### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 08 -0 02 20 -C R

______________________________ RAYMOND WAI ER WI RTH, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appea l from the 336th J udicial District Court

Fa nnin County , Texas Trial Court No. 22758

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C

. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Opinion by

J ustice Carte r2 O P I N I O N I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound A. The Le as ing Busi ne ss For mor e th antw e n ty

y e ar s , Ra

y mo n d Wa ie r Wi rth o w n e d an d o p e r a te d a s u c c e ssful automobile leasing business. The business was oper ated by two corpor ations: RW L easingdid the marke ting of

vehicles a

nd Wirth L easing , I nc., provide d the funding source s and re ceive d one-third of the pr of its . Wir th wa s the so le ow ne r of Wir th L e a sin g , I nc ., and wa s a fi ft y pe rc e nt o wn e r w ith J ames Rog ers, sa les manag er, of RW L easing . The sales forc e conta cted pr ospective c ustomers interested in lea sing a

vehicle; ba sed on the c u s tome rs' reque sts, W irth' s company would then contac t

a uto mob ile de a le rs hip s and loc a te the ve hic le de sir e d. Wir th L e a sin g , I nc ., ha d a greemen ts wi th

sever al major ba

nks where in Wi rth would arr ang e for transfe r of title t o the vehicle and assig n the lease contra ct to the bank f unding the transac tion. After the lease and the customer we re a pproved by the funding bank, a dr aft d raw n on an ac count of RW L easingat the Prosper , Texas, bank was sent to the automobile deale rship for the purcha se price of the ve hicle and the vehicle w as deliver ed t o t h e c u s t o m e r . T h e a u t o m o b i l e d e a l e r s h i p , o n r e c e i p t o f t h e dr a f t , w o u l d p r e p ar e the tit le d o cu m en t s p l ac i n g o wn er s h i p o f t h e v eh i cl e i n t h e fu n d i n g b an k an d a d ra ft wo u l d b e s en tt o W i rt h 's ba nk . Wh e n th e fu

nd ingba nk re c e ive d ti tle , it

wo uld e le c tr on ic a ll y tr ans fe r f

un ds int o th e RW L e a sin g ba

nk a c c ount in the Pr os pe r B ank . A t th a t ti me , Wir th w ou ld i ssu e a

c he c k o n th e RW L e a sin g ba

nk a c c ount and the dr a ft to the de a le rs hip wa s the n ho no re d. Th e c us tom e r m a de le a seTh e ind ic tme nt a lle g e d th a t pu rs ua nt t o o ne sc he me and c on tin uin g c ours e of

c on du c t, Wi rt

h 1 in te n ti o n a ll y

an d kn o w in g ly

u n la w f u ll y a p p r o p r iate d

mo to r v e h ic le s o f

th e a g g r e g a te v a lu e of $200,000.00 or more by

bring ing about a transfe r of title without the eff ective c onsent of B onham Chry sler Ply

mo uth D o d g e Je e p E ag le, I nc.; Toy ota of L ewisville, I nc.; McKinne y Dodg e, Inc.; L exus of Clear L ake, I nc.; and Par k Place Motorc ars Da llas, the owner s of the prope rty , and with the intent to deprive the owner s of the prope rty . T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 31.03(a) (Ve rnon Supp. 2008). 3 pay ments to the funding bank ac cordingto the terms of the c ontrac t. W i rt h 's agr ee m ent wit h the funding banks involved fe es or c ompensation paid to his company o n t h e contracts that had bee n

a pp ro ve d. Th is p ro c e ss h a d b e e n in pla c e fo r se ve ra l y e ars un til the e arl y pa rt of 20 05 , w he n s ome of the dr a ft s se nt t o a

uto mob ile de a le rs hip s w e re un pa id and Wir

th c los e d th e Pr os pe r b ank a c c ounts

. B. Unpaid Drafts Led to Thef t Conviction Fifte en dra fts to automobile dealer ships, all signe d by Roge rs, involving ove r $500,000.00

we re un pa id. Wir

th l a te r f ile d b ank ru ptc y and dis c ha rg e d a g re a t amou

nt o f d e bt. Wirth was indicted for thef t of proper

ty over $200,000.00 in c onnection with the tra nsfer of title of the fiftee n vehicles when t he drafts for e ach w ent unpaid. Alleg ations of theft involved one Fa nnin County

automobile deale rship and other alleg ations from o ther de aler ships outsi de the county ; they

wer e prose cuted a s a continuing conduct or scheme

. The jury found Wirth guilty of 1 the lesser offe nse of theft of $20,000.00 or more but less than $100,000.00 and asse ssed punishment at ten y ear s' imprisonment and a $10,000.00 fine, a nd rec ommended community supervision. The trial court sentenced Wi rth acc ording ly by placinghim on community supervision for f

ive y ear s and order ed that he pa

y restitution of $128,103.27.4

Wirth arg ues there is no evidence to satisfy the i ntent require ment—eff ectively arguing that the State ha s r e ins tit

ute d th e no tio n of a " de bto rs pr iso n" by c on vic tin g him

fo r f a ili ngto r e pa

y de bts

. He f urther a rg ues that the e vidence is insufficient to show that any part of the alleg ed co n t inuing theft occ urre d in Fannin County —and thus venue in that c ounty was improper . Finally , he ar g ues that if any c ri min a l w ro ng do ingoc c ur re d, it w a s no t a t his ha

nd , bu t a t th e ha

nd of Jame s Ro g e rs , an employ ee of t h e company . For any of these r easons, he contends, the c onviction must be

reve rsed. II. Legal and F actual Suf fi ciency Wirth arg ues that the e vidence is leg ally and fa ctual l y i n s ufficie nt to support the verdict beca use of a lack of any evidenc e that could support a finding of intent to commit theft—at least as t o an y w r o n g d o i n g i nF an n i nC o u n t y. A. Stand ard of Review I n revie wing the leg al suffic iency o f t h e ev i d en ce, w e view a ll of the evidenc e in the lig ht most favora

ble to the verdic t a

nd deter mine whether

any rational trier

of fa ct could have found the essential ele ments of the cr ime bey ond a re asonable doubt. J oh ns on v . S

tat e , 2 3 S. W. 3 d 1 , 7 ( T e x. Crim. App. 2000). I n a fa ctual suff

iciency revie w, we revie w all the evidenc e, but do so in a neutra l light and deter mine whether

the evidenc e supporting the verdic t is so weak or is so outweighe d by the g reat

we ig ht a nd pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e that th e jur y ' s v e rd ict is cle arl y

wr on g or

manif e stl y5

unjust. Lan c on v . S

tat e , 253 S.W. 3d 69 9, 70 5 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 08 ); Ro be rts v . S tat e , 220 S.W .3d 521, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). I n this analy sis, we use a hy pothetically

corr ect jury

char g e to eva l u at e both the leg al and fac tual sufficie ncy

of the e vidence

. Gr ott i v . S tat e , 273 S.W .3d 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Such

a c ha rg e a c c ur a te ly

se ts ou t the law, is a

uth or ize d by

the ind ic tme nt, do e s n ot u nn e c e ssa ri ly inc re a se the State ' s b ur de n o f p ro of or un ne c e ssa

ri ly re str ic t the State ' s th e or ie s o f l ia bil ity , a nd a de qu a te ly descr ibes the par

ticular off ense f or which the defe ndant was trie d. Vi lla rre al v . S tat e , 286 S.W .3d 32 1( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 09 ); Ma lik v . S tat e , 95 3 S.W. 2d 23 4, 24 0 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ). Wir th does not argue that the char g e is inc orre ct or not one authorized by the indictment, and it trac ks the indictment and the statute that c riminaliz es the c onduct involved. B. The Statute The jury was char g ed to de termine whether Wirth, pursua nt to one scheme or co n t i n u i ng

c ours e of c on du c t, c omm itt e d th e of fe ns e of the ft by in tent ion a lly

or kn ow ing ly

un lawf ull y appropr iating pr o p er t y by bring ing a

bout a transf

er of title (of automobiles) without the ef fec tive consent of the owner s and with intent to deprive the owner s of prope rty . The jury was a lso instructed that consent is not eff

ective if it is i nduced b y d ec ep t i o n. T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 31.01(3) (Ve rnon Supp. 2008). Dec eption was de fined in the c harg e as promising pe rfor

mance that is likely

to affe ct the judg ment of another in the transac tion a n d t hat the ac tor does not intend to perf orm or knows will not be6

perf ormed, e x cept that f

ailure to pe rfor

m the promise in issue without other evidenc e of intent or knowledg e is not sufficie nt pr oof that the actor did not intend to per form or knewthe promise would not be pe rfor med. T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 31.01(1)( E) (V ernon Supp. 2008). The e vidence was that Wirth was the boss in both businesses; W i rt h L easinghad the ag ree ments with the funding banks. Wirth handled bills, signed the pa y chec ks, hired and fire d, instit u t ed sales policies, a nd controlled a ll financial a spects of the companies. The Prosper B ank

acc ount manag er, Penny

Acke r, testified that only Wirth co n d u ct ed bankingon behalf of either company an d

th a t s h e d e a lt

w it h n o o th e r

p e r s o nf r o m e it h e r c o mp an y , th a t h e w a s th e p e r son notified when a draf

t arr ived and that he was the only person to send pa

y ment to cover

the dra fts. I n J anuar y and Fe bruar

y 2005, some draf

ts w ritten to the automobile deale rships failed to be honored. Spec ifically , Toy ota of L ewisville rec eived eig ht dr afts which we re dishonore d; the dates of the dra fts wer e betwee n J anuar y 31, 2005 throug h Fe bruar y 18, 2005. About the same time, Park Place Motors in D allas rec eived three unpaid draf ts within t hirty

day s. McKinney

Dodg e had two unpaid dra fts; Bonham Chry sler re ceive d one unpaid draf t dated J anuar

y 19, 2005; L exus of Cl ear L ake ha d an unpaid draf

t and contacted W irth, who s ent a chec k on the RW L easingacc ount, which

was a lso dishonored. All of the witnesses f rom the automobile dea lerships tes t i fi ed t h at they tr ans fe rr e d p os se ssi on

a nd tit le to t he ve hic le s, we re no t pai d o n th e dr a ft s, and we re un a ble to r e g a in possession of the vehicles. (Title had been transfe rre d by the deale rs to the re spective f unding ba nk.) L ikewise, th e e v id e n c e s h o w e d th a t f o r e a c h o f th e s e tr an s a c ti o n s , th e f

u n d in g b an k

a p p r o v e d the7

lease contra cts with the Wirth sa l es fo rc e, and funds to honor the dra fts wer e paid by those banks int o th e RW L e a sin g a c c ount at the Pr os pe r B ank . T he tot a l amou nt o f t he se fi ft e e n unp a id d

ra ft s amounted to over

$500,000.00. Ba

nk rec ords wer e introduce d, but none of the withdrawa ls to the Wirth companies have be en shown to be something other than ordinary business transac tions. On Marc h 5, 2005, the RW L easingbank acc ount w as closed by Wirth and the balanc e of $41,813.27 was withdra

wn. C. Cr im ina l Int e nt I n summary , Wirth ar g ues that the evidenc e is not such as would allow a jury to inf er that he had the intent to steal, but rather his ar g ument is that his busi ness fa iled. As previously stated, his c onviction is pursuant to a Penal Code provision that criminalizes taking funds from a

nother without their ef

fec tive consent—a

nd consent is not eff

ective if induced by dece ption—and dece ption includes promising pe rfor mance which the pr omisor does not intend to pe rfor m or knows will not be per formed. T he statute a lso states that failure to perfor m, standing alone, is not sufficie nt proof. T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 31.01 (Ve rnon Supp. 2008). The statute a n d h y

p o t h et ically

corr ect jury

char g e re quire the State to prove Wirth di d not intend to honor the dra fts or knewthey would not be honore d when issued. F urther, failure to honor the dra fts, without other evidenc e of intent or knowledg e, is not sufficie nt pr oof that Wirth di d not intend to perfor

m or knew the drafts would not be honored. The State argues the e vidence

su pp or tin g the fi nd ingis:8

(1) Wirth owned W irth L easing and controlled RW L easing and was solely in char g e of the bankingand fina

ncial aspe cts of the business. (2) Penny Acke r, a banker at the Prosper Ba nk, told Wirth there w ere insufficient funds to cover his drafts and he continued business as usua l. (3) The a

utomobile dealer ships took measures to attempt to collect on the dra fts, to no avail. (4) Wirth bl amed other s and denie d involvement. ( 5 ) Hi s o p u le n t li f

e s ty le s h o w e d h e " u s e d o th e r p e o p le ' s mo n e y f o r h is o w npersona l ben efi t w it ho ut th eir

perm is si on ." (6) His dishonesty with A meg y Ba nk on an unrelated matter showed intent to stea l from the c ar d e a le rs . Thi s C o u rt h as previously noted that a c laim of theft made in connec tion with a contrac t

r e qu i r e s p r o o f o f m o r e t h ana ni n t e n tt o d e p r i v e an d

a s u b s e qu e n ta

p p r o p r i a t i o no f

t h e p r o p e rt y . If only an intent and a

ppropriation ar e pre sent in a contra ctual ma tter, there is no criminal conduct beca use under the terms of the contra ct one ha s the rig ht to "depr ive the owne r of proper ty " in return for c onsideration. Ba ker v . Stat e , 986 S.W .2d 271, 274 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1998, pet. re f' d). We r ecog nize that criminal intent ma y be, indeed ty

pically must be, inferr ed fr om the nature of the a ctions taken. F urt h er , mental states ar e almost alwa y s inferr ed fr om acts and w ords. The mental culpability

of a de fenda

n t is of such a nature that it g ener ally must be inferr ed fr om theKi tin g c he c ks is the pr oc e ss o f d ra wi nga g a ins t ba lanc e s c re dit e d to un c oll e c te d c he c ks

. 2 9 circ umstances in which a prohibited act or omissi on occur s. A mental state is conc eale d within the mind of an indi vidual, and can onl y be dete rmined fr om his or her wor ds, acts, and c onduct. Mo or e

v . S tat e , 969 S.W .2d 4, 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)

. We w ill examine the State' s arguments and the

surr ound ingc ir c ums tanc e s f or c ir c ums tanti a l e vid e nc e that Wir th did no t in te nd

to h on or the dr a ft s or knewthe dra fts would not be paid whe n they wer e issued. 1. Testim ony of

P enny Acker Acke r testified that in the e arly d ay s o f t h e ac count, it was flush with money to cover the draf ts, but that beg an cha

ng ing a bout four or f

ive m onths befor e Wirth closed the ac count in 2005. (D e c e mbe r 200 4 thr ou g h earl y Marc h 200 5) . At th a t po int , th e re be g an to be ins uf fi c ie nt f un ds in the ac count to cover

the dra fts, and the Prosper Ba nk beg an re turning some of the dr af t s . Acke r te sti fi e d s he tho ug ht Wirt h mig ht be kit ing c he c ks and thu s th e ba nk be g an h old ingso me de po sit s

un til the y c le are d th e ba

nk on wh ic h th e y

we re dr awn . Ac ke r' s sp e c if ic tes ti mony

wa s th a t in 2 November

2004 the RW L easing bank acc ount ha d twelve insufficient c harg es. She did not speak to Wi rth about t h is, but noti fied a vice pr esident, who she be lieved had a meeting with Wi rth, at which time Wirth appear ed to bec ome ag itated, but she did not know if the issues she h ad been observingwer e discussed. When asked if Wirth knewdraf ts were outstanding w hen he c losed the bank ac count, Acke r stated, " As far as I can r emember , Ith i n k we h ad a co u ple." L ater , the following exchang e occ urre d:10 Q. J ust two questions, Ms. Acke r. Going back to the questi on about the a c c ount' s [si c ] cl os e d a

nd a ba nk is sen di ng a

dr a ft mon e y , a

nd if Mr . Wir th instructed y ou as y ou' ve said -- when the a ccount' s closed, to send those ba ck -- A. He didn' t instruct us to send it back. I mean - - Q. I ' m sorry . Imisunderstood y our testimony

. . . . This testimony

does not specif

ically show that Wirth was made a war e dra fts wer e still outst anding when h e cl o s ed the bank a ccount. F urther, the se eve nts occurr ed some time af ter the dr afts we re issued and the ve hicles we re de livered a nd could not direc tly

show Wirth's i ntent to dece ive at the time the drafts wer e is sued and the property was appropriate d. Relevant intent to deprive the owner of prope rty

is the acc used' s intent at the time of the taking

. Pe te rso n v . S tat e , 645 S.W .2d 807, 811 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 8 3 ) ( ci t i n g Gr iff in v. Sta te , 61 4 S.W. 2d 15 5 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 81 )) . " I n s um, the State must show a rational fac tfinder c ould have found appe llant had no intention of fulfilling his ob lig a tio n und e r t

he agreemen t, and his pr omi se to p e rf or m w a s ' me re ly

a ru se to a c c omp lis h th eft by decep ti on .'" J

ac ob s v . S

tat e , 230 S.W .3d 225 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2006, no p et

. ) ( qu o t i n g Kin g v . S

tat e , 17 S.W .3d 7, 15 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2000, pet. re f' d)). 2. P e r so nal G ain Another c onsideration in deter mining whe ther Wirth had cr im i n al i ntent is whether he experience d persona l ga in from the prope rty obtained. Chr ist e ns e n v . S tat e , 2 4 0 S. W. 3 d 2 5 , 3 3 ( T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 20 07 , n o p e t.)

. I n thi s c a se , the State int ro du c e d Wir

th' s b ank re c or ds , but has not directe d this Court t o any instances of

Wirth wit hdraw i n g fu nds for his per sonal g ain.11

No a tte mpt

wa s ma de to s ho w that any Wir th L e a sin g , I nc ., wi thd

ra wa l w a s n ot a

pr op e r b us ine ss item. I nstead, the State' s argument proce eds from the premise that the funding banks plac ed money in the RW L easingacc ount for ea ch dra ft repr esenting a vehic le transa ction and Wirth ex pended larg e sums of money

for housing , vehicles, a

nd rec reational property

and lived an " opulent" life sty le. B a se d o n th os e tw o f

a c ts, th e S tat e arg ue s th e jur y c ou ld r e a so na

bly inf e r t hat Wir th i nte nd e d to dece ive var ious automobile de aler ships whe n he had no intent to pay or knewthe dra fts would not be paid, a ll to support his lux urious lifesty le. B ut the evidenc e also shows that Wirth's business had pr od uc e d s ub sta

nti a l r e ve nu e fo r m any

y e ars su ff

ic ie nt t o s up po rt

an a bund ant l if

e (a c c or ding to Wirth's proposal, the busine ss had g ross profits of $651,179.02 for the first nine months of 2004). F ur the r, su c h a

c on c lus ion

re qu ir e s a

str e tc h o f l og ic . The fa c t th a t Wir th l ive s in a hig h s tyle c ou ld

rea sonably lead to a

n infere nce that he has acc ess to suf ficient funds to suppor

t it, n o t t h at he intentionally

issued draf

ts knowing the y

would not be paid. Both Wirth and J ames Roger s wer e authoriz ed to write c hecks or make withdra

wals fr om the RW L easingbank ac count. Ultimately , Wirth l ost his busi ness of many y ear s and decla

red pe rsonal bankruptc y . D. Extraneous Bad Acts 1. Blo odg oo d Tr ans ac ti on The State argu es t h at evidenc e of Wirth' s intent to deceive is shown by the testimony

of J ames B loodgood c oncer

ning the unrelated bus iness transac tion with Ray Wirth. Wirth complains12

this evidence was inadmissible, citing Rule 404 of the Te x as Rules of Evidenc e. See T EX . R. E V ID . 404. J im Bloodg ood, a vice president at Ameg y Ba nk, testified t o a sequence of over draf ts in two of Wirth's a ccounts, a

nd like wi s e s u s p ected Wirth of kiti ng . He testified that he ultimately asked Wirth t o liquidate secur ities that were partially used as collater al on a $50,000.00 line of cr edit, and to use t h e o v era g e (a

bout $36,000.00) toward the uncollecte d portion of Wirth's ac counts, and Bloodg ood rele ased the secur ities for that purpose . (Wirth had sever al ac counts t h er e, o ne for another of his companies, Cer

tified Vehic le L easing , and anothe r for Wirth L easing , as we ll as persona l acc ounts.) There is evidenc e that a form used by Bloodg ood, signe d by

him Febr uary 10, 2005, was a ltered a fter it wa s in Wirth' s possession a nd afte r the secur ities w ere sold, the funds wer e instead transmitted to Wirth's per sonal ac count—wher eupon he w ithdrew them in a series of cashie r' s chec ks from a diff ere nt branc h. Bloodg ood testified t hat hi s bank was ultimately unable to collec t on the line of cr edit and lost an additional $41,000.00 as a result of the uncollec ted fund tra nsfer s. So the question becomes wh e the r t he fa c t tha t evi de nc e sh ow e d Wir th m isl e d B loo dg oo d in to t hin kin g he wo uld

liq uid a te his

secur ities to pay

the loan to Ameg y

Ba nk, when, a ccor ding to B loodgood, he man aged to sell the stocks, which we re se curity for the loa

n, and have the money

transfe rre d to his own acc ount without paying the bank loan is evidence of an intent in this case to dec eive the a utomobile dealer ships and

s t e a l t h e i r m o n e y b y h a v i n g h i s s a l e s m an a g e r i s s u e dr a f

t s t o t h e d e a l e r s h i p s ?13

Te xas l aw d oe s n ot a llo w the pr e se ntatio n o f e vid e nc e of oth e r c ri me s, wr on g s, or a c ts t o prove the char acte r of a

person in orde r t o s how ac tion in conformity there with. T EX . R. E V ID . 404(b). " An ac cused pe rson is entitled to be tried on the a ccusation made in the State' s pleading and

no t on som e col lat eral cri me, or f or b ein g a crim in al gen eral ly ." Sim s v . S tat e , 273 S.W .3d 291, 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g Y ou ng v . S tat e , 159 Tex. Crim . 164, 165, 261 S.W .2d 836, 837 (1953))

. But ex trane ous offe nse evidence may be used to prove intent when that is an issue. T EX . R. E V ID . 404(b). In a case involving alleg ations of theft by dece ption f or failing to pa

y for g oods as ag ree d, the Texas Court of C riminal Appea ls has approved evidence of other business tra nsactions in which the defe ndant failed to pa y for the pr oducts. Plan te v . S tat e , 6 92 S.W. 2d

48 7 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 1985). Additi onally , the theft statute de clar es that other r ece nt and similar transac tions are admissible to show knowledg e or intent. T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 31.03(c)(1 ) (V er n o n Supp. 2008). The dif

ficulty is this s pecif

ic extraneous ac t may

also involve the prohibited use of char acte r evidenc e: to prove the ch ar ac t er o f a pe rson in order to show action in confor mity there with. See 1 Go o d e, Wellborn & Sharlot, Texas Practice : Guide to the Tex as Rules of Evidenc e § 4 04.6.3 (3d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2009). But if the t estimony of Bloodgood reg ardingthe other ba nk transac tion is admissibl e on the issue of intent, it does constitute some evidence on that m at erial issue. L og ically , if this evidenc e is rele vant on the i ssue of intent, it is some evidenc e fr om which a jury could infer

that Wirth di d not intend to honor the draf ts or knew they

would not be honore d, and14

there fore meets the minimum required f or the leg al sufficie ncy test. Rely ing on Plan te , we f

ind the evidenc e wa s admissible under Rule 404(b)

. Reviewing the evidenc e for fac tual sufficie ncy , we do so in a neutra l light to deter mine if the

ev i d en ce i s s o we ak o r so aga i n s t t h e gre at we i gh t an d p re p o n d er an ce o f th e ev i d en ce t h at t h e j u ry 's verdic t is clearly

wrongand unjust. This review r equire s us to attach some deg ree of probative value to the evidenc e and de termine the stre ng th or wea kness of the suppor t i n g evidenc e. As we have previously

outlined, the evidenc e that we found that constituted "some e vidence " to a llow the jury to infer the issue of

intent was the testimony

conce rning the other ba

nk transac tion. W hen we look at that transa ction, we f

ind that it is substantially dissimi lar to the a ll egations of deception lodg ed ag ainst Wi rth by

this indi ctment. I n the Bloodgood testimony , it is sug g ested that W irth manipulated B loo dg oo d a

nd his ba nk int o s ig nin g a

fo rm that late r w a s a lte re d. Sin ce the do c ume nt w a s in Wirth's possession, and since the document' s alteration allowed him to recei v e t h e funds without pa y ingthe ba

nk loa n, it is inf e rr e d that he a lte re d it or ha d it a lte re d. I f t his a lle g a tio n is tr

ue , Wir th deliberately

took affir mative ac tions which resulted in his improperly rec eiving the funds. B y c on tr a st, the dr a ft s is su e d to the a uto mob ile de a le rs hip s w e re do ne in t he re g ula r c ours e of Wirth's business that he ha d succe ssfully conducte d for m an y y ear s. No irre g ularity (such a s

a lte ri ngins tr

ume nts ) w a s sh ow n. Th e dr a ft s w e re sig ne d b y Rog ers , wh o h a d h and le d th e se transac tions for y ear s; the lease c ontrac ts were approve d by the funding banks; the money was sent to t h e l e a s i n g b an k

a c c o u n ta n d , e xc e p tf

o r t h e f i f t e e ndr a f t s e xe c u t e d

j u s tb e f o r e t h e b u s i n e ss15

collapsed, dr afts issued in the same manner had bee n honored by

Wirth's business for a

period of y ear s. For 2004, the company was issuing and honoringat least thirty to forty such dra fts eve ry month. W hile there is no ex planation as t o wh y t he funds to pay for the dr afts dissipated over a period of time, ne ither have we be en dire cted to any evidenc e of Wirth persona lly raiding the bank

acc ount. Considering the broad discr etion vested in the trial c ourt, while the e vidence of the Bloodg ood incident was not inadmissible, we f ind its probative value on the issue of W irth' s intent not to honor the draf

ts to be weak and insubstantial. Wirth also arg ues this evidence should have be en excluded under R u l e 4 0 3 o f the Te x as Rules of Evidenc e. See T EX . R. E V ID . 40 3. We re c og nize the br oa d dis c re tio n of the tr ia l c ourt to consider the fac tors reiter ated in Gi gli ob ian c o v . S

tate , 210 S.W .3d 637, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). B ased on that discretion, we c annot say the trial cour

t erre d in admitting this evidence

. 2. The Rogers Insurance P olicy W i rt h al s o co mp l ai n s ab o u t t h e ad m i s s i o n o f t es t i m o n y fr o m R o ger s a b o u t W i rt h 's liq uid a tio n o f w hat Ro g e rs te sti fi e d w a s an in sura nc e po lic y that r e pr e se nte d h is r e tir e me nt a c c ount. Th e te sti mony

wa s th a t Wirthha d p ur c ha se d a lif e ins ur anc e po lic y

de sig ne d to c omp e ns a te Wir th if Roge rs died while e mploy ed, with half the benef its to Wirth and half

to Roge rs' wife. H oweve r, if Roge rs re tired, he w as then to re ceive the cash value of the policy as his retire ment benef

it. The evidenc e wa s that Wi rth ca shed out the pol i cy

— at about the same time of the B loodgood16

tr ans a c tio n. Th e State argue s th is e vid e nc e sh ow e d Wirth ' s in te nt t o d e pr ive ano the r o f p ro pe rt y which he f

ormed or posse ssed at or a bout the same time the fr audulent dra fts wer e issued. Once ag ain, the g ener al rule is that evide nce of speci fi c i n s t ances of conduc t may not be introduced to prove the char acte r of a person in or der to show a ction in conformity to that char acte r. I t ma y be a dmi ssi ble fo r o the r i ssu e s, su c h a s in te nt. B ut t he pr op os e d ev ide nc e sh ou ld have so me rele vance to prove the intentional c o n d uct in the trial bef ore the court, not just the intentional conduct of

the extraneous ac t. Here , it is not entirely evident that Wirth's a cti o n s s h o wed an int ent io n t o d epri ve R ogers —t here is no wri tt en d ocu men tat io n o f t hi s agreem ent ; the Wir th b us ine ss purcha sed the insura

nce policy

and Rog ers c ontributed nothing; R o ger s d i d not retire f rom the bu sin e ss, bu t re sig ne d and le ft his e mpl oy me nt and be c ame e mpl oy e d e lse wh e re in t he a uto mob ile sales business. The f

act that Wirth cashe d in an insuranc e policy , some proce eds of which Rog ers claimed, is an e ntirely

di ff er en t m atter tha

n the cha rg e that he a

ppropriate d proper

ty from ca r deale rships by

causingRoge rs to issue them a dra ft. The thef t statute all ows the admission of evidenc e that the de fenda nt participate d in previous similar transac tions t o s how knowledg e or intent. T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 31.03(c) (1). At most, the S tate' s argument is that the liquidation of the ins ur anc e po li cy sh ow s Wir th d e pr ive d Ro g e rs of

pr op e rt y . T he log ic a l e xten sio n o f t his argument is that W irth, being unprincipled, would also cheat the c ar de aler s. This is nothi ng more tha n o ff e ri ngc ha ra c te r e vid e nc e by

the us e of

ba d a c ts t o s ug g e st the de fe nd ant a c te d in c on fo rm ity17

with that char acte r; such evide nce is inadmissible. But, in vie w of the entire evidenc e in this ca se, thi s is bu t a bli p on the sc re e n a nd did no t a ff e c t Wir th' s su bs tanti a l r ig hts and

is the re fo re ha

rm le ss. E. Closing the Account F ina lly , th e State argue s that Wir th' s c los ing of the a c c ount and wi thd ra wi ng$4 1, 00 0. 00 a lso proves his intent to dece ive. B ut the intent to deceive m u s t have oc curr ed whe n the dra fts wer e written. Doe s the fac t that Wi rth withdrew $41,000.00 evidenc e his intent that when Roger s issued draf ts on approved c ontrac ts, W irth intended that these e ight dr afts would not be honored? Fa iling to pay those draf

ts was a violation of his contra ct and pe rhaps shows a char acte r flaw, but it does not evidenc e Wirth's intentions to select dr afts that he would ref use to pay . There simply

is no evidence that when these draf

ts w ere issued by Roge rs on approve d contra cts, Wirth had an intention or knew they would not be honore d. F . Jury Ver dict We rec og n iz e th a t o u r

r e v ie w o f

f a c tu a l s u f f ic ie n c y mu s t b e d e f

e r e n ti a l t o th e ju

r y v erdic t with a hig h level of skepticism about t he jury verdic t require d befor e a reve rsal can occur. Ro be rts , 22 0 S. W.3 d at 524. B ut he re , the jur y ve rd ic t itse lf is ab str

us e . Th e jur

y wa s instru c te d tha t it

c ou ld convict Wirth under the indictment for theft over

$200,000.00 or for lesser offe nses. Since the jury convicted him of the lesser offense of theft ove r $20,000.00 but less than $100,000.00, and since the total amount of the fifte en dra fts was more than $500,000.00, the j ury could not ag ree that he wa s g uilty of theft as to some of the eleve n to twe lve draf ts in question. Ba sed on the dra ft amounts, at18

most the jury

could have found that he w as g uilty as to four of

the draft s . T h e ev i d ence of the

a lle g e d th e ft

wa s a lmo st ide nti c a l in e a c h c a se ; a dr a ft wa s is su e d b ut d ish on or e d a nd the a uto mob ile deale rships were unable to re cover either the money

or the a utomobi le. These fac ts were not disputed. The extraneous ba d acts introduce d applied to the entire case . I n eleve n or twelve of the draf t transac tions appare ntly

the jury found this e vidence was insuffic ient—but the same e vidence convince d the jury

he wa s g uilty

on t h re e o r fo u r of the drafts. This provides some a dditional skepticism about the ver dict. III . Ve nue Wirth arg ues that venue was not prope r in Fa nnin County

beca use the State did not produce le g a lly or fa c tua lly su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e tha

t an o ff e ns e oc c ur

re d w ith in F ann in C ounty . T his

argume nt w a s n ot p re se nte d to the tr ia l c ourt

. Un le ss ve nu e is d isp ute d in the tr ia l c ourt , o r u

nle ss the re cord a ffirmatively

shows the contra

ry , we must presume that venue w as prove d in the trial court. T EX . R. A PP . P. 44.2(c) (1). I n a case in w hich thefts are ag g reg ated unde r Section 31.09 of the Te xas P e na l Co de , th e y be c ome e le me nts of

a sin g le c ri me and ve nu e is p ro pe r i n a ny c ounty in which the individual thefts or a ny element ther eof oc curr ed. State v. W eave r , 982 S.W .2d 892, 893 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ); see T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 31 .0 9 ( Ve rn on 20 03 ). Th e State pr op e rl y all eged ag g re g a te d o ff

e ns e s and

fu rt he r t hat on e of

fe ns e oc c ur

re d in F a nn in C ounty , T e xas. Ev ide nc e wa s p ro du c e d th a t a dr a ft fr om Wi rt

h L e a sin g wa s pres ent ed to a F ann in C ounty automobile deale r. Since the ve n u e i s s u e was not raised at trial and the re cord doe s not show19

improper ve nue, we must presume the ve nue issue was prope rly proved. Wirth' s point of error on venue is ove rruled. IV . Co nc lusi on We h a ve dis c us se d e a c h o f t he ite ms o f e vid e nc e that th e State pr op os e s in dic a te s th a t Wir th dece ived the automobile dea lers by promising a perf

ormanc e that he did not intend to keep or that he knew would not be performe d. After revie wing all of t his evidenc e in detail and studying the trial

re c or d d ili g e ntl y , w e c on c lud e the e vid e nc e is f a c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

the jur y ve rd ic t. I t is

so we a k th a t th e jur

y ' s v e rd ic t is c le arl y

wr on g and

un jus t. We re mand

the c a se fo r a

ne w tri a l.

J ack Ca rter J ustice Date Submitted: J uly 2, 2009 Date D ecide d: September 28, 2009 Pub lis h