Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 220 / Friday, November 14, 1997 / Notices 61145

Bureau of Land Management. All

inquiries concerning the survey of the

above described land must be sent to the

Chief, Cadastral Survey, Idaho State

Office, Bureau of Land Management,

1387 South Vinnell Way, Boise, Idaho,

83709–1657.

Dated: November 4, 1997.

Duane E. Olsen,

Chief Cadastral Surveyor for Idaho.

[FR Doc. 97–29921 Filed 11–13–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4310–GG–M

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration

[Docket No. 97–5]

Martha Hernandez, M.D.; Reprimand

and Continuation of Registrations With

Restriction

On January 14, 1997, the Deputy

Assistant Administrator, Office of

Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement

Administration (DEA), issued an Order

to Show Cause to Martha Hernandez,

M.D., (Respondent) of Chicago, Illinois

and Gary, Indiana, notifying her of an

opportunity to show cause as to why

DEA should not revoke her DEA

Certificates of Registration, AH2262424

and BH4493475, pursuant to 21 U.S.C.

824(a)(1), and deny any pending

applications for renewal of her

registrations as a practitioner under 21

U.S.C. 823(f). The Order to Show Cause

alleged that Respondent materially

falsified two applications for

registration with DEA.

By letter dated February 6, 1997,

Respondent, through counsel, filed a

timely request for a hearing, and

following prehearing procedures, a

hearing was held in Chicago, Illinois on

May 27, 1997, before Administrative

Law Judge Gail A. Randall. At the

hearing, both parties called witnesses to

testify and introduced documentary

evidence. After the hearing, counsel for

both parties submitted proposed

findings of fact, conclusions of law and

argument. On September 5, 1997, Judge

Randall issued her Opinion and

Recommended Ruling, recommending

that Respondent’s registrations not be

revoked, but that Respondent be

reprimanded and that she be required to

submit certain documentation to DEA

on an annual basis for three years. On

September 25, 1997, the Government

filed exceptions to Judge Randall’s

Opinion and Recommended Ruling, and

on October 6, 1997, the record was

transmitted to the Acting Deputy

Administrator.

On October 15, 1997, Respondent

submitted a request to file a response to

the Government’s exceptions, as well as

her response to the exceptions.

Respondent argued that ‘‘[t]he

Government filed its exceptions on

September 25, 1997 and pursuant to

regulation the Respondent has 20 days

to request leave and file a response.’’ In

addition, Respondent stated that the

Government does not object to

Respondent filing a response to the

exceptions. The Acting Deputy

Administrator finds that Respondent

has misread 21 CFR 1316.66, which

provides for the filing of exceptions

within 20 days of service of the

Administrative Law Judge’s Opinion

and Recommended Ruling. The

regulation further provides that the

Administrative Law Judge may grant

time beyond the twenty days for the

filing of a response to any exceptions

filed. Nowhere in the regulations is a

party given 20 days from the filing of

exceptions to submit a response.

However, the Acting Deputy

Administrator will nonetheless consider

Respondent’s response to the

Government’s exceptions since it has

been represented that the Government

does not object to the consideration of

Respondent’s response.

The Acting Deputy Administrator has

considered the record in its entirety,

and pursuant to 21 CFR 1316.67, hereby

issues his final order based upon

findings of fact and conclusions of law

as hereinafter set forth. The Acting

Deputy Administrator adopts, in full,

the Opinion and Recommended Ruling

of the Administrative Law Judge. His

adoption is in no manner diminished by

any recitation of facts, issues and

conclusions herein, or of any failure to

mention a matter of fact or law.

The Acting Deputy Administrator

finds that Respondent is a psychiatrist

licensed to practice medicine in the

states of Illinois and Indiana, with a

DEA Certificate of Registration issued to

her in each state. On June 15, 1990, the

State of Illinois, Department of

Professional Regulation (IDPR) refused

to renew Respondent’s Illinois medical

license because she had defaulted on

her student loan payments. On

December 2, 1991, Respondent entered

into a consent order with IDPR, which

reinstated her Illinois medical license,

but placed her license on probation

until such time as she completes

repayment of her student loan. The

consent order set forth a schedule for

repayment of the loan. However, by

Order dated January 10, 1994, the IDPR

indefinitely suspended Respondent’s

Illinois medical license due to her

failure to abide by the repayment plan.

On October 1, 1994, Respondent

submitted a renewal application for

DEA Certificate of Registration

AH2262424 issued to her in Illinois. On

this renewal application, Respondent

indicated that she was currently

authorized to handle controlled

substances ‘‘in the state in which [she

is] operating or propos[ing] to operate’’,

yet she listed her Indiana state medical

license number. Also, Respondent

answered ‘‘No’’ to the liability question

which asked, ‘‘Has the applicant ever

been convicted of a crime in connection

with controlled substances under State

or Federal law, or ever surrendered or

had a Federal controlled substance

registration revoked, suspended,

restricted or denied, or ever had a State

professional license or controlled

substance registration revoked,

suspended, denied, restricted or placed

on probation?’’

DEA personnel telephonically

contacted Respondent on January 31,

1995, and again on May 3, 1995. During

these conversations, the DEA personnel

discussed with Respondent the effect of

the IDPR’s suspension upon

Respondent’s DEA registration; the

possible voluntary surrender of

Respondent’s Illinois DEA registration

in light of the continued suspension of

her Illinois medical license; and the

need for Respondent to submit a new

application for registration with DEA in

the State of Indiana. However, the DEA

personnel did not indicate to

Respondent during these conversations

that her answer to the liability question

on the October 1, 1994 renewal

application was incorrect or

questionable.

On May 5, 1995, Respondent

submitted a new application for a DEA

registration in the State of Indiana.

Again, she answered ‘‘No’’ to the

liability question which asks, ‘‘Has the

applicant ever had a State professional

license or controlled substance

registration revoked, suspended, denied,

restricted or placed on probation?’’

Subsequently, on July 10, 1995,

Respondent was issued DEA Certificate

of Registration BH4493475, in the State

of Indiana.

On June 16, 1995, Respondent

submitted an application to renew her

Indiana medical license. On that

application, Respondent answered ‘‘No’’

to a question which asked, ‘‘In the last

two years, has disciplinary action been

taken regarding any license, certificate,

registration or permit you hold or have

held?’’ As a result of this application,

Respondent’s Indiana medical license

was renewed on June 30, 1995.

Following her conversations with the

DEA personnel, Respondent decided not
61146 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 220 / Friday, November 14, 1997 / Notices

to surrender her Illinois DEA

registration. Judge Randall found that

‘‘Respondent credibly testified [at the

hearing in this matter] that she had

declined to surrender her DEA

Certificate of Registration because she

felt that the choices given on the DEA

surrender form pertaining to the reason

for the surrender implied failure on her

part to comply with Federal law in her

handling of controlled substances.’’

Judge Randall further found that

Respondent ‘‘credibly testified that she

had believed such form language did

not apply to her, since the suspension

of her Illinois medical license was due

to her inability to repay her Illinois

student loan, not due to her failure to

comply with Federal law in her

handling of controlled substances.’’

Since Respondent declined to

voluntarily surrender her Illinois DEA

registration, on November 27, 1995,

DEA issued an Order to Show Cause to

Respondent proposing to revoke her

Illinois DEA Certificate of Registration

in light of the fact that she was not then

authorized to handle controlled

substances in the State of Illinois due to

the continued suspension of her Illinois

medical license. However, on November

29, 1995, the IDPR entered into another

consent agreement with Respondent,

which reinstated Respondent’s Illinois

medical license and placed this license

on probation subject to Respondent’s

adhering to a student loan repayment

schedule. As a result of the consent

agreement, the November 27, 1995

Order to Show Cause was not pursued.

In July 1996, Respondent submitted

an application to renew her Illinois

medical license. On this application,

Respondent answered ‘‘Yes’’ to a

question which asked, ‘‘Since July 31,

1993, have you been denied a

professional license or permit, or

privilege of taking an examination, or

had a professional license or permit

disciplined in any way by any licensing

authority in Illinois or elsewhere?’’

Respondent testified that she answered

the question in the affirmative, after

discussing the interpretation of the

question with an Illinois official.

On July 8, 1996, the Indiana Medical

Licensing Board (Indiana Board) issued

a complaint against Respondent. The

complaint alleged that Respondent had

falsified her application for renewal of

her Indiana medical license dated June

16, 1995, by indicating that in the last

two years no disciplinary action had

been taken against any licenses that she

had held or was currently holding, even

though the IDPR had indefinitely

suspended her Illinois medical license

on January 10, 1994. In a letter dated

January 13, 1997, Respondent informed

the Indiana Board that ‘‘[a]t the time I

reapplied for my Indiana license [June

16, 1995] I was not aware of my Illinois

license being resuspended.’’ On July 14,

1997, the Indiana board issued its

Findings of Fact and Order finding that

Respondent’s conduct constituted

‘‘knowingly engaging in fraud or

material deception in order to obtain a

license to practice in violation of Ind.

Code. * * *’’ Accordingly, the Indiana

Board ordered that Respondent be

reprimanded, fined $200.00 and

assessed costs.

At the hearing in this matter,

Respondent contradicated her January

13, 1997 letter to the Indiana Board

when she agreed that in January and

May of 1995, she had had conversations

with DEA personnel concerning the

suspension of her Illinois medical

license in January 1995.

Judge Randall found that

‘‘Respondent credibly testified [at the

hearing in this matter] that during 1994

she had experienced unexpected

financial difficulties which contributed

to her inability to pay her student loans

* * * [and] that the suspension of her

Illinois medical license in January of

1994 was not a rememberable event to

her, since she was primarily practicing

medicine in Indiana in 1994, and given

the general turmoil of her life at that

time.’’ Judge Randall further found that

‘‘Respondent credibly testified that she

was unaware of a need for a separate

DEA Certificate of Registration to reflect

her Indiana place of business.’’ In

addition, Respondent testified that she

answered ‘‘No’’ to the liability question

on the DEA applications because she

thought that since she was applying for

a Federal registration to handle

controlled substances, the question only

pertained to actions taken based upon

malpractice, criminal activity, or

improper prescribing of controlled

substances, and not to the suspension of

a medical license due to a failure to

repay a student loan.

Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(1), ‘‘A

registration pursuant to section 823 of

this title to * * * dispense a controlled

substance * * * may be suspended or

revoked by the Attorney General upon

a finding that the registrant—(1) has

materially falsified any application filed

pursuant to or required by this

subchapter or subchapter II of this

chapter.’’ The Government contends

that Respondent’s DEA Certificates of

Registration should be revoked pursuant

to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(1) because she

falsified two different DEA applications

by indicating that no adverse action had

been taken against any of her state

professional licenses when in fact such

action had been taken against her

Illinois medical license. In addition, she

improperly answered a similar question

on her application for an Indiana

medical license. The Government argues

that the crucial issues are ‘‘Respondent’s

credibility and the ability of DEA

investigators to ascertain the status of a

registrant’s or an applicant’s past history

based upon answers to the applicable

liability questions.’’ The Government

contends that Respondent’s testimony

regarding her responses to the liability

questions was not credible.

Respondent admits that her responses

to the liability questions were incorrect.

However, Respondent argues that the

statements at issue were not ‘‘material’’

falsifications. Respondent further

contends that revocation would be too

harsh a sanction since she had no intent

to deceive or mislead DEA; because her

underlying misconduct was not related

to malpractice in her treatment of

patients or the mishandling of

controlled substances; and, since once

advised by the IDPR of the correct

interpretation of the liability questions,

she answered the question on her July

1996 state application appropriately.

As Judge Randall notes, ‘‘[a]nswers to

the liability question are material, since

the DEA relies upon such answers to

determine whether an investigation is

needed prior to grating the application.’’

DEA has previously held that in finding

that there has been a material

falsification of an application, it must be

determined that the applicant knew or

should have known that the response

given to the liability question was false.

See Bobby Watts, M.D., 58 FR 4699

(1993); Herbert J. Robinson, M.D., 59 FR

6304 (1994).

The Acting Deputy Administrator

concurs with Judge Randall’s

conclusion that Respondent materially

falsified her October 1, 1994 renewal

application for her Illinois DEA

Certificate of Registration and her May

5, 1995 application for a DEA

registration in Indiana. Respondent

indicated on both of these applications

that she had not had a state professional

license denied or suspended, even

through she knew that the renewal of

her Illinois medical license had been

denied in 1990, and that after being

reinstated, was again suspended in

1994. Respondent does not deny that

she incorrectly answered the liability

question on the applications, but

contends that she did not think that the

actions of the IDPR due to her failure to

repay her student loan was the type of

action that needed to be disclosed in

response to the question. The Acting

Deputy Administrator concurs with

Judge Randall’s conclusion that,

‘‘[a]lthough the Respondent credibly
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 220 / Friday, November 14, 1997 / Notices 61147

testified concerning her

misinterpretation of the question, she

was not relieved of her responsibility to

carefully read the question and to

honestly answer all parts of the

question.’’

Therefore, the Acting Deputy

Administrator concludes that based

upon Respondent’s material falsification

of the two applications, ground exist to

revoke her DEA Certificates of

Registration pursuant to 21 U.S.C.

824(a)(1). The question now becomes

whether the Acting Deputy

Administrator, in exercising his

discretion, believes that revocation is

the appropriate sanction in light of the

facts and circumstances of this case.

Judge Randall found that

‘‘Respondent’s testimony was credible

during her explanation of her confusion

concerning the DEA registration

requirements for her Indiana practice,

and her misunderstanding, albeit

unjustified, concerning the phrasing of

the liability questions in issue.’’

Therefore, Judge Randall concluded that

Respondent did not intend to deceive

DEA, but that her falsification of the

applications was due to her carelessness

and negligence. As Judge Randall noted,

‘‘lack of intent is irrelevant to the legal

test of material falsification.’’ However

she suggested that ‘‘such a lack of intent

should be considered in fitting the

remedy to the situation in this case.’’

The Government filed exceptions to

Judge Randall’s conclusion arguing that

Respondent intentionally sought to

deceive DEA by incorrectly answering

the liability question on the

applications. The Government argues

that Respondent clearly knew that her

Illinois medical license had been

suspended, yet she indicated on her

applications for registration that no

adverse action had been taken against

her state professional license.

The Acting Deputy Administrator

agrees with Judge Randall that a lack of

intent to deceive should be considered

in determining whether a registration

should be revoked. However, the Acting

Deputy Administrator further notes that

negligence and carelessness in

completing an application could be a

sufficient reason to revoke a registration.

In determining whether revocation is

warranted, the Acting Deputy

Administrator looks at the totality of the

circumstances in each case.

In this case, it is undisputed that

Respondent knew that her Illinois

medical license had been suspended.

But, the Acting Deputy Administrator

does not agree with the Government that

Respondent intended to deceive DEA in

responding to the liability question.

Respondent testified at the hearing in

this matter that she thought that since

she was applying to handle controlled

substances, the question on the

applications did not apply to her since

her Illinois medical license was

suspended due to her failure to repay a

student loan, and not due to inadequate

patient care or mishandling of

controlled substances. While this is

clearly an incorrect interpretation of the

liability question, the Acting Deputy

Administrator concurs with Judge

Randall’s conclusion that this is a

credible explanation for the

falsification.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the

Acting Deputy Administrator is troubled

by Respondent’s carelessness in failing

to carefully read the question on the

applications. However, the Acting

Deputy Administrator finds it

significant that prior to receiving the

Order to Show Cause in this matter

alleging that Respondent materially

falsified her applications, Respondent

answered a similar liability question

correctly on her July 1996 Illinois

application. Respondent testified that

she gave a different response on this

application after discussing the matter

with an Illinois official.

In considering the appropriate

sanction, Judge Randall also found it

significant that ‘‘both the Illinois

medical board and the Indiana medical

board chose to grant [Respondent’s]

applications, even in light of her past

failures to remain current in the

payment of her student loan, and more

recently, even in light of the Indiana

Board’s finding that the Respondent’s

June 1995 renewal application had been

prepared in a fraudulent or materially

deceptive manner.’’ The Government, in

its exceptions, argues that the fact that

the IDPR has not currently taken action

against Respondent’s Illinois medical

license should not be considered a

mitigating factor, since it has taken

significant action against her state

license in the past. The Acting Deputy

Administrator finds that the actions of

the state boards are relevant, although

not dispositive, in determining the

appropriate sanction in this matter. As

stated previously, the Acting Deputy

Administrator must look at all of the

circumstances surrounding a particular

case. The Acting Deputy Administrator

concludes that while it is true that

Respondent’s Illinois medical license

was not renewed in 1990 and was

suspended in 1994 due to her failure to

repay a student loan, the IDPR has seen

fit to allow Respondent to continue to

practice medicine as long as she

continues to repay her loan.

The Government further argues in its

exceptions that the action of the Indiana

Board should not be considered a

mitigating factor, because it was not the

result of an adjudicatory proceeding, but

rather a settlement conference. The

Government contends that in John W.

Copeland, M.D., 59 FR 46,063 (1994),

DEA previously held that a consent

decree between the Respondent and the

state in no way detracted from the

findings and conclusions found in the

DEA’s final order. In that case the thenDeputy Administrator found egregious

violations regarding the handling of

controlled substances and that the

consent order of the state board did not

change those findings. In this case, the

Acting Deputy Administrator has not

found similar violations. In fact, as the

Government points out, in this case the

Indiana Board found that Respondent

knowingly engaged in fraud or material

deception. The Indiana Board

nonetheless allowed her to continue to

practice medicine with a reprimand and

a fine. As stated previously, unlike the

Indiana Board, the Acting Deputy

Administrator has found that

Respondent did not intend to deceive

DEA with her answers to the liability

question on the applications.

To not consider a state’s action simply

because it was reached by agreement,

rather than following an adjudicatory

proceeding, would be unreasonable.

Therefore, the Acting Deputy

Administrator disagrees with the

Government’s contention that consent

orders should not be considered as

mitigating evidence. Accordingly, the

Acting Deputy Administrator agrees

with Judge Randall in this case, that

while not dispositive, the fact that both

the Indiana and Illinois medical

licensing authorities have allowed

Respondent to continue to practice

medicine is a mitigating factor when

evaluating all of the circumstances of

this case to determine the appropriate

sanction.

Judge Randall also found it

appropriate to consider that

Respondent’s falsification of her

applications stemmed from her failure

to repay a student loan, and that there

are no allegations that Respondent

improperly handled controlled

substances. As Judge Randall noted,

‘‘this lack of connection to controlled

substances is not dispositive of the

matter,’’ however, she suggested that, ‘‘it

is relevant in determining the

appropriate remedy.’’ The Government,

in its exceptions, argues that the lack of

improper handling of controlled

substances ‘‘should not be considered in

mitigation,’’ and that ‘‘DEA’s past policy

has been not to distinguish between

those falsifications that do and do not
61148 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 220 / Friday, November 14, 1997 / Notices

have related controlled substance

issues.’’

The Acting Deputy Administrator

agrees with the Government insofar as

DEA has in fact revoked registrations in

the past based upon the material

falsification of an application that was

not related to the mishandling of

controlled substances. See Ezzat E. Majd

Pour, M.D., 55 FR 47,547 (1990).

However, the Acting Deputy

Administrator concludes that in

exercising his discretion in determining

the appropriate remedy, he must

consider all of the facts and

circumstances of a particular case. Here,

it is relevant that Respondent credibly

testified that she did not think that the

liability question applied to her since

the suspension of her Illinois license

was to due to the improper handling of

controlled substances. The Acting

Deputy Administrator also finds it

relevant that Respondent correctly

answered a similar question on a

subsequent state application even before

she received the Order to Show Cause

from DEA alleging that she had

materially falsified two of her

applications.

Judge Randall concluded that

revocation would be too harsh a

sanction in this case, ‘‘[h]owever, the

Respondent’s failure to pay close

enough attention to the administrative

details necessary to maintain her

credentials in good standing warrants

some concern about the Respondent’s

meeting the responsibilities levied

against a person provided the authority

to prescribe and to dispense controlled

substances.’’ Therefore, Judge Randall

recommended that Respondent be

reprimanded for her failure to properly

complete here DEA registration

applications; and ‘‘that for a period of

three years, that Respondent be ordered

to file with the appropriate local DEA

resident office, on an annual basis, a

copy of a document from both the

Illinois and the Indiana medical boards

certifying that her medical licenses

remain in good standing in both States,

and that there is no impediment to her

handling controlled substances at the

State level.’’

The Acting Deputy Administrator

concludes that there is no question that

Respondent materially falsified two of

her applications for DEA registration.

This is extremely troubling since DEA

relies on accurate information being

submitted by its applicants. Further,

Respondent’s actions indicate a careless

disregard for attention to detail. This

lack of attention to detail is of great

concern to the Acting Deputy

Administrator since DEA registrants are

tasked with keeping meticulous records

regarding the handling of controlled

substances in order to prevent the

diversion of these dangerous substances.

However, the Acting Deputy

Administrator agrees with Judge Randall

that revocation would be too severe a

sanction given the facts and

circumstances of this case. The Acting

Deputy Administrator concurs with

Judge Randall’s recommendation that

Respondent be reprimanded for her

failure to properly complete her

applications for registration and that she

be required for a period of three years

to submit to the DEA Chicago Field

Division, on an annual basis,

documentation from both the Illinois

and the Indiana medical licensing

authorities certifying that her medical

licenses remain in good standing in both

states, and that there is no impediment

to her handling controlled substances at

the state level. The first such

documentation should be forwarded to

DEA within thirty days of the effective

date of this final order.

Accordingly, the Acting Deputy

Administrator of the Drug Enforcement

Administration, pursuant to the

authority vested in him by 21 U.S.C. 823

and 824, and 28 CFR 0.100(b) and 0.104,

hereby reprimands Martha Hernandez,

M.D., for failing to properly complete

her DEA registration applications. The

Acting Deputy Administrator further

orders that DEA Certificates of

Registration AH2262424 and

BH4493475, issued to Martha

Hernandez, M.D., be continued, and any

pending applications be granted, subject

to the above described restriction. This

order is effective December 15, 1997.

Dated: November 4, 1997.

James S. Milford,

Acting Deputy Administrator.

[FR Doc. 97–29972 Filed 11–13–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410–09–M

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration

Manufacturer of Controlled

Substances; Notice of Registration

By Notice dated July 29, 1997, and

published in the Federal Register on

August 26, 1997, (62 FR 45272),

Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., 59

Route 10, East Hanover, New Jersey

07936, made application by letter to the

Drug Enforcement Administration

(DEA) to be registered as a bulk

manufacturer of methylphenidate (1724)

a basic class of controlled substance

listed in Schedule II.

DEA has considered the factors in

Title 21, United States Code, Section

823(a) and determined that the

registration of Novartis Pharmaceuticals

Corp. to manufacture methylphenidate

is consistent with the public interest at

this time. Therefore, pursuant to 21

U.S.C. § 823 and 28 CFR 0.100 and

0.104, the Deputy Assistant

Administrator, Office of Diversion

Control, hereby orders that the

application submitted by the above firm

for registration as a bulk manufacturer

of the basic class of controlled substance

listed above is granted.

Dated: November 6, 1997.

John H. King,

Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of

Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement

Administration.

[FR Doc. 97–29973 Filed 11–13–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410–09–M

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employment Standards Administration

Wage and Hour Division

Minimum Wages for Federal and

Federally Assisted Construction;

General Wage Determination Decisions

General wage determination decisions

of the Secretary of Labor are issued in

accordance with applicable law and are

based on the information obtained by

the Department of Labor from its study

of local wage conditions and data made

available from other sources. They

specify the basic hourly wage rates and

fringe benefits which are determined to

be prevailing for the described classes of

laborers and mechanics employed on

construction projects of a similar

character and in the localities specified

therein.

The determinations in these decisions

of prevailing rates and fringe benefits

have been made in accordance with 29

CFR Part 1, by authority of the Secretary

of Labor pursuant to the provisions of

the Davis-Bacon Act of March 3, 1931,

as amended (46 Stat. 1494, as amended,

40 U.S.C. 276a) and of other Federal

statutes referred to in 29 CFR Part 1,

Appendix, as well as such additional

statutes as may from time to time be

enacted containing provisions for the

payment of wages determined to be

prevailing by the Secretary of Labor in

accordance with the Davis-Bacon Act.

The prevailing rates and fringe benefits

determined in these decisions shall, in

accordance with the provisions of the

foregoing statutes, constitute the

minimum wages payable on Federal and

federally assisted construction projects

to laborers and mechanics of the

specified classes engaged on contract