UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4655

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

HOSEA DIAMOND, a/k/a Jose,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District 

Judge. (3:09-cr-01109-JFA-3)

Submitted: January 31, 2012 Decided: February 9, 2012

Before KING, GREGORY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Edye U. Moran, MORAN LAW OFFICES, Columbia, South Carolina, for 

Appellant. Robert Claude Jendron, Jr., Assistant United States 

Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Hosea Diamond pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess 

with intent to distribute and distribute cocaine and cocaine 

base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). The district 

court sentenced Diamond to forty-one months of imprisonment and 

he now appeals. Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), questioning whether 

Diamond’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and whether the 

district court erred in adopting the revised presentence report. 

Diamond filed a pro se supplemental brief raising additional 

issues.*

 Finding no error, we affirm.

Counsel first questions whether Diamond’s guilty plea 

was knowing and voluntary where the district court set a 

deadline for the filing of a plea agreement in order to receive 

the benefit of acceptance of responsibility under the advisory 

Sentencing Guidelines. The purpose of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 

colloquy is to ensure that the plea of guilt is entered into 

knowingly and voluntarily. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 

55, 58 (2002). Accordingly, prior to accepting a guilty plea, a 

trial court, through colloquy with the defendant, must inform 

the defendant of, and determine that he understands, the nature 

 * We have considered the issues raised in Diamond’s pro se 

brief and conclude they lack merit. 
3

of the charges to which the plea is offered, any mandatory 

minimum penalty, the maximum possible penalty he faces, and the 

various rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 11(b). The court also must determine whether there is 

a factual basis for the plea. Id.; United States v. DeFusco, 

949 F.2d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 1991). We have thoroughly reviewed 

the record and conclude that the district court fully complied 

with the requirements of Rule 11 and that Diamond’s guilty plea 

was entered into knowingly and voluntarily. 

Counsel next questions whether the district court 

erred in adopting the undisputed revised presentence report. As 

Diamond failed to object to the presentence report in the 

district court, we review this issue for plain error. See Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 

(1993). To meet this standard, Diamond must demonstrate that 

there was error, that was plain, and that affected his 

substantial rights. Id. Moreover, even if Diamond demonstrates 

plain error occurred, we will not exercise discretion to correct 

the error “unless the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, 

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3), the district court 

“may accept any undisputed portion of the presentence report as 

a finding of fact.” Here, Diamond did not file any objections 
4

to the revised presentence report and averred at the sentencing 

hearing that he had no objections to the report. Accordingly, 

the district court did not err in accepting the findings in the 

revised presentence report as fact. 

We have examined the entire record in accordance with 

the requirements of Anders and have found no meritorious issues 

for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. This court requires that counsel inform Diamond, in 

writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the 

United States for further review. If Diamond requests that a 

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition 

would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for 

leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must 

state that a copy thereof was served on Diamond. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED