John J. C allahan was appointed to serve as acting Commissioner of the Social 1 Security Administra

tion effective March 1, 1997. He has been substituted for Shirley S. Chater pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c). United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 97-1488

___________ Donna Briggs, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Northern District of Iowa. John J. Callahan, Acting Commissioner, * Social Security Administration, * 1 * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: October 23, 1997 Filed: March 19, 1998

___________ Before McMILLIAN, FLOYD R. GIBSON, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

___________ BEAM, Circuit Judge.The H onorable Edward J. McManus, United States District Judge for th e 2 Northern District of Iowa. Rit alinis a central nervous system stimulant that is prescribed to stabiliz e 3 ch ildren who are diagnosed with attention deficit disorder. See Physician's Des k Reference 848 (50th ed. 1996). -2- Donna Br iggs appeals the district court's affirmance of the denial of he r 2 applicat ion for Child's Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") benefits based o n disability. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Donna Br iggs, who is now fourteen years old, has been diagnosed as havin g borderline intellectual functioning, attention deficit hyperactivit y disorder (ADHD), and a conduct disorder. Her application was denied initially and on reconsideration. She then sought review and was granted a hearing.
At the hea ring, both Donna Briggs and her mother, Brenda Briggs, testified

. Donna testified that she spends part of her day in a special educati on class. Her mother testifi ed that Donna has had problems in school since first grade. She stated tha t Donna is hyperactive, fidgety, disruptive, a ggressive and cannot concentrate. She also stated that her daugh ter's behavior and academic performance has improved since she was prescribed Ritalin. 3
The evidence presented at the hearing included a questionnaire prepared b y Donna's fifth-grade teacher no ting that Donna was performing below grade level in all academic areas. She described Donna as "low functioning," but stated t hat she "usually demonst rates appropriate behavior." The record also included reports fro m psychologists who examined Donna. Dr. Thomas Anderegg reported that Donna "is capable of doing all activities of daily living appropriat e for a child her age but requires-3-

supervision in order to do them consistently, " and has "significant behavioral problems that interfer

e with getting along with others and following rules." He found Donna to be functioning in the low average range of intelligence, with adaptive behavior in the average range. Another psyc hologist found that her "impairments do not substantially reduce her ability to function independently, appropriately, and effectively in an ageappropriate manner." The school psychologist reported that Donna's intellectua l functioning was within the borderline range, and that her reading and writt en expression skills were about two years behind those of her peers.
The admini strative law judge (ALJ) denied benefits. He found that althoug h Briggs had established the existence of a severe impairment, her condition did not meet or equal any impairment in the listing of presumptively disabling conditions. See 2 0 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subp t. P, App. 1 (the listings). The ALJ thus conducted an individual func tional assessment and found that Briggs was not disabled because she coul d functi on independently, appropriately, and effectively in an age-appropriate manner

. The appeals council affirmed, as did the district court. Briggs appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
We wi ll affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is supported by substantia l ev idence. See Young v. Shalala , 52 F.3d 200, 201-02 (8th Cir. 1995). Substantia l evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough that a re asonable mind would accept it as adequate to support the Commissioner's decision. See Lawrence v. Chater , 107 F.3d 674, 676 (8th Cir. 1997). In assessing the substantiality of evidence, we mus t consider evidence that detract s from the Commissioner's decision, as well as evidence that supports it. See Woolf v. Shalala , 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th C ir. 1993). We may not reverse the Commissioner merely because substantial evidence would have supported the opposite conclusion. See id.-4-

As an initial matter, there is a dispute between the parties over whether recent enactments to the Social Security Act apply to this action. Under the law in effect at the time the ALJ made his decision, a child was considered disabled if the child "suffers from any medically determinable physical or mental impairment of comparabl e severit y" to an impairment that would disable an adult. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A ) (1995). The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act o f 1996, which was signed into law on August 22, 1996, changed the standards by which child SSI benefits are awarded. See Pub. L. No . 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). The new legisla tion provides that a child will be considered disabled if he or she has a "medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which results in marked and severe functional limitations." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(3)(C)(i) (1997). The legislatio n applies to "any individual who applies for, or whose claim is finally adjudicated with respect to, Social Security benefits after t he date of the enactment of the Act." Pub. L. No. 104-193 § 211(d), 110 Stat. 2190. Since this a ction was still pending after August 22, 1996, the new legislation applies. See id. at § 211(d)(1)(A)(ii), 110 Stat. 2190. Legislative history indicates, however, that the new statutory definition imposes a standard for disability that is more stringent than the earlier standard for evaluating childhooddisability claims. See generally , H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-725 (1996) , repr intedin , 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2716 (stating "severe" should be given it s ordinary meaning, not "other than minor"); 142 Cong. Rec. S4095-05, S4099 (daily ed. April 25, 1996) (summary of centrist coalition budget--referri ng to "tightened definition of childho od disability"). Accordingly, if a claim had been properly denied under the old standard, it must also be denied under the new, more stringent, standard. We will thus ana lyze this action under the old standard, as did the ALJ. Because we find that Briggs is not

disabled under the old, more lenient, standard, we need not evaluate her case under the new, more stringent, standard.
Br iggs asserts that the ALJ erred in determining that she does not meet listin g 112.05(D) (Mental Retardation). See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App . 1 § 112.05(D).-5-

Tha t listing provides that a child is disabled if he or she has: 1) a valid verbal , performance, or full scale IQ of 60 to 70; and 2) "a physical or othe r mental impairment imposing additional and significant limitation of function." Id. Briggs's IQ score of 69 meets the first prong of the listing. Briggs contends that her ADHD and behavior problems impose sufficient limitations of function to satisfy the second prong

. We disa gree. Although the ALJ did not specifically discuss Briggs's condition in t he context of listing 112.05(D), we find the record supports the conclusion tha t Briggs's other impairments do not meet the requirements of the listing. The recor d shows that Briggs's hyperactivity has improved with medication. Reports from he r tea chers indicate that her behavior is acceptable at school. Although Brigg s undou btedly has additional impairments, there has been no showing that th e impairments impose a significant limitation on her activities. Even if a listing is not satisfied, a child may nonethele ss be disabled if the child's imp airment

is of comparable severity to that which would disable an adult. See 2 0 C.F.R. § 4 16.924(b) (1995). A child's impairments are considered comparable to an adult's disabling impairments only if they substantially reduce his or her ability t o functi on independently, appropriately, and effectively in an age-appropriate manner

. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a) (1995). The ALJ performs an individual functio n assessment in this regard. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924d(a) (1995).
We have reviewed the record and find that there is substantial evidence t o support the ALJ's finding that Briggs's mild mental retardation, coupled wi th her ADHD and behavior problems, are not of comparable severity to those which would disable an adult.
III. CONCLUSION The judgment of the district court is affirmed.-6-

A true copy. ATTEST: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.