[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 220 (Friday, November 14, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 61151-61152]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-29977]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-346]


In the Matter of Toledo Edison Company, Centerior Service 
Company, The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (Davis-Besse 
Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1); Exemption

I

    Toledo Edison Company, Centerior Service Company, and The Cleveland 
Electric Illuminating Company (the licensees) are the holders of 
Facility Operating License No. NPF-3, which authorizes operation of the 
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS), Unit 1 (the facility). The 
license provides, among other things, that the facility is subject to 
all the rules, regulations, and orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (the Commission) now or hereafter in effect.
    The facility is a pressurized-water reactor located at the 
licensees' site in Ottawa County, Ohio.

[[Page 61152]]

II

    Section 70.24 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 
``Criticality Accident Requirements,'' requires that each licensee 
authorized to possess special nuclear material maintain a criticality 
accident monitoring system in each area where such material is handled, 
used, or stored. Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 specify 
detection and sensitivity requirements that these monitors must meet. 
Subsection (a)(1) also specifies that all areas subject to criticality 
accident monitoring must be covered by two detectors. Subsection (a)(3) 
of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to maintain emergency procedures for 
each area in which this licensed special nuclear material is handled, 
used, or stored and provides that (1) the procedures ensure that all 
personnel withdraw to an area of safety upon the sounding of a 
criticality accident monitor alarm, (2) the procedures must include 
drills to familiarize personnel with the evacuation plan, and (3) the 
procedures designate responsible individuals for determining the cause 
of the alarm and placement of radiation survey instruments in 
accessible locations for use in such an emergency. Subsection (b)(1) of 
10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to provide the means for identifying 
quickly any personnel who have received a dose of 10 rads or more. 
Subsection (b)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to maintain 
personnel decontamination facilities, to maintain arrangements for a 
physician and other medical personnel qualified to handle radiation 
emergencies, and to maintain arrangements for the transportation of 
contaminated individuals to treatment facilities outside the site 
boundary. Paragraph (c) of 10 CFR 70.24 exempts Part 50 licensees from 
the requirements of paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 70.24 for special nuclear 
material used or to be used in the reactor. Subsection (d) of 10 CFR 
70.24 states that any licensee that believes that there is good cause 
why it should be granted an exemption from all or part of 10 CFR 70.24 
may apply to the Commission for such an exemption and shall specify the 
reasons for the relief requested.

III

    The special nuclear material that could be assembled into a 
critical mass at DBNPS is in the form of nuclear fuel. The quantity of 
special nuclear material other than fuel that is stored onsite in any 
given location is small enough to preclude achieving a critical mass. 
The Commission's technical staff has evaluated the possibility of an 
inadvertent criticality of the nuclear fuel at DBNPS and has determined 
that it is extremely unlikely that such an accident will occur if the 
licensees meet the following seven criteria:
    1. Only one new fuel assembly is allowed out of a shipping cask or 
storage rack at one time;
    2. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% 
confidence level, in the event that the fresh fuel storage racks are 
filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and 
flooded with pure water;
    3. If optimum moderation occurs at low moderator density, the k-
effective does not exceed 0.98, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence 
level, in the event that the fresh fuel storage racks are filled with 
fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with a 
moderator at the density corresponding to optimum moderation;
    4. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% 
confidence level, in the event that the spent fuel storage racks are 
filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and 
flooded with pure water;
    5. The quantity of special nuclear material, other than nuclear 
fuel, stored onsite in any given area is less than the quantity 
necessary for a critical mass;
    6. Radiation monitors, as required by General Design Criterion 63, 
are provided in fuel storage and handling areas to detect excessive 
radiation levels and to initiate appropriate safety actions; and
    7. The maximum nominal U-235 enrichment is limited to 5.0 weight 
percent.
    By letter dated January 30, 1997, as supplemented May 28 and 
October 3, 1997, the licensees requested an exemption from 10 CFR 
70.24. In this request, the licensees addressed the seven criteria 
given above. The Commission's technical staff has reviewed the 
licensees' submittals and has determined that DBNPS meets the criteria 
for prevention of inadvertent criticality. Therefore, the staff has 
determined that it is extremely unlikely an inadvertent criticality 
will occur in the handling of special nuclear materials or in their 
storage areas at DBNPS.
    The purpose of the criticality monitors required by 10 CFR 70.24 is 
to ensure that if a criticality were to occur during the handling of 
special nuclear material, personnel would be alerted to that fact and 
would take appropriate action. The staff has determined that it is 
extremely unlikely that such an accident could occur. Furthermore, the 
licensees have radiation monitors, as required by General Design 
Criterion 63, in fuel storage and handling areas. These monitors will 
alert personnel to excessive radiation levels and allow them to 
initiate appropriate safety actions. The low probability of an 
inadvertent criticality, together with the licensees' adherence to 
General Design Criterion 63, constitutes good cause for granting an 
exemption to the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24.
    The Commission has determined that pursuant to 10 CFR 70.14, this 
exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or 
the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public 
interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the licensees an 
exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 for DBNPS.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this exemption will not result in any significant adverse 
environmental impact (62 FR 59908).
    This exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of November 1997.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 97-29977 Filed 11-13-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P