1The Honorable Donald D. Alsop, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota. 

2Carlson argues Barzen’s action should be dismissed because she named only

the parent company for which she never worked instead of her actual employer,

Carlson Travel Group. As the district court declined to address this issue, we also

will not do so. See Daisy Mfg. Co. v. NCR Corp., 29 F.3d 389, 395 (8th Cir. 1994).

Therefore, throughout this opinion, we will use “Carlson” to refer interchangeably to

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 98-1985

___________

Molly Barzen, *

 *

Appellant, *

 * Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

 * District of Minnesota. 

Carlson Companies, Inc. *

 * [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellee. *

___________

 Submitted: March 1, 1999

 Filed: March 5, 1999

___________

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, WOLLMAN, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Molly Barzen appeals from the district court’s1

 grant of summary judgment to

her former employer, Carlson Companies, Inc. (Carlson),2 in this employment
the parent company or any of its subsidiaries for which Barzen worked.

-2-

discrimination action under the American with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.

§§ 12101-12213. Upon de novo review, see Kneibert v. Thomson Newspapers,

Mich., Inc., 129 F.3d 444, 451 (8th Cir. 1997), we affirm.

Barzen, then Carlson’s Director of Network Services, was involved in an

automobile accident on a business trip in January 1992. She was treated and released,

but soon began to feel disoriented. When she returned to work, she experienced panic

attacks and could not complete projects. Later that year, a neurologist diagnosed her

as having a closed-head injury, and she was placed on a paid medical leave of

absence from the end of July until September during which time she obtained

treatment and improved. She also received workers’ compensation benefits from

March until September for a 10% permanent partial disability. Barzen returned to

work in September, and in February 1994, her supervisor wrote in a performance

evaluation that Barzen was no longer experiencing problems as a result of her injury.

In the latter half of 1994, as a result of reorganization within Carlson, Barzen began

to report to a different supervisor, Matt Manley, who thought Barzen was

underperforming; the reorganization also resulted in an increase in Barzen’s work

load and work pressures. Around this time, Barzen began re-experiencing panic

attacks, and suffering from depression and loss of sleep. 

In February 1995, Barzen’s psychologist wrote Manley to inform him that

Barzen would be commencing a medical leave of absence due in part to the January

1992 accident. Barzen’s psychologist certified that Barzen could return to work so

long as she no longer reported to Manley, was given enough time to complete

projects, and was not subjected to undue pressure. In September 1995, Barzen filed

a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) asserting sex

and disability discrimination. In connection with another workers’ compensation

proceeding, two doctors testified that Barzen’s injury impaired her ability to function
-3-

on her job. While she was on leave, Carlson sent Barzen job postings to assist her in

finding another position within Carlson. Barzen, however, was unsuccessful in doing

so and continued on leave until she was terminated in April 1996.

To succeed on her ADA claim, Barzen had to show that she had a disability

within the meaning of the ADA, see Hennnenfent v. Mid Dakota Clinic, P.C., 164

F.3d 419, 421-22 (8th Cir. 1998), i.e., that a physical or mental impairment

“substantially limit[ed]” at least one of her “major life activities,” that she was

regarded as having such an impairment, or that she had a record of such an

impairment, see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C). 

The district court concluded that Barzen failed to demonstrate she was

substantially limited in her ability to perform any major life activity. We agree,

because Barzen failed to show her injury prevented her from performing a broad class

of jobs as compared to the average person possessing comparable training, skills, and

abilities. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1998) (defining “major life activities”); Snow

v. Ridgeview Med. Ctr., 128 F.3d 1201, 1206 (8th Cir. 1997) (defining “substantially

limits”; inability to perform single particular job does not constitute substantial

limitation in major life activity of working); Weiler v. Household Finance Corp., 101

F.3d 519, 524-25 (7th Cir. 1996) (inability to work under certain supervisor does not

substantially limit major life activity); cf. Rogers v. International Marine Terminals,

Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 759 (5th Cir. 1996) (existence of 13% permanent partial disability

did not demonstrate plaintiff was substantially impaired from performing major life

activity). 

Barzen also argued at her summary judgment hearing, and reasserts on appeal,

that she is disabled because Carlson regarded her as having an impairment that

substantially limited her ability to work. In particular, Barzen points to Carlson’s

grant of medical leave, and its statements in a letter she received while on leave that

she appeared incapable of performing her position. Upon review of the record,
3We note Barzen has not argued that she has a record of impairment.

-4-

however, we cannot say that Barzen has made a showing sufficient to survive

summary judgment that Carlson regarded her as being “disabled.” See Miller v. City

of Springfield, 146 F.3d 612, 615 (8th Cir. 1998) (employer must regard employee’s

overall employment opportunities as being limited, and not simply as being unable

to perform job of choice); cf. Cody v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., 139 F.3d 595, 598-99

(8th Cir. 1998) (offer of paid medical leave to employee did not demonstrate

employer regarded employee as disabled).3

We conclude the district court properly granted Carlson summary judgment on

Barzen’s ADA retaliation claim, as she produced no evidence linking either Carlson’s

decision to discharge her, or its refusal to hire her in other position, to her EEOC

charge. See Feltmann v. Sieben, 108 F.3d 970, 977 (8th Cir. 1997) (termination six

months after incident insufficient to support causal connection in retaliation claim);

cf. Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir. 1996) (speculative and conclusory

allegations cannot support retaliation claim). Finally, Barzen argues that Carlson

breached a “contract” under which Carlson promised to send her job postings for a

period of time; like the district court, we conclude no contract was formed because

consideration is lacking. See Chalmers v. Kanawyer, 544 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Minn.

Ct. App. 1995).

Accordingly, we affirm.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.