Court of Appeals, State of Michigan 

People of MI v Kevin Raynard Jackson 

Docket No. 322350 

LC No. 13-020353-FH 

ORDER 

Mark T. Boonstra 

Presiding Judge 

Henry William Saad 

Joel P. Hoekstra 

Judges 

The Court orders that the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED, and this Court's 

opinion issued October 13, 2015 is hereby VACA TED. A new opinion is attached to this order. 

A true copy entered and certified by Jerome W. Zimmer Jr .. Chief Clerk, on 

DEC 0 3 2015 

Date 

~~,GL Chie~ 
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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FOR PUBLICATION 

December 3, 2015 

9:00 a.m. 

v No. 322350 

Eaton Circuit Court 

KEVIN RAYNARD JACKSON, LC No. 13-020353-FH 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

ON RECONSIDERATION 

Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and SAAD and HOEKSTRA, JJ. 

BOONSTRA, P.J. 

 Defendant appeals by right his conviction, following a jury trial, of second-degree home 

invasion, MCL 750.110a(3). The trial court sentenced defendant as a second-offense habitual 

offender, MCL 769.10, to 88 months to 22 years’ imprisonment, with credit for 259 days served. 

We affirm. 

I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 The case arises out of the invasion of, and theft of household items and money from, 

Traci Brown’s home in Charlotte, Michigan on July 4, 2012. On that day, Brown and her three 

children left the home to visit her mother. According to Brown, her windows and doors were all 

locked when she left, and she did not leave her front door open. Brown testified that, other than 

herself and her children, only her mother and the father of her children knew that she and the 

children would be away. 

 Alyson Michelle Hotchkiss, who lived in the house next door to Brown, testified that she 

was on vacation on July 4 with her husband Randy, three of her daughters, and her grandson. 

She had given permission to her oldest daughter, Tashena Waycaster (who does not reside with 

her), and Dan Pion, to stay at her house while she was away; Hotchkiss testified that she allowed 

them to stay at her house while she was away because they were heroin addicts and basically 

homeless. Hotchkiss took her valuables with her when she left for vacation because she did not 

want the items stolen by Waycaster and Pion (presumably to be sold for drugs). 

 The backyard of LaVern and Theresa Bailey’s house borders both the Brown and 

Hotchkiss backyards. LaVern said that he was working on his computer around 10:00 a.m. on 
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the morning of July 4, 2012 when he saw a man carrying something and walking from the area 

of Brown’s house to the Hotchkiss house. LaVern was not positive that the man had come from 

Brown’s house, “but [the man] was so close to the house” that “it kind of surprised [him].” 

While LaVern did not see the man come directly out of Brown’s house, he did see him go into 

the Hotchkiss house. He described the man, who was approximately 40 yards away, as “[a] 

black man, medium build, short hair, about five eight, five ten.” LaVern and his wife saw the 

same man 15 minutes later walking from the side area of Brown’s house towards the Hotchkiss 

house, carrying a laundry basket filled with “all kinds of stuff,” as well as a brown jug or jar. 

The man put the basket on the deck of the Hotchkiss house, noticed that he was being watched 

by LaVern and his wife, and walked into the house. The Baileys thought it looked a little 

suspicious but did not call the police at that time. 

 Pion and Waycaster admitted that in July of 2012 they used heroin, cocaine, crack 

cocaine, and marijuana; Pion would sometimes steal things to pay for the drugs and Waycaster 

would prostitute herself for money to pay for the drugs. Pion and Waycaster testified that 

defendant was staying with them at the Hotchkiss house while her parents were on vacation 

around the Fourth of July in 2012. According to Pion and Waycaster, they ran into defendant at 

the Dairy Queen in town during the daytime and returned to Hotchkiss’s home to smoke 

marijuana and crack cocaine. They testified that after doing drugs with defendant, defendant 

said that he was going to leave and “hit a lick,” which is a slang term meaning that defendant 

was going to steal something. Pion said that defendant left and returned with a storage tote 

containing a couple of game systems, movies, and games; he placed the items in the basement of 

813 West Lawrence (the address of the Hotchkiss home) and then left and returned with what 

Pion thought was a 32-inch flat-screen television; according to Waycaster, defendant had socks 

on his hands. Pion claimed that defendant left the house again and Pion went to bed. Pion 

testified that Waycaster was with him at her mother’s house while defendant was coming and 

going from the house. Waycaster testified that defendant went in and out of the Hotchkiss house 

at least four separate times; she saw him carry in a flat-screen television, video game systems, 

DVDs, and games. Waycaster denied ever entering Brown’s house. Waycaster said that she told 

defendant that she “wanted something out of it,” i.e., a cut of the profits from selling the stolen 

goods, and that, when asked, defendant told her that he had stolen the items and pointed to the 

next door neighbor’s house. According to Waycaster, defendant showed her money in his 

pocket. Pion thought defendant was going to sell the stolen items so that they could buy drugs. 

Defendant was sleeping on the couch when Waycaster went to bed; when Pion and Waycaster 

woke up the next morning, most of the items defendant had brought into the house were gone, as 

was defendant. They found some small miscellaneous items taken by defendant still in the 

house, and hid them under a bed. Pion also discovered that $20 was missing from his car. 

 Matthew Andrews, a friend of defendant, testified that defendant was with him around 

noon on July 4, 2012 at a baseball game. According to Andrews, defendant went to Lake 

Michigan for the day with Andrews’ family and defendant’s girlfriend. They stayed in 

Saugatuck for a few hours and purchased fireworks on the way home, returning to Andrew’s 

house in Charlotte around 11:00 p.m. on July 4. Andrews testified that defendant spent the night 

at Andrews’ home. Mindy Dassance, who has a child with defendant, testified that defendant 

called her on July 5, 2012, asking her to pick him up at Andrews’ home; she said that she did so 

and drove him back to her home. According to Dassance, defendant did not own a vehicle. 
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 The Baileys called the police on July 5, 2012 after Theresa drove by Brown’s house and 

noticed that the front door was open. Charlotte Police Sergeant James Falk arrived at Brown’s 

house around 6:00 p.m. According to Falk, it was clear that the house had been broken into 

because items appeared to be missing and the rooms had been ransacked. Falk contacted Brown 

on the telephone at her mother’s home and informed her that her house had been broken into and 

that property had been stolen. Falk testified that after speaking with the Baileys he knocked on 

the door of the Hotchkiss house. No one answered the door but through a window he could see a 

green laundry basket lying on the floor in the basement. 

 Brown drove home after receiving the telephone call from Falk. Brown noted numerous 

items missing from her home: a 55-inch flat-screen television, an X-box 360, a Wii, two blue-ray 

DVD players, over 600 DVDs, 50 Xbox games, 100 Wii games, portable DVD players, a round 

glass jar partially full of coins, a 32-inch flat-screen television that had been in her bedroom, a 

candleholder from the kitchen, food items from the refrigerator and freezer, alcohol, a brand new 

digital camera with a manual, a new computer printer still in the box, prescription medications, 

hand-held personal gaming devices, 100 Game Boy DS games, a Dell laptop computer, a 

window air conditioner, a GPS, and a full-size cooler. Brown testified that the dresser drawers 

had been emptied in her and one of her son’s bedrooms, with the clothes strewn everywhere, and 

that a green laundry basket and $5,500 in cash had also been taken. In addition, she said that a 

television in another son’s bedroom was tipped over and on the floor and a Wii figurine was 

missing. The original insurance estimate to replace the stolen items, excluding the $5,500, was 

$24,000. 

 Falk returned to the Hotchkiss home later that night after the Baileys informed him that 

someone was home at that house. When questioned, Waycaster indicated that in the preceding 

five days a woman named “Jamie” had been at the home with them. Waycaster informed Falk 

that the green laundry basket found in the Brown house belonged to her mother. According to 

Pion, he and Waycaster realized during Falk’s questioning that the items defendant had brought 

into the Hotchkiss house had been stolen from Brown’s house. Pion and Waycaster testified that 

they did not tell the police about defendant staying with them because they did not want to get 

anyone in trouble; Waycaster also testified that she was afraid of getting into trouble because she 

felt somewhat responsible for holding stolen items. Pion testified that he did not know who lived 

at the Brown house or that they would be on vacation on July 4.

 Hotchkiss returned with her family to their house on July 6, 2012. When she got home, 

her landlord told her about the break-in at Brown’s house. Hotchkiss found items later identified 

as stolen from Brown’s house under her grandson’s bed and in other areas around her house. 

Hotchkiss said that she called the Charlotte Police Department as soon as she found the items. 

Hotchkiss spoke to Waycaster on the telephone before the police arrived and told her that she 

and Pion needed to speak to the police or they would not be allowed to stay in her home. Pion 

and Waycaster again spoke with police on July 8, 2012. At first, both Pion and Waycaster 

minimized their knowledge of the robbery, but both identified defendant and described his 

conduct on July 4. Pion testified that he did not feel pressured by the police to “give up a name” 

and denied that he named defendant because he was a black male he knew. 

 Hotchkiss testified that additional items were taken from her home four days after she 

returned from vacation; Pion and Waycaster were not at the house when it happened. Pion and 
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Waycaster came over to her house and she told them what happened. Pion showed Hotchkiss a 

text message that he said he had received from defendant; Hotchkiss testified that the content of 

the text was vindictive and threatening, and that the message 

was pertaining to the fact that he had found out that [Pion] and [Waycaster] had 

went and talked to the police and that he couldn’t believe that [Pion] basically 

would choose [Waycaster] over him since they were, they had grown up and been 

friends most of their lives. And that since he couldn’t get to [Waycaster] then he 

would have to then basically go after me and my three little ones. 

Hotchkiss never reported the text message to the police. Pion testified that he did not remember 

showing a text message to anyone but knew from the text that defendant was mad about 

something. 

 Brown later identified the green laundry basket, the change jar, jewelry, one of her son’s 

digital cameras, the Wii figurine, and two fans as belonging to her. At trial, Brown also 

identified a missing jar, a Wii steering wheel controller, a DVD, her digital camera with the 

manual, and a Polaroid camera. 

 During the trial, Pion testified that he had been charged with the felony of receiving and 

concealing stolen property and that in exchange for his testimony against defendant, the 

prosecutor’s office had agreed to allow him to plead guilty to a misdemeanor charge of receiving 

and concealing stolen property. Waycaster testified that she had also been charged with felony 

receiving and concealing stolen property, and that in exchange for her truthful testimony, the 

charges were reduced to misdemeanor receiving and concealing stolen property. 

 The jury convicted defendant of one count of second-degree home invasion, 

MCL 750.110a(3). Defendant was sentenced as described above. At sentencing, defendant 

received a score of 25 points for offense variable (OV) 13 (continuing pattern of felonious 

activity) and 5 points for OV 16 (value of stolen property). 

 This appeal followed. After defendant filed his appeal, he moved this Court to remand 

for resentencing pursuant to People v Lockridge, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 

149073, decided July 29, 2015). This Court denied his motion “without prejudice to the panel’s 

consideration of the issue in the context of the pending appeal.” People v Jackson, unpublished 

order of the Court of Appeals, issued September 4, 2015 (Docket No. 322350). 

II. INSTRUCTION ON LESSER OFFENSE 

 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the lesser-included 

offense of third-degree home invasion. Defendant maintains that, by providing essentially 

identical instructions on second-degree and third-degree home invasion, the instructions as a 

whole were confusing and allowed the jury to convict defendant of the higher offense (seconddegree home invasion) on no greater proof than would sustain a conviction for the lesser offense 

(third-degree home invasion), thus lowering the prosecution’s burden of proof on the former. 
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The record indicates that defendant’s counsel requested that the jury be so instructed, and 

affirmatively approved the jury instruction as read. Defendant has thus waived challenge to any 

error in this instruction. People v Chapo, 283 Mich App 360, 372-373; 770 NW2d 68 (2009).1

 Further, even if defendant had not waived appellate review of this issue, we would find 

that reversal was not required. “A criminal defendant is entitled to have a properly instructed 

jury consider the evidence against him.” People Riddle, 467 Mich 116, 124; 649 NW2d 30 

(2002). The jury instructions must include all elements of the charged offenses and any material 

issues, defenses, and theories if there is evidence to support them. People v Reed, 393 Mich 342, 

349-350; 224 NW2d 867, cert den 422 US 1044 (1975). This Court reviews unpreserved 

challenges to jury instructions for plain error affecting a party’s substantial rights. People v 

Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). 

 “MCL 768.32(1) permits the trier of fact to find a defendant guilty of a lesser offense if 

the lesser offense is necessarily included in the greater offense. A lesser offense is necessarily 

included in the greater offense when the elements necessary for the commission of the lesser 

offense are subsumed within the elements necessary for the commission of the greater offense.” 

People v Wilder, 485 Mich 35, 41; 780 NW2d 265 (2010). The trial court should give a 

“requested instruction on a necessarily included lesser offense . . . if the charged greater offense 

requires the jury to find a disputed factual element that is not part of the lesser included offense 

and a rational view of the evidence would support it.” People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335, 357; 646 

NW2d 127 (2002). 

 In this case, defendant was charged with second-degree home invasion, and defense 

counsel requested, and the jury was additionally instructed on, the lesser offense of third-degree 

home invasion, MCL 750.110a(4). Second-degree home invasion is established when: 

 A person who break and enters a dwelling with intent to commit a felony, 

larceny, or assault in the dwelling, or a person who breaks and enters a dwelling 

or enters a dwelling without permission and, at any time while he or she is 

entering, present in, or exiting the dwelling, commits a felony, or assault is guilty 

of home invasion in the second degree. [MCL 750.110a(3) (emphasis added).] 

 In relevant part, third-degree home invasion is established when a person: 

 (a) Breaks and enters a dwelling with intent to commit a misdemeanor in 

the dwelling, enters a dwelling without permission with intent to commit a 

misdemeanor in the dwelling, or breaks and enters a dwelling or enters a dwelling 

without permission and, at any time while he or she is entering, present in, or 

 

1

 We reject defendant’s assertion that such an alleged instructional error cannot be waived. See 

People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215-16; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). Further, for the reasons noted 

in this opinion, the instructions did not result in manifest injustice or prejudice to defendant. 

Carines, 460 Mich at 775. 
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exiting the dwelling, commits a misdemeanor. [MCL 750.110a(4)(a) (emphasis 

added).] 

 Our Supreme Court has held that “[t]he second element of the lesser crime, [intended] 

commission of a misdemeanor while present in the dwelling, is subsumed within the second 

element of the greater crime charged [there, first-degree home invasion], [intended] commission 

of a larceny while present in the dwelling, because every felony larceny necessarily includes 

within it a misdemeanor larceny.” See People v Wilder, 485 Mich 35, 46; 780 NW2d 265 

(2010). This Court had earlier concluded, in People v Sands, 261 Mich App 158, 163; 680 

NW2d 500 (2004), that the language of MCL 750.11a(2) permits a misdemeanor larceny or 

misdemeanor assault to serve as the predicate offense for first-degree home invasion, rather than 

requiring felony larceny or assault. The Court reasoned that, “because felonies are specifically 

listed as underlying crimes for first-degree home invasion, it would be redundant to list assault 

and larceny separately if subsection 110a(2) was referring to only felony assaults and larcenies.” 

Id. Although the Wilder and Sands Courts were considering the first-degree home invasion 

statute, its relevant language is the same as that of the second-degree home invasion statute. See 

MCL 750.110a(2), (3).2

 The rationale of those cases is therefore equally applicable to seconddegree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(3), and either a misdemeanor or felony larceny thus may 

serve as the predicate offense for second-degree home invasion. Consequently, where, as here, 

the predicate offense for the home invasion charge was a larceny, third-degree home invasion 

was a lesser-included offense of second-degree home invasion. 

 Nonetheless, under the facts of this case, a rational view of the evidence did not support 

the giving of an instruction on third-degree home invasion. Cornell, 466 Mich at 357. In this 

case, there was no is no record evidence that defendant entered Brown’s home to commit any 

crime other than a larceny. Specifically, Pion and Waycaster both testified that defendant said he 

was going to “hit a lick,” which is a slang term meaning that defendant was going to steal 

something, and returned to the house later carrying items in a basket. Because felony and 

misdemeanor larceny may serve as the predicate offense underlying second-degree home 

invasion, Sands, 261 Mich App at 163, and because there was no evidence of any predicate act 

other than that (larceny) supporting the second-degree home invasion charge, the evidence in this 

case did not allow for a distinction between second-degree home invasion and third-degree home 

invasion, and therefore did not support an instruction on third-degree home invasion. The trial 

court thus erred in giving that instruction. Cornell, 466 Mich 335, 357. 

 The trial court and counsel for the parties appeared to struggle with how to instruct the 

jury that both felony and misdemeanor larceny may serve as the predicate offense underlying 

second degree home invasion. However, if anything, this confusion aided defendant by allowing 

him a chance to be convicted of a lesser offense based on a predicate offense that would have 

supported a higher charge. Although defendant argues that the instruction given allowed the jury 

to convict him of a higher offense than that which the evidence supported, it is the converse that 

 

2

 First-degree home invasion requires proof of additional elements not at issue in this case. See 

MCL 750.110a(2)(a), (b). 
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is actually true: the instruction allowed defendant the chance to be convicted of a lesser offense 

than that which the evidence supported. Thus, the jury was allowed to consider a lesser charge 

that it should not have been allowed to consider. Had the jury convicted defendant of the lesser 

offense, he would have been subject to a lesser sentence. However, the jury convicted defendant 

of the higher charged offense, second-degree home invasion. We therefore hold that the 

improper jury instruction did not affect defendant’s substantial rights. Carines, 460 Mich at 763-

764.3 We further hold that a defendant may not request such an instruction, only to later claim 

resulting confusion in the jury instructions, thus harboring error as an appellate parachute. 

People v Buie, 491 Mich 294, 299; 817 NW2d 33 (2012). 

III. PROSECUTORIAL ERROR4

 Defendant next argues that the prosecution erred in improperly vouching for Pion and 

Waycaster’s credibility and bolstering their testimony during closing arguments, and additionally 

in soliciting testimony from Hotchkiss regarding a threatening text message that was not reported 

to the police. We disagree. Defendant’s trial counsel did not object to the prosecution’s 

comments regarding Pion and Waycaster’s testimony, to the specified closing argument 

comments related to them, or to Hotchkiss’s statement regarding the text message. This issue is 

thus unpreserved and reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. Carines, 460 Mich at 

763. Reversal is warranted only when plain error resulted in the conviction of an actually 

innocent defendant or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings.” People v Callon, 256 Mich App 312, 329; 662 NW2d 501 (2003). “Further, [this 

Court] cannot find error requiring reversal where a curative instruction could have alleviated any 

prejudicial effect.” Id. at 329–330. 

 

3

 Arguably, our analysis (based on existing caselaw) leads to a somewhat nonintuitive result: 

while third-degree home invasion is a necessarily-included lesser offense of second-degree home 

invasion involving larceny, cases where the predicate offense alleged is larceny (or assault, for 

that matter) will generally not require that an instruction on third-degree home invasion be given. 

But our analysis is consistent with the oft-repeated mantra that our task is to give fair and natural 

import to the language of statutes, and not to speculate as to the intent of the Legislature beyond 

the language expressed in the statute. See Chico-Polo v Dep’t of Corrections, 299 Mich App 

193, 198; 829 NW2d 314 (2013). Moreover, even if, in construing the home invasion statutory 

scheme as a whole, we were to interpret the elements of third-degree home invasion to require 

proof of an intended or committed misdemeanor apart from larceny or assault, our conclusion 

would not be altered. Rather, in that event, a jury instruction on third-degree home invasion still 

would be improper in this case, as it would be inconsistent with the charges and unsupported by 

the evidence. And in either event, the instruction, though erroneous, inured to defendant’s 

potential benefit and is not grounds for reversal. 

4

 As this Court recently noted in People v Cooper, 309 Mich App 74, 87-88; 867 NW2d 452 

(2015), although the term “prosecutorial misconduct” has become a term of art often used to 

describe any error committed by the prosecution, claims of inadvertent error by the prosecution 

are “better and more fairly presented as claims of ‘prosecutorial error,’ with only the most 

extreme cases rising to the level of ‘prosecutorial misconduct.’ ” 
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 We review claims of prosecutorial error on a case-by-case basis by examining the record 

and evaluating the prosecution’s remarks in context. People v Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 660; 

608 NW2d 123 (1999). “[T]he prosecutor is permitted to argue the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences arising from it.” People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 450, 454; 678 NW2d 631 (2004). 

However, the prosecution cannot vouch for the credibility of his or her witness “to the effect that 

he [or she] has some special knowledge concerning a witness’ truthfulness.” People v Bahoda, 

448 Mich 261, 276; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). A prosecutor may, however, make reference to a 

plea agreement containing a promise of truthfulness, provided that the agreement is not “used by 

the prosecution to suggest that the government had some special knowledge, not known to the 

jury, that the witness was testifying truthfully.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Additionally, “a prosecutor may comment on his own witnesses’ credibility during closing 

argument, especially when there is conflicting evidence and the question of the defendant’s guilt 

depends on which witnesses the jury believes.” Thomas, 260 Mich App at 455. 

In this case, defendant claims that the prosecution improperly vouched for Pion and 

Waycaster’s credibility during her closing argument by stating that they were testifying 

truthfully. The prosecution stated that Pion and Waycaster testified pursuant to a plea 

agreement, and that the “ongoing plea agreement [was] still intact and they ha[d] to testify 

truthfully.” The prosecution further argued that, despite their drug use, Pion and Waycaster had 

testified truthfully to the best of their ability and that their testimony was supported by other 

evidence, such as the testimony of neighbors who had seen a black male going between the 

Brown house and the Hotchkiss house. 

 Defense counsel repeatedly attacked Pion and Waycaster’s credibility because of their 

drug use and drug addiction. In context, the prosecution’s comments were made in response to 

defense counsel’s theory of the case, that Pion and Waycaster were not credible witnesses due to 

drug use. Thomas, 260 Mich App at 454. Further, although the prosecution made reference to 

the plea agreement, it did not “suggest that the government had some special knowledge, not 

known to the jury, that [they were] testifying truthfully.” Bahoda, 448 Mich at 276. We 

therefore find no error requiring reversal in the prosecution’s statements concerning Pion and 

Waycaster’s credibility. 

 Defendant further argues that the prosecution and the police did not have personal 

knowledge of the “threatening” text allegedly sent by defendant, and that the prosecution’s 

reference to it in closing argument denied him a fair trial. Hotchkiss first referred to the text 

message during her cross-examination by defense counsel. On redirect, the prosecution 

questioned Hotchkiss regarding the timing of the text message in relation to the break-in that 

occurred at her home. In context, it is clear that Hotchkiss gave an unresponsive answer to the 

prosecution’s questions after the prosecution twice instructed her not to discuss the content of the 

message. Unresponsive answers from witnesses are generally not prosecutorial error. See 

People v Hackney, 183 Mich App 516, 531; 455 NW2d 358 (1990) (stating that “[a]s a general 

rule, unresponsive testimony by a prosecution witness does not justify a mistrial unless the 

prosecutor knew in advance that the witness would give the unresponsive testimony or the 

prosecutor conspired with or encouraged the witness to give that testimony”). Further, the 

prosecution did not question Hotchkiss about the content of the text message, but did make it 

clear through its examination that no one was charged for the break-in and that Hotchkiss did not 

know for sure who took the items; thus, the prosecution further inquired into the incident, not the 
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text, to minimize the effect of the nonresponsive reference to the content of the text message. 

Finally, despite defendant’s assertion to the contrary, the prosecution did not refer to the text 

message during its closing argument and thus did not argue facts not in evidence. See People v 

Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 686; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). 

IV. JURY COMPOSITION 

 Defendant argues that his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial was violated by the jury 

empaneled to decide his case, because it did not represent a fair cross-section of the community. 

We disagree. Defendant did not raise this issue in the trial court and we review it for plain error 

affecting substantial rights. Carines, 460 Mich at 763-764. 

 A defendant has the right to be tried by an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section 

of the community. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 1; People v Bryant, 491 Mich 575, 

595; 822 NW2d 124, cert den ___ US ___; 133 S Ct 664 (2012). In Bryant, our Supreme Court 

explained that to establish a prima facie case of a violation of the Sixth Amendment’s fair-crosssection requirement, a defendant must show: 

(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the 

community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries 

are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in 

the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic 

exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. [Id. at 581-582, quoting 

Duren v Missouri, 439 US 357, 364; 99 S Ct 664; 58 L Ed 2d 579 (1979).] 

“[W]hen applying the relevant statistical tests, a court must examine the composition of jury 

pools and venires over time using the most reliable data available to determine whether 

representation is fair and reasonable.” Bryant, 491 Mich at 599-600. “A systematic exclusion is 

one that is inherent in the particular jury-selection process utilized.” Id. at 615-616 (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). 

 Defendant argues in this case that his jury was more Caucasian, more educated, and had 

more ties to law enforcement than a typical cross-section of the Eaton County community. In 

support of this assertion, defendant refers to the 2010-2011 United States Census of Eaton 

County, which according to defendant indicates that Eaton County is more than 90% Caucasian, 

about 6% African-American, and less than 4% Hispanic. Defendant asserts that his jury was 

“either all White, with no African-Americans present, or had only one member that was not 

White.” However, there is no evidence in the record of the racial makeup of defendant’s jury. 

Further, defendant provides no evidence indicating a “systematic” exclusion of AfricanAmericans from Eaton County jury pools. See Bryant, 491 Mich at 595. Defendant has thus 

failed to establish a prima facie case for violation of the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section 

requirement with regard to race. Id. 

 With regard to education level and ties to law enforcement, defendant provides no 

evidence that persons possessing a certain degree of education or ties to law enforcement, or 

lacking the same, are members of a “distinctive” group in the Eaton County community. Id. 

Further, the record, although it does not reflect the precise education levels of the selected jurors, 
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indicates that the jurors came from a wide variety of professions; additionally, while four jurors 

acknowledged ties to law enforcement, no evidence was presented that this was disproportionate 

compared to the community at large. We thus conclude that defendant has failed to establish a 

prima facie case for violation of the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section requirement with 

regard to education level or ties to law enforcement. Id.

Defendant also makes passing reference to the prosecution’s use of preemptory 

challenges to allegedly excuse one African-American juror. To the extent that defendant seeks 

to raise a Batson5

 challenge to the prosecution’s use of preemptory challenges, this issue is also 

unpreserved and reviewed for plain error. Carines, 460 Mich at 763-764. Further, “unless it is 

clear from the record that the prosecution is using its peremptory challenges in a discriminatory 

fashion, a defendant who fails to raise the issue or otherwise develop an adequate record of 

objections forfeits appellate review of the issue.” People v Vaughn, 200 Mich App 32, 40; 504 

NW2d 2 (1993). Our review of the record does not reveal that the challenged juror was, as 

defendant claims, challenged because of his race. The record is devoid of any evidence 

regarding the racial makeup of any of the prospective jurors, let alone the juror in question. 

V. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 

 Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the jury 

composition and selection, failing to object to prosecutorial error, and failing to diligently inquire 

as to the lack of effort in attempting to obtain from the telephone or telecommunication company 

information regarding the text message. We disagree. Defendant did not move the trial court for 

a new trial or a Ginther6 hearing. Our review of defendant’s claim is thus limited to errors 

apparent on the record. People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 48; 687 NW2d 342 (2004). 

 It is strongly presumed that defense counsel “rendered adequate assistance and made all 

significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” People v Vaughn, 

491 Mich 642, 670; 821 N2d 288 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). When 

reviewing defense counsel’s performance, the reviewing court must first objectively “determine 

whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide 

range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 690; 104 

S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed2d 674 (1984). Next, the defendant must show that trial counsel’s deficient 

performance prejudiced his defense—in other words, that “there is a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Vaughn, 491 Mich at 669 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The defendant must establish 

both prongs of this test to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v 

Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999). In addition, “to persuade a reviewing court that 

counsel was ineffective, a defendant must also overcome the presumption that the challenged 

action was trial strategy.” Id. 

 

5 Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79; 106 S Ct 1712; 90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986). 

6 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 442-443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). 
-11- 

 With regard to the jury composition and alleged prosecutorial error, defendant has failed 

to establish a factual predicate for this claim, as discussed earlier in Parts III and IV of this 

opinion. Hoag, 460 Mich at 6. With regard to defense counsel’s alleged failure to adequately 

investigate the text message, “[d]ecisions regarding what evidence to present, whether to call 

witnesses, and how to question witnesses are presumed to be matters of trial strategy.” People v 

Horn, 279 Mich App 31, 39; 755 NW2d 212 (2008). In addition, “[d]efense counsel’s failure to 

present certain evidence will only constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if it deprived 

defendant of a substantial defense.” People v Dunigan, 299 Mich App 579, 589; 831 NW2d 243 

(2013). A substantial defense is one that might have made a difference in the outcome of the 

trial. People v Chapo, 283 Mich App 360, 371; 770 NW2d 68 (2009). “Because the defendant 

bears the burden of demonstrating both deficient performance and prejudice, the defendant 

necessarily bears the burden of establishing the factual predicate for his claim.” People v 

Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001). 

 The record does not indicate that anyone ever informed the police of the text message 

Hotchkiss testified to viewing on Pion’s cellular telephone; Hotchkiss testified that she did not 

inform the police of the text after her house was robbed, and Pion testified that he did not show 

the text to anyone. Moreover, her original statement regarding the text was elicited from a 

question by trial counsel. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request purported 

evidence of which not even the police, let alone the prosecution, was aware. Thus, defendant 

cannot establish that trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. Strickland, 466 US at 690. Further, even if trial counsel’s performance was 

deficient on this issue, in light of other testimony incriminating defendant, defendant cannot 

demonstrate that he was deprived of a substantial defense. Dunigan, 299 Mich App at 589. 

VI. SENTENCING 

 As noted earlier in this opinion, defendant moved this Court to remand for resentencing 

in light of Lockridge, ___ Mich at ___. Our review of the record convinces us that remand is not 

required. 

 At the outset, we note that defendant does not argue on appeal that the trial court erred in 

its scoring of any OVs. That is, defendant does not argue that the court’s factual findings in 

scoring OVs 13 and 16 were clearly erroneous or not supported by a preponderance of the 

evidence. A trial court’s scoring of OVs must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence; 

we review the trial court’s findings of fact for clear error. People v Hardy, 494 Mich 430, 438; 

835 NW2d 340 (2013). Rather, defendant merely argues on appeal that the facts supporting the 

scoring of these OVs were not necessarily found by the jury or admitted by defendant, and that a 

remand is therefore required by Lockridge. 

 We reiterate that judicial fact-finding remains an important component of Michigan’s 

sentencing scheme post-Lockridge. Although the sentencing guidelines are no longer 

mandatory, “they remain a highly relevant consideration in a trial court’s exercise of sentencing 

discretion.” Lockridge, ___ Mich at ___ (slip op at 13). Lockridge simply requires that where, 
-12- 

as here, a trial court was not aware at the time of sentencing that the sentencing guidelines were 

advisory, we consider whether OVs were scored based on facts necessarily found by the jury or 

admitted by defendant, and whether, applying Lockridge, a remand is required.7

 We conclude that a remand is not required in this case. We do agree that the scoring for 

OV 16 was not based on facts admitted by defendant or necessarily found by the jury; however, 

the scoring of OV 13 was based on facts admitted by defendant. Because, as explained below, 

removing the 5 points scored for OV 16 from defendant’s OV score would not alter his minimum 

guidelines range, defendant has not made a threshold showing of plain error. 

 In Lockridge, the Supreme Court held that in order to avoid any Sixth Amendment 

violations, Michigan’s sentencing guidelines scheme was to be deemed advisory, instead of 

being mandatory. Id. at __ (slip op at 28). The concern is that when a judge makes findings of 

fact “beyond facts admitted by the defendant or found by the jury” in a sentencing proceeding 

that increases a defendant’s minimum sentence, this runs afoul of a defendant’s right to a jury 

trial. Id. at __ (slip op at 1). As a result, the guidelines no longer can be considered mandatory, 

but sentencing judges must consult the guidelines and “ ‘take them into account when 

sentencing.’ ” Id. at __ (slip op at 28), quoting United States v Booker, 543 US 220, 264; 125 S 

Ct 738; 160 L Ed 2d 621 (2005). 

 In determining whether there is any plain error under this new scheme, the first inquiry is 

whether the facts admitted by the defendant and the facts necessarily found by the jury “were 

sufficient to assess the minimum number of OV points necessary for the defendant’s score to fall 

in the cell of the sentencing grid under which he or she was sentenced.” Id. at __ (slip op at 32). 

If the answer is “yes,” then a defendant cannot establish any plain error. Id. at __ (slip op at 32). 

If the answer is “no,” then a remand to the trial court is required to allow it to determine whether, 

now aware of the advisory nature of the guidelines, the court would have imposed a materially 

different sentence. Id. at __ (slip op at 34). If the court determines that it would have imposed a 

materially different sentence, then it shall order resentencing. Id. at __ (slip op at 34). 

 In this case, defendant objected to the scoring of OV 16 (value of stolen property) at 

sentencing; further, because the jury was only required to find that defendant intended or did 

commit a larceny, not a larceny of a specific value, facts supporting this score were not 

necessarily found by a jury. See MCL 750.110a(3). They also were not admitted by defendant. 

 

7

 Indeed, sentences imposed by trial courts post-Lockridge (knowing of the advisory nature of 

the sentencing guidelines) will not require the consideration we must give the instant case. See 

Lockridge, ___ Mich at ___, slip op at 13 (“Because sentencing courts will hereafter not be 

bound by the applicable sentencing guidelines range, this remedy cures the Sixth Amendment 

flaw in our guidelines scheme . . . . Sentencing courts must, however, continue to consult the 

applicable guidelines range and take it into account when imposing a sentence.”) 
-13- 

We thus agree that, in considering whether defendant can make a threshold showing of plain 

error,8

 the 5 points scored for OV 16 should first be subtracted from defendant’s total OV score. 

 However, we disagree with defendant’s contention that the scoring of OV 13 was not 

based on facts admitted by defendant. A score of 25 points for OV 13 must be supported by 

facts indicating that the sentencing offense was part of a pattern of felonious activity involving 3 

or more crimes against a person within a five year period. See MCL 777.43(1)(c). Home 

invasion is a crime against a person. MCL 777.16f. The United States Supreme Court has 

recognized that a defendant’s admission of a prior conviction satisfies the requirement that a 

sentencing enhancement be based on facts admitted by a defendant or found by a jury. See 

Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466, 487; 120 S Ct 2348; 147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000) (“Because 

Almendarez-Torres had admitted the three earlier convictions for aggravated felonies--all of 

which had been entered pursuant to proceedings with substantial procedural safeguards of their 

own--no question concerning the right to a jury trial or the standard of proof that would apply to 

a contested issue of fact was before the Court.”), citing Almendarez-Torres v United States, 523 

US 224, 230; 120 S Ct 2348; 147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000). In this case, defendant had pled guilty in 

2012 to two charges of home invasion related to offenses committed earlier in 2010 and 2011. 

Defense counsel stipulated to these convictions at sentencing in this case. More significantly, in 

pleading guilty to those crimes against a person, defendant admitted his commission of those 

crimes, and admitted the factual basis for his guilty pleas to those crimes, in “proceedings with 

substantial procedural safeguards of their own.” Apprendi, 530 US at 487. Therefore, the facts 

underlying the scoring of OV 13 were admitted by defendant, and the points scored for OV 13 

need not be subtracted in considering defendant’s total OV score under Lockridge. 

 Reducing defendant’s OV score by 5 points (by subtracting the score for OV 16) would 

not alter defendant’s minimum sentencing guidelines range. Therefore, remand is not required 

under Lockridge. Lockridge, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 33.

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra 

/s/ Henry William Saad 

/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra 

 

8

 Our review of the record does not indicate, as indeed defendant does not argue on appeal, that 

the score for OV 16 was clearly erroneous or not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 

Hardy, 494 Mich at 438.