Confronting Security Challenges

on the Korean Peninsula

Edited by

Bruce E. Bechtol Jr.

Marine Corps University Press

Quantico, Virginia
Marine Corps University Press

3078 Upshur Avenue

Quantico, VA 22134

1st Printing, 2011

PCN 10600008100

ee views expressed in this book are solely those of the authors. eey do not necessarily reflect

the opinions of the organizations for which they work, Marine Corps University, the U.S.

Marine Corps, the Department of the Navy, or the U.S. government.
Contents

Introduction....................................................................................... 1

Bruce E. Bechtol Jr.

Chapter One

Transfer of Wartime Command—Some Personal eoughts.............. 7

Raymond P. Ayres Jr., Lieutenant General, USMC (Retired)

Chapter Two

North Korea’s Strategy of Compellence, Provocations, and the

Northern Limit Line........................................................................ 13

Robert M. Collins

Chapter Three

ee ROK–U.S. Military Alliance: Transformation and Change ...... 37

Cheon Seongwhun

Chapter Four

ee Lee Administration and Changes in ROK Strategic Culture ... 75

Doug Joong Kim

Chapter Five

ee North Korean Military ereat................................................... 99

Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.

Chapter Six

Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula.................................... 137

David Maxwell, Colonel, USA

Chapter Seven

Understanding North Korea’s Human Rights Abuses ................... 151

Chuck Downs

Chapter Eight

Breaking Barriers: ee Media War for North Korea...................... 167

Donald Kirk

Chapter Nine

ee “Faminist” State....................................................................... 189

George Alan Hutchinson

Symposium Participants................................................................ 219

iii

by Bruce E. Bechtol Jr.

On September 1, 2010, the Marine Corps University, the Korea

Economic Institute, and the Marine Corps University Foundation cohosted an academic symposium dealing with the Korean Peninsula. Entitled

“Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula,”the conference

brought together scholars, practitioners, policy officials, and university

students to address several challenging and ongoing questions dealing with

the peninsula.ee impressive list of speakers and panelists included retired

general officers and ambassadors who have years of experience in Korea and

the region, scholars from top universities and research institutes in both the

United States and Korea, and practitioners—from both the military and

policy communities—again from both countries.

eere was a variety of diverse perspectives presented at the symposium,

and as the reader will see in the book, they were often both relevant and

compelling. If there was one thing that all conference participants agreed on,

it was that the Korean Peninsula was and is in a state of flux. eis is easily

demonstrated if one simply considers that since the symposium convened

during the summer of 2010, North Korea has launched an artillery attack

against South Korean islands near the west coast of the peninsula, shown the

world that it now has a highly enriched uranium processing facility

(probably to be used for nuclear weaponization), and formally declared Kim

Jong-il’s third son as the next leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of

Korea (DPRK). Meanwhile, Pyongyang continues to engage in what are

probably the worst human rights practices on the planet.ee content of all

of the papers presented at the recent symposium was relevant to all of these

issues, and there were also many other points discussed that the reader is

likely to find interesting.

eere were three panels at the symposium, as well as two keynote

speakers. Ambassador Charles “Jack” Pritchard, president of the Korea

Economic Institute, gave an excellent speech addressing Northeast Asian

regional issues before more than 150 people at the symposium luncheon.

1

Introduction
Counterinsurgency Leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond

ee other keynote speaker, retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General

Raymond P. Ayres, presented an outstanding speech to open the symposium,

and graciously presented us with a copy.ee general’s speech, in its entirety,

is presented in chapter 1. It addresses the issue of changing wartime

operational control of Republic of Korea (ROK) and U.S. military forces—

an issue that is highly relevant today—and offers important perspectives for

those who will continue to deal with military issues on the Korean Peninsula

as the United States and the Republic of Korea transition their command

and control structure between now and 2015.

ee panels addressed important issues relevant for both the present and

future of the Korean Peninsula that remain important for the analysis and

planning of future military operations and diplomatic relationships. ee

peninsula is also an important security pivot in U.S. foreign policy and

military planning in the region—and one that will continue to be the focus

of attention for Washington because of the importance of the ROK–U.S.

alliance, and the unpredictable instability of the North Korean regime.

On the first panel, “Strategic Challenges on the Korean Peninsula,” all

three of the papers presented are included as chapters in this book. All of the

individuals who were kind enough to contribute their chapters to this

volume are former active duty U.S. or South Korean military personnel who

continue to contribute to the scholarship relating to Korea through their

work with the government and policy communities.

In chapter 2, “North Korea’s Strategy of Compellence, Provocations,

and the Northern Limit Line,” Robert M. Collins discusses the discernible

patterns of security policy that North Korea has displayed in recent years.

To do this, he addresses many recent and important issues, such as the

sinking of the ROK Navy corvette Cheonan, North Korea’s brinkmanship

and provocations, and possible actions that the ROK–U.S. alliance can take

to deter these actions.

In the second paper (chapter 3) from the first panel, “ee ROK–U.S.

Military Alliance: Transformation and Change,” Cheon Seongwhun

suggests a unique and comprehensive approach to strengthening the alliance

in light of the complex relationships and history that has existed between

these two great nations. He offers policy recommendations and important

perspectives that provide balance and shed light on the political, military,

and cultural issues that play a role in giving us all a better understanding of

2
what many consider to be Washington’s most important security

relationship in East Asia.

Doug Joong Kim, in the third paper from the first panel (chapter 4),

discusses how South Korean policy has changed dramatically since the

election of President Lee Myung-bak. Kim makes a compelling case for the

school of thought that since President Lee’s inauguration, South Korea has

been far more capable of containing North Korean aggression, of moving

closer to its key ally the United States, and improving its stature and

operational readiness as a force for security and stability in Northeast Asia.

ee second panel of the symposium was important because it addressed

an issue that has come to the forefront since the revelations of Kim Jongil’s poor health—“Planning for Contingencies on the Korean Peninsula.”It

has now become apparent from recent events in the North, that present and

future planning must involve not only experts from the military, but also

the international and geo-political arenas, regional specialists, and various

national and international agencies from both the United States and our

allies. It was in the spirit of this important “whole of government approach”

and doctrine that the second panel was convened.

In chapter 5, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. of Jane’s Defence Weekly addresses

both the conventional and unconventional military threat that North Korea

poses in his composition. Bermudez has written a simply brilliant essay

that—by the numbers—destroys many fallacies and rumors about North

Korea’s true military capabilities. eose who have an interest in the North

Korean order of battle, combat capabilities, and strategic military agenda,

will find this chapter to be both interesting, and quite compelling.

U.S. Army Colonel David Maxwell, a member of the faculty at the

National Defense University and one of the other presenters on the second

panel, has contributed the chapter entitled,“Irregular Warfare on the Korean

Peninsula.” In his essay, Colonel Maxwell, an expert and experienced

military planner and Special Forces officer, seeks to “explore some of the

potential outcomes on the Korean Peninsula following either collapse of

the Kim family regime or following conventional and unconventional

conflict with North Korea as well as to examine some of the possible ways

to prepare for and deal with those outcomes.”

ee third and final panel of the symposium was important because it

provided interesting analysis regarding an issue that is not often discussed

3

Introduction
at military conferences—human rights. Entitled, “Human Rights and the

Future of North Korea,” the panel presents three papers that address this

issue from distinctly different perspectives. Our contributors provide

chapters that address human rights in North Korea from the diverse

perspectives of a human rights activist and scholar, an expert logistician, and

a broadly experienced and highly respected journalist.

In chapter 7, entitled “Understanding North Korea’s Human Rights

Abuses,” Chuck Downs, the executive director of the Committee for

Human Rights in North Korea, states in part:

Basic freedoms, even those guaranteed by international agreements

the North Korean regime has signed, are routinely denied to North

Korea’s citizens. ee regime’s food distribution policy and its

political caste system predetermine that large segments of the

North Korean population receive none of the food provided by

international relief agencies and other countries. North Korea’s

political prison camps operate with an unmatched level of brutality.

Its human rights crisis has serious regional and international

consequences; it has caused a flow of refugees who often end up as

victims of exploitation, violence, or crime when they cross into

neighbouring countries, and China’s approach to this humanitarian

crisis is to send the refugees back to the North where they face

certain persecution.

eis essay provides a conceptual framework for understanding North

Korea’s human rights violations—and gives the reader extremely important

insights.

Don Kirk, a widely respected journalist on East Asian affairs, provides

us interesting and insightful analysis in chapter 8, entitled, “Breaking

Barriers: ee Media War for North Korea.” He gives us the unique

perspective of one who understands the media—particularly in East Asia—

better than almost anyone. His insights will offer the reader ideas and

important facts that will shed new light on how the press influences outside

views North Korea—and the regime itself.

ee final chapter addresses an issue that will be very important for both

military planners and non-governmental organizations with a stake in

North Korean human rights. In his essay entitled, “ee ‘Faminist’ State,”

George Hutchinson addresses up-to-date data that provides important

4

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula
information regarding North Korea’s constant fight to keep millions of its

people from being malnourished. He states in part:

Similar to the cycle that started in 1989, the period beginning in

2005 is characterized by increased international isolation, elevated

status of the military, and the murkiness associated with North

Korean political succession. However, unlike 1989, when the nation

failed to adapt to a world shifting under its feet, it is North Korea

that has systematically chosen to shift away from the world since

2005.

In this volume, our authors have given us several important theoretical

frameworks, new concepts, and diverse perspectives regarding the security

challenges that Washington and its allies now confront on the Korean

Peninsula. erough their research and writing, our distinguished scholars,

military officers, diplomats, and practitioners have made valuable

contributions to the scholarship relating to the security and the stability of

the Korean Peninsula, and the threats and challenges that are imminent for

the future. In addition to our contributing authors, I would like to thank

the gifted designer for this volume,Vincent J. Martinez. It is the hope of the

Marine Corps University, the Korea Economic Institute, and the Marine

Corps University Foundation—as well as all of the participants from the

symposium—that this book will inspire continued interest and motivate

further analysis within the military and policy communities regarding the

security issues now confronting the Korean Peninsula.

5

Introduction

Transfer of Wartime Command—Some Personal

Thoughts

by Lieutenant General Raymond P. Ayres Jr.

U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)

I was here [in Quantico, Virginia,] four years ago and made some

remarks about wartime operational control in Korea because the big topic

at that time was the transition to ROK [Republic of Korea] government

operational control of its forces during war. With the recent shift in the

effective date of the transfer of wartime command from April 2012 to

December 2015, it is in the headlines again—especially in Korea.

I want to share some of my personal thoughts about this. What I have

to say has nothing to do with any government position, ROK or U.S. It has

nothing to do with any military position. eis is just Ayres’ point of view.

As designated in United Nations Security Council Resolution 86 of

July 7, 1950, the United States is the executive agent for the United Nations

for all matters related to the armistice on the Korean Peninsula, to include

the resumption of hostilities. eat’s an important point. We’re not at peace

in Korea. We’re at armistice in Korea. People forget that we’re still

technically at war. eis responsibility is executed through the United

Nations Command or UNC.

ee UNC is not a warfighting command. ee warfighting would be

done by the Combined Forces Command (CFC)—at least while CFC still

continues to exist. CFC is a bilateral command formed between the

Republic of Korea and the United States. It is led by a binational system

where the national command authorities of both nations make the decisions.

ee United States runs the war in Korea if it resumes. eat gets lost in the

translation sometimes because a U.S. Army general commands both the

United Nations Command and the Combined Forces Command. It appears

that the United States is running the war, but he’s taking direction from

both national command authorities.

7

Chapter 1
CFC has its basis in the treaty between the two nations for the defense

of Korea in the event of another attack by the North. ee commander has

always been an American Army general—dual-hatted as the commander of

both UNC and CFC.eis dual-hatting makes perfect sense for the purpose

of ensuring consistency of focus. eere is no divergence between how the

United Nations Command and Combined Forces Command look at

things—the same commander is in charge.

ee U.S. force contribution is the United States Forces, Korea—USFK.

ee ROK contribution is almost the entire armed forces of Korea. Each

nation commands its own forces on a day-to-day basis during armistice, and

the Commander CFC exercises operational control of designated ROK and

U.S. forces during hostilities. eis follows the principle of war known as

“Unity of Command.” We only have 11 principles of war. We’ve had them

for a long time. Nobody disputes them. And they are valid as the

fundamental basis for how we conduct military operations.

ee CFC organization for combat includes six major Combined

Component Commands: Ground, Navy, Air, Marine, Special Operations,

and Psychological Operations.eree of these are commanded by Americans

with ROK deputy commanders. ee other three have ROK commanders

with U.S. deputies. eere are numerous units below these levels provided

by both the ROK and the United States.

Many aspects of operational control of combat units have been resolved

satisfactorily years ago. For example, an entire U.S. Army corps would fall

under the operational control of a ROK field army commander for combat

operations. ee current issue of transfer of wartime command deals with

the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, CFC, and component levels, not at the levels

below that.

ee United States has a firm national policy that U.S. forces will only

engage in combat under a U.S. commander. I agree with that policy

wholeheartedly. eis does not mean that there must there be an American

commander at every level in the chain of command, however. If the United

States can take this position wouldn’t an identical policy be equally

reasonable for other nations to apply? More specifically, if the war is taking

place in the Republic of Korea, a sovereign nation, why should their forces

operate under the operational control of a U.S. commander? It is not

automatically a bad idea that they might want to have wartime operational

8

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula
control of their forces.

I’m sure that this last question was the driving force behind former

President Roh Moo-hyun’s initiative for a “self-reliant defense” and

“wartime OPCON” of ROK forces.

Movement toward ROK lead in the defense of the ROK is a welcome

development. What would not be welcome would be the premature

assumption of responsibility. eat is why the shift to December 2015 has

occurred.

I don’t believe that we’ll see another shift in the effective date, and I am

convinced that the transition is going to happen. We’re not going back, no

matter how many people in the United States or the ROK—whether they’re

military or otherwise—think this is a bad idea. We’re going to do it.

Four years ago I said that we would do this as well as it can be done.

Now I think we’re going to do it even better with the additional time. ee

last thing we would want to do is shift this responsibility before we’re really

ready to do it. eat is exactly why it’s been postponed to December 2015

from April 2012.

Real experts have spent countless hours over many years working

through the details of bi-lateral command relationships during deliberate

planning and in exercises and wargames. It will ultimately be up to those

experts, who actually understand the challenges, to educate those who

don’t—if they will listen!

eere are no details that can’t be worked out once the right conditions

have been attained. In an ideal world the ROK would be totally selfsufficient with regard to its own national security. Up to the present time it

has not been ready for such self-sufficiency. ee ROK government has

prioritized national economic development and social programs over

national defense for decades. To be blunt—the desire for full sovereignty

over its own defense, by itself, will not change the current capabilities of the

ROK for national security. What makes the ROK defense issue so unique

is the “tyranny of proximity” where a large portion of more than a millionman military is within artillery range of the ROK capital of Seoul. ee

deterrence and defense challenges in this situation are extreme. No other

nation faces such challenges.

eere are areas where it has been mutually agreed that the ROK side

9

Transfer of Wartime Command—Some Personal Roughts
was ready to assume responsibility. ee special operations forces are

commanded by a ROK general. Rear area security is the responsibility of a

ROK Army commander. ee psychological operations effort is led by a

ROK general.ee counter–fire fight was assumed by the ROK side in 2005.

eere are other areas where the United States remains best able to

command and control, particularly air and sea operations. No nation in the

world comes close to the U.S. capabilities in these areas—and it would be

foolhardy to weaken our combined capabilities in these areas in particular.

eis brings us to ground operations. Despite being surrounded on three

sides by the sea, and notwithstanding the critical importance of airpower,

Korea remains a predominantly ground theater of operations. ee Army is

dominant among the ROK services.ee next Korean war will be won on the

ground.

More than 15 years ago the ROK four-star deputy CFC commander

was designated as the commander of the Ground Component Command,

or GCC. Prior to that, the CFC Commander functioned as his own GCC

commander. No separate staff was formed to be the GCC HQ. ee CFC

staff continued to function as the GCC staff. In my opinion, when this

arrangement was originally agreed to, it was more cosmetic than actual.eat

was probably fair enough in the beginning, however, the time has long

passed for this to be turned into reality. In recent years a small staff for the

GCC commander has been carved out of the ROK officers assigned to

CFC. eis has been a step in the right direction, but it is not sufficient.

eere needs to be a separate commander and a robust combined GCC

staff consisting of both ROK and U.S. officers established to support this

most critical component of CFC. Had we done this 10 years ago—when we

should have—all the necessary lessons would have already been learned, and

the doubts would have been relegated to history. Perhaps the issue of

“wartime OPCON’’ might never have been raised.

ee new concept calls for wartime operational command of ROK forces

by the ROK CJCS [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ]. ee new U.S.

contribution will be the U.S. Korea Command or KORCOM. eere will

be no Combined Forces Command. ee ROK side will be in the lead, and

KORCOM will be in support. eis is known as a “supported-supporting”

relationship, and it is well understood by both the ROK and U.S. militaries.

10

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula
ee most significant sacrifice the ROK–U.S. alliance is making is the

disestablishment of CFC. CFC was created to establish unity of command

in the face of a million-man-plus military, which is now armed with

significant WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and asymmetric

capabilities within artillery range of Seoul. However perfectly we work out

the details of the supported–supporting relationship, it will never completely

replicate unity of command.

ee day will come when the ROK is totally responsible for its own

national security and for its own defense. I have no idea when the conditions

will be right for that to occur. I suspect it will be decades. In the meantime

we have a new target date for the ROK side to assume responsibility for

taking the lead for the alliance in the defense of the ROK.

eere is actually a lot of good news associated with this.ee delay in the

transfer of wartime command from April 2012 until December 2015 is not

just pushing the effective date down the road. We will not simply pick up

the same plans three-and-a-half years later. It is an opportunity to

synchronize all major alliance initiatives starting immediately.To quote the

ROK Minister of National Defense Kim Tae-young, it is an “opportunity

to remodel the alliance for the next generation.” He is wrong only in one

regard. It is an opportunity to contribute to many generations to come.

ee extra three-and-a-half years will allow us to fully develop, train for,

and implement a robust ROK command and control capability and to

establish a fully capable ROK ground operations command among other

things.

ee shame will be on us if we fail to make the very most of this

opportunity.

11

Transfer of Wartime Command—Some Personal Roughts

13

Chapter 2

North Korea’s Strategy of Compellence,1

Provocations, and the Northern Limit Line

by Robert M. Collins

After fighting a war that ended not in peace but in an unsteady ceasefire

established by the July 27, 1953 Armistice Agreement, the Republic of

Korea–United States alliance has successfully deterred war on the Korean

Peninsula for 57 years. Yet, in the face of a relentless North Korean regime

determined to undermine the legitimacy and stability of the South Korean

government, the alliance has not been able to deter a steady stream of North

Korean military provocations, including those associated with Pyongyang’s

weapons of mass destruction and missile programs. North Korea has been

able to set the pace and level of political and military tensions on the Korean

Peninsula through the employment of a strategy of compellence using welltimed military provocations and other shows of force, supported by

provocative strategic communication initiatives, and modified by an

aggressive negotiation strategy and conciliatory diplomatic initiatives

designed to shape alliance responses—both unilateral and bilateral—and

garner political and economic concessions that support the survival of the

Kim family regime.

Clausewitz taught us that a state might use military force to achieve

political objectives. ee use of the military is but one tool of a state to gain

that objective,2 and North Korea has employed the military tool as well as

any other over the last half century in the conduct of its coercive diplomacy

and compellence strategy.eis strategy enables the attainment of otherwise

unattainable goals, considering North Korea’s moribund economy and their

provocative political and diplomatic tactics. We are all familiar with North

Korea’s steady stream of coercive actions over the decades since the end of

1 ee term “compellence” was coined by eomas Shelling in his book, Arms and Influence (New

Haven, CT:Yale University Press, 1966) to describe the counterpoint of deterrence.

2 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (translated by J. J. Graham) http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/

OnWar1873/BK1ch01.html.
the Korean War, and the sinking of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy

corvette Cheonan on March 26, 2010 is but the latest in a long history of

provocations.

I will attempt to put the sinking of the Cheonan in the context of North

Korea’s compellence strategy and examine what may be next on North

Korea’s provocation agenda.

Pyongyang’s Compellence Strategy

North and South Korea have been locked politically in a zero-sum game

even before the inception of both states in 1948.eeir politically antithetical

stances of communism versus anti-communism have since morphed over

the last 25 years into a classic confrontation between a totalitarian regime

and a full-blown democracy. While there has been on-again, off-again

progress on economic and social cooperation, the zero-sum approach in

government-to-government meetings remains a central characteristic in

inter-Korean relations, though rarely directly addressed as anything but

some formula of North-South unification. Fearing the superior diplomaticeconomic advances of the ROK, North Korea has chosen to develop a

coercive diplomacy to counter considerable ROK strengths.

As noted political scientist Alexander L. George has taught us,“coercive

diplomacy is a strategy that combines threats of force, and, if necessary, the

limited and selective use of force.”3 North Korea’s use of force to shape the

alliance has certainly not been limited, and it has been selective. Whether

to deter the United States, gain international acceptance of its nuclear and

long-range missile programs, demonstrate its own deterrence capabilities,

gain the withdrawal of U.S. Forces–Korea, eliminate the Northern Limit

Line, undermine the South Korean government, or gain concessions

contributing to survival of the Kim regime, North Korea’s provocations can

be and should be directly tied by analysts to the North’s political-military

objectives of its compellence strategy. eus, Pyongyang’s compellence

strategy serves the regime effectively in terms of gains versus losses in the

zero-sum game with South Korea.

A leading figure in developing the concepts of coercion, eomas

14

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

3 Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy As An Alternative to War

(Washington: U.S. Institute for Peace Press, 1991), 5–12.
Schelling, emphasizes that compellence is active and “induces his (target of

coercion) withdrawal, or his acquiescence, or his collaboration by an action

that threatens to hurt.”4 He further explains that compellence “requires that

the punishment be administered until the other acts rather than if he acts.”5

(For the alliance, deterrence and defense focuses on if he acts.) Apparently,

North Korea is an excellent student of Schelling’s, as it has consistently

“punished” the alliance through the aforementioned well-timed

provocations. Complementing these aggressive actions, North Korea

employs threatening themes and messages in its strategic communication

and information operations to imply that further force is forthcoming if

compliance by the alliance does not take place. ee North targets not only

ROK and U.S. leaders, but also their regional counterparts, the international

media, and the ROK public as well.

North Korea’s threats of war are nearly legendary. North Korean

compellence creates conditions favorable to further provocation over those

of deterrence and can create an imbalance of willingness to escalate,

particularly if domestic political debate and public opinion in the ROK

favors non-response by the alliance. Hyping tensions and threatening war

or retaliation serves to accentuate the perception that tensions are at an

intolerable level for those not accustomed to it.ee North Korean leadership

has proven that they are and has arguably shaped the ROK public by

inducing fear of war and creating by-products in political decision-making

in the ROK. North Korea has shown it is more motivated than the ROK

to use force and this is likely because the North demonstrates little

competence in other forms of national power compared to the South.

Laying in direct contrast to the alliance’s strategy of deterrence and

defense, North Korea’s compellence strategy has used a variety of

provocations to gain specific political, economic, and military concessions.

Due to Pyongyang’s consistent employment of provocations, the Korean

Peninsula has 57 years of experiencing crisis after crisis of varying intensity,

suffered nearly 600 ROK and U.S. military deaths, and has been to the brink

of war twice—in 1976 and 1994. While alliance deterrence depends upon

posture, vigilance, readiness, and capabilities to demonstrate strength, North

Korea chooses to initiate action strong enough to draw political and

economic responses but not so strong as to draw military retaliation.

15

North Korea’s Strategy of Compellence, Provocations, and the Northern Limit Line

4 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 67–80.

5 Ibid.
Besides the sobering strategic provocations of two nuclear tests and

continued development and launching of long-range ballistic missiles, by

2003, North Korea had conducted 1,439 major provocations, primarily

against the ROK, but also against U.S. personnel and assets.6 North Korea

has attacked and destroyed several U.S. aircraft, hijacked a U.S. naval ship

and ROK civilian aircraft, and murdered scores of South Korean citizens. It

has planned and attempted to assassinate the ROK president in 1968, 1970,

1974, 1981, and 1983. It has conducted naval skirmishes along the Northern

Limit Line (NLL) where the North Korean Navy sunk several ROK ships

in the 1960s, 1970s, 1990s, and this decade as well. It has hijacked hundreds

of ROK fishing boats for the purpose of training captured fishermen as

sleeper agents when returned to the South. Furthermore, from 1960 through

2007, North Korea has conducted 1,243 known infiltrations by 3,718

personnel. From 1973 through 2007 (not counting 1981–88), the North has

crossed the Northern Limit Line a total 4,166 times.7

On occasion, North Korea has gone beyond alliance thresholds such as

in the case of artillery exchanges in the 1960s8 and the 1976 axe murders in

the Joint Security Area. In the latter, the alliance executed a major show of

force by going to DEFCON 3 for three weeks, deploying the aircraft carrier

USS Midway (CVA 41) to Korean waters, and flying B-52 and F-111

missions along the DMZ for weeks.eis led to the only known “statement

of regret” from North Korean leader Kim Il-sung within hours of the

alliance response.9

Furthermore, I personally heard former Secretary of Defense William

Perry state twice that during the nuclear crisis of 1994, he was within two

days of recommending to then–President William J. Clinton an attack on

North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear plant to stop Pyongyang’s plutonium

program. Escalation from there is anybody’s guess, but the alliance most

assuredly would have received some form of major kinetic response.

16

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

6 Andrew Scobell and John M. Sanford, North Korea’s Military Rreat: Pyongyang’s Conventional

Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles, Strategic Studies Institute Monograph,

(Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, April 2007), 27.

7 Narushige Michishita, North Korea’s Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966-2008 (London:

Routledge, 2010), 202–3.

8 Interview data with USFK staff officer from the 1960s.

9 Richard A. Mobley, “Revisiting the Korean Tree-Trimming Incident,” Joint Forces Quarterly,

Summer 2003, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0KNN/is_35/ai_n8563325/pg_7/?tag=

content;col1.
North Korea has demonstrated that it recognizes some limits in their

compellence strategy and use of provocations. Even in the Cheonan sinking

the North has vigorously denied responsibility, presumably to limit alliance

justification for retaliation. Alliance credibility, particularly U.S. credibility

in terms of resolve to use force, no doubt lies in North Korean motivations

to limit its actions. ee North Korean perspective of U.S. credibility has

been shaped over the decades by the United States’ use of force to coerce a

number of international antagonists to its will. With deep involvement in

Vietnam, North Korea found during the 1960s it could be very aggressive

in the Korean eeater of Operations as the United States showed restraint

in serious provocations against U.S. aircraft and ships and the alliance found

it difficult to stop North Korean guerilla infiltrations. However, subsequent

U.S. use of force in Grenada, Panama, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo,

Somalia, two wars against Iraq, and Afghanistan—not to mention the

Korean War—have clearly demonstrated American resolve to use force. U.S.

forward deployment of ground, air, and naval forces in the ROK and Japan,

and treaty alliances with those two nations carry no small self-perceived

threat to the Kim family regime, particularly should Pyongyang find the

motivation or miscalculation to initiate hostilities against South Korea.

Despite North Korea’s read of this U.S. threat and regional commitment, the

question remains—is North Korea “deterrable?” ee answer would be

“apparently so,”given that North Korea has not executed a general attack in

the last 57 years. As is not so commonly understood, the ROK–U.S.

alliance’s most effective strategic communication lies in the military

intelligence collected by the Korean People’s Army’s own ISR—that is:

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—against alliance capabilities

and readiness activities.

But when it comes to provocation,North Korea appears to be “undeterrable.”

To paraphrase a noted economist, “strategy is not concerned with the efficient

application of force,but with the exploitation of potential force.”10 North Korea’s

strategy of compellence exploits North Korea’s capabilities and most recently,

that exploitation has centered in those areas where North Korea has invested its

capital in the military—in the asymmetric areas of their nuclear and missile

programs, as well as in the world’s largest special operations force.11

17

North Korea’s Strategy of Compellence, Provocations, and the Northern Limit Line

10 eomas Schelling, Re Strategy of Conflict, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960, 1980), 5.

11 For a comprehensive analysis of North Korea’s asymmetric military capabilities, see Bruce E. Bechtol Jr.,

Defiant Failed State: Re North Korean Rreat to International Security (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2010).
Tyranny of Proximity

ee single greatest enabler of this compellence strategy is the forward

deployment of the 1.2 million–man Korean People’s Army (KPA).ee KPA

is the fifth largest armed force in the world and about 70 percent of it is

deployed south of Pyongyang.12 eis emplacement has evolved

incrementally over the decades and can be characterized as “creeping

normalcy.” (See Figure 2.1) Most of the KPA is located within 43.5 miles

of the Demilitarized Zone which separates North Korea from South Korea,

and much of the KPA’s combat power—including long-range artillery and

short-range ballistic missiles—is located within 40 miles of the ROK capital

of Seoul. eis “tyranny of proximity” enables North Korea to attack with

little tactical warning.

ee KPA is comprised of 153 divisions and brigades. eis includes 20

corps commands that lead “60 infantry divisions/brigades, 25 mechanized

infantry brigades, 13 tank brigades, 25 special forces brigades, and 30

artillery brigades.13 North Korea maintains the world’s largest special

operations force of approximately 100,000 troops.14 Other estimates range

from 88,000 to 120,000,15 and one recent estimate puts those forces at

180,000.16 Approximately 250 systems of 170mm Koksan guns and 240mm

multiple-rocket launchers are deployed within range of Seoul.17

ee forward deployment of KPA forces and its associated long-range

artillery and missile arsenal threatens extensive damage to Seoul in any

future conflict in a limited or general attack, or provocation leading to

escalation of artillery exchanges. eis would destroy one the world’s 15

largest economies as Seoul is the economic as well as political and cultural

center of South Korea. Some estimates insist that the casualties from a

18

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

12 Statement of Gen Leon J. Laporte, Commander, United Nations Command, Commander,

Republic Of Korea–United States Combined Forces Command, and Commander, United States

Forces Korea; before ee Senate Armed Services Committee, 1 April 2004, http://www.dod.gov/

dodgc/olc/testimony_old/108_second.html.

13 Andrew Scobell and John M. Sanford, 22.

14 Statement of Gen B. B. Bell, Commander, United Nations Command; Commander, Republic Of

Korea–United States Combined Forces Command; and Commander, United States Forces Korea,

before the Senate Armed Services Committee; 7 March 2006.

15 Andrew Scobell and John M. Sanford. See ch4, n38.

16 Chosun Ilbo, “N. Korea ‘Has 180,000 Special Forces Ready to Cross into South,’” 16 June 2010,

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/06/16/2010061601318.html.

17 Statement of Gen B. B. Bell, 2006.
missile and artillery attack on the South could end up in the hundreds of

thousands. ee 170mm guns and 240mm rocket launchers are chemical

round–capable and could fire up to 10,000 rounds per minute on the capital

and surrounding areas.ee number of rounds the KPA could deliver across

the entire front is significantly higher and would be devastating to the ROK

and its population.

19

North Korea’s Strategy of Compellence, Provocations, and the Northern Limit Line

Figure 2.1 - Korean People’s Army Forward Deployment.

Source: USFK Story Brief, 2005, and Andrew Scobell and John Sanford, North Korea’s

Military Rreat: Pyongyang’s Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic

Missiles, Strategic Studies Institute Monograph (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, April

2007), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB771.pdf, 66.
ee chemical round capability of these systems would significantly

increase casualties, particularly against an unprotected civilian populace

of one of the world’s largest cities. One former U.S. commander of

ROK–U.S. Combined Forces Command stationed in Seoul estimated

that another all-out war on the Korean Peninsula would result in a

million casualties, roughly 52,000 American dead or wounded in the

first 90 days, more than $100 billion in costs to the United States, and

a trillion dollars in economic damages and lost business.18

erough manipulation of this “tyranny of proximity”Pyongyang has

been able to raise and lower political and military tensions almost at will

to achieve tactical and strategic goals of weakening or reversing

international and/or unilateral sanctions, influencing South Korea’s

public, and South Korea to pay the North about $2.2 billion in cash and

other support during the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun

administrations. eis was paid in return for North-South engagement

topped by a summit meeting with Kim Jong-il by each president.

Another major achievement was the acquisition of millions of metric

tons of heavy fuel oil from a U.S.-led consortium as a result of shutting

down the North’s Yongbyon nuclear plant in accordance with the

Agreed Framework of October 21, 1994.19

In my own subjective thinking, and I am certainly not alone, there

is no other military theater in the world where tactical actions so quickly

take on major strategic implications. North Korea’s proximitydominated force posture creates an environment where local

provocations set in motion actions and decisions that quickly impact

national leaders, immediately feed the security fears of the ROK public,

and are eagerly hyped by the ROK and international media.ee history

of North Korea’s provocations demonstrates that manipulation of this

proximity has become institutionalized within its leadership thinking

as the primary component of their compellence strategy.

20

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

18 Vernon Loeb and Peter Slevin, “Overcoming North Korea’s ‘Tyranny of Proximity’ ” Washington

Post, 20 January 2003, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A15466-2003Jan19?

language=printer.

19 See Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization—Executive Director’s Statement, 31

December 2004, http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/KEDO_AR_2004.pdf.
North Korean Negotiation Strategy

Complementing Pyongyang’s compellence strategy is the North’s

negotiation strategy.20 Once its provocations lead to the negotiation table,

the North exploits the desired de-escalation in tensions to obtain the desired

concessions. It employs both bilateral and multilateral negotiations to shape

the diplomatic environment, frequently pitting ROK interests against those

of the United States to gain the most from its interlocutor.

eere is a detectable pattern in the North’s negotiation strategy. One of

the best assessments of this process is the eight-step strategy explained

below by a U.S. Army officer with more than 150 negotiation sessions with

the North Koreans at the Joint Security Area in Panmunjom.

1. Cause the “appearance” of tension.

2. Blame the UNC, ROK, and United States for the tense

situation.

3. Quickly agree “in principle” to a major improvement in

relations and publicize the “breakthrough.”

4. Set artificial deadlines to pressure the other side.

5. Politicize and draw out negotiations front-loading the

agenda and demanding preconditions (which are often the

true objectives).

6. Blame the UNC, ROK, and United States for the

protracted talks.

7. Demand compensation or a major concession, before

attending future meetings.

8. Go back to step 1.21

21

North Korea’s Strategy of Compellence, Provocations, and the Northern Limit Line

20 For more information on North Korean negotiation strategies, see: Chuck Downs, Over the Line:

North Korea’s Negotiating Strategy (Washington: AEI Press, 1999); Richard Saccone, To the Brink

and Back: Negotiating with North Korea (Elizabeth, NJ: Hollym International, 2003); Scott Snyder,

Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior (Washington: United States Institute of

Peace Press, 1999); and C. Turner Joy, How Communists Negotiate (Santa Monica, CA: Fidelis

Publishers, 1970).

21 Interview with retired U.S. Army LtCol Stephen M. earp who developed these steps for the

United Nations Command in the late 1990s. He spent more than six years with the UNC Military

Armistice Commission and met with the North Korean People’s Army delegations at Panmunjom

on more than 150 occasions. He was the last UNC Officer to meet with the Chinese representative,

a total of 12 meetings.
eis strategy is employed quite successfully because the North can fall

back on provocations, kinetic or non-kinetic, at any time it perceives that

negotiations have failed from their perspective.

Pyongyang’s Shaping of the Northern Limit Line

ee sinking of the Cheonan was just the latest in Pyongyang’s efforts to

shape the confrontation over the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea

(sometimes called the West Sea in Korea). ee NLL was established

unilaterally in August 1953 by General Mark Clark, Commander, United

Nations Command (UNC), for the purpose of separating forces under the

conditions of an armistice.ee NLL became the maritime line in the water

whereby ROK and U.S. ships would not cross beyond into the North. eis

line took into account the security of the five Northwest Islands under UNC

control as designated in the Armistice.eough legally not a maritime border,

the NLL has served as a geographical point of contention since its

22

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

Figure 2.2 North Korea’s Sea Border Line Claim.

Source: ROK Ministry of Unification 2007, as reported in Bruce Bechtol, “ee Cheonan

Incident and North Korea’s Northern Limit Line Strategy,”

http://www.defensestudies.org/?p=2575#more-2575.
establishment—North Korea trying to change the status quo in the Yellow

Sea, and South Korea steadfastly defending the NLL as a defense line on

its western maritime flank.

North Korea originally demanded 12-mile territorial waters at the time

of armistice talks. In March 1955, through a cabinet resolution, the nation

decided its territorial waters would be 12 miles, although such an action was

never propagated to the outside world.22 Indeed, at the time, North Korea

did not maintain a navy of any credibility to enforce such a claim. At a

plenary meeting of the Military Armistice Commission in December 1973,

the North claimed that the entire area lying southeast of U-Do as being

their coastal waters, based on Article 13 of the Armistice Agreement. It

made the same claim during negotiations on the South–North Basic

Agreement in 1992.23 In July 1977, the DPRK declared a 200-mile exclusive

economic zone (EEZ) based on median lines. It then declared that the EEZ

boundary line was the sea military demarcation line in August 1997.24 At

the Panmunjom General Officers Talks of July 21, 1999, North Korea

declared that the line connecting the equidistant points between South and

North Korea and China was the new sea demarcation line and that the area

north of that line would be North Korea’s Sea Military Control Zone.25

(See Figure 2.2)

After the Korean People’s Army–Navy suffered losses in an engagement

with South Korean naval forces in November 2009, North Korea continued

to shape the Yellow Sea environment politically and militarily. ee DPRK,

in another attempt at abrogating the NLL, designated a “peace-time firing

zone”around it that December. In the following two months, KPA artillery

fired numerous volleys into the zone for the first time, claiming that these

firings were routine exercises.26

To demonstrate how important the Kim regime regards the conflict

over the NLL, one can look at the reassignment of General Kim Kyok-sik

from the senior KPA active-duty position of Chief of the KPA General

23

North Korea’s Strategy of Compellence, Provocations, and the Northern Limit Line

22 Republic Of Korea Ministry of National Defense, “ee Republic Of Korea Position Regarding

ee Northern Limit Line,” August 2002, http://www.military.co.kr/english/NLL/NLL.htm.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Sun-won Park, Strategic Posture Review: South Korea, Brookings Institution,

http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2010/0317_korea_park.aspx.
Staff—roughly the equivalent of the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff—to the position of KPA 4th Corps commander. On the surface this

appears to be a demotion after serving for two years as the chief and then

being relegated to the seemingly second tier of a frontline commander.eat

is odd to be sure. But a closer look at General Kim’s career shows that he was

the KPA 2d Corps commander for at least ten years from before 1997 to

February 2007.ee 2d Corps is deployed directly north of Seoul astride the

primary avenue of approach from North to South crossing the DMZ.

During that time, he would have studied the ROK–U.S. Combined Forces

Command and their operational plans more than anyone in the North as it

was his responsibility to lead the defeat of the alliance’s combined forces

should another Korean War break out. Also during that time, the KPA

deployed hundreds of long-range artillery systems comprised of 170mm

Koksan guns and 240mm multiple-rocket launchers, most of which can

range Seoul. As the 2d Corps commander, Kim would have been intimately

involved in the artillery’s deployment and related employment strategies

and plans. It is hard to imagine that any other KPA general understands as

well as Kim Kyok-sik the use of artillery as a “show of force”tool supporting

North Korea’s coercive diplomacy and compellence strategy. Upon

reassignment to the 4th Corps, General Kim completely redid the coastal

artillery deployment so as to provide maximum coastal ground support to

any KPA actions in the vicinity of the NLL and the Northwest Islands.

One report, quoting ROK intelligence sources, states that Kim

strengthened KPA guerilla training in the Yellow Sea area and that this was

detected several times by ROK ISR. ee same report went on to say that

“Kim Jong-il told Kim Kyok-sik that his mission was complete and that he

should come back”27 (presumably to Pyongyang).

Sinking of the Cheonan and the Alliance’s Response

On May 20, 2010, the ROK president-appointed Joint Civilian–

Military Investigation Group ( JIP) held a news conference and publicly

announced on Korean television the results of their eight-week investigation

into the sinking of the Cheonan. ee group was composed of experts from

24

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

27 Yonhap News, (Military Intelligence Report On KPA Actions Directly After ee Cheonan

Sinking), in Korean, 4 April 2010, http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LPOD&mid=

tvh&oid=001&aid=0003238455.
Australia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. eeir

findings were supported and confirmed by a separate Multinational

Combined Intelligence Task Force that included the ROK, United States,

Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom and was comprised of 25

experts from 10 ROK agencies, 22 military experts, and 24 foreign experts.28

ee two findings concluded that “of North Korea’s fleet of 70 submarines,

a ‘few small submarines, along with a mother ship’left a North Korean naval

base on the West (Yellow) Sea two to three days prior to the attack. When

the Cheonan sank on 26 March, a North Korea-made, wake-homing CHT02D torpedo created a shock wave and bubble effect that caused the corvette

to split apart and sink, leaving 46 ROK sailors dead, not to mention others

who died in salvage efforts.”29 ee conclusion was that North Korea was

responsible.

eese findings have not gone undisputed, including differing opinions

from within the ROK cabinet. Conspiracy theories include U.S. Navy

SEALs sinking the Cheonan so that the United States could scare the

Japanese into letting the U.S. Marine bases remain on Okinawa, or that a

ROK Navy submarine fired a previously-captured CHT-02D torpedo at

the warship to artificially create a crisis, or that the United States created this

incident to simulate a “Gulf of Tonkin incident” whereby it could justify

subsequent offensive actions against North Korea, or, according to one ROK

government official, the Cheonan sunk when hit by an old mine.30

Consequently, ROK President Lee announced that he was abrogating

the Inter-Korean Agreement on Maritime Transportation and North Korea

would no longer be able to sail its merchant ships through the Cheju Strait.

He also stated he was suspending inter-Korean trade and exchanges and

would continue anti–North Korean propaganda broadcasts along the DMZ.

In a turn of ROK military strategy, he stated that “if our territorial waters,

25

North Korea’s Strategy of Compellence, Provocations, and the Northern Limit Line

28 Park In-kook, “Letter dated 4 June 2010 from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of

Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations

Security Council, S/2010/281, 4 June 2010, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/

%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/DPRK%20S%202010%20281%

20SKorea%20Letter%20and%20Cheonan%20Report.pdf.

29 Re Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group, “Investigation Result on the Sinking of ROKS

Cheonan.” 20 May 2010, news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/20_05_10jigreport.pdf.

30 Peter Foster, “Cheonan Sinking: Top Ten Conspiracy eeories”Re Telegraph.

http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/peterfoster/100042229/cheonan-sinking-top-ten-conspiracytheories/.
airspace, or territory are militarily violated, we will immediately exercise our

right of self-defense.”31

North Korea’s Counter-response

In the 26 months leading up to the Cheonan attack, North Korea had

grown frustrated with South Korea’s Lee Myung-bak administration over

the discontinuation of the very generous non-reciprocal “sunshine” policies

of former Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun.eus North Korea

cut off most ties with the South and declared all inter-Korean agreements

as being “dead documents.”32 Subsequent to that, the DPRK navy suffered

an embarrassing loss of face during the November 2009 naval firefight along

the NLL. ee Cheonan sinking came just five months later. eis repeats a

similar “deadly defeat–recover face” exchange in 1999 and 2002, also along

the NLL. Soon after the November defeat, Kim Jong-il visited the North

Korean naval station at Nampo (directly north of and the closest naval base

to the NLL) and called upon the sailors there to become more advanced in

the navy’s weaponry and strategy. He also called for them to form suicide

squads so as to become heroes.33

Unsurprisingly, North Korea denied attacking the Cheonan, instead

claiming that the conservative Lee Myung-bak administration was

manufacturing a crisis to raise peninsular tensions and create domestic

support for his ruling party in the South’s June local elections.34 On May 28,

2010, Pyongyang televised a first-ever news conference by the Kim Jong-il–

chaired National Defense Commission that rebutted Seoul’s evidence point

by point.35 A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman laid out why

26

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

31 Gus Lubin, “South Korea ereatens War If North Korea Makes One More Provocation,”

Business Insider, 23 May 2010, http://www.businessinsider.com/south-korea-threatens-war-ifnorth-korea-makes-one-more-provocation-2010-5#ixzz0xU0bFaqx.

32 David Eimer, “North Korea Cuts All Links with South Korea.” Re Telegraph,

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/4394455/North-Korea-cuts-alllinks-with-South-Korea.html.

33 Chosun Ilbo, “Kim Jong-il Called for Stronger Navy After Defeat in Skirmish,” 6 May 2010,

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/05/06/2010050601362.html.

34 Miyoung Kim, “North Korea denies it sank South’s navy ship,” Reuters, 17 April 2010,

http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE63G0CN20100417.

35 Pyongyang Korean Central Television, “NDC News Conference on Cheonan Incident,” 28 May

2010, in Korean.
Seoul’s evidence on the Cheonan is flawed, reiterating a May 20 proposal to

send an “inspection team” to review the South’s case ( June 4).36

Only hours after U.S. President Barack H. Obama asked PRC President

Hu Jin-tao to take a stronger stance against North Korea on the Cheonan

sinking incident, Pyongyang announced that it would “bolster its nuclear

deterrent.”37 Whether that “bolstering” is weaponization of a plutonium

weapon mounted on a competent delivery system or a new highly-enriched

uranium device remains to be seen. One month later in July, North Korea

threatened to use nuclear weapons in a “retaliatory sacred war” in response

to alliance naval exercises.38

Perhaps, North Korea’s most significant gain from the attack on the

Cheonan was on the diplomatic front: China and Russia refused to accept

the JIP findings and thus, for the most part, defused alliance justification for

retaliation.

International Responses

ee ROK and United States took the findings and reported them

directly to the U.S. Security Council on June 4, 2010.39 ee ROK sought a

United Nations Security Council resolution condemning North Korea for

the attack, as well as seeking an apology and compensation from Pyongyang.

However, China blocked these demands, instead agreeing to a formal

statement that did not require a vote, but certainly of far less impact. Nor

would China refer to the attack directly, instead calling it a “sinking.”40

ee UNSC’s president for the month of July, Nigeria’s U Joy Ogwu,

read a president’s statement in lieu of a Security Council resolution

condemning North Korea. His statement acknowledged the JIP findings

27

North Korea’s Strategy of Compellence, Provocations, and the Northern Limit Line

36 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Station, “DPRK FM Spokesman on US, ROK

Attempting To Refer Cheonan Incident to UNSC,” 4 June 2010.

37 BBC, “North Korea ereatens ‘New’ Nuclear Deterrent” 28 June 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/

news/10430574.

38 Park Chan-Kyong, “N. Korea ereatens Nuclear Response To Naval War Games,” Sydney World

Herald, 24 July 2010, http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-world/nkorea-threatens-nuclearresponse-to-naval-war-games-20100724-10pg2.html.

39 See Park In-kook letter.

40 Joe Lauria, “China Stalls U.N. Efforts Against North Korea,” Wall Street Journal, 8 July 2010,

http://online.wsj.com/article/na_wsj_pub:sb10001424052748703636404575352962809339090.html.
blaming the DPRK for the attack and condemned the attack itself, but fell

short of directly condemning the North.41

eis led to public condemnation of North Korea by leaders of influential

nations such as Japan, United Kingdom, and Australia, not to mention the

alliance.

For China, the attack on the Cheonan immediately became a no-win

situation. By acknowledging that North Korea was responsible for the ship’s

sinking, China would be giving tacit approval for any ROK or U.S.

retaliatory response. Beijing lacks influence over Kim Jong-il’s decisions

unless they are willing to withhold aid such as food and fuel, less they create

instability inside North Korea. eat is counter to their desire for a stable

buffer state. Kim Jong-il met with PRC leader Hu Jin-tao in his visit to

Beijing May 3–6,42 shortly after attacking the Cheonan. eis put President

Hu in a difficult position at best. China needs North Korea as a strategic and

operational buffer from the United States and its influence in the ROK and

Japan. Consequently, the stability of North Korea is vital to this position

and the threat of escalating military tensions on the Korean Peninsula is

something Beijing must avoid from the outset—and they successfully did

so. By not supporting any UNSC resolution condemning North Korea,

ROK and U.S. justification for retaliation was essentially squashed.

Furthermore, when the alliance decided to conduct a major show of

force with an antisubmarine exercise—including the deployment of the

aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN 73)—in the Yellow Sea as a

less-than-kinetic response to North Korea’s sinking of the Cheonan, China

successfully pressured the deployment of the carrier to the other side of the

Korean Peninsula. eis kept major U.S. power out of waters adjacent to

China, and thereby de-escalated tensions.

ee crux of China’s position, however, is more accurately reflected in

the statement by PLA Major General Luo Yuan in which he stated, “It is

like your mother-in-law . . . you just can’t get rid of her. You have to find a

way to manage her.” He was discussing China–North Korean ties.

28

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

41 Security Council Condemns Attack On Republic Of Korea Naval Ship ‘Cheonan’, Stresses Need

To Prevent Further Attacks, Other Hostilities In Region. Security Council SC/9975, Meeting

6635, 9 July 2010, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9975.doc.htm.

42 CBSNews.com, “Kim Jong Il Ends Secret Trip To China.” 6 May 2010,

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/05/06/world/main6464954.shtml.
Representative of China’s position on the United States is Admiral Yang

Yi, a former director of the Institute for Strategic Studies at the People’s

Liberation Army National Defense University. He wrote in the August 13

edition of the China Daily newspaper that the U.S. decision to use a

nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in ROK-U.S. naval drills in the Yellow Sea

would provoke China. He went on to threaten that the United States would

“pay a costly price”for its “muddled decision,”and its adherence to the “Cold

War mentality.”43

Russia’s response had some significant parallels in terms of interest in

limiting U.S. influence within the region. Unlike a recently “leaked”Russian

Foreign Ministry policy document that gives an impression of being more

friendly to the West, Russia’s military doctrine document released last

February clearly has an anti-Western tone. According to the doctrine,

“dangers to Russia include deployment of foreign (i.e., American) troops in

states bordering Russia and strategic missile defense.”44 We should assume

that this applies to Russia’s view of the Korean Peninsula also. eere is no

love lost between Russia and North Korea but their common anti-U.S.

stance gives them common ground. Most Russian analysts see limiting the

influence of the United States in Northeast Asia as being far more

important than Russian–North Korean relations. eis fits quite well into

the international political aspect of Kim Jong-il’s survival strategy whereby

he can leverage major regional powers’ anti-U.S. stance to his advantage.

On the technical approach, Russia sent a team of four submarine and

torpedo experts from its navy to Seoul to evaluate the ROK JIP’s evidence

and concluded that there was insufficient evidence to find North Korea

guilty, insisting that the evidence was “not weighty enough.”45 ee Russian

team disputed the findings by focusing on timing issues, presence of fishing

nets on the Cheonan screws, and the assumption of sea mines in the area.46

29

North Korea’s Strategy of Compellence, Provocations, and the Northern Limit Line

43 Bloomberg, “Chinese Admiral Says U.S., South Korea Drills ‘Fresh Provocation’ to China,” 13

August 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-13/chinese-admiral-says-u-s-southkorea-drills-fresh-provocation-to-china.html.

44 David J. Kramer, “Russia’s ‘new’ stance remains anti-West,” Washington Post, June 22, 2010,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/21/AR2010062103696.html.

45 Vladimir Radyuhin, “Russian Probe Undercuts Cheonan Sinking eeory,”Re Hindu, 9 June 2010,

http://thehindu.com/news/international/article450117.ece.

46 Leonid Petrov, “Russia Navy Expert Team’s Analysis on the Cheonan Incident” WordPress, 28 July

2010, http://leonidpetrov.wordpress.com/2010/07/28/russian-navy-expert-team%E2%80%99sanalysis-on-the-cheonan-incident/.
ee bottom line is that Chinese and Russian responses seem to be

designed to keep the alliance from justifying a retaliatory response, and thus

a potential escalation of military tensions.

North Korea’s Next Steps

Further development of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs

have given the alliance new challenges in developing deterrence strategies.

Pyongyang has begun to tout their “nuclear deterrent”and the realization of

that will eventually undermine the relative stability of alliance deterrence

on the Korean Peninsula.

ee most dramatic recent change for the Kim regime is the realization that

Kim Jong-il will not be around forever.As the regime attempts a second dynastic

succession to Kim Il-song’s grandson,North Korea will have to continue to focus

on strategies that both gain concessions because they are needed in their overall

strategy—to include negating the NLL—and applying credit to the succession

process. From the North Korean perspective, their NLL claims are legitimate.

eerefore the North’s compellence strategy’s implementation will continue,

regardless of whether there is a succession issue or not.

ee development of missile systems and artillery tactics will continue to

increase the North’s capability along the NLL. Improvements in the

interoperability of the North Korean navy, air force, special operations forces,

and the adjacent coastal artillery will become evident in future shows of

force or direct provocations.

North Korea’s success in the Yellow Sea and along the NLL is critical

to establishing a flanking posture to Seoul’s west. Success here leaves Seoul

vulnerable to envelopment during a general or limited attack. But more

immediately, it would enable Pyongyang to launch provocations much closer

to Seoul’s western flank and provide the North with more coercion at the

negotiation table.

However, the most important development out of this tragedy, for

Pyongyang at least, was gaining tacit approval from China and Russia for

bad behavior that embarrassed both of them. Manipulation of Beijing’s and

Moscow’s preferred anti-U.S. position on security matters in Northeast Asia

will be invaluable in the years ahead as the Kim regime goes through

another uncertain succession process.

30

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula
Deterring Further North Korean Provocations

During a crisis on the Korean Peninsula that evolves into a road to war,

efforts at de-escalation become critical to all parties and regional actors

interested in avoiding conflict. As a potential crisis grows and expands, and

miscalculations develop—apparent or not—all parties will endeavor to avoid

war, both through deterrence measures and de-escalation efforts. North

Korea will walk a fine line in conducting provocations to gain concessions

supporting succession while simultaneously managing that succession, and

war is the last thing needed during transition.

Given how adept the Kim regime is in orchestrating the

implementation of its compellence strategy, deterring North Korean

provocations is difficult at best. However, there are further steps that the

alliance can take to increase their deterrence capability. A comprehensive

political-military deterrence strategy that leverages alliance diplomatic,

economic, and strategic communication capabilities to compliment the

significant military capabilities of the combined ROK and U.S. forces would

improve the deterrence posture of the alliance. Realistically, that posture is

very effective politically and militarily now, particularly in terms of deterring

a general or even limited attack. I propose implementing some concepts for

consideration in limiting provocations.

First, political leaders in both the ROK and United States must

recognize the North Korean regime for what it is. Many Korean analysts

make this trite statement without explaining what it means. North Korea is

a totalitarian political system that focuses not only on the continued survival

of its leadership at the expense of its people and everything else, but also the

prioritization of those values, procedures, and assets—particularly the

military and the security apparatus—that enable their survival. ee

aforementioned values are institutionalized not only within the Korean

Workers’ Party, military, and government, but most important, they are

inculcated at the individual level for every North Korean citizen—from

common laborer to five-star general and government minister—who is

evaluated and personally tested on their personal loyalty to Kim Jong-il and

the survival of the Kim family regime. ee institutionalization of these

values was hardened during and after the transition from Kim Il-song to

Kim Jong-il and we should expect the same during any successful transition

from Kim Jong-il to his son, likely Kim Jong-un. Expectations that the

31

North Korea’s Strategy of Compellence, Provocations, and the Northern Limit Line
regime will change to conform to international norms—other than as an

operational pause to gain time for regime asset consolidation and/or major

concession acquisition such as during the Agreed Framework—is wishful

thinking. North Korean obstinacy is demonstrated by its continued

provocations in the midst of very generous ROK engagement and U.S. focus

on the North’s denuclearization via the Six-Party Talks.

Second, the alliance must narrow the political seams within ROK

security that the North so frequently seeks to exploit. eere is a need to

institutionalize the situational awareness of the alliance’s national authorities

and their supporting government and military analysts relative to the reality

of tactical actions in the Korean eeater of Operations quickly leading to

strategic consequences. eis is not well understood within Washington,

DC’s beltway and it is overly politicized in the ROK. Neither is it

completely understood how well North Korea manipulates the tyranny of

proximity to maximize their ability to escalate and de-escalate politicalmilitary tensions to their tactical, operational, and strategic advantage. North

Korean tactical provocations should not be interpreted as just “North Korea

being North Korea” or “Kim Jong-il merely demanding attention.”

ee institutionalization of the alliance’s “two-plus-two”meeting format

should be a starting point for this process. Historically, this meeting was

attended by the ROK Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of National

Defense, as well as the U.S. Ambassador to the ROK and the Commander,

United Nations Command–Combined Forces Command–United States

Forces Korea on the U.S. side. However, to ensure complete alliance

situational awareness at the most senior levels, the ROK Blue House

National Security Advisor’s presence should be considered, even above that

of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. eat could make it a three-plus-two

meeting. ee institutionalization of this forum, which was marginalized

during the first decade of this century, could go a long way in developing a

strategic common operating picture that includes anticipation of North

Korean coercive actions, including provocations. eis forum will be even

more important after transition of wartime operational control of designated

ROK forces in December 2015.

eird, formulation and implementation of an alliance strategic influence

plan whereby the alliance gains through diplomatic, informational, military,

and economic skills the cooperation and support of the international

32

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula
community, including China and Russia, to dissuade the Kim regime from

coercive diplomacy and military provocations. Along these lines,

Commander, ROK–U.S. Combined Forces Command, General Walter

Sharp stated recently that “Kim Jong-il has said that North Korea will be a

great and powerful nation by 2012, and the only way he has to get to that

point is through military provocations and threatening the neighbors.”47 He

also stated that, “the Republic of Korea–U.S. alliance needs more from the

entire international community and all countries in the region, in particular

China. We believe all countries in the region and China need to work in

cooperation in addressing North Korean aggressive behavior. In particular

we will welcome Chinese action even behind the scenes.”48

Fourth, increasing the political impact of the ROK–U.S. Security

Consultative Meeting and the ROK–U.S. Military Committee Meeting

would improve the overall deterrence effect of those forums. Today, they

stand as a major communication vehicle to the Kim regime that the alliance

stands with great resolve in defending the ROK. However, bi-national

presidential and legislative public support for those meetings would improve

the message delivered to Pyongyang.

Fifth, the ROK side needs to spend more money on its defense. In

particular, the National Assembly needs to assume responsibility for funding

those capabilities that will improve deterrence.ee priority for that funding

should be the acquisition of a C4I—command, control, communication,

computers, and intelligence—system that vastly improves the responsiveness

of the ROK military communications. Such responsiveness was deemed

lacking by the ROK government’s Board of Audit and Inspection whose

examination of the Cheonan tragedy resulted in the recommendation of

relieving 27 leading military officers from their high-level positions of

responsibility.

ee Lee Myung-bak administration has taken notice of the need for

change. Recently, a 14-member presidential committee urged President Lee

to prepare operational plans for preemptive strikes against KPA bases by

the ROK military if North Korean provocations were evident. Committee

members stated that the Cheonan sinking had transformed their thinking

33

North Korea’s Strategy of Compellence, Provocations, and the Northern Limit Line

47 Song Sang-ho, “U.S. Expects More N.K. Provocations,” Korea Herald, 13 July 2010,

http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20100709000706.

48 Ibid.
on national defense and that the previous strategy of merely building

capability was insufficient as a deterrent.49 Rather than unilateral action, the

alliance must be prepared to hit North Korea proportionately where it

hurts—planned targets approved bilaterally—in the event of another

provocation that results in death and destruction in South Korea.

34

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

49 Korea Herald, “President Lee Urged to Switch to Active Deterrence,” 15 August 2010,

http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/nation_view.asp?newsIdx=71433&categoryCode=113.


The ROK–U.S. Military Alliance: Transformation

and Change

by Cheon Seongwhun

Ee Era of Transformation and Change

It is natural that a military alliance adapts itself to changing security

environments. Whether such changes are originated from internal needs of

each alliance partner, overall bilateral relationship, or regional/international

security dynamics, a stable and sustainable alliance must predict likely

challenges, prevent potential risks, and take on them in a nimble and

resolute way if they arise. Transformation and change often generates

strategic challenges or invites resistance from vested interests or force of

habit that must be overcome for the benefit of mutual alliance. Going

through several stages of transformation and change during the last six

decades, the ROK–U.S. alliance has grown mature, continued to build

strong partnership, and face ongoing challenges as well.

ee end of the Cold War provided the alliance with the first major

challenge since the signing of the mutual defense treaty on October 1, 1953.

ee political and military changes occurred in the Soviet Union and the

Eastern Europe were indeed transformational. ee United States reacted

swiftly to change the long-held alliance structure by taking such steps as—

withdrawing all tactical nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula, trying

to reduce the U.S. conventional military presence on the peninsula according

to the East Asian Security Initiative, agreeing to South Korean request of

transition of the operational control (OPCON) during peace time, and

letting a South Korean general lead the armistice talks with North Korea.

Some of the steps were put into practice and others not. For example,

realignment of the U.S. conventional forces in Korea was stopped because

of the emergence of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, while the

North flatly rejected a South Korean general as head of the United Nations

Command delegation.

37

Chapter 3
ee tragic terror attacks on September 11, 2001 was another event that

brought about transformational changes affecting security environments of

the bilateral alliance. ee United States has waged war on terror on two

fronts—Afghanistan and Iraq. Without guaranteeing triumphal successes,

these have affected U.S. domestic politics, its international relations, strategic

thinking, and defense postures. Most of all, based on the realization that

American power is not unlimited, U.S. policy makers have put that

awareness into both diplomatic and military practice.

During the 2008 presidential campaign, for example, foreign and

security policy planners in the Democratic camp proposed strategic

leadership as a new kind of American leadership. Strategic leadership is

based on the assumption that the 21st century is “an era of increasingly

diffuse power, spreading to many different states and from states to nonstate actors of many different kinds.”1 Considering that America cannot

take global leadership for granted, nor can it revert to what worked in

previous eras, strategic leadership requires “making wise and deliberate

choices about how, when, and with whom to lead.” It further says that “At

times, our interests are best served when others lead with us, or even taken

our place at the helm.”In conclusion,“a doctrine of strategic leadership seeks

effective action rather than American leadership for its own sake.”2

In the military area, the Obama administration’s Quadrennial Defense

Review (QDR) introduces a concept of a cooperative and tailored posture

for the U.S. defense role.eis new concept is based on the recognition that

while the United States will seek to strengthen or add cooperative measures

to address shared regional and global security concerns, “such an approach

recognizes that the United States cannot effectively manage these security

challenges on its own, nor should it attempt to do so.”3ee QDR points out

that “ee United States will work with our allies and partners to effectively

use limited resources by generating efficiencies and synergies from each

other’s portfolios of military capabilities, thereby enhancing our collective

abilities to solve global security problems.”4 About reforming security

assistance, it also emphasizes that “America’s efforts remain constrained by

38

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

1 Anne-Marie Slaughter, et al., Strategic Leadership: Framework for a 21st Century National Security

Strategy (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, July 2008), 5.

2 Ibid.

3 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2010), 63.

4 Ibid.
a complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources,

unwieldy processes, and a limited ability to sustain such undertakings

beyond a short period.”5

ee U.S. concept of strategic flexibility is also an element that can cause

changes in the security environments of the ROK–U.S. alliance. While the

United States seeks to optimize the use of its limited military resources

worldwide by strategic flexibility, South Korea is concerned about its

possible repercussions on the bilateral alliance.eese concerns include: “the

possible reduction of combined deterrent and defense capabilities on the

Korean Peninsula and the risk of unwanted ROK involvement in a U.S.

conflict with a third party if U.S. forces in South Korea are temporarily

deployed to a military contingency elsewhere.”6 ee two sides reached the

following compromise in 2006 at the foreign minister–level talks:

ee ROK, as an ally, fully understands the rationale for the

transformation of the U.S. global military strategy, and respects the

necessity for strategic flexibility of the U.S. forces in the ROK. In

the implementation of strategic flexibility, the U.S. respects the

ROK position that it shall not be involved in a regional conflict in

Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean people.7

Strategic flexibility could deepen the dilemma South Korea faces in

relation to a rising and vociferous China. Since the diplomatic normalization

in 1992, South Korea has expanded its ties with China across the board. As

the bilateral relationship matures, its national interests increasingly depend

upon the relationship with China. For example, China is placed as South

Korea’s number one trade partner, it accommodates the largest number of

South Korean students studying abroad, and plays a key role to resolve the

North Korean nuclear crisis as the host of the Six-Party Talks and the most

influential country vis-à-vis North Korea. As rising China’s influences are

growing in Northeast Asia as well as worldwide, South Korea will become

increasingly sensitive to what China says and does. In short, China is a

critical regional/international factor that can bring about changes in the

security environments on the Korean peninsula and the wider region.

39

Re ROK–U.S. Military Alliance: Transformation and Change

5 Ibid., 73.

6 “New Beginnings—in the U.S.–ROK Alliance: Recommendations to the Obama Administration,”

ee Korea Society and APARC at Stanford University, May 2010, 15.

7 U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-South Korea Relationship Enters New Era, State Says” January 19,

2006, www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2006/January/ 20060120134614ajesrom0.8530542.html.
China’s outright opposition to ROK–U.S. naval exercise in the wake of the

Cheonan incident and the U.S. decision not to let the aircraft carrier USS

George Washington (CVN 73) enter the West (Yellow) Sea is a visible hint

that the ROK–U.S. alliance comes to be affected by China.

Unchanging Realities on the Korean Peninsula

In this era of transformation and change, there are unchanging realities

on the Korean Peninsula that are often ignored but are very significant in the

context of the ROK–U.S. military alliance. First, the Korean Peninsula is still

at war, and the armistice agreement remains as valid today as it has been over

the last six decades. Second, the constitutional struggle between North and

South Korea, that is, ideological competition and political rivalry between

communism and parliamentarianism have never lessened,and in fact,seem to

be intensified just before another power succession in North Korea. eird,

North Korea’s military threat has not weakened despite South Korean

governments’ engagement policy which was first declared by President Park

Chung-hee in the early 1970s,intending to promote reconciliation,exchanges,

and cooperation. In fact, during the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun

administrations, South Korea was reckless by providing unconditional

assistance to the North Korean regime and ignoring the harsh security realities

on the peninsula.

In particular,North Korea’s increasing threat of asymmetrical capabilities

must be noted. According to a new strategic assessment by the U.S. Forces in

Korea (USFK), North Korea has spent dwindling coffers to build a surprise

attack capability “with little or no warning,”specifically designed for affecting

economic and political stability in South Korea.8 ee danger of overlooking

North Korea’s asymmetrical capabilities has been warned by several experts

both in South Korea and the United States.9 One American expert pointed

out that “ee North Korean military threat of 2010 is not the same as that of

40

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

8 eom Shanker and David Sanger, “U.S. to aid South Korea with naval defense plan,” New York Times,

May 30, 2010.

9 Park Chang-hee, “A theoretical analysis of asymmetrical strategies,” Quarterly Journal of Defense Policy

Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1, Spring 2008, 179–205; Park Chang-kwon,“North Korea’s asymmetrical strategies and South Korea’s response,”North Korea, March 2006, 121–32; Bruce Bechtol Jr.,Defiant Failed

State: Re North Korean Rreat to International Society (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2010); Andrew

Scobell and John Sanford,North Korea’s Military Rreat: Pyongyang’s Conventional Forces, Weapons of

Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 2007.
1990 against which South Korea has been so well prepared to defend.”10

According to him, North Korea’s military threat has not subsided in spite of

the overwhelming resource constraints, and by focusing limited resources on

asymmetric forces,“North Korea has maintained its capability to threaten the

South, and has also continued to maintain its belligerent and uncooperative

foreign policy.”11 In this context, he proposed to delay the timing of the

wartime OPCON which had been agreed to transition on April 17, 2012

between progressive President Roh Moo-hyun and President George W.

Bush in 2007. At the “Two-plus-Two” meeting of foreign and defense

ministers of the two countries in July 2010, the ROK and the United States

agreed to delay the transition to December 2015.12

ee Cheonan sinking that occurred in March 2010 is a vivid

manifestation of the unchanging realities on the Korean Peninsula despite

worldwide propensity to change and transformation and the relaxed “Cold

War is over”mentality.ee incident was the DPRK’s bold reaction to South

Korean President Lee Myung-bak’s principled North Korea policy based

on his realization of the unchanging realities regarding the North. eat is,

the Cheonan incident is the North Korean regime’s deliberate resistance to

the South’s prudent North Korea policy based on clear-headed awareness of

constant security parameters on the Korean Peninsula. In this respect, it was

a reminder of continuing North Korean threats that had often been

overlooked by South Korea and the United States.

ee Cheonan incident may be a harbinger of renewed North Korean

provocations during that nation’s tricky period of power succession. On

August 12, 2010, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates voiced suspicion

that the succession struggle could explain the attack on the South Korean

naval vessel and Kim Jong-il’s son “has to earn his stripes with the North

Korean military.” He also said that until the succession process is settled,

this may not be the only provocation from North Korea.13 According to

41

Re ROK–U.S. Military Alliance: Transformation and Change

10 Bruce Bechtol Jr., “ee U.S. and South Korea: challenges and remedies for wartime operation

control,” Washington, DC, Center for U.S.–Korea Policy, March 2010.

11 Ibid.

12 Joint Statement of ROK–U.S. Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting on the Occasion of the

60th Anniversary of the Outbreak of the Korean War, Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department

of State, July 21, 2012, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/07/144974.htm.

13 David Sanger and eom Shanker, “U.S. sees North Korea as rattling sabers for heir,” New York

Times, August 13, 2010.
retired U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General James R. Clapper Jr., then

nominee as director of National Intelligence, the most important lesson

from the Cheonan incident is “to realize that we may be entering a

dangerous new period when North Korea will once again attempt to

advance its internal and external political goals through direct attacks on

our allies in the Republic of Korea. Coupled with this is a renewed

realization that North Korea’s military forces still pose a threat that cannot

be taken lightly.”14 Clapper ranks the Cheonan incident as analogous to

North Korea’s bombing of Korean Airlines Flight 858 on November 29,

1987, which killed all 115 persons on board, or the recent unsuccessful

dispatch of an assassination team to South Korea to kill senior North

Korean defector Hwang Jang-yop.

Ee Cheonan Incident:

Reminder of Overlooked Ereats

Since Lee Myung-bak was sworn in as the 18th president of the

Republic of Korea in 2008, North Korea has launched an ever-increasing

hostile campaign against the South Korean government and the leading

conservative Grand National Party. Unlike previous progressive presidents,

Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, who were supportive of the Kim Jongil regime, President Lee has taken principled and rigid approaches in dealing

with North Korea. In return, the North has taken more belligerent actions

against the South, which have created concerns about current and future

security of the Korean Peninsula.

On January 17, 2009, the spokesman of the Joint Chief of Staff of the

Korean People’s Army (KPA) announced that the army would enter an allout confrontational stage against South Korea and counter any attempt to

nullify North Korea’s self-designated demarcation line on the West Sea.15

On February 2, just two weeks after the statement, the spokesman

demanded that the United States and South Korea dismantle their own

nuclear weapons and that denuclearization of the Korean peninsula be

realized by mutual nuclear disarmament rather than by unilateral

42

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

14 Additional Prehearing Questions for James R. Clapper Jr., Upon his nomination to be Director

of National Intelligence, Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate, July 20, 2010, 18,

http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/100720/clapperpre.pdf.

15 Korean Central News Agency, January 17, 2009.
dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.16 With hindsight, such

antagonistic statements from the highest military command authorities in

North Korea were a signal that the inter-Korean relations entered a military

confrontation stage, moving beyond just a political dispute.

On April 5, 2009, North Korea conducted its third long-range ballistic

missile test.ee next month, on May 25, it conducted its second nuclear test.

On March 26, 2010, the South Korean Navy corvette Cheonan was sunk in

the West Sea.It was at 2122 Friday evening when the warship sank just south

of the Northern Limit Line (NLL) near Baekryongdo Island. A sudden

underwater explosion ripped the ship in two,killing 46 of 108 sailors on board.

International Joint Investigation

Amid rumors and speculations of North Korean involvement in this

tragic incident, the South Korean government decided to launch a scientific,

objective, and thorough investigation without hasty prejudgment. To

increase the objectivity and fairness of the investigation, experts from the

United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Sweden, and later Canada

were invited to join and assist the investigation. Within South Korea, a

group of national experts in various fields were called from both military

and civilian sectors.ee Joint Civilian–Military Investigation Group ( JIG)

was formed with 25 experts from 10 South Korean institutions (22 military

personnel and 3 civilian specialists recommended by the national

parliament) and 24 foreign experts. ee JIG was composed of four task

forces—Scientific Investigation Team, Explosive Analysis Team, Ship

Structure Management Team, and Intelligence Analysis Team.

After the nearly two-month-long intensive investigation, on May 20,

the JIG reported the results of its investigation.ee essence of the report is

summarized as follows:17

• ee JIG assesses that a strong underwater explosion

generated by the detonation of a homing torpedo below and

to the left of the gas turbine room caused Republic of Korea

Ship (ROKS) Cheonan to split apart and sink.

43

Re ROK–U.S. Military Alliance: Transformation and Change

16 Korean Central News Agency, February 2, 2009.

17 ee Joint Civilian–Military Investigation Group, Investigation Result on the Sinking of ROKS

Cheonan, (Seoul: ee Ministry of National Defense, May 20, 2010).
44

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

• ROKS Cheonan was split apart and sunk due to a shockwave

and bubble effect produced by an underwater torpedo

explosion. ee explosion occurred approximately 3 m left of

the center of the gas turbine room, at a depth of about 6–9

m. ee weapon system used is confirmed to be a high

explosive torpedo with a net explosive weight of about 250

kilograms, manufactured by North Korea.

• ee Multinational Combined Intelligence Task Force,

comprised of five states including Canada confirmed that a

few small submarines and a mother ship supporting them

left a North Korean naval base in the West Sea two to three

days prior to the attack and returned to port two to three

days after the attack. It also confirmed that all submarines

from neighboring countries were either in or near their

respective home bases at the time of the incident.

• ee torpedo parts recovered at the site of the explosion by a

dredging ship on May 15, which include the five-blade

contra-rotating propellers, propulsion motor and a steering

section, perfectly match the schematics of the CHT-02D

torpedo included in introductory brochures provided to

foreign countries by North Korea for export purposes. ee

markings in Korean characters is consistent with the

marking of a previously obtained North Korean torpedo.

Russian and Chinese torpedoes are marked in their

respective languages.

• ee CHT-02D torpedo manufactured by North Korea

utilizes acoustic/wake homing and passive acoustic tracking

methods. It is a heavyweight torpedo with a diameter of 21

inches, a weight of 1.7 tons and a net explosive weight of up

to 250 kilograms.

With these findings the group concluded:

Based on all such relevant facts and classified analysis, we have

reached the clear conclusion that ROKS Cheonan was sunk as the

result of an external underwater explosion caused by a torpedo
made in North Korea. ee evidence points overwhelmingly to the

conclusion that the torpedo was fired by a North Korean

submarine. eere is no other plausible explanation.18

North Korea’s Reactions

Barely thirty minutes after the JIG reported its findings, the spokesman

of the National Defense Commission (NDC), the highest decision-making

apparatus in North Korea, issued a statement criticizing the joint

investigation. Defining the Cheonan incident as “a conspiratorial farce and

charade by the group of traitors in a deliberate and brigandish manner to

achieve certain political and military aims,” the statement declared the

following three points:

• ee NDC will dispatch an inspection group to South Korea

to verify material evidence proving that the sinking of the

warship is linked with North Korea.

• North Korea will promptly react to any “punishment” and

“retaliation” and to any “sanctions” infringing upon our state

interests with various forms of tough measures including an

all-out war. ee all-out war to be undertaken by us will be a

sacred war involving the whole nation.

• North Korea will brand any small incident that occurs in the

territorial waters, air and land where its sovereignty is

exercised including the West Sea as a provocation of

confrontation maniacs and react to it with unlimited

retaliatory blow, merciless strong physical blow.19

Following the position set by the NDC, North Korea launched an

extensive domestic and international campaign of denying its involvement

and blaming South Korea and the United States. At the time, Kim Jong-il

appeared to bet his regime’s fortune by ratcheting up tension on the Korean

Peninsula, using his asymmetrical advantages vis-à-vis South Korea.

45

Re ROK–U.S. Military Alliance: Transformation and Change

18 Ibid.

19 “Spokesman for the DPRK National Defense Commission Issues Statement,” Korean Central

News Agency, May 24, 2010, http://www.globalsecurity.org.
South Korea’s Responses

Four days after the investigation result was released in public, on May

24, President Lee Myung-bak made a nationwide address. He defined the

nature of the incident as “ee Cheonan was sunk by a surprise North Korean

torpedo attack. Again, the perpetrator was North Korea.”He said that “their

attack came at a time when the people of the Republic of Korea were

enjoying their well-earned rest after a hard day’s work. Once again, North

Korea violently shattered our peace.” Referring to the JIG’s findings,

President Lee insisted that “With the release of the final report, no

responsible country in the international community will be able to deny the

fact that the Cheonan was sunk by North Korea.”20

Promising to take stern postures to hold North Korea accountable,

President Lee announced seven major policy measures including “proactive

deterrence” as a new national security concept vis-à-vis North Korea.21

1. Regarding inter-Korean relations, South Korea will not

permit North Korean ships to make passage through any of

the shipping lanes in the waters under South Korea’s

control, which has been allowed by the Inter-Korean

Agreement on Maritime Transportation. South Korea will

suspend the inter-Korean trade and exchanges except

providing assistance for infants and children. Matters

pertaining to the Kaesong Industrial Complex will be duly

considered, taking its unique characteristics into

consideration.

2. Regarding South Korea’s military posture, it will not

tolerate any provocative act by North Korea and maintain

the principle of proactive deterrence. If South Korea’s

territorial waters, airspace or territory are violated, it will

immediately exercise its right of self-defense.

3. As an international response, South Korea will refer this

matter to the UN Security Council, so that the

international community can join it in holding North Korea

46

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

20 South Korean President Lee’s National Address, May 24, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/publication/

22199.

21 Ibid.
accountable. North Korea violated the Charter of the

United Nations and contravened the existing agreements

reached for the sake of peace and stability on the Korean

Peninsula, including the Korean War Armistice Agreement

and the Basic Agreement between South and North Korea.

4. Toward the North Korean authorities, President Lee

demands immediate apology to South Korea and the

international community and calls to immediately punish

those who are responsible for and those who are involved in

the incident.

5. Despite the tragic incident, President Lee reconfirms that

the overriding goal of South Korea is not military

confrontation but the attainment of real peace, stability, and

prosperity for all Koreans. He reiterates the South Korean

vision of realizing the peaceful reunification of the Korean

Peninsula.

6. President Lee expresses his regret that North Korea is a

country still holding onto an empty ambition of forcefully

reuniting the Korean Peninsula under the banner of

communism and a country that still believes in making

threats and committing terrorist activities. He sends a firm

message to the North Korean regime that it is time to

change and to start thinking about what is truly good for

the regime itself and its people.

7. For the South Korean public, President Lee sends an

awakening message. He acknowledges that South Koreans

had been forgetting the reality that the nation faces the most

belligerent regime in the world and that the ROK military

made mistakes as well. He promises to solidify the national

security readiness, reestablish the discipline, and reinforce

combat capabilities of the ROK. He asks the South Korean

public to strengthen its awareness of the importance of

national security and not to waver in the face of threats,

provocations, and divisive schemes by North Korea.

47

Re ROK–U.S. Military Alliance: Transformation and Change
Invincible Spirit: A Reincarnation of Team Spirit of

the ROK–U.S. Alliance

From the beginning, the Barack H. Obama administration has put

prime importance on restoring the damaged alliance relationship with

South Korea.ee new U.S. administration has carefully listened to the ROK

government and public in the process of formulating its North Korea

strategy. After the U.S. presidential election in November 2008, some South

Korean observers argued that the Lee Myung-bak government should revise

its inflexible North Korea strategy in order not to be sidelined when the

U.S.–Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) relations radically

improve during the Obama presidency. However, such opinion proved to be

groundless. ee United States has been vigilant not to be trapped by

Pyongyang’s tactic of playing Washington off against Seoul.

At the same time, the United States has pursued denuclearization of

North Korea through tough diplomacy—a U.S. version of a principled and

prudent approach. ee Obama administration thoroughly analyzed the

process and the achievements of the Six-Party Talks during the past six

years, and has promoted direct talks with North Korea as a supplementary

means to facilitate denuclearization in the context of the six-party

discussions. Bilateral contacts with Pyongyang have been made, based on

realistic judgment and experience, not on wishful thinking. As Secretary of

State Hillary Rodham Clinton remarked during her Senate confirmation

hearing, the Obama administration does not have an illusion on negotiating

with North Korea.22 With the abrogation of the Geneva Agreed

Framework, there are many people in the Democratic Party who believe

that they should not let themselves be fooled by Pyongyang twice.eus, the

United States has exercised “strategic patience”—a resolve that North Korea

has to make the first move to reengage and that it won’t be granted any

concessions.23

Such a stern position was manifested in the swift and rigid reaction to

the Cheonan incident. From the beginning, the United States provided

strong diplomatic and military support to South Korea. For instance, the

U.S. military mobilized two destroyers, one salvor, a landing vessel, and 15

48

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

22 “Senate confirmation hearing: Hillary Clinton,” New York Times, January 13, 2009.

23 Glenn Kessler, “Analysis: North Korea tests U.S. policy of ‘strategic patience’,” Washington Post,

May 27, 2010, A12.
divers to join the search and rescue mission for missing sailors and the

salvage operation of the wrecked ship.ee U.S. experts actively participated

in investigating the cause of the incident. ee Obama administration also

cooperated with the Lee Myung-bak government to hold North Korea

accountable on the international stage. Such a firm position indirectly

explains that the U.S. government is highly confident that sinking of

Cheonan was perpetuated by the North Korean leadership.24

Right after the JIG reported the result of the investigation, the White

House issued a statement to support the authenticity of the result and to

give a warning to North Korea. In essence, the statement made these

points:25

• ee United States strongly condemns the act of aggression.

• ee investigation report reflects an objective and scientific

review of the evidence and points overwhelmingly to the

conclusion that North Korea was responsible for this attack.

• eis attack constitutes a challenge to international peace and

security and is a violation of the Armistice Agreement.

• North Korea must understand that belligerence toward its

neighbors and defiance of the international community are

signs of weakness, not strength. Such unacceptable behavior

only deepens North Korea’s isolation.

Immediately after President Lee made his national address, the White

House issued a supporting statement with four major points:26

• President Obama fully supports President Lee in his

handling of the ROKS Cheonan incident and the objective

investigation that followed. ee measures that the

government of the ROK announced today are called for and

entirely appropriate.

• U.S. support for South Korea’s defense is unequivocal, and

the President has directed his military commanders to

49

Re ROK–U.S. Military Alliance: Transformation and Change

24 David Sanger, “U.S. implicates North Korean leader in attack,” New York Times, May 22, 2010.

25 Statement by the Press Secretary on the Republic of Korea Navy ship the Cheonan, Office of the

Press Secretary, ee White House, May 19, 2010.

26 Statement by the Press Secretary on the Republic of Korea, Office of the Press Secretary, ee

White House, May 24, 2010.
coordinate closely with their ROK counterparts to ensure

readiness and to deter future aggression.

• ee ROK intends to bring this issue to the United Nations

Security Council and the United States supports this move.

• In response to the pattern of North Korean provocation and

defiance of international law, the President has directed U.S.

government agencies to review their existing authorities and

policies related to the DPRK.

During her Asian tour on May 20 in Tokyo, Secretary of State Clinton

remarked that South Korea’s investigation of the sinking had been a

“thorough and comprehensive scientific examination” and added that

“[international responses] will not, and cannot, be business as usual.” And

she asserted that “It is important to send a clear message to North Korea

that provocative actions have consequences.”27 During her briefing for the

traveling press corps in Beijing on May 24, Secretary Clinton reiterated the

four points of the White House statement issued on the same day.28 At the

first Two-plus-Two meeting of foreign and defense ministers of the two

countries, both sides “committed to maintain a robust combined defense

posture capable of deterring and defeating any and all North Korean

threats.”29

Such strong U.S. support was developed into joint military exercises

around the Korean Peninsula. Most of all,“Invincible Spirit”, the largest air

and naval combined exercise in the history of the alliance, was held in the

East Sea (Sea of Japan) during July 25–28, 2010. ee exercise mobilized

about 8,000 U.S. and ROK troops, 200 fighter jets, attack submarines,

antisubmarine helicopters, and 20 vessels including the Nimitz-class USS

George Washington (CVN 73) and the ROK Navy’s 14,000-ton large-deck

landing ship Dokdo. Four U.S. stealth fighters—the F-22 Raptor—were also

deployed for the first time on the Korean Peninsula.30 Several more joint

exercises were planned to continue by the end of the year. ee two sides

50

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

27 Mark Landler, “Clinton condemns attack on South Korean ship,” New York Times, May 21, 2010.

28 Briefing on the Republic of Korea, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, May 24, 2010,

http://www.state.gov.

29 Joint Statement of ROK–U.S. Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting on the Occasion of the

60th Anniversary of the Outbreak of the Korean War.

30 Korea Times, July 26, 2010, 1.
conducted their annual Ulchi Freedom Guardian exercise during August

16–26. Follow-up naval and air exercises were scheduled both in the East

and West Seas until the end of December 2010.31

Invincible Spirit is a reincarnation of the “Team Spirit”military exercise

which was held between 1976 and 1993. Usually held in late March, Team

Spirit was a joint/combined exercise to evaluate and improve the

interoperability of the ROK and U.S. forces.ee ROK forces and USFK in

South Korea were augmented by U.S. Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force

units from outside the country, totaling 200,000 individuals participated.32

Because of the enormous scale of the exercise, Team Spirit was an effective

deterrent to the North Korean leadership by reigning in its provocative and

aggressive nature. It is well known that North Korean forces were fully

alerted whenever the exercise was conducted. Team Spirit was halted from

1994 in a bid to denuclearize North Korea, and instead, much scaled-down

mutations, most recently “Key Resolve,” have continued. In view of the

gravely worsened North Korean nuclear crisis, the decision to trade Team

Spirit for dismantling North Korea’s nuclear weapons development program

became a stark policy failure.

Remarkable Chinese Reaction

ee ROK–U.S. military cooperation in the wake of the Cheonan

sinking incident resulted in outbursts of Chinese exasperation. China’s

reaction was regarded as “one element in what appears to be an attempt to

turn the seas near it into a Chinese lake.”33 For instance, when it was

reported that the ROK–U.S. joint naval exercise was scheduled in the West

Sea near the eastern coastline of China, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Qin

Gang remarked: “We have expressed our serious concern to the relevant

parties, and will closely follow the development of the matter.”34 Two days

later, on July 8, he elaborated China’s opposition to the exercise:35

51

Re ROK–U.S. Military Alliance: Transformation and Change

31 Korea Times, July 29, 2010, 4.

32 “Team Spirit,” GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/team-spirit.htm.

33 Re Economist, July 31, 2010, 23.

34 “China seriously concerned about US–ROK naval drill: spokesman,” Xinhua News Agency, July

6, 2010.

35 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on July 8, 2010, Beijing,

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, July 9, 2010.
China has expressed grave concern to relevant parties over the issue.

Our position is consistent and clear. We firmly oppose foreign

military vessels and planes’ conducting activities in the Yellow Sea

and China’s coastal waters that undermine China’s security

interests. We hope relevant parties exercise calmness and restraint

and refrain from actions that might escalate tension in the region.

A week later, on July 15, Qin Gang reiterated Chinese opposition:36

We firmly oppose any foreign military vessel or plane conducting

activities in the Yellow Sea and China’s coastal waters undermining

China’s security interests. Under the current circumstances, we

hope relevant parties exercise calmness and restraint and refrain

from activities that would escalate tension in the region . . . . eis

is a typical Cold-War thinking, dividing Northeast Asia and AsiaPacific into different military blocs and viewing regional security

from a confrontational even antagonistic perspective. Now, the

situation has changed so much that no single country or military

bloc can resolve regional security issues alone which ask for joint

efforts of regional countries.

China intensified its campaign against the exercises by calling in highranking military officers as well. Major General Luo Yuan, deputy secretary

general with the PLA Academy of Military Sciences, explained the reasons

of Chinese opposition in an online discussion with citizens on People’s Daily

Online.

37 General Luo gave this rationale for China’s opposition:

• Chairman Mao Zedong once said, “We will never allow

others to keep snoring beside our beds.” If the United States

were in China’s shoes, would it allow China to stage military

exercises near its western and eastern coasts? Just like an old

Chinese saying goes, “Do not do unto others what you do

not want others to do unto you,” if the United States does

not wish to be treated in a specific way, it should not [force

its] way [on] others.

52

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

36 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on July 15, 2010, Beijing,

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, July 16, 2010.

37 “Why China opposes U.S.–South Korean military exercises in the Yellow Sea,” People’s Daily

Online, July 16, 2010.
• In terms of strategic thinking, China should take into

account the worst possibility and strive to seek the best

results. ee bottom line of strategic thinking is to nip the evil

in the bud. ee ultimate level of strategic thinking is to

subdue the enemy without fighting. Preventing crisis is the

best way to resolve and overcome the crisis. China’s current

tough stance is part of preventive diplomacy.

• In terms of geopolitical strategy, the Yellow Sea [West Sea]

is the gateway to China’s capital region and a vital passage to

the heartland of Beijing and Tianjin. In history, foreign

invaders repeatedly took the Yellow Sea as an entrance to . . .

the heartland of Beijing and Tianjin. ee drill area selected

by the United States and South Korea is only 500 kilometers

away from Beijing. China will be aware of the security

pressure from military exercises conducted by any country in

an area that is so close to China’s heartland. ee aircraft

carrier USS George Washington has a combat radius of 600

kilometers and its aircraft [have] a combat radius as long as

1,000 kilometers. eerefore, the military exercise in the area

has posed a direct security threat to China’s heartland and

the Bohai Rim Economic Circle.

• In a bid to safeguard security on the Korean Peninsula, the

U.N. Security Council has just issued a presidential

statement, requiring all parties to remain calm and restrained

[with regard] to the so-called Cheonan naval ship incident,

which had caused a major crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

On the other hand, the joint military exercise by the United

States and South Korea on the Yellow Sea has created a new

crisis. eis is another reason why China strongly opposes the

military exercise on the Yellow Sea. In order to safeguard

security on the Korean Peninsula, no country should create a

new crisis, instead they should control and deal with the

existing one.

• In terms of maintaining China–U.S. relations, especially the

two parties’ military relations, China must declare its solemn

stance. China has been working to promote the healthy

53

Re ROK–U.S. Military Alliance: Transformation and Change
development of China–U.S. military relations. eerefore,

China has clearly declared that it is willing to promote the

development of the two parties’ relations. Deputy Director of

the General Staff General Ma Xiaotian has also expressed his

welcome to U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates to visit

China at a proper time.

According to South Korean daily Hankook Ilbo, a professor of China’s

National Defense University remarked on July 20, that the ROK–U.S. joint

exercise’s true purpose is to intimidate China.38 As the Invincible Spirit

exercise was carried out in the East Sea, China conducted a large-scale livefire exercise including firing ground-to-air medium-range missiles in the

West Sea. According to the China’s state-run broadcasting service, CCTV,

an artillery battalion of the PLA held the unusual exercise in an island area

near the West Sea.39 Citing Secretary of State Clinton’s remark on July 27

at the Asian Regional Forum (ARF) held in Hanoi,40 a newspaper in South

Korea reported that new tension in Northeast Asia triggered by the

Cheonan incident spread into the South China Sea and moved toward

competition between the United States and China for hegemony in the

entire East Asian region.41 A similar observation was made by U.S. opinion

makers, for example, that the Invincible Spirit exercise in South Korea and

a diplomatic defense of the freedom of the South China Sea have shown an

emerging conflict between America’s renewed interests in Asia and Chinese

resentment of influence by a distant power in the region.42

In response to fierce Chinese opposition to a big naval and air joint

exercise involving the aircraft carrier George Washington in the West Sea, the

United States maintained a fundamental position that every country has its

own sovereign right to choose when and where to conduct military exercises.

For example, at a breakfast meeting organized by the East Asian Institute

54

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

38 Hankook Ilbo, July 21, 2010 (in Korean).

39 Korea Times, July 28, 2010, 1.

40 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated: “ee United States, like every nation, has a national

interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for

international law in the South China Sea. . . . ee United States supports a collaborative diplomatic

process by all claimants for resolving the various territorial disputes without coercion. We oppose

the use or threat of force by any claimant.” Remarks at Press Availability, National Convention

Center, Hanoi, Vietnam, July 23, 2010, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/145095.htm.

41 Maeil Business Newspaper, August 3, 2010 (in Korean).

42 Philip Bowring, “Washington shores up its strategic assets in Asia,” New York Times, August 2, 2010.
on July 9, General Walter Sharp, commander of the USFK stated that

“Every country has not only the right, but the obligation to train its forces

against the type of threats they see and to do it within their international

territory.”43 Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell also argued that

“Where we exercise, when we exercise, with whom and how, using what

assets and so forth, are determinations that are made by the United States

Navy, . . . by the Department of Defense, by the United States government.

. . . that is going to be the framework by which we make decisions such as

joint exercises with the Republic of Korea forthcoming in the . . . Yellow

Sea, or in the Sea of Japan.”44

Despite such strong rhetoric, the ROK and the United States decided

to hold the Invincible Spirit exercise in the East Sea (Sea of Japan) and keep

the USS George Washington from entering the West Sea. A ROK Defense

Ministry official admitted that Chinese objection was a factor in changing

the original plan of having the exercise in the West Sea.45 It should be noted

that this decision was an important setback caused by China’s unusually

strong opposition.eroughout the six decades of bilateral alliance, Invincible

Spirit is the first joint military exercise in which the Chinese government

raised a strong objection in public and the ROK–U.S. alliance retreated.

eis event signals that a rising China is beginning to exercise its growing

national power to influence the bilateral alliance in the name of protecting

national security and regional stability.

One day, China may make an issue of the new U.S. base, which is under

construction in Pyongtaek, a port city on the western coast of South Korea,

about 100 km south of Seoul. U.S. Air Force bases in Osan and Kunsan are

located nearby, which means that it will become a strategic hub combining

U.S. air, naval, and army assets. Following the rationale of General Luo of

the PLA Academy of Military Sciences, the Chinese could perceive the U.S.

base in Pyongtaek as a threat to “the gateway to China’s capital region and

a vital passage to the heartland of Beijing and Tianjin.” ee move of the

Invincible Spirit exercise to the East Sea opened the window for China’s

55

Re ROK–U.S. Military Alliance: Transformation and Change

43 Asian Security Studies Center, 2010 Annual Meeting of Asian Security Initiative, July 8–9, 2010,

Seoul, http://www.eai.or.kr/type_k/panelView.asp?bytag=n&catcode=&code=kor_event&idx=

9124&page=1.

44 DOD News Briefing with Geoff Morrell from the Pentagon, U.S. Department of Defense,

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), July 14, 2010.

45 “Compromise on drill by U.S., Korea,” JoongAng Daily, July 16, 2010.
future claim that U.S. presence along the western coast of the Korean

Peninsula should be constrained.

eis may be a troublesome signal that the ROK–U.S. alliance will be

influenced by a rising China, which raises concerns whether the alliance

could effectively deal with future contingencies in North Korea. ee

Department of Defense recognizes possible Chinese intervention when

such events occur. For example, a DOD report on China remarked that:46

China’s leaders hope to prevent regional instability from spilling

across China’s borders and thereby interfering with economic

development or domestic stability. Changes in regional security

dynamics—such as perceived threats to China’s ability to access and

transport foreign resources,or disruptions on the Korean Peninsula—

could lead to shifts in China’s military development and deployment

patterns, likely with consequences for neighboring states.

Belatedly the United States expressed its intention to hold a joint

exercise in the West Sea with the participation of the USS George

Washington.

47 However, to curtail Chinese disruptive influence on the

ROK–U.S. joint exercises and military alliance in the future, the two

countries should maintain firm opposition to China’s further interference.

And they should conduct the annual Cheonan air and naval exercise in the

West Sea for the memory of the ROK sailors lost in her sinking.

Lessons Learned from the North Korean Nuclear Crisis

eere are two important lessons to be learned from the two-decadelong process of resolving North Korea’s nuclear crisis. On the one hand,

U.S. security commitment to South Korea has been diminished, at least in

56

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

46 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010: A Report to

Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Office of the

Secretary of Defense, 2010, 16, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf.

47 Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell stated: “And we are also, obviously, planning other

maritime and air exercises between our two militaries as part of the sequence we had talked about

before. eey will be taking place in both the East and West Sea, and both the Sea of Japan and the

Yellow Sea. eey will once again involve the USS George Washington. And the USS George Washington

will exercise in the Yellow Sea, in the West Sea. But I don’t have for you yet dates when that exercise

involving that aircraft carrier will take place. But that will be . . . part of the sequence of exercises that

we conduct will be a return of the . . . George Washington, including exercising in the Yellow Sea.” U.S.

Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News

Transcript, August 5, 2010, http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=53001.
an indirect way, by its efforts to ally North Korea’s security concerns during

the course of various negotiations to resolve the crisis. On the other hand,

American politicians’ political interests effectively marginalized South

Korea’s security interests.

Repercussions of American Security Guarantee

to North Korea

Since the outbreak of the North Korean nuclear crisis in the early 1990s,

there have been constant worries that the U.S. security commitment,

especially the nuclear umbrella, has weakened.ee North Korean argument

that it had to develop nuclear weapons due to the American nuclear threat

has gained growing acceptance in the United States, thus this strategy can

claim to have earned some measure of success.

For example, North Korea successfully used the nuclear issue as a lure

to achieve the first U.S.–DPRK high-level talks after the Korean War in

June 1993. In the joint statement, the United States formally pledged not

to use or threaten to use armed force against North Korea, including nuclear

weapons.48ee United States made a similar promise in the Geneva Agreed

Framework signed on October 21, 1994 in Article III.1: “ee U.S. will

provide formal assurances to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear

weapons by the U.S.”49 ee September 19, 2005 Joint Declaration agreed

upon at the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks also made a similar security

guarantee to North Korea (Article 1): “ee United States affirmed that it

has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to

attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons.”50

In short, in the early 1990s, North Korea used termination of its nuclear

development programs as bait to extract repeated promises from the United

States not to use military force especially nuclear weapons. And 20 years

later, the DPRK is using abandonment of nuclear weapons as a pretext for

insisting on the signing of a peace treaty and deactivating the armistice

agreement which has formed the foundation of the ROK–U.S. joint

57

Re ROK–U.S. Military Alliance: Transformation and Change

48 Joint Statement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States of America,

New York, June 11, 1993.

49 Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic

of Korea, Geneva, October 21, 1994.

50 Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing, 19 September 2005.
deterrence against North Korea. eis is the reality of the North Korean

nuclear crisis today.

American Passion for Political Legacy Undermining

South Korea’s Security Interests

President William J. Clinton knew that the DPRK had operated a

highly enriched uranium (HEU) program with the help of Pakistan in

violation of the Geneva Agreed Framework. A report to the Speaker of

House of Representatives in November 1999 stated that:51

North Korea’s WMD programs pose a major threat to the United

States and its allies.eis threat has advanced considerably over the

past five years, particularly with the enhancement of North Korea’s

missile capabilities. eere is significant evidence that undeclared

nuclear weapons development activity continues, including efforts

to acquire uranium enrichment technologies and recent nuclearrelated high explosive tests. eis means that the United States

cannot discount the possibility that North Korea could produce

additional nuclear weapons outside of the constraints imposed by

the 1994 Agreed Framework.

President Clinton did not disclose this fact, however, concerned that

his diplomatic legacy centered on the Agreed Framework might be

damaged. Instead, he accelerated normalization talks with North Korea,

exchanged high-ranking officials, and issued a joint communiqué as if the

North loyally adhered to its non-nuclear promise. On October 12, 2000,

the communiqué was agreed on the occasion that North Korea’s special

envoy, Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok visited the United States and met with

President Clinton. In return, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited

Pyongyang and met Kim Jong-il.ee joint communiqué stipulated various

measures to improve the U.S.–DPRK relations, including that:52

Building on the principles laid out in the June 11, 1993 U.S.–

DPRK Joint Statement and reaffirmed in the October 21, 1994,

Agreed Framework, the two sides agreed to work to remove

58

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

51 North Korea Advisory Group, Report to the Speaker U.S. House of Representatives, November

1999, 2, http://www.house.gov/international_relations/nkag/report.htm.

52 ee U.S.–DPRK Joint Communiqué, October 12, 2000.
mistrust, build mutual confidence, and maintain an atmosphere in

which they can deal constructively with issues of central concern.

In this regard, the two sides reaffirmed that their relations should

be based on the principles of respect for each other’s sovereignty

and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, and noted the

value of regular diplomatic contacts, bilaterally and in broader fora.

In February 2000, President Clinton ignored a congressional request to

certify that North Korea was not seeking to develop nuclear weapons. In

response to the administration’s request for funding the Korean Peninsula

Energy Development Organization (KEDO), Congress asked the President

to certify that:53

• North Korea is complying with all provisions of the Agreed

Framework and progress is being made on the implementation of the Joint Denuclearization Agreement between

North and South Korea;

• North Korea is cooperating fully in the canning and safe

storage of all spent fuel from its 5 MWe reactor;

• North Korea has not significantly diverted assistance

provided by the United States for purposes for which it was

not intended, and

• ee United States is fully engaged in efforts to impede

North Korea’s development and export of ballistic missiles.

On February 24,2000,President Clinton spent 1.5 million dollars to fund

KEDO by waiving the requirement to certify that North Korea has not

diverted assistance provided by the United States for purposes for which it was

not intended; and it was not seeking to develop or acquire the capability to

enrich uranium, or any additional capability to reprocess spent nuclear fuel.54

ee much-praised Perry Report which was produced in October 1999

by former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, then U.S.–North Korea

Policy Coordinator and Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary

59

Re ROK–U.S. Military Alliance: Transformation and Change

53 Special Report–KEDO Funding, October 30, 1998, NAPSNet@nautilus.org.

54 “Presidential Memo on U.S. Contribution to KEDO,” Presidential Determination No. 2000-15,

Office of the Press Secretary, February 24, 2000, https://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/022400

-presidential-memo-on-us-contribution-to-kedo.htm.
of State, set out last-ditch diplomatic efforts toward North Korea. However,

the report articulated as its basic premise that “the policy review team has

serious concerns about possible continuing nuclear weapons-related work in

the DPRK.”55

During the George W. Bush presidency, the U.S. State Department on

October 11, 2008 removed North Korea from a list of state sponsors of

terrorism, meeting Pyongyang’s major demand in anticipation of its

reciprocal good behavior in verifying North Korea denuclearization.

Contrary to common expectations, this decision did not give the Kim Jongil regime any substantial benefits. For the delisting to bear any meaningful

fruit, North Korean society had to reform and open, and about 20 other

sanctions remained without change.ee U.S. decision, however, would have

helped Kim Jong-il reinforce his political legitimacy and authorities that

might have been weakened by his illness. Believing that their Dear Leader

won a one-to-one match with President Bush, North Korean elites could

have launched extensive propaganda campaign that Kim Jong-il brought

Americans to their knees without forgoing a piece of nuclear weaponry.

Internationally, the Bush administration’s decision might encourage further

reckless behaviors of other would-be proliferators.

A major motivation to rescind the designation of the DPRK as a state

sponsor of terrorism is the Bush administration’s aspiration for creating a

legacy. Bogged down in the Iraq War, isolated on the world stage, and with

no concrete domestic achievements, President Bush from his second term

regarded the North Korean nuclear crisis as an opportunity to produce a

political legacy. In the course of what former UN Ambassador John Bolton

called “legacy frenzy,”56 the Bush administration gave up key principles—

such as not having direct bilateral contacts with North Korea and holding

on to complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement—set back from

initial positions in the negotiations, and devoted itself to just producing an

agreement. ee outcome was disappointing with disablement much less

thorough than originally promised in February 2007 with the declaration

missing major parts of the DPRK nuclear programs such as the uranium

enrichment and proliferation activities, it contained no assurance of when

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

55 William Perry, Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations, October 12, 1999, http://www.state.gov/www.regions/eap/991012_northkorea_rpt.html.

56 John Bolton, “Bush owes his successor a tough finish on foreign policy,” Wall Street Journal,

September 6, 2008, A11.
and how nuclear weapons be dismantled, and provided inadequate

verification with many loopholes for the DPRK.

Under the motto of ABC (Anything But Clinton), Bush administration

officials heavily criticized and vowed to overhaul Clinton’s North Korea

policy. ee current nuclear crisis erupted in October 2002 when the Bush

administration correctly revealed the DPRK’s HEU program which had

long been masked by the Clinton administration’s legacy frenzy. Few would

have believed that President Bush would have followed the exactly same

path of his predecessor.

Critical observation of the American politicians’ legacy drives is not an

isolated view in South Korea. In his Foreign Affairs article,Yoichi Funabashi,

the editor-in-chief of the Asahi Shimbun, cited veteran Japanese diplomats’

views that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s drive to build her legacy by

scoring a diplomatic success with North Korea in the later days of the Bush

administration is similar to a disconcerting replay of Secretary Madeleine

Albright’s final days in the Clinton administration, when she feverishly tried

to arrange a visit to Pyongyang for President Clinton.57

For the Future of the Alliance

ee ROK–U.S. alliance has occasionally experienced difficult times in

the six decades of the alliance history. ee most turbulent period were the

10 years of progressive governments under South Korean Presidents Kim

Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. Gaping differences appeared over key issues,

which adversely influenced the bilateral relations. ee bilateral alliance

cannot and should not remain a fixture of the Cold War era. ee world as

a whole and Northeast Asia in particular has experienced significant

transformation and change since the war’s end.

It should not be forgotten, however, that the Korean Peninsula is yet to

escape the quagmire of the Cold War.Technically, North Korea and China

on the one side and South Korea and the United States on the other side

are still at war. ee North Korean nuclear crisis is the most dangerous

security threat South Korea has faced since the end of the Korean War.

Furthermore, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s illness and the ongoing

61

Re ROK–U.S. Military Alliance: Transformation and Change

57 Yoichi Funabashi, “Keeping up with Asia: America and the new balance of power,” Foreign

Affairs, September/October 2008, 110–25.
transfer of succession to his third son are creating unparalleled uncertainty

and instability in the North–South Korean relations and the wider region.

eus, any change in the deterrent postures against the DPRK should be

considered with maximum caution and sensitivity. ee ROK–U.S. alliance

should not be damaged by emotional distractions either. Seoul and

Washington should not forget that it has been Pyongyang’s strategic goal to

drive a wedge between the two sides. In view of the worsened bilateral

relationship during the Roh administration, several important remedial

measures were presented for forging a better alliance relationship with a

long-term vision and vigor.58 Although the bilateral relationship has

improved much after the change of governments on both sides, most of

those measures are still valid today.

eis paper adds three more policy measures for building a stronger and

better alliance in the future: respecting and committing to each other’s

commitments, strengthening joint long-term vision and formulating

common strategies, and protecting the armistice agreement and the United

Nations Command (UNC). A fundamental principle driving these

measures is that diplomatic engagement per se cannot be the right path in

dealing with North Korea. To successfully change North Korea either

through engagement or containment, what is needed is a clear understanding of the history and strategic meaning of the Korean division and an

astute reading of North Korean strategies. In particular, engagement based

on either sympathetic views of North Korea or wishful thinking is worse

than no engagement, and much worse than principled engagement with

clear-minded strategy and goals.59

Respecting and Committing to Each Other’s

Commitments

Every country has its own national interests, national objectives to meet

those interests, and policy tools to achieve these objectives. eat is, every

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

58 Cheon Seongwhun, “North Korea and the ROK–U.S. security alliance,” Armed Forces & Society,

Vol. 34, No. 1, October 2007, 19–24.

59 ee following articles are examples of proposing engagement based on either wishful thinking or

pro–North Korean regime views. Joel Wit, “Don’t sink diplomacy,” New York Times, May 18, 2010;

Donald Gregg, “Testing North Korean waters,” New York Times, August 31, 2010; Jimmy Carter,

“North Korea wants to make a deal,” New York Times, September 15, 2010.
country has its national commitments, and the ROK and the United States

should respect and commit themselves to each other’s major commitments.

ee commitments are varied depending on the issue area and the context

(bilateral/regional/international).

Some national commitments are related to its alliance partner. For the

ROK, for example, the commitments are peace and safety of the nation,

peaceful North–South Korean relations and unification, economic, and

cultural development and well-being of all Koreans, and active development

and use of science and technology. For the United States, ROK–related

national interests are, for instance, provision of effective deterrence,

maintenance of peace and stability, denuclearization of the Korean

Peninsula, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and more

balanced trade with South Korea.

Sometimes, allies’ national commitments conflict. Differences revealed

during the bilateral consultations on the issue of the strategic stability

concept is one such example. Another potential area where the two sides’

national commitments might differ is the revision of the bilateral

cooperation agreement for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Seoul and

Washington will start negotiation to update the agreement which will end

in 2014. eere exists concern that South Korea’s commitment to peaceful

uses of nuclear energy may be inconsistent with the United States’

commitment to world-wide nonproliferation and the nuclear weapon–free

world. In fact, Washington often has been hesitant regarding Seoul’s

research and development in the science and technology fields. For instance,

the United States expressed doubts on some R&D projects in the peaceful

uses of nuclear energy. And most South Koreans are curious about why

Russia, instead of the United States, has become their primary partner for

space development projects.

An obstacle to further strengthening the bilateral alliance is the

American mind-set regarding South Korea. ee current ROK is quite

different from what it was in 1974 when the bilateral nuclear cooperation

agreement was signed, not to mention the 1950s when the Korean War

ended. But American politicians and military and civilian bureaucracies have

a tendency to look at South Korea through the old lens.eat was one of the

causes of strong anti-American sentiments in South Korea during the

candle-light demonstrations in December 2002. ee United States mind63

Re ROK–U.S. Military Alliance: Transformation and Change
set has failed to catch up with the rapid growth and changes in South

Korean society. Such a mistake should not be repeated.

In regard to nuclear nonproliferation, despite North Korea’s determined

efforts for acquiring nuclear weapons, South Korea has firmly adhered to its

non-nuclear weapon policy since its first announcement in 1990.

Geostrategic circumstances on the Korean Peninsula, however, tend to

provide a rationale for the international community to be suspicious of

sincerity of South Korea’s non-nuclear weapon policy. North Korea’s nuclear

weapon program has only added to the suspicions.

Contrary to this traditional thought, the nuclear crisis has actually

increased the legitimacy of South Korea’s non-nuclear weapon policy.

Despite North Korea’s two nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, South Korean

governments, both liberal and conservative, have shown no hint of changing

current policy. Emotional voices in the country arguing for responding in

kind by going nuclear are overwhelmed by sensible government policies and

mature opinions of the majority of the public that call for following

international nonproliferation norms and rules in a responsible manner.ee

Obama administration’s reducing role of nuclear weapons will not disrupt

the resolve of South Korea’s current policy either.

To South Korea, its commitment to a non-nuclear weapon policy is on

a par with its commitment to alliance with the United States in two ways.

On the one hand, the United States’ extended deterrence including its

nuclear umbrella has filled the security vacuum incurred by the South’s nonnuclear weapon policy. ee history of the bilateral alliance proves that the

U.S. nuclear umbrella is efficient and effective to deter North Korea. On the

other hand, as a credible and responsible ally, South Korea is not careless

enough to behave in a manner that displeases its strongest ally. eerefore,

suspicion of South Korea’s non-nuclear weapon policy is outdated and futile,

and should not lay a shadow over the future partnership of the ROK–U.S.

alliance.

ee nuclear cooperation between Washington and Seoul should move

beyond the force of habit of the old days when South Korea struggled to

emerge from the rubble of the Korean War. With strong support and

assistance from the United States, South Korea has developed to become the

first donor-providing nation among the developing countries in the world.

Nowadays, South Korean products, culture, technologies, humanitarian

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula
65

Re ROK–U.S. Military Alliance: Transformation and Change

assistance, and diplomatic contributions reach out to many parts of the

world. In the realm of nuclear nonproliferation, South Korea also is proud

of becoming a role model to demonstrate that security can be attained

without nuclear weapons, and credible and transparent nuclear energy policy

brings prosperity and well-being to its people.

Strengthening Joint Long-term Vision and

Formulating Common Strategies

Moving beyond the trite perception, stereotyped attitudes, and fixed

mind-set, Seoul and Washington need a new vision with long-term

perspectives and acute awareness of the rapidly changing security dynamics

in East Asia, especially in the northeast.ee two countries have just started

this journey. At the summit in June 2009, President Lee Myung-bak and

President Obama declared the joint vision for the alliance. It covers building

the bilateral relationship onto three layers.60

First, in relation to the future of Korea, they agreed that

erough our alliance we aim to build a better future for all people

on the Korean Peninsula, establishing a durable peace on the

peninsula and leading to peaceful reunification on the principles

of free democracy and a market economy. We will work together

to achieve the complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea’s

nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, as well as ballistic

missile programs, and to promote respect for the fundamental

human rights of the North Korean people.

Second, the joint vision enlarges the scope of cooperation to the Asia-Pacific

region.

In the Asia-Pacific region we will work jointly with regional

institutions and partners to foster prosperity, keep the peace, and

improve the daily lives of the people of the region. We believe that

open societies and open economies create prosperity and support

human dignity, and our nations and civic organizations will

promote human rights, democracy, free markets, and trade and

investment liberalization in the region. To enhance security in the

60 Joint Vision For ee Alliance Of ee United States Of America And ee Republic Of Korea,

ee White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, June 16, 2009.
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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

Asia-Pacific, our governments will advocate for, and take part in,

effective cooperative regional efforts to promote mutual

understanding, confidence and transparency regarding security

issues among the nations of the region.

eird, the joint vision also proposes to work together on global security

issues and transnational crimes.

Our governments and our citizens will work closely to address the

global challenges of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction, piracy, organized crime and narcotics, climate change,

poverty, infringement on human rights, energy security, and

epidemic disease. ee alliance will enhance coordination on

peacekeeping, post-conflict stabilization and development

assistance, as is being undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan.We will

also strengthen coordination in multilateral mechanisms aimed at

global economic recovery such as the G20.

eis new vision laid out by the two presidents should be strengthened

and further developed in a number of ways. For example, on the future of

the Korean Peninsula, Seoul and Washington should agree that peaceful

unification must be led by South Korea based on democracy and a market

economy, and that a prosperous unified Korea will enhance regional stability

and world peace. In addition, the United States should confirm its extended

deterrence, including the nuclear umbrella, for the future unified Korea.

At the same time, the two countries need to develop common strategies

to put the joint vision into practice. Common strategies should be

formulated on at least three different fronts with certain key components.

• Diplomatic—Close consultation and shared understanding

are required to curtail any possible wedge in the bilateral

relationship. For example, “who leads which issue” needs to

be agreed upon in advance. For instance, South Korean

concern about intimate ties between the United States and

North Korea or being neglected in regional strategic matters

and American worry of secret deal between the two Koreas

should be eliminated.

• Defense—Deterrence should be reinforced against North

Korea’s asymmetric threat and joint military preparedness

must be upgraded for possible contingencies in North Korea.
Washington also needs to address security concerns in Seoul

which were triggered by its reducing the role of nuclear

weapons and the nuclear umbrella.

• Economic—Bilateral economic cooperation must expand

and increased economic ties will be an invaluable asset to

support the bilateral partnership. eus, failure of the pending

bilateral free trade agreement is not an option for forging a

better relationship between the two nations.

Protecting the Armistice Agreement and the UNC

ee year 2010 marked the 60th anniversary of the Korean War. On July

7, 1950, the United Nations Command was formed to fight against North

Korean forces that invaded South Korea on June 25 that year. Twenty-one

nations joined the UNC, with 16 countries sending combat troops and five

providing medical and material support.While the armistice system, signed

on July 27, 1953, has been the backbone of providing security on the Korean

Peninsula, the idea of replacing it with a new peace treaty is emerging as a

possible solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis.

On January 11, 2010, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry proposed to

conclude a peace treaty with the United States before resolving the nuclear

problem.61 eis is the latest version of Pyongyang’s proposal since the

Korean War, covering sequential linkage between nuclear and peace treaty

issues. North Korea alleged that its denuclearization is impossible without

mutual trust between the two countries, and that trust can only be built with

a peace treaty formally ending the war—the source of hostility.

However, the Workers’ Party of North Korea and its leadership have

devoted two generations to realizing the policy of national revolution and

unification by force on the peninsula. To North Koreans, the armistice

agreement has symbolized failure of the policy and is an obstacle to the

ultimate aim of unification on their terms. eat is why replacing the

armistice agreement has been a key strategic goal to North Korea. To

achieve this, North Korea has launched a two-prong strategy from the early

1970s: “military provocation” and “peace offensive.”

67

Re ROK–U.S. Military Alliance: Transformation and Change

61 Korean Central News Agency, January 11, 2010.
North Korea has specifically targeted the Northern Limit Line in the

West Sea for military provocation, which was not included in the initial

armistice agreement when the United Nations forces occupied the entire

sea area surrounding the peninsula. Later, the UN defined the NLL in a

manner to avoid unnecessary naval clashes.While adhering to this line until

the early 1970s, North Korea began to question the authenticity of the NLL

in an attempt to challenge the armistice agreement. Since 1999, there have

been four naval clashes provoked by North Korea along the NLL in the

West Sea, with the Cheonan sinking incident the latest deliberate attempt

to stir regional debate over the armistice agreement.

In parallel, Pyongyang has proposed to sign a peace treaty with

Washington, with the diverse involvement of relevant parties—China, the

United Nations, and South Korea. Initially reluctant to Pyongyang’s

demand, Washington has gradually changed its position over the years.

Especially, in conjunction with the dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear

programs, a growing number of American officials and academics are willing

to accept the idea. While President George H. W. Bush scorned it in 1992

at the first high-level contact with North Korea, 14 years later in November

2006, the younger Bush expressed his willingness to sign a declaration

ending the Korean War as a bid to denuclearize North Korea.62

It was President Clinton who erroneously accepted North Korea’s

proclaimed rhetoric that the pending threat of the United States and the

armistice agreement are responsible for the North Korean nuclear problem.In

the 1990s, he promised several times at the bilateral nuclear talks not to

threaten or use nuclear weapons against North Korea and launched the fourparty talks to build a permanent peace regime on the peninsula. It appears

that officials in the Obama administration are taking similar stances. For

example,Secretary Clinton remarked in February 2009 that the United States

will be willing to “replace the peninsula’s longstanding armistice agreements

with a permanent peace treaty” if North Korea is genuinely prepared to

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

62 In a meeting with President Roh Moo-hyun on November 18, 2006 in Hanoi, President George

W. Bush said: “And as I’ve made clear in a speech as recently as two days ago in Singapore, that we

want the North Korean leaders to hear that if it gives up its weapons—nuclear weapons ambitions,

that we would be willing to enter into security arrangements with the North Koreans, as well as

move forward new economic incentives for the North Korean people.” President Bush Meets with

President Roh of the Republic of Korea, ee Sheraton Hanoi, Hanoi, Vietnam, Office of the Press

Secretary, November 18, 2006, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/

11/20061118-4.html.
dismantle its nuclear programs.63 She made a similar remark at the ROK–

U.S.Foreign and Defense Ministers’meeting held in Seoul on July 21,2010.64

Traditionally, conservative governments in Seoul flatly rejected

Pyongyang’s demand. eey regarded it as a cunning strategy with multiple

purposes such as to exclude South Korea from the future peace building

efforts on the Korean Peninsula, to uphold North Korea as the only

legitimate entity to represent Koreans on the peninsula, to remove the

USFK, and to achieve unification on its terms.

ee previous progressive governments of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moohyun took a quite different approach, however. With the political slogans of

“dismantling the Cold War security framework” and “establishing a new

peace structure” respectively, these pro-North Korea administrations

attempted to change the existing armistice structure. It was carried out

under a broader political campaign of denying and correcting the so-called

“past of South Korea”—the establishment of conservative South Korean

governments. In a chain of purging efforts under this campaign, the

armistice agreement was a key element to overhaul the security area. When

Secretary of State Rice proposed an idea of replacing the armistice

agreement with a peace treaty, then ROK Minister of Foreign Affairs Ban

Ki-moon welcomed her proposal with great enthusiasm.65 ee new

conservative Lee Myung-bak administration understands the danger of

rushing into a peace treaty, but seems willing to include it as a part of

solution to the nuclear problem.

69

Re ROK–U.S. Military Alliance: Transformation and Change

63 She remarked that, “If North Korea is genuinely prepared to completely and verifiably eliminate

their nuclear weapons program, the Obama administration will be willing to normalize bilateral

relations, replace the peninsula’s longstanding armistice agreements with a permanent peace treaty,

and assist in meeting the energy and other economic needs of the North Korean people.” Hillary

Rodham Clinton, U.S.–Asia Relations: Indispensable to Our Future, Remarks at the Asia Society,

New York, New York, February 13, 2009, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/02/117333.htm.

64 She said: “North Korea can halt its provocative behavior, its threats and belligerence toward its

neighbors, take irreversible steps to fulfill its denuclearization commitments, and comply with

international law. And if North Korea chooses that path, sanctions will be lifted, energy and other

economic assistance will be provided, its relations with the United States will be normalized, and

the current armistice on the Peninsula will be replaced by a permanent peace agreement.” Press

Availability With Secretary Gates, Korean Foreign Minister Yu, and Korean Defense Minister

Kim, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Seoul,

South Korea, July 21, 2010, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/145014.htm.

65 Yoichi Funabashi, “ee Peninsula Question” (Joongangilbo News Magazine, 2007), 571 (Korean

translation).
Even though denuclearization of North Korea is important, trading off

the armistice agreement is no more than a self-defeating policy for the

United States and South Korea. And such a policy would be harmful to

long-term stability in Northeast Asia. It will create the wrong impression

that the armistice agreement and the UNC are responsible for North Korea’s

nuclear weapons development program—a long-held argument by North

Korea. Also, a U.S.–North Korea peace treaty will lead to some critical

strategic mistakes. It will:

• Support the long-lasting North Korean argument that the

Korean War was a national liberation war against U.S.

imperialism and that the USFK is a symbol of American

aggression;

• Accept the parallel argument that Washington and

Pyongyang are the sole parties of the war;

• Recognize Pyongyang as the only legitimate entity on the

peninsula after independence in 1945 and endorse it as a

winner of the decades-long constitutional struggle between

parliamentarianism of the South versus communism of the

North. (It should be noted that West Germany never

recognized the legitimacy of the Eastern German regime.);

• Let Pyongyang win political, ideological, and psychological

warfare vis-à-vis Seoul and Washington;

• Imply that North Korea deserves to play a key role in

unification issues and marginalizing South Korean interests;

and

• Strengthen pro–North Korea factions in South Korean

society and intensifying ideological struggle within it.

Even if South Korea is invited to join a peace treaty, it is still premature

and risky in the following reasons:

• ee price of denuclearizing North Korea is too cheap to

exchange for an armistice agreement. Hundreds of artillery

guns and missiles along the DMZ can turn the Seoul

metropolitan area into a sea of fire as North Korea has

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula
threatened. Pyongyang can deploy chemical weapons and has

formidable special troops ready to infiltrate South Korea. A

recent report by the U.S. State Department hints that North

Korea has continued to develop biological weapons and may

use them.66 Unless these threats are taken away, permanent

peace in Korea would be no more than an illusion.

• Peace building is a process, success of which will take time

and effort. Although trust is important, the North Korean

argument of building trust based solely on a mere peace

treaty is absurd. Peace building should be a front-loading

process. Without enduring efforts centered on initial

confidence building and arms reduction, enough trust cannot

be built to sign a peace treaty. As Alexander Vershbow,

former U.S. ambassador to Seoul, remarked in October 2007,

a peace treaty is “like the roof of a new house,” to get to the

point of which one needs to “complete work on the

foundation—confidence building measures and increased

openness on the part of North Korea—and the walls—full

denuclearization.”67

• Pyongyang is a chronic violator of agreements. History has

shown North Korea with a notorious habit that agreement is

one thing, and implementation is another. Unless the nature

of the leadership undergoes fundamental changes, a peace

treaty cannot guarantee genuine peace; it will only create a

false sense of security. It will be misused by Pyongyang for a

malicious campaign to unravel South Korean society as

numerous other documents have done so in the past.

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Re ROK–U.S. Military Alliance: Transformation and Change

66 ee document reports: “Available information indicates that North Korea may still consider the

use of biological weapons as a military option, and that it has continued its past effort to acquire

specialized equipment, materials, and expertise, some of which could support biological weapon

development. North Korea has yet to declare any of its biological research and development activities

as part of the BWC confidence-building measures.” Adherence to and Compliance with Arms

Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, Washington, DC,

Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, July 2010, 20–21.

67 Alexander Vershbow, “A peace regime on the Korean peninsula: the way ahead,” ee IFANS

Special Seminar on Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula: Visions and Task, October 26, 2007,

http://seoul.usembassy.gov/utils/eprintpage.html.
Despite occasional clashes, the Korean Peninsula has maintained a

relatively stable peace since the Korea War, mainly because of the existing

peace framework. eis consists of the armistice agreement, the UNC, and

the mutual defense treaty between the ROK and the United States. In

particular, any discussion about a new peace framework in the peninsula

must be based on positive appreciation of the armistice agreement and the

UNC. As the former UNC Commander General Burwell B. Bell III

remarked in March 2006, it is “the longest standing peace enforcement

coalition in the history of the United Nations.”68 To exchange the valuable

armistice system with North Korea’s uncertain denuclearization

commitment is nothing but yielding to its nuclear blackmail or being fooled

by its peace offensive.

ee Korean Peninsula remains home to the constitutional struggle

between parliamentarianism and hybrid communism—the last frontier of

the epochal struggle in the modern history. According to historian Philip

Bobbitt, such a struggle ends only when the superior constitutional order

dominates the weaker by bettering the welfare of the (Korean) nation and

thus, resolving the underlying constitutional question.69 A peace treaty must

be a tool to hallmark ending the struggle, not a makeshift to avoid the

fundamental strategic question.

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

68 Statement of Gen B. B. Bell, Commander, United Nations Command; Commander, Republic of

Korea–United States Combined Forces Command; and Commander, United States Forces Korea

before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 7, 2006, 21.

69 Philip Bobbitt, Re Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History (New York: Anchor

Books, 2002).


The Lee Administration and Changes in ROK

Strategic Culture

by Doug Joong Kim

ee year 2010 marked the anniversary of major historical events in

1910, 1945, 1950, 1990, and 2000 that profoundly affected Korea’s strategic

culture.ee manner in which the administration of President Lee Myungbak has shaped the strategic culture of the Republic of Korea (ROK),1

referred to as South Korea, since 2008 provides a remarkable contrast to

that of his two predecessors, Presidents Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) and

Roh Moo-hyun (2003–8).

On August 22, 1910, Imperial Japan annexed Korea as a colony.2 While

the treaty was subsequently found to be illegal and nullified, Korean

suffering was real and hard to reverse. ee annexation lasted for 35 years,

from August 29, 1910, to August 15, 1945.

eat month, the millennia-old unified Korean nation entered a new

phase of difficulty that still plagues modern Koreans while also threatening

regional peace and global security. Colonized Korea was liberated when

Imperial Japan unconditionally surrendered to the United States and Allied

forces on August 15, ending World War II.3 Liberation, however, brought

new tragedy as the nation was promptly divided along the 38th parallel into

two parts, which since the summer of 1948 have been governed by the ROK

in the south and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the

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Chapter 4

1 eis paper refers to South Korea as the Republic of Korea, ROK, Seoul, or simply “Korea.”

2 Tokyo announced the annexation on August 29, 1910. ee author has been arguing for years to

change the length of annexation from 36 to 35 years. Finally, the Korean Ministry of Foreign

Affairs and Trade changed the number to 35 in its publication Sixty Years of Diplomatic History of

Korea, 1948-2008, which was published in 2009. Still, most Koreans say 36. ee historical record

should be corrected.

3 ee two major catalysts to Tokyo’s decision to surrender unconditionally were the atomic

bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Soviet Union’s decision on August 8 to enter the war

against Japan.
north.4 eis national division produced the so-called “Korean question” of

which government would govern the Korean Peninsula.To resolve this, the

United Nations in 1947 called for UN-monitored free elections throughout

the peninsula to establish a national government.5 ee Soviet Union and

North Korean authorities forbade such elections in the north. UN monitors

observed the elections south of the 38th parallel, which led to the

establishment of the freely elected ROK government on August 15, 1948.

Four months later, the UN declared the ROK government to be the “only

[lawful] Government” on the Korean 6. ee struggle for a unified Korean

government to govern all Koreans on the peninsula is the underlying reason

for the ongoing Korean War.7

In 1950, to unify the Korean Peninsula under its control, North Korea

invaded the ROK on June 25.8 ee surprise amphibious landing at Inchon

on September 15 by United Nations forces under General Douglas

MacArthur changed the course of the war. U.S. and South Korean forces

pushed the invaders deep into their own territory before “Chinese

‘volunteers’intervened in October, ultimately enabling the DPRK to restore

its authority in North Korea.”9 By the time the cease-fire agreement was

signed on July 27, 1953, both China and the Soviet Union had become

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

4 On August 15, 1945, President Harry S. Truman proposed to Soviet Premier Josef Stalin that

Korea be temporarily divided along the 38th parallel to facilitate the surrender of Japanese forces in

Korea. Stalin agreed, evidently to avoid a confrontation with the United States by occupying the

entire peninsula and perhaps to encourage a quid pro quo under which Washington would permit

the Soviet Union to occupy the northern half of Hokkaido, which is the northernmost major

Japanese island. ee Soviet Union accepted the United States proposal to occupy the northern and

southern parts separately. ee United States was barely able to save the southern part of the Korean

peninsula. On August 15, 1948, the ROK (South Korea) was proclaimed, prompting Kim Il-sung

to announce the establishment of the communist Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK,

North Korea).

5 UN General Assembly Resolution 112(III), November 14, 1947.

6 UN General Assembly Resolution 195(III), December 12, 1948. ee United Nations accepted the

ROK and DPRK as members in 1991 (UNGA Resolution 702) but has not described the DPRK

as a “lawful government.”

7 Major combatant commanders signed an Armistice Agreement on July 27, 1953 to halt major

combat operations, transfer prisoners of war, and implement other measures. However, the

Armistice Agreement did not end the war but will remain in effect until “the peaceful settlement of

the Korean question” inter alia (Articles IV and V).

8 UN Security Council Resolution 82 (S/1501) noted “with grave concern the armed attack on the

Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea.”

9 “ee Korean War 1950-53” in South Korea: A Country Study, Federal Research Division

(Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1990).
involved. While the 1953 Armistice Agreement did stop major combat

operations, the signatories to the agreement understood that the Korean

War would persist until the Korean question is resolved.10

In 1990, South Korea and the Soviet Union established diplomatic

relations, raising South Korean hopes for a productive bilateral relationship.

A major catalyst for Moscow’s decision to establish diplomatic relations

with Seoul seems to have been the Soviet economic crisis. eis crisis

prompted President of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev to seek better

relations with all countries in the Asia-Pacific region regardless of

sociopolitical system, as he explained in his July 1986 Vladivostok and

August 1988 Krasnoyarsk speeches. Improved Seoul-Moscow relations

appear to have been carefully and systematically planned to include sports,

trade, and political relations. ee Soviets were eager to participate in the

1988 Seoul Olympics, if only for the sake of the athletic competition.

Moscow sent more than 6,000 athletes and fans to South Korea by ship

through Pusan and Inchon and via Aeroflot aircraft destined for Kimpo

Airport near Seoul. For its part, Seoul particularly honored Soviet athletes

and guests, and the Soviet team did not go home with empty hands.

Daewoo provided a range of souvenirs that included 36 South Korean

television sets, seven minibuses, four large buses, and four cars.11

ee year 2000 was an historic watershed in inter-Korea relations. In

mid-June, ROK President Kim Dae-jung and DPRK Chairman Kim Jongil conducted the first all-Korean summit meeting. eis event and the

resulting joint statement on June 15 raised hopes for improved relations.

Stockholm’s prestigious Nobel Foundation awarded its annual Peace Prize

to President Kim for this apparent breakthrough. However, his achievement

was tainted by revelations that his administration paid $500 million to

Pyongyang just before the summit.12 ee Lee administration has declared

that it will never offer such a “bribe.”

eerefore, 2010 is the 100th anniversary of the annexation of Korea by

Imperial Japan, the 65th anniversary of liberation, the 60th anniversary of

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Re Lee Administration and Changes in ROK Strategic Culture

10 Korean War Armistice Agreement—July 27, 1953, Articles IV and V. Article IV stipulates the

importance of resolving the Korean question and Article V states, “this Armistice Agreement shall

remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments . . . or by

provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement.”

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.
the Korean War, the 20th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic

relations between Korea and the Soviet Union, and the 10th anniversary of

the first South–North Korean summit meeting. Mindful of these major

events, the Korean public began the year with hope that it could become one

of reconciliation after sixty long years of tension and conflict.

Satisfying these hopes became more difficult, however, due to increased

North Korean belligerence that prompted significant changes in South

Korea’s strategic culture from a time of unfulfilled idealism from 1998–2007

under Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun to a more realistic

culture since February 2008 under President Lee Myung-bak.

Pre-Cheonan ROK Strategic Culture

Ongoing threats from North Korea have been a constant factor in ROK

security policy since Pyongyang launched the Korean War in 1950 to unify

the Korean Peninsula under its control.ee DPRK’s emergence as a nuclear

weapons state is an important case in point.

ee administrations of Presidents Kim and Roh tried to manage these

threats through historically generous engagement strategies from 1998–

2007. Kim’s “Sunshine” policy produced the first inter-Korea summit as

noted and follow-on agreements that changed the way Seoul publicly

described North Korea. eus, the ROK Ministry of National Defense

stopped referring to North Korea as the main security threat to South Korea

in its biennial defense white papers. Moreover, Seoul seemed to look the

other way as Pyongyang continued efforts to become a nuclear weapons

state even after finally succeeding in October 2006.13 One year later in

October 2007 the Roh administration sought an apparent business-as-usual

approach, which produced another generous set of initiatives in the second

inter-Korea summit.14

Despite South Korean popular hopes for a more benign security

environment based on the relatively progressive engagement policies and

inter-Korea summit agreements achieved by Kim and Roh, the North

Korean military threat had not diminished by late 2007. North Korea had

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

13 David E. Sanger, “North Koreans Say eey Tested Nuclear Device,” Re New York Times, October

9, 2006.

14 Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Jong-il, “Declaration on the Advancement of South–North Korean

Relations, Peace and Prosperity,” ROK Ministry of Unification, October 5, 2007.
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Re Lee Administration and Changes in ROK Strategic Culture

become a nuclear weapons state, and the possibility of denuclearizing the

North was very low. ee Six-Party Talks, which started during the Roh

administration, were deadlocked due to Pyongyang’s refusal to approve a

credible verification process.

In 2007 presidential candidate Lee Myung-bak recognized that the

Kim and Roh approaches had neither neutralized North Korea’s threats nor

substantively improved inter-Korea relations. Lee called for a new approach

that included the need for mutual reciprocity. He was elected president with

strong support from Korean conservatives and began to implement his new

approach when he was inaugurated in February 2008.

ee Lee administration’s first defense white paper in 2008 discussed

the North Korean threat more frankly than the previous two

administrations. ee 2008 Defense White Paper noted, “North Korea

maintains its huge conventional military power as before, and continues to

develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD). eis creates a threat to the

Korean Peninsula and to the general security of the region.”15 Moreover,

Pyongyang’s “proliferation of WMDs such as nuclear, biological, and

chemical weapons, as well as the means to deliver them through ballistic

missiles is considered one of the primary factors posing a major threat to

global security today. It is particularly damaging to global security that some

nations possess the technology to develop nuclear weapons and long-range

missiles. In addition, they can easily acquire related parts and materials on

the international black markets.”16

Such changes in ROK public diplomacy puzzled the South Korean

public, which had not realized the danger of the North Korean threat or

the scope of change in Lee’s North Korea policies. eey did not appreciate

the seriousness of the situation. Meanwhile, opposition parties continuously

criticized the policy changes, warning that they might cause a deterioration

of relations with the North. Seoul’s new stance also puzzled North Korean

leaders. Both groups needed to adjust to Lee’s approach and sometimes they

tried to turn the clock back.

Pyongyang took a more belligerent stance in 2009. On January 30,

North Korea’s Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea issued a

statement with the following key points that effectively nullified all inter15 Defense White Paper 2008 (Seoul: ROK Ministry of National Defense, 2008), 25.

16 Ibid., 10–11.
Korea agreements:

First, all the agreed points concerning the issue of putting an end

to the political and military confrontation between the north and

the south will be nullified [emphasis added].

Second, the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression,

Cooperation and Exchange between the North and the South and

the points on the military boundary line in the West [Yellow] Sea

stipulated in its appendix will be nullified [emphasis added].17

Pyongyang raised the stakes in the spring and summer. Ignoring several

UN Security Council resolutions, North Korea conducted another longrange ballistic missile test on April 5.18 On April 13, the president of the

UNSC stated,“ee Security Council this afternoon condemned the launch

carried out on 5 April by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in

contravention of Security Council resolution 1718 (2006), which barred the

East Asian country from conducting missile-related activities.”19 ee next

day Pyongyang belligerently replied, “ee DPRK will never participate in .

. . Six-Party Talks nor will it be bound any longer to any agreement of the

talks as they have been reduced to a platform for encroaching upon its

sovereignty and forcing it to disarm itself and bringing down its system.”20

On May 24, the DPRK conducted its second nuclear weapons test,21

prompting the UN Security Council on June 12 to issue Resolution 1874

further condemning North Korea. In September, the Kim Jong-il regime

sent a blunt letter to the UNSC, laying out a number of confrontational

positions, including the following: “ee DPRK totally rejects the UNSC

‘Resolution 1874’ which was unfairly orchestrated in June 13 in wanton

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

17 “DPRK to Scrap All Points Agreed with S. Korea over Political and Military Issues,”

[North]Korea Central News Agency, January 30, 2009.

18 Peter Foster, “North Korea launches missile in ‘satellite test,’” Re Telegraph, April 5, 2009,

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/5108535/North-Korea-launchesmissile-in-satellite-test.html.

19 UNSC 9634, “Security Council Condemns Launch by Democratic People’s Republic of Korea:

Agrees to Adjust Travel Ban, Assets Freeze, Arms Embargo Imposed in 2006,” UN Security

Council Department of Public Relations, April 13, 2009, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/

2009/sc9634.doc.htm.

20 “DPRK Foreign Ministry Vehemently Refutes UNSC’s ‘Presidential Statement,’” [North] Korean

News, April 14, 2009, http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm.

21 Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Claims to Conduct 2nd Nuclear Test,” Re New York Times, May

24, 2009.
violation of the DPRK’s sovereignty and dignity and that the DPRK will

never be bound by this resolution.”

Reprocessing of spent fuel rods is at its final phase and extracted

plutonium is being weaponized. Experimental uranium enrichment has

successfully been conducted to enter into completion phase.22

Despite these discouraging developments in 2009,the Korean public still

envisioned 2010 as a potential landmark year for inter-Korea relations. eey

hoped that Seoul and Pyongyang could make efforts to heal the wounds of the

Korean War, show cooperative gestures toward each other and other

participating countries in the war, including the United States, China, and

Russia. Over the course of 60 years since the Korean War, as its veterans get

older and fewer in number, some Koreans thought it would be appropriate to

invite those veterans—residing in Korea and abroad—to visit their old

battlefields,and give them a chance to console their psychological and physical

wounds and the memory of their fallen veterans, regardless of their

nationalities. After these visits, the veterans would tell their children and

friends about the importance of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.23

eese hopes were dashed on March 26, 2010, however, when North

Korea sank the ROK Ship Cheonan, consigning it and 46 ROK sailors to

become the most recent victims of the ongoing Korean War. eis surprise

attack reminded South Koreans that the North Korean threat could not be

easily neutralized. Pyongyang and the South Korean public would see a

significantly different response from the Lee administration compared to his

predecessors.

Post-Cheonan ROK Strategic Culture

ee news on March 26 was heartbreaking, especially for those whose

loved ones were on the sinking 1,200-ton ROK Navy corvette.eis incident

produced a major turning point in South Korean strategic culture, interKorean relations, and the security environment in Northeast Asia.24

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Re Lee Administration and Changes in ROK Strategic Culture

22 “DPRK Permanent Representative Sends Letter to President of UNSC,” [North] Korea Central

News Agency, September 4, 2009.

23 Does history repeat itself? Just before the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, North Korea exploded a

bomb on board a Korean jetliner in mid-air. One of the bombers is living in Korea, and recently

made a trip to Japan.

24 ee term “Cheonan incident” is inappropriate because it does not indicate that the ship was

attacked by the North and the North is responsible.
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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

A multinational inspection team later concluded that a North Korean

submarine sank the Cheonan with a single torpedo. Discussed below are the

results of the multinational inspection team, the domestic and international

responses, and initial ROK measures.

To determine what happened, Seoul invited 24 foreign experts to

investigate the incident,which comprised four support teams from the United

States,Australia,the United Kingdom,and Sweden.eeir report was released

on May 20, 2010, with the key finding that a North Korean submarine sank

the Cheonan with a single, indigenous (CHT-02D) torpedo.

President Lee addressed the nation on May 24 to explain the results of

the multinational investigation and their determination that North Korea

was responsible.25 He urged Koreans to be patient and tolerant, as many

feared that the two Koreas were heading toward a resumption of large-scale

combat operations on this the sixtieth anniversary of the Korean War. Fear

of hot war in Korea was the main concern, and the responses between the

government and the opposition parties were quite different.

ee president outlined several countermeasures, which excluded a

military role. He reminded the nation and foreign observers,“ee overriding

goal of the Republic of Korea is not military confrontation. Our goal has

always been the attainment of real peace and stability on the Korean

Peninsula. Our goal is to bring about prosperity for all Koreans. Our vision

is to realize the peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula.”

He demanded North Korea’s apology, saying: “Apologize immediately

to the Republic of Korea and the international community. Immediately

punish those who are responsible for and those who were involved in the

incident. eese are basic measures that the North has to take before

anything else. If the North continues to make excuses and wild assertions

as it has always done in the past, they will not find any place to stand in the

world.” Lee also pointed out that the Korean military made mistakes, “We

have to admit that our Armed Forces made mistakes as well. On the

occasion of this incident, the Government will solidify the national security

readiness.ee discipline of the Armed Forces will be reestablished, military

reform efforts will be expedited and combat capabilities will be reinforced

drastically.”26

25 President Lee Myung-bak, “Special Address to the Nation,” ee Blue House, May 24, 2010.

26 Ibid.
ee Korean public received government statements and the report’s

findings with surprisingly mixed feelings that included a level of discontent.

ee public became confused by conflicting news coverage and

government statements at the time of the incident.ee media reported the

incident as if it was the Winter Olympic Games in which Yuna Kim was the

star. ee National Assembly was more interested in publicity, holding live

hearings with responsible personnel from the Defense Ministry.ee details

of the rescue operations were broadcast like a video game. ee government

failed to quell important controversies over the issue.ee performance of the

administration in handling the Cheonan situation was, at the initial stage,

embarrassing. President Lee called it “the mistakes.”

Of more concern is the number of Koreans who challenge the report’s

findings, especially the many scholars and NGOs who favored the Kim and

Roh engagement policies with the North. eey even sent an e-mail to the

United Nations to influence the UNSC process, which embarrassed the

ROK government.eose groups still claim they acted properly. Meanwhile,

those who support the government are cautious about dealing with the issue

at academic conferences.

On balance,the Lee administration was wise to assemble a multinational

team to investigate the Cheonan sinking. While the ensuing report is

persuasive to most readers, certain aspects of this process were flawed.

Seoul should have invited experts from China, Russia, and Japan, as

they are members of the Six-Party Talks. Including Chinese and Russian

experts could have helped build stronger consensus to support Seoul’s

requests for relatively strong UN action.

ee official documents and presidential statements regarding the incident

were not well circulated among the Korean public. ee news media did not

handle the issue as well as it did in the previous two administrations. ee

government did not persuade the public to accept the investigation team’s

findings or successfully mobilize public awareness of the severity of the problem

and Pyongyang’s responsibility for another act of aggression against South

Korea.

Reaction to the Cheonan attack and the results of the international

investigation team varied among the key actors: North Korea, the United

Nations Security Council, and the surrounding powers—China, Russia, and

the United States.

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Re Lee Administration and Changes in ROK Strategic Culture
North Korea predictably denied any involvement in the Cheonan

incident. On May 23, for example, the [North] Korea Central News Agency

(KCNA) reported a “signed commentary” in the Rodong Sinmun that

stated,

ee “investigation into the case” was nothing but a red herring as

it was aimed to zealously spread a rumor about the “north’s

involvement in the case” and thus fan up atmosphere for extreme

animosity toward fellow countrymen and confrontation with them

among south Koreans of different circles and, at the same time,

openly unleash a war of aggression against the DPRK in collusion

with foreign forces under the pretext of what it called “security

crisis.”27

On May 25, one day after President Lee Myung-bak informed the

public of the findings by the international investigation team, KCNA

reported, “the ‘story about the north’s torpedo attack’ is a whopping lie.”28

Pyongyang has steadfastly denied any involvement in the incident, despite

the incontrovertible evidence examined by the multinational team.

ee UN Security Council issued a presidential statement on July 9,

2010, with two key sentences. One, “the Security Council condemns the

attack, which led to the sinking of the Republic of Korea Ship Cheonan.”

Two, “In view of the findings [of the South Korean-led multinational

investigation] which concluded that [North Korea] was responsible for

sinking the Cheonan, the Security Council expresses its deep concern.”29

ee statement mentions North Korea three times, including Pyongyang’s

claim that “it had nothing to do with the incident.”30 But it did not blame

Pyongyang for this act of aggression.

eis result was not fully satisfactory for the Lee administration. ee

administration had focused its diplomatic efforts on persuading the United

Nations to levy strong sanctions against the North. ee UNSC

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

27 “S. Korean Puppets’ Moves for Confrontation and War Flailed,” [North] Korea Central News

Agency, May 23, 2010.

28 “Military Commentator on Truth behind ‘Story of Attack by North,’” [North] Korea Central

News Agency, May 25, 2010.

29 “Security Council Condemns Attack on Republic of Korea Ship “Cheonan,” United Nations

Security Council (SC/9975), July 9, 2010, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/

sc9975.doc.htm.

30 Ibid.
fundamentally discounted the ROK’s basic position that “the North’s

sinking of the South Korean ship was an outright military provocation that

goes against all international treaties including the armistice [agreement]

and UN Charter and needs to be dealt in a firm manner.”31 ee UNSC

stance basically constitutes a South Korean defeat. On the other hand, the

UNSC statement represents a North Korean victory because it did not hold

Pyongyang accountable for sinking the warship.

Internationally, the Lee administration’s efforts to punish or sanction

the North were not so successful. Only the United States came to the ROK’s

aid with the first “Two-plus-Two” meetings of both countries’ defense and

foreign affairs ministers, and several military exercises. China and Russia

were not fully cooperative and there is criticism of Korea-China and KoreaRussia relations, saying the strategic partnerships were not working in this

case.

Since mid-June, Seoul’s decisions to improve certain aspects of its

defense posture and public outreach through the president’s Liberation Day

address reveal more changes in Korea’s strategic culture. On the 65th

anniversary of national liberation, August 15, 2010, Lee warned the North

through several messages in his annual address to the nation:

• eis [attack on the Cheonan] should never have happened.

ee North must never venture to carry out another

provocation nor will South Korea tolerate it if they do so

again.

• It is about time Pyongyang looked straight at reality, made a

courageous change and came up with a drastic decision.

• [T]he two Koreas first need to form a peace community that

assures security and peace on the peninsula. What is most

important in this connection is the denuclearization of the

peninsula.

• ee next step is to carry out comprehensive inter-Korean

exchanges and cooperation with a view to developing the

North’s economy dramatically. ee result will be an

economic community in which the two will work for

economic integration.

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Re Lee Administration and Changes in ROK Strategic Culture

31 “Korea, U.S. agree to delay OPCON transfer to 2015,” www.president.go.kr, June 28, 2010.
• Building on such a foundation, the two Koreas will

eventually be able to remove the wall of different systems

and establish a community of the Korean nation that will

ensure dignity, freedom and basic rights of all individuals.

erough this process, Koreans can ultimately bring about the

peaceful unification of Korea.

• Reunification will happen. It is therefore our duty to start

thinking about real and substantive ways to prepare for

reunification such as the adoption of a unification tax.32

ee unification tax proposal came under instant criticism. One

newspaper said, “[Lee’s] remarks came in the midst of high tension on the

Korean Peninsula since the deadly Cheonan sinking.”33 A newspaper

editorial pointed out,

President Lee Myung-bak’s proposal to introduce a unification tax

is creating quite a stir. . . .ee opposition camp is strongly opposed

to Lee’s idea, saying that it is an absurd move, considering the

administration is using a meager three percent of the fund created

to promote exchange and cooperation between South and North

Korea.34

ee controversies over the unification tax and President Lee’s vision of

unification might be perceived as an exit strategy from the Cheonan incident

and the following tensions on the Korean peninsula. Alternatively, the

proposal could represent the beginning of a national debate on a subject of

profound importance: shall Koreans become proactive on peaceful

unification or continue to be passive on reunification, leaving future

generations to cope with it?

ee Cheonan sinking produced several major changes in South Korea’s

defense posture, including military leadership and organization. In addition,

others made by President Roh Moo-hyun are to be reversed or modified.

On June 26, one day after the 60th anniversary of the Korean War

invasion by the North, Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Barack Obama

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

32 “Address by President Lee Myung-bak on the 65th anniversary of National Liberation,” August

15, 2010, www.president.go.kr.

33 JoongAng Daily, August 16, 2010.

34 “Division on Unification,” JoongAng Daily editorial, August 19, 2010.
announced that the transfer of wartime operational control (OpCon) from the

ROK–U.S. Combined Forces Command will be delayed three years to 2015.

eis is a major departure from the Roh administration initiative in 2007 to

assume wartime OpCon by April 17, 2012, which many Koreans believed

provided the country with insufficient time to acquire new capabilities.

North Korea’s second nuclear test in May 2009 persuaded many

Koreans that the OpCon transfer in 2012 would be premature. Defense

Minister Kim Tae-young pointed out that transferring OpCon then could

be “the worst-case scenario for the military,” because North Korea will

celebrate founder Kim Il-sung’s 100th birthday in April 2012 and probably

would have bolstered its nuclear capabilities for the event.35 Deferring the

transfer to 2015 would provide Seoul with more time to secure its own

intelligence gathering ability, strategic command and communication

system, and precision bombing skills.

After the June 16 summit meeting with President Obama, Lee said,

“In due consideration of the changed circumstances in the region, the two

presidents—in line with the prior request of the South Korean

government—reviewed the appropriateness of the timeline for conversion

and decided to delay the date by three years to December 2015.” By then,

the North will also have made it official that Kim Jong-il’s son will be

designated the next leader of North Korea.ee Lee administration made it

clear that the delay was requested by South Korea. Surprisingly, the

opposition parties did not object.

Security Focus

Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan, Defense Minister Kim Tae-young,

and Unification Minister Hyun In-taek were not affected by the August 8

cabinet reshuffle. Keeping them in position reinforced their reputations as

“the top executors of the Lee Myung-bak administration’s uncompromising

policies against North Korea.”ee media interpreted it in the following way:

ee survival of the three security-related ministers in Lee’s shakeup of his cabinet on August 8th reflects Seoul’s intention to

continue pressing Pyongyang over the sinking of the Cheonan

warship, according to political insiders. . . . ee official said the

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Re Lee Administration and Changes in ROK Strategic Culture

35 www.mnd.go.kr
important task of preparing for the G-20 Summit in November

and of preventing additional provocation from North Korea

leading up to the summit were considerations in keeping the three

ministers. . . . Analysts said the government took into consideration

the possibility that replacing the three ministers could send a wrong

signal to the North.

In addition, they are well aware of the measures to be taken to correct

the weak point of the Korean government in terms of national defense,

foreign, and unification policy, which were revealed by the Cheonan incident.

“eey should fix the cowshed after they lost the cow.”36

Military Service Review

ee duration of military service is to be reviewed. South Korea expects

its active-duty troops to shrink from 690,000 to 517,000 under a national

project called Defense Reform 2020. In 2007, the Roh government decided

to shorten the mandatory service term to 18 months by 2014. However,

after the Cheonan, this decision was questioned.

Lee Sang-woo, head of the Presidential Commission for National

Security Review that was established after the sinking, said that the duration

of military service should be at least 24 months to maintain professional

armed forces at full operational capacity. Shortening the duration of military

service would force South Korea to eventually reduce the number of its

troops to about 500,000 by 2020, from the current 655,000.37

eis change will draw criticism from candidate recruits who can be expected

to question why the service period was shortened from 24 to 18 months in the

first place. ee threat from North Korea had not changed. eerefore, the

background and intention of the Roh decision needs to be re-examined.

North Korea’s attack on the Cheonan prompted significant changes in

South Korea’s strategic culture with respect to national security planning

and unification, although some Koreans seem more inclined to accept North

Korean propaganda blaming the Lee administration for weakening interKorea relations than they are to hold Pyongyang accountable for its

aggression.

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

36 JoongAng Daily, August 10, 2010.

37 JoongAng Daily, August 14, 2010.
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Re Lee Administration and Changes in ROK Strategic Culture

For most Koreans and the administration, however, the incident

prompted new, more realistic perceptions regarding their security

environment and unification.eese include awareness that engagement with

North Korea had not reduced its hostility toward the ROK and South

Korea’s military capabilities neither deterred the North Korean attack nor

enabled an effective response. North Korea’s denials and the refusal of

China, Russia, and the United Nations to hold Pyongyang accountable for

the attack profoundly disappointed Koreans who had hoped for a more

responsible stance from these key actors.

ee attack and its aftermath shocked most Koreans into considering

several key points: North Korea will remain a serious threat until the

peaceful unification of a democratic Korea; engagement is desirable but

must be mutually beneficial and productive; the surrounding powers pursue

their own interests at ROK’s expense, although Washington’s firm support

and willingness to accept Seoul’s request to defer OpCon transfer to 2015

were a welcome exception; and ROK military capabilities require

enhancement.

Consequently, Koreans have tended to accept the Lee administration’s

initiatives to postpone the assumption of wartime OpCon transfer until

2015 and review the duration of military service. Developing a consensus on

the efficacy of inter-Korea engagement and unification planning are clear

challenges for the public and administration.

ee Lee administration took some important new steps on these

subjects as of the date of this paper. What else can it do in the future?

Beyond 2010

Mobilizing public support is essential for achieving ROK objectives to

deter North Korean aggression and ultimately achieve the peaceful

unification of a democratic Korea that would enhance regional peace and

prosperity. To supplement the previously discussed initiatives launched by

the Lee administration, four additional measures are suggested: improve

ROK relations with China, contain the North Korean threat, strengthen

ROK public awareness, and establish a new Korean National Guard.

Korea should pay more attention to enlisting China’s support for

Korean national interests, or at least neutralizing its opposition. China is a
member of the Six-Party Talks as well as a permanent member of the

United Nations Security Council. No progress can be made in either forum

without China’s support.

At the same time, the Lee administration needs to address an apparent

yearning among Korean intellectuals for China to become the “G-2” (with

the United States) and stand against U.S. dominance in Northeast Asia. For

them, the rise of China is great news.eey welcome such news items as the

New York Times’ “China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy.” eis

story notes that China’s economy now ranks second to the United States

and opines that “the rest of the world will have to reckon with a new

economic superpower.”38 Why these Korean intellectuals want China to

become the region’s dominant power is an important question with

significant implications for Korea’s security planning.

To get China’s support, Korea should expand its official—state-tostate—and public diplomacy toward China.

ee Lee administration failed to persuade China of North Korea’s

culpability for sinking the Cheonan and should have invited China to

participate in the investigation from the start. It is not too late to strengthen

state-to-state diplomacy to gain Beijing’s support for the future.

Stronger public diplomacy is needed to reach the Chinese public. Key

audiences should be public officials, members of the armed forces, news

media members and other opinion leaders, scholars, and Internet users,

whose numbers are rapidly increasing every year. ee number of Chinese

using the Internet soared from about 2 percent of the population (23 million

users) in 2000 to about 31 percent (420 million users) in 2010.39 Similar

growth in the years to come is expected.

Important messages should describe the Korean perspective on a range

of controversial themes. One might remind the audiences of North Korea’s

continuing aggression. Another might address China’s support for the

North Korean system that produces so much suffering among its people. A

third could be the benefits of a peacefully unified democratic Korea for

China, affirming that a unified democratic Korea would be a much better

neighbor than North Korea.

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

38 David Barboza, “China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy,” Re New York Times, August

15, 2010.
Another part of public diplomacy should be to invite Korean War

veterans from China, who fought against South Korea and the United

States during the Korean War, to visit South Korea. eose who suffered

from the war understand the tragedy of war better than anybody else. ee

goal would be to empower and encourage these aging Chinese veterans to

become strong supporters of peace on the Korean Peninsula and to tell their

fellow citizens about the danger of war. ee number of Chinese tourists to

Korea is growing fast, and the numbers will continue to increase as long as

it is a safe travel destination. Interestingly, the more Chinese visitors that

come to Korea, the safer it will become.

North Korea remains belligerent and unchanging. President Lee

reminded Koreans in his Liberation Day address on August 15th: “ee

entire world is changing. Changes are taking place faster than ever. But,

what is the situation in North Korea? Nothing has changed over the last

sixty years. . . . It is now time for the North Korean regime to change. . . . It

is time for the North Korean regime to start thinking about what is truly

good for the regime itself and its people.”40

Of course, Lee understands that change is the last thing the North

Korean regime wants, but this rhetoric is necessary for the sake of domestic

politics. When Lee explained the lessons of the Cheonan incident, he said,

“We had been forgetting the reality that the nation faces the most

belligerent regime in the world.”41

It is the reality that “options are limited for retaliation against the

North.”42 “Even if we decided to take military action, we’d be limited by the

Combined Forces commander’s right to hold back action under the

Combined Delegated Authority,”said Grand National Party legislator Kim

Jang-soo, a former defense minister. een what can Koreans do about it?

Bruce Bechtol Jr. believes Korea needs need both containment and

cooperation: “While many hope for an eventual peaceful end state for the

Korean Peninsula, as long as North Korea continues to develop, deploy, and

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Re Lee Administration and Changes in ROK Strategic Culture

39 “China Internet Usage Stats and Population Report,” Internet World Stats, February 2010,

http://www.internetworldstats.com/asia/cn.htm.

40 “Address by President Lee Myung-bak on the 65th anniversary of National Liberation,” August

15, 2010.

41 Ibid.

42 JoongAng Daily, April 19, 2010.
proliferate its robust WMD programs, only containment and cooperation

among allies will maintain security and stability in the region.”43 Containing

the North will be highly controversial but important to consider.

If Korea and the international community cannot make North Korea

change, the second best option is to keep the North from making further

provocations against the South. eere are at least two approaches to be

considered: review the “special relationship” with the North, and build

foreign support through international fora.

ee view of the relationship between the South and the North needs to

be reexamined. In 1991 both Koreas agreed to a “special relationship”in the

Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and

Cooperation between South and North Korea, the so-called Basic

Agreement.44 eat special relationship put the South at a disadvantage.

eere should be no aggression or killings such as occurred in the attack on

the Cheonan among participants of relationships established in a

nonaggression agreement. eis relationship also embodies the rationale of

the wealthy elder brother who has a moral obligation to help his poor

younger brother because it is the wise course of action.eere is a story about

these rich and the poor brothers. If the two fight each other, the poor one

claims that he has nothing to lose, while the rich one is afraid he might lose

everything.ee “special relationship” needs to be reevaluated the in light of

North Korea nullifying the Basic Agreement in 2009.45

Koreans should accept that the Korean War is ongoing until resolution

of the longstanding “Korean question.”ee only way to resolve the question

is to achieve the peaceful unification of a democratic Korea. In the

meantime, Korea needs to improve its deterrence capabilities through

diplomacy and developing better military skills.

Korea has hosted a number of major international conferences that

provide opportunities to inform visitors about key topics of national security.

ee November 2010 G20 meeting is one example, and another is the next

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

43 Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., “ee North Korean WMD ereat: Nuclear Programs, Missiles, and Proliferation,”

Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy, Strategy 21, Volume 13, Number 1 (Summer 2010), 250.

44 Chung Won-shik (South Korea’s chief delegate) and Yon Hyong-muk (North Korea’s chief delegate),

Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North

Korea, signed on December 13, 1991 and entered into force on February 19, 1992.

45 “DPRK to Scrap All Points Agreed with S. Korea over Political and Military Issues,’ [North] Korea

Central News Agency, January 30, 2009.
Nuclear Security Summit in 2012. If it attracts the same participation as

the first such summit in Washington, DC, in 2010, it will be the largest

summit Korea will have ever hosted. ee Washington summit was the

largest gathering of world leaders hosted by the United States in recent

history.46

ee Lee administration recognizes this will provide another

opportunity to “help rally the international community to make a stronger

commitment to resolving the North Korean nuclear problem.”47 Of course,

Seoul needs a sophisticated approach to inform the knowledgeable

participants in these high-level conferences. Blatant propaganda will be

counterproductive.

On August 13, 2010, the Asan Institute for Policy Studies held a

symposium on “Post-Cheonan Regional Security”at which the author asked

the question, “Will North Korea do the following in the near future—

conduct a nuclear test, launch a long-range missile, and engage in military

provocation?”ee answer was “yes, yes, and yes.”One of the presenters asked

the author, “How will South Korea respond?”

In answering this question, the author reminded the audience of

President Lee’s address on May 24: “Public awareness of the importance of

national security will be strengthened as well. We must never waver in the

face of threats, provocations, and divisive schemes by the North. We must

become one when it comes to national security.”

ee author noted that achieving President Lee’s envisioned consensus

will be a tough task. ee Lee administration’s perceptions and policies

regarding North Korea are significantly different from those of the Kim

and Roh governments, because their engagement was not truly productive.

ee Korean people are more interested in sports, the Olympic Games,

soccer, sports stars playing overseas, movies, video games, and so on. ee

general public is not interested in national security. Debates on security

issues are very rare and seminars on such issues are very few. eere have

been no congressional hearings since the findings in the Cheonan incident.

When China did not support the South Korean position at the UN Security

Council, the views of security experts and China experts were scarcely

reported in the news media. eat resulted in disbelief, mistrust, suspicion,

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Re Lee Administration and Changes in ROK Strategic Culture

46 “Korea Designated as Host of the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit,” ee Blue House, April 14, 2010.

47 Ibid.
and a lack of confidence in the military because the general public tends to

agree with those who appear on the media and the Internet.

ee Cheonan should not be forgotten by the Korean people. One way

to preserve its name in memoriam is to establish an on-site memorial to

the ship and its 46 sailors who went down with her. ee U.S. memorial to

the USS Arizona (BB 39) in Pearl Harbor is a good model.48

Strengthening the military reserve with a national guard would greatly

bolster Korea’s defense capabilities. In 1961, Korea adopted America’s

ROTC system, and it turned out to be a great success. A Korean National

Guard, patterned on the U.S. model, would be cost-effective and provide a

higher-caliber back-up to active duty forces than the current reserve force.

Most Korean army soldiers are draftees, but the military is gradually

recruiting volunteers to be professional soldiers, starting with the Marine

Corps, Air Force, and some areas of the Army. However, a volunteer military

costs a huge amount of money, due to the need to compete for talent with

private industry. What is urgent at this point is to invest more money in

advanced weapon systems, not on manpower.

ee reserve forces currently comprise individuals who have finished

their mandatory military service. But insufficient training, poor equipment,

and low morale reduce their ability to perform combat missions as reservists.

Many Korean men and women wish to serve their country. If they were well

trained and equipped with updated weapons, they could serve much longer

than their mandatory service terms. eey would constitute an army of

volunteers and should be promoted according to their capability and

achievements, thus enhancing professionalism. Moreover, the budget

requirements would be minimal, as they will be paid only when called to

active duty. For most reservists, this would amount to one weekend a month

and two weeks annually for training, i.e. a total period of 38 days.

To further enhance Korea’s defense capabilities, the Lee administration

should establish a Korean National Guard based on the U.S. model.

Since the cease-fire in July 1953, South Korea has never used its military

to retaliate against North Korea’s provocations. It is agreed that “Military

action means dialogue has broken down and the situation can only be

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

48 No navy ship in the future is to bear the name Cheonan, for it should be reserved for the ship

sunk on March 26, 2010.
changed through the use of force. It should always be the last resort; never

the first.”49 ee loss of human lives because of military clashes is not

acceptable, for human life is more important than anything else. To deter

future North Korean provocations, the Lee administration should build

support among neighboring countries to constrain Pyongyang. ee ROK–

U.S. security alliance is the most important guarantee for the security of

Korea, and Korea-Japan cooperation is also essential. Improving relations

with China and Russia is also necessary. In reaching out to the surrounding

powers, Seoul can work with them to make the Korean Peninsula a safer

place and may carve out an important role as a mediator in Northeast Asia.

ee year 2010 was not the landmark year that many Koreans had hoped

it would be because of the advent of a significantly more dangerous strategic

environment. Consequently, South Korea’s strategic culture had become less

idealistic and more pragmatic under the Lee Myung-bak administration.

eus, the Lee administration’s North Korea policy is different from that

of the Kim or Roh administrations. It still causes some confusion among the

Korean people and continues to draw criticism from the opposition parties,

which favor a relatively generous engagement policy with the North. ee

inability of the former “sunshine” type policies to produce a substantive

improvement in inter-Korea relations and a reduction in North Korea’s

military capabilities should undercut the credibility of those advocating a

return to those policies. Moreover, the Cheonan incident in March 2010

clarified that serious nature of the North Korean threat.

To ensure peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, the following

measures are recommended.

First, Korea should secure the support of the surrounding powers or at

least neutralize their opposition. Korea will then be secure. While each of

the powers is important for the security and the eventual unification of

Korea, China is especially so. Its role as a significant benefactor to

Pyongyang provides Beijing with inherent influence to dissuade the North

from threatening the South. eerefore, the Korean government should

expand its official and public diplomacy to build support among Chinese

government officials and its public.ee Internet provides one good method

for reaching these audiences.

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Re Lee Administration and Changes in ROK Strategic Culture

49 Chris Ryan, Fight to Win (London: Arrow Books, 2009), 275.
Second, containing North Korea’s threat is important, while

maintaining military preparedness and deterrence. eis is the minimum

defense. Resolution of the nuclear issue should remain a precondition for the

Lee administration to improve relations with the North.

eird, to maximize the combat readiness of Korean reserve forces, a

Korean National Guard should be established. It would be an army of

volunteers similar to the U.S. National Guard.

Fourth, the government should increase efforts to mobilize public

support of its policies to neutralize the North Korean threat and prepare

for peaceful unification.

Fifth, the 46 sailors lost in the Cheonan sinking should be the last

casualties of confrontation between the Koreas. Establishing a memorial

for the corvette and its lost crew members would be appropriate.

Finally, Koreans need to acknowledge the importance of developing a

patient plan to achieve peaceful unification in coordination with our only

ally. Peaceful unification of a democratic Korea ultimately is the only way to

end the Korean War and create a peaceful, prosperous region.

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula


99

Chapter 5

The North Korean Military Threat1

by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.

Re Korean people have many scores to settle with the U.S.

—Kim Myong-ch’ol, unofficial spokesperson for Kim Jong-il and

the DPRK, 20062

Overview3

Anyone with an interest in either the security and political affairs in

East Asia or the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

(WMD) and ballistic missiles understands that for at least the past thirty

years the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, more commonly

known as North Korea) has presented the international community with a

wide array of threats to regional security and global stability. Included

among the more salient components of this threat are: the world’s fourth

largest military, one of the world’s largest special operations forces, an active

nuclear weapons development program and the proliferation of related

technologies, active ballistic missile development programs and the

proliferation of ballistic missiles and related technologies, the largest ballistic

missile force in the developing world, significant inventory of deployed

chemical weapons and the proliferation of related technologies, an active

biological warfare research program, continued provocative military and

intelligence operations against the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan, the

1 eis paper draws heavily upon interview data collected by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and his

publications including: Defense White Paper, 1990 thru 2008 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense,

Republic of Korea, 1990-2008), Shield of the Great Leader: Re Armed Forces of North Korea (Sydney:

Allen & Unwin, 2001), Armed Forces of North Korea, 2d ed. (draft manuscript), “North Korea” in

Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments: China and Northeast Asia, Issue Twenty-Seven–2010

(London: IHS Jane’s, 2010), and North Korea: Re Foundations for Military Strength–Update 1995,

PC-1510-101-96 (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, March 1996), hereafter

Foundations Update.

2 Kim Myong-ch’ol, “Why Pyongyang is going Nuclear,” Asia Times, August 31, 2006,

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/HH31Dg01.html.

3 Defense White Paper, 2008 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 2008), 25–40, 316.
intermittent provision of military training and assistance to terrorist and

revolutionary organizations, systematic engagement in illicit narcotics

production and distribution, counterfeiting and money-laundering activities,

and a failed economy.4

Influencing and compounding the volatility of these characteristics are

two underlying factors—the national policy known as Military First

(son’gun chongch’i) and the ongoing transition of power from Kim Jong-il

to his son Kim Jong-un.

ee Military First policy instituted by Kim Jong-il places the Korean

People’s Army (KPA) and its leadership at the center of power and

resource allocation within the DPRK. A clear indicator of the success of

the policy is that the pinnacle of power within the DPRK is the National

Defense Commission (NDC), which consists of 13 members. Of these,

eight are general grade officers. ee power of the KPA and the influence

of the Military First policy are more clearly understood by the fact that the

army is the DPRK’s single largest employer, consumer, and industry.5

Although the question of a transition of power from Kim Jong-il to a

successor has likely been an important factor in maneuvering among the

DPRK’s power-holding elite for the past 10 years, it has risen to become

one of the primary concerns since Kim’s reported stroke in 2008. All

available information indicates that his 27-year-old son Kim Jong-un

(reportedly given the titles of “Brilliant Comrade” or “Morning Star

General”) is the designated heir.6 ee maneuverings surrounding this

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

4 Several of the more readily accessible analyses of the threat poised by the DPRK include:

Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., Defiant Failed State: Re North Korean Rreat to International Security

(Dulles: Potomac Books Inc., 2010); Paul Rexton Kan, Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., and Robert M.

Collins, Criminal Sovereignty: Understanding North Korea’s Illicit International Activities

(Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010); Gen Walter Sharp, 2010 testimony

before the Senate Armed Services Committee, http://www.usfk.mil/usfk/Uploads/110/

HACMILCON_March 2010.pdf; Bechtol, Red Rogue: Re Persistent Challenge of North Korea

(Dulles: Potomac Books Inc., 2007); Gen B. B. Bell, 2006 testimony before the Senate Armed

Services Committee, http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2006/March/Bell%2003-07-

06.pdf; Bermudez, Shield of the Great Leader; U.S. Marine Corps, North Korea Country

Handbook, Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, MCIA-2630-NK-016-97, Washington, DC,

May 1997; North Korea: Re Foundations for Military Strength (Washington, DC: Defense

Intelligence Agency, October 1991); Foundations Update; and Ministry of National Defense,

Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, Seoul, 1991–2009.

5 eis statement includes the Munitions Industry Department, which is responsible for the

weapons research, development, production, and sales infrastructure.
transition have witnessed substantial changes among the power-holding

elite during the past several years. Because of these and numerous other

personnel adjustments to ensure fealty to the Kim family and replace aging

leaders, the majority of the current power-holding elite, while being

consummate domestic political survivors, possess neither significant

combat, nor broad international diplomatic experience.7 eis is a

dangerous situation, fraught with genuine possibilities for miscalculation

for a nation that is heavily engaged in ongoing aggressive diplomatic and

military brinkmanship.8

ee KPA is a unified armed force that is the fourth largest in the world

(behind China, the United States, and India). Out of a population of 24

million, approximately 1.19 million (ground forces 1.02 million, navy .06

million, and air force .11 million) serve as active-duty personnel.9 A reserve

force numbering approximately 7.7 million augments this active-duty

component.10 eese forces are equipped with approximately 1,500 aircraft

and helicopters, 770 naval vessels and submarines, 3,900 tanks, 2,100

armored fighting vehicles, 8,500 artillery systems, 5,100 multiple rocket

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Re North Korean Military Rreat

6 ee website North Korea Leadership Watch, http://nkleadershipwatch.wordpress.com/, provides an

up-to-date source for information concerning the DPRK’s succession process, as well as its leadership

dynamics.; “Rare N. Korean Party Meeting ‘to Anoint Kim Jong-il’s Successor’,” Chosun Ilbo, June 28,

2010, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/06/28/2010062801266.html; and Martin

Fackler, “North Korea Appears to Tap Leader’s Son as Enigmatic Heir,”New York Times, April 24,

2010.

7 “N. Korea’s Succession Campaign Stirs Up More Discontent,” Chosun Ilbo, April 18, 2010,

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/05/18/2010051801337.html.

8 Some of the best studies concerning the Military First policy, dynamics of the DPRK leadership,

and the current transition of leadership can be found in: Ken E. Gause, North Korean Civil-Military

Trends: Military-First Politics to a Point (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006),

www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub728.pdf; Ken E. Gause, “ee North Korean

Leadership: Systems Dynamics and Fault Lines,” in Kongdan Oh Hassig, (ed.), North Korean Policy

Elites (Washington, DC: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2004) http://www.brookings.edu/views/

papers/fellows/oh20040601intro.pdf; and Michael Madden’s North Korean Leadership blog,

www.nkleadershipwatch.wordpress.com/. See also: Sang-hun Choe, “Succession May Be Behind N.

Korea’s New Belligerence,”New York Times, May 27, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/28/

world/asia/28north.html; “Bigwigs in North vie for Power over Investments,”JoongAng Daily, July 5,

2010, http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/ view.asp?aid=2922711; “N. Korean Regime Tries to

Regain Grip on Power,”Chosun Ilbo, June 8, 2010, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/

2010/06/08/2010060801330.html; and David E. Sanger and eom Shanker, “U.S. Sees North Korea

as Rattling Sabers for Heir”New York Times, August 13, 2010. 9 Defense White Paper, 2008, 316. An estimated 4 percent of active-duty and 8 percent of reserve

KPA personnel are female.

10 Ibid., 36–37, 316.
launchers, and 800 to 900 ballistic missiles. An estimated 70 percent of the

ground forces and 50 percent of air and naval forces are deployed within

100 kilometers of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) south of a line running

west to east through Pyongyang and Wonsan.eese forward deployed forces

are protected by a network of more than 4,000 underground facilities that

allows them to launch an invasion with minimal preparation or conduct a

defense in depth of the nation’s southern border.11

As impressive as this might appear, it belies the fact that the overall

conventional military capabilities of the armed forces of the DPRK have

slowly declined over the past 15 years and will continue to do so for the

foreseeable future.eere are many reasons for this,but the primary underlying

factors are more than a decade of famine and economic collapse. Officers and

enlisted personnel are generally undernourished and at the extreme low end

of being fit for service by ROK standards, despite the armed forces being a

high priority in the national budget.ee economic collapse has also severely

restricted training, maintenance, and the acquisition of modern weapons.

Despite being faced with such challenges the KPA remains a potent,

relatively well-trained, highly disciplined, conventional military threat to

the ROK force, which is undergoing continual, albeit slow, modernization.

Understanding that it could not match the growing sophistication and

technologically advanced war fighting capabilities of combined ROK and

U.S. forces, the KPA, since the 1960s, has pursued force expansion and

doctrinal developments emphasizing the use of asymmetric forces (e.g.,

information warfare, ballistic missiles, long-range artillery, special operations

forces, and weapons of mass destruction) in any future war on the Korean

Peninsula.eese asymmetric capabilities are formidable and are continuing

to develop.eat they present a significant threat to the ROK and all of East

Asia is evidenced by the dramatic expansion of its special operations forces,

the April 2009 ballistic missile test campaign, the May 2009 nuclear

weapons test, and July 2010 sinking of the ROK Navy corvette Cheonan.

Aside from the sheer size of the KPA, these asymmetric capabilities

represent its most distinguishing and lethal feature.12

Barring an unforeseen event, or series of events, of remarkable

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

11 eere are an estimated total of 8,000–10,000 underground facilities located throughout the nation.

12 “New ereat from N. Korea’s ‘Asymmetrical’ Warfare,”Chosun Ilbo, April 29, 2010, http://english.chosun

.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/04/29/2010042901362.html; and “North Adopts New War Invasion

Strategy,”JoongAng Daily, April 27, 2010, http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2919725.
proportions,the above characteristics will ensure that the DPRK will continue

to present a wide array of threats to regional security and global stability for

the foreseeable future. Significantly, the DPRK represents the country most

likely to involve the United States in a large-scale war. Any such war will

undoubtedly be sudden, violent, and extremely expensive in terms of human

and economic costs. It will likely experience the widespread use of chemical

weapons and ballistic missiles,and has the very real potential of witnessing the

first post-World War II use of nuclear weapons—by the DPRK.

Command and Control13

All power within the DPRK originates with Kim Jong-il, who is

simultaneously Chairman of the National Defense Commission, General

Secretary of the Korean Workers’Party (KWP), and Supreme Commander

of the KPA. Under the 1997 Constitution, the National Defense

Commission is the highest decision-making body.14 It is, in reality, the

pinnacle of power within the DPRK. ee primary path for command and

control of the KPA extends from the National Defense Commission to the

General Staff Department (GSD). From here, command and control flows

to the Korean People’s Navy Command, Korean People’s Air and Air

Defense Command, various bureaus and operational units.ee Ministry of

People’s Armed Forces represents the military externally and exercises

administrative authority over the KPA.Two secondary paths exist to ensure

political control of the KPA. ee first extends through the KWP Central

Committee to the Central Military Committee and onto the KPA General

Political Bureau subordinate to the National Defense Commission. From

the KPA General Political Bureau it extends down via a separate chain of

command to the lowest levels of the KPA. ee second extends from the

National Defense Commission to the Security Command, which also

maintains representatives to the lowest levels of the KPA. As a unified

armed force the Chief of the General Staff not only directly commands the

ground forces but also the naval and air forces.

During late 2008 Kim Jong-il suffered what has been widely reported

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Re North Korean Military Rreat

13 Defense White Paper, 2008, 31; Bermudez, Shield of the Great Leader, 20–55; Bermudez, Armed

Forces of North Korea, 2d ed. (draft manuscript); Bermudez, Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments,

466–7; and Foundations Update, 1–4.

14 While it had no practical effects, the DPRK Constitution was amended in April 2009 to state

that the Chairman of the Nation Defense Commission is the nation’s “Supreme Commander.”
to be a stroke from which he has slowly recovered. By early 2009 he had

resumed much of his former responsibilities. During his incapacitation,

however, de facto control of the DPRK passed to the National Defense

Commission and a small group of power-holding elites. While there were

undoubtedly some minor power struggles, the process of assuming power

and then returning it appears to have proceeded relatively smoothly. Some

adjustments were made within the leadership as a result of these experiences

and a number of personnel appointments were announced following the

first session of the Twelfth Supreme People’s Assembly on April 9, 2009. A

number of these were for natural reasons (for example, age, illness,

retirement, and so on), while the remaining were for political reasons.

During 2009-10 the DPRK initiated a number of personnel and

organizational changes within the National Defense Commission and

intelligence and internal security community that would bring about the most

dramatic reorganization in years. Most significantly, the commission was

expanded to 13 members.Of these,five now control the entire intelligence and

internal security community. While the Ministry of People’s Security was

transferred from the Cabinet to the commission, press reports also indicate

that numerous organizational changes occurred within those intelligence

organizations tasked with activities against the ROK and foreign intelligence

operations.Most significant was the reorganization of the Ministry of People’s

Armed Forces’ (MPAF) Reconnaissance Bureau into the Reconnaissance

General Bureau (RGB). eis organization, while it remains institutionally

subordinate to the MPAF,apparently reports directly to the commission Vice

Chairman General O Kuk-ryol.15 ee RGB is under the directorship of

Lieutenant General Kim Yong-ch’ol and is tasked with the coordination and

control of all operations against the ROK and foreign intelligence operations.

At the eird Plenum of the Twelfth Supreme People’s Assembly held

on June 7, 2010, Jang Song-taek, the director of the KWP Administration

Department, was appointed to vice chairman of the National Defense

Commission.16 In his position as director, both the State Security

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

15 O Kuk Ryol is considered an expert on intelligence operations having been the director of the

KWP’s Operations Department since 1989 and having overseen numerous anti-ROK operations as

well as the development of a number of classes of infiltration vessels, semi-submersible infiltration

landing craft, and mini-submarines. With his promotion to National Defense Commission vice

chairman it is unclear if he will continue as director of the Operations Department, now under the

new Reconnaissance General Bureau.
105

Re North Korean Military Rreat

Department and Ministry of People’s Security report directly to him. Jang’s

appointment means that all foreign intelligence (including anti-ROK

operations) and internal security organizations are under the control of two

of the four vice chairmen of the commission—General O Kuk-ryol and

Jang Song-taek respectively. ee consolidation of these powerful agencies

one level immediately below Kim Jong-il more clearly delineates the areas

of responsibilities for each agency and reduces operating inefficiencies

within the various agencies. Significantly, it also solidifies the powerbase for

the upcoming succession of Kim Jong-il by his son Kim Jong-un.

eis consolidation of capabilities under General O Kuk-ryol suggests

that the DPRK is adopting a policy calling for more provocative infiltrations

and operations against the ROK in the future. ee early 2010 attempted

assassination of former KWP Party Secretary Hwang Jang-yop, who

defected to the ROK, by two Reconnaissance General Bureau operatives

and the March 2010 sinking of the ROKN corvette Cheonan by what is

believed to be a Reconnaissance General Bureau Yeono-class midget

submarine may be indications of this.17

A noteworthy characteristic of the National Defense Commission

specifically, and the power-holding elite in general, is that a number of

members occupy multiple leadership positions within the KPA, KWP, and

intelligence and internal security services. eis cross-pollination and

concentration of power within the hands of a few individuals enables Kim

Jong-il, through the National Defense Commission, to easily maintain firm

control over all aspects of DPRK society and the flow of information. It

also means that the typical decision-making process and poles of political

power apparent in most nations are not present within the DPRK.

Ground Forces18

With approximately 1.02 million active-duty troops—augmented by a

reserve force of approximately 7.7 million—the ground forces are the largest

16 Jang Song-taek is married to Kim Jong-il’s sister Kim Kyong-hui and has been the director of the

KWP’s Administration Department since 2007.

17 eese recent operations are strongly reminiscent of the aggressive insurgency operations undertaken by the Reconnaissance Bureau during the mid to late 1960s.

18 Defense White Paper, 2008, 32-33; Bermudez, Shield of the Great Leader, 56–91; Bermudez, Armed

Forces of North Korea, 2d ed. (draft manuscript); Bermudez, Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments,

469–75; and Foundations Update, 13-15.
and most formidable component of the KPA. ee reserves include, among

others, the paramilitary forces of the Guard Command, Ministry of People’s

Security, Speed Battle Youth Shock Troops, and General Bureau of

Logistics Mobilization.19 ee size, organization, and combat capabilities of

the ground forces provide the DPRK with substantial defensive and

offensive capabilities. One of the KPA’s most salient aspects is its formidable

special operations force, totaling approximately 180,000 personnel. ee

primary mission of the ground forces component is the defense of the

DPRK and the protection of the Kim Jong-il regime. Secondary missions

include the reunification of the Korean Peninsula, conducting special

operations, internal security, and responding to natural disasters.

With the majority of the KPA’s active-duty ground forces deployed within

100 kilometers of the DMZ, while dictated by terrain, allows for the rapid

commitment of second and third echelon forces and facilitates an attack upon

the ROK with minimal redeployment and warning.It is estimated that should

the DPRK decide to initiate hostilities, under ideal conditions the ROK and

United States would have 24 to 72 hours warning at most—or as little as 12

to 24 hours if the KPA was already at an alerted status.

ee GSD-level mechanized infantry and tank divisions are deployed

along the primary avenues of approach to the ROK to provide effective

support. eey are also ideally positioned for exploiting breakthroughs and

to cover strategic rear areas from invasion.ee KPA’s sole remaining artillery

division and GSD-level artillery brigades are forward deployed and well

protected in underground facilities. Without moving, these long-range

artillery units are capable of barraging Seoul and providing deep fire support

to attacking KPA ground troops. ee Pyongyang Defense Command is

deployed in and around the capital city to provide protection in the case of

invasion and to serve as a counter-coup force if required.

Beginning in approximately 2000, the KPA initiated a comprehensive

program involving the reorganization, re-equipping, and redeployment of

ground force units as well as the restructuring and upgrading of reserve

forces and the rear-area command structure. Notable improvements include

the production and deployment of new tanks and long-range self-propelled

artillery systems (primarily 240mm multiple-rocket launchers and 170mm

106

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

19 With the exception of the Reserve Military Training Units the majority of the reserves will likely

be employed as reinforcements or replacements for regular KPA units or utilized as rear area

security units.
107

Re North Korean Military Rreat

self-propelled guns); the restructuring of two mechanized corps, one tank

corps, and one artillery corps into divisions; the expansion of existing light

infantry battalions into regiments; and the establishment of a number of

mechanized light infantry divisions.

eis has been accomplished during a period of economic crisis, which

has limited access to foreign equipment and precipitated fuel shortages,

restricting training and operations. Complicating this has been a series of

floods and famines that have affected every aspect of life within the DPRK.

Despite preferential treatment, the effects of these domestic crises on the

KPA ground component have been significant, especially upon units

deployed within the rear areas. Morale and discipline problems have

reportedly increased, training has fluctuated and some second and third

echelon units have had difficulty in maintaining operational readiness.

ee Ministry of People’s Armed Forces has also been forced to lower

the minimum entry requirements for service in the armed forces several

times to address the slow decline in the health of the general population.

eis itself has resulted in a slow but steady erosion of the physical stature

and well-being of the average KPA soldier. ee trend is toward shorter

troops with extremely little body fat and less muscle mass.20 Additionally, the

past seven years have reportedly witnessed a slow increase in the number of

females within the KPA. Whether this is a result of changing demographics

within the DPRK, or a means of addressing the declining number of males

fit for military service, is unclear.

ee factors leading to declining operational readiness within the KPA

appear to be most noticeable among the reserve units,moderately apparent in

units deployed along the DMZ, and least obvious within elite special

operations and ballistic missile units.Despite these problems the KPA ground

force component is currently judged to be capable of defending the territory

of the DPRK,conducting special operations against the ROK and Japan,and

maintaining internal security. It currently maintains the capability to initiate

a war of reunification against the ROK with little warning; however, it has a

declining capability to prosecute such a war for an extended period of time.21

20 “Healthier children through free lunch,” JoongAng Daily, March 24, 2010, http://joongangdaily

.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2918237.

21 Defense White Paper, 2008, 40. ee best available estimates are that the KPA maintains war

readiness reserves of two to three months worth of oil and ammunition.
Reconnaissance General Bureau22

ee Reconnaissance General Bureau is the primary organization tasked

with collecting foreign tactical and strategic intelligence and coordinating

or conducting all external special operations. It also exercises operational

control over agents engaged in military intelligence activities and oversees

the training, maintenance, and deployment of guerrilla teams available for

operation in the ROK. ee bureau director is Lieutenant General Kim

Yong-ch’ol.

While information concerning organizational changes within the

DPRK’s intelligence community is limited, that which is available suggests

that the Reconnaissance General Bureau was established by combining the

KWP’s Operations Bureau and Office No. 35 with the MPAF’s

Reconnaissance Bureau. ee Unification Front Department and External

Liaison Department were reduced to bureau-level organizations and remain

subordinate to the KWP’s Secretariat.

At this early stage there have been only a few significant organizational

changes within the various agencies subordinated to the Reconnaissance

General Bureau. Major changes will undoubtedly occur as the bureau

develops and redundancies are eliminated. For example, both the former

Operations Department and the Reconnaissance Bureau maintain large sea

escort or naval components. It would seem likely that these would be

combined in some fashion in the future. It is probable that coordination

and competition between the various agencies, frequently problem areas in

the past, will improve under the unified leadership thereby having the

potential to make the intelligence community more efficient.

ee RGB is headquartered in Pyongyang and organized into a

headquarters and six bureaus: First Bureau—Operations, Second—

Reconnaissance, eird—Foreign Intelligence, Fifth—Inter-Korean

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

22 Interview data acquired by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.; “N. Korea’s Command Center of Clandestine

Operations,” Chosun Ilbo, April 21, 2010, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/04/

21/2010042101137.html; Bermudez, “A New Emphasis on Operations Against South Korea?,” 38

North, posted 11 June 2010, http://38north.org/2010/06/a-new-emphasis-on-operations-againstsouth-korea/; “Reconnaissance General Bureau is Heart of N.K. Terrorism,”Korea Herald, May 26,

2010; Yu Yong-won and An Yong-hyon. “‘Dangerous Man’ O Kuk Ryol,”Chosun Ilbo, June 8, 2009;

and Ch’oe Son-yong and Chang Yong-hun. “North Korea Integrates Maneuvering Organs

Targeting the South and Overseas Into Reconnaissance General Bureau,” Yonhap, May 10, 2009,

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr.
Dialogue, Sixth—Technical, and Seventh—Rear Services.23

Special Operations Forces24

According to ROK intelligence sources the KPA deploys one of the

largest special operations forces in the world. eis force is organized into

approximately seven light infantry divisions, 25 special operations forces

brigades (12 light infantry/mechanized light infantry, three reconnaissance,

three airborne, two air force sniper, two navy sniper, and three sniper

brigades) and five to seven reconnaissance battalions. Additionally, infantry

divisions possess an organic light infantry battalion or regiment.25

ee primary missions of these special forces are: reconnaissance;

establishing a “Second Front” within the ROK/U.S. strategic rear;

decapitation and disruption of the ROK/U.S. command, control,

communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

(C4ISR) structure; neutralization of ROK and U.S. air bases; and

neutralization of ROK and U.S. missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

ee Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau is the primary

organization within the KPA tasked with the training and conduction of

unconventional and special warfare operations.During peacetime it is believed

to exercise administrative control over all special operations units, including

those of the Korean People’s Air Force (KPAF),Korean People’s Navy (KPN),

and possibly the Reconnaissance General Bureau. During wartime it will

function as the primary headquarters coordinating all special operations.

Beginning in 2000 but more significantly from 2003 to the present, the

KPA has undertaken a number of important organizational changes within

its ground forces units. Among the more significant changes was the expan109

Re North Korean Military Rreat

23 Some sources identify the bureaus as being numbered 1 thru 7. eere is no Fourth Bureau as a result

of Korean cultural traditions.

24 Defense White Paper, 2008, 33; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., North Korean Special Forces, 2d ed.

(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997); Bermudez,Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments, 472–73;

Foundations Update, 21–23; “N. Korea Moves 50,000 Special Forces to Frontline,”Chosun Ilbo, April 6,

2010, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/05/06/2010050600371 .html; and “N.

Korea ‘Has 180,000 Special Forces Ready to Cross into South’,”Chosun Ilbo, June 16, 2010,

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/06/16/2010061601318.html.

25 U.S. sources, however, credit the KPA with a significantly lower number. ee discrepancy arises

from the fact that ROK estimates include light infantry units organic to divisions and corps, as well as

infantry units converted to light infantry.
sion of existing division-level light infantry battalions within the DMZ corps

to regiments and the reorganization of seven infantry or mechanized infantry

divisions (approximately 50,000 troops) into light infantry divisions. eese

later organizational developments were apparently achieved by stripping the

divisions of the majority of their combat and combat support units (for

example artillery, armor, air defense, and so on). Accompanying these

organizational developments was the expansion of urban, nighttime, and

mountaineering training for all special operations units.26

It is believed that the KPA undertook these changes following a

strategic review of a future conflict on the Korean Peninsula, combined with

lessons learned from the recent conflicts in the Balkans, Iraq, and

Afghanistan, which convinced the KPA of the need for a greater number of

“light” units. eis is possibly one of the most significant developments in

KPA conventional forces in the past 20 years.

ee KPA takes great pride in its special operations forces, which it

frequently identifies as the “invincibles” (in the air force), “bombs” (in the

army), and “human torpedoes” (in the navy).27

Korean People’s Navy28

ee KPN is the smallest of the three services with a personnel strength

of approximately 60,000. It is headquartered in Pyongyang and is organized

into a Naval Command headquarters, Naval Staff, two fleet headquarters

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

26 “‘Human Torpedoes’ Are the North’s Secret Naval Weapon,”Chosun Ilbo, April 22, 2010, http://

english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/04/22/2010042201171.html, and Baek Seung-joo.“How

to Deal with the ereat of N. Korea’s Special Forces?,”Chosun Ilbo, May 12, 2010, http://english.chosun

.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/05/12/2010051201255.html.

27 “N Korea ‘Runs Naval Suicide Squads’,”Chosun Ilbo, March 30, 2010, http://english.chosun.com/site/

data/html_dir/2010/03/30/2010033000884.html.

28 Defense White Paper, 2008, 33–35; “Secret Report on Shwe Mann’s Visit Says Burma To Copy

DPRK, PRC Military Models,”Dr Lun Swe (blog), July 2, 2009, Open Source Center,

SEP20090709043001001; Bermudez, Shield of the Great Leader, 92–122; Bermudez,Armed Forces of

North Korea, 2d ed. (draft manuscript); Bermudez,Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments, 492–7;

Foundations Update, 16; “N. Korean Subs ‘Hard to Track All the Time’,”Chosun Ilbo, June 9, 2010,

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/04/09/2010040900289.html; “N. Korean Subs Ply

East Sea with Impunity,”Chosun Ilbo, May 27, 2007, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/

2010/05/27/2010052701296.html; “4 N. Korean Subs Disappear from Radar,”Chosun Ilbo, May 26,

2010; http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/05/26/2010052601246.html; and “Kim

Jong-il Called for Stronger Navy After Defeat in Skirmish,”Chosun Ilbo, May 6, 2010, http://english.

chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/05/06/2010050601362.html
(the East and West Sea Fleets), 13 to 16 squadrons, two navy sniper

brigades, a reconnaissance unit, two coastal defense missile regiments, an

unknown number of surveillance radar companies, and a naval

support/antisubmarine warfare air battalion/regiment. Approximately 40 to

60 percent of the navy’s combat vessels are deployed south of the

Pyongyang-Wonsan line. ee navy controls a number of ocean-going

merchant vessels and coordinates with the Ministry of Land and Marine

Transportation the operations of the DPRK’s merchant marine fleet;

provides support to the Reconnaissance General Bureau’s Maritime and

Operations Departments, which operate a number of Sang-O–class coastal

submarines, and Yeono- and Yugo-class midget submarines in the

infiltration role; coordinates coastal defense with the KPA’s coastal defense

artillery batteries; and coordinates coastal surveillance and security with the

Coastal Security Bureau and paramilitary organizations.

ee navy’s primary mission is to provide an afloat defense for the

approaches to the DPRK’s main ports and defend the territorial waters and

national coastlines. Secondary missions include the insertion of special

operations forces, coastal surveillance, and the protection and control of

coastal shipping and fishing operations. In the event of hostilities the KPN

would be tasked with amphibious lift and fire-support operations, support

to army ground force units, naval mine warfare, interdiction of enemy

shipping in waters adjacent to the Korean peninsula, and rear area security.

KPN submarines may extend this by conducting short-range offensive

patrols off both Japanese coasts; long-range offensive patrols in the East

China Sea, Philippine Sea, and approaches to Japan; and the insertion of

special operation forces throughout the region.

ee KPN has the appearance of being a modestly capable littoral force

with a relatively constant combat ship strength of approximately 770 vessels

(420 combat vessels, 130 air-cushioned vehicles, 90 infantry/mechanized

landing craft, 30 mine warfare, 30 support vessels, and 70 submarines),

which ranks it as one of the world’s largest navies. ee reality is, however,

significantly different.ee prolonged economic crises engulfing the country

limited access to equipment from abroad, and chronic fuel shortages have

impacted training and operations. Approximately 10 to 15 percent of the

KPN’s surface fleet is laid up for engine or hull repair in dry dock or at

graving docks. Additionally, another 10 to 15 percent of the surface fleet is

stored on land, both in the open and in tunnels. eese vessels require

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Re North Korean Military Rreat
112

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

maintenance to be restored to full service.eus the overall number of surface

vessels is significantly lower than the figure of 700. Submarine forces

(including those assigned to the Reconnaissance General Bureau), however,

appear to be in a higher state of readiness.

Additional factors negatively impacting operational readiness and

capabilities include: limited training, obsolescing equipment, the poor

material condition of a number of principal combatant ships, lack of

sophisticated electronic warfare (EW) equipment, shortage of modern

weapons, an inefficient and inadequate logistic system, cumbersome

administrative procedures, completely inadequate C4ISR, and moderate

morale. The fact that the navy is also divided into two fleets, one on each

side of the Korean Peninsula, virtually precludes the service from

bringing its full potential to bear in either sea or the possibility of

reinforcing either fleet.

ee combined KPN and Reconnaissance General Bureau’s submarine

force consists of approximately 70 boats—20 Romeo-class diesel-attack, 40

Sang-O–class coastal diesel-attack, approximately 5 Yeono-class midget

diesel-attack/reconnaissance, and 5 Yugo-class midget dieselattack/reconnaissance submarines. Although a significant portion of this

force is obsolete by Western naval standards, it poses a significant threat.

ee presence of even a single KPN or Reconnaissance General Bureau

submarine during wartime is a threat that cannot be ignored as seen by the

sinking of the ROKN corvette Cheonan (PCC-772).

At approximately 2122 (local time) on March 26, 2010, the Cheonan

exploded and sank while on patrol near Baengnyeong Island in the West

(Yellow) Sea near the Northern Limit Line. Forty-six ROK Navy

crewmembers were killed. While the immediate cause was unknown,

subsequent investigation concluded that it was attacked by a DPRK

submarine launching a CHT-20D torpedo. It is likely that the submarine

was a Yeono-class midget from the Reconnaissance General Bureau.29

Aside from its submarines the Reconnaissance General Bureau operates

approximately 20 “mother ships” and numerous different classes of highspeed semisubmersible infiltration landing craft.

29 ee single most comprehensive source concerning this incident is Joint Investigation Report: On

the Attack Against the ROK Ship Cheonan (Seoul: Republic of Korea Ministry of Defense, 2010).
The navy sniper brigades are primarily tasked with the seizure,

disruption, or destruction of key installations within coastal areas; assisting

the advance of KPA ground force units by enveloping coastal flanks;

assault landings to seize and control a beachhead to allow the landing of

standard ground force units; assisting standard ground force units during

river crossing/bridging operations within coastal areas; establishment of a

new front within the ROK’s strategic rear; and reconnaissance and special

operations.

The KPN is primarily a coastal defense force and ill-equipped and

ill-trained for “blue water” operations. It is judged to have a limited

capability to guard DPRK’s territorial waters (out to 12 nm) and insert

special operations forces into the Republic of Korea during peacetime. It

is unable, however, to enforce the claimed two hundred nm exclusive

economic zone. In the event of hostilities, the KPN possesses the

capability to conduct limited short-term offensive and defensive wartime

operations. It can deploy attack forces—surface and submarine—into both

the Yellow and East (Sea of Japan) Seas capable of interdicting

commercial shipping to and from the ROK and Japan, as well as

temporarily serving as a serious obstacle to hostile naval operations. The

KPN’s experiences with operating an inventory of both coastal and midget

submarines provides it with a limited wartime ability to interdict Japan’s

eastern ports and conduct special operations landings in the region. It also

possesses the ability to conduct two battalion-brigade and several

company-battalion–sized amphibious lift operations against the South.

These wartime capabilities are likely to be limited to the initial stages (the

first 30 days) of a renewed war.

The KPN’s limited abilities and weaknesses portend that in a future

war the advanced weaponry and combined operations capabilities of the

U.S. Navy and Republic of Korea Navy, combined with air supremacy,

would quickly neutralize the vast majority of the KPN’s surface

combatants, but not before it had conducted a number of amphibious

landings, laid numerous sea mines, and began the interdiction of coastal

shipping. KPN midget and coastal submarine operations would

undoubtedly prove more problematic for the U.S. and ROK navies and

would likely survive longer than the surface fleet.

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Re North Korean Military Rreat
Korean People’s Air Force30

With a personnel strength of approximately 110,000 (27,000 officers

and 83,000 enlisted) and 1,600–1,700 aircraft, the KPAF surpasses the

Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) and U.S. air components deployed

in the ROK in terms of personnel and number of aircraft in inventory.eis

ascendancy, however, is purely numerical since the KPAF is qualitatively

inferior in all aspects of combat capability and measures of effectiveness.

ee primary mission of the KPAF is the air defense of the DPRK

mainland and territorial waters. Secondary missions include reconnaissance,

transportation and logistic support, insertion of special operations forces,

strategic bombing, and provision of tactical air support to elements of the

KPA and KPN.

KPAF Supreme Headquarters and Air Defense Command

Headquarters, as well as the Western Air Defense Direction Headquarters,

are located in Pyongyang adjacent to the Miram Air Base.ee Eastern Air

Defense Direction Headquarters is at Songdong-ni Air Base.

ee KPAF is organized into a command element, air staff, air defense

headquarters, six air divisions, several independent air battalions, two air

force sniper brigades, a reconnaissance unit, unmanned aerial vehicle unit,

hot-air balloon units, sailplane units, approximately 19 surface-to-air missile

(SAM) brigades [organized into three air defense sectors], a SAM

maintenance depot, an unknown number of antiaircraft artillery (AAA)

regiments, unknown number of radar regiments, one to four searchlight

battalions, a communications regiment, an air traffic control regiment, and

several aircraft production and repair facilities. ee national air carrier, Air

Koryo, is directly subordinate to the KPAF.

Aviation assets are primarily of Russian and Chinese origin, including

approximately 200 Y-5 (An-2) biplanes and about 300 helicopters. A

significant, but unknown, percentage of the KPAF’s older aircraft inventory

is non-flyable and has been relegated to use as decoys, training aids for

special operations forces, cannibalized for spare parts, or simply left

114

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

30 Defense White Paper, 2008, 35–36; “Secret Report on Shwe Mann’s Visit Says Burma To Copy

DPRK, PRC Military Models,” Dr Lun Swe (blog), July 2, 2009, Open Source Center,

SEP20090709043001001, hereafter “Secret Report”; Bermudez, Shield of the Great Leader, 123–60;

Bermudez, Armed Forces of North Korea, 2d ed. (draft manuscript); Bermudez, Jane’s Sentinel

Country Risk Assessments, 480–7; and Foundations Update, 16–21.
abandoned on KPAF airfields.ee combat readiness rate of the operational

aircraft is estimated to be 65 to 75 percent for MiG-29, MiG-23, MiG-21,

and Su-25 types; 70 to 80 percent for F-5, F-6, and H-5; 75 to 85 percent

for Y-5; and 65 to 76 percent for helicopters. During his May 2010 visit to

China, Kim Jong-il is reported to have requested that China provide the

KPAF with the J-10 (F-10) next-generation fighter.31 It appears, however,

that the Chinese have declined to supply the aircraft at this time.

ee DPRK’s air defense network is arguably one of the densest in the

world. It is, however, based on obsolete weapons, missiles, and radars; and

is most effective at lower altitudes where masses of AAA fire can be brought

to bear on an intruder. Its high altitude SA-2/3/5 surface-to-air missiles

are, however, ineffective in a modern electronic-warfare (EW) environment.

ee DPRK has made modest progress since the mid-1990s in introducing

modernized radars and EW equipment to service. Among the items that

have been brought into use are global positioning satellite and airborne

warning and control system radar jammers.32

ee KPAF’s sniper brigades are primarily tasked with the neutralization

of ROK/U.S. air bases and C4ISR assets. Due to the importance assigned

to this wartime mission they receive priority tasking for the use of An-2

transports and helicopters.

eere are approximately 106 known airfields and heliports of various

types and levels of usability within North Korea. Of these, 12 are abandoned,

not usable, or their status is unknown but believed unusable.ee remaining

94 can be broken down as follows: 21 air bases (includes Sunan

International Airport); 28 airfields; 17 highway strips; two helicopter bases;

four VIP heliports, and more than 21 miscellaneous heliports/helipads. All

primary air bases are hardened to some extent, with many featuring

underground maintenance facilities, aircraft shelters, and dispersal areas.

Even secondary airfields have elements of hardening, often having roads

leading from the runway to fortified dispersal tunnels bored into hillsides;

in some cases, these may be one to two kilometers distant from the airfield

itself. ee KPAF possesses at least two “underground” air bases, Onch’onup on the west coast and Kangja-ri on the east.eese are distinguished from

115

Re North Korean Military Rreat

31 “Kim Jong-il Demands Fighter Jets from China,” Chosun Ilbo, June 17, 2010, http://english.

chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/06/17/2010061700535.html.

32 Defense White Paper, 2008, 36; and “Secret Report.”
other hardened air bases in having runways and hardstands that extend out

from underneath mountains, thus allowing aircraft the possibility of takingoff from under the mountain and landing directly into it.

With an inflexible and unsophisticated command and control system,

large numbers of obsolete aircraft, limited access to spare parts for its few

modern aircraft, and continual fuel shortages, significant deficiencies in pilot

training (some sources report that KPAF pilots average only 15 to 25 flying

hours per year), the KPAF is judged to possess only limited offensive and

defensive wartime capabilities and to be capable of conducting a surge of

offensive operations only during the initial phase of any hostilities. It is also

considered to have only a limited capability of guarding DPRK airspace

during peacetime.

Information Warfare33

One of the increasingly important and expanding components of the

Korean People’s Army offensive strategy is electronic warfare. eis is

understood by the KPA—which believes it will play a major role in all future

conflicts—to consist of operations using the electromagnetic spectrum to

attack the enemy. During the 1990s the KPA identified “electronic

intelligence warfare”(EIW,chonja chinungjon) as a new type of warfare, the

essence of which is the disruption or destruction of the opponent’s computer

networks thus paralyzing the enemy’s military command and control

system.34 Although this appears to be analogous to information warfare

(IW), the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces’ understanding may also

include elements of reconnaissance, cryptanalysis, intelligence collection,

and disinformation operations, as well as the use of the Internet to cause

disruption within the enemy’s social and economic homeland. During a

future conflict the KPA will likely employ IW capabilities to both protect

the DPRK’s C4ISR structure and to attack those of the ROK, United

States, and Japan.

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

33 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “SIGINT, EW and EIW in the Korean People’s Army: An Overview of

Development and Organization” in Bytes and Bullets: Information Technology Revolution and National

Security on the Korean Peninsula, ed. Alexandre Y. Mansourov (Honolulu: Asia Pacific Center for

Security Studies, 2005), 234–75, http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/

BytesAndBullets/TOC.pdf; and Bermudez,Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments, 464–65, 473–74.

34 “Future electronic warfare Discussed,” Nodong Sinmun, December 5, 1999, 6, Open Source Center.
Kim Jong-il stated in 2000 that the DPRK should “not prepare for

electronic warfare just because that is what others are doing. In modern

warfare, modern and conventional weapons must be massed and

combined.”35 Also in 2000, Kim Jong-il proclaimed that information

technology (IT) was a national priority. Defectors state that Kim’s oldest

son, Kim Jong-nam, was placed in charge of developing the IT sector. eis

has led to the computerization of the KPA. By 2005 most battalions were

equipped with a small number of computers. At this stage, these are only

typically used for exchanging documents between headquarters and

disseminating KWP publications and orders.

During 2003, in an effort to both support the fledgling information

technology sector and boost the KPA’s EIW capabilities, the DPRK

initiated a five-year campaign to expand and enhance the nation’s computer

technology.ee importance of this was re-emphasized by the KWP in 2006.

ee Internet is perceived by the DPRK leadership as both a propaganda

and information warfare tool of considerable importance.eis is attested to

by a January 2007 complaint that the ROK government’s blocking of access

to more than thirty websites considered pro-North was “a fascist action

against democracy and human rights” that “infringes upon the South

Koreans’ freedom of speech.”

In November 2007 the ROK and DPRK announced a joint project to

develop a Korean version of the Linux operating system to be known as

Hana Linux.36

eroughout the decade from 2000 to 2010, the DPRK has continued

to expand its IW capabilities and is believed to have engaged in numerous

electronic attacks against ROK, U.S., and Japanese defense and government

computer networks and systems. ee vast majority of these attacks have

originated from within China or Japan using compromised computer

systems. DPRK IW troops are frequently asserted as being very capable. In

December 2008 the ROK Ministry of Defense stated that the KPA was

continuing to strengthen its IW capabilities.

117

Re North Korean Military Rreat

35 Yong-hun Yi, “KPA Must Change in 21st Century,” Pukhan, January 2000, 86–93, Open Source

Center, FTS20000126000399.

36 Tim Alper, “Can Linux Finally Unite Korea?,” Guardian, January 17, 2008, http://www.guardian

.co.uk/technology/2008/jan/17/linux.korea; and “North and South Korea unite over Linux,”ZDnet,

November 30, 2007, http://news.zdnet.co.uk/software/0,1000000121,39291201,00.htm.
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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

Preliminary information suggests that EW and signals intelligence

(SIGINT) operations are conducted at all levels of the KPA and intelligence

community. EIW operations are conducted at the national level by the

General Staff Department, Reconnaissance General Bureau, and Ministry

of State Security, among others.Within the KPA, EIW elements are located

at General Staff Department, corps, division, brigade, and regiment levels.

Directly subordinate to the General Staff Department are the Electronic

Warfare Bureau—which holds the primary mission for EIW—the 121st

Surveillance Bureau (a.k.a., Unit 121), 204th Enemy Attack Bureau (Enemy

Attack Bureau No. 204) and No. 110 Research Center, although the

subordination of the last two units is unclear. Additionally, there are EIW

elements within the navy and air force.ee KPA believes that EW and EIW

are complimentary and must be integrated with conventional forces and

operations to be effective on the modern battlefield.37

ee 121st Surveillance Bureau, which reportedly consists of 300

personnel, is subordinate to the General Staff Department’s Reconnaissance

General Bureau. Until 1997 is was primarily concerned with military

communications intelligence (COMINT), including cryptographic

technology and the decryption of ROK, U.S., and Japanese military

cryptographic systems. Since then it has expanded its responsibilities to

include operating system technology and network traffic analysis. ee unit

reportedly conducts hacking activities and offensive military IW operations.38

ee 204th Enemy Attack Bureau, reportedly established in 2002 and

consisting of 100 personnel, is also believed to be subordinate to the

Reconnaissance General Bureau. It is responsible for conducting cyberpsychological warfare operations against the ROK armed forces personnel

and disseminating false information to the South’s general public.39

ee No. 110 Research Center is subordinate to the Reconnaissance

General Bureau. It reportedly has 500 to 600 personnel, maintains overseas

detachments,and conducts a wide range of offensive IW operations,although

these are believed to concentrate upon military and intelligence targets.40

37 Interview data acquired by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.; Ko So’ng-p’yo, “eere is a ‘CIA-Class’ Hacker

Group in North Korea’s Ministry of People’s Armed Forces,” JoongAng Ilbo, April 20, 2009,

http://joongangdaily.joins.com; and “North Korea Poised for Cyber Salvo,”Defensetech, April 20,

2009, http://defensetech.org/2009/04/20/north-korea-poised-for-cyber-salvo/.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.
Within the KWP are at least two IW organizations, the Basic Materials

Investigation Office and Operations Office.41 ee first is subordinate to

KWP Office 35 (a.k.a. Room 35), the intelligence unit in charge of

collecting political, economic, and social information on the ROK, Japan,

China, Southeast Asia, and Europe. ee basic materials office reportedly

consists of 50 personnel and is responsible for hacking activities and

offensive IW operations against political and economic targets and social

organizations. ee Operations Office is subordinate to the KWP’s United

Front Department, and reportedly consists of 50 personnel who conduct

cyber-psychological warfare against the ROK public. It disseminates false

information and antiwar messages to manipulate public opinion by

positively influencing citizens toward the DPRK and create a sense of

mistrust and dissatisfaction with the ROK government.

In addition to the above organizations, the Ministry of State Security

reportedly maintains a sizeable IW organization.

Ballistic Missiles42

“...the heroic people’s army that is equipped with the spirit of human

bombs and outer space striking means and can defeat any formidable

enemy in the world...”

—KCNA December 4, 199843

119

Re North Korean Military Rreat

41 Ibid.

42 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “Scud SRBM,” KPA Journal, Vol. 1, No. 3, March 2010, 5–9,

http://nkleadershipwatch.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/kpa-journal-vol-1-no-3.pdf; and Bermudez,

“KN-02,”KPA Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2, February 2010, 7–12,

http://nkleadershipwatch.files.wordpress.com/2010/02/kpa-journal-vol-1-no-2.pdf; “Secret Report”;

Steven A. Hildreth, North Korean Ballistic Missile Rreat to the United States (Washington, DC:

Congressional Research Service, January 2009); Bermudez, Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments,

517–27; Defense White Paper, 2008, 38–39; Bermudez, Shield of the Great Leader, 236–91; Bermudez,

Armed Forces of North Korea, 2d ed. (draft manuscript); Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., A History of Ballistic

Missile Development in the DPRK, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterrey Institute for

International Studies, Occasional Paper No. 2, 1999, http://cns.miis.edu/ opapers/op2/op2.pdf,

hereafter History of Ballistic Missile Development; Daniel A. Pinkston, Re North Korean Ballistic

Missile Program (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, 2008),

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub842.pdf; and Foundations Update, 21.

43 “Nodong Sinmun Essay Urges ‘Mercilessly’ Fighting US,” KCNA, December 4, 1998, Open

Source Center, FBIS-EAS-98-338.
North Korea has pursued a robust and expanding ballistic missile

development program since the late 1970s that has been assigned a national

priority at least equal to the nation’s nuclear program. Due to this emphasis,

the missile program has steadily progressed in spite of national economic

failure and cyclical famines since the late 1980s. All current indications

suggest that the missile development program is likely to continue as long

as the regime survives.

ee DPRK possesses the largest ballistic missile force in the developing

world and is on the threshold of deploying space launch vehicles (SLVs)

and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that could eventually

threaten the continental United States.44 eis is an ominous development

since there is little doubt that the DPRK perceives the ballistic missile to be

the delivery system of choice for nuclear weapons. Considerably more

disconcerting are the reports that during the 1990s the A. Q. Khan nuclearproliferation network provided the DPRK with the design for an

implosion-type nuclear warhead that could be carried by a ballistic missile.

Operational ballistic missiles within the KPA are under the

administrative and operational control of the Ballistic Missile Training and

Guidance Bureau, but wartime control of the missile units would likely be

ceded to the General Staff Department, or more likely, directly to the

National Defense Commission. ee KPA’s ballistic missile units are

deployed in two belts—forward and strategic rear. ee forward belt is

located 50–100 kilometers from the DMZ, while the strategic rear belt is

located 130–230 kilometers from the zone.

Among the ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles that are in KPA

inventory or under active development are:

• Short Range Ballistic Missiles (KN-02, Scud B, Scud C,

Scud D/Scud ER)

• Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (Nodong, Taepodong-1)

• Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (Taepodong-1,

Musudan [BM-25])

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

44 Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM): Range < 1,000 km; Medium-Range Ballistic Missile

(MRBM): Range 1,000–3,000 km; Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM): Range 3,000–

5,500 km; Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM): Range > 5,500 km; and Space Launch

Vehicle (SLV): Any rocket designed to place a payload into space.
• Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (Taepodong-2)

• Space Launch Vehicle (Paektusan-1 [Taepodong-1 SLV],

U’nha 1 [Taepodong-2 SLV])

It is estimated that since the start of ballistic missile production within

the DPRK a total of 1,150–1,350 systems have been produced. Of these

325–400 have been sold to other nations, and another 20 to 30 have been

used for initial operations, test, and evaluation, thus leaving a current

inventory of 800 to 900 missiles (some estimates go as high as 1,000). Of

these, U.S. sources estimate that approximately 600+ are Scud B/C/D/ER,

200 Nodong, and fewer than 50 other medium, intermediate, and

intercontinental missiles. ROK government sources present a somewhat

different inventory of 400 Scud and 450 Nodong missiles, with the

capability to build approximately 15 Taepodong systems.

Among analysts there is a growing discussion as to the viability of a

DPRK ballistic missile inventory of 800–900 systems. eis discussion

centers on the DPRK’s production capabilities, quality control, maintenance

competence, and C4ISR capabilities, all of which are below the standards

of all the states in East Asia. ee net result is that while the DPRK may

physically possess this inventory, there is a high probability that only 85 to

95 percent are actually serviceable. Of these only 85 to 90 percent could be

effectively employed due to C4ISR limitations and a generally low level of

realistic training among KPA missile troops. Nevertheless, the operational

realities within the region are such that even an inventory of 575 to 750

ballistic missiles presents a significant strategic threat. Even at the lower

inventory level, the KPA is capable of sustaining a rate-of-fire of 50 to 75

ballistic missiles an hour for the first few hours of a renewed conflict and 10

to 20 per day thereafter until the inventory is depleted. Notably, it is a threat

for which no state in the region currently possesses an effective defense.

ee DPRK is reported to possess a variety of warheads for its various

ballistic missile systems. eese include unitary high-explosive, highexplosive fragmentation, cluster/bomblet, and chemical, biological,

radiological dispersion, and nuclear. It is probable that at least some research

has been conducted into the development of fuel-air explosive,

electromagnetic pulse, and penetrating warheads.

121

Re North Korean Military Rreat
While a rudimentary chemical and biological warhead for ballistic missiles

is relatively simple to design and construct, that of an effective and reliable one

faces a number of technological challenges,such as high re-entry velocity,severely

high temperatures,and effectiveness of dispersal mechanisms.eese requirements

are just within the scientific and military capabilities of the DPRK, although it

is likely that they received some foreign assistance during their initial efforts.

ee requirements for the design and development of a reliable nuclear

warhead are an order-of-magnitude more demanding than those for chemical

and biological warheads.eey are at the outer limit of the scientific and military

capabilities of the DPRK, and it is probable this development program has also

received some foreign assistance.45

ee question of whether the DPRK possesses a workable nuclear warhead

design for ballistic missiles is a contentious one. In early 2007 senior DPRK

diplomat Kim Kye-kwan strongly suggested to David Albright,the president of

the Institute for Science and International Security, that his nation did in fact

possess such a capability.46 However, Japanese, ROK, and U.S. sources generally

believe that it has not yet achieved this.For example,in October 2009 the ROK

Ministry of National Defense stated that the DPRK might not have achieved

the technological advancements required to develop nuclear warheads for use

on ballistic missiles.Two months later,the Korea Institute of Defense Analyses,

in its annual report,supported this opinion.eree months later,in January 2010,

the U.S. Department of Defense stated that, “we must assume that sooner or

later [the DPRK] will have a successful test of itsTD-2 and,if there are no major

changes in its national security strategy in the next decade,it will be able to mate

a nuclear warhead to a proven delivery system.”47

eese assessments stand in contrast to information released in December

2009 citing a previously unpublicized account by A. Q. Khan. In this account,

Khan states that during a visit to the DPRK in 1999, he was shown boxes

containing components of three completed ballistic missile nuclear warheads.

He was informed that these could be assembled for use within an hour. He

further stated that “While they explained the construction [design of their

122

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

45 “Report Casts Doubt on N. Korea’s Ability to Deploy Nukes,”Chosun Ilbo, July 30, 2020,

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/07/30/2010073000795.html.

46 David Albright, North Korea’s Alleged Large-Scale Enrichment Plant: Yet Another Questionable

Extrapolation Based on Aluminum Tubes (Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International

Security, February 23, 2007), http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/DPRKenrichment 22Feb.pdf.

47 Ballistic Missiles Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2010), 4.
bombs], they quietly showed me the six boxes” containing split cores for the

warheads, as well as “sixty-four igniters/detonators per bomb packed in six

separate boxes.”48

For the foreseeable future it is unlikely that the DPRK nuclear weapons

program could develop a workable nuclear warhead design in the 100–400 kg

range without foreign assistance. It is likely that current generation nuclear

warhead designs—of unknown reliability—are in the 650–750 kg weight range.

Since the late 1980s North Korea has sold abroad approximately 325 to 400

Scud B/C/D/ER,Nodong,and Scud-ER ballistic missiles,as well as components

or the technology to produce these systems (and possibly the Taepodong family

of ballistic missiles). States to which the DPRK has sold or attempted to sell

ballistic missiles, components or technology include Egypt, Iran, Iraq , Libya,

Myanmar (Burma), Pakistan, Nigeria, Syria, UAE,Vietnam, and Yemen.

As U.S. and international counter-proliferation efforts (for example, the

Proliferation Security Initiative) have come into force,the nature of the DPRK’s

ballistic missile efforts have changed from the provision of complete systems to

specific sub-systems and technology transfers.eis in turn has led the North and

its proliferation partners (for example,Syria and Iran) to make more extensive use

of air routes rather than sea transportation as a means to transfer ballistic missile

components and technologies.As of 2008,the United States,in cooperation with

its allies and other interested states, were working to limit the DPRK’s use of

these air routes.

As a means to develop ballistic missile technology and to earn international

prestige the DPRK has pursued the development and testing of space launch

vehicles including three attempted satellite launches—August 31,1998; July 5–

6, 2006; and April 5, 2009. All three failed.49

123

Re North Korean Military Rreat

48 Arun Kumar, “Pakistan Helped North Korea Build Nuke?,” Washington Post, December 29, 2009;

and David Albright and Corey Hinderstein,“ee A. Q. Khan Illicit Nuclear Trade Network and

Implications for Nonproliferation Efforts,”Strategic Insights, Volume V, Issue 6, July 2006,

http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2006/Jul/albrightJul06.html.

49 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. in: “Launch Failure Frustrates North Korea’s Missile Aspirations,”Jane’s

Defence Weekly, April 7, 2009, jdw.janes.com; “Fully Assembled Unha SLV Sits on North Korean

Launch Pad,”Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 30, 2009, jdw.janes.com; “North Korea Set to Launch Taepo

Dong 2,”Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 5, 2006, jdw.janes.com; “Musudan-ni Launch Facility Keeps its

Secrets,”Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 5, 2006, jdw.janes.com; Taepo-dong Launch Brings DPRK Missiles

Back Into the Spotlight,”Jane’s Intelligence Review, Volume 10, Number 10, October 1998, 30–32; and

“North Koreans Test Two-stage IRBM Over Japan,”Jane’s Defence Weekly, Volume 30, Number 10, 9

September, 1998, 28.
For the foreseeable future the DPRK will continue the development

and production of a range of new and existing ballistic missile systems, and

will continue its attempts to place a satellite into low-earth orbit.eese later

efforts will provide a significant contribution to its IRBM and ICBM

development and production efforts.

Nuclear Weapons50

Re world does not deserve to exist without the DPRK... [and should the

DPRK implode] . . . we will take the rest of the world with us.

—Kim Jong-il51

Re more desperately the U.S. imperialists brandish their nukes and the

more zealously their lackeys follow them, the more rapidly the [DPRK’s]

nuclear deterrence will be bolstered up along the orbit of self-defense and

the more remote the prospect for the denuclearization of the Korean

peninsula will be become.

—National Defense Commission statement, July 201052

Over the past 40 years the DPRK has pursued an expanding nuclear

program to the point where it now possesses all the requisite technologies,

personnel,and infrastructure to produce nuclear weapons that are,at a minimum,

comparable to first-generation U.S.nuclear weapons.It is capable of employing

such weapons throughout the Korean Peninsula and to a lesser degree against

Japan.To date, North Korea has conducted two tests of what appear to be first

generation Pu-239 implosion weapons.ee country has publicly stated that it has

the right to conduct future tests when and where it wants. During late summer

2009, unconfirmed reports suggested that the DPRK was preparing for a third

nuclear test. As of July 2011, no such test has occurred.

124

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

50 Larry A. Niksch, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Developments and Diplomacy (Washington, DC:

Congressional Research Service, January 2010); Mary Beth Nikitin, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons

(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 2009); Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “North

Korea’s Nuclear Site” in “Nuclear Fallout—North Korea Returns to Proliferation Programme,”Jane’s

Intelligence Review, June 19, 2009, jir.janes.com; Defense White Paper, 2008, 37–38; Bermudez, Shield

of the Great Leader, 212–22; Bermudez, Armed Forces of North Korea, 2d ed. (draft manuscript);

Bermudez,Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments, 528–32; and Foundations Update, 11.

51 “Hwang Jang-yop Speaks: Preparations for War in North Korea,” http://www.nis.go.kr:7000/

democratic/index.html, accessed July 11, 2000.

52 “Quotations Of ee Day,” Associated Press, July 24, 2010.
Plutonium

Estimates of the DPRK nuclear weapons inventory are based upon the

level of weapons design technology and quantity of Pu-239 it possesses. At

present the best estimates available are that between 1989–2008 the DPRK

discharged spent fuel rods with a content of 46 to 64 kg of Pu-239 from all

its reactors combined. Of this total approximately 28 to 50 kg of Pu-239 was

separated and available for weapons production as of early 2008. If this is

reduced by the estimated 5 to 10 kg used in the October 2006 and May

2009 nuclear weapons tests, the total inventory of Pu-239 is 18 to 40 kg.

Assuming that the state of nuclear weapons design technology achieved by

the DPRK allows them to produce a weapon with approximately 5 kg of

Pu-239, the total amount available would provide for four to eight

weapons.53

eese figures compare favorably with the February 2008 statement by

Michael McConnell, the director of U.S. National Intelligence, that “if

Pyongyang has sophisticated technologies, it can make 12 nuclear bombs

with the 50 kilograms of plutonium thought to have been extracted. And if

not, the number can be lowered to six, which is more likely to be true.”54

During April 2009 the DPRK expelled American and International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors from Yongbyon and resumed

reprocessing activities at the Radio-Chemistry Laboratory. Given that it

would take three to six months to process the remaining fuel rods, and

assuming that no major obstacles were encountered, the reprocessing should

have been completed by the end of September 2009. On June 13, 2009 the

DPRK declared that “More than one third of the spent fuel rods has been

reprocessed to date.”55 een on September 4, 2009 it announced that “We

are also finalizing the reprocessing of the spent fuel rods and the plutonium

125

Re North Korean Military Rreat

53 “Report Casts Doubt” Chosun Ilbo; David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Jacqueline Shire, North

Korea’s Plutonium Declaration: A Starting Point for an Initial Verification Process (Washington,

DC:ISIS, January 10, 2008), http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/

NorthKoreaDeclaration10Jan2008.pdf; Niksch, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons; Nikitin, North

Korea’s Nuclear Weapons; and “Purported Ex-General Says DPRK Posses ‘Tens of Nuclear

Weapons,’” AFP, May 14, 2003.

54 “ROK Daily US DIA Director: DPRK Continuing To Develop Long-Range Ballistic Missile,”

Dong-A Ilbo, February 28, 2008, Open Source Center.

55 Sam Kim, “N. Korea to Push Ahead With Uranium Enrichment Over U.N. Sanctions,” Yonhap,

June 12, 2009, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr.
extracted are being weaponized.”56 Precisely how much this will add to Pu239 inventory is currently uncertain.

eese and other estimates of the DPRK’s possible nuclear weapons

inventory are currently based solely upon the amount of Pu-239 extracted

from its reactors at Yongbyon. Should, however, the DPRK have obtained

highly-enriched uranium (HEU) from foreign sources or a covert

indigenous uranium enrichment program, the stockpile of nuclear weapons

could be larger.

Uranium57

While the current estimates of the DPRK’s nuclear inventory are based

on Pu-239 weapons, revelations during 2002–4 that the DPRK had been

pursuing a HEU program with the assistance of Pakistan’s A. Q. Khan

Laboratories raised numerous additional concerns. Political developments

during 2004–10 have only contributed to the uncertainty surrounding the

program.

During October 2002, in a meeting with U.S. Assistant Secretary of

State James Kelly, DPRK First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju

admitted that his country was pursuing a HEU program. ee clear

implication of the admission was that this program was to produce fissile

material for nuclear weapons. eat the DPRK had, until this time, denied

all suggestions concerning a HEU program came as no surprise. It denied

its Pu-239 program during the late 1980s and early 1990s until it was

presented with incontrovertible proof by the IAEA, and it was only after

Kelly presented equally undeniable proof of a covert HEU effort that

minister Kang made his admission.ee revelations center on the transfer of

technology, equipment, and the exchange of personnel, primarily between

the DPRK and Pakistan, although Russia and China are reported to have

played a secondary role.

It is unclear when the current highly-enriched uranium program was

initiated, however, most analysts date it to the early 1990s and an expansion

of DPRK-Pakistan relations, which date to the early 1970s. ee nuclear

126

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

56 “DPRK Permanent Representative Sends Letter to President of UNSC,” KCNA, September 4, 2009,

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm.

57 Kumar, “Pakistan Helped North Korea;” Pervez Musharraf,In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (New York:

Free Press, 2008); and Albright and Hinderstein,“ee A.Q. Khan Illicit Nuclear Trade Network.”
relationship only began in late 1993 or early 1994, following Benazir

Bhutto’s re-election as Pakistan’s prime minister.

In December 1993 Bhutto initiated negotiations for the purchase of a

small number of the DPRK-produced Nodong ballistic missiles as well as

production technology. Within Pakistan the Nodong program, known

locally as the Ghauri, was centered at the Khan (Kahuta) Research

Laboratories.58 At this point A. Q. Khan, the director of the laboratories,

undertook a number of business transactions within the DPRK to provide

it with HEU technologies, centrifuges, drawings, and technical advice.

According to Khan, one Pakistani P-1 centrifuge was provided to the

DPRK during the 1990s and approximately 12 in 2000. Subsequent reports

in the Pakistani press speculated that the DPRK could have been enriching

uranium on a small scale by 2002. In a 2003 letter allegedly written by A.

Q. Khan to his wife and daughter he stated “(A retired general) brought

three million dollars from North Korea and asked me to provide a design

plan and machines.” Khan’s assistance to the North’s highly-enriched

uranium program lasted for at least six years. He is reported to have stated

that in return for Pakistan’s aid it received both the technology to produce

krytrons (high-speed switches used in nuclear trigger mechanisms) and

assistance in mating a nuclear warhead to the Ghauri ballistic missile.

President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan wrote in a 2006 memoir that he

became aware of Pakistani involvement in 1999 when he received reports

that DPRK nuclear experts, under the guise of ballistic missile engineers,

were being given secret nuclear briefings. ee extent of official Pakistani

government involvement in these exchanges is unclear.59

ee nuclear relationship is reported to have continued until late 2001

or early 2002 when it is believed to have been terminated (although some

sources suggest it continued longer).ee DPRK is currently judged to be in

the early stages of developing a gas-centrifuge HEU capability.

In February 2005 the ROK National Intelligence Service judgment was

that the North had “not yet built or possessed HEU nuclear bombs as it has

127

Re North Korean Military Rreat

58 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “Pakistan Achieves Ghauri Launch Success,” Jane’s Defence Weekly,

February 13, 2008, jdw.janes.com; and Bermudez, History of Ballistic Missile Development.

59 “N. Korea ‘Had Enriched Uranium in 2002,’” Chosun Ilbo, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/

html_dir/2009/12/29/2009122900357.html; and Myung-hwan Yu, “N. Korea ‘Started Enriching

Uranium in Late ‘90s,’”Chosun Ilbo, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/01/07/

2010010700540.html.
not yet reached the stage of building the HEU factory.”60 ee primary

reason for this was that the flow of key equipment from Khan Laboratories

in Pakistan had been halted. Given the previous lack of international

controls upon the DPRK, some U.S. officials believe that a rudimentary

research-scale HEU program—based on Pakistani technology—could have

been operational by early 2005. Although estimates vary considerably, such

a program could produce enough HEU for one additional nuclear weapon

each year.

In February 2008, U.S. National Intelligence Director Michael

McConnell stated that,“although North Korea denies it has HEU programs

and its proliferation activities, we think it is involved with both.”61 Concerns

over an HEU program continued to grow and on April 29, 2009 the DPRK

Foreign Ministry declared,“the DPRK will make a decision to build a lightwater reactor power plant and start the technological development for

ensuring self-production of nuclear fuel [that is uranium enrichment] as its

first process without delay.”62 Two months later, on June 13, 2009, the North

declared, “Pursuant to the decision to build its own light-water reactor,

enough success has been made in developing uranium enrichment

technology to provide nuclear fuel to allow the experimental procedure.”63

Responding to this two days later, ROK Unification Minister Hyun In-taek

stated, “As the U.S. raised the accusation in 2002, I believe [the HEU

program] had started before that. I believe it has been there for at least seven

to eight years.” Most recently on September 4, 2009 the DPRK Foreign

Ministry announced, “We’ve successfully done the experiment for

enrichment of uranium and it has entered the final stage”.

Any uranium enrichment facilities would most likely be located in

P’yongan-bukto or P’yongan-namdo Provinces. ee area bounded by

Kusong-Subch’on-Pukchin would appear to be most suited based upon the

power distribution and rail grids.

128

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

60 “N. Korea Has Yet to Build HEU-Based Nuke Bombs,” Yonhap, February 25, 2005,

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr.

61 Ed Johnson, “North Korea Maintains Uranium Enrichment Program, U.S. Says,” Bloomberg,

February 5, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/.

62 “North Korea ereatens Nuclear Test,” Reuters, April 29, 2009.

63 “DPRK FM Statement Announces ‘Strong Counter-Measures’ Against UNSC’s ‘Resolution

1874,’” KCNA, June 13, 2009, http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm.
Possible Early EMIS Program64

One of the questions concerning the production of highly-enriched

uranium within the DPRK is whether it ever pursued an electromagnetic

isotope separation (EMIS) effort. Calutrons—mass spectrometers used in

the uranium isotope separation process—use a great amount of electricity,

are expensive, and require constant maintenance. eey are, however,

relatively simple to produce and the technology was declassified decades

ago. In reviewing a timeline of nuclear developments within the DPRK a

conspicuous gap exists in the construction of nuclear-related facilities and

the establishment of nuclear-related organizations during the 1970s and

early 1980s. eis same period coincides with a high point in DPRK

economic and industrial capability to pursue an indigenous EMIS program.

Both the political climate on the Korean Peninsula and the status of the

ROK nuclear program at the time would suggest that it would be an

opportune time for the DPRK to initiate such a program. A possible early

EMIS program has not figured into any of the Six-Party Talks and the

assessment of various intelligence agencies is that if it did exist, it did not

contribute significantly to the DPRK’s current inventory of fissile material.

Biological Weapons65

Despite public statements to the contrary, the DPRK possesses the

indigenous capability to produce large quantities and varieties of biological

weapons. It also possesses the ability to employ such weapons both on the

Korean Peninsula and, to a lesser degree, worldwide using unconventional

methods of delivery. It is believed by most sources that while the DPRK

has an active biological warfare research effort, it has not weaponized

biological agents.

In general, the potential offensive use of biological weapons by the KPA

has not received the attention as that of chemical weapons.eis is probably

due to the DPRK’s limitations in biotechnology and the realization that,

once employed, there is almost no control over such weapons. Additionally,

the KPA must calculate that biological warfare (BW) is potentially a greater

129

Re North Korean Military Rreat

64 Interview data acquired by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.

65 Defense White Paper, 2008, 39–40; Bermudez, Shield of the Great Leader, 222–31; Bermudez,

Armed Forces of North Korea, 2d ed. (draft manuscript); Bermudez, Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk

Assessments, 523–33; and Foundations Update, 12
130

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

threat to the KPA than to the ROK or United States because of its limited

medical and bio-medical capabilities and poor public health system. eis

last point was emphasized during the first half of 2007 by outbreaks of footand-mouth disease and measles, both of which required significant

international assistance. For this reason, however, defensive biological

warfare has received significant attention.

While the former Soviet Union and China have provided the DPRK

with chemical agents, they are not believed to have provided any direct

assistance in the development of biological weapons. Such capabilities are

believed to have been developed indigenously. Biological warfare research is

thought to have begun sometime during the early 1960s and to have focused

primarily on ten to thirteen different strains of bacteria. At present, it is

believed that the DPRK has not employed genetic engineering or advanced

biotechnology to develop these bacteria.

Biological agents currently reported to be in the KPA inventory,

although uncertain, include anthrax (Bacillus anthracis), botulism

(Clostridium botulinum), cholera (Vibrio cholerae 01), hemorrhagic fever

(probably the Korean strain), various strains of the influenza, plague

(Yersinia pestis), smallpox (Variola), typhoid (Salmonella typhi), and yellow

fever. In October 2009 the ROK Ministry of Defense cited the above agents

and added dysentery.

Despite several reports of DPRK biological weapons proliferation

activities with Iran, this remains unconfirmed. It is known that MPAF

personnel, during the early 1990s, signed a military cooperation agreement

with Cuba and visited a “genetic-bioengineering institute.”Whether this is

an indicator of biological weapons cooperation between the two nations, or

not, is unclear.

Chemical Weapons66

ee DPRK currently produces and possesses the capability to effectively

employ throughout the Korean Peninsula significant quantities and varieties

of chemical weapons. It also has, to a lesser extent, the ability to employ

66 Defense White Paper, 2008, 39–40; Bermudez, Shield of the Great Leader, 231–35; Bermudez,

Armed Forces of North Korea, 2d ed. (draft manuscript); Bermudez, Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk

Assessments, 534–35; and Foundations Update, 12.
these weapons worldwide using unconventional methods of delivery.

ee KPA believes that chemical weapons will be a normal component

of any renewed conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Release authority for their

employment is believed to have been given to corps commanders should

they lose contact with Pyongyang. Additionally, the ROK Ministry of

Defense has identified six special corps munitions depots located at Sanumni (two sites—III Corps or Pyongyang Defense Command), Hwangch’on

(III Corps), Samsan-dong (II Corps or the Artillery Corps), Sariwon (IV

Corps), and Wangjaebong (V Corps). KPA defectors generally agree with

this deployment, indicating that such depots exist only with the corps

deployed along the DMZ (I, II, IV, and V) and not the rear area corps (III,

VI, VIII, and XI).67

Chemical weapons research, development, and production is the

responsibility of organizations subordinate to the KWP’s Munitions

Industry Department, specifically the Second Academy of Natural Sciences

and the Second Economic Committee’s Fifth Machine Industry Bureau.

Both organizations receive the cooperation and assistance from the

Academy of Sciences. ee Fifth Machine Industry Bureau, with the

assistance of the KPA’s Nuclear Chemical Defense Bureau, control all

facilities, or subfacilities, that manufacture chemical weapons. Additional

assistance is believed to be provided by the eird Machine Industry (artillery

shells), Fourth Machine Industry (missile warheads) and Seventh Machine

Industry (air delivered weapons) Bureaus.68

ee bureaus of the Second Economic Committee maintain regional

offices throughout the country, which not only manage its own production

facilities but also control certain production lines in various factories that are

operated by the ministries and departments subordinate to the cabinet. In

general, cabinet plants give higher priority to implementing the Second

Economic Committee’s production orders than other production orders.

ee DPRK is almost certainly self-sufficient in the production of all

necessary precursor chemicals for first generation chemical agents, including

nerve agents. ee best estimates available credit the North with an annual

production potential of 4,500 tons of chemical agents in peacetime and

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Re North Korean Military Rreat

67 Defense White Paper, 1990 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 1990), 74.

68 Interview data acquired by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.; “Status of North Korea’s Science and Technology

Development and Exchange, Part II,”Pukhan, March 1996, 121–30, Open Source Center.
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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

12,000 tons in wartime. Estimates of chemical weapons inventory have

varied considerably over the past ten years. In 1989, the inventory was

estimated to be “180 to 250 tons of chemical weapons of several kinds.”69

During October 2008 ROK Minister of Defense Kim Tae-young stated

that the DPRK possessed 5,000 tonnes of chemical agents.70 Current

estimates suggest an inventory of 2,500–5,000 metric tons of agents, the

majority of which is believed to be in the form of mustard, phosgene, sarin,

and V-agents.71 It is further believed that this inventory includes as many

as 150 ballistic missile warheads.ee KPA may also possess limited numbers

of binary (GB, GF, or VX) chemical munitions.

It is difficult to differentiate between locations associated with just the

production of feed stocks or precursors and those that actually produce

chemical agents.eis difficulty arises from several factors, most significantly,

facilities that produce dual-use chemicals are sometimes described as being

chemical agent factories. A possible example of this is the Hyesan Chemical

Factory in Yanggang-do that is sometimes identified as producing chemical

agents.Yet it is known to produce only intermediate products such as benzene,

phenol, hydrochloric acid, and sulfuric acid. It is also important to note that

the DPRK’s larger chemical complexes are sizable facilities consisting of

several smaller factories with different process units.Some of these complexes

(for example,February 8th Vinalon Complex) apparently produce feed stocks,

precursors and agents, but in different units within the complex. In reality,

however, only a small portion of any one complex is involved in chemical

agent production and these are probably purpose-built units.

When required, stored chemical agents are shipped in bulk form to

either the Kanggye Chemical Weapons Factory in Kanggye, Chagang-do,

or the Sakchu Chemical Weapons Factory in Sakchu, P’yongan-bukto. Here

the chemical agents are brought together with the munitions or warheads

to be filled.

Chemical agents currently reported to be in the KPA inventory include,

but are not necessarily limited to adamsite (DM), chloroacetophenone

69 “Daily Says North Stockpiling Biochemical Weapons,” Yonhap, June 23, 1990, http://english.

yonhapnews.co.kr; and “Daily Says North Stockpiling Biochemical Weapons” and “N. Korea is Mass

Producing Chemical Weapons: U.S. Report,”FPI International, 8 June 1986, 4.

70 Byun Duk-kun: “N. Korea Unlikely to Possess Nuclear Weapons: Military Chief,” Yonhap,

October 8, 2008, http://www.yonhapnews.net/.

71 Defense White Paper, 2008, 39–40.
(CN), chlorobenzylidene malononitrile (CS), chlorine (CL), cyanogen

chloride (CK), hydrogen cyanide (AC), mustard-family (H, HD or HL),

phosgene (CG and CX), sarin (GB), soman (GD), tabun (GA), and Vagents (VM and VX). It is important to note that according to KPA

defectors the DPRK produces a total of twenty different chemical agents for

use in weapons. For a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the DPRK’s

capability to produce or acquire certain precursors, it is believed that the

KPA has concentrated upon mustard, chlorine, phosgene, sarin, and the Vagents. While not as toxic as cyanide, mustard, or nerve agents—and thus

need to be employed in significantly larger quantities—chlorine and

phosgene are industrial chemicals that are easily manufactured. As an

example of production challenges the DPRK faces the production of soman

requires the use of pinacolyl alcohol, which is currently produced by only a

few companies in the world and in extremely small amounts, has no

commercial uses, and is on the Australia Group’s list of restricted products.72

To date, there have been no public indications that the DPRK produces

binary chemical agents.However,given the benefits of such weapons (such as

safety and a longer shelf-life),it is likely that some binary chemical agents are

in production. Additionally, the KPA has conducted extensive studies of the

Iran-Iraq War and Operation Desert Storm.eose studies have probably led

them to follow the Iraqi model with regard to binary chemical weapons. For

example, the Iraqis made the decision to produce binary sarin, however

because the DF precursor produced by Iraq was very impure—which would

result in an extremely short shelf life of sarin—they filled their munitions with

isopropyl and cyclohexyl alcohols and stored the DF separately. Immediately

prior to using the munitions the DF was added by hand.

eroughout the past 20 years there have been repeated reports that the

DPRK has provided chemical weapons, agents, or technology to Egypt,

Iran, Libya, and Syria. Most of these reports center on the sales of or

assistance in developing chemical warheads for Scud-class ballistic missiles.

Reports originating in the Middle East indicate that there was an

acceleration of chemical weapons–related activity between Syria and North

Korea during early 2007. eese reports identify the city of Aleppo as the

centre of this activity. It was near Aleppo that a chemical related accident

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Re North Korean Military Rreat

72 ee Australia Group is an informal association of 41 countries, which attempts to “ensure that

exports do not contribute to the development of chemical or biological weapons,”

http://www.australiagroup.net/en/index.html.
allegedly occurred in July 2007 in which both Syrian and DPRK personnel

were killed when a missile with a chemical warhead exploded prematurely.

eese reports, while numerous, remain to be confirmed.

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula


Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula

by Colonel David S. Maxwell, U.S. Army

Rere are only two ways to approach planning for the collapse of North

Korea: to be ill-prepared or to be really ill-prepared.

— Kurt Campbell, DASD, May 1, 19981

What is going to happen on the Korean Peninsula? eis is the question

that plagues policy makers, strategists, and military planners in the Republic

of Korea (ROK), the United States, and in Northeast Asia (NEA). If this

question can be answered, the next question is: How will the ROK, United

States, and the international community deal with what happens on the

peninsula?

While optimistic planners and policy makers hope for a so-called “soft

landing” with a peaceful reunification of the peninsula, prudence calls for

planning for the worst-case scenarios. eis contradicts the current focus of

the United States on having to “win the wars it is currently fighting” as

stated in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. ee worst cases are,

however, in the author’s opinion at once both the most dangerous and the

most likely threats in Northeast Asia and they should be considered.

eerefore soft landing and peaceful reunification scenarios will not be

addressed. While intentionally provocative, the ideas presented focus only

on one of the many complexities of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast

Asia: irregular warfare (IW).

Eliot Cohen and John Gooch in their seminal work on military failures

determined that militaries are generally unsuccessful for three reasons: the

failure to learn, adapt, and anticipate.2 With those in mind, the ROK-U.S.

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Chapter 6

1 Kurt Campbell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs—Asia Pacific

(DASD-ISA-APAC), remarks to USFK planners during a briefing at the Pentagon, 1 May 1998.

2 Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: Re Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: Free

Press, 1990).
alliance should learn from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, adapt

irregular warfare concepts to the security challenges on the Korean

Peninsula, and anticipate the collapse of the Kim family regime and the

complex, irregular threats that collapse will bring.

ee conventional wisdom would postulate that the worst-case situation

would be an attack by the North Korean military because surely the

devastation and widespread humanitarian suffering as well as global

economic impact would be on a scale that would far exceed any crisis that

has occurred since the end of World War II. While that could very well be

the case, there is little doubt about the military outcome of an attack by the

North on the South and its allies and that would be the destruction of the

[North] Korean People’s Army and the Kim family regime. Victory will

surely be in the South’s favor; however, the real worst-case scenario comes

from dealing with the aftermath, either post-regime collapse or postconflict.

Assumptions

ee fundamental assumption is that the threats that may emerge

following collapse or conflict on the peninsula will be characterized by being

irregular and these irregular threats will pose a dangerous and complex

situation that if not properly planned and prepared for could destabilize the

Korean Peninsula and the Northeast Asian region for years to come. eese

threats will be a source of human suffering in the region, as well as cause

significant security threats and economic turmoil, perhaps on a global scale.

It is imperative that these potential irregular threats be identified and

understood and that countermeasures be developed.

ee second fundamental assumption is that the North Korean people

will not welcome the Republic of Korea and its allies with open arms.eey

may be welcomed by some, perhaps many, but certainly not by all and

therein is a significant threat. It should be recalled that an assumption

regarding the liberation of Iraq was made in 2003 that postulated the Iraqi

people would welcome the United States as liberators. eis incorrect

assumption led to years of insurgency that was only countered after belated

recognition of the conditions that fostered the resistance and then

undertaking a significant shift in strategy.

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula
ee third assumption is that while irregular warfare is the current 21stcentury term for the conflicts that the United States is likely to face, planners

and policy makers do not appear to view the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating

Concept (IW JOC)3 as applying to the problems that can be expected to be

posed by a post-Kim family regime—North Korea. While the IW JOC

appears to be predisposed to countering the violent extremism of non-state

actors as well as asymmetric threats from state actors,a post-Kim North Korea

will at once have many characteristics of violent extremism (although based

on a different belief: the religious-like Juche ideology) and at the same time

use many of the already existing asymmetric capabilities developed by the

North Korean state. Additionally, and perhaps most important, the

assumption is made that remnants of the North Korean military,Communist

Party, and population will oppose the introduction of non-North Korean

forces and conduct a uniquely North Korean insurgency to accomplish the

classic insurgent goal of ridding a land of an occupying power. It should be

noted that the term “irregular warfare” in Korean is the same as

“unconventional warfare” and this breeds confusion within the alliance.

ee fourth assumption is that despite wishful thinking otherwise, China

is going to intervene during a crisis in the North in order to protect four

major interests. It must prevent the spillover of any conflict into China.

Second, it must prevent the flow of refugees into an area where there are

already some two million ethnic Koreans. eird, it will want to prevent not

only the loss of control of nuclear weapons, but also prevent nuclear weapons

from falling into ROK hands and simultaneously securing any information

and evidence that might demonstrate Chinese complicity in the North

Korean nuclear development program. Finally, China will want to ensure

access to the natural resources that it has already secured through multiyear leases (in some cases one hundred years) with the North Korean

government.eese interests will drive Chinese actions in the event of crisis,

either conflict or collapse.

ee fifth and final assumption is that while some planning has taken

place to deal with North Korean instability and the effects of a Kim regime

collapse, there has been insufficient preparation. Furthermore, in addition to

planning, actions can and should be taken prior to collapse to mitigate the

conditions and deal with the collapse effects. Unfortunately, despite some

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Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula

3 Department of Defense, “Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular ereats Joint Operating

Concept, Version 2.0,” 17 May 2010.
planning efforts to counter specific irregular threats, the ROK and the

United States in particular, have been distracted by the very real and

dangerous threat of North Korean nuclear weapons, delivery capabilities,

and proliferation while at the same time ensuring deterrence of an attack by

the North. Deterrence is paramount and the nuclear problem is a critical

international problem; however, successful deterrence over time will likely

result in the eventual collapse of the regime and the associated security and

humanitarian crises that it will bring.

Irregular Warfare and an End State for

the Korean Peninsula

If you concentrate exclusively on victory, while no thought for the after

effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by peace, while it is almost certain

that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war.

—B. H. Liddel-Hart4

To view the above assumptions from the perspective of the IW JOC

with the purpose of looking at the Korean Peninsula in light of irregular

warfare, it is necessary to begin with the concept’s definitions of both IW

and counterinsurgency:

Irregular warfare. A violent struggle among state and non-state

actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations.

Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches,

though it may employ the full range of military and other

capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and

will. ( JP 1-02)

Counterinsurgency. Comprehensive civilian and military efforts

taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances.

( JP 3-24)5

ee post-Kim regime North Korea is very likely to be a violent struggle

between state actors on the one hand—the ROK, United States, and

international community; and non-state actors on the other—the remnants

of the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) and the Communist Party,

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

4 B. H. Liddel-Hart quoted in Maj Susan E. Strednansky, USAF, “Balancing the Trinity: ee Fine

Art of Conflict Termination” (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, February 1996), 1.

5 Department of Defense, “Irregular Warfare.”
and members of a thoroughly indoctrinated population. Responses will

require indirect and asymmetric approaches. However, it not only may, but

also most likely will, require the full range of military and other capabilities

to erode—and in this case defeat—North Korean military remnants and

the legacy of the Kim family regime’s power, influence, and will over the

former North Korean population. Furthermore, it will most likely be

necessary for the ROK to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign in the

North to defeat an insurgency being executed by remnants of the North

Korean military and elite with the support of the coerced population.

Before the future problems can be addressed, however, a proposed answer

to the “Korea Question”—the division of the peninsula—should be

established.ee 1953 Armistice Agreement recommended that the political

leaders of all parties meet and determine a solution.6 Since no answer to this

question has been forthcoming in some 60 years and it is apparent that there

will be no capitulation by either the North or South, particularly as long as

the Kim family remains in power, it is necessary to define a possible answer.

During a meeting between President Lee Myung-bak and President

Barack Obama in June 2009, they reaffirmed the ROK-U.S. alliance and

set forth a vision:

erough our Alliance we aim to build a better future for all people

on the Korean Peninsula, establishing a durable peace on the

peninsula and leading to peaceful reunification on the principles

of free democracy and a market economy. We will work together

to achieve the complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea’s

nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, as well as ballistic

missile programs, and to promote respect for the fundamental

human rights of the North Korean people.7

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Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula

6 ee phrase “Korea question” is derived from the 1953 Armistice Agreement, Section IV, paragraph

60, which states: “In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question [emphasis added],

the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries

concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and

becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives

appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces

from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.”

7 White House Press Release, “Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of American and the

Republic of Korea,” 16 June 2009, Washington, DC, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/

Joint-vision-for-the-alliance-of-the-United-States-of-America-and-the-Republic-of-Korea/.
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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

eis vision can and should be the basis for policy and strategy

development. ee foundation for any effective strategy is to have

clearly defined end state and following the collapse of the regime

it will be necessary to have an end state that will focus policy

makers and military and civilian planners. A working proposed end

state that would answer the so-called “Korea question” could be

this:

A stable, secure, peaceful, economically vibrant, non-nuclear

peninsula, reunified under a liberal constitutional form of

government determined by the Korean people.8

eis is an end state that the ROK and international community should

strive to achieve and one that the ROK and U.S. alliance should agree upon

and base future planning.eis can ensure legitimacy of a reunified Korea in

the struggle for influence over the Korean people. Irregular warfare and

counterinsurgency are complex undertakings as evidenced by the past 10

years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq where there is no clear understandable

and attainable end state. eere is an opportunity now to establish an end

state for the Korean Peninsula that will allow for planning and preparation

and when crisis occurs, policy makers and planners will have a clear

understanding of what must be achieved.

Nature of the Kim Family Regime and its Influence over

the North Korean People

War embraces much more than politics: it is always an expression of

culture, often a determinant of cultural forms, in some societies the culture

itself.

—John Keegan in A History of Warfare9

Much has been written about the nature of the Kim family regime and

its affect on the Korean people and their psyche. However, the most succinct,

useful, and brilliant description can be found in the work of Adrian Buzo

as he describes the beginnings of the “guerrilla dynasty” built around the

8 eis end state was proposed in the author’s 2004 thesis. David S. Maxwell, “Beyond the Nuclear

Crisis: A Strategy for the Korean Peninsula,” National War College, National Defense University,

April 2004, 14.

9 John Keegan, A History of Warfare, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 12.
cult-like worship of Kim Il-sung.ee following provides the foundation for

understanding how the North Korean elite as well as much of the

population is likely to act:

In the course of this struggle against factional opponents, for the

first time Kim began to emphasize nationalism as a means of

rallying the population to the enormous sacrifices needed for postwar recovery. eis was a nationalism that first took shape in the

environment of the anti-Japanese guerrilla movement and

developed into a creed through the destruction of both the nonCommunist nationalist forces and much of the leftist intellectual

tradition of the domestic Communists. Kim’s nationalism did not

draw inspiration from Korean history, nor did it dwell on past

cultural achievements, for the serious study of history and

traditional culture soon effectively ceased in the DPRK

[Democratic People’s Republic of Korea]. Rather, DPRK

nationalism drew inspiration from the Spartan outlook of the

former Manchurian guerrillas. It was a harsh nationalism that

dwelt on past wrongs and promises of retribution for “national

traitors”and their foreign backers. DPRK nationalism stressed the

“purity”of all things Korean against the “contamination”of foreign

ideas, and inculcated in the population a sense of fear and

animosity toward the outside world.Above all, DPRK nationalism

stressed that the guerrilla ethos was not only the supreme, but also

the only legitimate basis on which to reconstitute a reunified Korea.10

A close reading of the above paragraph reveals a number of insights

that can foretell the actions of the remnants of the regime and the military

and a vast amount of the population. Sixty years of political indoctrination

emphasizing the myth of anti-Japanese partisan warfare and the guerrilla

exploits of Kim Il-sung as well as the total hostility to any foreign influence

has laid the foundation for a popular resistance to any intervention from

outside of North Korea, to include Koreans from the South. An analysis of

Buzo’s observations will show that a defeated NKPA and North Korean

people may fight to the death or live to fight another day. In either case the

result will be irregular threats against whatever outside force intervenes to

attempt to stabilize the chaos that will follow wartime defeat or regime

collapse.

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Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula

10 Adrian Buzo, Re Guerrilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea, (Boulder, CO:

Westview Press, 1999), 27. Emphasis added.
Although the North Korea people are suffering horrifically from living

under the harsh conditions of the past 60 years and,since the mid-1990s,after

the fall of the Soviet Union and the loss of economic aid it provided, because

of the indoctrination and mindset of the people, it does not necessarily

translate that they will welcome the collapse of the regime and reunification

of the peninsula. For the past six decades the people have been so thoroughly

indoctrinated that they have tremendous fear of anything outside of North

Korea. Combined with the guerrilla mindset, it should be assumed in the

worst case that the people will resist reunification that is not brought about

by the Kim family. ee guerrilla mindset will likely be the root cause of the

irregular threats that occur in and emanate from North Korea.

Asymmetric Ereats in North Korea

Although the current focus is on North Korea’s nuclear program,it should

be remembered that the North has developed a range of asymmetric threats

to support its campaign plans to reunify the peninsula under its control. First

and foremost it has the largest special operations force in the world.ee North

Korean regime has invested heavily in its SOF and they have proven very

adept over the years as illustrated by the numerous infiltration operations.

Much has been written about North Korean SOF, but suffice it to say given

the large numbers that have been trained over the years, combined with the

guerrilla mindset indoctrination of the population, prudent planners will

recognize that this is a recipe for a significant threat during conflict and both

post-conflict operations and a post-collapse situation.

In addition to the nuclear program, other weapons of mass destruction

have been under development for years including large stockpiles of

chemical weapons as well as probably some limited biological capabilities.

Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and associated material pose not

only direct threats to military and civilian personnel on the peninsula and

in the region, they potentially can be sold on the global arms market, which

could very well include terrorist organizations.ee regime has a track record

of proliferation of military hardware and any remnants of the regime will

likely exploit overseas contacts as a source of funding and leverage.

In addition to weapons of mass destruction, North Korea has worked

hard to develop missile delivery capabilities that it has sold to clients

particularly in the Middle East.ee presence of these systems in the North

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula
could provide an insurgency with capabilities never before seen and would

push the description of the insurgency toward the hybrid warfare model

that the Israelis faced in dealing with Hezbollah and has been well described

by Frank Hoffman, among others.

In addition to SOF and weapons capabilities,North Korea has developed

an extensive global network to support the regime through a myriad of illicit

activities which range from counterfeiting U.S. currency to drug

manufacturing and distribution to the counterfeiting of a range of goods from

cigarettes to Viagra.eis provides the capability to raise funds to support an

insurgency as well as a means to sell military technology as an additional

source of income. Of course that military technology could include WMD.

Analysis of the existing asymmetric threats shows that these capabilities

will be well suited to insurgent operations by remnants of the toppled

regime and its military. eese, if exploited, will be far more complex and

dangerous than any that were present in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Dealing with the Worst Case: Ee Kim Family Regime’s

Legacy of Irregular Ereats

If in taking a native den one thinks chiefly of the market that he will

establish there on the morrow, one does not take it in the ordinary way.

—Louis H. G. Lyautey: “ee Colonial Role of the Army,”Revue

Des Deux Mondes, February 15, 190011

While planning has taken place at various times over the years to allow

the alliance to react to such threats as terrorism, use of WMD, humanitarian

disaster and internally displaced persons/refugee flow, and internal civil war

two questions should be asked:

• Has the alliance prepared for the worst case—an insurgency

that opposes reunification—following collapse of the Kim

family regime?

• What can and should be done prior to collapse to assist in

mitigating the threats and shaping the outcome on the

peninsula?

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Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula

11 Robert Debs Heinl Jr., ed., Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis, MD: Naval

Institute Press, 1966), 69.
Although the “to-do list” is long, there are five key fundamental tasks

that the ROK-U.S. alliance and the international community must do to

prepare for the collapse of the Kim family regime. While not exhaustive,

focusing on these five tasks will provide the foundation needed to mitigate

the effects of irregular threats and improve the conditions for successful

alliance and international efforts to deal with the effects of regime collapse.

First, a decision must be made as to the end state envisioned for the

Korean Peninsula. As noted earlier, the ROK-U.S. alliance requires an end

state that could be along these lines: A stable, secure, peaceful, economically

vibrant, non-nuclear peninsula, reunified under a liberal constitutional form

of government determined by the Korean people.12

ee imperative of an end state will provide focus for planners and policy

makers and also yield the foundation for an influence campaign that is

critical to shaping the environment after the regime’s collapse.

Along with the establishment of the end state, a decision must be made

regarding alliance transformation and leadership of operations in North

Korea. It is imperative that South Korea leads the effort in reunification and

operations in the North because this will help to undermine the 60-plus

years of propaganda in which the South has been portrayed as a U.S. puppet.

However, as evidenced by the so-called “OPCON transfer” that was

originally scheduled for 2012 and was recently pushed back until 2015, the

ROK military does not yet have the resources to conduct independent

operations. In addition, the reality of the OPCON transfer issue is not solely

about command and control of ROK military forces.eis action is actually

the dissolution of the ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC)

which has been one of the most effective combined commands in the world

since 1978. It is commanded by an American four-star general with a ROK

four-star deputy. Rather than dissolve the command, perhaps it should

remain intact and its leadership shift to a ROK general in command with

a U.S. deputy. In this way the ROK would be in charge of operations in the

North and would still be able to exploit the expertise and full capabilities of

the combined command.13

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

12 Maxwell, “Beyond the Nuclear Crisis,” 14.

13 Bruce Bechtol, Defiant Failed State: Re North Korea Rreat to International Security (Washington,

DC: Potomac Books, 2010), 165–74.
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Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula

ee second most important action is to execute an influence campaign

focusing on the second-tier leaders to maintain control of their

organizations to prevent attack and a future insurgency.eis tier consists of

those corps, maneuver, and special operations commanders who control not

only forces but also WMD capabilities.eese leaders are key to maintaining

control of the NKPA. In addition, an active influence campaign is necessary

to prepare the North Korean population for a post-regime end state that

results in a reunified peninsula.eis is the most difficult, complex, and time

consuming effort, but one that is critical to beginning to undo the years of

political and social indoctrination that has used the Juche ideology as a de

facto religion for social control. Additionally, this indoctrination has

developed such high levels of distrust and fear of outsiders that any stability

operations will be extremely difficult. It also has made the population ripe

to support an insurgency especially if that continues to perpetuate the

regime myths of the legitimacy of North Korea being based on antiJapanese partisan warfare. Following regime collapse “anti-Japanese”will be

substituted with “anti-foreigner.”

Furthermore, a decision must be made to avoid the mistakes of the Iraq

war.ee North Korean military must be kept intact. It is one of the North’s

very few functioning institutions and can be a critical component for

maintaining internal stability as well as executing support and stabilization

operations. Most important, an intact military is one of the best methods to

prevent a future insurgency. However, keeping the military intact requires a

successful influence campaign to target those commanders who can and

should maintain control of their forces and work with the ROK military

and civilian leadership.

Eight years after Operation Enduring Freedom began in Afghanistan,

the “Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands”program was developed.eis recognized

the importance of having planners, both military and civilian, with sufficient

cultural expertise to understand the problems in the region and allow for

effective plans and policies to be developed that incorporate cultural

awareness and understanding. ee same mistake should not be made in

terms of North Korea. ROK and U.S. military and civilian North Korean

experts should be brought together and dedicated to planning for a North

Korean collapse. An investment should be made in developing younger

“North Korea Hands” to be ready to deal with the aftermath of the Kim

family regime. A competent staff and organization of experts cannot be
created rapidly after the crisis occurs. eis group needs to span the

professional spectrum and assist in the development of policy and strategy

as well as the campaign plan to deal with collapse. eey will also be able to

assist in the training and readiness of the military forces and civilian agencies

that will execute the operations to achieve the end state of a reunified Korea.

Last, an international coalition must be established to support

reunification of the peninsula. Most important, the ROK and the United

States must engage with China. Chinese actions will play a critical role in

the outcome of crisis on the peninsula in either post-conflict or postcollapse. ee ROK-U.S. alliance and China must find common ground in

interests and, through engagement and transparency, develop plans and

methods for minimizing the potential for conflict between the two.

eese efforts must, again, be undertaken prior to the crisis of regime

collapse. Reunification, while the responsibility of the ROK, will require

enormous resources not only in terms of manpower and material but also

funding. Numerous studies attest to the huge costs of reunification. eose

in Korea are likely to make German reunification pale in comparison

because of the vast differences in infrastructure and standards of living

between North and South. Failure to support reunification efforts and quell

an insurgency in the North will, however, as already stated, likely bring

instability in terms of security to Northeast Asia and also have global

economic impact. It is in the interest of the regional as well as the global

economic powers to support reunification. But the effort to build this

coalition must occur now, even if done behind closed doors, to prevent

political conflict prior to the collapse of the Kim regime.

ee irregular threats that will be present on the Korean Peninsula when

the regime collapses will be extremely complex and dangerous. While the

wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been difficult, the worst-case scenarios

on the peninsula will be far more difficult. ee threats must be understood

and planners and policy makers must take an objective and realistic look at

the problems that will have to be faced. While everyone may hope for a

“soft landing” and peaceful reunification, the alliance and international

community needs to prepare for the most likely and dangerous outcomes.

eis requires active preparatory actions by the ROK-U.S. alliance across the

instruments of national power.

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Planning is good, but preparation is better. While the regime has

demonstrated enormous resiliency muddling through severe internal crises

since the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994, a course of action cannot be to hope

that it will continue to survive. ee pressures on North Korea are likely to

someday cause attack or collapse, either of which will be catastrophic for

the ROK, the region, and international community.

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Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula

Understanding North Korea’s Human Rights

Abuses

by Chuck Downs

It is possible that this title for my presentation was assigned simply to

allow wide latitude for covering the topic of human rights in general. But

sometimes titles have a way of focusing a question, and this one caused me

to wonder what most needs to be understood about North Korea’s human

rights abuses.

ee fundamental aspects of this dire situation, after all, are well known.

Basic freedoms, even those guaranteed by international agreements the

North Korean regime has signed, are routinely denied to North Korea’s

citizens. ee regime’s food distribution policy and its political caste system

predetermine that large segments of the North Korean population receive

none of the food provided by international relief agencies and other

countries. North Korea’s political prison camps operate with an unmatched

level of brutality. Its human rights crisis has serious regional and

international consequences; it has caused a flow of refugees who often end

up as victims of exploitation, violence, or crime when they cross into

neighboring countries, and China’s approach to this humanitarian crisis is

to send the refugees back to the North where they face certain persecution.

eese and the other human rights concerns are merely the tip of the iceberg.

ee regime is so oppressive we cannot be certain we know the full

dimensions of its human rights abuses.

Bruce Bechtol reminded me recently that we originally met some ten

years ago in a small meeting called to discuss North Korean proliferation.

During that session’s broad discussion of the nature of the regime, I made

an example of collective punishment as a characteristic of the regime’s

method of coercion and control. A well-known specialist in China

responded that there was nothing new or unique about North Korea’s use

of collective punishment; it had been used throughout Asia, and had

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Chapter 7
historical roots in Korea’s kingdoms. I recognize the accuracy of his

assertion, and understand that collective punishment was used not only in

Asia, but in medieval Europe, and ancient Rome and Greece as well. It is by

no means a purely Asian means of punishment. Its use today, however, is a

matter of considerable contemporary concern. It violates not only codified

declarations of human rights but also internationally accepted standards of

appropriate governmental behavior. Its use by the modern North Korean

regime cannot be dismissed as culturally Korean or justified on the basis of

longstanding practice. Because Kim Il-sung decreed that three generations

of a traitor’s family must be wiped out, innocent people who often have no

idea what the offense of their accused relative did or said are also

incarcerated in North Korea’s political prisons.

At about the same time, a colleague published a book on the North’s

negotiating style that took a decidedly different view from mine on what

motivates the Kim regime’s negotiating behavior. He wrote that Kim Ilsung’s emphasis on the importance of centralized political power emerged

from the rigorous demands of life in guerrilla camps.1 If that is meant as an

explanation for Kim’s advocacy and adherence to absolute rule by one man—

himself—it is completely misleading. Kim Il-sung and his son have been

guided by the same greed and megalomania that has motivated tyrants since

the dawn of history.

We Americans benefit from a long cultural tradition of fighting to

defend human rights, one that has roots thousands of years before the

founding of our republic. Our nation’s birth was accompanied by a

declaration of rights. Our cultural tradition of fighting for freedom, however,

did not start in 1776.ee notions that guided the founding fathers, among

whom lived close to our session today in Quantico—Washington, Jefferson,

Madison, and Mason—were in their minds because their classical education

taught them that tyranny must be challenged and subdued.

Such an understanding of history, gained through an analysis of the

tortuous and difficult history of the Western tradition—from the wars of the

ancient democracies in Greece and Rome through the development of

concepts of sovereignty and political legitimacy in Europe—has a global

relevance, even to cultures as distant as Korea and even to histories as

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

1 See, for example, “Factors Shaping North Korean Worldviews,” chap. 1 in Scott Snyder,

Negotiating on the Edge (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 17–28.
troubled as China’s.We should not discard our historical traditions when we

discuss the human rights abuses of a place like North Korea.

eucydides’ histories are replete with examples of the rise and fall of

the fortunes of various governments of ancient Greece. His verdict on oneman rule, however, applies equally well to modern North Korea. He

describes “their habit of providing simply for themselves, of looking solely

to their personal comfort and family aggrandizement.”2 Aristotle echoed

that conclusion. A tyrannical government he said, governed “with a view to

its own advantage, not to that of its subjects.”3

eese were matters that weighed heavily on the minds of the American

founding fathers. Washington wrote letters to Jefferson in which he

mentioned the excesses of Roman Emperor Nero as though his corrupt

tyrannical rule were the stuff of contemporary news. We may not be so

attentive to classical precedents, but the reign of Nero gives plenty of

grounds for comparison with the reign of Kim Jong-il. On May 22, 2009,

we were able to pick up a copy of the Wall Street Journal to read the front

page article about how Curtis Melvin and Joshua Stanton, two expert

analysts of publicly available satellite images, had located the waterslide and

wave pool at one of Kim Jong-il’s many villas.4 ee prison camp survivor

Kang Chul-hwan has also done an excellent job of finding evidence of the

Kim family’s lavish lifestyle. Excessive luxury is the norm for a profligate

regime that rules an impoverished, starving citizenry.

Lincoln compared such misappropriation of public resources to slavery.

He described it as the same logic that says, “You work and toil and earn

bread, and I’ll eat it.” He said, “No matter in what shape it comes, whether

from the mouth of a king who seeks to bestride the people of his own nation

and live by the fruit of their labor, or from one race of men as an apology

for enslaving another race, it is the same tyrannical principle.”5

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Understanding North Korea’s Human Rights Abuses

2 eucydides, 1.17 Hellas, in Robert B. Strassler, ed., Re Landmark Rucydides, (New York: ee Free

Press, 1996), 13.

3 Aristotle, Politics, Book IV, chap. X, in Ernest Barker, Re Politics of Aristotle (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1971), 179.

4 Evan Ramstad, “Gulags, Nukes, and a Water Slide: Citizen Spies Lift North Korea’s Veil,” Wall

Street Journal, May 22, 2009, 1.

5 Abraham Lincoln quoted in John George Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A History, vol.

2, part 3 of 8, http://www.fullbooks.com/Abraham-Lincoln-A-History-Volume-23.html.
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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

Ee Regime’s Starvation Policy and Human Rights

Aristotle saw public impoverishment as an objective of tyranny: “so that

the common citizens will be occupied with earning their livelihood and will

have neither leisure nor opportunity to engage in conspiratorial acts.” We

have seen this phenomenon in contemporary North Korea. Haggard and

Noland, in their study “Hunger and Human Rights,”observed that between

1995 and 1998, as famine approached, the North Korean regime failed to

request international assistance. eey explained that in the ensuing years,

North Koreans suffered through a catastrophe that resulted in as many as

one million deaths from starvation and hunger-related diseases; this

represented between three to five percent of the population. ee regime

ignored internationally accepted norms for aid distribution, which are

designed to ensure that the aid reaches those who need it most. Instead, it

rewarded those whom it deemed loyal to the regime, and withholding food

from those it deemed disloyal.6

As the crisis deepened and information about the ongoing catastrophe

leaked out, Japan and South Korea began providing food and humanitarian

supplies in June 1995. Later, the United States and European Union nations

also contributed massive amounts of assistance, as well as private aid from

NGOs such as the Red Cross, and through the UN World Food Program.

As aid began arriving, the North Korean government demonstrated its venal

duplicity by reducing the amount the regime had been spending on

purchasing food from external sources. Put simply, the government did not

use the world’s aid to supplement the available food supply; it reduced the

domestic food supply.7

When it received aid, the regime pursued several policies designed to

control aid distribution, hinder effective monitoring, and create

opportunities for controlling and diverting aid for the government’s

purposes. Due to the lack of transparency and effective monitoring, there

6 ee information on human rights abuses in North Korea presented here is taken directly from

publications of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK). ee majority of the

information presented was originally published in: Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, “Hunger

and Human Rights,” (Washington, DC: HRNK, 2005) and DLA Piper et al., Failure to Protect: A

Call for the UN Security Council to Act in North Korea, (Washington, DC: DLA Piper and HRNK,

2006). ee specific references to statistics on hunger in North Korea are found in Haggard and

Noland, 14–15, 23–29, and DLA Piper, 12–13.

7 See Haggard and Noland, 14–15.
were widespread reports that significant amounts of foreign aid were not

reaching the most deserving recipients. Aid was diverted to the same

privileged persons the party favored under the public distribution system,

including the military, party officials, and party loyalists.8

Aristotle also pointed out that “it is part of these tyrannical measures to

impoverish the nation so as to bolster the funds available for military

defense.”Pyongyang took advantage of the foreign aid to divert government

revenue away from food assistance and use the savings to fund the

government’s other priorities, such as military weapons programs.9 North

Korea’s songun—military first—policy fits well with eucydides’observation

that tyrants “make safety the great aim of their accomplishments.”10 As it

was cutting its purchases of food imports in 1999, the North Korean

government bought 40 MiG-21 fighters and eight military helicopters from

Kazakhstan. Further, the government continued to pursue its expensive

nuclear programs during the famine, spending currency that should have

been used to feed its people. Even at the height of the famine, the

government demonstrated that it prioritizes its military over the basic

survival needs of its population.11

Kim Jong-il’s Ill-gotten Wealth

Aristotle defined tyranny as “that arbitrary power of an individual which

is responsible to no one.”12 We should not be surprised that a regime like

North Korea engages in illicit activities within and outside its borders. In

order to finance its military programs, security services, and loyal elite, the

North Korean regime has systematically engaged in weapons proliferation,

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Understanding North Korea’s Human Rights Abuses

8 Haggard and Noland have questioned whether outright direct diversion to privileged persons,

including the military, occurred on a large scale. eey argue that the military and other privileged

persons had the means to purchase and acquire food on their own, and presumably they were given

the first portions of the aid from China and South Korea, which was given with no monitoring or

commitment that the aid be distributed on the basis of need rather than class. Instead, Haggard and

Noland have suggested that the diversion that occurred was of World Food Program and nongovernmental organization aid into illegal markets, where those diverting the aid could sell it at a

profit themselves. Of course, those with sufficient money to make such purchases were not the most

needy or vulnerable. Haggard and Noland, 24.

9 See Haggard and Noland, 16–17.

10 eucydides, 1.17 Hellas, in Strassler, Re Landmark Rucydides, 13.

11 See Haggard and Noland, 16–17.

12 Aristotle, Politics, Book IV, chap. X, in Barker, Re Politics of Aristotle, 179.
drug trafficking, counterfeiting of goods and currency, and banking and

insurance fraud. Despite Kim Jong-il’s denials, the evidence demonstrates

that North Korea engages in drug trafficking—from $500 million to $1

billion per year—as a source of foreign currency to fund its WMD program

and other government initiatives.13

As Kan, Bechtol, and Collins point out in the superb book on North

Korea’s state-run criminal enterprises,Criminal Sovereignty: Understanding

North Korea’s Illicit International Activities (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War

College, 2010), North Korean diplomats have a long history of dealing in

contraband.Almost all of North Korea’s diplomatic corps in Scandinavia were

expelled in 1976 for running a smuggling ring for alcohol and cigarettes

through Norway, Denmark, and Finland. Since then, more than 20 North

Korean diplomats, agents, and trade officials have been implicated in illicit

drug operations in more than 12 countries,including Egypt,Venezuela,India,

Germany,Nepal,Sweden,Zambia,Ethiopia,and Laos.Japanese drug officials

report that 43 percent of all illegal drugs imported to Japan comes from North

Korea, providing a large cash profit for the North Korean government. Raids

in Taiwan and Japan have uncovered heroin that was packed in the exact same

rice bags that were used to ship donated rice to North Korea as famine relief—

thus identifying North Korea as the source of the drugs.14

ee United States has determined that a definitive connection exists

between the North Korean government and the high-quality,counterfeit $100

bills commonly known as “supernotes.” According to the most reliable

statistics, North Korea has produced between $45 million and $100 million

in supernotes since 1989, and estimates of its current yearly production range

between $3 million and $25 million per year. Evidence indicating North

Korea’s involvement includes instances in which North Korean officials were

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

13 ee information on North Korea’s illicit activities is taken from a report published by the

Committee for Human Rights: DLA Piper et al., Failure to Protect: A Call for the UN Security Council

to Act in North Korea, (Washington, DC: DLA Piper and HRNK, 2006), which cited “Heroin Busts

Point to Source of Funds for North Koreans,”Wall Street Journal, April 23, 2003 (referencing figures

from U.S. military command in South Korea). According to the U.S. State Department, “it is likely,

but not certain, that the North Korean government sponsors criminal activities, including narcotics

production and trafficking, in order to earn foreign currency for the state and its leaders.”International

Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2006 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2006).

14 Jay Solomon and Jason Dean, “Drug Money: Heroin Busts Point to Source of Funds for North

Koreans,” Wall Street Journal, April 23, 2003; Aristotle, Politics, Book IV, chap. X, in Barker, Re Politics

of Aristotle, 179; Anthony Spaeth, “Kim’s Rackets,”TIME Asia, June 9, 2003, 14; and Balbina Y.

Hwang, “Curtailing North Korea’s Illicit Activities,” (Heritage Foundation, August 25, 2003), 4.
caught carrying the counterfeit bills. Defectors have identified the buildings

in Pyongyang and Pyongsong that contain the counterfeiting equipment.15

eough its economic threat to the United States is often described as

minimal, producing counterfeit currency has a deleterious effect on the U.S.

currency system and harms diplomatic relations between the United States

and the rest of the world. Equally important, it should remind us of the

kind of government we are dealing with in North Korea. David Asher, a

former advisor in the U.S. State Department, observes: “If [North Korea is]

going to counterfeit our currency the entire time they’re engaged in

diplomatic negotiations, what does that say about their sincerity?”16

North Korea also uses weapons proliferation, a subject raised in other

sessions of the conference, as a way to generate foreign income. eere are

reliable reports that North Korea provided chemical and biological weapons

technology to both Syria and Iran in the early 1990s. However, their export

of WMD is dwarfed by North Korea’s exports of ballistic missiles; a U.S.

government study performed in 2004 estimated that North Korea earned

$560 million from missile sales in 2001 alone.17

Insurance scams run under the authority of high-level associates of Kim

Jong-il in secret offices like Office Number 39 and the Organization and

Guidance Department of the Party have netted Kim a huge fortune located

in sundry financial institutions in the West, with costs to the international

re-insurance industry reportedly reaching $30 million annually in the past

decade. As a result of the courageous testimony of a defector named Kim

Kwang-jin, who had worked for North Korea’s “Korean National Insurance

Corporation,”the intentions and objectives of the North’s undertaking in reinsurance scams are now exposed and explained. His revelations have

brought an end to one method the corrupt regime purloined from external

sources the funds it needed to maintain its internal oppression. In the long

run, his work advances the freedom of the average North Korean, since it

weakens the capabilities of the totalitarian regime.

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15 Raphael F. Perl and Dick K. Nanto, “North Korean Counterfeiting of U.S. Currency”

(Congressional Research Service, March 22, 2006), 8; and Stephen Mihm, “No Ordinary

Counterfeit,” New York Times Magazine, July 23, 2006, 40.

16 DLA Piper et al., Failure to Protect.

17 Larry A. Niksch, “Korea: U.S.–Korean Relations—Issues for Congress 6” (Congressional Research

Service, April 14, 2006), 7, cited in DLA Piper et al., 67. See also Jon Herskovitz, “North Korea’s

Missiles Find Fewer Buyers,” Gulf Times, September 6, 2006, cited in DLA Piper et al.
Suppression of Political Dissent

Totalitarian governments’ efforts to control the thoughts and

expressions of their people have an ancient and terrible history. Aristotle

observed that this policy had two components—first, to let the people know

nothing of what the government did, but second, to let the government

know everything that the people did: “it is part [of the nature of tyranny]

to strive to see that all the affairs of the tyrant are secret, but that nothing

is kept hidden of what any subject says or does, rather everywhere he will

be spied upon.”18

A vast network of internal spy agencies has been instituted in North

Korea, just as it was in the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc. Set up

along lines laid out by Soviet advisors, the North’s secret security agencies,

like those of Stalinist Russia, have operated a system of gulags characterized

by false imprisonment, persecution based on political grounds,

extermination, enslavement, and torture.

An estimated 200,000 people are now imprisoned in North Korea’s

various prison camps, and it is believed that as many as 400,000 prisoners

have died in these camps over the past 30 years. ee situation for political

dissenters worsened when Kim Jong-il began to fear that the communist

collapse which swept through Eastern Europe in the late 1980s would

spread and challenge his rule. As his insecurity increased, so did the number

of political prisoners housed in North Korea’s political prisons.19

In addition to an accused individual, the State Security Department

also detains up to three generations of the accused’s family members,

including the mother, father, sisters, brothers, children, and grandchildren.

Like the accused, the family members are not granted a trial. Instead, they

are picked up and transported to political prisons without being provided

any information as to when, if ever, they will be released.eere is a systemic

use of torture in interrogations and as punishment in the political prisons.

Political prisoners are tortured first in an effort to get them to “confess.”

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18 Aristotle, Politics, Book V, chap. XI, sect. X, in Barker, Re Politics of Aristotle, 244–45.

19 A report of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea: David Hawk, “ee Hidden

Gulag: Exposing North Korea’s Prison Camps” (Washington, DC: HRNK, 2003), 24; Choi SungChol, “ee International Community and Human Rights in North Korea” (Center for the

Advancement of North Korean Human Rights, 1996), 11. ee estimate of deaths in the camps

covers the period 1972–95.
Many prisoners report that guards engage in beatings so vicious that

prisoners’eyes fall out or bones are exposed. A commonly reported tactic of

extracting confessions is to threaten loved ones.20

Prisoners are provided only starvation-level food rations despite the fact

that they are forced to engage in physically demanding labor. It is this

combination that often turns the labor camps into death camps.

Ee Regime’s Control of Public Information

As noted, Aristotle observed that while tyrannical government sought

to know everything about what people did, they also sought to guarantee

secrecy regarding what the government did. Two thousand years later,

Winston Churchill put it in these terms:

You see these dictators on their pedestals, surrounded by the

bayonets of their soldiers and the truncheons of their police. Yet in

their hearts there is unspoken—unspeakable!—fear.eey are afraid

of words and thoughts! Words spoken abroad, thoughts stirring at

home, all the more powerful because they are forbidden. eese

terrify them. A little mouse—a little tiny mouse!—of thought

appears in the room, and even the mightiest potentates are thrown

into panic.21

Americans certainly understand well the need for communications

during a period of great political change. During the American struggle for

independence, Benjamin Franklin’s Philadelphia newspaper was able to tell

people in America what they wanted to know from a uniquely American

perspective. His newspaper served to disseminate information on

proceedings of the Continental Congress, and laid one of the foundation

stones for the guarantee of freedom of the press. It also helped to consolidate

ideas and galvanize public opinion.

ee recent advent of personal communications in North Korea brought

on primarily by cell phones and radios, has had a dramatic effect on what is

known about the North Korean regime, and has exposed both the regime’s

brutality and instability. As a New York Times article reported on March

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20 Hawk, “ee Hidden Gulag,” 59.

21 Winston Churchill quoted in “All Great Quotes,” available online at http://www.allgreatquotes.com/

winston_churchill_quotes11.shtml.
29, 2010, “North Korea, one of the world’s most impenetrable nations, is

facing a new threat: networks of its own citizens feeding information about

life there to South Korea and its Western allies.” ee article stated that

reporters and activists seeking news from inside North Korea go to China

to find North Koreans who are allowed to travel there, give them cell phones

to take back to the North, and then post their stories on blog sites and news

services in South Korea. One Committee for Human Rights in North

Korea (HRNK) board member, Nicholas Eberstadt, interviewed for the

piece, commented, “In an information vacuum like North Korea, any

additional tidbits — even the swamp of rumors — is helpful.”22

More needs to be known about how to get information into North

Korea, especially into the hands of people who will benefit from better

informed perspectives on political developments. Significant defectors from

the bureaucratic class in Pyongyang are available to explain the official

apparatus of information dissemination. HRNK has accordingly taken on

a comprehensive study of how information is shared and disseminated

within North Korea.

Our study will entail an analysis of the following channels of

information:

• Officially-sponsored connections to external media. We

know that North Korea pays for a feed from Reuters in

particular. We will report on how access to this information

is controlled, who gets access, under what circumstances, and

what authorized North Korean users are permitted to do

with the information. We want to cover the scale of

dissemination, contents, censorship, contract procedure and

impact;

• Official Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)

government sources of information that are in circulation,

comparing the information flow that is made available to the

bureaucracy and the general populace;

• ee North Korean education system and its role in

development of information, dissemination, and control;

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22 Choe Sang-hun, “North Koreans Use Cellphones to Bare Secrets,” New York Times, March 28, 2010.
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Understanding North Korea’s Human Rights Abuses

• ee impact of official and unofficial rumors, word of mouth,

their different sources and impacts. It is clear that there

exists an “elite rumor mill” in Pyongyang that sends signals

throughout the party apparatus on important matters that

are about to be decided. We want to study how that works

and how the regime uses this system to engender support

and loyalty.

• ee effect of information “leaks” by individuals, fabrication

by state security apparatus, its nature and consequences;

• ee nature and impact of the increasing inflow of

information from outside, for example, balloons from South

Korea and their impact;

• ee burgeoning impact of external news transmitted through

radio or cell phones, and the impact it may be having on the

ruling class in Pyongyang.

We hope to understand what types of information are available to

different spectra of the population, what are their sources, how strictly the

state controls the information flows, what are the informal channels of

outside information, how effective the balloon leaflets across the DMZ and

U.S.-sponsored broadcasting such as Radio Free Asia and Voice Of America

are. eis study will provide the international community, human rights

activists, and policy makers a clearer picture of what information North

Koreans need and how to increase input from outside to promote freedom

and democracy in North Korea. Informing North Koreans is critical for

promoting their understanding of the nature of the Kim regime and its

connection to their misery, as well as to preparing them for the possibility

of being free in the future.

What Can Be Done As the Kim Regime Ends?

ee record of the United Nations in condemning the Kim regime’s

human rights abuses is increasingly strong. ee human rights situation in

North Korea is, the UN Secretary-General stated in Seoul in 2008,

“unacceptable.”23 eailand’s Professor Vitit Muntarbhorn was appointed

23 “Ban Urges NK to Improve Human Rights,” Korea Times, 4 July 2008.
Special Rapporteur for the Situation of Human Rights in North Korea by

the Commission on Human Rights in July 2004. In response to his first

report to the United Nations issued on January 10, 2005, the General

Assembly has passed a number of resolutions concerning the human rights

situation in the North. As recently as December 2009, the UN’s Human

Rights Council convened a “Universal Periodic Review”in Geneva to address

the regime’s abuses in direct dialogue with the government of North Korea.24

Similarly, the Congress of the United States, the National Assembly of

South Korea, and the Diet of Japan, and parliaments of Canada, Australia,

and the European Union have also either enacted legislation or have

provisions under consideration that attempt to support the people of North

Korea and influence the regime to adopt more humanitarian policies.

Notwithstanding these actions, policy makers, not just in the United

States and other countries as well, tend to focus attention more closely on

the regime’s military challenges, threats to peace, and nuclear development.

Yet there are precedents for integrating human rights concerns into policies

toward countries where nuclear weapons have occupied a central point of

discussion. For example, both Democratic and Republican administrations

found effective bilateral and multilateral means of promoting human rights

goals with the Soviet Union even though they were negotiating nuclear

weapons agreements with its leaders at the same time. Ideally, broader

discussions about political, economic, energy, human rights, and

humanitarian concerns have the potential to create a more solid foundation

for talks about nuclear issues.

ee reality is that the regime’s recent actions have become increasingly

defiant, even as it totters on the verge of an unstable transition—inevitable

because of Kim Jong-il’s impending death. ee recent sinking of the ROK

corvette Cheonan raises the specter of war and increased tension, and, if

unchecked, the possibility of additional provocative behavior. As Aristotle

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24 A professor of law at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, eailand, Muntarbhorn has served

in various capacities in the United Nations system, including as Special Rapporteur on the Sale of

Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (1990–94) and as expert or adviser to many

United Nations organizations. See “Vitit Muntarbhorn Appointed UN Special Rapporteur on

Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” HR/4786, August 6,

2004. See “Special Rapporteur for the Comm’n on Human Rights, Question of the Violation of

Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom In Any Part Of the World: Situation of Human Rights

in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/34 (January 10, 2005), at

2. General Assembly Resolution 60/173.
told us two millennia ago, “the same vein of policy . . . makes tyrants warmongers, with the object of keeping their subjects constantly occupied and

continually in need of a leader.”25

As Kim Jong-il attempts to pass his monopoly of power to his youngest

son, the international community faces a situation that is even more

challenging than that of the past 60 years. ee impending change of

leadership when Kim dies presents both a fearsome concern and an

opportunity for regional peace and security.ee implications for the human

rights of North Korea’s people are profound. Although new leadership may

not reverse Kim’s policies overnight, it could prove more receptive to

addressing some human rights concerns as a means of signaling to the rest

of the world that its intentions are not aggressive.

If new leadership comes to power in Pyongyang, and the new leaders

seek to develop a different relationship with the rest of the world, human

rights concerns could play a major role in testing the new leadership’s

intentions. Let us assume that even leaders who are predisposed to

normalizing North Korea’s relationship with its neighbors might be unable

for internal political reasons to dispose of the North’s nuclear weapons

program. ee United States could raise human rights concerns and seek

North Korean agreement on specific human rights measures that might not

undermine the new leadership’s standing, such as:

• Accounting for the foreign citizens of 12 nations who are

held against their will in North Korea, as a result of the

regime’s abductions, hostage-taking, and other extenuating

circumstances;

• Facilitating reunifications for families who have been

separated since the Korean War and for those separated

from their families because of famine, extreme poverty, and

political persecution in the North. Although the Kim regime

has allowed brief visits under closely-supervised family

reunions, only 1,600 of the 125,000 South Korean applicants

have been able to participate. Some 10 million await

information about missing family members;

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Understanding North Korea’s Human Rights Abuses

25 Aristotle, Politics, Book V, chap. XI, sect. X, in Barker, The Politics of Aristotle, 245.
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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

• Improving international monitoring of food distribution to

ensure it reaches the intended recipients;

• Decriminalizing movement within North Korea and across

the border, and an end to the persecution of those who

return voluntarily or are forced back into North Korea;

• Releasing innocent children and family members of those

convicted of political crimes;

• Providing access to prisoners by the International

Committee of the Red Cross, the World Food Program, and

other international agencies; and

• Reviews of the cases of prisoners of conscience with the Red

Cross or Amnesty International with a view to their release.

While these steps do not address the full range of human rights abuses

committed by the North Korean regime, they represent human rights issues

that could possibly be raised in negotiations with new leadership. While

this list is ordered in what is roughly what I would expect the new regime

to be able to pursue, any outsider’s understanding of the political difficulty

of such moves is highly subjective.ee range of steps available to new leaders

has much to do with their own internal political assessments—indeed, even

questions of who is in charge of what function undertaken by the previous

regime. ee point here is that by engaging in human rights discussions, we

will be representing our values well and expanding our comprehension of

what can be accomplished with any new group of leaders.

eese issues could possibly be discussed without unseating an incoming

leader whose power might not be secure enough to allow a more complete

reversal of the Kim regime’s onerous security policies. Admittedly this is a

fragile, complex, and sensitive process, and may lead to the unfortunate

conclusion that incoming leaders are not in fact reliable or willing to change,

but there is, nevertheless, some hope in the current circumstances.

eere are many here who will say that even hoping to address these issues

with new leadership in North Korea is overly optimistic. ee defector Kim

Kwang-jin can certainly attest to the pressures that will be on Chang Sangtaek as he takes over a kind of regency for Kim Jong-eun, and Bruce Bechtol

can point out that O Kuk-ryol is a considerable force to be contended with,

who will have his own reasons to keep North Korea’s tyrannical system going.
But what the classical tradition of Western political development

teaches us is that tyrannies, simply because they serve only one individual,

do not last. When democracy takes hold, it tends to expand and strengthen.

As Washington wrote to Madison, “Liberty, when it begins to take root, is

a plant of rapid growth.”26 Tyrannies, on the other hand, topple with their

leaders; in spite of their emphasis on security, they are less stable forms of

government. If we can take advantage of the pending change in North

Korea to advance a freer society there, Aristotle offers a final promise for a

positive result: “No freeman, if he can escape from it, will endure such a

government.”27

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Understanding North Korea’s Human Rights Abuses

26 George Washington, letter to James Madison, 2 March 1788.

27 Aristotle, Politics, Book IV, chap. X in Barker, Re Politics of Aristotle, 179.

Breaking Barriers: The Media War for

North Korea

Ha Tae-keung, president of Open Radio for North Korea, one of several

Seoul-based stations aiming broadcasts into North Korea, boasts one piece

of evidence of the impact of his broadcasts that none of Open Radio’s

competitors is likely to match. After the station in April 2010 quoted a

North Korean fortune teller as saying that North Korean leader Kim Jongil would die on May 16, Kim in the six-day period from May 16 to May 22

was reported by the North Korean media to have made 16 field trips to

factories, farms, and military units. “He is sensitive to rumors of his death,”

said Ha. “He would like to be subduing the rumor.”1

Like many reports of whatever is going on in North Korea, this one is

impossible to prove or, for that matter, to disprove. Nobody can be really

certain that Kim Jong-il made all those field trips, regardless of the claims

of the North Korean reports. eere is no way to double-check whether the

fortune-teller actually made the forecast, as reported to Open Radio by one

of its “Deep eroat” contacts inside North Korea, and of course it is

impossible to know if word of the Open Radio broadcast reached Kim Jongil or his inner circle. Still, what is clear is that the story as told by Ha, fortifies

his view that the broadcasts of Open Radio and other more powerful but not

necessarily more influential stations—ranging from South Korea’s Korean

Broadcasting System to the U.S. government’s Voice of America and the

government-funded Radio Free Asia, set up as a “non-profit corporation”—

are definitely heard and, in a sense, heeded inside North Korea.

Whether they’re having a very positive impact is another matter. Since

many of the broadcasts touch upon the issue of North Korea’s appalling

record on human rights, the question is how much they can influence policy

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Chapter 8

1 Ha Tae-keung recounted this story on several occasions, including a seminar on September 28,

2010, at the Seoul Foreign Correspondents’ Club. ee author attended the seminar on the day of

the Workers’ Party conference in Pyongyang at which Kim Jong-eun’s third son was named vicechairman of the party’s military commission and a member of the party’s central committee.
or practice when it comes to human rights abuses. Certainly North Korea

in a number of forums, such as meetings of the United Nations Council on

Human Rights in Geneva, has shown deep hostility to charges of a wide

range of abuses, ranging from unspeakable forms of torture in prison camps

to total denial of freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of

religion for all its people. Despite loud public denials, North Korea may

have responded to reports on human rights abuses with cosmetic shifts

intended to somewhat improve the country’s international image.

Beneath that level, however, in terms of the punishment inflicted on

citizens suspected of the most heinous of crimes, defiance, or even expression

of doubts about the rule of Kim Jong-il, and somewhat lesser offenses, such

as theft of vital supplies and materials, it would be difficult to find evidence

of any movement toward leniency. ee emphasis to date appears to have

been an occasional desire to improve appearances while perpetuating the

abuses that have characterized North Korea’s one-family rule since Kim

Jong-il’s father, Kim Il-sung, was named premier at the founding of the

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in September 1948. (He

assumed the title of president in 1972 and—since his death in July 1994—

has remained “eternal president.”)

eose with the deepest convictions of the influence of the media are

likely to cite radio broadcasts as well as leaflets dropped from balloons lofted

from sites just below the Demilitarized Zone between the two Koreas.

Beyond those efforts at media penetration into North Korea are periodic

articles in foreign newspapers and magazines, most of them based on

interviews with defectors inside China or in South Korea, as well as books

and other studies, notably those by David Hawk, author of Re Hidden

Gulag: Exposing North Korea’s Prison Camps: Prisoners’ Testimonies and

Satellite Photographs (Washington, DC: U.S. Committee for Human Rights

in North Korea, 2003), a detailed exposé of conditions at camps inside

North Korea, and other works. ee impact of any of these reports and

studies is difficult if not impossible to ascertain.

ee impression, however, is that radio broadcasts have the most

immediate and enduring impact, partly because they recur daily, several

hours a day. North Koreans are banned by law from listening to them and

risk severe penalties if caught in the act. ee problem of tuning in is all the

more difficult since radios and televisions in North Korea are calibrated for

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula
listening or viewing only to North Korean stations. A certain technical skill

is required to be able to dial stations in South Korea, China, or elsewhere.

ee penalties if caught are severe, and jamming is routine. Short-wave radios

for listening to foreign broadcasts are available through contacts in China

for the equivalent of a few dollars, but those found carrying or listening to

them may be punished as traitors. Since there are few power outlets, and

scant electrical current, radios and TVs rely on batteries that are often

unavailable and too expensive for many people.

Occasionally, however, the media coverage has been so blood-curdling

as to elicit a real response from North Korea. One of the most dramatic

examples in recent years was videotape shot by a North Korean of executions

on two successive days, March 1 and 2, 2005, in Hoeryong city, North

Hamgyong Province near the Tumen River border with China in the far

northeast of the country. ee 12-minute videotape was initially aired by

Japan Independent News Net ( Jin-net, www.jin-net.co.jp) and then

distributed by Life Funds for North Korean Refugees (LFNKR,

www.northkoreanrefugees.com), a non-governmental organization (NGO)

in Japan that also produced a book, Are Rey Telling the Truth—Brutality

Beyond Belief, based on interviews with more than 200 defectors who had

escaped to China. ee videotape is significant not for revealing anything

new, since defectors for years have been telling interviewers about public

executions, but as the first documentary image of the actual event.2

LFNKR, which distributed copies of the tape with subtitles in English

as well as Japanese, has described the contents in consummate detail. “In

each case, a large crowd, probably numbering several thousand, watched as

verdicts were read aloud,” said the description. “ee executions by firing

squad were then carried out within minutes.”In the first case, near a market

in central Hoeryong, the chief judge of the province read out his decisions

against 11 defendants, most of them charged with “illegal border crossing”

and “human trafficking,” of whom two were sentenced to death, two

received life sentences, and the remaining seven between 10- and 15-years

hard labor. In the second trial, in another district of Hoeryong city 10

kilometers to the west near a railroad station, two people were sentenced

on the same charges, one to death, the other to 10 years in prison.

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Breaking Barriers: Re Media War for North Korea

2 International Group of Human Rights Volunteers. Are Rey Telling the Truth: Is North Korea

Practicing Brutality Beyond Belief (Tokyo: Life Funds for North Korean Refugees, 2004). PDF ebook. Available at http://www.northkoreanrefugees.com.
ee LFNKR site describes the procedure with an accuracy corroborated

in interviews that the author has had in China across the Tumen River

border in the town of Tumen and also in Yanji, capital of the Yanbian

Korean Autonomous County and the major center for sub rosa activities on

behalf of refugees who have escaped to China.“Defectors from North Korea

tell us that when open trials or public executions are scheduled, the people

are mobilized by the organizations to which they belong,” according to the

LFNKR website. “Sometimes, children attend, being led by teachers.

Announcement bills are posted throughout the city, and loudspeaker cars

drive around announcing the events. All inhabitants are expected to attend

the events, although absentees are allegedly not punished.”3

After the tape was played on television stations in Japan, and to a much

lesser extent elsewhere, North Korean authorities conducted a thorough

investigation to discover who had shot it and smuggled it into China, but

were not able to find the miscreant. “North Korea is not so powerful,”

according to Kim Sang-hun, chairperson of the North Korea Human Rights

Database Center in Seoul. “eey were not able to pinpoint anyone.” Kim,

who said that he knows the person who shot the tape, and Ha Tae-keung

are convinced the number of public executions decreased as a result of media

publicity surrounding this and other reports. Also North Korean authorities

may have decided to conduct executions further from the border to keep

incriminating tapes from getting out so easily via would-be defectors and

others crossing the border, some not to escape but to do barter trade and see

relatives and contacts.

Yet another dividend of such exposés, in the view of Kim Sang-hun,

who worked for 20 years for the United Nations’ World Food Programme

before dedicating himself to efforts on behalf of defectors, is that North

Korea has consolidated its gulag system, closing down some of the infamous

camps where the worst cases of torture and executions occurred. “ee

number of PPC [political prison camps] eventually increased to a maximum

of eleven at one time,” Kim wrote at the conclusion of a lengthy report on

the camps. It is now believed that North Korean leaders closed at least three

camps near the Chinese border “in response to protests from international

human rights NGOs as well as intensified demand for an international

human rights inspection team to be fielded in North Korea.” After another

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

3 Ibid.
camp near Pyongyang “was closed for fear of detection by the international

community,” said Kim, his organization confirmed that prisoners in all

camps that were shut down were relocated or released.“It is understood that

the shutdown and relocation of some PPC in the 1990s were North Korea’s

reaction to increasing international concern.”

Nonetheless, Kim Sang-hun went on, “North Korea continues to this

day to operate five maximum-security camps and one high-security camp.”

People know a person is detained when he or she “is found to have suddenly

gone missing.” Kim through his contacts in North Korea and among

defectors in South Korea and China concluded that the five remaining

camps hold approximately 200,000 prisoners, the same number as when

there were 11 camps, a constantly fluctuating mass in which the dead and

dying are regularly replaced by new inmates. ee only difference, said Kim,

is that “changes in social attitudes of North Koreans have increased the cases

of confirmation through tips by SSA [state security agency] officers that

the missing person was, in fact, sent to the PPC.”4

Timothy Peters, whose Helping Hands Korea helps brings defectors to

South Korea from China, sees any sense of real change as misleading.

“Media attention may have caused North Korea to change locations of its

prison camps,” he said, “but relocating camps is not the same as improving

human rights!”5

Foreign media reports are not the only reason why attitudes are

evolving, however superficially. ee North Korean leadership struggle, in

which Kim Jong-il, recovering from a stroke that he suffered in August

2008, battling diabetes, on dialysis under the supervision of Chinese doctors

and specialists from elsewhere, has been distracted from day-to-day

governance. North Korea’s endemic economic problems, exacerbated by an

ill-considered attempt at currency reform in late 2009 and early 2010, have

steadily worsened. Some analysts believe the problem of feeding the

populace is approaching the level of the mid-1990s when the country

suffered from severe famine in which as many as two million people died

from starvation, malnutrition and disease.eis time, however, at least some

of North Korea’s 24 million people are assumed to be better informed, if

only slightly, as a result of media reports.

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Breaking Barriers: Re Media War for North Korea

4 Kim Sang-hun, interview, Seoul, August 2010.

5 Tim Peters, interview, Seoul, 2010.
eat factor, said Ha Tae-keung, has impelled the government to act

perhaps more quickly than before on pressing issues. As a prime example, he

cited the realization of Kim Jong-il that the reform in which the currency was

revalued by lopping off two zeroes from the exchange rate, had been a failure.

“Kim Jong-il did not watch North Korean TV,” he said. “Instead, he pays

attention to the South Korean media. We reported a lot about currency

reform.” One result was that Pak Nam-gi, the finance and planning chief of

the ruling Workers’Party,was reported to have been executed in March 2010.6

ee reports of Pak’s demise were originally carried on the websites of Ha’s

Open Radio and North Korea Reform Radio,another Seoul-based station,as

well as those of two South Korean NGOs with contacts in North Korea,Daily

NK and Good Friends, neither of which broadcast into the North but are a

regular source for North Korea-watchers. Kim Seung-chul, speaking for

North Korea Reform Radio in an interview with Re Korea Times,

summarized his view of the impact.ee Pyongyang regime “was almost forced

to allow the reopening of markets in the wake of the failed currency reform,”

he said. “eey realized that the people are not what they used to be. . . . Now

these people know how the outside world works as they can access uncensored

information by secretly tuning into radio programs or reading leaflets.”7

Websites of these and other organizations disseminate news in English

and Korean concerning what their contacts tell them is going on inside

North Korea, providing windows into the North that did not exist until

several years ago. eis kind of reporting is at the forefront of a high-tech

information explosion whose impact is not exactly clear. On the one hand,

it is far easier now than it was five or ten years ago to broadcast into North

Korea and, on the other hand, mobile telephones arm contacts with the

means to get through to the South at the risk of being caught and punished

severely. Many of the contacts along the Yalu and Tumen River borders with

China, use Chinese mobile phone services. A few are deeper inside North

Korea; some in southern regions not far from the Demilitarized Zone rely

on South Korean services. ee information they provide is not uniformly

reliable, and reports may be at variance with one another. Still, those North

Koreans who dare to tune in know much more about South Korea, the

region, and the world, and foreign audiences know much more about North

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

6 Ha Tae-keung, interview, Seoul, August 2010.

7 Re Korea Times, June 1, 2010.
Korea, than was imaginable before 2005 or 2006 when small stations in

Seoul began regular broadcasts into the North.

Open Radio competes with three other Seoul-based stations, Radio

Free Chosun, North Korea Reform Radio, and Free North Korea Radio.

eey are all quite different. Open Radio broadcasts four hours daily into

North Korea, two hours on shortwave, one on AM and the fourth on FM;

Radio Free Chosun broadcasts three hours each day, all shortwave; North

Korea Reform Radio broadcasts one hour daily, shortwave; Free North

Korea Radio at one stage was broadcasting five hours a day on three

shortwave bands. Open Radio offers soap operas and a fictionalized serial

that makes much of a potential rivalry between Kim Jong-eun, Kim Jongil’s third son and heir presumptive, and Jang Song-thaek, Kim Jong-il’s

brother-in-law, who may have visions of ruling as a regent, a power behind

the throne, after Kim Jong-il leaves the scene.

Radio Free Chosun, a cooperative operated by activists and defectors,

and North Korea Reform Radio and Free North Korea Radio, owned by

defectors, are both regarded as more fiercely political than Open Radio.

“Stations such as Free North Korea Radio, Radio Free Chosun, Open Radio

North Korea and North Korea Reform Radio are the best way to open a

breach in Pyongyang’s mind-destroying propaganda,” said Reporters

Without Borders in a ceremony in November 2009 at which Kim Seongmin, founder of Free North Korea Radio, who defected to the South in

1996, won a prize from the anticommunist Taiwan Foundation for

Democracy for “courageous defiance” of the North Korean regime.8

eese stations, distinctive and determined as they are, face different and

stronger competition from two U.S. government networks, Voice of

America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA). eese focus on North Korea

with mounting intensity as a dividend of the North Korea Human Rights

Act passed by Congress in 2004 that authorized funding for more

programming and more people, mostly Koreans. VOA, broadcasting since

1942, had been slow to penetrate the obstacles to reaching listeners in North

Korea. Its Korean service expanded by a half hour from three hours a day

in 2006 and in 2007 to five hours a day on four bands, two shortwave and

two medium wave. ee number of Koreans on the payroll rose from 20 to

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Breaking Barriers: Re Media War for North Korea

8 Reporters Without Borders, “Call for more international support for exile radios after station

director wins award,” November 6, 2009, http://en.rsf.org/north-korea-call-for-more-international06-11-2009,34926.
40 in Washington and several more in a newly opened office in Seoul next

to the bureau of the American correspondent responsible for filing for VOA

in English.9 In its broadcasts for North Korean listeners, VOA hewed to

the factual, dry analytical tone of its reporting in other languages, notably

English, for a global audience outside the United States, where it is banned

from broadcasting by congressional fiat.

Radio Free Asia, having begun broadcasting to North Korea in 1997,

increased broadcast time to five hours a day on eight bands, four shortwave

and four medium wave, and opened a bureau in Seoul almost in tandem

with VOA. From the outset, however, RFA has differed from VOA in the

sometimes outraged tone of its reports and commentary, often picking upon

scandals, human rights violations, and other wrongdoing in a muckraking

style.ee service signaled its crusading approach in a statement of purpose

that noted that Freedom House in New York “ranks North Korea dead last

in its annual press freedom index and gives it the lowest possible rating for

both political rights and civil liberties and Reporters Without Borders

ranked the dictatorship 174 out of 175 in their 2009 Media Freedom Index.”

ee statement cited a U.S. State Department human rights report

describing North Korea as “a dictatorship under the absolute rule of Kim

Jong-il” where “members of the security forces have committed numerous

serious human rights abuses”including “extrajudicial killings, disappearances

and arbitrary detention” while political prisoners were consigned to “harsh

and life-threatening prison conditions” that included “forced abortions and

infanticide.”10

eat said, RFA aspires to “offer a faint glimmer of the outside world that

is growing somewhat brighter as more citizens take the risk to reset their fixed

radios to stations beyond the DPRK,” despite the omnipresent fear of 10-

year jail terms said to be “common for accessing foreign media.” RFA is

especially proud of a six-part series produced in 2009 exposing the plight of

North Korean refugees in China and “the harsh conditions facing child

defectors and the human trafficking of North Korean girls and women.”RFA

received a David Burke Distinguished Journalism Award from the

Broadcasting Board of Governors for a series produced in 2006 in which a

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

9 VOA, “Voice of America to Expand Korean Service,” press release, December 6, 2006; Kyodo,

“FOCUS: Voice of America boosting programs targeted at N. Korea,” Washington, November 30,

2009.

10 Radio Free Asia, “Radio Free Asia’s Korea Operations,” March 2010.
defector working for RFA returned to China and “interviewed 14 North

Korean women who had fallen victim to criminal gangs of traffickers on both

sides of the border.”ee station had no doubt someone in a high position was

listening. Kim Jong-il, it alleged, had “fired a number of officials after RFA

exclusively reported on corruption involving the North Korean agency that

handles humanitarian aid and South Korean investment in the North,”

though how RFA knew that Kim had done the firing was not revealed.11

Operators of the small stations take pride in their independence and

their feisty desire to get through to their brethren in the North on their own

terms rather than as mouthpieces for large government-owned

organizations.eey too, however, depend on American funding for survival.

ee prime conduits have been the State Department and the National

Endowment for Democracy (NED). ee endowment calls itself a “private

non-profit foundation” but is “funded largely by the U.S. Congress,” was

“created jointly by Republicans and Democrats,”and is “governed by a board

balanced between both parties”while enjoying “congressional support across

the political spectrum.”12 NED makes a point of transparency, listing

precisely how much it gives each year to each beneficiary. ee figures for

2009 included $150,000 each for Free North Korea Radio, Open Radio for

North Korea, and Radio Free Chosun and $175,000 for NK

Communications to produce North Korea Reform Radio.13

In keeping with its “belief that freedom is a universal human aspiration

that can be realized through the development of democratic institutions,

procedures, and values,” NED definitely has a monopoly on encouraging

the non-governmental flow of information into North Korea. Daily NK

received $145,000; Kim Sang-hun’s Database Center, $80,000; and

Imjingang Publishing, publisher of Imjingang, a quarterly journal named

for the Imjin River that flows from North to South Korea to the Yellow

Sea, garnered $85,000 “for North Korean citizens to share information and

opinions about North Korean culture, economics, politics, and other

developments.”14ee magazine features reports by North Koreans who have

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Breaking Barriers: Re Media War for North Korea

11 Ibid.

12 National Endowment for Democracy, “About NED,” www.ned.org.

13 National Endowment for Democracy, “Active North Korea-Related Projects,” Washington,

March 2010.

14 Ibid. Imjingang broke off in 2009 from its former Japanese partner, Rimjingang, based in Osaka,

which also publishes articles about North Korean issues. Rimjingang is not funded by NED.
smuggled themselves, and their material, out of the country. Given the

funding for all these organizations, they’re not going to bite the hands that

are feeding them; most of them also get funding, not specifically listed but

all told about $1 million a year, from the State Department. (Kim Sanghun denies the CIA is pitching in. “Basically,” he said, “the CIA is not

interested in human rights in North Korea.”15)

How effective is the media blitzkrieg? For a grant of another $50,000,

InterMedia Survey Institute, a research firm located near NED’s offices in

Washington, surveyed 250 refugees and “legal travelers” from North Korea

in the Yanbian region between April 15 and August 31, 2009. Despite

“expertise” drawn from former staffers of VOA and Radio Free

Europe/Radio Liberty, another U.S. government network, the results were

so vague as to raise doubts about the survey’s validity. “eis year’s survey

establishes that, even without strict media access selection criteria, North

Korean refugees are listening to independent broadcasts inside North

Korea,” said its slickly packaged report, acknowledging the majority of

respondents were from right across the Tumen River. “Starved for

information,” it went on, “North Koreans are not very discriminating

content consumers and seem to have very little brand preference” while

“likely to listen to whatever broadcast they can receive most clearly.”16

One weakness of the survey lies in the use of phrases such as “had access

to”—whether to a TV, a cassette with radio, or a simple radio or a cell phone

was not clear. “Access” could mean sharing with a friend or neighbor or

anywhere else beyond the purview of the law. ee survey found what was

well known, that “advanced technology is now much more common in

North Korea than ever before,”that “many North Koreans are now watching

VCD and DVDs, including many from South Korea,” and that “many

defectors to China are able to keep in touch with those inside North Korea

via cell phones.”17

How many people actually are tuning in, for how long and how often,

has never been certain despite extravagant claims. VOA in a press release

said that “a U.S. private research agency estimates that 36 percent of North

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

15 Kim Sang-hun, interview, Seoul, August 2010.

16 Inter-Media, “International Broadcasting in North Korea: North Korea Refugee/Traveler Survey

Report,” Washington, April-August 2009, 5–6.

17 Ibid., 4–5.
Koreans listen to its programmes at least once a week,”but did not name the

agency or the basis for the estimate.18 Marcus Noland of the Peterson

Institute found that 19 percent of 1,300 North Koreans polled in China

and 300 in South Korea wanted to go to the U.S. despite “lifelong

unrelenting exposure to anti-U.S. propaganda”and surmised that was due to

RFA and others “gradually penetrating North Korea.”19 eere is, however,

no way to verify this roseate analysis. Nor is it known exactly how or just

where the respondents were selected, who interviewed them, and under

what conditions. Kim Sang-hun, after years of meeting defectors, attributes

desires to go to the United States to stories heard when they got out of

North Korea about how it was “the richest country in the world.”eat poll,

he said, showed “how blind and confused they are.”20

Actually, the most listened-to “foreign” radio station in North Korea has

long been an offshoot of the South Korean government, KBS, the Korean

Broadcasting System. ee station’s “global” broadcasts have been targeting

North Koreans as well as the large Korean-Chinese community in the Yanbian

region of China’s Jilin Province and Koreans living in Russia for more than 50

years.Its influence,however,receded after President Kim Dae-jung,propound177

Breaking Barriers: Re Media War for North Korea

18 VOA, press release, December 6, 2006.

19 Agence France Presse, April 30, 2009, reporting on survey released on April 29, 2009. RFA also

cited Marcus Noland’s report in “Radio Free Asia’s Korea Operations,” March 2010.

20 Kim Sang-hun, interview, Seoul, August 2010.

Figure 8.1: Media Access in North Korea

Inter-Media,“North Korean Refugee/Traveler Survey Report, April-August, 2009,”5. (ee graphic

does not reveal what percent of radios or TV sets pick up broadcasts from outside North Korea.)
ing his Sunshine Policy of reconciliation, had KBS tone down its broadcasts

after his inauguration in February 1998 to a five-year term as president. Some

KBS broadcasts stopped altogether under the inter-Korean agreement reached

between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il at their June 2000 summit in

Pyongyang.Restraints on its broadcasts into North Korea were lifted after the

sinking of the South Korean navy corvette Cheonan by a torpedo fired by a

North Korean midget submarine on March 26, 2010.ee allure of traditional

Korean drama and popular songs,in addition to informational programs about

development in booming South Korea, guarantee a clandestine audience.

Defectors also report sharing CDs of popular programs from the South.

In any case, the real listenership of all these stations is debatable. ee

Ministry of Unification, in one of the surveys that defectors—most often

from China or a Southeast Asian nation to which they make their way from

China—complete after arriving in South Korea, has found the number of

listeners to be quite small. ee numbers reported by independent surveys

include those who listened to a station briefly, once or twice. Some defectors

are suspected, moreover, of seeing it to their advantage to exaggerate on

whether or how often they heard foreign broadcasts. Defectors report having

received in some cases enormous sums for “interviews,” between 200,000

and 300,000 won, that is, nearly $200 to $300, and gifts of 100,000 won,

$90, are common. “eey know what kind of stories interest interviewers,”

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

Figure 8.2: What Information Do You Expect to Obtain from International Radio?

Inter-Media, “North Korean Refugee/Traveler Survey Report, April-August, 2009,” 7. (ee

graphic does not give actual numbers of listeners, how often they listened or to what stations.)
said a South Korean source. How could they not know how to respond

when the questions are as simplistic as, “Do you think your human rights

were violated?” and, “Have you ever seen a public execution?” Claims of

twenty percent listenership are “high,”said one official; still, he believes they

had “significant” influence. “Once a (potential) defector listens to a

broadcast,” he said, “he desires the world outside of North Korea.”21

In attempting to broadcast to North Korea, however, South Korean

stations face one obstacle that would seem improbable considering the NorthSouth confrontation.eey all must spend 90 percent of their funding simply

on buying the rights to use viable frequencies from foreign companies.“eat’s

because South Korea does not allow them to have shortwave frequencies,”

said the official. “eey buy frequencies from China, Mongolia, and other

nations. Regulation on these matters is less strict in China and Mongolia.

Frequencies must be allocated.eese stations are so small,and they don’t have

enough money. It costs between five billion and 10 billion won (nearly five

million to 10 million dollars) to buy the frequencies.” South Korean

authorities are concerned about possible conflicts with major South Korean

broadcasters. “eere might be serious confusion,” he said. “It is problematic.

We have discussed with government agencies. Right now it is impossible.”

ee government-run KBS carries broadcasts on medium-wave, shortwave,

and AM frequencies into North Korea, he explained, and RFA is able to use

a frequency previously allocated to KBS.22

Access to funding assures the biggest audiences tune in to RFA and VOA,

for which the Broadcasting Board of Governors, an independent U.S. federal

agency charged with all government-funded international broadcasting,

allocated $8.5 million in the 2010 fiscal year and $7.8 million the year before.

eose figures are many times the $1 million that the State Department

provided in 2010 for South Korean “programs to promote media freedom in

North Korea (including, but not limited to, broadcasting).”23

As a result, RFA and VOA probably claim 80 percent of the listeners

in North Korea, meaning those who might listen as much as two or three

time a week for 10 to 20 minutes each time. ee duration of listening time

is limited not just by the fear of discovery. Equally important, since virtually

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Breaking Barriers: Re Media War for North Korea

21 Interview with Ministry of Unification official, Seoul, August 2010. ee official who gave the

interview on a background basis asked to remain anonymous.

22 Ibid.

23 U.S. Embassy, Seoul, provided these figures, October 5, 2010, in response to the author’s query.
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all radios run on batteries in a country in which plug-in sockets for

electricity are largely nonexistent, people must scrounge for batteries that are

costly and hard to find. More often than not, they are smuggled in from

China, along with cheap shortwave radios, and sold on the black markets

that do business, sometimes quite openly, throughout the country.

ee problems of the small stations, moreover, are compounded by

allegations of financial misdeeds. Funding for Free North Korea Radio was

suspended by both the State Department and NED in an accounting

scandal that the station’s defenders, including influential American activists,

say resulted from misunderstandings and ill-founded gossip, and the station

had to broadcast over the internet with a very simple home page. At the

same time, the station faced threats made by unidentified individuals against

the owner of the building where it had its office and studio.24

“eere are many other scandals about the other three stations,” said a

South Korean official. Rumors persist that some bosses enriched

themselves while dedicated defectors who worked for them got by on

subsistence wages.25

eere is no doubt, though, that all these stations have one special core

listenership: North Korean monitors hanging on their every word.

Pyongyang’s Korean Central News Agency repeatedly denounces RFA and

VOA in verbiage as flattering in a reverse manner from any rave reviews for

a book or show. North Korean rhetoricians have come to view RFA with its

exposé-type reporting as more odious than the bland VOA. Both, however,

have been bestowed with the ultimate accolade, that of “reptile” media, a

term not used to describe South Korean stations. After funds for RFA and

VOA increased under the North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004, KCNA

on January 2, 2008, reported “the U.S. intensified smear broadcasting” as

“part of its vicious moves to tarnish the image of the DPRK in the

international arena and pull down the socialist system in the DPRK

centered on the popular masses.” ee article also charged “the U.S. has

craftily worked hard to introduce transistor radios, CDs of unsavory

contents, and other publications through various channels into the DPRK

24 A State Department official and NED confirmed suspension of funding for Free North Korea

Radio. A South Korean official, who did not want to be identified, reported the threats.

25 A South Korean official cited the scandals. An anonymous source at a non-governmental

organization cited other anomalies.
in a bid to cause ideological and political vacillation, disintegration, and

degeneration among the people in the DPRK and social disorder.”26

ee Seoul-based stations also come in for their share of vituperation.

After the inauguration of the conservative Lee Myung-bak as South Korea’s

president in February 2008, the North’s Central Committee of the

Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland blasted the

South’s “right-wing conservatives”for having “gathered riffraff to set up such

smear broadcastings as ‘broadcasting for the north,’‘missionary broadcasting

for the north,’and ‘broadcasting for reform in the north’”as “a shock brigade

in the campaign against the DPRK.”RFA and VOA,“speaking for the U.S.

right-wing conservatives, are joining in,” said the tirade, “instigating the

south [sic] Korean conservatives to do so.” And the rhetoric did not omit

Japan, vowing to “never overlook such provocative smear broadcasting

launched by the south Korean conservative ruling quarters and the U.S. and

Japanese reactionaries to dare to defame the destiny of the DPRK.”27

North Korean protests are welcomed by yet another potential source of

information beyond North Korea’s borders, that of defectors whose specialty

is to send balloons over the North dropping leaflets printed on waterproof

sheets of plastic with stories about the North’s ruling Kim dynasty, Kim Jongil’s health, scandals among relatives, their luxurious lifestyle, human rights

abuses, the North’s true role in the Korean War, and other titillating tidbits.

Lee Min-bok, a self-styled “agricultural expert” who claimed to have once

been a member of the Science Academy of the DPRK, has led one of three

groups launching the balloons. In October 2008, Lee—a defector who had

been captured, imprisoned, released, and defected again—was pondering the

balloons’ impact and considering quitting the project when North Korea

called for talks with South Korean officials at the truce village of Panmunjom

to protest the balloon-casts. After the unification ministry asked Lee and

other balloonists to halt the launches, he renewed his campaign with

contributions from donors.28

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Breaking Barriers: Re Media War for North Korea

26 Korean Central News Agency, “U.S. Criminal Smear Campaign against DPRK Disclosed,”

Pyongyang, January 2, 2008.

27 Korean Central News Agency, “Anti-DPRK Smear Broadcasting Campaign Accused,”

Pyongyang, March 16, 2008.

28 Donald Kirk, “North Korea hits back at balloon activism from South,” Christian Science Monitor,

http://www.csmonitor.com, November 13, 2008; Kirk, “Will North Korea cut a nuclear deal before

Obama arrives?”Christian Science Monitor, December 9, 2008.
Lee Min-bok “was reinvigorated,”said Kim Sang-hun.“eat angry protest

from North Korea gave him fresh strength.”A devout Christian who utters a

fervent prayer every time he and a cohort let go the string by which they cling

to each balloon, Lee described his campaign to me as “psychological warfare”

for which he had to write new leaflets every week. “We explain the high

standard of living in South Korea, and we bring religious messages,”he said.

One rainy afternoon in late November 2008, when the wind was blowing

south to north across the ruins of a temple that had been an interrogation

center for North Koreans in mountainous Chorwon district, which had been

bloodied in some of the Korean War’s worst battles,Lee launched 10 balloons

bearing 100,000 leaflets. Mingled with the leaflets were South Korean candy

bar wrappers and batteries for short-wave radios.ee wrappers were to confuse

North Korean soldiers and police who might order time-wasting searches for

the “traitors” receiving candy smuggled in from the South.ee batteries were

to enable people to tune in to South Korean broadcasts. Each balloon had an

instrument that Lee calibrated on the basis of computerized readings of wind

currents to fly a specific distance and direction before letting its load of leaflets

flutter down to the target area. ee seriousness of government pleas to stop

the balloon-casts was belied by the presence of two genial men in sport clothes,

either policemen or intelligence operatives, watching discreetly from an

unmarked SUV across the parking lot. eey said they were there “for safety.”

So anxious were they to carry out their task properly that they followed Lee’s

van into Seoul before waving farewells and disappearing.29

Balloon-casts, however, are only possible for half a year, generally from

June through November, when favorable winds blow from south to north.

And meteorological checks notwithstanding, most of the leaflets somehow

land fairly near the demilitarized one, falling into the hands of North

Korean soldiers rather than civilians. Few ordinary people see them,

according to a South Korean official, and fewer still want to pick them up

after having heard North Korean propaganda reports that they are actually

poisonous to the touch. North Korean soldiers might also be susceptible to

propaganda, however, after years of hardship and privation. North Korean

authorities have to be sensitive to the impact on troops who might want to

know more about the regime they are defending.30

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

29 Donald Kirk, “A change of wind over North Korea,” Asia Times, December 6, 2008. ee author

witnessed the balloon launch described in the article.

30 A South Korean official offered this anonymous view of the impact of balloon-casts.
ee real impact of the leaflet drops is if anything more difficult to assess

than that of the radio programs. Anecdotal evidence has been quite

haphazard. After he was picked up by Chinese police following his first

escape from North Korea 1990 and returned to North Korea, Lee Min-bok

encountered a prisoner in his cell in a detention center for defectors who had

gone to China after reading a leaflet dropped by a balloon. ee man had

evidently picked up the leaflet just above the Demilitarized Zone. Lee said

the prisoner had “walked hundreds of kilometers” before crossing into

China,“where he was arrested and repatriated back to North Korea against

his will.” Kim Sang-hun noted that one defector, formerly “a high-ranking

senior member” in the North, had told him he decided to defect “when he

saw a cartoon on a leaflet from a balloon.”ee cartoon was quite graphic. It

showed a woman carrying food on her head walking next to a Chinese

holding a knife. ee caption had him asking the woman, “Are you going to

give me your food or your body?” to which the woman answered, “You can

have my body.”31

Lee Min-bok has another personal reason besides his balloon-casts for

believing in media exposure. He ascribed his release in February 1991 after

three months’ detention to the impact of publicity surrounding reports by

Amnesty International and others. “eere was an internal instruction from

Pyongyang, which I overheard from conversations among interrogators, that

North Korea had recently told the international community that there are

no political prisoners in North Korea,”he said in an account for Kim Sanghun. As a result, authorities were told,“Do not produce too many prisoners”

and “keep the number of prisoners to a minimum by sending the less serious

offenders to local civil groups for guidance and supervision.” It was that

word, on top of his previous record as “a recognized scientist and a devoted

supporter of the party,” he said, that got him his release after having

“withstood beatings”while telling interrogators “my objective was scientific

observation in the interest of the state.”He defected again four months later,

in June 1991, first to China, then a year later to Russia and finally, in May

1994, to the office of the UN High Commission for Refugees in Moscow,

which got him to South Korea in 1995 through the International

Committee of the Red Cross.32

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Breaking Barriers: Re Media War for North Korea

31 Kim Sang-hun, interview, Seoul, August 2010.

32 Lee Min-bok, quoted by Kim Sang-hun, interview, August 2010.
Rajiv Narayan, in charge of investigations in Northeast Asia for

Amnesty International in London, is guardedly hopeful despite terrible

frustrations: “Most people we get to interview in South Korea or in China

are from the border provinces in North Korea.” Still, he said, “that is

gradually changing” as a result of a certain freedom of movement

engendered by “years of food crisis and increased awareness among North

Koreans that to survive they have to depend on movement and the private

markets.” Another problem, however, is “there are so few senior officials

from North Korea to interview or willing to testify so we rarely get a

view/understanding into the working of the policy-making process.”Along

with “lack of access,” said Narayan, “is the difficulty of actually crosschecking episodes of human rights violations.” Sources are “never in North

Korea but outside,” and there are “rarely two sources to cross-check.” And

“on the rare occasions when we do get footage of human rights violations

they lack further details such as where and when they took place, who were

the victims, who were the perpetrators” and, above all, “is the footage

credible?” Yes, he said, “I must admit gradually there is more information

available, but the above questions on credible, verifiable information,

especially in the area of human rights, remain.”33

Kay Seok, the Korean researcher for Human Rights Watch, is not sure

how much is changing. She doubts if many North Koreans have heard

foreign broadcasts or, if they have, that they have had much impact. She

believes most balloon leaflets fall into the hands of soldiers near the

Demilitarized Zone. She views the record on imprisonment and torture as

fluctuating, not improving.“North Korea in recent years has even increased

punishment for defectors,” she said. Nor does Seok see diplomatic pressure

as successful. In an article for the Huffington Post, she said the UN Human

Rights Council in Geneva in March 2010 had concluded its “universal

periodic review,” conducted every four years for each member country, of

North Korea’s human rights record.ee North Korean ambassador, besieged

for comment by other ambassadors, said only that he had “taken note”of the

report, Seok wrote, but a North Korean diplomat stated that his government

“categorically rejects” the mandate of the UN special rapporteur on human

rights in North Korea as “a despicable, sinister back-door approach” and “a

political plot”against his government.“International efforts to engage North

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

33 Rajiv Narayan, e-mail message to author, August 3, 2010.
Korea on human rights have made strides in raising awareness and building

pressure,” said Seok, “but there is still a long way to go to achieve

fundamental change.”34

For all the isolated successes, by any standard the war waged by the

media—mainly via broadcasts, websites, and leaflets—has had mixed results.

“eere’s no doubt that attacking North Korea on the grounds of human

rights violations has had an impact,”said Kim Sang-hun, but only to compel

authorities to cover up abuses, not to begin to eliminate them. As an

example, he pointed to construction in Pyongyang about 20 years ago of

two churches, one Protestant, the other Catholic.“eese churches are empty

except when foreign preachers come,” he said. On those occasions about

150 people are given orientations on how to behave in a church service. If

any of them seem to believe in the prayers they are repeating, they are

admonished and, if they go on attempting to practice Christianity, face the

same torture, banishment to a gulag, and possible execution as do those

caught with Bibles and holding secret services.35

Tom Coyner, a business consultant with a long background in South

Korea, believes that “most of the media comment on North Korean human

rights”reflects “outside perspectives and indeed values sets.”Much as North

Koreans might dislike “curtailment of daily freedoms under their local

cadre,”Coyner wondered how many were “at all aware or concerned with the

fundamental concept of ‘human rights.’”Any attempt “to tell North Koreans

that they lack basic human rights could be viewed as a frontal attack on the

core values—mythical or real—of their society.” For starters, “one would

have to patiently explain just what are human rights and why most people

in other nations demand them”— “a most perplexing or inflammatory

exercise.” Basically, Coyner distrusted “the relevance of what the Western

media may be broadcasting vis-à-vis the daily concerns of most North

Koreans.”36

ee anger of North Korean authorities over criticism on human rights,

however, has convinced activists of the need for unremitting pressure. eey

are “highly sensitive to international media coverage,” said Michael Breen,

a Seoul-based writer and consultant who has visited North Korea a number

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Breaking Barriers: Re Media War for North Korea

34 Kay Seok, “Why We Need to Keep the Spotlight on North Korea,” Huffington Post, March 2010.

35 Kim Sang-hun, interview, Seoul, August 2010.

36 Tom Coyner, e-mail message to author, August 4, 2010.
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of times and met Kim Il-sung with a delegation of foreign journalists shortly

before he died in July 1994. “Critical stories in the South Korean media

caused problems for the rapprochement policy of Kim Dae-jung.

Sometimes, North Koreans working on visits that were internally sensitive

warned overseas counterparts that any media coverage prior to a visit would

result in cancellation.” Author of a book on Kim Jong-il, Breen believes

pressure on human rights abuses has had a certain qualified success. “In the

early 1990s when they anticipated imminent ties with the United States

and, with it, visits by U.S. congressmen thumping the table about human

rights, justice officials in Pyongyang reviewed the possibility of ending the

death penalty,” he said. “ee purpose would be to have something over the

U.S.,” Breen noted, but Kim Il-sung’s death intervened. In any case, there

has been no other report of North Korea ever considering giving up

executions.37

Norbert Vollertsen, a German doctor who spent 18 months in North

Korea before his expulsion in early 2001 for revealing the ills of the medical

system, credits media reports with having had some effect, albeit unproven,

on the lives of those caught up in the gulag system. “Yes, I still think media

works when it comes to get a picture about the bad situation in North

Korea,” said Vollertsen. “I learned from some North Korean refugees the

situation in some gulags is improving because the North Koreans know

about this watching media eye.” In Pyongyang, “I was very often asked by

high-ranking officials about the public view in Germany, about their picture

in TV, newspapers, etc.” For Vollertsen, the reason for such concern was

clear: “eey do not want to lose their face in the media world.eey are very

concerned about their dignity, their pride about Korean culture, ‘real

socialism,’ etc. And their only luck so far is that there was not so much

interest in tiny North Korea.”38

37 Michael Breen, e-mail message to author, August 5, 2010.

38 Norbert Vollertsen, e-mail message to author, August 3, 2010.


The “Faminist” State

by George Alan Hutchinson

Over the past two decades, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

(DPRK)—North Korea—has faltered at effectively feeding its population.

eis inefficacy was dramatically manifested during the 1990s when millions

suffered and hundreds of thousands died during a protracted famine. ee

North Korean government refers stoically to the 1990s famine as the

“Arduous March,” and tends to rationalize its cause by placing primary

blame on natural disasters.1 While it is true that the country suffered due to

seasonal flooding during the period—something not out of the ordinary

considering the intense period of annual rainfall (known as Chang-ma) on

the Korean Peninsula—events with far greater implications began unfolding

in 1989 that would ultimately expose North Korea’s fouled system of

providing food to its population.ee DPRK declared an end to the Arduous

March in 2000 but food shortages have persisted. A cycle of events,

strikingly similar to those which started in 1989, has begun to unfold since

2005, and nation appears to be, yet again, hurtling headlong into another

disastrous famine. Both periods—one beginning in 1989 and the other in

2005—are characterized by sharp increases in international isolation,

precarious succession politics, and overt primacy of the military.

Shaping of the 1990s Famine

For North Korea, the year 1989 marked an epochal plunge into the

stark realities of the 1990s. Low on money and credit, the country was

caught flat-footed when communism began collapsing that year. Many

socialist countries, freed suddenly from the iron grip of the Soviet Union,

sprinted toward market economies. Conversely, the DPRK stood still.

Dumbfounded by the dramatic swirl of change, the country looked on as the

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Chapter 9

1 See “DPR Korea FAQ,” Official Webpage of ee Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,

http://www.korea-dpr.com/forum/?page_id=39.
system of barter and subsidies it had customarily used to obtain food, fuel,

and fertilizer slowly dissolved. As factories went idle, harvest yields declined,

and people began to starve, North Korea rapidly slid into crisis.een, on the

heels of communism’s collapse, Kim Il-sung died in 1994 and a prolonged

succession of power ensued. Although all the mechanisms were in place for

Kim Jong-il to take the dynastic reins immediately following his father’s

death, it took longer than three years for him to gain full authority as the

DPRK’s leader. It is during this fuzzy period of governance transition that

the population may have suffered the most due to chronic food shortages.

By the time he was fully positioned, Kim Jong-il had clearly identified the

military—an entity with an enormous appetite for food and fuel—as his

country’s top priority for care and feeding. ee Songun (military first)

ideology officially recognized the needs of the military as the country’s most

pressing requirement. Songun created crass justification to allocate vast

resources to the military while other sectors of the country were atrophying.

Shaping of North Korea’s Second Famine

beginning in 2005

Similar to the cycle that started in 1989, the period beginning in 2005

is characterized by increased international isolation, elevated status of the

military, and the murkiness associated with North Korean political

succession. However, unlike 1989, when the nation failed to adapt to a world

shifting under its feet, it is North Korea that has systematically chosen to

shift away from the world since 2005.

In an effort to stem the first famine, the United Nations (UN) World

Food Program (WFP) had operated inside the DPRK since 1995,

delivering food and attempting, to the extent it could, to ensure it was going

where it was intended to go. Efforts by the WFP and other

nongovernmental organizations (NGO) were pivotal in eventually making

headway against the effects of the famine, and food assistance operations

continued there. By 2005, as a result of negotiating, the WFP had increased

its footprint, and several staff members were operating out of offices within

the country to help monitor food delivery throughout the DPRK. Because

of this sizable foreign presence, Pyongyang was suspicious and

uncomfortable. eus, in August 2005, with signs of a bumper harvest on

the horizon, North Korea recognized an opportunity to be rid of the

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula
“intrusive” WFP and ordered the program to shut down. At the time, in

addition to the assistance from the WFP, unconditional food aid had been

streaming in from China and South Korea, virtually unmonitored.eis gave

the North added confidence in its decision to shut down the WFP, and the

country reverted to its previously failed public distribution system. From

this point on, the DPRK has operated within increasingly thin food supply

margins, employing on-again, off-again negotiations with the broader

international donor community as it deals with its chronic food shortages.

As a result, the international community’s fatigue and antipathy toward

North Korea has grown.

Since 2005, the world has watched with a mixture of repugnance and

bafflement as North Korea scrambles to feed its people, largely through

generous international offerings, while it simultaneously pursues an

aggressive and expensive agenda to develop nuclear weapons, ballistic

missiles, and other asymmetric military capabilities. ee North has

systematically driven a wedge between itself and most of the international

community through its nuclear tests, missile launches, and provocative use

of its military. Sanction after sanction, through its own rogue behavior, the

North has further isolated itself from the international community, the

donor source for WFP food aid. As greater primacy is given to the military

and speculation regarding the health of Kim Jong-il increases, large

questions loom over how the country would handle another power

succession. A cloud of uncertainty is accompanying widespread speculation

that Kim is preparing to transfer power to his son. If true, the succession

could prove to be intriguing, as it lacks the trappings of the well-orchestrated

path previously created for Kim to succeed his father.

As this parallel cycle of events unfolds, North Korea continues to

experience catastrophic floods. Particularly devastating floods occurred in

2006, 2007, and 2010.2 But floods are not the primary cause of the country’s

food shortages.ee nation’s floods are highly predictable events that, due to

poor policy and fruitless agronomic planning, have only served to exacerbate

and call attention to the country’s ongoing food shortages.

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Re “Faminist” State

2 See “North Korea hit by severe floods, state media reports,” BBC News, Asia Pacific,

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-10813197.
Pre-built Framework for Disaster—

Bad Agronomics and Big Debt

ee WFP ascribes the following reasons for North Korea’s food

shortage plight: “[A] lack of arable land, poor soil management, insufficient

water reservoirs to combat drought, shortages of fuel and fertilizer, outdated

economic, transport, and information infrastructure, and a general

vulnerability to natural disasters.”3 While this is a reasonable

characterization, further clarification is needed. In actuality, as a percentage

of its total land area, the North has a fair amount of arable land—about the

same as the United Kingdom.4 In fact, it has more arable land (hectares per

person) than either South Korea or China.5 eus, more information is

required to understand why the country is susceptible to shortages of food.

ee process of confiscating privately owned land in North Korea began

in 1946 with the Land Reform Act. From 1954–58, the government

implemented a phased collectivization of land resulting in cooperative farms

at the village level. Seeking to achieve greater output, the village cooperatives

were merged to create a single collective made up of about 300 households

at the Ri (district) administrative level. eis created roughly 3,000

cooperative farms throughout the country. Farm machinery was required in

order to operate these larger farms effectively. In turn, fuel and spare parts

were needed for the machines to work effectively. To distribute the

agricultural products being cultivated, a rationing system was introduced.

eis system, which began as early as 1946, eventually grew into the Public

Distribution System (PDS) which allocated food on a gram-per-day, perperson basis according to occupation. Food collected from the cooperative

farms went into the PDS, which did not apply to the farm workers. Rather,

as part of the collective farm system, families living on the cooperatives were

allotted about 100 square meters of land to use for their private cultivation

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

3 See “Countries: Korea, Democratic People’s Republic (DPRK), World Food Programme,

http://www.wfp.org/countries/korea-democratic-peoples-republic-dprk.

4 See “Agricultural Statistics,” NationMaster.com, http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/agr_ara_

lan_of_lan_are-agriculture-arable-land-of-area.

5 See “Arable Land (Hectares per person),” Trading Economics, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/

north-korea/arable-land-hectares-per-person-wb-data.html, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/

south-korea/arable-land-hectares-per-person-wb-data.html, and http://www.tradingeconomics.com/

china/arable-land-hectares-per-person-wb-data.html. For a similar point regarding North Korea’s

arable land, see John Feffer, “North Korea and the Politics of Famine Part 1: Failure in the Fields,”

Asia Times Online, September 22, 2006, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/HI22Dg01.html.
“kitchen gardens.” Productivity on these private plots tended to be three to

five times higher than on the farms, probably because farmers were

motivated to care more for them, and frequently skimmed fertilizers and

pesticides from the cooperatives for use on them.6

By the 1960s, North Korea wasn’t satisfied with domestic yields so

farmers were ordered to clear mountain slopes of trees in favor of planting

corn. eis was a temporary answer to increased grain production; but

harvesting, transporting and distributing the corn required even more

machines and fuel. Also, large-scale cultivation of corn helped deplete the

soil of nutrients, rendering it infertile unless additional fertilizer was used.

ee most damaging aspect of this policy was that as the trees were cleared,

the annual heavy rains invariably caused landslides that would wash away

the crops and then blanket lowlands with silt and gravel.7

Approximately 75 percent of North Korea’s total annual precipitation

occurs during Chang-ma, the rainy season during July and August. Because

of this compressed period of heavy rainfall, water had to be stored and then

distributed to irrigate crops throughout the year.To reach all of the collective

farms, the North had to construct 40,000 kilometers of canals along with

thousands of reservoirs and pumping stations. An extensive irrigation

network system such as this only works if it is maintained and has sufficient

spares and energy input. Other essential elements required for ensuring

acceptable grain yields include fertilizer and pesticides, the production of

which is energy intensive.8 eus, for the North’s energy-intensive

agricultural system to be sustainable, it would need access to vital

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Re “Faminist” State

6 See Woon-Keun Kim, “ee Agricultural Situation of North Korea,” Food and Fertilizer

Technology Center for the Asian and Pacific Region, September 1, 1999, http://www.agnet.org/

library/eb/475/; Jaewoong Yoo, “Hunger in North Korea: a Challenge for Global Peace,” ee

World Food Prize, http://www.worldfoodprize.org/documents/filelibrary/images/youth_programs/

research_papers/2009_papers/CharterSchoolofDE_JYoo_EEAC1ECC35512.pdf; and “Starved of

Rights: Human Rights and the Food Crisis in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North

Korea),” Amnesty International, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA24/003/2004/en/

f5daaf5b-d645-11dd-ab95-a13b602c0642/asa240032004en.pdf.

7 See Woon-Keun Kim, “ee Agricultural Situation of North Korea,” Hong Soon-jick,

“Environmental Pollution in North Korea: Another South Korean Burden?,” Institute for East

Asian Studies, Summer 1999, http://www.ieas.or.kr/vol11_2/hongsoonjik.htm.

8 See Woon-Keun Kim, “ee Agricultural Situation of North Korea,” and Jaewoong Yoo, “Hunger

in North Korea,” “(North Korean) Agriculture,” Country Studies US, http://countrystudies.us/

north-korea/49.htm.
resources—energy supplies, chemicals, fertilizers, pesticides, and spares.

Despite the country’s proclaimed adherence to the juche (self-reliance)

ideology, it is doubtful it has ever had the capability of producing enough

of these vital resources. eis reality was kept out of view during the days of

Cold War patronage of China and the Soviet Union.

Sensing the growing reality of its dependency, in the early 1970s, the

DPRK attempted to diversify away from its Cold War patrons.It intended on

boosting its economy through a program of heavy industrial modernization

and made billions in U.S. dollars in purchases of capital goods from Japan

and western European countries.By doing so,however,it drastically increased

its trade deficit and went into debt. By 1980 North Korea became the first

communist country to default on loans from free-market economies. Debts

went unpaid and interest continued to mount. By the end of 1989, its total

foreign debt was $6.78 billion with $3.13 billion owed to the Soviet Union,

$900 million to China, and $530 million to Japan.9

1989—North Korea’s Steep Decline Begins

ee summer of 1989 witnessed North Korea briefly lifting its hermetic

seal as 22,000 people from 177 countries poured into Pyongyang to attend

the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students.10 Held during “Anti–United

States Month,”the week-long festival’s theme was apropos: “anti-imperialist

solidarity, peace, and friendship.”To prepare for the festivities, the country,

already wracked with debt, mobilized vast labor resources and spared no

expense. Numerous structures were built or refurbished and more than 1,000

Mercedes-Benz automobiles were imported to shuttle guests. Children were

mobilized to help prepare for cultural shows and rallies. ee North even

offered free air travel to the event.11 eis degree of lavishness seemed

contrary to North Korea’s understanding of its own downward spiraling

fiscal situation. Nevertheless, the nation’s pride and reputation were on the

line. Seoul had just hosted the 1988 Summer Olympics.

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

9 See “Commanding Heights, North Korea,” PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/

lo/countries/kp/kp_overview.html, and “North Korea, Foreign Trade,” Country-data.com,

http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-9580.html.

10 See “Festivals,” World Federation of Democratic Youth, http://www.wfdy.org/festivals.

11 See Nicholas D. Kristof, “North Korea Bids Hello to the World,” New York Times, July 1, 1989,

http://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/01/world/north-korea-bids-hello-to-the-world.html?scp=5&

sq=north%20korea%20youth%20festival&st=nyt&pagewanted=1.
North Korea’s previous demands to co-host the 1988 Olympics were

rebuffed by South Korea and the International Olympic Committee.To make

matters worse,the Soviet Union,China,and the entire eastern-European bloc

refused to go along with Pyongyang’s idea to boycott the games.12 eus, the

Youth Festival provided an opportunity for the North to recover lost face and

gain recognition that goes along with hosting a major international event. In

the end, Pyongyang trumpeted the festival as a great success, and Kim Jongil was credited with wisely leading the effort.13 But success came with a price.

According to its own records, North Korea spent almost $9 billion on the

festival.14 Perhaps the best metaphor of the nation’s reckless extravagance was

(and still is) the Ryu Gyong Hotel. At 105 stories tall the pyramid-shaped

building is the most prominent fixture in Pyongyang, but it’s not occupied.

Construction began in 1987 and was intended to be complete by the start of

the festival. All construction, however, stopped in 1992. Sixteen years later in

2008, an Egyptian company resumed construction.15 A Web site boasts that

the building will be finished by 2012, the 100th anniversary of the birth of

Kim Il-sung.16 eus, from the echoes of the empty Ryu Gyong and the

shadows cast by the debt incurred from the youth festival, a growing sense of

uneasiness was descending in 1989.

In the same month as the youth festival, Seoul opened a trade office in

Moscow.17 Just weeks before,the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was rocked

by pro-democracy protests in Tiananmen Square. Meanwhile, Moscow was

pulling its troops out of Afghanistan, signaling what would become the end of

Soviet expansion and influence. Before the year’s end, more psychologically

195

Re “Faminist” State

12 See Michael Janofsky, “Olympics; Village Opens Amid Balloons and Armed Guards,” New York

Times, September 4, 1988, http://www.nytimes.com/1988/09/04/sports/olympics-village-opensamid-balloons-and-armed-guards.html?scp=2&sq=north+korea+boycott+olympics+&st=nyt.

13 See Kim Jong Il: Brief History (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1998),

http://libweb.uoregon.edu/ec/e-asia/readb/103.pdf.

14 See Sheryl WuDunn, “Now, North Korea Would Like to Reach Out,” ee World, New York

Times, July 9, 1989, http://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/09/weekinreview/the-world-now-northkorea-would-like-to-reach-out.html.

15 See David Durbach, “Egypt to Resurrect Pyongyang’s Phantom Pyramid,” Re Korea Times, June

9, 2008, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2008/06/160_25545.html, and “North

Korea’s Ryugyong Hotel Wakes from its Coma,”Chicago Tribune, from Reuters, July 18, 2008,

http://www.chicagotribune.com/travel/la-trw-north-korea-ryugyong-hotel19-2008jul19,0,

23210.story.

16 See Ryugyong Hotel, North-Korea, http://ryugyonghotel.com/index.html.

17 See “Relations with the Soviet Union,” Country Studies US, http://countrystudies.us/southkorea/77.htm.
disturbing events would play out in front of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il.

Communism collapsed in Poland,Hungary,and Czechoslovakia.On November

9, East Germans were given sudden notice that they were free to travel to West

Germany. Bulldozers began dismantling the Berlin Wall the following day.18

Ultimately East and West Germany were reunified—on West German terms.

ee next month (December),the United States launched an assault on Panama

and quickly captured its dictator, General Manuel Noriega, for delivery back to

the United States to stand trial for cocaine trafficking, racketeering, and money

laundering.19 Finally, on Christmas Day, 1989, shortly after his communist

government was overthrown, Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu and his

wife were executed by firing squad.Video showing their trial and execution were

shown on television repeatedly throughout the world.20 Undoubtedly, Kim Ilsung and Kim Jong-il were watching with discomfort as these events played out.

Money Talks: Ee Abandonment of North Korea

By 1990,communism was collapsing around the world.On June 4,Soviet

President Mikhail Gorbachev met with South Korean President Roh Tae-woo

in San Francisco.ee historic meeting was the first time since the division of

Korea after World War II that Soviet and South Korean heads of state met to

speak with one another.21 Reacting to the meeting, the DPRK reeled and

rebuked it as ‘‘shameless” and “flunkyist.’’22 Making matters worse for

Pyongyang, the Soviets served notice that they would soon demand hard

currency for their transactions.23 Possibly even worse, by October, in a move

that would pave the way toward eventually establishing diplomatic ties, South

196

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

18 See “9 Nov: Berlin Wall Falls,” BBC One-minute World News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/

7934661.stm.

19 David Jolly, “French Court Sentences Noriega to 7 Years,”New York Times, July 7, 2010,

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/08/world/americas/08noriega.html?_r=1.

20 William Horsley, “Romania’s Bloody Revolution,” BBC News, December 22, 1999,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/574200.stm.

21 Jim Mann, “Gorbachev, Roh Hold Historic Postwar Talks,”Los Angeles Times, June 5, 1990,

http://articles.latimes.com/1990-06-05/news/mn-488_1_south-korean-president.

22 James Sterngold, “North Korea Faults Roh and Gorbachev,”New York Times, June 8, 1990,

http://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/08/world/north-korea-faults-roh-and-gorbachev.html?scp=6&sq=

soviet+north+korea+relations&st=nyt.

23 Steven R. Weisman, “Increasingly Isolated, North Korea Starts Talking,”ee World, New York Times,

September 9, 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/09/weekinreview/the-world-increasingly-isolatednorth-korea-starts-talking.html?scp=1&sq=soviet+north+korea+demand+hard+currency&st=nyt.
Korea signed an agreement with China to exchange trade offices.24 een in

1992, South Korea and China formally established diplomatic relations, and

China applied further economic pressure on North Korea by announcing that

all trade beginning in 1993 would have to be paid for in cash.25 In the early

1990s, Seoul and Pyongyang were on markedly divergent paths.

Nukes, Jimmy Carter, and the Death of Kim Il-sung

As China and the Soviet Union were forging new ties with South

Korea, it appeared North Korea had lost the longtime support of its two

major benefactors. Meanwhile, the DPRK’s domestic food production was

declining and the country was experiencing negative growth in gross

domestic product (GDP).

197

Re “Faminist” State

Figure 9.1: North Korea’s GDP Growth Rate, 1990–200026

24 Nicholas D. Kristof, “Beijing and Seoul Sign Trade Accord,” New York Times, October 21, 1990,

http://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/21/world/beijing-and-seoul-sign-trade-accord.html?scp=3&sq=

china+south+korea+relations+improved&st=nyt.

25 Nicholas D. Kristof, “Cash Only, No Bartering, China Tells North Koreans,” New York Times,

December 30, 1992, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/30/world/cash-only-no-bartering-chinatells-north-koreans.html?scp=2&sq=china+hard+currency+north+korea&st=nyt.

26 See “Economic Statistics System,” Bank of Korea, http://ecos.bok.or.kr/EIndex_en.jsp.

Source: Bank of Korea
By 1991, credible reports of widespread hunger in North Korea were

beginning to surface.To deal with the apparent food shortages, Pyongyang

reduced food rations through the PDS and launched a “let’s eat two meals

a day”campaign.ee government was also encouraging citizens to forage for

wild foods, such as roots, grasses, stalks, and tree bark.27 eere were claims

that one-third of the nation’s factories were closed down, with half of the

rest operating sporadically because of shortages in energy and raw

materials.28 Recognizing the changing times and the need for cash, the

government announced in December 1991 the establishment of a special

economic zone offering preferential tax rates for foreign investors.29 In May

1992, the country invited a group of 145 academics and business executives

along with scores of journalists from Japan, China, the United States and

South Korea to the Port of Najin to spur investment in the new special

economic zone.30 Despite these efforts, this early attempt at partially

opening up failed to attract interest. Perhaps Kim Il-sung was reluctant to

open up to trade. Nevertheless, Kim would choose the development of a

nuclear weapon as the path to bolstering the North’s military capability

while extracting concessions from the West. Worldwide, the nuclear issue

dominated news about North Korea, obscuring the severity of deteriorating

conditions that were building up just prior to the famine.

Beginning in the late 1980s, there were a series of crises surrounding the

possibility of the DPRK developing nuclear weapons. ee first crisis

occurred after North Korea joined the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

(NPT) in 1985, but refused to sign an accompanying safeguards agreement

allowing inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

198

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

27 See “ee Crumbling State of Health Care in North Korea,” Amnesty International,

http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA24/001/2010/en/13a097fc-4bda-4119-aae5-

73e0dd446193/asa240012010en.pdf.

28 Nicholas D. Kristof, “A Stalinist’s Paradise In Korea Flounders,” ee World, New York Times,

October 27, 1991, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/27/weekinreview/the-world-a-stalinist-sparadise-in-korea-flounders.html?scp=4&sq=north+korea+food&st=nyt.

29 Nicholas D. Kristof, “Hunger and Other Hardships Are Said to Deepen North Korean

Discontent,” New York Times, February 18, 1992, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/02/18/world/

hunger-and-other-hardships-are-said-to-deepen-north-korean-discontent.html.

30 David E. Sanger, “North Korea Asks Investors to Look Beyond Bleakness of Communist Decay,”

New York Times, May 21, 1992, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/21/world/north-korea-asksinvestors-to-look-beyond-bleakness-of-communist-decay.html?scp=1&sq=food economy north

korea&st=nyt&pagewanted=1.
ee North violated two 18-month deadlines, but the crisis was averted in

December 1991 when Pyongyang accepted a South Korean proposal to

denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. As a reward, the United States

suspended the annual U.S.–South Korean “Team Spirit” military exercise

and arranged the first-ever meeting of high-ranking U.S. and North Korean

officials in New York.

Having capitalized nicely, the DPRK continued to sharpen its

brinkmanship strategy. ee next crisis occurred when the IAEA wanted to

inspect suspected nuclear facilities in Yongbyon. Wanting to avoid this, the

North announced its withdrawal from the NPT in March 1993. A new

round of negotiations ensued and when the United States provided it with

assurances against the threat of using force, North Korea announced it

would unilaterally “suspend”its withdrawal from the NPT.een in 1994, it

caused an uproar when it unloaded spent fuel from its reactor in Yongbyon,

giving the country nuclear weapons-grade plutonium. As the United States

reviewed war plans and options to punish the DPRK, former President

Jimmy Carter traveled to the country in June 1994 and managed to strike

a deal with Kim Il-sung. Apparently President Carter gave assurances to

the North which in turn, gave Kim room to make vague promises to open

nuclear facilities for inspection, pending high-level talks with Washington.

ee meeting, arguably aimed at saving face and averting war, eventually led

to the Agreed Framework on October 21, 1994, whereby the United States

and its allies would provide light-water reactors in addition to other forms

of compensation.31 eree weeks later, on July 8, 1994, at age 82, Kim Ilsung suffered a heart attack and died.32

Kim Jong-il’s Ascendancy and the

Preeminence of the Military

As throngs flocked to Pyongyang to mourn the death of Kim, reports

were circulating that the North Korean government was dipping into its rice

199

Re “Faminist” State

31 See Bong-Geun Jun, “North Korean Nuclear Crises: An End in Sight?” Arms Control Association,

Arms Control Today, January/February 2006, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_ 01-02/JAN

FEB-NKCover.asp.

32 David E. Sanger, “Kim Il Sung Dead at Age 82; Led North Korea 5 Decades; Was Near Talks

With South,” New York Times, July 9, 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/09/world/kim-ilsung-dead-at-age-82-led-north-korea-5-decades-was-near-talks-with-south.html?scp=4&sq=deat

h+kim+&st=nyt.
reserves to quell unrest and handle the hungry crowds. With a 1.1 million–

member army, a dwindling supply of food, and a shrinking economic output,

there was speculation as to whether Kim Jong-il would follow his father’s path

of juche or if he would follow liberalization, building upon previous efforts to

set up a free trade zone to attract foreign companies near the city of Najin in

the northeast.33 When Kim Jong-il did not appear at the ceremony marking

the end of the 100-day mourning period for his father, there was speculation

that he was either suffering from health problems or was facing a power

struggle.34 Even after the declared three-year mourning period for Kim Ilsung was officially over, it would be several more months until the younger

Kim would step into a clear position of leadership.35

Kim Jong-il had previously been appointed supreme commander of the

North Korean People’s Army (KPA) in 1991 and chairman of the National

Defense Commission in 1993.36 Despite this solid positioning, it wasn’t

until his election to the position of secretary general of the Korean Workers

Party on October 8, 1997, that the Kim Jong-il era of leadership officially

began. In a speech given at the time, he indicated that “No matter how

difficult the economic situation is, strengthen the military first; labor later.”

eis gave rise to the Songun ideology, where military power would be used

to shore up the regime. ee ideology was described in the Nodong Sinmun

as “giving all priority to the military and the strengthening thereof,” which

would then enable “the might of the people’s army to push forth with the

revolution and other related endeavors.”37 Songun would be the means by

which Kim Jong-il could guarantee the survival of his regime while

increasing the capability of the military, all at the dire expense of the North

Korean population writ large.

200

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

33 See Andrew Pollack, “North Korea Said to Dip Into Rice Reserves to Bar Unrest,” New York

Times, July 18, 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/18/world/north-korea-said-to-dip-intorice-reserves-to-bar-unrest.html?scp=1&sq=north korea contaminated foreign&st=nyt&

pagewanted=1.

34 See “Absence in North Korea,” New York Times, October 16, 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/

1994/10/16/world/absence-in-north-korea.html?scp=5&sq=north+korea+kim+speculation&st=nyt.

35 See “North Korea Ends Mourning for Kim Il Sung,” CNN Interactive, July 8, 1997,

http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9707/08/north.korea/.

36 See “North Korea: ee Foundations for Military Strength—Update 1995,” ch1, “A Post-Kim-Ilsong North Korea,” Federation of American Scientists, December 1995,

http://www.fas.org/irp/dia/product/knfms95/1510-101_chp1.html.

37 See “ee Death of Kim Il-sung and Rule by Legacy,” KBS World, http://world.kbs.co.kr/

english/event/nkorea_nuclear/general_02d.htm.
Ee “Arduous March”

In secret meetings in Beijing in June 1995, the North brokered a deal

to secure food aid from South Korea and Japan.38 After one shipment each

of rice from Japan (300,000 tons) and South Korea (150,000 tons), tensions

erupted and the flow of aid stalled.39ee DPRK then turned to the UN. By

August 1995, the UN’s Department of Humanitarian Affairs reported that

North Korea was seeking aid to recover from floods which had caused $15

billion in damage.40 Shortly thereafter, the WFP appealed for $8.8 million

in aid and warned of the possibility of a widespread famine in the country.41

Food shipments began in November 1995.42 Early on, there were signs that

the relief program would not operate unimpeded. In February 1996,

apparently because of objections from within the military for seeking

“outside help,”North Korea indicated that it wanted relief agencies to cease

appeals for relief.43 However, the relief operation continued. By May 1996,

the WFP reported that there were some cases of malnutrition, but they were

not widespread. ee report implied, however, that if food aid did not

increase, malnutrition would become widespread.44

201

Re “Faminist” State

38 See “North Korea Agrees To Get Rice From South,” World News Briefs, New York Times, June 22,

1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/22/world/world-news-briefs-north-korea-agrees-to-getrice-from-south.html?scp=5&sq=north+korea+aid+&st=nyt.

39 See “Seoul Still Rules Out Aid for North Korea,” New York Times, December 28, 1995,

http://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/28/world/seoul-still-rules-out-aid-for-north-korea.html?scp=3&

sq=150%2C000+tons+of+rice+korea&st=nyt.

40 See “World News Briefs; Floods Strike 5 Million, North Korea Reports,” New York Times, August

31, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/31/world/world-news-briefs-floods-strike-5-millionnorth-korea-reports.html?scp=5&sq=+food++north+korea&st=nyt.

41 See “U.N. Says North Korea Faces Danger of Famine,” New York Times, December 14, 1995,

http://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/14/world/un-says-north-korea-faces-danger-of-famine.html?

scp=1&sq=famine+%248.8+world+food+program+north+korea&st=nyt.

42 See “U.N. Sends Rice To North Korea,” Washington Post, November 24, 1995,

http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/19469709.html?FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT

&date=Nov+24%2C+1995&author=&pub=ee+Washington+Post+(pre-1997+Fulltext)&edition=

&startpage=A.34&desc=U.N.+Sends+Rice+To+North+Korea.

43 See Nicholas D. Kristof, “North Korea Tells Groups To Halt Drive For Flood Aid,” New York

Times, February 8, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/08/world/north-korea-tells-groups-tohalt-drive-for-flood-aid.html?scp=3&sq=north+korea+famine+aid+&st=nyt.

44 See Nicholas D. Kristof, “U.N. Says North Korea Will Face Famine as Early as eis Summer,”

New York Times, May 14, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/05/14/world/un-says-north-koreawill-face-famine-as-early-as-this-summer.html?scp=14&sq=aid+north+korea+famine&st=nyt.
During food relief operations, Northern officials did not allow for the

monitoring of food aid distribution and it was widely suspected that a good

portion of the aid was being diverted to the military.45 Relief officials

acknowledged being unable to move freely about and foreign reporters were

barred from entering the country.46 A 1999 General Accounting Office

report found that the WFP was “not able to monitor adequately what

happens to food aid donated by the United States to North Korea.” ee

report contended that 90 percent of North Korean institutions (including

orphanages, hospitals, and schools) that had received food aid had not been

visited by the WFP to observe distribution of food.47

Although food aid was getting into the country, it was not being

equitably distributed. After operating within North Korea since 1995,

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF, or Doctors without Borders) decided to

withdraw in September 1998. erough field teams, MSF attempted to

supply medicine and training for workers at more than one thousand health

centers and run 60 feeding centers for malnourished children, but

eventually the organization became convinced that their aid was not

reaching those in need.48 Other aid groups and North Korean migrants in

China reported that grain was being unequally directed to the elite in

Pyongyang and others with political connections. Some of the aid was

finding its way to the North’s black markets. With the relief program not

working as intended, the hungry developed coping mechanisms and

survival strategies throughout the course of the famine. Some grew food in

private gardens for re-sale on quasi-legal gray markets. In the northern

provinces, believed to be most severely affected, many crossed the border

into China looking for food and money. By 2000, relief groups were

202

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

45 See “A Hint the North Korea Army Dines on Food Aid,” New York Times, August 14, 1997,

http://www.nytimes.com/1997/08/14/world/a-hint-the-north-korea-army-dines-on-foodaid.html?scp=6&sq=north+korea+famine+aid&st=nyt.

46 Barbara Crossette, “Relief Teams Say North Korea Faces Vast Drought Emergency,” New York

Times, August 5, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/08/05/world/relief-teams-say-north-koreafaces-vast-drought-emergency.html?scp=14&sq=north+korea+famine+aid&st=nyt.

47 Barbara Crossette, “U.S. Study Finds Lack of Control In U.N. Food Aid to North Korea,” New

York Times, October 12, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/12/world/us-study-finds-lack-ofcontrol-in-un-food-aid-to-north-korea.html?scp=8&sq=north+korea+famine&st=nyt.

48 See “ee Humanitarian Situation and Refugees in North Korea,” Médecins Sans Frontières, May

2, 2002, http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?objectid=9AC11A91-55C7-4192-

BF04DDAB4F25D4F1&component=toolkit.article&method=full_html.
estimating that there were 100,000 to 200,000 North Koreans living

illegally in China.49

By 1999, it appeared the DPRK was finally emerging from the worst of

the famine. It was thought that as many as two to three million people died

during the period, although this number has since been scaled down into the

hundreds of thousands. It is estimated that due to the famine, more than 65

percent of North Korean children under five had stunted growth while more

than 15 percent suffered acute malnutrition.50 With food supplies

accumulating and signs of relief in sight, the government officially declared

the end of the “Arduous March” in October 2000 during events coinciding

with the 55th anniversary of the Korean Workers Party. ee October 3

edition of the Nodong Simmun read, “No people or nation in the history of

mankind has endured a greater period of peril.”51

2005—High-stepping Headlong into Crisis

In the same way that 1989 was the precipice from which North Korea

would plunge into the first period of famine during the 1990s, 2005 marked

the country’s abrupt shift away from a path toward food security. Conditions

had been improving, largely due to WFP relief operations in place since

1995, help from NGOs, and large bilateral donations from South Korea

and China that began in 2000. It appeared the North had found a way to

work with the international community to deal with its food shortages.

However, the DPRK shifted its tactics and began seeking a way to continue

receiving enough food aid while reducing the influence of the WFP.

No conditions had been attached to the aid streaming in from South

Korea and China.And by all appearances,China was not monitoring its food

assistance at all, and the South, operating under the “Sunshine” policy, had

only a small monitoring system in place. South Korean officials conducted

203

Re “Faminist” State

49 Elisabeth Rosenthal, “Famine in North Korea Creates Steady Human Flow Into China,” New

York Times, June 10, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/06/10/world/famine-in-north-koreacreates-steady-human-flow-into-china.html?scp=1&sq=north+korea+famine&st=nyt; and Nicholas

D. Kristof, “U.N. Says North Korea Will Face Famine.”

50 Barbara Crossette, “Korean Famine Toll: More ean 2 Million,” New York Times, August 20,

1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/20/world/korean-famine-toll-more-than-2-million.html?

scp=5&sq=north korea famine&st=nyt&pagewanted=2.

51 See “ee Death of Kim Il-sung and Rule by Legacy,” KBS World, http://world.kbs.co.kr/

english/event/nkorea_nuclear/general_02d.htm.
only 20 sampling trips to monitor food distribution centers in 2005.

Conversely, by North Korean standards, the WFP’s presence was much more

intrusive, with more than 40 expatriate staff in six offices conducting

thousands of monitoring trips around the country each year.53ee WFP had

negotiated a greater ability to monitor food delivery since 1995,and as a result,

monitoring visits had increased substantially. During 2004, the WFP visited

161 of the North’s 203 counties to monitor food distribution. However, the

DPRK began to clamp down on the WFP’s reach. By the fall of that year, it

began applying access restrictions to certain areas and refusing a larger number

of requests for monitoring visits than it had in previous years.54

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

52 Data for 1989 and 1990, and 2009 and 2010 import data obtained from USDA FAS Production,

Supply and Distribution Online (http://www.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/); data for 1991–2001obtained

from GAIN Report (Korea, Republic of, Grain and Feed, North Korea Agricultural Situation, 2005);

annual food grain requirement is an estimate from the Korea Rural Economic Institute; 2009

production data is from South Korea’s Unification Ministry, from “N. Korea Food Crisis to Worsen

after Poor Harvest,” AFP (Google News), February 9, 2010, http://www.google.com/

hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5g11qy4hB9KWa_GsDHIqbcabW3oCA; 2010 production data is

from the Korea Rural Economic Institute: Kim So-Hyun, “North Korea opens port to China,

Russia,” Asia News Network, September 3, 2010, http://www.asianewsnet.net/news.php?id=

10603&sec=2.

53 See Mark E. Manyin, “U.S. Assistance to North Korea: Fact Sheet,” Congressional Research

Service, CRS Report for Congress, October 11, 2006, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/

76907.pdf.

54 See “Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of,” U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy,

Human Rights, and Labor, February 28, 2005, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41646.htm.

Figure 9.2: The Two Periods of Famine in North Korea52
With relatively unmonitored food aid flowing in from China and South

Korea and signs of an unexpected bumper harvest on the horizon, in August

2005 the DPRK advised that international humanitarian assistance would

end by January 1, 2006. UN offices could stay open, but all expatriate staff

would have to leave. Any future assistance would have to be “developmental”

in nature and implemented entirely by North Korean nationals.55 In

addition to expelling the WFP staff, 12 European aid groups were ordered

to leave, apparently due to unhappiness over the European Union’s proposed

resolution to criticize the North’s human rights record.56 Concurrent with

the expulsion of Western aid that August, North Korea introduced bans on

private sales of grain throughout the country, and in October, at the 60th

anniversary of the Korean Workers Party, announced that the PDS would

be restored in full.57

Perhaps realizing its miscalculation, within a few months, the North

reestablished WFP aid, albeit at a level that was greatly scaled back from

previous efforts. Contents of the new program were established by the WFP

in February 2006. Its intent was to target children, young women, and the

underemployed in 50 of the most vulnerable counties.58eat May, it agreed

to negotiated terms of the deal.ee new, scaled down program would reach

only 30 counties, unlike the previous program which had extended to more

than 160. ee number of WFP staff would also be greatly reduced, from

more than 40 under the old program to only 10.59

As North Korea was fine-tuning a strategy to maintain just enough

food supply while reducing dependency and down-sizing foreign presence,

a disruptive event with disastrous economic effects occurred on September

205

Re “Faminist” State

55 See “Report on U.S. Humanitarian Assistance to North Koreans,” United States House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, April 15, 2006, http://internationalrelations.house.gov/

archives/109/4-06usaid.pdf.

56 James Brooke, “By Order of North Korea, U.N. Halts Food Assistance eere,” New York Times,

January 7, 2006, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D00E0D81E30F934A35752C0A9

609C8B63.

57 See Andrei Lankov, “Pyongyang Strikes Back: North Korean Policies of 2002–8 and Attempts to

Reverse ‘De-Stalinization from Below,’” ee National Bureau of Asian Research, July 2009,

http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/policy-forums-online/security2009-2010/

09056Lankov.pdf.

58 See “WFP Governing Body Approves North Korea Aid Plan,” World Food Programme, February

23, 2006, http://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/wfp-governing-body-approves-north-korea-aid-plan.

59 See Kirit Radia, “North Korea Food Aid Revived, Without U.S.,” ABC News International, May 11,

2006, http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=1952301&page=2.
15, 2005. Citing the Patriot Act, the U.S. Department of Treasury

designated Banco Delta Asia as a “primary money laundering concern.”60

For more than two decades the bank had handled the North’s financial

transactions. ee allegations about the bank’s relationship with the North

and a warning that the bank could be excluded from future dealings with the

U.S. financial system created immediate problems for Pyongyang. About

$25 million in North Korean assets were frozen and other financial

institutions began shedding ties with the DPRK, making it increasingly

difficult for the country to execute international financial transactions.61

Floods, Missiles, and More Nukes

On July 4, 2006, North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles,

including the long-range Taepodong-2.62 In a countermove that appeared

to take the North by surprise, South Korea suspended humanitarian aid

shortly thereafter on July 14, effectively postponing a shipment of 500,000

tons of rice.63ee next day, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted

Resolution 1695 condemning the DPRK for the launches.64 Almost as if

to add to the punishment, within days after the UN Resolution, torrential

rains swept through the North, causing landslides and destruction. Entire

villages were swept away and thousands of homes were lost.65ee flooding

destroyed hundreds of bridges and thousands of acres of farmland, causing

food prices to skyrocket and making food distribution “nearly

206

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

60 See “Treasury Designates Banco Delta Asia as Primary Money Laundering Concern under USA

Patriot Act,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, September 15, 2005, http://www.ustreas.gov/press/

releases/js2720.htm.

61 See David Lague and Donald Greenlees, “Squeeze on Banco Delta Asia hit North Korea where

it Hurt,” New York Times, January 18, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/18/world/asia/

18iht-north.4255039.html?pagewanted=1.

62 See Steven A. Hildreth, “North Korean Ballistic Missile ereat to the United States,”

Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, October 18, 2006,

http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/76930.pdf.

63 Anthony Faiola, “S. Korea Suspends Food Aid to North,” Washington Post, July 14, 2006,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/13/AR2006071300751.html.

64 See “Security Council Condemns Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Missile Launches,

Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1695 (2006),” United Nations Security Council, July 15, 2006,

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8778.doc.htm.

65 See “‘Hundreds Dead’ in N Korea Floods,” BBC News, July 21, 2006,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5202482.stm.
impossible.”66 Undeterred, on October 3, the Foreign Ministry announced

that the country would conduct a test of a nuclear device.67 Less than a

week later, on October 9, North Korea became the eighth country to join

the “club” of nuclear weapons states.68 On October 14, the UN Security

Council unanimously adopted UN Resolution 1718 condemning the

nuclear test.69 Humanitarian assistance was exempted from the resolution.

While the DPRK showed off its military capabilities, it clearly did so at

the expense of its people. In 2006, aid from China was dramatically

decreased, with none coming from South Korea. Strapped for cash, hit

hard by flooding, and increasingly isolated, things would not improve for

the North in 2007.

For five days in August 2007, from the 7th to the 11th, North Korea

experienced torrential rains resulting in massive destruction.ee Agriculture

Ministry issued an extensive report,claiming 11 percent of rice and corn fields

in the country were either submerged, buried, or washed away. ee level of

detail in this and other official reports appeared to indicate desperation and a

heightened outcry for help to the outside world.70 Previously receptive to the

North’s requests through the “Sunshine”policy, politics were now trending in

the opposite direction in South Korea. On August 20, a former Seoul mayor,

Lee Myung-bak, won the presidential nomination of South Korea’s Grand

National Party, making him a clear front-runner to succeed the left-leaning

President Roh Moo-hyun.71 Weeks later in September, an event that

underscored the limits of nuclear proliferation occurred when Israeli jets

attacked and destroyed a facility in Syria that was believed to be a nuclear

207

Re “Faminist” State

66 See “Floods Claim Huge Toll in North Korea, Group Says,” New York Times, August 17, 2006,

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/17/world/asia/17floods.html?_r=1&scp=9&sq=food+aid+north+

korea&st=nyt.

67 See “North Korea Pledges to Test Nuclear Bomb,” CNN.com, October 4, 2006,

http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/10/03/nkorea.nuclear/index.html.

68 See David E. Sanger, “North Koreans Say eey Tested Nuclear Device,” New York Times,

October 9, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/09/world/asia/09korea.html.

69 See “Security Council Condemns Nuclear Test by Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,

Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1718 (2006),” United Nations Security Council, October 14,

2006, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8853.doc.htm.

70 See “Report: North Korea Loses 11 Percent of Crops in Floods,” FoxNews.com, August 15,

2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,293310,00.html?sPage=fnc.world/northkorea.

71 See “NAPSNet Daily Report Monday, August 20, 2007,” 6; and “ROK Presidential Race,”

Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, August 20, 2007, http://www.nautilus.org/

mailing-lists/napsnet/dr/2007/20070820.html#item6.
construction project modeled after the North Korean Yongbyon facility. ee

reactor was being built with possible technical assistance from Pyongyang.72

eat December, Lee easily won the presidential election, restoring

conservatives to power with pledges to get tougher on the DPRK and mend

relations with the United States.73 Further exacerbating matters, China

implemented a series of grain export reduction measures that month as a

reaction to public discontent about rising food prices.One measure eliminated

a 13 percent tax rebate on grain exports.eis policy change negatively affected

food supply in the North and helped to drive up food prices.74

By 2008,with food and energy prices soaring throughout the world,there

was mounting concern that the DPRK was on the verge of another famine.

ee WFP warned in April that a potential humanitarian crisis was

approaching due to looming food shortages. North Korean food prices were

rising rapidly—one third of a month’s salary was required to buy a few days

worth of rice.75 eere were other, more dire warnings. A Newsweek report

noted that the margin between the minimum food requirements and existing

supply had dwindled to 100,000 metric tons—enough to last approximately

two weeks.76 Responding to the developing crisis, the United States pledged

in May to provide the North with 500,000 tons of food.ee plan was to begin

in June,with the WFP distributing 400,000 tons and the rest to be distributed

by nongovernmental organizations. ee new agreement was to allow for

Korean-speaking aid workers, random monitoring inspections, and access to

warehouses and other facilities by monitoring officials.It was expected that 65

monitors would be employed at five sub-offices in a similar construct to that

which the WFP used when it operated in the DPRK until 2005.77eis would

be the largest one-year amount of food since 1999, when the United States

208

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

72 See David E. Sanger and Mark Mazzetti, “Israel Struck Syrian Nuclear Project, Analysts Say,” New

York Times, October 14, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/14/washington/14weapons.html?hp.

73 Choe Sang-Hun, “Lee Easily Wins Presidential Election in South Korea,” New York Times,

December 19, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/19/world/asia/19iht-korea.html.

74 See Bill Powell, “ee Next Great North Korean Famine,”Time, May 6, 2008, http://www.time.com/

time/world/article/0,8599,1737780-2,00.html.

75 See “WFP Warns of Potential Humanitarian Food Crisis in DPRK Following Critically Low

Harvest,” World Food Programme, April 16, 2008, http://www.wfp.org/node/197.

76 Stephan Haggard, “Asia’s Other Crisis,” Newsweek, May 17, 2008, http://www.newsweek.com/

2008/05/17/asia-s-other-crisis.html.

77 Glenn Kessler, “U.S. to Send N. Korea 500,000 Tons of Food Aid,” May 17, 2008, Washington Post,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/16/AR2008051601721.html.
provided close to 700,000 metric tons. As one might reasonably expect, the

agreement eventually broke down due to different interpretations by the

United States and North Koreans over implementation and shipments to the

WFP were suspended in December 2008.78 In March 2009, the DPRK

informed the United States that it no longer wanted additional U.S. food

assistance.79

Power Succession North Korean Style: Ee Bumpy

Perpetuation of the Kim Dynasty

Kim Jong-il had apparently suffered a stroke sometime in mid-August

2008 and was noticeably absent at the September parade marking the 60th

anniversary of the founding of the DPRK. Although his death did not

appear imminent and there were no signs of unrest, the event triggered

considerable concern. ee question of who would take his place should he

die or become incapacitated was being raised with great interest.80 During

Kim Jong-il’s recovery period, his brother-in-law, Jang Song-taek, effectively

ruled North Korea.81 In April 2009, he was appointed as a National Defense

Commission member during at the 12th Supreme People’s Assembly

(SPA).82 Days before the assembly, Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong-il’s youngest

son, was appointed to a low-level post at the National Defense

Commission.83 By June 2009, South Korean newspapers were reporting that

Kim Jong-il had named his youngest son as his successor. Apparently, Kim

had instructed officials to pledge allegiance to his youngest son and North

209

Re “Faminist” State

78 See Mark E. Manyin and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Foreign Assistance to North Korea,” Congressional

Research Service, March 12, 2010, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40095.pdf.

79 See Kirit Radia, “North Korea Rejects US Food Aid, Kicks Out US NGOs,” ABC News, March 17,

2009, http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalradar/2009/03/north-korea-can.html.

80 See Mark Mazzetti and Choe Sang-Hun, “Analysts Try to Envision North Korea in Transition,”

New York Times, September 11, 2008, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D0CE2D7143

BF932A2575AC0A96E9C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=1.

81 Justin McCurry, “Kim Jong-il ‘Names Youngest Son’ as North Korea’s Next Leader,” Guardian.co.uk,

June 2, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/02/north-korea-kim-jong-il.

82 See “Jang Song Taek Becomes NDC Vice Chairman, Choe Yong Rim Cabinet Premier,” North

Korea Leadership Watch, July 6, 2010, http://nkleadershipwatch.wordpress.com/2010/06/07/jangsong-taek-becomes-ndc-vice-chairman-choe-yong-rim-cabinet-premier/.

83 See “N. Korean Leader’s Son Appointed to Post in Top Military Body,” Yonhap News Agency, April

30, 2009, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2009/04/29/88/0401000000AEN2009042900

7600325F.html.
Koreans were learning a new song referring to Kim Jong-un as “the young

leader.”84 An aggressive campaign was under way to pump up adulation for

the younger Kim, designated at this point as the “brilliant comrade.”

Mysteriously, however, the campaign stopped abruptly in August 2009

without explanation. It was speculated that Kim Jong-il had recovered and

was in good shape, and it was thus politically incorrect to mention the

succession issue.85

In June 2010, Jang Song-taek was promoted to vice-chairman of the

National Defense Commission at a session of the Supreme People’s

Assembly. His elevation positioned him to act in the capacity of an official

guardian for Kim Jong-un, should Kim Jong-il suddenly die.86 On June 26,

the Korean Central News Agency announced that the Political Bureau of

the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Central Committee would convene in

early September 2010. “[A] conference of the WPK for electing its highest

leading body reflecting the new requirements of the WPK.” eis was the

first time in decades that the country’s political elite had been called to

attend a WPK convention. Analysts saw this as a move intended to pave the

way for transition to Kim Jong-un. Kim Jong-il officially began to succeed

his father by assuming a WPK title at a convention in 1980.87

Spitting Venom: Ee North Korean Military

Lashes Out

In 2009, all references to the word “communism” were removed from the

DPRK constitution and replaced with the word “Songun.”By the end of 2009,

indications were that the North Korean military had taken complete command

of the nation’s economy. With missile and weapons sales decreased because of

UN sanctions, the army had taken up aggressive management of state trading

companies, focusing on increased sales of natural resources such as coal, iron

ore,and other minerals to China.Under the army’s control of the mines,mineral

210

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

84 Justin McCurry, “Kim Jong-il ‘Names Youngest Son.’”

85 See Andrei Lankov, “North Korea’s Succession Gets Twisted,” Asia Times Online, September 11,

2009, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/KI11Dg01.html.

86 See “Kim Jong Il Shown on TV, His Relative Promoted,” CBS News.com, June 7, 2010,

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/06/07/world/main6556694.shtml.

87 Jack Kim and Suh Kyung-min, “North Korea Party to Pick New Leadership,” Reuters, June 26,

2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65P0SI20100626.
exports to China increased and larger amounts of revenue began flowing into

the military’s operating budgets. ee army had also deployed soldiers to all of

the country’s 3,000 cooperative farms to ensure workers were not shortchanging

the military.ee soldiers also monitored the tens of thousands of city dwellers

brought to the farms to help with the fall harvest.ee military’s haul from the

farms is quite substantial. In the northern areas where production and supplies

are usually lean, the military takes roughly 25 percent of the total grain

production. In other areas of the country, the military skims less, taking about

five to seven percent.88 Growing in power, influence, and perhaps in its

confidence, the military was prepared to lash out beginning in 2009.

In April, North Korea launched a Taepodong-2 missile in a purported

attempt to put a satellite into orbit.Despite the North’s reports to the contrary,

the United States Northern Command reported that the payload splashed

into the Sea of Japan,essentially making the launch a non-success.89 Following

this,on May 25,the DPRK conducted a second underground nuclear test.ee

U.S. intelligence community assessed the yield as being approximately a few

kilotons, making it larger than the first nuclear test in 2006, which was about

one kiloton.90ee UN Security Council unanimously adopted UN Resolution

1874, which condemned the test and toughened sanctions. Humanitarian

assistance was exempted.91 Bent on pushing the envelope,the North revisited

the Northern Limit Line (NLL) dispute.

On March 26, 2010, a South Korean warship, the Cheonan, was on

routine patrol in the Yellow Sea, not far from the disputed NLL. Without

warning, the ship suddenly exploded, broke up and sank, killing 46 of the

104 sailors on board. South Korea assembled an international team that

included Australia, Canada, Britain, and Sweden, and presented forensic

evidence, which they said proved that a torpedo fired from a DPRK

submarine caused the explosion. Included with the forensic evidence was

211

Re “Faminist” State

88 Blaine Harden, “In North Korea, the Military Now Issues Economic Orders,” Washington Post,

November 3, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/02/

AR2009110203603.html?sid=ST2009110203677.

89 See William J. Broad, “North Korean Missile Launch Was a Failure, Experts Say,” New York

Times, April 5, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/06/world/asia/06korea.html.

90 See Deborah Charles and Tabassum Zakaria, “North Korea’s May Nuclear Test Few Kilotons:

U.S.,” Reuters, June 15, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE55E5BA20090615.

91 See “Security Council, Acting Unanimously, Condemns in Strongest Terms Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea Nuclear Test, Toughens Sanctions,” United Nations Security Council, June 12,

2009, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9679.doc.htm.
part of a torpedo propeller with an apparent North Korean serial number.92

South Korean President Lee Myung-bak announced that his country

“would cut nearly all trade with North Korea, deny North Korean merchant

ships use of South Korean sea lanes, and ask the UN Security Council to

punish the North.”93 On July 9, the UN Security Council released a

statement condemning the attack on the Cheonan.

94 While the tone of the

statement is stern, it does not contain concrete punitive measures. ee

statement refrained from directly calling the North out as the perpetrator.

Reacting to the statement, North Korean Ambassador Sin Son-ho told

reporters the statement was a “diplomatic victory” for Pyongyang.95

Knee-jerk Reactions and Band-Aid Solutions:

Signs of a Worsening Crisis Appear

In July 2009, the WFP reported that it had received little funding since

2008—only 15 percent of $500 million needed—and the DPRK had imposed

new restrictions.96 Having only received $75 million, the WFP was planning

to provide food aid to just 57 of the 131 countries expecting assistance.A joint

report from WFP and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

warned that nine million people in North Korea could go hungry due to

shortages.97 In the meantime, state controls over the lives of North Koreans

were becoming increasingly onerous.

ee North was taking tougher than usual measures to crack down on

markets,banning small-plot farms,chasing vendors from the streets,and requiring

212

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

92 See: “ee Cheonan (Ship),”Times Topics,New York Times, May 20, 2010, http://topics.nytimes.com/

top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/cheonan_ship/index.html.

93 Choe Sang-Hun, “Korean Tensions Grow as South Curbs Trade to North,” New York Times, May

23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/24/world/asia/24korea.html.

94 See “Security Council Condemns Attack on Republic of Korea Naval Ship ‘Cheonan,’Stresses Need

to Prevent Further Attacks, Other Hostilities in Region,”United Nations Security Council, July 9,

2010, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9975.doc.htm.

95 See “UN Security Council Condemns ‘Cheonan’Sinking,”VOANews.com, July 9, 2010,

http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/UN-Council-Draft-Condemns-Sinking-of-South-KoreanShip-98097064.html.

96 See “World Food Program Reports Difficulties in North Korea,” VOANews.com, July 1, 2009,

http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-07-01-voa10-68819107.html.

97 See “North Korea Food Aid Slashed,” Oneworld.net, July 7, 2009, http://us.oneworld.net/article/

365130-lack-food-and-funds-north-korea.
goods to only be sold in state-owned stores.98 In an apparent attempt by North

Korea to reassert control over the economy and curb market activity, it issued a

decree on November 30 to revalue banknotes at a rate of 100 to 1.In addition to

the revaluation, the allowable amount of currency people could exchange was

restricted. Cash kept on hand above that limit would be rendered worthless, the

effect of which would effectively wipe out holder savings.Analysts speculated that

the main reason for the revaluation was to rein in a newly emerging middle class

that was deriving its growing wealth by trading in the markets.99ee revaluation

sparked public outrage and confusion was rampant.eere were reports of inflation,

increased food shortages,and violence.In one report,agents of the People’s Safety

Agency,a DPRK government entity conducting a“Fifty Day Battle”against illegal

enterprises, were attacked as they investigated market activity in the city of

Pyongsung, North Pyongan Province. In another report from the city of

Chongjin, a steel worker killed a National Security Agency agent.100 Due to the

huge outcry, the government offered a rare public apology. In February 2010,

Prime Minister Kim Yong-il stated,“I offer a sincere apology about the currency

reform,as we pushed ahead with it without sufficient preparation and it caused a

great pain to the people.”101ee following month, Pak Nam-gi, the official who

oversaw the currency revaluation, was executed by firing squad.102

Adding to the rapidly deteriorating situation, South Korea’s Unification

Ministry reported that North Korea produced an estimated 4.11 million

tons of grain in 2009, a five percent drop from the 4.3 million tons in 2008.

ee South’s Rural Economic Institute forecasted the North’s food grain

output to reach 3.84 million tons in 2010, while the UN Food and

Agriculture Organization estimated an output of 3.52 million tons. With

213

Re “Faminist” State

98 Blaine Harden, “North Korea Tightening Its Restrictions on Markets, Food Aid,” Washington

Post, July 14, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/13/

AR2009071303293.html.

99 See “North Korean Official ‘Sacked’ over Currency Chaos,” BBC News, February 3, 2010,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8494978.stm.

100 Richard Lloyd Parry, “Food Shortages and Violence Mount in North Korea as Utopian Dream

Fails,” Re Times, February 4, 2010, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/

article7013254.ece.

101 Choe Sang-Hun, “N. Korea Said to Apologize Over Currency Changes,” February 11, 2010,

Asia Pacific, New York Times, February 11, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/12/world/

asia/12korea.html.

102 Richard Lloyd Parry, “North Korea executes top official Pak Nam Gi who oversaw currency

evaluation,” Re Times, March 19, 2010, http//www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/

article7066576.ece.
annual demand being roughly 5.4 million tons, it is expected that the

DPRK’s food shortages will grow worse.103 Worsened by apparent coldweather damage to winter crops, North Korean authorities began faxing

requests to South Korean food aid organizations in the spring of 2010,

heightening concerns over its agricultural situation.104 Running out of

options, North Korea turned to China.

On May 3, 2010, Kim Jong-il made his first overseas trip since suffering

a stroke in 2008, travelling to China by train.105 It was thought that he was

seeking extraordinary support from China—$10 billion in direct

investment, one million tons of food, and 800,000 tons of oil.106 eree days

later at a luncheon with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, the Chinese

government informed Kim that China would not provide extraordinary aid

outside the framework of existing UN Security Council sanctions against

Pyongyang.107 Rebuffed, Kim cut the trip short and returned to Pyongyang.

Also in May, the WFP reported that food aid to the North would run out

at the end of June due to a drop in international donations.108 ee next

month, a South Korean welfare organization with contacts in North Korea

reported that Pyongyang had totally stopped supplying food rations to its

citizens and private markets were again operating around the clock. ee

ruling Communist Party apparently issued a directive on May 26 advising

work units and individuals to “fend for themselves.”109 As of that date

markets are no longer forced to close at 6 or 7 p.m., rules restricting

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

103 See Kim So-Hyun, “North Korea opens port to China, Russia,” Asia News Network, September

3, 2010, http://www.asianewsnet.net/news.php?id=10603&sec=2; and “N. Korea Food Crisis to

Worsen after Poor Harvest,” AFP (Google News), February 9, 2010,

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5g11qy4hB9KWa_GsDHIqbcabW3oCA.

104 Hwang Ju Hee, “North Korea Makes Food Aid Request,” DailyNK, May 7, 2010,

http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=6339.

105 Jane Macartney, “North Korean Leader Kim Jong Il Travels to China,” Times Online, May 3,

2010, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article7114797.ece.

106 Kim Se-jeong, “North Korea Begged China for Food Aid,” Re Korea Times, August 13, 2010,

http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/08/116_71390.html.

107 Chang Se-jeong and Ser Myo-ja, “Beijing’s Rebuff Made Kim Cut China Trip Short,” Korea

JoongAng Daily, May 17, 2010, http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2920556.

108 Bomi Lim, “North Korea’s Food Aid Will Run Out Next Month, UN Agency Says,” Bloomberg

Businessweek, May 3, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-05-03/north-korea-s-foodaid-will-run-out-next-month-un-agency-says.html.

109 See “Welfare Group Claims North Korea Has Halted Food Rations to Citizens,”

VOANews.com, June 14, 2010, http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/Welfare-Group-ClaimsNorth-Korea-Has-Halted-Food-Rations-to-Citizens-96284153.html.
customers to women older than 40 have been dropped, and a ban on

allowing certain goods to be sold has been lifted.110

For two decades, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has

faltered at providing food for its people. eis inability was first manifested

quite dramatically during the 1990s, when hundreds of thousands died as a

result of famine. North Korea blamed natural disasters, primarily flooding,

for the food shortages during the period. However, years of poor agronomic

policy, crumbling infrastructure, a lack of strategic resources and the inability

to generate currency had already created several extraordinarily

vulnerabilities for the North. In 1989, the country was caught off guard as

it entered a cycle marked by increased international isolation, a murky and

protracted period of political succession, and a growing preeminence of the

military. Since 2005, it has entered a similar cycle. As a result, the DPRK is

heading into—if not already steeped in—a second, disastrous famine.

Fully recognizing that the only avenue to mitigate the effects of a second

famine is through outside support, the North is once again scrambling

ineffectively to negotiate on its terms. Pyongyang no longer has the ability

to manipulate “Sunshine” concessions from South Korea and has thus lost

the leverage it once enjoyed. Rather than focusing on generous aid packages

that result in nothing of reciprocal value from North Korea, South Korean

President Lee Myung-bak is considering other avenues. He has cut trade

with the North and has openly called for a special “reunification tax.”111 ee

South Korean military has reportedly incorporated scenarios that envision

occupying and stabilizing North Korea in a joint military exercise with the

United States.112 Pyongyang’s negotiating tactics are being further

complicated as aid for the DPRK continues to dry up due to donor nations’

growing weariness of the country’s on-again, off-again antics, and as the need

to increase aid for other disaster-stricken countries, such as Pakistan,

increases. Even China appears reluctant to commit to offering much support.

215

Re “Faminist” State

110 See: “Fearing Famine, N. Korea Drops Private-Market Limits,” Columbus Dispatch, June 19,

2010, http://www.dispatch.com/live/content/national_world/stories/2010/06/19/fearing-famine-n-

-korea-drops-private-market-limits.html?sid=101.

111 Bomi Lim and Shinhye Kang, “South Korea Calls for Unity Tax as North Slams Drills,”

Bloomberg, August 15, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-15/lee-says-south-koreamay-need-extra-tax-to-pay-for-eventual-reunification.html.

112 See “S. Korea Military Drill Envisions ‘Occupying N. Korea,”’ Breitbart (AFP), August 24, 2010.

http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=CNG.60d0175d237b195337baaf43871770ad.491.
Despite its reliance on other countries for support, North Korea

continues to defy the international community with its expensive pursuit of

nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, along with its demonstrated

willingness to lash out with its military. As a result, it grows increasingly

isolated and its options become further limited. Should Kim Jong-il die in

the near future and a murky, protracted period of political transition ensue,

the effects will be even more dramatic.

It is possible that Pyongyang will work an eleventh-hour deal to increase

food aid. However, even if it does, it may be too late, as the wheels of famine

have already been put into motion. In the meantime, signs of growing social

unrest are evident and Pyongyang appears to be operating in an erratic crisis

management mode marked by drastic pendulum swings in policy. Should

events play out predictably,the nation will attempt to sustain the military and

the Pyongyang elite with existing supplies of food as it negotiates haphazardly

for aid for the rest of its people. In the meantime, the government may

continue to adjust rations and experiment with radical changes to market and

currency policies as it strives to manage its affairs through the second famine.

eose poorly positioned or not adequately affiliated will unfairly suffer and

many in the outlying areas, including scores of children, will tragically die.

ee question will be whether North Korea will be able to effectively manage

its neighbors and the rest of the international community in time to avoid

the full, disastrous brunt of its second great famine.

216

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula


Symposium Participants

Lieutenant General Raymond P. Ayres Jr., USMC

(Retired)

Lieutenant General Raymond P. Ayres Jr., USMC (Retired), served as

the Assistant Chief of Staff, Combined/Joint-5, United Nations Command,

Combined Forces Command, United States Forces Korea, and as the

Commander, U. S. Marine Corps Forces Korea before his retirement in

October 2002. A graduate of Iona College, the Naval War College, and

Salve Regina College, he received his Marine Corps commission in August

1966 after completing Officer Candidate School. Service with 2d Battalion,

3d Marines in the Republic of Vietnam followed after the Basic School.

He later completed Amphibious Warfare School and Marine Corps

Command and Staff College. He served as Deputy Commanding General,

II Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina;

Commander, Joint Task Force 160, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in support of

Operation Sea Signal; and Commanding General, 3d Marine Division,

Okinawa, Japan.

Bruce E. Bechtol Jr.

Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., an associate professor of political science at Angelo

State University, is a fellow at the Institute for Corean-American Studies

and sits on the boards of directors of the International Council on Korean

Studies and the Council on U.S.–Korean Security Studies. He was formerly

a professor of international relations at the Marine Corps Command and

Staff College and an assistant professor of national security studies at the Air

Command and Staff College. Bechtol is the author of Defiant Failed State:

Re North Korean Rreat to International Security (2010), Red Rogue: Re

Persistent Challenge of North Korea (2007), and the editor of Re Quest for

a Unified Korea: Strategies for the Cultural and Interagency Process (2007).

219
Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.

Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. is an internationally recognized analyst, author,

and lecturer on North Korean defense and intelligence affairs, and ballistic

missile development in the eird World. He is concurrently a senior analyst

and author for Jane’s Information Group and editor of KPA Journal.

Bermudez has authored five books—including Shield of the Great Leader:

Re Armed Forces of North Korea (2001), and North Korean Special Forces–

2nd Ed. (1997), which were both translated into Korean and Japanese—and

more than 100 articles, reports, and monographs on these subjects. He has

lectured extensively in academic and government environments and worked

as a consultant, both in the United States and the Republic of Korea.

Cheon Seongwhun

Cheon Seongwhun is a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for

National Unification in Seoul. He is a member of policy advisory

committees for the Ministries of Unification and National Defense of the

Republic of Korea (ROK) government; a member of the advisory

commission for the Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Unification Committee in

the ROK parliament; and an editorial consultant for Radio Free Asia. He

is the author of numerous books and reports including ROK–U.S. Strategic

Cooperation for Denuclearizing North Korea (2009); PSI and the South

Korean Position (2008); and Cooperatively Enhancing Military

Transparency on the Korean Peninsula: A Comprehensive Approach (1999).

Cheon is the recipient of the Commendation of President of the Republic

of Korea in 2003, an award for excellent research from the Korea Research

Council for Humanities and Social Sciences in 2001, 2002, and 2003.

Robert M. Collins

Robert M. Collins is an adjunct fellow at the Korea Institute for

Maritime Strategy in Seoul. He is a 37-year veteran employee of the

Department of the Army and served 31 years in various capacities with the

U.S. military in Korea, including several liaison positions with the Republic

of Korea military. He completed his career in June 2009 as Chief of Strategy,

ROKUS Combined Forces Command, Seoul. Collins served the four-star

U.S. commander as one of his two senior political analysts on North and

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Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula
South Korean politics, Northeast Asian security issues, and challenges

within the ROK-U.S. alliance. In that capacity he developed strategies and

policy and planning concepts in pursuit of U.S. and ROK-U.S. alliance

security interests relative to the North Korean threat and regional security

challenges.

Chuck Downs

Chuck Downs, executive director of the United States Committee for

Human Rights in North Korea, wrote Over the Line: North Korea’s

Negotiating Strategy (1999)—later translated into Korean and Japanese—

while serving as associate director of the Asian studies program at the

American Enterprise Institute. He was also co-editor with Ambassador

James R. Lilley of Crisis in the Taiwan Strait (1997). He served as senior

defense and foreign policy advisor to the House Republican Policy

Committee of the U. S. House of Representatives, and has published

numerous articles and testified before Congress on foreign policy and

defense issues.

Nicholas Eberstadt

Nicholas Eberstadt holds the Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy

at the American Enterprise Institute. He is the senior adviser to the

National Bureau of Asian Research, and serves on the Advisory Council of

the Korean Economic Institute of America and the board of directors of

the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. He has written

extensively on issues of demography, development, and international

security. His books on Korean affairs include Policy and Economic

Performance in Divided Korea During Re Cold War Era: 1945-91 (2010),

Re North Korean Economy Between Crisis and Catastrophe (2009),Korea’s

Future and the Great Powers (co-editor, 2001), Re End of North Korea

(1999), and Re Population of North Korea (co-author, 1995).

Nicole Finnemann

Nicole Finnemann is the director of research and academic affairs at

the Korea Economic Institute and responsible for issues related to North

Korea and outreach including KEI’s Academic Paper series.

221

Symposium Participants
With a focus on negotiation and North Korea, she co-organizes a

Human Security in North Korea forum with Greg Scarlatoiu. After

meetings with DPRK ministry officials in Pyongyang in 2008 and 2009,

she authored “Getting to Normal: A Six Party Talks Simulation,” and

conducted simulations for more than 2,000 participants around the country,

exposing them to the competing interests and needs of the six nations

negotiating the denuclearization of North Korea. She has participated in

referendum and peace agreement drafting for the Public International Law

and Policy Group, and co-founded the American University Negotiation

Project.

L. Gordon Flake

L. Gordon Flake is executive director of the Maureen and Mike

Mansfield Foundation, which he joined in 1999. He was previously a senior

fellow and associate director of the Program on Conflict Resolution at ee

Atlantic Council of the United States, and director for research and

academic affairs at the Korea Economic Institute of America. He is coeditor of both New Political Realities in Seoul: Working toward a Common

Approach to Strengthen U.S.-Korean Relations (2008) and Paved with Good

Intentions: the NGO Experience in North Korea (2003), and has published

extensively on policy issues in Asia. He is a regular contributor on Korea

issues in the U.S. and Asian press and has traveled to North Korea numerous

times. He is a member of the London-based International Institute for

Strategic Studies and serves on the board of the United States Committee

of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific as well as on

that of the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, and the

Advisory Council of the Korea Economic Institute of America.

Major General Donald R. Gardner, USMC (Retired)

Major General Donald R. Gardner, USMC (Retired), is president

emeritus of Marine Corps University, where he served from 2004–9. Prior

to that, he was chief executive officer for the Marine Corps University

Foundation after his retirement from the U.S. Marine Corps in 1994. A

graduate of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and a

distinguished graduate of the Naval War College, his command assignments

included: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein); Commanding

222

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula
General, III Marine Expeditionary Force; and Commanding General,

Marine Corps Bases, Japan. He was awarded the Order of the Rising Sun,

eird Class, by the Emperor of Japan for his dedicated service to the security

of Japan and the mutual cooperation between Japan and the United States.

George Alan Hutchinson

George Alan Hutchinson is an energy policy consultant for Concurrent

Technologies Corporation, who supports the Office of the Deputy Assistant

Secretary of the Air Force (Energy, Environment, Safety, and Occupational

Health). After Air Force service with expertise in Korean affairs and

language, he served as a linguist to the Special United States Liaison,

Advisor Korea, and the National Security Agency. He has written articles

about U.S.-ROK arms relations for the Air Force Journal of Logistics, and

contributed papers covering North Korean military doctrine and Republic

of Korea energy dependency vulnerabilities.

Doug Joong Kim

Doug Joong Kim is a professor of Russian studies at Kyonggi University

and specializes in the U.S.-Russia-China strategic relations in Northeast

Asia and North-South Korean affairs. He served as dean of the College of

International Studies at Kyonggi, and chairman of the Committee on

Central Asian Studies at the Korean Association of International Studies.

He is the author of U.S.-China Relations and Russia and Soviet Forces in

the Korean War, and edited Foreign Relations of North Korea: During Kim

Il Sung’s Last Days (1994) and U.S. Policies in Northeast Asia. He also

translated Re Kimchi Matters: Global Business and Local Politics in a

Crisis-Driven World (2003) into Korean and is currently working on

Twenty Years of Russia-Korean Relations and Re Korean War II.

Helen-Louise Hunter

Helen-Louise Hunter is a founding member of the Committee for

Human Rights in North Korea, which has, since its inception in 2001,

published a number of significant studies on North Korea’s human rights

abuses. She was a political analyst at the CIA for 23 years and served as the

assistant national intelligence officer for the Far East from 1979–81. She is

223

Symposium Participants
the author of Kim Il-song’s North Korea (1999) and coauthor of North

Korea, A Country Study (2008). Her most recent books are Sukarno and

the Indonesian Coup: Re Untold Story (2007) and Zanzibar: Re Hundred

Days Revolution (2009).

Hugo Wheegook Kim

Hugo Wheegook Kim is president and founder of the East-West

Research Institute and editor-in-chief of the International Journal of

Korean Studies. He has published a number of articles in academic journals

and written three books, including Korean Americans and Inter-Korean

Relations (2003). His current project is History of Politics and Economy:

Reory and Practice. After active duty in the Korean Army, he retired as a

professor of the Korea National Defense University in Seoul.

Sang Joo Kim

Sang Joo Kim is senior fellow and executive vice president of Institute

for Corean-American Studies, and chief executive officer of the institute’s

Liberty Foundation. He also serves on the boards of a number of civic

organizations including the Philadelphia Bar Association International Law

Committee, and is a member of the American eoracic Society.

Don Kirk

Don Kirk, journalist and author, has been reporting and writing from

Asia since 1962. He first visited Korea as Far East correspondent for the

Chicago Tribune in 1972, and has published three books about the

country—Korea Betrayed: Kim Dae Jung and Sunshine (2009), Korean

Crisis: Unraveling of the Miracle in the IMF Era (2001), and Korean

Dynasty: Hyundai and Chung Ju Yung (1997)—and written numerous

magazine, journal, and newspaper articles on Korea, Japan, and Southeast

Asia. He has reported for newspapers and magazines on such topics as the

Kwangju revolt, five Korean presidential elections, the 1997–8 economic

crisis and the North Korean nuclear issue.

224

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula
Colonel David S. Maxwell, USA

Colonel David S. Maxwell, USA, is Chief, Strategic Initiatives Group,

U.S. Army Special Operations Command; a fellow at the Institute of

Corean-American Studies; sits on the board of advisors for Small Wars

Journal, and is a member of the faculty at the National War College. With

21 years service in Asia, his most recent deployed assignment was

commander of the Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines. He

served as a planner on the United Nations Command/Combined Forces

Command/United States Forces Korea CJ3 staff, and later as the director

of Plans, Policy, and Strategy ( J5) for Special Operations Command Korea.

John Park

John Park is a senior research associate and director, Northeast Asia

Center for Conflict Analysis and Preventions, U.S. Institute of Peace. He is

a co-director of the U.S.-China Project on Crisis Avoidance and

Cooperation. He is also a co-director of the Trilateral Dialogue in Northeast

Asia, which brings together government and military officials from the U.S.,

ROK, and Japan. He was previously the project leader of the North Korea

Analysis Group at the Harvard Kennedy School. His recent publications

include, “North Korea, Inc.: Gaining Insights into North Korean Regime

Stability from Recent Commercial Activities” (2009), and “North Korea’s

Nuclear Policy Behavior: Deterrence and Leverage,” in Nuclear Weapons and

Security in 21st Century Asia (2008).

Tim Peters

Tim Peters is a Christian activist and founder in 1990 of Helping

Hands Korea. His service spans more than three-and-a-half decades, six

countries, and the Caribbean and Polynesian islands. He resides with his

wife in South Korea where he has lived on three occasions for a total of

nearly 20 years since 1975. He has worked as an editor and speechwriter

for the Korean Commission of UNESCO, the Korean National Red Cross,

and the Federation of Korean Industries in Seoul. He wrote a paper for the

World Economic Forum outlining the then-current (2004) predicament of

300,000 North Korean refugees in China, projecting scenarios of the crisis,

and recommending practical aid measures.

225

Symposium Participants
Ambassador Charles L. (Jack) Pritchard

Ambassador Charles L. ( Jack) Pritchard is president of the Korea

Economic Institute in Washington. Prior to joining KEI, he was a visiting

fellow at the Brookings Institution. He served as ambassador and special

envoy for negotiations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and

United States representative to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development

Organization from April 2001 until September 2003. Previously, he was

special assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and senior

director for Asian Affairs in the President William J. Clinton

administration. During that period he was also the director of Asian affairs

in the National Security Council and deputy chief negotiator for the Four

Party Peace Talks, which aimed at reducing the tensions on the Korean

Peninsula.

Alan D. Romberg

Alan D. Romberg is distinguished fellow and director of the East Asia

Program at ee Henry L. Stimson Center, and a member of the Asia

Society Policy Advisory Board, the Korea Economic Institute Advisory

Council, the board of directors of the U.S. Council for Security Cooperation

in the Asia Pacific, the advisory board of the Public Intellectuals Program

of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, and the editorial

board of Asian Politics & Policies. He has written extensively on U.S. policy,

focusing on U.S. relations with the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan,

Korea, and Japan, and is author of Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice:

American Policy Toward Taiwan and U.S.-PRC Relations (2003), which

was published in translation in China (2007). He has served as principal

deputy director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, senior

adviser and director of the Washington office of the U.S. Permanent

Representative to the United Nations, and special assistant to the Secretary

of the Navy.

Greg Scarlatoiu

Greg Scarlatoiu, director of business issues and public affairs of the

Korea Economic Institute, is responsible for managing outreach programs

to educate Americans on developments in Korea and U.S.-Korea relations.

226

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula
He organizes KEI’s Opinion Leaders Seminar, Future of Korea, and

Ambassadors’ Dialogue programs and serves as director of the Korea Club

and the Korea-Japan Study Group. He has written extensively on human

rights violations in North Korea and the applicability of the Eastern

European experience for U.S.-based public broadcasters and the Korean

language press, and has lectured on the situation in North Korea for KoreanAmerican organizations. Since 1995, he has been a Korean language

broadcaster for stations including the Korea Broadcasting System in South

Korea and Radio Free Asia in Washington, DC.

Jude Shea

Jude Shea is the founder and director of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK)

Korea Battle Simulation Center and the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces

Command (CFC) Combined Battle Simulation Center. He has been a

leader in improving the use of simulations to drive military exercises;

particularly in the areas of large scale, full-spectrum operations and the use

of wide-area networking to distribute simulations to sites throughout the

world. Prior to entering the civil service, Shea served in the U.S. Army for

32 years. His last active duty assignment was as Chief, Command Post

Exercise Branch, C/J3 Exercise Division, CFC/USFK.

Scott Snyder

Scott Snyder is director of the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy at ee Asia

Foundation and a senior associate at Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and

International Studies. He is also the adjunct senior fellow for Korean

Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Among his books are China’s

Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security (2009), Negotiating

on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior (1999), and co-edited with

L. Gordon Flake, Paved With Good Intentions: Re NGO Experience in

North Korea (2003). He lived in Seoul as Korea representative of ee Asia

Foundation during 2000-4. Previously, he served as a program officer in the

Research and Studies Program of the U.S. Institute of Peace, and as acting

director of ee Asia Society’s Contemporary Affairs Program.

227

Symposium Participants


e Korean Peninsula was and is in a state of flux. More than 60 years

after the war that left the country divided,the policies and unpredictability of the

North Korean regime, in conjunction with the U.S. alliance with South Korea

and the involvement of China in the area, leave the situation there one of the

most capricious on the globe.

Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula presents the

opinions from experts on the subject matter from the policy, military, and

academic communities. Drawn from talks at a conference in September 2010 at

Marine Corps University, the papers explore the enduring security challenges,

the state of existing political and military relationships,the economic implications

of unification, and the human rights concerns within North and South Korea.

eey also reiterate the importance for the broader East Asia region of peaceful

resolution of the Korean issues.

Keynote

Lieutenant General Raymond Ayres Jr., USMC (Ret.)

Strategic Challenges on the Korean

Peninsula

North Korea’s Strategy of Compellence,

Provocations, and the Northern Limit

Line

Robert M. Collins

Re ROK–U.S. Military Alliance:

Transformation and Change

Chun Seongwhun

Re Lee Administration and Changes in

ROK Strategic Culture

Doug Joong Kim

Planning for Contingencies on the

Korean Peninsula

Re North Korean Military Rreat

Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.

Irregular Warfare on the Korean

Peninsula

Colonel David Maxwell, USA

Human Rights and the Future of

North Korea

Understanding North Korea’s Human

Rights Abuses

Chuck Downs

Breaking Barriers: Re Media War for

North Korea

Donald Kirk

Re“Faminist” State

George Alan Hutchinson