NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LAURENCE WOODS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

D. STATON, Sheriff; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-35729 

D.C. No. 3:15-cv-02169-PK 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Michael W. Mosman, Chief Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 13, 2018**

Before: LEAVY, M. SMITH, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

Laurence Woods appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment 

in his action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and 

Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) alleging that defendants interfered with 

the practice of his religion. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAR 22 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-35729 

review de novo. Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1030 (9th Cir. 2015). We 

affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Woods’s RLUIPA 

claims because RLUIPA does not allow for damages against individuals sued in 

their official or individual capacities or for injunctive relief for individuals that are 

not incarcerated. See id. at 1031 (RLUIPA claim for injunctive relief is moot 

where the plaintiff has been released from custody); Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 

904 (9th Cir. 2014) (RLUIPA does not authorize lawsuits against government 

employees in their individual capacity); Holley v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 599 F.3d 

1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars [an inmate’s] suit for 

official-capacity damages under RLUIPA.”).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Woods’s Free 

Exercise Clause claims because Woods failed to raise a genuine dispute of material 

fact as to whether defendants’ actions substantially burdened the practice of his 

religion or whether the regulations were not reasonably related to a legitimate 

penological interest. See Jones, 791 F.3d at 1031-32 (defining substantial burden); 

see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987) (factors for determining 

whether a prison regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate penological 
3 17-35729 

interest).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Woods’s 

Establishment Clause claims because Woods failed to raise a genuine dispute of 

material fact as to whether defendants’ actions had no secular purpose or whether 

they had the principal or primary effect of advancing religion.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Woods’s Equal 

Protection Clause claims because Woods failed to raise a genuine dispute of 

material fact as to whether defendants discriminated against him due to his 

religion. See Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th 

Cir. 2013) (requirements for an equal protection claim).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued 

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on 

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.