ARCTIC 

CAPABILITIES

DOD Addressed Many 

Specified Reporting 

Elements in Its 2011 

Arctic Report but 

Should Take Steps to 

Meet Near- and Longterm Needs

Report to Congressional Committees

January 2012

GAO-12-180

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-180, a report to 

congressional committees 

January 2012

ARCTIC CAPABILITIES

DOD Addressed Many Specified Reporting Elements 

in Its 2011 Arctic Report but Should Take Steps to 

Meet Near- and Long-term Needs 

Why GAO Did This Study

The gradual retreat of polar sea ice, 

combined with an expected increase in 

human activity––shipping traffic, oil 

and gas exploration, and tourism in the 

Arctic region––could eventually 

increase the need for a U.S. military 

and homeland security presence in the 

Arctic. As a result, the Department of 

Defense (DOD) must begin preparing 

to access, operate, and protect 

national interests there. House Report 

111-491 directed DOD to prepare a 

report on Arctic Operations and the 

Northwest Passage, and specified five 

reporting elements that should be 

addressed. House Report 112-78 

directed GAO to review DOD’s report. 

GAO assessed the extent to which 1) 

DOD’s Report to Congress on Arctic 

Operations and the Northwest 

Passage (Arctic Report) addressed the 

specified reporting elements and 2) 

DOD has efforts under way to identify 

and prioritize the capabilities needed to 

meet national security objectives in the 

Arctic. GAO analyzed DOD’s Arctic 

Report and related documents and 

interviewed DOD and U.S. Coast 

Guard officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD develop a 

risk-based investment strategy and 

timeline for developing Arctic 

capabilities needed in the near-term;

and establish a forum with the Coast 

Guard to identify collaborative Arctic 

capability investments over the longterm. DOD and the Department of 

Homeland Security generally agreed

with GAO’s recommendations.

What GAO Found 

DOD’s Arctic Report, submitted May 31, 2011, addressed three and partially 

addressed two of the elements specified in the House Report, as shown in the 

table below.

Extent to Which DOD’s Arctic Report Addressed the Five Specified Reporting Elements

Specified reporting element GAO assessment 

An assessment of the strategic national security 

objectives and restrictions in the Arctic region.

Addressed 

An assessment on mission capabilities required 

to support the strategic national security 

objectives and a timeline to obtain such 

capabilities.

Partially addressed (does not include a timeline 

for obtaining needed capabilities) 

An assessment of an amended unified 

command plan that addresses opportunities of 

obtaining continuity of effort in the Arctic Ocean 

by a single combatant commander.

Addressed 

An assessment of the basing infrastructure 

required to support Arctic strategic objectives, 

including the need for a deep-water port in the 

Arctic.

Addressed

An assessment of the status of and need for 

icebreakers to determine whether icebreakers 

provide important or required mission 

capabilities to support Arctic strategic national 

security objectives, and an assessment of the 

minimum and optimal number of icebreakers 

that may be needed.

Partially addressed (does not include an 

assessment of the minimum and optimal number 

of icebreakers) 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD’s Arctic Report.

While DOD has undertaken some efforts to assess the capabilities needed to 

meet national security objectives in the Arctic, it is unclear whether DOD will be 

in a position to provide needed capabilities in a timely and efficient manner 

because it lacks a risk-based investment strategy for addressing near-term 

needs and a collaborative forum with the Coast Guard for addressing long-term

capability needs. DOD’s Arctic Report acknowledges that it has some near-term 

gaps in key capabilities needed to communicate, navigate, and maintain 

awareness of activity in the region. However, DOD has not yet evaluated, 

selected, or implemented alternatives for prioritizing and addressing near-term 

Arctic capability needs. In addition, DOD and the Coast Guard have established 

a working group to identify potential collaborative efforts to enhance U.S. Arctic 

capabilities. This working group is focused on identifying potential near-term 

investments but not longer-term needs, and it is currently expected to be 

dissolved in January 2012. Uncertainty involving the rate of Arctic climate change 

necessitates careful planning to ensure efficient use of resources in developing 

Arctic needs such as basing infrastructure and icebreakers, which require long 

lead times to develop and are expensive to build and maintain. Without taking 

steps to meet near- and long-term Arctic capability needs, DOD risks making 

premature Arctic investments, being late in obtaining needed capabilities, or 

missing opportunities to minimize costs by collaborating on investments with the 

Coast Guard. 

View GAO-12-180. For more information, 

contact John Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or 

pendletonj@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

Letter 1 

Background 4

DOD’s Arctic Report Addressed or Partially Addressed All Five 

Specified Reporting Elements 10

DOD Has Identified Arctic Capability Gaps, but Lacks a 

Comprehensive Approach to Addressing Arctic Capabilities 12

Conclusions 17

Recommendations for Executive Action 18

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 18

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 22

Appendix II Extent to which DOD’s Arctic Report Addressed Specified Reporting 

Elements 24

Appendix III Change in Summer Minimum Ice Extent from 2001 to 2011, Compared 

with the 1979 to 2000 Median Minimum Ice Extent 29

Appendix IV Policy Guidance on the Arctic Identified in DOD’s Arctic Report 32

Appendix V Arctic Responsibilities under the Unified Command Plan: 2008 

and 2011 33

Appendix VI Comments from the Department of Defense 34

Appendix VII Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 37

Appendix VIII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 39

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

Related GAO Products 40

Figures

Figure 1: Change in Summer Minimum Ice Extent from 2001 to 

2011, Compared with the 1979 to 2000 Median Minimum 

Ice Extent 5

Figure 2: DOD Facilities and Coast Guard Assets in the Arctic and 

Alaska 8

Figure 3: GAO Assessment of the Extent to Which DOD’s Arctic 

Report Addressed the Five Specified Reporting Elements 11

Abbreviations

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOD Department of Defense

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page 1 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, DC 20548

January 13, 2012

Congressional Committees

The gradual retreat of polar sea ice in the Arctic region, combined with an 

expected increase in human activity—shipping traffic, oil and gas 

exploration, and tourism—could eventually increase the need for a U.S. 

military and homeland security presence in the Arctic.1 In recognition of 

increasing strategic interest in the Arctic, the United States has developed 

national level policies that guide the actions of the Department of Defense 

(DOD), the U.S. Coast Guard, and other stakeholders in the region. 

These policies indicate that the United States has an enduring interest in 

working collaboratively with other nations to address the emerging 

challenges arising from the impacts of climate change and globalization in

the Arctic, and they identify Arctic national security needs including 

protecting the environment, managing resources, and supporting 

scientific research.2

Over the years, we have completed a number of reviews related to the 

challenges of developing capabilities for operating in the Arctic. For 

example, we have reported on the difficulties DOD and other agencies 

face in achieving maritime domain awareness.3 We testified on the 

challenges of translating climate data into information that officials need 

to make decisions.4

 

1

The DOD Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage defines 

the Arctic as the region that encompasses all U.S. and foreign territory north of the Arctic 

Circle, all U.S. territory north and west of the boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon, 

and Kiskokwim Rivers, and all contiguous seas and straits north of and adjacent to the 

Arctic Circle. According to the report, this definition is consistent with the Arctic Research 

and Policy Act of 1984 (15 U.S.C. §4111) and Arctic Council usage.

We also reported on the Coast Guard’s coordination 

2

National Security Presidential Directive 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25, 

Arctic Region Policy (Jan. 9, 2009); National Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.: May 

2010).

3

GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a Strategic, RiskBased Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain Awareness, GAO-11-621 (Washington, 

D.C.: June 20, 2011). According to DOD’s Arctic Report, maritime domain awareness 

refers to the effective understanding of anything associated with maritime activity that 

could affect the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States.

4

GAO, Climate Change Adaptation: Federal Efforts to Provide Information Could Help 

Government Decision Making, GAO-12-238T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2011).

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

with stakeholders on Arctic policy and efforts to identify Arctic 

requirements and capability gaps.5

In light of continuing concerns, the House Armed Services Committee 

directed DOD to provide a report to the congressional defense 

committees on its Arctic operations in the House Report accompanying a 

proposed bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2011 (H.R. 5136).

A list of these related products is 

included at the end of this report.

6

House Report 112-78, which accompanied a proposed bill for the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (H.R. 1540), 

directed us to provide an assessment of DOD’s Arctic Report, any 

shortfalls noted, recommendations for legislative action, and any 

information deemed appropriate in the context of the review to the 

congressional defense committees within 180 days of receiving DOD’s 

Arctic Report.

Specifically, DOD was directed to address five 

elements in the report, including an assessment of (1) the strategic 

national security objectives and restrictions in the Arctic region; (2) 

mission capabilities required to support the strategic national security 

objectives and a timeline to obtain such capabilities; (3) an amended 

unified command plan that addresses opportunities of obtaining continuity 

of effort in the Arctic Ocean by a single combatant commander; (4) the 

basing infrastructure required to support Arctic strategic objectives, 

including the need for a deep-water port in the Arctic; and (5) the status of 

and need for icebreakers to determine whether icebreakers provide 

important or required mission capabilities to support Arctic strategic 

national security objectives and an assessment of the minimum and 

optimal number of icebreakers that may be needed. DOD submitted its 

Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage

(Arctic Report) on May 31, 2011.

7

 

5

GAO, Coast Guard: Efforts to Identify Arctic Requirements Are Ongoing, but More 

Communication about Agency Planning Efforts Would Be Beneficial, 

Specifically, our objectives are to assess the extent to 

which (1) DOD’s Arctic Report addressed the specified reporting 

elements and (2) DOD has efforts under way to identify and prioritize the 

capabilities needed to meet national security objectives in the Arctic. This 

GAO-10-870 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2010).

6

H. R. Rep. No. 111-491, at 337 (2010). 

7

H. R. Rep. No. 112-78, at 291 (2011). 
 

Page 3 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

letter and appendix II provide our response to the direction in the house 

report and include an assessment of the degree to which DOD addressed 

each of the five specified reporting elements in its report provided to the 

defense committees.

To assess the extent to which DOD’s Arctic Report addressed the five 

specified reporting elements, two GAO analysts independently reviewed 

and compared the Arctic Report with the direction in the House Report. 

We considered the reporting element to be addressed when the Arctic 

Report explicitly addressed all parts of the element. We considered the 

reporting element partially addressed when the Arctic Report addressed 

at least one or more parts of the element, but not all parts of the element. 

We considered the reporting element not addressed when the Arctic 

Report did not explicitly address any part of the element. To assess the 

extent to which DOD has efforts under way to identify and prioritize the 

capabilities needed to meet national security objectives in the Arctic, we 

reviewed documentation related to DOD’s Arctic operations, such as the 

U.S. Navy’s November 2009 Arctic Roadmap, the February 2010 

Quadrennial Defense Review, the U.S. European Command’s April 2011 

Arctic Strategic Assessment, the U.S. Coast Guard’s July 2011 High 

Latitude Study,

8

We conducted this performance audit from July 2011 to January 2012 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

and the Navy’s September 2011 Arctic Capabilities 

Based Assessment. We interviewed officials from the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense; Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; 

U.S. Northern Command and the North American Aerospace Defense 

Command; U.S. European Command; U.S. Pacific Command; U.S. 

Transportation Command; and U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine 

Corps Arctic offices. We also interviewed Coast Guard officials to 

determine their contribution to and collaboration with DOD on the Arctic 

Report. 

 

8

ABS Consulting, High Latitude Study Mission Analysis Report, a report contracted by 

United States Coast Guard, July 2010.
 

Page 4 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. See appendix I for a more 

detailed description of our scope and methodology.

Scientific research and projections of the changes taking place in the 

Arctic vary, but there is a general consensus that Arctic sea ice is 

diminishing. As recently as September 2011, scientists at the U.S. 

National Snow and Ice Data Center reported that the annual Arctic 

minimum sea ice extent for 2011 was the second lowest in the satellite 

record, and 938,000 square miles below the 1979 to 2000 average 

annual minimum (see fig. 1). Much of the Arctic Ocean remains icecovered for a majority of the year, but some scientists have projected that 

the Arctic will be ice-diminished for periods of time in the summer by as 

soon as 2040.9

 

9

A Joint Coast Guard/U.S. Navy Statement on Arctic ice terminology supports usage of 

the term “ice-diminished” rather than “ice-free” because both agencies recognize that the 

region will continue to remain ice-covered during the wintertime through the end of this 

century and the current and projected decline in Arctic sea ice is highly variable from year 

to year. The term “ice-free” means that no ice of any kind is present. The term “icediminished” refers to sea ice concentrations of up to 15 percent ice in the area. 

Background

Diminishing Ice Opens 

Potential for Increased 

Human Activity in the 

Arctic
 

Page 5 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

Figure 1: Change in Summer Minimum Ice Extent from 2001 to 2011, Compared with the 1979 to 2000 Median Minimum Ice 

Extent 

Note: The median ice edge displays the average annual minimum position of the ice edge. 

These environmental changes in the Arctic are making maritime transit 

more feasible and are increasing the likelihood of further expansion in 

human activity including tourism, oil and gas extraction, commercial 

shipping, and fishing in the region.10

 

10In August and December 2011, the Department of the Interior approved preliminary 

plans for one operator to drill for oil and gas, pending receipt of the operator’s well 

containment plan and other requirements. 

 For example, in 2011, northern transSource: National Snow and Ice Data Center.

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Median ice edge

September 2011 sea ice extent

Sea ice extent

Interactivity

instructions

Roll over the year to view

recorded ice extent.

See appendix III for the 

non-interactive version.

Greenland

Alaska

Canada Norway

Russia

Sweeden

Finland

Ireland

England

Iceland

Note: The median ice edge displays the average annual minimum position of the ice edge.
 

Page 6 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

shipping routes opened during the summer months,11 which permitted 

more than 40 vessels to transit between June and October 2011. The 

Northern Sea Route opened by mid-August, and appeared to remain 

open through September, while the Northwest Passage opened for 

periods in the summer for the fifth year in a row. See figure 2 for locations 

of these shipping routes. Despite these changes, however, several 

enduring characteristics still provide challenges to surface navigation in 

the Arctic, including large amounts of winter ice and increased movement 

of ice from spring to fall. Increased movement of sea ice makes its 

location less predictable, a situation that is likely to increase the risk for 

ships to become trapped or damaged by ice impacts.12 DOD’s Arctic

Report states that scientists currently project transpolar routes will not be

reliably open until around 2040 and then only for a limited period during 

the summer and early fall. DOD’s report assessed that most national 

security missions will likely be limited to those months.

Key strategy and policy documents detail the United States’ national 

security objectives and guide DOD’s and other stakeholders’ operations 

in the Arctic. The 2009 National Security Presidential Directive 

66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25, Arctic Region Policy, 

establishes U.S. policy with respect to the Arctic region and tasks senior 

officials, including the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, 

with its implementation. This directive identifies specific U.S. national 

security and homeland security interests in the Arctic, including missile 

defense and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems for 

strategic sealift, maritime presence and security operations; and ensuring 

freedom of navigation and overflight. Additionally, the 2010 National 

Security Strategy identifies four enduring national interests that are 

relevant to the Arctic13

 

11Open water indicates a large area of freely navigable water in which sea ice is present in 

concentrations less than 10 percent. No ice of land origin is present. 

and states that the U.S. has broad and 

12These challenges are noted in the U.S. Coast Guard’s High Latitude Study, which the 

Coast Guard provided to Congress in July 2011. 

13The four enduring interests identified in the 2010 National Security Strategy are (1) the 

security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners; (2) a strong, 

innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that 

promotes opportunity and prosperity; (3) respect for universal values at home and around 

the world; and (4) an international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes 

peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges. 

National Policies Guide 

DOD and Other 

Stakeholders’ Operations 

in the Arctic
 

Page 7 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

fundamental interests in the Arctic. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense 

Review also provides top-level DOD policy guidance on the Arctic, 

highlighting the need for DOD to work collaboratively with interagency 

partners such as the Coast Guard to address gaps in Arctic 

communications, domain awareness, search and rescue, and 

environmental observation and forecasting. Finally, since the Arctic region 

is primarily a maritime domain, existing U.S. guidance relating to maritime 

areas continues to apply, such as the September 2005 National Strategy 

for Maritime Security and National Security Presidential Directive 

41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13, the Maritime Security 

Policy. 

DOD is responsible in the Arctic and elsewhere for securing the United 

States from direct attack; securing strategic access and retaining global 

freedom of action; strengthening existing and emerging alliances and 

partnerships; and establishing favorable security conditions. Additionally, 

the Navy has developed an Arctic Roadmap which lists Navy action 

items, objectives, and desired effects for the Arctic region from fiscal 

years 2010 to 2014.14

Since the Arctic is primarily a maritime domain, the Coast Guard plays a 

significant role in Arctic policy implementation and enforcement. The 

Coast Guard is a multimission, maritime military service within the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that has responsibilities 

including maritime safety, security, environmental protection, and national 

defense, among other missions. Therefore, as more navigable ocean 

water emerges in the Arctic and human activity increases, the Coast 

Guard will face expanding responsibilities in the region. For DOD facilities 

and Coast Guard assets in the Arctic and Alaska, see figure 2.

Focus areas include training, communications, 

operational investments, and environmental protection.

 

14U.S. Navy, Arctic Roadmap (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 2009).

Multiple Federal 

Stakeholders Have Arctic 

Responsibilities
 

Page 8 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

Figure 2: DOD Facilities and Coast Guard Assets in the Arctic and Alaska
 

Page 9 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

Other federal stakeholders include:

• The National Science Foundation, which is responsible for funding 

U.S. Arctic research—including research on the causes and impacts 

of climate change––and providing associated logistics and 

infrastructure support to conduct this research. The National Science 

Foundation and the Coast Guard also coordinate on the use of the 

Coast Guard’s icebreakers for scientific research.

• The Department of State, which is responsible for formulating and 

implementing U.S. policy on international issues concerning the 

Arctic, leading the domestic interagency Arctic Policy Group, and 

leading U.S. participation in the Arctic Council.15

• The Department of the Interior, which is responsible for oversight and 

regulation of resource development in U.S. Arctic regions. The 

department also coordinates with the Coast Guard on safety 

compliance inspections of offshore energy facilities and in the event of 

a major oil spill.

• The Department of Transportation and its component agency, the 

Maritime Administration, which works on marine transportation and 

shipping issues in the Arctic and elsewhere, among other things.

• The Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration, which provides information on Arctic oceanic and 

atmospheric conditions and issues weather and ice forecasts, among 

other responsibilities.

 

15The Arctic Council is a high level intergovernmental forum for promoting cooperation, 

coordination and interaction among the Arctic states, with the involvement of the Arctic 

indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in 

particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection. The eight 

permanent member states include Canada, Denmark (representing also Greenland and 

Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States.
 

Page 10 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

DOD’s May 2011 Arctic Report either addressed or partially addressed all 

of the elements specified in the House Report.16 Specifically, our analysis 

showed that, of the five reporting elements, DOD addressed three and 

partially addressed two. The elements not fully addressed were to have 

included a timeline to obtain needed Arctic capabilities and an 

assessment of the minimum and optimal number of icebreakers that may 

be needed to support Arctic strategic national security objectives. 

According to DOD officials, these elements were not fully addressed for a 

number of reasons such as DOD’s assessment that Arctic operations are 

a challenge but not yet an urgency; the report’s being written prior to 

initiating the formal DOD capabilities development process, making it 

difficult to provide a timeline for obtaining Arctic capabilities; and DOD’s 

assessment that its need for icebreakers is currently limited to one 

mission per year. Furthermore, DOD’s Arctic Report notes that significant 

uncertainty remains about the extent, rate, and impact of climate change 

in the Arctic and the pace at which human activity will increase, making it 

challenging for DOD to plan for possible future conditions in the region 

and to mobilize public or political support for investments in U.S. Arctic 

capabilities or infrastructure. Figure 3 below summarizes our assessment 

of the extent to which DOD’s Arctic Report included each of the specified 

reporting elements and the reasons DOD officials provided for any 

elements that were not fully addressed. Appendix II includes our detailed 

evaluation of each of the specified reporting elements.

 

16H. R. Rep. No. 111-491, at 337 (2010). 

DOD’s Arctic Report

Addressed or Partially 

Addressed All Five 

Specified Reporting 

Elements
 

Page 11 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

Figure 3: GAO Assessment of the Extent to Which DOD’s Arctic Report Addressed the Five Specified Reporting Elements 
 

Page 12 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

DOD has several efforts under way to assess the capabilities needed to 

support U.S. strategic objectives in the Arctic. However, it has not yet 

developed a comprehensive approach to addressing Arctic capabilities 

that would include steps such as developing a risk-based investment 

strategy and timeline to address near-term needs and establishing a 

collaborative forum with the Coast Guard to identify long-term Arctic 

investments.

While DOD’s Arctic Report assessed a relatively low level of threat in the 

Arctic region, it noted three capability gaps that have the potential to 

hamper Arctic operations. These gaps include (1) limited 

communications, such as degraded high-frequency radio signals in 

latitudes above 70°N because of magnetic and solar phenomena; (2) 

degraded global positioning system performance that could affect 

missions that require precision navigation, such as search and rescue; 

and (3) limited awareness across all domains in the Arctic because of 

distances, limited presence, and the harsh environment. Other key 

challenges identified include: shortfalls in ice and weather reporting and 

forecasting; limitations in command, control, communications, computers, 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance because of a lack of assets 

and harsh environmental conditions; limited inventory of ice-capable 

vessels; and limited shore-based infrastructure. According to DOD’s 

Arctic Report, capabilities will need to be reassessed as conditions 

change, and gaps will need to be addressed to be prepared to operate in 

a more accessible Arctic. Other stakeholders have also assessed Arctic 

capability gaps. Examples of these efforts include the following:

• U.S. Northern Command initiated a commander’s estimate for the 

Arctic in December 2010 that, according to officials, will establish the 

commander’s intent and missions in the Arctic and identify capability 

shortfalls. In addition, Northern Command identified two Arctic-specific 

capability gaps (communications and maritime domain awareness) in 

its fiscal years 2013 through 2017 integrated priority list, which defines 

the combatant command’s highest-priority capability gaps for the 

near-term, including shortfalls that may adversely affect missions.

• U.S. European Command completed an Arctic Strategic Assessment

in April 2011 that, among other things, identified Arctic capability gaps 

in the areas of environmental protection, maritime domain awareness, 

DOD Has Identified 

Arctic Capability 

Gaps, but Lacks a 

Comprehensive 

Approach to 

Addressing Arctic 

Capabilities

DOD Has Efforts Under 

Way to Assess Near-term 

Arctic Capability Gaps but 

Lacks a Risk-Based 

Investment Strategy to 

Address These Gaps
 

Page 13 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

cooperative development of environmental awareness technology, 

sharing of environmental data, and lessons learned on infrastructure 

development. In addition, it recommended that the command conduct 

a more detailed mission analysis for potential Arctic missions, 

complete a detailed capability estimate for Arctic operations, and work 

in conjunction with Northern Command and the Departments of the 

Navy and Air Force to conduct a comprehensive capabilities-based 

assessment for the Arctic.

• DOD and DHS established the Capabilities Assessment Working 

Group (working group) in May 2011 to identify shared Arctic capability 

gaps as well as opportunities and approaches to overcome them, to 

include making recommendations for near-term investments.17

• U.S. Navy completed its first Arctic capabilities-based assessment in 

September 2011 and is developing a second capabilities-based 

assessment focused on observing, mapping, and environmental 

prediction capabilities in the Arctic, which officials expect to be 

The 

working group was directed by its Terms of Reference to focus on four 

primary capability areas when identifying potential collaborative efforts 

to enhance Arctic capabilities, including near-term investments. Those 

capability areas include maritime domain awareness, 

communications, infrastructure, and presence. The working group 

was also directed to identify overlaps and redundancies in established 

and emerging DOD and DHS Arctic requirements. As the advocate for 

Arctic capabilities, Northern Command was assigned lead 

responsibility for DOD in the working group, while the Coast Guard 

was assigned lead responsibility for DHS. The establishment of the 

working group—which, among other things, is to identify opportunities 

for bi-departmental action to close Arctic capability gaps and issue 

recommendations for near-term investments—helps to ensure that 

collaboration between the Coast Guard and DOD is taking place to 

identify near-term capabilities needed to support current planning and 

operations. Although the working group is developing a paper with its 

recommendations, officials indicated that additional assessments 

would be required to address those recommendations.

 

17The Capabilities Assessment Working Group was chartered by the DOD and DHS 

Capabilities Development Working Group, established by the DOD Under Secretary for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the DHS Under Secretary for Science and 

Technology; and the DHS Under Secretary for Management. The Capabilities 

Development Working Group is a mechanism for improving cooperation and facilitating 

decision-making on DOD-DHS capability development. The group’s charter states it will 

meet quarterly to discuss topics of mutual interest.
 

Page 14 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

completed in the spring of 2012. The Navy’s first Arctic capabilitiesbased assessment identified three critical capability gaps as the 

highest priorities, including the capabilities to provide environmental 

information; maneuver safely on the sea surface; and conduct 

training, exercise, and education. This assessment recommended 

several near-term actions to address these gaps.

DOD’s Arctic Report states that the development of Arctic capabilities 

requires a deliberate risk-based investment strategy, but DOD has not 

developed such a strategy. Although DOD and its components have 

identified current Arctic capability gaps, the department may not be taking 

appropriate steps to best ensure its future preparedness because DOD 

lacks a risk-based investment strategy and a timeline for addressing nearterm capability needs. According to DOD officials, there had been no 

Arctic-related submissions to its formal capabilities development process 

as of September 2011; this process could take two or more years to be 

approved, followed by additional time for actual capability development.18

Our prior work has shown that industry best practices include using a riskbased strategy to prioritize and address capability gaps.19

 

18For further discussion on DOD’s formal capabilities development process (the Joint 

Capabilities Integration and Development System) see GAO, Defense Acquisitions: 

DOD’s Requirements Determination Process Has Not Been Effective in Prioritizing Joint 

Capabilities, 

A risk-based 

investment strategy may be used to define and prioritize related resource 

and operational requirements, as well as develop a timeline to obtain 

those requirements. This strategy includes five key phases: (1) setting 

strategic goals and objectives, and determining constraints; (2) assessing 

risks; (3) evaluating alternatives for addressing these risks; (4) selecting 

the appropriate alternatives; and (5) implementing the alternatives and 

monitoring the progress made and results achieved. Even though DOD 

has made preliminary efforts to identify Arctic capability gaps and assess 

strategic objectives, constraints, and risks in the Arctic, DOD has not yet 

evaluated, selected, or implemented alternatives for prioritizing and 

addressing near-term Arctic capability needs. For example, DOD officials 

stated that they are at the beginning stages of assessing Arctic capability 

gaps and challenges and have not yet begun to consider potential 

alternative solutions for addressing these gaps. Alternatives could include 

GAO-08-1060 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 2008).

19GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a Strategic, RiskBased Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain Awareness, GAO-11-621 (Washington, 

D.C.: June 20, 2011).
 

Page 15 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

those that would minimize DOD investments by leveraging capabilities of 

interagency and international partners or they could also include 

submissions to DOD’s formal capabilities development process. Another 

alternative could include accepting the risk of potentially being late to 

develop these needed capabilities in order to provide limited fiscal 

resources to other priorities.

Given that the opening in the Arctic presents a wide range of challenges 

for DOD, a risk-based investment strategy and timeline can help DOD 

develop the capabilities needed to meet national security interests in the 

region. Without a risk-based investment strategy and timeline for 

prioritizing and addressing near-term Arctic capability gaps and 

challenges, which is periodically updated to reflect evolving needs, DOD 

could be slow to develop needed capabilities, potentially facing 

operational risk and higher costs if the need arises to execute plans 

rapidly. Conversely, DOD could move too early, making premature Arctic 

investments that take resources from other, more pressing needs or 

producing capabilities that could be outdated before they are used.

While DOD and DHS have established the working group to identify 

shared near-term Arctic capability gaps, this collaborative forum is not 

intended to address long-term Arctic capability gaps or identify 

opportunities for joint investments over the longer-term. DOD 

acknowledged the importance of collaboration with the Coast Guard over 

the long-term in its 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, which states that 

the department must work with the Coast Guard and DHS to develop 

Arctic capabilities to support both current and future planning and 

operations. According to DOD and Coast Guard officials, although the 

working group is primarily focused on near-term investments, it has 

discussed some mid- to long-term capability needs. However, DOD and 

Coast Guard officials stated that after the completion of the working 

group’s paper, expected in January 2012, the working group will have 

completed the tasks detailed in the Terms of Reference and will be 

dissolved. Consequently, no forum will exist to further address any mid- to 

long-term capability needs.

Although we have previously reported that there are several existing 

interagency organizations working on Arctic issues, these organizations 

do not specifically address Arctic capability needs. These organizations 

DOD and DHS Have 

Established a 

Collaborative Forum to 

Identify Potential Nearterm Investments but Not 

Long-term Needs
 

Page 16 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

include the Interagency Policy Committee on the Arctic, the Arctic Policy 

Group, and the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee, among 

others.20

While Northern Command officials stated they have plans for periodic 

reassessment of long-term capability needs, such as icebreakers or 

basing infrastructure including a deep-water port, it is not clear how those 

plans consider collaboration with the Coast Guard. For example, officials 

stated the biennial review of Northern Command’s Theater Campaign 

Plan

DOD and DHS also have long-standing memorandums of 

agreement related to coordination between DOD and the Coast Guard in 

both maritime homeland security and maritime homeland defense. The 

objectives of these interagency organizations range from developing 

coordinated research policy for the Arctic region to tracking 

implementation of national Arctic policy to identifying implementation 

gaps, but do not specifically address capability gaps in the Arctic. 

According to DOD and Coast Guard officials we spoke with, only the 

working group is focused specifically on addressing Arctic capabilities. 

After the working group completes its tasks in January 2012, there will be 

no DOD and Coast Guard organization focused specifically on reducing 

overlap and redundancies or collaborating to address Arctic capability 

gaps in support of future planning and operations, as is directed by the 

2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. 

21 and Strategic Infrastructure Master Plan22

 

20The Interagency Policy Committee on the Arctic was created in March 2010 to 

coordinate governmentwide implementation of National Security Presidential Directive 

66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25, and is co-chaired by the White House’s 

National Security Staff and Council on Environmental Quality. The Arctic Policy Group 

was established in 1971 to coordinate U.S. policy positions on international Arctic issues 

and is led by the Department of State. The Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee 

was established by the Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 to help set priorities for 

future Arctic research. In July 2010, responsibility for this committee shifted to the National 

Science and Technology Council. See 

will consider long-term 

capability and infrastructure needs. They added that the commander’s 

Arctic Estimate is reviewed annually and also considers long-term 

GAO-10-870, appendix IV for descriptions of other 

select interagency coordination efforts. 

21A theater campaign plan encompasses the activities of a supported geographic 

combatant commander, which accomplish strategic or operational objectives within a 

theater of war or theater of operations, and translates national or theater strategy into 

operational concepts and those concepts into unified action.

22A strategic infrastructure master plan identifies infrastructure requirements, installation 

and facility locations, existing or planned capabilities at each location, and required 

infrastructure improvements. 
 

Page 17 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

priorities, such as identifying a need for icebreakers. However, the 

officials stated that the Arctic Estimate does not identify how DOD would 

acquire those icebreakers or how it would coordinate with the Coast 

Guard—the operator of the nation’s icebreakers23

Our prior work has shown that collaboration with partners can help avoid 

wasting scarce resources and increase effectiveness of efforts.

—to reconstruct existing 

or build new icebreakers. The Coast Guard has a more immediate need 

to develop Arctic capabilities such as icebreakers and has taken steps to 

address some long-term capability gaps. Meanwhile, given that it could 

take approximately 10 years to develop icebreakers, the process for DOD 

and the Coast Guard to identify and procure new icebreakers would have 

to begin within the next year to ensure that U.S. heavy icebreaking 

capabilities are maintained beyond 2020.

24 Without 

specific plans for a collaborative forum between DOD and the Coast 

Guard to address long-term Arctic capability gaps and to identify 

opportunities for joint investments over the longer-term, DOD may miss 

opportunities to leverage resources with the Coast Guard to enhance 

future Arctic capabilities.

At this time, significant DOD investments in Arctic capabilities may not be 

needed, but that does not preclude taking steps to anticipate and prepare 

for Arctic operations in the future. Addressing near-term gaps is essential 

for DOD to have the key enabling capabilities it needs to communicate, 

navigate, and maintain awareness of activity in the region. An investment 

strategy that identifies and prioritizes near-term Arctic capability needs 

 

23The Navy and the Coast Guard have a long-standing memorandum of agreement 

regarding the use of the nation’s icebreakers—the Coast Guard operates the nation’s 

icebreakers and uses them, when needed, to support the Navy. The 1965 U.S. Navy-U.S. 

Treasury Memorandum of Agreement was executed to permit consolidation of the 

icebreaker fleet under one agency. That rationale was reinforced by a 1982 Roles and 

Missions Study which stated that polar icebreakers should be centrally managed by one 

agency and that the Coast Guard was the appropriate one because of the multimission 

nature of polar ice operations. This memorandum of agreement was updated in 2008. The 

signatories were DOD and DHS and the agreement included an update on responsibilities 

for coastal security.

24GAO, Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of National 

Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information Sharing, GAO-09-904SP 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 2009); and GAO, National Security: Key Challenges and 

Solutions to Strengthen Interagency Collaboration, GAO-10-822T (Washington, D.C.: 

June 9, 2010).

Conclusions
 

Page 18 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

and identifies a timeline to address them would be useful for decision 

makers in planning and budgeting. Without taking deliberate steps to 

analyze risks in the Arctic and prioritize related resource and operational 

requirements, DOD could later find itself faced with urgent needs, 

resulting in higher costs that could have been avoided.

In addition, unless DOD and DHS continue to collaborate to identify 

opportunities for interagency action to close Arctic capability gaps, DOD 

could miss out on opportunities to work with the Coast Guard to leverage 

resources for shared needs. DOD may choose to create a new 

collaborative forum or incorporate this collaboration into an existing forum 

or process. Given the different missions and associated timelines of DOD 

and the Coast Guard for developing Arctic capabilities, it is important that 

the two agencies work together to avoid fragmented efforts and reduce 

unaffordable overlap and redundancies while addressing Arctic capability 

gaps in support of future planning and operations.

To more effectively leverage federal investments in Arctic capabilities in a 

resource-constrained environment and ensure needed capabilities are 

developed in a timely way, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, 

in consultation with the Secretary of the Department of Homeland 

Security, take the following two actions:

• develop a risk-based investment strategy that: 1) identifies and 

prioritizes near-term Arctic capability needs, 2) develops a timeline for 

addressing them, and 3) is updated as appropriate; and

• establish a collaborative forum with the Coast Guard to fully leverage 

federal investments and help avoid overlap and redundancies in 

addressing long-term Arctic capability needs.

In written comments on a draft of this report, DHS concurred with both of 

our recommendations. For its part, DOD partially concurred with both of 

our recommendations. It generally agreed that the department needed to 

take action to address the issues we raised but indicated it is already 

taking initial steps to address them. DOD and DHS’s comments are 

reprinted in appendices VI and VII, respectively. Technical comments 

were provided separately and incorporated as appropriate. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 19 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

With respect to DOD’s comments on our first recommendation, DOD 

stated that its existing processes—including prioritizing Arctic capability 

needs through the Commander’s annual integrated priority lists; balancing 

those needs against other requirements through the annual planning, 

programming, budgeting, and execution system process; and addressing 

Service requirements through program objective memorandum 

submissions—enable DOD to balance the risk of being late-to-need with 

the opportunity cost of making premature Arctic investments. However, 

DOD’s response did not address how it would develop a risk-based 

investment strategy. As stated in our report, DOD has considered some 

elements of such a risk-based investment strategy by setting strategic 

goals and objectives, determining constraints, and assessing risks (such 

as Northern Command’s inclusion of two Arctic-specific capability needs 

in its fiscal years 2013 through 2017 integrated priority list). However, 

DOD has not yet conducted the remaining three phases of a risk-based 

investment strategy: evaluating alternatives for addressing these risks, 

selecting the appropriate alternatives, and implementing the alternatives 

and monitoring the progress made and results achieved. We believe that 

considering potential alternative solutions, such as leveraging the 

capabilities of interagency or international partners, could help minimize 

DOD’s investment in Arctic capabilities. DOD’s Arctic Report also 

emphasized the need for a risk-based investment strategy, noting that 

“the long lead time associated with capability development, particularly 

the procurement of space-based assets and ships, requires a deliberate 

risk-based investment strategy” and noted that “additional capability 

analysis will be required.” By developing a risk-based investment strategy 

to prioritize near-term investment needs and a timeline for addressing 

them, DOD can be better prepared in its planning and budgeting 

decisions.

With respect to our second recommendation, both DOD and DHS cited 

the importance of collaboration to develop Arctic capabilities and 

identified some existing forums that include Arctic issues, such as the 

annual Navy and Coast Guard staff talks and the joint DOD-DHS 

Capabilities Development Working Group. Our report also identified 

additional existing interagency organizations working on Arctic issues, 

and we agree that these forums can help avoid overlap and redundancies 

in addressing long-term Arctic capability needs. However, these forums 

do not specifically focus on Arctic capability needs, and no DOD and 

Coast Guard forum will be focused on reducing overlap and redundancies 

or collaborating to address Arctic capability gaps following the dissolution 

of the Arctic Capabilities Assessment Working Group in January 2012. 

We continue to believe that focusing specifically on long-term Arctic 
 

Page 20 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

capability needs will enable DOD and the Coast Guard to better leverage 

resources for shared needs. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the 

Department of Homeland Security. In addition, the report is available at 

no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staffs have questions about this report, please contact me 

at pendletonj@gao.gov or (202) 512-3489. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report 

are listed in appendix VIII. 

John H. Pendleton

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
 

Page 21 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable John McCain

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Daniel Inouye

Chairman

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon 

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W. “Bill” Young

Chairman

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 22 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

The objectives of our work were to determine the extent to which (1) the 

Department of Defense (DOD) report on the Arctic addresses the 

reporting elements specified in House Report 111-4911

To address the extent to which DOD’s report on the Arctic addresses the 

reporting elements specified in House Report 111-491, we evaluated the 

DOD Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest 

Passage (Arctic Report) issued in May 2011. We determined that the 

extent to which DOD addressed each specified element would be rated 

as either “addressed,” “partially addressed,” or “not addressed.” These 

categories were defined as follows:

and (2) DOD has 

efforts under way to identify and prioritize the capabilities needed to meet 

national security objectives in the Arctic. To gather information for both 

objectives we reviewed various DOD and Coast Guard documentation. 

We interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense; 

Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; U.S. Northern 

Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command; U.S. 

European Command; U.S. Pacific Command; U.S. Transportation 

Command; and U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps Arctic 

offices. We also interviewed Coast Guard officials to determine their 

contribution to DOD’s efforts to identify and prioritize capabilities.

• Addressed: An element is addressed when the Arctic Report explicitly 

addresses all parts of the element.

• Partially addressed: An element is partially addressed when the Arctic 

Report addresses at least one or more parts of the element, but not all 

parts of the element.

• Not addressed: An element is not addressed when the Arctic Report

did not explicitly address any part of the element.

Specifically, two GAO analysts independently reviewed and compared the 

Arctic Report with the direction in the House Report; assessed whether 

each element was addressed, partially addressed, or not addressed; and 

recorded their assessment and the basis for the assessment. The final 

assessment reflected the analysts’ consensus based on the individual 

assessments. In addition, we interviewed DOD officials involved in 

preparing the Arctic Report to discuss their interpretation of the direction 

in the House Report and the DOD report’s findings. To provide context, 

 

1

H.R. Rep. No. 111-491, at 337 (2010). This report accompanied H.R. 5136, a proposed 

bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 23 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

our assessment also reflected our review of relevant DOD and Coast 

Guard documents, as well as issues raised in recent GAO reports that 

specifically relate to some of the specified reporting elements.

To address the extent to which DOD has efforts under way to identify and 

prioritize the capabilities needed to meet national security objectives in 

the Arctic, we reviewed documentation related to DOD’s Arctic 

operations, such as the U.S. Navy’s November 2009 Arctic Roadmap, the 

February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, the U.S. European 

Command’s April 2011 Arctic Strategic Assessment, the U.S. Coast 

Guard’s July 2011 High Latitude Study, and the Navy’s September 2011 

Arctic Capabilities Based Assessment. We also interviewed officials from 

various DOD and Coast Guard offices.

We conducted this performance audit from July 2011 to January 2012 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Extent to which DOD’s Arctic Report Addressed Specified Reporting Elements 

Page 24 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

Detailed Assessment of This Element 

We determined that the Department of Defense (DOD) addressed this 

element because the Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the 

Northwest Passage (Arctic Report) includes an assessment of U.S. 

strategic national security objectives and restrictions in the Arctic. 

Specifically, the report states that DOD reviewed national-level policy 

guidance and concluded that the overarching strategic national security 

objective for the Arctic is a stable and secure region where U.S. national 

interests are safeguarded and the U.S. homeland is protected (see fig. 4 

for descriptions of the policy guidance documents DOD reviewed). The 

report further identifies two DOD strategic objectives to achieve the 

desired end-state for the Arctic: (1) prevent and deter conflict and (2) 

prepare to respond to a wide range of challenges and contingencies. In 

addition, the report identifies and examines restrictions in the Arctic. For 

example, the report states that uncertainty about the extent, impact, and 

rate of climate change in the Arctic will make it challenging to plan for 

possible future conditions in the region and to mobilize public or political 

support for investments in U.S. Arctic capabilities or infrastructure. 

Figure 4: Policy Guidance on the Arctic Identified in DOD’s Arctic Report 

Related Findings from Previous GAO Reports 

In 2010, we reported on the difficulties associated with developing 

capabilities needed to understand the extent, rate, and impact of climate 

change. Specifically, we found that while agencies have taken steps to plan 

for some continued climate observations via satellite data in the near-term, 

they lack a strategy for the long-term provision of such data.1

 

1

GAO, Environmental Satellites: Strategy Needed to Sustain Critical Climate and Space 

Weather Measurements, 

 For example, 

we reported that DOD has not established plans to restore the full set of 

capabilities intended for the National Polar-orbiting Operational 

Environmental Satellite System over the life of the program. We noted that 

without a comprehensive long-term strategy for continuing environmental 

measurements over the coming decades and a means for implementing it, 

agencies will continue to independently pursue their immediate priorities on 

an ad-hoc basis, the economic benefits of a coordinated approach to 

investments in earth observation may be lost, and our nation’s ability to 

understand climate change may be limited. 

GAO-10-456 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 2010). 

Reporting Requirement 

H. R. Rep. No. 111-491, which 

accompanied a proposed bill for 

the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (H.R. 

5136), directed DOD to submit a 

report on Arctic Operations and the 

Northwest Passage. This report is 

to include, among other things, an 

assessment of the strategic 

national security objectives and 

restrictions in the Arctic region. 

Our Assessment: 

Addressed 

Based on our assessment, we 

determined that DOD addressed 

this reporting element. 

Reporting Element 1: Strategic National 

Security Objectives and Restrictions in the 

Arctic 

Source: GAO analysis.

Arctic national security objective:

“A stable and secure region where U.S. national

interests are safeguarded and the U.S. homeland is protected.”

National Security 

Presidential

Directive 66/Homeland 

Security Presidential 

Directive 25, Arctic 

Region Policy

2010 National

Security Strategy

Executive Order

13547 Stewardship of

the Ocean, Our Coasts, 

and the Great Lakes

2010 Quadrennial 

Defense Review 

Interactivity instructions

Roll over the document name to view short description. See appendix IV for the non-interactive version.
Appendix II: Extent to which DOD’s Arctic Report Addressed Specified Reporting Elements

Page 25 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

Detailed Assessment of This Element

We determined that DOD partially addressed this element because the 

Arctic Report includes a capability gap assessment in relation to Arctic 

mission areas but does not provide a timeline to obtain such capabilities. 

Specifically, the report identifies potential Arctic capability gaps over the 

near- (2010-2020), mid- (2020-2030), and far-term (beyond 2030) that 

may affect DOD’s ability to accomplish four of nine mission areas in the 

region, including maritime domain awareness, maritime security, search 

and rescue, and sea control. The report notes that three capability gaps 

in particular have the potential to hamper Arctic operations across all 

time frames: (1) insufficient communications architecture, (2) degraded 

Global Positioning System performance, and (3) extremely limited 

domain awareness. Other key challenges identified include: shortfalls in 

ice and weather reporting and forecasting; limitations in command, 

control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and 

reconnaissance; and limited shore-based infrastructure and inventory of 

ice-capable vessels. Although DOD states in the report that capabilities 

will need to be reassessed as conditions change and gaps addressed in 

order to be prepared to operate in a more accessible Arctic, it does not 

provide a timeline for addressing capability gaps or challenges identified. 

Related Findings from Previous GAO Reports

We previously reported on the challenges DOD and Coast Guard face in 

achieving maritime domain awareness, a capability gap identified in 

DOD’s Arctic Report. For example, in 2011 we found that DOD lacks a 

strategic, risk-based approach to manage its maritime domain awareness 

efforts and to address high priority capability gaps.2 To improve DOD’s 

ability to manage the implementation of maritime domain awareness

across DOD, we recommended that DOD develop and implement a 

departmentwide strategy that: identifies objectives and roles and 

responsibilities for achieving maritime domain awareness; aligns efforts 

and objectives with DOD’s process for determining requirements and 

allocating resources; identifies capability resourcing responsibilities; and 

includes performance measures. We also recommended that DOD, in 

collaboration with other stakeholders such as the Coast Guard, perform a 

comprehensive risk-based analysis to prioritize and address DOD’s 

critical maritime capability gaps and guide future investments. DOD 

concurred with our recommendations and identified actions it is taking—

or plans to take—to address them. We also reported in 2010 that the 

Coast Guard faces challenges in achieving Arctic domain awareness, 

including inadequate Arctic Ocean and weather data, lack of 

communication infrastructure, limited intelligence information, and lack of 

a physical presence in the Arctic.3

 

2

GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a Strategic, RiskBased Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain Awareness, 

Other challenges reported include 

minimal assets and infrastructure for Arctic missions and diminishing fleet 

expertise for operating in Arctic-type conditions. 

GAO-11-621 (Washington, 

D.C.: June 20, 2011). 3

GAO, Coast Guard: Efforts to Identify Arctic Requirements Are Ongoing, but More 

Communication about Agency Planning Efforts Would Be Beneficial, GAO-10-870

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2010).

Reporting Requirement

H. R. Rep. No. 111-491, which

accompanied a proposed bill for 

the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (H.R. 

5136), directed DOD to submit a 

report on Arctic Operations and the 

Northwest Passage. This report is 

to include, among other things, an 

assessment on mission capabilities 

required to support the strategic 

national security objectives and a 

timeline to obtain such capabilities.

Our Assessment: 

Partially Addressed

Based on our assessment, we 

determined that DOD partially 

addressed this reporting element. 

Reporting Element 2: Required Mission 

Capabilities and a Timeline to Obtain Such 

Capabilities 
Appendix II: Extent to which DOD’s Arctic Report Addressed Specified Reporting Elements

Page 2 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

Detailed Assessment of This Element 

We determined that DOD addressed this element because the Arctic 

Report includes an assessment of the revised April 2011 Unified 

Command Plan that addresses the impact of aligning the Arctic Ocean 

under a single combatant commander. The April 2011 Unified Command 

Plan shifted areas of responsibility boundaries in the Arctic region. As a 

result of this realignment, responsibility for the Arctic region is now 

shared between U.S. Northern and U.S. European Commands—

previously, under the 2008 Unified Command Plan, the two commands 

and U.S. Pacific Command shared responsibility for the region, as shown 

in figure 5. In addition, the April 2011 Unified Command Plan assigned 

Northern Command responsibility for advocating for Arctic capabilities. 

The Arctic Report states that having two combatant commands 

responsible for a portion of the Arctic Ocean aligned with adjacent land 

boundaries is an arrangement best suited to achieve continuity of effort 

with key regional partners and that aligning the entire Arctic Ocean under 

a single combatant command would disrupt progress in theater security 

cooperation achieved over decades of dialogue and confidence building 

by Northern and European Commands with regional stakeholders. The 

report also notes that although having multiple combatant commands 

with responsibility in the Arctic Ocean makes coordination more 

challenging, having too few would leave out key stakeholders, diminish 

long-standing relationships, and potentially alienate important partners. 

Figure 5: Arctic Responsibilities under the Unified Command Plan: 2008 and 2011 

Reporting Requirement 

H. R. Rep. No. 111-491, which 

accompanied a proposed bill for 

the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (H.R. 

5136), directed DOD to submit a 

report on Arctic Operations and the 

Northwest Passage. This report is 

to include, among other things, an 

assessment of an amended unified 

command plan that addresses 

opportunities of obtaining continuity 

of effort in the Arctic Ocean by a 

single combatant commander. 

Our Assessment: 

Addressed 

Based on our assessment, we 

determined that DOD addressed 

this reporting element. 

Reporting Element 3: Amended Unified 

Command Plan 

Source: GAO analysis of the 2008 and 2011 Unified Command Plans.

2008 2011

Interactivity instructions

Click on each year’s map to view larger. See appendix V for the non-interactive version.

U.S. Northern Command

U.S. European Command

U.S. Pacific Command
Appendix II: Extent to which DOD’s Arctic Report Addressed Specified Reporting Elements

Page 27 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

Detailed Assessment of This Element

We determined that DOD addressed this element because the Arctic 

Report assesses the existing Arctic infrastructure to be adequate to meet 

near- (2010-2020) to mid-term (2020-2030) U.S. national security needs, 

noting that DOD does not currently anticipate a need for the construction 

of additional bases or a deep-draft port in Alaska before 2020.

Specifically, the Arctic Report examines the defense infrastructure such 

as bases, ports, and airfields needed to support DOD strategic objectives 

for the Arctic, and it discusses the environmental challenges and higher 

costs associated with construction and maintenance of Arctic 

infrastructure. It concludes that with the low potential for armed conflict in 

the region, existing DOD posture is adequate to meet U.S. defense 

needs through 2030. In addition, the report states that DOD does not 

currently anticipate a need for the construction of a deep-draft port in 

Alaska before 2020. The report does not address the basing 

infrastructure required to support long-term U.S. national security needs. 

The report notes that given the long lead times for construction of major 

infrastructure in the region, DOD will periodically reevaluate this 

assessment as activity in the region gradually increases and the 

combatant commanders update their regional plans on a regular basis. 

The report also states that one area for future assessment might be the 

need for a co-located airport and port facility suitable for deployment of 

undersea search and rescue assets but does not provide a timeline for 

completing such an assessment. 

Related Findings from Previous GAO Reports

Our prior work has identified the high costs associated with operating and 

maintaining installations outside the contiguous United States. In 

February 2011, we reported that DOD’s posture-planning guidance does 

not require the combatant commands to compile and report 

comprehensive cost data associated with posture requirements or to 

analyze the costs and benefits of posture alternatives when considering 

changes to posture.4

 

4

GAO, Defense Management: Additional Cost Information and Stakeholder Input Needed 

to Assess Military Posture in Europe, 

We noted that without such requirements, DOD’s 

posture-planning process will continue to lack critical information that 

could be used by decision makers as they deliberate posture 

requirements and potential opportunities to obtain greater cost 

efficiencies may not be identified. We recommended that DOD revise its 

posture-planning guidance to require combatant commands to include 

the costs associated with initiatives that would alter future posture, and 

that DOD provide guidance on how the combatant commands should 

analyze the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action when 

considering proposed changes to posture. DOD agreed with our 

recommendations and identified corrective actions, but additional steps 

are needed to fully address the recommendations. These findings 

underscore the importance of DOD and Northern Command identifying 

and analyzing the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action 

associated with future defense posture in the Arctic.

GAO-11-131 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2011).

Reporting Requirement

H. R. Rep. No. 111-491, which 

accompanied a proposed bill for 

the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (H.R. 

5136), directed DOD to submit a 

report on Arctic Operations and the 

Northwest Passage. This report is 

to include, among other things, an 

assessment of the basing 

infrastructure required to support 

Arctic strategic objectives, 

including the need for a deep-water 

port in the Arctic. 

Our Assessment: 

Addressed

Based on our assessment, we 

determined that DOD addressed 

this reporting element. 

Reporting Element 4: Required Basing 

Infrastructure, Including the Need for a DeepWater Port 
Appendix II: Extent to which DOD’s Arctic Report Addressed Specified Reporting Elements

Page 28 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

Detailed Assessment of This Element

We determined that DOD partially addressed this element because the 

Arctic Report identifies current U.S. polar icebreakers, but it provides 

limited details on the status of U.S. icebreakers and does not assess the 

minimum and optimal number of icebreakers that may be needed. For 

example, the Arctic Report states that the U.S. Coast Guard owns the 

U.S. inventory of three icebreakers, while the U.S. Navy owns one icestrengthened tanker. The three U.S. icebreakers include the Healy, a 

medium-duty icebreaker with an estimated 18 years of service life 

remaining; the Polar Sea, a heavy-duty icebreaker expected to be 

decommissioned in fiscal year 2011 because of engine problems; and 

the Polar Star, a heavy-duty icebreaker expected to return to service in 

2013 with an estimated 7 to 10 years of service life remaining. The Arctic 

Report also states that DOD’s current needs are met by foreign-flagged 

commercial contract vessels or through cooperation with Canada. It 

notes that in the future, assured access in the Arctic could be met by 

means other than icebreakers, including submarines, aircraft, and icestrengthened vessels. However, the Arctic Report does not provide an 

assessment of the minimum or optimal number of icebreakers or other 

needed assets, although it does note that the U.S. Navy’s 2011 

Capabilities Based Assessment and a Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) effort to study icebreaking options in fiscal year 2012 will provide 

further information about future U.S. icebreaking needs. 

Related Findings from Other Coast Guard and DHS Reports 

In July 2011, the Coast Guard provided the High Latitude Study to 

Congress, which concluded that the Coast Guard requires six heavy and 

four medium icebreakers to fulfill its statutory mission requirements and 

the Navy’s presence requirements in the polar regions. The report also 

identified six scenarios for meeting needs in the Arctic that include 

capabilities beyond icebreakers, such as non-icebreaker cutters and 

aircraft. The DHS Office of the Inspector General also reported in 

January 2011 that the Coast Guard is unable to meet its current Arctic 

mission requirements with existing icebreaking resources, including 

providing DOD with assured access to the region, and without funding for 

new icebreakers or service life extensions for existing icebreakers with 

sufficient lead time, the U.S. will lose all polar icebreaking capabilities by 

2029. However, as we have previously reported, given the uncertainty 

about the Coast Guard’s long-term budget outlook, it may be a significant 

challenge for the Coast Guard to obtain these Arctic capabilities.

5

 

5

 In 

November 2011, the Coast Guard provided to Congress a report that

assessed options for recapitalizing its existing icebreaker fleet. The 

report found that the most cost effective option is to build two new heavy 

icebreakers, while performing minimal maintenance to keep the existing 

icebreakers operational while construction is taking place. However, the 

report noted that acquiring two new heavy icebreakers through the Coast 

Guard budget would have significant adverse impact on all Coast Guard

activities, and concluded that the recapitalization of the polar icebreaker 

fleet cannot be funded within the Coast Guard budget.

GAO-10-870. 

Reporting Requirement

H. R. Rep. No. 111-491, which 

accompanied a proposed bill for 

the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (H.R. 

5136), directed DOD to submit a 

report on Arctic Operations and the 

Northwest Passage. This report is 

to include, among other things, an 

assessment of the status of and 

need for icebreakers to determine 

whether icebreakers provide 

important or required mission 

capabilities to support Arctic 

strategic national security 

objectives, and an assessment of 

the minimum and optimal number 

of icebreakers that may be needed. 

Our Assessment: 

Partially Addressed

Based on our assessment, we 

determined that DOD partially 

addressed this reporting element. 

Figure 6: Polar Sea in Dry-Dock

Reporting Element 5: Status of and Need for 

Icebreakers, Including an Assessment of the 

Minimum and Optimal Number of Icebreakers
Appendix III: Change in Summer Minimum Ice 

Extent from 2001 to 2011, Compared with the 

1979 to 2000 Median Minimum Ice Extent 

Page 29 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

Appendix III: Change in Summer Minimum 

Ice Extent from 2001 to 2011, Compared with 

the 1979 to 2000 Median Minimum Ice Extent
Appendix III: Change in Summer Minimum Ice 

Extent from 2001 to 2011, Compared with the 

1979 to 2000 Median Minimum Ice Extent 

Page 30 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 
Appendix III: Change in Summer Minimum Ice 

Extent from 2001 to 2011, Compared with the 

1979 to 2000 Median Minimum Ice Extent 

Page 31 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 
Appendix IV: Policy Guidance on the Arctic 

Identified in DOD’s Arctic Report 

Page 32 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

Appendix IV: Policy Guidance on the Arctic 

Identified in DOD’s Arctic Report
Appendix V: Arctic Responsibilities under the 

Unified Command Plan: 2008 and 2011

Page 33 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

Appendix V: Arctic Responsibilities under the 

Unified Command Plan: 2008 and 2011
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 34 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

Appendix VI: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 35 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 36 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 37 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

Appendix VII: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security 
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 38 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 
Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 39 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report 

were Suzanne Wren (Assistant Director), Susan Ditto, Nicole Harms, 

Timothy Persons, Steven Putansu, Frank Rusco, Jodie Sandel, Amie 

Steele, and Esther Toledo.

Stephen L. Caldwell (Director), Dawn Hoff (Assistant Director), and

Elizabeth Kowalewski contributed expertise on the Department of 

Homeland Security and Coast Guard.

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 40 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

Coast Guard: Observations on Arctic Requirements, Icebreakers, and 

Coordination with Stakeholders. GAO-12-254T. Washington, D.C.: 

December 1, 2011.

Climate Change Adaptation: Federal Efforts to Provide Information Could 

Help Government Decision Making. GAO-12-238T. Washington, D.C.: 

November 16, 2011.

Coast Guard: Action Needed as Approved Deepwater Program Remains 

Unachievable. GAO-12-101T. Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2011.

Polar Satellites: Agencies Need to Address Potential Gaps in Weather 

and Climate Data Coverage. GAO-11-945T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 23, 2011.

Climate engineering: Technical status, future directions, and potential 

responses. GAO-11-71. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2011.

Homeland Defense: Actions Needed to Improve DOD Planning and 

Coordination for Maritime Operations. GAO-11-661. Washington, D.C.: 

June 23, 2011.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a Strategic, 

Risk-Based Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain Awareness. 

GAO-11-621. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2011.

Defense Management: Perspectives on the Involvement of the 

Combatant Commands in the Development of Joint Requirements. 

GAO-11-527R. Washington, D.C.: May 20, 2011.

Coast Guard: Observations on Acquisition Management and Efforts to 

Reassess the Deepwater Program. GAO-11-535T. Washington, D.C.: 

April 13, 2011.

Defense Management: Additional Cost Information and Stakeholder Input 

Needed to Assess Military Posture in Europe. GAO-11-131. Washington, 

D.C.: February 3, 2011.

Coast Guard: Efforts to Identify Arctic Requirements Are Ongoing, but 

More Communication about Agency Planning Efforts Would Be 

Beneficial. GAO-10-870. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2010.

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 41 GAO-12-180 Arctic Capabilities 

Environmental Satellites: Strategy Needed to Sustain Critical Climate and 

Space Weather Measurements. GAO-10-456. Washington, D.C.: April 27, 

2010.

Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of 

National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information 

Sharing. GAO-09-904SP. Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2009.

Defense Acquisitions: DOD’s Requirements Determination Process Has 

Not Been Effective in Prioritizing Joint Capabilities. GAO-08-1060. 

Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2008.

Coast Guard: Condition of Some Aids-to-Navigation and Domestic 

Icebreaking Vessels Has Declined; Effect on Mission Performance 

Appears Mixed. GAO-06-979. Washington, D.C.: September 22, 2006.

Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance 

and Results Act. GAO/GGD-96-118. Washington, D.C.: June 1996.

(351635)
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