COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Beales and Senior Judge Willis 

ERIC CHRISTOPHER LOGAN 

v. Record Nos. 0341-06-1 and MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 0363-06-1 PER CURIAM 

 DECEMBER 5, 2006 

CITY OF HAMPTON DEPARTMENT 

 OF SOCIAL SERVICES 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON 

Wilford Taylor, Jr., Judge 

 (J. Robert Harris, III, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting 

on brief. 

 (Rachel Allen, Assistant City Attorney, on brief), for appellee. 

Appellee submitting on brief. 

 (Robert G. Saunders, Guardian ad litem; The Law Firm of Thomas 

L. Hunter, P.C., on brief), for the infant child. Guardian ad litem

submitting on brief. 

 In a proceeding involving Eric C. Logan’s (“father”) minor child, T., father argues that 

the trial court erred by changing the goal from return home to adoption. He also maintains the 

trial court erred by terminating his parental rights. We disagree, and affirm the decision of the 

trial court. 

Background

On appeal, we view the evidence in the “‘light most favorable’ to the prevailing party in 

the circuit court and grant to that party the benefit of ‘all reasonable inferences fairly deducible 

therefrom.’” Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 257, 262, 616 S.E.2d 765, 767 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 
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(2005) (quoting Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 

S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991)). 

 T., along with her two older half-brothers, was removed from her residence on March 16, 

2004, when she was five months old. On March 11, 2004, T.’s mother had been arrested on 

multiple outstanding felony warrants. The following day, father was arrested and charged with 

six counts of felony child abuse of T.’s older half-brothers. The boys came under the care of the 

Hampton Department of Social Services (“DSS”), and had severe belt marks, areas of scabbing, 

and broken skin on their face, arms, and back. 

 Despite the arrests of T.’s parents, the initial goal established by DSS was to return T. to 

her parents or to place her with her maternal grandmother. DSS established several goals in the 

initial foster care service plan for father to accomplish T.’s return home. Father was required to 

“complete a parenting capacity evaluation . . . and a substance abuse evaluation . . . and comply 

with all recommendations . . . .” He was also required to “follow through with recommendations 

of the Department,” and “demonstrate [his] commitment to work with the Department towards 

the goal of reunification.” Furthermore, he was to visit T. at least once a month. 

 From the time T. was removed on March 16, 2004, until the goal was changed to 

adoption on October 18, 2005, father was incarcerated on three separate occasions. The first 

incarceration lasted for one week in March 2004; the second incarceration was from February to 

April 2005; and three days after his release in April, father was incarcerated again in connection 

with the attempted rape, abduction, and malicious wounding of T.’s mother on April 24, 2005. 

Father was sentenced to six years for these offenses, with five years suspended, and was 

incarcerated at the time of the hearing in circuit court on the petition to change the goal to 

adoption and to terminate father’s parental rights. 
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 The circuit court hearing was held on January 4, 2006. In support of its petition to 

change the goal to adoption and to terminate father’s parental rights, DSS relied on father’s 

failure to accomplish several goals. Specifically, father failed to undergo psychiatric therapy for 

possible bipolar disorder, as recommended by his parenting capacity evaluation, and did not 

complete a substance abuse evaluation. Without explanation, he also stopped visiting T. in 

December 2004. DSS cited father’s inability to meet T.’s needs as the result of his frequent 

incarcerations, as well as his failure to demonstrate a commitment to reunify with T., as 

evidenced by his assaulting and abducting T.’s mother. 

 T., born September 25, 2003, and her half-brothers have resided with the same foster 

parents from the time of their removal through the termination hearing. Brenda Dixon, their 

foster mother, testified T. and her siblings are doing well under her care. Social worker Shelley 

Matthews stated she had observed the children in the foster home on a monthly basis, and they 

had “very much” bonded with their foster parents. At the time of the termination hearing, T. was 

two years old. 

 Following the hearing, the circuit court granted the petition to change the goal to 

adoption pursuant to Code § 16.1-282, as well as the petition to terminate father’s parental rights 

pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). This appeal followed. 

Analysis

 Father argues the trial court erred by changing the goal from return to home to adoption, 

and in terminating his parental rights. Because we affirm the trial court’s decision to terminate 

father’s parental rights, we also affirm its decision approving the change in goal to adoption.1

 1

 “Our decision to affirm the termination order necessarily subsumes this aspect of [his] 

appeal because a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard governs judicial modifications of 

foster care plans.” Toms, 46 Va. App. at 265 n.3, 616 S.E.2d at 769 n.3 (citing Richmond Dep’t 

of Soc. Servs. v. Carter, 28 Va. App. 494, 497, 507 S.E.2d 87, 88 (1998); Padilla v. Norfolk Div. 

of Soc. Servs., 22 Va. App. 643, 645, 472 S.E.2d 648, 649 (1996)). 
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When reviewing a decision to terminate parental rights, we presume the circuit court 

“‘thoroughly weighed all the evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and made its 

determination based on the child’s best interests.’” Toms, 46 Va. App. at 265-66, 616 S.E.2d at 

769 (quoting Fields v. Dinwiddie County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 1, 7, 614 S.E.2d 656, 

659 (2005)). “The trial court’s judgment, ‘when based on evidence heard ore tenus, will not be 

disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Id. at 266, 616 

S.E.2d at 769 (quoting Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463 (citation omitted)). “In its 

capacity as factfinder, therefore, the circuit court retains ‘broad discretion in making the 

decisions necessary to guard and to foster a child’s best interests.’” Id. (quoting Farley v. Farley, 

9 Va. App. 326, 328, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990)). 

 The trial court terminated father’s parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). Code 

§ 16.1-283(C)(2) requires clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interests 

of the child and that 

the parent . . . without good cause, ha[s] been unwilling or unable 

within a reasonable period of time not to exceed twelve months 

from the date the child was placed in foster care to remedy 

substantially the conditions which led to or required continuation 

of the child’s foster care placement, notwithstanding the 

reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health 

or other rehabilitative agencies to such end. 

 Father argues the trial court’s decision to terminate his parental rights was erroneously 

based solely upon his incarceration. He notes that he had not abused T., he was “opposed” to the 

termination of his parental rights, and he “wished for his relatives to be considered as a possible 

placement.”2

 2

 To the extent father argues that termination was inappropriate because DSS failed to 

investigate placement with his relatives, we note that he lodged no objection to the circuit’s 

ruling on this basis and, therefore, we decline to address this issue for the first time on appeal. 

See Rule 5A:18. 
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While father’s incarceration, standing alone, is not sufficient to support the trial court’s 

termination of his parental rights, “it is a valid and proper circumstance which, when combined 

with other evidence concerning the parent/child relationship, can support [the] court’s finding 

that the best interests of the child will be served by termination.” Ferguson v. Stafford County 

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 14 Va. App. 333, 340, 417 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1992). By the same token, Code 

§ 16.1-283(C)(2) contains no excuse for a parent’s failure to remedy the conditions leading to 

foster care because he has been incarcerated for over twelve months subsequent to the child’s 

placement in foster care. 

 The evidence showed not only that father had been repeatedly incarcerated during T.’s 

placement in foster care, but that he had physically abused T.’s older half-brothers and assaulted 

and abducted her mother. Futhermore, father failed to undergo psychiatric counseling and to 

complete a substance abuse evaluation, as required by DSS to facilitate T.’s return to him. By 

his actions and inactions, father failed to meet the requirements established in the foster care plan 

for T.’s return. 

 “When addressing matters concerning a child . . . the paramount consideration of a trial 

court is the child’s best interests.” Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463. “It is clearly 

not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or 

even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax County 

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). Even prior to his 

incarceration, father failed to maintain visitation with T. and to complete the substance abuse 

evaluation required by DSS. Furthermore, father failed to undergo psychiatric counseling for 

bipolar disorder as recommended by his parenting capacity evaluation. Upon release from 

incarceration in April 2005, father demonstrated his lack of commitment to T.’s return by 

assaulting and abducting T.’s mother. Notably, father had been incarcerated on three separate 
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occasions between March 2004 and the time of the termination hearing. “‘[P]ast actions and 

relationships over a meaningful period serve as good indicators of what the future may be 

expected to hold.’” Linkous v. Kingery, 10 Va. App. 45, 56, 390 S.E.2d 188, 194 (1990) 

(quoting Frye v. Spotte, 4 Va. App. 530, 536, 359 S.E.2d 315, 319 (1987)). 

 DSS proved by clear and convincing evidence that father, “without good cause, [was] 

unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed twelve months . . . to 

remedy substantially the conditions which led to or required continuation of” T.’s placement in 

foster care. Furthermore, because T. had a strong bond with her foster parents and had limited 

contact with father since infancy, the trial court did not err in finding that termination was in her 

best interests. 

Based upon the foregoing, the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s 

termination of father’s parental rights and its decision to change the goal in the permanent foster 

care service plan to adoption. 

 Affirmed.