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67 –124 PDF 2012

S. Hrg. 112–384 

EXPLORING DRUG GANGS’ EVER–EVOLVING 

TACTICS TO PENETRATE THE BORDER AND THE 

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S ABILITY TO STOP THEM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY 

AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 31, 2011 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 

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(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

NICHOLAS A. ROSSI, Minority Staff Director 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

JOYCE WARD Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee 

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas, Chairman 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

JON TESTER, Montana 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

KIRK ROBERTSON, Majority Staff Director 

RYAN TULLY, Minority Staff Director 

JASON BOCKENSTEDT, Professional Staff Member 

KELSEY STROUD, Chief Clerk 

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C O N T E N T S 

Opening statement: Page 

Senator Pryor .................................................................................................... 1 

Senator Ensign ................................................................................................. 3 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Pryor .................................................................................................... 29 

Senator Ensign ................................................................................................. 36 

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, MARCH 31, 2011 

Donna Bucella, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Intelligence and Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 5 

James A. Dinkins, Executive Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security .......................................... 7 

Thomas H. Harrigan, Assistant Administrator and Chief of Operations, Drug 

Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of Justice ............................... 9 

Frances Flener, Arkansas State Drug Director, State of Arkansas .................... 20 

L. Kent Bitsko, Executive Director, Nevada High Intensity Drug Trafficking 

Area ....................................................................................................................... 23 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Bitsko, L. Kent: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 23 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 79 

Bucella, Donna: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 38 

Dinkins, James A.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 49 

Flener, Frances: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 20 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 72 

Harrigan, Thomas H.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 9 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 62 

APPENDIX 

Photos referenced by Senator Pryor ....................................................................... 33 

Photos referenced by Senator Pryor ....................................................................... 34 

Photo referenced by Senator Pryor ........................................................................ 35 

Questions and responses for the Record from: 

Ms. Bucella ........................................................................................................ 85 

Mr. Dinkins ....................................................................................................... 94 

Mr. Harrigan ..................................................................................................... 101 

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EXPLORING DRUG GANGS’ 

EVER–EVOLVING TACTICS TO PENETRATE 

THE BORDER AND THE FEDERAL 

GOVERNMENT’S ABILITY TO STOP THEM 

THURSDAY, MARCH 31, 2011 

U.S. SENATE,

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY

AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,

OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in 

Room SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Mark L. 

Pryor, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Pryor and Ensign. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PRYOR 

Senator PRYOR. I want to thank everybody for being here, and I 

certainly want to thank Senator Ensign for being here. 

Before we begin, I want to offer my condolences to the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the family of ICE Agent 

Jaime J. Zapata. Agent Zapata was killed after he and Victor Avila 

were shot in the line of duty in February. These agents will always 

be remembered for their heroic service, and I extend my wishes for 

a speedy recovery to Agent Avila and pray that Agent Zapata’s 

family is comforted through this very difficult time. 

Today, this Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery and Intergovernmental Affairs will discuss methods drug gangs are using to penetrate the Southwest border in an effort to traffic drugs and people 

into the United States. We have asked witnesses from the Federal 

border protection and drug enforcement agencies to join us today, 

as well as officials from the States of Arkansas and Nevada. 

I would like to extend a special thank you to Ms. Fran Flener 

for being here today and traveling from Arkansas. She is not only 

a dear friend, but she also happens to be a very knowledgeable expert and I am glad she is able to be here today. 

The fight to secure the United States borders is a constant concern for the people living in the border States as well as the government officials who represent them. There are few threats as 

deadly and menacing as those posed by drug gangs, particularly 

Mexican drug gangs, operating near the border. Many Americans, 

and likewise, many lawmakers, may be inclined to believe that this 

problem is for the border States only and for the border States to 

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solve, yet there can be no doubt that this is a problem for all Americans, North to South, Coast to Coast. An estimated 230 American 

cities, including three cities in Arkansas, have a presence of the 

Mexican drug cartels in their communities. We must do everything 

we can to disrupt their networks and to prevent them from moving 

product onto American soil. 

News coming out of the Southwest is filled with stories detailing 

new and inventive tactics the drug gangs have employed in an effort to move greater quantities of drugs and people across the 

United States border. Drug gangs have begun to use bold tactics 

that include creating mock border patrol vehicles to bypass legitimate border officials, and modifying vehicles to look like Wal-Mart 

trucks or FedEx vans. Just last week, a white van pulled up to a 

border checkpoint along Interstate 8 in eastern San Diego County. 

The van appeared to be filled with Marines in uniforms. According 

to the Associated Press, a plainclothes Border Patrol Agent who 

had served in the Marine Corps became suspicious when the driver 

did not know the birthday of the Marine Corps. In the end, 13 fake 

Marines were actually illegal Mexican immigrants and two were 

suspected drug smugglers. 

The efforts of drug gangs to smuggle people and goods range 

from the truly bizarre to the truly extraordinary. This past January, U.S. National Guard troops at the Naco Border Patrol station 

about 80 miles southwest of Tucson alerted the Mexican Army 

after a surveillance camera spotted several traffickers hurling bundles of marijuana over the border with a catapult. The catapult 

was found about 20 yards from the border on a flatbed platform 

towed by an SUV, according to the Associated Press. 

Officials estimate that Mexican drug cartels smuggle up to $25 

billion of illegal drugs, as well as people, into the United States. 

They also have begun to use small planes or ultralight aircraft to 

fly over the border and beneath radar detection. According to the 

U.S. Customs and Border Patrol Agency (CBP), from October 2009 

to mid-April 2010, the agency detected 193 suspected airspace incursions and 135 confirmed incursions by ultralight aircraft. The 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency believes the 

number of incursions over the border more than tripled between 

fiscal years 2009 and 2010, from 118 to 379. However, only 10 

ultralights have been seized and only 27 people arrested for using 

them to smuggle drugs. 

Drug gangs have also begun using drug submarines, mostly to 

transport cocaine from Colombia into Mexico, although more recently, they have been found closer to U.S. waters. While most 

drug submarines are unsophisticated, and unable to dive deep into 

the seas, and propelled by small diesel engines, some drug gangs 

are now spending money on more advanced submarines. According 

to a recent Homeland Security Today article that ran in July of last 

year, Ecuadorian counternarcotics officials working with the Drug 

Enforcement Agency (DEA) seized a fully operational submarine 

built for the primary purpose of transporting multi-ton quantities 

of cocaine. The submarine came equipped with a periscope and air 

conditioning system. DEA intelligence helped lead the seizure of 

the submarine, which was the first seizure of its kind. 

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Another hard-to-detect tactic is the use of drug tunnels. While 

the use of these tunnels is known to be widespread, they continue 

to evolve in both number and sophistication. In 2006, CBP had discovered 75 smuggling tunnels along the U.S.-Mexican border. 

These tunnels range from unsophisticated just boar-holes stretching hundreds of feet in length, to far more sophisticated tunnels 

made with wood and cinderblock walls, rail systems, electricity, 

and ventilation. Last Thanksgiving, United States and Mexican authorities discovered a tunnel that started in the kitchen of a home 

in Tijuana, Mexico. The tunnel ran a half-mile, or about 7 football 

fields, into two Southern California warehouse. The tunnel was 

found when officials noticed a tractor trailer arriving at a warehouse in Southern California and the authorities found the truck 

stuffed with 27,000 600-pound packages of marijuana worth $20 

million. 

Tunnels dug into the warehouse present a particular problem because there are hundreds, if not thousands, of privately owned 

warehouses in cities along the border. Border security personnel 

have expressed frustration that they do not have the resources to 

adequately attack this problem. 

These are just a few examples that may illustrate the scope and 

the scale of the problem, so the intent of this hearing is to, first, 

examine the strategies our Federal agencies are employing to stop 

drug gangs; second, the level of coordination between Federal agencies and between Federal agencies and State and local governments; and third, whether agencies have the resources and manpower to creatively respond to these new tactics. We will also hear 

from Arkansas and Nevada witnesses about the consequences that 

result when drug gangs succeed and their products reach our cities. 

Senator Ensign. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ENSIGN 

Senator ENSIGN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a very important hearing today and I want to thank all of our witnesses who 

have taken the time out of their schedules to testify, including 

Lieutenant Kent Bitsko, who has traveled here from Nevada. 

I also want to thank all the men and women who work very hard 

24–7 every day of the year to secure our borders. Those who work 

at our Nation’s air, land, and seaports, those who are on foreign 

postings, those who work in our Nation’s interior, whether in uniform or plainclothes, whether they are from ICE, CBP, DEA, or 

other Federal, State, or local agencies. They all deserve sincere appreciation for doing a very tough job and doing it very well. 

Some of these officers have made the ultimate sacrifice. From 

decades past, we recall the service of DEA Special Agent Enrique 

‘‘Kike’’ Camarena. In recent years, we mourned the loss of Border 

Patrol Agents Robert Rosas and Brian Terry, and now in just the 

past few months, we suffered the loss, as the Chairman said, of 

ICE Special Agent Jaime Zapata. All served their Nation well, and 

we can best honor them by taking up their fallen standard and continuing and ultimately finishing their work by securing our borders. 

We will discuss today various tactics used by the drug and alien 

smugglers to achieve their goals, from disguising illegal aliens as 

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U.S. Marines in uniform and traveling in vehicles masquerading as 

official U.S. Government transports, to using submarines and small 

boats to haul dope up our coasts, to crafting elaborate tunnels underneath our borders that bring illegal aliens and dangerous narcotics and other contraband into our country, the drug and alien 

smugglers will literally stop at nothing. 

The situation at our southern border is, without a doubt, very 

critical to our current and our future security. According to the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), in its 2010 study, the calendar year 2009 saw an increase in the availability of heroin, 

methamphetamines, and marijuana smuggled over our southern 

border. The insidious reach of the Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO) across our southern border and into our communities is not limited strictly to the border area, through which they 

peddle their drugs with deadly results. Again, according to the 

NDIC, Mexican drug cartels are the only DTOs active in every region of the United States, including the States of every Member of 

this Subcommittee. 

These drug cartels’ reach has even arrived here in our Nation’s 

capital. The Washington Post reported recently that the D.C. Metropolitan Police and special agents from Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement/Homeland Security investigations arrested 8 suspects 

believed to be connected with Mexico’s La Familia drug cartel, 

whose objective was to expand their operation in this District and 

the surrounding area. This multi-city investigation netted over $5 

million worth of crystal meth alone. 

Just as ominous, the Mexican drug cartels, according to reports, 

have expanded their relationship with street and prison gangs in 

the United States and have increased their distribution of illegal 

drugs into more rural and suburban areas. This drug trade has 

brought enormous revenues to these cartels. Tens of billions of dollars are smuggled from the United States throughout the Southwest border into Mexico. This blood money helps the cartels tempt 

some of our officers on the border to forsake their oaths to uphold 

the law for private gain. We know, however, that these dirty few 

are just a small microcosm of the total workforce and the vast majority are truly the rule to the exception. 

The end result is that innocent people are caught up in the violence. The Mexican government reported recently that over 34,000 

people have been killed in their country in drug war-related deaths 

since 2007. Considering that last year’s total of 15,273 marked almost a 59 percent increase in the numbers. Unfortunately, those 

numbers are still going up. 

The violence has also occurred in our country. Drug and alien 

smugglers have kidnapped innocent people to further their objectives, have emboldened street gangs to become more violent, thus 

placing more of our brave law enforcement officers and ourselves 

in greater danger. 

This is a battle that we must win. We must win it because the 

drugs and the violence threaten individuals and communities 

across our Nation. We must win it because we need secure borders 

to ensure our national security. And we must win it on behalf of 

those who already have made the ultimate sacrifice in this fight. 

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1The prepared statement of Ms. Bucella appears in the appendix on page 38. 

Again, I want to thank our witnesses and you, Mr. Chairman, for 

holding this very important hearing. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Senator Ensign. 

We have three very good witnesses in our first panel and I want 

to welcome each of you to the Subcommittee. What we are going 

to do is have you do your opening statement in about 5 minutes. 

But first, let me just run down the list and introduce each one of 

you very quickly and then I will open up with you, Ms. Bucella. 

Our first witness today is Donna Bucella. She is the Assistant 

Commissioner of the Office of Intelligence and Operations at the 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency. 

Our next witness is James Dinkins. He is Executive Director of 

the Office of Homeland Security Investigations at U.S. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement. 

Our third witness is Thomas Harrigan. He is the Assistant Administrator and Chief of Operations at the Drug Enforcement Administration. 

I want to thank all of you all for being here, and Ms. Bucella, 

if you would lead off. Thank you. 

TESTIMONY OF DONNA BUCELLA,1 ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS, U.S. 

CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Ms. BUCELLA. Good morning, Chairman Pryor, Ranking Member 

Ensign. It is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection’s efforts to secure our Nation’s borders. As America’s front-line border agency, CBP is responsible for 

securing America’s borders against threats while facilitating legal 

trade and travel. 

I would like to begin by recognizing those at the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) who have given their lives in the service 

to our Nation. The loss of these brave agents is a stark reminder 

of the sacrifices made by the men and women of DHS every day. 

It also strengthens our resolve to continue to do everything in our 

power to protect against, mitigate, and respond to the threats and 

secure our border. 

Over the past 2 years, DHS has dedicated historic levels of personnel, technology, and resources to the Southwest border. With 

funding providing by the enacted 2010 Border Security Supplement, we are continuing to add technology, manpower, and infrastructure to the Southwest border. 

Nonetheless, CBP still faces significant challenges. We remain 

concerned about the drug cartel violence taking place in Mexico 

and continue to guard against spillover effects in the United 

States. We will continue to assess and support the investments in 

the manpower, technology, and resources that have proven to be effective over the last 2 years in order to keep our borders secure and 

the communities along it safe. 

Our mission is complex and challenging. Vast open expanses of 

remote and rugged terrain between our ports of entry (POEs), coupled with the large volumes of legitimate trade and traffic at our 

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ports of entry, are regularly exploited by smugglers and other 

cross-border criminal organizations. To further complicate our 

interdiction efforts, smugglers use a wide range of ever-evolving 

methods to attempt to move their illicit goods into the United 

States, both at and between our ports of entry. In general, marijuana is the primary form of contraband encountered between the 

ports of entry, while smugglers attempt to move cocaine, heroin, 

and methamphetamine through the ports of entry. While the routes 

and smuggling techniques differ somewhat in these environments, 

the challenge for our front-line personnel remains the same. 

Examples of concealment techniques in vehicles and commercial 

conveyances include the exploitation of natural factory voids in vehicles, airbag compartments, quarter panels, transmissions, nonfactory compartments in engine airtake manifolds, batteries, radiators, and gas tanks. These concealment techniques are used to illicitly move all manner of contraband, from narcotics, currency, 

firearms, and on some occasions people. To detect this contraband 

in vehicles and other conveyances, we employ a wide range of interdiction methods, to include officer intuition, behavioral observation, 

fiber optic scopes, and non-intrusive inspection technologies. 

Even with the deployment of all this, in the real environment, 

drug trafficking organizations continue to use the rail cars to transport narcotics to and across the Southwest border. One of the most 

common techniques is the use of natural voids in the chassis systems of the various rail cars. 

Due to the increased CBP land and air intradiction efforts 

against the U.S.-Mexico border, drug and human smuggling and 

trafficking organizations are increasingly turning to maritime 

smuggling routes to get their illegal cargo into the United States. 

Mexican smuggling organizations use a variety of methods to enter 

into the United States, including the use of small wooden vessels 

to evade detection. These organizations also use pleasure boats, 

shrimp boats, fishing boats in an attempt to blend into legitimate 

boat trafficking. 

In the ravine environment, a primary method of crossing illegal 

goods and people through our borders are use of high-speed vessels 

that can come across the rivers in a matter of seconds. Other methods, such as the ultralight aircraft, which are attractive to smugglers because of their size and capability to fly extremely low. Detecting the tracking of ultralight aircraft is very difficult using 

standard radar technologies. 

In addition, smuggling methods include use of tunnels. Tunnels 

have ranged from very sophisticated to very rudimentary. CBP 

works with ICE, DEA, and the Department of Homeland Security 

Science and Technology Directorate to test and ultimately deploy 

tunnel detection technology. 

We also work with our foreign, State, local, Tribal, and Federal 

partners to address the problems of the Southwest border and combat transnational threats. CBP hosts a weekly Southwest State of 

the Border teleconference in which we share the different types of 

concealment techniques and methods with our partners. These teleconferences include up to 290 participants on a weekly basis. 

Beyond this measure, in recent months, we announced the Arizona Joint Field Command at CBP. This brings together and aligns 

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1The prepared statement of Mr. Dinkins appears in the appendix on page 49. 

Border Patrol, air and marine field operations under a unified command structure to better, in a more comprehensive way, meet the 

unique challenges faced at our border, especially in Arizona. 

Despite these many challenges we face in our operational areas 

of responsibility, we have, through collaboration and coordination 

with our partner, made great strides. With your continued assistance, we will continue to refine and further enhance our effectiveness in detection and interdiction capabilities. 

Thank you for this opportunity for me to testify about the work 

at CBP. We are committed to providing our front-line agents and 

officers with the tools they need to effectively achieve the primary 

mission of securing our borders, and I look forward to answering 

any of your questions. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. Mr. Dinkins. 

TESTIMONY OF JAMES A. DINKINS,1 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. DINKINS. Chairman Pryor and Ranking Member Ensign, on 

behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Assistant Secretary Morton, I 

would like to thank you for the opportunity to discuss ICE’s efforts 

to investigate, disrupt, and dismantle transnational criminal organizations. 

As you mentioned, we experienced a terrible tragedy within our 

agency last month involving two Special Agents assigned to our 

Mexico office. Special Agent Jaime Zapata lost his life, and Special 

Agent Victor Avila was seriously injured after being ambushed 

while driving in a U.S. Government vehicle. This senseless act of 

violence serves as a clear reminder of the dangers confronted and 

sacrifices made each and every day by our Nation’s law enforcement officers. Our prayers remain with both the Zapata family for 

their loss and for Special Agent Victor Avila’s speedy recovery. 

Since the incident, ICE Special Agents have been working with 

our Federal law enforcement partners at DHS and the Department 

of Justice (DOJ) to support our Mexican partners in their efforts 

to track down the perpetrators of this heinous attack and to ensure 

those responsible for the murder of Special Agent Zapata are 

brought to justice. 

As you know, the illicit flow of drugs, money, weapons, as well 

as human smuggling and trafficking are part of a complex interconnected system of illicit pathways and international criminal organizations that span the globe. ICE targets these criminal organizations at every critical phase in the illicit cycle—internationally 

with our foreign law enforcement partners, where the drugs are 

produced and the drugs originate, at our borders with CBP, where 

the transportation cells attempt to exploit America’s legitimate 

trade, travel, and transportation systems, and throughout the 

United States with our Federal, State, and local, Tribal law enforcement partners in large and small communities where the 

criminal organizations earn substantial profits from the sale and 

distribution of their illicit cargo. 

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To combat these transnational criminal organizations, ICE has 

69 offices in 47 countries, as well as more than 200 offices located 

throughout the United States. This includes substantial resources 

along the Southwest border, where since March 2009, ICE has doubled the personnel assigned to the Border Enforcement Security 

Task Forces (BEST) program, increased the number of intelligence 

analysts, and have deployed nearly five times more border liaison 

officers to work with our Mexican counterparts. Indeed, ICE now 

has nearly one-quarter of our personnel assigned to the Southwest 

border, more Special Agents and officers than ever before. 

I am pleased to report our efforts to dismantle transnational 

criminal organizations are producing results. For example, in November 2010, the San Diego Tunnel Task Force, which is part of 

the San Diego BEST, discovered two tunnels and seized more than 

50 tons of marijuana. The first tunnel, discovered on November 2, 

2010, was a 600-yard underground cross-border passageway 

equipped with rail, lighting, and ventilation systems. Solid investigative work in collaboration with our Mexican law enforcement 

partners led to the discovery and resulted in the seizure of 30 tons 

of marijuana. 

The second tunnel, discovered on November 26, 2010, was even 

more sophisticated, included reinforced supports, advanced rail, 

and electrical and ventilation systems. This tunnel discovery resulted in the arrests of eight individuals and the seizure of more 

than 20 tons of marijuana. 

We have also observed increasing collaboration between drug 

trafficking organizations and transnational gangs. To combat 

transnational gangs, in 2005, ICE launched Operation Community 

Shield, and since that time, we have arrested more than 20,000 

gang members and associates. Seven-thousand-six-hundred-andninety-nine of those had prior violent criminal histories. 

Just last month, ICE completed Project Southern Tempest, the 

largest ever ICE-led national initiative targeting gangs with ties to 

the Mexican drug trafficking organizations. Southern Tempest involved operations in over 160 U.S. cities, working side by side with 

more than 173 Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies 

and led to the arrests of over 600 gang members and associates. 

This operation demonstrates the need to not only combat criminal 

organizations operating along the Southern border, but also targeting their operations throughout the United States and abroad. 

I want to thank you again for the opportunity to be here today 

and appreciate all the support you have provided to ICE in our efforts to combat transnational smuggling, and I would be happy to 

answer any questions. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. Mr. Harrigan. 

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1The prepared statement of Mr. Harrigan appears in the appendix on page 62. 

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS H. HARRIGAN,1 ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR AND CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, DRUG ENFORCEMENT 

ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. HARRIGAN. Good morning, Chairman Pryor, Ranking Member Ensign. On behalf of the men and women and the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Michele Leonhart, 

I appreciate your invitation to testify today regarding the sophisticated methods that Mexican drug trafficking organizations use to 

move illegal drugs through Mexico and into the United States. 

Please know, in carrying out its mission, the DEA and the border 

begins with the sources of supply in South America. DEA has the 

largest United States law enforcement presence overseas, and since 

1973 has been assigned the global enforcement mission that extends far beyond our Nation’s borders. 

Our strategy in the Western Hemisphere is named the Drug 

Flow Attack Strategy. The Drug Flow Attack Strategy acts as a forward defense, a defense in debt, if you will, of the United States 

by interdicting the flow of illegal drugs and traffickers who smuggle them northward before they reach Mexico or the Southwest border. Stopping the drugs before they reach Mexico and the Southwest border impacts the United States drug supply, weakens the 

Mexican cartels, and helps reduce border violence. 

The Southwest border and the security threat posed by drug trafficking along the border is not a new issue for the DEA. As the lead 

United States law enforcement agency responsible for enforcing the 

drug laws of the United States, DEA special agents have been on 

the front line of both sides of the Southwest border for decades, 

gathering intelligence and conducting enforcement operations to 

dismantle the most powerful and ruthless drug trafficking organizations. The operations of these organizations have destabilizing effects not only in the border region, but throughout Mexico. 

The Southwest border is the principal arrival zone for most illegal drugs smuggled into the United States as well as being the predominant staging area for the drugs’ subsequent distribution 

throughout the United States. This area is particularly vulnerable 

to drug smuggling because of the enormous volume of people and 

legitimate goods crossing the border between the two countries 

each day. 

DEA’s Concealment Trap Initiative (CTI), contracts the service 

providers who build concealed trap compartments or use natural 

voids in vehicles and other conveyances for drug trafficking organizations to conceal their drugs entering the United States and to 

conceal bulk currency destined for Mexico from the U.S. Drug traffickers recognize that bulk currency is subject to seizure and easily 

forfeited when discovered by law enforcement authorities. To 

counter this, they employ a myriad of techniques, including the use 

of concealment traps, to impede law enforcement efforts to discover 

and seize illicit drug proceeds. DEA seized just under $39 million 

in addition to drugs and weapons in 2010 under this program 

alone. 

The DEA works vigorously in cooperation with its Federal, State, 

local, and foreign counterparts in mounting a sustained and agH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

10 

gressive organizational attack strategy against the Mexican drug 

trafficking organizations. The disruption and dismantlement of 

these organizations, the denial of proceeds, and the seizure of assets significantly impacts the organizations’ ability to exercise influence and to further destabilize the region. 

Project Reckoning, Operation Accelerator, Project Coronado, and 

most recently Operation Bombardier are all examples of this collaboration. While these collaborative operations are extended to 

break the power and impunity of the cartels in the short term, they 

also exacerbate the violence in Mexico. These efforts are directly 

supported by the DEA-led El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC). 

EPIC is a multi-agency tactical and strategic intelligence center 

consisting of almost 30 law enforcement organizations, to include 

representatives from Mexico and Colombia. 

There are several noteworthy interagency efforts being coordinated along the Southwest border, as well. The first of these is 

President Obama’s National Southwest Border Counternarcotics 

Strategy that was introduced last year by Attorney General Holder, 

DHS Secretary Napolitano, and Director Kerlikowske from the Office of National Drug Control Policy. This strategy is designed to 

stem the flow of illegal drugs and their illicit proceeds across the 

Southwest border and reduce associated crime and violence in the 

region. 

Another excellent example is the Southwest Border Initiative, 

which has been in operation since 1994. This multi-agency enforcement operation attacks Mexico-based drug trafficking organizations 

operating along the Southwest border. In a cooperative effort, DEA, 

the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), ICE, CBP, and the U.S. 

Attorneys’ Offices around the country conduct judicially approved 

electronic wire intercepts that ultimately identify all levels of these 

organizations. 

In short, guided by intelligence, DEA is working diligently on 

both sides of the border to stem the flow of illegal drugs and assist 

our Mexican counterparts. DEA recognizes that interagency and 

international collaboration and coordination is fundamental to our 

success. DEA will continue to closely monitor the security situation 

in Mexico and ensure that the rampant violence does not spill over 

the border by continuing to lend assistance and support to the 

Calderon administration. 

Again, Chairman Pryor, Ranking Member Ensign, I want to 

thank you for this opportunity to testify and we will be happy to 

address any questions you may have. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you all for your testimony and for being 

here today and all the things that you do. 

Let me start with a general question really for the whole panel. 

Each of you in your agencies play a very important role in this. 

Just a general question. Are there overlaps where there should not 

be? Are there gaps where there should not be? How is the system 

working? If there are conflicts among the agencies, how are those 

resolved? So Ms. Bucella. 

Ms. BUCELLA. Right now, we are embedded, literally, with ICE 

and their groups and with DEA, whether it is incident or Special 

Operations Division. We are also embedded with ICE and DEA at 

EPIC. Really, it is a collaborative. Many of us have been given the 

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11 

charter to do somewhat different. For us, it is protect the borders. 

We really are the interdictors. 

But we can only do that and be successful by giving and sharing 

the information that we receive with our partners on the border. 

And so there is probably much more that we can do. We are finding 

it on a daily basis. We are working closely with ICE on the San 

Diego Tunnel Initiative and we have had over 130 tunnels that we 

have found. And as Mr. Dinkins said, it is very sophisticated and 

how we find it is either through technology and/or from cooperators 

and from intelligence. 

And so I will defer to my partners here, but we, on a daily basis, 

our agencies are intertwined because of the roles and missions that 

we each have that might be a little bit unique. 

Mr. DINKINS. Yes, sir. As she had mentioned, we do have distinctive roles in what we do, although there is a combined mission that 

we all share and that is protecting the border, stopping the flow 

of drugs, and so forth. And I can tell you, since I have been doing 

this job now 15 months, I thought one of the biggest challenges I 

would do is actually really with these two folks here is institutionalize that collaboration, and it has actually been a pleasure to 

do so. 

Since DHS was created, I can tell you that we have never had 

a better working relationship where CBP and ICE are literally codependent upon each other to get our jobs done, from the interdiction to taking it under the investigations. And that has likewise 

been with the Drug Enforcement Administration. Since I have been 

around in 25 years, I do not think that we have a better, more collaborative working relationship with DEA. They have a distinctive 

mission when it comes to narcotics. We have the mission when it 

comes to the smuggling, and those missions blend together. But I 

would not call it overlap as much as a partnership. 

Mr. HARRIGAN. Thank you very much, Senator. As Donna and 

Jim said, Senator, without question, I think the coordination and 

collaboration between the agencies, and not just the agencies represented here at the table but the interagency, as well, to include 

the Governments of Mexico, and as I mentioned in my opening 

statement, the Southwest border for DEA starts in Colombia. That 

is where we key our resources to target the organizations and the 

cartels that move the drugs through Central America and Mexico, 

as well. 

So everything we do is intelligence-driven. We try to work smarter, obviously with less. And we que up ICE. We will que up the 

interdictive CBP, as well, based upon the information and the intelligence that we derive from our sources down—and our counterparts, as well—down in Colombia and Central America, because, 

again, when you measure seizures down along the isthmus of Central America or in Colombia, you typically count it by multi-tons. 

When seizures are made along the border, we typically count them 

in maybe pound or kilo quantities. So again, we direct our resources down south of the border but work extremely closely with 

ICE and CBP, because if not, we are going to fail. 

Senator PRYOR. Mr. Dinkins, let me just ask you this, since you 

are in the middle of the table and you are talking about how well 

everything works together, and I am glad to hear that, but with 

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12 

1The photo referenced by Senator Pryor appears in the appendix on page 33. 

2The photo referenced by Senator Pryor appears in the appendix on page 33. 

3The photo referenced by Senator Pryor appears in the appendix on page 34. 

multi-agencies involved, is the decisionmaking sometimes slow or 

cumbersome? I mean, can we streamline anything or does it need 

any streamlining? 

Mr. DINKINS. Generally, our field commanders downrange, our 

Special Agents in Charge and Port Directors and the DFOs from 

CBP, they are the ones that are interacting on a daily basis, literally working side by side with each other. So those decisions are 

made instantaneously as those cases are developed and present 

themselves. So there is not a bottleneck where things are having 

to go up to a headquarters structure and so forth of being worked 

out. Most of these cases might be led by one agency or another 

agency, but there are joint decisions being made along that investigation, along the way. 

Senator PRYOR. Right. So right here, we have a photo of, I guess 

this is the catapult1 contraption that someone seized, I guess the 

Mexican Army seized this on the Mexican side of the border. And 

then I have a couple of others that I will show that are some vans2

and trucks3 that have been modified and painted and maybe stolen. I am not quite sure of the whole story of these. But these are 

examples of how the cartel has taken extraordinary measures to 

try to get things across the border. 

It seems like their tactics are always changing and they just kind 

of have a kaleidoscope of options there and it is like they will try 

anything to get the drugs across. So how do we keep up with that? 

I can start with anyone, but why not you, Ms. Bucella, and tell us, 

how do we keep up with that? Is it a training matter, or how do 

we stay on top of this? 

Ms. BUCELLA. It is imagination and innovation. The drug cartels 

are not hampered or limited by money. They have a business model 

and they will throw whatever they have at it. 

In addition, I think what has been absolutely evident to us is 

this is not a Federal law enforcement response. This is Federal, 

State, and local. We are literally on the borders dealing with our 

State and local counterparts because they see people come into the 

community. They see some strange things happening. And if we 

can identify that person who is bringing drugs into the United 

States through ICE and DEA and then find out sort of where they 

are, what the routes, methods, manners, and means, how did it 

happen. I mean, we many times have seen busloads filled with millions of dollars of money leaving the United States. 

So that is where our work begins. That is where we try to share 

all the information. It is no longer a matter of it is mine and my 

information not to share with one another. Because the drug cartels are so innovative and so quick and so adaptable, we have to 

work together. 

Senator ENSIGN. Well, once again, thank you all for being here. 

I have a few questions—actually, I have a lot of questions, but 

some of them, we will submit for the record because of the limited 

time today. 

But just to address the corruption problem, even though it may 

be limited, obviously, that is something that has to be addressed 

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13 

so that it does not spread. I know that there have been cases where 

the one woman who was found to be corrupt, hanging out at the 

bars with the drug dealers and things like that, can you describe 

basically for any of your organizations the methods that you use to 

try to detect whether there is potential corruption, whether an officer is being corrupted, and the preventative techniques? I know it 

is impossible to eliminate it completely. We are talking about a lot 

of money here and the potential is always going to be there. But 

can you just describe some of the things that you look for? We can 

just start and go down the table. 

Ms. BUCELLA. On behalf of CBP, when we have insight into the 

corruption cases, because DHS IG really is the lead on that, for us, 

it is trying to figure out all the method, manners, and means, and 

then instill for training. Fortunately also for CBP, because we have 

technology using many different types of readers when people are 

coming through the entry, we can take a look and go back looking 

at the technology to figure out who was in what lane and when and 

how, and sometimes when there has been detection of drugs in a 

vehicle or something, we can go back and figure out who was on 

the line at that time. So a lot of it is training. 

One of the challenges that we have is that we are not necessarily 

always aware of the number of corruption investigations, because 

as I said, it is usually led by DHS Inspector General and with the 

partnership at times with ICE. 

Senator ENSIGN. Mr. Dinkins. 

Mr. DINKINS. At ICE, in the hiring process, one thing is that we 

hire a lot of our Special Agents because the requirements—they are 

coming from other law enforcement agencies, so they actually even 

have a proven track record. So we are bringing them on after they 

have already had one background investigation. Now they are getting a second check and balance, as well. And if they have had any 

administrative issues with their previous agency, we can actually 

remove them from the process. 

But in addition to that, while you are on the job, I still am 

amazed that we have over a 20-year-old case management system, 

but that case management system, every time you key a stroke into 

the system, it is recorded. So if you were to run my name, for example, it is going to be recorded, and those things get audited regularly, so that actually can tell you if somebody is actually searching 

outside of their lane where they should not be looking for cartels 

to see if somebody is under investigation and so forth. 

As well as a good, healthy organization, to make sure that people 

realize that it is not tolerated at all is by having good checks and 

balances in your system just on everyday administrative things, ensuring that there are repercussions for the small things that might 

seem to be a technical, administrative violation, but in fact, that 

can perpetuate itself into an environment where people feel that it 

is OK to violate the rules. So it is really by having a whole, complete approach to integrity. 

Mr. HARRIGAN. Senator, you are exactly right. I do not think we 

could ever obviously eliminate corruption, but we could certainly 

minimize it. What DEA does in Mexico, we partner up very closely. 

We have what we call our Sensitive Investigative Units (SIUs), and 

these police officers are hand picked, not only by DEA but by our 

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14 

counterparts, in this case, our Mexican counterparts, the Mexican 

Federal Police, the Mexican PGR, and the Attorney General’s Office. These offices are vetted. They are Leahy-vetted. There is background investigations conducted, as well. They are trained by DEA 

down in our academy in Quantico. And they really are the best of 

the best, if you will. We have enormous confidence in them. 

We have, like I said, since 1973, have had the largest U.S. Federal law enforcement presence overseas, and knock on wood, there 

has been very minimal corruption, not only in Mexico, but we have 

13 of these SIUs around the world, whether it is Mexico, Colombia, 

Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia. So again, we attempt to minimize 

the corruption, and I think we have been—and the Mexicans lately 

have been extremely successful. 

There was the arrest several years ago in Mexico of someone in 

the Deputy Attorney General’s Office who was accepting bribes 

from one of the cartels to the tune of about $450,000 per month. 

So again, working very closely with our Mexican counterparts, especially through these SIUs, because that is where we bring our 

most significant investigations are conducted through the SIU in 

an attempt to, again, limit and minimize the effect of corruption. 

Senator ENSIGN. If we could just try to take a larger view, we 

know, as all the testimony, the reports that we get, they are getting more and more sophisticated. They are kind of like the—they 

are very much like the terrorist organizations. We do one thing; 

they adjust to it. They are going to constantly adjust. 

But the bigger picture item is do we have the resources, are we 

putting the kind of resources that we need to protect our country 

from drugs, from other types of illicit activities that could come 

across our borders, especially, obviously, the Southwest border—by 

the way, I want to compliment—I have been down there, and it is 

extraordinary what you all are doing. It really is, the professionalism. Many years ago, it was not looked at that way, but the 

law enforcement professionalism now on the border is really extraordinary. 

But the other side of the border is continuing to get worse. The 

violence, obviously, we hear about is getting worse. And there is a 

great deal, because the money is getting larger and we have obviously a demand problem on this side. I think the Mexican government is exactly right, that we need to do a lot more about the demand problem. I have actually encouraged the President in his 

State of the Union Address, I wish that actually he would address 

that, basically, that if you are using drugs in the United States, 

kind of sending that message from the White House that if you are 

using drugs in the United States, that you are hurting our national 

security, that you are funding these incredibly violent drug cartels 

as well as other terrorists around the world. 

But looking at the big picture, do we have the kind of resources 

that we need and what more can Congress do? Do we need the 

military down there or the National Guard or whatever? Do we 

need more agents in the various departments? Do we need more 

technology? Is it more of the fence? Is it more—obviously, between 

submarines, between tunnels, between everything that you have, 

you have huge challenges. So taking more of a 30,000-foot picture 

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15 

here, can you kind of describe, and I just want kind of each one 

of your perspective on that. 

Ms. BUCELLA. Well, technology is always needed, but trying to 

figure out what kind of technology, as you said, they change all the 

time. The tunnel technology has been helpful, but you cannot use 

something just separately. We need to have intelligence in using 

that. 

The submersibles and the semi-submersibles you could probably 

find, especially if you are up in the air, because they have to float 

at some point. But the totally submersibles, that is a whole different realm in the technology field. 

It is a challenge. I think that one of the—as Tom Harrigan said 

and Mr. Dinkins, we really do rely and work very hard with our 

partners down South. That is integral. And actually with all of our 

military. Yesterday, I spent some time with the Joint Interagency 

Task Force (JIATF) North and our people that are down there, and 

they are down at EPIC and they are helping with us. Not that the 

Department of Defense (DOD) solution is the solution, but frankly, 

we can leverage some of the skill sets that they have. 

For us, some of the topography in Arizona is much like Afghanistan. So we can look to our DOD partners to find out what technologies they are using that could be helpful for us. So it really is 

trying to identify what technologies are out there and then communicate with our partners to try to leverage the best technologies 

that are out there. 

Senator ENSIGN. Mr. Dinkins. 

Mr. DINKINS. Yes, I think both of you have actually recognized 

the fact, is this is not just a border issue. We just cannot put all 

of our resources on the border and expect that this is going to be 

the problem solver. We really have to look at where the root of the 

problem is, and as Mr. Harrigan mentioned with DEA, for example, 

in narcotics, the source of the narcotics can be as far away as Colombia and we have to ensure that we are working to deal with 

those threats actually before they hit our border. But also, we also 

have to make sure that those organizations that are operating 

within our communities are actually being held accountable for 

their illegal actions, because that is where a significant amount of 

the proceeds are actually being generated from. 

I would say we are at all high levels at ICE. I mean, we have 

grown substantially. We have a lot of resources. There is still room 

to grow as far as technology goes. There are, overseas and deployment of overseas, it is not just—for example, if you can work in 

South and Central America at the pathways that are being exploited by alien smuggling organizations, bringing up the aliens, it 

is not just enough to wait for those aliens to hit our border, either. 

If we can change policy, work with our Federal and law enforcement partners to actually interdict those individuals before they 

get into Mexico and before they land on our Southwest border, we 

are going to be a lot better off. 

So as Mr. Harrigan mentioned, they have SIU units. At ICE, we 

refer to ours as vetted units. We have nine of those located 

throughout the world. They are indispensable because their priorities become the priorities of what the United States law enforcement priorities are. They are there to work for you, and you can 

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trust them because they have been polygraphed, vetted, and 

backgrounded. So there is never enough technology, and I think 

that we need to continue to push our borders out. 

Senator ENSIGN. Mr. Harrigan, also, when you address this, just 

very briefly, does any of the, like, heroin and things coming from 

Afghanistan, how does that enter into the United States, as well? 

Mr. HARRIGAN. Well, typically, sir, in Afghanistan, we see, despite Afghanistan being the most prolific producer of opium—it produces over 90 percent of the world’s opium—in the United States, 

we see less than 3 percent of the heroin seized here comes from 

Southwest Asia, comes from Afghanistan. Although, interestingly 

enough, our neighbors to the north in Canada, most of the heroin 

they are seizing right now, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 

comes from Afghanistan, we have not seen it yet here in the United 

States. But the ones that we have seen, the seizures that have 

been made have been by couriers coming over, flights originating 

in Southwest Asia, transiting through Europe, and then on to the 

United States, primarily the New York area, JFK. 

Relative to Mexico, sir, as Donna and Jim alluded to, technology 

obviously is the key. Every time it appears that we develop some 

sort of new technology to defeat something the traffickers have, 

they come up with something new. So again, technology is always 

key. 

But I think what we need to keep in mind, as I mentioned earlier, is the continued developments of these SIUs, these Sensitive 

Investigative Units, and we cannot lose sight of the fact, whenever 

we talk about Mexico or the Southwest border, we need to keep 

Central America in the discussion, as well, because there is unprecedented stress, in my opinion, by the Mexicans, the government of 

Mexico, right now on these cartels, by the United States, by the Colombians from the south. So we are pushing these cartels, if you 

will, down south into Central America. 

So DEA is continuing to buildup these SIUs, not only in Mexico. 

We have 11 offices right now in Mexico, but we also have an office 

in each of the Central America countries, as well. We are establishing vetted units, and the next degree up from a vetted unit 

would be an SIU, and that is what we need to do to have, I believe, 

any significant impact on these cartels. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Senator Ensign, and thank you for 

all of your responses. 

I have several questions for the record, but what I would like to 

do is just ask three or four real quick ones to you, Ms. Bucella, and 

then we can followup with the panel in writing. 

But let me ask about really the delivery mechanisms that we 

talk about. One of the things you talk about is the ultralight planes 

and how it is difficult to detect them. It seems to me that part of 

that is a technology issue, that you need to have the proper radars, 

or exactly how you do that, I am not sure, but you would have to 

have the proper detection equipment. But you also need the people 

there to respond quickly once you sense a plane coming or going, 

because they are not using traditional airports, I am guessing, in 

most cases. So what do we need to do there? 

Ms. BUCELLA. Well, again, I cannot underestimate intelligence 

and the informant capability, because the ultralights end up going 

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17 

to a very remote, rural area, and as you know, even with some of 

our technologies, we are not able—they go to the remote, rural 

areas, with all due respect, I believe, knowing that we do not have 

coverage there. And trying to get someone in the middle of a desert 

in the middle of the night is difficult. 

And so the technology part of being able to see overhead where 

it is—there are some areas where we know ultralights generally 

come in, but it is such a wide area. And so even if we had coverage 

up above that, you really have to, especially if they come in at 

night, and they do not exactly have lights on, so you have to really 

know where you are looking, and it is almost like looking through 

a straw, yet you want something with a higher visibility and much 

wider coverage. 

So that has been a challenge for us, but we are working together 

to try to get some of the better technologies for radar, to be able 

to censor some of the changes in movement of the air so that we 

are able to identify an ultralight going in. But again, a huge challenge. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. And also on the submarines, you mentioned 

those, and some are true submarines and some are, what did you 

call them, semi-submersibles? 

Ms. BUCELLA. Semi-submersibles. In other words, they have to 

come up for air, sort of like a turtle. 

Senator PRYOR. Right. And so where are you seeing these? In 

some of the things I read, some of these are not necessarily in U.S. 

waters, but they are coming from Latin American countries, maybe 

up to Mexico or whatever. So tell us where those are showing up, 

how many of those, and what trends you are seeing there. 

Ms. BUCELLA. Sure. I think it really started from back in the 

1990s when I was a U.S. Attorney in the Middle District of Florida. 

We knew that the drugs were coming up from Colombia and going 

through Panama, and so we are seeing much of it through the Caribbean, and some of these semi-submersibles, we are also finding 

in Central America, and they literally are made in parts, three or 

four large parts. I know Mr. Harrigan can talk to you a little bit 

more about that in detail, but that is what we are starting to see. 

First it was go-fast boats, the motherload, short boats, and then 

the semi-submersibles, and now the submersibles. 

Senator PRYOR. Mr. Harrigan. 

Mr. HARRIGAN. Donna brings up a great point. Obviously, as we 

spoke about technology before, these organizations just continue to 

evolve and to evade technology or develop new technology. The 

semi-submersibles, now we see the fully submersibles. You had alluded to earlier, sir, the fully submersible that was seized down in 

the Ecuadorian jungle. That was based upon collaborative efforts of 

the Ecuadorian police, the Colombian police, and the DEA. 

The difficulty, it is an incredible difficulty for us and our counterparts down there. These fully submersibles, are being constructed 

in triple-canopy jungle. So it is very difficult to detect. That is 

where I had alluded to in my opening statement where we need 

sources down there that provide this information, because the bottom line is without those sources, there is no way we would have 

ever detected that fully submersible. 

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1The photo referenced by Senator Pryor appears in the appendix on page 34. 

2The photo referenced by Senator Pryor appears in the appendix on page 35. 

And another question comes to mind. That particular fully submersible was getting ready to transport, to smuggle in drugs. What 

if it is not drugs? What if it is weapons of mass destruction? What 

if it is—you could let your imagination run wild. So it is not just 

drugs that they are transporting, and we have to keep that in mind 

when we deal with, whether it is a semi-submersible, or more 

alarmingly, these fully submersible vehicles, vessels, now. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. And, Ms. Bucella, really the last 

question that I have before we turn it back over to Senator Ensign 

and then go to the second panel would be we have a couple of photographs here of the tunnels, and I think there are two different 

locations that we have photographs of. One is a location you can 

see that is a very sophisticated tunnel.1 I do not know the whole 

story on that one. And then the second one shows by aerial photograph2 what the tunnel looks like, 1,300 feet long. 

So I think in your testimony or in an answer to a question, you 

said that I think we found 130 of these so far—— 

Ms. BUCELLA. Mm-hmm. 

Senator PRYOR [continuing]. Or maybe more, and it sounds like 

you have some technology to detect, and there again, you rely on 

the intelligence to try to understand what is there. But how can 

we do better to locate and shut down these tunnels? 

Ms. BUCELLA. Yes, sir. Actually, we have found most of our tunnels, and I know Mr. Dinkins can talk a little bit about this, most 

of our tunnels have been on the Southwest border. Again, as I said, 

sometimes we find it just by Border Patrol agents hearing something beneath them. These tunnels are not—some of them, frankly, 

I was down at the border a couple of weeks ago and it was 80 feet 

down, sophisticated, air conditioned units. You could put trains in 

them. So obviously they are not being made by somebody with a 

spoon. But there are many of them which are—quite frankly, I do 

not know why anybody would go down there. They are very, very 

narrow and they are able to push them through. 

The technology, we are working with DOD and working with 

DHS science and technology just to figure out how you can tell if 

there is movement underground. The problem with some of these 

tunnels, though, is because on the border they have extensive 

drainage systems, and that is—some of those are just drainage systems and are not tunnels, but these cartel members and narcotics 

traffickers, they will not stop at anything, sir. 

So, really, it is the technology coupled with behavioral intuition 

and informants and intelligence. 

Senator PRYOR. Anybody else on that? 

Mr. DINKINS. One thing is I think it is key to point out on these 

tunnels, is while we have increasingly seen them rise over the 

number that we have actually been able to detect in the last 2 

years, they are also very costly. Some of these are very costly, like 

the picture you have up there. They could take 2 years to build. 

So there is nothing that gives us more pleasure than to have somebody take 2 years to build something, and then just as they are 

popping their head out of that rabbit hole, is to crush it back down 

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19 

on top of them. That is something that we have been successful 

doing with a lot of investigative work, too. 

On the San Diego Tunnel Task Force, we have CBP, DEA, and 

ICE all working together. They developed a lot of good methodologies that now we are employing all the way over to Arizona. For 

example, with border communities that literally have warehouses 

and homes right there, they are doing outreach. They are educating 

the people, because these folks cannot work in a vacuum. There is 

going to be some type of suspicious activity. So in addition to the 

technology, good old fashioned police work and hitting the beat has 

actually been very effective, as well. 

Senator PRYOR. Good. Senator Ensign, did you have any other 

questions? 

Senator ENSIGN. Just very quickly, getting back to the subs 

issue, is this something that when we get to the fully submersibles, 

is this something that is going to take the Navy being involved 

with, as well? 

Mr. HARRIGAN. Sir, yes, and as Donna had mentioned earlier, we 

work very closely with the Department of Defense. For DEA, it is 

the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense for Counternarcotics. 

But JIATF South is very much involved. SOUTHCOM is very 

much involved. Yes, we work extraordinarily closely with them, 

and also our foreign counterparts, the Colombian navy, primarily, 

the Ecuadorian navy, as well. 

Senator ENSIGN. OK. And then, briefly, getting back to the ultralights and some of these more remote areas, I am very familiar 

with the, I like to call them remotely piloted vehicles instead of the 

drones, because they actually have a human flying them, and they 

do a lot of those actually out of my home State up at Creech Air 

Force Base. But is that some of the technology, more of that is 

needed with even the wider camera angles and the more sophistication that they are developing all the time with that, flying higher, being able to see more, see at night, the whole thing like that? 

Is that more of the technology you are talking about? 

Ms. BUCELLA. Yes, sir. Absolutely. Those are invaluable to us for 

a whole host of reasons. 

Senator ENSIGN. OK. Mr. Chairman, I have a lot of questions. 

We will just submit those for the record. But I want to thank the 

panel, also. It has been excellent testimony this morning. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, and I do want to thank the panel, 

as well. I have some other questions for the record that we will 

submit. We will leave the record open for 2 weeks, and I am sure 

some of the other Subcommittee members who could not be here 

today may have questions for you, as well, so if you can work with 

the staff on getting those back to us. Thank you very much for 

being here, all three of you. 

I will go ahead and introduce our second panel now, and as we 

are swapping out the desks there, I will go ahead and just say a 

few words about our two witnesses who will testify next. 

Our first witness is Fran Flener. She is the Arkansas Drug Director. She has been there since 2007 and she will talk about drug 

distribution threats in Arkansas and what Arkansas is doing with 

the Federal Government and other States and local governments, 

et cetera. 

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1The prepared statement of Ms. Flener appears in the appendix on page 72. 

Our second witness is Kent Bitsko. He is the Director of the Nevada High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA), and I will 

turn this over to Senator Ensign to properly introduce him. 

Senator ENSIGN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Kent Bitsko is a long-time resident of Las Vegas, Executive Director of the Nevada High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, a longtime law enforcement veteran, 30 years with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, assigned to vice, narcotics, training the 

canine units, helped form the forerunner of High Intensity Drug 

Trafficking Areas and the Drug Interdiction Crime Enforcement 

Task Force (DICE). He served 4 years in the canine program, and 

as a matter of fact, Las Vegas Metro named their canine training 

facility after Kent. It is now called the Lieutenant Kent Bitsko Canine Training Facility. 

He retired. His retirement lasted all of one year and then he 

joined HIDTA in 2007 as their Executive Director, and under his 

leadership, HIDTA has grown to 12 enforcement task forces and 4 

administrative initiatives. 

So we welcome you and thanks for being here. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Flener, do you want to go ahead. 

TESTIMONY OF FRANCES FLENER,1 ARKANSAS STATE DRUG 

DIRECTOR, STATE OF ARKANSAS 

Ms. FLENER. Chairman Pryor, Ranking Member Ensign, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee and honored guests, it is 

my distinct pleasure to testify before you today. My name is Fran 

Flener and I am the Arkansas State Drug Director. On behalf of 

Governor Mike Beebe and our State, I would like to thank this 

Subcommittee for its continued support for the coordination of 

counternarcotics enforcement at all levels. 

Senator Pryor, we are grateful for your continuing support of the 

men and women in law enforcement. Throughout your career, you 

have been a champion for crime prevention and community engagement. A bulletproof vest program that you began years ago for the 

increased safety of rural law enforcement still continues today, and 

the Secure Our Schools Program has enabled our kids to have a 

safer environment in which to study and learn. For each of these 

and others, I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for 

your outstanding leadership that has supported law enforcement at 

all levels. 

Arkansas is a predominately rural, agricultural State that for 

many reasons serves as an area in which drug trafficking organizations become established. Its relatively low population, rural areas, 

and small law enforcement presence in some remote regions provide the privacy required by those manufacturing and/or distributing drugs. Further, Arkansas’s central location in the United 

States with its interstate highways provide primary corridors to 

transport those drugs to and through the State to the Midwest and 

the East Coast. 

Small Arkansas towns are increasingly facing drug distribution 

activities similar to what has historically been limited to the more 

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urban areas. DTOs have established themselves as the primary 

wholesale and mid-level distributors of methamphetamine, powder 

cocaine, marijuana, and heroin. As drug networks expand, cells are 

progressively being set up in rural areas to become supply hubs for 

the metropolitan areas of the State. This rural-to-urban distribution reflects a reversal from traditional patterns of the illicit drug 

trade. 

The impact and scope of methamphetamine distribution in Arkansas is well illustrated by a collaborative investigation known as 

Operation Ice Princess. This DEA-led investigation included five 

additional Federal agencies, the Arkansas State Police, the Arkansas Highway Police, four drug task forces, four county sheriffs, five 

police departments, and the Arkansas National Guard. Operation 

Ice Princess dismantled a large scale ice methamphetamine distribution ring that was based in Jonesboro, with distribution cells 

in five counties. Investigators learned that these multi-pound quantities of methamphetamine ice originating in Mexico were regularly 

being distributed throughout the State through a network of distributions located in Jonesboro, Searcy, Kensett, Rose Bud, Batesville, and Little Rock. 

The abuse and diversion of pharmaceuticals in the past 4 years 

has been an alarming and emerging threat. Many in the law enforcement community believe drug trafficking organizations, along 

with unaffiliated drug-seeking individuals, engage in robberies and 

burglaries of pharmacies, forge prescriptions, doctor shop, and steal 

from private residences in order to obtain pharmaceutical drugs to 

distribute. 

Two weeks ago, Governor Beebe signed into law a prescription 

drug monitoring program that will address some of these diversion 

issues. The implementation of this system, however, is contingent 

upon receiving Federal funding through the National All Schedules 

Prescription Reporting and the Harold Rogers Prescription Drug 

Monitoring Programs. 

The Gulf Coast HIDTA report that pharmaceuticals, in addition 

to being primarily locally diverted, also arrive in Arkansas via the 

Southwest border. Law enforcement agencies are increasingly reporting interdiction of prescription drugs with any arrests they 

make, regardless of it is a drug arrest or not. 

The continuing expansion of drug trafficking groups and their 

distribution of narcotics through rural Arkansas areas result in tremendous strains on local criminal justice systems. Small Arkansas 

towns, such as Kensett and Rose Bud, with populations of 1,648 

and 459, respectively, lack the necessary resources to effectively 

combat this drug problem alone. 

Fortunately, Arkansas benefits from having outstanding relationships and collaboration among Federal, State, and local law enforcement. Arkansas’s participation in federally funded drug enforcement initiatives serve to provide the means for greatly enhanced counterdrug efforts. Since joining the Gulf Coast HIDTA in 

2008, Arkansas has gained many advantages in its capacity to attack the command and control of drug trafficking organizations. 

Specifically, it has provided for additional major case investigations, including complex conspiracy cases, increased criminal interdiction, enhanced information sharing and intelligence-based policH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

22 

ing, and invaluable drug training. HIDTA has been the key component in fostering those partnerships and collaboration among agencies that have led to a leveraging of resources and increased sharing of intelligence. 

Thanks in part, also, to Federal funding through the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, our State’s ability to combine intelligence has been bolstered by the launching of the State Fusion 

Center in 2009. The Fusion Center allows law enforcement agencies access to an array of intelligence databases. Arkansas’s 19 

Byrne/JAG funded drug task forces often initiate investigations 

which are later revealed to be components of a broader drug crime 

network. These DTFs have continually been reduced in funding 

since 2008. 

Given the severity of the Nation’s drug problems and the often 

tragic consequences which result from them, it is of vital importance that an adequate, sustained level of resources be devoted to 

prevention, treatment, and enforcement efforts that produce results. Federal, State, and local drug enforcement programs protect 

rural communities that are increasingly besieged by violent criminal drug organizations. Without a full array of law enforcement beginning at the very fundamental levels that feed intelligence up the 

chain into larger agencies, pieces of that puzzle that make up the 

complex and well-developed drug trafficking organizations will 

never be put together. 

We recommend a restoration to the DEA funding for methamphetamine laboratory cleanup. Other enforcement operations in 

public health will suffer if this cleanup funding is not restored or 

if less expensive alternatives are not developed and funded. We 

also recommend continued funding and support of prescription 

monitoring programs across the country. Without Federal funding, 

Arkansas will not be able to develop and implement a PDMP. 

Arkansas, while currently experiencing great benefits from its 

membership in the Gulf Coast HIDTA, would benefit even more by 

the expansion of counties with high drug activity. 

Finally, we recommend that the Byrne/JAG Assistance Grants be 

funded at the 2002–2003 level. This will benefit programs nationwide, and in Arkansas, it will allow for an increase in the proactive 

development of drug cases. 

In conclusion, the abuse, manufacturing, and distribution of illicit drugs in both Arkansas and the United States pose serious but 

not insurmountable challenges. To affect positive change, a complementary and multifaceted approach, including prevention, education, treatment, and enforcement is required. If we are to expect 

to make a difference in our efforts to combat drugs and their consequences, each of these components must remain a high priority 

and receive all necessary resources to achieve success. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today, and I will 

be happy to answer any questions at your convenience. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Ms. Flener. It is great for you to be 

here—— 

Ms. FLENER. Thank you. 

Senator PRYOR [continuing]. And we appreciate your traveling 

up. Mr. Bitsko. 

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1The prepared statement of Mr. Bitsko appears in the appendix on page 79. 

TESTIMONY OF L. KENT BITSKO,1 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

NEVADA HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA 

Mr. BITSKO. Senator Pryor, Ranking Member Ensign, I appreciate the opportunity to come and address this Subcommittee. My 

testimony is going to address a few cases that we have experienced 

in Nevada that outline the impact that the cartels have directly on 

Southern Nevada. 

The first one got a lot of media attention in 2008. It was the Cole 

Puffinburger kidnapping. Cole Puffinburger was a 6-year-old boy 

who had the misfortune of having Mr. Tinnemeyer as his grandfather. Mr. Tinnemeyer was transporting cocaine for the Sinaloa 

drug cartel and decided on his sixth trip transporting 247 kilos 

from the Southwest border to the East Coast that he would steal 

$4.5 million from the cartel. Well, the cartel contracted with a couple of local cell leaders in Nevada and kidnapped Cole to try and 

get his grandfather out of hiding and to recover the money that he 

had stolen from them. We were fortunate enough. Working our 

HIDTA Investigative Support Center (ISC) with the Fusion Center 

led to the recovery of Cole unharmed and the prosecution of the 

local cell head leaders. They were not convicted of the kidnapping, 

but they were convicted of drug trafficking. 

The second case, we have some pictures, I believe, of a hidden 

compartment that was located in a trailer. It was the Sanchez case. 

Operatives from the local La Familia cell head met with undercover operatives at the Mandalay Bay Resort and Casino in Las 

Vegas. Over the subsequent couple of weeks, there were several 

narcotics undercover buys that transpired. When they took down 

Mr. Sanchez and his associates, intelligence led to his stash house, 

which was located in the Central Western part of Las Vegas. When 

they hit this house with a search warrant—well, it was a trailer, 

and the trailer was worth about $15,000, and the compartment 

that they found located under the bed, kind of a basement built 

under the trailer, they inadvertently found the button that activated the bed coming up, opened up the compartment, found automatic weapons, a drug stash, and they spent $20,000 on the compartment in a trailer that was not worth $15,000. So it gives you 

an idea of the level of commitment that they have in hiding their 

narcotics and preventing both the police and their competitive drug 

trafficking organizations from getting to their stash. 

The third and fourth case that I want to talk a little bit about, 

it is a case that the Southern Nevada Drug Task Force, a part of 

HIDTA, has been working since 2007. This case started with a oneounce cocaine purchase from just a local Mexican national, did not 

really know what they had when they started running this person’s 

name through all the databases that they had available to them. 

They discovered that he was very involved with the La Familia 

drug cartel, and over the following 21⁄2 years this investigation has 

been going on, it has resulted in the recovery of $1.1 million in 

bulk cash, 42 kilos of cocaine, 150 kilos of methamphetamine, 42 

search warrants served, 114 different telephone intercepts, and 65 

arrests, dismantled several cartel cells across the Nation. They 

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worked with DEA’s intelligence division and participated in the dismantlement of cell heads in California and in points East, also. 

This spun into the Meno case, which was another La Familia cell 

in Nevada. This gentleman was using an 18-wheeler to pick up cocaine on the Southwest border and transport it into Las Vegas and 

then also many cities in the Central and Eastern part of the 

United States. At one point, phone recordings indicated that he 

was transporting $450,000 in bulk cash after making his drug deliveries. It went back to Las Vegas, and before they could react and 

get a search warrant at the house, he got it out of there and it was 

taken back down to Mexico in the bulk cash. 

These cases are just a sampling of what we are dealing with in 

Southern Nevada and what law enforcement and the prosecutors 

are tasked with in Southern Nevada. 

Some of the things that the cartels are doing that are trying to 

thwart the efforts of law enforcement, they are using Skype, BlackBerry e-mail accounts. They are posting e-mail drafts to an e-mail 

account, and then instead of transmitting them, they are giving 

that e-mail access code to their co-conspirators where they can go 

in and get the message, trying to keep law enforcement from intercepting. The DTOs in Nevada are also using Mexican cell services 

and they are ‘‘push to talk,’’ and because these are based out of 

Mexico, the law enforcements cannot get the subscriber information 

to go up on warrants and to go up on Title 3s. 

Nevada HIDTA has had a significant impact in the law enforcement cooperation in Nevada, both Washoe County and Clark County. As Senator Ensign mentioned, we have 12 enforcement initiatives. This has not always been the case in Southern Nevada. 

When I was working narcotics, we would start a task force and 

somebody would get mad at somebody else and everybody would 

take their toys and go home. 

Well, with the advent of the HIDTA and with those heads of 

agencies having to sit across the table every quarter with their 

Federal counterparts and their State counterparts, any time there 

is a difference, they have been able to work it out. So since 2001 

and the advent of HIDTA, we have had an extremely close working 

relationship with all the Federal agencies, all the State and local 

agencies. It has been a great relationship and we hope to see that 

continue. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Bitsko. Let me followup on that 

last statement you just made about HIDTA. It sounds like it is a 

program that has worked well. Are there things that we can do better or should we expand it, or, I mean, tell me what the future 

should look like. 

Mr. BITSKO. Well, when you work in law enforcement, you can 

always spend more money. I mean, the supply of narcotics out 

there for us to go out and purchase and to attack is never ending. 

Even in a State that has as small a population as Nevada—I think 

we are at about 4 million people—there is enough that we could 

work it nonstop. 

But the HIDTA has about 120 law enforcement personnel that is assigned to it. We have a $3.2 million budget. Almost a little 

over a third of that goes to our intelligence-based policing. We are 

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doing fine with money. We really are. The law enforcement community, because of the economic adversities they are facing in Nevada, 

they do not have the personnel to put more people into the HIDTA 

task forces. It is amazing to me that they have been able to continue with their commitment to the HIDTA, because we have not 

had anybody reduce their commitment, but in talking to the heads 

of agencies, they do not have any more people. They are, like everybody else, trying to do more with less, and Nevada has been hit 

harder economically than about anyplace else in the country and 

they are really struggling to stay above water. 

Senator PRYOR. Ms. Flener, we have in our State some areas that 

are designated HIDTA-designated areas, and how is that working 

for us in our State? 

Ms. FLENER. Well, I cannot echo what Kent has said enough. 

HIDTA works. We only have four counties in our State, so we have 

two initiatives in the Northwest corner and in Central Arkansas. 

So we do not have the I–40, where it comes into Arkansas or exits 

Arkansas, and, of course, that is a major transportation. 

But HIDTA has in addition to just those four counties, the training that HIDTA has enabled law enforcement all across the State 

to take advantage of at no cost it is free and it is top-of-the-line 

stuff, and the intelligence network that has brought to the State 

has been just great. Great. HIDTA works. 

Senator PRYOR. Good. 

Ms. FLENER. HIDTA works. 

Senator PRYOR. And I know that you mentioned we only have it 

in four counties in our State, but you also mentioned in your testimony about some of the challenges in small-town America and 

what we are seeing a lot of methamphetamine there and a lot of 

other things, of course, as well, but a lot of methamphetamine 

there. I assume one of the challenges with small-town America is 

that, first, they do not have very big police forces. They do not have 

a lot of resources. Walk through with us some of the challenges 

that small-town America faces. 

Ms. FLENER. Well, when you think about it for a minute, here 

you have—for instance, I mentioned Rose Bud, 400 and less than 

500 people in that little community. They have no means to fund 

anyone that can just specifically be assigned to drug enforcement, 

even though probably 90 percent of their problems are drug-related. So without funding from drug task forces through this 

Byrne/JAG program, we do not have anybody that is even working 

drugs. And then now we have been reduced to such a level that our 

drug task forces are multi-jurisdictional. They make up maybe 

four, five, six counties. They have been reduced. Maybe they have 

two law enforcement or two drug agents to cover that entire area. 

The admiration that I have for those people that have really 

stuck with this program, they are dedicated, they take advantage 

of opportunities when they can. I have quarterly meetings of the 

drug force task commanders, and to hear them come in and tell 

some of the stories that they do, it is quite—they have my utmost 

admiration. 

Senator PRYOR. Good. Senator Ensign. 

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Senator ENSIGN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and both of you, 

once again, thanks for coming from our States to come here and 

give us that perspective from local folks after the Feds. 

One of the things, as you know, Kent, I have toured Fusion Centers and DEA and the FBI and the HIDTA centers, and it really 

is remarkable, and everybody I keep talking to, the cooperation and 

coordination at all levels now is so much better than it used to be. 

It used to be so many of the turf battles. This is our turf. Do not 

step into it. It is like the Feds, we are the enemy, or whatever. 

That seems to have mostly gone away. I am sure it still happens 

somewhat, but it seems to have mostly gone away because it is 

such a critical issue. 

You are dealing with on the front lines, obviously, and seeing 

what is happening in the local communities. One of the questions 

that I do get that I just always like to ask people who are on the 

front lines, you get this question about legalizing marijuana, legalizing other types of drugs. I would just like your personal opinion. 

You guys have been doing this for a long time. One is on legalizing 

just marijuana, and then the other would be on legalizing other 

types of drugs, because they say that if—the argument goes this 

way, that if you legalize it, you take away the criminal aspect of 

it. So I am not trying to prejudice your answer or anything like 

that. I am just saying what people who are for legalization say and 

I would just like your responses to it, either one. 

Mr. BITSKO. Having dealt with this for many years of my law enforcement career, having seen the impacts of narcotics in my family, I do not know anybody that decided on a Friday night that had 

never done drugs, oh, I think I will go do some crack cocaine. Everybody starts with something, whether it is marijuana or whether 

it is pharmaceuticals. They do not normally start doing heroin or 

cocaine or methamphetamine. So I think it is disingenuous for anybody to say that marijuana is not a gateway drug. 

I will give you a little bit of an idea of the impact that marijuana 

is having on the local scene in Las Vegas. At the beginning of 2010, 

we had no dispensaries in Las Vegas. By October 2010, we had 62 

dispensaries, marijuana dispensaries in Las Vegas that were dispensing marijuana and marijuana edibles. Working in partnership 

with Las Vegas Metro, with the U.S. Attorney’s Office and DEA, 

they served search warrants on 18 of those organizations. They 

seized over 300 pounds of finished product, and I do not remember 

the exact tonnage of edibles that they seized, but they seized a lot 

of edibles. They arrested 18 people on Federal indictments. We 

have seen—and I believe it is in direct relation to these 

dispensaries—the marijuana indoor grows are up by about 60 percent over the last 3 years. We are on pace in 2011 to do 200 indoor 

grows in Southern Nevada. Now, Northern Nevada does not have 

the problem with indoor grows because they are getting their marijuana from over the hill in Central California. 

Las Vegas Metropolitan Police reported when I was preparing 

my annual report and threat assessment that they had eight homicides in 2010 directly related to marijuana, including a 12-year-old 

girl that was killed in a home invasion. I think it was the uncle 

that was living in the house owed money to a DTO, and they went 

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over to collect and a home invasion wound up killing a 12-year-old 

girl, and that was behind marijuana. 

So the effect that marijuana is having on our communities and 

on our children and the other segments is—it is almost indescribable, and it is the biggest cash crop. I mean, we talk about heroin 

and methamphetamine and cocaine, but there is a lot more money 

being made in Mexico from heroin, or, I mean, from marijuana 

than there is the other drugs. 

Senator ENSIGN. So I would take that you would not be for legalization. 

Mr. BITSKO. Oh, no way. 

Ms. FLENER. I will state right off the record, I am not for any 

legalization of marijuana. Kent said it beautifully when he said nobody goes out and starts with crack cocaine or methamphetamine 

or whatever. But look at the problems that we have with drugs. If 

we legalize marijuana, the usage will go up. We do not even begin 

to take care, through treatment and prevention, of the problems 

that we now are experiencing, and we have programs that work. 

I think this goes back to what you said earlier, Senator, about 

the need for education, treatment, and prevention. We have such 

an education curve that we need to make with marijuana. The 

marijuana of the 1960s is not the marijuana of today. Where is it, 

in Mississippi? I forget which one of the universities in Mississippi 

does the marijuana programs, at least for our part of the country 

in terms of testing the drugs that are confiscated and their drug 

content. They tell us that it is going up, like, 600 percent in the 

drug strength. So no way do I want to make anything else for my 

grandkids, Kent’s grandkids, to be the gateway and the path down 

that slippery slope of addiction. 

Senator ENSIGN. Well, I want to thank both of you. I have to actually get to another meeting. I would just like to make one other 

comment on it. It is really amazing. Everybody made fun of Nancy 

Reagan’s ‘‘Just Say No’’ campaign, but drug use during the 1980s 

really went down dramatically. That is one of the reasons I said 

in my opening statement I have been trying to talk—or in my questioning that the Federal panel has been trying to talk. I tried to 

talk President Bush into it when he was President. I tried to talk 

to President Obama. I really do think that the bully pulpit to use 

to talk to our youth. 

Unfortunately, when I go—I speak to high schools all the time. 

Kids today think marijuana is a joke. They do. I get asked this 

question by young people, every single high school I go to speak to, 

almost without fail. They always ask me, how do you feel about legalizing marijuana? That is why I asked you the question today. 

And when somebody asks that question, all the kids laugh. They 

do, because marijuana usage to most kids today is a joke and it 

needs to become more serious, because the effects are so devastating. And that is the reason that I mentioned it today. So I 

thank both of you for being here. 

Ms. FLENER. Thank you. 

Senator PRYOR. Senator Ensign, thank you for being here and 

thank you for your questions. 

I do have a couple followups with each one of you. On the Mexican drug cartels, one of the concerns I have is that there is a lot 

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of gang involvement in the United States that is Mexican-related, 

and now I am afraid we are starting to see that in our prison system. Really, the question I would have is how do you interpret all 

this? What do you think it means that we are seeing more and 

more gang presence in the United States that are Mexican drug 

cartel related and it looks like it is in the prison system now. I 

guess the concern I might have is that when these folks come out 

of prison, maybe the numbers have even multiplied in the prison 

because they come out of prison ready to go into the Mexican drug 

gang. 

Ms. FLENER. Well, here again, we have programs that we are attempting to fund, the second-chance programs for people that are 

coming out of prisons. It is a tough issue. But we have to have in 

place follow-up, recovery centers for people that are leaving prison 

to integrate them back into society and help them regain their status of tax-paying citizens in our country. 

Healthy organizations are sometimes difficult and require a lot 

of leadership. If you want a healthy organization, whether it is a 

HIDTA or a drug task force or whatever, you have to have good 

people at the helm, and I think we do that to some extent. We have 

to improve upon that, too. 

Senator PRYOR. Mr. Bitsko. 

Mr. BITSKO. Nevada has approximately 580 identified gangs and 

20,000 gang members. This has been relatively consistent. It is 

going up a little bit. Paisa, I believe is how it is pronounced, gang 

is probably the one that is most affiliated with the Mexican cartels 

in Nevada, and they are acting as enforcers. They are acting as distributors. 

I think one of the things we have to be careful with, I mean, the 

problem is overwhelming the cartel influence, but we need to be 

sure that we differentiate between a Mexican national DTO that is 

distributing drugs that may be four or five steps removed from the 

cartel. So no doubt that the gang members, no matter what nationality they are, are having a great impact on the drug dealing in Nevada—that is all I can speak to, but I am sure across the country— 

but not all of them are affiliated with the cartels. 

Senator PRYOR. Right. Listen, I want to thank both of you all for 

being here and coming to Washington and spending your day with 

us here. I know that Senator Ensign and I are both just delighted 

to have each of you here. 

What we will do is, like with the previous panel, we will leave 

this record open for 2 weeks. There may be some followup questions. I am not sure if Senator Ensign had time to ask all of his 

of this panel. 

But thank you all for being here, and with that, we will adjourn 

the hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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67124.067
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H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


67124.068
96 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


67124.069
97 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


67124.070
98 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


67124.071
99 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


67124.072
100 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


67124.073
101 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


67124.074
102 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


67124.075
103 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


67124.076
104 

Æ 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


67124.077