### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON Apr il 24, 200 8 S es sio n
RON ALD E. CR OOK

v. LANDON DESPEAUX
Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Sh elby County No. CT-002869-06 Rita L. Stotts, Judge

No. W2007-00941-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Novem ber 19, 2008

This is an a

p p e a l f r o m a g r an t o f s umm ar

y ju d g me n t in a p e r s o n a l in ju r y c a s e

. T h e plaintiff, a diabetic, c o n s u med a substantial amount of a lcohol and then pr ocee ded to drive south towar ds an intersec tion. At a

bout the same time, the de fenda nt was trave ling e ast toward the same interse ction. The plaintiff’s vehicle skidded, hit the curb, and then collided with a telephone pole. Afterthe onecar acc ident, the plaintiff followe d the def endant a nd his f amily to a near

by parking lot and acc used the def endant of runningthe s top sign at the i ntersec tion and causing the pl aintiff’s accide nt. After that, the police a

rrived a nd g ave the plaintiff a brea thaly zer test, which he failed. The plaintiff wa s later c onvicted of r eckles s d riving and drivingunder the influence of an intoxi cant in conne ction with the acc ident. At his criminal trial, the plaintiff a dmitted drinking a lcohol and that his tires we re in poor condition. Th e p l aintiff neve rtheless filed a neg lige nce c laim ag ainst the defe ndant. The defe ndant filed a motion for summary judgme nt. The trial cour t gr anted summary

judgme nt to the de fe nd ant, fi nd ingthat, b ased on the pla int if

f d ia be tic ’s int oxic atio n a

nd fa ult y tir e s, he wa s, a s a matter of law, at least fifty perc ent at fa ult for his own injuries. The plaintiff a ppeals, a rguing that the tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in g ra nti ngthe de fe nd ant’ s mo tio n f or summa ry jud g me nt. We a ff

ir m.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., delivere d the opinion of the Court, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., and W A LTER C. K

UR TZ , S P

. J ., joined. Appellant, Ronald E. Crook, Memphis, Tenne ssee, pro s e
Kevin B askette, Me mphis, Tennessee , for the A ppellee L andon De speauxR ul e 10. M emor andum O pi ni on 1

T h is C o u rt, w ith the c o n c u rr e n c e o f all ju d g e s p a rtic ip a ting in the c a se , m a y a ff irm , re v e rs e o r m o d ify t he act i o ns o f

t he t ri al co u rt b y m em o randum op i ni o n when a f o rma l op i ni o n wo ul d have no prec edent i al va l ue. W hen a c as e i s d ec i d ed b y m emo r andum opi ni on i t s hal l be des i gn at ed “M E M O R A N D U M O P IN IO N ”, s hal l not b e p ub l i shed, and s hal l not b e ci t ed or re lied o n f o r any
r eas on i n a ny un r el at ed cas e.

T en n

. Ct

. App. R. 10.

I t i s u n l aw f

u l t o ope r at e an a u t omobi l e wi t h a bl ood al coh ol con ce n t r at i on at or abov e 0. 08%

. T

. C. A. § 55- 10- 2 4 0 1 (a)( 2 ) ( 2 0 0 4 ).

M r. and M rs . D e sp e a u x te st i f i ed at t he cri m i nal t ri al t hat , f rom t he t i m e t hat C roo k co nf ronted t hem i n t he 3
p arki ng l o t unt i l t he p o l i ce arri ved , C roo k was conti nuo usl y i n t hei r p res ence, excep t f o r an app roximatel y t hi rt y - second inte rv a l i n w h ic h C ro o k re trie v e d a no te p a d fro m his c a r, a n d tha t t h e y d id no t se e him d rin k a n y a lc o h o l.
-2- M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION 1

L ate in the a fternoon of

J uly 30, 2 0 0 4 , P laintiff/Appellant Ronald E. Crook (“ Crook”), a dia be tic , d ra nk a su bs tanti a l qu ant it y of alc oh ol a nd the n p ro c e e de d to dr ive on the str e e ts i n Memphis, Tennesse e. At appr ox imately 6:00 p.m. that day , he wa s travelingthroug h the intersec tion of Shady Grove Road and South Perkins Road, lost control of h i s v eh i cl e, slid into the curb, and
cra shed into a telephone pole. At the same time, D efe ndant/Appellee L an d o n De s peaux (“D espea u x ”) was drivinghis family van, takinghis wife and f amily out to dinner. As he pa ssed throug h the intersec tion of Shady Grove and South Perkins, he looked in his rea r view mirror

and saw Crook’s ve hicle hit the telephone pole. Be fore Despe aux could turn his vehicle ar ound to chec k
on the dr ive r who hit

the po le , h e saw C ro ok

put hi s car in re ve rs e and dr ive ba c k into t he str e e t, s o Despe aux continued to the res t au rant. Crook followe d Despe aux and his family to the restaur ant parking lot a

nd confr onted them, acc using Despe aux of having rolled throug h a s t o p s i gn at t he intersec tion and causingthe ac cident. Alar m ed at Crook’ s parkinglot confrontation, De speaux’s wife c alled the police

. When police offic ers a

rrived at t h e p ar k i nglot, they arr ested Crook for

driving under the influence and reckless driving. Crook voluntarily submitt ed to a breathaly zer test, which indicate d a blood alcohol concentration of 0.150. Crook was charg ed with drivi ngunder the influence of an 2 intox icant and r eckle ss driving.

A cr iminal trial ensued. At his criminal j u ry t rial, Crook testified that he suffe red f rom diabetes a nd admitted that he had consumed approximately six ty ounces of beer not long befor e the
a c c ide nt. He c on c e de d th at he wa s awa re that, a s a

dia be tic , h e sh ou ld no t dr ink a lc oh ol. De sp ite thi s, Cr oo k ma int a ine d at hi s c ri min a l tr ia l th at he wa s n ot i nto xicate d at th e tim e of t he ac c ide nt. Crook asser

ted that, af

ter the acc ident while waiting for the police to a rrive, he quickly

drank a nother forty -eig ht ounces of be er. At trial, Crook also conc eded that the poor c ondition of his ti res may 3 have c on tr ibute d to the a c c ide nt.In a n a p p e a l f ro m the G e n e ra l S e ssio n s C o u rt to the C irc u it C o u rt, the a p p e llan t is e n tit le d to a trial de no vo
. 4
T .C .A . § 1 6 -1 5 -7 2 9 (1 9 9 4 & S u p p . 2 0 0 8 ); s ee War e v. M eh ar r y M edi cal

Coll ege , 89 8 S.W

. 2 d 18 1 (T enn. 19 9 5 ).
-3- After hear ing Crook’ s testimony , the jury found him guilty on the char g es of dr iving unde r the influenc e and r eckle ss driving. H e re ceive d concur rent sentenc es of eleve n months, twenty -nine day s with service of four

day s for e ach c onviction. He appe aled his convic tion and sentenc e to the Tenne ssee Court of

Criminal Appeals, which a ffirme d both. See State v. Crook , No. W2005-02476- CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 3516216, at *5 (Te nn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2006)

. Me anwhil e , un de te rr e d by the c ri min a l c ha rg e s a g a ins t hi m, C ro ok

c a us e d a c ivi l w arr ant t o be iss ue d a g a ins t D e sp e a ux in t he She lby

County Ge ne ral S ess io ns Court . I n th e c ivi l w arr ant, Crook soug ht a judg ment for proper ty damag e in the amount of $25,000. Crook’s c omplaint alleg ed, inte r a lia , that Despe aux’s ve hicle went though the intersec tion of Shady Grove and Perkins at the same time Crook we nt throug h the intersec tion, and that Despe aux fa iled to stop at the stop sig n, cut off Crook’ s vehicle, a

nd stopped suddenly . W h en C ro o k rea cted, his vehic le slid on the wet paveme nt, hit the curb, an dthen hit the telephone pole . Crook further asser ted that Despe aux’s actions amounted to neg lige nce. On M ay 23, 2006, the Gene ral Sessions Court entere d judgme nt in f avo r o f D e sp e a

ux. Cro ok a

pp e a le d th e Ge ne ra l Se ssi on s ju dg me nt t o th e She lby County Cir c uit Court

. 4

In Circuit Court, Despe aux filed a motion for summary judgme nt. In support of his motion, De sp e a ux c ite d th e fo llo wi ngun dis pute d f a c ts:
6. [C rook] s ubmitted to a breathaly zer test, which demonstrated the pla int if f t o h ave a

blo od a lc oh ol c on te nt of .1 50

. At the tim e of thi s acc ident, the leg al limit for intox ication in the State of Tenne ssee wa s .08. 7. Duringhis DUItrial, Mr. Crook a d m i t t ed that on the da y of the
acc ident, befor e the a ccide nt occurre d, he purc hased two 41- ounce bottles of Miller Hig h L ite beer from the Super lo Foods . . . . 8. Mr. Crook consumed 60 ounc es of this bee r at his home over a four hour per iod. 9. Mr . Cr oo k is a

dia be tic wh o is ins uli n d e pe nd e nt. 10

. Mr . Cr oo k is awa

re that a s a

dia be tic , h e sh ou ld n ot d

ri nk a lc oh ol. 11

. Mr . Cr oo k to ok

ins uli n at 3: 00 p. m. 12. Mr. Crook needs to e at about an hour or an hour

and one- half [after ] takinghis insuli n. 13. Mr. Crook had nothing to e at from the time he took his insulin at 3:00 p. m. u nti l th e a c c ide nt. 14. Mr. Crook was having problems wit h his blood sug ar on the date of the a c c ide nt. 15. Mr. Crook’s blood sug ar c an drop sudde nly without him beingawa

re of it.S ec t i o n 5 5

- 1 0

- 4 0 8 rea d s: 5

Fo r t h e pu r po s e of

pr ov i n g a v i ol a t i on of § 55

- 10

- 40 1( a ) ( 1) , e v i de n c e t h a t t h e r e w a s , a t t h e t i me al l eg ed, e i g h t

- h u n dr edt h s of one per ce n t (. 08% ) or mor e by w ei g h t of a l coh ol i n t h e def

en dan t ’ s bl ood sh a ll c re a te a p re su m p tio n tha t t h e d e fen d a n t’s a b ili ty t o d riv e w a s su ff ic ie n tly im p a ire d the re b y to
co nst i t ut e a vi o l at i o n of § 55

- 1 0

- 4 0 1 (a)( 1 ).

T .C .A

. § 5 5

- 1 0

- 4 0 8 (2 0 0 4 ). S ec t i o n 5 5

- 1 0

- 4 0 1 st ates:

( a) I t i s u n l aw f

u l f or an y per s on t o dr i v e or t o be i n ph y s i ca l con t r ol of a n y a u t omobi l e or ot h er mot or d riv e n ve h ic le o n a n y o f the p u b lic ro a d s a n d hig h w a ys o f t h e sta te , o r o n a n y stre e ts o r a lleys, o r w h ile on t he premi s es of

an y s hopp i ng ce nt er , t r ai l er par k or a ny a p artm en t hous e c om pl ex, or any ot her premi s es wh i ch i s ge ner al l y f r equen t ed by t he publ i c a t l ar ge, wh i l e: (1) U nd er t he i nf

l uence o f

an y int o xi cant , m ari

juana, narcoti c d rug, or d rug pr odu ci n g s t i mu l at i n g e f f ec t s on t h e ce n t r al n er v ou s s y s t em; or (2) T he al co ho l c o ncent rat i o n in such p ers o n’ s b l o o d o r breat h i s ei ght

- hund redths of one per cen t (

. 08 % ) or mo r e.

I d. § 5 5

- 1 0

- 4 0 1 (a). A l t ho ugh t hese st at ut es deal exp l i ci t l y wi t h a presum p t i o n of i nt o xi cat i o n i n cri m i nal pro secut i o ns f o r dri vi ng unde r t he i nf l uence o f an i nt o xi cant , co urt s have f o und t he p res um p t i o n t o b e ap p l i cab l e i n ci vi l pro ceed i ngs
a s w e ll. Se e, e. g. , M cI nt yr e v. Bal en t i ne , 8 3 3 S .W .2 d 5 2 , 5 8

– 5 9 (T e n n . 1 9 9 2 ); Br own v. J. C. Penne y Li f e I ns . Co. , 8 6 1 S.W

. 2 d 83 4 , 83 6 (T enn. C t

. A p p

. 19 9 2 ).
-4- 16. L ow blood sug ar c an ca use conf usion , sweating, tre mbling and faintness in Mr. Crook. 17. The tires on Mr . Crook’s vehicle are “less than g ood tires and in a poor condition.”

In s up po rt of his mot ion , D e sp e a

ux su bmi tte d a tra

ns c ri pt of Cr oo k’ s te sti mony

in h is c ri min a l tr ia l.

In the memora

ndum in support of his summ ary judgme nt motion, Despeaux asserted the d o c tr in e o f c o mp ar ati v e f a u lt

. Re ly in g o n T e n n e s s e e Co d e A n n o tate d § 5 5

- 1 0

- 4 0 8, Despe aux 5
c on te nd e d th at Cr oo k’ s b loo d a lc oh ol c on c e ntr atio n at th e tim e of the a c c ide nt r a ise d a

re butta ble presumption of intox ication, and that, considering the level of Crook’s intox ication, his diabetes a nd failure to eat af

ter takinghis insuli n, and the substanda rd conditi o n o f hi s tires, rea sonable minds
c ou ld n ot d isa g re e ov e r whe the r C ro ok wa s at le a st fi ft y pe rc e nt at f a ult fo r t he dama g e to h is
ve hic le . A c c or din g ly , D e sp e a ux argue d, Cr oo k’s own ne g lig e nc e wa s th e pr oximate c a us e of his p r o p e rty d ama g e , an d

p r e c lu d e d

an y r e c o v e r y f r o m D e s p e a

u x.
In Crook’s re sponse to t h e s u m m ary judgme nt motion, he took is sue with Despe aux’s
a lle g atio n th at he wa s intoxic ate d at th e ti me of the a c c ide nt. He su

bmi tte d h is o wn

a ff ida vit , in which he stated that the ac cident occ urre d at appr ox imately 6:00 p.m., but that he had not consumed any al co h o l s i n ce 4:20 p.m. His af fidavit stated that, appr ox imately 20–30 minutes after

the
acc ident, he dra

nk 48 ounces of

beer while sitting in the bac k seat of his c ar.-5-

On Marc h 12, 2007, the trial cour t he ld a hear ing on Despe aux’s summary judgme nt motion. There is no transcript of the hear ing, but Crook a pparen tly made numer ous statements to the trial jud g e on his ve rs ion of the fa c ts. In its wr itt e n o rd e r, the tr ia l c ourt re lie d h e avil y

on the state me nts
m ad e b y C ro o k atth e h ea ri n g: The plaintiff, Ronald Crook, was tried and convicted by a jury on J uly 11-13, 2005 in the Shelby County Criminal Court, Division X, for dr iving unde r the influenc e and
re c kle ss d

ri vin g . D uri ng the p la int if f’ s D UI tr ia l, t he pr oo f c on c lus ive ly demonstrated that following the acc ident of Jul y 30, 2004, Mr. C rook was arre sted and cha rg ed with drivingunder the influence of an intoxi cant. He submitt ed to a breathaly zer test, which demonstrated t h e p laintiff to have a blood alcohol content of .150. At the time of this ac cident, the leg al limit for intox ication in t h e S t ate of Tenne ssee wa s .08. Duringhis DUItrial, and at the hear ing on the s ubject mot ion for summary jud g me nt on Mar ch 12 , 2 00 7, Mr . Cr oo k a dmi tte d th at on the da y of the a c c ide nt, befor e the a ccide nt occur

red, he consumed sixt y

ounces of Miller Hig h L ife beer

over a fo ur ho ur pe ri od in t he six ho ur s le a din gup to t he a c c ide nt. The Court fur

ther finds, upon the r ecor d in this cause and upon st atements of the pla int if

f o n M arc h 12, 20 07 , that he is a n in su lin de pe nd e nt d ia

be tic . O n th e date of the a ccide nt, Mr. Crook took his insul in at ar o u n d 3 : 0 0 p.m. knowing that he neede d to eat within a hour or a hour a nd one-ha lf afte r takingthe insulin. Mr. Crook had nothingto eat fr om the time he took h i s insulin at 3:00 p.m . until the accide nt that oc c ur re d at a bo ut 6 :00 p. m. Th e Court fu rt he r fi nd s that up on

the re c or d in

thi s c a us e and up on state me nts of Mr . Cro ok on Marc h 12, 20 07 , th at th e tir e s o n M r. Cr oo k’ s v e hic le we re in a state of disrepa ir such that appr ox imately half of the trea d was wor n down. The Court fur

ther finds that upo n t h e evidence pr esente d to it by the entire
rec ord in this cause, up o n s t at em en ts made by Mr. Crook on Marc h 12, 2007, and pursuant to Tenne ssee Code Annotated § 55-10-408, that his blood alcohol c ontent of .15 ra ised a re buttable pre sumption of intox ication. The Court fur

ther finds th at t h e only

proof the pla intiff prese nted at the hear ing on sa id subject mot i o n for summ ary judgme nt on March 12, 2007 to r ebut this presumption of intox ication was his stateme nt that he was not drunk, that he had consumed six ty ounces of beer over a four hour period, a nd that he consume d another forty -eig ht ounces of be er a fter the acc ident. Mr. Crook also made ref ere nce at the hear ing to suff

eringfrom chr onic depr ession. Th e C o urt f

urth e r f i n d s

. . . th at th e e v i d e n c e th e p l a i n t i f f p r e s e nte d in response to Defe ndant’s motion for summary judgme nt was not sufficie nt to rebut the pre sumption of intox ication and that the pla intiff has fa iled to demonstrate a materia l fac tual dispute. The Court fur

th er f inds that based upon the e ntire re cord in this cause and up on state me nts of

Ron a ld Cro ok on Ma

rc h 12, 20 07 , that no r e a so na ble jur or c ou ldI n h i s a ppel l at e br i ef , i n a ddi t i on t o ch al l en g i n g t h e g r an t of D es pea u x ’ s mot i on f or s u mmar y j u dg men t , Cr ook 6
argues t hat t he t ri al co urt err ed i n de ny i ng C roo k’ s repe at ed ef f o rt s t o co m p el D espea ux t o i d ent i f y hi s t hree chi l d ren, pur po r t edl y as pers ons wi t h k nowl edge of t he acc i dent

. I ndeed, t he r ecor d cont ai ns nu merous f i l i ng s s ubmi t t ed by l ocal
s chool s an d ot her s s eek i ng t o quas h Crook’ s us e of di s cover y t o at t emp t t o f orce t hem t o di s cl ose wh et her ch i l dren na med D es peaux at t ended a part i cul ar s chool , and t hei r i dent i t i es and cont act i nf ormat i on. T he t r i al cour t appropri at el y deni ed C roo k’ s repe at ed request s. I n ad d i t i o n, C roo k a sks thi s C o urt to revi ew whether D espea ux’ s at t o rney c o m m i t t ed f raud b y no t co m p lying w ith su c h d isc o v e ry re q u e sts, a n d w h e the r th e trial c o u rt e rr e d in n o t ho ld ing D e sp e a u x ’s atto rn e y in
co nt em p t

. T he o nl y o rder i d ent i f i ed i n C roo k’ s no t i ce o f ap p eal i s t he o rder grant i ng D espea ux’ s m o t i o n f o r s um m ary ju d g m e n t. T h is o rd e r a d d re sse s n o n e o f t h e se o the r th re e issu e s tha t D e sp e a u x se e k s to ra ise o n a p p e a l. C o n se q u e n tly, t he o nl y i ss ue p rop erl y rai sed o n ap p eal i s whether t he C i rcui t C o urt p rop erl y grant ed D espea ux’ s m o t i o n f o r s um m ary ju d g m e n t, a n d w e d e c line to a d d re ss th e o the r issu e s. Se e Cox v. She ll O i l Co. , 19 6 S.W

. 3 d 74 7 (T enn. C t

. A p p

. 20 0 5 ).
-6- fi nd the pla int if

f t o b e le ss tha

n 50 % at- fa

ult fo r the mot or ve hic le a c c ide nt whic h is the su bje c t of thi s la ws uit

. There fore , based on the evidenc e at the cr iminal trial and Crook’s statements in the he aring , the trial
c o urt gr an te d

s umm ar y ju d g me n t i nf

av o r o f D e s p e a u x.
Crook now appea ls the g rant of Despe aux’s motion for summary judgme nt. He r aises four issues. The only

issue proper ly

befor e this Court is whether t h e Circuit Court erre d in gr anting 6 Despe aux’s moti on for summary judgme nt; therefor e, we addre ss that issue.

As only questions of l aw are involved upon appea l from sum mary judgme nt, we af

ford the trial court’s judgme nt no presumption of cor rec tness. Bai

n v . W e lls , 936 S.W .2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 19 97 ). Summary jud g me nt is ap pr op ri ate “ if the ple a din g s, de po sit ion s, ans we rs to i nte rr og ator ie s, and a dmi ssi on s o n fi le , to g e the r w iththe a ff ida vit s, if any , s ho w that th e re is n o g e nu ine iss ue a s to
any mate ri a l f

a c t and that th e mov ing pa

rt y is e nti tle d to a jud g me nt a s a matte r o f l aw. ” Te nn . R. Civ. P. 56. 0 4

. T h e p arty s e e k in gs umm ar

y ju d g me n t “ h a s th e b ur d e no f p r o v in gth at i ts motion satisfies these require ments.” Bai n , 9 3 6 S

. W

. 2 d

at6 2 2 (c i t i n g Downen v. Alls tate Ins. C o. , 811 S.W. 2d 52 3, 52 4 (T e nn . 1 99 1) ). Th e burd e n th e n “ sh if ts t o th e no nmo vin gpa

rt y to s e t f or th s pe c if ic fac ts establishing the e x istence of disputed, material fa cts which must be re solved by the trier of fac t.” Id. (c i t i n g By rd

v . Ha ll , 847 S.W .2d 208, 215 (Tenn. 1993)). We view the evidenc e in t he
rec ord “in the lig ht most favorable to the nonmoving pa rty and . .

. draw all rea sonable infe renc es in the nonmoving party ’s favor .” Id. (c i t i n g By rd, 847 S.W .2d at 210–11). We will aff irm a g rant of summa ry jud g me nt “ on ly

wh e n b oth

the fa c ts a

nd the inf e re nc e s to be dr awn

fr om the fa c ts p e rm it
a re asonable person to re ach only one conc lusion.” Id. (c i t i n g By rd, 847 S.W .2d at 210–11). Our Supreme Court has adopted the modified sy s t em of c omparative fault. McIntyre v. Ba len tine , 8 3 3 S

. W

. 2 d 5 2 , 5 7 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 2 )

. U n d e r a c o mp ar at i v e f a u l t s y s t e m , “ s o l o n g a s a plaintiff’s neg lige nce r emains less than the de fenda nt’s neg lige nce the plaintiff m ay rec over.” Id. Crook argues that he r ebutted the statutory presumption of i ntox ication at the t ime of the a ccide nt and esta blish ed a gen uine dispute over a materia l issue of fac t. We first address whe ther Crook rebutted the presumption of his intox ication at the time of the acc ident, arisingfrom his blooda lc oh ol l e ve l. We the n look at whe the r, ba se d o n th e fa c ts e sta bli sh e d, any

re a so na ble jur or c ou ld-7-

find Crook to be less than fif ty perc ent at fa

ult for the dama g e to his vehicle. Se eBai n , 936 S.W .2d at 622.

In c on sid e ri nga

mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, of

c ours e , w e do no t ass e ss the c re dib ili ty of the e vidence , and we assume the truth of Crook’s ve rsion of the fa cts. Mc Car le y v . W est Q ual ity Food Service , 960 S.W .2d 585, 588 (Tenn. 1998). Even taking Crook’s version of the fa cts as true , howeve r, he ha s not rebu t t ed the pr esumption that his “ability to drive wa s sufficiently

impaired .

. . to c on sti tut e a

vio latio n of § 55- 10 -4 01 (a )( 1) .” T. C.A . § 55 -1 0- 40 8 ( 20 04 ). Cr oo k a dmi ts that, de sp ite the fa c t th at he is a dia be tic , he dran k a sub sta

nti a l amou

nt o f b e e r p ri or

to t he a c c ide nt. Crook asser

ts that he quickly

drank e ven more beer

while waitingfor police o ff i ce rs t o arr ive. Assuming this to be true, e vidence that Crook drank still mor e beer afte r the acc ident is simpl y proof that he beca

me more intoxi cate d, not that he was not intox icated a t the time of the ac cident. “[T]he non-moving party ’s burde n is not satisfied by simply showing that there is some ‘metaphy sical doubt as to the mater ial fac ts.’ Rather, the non-movant must show that the re cord w ould support a finding by a ‘r ational trier of

fac t’ in favor of the non-mova nt.” Bill s v. Conseco Ins. Co. , No. M2002- 0 1 9 0 6 -C OA -R 3 -C V, 2 0 0 3 W L2 2 4 5 5 3 9 9 , at* 7 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. Oc t

. 2 8 , 2 0 0 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Ma y nard
v. V anderbilt Un iv. , No. 01-A- 01-9211-CH-00437, 1993 T enn. App. L EXI S 351, at *16–17 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. May

14 , 1 99 3) ); see also Brown v. J. C. Penney Life Ins. C o. , 861 S.W .2d 834, 836 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). In light of the 0.15 blood a lcohol results, we ag ree with the trial court that Crook did not rebut the statutory presumption of intox ication.

In addition to his i ntox ication, Crook admitted at the he aringthat he took i nsulin at approximately

3:00 p.m., knowing that he should eat within an hour a nd a half. Neve rtheless, by the tim e the a c c ide nt o c c ur

re d at a pp ro ximate ly

6:0 0 p .m. , th e on ly

thi ngCr oo k h a d in g e ste d w a s a substantia l quantity

of bee r. In Crook’s cr iminal court testimony , he desc ribed his diabetic low blood
s u gar s y mp t o m s as co n fu s i o nan d s o m e s we at i n g an d

tre mb l i n g.
Moreove r, Crook asse rts that, at the time of the a ccide nt, the streets wer e wet fr om rain. He admitted to the tr ia l c o urt a t t h e h e ar in gth at t

h e ti r e s o nh is v e h ic le w e r e in s u c hd is r e p a ir

th at approximately

half of the trea d was wor n down, leavinghim ill -e q u i p p ed to dea l with rain-slick str e e ts.
We assume the truth of Crook’ s assertion that De speaux d i d n o t stop at the stop sign. Ho we ve r, Cr oo k d oe s n ot a lle g e that De sp e a ux’s ve hic le c oll ide d with his ve hic le and pu sh e d it int o th e t el ep h o n e p o l e. R at h er , C ro o k as s ert s th atDe s p eau x ’s p urp o rt edfa i l ure t o s t o p atth e s t o p s i gn fo rc e d h im t o r e a c t qu ic kly on the ra in- sli c k s tr e e ts. Cr oo k’ s d ia be tic c on ditio n cou pl ed w ithhis intox ication meant that he “did not have the normal use of his phy sical or menta l fac ulties,” rende ringhim “incapab l e o f [re]acting in a manner in which an or dinarily

prudent a

nd cautious person, in full possession of his fac ulties, using re asonable car e, would [ re ] act under like conditions.” Bro wn , 861 S.W .2d at 836. His impaired a bility to rea ct to the circ umstances, c oupled with the poor condition of his tires, re sulted in his vehicle skidding into the curb a nd the telephone po le . “ Whil e c omp arativ e fa ult is ty pic a lly a qu e sti on for th e tr ie r o f f

a c t, s umm ary

jud g me nt i s appropr iate in those situations where rea sonable minds could only conclude that . . . the plaintiff’s-8-

fault was equal to or greater than the fault of the de fenda nt.” No rri

s v . P ruit te , No. 01A01-9709- C V

- 0 0 5 0 6 , 1 9 9 8 W L1 9 8 8 5 6 3 , at* 3 (c i t i n g J OHN A. D AY & D ONAL D C A PP A RE LLA , T ENNES S EE L A W O F C OM PARATI VE F A U LT 12–18 (1997))

. Under all of these c ircumstance s, we must find that any rea sonable juror

would have to c onclude that Crook wa s primarily responsible for his vehicle’s collision with t he tel ep h o n e pole. The ref ore, w e agree with the trial court’ s conclusion that no
re a so na ble jur or c ou ld f ind Cr oo k to be le ss t

ha n f if ty pe rc e nt at f

a ult fo r t he a c c ide nt.
The de cision of the trial court is aff irmed. C osts of this appeal ar e asse ssed ag ainst Appellant Ronald E. Crook, and his surety , for whic h execution may issue if nec essar

y
.

___________________________________ HOL L Y M. KI RBY, JUDGE