IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-10885

Summary Calendar 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

JESSE CARRILLO, JR., also known as Baby 9, 

Defendant-Appellant 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas 

USDC No. 4:16-CR-22-1 

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, PRADO, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

 Jesse Carrillo, Jr., pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute methamphetamine and was sentenced to 188 months of 

imprisonment and four years of supervised release. Carrillo challenges the 

district court’s calculation of his sentence, arguing that the district court 

clearly erred by applying an enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G § 2D1.1(b)(1), 

based on the finding that he possessed a dangerous weapon in connection with 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 15, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 16-10885 Document: 00513992333 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/15/2017
No. 16-10885

2 

the offense, and an enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12), based 

on the finding that he maintained a premises for purposes of distributing a 

controlled substance. 

Carrillo argues that the district court erred by applying the § 2D1.1(b)(1) 

enhancement because there is no evidence that he possessed a weapon while 

conducting any drug trafficking transactions or that any such transactions 

occurred at his residence. He also argues that the firearm was not in proximity 

to the drugs. 

We find no clear error with the district court’s application of the 

enhancement. The fact that some drug trafficking conduct occurred outside of 

Carrillo’s residence is not fatal to the application of the § 2D1.1(b)(1) 

enhancement given that Carrillo’s conduct––storing drugs and drug proceeds 

in his residence––is clearly associated with his distribution offense. See United 

States v. Marquez, 685 F.3d 501, 508 (5th Cir. 2012). Likewise, although the 

gun was found in a different location on the premises than the drugs, the 

district court could have drawn a reasonable inference from the unrebutted 

evidence in the presentence report that the weapon was accessible to Carrillo 

to protect the methamphetamine and drug proceeds stored in the garage. 

See United States v. King, 773 F.3d 48, 52 (5th Cir. 2014); see also United States 

v. Juluke, 426 F.3d 323, 326, 328-29 (5th Cir. 2005). 

Carrillo’s challenge to the premises enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(12) 

is likewise unavailing. He argues that that the storage of the drugs in his 

house was “incidental or collateral” to the primary purpose of the premises, 

which was to provide him and his family with a place to live. In support of his 

argument, Carrillo points primarily to the fact that he did not sell 

methamphetamine directly out of his home, but instead transported the drugs 

elsewhere for sale. Certainly, § 2D1.1(b)(12) requires that a defendant’s 

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3 

purpose of storing a controlled substance for distribution at a premises may 

not be merely “incidental or collateral,” but that use “need not be the sole 

purpose for which the premises was maintained.” § 2D1.1, cmt. n.17. 

Therefore, a defendant’s additional use of a premises as a family home is not 

necessarily fatal to application of § 2D1.1(b)(12), so long as facts in the record 

support that storage of the controlled substance was “one of the defendant’s 

primary or principal uses for the premises.” Id; accord United States v. 

Barragan-Malfabon, 537 F. App’x 483, 484-85 (5th Cir. 2013) (unpublished).

Under clear error review, the district court’s conclusion that 

§ 2D1.1(b)(12) applies need only be “plausible in light of the record as a whole.” 

See United States v. Villanueva, 408 F.3d 193, 203 (5th Cir. 2005). Here, there 

are sufficient facts in the record, which taken together support the district 

court’s finding that Carrillo’s storage of the methamphetamine in his home for 

distribution was “one of [his] primary or principal uses for the premises” and 

was not merely an “incidental or collateral” use. § 2D1.1, cmt. n.17. For 

example, the district court was free to consider the unrebutted factual findings

in the Pre-sentence Report illustrating the large quantity of 

methamphetamine stored in Carrillo’s garage, as well as the over $12,000 in 

drug proceeds also stored there and various other containers with 

methamphetamine residue. The PSR further contained evidence suggesting 

that, in addition to the garage, Carrillo also used his former residence as a 

premises for drug distribution and likely for storage, and he conducted drug 

transactions in the parking lot of that residence on multiple occasions. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

 Case: 16-10885 Document: 00513992333 Page: 3 Date Filed: 05/15/2017