Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter Citation Limited Pursu ant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32. 3 

# United Stat es Court of Appeals

For the First C ircuit

No. 04-1173 TRICIA L. RUBACKY, Plaintiff, Appellant,

v. MORGAN STANLEY DEAN WITTER CREDIT CORPORATION,

Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE [Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge ]
Before Boudin, Chief Judge , Lipez and Howard, Circuit Judges . Tricia L. Rubackyon brief pro se. DavidM. Rosen and Harmon Law Offices, P.C. , on brief for appellee.
July 23, 2004-2- Per Curiam . Th is is an interlocutory appeal from the district court's denial of pro se plaintiff's motion to enjoin defendant lender's foreclosure sale of plaintiff's home. Because the sale has now occurred, plaintiff's request to enjoin the sale has become moot, and she has failed to demonstrate the requisite threat of immediate harm or the likelihood of success on the merits to warrant any other preliminary injunctive relief.

As we recently reiterated, where "[t]h e po sture of the
case has changed in significant ways since the plaintiff initially made her motion for a preliminary injunction," the justiciability of an interlocutory appeal from the denial of that motion "is called into question." Matos v. Clinton Sch. Dist. , 367 F.3d 68, 72 (1 st Cir. 2004) (citing CMM Cable Rep., Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., Inc. , 48 F.3d 618, 621 (1 st Cir. 1995)). And, where, as here, the event that plaintiff sought to enjoin--the January 2004 foreclosure sale--has already occurred, "this court lacks the power to turn back the clock and, accordingly, . . . the appeal is moot." Matos , 367 F.3d at 72.

Altho u gh plaintiff's motion also sought to enjoin any future foreclosure sale, there is no evidence that any future sale has been or will be scheduled before the trial, which is scheduled to occur this fall. In the absence of a real threat of immediate andirreparable harm, the district court appropriately declined to issue a preliminary injunction. Id. at 74 (affirming denial of-3-

preliminaryinjunction where claim for relief "lacks immediacy . . . [and] record reflects no reason why that relief, if due, cannot await a full-dress trial"). Also, to the extent that plaintiff's present motion for preliminary injunctive relief was based on the
same grounds as her earlier one, there is little likelihood that plaintiff will succeed on those grounds for the reasons stated by the magistrate judge in his Report and Recommendation that the earlier motion be denied.

The district court also properly denied plaintiff's request for injunctive relief against defendant's counsel, prohibiting them "from conducting any foreclosure auctions within the court's borders" until various actions are taken. As recogniz edb y the magistrate judge, defendant's counsel "are not parties to this suit and the allegations [against them] provide no basis for an injunction against the defendant."

The district court did not directly address plaintiff's further request "[t]hat the court order Defendant to remove 'prays' fromall its documents in a religiously neutral way." We a ssume that def endant us es the word "prayer" in the legal sense of a "request addressed to the court and app earing at the end of a pleading; esp., a request for specific relief or damages," Black's Law Dictionary(8 th ed. 2004), rather than in any religious sense. Accordingly, the district court prop erly denied that request for relief as well. For the above reasons, plaintiff's appeal from the-4-

district court's denial of her request to enjoin the sale that has alreadyoccurred is dismissedas moot, and th e d istrict court's denial o f plaintiff's other requests for preliminary injunctive relief is affirmed .