### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 5 -00 356 -CV

Buffalo Equit ie s, Lt d. , A ppe lla nt

v. The City of Au stin , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 98TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. GN501665 , HO NORAB LE MARGARET A. COO P ER , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Buf falo Equities, L td. (“B EL ”) w anted to deve lop its prope rty for r esidential and
commerc ial purposes a

nd applied to have its prope rty appropr iately re- zoned. Part of the propose d development c onsisted of improvements to an e aseme nt BEL owns that runs ac ross its neighbor ’s proper ty . The City

of Austin ag ree d to re-zone B EL ’s pr o p er t y . Howeve r, a City employ ee, Gr e g or y Gu e rn se y , la

te r wro te a

le tte r t o B EL

inf or min gB EL

that it s d e ve lop me nt p lan s f or its
e a s e m e n td i d

n o tc o m p l y w i t h t h e r e l e v an tz o n i n g r e s t r i c t i o n s o nB E L ’ s n e i g hb o r ’ s p r o p e rt y. Fur ther, Gue rnsey

stated that B EL , as an e aseme nt owner, c ould not file to have its n ei gh b o r’s proper ty re- zoned. Ra the r t ha n a pp e a lin g Gu e rn se y ’s de te rm inatio n or se e kin g a pp ro va l f ro m th e City fo r i ts d e ve lop me nt p lans , B EL , in li g ht o f Gue rn se y ’s le tte r, fi le d s uit a g a ins t th e City
se e kin g va

ri ou s d e c laratio ns and

arguin g tha

t th e City ’s a c tio ns c on sti tut e d a n im pe rm iss ibl eAt the tim e the a g re e me nt w a s e nte re d, Spe e dy Sto p w a s n ot t

he ow ne r o f t

he pr op e rt

y in 1 question. Howeve r, by

the time this lawsuit was filed, Spee dy Stop had purcha sed the prope rty . For ease of re ading , we will re fer to the owner

of the prope rty

as Speedy

Stop. A l t h o u g h B E Lo r i g i n a l l y c h ar a c t e r i z e d t h e p a v e d p o rt i o n o f t h e e a s e m e n ta s a dr i v e w ay, 2 it co n t en ds on appea l that the strip is actually an “a cce ss street.” See Austin, Tex., C ode § 25-4- 157(A)( 1) (de fining “ac cess stre et” a s “stree t that pr ovides acc ess to a sub-division by connec ting to a n external street” ). Howeve r, bec ause the distinction i s not releva nt to our ultim ate c onclusion, we will re fer

to the strip as a drive way . 2 regulatory

taking of BEL ’s prope rty
. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 37.001-.011 (We st 1 99 7 & Sup p. 20 07 ) ( de c larator y jud g me nt a c t) ; S

h e ff ie ld D e v . Co

. , I

n c . v . City of Gle nn He igh ts , 140 S.W .3d 660, 672-73 (Tex
. 2004) (ex plaining when reg ulatory taking may occur ). The distr ic t c o u rt d is mi s s e d

B E L ’ s r e g u lato r

y ta k in g s c la im

f o r la c k o f ju r is d ic ti o nan d

d e c la r e d that BEL ’s intended use for the ease ment did not comply with the zoning re strictions on the proper ty and that an e a s e me n t o w n e r ma y n o t in it iate r e - zo n in g p r o c e d u r e s . B E L a

p p e a ls th e ju d g me n t of the district court. We will dismi ss one of B EL ’s claims for want of subjec t-matt er j u risdiction and aff irm the rema ining por

tions of the district court’s judg ment.

BACK GR OUND BEL owns approximately

119 acr es in Travis County . I n 1 9 9 7 , i t entered into an
ease ment ag ree ment with one of its neig hbors, Speedy Stop. Although the re a

re ot h er m eans of 1 enter ing a nd exit ing B EL ’s prope rty , the ea sement af fords B ELacce s s t o h ighw ay 290—a major highw ay in Austin—through a

drivewa y over Spee dy

Stop’s property

that is p ar t o f a sig nalized 2 intersec tion with the highwa y . BEL wanted to de velop a lar g e portion of its proper ty in to r e sidential and commer cial
are a s, and in 20 00 , B EL a pp lie d to have its pr op e rt y re -zo ne d a s a “ pla

nn e d un it d e ve lop me nt”Although not releva nt to the ul timate outcome of this case , we do note that Speedy Stop 3 has eng ag ed in c ommercia l a ctivities on its prope rty for y ear s. See Austin, Tex., C ode § 25-2- 222 (providing that, in ge nera l, property annexed by City will initially be desig nated a s rura l residenc e district reg ardle ss of proper ty ’s ac tual use). 3 (“PUD” ), which is the de signation given to “ larg e or c omplex single or multi-use deve lopment that is planned as a

single contig uous project a nd that is under un i fi ed contr ol.” See Austin, Tex., Code § 25-2-144. The City approve d the re -zoning re quest. Th ro ug h d isc us sio ns B E L h a d w i th v ari ou s Ci ty

e mpl oy e e s a

bo ut d e ve lop ingthe fi rs t phase of the PUD, B ELwas infor

med that the City would probably not approve BEL ’s plans for the first phase of

its proposed deve l o p m en t. I n response to these discussions, BEL asked the City ’s De ve lop me nt Se rv ic e s Mana g e r, Gr e g or y Gu e rn se y , to iss ue a

state me nt c on c e rn ingB EL ’s pla ns . Shortly there afte r, Gue rnsey sent BEL a letter in which he stated that BEL ’s proposed dr iveway over t h e e a s e m e n t d i d

n o tc o mp l y

w i t h t h e z o n i n g r e s t r i c t i o n s o nB E L’ s n e i g hb o r ’ s p r o p e rt y . In particula r, Gue rnsey

stated that Speedy

S t o p ’s p roperty

was zoned as a

“rur al re sidence district,” which is the desig nation used “f or a low de nsity

residential use on a lot that is a m i n i m u m o f one
acr e,” see Austin, Tex., Code § 25-2-54, but conclude d that BEL ’s proposed de velopment for the 3
e a se me nt co ns tit

ute d a “c omm e rc ia l dri ve wa y .” F ur the r, Gu e rn se y op ine d that BE L c ou ld not a pp ly to have Spee dy

Stop’s property

re- zoned for commer cial p u rposes be cause BEL did not own the proper ty . After rec eiving the l etter, BEL asked the City ’s Z oning a nd Platting Commiss ion to issue
a re quest to re- zone Speedy Stop’s pr operty for commerc ial purposes, but the Commi ssion denied that reque st. See id. § 25-2-242 (providing that, among other g roups, re -zoning of pr operty may be initiated by

City Council, L and Use Commi ssion, and rec ord owne r of pr operty ).I n it s p e tit ion , B EL a lso ma de se ve ra l c la ims a g a ins t Spee dy Sto p. Ho we ve r, the c la ims 4 a g a ins t Spe e dy Sto p we re su bs e qu e ntl y se ve re d fr om the c la ims a g a ins t th e City . T his a pp e a l on ly conce rns the cla ims ag ainst the City
. 4

I n 2004, BEL

filed suit a g ainst the City . I n its petiti on, BEL soug ht a dec laration that the City ’s rules a

nd regulations do not pro h i b i t t he use of the drivew ay

as par t of the PUD development. Alternatively , BEL soug ht a dec laration that the owner of an ea sement may

file an
a pp lic a tio n to re -zo ne the pr op e rt y up on wh ic h it s e a se me nt i s l ocat ed. F ina lly , B EL br ou g ht a regulatory

taking s claim ag ainst the Ci t y , as s er t ing that by prohibiting B ELfrom building the dr i v e w ay, t h e C i t y h a s “ u n r e a s o n a b l y i n t e r f e r e d w i t h [ B E L ] ’ s r i g h tt o u s e an d e n j o y” i t s p r o p e rt y. 4 I n response , the City filed a ple a to the jurisdiction, contendingthat the district court did not have jurisdiction over the case beca use BEL had failed to e x haust its a dminist rative r emedies prior to filing suit. I n particula r, the City

argued that B ELfail ed t o p roper ly appea l Guernse y ’s deter mination that the proposed development on the ea sement wa s a commer cial drive way and that the drivew ay

did not comply

with the rele vant zoning re strictions. Both B ELand the City filed cross-motions for summar y judgme nt. After revie wi n g the var ious moti ons, the district court dismissed BEL ’s re g ulatory t a k i n g s c l a i m o n t h e g r o u n d t h a tt h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtd i d n o th a v e j u r i s d i c t i o nt o h e ar t h e c l a i m . In addition, the district court orde red that BEL ’s intended use for the dr iveway and ea sement did not comply with the rele vant zoning re strictions beca use the zoning f

or the prope rty

on which the
ease ment rests did not match the PUD’s zoning restric tions. I n particular, the cour t declar ed that BEL ’s intended use for the e aseme nt qualified as a n “ac cessor

y use” to the P UD and that the zoning f o r a c c e s s o r y u s e s mu s t b e c o n s is te n t w it h th e zo n in g f

o r th e “ p r inc ipal use.” See Austin, Tex.,5

Code §§ 25-2-891 ( providing , in releva nt part, that ac cessor

y use is use t hat is incidental to and
c us tom ari ly

a sso c iate d w ithpr inc ipa l us e ), 25 -2 -8 92 (s tatin g that, i n g e ne ra l, r e g ulatio ns a pp lic a ble to principal use a

pply to acc essory

use). F urthermor e, the c ourt dec lare d that BEL , as an e aseme nt
ow ne r, may

no t in iti a te re -zo nin g pr oc e dure s f or the pr op e rt

y on wh ic h its e a se me nt r e sts be c a us e BEL was not the “re cord owner ” of the proper ty
. BEL appea ls the judgme nt of the district court.
SCO P E A ND STA ND AR D O F RE VI EW The standa

rds for obtaining a traditional summary judgme nt are well established: the movant must show that there is no g enuine issue of materia l f

act and that he is e ntitled to judgment
as a matter of law ; in deciding whether there is a disputed material f act issue pr ecludingsummary jud g me nt, the c ourt

mus t ta ke e vid e nc e fa

vo ra ble to t he no nmo va

nt a s tr ue , in du lg e e ve ry

re a so na ble infere nce in f

av o r o f t he nonmovant, and r esolve a ny doubts in the nonmovant’s favor
. Se rg e an t E

nte rs. , I nc . v . S tra y ho rn , 112 S.W .3d 241, 245 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 2003, no pe t.) (citing Cat he yv . B oo th , 9 00 S.W. 2d

33 9, 34 1 ( Te x. 19 95 ); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co. , 690 S.W .2d 546, 54 8- 49 (T e x. 19 85 )) ; see Tex. R. C iv. P. 166a(c). I f the movant e stabl i s h es a r ight to summary judgme nt, the burden shifts to the nonmovant, who must present summary -judg ment evidenc e to the trial court r aising a g enuine issue of materia l fac t to preclude summary judgme nt. Cannon v. Texas Indep. Bank

, 1 S.W .3d 218, 223 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, pet. denied)
. I f t he evide nce r aises no more than a

surmise or suspicion of a fac t i n issue, no g enuine issue of fac t exi sts to defeat summary judgme nt. Selz v. Friendly Chevrolet, Ltd. , 1 5 2 S.W .3d 833, 837 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) (c iting W

iggins v. Ove rstreet , 962 S.W .2d 198, 200 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dis t.] 1998, writ denied) ). We revie w the trial c ourt’s dec i s i o n t o grant summary judgme nt de novo.6

Sergeant Enters., I

nc. , 1 1 2 S
. W
. 3 d

at 2 4 5 (c i t i n g N

a tividad v. Alex

sis, Inc. , 875 S.W .2d 695, 699 (Tex. 1994)).

When the parties f

ile cross-motions for summ ary judgme nt and whe n the trial cour t g rants one motion and denies the other, the non-pre vailing pa rty may appea l the denial of its motion
as well as the de cision to gr ant the pre vailing pa rty ’s motion. Id. I n this sit uation, an appe llate cour t should r eview the summary judgme nt e vidence from both side s and deter mine all t h e q u est ions prese nted. FM Pr op s. Op e ra tin g Co. v . Cit y of Au sti n , 22 S.W .3d 868, 872 (Tex. 2000). After
re vie wi ngthe e vid e nc e , th e a pp e llate c ourt

“ sh ou ld r e nd e r t

he jud g me nt t

hat th e tr ia l c ourt

sh ou ld have r ender ed.” Id.
DI SCU SSIO N

On appe al, B EL raises three issues. I n particula r, BEL argues that the district cour t
err ed in issuing its first declar ation in favor of the City , in declar ing that an ea sement owne r may not seek to re -zone the prope rty upon which its ease ment rests, and in dism i s s i n g BEL ’s re g ulatory taking s claim. I n response , the City argues (1) that this Court does not h av e subj ect- matter jurisdiction over B EL ’s first cla im be cause BEL failed to e x haust its administ rative r emedies be fore filing this lawsuit, (2) that the district court’s second declaration was corre ct, and (3) that the district court c orre ctly

conclude d that it did not have jurisdiction over B EL ’s re g ulatory taking s claim. For the re as o ns that follow, we c onclude that we do not have jurisdiction over BEL ’s first cla im but conclude that the district c ourt’s second decla ration was proper . We a lso conclude that the district
c ourt ’s de te rm inatio n th a t it did no t ha ve jur isd ic tio n o ve r B EL ’s thi rd c la im w a s p ro pe r. F or

e a se7

of re a din g , w e wi ll f

ir st a dd re ss the jur isd ic tio na l ar g ume nts a s the y re late to the fi rs t and thi rd c la im. Finally , we will addr ess the mer its of BEL ’s sec ond claim.
F irst De clarat ion

Although it did not file a notice of appe al, the City asser ts on appea l that the district court did not have jurisdiction over B EL ’s first dec laration and should ha ve g rante d its plea to the jurisdiction on that issue. See University of Tex. Sw. Me d. Ctr. v. Loutz enhiser , 140 S.W .3d 351, 358 (T e x. 20 04 ) ( e xpla ini ngtha t su bje c t- matte r j ur isd ic tio n c ann ot b e wa ive d an d ca n b e ra ise d f

or fi rs t time on appea l by

parties or court and that courts have obligation to ascerta in whether jurisdiction exis ts reg ardle ss of whethe r par ties question its ex istence)
. A deter mination of whether

a cour t has jurisdiction over a c laim presents a question of law. Harris County v. Syke s , 136 S.W .3d 635, 638 (T e x. 20 04 ); Texas De

p’t of Parks &W

ildlif e v. M iranda , 133 S.W .3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). A plea to the jur isdiction “is a dilatory plea that seeks dismissal of a ca se for lack of subject matter jur isdiction.” Syke s , 1 36 S.W. 3d a t 638. A p la int if f h a s th e burd e n o f a lle g ingfa c ts that demonstrate that a court has jurisdiction over the c laims. See M iranda , 133 S.W .3d at 226. To preva il, a defe ndant must e stablish that there is a n “incur able jurisdictional defe ct on the fa ce of the pleading s.” City of Austi n v. Range l , 1 8 4 S. W. 3 d 3 7 7 , 3 8 4 ( T e x. A p p . — A u s ti n2 0 0 6 , n o p e t. )
. We construe ple ading s in favor of the pleade r, but “[i] f the plea dings a ffirmatively neg ate the e x istence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may be g rante d without a llowing the pl ai n t i ff s an opportunity

to amend.” Miranda , 133 S.W .3d at 226. The City contends that Gue rnsey ’s letter c onsti t u t ed a “use classification” deter mination that BEL should have appea led i f i t was unhappy with the determination. The City ’sBEL does not dispute that the di rec tor deleg ated this authority to Guernse y

or ar g ue that 5 this ty pe of de leg ation is improper. 8 code a uthorizes the director of

the Neig hborhood Planning and Z on i n g De partment to make useclassification determinations “for an existi ng or propose d use or a ct i v i t y .” See Austin, Tex., C o d e § 2 5
- 2

- 2
. A c c o r d i n g t o t h e C i t y, t h e d i r e c t o r h a s d e l e g a t e d

t h i s a u t h o r i t y t o G u e r

n s e y. In 5 response to a re q u es t b y BE L , Guer nsey informed B ELthat its proposed use of the ease ment constituted a commer cial drive way that did not comply with the zoning re strictions on Speedy Stop’s proper ty . The Austin code provides that a pa rty dissatisfied with an “a

ppropriate use cla ssification” deter mination may

appea l the deter

mination to the Board of Adjustment. Austin, Tex., C ode § 25-2- 2; see also id. § 25-1-182 ( specify ing 20- day

deadline f

or app ea l i n g). Simil arly , the local g overnme nt code pr ovides that the Boa rd of Adjustment ma

y “hea r and decide an appea l that alleg es
e r r o r in a []
. . . d e te r

mi n a ti o n ma d e b y

an ad mi ni strat iv e off

ic ial in the enfor ceme nt of” a local
zon ingor din anc e . T e x. L oc a l G ov ’t Cod e Ann. § 211 .0 09 (a ) ( Wes t 20 08 ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) ; see id. § 211.010 (deta iling who may file appe al with Boa

rd of Adjustment conc erningdecision made by “administrative of

fi ci al ”). F urther, the local g overnme nt code a lso specifies that a fter obta ining revie w by the B oard of

Adjustment, an ag g rieve d p ar ty may seek judicia l reviewof the B oard’ s deter mination. Id. § 211.011.

Courts h ave routinely

held that the administrative r emedies a vailable unde r the portions of the loca l gove rnment rele vant to this appea l must be exhausted befor e a party may seek judicial revie w of a deter

mination made by an administrative officia l. See, e .g. , City of S an An ton io v. El Dorado Amuse ment Co. , 195 S.W .3d 238, 250 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, pet. denied) ;9

W inn v. City of Irving , 7 70 S.W. 2d 10 , 1 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —D a lla s 1 98 9, no wr it) ; se e als o Grimes v. Stringer , 9 57 S.W. 2d 86 5, 86 9 ( Te x. Ap p. —T y le r 1 99 7, pe t. d e nie d) (c on str uin g ph ra se

“ may a pp e a l” in s tatut e to m e an th a t a g g ri e ve d p art y ha s d isc re tio n to a

pp e a l de te rm inatio n, bu t if party elec ts to, it must be appea led to administrative body specifie d in statute rathe r than to court). The re quirement of a dminist rative e x haus t ion compels a pa rty to “pursue a ll available r emedies within the administrative proce ss befor e seeking judicial relief .” Larry Koch, Inc. v . Texas Natural Res. Conser

v ation Comm’n , 52 S.W .3d 833, 839 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. denied). T he fa ilure to c omp ly

wi th t his re qu ir e me nt b e fo re se e kin g jud ic ia l r e vi ew dep rive s a c ourt of jur isd ic tio n to decide the ca se. Id.

B EL did no t a pp e a l G uerns e y ’s de te rm inatio n to the B oa rd of Ad jus tme nt. Conse q uently , the City ’s position has not officially been de termined throug h the administrative proce ss, and there is no justi ciable c ontroversy prese nt. W

inn , 7 70 S.W. 2d

a t 11 -1 2; see El Dorado Amuseme nt Co. , 195 S.W .3d at 250.

BEL claims that it wa s unnece ssary for it to exhaust it s administrative reme dies prior to f ili ngsu it b e c a

us e the re lie f i t so ug ht f

e ll wi thi n se ve ra l e xce pti on s to the e xha us tio n r e qu ir e me nt. On a pp e a l, B EL

ha s c ha ra c te ri zed the de c lara

tio n it or ig ina lly

so ug ht a s a

de c laratio n th a t “ the City has no discre tion to refuse to a cce pt, pr ocess a nd approve BEL ’s application based on its new and inv a lid c on dit ion

it h a s im po se d o n d e ve lop me nt o f t he B EL tr a c t and the City ha s e xce e de d it s
a uth or ity in s o d oin g .” I n o the r w or ds , B EL c la ims tha

t it is se e kin g a de c lara

tio n statin g that a s a
re su lt o f t he City a pp ro vin g its PUD de sig natio n, the City is e ff e c tiv e ly pr e c lud e d f

ro m im pr op e rl y imposing a c ondition on the proposed deve lopm en t o f BE L ’s proper ty at a late r stag e in theAlthough w e nee d not rea ch the mer it s of whethe r Gue rnsey ’s cha rac terization of the 6 intended use f

or the e aseme nt as a commercia l drivewa y was a n improper use classification, we do no te that a lth ou g h th e c od e do e s no t sp e c if ic a lly inc lud e “ c omm e rc ia l dr ive wa y s” in its lis t of

“ us e c la ssi fi c a tio ns ,” no thi ngin the c od e ind ic a te s th a t th e lis t is e xha us tiv e . In f

a c t, s e c tio n 2 5- 2- 2 s e e ms t o a c kn o w l e d g e t h a ta p r o p o s e d u s e m i g h tn o tf i tw i t h i no n e o f

t h e e nu m e r a t e d

c a t e g o r i e s . In particula r, the sec tion inst ructs the r eviewe r to “conside r the c hara cter istics of the proposed use and the similarities, if any , of the us e to oth e r cl a ssi fi e d use s. ” Au sti n, Te x., Co de § 2 5- 2- 2( B ) ( e mph a sis added) . Moreove r, the c ode does include drivewa y s within the description of a specific commerc ial use cla ssification, which is s o me indication that the City intended for

revie wer s to consider drivewa y s as par t of a “ use cla ssification” de termination. See id. 10 development a

pproval proc ess, e.g ., site- or building-pe rmit a pproval. B ELasser

ts that resolution of this issue involves, among other thing s, determinations of pur e questions of law and a deter mination of whether

a city employ ee ha s exceede d its au t h o ri ty : determinations that B EL claims do not require administrative exhaustion. See H enry v . K aufman County Dev . Dist. No. 1 , 150 S.W .3d 498, 503 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. g rante d and ca se re manded by ag r.). I n particula

r, B EL co ntends that the re solution of its first issue will involve consideration of whether

the City may condition the approva l of a site-plan application filed by BEL on “fulfillment of a

condi t i o n that is not required unde r either the PUD Ordina

nce or the Code.” Fur thermore , BEL

alleg es that re sol ution of the issue will involve a deter mination of whether

the City ’s employ ees ma

y cre ate ne w use c lassifications without approva l by t h e C ity Council and
w h e t h e r t h e c r e a t i o no f

a n e w c l a s s i f

i c a t i o ni s “ b e yo n d

t h e s c o p e o f

” t h e e mp l o ye e ’ s a

u t h o r i t y. Spe c if ic a lly , B EL

argue s th a t th e City ’s c od e do e s not list a “ c omm e rc ia l dr ive wa y ” a s a ty pe of “ us e classification,” see Au sti n, Te x., Code §§ 25 -2 -1 (d e sc ri bin g “ ma jor us e c a te g or ie s” a s “ re sid e nti a l,
c omm e rc ia l, i nd

us tr ia l, c ivi c , a

nd a g ri c ult ur a l” ), 25-2 -4 (l ist ing

69 sp e c if

ic c omm e rc ia l us e classifications), and that the cr eation of this new ty pe of classification wa s bey ond Guer nsey ’s or the d i r e c t o r o f t h e N e i g hb o r

h o o d P l an n i n g an d

Z o n i n g D e p art m e n t ’ s a

u t h o r i t y. 611 As a preliminary matter, we note that BEL ’s cha rac terization of this iss ue on appe al differ s from what was stated in B EL ’s orig inal petition, whic h soug ht a decla ration “that the City

of Austin rules and re g ulations (including the L and De velopm en t Code) do not prohibit use of the dr i v e w ay ar e a i d e n t i f

i e d i nt h e 1 9 9 7 D r i v e w ay E a s e m e n tA g r e e m e n ta c r o s s [ r u r a l r e s i d e n t i a l l y] zoned property

to acc ess the . . . [PUD] , reg ardle ss of the use in the
. . . PUD.” This declar ation, by its terms, is factually

depende nt and does not pre sent pure que stions of law. Moreove r, the fa ct that a party sug g ests that the resolution of the issue a s framed on
a p p e a l m i g h ti n v o l v e s o m e d e t e r m i n a t i o n s o f l aw c an n o tb e t h e e n d

o f o u r j u r i s d i c t i o n a l i n qu i r

y; rathe r, we must a lso a scer tain whether the deter

mination of the “pur e questions of law ” spec ified ar e in fac t questions of law and, if so, whether addre ssing those questions, on their own, will resolve the actua l controver sy

at i ssue. A declaration that the C ity may not impose a condition for a pproval that is contra ry to the City ’s code will not resolve the contr oversy over w hether

Guer nsey ’s deter

mination and a pote ntial decision by the City to foresta ll development ar e improper and contr ary

to the City ’s
co d e. Simi larly , a dec laration that the Cit y ’s employ ees ma y not cre ate ne w use c lassifications without approval by

the City Council will not , o n i t s o wn , resolve the conflict of whether BEL ’s proposed improve ments to the ease men t wi ll violate releva nt zoni ng restric tions or whether Guer nsey ’s deter

mination that BEL ’s i ntended use for the ease ment was c ommercia l in nature wa s inacc urate or improper
.

The fir st issue on appea l will not be resolved by consideration of pure que stions of law and w ill invol ve conside ration of sig nificant fa ctual matter s, rende ring it an issue primed for administrative exhaustion. Moreove r, bec ause B ELhas by passed the a dminist rative pr ocess, we have no way of knowing what the City ’s ultimate r esponse to BEL ’s ar g uments would have be en.12 Although in pa

rt of its argument BEL conce des that Guer nsey ’s letter c onstitut ed a use dete rmination, albeit an improper one, B ELalso argues that the lettercould not constitute a usec la ssi fi c a tio n d e te rm inatio n. As de sc ri be d p re vio us ly , th e City ’s c od e do e s n ot s pe c if ic a lly lis t “commer cial drive way” as a ty pe of use classification, see Austin, Tex., C ode §§ 25-2- 1, 25-2-4, a nd for this rea son, BEL

contends that the le tter did not qualify as a use deter

mination. Ev e n a ssumin g that the le tte r wa s not a use de te rm inatio n an d that the le tte r wa s in fac t just an opinion by

one of the City ’s employ ees, w e would still conclude t h at we do not have jur isd ic tio n o ve r t

he c a se be c a

us e no jus tic ia

ble c on tr ov e rs y is p re se nt. Pr ior to f ili ngsu it, B EL

did
no t f ile an a c tua l si te -p lan a

pp lic a tio n, and

the City ha s, the re fo re , ta

ke n n o p os iti on

on wh e the r i t would approve an application. See Austin, Tex., C ode §§ 25-5- 1 (p ro v i d i n g , w ithc e rt a in e xce pti on s, t h at “as i t e p l an m u s t b e ap p ro v edan d re l ea s edu n d er

t h i s ch ap t er

b ef o re : (1 ) ap er s o nm ay

ch an ge the use of p ro p er ty ; (2) a pe rson may develop pr operty ; or (3) the building off icial may issue a bu ild ingpe rm it) ,” 25 -5 -1 49 (s tatin g that si te -p lan ap pli c ant may a pp e a l den ia l of its ap pli c a tio n to City Council). Consequently , if Guer nsey ’s letter w as not a use de termination, BE L has asked the dis tr ic t c ourt

and thi s Co ur

t to iss ue an a dvis ory op in ion r e g ard ingits futur e ri g hts if the City decide s to deny

BEL ’s application, and there is, theref ore, no a ctual contr oversy to resolve. See T h o ma s v. City of San Marcos , 4 77 S.W. 2d 32 2, 32 4 ( Te x. Civ . App .— Au sti n 1 97 2, no wr it) (conc luding that whe n City officia l sent proper

ty owner letter re questing owner cea se deve lopment of his pr op e rt

y , c ourt did no t ha ve jur isd ic tio n o ve r c la im b e c a us e ow ne r d id n ot f

ile fo r pe rm its to build on property

and, ther efor e, had not e x hausted a dminist rative r emedies)
. Acc ording ly , whether

th e letter is viewed as a

use dete rmination or not, this Court does not have jurisdiction over BEL ’s first issue. Consequently , we c onclude that the district c ourt13

sh ou ld h a ve g ra

nte d th e City ’s ple a

to t he jur isd ic tio n w ithre sp e c t to thi s is su e . M or e ov e r, be c a us e BE L a dmi ts th a t it d id n o t a p p e a l G u e r

n s e y ’ s d e te r

mi n a ti o n o r f

il e a s it e - p la

n a p p lication, we
c on c lud e that th e re c or d a ff ir mativ e ly ne g a te s th e e xist e nc e of jur isd ic tio n a

nd that di smi ssa l is appropr iate. See Tex
. R. Ap p. P. 4 3. 2 ( e xpla ini ngthat on e of pe rm iss ibl e ty

pe s o f a pp e llate jud g me nts is t o d ism iss ); South Tex. W ater Auth. v. Lomas , 223 S.W .3d 304, 308 (Tex. 2007) (dismissing ca se af

ter de termining court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over ca se).
Re gul at or y Ta king s C lai m

I n addition to the declar ations sought a g ainst the City , BEL al s o contends that the City ’s ac tions constitut ed a r egulatory taking of B EL ’s prope rty bec au s e b y

“deny ing [BE L ] t he
a bil ity to b uil d th e dr ive wa

y , [th e ] City

. . . h a s den ied [ BEL ] a ll e c on omi c a lly via ble us e of the ir proper ty and [the] C ity

. . . has unreasonably interfe red with [BEL ’s] rig ht to use and enjoy same.” Se e Ro wle tt/

20 00 v . C it

y of Rowle tt , 231 S.W .3d 587, 590-91 (Te x . App.—Dallas 2007, no pe t.) (e xpla ini ngthat c ity ’s pa ssa ge o f or din anc e may inj ur e pr op e rt

y ’s va lue or

us e fu lne ss, wh ic h, in some circ umstances, mig ht constitute taking)
.

T o b r in g a

r e g u lato r y ta k in g s c la im , th e c la im

mu s t b e r ip e f

o r r e solution. See Ma y he w v. To wn o

f Su nn y v ale , 9 64 S.W. 2d

92 2, 92 9 ( Te x. 19 98 ); see also Patterson v. Planne d Parenthood , 971 S.W .2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998) (explaining that ripene ss is nece ssary component of
su bje c t- ma tte r j ur isd ic tio n a nd c on c e rn s w he n a

c la im may be ma de ). F or a re g ulator y takin g s c la im to b e ri pe , “ the re mus t be a fi na l de c isi on

re g ard ing the a

pp lic a tio n of the re g ulatio ns to t he pr op e rt

y at issue.” Mayhe w , 964 S.W .2d at 929. A final decision usually occur s afte r a development plan ha s been f ormally reje cted by

a city and af ter the ci t y

has re jected the proper

ty owner ’s re quest for aI t is worth noting ag ain that B ELhas not ac tually filed a site-plan application to develop 7 its property

and that, conse quently , the City has not forma lly

ref used to ac cept a

n application. 14 varia nce. Id. at 929-30. In this contex t, the term “va rian ce ” i s applied flexibly and enc ompasses permits and other

applications that provide r elief that is si m i l ar t o a var iance
. City of Ho us ton v . Ko lb , 982 S.W .2d 949, 952 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1999, pet. denied)
. The purpose be hind requiringthe denial of a var iance or s i m i l ar reque sted relief is to give the city

an opportunity

to gr ant some for

m of relief

or make a policy

deci s i o n t h at will abrog ate the a lleg ed taking
. Id. The re quirement of a final dec ision stems, i n part, fr om the nee d to have suff icient evidenc e to be a

ble to compar e uses pr ohibited by the regulation with permissible uses that may be made of the af fec ted prope rt y i n order

to properly

asce rtain whe ther a

taking has in fac t occur

red. See M ayhew , 964 S.W .2d at 929. Al tho ug h B EL

re c e ive d a

le tte r f ro m a City

e mpl oy e e statin g that B EL ’s int e nd e d u se fo r t he e a se me nt d id n ot c omp ly wi th t he re le va nt zo nin g re str ic tio ns , B EL ha s not refe rr e d u s to any regulation or ca se that equates this t y p e o f l et t er w ith a reje ction of a de velopment plan, that
es t ab l i s h es t h at t h e r ec ei p to f t h i s t y p e o f l et t er fo re cl o s es co n t i nu ed d ev el o p m en t ap p ro v al t h ro u gh sit e -p lan a

pp lic a tio ns and

bu ild ing -p e rm it a

pp lic a tio ns , o r t

hat c ha ra c te ri zes thi s ty

pe of le tte r a s a fi nal dec ision on the matter. On the contr ary , the var ious reports and the ordinanc e g rantingthe 7 PUD desig nation all demonstrate that t h e C i ty has not fore closed the possibility that BEL will be able to deve lop the ease ment in question: quit e the c ontrary , they all contemplat e d evelopment of the ea sement. More over, e ven assuming that the letter is a r ejec tion of BEL ’s dev elopm ent plan, noth in g in

th e r e c o r d

d e mo n s tr a te s th a t B E Ls o u g h t a v ar ia n c e o r s im il ar r e li e f f r o m Gu ernse y ’s deter mination, and conseque ntly , the City has not issued a de nial of the re lief re quested.15 BEL insists that, in this case, it was unne cessa ry for B ELto file for a varia

nce in order for this Court to ha

ve jurisdiction ove r the c laim. Specifica lly , BEL contends that it is unnece ssary fo r ap ar t y t o fi l e w h at am o u n t s t o “f u t i l e v ar i an ce re qu es t s o r re -ap p l i ca t i o n s ” b ef o re fi l i n g a t ak i n gs claim. See id. at 929-30. Howeve r, nothing in the letter or the rema inder of the rec ord indicate s that BEL had bee n informed that it would have been f utile to petition fo r s o m e ty pe of r elief f

rom Guer nsey ’s deter

mination or that Guernse y and other officia ls would have be en u nr e c e p ti v e to B E L ’s
argume nts . F ur

the rm or e , B EL

pr e se nte d no e vid e nc e or te sti mony

fr om C ity

of fi c ia ls that th e City would not have c onsidered a llowing f o r a v ar i an ce o r some other form of r elief. Se e Kolb , 982 S.W .2d at 953-54 (de tailing test i m o n y of var ious officials that it would have be en futile for pro p e rty o w n e r to f il e f o r v ar ia n c e b e c a u s e c it y w o u ld n o t h a v e a

p p r o v e d it u n d e r any circ umstances)
.

Moreove r, the c ase B ELrelies on a s demonstrating that it would be futil e fo r BEL to file applications is distinguishable from this case. In Mayhe w , the May hews re quested a

pproval to build between 3,650 a

nd 5,025 proper

ties, but the May

hews modified their application by asking to d e v e lo p f

e w e r p r o p e rti e s a f

te r r e c e iv in g n e g a ti v e f

e e d b a c k f r o m t h e to w n ’ s zo n in g c o mm itte e. 964 S.W .2d at 931. Even after the May hews made the modification, the town of Sunny vale de nied a planne d development application, but the May hews did not file for a varia nce. 964 S.W .2d at 931. I n d e te rm ini ngthat th e c la im w a s r ipe , th e c ourt no te d th a t th e Ma

y he ws ’ p ro po se d mo dif

ic a tio n to their application might have, on its own, satisfied th e v ariance r equire ment. But e ven if the modification was not a va rianc e, the c o u rt co n cluded that it s till had jurisdiction because the May hews a lleg ed that they

co u l d not make an a dditional compromise to the number of pr operties that w e re to b e de ve lop e d b e c a us e any fu rt he r r e du c tio n w ou ld r e nd e r t he pr oject e c on omi c a llyThe City limit ed its jurisdictional arguments to BEL ’s first and third issues a nd does not 8 contend that this Court lacks jurisdiction over B EL ’s sec ond issue on appea l. Howeve r, we note that unlike the first issue, the s econd issue c oncer ns a pure question of law, r ender ing the deter mination appropr iate for

decision despite the f

act that B ELhad not exhaus t ed al l o f i ts administrative reme dies. See H

enry v . Kaufman County De v. Dist. No. 1 , 1 50 S.W. 3d 49 8, 50 3 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin 2004, pet. g rante d and ca se remanded by ag r.). Fur thermore , prior to filing suit, B ELwas infor med by a City employ ee that it would be unable to apply to re-zone Spee dy

Stop’s property , and B EL ’s petition to the Ci ty ’s Z oning a nd Plattin g C o m m i s sion to iss ue a r equest to re -zone Speedy Stop’s property

was de nied. Consequently , there is a “justiciable c ontroversy as t o t h e ri g hts and status of” the pa

rties , and the requested de clar ation will “actua lly resolve the controve rsy .” Brooks v. Northglen Ass’n , 1 41 S.W. 3d 15 8, 16 3- 64 (T e x. 20 04 ); see Tex as Dep’t of Pub. Sa fe ty v . M oo re , 98 5 S. W.2 d 1 49 , 1 54 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin 19 98 , n o p e t.) (e xpla ini ngthat ju sti c ia ble controve rsy

“is one in which a

rea l a nd substantial c ontroversy exis ts involvi ng a g enuine c onflict of tang ible interests and not mer ely a theor etical dispute” ).

16 unviable. Id. a t9 3 1

- 3 2
. In e s s e n c e , t h e c o u rtc o n c l u d e d t h a ta f t e r r e c e i v i n g a

r e j e c t i o nb y a

c i t y, pr op e rt y ow ne rs sh ou ld no t be re qu ir e d to su bmi t a dd iti on a l pe rm its fo r de ve lop me nt t hat would rende r the de velopment unprofitable befor e beingable to see k judicial relief
. Id. at 932. Fur

ther, the cour t in dicated that if the May hews ha d not made the e conomic alleg ation, the claim mig ht otherwise not be ripe. Id.

Neither of those circ umstances is pr esent here . BEL proposed no modification after
re c e ivi ngthe le tte r f

ro m G ue rn se y , a

nd B EL ha s n ot d e mon str a te d th a t any mo di fic a tio n to its proposed de velopment would re nder the development e conomically undesirable
. F o r a l l t h e r e a s o n s p r e v i o u s l y g i v e n , w e c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u rtc orre c tly deter mined that it did not have jurisdiction over B EL ’s re g ulatory taking s claim, aff

irm that portion of the district cour

t’s judgme nt, and over

rule B EL ’s third issue on appe al.
Second Declarat ion

I n addition to the f

irst declar ation previously discussed, B EL

a lso so ug ht a 8 d e c l ar a t i o nt h a t“ ano w n e r o f ane a s e m e n th a s t h e r i g h tt o f i l e ana p p l i c a t i o nt o r e - z o n e , i f

n e c e s s ar y,17

the ar ea subje ct to such easement.” The Austin code list s the individuals and g overnme ntal bodies that may file to re- zone property

and p ro v i d es , i n rele vant par t, that zoni ng or re -zoning may be initiated by “(1) [t he City ] C ouncil; (2) [the] L and Use Commi ssion; (3) [t he] recor d owner ; (4) [the] Hi sto ri c L andmark Com mis sio n, . . . ; or (5 ) fo r a pr op os e d his tor ic are a (H D) c omb ini ngdis tr ic t, petition of the owner s o f at least 60 per cent of the land in the propose d district.” Austin, Tex., Code § 25-2-242. A fter c onstruing thi s p o rt ion of the code , the district court issued a decla ration stating that beca

use B EL“is not a ‘recor d owner ’” of the prope rty

on which its ease ment sits, it “may not . . . initi ate zoning or

rezoning of [the] proper

ty subject to the ea sement.” On a pp e a l, B EL

argue s tha t the dis tr ic t court e rr e d in iss uin g the de c lara

tio n a nd in ref u s in g to ma

k e th e d e c la

r a ti o n th a t B E L o r ig in a ll y r e qu e s te d
. I n ma k in g th is a s s e rti o n , BEL contends that a s a re sult of enteringinto an ease ment ag ree ment with Speedy Stop, it is a “re cord
owner ” of a

proper ty interest in Speedy

Stop’s property . BEL

further n o t es that beca

use it is an
ease ment holder, it has a r ight to use t h e ea sement that is superior to Spee dy Stop’s, see Mc Da nie l v . Ca lv e rt , 875 S.W .2d 482, 485 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1994, no writ), and that it has whateve r implied rig hts to the property are nece ssary “to fairly enjoy the rig hts ex pressly

g rante d,” see M arcus Cable Assocs. v. Krohn , 90 S.W .3d 697, 701 (Tex. 2002). I n light of the prec eding , BEL insists that the d is tric t c ourt’s dec laration that BEL may not seek to re -zone the prope rty is errone ous and is an inac curate construc tion of the C ity ’s code that leads to the absurd result t hat an owner of a trac t that has had its property zoned as a PUD will be prohibited from de veloping its property if the ea sement that will ser v e as an entr ance to the de ve lop me nt i s n ot a

pp ro pr iate ly

zon e d b ut w ill a lso be pr oh ibi te d fr om fi lin g to have the pr op e rt y
re -zo ne d. Mo re ov e r, B EL argue s th a t th e City ’s re fu sa l to a c c e pt i ts zo nin g mod if ic a tio n r e qu e st i s arbitra ry , unrea sonable, a

nd in excess of its authority
.18 Re so lut ion

of thi s is su e inv olv e s c on str uin g va ri ou s Ci ty ord inan c e s, wh ic h is a question of law r eviewe d de novo. See B ragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth. , 7 1 S
. W
. 3 d 729, 734 (T e x. 20 02 ); U

S A W a s t e S e r v s . o f H o u s t o n , I n c . v . Stra

y ho rn , 150 S.W .3d 491, 494 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin

20 04 , p e t. d e nie d) ; see also Coppell v. Ge neral Home s Corp. , 763 S.W .2d 448, 45 3 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 198 8, wr it d e nie d) (e xpla ini ngthat c ou rt s c on str ue c ity or din anc e s in

same
manner that t h ey const rue statutes) . When construing ordinanc es, we must ascer tain the intent of the g ov er n i n g b o d y

enac ting the r egulations at issue. Cop pe ll , 763 S.W .2d at 453; see Fleming Foods of Tex. v . Rylander , 6 S.W. 3d 27 8, 28 4 ( Te x. 19 99 ). I n de te rm ini ngint e nt, c ourt s should look to the pl ain m eaning of t he words used i n the ordinances. Cop pe ll , 763 S.W .2d at 43;

see Fireman’s Fund County M ut. Ins. Co. v. Hidi , 13 S.W.3 d 767 , 768 -6 9 (T e x. 20 00 ). We p re sume t h a te v e r y w o r d w a s d e l i b e r a t e l y c h o s e nan d t h a te x c l u d e d

w o r d s w e r e l e f

to u tp u r p o s e l y. US A W as te Se rv s. , 150 S.W .3d at 494. W hen determining intent, the entire regulation, not isol ated portions, must be considere d. Cop pe ll , 763 S.W .2d at 453; Jones v . Fowler , 969 S.W .2d 429, 432 (Tex. 1 9 98). In deter

mining intent, cour

ts also give serious consider ation to an ag ency ’s interpre tation of a statute that the a g ency is charg ed with enf

orcing provided that the interpre tation is reasona ble and c onsistent with the releva nt gov e r n in g regulations. Continental C as. Co. v. Downs , 81 S.W. 3d 80 3, 80 7 ( Te x. 20 02 ); see City of Austin v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. , 92 S.W .3d 434, 441-42 (Te x . 2002).

For the re asons that follow, we disag ree with BEL . Fir s t , t h e d i strict court’s de c laratio n is c on sis te nt w iththe re le vant gove rn ingre g ulatio ns . T he City ’s c od e sp e c if ie s th a t a “re cord ow ner” may

initiate re-zoning proce dures. Austin, Te x ., Code § 25-2-242. The code de fines
a re cord ow ner a s “the owne r of r eal property as shown by the deed rec ords of the county in which the prope rty

is located.” Id. § 2 5- 1- 21 (8 6) ; see also id. § 25-1-134( B) (explaining that whe n notice19

needs to be g iven to “re cord owner” of real property , notice may be made “by mailing notice to the
owner at the stree t addre ss of the prope rty or, if the prope rty

does not have a stree t addre ss, to the return a ddress shown on the de ed”)
.

Se c on d, th e d e c l a

r a t i o n i s a l s o c o n s i s t e nt

w i th c omm on

law p ri nc ipl e s a sso c iate d w ith
ease ments. “[A] n ease ment is a nonpossessory interest that authoriz es i ts holder to use prope rty for only particula

r purposes” and constitutes a limit ed relinquishment of the rig ht of a prope rty owner to exclude others from his property
. Krohn , 9 0 S. W.3 d at 70 0; see Re state me nt ( Th ir d) of Pr op e rt y (Servitudes) § 1.2 c mt. d (distinguishing be tween e aseme nts , wh i ch allow owner to only use land for spe cific pur

poses, and possessor

y land intere st, which permits owner t o u s e p ro p erty for a ny purpose) . I n other wor ds, an ea sement is a privil eg e to use land that is completely distinct from
owner ship of the land, Hu be rt v . D av is , 170 S.W .3d 706, 710 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, no pe t.), and
an ease ment does not c onvey title to prope rty , Stephen F. Austin State Univ. v. F lynn , 228 S.W .3d 65 3, 65 8 ( Te x. 20 07 ); Lakeside Launche s, Inc. v . Austin Y

acht Club, Inc. , 7 5 0 S. W. 2 d 8 6 8 , 873 (Tex. App.—Austin 1988, writ denied).

Third, the decla

ration is also consistent with the construc tion of the regulations made by the ag ency

responsible for administering the C ity ’s z oning regulations. Acc ording to Guernse y ’s aff idavit, the Neig hborhood Plannin g a n d Z o n in g D e p a r tm e nt, wh ic h

is r e s p o n s ib le for a dminist ering the City ’s zoning re g ulations, equates the phrase “re cord owner ” with “ land owner ” or “fe e owne r.” Although B ELmay

own an e aseme nt rig ht, it is n o t t h e o wner of the prope rty on which its easement r ests.

Finally , the decla

ration is consistent with the terms of the ease ment in question. An
e a se me nt i s an a g re e me nt b e tw e e n a pr op e rt y ow ne r a nd ano the r p art

y , a nd fo r t his re a so n, c ourt s apply basic contract principles of construction when determining the terms of the ag ree ment. Krohn ,I n this opini on, we make n o co m m en t on whether BEL may sue Speedy

Stop to compel 9 Speedy Stop to i nitiate a zoning r equest. We only note that the ea sement did not expressly g ive B EL the ability to initi ate a

zoning cha

ng e. 20 9 0 S.W .3d at 700. The pa rties’ e x press intentions deter mine the scope of the e aseme nt. Id. The
ease ment ag ree ment at issue here specifies t hat i t “conta ins the entire a g ree ment betwee n the par ties relating to the easeme nts, rig hts and privil eg es her ein g rante d and under taken.” The a g ree ment does
n o tm e n t i o nz o n i n g i nan y m an n e r an d d o e s n o t b e qu e a t h t h e r i g h tt o r e - z o n e t h e p r o p e rt y t o B E L. 9 Cf. Cr oss v. Dall as County Flood Control Dist. No. 1 , 773 S.W .2d 49, 50 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, no writ) (de tailing e aseme nt require ments, which included r equire ment that ease ment owner support all zoning re quests and building- permit reque sts made by proper ty owner ). F o r t h e s e r e a s o n s , w e ar e p e r s u a d e d t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u rtp r o p e r l y d e c l ar e d t h a tB E L,
a s an e a se me nt ow ne r, may no t se e k to re -zo ne the pr op e rt y on wh ic h it s e a se me nt r e sts
. Acc ording ly , we ove rrule B EL ’s sec ond issue on appea l.
CO NC LU SION I n light of the prec eding , we dismiss BEL ’s first i s s u e o n ap p eal and aff irm the
rema inder of the district court’s judg ment.

David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and He nson Affir med in part; Dismissed in part Filed: May

9, 2008