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________________________________ Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan 48909

Chie f Justice Justices Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Clifford W. Taylor Robert P. Young, Jr. 

# Opinion

Stephen J. Markman FILED OCTOBER 22, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 121355 JOHN V. JONES, Defendant-Appellant.

PER CURIAM Defendant has applied for leave to appeal from the Court of Appeals order directing the trial court to immedi at ely revoke his bond. He argues that his pending application for

a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court is an “appeal” for the purpose of MCL 770.8, so that he remains entitled to be free on bond. We hold that an application for a writ of habeas corpus is not an appeal within the meaning of MCL 770.8. We thus affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.I In1999, defendant conditionally p leaded guilty 1 to a charge of possessing 225 or more grams, but less than 650 grams, of cocaine inviolation of MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(ii), and the court sentenced him to a seven-and-one-half to thirty-year term of imprisonment. The plea agreement permitted defendant to appeal the legality of a search warrant that led to the discovery of the cocaine. The agreement also permitted defendant to remain free on bond “pending appeal.” The trial court accepted the plea, senten ced defendant in accordance withthe agreement, and entered an order that permitted him to be free on bond of $50,000 or ten percent pending appeal. The Court of Appeals denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal for lack of merit in the grounds presente d. 2 This Court also denied leave to appea l. 3 D efendant then petitionedthe United States Supreme Cou rt for a writ of

1 Conditional pleas are permitted under MCR 6.301(C)(2) (permitting conditional pleas to preserve for appeal specified pretrial rulings and entitling the defendant to withdraw his plea if the specified pretr ial ruling is overturned on appea l); see also People v Reid , 420 Mich 326; 362 NW2d 65 5 (1984).

2 Unpublishedorder, entered Augus t 30, 2000 (Docket No. 228299).

3 463 Mich 976; 623 NW2d 599, reconsiderationden 463 Mich 976 (2001). 2certiorari, which it denied. 4 The prosecutor the n moved in the trial court to revoke defendant’s bond. While that motion was p ending , defendant filedan applicationfor a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of M ichi gan pursuant to 28 USC 2254. The prosecutor argued before the trial court that the federal habeas corpus proceeding was an independent civil action rather than a continuation of direct appellate review, and that the trial court therefore no longer hadauthority to continue bond. The trial court denied the prosecutor’s motion, but increased defendant’s bond to $100,000. The p ro secutor then filed an emergency application for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversedan d or dered the trial court to immediately revoke defendant’s b ond and remand him to the custody of the Department of Corrections. 5 Defendant then file d in t his Court an applicationfor leave to appeal and a motion for stay of proceedings. We denied the motion for stay while we

4 Jones v Michigan , 534 US 954; 122 S Ct 354; 151 L Ed 2d 267 (2001).

5 Unpublishedorder, entered Apr il 4, 2002 (Docket No. 239673), clarified, unpublished order, entered April 22, 2002 (clarifying that the prio r orde r had immediate effect under MCR 7.215[F][2]). 3consideredthe application for leave to app eal. 6 We now affirm. II Defendant argues that he is entitledto remain at liberty during the pendency of his application for a writ of habeas corpus because the federal proceeding is an app eal fo r the purpose of MCL 770.8. This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. Lesner v Liquid Disposal, Inc , 466 Mich 95, 99; 643 NW2d 553 (2002). MCL 770.8 provides: During the time between the trial court judgment and the decision of the court to which an appeal is taken, the trial judge may admit the def endant to bail, if the offense charged is bailable and if the offense i s no t an assaultive crime as defined in section 9a of this chapter. This provision permits b ail only during the process of appeal . The statute does not define the word “appeal,” so we may consult a dictionary to ascertain the meaning of the term. Consumers Power Co v Public Service Comm , 460 Mich 148, 163,

n10; 596 NW2d 126 (1999) (citing MCL 8.3a). The Legislature requ ire s that “technical words and phrases, and such as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law,

6 644 NW2d 762 (2002). 4shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar andappropriate meaning.” MCL 8.3a. B ecause “appeal” is a legal term of art, resort to a legal dictionary to determine its meaning is app ropriate. See Consumers Power , 460 Mich 163. An “appeal” is “[r]esort to a superior (i.e., appellate) court to review the decisionof an inferior (i.e., t rial) court or administrative agency. A complaint t o a higher tribunal of an error or injustice committed by a lower tribunal, in which the error or injustice is sought to be corrected or reversed.” Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed). This definition does not describe the instant rela tio nshipin which state courts are not “inferior” to or “lower” than federal courts, and fed eral c ourts are not “superior” to or “higher” than state courts. Rather, such courts constitute separate systems of justice. 28 USC 2254 does not grant federal courts the power of appellate review of state court convictions. Rather, it provides for an original proceeding in a fede ral court challenging the custody of a person who is detained under a judgment of a state court. It sets forth a proce ss o f “application” for a writ and denominates one who seeks a writ as an “applicant” rather than an “appellant.” In short, the statute does not provide for direct or appellate review of the 5state court judgment of conviction an d s entence. 28 USC 2254(a)-(h). Moreover, as the United States Supreme Court has explained: The whole history of the writ—its unique development—refutes a construction of the federal courts’ habeas corpus powers that would assimilate their task to that of cou rts of appellate review. The function on habeas is different. It is to test by way of an original civil proceeding, independent of the normal channels of review of cri mina l judgments, the very gravest allegations. State prisoners are entitled to relief on federal habeas corpus only upon proving that their detention violates the fundamental liberties of the person, safeguardedagainst state action by the Federal Constitution. [ Townsend v Sain , 3 72 US 293, 311­ 312; 83 S Ct 745; 9 L Ed 2d 770 (1963), o verrule d inpart on other grounds Keeney v Tamayo-Reyes , 504 US 1; 112 S Ct 1715; 118 L Ed 2d 318 (1992).] Similarly, Michigan case law has long distinguished applications for the writ of habeas corpus from appeals from criminal proceedings: Habeas co rpus is a civil proceeding the main purpose of whichis to cause the release of persons illegally confined, to inquire into the authority of law by which a person is deprived of hi s liberty. Application for the writ of habeas corpus is not made in the criminal proceedings; it is made ina new andindependent civil action instituted to enforce a civil right , the right to liberty. [ People v McCager , 367 Mich 116, 121; 116 NW2d 205 (1962)(citations omitted).] See also In re Palm , 255 Mich 632, 634; 23 8 NW 7 32 (1931) (“The writ of habeas corpus cannot function as a writ of 6error”). A

federal district court considering an applicationunder 28 USC 2254 is simply a trial court exercising original jurisdiction over an application for a writ authorized under federal law. See 28 USC 133 1. That its habeas corpus jurisdictionpermits it, under carefully defined circumstances, to scrutinize state court proceedings for allegedviolations of the United States Constitution and federal laws does not transform the f eder al district court into a superior appellate court with jurisdiction to reverse the judgment of a prisoner’s conviction. Rather, its power is limitedto granting a writ that compels the release of the prisoner from unlawful detention. Accordingly, w e hold that an application for a writ of habeas corpus does not constitute a criminal “appeal” within the meaning of MCL 770.8. A court’s authority to grant a bond under MCL 770.8 is limited to the time during the appellate process, and federal habeas corpus proceedings are not a continuation of that process. III For the foregoing reasons we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. C ORRIGAN , C.J., and C AVANAGH , WEAVER , K ELLY , T AYLOR , Y OUNG , and 7M ARKMAN , JJ., concurred.

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