* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### NOV 1 1999 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 99-8015

v. District of Wyoming DAVID CAMPOS-CAMPOS,

Defendant-Appellant. (D.C. NO. 97-CR-125-B)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before TACHA , MCKAY , andHENRY , Circuit Judges.

On November 20, 1997, David Campos-Campos was indic ted by a federal grand jury in Cheyenne, Wyoming. He was charged wi th possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and aiding and abetting i n violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (count1), possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and aiding and abetting i n violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B) (count 2), and illegal r e-entry of a deported alien in-2-

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (count 3). After t he district court denied his motion to suppress physical evidence, Mr. Campos-Campos entered conditional pleas of guilty to all counts, preserving his rightto appeal the denial of his suppression motion. On appeal, Mr. Campos-Campos argues that he did notconsent to the automobile search and that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence found during that search. Becaus e we agree with the district court’s determination that Mr. Campos-Campos consented to the search of the entire vehicle, we affirm the denial of his motion to suppress.

I. BACKGROUND Mr. Campos-Campos and co-defendant Ricardo Mendoza were traveling east on I-80 near Laramie, Wyoming, when they were spotted by Wyoming Highway Patrol Officer David Chatfield. Due to the make of their vehicle—a Crown Victoria with a large trunk and tinted window s—and its California license plates, Officer Chatfield decided to follow and obs erve Mr. Campos-Campos and Mr. Mendoza. His radar indicated the vehicle was t raveling ninety-one miles per hour, so Officer Chatfield pursued and stopped it at 10:51 a.m. Officer Chatfield approached the driver’s side of the car and explained he stopped the vehicle for speeding. The driver, Mr. Campos-Campos, spoke in-3-

Spanish to Mr. Mendoza, who informed Officer Chatfi eld that Mr. CamposCampos did not speak English. Through translation, Officer Chatfield requested an d received the driver’s license and registration for the automobile. The a ddress on Mr. Campos-Campos’ driver’s license matched that on the vehicle regist ration, but he claimed he was too nervous to recall the owner’s name. Officer Ch atfield requested identification from the passenger, then returned to his patrol carwith the documents. While awaiting an NCIC and license plate checks, Of ficer Chatfield requested the assistance of Officer Dyer, fluent inSpanish. Primarily due to Mr. Campos-Campos’ nervousness, Officer Chatfield suspe cted drug trafficking, so he also requested a canine unit. Because the NCIC rep ort came back negative and the license plate check revealed that the vehicle h ad not been reported stolen, Officer Chatfield prepared the traffic citation. After the canine unit arrived approximately ten min utes later, Officer Chatfield approached the driver’s side of the vehic le. When he arrived, Mr. Campos-Campos accurately volunteered the name of th e owner and admitted that he understood some English. Officer Chatfield deli vered a copy of the citation, an envelope, and a court slip, then explained the i tems in English. He then asked Mr. Campos-Campos, in English, if he understood what he had been told. Mr. Campos-Campos responded affirmatively.-4-

Officer Chatfield then stated, “Okay. You’re good to go.” Rec. vol. II, at 28. He asked if Mr. Campos-Campos had any question s. Mr. Campos-Campos replied, “No.” Id. When asked, Mr. Campos-Campos expressed a willing ness to answer additional questions. The patrolman then as ked whether the occupants of the vehicle possessed any drugs or large sums of mo ney. Mr. Campos-Campos answered, “No.” Id. at 29. Officer Chatfield then inquired, “Do you m ind if I search your car for drugs and money?” Id. Mr. Campos-Campos did not object and “popped the trunk with the button.” Id. The exchange was recorded by Officer Chatfield , and the District Court found “t hat the officers went out of their way to insure [sic] that miscommunication did not o ccur and that consent was freely given.” Rec. vol. I, doc. 44, at 5 (Order D enying Defendants’ Motion to Suppress) [hereinafter Order]. The dog failed to alert and Officer Chatfield found no drugs in the trunk. At the same time, Officer Dyer asked, in English an d from the passenger side, if he could look in the backseat. Mr. Mendoza “turned around to his right and over his right shoulder unlocked the back door on the ri ght side,” but said nothing. Rec. vol. II, at 85. Mr. Campos-Campos gave no rea ction to Officer Dyer’s question. See id. at 97. Officer Dyer entered the back seat area, t ugged at the back seat, and saw packages of contraband.-5-

The arrest took place at 11:59 a.m. A later search of the automobile revealed approximately twelve bricks of marijuana b ehind the seat, as well as four bricks of cocaine and one brick of marijuana in the spare tire.

II. DISCUSSION Mr. Campos-Campos claims that the search went beyon d the scope of his consent. He further contends that the search of th e interior of the vehicle was illegal, because the passenger, Mr. Mendoza, lacked authority to consent when he unlocked the rear door to give access. The government contends that Mr. Campos-Campos lack ed standing to challenge the search, because he failed to establis h a possessory right in the vehicle or the drugs found therein. Even if he did have standing, the government contends that Mr. Campos-Campos consented to the se arch and made no effort to object or stop Mr. Mendoza from unlocking the door. Because standing is a threshold issue, we address it before the merits of the appeal.

A. Did Mr. Campos-Campos establish the necessary pos sessory interest and expectation of privacy to challenge the search?-6-

In the district court the United States argued Mr. Campos-Campos lacked standing to challenge the search, because he was no t the owner of the vehicle. The district court did not directly address standin g in its written order, implicitly finding standing to exist. When there is no disput e concerning the relevant facts, we review issue of standing de novo . See United States v. Rascon , 922 F.2d 584, 586 (10th Cir. 1990). In support of its argument that Mr. Campos-Campos f ailed to establish the necessary possessory interest and reasonable expect ation of privacy for standing to challenge the search, the United States relies o n United States v. Betancur , 24 F.3d 73, 76 (10th Cir. 1994), United States v. Rubi o-Rivera , 917 F.2d 1271, 1275 (10th Cir. 1990), Rascon , 922 F.2d at 586, United States v. Arango , 912 F.2d 441, 445 (10th Cir. 1990), and United States v. Erickson , 732 F.2d 788, 790 (10th Cir. 1984). In each of those cases, the police officer inquired as to t he defendant’s possession of the automobile. Where, upon inquiry, the defendant fai led to establish any connection to the owner or a person with authority to grant possession, we found no standing. Where the defendant established a sli ght connection to the owner, we found standing to exist. For example, in United States v. Soto , 988 F.2d 1548, 1553 (10th Cir. 1993), the defendant stated that he borrowed the automobile from his uncle, the registration matched his uncle’s name, and a comput er check revealed that it had-7-

not been reported stolen. We held that those facts conferred standing to the defendant. See id. Here, Mr. Campos-Campos accurately volunteered th e owner’s name, the address on his driver’s license m atched that on the registration, and a computer check revealed that the automobile h ad not been reported stolen. Apparently satisfied with Mr. Campos-Campos’ posses sory right, Officer Chatfield returned the license and registration wit hout inquiring further. Consequently, he sought consent to search the vehic le. Given these facts, we hold that Mr. Campos-Campos established a sufficiently v alid possessory interest in the automobile and reasonable expectation of privac y to challenge the search.

B. Did Mr. Campos-Campos consent to the search of th e interior of the automobile? Mr. Campos-Campos claims that while he may have con sented to the search of the trunk, he did not consent to the search of t he automobile interior. The District Court determined that the act of opening t he trunk in response to a request to search the trunk and car manifested his consent to search the entire vehicle: “consent to the search was freely and volu ntarily given.” Order at 4. The District Court further found that Mr. Campos-Campos “acquiesced through his silence” to the request to search the back seat . Id. at 5. In so holding, the District Court noted “interviews with both Defendants following their arrest-8-

revealed that they had understood the search reques ts and had freely consented.” Id. When we review an order denying a motion to suppres s, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the governm ent and accept the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. See United States v. Gama-Bastidas , 142 F.3d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir. 1998). We conclud e that the District Court did not commit clear error. “It is clear that the scope of a consent search is limited by the breadth of the consent given.” United States v. Pena , 920 F.2d 1509, 1514 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied , 501 U.S. 1207 (1991). In evaluating the scope of a suspect’s consent, we apply an “objective reasonableness” standard: “what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the ex change between the officer and the suspect?” United States v. McRae , 81 F3d. 1528, 1537 (10th Cir. 1996) (quotations omitted). Considering the “totality of the circumstances” and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the gov ernment, we determine “[w]hether a search remains within the boundaries o f the consent” given. Pena , 920 F.2d at 1514-15. Mr. Campos-Campos claims that, due to the language barrier, there was “significant confusion,” Aplt. Reply Br. at 4, but this assertion is without merit. The district court specifically found that the offi cers went out of their way to-9-

ensure that no language barrier existed. See Order at 5. A review of the record reveals scant evidence to the contrary. The office rs asked if they could search the trunk and car for drugs or money. Mr. Campos-Campo s’ response was to open the trunk. Clearly, the act of opening the trunk m anifested consent to search that part of the vehicle. See United States v. Gordon , 173 F.3d 761, 766 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Non-verbal conduct, considered with other f actors, can constitute voluntary consent to search.”). One may reasonably conclude that the act of opening the trunk also gave consent to search the interior of the vehicle, sinc e that portion was included in the question. See id. Had Mr. Campos-Campos’ consent not included the automobile interior, he was obliged to object when the search went too far. See id. (“We consistently and repeatedly have held a defendant’s failure to limit the scope of a general authorization to search, and failure to obj ect when the search exceeds what he later claims was a more limited consent, is an indication the search was within the scope of consent.”); see also Pena , 920 F.2d at 1514-15 (holding that where a suspect does not limit the scope of a searc h, and does not object when the search exceeds what he later claims was a more limi ted consent, an officer is justified in searching the entire vehicle); McRae , 81 F.3d at 1538; United States v. Wacker , 72 F.3d 1453, 1470 (10th Cir. 1995); United State s v. Espinosa , 782 F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir. 1986).-10-

Mr. Campos-Campos rightly claims that because Mr. M endoza lacked any common authority over the automobile, he could not consent to the search; therefore, the government can not rely on any conse nt given by Mr. Mendoza. See United States v. Matlock , 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). Nonetheless, the government relied on Mr. Campos-Campos’ own consent , so Mr. Mendoza’s authority is irrelevant. Mr. Campos-Campos also claims that he did not have the opportunity to object to the search of the interior. According to his own brief, however, he made no response whatsoever and just stared straight ahe ad when Officer Dyer asked if he could search the backseat. See Aplt. Br. at 9. Had the request been beyond the scope of his consent, he would have assuredly r eacted in some manner to the question or to Mr. Mendoza’s act of unlocking the d oor. Perhaps if he had given some reaction or protestation, but Officer Dyer hadjumped into the rear too soon to be stopped, the argument would have merit. Thatis not the case here. Considering the totality of the circumstances, Mr. Campos-Campos consented to the search of the trunk, as well as th e interior of the vehicle. He did not limit the scope of that consent. Thus, the Dis trict Court correctly denied his motion to suppress.

III. CONCLUSION-11-

In summary, we agree with the district court that M r. Campos-Campos consented to the search of the entire vehicle. Acc ordingly, we AFFIRM the denial of the motion to suppress. ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Robert H. Henry Circuit Judge