* This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicataand collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 7/29/96 TENTH CIRCUIT

_____________________ ROBERT RICHARDSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. ALBERTSON'S, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Defendant-Appellee. No. 96-1036 (D.C. No. 94-B-1774) (D. Colorado)

_____________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

_____________________ Before BRORBY, EBEL and HENRY , Circuit Judges.

_____________________ After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appearing pro se, Robert Richardson appeals the dis trict court's order-2-

granting Albertson's motion for summary judgment onhis claims that Albertson's termination of his employment violated the American s with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. , Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as ame nded, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. , and 42 U.S.C. §1981. We affirm.
Albertson's terminated Mr. Richardson from his posi tion as a baker on August 7, 1993. Mr. Richardson, an African American, claims he was fired for being absent from work for two days without having a doctor's note for verification while white employees were not require d to produce doctor's notes for similar absences. Albertson's claims they fire d Mr. Richardson "for failing to report to work as scheduled, failing to comply witha reasonable request that he provide documentation concerning his absence, and b ecause of Albertson's belief that he lied about the events of June 2-5, 1992, as ked a co-worker to lie for him, and falsely denied reporting to work."
Prior to filing his complaint in district court, Mr . Richardson was required to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding hi s claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2 000e-5; 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); Khader v. Aspin , 1 F.3d 968, 970 (10th Cir. 1993). He attempted t o do this by filing a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the-3-

"Commission"). In its determination letter, the Co mmission found "Charging party has failed to provide, medical documentation to show that he is a qualified individual as required by the ADA. Therefore, the Commission finds that it has no jurisdiction on the allegations filed under the Americans with Disabilities Act." We have held that "when a complainant refuse s or fails to provide the agency information sufficient to evaluate the merit s of the claim, he or she cannot be deemed to have exhausted administrative remedies ." Khader , 1 F.3d at 971 (internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore a gree with the district court's finding that it lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Richar dson's claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act because by failing to provide the Commission with the documents it needed to determine his claim , he failed to adequately exhaust his administrative remedies.

The Commission's letter did dismiss Mr. Richardson' s Title VII claims on the merits. We agree with the district court that he failed to show any evidence of racial discrimination and his Title VII claim and h is § 1981 claim were properly dismissed on summary judgment. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union , 491 U.S. 164, 186-87 (1989) (same analysis applies to T itle VII and § 1981 claims). Under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), an employee carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of racial-4-

discrimination. If this is done, the burden then s hifts to the employer to show a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminati ng the plaintiff. Id. If the employer does so, the burden then shifts back to th e plaintiff to establish the employer's reasons as pretext. Id. at 804; Randle v. City of Aurora , 69 F.3d 441, 451 (10th Cir. 1995). The district court found: Assuming that Richardson can set forth a prima faci e case of racial discrimination, Albertson's has met its burden of s etting forth a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminatin g him. Albertson's proffers affidavits of four employees w ho confirm the events of June 2 through 5. These facts are uncont roverted based on Richardson's failure to provide evidence other thanhis own conclusory allegations regarding these events. The refore, Richardson presents no evidence that the proffered reasons forhis termination were pretextual. Accordingly, he fails to set forth a prima facie case of racial discrimination and Albertson's is entitle d to summary judgment on Richardson's Title VII and § 1981 claim s. After liberally construing the record, the only evi dence we can find that Mr. Richardson offers of race discrimination are his un supported allegations white coworkers were not fired for failing to report to w ork and his statement that he has shown "his witness and produce[d] evidence to s how a genuine issue in his pretrial disclosures." He fails to identify who th is witness is or what their testimony would be; nor does he identify any non-mi nority coworkers who were treated differently than he was. He also fails to provide any evidence to dispute the legitimate reasons Albertson's gave for terminating him. Mere conclusory allegations unsupported by any evidence are not eno ugh to withstand a motion for-5-

summary judgment.

The order of the district court is AFFIRMED
.

Entered for the Court: WADE BRORBY United States Circuit Judge