase satellite operations efficiencies. We 

expect to issue our report based on this review later this fall.

Though our reports over the year indicate there is more room for 

improvement, DOD continues to work to ensure that its space programs 

are more executable and produce a better return on investment. Many of 

the actions it has been taking are intended to address root causes of 

problems, though it will take time to determine whether these actions are 

successful and they need to be complemented by decisions on how best 

to lead, organize, and support space activities.

Our past work has identified a number of causes of acquisition problems, 

but several consistently stand out. At a higher level, DOD has tended to 

start more weapon programs than is affordable, creating a competition for 

funding that focuses on advocacy at the expense of realism and sound 

management. DOD has also tended to start its space programs before it 

has the assurance that the capabilities it is pursuing can be achieved 

within available resources and time constraints. There is no way to 

accurately estimate how long it would take to design, develop, and build a 

satellite system when critical technologies planned for that system are still 

in relatively early stages of discovery and invention. Finally, programs 

Actions Being Taken 

to Address Space 

Acquisition Problems

Causes of Acquisition 

Problems
 

Page 16 GAO-12-563T 

have historically attempted to satisfy all requirements in a single step, 

regardless of the design challenges or the maturity of the technologies 

necessary to achieve the full capability. DOD’s preference to make larger, 

complex satellites that perform a multitude of missions has stretched 

technology challenges beyond current capabilities in some cases. Figure 

2 illustrates the negative influences that can cause programs to fail.

Figure 2: Negative Influences that Can Cause Programs to Fail

Our work has recommended numerous actions that can be taken to 

address the problems we identified. Generally, we have recommended 

that DOD separate technology discovery from acquisition, follow an 

incremental path toward meeting user needs, match resources and 

requirements at program start, and use quantifiable data and 

demonstrable knowledge to make decisions to move to next phases. We 

have also identified practices related to cost estimating, program 
 

Page 17 GAO-12-563T 

manager tenure, quality assurance, technology transition, and an array of 

other aspects of acquisition program management that could benefit 

space programs.11 DOD has generally concurred with our 

recommendations, and, as described below, has undertaken an array of 

actions to establish a better foundation for acquisition success.

As we reported last year, DOD has implemented or has been 

implementing a number of actions to reform how space and weapon 

systems are acquired, both through its own initiatives as well as those 

required by statute. Among other actions, DOD intends to follow 

incremental or evolutionary acquisition processes for space programs 

versus pursuing significant leaps in capabilities involving technology risk, 

and has done so with the only new satellite program undertaken by the 

Air Force in recent years—GPS III and more recently with Joint Space 

Operations Center Mission System, which supports space situational 

awareness activities. DOD and the Air Force are also working to 

streamline management and oversight of the national security space 

enterprise. For example, all Air Force space system acquisition 

responsibility has been assigned to the office responsible for all other Air 

Force acquisition efforts, and options for streamlining the many space 

committees, boards, and councils is under ongoing review. These and 

other actions being taken that could improve space system acquisition 

outcomes, that we have not assessed, are described in table 2.

 

11 GAO, Space Acquisitions: DOD Poised to Enhance Space Capabilities but, Persistent 

Challenges Remain in Developing Space Systems, GAO-10-447T (Washington, D.C.: 

March 10, 2010). 

Actions to Improve Space 

and Weapon Systems 

Acquisitions 
 

Page 18 GAO-12-563T 

Table 2: Actions Being Taken That Could Benefit Space System Acquisition Outcomes 

Category Actions

National policy • In June 2010, the President of the United States issued the new National Space Policy which establishes 

overarching national policy for the conduct of U.S. space activities. The policy states that the Secretary of 

Defense and the Director of National Intelligence are responsible for developing, acquiring, and operating 

space systems and networks to support U.S. national security and enable defense and intelligence 

operations. The policy helps to clarify the Secretary of Defense’s roles and responsibilities for coordinating 

space system acquisitions that span DOD and federal agencies, such as those for space situational 

awareness.

• In January 2011, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence issued the National 

Security Space Strategy to build on the National Space Policy and help inform planning, programming, 

acquisition, operations, and analysis.

Acquisitions • We expressed concern over DOD’s tailored national security space acquisition policy—initially issued in 

2003—primarily because it did not alter DOD’s practice of committing to major investments before knowing 

what resources will be required to deliver promised capability. Instead, the policy encouraged development 

of leading-edge technology within product development, that is, at the same time the program manager is 

designing the system and undertaking other product development activities. In 2009, DOD eliminated the 

space acquisition policy and moved the acquisition of space systems under DOD’s updated acquisition 

guidance for defense acquisition programs (DOD Instruction 5000.02). In October 2010, the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics issued a new space acquisition policy to be 

incorporated into that instruction that introduces specific management and oversight processes for acquiring 

major space systems, including retaining the requirement for independent program assessments to be 

conducted prior to major acquisition milestones.

Management and 

oversight

• In June 2008, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics created the Space 

and Intelligence Capabilities Office (SIO) to oversee all major DOD space and intelligence related 

acquisitions, including space-based communications programs, space control activities, space launch 

ranges, and all related ground systems. The SIO is to develop and recommend policies, investment 

strategies, and programs that improve, streamline, and strengthen DOD component space and intelligence 

related system acquisition, organization, technology and development activities.

• In May 2009, Air Force leadership signed the Acquisition Improvement Plan which lists five initiatives for 

improving how the Air Force obtains new capabilities.a

• In August 2010, the Secretary of Defense announced the elimination of the Office of the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Networks and Information Integration (ASD/NII) as part of a broader effort to eliminate 

organizations that perform duplicative functions or that have outlived their purpose.

One of these initiatives relates to establishing clear 

lines of authority and accountability within acquisition organizations. In August 2010, the Secretary of the Air 

Force transferred space system acquisition responsibility from the Under Secretary of the Air Force to the 

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, thereby assigning all Air Force acquisition responsibility 

to one office. As part of this realignment, the Program Executive Officer for Space, who previously reported 

to the Undersecretary of the Air Force, now reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 

Acquisition.

b

• In November 2010, the Deputy Secretary of Defense authorized the disestablishment of the National 

Security Space Office (NSSO).

The elimination of this 

organization may help to reduce the problems associated with the wide range of stakeholders within DOD 

responsible for overseeing the development of space-based capabilities.

c The elimination of this office may also help to streamline national security 

space system acquisition management and oversight. Furthermore, the Deputy Secretary of Defense 

revalidated the Secretary of the Air Force as DOD Executive Agent for Space and directed the creation of a 

Defense Space Council (DSC)—chaired by the DOD Executive Agent for Space and with representatives 

from across DOD—to inform, coordinate, and resolve space issues for DOD. According to DOD, the council 

will be looking at streamlining the many defense and national security space committees, boards, and 

councils by reviewing more than 15 space-related organizations and making recommendations on their 

cancellation, consolidation, dissolution, or realignment under the DSC.
 

Page 19 GAO-12-563T 

Category Actions

Program 

management 

assistance

• The Space and Missile Systems Center—the Air Force’s primary organization responsible for acquiring 

space systems—resurrected a program management assistance group in 2007 to help mitigate program 

management, system integration, and program control deficiencies within specific ongoing programs. This 

group assists and supplements wing commanders and program offices in fixing common problems, raising 

core competencies, and providing a consistent culture that sweeps across programs. According to the, at 

the time, Global Positioning System (GPS) Directorate Commander, this group was an integral part of the 

overall process providing application-oriented training, templates, analyses, and assessments vital to the 

GPS IIIA baseline review. According to a senior program management assistance group official, the group 

has provided assistance to other major programs, including GPS ground control segment (OCX), Space 

Based Infrared System (SBIRS), and Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS). 

Workforce • Another initiative in the Air Force Acquisition Improvement Plan is to revitalize the acquisition workforce by, 

among other things, increasing the number of authorized positions and providing for additional hiring, 

examining the proper mix of military and civilian personnel, and establishing training and experience 

objectives as part of the career paths for each acquisition specialty and increasing the availability of 

specialized training. As we reported in 2010, the Air Force was continuing efforts to bring space operators 

and space system acquirers together through the Advanced Space Operations School and the National 

Security Space Institute. The Air Force anticipated that this higher-level education would be integral to 

preparing space leaders with the best acquisition know-how.

Cost estimating • The Air Force took actions to strengthen cost estimating. For example, we recommended that the Secretary 

of the Air Force ensure that cost estimates are updated as major events occur within a program that could 

have a material impact on cost, and that the roles and responsibilities of the various Air Force costestimating organizations be clearly articulated.d

Military standards

An Air Force policy directive now requires that cost 

estimates for major programs be updated annually, and lays out roles and responsibilities for Air Force costestimating organizations. Additionally, the Joint Space Cost Council—formed in 2007 with membership 

across industry and military and civil government agencies—is actively working to improve cost credibility 

and realism in estimates, budgets, schedules, data, proposals, and program execution. For example, one 

initiative has developed a standard work breakdown structure that is being vetted through industry and 

government.

• Over the last several years, the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center has taken action aimed at 

preventing parts quality problems by issuing policy relating to specifications and standards. According to 

officials, it is requiring the GPS III program development contractor to meet these specifications and 

standards.

• In February 2011, the Air Force’s Space and Missile Systems Center, Missile Defense Agency, NASA, and 

the National Reconnaissance Office signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in February 2011 to 

encourage additional interagency cooperation in order to strengthen mission assurance practices. The MOU 

calls on the agencies to develop and share lessons learned and best practices to ensure mission success 

through a framework of collaborative mission assurance. Objectives include developing core mission 

assurance practices and tools; clear and executable mission assurance plans; a robust mission assurance 

infrastructure and guidelines for tailoring specifications and standards for parts, materials, and processes; 

and, establishing standard contractual language to ensure consistent specification of core standards and 

deliverables.

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data and previous GAO reports.

a

The Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Air Force issued the Air Force Acquisition 

Improvement Plan to recapture acquisition excellence by rebuilding an Air Force acquisition culture 

that delivers products and services as promised—on time, within budget, and in compliance with all 

laws, policies, and regulations. The plan consists of five initiatives: (1) revitalize the Air Force 

acquisition workforce, (2) improve the requirements generation process, (3) instill budget and 

financial discipline, (4) improve major Air Force systems source selections, and (5) establish clear 

lines of authority and accountability within acquisition organizations

b

The ASD/NII’s responsibilities included serving as the principal staff assistant on non-intelligence 

space matters; information technology, including National Security Systems; information resource 

management; and sensitive information integration. The ASD/NII also served as the principal staff 

assistant for issues such as command and control and net-centric capabilities.
 

Page 20 GAO-12-563T 

c

As part of this direction, the Deputy Secretary of Defense authorized the establishment of a jointly 

manned space office to restructure and replace the NSSO. The NSSO supported the Secretary of the 

Air Force who, as the DOD Executive Agent for Space, was responsible for developing, coordinating, 

and integrating plans and programs for space systems and the acquisition of DOD space major 

defense acquisition programs, and was responsible for executing the space major defense acquisition 

programs, when delegated that authority by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics. The specific roles and responsibilities of the DOD Executive Agent for 

Space are defined in Department of Defense Directive 5101.2, DOD Executive Agent for Space (June 

3, 2003).

d

GAO, Space Acquisitions: DOD Needs to Take More Action to Address Unrealistic Initial Cost 

Estimates of Space Systems, GAO-07-96 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006).

Congress and DOD have taken major steps toward reforming the defense 

acquisition system in ways that may increase the likelihood that weapon 

programs will succeed in meeting planned cost and schedule objectives.12

In particular, DOD policy and legislative provisions place greater 

emphasis on front-end planning and establishing sound business cases 

for starting programs. For example, the provisions require programs to 

invest more time and resources to refine concepts through early systems 

engineering, strengthening cost estimating, developing technologies, 

building prototypes, holding early milestone reviews, and developing 

preliminary designs before starting system development.13

While DOD has taken steps to implement the provisions, it is too soon to 

determine if Congress’s and DOD’s reform efforts will improve weapon 

program outcomes. For example, in June 2011 we reported on the Joint 

Requirements Oversight Council’s (JROC) efforts to ensure trade-offs 

among cost, schedule, and performance objectives, as directed by the 

These 

provisions are intended to enable programs to refine a weapon system 

concept and make cost, schedule, and performance trade-offs before 

significant commitments are made. In addition, DOD policy requires 

establishment of configuration steering boards that meet annually to 

review program requirements changes as well as to make 

recommendations on proposed descoping options that could reduce 

program costs or moderate requirements. Fundamentally, these 

provisions should help (1) programs replace risk with knowledge and (2) 

set up more executable programs.

 

12 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Strong Leadership Is Key to Planning and Executing 

Stable Weapon Programs, GAO-10-522 (Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2010). 

13 Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA), Pub. L. No. 111-23; DOD 

Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (2008).
 

Page 21 GAO-12-563T 

Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act .14 We found that the JROC did 

not always consider tradeoffs or influence tradeoff decisions, military 

services did not consistently provide high quality resource estimates to 

the JROC, and JROC did not consistently prioritize requirements and 

capability gaps. We recommended that the JROC establish a mechanism 

to review analysis of alternatives results earlier in the acquisition process, 

require higher quality resource estimates from requirements sponsors, 

prioritize requirements across proposed programs, and address potential 

redundancies during requirements reviews. The Joint Staff partially 

concurred with our recommendations and generally agreed with their 

intent, but differed with us on how to implement them.

The actions that the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Air Force 

have been taking to address acquisition problems are good steps. But 

there are still significant barriers to ensuring investments are optimized, 

including fragmented leadership, the high cost of launch, uncertainty 

about the future for technology advancements, and disconnects between 

the fielding of satellites with user equipment and ground systems needed 

to take advantage of expensive new capabilities. In particular:

• Leadership. In past years, we have reported that a major challenge to 

leadership is that the community’s authorities and responsibilities are 

spread across the department, and there is no single authority 

responsible for these programs below the President. Both the DOD 

and Air Force have taken a number of steps to streamline and clarify 

leadership for space. Time will tell whether these steps will help 

resolve issues such as a difficulty holding any one person or 

organization accountable for balancing needs against wants, for 

resolving conflicts among the many organizations involved with space, 

and for ensuring that resources are dedicated where they need to be 

dedicated. The department is still struggling with disconnects between 

programs that need to be linked together, such as a satellite program 

and its user equipment program. And at a higher level, we have 

reported that it still appears as if agencies involved in space

 

14 GAO, DOD Weapons Systems: Missed Trade-off Opportunities During Requirements 

Reviews, GAO-11-502 (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2011).

Remaining Challenges
 

Page 22 GAO-12-563T 

acquisitions do not coordinate to the extent that they can in such 

areas as launch acquisitions and space S&T planning. 15

• Launch costs. A factor influencing how space programs are designed 

is the price of launch, which can range anywhere from around $100 

million to well over $200 million. With prices being so high, programs 

often seek to maximize the “real estate” on board a satellite by 

including more capabilities than can sometimes be handled by a 

single program or within the time period desired for the program.

Moreover, the Air Force recently developed a new launch acquisition 

strategy designed in part to contain launch prices, but given remaining 

knowledge gaps, achieving this outcome is uncertain. At the same 

time, potential new providers promise lower costs for launch, but none 

of them have been certified to launch the larger national security 

satellites, and it is uncertain whether their prices can stay low as they 

work to meet standards and expectations set by government 

agencies. The dilemma of high launch costs, in our view, makes it 

more important for the Air Force to gain insight into costs and pricing 

behind its new strategy and to have a complete understanding of the 

industrial base and related vulnerabilities as well as mission 

assurance activities and related costs. It would also behoove 

agencies to work together, not only to bring in new entrants which 

they are now doing, but in setting a future course for launch. S&T 

planning, for example, has been cited as a weak area for launch, even 

though investments in new propulsion and vehicle concepts have the 

potential to evolve capabilities and lower costs.

• S&T and related investments. Recent proposed funding cuts have 

raised questions about how future technology advancements will be 

achieved in space. The Space Test Program (STP) was targeted for 

termination in the fiscal year 2013 budget. STP was created in 1965 

to serve as an integrator to provide launch opportunities for 

experimental satellites. This program enabled new technologies to get 

on orbit, and pave the way in an affordable manner for new space 

capabilities. STP has spawned many current and valuable space 

programs, most notably GPS. With the cancelation of this program, 

the Secretary of the Air Force has stated that the organizations that

develop these new space technologies, including academic 

institutions, government laboratories, and others, will be required to 

shoulder the burden of launch costs, estimated at around $50 million 

 

15 GAO, 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and 

Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-12-342SP 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb.28, 2012).
 

Page 23 GAO-12-563T 

per year. DOD has also proposed cancellation of the Operationally 

Responsive Space (ORS) program. ORS was intended to provide 

short-term and low-cost tactical capabilities to warfighters. The ORS 

program’s long-term goals were to reduce the cost of space 

development by fostering low cost launch methods as well as

common design and interface methods. Average spending by the 

ORS program was about $100 million per year from fiscal years 2007- 

through 2011. While there are still investments available for the Air 

Force Research Laboratory and other organizations involved in S&T, 

as we mentioned earlier, planning for these investments has not been 

robust or very strategic. Another potential challenge to future space 

capability innovations is the Efficient Space Procurement (ESP) 

initiative, formerly known as the Evolutionary Acquisition for Space 

Efficiency (EASE). ESP is intended as a way to reduce costs for DOD 

space programs while improving acquisition outcomes by buying 

satellites in “block buys” instead of individually, accruing cost savings 

which are to be reinvested into a modernization program to evolve 

capabilities for future increments of that satellite program. At this time, 

it is unclear how this approach will ensure there will still be a focus on 

making significant leaps in technology or what the next generation of 

space systems will look like and be able to come into fruition.

• Disconnects between fielding satellites, ground systems, and user 

equipment. DOD faces challenges in synchronizing capabilities 

offered by new satellite programs with the ground control stations that 

are necessary for receiving and processing information from the new 

space systems, and in some cases, the user terminals that deliver this 

information to users.16 When space, ground and user segments are 

not synchronized, there is the potential for wasted on-orbit capability 

and delays in the ability of users to take advantage of new systems.

As long as this condition exists, the improvements being made to 

acquisition practices on the satellite side will be minimized. A few 

examples are highlighted below in table 3.

 

16 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Challenges in Aligning Space System Components, 

GAO-10-55 (Washington, D.C.: Oct 29, 2009).
 

Page 24 GAO-12-563T 

Table 3: Examples of significant disconnects between satellites, ground systems, and user equipment acquisitions

SBIRS The first Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) satellite was launched in May 2011 and carries 

scanning and staring sensors designed to provide early missile warning capabilities. However, DOD 

will not be able to fully utilize the data collected from the staring sensor because the ground segment 

software that is to process the sensor’s data is not planned to be fully functional until at least 2018. 

This means that complete, usable data from the staring sensor will not be available until about 7 

years after the satellite is on orbit.

GPS Ground System Modernizations to the Global Positioning System (GPS) have also faced synchronization challenges 

between the GPS III satellites, which are currently under development, a concurrently developed new 

ground control system, and new military user equipment that will be able to utilize the capabilities of 

the new satellites. The new GPS ground control segment (OCX) is being developed to take 

advantage of the modernized capabilities of the GPS III satellites. OCX is required for full operation 

of the new GPS satellites, but the contractor does not plan to deliver the first increment of OCX until 

August 2015—15 months after the first planned GPS III satellite launch. Because of this disconnect, 

the GPS directorate is funding the development of a separate GPS launch and checkout system that 

is to provide an earlier command and control capability for the first GPS III satellite, but it unclear at 

this time when this capability will be delivered. This gap-filler capability will not enable the new 

capabilities offered by GPS III satellites, such as a jam resistant military signal and three new civil 

signals, so most of these capabilities will be unused until OCX Block 2 is delivered in 2016.

GPS User Equipment DOD is planning to field new GPS user equipment on a variety of air-, ground-, and sea-based 

platforms to utilize the modernized military signal made available by the newer GPS satellites. 

Although the availability of the new signal on satellites would be operational within the next few 

years, user equipment is not expected to be fully fielded to the warfighters until many years later, 

possibly as late as 2025. As a result, the military services’ ability to achieve a joint navigation 

capability, an essential element of conducting future military operations, as well as benefit from the 

jam-resistant and stronger new GPS signals may not be fully realized until a decade after the first 

GPS III launch.

FAB-T The Air Force’s Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) and the Family of Advanced Beyond 

Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T) programs have experienced a problems with synchronization of 

various system components which will provide protected communications for nuclear and 

conventional forces as well as many airborne assets and ground command posts. As one of the 

primary user terminal programs associated with AEHF, FAB-T has experienced numerous problems 

and the delivery of terminals is not currently aligned with the AEHF satellite program. Specifically, 

current estimates show that FAB-T will reach its initial operational capability in 2017, 3 years after 

AEHF is scheduled to reach its initial operating capability. In the meantime, the Air Force plans to 

conduct an independent alternative with reduced requirements to mitigate risk.

Joint Space Operations Center 

Mission System

Another area where synchronization in system development may pose problems is the Air Force’s 

Joint Space Operations Center Mission System (JMS) and Space Fence programs. JMS is to 

process data about space assets gathered by the Space Fence and other Space Situational 

Awareness (SSA) programs, and will increase DOD’s ability to track objects in space from about 

10,000 objects with the current system to over 100,000 objects. According to the Space Fence 

program office, JMS needs to be available when the Space Fence is fielded because the amount of 

data Space Fence will generate exceeds existing command and control system performance limits. 

JMS recently underwent a change to its acquisition strategy, dividing the program’s development into 

two increments to reduce risk and more rapidly deliver needed capabilities. The first Space Fence 

radar site is scheduled to provide initial operational capability by the end of fiscal year 2017, and to 

avoid a synchronization problem, JMS needs to be operational by this time.

Source: GAO analysis
 

Page 25 GAO-12-563T 

After more than a decade of serious acquisition difficulties, DOD is 

starting to launch new generations of satellites that promise vast 

enhancements in capability. Moreover, given the nation’s fiscal 

challenges, DOD’s focus on streamlining leadership, fixing problems, and 

implementing reforms is promising. But there are still significant barriers 

to achieve acquisition success that need to be addressed to maintain 

space superiority in an era of fiscal austerity. All of the barriers—

leadership fragmentation, launch costs, S&T planning, and disconnects 

between space and ground assets—require action from the Air Force and 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense as well as the participation and 

cooperation of all the military services, the intelligence community, and 

other agencies such as NASA and NOAA. Moreover, though successful 

launches are being experienced, problems within ongoing development 

efforts such as GPS III, indicate that space acquisitions are still at risk of 

significant cost and schedule problems, and attention to reforms must be 

sustained.

Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, this completes my 

prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you 

and Members of the Subcommittee may have at this time.

For further information about this statement, please contact Cristina 

Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to 

this statement include Art Gallegos, Assistant Director; Maricela 

Cherveny; Laura Hook; Angela Pleasants; Roxanna Sun; Bob Swierczek; 

and Alyssa Weir.

Concluding Remarks

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products

Page 26 GAO-12-563T 

2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and 

Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-12-342SP 

(Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012).

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Needs to Ensure New 

Acquisition Strategy Is Based on Sufficient Information, GAO-11-641 

(Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2011).

Space Research: Content and Coordination of Space Science and 

Technology Strategy Need to Be More Robust, GAO-11-722 

(Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2011).

Space and Missile Defense Acquisitions: Periodic Assessment Needed to 

Correct Parts Quality Problems in Major Programs, GAO-11-404 

(Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2011).

DOD Weapons Systems: Missed Trade-off Opportunities During 

Requirements Reviews, GAO-11-502 (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2011).

Space Acquisitions: DOD Delivering New Generations of Satellites, but 

Space System Acquisition Challenges Remain, GAO-11-590T 

(Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2011).

Defense Acquisitions: Challenges in Aligning Space System 

Components, GAO-10-55 (Washington, D.C.: October 29, 2009).

Global Positioning System: Challenges in Sustaining and Upgrading 

Capabilities Persist. GAO-10-636. (Washington, D.C.: September 15, 

2010). 

Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Agencies Must Act Quickly to 

Address Risks That Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and Climate 

Data. GAO-10-558. (Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2010). 

Defense Acquisitions: Strong Leadership Is Key to Planning and 

Executing Stable Weapon Programs, GAO-10-522 (Washington, D.C.: 

May 6, 2010).

Space Acquisitions: DOD Poised to Enhance Space Capabilities but, 

Persistent Challenges Remain in Developing Space Systems, 

GAO-10-447T (Washington, D.C.: March 10, 2010).

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 27 GAO-12-563T 

Space Acquisitions: Government and Industry Partners Face Substantial 

Challenges in Developing New DOD Space Systems. GAO-09-648T. 

(Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2009). 

Space Acquisitions: Uncertainties in the Evolved Expendable Launch 

Vehicle Program Pose Management and Oversight Challenges. 

GAO-08-1039. (Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2008). 

Defense Space Activities: National Security Space Strategy Needed to 

Guide Future DOD Space Efforts. GAO-08-431R. (Washington, D.C.: 

March 27, 2008). 

(121045)
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