19–006 

112TH CONGRESS REPT. 112–507 " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2d Session Part 1 

TO AMEND THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 TO REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF AGREEMENTS FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 

MAY 30, 2012.—Ordered to be printed 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

[To accompany H.R. 1280] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the bill 

(H.R. 1280) to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to require 

congressional approval of agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation with foreign countries, and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and 

recommends that the bill as amended do pass. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

The Amendment ...................................................................................................... 2 

Background and Purpose ........................................................................................ 6 

Hearings ................................................................................................................... 13 

Committee Consideration and Votes ...................................................................... 13 

Committee Oversight Findings ............................................................................... 14 

New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures ...................................................... 14 

Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate .......................................................... 14 

Performance Goals and Objectives ......................................................................... 16 

New Advisory Committees ...................................................................................... 16 

Congressional Accountability Act ........................................................................... 16 

Earmark Identification ............................................................................................ 16 

Section-by-Section Analysis .................................................................................... 16 

Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported ..................................... 20 


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THE AMENDMENT

The amendment is as follows: 

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: 

SECTION 1. REQUIREMENT FOR CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF AGREEMENTS FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION. 

(a) COOPERATION WITH OTHER NATIONS.—Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act 

of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) is amended— 

(1) in the matter preceding subsection a., by striking ‘‘No cooperation’’ and inserting ‘‘Subject to subsection f., no cooperation’’; 

(2) in subsection a.— 

(A) in paragraph (3), by inserting ‘‘or acquired from any other source’’ 

after ‘‘pursuant to such agreement’’ each place it appears; 

(B) in paragraph (4)— 

(i) by striking ‘‘or terminates or’’ and inserting ‘‘, terminates,’’; and 

(ii) by inserting ‘‘, or violates or abrogates any provision contained 

within such agreement’’ after ‘‘IAEA safeguards’’; 

(C) in paragraph (6), by inserting ‘‘or acquired from any other source’’ 

after ‘‘agreement’’ each place it appears; 

(D) in paragraph (8), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end; 

(E) in paragraph (9), by striking the period at the end and inserting a 

semicolon; and 

(F) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following new paragraphs: 

‘‘(10) a guaranty by the cooperating party that no nationals of a third 

country shall be permitted access to any reactor, related equipment, or sensitive materials transferred under the agreement for cooperation without 

the prior consent of the United States; and 

‘‘(11) a commitment to maintain and, in the case of a country without 

such a legal regime in place, a commitment to enact at the earliest possible 

date, and in no case later than one year after the agreement enters into 

force, a legal regime providing for adequate protection from civil liability 

that will allow for the participation of United States suppliers in any effort 

by the country to develop civilian nuclear power.’’; 

(3) in the matter following paragraph (11) (as added by paragraph (2)(F) of 

this subsection), by striking ‘‘The President may exempt a proposed agreement 

for cooperation’’ and all that follows through ‘‘common defense and security.’’; 

(4) in subsection c., by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end; 

(5) in subsection d.— 

(A) in the first sentence— 

(i) by striking ‘‘not’’ the first and second place it appears; 

(ii) by inserting ‘‘only’’ after ‘‘effective’’ the first place it appears; and 

(iii) by striking ‘‘: Provided further,’’ and all that follows through 

‘‘such agreement’’ and inserting ‘‘, unless the proposed agreement includes a requirement as part of the agreement for cooperation or other 

legally binding document that is considered part of the agreement that 

no enrichment or reprocessing activities, or acquisition or construction 

of facilities for such activities, will occur within the territory over which 

the cooperating party exercises sovereignty, in which case the agreement shall become effective unless the Congress adopts, and there is 

enacted, a joint resolution of disapproval (1) during such sixty-day period for a new agreement; or (2) during a period of 30 days of continuous session for a renewal agreement’’; and 

(B) by striking the final period and inserting ‘‘; and’’; 

(6) by redesignating subsection e. as subsection f.; 

(7) by inserting immediately after subsection d. the following new subsection: 

‘‘e. the cooperating party— 

‘‘(1) has acceded to and is fully implementing the provisions and guidelines of— 

‘‘(A) the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (commonly known as the ‘Chemical Weapons Convention’); 

‘‘(B) the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on their 

Destruction (commonly known as the ‘Biological Weapons Convention’); 

and 

‘‘(C) all other international agreements to which the United States is 

a party regarding the export of nuclear, chemical, biological, and adVerDate Mar 15 2010 03:10 May 31, 2012 Jkt 019006 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\HR507P1.XXX HR507P1

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vanced conventional weapons, including missiles and other delivery 

systems; 

‘‘(2) has established and is fully implementing an effective export control 

system, including fully implementing the provisions and guidelines of 

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540; 

‘‘(3) is in full compliance with all United Nations conventions to which 

the United States is a party and all Security Council resolutions regarding 

the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including— 

‘‘(A) the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; 

and 

‘‘(B) the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression 

of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; 

‘‘(4) is not a Destination of Diversion Concern under section 303 of the 

Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 

(Public Law 111–195); 

‘‘(5) is closely cooperating with the United States to prevent state sponsors of terrorism (the term ‘state sponsor of terrorism’ means a country the 

government of which has been determined by the Secretary of State, for 

purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, section 

620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export 

Control Act, or other provision of law, is a government that has repeatedly 

provided support for acts of international terrorism) from— 

‘‘(A) acquiring or developing chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons 

or related technologies; or 

‘‘(B) acquiring or developing destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons, including ballistic missiles; and 

‘‘(6) has signed, ratified, and is fully implementing an Additional Protocol 

to its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.’’; 

and 

(8) by adding after subsection f. (as redesignated by paragraph (6) of this subsection) the following new subsection: 

‘‘g. For purposes of this section— 

‘‘(1) the term ‘new agreement’ means an agreement for cooperation with 

a country with respect to which the United States has not, on or after the 

date of the enactment of this subsection, entered into such an agreement; 

and 

‘‘(2) the term ‘renewal agreement’ means an agreement for cooperation 

with a country with respect to which the United States has, before the date 

of the enactment of this subsection, entered into such an agreement.’’. 

(b) SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS.—Section 131 a. (1) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2160 

a.(1)) is amended— 

(1) in the second sentence, by striking ‘‘security,’’ and all that follows through 

‘‘publication.’’ and inserting ‘‘security.’’; and 

(2) by inserting after the second sentence the following new sentences: ‘‘Such 

subsequent arrangement shall become effective only if Congress enacts a joint 

resolution of approval according to the procedures of sections 123 d. and 130 

i. of this Act. Any such nuclear proliferation assessment statement shall be submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and 

the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate not later than the 31st day 

of continuous session after submission of the subsequent arrangement.’’. 

SEC. 2. WITHDRAWAL FROM THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. 

(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to oppose the 

withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (in this 

section referred to as the ‘‘Treaty’’) of any country that is a party to the Treaty and 

to use all political, economic, and diplomatic means at its disposal to deter, prevent, 

or reverse any such withdrawal from the Treaty. 

(b) PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN ASSISTANCE.—Notwithstanding any other provision 

of law, no assistance (other than humanitarian assistance) under any provision of 

law may be provided to a country that has withdrawn from the Treaty on or after 

the date of the enactment of this Act. 

(c) RETURN OF ALL UNITED STATES-ORIGIN MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT.—The 

United States shall seek the return of any material, equipment, or components 

transferred under an agreement for civil nuclear cooperation that is in force pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) on or after 

the date of the enactment of this Act, and any special fissionable material produced 

through the use of such material, equipment, or components previously provided to 

a country that withdraws from the Treaty. 


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SEC. 3. REPORT ON COMPARABILITY OF NONPROLIFERATION CONDITIONS BY FOREIGN NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS. 

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President 

shall transmit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives 

and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the extent to 

which each country that engages in civil nuclear exports (including power and research nuclear reactors) requires nuclear nonproliferation requirements as conditions for export comparable to those under this Act. Such report shall also— 

(1) detail the extent to which the exports of each such country incorporate 

United States-origin components, technology, or materials that require United 

States approval for re-export; 

(2) detail the civil nuclear-related trade and investments in the United States 

by any entity from each such country; and 

(3) list any United States grant, concessionary loan or loan guarantee, or any 

other incentive or inducement to any such country or entity related to nuclear 

exports or investments in the United States. 

SEC. 4. INITIATIVES AND NEGOTIATIONS RELATING TO AGREEMENTS FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION. 

Subsection f. of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), 

as redesignated pursuant to section 1(a)(6) of this Act, is amended to read as follows: 

‘‘f. The President shall keep the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 

of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate fully 

and currently informed of any initiative or negotiations relating to a new or 

amended agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to this section 

prior to the President’s announcement of such initiative or negotiations. The 

President shall consult with the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 

Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate concerning such initiative or negotiations beginning not later than 15 calendar 

days after the initiation of any such negotiations, or the receipt or transmission 

of a draft agreement, whichever occurs first, and monthly thereafter until such 

time as the negotiations are concluded.’’. 

SEC. 5. CONDUCT RESULTING IN TERMINATION OF NUCLEAR EXPORTS. 

Section 129 a. (2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2158) is amended— 

(1) in subparagraph (C), by inserting ‘‘or’’ after the semicolon; and 

(2) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following new subparagraph: 

‘‘(D) been determined to be a ‘country of proliferation concern’ under section 1055(g)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2010 (50 U.S.C. 2371(g)(2));’’. 

SEC. 6. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW PROCEDURES. 

Section 130 i. (1) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2159) is amended— 

(1) by redesignating subparagraphs (B) and (C) as subparagraphs (C) and (D), 

respectively; and 

(2) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following new subparagraph: 

‘‘(B) for an agreement for cooperation pursuant to section 123 of this Act, a 

joint resolution, the matter after the resolving clause of which— 

‘‘(i) is as follows: ‘That the Congress does favor the proposed agreement 

for cooperation transmitted to the Congress by the President on 

llllllllll.’; and 

‘‘(ii) includes, immediately after the language specified in clause (i), any 

other provisions to accompany such proposed agreement for cooperation.’’. 

SEC. 7. REQUIREMENT OF LIABILITY PROTECTION FOR UNITED STATES NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS. 

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is amended by inserting after section 134 (42 

U.S.C. 2160d) the following new section: 

‘‘SEC. 135. REQUIREMENT OF LIABILITY PROTECTION FOR UNITED STATES NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS. 

‘‘The President may not issue a license for the export of nuclear material, facilities, components, or other goods, services, or technology to a country pursuant to 

an agreement that has entered into force after the date of the enactment of this section unless the President determines that such country has liability protection for 

United States nuclear suppliers that is equivalent to the liability protection specified under the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage.’’. 


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SEC. 8. PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO STATE SPONSORS OF PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS 

OF MASS DESTRUCTION. 

(a) PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE.—The United States shall not provide any assistance under Public Law 87–195, Public Law 90–629, the Food for Peace Act, the 

Peace Corps Act, or the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 to any country if the Secretary of State determines that the government of the country has repeatedly provided support for acts of proliferation of equipment, technology, or materials to support the design, acquisition, manufacture, or use of weapons of mass destruction or 

the acquisition or development of ballistic missiles to carry such weapons. 

(b) PUBLICATION OF DETERMINATIONS.—Each determination of the Secretary of 

State under subsection (a) shall be published in the Federal Register. 

(c) RESCISSION.—A determination of the Secretary of State under subsection (a) 

may not be rescinded unless the Secretary submits to the appropriate congressional 

committees— 

(1) before the proposed rescission would take effect, a report certifying that— 

(A) there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies 

of the government of the country concerned; 

(B) the government is not supporting acts of proliferation of equipment, 

technology, or materials to support the design, acquisition, manufacture, or 

use of weapons of mass destruction; and 

(C) the government has provided assurances that it will not support such 

acts in the future; or 

(2) at least 45 days before the proposed rescission would take effect, a report 

justifying the rescission and certifying that— 

(A) the government of the country concerned has not provided any support for acts of proliferation of equipment, technology, or materials to support the design, acquisition, manufacture, or use of weapons of mass destruction during the preceding 24-month period; and 

(B) the government has provided assurances that it will not support such 

acts of proliferation in the future. 

(d) WAIVER.—The President may waive the requirements of subsection (a) on a 

case-by-case basis if— 

(1) the President determines that national security interests or humanitarian 

reasons justify a waiver of such requirements, except that humanitarian reasons may not be used to justify the waiver of such requirements to provide security assistance under Public Law 87–195, Public Law 90–629, or the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945; and 

(2) at least 15 days before the waiver takes effect, the President consults with 

the appropriate congressional committees regarding the proposed waiver and 

submits to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing— 

(A) the name of the recipient country; 

(B) a description of the national security interests or humanitarian reasons that require the waiver; 

(C) the type and amount of and the justification for the assistance to be 

provided pursuant to the waiver; and 

(D) the period of time during which such waiver will be effective. 

SEC. 9. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL AS A CRITERION FOR UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE. 

(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to ensure that 

each country that is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should bring into force an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with 

the IAEA. 

(b) CRITERION FOR ASSISTANCE.—The United States shall, when considering the 

provision of assistance under Public Law 87–195 or Public Law 90–629 to a country 

that is a party to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, take into 

consideration whether the proposed recipient has in force an Additional Protocol to 

its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. 

SEC. 10. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

It is the sense of Congress that the President should ensure that participation in 

international nuclear programs conducted by the United States is limited to the 

greatest extent practicable to governmental and nongovernmental participants from 

countries that have adopted nonproliferation provisions in their nuclear cooperation 

and nuclear export control policies comparable to the policies specified in section 123 

of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2153), as amended by this Act. 


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BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE

Stopping Iran’s aggressive pursuit of nuclear weapons has been 

one of the highest priorities for U.S. national security policy for 

more than a decade. As Iran has moved closer to achieving its goal, 

several other countries in the region have launched their own nuclear programs. Although each describes the intended use as entirely peaceful, namely for electricity generation, medicine, and research, it is clear that many of these efforts are in response to 

Iran’s continued progress. Thus, the groundwork is being laid for 

the spread of a nuclear weapons capability from one unstable regime to another throughout the Middle East. 

Despite the clear dangers involved, the U.S. and other countries 

are inadvertently encouraging this development by promoting nuclear cooperation agreements which, in the view of the committee, 

contain insufficient safeguards to ensure that nuclear power and 

research activities supported by such agreements are entirely for 

peaceful purposes. 

The greatest threat stems from the spread of the capability to 

produce fissile material, either by enriching uranium or reprocessing spent fuel to extract unused uranium or plutonium (ENR). Unfortunately, fissile material can be used not only for peaceful purposes but also for nuclear and radiological weapons. Virtually any 

nuclear program, including one with an ENR component, can be 

described as being intended solely for peaceful purposes, but such 

programs are essentially identical to those needed for weapons development. Thus, the foundation for a nuclear weapons program 

can be built in full view of the world as long as a benign purpose 

is asserted, however fictional. This is the strategy that Iran has 

employed from the outset, supplementing its public activities with 

clandestine efforts which, when exposed, it maintains are actually 

devoted entirely to medicine, research, and the generation of electricity. 

Efforts by the U.S. and other responsible countries to stop Iran’s 

nuclear program are undermined by the simultaneous promotion of 

nuclear programs throughout the Middle East, especially by nuclear cooperation agreements that do not contain guarantees that 

these countries will not follow in Iran’s footsteps. Any future agreements should contain a provision that the cooperating country will 

not develop or acquire any uranium enrichment or spent-fuel reprocessing facilities, or engage in such activities, as a critical counterpoint to Iran. The United States, and indeed all nuclear suppliers, must be careful that they do not encourage, however inadvertently, the perception that Iran is merely exercising its ‘‘right’’ 

to have all aspects of a civil nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment and reprocessing, regardless of its actual intended use. 

Each new nuclear program in the region expands the risk. Recent events have demonstrated that many regimes in the Middle 

East are unstable and that it is impossible to predict who may 

come to power should these fall. With that power would come the 

option to use any existing nuclear infrastructure to establish a 

military program. Given this alarming possibility, U.S. national interests argue strongly for stopping this trend, especially preventing 

the acquisition of an ENR capability by additional countries, regardless of any claimed purpose. But the U.S. has instead declared 


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that preventing the acquisition of an ENR capability—and thus the 

option of its diversion to military uses—will no longer be a necessary condition in considering new nuclear cooperation agreements. Regardless of any assurances provided by opponents of adding sufficient safeguards in these agreements, we may in fact be 

helping to bring about an enormous geopolitical upheaval. 

That process is already underway. Turki al-Faisal, a high ranking Saudi prince and the former head of the Saudi intelligence 

service, openly stated in December 2011 that Saudi Arabia was 

considering producing nuclear weapons, largely in response to the 

threat from Iran. Despite these and similar assertions, the U.S. has 

entered into discussions and possibly negotiations for a nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia, which is unlikely to be required to permanently forego acquiring an ENR capability. Absent 

this guarantee, the U.S. may end up helping Saudi Arabia acquire 

nuclear facilities, material, and expertise that could be employed 

for either civilian or military use in the future. 

Stopping Enrichment and Reprocessing 

Countries seeking nuclear weapons are constrained by extraordinary difficulties, their options being either to obtain them or 

their components from other countries or produce them indigenously. To date, no transfer of a functional nuclear device is known 

to have occurred, although China is reported to have provided 

Pakistan with nuclear weapons designs and related technologies. 

The composition of North Korea’s transfer of nuclear-related items 

to Pakistan, Iran, and other countries has yet to be fully revealed. 

Regarding indigenous manufacture, the scale and complexity of 

the industrial infrastructure needed to produce all of the required 

elements, the highly advanced technology involved, and the enormous costs have presented insuperable obstacles to all but a handful of states. Countries such as North Korea and Pakistan which 

have developed their own capacity were able to do so only after securing much of the requisite technology, expertise, and industrial 

equipment from abroad. Had Iran been forced to rely solely on its 

own resources, it would not have been able to advance its nuclear 

program, civil or military, to anything approaching its current capabilities. Its progress has been made possible only by filling the 

many gaps through transfers from clandestine sources in Pakistan, 

North Korea, Russia, and other countries. Shutting off the sources 

of supply for these and other countries seeking nuclear weapons 

has long been a central objective of U.S. nonproliferation policy. 

Of these several challenges, the greatest is acquiring the capacity 

to produce fissile material through the ENR fuel cycle. A lesser, 

but related challenge is achieving a sufficiently high level of enrichment. The uranium used in civilian nuclear reactors to generate 

electricity is typically enriched to a level of 3–5%. That used for 

medical purposes or for research can reach as high as 20%. But 

weapons-grade material must be enriched to at least 90%. The first 

two can be purchased on the world market, but the latter cannot. 

Unfortunately, the infrastructure needed to produce weaponsgrade fissile material is essentially the same as that used for 

peaceful purposes. A country seeking nuclear weapons can employ 

an ostensibly civilian program as camouflage for a clandestine military program. Under the guise of peaceful pursuits, most, if not all, 


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of the infrastructure needed for ENR fuel cycle can be constructed 

in the open, thereby rendering detection of the purely military aspects far more difficult, if not impossible, especially in closed societies. The problem is made even more difficult if a country waits 

until its civilian program is fully established before embarking on 

a military counterpart. 

North Korea used this stratagem to develop its plutonium-based 

nuclear device and is currently doing the same with uranium enrichment. Saddam Hussein’s initial nuclear weapons program was 

cloaked by Iraq’s civil nuclear power program, but Israel’s destruction of the ostensibly peaceful reactor at Osirak in 1981 was a 

major blow to Saddam’s military program. The far more massive effort he subsequently embarked upon was uncovered only as a result of his defeat in the 1991 Gulf War and the intensive search 

for weapons that followed that war. Syria’s declared nuclear program had concealed a nuclear reactor secretly built by North 

Korea, but in 2007 that was also destroyed by an Israeli airstrike. 

Iran is following much the same course and has constructed a 

massive nuclear complex that it claims is solely for the purpose of 

generating electricity, as well as for medical use and research. 

Much of this has been done in full view of inspectors from the 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) during their visits to 

a number of identified facilities over several years, although several suspected clandestine sites have remained off limits. Nevertheless, successive revelations of secret nuclear facilities, such the 

Natanz and Fordow uranium enrichment facilities, as well as the 

IAEA’s discovery of evidence that Iran has performed extensive 

work related to nuclear warheads, demonstrates that the primary 

purpose of Iran’s nuclear program is military. 

Claims by countries that their efforts to acquire an ENR capability are solely for peaceful purposes are very difficult to justify for 

many reasons. The prohibitive costs and difficulties involved with 

enriching uranium or reprocessing plutonium ensure that there is 

little economic motivation for countries that are not already engaged in producing nuclear fuel to do so. As fissile material for civilian use is widely available on the world market from multiple 

sources, the rationale offered by Iran and other countries that they 

must produce their own fuel to prevent an interruption of supply 

cannot be supported. Further, the IAEA has established an international nuclear fuel bank specifically to address this potential 

problem. For these reasons, and because the infrastructure used to 

make fissile material for civilian use is in principle the same as 

that needed for weapons, efforts by countries to construct their own 

ENR capability is strong evidence that the actual intent is military. 

The Inadequacy of the Nonproliferation Regime 

The most fundamental element of the global nonproliferation regime is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was 

concluded in 1968 and subsequently ratified by every country except India, Pakistan, and Israel (North Korea withdrew from the 

NPT in 2003). The treaty prohibits efforts to acquire nuclear weapons by countries other than those which possessed them at the 

time the treaty was opened for signature in 1968, namely the socalled ‘‘nuclear weapon states’’: the U.S.; the Soviet Union, of which 

Russia is the successor state; Great Britain; France; and China. 


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The NPT allows countries to develop nuclear programs for peaceful 

purposes, but it requires these countries to adopt comprehensive 

safeguards for their nuclear facilities and undergo regular inspection by the IAEA to ensure that nothing is being diverted for military use. 

A major flaw in the treaty is its reliance on voluntary disclosure 

by the signatories. The discovery of Iraq’s massive nuclear program 

in 1993 despite years of inspections by the IAEA prompted the 

IAEA to develop strengthened safeguards in 1997 with what is 

known as the Additional Protocol (AP). By giving the IAEA far 

greater freedom to conduct intrusive inspections on demand, the 

AP greatly reduces the ability to hide clandestine nuclear operations. Unfortunately, the AP’s adoption is not mandatory, and 

countries such as Iran and Syria have refused to implement it because it would make their nuclear weapons programs far harder to 

conceal. 

Despite these and other measures to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime, nuclear technology, expertise, materials, and 

equipment may still be available on the black market to countries 

engaged in developing a nuclear weapons capability, the most important example of which was the network established by Pakistani 

nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. Until its operations were exposed in 2004, this network provided key nuclear elements to Iran, 

Libya, and other countries. North Korea has also clandestinely provided indispensable elements to Iran and other countries, including 

building a nuclear reactor in Syria. Shutting down these clandestine sources remains a high priority for the U.S. and other countries, but the existence and extent of other possible networks are 

unknown. 

Another reason the global nonproliferation regime remains inadequate to preventing the acquisition of the ENR fuel cycle is that 

many of the necessary components are openly and legitimately sold 

on the world market. The U.S. and other responsible countries 

have tried to restrict the commercial availability of many of the 

necessary inputs. The most important mechanism for doing so is 

the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) which was established in the 

aftermath of India’s surprise detonation of a nuclear device in 

1974. The NSG is made up of nuclear-exporting countries which 

adopt common guidelines to prevent items from being diverted by 

recipient countries to the construction of an ENR fuel cycle or for 

military purposes. 

These guidelines have been tightened over the years, most recently in June 2011, but they are voluntary and loosely interpreted 

by member states. The result is that commercial sales, ranging 

from nuclear fuel to complete reactors by countries such as France, 

Russia, Britain, and the U.S., have been only partially constrained. 

Given the projected hundreds of billions of dollars at stake as a result of the ‘‘global renaissance’’ of nuclear power, exporting countries are eager to maximize sales by their domestic companies, 

many of which are state-owned and subsidized, and are reluctant 

to add new safeguards to the existing international patchwork. The 

result is that limits on the initiation and development of nuclear 

programs around the world are determined more by a lack of financing than concerns about proliferation. 


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The most vigorous suppliers seeking new outlets are French and 

Russian companies, but they are far from alone, as American, 

South Korean, and exporters from many other countries compete 

for markets. Not only are the French and Russian companies stateowned, but their governments are actively engaged in promoting 

nuclear sales. High-ranking officials, such as President Sarkozy of 

France, often openly act as salesmen for these firms when dealing 

with their counterparts. 

As one country after another, including India, North Korea, and 

Pakistan, among others, demonstrated that a civilian nuclear energy program could be a springboard to a military capability, the 

potential military uses of ‘‘peaceful’’ nuclear programs has become 

increasingly obvious. Nevertheless, commercial concerns continue 

to dominate the policies of many exporting countries. 

The ‘‘Gold Standard’’ 

In 2008, the Bush administration began negotiations with the 

United Arab Emirates (UAE) for a nuclear cooperation agreement 

to support the UAE’s development of its planned massive nuclear 

energy program. Given the UAE’s small population and economy, 

as well as its large reserves of hydrocarbons, many outside experts 

questioned the actual intent of this program and thus the emphasis 

placed by the UAE on an agreement with the U.S. when the requisite infrastructure could be purchased on the world market from 

other countries. 

The UAE clearly valued the prospective agreement as a public 

affirmation of strong U.S.-UAE ties in the face of an increasing 

threat from Iran, as well as a U.S. seal of approval for its stated 

ambition to become a major exporter of electricity to the region. 

The Bush and Obama administrations focused on the agreement’s 

utility in advancing broader foreign policy goals, namely shoring up 

the U.S. strategic position in the Persian Gulf. In the end, this political purpose, coupled with commercial considerations, overrode 

the strong objections of those who feared that the agreement could 

encourage a further spread of nuclear programs in the region. 

The committee was skeptical of the agreement when initially 

briefed by the Bush administration, due in large part to the UAE’s 

history of serving as a transshipment point for sensitive exports to 

Iran as a result of its rudimentary export control regime. The committee was also concerned that the administration had not asked 

the UAE to formalize in the agreement a prior public pledge not 

to enrich or reprocess. Ultimately, both the Bush administration 

and the UAE agreed to revise the agreement to include a provision 

to that effect, which was signed in January 2009. Due to continuing Congressional concern, the Obama administration sought a 

more explicit commitment and renegotiated the text to include a legally-binding obligation by the UAE not to enrich or reprocess. This 

revised agreement was signed, submitted to the Congress, and 

went into force in 2010. The formal no-ENR commitment it contained was dubbed by a Department of State spokesman as the 

‘‘gold standard’’ for all future agreements. 

Subsequently, however, the application of this precedent was limited to countries in the Middle East. This approach apparently 

arose from concerns that a wider application of the ‘‘gold standard’’ 

might have a potentially negative impact on commercial sales by 


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1Section 123(a) lists nine criteria that an agreement must meet unless the President determines an exemption is necessary. These include guarantees that 

• safeguards on transferred nuclear material and equipment continue in perpetuity; 

• full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are applied in nonnuclear weapon states; 

• nothing transferred is used for any nuclear explosive device or for any other military 

purpose, except in the case of cooperation agreements with nuclear weapon states, in 

which the United States has the right to demand the return of transferred nuclear 

Continued 

the U.S. nuclear industry, which asserted that efforts to secure 

commitments from countries not to engage in ENR activities would 

place U.S. companies at a competitive disadvantage vis-a`-vis their 

foreign competitors. However, there is no evidence to support this 

concern, and the committee believes that a serious effort to convince potential recipients of U.S. nuclear exports to adopt some 

form of the UAE example would have significant nonproliferation 

benefits without sacrificing legitimate commerce. 

This limited application was further narrowed in January 2012 

when the State Department formally informed the committee that 

the no-ENR policy would be optional apparently in every instance, 

presumably even in the Middle East. 

This change in policy threatens to undo the no-ENR condition in 

the agreement with the UAE. The ‘‘Agreed Minute’’ attached to the 

U.S.-UAE agreement states that ‘‘the fields of cooperation, terms 

and conditions . . . shall be no less favorable in scope and effect 

than those which may be accorded, from time to time, to any other 

non-nuclear-weapon State in the Middle East in a peaceful nuclear 

cooperation agreement.’’ Thus, should the U.S. sign an agreement 

with another country in the region that does not contain a no-ENR 

commitment, the UAE will be liberated from this restriction entirely. 

At the same time, nuclear cooperation agreements have become 

increasingly valuable instruments for achieving U.S. foreign policy 

objectives. For example, a nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia was viewed by both the Bush and Obama administrations 

largely in terms of its potentially positive impact on relations between the two countries, namely as a U.S. concession of tangible 

value to be exchanged for Russian cooperation in other areas. That 

agreement eventually went into effect in 2011. 

The committee is concerned that nonproliferation provisions in 

future nuclear cooperation agreements may be subordinated to 

commercial and political considerations. The result would be to 

forgo a major opportunity to advance this country’s fundamental 

national security interests that are threatened by the spread of nuclear weapons. 

The Need for a Strengthened Congressional Role 

Any significant nuclear-related export for civil purposes—e.g., 

power reactors, research reactors, related equipment, and reactor 

fuel—requires a nuclear cooperation agreement between the U.S. 

and the partner country to be in force, which sets the terms of the 

transfer and use of such equipment and material. These agreements are authorized by section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 

1954, as amended, and are often referred to as ‘‘123 agreements.’’ 

Section 123 sets nine nonproliferation conditions that each agreement must satisfy.1 If an agreement satisfies these conditions, the 


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materials and equipment, as well as any special nuclear material produced through 

their use, if the cooperating state detonates a nuclear explosive device or terminates 

or abrogates its IAEA safeguards agreement; • there is no retransfer of material or classified data without U.S. consent; • physical security on nuclear material is maintained; • there is no enrichment or reprocessing by the recipient state of transferred nuclear 

material or nuclear material produced with materials or facilities transferred pursuant to the agreement without prior approval; • storage for transferred plutonium and highly enriched uranium is approved in advance by the United States; and • any material or facility produced or constructed through use of special nuclear technology transferred under the cooperation agreement is subject to all of the above requirements. 

President may submit the agreement to Congress for a period of 90 

days of ‘‘continuous session,’’ a period that can last six months or 

longer, depending on the Congressional calendar. The proposed 

agreement will go into force automatically unless Congress enacts 

a Joint Resolution of disapproval. Given that the President would 

presumably veto such a resolution, the effective requirement is a 

2/3 vote by both chambers to override, an extraordinarily high barrier. If an agreement does not satisfy one or more of these conditions, the President has the option to formally exempt it from this 

statutory requirement, but that route requires Congress to enact a 

Joint Resolution of approval for the agreement to come into force. 

The relatively small role of Congress is the product of the Atomic 

Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, which was enacted at a time when nuclear power was commonly assumed to be a benign source of energy 

for the world. The U.S. being the leader in the relevant technology, 

civilian nuclear cooperation agreements with other countries were 

encouraged for commercial reasons, with relatively little consideration given to preventing proliferation. As such, Congress restricted 

itself to a largely passive role in their review and approval. 

Since that time, however, and despite the significant strengthening of the AEA by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, nuclear weapons programs have continued to proliferate. As noted 

previously, Saddam Hussein’s massive program was uncovered in 

1991, and fortunately destroyed, in the aftermath of the first Gulf 

War; North Korea has developed and tested nuclear weapons; Iran 

has illicitly constructed and is operating several uranium enrichment facilities supporting a barely concealed nuclear weapons program; Libya obtained, and subsequently surrendered, uranium enrichment equipment and weapons designs; and Syria constructed a 

covert nuclear reactor with the apparent assistance of North Korea, 

which was destroyed by an Israeli airstrike in 2007. In addition, 

the extensive black market network headed by A.Q. Khan of Pakistan had supplied uranium enrichment technology and equipment 

to North Korea, Iran, Libya, and possibly other countries. These 

developments have significantly changed the nature and scope of 

the threat posed by further proliferation, necessitating an updating 

and strengthening of U.S. nonproliferation policy, including U.S. 

nuclear cooperation agreements. 

H.R. 1280 

To that end, H.R. 1280 and H.R. 1320 were introduced in 2011 

by Chairman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking Member Howard 

Berman, respectively, to update section 123 and other provisions of 

the Atomic Energy Act to address the increasing threat posed by 

the spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. The legislaVerDate Mar 15 2010 03:10 May 31, 2012 Jkt 019006 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR507P1.XXX HR507P1

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tion was also intended to enhance the role of Congress in nuclear 

trade in keeping with its constitutional authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations. On April 14, 2011, the committee 

marked up H.R. 1280, with amendments including several provisions from H.R. 1320, and passed it unanimously. 

H.R. 1280 amends the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to reinforce 

U.S. nonproliferation policy, especially by strengthening the role of 

Congress in reviewing and approving nuclear cooperation agreements proposed by the President. It accomplishes this through 

modest changes to the AEA, the most important being that new 

agreements with countries that do not possess ENR capabilities, 

but which refuse to provide guarantees that they will not seek to 

obtain them, cannot go into effect unless approved by Congress 

through a Joint Resolution. This provision does not prevent such 

agreements but instead allows Congress the opportunity to examine and weigh the broad range of relevant factors—foreign policy, 

political, commercial, and others—to ensure that proposed agreements meet fundamental U.S. interests and that these are not 

being sacrificed for commercial or political considerations. If a proposed nuclear cooperation agreement does contain such a commitment, the current procedure for Congressional consideration will 

remain the same, namely an automatic approval after 90 days of 

continuous session unless Congress passes a Joint Resolution of 

disapproval. 

H.R. 1280 also expands the requirements for countries seeking 

nuclear cooperation agreements with the U.S to include adherence 

to basic international and multinational nonproliferation agreements and conventions, implementation of an effective export control system, and cooperation with the U.S. to prevent state sponsors of terrorism from acquiring or developing chemical, biological, 

or nuclear weapons of mass destruction, among other measures. 

None of these conditions imposes an undue burden, and it is questionable why the U.S. would want to engage in nuclear cooperation 

with a country that did not already meet them. 

HEARINGS

The full committee held a hearing on March 17, 2011, titled, 

‘‘The Global Nuclear Revival and U.S. Nonproliferation Policy.’’ 

COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION AND VOTES

On April 14, 2011, the Foreign Affairs Committee marked up the 

bill, H.R. 1280, pursuant to notice, in open session. Chairman RosLehtinen offered an amendment in the nature of a substitute (RosLehtinen 47) that, by unanimous consent, was considered base text. 

1) Rep. Sherman offered en bloc amendments regarding adequate civil liability protections for U.S. suppliers of civilian 

nuclear power efforts (Sherman 14) and the sense of Congress that participation in U.S. international nuclear programs should be limited to participants that have adopted 

nonproliferation and export control policies comparable to 

section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (Sherman 16); agreed 

to by voice vote. 


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The Ros-Lehtinen substitute amendment (as amended 

by Sherman 14 and 16) was agreed to by a roll call vote 

of 34 ayes–0 noes. 

Voting yes: Ros-Lehtinen, Smith (NJ), Burton, Gallegly, 

Rohrabacher, Manzullo, Royce, Chabot, Wilson (SC), Fortenberry, Poe, Bilirakis, Schmidt, Johnson (OH), Rivera, 

Kelly, Griffin, Duncan, Buerkle, Ellmers, Berman, Ackerman, Sherman, Sires, Connolly, Deutch, Cardoza, Chandler, Higgins, Schwartz, Wilson (FL), Bass, Keating, 

Cicilline. 

H.R. 1280, as amended, was ordered favorably reported to the 

House, by voice vote. 

COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of House Rule XIII, the committee reports that the findings and recommendations of the committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of House 

Rule X, are incorporated in the ‘‘Background and Purpose’’ portion 

of this report, above. 

NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY AND TAX EXPENDITURES

In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of House Rule XIII, the committee adopts as its own the estimate of new budget authority, entitlement authority, and tax expenditures or revenues contained in 

the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional 

Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional Budget 

Act of 1974. 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

U.S. CONGRESS, 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 

Washington, DC, June 17, 2011. 

Hon. ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Chairman, 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

House of Representatives, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MADAM CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has 

prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 1280, a bill to amend 

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to require Congressional approval 

of agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation with foreign countries, and for other purposes. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Raymond Hall, who can 

be reached at 226–2840. 

Sincerely, 

DOUGLAS W. ELMENDORF. 

Enclosure 

cc: Honorable Howard L. Berman 

Ranking Member 


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H.R. 1280—A bill to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to require Congressional approval of agreements for peaceful nuclear 

cooperation with foreign countries, and for other purposes 

As amended by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on April 

14, 2011 

H.R. 1280 would amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 by adding new requirements for agreements for commercial nuclear exports negotiated under section 123 of that act. Such agreements are 

required for U.S. companies to export commercial nuclear materials, technologies, and services to foreign nations. The bill would 

require nations signing those agreements to forswear any future 

development of facilities for enriching or reprocessing nuclear materials. That requirement could lead to fewer agreements between 

the United States and foreign countries, but CBO estimates that it 

would have no significant effect on the budget. 

The bill also would increase Congressional reporting requirements related to negotiating section 123 agreements. Such requirements would have an insignificant effect on the budget, CBO estimates. Those costs would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds. 

Pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply because enacting the bill 

would not affect direct spending or revenues. 

H.R. 1280 would impose both intergovernmental and private-sector mandates, as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 

(UMRA), on U.S. exporters of nuclear materials and other defenserelated items sent as non-humanitarian assistance. Because of uncertainty about the future income from such exports, CBO cannot 

determine whether the aggregate cost of the private-sector mandates contained in the legislation would exceed the annual threshold established in UMRA ($142 million for private-sector mandates 

in 2011, adjusted annually for inflation). However, given the nature 

of the exports being restricted and the limited number of public entities affected, CBO estimates the aggregate cost of the mandates 

on the public sector would not exceed the annual threshold established in UMRA ($71 million for intergovernmental mandates in 

2011, adjusted annually for inflation). 

The bill would prohibit U.S. suppliers from exporting some items 

and services that are sent as non-humanitarian assistance to any 

country that withdraws from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 

of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Given the low historical rate of withdrawal from the NPT, it is unlikely that this mandate would be imposed. If, however, a country withdraws from the NPT, some private-sector entities could lose income. CBO cannot estimate the 

magnitude of such losses because the value of assistance and exports from private-sector entities varies greatly and the number of 

items exported as a form of assistance is unknown. CBO estimates 

that the cost of the mandate on state, local, and tribal governments 

would be small because assistance and exports from public entities—primarily colleges and universities—is far more limited. 

The bill also would impose a mandate on U.S. nuclear suppliers 

by prohibiting the export of nuclear materials and technologies to 

any country designated by the Director of the CIA as one of proliferation concern. Based on information from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and historical data on the total value of U.S. 


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nuclear exports and their distribution among importing countries, 

CBO expects that the forgone income from nuclear exports, if suspended, would probably be minimal for both public (including mostly universities) and private exporters. 

The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are Raymond Hall (for 

the federal costs), J’nell Blanco (for the intergovernmental impact), 

and Marin Randall (for the private-sector impact). This estimate 

was approved by Theresa Gullo, Deputy Assistant Director for 

Budget Analysis. 

PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

As explained more specifically in the ‘‘Background and Purpose’’ 

and ‘‘Section-by-Section Analysis’’ portions of this report, the principal goals of H.R. 1280 are to enhance the role of Congress in the 

review and approval of nuclear cooperation agreements and to add 

certain nonproliferation-related conditions to the requirements for 

such agreements. 

NEW ADVISORY COMMITTEES

H.R. 1280 does not establish or authorize any new advisory committees. 

CONGRESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACT

H.R. 1280 does not relate to terms and conditions of employment 

or access to public services or accommodations, as described in section 102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act (P.L. 104–1). 

EARMARK IDENTIFICATION

H.R. 1280 does not contain any congressional earmarks, limited 

tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clauses 9(e), 

9(f), and 9(g) of House Rule XXI. 

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

Section 1. Requirement for Congressional Approval of Agreements 

for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation 

This section makes several changes to the Atomic Energy Act of 

1954 (AEA) to strengthen the existing nonproliferation conditions 

that any new nuclear cooperation agreement must meet in order to 

be submitted by the President for Congressional consideration. It 

also makes a change to the manner in which Congress considers 

such agreements. 

Section 123(a)(3) of the AEA forbids a cooperating country in a 

nuclear cooperation agreement from using any U.S.-exported equipment or material, or any byproduct material, in or for development 

of a nuclear explosive device. This section broadens this requirement to include any such material, equipment, or material acquired from any other source, foreign or domestic. 

Section 123 (a)(4) of the AEA requires that any proposed nuclear 

cooperation agreement confer upon the United States the ‘‘right of 

return’’ of any U.S.-origin nuclear exported item or material, or byproduct material, if the cooperating country detonates a nuclear explosive device or terminates or abrogates an International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement. This section of H.R. 


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1280, as amended, expands the scope of this requirement to include 

the violation of any provision of its nuclear cooperation agreement 

with the United States. 

Section 123(a)(6) requires that any nuclear cooperation agreement must commit the cooperating country to maintain ‘‘adequate 

physical security’’ regarding any nuclear material exported to that 

country by the U.S., or any byproduct nuclear material. This section of H.R. 1280, as amended, broadens the application of that 

commitment to extend to any nuclear material acquired from any 

other source other than the United States. 

This section adds two new requirements to those in section 123 

(a) of the AEA: 

• a guaranty by the cooperating party that no nationals of a 

third country will be permitted access to any reactor, related 

equipment, or sensitive materials transferred under the agreement for cooperation without the prior consent of the United 

States; and 

• a commitment to maintain and, in the case of a country without such a legal regime in place, a commitment to enact at the 

earliest possible date, and in no case later than one year after 

the agreement enters into force, a legal regime providing for 

adequate protection from civil liability that will allow for the 

participation of United States suppliers in any effort by the 

country to develop civilian nuclear power.’’ 

Section 123(d) of the AEA sets forth the procedures by which a 

proposed agreement for cooperation that has been submitted to the 

Congress is to be reviewed. This section of H.R. 1280, as amended, 

requires that a proposed agreement for civil nuclear cooperation 

that does not contain a legally-binding commitment that the cooperating country will not engage in uranium enrichment or spentfuel reprocessing activities (ENR), or acquire or construct facilities 

for such activities, anywhere in its territory, can come into effect 

only if Congress adopts, and there is enacted, a joint resolution of 

approval. If a proposed new agreement does contain such a commitment, it can go into effect after lying before Congress for 90 days 

of continuous session, unless the Congress adopts and enacts a 

joint resolution of disapproval during the last 60 days of continuous 

session of such period. For the renewal of an existing agreement 

with a commitment to forgo ENR, Congress will have 30 days of 

continuous session to disapprove such agreement. 

This section also adds conditions that a cooperating party must 

meet in order to qualify for a nuclear cooperation agreement with 

the United States: 

• the cooperating party has acceded to and is fully implementing 

the provisions and guidelines of the Chemical Weapons Convention; the Biological Weapons Convention; and all other 

international agreements to which the United States is a party 

regarding the export of nuclear, chemical, biological, and advanced conventional weapons, including missiles and other delivery systems; 

• has established and is fully implementing an effective export 

control system, including fully implementing the provisions 


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and guidelines of United Nations Security Council Resolution 

1540; 

• is in full compliance with all United Nations conventions to 

which the United States is a party and all Security Council 

resolutions regarding the prevention of the proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction, including the Convention on the 

Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of 

Nuclear Terrorism; 

• is not a Destination of Diversion Concern under section 303 of 

the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Public Law 111–195); 

• is closely cooperating with the United States to prevent state 

sponsors of terrorism from acquiring or developing chemical, 

biological, or nuclear weapons or related technologies or acquiring or developing destabilizing numbers and types of advanced 

conventional weapons, including ballistic missiles; and 

• has signed, ratified, and is fully implementing an Additional 

Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. 

This section also states that subsequent arrangements to existing 

nuclear cooperation agreements can become effective only if Congress enacts a joint resolution of approval according to the amended procedures noted above. 

Section 2. Withdrawal from Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 

This section states that it is the policy of the United States government to oppose the withdrawal by any signatory from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to use 

all political, economic, and diplomatic means to deter, prevent, or 

reverse any such withdrawal. It prohibits U.S. assistance, other 

than humanitarian assistance, from being provided to any such 

country and requires the U.S. to seek the return of any material, 

equipment, or components transferred to the country under a nuclear cooperation agreement. 

Section 3. Report on Comparability of Nonproliferation Conditions 

by Foreign Nuclear Suppliers. 

This section requires the President to provide the Committee on 

Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee 

on Foreign Relations of the Senate within 180 days after the enactment of this Act a report on the extent to which each country that 

engages in civil nuclear exports requires nuclear nonproliferation 

conditions comparable to those in this Act. The report must include 

information on U.S.-origin components in each country’s nuclear 

exports, investments in the U.S. by entities from those countries 

that are engaged in nuclear exports, and any U.S. grant, loan, or 

loan guarantee to such country or entity. 

Section 4. Initiatives and Negotiations Relating to Agreements for 

Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation. 

This provision amends subsection (f) of section 123 (as redesignated), to require the President to keep the Committee on Foreign 

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eign Relations of the Senate fully and currently informed of any 

initiative or negotiations relating to a new or amended agreement 

for peaceful nuclear cooperation prior to the President’s announcement of such initiative or negotiations. The President is also required to consult with the committees concerning such initiative or 

negotiations beginning not later than 15 calendar days after the 

initiation of any such negotiations, or the receipt or transmission 

of a draft agreement, whichever occurs first, and monthly thereafter until such time as the negotiations are concluded. 

Section 5. Conduct Resulting In Termination of Nuclear Exports. 

Section 5 amends section 129 a.(2) of the AEA to insert a new 

subparagraph (D) which prohibits the export of any U.S. nuclear 

materials, equipment, or sensitive nuclear technology to any nation 

or group of nations that has been determined by the President to 

be a ‘country of proliferation concern’ under section 1055(g)(2) of 

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (50 

U.S.C. 2371(g)(2)). 

Section 6. Congressional Review Procedures. 

This section amends section 130 i.(1) of the AEA to specify the 

language of the joint resolution of approval addressed in section 1 

of this Act. This provision allows the Congress to add provisions to 

a joint resolution of approval, e.g., reports, conditions for the entry 

into force of the agreement or the granting of export licenses pursuant to such agreement, and other relevant provisions. 

The AEA allows Congress only two options: to approve or disapprove of a proposed nuclear cooperation agreement without 

amendment. H.R. 1280 retains this same set of options for new 

agreements that include a legally binding commitment to forgo acquiring an ENR capability. For agreements that do not have this 

ENR provision, H.R. 1280 would require that Congress affirmatively vote to approve such agreements, as well as provide the option to add conditions, e.g., a requirement for a Presidential certification regarding the nonproliferation behavior of the country before 

the agreement could come into force. By contrast, a similar requirement for the U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement required 

passage of separate legislation. Such conditions could facilitate approval of such agreements by addressing Congressional concerns 

regarding the agreement, such as the country’s commitment to nonproliferation. 

Section 7. Requirement of Liability Protection for United States Nuclear Suppliers. 

This section amends the AEA to require that, prior to issuing a 

license for any nuclear export, the President must certify that a cooperating country has liability protection for United States nuclear 

suppliers equivalent to that of the Convention on Supplementary 

Compensation for Nuclear Damage. 

Section 8. Prohibition on Assistance to State Sponsors of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

This section prohibits U.S. assistance to countries the governments of which have repeatedly engaged in or supported proliferation activities if the Secretary of State has issued a determination 


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to that effect. This determination must be published in the Federal 

Register and cannot be rescinded unless the Secretary provides to 

the appropriate committees a report certifying that the government 

of that country is not engaged in or supporting proliferation activities and has provided assurances that it will not engage in such activities in the future or that the government has not engaged in 

proliferation activities in the previous 24 months. The President 

may waive this requirement if he determines that U.S. national security or humanitarian reason justify a waiver and provides to the 

appropriate congressional committees a report stating the reasons 

for the waiver and the type and amount of the proposed assistance. 

Section 9. Additional Protocol as a Criterion for United States Assistance. 

This section states that it is the policy of the U.S. to ensure that 

every signatory of the NPT should bring into force an Additional 

Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. It also requires the U.S. to take this policy into account when considering 

providing assistance to any country. 

Section 10. Sense of Congress. 

This section states that it is the sense of Congress that the President should ensure that participation in international nuclear programs conducted by the United States is limited to the greatest extent practicable to governmental and nongovernmental participants 

from countries that have adopted nonproliferation provisions in 

their nuclear cooperation and nuclear export control policies comparable to the policies specified in section 123 of the AEA as 

amended by this Act. 

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, 

as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, 

existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): 

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 

TITLE I—ATOMIC ENERGY 

* * * * * * * 

CHAPTER 11—INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 123. COOPERATION WITH OTHER NATIONS.—øNo cooperation¿ Subject to subsection f., no cooperation with any nation, group 

of nations or regional defense organization pursuant to section 53, 

54 a., 57, 64, 82, 91, 103, 104, or 144 shall be undertaken until— 

a. the proposed agreement for cooperation has been 

submitted to the President, which proposed arrangement 

shall include the terms, conditions, duration, nature, and 


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scope of the cooperation; and shall include the following requirements: 

(1) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

(3) except in the case of those agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91 c., a 

guaranty by the cooperating party that no nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology 

to be transferred pursuant to such agreement or acquired from any other source, and no special nuclear 

material produced through the use of any nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology 

transferred pursuant to such agreement or acquired 

from any other source, will be used for any nuclear explosive device, or for research on or development of 

any nuclear explosive device, or for any other military 

purpose; 

(4) except in the case of those agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91 c. and 

agreements for cooperation with nuclear-weapon 

states, a stipulation that the United States shall have 

the right to require the return of any nuclear materials and equipment transferred pursuant thereto and 

any special nuclear material produced through the use 

thereof if the cooperating party detonates a nuclear 

explosive device øor terminates or¿, terminates, abrogates an agreement providing for IAEA safeguards, or 

violates or abrogates any provision contained within 

such agreement; 

* * * * * * * 

(6) a guaranty by the cooperating party that adequate physical security will be maintained with respect to any nuclear material transferred pursuant to 

such agreement or acquired from any other source and 

with respect to any special nuclear material used in or 

produced through the use of any material, production 

facility, or utilization facility transferred pursuant to 

such agreement or acquired from any other source; 

* * * * * * * 

(8) except in the case of agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91 c., 144 b. 144 

c., or 144 d., a guaranty by the cooperating party that 

no plutonium, no uranium 233, and no uranium enriched to greater than twenty percent in the isotope 

235, transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation, or recovered from any source or special nuclear material so transferred or from any source or 

special nuclear material used in any production facility or utilization facility transferred pursuant to the 

agreement for cooperation, will be stored in any facility that has not been approved in advance by the 

United States; øand¿ 


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(9) except in the case of agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91 c., 144 b., 144 

c., or 144 d., a guaranty by the cooperating party that 

any special nuclear material, production facility, or 

utilization facility produced or constructed under the 

jurisdiction of the cooperating party by or through the 

use of any sensitive nuclear technology transferred 

pursuant to such agreement for cooperation will be 

subject to all the requirements specified in this 

subsectionø.¿; 

(10) a guaranty by the cooperating party that no nationals of a third country shall be permitted access to any 

reactor, related equipment, or sensitive materials transferred under the agreement for cooperation without the 

prior consent of the United States; and 

(11) a commitment to maintain and, in the case of a 

country without such a legal regime in place, a commitment to enact at the earliest possible date, and in no case 

later than one year after the agreement enters into force, a 

legal regime providing for adequate protection from civil liability that will allow for the participation of United States 

suppliers in any effort by the country to develop civilian nuclear power. 

øThe President may exempt a proposed agreement for cooperation 

(except an agreement arranged pursuant to subsection 91 c., 144 

b., 144 c., or 144 d.) from any of the requirements of the foregoing 

sentence if he determines that inclusion of any such requirement 

would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States 

non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.¿ Except in the case of those agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91 c., 144 b., 144 c., or 

144 d., any proposed agreement for cooperation shall be negotiated 

by the Secretary of State, with the technical assistance and concurrence of the Secretary of Energy; and after consultation with the 

Commission shall be submitted to the President jointly by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Energy accompanied by the 

views and recommendations of the Secretary of State, the Secretary 

of Energy, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Secretary 

of State shall also provide to the President an unclassified Nuclear 

Proliferation Assessment Statement (A) which shall analyze the 

consistency of the text of the proposed agreement for cooperation 

with all the requirements of this Act, with specific attention to 

whether the proposed agreement is consistent with each of the criteria set forth in this subsection, and (B) regarding the adequacy 

of the safeguards and other control mechanisms and the peaceful 

use assurances contained in the agreement for cooperation to ensure that any assistance furnished thereunder will not be used to 

further any military or nuclear explosive purpose. Each Nuclear 

Proliferation Assessment Statement prepared pursuant to this Act 

shall be accompanied by a classified annex, prepared in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, summarizing relevant classified information. In the case of those agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91 c., 144 b., 144 c., or 

144 d., any proposed agreement for cooperation shall be submitted 

to the President by the Secretary of Energy or, in the case of those 


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23 

agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91 c., 

144 b., or 144 d. which are to be implemented by the Department 

of Defense, by the Secretary of Defense; 

* * * * * * * 

c. the proposed agreement for cooperation (if not an 

agreement subject to subsection d.) together with the approval and determination of the President, has been submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 

of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate for a period of thirty days of continuous 

session (as defined in subsection 130 g.): Provided, however, That these committees, after having received such 

agreement for cooperation, may by resolution in writing 

waive the conditions of all or any portion of such thirtyday period; øand¿ 

d. the proposed agreement for cooperation (if arranged 

pursuant to subsection 91 c., 144 b., 144 c., or 144 d., or 

if entailing implementation of section 53, 54 a., 103, or 104 

in relation to a reactor that may be capable of producing 

more than five thermal megawatts or special nuclear material for use in connection therewith) has been submitted 

to the Congress, together with the approval and determination of the President, for a period of sixty days of continuous session (as defined in subsection 130 g. of this Act) 

and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 

Relations of the Senate, and in addition, in the case of a 

proposed agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to 

subsection 91 c., 144 b., 144 c., or 144 d., the Committee 

on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and 

the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, but such 

proposed agreement for cooperation shall ønot¿ become effective only if during such sixty-day period the Congress 

adopts, and there is enacted, a joint resolution stating in 

substance that the Congress does ønot¿ favor the proposed 

agreement for cooperation: Provided, That the sixty-day 

period shall not begin until a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement prepared by the Secretary of State, and 

any annexes thereto, when required by subsection 123 a., 

have been submitted to the Congressø: Provided further, 

That an agreement for cooperation exempted by the President pursuant to subsection a. from any requirement contained in that subsection, or an agreement exempted pursuant to section 104(a)(1) of the Henry J. Hyde United 

States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 

2006, shall not become effective unless the Congress 

adopts, and there is enacted, a joint resolution stating that 

the Congress does favor such agreement¿, unless the proposed agreement includes a requirement as part of the 

agreement for cooperation or other legally binding document that is considered part of the agreement that no enrichment or reprocessing activities, or acquisition or construction of facilities for such activities, will occur within 

the territory over which the cooperating party exercises sovereignty, in which case the agreement shall become effective 


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unless the Congress adopts, and there is enacted, a joint 

resolution of disapproval (1) during such sixty-day period 

for a new agreement; or (2) during a period of 30 days of 

continuous session for a renewal agreement. During the 

sixty-day period the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 

Relations of the Senate shall each hold hearings on the 

proposed agreement for cooperation and submit a report to 

their respective bodies recommending whether it should be 

approved or disapproved. Any such proposed agreement for 

cooperation shall be considered pursuant to the procedures 

set forth in section 130 i. of this Act. 

Following submission of a proposed agreement for cooperation (except an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to 

subsection 91 c., 144 b., 144 c., or 144 d.) to the Committee on 

Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of State, the Department 

of Energy, and the Department of Defense shall, upon the request of either of those committees, promptly furnish to those 

committees their views as to whether the safeguards and other 

controls contained therein provide an adequate framework to 

ensure that any exports as contemplated by such agreement 

will not be inimical to or constitute an unreasonable risk to the 

common defense and security. 

If, after the date of enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

Act of 1978, the Congress fails to disapprove a proposed agreement 

for cooperation which exempts the recipient nation from the requirement set forth in subsection 123 a. (2), such failure to act 

shall constitute a failure to adopt a resolution of disapproval pursuant to subsection 128 b. (3) for purposes of the Commission’s consideration of applications and requests under section 126 a. (2) and 

there shall be no congressional review pursuant to section 128 of 

any subsequent license or authorization with respect to that state 

until the first such license or authorization which is issued after 

twelve months from the elapse of the sixty-day period in which the 

agreement for cooperation in question is reviewed by the 

Congressø.¿; and 

e. the cooperating party— 

(1) has acceded to and is fully implementing the provisions and guidelines of— 

(A) the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 

Weapons and on their Destruction (commonly known 

as the ‘‘Chemical Weapons Convention’’); 

(B) the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 

and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (commonly known as the ‘‘Biological Weapons Convention’’); 

and 

(C) all other international agreements to which the 

United States is a party regarding the export of nuclear, chemical, biological, and advanced conventional 

weapons, including missiles and other delivery systems; 


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(2) has established and is fully implementing an effective export control system, including fully implementing the 

provisions and guidelines of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540; 

(3) is in full compliance with all United Nations conventions to which the United States is a party and all Security Council resolutions regarding the prevention of the 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including— 

(A) the Convention on the Physical Protection of 

Nuclear Material; and 

(B) the United Nations International Convention 

for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; 

(4) is not a Destination of Diversion Concern under section 303 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Public Law 111–195); 

(5) is closely cooperating with the United States to prevent state sponsors of terrorism (the term ‘‘state sponsor of 

terrorism’’ means a country the government of which has 

been determined by the Secretary of State, for purposes of 

section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 

of the Arms Export Control Act, or other provision of law, 

is a government that has repeatedly provided support for 

acts of international terrorism) from— 

(A) acquiring or developing chemical, biological, or 

nuclear weapons or related technologies; or 

(B) acquiring or developing destabilizing numbers 

and types of advanced conventional weapons, including 

ballistic missiles; and 

(6) has signed, ratified, and is fully implementing an 

Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the 

International Atomic Energy Agency. 

øe. The President shall keep the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate fully and currently informed of any initiative or negotiations relating to 

a new or amended agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to this section (except an agreement arranged pursuant to section 91 c., 144 b., 144 c., or 144 d., 

or an amendment thereto).¿ 

f. The President shall keep the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate fully and currently informed of any 

initiative or negotiations relating to a new or amended agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to this section 

prior to the President’s announcement of such initiative or negotiations. The President shall consult with the Committee on 

Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate concerning such initiative or negotiations beginning not later than 15 calendar 

days after the initiation of any such negotiations, or the receipt 

or transmission of a draft agreement, whichever occurs first, 

and monthly thereafter until such time as the negotiations are 

concluded. 

g. For purposes of this section— 


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(1) the term ‘‘new agreement’’ means an agreement for 

cooperation with a country with respect to which the United 

States has not, on or after the date of the enactment of this 

subsection, entered into such an agreement; and 

(2) the term ‘‘renewal agreement’’ means an agreement 

for cooperation with a country with respect to which the 

United States has, before the date of the enactment of this 

subsection, entered into such an agreement. 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 129. CONDUCT RESULTING IN TERMINATION OF NUCLEAR

EXPORTS.— 

a. No nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear 

technology shall be exported to— 

(1) * * * 

(2) any nation or group of nations that is found by the 

President to have, at any time after the effective date of this 

section, 

(A) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

(C) entered into an agreement after the date of enactment of this section for the transfer of reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology to the sovereign control of 

a non-nuclear-weapon state except in connection with an 

international fuel cycle evaluation in which the United 

States is a participant or pursuant to a subsequent international agreement or understanding to which the United 

States subscribes; or 

(D) been determined to be a ‘‘country of proliferation 

concern’’ under section 1055(g)(2) of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (50 U.S.C. 

2371(g)(2)); 

unless the President determines that cessation of such exports 

would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States 

non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security: Provided, That prior to the effective date of any 

such determination, the President’s determination, together with a 

report containing the reasons for his determination, shall be submitted to the Congress and referred to the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate for a period of sixty days of continuous 

session (as defined in subsection 130 g. of this Act), but any such 

determination shall not become effective if during such sixty-day 

period the Congress adopts, and there is enacted, a joint resolution 

stating in substance that it does not favor the determination. Any 

such determination shall be considered pursuant to the procedures 

set forth in section 130 of this Act for the consideration of Presidential submissions. 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 130. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW PROCEDURES.— 

a. * * * 

* * * * * * * 

i.(1) For the purposes of this subsection, the term ‘‘joint resolution’’ means— 


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(A) * * * 

(B) for an agreement for cooperation pursuant to section 

123 of this Act, a joint resolution, the matter after the resolving 

clause of which— 

(i) is as follows: ‘‘That the Congress does favor the proposed agreement for cooperation transmitted to the Congress by the President on llllllllll.’’; and 

(ii) includes, immediately after the language specified 

in clause (i), any other provisions to accompany such proposed agreement for cooperation. 

ø(B)¿ (C) for a determination under section 129 of this Act, 

a joint resolution, the matter after the resolving clause of 

which is as follows: ‘‘That the Congress does not favor the determination transmitted to the Congress by the President on 

lllll.’’, or 

ø(C)¿ (D) for a subsequent arrangement under section 201 

of the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and 

Nonproliferation Enhancement Act, a joint resolution, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: ‘‘That the 

Congress does not favor the subsequent arrangement to the 

Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the 

United States of America and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy that was transmitted 

to Congress by the President on September 10, 2008.’’, 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 131. SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS.— a.(1) Prior to entering into any proposed subsequent arrangement under an agreement for cooperation (other than an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91 c., 144 b., 

or 144 c. of this Act), the Secretary of Energy shall obtain the concurrence of the Secretary of State and shall consult with the Commission, and the Secretary of Defense: Provided, That the Secretary of State shall have the leading role in any negotiations of 

a policy nature pertaining to any proposed subsequent arrangement regarding arrangements for the storage or disposition of irradiated fuel elements or approvals for the transfer, for which prior 

approval is required under an agreement for cooperation, by a recipient of source or special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, or nuclear technology. Notice of any proposed subsequent arrangement shall be published in the Federal Register, together with the written determination of the Secretary of Energy 

that such arrangement will not be inimical to the common defense 

and øsecurity, and such proposed subsequent arrangement shall 

not take effect before fifteen days after publication.¿ security. Such 

subsequent arrangement shall become effective only if Congress enacts a joint resolution of approval according to the procedures of 

sections 123 d. and 130 i. of this Act. Any such nuclear proliferation 

assessment statement shall be submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 

Foreign Relations of the Senate not later than the 31st day of continuous session after submission of the subsequent arrangement. 

Whenever the Secretary of State is required to prepare a Nuclear 

Proliferation Assessment Statement pursuant to paragraph (2) of 

this subsection, notice of the proposed subsequent arrangement 

which is the subject of the requirement to prepare a Nuclear ProVerDate Mar 15 2010 03:10 May 31, 2012 Jkt 019006 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR507P1.XXX HR507P1

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liferation Assessment Statement shall not be published until after 

the receipt by the Secretary of Energy of such Statement or the expiration of the time authorized by subsection c. for the preparation 

of such Statement, whichever occurs first. 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 135. REQUIREMENT OF LIABILITY PROTECTION FOR UNITED 

STATES NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS. 

The President may not issue a license for the export of nuclear 

material, facilities, components, or other goods, services, or technology to a country pursuant to an agreement that has entered into 

force after the date of the enactment of this section unless the President determines that such country has liability protection for United 

States nuclear suppliers that is equivalent to the liability protection 

specified under the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for 

Nuclear Damage. 

* * * * * * * 

Æ 


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