IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

In the Matter of the Dependency of

L.S.†

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. 39817-0-III

(consolidated with

No. 39818-8-III)

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

LAWRENCE-BERREY, C.J. — In 2023, an Adams County trial court entered a 

dependency order and out-of-home placement for L.S., a five-year-old autistic child. 

Prior to the order, the State had removed L.S. from his parents’ home over concerns of 

neglect, domestic violence between the parents, drug use, and other deficiencies. L.S. 

had repeatedly arrived at school wearing badly soiled clothes. L.S.’s mother, with L.S. in 

her care, had twice been kicked out of a shelter for drug use. The State’s concerns 

regarding violence in L.S.’s home were confirmed when L.S.’s father, on the day of 

removal, initiated a seven-hour standoff with law enforcement during which he verbally 

threatened officers. On other occasions, L.S.’s father had thwarted the State’s attempts to 

conduct home walk-throughs and administer drug tests.

The parents appealed the trial court’s dependency and dispositional orders, and 

this court consolidated those appeals. Because substantial evidence supports findings 

 

† To protect the privacy interests of the minor child, we use their initials 

throughout this opinion. Gen. Order for Court of Appeals, In re Changes to Case Title

(Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2018) (effective September 1, 2018), http://www.courts.

wa.gov/appellate_trial_courts.

FILED

MAY 16, 2024

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
No. 39817-0-III; No. 39818-8-III

In re Dependency of L.S.

2

sufficient to sustain the trial court’s orders, we generally affirm. We remand for the trial 

court to consider placement with a relative.

FACTS

In 2023, the Washington Department of Children, Youth, and Families (the 

Department) filed a dependency petition for L.S., a high-needs, autistic five-year-old 

living in Ritzville. L.S. had come to the Department’s attention when B.S.—L.S.’s 

father—had removed L.S. from school and left him at the Vanessa Behan Crisis Nursery 

in Spokane. As B.S. eventually explained to the Department, he had brought the child to 

Vanessa Behan because he believed V.M., L.S.’s mother, was cheating on B.S. and 

associating with gang members who had harmed their child. 

When Vanessa Behan informed the Department of L.S.’s situation, social worker 

Kimberly Stacy contacted V.M. in Ritzville, where she was living at a motel after B.S. 

had locked her out of the family home. At their first meeting, V.M. disclosed to Ms. 

Stacy that B.S. physically abused her and that lately the abuse had gotten worse. V.M. 

showed Ms. Stacy where B.S. had (1) knocked teeth out of her mouth, and (2) hit her ribs 

with a baseball bat, resulting in visible swelling. On this or another occasion, V.M. 

further reported that B.S. abused her in front of L.S., who would cover his ears and cry 

while the abuse occurred. 
No. 39817-0-III; No. 39818-8-III

In re Dependency of L.S.

3

Pursuant to these reports, Ms. Stacy eventually provided V.M. with instructions 

for how to enlist the help of a domestic violence advocate. V.M. failed to contact the 

advocate, however, because—according to Ms. Stacy—V.M. was “confused with 

multiple phone calls of one step at a time of what to do.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 218. 

V.M.’s failure to contact the advocate corroborated V.M.’s disclosure to Ms. Stacy that 

she—V.M.—suffered from cognitive limitations. V.M. admitted that these limitations 

prevented her from managing L.S.’s appointments and coordinating with L.S.’s school. 

As a result, B.S. had assumed exclusive responsibility for those tasks. V.M.’s own 

assessment of her limitations comported with the eventual testimony of social worker 

Patricia Rodriguez, who stated that V.M. “does have a hard time understanding—simple, 

like, commands and—the cognitive—there’s some cognitive delays.” Rep. of Proc. (RP)

at 42.

With Ms. Stacy’s assistance, V.M. retrieved L.S. from Vanessa Behan and moved 

with him into a different Spokane shelter. Within 24 hours, that shelter evicted V.M. and 

L.S. because V.M. had smoked cannabis in the shelter’s bathroom. Ms. Stacy intervened, 

securing a second opportunity for V.M. at the shelter. That opportunity lasted “a couple 

days” before the shelter again evicted V.M. and L.S. owing to V.M. smoking cannabis in 

their room. CP at 216. V.M. moved into a hotel with L.S. Around this time, a swab test 

administered to V.M. indicated methamphetamine use. 
No. 39817-0-III; No. 39818-8-III

In re Dependency of L.S.

4

While still living in Spokane, V.M. sought a protection order against B.S. in 

Adams County. B.S. attended the protection order hearing, and the record does not 

indicate that the trial court imposed any order. Although Ms. Stacy had expressed to 

V.M. the Department’s concern about her reuniting with B.S., V.M. and L.S. resumed 

their life with B.S. in Ritzville after the protection order hearing. 

Beyond (1) V.M.’s drug use and cognitive limitations, and (2) B.S.’s violent and 

erratic disposition, the Department also grew concerned over reports from L.S.’s school 

about the state of the child’s hygiene. According to Camille Nelson, L.S.’s special 

education teacher, L.S. had begun arriving at school in soiled clothing and dirty diapers 

from the previous night. Once, L.S. showed up to school for days on end wearing the 

same vomit-stained sweatpants. Ms. Nelson informed L.S.’s parents of these hygiene 

issues, but the parents failed to address them. Ms. Nelson testified that she saw no 

improvement in L.S.’s hygiene during the time she worked with him. 

Still another concern for the Department was B.S.’s refusal to allow the 

Department to (1) conduct walk-throughs of his and V.M.’s home, or (2) administer 

urinalysis or additional swab tests to V.M. According to Ms. Stacy, B.S. would only 

consent to these measures if they occurred at a date and time of his choosing. Ms. Stacy 

explained to B.S. that walk-throughs and drug tests only were meaningful when 

administered randomly. Nevertheless, B.S. did not alter his position on the matter. Ms. 
No. 39817-0-III; No. 39818-8-III

In re Dependency of L.S.

5

Stacy reported that B.S. in multiple conversations with her had yelled and made her feel 

unsafe. Several other individuals lodged similar complaints about B.S. As one example, 

multiple staff members at a hospital accused B.S. of threatening to kill them if they did 

not promptly refill his prescription. The Department eventually offered B.S. anger 

management classes. 

In February 2023, the Department filed its dependency petition and coordinated 

with law enforcement to remove L.S. from B.S.’s and V.M.’s home. When law 

enforcement attempted to take L.S. into custody, however, B.S. initiated a standoff that 

lasted seven hours. Although B.S. did not engage in physical violence, he threatened 

such violence when he asked an officer whether that officer was “‘willing to fight to [his] 

last breath’” to execute the removal order. RP at 28. Eventually, B.S. surrendered L.S. 

to the officers. 

Ahead of the dependency hearing, the Department placed L.S. at a foster home in 

Pasco that was qualified to meet the child’s elevated needs. Although the Department 

coordinated regular parental visits, and facilitated those visits by offering transportation, 

B.S. and V.M. consistently failed to attend the visits. 

As of the dependency hearing, the Department had offered or provided to B.S. and 

V.M. the following services: urinalysis testing, oral swabbing, family preservation 

services, domestic violence services, anger management classes, and emergency housing. 
No. 39817-0-III; No. 39818-8-III

In re Dependency of L.S.

6

According to Ms. Rodriguez, the Department also had offered V.M. a neuropsychological 

evaluation and B.S. a mental health evaluation. Coordinated special education services 

also were available through L.S.’s school. 

The trial court entered (1) a dependency order and (2) a dispositional order 

authorizing L.S.’s continued placement in foster care. Although the Department ahead of 

the dependency hearing had informed the trial court that L.S.’s maternal grandmother 

was interested in caring for L.S., the court failed to complete the section of its boilerplate 

order related to relative placement. Moreover, the trial court at the fact-finding hearing 

did not address the possibility of relative placement. 

Finally, the trial court when announcing its ruling noted that “during this trial there 

were three, sometimes four, deputy sheriff’s [sic] present because of the perceived 

dangerousness of [B.S.].” RP at 71.

B.S. and V.M. timely appeal. Our court has consolidated the parents’ appeals.

ANALYSIS

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND RESULTING ORDERS

B.S. argues the trial court erred where its findings supporting dependency and outof-home placement did not derive from substantial evidence. We agree that finding of 

fact D (finding 2) was in error. However, substantial evidence supports the remaining 

findings such that we affirm the trial court’s orders.
No. 39817-0-III; No. 39818-8-III

In re Dependency of L.S.

7

Standard of review

Our court will affirm a dependency order where the findings supporting that order 

derive from substantial evidence, and where the trial court applies sound law to those 

findings. In re Dependency of M.P., 76 Wn. App. 87, 90, 882 P.2d 1180 (1994). 

Substantial evidence is that quantum of evidence necessary to persuade a fair-minded 

person of the truth of the premise. In re Dependency of J.D.P., 17 Wn. App. 2d 744, 755, 

487 P.3d 960 (2021).

Finding of fact D (finding 2)

The trial court found, under finding of fact D (finding 2), that “clear, cogent, and 

convincing evidence” indicates a “manifest danger . . . that [L.S.] will suffer serious 

abuse or neglect” if not removed from B.S.’s and V.M.’s home. CP at 147. Evidence is 

clear, cogent, and convincing where it renders the truth of the premise “‘highly 

probable.’” In re Welfare of Sego, 82 Wn.2d 736, 739, 513 P.2d 831 (1973) (quoting 

Supove v. Densmoor, 225 Or. 365, 372, 358 P.2d 510 (1961)).

Here, considerable evidence supports the notion that B.S. exhibited violent 

tendencies. When law enforcement attempted to remove L.S. from the family home, B.S. 

began a seven-hour standoff and, with L.S. present, asked one officer if he was willing to 

die to remove L.S. Social worker Kimberly Stacy stated that B.S. exhibited verbal 

aggression toward her. Other parties—including hospital staff—made similar 
No. 39817-0-III; No. 39818-8-III

In re Dependency of L.S.

8

allegations. Additionally, V.M. accused B.S. of domestic violence and complained that 

B.S. had knocked some of her teeth out. 

Although there is no evidence that B.S. acted violently toward L.S., this is not 

necessary to sustain the trial court’s finding. A child hearing or seeing a parent acting in 

an abusive manner is a victim of abuse. Rodriguez v. Zavala, 188 Wn.2d 586, 595-98, 

398 P.3d 1071 (2017) (a child who hears or sees domestic violence is a victim of 

domestic violence). The degree of psychological abuse that L.S. would suffer and the 

probability it would continue are substantial, given B.S.’s tendency to escalate conflicts.

As to neglect, evidence supports the notion that B.S. and V.M. neglected L.S. by 

failing to maintain the child’s hygiene. However, and as conceded by the Department, 

little evidence supports the finding that L.S. faced manifest danger of serious neglect. 

We remand for the trial court to vacate this finding.

Remaining findings

Substantial evidence also supports the remaining findings B.S. challenges on 

appeal.

i. Finding of fact C; finding of fact D (finding 1)

Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings, under finding of fact C and 

finding of fact D (finding 1), that no parent or guardian is available to care for L.S. 

Specifically, (1) the state of L.S.’s hygiene, (2) B.S.’s and V.M.’s parental deficiencies, 
No. 39817-0-III; No. 39818-8-III

In re Dependency of L.S.

9

and (3) B.S.’s and V.M.’s lack of parental engagement coalesces to support the 

challenged findings. 

(a) L.S.’s hygiene

Special education teacher Camille Nelson, who worked with L.S. daily, testified 

that the child’s hygiene began to deteriorate after her first month of working with him. 

During that time, L.S. began to arrive at school in dirty clothes or in his nighttime diaper 

from the previous night. At one point, L.S. arrived at school wearing sweatpants with his 

own vomit on them and then arrived at school wearing the same vomit-stained 

sweatpants for several days thereafter. When Ms. Nelson contacted B.S. and V.M. about 

these issues, the parents did not remedy the problems. Ms. Nelson testified that she saw 

no improvement in L.S.’s hygiene during the time she worked with him.

Viewed as a whole, Ms. Nelson’s testimony supports the finding that neither B.S. 

nor V.M. was sufficiently engaged with L.S. to care for the child’s needs. The parents 

attribute L.S.’s poor hygiene to his developmental challenges. However, no 

developmental challenge excuses a parent sending their child to school wearing a dirty 

diaper from the night before, or sending their child to school for days on end wearing the 

same vomit-stained sweatpants. 
No. 39817-0-III; No. 39818-8-III

In re Dependency of L.S.

10

(b) Parental deficiencies: B.S.

The record establishes that B.S.’s regular interpersonal conflict caused him to 

fixate on his needs at the expense of L.S.’s well-being. 

As one example, B.S. initiated a standoff with law enforcement when officers 

attempted to remove L.S. from B.S.’s home. Rather than cooperate with law enforcement 

or ask productive questions, B.S. escalated the conflict by asking an officer if he was 

“‘willing to fight to [his] last breath’” to remove L.S. RP at 28. The standoff lasted 

seven hours, for the full duration of which L.S. remained within B.S.’s home witnessing 

his father’s erratic behavior. Where a high-needs child is captive to a high-tension 

environment, and where his father rather than ameliorating the tension needlessly 

exacerbates and prolongs it, that father has shown himself numb to his child’s needs. 

On another occasion, B.S. failed to subordinate his distrust of V.M. to his child’s 

well-being. Having decided that V.M. was cheating on him, B.S. took L.S. out of school, 

drove to Spokane, and left the high-needs child at the Vanessa Behan Crisis Nursery. 

When explaining his decision, B.S. did not express reservations about disrupting L.S.’s 

routines or schooling. He did not express any concern about the trauma L.S. would 

necessarily sustain as a result of being left for days in the care of strangers in an 

unfamiliar city. Instead, B.S. justified absconding with L.S. on the grounds that the men 

V.M. was involved with had harmed his child. However, B.S. did not explain how he 
No. 39817-0-III; No. 39818-8-III

In re Dependency of L.S.

11

had reached that conclusion, given that L.S. is nonverbal and could not have relayed any 

such information. 

On other occasions, B.S. became violent with V.M. V.M. claimed this violence 

had worsened in the years preceding L.S.’s removal, and that B.S. on one occasion had 

knocked her teeth out. On another occasion, B.S. had struck V.M.’s ribs with a baseball 

bat. Clearly, abuse of this sort evinces innumerable serious problems. Specific to this 

analysis, however, it evinces B.S.’s inability to prioritize the tranquility of L.S.’s 

homelife over his own need to actualize violent tendencies.

Taken together, the above episodes suggest a propensity on B.S.’s part to focus so 

myopically on his own quarrels, vendettas, and impulses as to overlook L.S.’s needs. 

Such behavior would be problematic in any parental context. It is particularly 

problematic where the child involved has heightened needs requiring acute parental 

vigilance. 

(c) Parental deficiencies: V.M.

The record establishes that V.M.’s substance abuse issues and cognitive delays 

prevented her from caring for L.S. Additionally, V.M. demonstrated a wavering 

commitment to removing L.S. from a home where domestic violence was chronic.

After B.S. left L.S. at Vanessa Behan, the Department assisted V.M. in collecting 

L.S. from the shelter and establishing them both at a separate shelter. This represented an 
No. 39817-0-III; No. 39818-8-III

In re Dependency of L.S.

12

opportunity for V.M. to care for L.S. in a safe environment fully removed from the threat 

B.S. posed. However, within 24 hours, V.M. forfeited their room at the shelter by 

smoking cannabis on the premises. The Department successfully intervened, securing 

V.M. a second chance at the shelter. However, only days later, the shelter removed V.M. 

permanently after catching her smoking cannabis a second time. In short, V.M. in the 

span of just a few days received two opportunities to house L.S. in an abuse-free 

environment, and in the span of just a few days her substance abuse issues thwarted both 

opportunities. Also, V.M. tested positive for methamphetamine use.

In addition to substance abuse, V.M.’s cognitive challenges frustrated her ability 

to care for L.S. For example, when Ms. Stacy gave V.M. instructions for how to enlist 

the services of a domestic violence advocate, V.M. was confused and could not follow 

those instructions. Ms. Stacy’s account of V.M.’s cognitive limitations comports with 

Ms. Rodriguez’s testimony. According to Ms. Rodriguez, V.M. “does have a hard time 

understanding—simple, like, commands and—the cognitive—there’s some cognitive 

delays.” RP at 42. Indeed, V.M. herself corroborated Ms. Stacy’s and Ms. Rodriquez’s 

assessments when she admitted to Ms. Stacy that her own cognitive delays prevented her 

from managing L.S.’s appointments and coordinating with L.S.’s school.

Finally, V.M. also demonstrated deficient parenting skills when she abandoned her 

efforts to extract L.S. from a home where domestic violence was chronic. As mentioned 
No. 39817-0-III; No. 39818-8-III

In re Dependency of L.S.

13

already, V.M. did initially take steps toward achieving this extraction. She moved with 

L.S. to a shelter in Spokane and, when the shelter no longer was available, she checked 

into a hotel with her child. Moreover, she sought a protection order against B.S. 

However, rather than pursuing that order, V.M. abruptly changed course and reunited 

with B.S.

For the foregoing reasons, the record supports the finding that V.M.’s substance 

abuse issues, cognitive delays, and wavering commitment to removing L.S. from a 

violent home prevented her from caring for her child. 

(d) Lack of engagement with services

The record shows that B.S. and V.M. repeatedly declined opportunities to cultivate 

a better homelife for L.S. Specifically, B.S. and V.M. (1) refused to allow the 

Department to administer a urinalysis test to V.M., except at a date and time of B.S.’s 

choosing, (2) refused to permit a home walk-through, (3) failed to implement the hygiene 

instructions L.S.’s school provided, and (4) failed to visit L.S. in foster care despite the 

Department facilitating those visits by providing transportation.

(e) Conclusion

The record supports the finding that B.S. and V.M. each exhibited deficiencies that 

prevented them from caring for L.S. The record also supports the finding that B.S. and 
No. 39817-0-III; No. 39818-8-III

In re Dependency of L.S.

14

V.M. did not engage in services to remedy those deficiencies. The trial court 

appropriately entered finding of fact C and finding of fact D (finding 1).

ii. Finding of fact 2

Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding, under finding of fact 2, that 

B.S.’s and V.M.’s home is “volatile and unstable, characterized by domestic violence and 

drug use.” CP at 152. The home is manifestly volatile and unstable, as B.S. and V.M. 

compelled L.S. to move four times in 11 days—from his own home to Vanessa Behan, 

from Vanessa Behan to a second shelter, from the second shelter to a hotel, and from the 

hotel back to his own home. During this time, L.S. was unable to attend school and 

benefit from the education and services he received there.1

The home also was characterized by domestic violence and drug use, as V.M. 

herself reported domestic violence to Ms. Stacy. V.M. also tested positive for 

methamphetamine use and twice in one week forfeited stable housing owing to her 

cannabis habit.

The trial court properly entered finding of fact 2. Moreover, this finding derived 

from substantial evidence—as described supra—even if the court erred where it stated on 

 

1 We infer that L.S., while living in Spokane, was unable to attend school in 

Ritzville, which is an hour’s drive.
No. 39817-0-III; No. 39818-8-III

In re Dependency of L.S.

15

the record that law enforcement officers had regularly attended court proceedings to 

monitor B.S. To the extent that statement was error, it was harmless.

iii. Finding of fact 5

Substantial evidence likewise supports the trial court’s finding, under finding of 

fact 5, that “[L.S.]’s hygiene had become deplorable and unacceptable by the time [of 

removal].” CP at 152. As stated above, L.S. had begun arriving at school wearing used 

diapers from the preceding night. Once, he had arrived at school for several consecutive 

days wearing the same vomit-stained sweatpants. When the school informed B.S. and 

V.M. of these hygiene issues, B.S. and V.M. failed to remedy them. Moreover, these 

issues did not derive from L.S.’s autism, as autism does not prevent a parent from 

replacing vomit-stained sweatpants with clean ones. The trial court properly entered 

finding of fact 5.

iv. Finding of fact E

Finally, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding, under finding of 

fact E, that reasonable efforts to avoid removal failed because (1) L.S.’s “health, safety, 

and welfare . . . cannot be adequately protected in the home,” and (2) specific services 

offered or provided to B.S. and V.M. have not succeeded in remedying parental 

deficiencies. CP at 147.
No. 39817-0-III; No. 39818-8-III

In re Dependency of L.S.

16

(a) Reasonable efforts

The Department made reasonable efforts to avoid out-of-home placement where it 

offered B.S. and V.M. the following: urinalysis testing, oral swabbing, family 

preservation services, domestic violence services, anger management classes, emergency 

housing, neuropsychological evaluation (for V.M.), and mental health evaluation (for 

B.S.). L.S.’s school also provided the family with coordinated special education services.

As a regimen, the above services responded to B.S.’s and V.M.’s specific 

parenting deficiencies—namely, chemical dependency, domestic violence, cognitive 

deficiencies, and mismanagement of child hygiene. B.S. argues the Department failed to 

offer a necessary service where it did not provide medication or toilet training services to 

address L.S.’s hygiene issues. However, B.S. and V.M. did receive adequate services in 

this regard where Ms. Nelson communicated to them that L.S. should not arrive at school 

in the same vomit-stained sweatpants for days on end. Washing and replacing the child’s 

sweatpants did not require medication or toilet training services. It required only B.S. 

and V.M. to heed Ms. Nelson’s instructions, which they failed to do. The trial court 

properly found that the Department had made reasonable efforts to avoid out-of-home 

placement.
No. 39817-0-III; No. 39818-8-III

In re Dependency of L.S.

17

(b) Services unsuccessful

Substantial evidence indicates that the services the Department offered B.S. and 

V.M. did not succeed. Despite Ms. Nelson’s efforts, B.S. and V.M. failed to address 

L.S.’s hygiene deficiencies. Despite Ms. Stacy’s efforts, V.M. both (1) failed to sustain 

safe housing for L.S., and (2) failed to separate herself and L.S. from a home where 

domestic violence was chronic. The urinalysis and home walk-throughs were not 

successful because B.S. thwarted these services. Where the Department administered an 

oral swab to V.M., that swab indicated methamphetamine use. Accordingly, the trial 

court properly found that services offered or provided to B.S. and V.M. did not obviate 

the need for out-of-home placement.

(c) Inability to ensure health, safety, and welfare

Notwithstanding the success or failure of offered services, substantial evidence 

indicates that the Department could not have ensured L.S.’s health, safety, and welfare in 

the family’s home where B.S. obstructed the Department’s access to that home. Even if 

B.S. and V.M. had accepted services, and even if those services had succeeded, the 

Department could not have ensured L.S.’s protection where it could not evaluate the 

child’s domestic environment.

The trial court properly found that it could not protect L.S. while the child lived in 

B.S.’s and V.M.’s home.
No. 39817-0-III; No. 39818-8-III

In re Dependency of L.S.

18

(d) Conclusion

By offering or providing services that addressed B.S.’s and V.M.’s parenting 

deficiencies, the Department made reasonable efforts toward avoiding out-of-home 

placement. Those efforts failed when B.S. and V.M. did not partake in the available 

services. Even if the services had succeeded, the Department could not ensure L.S.’s 

health, safety, and welfare where B.S. refused access to the family’s home. For all these 

reasons, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding of fact E.

Resulting orders

1. Dependency order

A dependency order is appropriate where the Department shows by a 

preponderance of evidence that the child in question meets one of the statutory 

definitions of a “dependent child.” RCW 13.34.110(1). As one definition, a child is 

dependent where he “[h]as no parent, guardian, or custodian capable of adequately caring 

for [him], such that the child is in circumstances which constitute a danger of substantial 

damage to the child’s psychological or physical development.” RCW 13.34.030(6)(c). 

When considering whether a parent may adequately care for a child, a trial court may 

consider both the child’s special needs and the parent’s limitations. In re Dependency of 

Schermer, 161 Wn.2d 927, 944, 169 P.3d 452 (2007).
No. 39817-0-III; No. 39818-8-III

In re Dependency of L.S.

19

Here, a preponderance of evidence supports the finding that B.S. and V.M. were 

not capable of caring for L.S., given the parents’ limitations and the child’s considerable 

needs. Specifically—as discussed supra—substantial evidence supports the following 

findings:

• L.S. is a high-needs child requiring intensive, sustained, and attentive care.

• V.M. failed to sustain safe housing for L.S. even where the Department 

affirmatively and repeatedly arranged such housing.

• V.M. failed to discontinue cannabis use even when doing so would have 

ensured continued safe housing for L.S.

• V.M. used methamphetamine.

• V.M. failed to remove L.S. from a home where domestic violence occurred and 

was worsening.

• V.M. failed to obtain the services of a domestic violence advocate despite the 

Department providing instructions for how to obtain those services.

• B.S. created a violent environment for L.S. by subjecting V.M. to physical 

abuse.

• B.S. failed to prioritize L.S.’s routines and schooling over his own vendettas, 

quarrels, and impulses.
No. 39817-0-III; No. 39818-8-III

In re Dependency of L.S.

20

• B.S. subjected L.S. to unnecessary stress and tension by initiating and 

prolonging a standoff with law enforcement in L.S.’s presence.

• B.S. refused drug tests and residential walk-throughs designed to ensure L.S.’s 

welfare and safety.

• Both B.S. and V.M. failed to care for L.S.’s personal hygiene, even after L.S.’s 

teacher informed them of hygiene deficiencies.

• Both B.S. and V.M. failed to visit L.S. in foster care despite the Department 

facilitating those visits by providing transportation.

In light of these verities, the trial court was justified in finding that B.S. and V.M. 

were more likely than not incapable of caring for L.S. See In re Pers. Restraint of Pugh, 

7 Wn. App. 2d 412, 422, 433 P.3d 872 (2019) (a preponderance of evidence exists where 

the premise is more likely than not true). This is especially so given that B.S. and V.M. 

failed to provide any meaningful evidence in support of their ability to care attentively for 

a high-needs child. The dependency order was proper.

2. Out-of-home dispositional order

A trial court may not order out-of-home placement for a child unless the 

Department has first made reasonable efforts to obviate the need for such a placement. 

RCW 13.34.130(6). Where the court orders out-of-home placement, it must specify 

the offered or provided services that constitute the Department’s reasonable efforts. 
No. 39817-0-III; No. 39818-8-III

In re Dependency of L.S.

21

RCW 13.34.130(6). Where such efforts fail, out-of-home placement may be appropriate. 

RCW 13.34.130(6). Out-of-home placement may also be appropriate where the 

Department’s efforts succeed but where the State nevertheless cannot ensure the child’s 

health, safety, and welfare in the parents’ home. RCW 13.34.130(6).

Here, the Department made reasonable efforts to obviate the need for out-of-home 

placement where it offered or provided services tailored to B.S.’s and V.M.’s specific 

needs. Those efforts failed when B.S. and V.M. did not partake in the available services. 

Even if the services had succeeded, the Department could not have ensured L.S.’s health, 

safety, and welfare in the family home where B.S. refused access to that home. 

INTERESTED RELATIVE

B.S. argues the trial court erred where it failed to explore the possibility of placing 

L.S. with an interested relative. We agree.

Standard of review

Our court reviews a child’s dispositional order for abuse of discretion. In re 

Dependency of A.C., 74 Wn. App. 271, 275, 873 P.2d 535 (1994). A trial court exceeds 

its discretion where its findings lack support from the record or where its conclusions 

apply incorrect law. In re Dependency of T.L.G., 139 Wn. App. 1, 15, 156 P.3d 222

(2007).
No. 39817-0-111; No. 39818-8-111 

In re Dependency of L. S. 

Placement with relative 

A trial court may authorize placing a child with an unrelated party only where the 

Department cannot place the child with an interested relative (or other party familiar with 

the child), or when doing so would harm reunification efforts. RCW 13.34.130(3). 

Here, the Department informed the trial court that L.S.'s maternal grandmother 

was interested in caring for L.S. However, the court failed to complete the section of its 

boilerplate order related to relative placement. Moreover, the trial court at the factfinding hearing did not address the possibility of relative placement. This was error. 

CONCLUSION 

We generally affirm, but we remand for the trial court to vacate the "serious 

neglect" finding and to consider relative placement. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to 

RCW 2.06.040. 

WE CONCUR: 

Pennell, J. .. Cooney, J. 

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