AlA Global Perspective of

Successes, Failures, and Prospects

Qaida

Edited by

Norman Cigar and Stephanie E. Kramer

after Ten Years of War
after Ten Years of War

Al-Qaida

A Global Perspective of Successes,

Failures, and Prospects

Marine Corps University Press

Quantico, Virginia

MARINE CORPS

U N I V E R S I T Y P R E S S

Edited by

Norman Cigar and Stephanie E. Kramer
This project was sponsored by Marine Corps University, the Minerva

Initiative, and the Marine Corps University Foundation.

Published by

Marine Corps University Press

3078 Upshur Avenue

Quantico, VA

22134

www.tecom.usmc.mil/mcu/mcupress

1st Printing, 2011

PCN 10600008400

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this book are solely those of the authors. They do not

necessarily reflect the opinions of the organizations for which they work,

Marine Corps University, the U.S. Marine Corps, the Department of the

Navy, or the U.S. government.

About the Minerva Initiative at Marine Corps University

The Minerva Initiative is a Department of Defense program that supports

university-based social science research in areas of strategic interest to the

U.S. government. Marine Corps University has been selected to continue

research on terrorist organizations and ideologies. For more information

about the Minerva program, go to http://minerva.dtic.mil/.

MARINE CORPS

U N I V E R S I T Y
Contents

Preface...........................................................................................................................................v

1. Keynote Address: The Deep Fight................................................................................1

General Michael V. Hayden, USAF (Ret.)

2. Al-Qaida’s War with the United Nations and the State System......................15

Christopher C. Harmon

3. Al-Qaida’s Theater Strategy: Waging a World War .............................................35

Norman Cigar

4. East Africa and the Horn................................................................................................55

David H. Shinn

5. The State of Al-Qaida in Southeast Asia Ten Years since 9/11 ......................83

Adam Dolnik

6. Al-Qaida and Terrorism in the Arab East: Rise, Decline,

and the Effects of Doctrine Revisions and the Arab Revolutions.................101

Amr Abdalla and Arezou Hassanzadeh

7. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb..............................................................................129

Ricardo René Larémont

8. Al-Qaida and Central Asia: A Slowly Developing

and Multipurpose Presence..........................................................................................151

Michael F. Scheuer

9. Power by Proxy: Al-Qaida in Pakistan....................................................................161

Haider Ali Hussein Mullick

10. Toward a Differential Analysis of Al-Qaida and the Jihadist

Terrorist Threat to Western European Nations.................................................181

Fernando Reinares

11. Al-Qaida and the United States: A Panel Presentation..................................193

Peter Bergen

Contributors...........................................................................................................................203

Preface | v

The papers that follow are the proceedings of the Marine Corps University

conference “Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War: A Global Perspective of Successes,

Failures, and Prospects.” Our intent in holding this conference was to

comprehend the multidimensional aspects of Al-Qaida’s threat in various

theaters where it has operated over the past decade since the events of 11

September 2001, or where it may still do so in the future. We sought a net

assessment of what Al-Qaida has done successfully and where it has failed in

different parts of the world in order to develop a better understanding of how

to deal more effectively with the challenge that Al-Qaida still poses for

international security.

We were fortunate to be able to host a broad spectrum of leading authorities on

Al-Qaida from both the United States and the regions under discussion who

represented academia, the government, the military, think tanks, and the media.

The intent was to use a comparative regional approach to benefit from the

expertise of the participants on each geographic/cultural theater in order to

bring into focus Al-Qaida’s objectives, strategy, and policy over the past decade

and to provide guideposts for Al-Qaida’s future activity in those regions.

Understanding the particular dynamics of each theater and how each theater

contributes to Al-Qaida’s overall strategy can help clarify the needs for

continuing security efforts, as well as help define the roles that the Marine

Corps, other agencies in the U.S. government, and our friends and allies must

continue to play.

General Michael V. Hayden, USAF (Ret.), who has held posts as director,

Central Intelligence Agency; director, National Security Agency; and principal

deputy director of National Intelligence, delivered an insightful keynote address,

synthesizing the progress made against Al-Qaida over the past decade and

providing insights into future prospects in the continuing war. Two

presentations addressed the basic ideological and geopolitical framework

Preface
vi | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

underlying the strategic culture of central Al-Qaida’s leadership, focusing in

particular on Al-Qaida’s military strategy and its hostility toward the

international system.

The succeeding panels each had a regional focus, and speakers were asked to

address a common framework of issues for their geographic areas of expertise.

The key issues—Al-Qaida’s objectives; organizational structure; strategy;

targeting; reasons for successes and failures against U.S., international, and local

interests; and likely future prospects—provided a common approach aimed at

the formation of a comprehensive assessment as well as a vehicle to highlight

the distinctive elements of each region.

One key factor that emerged from the various presentations was the sheer

variety of issues, leaderships, local security environments, and prospects for the

local groups that are affiliated with Al-Qaida in some way. The complexity of

the challenge underlines the need for a complex response, modulated to

respond to the particular shape and activity of central Al-Qaida and affiliated

groups in different theaters.

Other key judgments were that Al-Qaida continues to harbor implacable

hostility toward the international system, the United States, Israel, and many

local governments; that the central Al-Qaida leadership operates according to

concrete long-range plans, although the effectiveness of such plans is often

undermined by flawed assumptions and an inability to implement on the

ground; that the nature of the relationship between the central Al-Qaida

leadership and individual regional branches, affiliates, and allies varies

considerably in terms of levels of ideological and financial dependence,

command and control architecture, and unity of purpose; that Al-Qaida’s

response to the ongoing Arab Spring has been unsure and ineffective; that local

grievances and issues are likely to favor the continuation of the existence of

groups adhering to or cooperating with Al-Qaida; that Al-Qaida, although

considerably weakened over the past decade by successful countermeasures by

the United States and regional states, remains a threat that is far from negligible;

that Al-Qaida’s strikes will likely be small, diffuse, and hard to detect, rather

than large 9/11-style attacks; that fragile states, in particular, continue to be

vulnerable to potential inroads by Al-Qaida and of concern for local and

international security and stability; and that U.S. policies affecting the shape of

the end-state in theaters such as Iraq and Afghanistan raise uncertainties as to

the potential for exploitation by Al-Qaida.
The conference was held at the Gaylord National Convention Center, National

Harbor, Maryland, on 26 April 2011, just days before the death of Usama Bin

Ladin. The texts of the presentations were maintained as originally given,

although the authors were afforded the opportunity to add a postscript to

address the impact of Bin Ladin’s death.

The conference was made possible through the generosity of the Minerva

Initiative, the Marine Corps University, and the Marine Corps University

Foundation. Special thanks are extended to Dr. Amin Tarzi and Dr. Christopher

C. Harmon of the Marine Corps University for their valuable professional input

in the planning of this conference; to Lieutenant Colonel Salvatore Viscuso,

USMC, for his unstinting administrative involvement in its execution; and to

Major General Thomas M. Murray, USMC, president of Marine Corps

University, and Dr. Jerre W. Wilson, vice president for academic affairs, Marine

Corps University, for their support and encouragement at every stage of the

process. Finally, the Marine Corps University Press provided indispensible

assistance in publishing these proceedings. Thanks are extended to Andrea L.

Connell and James M. Caiella for their editorial contributions, to Rob Kocher

for his work on the book’s design, and especially to Shawn H. Vreeland for his

expert editorial work and overall management of the process from beginning

to end.

Preface | vii

Keynote Address | 1

MAJOR GENERAL THOMAS MURRAY: Now it’s my honor and truly a

pleasure to introduce our keynote speaker for today, General Michael V.

Hayden. General Hayden’s one of those individuals, rare as it may be at this

point, who has really dedicated his entire adult life to the service of our country.

He spent more than 40 years in the United States Air Force and reached the

pinnacle of command and leadership in the Air Force, holding positions such

as commander of the Air Intelligence Agency and the Joint Command and

Control Warfare Center.

Following his time in the Air Force, he was named as a director of the National

Security Agency, holding that position longer than anyone else, and turning

what used to be referred to as “no such agency” into an entity that was much

more open and well understood. Following that, [from] 2005 to 2006, [he] was

named as the deputy director of national intelligence and had oversight of all

of our nation’s intelligence assets. And then finally, at least for the time being,

from 2006 to 2009, was named the director of the CIA [Central

Intelligence Agency].

Basically, if it has anything to do with intelligence, General Hayden was not

only involved, but was at the forefront of it.

GENERAL MICHAEL HAYDEN: Well, good morning, and thanks for the

opportunity to be with you here this morning. I look out and see so many

familiar faces and I must admit I’m somewhat intimidated that I’ve come up

1

Keynote Address:

The Deep Fight

General Michael V. Hayden, USAF (Ret.)

Introductory Remarks by

Major General Thomas M. Murray, USMC

President, Marine Corps University
2 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

here [to] be the keynote speaker and set the table for what are bound to be

some really fascinating panels this afternoon.

I’ve been tasked to do what my friends in the State Department call the

“Chapeau” presentation. Not being from the State Department, I’ll use what my

Army friends call it: I get to do “big hand, little map,” in terms of Al-Qaida after

10 years. You’re going to drill down on specific areas, with very well organized

panels through the course of the day. And so much of what I have said will be

unsaid or implied, but I hope I succeed in at least setting the table for the deeper

discussions that follow.

Well, let me begin with a conversation I had several years [ago] now; it was

August of 2008. I was still director and I was speaking with Joby Warrick of the

Washington Post. Joby, frankly, I believe is a very good journalist; he covered the

intelligence beat for the Post at the time. And I was doing, as I have been warned

I am doing this morning, an on-the-record presentation to Joby about Al-Qaida

and other things with regard to the agency—and he just point blank said, “On

this war on terror, how are we doing?”

And [he] caught me off guard just a second, and I kind of double clutched and

simply responded, “Well, frankly, Joby, not too badly.” And I rattled off three

or four things that I’ll repeat for you now, and then maybe perhaps bring those

data points forward into the future to the current day.

First thing I said was “not too badly”; Al-Qaida has suffered near strategic defeat

in Iraq. Most importantly, knowing full well what the [Marine] Corps had done

in Al-Anbar Province, what the agency had worked very hard with the Marines

to do in Anbar—one of the finest, most heartfelt notes I ever got as director was

from—was one handwritten from [Lieutenant] General [John F.] Sattler at the

end of his tour there. Nonetheless, Al-Qaida was fundamentally defeated in

Anbar and in Iraq by Sunni Arab arms, who have rejected both the vision and

the tactics of Al-Qaida.

I went on to say they had suffered, what to my eyes was strategic defeat in Saudi

Arabia. They had made a great tactical error, breaking what [seemed] to have

been an implied cease-fire in the kingdom: [a tacit agreement] that there will

be a certain presence perhaps permitted, but there will be no violence within the

kingdom.

When they broke that compact and began violence, if you recall, against

Western housing areas and so on, Mohammad Bin Nayef, the head of Saudi
Keynote Address | 3

Mabahith (Saudi Intelligence)—whom I have the highest regard for—created a

list. I think it was [a] pretty long list, about a hundred names of folks that had

to be, as we euphemistically say, “taken off the battlefield.” And Prince

Mohammad [Bin Nayef], over the next several months, took them all—all—off

the battlefield. And then he created another list and did the same thing.

I pointed out to Joby in this conversation in August 2008 that we had begun to

put great pressure on Al-Qaida main in Pakistan and that an awful lot of the

Al-Qaida senior leadership were spending more of their waking moments

worried about their own survival than they were thinking about threatening

your or my survival.

And finally I said, “And Joby, globally there are now authentic voices within

Islam who are challenging both the vision—caliphate—and the tactics—terror—of

Al-Qaida. So, all in all, not bad.”

Now if you ask me that today—and I know there may be points of disagreement

and I’m not, please, I’m not trying to be Pollyannaish; I’m going to bring up

some very dark clouds here in a few minutes—but if you ask me the question

again today, I think I’d say “not bad.”

And I think it’s not bad—and here’s a point I’d like to dwell on just for a moment

because it has to do with Al-Qaida, but it has more to do with us—it’s not bad

because there has been amazing continuity in this conflict between the 43rd

and the 44th presidents of the United States. I’m going to mention some

discontinuities here in a few minutes, but let me just rattle off the continuities:

indefinite detention, military commissions, the opposition to the extension of

the writ of habeas corpus to prisoners that we keep in Bagram in Afghanistan,

[and] state secrets.

The [Barack H.] Obama administration, although there’ve been some

differences in style, has been as aggressive in invoking the states secrets

documents—or doctrine—in a variety of court cases as was the [George W.] Bush

administration. Frankly, since I’m personally named in several of those court

cases, I’m really delighted they’re still invoking state secrets.

Secondly, Congressional notification. [With] this administration, it had to do

with covert action. This administration was as prepared as the last

administration to veto an intelligence authorization bill that actually put the

power of who in Congress would be notified about a covert action into the

hands of the Congress as opposed to the hands of the president. The language
that the administration used in publicizing its veto threat . . . could have been

written four, five, eight years ago.

We continue targeted killings. And most importantly, the most fundamental

continuity is that this president, like his predecessor, has simply said, “We are a

nation at war. We are at war with Al-Qaida and its affiliates.”

Now, there’ve been discontinuities. Some of you may have read an op-ed or

two that I may have penned about discontinuities. There was the effort to

close[the] Guantanamo [Bay detention facility], which of course is not going

[to] happen any time soon. There was the whole question of civilian trials in

Manhattan, which of course are not going to happen any time soon.

And then there’s the question of interrogations. Two days after he was

inaugurated, President Obama published an executive order ending the CIA

interrogation program. It actually had been a successful program. We learned a

great deal about Al-Qaida from that very limited, very targeted, very focused

effort that had gone on since 2002. At the time that President Obama issued that

executive order, I actually wrote a letter to the CIA workforce—and it’s still

available on the CIA website, cia.gov; just go back to “Director Letters” and

click on January 2009 and go to January 22nd or January 23rd and it’s still there—

and there you have me saying we have gotten precisely what it is we expect and

deserve to get from the chief executive. We have gotten clear instructions.

The president has given us the new box. It’s a little different from the old box,

but he has given us the box. And we will now be as aggressive inside the new

box—as those of you who are looking up here can see, the new box is a little

smaller than the old box—we will be as aggressive inside the new box as we

were inside the old box to defend the republic. That’s how I felt then, that’s

how I feel now. The most important thing we needed from the president

was clarity.

But I actually thought we were going to get a new interrogation program too.

And frankly—some of you may disagree, and I’d be happy to hear your

disagreements in the Q&A—we don’t have one. I do not know of an Al-Qaida

terrorist captured outside of Iraq or Afghanistan who is or has been in American

custody since January of 2009. We have been, as our default option, killing

terrorists rather than capturing them. Not that I mind killing them; it’s useful in

the war, and frankly, satisfying. But tactically, in all instances, it may not be the

most optimal solution.

4 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
But that said—now, I apologize for having dwelled on the discontinuities,

because my main point is the powerful continuities between the two presidents.

I gave a talk at the German embassy—I was director for about a year, so it

would’ve been the spring of 2007. The Germans were in the chair of the

European Union at the time. Ambassador [Klaus] Scharioth, the German

ambassador, would have—I have to say this carefully to be precise—all the

ambassadors to the United States from the states of the European Union over

for lunch every other week, and the ambassador, Ambassador Scharioth, would

have an American government official come in to talk, and it was my turn. He’d

invited me to come as director of CIA, and I decided, all right, well, this is pretty

interesting; it’s going to be a very fine meal, so let me earn my keep here. Let’s

talk about renditions, detentions, and interrogations to the gathered

ambassadors of the European Union.

Now, I had a wonderful staff at CIA. They did great speeches. It was rare that

I didn’t pull out a pen and change an adverb or two and suggest a point or

something, but this is a speech that I actually spent a fair amount of time on

personally. And I still recall—I actually reread it a week or two ago—I still recall

a paragraph, about page two or three:

Let me tell you, so that there’s no misunderstanding, what I believe, what

my agency believes, and what I believe my country believes. We are a nation

at war. We are at war with Al-Qaida and its affiliates. This war is global in

scope and I can only fulfill my responsibilities to the citizens of my republic

by taking this fight to this enemy wherever he may be.

Two points: one, no other country represented in that room agreed with any

of these four sentences. Second point: President Obama clearly does. After that

paragraph that I just kind of air quoted for you, I still recall the next line I gave:

“So please, do not be confused, this is not about Texas, this is about America.”

And frankly, I think that’s true.

So, going back to Joby’s question to me several years ago and that he repeated

to me today: how we are doing. I said not so bad—not too badly. And we’re not

doing too badly because I think we’ve got an American solution to this. There

has been continuity between two presidents, [but] you know as well as I—and

you’re probably going to fill up the rest of the day with this part of the

discussion—you know as well as I, this has not been an unqualified success.

We’ve got issues. It’s been really quite interesting.

Keynote Address | 5
[So], as director and in my second life, which cloud is most dark? I can assure

you, when I became director in May 2006, it was all Iraq, all the time. And I used

to love going to Afghanistan because everything there seemed to be so much

more clear, and things were going so well. And of course, over time, Iraq seemed

to get on a fairly even course, and it was all about Afghanistan. Frankly—and this

has somewhat happened since I’ve left government, although you can see it in

my last 12 months there—frankly, now the dark cloud really is Pakistan and

what’s going on there, or what’s not going on there.

The Pakistani state—and I have good friends there, [and] many of you do as

well—the Pakistani state is under tremendous stress. I mean, down to the core

of the essence, what constitutes Pakistan? That kind of existential stress.

Husain Haqqani is the Pakistani ambassador to the United States. Before he

was ambassador, Ambassador Haqqani was a journalist. He actually wrote a

history of Pakistan, entitled Between Mosque and Military. I think it’s a wonderful

title and it’s a wonderful book, and it points out what Pakistan does when it is

under stress, as it is now. And when it’s under stress, it turns to two solution sets:

one is the military—and they’ve tried that course of action several times in its

history, and they are not going there at the moment—the other is [the] mosque.

And I think you can see from even the press accounts of what’s going on in

Pakistan, there has seemed to have been a lurch in the direction of the mosque,

and there are elements of that—I’m choosing my words precisely here—and there

are elements of that that make this overall problem we have mutually with them

more difficult to solve.

So I said, not unqualified success, and it’s not an unqualified success because

Al-Qaida is a learning, adaptive enemy. You’re all going to talk about, I know,

the growth in importance of franchises. You’re going to talk about Al-Qaida in

the Horn of Africa, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, and I know you’re going

to talk about Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula.

You know, when I was director, I could say without qualification, “Every known

threat to the United States has threads, multiple threads that take it back to the

tribal region of Pakistan.” And that was true, even in retrospect, looking at the

time when I was director. That’s an absolute truth.

And then on Christmas Day 2009, we were attacked; the homeland was

attacked. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, Schiphol-Detroit, Northwest flight,

6 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
Christmas Day. We were attacked with no threads to Al-Qaida main. No

threads back to the tribal region of Pakistan. We were attacked from a franchise.

I talked to Mike [E.] Leiter and other folks at the National Counterterrorism

Center. There is an echo—this is me talking now, not Mike, OK, so please don’t

impute this to him—remember back in 2001, why didn’t you guys warn us? And

if you were in government at that time, if you were in the intel community, I

mean, [then–CIA Director] George [J.] Tenet was right. The system was

blinking red. I don’t know how many imminent warnings we issued from NSA

[National Security Agency] during the summer of 2001. But we failed in our

imagination. I don’t think it was failure of intellect, it was a failure of imagination

to believe that, although the dashboard was blinking red, that the attack was

coming here.

Same thing in 2009. We knew Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula was up to

something. Dashboard kind of blinking red. But as in 2001, [we had] a failure

of imagination that a franchise would actually be conducting an attack on the

homeland.

So that’s an adaptation. Again, Al-Qaida: a learning, adaptive enemy.

There’s another adaptation which I know you’re going to talk about in the

Western panel. And this has to do with the self-radicalized conducting what

you and I would call low-level attacks. If I can just beg your indulgence—by the

way, you should note that although with close to 40 years in an American

military uniform, I am up here without PowerPoint slides. I just want you to

know that.

But if I did have a slide, this is the moment when I would say, “slide, please.”

And since I don’t, I’m going to do hand puppets up here, so you need to pay

attention. Now—no, really.

All right. [Gen Hayden holds out his left arm to the side, parallel to the floor]

If you imagine that this is what we’ve been doing—which I’ve said has been not

bad; “Joby, we’re doing OK”—this is the level of effort in its totality. This is what’s

happening at Dulles and [Reagan] National [airports], this is what’s happening

in the FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas], this—I mean, just the totality

of the American effort.

Keynote Address | 7
If you look at the preferred Al-Qaida means of attack, the preferred Al-Qaida

attack, this spectacular, mass-casualty assault against the iconic target—they’re

up here [Gen Hayden gestures to the space above his outstretched arm]: 9/11,

World Trade Center 1, East Africa embassies, Bojinka, the multiple airliners

over the Pacific, the 2006 liquid explosive plot coming out of Great Britain1—you

know, the reason we can’t take liquids through the lines anymore—OK, they’re

all up here.

And believe me—an intelligence officer never says never, and so I’m not saying

this could never happen—but this is really hard for them to do this now. These

[plots] are complicated, they’re complex, they’re relatively slow moving, and

they have multiple threads. And we’re good enough now, we grab this thread,

that thread, this thread over here—we start rolling that thing up, and pretty soon

we’ve got a fur ball right there in the middle of our desk, and we have a pretty

good idea of what’s going on, and we disrupt the plot.

I mentioned I became director in 2006; that was just as the airliner plot—the

hydrogen peroxide plot—was blossoming in Great Britain. I became director,

they sat me down, and we spent a couple hours, and they were telling me

everything we knew about this. Again, I don’t want to sound arrogant, but in a

sense, we kind of owned the plot. The only argument we had with our British

counterparts was, “When are you guys going [to] arrest these people”? With

the British wanting it to run a bit further for the ultimate court case, and we’re

kind of wringing our hands on this side of the Atlantic saying, “But they bought

the hydrogen peroxide.”

Hard to do. We’ve been successful. As a measure of our success, now look below

Hayden’s arm [General Hayden gestures to the area below his outstretched

arm]: Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Detroit guy; Najibullah Zazi, [the] guy

driving from Denver to the New York metro station; [U.S. Army] Major [Nidal]

1 “9/11” refers to the 11 September 2001 attacks; “World Trade Center 1” is a reference to the 26

February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. The “East African embassies” of the United

States in Tanzania and Kenya were bombed on 7 August 1998. The “Bojinka” plot was a largescale plan to blow up multiple airliners as they transited from Asia to the United States, and the

“2006 liquid explosive plot” relates to a plan to detonate liquid explosives on board several

airliners departing the United Kingdom.

8 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
Hasan; Faisal Shahzad, Times Square—all down here.2 This little hand puppet,

instead of a viewgraph, actually contains some really important fundamental

questions for Americans, for our policy on the War on Terror.

What do you want me to do with my left arm? You want to live with this? Or

do you want me to go down? How much more of your commerce, your

convenience, your privacy do you want me to squeeze in order to be more

capable against this flavor of plot? Put quite another way, both metaphorically

and actually, how much more do you want to take off at [Reagan]National or

at Dulles?

Second fundamental question coming out of this—look, I know that this is a

stew, all right? But the flavor in this stew is largely foreign, and largely

intelligence derived. The flavor in this stew is more domestic, and more law

enforcement derived. Are we capable of shifting our weight to be more suitable

to this flavor of threat? [Emphasis added]

Let me give you an example. The National Counterterrorism Center is actually

an American success story; I really believe that. It has improved the sharing of

information this way, up here. Left to right, between the big national threeletters: FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], CIA, NSA. [We are] much less

good at sharing it this way [from the bottom up]: federal, state and local, tribal.

Are we able to make this shift?

Finally—my left arm’s getting tired—you realize the stuff down here [area under

the “threat level arm”], that’s like penalty kicks in soccer. It doesn’t matter how

good our goalie is—and we do want a really good goalie—this ball is going in the

back of the net. This is going to happen. We need to be prepared as a people,

and our political leadership needs to be informing our people, that this indeed

will happen.

2 Often referred to as the “Underwear Bomber,” Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian, is awaiting trial for

allegedly attempting to detonate plastic explosives while on a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit

in 2009. Zazi, an Afghan American, was arrested as part of a 2009 Al-Qaida plot to conduct

suicide bombings on New York City subway trains. Major Hasan is the only suspect in the

November 2009 shootings at Ford Hood, Texas, which resulted in the death of 13 people.

Shahzad is a Pakistani American who was convicted of attempting to detonate a car bomb in

Times Square in 2010.

Keynote Address | 9
10 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

If you watch Michael Leiter’s testimony out of the NCTC [National

Counterterrorism Center]; if you watch Secretary [of Homeland Security Janet]

Napolitano’s testimony, secretary for homeland security—Mike especially, and

Secretary Napolitano a little less, directly are trying to tell folks about this, for

this reason: when this happens, we need to be careful that in our reaction, dare

I say, in our overreaction, we don’t turn what should have been a tactical defeat

for us into some sort of strategic accomplishment for our enemy, Al-Qaida.

All right, everything I’ve said in the last—looks like 17 minutes—has to do with

what we military folks in the audience would call “the close battle.” You know,

what is it we do with the guy who’s already committed to kill us coming in

over the perimeter wire? And I think all of us—certainly those of us who grew

up, matured in the ‘70s and ‘80s with the concept of Air-Land Battle—certainly

appreciate the deep fight.

Recall that? When Air-Land Battle was developed, it had to do with echelon

tank armies. It was, I’ve got to defend at the FLOT [forward line of own troops],

[I’ve] got to defend at the FEBA [forward edge of battle area], but I want to

affect tomorrow’s battle and the battle the day after by turning the second and

third and fourth echelons into digestible doses by the time they get to the

forward line of troops.

Well, in this war, the close battle is about people who are already committed to

killing us, and we have to deal with them—that’s the close fight. The deep fight

is about the production rate of those people who tomorrow or the next day

will be committed to killing us. And again, as somewhat successful as I think we

have been with regard to the [close] fight, we have almost not been on the

battlefield when it comes to the deep fight. This has been really hard for us.

Now, I’ve had this discussion with folks who have much deeper knowledge

about this than I, and I’m trying to choose my words carefully here to reflect

their concerns and if I get it imperfectly, I apologize.

But fundamentally, discussions about the deep battle, that production rate of

people who ultimately want to come kill us, rotate around the question of Islam.

And the meaning of Islam—or what people, some people, impute is the meaning

of Islam—or Islam at least provides the context within which people are

radicalized.
And that’s a really hard discussion for Americans to join, or to join with a sense

of being an authentic voice. Look, I know we’re a multicultural society, I know

we’re a society of immigrants, I know that Islam is one of the great religions

represented inside American culture, but I also know fundamentally, we’re a

Judeo-Christian culture. That fundamentally the broad contours of our culture

have been formed by Western European and black African heritage.

This isn’t like communism; remember the deep fight for communism? Hold

them at Fulda,3 make sure they don’t attack, and we’ll take them in the

ideological fight? We were a pretty authentic voice when it came to the

ideological fight with communism. For whatever else communism may have

been, it was indeed a Western philosophy, written by a German in a library in

London. We had an authentic voice there. It’s harder for us to be a legitimate

participant in the deep battle as it’s been previously defined.

But something happened. Something happened in the last three to four months.

We are all spending our evenings watching whatever newscast we watch

looking at the daily report on the events of the Arab Spring.4

It is a very difficult challenge for all of us. I actually talked to someone still in

government who’s an analyst with regard to this, and he said this [in] quite [an]

elegant way. He says, in addition to the factual uncertainty—what’s going on—

there is a values uncertainty. We’re not sure what . . . to think about what is

going on. And so as much as the Middle East is grappling with these new

phenomena, we, and our understanding, are attempting to grapple with these

new phenomena. And you know as well as I, there are multiple narratives

playing out here.

There’s oppressed/oppressor, there’s East/West, there’s Sunni/Shia, there’s

have/have nots. We are comfortable with the oppressed-oppressor, we kind of

understand that, but this is a real mélange here. Well, whatever it ultimately

becomes, however it is we figure it out, whatever it is we finally decide is the

main narrative here, some things are already clear. It’s a narrative that Al-Qaida

must reject, because Al-Qaida rejects the nation-state; Al-Qaida rejects the

3 Fulda Gap, the area between the East German border and Frankfurt, West Germany, during

the Cold War.

4 The Arab Spring, or Arab Awakening, is a series of demonstrations and revolutions in the

Middle East and North Africa that began in December 2010

Keynote Address | 11
12 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

political process; Al-Qaida thinks the current world order is illegitimate; AlQaida rejects the state monopoly on power, which is kind of—since the Treaty

of Westphalia—how we’ve viewed the use of power in civilized societies.

This is a narrative with some great promise. It’s also a narrative we know

something about. It’s a narrative in which we actually can be an authentic voice.

We know a little bit about pluralism. We know a little bit about fundamental

rights. We know a little bit about individual freedoms. We know a little bit about

government transparency. We know a little bit about government accountability.

If this moves in the direction it seems to be moving, as turbulent as it is, it seems

to be redefining at least a portion of the deep fight, one which has some hopeful

ray of light in it, for the purposes of our discussion here this morning.

This is not without problems. In terms of the immediate future—and this is

measured in months, not weeks—we’ve got a bunch of really good

counterterrorism partners who, at the very best, are distracted. In addition, if

you believe a little bit of what I suggested earlier about Al-Qaida and what

we’ve done—if I were British, I’d say, “you know, they’re a bit on their back foot”;

since I’m an American, I’d probably say, in smaller groups, that “they’re back on

another part of their body.”

This gives them a chance, like little prairie dogs, they kind of look out from the

hole, and—to badly mix my metaphors here—catch a second wind to get a little

space within which to operate. So this is not an unqualified blessing for us, but

over the longer term, much of what is happening now in the Middle East has

to be a fundamental threat to Al-Qaida at its existential base.

Look, there are a lot more things we could cover. I’m going to toss out just

some lingering questions. I mean, frankly, these are questions I’d like to have the

answer to. After all this time in government, [as] director of the CIA, I can ask

any number of analysts to come on by and sit with me and tell me about this

and that. I still have some fundamental questions. Let me give you one. Some

people have written that fundamentally, this is about the Middle East and its

clash with modernity, and how it accommodates it. Others write this is Islam

and its clash with modernity.

I’m a Christian. Christianity went through this cycle, middle of the seventeenth

century. Thirty Years’ War, followed by Renaissance, Reformation,

Enlightenment. The question I have to ask is, that arc that Christianity seemed
to follow, moving a bit from a more to a less transcendental kind of religion—is

that the arc all monotheisms will follow? Or is that a peculiarly Western

European phenomenon and one which we have no right to expect should be

followed by any other great monotheism? I don’t know, but the answer’s kind

of important.

You know, there’s another whole way of looking at the problem, and I actually

began to get some briefings on this before I left government, and I’d love to

follow up. Put aside where we are and what we’re doing. Focus like a laser on

Al-Qaida and compare Al-Qaida to the expected life cycle of any revolutionary

movement. In other words, Al-Qaida as an idea, Al-Qaida as a discontinuity—

we’ve seen these before. There’s a pattern. Let me give you the shorthand:

where’s Al-Qaida in its life cycle? I’d like to see some scholarship on that.

Remember the left hand, and down here, and Najibullah Zazi, and Faisal

Shahzad, and so on, when you kind of turn the page back, and say, why are

these guys doing this? What’s motivating them? I’m beginning to think this has

a lot more to do with the Crips and the Bloods than it does with the holy

Quran, that this may be about the same kind of motivation that animates kids

to join gangs, and has very little to do with any kind of theology. It’s about

youthful alienation and the longing to belong to something, anything.

So how does that play into the deep fight and the production rate of people

who want to come kill us? Mike Leiter—I keep quoting Mike, so you must get

the impression I think very highly of him—Michael was asked a question in a

recent hearing: where is the most serious threat to the American homeland

coming from these days? And he said, unqualifiedly, it’s coming from Yemen.

It’s AQAP [Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula].

OK. So what’s going on with Al-Qaida main? What’s their role in all of this?

I was up at West Point for their counterterrorism center there that works only

on unclassified documents. About a year or so ago, they gave me a hypothesis.

Al-Qaida main is like IBM Solutions. They’re now a consulting service. What

they give to the franchises are the name, legitimacy, some financing, some

expert advice—they’re the after-action report guys, the keepers of doctrine, and

I don’t mean doctrine just in religious doctrine, but in operational art kind of

doctrine—“we don’t do the terror, we make the terror better.”

Keynote Address | 13
14 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

I don’t know. But I will tell you this: when pressure was increased on Al-Qaida

main, beginning, oh, pick a date, July 7, 2008, and much of their senior

leadership had been taken off the battlefield, we expected them to move. We

were all prepared for Al-Qaida main going for a safer haven than the tribal

region we projected would become. They haven’t. They’ve stayed. We actually

thought: standing by, get them on the move, they’re vulnerable when they’re

moving, this is the time for us to really begin to sweep up. Maybe that’s why

they didn’t move. I don’t know, but they haven’t. Even under great pressure.

So what’s the role of Al-Qaida main? One or two other [points], and I’ll stop.

I’ve been suggesting some pretty fundamental questions here, questions that

deserve very candid discussions, very honest dialogue.

I am troubled sometimes by the care or, dare I say, the over-care by which we

sometimes try to describe these events. I don’t know whether I’m allowed to say

“Islamic extremism” anymore. I don’t know if I can use the word “jihad,” I don’t

know if I can say “jihadist”—they use it, but I’ve said it a couple of times. I know

we need to be careful with our language, but we need not be so careful that we

confuse ourselves. And so, as we get to these fundamental questions, I think

that basic honesty about what constitutes language and how we express it is

needed.

And finally, back to the theme I started, you know, “Turning to the Deep Fight”

was actually the title of this. I know how we fight the close fight does affect

how the deep fight goes, that we can take actions here in the close battle that

make it easier or harder to win the deeper battle. Now personally, with my own

life experience, I’m willing to be quite tough here in the close fight. And others

have argued that some of the things we’ve done, being what I call tough in the

close fight, have made the deep fight tougher. I understand the arguments. I’m

not willing to judge who’s right or who’s wrong.

But I do know this fight [the close fight] does have a bit of a shaping function

for that one [the deep fight]. The question I leave with you—what is the

relationship and how much freedom of action do we think we have here, with,

after all, folks who are already committed to kill us, in order to make this part

of the conflict more easy for us to achieve success?

Well, as I promised, not many answers and fairly personal experience here. But

I hope I have set the table for what I know will be far more detailed, far more

scholarly addresses of these kinds of questions. And with that I will stop.
The International System | 15

Political scientists often term countries working within the international system—

and at ease with it—as “status quo powers.” Their opposites—looking for

expansion or a greater share of power—are termed “revisionist” or even

“revolutionary” powers. Al-Qaida may be a substate actor, but it is confident

enough, ideologically cohesive, active through members and affiliates in dozens

of countries, and strong enough to be considered a “revisionist power.”

This proposition may deserve attention. For all the bales of writing—much of it

quite good—about Al-Qaida and its affiliates, there are scarcely a few words in

the English-language materials1 about the intense distaste Al-Qaida harbors for

the United Nations (UN) and for the international system of states. Some of

what follows will not surprise academic experts on Islam or Islamism, but for

most readers, this essay may help fill a gap in our understanding of the enemy

2

Al-Qaida’s War with the

United Nations and the

State System

Christopher C. Harmon

Aren’t our tragedies actually a result of the United Nations’ actions?

—Usama Bin Ladin, 3 November 2001

Any author finds it easy to give away his books once they are written. It is harder to elicit sound

critical commentary on rough drafts. Thus, my eagerness to thank four friends with good critical

eyes for their assistance with this chapter: Douglas Streusand, Carl Shelton, Sebastian Gorka, and

Norman Cigar. As well, I am obliged to Marine Corps Research Center librarian Lindsay

Kleinow for some press clippings on past Al-Qaida attacks on the UN.

1 General texts on terrorism (including the different editions of my Terrorism Today [New York

and London: Routledge, 2000, 2007]) unfortunately omit serious study of the Al-Qaida attacks

against UN principles and personnel. Books that focus on Al-Qaida rarely do better, do not treat

the terrorists’ views of the UN, and usually omit a listing for “United Nations” in their indices.
16 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

with whom we have had 10 years of war. The present paper draws attention to

the words of the terrorists themselves, to their doctrine, and to their deeds. And

once one begins to look closely, a long pattern emerges, a pattern of references

by Al-Qaida leaders decrying the UN and the system of states more generally.

Usama Bin Ladin’s 1996 “Declaration of Jihad against the Americans Occupying

the Land of the Two Sacred Sanctuaries” bares its teeth at the UN for being

“immoral” (or “unjust”) and for helping the United States in “preventing the

dispossessed from arming themselves.”2 Typical is the following 2002 passage

penned by Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the leader of Egypt’s Al-Jihad terrorist

group who merged his organization with Al-Qaida:

The United Nations are, from the Muslim point of view, an impious

international institution. We should not be members, and we should not

rely on its arbitration, because its ability to judge is based on the refusal of

revealed law and docile submission to the will of the world’s top five

criminals, who dominate the leadership body known as the Security

Council.3

The doctrine of Al-Qaida can be described in many ways; one of the best would

be “revolutionary internationalism.” This is war against the status quo, and

against the system of states—not merely a quarrel with certain named countries.

As with anarchists, communists, and some strains of ecological terrorists, the AlQaida creed is inherently international, and the successes and failures of

comrades in one place are meaningful and affective for all others elsewhere. As

befits ideology of any kind, the political program at the grandest and most

global level is linked closely to the individual acts of fighters in action around

the world.

2 This lengthy Al-Qaida document of 1996 is reprinted in Messages to the World: The Statements of

Osama bin Laden, ed. Bruce B. Lawrence, trans. James Howarth (London and New York: Verso,

2005). Page 25 uses “immoral,” but a different volume of Bin Ladin speeches translates the word

as “unjust.”

3 An excerpt from “Loyalty and Separation: Changing an Article of Faith and Losing Sight of

Reality,” Ayman Al-Zawahiri, in Al Qaeda in Its Own Words, ed. Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre

Milelli, trans. Pascale Ghazaleh (Cambridge MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2008),

226. Scholars can do much better than this collection, which is very small and marred by its

disinterest in chronology and in the sources for the speeches and videos cited.
An example is the dual American-Yemeni national Anwar Al-Awlaki,4 who is

believed to be in Yemen. He is at the helm of the important new Islamist

terrorist magazine Inspire, and what he publishes provides further examples of

this revolutionary internationalism. Its second edition, published in fall 2010,

reprints pages of “The Global Islamic Resistance Call” by Abu Musab Al-Suri,

the theorist captured in Pakistan in 2005. Not officially a member of Al-Qaida,5

this prominent teacher of self-declared jihadis puts his lessons under the rubric

of “The School of Open Fronts,” speaks to all “mujahidin” everywhere, and sees

himself as helping to “mobiliz[e] the Islamic nation, with its hundreds of

millions. . . .”6 He devotes himself to strategy, to the organization and actions

that are necessary, and to promoting “Individual Terrorism Jihad.”7 In this piece,

Al-Suri underscores the “global” character of everything he argues for, declaring

his military theory “dependent upon moving on a global horizon.”

Such references to revolutionary internationalism by Al-Qaida principals open

up at least five separable facets of the doctrine for our examination: Al-Qaida’s

exaltation of the Umma; its disdain for established geopolitical boundaries; its

hatred of the United States’ status as a “global hegemon”; its resentment towards

the UN; and finally, its advocacy for terrorist acts as a way to right the moral

wrongs of the international community.

The All-Important Umma

The first of these facets is the promotion of the Umma—the worldwide Islamic

community—and Al-Qaida’s related campaign against nationalism. On principle,

Muslims do not recognize individual “nations.” Even Islamists watch their words

when writing about supporting any “struggle to free a captive Muslim people”;

4 Al-Awlaki was killed in a U.S. drone strike on 30 September 2011, while this book was in

production.

5 While Al-Suri’s writing and character are clearly admired by Inspire’s editors, I am told by Dr.

Norman L. Cigar of Marine Corps University that the newest edition of Al-Zawahiri’s Knights

Under the Prophet’s Banner (in Arabic, 2011) declares that Al-Suri is not an Al-Qaida member.

6 Abu Musab Al-Suri, “The Jihadi Experience: The Open Fronts and The Individual Initiative,” in

The Global Islamic Resistance Call, reprinted in Inspire 2 (Fall 2010): 17. I am grateful to Michael V.

Samarov for drawing my attention to Al-Suri’s importance in 2006. Now a lieutenant colonel,

Samarov commands the Instructor Battalion of The Basic School for the U.S. Marine Corps in

Quantico, VA.

7 Al-Suri’s invocations to “Individual Terrorism Jihad and activity by small units” are numerous.

Unlike some Western commentators, many terrorists do know just what terrorism is and are not

embarrassed to advocate for it. Many examples appear in the preface to my second edition of

Terrorism Today, 1–5.

The International System | 17
18 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

they naturally judge nationalism to be constrictive and limiting to Islam. A very

concrete indicator of their views is in how their recruiters welcome men from

any and all countries who meet the high standards of the terrorist organization.

The ideal recruit is well-described in the “Second Lesson” of the manual

Military Studies in the Jihad Against The Tyrants: The Al-Qaeda Training Manual,

found in Manchester in May 2000: qualifications are “Islam . . . Commitment to

the Organization’s ideology . . . Maturity . . . Sacrifice . . . Listening and

Obedience . . . ,” and on and on through nine more qualifications.8 There is no

requirement whatsoever to grow up as a Muslim, be Arab, be a certain color,

or hold citizenship in a predominantly Muslim state.

Like Vladimir Lenin, or Joseph Stalin, both of whom wrote against nationalism,

our enemy today must find nationalist fervor to be dangerous to the cohesion

of this new movement. Whatever gaps do exist in Al-Qaida are potential critical

vulnerabilities; American public diplomacy does little or nothing to exploit

them, but we may hope covert psychological operations seek out and exploit

national and regional differences within the Al-Qaida membership.

What is important to the ideologues? Of course, it is the Umma. The Muslim

population, very much transnational, multicultural and multilingual, is deemed

the source of current and future strengths. If nothing is more artificial than a

state’s boundaries, nothing is more real and worthy than the Umma. There are

the people to be served by the fighting men; they represent the truth of religion;

these faithful people are the collective foundation of the future Caliphate.

Terrorists fight for, and ideologists write for, the Muslim nation, which means

a great people spread over dozens of different countries. If India may be studied

as a country of many nations, the Umma is a nation that reaches through

innumerable countries.

Usama Bin Ladin reminds the faithful that “uniting the nation under Islam”

cannot be achieved solely through political reforms or via lectures and books;

it can only be attained “through a practical plan involving the entire [Islamic]

nation, each according to his own capabilities, beginning with prayer to God

and ending with fighting in the cause of God, for fighting in the cause of God

is an indivisible part of our religion. In fact, it is the pinnacle of religion.”9

8 Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants: The Al-Qaeda Training Manual, ed. Jerrold M.

Post (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center, August 2004).

9 “Resist the New Rome,” is a 47-minute audiotape by Usama Bin Ladin, a part of which was

broadcast by Al Jazeera on 4 January 2004. Reprinted in Lawrence, Messages, 230.
In a very real sense, no country matters; the transboundary “nation of the

faithful” is the only entity worthy of the future political order, according to

today’s Islamist terrorists.

The Fallacy of Borders

A second and related way that Al-Qaida’s revolutionary internationalism is

displayed is in the rhetorical assault on present and old borders. The fall 2010

issue of Inspire, so fresh and trendy and aimed at youth in many ways, rages

against the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 as though it were signed yesterday.

And why not? That British-French accord still governs where borders lie

between Syria and Iraq. It affected Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, and it would

become important to the future state called Israel.10 We return to Islamist

strategic thinker Al-Suri for his comments on culture and geographical

affiliation.

If we go to any Muslim now, and ask him: “where are you from?” Indeed,

he will mention his country: from Egypt . . . from Syria . . . from Tunisia . .

. from Saudi Arabia . . . etc. He will not mention his city first, and tell you

that he is from Damascus, Beirut, Cairo, or Tashkent . . . because he is

committed to the borders of Sykes-Picot, drawn in his mind by

colonialism.11 [Instead] [w]hat we now need to establish in the minds of

the mujahidin . . . is the true sense of belonging and commitment to . . . this

brotherhood.

Then Al-Suri quotes a Koranic passage on “brotherhood”—which is the furthest

thing from country affiliation as a ground for self-identity. Usama Bin Ladin

contributes on the same topic in the same magazine: “I also reassure our people

in Palestine in particular that we will expand our jihad—Allah permitting—and

will neither recognize the borders of Sykes Picot nor the rulers whom

colonialism put in place.” As of 11 September 2001, Bin Ladin continues, AlQaida is fighting “the biggest ally of the Zionist enemy, America,” especially in

Iraq, Afghanistan, the Islamic Maghreb, and Somalia, and will never recognize

any state for the Jews. He attacks all Arabs who have accepted any Jewish state

presence, including Hamas and “some leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood” for

10 Lawrence follows a Bin Ladin declamation on Sykes-Picot (on 14 February 2003) with a

footnote in his Messages, 187.

11 The ellipses are in the quotation, not added. This text, and the line following, are from page

21 of the second issue of Inspire, cited above.

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20 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

failing to employ jihad to liberate all of Palestine: “[W]e shall not respect the

international charters which recognize the Zionist entity . . . blood for blood and

destruction for destruction.”12

Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaida’s number two leader, also makes stirring reading

on international affairs. Unlike Abdulah Azzam, the Al-Qaida co-founder of the

late 1980s who resisted a tangle with the United States in preference for warring

against the “close enemies,”13 this Egyptian doctor believes in and works for

Bin Ladin’s fully internationalist strategy.14 Al-Zawahiri’s innumerable

broadcasts, as well as his book Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, attack the

world system, the UN, and the U.S. role in upholding both. His text Loyalty

and Separation, published in 2002, warns Muslims against being misled by

foreign intellectual and moral campaigns that parallel the “crusading military

campaign, whose aim is to maintain the unjust status quo.”15

The Unjust Hegemon

Third, the Al-Qaida global terrorist organization is targeted against the “new

hegemon,” the United States. Support of Israel is one of many reasons

Washington is so labeled. Bin Ladin is correct in arguing that America is Israel’s

biggest ally, and he does not need to study Carl von Clausewitz to see that, for

certain smaller countries, a large partner may be their strategic center of gravity.

12 “Until We Taste What Hamza Bin Abd Al-Muttalib Tasted,” a 2008 Bin Ladin excerpt

reprinted beneath a picture of the wreckage in New York City on 11 Sept. 2001, Inspire 2 (Fall

2010), 10. The Muslim Brotherhood, referenced in the above quotation, is not a terrorist

organization and is criticized by some Islamists for alleged accomodationism. The difference is in

means, not ends. A typical passage from Muslim Brotherhood writing presents Islam as a

distinctive and alternative civilization, hopes for its triumph, and “supports the global Islamic

state, wherever it is.” That quotation is from the 18-page “Explanatory Memorandum on the

Strategic Goals for the Group in North America,” by Mohammed Akram, member of the Shura

Council of the U.S Brotherhood; quoted by Lorenzo G. Vidino, The New Moslem Brotherhood in

the West (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 171.

13 The sentence relies mainly on standard books about the early years of Al-Qaida. My colleague

Sebastian Gorka has kindly provided a copy of Abdullah Azzam’s self-described “fatwa” on

Defense of the Muslim Lands; it hopes for fighting in the Philippines, Lebanon, Chad, etc., and the

founding of a Caliphate, but the treatise emphasizes the need for winning in Afghanistan, to start,

and then in Palestine.

14 Al-Zawahiri’s earlier militant activism targeted the Egyptian government. Being captured

(and, he alleges, tortured in jail) and perhaps time and other factors, including strategic

reconsideration, altered his view and made him seek out alliance with Bin Ladin’s Al-Qaida. His

Al-Jihad organization formally accomplished this in June 2001.

15 Al-Zawahiri’s words are quoted by Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 230.
Economics is another way the United States is deemed hegemonic: America is

said to be the grandest of modern thieves, and rhetoric about the “theft of Arab

oil” has long had a place in Bin Ladin’s news releases. Then there is the martial

sector: America is allegedly the great occupier—encircling the world with a belt

of military bases and intelligence posts, while suffocating all that is healthy with

its cultural and economic influences. Furious that the collective states of the

“Islamic World...cannot say no to the United States,” Bin Ladin bodyguard

Abu Jandal thus sees a strategic role for the kind of attack conducted by a tiny

party on the destroyer USS Cole (DDG 67): it was done “to break U.S. prestige

and hegemony over Muslim shores and sea. This was the main reason.”16

Therefore, “The New Rome” makes an apt title for the wide-ranging, somewhat

disorganized, yet trenchant anti-U.S. audiotape of a 2004 Bin Ladin lecture.

When Bin Ladin delivered it to news agency Al Jazeera, the Gulf region was

roiling in war—a war that had originated with impetus from Washington. This

was an opportunity to talk about the present, the near-past (the 1990–91 Gulf

War), and “crusades” into the region for more than the past two millennia. As

is well-known, the first Gulf War (to liberate Kuwait from Iraq) outraged Bin

Ladin and made him beseech high Saudi authorities to attempt a national

defense of Arabia that would not include a U.S. military presence in the Saudi

kingdom. The authorities disagreed; the Americans came. Liberating Kuwait,

the Coalition left the kingdom—but those two facts have not been reflected in

current Al-Qaida rhetoric. Bin Ladin’s “New Rome” lecture abhorred the 2003

occupation of Iraq, which “desecrated” the house of the Caliphate.17 “The raid

of the [new] Romans started in Iraq; no one knows where it will end,” declared

Bin Ladin. Discussion of occupied Afghanistan adds to this speech of 2004.

And yet, in another passage, he does assert how it will end—with Muslim

victories and, everywhere, expulsion of the new “Crusaders.” Bin Ladin claims

that, ultimately, history always shows that nobody “could stand in the way of

the battalions of faith. The Persians, Tartars, Turks, Romans, and Berbers

collapsed in front of the shouts of ‘God is great.’ So will these new Romans.”18

16 Abu Jandal is quoted at length by Peter L. Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know (New York:

Free Press, 2006), 251.

17 Dr. Douglas E. Streusand, author and a Marine Corps University expert on Islamic thought,

explains that this line refers to the Abbasid Caliphate’s end in 1258. That would mean (1) that

the true “desecration” was seven and a half centuries prior, and (2) the damage done was by the

Mongols. Yet Bin Ladin sees this as an evocative backdrop to new U.S. actions.

18 Bin Ladin, “Resist the New Rome,” 230.

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22 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

U.S. power is loathed not only because the chief terrorist sees Washington as

“imperial.” The U.S. specifically is the orchestrator of a worldwide coalition.

Any thoughtful revisionist of the world system attends to that U.S. role, and

not only to the size of U.S. armies or air forces. The United States is the

Coalition leader and a Crusader. So, the long lecture against America in early

2004 was followed by an appeal “To the Peoples of Europe.” This approach to,

and criticism of, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Coalition starts with

reference to the 11 March 2004 destruction of Spanish trains by terrorism, and

then Bin Ladin offers a bargain. Here is the terrorist as negotiator. Quit fighting,

he essentially says, and specifically, quit the Spanish partnership with “the

American conspiracy against the great Islamic world,” and peace will come to

your land. Now, this pledge should not be believed, coming from a spokesman

who refers often19 to reliberating Iberia and restoring the land called “Al

Andalus,” which was formerly Muslim-ruled for seven centuries. Spain did

withdraw its troops from Iraq—although the work of Fernando Reinares

attributes that to internal decisions reached just before the Madrid train massacre.

When Spain or Germany are discussed and denounced by Al-Qaida, it is usually

for their roles fighting in Iraq or Afghanistan, and they may be pilloried as parts

of grander U.S. plans for controlling the world. When the Arab regimes are

attacked—as they are so sharply in the introductory pages of the jihadi training

manual Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants—it can be for apostasy,

or for giving in to American designs for the region. Washington may be the “far

enemy” for Islamists, but it is the guarantor of nearby Israel’s persistence on the

map. American-run coalitions are central to America’s global project, which,

according to American citizen turned Al-Qaida propagandist Samir Khan, is

the “containment” of Islam. The United States arranges this containment with

allies, a network of military bases and espionage posts, and economic influences,

according to the angry men. To return to Bin Ladin’s lectures, this threat, this

presence, is not uniquely American, or new. Rather, it was “over 2500 years ago

that the West invaded”; the fight with the West is one between right and

19 Bin Ladin and Al-Zawahiri have “routinely called for the recapture of the former Muslimcontrolled region in Spain they still call ‘al-Andalus,’” according to the U.S. Department of State’s

Country Reports on Terrorism: 2007 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008); see

the “Spain” section.
falsehood, one that will continue “until Judgment Day.”20 They see a “war of

civilizations” with America leading the enemy.

A Group of Pawns: The United Nations

The many ways the U.S. allegedly orchestrates the containment of Islam include

a fourth extension of argument, which concerns a global entity that is anathema

to Al-Qaida: the UN. The UN’s culture, system and structure, sanctions, and

armed intervention forces are all deeply resented. This fourth topic, and its

linkage back to our third (U.S. hegemony), are captured in a recent major

address by Mullah Muhammad Omar, who for a decade and a half has led the

Taliban and been a close ally of Bin Ladin.

The colonialist countries led by America, want to turn our historical and

independent country [Afghanistan] into a military base under various

pretexts. It has persuaded some other countries to align with them and even

have compelled the World Body of the United Nations to issue resolutions

palatable to the USA. It has turned the World Body, de facto, into [a]

personal entity of America.21

In Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, Al-Zawahiri listed six international entities

that the Western powers allegedly use to fight Islam; the first of these “tools” is

the UN.22 Four years later, in his October 2005 letter to the Iraqi affiliate leader

Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, the number two Al-Qaida leader pointed to this

supposedly unified enemy—the UN and the United States—when referring to

need for readiness against “the conspiracies of the Americans and the United

Nations and their plans.”23 Bin Ladin, in an audiotape for a mass Muslim

20 Samir Khan, “I Am Proud to be a Traitor to America,” Inspire 2 (Fall 2010). In pages 45-49 he

has much to say about the “containment” of Islam by U.S. power and the many other

governments “not particularly happy about a shari’ah based state that would have jihad as part of

its foreign policy.” Usama Bin Ladin’s own references to continuous war with the West “until

Judgment Day” are frequent enough to need no citation.

21 “Message of Felicitation of the Esteemed Amir-ul-Momineen on the Occasion of Eid-ulOdha,” Taliban’s Voice of Jihad Online, in English, (15 November 2010), repr. by Open Source

Center, accessed 18 November 2010. This seven-page message offers little of Al-Qaida’s

internationalism; it is devoted closely to Afghan affairs.

22 Laura Mansfield , ed. and trans., His Own Words: A Translation of the Writings of Dr. Ayman al

Zawahiri, (n.p.: TLG Publications, 2006), 203. This useful collection is dominated by the full text

in English of the first edition of Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner (2001).

23 Mansfield, His Own Words, 261.

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audience in early 2001, decried violations of Islam “under the supervision of the

new world order and under the auspices of the United Nations, which has

clearly become a tool with which the plans of global unbelief against Muslims

are implemented.”24

The savagery towards the UN, and the deprecatory linkage of it and America,

are visible on the surface in an Al-Qaida message that came with the truck

bombing of UN headquarters and relief agencies in Baghdad on 19 August

2003. In a six-page polemic, Al-Qaida’s Abu Hafs al Masri Brigades laid out the

case against the UN—for all the Muslims it has neglected worldwide, and all the

Muslim gains it has opposed. From the geopolitical level, the tirade descends to

the ad hominem, fixating upon one UN diplomat killed in the company of two

dozen others when the truck bomb exploded. The UN Secretary General’s

special representative to Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello, was a celebrated

humanitarian and peacemaker, but Al-Qaida hated him on two grounds. First,

he was then-President George W. Bush’s nominee to succeed Kofi Annan at

the UN—deemed “a branch of the US State Department”—and second, de

Mello’s diplomatic work included the case of East Timor, a small and largely

Roman Catholic region he helped to regain independence from Indonesia in

2002. This, according to Al-Qaida, was a “criminal” act for political reasons,

and de Mello was thus derided as “the Crusader who carved up part of the land

of Islam.”25

Bin Ladin personally had used very strong words about East Timor before, in

November 2001, words again targeting the UN:

Look at the position of the West and the United Nations with regard to

events in Indonesia. They moved to partition the most populous nation in

the Islamic world. That criminal Kofi Annan publicly put pressure on the

24 “Under Mullah Omar,” a 9 April 2001 audiotape that Bin Ladin made for delegates to the

International Conference of Deobandis, held at Taro Jaba Pakistan; see Lawrence, Messages, 96.

25 For this important document there are mixed attributions and only the shortest quotations in

the press, as in the William Shawcross book Allies: The U.S., Britain, Europe and their War in Iraq

(Cambridge MA: Perseus Books, 2004), 6. London’s Arabic-language periodical Al Hayah

published long excerpts on 25 August 2003, and what is apparently the full text appeared in

Arabic in Quds Press on 25 August 2003. The Quds Press version was translated and reprinted as

“‘Text’ of Al-Qaida Statement on Baghdad UN Headquarters Bombing” by the Open Source

Center; accessed 10 March 2011. This is the most lengthy single treatment that could be found

in English by Al-Qaida concerning its causes against the UN.
Indonesian government, telling it that it had 24 hours to partition and

separate East Timor from Indonesia; otherwise he would have to introduce

military forces to do it. The Crusader armies of Australia were on the shores

of Indonesia and they did in fact intervene and separate East Timor, which

is part of the Islamic world.26

The UN seemed revolutionary—even threatening—to some when it was created

in the 1940s. Today, to Al-Qaida, it is an archetypal and forceful defender of an

evil world status quo. To them, the UN is seen as conservative—which is ironic,

or even comical, to American political conservatives. The UN is deemed a

guarantor of “secularism,” a crushing word. Its occasional deployments of troops

and enforceable resolutions reflect the will of the “anti-Muslim” and “atheistic”

powers China, Russia, France, United Kingdom, and United States. Those very

deployments allegedly harm Muslims in large numbers in such places as the

Sudan, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

According to Anwar Al-Awlaki, a preacher and propagandist who has inspired

terrorist attacks against Americans, the UN Security Council architecture keeps

Muslim powers out—a half truth that ignores the 10 rotating positions that are

sometimes filled by countries with Muslim populations. He claims, “We only

have a presence in the crammed hall of the general assembly of the United

Nations, but not at the Security Council which is still off limits to the 50 plus

Muslim states.” Al-Awlaki adds a revealing footnote: he is merely “describing the

current state of affairs,” not lobbying for Muslim inclusion. Al-Awlaki “by no

means” approves of Muslim states being part of the organization.27 Why should

he, when his ideology demands rule by the unified Umma under the sharia?

In this line of argument, Al-Awlaki follows in footsteps of the ideological

masters who are his contemporaries and inspiration. Usama Bin Ladin’s

frequent criticisms of the UN and its policies might be thought to begin with

its role in creation of the State of Israel, but he usually avoids 1948. His most

common critique—often made as well by Al-Zawahiri—is of the global body’s

sanctions. These were imposed upon his state hosts and sponsors: the Sudan in

1996 and then Taliban-ruled Afghanistan in 1999. In the latter case, sanctions

26 Usama Bin Ladin, “Crusader Wars,” a message of 3 November 2003 delivered to Al Jazeera

television; Lawrence, Messages, 137.

27 Shaykh Anwar Al-Awlaki, “The New Mardin Declaration: An Attempt at Justifying the New

World Order,” Inspire 2 (Fall 2010), 34.

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explicitly included the Al-Qaida leader and some top associates, which could

have impacted their travels, banking, and operations. These sanctions do appear

to have had useful effects, and they represent a revolutionary departure from

decades of UN inaction on terrorism. The Security Council actions were also

prompted by U.S. unilateral efforts just prior to them—another reason for AlQaida to see the U.S. and UN as “the same thing.” Bin Ladin’s messages and

speeches also stressed the UN role in anti-Saddam sanctions that supposedly

starved hundreds of thousands of Iraqi babies and children, allegedly depriving

them of milk, other foodstuffs, and medicines. When Bin Ladin gave a 1996

interview to the Australian journal Nida’ul Islam, he put that death figure at over

600,000.28 Later, a million or more was his common numerical reference.

Al-Qaida is angered by the world body’s inactions, not only its actions, as

illustrated by the following two examples. Bin Ladin alleges that in 1996 Israeli

pilots bombed the UN building in Qana, Lebanon, killing dozens of children

and women sheltered there. According to him, instead of responding to this

tragedy, the UN submitted to American will and did nothing. At that time, Bin

Ladin continues, Gerry Adams (of the Irish Republican Army “Provos” and

Sinn Fein) was received as a political leader at the White House—one more

indication that the United States is “the leader of terrorism and crime in the

world.” The second example has a more regular Bin Ladin theme: in 1995

Muslims were slaughtered in Srebenica, Bosnia, on the UN’s watch. Nothing

was done to stop the massacre. Again he pokes his knife at the U.S. connection:

several American officials did resign in protest, Bin Ladin asserts, but most did

nothing because “the pro-Jewish lobby has taken the United States and the West

hostage.”29

In truth, most UN interventions have been intended to save lives, and often

these have been the lives of people who are Muslim. Yet, Bin Ladin’s stream of

tapes and messages never include a whisper of acknowledgement of such

intentions, let alone assistance, to Muslims. When mass starvation afflicted

28 “The New Powder Keg in the Middle East,” an interview with Usama Bin Ladin published in

Nida’ul Islam 15 (October–November 1996), repr. in Lawrence, Messages, 40. Lawrence does not

defend so high a number but offers objective evidence for lower death figures under the

embargos.

29 The sources are, respectively, a March 1997 interview with CNN, and an interview published

in Urdu and Arabic in newspapers in early November 2001; see Lawrence, Messages, 51 and 142.

The message of 2001 on “Crusader Wars” (Messages, 133–38) is also replete with references to

Muslim populations that allegedly have been victimized.
Somalia in the early 1990s, action—much of it effective—was taken by

international relief agencies protected under the UN Charter’s Chapter VII,

with the UN concerting action with the United States and two dozen other

coalition partners. Did Al-Qaida notice? Yes: the organization responded by

rushing in trusted combatants30 to fight the UN interventionists (and most

Somalis) by takings sides with General M. Farah Aideed. Al-Qaida’s

intervention cell included Muhammad Sadiq Odeh, a Palestinian who joined

the terrorist organization in part, he says, because “it did not matter what

nationality you were.” His orders to fight in Somalia came in March 1993 from

Sayf Al-Adl, the very Egyptian whom Der Spiegel now reports to be the new

number three man in Al-Qaida, its lead military commander.31

Perhaps this yielded the first Al-Qaida bomb plot against that worldwide

enemy, the UN. According to the transcript of court testimony of a Moroccan

member of Al-Qaida, L’Houssaine Kherchtou:

I was helping other people of al-Qaida in Nairobi. Some people of al-Qaida

they were in Somalia, and if somebody needs help while he’s transiting

Nairobi to travel to Sudan, if he needs a translator or any assistance, I was

there to do that. I met many people there. They were going to Somalia to

train people there. They were against the presence of the United Nations in

Somalia. They [the members of al-Qaida] helped some Somalis they wanted

to put some explosives in a car and to put it inside a compound of United

Nations, and they didn’t succeed to do that.32

This Al-Qaida interest in attacking the main sponsor of a humanitarian relief

mission has many echoes in contemporary times. One might hope that

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) not controlled by the UN might

escape terrorist brutalities. In fact, gunmen of many revolutionary stripes, such

as the Maoists of Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru, have directed

30 While there has been doubt about how many Al-Qaida members joined the Somali fights

during the mass starvation, Bin Ladin himself is clear that some were there, sent to oppose

international armed forces marshaled by the UN and Security Council acting under the charter

in Operations Provide Relief, Restore Hope, and Continue Hope.

31 From a report of FBI agents who interviewed M. Sadiq Odeh in Nairobi in August 1998,

included in Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, 138–39.

32 Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, 141. The plotters’ safe house in Mogadishu was next to

one that came under fire from a U.S. helicopter, causing the Al-Qaida conspirators to flee the

next day for fear they would be caught by the Americans, according to Kherchtou.

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violence at aid givers.33 Taliban terrorists systematically attack and destroy

schools in Afghanistan, including schools that foreigners have built as aid

projects. The Taliban hate the outsiders; they hate the idea that girls will get an

education; they hate the fact that Afghans could be encouraged by schooling

to think in ways outside the deep and narrow rut in which they currently think.

The 1993 plot against the UN building in Mogadishu is of interest for a related

second reason: it was a precedent for many other such plots and attacks with

bombs or small arms against the personnel and facilities of the UN (see the

appendix listing some of the attacks on the UN at the end of this paper). This

animus against the UN is part of an ineradicable, unquenchable thirst for power

by Al-Qaida and affiliates; their views of a new world order do not comport

with the new world order created in 1945. We thus approach our final category

of discussion.

What’s Wrong with the World and How to Fix It

Al-Qaida’s internationalist ideology dictates direct attacks on the principles,

values, and modes of what we loosely call the “international community.” These

attacks are expressed by terrorism and religious war; by the campaign against

democracy; by the endless critiques of both secularism and low public morals,

east and west; by the overt approval of Taliban’s destruction of ancient stone

statues of Buddha in Bamiyan; and so on. These efforts are preludes to

something higher and very significant: creation of a new Caliphate. The same

publications that call for terrorism link its results to much higher aims. Terrorist

attacks are intended to shred their enemies, in an ongoing and protracted war

of attrition. The “holy” results of this contest are to eventually be a new

Caliphate, embracing as many as possible of the beloved Umma. The terrorists

eventually want to build, and not only be known for destroying.

This effort demands much at multiple levels; we begin here with the low. The

decade-old manual Military Studies in the Jihad Against The Tyrants offered 18

chapters of practical and often brutal advice. Now the manual gets a sort of

update every few months in the new magazine Inspire. The former ranking

Republican member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,

33 The interested reader may wish to see my essay “The Assault on Aid Workers: A New Pattern

in Terrorism,” inaugurating the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies’

published paper series Security Insights (January 2008) and available on the center’s website

(http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/en/nav-security-insights.html).
Peter Hoekstra, said after the first issue, “It was an unfortunately well-done

magazine and a virtual how-to guide for becoming a terrorist.” Inspire soon

reprinted his quote as an endorsement. “An individual god-given duty to make

jihad even apart from any group” is ceaselessly advocated in the serial’s five

editions. “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom” has pictures and

instructions on turning a lamp and a piece of pipe into a shrapnel bomb.

“Destroying Buildings” details the mechanics of timed firebombs—perfect for

burning down the apartment complex one was renting. “The Ultimate Mowing

Machine” displays that weapon in every American’s garage, a pickup truck, and

explains how to weld blades to the front bumper with the promise of driving

this personal tank into a thick American crowd. The special issue called simply

“$4,200” boasts of the low price for preparing the ink printer bombs dispatched

via UPS air freight last year. The descriptions of how to replicate such work

comes with a repackaged quotation from Bin Ladin: “If our messages can reach

you by words, then we wouldn’t have traveled by planes.” Thus we are reminded

not only of 9-11 but of the nineteenth-century anarchist notion of “propaganda

of the deed.” Al-Qaida, too, openly exhorts readers to commit individual

terrorist attacks.34 Inspire, as Al-Qaida’s latest media organ, is working hard to

make the wish actionable for the average man who is, according to the

propagandists, trapped in life in a Western country. It is a recipe for anarchy

behind enemy lines. Terrorism tries to make war on Western civilization.

Reminded of the low mechanics of terrorism, by individual or cell or larger

group, Inspire and other Al-Qaida propaganda and political works instruct and

challenge the reader at a far higher level—that most vital political problem of

refounding a Caliphate. This is to be done because, these works claim, truth

requires the joining of religion with politics. This is to be done, they note,

because at present the world’s rulers of countries are nearly all secular, or atheist,

or the wrong religion, or worst of all, apostates to Islam. Terror will cleanse.

And finally, this is to be done because, according to them, only with creation

of a new state can one be assured of a socially and morally pure Muslim land,

the idyllic polity from which base things have been purged.

Bin Ladin called in 2002 for “the removal of these governments” as “an

obligation upon us and a necessary step to free the umma, to make the sharia

34 In many respects, Al-Qaida is a kind of “vanguard” on the Bolshevik model. But Lenin was far

more controlling, even speaking out at times against individual terrorism; when terrorism was

needed, he preferred to have his party in charge of it.

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the supreme law.”35 This recalled a longer and more inflammatory oration made

the year before elaborating why Muslims could never be free of “mischief,

inequality, irresponsibility [and] the man-made laws that America has forced on

its collaborators in the region [until] our umma can be ruled by the Book that

has been sent down by its Creator. . . .This nation should establish the religious

caliphate of our umma . . . the righteous caliph will return with the permission

of God.”36Al-Zawahiri not only agrees with this; his writings and messages

outnumber those of Bin Ladin, and Al-Zawahiri invokes the new Caliphate

perhaps more often than Bin Ladin does.

Al-Awlaki’s recent long article for Inspire is the kind of fresh material that

students of terrorism must study to see how the individual act is linked to larger

war with the global status quo. The fall 2010 essay is an exegesis of, and a

response to, something called the “New Mardin Declaration” that was issued by

an international and credible group of Muslim scholars in Turkey on 30 March

2010. In that piece, these scholars criticized terrorism, and ideologists who try

to justify terrorism by Muslims, and the promiscuous issuance of fatwas by

unqualified and violent leaders. (Americans say often that “moderate Muslims

need to stand up to their own extremists”; yet they often do, and here was a

good case.) Al-Awlaki the terrorist thus attacks the gentle Mardin Declaration

and gives us the counter case in eight pages. He is honest enough to cite at

length the Muslim clerics who oppose him. Then he openly argues for “terror”—

the word appears repeatedly—as part of a fundamental struggle against other

religions. The rhetorical attacks include harsh words for those who, he says,

worship cows. There is concern over Iran and its building Shia powers; this

potential Sunni-Shia war is a fascinating subtext of some Al-Qaida literature.

Al-Awlaki has mocking words for any who dare to consider nonviolence—

Martin Luther King and Gandhi are specifically deprecated by name. The

metaphor of the dove of peace is skewered: instead of “pigeons and live

branches,” he says one needs “bullets and bombs.” And throughout come

vigorous repudiations of the international status quo. Believers, bravely standing

on the battleground, need no scholarly or clerical counsel about living in “a

35 Usama Bin Ladin, “To the Americans,” (6 October 2002), in Lawrence, Messages, 163.

36 Taysir Alluni, “Terror for Terror,” an interview with Bin Ladin conducted in late October 2001

near Kabul, and broadcast by Al Jazeera 31 January 2002; repr. in Lawrence, Messages, 121.
civilized world under the protection of international treaties,” he asserts. He

then goes on to say that

we stand firmly by the giant classical Imams of the umma and we will not

be deterred by the dwarfs of today, and we refuse all attempts of rewriting

the Islamic shariah to kowtow to a New World Order that doesn’t belong

to us and must be challenged and changed.37

Conclusion

While the terrorists’ words against the state system are plain, they have often

been lost or not passed along to the thinking public, and so have had little part

in public discourse. The extremists’ policy declarations have been all but veiled

in commentaries by some area studies experts and scholars of Islam, who not

only decline to comment on the topic of a new Caliphate but counsel auditors

in the West against discussing it seriously. Unfortunately their judgment—or

prejudice—may be less important than the views of the ideologists and terrorists

now killing for the dream of a new Caliphate. To date it may be reporter-turnedauthor Peter Bergen who has taken the most appropriate public posture: in his

first book Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden, he reported

the Islamists’ aspirations, but added that their strategic success is not more likely

than the sudden reemergence of the Holy Roman Empire within Europe.38

How has the Arab Spring affected Al-Qaida? No one yet knows, but we should

be optimistic. Most of these dramatic revolutions and popular changes sweeping

through the region seem to leave the terrorists behind. In the well-chosen and

forward-looking words of New York Times reporter Scott Shane in late February

2011:

Opposition movements that have appeared so suddenly and proved so

powerful have shunned the two central tenets of the Qaeda credo:

37 Lawrence, Messages, 40. This final page of text appears alongside a bold black silhouette of a

gunman “firing” into the face of the reader. The fierceness of the article’s critique of reconciliation

or nonviolence as a form of conflict resolution echoes the opening pages of the jihad manual

found in Manchester, which mockingly repudiate “Socratic dialogues . . . Platonic ideals . . .

Aristotelian diplomacy” while underscoring need for “the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of

assassination, bombing, and destruction, and the diplomacy of the cannon and machine-gun.”

38 Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden (New York: Free Press,

2001), 21.

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murderous violence and religious fanaticism. The demonstrators have used

force defensively, treated Islam as an afterthought and embraced democracy,

which is anathema to Osama bin Ladin and his followers.39

Al-Qaida is not making progress. It is weaker than it was in mid-2001.40 But the

core organization appears tireless, and its plain words remain deadly and

serious. Status as a narrow minority is no shock—they are accustomed to it. This

is why considering Al-Qaida an international terrorist organization has always

been more appropriate than calling them “global insurgency.” While good at

propaganda, they do not do the hard work of political mobilization of

insurgents. They do not have deep popular support. Their command and

control functions are too weak to orchestrate “global insurgency.” They cannot

hold on to any geographical gains of world significance—and the few Islamist

organizations that actually do hold territory (Hamas, Hizbollah) do not seem

to concert major actions with Al-Qaida in the way a “grand strategy” would

demand. Making occasional limited gains in limited rubrics, but not perceptibly

closer to their larger goals of policy, Al-Qaida marches on. Thousands of trained

recruits are still at liberty. There is a most disturbing absence of defectors from

the core. Al-Qaida’s top leaders are ever in the field. The organization seems to

enrich itself with new ideas and concepts. Al-Qaida deserves, and retains, its

informal title as the “most powerful international terror organization in history.”

And it is far more patient than most.

39 Scott Shane , “As Regimes Fall in Arab World, Al-Qaida Sees History Fly By,” New York Times,

28 February 2011.

40 A contrary view—that Al-Qaida is stronger than it was—may be found in Leah Farrall, “How

Al-Qaida Works,” Foreign Affairs (March–April, 2011), 128–38.
Some Attacks on the United Nations

by Al-Qaida and Affiliates

1993: Responding to U.S. and UN aid missions in starving Somalia, Al-Qaida

sends in a few fighters to join President Aideed’s side in the civil war and oppose

the UN presence. Unsuccessful vehicle bomb plot against a UN compound.

1993: The UN headquarters building in Manhattan is among the targets of

Islamist plotters organized by Egypt’s Omar Abdel Rahman, who is now jailed

in the United States.

2003: On 19 August, the Canal Hotel in Baghdad, long home to the UN

headquarters and relief agencies, is truck bombed by Al-Zarqawi’s Al-Qaida in

Iraq. Twenty-three people died in this attack, including the Secretary General’s

Special Representative Sergio Vieira de Mello. The UN decides to send a third

of its work force home as a result.

2003: On 22 September, the UN’s Canal Hotel offices are bombed again,

wounding 19 people from a dozen different countries. After this bombing, the

UN orders all of its 600 employees out of Iraq.

2004: In early May in Afghanistan, Taliban apparently kills two Britons as part

of “a string of assaults on UN staff preparing the country for crucial polls,”

according to the Belfast News Letter.

2007: On December 11, UN offices in Algiers are hit with a vehicle bomb, while

another bomber strikes simultaneously an Algerian government building.

Dozens of casualties occur in these attacks, which were claimed by Al-Qaida in

the Islamic Maghreb.

2008: On 14 December, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb kidnaps Canadian

UN envoy to Niger Robert Fowler and diplomat Louis G. Fuay, also of the UN

(Fowler is freed in 2009).

2009: In July, Al-Qaida’s ally Al-Shabaab loots equipment and vehicles from

UN compounds in Wajid and Baidoa, Somalia, prompting the UN to suspend

many humanitarian operations.

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34 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

2009: In September, Al-Shabaab suicide bombers use stolen UN vehicles to

attack a peacekeepers’ base in Mogadishu, Somalia, killing 21.

2009: In late October, Taliban suicide attackers storm the Bakhtar guest house

in Kabul, Afghanistan, used by UN employees, killing five of them in addition

to several Afghans.

2010: The U.S. Department of State’s annual report on terrorism notes the

continuing pattern of insurgents in Afghanistan targeting the UN Assistance

Mission to Afghanistan, NGOs, and recipients of NGO aid.
Theater Strategy | 35

Understanding how Al-Qaida has planned to fight the war it has been engaged

in can provide insights into how to better anticipate and respond to the

challenge that the organization poses. A key element of that perspective is how

Mother Al-Qaida’s (Al-Qaida Al-Umm’s)1 leadership thinks conceptually in

terms of its theater strategy. The intent here is to analyze Al-Qaida’s decision

making on two levels of this issue: functionally, how it has planned and

conducted its operations; and spatially, how it has tried to select the theaters in

which to apply its military strategy.2

Translating strategic political objectives into actionable military strategies, of

course, involves making decisions and choices. When it works as intended, AlQaida’s decision-making process relies on analysis that is often as hardheaded

and unsentimental as any done anywhere else. Although its ultimate objectives

are shaped by idealism, Al-Qaida does think in geostrategic terms, and the

theater strategy it has developed to achieve those objectives has been based to

a significant degree on realpolitik.

3

Al-Qaida’s Theater Strategy:

Waging a World War

Norman Cigar

My thanks to my colleague Dr. Christopher C. Harmon for his valuable insights on a draft of this

paper.

1 “Mother al-Qaida” is used here in the sense of Al-Qaida’s central leadership and staff, in

contrast to the local affiliates, allies, offshoots, branches, or task-forces, whose relationship to the

center can vary from case to case.

2 “Theater” here is used to mean simply a self-contained geographical area for the conduct of

armed conflict. Al-Qaida policy makers and analysts use various synonymous terms to designate

such operational zones (jabha, thaghr, saha, masrah, midan), but here all such terms will be

translated as “theater.”
36 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

In one sense, the analytical and operational framework that Mother Al-Qaida

developed is a model with different degrees of applicability in the real world.

First, it relies on paradigms or assumptions that are frequently questionable.

Second, its application is often difficult, in light of the web of sundry affiliates,

allies, offshoots, and individuals around the world that constitute Al-Qaida’s

“army.” These actors often have their own parochial interests and specific

operational requirements, a situation that obliges Al-Qaida to manage with

varying forms of command relationships, ranging from close coordination with

the central leadership (such as with Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia and, later, with

its follow-on in Yemen) to, at best, general unity of purpose with other

organizations or even freelancers. Third, Al-Qaida does not operate in a vacuum

against a passive adversary, and Al-Qaida’s strategy and execution have of

necessity been affected and often neutralized by what the United States and

other adversaries have done to counter the organization.3

Nevertheless, Al-Qaida’s analytical process and strategic design—however

imperfect as tools in guiding such a disparate collection of players—have

provided some recognizable structure and direction to its overall war effort.

Strategic Objectives

Of course, ideology does provide guideposts and legitimacy for Mother AlQaida’s ultimate strategic objectives. Its religiously based goals consist of

reversing a secularizing wave in the Muslim world, and its geopolitical goals

are to liberate Palestine (which has been an enduring touchstone in Bin Ladin’s

thinking) and unite the Muslim lands into a single state—a Caliphate based on

religious law.4 Al-Qaida also dates the start of the war from 9/11 and has viewed

3 At play is an interactive process of wills or, as Carl von Clausewitz aptly characterized it in his

classic work, something similar to a wrestling match where opponents’ behavior is to be

understood by how they interact, thereby shaping each others’ options, actions, and reactions.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael E. Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1984), 75, 77, 81.

4 As Ayman Al-Zawahiri expressed it, “The solution is to establish an Islamic state that can stand

up to the Crusader-Jewish alliance in order to expel the latter’s forces from the lands of Islam and

to depose the puppet rulers and to set up and defend an Islamic government.” Izaz rayat al-islam

[Making the Banner of Islam More Powerful], August 2003, http://www.tawhed.ws/dl?i=vfvfbgnh.
it as a total war, pitting Islam against all its enemies, led by the Western

“Crusaders” and Israel, with the very existence of Islam at stake.5

The greatest obstacle to achieving these objectives—and therefore the main

enemy, as Bin Ladin has said repeatedly—is the United States. It is America that

occupies the Muslim world, props up local rulers and Israel, and refuses to

accept an Islamic state.6 Not surprisingly, as the late Mustafa Abu Al-Yazid (aka

Said al-Masri, eventually Al-Qaida’s number-three man) confirmed, the thrust

of Al-Qaida’s strategy was to “strike at the head, the head of the snake, the

greatest tyrant, the Americans.”7 In order to overcome this obstacle,

intermediate military operational objectives had to be developed in harmony

with, and supporting, the political strategy, which would open the way for the

achievement of Al-Qaida’s strategic political goals.

It is the senior leadership of Bin Ladin and his main staff of advisers and close

associates who sets strategic objectives and provides overall guidance. As

Mustafa Abu Al-Yazid corroborated, it was Bin Ladin who had “specified . . . the

practical steps we intend to take” with respect to Al-Qaida’s theater strategy.8

Al-Qaida—like any rational actor—operates, to the greatest extent possible,

according to plans it has developed. As Sayf Al-Adl (at one time Al-Qaida’s

military leader) stressed repeatedly, it is vital to have “a clear plan, which

5 As Ayman Al-Zawahiri saw it, the 9/11 raids were “the first big battle in the Muslim Umma’s

jihad in response to the modern-day Crusader aggression,” Fursan taht rayat al-nabi [Knights

under the Prophet’s Banner], 2nd ed., part 1 (Al-Sahab, 2010), 253. Also according to Al-Zawahiri,

“If we do not resist, we [i.e., the Umma] will be finished.” “Haqa’iq al-sira bayn al-islam wa’l-kufr”

[“The Truth about the Struggle between Islam and Unbelief”], 27 Dhu al-qada 1427/18

December 2006, http://www.tawhed.ws/pr?i=6664.

6 As Al-Zawahiri attributed to Bin Ladin, “If America retreats in defeat from the Islamic lands . . .

the battles against its supporters will be easier and simpler.” Al-Zawahiri, Fursan, 2nd ed., 184. As

one Al-Qaida political-military thinker put it, defeating the United States would lead to “total

paralysis” and “national frustration” in the United States, whereupon “it will have no choice but

to accept Bin Ladin’s demands . . . and stop its support for Israel, lift the blockade of Iraq,

withdraw its forces from the Land of the Two Holy Places, and abandon the Arab dictators.”

Luways Atiyat Allah, “Al-Munazara al-kubra: Al-Qaida wa’l-harakiyyun wajhan li-wajhin” [“The

Great Confrontation: Al-Qaida and the Old-Style Movement Members Face Off”], in Abu Jandal

al-Azdi, Usama Bin Ladin mujaddid al-zaman wa-qahir al-amrikan [Usama Bin Ladin the Renewer of

the Age and the Conqueror of the Americans], 2003, 320–21.

7 Mustafa Abu Al-Yazid, interview by Ahmad Zaydan, “Liqa’ al-yawm” [“Today’s Interview”], AlJazira TV, 23 June 2009, http://www.aljazeera.net.

8 Ibid.

Theater Strategy | 37
38 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

determines the necessary ways and means, and the time needed for execution

and a successful completion. Any action not based on a plan can be considered

[only] a random act, and unlikely to be productive.”9

We know that a general plan was discussed and developed during a series of farranging discussions among top Al-Qaida and affiliated leaders in Afghanistan

during the summer of 2000.10 Moreover, a Saudi newspaper claimed to have in

its possession a copy of a long-range strategy document that Al-Qaida allegedly

had drafted, consisting of a highly optimistic phased plan extending over 16

years, confirming much of the operational thinking behind Al-Qaida’s moves.11

The time horizon for Al-Qaida’s theater plans can extend even decades into

the future.12 Ultimately, victory would come in terms of a “political victory,”

with the achievement of Al-Qaida’s political objectives.13

9 According to Sayf Al-Adl’s handwritten memoirs, reproduced in Fu’ad Husayn, Al-Zarqawi: AlJil al-thani li’l-Qaida [Al-Zarqawi: Al-Qaida’s Second Generation] (Beirut: Dar al-Khayyal, 2005),

140.

10 Numan Bin Uthman, the head of Al-Qaida’s Libyan component at the time, who had access

to the Al-Qaida leadership and was one of the participants in these sessions, provides an account

in his interview by Kamil Al-Tawil, “Al-Wajh al-akhar li’l-Qaida” [“Al-Qaida’s Other Face”], part 1,

Al-Hayat (London), 25 September 2010, http://international.daralhayat.com/print/184524.

11 Yasir Ba Amir, “Dawlat Al-Qaida am 2016; Al-Marahil tashmil istifzaz Amrika li-irtikab afal

irtijaliya didd al-muslimin”[“An Al-Qaida State in 2016; The Phases Include Provoking America

into Taking Rash Actions against the Muslims”], Al-Watan (Abha, Saudi Arabia), 4 May 2010,

http://www.alwatan.com.sa/news/newsPrinting.asp?issueno=3294&id=120233.

12 For example, one Al-Qaida official noted that the plan for Iraq extended 20 years into the

future. Asad Al-Jihad 2, “Istiratijiyat tanzim Al-Qaida fi 11/9/2008 wa-bad’ mukhattatih al-azim”

[“Al-Qaida’s Strategy on 11/9/2008 and the Great Beginning of Its Plan”], 11 September 2008,

http://althoghor.com/forum/index.php?showtopic=3004. Asad Al-Jihad 2 most likely was

Muhammad Al-Hakayima (died in 2008), an Egyptian who reportedly was Al-Qaida’s media

coordinator. For his part, Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin—a Saudi military thinker and for a time leader

of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula—envisaged a protracted insurgency in Saudi Arabia that

would last 20–30 years. Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin, speaking on video number 28, dealing with the

Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula attack at Al-Khobar: http://www.al-qa3eedon.com. For

Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the establishment of an Islamic government in Egypt could take “several

generations” to achieve. Fursan taht rayat al-nabi [Knights under the Prophet’s Banner], 1st ed.,

2001, 112.

13 Al-Zawahiri, Fursan, 2nd ed., 138. As a Saudi Al-Qaida theorist underlined, victory would not

be based on the number of enemy killed or the amount of weapons used, but “in achieving the

big strategic objectives.” Luways Atiyat Allah, “Al-Nizam al-duwali al-jadid bi-qalam Usama Bin

Ladin” [“The New World Order As Usama Bin Ladin Sees It”], 15 April 2007,

http://www.alsaha.com/users/415647119/entries/35460.
Military Strategy and Assumptions

However, in order to achieve success, Al-Qaida had to overcome military

obstacles to its strategic objectives and translate its political objectives into

attainable operational objectives and a workable strategic military plan for use

at the theater level, which it did with input by Al-Qaida’s military thinkers early

in the process. At the operational level, Al-Qaida developed an interrelated

package of objectives, whose main points included forcing the United States to

leave the Arabian Peninsula, to end its support for Israel, and to stop intervening

in the Muslim world in general.14

The envisioned military strategy that Al-Qaida crystallized over time to achieve

these objectives was centered on trying to break the will of the United States.15

According to Bin Ladin, the United States is clearly the key because, with its

defeat, resistance to achieving Al-Qaida’s objectives will collapse.16 Given the

evident overmatch presented by its stronger and more technologically advanced

adversaries, Al-Qaida’s focus has been on fighting an asymmetric war and,

moreover, as Al-Zawahiri stressed, a “people’s war,” requiring the mobilization

of the masses.17

Basic assumptions underlay Al-Qaida’s strategy—many of which were flawed.

Significantly, Al-Qaida’s leadership had become convinced that the United

14 Usama Bin Ladin, interview by Taysir Alluni, “Al-Nass al-kamil li-liqa’ al-suhufi ma Usama Bin

Ladin” [“The Complete Text of the Press Interview with Usama Bin Ladin”], 21 October 2001,

http://www.alarabnews.com/alshaab/GIF/29-03-2002/Usama.htm.

15 For Ayman al-Zawahiri, “breaking the will” (tahtim manawiyat) is a key objective for defeating

an adversary, Fursan, 1st ed., 111. One of Al-Qaida’s most prominent military thinkers and

eventually head of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, Yusuf Al-Ayyari, emphasizes forcefully the

point about targeting and defeating the enemy’s will, defining defeat as “the destruction of the

will to fight.” Videotape Harb al-asabat [Guerrilla War], n.d., http://www.qa3edoon.com. AlQaida’s local branches also accepted that perspective, as in Iraq, where an analysis concluded

that “the nature of the struggle against the Crusader coalition has been a struggle of wills and

endurance.” The Islamic State of Iraq, “Bayn al-inhirafat al-manhajiya wa’l-thawabit al-jihadiya

[“Between Doctrinal Deviations and Jihadi Steadfastness”], 27 August 2007, http://m3-f.com/

forum/showthread.php?t=548.

16 “Focus on striking the head of unbelief [i.e., the United States] until it collapses; when the

latter collapses, the rest of the periphery will join it in defeat, collapse, and oblivion.” Usama Bin

Ladin, “Bayan min Usama Bin Ladin wa-tanzim Al-Qaida ila al-umma al-islamiya”

[“Communique from Usama Bin Ladin and Al-Qaida to the Islamic Umma”], 12 December

2002, http://www.tawhed.ws/pr?i=0504094h.

17 Al-Zawahiri, Fursan, 2nd ed., 110–11, 137–38. Al-Zawahiri, indeed, explicitly refers to Western

military thinkers for inspiration.

Theater Strategy | 39
40 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

States would be fairly easy to defeat.18 Al-Qaida recognized that the United

States had a large military and extensive economic advantages but, at the same

time, believed that American power was vulnerable. Bin Ladin was confident

that “we can target that fragile base [of U.S. power] and concentrate on the

critical vulnerabilities (abraz nuqat al-daf)” so that the United States could be

made to “reel, to shrink back, and abandon its leadership and oppression of the

world.”19 Specifically, at the theater level, Al-Qaida planners identified such

critical vulnerabilities as casualties, economic cost, and time that could be used

to undermine U.S. will and lead to its defeat.

The perception within Al-Qaida was that the United States was not willing to

take casualties, limiting its military effectiveness and staying power.20 Al-Qaida

also accepted as true that the U.S. military lacked courage and was afraid to

engage the enemy face-to-face, relying instead on airpower.21 Early in the war,

one Al-Qaida military thinker had concluded that in Afghanistan “the American

people will see the unprecedented number of unjustifiable casualties and will

conclude that it is best to put a stop to [the war] sooner rather than later.”22

18 As Al-Zawahiri told an interviewer in 1998, “Defeating America is not difficult. America was

defeated in Vietnam and was forced to leave Lebanon and Somalia. If we stand up to it

resolutely, it may end up the same way as the Soviet Union; everything depends on our focusing

all our efforts on resisting.” Interview by Jamal Ismail, “Ibn Ladin wa’l-Jazira wa-ana” [“Bin

Ladin, Al-Jazira, and I”], http://www.4shared.com/file/46536954/f1ad06d9/

_.html?dirPwdverified=e58bbdb3. Bin Ladin also believed that “America’s defeat, by the grace of

God . . . will be easier for us . . . than was the earlier defeat of the Soviet Union.” Interview with

Bin Ladin, “Al-Nass al-kamil.” As Bin Ladin also told his followers, “We tested them [i.e., the

Americans] in Somalia and saw that they are a paper tiger.” Reported in Bin Uthman, “Al-Wajh

al-akhar,” part 1.

19 Usama Bin Ladin, Tawjihat manhajiya (2) [Programmatic Guidance (2)], 1423/2002–3,

http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=yiqgogik.

20 Thus, “America has not been able to carry through many of its plans because of its leaders’

hesitation about bearing the responsibility of casualties; this reveals a weakness of our enemy.”

Al-Zawahiri, Fursan, 2nd ed., 210.

21 As Ayman Al-Zawahiri saw it, U.S. soldiers “are the greatest of cowards, and the weakest of

the weak, relying only on reconnaissance and then stand-off strikes, and by renting gangs of

mercenaries and bandits. Otherwise, they have no courage, initiative, patience, or staying-power.”

Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Taht rayat al-qur’an [Under the Banner of the Qur’an] (Al-Sahab li’l-intaj alilami, 19 Dhu al-hijja 1425/30 January 2005), 8–9. Al-Zawahiri claimed that Bin Ladin had

subscribed to the same views already in the early days, and that the latter allegedly had said that

“the Crusaders, in reality, are cowards, having no principles or morals, but only money and

equipment,” and that they would “run away after any real confrontation with the armies of

Islam.” Al-Zawahiri, Fursan, 2nd ed., 183.

22 Abu Ubayd Al-Qurayshi, “Awham Amrika” [“America’s Delusions”], Al-Ansar, no. 15 (Jumada

II 1423/10 February 2002): 11.
Al-Qaida also recognized the importance of the U.S. economy as a critical

requirement—one which the United States needed in order to be able to fight

wars—and the necessity of targeting it as a potential critical vulnerability.23 In

particular, according to Al-Zawahiri, oil is vital to the U.S. economy and, in his

view, “you [the United States] will be expelled from the Gulf, God willing . . .

whereupon your economic collapse will ensue.”24 According to Mustafa Abu AlYazid, when opening the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia) theater “our plan

was focused on hitting U.S. targets,” and especially the oil assets, which the

Americans “steal and feed upon.”25

The assumption of America’s lack of staying power, fueled by problems with the

economy and casualties, also made time a disadvantage for the United States.

Therefore, the war was to be protracted, with no time deadline, but instead be

event driven, with the attainment of objectives to be the only measure of success

for Al-Qaida.26 As Bin Ladin warned, although the war had already lasted seven

years, Al-Qaida was prepared to go on with the war “for seven more years, and

then another seven years, and still another seven years after that,” and he asked

rhetorically: “Can America continue the war against us for several more

decades?”27

23 As one Al-Qaida analysis noted of the U.S. economy, “It is the main pillar of overwhelming

American military power . . . as well as an important element which America uses to implement

its foreign policy.” And, “It was the strength of the American economy which made it the

backbone of this superpower.” Nevertheless, the analysis saw the possibility that “the collapse of

the economy means the collapse of the state . . . it is very possible that the [U. S.] economy will

collapse.” Nazif al-khasa’ir al-amrikiya [The Attrition from American Losses] (Markaz al-dirasat wa-lbuhuth al-islamiya, October 2003), http://taw7ed.110mb.com/Nazeef.htm. This establishment is

an Al-Qaida think tank.

24 Ayman Al-Zawahiri, “Nass liqa’ Al-Sahab ma Al-Shaykh Ayman Al-Zawahiri, hafizahu Allah”

[“Text of Al-Sahab’s Interview with Shaykh Ayman Al-Zawahiri, May God Preserve Him”],

September 2006, http://majdah.maktoob.com/vb/showthread.php?t=33162. Al-Qaida’s

leadership, not unexpectedly, has instructed the mujahidin repeatedly to focus on targeting the

oil sector. For example, see the interview with Al-Zawahiri, “Arba sanawat ala ghazwatay

Nyuyurk wa-Washintun” [“Four Years after the Two Raids on New York and Washington”],

Shaban 1426/August–September 2005, http://213.42.28.59/forum/showthread.php?t=46637.

25 Interview with Abu Al-Yazid, “Liqa’ al-yawm.”

26 Al-Zawahiri, Fursan, 2nd ed., 112.

27 Usama Bin Ladin, “Dawa ila al-jihad li-waqf al-udwan ala Ghazza” [“Call for a Jihad to Stop

the Aggression against Gaza”], January 2009, http://alboraq.info/showthread.php?p=267452.

Theater Strategy | 41
42 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

These vulnerabilities could be targeted by both an indirect and direct approach.

That is, there would be a combination of direct raids against enemy homelands—

such as 9/11 or those in London in 2005 or in Madrid in 2004, which one can

view as the equivalent of World War II–type strategic bombing—alongside

within-theater raids and sustained engagement on the ground aimed at an

indirect overextension and attrition of the United States and its allies in a

protracted war.28 All engagements, ideally, should be designed to support the

broader operational and strategic objectives. As Yusuf Al-Ayyari—then head of

Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula—characterized the strike he had engineered

in Riyadh, this was “a link in the chain of the long war against the Crusaders.”29

In addition, Al-Qaida encourages spontaneous harassing attacks, although it

cannot control, but only inspire, such strikes.30

Selecting Where to Fight

Deciding where to engage its adversaries—i.e., translating military strategy onto

a geographic space as part of its indirect approach to fighting the United States—

is an important but complex process for Al-Qaida. From Bin Ladin’s

perspective, there is a “world war against Islam,” and Al-Qaida has been seen

28 For example, to deal with the West and Israel, Al-Zawahiri confirmed the need for a

combination of blows such as 9/11 and battles in local theaters “to expel the Crusader-Zionist

enemy from the Islamic lands, especially from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine. The forces of

aggression against the Islamic world must pay a heavy price for this aggression.” Ayman alZawahiri, “Al-Badil huwa al-dawa wa’l-jihad” [“The Alternative Is Outreach and Jihad”],

Muharram 1427/February 2006, http://www.tawhed.ws/pr?i=5238. Likewise, as an Al-Qaida

think tank concluded, a combination of spectacular raids and attrition insurgency warfare could

bring about victory against the United States: “The current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq

represent tactical attrition which accelerate the process resulting from the Blessed Raid [i.e.,

9/11],” Nazif al-khasa’ir.

29 Yusuf Al-Ayyari, Ghazwat al-hadi ashar min rabi al-awwal, amaliyat Sharq Al-Riyad wa-harbuna

ma Amrika wa-umala’iha [The Raid of Eleven Rabi I, the East Riyadh Operation and Our War against

America and Its Stooges], (Markaz al-dirasat wa’l-buhuth al-islamiya, 2003), 35.

30 Al-Zawahiri encouraged Muslims to attack U.S. interests in a harassing effort on a global

scale: “The Muslim youth must extend the battle against the Jews and Crusaders over the largest

possible area of the globe, and to threaten their interests everywhere.” Al-Zawahiri, Taht rayat alqur’an, 17. One Al-Qaida theorist noted that “even operations of a small size or impact, and even

if they are only clubbing a Crusader on the head” will have a cumulative effect over the long

term, Abu Bakr Naji, Tariq al-tamkin [Paving the Way], 2008, 9.
as a necessary global response to meet the global challenge.31 Since the main

enemy is the United States, theaters ought to be vehicles that target the latter’s

critical vulnerabilities and be a factor in the United States’ defeat by engaging

U.S. forces and interests—or those of U.S. partners—in order to undermine the

alliances on which America relies to conduct its own regional strategies.

A key component of Al-Qaida’s attritional strategy has been to overextend U.S.

forces by seeking to compel the latter to engage in multiple theaters around the

globe. According to Sayf Al-Adl, then a senior figure in Al-Qaida, following the

latter’s precipitous withdrawal from Afghanistan, “Our plan . . . was to try to

open numerous new battlefields for the Americans in order to disperse their

forces and prevent them from massing in any one area.”32 In fact, as one leading

Al-Qaida military thinker assessed, one of the major achievements of 9/11 was

that “this raid caused [i.e., as a result of the U.S. reaction] an enormous

overextension of America’s capabilities, since the latter was compelled to spread

its forces to numerous theaters without being able to achieve victory in any one

of them.”33 In effect, following 9/11, new theaters were opened in Saudi Arabia

and in Iraq, and according to Numan Bin Uthman, the head of Al-Qaida’s

former Libyan branch of Al-Qaida, there was a renewed push about 2007 to

further “globalize the jihad” by establishing additional theaters.34

Based on its priorities, Al-Qaida’s leadership viewed both Afghanistan and Iraq

as ideal theaters for attriting the United States, and both were said to prove that

“the blow which it [i.e., the United States] wanted to deliver against terrorism

31 Usama Bin Ladin, “Al-Sabil li-ihbat al-mu’amarat” [“The Way to Frustrate Plots”], July 2007,

http://www.iraqipa.net/12_2007/26_31/News/a12_30des07.html. Ayman Al-Zawahiri notes

that he had seen Al-Qaida could not be successful in isolated situations, facing what it

interpreted as a global challenge to Islam. “Haqa’iq al-sira bayn al-islam wa’l-kufr” [“Realities of

the Conflict between Islam and Unbelief”], 27 Dhu al-qada 1427/18 December 2006,

http://alqimmah.net/showthread.php?t=1921.

32 According to Sayf Al-Adl, Al-Zarqawi, 135.

33 Abu Ubayd Al-Qurayshi, “Ghazwat 11 sibtimbir aw al-mustahil idh sar mumkinan” [“The 11

September Raid Or When the Impossible Became Possible’], [2002 or 2003],

http://www.geocities.com/aloswa/adab/11sep_mostahol.html?200820. Likewise, a leading

figure in Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula was clearly satisfied that, since 9/11, “a number of

jihadi fronts have sprung up in various parts of the world.” Saud Bin Hamud Al-Utaybi, “Fatihat

al-majalla” [“Lead Editorial”], Sawt Al-Jihad, no. 28, Ramadan 1425/October–November 2004, 3.

34 As confirmed by Numan Bin Uthman, interview by Kamil Al-Tawil with Numan Bin Uthman,

“Al-Wajh al-akhar li’l-Qaida” [Al-Qaida’s Other Face], part 5, Al-Hayat, 29 September 2010,

http://international .darlhayat.com/print/185877.

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44 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

rebounded against the latter instead with major attrition in terms of American

blood and the economy.”35 In fact, a policy assessment completed by an AlQaida think tank at the beginning of the U.S. campaign in Iraq offered guidance

to that effect for the impending resistance movement. Promoting a guerrilla

war, the study predicted that Iraq could be turned into “a second Vietnam” and

insisted that “it is imperative that Iraq be made into a theater of attrition for the

Crusaders, and indeed a grave for them.”36 So important was the attrition

function for this theater that the study suggested that even if half of the

thousands of expected mujahidin who were expected to fight died in the

process, it was still worth it for the Umma overall.37 Ayman Al-Zawahiri himself

was to note that “because of the overriding importance of the two jihadi fronts

of Afghanistan and Iraq, all Muslims must support them so that the American

forces exit from the two theaters paralyzed and incapacitated . . . and pay the

price for their aggression against the Muslims and for helping Israel.”38

One can categorize the theaters according to how Al-Qaida came to engage

there. First, are the theaters of choice, which Al-Qaida has assessed as being of

value and advantageous to engaging and has taken the initiative to do so; these

include Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the Horn of Africa. Second, there are the

theaters of opportunity, those which presented themselves largely not at AlQaida’s initiative—whether in Iraq through the collapse of the Saddam Hussein

regime in the wake of the U.S. invasion, or in North Africa with the adherence

to Al-Qaida of an existing jihadist organization. These theaters could elicit,

respectively, either significant or very limited involvement by Mother Al-Qaida.

Third, there are the theaters of necessity, those theaters in which Al-Qaida had

little choice but to engage even at a distinct disadvantage, whether because of

35 Al-Zawahiri, Taht rayat al-qur’an, 6.

36 Nasa’ih wa-tawjihat askariya li’l-mujahidin fi Ard Al-Rafidayn [Advice and Military Guidance for

the Mujahidin in Mesopotamia], (Markaz al-dirasat wa-l-buhuth al-islamiya, 1424/2003), 12, 21. In

fact, Iraq was portrayed for the United Sates in terms of “the beginning of the collapse and the

loss of its status as an empire and a great power,” Nazif al-khasa’ir.

37 Nasa’ih, 23.

38 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Kalima hawl al-udwan al-sahyu/salibi ala Ghazza wa-Lubnan” [“Speech

about the Zionist/Crusader Aggression against Gaza and Lebanon”], Jumada II 1427/June–July

2006, http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=3zmcpovn. Even after U.S. casualties had declined in Iraq, AlZawahiri continued to view attrition in that theater—in terms of economic cost—as a significant

factor, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, “Haqa’iq al-jihad wa-abatil al-nifaq” [“The Truth About the Jihad and

the Idle Talk of Hypocrisy”], 27 November 2009, http://www.majahden.com/vb/

showthread.php?t=27360.
a direct security challenge, as in Afghanistan (which I believe was the result of

a major Al-Qaida miscalculation about the probable U.S. reaction to the 9/11

attack), or for political reasons, as in Palestine (where political pressure from

criticism of Al-Qaida’s passivity may have forced premature and doomed

involvement in Gaza and Lebanon).

Finally, there are the theaters of refusal, those theaters such as Libya, Central

Asia, Egypt, or China where Al-Qaida has refused battle or exerted only

minimal or sporadic effort because it lacks the assets, the operational

environment is unfavorable, or the area is of secondary immediate importance.

In these cases, its involvement may at any one time be limited to media and

moral support or some training.39

Al-Qaida’s evaluation of theaters can be understood primarily in functional

terms, that is the extent to which theaters were likely to contribute to what AlQaida seeks to accomplish operationally in support of its larger strategic

objectives. The evaluation of a theater usually occurs within a global framework,

and the theaters are considered as interdependent and ought to be part of a

cohesive joint effort. As Ayman Al-Zawahiri has observed, “We are fighting a

single war on multiple fronts” or theaters.40 A study by a think tank serving as

an outlet for Al-Qaida analyses stressed that calculations should not be based

on what is good or bad for any one individual theater. Rather, taking the case

of Iraq as an example, “As an Umma, we have to ask what is good for the Umma

as a whole when deploying the youth, rather than asking what is good for Iraq

and the Iraqi people?”41

39 As a former instructor of insurgency courses in Al-Qaida’s professional military educational

system noted, “I used to often reiterate to my brothers in some of the courses on the

organization and management of insurgencies that there were some states . . . in which it was

difficult to mount a successful insurgency, due to numerous geographic, social, and economic

factors.” For that source, such states included Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and some of the Gulf states.

Abu Ubayda Abd Allah Al-Adam, Thawrat al-shuub wa-nihayat al-mulk al-jabri? [The Popular

Revolts and an End to Authoritarian Rule?], (Markaz al-fajr li’l-ilam, 1432/2011), 3.

40 Al-Zawahiri, “Nass liqa’ Al-Sahab.” One of the lessons he took from previous failure in Egypt

was that “the battle between Islam and Unbelief could not be limited to a single region or area,”

since Islam’s enemies were everywhere. Al-Zawahiri, Fursan, 2nd ed., 108.

41 Nasa’ih wa-tawjihat askariya li’l-mujahidin fi Ard Al-Rafidayn [Advice and Military Guidance for

the Mujahidin in Mesopotamia], (Markaz al-dirasat wa-l-buhuth al-islamiya, 1424/2003), 21.

Theater Strategy | 45
46 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

Writing in one of the journals published by Mother Al-Qaida, an analyst

likewise noted that “the jihad is interconnected in the world, with no

fragmentation between fronts, [even] the ones the furthest apart.”42 And as Bin

Ladin explained his intent in late 2001, “All [the blows] are mutually supportive

of each other. When we strike the Americans in the cause of Palestine that also

serves as a blow in the cause for the Land of the Two Holy sites [i.e., Saudi

Arabia], and vice-versa.”43 Perhaps this relationship is most graphically

illustrated by Abu Dujana Al-Khurasani (the Jordanian best known for his

suicide attack on a Central Intelligence Agency station in Afghanistan in 2009),

who remarked that “if one [of Al-Qaida’s members] sneezes in Kandahar

[Afghanistan], another who is in Al-Anbar [Iraq] will say ‘God bless you.’”44

Case Studies of Theater Selection

In evaluating potential theaters where it could apply its military strategy, AlQaida relied predominantly on realpolitik criteria and methodology, although

ideological considerations were never distant. This infusion of realpolitik is

important in the decision-making calculus even for someone as ideologically

committed as Bin Ladin. Thus, when he proclaimed a jihad in 1996 in Saudi

Arabia (although years before actually opening a theater there), he highlighted

its religious importance by stating that “the Land of the Two Holy Places [i.e.,

Saudi Arabia] represents a symbol of the unity of the Islamic world, [with] the

holy Kaba, which is the qibla [i.e., focal point of prayer] for all Muslims,” and

he noted that its population were direct descendants of Muhammad’s

companions. Concurrently, however, he also argued in geopolitical terms that

“the Land of the Two Holy Places represents an important economic force in

the Islamic world, since the largest oil reserves in the world are located there,”

and because in neighboring Yemen Al-Qaida has “strategic depth and a

reservoir of a significant population base of fighters for God’s cause.”45

42 Hadi Al-Ruh, “Dawlat Al-Iraq Al-Islamiya wa-dawrha al-qadim fi al-jihad al-alami” [“The

Islamic State of Iraq and Its Coming Role in the International Jihad”], Al-Mushtaqun Ila Al-Janna,

no. 3, Dhu al-hijja 1430/November–December 2009, 60.

43 Interview with Bin Ladin, “Al-Nass al-kamil.”

44 Abu Dujana Al-Khurasani, “Ahbab Usama” [“Usama’s Fans”], 9 February 2008,

http://majahden.com/vb/showthread.php?t=12499.

45 Usama Bin Ladin, “Risala min Usama Bin Muhammad Bin Ladin ila ikhwanih al-muslimin fi

al-alam kaffatan wa-Jazirat Al-Arab khassatan” [“Message from Usama Bin Muhammad Bin

Ladin to His Muslim Brethren around the World in General and in the Arabian Peninsula

Specifically”], 9 Rabi II 1417/23 August 1996, http://www.tawhed.ws/pr?i=Z531.
At the operational level, according to Bin Ladin, there must also be a careful

determination, informed by military expertise, as to whether conditions are ripe

for jihad in any specific country: “If the conditions are not ripe, they must then

refrain and desist.”46 Important analytical criteria in Al-Qaida’s decision on

whether to open a new theater have included the need for a certain level of

local support, a favorable operating environment, and reasonable prospects for

success. For example, in explaining Al-Qaida’s cautious approach to opening a

theater in Palestine, an Al-Qaida spokesman stressed that the Palestinians

themselves first needed to play a more vigorous part in preparing the way for

foreign mujahidin by training local fighters, organizing cells, obtaining arms and

establishing arms caches, drawing maps, and absorbing Al-Qaida’s policy

statements. This suggests that at the time the appropriate factors for a new

theater were not yet present.47

A subsequent evaluation of why Al-Qaida chose to develop the Yemeni theater

gives a fair picture of the factors at all levels that are considered in making such

decisions. In that vein, the deputy leader of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula

and Yemen,48 Abu Sufyan Al-Azdi Al-Shihri, of course highlighted the region’s

ideological/religious importance by calling it “Muhammad’s Peninsula” and

“Islam’s Peninsula.” Al-Shihri, however, paid even greater attention to the

impact his theater could have on Al-Qaida’s overall strategy, citing that “the

infidel nations” had shown “the geographical significance of this region,

especially the maritime aspect, and the importance of the Bab Al-Mandab

[Strait] which, if we control—God willing—and return it to Islamic control, would

be a great victory with a global impact. The Bab [Al-Mandab] would thereby

be closed off and the Jews would be throttled because it is through [it] that

America provides them with support, by way of the Red Sea.”49 Al-Shihri

underlines that the mujahidin in the two adjoining theaters of Arabia and the

Horn of Africa can also threaten the sea lanes used for the world’s oil supply.50

46 Interview with Bin Ladin, “Ibn Ladin wa’l-Jazira.”

47 Asad Al-Jihad 2 [Muhammad Al-Hakayima], “Tawqit dukhul tanzim Al-Qaida ila Falastin”

[“The Timing of Al-Qaida’s Entry into Palestine”], 2008, www.ye1.org/vb/

showthread.php?t=225245.

48 Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula eventually merged with the Yemeni branch to become AlQaida in the Arabian Peninsula and Yemen.

49 Abu Sufyan Al-Azdi (Said Al-Shihri), “Radd al-udwan al-salibi” [“Repelling the Crusader

Aggression”], early 2010, http://202.71.102.68/~alfaloj/vb/showthread.php?p=725409.

50 Ibid.

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48 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

Further, at an operational level, an assessment in the journal of Al-Qaida in the

Arabian Peninsula and Yemen notes that Yemen had been selected as “the

springboard to liberate the Arabian Peninsula,” and stresses that this was based

on Bin Ladin’s own guidance. The analytical components at an operational

level supporting that decision identified the favorable tribal nature of Yemen’s

society—marked by religiosity and a love of independence; its rugged terrain;

long mountain, desert, and maritime borders; a weak and corrupt government;

a population suffering from poverty, unemployment, and high prices; as well as

the presence of weak and discredited potentially rival Islamic organizations.

And, the mujahidin would be able to organize and mass in areas outside

government control. These concrete conditions made Yemen “appropriate to

adopt the idea of the jihad . . . and the ideal location for the mujahidin

at present.”51

Managing the Theaters

Prioritizing the effort among theaters often competing for attention and guiding

operations can also be complicated. Bin Ladin has the authority to set the broad

strategic goals, as he had done for Saudi Arabia.52 Nevertheless, there is a whole

spectrum of the extent to which he has actual control over the many Al-Qaida

branches, offshoots, and allies, ranging from significant to minimal.

In practical terms, Al-Qaida’s leadership can influence the relative importance

of specific theaters at any stage by encouraging the deployment of personnel

and cadres; sending money; and providing analytical attention, media publicity,

51 Hamil Al-Misk, “Min huna nabda” [“This Is Where We Begin”] Sada Al-Malahim, no. 8, Rabi I

1430/February–March 2009, 27, 29. A spokesman with ties to the senior Al-Qaida leadership

echoed pretty much these same considerations, Asad Al-Jihad 2, “Istiratijiyat tanzim Al-Qaida fi

11/9/2008 wa-bad’ mukhattatih al-azim” [“Al-Qaida’s Strategy on 11/9/2008 and the Great

Beginning of Its Plan”], 11 September 2008, http://althoghor.com/forum/

index.php?showtopic=3004.

52 Interview with Abu Al-Yazid, “Liqa’ al-yawm.” In fact, following the setbacks in the wake of

9/11, Al-Qaida decided to open a theater in Saudi Arabia, most probably as a means to relieve

the unexpected pressure on Mother Al-Qaida. According to Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula’s

official defense of this controversial policy choice, following 9/11 “orders came to the mujahidin

to initiate activity in the Peninsula and to prepare for that.” Tasa’ulat hawl jihad al-salibiyyin fi

Jazirat Al-Arab [Second-guessing the Jihad against the Crusaders in the Arabian Peninsula], appendix

in Abd al-Aziz Al-Anazi, Azhar al-riyadh, [Flowers in the Garden], (Majmuat al-ansar al-baridiya,

1430/2009), 53. The actual text was written circa 2004.
and public encouragement53—all elements that also serve as guidance to the

organization’s membership and sympathizers.

In order to be able to wage a war over such far-flung theaters, Mother Al-Qaida

has innovated a command and control philosophy. It has fused traditional

regional patrimonialism (stressing personal loyalty and cohesion) with elements

of mission-type orders, or delegated authority. The central leaders provide

general goals and guidance, while allowing subordinates substantial freedom of

action and initiative in fulfilling the commander’s intent. Al-Qaida relies for

control on its educational system, personnel selection, provision of

programmatic guidance, and control of the media to promote the necessary

common understanding and unity of purpose for its theater commanders.

Local leaders naturally tend to highlight their own importance and view their

own theater as the main effort, and theater commanders can be sensitive about

their own area of operations, especially when theaters abut. Thus, Al-Qaida in

Saudi Arabia saw itself at the main theater; according to an official Al-Qaida in

the Arabian Peninsula publication, “The wise person realizes that fighting by

many infidel armies against the Muslims outside the [Arabian] Peninsula is

nothing more than a long-term prelude to turning to this Peninsula, since they

understand that this Peninsula is the head and everything else are [only] the

wings.”54

Conversely, for Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, his own theater of Iraq was “in the

Arab heartland. And the distance between it and the Land of the Two Holy

Shrines [Saudi Arabia] and Al-Aqsa [Mosque] is [only] a stone’s throw. We

know from God’s religion that the real and decisive battle between unbelief and

53 Thus, according to Ayman Al-Zawahiri, “The Islamic Umma everywhere is responsible for

supporting the jihadi work in the active jihad theaters against the Crusaders and the Jews.

Muslims must outdo one another in supporting [the theaters] with manpower, money,

equipment, and expertise, and one should not even consider the Muslims’ zakat [alms tax] and

charity before the needs of these theaters are met. The mujahidin in the Iraq and Afghanistan

theaters are the first line of defense for Islam and the Muslims.” “Al-Badil.” Priority among

theaters can vary over time; as Bin Ladin noted with respect to Palestine and Saudi Arabia,

“sometimes conditions in one or the other of these two cases will propel one or the other more,

and we will move in that direction, but without ignoring the other one.” Interview with Bin

Ladin, “Al-Nass al-kamil.”

54 Tasa’ulat wa-shubuhat hawl al-mujahidin wa-amaliyathim [Second-guessing and Doubts about the

Mujahidin and Their Operations], (Al-Qaidun, Rabi II 1425/May–June 2004),

http://www.qa3edoon.com/TasaolatWEB/an-037.htm.

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50 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

Islam is in this land, that is in Sham [Greater Syria] and the area around it.

Therefore, we must make whatever effort is necessary and do the utmost to

establish a foothold in this land.”55

Local Al-Qaida leaders ideally should recognize the importance of theater

synergy and stay within their own areas of responsibility, while deferring

broader decisions related to general strategy to Bin Ladin. As he cautioned,

“Let each one of us take care of his own theater,” and, by doing so, he reassured

his followers that the theaters would be supporting each other in a

common effort.56

When the system works as intended, as in the case of Al-Qaida’s branch then

operating in Saudi Arabia, Bin Ladin would set the broad strategic goals for the

local branch.57 As Yusuf Al-Ayyari, then leader of Al-Qaida in the Arabian

Peninsula and a faithful disciple of Bin Ladin stressed (evidently in response to

debates within his local branch on priorities among theaters), elements who

pushed local concerns “are blind to the Muslims’ broader interests . . . and ought

to shut up if those who bear responsibility for the Umma [i.e., Al-Qaida’s main

leaders] speak.”58 As another Al-Qaida branch that had close ties to the center,

Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and Yemen noted in its official journal,

operations in various theaters depended on both “God’s favor and by careful

centralized planning”

59 (emphasis added).

In many cases, however, such control is limited. The leadership, of course, could

still focus its attention, or turn the commander’s telescope, to specific areas,

particularly if there are setbacks.60 Thus, as Mother Al-Qaida became

55 Captured letter from Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi to an unknown recipient, released by the

Coalition Provisional Authority in February 2004, http://www.cpairaq.org/arabic/transcripts/20040212_zarqawi_full-arabic.html.

56 Usama Bin Ladin, “Al-Nizal al-nizal ya abtal Al-Sumal” [“Battle, Battle, Oh Heroes of

Somalia”], March 2009, http://www.as-ansar.com/vb/showthread.php?p=18752.

57 Interview with Abu Al-Yazid, “Liqa’ al-yawm.”

58 Al-Ayyari, Ghazwat al-hadi ashar, 33.

59 Hamil Al-Misk, “Fi Al-Aqsa naltaqi; Sinariyu inhiyar al-nizam al-hakim” [“We Will Meet in

Al-Aqsa; A Scenario for the Collapse of the Ruling Regime”], Sada Al-Malahim, no. 9, Jumada I

1430/April–May 2009, 27, 31.

60 For example, according to Numan Bin Uthman, Bin Ladin himself had ordered Al-Qaida to

cease its campaign in Saudi Arabia in the wake of its defeat there by Saudi security, interview by

Kamil Al-Tawil, “Al-Wajh al-akhar li’l-Qaida,” part 4, Al-Hayat, 28 September 2010,

http://international.daralhayat.com/print/185506.
increasingly displeased with Al-Zarqawi’s blunders in Iraq—such as becoming

embroiled in a civil war with the Shia, mismanaging the tribes, engaging in setpiece battles, broadcasting gruesome videos of executions, and so forth—it had

tried to force him to modify his policies by providing private and public rebukes

and guidance, although clearly with limited effect since the system relied heavily

on voluntary submission to authority.61 Highlighting the limitations of AlQaida’s system of command and control, Al-Zarqawi had not been educated by

Al-Qaida, had not advanced within its system, and had been only a default

candidate to lead operations in Iraq in the absence of others.

Conclusions and Future Prospects

Clearly, the military results that Al-Qaida intended to lead to the organization’s

strategic goals have been less successful than promised when the war began.

Basic assumptions as to the weakness of U.S. will, the staying power of its

military, and the fragility of its economy; the brittleness of U.S. alliances; the

weakness of local regimes; and Al-Qaida’s ability to withstand heavy battle

losses have proved completely wrong or at least overly optimistic. In particular,

arrests and high battlefield losses have eliminated cadres who cannot be

replaced easily, especially as countermeasures and the inability to establish

substantial safe areas have crippled Al-Qaida’s ability to educate new cadres.

Realistically, the ensuing war has proven very painful for Al-Qaida, so much so

that Bin Ladin was induced to offer a truce to the new U.S. administration in

2009, accompanied by a somewhat hollow warning that otherwise “we will

have no option but to continue the war of attrition against you along all possible

lines of operation, as we attrited the Soviet Union for a decade until it fell

apart.”62 Al-Qaida leaders and spokesmen have felt it necessary from the first

to remind followers that “war is a see-saw . . . one day we have the advantage,

61 As confirmed by Numan Bin Uthman. Interview by Kamil Al-Tawil with Numan bin Uthman,

“Al-Wajh al-akhar li’l-Qaida” [“Al-Qaida’s Other Face”], part 3, Al-Hayat, 27 September 2010,

http://international .darlhayat.com/print/185480. Even in his eulogy of Al-Zarqawi, Bin Ladin

was critical, reminding his audience that “Abu Musab . . . had had clear instructions to focus his

combat on the occupying aggressors, and most especially on the Americans, and to treat as

neutrals all those wishing to be neutral.” “Ritha’ al-shaykh Abi Musab Al-Zarqawi” [“Eulogy for

Shaykh Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi”], Jumada II 1427/June–July 2006, www.tawhed.ws/pr?i=5811.

62 Usama Bin Ladin, “Bayan li’l-shab al-amriki” [“Communiqué to the American People”], 13

September 2009, http://www.archive.org/details/ASD-BenLaden.

Theater Strategy | 51
52 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

another day the enemy does, and fortunes alternate . . . neither side will always

be victorious.”63 However, ideological factors have provided reassurance of final

victory for, as Al-Qaida’s then-spokesman posited, relying for his assurance on

the Quran, “we believe that in the end the Believers will win.”64

Several conclusions and implications can be drawn from the preceding analysis.

First, Al-Qaida plans for and fights war in a rational and methodical way, with

realpolitik considerations key to decision making. Second, Al-Qaida’s

ideologically inspired strategic objectives may be unrealistic and overambitious,

and they simply cannot be supported at the operational level, given the existing

balance of power in the world. Third, any operational plans can only be as good

as the assumptions on which they are based and the ability to execute them.

One can question many of Al-Qaida’s key assumptions, based on doubtful

analysis, as well as the policy choices which have often been beyond Al-Qaida’s

capability to implement. Of course, one can point to numerous resulting

blunders on the ground for Al-Qaida. Fourth, Al-Qaida’s military strategy is

likely to continue to support enduring long-range goals along the same lines,

with a dual emphasis on insurgencies and out-of-area strikes (spectacular ones

if possible, but more feasible, small-scale ones are more likely), with adaptations

as necessary based on lessons learned or emerging threats. As part of that same

strategy, Al-Qaida, however unrealistically, would no doubt like to extend its

operational area further by expanding existing theaters and opening new ones

to further extend U.S. forces.

Given its history of objectives, plans, and theater criteria, where might Al-Qaida

hope to open new theaters in the future? Clearly, with the ongoing turmoil in

the Middle East, Al-Qaida may be looking for opportunities in the region,

although adapting and forecasting there have become even more difficult than

usual, including for Al-Qaida. Al-Qaida is likely to probe but can be expected

to conduct hardheaded analysis before committing to more doomed ventures

such as Gaza or Lebanon. A lack of assets, a prevalence of local competitors,

and an intact security apparatus will limit prospects in Egypt and Tunisia.

Likewise, in the more chaotic Libya, Al-Qaida’s assets are limited (and mostly

clustered in the group that broke away from Mother Al-Qaida in 2009). Syria,

on the other hand, with its sectarian divisions and long-standing, pent-up

63 Interview with Sulayman Abu Ghayth, 2002, http://www.hdrmut.net/vb/t174274.html.

64 Ibid.
grievances that will likely to lead to major turmoil if the present ruling system

were to disintegrate, may hold better prospects for Al-Qaida activity and would

be attractive because of its proximity to Iraq and Israel. In addition, the unsettled

situation in Yemen, Iraq, and Pakistan will continue to draw Al-Qaida’s attention

in search for expanded opportunities. Failing states in Africa may also provide

suitable conditions for expansion in the future. In particular, Darfur has been an

area where Al-Qaida expected and hoped for a U.S. intervention. Al-Qaida

would like to wage jihad in Darfur because of the country’s isolation and the

related operational difficulties for the West, because of its nature as a gateway

to other fragile African countries, and because of Al-Qaida’s long-standing

familiarity with the region.

Ultimately, Al-Qaida is likely to continue to try to decide on new theaters based

on such long-standing criteria as suitability of the operational environment

(both in terms of local and broader Islamic support) and the value of such a

theater in attriting adversaries or in contributing to influence Al-Qaida’s goals

of affecting key areas, such as Palestine. However, as a result of the increasingly

effective countermeasures by the United States and other actors over the past

few years, Al-Qaida will continue to find its wartime strategy and plans difficult

to implement and will be increasingly unable to achieve the military objectives

necessary to achieve its strategic goals.

Postscript

The elimination of Usama Bin Ladin in May 2011 is likely to result in a period

of disarray within Mother Al-Qaida as new leaderships are sorted out. This

juncture could provide Al-Qaida with the opportunity for a strategic

reassessment and the crafting of more realistic objectives and political and

military strategies. However, a basic reassessment will be difficult for a new

leadership, as such a process would entail abandoning long-held paradigms and

an admission of Bin Ladin’s own basic errors. Moreover, given the imbalance

in military potential, Al-Qaida’s options may be limited, and it is likely to

continue to focus on a protracted war of attrition, although one cannot exclude

a resort to weapons of mass destruction should they become available.

Nevertheless, in light of very real operational difficulties, Al-Qaida will find it

increasingly difficult to plan for and wage a global war, and especially so if it

were to fragment as an organization into completely uncoordinated local

affiliates.

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54 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

HORN OF AFRICA

803385AI (G02079) 2-09
East Africa and the Horn | 55

The countries of East Africa and the Horn of Africa offer an attractive

environment for Al-Qaida and extremist organizations to exploit. Poverty is

widespread. Social and economic inequality is common. Political

marginalization of minority groups exists throughout the region. Most of the

countries have leaders who tend to be autocratic and have been in power for

many years. Corruption is a serious problem. Land and sea borders are porous

and poorly controlled. Weapons are easily available, especially in Somalia, which

has been a failed state since 1991. Ethnic tension or outright conflict has long

plagued the region. The population of each country is either predominantly

Muslim or has an important Muslim minority. All of the countries are relatively

close geographically to Al-Qaida’s operations in the Maghreb, Arabian

Peninsula, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. It should not be a surprise that Al-Qaida

focused early on this region; it is perhaps surprising, however, that Al-Qaida has

not been even more effective given the local conditions and effort that it has

invested here.1

In the Beginning, Sudan

An evaluation of Al-Qaida in East Africa and the Horn requires stepping back

more than 20 years in order to capture its evolution. An Islamist government

seized power in Sudan in 1989. It had the support of Hassan Al-Turabi’s

National Islamic Front (NIF), which sent a delegation to meet with Usama Bin

Ladin and invite him to establish a presence in Sudan. Bin Ladin sent a team

to Khartoum, and he moved most of Al-Qaida’s best trained and experienced

4

East Africa

and the Horn

David H. Shinn

1 For an earlier analysis of this subject, see David Shinn, “Al-Qaeda in East Africa and the Horn,”

Journal of Conflict Studies 27, no. 1 (Summer 2007): 47–75.
56 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

fighters—numbering 1,000 to 1,500—to Sudan between late 1989 and late 1991.

Bin Ladin retained a training and operational infrastructure in Afghanistan and

Pakistan; he joined his colleagues in Sudan in December 1991.2

Bin Ladin established some 30 businesses in Sudan, mostly in the construction

and agricultural sectors. He invested some $200 million and employed many of

the Afghan Arabs who had fought with him against the Soviet Union. Many

others were Egyptian members of the radical Islamic Jihad and Jama’at

Islamiyah. Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir provided a letter to Wadi AlAqiq, Bin Ladin’s main Sudanese holding company, which exempted Al-Qaida

from some financial requirements while operating in the country. Al-Qaida used

one of its farms for refresher training in weapons and explosives. One of the

groups that used the facility was the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Bin Ladin cultivated

senior officials in the government and military and reportedly invested $50

million in a bank closely linked to Sudanese leaders. The Sudanese intelligence

service was the intermediary between Al-Qaida and the government.3

The time when the United States learned about the threat posed globally by AlQaida and its activities in East Africa and the Horn is significant in terms of the

U.S. policy response. In the early years as Al-Qaida built its organization in

Sudan, it was not on the U.S. counterterrorism radar screen. Bin Ladin and AlQaida never came up, for example, in the initial investigation of the 1993 New

York World Trade Center bombing. The United States only subsequently

established the link. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did learn in 1993

that Bin Ladin was channeling funds to Egyptian extremists, but a 1995

National Intelligence Estimate on terrorism did not mention Bin Ladin as a key

player in terrorism. He was known only as a financier of Islamist terrorist groups

and not as someone directly involved in the organization and planning of

operations.4 In fact, the United States only learned that Bin Ladin’s empire went

2 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Berkley Books, 2002),

39–41; Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Alfred

A. Knopf, 2007), 164–65.

3 Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of al Qaeda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006),

47–48; Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 41–45, 209; Donald Petterson, Inside Sudan: Political Islam,

Conflict, and Catastrophe (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999), 95–96. The 9/11 Commission Report (New

York: W.W. Norton, 2004), 57–58.

4 Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror (New York: Free Press,

2004), 78–79, 134; The 9/11 Commission Report, 108–9.
by the name Al-Qaida in 1996, when one of his associates in Sudan, Jamal AlFadl, provided the United States with details of the organization.5

According to one of Bin Ladin’s close associates, by 1994 the Sudanese were

becoming increasingly unhappy with his presence in the country.6 Following an

assassination attempt against Bin Ladin, which he attributed to Saudi Arabia,

Bin Ladin decided to step up his political activism, especially against the Saudis,

but followed a practice of not taking credit for terrorist attacks.7 This resulted

in growing pressure by Saudi Arabia and the United States on Sudan to expel

Bin Ladin.

In March 1996, U.S. intelligence officials presented a visiting Sudanese major

general, Al-Fatih Erwa, with a two page “non-paper” that contained a list of

actions that Sudan should take if it wanted to improve relations with the United

States. Among the items, the United States asked Sudan to provide the names,

dates of arrival, departure and destination, and passport data for the mujahidin

that Bin Ladin brought to Sudan. In its response, Sudan went further than the

request in the “non-paper” and in mid-May 1996 expelled Bin Ladin, who left

with two of his sons and some bodyguards for Jalalabad, Afghanistan. Dozens

of other Al-Qaida members followed on later flights. Sudan increasingly saw Bin

Ladin as a liability but insisted publicly that he departed of his own volition

and had not been forced out. Bin Ladin acknowledged in 1998, however, that

he had left Sudan because Khartoum could no longer bear the pressure from the

U.S. government.8

Being forced out of Sudan in 1996 was one of Al-Qaida’s first major setbacks.

A combination of Sudanese unhappiness with the Al-Qaida operation and

concern that its presence in the country prevented improved relations with the

United States largely accounted for the decision. Saudi pressure also contributed

to the expulsion, which resulted in significant financial losses for Bin Ladin’s

5 Clarke, Against All Enemies, 148.

6 Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 45.

7 Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 45–47; Atwan, The Secret History, 49.

8 Atwan, The Secret History, 51; The 9/11 Commission Report, 63; Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 51–

52, 208; Anonymous [Michael Scheuer], Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical

Islam, and the Future of America (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002), 143–47; and George Tenet, At

the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 103.

East Africa and the Horn | 57
58 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

extensive business interests in Sudan.9 Unfortunately, neither the United States

nor Saudi Arabia took advantage of his ill fortune. Although Sudan was

probably not willing to turn him over to the United States, there is no indication

that Washington even asked. In all fairness, there was probably inadequate

evidence against him in the spring of 1996 to charge him and produce a

conviction in an American court. Saudi Arabia appeared to be uninterested in

receiving such a controversial member of a prominent Saudi family. Hence, he

returned to Afghanistan and the rest is history.

Somalia Becomes an Early Target

Somalia’s status as a failed state beginning early in 1991 and efforts by the

United States military beginning in 1992 to provide emergency food aid to

starving Somalis provided an opportunity for Bin Ladin to attack the “far

enemy” closer to home. The massive U.S.-led United Task Force that arrived in

Somalia in December 1992 to open corridors for the delivery of food to famine

victims led to a decision by Bin Ladin to take advantage of the situation. He

gave responsibility for this operation to Abu Hafs Al-Masri, also known as

Mohammed Atef. Abu Hafs, who was born in Egypt, was one of Bin Ladin’s

most talented, trusted and militant lieutenants. Before Abu Hafs’ death in

November 2001 in Afghanistan during a coalition bomb attack, Bin Ladin had

nominated him as his replacement.10

In the early 1990s, Abu Hafs was Al-Qaida’s Africa regional leader, and made

multiple trips to Somalia from Khartoum beginning in 1992. He met with

militants, assessed capabilities, and made arrangements to provide training and

arms for fighters. In late January 1993, he designated a team of Al-Qaida

veterans to conduct operations in Somalia. Al-Qaida believed that Somalia

would offer a safe haven for its operations and allow it to target the United

States in Somalia and the Arabian Peninsula. The first Al-Qaida operatives left

Peshawar, Pakistan, transited Kenya, and arrived in Somalia in early February

1993. The group operated as a traditional special forces group, working closely

9 Wright, The Looming Tower, 222–23; Atwan, The Secret History, 51–53.

10 Harmony Project, Al-Qaida’s (Mis)adventures in the Horn of Africa, 107, see

www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/aqII.asp. The Harmony Project by the Combating Terrorism Center at

West Point is the most comprehensive research effort so far on the role of Al-Qaida in the region.

It includes original, mostly early, Al-Qaida documents. It has a heavy focus on Kenya and

Somalia, and offers relatively little information on the rest of the region.
with a Somali extremist organization known as Al-Ittihad Al-Islami (AIAI).

Together with AIAI, the Al-Qaida operatives established three training camps

in Somalia and took orders from Al-Qaida headquarters in Khartoum.11

In December 1992, there was an attack on a hotel in Yemen in the belief that

U.S. Air Force personnel supporting the U.S.-led operation in Somalia were

staying there. Thanks to a tip from Yemeni security, the Americans had left the

hotel before the bombing. At the time of the attack in Yemen and throughout

the U.S. involvement in Somalia from 1992 until 1994, the William J. Clinton

administration was not aware of any Al-Qaida role.12 It was only several years

later that evidence began to surface positively implicating Al-Qaida in events in

Somalia and East Africa and the Horn more generally.13

Al-Qaida’s chief instructor, Ali Muhammad, began training AIAI personnel in

early 1993. Rohan Gunaratna argues that these personnel were responsible for

shooting down two U.S. Black Hawk helicopters and killing 18 U.S. military

personnel during the 3-4 October 1993 battle in Mogadishu that led ultimately

to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia. Gunaratna, who has held a series

of counterterrorism positions and is now at Nanying Technological University

in Singapore, asserted that Al-Qaida-trained Somalis also killed Belgian and

Pakistani peacekeepers in Somalia.14 The 9/11 Commission Report tends to

support this account but acknowledged it may reflect Al-Qaida boasting.15

Michael Scheuer, then-chief of the Bin Ladin Unit at CIA, although withholding

final judgment on Al-Qaida’s role in aiding the Somalis, seemed inclined to

concur with the argument for robust Al-Qaida involvement.16 In a conversation

well after the event with the editor in chief of Al Quds Al-Arabi, Bin Ladin told

11 Harmony Project, Al-Qaida’s (Mis)adventures, 5–6, 79. For a good analysis of AIAI, see Andre

Le Sage, “Prospects for Al Itihad & Islamist Radicalism in Somalia,” Review of African Political

Economy 28, no. 89 (September 2001): 472–77 and Matt Bryden, “No Quick Fixes: Coming to

Terms with Terrorism, Islam, and Statelessness in Somalia,” Journal of Conflict Studies 13, no. 2

(Fall 2003): 24–56.

12 Clarke, Against All Enemies, 88.

13 The 9/11 Commission Report stated that U.S. intelligence did not learn of Al-Qaida’s

involvement in Somalia until 1996; 468 n45.

14 Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 206–7.

15 The 9/11 Commission Report, 60.

16 Anonymous, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes, 136–37.

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Abdel Bari Atwan that Al-Qaida’s Afghan Arabs were behind the October 1993

attack on the Americans.17

Pulitzer Prize–winning author Lawrence Wright holds a different view. He

pointed out that although Bin Ladin claimed he sent 250 fighters to Somalia to

attack U.S. troops, Sudanese intelligence reports said the number was only a

handful. According to Wright, Al-Qaida operatives concluded that Somalis were

not appreciative of their assistance and relations were strained. Wright believed

that Bin Ladin simply took credit for victories in which Al-Qaida had little

involvement. He also observed that the United States dropped charges of AlQaida responsibility for the killing of Americans in Somalia in a case against

Bin Ladin in a New York court. No testimony in any court case against AlQaida operatives proved that Bin Ladin or Al-Qaida operatives were

responsible for the deaths of Americans in Somalia.18

The Combating Terrorism Center’s Harmony Project provides an excellent

analysis of early Al-Qaida involvement in Somalia and the problems the

organization faced. It clearly intended to establish a franchise in Somalia and

leaders such as Abu Hafs expected that the country would be a low-cost

recruiting ground where disaffected Somalis in a failed state would flock to its

ranks to expel the international peacekeeping force. Somalia seemed to be

another Afghanistan in the eyes of Al-Qaida. The Harmony Project concluded

that the reality of the situation was very different. Al-Qaida underestimated the

cost of operating in Somalia. Getting in and out of the country was costly, and

expenses resulting from corruption in neighboring states were high, while poor

security in Somalia further increased costs. Al-Qaida experienced extortion from

Somali clans and unanticipated losses when bandits attacked their convoys.

And it overestimated the degree to which Somalis would become jihadis,

especially if there was no financial incentive. While many Somali clan leaders

and warlords wanted the U.S. and UN forces to leave Somalia, their first goal

was the security of their clan against others. Abu Hafs spent considerable time

and scarce resources building consensus among Somali leaders to keep the focus

on expelling foreign occupiers instead of fighting with other Somalis.19

17 Atwan, The Secret History, 36, 166.

18 Wright, The Looming Tower, 188–89, 266.

19 Harmony Project, Al-Qaida’s (Mis)adventures, 14, 19–21.
In addition, Al-Qaida failed to understand the importance of traditional Sufi

doctrine in Somali Islam. It tried to convince Somalis to accept Salafi beliefs

without offering financial incentives. In some cases, Al-Qaida operatives

appeared stunned at the depth of resistance they encountered from Sufi clerics

and did not appreciate the Somali attachment to clans and sub-clans. The

Harmony Project said Al-Qaida’s efforts were largely ineffective for many of

the same reasons that Western interventions failed in the past. It simply did not

understand the political, economic, and social dynamics of the country. Unlike

the tribal areas of Pakistan, it found a lawless land of shifting alliances that lacked

Sunni unity. Al-Qaida largely failed to overcome local loyalties, although it did

penetrate a few sub-clans. The Somali practice of inclusive, consensus decisionmaking collided with Al-Qaida’s need for rapid top-down decisions, and

Al-Qaida complained about the lack of secrecy. The primacy of clan ultimately

frustrated Al-Qaida’s efforts to recruit and develop a unified coalition.20

Nonetheless, Al-Qaida did have some early success in Somalia. It managed to

recruit a number of young Somalis who found the call to jihad compatible with

their need for employment and desire for adventure. A few may have been

attracted by the extremist ideology. Al-Qaida also found increasing acceptance

in those areas where it was possible to establish relative security and order. It

accomplished this at Ras Kamboni, a small Indian Ocean port town near the

Kenya border. Since the early 1990s, the port has remained a hotbed of

extremist Islam and was a stronghold of the subsequent Islamic Courts

movement. There were persistent reports that the town served as a terrorist

training camp where jihadis from outside the country were frequent visitors. In

spite of these limited early successes, which became important during the later

rise of Al-Shabaab, the Harmony Project concluded that foreign jihadis

encountered more adversity than success during Al-Qaida’s first 18 months

in Somalia.21

Other Early Al-Qaida Activity in the Horn

The Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM) originated at a conference in

Khartoum in 1988 when the Eritrean Muslim Pioneers Organization and the

Eritrean National Islamic Liberation Front merged with several smaller

20 Ibid., 22, 42–43.

21 Ibid., 6, 23.

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organizations. The first EIJM militants entered Eritrea from Sudan in 1988, but

did not begin offensive military operations until a year later. When Al-Qaida

was based in Khartoum, it trained several hundred movement fighters in its

Sudanese and Afghan camps and provided funding to improve their military

capability. By the mid-1990s, EIJM had an estimated 500 fighters, and even

held a seat on Al-Qaida’s international network’s coordinating council, the

Majlis Al-Fatwa. By 1993, EIJM was carrying out occasional raids and ambushes

inside Eritrea. Following its second general conference in Khartoum in 1994,

EIJM expanded its attacks. This underscored its link to Al-Qaida and in early

1995 led to a break in relations between Eritrea and Sudan. Asmara then began

calling for the overthrow of the government in Khartoum.22

Djibouti, which has been the location of a French military base for many years

and became in December 2002 the site for the only U.S. military base in Africa—

Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa—has managed to avoid any

significant Al-Qaida activity.23 This did not happen, however, for lack of trying.

Abu Hafs complained in an internal Al-Qaida memo dating from the early

1990s that its operative in Djibouti had to be removed immediately “because he

is susceptible to Djibouti’s corruption as a single male, and replaced with Abu

Ahmed Al-Radji, who is married.”24 The Iraqi intelligence service in Djibouti

reported in 2001 that Al-Qaida delivered messages in Arabic and French,

allegedly signed by Bin Ladin, threatening to blow up certain foreign companies

in Djibouti unless they ceased cooperating with the United States. This threat

resulted in no Al-Qaida attack.25

Although Ethiopia has experienced a number of terrorist attacks since the early

1990s, most of them can be attributed to locally-based dissident groups. Abu

Hafs did send a team of Al-Qaida operatives to Ethiopia’s Somali-inhabited

Ogaden region in January 1993 where they worked with AIAI. He appointed

Sayf Al-Islam as Al-Qaida’s representative to the organization, and also detailed

in an internal Al-Qaida document some of the financial assistance provided to

22 Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 202. Dan Connell, “Eritrea: On a Slow Fuse,” in Battling Terrorism

in the Horn of Africa (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 78–79.

23 For a description of the U.S. and French military presence in Djibouti, see Berouk Mesfin,

“Elections, Politics and External Involvement in Djibouti,” Institute for Security Studies Situation

Report (14 April 2011), 8–10.

24 Harmony Project, Al-Qaida’s (Mis)adventures, 210–11.

25 Ibid., 221.
AIAI in 1993. AIAI conducted a number of attacks in Ethiopia and severely

injured the ethnic Somali minister of transportation in a 1996 assassination

attempt in Addis Ababa. The same year, Ethiopian cross-border raids against

AIAI’s strongholds at Luuq and Buulo Haawa in Somalia severely weakened it.

AIAI attacks inside Ethiopia ended by the late 1990s, and it disappeared as a

meaningful organization, although some of its leaders, especially Hassan Dahir

Aweys, subsequently emerged as key figures in Somali extremist groups.26

There was an unsuccessful assassination attempt against Egyptian President

Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 in Addis Ababa as he went from the airport to an

Organization of African Unity meeting in the city center. Egypt’s Gama’at AlIslamiya (The Islamic Group) carried out the attack with help from persons in

Sudan. Mustafa Hamza, Gama’at’s operations chief and manager of Bin Ladin’s

business interests in Khartoum, planned the attack.27 Radios purchased by AlQaida in Japan were used in the plot and the United States believes the person

responsible for the purchase of the radios was in charge of finance for Al-Qaida

and close to Bin Ladin.28 Sudan’s NIF leader, Hassan Al-Turabi, acknowledged

the involvement of unnamed Sudanese officials in the failed assassination

attempt, but insisted President Al-Bashir did not know of the plot and that Bin

Ladin had nothing to do with it.29 The evidence is convincing that Al-Qaida

played a role in nearly ending Mubarak’s life.

Al-Qaida Shifts Its Focus to East Africa

Al-Qaida began building cells in Kenya in the early 1990s, but kept a low profile.

Wadih El-Hage went to Nairobi in 1994 to run the Al-Qaida operation and

remained until September 1997. Born in Lebanon and a U.S. citizen by marriage,

he had served as Bin Ladin’s personal secretary. He returned to the United

States under pressure from Kenyan and U.S. authorities, and the Federal Bureau

of Investigation (FBI) arrested him in October 1998 following the bombing of

U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in August 1998. He was convicted

26 Ibid., 107–10, 189–92, 208–10. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 204–5.

27 Anonymous, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes, 140; Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 50; and Atwan, The

Secret History, 77. Wright, The Looming Tower, 213–15.

28 “Al-Qaeda Bought Radio Sets in Japan for Mubarak Assassination Bid,” Agence France Presse,

17 June 2003.

29 “Sudan Islamist Leader Denies Links to Bin Laden, Mubarak Assassination Plot,” BBC

Worldwide Monitoring, 24 March 2006, text of report by Dubai-based Al-Arabiya TV on 17 March

2006.

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64 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

of terrorism charges in 2001.30 The CIA knew there had been an Al-Qaida cell

in Kenya but thought that, working with the Kenyan police, they had broken it

up when Kenyan authorities arrested five individuals in Nairobi in 1997

suspected of connections with Bin Ladin.31 Writing in 2005, former U.S.

Ambassador to Kenya Johnnie Carson said that although Kenya had not

produced any indigenous terrorist organization, at least one and probably two

Al-Qaida cells had operated there for more than a decade. He added that more

than a half dozen Kenyan nationals and their family members have been

implicated in significant Al-Qaida attacks and three of Al-Qaida’s senior leaders

in East Africa traveled routinely in and out of Kenya.32

In 1994, Al-Qaida began planning the August 1998 bombings of the U.S.

embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Abu Ubayda Al-Banshiri and,

following his death, his deputy and successor, Abu Hafs, did the planning

together with Ali Muhammad, who took pictures and made sketches of the

Nairobi embassy. Bin Ladin, then in Khartoum, applied his engineering

knowledge to identify the best entry for the explosive-laden vehicle. Originally

planned for 1996, Al-Qaida delayed the operation due to difficulties in Sudan

that followed the failed 1995 assassination of President Mubarak, the death of

Al-Banshiri, and the expulsion of Bin Ladin. In the operation against the

embassy, which was planned as a suicide mission, two Saudis entered its

perimeter in an explosive-laden truck. One died in the blast; the other, Rashed

Daoud Al-Owali, jumped out of the vehicle before the explosion occurred and

escaped. The attack killed 213 people and wounded about 4,500, the vast

majority Kenyan. Authorities in Kenya arrested Al-Owali and sent him to the

United States, where a court in New York convicted him in 2001; he is serving

a life sentence.33

The bombing of the embassy in Dar es Salaam resulted in 11 deaths and 85

injuries, most of them Tanzanians. Al-Qaida operatives involved in the attack

30 Anonymous, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes, 94, 214.

31 Clarke, Against All Enemies, 183; Georgetown University, “The 1998 Terrorist Bombings of

U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania: Failures of Intelligence or of Policy Priorities?” Working

Group Report no. 11 (14 March 2005), 8–10.

32 Johnnie Carson, “Kenya: the Struggle against Terrorism,” in Battling Terrorism in the Horn of

Africa, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2005), 174, 185.

33 Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 212–14; Wright, The Looming Tower, 270–72; Anonymous, Through

Our Enemies’ Eyes, 218; Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, 114–15; Harmony Project, Al-Qaida’s

(Mis)adventures, 94; Atwan, The Secret History, 15, 25, 93.
included two Tanzanians from Zanzibar—Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani and Khalfan

Khamis Mohamed. South African authorities captured Mohamed and a U.S.

court convicted him in 2001. He is serving a life term in Florence, Colorado. A

joint U.S.-Pakistani raid in Gurjat, Pakistan, captured Ghailani in 2004. Ghailani

told military officers at Guantanamo Bay that he had not knowingly

participated in any terrorist act but admitted joining Al-Qaida operatives after

the bombing and undergoing training in Afghanistan.34 During his trial, it

became apparent that he had contact with jihadis dating back to 1996.35 In

2011, a jury in New York convicted him of conspiracy to destroy government

buildings and property, and he was sentenced to life in prison without parole.36

An extensive study by Global Witness concluded that Nairobi-based Al-Qaida

operatives Wadih El-Hage and Abu Ubadiah Al-Banshiri began in 1993 to use

diamonds, tanzanite, and rubies as a resource to fund Al-Qaida cells. Al-Qaida

purchased property in Tanzania to mine diamonds and gold and established

trading companies to launder illicit diamonds that probably came from the

Democratic Republic of the Congo. For this purpose, they established Taheer

Ltd. and Tanzanite King in Tanzania. Evidence presented at the trial of Wadih

El-Hage seemed to confirm this conclusion.37 The government of Tanzania has

denied the allegations, and at one point the U.S. Department of State also said

there is no connection to Tanzania. A cottage industry has developed around

these charges that continue to insist there is a link.

Turning to Uganda, in 1994 Al-Qaida supported the obscure Salafi Foundation

of Uganda, which led to the Ugandan Mujahedin Freedom Fighters. It

eventually evolved into an anti-Uganda government group known as the Allied

Democratic Forces (ADF). Al-Qaida helped set up training camps for the ADF,

which operated out of the eastern Congo. The group launched its first attack

against Uganda in 1996 and has been shrouded in mystery ever since. It

34 Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 214-15; Anonymous, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes, 215; Wright, The

Looming Tower, 272; Josh White and Julie Tate, “Detainee Says He Didn’t Know About Bombing

Plot,” Washington Post, 24 March 2007.

35 Benjamin Weiser, “Conspirator’s Path from Poverty as a Boy in Zanzibar to Bin Ladin’s Side,”

New York Times, 23 January 2011.

36 Clyde Haberman, “A Verdict Replies to Terrorists, and to Critics,” New York Times, 27 January

2011.

37 Global Witness, “For a Few Dollars More: How Al-Qaeda Moved into the Diamond Trade,”

April 2003, 28–38.

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66 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

periodically disappears and resurfaces. There were several reports that its leader,

Jamil Mukulu, received training from Al-Qaida in Sudan before the departure

of Bin Ladin for Afghanistan.38 Uganda’s minister of internal affairs told

parliament in 2002 that ADF had ties with Al-Qaida. The Ugandan government

said in the same year that Al-Qaida trained senior ADF leaders in Afghanistan.39

In 1998, Ugandan authorities detained 20 suspects linked to Al-Qaida who were

thought to be planning an attack against the U.S. embassy in Kampala, the

Ugandan capital. The Egyptian intelligence service informed the United States

that a senior operative from Jemaah Islamiya, a Southeast Asian terrorist

organization allied with Al-Qaida, was planning attacks on U.S. and Israeli

interests in the capital. Four trucks filled with C-4 explosives had reportedly

been brought there and operatives had begun casing the U.S. embassy, which

closed down after learning of the threat.40

Post-9/11 Al-Qaida Developments in Sudan, Eritrea,

and Kenya

With the departure of Al-Qaida from Sudan in 1996 and the political

marginalization of Al-Turabi’s NIF, counterterrorism cooperation between

Khartoum and Washington began near the end of the Clinton administration.

It picked up in the George W. Bush administration after 9/11. The State

Department even acknowledged in the 2006 Country Reports on Terrorism

that “the Sudanese government was a strong partner in the War on Terror and

aggressively pursued terrorist operations directly involving threats to U.S.

interests and personnel in Sudan.”41 Relations between Khartoum and Al-Qaida

became strained, and Al-Qaida began calling for mujahidin to join the struggle

in Darfur. These calls apparently went unheeded.

In July 2006, Al-Qaida claimed to have established a covert organization in

Sudan. Months later a group calling itself Al-Qaida in Sudan and Africa claimed

38 Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 218. Andrew McGregor, “Oil and Jihad in Central Africa: The

Rise and Fall of Uganda’s ADF,” Terrorism Monitor 5, no. 24 (27 December 2007).

39 “Government Troops Capture Allied Forces Top Aide,” New Vision [Kampala], 8 January

2002; “Kampala Blacklists Al-Qaeda Terrorists,” New Vision, 20 March 2002.

40 Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, 155; Clarke, Against All Enemies, 183.

41 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2006, www.state.gov/s/ct/rls

/crt/2006/82736.htm. See also Angel Rabasa, “Radical Islam in East Africa,” Rand Project Air

Force (2009), 51.
responsibility for kidnapping and beheading the chief editor of Al-Wifaq, a

Sudanese independent daily. The organization said it murdered the journalist

because he defamed Muhammad. It was not clear if this group had ties to Bin

Ladin’s organization or simply borrowed the name. The U.S. government

concluded in 2006 that there was no proof Al-Qaida–affiliated extremists were

active in Sudan,42 which has continued to cooperate with the United States in

countering terrorism. In 2008, terrorists killed a U.S. Agency for International

Development officer, John Granville, in Khartoum. Two previously unknown

groups, Ansar Al-Tawhid (Supporters of Monotheism) and Al-Qaida in the

Land of the Two Niles, separately claimed responsibility for the assassination.

The Sudanese government disputed the existence of both organizations, and

the assassins, who were captured, were not charged with belonging to

either group.43

War broke out unexpectedly in 1998 between Eritrea and Ethiopia. At the time,

Eritrea had no diplomatic relations with Sudan, and Ethiopia had frosty

relations. Both countries decided, however, it was necessary to repair relations

with Sudan in order to focus on the conflict between the two of them. It took

Eritrea longer to improve ties with Sudan in part because EIJM continued to

operate out of Sudan against Eritrea. In 2003, Eritrea charged the movement

with killing a British geologist in the country; EIJM denied the allegation. On

the other hand, it claimed responsibility for a hotel bombing and ambush that

killed 46 Eritrean military personnel. EIJM changed its name in 2003 to the

Eritrean Islamic Reform Movement (EIRM). Although some analysts believe it

remains linked to Al-Qaida, the evidence is thin. EIRM’s goal is the overthrow

of the Eritrean government, where Al-Qaida does not appear in recent years to

have been seriously involved.44

In 2002, Al-Qaida bombed the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Kikambala along

the beach north of Mombasa, Kenya, killing 15 persons and injuring another 35.

In a coordinated attack, an Al-Qaida team fired two SA-7 missiles at an Israeli

42 Reuven Paz, “Special Issue: Al-Qaeda in Africa.” Islam in Africa Newsletter 2, no. 1 (January

2007): 8–9; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2006.

43 Andrew McGregor, “Alleged Assassins of U.S. Diplomat Claim Khartoum Regime Incites

People to Jihad,” Terrorism Focus 6, no. 4 (6 February 2009). “U.S. Diplomat’s Assassins Escape

from Notorious Sudanese Prison,” Terrorism Monitor 8, no. 25 (24 June 2010).

44 Angel Rabasa et al., Beyond al-Qaeda: The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe, Rand project for

the U.S. Air Force, 44–49, www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs

/2006/RAND_MG430.pdf. “The Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM)”,

www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/pdf/EIJM.pdf.

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68 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

passenger plane, Arkia flight 582, which departed from Moi International

Airport in Mombasa. The attack failed and investigators found two missile

launchers and two additional SA-7 missiles at the launch site. They were from

the same series and production line as missiles fired by Al-Qaida at an American

military plane in Saudi Arabia earlier in the year. The mastermind behind the

attacks was Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, who took part in organizing the 1998

attack on the U.S. embassy in Nairobi and is today the Al-Qaida representative

in East Africa. An Al-Qaida spokesman took credit for the attacks in an audio

tape broadcast by Al-Jazeera television.45

The United States warned its citizens early in 2003 to avoid unessential travel

to Kenya, while the United Kingdom suspended international flights to Kenya

for about a month, and President George W. Bush rescheduled a trip to Africa

and ultimately replaced a stop in Nairobi for one in Kampala. There was a fear

that Al-Qaida terrorists might try to attack the president’s plane with a

shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile. U.S. and British intelligence did foil

an Al-Qaida plot in June 2003 designed to crash an airplane and drive a truck

full of explosives into the new American embassy in Nairobi. The plan was

developed in Somalia and involved participation of Somalis and SomaliKenyans associated with Al-Qaida.46

The U.S. has not been satisfied with Kenyan efforts to prosecute alleged AlQaida operatives captured in the country. In June 2005, a Kenyan court

acquitted seven suspects arrested on charges related to one or more of the

following events: the 2002 Kikambala hotel bombing and attempted downing

of Israeli Arkia flight 582, the 1998 attack on the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, and

the 2003 plot to attack the new U.S. embassy. While Kenya subsequently took

a more proactive approach to countering Al-Qaida, the organization almost

certainly continues to maintain cells in the country.47

45 Shaul Shay, The Red Sea Terror Triangle (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 148–

52. Harmony Project, Al-Qaida’s (Mis)adventures, 48, 98–99; “Kenya: Al-Qaeda Claims Role in

Hotel Blast; Other Developments,” Facts on File World News Digest, 8 December 2002; “Kenya

Hotel Bombing Suspects Linked to Alleged Al-Qaeda Operative,” Agence France Presse, 20

January 2005; and Carson, “Kenya,” 180–83.

46 Carson, “Kenya,” 188–89; Reuben Kyama, “The Threat of Terrorism to Kenya,” Terrorism

Monitor 4, no. 19 (5 October 2006); Shay, Terror Triangle, 152–53. Kenneth J. Menkhaus,

“Somalia and Somaliland: Terrorism, Political Islam and State Collapse” in Battling Terrorism in the

Horn of Africa, 42.

47 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2006; Harmony Project, Al-Qaida’s

(Mis)adventures, 49.
Al-Qaida Refocuses on Somalia

The United States has long believed that extremist elements in Somalia,

especially AIAI, protected three Al-Qaida operatives—Fazul Abdullah

Mohammed from the Comoro Islands, Abu Talha Al-Sudani from Sudan, and

Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan from Kenya—who took part in the 1998 U.S. embassy

bombings.48 The United States also concluded that AIAI received some of its

funding from the Saudi Islamic charity, Al-Haramain, which had ties to AlQaida and offices throughout the region. Washington pressured Saudi Arabia to

shut down Al-Haramain globally.49

Islamic courts first appeared in Somalia in the early 1990s and actually helped

establish a degree of security in an anarchic situation. They also attracted an

extremist element and some Somalis who had training in Afghanistan and

followed a jihadist agenda. This element included Ibrahim Al-Afghani, Muktar

Robow, and Aden Hashi Ayro. The courts eventually developed their own

militia, which tended to be the most radical component and is believed to have

provided protection to the three Al-Qaida operatives sought by the United

States.50 The United States became increasingly concerned with the perceived

radicalization of the Islamic courts and in February 2006 funded the creation of

the Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), a

coalition of discredited warlords opposed to the courts. The U.S. goal in funding

the alliance appears to have had the narrow purpose of capturing Al-Qaida

operatives who had taken refuge in Somalia. The ARPCT used the opportunity

to wage war on the courts; however, the effort failed miserably and the courts

emerged stronger than ever.51

48 Al-Sudani was killed in 2007 during an Ethiopian airstrike along the Kenya-Somali border. See

“Somali Mujahideen Confirm Al-Qaeda Suspect Abu Talha Al-Sudani Killed Last Year,” Terrorism

Focus 5, no. 32 (10 September 2008). U.S. special operations forces killed Nabhan in 2009 during

a helicopter raid from a ship in the Indian Ocean as he was travelling with a small group of

militants south of Mogadishu. See Jeffrey Gettleman and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Kills Top Qaeda

Militant in Southern Somalia,” New York Times, 15 September 2009.

49 Menkhaus, “Somalia and Somaliland,” 38–44; Bryden, “No Quick Fixes,” 33–35; Shay, Terror

Triangle, 94; and Harmony Project, Al-Qaida’s (Mis)adventures, 42. For a listing of the AlHaramain offices and their links to Al-Qaida, see www.treasury.gov/resource-center/

terrorist-illicit-finance/Pages/protecting-charities_execorder_13224-a.aspx.

50 International Crisis Group, “Can the Somali Crisis Be Contained?” Africa Report no. 116 (10

August 2006), 9–10.

51 Ibid., 11–13.

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70 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

By the end of 2006, the Islamic courts controlled about 50 percent of former

Italian Somalia. The internationally-recognized Transitional Federal

Government (TFG) was confined to Baidoa in south-central Somalia, where

Ethiopian troops protected it, and a few other areas. Al-Qaida’s role during this

period was generally passive; it gave verbal support to the Islamic courts and

warned the West not to interfere.52 Ethiopia, which has a large Somali minority

in the Ogaden region neighboring Somalia, became increasingly concerned.

The United States argued that the courts had become hijacked by extremists,

especially by an organization known as Al-Shabaab (The Youth).53

A steady influx of jihadi volunteers from across the Muslim world strengthened

the Al-Qaida presence in Somalia in late 2006. Most were not battle-hardened

veterans but inexperienced fighters who required considerable supervision by

the courts.54 The courts sent their poorly trained and largely conscripted militia

to Baidoa late in 2006 to confront the TFG and professional Ethiopian military

forces. The Ethiopians quickly crushed the militia and then entered Mogadishu

unopposed. The leadership of the Islamic courts and its Al-Qaida supporters

dispersed to southern Somalia, pursued by Ethiopian forces and small numbers

of U.S. Special Forces from Kenya. While Ethiopia scored a quick victory,

historical animosity between Ethiopians and Somalis gave Al-Shabaab a new

and important theme for recruitment.

In January 2007, the United States launched two Lockheed AC-130 Spectre

gunship attacks against the Islamic court and Al-Shabaab leaders who fled to

52 Paz, “Special Issue,” 16.

53 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2006. Al-Shabaab formally incorporated

in 2003 at an AIAI alumni conference in Las Anod, Somaliland. About a dozen, young battlehardened, Afghan-trained Somali men stormed out of the AIAI conference in opposition to a

proposed agenda that stressed creation of a Salafi political organization that seemed too willing

to accommodate the status quo. Days later, the radical dissidents organized a parallel conference

in Las Anod and launched Al-Shabaab as a Salafi-jihadist movement. The principal leaders of the

breakaway faction were Aden Hashi Ayro, killed in 2008 during an American missile strike on

his home in Dusamareb, Somalia, and Ahmed Abdi Aw-Mohamed “Godane.” Ayro trained in

Afghanistan with Al-Qaida during the late 1990s. Godane fought with Al-Qaida in Afghanistan

until the end of 2001 and patterned Al-Shabaab’s chain of command after the one used by AlQaida. See Abdirahman “Aynte” Ali, “The Anatomy of Al- Shabaab,” June 2010 unpublished

paper, 11–16.

54 International Crisis Group, “Somalia: The Tough Part Is Ahead,” Africa Briefing no. 45 (26

January 2007), 4–5.
southern Somalia. The first strike near Ras Kamboni killed eight militants while

the second strike targeted Sheikh Ahmed Madobe, a senior Islamic court leader.

Madobe survived the attack but apparently was later captured by the

Ethiopians. The AC-130 operated out of a small airfield in eastern Ethiopia, a

fact denied by Ethiopia.55 Members of U.S. Task Force 88 were on the ground

in southern Somalia searching for key Al-Qaida operatives, especially Fazul

Abdullah Mohammed. One of the persons captured—a U.S. citizen from New

Jersey, Amir Mohamed Meshal—told investigators that he had been at an AlQaida camp west of Mogadishu but denied being a fighter or undergoing

military training.56 In June 2007, a U.S. warship attacked a small group of AlQaida suspects in a mountainous region near the coast in the semi-autonomous

region of Puntland in northeastern Somalia. There was no public confirmation

that the persons killed in the attack were linked to Al-Qaida.57

U.S. Ambassador to Kenya Michael E. Ranneberger commented in 2007 that

Al-Shabaab harbored Al-Qaida members responsible for the attacks on the

American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. He added that Saudi Arabia

believed that Somalia had become an important training ground for Saudis

affiliated with Al-Qaida. The State Department announced that 10 Al-Qaida

operatives remained in Somalia who were at least partially responsible for the

growing violence in Mogadishu. It noted that six of them are well known Somali

leaders in the Islamic courts, while four are international Al-Qaida members

with years of experience in Africa.58 Ambassador Ranneberger added that AlQaida has for many years been using Somalia as a safe haven and base of

operations.59

55 Michael R. Gordon and Mark Mazzetti, “Ethiopia Denies U.S. Troops Staged Somalia Attacks

from Its Territory,” Associated Press, 23 February 2007; Gordon and Mazzetti, “U.S. Used Base in

Ethiopia to Hunt Al-Qaeda in Africa,” New York Times, 23 February 2007; Comments by Theresa

Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, Center for Strategic and

International Studies in Washington, DC, on 17 January 2007; Guled Mohamed, “‘Many Dead’ in

U.S. Strike at al Qaeda in Somalia,” Reuters, 9 January 2007.

56 “Kenya: Computer May Hold Clue on Terror Suspect,” The Nation [Nairobi], 24 January 2007;

Harmony Project, Al-Qaida’s (Mis)adventures , 99–100; Jonathan Landay, “Imprisoned U.S.

Citizen Says He Was in an Al-Qaeda Camp in Somalia, But Was Never a Fighter,” McClatchy

Newspapers, 24 March 2007.

57 “U.S. Attacks Somali Militant Base,” BBC News, 2 June 2007. Abdiqani Hassan, “Somali Region

Says U.S. Planes Hunting Islamists,” Reuters, 12 June 2007.

58 Chris Tomlinson, “Islamic Militants Rebound in Somalia,” Associated Press, 27 April 2007.

59 U.S. Department of State, USINFO Web chat transcript, 23 May 2007.

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72 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

The Pentagon announced in June 2007 the capture and transfer to Guantanamo

of a suspected Al-Qaida terrorist, a Somali national identified as Abdullahi Sudi

Arale. A Defense Department spokesperson described him as “an extremely

dangerous member of the al-Qaida network,” adding that he was suspected of

acting as a courier between Al-Qaida in East Africa and the network in

Pakistan.60 The Pentagon also alleged that Arale had held a leadership role in

Somalia’s Islamic courts structure and stated that his capture underscored the

threat that the United States faces from dangerous extremists.61 At the time of

his arrest, most Somalia watchers had never heard of Arale, who is also known

as Ismail Mahmoud Muhammad. After two-and-a-half years at Guantanamo,

Arale was among those released without charges and, in his case, sent to

Somaliland.62 This case serves as a cautionary tale that alleged early connections

with Al-Qaida do not always hold up.

Al-Shabaab Replaces Al-Qaida as the Key Regional

Jihadist Organization

During the latter part of the first decade of the twenty-first century, Al-Shabaab

became the predominant jihadi organization in the region, although it focuses

almost all of its effort on Somalia. Al-Qaida’s role has diminished. This is

consistent with global changes in its approach, although there is not complete

agreement among the experts on Al-Qaida’s current standing. Rohan

Gunaratna and Aviv Oreg, with Israel’s Civil Effort in Fighting International

Terrorism, emphasize that Al-Qaida still exists as a formal organization with a

solid structure and the ability to survive the difficulties it is facing.63 They argue

that within the global jihad movement, it remains by far the most prominent

element. At the same time, they acknowledge there is a question about its

functional role as an umbrella organization that has loose ties with its internal

branches. They fully expect Al-Shabaab to join the Al-Qaida organization.64

60 “Terrorism Suspect Captured in Somalia,” Associated Press, 6 June 2007.

61 Josh White, “Pentagon Says Terror Suspect Has Been Moved to Guantanamo,” Washington

Post, 7 June 2007; Carol Rosenberg, “Terror Suspect Sent from Africa to Guantanamo,” Miami

Herald, 7 June 2007.

62 Andy Worthington, “The Stories of the Two Somalis Freed from Guantanamo,” 21 December

2009, http://pubrecord.org/law/6346/stories-somalis-freed-guantanamo/print/.

63 Rohan Gunaratna and Aviv Oreg, “Al Qaeda’s Organizational Structure and Its Evolution,”

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33, no. 12 (December 2010): 1044.

64 Ibid., 1051, 1053–54.
Leah Farrall, former senior counterterrorism intelligence analyst with the

Australian Federal Police, explains that Al-Qaida today does not exercise full

command and control over its branches and franchises. Levels of command

authority are not always clear, and personal ties among militants sometimes

transcend the command structure between the core, branches, and franchises.65

Farrall adds that Al-Qaida approaches mergers warily. Al-Shabaab declared

allegiance to Bin Ladin in an effort to join Al-Qaida as a franchise. But infighting

between Al-Shabaab and a competing organization, Hizb Al-Islam, kept AlQaida from fully accepting Al-Shabaab. With the possible exception of

Al-Shabaab, Farrall argues that Al-Qaida is unlikely to acquire any new

subsidiaries in the immediate future.66

Alex Gallo, an associate at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point,

writes that Al-Qaida has fundamentally shifted its organizational approach and

goals. It now operates within a highly competitive environment vis-à-vis other

jihadist groups and engages almost exclusively in professional consulting or

advisory entrepreneurial activity. It serves as a financial adviser and facilitator

and provides the ideological coherence within the global jihadist movement.

Al-Qaida’s representative in East Africa, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, sees

himself as a consultant to Al-Shabaab on issues such as advanced training

courses for the elite forces, specialized programs to train snipers, courses in

information technology, and establishing a budget. This approach allows AlQaida to claim that it is actively engaged in waging violence against the “far

enemy” while remaining unburdened by the actual cost of waging violence.

Local groups such as Al-Shabaab have the freedom to operate in the manner

that they choose.67

Another group of analysts recently argued that Al-Qaida’s most significant

contribution to global terrorism today comes in the form of ideological direction

and inspiration. As the initiator of global Islamist terrorism against Western

interests, Bin Ladin maintained his symbolic value as a figurehead.

65 Leah Farrall, “How al Qaeda Works,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (March/April 2011): 133–34.

66 Ibid., 136–37.

67 Alex Gallo, “Understanding Al-Qa’ida’s Business Model,” CTC Sentinel 4, no.1 (January 2011),

15–18.

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74 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

Consequently, his statements and those issued by his deputies still carry

significant weight in militant circles.68

Since 2007, public statements by both Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaida have moved

the two organizations closer to each other. In 2008, the U.S. Department of

State designated Al-Shabaab a terrorist organization. In June of that year, AlShabaab leader Abdi Aw-Mohamed “Godane” praised Bin Ladin and his

deputy, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, and the larger global jihad movement. He also

explicitly declared Al-Shabaab’s intention to attack the United States and

implied that the organization had become part of the Al-Qaida movement.

Soon thereafter, Al-Shabaab released a video that pledged loyalty to Al-Qaida

and urged young Muslims to join the cause. In July 2009, Godane made a

speech that referred to senior figures in Al-Qaida as the leaders of global jihad

and linked the war in Somalia to those in Afghanistan and Iraq. In September

2009, Al-Shabaab released another video that pledged allegiance to Bin Ladin,

and in 2010, it issued a statement that compared jihad in the Horn of Africa to

the one led by Al-Qaida and Bin Ladin.69

Al-Qaida reciprocated by regularly voicing support for jihad in Somalia

beginning in 2006. In June 2008, one of Al-Qaida’s most senior commanders,

Abu Yahya Al-Libi, recognized Al-Shabaab for the first time and said Somalis

should accept nothing less than an independent Islamic state. The three top

leaders of Al-Qaida made statements in 2009 supporting Al-Shabaab’s

campaign in Somalia. Bin Ladin released only five statements in 2009, but

devoted one of them to Somalia, calling the conflict a war between Islam and

the international Crusade. By recognizing Somalia’s significant role in global

jihad, Al-Qaida gave credibility to Al-Shabaab.70

68 Rick “Ozzie” Nelson and Thomas M. Sanderson, “A Threat Transformed: Al Qaeda and

Associated Movements in 2011,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2011,

15.

69 For a good summary of Al-Shabaab messages linking it to Al-Qaida, see Christopher

Harnisch, “The Terror Threat from Somalia: The Internationalization of al Shabaab,” American

Enterprise Institute Report, 12 February 2010, 24–27. See also Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “The

Strategic Challenge of Somalia’s Al-Shabaab: Dimensions of Jihad,” Middle East Quarterly (Fall

2009): 25–36; and Sarah Childress, “Somalia’s Al-Shabaab to Ally with Al-Qaeda,” Wall Street

Journal, 2 February 2010. For a more detailed account of Al-Shabaab, see David Shinn, “AlShabaab’s Foreign Threat to Somalia,” Orbis 55, no. 2 (March–June 2011): 203–15.

70 Harnisch, “The Terror Threat, 27–28.
In spite of their common cause and the mutual statements of support voiced by

Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaida, most analysts do not believe that the organization is

a branch or under the operational control of Al-Qaida. The 2009 State

Department annual report on terrorism stated explicitly that Al-Qaida and AlShabaab are not formally merged, but acknowledged there are many links

between the two. The United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia concluded

that extremists within Al-Shabaab are seeking, with limited success, to align the

organization more closely with Al-Qaida. In 2009, Al-Shabaab formally

renamed itself Harakat al Shabaab Al-Mujahidin (Mujahideen Youth

Movement) to underscore its jihadist identity and the global nature of its

agenda.71

Al-Shabaab has borrowed heavily from the Taliban and Al-Qaida playbooks.

Suicide bombings, which were unknown in Somalia prior to 2006 and are even

alien to Somali culture, have become commonplace under Al-Shabaab. Its

leaders accept death worship, which includes practices such as suicide

bombings, the use of human shields, and beheading as a punishment. AlShabaab’s rhetoric increasingly resembles that of Al-Qaida. It avoids Somali

nationalist slogans and refuses to use the traditional Somali flag, which it

replaced with a black flag emblazoned with the Shahaada (declaration of the

faith) in white text. It often holds press conferences in Arabic rather than the

more common Somali language. As in the case of Al-Qaida, it has developed

an effective communications and media effort to get its message out and for

recruitment purposes. Al-Shabaab is looking more and more like the Taliban of

the 1990s.72

Current estimates of Al-Shabaab’s armed strength range between 3,000 and

7,000 fighters, mostly native-born Somalis. The largest foreign component,

perhaps numbering a thousand or more, consists of Somalis born in neighboring

countries or those from the diaspora. There are probably between 200 and 300

non-Somali foreign jihadis fighting alongside Al-Shabaab. These come primarily

71 Ibid., 19. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009,

www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/140883.htm. “Somalia’s Divided Islamists,” International Crisis

Group Africa Briefing no. 74 (18 May 2010), 7.

72 Stig Jarle Hansen, “Revenge or Reward? The Case of Somalia’s Suicide Bombers,” Journal of

Terrorism Research, Issue 1 (2010): 21–24; Abdirahman “Aynte” Ali, Anatomy, 22–23; Jason

Straziuso and Mohamed Olad Hassan, “Somali Rebels Looking Increasingly Like Taliban,”

Associated Press, 22 August 2010; and Tom Pippard, “Al-Shabaab’s Agenda in the Wake of the

Kampala Suicide Attacks,” CTC Sentinel 3, no. 7 (July 2010): 5.

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76 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

from the Swahili coast of Kenya and Tanzania, Eritrea, Pakistan, Bangladesh,

India, Afghanistan, Yemen, Sudan, Uganda, and Saudi Arabia.73 Anonymous

sources in the U.S. military and intelligence community put the number of

foreigners in Somalia affiliated with Al-Qaida at up to 200.74 The African Union

Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which has about 9,000 troops from Uganda

and Burundi in Mogadishu to assist the internationally recognized Somali TFG,

announced that during fighting early in 2011, its forces killed at least six foreign

“Al-Qaida-connected commanders.” AMISOM provided the names of the

commanders and said there was one each from Yemen, Pakistan, India, Kenya,

Syria, and one nationality not known.75

Al-Shabaab had a success of sorts in December 2010 when it forced its primary

competitor, Hassan Dahir Aweys’ Hizb Al-Islam to merge with it. Differences

between the two groups apparently were one of the major reasons why AlQaida has been reluctant to give Al-Shabaab the kind of formal association that

it has with Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Al-Qaida in the

Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). This shotgun marriage has not, however, resolved

their problems. Some observers believe that no more than one-third of Hizb AlIslam’s followers joined Al-Shabaab. Those who did sign on reportedly

abstained from taking part in the fighting in Mogadishu early in 2011 against the

AMISOM and TFG forces.76

Al-Shabaab Looks Beyond Somalia

There is a long history of contact between Somalia and Yemen. Over the years

as many as 700,000 Somalis have made their way to Yemen. The vast majority

sought improved security or better economic livelihood. Al-Shabaab has almost

certainly made occasional use of this human conveyer belt to send followers to

and from Yemen. There is growing evidence that small numbers of the

organization make their way to Yemen, and Yemenis previously aligned with AlQaida in Yemen and now AQAP go to Somalia. Some analysts who follow

73 Shinn, “Al-Shabaab’s Foreign Threat to Somalia,” 209–10.

74 Barbara Starr, “Up to 200 Foreign Fighters in Somalia, U.S. Officials Say,” CNN, 4 June 2010.

75 AMISOM press release dated 20 February 2011.

76 Muhyadin Ahmed Roble, “Merger of Islamist Groups Challenges Somali Government’s

Pledge to Retake Mogadishu,” Terrorism Monitor 9, no. 6 (10 February 2011): 5–6; “Former Hisb

Al-Islam Forces Abstain from Fighting in Somali Capital,” Shabeelle Media Network, 14 March

2011.
Yemen and Somalia believe that Al-Shabaab and AQAP have developed a

collaborative relationship which, at a minimum, involves the sharing of

personnel, weapons, and training. The relationship may not yet involve strategic

cooperation, but it has that potential. In recent months, Al-Shabaab has

strengthened its ties with AQAP, which is in keeping with the tendency of AlQaida central to delegate responsibility to affiliates and be available to serve as

a consultant.77

Al-Shabaab’s first known attack outside Somalia occurred in July 2010, when it

perpetrated three coordinated bombings in Kampala, Uganda, killing 79 people,

mostly Ugandans. Four Ugandans admitted involvement in the attacks; two

had previous ties to Al-Shabaab while the others were apparently recruited in

Kampala. One confessed that he escorted a Kenyan suicide bomber to the

location of one of the attacks. Al-Shabaab had threatened the Ugandan

government on numerous occasions and said that it targeted Uganda because

it was sending troops to the AMISOM force in Mogadishu.78 Al-Shabaab

claimed responsibility for the attacks and Al-Qaida said nothing about them.

While there has been some speculation that Al-Qaida was actually behind the

bombings, the preponderance of evidence suggests Al-Shabaab was

responsible.79 The organization has also stepped up its threats to carry out

attacks against Burundi because it too provides troops for AMISOM.80

In 2011, Kenya increased its support for the TFG and began to put additional

pressure on Al-Shabaab from its side of the Somali border. Al-Shabaab

responded that it would take stern action against Kenya and called on Kenyan

Muslims to rise up against the government. Kenya then arrested a number of

people it claimed were planning to carry out terrorist attacks in the country at

77 Conversation on 25 March 2011 in Washington, DC, between author and AMISOM official;

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia: A Ticking Time

Bomb,” 21 January 2010, 13–14; Alistair Harris, “Yemen: On the Brink,” Carnegie Endowment

for International Peace, no. 111 (May 2010), 9; “Al-Qaida, Affiliates Showing Greater

Coordination,” NPR’s All Things Considered, 11 November 2010; and Sara A. Carter, “Al Qaeda

Reaps Recruits from Somali Refugees in Yemen,” Examiner (Washington, DC), 25 May 2010.

78 “We Are Sorry, Say 7/11 Suicide Bombers,” New Vision, 12 August 2010; “Suspect Says Rage

at US Led Him to Plot Ugandan Bombs,” Reuters, 12 August 2010.

79 “No Evidence of Al-Shabaab Role in Kampala Bombings—FBI,” Uganda Record [Kampala], 28

July 2010.

80 Abdulkadir Khalif, “Al-Shabaab Warns Burundi of Revenge Attack,” Africa Review [Nairobi], 2

March 2011.

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78 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

the behest of Al-Shabaab. The police commissioner charged Al-Shabaab with

recruiting dozens of Kenyan youth. The government also charged that a Kenyan

Islamic preacher has been associated with Al-Shabaab since 2009 when he

received military training in Somalia and has subsequently recruited Kenyans for

Al-Shabaab.81

This analysis earlier cited a possible link between the anti-Uganda government

ADF and Al-Qaida. Ugandan officials now charge there are links between the

ADF and Al-Shabaab. The ADF still lacks a coherent ideology and some

analysts do not believe that it has any interest in a jihadi agenda.82 According

to a Ugandan intelligence report, however, remnants of the ADF helped train

those involved in the July 2010 Kampala bombings.83 A spokesperson for the

Ugandan armed forces subsequently stated that “we believe the Al-Shabaab

movement and ADF have both been trained by Al-Qaida and they jointly

carried out the attacks on the 11th of July in Kampala.”84 Uganda’s inspector

general of police commented in February 2011 that Al-Shabaab and the ADF

were planning a terrorist attack in Uganda on Valentine’s Day.85 Although there

was no attack, Ugandan officials continue to insist, in spite of skepticism by

outside analysts, that there is a link between Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaida, and

the ADF.

There has been much speculation concerning Al-Shabaab’s connection with

Somali piracy, but also agreement that it has not directly involved itself. In fact,

most of the operational pirate bases are located along the Puntland coast, which

is largely outside Al-Shabaab’s area of control. On the other hand, there are

81 Abdulkadir Khalif, “Al-Shabaab Calls for Revolts in Ethiopia and Kenya,” Africa Review, 7

March 2011; “Suspected Al Shabaab Terror Squad Named,” Nairobi Star, 8 March 2011; “Two

Kenyans Arrested over Alleged Links to Somali Rebel Group,” Standard [Nairobi], 30 March

2011; “Police Chief Says Somali Rebels Recruiting Kenyan Youth,” Daily Nation [Nairobi], 11

April 2011; and “Government Accuses Islam Preacher of Recruiting Young Men to Al Shabaab,”

Nairobi Star, 14 April 2011.

82 Duncan Woodside, “Rebel Alliance: Foreign Policy among Uganda’s Islamist Forces,” Jane’s

Intelligence Review 22, no. 11 (November 2010): 14–17.

83 Chris Obore and Richard Wanambwa, “Museveni Meets Spy Chiefs over Somalia,” Daily

Monitor [Kampala], 25 July 2010.

84 “Uganda Says ADF Rebel Group Has Links with Somalia’s Al-Shabaab,” Puntlandpost, web

site monitored by BBC, 4 August 2010.

85 Andrew Bagala, “Police Warn on Valentine Day Bomb Threat,” Daily Monitor [Kampala], 6

February 2011.
persistent reports that the organization has extracted fees or taxes from those

pirates who do operate from territory they control, and there have been a few

accounts that it has trained pirates for a fee or perhaps to cover the cost of

moving personnel and arms between Somalia and the Arabian Peninsula.86 In

February 2011, pirate sources in Hobyo claimed that Al-Shabaab fighters in

Harardhere demanded 20 percent of the ransom payments for nine ships being

held offshore of the village. The pirates reportedly refused and moved the ships

to Hobyo, which is controlled by Somali clans hostile to Al-Shabaab. In

apparent retribution, Al-Shabaab then arrested 50 pirates in Harardhere.87 At a

Congressional hearing in April 2011, General Carter F. Ham, commander of

U.S. Africa Command, said he believes Al-Shabaab receives at least some

economic support from pirate activity and, given its links to Al-Qaida, it is “only

a matter of time before Al-Qaida becomes associated with pirates as well.”88

The only known Al-Shabaab connection to an attack outside the East Africa

region occurred in Australia in 2009. An Australian court convicted two

naturalized Lebanese Australians and one naturalized Somali Australian of a

plot to carry out a suicide-style attack against the Holsworthy Barracks army

base outside Sydney. The case uncovered a network that was apparently

responsible for funneling fighters and funding to Al-Shabaab. While there were

links between the Australians and Al-Shabaab, it does not appear that the

organization was directly responsible for tasking the men to carry out the

attack.89 Al-Shabaab has attracted a significant number of Somalis from the

global diaspora, including at least two dozen from the United States, and a small

number of non-Somalis.90 So far, they do not appear to have returned to their

adopted country for the purpose of carrying out terrorist attacks. The possibility

remains, however, that this may become part of Al-Shabaab’s agenda and the

organization is better positioned than most Al-Qaida affiliates to conduct

86 “Analysis: Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” CTTA: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis 2,

no. 4 (April 2010): 8.

87 “Somali Islamists, Pirates Dispute Ransom Cuts,” Agence France Presse, 19 February 2011;

“Islamists Arrest Suspected Pirates in Central Somali Town,” Shabeelle Media Network, 29 March

2011.

88 Pauline Jelinek, “Commander Predicts al-Qaida Will One Day Have Links with Somali

Pirates,” Associated Press, 7 April 2011.

89 Raffaello Pantucci, “Operation Neath: Is Somalia’s al-Shabaab Movement Active in Australia?”

Terrorism Monitor 9, no. 3 (20 January 2011): 5–6.

90 Shinn, “Al Shabaab’s Foreign Threat to Somalia,” 211–13

East Africa and the Horn | 79
80 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

terrorist attacks in countries where there is a large Somali diaspora, including

the United States.91

The Impact of Bin Ladin’s Death

The death of Usama Bin Ladin on 2 May 2011 (Pakistan time) will probably not

have a significant impact on Al-Shabaab’s operations in Somalia.92 Although it

had links with and drew inspiration from Al-Qaida, guidance and material

support from Bin Ladin’s organization seems to be limited. The most famous

Al-Shabaab recruit from the United States, Omar Hammami, aka Abu Mansur

Al-Amriki, commented in an English-language video on Al-Shabaab’s Web site

the day after Bin Ladin’s death that the Somali terrorist organization is in a long

war with the United States.93 Senior Al-Shabaab official Sheikh Hassan Dahir

Aweys praised Bin Ladin and urged his organization to “step up attacks against

the West.”94 Al-Shabaab’s spokesperson, Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage,

subsequently told reporters in Mogadishu that Al-Shabaab would avenge the

killing of Bin Ladin.95

A more important Al-Qaida-related development for Al-Shabaab was the death

in Mogadishu on 7 June 2011 of Fazul Abdullah Muhammad, Al-Qaida’s head

in East Africa. In a vehicle filled with medicine, laptops, and mobile phones,

Fazul apparently made a wrong turn in Mogadishu and drove into a roadblock

manned by TFG soldiers. He died in the ensuing firefight.96 Fazul has a long

history of collaboration with Al-Shabaab and had been Al-Qaida’s most

effective operative in East Africa since he helped plan the 1998 U.S. embassy

bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.

91 Nelson and Sanderson, “A Threat Transformed,” 16–17.

92 Richard Lough, “Bin Laden Death Will Not Dampen Somali Insurgency,” Reuters, 5 May

2011; and Solomon A. Dersso and Berouk Mesfin, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, 19

May 2011.

93 CNN report on 12 May 2011.

94 Comments made over Radio Gaalkacyo on 3 May 2011.

95 Hamsa Omar, “Somali Militants Vow Revenge for Bin Laden Amid Security Alert,” Bloomberg,

9 May 2011.

96 “Al-Qaeda’s East Africa Chief ‘Killed in Somalia’.” Radio Netherlands Worldwide, 11 June 2011;

and “Al Qaeda’s East Africa Chief Killed in Mogadishu: Kenya Police,” NDTV, 11 June 2011.
Conclusion

Al-Qaida’s position in East Africa and the Horn has gone from one of relative

strength—especially when Bin Ladin had his headquarters in Sudan from 1991

until 1996, and when it was able to attack U.S. embassies in 1998 and Israeli

interests in Kenya in 2002—to one of relative weakness. To some extent, AlShabaab, which maintains close ties to Al-Qaida, has compensated for the Bin

Ladin organization’s decreased capacity and engagement in the region. While

Al-Shabaab remains in a strong position in Somalia, it has serious internal

problems and has never attracted widespread Somali support. It remains in

power through intimidation and a weak and divided opponent, the TFG.

However, growing Al-Shabaab alienation of Somalis and even a modicum of

improvement by the TFG or a replacement regime could tip the scales and put

both Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaida in a much weaker position in Somalia and

throughout East Africa and the Horn.

East Africa and the Horn | 81
82 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

SOUTHEAST ASIA

803409A1 (G00834) 6-09
Southeast Asia | 83

This paper focuses on the activities and prospects of Al-Qaida in Southeast

Asia, one of its key operational theatres. The first part is a brief overview of AlQaida’s activities in the region and analyzes some of the factors that made

Southeast Asia an attractive operational theater for the group. The second part

focuses on the Al-Qaida-linked operations in the region and also discusses the

trajectory of the organizational and operational evolution of these attacks. The

third part assesses the current state of the Al-Qaida threat in the region,

analyzing the reasons behind successes and failures of counterterrorism efforts

in Southeast Asia. The prospects for the future are assessed in the conclusion.

Attractiveness of Southeast Asia to Al-Qaida

According to some sources, Al-Qaida invested up to one-fifth of its operational

strength into Southeast Asia (SEA),1 mainly through its predominantly

Indonesian regional affiliate, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). While JI has sometimes been

described as Al-Qaida’s operational arm in the region, other sources claim that

this label overestimates the formality of the relationship.2 Nevertheless, between

1993 and at least 2002, every major Al-Qaida attack had some identifiable links

5

The State of Al-Qaida in

Southeast Asia Ten Years

since 9/11

Adam Dolnik

1 See Tuli Sinha, “Mapping the al-Qaeda Linkages in South-East Asia: How Real is the Threat?

Mainstream, November 2009; and Report to the UN Security Council by the Security Council

Monitoring Group, ‘1267’ Committee, Security Council Report S/2003/669, 7 July 2003, 15, cited in

Bruce Vaughn and others, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, (Congressional Research Service:

Washington, DC, 2009), 3, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf.

2 Peter Chalk, Angel Rabasa, William Rosenau, and Leanne Piggott, The Evolving Terrorist Threat

to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment (Rand Corporation: Arlington, VA, 2009), 92.
84 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

to SEA.3 As with theaters in other parts of the world, the keys to Al-Qaida’s

influence in the region were funding and training.

A number of key factors made SEA attractive for Al-Qaida. First, it is a region

with populous Muslim communities, with Indonesia, of course, being the largest

Muslim country in the world, and Malaysia and Brunei also being

predominantly Muslim. Even more importantly, the region has Muslim

minorities who feel disenfranchised in the southern Philippines and southern

Thailand, and to a lesser extent in Singapore, Myanmar, and Cambodia. And

while Islamic militants actively involved in terrorist activities operate on the

fringes of any society, even a tiny percentage from the 259 million Muslims

living in the region still accounts for a considerable number of potential recruits.4

Another associated issue is the presence of a wide network of Islamic charities,

as well as the hawala informal banking system, both of which had been used by

Al-Qaida to channel money to militant groups in the region.5

Closely related to this issue is the presence of local conflicts that Al-Qaida has

tried to incorporate into its global narrative of a Judeo-Christian conspiracy to

subdue and defeat Islam, most notably in the southern Philippines and to a

lesser extent in southern Thailand. Particularly important was the ChristianMuslim conflict in Ambon, on the island of Maluku, and Poso, on Sulawesi

Island in Indonesia, which started in 1999 and 2000. These conflicts were key

in providing great opportunities for the Indonesian jihadi groups such as JI,

Laskar Jundullah, Laskar Jihad, and KOMPAK (translates as Action Committee

for Crisis Response) to not only boost their recruitment efforts, but also to

provide opportunities for their recruits to gain experience on the battlefield,

enhancing the capacity to conduct terrorist operations in the future.

3 Maria Ressa, Seeds (New York: Free Press, 2003), 10.

4 Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, The Future of Global Muslim Population: Projections for

2010–2030 (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center Publications, 2011).

5 According to Interpol, the hawala system is an informal, global money transfer system—or

“alternative remittance system”—that does not physically move money. The system relies heavily

on trust and personal ties between correspondents, or hawaladers, in various countries. For

instance, if Person A needs to send money to Person B in another location, Person A will

approach his/her local hawalader, who will then tell a fellow hawalader in Person B’s location to

give money to Person B. The understanding is that at some point, the first hawalader will settle

the debt to the second hawalader through a similar transaction. For more information, see

Interpol’s site “The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and Its Role in Money Laundering,”

at http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/hawala.
The third key factor is the endemic level of corruption present in the region,

with countries like Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam

consistently ranking at the bottom of Transparency International’s Corruption

Perceptions Index.6 Corruption, of course, assists terrorists in multiple ways,

such as avoiding arrest, setting up bank accounts, obtaining fraudulent

identification, and overcoming border restrictions. For instance, in October

2002, Riduan Isamuddin (aka Hambali), the highest-ranking non-Arab member

of Al-Qaida, bypassed Cambodian immigration formalities and rented a

guesthouse in Phnom Pehn.7 Similarly, in 2010 it was discovered that a key JI

operational lead, Dulmatin, who had a 10 million dollar bounty on his head, was

not hiding in the southern Philippines as previously thought, but was present

in Indonesia in possession of a legal passport and a fake identification card.

Fourth, many SEA countries are dependent on tourism for income, which

results in relatively lax visa requirements. This, in combination with porous

borders between many of the countries in the region, most importantly

Indonesia and the Philippines, results in an ease of movement of people and

illicit material.

Fifth, the withdrawal of state sponsors from the region—in particular, Libya,

which sponsored the Moro National Liberation Front for many years—provided

a vacuum in sponsorship that Al-Qaida was able to use to its advantage.8 Sixth,

the Asian economic crisis of 1997 not only created an economic turmoil that

generally tends to favor radicals, it also led to the fall of the Suharto regime in

Indonesia, a change that had widespread implications for the growth of the

long-repressed Islamist militancy in the country. In the immediate aftermath,

Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir returned from exile and founded JI,

with the openly declared goal of bringing about the rule of sharia in the country.

The weakened central control following the fall of Suharto also contributed to

the escalation of bottled-up tensions between Muslim and Christian

communities on the islands of Maluku and Sulawesi in 1999 and 2000, the

aforementioned escalation of which provided JI with the opportunity to recruit

and battle train hundreds of jihadists in the communal violence.9

6 While the list of countries in the index has expanded in the last decade, Indonesia in particular

has been consistently ranked among the most corrupt countries in the world.

7 Chalk et al., The Evolving Terrorist Threat, 200.

8 Vaughn et al., Terrorism in Southeast Asia, 3.

9 Ibid., 5.

Southeast Asia | 85
86 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

And, finally, past relationships from Afghanistan—up to a thousand Southeast

Asians had fought against the Soviets—were important in providing Al-Qaida

with the personal relationships needed to establish a foothold in the region.

Similarly, marriages were strategically significant in forging regional alliances

between not just Arab Al-Qaida fighters and members of local groups, but

among and within members of these local groups as well.10

Early Al-Qaida Involvement in Southeast Asia

The history of Al-Qaida’s involvement in the region, while fascinating, is

generally well known, so this chapter will recapitulate only some of the key

points. In 1991 Usama Bin Ladin sent his brother-in-law, Mohammed Jamal

Khalifa, to the Philippines, to try to set up a network of charities that would

later be used for funding terrorist operations. Khalifa was responsible for making

the key link between Aburajak Janjalani and Bin Ladin, which later led to the

founding of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). On December 23, 1991, Khalifa

handed over 30,000 pesos to Janjalani’s men in a mosque in Basilan, bankrolling

the first terrorist operation of the ASG: the bombing of a church in Jolo. Khalifa

also worked with an Islamic charity called Konsojaya, which had Riduan

Isamuddin (aka Hambali), on its board of directors.11 An Afghan war veteran,

Hambali would later become the key contact for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in

the region, and it was Hambali who, until his 2004 arrest in Thailand, sat atop

Al-Qaida operations in Southeast Asia.

The regional activities of the 1993 World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Ahmed

Yousef and his uncle and 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who

spent a considerable amount of time preparing operations in the Philippines, are

generally well known. Here, Yousef plotted assassinations of President Bill

Clinton and the Pope, a 9/11 style attack on the Central Intelligence Agency

headquarters in Langley, Virginia, as well as the infamous Oplan Bojinka, an

elaborate plot to blow up 12 airliners in midcourse flight. In a dry run for the

Bojinka plot, Yousef boarded Philippines Airlines flight 434 on 11 December

1994 and assembled a liquid nitroglycerin-based explosive device in the lavatory,

placing it in the life vest compartment under seat 26K prior to disembarking in

Cebu City. The airplane took on more passengers and continued toward Narita

10 Zachary Abuza, “Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: Exploring the Linkages” (presentation at

Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, 7 March 2003).

11 Ressa, Seeds, 73.
Airport in Tokyo, with the bomb exploding en route, killing one passenger and

injuring 10 others. Yousef was unable to complete the Bojinka plot after his

laptop was confiscated and a close colleague was arrested in the aftermath of

an accidental fire, which occurred while Yousef was mixing explosives in his

Manila apartment.12

Following the breakup of the Ramzi Yousef cell, Al-Qaida shifted its strategy in

the region by relying less on its own operatives to conduct entire plots, and

instead on outsourcing much of the groundwork to local affiliate groups. This

strategy made sense, as local operatives had good knowledge of the area, spoke

the local language, and already had an infrastructure and the manpower in place

that could be used to mount operations. Al-Qaida’s core operatives such as

Mohammad Mansour Jabbarah, Omar Al-Farouq, or Fathur Roman Al-Ghozi

were then sent into the region to oversee and guide these local efforts.

As mentioned earlier, the most important partner of Al-Qaida in the region was

JI, whose first terrorist operation was the controversial Istiqlal Mosque bombing

of April 1999, in which supposed JI operatives detonated a bomb in Southeast

Asia’s largest mosque, allegedly as part of an attempt to spark a MuslimChristian confrontation.13 In July of the same year, JI, in concert with its

Malaysian affiliate Kumpulan Mujahedeen Malaysia (KMM), bombed the

Atrium Mall in Jakarta, and followed that with the August 2000 JI bombing of

the Philippine ambassador’s residence in the same city. The latter act was an

alleged expression of gratitude to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF in

the Philippines) for the training it provided to JI members. The first notable

operation that caught Al-Qaida’s attention, however, was the Christmas 2000

synchronized bombing of 38 churches in 11 Indonesian cities, which killed 19

people and injured 120 others, followed by five nearly simultaneous explosions

in Manila, in which 22 people died. At this point, significant operational

mistakes occurred, with many of the bombs failing to detonate, and one of the

key operatives getting killed by an accidental explosion after he forgot to change

the SIM card in the phone that was rigged as the switch to the explosive device

he was carrying on a motorbike. Nevertheless, there would be a dramatic shift

in terms of the capability of JI to mount very lethal operations in the future.

12 Yousef was able to flee to Pakistan where he was arrested a month later.

13 Ressa, Seeds, 101.

Southeast Asia | 87
88 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

By this time, Al-Qaida had been fully involved in planning multiple plots and

activities in the region. Firstly, following the increased difficulty faced by AlQaida recruits in accessing the training camps in Afghanistan, Bin Ladin

allegedly made a phone call to Hashim Salamat, the leader of the MILF, asking

for new Al-Qaida camps to be set up in the southern Philippines.14 In June 2000,

Al-Qaida’s key leaders Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Muhammad Atef visited

Indonesia, traveling to Ambon, West Papua, and Aceh, where they were

allegedly guided by Omar Al-Farouq and Agus Dwikarna, the leader of another

JI affiliate, Lashkar Jundullah.15 Another key event in the region was the

infamous January 2000 meeting at the Evergreen Park condominium in Kuala

Lumpur, where top Al-Qaida operatives prepared for the September 11 attacks,

reviewed the failed USS The Sullivans (DDG 68) operation in Yemen, and

planned the attack on the USS Cole (DDG 67). At the time, the main planner,

Khallad Bin Attash, allegedly suggested launching a similar attack using suicide

terrorists to crash a small boat into U.S. naval vessels at Port Klang, Malaysia.

In addition, according to the interrogation of Omar Al-Farouq, a senior AlQaeda operative, a Somali member active in Indonesia was plotting to attack

U.S. naval vessels in the crowded Indonesian port of Surabaya, but was allegedly

unable to recruit the necessary suicide volunteers.16 The idea of suicide boats

attacking ships in port was revived on two more occasions but never

materialized.

Post-9/11 Involvement of Al-Qaida

in Southeast Asia

Following the successful execution of the 9/11 attacks, top Al-Qaida operatives

again turned their focus toward Southeast Asia, the region they now called the

“second front” of the struggle. To commemorate the first anniversary of 9/11,

Al-Qaida planned to blow up Western embassies and banks in the region. The

plan was again to use local allied groups to select the targets, conduct

reconnaissance, prepare the staging ground, and then hand the attack over to

experienced Al-Qaida operatives and imported Arab suicide bombers. The

original attack was first planned to take place in the Philippines, but following

14 Ibid., 133.

15 Ibid., 96.

16 Zachary Abuza, “Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Keeping Al-Qaeda at Bay,” Terrorism Monitor 2,

no. 9, 19 May 2005.
the discovery that the preferred targets were too difficult to attack, the plot was

moved to Singapore instead. However, the Internal Security Department of the

city-state arrested the plotters before they could launch their operation. The

narrated videotape featuring surveillance footage of key targets in Singapore

was later found in the rubble of Abu Hafs Al-Masri’s (aka Muhammad Atef)

house in Afghanistan, after he was killed in an airstrike in November 2001.

The dismantling of the Singapore JI cell along with the arrests of key Al-Qaida

operatives in the region, such as Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi and Omar AlFarouq, was a considerable setback to Al-Qaida and its sympathetic wing within

the JI. Eager to finally succeed in a major attack in Southeast Asia, Al-Qaida

made the decision to deviate from its preferred modus operandi in two

important aspects. First, the idea of importing suicide bombers from abroad

was abandoned, and from this moment on, suicide bombings in the region

would be carried out by locals. Further, after realizing the tactical advantages of

using non-Arab suicide attackers, who would not be subject to as much scrutiny

at American airports as Arabs, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed allegedly even

planned to use Southeast Asians for his plot to hijack an airplane and fly it into

the Library Tower in Los Angeles.17 Another similar plot was then devised

around the same time by the remnants of the Singapore cell of JI, whose leader,

Mas Salamat Kastari, allegedly plotted both to bomb Singapore’s Changi

Airport and to hijack an Aeroflot jetliner from Bangkok’s Don Muang Airport

and crash it into Changi, in a show of Islamic solidarity with the Chechens.

The second important aspect in which Al-Qaida changed its operational

protocol in the region was to modify its targeting preferences. In order to deliver

a strike that would finally succeed, a decision was taken by Hambali to switch

from attacking hard targets such as embassies and military installations to soft

targets such as hotels, bars, and clubs frequented by Western tourists. Otherwise

Al-Qaida’s modus operandi remained constant: multiple synchronized suicide

bombings designed to maximize civilian casualties.

Bali would be the first success. On 12 October 2002, a man detonated a suicide

belt in Patty’s Bar in Kuta. As people fled out onto the street in panic, another

suicide bomber detonated a van loaded with nearly 1,000 kilograms of

explosives in the middle of the quickly forming crowd. According to one of the

17 Tabassum Zakaria, “Bush Details Al-Qaeda Plot to Hit LA,” Reuters, 10 February 2006,

http://today.reuters.com/.

Southeast Asia | 89
90 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

terrorists, the bomb weighed 1,000 kilograms as a symbolic payback for the

one-ton bombs America dropped on Muslims in the Middle East.18 The bomb,

although only 30 percent efficient, produced a large enough explosion and

subsequent fire to kill 202 people, marking the deadliest attack since 9/11, and

at the time the ninth deadliest terrorist attack since World War II. According to

interrogation reports, the Bali terrorists originally planned for even greater

carnage by incorporating a third suicide bomber who was supposed to ride a

motorcycle through the doors of the packed Sari Club and detonate himself.

The plan was abandoned only after it was discovered the man chosen for the

suicide task could not ride a motorcycle.19

The Bali bombings were a groundbreaking event in the region, adhering to

typical Al-Qaida modus operandi: the tactic of synchronized suicide bombers,

the choice of a Western target, and unprecedented lethality. Also noteworthy

is the fact that the majority of the key JI personalities that were later involved

in pro-Al-Qaida terrorist activities can be linked to this original operation.

Among them were Azhari Bin Husin—the chief bomb maker with a Ph.D. in

applied mathematics from the University of Reading in the U.K., who was

brought in at the last minute to assist with building the explosive device—and

Noordin Muhammad Top—a peripheral player with knowledge of the operation

but little direct involvement.20 Following a wave of arrests of multiple Bali

perpetrators, (i.e., Mukhlas, Amrozi, Ali Imron, Imam Samudra, and Hambali),

and the escape of others to the southern Philippines (i.e., Dulmatin and Umar

Patek), these two men would fill the vacuum that was created and would form

a splinter group that would be responsible for some of the most important

terrorist attacks in the region. Top appears to have been in charge, having some

alleged communications with JI but not an endorsement to conduct

operations.21 By 2005, Top’s splinter group was calling itself “Al-Qaida in the

Malay Archipelago.”22

18 Wayne Miller, “Bali Attack Delayed a Day, Mastermind Reveals,” Age (Australia), 5 July 2003.

19 Cindy Wockner, “Third Suicide Bomber Planned,” Advertiser (Australia), 23 July 2003.

20 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: The Hotel Bombings, Asia Briefing 94, (Jakarta/Brussels,

2009), 2, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/b94-indonesiathe-hotel-bombings.aspx.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.
Only nine months after the Bali attack, suicide terror would reach the

Indonesian capital. On 5 August 2003, a car bomb exploded outside the J.W.

Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, killing 12 people and wounding 150 others. The link

between the two attacks was immediately obvious. As in the Bali bombing, the

perpetrators in Jakarta used the same kind of explosives, as well as mobile

phones for the purposes of remote detonation. In addition, in both attacks the

perpetrators tried to scrape off the identification numbers on the vehicles used

so they would not be easily traceable to the original owner.23 The explosive

device in Jakarta was smaller, consisting of six plastic boxes containing “black

powder” weighing 19 kilograms each,24 but it was still clear the attack was

aimed to create as many casualties as possible. In order to increase lethality, the

terrorists attached dozens of bars of laundry soap to containers of inflammable

liquid that were placed next to the bomb. The mixture of sodium and fatty acids

in the soap helped create fireballs that engulfed some of the victims. According

to investigators, the bomb was personally detonated via a mobile phone by Dr.

Azhari Bin Husin, JI’s top bomb maker, who escaped from the scene on the

back of a motorcycle. The explosion produced a two-meter-wide crater,

penetrating through 32-centimeter-thick concrete into the basement, and the

suicide bomber’s head was catapulted all the way to the hotel’s fifth floor.25

Thirteen months later, on 9 September 2004, a nearly identical suicide truck

bombing took place at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, killing 10 people and

injuring more than 180 others. The pattern was a familiar one: Azhari driving

a suicide truck bomb within several hundred meters from the target, then

handing over the wheel to the suicide bomber and remotely detonating the

device and escaping on the back of a motorcycle.26 The attack was a clear

demonstration that, despite the apprehension of Hambali in 2004 in Thailand,

the pro-Al-Qaida wing in the JI was still a potent force. In addition, the timing

of the attack was also striking; as in previous cases, the attack took place during

the three months between August and October, a time period that was already

becoming known in Southeast Asia as “JI bombing season.”

23 “Jakarta Bomber: Qaeda Group Link,” CBS News, 8 August 2003.

24 Damar Harsanto, “Reenactment Traces Bomb Assembly,” Jakarta Post, 10 December 2003.

25 “Police Complete Preliminary Reconstruction of Marriott Blast,” Jakarta Post, 14 August 2003.

26 “Militant Admits Surveying Australian Embassy Ahead of Bombing,” AFP, 2 August 2005.

Southeast Asia | 91
92 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

This timing pattern was again confirmed a year later in Bali when, on 1 October

2005, three suicide bombers detonated explosive backpacks at the seaside area

of Jimbaran Bay and the bar and shopping hub of Kuta, killing 23 people and

wounding 102 more. A 34-page document, which was later discovered on

Azhari’s computer, revealed many fascinating details about the reconnaissance

and planning of the attack.27 One of the observations that Azhari noted was

the tightening of the security environment in Bali, which would require

significant changes from the plan used in the first Bali bombing. Since it would

now be more difficult to rent a safe house and prepare a large explosive device

that could be put into a truck, the devices were designed to fit into small

daypacks to be less suspicious and were assembled in Java and only then

brought on a bus and ferry to Bali. The bombers were instructed to conduct the

reconnaissance for the attack themselves, and it was up to them to propose

targets and agree on suitable attire. This is a trend observable in other parts of

the world as well—self-sustaining suicide bombers who are supposed to do the

reconnaissance themselves, select their own method of infiltration, and all die

in the attack. The bombers in Bali initially decided to attack discos, but later

chose several restaurants as substitute targets.28 They were instructed to take

motorbike taxis to the respective locations, since this mode of transportation

does not provide an opportunity for the driver to handle the luggage, and also

prevents too much communication between the driver and the passenger.

Dynamics of Suicide Terrorism in Southeast Asia

It is important to note that all the suicide bombings in Indonesia were carried

out by a pro-Al-Qaida splinter group centered around Dr. Azhari and Noordin

Mohammed Top, and not mainstream JI. According to Nasir Abbas, who was

a key JI operative until his arrest in 2003, members of this faction “see

themselves as fighting a new world battle. . . . They say, we can attack civilians

anywhere, just as Americans attack Muslim civilians all over the world.”29 This

was in sharp contrast with the JI core, whose actions and objectives were very

much local in nature, and the idea of killing civilians met with considerable

opposition on both ideological and strategic grounds. The exact nature and

27 Raymond Bonner, “A Terror Strike, Choreographed on a Computer,” New York Times, 3 July

2006.

28 The reason for this substitution followed the observation that it would be difficult to bring in

backpacks because no one carries backpacks into a disco at 9 p.m. in Bali.

29 Robin McDowell, “Indonesians Ask Why Fellow Muslims are Turning to Suicide Bombings,”

Associated Press, 4 December 2005.
strength of this pro-Al-Qaida faction has been difficult to assess, as the group’s

membership frequently changes and its members tend to use different names

over time. On the one hand, as far back as the J.W. Marriott bombing, reports

emerged that the suicide bomber may have been a member of a new 15-

member suicide strike brigade called “Laskar Khos” (Special Force), allegedly

led by a man called Mustofa (also known as Pranata Yuda, Abu Tholut, Yono,

and Imron)30—the former head of the JI Mantiqi Thalid (III).31 Then, following

the second Bali bombing, another new group name surfaced, with the allegation

that the suicide bombers came from a group called “Thoifah Muqatilah”

(Combat Unit). And, while according to Nassir Abbas, the name Thoifah

Muqatilah had been around since the first Bali bombing,32 some analysts

believed that the group was in essence a continuation of the Laskar Khos, in the

sense that Thoifah Muqatilah’s role was to reestablish Laskar Khos after the

latter had been crippled by a number of arrests.33 Either way, this “suicide

battalion” did not appear to be a permanent body of suicide fighters always

prepared to strike, but rather a group of planners and indoctrinators that tapped

into the resources of other groups, such as Ring Banten, to recruit suicide

bombers for specific operations.

Regarding the actual suicide bombers, several patterns were apparent. First, the

bombers did not share a clear common sociological profile, as they came from

various locations in Indonesia and from various educational and economic

backgrounds.34 Contrary to popular myth, only one of them was a graduate of

the infamous “terrorist school,” the Pondok Pesantren Al-Mukmin in Ngruki.35

Secondly, most of the bombers were not members of JI itself, but were rather

recruited and indoctrinated specifically for suicide operations by father–like

figures within the fringe JI around Noordin Mohammed Top and Azahari Bin

Husin. Thirdly, it has been common practice for suicide bombers to leave some

traces of their intent. Iqbal and Heri Golun from the first Bali and Australian

30 Damar Harsanto, “Police Confirm Asmar’s JI Ties,” Jakarta Post, 18–24 October 2005.

31 Maria Ressa, “Fears of New Suicide Terror Squad,” CNN, 26 February 2004.

32 Interview with Sidney Jones, “The Hardliners Are Called Thoifah Muqatilah,” Tempo

Magazine, 18–24 October 2005.

33 John Aglionby, “The Price of Democracy,” Guardian (United Kingdom), 4 October 2005.

34 Noor Huda Ismail, “Quest for the Meaning of Life Drives Educated Men to Death,”

Australian, 12 December 2005.

35 Sidney Jones, “Terrorism’s Toxic Strains,” Age, 5 October 2005.

Southeast Asia | 93
94 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

Embassy attacks left behind written suicide notes, while Asmar Latin Sani, the

J.W. Marriott bomber, left behind e-mails in which he expressed a desire “to

marry as soon as possible,” or to carry out a martyrdom operation.36 Salik M.

Firdaus, Misno, and Aip Hidayat,37 the second Bali suicide bombers, all left

behind statements on video,38 possibly signaling intent by the group to use these

statements as a recruiting tool for future suicide bombers. Fourthly, all of these

suicide notes and videos reveal that while the outlook of the organizers was

international, the bombers themselves were inspired by local factors, such as a

living legacy of rebellion in West Java or the grievances from recent communal

conflicts such as Ambon and Poso.39

Jemaah Islamiyah’s Decline

In November 2005, after the second Bali bombing attack, Azhari Bin Husin was

killed in a shootout, and this effort seemed to have paid immediate dividends

when the “JI bombing season” did not materialize over the next four years.

There are several possible reasons why this was the case. Azhari was absolutely

key as a bomb maker, and although he did have a few disciples, it is

unquestionable that his demise created a considerable capability gap. That being

said, other possible explanations include the fact that Noordin Mohammad Top

apparently had a deal with some members of the JI leadership structures, which

stipulated that he could use the JI infrastructure to hide from Indonesian

authorities but only under the condition that he would refrain from these types

of operations.40

Either way, beginning in 2005, there was a noticeable decline in terrorist

activities in Indonesia, which did not go unnoticed. In November 2008 CIA

Director Michael V. Hayden presented an optimistic assessment of the JI threat,

stating that “while JI still exists today, its once robust relationship with Al-Qaida

36 John Aglionby, “Jakarta Bomber in Terror Network,” Guardian, 9 August 2003.

37 Eva C. Komandjaja, “Police Identify Third Bali Suicide Bomber,” Jakarta Post, 20 November

2005.

38 Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), United States Department of State Bureau of

Diplomatic Security, OSAC Newsletter, November 2005, https://www.osac.gov/pages/

NewsLetter.aspx.

39 Jones, “Terrorism’s Toxic Strains.” Ambon and Poso were regional conflicts in the late 1990s

and early 2000s marked by severe sectarian violence between Christians and Muslims.

40 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: The Hotel Bombings, 4.
is gone, its plots are increasingly detected and disrupted, and hundreds of its

leaders and operatives have been captured or killed by the Indonesian national

police.”41 Around the same time, a senior U.S. intelligence official was quoted

as saying, “There’s a possibility of the end of the JI threat.”42

But despite this general and well-founded optimism, on June 17, 2009, Jakarta

again witnessed the return of terror, with twin suicide bombings at the J.W.

Marriott and the Ritz-Carlton hotels. Nine people were killed and 50 injured in

the first JI attack in Indonesia in four years. In this case, the bombers knew that

it would be difficult to bring ready-made devices through the security at the

hotels, which led them to rent a room in one of the hotels and assemble the

devices there. The terrorists also had a man on the inside—a florist in the RitzCarlton—who started working there three years before the attack and actually

gave up a well-paid job in another hotel to take on the florist position,

suggesting a deliberate infiltration quite far in advance. There are again multiple

explanations for the timing of these attacks. As mentioned earlier, part of the

reason why there had been no suicide bombings for four years in Indonesia was

the apparent deal Top had with JI leadership about refraining from such

operations in exchange for protection. According to the International Crisis

Group, which produces some of the most informed analyses of terrorism in

Southeast Asia, the agreement may have broken down after the June 2007 arrest

of Abu Dujana, Top’s key contact in JI. Another possible explanation might

have been a sudden influx of overseas funds to bankroll the operation, but this

hypothesis has yet to be confirmed.43 Top himself was killed shortly after the

attack in August 2009, after a 17-hour siege of one of his hideouts in Central

Java, creating a widespread perception that the most urgent terrorist threat to

Indonesia had finally been eliminated.

Recent Trends

This optimism, however, receded somewhat following the surprising discovery

41 Alex Kingsbury, “CIA Director Says al Qaeda Much Weaker in Southeast Asia,” USNews.com,

13 November 2008, http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2008/11/13/ cia-directorsays-al-qaeda-much-weaker-in-southeast-asia.

42 Alex Kingsbury, “Lessons from the Near-Defeat of a Once-Feared al Qaeda Affiliate in

Indonesia,” USNews.com, 28 October 2008, http://www.usnews.com/news/world

/articles/2008/10/28/lessons-from-the-near-defeat-of-a-once-feared-al-qaeda-affiliate-inindonesia.

43 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: The Hotel Bombings, 4.

Southeast Asia | 95
96 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

of a terrorist training camp in Aceh, Sumatra, in February 2010.44 The camp

was run by a group that called itself “Al-Qaida in Aceh”—also known as “AlQaida in the Veranda of Mecca,” which was basically a cross section of different

militant groups from Indonesia, including former associates of the late Noordin

Mohammed Top, dissatisfied elements of the mainstream JI, and members of

the KOMPAK Mujahidin and Rang Banten (splinter elements of Darul Islam).

The discovery of the camp came as a surprise because the Acehnese are not

known for supporting radical Islam—and it would not be the most logical place

to set up this camp in terms of being able to rely on a sympathetic support base.

Nevertheless, the mountainous terrain was seen as beneficial, and its suitability

for guerilla warfare had previously been demonstrated by the Free Aceh

Movement (GAM), which was able to resist the Indonesian army in this region

for over 30 years.

Besides terrain, the group chose Aceh as its base because of the established

presence of Islamic charities with militant links that had been set up during the

tsunami relief effort in 2004. Simultaneously, as part of negotiations for greater

autonomy, Aceh had been granted the right to implement sharia law, a step

that attracted many radical clerics to set up base in the region. But despite these

seemingly favorable conditions, it was precisely the lack of support among the

local Acehnese that led to the reporting of the camp to the Indonesian

authorities, resulting in the raid that disrupted terrorist operations in Aceh.

Another surprise was the discovery that the head of operations at the camp

was none other than Joko Pitono (aka Dulmatin), one of the top JI bomb

makers, who was widely believed to be hiding in the southern Philippines.

There was a huge manhunt following the unearthing of the camp, in which

Dulmatin and several other key leaders of the group were killed in March 2010.

The discovery of the camp demonstrated important shifts in the Indonesian

militant movement. The presence of a cross section of the multiple jihadi groups

showed considerable discontent and disagreement within the wider JI

movement about overall strategy and tactics. The mainstream JI group was seen

as too passive, putting too much emphasis on dakwah (the preaching of Islam)

and building up the Islamic community, holding off on armed operations until

a critical mass had been established. Simultaneously, there was strong critique

of the Noordin Mohammad Top splinter cell, which tended to focus on

44 Zachary Abuza, “New Directions for Indonesian Militants after Successful Counterterrorist

Operations,” Terrorism Monitor 8, no. 41, 11 November 2010.
operations for the sake of the operations themselves and martyrdom-seeking,

without much consideration for the implications of these suicide attacks on the

survival of the jihad movement and its goal of implementing sharia law across

Indonesia. The newly formed Al-Qaida in Aceh in this sense formed a third

pole, which upheld JI’s ambition of establishing Islamic law in Indonesia but,

simultaneously, took a much more proactive approach in the use of terrorist

operations as a means toward that end. The key difference with Top’s approach

in this regard, besides the more long-term vision and strategy behind terrorist

operations, was a redefinition of targeting preferences. Unlike Top, who focused

mainly on foreign targets, this new group chose to attack primarily local officials

and members of the law enforcement community who were perceived as

standing in the way of implementation of sharia in Indonesia.45 Another

difference vis à vis Top’s strategy was to focus on smaller tactical operations

and assassinations of key figures, while taking active precautions to limit Muslim

casualties—something that Top was widely criticized for in the past. Among the

plans of Al-Qaida in Aceh was to assassinate President Susilo Bambang

Yudhoyono and other top officials during the Independence Day ceremony.

The attackers also allegedly planned to launch a Mumbai-style attack against

hotels in Jakarta, focusing on foreign nationals.46

On a final note to this chronology, it is important to mention the latest terrorist

attack in Indonesia to date, which seems to confirm the latest trend of focused

assassinations of local officials. On 15 April 2011, a suicide bomber walked into

the police mosque in Cirebon City and detonated himself in the front section

of the mosque during prayers in an apparent attempt to kill the local police

chief. The target survived the attack with injuries while the bomber remained

the sole fatality, and photographs from the scene demonstrate the weakness of

the explosive device used. It is tempting to conclude that the bomb-making

capability gap that started with the death of Azhari Bin Husin continues, but any

such conclusion would be premature.

Conclusion

Overall, the effort to fight Al-Qaida’s influence in Southeast Asia appears to be

45 International Crisis Group: Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh, Asia Report no. 189

(Jakarta/Brussels, 20 April 2010), 2, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-eastasia/indonesia/189-indonesia-jihadi-surprise-in-aceh.aspx.

46 “Indonesia: Plot to Kill President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono,” Newsofap.com, 14 May 2010,

http://www.newsofap.com/newsofap-15293-26-indonesia-plot-to-kill-president-susilo-bambangyudhoyono-newsofap.html.

Southeast Asia | 97
98 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

a success story. At present, there are at least two degrees of separation between

Al-Qaida and the local groups. First of all, the 2003 arrest of Hambali, who was

a key link to Al-Qaida, appears to have seriously disrupted JI’s connection to the

group, creating a gap that was never adequately filled.47 Even more importantly,

the local militant movements ranging from the MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation

Front) in the Philippines, through JI in Indonesia to BRN-COORDINATE48 in

southern Thailand, have demonstrated a strong preference to adhering to their

own local objectives, either rejecting outright or gradually shying away from

Al-Qaida and its global terrorist ambitions. Even JI, which at one point served

as a key link between Al-Qaida and local groups, and which used to have its

own wider regional ambition in Southeast Asia, has essentially scaled back to

focus on Indonesia only.

Other important successes include the reduction of JI members though arrests

from several thousand in 2000 to only a few hundred; a semisuccessful program

of rehabilitating and co-opting former militants; de-escalation of the communal

conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi; and a fairly transparent judicial process for

trying terrorism suspects, which contributed to changing views on JI within

Indonesian society.49 Just as important are factors inside the JI itself, such as its

vulnerable hierarchical organizational structure, disagreements about ideology

and the strategic and religious justifications for the use of terrorism, the existence

of competing factions, and the reorientation of the mainstream JI base to

grassroots recruitment and indoctrination with the long-term goal of

implementing the sharia in Indonesia.50 And, while the discovery of the terrorist

training camp in Aceh is a cause of concern, the assumption that the

organization’s name, “Al-Qaida in Aceh,” signals a closer allegiance to Al-Qaida

is essentially mistaken, as the group adopted the name primarily because of its

47 Vaughn et al., Terrorism in Southeast Asia, 6.

48 Barisan Revolusi Nasional Patani-Melayu-Koordinasi, or the Patani Malay National

Revolutionary Front-Coordinate.

49 Chalk et al., The Evolving Terrorist Threat, 83; Kingsbury, “Lessons.”

50 The group’s structure is generally well-known, having originally consisted of a hierarchical

structure headed by a five-member advisory council that sat on top of four functional committees

and four mantiqis (regional brigades), which also had functional specializations (fundraising,

religious indoctrination, training, and weapons procurement). Beneath each mantiqi there were at

least three additional layers. But despite the highly hierarchical structure, regional leaders

operated with a considerable level of autonomy, and the group further adapted its structure to a

less vulnerable setup following the wave of arrests after the Bali bombings of 2002.
recognizable “brand” nature.51 Furthermore, the group’s modus operandi and

targeting preferences represented a clear departure from, as opposed to

adherence to, Al-Qaida’s tactical and targeting preferences.

On a final note, some of the more recent trends suggest a level of

decentralization of the threat, where small groups of individuals decide to act

on their own in support of an ideology or cause, in a way that is not dissimilar

to the threat of homegrown terrorism in the West. This phenomenon of local

bottom-up radicalization and self-radicalization for purposes of attack was

demonstrated by the unsuccessful plots planned by a number of groups in

Indonesia: the Medan, Bandung, Palembang, and Klaten groups.52 Similarly to

their counterparts in the West, these groups have limited links to established

terrorist groups and thus lack appropriate training, which results in a

comparative lack of operational skill and a limited level of destructive power. By

the same token, these groups are notoriously more difficult to detect and

disrupt, signaling the likelihood that small-scale operations in the region will

continue. It also cannot be ruled out that some of these homegrown groups

and other JI splinter elements will try to make contact with Al-Qaida central,

as was the case of the long-time fugitive Umar Patek, who was arrested on 25

January 2011 in the now infamous Pakistani town of Abbottabad,53 allegedly

on his way to meet senior Al-Qaida leaders in North Waziristan.54 That being

said, the fact remains that the level of threat posed by Al-Qaida-linked groups

in Southeast Asia has diminished significantly.

51 International Crisis Group, Jihadi Surprise.

52 International Crisis Group, Indonesian Jihadism: Small Groups, Big Plans, Asia Report no. 204

(19 April 2011), http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-eastasia/indonesia/204%20Indonesian%20Jihadism%20%20Small%20Groups%20Big%20Plans.pdf.

53 Abbottabad is now infamous as the city where U.S. forces killed Bin Ladin on 2 May 2011

(local time).

54 Niniek Karmini, “How Umar Patek’s Road Came to An End in Pakistan,” Jakarta Globe, 15

April 2011, http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/how-umar-pateks-road-came-to-an-end-inpakistan/435584.

Southeast Asia | 99
100 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

MIDDLE EAST

803513AI (G00412) 7-11
the Arab East | 101

This paper assesses the presence and influence of Al-Qaida and like-minded

groups in the Arab East (Mashriq) in the last 10 years, with particular focus on

that presence and influence in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Palestine, and Egypt.

Using a framework based on the degree of links between Al-Qaida and

operatives in those countries, we examine the changes that may have occurred

within the groups and the resultant effects on security. We follow our country

analyses with an argument that two major processes—Doctrine Revisions

(Muragaat Fikriya, or Muragaat Fiqhiya)

1 among the jihadist activists and the

2011 Arab Awakening—are making significant contributions to the eradication

of the root religious, cultural, and political underpinnings of terrorism in the

name of Islam, as well as attenuating the influence of Al-Qaida and similar

groups in the Arab East. The recent Arab revolutions, along with the Doctrine

Revisions that have been implemented widely in Egypt and elsewhere,

constitute the most effective preventive measures for reducing the recruiting

pool for radical terrorist groups at all levels.

6

Al-Qaida and Terrorism in

the Arab East:

Rise, Decline, and the Effects of

Doctrine Revisions and the Arab

Revolutions

Amr Abdalla and Arezou Hassanzadeh

The editors extend their thanks to Jason Lynch, former intern at the University for Peace, for his

assistance in the preparation of this piece.

1 The term “Doctrine Revisions” refers to the process that leaders of militant Egyptian groups,

especially Islamic Jihad and Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiya, embarked on in the 1990s to reflect upon the

religious interpretations that had justified committing acts of violence against governments and

civilians threatening their efforts to establish their version of an Islamic state and society. The

process succeeded in transforming the beliefs and approaches of several of the leaders of those

organizations who later, with the support of the Egyptian government, produced literature

proving the fallacy of their violent interpretations and invited militants to repent and resort

instead to peaceful means to achieve their objectives. The process was later replicated in other

countries such as Libya, Yemen, and Indonesia.
A major assumption in this paper is that militant Muslim movements

worldwide, including in the Arab East, are more often than not loosely

connected organizationally, while members of such groups usually share similar

ideologies and opt for similar militant approaches against their enemies. They

do not always develop direct organizational links, but occasionally link with

each other to conduct specific militant acts. One important implication for

security and legal counterterrorism efforts is that attempts to establish direct

organizational links among those groups—which is usually needed to prosecute

those who had committed acts of terror—fail to bring about convictions in courts

of law because such linkage is easily contested. Security counterterrorism efforts

also run the risk of failing to detect large numbers of such groups when the

search is focused on groups that are organizationally tied to Al-Qaida or other

known organizations.

Accordingly, we apply a framework that proposes that militant Muslim

movements in the Arab East vary in their degree of relation and connection to

Al-Qaida. We suggest that there are four levels of such relation and connection.

The first level includes groups that are directly related to Al-Qaida

organizationally. These are groups that operate with direct instructions, and

with organizational support, from known Al-Qaida leaders. The organization

that operated in Iraq under Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi was an example of a level

one group. A second level includes groups that are relatively large and organized

yet not directly connected to Al-Qaida organizationally. Instead, such groups

adhere to a great extent to the same beliefs, ideologies, and modes of operation

as Al-Qaida. Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and Yemen is an example of

such a group. Level three includes groups that share the same ideologies and

beliefs but that are hardly large or organized. These are usually gatherings of

youths who attend neighborhood mosques and eventually become radical and

militant in their interpretations of their religious duties towards society, which

they define as an enemy of Islam. Such groups are usually made up of a small

number of individuals and may suddenly launch an act of terror. As these bands

become more radical, they may connect or coordinate their efforts with likeminded organizations or other groups of youths. These groups have been

responsible for repeated acts of terror in Egypt and elsewhere over the past two

decades. Finally, level four groups are primarily composed of outlaws who, for

example, deal in illegal drugs or arm smuggling. They take on a religious

disguise that gives them legitimacy in their communities, and at times they may

collaborate with level one and level two groups to trade protection in return for

financial support.

102 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
Depending on several factors, especially the degree of damage inflicted on

organized level one and two groups by security and legal agencies, groups may

move along the continuum of connectedness to Al-Qaida. For example, AlQaida in Iraq is moving away from level one towards a level two connection

after sustaining severe blows to their infrastructure. Level three groups usually

remain at that stage and continue to be the ones that elude security efforts to

the greatest extent, as they are often homegrown and have little detectable

linkage to level one and two groups. Level four groups also usually remain

connected to level one and two groups, and the continuity of their connection

depends on the stability of the militant groups to which they are tied. It is worth

noting that we do not find any level four groups in this specific review; however,

the distinction exists in other case studies, and thus we choose to include it.

In the following sections, we will examine the state of militant Muslim

movements in the Arab East using the framework of organizational proximity

to Al-Qaida.

Yemen

Background

Emerging in Yemen in January 2009, Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula

(AQAP) is the best known Al-Qaida-affiliated group in the Arabian Peninsula

region, and it is notably active in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. The presence of AlQaida in Yemen, however, can be traced back to the 1990s. The presence of

Al-Qaida in Yemen is distinguishable in two different phases: the first phase

from May 1998 to November 2003 and the second phase from February 2006

to the present. 

First Phase (May 1998–November 2003)

During this phase, the presence of Al-Qaida in Yemen can be found either in

local Islamic groups’ modus operandi or in operations conducted by Al-Qaida

members as a part of their global jihad ideology within the territory of Yemen.

Among the groups active during this period, the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army

(AAIA) was one of the most prominent. Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, Abu Ali

Al-Harthi, and Muhammad Hamdi Al-Ahdal were the three Al-Qaida members

planning and conducting terrorist operations in Yemen.

the Arab East | 103
The Aden-Abyan Islamic Army

The AAIA initially was established as an informal group of “Arab Afghan”

jihadists who, after their return from fighting against the Soviet occupation of

Afghanistan, gravitated around Zayn Al-Abdin Al-Mihdhar, alias Abu Hassan.2

AAIA gradually became one of the prominent independent Islamic militant

organizations in Yemen in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 

In May 1998, AAIA declared as its main objectives deposing the Yemeni regime,

establishing an Islamic state under the sharia, and eliminating all Western

interests from Yemen. Earlier that month, Yemeni security forces had attacked

the AAIA camp in Abyan, claiming that jihadists aimed “to train and resume

their halted activities” in Yemen after their return from Afghanistan.3

AAIA engaged in some terrorist operations, such as kidnappings and bombings,

in pursuit of their objectives. Two of their most significant operations included

the kidnapping of 16 foreigners in December 1998, which led to the execution

of their leader Abu Hasan Zayn Al-Abdin Al-Mihdhar in October 19994 and his

subsequent replacement by Shaykh Khalid Abd Al-Nabi (alias Khalid Abd AlRabb Al-Nabi Al-Yazidi) as the new AAIA leader, and the attack on the USS

Cole (DDG 67) in the port of Aden in October 2000.

First Phase Links with the Central Al-Qaida Leadership

The relationship between AAIA and Al-Qaida is ambiguous. AAIA has

declared its support to Al-Qaida in some of its statements. In its Country

Terrorism Reports from 2004 to 2006, the U.S. Department of State reported that

AAIA expressed support for Usama Bin Ladin in its early communiqués in

1998. It has also been claimed that “when the Yemeni government tried to close

the Islamic Army’s training camp, a Bin Ladin representative attempted to

mediate.”5 Later that year, AAIA announced its support and praise for Al2 Sheila Carapico, “Yemen and the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army,” MERIP Press Information Note

35, 18 October 2000.

3 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Yemen: Whether al-Jihad or any other terrorist

organization had a presence in Yemen between 1994 and August 1995, and whether al-Jihad was

active in the country before or after this period,” 12 February 2003, accessed 30 May 2011,

http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,IRBC,,YEM,3f7d4e3ce,0.html.

4 “Tourists’ kidnapper executed in Yemen,” Guardian (United Kingdom), 18 October 1999,

accessed 4 June 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/1999/oct/18/yemen.

5 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Yemen: Whether al-Jihad.”

104 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
Qaida’s attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania,6 expressed its

support for Usama Bin Ladin, and encouraged the Yemeni people to attack

Americans and destroy their property after an American raid on Bin Ladin’s

camp in Afghanistan.7

Moreover, there are allegations of cooperation between the two groups in some

of the operations conducted in Yemen. AAIA is suspected of cooperating with

Al-Qaida in a number of small-scale bombings in Aden and Abyan,8 as well as

in the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole,

9 the attempted attack on the USS

The Sullivans (DDG 68) in January 2000, and the suicide boat attack on the oil

tanker MV Limburg in October 2002.10 AAIA renounced violence in 2003, and,

as stated by its last leader, Shaykh Khalid, it cannot definitively be said “whether

[the AAIA] actually exists and is effective or anything else.”11

While the relationship between AAIA and Al-Qaida is foggy, Al-Qaida had at

least three operatives in Yemen at this time: Abd Al Rahim al-Nashiri, Abu Ali

Al-Harthi, and Muhammad Hamdi Al-Ahdal (aka Abu Issam Al-Makki).

Abd Al-Rahim al-Nashiri joined Al-Qaida officially in 1998 and functioned as

Al-Qaida’s commander in the entire Arab peninsula from late 2000 onward.12

6 “Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA) (Yemen),” Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 15 October

2010, accessed 13 June 2011, http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-World-Insurgency-andTerrorism/Aden-Abyan-Islamic-Army-AAIA-Yemen.html.

7 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START),

“Terrorist Organization Profile: Aden Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA),” University of Maryland,

accessed 30 May 2011, http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/

terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4.

8 Abdu Zinah, “Qiyadat al-Jihad Dakhil al-Sujun al-Misriya Ta’kuf ‘ala I’dad Bayan Mubadarat

Waqf al-’Unf” (“The Commanders of al-Jihad inside Egyptian Prisons Are Engaging in Preparing

a Communiqué for an Initiative for Halting Violence,” Asharq Al-Awsat, (London) 19 April

2007a, 1.

9 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Yemen: Whether al-Jihad.”

10 “Aden-Abyan Islamic Army,” Global Security, 7 June 2005, accessed 11 June 2011,

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/aden-abyan.htm.

11 Jamestown Foundation, “Al-Qaeda Usurps Yemen’s Aden-Abyan Army,” Terrorism Monitor 8,

no. 41 (2010), accessed 16 June 2011, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/

?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37162&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=26&cHash=f6533561fd.

12 “Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri,” Global Jihad, 7 December 2007, accessed 7 June 2011,

http://www.globaljihad.net/view_page.asp?id=304.

the Arab East | 105
He had a leading role in the attempted attack on The Sullivans in January 2000

and the successful attack on the Cole in October 2000. The Limburg attack in

October 2002 has also been one of his achievements in Yemen. About a month

after the Limburg attack, al-Nashiri was captured in the United Arab Emirates

in November 2002 and handed over to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).13

Abu Ali Al-Harthi fought alongside Usama Bin Ladin against Soviet forces in

Afghanistan and later became a close associate of his in Sudan in the early

1990s. Abu Ali Al-Harthi was considered Al-Qaida’s chief operative in Yemen.14

He is suspected of being involved in the attack on the Cole in 2000 and the

Limburg attack in 2002. Al-Harthi is believed to have been killed in an attack by

a U.S. Predator drone aircraft in November 2002.15

Muhammad Hamdi Al-Ahdal was believed to be Al-Qaida’s second man in

Yemen after Al-Harthi. He fought in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Chechnya and

traveled to Afghanistan several times. Al-Ahdal had a significant role in

“financing, planning, facilitating, preparing or perpetrating of acts or activities

by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf or in support of [AlQaida] . . . supplying, selling or transferring arms and related material to

[Al-Qaida] . . . [or] otherwise supporting acts or activities of [Al-Qaida]” in

Yemen.16 He also participated in the attacks on the Cole and the Limburg. AlAhdal was arrested in November 2003.17

Second Phase (February 2006–Present)

With its most significant members killed or arrested and its supporting groups

weakened, Al-Qaida’s presence in Yemen became rather insignificant beginning

in late 2003. On February 3, 2006, however, a new phase of Al-Qaida in Yemen

13 Peter L. Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of Al Qaeda’s Leader (New

York: Free Press, 2006), 251–53.

14 “Profile: Ali Qaed Senyan al-Harthi,” BBC News, 5 November 2002, accessed 7 June 2011,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2404443.stm.

15 “CIA ‘Killed Al-Qaeda Suspects’ in Yemen,” BBC News, 5 November 2002, accessed 7 June

2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/2402479.stm.

16 United Nations Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267, United

Nations, 29 November 2006, accessed 4 June 2011,

http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267_guidelines.pdf.

17 “Yemeni ‘Al-Qaeda Chief’ Captured,” BBC News, 25 November 2003, accessed 7 June 2011,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3238188.stm.

106 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
commenced. Twenty-three of the most wanted prisoners escaped from the

Political Security Central Prison in Sanaa, 13 of whom were accused of

involvement in the Cole and Limburg attacks.18 Among those escapees who

proved to be the most problematic were Nassar Al-Wahishi, a former personal

assistant to Bin Ladin19 and Qasim Al-Raimi. 

After escaping from the prison, Al-Wahishi and Al-Raimi started to form a new

generation of Al-Qaida in Yemen, consisting of both recruits and experienced

jihadists returning from Iraq and Afghanistan.20 Compared to the old

generation, this new generation of Al-Qaida in Yemen tends to target the

government more directly. This can be linked to the statement released by Bin

Ladin in July 2006, addressing President Ali Abdullah Saleh as the “traitor who

is submissive to America.”21 According to one analyst: 

The older generation, while passionate about global jihad, was more

concerned with local matters, and more willing to play by the time-honored

Yemeni rules of bargaining and negotiating in order to keep Saleh from

destroying their safe haven. Not so with the new generation—they willingly

criticize Saleh harshly, and seem immune to the lure of the negotiation

room.22

Known as Al-Qaida in Yemen, this new generation of Al-Qaida, with AlWahishi as its leader and Al-Raimi as its military commander, conducted several

terrorist operations in Yemen before January 2009. A notable example is the

attack on the U.S. embassy in Sanaa in September 2008.23

18 “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” Yemen Times, 14 February 2011, accessed 7 June 2011,

http://www.yementimes.com/defaultdet.aspx?SUB_ID=35571.

19 Sudarsan Raghavan, “Al-Qaeda Group in Yemen Gaining Prominence,” Washington Post, 28

December 2009, accessed 7 June 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/12/27/AR2009122702022.html.

20 “Profile: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” BBC News, 14 June 2011, accessed 15 June 2011,

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11483095.

21 “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” Yemen Times.

22 Brian O’Neill, “New Generation of al-Qaeda on Trial in Yemen,” Terrorism Focus 4 no. 39

(2007).

23 “Profile: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” BBC News.

the Arab East | 107
Then, in January 2009, Yemeni and Saudi Islamist militant groups affiliated with

Al-Qaida merged into AQAP, a group formed in early 2003 in Saudi Arabia.24

On January 23, 2009, Al-Malahim Media Foundation, the media arm of AQAP,

released a videotape titled as “From Here We Begin . . . And at Al-Aqsa We

Meet,” in which the group announced that the Saudi jihadists pledged allegiance

to its leaders “to combine the efforts of the Mojahidoon, in defense of the

Muslim world, and to liberate the Noble Aqsa Mosque”; they also declared that

they would now act under the name of “Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula.”25

In October 2010, AQAP’s military commander, Al-Raimi, announced the

creation of the “Aden-Abyan Army” to free the country from “crusaders and

their apostate agents.”26

According to the U.S. Congressional Research Service, AQAP’s current primary

goals include attacking the U.S. homeland, attacking U.S. and Western interests

in Yemen, destabilizing the Yemeni government, and assassinating members of

the Saudi royal family.27

Current Links with the Central Al-Qaida Leadership

The links between AQAP and central Al-Qaida seem to be strong. Nasser AlWahishi has been a close aide to Usama Bin Ladin, and his deputy, Said

Al-Shihri, is a Saudi national repatriated from the Guantanamo Bay prison

camp.28 Moreover, Al-Shihri’s leadership has been confirmed by Al-Qaida’s

second-in-command, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, “due to his knowledge of the Yemeni

tribes and his close ties to youth groups and adolescent mujahideen.”29

24 Ibid.

25 “From Here We Begin and At Al-Aqsa We Meet,” Global Islamic Media Front, accessed 15 June

2011, http://www.archive.org/details/Aqsaaa.

26 “Yemen Qaeda Chief Announces Formation of Army,” Asharq Al-Awsat, 10 December 2010, 7

June 2011, http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=1&id=22639.

27 Jeremy M. Sharp, Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations, CRS Report for Congress RL34170 (8

June 2011), 11–13, accessed 20 June 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34170.pdf.

28 Jayshree Bajoria and Greg Bruno, “Backgrounder: al-Qaeda,” Council on Foreign Relations

Backgrounder, 17 June 2011, accessed 22 June 2011, http://www.cfr.org/terroristorganizations/al-qaeda-k-al-qaida-al-qaida/p9126.

29 Jamestown Foundation, “Former AQAP Intelligence Chief Describes Egyptian Role in AlQaeda,” Terrorism Monitor 8 no. 43 (2010): 1, accessed 7 June 2011,

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37205&cHash=e

119e7cbbe.

108 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
Significantly, in the famous videotape released by AQAP in January 2009

announcing the merger between the Yemeni and Saudi jihadist cells, Bin Ladin

and Al-Zawahiri were referred to as the organization’s “leaders and elders”

whom AQAP’s mujahidin are following to fulfill their “promise and jihad.”30

There are some allegations that AQAP is receiving “strategic and philosophic

guidance” from Bin Ladin and other members of Al-Qaida’s central

leadership.31 According to the Wall Street Journal, U.S. intelligence officials have

observed “increased collaboration and communion” between the AQAP and

central Al-Qaida. 32 In addition, AQAP shares strong global jihadist ideologies

and objectives with central Al-Qaida. 

Despite these links in hierarchical and organizational ties, most analysts believe

that AQAP operates independently. According to Glenn Carle, former Deputy

National Intelligence Officer for Transnational Threats, “Usama Bin Ladin

inspires, but does not order, his brethren in Yemen.”33 In response to the

question, “Are they centrally controlled by Usama Bin Ladin, wherever he is?”

Carle stated, “I think the answer is, no.”34 And to the question “Do they receive

general operation guidance?” he replied, “Probably in some ways they do. . . .

There might be some [logistical] support, generally not too much.”35 According

to one analyst:

Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has eclipsed its superiors in

terms of recruiting, propaganda, and military operations. Unlike many other

Al-Qaida affiliates, these cadres are integrated into the indigenous society.

30 “From Here We Begin and At Al-Aqsa We Meet,” Global Islamic Media Front.

31 American Enterprise Institute, “Pakistan Security Brief–November 5, 2010,” Critical Threats, 5

November 2010, accessed 11 June 2011, http://www.criticalthreats.org/pakistan-securitybrief/pakistan-security-brief-%E2%80%93-november-5-2010.

32 Adam Entous and Margaret Coker, “Pakistan al-Qaeda Aids Yemen Plots,” Wall Street Journal,

4 November 2010, accessed 7 June 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/

SB10001424052748704805204575594672841436244.html.

33 Gary Thomas, “Al-Qaida in Arabian Peninsula Comes into Its Own,” VOA News, 4 November

2010, accessed 7 June 2011, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/news-analysis/Al-Qaidain-Arabian-Peninsula-Comes-Into-Its-Own-106681868.html.

34 Thomas, “Al-Qaida in Arabian Peninsula Comes into Its Own.”

35 Ibid.

the Arab East | 109
This unique mixture of global aspirations and local roots makes AQAP a

more adaptive, tenacious adversary than its counterparts in Afghanistan,

Iraq, Somalia, and elsewhere.36

Level of Connection with Al-Qaida

Overall, it seems that the presence of Al-Qaida in Yemen during the last 10

years has remained at the second level. Both AAIA and AQAP have adhered

to the fundamental ideological orientation and modes of operation of central AlQaida, but neither of them has been directly bound by the organizational and

hierarchical structure of Al-Qaida. Although during recent years, after the

emergence of AQAP, the connections with Al-Qaida became stronger, both

AAIA and AQAP have acted independently, and there is no indication that

they were operating under the orders and instructions of the central Al-Qaida

leadership.

Saudi Arabia

Background

As noted above, AQAP is the best known group affiliated with Al-Qaida in the

Arabian Peninsula region. Although revived by a merger of Saudi and Yemeni

jihadist cells in January 2009, the emergence of the core of the group goes back

to May 2003 in Saudi Arabia.

Different phases of AQAP’s presence in Saudi Arabia can be best explained

based on the briefings from Saudi Ministry of Interior’s counterterrorism

advisors in Riyadh and Washington, DC, in 2008. According to Saudi officials,

there are three phases of Al-Qaida’s campaign in Saudi Arabia; we add the

fourth one to cover the current era, from January 2009 to today.37

36 Christopher Swift, “Al-Qaeda after Usama bin Laden,” Christopher Swift Blog, 1 May 2011.

accessed 7 June 2011, http://christopher-swift.com/blog/al-qaeda-after-Usama-bin-laden.

37 Christopher M. Blanchard, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations CRS Report for

Congress RL33533 (Congressional Research Service: 16 December 2009), 24, accessed 7 June

2011, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/135931.pdf.

110 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
The “Momentum” Phase (May 2003–June 2004)

Although there are some allegations that AQAP had begun to organize its initial

attacks by early 2002,38 the newborn network of Islamist militants did not begin

its large-scale attacks until May 2003. Composed of hundreds of well-trained

“Arab Afghan” veterans, AQAP in its primitive stage had “created a network of

storage caches and safe houses based on the work of local and foreign operatives

trained in document forgery, fund-raising, publishing, weapons and explosives

use, and personal security techniques.”39

The “Regrouping” Phase (June 2004–April 2005)

Following the government’s counterterrorism reactions, AQAP began to adapt

a new organizational structure, comprised of small cells. While these units had

their own leadership, distinct tactics, and conducted separated operations, they

considered themselves a part of a whole.40 During this period, AQAP conducted

mostly small-scale attacks.

The “Fragmentation” Phase (April 2005–January 2009)41

Following the deaths and arrests of most of its significant members, AQAP

became gradually dismantled and fragmented with significant setbacks during

this period.42 Confident of the full success of the government’s counterterrorism

campaign in confronting AQAP, King Abdullah stated in 2006 that “I can assure

you that your country is well and the evil-doers are, thank God, defeated.”43

38 International Crisis Group, Saudi Arabia Backgrounder: Who Are the Islamists?, Middle East

Report No. 31 (2004), 12, accessed 7 June 2011, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/

middle-east-north-africa/iran-gulf/saudi-arabia/031-saudi-arabia-backgrounder-who-are-theislamists.aspx.

39 Blanchard, Saudi Arabia, 24.

40 International Crisis Group, Saudi Arabia Backgrounder, 12.

41 It must be noted that in the original classification of phases by Saudi counterterrorism officials,

this stage ranged from April 2005 to April 2008.

42 John Rollins, Al-Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for

U.S. Policy, CRS Report for Congress R41070 (Congressional Research Service: 2011), 14,

accessed 7 June 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41070.pdf. 

43 “Saudi King Says Al-Qaeda Militants Defeated,” Reuters, 7 June 2006, accessed 12 June 2011,

http://news.oneindia.in/2006/06/07/saudi-king-says-al-qaeda-militants-defeated1149673106.html.

the Arab East | 111
The “Revival” Phase (January 2009–Present)

On January 23, 2009, the fragmented remaining AQAP cells in Saudi Arabia

pledged allegiance to Yemeni jihadists’ leaders “to combine the efforts of the

Mojahidoon, in defense of the Muslim world, and to liberate the Noble Aqsa

Mosque.”44 Operating under the Yemeni jihadists’ dominance and leadership,

the organization is continuing to act under the name of AQAP.

Links with Central Al-Qaida Leadership

Concerning the links between AQAP and the central Al-Qaida leadership, it is

important to distinguish between the time prior to their merger with the Yemeni

jihadists and the subsequent period.

The initial core of AQAP formed in Saudi Arabia following the return of

hundreds of jihadists either from anti-Soviet campaigns or training camps in

Afghanistan. Therefore, from the very beginning, AQAP had strong shared

military expertise and ideological ties with Al-Qaida in Afghanistan. There are

even some indications that some of these Islamist militants had orders from

Usama Bin Ladin to carry out operations in Saudi Arabia.45 While AQAP was

breaking into small cells and becoming further fragmented, this overarching

common ideological perspective played a key role in maintaining the

organization’s sense of unity—both as a Saudi and as an international jihadist

movement under the supreme guidance of Al-Qaida central leaders.46

Nevertheless, leaving aside the common ideological aspects, there is no proof

that AQAP at this stage had been a subdivision of central Al-Qaida, had been

under its hierarchical structure, or was receiving any instruction or even

communication from Al-Qaida’s central leadership. Yet, after the merger with

Yemeni cells, the ties between AQAP and central Al-Qaida increased. The new

leaders of the organization have close personal ties with Al-Qaida’s central

44 “From Here We Begin and At Al-Aqsa We Meet,” Global Islamic Media Front.

45 International Crisis Group, Saudi Arabia Backgrounder, 12.

46 It must be noted that this does not mean AQAP’s ideological orientation was identical with

the central Al-Qaida orientation. For instance, contrary to central Al-Qaida leadership, AQAP

has always concentrated on domestic matters rather than overseas concerns. See International

Crisis Group, Saudi Arabia Backgrounder,12.

112 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
leadership; moreover, there are some allegations that AQAP is now receiving

“strategic and philosophical guidance” from Al-Qaida’s central leadership and

that the level of “collaboration and communion” has increased.47

Level of Connection with Al-Qaida

Regarding the level of connectedness to Al-Qaida, it seems that AQAP has

never gotten closer to Al-Qaida than level two. Although the ties between

AQAP and central Al-Qaida seem to be stronger after the merger with Yemeni

cells, it has never reached the level one threshold.

Iraq

Background

Iraq is of particular importance for Al-Qaida, as it is the organization’s second

front after Afghanistan.48 The U.S. Department of State reported in 2006 that

Tanzim Qaedat Al-Jihad fi Bilad Al-Rafidayn (Al-Qaida of the Jihad

Organization in the Land of Two Rivers), known as Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI),

was the Iraqi group most known for its affiliation with Al-Qaida.49

After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi began to form

an insurgent network “composed of foreign fighters, remnants of Ansar al-Islam

and indigenous Sunni extremists.”50 By fall 2003, Al-Zarqawi was recognized

as the “regional emir of Islamist terrorists in Iraq.”51

Originally known as Jamaat Al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad (JTJ), AQI was established

officially in October 2004, when Al-Zarqawi pledged allegiance to Usama Bin

47 American Enterprise Institute, “Pakistan Security Brief.”

48 “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” Yemen Times.

49 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Middle East and

North Africa Overview,” Country Reports on Terrorism 2005 (2006): 126–47, accessed 7 June 2011,

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65462.pdf.

50 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Country of Origin Information on Iraq,” 3

October 2005, 68, accessed 7 June 2011, http://www.internal-displacement.org/

8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/096267160DEB1198802570B700594512/$file/Iraq+CO

I+October+2005.pdf.

51 “Al-Qaeda in Iraq,” Global Security, 11 January 2006, accessed 7 June 2011,

http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/al-qaeda_in_iraq.htm.

the Arab East | 113
Ladin as the leader of central Al-Qaida group.52 Best known for its extreme

positions, AQI was responsible for several attacks targeting a wide variety of

groups and individuals, mainly by suicide bombing. The group often claims

responsibility for its operation under the name of the Islamic State of Iraq, an

umbrella organization of Iraqi insurgent groups formed in October 2006.53

In terms of structure, it is claimed that the group is composed of 15 brigades.54

According to the International Crisis Group’s report from February 2006, AQI

“appears to be surprisingly well-structured; it should neither be blown up into

a Leviathan nor ignored as a mirage, but rather considered as one among a

handful of particularly powerful groups.”55 In addition, there were several smaller

jihadist cells that had sworn allegiance to Al-Zarqawi.56

AQI’s objectives have evolved over time from part of the global jihad movement

that targeted primarily Western interests around the world to a more Iraqfocused militant organization.57 The organization has been weakened during

the last few years, in particular by the loss of Al-Zarqawi in a U.S. airstrike in

June 200658 and the death of his successor Abu Umar Al-Baghdadi in April

2010.59 This does not mean, however, that the organization has vanished.

52 “Leaders’ deaths a blow to al Qaeda in Iraq,” Washington Times, 19 April 2010, accessed 7 June

2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/apr/19/iraq-says-2-top-al-qaeda-figureskilled.

53 John Lumpkin, “Islamic State of Iraq,” Global Security, 22 December 2006, accessed 7 June

2011, http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/islamic_state_of_iraq.htm.

54 International Crisis Group, “In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency,” Middle East

Report No. 50 (2006), 2–8, accessed 11 June 2011, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/

middle-east-north-africa/iraq-syria-lebanon/iraq/050-in-their-own-words-reading-the-iraqiinsurgency.aspx.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.

57 Kenneth Katzman, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, CRS Report for Congress RL

31339 (United States Congressional Research Service: 2009), 22, accessed 7 June 2011,

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL31339.pdf.

58 Katzman, Iraq: Post-Saddam, 22.

59 “Sunni militants in Iraq name new leader,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 16 May 2010,

accessed 7 June 2011, http://www.rferl.org/content/Sunni_Militants_In_Iraq_Name

_ New_Leader/2043599.html.

114 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
According to Iraqi officials, the group is still posing “a serious challenge to the

country’s stability despite recent blows to its command structure.”60

Links with the Central Al-Qaida Leadership

From the very beginning of its emergence, JTJ (as AQI was initially called) was

considered to be Al-Qaida’s branch in Iraq. In October 17, 2004, Al-Zarqawi

pledged allegiance to Usama Bin Ladin. In his statement, Al-Zarqawi held that 

our respected brothers in Al-Qaida understood the strategy of Jama’at AlTawhid wa Al-Jihad in the land of the two rivers [Iraq] and the caliphates

and their hearts opened to their approach. . . . We deliver to the nation the

news that both Jama’at Al-Tawhid wa Al-Jihad’s Amir [Al-Zarqawi] and

soldiers have pledged allegiance to the sheikh of the mujahedin, Usama Bin

Ladin, and that they will follow his orders in jihad for the sake of God so

there will be no more tumult or oppression, and justice and faith in God will

prevail.61

Shortly thereafter, on 20 October 2004, JTJ announced that it had officially

joined Al-Qaida.62

The links between AQI and central Al-Qaida were, in particular, highlighted in

July 2005, when Al-Zarqawi sent a letter to Al-Qaida’s second-in-command,

Ayman Al-Zawahiri. In the letter, which is summarized in the U.S. Department

of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, Al-Zarqawi described his

organization’s long-term goals as a four-stage plan “to expand the Iraq war to

include expelling U.S. forces, establishing an Islamic authority, spreading the

conflict to Iraq’s secular neighbors, and engaging in battle with Israel.”63

On the other hand, Al-Qaida’s central leadership also declared its support for

AQI on different occasions. For instance, Bin Ladin, in December 2004,

60 Ibid.

61 John Pike, “Jamaat al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad / Unity and Jihad Group, Tanzim Qa’idat Al-Jihad in

Bilad alRafidayn (Organization of Jihad’s Base in the Country of the Two Rivers),” Global

Security, 6 December 2006, accessed 7 June 2011,

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/zarqawi.htm.

62 Pike, “Jamaat al-Tawhid.”

63 U.S. Department of State, “Middle East and North Africa,” 132.

the Arab East | 115
endorsed Al-Zarqawi as his “official emissary” in Iraq.64 Another reference can

be made to a video statement released in July 2007 by Al-Qaida’s second man,

Al-Zawahiri, in which he encouraged “Iraqis and Muslims in general to show

greater support for the Islamic State of Iraq, an Al-Qaida insurgent front in the

country.”65

After Al-Zarqawi was killed in 2006,66 his successor Abu Umar Al-Baghdadi

also focused on strengthening the organization’s links with central Al-Qaida.67

Al-Baghdadi’s successor, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi Al-Husseini Al-Qurayshi,

followed the same path. The group is still on the United Nations (UN) 1267

Committee’s list for their ties to Al-Qaida.

As stated in the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor, with the partial

withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, the organization has fulfilled one of its

main objectives and lost one of its essential reasons for existence. Accordingly,

“the additional loss of local support may mean linking the ISI [Islamic State of

Iraq] to the global agenda of Al-Qaida central [which] could offer a means of

perpetuating the movement.”68

Level of Connection with Al-Qaida Central

With its leaders having sworn allegiance to Bin Ladin, AQI from the very outset

identified itself as Al-Qaida’s regional branch in Iraq. This has been confirmed

by subsequent communications and connections between two groups, including

their communication about the organization’s long-term objectives. Therefore,

AQI is an example of a level one group affiliated to central Al-Qaida.

64 United Nations Committee Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading

Treatment or Punishment, “Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article

19 of the Convention,” 6 May 2005, 50, accessed 7 June 2011, http://www.state.gov/

documents/organization/62175.pdf.

65 “New al-Qaida video calls on Muslims to unite in Jihad,” Associated Press, 4 July 2007,

accessed 7 June 2011, http://www.wsvn.com/news/articles/world/MI53736/.

66 Katzman, Iraq: Post-Saddam, 22.

67 Murad Batal Al-Shishani, “Is the Islamic State of Iraq Going Global?,” Terrorism Monitor 9 no.4

(2011)

68 Ibid.

116 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
Palestine

From the very outset of the formation of Al-Qaida, Palestine has been an

integral part of its ideology, and both central Al-Qaida and its offshoots have

considered the liberation of Palestine to be one of their main objectives.

However, compared to other Al-Qaida fronts, the presence of Al-Qaida in

Palestine has always been rather insignificant. Nevertheless, sometimes there

have been allegations that Al-Qaida is present in the region. In December 2002,

Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon stated that Israel believed that Al-Qaida had

established a presence in Gaza.69 In March 2006, Palestinian Authority President

Mahmoud Abbas confirmed these remarks, stating, “We have signs of the

presence of Al-Qaida in Gaza and the West Bank.”70

Following the electoral victory of Hamas in 2006, the situation in Gaza provided

an opportunity for some jihadist groups accused of affiliation with Al-Qaida to

commence their own activities there. Among these groups, Jaysh Al-Islam

(Army of Islam) was especially notable.

Background

Jaysh Al-Islam was formed by members of the Popular Resistance Committees,

one of Gaza’s largest militant factions, in late 2005.71 It is led by Mumtaz

Dughmush, a former member of the Palestinian Authority’s Preventive Security

Organisation, “who for years allegedly had been contracted for militant

operations by both Hamas and Fatah.”72

The group’s first operation that attracted public attention was the kidnapping

of the Israeli soldier Gilad Schalit. In this operation, which was launched on 25

June 2006, Jaysh Al-Islam joined with two other groups: the Izz Al-Din Al69 “Israel says al-Qaeda active in Gaza,” BBC News, 5 December 2002, accessed 7 June 2011,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2546863.stm.

70 “Abbas: Al-Qaeda infiltrating West Bank, Gaza,” Associated Press, 2 March 2006, accessed 7

June 2011, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11634430/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/

t/abbas-al-qaida-infiltrating-west-bank-gaza.

71 International Crisis Group, Radical Islam in Gaza, Middle East Report no. 104, (29 March

2011), accessed 7 June 2011, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East

%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/104%20Radical%20Islam%20in%20Gaza.ashx.

72 International Crisis Group, Radical Islam in Gaza. 

the Arab East | 117
Qassam Brigades (the military wing of Hamas) and the Salah Al-Din Brigades.

This operation demonstrated the group’s organizational capacities and its

capability to cooperate with other armed forces in Gaza, thereby “creating new

strategic possibilities in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”73

Jaysh Al-Islam was later involved in kidnapping several foreign journalists,

including Alan G. Johnston, a BBC reporter, in March 2007. In exchange for

Johnston, the group demanded the release of an Al-Qaida-affiliated cleric, Abu

Qatada Al-Filastini (Umar Mahmud Uthman), who is believed to be Al-Qaida’s

spiritual leader in Europe.74

Links with the Central Al-Qaida Leadership

Jaysh Al-Islam’s success in operating out of Hamas and Fatah areas, on the one

hand, and its reference to jihadist elements and ideologies, on the other, have

raised allegations among the media and officials about its cooperation with AlQaida and its position as an Al-Qaida subsidiary in Palestine.75 In a videotape

attributed to the group, Jaysh Al-Islam stated that “it is not fighting ‘for a piece

of land’ but waging a religious war aimed at restoring a religious caliphate, or

government, throughout the Muslim world.”76

Jaysh Al-Islam, however, states that the group “is not part of Al-Qaida.”77 Israel,

Hamas, and some other jihadist groups share this assessment.78 According to

the director of Gaza’s Internal Security Service, “Jaysh al-Islam takes on the

73 Rafid Fadhil Ali, “Al-Qaeda’s Palestinian Inroads,” Terrorism Monitor 6 no. 8 (2008), accessed 7

June 2011, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%

5D=4864&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=167&no_cache=1.

74 Ali, “Al-Qaeda’s Palestinian Inroads.”

75 LtCol Jonathan Dahoah Halevi, “Al-Qaeda Affiliate–Jaish al-Islam–Receives Formal Sanctuary

in Hamas-Ruled Gaza,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs 8 no. 7 (August 2008), accessed 7 June

2011, http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=

111&FID=442&PID=0&IID=2408.

76 Michael Slackman and Souad Mekhennet, “A New Group that Seems to Share Al-Qaeda’s

Agenda,” New York Times, 8 July 2006, accessed 21 June 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/

2006/07/08/world/middleeast/08islam.html.

77 International Crisis Group, Radical Islam in Gaza.

78 Ibid.

118 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
appearance of Salafi groups merely to attract new members.”79 Overall, it seems

that the ties between Jaysh Al-Islam and Al-Qaida central leadership are limited

to sharing some ideological orientations; there appears to be no hierarchical or

operational connection.

The Level of Connection with Al-Qaida

The presence of Al-Qaida in Palestine has been highlighted during the last

several years, but it has always been very limited. Adhering to elements of global

jihadist ideologies, Jaysh Al-Islam is an example of a level two group affiliated

with Al-Qaida.

Egypt

Background

Focusing on the last 10 years, the analysis above regarding Yemen, Iraq, and

other parts of the Middle East suggests that Egyptian jihadists seemed to

contribute to the buildup of Al-Qaida or Al-Qaida-like groups outside of Egypt.

Yet, in their own country, a retreat from violent jihadist doctrine is gaining

ground. Egypt’s militant Islamists have always had a unique relationship with

Al-Qaida. Starting with the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the

late 1980s and 1990s, Egyptian jihadists from the Islamic Jihad Organization

flocked to Afghanistan to fight the infidels. Ayman Al-Zawahiri and

Mohammed Atif, both charged in the Islamic Jihad court case in the early 1980s,

were among those who would later rise to leadership positions within Al-Qaida.

A new trend towards pacifying the main Egyptian jihadist groups is successfully

underway. The aforementioned Muragaat Fikriya, or Muragaat Fiqhiya

(Doctrinal Revisions), led by former leaders of the Islamic Jihad and Al-Jamaa

Al-Islamiya organizations, resulted in diverting thousands of actual and potential

jihadists towards accepting nonviolence as a method of achieving their goals of

establishing Islamic states and societies. Their efforts weakened the violent

expressions of Islamic Jihad and of Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiya, leaving the jihad scene

primarily to a few level two groups from Palestine, as well as to the rare

Egyptian level three groups.

79 Ibid. Salafism is a Sunni Islamic movement that views the first three generations of Muslims as

models for how Islam should be practiced. 

the Arab East | 119
As Amr Elshobki stated, “Terror has shifted in its shape and motivation over the

years. Recent attacks tend to have an individualistic touch. The perpetrators

are individuals who do not belong to any of the major militant groups, are not

interested in cohesive doctrines, hierarchical organizations, or centralized

authority.”80 The violent actions of level one and two groups have largely

disappeared during the past 10 years, as these organizations have turned their

focus on rebuilding themselves as members of a wider civil society. 

The Level of Connection with Al-Qaida

Elshobki recently observed that “[t]he political scene of today differs markedly

from the one in which well-organized militant groups first took shape. The

Muslim Brotherhood is now the dominant force among Islamists in Egypt.”81

The success of Doctrine Revisions, as will be explained in more detail below,

leads us to conclude that Egypt has witnessed a sharp decline of level two

groups (which were mainly the Islamic Jihad and Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiya) in terms

of ideology and propensity towards violence. Individual acts of terror continue

to be present, attributable to level three groups, although those too are

declining, as the groups are also influenced by the growing trend, especially in

the post-2011 revolution era, to join the political scene. According to Elshobki:

Exactly how many Egyptian jihadi prisoners have repented, and to which

movements they belonged, remains unknown. Estimates range from 20,000

to 30,000, the majority of whom (some 12,000) are members of Al-Gama’a

Al-Islamiyya [Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiya], the militant organization that

perpetrated much of the Islamist violence of the 1980s and 1990s. The

remainder are members of smaller groups, mostly Al-Jihad [Islamic Jihad],

or are independent jihadists espousing Salafi ideologies.82

At the same time, the situation in Iraq, Yemen, and Afghanistan, coupled with

more efficient Internet links to level one and two groups elsewhere,83 will

80 Amr Elshobki, “The future and limitations of Jihad’s revisions,” Al-Ahram (Cairo), accessed 26

June 2011, http://acpss.ahram.org.eg/eng/ahram/2004/7/5/EGYP117.HTM.

81 Ibid.

82 Ibid.

83 It is worth noting that “the availability of sophisticated internet websites to preach hatred and

oppression is now seen on a wide scale. We have also seen recently how modern media and the

internet have been used to widely show atrocities committed against innocent civilians” See Amr

Abdalla and others, Improving the Quality of Islamic Education in Developing Countries: Innovative

120 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
continue to produce level three terror activities and exhort Egyptian jihadists to

join and lead level one and two groups from outside of Egypt.

The Doctrine Revisions and the Deradicalization Process in Egypt

The idea of Doctrine Revisions, or deradicalization in Egypt, was hugely

influential and was brought to the fore by the writings of Dr. Sayyid Imam AlSharif.84 Over time, the revisions have had their successes and challenges.

Revisions appeared back in the 1980s among those sentenced in connection

with President Anwar Sadat’s assassination after self-reflection by jihad groups

to effect political change by the assassination. These revisions began as the ideas

of individuals, but were adopted by larger movements in later decades—namely,

by Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiya in 1997 and by Islamic Jihad in 2007. 

Since February 2007, after their revision’s publication, Al-Sharif and other

Islamic Jihad commanders have been touring Egyptian prisons to hold meetings

with their followers.85 The visits initially featured small meetings with the

commanders of Islamic Jihad factions in an effort to organize a common stance.

This was followed by lectures and question-and-answer periods between the

Islamic Jihad leadership and the lower ranks.86 This type of interaction was

modeled after the leadership of the Islamic Groups, which held 10 months of

discussions and meetings with their followers in 2002. According to political

scientist Omar Ashour, the deradicalization process appeared successful: the

group has seen no armed operations since 1999, no significant splits within the

movement have occurred, and around 25 volumes have been authored by the

Islamic Group leaders supporting their new ideology with both theological and

rational arguments.87

Approaches (Creative Associates International, 2006), 54,

http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com/caiistaff/dashboard_giroadmincaiistaff/dashboa

rd_caiiadmindatabase/publications/Abdula%20Paper%20FINAL%205-22-06%20_4_.pdf.

84 Dr. Sayyid Imam Al-Sharif was a chief ideologue of the Arab jihadists and jihad groups, as

well as Emir of Egypt’s Islamic Jihad organization. In 1988, Al-Sharif authored what is regarded

as nothing short of a jihadist manifesto for all violent religious movements titled, Al-Umda fi Idad

Al-Idda [Preparation for Jihad]. He published revisions of his previous writings in 2007. 

85 Omar Ashour, “De-Radicalization of Jihad? The Impact of Egyptian Islamist Revisionists on

Al-Qaeda,” Perspectives on Terrorism, 2 no. 5 (2008), http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/

pt/index.php/pot/article/view/36/html.

86 Ibid.

87 Ibid. 

the Arab East | 121
Dr. Rafiq Habib,88 commenting on the Egyptian revisions in 2008, asserted that

revisions by Islamic Jihad and Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiya aimed to establish visions

based on peaceful change that would bring the Islamic and national powers

together as a means of ending or terminating violence.89 Further, Al-Sharif,

theorist of Islamic Jihad in Egypt, says that the revisions of the two jihadist

Egyptian groups have nothing to do with the security pressures or torture

practiced against the members of the groups while in prisons. He suggests that

the revisions are the product of an interpretation that sees the use of armed

violence in the process of internal change as ineffective and that sees violence

as causing harm to the “Islamic” groups and to Egyptian society as a whole.

The two scholars bring to the fore the following notions: 

that previous arguments that understood the Egyptian revisions as the

product of torture are invalid, as torture has been a long-term practice

within Egyptian prisons for decades; 

that the Doctrine Revisions turned into a collective, communal operation

(i.e., they became group-based, not individual ideas). 

that the foundations of these revisions are a result of self-criticism by groups

involved in Sadat’s assassination, who eventually came to terms with the

reality that their acts had not changed the existing state of affairs in Egypt;

that Egyptian security officials have, over time, changed their attitude

towards revisions, especially after the incident of the Luxor terrorist attack

on foreign terrorists; and 

that revisions were a product of experience itself, as the employment of

violence in the process of internal change harmed all parties involved—

including the jihad-oriented groups, Egyptian society, and the authorities.

According to author Marwin Shehadeh, the most important impact of the

revisions on the violent jihadist Salafist movement is the creation of confusion

within the movement, particularly within the mother organization Al-Qaida,

88 Dr. Rafiq Habib is one of the most prominent specialists on Islamic movements. Abdul

Rahman Hashim, “Revisions Add to Islamic Moderation,” accessed 13 June 2011,

http://www.islamonline.net.

89 Hashim, “Revisions Add to Islamic Moderation.”

122 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
which rejects these revisions.90 Moreover, with Egyptian revisions owing their

roots to persons like Sayyid Imam Al-Sharif, who has held influential positions

both inside and outside Egypt, there is the potential for Egyptian revisions

playing a role outside Egypt. Habib argues that Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiya’s revisions

represent an additional support to the moderation of Islam and a peaceful

approach toward change.91 This represents a success for the Islamic school to

which the Muslim Brotherhood belonged from the very beginning of its

emergence. 

Nevertheless, Egypt’s security officials did not take such revisions seriously and

internal jihadi revisions were not widely known; this can be attributed largely

to the refusal of security officials to have any dialogue with the Islamists and the

authorities’ tendency to regard violent security measures as the only solutions.

Habib cautions that such policies, which close the door to peaceful change, can

precipitate the recurrence of further violence.

The Prospects for Doctrine Revisions and Deradicalization 

The success or failure of the revisions depends on the structural conditions of

the countries or regions from which the jihadists hail. In other words, the longterm solution is more political than religious, as the Indonesian approach has

demonstrated. In addition to allowing self-evaluation of detained terrorists

through rehumanization processes, it might be time that Arabic regimes

behaved in a humane manner towards the terrorists and became less oppressive.

A lack of such a transformation could explain the reason that, through the

Arabic Awakening, the jihadist groups as well as the Arabic regimes have lost

so much after years of competing for survival. As the Arab Awakening continues

to change the structural conditions of the Arab world, it is worth probing or

researching the perceptions that new generations of jihadists have regarding

revisions or deradicalization. According to Ashour, the phenomenon of

deradicalization is not confined only to Egyptian militants. It has also been

adopted by Algerian, Saudi, Yemeni, Jordanian, Tajik, Malaysian, and Indonesian

armed Islamist movements, factions, and individuals.92 It should be noted here

90 Marwin Shehadeh, “Weakening al-Qaeda: Literature Review Challenges its Authority,” Arab

Insight, 2 no. 6 (2009): 25–36, accessed 13 June 2011, http://www.arabinsight.org/

pdf/Arabinsight28.pdf.

91 Hashim, “Revisions Add to Islamic Moderation.”

92 Ashour, “De-Radicalization of Jihad?”

the Arab East | 123
that the deradicalization process is primarily concerned with changing the

attitudes of these movements toward violence—specifically violence against

civilians (terrorism). The process also touches on other issues like stances on

democracy and women, but there have been no major changes regarding these

issues.93 Khalil Al-Anany says there is a need to tackle the belief that defectors

or those who have undergone revisions have either strayed from the “right path”

or have been coerced.94 Clearly, efforts need to be made to understand the

factors contributing to the rehumanization process because it is an essential

component in combating the extremist subculture that defines others as less

than human beings, the spilling of whose blood is halal (permissible).95

The Impact of the Arab Revolutions on Muslim Militancy and Terrorism 

It is perhaps safe to argue that most policy makers and intellectuals assumed and

feared that Al-Qaida or its affiliates would succeed in what some of their

founding fathers in Egypt failed to do in 1981: to establish autocratic Islamic

states. It can also be argued that regimes in the Arab Mashriq (the East)

exercised the maximum security measures to fight Al-Qaida and other forms of

Islamic militancy. This was seen by many in the world as a somewhat justified

approach given: 1) the level of violence inflicted by Al-Qaida and its affiliates

on civilians and the economic interests of these countries; and 2) the threat that

they posed should they succeed in toppling the ruling regimes of the Arab

Mashriq and establishing autocratic Islamic states.

This scenario assumed that Arab countries in general faced two options: to

remain under the control of their current regimes or to fall to Taliban-style

Islamic militant states. The second option, strongly rejected by most Arabs and

the West, seemed to increase the level of tolerance for the Arab regimes’

violations of human rights, their use of brute force and torture against

opponents, their suppression of democracy, and their corruption. These

practices may have succeeded in reducing the threat of Islamic militancy in

93 Ibid.

94 Khalil Al-Anany, “In Focus: Jihad Revisions: It is too Late,” Daily Star (Cairo), 27 November

2007, accessed 7 June 2011, http://www.dailystaregypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=10511.

95 Mark Woodward, Ali Amin, and Inayah Rohmaniyah, “Police Power, Soft Power and

Extremist Sub-culture in Indonesia,” COMOPS Journal, accessed 7 June 2011,

http://comops.org/journal/2010/03/28/police-power-soft-power-and-extremist-sub-culture-inindonesia.

124 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, but almost no one anticipated

that the negative economic and political effects of these practices and policies

on the wider populations would erupt into revolutions against their regimes.

The revolutions we are witnessing in the Arab world are calling for democratic

changes. Religious elements, including the Muslim Brotherhood and some Salafi

groups, have joined these revolutions with a clear understanding of their civic

democratic nature. Will these changes have an effect on the presence of AlQaida, its affiliates, and the recruiting pool of like-minded gatherings of youth?

The answer is yes. There is a great potential for reducing the presence and

effectiveness of Al-Qaida in the Arab world. While security and military

measures are always necessary and needed to prevent and combat real threats,

their use should be governed by law and the UN’s Declaration of Human

Rights. Of course, such measures in the Arab-Islamic context will not effectively

destabilize Al-Qaida as an organization or as an ideology. What will destabilize

them are efforts at the social, political, and religious levels. These revolutions are

paving the way for applying such measures.

This analysis suggests that the revolutions in the Arab world, as the leading

Egyptian Islamist lawyer Montasir Al-Zayyat said in April 2011, are creating

conditions conducive to renouncing violence among Islamist militant groups

such as Islamic Jihad and Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiya (both strongly linked to AlQaida ideologically and organizationally).96 The democratic revolutions are

offering a historic opportunity to transform such organizations, and, more

importantly, they are providing a foundation upon which like-minded

gatherings of militant youth can move towards participation in nonviolent

pluralistic modes of politics. For this to be accomplished, newly elected

governments in the Arab world must allow space for the nonviolent

engagement of those groups. This requires that they abandon the use of state

terror and torture and resort to legal methods consistent with principles of

human rights. 

The United States and its allies must also rise to the historic occasion of the

current events by: 1) abandoning support for dictatorial regimes that have for

long justified their grip over power by the role they play in the war against

terror and ensuring the security of their states; 2) supporting unequivocally (and

96 Mohamed Salah Alzahar, “The Islamic Movement in Egypt after the January Revolution:

Where to? (3)” Al-Akhbar (Cairo) 19 April 2011, 1st edition: 12+. 

the Arab East | 125
without falling into double-standard politics) all the popular revolutions and

their democratic transitions; and 3) encouraging the continuation and spread of

Doctrine Revisions that, as explained earlier, have been used successfully in

Egypt and elsewhere to convert militants’ beliefs and attitudes towards

renouncing violence and embracing peaceful approaches.

If these measures are carried out, Al-Qaida will lose a wide range of potential

supporters and sympathizers who would opt for nonviolent democratic

expressions of their values, beliefs, and grievances. Evidence in Egypt and

Tunisia already supports the notion that previously militant groups, and ardent

militant figures such as Abbud Al-Zumur, have abandoned publicly their

militant ways in favor of engagement in the emerging political arena. A

concerted effort along these lines, taking into consideration the foundational

changes that are shaping countries of the Arab Mashriq, will prove to be most

useful in targeting the breeding grounds of extremism and Islamic militancy.

The Way Ahead

The story in the Arab East today is not that of Al-Qaida and militant Muslim

groups. Instead, it is the story of the popular uprisings and revolutions to

nonviolently establish democracy and justice. The Arab revolutions are

sweeping the region; already, Egypt and Tunisia are reaping the benefits of the

newly attained freedom and liberties, as evident from fair referendums on

constitutions and freedom to form political parties. 

However, experience shows that success in toppling a dictatorial regime,

introducing democratic reforms, and even building democratic institutions is

no guarantee for development and prosperity. Similar experiences in the

Philippines in 1986 and Bangladesh in 1991, for example, show that their

successful struggles for democracy did not necessarily bring about an

improvement in people’s lives. Poverty is still rampant; democracy is

dysfunctional, to say the least; and development has not progressed to the level

of expectations that people had at the time of revolutions. Iran is another

example of a popular revolution that led to a more severe autocratic regime.

On the bright side, the example of Korea provides hope to Arab revolutions, as

it has seen rather successful development and institutionalization of effective

democracy after the 1987 popular movement. Arab people undergoing these

revolutions are at a historic crossroads. It is the first time in their histories that

126 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
people are taking real charge of their own destinies. At the same time, though,

there are many issues that must be addressed, such as the distribution of

resources, poverty, and development. The Arab people also continue to be

influenced by international dynamics in light of the unsettled conflict with Israel

and the strong sense of injustice regarding Palestinian rights. 

How will the newly elected governments in the “free” Arab world respond to

these challenges? It is anyone’s guess. But based on observations of the events

of the past few months, especially in Egypt, we are optimistic. The spirit of

hope, the amount of determination, and the will to improve the conditions of

the country are unprecedented. Youth, not the old guard, holds the key to

success. Lastly, an amazing outcome of these revolutions is the revival of PanArabism. Arab people finally see a hope for a true Arab unification—a dream

that many feel they can almost touch!

the Arab East | 127
NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

803397AI (G02378) 6-09

128 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
the Islamic Maghreb | 129

Introduction

This chapter describes the genesis and development of Al-Qaida in the Islamic

Maghreb (AQIM). It also discusses AQIM’s strategic objectives, its leadership,

its tactical operations, its financing, and the destabilizing effects of Libya’s civil

war in the region. 

Genesis and Development

The formation of AQIM was formally announced in January 2007. During that

month, Abdelmalek Droukdel, the leader of another group that had been called

the GSPC or the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (Salafist

Group for Preaching and Combat), declared that he was changing the name of

that organization to AQIM to link formally with Al-Qaida Central (AQC), then

led by Usama Bin Ladin and Ayman Al-Zawahiri.1 Although notice of a

possible linkage between the GSPC and Al-Qaida had been leaked to the press

in September 2006, the official name change and the formalization of the

relationship between the two groups was only announced on 24 January 2007.2

7

Al-Qaida in the 

Islamic Maghreb

Ricardo René Larémont

This research was made possible in part with funds provided by the Office of Naval Research.

1 The present leadership of Al-Qaida is undetermined because members of the U.S. special

operations forces assassinated Usama Bin Ladin in Pakistan on 2 May 2011 (local time). See

Peter Baker, Helene Cooper, and Mark Mazzeti, “Bin Ladin is Dead, Obama Says,” New York

Times, 1 May 2011, www.newyorktimes.com/2011/05/02/world/asia/Usama-bin-Ladin-iskilled.html.

2 “Al-Qaeda ‘Issues France Threat’,” BBC News, 14 September 2006; Simon Tisdall, “Fears grow

of a radical Islamist Maghreb,” Guardian (London), 14 February 2007; Roula Khalaf and Stephen

Fidler, “Why Algeria Extremists ‘Re-branded’,” Financial Times, 20 April 2007.
What occurred during 2007 and afterwards was essentially a rebranding of 

the GSPC. 

The GSPC had origins within yet another group called the GIA or the Groupe

Islamiste Armé (Armed Islamic Group). The GIA had origins among Algerians

who went to Pakistan and Afghanistan to wage armed jihad against the Soviet

Union in the late 1980s.3 Upon returning to Algeria from Afghanistan and

Pakistan, these returning jihadists—who were being led principally by Qari Saïd,

Mansour Meliani, Abdelkader Chibouti, and Abdelhak Layada—formed the

GIA to contest Algeria’s military establishment, which seized control of the

state on 11 January 1992.4

On that date, the Algerian military annulled the results of a national

parliamentary election that had been held on 26 December 1991. After the

initial tally of the election ballots, it soon became clear that an Islamist party, the

FIS or the Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front), would be declared

the victors of the election because it had won 188 seats in the parliament.5

When the military realized that the FIS would seize control of the parliament,

it initiated its seizure of the government. When faced with this coup d’état by

the military, Algerian Islamists formed two armed resistance movements. The

first, called the AIS or Armée Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Army),

eventually agreed to lay down its arms during September 1997 and accept a

general amnesty from the Algerian government.6 The second, which was the

GIA, decided to continue with armed resistance. 

From 1992 until 1998, the GIA initiated a brutal military campaign of resistance

against the Algerian state that targeted not only soldiers and police officers but

also a considerable number of Algerian civilians and foreign workers who

resided in Algeria. The GIA’s strategy of targeting civilians—especially when it

was being led by Djamel Zitouni—severely backfired; it caused profound

alienation between the group and the masses of Algerians. Dissident members

3 Camille Tawil, Brothers in Arms: The Story of Al-Qa’ida and the Arab Jihadists (London: Saqi,

2010), 44–48.

4 Tawil, Brothers, 67–77; Camille Tawil, Al-Haraka Al-Islamiyya Al-Mussallah fi Al-Jaza’ir: Min AlInqadh ila Al-Jama’a (Beirut: Dar Al-Nahar, 1998), 53–90.

5 Anneli Botha, Terrorism in the Maghreb: The Transnationalisation of Domestic Terrorism (Pretoria,

South Africa: Institute of Security Studies, 2008), 29.

6 Tawil, Brothers, 134.

130 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
within the GIA who disagreed with the strategy and tactics of targeting civilians

departed from the GIA to create the aforementioned GSPC, which they

declared would not target civilians. The GSPC was founded during 

September 1998.7

The GSPC’s leaders were Hassan Hattab, Abderrazek Al-Bara, Nabil Sahraoui,

Abdelmadjid Dishu, and Ammari Saïfi.8 Under their leadership, the GSPC

enjoyed considerable success in mounting paramilitary attacks within Algeria,

which induced the government of Algeria to initiate a program of repression

and infiltration of the group. The Algerian government’s counterterrorism

program was substantially successful, causing dissension within the GIA and

leading to Hattab’s eventual loss of control of the group. By June 2003, Hattab

would be replaced by a trio of successors, including Nabil Sahraoui and two

deputies: Abdelmalek Droukdel and Ammari Saïfi.9 Under the GSPC’s new

leadership arrangement, Sahraoui assumed principal control of the GSPC and

Abdelmalek Droukdel became his primary deputy. During this early phase, the

GSPC operated primarily in northern Algeria (most notably in Boumerdès,

Tizi-Ouzou, Batna, Djidjel, Skikda, Annaba, and Biskra) while Sahraoui began

designing plans for the extension of GSPC operations into southern Algeria.10

In furtherance of this southern strategy, Sahraoui designated Ammari Saïfi and

yet another newcomer named Mokhtar Belmokhtar as leaders of AQIM’s

southern operations. AQIM’s southern theater originally embraced southern

Algeria but eventually enlarged itself to include remote regions within Mali,

Mauritania, Niger, and Chad. 

7 Mohammed M. Hafez, “Armed Islamist Movements and Political Violence in Algeria,” Middle

East Journal 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2000): 572–91; Jean-Pierre Filiu, “The Local and Global Jihad in

Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb,” Middle East Journal 63, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 213–26; “The

Salafist Group for Call and Combat,” Center for Defense Information, January 14, 2003,

www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?documentid=386&programID=39&from_page=../friendly

version/printversion.cfm, accessed 10 February 2003.

8 Tawil, Brothers, 134–35.

9 Carlos Echeverria Jesús, “The Recent Activities in the Sahel-Sahara Area,” African Journal for

the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (2010): 25; Liess Boukra, “Du Groupe Salafiste pour le

Combat (GSPC) à la Qaida au Maghreb Islamique (AQMI)”, African Journal for the Prevention

and Combating of Terrorism (2010): 49–50; Filiu, “The Local and Global Jihad,” 220 n34. Sahraoui

was officially named emir of the organization in a declaration issued 17 August 2005; he actually

started assuming that responsibility during August 2003.

10 Boukra, “Du Groupe Salafiste”, 44–46.

the Islamic Maghreb | 131
Amari Saïfi, one of these two designated leaders in the south, was also known

as “Abdelrazek El-Para” because he had formerly been a parachutist in the

Algerian army. Saïfi obtained considerable notoriety for planning and executing

a spectacular kidnapping of 32 Europeans in southern Algeria during early 2003.

Approximately a year later (in March 2004), a Chadian rebel group known as

the Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice Tchadien (Chadian Movement

for Democracy and Justice) captured Saïfi in northern Chad and turned him

over to the custody of Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi, who in turn

delivered him to the Algerian government. The Algerian government tried and

sentenced him to life imprisonment.11

Eventually, in 2004, Nabil Sahraoui, the overall leader of the GSPC, would be

killed in the northern Algeria when he became engaged in a shoot-out with

Algerian security forces. Upon his death, his primary deputy, Abdelmalek

Droukdel, took control of the GSPC.12 Droukdel’s strategic views and

philosophy were different and more internationally oriented than Sahraoui’s.

Droukdel emphasized the GSPC’s intention to engage the “far enemy” of Islam,

(i.e., United States and European states) and his view of jihad was compatible

with those of Usama Bin Ladin and Ayman Al-Zawahiri.13 Because of their

11 “Algerian Rebel Gets Life Sentence,” BBC News, 25 June 2005, accessed 27 December 2010,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4622859.stm, or http://english.aljazeera.net/

focus/2010/07/201071994556568919.html; Stephen Ulph, “Algerian GSPC Launch Attack in

Mauritania,” Terrorism Focus 2, no.11 (13 June 2005). Some international observers, however, and

especially British analyst Jeremy Keenan, have claimed that Ammari Saïfi was actually an

Algerian government intelligence operative who participated in a “false flag” operation within the

GSPC for the express purpose of infiltrating it on behalf of the Algerian government.

12 Andrew Black, “Mokhtar Belmokhtar: The Algerian Jihad’s Southern Amir,” Terrorism Monitor

7, no. 12, (8 May 2009), accessed 27 December 2010, www.jamestown.org/

single?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5D=34964.

13 Andrew Black, “AQIM’s Expanding Internationalist Agenda,” CTC Sentinel 1, no. 5 (April

2008): 12–14; Mathieu Guidère, “Une filiale algérienne pour Al-Qaida, Le Monde Diplomatique,

November 2006, accessed 27 November 2010, www.le-monde-diplomatique/2006/

11/GUIDERE/14167; Filiu, “The Local and Global Jihad,” 222; Jonathan Schanzer, “Algeria’s

GSPC and America’s War on Terror,” Policy Watch, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 15

October 2002, accessed 27 November 2010, www.washingtoninstitute.org/

templateC05.php?CID=1544; Dan Darling, “Social Analysis: Al-Qaeda’s African Arm”,

WindsofChange.net, 1 April 2004, accessed 27 November 2010,

www.windsofchange.net/archives/004795.html; Stephen Ulph, “Mauritania and the GSPC

Spectre, Terrorism Focus 2, no. 9 (18 May 2005), accessed 27 November 2010,

www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnew%5Btt_news%5D=476).

132 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
convergence of interests, Droukdel decided to merge his group to Al-Qaida

Central, with Droukdel swearing his allegiance to Bin Ladin.14 The preliminary

announcement about the formation of AQIM was released on 11 September

2006 (the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks), while the formal announcement

of merger was made during January 2007.15

AQIM Today: Geography, the Tribes, and Leadership

Geography

AQIM’s northern theater of operations extends from a region east of Algiers and

continues eastwards through the Kabylie towards Tunisia. 

In its southern theater of operations, AQIM has created a base of operations in

northern Mali (principally in the city of Kidal) and from that base it has roamed

into southern Algeria, southern Libya, southeastern Mauritania, northern and

eastern Mali, and northern and western Niger. It has also publicly declared (and

there is some evidence to support this) that it intends to link with Islamic

militants in northern Nigeria. Indeed, the leader of northern Nigeria’s Boko

14 Souad Mekhennet, Michael Moss, Eric Schmitt, Elaine Sciolino, and Margot Williams,

“Ragtag Insurgency Gets a Lifeline from Al Qaeda,” New York Times, 1 July 2008.

15 Guidère, “Une filiale algérienne pour Al-Qaida”; “Algerian Group joins Al-Qaeda brand,” 26

January 2007, accessed 26 October 2010, http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/23E2EB3C7B4F-4447-80CD-26EDAFEF18E8.htm .

the Islamic Maghreb | 133
Haram, Muhammed Abu Bakr Bin Muhammad Al-Shakwa, has pledged his

allegiance to AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel.16

Within the Sahel, AQIM has been able to operate with increasing effectiveness

because it has created havens with members of the Tuareg and Bérabiche tribes in

the region. With tactics that remind us of Al-Qaida’s operations in Pakistan and

Afghanistan, AQIM has found remote regions—principally in Mali and secondarily

in Algeria, Mauritania, and Niger—where it can operate substantially free of

governmental surveillance or interference. By operating in remote regions beyond the

purview of state policing and by relying upon revenue obtained from ransoms paid

for hostages and trade in contraband, AQIM has been able to create a geographical

and economic environment in which it can not only survive but also expand. While

AQIM does not pose an existential threat to the central governments in the region

16 International Crisis Group, “Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict,” Africa Report , No.

168, 20 December 2010; Arabic Media Monitor, “Boko Haram Releases Eid Al-Fitr Address Via

Al-Qaeda in North Africa’s Media Division Calling on Muslims to Wage Jihad,” Jihadist Forum

Monitor, 2 October 2010.

134 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
(which may explain the anemic governmental response to AQIM), it nevertheless

has begun to expand its geographical region of operations gradually, which

constitutes an emerging threat to state sovereignty in the region. Regional political

leaders are belatedly recognizing this emerging threat and beginning to devise plans

to deal with it.

The Tribes

The relationship between AQIM and the Tuareg is one of both cooperation and

conflict. AQIM’s pattern of survival in the Sahel is clearly reminiscent of AQC’s

methods in Afghanistan and Pakistan where it was able to obtain refuge among the

Pashtun tribes in that region. In both of these sanctuaries (Afghanistan/Pakistan and

the Sahel), the local and central governments have had their effectiveness and

capacity as governments diminished as Al-Qaida’s and AQIM’s effectiveness and

capacity have remained constant or have expanded. The threat to central

governments in the Sahel now is that AQIM is beginning to function as a

government unto itself in some outlying regions. It is able to demand taxes from

local tribes; render justice on its own terms; attack representatives of the state,

including the police and the military; and kidnap foreign visitors for ransom in the

region, either independently or in collaboration with the Tuareg or Bérabiche tribes. 

AQIM Leadership

Since the merger, Droukdel has remained as the nominal leader of AQIM. He was

born on 20 April 1970 in the town of Meftah, in the province of Blida, which is just

south of Algiers. According to Algerian security officials, he roams from residence to

residence in the region of the Kabylie mountains, which are east of the capital Algiers. 

He has two deputies, Mokhtar Belmokhtar and Yahia Abu Amar Abid Hammadou

(aka Abdelhamid Abu Zeid), who direct southern operations. Of this duo, Abu Zeid

allegedly is the more ideologically committed Islamist, while Mokhtar Belmokhtar

earns substantial income from trade in contraband and seems to operate somewhat

independently of Droukdel and Abu Zeid.17 

17 Dario Cristani and Riccardo Fabiani, “AQIM Funds Terrorist Organizations with Thriving SahelBased Kidnapping Industry,” Terrorism Monitor 8, no. 4 (28 January 2010), accessed 25 November 2010,

www.jamestown.orf/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5D=35963); Reuters, “FACTBOX-Al Qaeda’s

Sahara Wing,” 25 July 2010, accessed 25 November 2010, www.reuters.com/article/2010/07

/25/idUSLDE66O0DE; El Watan, 1 August 2007; Agence France Presse, 11 January 2010.

the Islamic Maghreb | 135
Abu Zeid’s umbrella group is called the Katibat Al-Fatahin and it embraces

three subgroups (the Talaia Al-Salafiya, the Nasr Aflou, and the Muhajiroun

[the Emigrants]). They circulate in and around Mont Thadak, Aït Moulay, In

Abog, and Thessalit.18

Belmokhtar’s group is called the Katibat Al-Mulathamin (the Masked Brigade)

and operates in and around Timbuktu, Arouane, and Boujebha Taoudenni in

Mali, while in Algeria it operates principally in Bordj Badji Mokhtar, Omar

Driss, Tamanrasset, and Djanet. 19

Aiding Belmokhtar and Abu Zeid are Yahya Abu Ammar (aka Yahya Jouadi),

who operates in the deep south of Algeria and in Mauritania; Abu Anas AlShingieti or Al-Shanqiti, who can be found in the southeast; and Abdelkarim

“the Touareg,” who rules out of Kidal, an important city in northern Mali.20

Mokhtar Belmokhtar was born 1 June 1972 in Ghardaïa in central Algeria. He

claims to have entered armed Islamist struggle during 1991, when at the age of

19 he traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan and obtained training from AlQaida. Belmokhtar claims to have undertaken training in the

Afghanistan/Pakistan region in Khalden, Jihad Wal, and Al-Qaida’s Jalalabad

camp. In 1993 he returned to Algeria where he formed the Katibat Al-Shuhada

(Martyrs’ Battalion) in the city of Ghardaïa.21 From this Algerian city on the

northern edge of the Sahara, Belmokhtar then began moving southwards,

establishing a network of operations throughout the Sahara and Sahel. 

Belmokhtar has become particularly effective in the Sahelian region because he

has married four women from prominent Tuareg and Bérabiche families from

the area. His wives’ families and clans have provided him with refuge and

18 Agence France Presse, 11 January 2010; Reuters, “FACTBOX-Al Qaeda’s Sahara Wing”;

Boukra, “Du Groupe Salafiste,” 54.

19 Boukra, “Du Groupe Salafiste,” 54

20 Murad Batal Al-Shishani, “Salafi-Jihadis in Mauritania at the Center of Al-Qaeda’s Strategy,”

Terrorism Monitor 8, no. 12 (26 March 2010); “Abdelkrim le Touareg, l’étoile montante du

terrorisme,” France Soir, 10 November 2010, accessed 28 March 2011,

www.francesoir.fr/abdelkarim-touareg-l’etoile-montante-du-terrorisme-61122.html; Mathieu

Guidère, “The Tribal Alliance within AQIM,” CTC Sentinel 4, no. 2 (February 2011).

21 Al-Majallah, 14 March 1999.

136 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
protection, making it more difficult for him to be apprehended.22 Despite these

marriage linkages, however, Belmokhtar remains somewhat vulnerable. His

operations and comparative wealth have provoked armed conflict with other

fighters and groups in the region, particularly those belonging to Tuareg leader

Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, the leader of the Alliance Démocratique du 23 mai pour

le Changement (23 May Democratic Alliance for Change), which is based in

northern Mali.23

Strategic Objectives and Tactical Operations

AQIM has had three strategic objectives: (1) the overthrow of the government

of Algeria; (2) the creation of a safe haven among the Tuareg tribes of Mali,

Niger, and Mauritania where it can obtain refuge and also encourage Tuareg

rebellion against central states; and (3) the targeting of France, Great Britain,

Germany, Belgium, and Spain through planned bombings by its affiliated

members in Europe.

Paramilitary Attacks 

In pursuit of these objectives, AQIM and its predecessor, the GSPC, have

launched a series of paramilitary attacks in the region over time. Within its

northern theater of operations, AQIM has attacked Algerian military and police

forces and killed foreign nationals who work in Algeria. AQIM in the north has

also adopted the newer tactic of suicide bombings, which until its introduction

by AQIM had not been practiced by Algerian militants. Apparently this tactic

was imported by AQIM militants who returned from operations in Iraq.24

Within the southern theater of operations, AQIM has engaged in attacks on

security forces from the governments of Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, and Niger

while maintaining lucrative contraband and kidnapping activities. A list of

AQIM’s paramilitary attacks appears below.

12 February 2004: GSPC attacks a police patrol near Tighremt (Blida),

Algeria. Seven police officers are killed and three wounded.

22 Boukra, “Du Groupe Salafiste,” 53; L’Aube, 9 April 2009; Le Soir d’Algérie, 14 April 2008.

23 Le Quotidien d’Oran, October 2006; Reuters, 2 November 2006.

24 Botha, Terrorism in the Maghreb, 20; Guidère, “Une filiale algérienne pour Al-Qaida”; Scott

Stewart and Fred Burton, “Algeria: Taking the Pulse of AQIM”, STRATFOR, 24 June 2009,

accessed 25 November 2010, www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090624_algeria_taking_pulse_aqim;

Geoff D. Porter, “AQIM’s Objectives in the North Africa,” CTC Sentinel 4, no. 2 (February 2011): 7.

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the Islamic Maghreb | 137
June 2005: GSPC attacks the Lemgheiti barracks of the Mauritanian army,

which is an isolated military outpost in the extreme northeast of the country.

Fifteen Mauritanian soldiers are killed.25

10 December 2006: AQIM bombs a bus in the Bouchaoui forest on the

outskirts of Algiers that is carrying British, Canadian, and American workers

for Kellogg Brown & Root, an affiliate of Halliburton, a company based in

the United States. One person is killed, and nine wounded.

11 April 2007: A triple suicide attack in Algiers kills 33 people and injures

hundreds.26

11 July 2007: A suicide attack on the outskirts of Algiers kills 10 soldiers.

December 2007: AQIM kills four French tourists in Mauritania, leading to

the cancellation of the Paris to Dakar motor rally. 

December 2007: AQIM launches a double suicide bombing in Algiers,

targeting offices of the United Nations (UN) and the Constitutional Court.

Forty-one people are killed, 170 injured.

2007: Morocco suffers bombings in Casablanca. No casualties.

February 2008: The Israeli Embassy in Nouakchott is attacked with gunfire

without any mortalities.

September 2008: A Mauritanian army patrol is attacked in Tourine. Twelve

soldiers are killed.

June–July 2009: Algerian army is attacked at Tipaza. Eighteen killed.

June 2009: One American aid worker is killed at Nouakchott.

July 2009: Malian army is attacked at Al-Wasra in northern Mali. Twentyeight are killed.

25 Stephen Ulph, “Algerian GSPC Launch Attack in Mauritania,” Terrorism Focus 2, no.11 (13

June 2005).

26 Fiona Govan, “Bombs Kill 33 as Terror Returns to Algiers,” Telegraph (London), 13 April 2007.

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138 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
July 2010: Algerian army is attacked along Algeria-Mali border. Eleven

killed.

10 January 2011: AQIM attacks a military vehicle in Tissemsilt Province,

Algeria. One soldier is killed.

5 February 2011: One Algerian soldier is killed on a road near Si Mustafa.

10 February 2011: A gendarme of the Republican Guard is killed near

Boumerdes, Algeria.

4 March 2011: Algerian army is attacked near Djanet. Two killed.

14 March 2011: Algerian army is assaulted near Djidjel. Two killed.

15 April 2011: An Algerian army outpost in Azagza, at the edge of the

Yakouren forest, is attacked. Ten soldiers are killed.

April 16, 2011: Five soldiers and two militants are killed in a firefight near

Boumerdès, Algeria.

May 13, 2011: Seven soldiers are killed in an ambush near Djidjel, Algeria.

The number of AQIM-inflicted casualties provides a metric for assessing the

threat posed by AQIM. However, paramilitary attacks are only one aspect of the

AQIM threat. The activities that AQIM engages in to fund their operations

may be as much, or more, of a problem. 

Survival in the Sahel: AQIM Involvement in

Contraband, Human Trafficking, and Kidnapping

The Sahara and Sahel are part of a climatic region that receives little rainfall; it

is an area bereft of substantial rivers, with its inhabitants relying mostly on oases

for their water supply. The region, like many others in the world, is also subject

to the effects of global climate change. Anomalously and disturbingly—at least

from the viewpoint of crop management—climate models recently have

predicted both an increase in rainfall in the region accompanied by a surge in the

intensity of the rainfall (leading to the destruction of crops), as well as increased

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the Islamic Maghreb | 139
unpredictability, which further enhances the fragility of the ecosystem and its

capacity to sustain life and economic development.27

In this region of ecological and economic distress, AQIM within its southern

theater has found a means of surviving by linking economically and

symbiotically with local Tuareg and Bérabiche tribes in the clandestine

trafficking of various products (most often cocaine, cannabis resin or hashish,

and counterfeit tobacco). Beyond drugs and tobacco, their trade in contraband

goods has also included human beings, as they arrange the transport of

undocumented workers. AQIM’s third and final basis for obtaining income has

involved the tactical kidnappings of Europeans whose governments or

employers have paid ransoms for their release. 

The Contraband Trade

Because of its agricultural marginality, AQIM’s activities in the Sahara and the

Sahel have centered upon the clandestine trafficking of cocaine, hashish, and

counterfeit cigarettes.28 When AQIM does not directly participate in the

contraband trade, it frequently “taxes” those who do obtain income from or

traffic in contraband goods. AQIM’s participation in the trafficking or taxation

of contraband has ensured income for the organization, particularly as the

demand for their goods has risen.

The European market demand for cocaine has doubled between 1998 and 2008,

with the estimated number of European users increasing from 2 million in 1998

to 4.1 million in 2008. While cocaine consumption in North America has

decreased during the same time period, it has increased in Europe, resulting in

a cocaine market that was valued at $34 billion in 2008.29 The largest European

27 James Owen, “Sahara Desert Greening Due to Climate Change?” National Geographic News, 31

July 2009, accessed 28 March 2011, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/new/2009/07/

090731-green.sahara.html. 

28 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa,

December 2007, accessed 28 March 2011, www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Cocainetrafficking-Africa-en.pdf ; International Crisis Group, “Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or

Fiction?,” ICG Middle East Report no. 29, 31 March 2005; Kate Willson, “Terrorism and Tobacco:

How Cigarettes Finance Jihad and Insurgency Worldwide,” Cutting Edge, 29 June 2009, 5–6, accessed

2 April 2011, www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/tobacco/assets/pdf/

TobaccoTerrorismIllicitTradeDownload.org. 

29 UNODC, World Drug Report 2010 (New York: United Nations, 2010), 12, 70, 83.

140 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
markets for cocaine are the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Germany, and France

(in that order), and the narcotraficantes’ (drug traffickers’) preferred method of

transport for cocaine into Europe is by sea using container ships. 

Ports of departure in South America include Argentina, Brazil, Colombia,

Suriname, and Venezuela, and ports of entry in Europe include Belgium,

Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, with ports

in Spain and the United Kingdom being the preferred points of entry.30

According to the European Union, “Three main sea routes to Europe have been

identified: the Northern route, leading from the Caribbean via the Azores to

Portugal and Spain; the Central route from South America via Cape Verde or

Madeira and the Canary Islands to Europe; and, more recently, the African

route from South America to West Africa and from there mainly to Spain 

and Portugal.”31

Besides maritime trafficking of cocaine, the secondary pathway into Europe

involves air transport through West Africa and the Sahel. West Africa and the

Sahel became logical choices for the narcotraficantes because of the paltry police

resources deployed in both regions. Of these two regions, West Africa has

played a greater role in the cocaine trafficking trade because of its easier air

access from South America. The primary departure points for South American

narcotics-laden aircraft to West Africa seem to be Venezuela and Brazil.32

(Venezuela and Brazil are close to the coca growing regions of Colombia, Peru,

and Bolivia, and they are geographically closest in South America to West

Africa.) Other Western Hemispheric countries seriously involved in airborne

cocaine trafficking seem to include Uruguay, the Netherlands Antilles, the

Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Costa Rica. 

30 EMCDDA-Europol, Cocaine: A European Union Perspective in the Global Context (Luxembourg:

Publications of the European Union, 2010), 20; UNODC, World Drug Report 2010, 18; World

Customs Organization, Customs and Drugs Report 2008 (Brussels: World Customs Organization,

2009), accessed 28 March 2011, www.wcoomd.org/files/1.%20Public%20files/

PDFandDocuments/ Enforcement/Drug%202008%20EN%20web.pdf .

31 EMCDDA-Europol, Cocaine, 20.

32 Ibid.

the Islamic Maghreb | 141
Data provided by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime indicate that cocaine

shipments from South America to West Africa escalated considerably between

2004 and 2007 and then began declining gradually beginning in 2008.33 In West

Africa the key transshipment points were Benin, Gambia, Ghana, GuineaBissau, Guinea-Conakry, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Senegal.34 Beginning in

2007, however, as Interpol and other interested police agencies began

intensifying their interdiction efforts in West Africa, cocaine traffickers

apparently shifted their patterns of airborne trafficking to a less-policed area: 

the Sahel.

The possibility of participating in cocaine trafficking and deriving income from

that activity led AQIM to collaborate with South American narcotraficantes.

AQIM’s more recent entry into airborne cocaine trafficking has changed the

dynamic of the contraband trade within the Sahel. While AQIM had formerly

participated in the cannabis resin and cigarette trade, their entry into the cocaine

market has substantially raised their potential to raise income for terrorist

activity. AQIM’s collaboration with South American drug traffickers has also

enabled them to learn more professional methods of contraband transport, and

it has given them access to light- and medium-weight arms that can easily be

packaged along with the cocaine from South America.

While cocaine seizure data figures vary from year to year, they cannot possibly

capture the true dimension of cocaine trafficking in West Africa and the Sahel,

especially given the paucity of policing resources available in both regions. In

other words, seizures may not necessarily reveal the extent of actual narcotics

trafficking in the region. Nevertheless, despite these insufficient and even

contradictory data, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime does calculate that the

volume of the cocaine trade in the region in 2007 was 60 times the amount of

the trade in 2002.35 Even if there has been a decline in trafficking since 2007, the

effects and consequences of cocaine trafficking in the region are formidable.

What has become more evident is that as West African governments and their

allies have ramped up interdiction efforts in both West African coastal waters

33 Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook, “Illegal Drug Trade in Africa: Trends and U.S. Policy,”

Congressional Research Service, Report R40838, 26 February 2010; UNODC, World Drug Report

2010, 12, 19.

34 EMCDDA-Europol, Cocaine, 22.

35 UNODC, Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa, 7 

142 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
and on the West African mainland, the South American–based cartels involved

in the cocaine trade began diverting some of their flights from coastal West

Africa to the Sahel, and especially to the less-populous and less-policed Mali,

which enabled the traffickers to evade enhanced police surveillance in West

Africa.36 The crash of a Boeing 727 loaded with approximately 10 tons of

cocaine in Mali in November 2009 may provide evidence of these shifting

patterns of cocaine transport.37

The Movement of Undocumented Workers

AQIM also profits when it assists smugglers who bring undocumented workers

from sub-Saharan Africa to Libya and Algeria. AQIM and the Tuareg have been

engaged in the movement of undocumented workers from the northern edge

of the African savannah (particularly from Nigeria, Ghana, and Burkina Faso)

to intermediary cities of the Saharan region (especially Kidal in Mali,

Tamanrasset in Algeria, and Agadez in Niger). From these intermediate cities,

sub-Saharan workers find transport to the Mediterranean cities of Tripoli and

Algiers. From Tripoli and Algiers these workers can purchase entry into Europe,

with the principal countries of entry being Italy, France, Spain, or Malta.

According to various sources, the numbers of undocumented workers for North

African countries are as follows: 

• Libya: between 750,000 and 2.5 million38

• Algeria: 230,00039

36 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, “Three Al Qaeda Associates Arrested on Drug and

Terrorism Charges,” press release, 18 December 2009, www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/

pr121809.html (accessed 2 April 2011); Wyler and Cook, “Illegal Drug Trade in Africa,” 3.

37 Dario Cristiani, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Africa-to-Europe Narco-Trafficking

Connection,” Terrorism Monitor 8, no. 43 (November 24, 2010): 5–6; Le Figaro, 19 March 2010.

38 Claire MacDougall, “How Qaddafi Helped Fuel Fury Towards Africans in Libya,” Christian

Science Monitor, 6 March 2011, 111. www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2011/0306/HowQaddafi-helped-fuel-fury-towards-Africans-in-Libya (accessed 1 April 2011).

39 Anna di Bartolomeo, Thibaut Jaulin, and Delphine Perrin, CARIM-Migration Profile: Algeria

(Florence: European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 2010), 1.

the Islamic Maghreb | 143
• Morocco: indeterminate number40

• Mauritania: 68,00041

• Tunisia: 35,00042

Of these countries, Libya was the most desired destination because the gross

domestic product (GDP) per capita and employment opportunities were the

best there. With the recent civil war in Libya, there has been a shift of

undocumented workers away from that country. The provision of GDP per

capita figures for North African countries in the following chart explains why

Libya remained attractive to sub-Saharan African workers.

40 Anna di Bartolomeo, Tamirace Fakhoury, and Delphine Perrin, CARIM-Migration Profile:

Morocco (Florence: European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies,

2009), 1.

41 Anna di Bartolomeo, Tamirace Fakhoury, and Delphine Perrin, CARIM-Migration Profile:

Mauritania (Florence: European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced

Studies, 2010), 1.

42 Anna di Bartolomeo, Tamirace Fakhoury, and Delphine Perrin, CARIM-Migration Profile:

Tunisia (Florence: European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies,

2010), 1.

Source: All GDP Data from the CIA World Factbook,

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/index.html.

144 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
As these GDP data show, Libya simply provided the best opportunity for

earning income. As such, it became the preferred destination for sub-Saharan

migrants. African workers in Libya most often had origins in Cameroon, the

Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia,

Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, and Sudan, with Egyptians comprising the largest

group.43

East Africans usually entered Libya through the province and town of Kufra

that lies in the southeastern part of the country. Migrants from West Africa

usually have had two principal destinations: Morocco or Libya. Many West

Africans who journey to Morocco often hope to reach Spain. To get to

Morocco they usually trek along the West African coastal countries. West

Africans who sought Libya or perhaps eventually Italy as their ultimate

destination travelled across the Sahara with the assistance of informal but

regularly organized transportation companies that often had the Tuareg or

members of Al-Qaida as partners in the enterprises.44 

Kidnappings and Ransom

Besides the aforementioned income-generating activities, clearly the most

lucrative venture has been the kidnapping and ransom of Europeans.45 These

ransom payments have reportedly garnered $60–175 million in income for

AQIM.46 Kamel Rezzag Bara, advisor to Algerian President Bouteflika, has

claimed that European governments have paid 150 million Euros in ransom to

43 Human Rights Watch, Libya/Stemming the Flow: Abuses against Migrants, Asylum Seekers and

Refugees, 18, no. 5(E) (September 2006): 6.

44 Fabrizio Gatti, “La nuova ondata,” L’Espresso (Rome), 17 March 2005, accessed 2 April 2011,

www.espresso.repubblica.it/la-nuova-ondata/2076172.

45 Alex Thurston, “AQIM Kidnappings and Murders in the Sahel, 2007-Present” [updated],

accessed 2 April 2011, sahelblog.wordpress.com/2011/01/18/aqim-kidnappings-and-murders-inthe-sahel-2007-present.

46 Vivienne Walt, “Terror Hostage Situations: Rescue or Ransom?,” Time, 12 October, 2010,

accessed 28 March 2011, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2024420,00.html;

“10mln Ransom for Spanish Hostages-Mediator,” Yahoo/Maktoob News, 24 August 2010, accessed

28 March 2011, http://en.news.maktoob.com/20090000509404/_10_mln_ransom_

for_Spanish_hostages_-mediator/Article.htm; Jean-Charles Brisard, “AQIM Kidnap-for-Ransom

practice: A Worrisome Challenge to the War Against Terrorism Financing,” accessed 28 March

2011, www.analyst-network.com/article.php?art_id=3592.

the Islamic Maghreb | 145
AQIM since 2003.47 The following is a list of kidnappings, ransoms paid, and

hostages killed since 2003.

11 September 2003: The GSPC kidnaps 32 European tourists in Libya and

takes them to Algeria. German government pays $5 million ransom.

24 December 2007: Four French tourists are killed in Mauritania.

22 February 2008: Two Austrian tourists are kidnapped near the Grand Erg

dunes in Tunisia; they are subsequently moved to Mali. Austrian

government allegedly pays $4 million ransom. Hostages released. 

14 December 2008: Two Canadian diplomats are kidnapped on highway

north of Niamey, Niger. Hostages are released in exchange for AQIM

prisoners in Niger.48

22 January 2009: Five European tourists are kidnapped in eastern Mali, near

Niger border. AQIM says it released two hostages after four of their fellow

militants are released from jail. One of the tourists, Edwin Dyer, a Briton, is

killed after the government of Great Britain refused to release Abu Qatada,

an Islamist militant of Palestinian origin imprisoned in Britain. The fourth

tourist, a Swiss, is released after the Swiss government allegedly paid

ransom.

23 June 2009: An American aid worker is killed in Mauritania during a

kidnapping attempt.

25 November 2009: A French citizen is kidnapped in Ménaka, Mali. AQIM

releases hostage after Mali releases four AQIM fighters in prison.

29 November 2009: Three Spanish aid workers are kidnapped near

Nouadhibou, Mauritania. Hostages are released after alleged payment of

ransom by Spanish government. Ransom amount ranges between $4.8

million and $12.7 million.

47 “AQIM Funds Mother Al-Qaida,” Money Jihad (blog), 22 November 2010, accessed 2 April

2011, www.moneyjihad.wordpress.com/tag/aqim-funds-mother-Al-qaeda; “Al-Qaida Looks to

Sahel for New Funding Sources,” 11 October 2010, Magharebia, accessed 2 April 2011,

www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/aw11/features/2010/11/10/feature-01.

48 El Khabar (Algiers), 22 February 2009.

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146 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
18 December 2009: Two Italian citizens are kidnapped in Mauritania. They

are released on April 16, 2010. No indication of whether ransom was paid.

16 September 2010: Five French, one Togolese, and one Malgache are

seized at Arlit uranium mine in Niger. AQIM still holds hostages. One of the

French hostages, the Togolese, and the Malgache are released on February

26, 2011. Ninety million Euro ransom demanded on March 22, 2011.

7 January 2011. One French aid worker and

one French tourist are kidnapped in

Niamey. Both are killed by AQIM while

French and Nigerien troops pursue their

captors.

3 February 2011. One Italian tourist is

kidnapped near Djanet, Algeria.

The totals reveal that over 60 Westerners

were kidnapped between 2003 and 2011,

keeping in mind that 32 of that number

were seized in 2003. While the number of persons seized is one metric of the

threat posed by AQIM, the ransoms paid is a more serious metric because they

provide the funds for AQIM’s continued operations.

The Destabilizing Effects of Libya’s Civil War

The recent civil war in Libya will have a profoundly destabilizing effect upon

the Sahel region. As politically and mentally unpredictable as he is, President

Gaddafi has served as a source of stability in the region. Gaddafi was firmly

opposed to Al-Qaida, and he was increasingly cooperating with the West on

security matters.

The civil war that began on 15 February 2011 will unleash forces that will be

beyond anyone’s control. In the final analysis, the destabilization of the Gaddafi

regime will provide a net gain to Al-Qaida. Although Al-Qaida members

constitute a minority among the forces that oppose President Gaddafi’s regime,

the lack of political and military coherence among the rebels will create a

vacuum within which Al-Qaida will be able to expand. The extent of its ultimate

threat to the region is difficult to gauge at this time.

•

•

•

•

the Islamic Maghreb | 147
The principal concern is that ammunition depots near Benghazi and Ajdabiyah

have been raided. In those bunkers were thousands of 122mm Grad rockets;

handheld SA-7 surface-to-air missiles; various guided antitank missiles;

handheld rocket propelled launchers (RPG-70); antitank missiles; 105mm

Howitzer high-explosive projectiles; 105mm white phosphorous artillery

projectiles; 105mm High-Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) recoilless guns; 100mm,

122mm, and 155mm artillery shells; 51mm, 60mm, 81mm, and 120mm highexplosive mortar rounds; 81mm white phosphorous mortar shells; and other

munitions.49 Chadian President Idriss Deby has specifically alleged that

members of AQIM have pillaged surface-to-air missiles and other arms from the

Adjabiya depot and transferred those weapons to Ténéré, one of their

strongholds in northeastern Niger and western Chad.50

If the Libyan rebel forces based in Benghazi eventually fail to create a state with

an effective security regime that can control access to weapons, both Libya and

its neighbors in the Sahel will become more insecure. The armaments from the

depots at Benghazi and Ajdabiya will have been delivered to unreliable hands

and will proliferate both locally and regionally. Although Al-Qaida members

represent a minority among Libyan rebels, if a new and stable Libyan state is

not constituted in the eastern region of the country, the ensuing chaos will

create a more hospitable environment in which Al-Qaida and other subversives

will be able to operate.

The instability in Libya will have collateral effects in Algeria, Mali, Chad, and

Niger. Already there have been reports of Malians, Nigeriens, Chadians, and

even Nigerians who have been enticed to work for Gaddafi’s military forces.

Claims are made that they are being paid up to $1,000 a day.51 Given the de

49 Human Rights Watch, “Libya: Abandoned Weapons, Landmines Endanger Civilians,” 5 April

2011, accessed 10 April 2011, www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/o4/05/libya-adandoned-weaponslandmines-endanger-civilians-o.

50 Daya Gamage, “Libyan Rebel Commander Admits Link to Al-Qaeda: Chad President Says

Al-Qaeda Acquired Weapons in Rebel Zone,” Asia Tribune, accessed 30 March 2011,

www.asiantribune.com/news/2011/03/28/libyan-rebel-commander-admits-link-Al-qaeda-chadpresident-says-Al-qaeda-acquired-we.

51 David Smith, “Has Gaddafi Unleashed a Mercenary Force on Libya?,” Guardian, 22 February

2011, accessed 10 April 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/22/gaddafimercenary-force-libya; Martin Vogl, “Tuaregs ‘Join Gaddafi’s Mercenaries,’” BBC World News,

accessed 28 March 2011, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-12647115; M. Oudina, “Libya: Malian

Tuareg, Threat to Sahel,” accessed 10 April 2011, www.ennaharonline.com/en/international/

6142.html. 

148 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
facto destabilization that has already occurred, a regional plan for restabilization

is certainly in order.

Conclusion

The recent assassination of Usama Bin Ladin on 2 May 2011 (Pakistan time) has

realistically weakened the hierarchical link between AQC and AQIM, forcing

or freeing AQIM to function autonomously in the region. AQIM and Al-Qaida

in the Arabian Peninsula had already demonstrated considerable capabilities to

operate independently of Usama Bin Ladin’s or Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s direction.

Their linkage to AQC simply reinforced international solidarity among Islamist

activists. 

From a global perspective, the principal narrative and rationale for Islamist

resistance were based upon two factors: the West’s support of authoritarian

regimes in Muslim world and the failure of the West—and the United States in

particular—to be an honest broker in negotiating a peace settlement between

Israelis and Palestinians that would lead to the creation of a Palestinian state.

The first element of the Islamist resistance narrative has been weakened. The

West’s political and financial support of more democratic regimes in Tunisia

and Egypt helps to create a new narrative in which the West, particularly the

United States, demonstrates its hope of liberty for Muslim peoples. The second

aspect of the resistance narrative, that the United States can function as an

honest broker in the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli land question, still needs

to be addressed.

In North Africa and the Sahel, AQIM continues to exist as the principal Islamist

fighting group, and it will continue to operate in Algeria, Mali, Niger,

Mauritania, and, to some extent, Chad. It will seek to expand and merge with

Islamist groups in Morocco and Libya. The civil war in Libya, if not resolved

adequately and swiftly, will provide a new opportunity for Islamists in the region

to organize, especially because the political and security order provided by

Muammar Gaddafi has been shattered. This region needs focused attention,

especially given its proximity to Europe and the effects that it may have on that

continent.

the Islamic Maghreb | 149
THE CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

803398AI (G02347) 6-09

150 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
Central Asia | 151

Because Usama Bin Ladin had the ability to keep his eyes on the prize—which

for Al-Qaida is bleeding the United States in multiple ways—the main interests

of other Islamist groups and their theaters of operation often do not register

among Al-Qaida’s top priorities. Central Asia is such an interest. Bin Ladin’s

relative quiet about events and trends in Central Asia before his death, however,

should not be taken as a lack of interest, but rather as a reflection of the reality

he and his lieutenants saw there. 

The History and Current Status of Al-Qaida in

Central Asia

Central Asia, which Al-Qaida defines as the region bracketed by Chechnya and

China’s Xinjiang Province, always was of strong interest to Bin Ladin. His

deputy, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, and the now-imprisoned Al-Qaida strategist, Abu

Musab Al-Suri, for example, have long argued that the former Soviet Central

Asian republics are the indispensable bridge between Islam in Europe and the

Middle East and Islam in the Far East. But all three men believed that Al-Qaida

needed to devote few resources to the region because the group’s indirect and

direct allies—states like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and their nongovernmental

organizations (NGOs), and groups like Hizb Al-Tahrir—were already hard at

work reacquainting Central Asian Muslims with conservative Sunni Islam,

especially Wahabi and Salafist beliefs.

Indeed, other entities began running Sunni missionary operations in Central

Asia at almost the same time that Al-Qaida began its training, weapons

procurement, and combat support activities there. The initial motivation for

8

Al-Qaida and Central Asia:

A Slowly Developing and 

Multipurpose Presence

Michael F. Scheuer
Islamist activism in the region was, of course, Moscow’s 1979 invasion and

occupation of Afghanistan. Instead of solidifying the Afghan communists’ rule

in the country and creating a secular buffer state between the USSR and Arab

radicals—as Moscow planned—the Red Army’s unsuccessful Afghan campaign

promoted the further Islamicization of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and gave

Afghan insurgents and their Arab comrades-in-arms and monetary benefactors

the chance to make contacts with Central Asian Muslims and to begin

spreading their religious message in Soviet Central Asia. Ahmed Shah Masood’s

Tajik-dominated Jamiat Islami was active in this regard, as were—to a lesser

extent—Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizbi Islami, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf’s Islamic

Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan, and then-Pakistani President Zia’s

intelligence services.

Some Central Asian Muslims, moreover, gained training and combat experience

serving with Masood’s forces during the anti-Soviet jihad. At this stage—1979–

1989—Al-Qaida’s role in Central Asia was negligible and focused on providing

some funding and military advisers to Masood, although a few Uzbeks and

Tajiks trained with Al-Qaida before the 1992 demise of the Afghan communist

regime.

In 1989 and shortly after, three events occurred that created an environment in

which the Sunnis’ Islamicization of Central Asia accelerated: the 1989

withdrawal of the Red Army from Afghanistan; the 1991 collapse of the USSR’s

central government and the consequent empowerment of massively corrupt

and ruthless anti-Muslim dictators in the former Central Asian republics; and

the eradication of the Afghan communist regime in 1992. 

These events turned the eyes of many Middle Eastern Islamists—states,

individuals, and nonstate actors—toward Central Asia and the opportunities and

religious duty emerging there to create Islamic states from the former Soviet

republics. First out of the starting box were Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the other

Gulf states. Their activities in support of the Afghan mujahidin were not only

meant to help the Afghans defeat the Soviets, but also to make Afghanistan and

Pakistan a base from which to deploy Salafi and Wahabist proselytizers to

Central Asia to bring fallen-away Soviet Muslims back to their Sunni faith. The

Gulf States also intended to prevent what they feared would be Iran’s efforts to

152 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
spread Shiism in the region’s overwhelmingly but also nominally Muslim

population. To this day, a fear of Iran-backed Shia expansionism in Central Asia

is at the core of the Arab Peninsula regimes’ policies toward the region—an

emphasis that was sharpened by the transfer of power to Shias in Iraq that was

presided over by Washington.

With Riyadh in the van, nongovernmental organizations from the Gulf States

set up shop in Central Asia—openly and covertly—and began providing their

standard retinue of products: health services, cottage-industry skills,

kindergarten and grammar school education, and religious indoctrination. In

addition, the Arab Peninsula—especially Saudi Arabia—is home to many nowwealthy descendants of Uzbek and other Central Asian Muslims who fled the

Bolshevik occupation of the region in the 1920s and 1930s, and it is a sure bet

that these men continue to contribute funds to fuel a Sunni renaissance in their

former homelands.

For Bin Ladin and Al-Qaida, the 1989 to 1995 period afforded a chance to

engage in more than a minor way with Central Asian Muslims. Al-Qaida was

founded, in part, to maintain a ready reserve of trained Islamist fighters who

could be sent to support oppressed Muslims in other Muslim states, such as

Kashmir and Mindanao. With the Soviet and Afghan Communists no longer an

obstacle, Al-Qaida began dispatching trained fighters to fulfill that purpose.

The outbreak of an Islamist rebellion in Tajikistan in 1991 (lasting to 1997),

therefore, prompted Bin Ladin and other Arab mujahidin leaders to send a

limited cadre to support Tajik Islamist forces. Among these men were Bin

Ladin’s close associate, Wali Khan Amin Shah; the soon-to-be-famous mujahid,

Ibn Khattab; and Bin Ladin’s longtime bodyguard, the Yemeni, Abu Jandal. In

addition, Bin Ladin, even after his 1991 move to Sudan, continued to run

training camps in Afghanistan where he welcomed the chance to train Tajik,

Uzbek, Uighur, and Chechen volunteers. The former Western intelligence

penetrator of Al-Qaida, Omar Nasiri, has documented the training of many

Central Asians in Al-Qaida camps in his fine and detailed book, Inside the Jihad.

1

1 Omar Nasiri, Inside the Jihad: My Life with Al Qaeda (New York,: Basic Books, 2006).

Central Asia | 153
With this said, however, Bin Ladin in these years deliberately limited Al-Qaida’s

role in Central Asia to building contacts and quietly training and arming Islamist

fighters. He was more than content to have the great bulk of Islamicizing done

by the personnel, funds, and NGOs provided by the Saudi government, other

Gulf regimes, and wealthy individuals. There were two main reasons for Bin

Ladin’s decision to limit Al-Qaida’s activities in Central Asia to clandestine

support for local Islamists—such as training in Afghan camps—and weapons

acquisition. 

First, there were at this time no U.S. targets in the region whose destruction

would further Al-Qaida’s goal of bleeding America’s economy; indeed, a high

level of resources deployed to Central Asia would undercut Al-Qaida’s

capability to develop infrastructure and carry out operations in regions

containing lucrative U.S. targets.

Second, and more important, Bin Ladin and his lieutenants assessed the former

Soviet Central Asian republics as prime ground on which to procure Sovietmade conventional weapons—left behind in ample stockpiles by the Red

Army—as well as to seek weapons of mass destruction (WMD) components

and/or off-the-shelf chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. The high

importance to Al-Qaida of this weaponry mandated an effective but minimal

on-the-ground presence that would not attract U.S. and Western attention to

its acquisition activities. Around 1992, Al-Qaida set up a WMD-acquisition

unit—staffed by hard scientists, technicians, and engineers—and its activities have

since targeted the former Soviet Union’s (FSU) WMD arsenal.

Building on relationships made by the Afghan mujahidin with Red Army,

GRU,2 and KGB officers who were involved in narcotics trafficking, gem

smuggling, and other illicit activities during the anti-Soviet jihad, Al-Qaida

quietly started WMD shopping in the FSU. Because the organization’s

leadership attached high priority to these endeavors—and because other entities

were effectively spreading Allah’s word and wielding the Prophet’s sword across

the region—Bin Ladin ensured that Al-Qaida’s Central Asian operations kept a

2 The GRU or Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye was the Soviet Union’s foreign military

intelligence directorate, and it serves the same function for Russia today.

154 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
low profile, thereby avoiding the notoriety that might accelerate the slow pace

of U.S.-Russian efforts to secure the FSU’s WMD arsenal.

After Bin Ladin moved back to Afghanistan in May 1996, Al-Qaida’s activities

in Central Asia continued to focus on weapons procurement, sending combat

veterans to advise Islamist groups fighting in the region—with a greater emphasis

on Uzbekistan—and on training Central Asians in Afghan camps. That Al-Qaida

both trained and won the allegiance of a goodly number of Chechen, Tajik,

Uzbek, and Uighur Islamists is evident from the prominent part that fighters of

those nationalities played in battles against the 2001 U.S.-led invasion of

Afghanistan. 

Chechen and Uzbek fighters, for example, fought in a stubborn and disciplined

fashion against Northern Alliance forces in northern Afghanistan, as well as

against U.S. forces in the southern and eastern Afghan provinces. More recently,

Central Asian mujahidin trained by Al-Qaida or the Afghan or Pakistani Taliban

have restarted what were semidormant insurgencies in Uzbekistan and

Tajikistan and have introduced the tactic of suicide bombing in the former

Soviet republics, most recently in Kazakhstan. 

In addition, Pakistan’s army and intelligence services have endured hard fighting

and considerable casualties battling Chechens, Uzbeks, and some Uighurs since

2003 when they began operating against Pashtun tribal fighters, Al-Qaida, and

Taliban forces in South Waziristan, Bajaur, Swat, and other agencies in the

country’s tribal region. Moreover, the prolonged presence in these agencies of

significant numbers of mujahidin from the North Caucasus and Central Asia—

which would have been virtually unthinkable in cultural and tribal terms during

the anti-Soviet jihad in the 1980s—is a clear indication of the rapid growth of an

increasingly militant, Middle East-style “orthodox” Islam among Pakistan’s

Pashtun tribes. 

Currently, the strategy of Al-Qaida and the Afghan Taliban toward the Central

Asian states displays the consistent themes of assisting Central Asian mujahidin

with training and providing combat veterans with support to Islamic

movements; seeking conventional and nonconventional weapons in or through

the region; and building an organizational infrastructure to give Al-Qaida and

Central Asia | 155
the Afghan Taliban better operational access to Central Asia, Russia, and

western China. Al-Qaida’s leadership also appears to be planning to have its

fighters take a larger role in attacking the expanded, post-2001 U.S. presence in

Central Asia, especially in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and along the routes used

by the U.S.-NATO Coalition for the overland resupply of its forces in

Afghanistan. 

Al-Qaida’s Regional Assessment: 

In for the Long Haul

In reviewing the evolution of Al-Qaida’s approach to Central Asia, one is

reminded of Leo Tolstoy’s timeless military axiom in War and Peace that “the

strongest warriors are these two—time and patience.” Al-Qaida’s patient strategy

focuses on targeted involvement in Central Asia while at the same time

maintaining a strategic distance and allowing the region’s internal problems to

work to its advantage.

Before America’s 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, Bin Ladin sparingly applied AlQaida resources to train and arm Islamist fighters but focused on keeping the

area open for buying conventional arms and for the activities of Al-Qaida’s

WMD acquisition unit. Bin Ladin and his lieutenants clearly assessed that time

was on Islam’s side in Central Asia. They judged that the combination of

oppression by anti-Islamic governments in the former republics; China’s

genocide-by-inundation of its Muslim Uighurs; the fast-growing interest in a

more conservative Islam among Central Asian Muslims; the development of

Gulf State-sponsored NGO and proselytizing networks in the region; the

growth in Afghan-controlled narcotics trafficking networks through Central

Asia; the increased and well-publicized presence of Israel and Hindu India in the

region; and the steady, although often viciously opposed, expansion of the proKhalifate Hizb-ut Tahrir organization across the region would surely push

Islamic militancy ahead faster than could Al-Qaida and the Afghan Taliban.

In a June 2002 letter to Mullah Omar—posted on the website of West Point’s

Combating Terrorism Center—Bin Ladin summed up the trajectory of Al

156 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
Qaida’s actions in Central Asia and described the ongoing importance of the

region to the anti-U.S. jihad.3

During the previous period [i.e., before the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan],

with the grace of Allah, we were successful in cooperating with our brothers

in Tajikistan in various fields including training. We were able to train a good

number of them, arm them and deliver them to Tajikistan. Moreover, Allah

facilitated to us delivering weapons to them; we pray Allah grants us 

all victory.

We need to cooperate all together to continue this matter, especially Jihad

continuation in the Islamic Republics [of Central Asia which] will keep the

enemies busy and divert them from the Afghani issue and ease the pressure

off. The enemies of Islam[’s] problem will become how to stop the

spreading of Islam into the Islamic Republics and not the Afghani issue.

Consequently, the efforts of the Russians and their American allies will 

be scattered.

It is fact that the Islamic Republic’s region is rich with significant scientific

experiences in conventional and nonconventional military industries, which

will have a great role in future Jihad against the enemies of Islam.

Today, Al-Qaida’s vision seems to be panning out, as Al-Qaida and its allies are

benefiting from the governmental oppression, endemic corruption, deepening

political chaos, and ethnic violence in Central Asia without—according to

publicly available information—having had to expend substantial man power or

financial resources there. In an odd way, the U.S.-led occupation of Afghanistan

and the Coalition’s use of Central Asian support bases, which Washington and

NATO expected to moderate Islamist militancy in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and

Central Asia, seems to have contributed to increased Islamist unrest across the

region. Islamic militancy and subversion are now major problems in Uzbekistan,

Tajikistan, and—to a limited extent—in Kyrgyzstan.

3 Document is located in the Harmony Database at the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S.

Military Academy, West Point, NY. Document ID AFGP-2002-600321,

http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/AFGP-2002-600321-Trans.pdf.

Central Asia | 157
Six months into 2011, for example, (a) there have been numerous engagements

between Tajik mujahidin and the Dushanbe regime’s forces and their Uzbek

allies, and the International Crisis Group has predicted a resumption of the civil

war between the Tajik regime and Islamist militants; (b) the new leader of the

Islamic Union of Uzbekistan (Usmon Odil), a close ally of both Al-Qaida and

the Afghan Taliban, has promised a “new program” inside Uzbekistan; (c) the

Kyrgyz regime has claimed that over 200 young Kyrgyz men have departed the

country, bound for insurgent training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan; and

(d) two suicide bombings occurred in Kazakhstan in May 2011, the second just

days after the Afghan Taliban had warned the Kazakh regime that “negative

consequences” would follow its decision to send four Kazakh “specialists” to

assist at NATO headquarters in Afghanistan.

A Look Ahead

Most important for Al-Qaida, America and its allies still show little sign that

they believe Al-Qaida is a significant threat in Central Asia; Washington, for

example, publicly has shown little urgency in completing the program to secure

the former USSR’s WMD arsenal. This reality leaves Al-Qaida with ongoing

acquisition opportunities, although the wording of Bin Ladin’s above-quoted

letter to Mullah Omar certainly can be read as stating that those opportunities

have long since been successfully exploited. Overall, the United States and other

NATO governments face a Hobson’s choice in Central Asia between two policy

options; either choice will benefit Al-Qaida and its Islamist allies. One choice

is to maintain the policy status quo: seeking bases, facilitating overland and

aerial resupply from Russia and Central Asia to Afghanistan (all with a desperate

eagerness to participate in exploiting the region’s energy resources), while

simultaneously reserving the right to publicly upbraid and sanction Central

Asian regimes for human rights abuses. 

The other choice is for Washington and the Europeans to refocus and

strengthen their insistence on substantive human rights reforms by Central

Asian regimes. This choice would please the Western media and the human

rights lobby, at the risk of losing key components of the U.S.-NATO Coalition’s

logistical system, as well as any measure of influence the United States and its

allies may now have on the regimes’ brutal behavior vis-à-vis their domestic

158 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
Islamists. This policy also would give Russia and China an even longer leg up

in the competition for regional energy resources.

As in so many other cases in America’s war with Al-Qaida and Islamism,

Washington and NATO have come face-to-face with a lose-lose situation in

Central Asia. Either policy choice will stimulate Islamist militancy in Central

Asia. That has long been Al-Qaida’s major, non-WMD-related goal in the

region, and, for now, Al-Qaida can continue to see it gradually being realized

with only a minor expenditure of the group’s resources. Al-Qaida can also

anticipate a much more exploitable operational environment in Central Asia

after the U.S.-NATO Coalition withdraws and thereby eases access to Central

Asia from Afghanistan.

Central Asia | 159
803471AI (G02807) 12-10

PAKISTAN

160 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
Pakistan | 161

Despite its global reach, Al-Qaida’s major base of operations,

counterintelligence, propaganda, recruitment, finances, and most lethal allies

remain in nuclear-armed Pakistan.1 No other country is more vital for its survival

and growth, and incidentally, none is more critical to American and

international security and Afghanistan’s stability. This chapter examines the

scope and scale of Al-Qaida’s emerging strategy in Pakistan after the death of

Usama Bin Ladin, and how it impacts U.S. interests and Pakistani stability.2

A month after U.S. Navy SEALs killed Al-Qaida’s founder and the man

responsible for 9/11, Usama Bin Ladin, a drone strike killed another key leader—

one perhaps more important to Al-Qaida’s operation in Afghanistan and

Pakistan—Ilyas Kashmiri.3 It was clear that Al-Qaida was rupturing after years

of successful interdiction by the Pakistani military, U.S. drone strikes, and joint

and separate U.S. and Pakistani covert counterterrorism operations. 

In the fall of 2010, drone strikes killed Mustafa Abu Al-Yazid, Al-Qaida’s

operations chief for Afghanistan and Pakistan, in North Waziristan.4 Twenty9

Power by Proxy: 

Al-Qaida in Pakistan

Haider Ali Hussein Mullick

1 “Germany Says Investigating U.S. Drone Strike Deaths,” Dawn (Karachi), 5 October 2010.

2 Parts of this chapter incorporate findings from my presentation at the Marine Corps University

conference, “Al-Qaida after 10 Years of War: A Global Perspective of Successes, Failures, and

Prospects,” 26 April 2011, and my Institute for Social Policy and Understanding report on AlQaida: Al Qaeda and Pakistan: Current Role and Future Consideration (Clinton TWP, Michigan:

Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 2009).

3 Ron Moreau and Sami Yousafzai, “Al Qaeda Commander Ilyas Kashmiri Killed in U.S. Predator

Strike,” Daily Beast, 4 June 2011.

4 Author interview with Pakistani government officials during September 2010; also see “Drone

Strike in Pakistan Kills 3,”CNN Wire Staff, 25 September 2010, and “Pakistan Al-Qaeda Chief

Killed by U.S. Drone,” Dawn, 28 September 2010.
two strikes in September targeted Al-Qaida and key allies suspected of planning

multiple terrorist attacks in Europe.5 The number was the highest in any given

month since 9/11 and equal to about two-thirds of all such attacks in 2008.6

Some of Al-Qaida’s key partners are similarly under attack, especially the

Pakistani Taliban. In addition to killing Al-Qaida members, the fall attacks

eliminated Qari Hussain, Pakistani Taliban’s No. 1 suicide-attack recruiter,

planner, and financer.7

A few months after Usama Bin Ladin was killed, Al-Qaida announced Usama’s

replacement, his trusted and able deputy, Ayman Al-Zawahiri. However, that

did little to revive the terrorist organization’s resources, reach, and appeal, which

had been constantly weakened by Pakistani and American counterterrorism

operations since 2011 near the porous Afghanistan-Pakistan border, the

Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).8 In fact, U.S. Secretary of Defense

Leon Panetta and incoming National Counterterrorism Director Matt Olsen

believe that due to a decade-long debilitation of Al-Qaida, the stage is set for a

decisive victory against the organization if U.S. counterterrorism pressure

holds.9 Finally, some analysts are writing Al-Qaida off as a dysfunctional and

incompetent organization that since 9/11 has failed to flip a single Muslim

country to its Islamist Caliphate; has failed to back up its strong rhetoric of

attacks against, and revolutions in, America or Europe; has failed to initiate or

control the Arab Spring revolutions; and has been unable to capture Pakistani

nuclear weapons.10

5 “Al-Qaeda Terror Plot Targeting Europe Uncovered,” BBC, 29 September 2010.

6 Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies briefing to author, June 2010. Also see Year of the Drone: An

Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan 2004–2011 (Washington, DC: New American

Foundation, 2010); and Bill Roggio and Alexander Mayer, “Charting the Data for U.S. Airstrikes

in Pakistan, 2004–2011,” Long War Journal, 2011.

7 “TTP’s Top Gun Qari Hussain Killed,” Dawn, 16 October 2010.

8 Briefing to the author by senior Pakistani intelligence officials, August 2010. See, for example,

“Al Qaeda Network Severely Degraded: Holbrooke,” Dawn, 19 June 2010, and Joby Warrick and

Peter Finn, “CIA Director Says Secret Attacks in Pakistan Have Hobbled Al Qaeda,” Washington

Post, 18 March 2010.

9 Kimberly Dozier, “US Counterterror Official: Al Qaida on the Defense,” Associated Press, 26

July 2011; and “New Defense Secretary Panetta: We Have Al Qaeda ‘On the Run’,” CNN, 9 July

2011.

10 See for example, John Mueller, “The Truth About Al Qaeda: Bin Laden’s Files Revealed the

Terrorists in Dramatic Decline,” Foreign Affairs, 2 August 2011; Nancy MacDonald, “The

Beginning of the End of Al Qaeda?” Maclean’s Canada, 11 May 2011; and Rania Abouzeid, “How

the Arab Spring Made Bin Laden an Afterthought,” Time, 2 May 2011.

162 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
Al-Qaida’s strength, however, is not in its numbers or its attachment to one

charismatic leader, as is the case with many transnational terrorist organizations,

like Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers. Rather, Al-Qaida’s strength is in its ability to

diffuse into, and partner with, pan-Islamist movements of various colors and

propensities for global operations in South Asia, the Middle East, North Africa,

Europe, and the United States. While its finances, recruits, training grounds,

and approval ratings have declined, Al-Qaida is prospering through its heirapparent organizations, most notably Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the most active

militant group in Pakistan today. 

These Al-Qaida partnerships remain strongest in nuclear-armed Pakistan, more

so than in Yemen or the Horn of Africa, even after the death of Usama Bin

Ladin. The failure of Al-Qaida to acquire weapons of mass destruction and

ignite an Islamist revolution in Pakistan has weakened the central organization

but not its key allies. Dismantlement has done little to hamper Al-Qaida’s efforts

to merge with Pakistan-based jihadi organizations, or move its base from

Pakistan. 

Why Pakistan?

Burgeoning U.S.-Pakistan tensions after the death of Usama Bin Ladin, U.S.

military aid curtailment,11 a failure to stabilize the rustic Swat Valley and South

Waziristan after the success of the Pakistani surge in 2009,12 struggles with

clearing and holding insurgent sanctuaries in the Mohmand and Kurram tribal

agencies, the Pakistani military’s reluctance to go after the Haqqani network in

North Waziristan,13 and a fear of a repeat of 2010’s devastating floods on a

worsening economy14 collectively make Pakistan Al-Qaida’s optimum base of

operations. In addition, the rise of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in

Balochistan15 and a mini ethnic civil war in Karachi has claimed thousands of

11 Jessica Rettig, “United States, Pakistan Navigate New Tensions in Fraught Relationship,” US

News & World Report, 25 July 2011; and Rasool Dawar, “US Aid Cutoff Followed by Drone Strike

in Pakistan,” Associated Press, 11 July 2011.

12 Haider A. H. Mullick, The Pakistani Surge: The Way Forward for Counterinsurgency in Pakistan,

Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2 July 2010.

13 See for example, “Pakistani General Condemns North Waziristan ‘Hype,’” Dawn, 1 June 2011.

14 See for example, “Oxfam Warns that Pakistan Has Failed to Learn Lessons of Floods,”

Telegraph (United Kingdom), 26 July 2011.

15 “Improvised Explosive Attacks Soar in Pakistan,” Reuters, 5 July 2011.

Pakistan | 163
lives.16 Al-Qaida Central can take little direct credit for the unrest in Balochistan

or Karachi, but it is certainly reaping the benefits of overstretched Pakistani

security forces with diminishing U.S. aid.

Further, Pakistan is still reeling from the destruction of the July 2010 floods—

when the Indus River swelled into a tidal wave rendering millions homeless

and taking over one-fifth of the country. Before the inundation, the 2009

“Pakistani Surge” had successfully cleared (and continues to hold) the Swat

Valley and South Waziristan,17 but the flood seriously endangered these gains.

Roughly 60,000 troops were moved away from counterinsurgency operations

to relief efforts, abruptly ending the surge and leaving the Haqqani Network, the

Pakistani Taliban, and Al-Qaida in North Waziristan to regroup and wreak

havoc in Afghanistan and Pakistan.18 Since then, the Pakistani military has

struggled to replicate its success to clear and hold in the Mohmand and

Khurram agencies. The 2010 floods were a major game changer, and Al-Qaida

and associates took full advantage of the opportunity. They provided highly

visible (but meager) food and medical support19 and launched suicide attacks

nationwide.20 Another flood could further destabilize this country on the brink

of economic collapse.21

Further still, Pakistan-based militant groups sympathetic to Al-Qaida, such as

LeT, remain largely unharmed and are expanding operations in southern

Punjab, Sindh, and eastern Afghanistan. In August and September of 2010, there

were six suicide attacks and 70 terrorist incidents including targeted killings and

16 “Karachi: Report says 1,100 Killed in First Half of 2011,” BBC, 5 July 2011.

17 For details see, “The Pakistani Surge: The Way Forward for Counterinsurgency in Pakistan,”

Special Report, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, June 2010.

18 Author interviews with senior Inter-Services Public Relations and National Disaster

Management Authority officials, August and September 2010. See also, “Pakistan Floods Could

Give Taliban Time to Regroup,” Dawn, 12 August 2010; and Tom Nagorski, “Pakistan Floods

Destroy Bridges—World Roundup,” ABC News, 13 August 2010.

19 Senior officials, National Disaster Management Authority briefing to author, September 2010.

See “Help Flood Victims or Al Qaeda Will Move In,” Sun (London), 19 August 2010.

20 Unclassified intelligence briefing to author by Pakistani government officials, September 2010;

and Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Business as Usual: Floods Have Not Slowed Militant Attacks,”

Newline, 26 September 2010. 

21 See for example, Ben Sheppard, “Pakistan Warned After One Year After Worst-Ever Floods,”

AFP, 25 July 2011.

164 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
IED attacks.22 In the first six months of 2011, there were 3,100 terrorist

attacks,23 and 24 suicide attacks,24 and from January to March 2011, there were

217 IED attacks, most of them in FATA, but there were at least 28 attacks near

Islamabad, 33 in Balochistan, and 17 in Karachi, indicating a dangerous trend.25

Since 2001, Al-Qaida-inspired terrorism—acts of extreme violence to achieve

political goals—has killed 35,000 civilians and 3,500 security forces in Pakistan;

the highest loses for any single country in the U.S.-led Coalition against global

22 Inter-Services Public Relations intelligence briefing to author, September 2010.

23 Pak Institute for Peace Studies, “Pakistan Security Report,” 2008, 2009, 2010, and subsequent

monthly updates.

24 “Fidayeen (Suicide Squad) Attacks in Pakistan,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, accessed 1 July

2011, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/Fidayeenattack.htm.

25 The National Counterterrorism Center, Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS), accessed

8 August 2011, https://wits.nctc.gov.

IED Attacks in Pakistan: August 2008–March 2011

Source: Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS)

Pakistan | 165
terrorism.26 Today more Pakistani soldiers have lost their lives on the altar of

Pakistani freedom than in the war against India in 1965. Pakistani security

practitioners and analysts believe that most of these attacks were not conducted

by Al-Qaida proper, but rather LeT and company. 

Leaderless Alliances

Al-Qaida’s Network

Al-Qaida works with partners as a conglomerate that exports and imports

resources and tactics to survive and grow. Despite considerable degradation

over the years, culminating in the killing of Usama Bin Ladin, 21-year-old AlQaida still inspires most major Pakistani insurgent groups, including the Quetta

Shura (Afghan Taliban in Quetta, Pakistan); the Haqqani Network; the Pakistani

Taliban; and LeT & Co., which comprises LeT, Jash-e-Mohammad (JeM), and

Sipeh-e-Sahaba (SeS).27 It also partners with Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), separatist

groups like the Baloch Liberation Army, and criminal syndicates.

Without such a coalition of jihadi, national, and ethno-sectarian groups, AlQaida cannot achieve its goal of creating a radical Islamist world

government—Caliphate—by bankrupting and demoralizing the United States

and its allies. Its partners employ terrorism to achieve their goals; and they all

shop at Al-Qaida’s physical and virtual warehouses. 

The Trade Model

Al-Qaida’s strength lies in its modus operandi—its ability to inflict harm by

strategically employing chaos. It mixes defensive tactics like morphing out of

sight,28 operational, training, and ideological support to affiliates and constantly

26 Author interview with retired LtGen Mahmud Durrani, former National Security Adviser

(2008-9), November 2009; and Dr. Mqasudyul Hasan Nuri, senior research fellow, Islamabad

Policy Research Institute, May 2010; also see “Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003–

2010,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, September 2010. See also, Najam Sethi, “Problems and

Prospects in Afghanistan Endgame,” News International (Pakistan), 17 July 2011.

27 See Mairam Abou Zahab, “The SSP: Herald of Militant Sunni Islam in Pakistan,” in Armed

Militias of South Asia: Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists, ed. Laurent Gayer and Christophe

Jaffrelot (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2009), 159–76.

28 “Defense in depth” is defined as an information operations strategy to achieve information

assurance by the U.S. National Security Council. See NSC paper “Defense in Depth: A Practical

Strategy for Achieving Information Assurance in Today’s Highly Networked Environment,”

Information Assurance Solutions Group.

166 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
improves its tactics.29 It has survived and thrived due to a highly profitable “train

the trainer program,” which extends franchises to worthy applicants and

partners. The trainees of this program, most notably LeT members, have

increased Al-Qaida’s influence by continuously increasing recruitment and local

support.

In this respect, Al-Qaida has succeeded in creating single leaderless alliances

built around what can be described as a trade model. It continues to provide

advanced training in third-generation IEDs,30 plastic explosives,

counterintelligence, information operations, recruitment, and fundraising

campaigns.31 Al-Qaida and affiliates manage, or have access to, several IEDmaking factories, which produce most of the materials used in Pakistan and

Afghanistan.32 On balance, Al-Qaida leads several training initiatives, and

collaborates with jihadi groups in northern tribal areas and southern cities like

Karachi. The table illustrates the goods and services exchanged among Al-Qaida

and its partners.

29 Haider A. H. Mullick, “Al Qaeda’s Strategic Chaos,” News International, 4 June 2008.

30 Author briefed by Pakistani counterinsurgency strategists while visiting an IED research

facility in Quetta, Pakistan, in June 2010.

31 Author interview with Frontier Corps, 11th Corps, Military Intelligence, ISI, and Police

Special Branch officials during October 2009 and August and September 2010.

32 Thom Shanker, “Suspicions Rise as Pakistan Bomb Labs Empty Before Raids,” New York

Times, 19 June 2011.

Goods and Services Exchanged Between Al-Qaida 

and Its Partners

Organization Goals Objectives Strategy Imports from

Al-Qaida

Exports to

Al-Qaida

Al-Qaida Overturn modern

world order; replace with AlQaida Caliphate

Engage U.S. and

Coalition partners in

perpetual war; steal

Pakistani nuclear

weapons

Delegate major operations to partners, especially LeT; retain

support of followers

through perennial terrorist attacks

— —

Pakistani

Taliban 

(national 

insurgency)

Overthrow Pakistan’s government, gain

nuclear

weapons, and

conduct limited

attacks against

Al-Qaida’s enemies worldwide

Weaken security,

rule of law, social

well-being, governance, and the

economy in FATA

and KhyberPakhtunkhwa

Retain popular support and outlast Pakistan’s security forcesTrainers, explosives,

strategic communications,

and counterintelligence

expertise

Funding, recruits, protection, and

liaison with

friendly

tribes

Pakistan | 167
Goods and Services Exchanged Between Al-Qaida and Its Partners

(continued)

Organization Goals Objectives Strategy Imports from

Al-Qaida

Exports to AlQaida

Haqqani Network (Afghan

insurgency)

Overthrow

Afghanistan’s

government (especially in the

eastern Paktiya

Loya region)

Weaken security, rule of

law, social well-being, governance, and the economy

in Paktiya Loya region

(Regional Command East)

Retain popular support in

Afghanistan and FATA,

outlast International Security Assistance Force

(ISAF) forces, and support TTP and the Quetta

Shura when required

Trainers, explosives, strategic

communications, and counterintelligence

expertise

Funding, recruits,

and protection in

northeastern

Afghanistan

Afghan Taliban

insurgency

(Quetta Shura)

Overthrow U.S.-

supported

Afghanistan

government

Weaken security, rule of

law, social well-being, governance, and the economy

in southern Afghanistan

Retain popular support,

outlast ISAF forces, support the Haqqani Network when required, and

curry favor with Pakistani

intelligence 

Strategic communications and

counterintelligence expertise

Recruits, operational

support, and protection in southern

Afghanistan

LeT & Co.

Replace Pakistan’s government with

pro-Islamist,

anti-Indian military dictatorship

Infiltrate Pakistani military

and replace pro-U.S. Army

and intelligence officials;

attack India to cause an

India-Pakistan war; and

weaken rule of law, social

well-being, governance,

and the economy in

FATA, KhyberPakhtunkhwa, Punjab,

Sindh, Balochistan, and

Regional Command East

Incorporate lessons from

Pakistani Taliban, expand

operations clandestinely,

and avoid openly challenging the state; instead,

fund political parties and

candidates and partner

with criminal syndicates

Counterintelligence expertiseOperational support,

recruits, and protection in Punjab and

Sindh

Sectarian

groups

Replace Pakistan’s government with a

pro-sectarian Islamist military

dictatorship

Eliminate opposing sects’

representation in intelligentsia, military, and civilian administration

Incorporate lessons from

Pakistani Taliban and

partner with LeT & Co.

Trainers, explosives, strategic

communications, and counterintelligence

expertise

Funds and recruits

Separatists

Gain independence from Pakistan (mostly in

Balochistan, but

there are also

low-level irredentists in Sindh

and GilgitBaltistan)

Weaken Pakistan’s security

forces in Balochistan, especially the paramilitary

Frontier Corps, and replace Balochi pro-Pakistan

political, police, and military leaders; attack Punjabis in Balochistan

Outlast the state and seek

external support (e.g., Indian intelligence, Iranian

Balochi rebels, and

Afghan sanctuary)

Limited explosives and communications

expertise

Indirectly provide

sanctuary (e.g.,

northern Balochistan is controlled by

pro-Taliban Pashtun

tribes, and Talibanseparatists have a

“live and let live”

pact.)

Enablers 

(criminals)

Expand drug

trade and partner with kidnapping and

smuggling rings

Weaken governance, rule

of law, and police

Take advantage of the

state’s weakness and offer

services to Al-Qaida,

LeT, and local political

parties for protection

Protection Money laundering

and fundraising

168 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
The Importance of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT & Co.) 

As Al-Qaida diffuses into Pakistani jihadi groups, while keeping its ideology

and goal intact, there are militant groups eager to take Al-Qaida’s mantle with

aggressive publicity. The most likely heir to Al-Qaida in the region, with

increasing international ambitions, is LeT & Co. 

LeT, JeM, and SeS—collectively referred to as LeT & Co.—remain largely

unharmed and are expanding operations in southern Punjab, Sindh, and eastern

Afghanistan. Since 9/11 these groups have grown in size, expertise, reach, and

stature in the jihadi world, exemplified by LeT’s dramatic Mumbai attacks in

2008. LeT has long-standing ties with Al-Qaida and a common Cold War

history. For example, LeT, which is known for its bases in Punjab and

operations in India, was founded in Afghanistan’s Kunar Province by Hafiz

Mohammad Saeed in 1991.33 It has networks in southern and eastern

Afghanistan in partnership with the Haqqani Network and the Quetta Shura,

in Indian cities, and in Indian-administered Kashmir. 

While Al-Qaida, the Pakistani Taliban, and some Afghan Taliban have suffered

from Pakistani military operations and U.S. drone strikes, and declined in

numbers, LeT & Co. has had friendly ties with Pakistani intelligence—InterServices Intelligence (ISI)—and support in southern Punjab and Sindh. This has

33 See Amir Mir, Talibanization of Pakistan: From 9/11 to 26/11(New Delhi: Pentagon Security

International Press, 2009), 54.

Pakistan | 169
enabled it to grow, and achieve its pan-Islamist dream of a Caliphate through

global terrorism.34 LeT and Co. shares Al-Qaida’s goals—to spread religious

extremism in Pakistan, promote fascism, and defeat the United States and its

allies through attrition—and makes Al-Qaida stronger despite the loss of Usama

Bin Ladin, debilitating drone strikes, and aggressive Pakistani counterterrorism

operations.

With a robust paper and electronic propaganda campaign, LeT & Co. produces

broadcast media products and prints pamphlets, booklets, magazines, and

books. It has many members, such as the Al Badr mujahedeen, who have

mastered strategic communications by introducing jihadi art exhibitions and

poetry readings. Similarly, JeM regularly engages with madrassas and public

schools to recruit for jihadi training.35

In addition to aggressive propaganda, LeT details mid-level operations officers

to Al-Qaida and the Pakistani Taliban. Pakistani detention officers say that the

most effective insurgent strategists captured from 2008–11 in the tribal areas

and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) are affiliated with LeT, SeS, or JeM.36

Moreover, LeT has formally joined forces with Al-Qaida on several occasions.

In 2002, Brigade 313 was created by members of JeM, LeT, LeJ, Harkat-AlJehad Al-Islami, and Harkatul Mujahideen Al-Almi.37 These groups recruit

many Punjabis as well as Afghans for operations in the International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF) Regional Command East (e.g., Paktika, Paktia, Kunar,

and Nuristan) and South (Helmand and Kandahar).38 

Syed Saleem Shahzad, a Pakistani journalist following Al-Qaida’s transformation

who was allegedly killed by Pakistani intelligence in May,39 wrote in his book

34 See Reza Khan, “Pakistan Denies Militant Group is Global Terror Threat,” Washington Times,

25 August 2010.

35 Muhammad Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan (Lahore: Mashal Books,

2009), 97.

36 JeM is an offshoot of Harkat ul Mujahideen. Author interview with Pakistan’s Army 11th

Corps officials, June 2010.

37 Author interview with Pakistani Police Special Branch officials during August 2010. See Rana,

A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 10.

38 Author interview with Ashraf Ali, president, FATA Research Center, May 2010.

39 Declan Walsh, “Missing Pakistan Journalist Saleem Shahzaqd Found Dead near Islamabad,”

Guardian (London), 1 June 2011.

170 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban that Al-Qaida has a cozy relationship with LeT’s

chief of operations, Zakiur Rahman Lakhvi. In 2005, Al-Qaida created two

organizations that helped Afghan Taliban and LeT and JeM pursue the jointgoal of pressuring the United States and Pakistan. Jaishul Al-Qibla Al-Jihadi

Al-Siri Al-Alami focused on training young Pakistani insurgents to fight in

Afghanistan; and the Pakistani Jundullah (not to be confused with the Iranian

Jandullah) created a cadre of specialized fighters to fight against Pakistani troops

in FATA by recruiting Waziris from North and South Waziristan.40

Moreover, this syndicate has developed highly dynamic symbiotic partnerships

with criminal syndicates and constantly applies lessons learned and findings

from after-action reviews of co-insurgents. For example, LeT & Co. learned the

lessons from the weaknesses of the Pakistani Taliban’s 2009 strategy in the Swat

Valley. Instead of overtly challenging the state, LeT has adopted a covert mafiamodel of financing political campaigns in southern Punjab.

Structure, Recruitment, and Training

Al-Qaida and the affiliates’ structure, recruitment, and training allow them to

remain incognito, creating a false picture of dismantlement, when in reality,

they are strengthening teamwork.

Structure

While LeT is the likely heir to Al-Qaida, the strength of the network remains

in its ability to decentralize operations and work as a team. Most militant groups

affiliated with LeT & Co. have several lines of operations run by specific

divisions. The “governance division” is responsible for retaining and replenishing

leaders. While the third-tier leadership intentionally keeps a low profile to

protect their identity and mission-sensitive information, the founding members

often run massive public relations campaigns through print, electronic, and

online media. For example, LeT’s leader, Hafiz Saeed, is under house arrest but

continues to give media interviews berating the United States, India, and Israel

for all the ills facing the Muslim world. 

Moreover, these groups usually have a “rule of law” division that acts as a

human resources department and enforces financial and moral austerity in the

40 Syed Saleem Shahzad, Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11 (London:

Pluto Press, 2011), 26–35.

Pakistan | 171
early stages of development of a militant group. At later stages it creates and

implements legal strategies in areas under its control; for example, the Pakistani

Taliban runs sharia courts in the Swat Valley.41 Other groups, such as LeT and

JeM, have similar divisions such as the Department of Amar Bil Maaruf-o-Nahi

annal Munkar-o-Ehtesab (which enforces accountability and virtue, and

prevents vice), the Department of Ehtesab (justice), and the Department of

Ehya-e-Sunnah (Revival of Sunnat).42

Information operations are usually termed “critical for mission success” with

the ultimate goal of retaining and expanding local support, before and after an

operation. In LeT, the Department of Broadcasting and Publications (media)

devises and implements the group’s communications strategy. From chat rooms

to radio talk shows, Al-Qaida and associates share resources and expertise, often

repeating the same messages. Tax collection, fundraising, and recruitment are

handled separately; usually, fundraising is required to expand recruitment. The

Liaison Division constantly looks for more partners and funders, including drug

lords, kidnapping experts, and smugglers. 

Additionally, supporting martyrs’ families is critical to retaining popular support.

Usually there is a “Martyrs’ Division” to manage life insurance policies, social

security, funeral expenses, timely information to heirs, initial aid, dissemination

of the organizations’ publications, commemorative plaques, last wills and

testaments, and the martyrs’ records and estates. The Department of Aseerin

(prisoners), which is responsible for detainee operations, is equally important.43

Recruitment

Insurgent recruitment is a real concern for Pakistan and the United States. While

some groups like the Pakistani Taliban are considered enemies of the Pakistani

state, other splinters of groups like LeT that are still focused on Indianadministered Kashmir, and on minimizing Indian influence in Afghanistan by

force, remain vital Pakistani proxies, and therefore face less insurgent

interdiction. Lesser-known groups with a missionary cover like Hizb ul-Tahrir

41 Author interview with senior intelligence official in May 2010. See “Pakistan’s Swat Gets

Sharia Courts,” Al Jazeera, 17 March 2010.

42 See Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 229.

43 Author interview with Shabana Fayaz, associate professor, Defense and Strategic Studies

Department, Quaid-e-Azam University, May 2010.

172 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
(HuT) share Al-Qaida’s broad goals but ostensibly promote peaceful ways of

achieving them.44 For example HuT believes in creating a nuclear-armed

Caliphate, starting in Pakistan, with the help of Pakistani military officers. After

Usama Bin Ladin’s death, Brigadier Ali Khan, then working in the Pakistani

Army Headquarters, was arrested for HuT links and planning a coup. Such a

coup, though unlikely, would result in nuclear-armed terrorists, directly and

significantly threatening U.S. interests in the region. 

There are similarly dangerous trends in Pakistani Army recruitment patterns.

Many young recruits now come from areas that have high representation of

jihadi organizations.45 Moreover, there are reports of Al-Qaida infiltrating the

Pakistani Navy.46 The recent attack on a Pakistani Navy Base in Karachi is a

stark example of Al-Qaida and affiliates working together with critical support

from inside the Pakistani military.47 Eerily reminiscent of the Mumbai attack, a

small group of terrorists besieged the base for 17 hours and damaged three

newly delivered U.S. P3C Orion maritime surveillance aircraft valued at $36

million each. Al-Qaida and the Pakistani Taliban both took responsibility.48

In addition to making inroads into the Pakistani military, Al-Qaida and

associates also have an external structure that relies on madrassas and religious

parties to help create “social” wings that ostensibly provide charity to mask

terrorist activities and build support for the networks.49 Certain political parties

like the Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan and the Jamiat-ul-Islam, as well as proselytizing

groups such as the Tablighi Jamaat (TJ), act as enablers for Al-Qaida and

associates by supporting recruitment in radical madrassas and fundraising at

mosques all over Pakistan.50 TJ is a “gateway drug” that develops—at the very

44 For more on HuT, read for example, Ayesha Umar, “Hizb ut-Tahrir in Pakistan,” Newsline, 5

August 2011.

45 C. Christine Fair and Shuja Nawaz, “The Changing Pakistan Army Officer Corps,” Journal of

Strategic Studies 34 (2011): 63-94

46 Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Al Qaeda had warned of Pakistan Strike,” Asia Times, 27 May 2011.

47 See for example, Tufail Ahmed, “Pakistani Military Officers’ Links with Jihadist

Organizations,” Middle East Media Research Institute, 21 August 2011.

48 Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda had warned of Pakistan Strike.”

49 For example, Jamaat-ud-Dawa is a front for LeT. See “Jamaat-ud-Dawa Easily Evades Ban,”

Dawn, 24 February 2010.

50 See “Tablighi Jamaat: Discourse and Challenges,” Conflict and Peace Studies, Pak Institute for

Peace Studies 2 (April–June 2009); and Iftikhar Malik, Pakistan: Democracy, Terrorism and the

Building of a Nation, (Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2010), 133–40. 

Pakistan | 173
least—sympathy for jihadi groups. On the ideological and sectarian spectrum, AlQaida’s supporters are mostly Sunni Deobandis.51 However, not all Sunni

militant groups work with Al-Qaida. For example, Barelvi groups such as Sunni

Tehreek have recently clashed with SeS in Karachi.52

51 Alhe Hadis, Wahhabis, and Salafis are closely related to the Deobandis in that they all reject

the heterodox view of Barelvis and the Sufis. 

52 See, “Sunni Tehreek, SSP Clash Leaves Two Dead,” Daily Times, 19 August 2011.

53 Author interview with senior Pakistani intelligence officials during August 2010, and Khurram

Iqbal, fellow, Pak Institute for Peace Studies, June 2010.

54 Author interviews with senior intelligence officials during August 2010.

Al-Qaida and Affiliates’ General Training Schedule53

Course Prerequisites Brief Description Time

Jihad 101: Tasis—

Foundation Course

Applicant must be single and in good

health

No military training. Indoctrination of jihad. (Note:

sectarian organizations conduct an additional 21-day

course, such as Ahle Hadis)

30 days 

Jihad 201: Al Raad

—Thunder Training

Jihad 101. Applicant must remain single, have no chronic illness, be able to

read and write (5th grade education),

and must pass a “true believer test”54

Indoctrination plus preliminary military training.

(Note: Some organizations conduct mental and 

physical entrance tests)

90 days 

Jihad 301: Guerilla

Training

Jihad 101 and 201. Must pass true believer test and write “will” and give to

ameer (religious leader) of the camp

Setting up basic ambushes, basic explosives and

weapons training (small arms, hand-to-hand 

combat, etc.)

180 days 

Jihad 401: Jandla—

Ambush Tactics

Jihad 101, 201, and 301 How to set up second- and third-generation ambushes

using modern IED creation, placement, and detonation; automatic weapons and high-grade explosives;

and heavy weapons (e.g. Stinger missiles, and rocket

propelled grenades). Exclusively taught by trainers

from large jihadi groups like LeT, HM, Harkat-ul-Islami, Tehreekul Mujahideen

270 days 

Jihad 402: Doshka

Advanced Small

Arms Training

(elective)

Jihad 101 and 201 Small arms training as part of quick reaction units 10 days

Jihad 403: Domela

Medium Arms

Training (advanced

elective)

Jihad 101, 201, and 402 Shoulder-held arms advanced training 30 days

Jihad 404: Zakzak

(discontinued 

elective)

Jihad 101, 201, 402, and 403 Taught how to use small tanks (was available in

Afghanistan before 9/11); currently not offered

30 days

Jihad 405: Launching—Senior 

Synthesis

Jihad 101, 201, 402, and 403 Senior instructors ask students to pick three areas of

operations and then receive objectives and deployments based on specific mission demands and 

priorities

5 days

174 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
Training

After recruitment, new members from madrassas, public schools, or elsewhere

usually follow the training curriculum and schedule listed in the table on the

previous page. 

How Al-Qaida and Associates 

Measure Effectiveness

Multiple field research trips to Pakistan and numerous engagements with

security analysts and intelligence officials reveal a dynamic Al-Qaida that

survives not because of its core membership, but because it continues to inspire,

abet, and train partners like LeT. For this purpose, Al-Qaida and associates have

developed manifestos, standard operating procedures, training and combat

manuals, after-action review procedures, small quick-action teams, and metrics

to measure success. Recently, Al-Qaida posted an ISI-inspired espionage

manual.55 The metrics’ focus on the Al-Qaida syndicate’s appeal, reach, strength,

and coherence greatly benefits the group as members increase partnerships and

operations. Among the more important metrics for Al-Qaida are those found

in the table below.

55 Greg Miller, “Al-Qaeda’s Terrorist Tool Kit Now Includes Training Manuals from Pakistani

Spy Agency,” Washington Post, 15 July 2011.

Al-Qaida’s Metrics

Metric Examples of Indicators

Al-Qaida and affiliates’ mobility

Number and quality of roads and bridges

Number of Pakistani forward operating bases

Pakistani or foreign air surveillance and ability to strike (e.g., 

the number of helicopter or drone strikes)

Frontier Corps/Frontier Constabulary/Army/police checkpoints

Speed of movement in relation to terrain 

Members

How many were killed and injured, and where?

How were they killed or injured?

Rate of attrition

Rate of recruitment and retention

Pakistan | 175
How Pakistan Has Countered 

Al-Qaida and Affiliates

Pakistan’s security forces are under great stress. The army is struggling to hold

the Swat Valley and southern and northern FATA as it juggles political instability

and rising violence in Balochistan and Sindh.56 The gains made in 200957 in

post-conflict stabilization, such as district reconstruction teams and temporary

population resettlement, are in great danger. While the American-Pakistani

56 See “Legal Action: Court Asked to Disqualify Gilani,” Express Tribune, 10 August 2011; and

“Musharraf Warns of New Military Coup in Pakistan,” AFP, 30 September 2010.

57 See Haider Ali Hussein Mullick, “Holding Pakistan: The Second Phase of Pakistan’s

Counterinsurgency Operations,” Foreign Affairs, 24 March 2010.

Al-Qaida’s Metrics (continued)

Metric Examples of Indicators

Lessons learned

Which tactics work and which do not?

Types of IEDs and rate of success

Types of ambushes and rate of success

Popular support

Number of spy beheadings

Rate of successfully resolving inter- and intra-tribal disputes

How many local services provided increase recruitment and fundraising (e.g., Taliban

sharia courts and LeT flood relief)?

Resolving inter- and

intra-group rivalries

Who and how often do groups within clusters (e.g., LeT & Co., separatists, and sectarian groups) fight?

What works and what does not work in resolving such disputes?

Exploiting socioeconomic and ethnic 

disharmony in Pakistan

Number of retaliatory attacks between Pashtuns and Muhajirs in Karachi

Number of Sindhi and Balochi separatists willing to partner with Al-Qaida in exchange for training in IEDs

Al-Qaida and associates’ willingness to

intervene

Number of likely partners

Potential partners’ capabilities

Number of likely sympathizers

Number of counterintelligence assets

Type of communications infrastructure available

Type of medical services available

Al-Qaida and associates’ membership:

Testing 

eligibility

Group’s strength (members, resources, etc.)

Group’s past success and failures (quantity and quality of attacks)

Types of tribal and ethno-sectarian links 

Propensity to splinter (how often have group members disagreed, how many splinter

groups, etc.)

176 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
intelligence-sharing cracks, military and development partnerships have suffered

tremendously after the killing of Usama Bin Ladin and its fallout in Pakistan. In

a recent Pew Research poll, 63 percent of Pakistanis disapproved of the killing

of Usama Bin Ladin by U.S. Navy SEALs, and 55 percent said it was a bad idea

regardless of who killed him or how. 

Approximately 69 percent of Pakistanis believe the United States is an enemy,

yet it is insignificant when they are asked to name the greatest threat to Pakistan.

India, at 57 percent, is viewed as the greatest threat, while 19 percent believe it

to be the Taliban. Al-Qaida only registers at 5 percent. Pro-American President

Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan has an 11 percent approval rating, while the Army

Chief General Ashfaq Kayani is rated at 52 percent.58

In the midst of such high anti-Americanism, the under-resourced Pakistani

police and paramilitary forces (Rangers and Frontier Corps) are struggling to

calm the port city of Karachi and the rustic tribal areas. Plans to attack North

Waziristan, the hub of Al-Qaida, the Haqqani Network, and run-away Pakistani

Taliban leaders is on indefinite hold given the uncertainty of Pakistan’s role in

the final reconciliation in Afghanistan, the operations in Mohmand and

Khurram, and the rising insecurity in the south. LeT & Co. are, however,

expanding operations, recruitment, and finances, while Pakistani intelligence is

ambivalent about what proxies it

should continue to support and

how it should deal with those

who are at war with Pakistan.59

Since 9/11, Pakistan’s ISI,

military intelligence, Intelligence

Bureau, and police Special

Branch have undergone reforms

that created new divisions

focused on counterterrorism.

While more groups are added to

58 “U.S. Image in Pakistan Falls No Further Following bin Laden Killing,” Pew Research Center

Publications, 21 June 2011.

59 For a detailed look at Pakistan’s historic national security doctrine to foment insurgencies in

India and Pakistan, see Haider Ali Hussein Mullick’s Pakistan’s Security Paradox: Countering and

Fomenting Insurgencies (Hulburt Field, FL: U.S. Joint Special Operations University Press, 2009),

11–61.

Pakistan | 177
the list of enemies, such as the Pakistani Taliban and some Afghan Taliban,

along with Al-Qaida, others such as LeT & Co. remain unscathed. In fact, the

Haqqani Network is still considered Pakistan’s “government in a box” for the

International Security Assistance Force Regional Command East area. The

Pakistani army pushes for regional reconciliation between the Quetta Shura and

Kabul in exchange for a limited role for the Haqqani Network, and ostensibly

the elimination of Al-Qaida’s sanctuaries. 

Conclusion

The United States and Pakistan must act together and act fast against Al-Qaida

and its associates that are taking full advantage of Pakistan’s instability. If

Pakistan sees Afghanistan through the optics of perceived or real Indian

encirclement, then Washington must support the ongoing India-Pakistan

dialogue and focus it toward an Afghan-led resolution. Pakistan must team up

with ISAF as it moves forces to Regional Command East (the eastern provinces

bordering FATA) and launch a North Waziristan operation to create a true

hammer and anvil effect. 

The Pakistani army and Frontier Corps have come a long way from the days

of conducting “out-terrorize the terrorist” campaigns, cutting deals with all of

the United States’ enemies, and failing to deter the Pakistani and Afghan

Taliban’s expansion. Today, they have better counterinsurgency training and

tools. But Pakistan still needs helicopters and support in building up its

intelligence and police forces. Despite Washington’s budgetary constraints, the

recently announced military aid terminations hurt U.S.-Pakistan relations and

endanger U.S.-supported Pakistani efforts at training and equipping paramilitary

forces like the Rangers and Frontier Corps. Moreover, public and clear

cooperation on U.S. drone strikes is important to revive trust on both sides and

to help ordinary Pakistanis understand the fact that most insurgents targeted

have killed thousands of Pakistanis, many of them women and children.

Without additional equipment now or centers of training in the long haul, the

Pakistani military will most likely cut deals with its proxies to provide ephemeral

stability at the cost of grave instability in Afghanistan. 

178 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
In the end, Pakistan must realize that it must fight all of Al-Qaida’s affiliates for

its own safety, security, and prosperity. Without a clear policy to target AlQaida and its affiliates, especially LeT, and without adequate pressure on

Islamabad to reorient its national security calculus, Washington may find that

Al-Qaida is dismantled, but that more dangerous transnational terrorists are on

the horizon—Al-Qaida’s power by proxy.

Pakistan | 179
803462AI (G00772) 6-10

EUROPE

180 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
Western Europe | 181

Western Europe is not the main theater of global terrorism, that is, of terrorism

related directly or indirectly to Al-Qaida. The number of Al-Qaida–based

jihadist attacks committed in Western Europe starting in the 1990s, shortly after

the emergence of this terrorist structure, through the present, is very small

compared with that in other regions. Indeed, the main theaters of jihadist

terrorist violence are currently South Asia and the Middle East, where attacks

inspired by ideological orientation are frequent. These sorts of attacks are also

considerable in the Maghreb and in East Africa. Moreover, the extremist

Neosalafist terrorist threat that hovers over Western European nations can

largely be traced to collective actors located in countries of these other areas of

the world, such as Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, Algeria, and Somalia.

More than 15 years have elapsed since the 1995 attacks in Paris, the first incident

linked to contemporary jihadist terrorism in Western Europe.1 And already 10

years have passed since the catastrophic attacks that took place in New York

and Washington in 2001. Today, the actors of global jihadist terrorism constitute

a polymorphous phenomenon, of which at least four major components can be

distinguished. First is Al-Qaida Central, the core and template for global

jihadism as a whole. Second are the territorial extensions that Al-Qaida has

10

Toward a Differential

Analysis of Al-Qaida and the

Jihadist Terrorist Threat to

Western European Nations

Fernando Reinares

1 In 1995, members of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) bombed the Paris public transit

system, reportedly to punish France for supporting the Algerian government’s crackdown on

Islamic rebels.
progressively established since 2003, namely Al-Qaida in Iraq, Al-Qaida in the

Arabian Peninsula, and Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. The third contingent

is the heterogeneous array of groups and organizations associated with the AlQaida terrorist structure, including Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Al-Shabaab, the

Islamic Jihad Union, and Abu Sayyaf. Fourth are the individuals and

independent cells that adhere to the same fundamentalist conception of Islam

but have no ties to entities corresponding to any of the previous three

components. 

These four components of global jihadist terrorism, either separately or

intermingled in varying forms, have proven to be a source of threat to Western

Europe. This has been shown in the various incidents that can be attributed to

this phenomenon, including attacks that were actually perpetrated or attack

plans and preparations that were thwarted by the intelligence services and

police agencies, particularly over the past decade. Sometimes only a single

jihadist actor was behind them, either from Al-Qaida, one of its territorial

extensions, some of its related groups or organizations, or independent cells or

isolated individuals acting on their own. On other occasions, events have

brought attention to the often composite nature of the global terrorism threat

in Western Europe—the attacks are from a varying, sometimes unique,

combination of the actors from different components of this phenomenon.

Whatever the case, when the preparation, planning, or implementation of an

attack has involved connections with a terrorist entity based abroad, the

incidents have tended to be greater in scale and consequences.

Regardless of the different forms that global terrorism may eventually adopt in

Western Europe and the modalities, procedures, and selection of targets for the

attacks, a question arises. Is this global terrorism threat uniformly distributed

across Europe in general, and across Western Europe in particular? Or, on the

contrary, does it affect some European countries more than others? And if the

threat of global terrorism is found to not affect the different Western European

nations evenly, what factors would explain these disparities?

A Homogenous or Differential Theater?

In principle, all European countries are threatened by global terrorism; however,

such a threat has not and does not affect the various European countries equally.

A quick glance at two public documents of reference on the successful and failed

attacks and the data and assessments of this phenomenon—the annual reports

182 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
by Europol within the European Union and by the Department of State in the

United States—show that the challenges posed by this phenomenon do not

appear to impinge homogenously on the European countries.2 All data indicate

that the scope of this problem seems comparatively greater in the countries of

Western Europe than in Eastern Europe, and there are also significant variations

within the western geopolitical zone. 

For instance, since 2002, the main and most lethal acts of jihadist terrorism in

Western Europe have taken place in Spain and the United Kingdom. Other

minor incidents have occurred in the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, and Germany.

The planning and preparations for new attacks have been thwarted in these

and other countries, such as Denmark, France, and Belgium, as well as in

Norway, which is outside the European Union. According to Europol’s EU

Terrorism and Situation Trend Report, hundreds of individuals suspected of Islamist

terrorist activities were arrested in both Spain and France between 2007 and

2009.3 The UK could not provide data for the Europol report, but a UK

government statistical report of aggregate arrests related to terrorism suggests

similar numbers.4 In contrast, the number of arrests made in connection with

this type of conduct in Italy, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands

amount to less than three figures, fluctuating between 10 and 90 incidents per

country over the same period. In other Western European countries, the figures

were considerably smaller; the number of arrests made was fewer than five in

Austria or Sweden. 

It may thus be possible to deduce from these indicators and assessments that the

challenge posed by global terrorism has been, and is, far more serious for some

European countries than for others. Therefore, a differential analysis, rather

than one that considers Europe as a homogenous bloc, is required to explain

2 Europol, TESAT 2010: EU Terrorism and Situation Trend Report,

https://www.europol.europa.eu/latest_publications/2, hereafter Europol, TESAT 2010; Office of

the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, “Chapter 2: Europe and Eurasia

Overview,” in Country Reports on Terrorism, updated annually, http://www.state.gov/

s/ct/rls/crt/2010/170256.htm. 

3 Europol, TESAT 2010, 51. 

4 The Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, Home Office Statistics, “Statistics on

Terrorism: Arrests and Outcomes: Great Britain” Home Office Statistical Bulletin: 11 September

2001 to 31 March 2008, (13 May 2009), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/

20110220105210/rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs09/hosb0409.pdf.

Western Europe | 183
these apparently significant variations. A differential analysis aims at identifying,

even if tentatively, the possible structural differences between Western European

countries that are relevant to understanding the disparities in how the countries

are affected by the current threat of terrorism directly or indirectly related to AlQaida. These structural factors are above all—but not exclusively—historical,

geographical, social, economic, and political. Each factor will be briefly

examined separately.

Relevant Historical Antecedents

When assessing the potential for a jihadist attack, a particularly relevant

difference between the countries of Western Europe relates to their historical

relationship with the Islamic world, as the Islamic world is where parent jihadist

entities are based and where most Muslims live. In this sense, two such historical

indicators are particularly meaningful. First, there are European countries with

a colonialist past in territories with majority Muslim populations in North

Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Second, a portion of

what we now refer to as Western Europe was under Muslim control during the

Middle Ages.

Even though generations have elapsed since the colonial era, resentment and

animosity toward former European colonial powers remain entrenched in the

political culture of the Muslim societies that became independent states, many

only in the 1950s or 1960s. The jihadist narrative recurrently appeals to these

persistent attitudes, blaming the colonial countries for fragmenting the nation

of Islam by introducing arbitrarily imposed borders. Both the United Kingdom

and France are particularly salient among the European nations which, as past

colonial powers, ruled vast areas of the world that were inhabited by people

who in one way or another considered themselves followers of religious

confessions based on the postulates of Islam. Other European countries like

Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands also had a colonial presence, albeit more

limited, in certain areas within these same regions of the world. 

But for some Western European countries, these colonial ties to the Islamic

world are not the only historical factor that should to be taken into account

when making a differential analysis of the threat that jihadist terrorism currently

poses to the region. Indeed, as noted earlier, a portion of Western Europe itself

was under Islamic control for centuries during the Middle Ages. Between the

eighth and fifteenth centuries, Islam ruled over a good part of the Iberian

184 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
Peninsula—what is now Spain and Portugal—which was penetrated by North

African Arabs and Berbers in 711 as part of the westward expansion of Islam

from its place of origin. To the leaders of Al-Qaida and its territorial extensions,

especially Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Andalus (the name given to the

Muslim social and political entity established in the Iberian Peninsula) is not

only an expression of the size and splendor once attained by a civilization based

on Islam. To them, it denotes a territory ascribed perpetually to Islam, and one

that has been occupied by infidels now for more than 500 years.

Distance from the Foci of Threat

The geographical factor that needs to be considered when attempting to explain

why some Western European countries are more affected by the threat of

jihadist terrorism than others is the proximity of each country to the areas that

are the foci of this violence. This is fundamentally a question of the distance

between the West European countries and the zones where the groups and

organizations involved in the global network of jihadism have their main base

or develop their terrorist campaigns. It is from those adjacent or nearby areas

that jihadist entities can spread terrorist elements into Western Europe with a

variety of purposes, ranging from the mobilization of human and material

resources —that is to say, recruitment and fund-raising—to the preparation and

execution of attacks, often based on the aforementioned tasks.

According to this geographical approach, while taking into consideration that

Western Europe as a whole is far from the epicenter of global terrorism (the

tribal areas of Pakistan), three countries located at its southern frontier—France,

Spain, and Italy—would be relatively more exposed to the threat of jihadist

terrorism than others in Western Europe. This is because Al-Qaida in the

Islamic Maghreb, a territorial extension of Al-Qaida established in September

2006, is based in Algeria and has spread across other North African countries

and south of the Sahara, particularly toward the Sahel.5 While France, Italy,

and Spain are most at risk, a certain proximity to the North African terrorism

hub should be taken into account with respect to other European countries

that border on the three countries already mentioned.

5 Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb was formed on the basis of a mutually convenient agreement

between the main jihadist organization active in North Africa at the time, the so-called Salafist

Group for Preaching and Combat, and the terrorist structure led in these years by Usama Bin

Ladin.

Western Europe | 185
Another focal point of terrorism is the Balkans in general and Bosnia in

particular. While this area is less salient nowadays, it was very important to the

development of Islamist terrorism networks in Western Europe during the

1990s and should therefore not be ignored. This threat base would be of

particular concern to Austria, Italy, and Greece, which also borders on Turkey,

a country of transit for jihadists traveling between Western Europe and the

Middle East or South Asia over the past two decades. However, the recent

attack record in countries like the UK have shown that this threat is no less

considerable in Western European countries that are geographically distant

from the foci of global jihadism. This is due to sociological factors that act as

intervening variables and are capable of mitigating the relative importance of the

historical and geographical factors.

Sociodemographic Factors

Among the aforementioned sociological factors, the size and composition of

the Muslim communities living in each country are particularly significant, as it

is within these communities that violent radicalization processes occur and

terrorists attempt to operate. In this respect, the number and proportion of

European Muslims, or Muslims residing in Western Europe, varies markedly

from one country to another. In absolute numbers, France, Germany, the United

Kingdom, Spain, and Italy have the largest Muslim populations.6 The numbers

for these countries fluctuate between one and five million inhabitants, aggregate

figures that are much higher than those in other Western European nations. 

Below these numbers but well above the 100,000 mark, seven other Western

European countries should be listed: the Netherlands, Greece, Switzerland,

Austria, Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden. Moreover, in relative terms, the

countries with the highest proportions of Muslims with respect to the

population as a whole include not only France, the United Kingdom, Germany,

Spain, and Italy—albeit with notable variations among them—but also those other

seven, all with a population of more than two percent Muslims or natives of

predominantly Muslim societies. Even in some of the latter cases, this

percentage is more than double, or considerably higher, than that of some of the

five Western European nations that have, in absolute terms, the largest number

of Muslim inhabitants. 

6 All Muslim population statistics from the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public

Life, “Regional Distribution of Muslims: Europe,” The Future of the Global Muslim Population,

http://pewforum.org/future-of-the-global-muslim-population-regional-europe.aspx#1.

186 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
Nevertheless, some data suggest significant differences in the degrees of jihadist

radicalization observed within the different Muslim communities established in

Western Europe, depending on their origin.7 For example, the level of

radicalization tends to be greater among individuals originally from Pakistan

than among those from Turkey, owing to the particular traits of the prevailing

Islamic character in the societies of origin. These variations can be interpreted

as the effect of the specific cultural contents of those countries with majority

Muslim societies that instill in their inhabitants different ways of understanding

and experiencing Islam. However, there is a plausible hypothesis that these

levels tend to even out in the case of second- and third-generation descendants

of Muslim immigrants. Even so, insufficient comparative evidence exists to

assert that the second and third generations are any more or less prone to

violent radicalization than the first generations. 

The Economy and Global Presence

Al-Qaida and the rest of the actors belonging to the current web of global

terrorism repeatedly proclaim that one of their purposes in inflicting harm on

what they call the “far enemy” is to seriously undermine the economies of the

countries in question and to ensure that their attacks (or the credible threat of

such attacks) have negative repercussions on the international economy. In a

message broadcast in 2009, Usama Bin Ladin boasted that the attacks of 11

September 2001 had caused not only destruction and deaths on American soil

but also the international financial crisis and the economic difficulties that the

West has been experiencing in general. It is not unusual for the leaders of jihadist

terrorist groups and organizations to bear in mind such considerations and even

publicly announce their intentions when choosing targets for their acts of

violence.

In this sense, it should be borne in mind that not all Western European countries

have the same economic importance or hold the same weight in the

international economy. Thus, the interests to be undermined are not in principle

equally attractive as targets of global terrorism. On the basis of the projection

of national economies (i.e., the foreign exposure of the different European

nations through trade in goods and services, energy and investments), Germany,

7 King’s College London, Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Militant Movement in Europe

(Kings College: London, 2007), 15,

http://icsr.info/publications/papers/1234516791ICSREUResearchReport_Proof1.pdf.

Western Europe | 187
the United Kingdom, and France rank particularly high. The Netherlands,

Belgium, Italy, Spain, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, and Ireland can be

classified in a second bloc, while the remaining countries fall into a third.

Closely linked to the externally projected economic weight of the various

Western European countries, but with greater scope and an intrinsic significance

of its own, is the global presence of the various nations, or their geopolitical

clout. This variable takes into account the countries’ international positioning

in different areas—such as their military strength and political influence—that

enables them to exercise power on the world stage. It is assumed that the

countries that enjoy a more prominent position in this respect will be

particularly attractive as targets for Al-Qaida and the groups and organizations

belonging to the global terrorist network. Accordingly, three Western European

countries stand out considerably above the rest: once again, these are Germany,

France, and the United Kingdom. Behind them are Italy, Spain, the Netherlands,

and Belgium, followed by the rest of the nations, though there are considerable

differences among them as to their global presence.

Dimensions of the Political Variable

In order to be able to assess what factors make some Western European

countries more likely to be affected by Al-Qaida and jihadist terrorism than

others, it is important to pay attention to the political variable and to focus on

foreign policies that are particularly relevant to the phenomenon of terrorism.

Above all, the political variable that matters is whether or not these nations

have troops deployed in areas of the world with predominantly Muslim

populations, whatever their mission is. It is known that Al-Qaida, its territorial

extensions, or its associated groups and organizations routinely issue

communiqués hostile to European countries with a military presence in

Afghanistan and also in Lebanon. These are very similar in content to those

previously issued with respect to the deployment of European soldiers in Iraq.

Although all the European Union member states contribute in some way or

another to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that performs its

mission in Afghanistan, the contingents sent by the United Kingdom, Germany,

France, Italy, and Spain are particularly significant. Those of other European

countries such as Denmark, Belgium, and Sweden are also considerable and

those of the Netherlands, Finland, Greece, and Portugal are not insignificant. As

for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), nine countries in

188 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
Western Europe have been contributing to it since 2006, to different degrees.

These are Spain, Italy, France, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland,

and Portugal.

There is also a domestic dimension to the political variable that is more

circumstantial, but complementary and closely linked to the previous one. This

is the holding of national elections, which appears to influence annual variations

in the threat of jihadist terrorism to Western European countries and should

therefore be considered. Elections are perceived by the actors of global jihadism

as opportunities to influence citizens’ attitudes and behavior, and to bring about

changes in the foreign policy of their respective governments. 

For instance, on 11 March 2004, terrorists bombed trains in Madrid only three

days before the elections that replaced the governing party and led to the

withdrawal of the Spanish troops who had been stationed in Iraq since the

previous year. The terrorist actors present the 2004 attacks as influential and as

a success to be repeated in other countries. In 2009, Al-Qaida repeatedly

threatened German citizens with a similar attack in their country if, in the

elections scheduled for November of that year, they did not vote in such a way

that their government representatives would then decide to withdraw

Germany’s troops from Afghanistan.

Additional Circumstances and Issues

In addition to the varying historical, geographical, sociodemographic, economic,

and political factors that help to better clarify why jihadist terrorism appears to

be more of a problem for some Western European countries than it does for

others, it is necessary to take into account additional circumstances and issues

significant from the perspective of a differential analysis. These are, in particular,

circumstances and issues that inspire a special animosity toward certain

countries on the part of Al-Qaida and other actors belonging to the global

terrorist network. This special animosity is often expressed by aggressive

targeting by jihadist propaganda efforts in messages that are disseminated

widely through numerous existing jihadist websites. 

For instance, from the terrorists’ viewpoint, countries where more

counterterrorism operations have been conducted may well be branded as

particularly hostile far enemies. Actions aimed at preventing and combating

global terrorism in Western Europe through recent years, with police operations

Western Europe | 189
resulting in the dismantling of numerous jihadist networks and the arrest of

hundreds of individuals accused of involvement in activities related to this form

of crime, have a probable paradoxical effect.

Such is the case in the United Kingdom, France, and Spain, followed by Italy,

Belgium, Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands. Even if the potential threat

is contained or reduced by the response of the national security agencies, the

propaganda of global jihadism stimulates motivation for terrorist acts against

those countries based on resentment or a desire for vengeance.

Moreover, other specific issues concerning one or some Western European

countries can increase their potential for being targeted by the groups and

organizations involved in current global terrorism. Particularly worth

mentioning are the caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad published in a

Danish newspaper a few years ago and later reproduced by a Swedish

newspaper. These actions continue to enrage jihadists and stimulate the

perpetration of attacks on the country’s citizens and interests. Likewise, the

French ban on certain veils worn by women, which jihadist terrorist groups and

organizations regard as Islamic symbols and imperatives, has sparked a virulent

reaction in the form of hostile proclamations and communications from their

leaders. A similar case is the Swiss referendum limiting the maximum height of

the minarets of mosques built in the country.

Conclusions

If, for each of the factors considered, we could award points on a scale of values

in accordance with the low, medium, or high relevance of these variables for

each nation—and then add them together and find the corresponding ratio—it

would become evident that, irrespective of fluctuations in the level and nature

of the threat of global terrorism at any particular moment, a series of structural

or persistent conditions make four Western European countries more likely to

be affected by this phenomenon to a significant degree in the short and medium

term: the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Spain. Next would come

Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, followed

by Greece and Switzerland. The remaining Western European countries might

be expected to be less affected by jihadist terrorism than others within the same

geopolitical region in the near future, although by no means are they free from

the possibility of an attack.

190 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
Interestingly, public perceptions of the terrorist threat do not exactly coincide

with this tentative classification, although there is a rough correlation.

According to the Eurobarometer data recorded between 2006 and 2010—that

is, for the five-year period immediately after the attacks in Madrid in March

2004 and in London in July 2005—the average percentage of European citizens

who regarded terrorism as one of the two most important problems faced by

their respective countries was more than 10 percent in Spain (where this

concern is not limited to the threat of international terrorism), Denmark, the

United Kingdom, and the Netherlands.8 Figures below 10 percent but above 3

percent were recorded in Italy, Germany, France, and Belgium, as well as in

Austria. Public opinion in other Western European nations expressed relatively

less concern about the threat of terrorism compared to other pressing economic,

social, and political problems. Among the latter was Sweden, although the last

of the surveys considered was conducted in the country only months before a

jihadist suicide bomber died on 11 December 2010 while trying to execute a

series of potentially lethal attacks in a busy pedestrian area of downtown

Stockholm. 

8 The Standard Eurobarometer surveys are published twice per year, surveying the citizens in

each European Union country about a wide range of issues. The 2006–10 averages are those of

the author. The original reports from each year can be found at

http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm. It is noteworthy that spring 2011

saw an increase in perceived threat from terrorism among Western European nations, even with

ongoing economic concerns. Twelve percent of the German population named terrorism as one

of the two largest concerns for the EU; France registered 16 percent; Italy, 14 percent; and the

United Kingdom, 15 percent. 

Western Europe | 191

the United States | 193

My comments are about the United States and the threat to the United States.

And I think I have a fair amount of good news and some elements of bad news.

It’s easy to deliver bad news because nobody remembers when the sky didn’t

fall when you say the sky was going to fall. But my view is that the Al-Qaida

threat is very much attenuated. A 9/11-style attack on the United States is

basically almost impossible.

There is a school of thought—in fact, Michael [F.] Scheuer, who is a friend and

a colleague in this area of study—Mike has said in the past, the reason that there

hasn’t been a 9/11-style event is because they’re just waiting to do something

bigger. Now, to quote kind of a philosopher of science, this is a non-falsifiable

statement, in a sense—in the sense that if it doesn’t happen, it’s more proof that

they’re just waiting to do something bigger. 

I don’t believe in non-falsifiable statements. I don’t think that [Al-Qaida is]

waiting to do something bigger. I mean, they would if they could, but they

[can’t]. In fact, there’s a lot of countervailing evidence to show that they’re

willing to get anything through. 

Look at Najibullah Zazi, the Afghan-American who tried to blow up the

hydrogen peroxide bomb in the subway in Manhattan in September of 2009.

You know, he was willing to kill a few dozen people in Manhattan. He was

trained by Al-Qaida. So they’re looking to get anything through. At this point

they haven’t been very successful, obviously. 

In fact, it’s pretty striking to me that only 17 Americans have been killed by

jihadist terrorists in this country since 9/11, something that we would not have

predicted a year or two after 9/11: 13 at Fort Hood in Texas; one at the Little

11

Al-Qaida and 

the United States: 

A Panel Presentation

Peter Bergen
Rock Army recruiting center; and two at Los Angeles International Airport by

an Egyptian guy who attacked the El Al counter, killing two people. I guess

that makes 16.

So, more people die in their bathtubs every year in the United States than have

died in jihadi terrorist attacks over the last decade. And we at the New America

Foundation have looked at every jihadi terrorist case where anybody has been

charged or convicted of a crime since 9/11, and there are some interesting

takeaways from that. 

There are about 177 cases as of today. There’s very little ethnic profile. I just

will give you the numbers: 26 percent were of Arab or Middle Eastern descent,

10 percent were African American, 13 percent were Caucasian, 18 percent were

South Asian, 20 percent were Somali, and 12 percent were mixed or other

ethnic backgrounds. So there’s no ethic profile of these jihadi terrorists in the

United States.

It is interesting that in 2009 there were more jihadi terrorism cases than in any

year we’ve had previously—43 cases. Now, the question is, was that an outlier

or was that part of a larger pattern? And to what extent was that larger number

affected by quite a large number of Somali American cases that were charged

or people who were convicted in that year? My guess is it might be an outlier,

but we will see. 

Certainly, Fernando Reinares has ably demonstrated in his presentation [that]

obviously [within] the European Muslim population there has been a fair

amount of radicalization that’s gone on. And I think in the United States we

thought that we would be exempt from that because American Muslims are

better educated than most Americans. On average, they have higher incomes,

they don’t live in ghettos—all the things not true in Europe. And I think that we

thought we would be somewhat insulated from these kinds of ideas

domestically here. And I think to a large degree that is true, but in 2009, that

trend came into some question. Let’s hope that 2009 was an outlier. 

Another sort of interesting factor in these [cases] is [that] there are more

American leaders in these groups than we’ve seen in the past, which I think is

interesting. For instance, Shukri Jumah, who grew up in Brooklyn and then

moved to Florida, is apparently now Al-Qaida’s sort of external operations

director. 

194 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
Omar Hammami, who grew up in Alabama [and] was a Baptist who converted

to Islam, is a leader of Al-Shabaab in Somalia right now; [Anwar] Al-Awlaki—I

don’t need to detain you with that—is the cleric from New Mexico who is

playing such a prominent role in Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula; and then

of course, David Headley, who actually was instrumental in scoping out the

sites for the attacks in Mumbai in 2008. [H]e played a lead role in the planning

of that attack. And this is sort of a new phenomenon . . . [w]e used to worry

about terrorists coming to the United States; now we’re in the business of

exporting terrorists. 

Look at not just Headley, who planned the Mumbai attacks and was also

planning to attack the Danish newspaper that published the cartoons of the

Prophet Muhammad, but also look at “Jihad Jane” [Colleen R. LaRose], who

traveled to Europe planning to attack a Swedish cartoonist, a woman from

Pennsylvania. And look, of course, at the at least 20, 24 cases of Somali

Americans volunteering for the jihad in Somalia. There’s sort of a diversification. 

Also, the kinds of people attracted to these ideas—and my hypothesis here is

obviously unprovable—is that 30 years ago, if you wanted to act against the U.S.

government, you would have joined the Black Panthers or the Weather

Underground, and now if you want to [do that], jihadism is kind of one of the

only outlets that’s really left. 

And so [for] somebody like “Jihad Jane,” the woman from Pennsylvania—47, a

high school dropout, several failed marriages under her belt—joining the jihad

gave her life some meaning that she probably didn’t really have at the time.

Bryant Neal Vinas from Long Island, who actually trained in an Al-Qaida

training camp in [20]08, is also a high school dropout who flunked out of the

U.S. military after three weeks.

But then you have Major Nidal Hasan, who is a medical doctor earning $90,000

a year, or Faisal Shahzad, the guy who tried to blow up an SUV in Times Square

in May of 2010, who is a financial analyst, of all unlikely places, at the Elizabeth

Arden Cosmetics Company in Connecticut before he decided to go on his

career of jihadism.

So there’s very little way to profile people economically, ethnically. And then

of course they’re joining lots of different groups. The conference is about AlQaida, but one of the points about Al-Qaida is it has infected, ideologically,

the United States | 195
other groups, including the Pakistani Taliban, Al-Shabaab, Lashkar-e-Taiba,

and others.

So, given that sort of brief sketch of the kinds of cases we’ve seen in the United

States since 9/11, what can we expect in the future? I think small-scale attacks.

Faisal Shahzad represents the kind of attack we might expect in the future—in

a sense, on the same scale of Oklahoma City. I think that’s the outer kind of

limits of the kinds of attacks we could see in this country. 

Oklahoma City, remember, killed 168 people. It was essentially two people with

some help from a third. But there’s a natural ceiling to which the kinds of

disorganized groups—or even somebody, a lone wolf trained by Al-Qaida—

there’s a natural ceiling to the kind of damage they can do.

Fernando [Reinares, European terrorism analyst] talked about the debate

between those who talk about a leaderless jihad and those who talk about a

leader-led jihad. In my view, if the jihad is leaderless, you don’t need to have

another conference on Al-Qaida because there’s a natural ceiling of what

leaderless groups can do.

Major Nidal Hasan, in a sense, was a classic lone wolf. He killed 13 people. But

he didn’t kill 3,000 people. He wasn’t part of a group that killed 3,000 people. I

think about the invasion of Normandy. It wasn’t a sort of group of like-minded

guys who got together and sort of did the invasion of Normandy. It was the

most organized group in history: the U.S. military.

And so, to get a large-scale attack, you need an organization, and Al-Qaida, the

organization, has been put under tremendous pressure. If you think about what

it took to do 9/11, it was money transfers in Dubai, training in Afghanistan,

command and control in Germany, and flight lessons in the United States.

[Y]ou know the story. It was a very complex thing. Each one of those activities

now would be discovered and interrupted by European law enforcement,

American law enforcement, and others. So, smaller-scale attacks [instead]. 

I [also] think it’s not impossible that we will see American suicide attackers.

The reason I say that is Major Nidal Hasan planned a sort of jihad. He was

planning sort of a death by cop almost. When he went into Fort Hood, he was

expecting to die, and of course he didn’t. But when you’ve seen people like

Major Nidal Hasan and when you’ve seen American citizens—as you know,

196 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
there have been two American citizens who conducted suicide operations in

Somalia—once it’s happened elsewhere, it can happen here. 

The British were very naïve about this. They assumed that because there have

been British suicide attackers overseas in Kashmir and in Tel Aviv in 2003, they

didn’t think it would happen domestically. And then of course 7/7 [the 2005

London subway bombings] happened. There were four suicide attackers

simultaneously. 

U.S. military targets of course for these kinds of groups are very, very attractive—

American soldiers fighting wars in two, and now arguably in three, Muslim

countries make them a very attractive target. I don’t need to tell this audience

that Daniel [P.] Boyd from North Carolina was planning to attack [Marine

Corps Base] Quantico. We’ve had the Fort Dix case. We’ve had Major Nidal

Hasan. We’ve had the Little Rock case. And there are others.

I think it’s not implausible that assassinations of officials might be something [to

look out for]. We haven’t seen it in this country, but Al-Qaida has actually had

a very long record of assassinating people; that’s not, I think, mostly well

understood. 

Al-Qaida and Al-Qaida–like groups [have attempted many assassinations]—

starting with [Anwar] Sadat in 1981; going on to kill [Ahmad Shah] Massoud

two days before 9/11; killing Benazir Bhutto in 2007; launching two attempts

against General [Pervez] Musharraf in the 2003 time period; [attempting

multiple times] to kill Kurt Westergaard, the Danish cartoonist who painted the

first pictures of the Prophet Muhammad; and others. So, for instance, if I was a

jihadi, who I would be very interested in killing is Terry Jones, the pastor in

Florida who burned the Quran. I think that he has really set himself up for that

kind of thing.

Fedayeen-style attacks,1 I think not in this country but perhaps in Europe.

Mumbai had such a success. Part of the success was that the story was alive for

60 hours. It was designed for television, and of course it worked. And so, we’ve

had the alert, which was really directed I think mostly toward Germany, based

on the Germans who were training with the Islamic Jihad Union and Islamic

1 Literally “ones who sacrifice themselves,” the fedayeen are paramilitary commandos or

guerillas, especially Arab commandos operating against Israel.

the United States | 197
Movement Uzbekistan. We had the Europe-wide alert. The [U.S.] State

Department issued a very stern warning in the fall of [2010] about fedayeenstyle attacks with multiple attackers. I don’t think that’s necessarily plausible

here, but you could imagine an attack on a U.S. military base in Europe with a

sort of fedayeen-style attack.

And, finally, will these attackers attack in some sort of anonymous American

town, sort of “Anywhereville, USA”? And I think the short answer is Al-Qaida

is not interested in attacking in Des Moines because the people that it’s trying

to influence and impress have never heard of Des Moines. They’ve heard of

New York, they’ve heard of Washington, and they’ve heard of American

commercial aviation. And so they keep coming back to the same target sets. 

Look at Najibullah Zazi [the suspect in the 2009 New York City subway bomb

plot]. He was living in Denver, Colorado, when he planned his attack in

Manhattan. He actually drove across the country, having originally lived in New

York. He moved to Denver and then he came back. So, for Al-Qaida itself, and

these bigger groups, I think New York and Washington, and commercial

aviation have remained a kind of obsession.

I want to pull back a little bit beyond the United States [and talk] about factors

that I think are influencing Al-Qaida both negatively and positively, because it

affects their ability to do these kinds of operations. I think there are four things

that are operating positively for them and four things that are acting negatively.

The positive [for Al-Qaida] is that they’ve infected, ideologically, other groups

in South Asia that don’t call themselves Al-Qaida. Look at the Pakistani Taliban.

I’m glad Fernando mentioned in passing Barcelona, in January of 2008, because

this was the huge canary in the mine that was not noticed. The Pakistani Taliban

sent multiple suicide bombers to Barcelona in January of 2008, and it’s gotten

very little attention in this country, but it served to completely undercut the

idea, “Hey, the Pakistani Taliban are just a bunch of people who only care about

what’s going on in Pakistan.” And then of course we had Faisal Shahzad being

sent to Times Square in May of 2010. So, these groups that were kind of

provincial in outlook, who don’t call themselves Al-Qaida, are now adopting an

Al-Qaida –like agenda. 

Then of course there’s the affiliates. I think it was extremely predictable that

Al-Qaida in Iraq was not out of business as an insurgent organization that

198 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
controlled Anbar Province, according to the [U.S.] Marines’ assessment in 2006.

Of course they are no longer that kind of organization. But just as you don’t

invite the hit man to dinner if you’re a Mafia family, I think Al-Qaida in Iraq has

a similar role for Sunni insurgent groups interested in the status of Kirkuk,

interested in fomenting attacks against the central government. They don’t like

Al-Qaida in Iraq particularly, but they’re willing to do business for them, because

Al-Qaida in Iraq will do the kinds of things that will interrupt the Kurdish

takeover of Kirkuk or interrupt the central—what the Sunni militant groups

regard as a Shia—government.

Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb is, I think, pretty quiescent right now. AlShabaab has shown, very interestingly, an ability to do out-of-area operations,

not only in Uganda but also in Denmark. They sent an assassin to kill the

Danish cartoonist. Luckily he had a safe room and managed to escape being

killed. So, these groups, the affiliates, they’re up, they’re down, but they remain,

they have some capacity. 

Another factor operating in these groups’ favor is of course [that] Usama Bin

Ladin and Ayman Al-Zawahiri are still out there. And I think it’s not

insignificant that a leader, particularly Bin Ladin, who is the author ultimately

of 9/11, is still out there.2 He celebrated his 54th birthday on February 15th.

He’s not an old guy. It’s very strange to me that he has said nothing about the

events in the Middle East, suggesting maybe that the drone attacks are kind of

making him worried about security, or maybe he doesn’t know what to say.

The events in the Middle East are very, very difficult, I think, for Bin Ladin 

to process. 

And then, another thing that might work in their favor—and this is sort of new—

is the real nadir that U.S.-Pakistani relations have arrived at. I can’t think of a

time where relations have been worse. And obviously we need the Pakistanis.

As Mike Scheuer correctly said, it was always very naïve to think that our

interests and Pakistani interests were going to align. But they have been more

aligned recently than perhaps in the past.

If you look at the operations in Swat and South Waziristan, these were serious

operations, particularly the ones in South Waziristan, where the Pakistani

2 Bin Ladin was killed by a U.S. special operations forces team in Abbottabad, Pakistan, on 2

May 2011 (local time), less than a week after this conference was held.

the United States | 199
military had gone in 2005 and 2006 and had done sort of performance art

operations basically to say, “Hey, we’re getting this money and look what we’re

doing.” In fact, one of the operations actually coincided to the day with a visit

to Islamabad of Secretary [of State Colin L.] Powell. So basically, those initial

operations were just done to say, “Hey, we’re doing something.”

The 2009 operation in South Waziristan was a real operation involving

substantial military planning, a lot of attacks from the air against Taliban

hideouts for months, blocking positions, and 30,000 men. That is not something

we could have predicted would have happened four years ago, and it did

happen. So, the fact that we’re in this real nadir of relationships with the

Pakistanis is a problem, particularly since they’ve been doing more things that

we wanted them to do—recently—perhaps [more] than could have 

been expected.

Now, what are the negatives for Al-Qaida? I think the drones are a very doubleedged sword for [them]. We at the New America Foundation have done a very

transparent Web site looking at every drone attack, and we calculate that the

number of leaders that have been killed by these drones is basically two percent.

Most of the victims of the attacks are lower-level militants, while six percent, as

we calculate now, are civilians. [This number] is very close to what U.S. officials

of course say off the record, which is about a two percent or less civilian 

casualty rate.

But I think, you know, as you probably all well know, President [Barack H.]

Obama has authorized quadruple the number of drone strikes in Pakistan than

President [George W.] Bush did in the eight years he was in office. So this

program has really accelerated, and I think it’s reached the point of being

counterproductive. The day after the Raymond Davis case3

—you may recall,

when he was released, that we did drone strikes, killing at least 40 people in the

tribal regions—General [Ashfaq Parvez] Kayani, who very rarely makes these

kinds of public statements, came out with a very strongly worded statement

essentially saying this was outrageous, civilians were killed.

3 Raymond A. Davis, a Central Intelligence Agency contractor living in Lahore, Pakistan, was

accused of killing two Pakistani civilians, but was released after the U.S. government paid the

families diya (blood money).

200 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
And they are our ally. We do have to sort of respect their sovereign country.

And I think that a more transparent drone program and fewer of them, [one]

that was more well-calibrated to really going after the high-value targets, [would

be more prudent]. I think there’s a great bureaucratic impulse to just do things

because you can do them. And I think the drone program is no longer being

very [effective]—we can do it so we’re just doing it and we’re doing it and we’re

doing it. But I think there are larger strategic questions that we need to 

think about.

So the drone program has certainly had some impact on Al-Qaida. I don’t want

to take that away. One—this is a hypothesis on my part—Faisal Shahzad was in

Waziristan for 40 days getting training for the attack in Times Square, but he

only got 5 days training. And my hypothesis is that was because the drone

program was putting quite a lot of pressure on his ability to get the training.

And then there are three final points in terms of negatives for Al-Qaida. One is

the kind of sharply declining support for these kind of [groups], Al-Qaida, and

particularly the Taliban in Pakistan. Support for suicide bombing, Al-Qaida, and

Usama Bin Ladin has just cratered in Pakistan.

And then, zooming out a little bit further, that’s true around the Muslim world

[in] countries like Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, [and] Saudi Arabia. Al-Qaida is

losing the war of ideas in the Muslim world, not because the United States is

winning them, certainly, but because Al-Qaida is losing them. And it was always

a very naïve idea to think somehow we were going to win the war of ideas. It’s

about other people losing them, and Al-Qaida is losing them, for three or four

very obvious reasons. 

These groups have killed mostly Muslim civilians. For groups that position

themselves as the defenders of Islam, this is not impressive. Also, they’re not

offering anything positive. We know what they’re against. If Bin Ladin was here

and you’re saying, “What are you trying to do?” he would say, “The restoration

of the Caliphate.” By that he doesn’t mean the restoration of the Ottoman

Empire, a relatively rational group of people; he means Taliban-style theocracies

from Indonesia to Morocco. And most Muslims don’t want that. 

I mean, the one thing people are not demanding right now in the Middle East

is a Taliban-style theocracy. Very few people want that. There’s nothing quite

like living under the Taliban as a prophylactic to have a very hostile view of

the United States | 201
them. Only seven percent of Afghans, for instance, have a favorable view of the

Taliban. So, Muslims have seen what the Taliban did in Afghanistan. They know

what Al-Qaida is offering—very little, just violence. And so Al-Qaida is losing the

war of ideas in the Muslim world.

And that takes me into my final point, which is what’s going on in the Middle

East now. It’s very striking to me that we haven’t seen a single picture of Usama

Bin Ladin, in any demonstration in Cairo, in Benghazi, in Bahrain—anywhere—

Jordan, Syria. Bin Ladin is not part of this conversation. No one is spouting

Al-Qaida’s venomous anti-Western rhetoric. I haven’t seen a single American

flag burning, or a single Israeli flag burning. I mean, this is so pro forma in that

part of the world and it just isn’t happening, suggesting to me that Al-Qaida is,

as President Obama very eloquently put it, a “small man on the wrong side of

history.” And history just got a lot faster for them.

202 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
Contributors | 203

Amr Abdalla is professor and vice rector at the United Nations–mandated

University for Peace (UPEACE). Before arriving at UPEACE, he was a senior

fellow with the Peace Operations Policy Program at George Mason University

and a professor of conflict resolution at the Graduate School of Islamic and

Social Sciences in Leesburg, Virginia. He obtained a law degree in Egypt, where

he practiced law as a prosecuting attorney from 1978 to 1986, before

immigrating to the United States, where he obtained a master’s degree in

sociology and a doctorate in conflict analysis and resolution from George

Mason University. From October 1981 to December 1986, Abdalla was a

prosecuting attorney with the National Security Attorney General Office in

Egypt, participating in the prosecution of numerous members of the Islamic

Jihad organization responsible for terrorist crimes and the assassination of

President Anwar Sadat.

Peter Bergen is the director of the National Security Studies Program at the

New America Foundation in Washington, DC. He is a print and television

journalist and the author of Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin

Laden (2001), The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of Al Qaeda’s Leader

(2006), and The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict Between America and AlQaeda (2011). Holy War, Inc. and The Osama bin Laden I Know were recognized

among the best nonfiction books of the year by the Washington Post, and

documentaries based on the books were nominated for Emmys in 2002 and

2007. Bergen is also CNN’s national security analyst and a fellow at New York

University’s Center on Law and Security. In addition, he has testified multiple

times on Capitol Hill. He received a master’s degree in modern history from

New College, Oxford University.

Contributors
Norman Cigar is director of regional studies and the Minerva Research Chair

at the Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia. Previously, he taught at

the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College and the Marine Corps

School of Advanced Warfighting. He has served as a senior analyst at the

Pentagon, where he worked in the Office of the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff

for Intelligence. He is the author of numerous works on politics and security

issues dealing with the Middle East and the Balkans and has been a consultant

at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia at the Hague.

His recent research has focused on jihadist thinking about unconventional war,

and his recent publications include Al-Qa’ida’s Doctrine for Insurgency: ‘Abd Al-

’Aziz Al-Muqrin’s A Practical Course for Guerilla War (2008). He holds a D.

Phil. from Oxford; a Master of International Affairs degree from the School of

International and Public Affairs, Columbia University; and a Master of Science

degree from the National Defense Intelligence College (formerly known as Joint

Military Intelligence College). 

Adam Dolnik is the director of terrorism studies at the Centre for Transnational

Crime Prevention at the University of Wollongong in Australia and a professor

of counterterrorism at the George C. Marshall Center for European Security

Studies in Garmisch, Germany. Formerly, Dolnik served as chief trainer at the

International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Singapore

and as a researcher at the WMD Terrorism Research Project at the Monterey

Institute of International Studies in California. He has lectured for various

governmental and nongovernmental organizations and agencies in over 40

countries and regularly conducts field research in conflict zones. Dolnik’s books

include Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technologies, Tactics, and Global Trends

(2007); Negotiating Hostage Crises with the New Terrorists (2007); and Terrorism

Field Research: A Guide (forthcoming in 2012); he has also published over 50

reports and articles on terrorism-related issues. 

Christopher C. Harmon came to Marine Corps University (MCU) as a

professor of international relations after four years on the faculty of the Naval

War College, and he remained with the Marines for the next 14 years. In 2005,

Harmon inaugurated the Kim T. Adamson Chair of Insurgency and Terrorism

at MCU, and he began writing the second edition of his graduate-level textbook

Terrorism Today (2007). Between 2007 and 2010, he was an executive in the

Germany-based Program on Terrorism and Security Studies of the George C.

Marshall European Center for Security Studies. While there he completed

another book project, Toward A Grand Strategy Against Terrorism (2010),

204 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
coedited and cowritten with A. N. Pratt and Seb Gorka and published by

McGraw-Hill. His most recent journal contributions were to Orbis and Strategic

Studies Quarterly. Dr. Harmon is now MCU’s Matthew C. Horner Chair of

Military Theory, and his teaching load includes a Counterterrorism Strategies

course. 

Arezou Hazzanzadeh is a Ph.D. candidate at the Graduate Institute of

International and Development Studies and an admitted member of the Iranian

Central Bar Association. Her research is in the areas of sharia law and

international humanitarian law with a focus on extremist Muslim nonstate

actors’ modus operandi. She has collaborated with the UNESCO Chair for

Human Rights, Peace and Democracy in Tehran as a researcher as well as the

International Committee of the Red Cross as a legal attaché. Ms. Hassanzadeh

received her LL.M. degree in international humanitarian law from the Geneva

Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights. Prior to that,

she received her bachelor’s degree in English language and literature from

Shahid Beheshti University School of Literature and Humanities and her LL.B.

degree from Shahid Beheshti University School of Law. 

General Michael V. Hayden, USAF (Ret.), became director of the CIA in May

2006, capping a long career of service to the United States. Appointed director

of the National Security Agency (NSA) by President William J. Clinton in 1999,

he served in that capacity until 2005. From April 2005 to May 2006, Hayden

was the number one military intelligence officer in the country, serving as

Deputy Director of National Intelligence. In this role, he helped oversee the

entire intelligence community, including the CIA, NSA, Defense Intelligence

Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and National Reconnaissance

Office. General Hayden entered active duty in the U.S. Air Force in 1969, after

earning a bachelor’s degree in history and a master’s degree in modern

American history, both from Duquesne University. In his military career, he

served as commander of the Air Intelligence Agency and director of the Joint

Command and Control Warfare Center. He has also served in senior staff

positions at the Pentagon, the headquarters of the U.S. European Command, the

National Security Council, and the U.S. Embassy in Bulgaria. General Hayden

is now a principal at the Chertoff Group in Washington, DC, and a

distinguished visiting professor at George Mason University. 

Contributors | 205
Stephanie E. Kramer is currently the research assistant for the Minerva

Initiative at Marine Corps University. Prior to joining the university, she worked

as a research associate at the Congressional Research Service in the foreign

affairs, defense, and trade division. She holds a bachelor’s degree in linguistics

from the University of California, Santa Cruz, where she graduated summa cum

laude and Phi Beta Kappa.

Ricardo René Larémont is professor of political science and sociology at the

State University of New York, Binghamton, and a Carnegie Corporation Scholar

on Islam. He has a law degree from New York University Law School and a

doctorate from Yale University. His principal books include Islamic Law and

Politics in Northern Nigeria (2011); Islam and the Politics of Resistance in Algeria,

1783–1992 (1999); The Causes of War and the Consequences of Peacekeeping in Africa

(2000); and Borders, Nationalism, and the African State (2005). His research

focuses on political Islam; Islamic law; conflict resolution; democratization; and

civil-military relations, usually in the region of North Africa and the Sahel.

Haider Ali Hussein Mullick is a fellow at the Institute for Social Policy and

Understanding and has worked with the Joint Special Operation University. He

consults frequently with the U.S. government, and in 2009–10 General David

H. Petraeus, USA, asked him to conduct research on Pakistan’s security policy.

Washington Post’s David Ignatius described Mullick as “one of the brightest and

most balanced analysts on Pakistan,” and Financial Times called him an

“authority on Pakistani militancy.” Mullick has appeared on CNN, BBC, PBS,

NPR Radio, ITN, Al Jazeera, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Voice of

America. He has written for the Woodrow Wilson Center, the Heritage

Foundation, Foreign Affairs, Yale Global, World Politics Review, Washington Post,

Newsweek, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Oxford Analytica, the

Pakistan Security Research Unit, and Jane’s. He is the author of Al Qaeda and

Pakistan: Current Role and Future Considerations (2010) and Pakistan’s Security

Paradox: Countering and Fomenting Insurgencies (2009).

Fernando Reinares is professor of government at Universidad Rey Juan Carlos

and a senior analyst on international terrorism at Real Instituto Elcano, a

Madrid-based think tank. He is also the director of the permanent seminar on

terrorism studies at the Ortega-Marañón Foundation, the academic director of

the International Counter-Terrorism Academic Community in Rome, and on

the board for the terrorism studies program at St. Andrews University. He also

serves as an advisor for many other international institutions working on

206 | Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War
terrorism issues. After the Madrid train bombings in 2004, he served a term as

senior advisor on antiterrorist policy to Spain’s minister of interior and as

chairman of the European Commission Expert Group on Violent

Radicalization. He is a contributing editor of Studies in Conflict and Terrorism

and the author of numerous books and articles on terrorism issues. Dr. Reinares

was awarded the Cross of Military Merit by the Spanish Ministry of Defence 

in 2010.

Michael F. Scheuer is the former head of the CIA’s Bin Laden Unit, where he

also ran the Rendition Program. He resigned from the CIA in November 2004

after nearly two decades of experience in covert action and national security

issues related to Afghanistan, South Asia, and the Middle East. A New York

Times and Washington Post bestselling author, Scheuer has written Marching

Toward Hell: America and Islam After Iraq (2008); Imperial Hubris: Why the West

is Losing the War on Terrorism (2004); and Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama bin

Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America (2002). He published Osama bin

Laden: A Biography in February 2011 with Oxford University Press. Scheuer and

his writings are frequently featured in print and television media outlets both

domestically and around the globe. He is currently an adjunct professor of

security studies at Georgetown University.

David H. Shinn has been an adjunct professor in the Elliott School of

International Affairs at George Washington University for the past 10

years. Previously, he served for 37 years in the U.S. Foreign Service with

assignments at embassies in Lebanon, Kenya, Tanzania, Mauritania, Cameroon,

Sudan and as an ambassador to Burkina Faso and Ethiopia. He was the director

for East African affairs for the State Department during the mid-1990s and

coordinator for Somalia during the international intervention in the early

1990s. His areas of specialty are East Africa and the Horn of Africa, ChinaAfrica relations, and African conflicts. Ambassador Shinn also serves on the

board of several nongovernmental organizations. He has a doctorate in political

science from George Washington University and blogs at http://

davidshinn.blogspot.com. 

Contributors | 207
Since the September 2001 attacks on the World Trade

Center and the Pentagon, the United States has been at war with AlQaida. Over the past 10 years, counterterrorism efforts have disrupted

its main training facilities and eliminated much of the core leadership

structure, including the mastermind Usama Bin Ladin. Despite this, AlQaida has proved resilient. While the core leadership has been compromised, regional Al-Qaida offshoots and affiliated Islamist terrorist groups

have formed, developed, and become prominent in their own right.

To aid in examining and explaining Al-Qaida’s trajectory, the

Minerva Initiative at Marine Corps University hosted a conference in the spring of 2011, just days before Bin Ladin’s demise.

The panels at this conference addressed diverse issues such as AlQaida’s overarching strategy; the degree of control that central

Al-Qaida leadership maintains over regional franchises; and the

strategies, tactics, successes, and failures in each theater of operation. The resulting papers in Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War

contribute to the ongoing and ever-evolving net assessment of AlQaida and its future prospects, and they help inform the crafting

of a war termination phase with Al-Qaida.

MARINE CORPS

U N I V E R S I T Y P R E S S

Cover design: Robert Kocher