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U.S. POLICY IN YEMEN

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND

SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 19, 2011

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

FRANK G. LOWENSTEIN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

——————

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND

SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

Benjamin, Hon. Daniel, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department 

of State, Washington, DC .................................................................................... 4

Prepared joint statement with Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson ................. 5

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator John F. 

Kerry .............................................................................................................. 46

Boucek, Dr. Christopher, associate, Carnegie Middle East Program, Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC ..................................... 28

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 30

Capozzola, Christa, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Democracy, 

Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for International 

Development, Washington, DC ........................................................................... 9

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 10

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator John F. 

Kerry .............................................................................................................. 43

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Robert P. 

Casey, Jr. ....................................................................................................... 47

Casey, Hon. Robert P., U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania, opening statement .... 1

Green, Daniel R., Soref Fellow, Washington Institute on Near East Policy, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 25

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 27

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator from Idaho, opening statement .................. 3

Sanderson, Hon. Janet, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern 

Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ......................................... 12

Prepared joint statement with Hon. Daniel Benjamin .................................. 5

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator John F. 

Kerry .............................................................................................................. 45

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator James E. 

Risch ............................................................................................................... 47

(III)

(1)

U.S. POLICY IN YEMEN 

TUESDAY, JULY 19, 2011

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND

SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert P. Casey 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Casey, Coons, Udall, Risch, and Corker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY,

U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA 

Senator CASEY. The hearing will come to order. 

I will start with an opening statement, and then we’ll of course 

introduce our witnesses, and then we may have other statements 

as well. 

But I want to thank everyone for being here. We’re getting 

started just at the right time. And we’re here today for a very important purpose. 

We’re here today to discuss the complex set of challenges facing 

United States policy in Yemen, and that examination of policy 

comes amid 5 months of popular protests and political unrest. 

During this historic period of sweeping change in countries like 

Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria, Yemen often gets overlooked. However, 

as a result of the power vacuum caused by President Saleh’s departure to Saudi Arabia in June, there are serious concerns over the 

government’s ability to prevent al-Qaeda from gaining a foothold, 

or I should say a stronghold, in the country, as well as broader concerns about the growing humanitarian and economic crises that are 

plaguing Yemen today. 

Al-Qaeda’s presence in Yemen is not new. We know that. But it 

has grown increasingly worrisome in the past several years. 

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, as we know by the acronym 

AQAP, has carried out multiple attacks against the people of 

Yemen and also against Americans as well as other countries and 

her citizens. 

We all remember the foiled Christmas Day so-called underwear 

bomber attack in 2009, which revealed AQAP’s strategy of direct 

attacks on the U.S. homeland. In October of last year, Yemeni terrorists again targeted the United States homeland with UPS packages containing explosives. One of the packages was bound for the 

2

Philadelphia International Airport in my home State of Pennsylvania. 

Given the direct threat that AQAP poses to United States national security interests, and taking into account significant gains 

made in United States operations against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan 

and Pakistan over the past year, counterterrorism efforts in Yemen 

must be a central focus of our national security strategy. 

That said, our counterterrorism concerns are closely intertwined 

with political, economic, and developmental challenges as well. And 

those challenges are those that the United States must work to 

address as part of a holistic approach to this challenge. 

First of all, I’ll just outline three priorities. First, we need a better understanding of the political opposition and prospects for 

democratic reform. Acting President Hadi, the Vice President in 

Yemen, has only a small power base, and the opposition appears 

fractured between the so-called Joint Meeting Parties, the JMP, 

and other individuals, such as Ali Muhsin, the former commander 

of the First Armored Division, and Sheikh al-Ahmar, leader of the 

powerful al-Ahmar family. 

Over the weekend, elements of the opposition announced the formation of a shadow government, though the composition and support for the group remains unclear. It is clear, however, that the 

transition process will take place sooner or later. 

The President has committed to eventually stepping down, which 

will result in new leadership for Yemen, the first time in 33 years. 

But the United States needs to be prepared for this post-Saleh government, whatever that might be, and we don’t know the contours 

of that yet. 

Second priority of the three that I’ll mention in this statement, 

we must be prepared to address the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian crisis. The violence between pro-Saleh forces and opposition 

demonstrators has only exacerbated already chronically poor conditions in the country itself, where the average citizen survives on 

less than $2 a day. 

A third of Yemen’s population is undernourished and the country 

is facing a severe water shortage. It also faces, as well, a food and 

fuel crisis at the same time. 

Education indicators are among the lowest in the Middle East. 

Only 32 percent—32 percent—of girls are attending secondary 

school. 

The United States needs to send a message of solidarity with the 

people of Yemen, and part of that message we need to send is that 

we’re concerned about their well-being and their prospects for the 

future. While the United States will not be able to solve the 

daunting development and economic challenges facing Yemen, we 

can help mitigate their impact through our development and 

humanitarian assistance. 

Third and final point, the United States and our international 

partners should develop a long-term strategy on conflict resolution 

in Yemen. In a country rife with tribal conflict, most recently and 

notably the Houthi rebellion in the north and secessionist movements in the south, al-Qaeda has found a safe haven. 

This is a clear example of how our counterterrorism strategy 

must have a civilian component. USAID has done good work 

3

through community outreach programs aimed at fighting extremism among young people, but this is just the tip of the iceberg. 

Saudi Arabia has a unique role to play, given its strong ties to the 

Yemeni people and security interests. 

We must think strategically about how best to leverage our collective resources to achieve a sustainable development policy. 

As we turn to our witnesses, it’s important to emphasize that 

Yemen cannot be viewed through a single lens. In a country where 

vast political, security, humanitarian, and development challenges 

continually converge, the United States must endeavor to formulate a coordinated short-term and a long-term policy based on our 

core national security interests. 

So I commend our diplomats, and I want to commend, in particular, Gary Feierstein and Deputy Chief of Mission Elizabeth 

Richard, who work continuously in an increasingly difficult environment. 

I look forward to hearing more about how the United States can 

better examine and address the threats posed to our national security and, ultimately, to better meet the legitimate needs of the 

Yemeni people. 

And now I turn to our ranking member, Senator Risch. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,

U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO 

Senator RISCH. Chairman Casey, thank you so much for scheduling this hearing. It’s really appropriate that we do focus on 

Yemen at this particular time. 

With the Arab Spring and the many changes that are coming to 

the Middle East, it’s really important that we do focus on Yemen, 

which is becoming increasingly more important to United States 

policy in the Middle East. 

As we all know, Yemen lies in the strategic crossroads between 

the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa. It has seen a flow 

of extremism and terrorists cross back and forth. And recent victories of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and in Southern 

Yemen should be troubling for United States policymakers. 

It seems the Department of Defense is pursuing counterterrorism 

policies which indeed have demonstrated some success, but many 

State Department resources have been focused very much on the 

capital, and the outlying areas of Yemen need more attention. 

We need a more comprehensive strategy that coordinates the activities of the State Department and the Department of Defense. 

While there are immediate challenges we must confront in 

Yemen, we must also make sure we are not making longer term 

issues in the country worse. The dangers of Yemen breaking apart 

and becoming even more of a lawless landscape will have serious 

repercussions on the long-term interests of the United States in the 

region. 

Another safe haven for pirates, the potential for attacks like the 

USS Cole, and other threats endanger U.S. interests and personnel 

in the region. 

I hope we can quickly develop a broader strategy, because the 

consequences for the region could be severe if we don’t. 

4

I welcome this hearing today in order to hear from our witnesses 

and their thoughts on solutions and moving forward in the region. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Risch. 

I’ll introduce our witnesses, and we’ll go right to their testimony. 

In our first panel—and I’ll limit the introduction to our first 

panel, and we’ll do the second panel when we reach that point—

we’ll hear from the Honorable Janet Sanderson, Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs; the Honorable Daniel 

Benjamin, Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the Department of 

State; and Ms. Christa Capozzola, Deputy Assistant Administrator 

in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance at USAID. 

And for purposes of movement from left to right, Ambassador 

Benjamin, I think we’ll start with you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL BENJAMIN, COORDINATOR FOR 

COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Chairman Casey, Ranking Member 

Risch, thank you very much for inviting me to appear before you 

today. 

As you’ll hear in a few moments from my colleague, Ambassador 

Sanderson, the situation in Yemen in terms of politics and economics is quite tenuous. 

The presence of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP, 

means that this volatile situation has a direct bearing on our national security. As we’ve seen with both the 2009 Christmas Day 

bomb attempt and the cargo bomb attempts 1 year later in fall of 

2010, AQAP has developed not just the desire but also the capability to launch strikes against the United States at home. 

As a result of the last several months of political unrest, the Government of Yemen’s efforts against AQAP have suffered a setback. 

When it called most of its security forces back from the provinces, 

including its counterterrorism units, to Sanaa, where most of them 

remain today, AQAP took advantage of the power vacuum to expand its operational territory, particularly in the south, which historically has resisted rule from the north and the capital in Sanaa. 

AQAP has made territorial gains in Abyan governance, specifically attacking the capital city of Zinjibar. This potentially threatens the port city of Aden and gives AQAP access to international 

sea-lanes. 

Our two-pronged strategy recognizes that Yemen’s long-term stability requires addressing the factors that lead to instability by promoting good governance, the rule of law, and human and economic 

development. However, in order to promote those long-term goals, 

we must help the government confront the immediate security 

threat represented by al-Qaeda. 

Our counterterrorism strategy strives to build the capabilities of 

Yemen’s security forces to effectively combat AQAP and other terrorist elements, and also to reduce the appeal of AQAP to potential 

recruits. 

In 2010, the United States provided an estimated $179.8 million 

in training and assistance to Yemen’s key counterterrorism and 

5

related law enforcement units. Specifically, through 1206 section 

funding, DOD has helped build the capacity of Yemen’s military 

forces to conduct counterterrorism operations with programs that 

provide training and equipment to Yemen special operation forces, 

Yemen coast guard, border security forces, and the Yemeni air 

force. 

However, no FY 2011 1206 funding has been programmed for 

Yemen, unfortunately, because of the security situation and political unrest. 

Antiterrorism assistance training is provided to the Ministry of 

Interior’s Criminal Investigative Division and to the Central Security Organization, and it focuses on building investigative capabilities of the police and the security forces to detect, disrupt, and 

respond to terrorist threats. 

ATA program objectives also include improving cross-ministerial 

coordination, strengthening crisis response, and developing the 

ability to detect dangerous devices upon entry at land, air, and 

maritime borders. However, again, due to the security situation, 

ATA training was suspended in February, and we plan to resume 

it when the situation improves. 

We have also provided training and equipment for improving biometric databases and aviation security, and assistance to build 

capacity of the criminal justice sector. 

In addition to security assistance, we are gearing up some important efforts in the area of countering violent extremism. With the 

Department of Defense, we have a project to assess radicalization 

at the provincial level, to develop tailored approaches to counter 

violent extremism, including viable alternatives for at-risk youth, 

encouraging local credible voices to challenge the AQAP message. 

To develop a better understanding of AQAP messaging and audiences, the State Department’s Counterterrorism Strategic Communications Center is commissioning research and analysis projects 

that will outline AQAP narratives, including how these narratives 

align with or conflict with specific audiences. 

Despite the challenge posed by the political situation, our 

counterterrorism cooperation continues, as we share a common interest with the Yemeni Government of fighting terrorism and 

defeating AQAP. It is important to underscore that our counterterrorism partnership goes beyond one individual. And based on 

our conversations with a broad cross-section of Yemenis, we are 

confident that it will continue once a political resolution is 

achieved. 

I want to thank you very much, again, for inviting me to testify 

before this committee on this very important subject, and I look 

forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Ambassador Benjamin and 

Ambassador Sanderson follows:]

PREPARED JOINT STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR DANIEL BENJAMIN AND

AMBASSADOR JANET A. SANDERSON

Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting us to appear before you today. Representing our colleagues in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and the Office of the Coordinator for 

Counter Terrorism, we appreciate the committee’s abiding interest in and attention 

to our Nation’s priorities and goals in the region. We are pleased to present the comVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:12 Apr 27, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011IS~1\071911~1.TXT BETTY
6

mittee with an overview of the administration’s policy and our relationship with 

Yemen. 

Civil unrest in the Middle East and North Africa has focused attention closely on 

the broad issue of governance across the region, particularly in Yemen. Yemen is 

confronting myriad political, economic, social, security, and governance challenges 

and the current political crisis has exacerbated systemic issues such as unemployment, lack of opportunities for a large youth bulge and rapidly growing population, 

unequal development, political marginalization, widespread corruption, weak state 

institutions, declining government revenues, growing natural resource scarcity, and 

terrorism. Consistent with United States national interests, we have been working 

to help Yemen address these challenges. 

The 2009 Christmas Day bomb attempt and cargo bomb attempts in fall 2010 

made us all acutely aware of the threats posed by ungoverned and poorly governed 

spaces in Yemen and around the world. But this is not a new security concern.

Al-Qaeda has had a presence in Yemen since at least December 1992, when it attempted to bomb a hotel in Aden where American military personnel were staying. 

Today al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has developed not just the desire 

but also the capability to launch strikes against United States territory. More than 

ever, AQAP demonstrates that its terrorist violence is directed both inside and outside Yemen, and the rise of the self-styled AQAP presents a direct threat to the security and well-being of the people of Yemen, the broader Arabian Peninsula, and 

to the United States, its friends, and allies. A key part of our work to ‘‘disrupt, dismantle, and defeat’’ al-Qaeda involves addressing the problem of terrorism in 

Yemen from a comprehensive, long-term perspective, including a commitment by the 

broader international community and a bilateral partnership with the United States 

to build capacity. 

U.S. POLICY IN YEMEN

We recognize that terrorists have taken advantage of a lack of security in various 

regions of Yemen as a result of the political uncertainty and internal conflicts. We 

also know that Yemen faces many resource challenges that negatively impact good 

governance, the delivery of services, and the effectiveness of the security architecture that is needed to effectively combat terrorism. For that reason the United 

States has adopted a two-pronged strategy for Yemen—helping the government confront the immediate security threat represented by al-Qaeda, and mitigating the 

serious political, economic, and governance issues that the country faces over the 

long term—the drivers of instability. 

RECENT POLITICAL UNREST

Peaceful civic engagement in national affairs is key to the democratic process. As 

is true in every country, it is ultimately for the people of Yemen to decide who governs. While most protests in Yemen have been peaceful since they began in January 

of this year, there have been violent clashes between pro- and anti-government demonstrators and between protestors and government security forces and irregular elements using force to break up demonstrations. These have resulted in many injuries 

and deaths. We are particularly concerned by government use of force against demonstrators and incidents in which one group or another appears to have provoked 

clashes. The United States has strongly urged and publicly called for the Yemeni 

Government to investigate and prosecute all acts of violence against protestors. We 

have continuously called for all Yemenis, including the government, to refrain from 

violence and exercise restraint, and we continue to express our support for the right 

of all Yemenis, like people everywhere, to peacefully demonstrate. 

The United States continues its regular engagement with the government, including both President Ali Abdullah Saleh (who is currently recovering in Saudi Arabia 

from injuries following a June 3 attack on his compound) and the Acting President, 

Vice President Abdo Rabbu Mansour al-Hadi. Our Embassy also meets with leaders 

of the opposition parties and civil society activists on the range of issues of interest 

to the United States, including political reform. We support efforts of the Yemeni 

Government, the opposition parties, and civil society to come together through dialogue to peacefully resolve political differences. We strongly support the Gulf 

Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative which would lead to a peaceful and orderly political transition. While there have been many proposals to resolve political differences, only the GCC initiative was put into writing and signed by both the ruling 

General People’s Congress Party and the opposition coalition Joint Meeting Parties. 

Furthermore, the GCC initiative calls for a transition via democratic elections, 

which we believe are critical to long-term stability and government accountability. 

President Saleh has repeatedly said he will sign the agreement, but has also repeatVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:12 Apr 27, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011IS~1\071911~1.TXT BETTY
7

edly refused to sign it. We continue to call on him to sign the initiative as the last 

remaining signatory so that a transition of power can begin immediately. 

COUNTERTERRORISM AND SECURITY EFFORTS

Our political efforts are just one element of our work in Yemen. We are implementing a multifaceted strategy designed to address the terrorist activity that 

threatens Yemen and the United States, as well as the causes underlying Yemen’s 

instability. This strategy marshals U.S. resources to improve Yemen’s macroeconomic stability, increase the sustainable and equitable delivery of services, and 

improve local governance and civic participation over the long term while addressing 

immediate political and security concerns in the short term. We are not alone in 

this effort. Yemen’s neighbors, European countries and multilateral organizations 

have come together to assist Yemen in dealing with its multiple challenges in the 

political, economic, and security areas. 

Our counterterrorism strategy focuses on building the capabilities of Yemen’s security forces to counter AQAP effectively. AQAP has developed not just the desire 

but also the capability to launch strikes against the United States as demonstrated 

by the 2009 Christmas Day bomb attempt and the cargo package bomb attempts 

of October 2010. Our strategic approach to terrorism and the serious political, economic, and governance issues that Yemen faces must be comprehensive and sustained, taking into account a wide range of political, cultural, and socioeconomic 

factors. 

The current protracted political standoff is having an adverse impact on the security situation in Yemen. AQAP has taken advantage of ongoing political unrest to 

expand its operational territory, especially in the south. The Government of Yemen’s 

efforts against terrorist elements have suffered a setback due to the last several 

months of political unrest. The government called back most of its security forces, 

including its counterterrorism units, to Sanaa where most of them remain. As a result, AQAP has made territorial gains in Abyan governorate, specifically attacking 

and remaining in the capital city of Zinjibar. This is of great concern to us and the 

Yemeni Government. 

Despite the challenge posed by the political situation, our counterterrorism cooperation continues as we share a common interest with the Yemeni Government 

in fighting terrorism and defeating AQAP. It is important to underscore: Our 

counterterrorism partnership goes beyond one individual, and based on our conversations with a broad cross-section of Yemenis, we are confident that it will continue once a political resolution is reached. 

To help meet our security interests, in 2010, the United States provided an estimated $172 million in training and assistance to Yemen’s key counterterrorism and 

related law enforcement units:

Through 1206 section funding, DOD has helped build the capacity of 

Yemen’s military forces to conduct counterterrorism operations. Section 

1206 programs provide training and equipment to Yemen Special Operations Forces (YSOF), Yemen Coast Guard (YCG), Border Security Forces, 

and the Yemen Air Force (YAF). However, no FY 2011 1206 funding has 

been programmed for Yemen because of the security situation and political 

unrest. 

The Office of Antiterrorism Assistance (DS/T/ATA) has provided 

Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) to the Yemen Government on an intermittent basis since 1987. ATA training is provided to the Ministry of Interior’s 

(MOI) Criminal Investigative Division (CID) and Central Security Organization (CSO) and focuses on building investigative capabilities of the police 

and security forces to detect, disrupt, and respond to terrorist threats. ATA 

program objectives include building investigative capabilities, improving 

cross-ministerial coordination, strengthening crisis response and developing 

the ability to detect dangerous devices upon entry at land, air, and maritime borders. However, due to the security situation, ATA training was 

suspended in February. We plan to recommence our assistance when the 

situation improves. 

In addition, we have also provided other assistance, including training 

and equipment for improving biometric databases and aviation security, 

and assistance to build the capacity of the criminal justice sector.

In addition to security assistance, we have begun an effort to develop a better understanding of AQAP messaging and audiences, so we can effectively counter its 

narrative and reduce its recruiting. The State Department’s Counterterrorism Strategic Communication Center (CSCC) is commissioning a research and analysis 

8

project that outlines AQAP narratives, including how these narratives align with or 

conflict with specific audiences, as al-Qaeda communicators routinely tailor their 

messaging to local contexts. In addition, we are working with DOD to assess 

radicalization at the provincial level in Yemen, so that we can develop tailored 

approaches to counter terrorism, including viable alternatives for at-risk youth and 

encourage locally credible voices to challenge the AQAP message. 

HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS

To advance our strategy, we’ve engaged consistently and intensively with our 

Yemeni counterparts—from the highest levels of the Yemeni Government to interlocutors from civil society and the private sector. Senior administration civilian and 

military officials—including Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton—have visited Yemen this year. 

In FY 2010, we significantly increased our humanitarian and development assistance to Yemen—providing over $100 million. These funds go toward efforts to 

strengthen civil society, support community-level development, and improve livelihoods to address the long-term drivers of instability. The portfolio utilizes small 

scale, community-based projects and possesses sufficient flexibility to respond to 

rapidly changing economic and political conditions. Following months of unrest in 

Yemen, USAID focused its programming on the immediate needs of affected communities. Yemen’s unrest has paralyzed economic and social development. The impact 

of this unrest on the daily lives of Yemenis, particularly the most vulnerable, has 

been devastating. As my colleague from USAID will discuss in more detail, USAID 

has expanded humanitarian assistance to help those displaced by violence in the 

south of Yemen and also continued to support vulnerable families displaced by earlier conflict in northern Yemen. Quick impact activities, designed to provide cash 

for work opportunities or assist with immediate needs such as water access, are also 

underway. 

Separately, the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) is working with Yemeni civil society to empower Yemenis to shape their own future. MEPI supports elements essential to an inclusive society, such as responsible and representative political parties, effective and robust nongovernmental organizations, independent 

media, full civic participation by women, and a responsive educational system and 

private sector. We are committed to working with the Yemeni people and coordinating with our international partners as we work together on the full scope of 

issues. 

We welcome the involvement of the international financial institutions and multilateral development banks, notably the World Bank and International Monetary 

Fund (IMF) along with key donor countries in addressing Yemen’s economic and development challenges. As part of a broad global partnership, the United States and 

other partners have actively sought to help Yemen address the challenges that it 

faces, enhancing Yemen’s security and improving its governance. The Friends of 

Yemen process provides a forum for the United States to engage international partners, including regional states, as we collectively work with the Government of 

Yemen to help address its challenges. Most World Bank and IMF work is on hold 

given the current situation, but we are committed to supporting international organizations as best we can in the immediate environment and are prepared to move 

forward to do more as soon as the conditions permit. If and when Yemen’s political 

transition occurs, we will focus on helping Yemen secure financial assistance to stabilize its economy in the near term, while concurrently working with the international donor community to support Yemen in initiating a series of reforms that 

would lay the ground work for sustainable growth. 

We also believe there will be an opportunity to continue important international 

engagement to assist the Government of Yemen in growing more transparent and 

responsive to the requirements of its citizens through the Friends of Yemen process 

once the Yemeni Government initiates political transition. A Friends of Yemen 

meeting scheduled for March 22 was postponed indefinitely by the Yemeni Government due to the political crisis and it is unlikely that we will be able to have a 

meeting before political transition takes place. 

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, the goal of U.S. and international efforts is a stable, secure, prosperous, and effectively governed Yemen. This is an ambitious long-term goal that 

demands deep and ongoing coordination with the Yemeni Government, Yemeni civil 

society, and international partners. The United States and the international community will be able to more effectively engage in Yemen across a spectrum of issues 

9

including political, security, economic, social, and governance reform, once the Yemeni Government initiates political transition and identifies its way forward. 

Thank you for inviting us to testify before your committee today. We’d be happy 

to take any questions that you might have.

Senator Casey. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Capozzola. 

STATEMENT OF CHRISTA CAPOZZOLA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, 

AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. CAPOZZOLA. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member, thank 

you for your invitation to testify before you today on Yemen. 

The challenges and constraints to security, stability, and economic development for the Yemeni people are growing. The current 

political crisis and related economic impacts on foreign exchange, 

on imports, and on food and fuel access are increasing the number 

of vulnerable people countrywide. 

At the same time, the increasing political violence has displaced 

an additional 70,000 or so people from their homes since February, 

adding to the already large humanitarian situation in the country. 

USAID’s programs and partners are responding to these fluid 

conditions under difficult circumstance. The strategy and portfolio 

were designed with sufficient flexibility to deal with evolving conditions, but the overarching goal of the strategy remains: to help 

build a solid foundation and the overall resilience and stability to 

enable Yemen to meet its development challenges longer term and 

mitigate the drivers of extremism. 

The agency is doing this by focusing on two priorities: First, community-led activities to improve livelihoods for vulnerable population, and especially youth. These activities include cash for work, 

typically for community infrastructure improvements, like health 

services and safe drinking water access, also includes support for 

small farmers, access to improved inputs and irrigation. 

Linked to this community-based effort is, of course, also USAID’s 

maternal and child health program, including, for example, the 

1,500 midwives we’ve trained just in the past year to improve women’s access to health services around the country, plus also, of 

course, the range of community-based youth engagement and vocational training activities that we’re supporting around the country. 

The second area of emphasis is broadly the democracy and 

governance area, helping to improve governance capacity and 

strengthening the role of civil society in Yemen, so ultimately 

Yemen can achieve more inclusive and effective institutions that 

are able to respond to Yemen’s citizens and mitigate conflict. 

So how are we pivoting to meet these new challenges? First, let 

me say that although the U.S. mission is under order of departure, 

the USAID mission is still staffed at three, down from five. 

USAID’s implementing partners are facing increased security constraints, and the pace of implementation in certain programs has 

slowed. But we continue to operate throughout the country. 

Where we face new and acute security challenges plus humanitarian requirements, such as in the south in and around Zinjibar, 

access is a constraint to monitoring conditions and responding to 

10

needs, but some key partners are operational and delivering 

humanitarian aid to those in need. 

Further, USAID is closely coordinating with international organization partners and other bilateral donors to prepare for worsening 

food and humanitarian conditions by identifying needs and 

prepositioning relief in the areas of greatest concern. 

We’re also coordinating with our international partners to prepare for a potential transition. USAID coled a recent assessment of 

expected electoral process needs in the near future. 

In addition to contingency planning, we are taking action under 

these rapidly evolving conditions. USAID is expanding its geographic scope to include urban areas where recent unrest has paralyzed more basic services and increased the number of vulnerable 

people. We are continuing summer programs for over 14,000 youths 

in five governorates, based on a successful pilot of youth engagement that was done last year. 

The agency is providing, for example, medical supplies and pharmaceuticals to health facilities that are treating the wounded in 

cities that are facing extended violent protests. 

Yemen is facing immense challenges at the same time local and 

global in nature, and it is in support of vital U.S. national interests 

to continue to provide development assistance to Yemen. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Capozzola follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRISTA CAPOZZOLA

Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today on the United States development 

priorities in Yemen. In my testimony today, I will describe how USAID is helping 

the people of Yemen cope with the impact of the current political and economic crisis, and identify and mitigate the long-term drivers of extremism and instability. 

CHALLENGES

Long-term underdevelopment throughout Yemen has resulted in chronic poverty, 

poor nutrition, and substandard living conditions, particularly related to food insecurity and limited water supplies. The recent political upheaval has resulted in a 

dire economic situation and increased humanitarian needs. Access to water is another key challenge, and fuel shortages have worsened the situation because it renders many wells inoperable. The political situation has exacerbated these underlying 

challenges. The near total breakdown of government services outside Sanaa has 

likewise heightened security and access problems for both the U.S. Government and 

our international partners in the most affected areas. Political violence has displaced 60,000–70,000 Yemenis from their homes since February, primarily in the 

south. This is in addition to the internally displaced people (IDPs) and conflictaffected Yeminis connected to the ongoing conflict in the north. 

USAID STRATEGY

Despite security challenges and political turmoil, the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) programs continue to operate throughout the country. Most local field offices and teams are able to operate, managing and monitoring 

programs in some of the most volatile areas of the country. Project implementation 

has slowed due to security challenges and fuel shortages. Access in some area, particularly southern Yemen, remains a persistent constraint to monitoring conditions 

and responding to emerging needs. 

USAID’s portfolio is designed with sufficient flexibility to respond to rapidly 

changing economic and political conditions. The program supports small-scale community-led projects to improve the livelihoods for vulnerable population. These 

include cash for work—particularly focused on Yemeni youth—for infrastructure 

improvements; health services and safe drinking water; provision of agricultural inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:12 Apr 27, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011IS~1\071911~1.TXT BETTY
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puts like seed and fertilizer; veterinary services and training; and microfinance and 

small enterprise support. 

Longer term development objectives are focused on building governance capacity 

at the local level, particularly for service-oriented ministries such as health and education and strengthening civil society organizations to mitigate conflict and 

strengthen avenues for civic participation and more inclusive governance. 

CURRENT SITUATION AND PROGRAMMATIC SHIFTS

In the wake of recent protests, political violence, and the economic downturn, 

USAID is expanding its geographic scope to include populations in urban areas 

where recent unrest has paralyzed the provision of basic services. A USAID assessment team is on the ground this week to evaluate the situation, and recommend 

appropriate additional interventions. 

Expanding political violence in and around the Abyan governorate has resulted 

in over 50,000–60,000 IDPs, primarily in Aden, Lahj, and Abyan governorates. In 

response, USAID is providing clean water and emergency relief commodities. In recent weeks, USAID has provided more than $4.8 million in additional humanitarian 

assistance to Yemen, including $3.6 million to respond to the increasing needs of 

internally displaced persons in Aden and Lahj governorates in southern Yemen. It 

is important to note that USAID continues to support a robust humanitarian program in the north to assist 400,000 IDPs and conflict-affected Yemenis. This multisector humanitarian response is concentrating on water and sanitation programs, 

including rehabilitating water points and addressing high salinity levels of household water. 

Throughout the entire country in FY 2011 to date, the U.S. Government’s humanitarian efforts total nearly $48 million, including almost $12 million from the International Disaster Assistance account, $20.2 million from Food for Peace Title II food 

aid, and $15.3 million for Yemeni IDPs and refugees from the Horn of Africa from 

the State Department’s Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM). Over 

$35 million of the humanitarian assistance we provided is funding the current 

United Nations consolidated appeal for Yemen, for which the U.S. Government is 

the No. 1 donor worldwide. In FY 2010, the U.S. Government provided $45 million 

in humanitarian assistance for Yemen. 

Recognizing that deteriorating economic conditions could trigger severe food insecurity and other humanitarian consequences, USAID and the State Department are 

coordinating closely with its partners and other international donors to identify 

needs and preposition emergency relief supplies in the areas of greatest concern. 

Additionally, since public utilities, schools, hospitals, clinics, and other service 

providers are finding themselves short on government capacity, supplies, fuel and 

staff, USAID is providing assistance to help maintain much-needed social services 

in some of the highest priority, least accessible areas around the country. USAID 

has also been responding to acute emergency requirements at the sites of large-scale 

protests in four cities by providing medical equipment and commodities to health 

facilities that are servicing those wounded in the protest violence. 

U.S. Government programming is able to respond to the evolving needs of the 

Yemeni people and mitigate the effect of the worsening political and economic crisis. 

The agency is implementing seven water projects to expand networks to reach more 

households and markets and rehabilitate wells and public water storage tanks. 

These projects improve access to water and sanitation for 15,900 beneficiaries in five 

northern districts, where 2 months of clashes between Houthi militants and tribesmen have displaced hundreds of families. USAID partners are also rehabilitating 

roads in underserved areas. The roads improve access to services and markets for 

39,000 residents of 80 villages while preventing isolated safe havens that can be exploited by militants. 

Additionally, USAID is equipping and supporting the operations of mobile medical 

teams that visit underserved communities, treating approximately 3,000 cases per 

month, and working with clinics to ensure that they are able to operate cold storage 

units for medications. The 1,500 midwives we have trained in the past year are continuing to provide maternal and child health care to their communities. 

Almost a quarter of our assistance supports democratic reform by encouraging citizen participation in the political process and strengthening government institutions 

to deliver public services. USAID will build on existing investments to respond to 

a possible political transition scenario. For example, USAID provided support to 

Yemen in the last Presidential and parliamentary elections and we are prepared to 

assist with future political processes and elections. 

Total funding implemented by USAID (other than humanitarian assistance) grew 

to $77.6 million in FY 2010, including crisis-response contingency allocations from 

12

Department of Defense section 1207 resources ($10 million) and USAID’s Complex 

Crises Fund ($12.8 million). These resources have been critical for USAID’s capacity 

to operate flexibly and effectively throughout the country. The total amount of funding for FY 2011 from all accounts for Yemen is still under consideration. 

CONCLUSION

USAID is meeting increasing challenges in Yemen and will continue to exercise 

rapid and flexible assistance response to evolving conditions related to a possible 

political transition, economic crisis, and humanitarian needs. I appreciate the 

opportunity to share what we are doing to support the needs and aspirations of the 

Yemeni people for a more stable, unified, and prosperous nation. 

I look forward to your questions.

Senator Casey. Thanks very much. 

Ambassador Sanderson. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JANET SANDERSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador SANDERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of the committee, let me first join with my colleagues to thank 

you for inviting us to appear before you today. We appreciate the 

committee’s abiding interest in and attention to our Nation’s priorities and goals in the region. We are pleased to present the committee with an overview of the administration’s policy and our relationship with Yemen. 

As you rightly note, Mr. Chairman, civil unrest in the Middle 

East and North Africa in the past 6 months has focused attention 

on governance across the region. 

Yemen is, indeed, confronting myriad political, economic, social, 

security, and governance challenges, and the current political crisis 

has exacerbated systemic issues such as unemployment, a rapidly 

growing population, weak state institutions, declining government 

revenues, growing natural resource scarcity, and, of course, violent 

extremism. 

Consistent with U.S. national interests, we have adopted a twopronged strategy for Yemen, helping the government confront the 

immediate security threat represented by al-Qaeda, and mitigating 

serious political, economic, and governance issues that the country 

faces over the long term, the drivers of instability. 

The United States continues its regular engagement with the 

government, including with President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who’s 

currently, as you know, recovering in Saudi Arabia from his injuries following a June 3 attack on his compound; the acting President, Vice President Abdu Rabu Mansour al-Hadi; the opposition; 

civil society activists; and others interested in Yemen’s future. 

We strongly support the Gulf Cooperation Council’s initiative, 

which we believe would lead to a peaceful and orderly political 

transition, the GCC initiative signed by both the ruling General 

People’s Congress Party and the opposition coalition Joint Meeting 

Parties. 

Only President Saleh is blocking the agreement moving forward, 

and we continue to call on him to sign the initiative. 

The situation on the ground remains extremely fluid, but the solution will come and must come from the Yemeni people, with the 

assistance and support of their international partners, namely the 

13

GCC and Saudi Arabia. Conditions in Yemen continue to deteriorate under the pressure of growing protests and increasing divisions throughout the country. 

Widespread inflation, including rising commodity prices, decreasing liquidity, and the threat of a food shortage this summer foreshadow an economic crisis in the coming months. 

While most protests in Yemen have been peaceful over the last 

couple of months, there have been violent clashes between pro- and 

anti-government demonstrators, and between protesters and government security forces and irregular elements using force to break 

up demonstrations. The United States has strongly urged the Yemeni Government to investigate and prosecute all acts of violence 

against protesters. 

Ultimately, Mr. Chairman, the goal of the United States and 

international efforts is a stable, secure, prosperous, and effectively 

governed Yemen. This is an ambitious, long-term goal that demands the deep and ongoing coordination with the Yemeni Government and the international partners. We will be able to more effectively engage in Yemen once the Yemeni Government initiates the 

political transition and identifies its way forward. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting us to testify before your 

committee today, and thank you so much on behalf of Ambassador 

Feierstein and his colleagues at Embassy Sanaa for your very kind 

words. They certainly deserve it. My colleagues and I are very 

happy now to take your questions. 

Thank you.

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—See page 5 for the prepared joint statement of 

Ambassador Sanderson and Ambassador Benjamin.]

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much. And to each of you, thank 

you for staying with your time limits even without being warned 

about time. We’re grateful. 

Let me just provide kind of a setting for my questions, and then 

I’ll start with Ambassador Sanderson. 

When you go through the list of challenges that we face, and of 

course the people of Yemen face directly, whether it’s the basic 

security challenge because of the threat posed by al-Qaeda, not to 

mention other security issues, the poverty issue, health care—you 

go down the list. I’m not sure there’s a place in the world that has 

more. 

And then when you juxtapose that with the unusual circumstances as compared to even other countries in the region, and a 

lot of other places, where there was fervor for change, you had 

some kind of transition process, or at least the elements of a transition. There was a leader of one kind or another or a group of leaders where you could have a transition. Here, we have very little of 

that. 

And of course, we’ve got a President who’s not physically there, 

but also has kind of given, in my judgment, a lot of mixed signals 

to us and to the world. So there’s a lot of—to say there’s volatility 

and uncertainty is an understatement. 

In the context of all that, all of those challenges, plus the unusual dynamic, which I just outlined and probably haven’t done 

justice to, we get the news that there’s a 17-member council, which 

some have described as kind of a shadow government of techVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:12 Apr 27, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011IS~1\071911~1.TXT BETTY
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nocrats, that will ultimately select 501 members of a national 

assembly. And yet according to one published report, I guess it was 

the New York Times, that says that many of the members of the 

council weren’t informed that they were named to the council. 

So you have yet even more uncertainty and a lot of questions 

about whether or not just day-to-day governance can take place, 

which of course exacerbates the security and other problems. 

Can you tell us anything about that in terms of any current information about this recent news about the council? And anything 

you can tell us that’s an update on the President, what his intentions are, what we believe his intentions are? 

Just the kind of basic day-to-day who’s in charge and kind of fundamental governance questions. 

Ambassador SANDERSON. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me 

try, if I can. 

You’ve covered a wide, wide group of topics, and I think they do 

point to the enormous challenges that the Yemenis face not only 

today, but also in the longer term. 

With regard to the President, as I stated in my testimony, he is 

indeed still in Saudi Arabia recovering. We have seen reports from 

people close to him that he’s interested in returning to Sanaa. 

We’re obviously not able to confirm that one way or another. 

But obviously, whatever he does looms large in the political calculations of everyone on the ground in Yemen right now. 

We strongly believe that a transition is necessary, that an orderly, peaceful transition is the only way to begin to lead Yemen 

out of the crisis that it has been in for the last few months. 

We are strongly supportive, as I said, of the GCC initiative. We 

believe that this is one way within the framework of the existing 

Yemeni Constitution that not only leads to elections, but also 

allows the opposition, the public, the protesters, all to have a voice 

in Yemen’s future. So we continue to strongly urge President Saleh 

to sign and implement the agreement. 

In terms of the day-to-day governance of Yemen, the Acting 

President under the terms of the constitution, is Vice President

al-Hadi. He is a southerner who has been rather retiring in the 

past. He appears to be willing to sort of step up to the plate and 

begin to make the hard decisions that a President, even an interim 

or Acting President of Yemen, must do. He has been meeting with 

the opposition; he has been meeting with members of his own 

party; he has been meeting with protesters; and he has been meeting with the military to try and come to some type of agreement 

to continue and indeed enhance the political dialogue that’s going 

to be so important for Yemen. 

And obviously, what the endgame looks like in terms of who will 

lead Yemen into the future, that’s still very much up in the air. We 

do hope, at the end of these consultations, we hope that the President will sign the GCC agreement. We hope that, therefore, that 

would allow a national unity government to come forward and, 

again, move toward elections, as I said, within a period of 60 days. 

We’ve seen these reports that say that some of the protesters 

have established a national council. Frankly, we don’t have a lot 

of information about it yet. There’s no provision for such a council 

within the terms of the constitution. 

15

Our understanding from Ambassador Feierstein and others is 

there were people who were named to the council who were caught 

unawares and did not expect to be so named. It seems to us that 

at this point this council does not have a lot of traction, but the 

political environment in Sanaa remains quite fluid. So I think we’ll 

have to see how it plays out. 

I get back to my original point. We believe that political dialogue 

is essential to unravel this set of knots that the Yemeni political 

process finds itself in. We believe that Saleh’s role in that is going 

to be critical, but we also think that an open political dialogue between the parties, the opposition, the protesters, the youth, and 

certainly civil society, is going to be very important for the future. 

Senator CASEY. I wanted to ask you before I turn to Senator 

Risch, as you could note from my opening, I believe we should be 

sending a very clear message to the people of Yemen that we’re 

focused on their concerns as well. 

And sometimes, as it happens, sometimes just by implication or 

maybe by emphasis, we focus appropriately on counterterrorism, 

but sometimes that can, in some ways, downgrade or deemphasize 

our focus on the people. 

I guess I’d ask, on behalf of the administration, what would you 

say, if you had a room full of citizens of Yemen here, what would 

you say to them in terms of our focus and our message to them, 

beyond the common focus that we have on al-Qaeda and other 

extremists? 

Ambassador SANDERSON. Well, I think, sir, that’s an excellent 

question. And I do want to stress the fact that we see our partnership with Yemen far beyond the prism of counterterrorism cooperation. Obviously, that’s important. But we have broad relations in 

terms of our assistance relationship, our public diplomacy outreach, 

and our support for civil society. 

We are working very closely with the Yemeni people on priorities 

that are important to them. They face, as you noted, enormous economic challenges that frankly are driving the country, I’m afraid, 

into immediate crisis. But we understand that our relationship is 

simply not a security or a military relationship, that it has to be 

broader, fuller, and it must bring to bear all the resources of the 

U.S. Government, so we can support Yemen as they go through 

what is going to be an extraordinarily difficult transition for them. 

Senator CASEY. And I’ll turn to Senator Risch. I might ask you 

a little bit later about the kind of results that our taxpayers can 

see, and by way of measuring. 

Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Well, can you describe for us the situation down 

in the southwest, where the militants seem to be in charge, and

al-Qaeda’s influence in that regard? 

Ambassador SANDERSON. Senator, what we have seen as a result 

of this focus by the government on the security situation, the political unrest in the large cities, is a growing space in which extremists have been able to operate. 

There are reports that Islamic militants, among them included 

some members of al-Qaeda, have gone in and taken control of the 

city of Zinjibar. There are reports that a couple smaller cities in 

that area have also been taken over by militants. We do know that 

16

the 25th Mechanized Division in the Zinjibar garrison is under 

siege and has not been relieved, although the government is trying 

to find a way to do that in the very near future. 

It speaks to our concern about control of the central authority 

over various parts of the country. Even the Vice President himself 

has admitted that the government does not have control in 5 of the 

21 governorates. 

What we are concerned about, obviously, is with this focus on the 

political malaise, with this focus on the political unrest, that the 

very real threat to Yemen, to us, to the people of the region, from 

al-Qaeda and from extremists, is going unaddressed. It’s one of the 

reasons why we continue to urge President Saleh and the various 

players to come to some type of agreement to get the political dialogue started and get a solution under way. 

But, yes, we are quite concerned about the situation in the southwest. 

Senator RISCH. Ambassador Benjamin, do you have anything to 

add to that? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Senator, it is of course a matter of great 

concern that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula sees this opportunity to establish a territorial hold on this area in Zinjibar and 

Jaar. It is something that we are watching with great concern. 

We are worried, obviously, when they have a safer haven in 

which to operate. We are worried that they threaten the city of 

Aden to some extent, and that, of course, if they are able to get 

access to the sea, that presents other concerns. 

And, really, I just want to echo what Ambassador Sanderson 

said. It is vitally important that the transition take place and that 

the security forces in Yemen get back to business, that we be able 

to resume the full range of training activities that we have with 

them so that they can deal with this issue. 

And undergoverned spaces are not new to Yemen. This has been 

a problem for not just years but decades. 

But the situation is quite worrisome. And that is really why it’s 

so important that the political stalemate be broken. 

Senator RISCH. One of the reasons I ask this is you mentioned 

the money that the United States was spending in arming and 

training the security forces. And we have learned the hard way 

that sometimes the people that we are arming and training become 

our adversaries in the future. I don’t need to go into specific examples of that. We all know. 

Is that a concern here? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I don’t think it’s really a paramount concern right now. The militants who are active in the south are not 

people that we have armed or trained before in any way. And we 

don’t expect that there would be many individuals who would defect from the armed forces and join with this group of militants. 

What we are occasionally concerned about is that the weaponry 

and the training that we give particular forces are used for the reason that they were given. And we maintain a very scrupulous enduse monitoring. Obviously, our monitoring is somewhat affected by 

the fact that the situation, the security situation, is not what we 

would like, and, therefore, our ability to investigate is limited. 

17

But I don’t think that we have to worry right now about Yemen 

tilting the other way. 

And I would just want to underscore another part of my statement, which is that we do believe that there is a strong desire on 

the part of Yemenis across most of the political spectrum to cooperate with us and deal with the terrorist threat within Yemen’s borders. And the soundings that the Embassy has taken in the opposition, for example, have been quite clear about that. 

And our counterterrorism cooperation really is not just about one 

person, one particular leadership group. It is very much about 

helping the people of Yemen deal with this pernicious presence 

within the Yemeni state. 

Senator RISCH. Well, I appreciate that. And that was the reason 

I asked the question, is, if you look at that, it certainly seems to 

me, at least, that there is some risk that this blossoms out and envelopes the whole country, where they’re as weak as they are, 

where the government is as weak as it is, and the people really 

ineffective in being able to govern themselves. And your words

are comforting. I hope that’s the situation and continues to be the 

situation. 

Thank you. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Senator Risch. 

Senator Coons. 

Senator COONS. I want to thank Senator Casey for holding this 

critically important hearing on United States policy in Yemen. 

And I am deeply concerned, as are other members of the committee, about Yemen, given the presence of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and recent political upheaval and other sources of 

instability the panel has ably described. 

In our recent hearings as a full committee on Afghanistan, I 

made the case that, in my view, the United States has to maintain 

the resources and flexibility needed to respond to other emerging 

security threats such as those in Iran and Somalia and specifically 

Yemen. And I’m increasingly concerned that our commitment in 

Afghanistan has limited the resources available for addressing such 

threats. 

And I wanted to start by asking Ambassador Sanderson, do you 

believe the United States has dedicated the resources really necessary for addressing emerging security threats and the other 

development-related sources of instability in Yemen? 

And I’d be interested in an overview from all three of the panel 

members about whether you think we’re providing the needed both 

capital and political and developmental resources to deal with the 

challenges in Yemen. 

Ambassador SANDERSON. Well, thank you, Senator. 

I have to say that there’s been a significant increase, as you are 

aware, in our assistance both from the civilian and the military 

side, since 2009, to Yemen. We have, I think, a holistic approach 

to our policy toward Yemen, that, on one hand, we are working 

hard to try and address the issue of terrorism, to address the issue 

of extremism, to provide the training and equipment to the Yemenis so they can deal with this very important issue. 

18

On the other hand, we understand that we have to focus on 

development, governance, social issues, the types of things that do 

create the conditions in which extremism can flourish. 

So I have to say that, from our perspective in the State Department, we have the tools we need, at least at this point, to do the 

necessary in Yemen. 

To be honest, in Yemen we are somewhat hamstrung by the absorptive capacity of the Yemenis themselves. There is not a large 

capacity to take on either large amounts of development assistance. 

On the military side, we very much focused on the C.T. elements 

that are going to be partners with us in the effort against violent 

extremism. 

But we have been, I’d like to say, very creative in the tools that 

we’re bringing to bear on the myriad problems that Yemen faces, 

whether it’s through the typical traditional aid programs that 

Christa can talk about or the Middle East Partnership Initiative, 

where we have a very robust program in Yemen that addresses 

things like political party development and civic education, as well 

as things like child brides. 

I think that we have the tools we need to address issues on the 

ground. I have to, however, flag the fact that when there is this 

transition, this political transition, the needs of the Yemeni people, 

I think, are going to become much greater. And the international 

community, of which the United States is, obviously, a leading 

player, is going to have to step up and help the Yemenis in this 

new political environment move forward. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Ms. CAPOZZOLA. Thank you. 

To reiterate what my colleague has said, our resources were 

stepped up last year, in fiscal year 2010, quite significantly. In 

terms of development and humanitarian assistance, they more 

than doubled compared to fiscal year 2009. 

So we’re really stepping up our game and using, as was said, a 

variety of creative mechanisms to extend our reach throughout the 

country, get into more communities in more areas, do more community-level investments, the kinds of things we can do in this environment, where we may not have the type of partnership we need 

at the central level to tackle some of the fundamental development 

challenges, for example, water. So we’re doing a lot of local-level 

water with these increased resources and, I think, sending a very 

strong message to the Yemeni people about United States support 

for their situation. 

On the other hand, we can’t address the longer term water challenges that Yemen faces right now until attention can be turned to 

that in the center on key policies and engagement with the broader 

international community to bring the kind of investment together 

that will tackle those sorts of challenges. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

And, Ambassador Benjamin, if I might add to the question of 

whether we’ve got sufficient resources to deal with security issues, 

we’ve partnered with the Saudis to some extent. We’ve diverged 

with them, to some extent, in terms of our policy and our approach. 

I’d be interested in hearing your comment on both. 

19

Ambassador BENJAMIN. First, on the resources, let me just elaborate on what’s been said before and say that the primary constraint 

on making progress in Yemen right now is not the numbers. It’s 

the political situation that inhibits our ability to spend effectively. 

And just to give you one indicative set of numbers, our 1206 funding went from $4.3 million in 2006 to $153 million in 2010. 

That’s an extraordinary leap. Yet we are unable to spend 1206 

money this year because of the political insecurity. 

So I think we have the right mix of resources, and I should also 

add that from a counterterrorism perspective, I’m particularly 

pleased at the strong commitment that the administration has to 

invest on the development side and governance side, because that’s 

vitally important for dealing with the fundamental underlying 

causes that drive extremism. 

The real issue will be when we can get back to work there. 

You asked about the relationship with Saudi Arabia. We consult 

with the Saudis every step of the way. They, obviously, are the 

most influential power in the region and Yemen’s neighbor to the 

north. I think that we have, actually, a very clear understanding 

of the requirements there. They share our desire to see resolution 

of the political situation and to get on with helping Yemenis solve 

their security problem and deal with the very, very formidable 

long-term economic development and governance problems that 

they face. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Thank you, Senator. 

Senator CASEY. Thanks, Senator Coons. 

I wanted to start this round with Ms. Capozzola with regard to 

not just the dollar amounts and what it’s being spent for, but what 

results you’re seeing. And I can’t even begin to describe, maybe you 

could, if you had a lot of time, the challenges you face. And USAID 

is always facing difficult environments, but this has to be one of 

the most difficult, where you have not just a tremendous need, but 

with the rise in violence and other complicating factors, it’s harder 

to deliver on what we propose or promise or fund. 

But I was just going through your testimony and just kind of 

highlighting some of the things you’ve mentioned as progress, 

either progress or just initiatives. I’m looking at page 2 of your testimony, where you describe some of the challenges in the number 

of internally displaced persons, 50,000 to 60,000, and the help 

you’re providing there—clean water, emergency relief, humanitarian programs. You highlight health care services, agricultural 

inputs. 

And then on page 3 you actually list, in a more specific way, 

some of the work that’s being done—seven water projects, water 

and sanitation for 15,900 beneficiaries in five northern districts, 

rehabilitation of roads, mobile medical teams, 1,500 midwives, you 

go down the list. 

I’m going to ask you two questions. What’s the best way to articulate results from all of that effort, say, over the last year or two? 

No. 1, what’s the best way to articulate the results? 

And then No. 2, can you provide us with any vignettes or examples or testimony that would make the linkage between poverty 

and economic devastation or desperation, maybe, that you’re seeing 

20

leading directly to extremism or terrorist activity, or at least the 

inspiration for that? Because we say that in a way where we, I 

guess, believe it’s self-evident, that if someone is poor and desperate and hungry, they may turn to extremism. But I wanted to 

ask you, because you may be seeing things on the ground that are 

more evident or are more powerful of an example of how those conditions lead to extremism. 

But, first, the question on kind of results for our dollars and our 

taxpayers. 

Ms. CAPOZZOLA. Thank you for the excellent question, Senator. 

I think that really is a key question. We talk about our objectives 

in terms of mitigating the causes of instability. We have a very 

broad portfolio with a lot of activities around the country. And 

what is it all adding up to in terms of impact? This is the key question. 

At the first level, I think USAID’s activities are fully engaging 

with Yemeni people. And to your earlier question about the message that we’re sending, I think that it’s on the first level very 

important to look at the outputs and the engagement of our work 

in terms of the number of youths that we reach and provide training services and development activities to, the number of women 

who get improved access to health care. 

But those are outputs and, to be honest, in my view, the ultimate 

outcome, which is laying a more solid foundation for Yemen’s development, we aren’t there yet to be able to really evaluate in this 

current environment what that impact is. 

But that really is the ultimate indicator. Will we be in a position 

in the near future for the Yemeni people to move forward on some 

of the fundamental development challenges: jobs, water, services 

and, you know, constructive engagement between government and 

citizenry that will move the country forward and beyond the cycle 

of conflict and instability? 

We have a lot of anecdotal examples of the way projects at the 

community level mitigate conflict. So, for example, in a few different areas in the north, there’s a lot of conflict between tribes 

that is created by access to water for farming. And programs that 

have been just doing simple repairs to irrigation canals that have 

been neglected for many years are having a documented impact on 

these communities and how they are able to prevent and work out 

conflicts over water access. 

So we see a lot of examples like that at the local level. And, 

again, our ultimate goal is to see that add up to a bigger impact 

for the country as a whole. 

Senator CASEY. We can get to the second question in a moment. 

But I want to press you a little bit on the first part, or the first 

question. 

We’re living in an environment here, fiscally and in terms of our 

budget, where I think taxpayers need to see results. Especially 

they don’t expect results in 2 months, but I think over a year, and 

in some cases 2 years, when you can make that comparison to 

say—I mean, some of what you have here are results. 

When you say there are 1,500 midwives who were trained, that’s 

a result. We know you can extrapolate from that the number of 

21

pregnant women that will be helped, or at least get a good estimate. 

When you say improved access to water and sanitation for 15,900 

beneficiaries, that’s a result you can measure. 

But I think in order for this to work, in order for us to sustain 

support for strategies that are going to have these kinds of positive 

outcomes, we’ve got to be able to list, itemize, measure. And I know 

that’s difficult, but I’d urge you to try to continue to provide those 

kinds of lists. 

I know I’m almost out of time for this section. Let me just add 

a little more time to my question period. 

This linkage or the perceived linkage between poverty and desperation and extremism, can you give us any insight into that or 

any evidence? 

Ms. CAPOZZOLA. Well, I think it’s been documented in a number 

of analyses that there’s a very strong link between economic opportunity and attraction to extremism in a number of different settings. I don’t have an assessment at this time of our Yemen youth 

activities to be able to say, ‘‘Here, look at the analysis.’’ I will look 

into it and see if I can find a specific, project-level, community-level 

story for you, because I think it’s a great question. 

And the work that we’re doing with just this summer reaching 

over 14,000 youth around the country is extremely important. The 

work that we’re doing in—there are at least four different new 

vocational training centers that are providing small business and 

entrepreneurial skills to youth. 

We are also in the civil society side of the portfolio engaging to 

support emerging youth leaders. And I think this is very important 

in working closely with the Embassy on those activities. 

As you said, there are a lot of outputs and interim results that 

we can point to about the types of good impacts we’re having on 

people’s lives. And we’ll continue to make that presentation as 

strongly as we can. 

Senator CASEY. I’ll come back to Ambassador Benjamin in a 

moment. 

But, Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Briefly, as we do need to get to the next panel, 

but Ms. Capozzola, something that’s of interest to me and I suspect 

of interest to a lot of other Senators up here is, can you give us 

your assessment of how Americans are held in regard in Yemen? 

And I ask that question because a lot of us are relatively concerned, and I guess offended to a degree, as to how poorly we’re 

held in repute in Pakistan. 

You know, we went in there and spent hundreds of millions of 

dollars rebuilding their bridges after the floods in Swat Valley, and 

we put in billions of dollars there every year. And they have objective measurements that show that the favorability of America is in 

the single digits in Pakistan. 

And, frankly, that’s pretty disgusting when you’re spending that 

kind of money there, and you’re trying to help people, and you get 

no appreciation for it. And I understand there’s no objective standard in Yemen because it’s more difficult—it would probably be impossible, really, to measure on an objective basis. 

22

But maybe from anecdotal testimony or from some subjective 

standpoint, can you give me your description of how we’re held? 

Ms. CAPOZZOLA. Thank you, Senator, for that question. 

In general, USAID’s experience is that the perception of Americans and our aid is positive. And I guess the way that I can help 

illustrate that most poignantly is that we brand our assistance in 

most cases throughout the country. So it’s tagged. It’s clear who it’s 

coming from. 

So this is important in terms of the messaging, again, Senator 

Casey. 

But it also means that we are able to operate—our partners, 

many USAID partners, are able to operate openly as funded by the 

American people. And this is well-received and is done, you know, 

for the most part, safely throughout the country. 

Senator RISCH. What would be just a gut feeling if they did some 

objective standard or did an objective survey? What percent of the 

people of the country do you think would respond that they were 

favorable or at least neutral as far as the United States is 

concerned? 

Ms. CAPOZZOLA. I really can’t speculate. I may also turn to my 

colleague from State to see if there have been any surveys done. 

I am not familiar with data on perceptions. It may have been 

done. 

But is there a recent experience you can point to either? 

Ambassador SANDERSON. Senator, I’ve seen some of the Pew reports and others that have done some surveys in the region, but 

I’m not aware that there’s anything on Yemen specifically. 

I can only share, as does Christa, some anecdotal evidence in 

terms of our Embassy outreach. 

Until the most recent security problems, the Embassy was really 

moving outside of Sanaa to make sure that there was a sense 

among the Yemenis that it was more than just a focus on the capital, which is sometimes one of the things that we are accused of, 

no matter where we are. 

The reception that the Ambassador and Embassy colleagues have 

received throughout the country has been extremely good. 

In terms of specific information, we can look into that and see 

if there have been some more recent polls, but I don’t have anything to share with you. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Senator CASEY. Just a couple of followups. 

Ambassador Benjamin, did you have anything you wanted to add 

on the question of that linkage between poverty or desperation and 

extremism? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I would like to address that. 

I should also say to Senator Risch that we know from pockets of 

polling that the United States is much more popular in Yemen 

than it is in Pakistan. I’m sure there’s more data out there we can 

get you. 

I will tell you that last year, the National Defense University 

hosted a large group of Yemeni officials from the government and 

from civil society. I met with them two or three times. Many other 

officials met with them. The desire to engage with the United 

23

States is very, very powerful. There is a deep desire to work 

together to deal with Yemen’s problems. 

So I think that we have strong partners there who, once they are 

enabled by the political situation, will want to collaborate with us, 

cooperate with us, to address some of Yemen’s pressing challenges. 

Senator Casey, on the issue of poverty and radicalism, I think it’s 

important to underscore that the research indicates that there is 

not a direct link between poverty and radicalization. 

Poverty is often used by those who incite others to become radical in an instrumental fashion to illustrate that their position in 

the world is poor, and it is poor because they’re being oppressed by 

others, and, therefore, they should become more radical. I think 

that our findings that are particularly relevant to Yemen—and, by 

the way, just to step back for a second, if you look across the range 

of key terrorist operatives, ones who have been, you know, wrapped 

up, arrested, disrupted over the years, there are an awful lot of 

people who have never known real poverty, but who, in fact, 

because they enjoyed some comfort in life, had the leisure to develop radical ideas, if you will. 

Nonetheless, it’s very important to go at the fundamental socioeconomic problems as well, because one of the key drivers of 

radicalization is poor governance and the failure of governments to 

provide fundamental social goods, such as services. And this is 

something that comes out in conversation again and again with 

Yemenis, their frustration that they don’t have adequate education 

for their children, that they don’t have water, sanitation, any number of different kinds of those things that we take for granted and 

we consider to be fundamentals of modern life. 

And so that’s why the development aspect of our policy is so 

important, not just to lift people out of poverty, which is an important goal in its own right, but also because their sense that they 

are partaking of the modern economy, the modern world, that 

they’re on an equal footing with others, is vitally important. And 

corruption and poor governance are key drivers—key drivers—of 

radicalization. 

Senator CASEY. I know we’re just about out of time. 

Let me just highlight one part of your testimony and ask you one 

quick question. 

On page 2, Ambassador Benjamin, you say that—and I’m glad 

you have this in your testimony, by the way—‘‘The United States 

has strongly urged and publicly called for the Yemeni Government 

to investigate and prosecute all acts of violence against protesters.’’

You don’t have to comment on that. I’m just commending you for 

putting that in there. It’s important we do that. 

But the point that you make, there’s so many you could make 

about the security situation. We don’t have nearly enough time, but 

you say on page 3, ‘‘Our counterterrorism strategy focuses on building the capabilities of Yemen’s security forces to counter al-Qaeda, 

AQAP, effectively.’’

And I know you’ve addressed this already, to a certain extent, 

but what can you tell us about that? Because, look, when our taxpayers see our efforts and our dollars, they want to—when I asked 

about results earlier on other fronts, they want to be able to say 

24

that we’re getting results here and that the Yemeni security forces 

can do this on their own at some point. 

What kind of progress report or what kind of indication can you 

give us about how we’re doing on that score? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Senator, the view from the administration, particularly from DOD, which is doing, of course, the lion’s 

share of the training, although State Department, through 

antiterrorism training, is doing a good deal as well, is that the 

Yemenis are improving their capacities; that they are making good 

progress toward being able to deal with the threats within their 

border. 

But it is important to recognize that our engagement in Yemen 

was interrupted for many years. Yemen did not have the kind of 

mentoring programs, the kind of training programs, that many of 

our other counterterrorism partners had. It was really when the 

Obama administration came into office that a review was done in 

March, the beginning of March 2009. It was recognized that Yemen 

was a major challenge in the world of counterterrorism. 

And it was not until December, after many conversations with 

the Yemenis, that we really felt that they were on board with the 

project and in fact took their first actions against AQAP. This, as 

you may recall, was just shortly before the attempted December 25 

bombing of the Northwest flight. 

So this is a military and a set of Ministry of Interior that is civilian units that are making good progress, but obviously, have a lot 

to learn. 

So again, vitally important that we get back to the work of training these units, so that they can take on the missions they need 

to. 

Senator CASEY. Well, thank you very much. 

I know we’re out of time, and I’m sure members will have questions for the record that you can answer in that way. 

We wish we had more time, but we’re grateful for the testimony 

and for your work, the public service work, that each of you do, and 

we’ll move to our second panel. 

Thank you very much. 

As we are transitioning, I will indicate that our second panel has 

two individuals testifying. First of all, Dr. Christopher Boucek, the 

Middle East research associate at the Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace; and also, we have Mr. Daniel Green, Soref 

Fellow at the Washington Institute on Near East Policy, who will 

testify. 

We’ll ask each of our witnesses to provide an opening statement. 

As you noticed, the first panel stayed well within their time limits, 

which we try to be roughly within the 5-minute timeframe, as is 

true of the first panel. 

I’m not sure I said this for the record, but their full testimony 

will be made part of the record, as will each of our two panelists 

on this second panel. So your full testimony will be made part of 

the record. 

And if you could provide about a 5-minute summary, then we’ll 

have a period of questions. 

And, Mr. Green, we can start with you. Thank you for being 

here. 

25

STATEMENT OF DANIEL R. GREEN, SOREF FELLOW, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE ON NEAR EAST POLICY, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. GREEN. Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the committee, thank you for allowing me to speak with you 

today about the challenges our country faces in Yemen. 

Since the outbreak of protests earlier this year against the continued rule of Yemen’s President Ali Abdullah Saleh, there’s been 

a significant increase in activity of al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Yemen, 

al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. 

Much of this has to do with the fact that the Yemeni security 

personnel are preoccupied with either regime survival or regime 

change in Sanaa or protecting protesters. Most notably, the U.S.-

trained Republican Guard has been battling members of the 

Hashid tribal confederation in Sanaa and not focusing on 

counterterrorism missions. 

There have also been reports that President Saleh has deliberately removed his security personnel from certain areas of the 

country to precipitate a security crisis in an attempt to prompt the 

United States to support him as the only solutions to the problem 

of al-Qaeda. 

The security situation in Yemen’s countryside where al-Qaeda is 

principally located is deteriorating rapidly. Over the last 4 months, 

AQAP’s low-level activities of killings, targeted assassinations, 

thefts, and kidnappings have expanded and become more sophisticated. On March 27, as you well know, alleged AQAP members 

seized a munitions factory in the town of Jaar in Abyan province. 

This was followed by a May 29 operation where more than 200 

alleged AQAP members overran the town of Zanjibar, the capital 

of Abyan in southern Yemen, which is just east of the major city 

of Aden. 

AQAP’s siege of Zanjibar is ongoing and the Yemeni military is 

attempting to retake the city with the assistance of local tribesmen. 

On June 22, several dozen alleged al-Qaeda prisoners escaped 

from a prison in the port city of Al-Mukalla. These and other incidents have contributed to a general sense of lawlessness in the 

countryside, enhancing AQAP’s ability to mount additional attacks 

against the U.S. homeland and our interests. 

Although conflicts in the capital will affect Yemen’s future course 

as a nation, efforts to control the provinces more directly affect 

United States national security interests. The key battle with 

AQAP is in the countryside and the U.S. Government needs to pay 

more attention to this problem and craft a suitable strategy to 

address it. 

As part of this effort, the Washington Institute for Near East 

Policy is conducting a series of studies on the key provinces within 

which al-Qaeda is located. Much like the organization of AQAP, the 

U.S. approach must be decentralized, locally based, long-term, and 

holistic, blending military and civil approaches. 

Saleh has traditionally been the greatest impediment to an 

expanded U.S. presence in the countryside. With the President convalescing in Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s political factions in a stalemate, now is the time to consider offering Saleh an expanded aid 

package to help the government stabilize the provinces. 

26

We should adopt a forward strategy consisting of four main components. In many respects, these are more about how we are organized in Yemen rather than how many resources we are devoting 

to the problem. 

First, the United States needs a robust foreign internal defense 

program. Washington should consider an expanded training initiative for Yemen’s security services, concentrating on both its 

counterterrorism units and its conventional forces. United States 

trainers should embed with Yemeni units deployed to the provinces. The government forces would then benefit directly from U.S. 

training and equipment as they confront AQAP in the countryside. 

Additionally, Washington’s understanding of provincial dynamics 

would improve considerably. 

Second, the United States needs to establish a foreign internal 

governance strategy to complement a foreign internal defense strategy. With the security initiative underway, the United States 

should evaluate the practical aspects of decentralizing its governance and development programs moving some of them from the 

capital to the countryside in partnership with provincial governors 

or other officials, including possibly tribal leaders. This might be 

facilitated by having a consulate presence in central or eastern 

Yemen, although I realize that’s a significant political gesture. 

The decentralized approach would bolster local governance and 

mitigate some of the underlying grievances that AQAP exploits to 

increase its support. 

Third, the United States needs to leverage the human terrain 

more effectively to defeat al-Qaeda. The United States should consider a dedicated effort to map Yemen’s human terrain and gain a 

better understanding of local communities. 

Additionally, the State Department, the United States Agency for 

International Development, and the United States military should 

extend the tours of select personnel serving in Yemen in order to 

facilitate a deeper understanding of the local situation. Within this 

framework, the United States should develop a Yemen Hands initiative similar to the Afghan Hands initiative, wherein United 

States personnel work in the country for a number of years. These 

approaches would even help the continuity problems that result 

from constant personnel rotations. 

And then, finally, the United States should consider appointing 

a special envoy to supplement the work of our United States 

Ambassador in Yemen and assist him in regional diplomacy efforts 

to promote stability in Yemen and to ensure that the issue of 

AQAP continues to receive the attention it requires. This person 

would provide a needed alternative to an overwhelming 

counterterrorism narrative that has often prompted Yemenis to be 

skeptical of United States intentions. The envoy can also address 

the growing relationship between AQAP and Islamist militants in 

Somalia and work to craft a strategy to confront both. 

Thank you, and I look forward to answer any questions you may 

have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Green follows:]

27

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DANIEL R. GREEN

Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the committee, thank 

you for allowing me to speak with you today about the challenges our country faces 

in Yemen. 

Since the outbreak of protests earlier this year against the continued rule of 

Yemen’s President Ali Abdullah Saleh, there has been a significant increase in activity of al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Yemen, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). 

Much of this has to do with the fact that Yemeni security personnel are preoccupied 

with regime survival or regime change in Sana’a or with protecting protesters. Most 

notably, the U.S.-trained Republican Guard has been battling members of the 

Hashid Tribal Confederation in Sana’a and not focusing on counterterrorism missions. There have also been reports that President Saleh has deliberately removed 

his security personnel from certain areas of the country to precipitate a security crisis in an attempt to prompt the United States to support him as the only solution 

to the problem of al-Qaeda. 

The security situation in Yemen’s countryside, where al-Qaeda is principally 

located, is deteriorating rapidly. Over the last 4 months, AQAP’s low-level activities 

of killings, targeted assassinations, thefts, and kidnappings have expanded and become more sophisticated. On March 27, for example, alleged AQAP members seized 

a munitions factory in the town of Jaar in Abyan province. This was followed by 

a May 29 operation where more than 200 alleged AQAP members overran the town 

of Zinjibar, the capital of Abyan in southern Yemen, which is just east of the major 

city of Aden. AQAP’s siege of Zinjibar is ongoing and the Yemeni military is attempting to retake the city with the assistance of local tribesmen. On June 22, several dozen alleged al-Qaeda prisoners escaped from a prison in the port city of

Al-Mukalla. These and other incidents have contributed to a general sense of lawlessness in the countryside, enhancing AQAP’s ability to mount additional attacks 

against the U.S. homeland and our interests. 

Although conflicts in the capital will affect Yemen’s future course as a nation, 

efforts to control the provinces more directly affect U.S. national security interests. 

The key battle with AQAP is in the countryside, and the U.S. Government needs 

to pay more attention to this problem and craft a suitable strategy to address it. 

To address this issue, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy is conducting 

a series of studies on the key provinces within which al-Qaeda is located. 

Much like the organization of AQAP, the U.S. approach must be decentralized, 

locally based, long-term, and holistic, blending military and civil approaches. Saleh 

has typically been the greatest impediment to an expanded U.S. presence in the 

countryside. With the President convalescing in Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s political 

factions in a stalemate, now is the time to consider offering Sana’a an expanded aid 

package to help the government stabilize the provinces. We should adopt a forward 

strategy, consisting of four main components. In many respects, these are more 

about how we are organized in Yemen rather than how many resources we are devoting to the problem. 

First, the United States needs a robust Foreign Internal Defense program. Washington should propose an expanded training initiative for Yemen’s security services, 

concentrating on both its counterterrorism units and conventional forces. U.S. trainers should embed with Yemeni units deployed to the provinces. Government forces 

would then benefit directly from U.S. training and equipment as they confront 

AQAP in the countryside. Additionally, Washington’s understanding of provincial 

dynamics would improve. 

Second, the United States needs to establish a Foreign Internal Governance strategy. With the security initiative underway, the United States should evaluate the 

practical aspects of decentralizing its governance and development programs, moving some of them from the capital to the countryside in partnership with provincial 

governors or other officials, including possibly tribal leaders. This might be facilitated by having a consulate presence in central or eastern Yemen. The decentralized 

approach would bolster local governance and mitigate some of the underlying grievances that AQAP exploits to increase its support. 

Third, the United States needs to leverage the human terrain more effectively to 

defeat al-Qaeda. The United States should consider a dedicated effort to map Yemen’s human terrain and gain a better understanding of local communities. Additionally, the State Department, the United States Agency for International Development, and the U.S. military should extend the tours of select personnel serving in 

Yemen in order to facilitate a deeper understanding of the local situation. Within 

this framework, the United States should develop a ‘‘Yemen Hands’’ initiative similar to the ‘‘Afghan Hands’’ program, wherein U.S. personnel work in the country for 

28

a number of years. These approaches would even out the continuity problems that 

result from constant personnel rotations. 

Finally, the United States should appoint a Special Envoy to supplement the work 

of our Ambassador in Yemen and assist him in regional diplomacy efforts to promote stability in Yemen and to ensure that the issue of AQAP continues to receive 

the attention it requires. This person would provide a needed alternative to an 

overwhelming counterterrorism narrative that has often prompted Yemenis to be 

skeptical of U.S. intentions. The envoy can also address the growing relationship between AQAP and Islamist militants in Somalia and work to craft a strategy to confront both. 

Although any U.S. strategy for Yemen will be difficult to implement, it will be 

harder if there is a limited understanding of the country outside the major cities. 

It is only through a better understanding of local dynamics and the ability to influence them that U.S. policymakers will be able to make the crucial decisions needed 

to defeat al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. 

Thank you and I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

Senator CASEY. Thanks, Mr. Green. 

Dr. Boucek. 

STATEMENT OF DR. CHRISTOPHER BOUCEK, ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT 

FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. BOUCEK. Thank you very much. 

Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, members of the subcommittee, I’d like to thank the subcommittee again for the opportunity to be here today to discuss what is truly a very critical issue 

for the United States, policy toward Yemen. 

And I’d like to start off by saying that I think it’s important that 

we keep in mind that there’s very much that we do not know about 

what’s going on in Yemen right now. It’s incredibly difficult to get 

accurate information about what’s happening. It’s more and more 

difficult to travel throughout most parts of the country. And it’s a 

very fluid and changing situation, as was noted in the first panel. 

I think it’s also important to note that the initial fears of violence, mass violence, how bad things could really go, have not come 

to pass. There have certainly been some episodes of very severe violence, but it has not devolved into the civil war that I think many 

people were talking about 5, 6 months ago. 

That said, it still can go very wrong very quickly. I think this 

goes to the importance of why we’re here today to speak about 

Yemen. 

Yemen’s problems are very well-known. They were gone over at 

length in the first panel. But I think it bears keeping in mind that 

the failing economy is really at the heart, I would argue, of everything that’s going wrong in the country. 

We have a situation of rampant poverty—really, truly grinding 

poverty—rampant corruption, unemployment that’s officially at 35 

percent, which would put it on par with the Great Depression in 

this country. In actuality, it’s probably much higher than that. A 

whole host of governance deficiencies and abuses, resource depletion, and nearly one of the highest population growth rates anywhere in the world. 

All that said, I think it’s very challenging when we’re talking 

about United States policy, because everyone knows what we want 

to avoid in Yemen—state failure or state collapse—but no one can 

really tell you what that looks like or how that might happen. 

29

So I think for policymakers, it’s especially difficult trying to come 

up with the prescriptive measures to address what you can’t imagine and you can’t think through what the causes may be. 

There are no easy options in Yemen. There are no easy policy 

solutions. If there were, I think we would have come up with them 

by now. 

And I think it’s especially important that we look at Yemen with 

a healthy dose of realism about what we can accomplish and what 

we can’t. Ultimately, at the end of the day, the United States has 

very little leverage with which to influence events in Yemen. However, what we can do is help to alleviate how bad things will be. 

And I think it’s by making progress against the whole spectrum 

of Yemen’s challenges that we can give the Yemeni Government 

more space to breathe and deal with these issues and alleviate the 

humanitarian impact of how bad this will truly be. 

Much of American policy toward Yemen has been focused on 

counterterrorism. And despite, I think, all of the efforts of our Government and what we heard in the first panel, I think the perception in Yemen is still that counterterrorism and al-Qaeda is what 

the United States cares about. 

And while there’s certainly a need for a robust counterterrorism 

program, there are also a number of other things that we can look 

at and we probably should look at. And I would say that corruption 

and access to water are two of the most important issues that we 

can focus on. 

These are issues that affect every Yemeni. There are things that 

we can do to improve the situation, because security and stability 

will come when the situation and conditions in Yemen improve, full 

stop, for everyone in Yemen. 

We need to make sure that our policy is geared toward addressing the public of Yemen, not the government. I think that’s an 

important message that we need to maintain. 

And we need to make sure that we continue to focus our aid and 

assistance programs not only on areas where we’re concerned about 

al-Qaeda or radicalization, because, again, that sends the message 

that this is the only reason why we’re interested in Yemen. 

And I think in my testimony I go through a number of points, 

but I’d just like to spend the few minutes that I have left talking 

about two issues: the economy and Saudi Arabia. And I really 

think that after this political crisis ends, one way or another, the 

economy will dwarf this current problem. 

The problems facing the Yemeni economy are overwhelming. If 

Yemen is not yet a failed economy, it’s probably on its way to being 

one extremely soon. Food prices, fuel prices, cooking gas fuel have 

all skyrocketed, and this is in the country with the most vulnerable 

population in the region, the poorest country in the region. 

On Saudi policy, I think it’s important to stress that there is not 

one Saudi policy toward Yemen; there’s not one Saudi policy on just 

about anything. I think the Saudis are trying to figure all of this 

out right now, just as many others are. But security and stability 

is the key issue that the Saudis are concerned about. 

And with that, I look forward to your questions, and thank you 

again for the opportunity to be here. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Boucek follows:]

30

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. CHRISTOPHER BOUCEK

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here to discuss U.S. policy toward Yemen. 

Yemen presents a complex challenge for U.S. foreign policy. Successive American 

administrations have grappled with implementing an integrated policy toward 

Yemen. There is near unanimity on what the United States and its allies want to 

avoid in Yemen: the collapse of the state and greater operational space for al-Qaeda 

to plan and launch attacks against the United States, and its interests, friends, and 

allies. A key obstacle, however, is that no one can really articulate what a ‘‘failed’’ 

Yemen looks like, much less the triggers that might lead to state failure. It has 

therefore been extremely difficult for policymakers to design a policy when they do 

not know what they want to avoid and do not know how it might happen. 

In large part, U.S. policy toward Yemen has focused almost exclusively on the 

issues of terrorism, counterterrorism, and al-Qaeda. To be sure, terrorism and security are major issues with regards to Yemen; however, the United States should not 

allow these issues to dominate the relationship. Terrorism and al-Qaeda may be the 

current issues of most concern to Washington, but they are not the greatest threats 

to Yemeni stability. 

In order to improve security and stability in Yemen, U.S. policy should be focused 

on addressing the systemic sources of instability in the country. These include a collapsing economy, rampant corruption, widespread unemployment, rapid resource 

depletion, and a series of political and socioeconomic challenges that have manifested as security challenges to the current government. A policy centered on 

counterterrorism to the near exclusion of other issues will ultimately prove counterproductive. While initial gains may be seen, they may be short lived. Improving 

American and allied security will come when conditions in Yemen improve. 

YEMEN’S NUMEROUS CHALLENGES

Yemen is facing an unprecedented confluence of crises, the combination of which 

threatens to overwhelm the beleaguered Yemeni Government. The country’s problems include international terrorism, violent extremism, religious and tribal conflict, 

separatism, and transnational smuggling. Attempts to build effective national governance are frustrated by porous borders, a heavily armed population, and a historical absence of much central government control. More than 3 million barrels of oil 

pass the country’s coast every day, through treacherous waters where Islamist terrorists and Somali pirates have staged several successful maritime attacks, threatening to disrupt international commerce and the flow of vital hydrocarbons. These 

challenges not only endanger Yemen’s stability and regional security, but they also 

threaten American foreign policy and national security interests. 

Interrelated economic, demographic, and domestic security challenges are converging to threaten the stability of Yemen. At the heart of the country’s problems 

is a looming economic collapse. Yemen’s oil reserves are fast running out, with few 

viable options for a sustainable post-oil economy. Yemen is the poorest country in 

the Arab world, with most people surviving on less than $2 per day and, in many 

places, just $1 per day. Its population growth rate, which exceeds 3 percent per 

year, is among the world’s highest. The government has been unable to provide adequate educational or other public services for the rapidly expanding population, 

more than two-thirds of which is under the age of 24, and illiteracy stands at over 

50 percent in general and close to 70 percent for women. The failing economy and 

poorly prepared workforce have pushed unemployment to almost 40 percent. The 

country’s dire economic circumstances will soon limit the government’s ability to 

deliver the funds needed to hold the country together. The population is expected 

to double to 40 million over the next two decades, by which time Yemen will no 

longer be an oil producer, and its water resources will be severely diminished. This 

is currently the greatest source of violence in the country; an estimated 80 percent 

of violence in Yemen is about access to water. A rapidly expanding and increasingly 

poorer population places unbearable pressure on the government’s ability to provide 

basic services. Domestic security is endangered by Islamist terrorism, magnified by 

a resurgent al-Qaeda organization, an armed insurrection in the North, and an active secessionist movement in the South. 

Yemen’s challenges are compounded by corruption, severe governance deficiencies, 

and an absence of central government control in much of the country, as well as 

by the pending transition in political leadership. While President Ali Abdullah Saleh 

announced in February that he would not stand for reelection, he has no obvious 

successor. The post-Saleh government will be severely strained by a combination of 

reduced revenue, diminished state capacity, and three ongoing conflicts. 

31

YEMEN AND THE ARAB SPRING

This year has witnessed historic change sweeping the Middle East and the recent 

wave of unrest has not spared Yemen. Since late. January, popular protests in 

Sana’a, Taiz, Aden, and other cities have been ongoing against the government of 

President Saleh. This recent protest movement has mobilized a segment of the population that had previously presented little challenge to the Yemeni Government. 

In an attempt to short-circuit the protest movement, the government announced a 

series of economic concessions. It sought to maintain the allegiance of the military 

and security forces by announcing pay raises and even access to free food and gas. 

It addressed the concerns of civil servants by putting into immediate effect salary 

increases for the lowest paid employees originally scheduled for October 2011. It cut 

the national income tax by half and reportedly increased some subsidies and introduced new price controls. The government also waved university tuition fees for currently enrolled students and announced a scheme to help new university graduates 

find employment. Finally, it extended social welfare assistance to an additional onehalf million families. 

When economic measures failed to quell the discontent, President Saleh turned 

to political concessions. In a speech to the Parliament and shura council on February 2, he announced that he would not stand for reelection in 2013 and that his 

eldest son and presumed heir, General Ahmed All Abdullah Saleh, commander of 

the Republican Guard, would also not run for President. He ‘‘froze’’ the implementation of a controversial constitutional amendment eliminating term limits on the 

Presidency. Saleh also stated that regional governors would now be directly elected 

rather than indirectly elected by local councils, a little noticed but important 

change. And finally, he called for the formation of a national unity government and 

the relaunching of the stalled national dialogue process, and postponed parliamentary elections scheduled for this April to allow time to properly prepare. 

The protest/opposition movement includes several different groupings. Youth and 

civil society demonstrators launched the initial protests. It has been estimated that 

this group represents only a fraction of the total number of protesters on the streets. 

After the protests proved to not be short-lived, the ‘‘official’’ opposition—the Joint 

Meeting Parties (JMP)subsequently joined the demonstrations. The JMP includes 

the Yemeni Socialist Party, the Islamist Isiah party, and several other smaller parties. Overlaid on top of this are personal rivalries of the country’s power elite, most 

often characterized by enmity and fighting between the Saleh and the al-Ahmar 

families. 

The current political opposition in Yemen is not unified. They are united only inasmuch as they all want to see the Saleh government step down. As for what comes 

after President Saleh, there seems to be considerable disagreement. 

As Yemen’s political crisis drags on, conditions have severely deteriorated. For almost 2 weeks at the end of May, fierce fighting broke out in the capital between 

government forces and those aligned with the al-Ahmar family. On June 3, President Saleh and a number of senior government officials were gravely wounded when 

a bomb exploded in a Presidential mosque during Friday prayers. Saleh survived 

the assassination attempt, and was transported to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment where he remains today. Following the attack, a cease-fire was negotiated by 

Saudi Arabia. The exact nature of President Saleh’s injuries is not publically known, 

although it is likely that he will remain in Riyadh recuperating for the foreseeable 

future. A number of questions surround his possible return. 

AL-QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

Since its creation in January 2009, the Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian 

Peninsula (AQAP) has eclipsed ‘‘core al-Qaeda’’ as a primary terrorist threat to U.S. 

national security. In an address at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 

last December, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 

Counterterrorism John Brennan termed AQAP ‘‘the most operationally active node 

of the al-Qaeda network.’’ In testimony earlier this year, National Counterterrorism 

Center Director Michael Leiter referred to AQAP as the most significant risk to the 

U.S. homeland. 

AQAP has rapidly evolved into an increasingly lethal and agile organization, with 

a proven track record of mounting operations within Yemen, regionally and internationally. AQAP thrives on Yemen’s internal disarray. The government’s inability 

to control territory provides the space al-Qaeda craves, using poverty and legitimate 

grievances against a repressive domestic regime to win support. The organization 

has a very fast learning curve, quickly adjusts and improvises, and is very adept 

at exploiting opportunities. AQAP has been clear in stating its planned objectives, 

and it has repeatedly delivered on its threats. 

32

The attempted bombing of Northwest Flight 253 over Detroit on Christmas Day 

2009 marked the first time since the September 11 attacks that al-Qaeda had successfully engaged a domestic American target. This attack was further noteworthy 

because the plot did not originate in South Asia with the al-Qaeda senior leadership—it came from Yemen. The Christmas Day attack was followed some 10 months 

later when AQAP again targeted U.S. aviation with the attempted delivery of explosives concealed as cargo packages mailed from Yemen. 

Since the start of the protest movement, the Yemeni Government has redeployed 

its counterterrorism assets from going after AQAP and moved them to bolster internal security. Islamist fighters—possibly including some al-Qaeda elements—have 

been increasingly active in the south of the country. It must be noted that there 

is a broad range of Islamist actors in Yemen, and it is frequently very difficult to 

determine with certainty what group or movement is responsible for specific actions 

in much of the country. In recent weeks, the Yemeni Government has sought to take 

more aggressive action, and has killed a number of senior al-Qaeda operatives, including two wanted Saudi nationals (Waleed All Mishafi alMishafi Assiri, No. 83 on 

Saudi Arabia’s 2009 list of 85 most wanted; and Ahmed Abdulaziz Jasser al-Jasser, 

No. 1 on Saudi Arabia’s 2011 list of 47 most wanted). 

As the central government’s authority continues to recede, the operational space 

for AQAP is increasing. While the Saleh government has sought to reassert control 

in some areas, their ability to fully establish control is not known. 

CONCLUSION

Developments in Yemen are of critical importance to the United States, and 

Washington has deep and enduring national interests in promoting stability and security that go beyond terrorism and al-Qaeda. A terrorism-centric U.S. policy may 

generate short-term gain in the struggle against violent extremism, but it also risks 

creating greater problems down the road. 

There is no dispute that American policy toward Yemen must include a robust 

counterterrorism element, but this cannot be at the exclusion of all other issues. The 

United States and its allies can work to improve security in Yemen by focusing on 

issues other than direct action counterterrorism operations. Washington should also 

focus on other indirect measures that can help bolster security and stability in 

Yemen. For instances, aiding the Yemeni Government in drafting effective 

counterterrorism legislation will help empower law enforcement officials to charge 

and prosecute individuals engaged in and supporting terrorism. Judicial training 

programs can help promote fairer practices and improve conviction rates. There is 

research that demonstrates that abuse by police, intelligence, and domestic security 

agencies leads to future recruitment and radicalization. Efforts to professionalize 

these services can help reduce such effects. Improvements in prison conditions will 

not only help to reduce recidivism, but it will also help decrease the number of nowinfamous ‘‘escapes.’’

Serious and sustained effort must also be focused on Yemen’s many other challenges, including those outlined above. Two key issues that should receive more attention are corruption and access to water. These issues affect almost every Yemeni. 

Land reform is another crucial area. Support for programs to consolidate land registries and establish lawful ownership can help diffuse conflict. 

The primary policy challenge with regard to Yemen is how to build the relationship between the Yemeni people and their government. This requires building the 

capacity of the Yemeni Government to be responsive to the needs of its people and 

to expand the capability of the government to deliver basic services throughout the 

country. This will necessitate measures to bolster the government’s legitimacy as 

well as its ability to exercise control throughout the entire national territory. It will 

also likely require empowering local governments to administer their affairs in harmony with priorities mutually developed by Sana’a and the governorates, as well 

as sharing revenues to fund local development. 

There is little disagreement that Yemen is a critical state-at-risk, beset by a 

daunting set of challenges. In spite of this, the United States has yet to craft and 

implement a unified strategic policy for Yemen. Washington must identify what it 

seeks to accomplish in Yemen. These goals will also need to be tempered by reality. 

Moreover, Washington has very little leverage with which to influence events in 

Yemen. We will need to be realistic about what the United States—and the international community—can accomplish in Yemen. Ultimately, many of Yemen’s problems cannot be solved. Resource depletion, economic failure, and explosive population growth represent an almost insurmountable set of challenges, and these 

conditions cannot be completely reversed. Rather than eliminating these factors, 

U.S. policy can help to minimize their impact. If we work to make small improveVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:12 Apr 27, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011IS~1\071911~1.TXT BETTY
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ments across the spectrum of challenges, we can reduce the severity of their impact, 

lessen the humanitarian suffering, and bolster the Yemeni Government. This will 

hopefully improve U.S. security and bolster Yemeni stability.

Senator CASEY. Thanks very much. 

Both panels did a good job on time. You’re setting a good example. 

I wanted to, not by way of a competition or a challenge between 

panel one and panel two, but Doctor, I wanted to ask you first, 

when you outlined the two among many challenges, but you highlight two that you spoke to and it’s in your testimony, both corruption and access to water, when you hear USAID’s testimony, when 

you hear the State Department’s testimony, when you examine and 

consider other evidence on the record, how do you assess U.S. 

efforts on just those two, anticorruption measures and strategies to 

help on the question of water or other kind of basic needs? 

Dr. BOUCEK. Thank you. I think the points that were made about 

efforts to improve irrigation canals, I think those need to be commended. But there’s an awful lot more that we can and should be 

doing, right? 

It’s been estimated that 80 percent of violence in Yemen is about 

people fighting over water, or access to water, the land that controls water. I think it’s very easy, if we’re looking at TV coverage 

or media coverage, to think that it’s all about al-Qaeda and violence, and actually it’s something else. 

So I think we can do more in this area, I’d say helping with rain 

collection, helping with programs to deliver the message about how 

you use water and what it has to do with security and stability. 

I mean, this is a huge area that we can do more about. 

It’s terrible to think that when it rains in the capital, there are 

children that die, because of drowning in a country that’s running 

out of water. So I think we can do more to help Yemenis collect 

water and reintroduce traditional methods of irrigation, et cetera. 

On corruption, I don’t think we can do too much on any of these 

issues, right? I mean, we can always probably do more. 

And I think these are the two issues that not only affect every 

Yemeni, but I think increasingly are going to be the sources of 

future violence and instability. 

Senator CASEY. When you look at the question of those priorities 

that you outline, water and corruption, and you set that aside or 

next to the efforts we’re undertaking now, both dollars and in 

terms of the number of initiatives or number of strategies, are we 

trying to do too many things? Or do you think we should concentrate more on these priorities? Or what’s your sense of the way 

we’ve been both prioritizing and being successful in the results we 

get? 

Dr. BOUCEK. My perception is that American policy is geared at 

counterterrorism and al-Qaeda, No. 1, and everything else is after 

that. And I think we all understand what the reasons for that are. 

But I don’t think that we are doing enough to focus on these 

other issues. I think we have a very immediate, near-term look at 

this problem. And this is going to take years to deal with. 

So I think if you look at the central problem, it seems to me, in 

Yemen is how do you improve the relationship between the government and the people? How do you build capacity in the Yemeni 

34

Government to be a more responsive government, able to deliver 

more services? And how do you build the belief in the people to 

think that their government is not working against them. And that 

is not a fast-solving problem. 

I think anyplace where you have receding state authority this is 

an issue, and it will be an issue going forward, not just in Yemen, 

but throughout large parts of the world. 

Senator CASEY. Mr. Green, I wanted to ask you about—you outlined in your testimony four policy ideas. Number one—I’m 

shorthanding this for purposes of the question—but number one, 

an expanded training initiative; number two, an internal governance strategy, a more robust effort there. You also outline a mapping of Yemen’s human terrain, a kind of new initiative there similar to what we’re undertaking in Afghanistan. And then, fourth, 

the appointment of a special envoy. 

When you make these recommendations, are you saying that 

we’re not currently undertaking any of them? Or do you see some 

of them as an expansion of what we’re doing? Or as I was saying 

before, more of a focused approach? 

Mr. GREEN. Well, sir, I served in Iraq and Afghanistan. I served 

a year with the State Department in Afghanistan, served with the 

Navy in Afghanistan and Iraq. And you see again and again the 

State Department, USAID, having difficulties adjusting to the challenges of irregular warfare and a decentralized enemy. 

And when I started working on Yemen, it’s a very familiar situation to me, although it’s not, obviously, Iraq and Afghanistan. And 

a lot of it’s capital-centric. It is focused on working with local partners that may or may not work in the areas we’re mostly concerned 

with. It’s overly centralized. It’s very focused on process and sort 

of the factions that are in the national capital. 

And if I could tell you what the political—I can’t tell you what 

the political opposition is in Shabwa province, where the al-Awlaki 

tribe is. That’s the political opposition we need to be worried about, 

in addition to certainly that which is going on in Sanaa. But we 

don’t have a good understanding of the human terrain. 

Just now, in Afghanistan, we’re really mapping the human terrain, here 8 or 9 years into the conflict. And, in Iraq, it almost happened by accident that we—for example, they had the Anbar Awakening. Our sensitivity to these nonstate types of identifies is not 

particularly well-developed. 

And I think most of our human terrain is probably focused on 

the counterterrorism mission, sort of find, fix, and finish, but not 

about the human terrain to leverage it, and showing that we have 

a sensitivity to the interests of the people. 

Senator CASEY. And you mentioned in your testimony a number 

of times about the effort you think we should undertake in the 

countryside. 

Mr. GREEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator CASEY. And how do you best describe that? Because I realize that sometimes we make efforts in another country that are 

focused on the capital or a big urban area. But can you describe 

what you mean by that and why it’s of particular concern in 

Yemen? 

Mr. GREEN. Yes, sir. 

35

You know, again, going back to Iraq and Afghanistan, we always 

seem to just have to relearn some of these lessons that so much 

of the situation out in the countryside affects our interests. 

And our ability to influence that is often through national level 

programs or national implementing partners that, for one reason or 

another, don’t go out to areas that are either too dangerous or 

aren’t considered strategic. And I think that’s the same problem we 

have in Yemen. 

And, unfortunately, no one wants to send anyone into harm’s 

way. But at the same time, no one wants to see al-Qaeda have a 

successful attack. Somewhere between those two left and right 

parameters there’s got to be something we can do that can put 

folks into these areas, to show the American face isn’t just counterterrorism strikes but people have an interest in their livelihoods. 

Senator CASEY. Is there a model that you can point to in Iraq or 

Afghanistan, or efforts that are anywhere, where you think we can 

draw a lot of good inspiration from that’s not capital- or Embassycentric, but is more kind of local and countryside in nature? 

Mr. GREEN. Yes, sir. I worked at a provincial reconstruction team 

in Afghanistan for a year. And that is one attempt. There’s also 

district support teams, which are three-man or three-person elements in Afghanistan, for instance. 

But in Yemen, we have something called civil military support 

elements, which are an interesting innovation there. The people 

who principally man, I believe, are the military, but they wear 

civilian clothes. And a lot of what they’re doing is sort of doing that 

humanitarian work and human terrain mapping. 

And it’s a very small program. It’s an unclassified program. But 

I think that’s a way that we might be able to address some of these 

problems. 

My preference, of course, would be State Department AID people. 

But our force protection concerns are so great. Obviously, no one 

wants to lose an American life unnecessarily. But you can’t have 

a policy of having holistic, long-term strategy with an Embassy 

that’s on ordered departure. These are incompatible goals. 

And I understand the need to—I don’t have the responsibility, 

obviously, of governance here, but we have a lot of lessons we 

learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we seem to be chronically forgetting some elements of those. 

Senator CASEY. But you said in Yemen now we have a kind of 

a foundation for that. But you think it needs to be——

Mr. GREEN. Yes, sir. I think it needs to be expanded significantly. And frankly, we have a generation of State and AID folks 

who’ve been in ambushes, who’ve been in firefights, who’ve been 

out in these areas, where it’s pretty dodgy. And frankly, Yemen, in 

some ways, looks, you know, peaceable compared to what some of 

us have gone through. 

Senator CASEY. Thanks very much. 

Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you. 

First of all, both of you, I appreciate your pragmatism on these 

issues. Sometimes we don’t get a lot of pragmatism here. And we’re 

not always good at pragmatism. So I appreciate those. 

36

And I appreciate your views that we really should focus on what 

we can do, not only what we should do, but what we can do, 

because we lose sight of that a lot of times, and we get bogged 

down pretty badly, if we lose sight of what we can do. 

Mr. Boucek, you said it was getting more difficult to travel 

around the country. In what regard? Are you talking about 

mechanically, physically? Or are you talking about from a security 

standpoint? Or what are you talking about? 

Dr. BOUCEK. What we’ve seen is, as the situation has deteriorated in Yemen, it’s become less safe for foreigners, for Americans, 

to travel in lots of parts of the country. And I think especially, 

right now, there’s some sort of a limbo. It’s unsure. 

The President is recuperating in Saudi Arabia. The fighting is in 

some sort of a lull. And I think people are apprehensive and fearful 

that fighting can start again, even in the capital, where most foreigners spend most of their time. 

Senator RISCH. Appreciate that. I’d appreciate hearing both of 

your views on what, from the average—if there is such a thing—

Yemeni, how do they view Americans? 

Mr. GREEN. I think, like anything, if your principal experience 

with a country is kinetic, you tend to have a darker perspective. 

For example, when I was in Afghanistan, whenever I met an infantryman, his interaction with Afghans was usually in firefights, 

so he often had a fairly dim view of Afghans. Whereas, from my 

perspective, most of mine were building schools and building roads 

and things of that nature, so I tended to have a positive perspective. 

I think my sense is the Yemenis are very curious about Americans and not many of them ever met any of them, but the little 

interaction they’ve had is, if it’s been through let’s say a Predator 

strike or something like that, they may have a dim view of that. 

But it just also goes back to whether there were civilian casualties 

involved in that as well. 

I think my sense is that there’s an openness to our presence 

there. But how we’re there is more important than the fact we’re 

there, I think. 

Senator RISCH. Mr. Boucek. 

Dr. BOUCEK. I think I would have a bit more of a pessimistic 

view on this. And not having any data in front of me, I would venture to guess that probably the view of the United States is probably less positive than was alluded to in the previous panel. 

There’s a difference, I think, between perceptions of American 

foreign policy, what U.S. Government has been perceived as doing, 

if it’s counterterrorism operations or support for a government 

that’s unpopular, and how individual Americans are received. And 

I think it’s very difficult to get accurate polling data or public perception data out of that. But I think a wide view, I would venture 

to guess, is that it’s less positive instead of more positive. 

Senator RISCH. Finally, I want to explore one other area that we 

really haven’t talked about much, and that is as we move forward, 

how do the natural resources of the country—gas and oil—play into 

all of this? 

Mr. Boucek, you want to take a run at that? 

37

Dr. BOUCEK. The oil will run out sooner rather than later in 

Yemen. I think there have been a variety of estimates. 

Within 10 years, I think, is the commonly thought idea of when 

the oil is going to run out, commercially viable, extractable oil. 

Natural gas will generate revenues for the next 20 years or so through royalties and revenues, about $20 billion over the course 

of the next 20 years, so $1 billion per year. That will not make up 

for the shortfall. 

The economy is in freefall. And the big concern, I think, is any 

government that comes next. Who knows what it’ll be like, but I’m 

afraid they will look at the balance sheets and they will see that 

there is no money to pay for anything. There’s no money to pay for 

things right now. There’s a huge budget deficit from last year. 

And if they enact all of the current spending, plus the new 

spending that was announced at the beginning of this year around 

the start of the protest movement, that would equal another 3.5 

percent, which they do not have the money to make up. 

So, either way, Yemen is headed for financial catastrophe. 

Senator RISCH. Mr. Green. 

Mr. GREEN. Sir, I agree with most of what Chris said. 

I think we do have to focus also on the state of the economy over 

there. And I think, for example, Under Secretary of Defense 

Brinkley’s office does a lot of great advisory work with private 

industry in Iraq and Afghanistan. I know there’s some effort or it 

has already occurred they are being wrapped into USAID. 

But I think focusing on the private sector is absolutely central. 

Obviously, we do that here first in the United States. But we have 

to do that as well in Yemen, and not look at it simply as a development crisis. 

I mean, there are plenty of people there who are involved in business and want to make money and want to help their communities. 

I think we need to focus on that as well. 

Senator RISCH. Mr. Boucek, you said they were going to run out 

of oil. Is that because they haven’t done the exploration that they 

need? Or is it just a fact that physically that their reserves are 

depleted? 

Dr. BOUCEK. I think it’s the result of several factors. One is the 

big international operating companies do not typically go to Yemen 

to look. There are only, I think, 6 production blocks that are productive in Yemen out of 90 or so. And Yemen is not blessed with 

the hydrocarbon resources that some of its neighbors are. 

More and more, it’s a difficult environment to operate in. And the 

easily extractable oil has already been extracted. 

So at its height, Yemen was producing maybe 450,000 barrels 

per day. That dropped, maybe, to just under 200,000, and recently, 

it was probably under 100,000, compared to 9.5 million barrels per 

day in Saudi Arabia. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CASEY. Thanks, Senator Risch. 

I want to ask Dr. Boucek about some of the other points you 

made in your testimony, or the written version, the conclusions. 

You mentioned in the second paragraph of your section on conclusions some really interesting topics which we can often easily 

38

overlook. And you’re saying, ‘‘Judicial training programs can help 

promote fairer practices and improve conviction rates. There’s 

research that demonstrates that abuse by police, intelligence, and 

domestic security agencies leads to future recruitment and 

radicalization.’’

What can you tell us more about that, but I guess, more particularly, what can you tell us that we could be doing or are doing to 

try to move forward a judicial training program or other help on 

their judiciary? 

Dr. BOUCEK. Thank you. 

I think what I would say is that if our goal is to improve security 

and stability in Yemen, we can work to improve the security of the 

country through indirect means as well as through the direct 

counterterrorism measures that have been discussed earlier. 

I think you can make progress all across the line. You can improve the investigative skills to make sure that the authorities apprehend the right individual. As you noted, in the testimony I 

wrote that abuse and arbitrary detention leads to future recruitment and radicalization, not just in Yemen but throughout the 

region. 

We can improve the abilities of the judges and prosecutors to get 

convictions. We can improve the ability of the Yemeni authorities 

to charge people by helping them draft and implement effective 

counterterrorism legislation to criminalize the behavior that we 

would like to see criminalized. 

We could help improve prisons. This is a huge area that we 

should do more about. Bad stuff comes out of prisons in the region, 

and we want to make sure that people, when they do get convicted, 

stay incarcerated, something that doesn’t always happen in Yemen. 

So I think there are things that we can do all along this process, 

short of arming and doing the kinetic counterterrorism operations. 

I’d also add that I think, in those programs, you can do more 

rule-of-law training. You can do more English-language training. 

You can do more training on the connection between abuses and 

grievances and recruitment, radicalization, criminality, et cetera. 

I think this is an area that we can focus on. And if it’s something 

that the American Government can’t or shouldn’t be doing, we have 

lots of friends and allies that do this very well. And we need to look 

at this in a broader sense, I believe. 

Senator CASEY. And I guess you would argue that that would be 

linked to your focus on anticorruption? I mean, ultimately, that’s 

part of what a good judiciary would result in. 

And you also say, toward the end, you talk about the relationship 

between the Yemeni people and their government. Tell us more 

about that, because it’s a broad statement, and again, something 

we often take for granted. But the confidence in, or legitimacy for 

or about, and the support for, ultimately, a government like the 

people of Yemen have experienced will determine so much. 

And I just want to get your sense of what you mean, what 

undergirds that statement about the relationship between the government and its people? 

Dr. BOUCEK. We and our allies, I think, can do a lot to help improve the capacity of the Yemeni Government to be a more responVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:12 Apr 27, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011IS~1\071911~1.TXT BETTY
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sive government, able to deliver more civil services, able to be in 

greater control of the territory in Yemen. 

But also, I think when everyone is equal before the law, when 

everyone is prosecuted the same, when corruption at the top and 

at the bottom goes through the same process, and when it’s a process-driven situation instead of a personality driven situation, or 

who I know to help me get something—and starting off knowing 

that none of this is going to be easy to do or that it’s going to be 

completely solvable. I think, if we make improvements on that, because I think there is a perception right now that the government 

is not working in the interests of the people. If it’s economics, if it’s 

social, education opportunities, then I think you can do more to improve that relationship by addressing those issues that common 

Yemenis complain about, about government abuses, about the 

unequal application of the law. 

Senator CASEY. And I was going to ask, Mr. Green—I’ll ask both 

of you this question, but I’ll start with Mr. Green. 

There are a number of scenarios that some have sketched as to 

the succession that will take place. And do you have any sense of 

what’s most likely or what’s, maybe, most optimal for the people 

of Yemen, in terms of transition to a new President, a new government, a new era, really, after more than 30 years of rule? What’s 

your sense of that? 

Mr. GREEN. Sir, obviously, a lot of this hinges upon what President Saleh’s going to do, whether he comes back or not. 

But it seems as if the factions in the capital are, sort of, at a 

military stalemate. And I like to think of it as whether it’s going 

to be a revolution, it’s going to be evolution, or deevolution. 

And, I mean, there are many ways it could go, for sure, and 

that’s just in Sanaa. You know, Taiz and Aden are other things 

that are going on. 

I think, certainly, there’s going to have to be some sort of a process, and maybe August 2 might be the date. That will have been 

60 days since President Saleh left for Saudi Arabia, where the constitution says there has to be an election around that date. 

I think that might be a forcing mechanism for some sort of way 

forward. But if there is an election, it has to have the confidence 

of the people, and it has to be perceived as legitimate. And there 

has to be some likely outside participant to help monitor that. You 

know, and all the normal suspects, if you will, the United States, 

even Saudis, are sort of tainted, to one degree or another. Maybe 

unfairly, but they are by some population groups. 

So it might require a U.N. presence or some other presence to 

give people confidence that their vote matters. 

Senator CASEY. What do you think is optimal, though? 

Mr. GREEN. I think, frankly, there might be an evolutionary process. We’re not going to see, I think, a complete setting aside of 

Saleh and all his supporters. I think they’re a part of the political 

geography. They’re not going to go away. Certainly, no one can 

force them to, if only for the fact that they’re armed. 

And there might be some sort of parliamentary system that 

develops or elections where some of these factions feel like they 

have greater representation, and there may have to be some element of power-sharing. But getting people to walk back from shootVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:12 Apr 27, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011IS~1\071911~1.TXT BETTY
40

ing at each other is going to be a process, and making sure they 

have confidence in the electoral process is also another challenge 

to meet that goal. 

Senator CASEY. Doctor, anything on this? 

Dr. BOUCEK. I think we don’t know how things are going to turn 

out. I think, most likely, I would tend toward thinking that there 

will be a system where the elites in the country, the power elites 

inside the regime and outside the regime, come together to address 

some sort of a negotiated settlement, where you don’t see much of 

a change in the system. 

And I think there’s a belief in Yemen and in the region that no 

outside actor really wants to see a wholesale change. And I think, 

should that happen, maybe it’s—I don’t know if this would be evolution or how they would fit in with this. I think, you know, the 

youth or the civil society protesters who started all this, they’re 

going to be the ones to lose out, because they don’t have a constituency behind them. And this is the one group that’s talking about 

the things that our Government talks about, if it’s accountability 

or transparency or freedom or democracy. 

I would like to see elections. I’d like to see a transition. I think 

how the Yemeni Government will deal with that has yet to be seen. 

I think, you know, there’s a lot of things that are still unclear. 

But it seems to me that calling for early elections and then moving toward some sort of a transition is what has to happen to get 

out of this situation. 

The President has already said that he won’t stand again for 

reelection in 2013, that his son will not contest the election. 

I think we need to start this process and move toward it. And 

where the United States and the international community can be 

most helpful is help to prepare for that eventuality, help train 

voter registers, help reform voter rolls, all these things that will 

need to happen, because the GCC and the plans that have been endorsed call for very quick elections. I’m not sure that’s either in the 

best interests of Yemen or security and stability in the region. 

Senator CASEY. Mr. Green, how about al-Qaeda? We hear reports 

all the time about al-Qaeda generally, and obviously a lot of news 

and a lot of focus on the May 1 and 2, with regard to the killing 

of Osama bin Laden, but of course an appropriate shift in focus 

now to a place like Yemen and AQAP. 

And I think most security experts, I guess, would say that’s 

where they’re strongest or at least seem to have the strongest foundation in place. 

But what’s your assessment today with regard to AQAP, its 

strength and viability, and al-Qaeda, more generally, today versus 

where we were 6 months ago? 

Mr. GREEN. You know, whenever you look at insurgencies and 

also for counterterrorism—or, excuse me, terrorist organizations, 

there’s always a lot of sort of low-level activity that’s often mistaken as criminality. You’ll see bank robberies, you’ll see occasional 

killings. 

And a lot of these are the precursors or the beginning of an organization. They’re gathering money to fund future operations. They 

overran, for instance, a munitions factory in Jaar, acquired more 

weaponry. 

41

The fact that they were able to mount—and I don’t understand 

exactly how many people were involved, but at least 200, if not 

more. To overrun Zanzibar in Abyan province is a real measure of 

the level to which they have advanced. It takes a lot of people, at 

minimum, but also leadership and sophistication, the ability to 

communicate, and, frankly, the confidence of the regular foot soldier in his leaders to take and hold land. 

That’s a real measure of the state of that particular organization. 

That’s as true for the Taliban as it is for any Iraqi insurgency 

group. 

So I think they now have an internal sort of, say, safe haven. A 

lot of our focus has been on the violence in Abyan province. But 

I like to think sometimes there are areas that have no violence. 

That doesn’t mean that al-Qaeda doesn’t control it. They control it 

so thoroughly that there is no violence. 

I think if you look at some of the provinces, like Marib and 

Shabwah, Abyan, these places—maybe not in Abyan—but there is 

an absence of violence, which doesn’t mean violence is absent, if 

you will. I think they have everything they really need right now 

to plan, to fund, to recruit. 

You know, the Internet obviously makes it very easy way for 

them to influence, which they’ve done repeatedly. 

Senator CASEY. So you’d say that, whether it’s comparing now to 

6 months ago or even a year ago, you’d say that AQAP’s capacity 

to launch an attack, a strike, on our homeland has been enhanced 

as opposed to degraded? 

Mr. GREEN. Their capacity to do so has been increased. We, of 

course, have responded to the various attacks with more preventive 

measures and in some cases going after them. 

But with an Embassy that’s on lockdown, that’s on reduced manning, we’re not completely blind, but we are very much operating 

in sort of the dusk, if you will, or almost nighttime. 

We don’t have a good understanding of what’s going on, I believe, 

outside of the capital region or the big cities. That makes it very 

difficult to plan. And we have to, I think, incur some risk and put 

some of our personnel out in areas. 

I’m not saying necessarily put 12 Americans in Marib province 

overnight, but there are ways of doing this that can get us a little 

more forward-deployed and inside the country, if only to improve 

our understanding of the dynamics in the countryside, let alone influencing them or shaping them. 

Senator CASEY. Doctor, anything on the security front, with regard to AQAP or al-Qaeda generally? 

Dr. BOUCEK. Well, I would just add to that I think we see the 

undergoverned spaces are getting larger in Yemen, as the state’s 

authority recedes, either by choice or by——

Senator CASEY. You say ungoverned or undergoverned? 

Dr. BOUCEK. Undergoverned, I would say. 

Either as the state’s authority and presence and capacity to do 

this recedes intentionally or as things fall apart in Yemen, I think 

we see in AQAP an organization that is increasingly lethal, increasingly opportunistic, that demonstrates a very quick learning 

curve. 

42

Very clearly, AQAP has the intention and capacity to strike 

locally in Yemen, regionally and internationally. And increasingly, 

it seems they have the capacity to do so. 

Not just in Yemen, but I think the other side of this is the potential for AQAP or those affiliated or aligned with AQAP to reach 

back into communities in this country and in Western Europe 

through English language, non-Arabic language materials, through 

the Internet, to reach individuals that are not otherwise part of the 

counterterrorism landscape. 

And just today, there’s another issue of Inspire magazine that’s 

been released. It’s a clue the organization is continuing to do this, 

despite everything that we see going on in the country. 

Senator CASEY. Well, I think we’re ready to wrap up, but anything that either of our witnesses would want to say for the record 

that would be of interest, or an area that you think we should, here 

in the Senate or the House, especially here in the Senate, areas 

that you think we should focus on the next couple of months? 

Mr. GREEN. Just one thing. I realize we have challenging economic times and fiscal times. And I think we sometimes mistake 

throwing lots of resources at a problem as a possible strategy. I 

really do think how we’re organized matters sometimes a heck of 

a lot more than how much money we’re spending on things. 

Again, my experience is working in isolated forward-operating 

bases in Afghanistan and Iraq, and working with Afghans who had 

never met an American, and I’m not saying that that’s what would 

occur in Yemen, but we have to incur some risk on our side of getting out behind these concrete walls in Sanaa and really living 

amongst the people out in the provinces. 

And we can start with provinces that are relatively safe, safer at 

least—we don’t have to start where al-Qaeda is the strongest—if 

only to learn lessons. But I think too frequently we get focused on 

how much money we’re spending or not spending. And I realize at 

the end of the day, it’s very important, of course. But I think that’s 

the big challenge. 

I don’t know how much can be done from the Senate side, but 

it’s certainly something to think about. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. 

Doctor, anything before we go? 

Dr. BOUCEK. I’d just add to that I think recognizing the economic 

challenges, and I don’t want to underestimate Yemen’s ability to 

absorb money, because I think as much money as we want to spend 

in Yemen, we can find people to spend it. I think as was just mentioned, we don’t need to find high-cost, high-impact solutions for 

some of these challenges. I think there are lower-cost, high-impact 

things we can do that would make a big difference. 

But I think this comes back to a fundamental challenge I see is 

that we do not resource this issue, Yemen, the way we talk about 

it. 

By that I mean we’ve heard all kind of counterterrorism officials 

talk about how AQAP is the biggest threat and that Yemen is the 

biggest challenge, but we do not resource it anywhere near the 

level that we do, say, Pakistan. 

43

And we know what will happen in Yemen if we don’t do anything. And after the next attack or after things fall apart further 

in Yemen, it will get more difficult. 

So as painful and as difficult as these choices are now, there are 

worse, fewer options in the future. 

Senator CASEY. We’re out of time, I know, but thank you very 

much. 

The record will be open for questions that members can submit, 

but we thank you for your testimony and grateful for the time you 

spent with us. 

We’re adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR CHRISTA CAPOZZOLA TO

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. Sanaa could become the first capital city in the world to run out of 

water. Some analysts have said that much of the violence and instability in Yemen 

is related to water shortages.

• How is the United States, in conjunction with the international community, 

addressing this growing need in a sustainable way?

Answer. Yemen is one of the world’s 10-most water-scarce countries. In many of 

Yemen’s mountainous areas, available drinking water is down to less than 1 quart 

per person per day. The nation’s aquifers are being mined at an alarming rate; 

groundwater levels have been falling by 10 to 20 feet annually, threatening agriculture and leaving major cities without adequate safe drinking water. The water 

crisis is the result of mainly five factors: rising domestic consumption, poor water 

management, corruption, absence of resource governance, and wasteful irrigation 

techniques. The water-intensive qat cultivation presents an extra burden on the already limited water resources of Yemen; it also fuels corruption, creating a destructive cycle. 

The violence and instability in Yemen emanates in part from political, grassroots 

sentiments fostered by the Arab Spring. The lack of a political solution has exacerbated a crisis which has destabilized Yemen’s economy on a number of fronts. It has 

also hampered the government’s ability to provide basic services and maintain infrastructure—including water networks. 

Availability of clean drinking water and management of remaining ground water 

resources are two key issues on which the international community has engaged the 

Yemeni Government, academics, agriculturalists, and communities as a way of encouraging open discussion and moving toward solutions. Donors assisted the Republic of Yemen Government in establishing the Water and Environment Ministry and 

developing a National Water Sector Strategy and Investment Program; however, the 

Ministry’s legal oversight is limited and the four government institutions charged 

with implementing the strategy need to be strengthened. USAID and others are 

working with the Yemeni authorities on environmental and water policy reforms 

and on public awareness campaigns to increase public engagement on the issues. 

At the subnational and community level, USAID is implementing activities to 

promote effective water management techniques for household and agricultural purposes, including: improving water harvesting techniques for rainwater; rehabilitating water storage/distribution structures; training farmers on point source irrigation systems; promoting water-efficient crops; and demonstrating low-cost filtration 

systems, readily available in Yemen, to encourage water management and sanitation at the household level. USAID has been involved in the water sector in Yemen 

since the 1970s; at that time, Yemen was more effectively managing its water resources. However, given the existing political underpinnings to the situation, current activities are not guaranteed to solve the problem. 

Additional donor activity includes: (1) The World Bank is focusing on urban and 

rural measures to promote soil conservation, modern irrigation methods, and public 

awareness of water conservation; (2) Germany is assisting municipal water utilities 

to improve cost recovery and fees; (3) Japan is preparing to initiate rural water supply projects at 19 sites in five governorates; and (4) the Dutch-funded urban and 

44

rural water, sanitation, and irrigation infrastructure projects and worked with the 

government to increase institutional capacity and promote water sector reforms.

Question. How can the United States, while continuing to pursue a robust 

counterterrorism strategy and partnership, better demonstrate to the Yemeni people 

that United States-Yemeni cooperation extends beyond counterterrorism?

Answer. The U.S. Government is committed to working closely with the Yemeni 

people, as well as with Yemen’s neighbors and the international community, to 

bring peace and stability to a country that has experienced too much bloodshed and 

hardship over the past several years. 

The United States can continue to demonstrate to the Yemeni people that our cooperation extends beyond counterterrorism by continuing to respond to evolving conditions on the ground with targeted and effective assistance programming. USAID 

engages citizens and their leaders on issues that concern daily life in Yemen, demonstrating to the Yemeni people that United States-Yemeni cooperation extends beyond counterterrorism. Livelihoods programs work with the most vulnerable populations on activities that address basic development needs in health, education, and 

agriculture, including mobile medical clinics, small enterprise support, and provision 

of agricultural inputs like seeds and fertilizer. Programs at both the subnational 

and national levels help civil servants and political leaders develop capability for 

managing community services and responding to citizens’ needs. 

USAID humanitarian programs respond to the Saada conflict in the north and to 

recent population displacements in the south by providing clean water, emergency 

relief commodities, medical equipment and care, and food assistance.

Question. In light of the difficult operating environment in Yemen, and the fact 

that Embassy staff are on ordered departure, please describe any impediments to 

operating and disbursing U.S. assistance funding in the country.

• How is USAID adapting its program to a deteriorating security environment?

Answer. In response to political turmoil and security challenges in Yemen, USAID 

is adapting its program in a number of ways. For example, USAID is increasing the 

number of quick impact projects and expanding geographic targets to meet the 

emerging relief and recovery needs in both urban and rural communities. Since public utilities, schools, hospitals, clinics, and other service providers are suffering from 

lack of supplies, fuel, and staff, USAID is providing assistance to help maintain 

much needed social services in some of the highest priority, least accessible areas 

around the country. 

USAID is also responding to acute emergency requirements at the sites of largescale protests in four cities by providing medical equipment and commodities to 

health facilities that are servicing those wounded in the protest violence. The number of cases served by mobile medical teams has increased due to temporary clinic 

closures; USAID continues to equip and support the operations of these teams despite the rising fuel and equipment costs. 

USAID recognizes that maintaining development and humanitarian assistance 

programs in Yemen is essential to ensuring that the U.S. Government continues to 

show commitment to the Yemeni people. USAID programs continue to operate 

throughout the country; however, project implementation has slowed due to security 

challenges, fuel shortages, power outages, evacuation of USG and implementing 

partner staff, and other issues. While many implementing partner expats are returning, they continue to face challenges such as: (1) Access in some areas remains 

a persistent constraint to monitoring and responding to emerging needs; (2) the absence of government interlocutors and international organizations due to evacuations has impeded progress, particularly in rural areas; and (3) sporadic availability of foreign currency has made payments for goods, services, and staff salaries 

difficult for implementing partners.

Question. A May attack against an oil pipeline in the Marib province severely disrupted Yemen’s oil flow for nearly 2 months, further exacerbating Yemen’s economic 

crisis.

• Are there steps the United States and international community can take to help 

support Yemen’s ability to protect its energy infrastructure?

Answer. USAID/Yemen does not have any energy or security projects in its portfolio. This question has been referred to the Department of State. 

45

RESPONSES OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY JANET SANDERSON TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. Sanaa could become the first capital city in the world to run out of 

water. Some analysts have said that much of the violence and instability in Yemen 

is related to water shortages. How is the United States, in conjunction with the 

international community, addressing this growing need in a sustainable way?

Answer. The violence and instability in Yemen emanates in part from political, 

grassroots sentiments fostered by the Arab Spring. The lack of a political solution 

has exacerbated a crisis which has destabilized Yemen’s economy on a number of 

fronts. It has also hampered the government’s ability to provide basic services and 

maintain infrastructure—including water networks. 

Availability of clean drinking water and management of remaining ground water 

resources are two key issues on which the international community has engaged the 

Yemeni Government, academics, agriculturalists, and communities as a way of encouraging open discussion and moving toward solutions. Donors assisted the Republic of Yemen Government in establishing its Water and Environment Ministry and 

in developing a National Water Sector Strategy and Investment Program; however, 

the Ministry’s legal oversight is limited and the four government institutions 

charged with implementing the strategy need to be strengthened. USAID and others 

are working with the Yemeni authorities on environmental and water policy reforms 

and on public awareness campaigns to increase public engagement on the issues. 

At the subnational and community level, USAID is implementing activities to 

promote effective water management techniques for household and agricultural purposes, including: improving water harvesting techniques for rainwater; rehabilitating water storage/distribution structures; training farmers on point source irrigation systems; promoting water-efficient crops; and demonstrating low-cost filtration 

systems, readily available in Yemen, to encourage water management and sanitation at the household level. 

Additional donor activity includes: (1) The World Bank is focusing on urban and 

rural measures to promote soil conservation, modern irrigation methods, and public 

awareness of water conservation; (2) Germany is assisting municipal water utilities 

to improve cost recovery and fees; (3) Japan is preparing to initiate rural water supply projects at 19 sites in five governorates; and (4) the Dutch funded urban and 

rural water, sanitation, and irrigation infrastructure projects and worked with the 

government to increase institutional capacity and promote water sector reforms.

Question. How can the United States, while continuing to pursue a robust 

counterterrorism strategy and partnership, better demonstrate to the Yemeni people 

that United States-Yemeni cooperation extends beyond counterterrorism?

Answer. In Yemen, we support a two-pronged approach that aims to strengthen 

the Government of Yemen’s ability to promote security and minimize the threat 

from violent extremists, while addressing the drivers of instability including the deteriorating economic situation, deficiencies in government capacity to provide essential services to the Yemeni people, poor governance, and limited transparency. The 

Yemeni people face significant challenges on the security, governance, and economic 

fronts. In tackling these conditions, the United States continues to implement a 

broad approach by addressing longer term political, economic, and social challenges, 

which Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) exploits to create a safe haven. 

The United States provides counterterrorism and security assistance to Yemen, 

but also provides humanitarian and development assistance directly to the Yemeni 

people. We take steps to increase the Government of Yemen’s ability to provide services and be responsible to the needs of its people, and we support efforts by Yemen’s 

vibrant civil society to hold its government accountable. We continue to emphasize 

our two-pronged approach—helping the government confront the immediate security 

concern of al-Qaeda and mitigating the serious political, economic, and governance 

issues that the country faces over the long term—in bilateral and multilateral messaging on Yemen.

Question. In light of the difficult operating environment in Yemen, and the fact 

that Embassy staff are on ordered departure, please describe any impediments to 

operating and disbursing U.S. assistance funding in the country. How is USAID 

adapting its program to a deteriorating security environment?

Answer. In response to political turmoil and security challenges in Yemen, USAID 

is adapting its program in a number of ways. For example, USAID is increasing the 

number of quick impact projects and expanding geographic targets to meet the 

emerging relief and recovery needs in both urban and rural communities. Since public utilities, schools, hospitals, clinics, and other service providers are suffering from 

46

lack of supplies, fuel, and staff, USAID is providing assistance to help maintain 

much-needed social services in some of the highest priority, least accessible areas 

around the country. 

USAID is also responding to acute emergency requirements at the sites of largescale protests in four cities by providing medical equipment and commodities to 

health facilities that are servicing those wounded in the protest violence. The number of cases served by mobile medical teams has increased due to temporary clinic 

closures; USAID continues to equip and support the operations of these teams 

despite the rising fuel and equipment costs. 

USAID recognizes that maintaining development and humanitarian assistance 

programs in Yemen is essential to ensuring that the U.S. Government continues to 

show commitment to the Yemeni people. USAID programs continue to operate 

throughout the country; however, project implementation has slowed due to security 

challenges, fuel shortages, power outages, evacuation of USG and implementing 

partner staff. While many implementing partner expatriates are returning, they 

continue to face challenges such as: (1) Access in some areas remains a persistent 

constraint to monitoring and responding to emerging needs; (2) the absence of government interlocutors and international organizations due to evacuations has impeded progress, particularly in rural areas; and (3) Sporadic availability of foreign 

currency has made payments for goods, services, and staff salaries difficult for implementing partners.

Question. A May attack against an oil pipeline in the Marib province severely disrupted Yemen’s oil flow for nearly 2 months, further exacerbating Yemen’s economic 

crisis. Are there steps the United States and international community can take to 

help support Yemen’s ability to protect its energy infrastructure?

Answer. In Yemen, oil pipelines run above ground through rural, open areas often 

governed by tribal leaders. While the United States and others in the international 

community can advise the Yemeni Government on energy infrastructure protection, 

it is up to the Yemeni Government to ensure successful relations with the tribal 

leaders of the areas through which oil pipelines run. The United States and the 

international community will continue to advise the Yemeni Government of steps 

to improve critical infrastructure protection. 

RESPONSES OF COORDINATOR FOR COUNTER TERRORISM AMBASSADOR DANIEL

BENJAMIN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. How can the United States, while continuing to pursue a robust 

counterterrorism strategy and partnership, better demonstrate to the Yemeni people 

that United States-Yemeni cooperation extends beyond counterterrorism?

Answer. In Yemen, we support a two-pronged approach that aims to strengthen 

the Government of Yemen’s ability to promote security and minimize the threat 

from violent extremists, while addressing the drivers of instability. Those drivers include the deteriorating economic situation, deficiencies in government capacity to 

provide essential services to the Yemeni people, poor governance, and limited transparency. The Yemeni Government and people face significant challenges on the security, governance, and economic fronts. In tackling these conditions, the United 

States continues to implement policies and programs to address longer term political, economic, and social challenges, which Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

(AQAP) exploits to create a safe haven. 

The United States provides counterterrorism and security assistance to Yemen, 

but also provides humanitarian and development assistance directly to the Yemeni 

people. We take steps to increase the Government of Yemen’s ability to provide services and to be responsible to the needs of its people, and we support efforts by Yemen’s vibrant civil society to hold its government accountable. We continue to emphasize our two-pronged approach—helping the government confront the immediate 

security concern of al-Qaeda and mitigating the serious political, economic, and 

governance issues that the country faces over the long term—in bilateral and multilateral messaging on Yemen.

Question. A May attack against an oil pipeline in the Marib province severely disrupted Yemen’s oil flow for nearly 2 months, further exacerbating Yemen’s economic 

crisis. Are there steps the United States and international community can take to 

help support Yemen’s ability to protect its energy infrastructure?

Answer. In Yemen, oil pipelines run above ground through rural, open areas often 

governed by tribal leaders. While the United States and others in the international 

community can advise the Yemeni Government on energy infrastructure protection, 

47

the Yemeni Government must work to ensure successful relations with the tribal 

leaders of the areas through which oil pipelines run. The United States and the 

international community will continue to advise the Yemeni Government of possible 

steps to improve critical infrastructure protection.

Question. You noted in your testimony that ‘‘no FY 2011 1206 funding has been 

programmed for Yemen because of the security situation and political unrest.’’ How 

has this delay in 1206 programming affected Yemen’s ability, and the ability of the 

Special Operations Forces in particular, to combat Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula? How does it affect the bilateral security relationship?

Answer. The delay in delivery and programming of 1206-funded equipment for 

Yemen has not so far affected the Yemeni Government’s ability to respond to terrorist threats. Recommendations for FY 2011 1206 programs required long leadtimes and the equipment would not have been delivered for over 12 months. We continue regular communication and cooperation with our counterparts in the Yemeni 

Government regarding their counterterrorism operations, and continue to build the 

relationship.

Question. What is the relationship between the Ansar al-Shariah group, which 

has reportedly seized territory in Abyan province, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian 

Peninsula?

Answer. Ansar al-Shariah is the name that Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

(AQAP) is using in Yemen’s Abyan Governorate. AQAP uses the name Ansar alShariah most likely in attempt to better relate to the local population and divert 

attention from its al-Qaeda connection. 

RESPONSES OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY JANET SANDERSON TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

Question. Stepping back from the immediate security challenges and threats, 

what are the strategic objectives of the United States in Yemen? And given the deteriorating security situation and its impact on U.S. ability to conduct development 

outreach and CT training programs. What tools are at U.S. disposal to pursue these 

strategic objectives?

Answer. In Yemen, we are working to strengthen the Government of Yemen’s 

ability to promote security and minimize the threat from violent extremists, while 

addressing the drivers of instability including the deteriorating economic situation, 

deficiencies in government capacity to provide essential services to the Yemeni 

people, poor governance, and limited transparency. The Yemeni people face significant challenges on the security, governance, and economic fronts. In tackling these 

conditions, the United States continues to provide a range of assistance in the context of quiet diplomacy and international partnership to address these long-term 

objectives.

Question. What could the United States be doing to better prepare for a prolonged 

period of unrest in Yemen?

Answer. We continue to advocate for peaceful dialogue as the best solution to the 

political crisis in Yemen. Genuine participation by all sides, including youth and 

civil society, in an open and transparent process that addresses the legitimate concerns of the Yemeni people, including their political and economic aspirations, will 

assure the success of political transition. We will continue to work with our international partners to secure an agreement that is acceptable to both the government 

and the opposition. 

In conjunction with any political solution, there must also be wide-ranging international engagement to help the Yemeni government solve its looming economic crisis in order to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and ensure long-term economic 

and social stability. The United States has focused on promoting transparency and 

political, economic, and governance reform as well as our counterterrorism relationship. We have consistently engaged with both President Saleh and members of the 

formal and informal opposition and will continue to do so in an effort to promote 

dialogue and a peaceful resolution of conflict. 

RESPONSES OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR CHRISTA CAPOZZOLA TO

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR. 

Question. During his July 10 visit to Saudi Arabia, White House Counterterrorism 

Advisor John Brennan urged President Saleh to ‘‘fulfill expeditiously’’ his pledge to 

48

sign the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) agreement as the best way to ensure continued U.S. assistance.

• Should the U.S. condition future aid to Yemen based on democratic reform?

Answer. Underdevelopment in Yemen has resulted in widespread poverty, chronic 

food insecurity, inadequate health care, and limited water supplies. Since early February 2011, clashes between Republic of Yemen Government military forces, 

antigovernment demonstrators, progovernment demonstrators, rival tribes, and militant and terrorist groups have exacerbated these conditions. Political unrest has 

heightened concerns regarding security, access, and the government’s ability to provide basic services. 

U.S. Government is committed to working closely with the Yemeni people as well 

as with Yemen’s neighbors and the international community to bring peace and stability to a country that has unfortunately experienced too much bloodshed and hardship over the past several years. The political transition is critical to resolving the 

many challenges to Yemen’s security, including the humanitarian crisis, economic 

difficulties, and the threat from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. 

USAID/Yemen strategy is an integral part of the larger, National Security Council-coordinated interagency strategy for Yemen. Programming addresses the drivers 

of instability and responds to the articulated needs and frustrations of vulnerable 

communities. These communities are in the governorates most susceptible to extremist ideologies and prone to violent means of resolving grievances. Making aid, 

particularly humanitarian assistance, contingent on democratic reform could further 

frustrate these vulnerable, already marginalized populations. Prior to the political 

crisis we were working through the international Friends of Yemen forum and bilaterally to help the Yemenis identify economic, governance, and rule of law reforms 

that could be implemented to help Yemen address its many challenges. We will resume those efforts once the political environment permits but should not restrict aid 

to progress in democratic reform when we are simultaneously working on reforms 

in so many other areas. 

Despite security challenges and political turmoil, USAID continues to provide assistance and respond to evolving conditions in Yemen. USAID has already committed over $40 million in FY11 to respond to the increasing humanitarian needs 

and is increasing the number of rapid response projects to meet emerging relief and 

recovery needs in both urban and rural communities.

Question. Outside of conditioning assistance, what steps will a transitional government need to take to satisfy the American tax payer’s concerns that foreign 

assistance is spent wisely?

Answer. Yemen faces very serious political, economic, and security challenges. The 

United States has been working closely with Yemeni officials and opposition elements, GCC partners, and other international actors to bring an end to the political 

turmoil and violence in Yemen. The United States supports the Yemeni people’s 

aspirations for meaningful political reform, but it is up to the Yemeni people to decide what form political reform takes. 

As part of its procurement reform process through USAID Forward, our programming is designed to enhance partnership with the host country and achieve more 

effective results by increasing host country accountability for program outcomes. 

USAID will continue to counter corruption and to thoroughly vet all grant proposals and grant recipients to ensure that foreign assistance is spent wisely.

• To prevent corruption, USAID does not provide cash assistance in Yemen, and 

does not provide direct monetary support to the Republic of Yemen Government. 

The majority of our support is to communities, and is provided in the form of 

in-kind assistance. Community engagement is an essential element in countering corruption, as communities who have bought in to the activities and see 

the benefits of them are less likely to allow those activities to fall victim to corrupt practices and fail. 

• USAID has standard provisions in all its contracting instruments regarding vetting. We have reviewed those provisions with all our implementing partners in 

Yemen, and partners have processes in place to vet recipients of grants through 

all our programs.

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