16-4114 

Kalavaci v. Sessions 

BIA 

 Poczter, IJ 

A206 434 776 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 23rd 4 day of May, two thousand eighteen. 

5 

6 PRESENT: 

7 RALPH K. WINTER, 

8 GUIDO CALABRESI,

9 DENNY CHIN,

10 Circuit Judges. 

11 _____________________________________ 

12 

13 XHULJAN KALAVACI, 

14 

15 Petitioner, 

16 

17 v. 16-4114 

18 NAC 

19 

20 JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, 

21 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

22 

23 Respondent. 

24 _____________________________________ 

25 

26 FOR PETITIONER: Adrian Spirollari, Brooklyn, NY. 

27 

28 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 
2 

1 Attorney General; Keith I. 

2 McManus, Assistant Director; 

3 Scott M. Marconda, Trial 

4 Attorney, Office of Immigration 

5 Litigation, United States 

6 Department of Justice, 

7 Washington, DC. 

8 

9 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

10 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

11 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

12 is DENIED. 

13 Petitioner Xhuljan Kalavaci, a native and citizen of 

14 Albania, seeks review of a November 10, 2016, decision of the 

15 BIA affirming a June 1, 2016, decision of an Immigration Judge 

16 (“IJ”) denying Kalavaci’s application for asylum, withholding 

17 of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 

18 (“CAT”). In re Xhuljan Kalavaci, No. A206 434 776 (B.I.A. 

19 Nov. 10, 2016), aff’g No. A206 434 776 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City 

20 June 1, 2016). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

21 underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 

22 Under the circumstances of this case, we review both the 

23 IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions “for the sake of completeness.” 

24 Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d 

25 Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review are well 

26 established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v. 
3 

1 Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008)(per curiam). 

2 The governing REAL ID Act credibility standard provides 

3 that the agency must “[c]onsider[] the totality of the 

4 circumstances,” and may base a credibility finding on an 

5 applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” the 

6 plausibility of his account, and inconsistencies or omissions 

7 in his or his witness’s statements, “without regard to 

8 whether” they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 

9 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 

10 163-64, 166-67. “A petitioner must do more than offer a 

11 plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to 

12 secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact13 finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” Majidi 

14 v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal 

15 quotation marks omitted). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s 

16 credibility determination unless . . . it is plain that no 

17 reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility 

18 ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. For the reasons that 

19 follow, we conclude that the agency did not err in finding 

20 Kalavaci not credible. 

21 First, the agency reasonably relied on the inconsistency 

22 between Kalavaci’s testimony that his family members did not 
4 

1 work for a political candidate and the candidate’s letter 

2 that members of Kalavaci’s family were on his staff. See id. 

3 at 166-67. The BIA was not required to credit Kalavaci’s 

4 explanation that being on staff and working for a candidate 

5 are not the same thing. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80. Nor do 

6 Kalavaci’s current explanations compel a contrary conclusion. 

7 His explanations that the candidate may have meant extended 

8 family members or family members who worked for the candidate 

9 when Kalavaci was a child are speculative and do not resolve 

10 the inconsistency. Id. 

11 Second, the agency reasonably relied on Kalavaci’s 

12 inconsistent testimony about whether his father was both an 

13 organizer during elections and a member of the voting 

14 commission, as well as his father’s omission of the alleged 

15 membership on the commission and threats that Kalavaci 

16 received. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166-67. The agency 

17 was not required to accept Kalavaci’s explanation that an 

18 organizer and a member are the same. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 

19 80. Nor would the agency have been compelled to accept 

20 Kalavaci’s new, and unexhausted, explanations for his 

21 father’s omissions. He argues that his father’s general 

22 mention of a threat from an activist was sufficient to 
5 

1 corroborate multiple threatening calls and that his father 

2 may have served on the voting commission when Kalavaci was a 

3 child. The first explanation, although plausible, is not 

4 compelling, and the second is again speculative. Id.; see 

5 Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167-68 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Where 

6 there are two permissible views of the evidence, the 

7 factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly 

8 erroneous. . . . [R]ecord support for a contrary inference—

9 even one more plausible or more natural—does not suggest 

10 error.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

11 Finally, the adverse credibility determination is 

12 further bolstered by the IJ’s observations of Kalavaci’s 

13 demeanor and his lack of reliable corroboration. “[D]emeanor 

14 is paradigmatically the sort of evidence that a fact-finder 

15 is best positioned to evaluate,” Li Zu Guan v. INS, 453 F.3d 

16 129, 140 (2d Cir. 2006), and “[w]e give particular deference 

17 to credibility determinations that are based on the 

18 adjudicator’s observation of the applicant’s demeanor,” Jin 

19 Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 

20 2005); see also Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 

21 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006) (observing that the weight 

22 accorded to an applicant’s “evidence lie[s] largely within 
6 

1 the discretion of the IJ.” (internal quotation marks 

2 omitted)); Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 

3 2007) (per curiam)(“An applicant’s failure to corroborate his 

4 or her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence 

5 of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to 

6 rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into 

7 question.”). 

8 Given the foregoing findings, the adverse credibility 

9 determination is supported by the “totality of the 

10 circumstances.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. The adverse 

11 credibility determination is therefore dispositive of asylum, 

12 withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three 

13 claims are based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. 

14 Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006). 

15 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

16 DENIED. 

17 FOR THE COURT: 

18 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 

19 Clerk of Court