S. HRG. 112–399

NOMINATIONS OF THE 112TH

CONGRESS—FIRST SESSION

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 16 THROUGH DECEMBER 8, 2011

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

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NOMINATIONS OF THE 112TH CONGRESS—FIRST SESSION 

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74–273 PDF 2012

S. HRG. 112–399

NOMINATIONS OF THE 112TH

CONGRESS—FIRST SESSION

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 16 THROUGH DECEMBER 8, 2011

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

112TH CONGRESS—FIRST SESSION

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

*FRANK G. LOWENSTEIN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

*Note: WILLIAM C. DANVERS (assumed Staff Director position as of October 3, 2011)

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

[Any additional material relating to these nominees may be found

at the end of the applicable day’s hearing.]

Page

Wednesday, March 16, 2011 ............................................................................... 1

Joseph M. Torsella, of Pennsylvania, to be Representative to the United 

Nations for U.N. Management and Reform, with the rank of Ambassador 

and Alternate U.S. Representative to the 65th session of the U.N. General 

Assembly ............................................................................................................... 6

Tuesday, March 29, 2011 ..................................................................................... 43

Suzan D. Johnson Cook, of New York, to be Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom ................................................................................. 47

Tuesday, April 5, 2011 (a.m.) .............................................................................. 71

Robert Patterson, of New York, a Career Member of the Senior Foreign 

Service, Class of Counselor, to be Ambassador to Turkmenistan .................... 75

Mara E. Rudman, of Massachusetts, to be an Assistant Administrator of 

the United States Agency for International Development ............................... 78

Tuesday, April 5, 2011 (p.m.) ............................................................................. 109

Scott Gration, of New Jersey, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Kenya ....... 114

Michelle Gavin, of the District of Columbia, to be Ambassador to the Republic 

of Botswana .......................................................................................................... 115

Wednesday, April 6, 2011 .................................................................................... 137

David Bruce Shear, of New York, to be Ambassador to the Socialist Republic 

of Vietnam ............................................................................................................ 142

Kurt Walter Tong, of Maryland, for the rank of Ambassador during his 

tenure as U.S. Senior Official for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 

(APEC) Forum ...................................................................................................... 144

Wednesday, May 4, 2011 ...................................................................................... 163

Daniel Benjamin Shapiro, of Illinois, to be Ambassador to Israel ...................... 168

Stuart E. Jones, of Virginia, a Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service, 

Class of Minister-Counselor, to be Ambassador to the Hashemite Kingdom 

of Jordan ............................................................................................................... 172

Hon. George Albert Krol, of New Jersey, a Career Member of the Senior 

Foreign Service, Class of Minister-Counselor, to be Ambassador to the 

Republic of Uzbekistan ........................................................................................ 181

Henry S. Ensher, of California, a Career Member of the Senior Foreign 

Service, Class of Counselor, to be Ambassador to the People’s Democratic 

Republic of Algeria ............................................................................................... 185

Page

IV

Thursday, May 26, 2011 ....................................................................................... 207

Hon. Gary Locke, of Washington, to be Ambassador to the People’s Republic 

of China ................................................................................................................. 211

Tuesday, June 7, 2011 .......................................................................................... 263

Jeanine E. Jackson, of Wyoming, to be Ambassador to the Republic of 

Malawi .................................................................................................................. 269

Geeta Pasi, of New York, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Djibouti ........... 271

Donald Koran, of California, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Rwanda ...... 274

Lewis Lukens, of Virginia, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Senegal 

and to serve concurrently as Ambassador to the Republic of Guinea-Bissau . 277

Ariel Pablos-Me ́ndez, of New York, to be Assistant Administrator of the 

United States Agency for International Development ...................................... 279

Wednesday, June 8, 2011 .................................................................................... 299

Jonathan D. Farrar, of California, to be Ambassador to the Republic of 

Nicaragua .............................................................................................................. 302

Lisa J. Kubiske, of Virginia, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Honduras ... 304

James H. Thessin, of Virginia, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Paraguay 307

D. Brent Hardt, of Florida, to be Ambassador to the Co-operative Republic 

of Guyana .............................................................................................................. 309

Tuesday, June 21, 2011 ........................................................................................ 341

Hon. Anne W. Patterson, of Virginia, to be Ambassador to the Arab Republic 

of Egypt ................................................................................................................. 346

Michael H. Corbin, of California, to be Ambassador to the United Arab 

Emirates ................................................................................................................ 366

Susan L. Ziadeh, of Washington, to be Ambassador to the State of Qatar ........ 369

Matthew H. Tueller, of Utah, to be Ambassador to the State of Kuwait ........... 371

Kenneth J. Fairfax, of Kentucky, to be Ambassador to the Republic of 

Kazakhstan ........................................................................................................... 374

Wednesday, June 29, 2011 .................................................................................. 411

Derek J. Mitchell, of Connecticut, to be Special Representative and Policy 

Coordinator for Burma, with the rank of Ambassador ..................................... 416

Frankie Annette Reed, of Maryland, to be Ambassador to the Republic of 

the Fiji Islands, and to serve concurrently as Ambassador to the Republic 

of Nauru, the Kingdom of Tonga, Tuvalu, and the Republic of Kiribati ......... 422

Wednesday, July 13, 2011 ................................................................................... 439

Paul D. Wohlers, of Washington, to be Ambassador to the Republic of 

Macedonia ............................................................................................................. 442

William H. Moser, of North Carolina, to be Ambassador to the Republic 

of Moldova ............................................................................................................. 445

John A. Heffern, of Missouri, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Armenia .... 447

Thomas M. Countryman, of Washington, to be Assistant Secretary of State 

for International Security and Non-Proliferation .............................................. 460

Jeffrey DeLaurentis, of New York, to be Alternate Representative of the 

United States of America for Special Political Affairs in the United Nations, 

with the rank of Ambassador, and Alternate Representative of the United 

States of America to the Sessions of the General Assembly of the United 

Nations .................................................................................................................. 463

Tuesday, July 19, 2011 ......................................................................................... 483

David S. Adams, of the District of Columbia, to be Assistant Secretary of 

State for Legislative Affairs ................................................................................ 486

Joyce A. Barr, of Washington, to be Assistant Secretary of State for Administration ................................................................................................................... 488

Page

V

Wednesday, July 20, 2011 ................................................................................... 507

Hon. Earl Anthony Wayne, of Maryland, to be Ambassador to Mexico .............. 511

Arnold Chacon, of Virginia, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Guatemala ... 517

Thursday, July 21, 2011 ...................................................................................... 539

Sung Y. Kim, of California, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Korea ............ 543

Tuesday, August 2, 2011 ...................................................................................... 555

Hon. Norman L. Eisen, of the District of Columbia, to be Ambassador to 

the Czech Republic ............................................................................................... 562

Hon. Francis Joseph Ricciardone, Jr., of Massachusetts, to be Ambassador 

to the Republic of Turkey .................................................................................... 565

Hon. Robert S. Ford, of Vermont, to be Ambassador to the Syrian Arab 

Republic ................................................................................................................ 571

Wednesday, September 7, 2011 ......................................................................... 621

Hon. Wendy R. Sherman, of Maryland, to be Under Secretary of State for 

Political Affairs ..................................................................................................... 626

Wednesday, September 21, 2011 ....................................................................... 669

Robert A. Mandell, of Florida, to be U.S. Ambassador to Luxembourg .............. 673

Hon. Thomas Charles Krajeski, of Virginia, to be U.S. Ambassador to the 

Kingdom of Bahrain ............................................................................................. 676

Hon. Dan W. Mozena, of Iowa, to be U.S. Ambassador to the People’s Republic 

of Bangladesh ....................................................................................................... 678

Michael A. Hammer, of the District of Columbia, to be Assistant Secretary 

of State for Public Affairs .................................................................................... 681

Wednesday, October 5, 2011 ............................................................................... 713

Susan Denise Page, of Illinois, to be Ambassador to the Republic of South 

Sudan .................................................................................................................... 718

Adrienne S. O’Neal, of Michigan, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Cape 

Verde ..................................................................................................................... 721

Mary Beth Leonard, of Massachusetts, to be Ambassador to the Republic 

of Mali ................................................................................................................... 724

Mark Francis Brzezinski, of Virginia, to be Ambassador to Sweden .................. 726

Wednesday, October 12, 2011 ............................................................................ 745

Dr. Michael Anthony McFaul, of California, to be Ambassador to the Russian 

Federation ............................................................................................................. 750

Tuesday, November 8, 2011 ................................................................................ 807

Hon. Roberta S. Jacobson, of Maryland, to be an Assistant Secretary of 

State for Western Hemisphere Affairs ............................................................... 810

Hon. Mari Carmen Aponte, of the District of Columbia, to be Ambassador 

to the Republic of El Salvador ............................................................................ 830

Adam E. Namm, of New York, to be an Ambassador to the Republic of 

Ecuador ................................................................................................................. 833

Elizabeth M. Cousens, of Washington, to be Representative of the United 

States of America on the Economic and Social Council of the United 

Nations, with the rank of Ambassador; and, to be an Alternate Representative of the United States of America to the Sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, during her tenure of service as Representative 

of the United States of America on the Economic and Social Council of 

the United Nations .............................................................................................. 836

Page

VI

Thursday, December 8, 2011 .............................................................................. 891

Earl W. Gast, of California, to be an Assistant Administrator of the United 

States Agency for International Development ................................................... 893

Tara D. Sonenshine, of Maryland, to be Under Secretary of State for Public 

Diplomacy ............................................................................................................. 895

Anne Claire Richard, of New York, to be Assistant Secretary of State for 

Population, Refugees, and Migration ................................................................. 899

Robert E. Whitehead, of Florida, to be Ambassador to the Togolese Republic .. 902

(1)

NOMINATION 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 16, 2011

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

Joseph M. Torsella, of Pennsylvania, to be Representative to the 

United Nations for U.N. Management and Reform, with the 

rank of Ambassador and Alternate U.S. Representative to the 

65th session of the U.N. General Assembly 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert P. Casey, 

presiding. 

Present: Senators Casey, Rubio, DeMint, and Lee. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR.,

U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA 

Senator CASEY. The hearing will come to order. 

First of all, I want to thank the nominee, Joe Torsella, for being 

here and for taking the time to come back. 

And I appreciate the attendance here of our ranking member, 

Senator DeMint. 

Today the Foreign Relations Committee meets to examine the 

nomination of Joe Torsella to be Representative of the United 

States of America to the United Nations for Management and Reform, with the rank of Ambassador and Alternative U.S. Representative to the 65th session of the U.N. General Assembly. 

Joe Torsella has been here before, and we’re grateful that he’s 

back. His wife, Carolyn, is with us. And I’m told that your daughter, Grace, is here and your son, Joe—is that—did I get that right? 

Thanks very much for being here. We’re grateful. 

And we know that—as I think I said before, that when a public 

official, elected or appointed, puts themself forward for public service, I know that’s a commitment that you make, but also that your 

family makes. And I know that’s a challenge, and we’re grateful 

that your family is here to support you. 

In the past 2 years, the world has witnessed a shift, in the 

United States foreign policy, toward a comprehensive 

multilateralism which is embodied in our renewed commitment to 

the international system that the United Nations represents. This 

new direction is critically important to how we conduct foreign policy and how we relate to the United Nations. 

2

The United States was one of the primary architects of the 

United Nations and its affiliated bodies. And as a world leader, the 

United States not only has role to play to be an active participant 

in the United Nations, but also has an obligation to ensure that the 

U.N. has measures of accountability applied to it. 

To that end, Joe Torsella’s record as a dedicated in innovative reformer will serve him well in this important post as U.S. Representative to the United Nations for Management and Reform. 

In these times of sweeping geopolitical change, the administration has worked, for the past 2 years, to make America stronger 

and more secure by pursuing a strategy of national renewal and 

energetic global leadership. Ambassador Rice has made this case 

before, and I’d like to take the opportunity to discuss briefly how 

the United Nations fits into that strategy—why we need the U.N., 

how it makes us all safer, and what we’re doing to fix its shortcomings and help fulfill its potential. 

In these tough economic times here in the United States, and indeed, around the world, we’re all focused on a growing economy. 

We’re in recovery, but we’ve got a long way to go. We want to make 

sure we’re doing everything possible to provide jobs for Americans 

who are hurting and out of work. 

Yet, even as we get our own house in order, we cannot afford to 

ignore problems beyond our borders. When nuclear weapons materials remain unsecured in many countries around the world, we are 

all put at risk. When states are wracked by conflict or ravaged by 

poverty, they can incubate threats that spread across borders, from 

terrorism to pandemic disease, from criminal networks to environmental degradation. Like it or not, we live in a new era of challenges that cross borders as freely as a storm, challenges that even 

the world’s most powerful country often cannot tackle on its own. 

In the 21st century, indifference is not an option. Withdrawing 

from the world community is not only bad policy, it is, in fact, dangerous. 

America cannot police every conflict and every crisis, and—or 

shelter every refugee. The United Nations provides a real return on 

our tax dollars by bringing the world’s countries together to share 

the cost of providing stability, vital aid, and hope in the world’s 

most broken places. Because of the U.N., the world doesn’t look to 

America to solve every problem alone. Our participation in the 

U.N. is a wise investment. But, with any investment, I should say, 

we must constantly work to better ensure that management and effective reforms are in place for that organization; in this case, the 

United Nations. 

The Foreign Relations Committee has taken steps to address our 

Nation’s arrears to the U.N. over the past 2 years. However, in 

doing so, the committee has called upon the U.N. to implement a 

series of reforms and to improve its evaluation and transparency 

policies. As the biggest contributor to the U.N., we expect, and we 

deserve, accountability to ensure that our taxpayer dollars are 

spent wisely and efficiently.

3

The United Nations can be more efficient and effective, and I 

know that Joe Torsella has ideas on how to make that happen. I 

support his confirmation to serve our country at the U.S. mission 

at the United Nations, because I believe he has the background 

and experience and commitment to public service to enhance our 

active U.S. presence at the U.N. by ensuring that our tax dollars 

are spent wisely. 

Joe has been a faithful public servant and a leading entrepreneur in Pennsylvania throughout his career. As deputy mayor 

for policy and planning in Philadelphia, he helped lead Philadelphia out of its economic and fiscal crisis by implementing strategic 

reforms that the New York Times described as ‘‘the most stunning 

turnaround in recent urban history.’’

Most recently, he has served as the chairman of the Pennsylvania Board of Education, one of the Nation’s largest public school 

systems, with over 500 public school districts and 14 State universities. Under Joe Torsella’s leadership, the Board of Education 

adopted and implemented groundbreaking State education standards and new high school graduation requirements. These reforms 

require students to demonstrate proficiency in core subject matters 

in order to receive a diploma, thereby strengthening public education in the Commonwealth and holding schools accountable. 

These reforms don’t come easily. They are a result of building consensus with a variety of stakeholders. And Joe has gotten results. 

Joe has also been instrumental in the establishment of Philadelphia’s National Constitution Center. The center is dedicated to increasing the public’s understanding of, and appreciation for, the 

U.S. Constitution. 

Finally, I will enter into the record a letter from President 

George Herbert Walker Bush which indicates his close working relationship with Joe Torsella when Joe was the chairman of the 

board of the Constitution Center. And I’ll enter that into the record 

and just read, for the record, one sentence from that letter. And I’m 

quoting former President Bush. ‘‘As a former Ambassador to the 

United Nations, I could not be more confident in Joe’s qualifications for this job. I would have been proud to have him on my 

team. He’s a man of character and principle and will represent our 

Nation well.’’

I think that’s well said by one of our former Presidents. 

With Joe Torsella representing the United States on management reform issues, we can have the confidence that our Nation’s 

interests will be effectively championed and that this portfolio will 

be professionally and efficiently managed on behalf of the people of 

the United States. 

[The letter referred to by Senator Casey follows:]

4

Senator CASEY. And, with that, I turn to our distinguished ranking member, Senator DeMint. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM DeMINT,

U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA 

Senator DEMINT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Torsella. I appreciate your meeting with me in 

our office. I feel very good about your nomination. 

I appreciate the chairman pointing out the importance of the 

United Nations. Having an international body is obviously critical 

to a lot of things in the world, which makes the problems perhaps 

that much more important, as well. 


bush.eps
5

And whether it comes to budget processes or peacekeeping operations, oversight, or transparency, the United Nations has been unacceptably slow to reform. Waste, fraud, abuse, and general mismanagement are widespread at the U.N. Yet, the position of U.S. 

Representatives the United Nations for Management and Reform 

has been vacant for over 2 years. That makes it appear that the 

United Nations oversight has simply not been a priority to the administration, which I hope you can change. 

This is unfortunate. The United States is by far the largest contributor to the United Nations, donating more than $6 billion in 

2009 alone. I believe American taxpayers deserve more accountability for their dollars. 

One major area of concern is the mandated items Americans are 

forced to pay for our nonvoluntary U.N. contributions. Because of 

this, Americans end up paying for programs that do not align with 

our national security and foreign policy objectives. For example, 

since 2006, nearly half of the country-specific resolutions passed by 

the United Nations Humans Rights Council, which Americans are 

required to fund, have focused on condemning Israel. Meanwhile, 

notorious human rights offenders, like Iran and Cuba, have been 

ignored. 

In the past, the United States has pressured the U.N. to review 

their mandates. This process has stalled, largely because U.N. 

member states are focused on protecting the funding for their pet 

programs. Over 9,000 of these programs currently exist. Programs 

that duplicate each other, and outdated mandates, must be streamlined, eliminated, and merged. 

The United States also sends the United Nations voluntary contributions. President Obama’s bipartisan debt commission proposed 

making a reduction in the amount of voluntary contributions the 

United States gives the U.N. on its draft of spending-cut proposals. 

And we should go much further. The United Kingdom, as you’re 

aware, has recommended cutting funding for four agencies, and put 

on notice—put others on notice for urgent improvement, or they 

would face cuts, as well. The United States should examine these 

cuts and take similar actions. 

Finally, U.N. peacekeeping missions must have more accountability—much more. According to a 2007 report by the United Nations Office on Internal Oversight Services, of roughly $1.4 billion 

in peacekeeping contracts examined, significant corruption schemes 

were involved in roughly 44 percent of these contracts, totaling 

about $619 million. This is a topic I’d like to pursue further during 

the question-and-answer period, but I’ll stop and let you give your 

statement. 

And Mr. Chairman, I suspect if they call the vote sometimes, we 

can listen to his statement, and then come back and ask some 

questions, if that suits you. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Senator DeMint. 

Mr. Torsella, if you could provide your opening. And we may 

have to take a brief break to go to vote. 

Mr. TORSELLA. Thank you. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. 

6

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH M. TORSELLA, OF PENNSYLVANIA, TO 

BE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS FOR U.N. 

MANAGEMENT AND REFORM, WITH THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR AND ALTERNATIVE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE 

65TH SESSION OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY 

Mr. TORSELLA. Chairman Casey, thank you for that introduction. 

Senator DeMint, thank you for your comments and for your courtesy on our recent visit. 

Chairman, Ranking Member, Senator Lee, I’m honored to be 

here today. 

I will abbreviate my full statement slightly, in the interest of the 

voting you have to do, and submit the full testimony for the record. 

Senator CASEY. Let me just say, it will be made part of the 

record. 

Mr. TORSELLA. Thank you. And I would also like to recognize—

in addition to the family members who are here today—our two 

children, Kelly Logan and Travis Logan, who are older, and who 

are not here—for good reasons, in one case, because she has a job; 

and, in the second case, because he’s enlisted in the National 

Guard Reserve and is at basic training. So, they’re with us in spirit 

and behind the nomination, as well. 

I’m deeply honored to come before you as the President’s nominee for this position, and grateful to the President, to Secretary 

Clinton, and Ambassador Rice for their confidence in me. 

And I want to echo what you said, Chairman Casey, that the 

United Nations was born, in part, here in this committee, that your 

predecessors were among the earliest advocates and architects and, 

when appropriate, constructive critics of the United Nations, because they believed that an effective U.N. that had vigorous American leadership was in our national security interest. Their beliefs, 

in my judgment, remain true today. At its best, the U.N. can be 

a powerful tool to the United States, and a force multiplier to advance our interests and our values. 

When U.N. peacekeepers are on the ground, they are there at a 

fraction of the cost and the risk of the United States acting alone. 

When the U.N. builds the civic muscles of a failing state, or a fragile state, it helps protect American citizens from the threats that 

can grow in failed states. And when U.N. agencies, such as 

UNICEF, for example, work to eradicate polio around the globe, 

we’re protecting the health of Americans here at home. 

But, neither the U.N. nor its member states are always at their 

best. And all too often, we have seen them at their worst. As Ambassador Rice has said, there is a serious gap separating the vision 

of the U.N.’s founders from the institution of today. And the investments that we’ve made and the challenges that we face are both 

too great for us to tolerate any waste, inefficiency, or abuse anywhere in the U.N. system. The global stakes are too high to allow 

biased agendas, narrow interests or political grandstanding to prevail anywhere in the U.N.’s Chambers. 

In recent years, U.S.-led comprehensive reform efforts have gathered steam and achieved some real, meaningful results, but there 

is much, much more work to be done to help the U.N. achieve a 

culture of economy, effectiveness, ethics, and excellence. I can further detail the steps that I believe lie ahead. In general, oversight 

7

and auditing must be strengthened, management and procurement 

systems must be upgraded, human resource reforms must be undertaken, and business processes need to be streamlined and 

brought into the 21st century. Those early steps that have been 

taken, on whistleblower protection, for example, need to be fully 

protected and fully implemented. 

I’ve spent much of my career bringing reform and accountability 

to public organizations in challenging contexts. As chairman of the 

Pennsylvania State Board of Education, as you said, Senator, I 

oversee a system with 500 school districts and 14 universities. And 

the hallmark of my tenure there has been implementing an accountability measure that was contested and hard-fought in the 

face of some determined opposition that guarantees that taxpayers 

get results for the dollars that we spend on education in Pennsylvania. 

When I was deputy mayor of Philadelphia that city was on the 

verge of bankruptcy—decades of poor management practices made 

it a city, in the words of one magazine, ‘‘that set the standard for 

municipal distress in the 1990s.’’ My portfolio was management reform. I helped negotiate groundbreaking contracts with Philadelphia’s 25,000 employees, of which the Wall Street Journal said, 

‘‘Taxpayers can only applaud.’’ I spearheaded reforms, from contracting out to civil service reforms, overhauling a bloated disability benefit system, and making innovative investments in productivity that closed a $1.4 billion cumulative deficit without raising taxes. As you said, the New York Times and others called it 

the most stunning turnaround in history. 

And finally, when I came to the National Constitution Center, 

that project was in some public and financial turmoil. And I’m 

proud to say that I steered it to an on-time, on-budget, and bipartisan success. And I led it to a thriving program of public diplomacy. The Constitution Center has introduced tens of thousands of 

international visitors to American ideas and ideals. We’ve worked 

in Afghanistan on democracy education efforts. We’ve hosted hundreds of international leaders, heads of state and heads of government, to grassroots democracy activists, from Australia, Brazil, and 

Cameroon, to Serbia, Tunisia, and the U.K. 

So, I come here today as a proud patriot who also has a deep 

commitment to America’s engagement with the world and at the 

United Nations, a demonstrated history of managing taxpayer dollars carefully, a willingness to listen to good ideas from all quarters, and a lifetime of experience as a strong voice for reform in 

public institutions, and a builder of coalitions to achieve it. 

It would be a great privilege, if confirmed, to use that experience, 

working with others in the administration, in Congress, and most 

especially here in this committee, to help the U.N. live up to both 

its ideals and potential, to renew and strengthen it for our century, 

just as your predecessors, in 1945, did for theirs. 

Thank you. And I look forward to answering questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Torsella follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH M. TORSELLA

Thank you Chairman Casey, Ranking Member DeMint, and distinguished members. I am honored to come before you as the President’s nominee to be the U.S. 

Representative to the United Nations for Management and Reform, and I am grateVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
8

ful to President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and Ambassador Rice for their 

confidence. 

The United Nations was born, in part, in this committee. Your predecessors were 

among its earliest architects, advocates and, occasionally, constructive critics 

because they believed that an effective United Nations—with vigorous American 

leadership—was in America’s national security interest. 

Their beliefs remain true today. At its best, the U.N. can be a powerful tool and 

force multiplier for advancing our interests and values. When U.N. peacekeepers are 

on the ground helping to protect civilians and advancing peace globally, they do so 

at a fraction of the cost and risk of the U.S. acting alone. When the U.N. builds 

the civic muscles of fragile states, American citizens are made safer from the threats 

that grow in failed states. When U.N. agencies such as UNICEF work to eradicate 

polio around the globe, we protect the health of Americans here at home. 

But neither the U.N. nor all its member states are always at their best; all too 

often, we have seen them at their worst. As Ambassador Rice has said, a serious 

gap still separates the vision of the U.N.’s founders from the institution of today. 

Both the investments we’ve made and challenges we face are too great to tolerate 

waste, inefficiency, or abuse anywhere in the U.N. system. And the global stakes 

are too high to allow biased agendas, narrow interests, or political grandstanding 

to prevail in any of the U.N.’s chambers. 

In recent years, U.S.-led comprehensive reform efforts have gathered steam and 

achieved some meaningful results. But there is much more work to be done to help 

the United Nations nurture a culture of economy, effectiveness, ethics, and excellence. 

Oversight, auditing, and evaluation must be strengthened to better ensure that 

U.S. funds are spent wisely and cleanly. Management and procurement systems 

must be upgraded and updated for accountability and transparency throughout the 

U.N.’s activities worldwide. Critical human resource reforms are essential to equipping the U.N. with a workforce that is held accountable for delivering results. Business processes need to be streamlined, aligned with best practices, and brought into 

the 21st century. And important first steps achieved in the areas of whistleblower 

protection, financial disclosure, and budgetary discipline must be protected and fully 

implemented. 

I have spent much of my career bringing reform and accountability to public organizations in challenging contexts. As chairman of the Pennsylvania State Board of 

Education, I oversee a system with 500 school districts, 14 universities, and billions 

in public funds. Under my leadership we’ve made the board’s workings more transparent and open to the public, and passed a landmark accountability measure—in 

the face of determined opposition—which implemented rigorous new high school 

graduation requirements, the first such change in a generation. 

As a deputy mayor of Philadelphia at a time when that city was on the verge of 

bankruptcy and decades of poor management practices had made it, in the words 

of City and State Magazine, ‘‘the city that . . . set the standard for municipal distress in the 1990s,’’ my portfolio was management and reform. I helped negotiate 

groundbreaking contracts with Philadelphia’s 25,000-person workforce of which The 

Wall Street Journal said ‘‘taxpayers can only applaud.’’ I spearheaded reforms—

from competitive contracting out of city services to civil service reform, from overhauling a bloated disability benefits system that encouraged abuse to innovative 

investments in productivity—that closed a $1.4 billion cumulative deficit without 

raising taxes. The New York Times called it ‘‘the most stunning turnaround in recent urban history.’’

And I came to the National Constitution Center when that $185 million project 

was in public and financial turmoil. I’m proud to say that I steered it to an on-time, 

on-budget, and bipartisan success, and led it to a thriving program of public diplomacy. 

The Constitution Center has introduced tens of thousands of everyday international visitors to American ideas and ideals, worked in Afghanistan on democracy 

education efforts, and hosted hundreds of international leaders, from heads of state 

and government to grassroots democracy activists, from countries ranging from Australia, Brazil, and Cameroon to Serbia, Tunisia, and the United Kingdom. 

So I come here today as a proud patriot who also has a deep commitment to 

America’s engagement with the world and at the United Nations, a demonstrated 

history of managing taxpayer dollars carefully, a willingness to listen to good ideas 

from all quarters, and a lifetime of experience as a strong voice for reform in public 

institutions and a builder of coalitions to achieve it. 

It would be a privilege, if confirmed, to use that experience—working with others 

in the administration, in Congress, and especially in this committee—to help the 

9

U.N. live up to both its ideals and potential, to renew and strengthen the U.N. for 

our century, just as your predecessors in 1945 did for theirs. 

Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.

Senator CASEY. Thank you Mr. Torsella. 

We will take a break for what are two votes, and get back here 

as soon as possible. 

Thank you. 

Mr. TORSELLA. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Senator CASEY. Well, thanks, everyone. We’re back. And I know 

that other members will be joining us. We just had two votes, and 

I did a little running, so I got a little exercise in between. 

But, let me start with some questions. And I know that Senator 

DeMint, and maybe Senator Lee, will be back, as well, for questions. 

I wanted to ask you about your experience, which obviously is 

relevant to any nomination hearing. But, I did note, for the record, 

some of the experience, but, in my judgment, it’s a substantial body 

of experience that bears directly on the assignment you’d have at 

the United Nations. It’s easy to talk about reform in management 

and accountability. It’s harder to do it in the real world of the private sector, or even, maybe even harder on some days, the real 

world of government. And as someone who’s not only run for public 

office, but was in a position in two different State government 

agencies where we had to change the way business was done, and 

throw out the old ways and start down a new path. I know how 

difficult that can be, so I have great admiration for what you’ve 

done. 

But, I wanted to give you some time just to kind of walk through 

some of what you covered in your statement, your previous experience and how that bears directly on the job you’ll have. 

Mr. TORSELLA. Thank you, Senator. Thank you. 

As I alluded to in my statement, I began my career in public affairs as deputy mayor of Philadelphia at a very difficult time. And 

almost all the attention of those of us who were in government 

then, and I was one of the deputy mayors for the city, was around 

a crisis of management, reform, and accountability. It was not only 

a financial crisis, but a broader crisis of confidence that people had 

in government. And over the course of several years and painstaking coalition-building, we changed the way the city did business, 

and did it in a way that translated to the bottom line, and didn’t 

do it by any of the easy, obvious solutions, which, at the time, was, 

you know, raising taxes, because our judgment was that the city 

couldn’t bear it. 

I later had my own business, and subsequently was at the Constitution Center on two different tours of duty, for a total of 10 

years, both in the institution ‘‘building’’ phase of the project, which 

was a nearly $200 million project, and then in the running of it. 

I am proud to say that, for all the years I ran it, despite the situation when I got there, we never ran a deficit, we never borrowed 

a dime, and we, as I suggested, debuted it in a way that won bipartisan applause, and has put it above politics. 

And then, finally, at the State Board of Education, when I came 

in, the proposal to require graduates to pass competency exams in 

10

basic subjects was dead. It had been dead on arrival for more than 

about 6 months in a State where 40 percent of our graduates 

weren’t reading or doing math at grade level. And we had a total 

of many billions of dollars in the system, producing graduates who 

had diplomas that weren’t worth all that much. And I sorted 

through the issues, found the common ground, persuaded opponents to become supporters, and pushed something across the finish line. 

All these are complicated public institutions with multiple constituencies and high stakes and in circumstances where people 

didn’t expect results. 

Now, I want to note that if confirmed, I’d have the profound 

honor of being ‘‘our ambassador,’’ standing up for ‘‘our interests 

and our values,’’ not full authority over the whole system, but I 

think that those talents of building coalitions, finding common 

ground on reform, standing up, making progress when you can, 

with partners when you can, standing up when you can’t, and calling attention to things. I think all those things are relevant and 

will be useful, and I look forward, if confirmed, to deploying them. 

Senator CASEY. Before turning to Senator DeMint, who was very 

patient when I was running late, earlier today, so I will stay within 

my question timeframe, but—and you may have to do this more 

than just in the 2 minutes or so, please preview, based upon your 

knowledge of the United Nations, and the management and other 

reforms you’d have to bring to bear on the—at the United Nations—just maybe a list or a summary would be helpful, I think. 

Mr. TORSELLA. Well, I do—thank you for the opportunity to talk 

about this—I do want to reserve my final say on this until I have 

the benefit of talented people in the mission and the State Department and, I hope, like-minded reform colleagues from different 

member states at the U.N. But, as I see it today, I think there are 

three broad priorities for the next Representative for Management 

and Reform. 

No. 1 is institutionalizing and strengthening the oversight function at the U.N. Senator DeMint alluded to a report of a few years 

ago about procurement. That report is what a healthy oversight 

function can do. The United States led the effort to establish the 

Office of Internal Oversight Services at the U.N. There is a terrific 

new head of that office, who is at the beginning of her 5-year term 

but it is not fully staffed, not fully staffed at some high levels. And 

it has not been given the financial and operational independence 

it needs to be the watchdog, which is, I know, a term from your 

past, Senator, that you are familiar with—that keeps things on the 

straight and narrow. 

No. 2 is, broadly, budget discipline. As we heard, the U.N. budget 

has grown substantially, and we are the largest contributor to the 

U.N. budget. And it is eminently in our interest that there be appropriate belt-tightening and management for effectiveness. It is 

also, though, I want to say, in the interest of other members states 

in the U.N., and the U.N., as an institution, because its credibility 

is directly related to the perceptions people have. So, broadly, the 

budget discipline and budget processes, and dealing with those resources. 

11

And then, third, those reforms that I believe can have a systematic impact, not just the impact of 1 month or a headline, but 

whether that’s extending the ethics framework—the disclosure requirements on financial interests, or whether it’s software systems 

that’ll reap tens and hundreds of millions in benefits, things that 

make real, longstanding change. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much. 

Senator DeMint. 

Senator DEMINT. Thank you, Chairman Casey. 

I’d like to focus for a minute on the peacekeeping operations and 

the U.S. contributions to those. Even though the United Nations 

supposedly has a zero-tolerance policy when it come to abuses 

against women and children, peacekeeping missions have been 

plagued with allegations of misconduct by U.N. peacekeepers. I 

mean, this is deeply disturbing. And I know that this has been 

none of your doing, at this point, but I think the record is important. And I’d like to start by reading you a few figures about these 

allegations, and how much money American taxpayers have spent 

on those very missions. 

In 2010, 83 allegations of misconduct against U.N. peacekeepers 

and civilian personnel were reported. The U.S. contribution to U.N. 

peacekeeping activities was roughly $2.13 billion that year. 

In 2009, there were 40 reported allegations of sexual abuse by 

U.N. peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The U.S.-

assessed contribution for that year in the DRC was roughly $210 

million. 

In 2007, U.N. peacekeepers were accused of serious allegations 

of widespread sexual exploitation and abuse in the Ivory Coast. 

U.S. contributions to that mission in 2007 were roughly $138 million. 

A 2007 source reported that 20 allegations of U.N. peacekeeping 

sexual misconduct with children in Southern Sudan. U.S. taxpayerfunded contributions for that mission in 2007 was roughly $215 

million. 

Just a couple of more of these. But, in November, 2007, peacekeepers were removed from Haiti following allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse of children. U.S. contributions to this peacekeeping mission were around $96 million. 

In 2005, U.N. peacekeepers were reported to have traded in gold 

and sold weapons to militia groups. U.S. taxpayers, in 2005, gave 

over $293 million to the peacekeeping mission in the DRC. 

That brings me to my question. Are you willing to cut funding 

for these missions where women and children have been abused? 

If not, why should American taxpayers continue to pay for missions 

where women and children have been hurt? 

And we realize that, again, the special interests that are involved 

here are going to be very determined to keep the funding without 

the oversight that you talk about. And the culture of the U.N. is 

going to be very difficult to change. But, as you look at these figures, as you hear them—and I’m sure you’re aware of a lot of 

them—how do you intend to address it? And what are you going 

to do, as far as funding versus mission, if we know there’s a problem of this kind? 

12

Mr. TORSELLA. Well, thank you, Senator. I want to wholeheartedly agree that any incidence of sexual exploitation, by any 

peacekeeper, is something that ought to trouble us greatly and is 

unacceptable. Even against the context of 120,000 deployed in 14 

different missions, the numbers of incidents is deeply troubling, offensive, and unacceptable. 

Peacekeeping is something that cuts across many of the portfolios of the senior team at the mission, from the Permanent Representative to others. And I would look forward to working with my 

colleagues to continue to make strides on this problem. There have 

been some recent reforms put in place. There are now conduct and 

discipline teams deployed who weren’t before. But, there is clearly 

much to do to support the zero-tolerance policy that the U.S. Government has gotten behind, that there should be no more such reports as we go forward. And we need to work with the whole U.N. 

system, and other member states, to make sure that that is the 

case. 

Senator DEMINT. Can you help explain—and again, I know 

you’re looking at this, relatively new—but, what could be the explanation, after, you know, more than 5 years of these reports—and 

some of them have been publicized in the international media—

why so little has been done at the U.N. to address this? You would 

think they understand the importance of the credibility and the 

international community, but there has been resistance even to 

deal with this. 

Mr. TORSELLA. Well, as you suggest, Senator, it’s difficult for me 

to talk about what precedes what I hope will be my tenure. 

Senator DEMINT. Right. 

Mr. TORSELLA. But, I think one of the broader contexts that you 

alluded to is that this has been an area of tremendous growth in 

a very short period of time, that the size and scope and complexity 

of peacekeeping operations, over approximately the last decade, has 

almost, I think, essentially quadrupled, and not just in size, but 

what used to be very conventional kinds of truly peacekeeping missions have become much more complicated in some much more difficult circumstances. So, that obviously makes everything that has 

to do with peacekeeping more challenging. And I think that the architecture of managing this has lagged behind what we’ve expected 

them to do. 

Now, I think what we need to do is make sure that that’s no 

longer the case, not just to be a moral voice, but to understand this 

comes down to who are the leaders of each mission, which is something we need to devote attention to, and how are they pursuing 

these matters. 

Senator DEMINT. Just a quick question before I run out of time. 

Will you be willing to hold the budget hostage, in effect—our payments, our contributions to various aspects of the United Nations—

in order to get the attention of these people here? Are you willing 

to come back to us and suggest we withhold funding until we get 

certain reforms? Because I think that’s the only leverage we are ultimately going to have. 

Mr. TORSELLA. Well, Senator, I am willing to get the attention 

and make the progress. And I’m willing to—and hope to work with 

you to do that. The U.S. Government position on withholding has 

13

been that our best chance of getting reforms comes from advocating 

from the position of strength that, thanks to all of you, we now 

have. No one can say the United States has not done its share and 

is not paying its assessed dues. 

I understand that there are valid concerns. There are good people with different points of view around this issue. And what I 

want to take away from that debate is a universal commitment to 

changing the results that we see, and leveraging the resources we 

have to get those results. 

Senator DEMINT. Thank you, Mr. Torsella. 

Senator CASEY. Senator Lee. 

Senator LEE. Thank you for joining us today, Mr. Torsella. 

I had some questions about the U.N. Human Rights Council. 

Since 2006, the Human Rights Council has adopted a total of, I believe, 67 country-specific resolutions. Of those 67, 32, almost half 

of them, focused specifically on Israel. And the U.S. membership on 

the U.N. Human Rights Council hasn’t exactly reversed this trend. 

In 2010 alone, I think there were a total—there have been a total 

of eight resolutions adopted condemning Israel in some way, or 

Israel’s actions. 

Can you tell me whether you perceive an anti-Israel bias in this? 

And, if so, what can be done about that? 

Mr. TORSELLA. Thank you, Senator. 

As I believe it’s been described by senior officials in this administration, the Human Rights Council has been a poster child for some 

of what’s wrong with the U.N. And there has been, as Ambassador 

Rice has said, a grotesquely unbalanced treatment of Israel in the 

resolutions, for example, that you’ve talked about. 

The administration’s decision to join the Human Rights Council 

is based, again, on the premise that, as I’ve heard it said, ‘‘If we’re 

not at the table, we’re probably on the menu,’’ and that we can do 

best by such allies by showing up for the fight. It doesn’t mean 

we’re going to win all of them, but we’ll win more than we would 

if we didn’t show up. 

Now, I would hope to be a part of the efforts that the Ambassador described, to remedy that disproportionate treatment, and to 

stand up against it. And I do think the Human Rights Council is 

an institution that is in need of reform. And I’d hope, working with 

others in the administration and in the mission, to advance that 

cause. 

Senator LEE. Yes. No; I think that’s good. I’m pleased to hear 

that. 

Do you know what, if anything, the Human Rights Council has 

done to address serious human rights problems in China, Iran, and 

Venezuela, just to name a few examples? 

Mr. TORSELLA. Well, the Human Rights Council is widely considered by the administration to be far from what we and others 

hoped it would be when it replaced its predecessor body. There is 

a good argument to be made that the engagement of the administration has resulted in progress—three examples that I could talk 

about, quickly. One is the extension of the mandate for the special 

expert on Sudan, which was opposed by others and we succeeded 

at. No. 2, the appointment of a special rapporteur for freedom of 

assembly, which was again resisted by some of the notorious violaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
14

tors. And No. 3, our very visible efforts to keep Iran from winning 

a seat on the Human Rights Council to avoid making a further 

mockery of its intent. 

Now, those are three examples where it worked. There are other 

examples, as you point out, where the results aren’t acceptable. 

But, I think what it comes down to is the elbow grease and determination to keep showing up, keep having the fights, and use the 

platform for the purpose for which it was intended. 

Senator LEE. OK. Thank you. 

Now, funding for some U.N. programs, including the U.N. Office 

on the High Commissioner—Office of the High Commissioner for 

Human Rights and the U.N. Environmental Fund—are funded on 

a voluntary basis. Are there other programs that you think could 

be funded on a voluntary basis that are not, currently? 

Mr. TORSELLA. I would not want to express a judgment today 

about particular programs. And I’d also note that it is the strong 

view of the administration that assessed programs are a treaty obligation, but also, the administration believes voluntary programs 

are a platform from which we can argue effectively for looking 

broadly. 

What I’d say from following some of the discussions that have 

been going on over the last few months, and what I hear when people talk about the voluntary programs, is that they maintain a 

higher standard of transparency, a higher standard of accountability, and a very natural sense of wanting to be responsive to donors, and deliver results. I think those themes and things like 

sharing audit information are something that ought to apply across 

the board, period, in the U.N. system. 

Senator LEE. Right. Accountability is an important thing in any 

government or any quasi-government body or international group. 

And yet, within the United Nations, you don’t have quite the same 

forces that apply here. It comes with some of the trappings of a legislative body. It appears, on some levels, to be something like that. 

And yet, the people serve on that body, not as elected representatives of any group of people, but as representatives of various countries. And some of the countries’ officials are not, themselves, elected; some of them are despots and tyrants and so forth. So, accountability becomes a difficult thing. It’s not like they can vote and 

then expect to be accountable to any one group of people. Is there 

anything we can do to offset the lack of accountability that happens 

as a result of that? 

Mr. TORSELLA. Well, the short answer is, I hope so. And the 

longer answer is that I don’t want to give you the impression that 

my arrival is going to be greeted with ticker-tape parades and 

champagne. 

Senator LEE. It should be. It should be. [Laughter.] 

Mr. TORSELLA. Thank you, Senator. 

But, I believe—as I outlined, at the beginning of my testimony, 

a case that an effective U.N. is in our interest. But, I believe that 

it’s also in the enlightened self-interest of the U.N., as an institution, and in the interest of many Member States, obviously not all, 

and never all. I will do my best to make that argument and to figure out the practical politics of moving these issues forward. 

15

There was recently, by the way, at great effort and cost to the 

U.S. political capital, the adoption by the General Assembly, for the 

first time ever, of a definition of accountability for all U.N. employees. That was a herculean struggle, and that’s a start. 

Senator LEE. Great. 

Thank you very much, sir. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Senator Lee. 

Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Good morning, Mr. Torsella. 

A couple of questions. I want to build on what Senator Lee asked 

about the human rights entity. It has such distinguished members, 

now, as Libya and Angola. Libya, in fact, was approved by 145 of 

the U.N. Member States, which is appalling since Libya, today, is 

what they were back then, too. So, my question is, when the United 

States—when this administration made the decision to join the 

commission—you stated earlier—and I get the point you’re trying 

to make—that you’re not on the table, you’re on the menu. The 

counterargument to that, however, is that joining it gives this organization, or this entity, legitimacy, that, in essence, it makes it look 

like a real organization, when, in fact, it appears to be largely a 

collection of human rights abusers, for the most part. 

So, obviously, you don’t agree with that assessment. I would hope 

you can expand further on why it’s important that we are a member of that. And the previous administration chose not to join it; 

they felt that our participation in it gave this organization legitimacy. 

Mr. TORSELLA. Thank you, Senator. And again, I want to be careful not to speak to decisions that I wasn’t a part of, or to suggest 

that decisions will be only in my portfolio. But, the administration’s 

view of vigorous engagement is the guiding principle, and has been 

the guiding principle, across the board, that with that engagement 

comes the opportunity to be a critic, when that’s appropriate, and 

that that’s easier to do, and easier to do effectively, when we’re 

around the table. 

Now, I know that there are strong critics of the Human Rights 

Council. And I believe people of goodwill can disagree on this. 

There are strong critics of the Human Rights Council, though, who 

are glad that we’re there to stand up, as we do. And there have 

been a number of votes that have been won—or, in the past, lost—

by a margin of one, where there would have been some difference, 

if we weren’t involved. 

I don’t want to, even for a minute, suggest that it’s an institution 

that is living up to what the hopes of the U.N. founders might have 

been. I don’t want to suggest, for a minute, that the disproportionate and biased treatment of Israel ought to be acceptable. But, 

there has been progress made. And when you talk about, for example, the case of Libya being elected—a lot of what happened in the 

past was that—because of the way that the election system worked, 

there were uncontested regional elections. And since engaging, the 

U.S. Government has been active in the politicking. And I think 

you saw, in the expulsion of Libya from the Human Rights Council, 

a historic first, may be one of the fruits of that policy. 

16

So, I would argue that we ought to continue to use our voices and 

our votes. And as I say, we will not win all those fights, but we 

will win more than if we weren’t there. 

Senator RUBIO. Well, that premises the notion that we would see 

behavior after we joined that looks different from behavior before 

we joined it. And yet, it’s hard to find any examples of things that 

we prevented from happening. 

For example, the Council still has not addressed human rights 

violations in China, in Cuba, in Iran, and other places. In essence, 

I’m struggling to find examples of how joining it has actually influenced, or whether the Council continues to behave exactly the same 

way it did before we joined it. The only difference being, of course, 

that now the U.S. is a part of it. So, instead of pointing it out for 

what it is—you know, a charade—people can now say, ‘‘But, you’re 

a member, you’re at the table, and ultimately, you’ve blessed and 

legitimized this process.’’

Mr. TORSELLA. Senator, I’d like to take the particulars of the 

cases you raised for the record and get you some further information. 

[The written information from Joseph Torsella follows:]

Generally, I do believe that there are differences. Where on the spectrum they are 

between what the unacceptable reality is and where the ideal ought to be, I think 

we can both agree, they’re at the real low end. But, in the case of action on Sudan, 

in the case of keeping Iran off, in the case of the number of special sessions devoted 

to Israel in the time that we were off versus the time that we were on, I do believe 

that it’s progress. And so, we’re both going to agree that, on the scale of where it 

ought to be, it is not moved nearly far enough along. 

While there is still much work to be done to reform the Human Rights Council 

into an institution that lives up to U.N. values and U.S. aspirations, in recent 

months, the Council has achieved several victories for human rights that could not 

have been accomplished without U.S. leadership and support:

• In March 2011, the Council took assertive action to highlight Iran’s deteriorating human rights situation by establishing its first country-specific 

Rapporteur—a Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights Situation in Iran. 

• In February 2011, the United States played a pivotal role in convening the 

Council’s Special Session in which the Council condemned the recent human 

rights violations and other acts of violence committed by the Government of 

Libya, created an independent Commission of Inquiry to investigate those violations, and recommended to the U.N. General Assembly that it suspend Libya’s 

membership rights on the Council. Days later, in an unprecedented consensus 

decision, the General Assembly suspended Libya. 

• The United States was instrumental in galvanizing support for a consensus resolution that marks a sea change in the dialogue on countering offensive speech 

based upon religion or belief through the ‘‘Combating Discrimination and Violence’’ resolution, rejecting limitations on free speech and embracing dialogue 

and education. This effort was lauded by the U.S. Commission on International 

Religious Freedom. 

• After the violence following elections in Coˆte d’Ivoire last December, we worked 

closely with the African Group to hold a special session on the human rights 

crisis that was taking place. This led directly to the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry for Coˆte d’Ivoire in the March session. 

• In September 2010, the U.S. Government cosponsored a resolution to create the 

first-ever Special Rapporteur to protect Freedom of Assembly and Association, 

to monitor crackdowns on civil society groups and advance protection of the 

right to free assembly and association through its vigilant exposure of state 

conduct. 

• Just last week, U.S. efforts led to a Human Rights Council Special Session on 

the human rights situation in Syria resulting in a resolution condemning the 

ongoing violence and calling for a mission to investigate violations and ensure 

full accountability. 

• The United States has maintained a vocal, principled stand against the Council’s biased focus on Israel. We’ve been there to contest moves to single Israel 

17

out unfairly. The United States is by far Israel’s strongest supporter on the 

Council. The Government of Israel has regularly expressed appreciation for the 

role the United States plays in the Council. The March session included six resolutions targeting Israel. The United States opposed all six resolutions and 

issued strong explanations of votes pointing out how biased and unhelpful these 

resolutions are. We cast the only ‘‘no’’ vote on five of these resolutions. If the 

United States were not on the Council, we would not have the opportunity to 

make these statements from the floor and these resolutions would have passed 

by consensus.

Mr. TORSELLA. Generally, I do believe that there are differences. 

Where on the spectrum they are between what the unacceptable reality is and where the ideal ought to be, I think we can both agree, 

they’re at the real low end. But, in the case of action on Sudan, 

in the case of keeping Iran off, in the case of the number of special 

sessions devoted to Israel in the time that we were off versus the 

time that we were on, I do believe that it’s progress. And so, we’re 

both going to agree that, on the scale of where it ought to be, it 

is not moved nearly far enough along. 

Senator RUBIO. And again, I know you didn’t make this decision, 

but, I do want to drive the point home, because it’s an important 

thing, going forward. Sudan is really low-hanging fruit. I mean—

OK, Sudan. But, where we really—where an entity like this would 

really grow and be a legitimate entity that you could look at and 

say, ‘‘Boy, I’m glad we have this,’’ is for them to say something 

about—like torture and other outrageous things that are happening in places like China; the constant daily roundup of dissidents in Cuba and multiple other places like that, where they 

don’t get to. On the other hand, they dedicate this inordinate 

amount of time to Israel. And so, it’s hard for me to see where us 

joining this Council has changed what it is, other than the fact that 

us joining it may have given it legitimacy it once did not have. 

But, I want to—my time is running out—I did want to ask your 

view—and, in particular, the administration’s view—on the propriety and effectiveness of using funding as leverage to achieve reforms. I think there is, in my opinion, a well-documented history 

of U.N. reforms that have been the result of a congressional determination to withhold funding for the organization or certain functions of the organization. What are your views on it? What are the 

administration’s views? Is this a legitimate tool in our arsenal that 

we will use to hopefully push for some of these reforms, or not? 

Mr. TORSELLA. Thank you, Senator. And I guess I would answer 

that I think that using the resources that we bring to bear to this 

as a tool is legitimate. The disagreement may be about whether 

using that means using the authority they give you, or withholding 

them at the beginning. And I think that’s where the administration 

would differ. 

In terms of the assessed contributions that we make to the U.N., 

the administration clearly believes, and I agree, that we have a 

better ability to effect change by having paid our dues, as we have 

done, and that, within that U.N. budget, there are going to be 

things that we and any reasonable person ought to think are inappropriate. But, there are also things that are vitally important to 

our national interest—like the enormous programs that the U.N. is 

responsible for, in both Afghanistan and Iraq, where there are close 

18

to 4,000 civilians in the civilian surge, letting us bring our troops 

home—that is in the regular budget, for example. 

So, I don’t disagree that we ought to use the position of being the 

largest funder, use the talents of the U.S. Government, and use 

that authority to speak for reform. 

Senator RUBIO. I’m sorry. Now I’m over time. I want to ask one 

quick question. This administration has brought us current. What 

reforms have we gotten? What meaningful reforms have happened 

as a result of that? 

Mr. TORSELLA. Senator, I would hope to be able to give you the 

best answer to that after I’ve been on the job for a year or two, if 

I have the honor to be confirmed. There has been real progress in 

establishing the Office of Internal Oversight Services. There is a 

terrific and talented and independent and tough auditor, the Canadian, Carman LaPointe, who’s the head of that. There is the new 

establishment of a U.N. ethics office, although its writ has not been 

extended far enough. And there has been, within the last week, the 

news report of the Secretary General instructing a 3-percent cut in 

the budget, from current levels, which is—that we may argue, and 

I probably will, about whether that’s sufficient. But, that is the 

first time in 10 years that’s happened. 

Now, against the larger story of some of the troubles that were 

revealed over the course of the last few years, are we where we 

need to be? No. But, I believe that we ought to use the investments 

that we’ve made to demand that those changes be made and to put 

together, carefully, the coalitions that it takes to get them. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Senator Rubio. 

I’ll make three quick points before turning to—Senator DeMint, 

I know, has at least one question, if not more. 

First of all, on the question of Libya, what has transpired recently. We know that—as you noted in your testimony, that Libya’s 

been suspended from the Human Rights Council. It was a unanimous vote, I guess, on March 1, if I’m correct. So, I think—I just 

wanted to amplify the record on that. 

Second, with regard to the important questions that Senator 

DeMint raised, I don’t think there’s much, if any, disagreement in 

this room that not only will the administration demand results 

from the U.N. and from the administration itself, but this committee will demand results. And I think the United Nations needs 

to know that, and the administration needs to know that, when it 

comes to those horrific crimes that were committed that Senator 

DeMint spoke to. 

And finally—and I would say, in the interests of further endorsing the nominee who is before us, Mr. Torsella, in his record—if 

you read his record, and read the results that come from that 

record, when it comes to all of these issues, in terms of getting results and ensuring that justice is served, especially for people that 

are vulnerable, I think he’ll be unyielding, and will insist upon results. 

And one final point. Some of these issues are a little beyond his 

purview. I just want to note, for the record, the basic responsibilities of the U.S. Representative for the United Nations for Management Reform. It’s, basically, five. One is on the issue of U.N. reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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form; second, budget management; third, fraud and mismanagement; fourth, procurement practices; and then, fifth, interaction 

with business. And I think that’s a pretty broad portfolio, but I 

know that, even if a question arose that came across his radar 

screen that he had any voice that would speak—that he had a 

chance to speak to with his voice, I think it’ll be unyielding, and 

not just getting results, but also protecting the vulnerable people. 

Senator DeMint. 

Senator DEMINT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We’ll keep honing in, here, on really, cleaning up the act of the 

U.N., because of its importance. I don’t think anyone here is trying 

to undermine the importance. But, it has been frustrating, over the 

years, to see things that just were unaddressed that seemed so obvious. 

Right now, the acting director of the U.N.’s Investigation Division, Michael Dudley, is under investigation. The U.N.’s Internal 

Oversight Office is suffering from a lack of credibility. Secretary 

General ignores its recommendations. And the former head of the 

office wrote a scathing end-of-mission report, which described the 

Secretary General as unaccountable and unworthy of the position. 

If confirmed, will you use the voice and vote of the United States 

to ensure that a reputable, independent, and qualified chief investigator is appointed? 

Mr. TORSELLA. Yes. Senator, I think that goes to the core of giving every interested party an assurance that things really are different and there will be a new day. I think, as you know from your 

experience in government, the existence of oversight institutions 

which cannot be tampered with and that don’t have their budgets 

and their authority changed is absolutely crucial. I think that is 

among the first items on my list. And having someone in that position, as well as having the staff slots on the Financial Crimes Unit 

of that office, which we were instrumental in demanding be 

formed—having those positions filled is virtually my highest priority. 

Senator DEMINT. Well, thank you for your answers. Thank you 

and your family for being here. And I know we all look forward to 

your confirmation. 

Mr. TORSELLA. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Senator DeMint, our ranking member. 

And, Mr. Torsella, thank you very much. And I’m using the ‘‘Mr.’’ 

to be formal here, but I—once in a while, I can call you Joe. 

But, you’ve done well in this hearing and in your previous engagement with this committee. We’re grateful for your time and 

your commitment to public service. I think you’ve done well on behalf of your family and your friends and supporters in southeastern 

Pennsylvania. But, I want to note, for the record, that you’re a 

proud son of Danville, Pennsylvania. 

So, we thank you very much. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

20

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF JOSEPH TORSELLA TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. Various administration officials have stated that the administration is 

fighting hard to increase transparency, accountability, and budgetary restraint at 

the United Nations. However, few specific details have been offered about what reforms have been adopted and implemented to address these goals over the past 2 

years.

• Please provide a detailed account of the U.N. reforms achieved at the behest 

of the United States over the past 2 years, the degree to which those reforms 

have been implemented and are being observed, and specific examples of how 

those efforts are serving to improve transparency and accountability in the U.N. 

and resulting in reductions in the U.N. regular and peacekeeping budgets.

Answer. The administration has pushed aggressively for sound management and 

budgeting, accountability, and transparency at the U.N. For example, the United 

States has been a force in achieving the following recent reforms. 

1. In December 2008, the United States, along with other likeminded Member 

States, succeeded in securing a General Assembly resolution to transfer the function 

and caseload of the Procurement Task Force (PTF) to the Investigations Division of 

the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). 

2. As a result of strong U.S. leadership, the General Assembly in June 2009 endorsed a 3-year pilot for investigations hubs of the Office of Internal Oversight 

Services (OIOS) in Nairobi, Vienna, and New York designed to enhance investigative capacity in the field. 

3. In July 2009, with strong U.S. support, a new comprehensive internal justice 

system for addressing staff grievances came into effect that consists of professional 

and independent tribunals to expedite the resolution of cases and an informal dispute resolution process to enable staff to seek redress before resorting to litigation. 

The new internal justice system enhances transparency, fairness, efficiency, and accountability in the management of U.N. personnel. 

4. In the past 2 years, the United States has led efforts to streamline the U.N.’s 

myriad staff contract arrangements and harmonizing conditions of service across the 

U.N. system. In December 2010, the General Assembly established parameters for 

granting continuing contracts and made significant strides in harmonizing the 

conditions of service for staff across the U.N. system serving in nonfamily duty 

stations. 

5. The United States played a leading role in the establishment of U.N. Women, 

which on January 1, 2011, consolidated four U.N. agencies into one, strengthening 

and streamlining the U.N.’s work to advance gender equality and women’s 

empowerment. 

6. The United States led efforts in the Security Council to adopt Resolution 1820, 

which gives the U.N. better tools to combat sexual violence in conflict zones and 

established the first-ever U.N. Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict 

in order to bring more focus on these serious issues. 

7. The United States succeeded in securing General Assembly adoption of the 

U.N. Global Field Support Strategy, which will yield greater efficiencies in administrative and logistics support for U.N. field operations. 

8. The United States was instrumental in achieving the passage of a General 

Assembly resolution in March 2010 on accountability that will hold U.N. officials 

responsible for safeguarding resources and achieving results. 

9. The United Nations has not established a single new peacekeeping mission in 

the past 2 years. In 2010, the U.N. peacekeeping budget decreased for the first time 

in 6 years. The United States supported the closure of MINURCAT (U.N. peacekeeping mission in Chad and the Central African Republic), saving up to $600 million per year. The United States also led efforts to end the U.N. Special Political 

Mission in Nepal once its contributions reached the point of diminishing returns. 

I would also like to mention two areas where the United States was successful 

in ensuring that hard-fought reforms remain in place. First, in 2009 during negotiations over the scale of assessment for the U.N. regular budget, the United States 

succeeded in beating back attempts to increase the U.S. share of the U.N. budget 

and thereby averted hundreds of millions in possible new assessments. Second, the 

United States in March 2010 was critical in securing a General Assembly resolution 

that preserves the existing mandates governing OIOS as well as those that allow 

access to OIOS reports by Member States. Maintaining access to OIOS audit reports 

is crucial to fulfilling our fiduciary responsibilities and building a culture of transVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
21

parency and accountability at the U.N. The United States continues to ensure that 

OIOS has the resources it needs and serves as the primary investigative oversight 

role in the U.N. 

The administration’s commitment to U.N. reform is clear, as is the need for much 

more to be done throughout the U.N. system. If confirmed, my mission would be to 

build on the progress made to accelerate the implementation of reforms that would 

make it more efficient, transparent, and productive.

Question. The U.N. Headquarters is undergoing a major renovation.

• What is the current projected budget of the Capital Master Plan? 

• Is the CMP schedule on time? 

• What is the next major benchmark? 

• What is the cost to the United States for the CMP? 

• Will the administration require any additional funding?

Answer. In 2006, the U.N. General Assembly approved a project budget of $1.88 

billion in 2006 for the U.N. Headquarters renovation. The United States is paying 

22 percent: $75.5 million annually over 5 years, plus contributions made during the 

design phase for a total of approximately $415 million. 

Construction began in May 2008 and is expected to be complete in 2014, with the 

project being bid in multiple parts. Additional time is being built into the project 

schedule in order to complete perimeter security enhancements. 

During 2011, construction work will continue on the Secretariat and Conference 

buildings and the basement areas of the complex. The Secretariat building is scheduled for completion in 2012. Work on the General Assembly building will commence 

in 2012 as well. 

The U.N. has been steadily reducing the projected cost overruns on the project 

and remains confident this project will be completed on or very close to budget. The 

U.N. continues to work with its design team to find ways to reduce costs through 

the value engineering process and has been able to bring some parts of the project 

in under budget through competitive bidding and tough negotiations. This does not 

take into account additional costs of approximately $162.5 million for items related 

to but not included in the scope of the Capital Master Plan such as permanent furnishings and construction security. The General Assembly is expected to consider 

in the fall how these costs will be financed (i.e. through the CMP budget or in the 

regular budget) given that the U.N. has indicated not all of these costs will be able 

to be absorbed within the Capital Master Plan budget.

Question. Earlier this year, the House voted on legislation to seek the reimbursement of $179 million owed to the United States from the U.N. Tax Equalization 

Fund. On the morning of the vote, the State Department notified Congress that it 

had given the U.N. $100 million of that money to the U.N. for unspecified security 

upgrades.

• Who authorized this decision and when was the decision made? 

• Under what legal authority did the State Department make that decision? 

• Have you received a detailed plan for those upgrades and a comprehensive explanation of how the U.N. arrived at the $100 million cost for the upgrades? 

• Why weren’t these upgrades included as part of the U.N. Capital Master Plan, 

which would have reduced the U.N. share of the costs from $100 million to $22 

million? 

• Does Congress have your guarantee that none of the $100 million will be used 

to pay for upgrades inside the U.N. building or on the grounds or for any other 

purpose that should be handled jointly by the U.N. Member States under the 

Capital Master Plan? 

• Is it true that the city of New York requested these changes—please provide 

a copy of any such request.

Answer. Under Secretary Kennedy informed the relevant committees, including 

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in a December 29, 2010, letter that the 

United Nations is taking action to address significant physical security concerns 

related to the protection of the U.N. Headquarters complex in New York and will 

use $100 million from the U.N. Tax Equalization Fund (TEF) to fund these critical 

enhancements. It is the view of the Department of State that the United Nations’ 

application of those fund balances, since the original U.S. contributions had been 

previously obligated and disbursed, does not require further authorization under 

U.S. law. 

I would make it a high priority, if confirmed, to see that the formulas and procedures related to the TEF are changed so that such fund balances do not accrue in 

the future. 

22

In a January 11, 2011, letter to the U.N., Under Secretary Kennedy acknowledged 

the United Nations’ use of these funds, and, to ensure appropriate oversight of the 

project, asked that the United Nations provide detailed monthly updates on its 

status. 

In response to this request, the U.N. has agreed to provide the Department with 

monthly reporting on the project’s progress and the associated use of funds. This 

report provides a mechanism for the United States to monitor how the funds are 

being expended and to ensure that it is consistent with the agreed elements of the 

project. I have been informed that providing structural upgrades within the U.N. 

complex is the best practical measure for mitigating the security threat from adjacent New York City streets, given the inability to close or realign those streets. As 

a result, some of the work to implement the perimeter security enhancements will 

be completed within the U.N. complex. 

The U.N. had shared plans and cost documents with the Department on the security work it plans to undertake as a result of extensive consultations with the 

Department and the city of New York. The city of New York has urged the U.N. 

to incorporate more stringent security measures into the ongoing renovations [see 

attachment]. 

These heightened security requirements evolved during the execution of the CMP. 

In recent years the U.N. has faced increasing attacks around the world, such that 

the threat environment for the institution had significantly increased. The proposed 

upgrades adapt the project design to the new threat environment since the CMP 

scope originally agreed in 2006 was based on a lower anticipated threat level. I understand that in order to fully integrate the perimeter security enhancements into 

the CMP, General Assembly agreement would have been needed, which would have 

further delayed vital upgrades to the Conference Building, and would have likely 

resulted in cost escalation for the overall CMP.

23


QFR16.eps
24


QFR16a.eps
25

Question. The Secretary General called for the next U.N. budget to be cut by 3 

percent. As you know, the current proposed 2-year budget for 2012 and 2013 is $5.5 

billion.

• What areas would the administration like to see reduced or eliminated from the 

U.N. budget? 

• On what basis are these cuts being justified since the U.N. has failed to follow 

through with its mandate review? 

• Why do U.N. funds and programs that receive vast amounts of funding such 

as UNEP and UNWRA, which both receive less than 5 percent of their budgets 

from the U.N. regular budget still receive funding through the U.N. regular 


QFR16b.eps
26

budget? Shouldn’t the United States look to trim the U.N. regular budget by 

ending the token support for these offices through the regular budget? 

• In December 2009, the U.N. approved a 2-year budget of $5.156 billion for 2010 

and 2011. Thus, even assuming that the Secretary General is able to get a 3-

percent cut from the proposed budget, the U.N. budget would be growing by 3 

percent based on the previous budget. As you know, the U.N. budget has grown 

even faster than the U.S. budget since 2000. Is that expansion justified? 

• Do you think that the Secretary General’s proposed 3-percent budget cut is 

sufficient? 

• Why doesn’t the United States insist on a zero-growth budget proposal based 

on the initial proposal in 2009?

Answer. The United States has consistently sought to make reductions in those 

areas of the U.N. budget where resources are not being utilized as efficiently and 

effectively as possible. We believe the U.N. can meet its responsibilities without 

growing the budget by increasing efficiencies through streamlining processes, examining structural costs at all levels, eliminating unproductive administrative practices and obsolete functions, leveraging modern technology, and adopting proven 

best practices. We also believe that the U.N. should critically review its staffing levels and opportunities for competitive contracting of some services. These efforts to 

increase efficiencies and reduce the budget can be accomplished without eliminating 

mandates. However, it is important to recognize the difficulties inherent in trying 

to achieve U.S. priorities within the U.N.’s framework of universal membership and 

consensus-based decisionmaking. The U.S Government strives to strike a balance 

between making what reductions are possible while also maintaining the support 

needed from others to achieve our highest diplomatic and security priorities. 

For programs such as UNWRA and UNEP, my understanding is that the USG 

goal has generally been to prevent the provision of additional resources from the 

U.N. regular budget. 

In 2010, the General Assembly invited the Secretary General to prepare the 

2012–13 biennium budget on the basis of the $5.397 billion estimate, reflecting an 

increase of less than 1 percent over the current 2010–11 biennial budget of $5.367 

billion. Although the U.N. regular budget has more than slightly doubled since the 

2000–01 biennium, Special Political Missions (SPMs) have increased from $115.3 

million to $1.2 billion during this same period, with much of the increase in SPMs 

attributable to the U.N. Assistance Missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. As we work 

to contain unnecessary growth in the U.N. budget, we must keep in mind the extent 

to which U.S. priorities have contributed to expansion of the regular budget. 

While I do not believe that any single step, such as the Secretary General’s proposed 3-percent reduction, is itself sufficient to achieve the effective, economical 

U.N. we hope for, I strongly support the Secretary General’s initiative to try to implement a 3-percent reduction in the regular budget. This would be the first proposed reduction compared to the previous year of spending in 10 years. It is notable 

that the U.N. has recognized the need to demonstrate greater budget discipline in 

response to the difficult budgetary environment faced by many Member States. This 

initiative will create challenges for the U.N. given such exercises have typically been 

poorly received by many Member States. However, if the Secretary General is successful in putting this forward to the General Assembly, it offers a more favorable 

basis for discussions on the 2012–13 budget during the fall UNGA, which we and 

many like-minded Member States will seek to capitalize on. We will work with other 

Member States to achieve a budget outcome that reflects restraint while allowing 

the U.N. to maintain operational effectiveness.

Question. Please provide a breakdown (by percent and dollar figure) showing the 

top five recipient countries of U.N. procurement orders for the following U.N. agencies/offices/programs, for the most recent U.N. fiscal year: U.N. Peacekeeping operations; World Food Programme; U.N. Capital Master Plan; UN/UNDP Headquarters 

in New York.

Answer. U.N. Systemwide: Across the entire U.N. system, which includes the U.N. 

Secretariat, funds and programs, and specialized agencies, procurement orders totaled $13.8 billion in 2009*. The breakdown of the top five recipient countries of procurement contracts systemwide is as follows:

27

Countries Percent 

United States ............................................................................................................................. $1,734,000,000 12.57

Switzerland ................................................................................................................................ 843,800,000 6.11

India ........................................................................................................................................... 676,700,000 4.90

Sudan ......................................................................................................................................... 641,700,000 4.65

Russian Federation .................................................................................................................... 463,200,000 3.36

Other .......................................................................................................................................... 9,440,600,000 68.41

* A thorough breakdown for 2010 is not yet available. 

U.N. Capital Master Plan (CMP): Skanska trade contracts represent the majority 

of CMP procurement orders. The Skanska trade contracts for 2009 * total 

$633,197,529. The breakdown of the top five recipient countries of CMP procurement contracts is as follows:

Countries Percent 

United States ............................................................................................................................. $605,363,903 **95.60

Mexico ........................................................................................................................................ 8,055,998 1.27

Germany ..................................................................................................................................... 2,243,446 0.35

Canada ...................................................................................................................................... 1,113,347 0.18

China ......................................................................................................................................... 1,048,412 0.17

Other .......................................................................................................................................... 15,372,423 2.42

* A thorough breakdown for 2010 is not yet available. 

** Of the total procurement contracts. 

U.N. Peacekeeping Operations: The Department of Peacekeeping Operations 

(DPKO) procurement for 2010 totaled $2,483,011,729. The breakdown of the top five 

recipient countries of DPKO procurement contracts is as follows:

Countries Percent 

Sudan ......................................................................................................................................... $269,614,943 10.86

United States ............................................................................................................................. 187,838,135 7.56

Switzerland ................................................................................................................................ 139,590,239 5.62

Italy ............................................................................................................................................ 132,391,948 5.33

Panama ...................................................................................................................................... 75,360,992 3.03

Other .......................................................................................................................................... 1,678,215,472 67.59

World Food Programme (WFP): In 2010, WFP globally procured 3,166,320 metric 

tons of food commodities, with a total cash value of US$1,250,000,000. The breakdown of the top five recipient countries of WFP procurement contracts is as follows:

Countries Percent 

Pakistan ..................................................................................................................................... $214,356,000 17.15

Ethiopia ...................................................................................................................................... 88,416,000 7.07

South Africa ............................................................................................................................... 65,738,000 5.26

Ukraine ....................................................................................................................................... 63,644,000 5.09

Indonesia ................................................................................................................................... 60,235,000 4.82

Other .......................................................................................................................................... 757,611,000 60.61

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP): The UNDP awarded 

$252,109,847 worth of contracts in 2010. The breakdown of the top five recipient 

countries of UNDP procurement contracts is as follows:

Countries Percent 

Germany ..................................................................................................................................... $64,744,075 25.69

The Netherlands ......................................................................................................................... 36,759,115 14.58

Germany/Cyprus* ....................................................................................................................... 35,108,085 13.93

Austria ....................................................................................................................................... 30,643,265 12.15

India ........................................................................................................................................... 16,155,931 6.41

Other .......................................................................................................................................... 68,699,376 27.25

* The contract was jointly awarded to both countries, and a breakdown was not provided. 

28

Question. As you may be aware, some have expressed concern with a February 

2009 report by the U.N. Independent Audit Advisory Committee (IAAC), Vacant 

Posts in the Office of Internal Oversight Services, which found that OIOS had vacancies in over 27 percent of its authorized posts, including all three director-level 

positions. The report expressed concern that the high vacancy rate will have an ‘‘adverse impact on the capacity and ability’’ of OIOS to accomplish its work. Please 

provide a staffing pattern for OIOS showing all positions and indicating which are 

vacant and the length of their vacancy. Identify which positions are encumbered by 

American nationals.

Answer. I am providing the most recent staffing chart for OIOS, dated February 

28, 2011.


OIOS.eps
29


OIOS2.eps
30


OIOS3.eps
31


OIOS4.eps
32


OIOS5.eps
33


OIOS6.eps
34


OIOS7.eps
35


OIOS8.eps
36


OIOS9.eps
37


OIOS10.eps
38


OIOS11.eps
39


OIOS12.eps
40

Question. In your remarks to the committee, you mentioned concern regarding the 

U.N.’s Whistleblower policy. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the current 

policy?

Answer. In 2005, the Secretary General issued the U.N. whistleblower protection 

policy (ST/SGB/2005/21). This policy was developed after months of consultation 

with outside experts and State Department officials. The Government Accountability 

Project, a public advocacy group dedicated to advancing corporate and public 

accountability and promoting whistleblower protections, hailed the U.N. whistleblower policy as the ‘‘benchmark for other Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)’’ 

to follow. 

The U.N.’s whistleblower policy clearly establishes that reporting misconduct and 

cooperating with U.N. audits and investigations are protected activities. It also 

establishes a recourse mechanism for U.N. personnel who are subjected to retaliation or threatened with retaliation. 

While the Secretary General’s ethics framework for the U.N. funds and programs 

(ST/SGB/2007/11) created the U.N. Ethics Committee to unify ethical standards 

across organizations, whistleblower protections vary greatly across the various funds 

and programs. Compared to the Secretariat’s policy, whistleblower protections at the 

funds and programs are considered weaker and less comprehensive. If confirmed, 

I would work to ensure the strengthening and implementation of whistleblower protections throughout the U.N. system.

Question. As part of your pledge to help institute oversight responsibilities, if confirmed, will you continue the policy established during the Bush administration of 

posting U.N. audits on the USUN Web site? If not, why not?

Answer. The Obama administration has continued the practice of posting audits 

by the U.N. Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) on USUN’s public Web site, 

and if confirmed I plan to continue to post U.N. audits on USUN’s public Web site. 

You can find these reports at: http://usun.state.gov/about/unlreform/oios/

index.htm.

Question. The United Nations Development Program is a major implementer for 

the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria, and Tuberculosis. According to the UNDP, 

as of January 2011, UNDP is currently Principal Recipient in 27 countries, managing a total of 60 active grants amounting to more than $1.1 billion. Policies of 

the Executive Board of the UNDP only allow Member States, not nongovernmental 

organizations such as the Global Fund or World Bank, access to internal audits, 

even when fraud is suspected in the grants.

• What actions should the United States pursue to increase the transparency and 

ensure the integrity of United States taxpayer investments in the Global Fund 

that are managed through UNDP?

Answer. The United States is committed to ensuring Global Fund resources reach 

people in need and are used as effectively and efficiently as possible to save lives. 

We strongly support the Global Fund’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG), and 

its ongoing efforts to strengthen the Global Fund’s oversight systems. We have consistently advocated for increased transparency, accountability, and oversight over 

U.S. contributions to the Global Fund, including Global Fund resources managed by 

UNDP. 

The United States has had high-level discussions with UNDP management on the 

importance of sharing relevant audit information with the Global Fund’s OIG and 

cooperating with the OIG in instances of suspected fraud. While UNDP does not 

currently share its internal audit reports with the Global Fund, UNDP has taken 

several interim steps to coordinate with the Global Fund’s OIG, including (1) consulting with the OIG on development of UNDP’s annual audit plan; (2) sharing 

summaries of UNDP’s Global Fund-related audits; and (3) bringing potential irregularities involving Global Fund projects to the attention of the OIG whenever and 

wherever they are found. These steps are helpful but not sufficient, and the United 

States is continuing to push for full Global Fund access to relevant UNDP audit 

reports. 

With strong U.S. encouragement, UNDP management has agreed to present options for allowing increased access to its audit reports to the UNDP Executive Board 

for consideration and approval in September 2011. The United States is working to 

build support among UNDP Board members for amendments to UNDP’s audit disclosure policies that would allow increased transparency, accountability, and oversight over resources under UNDP management. 

In addition, the United States is committed to sound management and accountability within the Global Fund and strongly supports the establishment of the 

Global Fund Board’s Comprehensive Reform Working Group and the High-Level 

41

Panel on Global Fund Fiduciary Controls and Oversight, which is being chaired by 

Former Secretary for Health and Human Services, Michael Leavitt, and the former 

President of Botswana, Festus Mogae.

Question. On March 1, 2011, the United Kingdom Department for International 

Development issued a Multilateral Review. This report evaluated the 43 international funds and organizations to which the United Kingdom contributes on value 

for the money and each fund’s and organization’s effectiveness in combating poverty, 

taking in account transparency and accountability. In trying to maximize our multilateral investments, should the Department of State, in consultation with USAID 

and Department of Treasury conduct a similar study?

Answer. I am reviewing the DFID Multilateral Review and look forward to discussing its findings with U.N. officials, if confirmed. 

A broad and standardized review of agency performance, such as the DFID 

Review, is a worthwhile approach that merits thorough and thoughtful consideration. If confirmed I would review the suggestion of such a study carefully, against 

the background of the U.S. Government’s current evaluation mechanisms. 

I understand that the previous U.S. Ambassador for Management and Reform 

established the U.N. Transparency and Accountability Initiative (UNTAI) to verify 

that concrete improvements in management and accountability are being made by 

the U.N. system. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the successful UNTAI initiative and possibly improving its usefulness and relevance. In the current budget 

environment, it is important for international organizations to show that they are 

having the impact that recipients and donors expect. If confirmed, one of my main 

tasks will be to assess the U.N.’s performance and push for improvements wherever 

necessary. I would keep Congress, and this committee in particular, fully informed 

of what I find. 

(43)

NOMINATION 

TUESDAY, MARCH 29, 2011

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

Suzan D. Johnson Cook, of New York, to be Ambassador at Large 

for International Religious Freedom 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m., in room 

SD–19, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Barbara Boxer, presiding. 

Present: Senators Boxer, Menendez, Lugar, DeMint, and Lee. 

Also Present: Senator Gillibrand. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER,

U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA 

Senator BOXER. Could you take your seat, and we will start. 

The full Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate meets to consider the nomination of Dr. Suzan B. Johnson Cook to be Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom. 

Last month, President Obama nominated Dr. Cook to be the Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom for the second time. Dr. Cook was nominated for this post in the last Congress, but the Senate did not complete action on her nomination before adjourning in December. 

We hope Dr. Cook’s second nomination hearing in 5 months will 

give all members of this committee the opportunity they need to 

complete questioning of Dr. Cook so that we can get her into her 

position as soon as possible. 

This nomination is very important, particularly to Secretary of 

State Hillary Clinton, who specifically requested that we move on 

Dr. Cook’s nomination when she appeared before this committee a 

few short weeks ago. During that hearing—hang on. 

[Pause.] 

Senator BOXER. During that hearing, Secretary Clinton noted 

that she believes Dr. Cook’s professional background and demeanor 

are particularly well suited for the post. Dr. Cook holds a Doctor 

of Ministry from the United Theological Seminary and a Master of 

Divinity from the Union Theological Seminary, in addition to a 

number of other professional degrees. 

From 1996 to 2009, she was the senior pastor at the Bronx 

Christian Fellowship Baptist Church. She also served as the first 

44

female president of the Hampton University Ministers Conference, 

which brings together thousands of African-American clergy members from various denominations across the country. 

You are a real pioneer here for women. You were the first female 

chaplain of the New York City Police Department; served as an associate dean of Harvard Divinity School at Harvard; served on the 

advisory board of President Bill Clinton’s Initiative on Race. Most 

recently, she founded Wisdom Women Worldwide, which brings together women religious leaders from all over the globe. 

If confirmed, Dr. Cook will serve as the principal adviser to the 

President and the Secretary of State on matters affecting religious 

freedom abroad, and we all know how important that is. She will 

be specifically charged with developing strategies and policies to 

promote religious freedom around the world, recommending appropriate responses by the United States when violations of religious 

freedom occur, and helping to promote reconciliation in areas 

where religion is a factor in conflicts. And again, we know this happens too often. 

These are important responsibilities that will require tremendous 

dedication and persistence. In December 2009—would you just sit 

in any one of those chairs that you wish? In December 2009, the 

Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life issued 

a report highlighting the fact that 64 nations in the world have 

high or very high restrictions on religion. Religious minorities bear 

the brunt of these restrictions. 

The people living in these countries account for nearly 70 percent 

of the world’s population of 6.9 billion. These figures are staggering 

and should serve as a reminder of why we should quickly fill this 

post. 

As Secretary Clinton has said, ‘‘Religious freedom provides a cornerstone for every healthy society.’’ At this time of tremendous 

change throughout the world, it is more important than ever that 

there be a strong voice from the United States to stand up for those 

who may be enduring brutality or seeing their rights slip away for 

no other reason than their religion. 

And I am going to turn to Senator DeMint for any comments he 

may have, unless he yields to Senator Lugar. It is up to Senator 

DeMint. 

Senator DEMINT. Senator Lugar, would you like to go first? 

Senator BOXER. Either way. All right. 

Then I will turn a moment and as soon as my colleagues finish, 

I am going to call on Senator Gillibrand because I know that she 

will briefly introduce Dr. Cook, and she is excited to do that. And 

then I know she has to depart for another commitment. But can 

you wait until the two Senators? OK. 

Let us do it, 5 minutes each. Yes? 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM DeMINT,

U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA 

Senator DEMINT. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Thank you, Dr. Cook. I appreciate your being here. 

And thank you for your willingness to serve our country. 

The Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom is 

intended to be the principal adviser to the President of the United 

45

States and the Secretary of State regarding matters affecting religious freedom abroad. This person also advises the U.S. Government on our policies, including appropriate responses when rights 

are violated. 

Religious freedom is a very serious issue and requires effective 

leadership, attention, and, when necessary, pressure. Religious 

freedom is a cornerstone of the foundation that makes democracy 

and free enterprise work worldwide. Whether in Iraq, in Afghanistan, where we are giving blood and treasure, or India, the world’s 

largest democracy where they are on the watch list for failing to 

ensure the rights of religious minorities, religious freedom must be 

a priority of our Nation. 

As you know, there have been questions raised about the long vacancy of this post, who controls the International Religious Freedom Office, and how much of a priority this office is to the State 

Department. Just as important, there are a number of indications 

that international religious freedom is not your passion, nor your 

area of particular expertise. 

Having an Ambassador that is well respected and prepared to 

address the challenges we face today is important to me and vital 

to our country. In fact, it is one of the biggest issues that I hear 

about around the world from missionaries and others doing humanitarian aid is the concern that the people we have there could not 

even openly practice their faith because of oppressive governments 

or the lack of freedom of religion. 

And frankly, I have found it takes a very compelling argument 

and a lot of pressure to even get these other governments to listen 

to these concerns. So I am concerned about a person in this position we are talking about having the passion, the courage, the boldness to deal with this issue. 

But thank you for being here. I am interested in hearing from 

you and look forward to your vision, your leadership for this position. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Senator, very, very much. 

And Senator Lugar, and then followed by Senator Gillibrand. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Today, the Foreign Relations Committee again considers the 

nomination of Dr. Suzan Johnson Cook to serve as Ambassador at 

Large for International Religious Freedom. If confirmed, the nominee would serve as principal adviser to the President and Secretary 

of State on religious liberty issues. 

Her responsibilities would include submitting the annual report 

on the state of religious freedom to Congress, engaging other nations on religious freedom issues, and recommending appropriate 

responses to violations of religious liberty. 

Before Dr. Cook’s hearing in November, I submitted 37 questions 

for the record to her regarding the organization and mission of the 

Office of International Religious Freedom, as well as countries of 

particular concern, such as Burma, China, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, 

and Sudan. I appreciate Dr. Cook’s answers to these questions, as 

well as several more that I have submitted since that time. Dr. 

46

Cook’s answers are posted on my Web site for members and the 

public to review. 

During the last decade, the Office of International Religious 

Freedom has engaged numerous countries on ways to improve their 

religious freedom practices. For example, an agreement negotiated 

with Vietnam involved new laws on religion, the release of dozens 

of religious prisoners, and the reopening of hundreds of places of 

worship. The office worked extensively in Saudi Arabia to remove 

intolerant teachings from school books and to advocate for the right 

of religious minorities to hold meetings. Advances of this type require painstaking diplomacy, but I believe it is important for the 

U.S. Government to be seen unmistakably as an advocate for religious freedom. 

Dr. Cook, if confirmed, will have a difficult challenge ahead of 

her. The administration waited a year and a half before making 

this appointment, leaving the IRF office without the leadership and 

institutional strength that comes with an ambassador. Inevitably, 

this was perceived as a signal that the administration did not place 

a high priority on the role of the IRF Ambassador. 

At the end of the last Congress, this nomination was delayed further when the nominee did not get a vote in the Senate. I join 

many Members of Congress who believe that the IRF office has a 

vital role to play in U.S. foreign policy. The office has shown that 

it can produce excellent results if it enjoys institutional backing 

from the State Department and the White House. 

It is especially important that Dr. Cook has access to the Secretary of State and other top decisionmakers; that she has hiring 

and supervisory authority over her staff; that the staff is allowed 

to focus on the core mission of international religious freedom; and 

that the office retains independence and has sufficient operating 

funds. 

I welcome Dr. Cook to the Foreign Relations Committee and look 

forward to her insights on religious freedom priorities. 

I thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much. We are very honored that 

you are here, both of you. We are very happy. 

And Senator Gillibrand. 

STATEMENT OF HON. KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND,

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW YORK 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

I am delighted to be here today to introduce Dr. Suzan Johnson 

Cook for the position of Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom. 

Chairwoman Boxer, Ranking Member DeMint, I really appreciate 

you holding this hearing. It makes an enormous difference, and I 

am very grateful to be here. 

Not only has Dr. Cook distinguished herself as a New Yorker, 

she clearly has the experience and qualities needed to be a successful Ambassador at Large. And Senator DeMint, you have asked for 

passion, concern, and boldness. I can assure you Dr. Cook has so 

much of each of those qualities, she will not only astound you, she 

will very much fit the bill. 

47

She is a religious leader of high character and accomplishment, 

having served as the first woman senior pastor at the American 

Baptist Churches USA and the first female chaplain of the New 

York City Fire Department. Beyond her pastoral experience, she 

has been a leader in bridging faith and public service. She served 

with distinction in the Clinton White House and as a faith liaison 

at the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 

She is also experienced working at the international level, having 

led delegations to critical countries, such as South Africa, Israel, 

Jordan, and Egypt. Additionally, she is the immediate past president of the Hampton University Ministers Conference and founder 

of the Wisdom Women Worldwide, the first global center for women 

religious leaders. 

As you know, religious minorities have recently suffered from recent attacks in a number of countries, including Indonesia, Pakistan, and Egypt. It is urgent that we promptly confirm an Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom. It is vital that 

the United States has the leadership in place to work with the 

international community to protect the rights of religious minorities and advance the cause of religious freedom and tolerance 

across the globe. 

I believe Dr. Cook will represent our country with great honor 

and distinction, and with great enthusiasm, I support this nomination as Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom. 

And Dr. Cook, when you do give your testimony, please introduce 

your family. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Senator. 

Dr. Cook. 

STATEMENT OF SUZAN D. JOHNSON COOK, OF NEW YORK, TO 

BE AMBASSADOR AT LARGE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 

Dr. COOK. Madam Chair, Senator Gillibrand, and members of the 

committee, thank you so much for the opportunity to appear before 

you today. 

I am truly grateful for your consideration of my nomination by 

President Obama as United States Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom. I am deeply honored by the trust that 

President Obama and Secretary Clinton have placed in me by 

nominating me to serve our Nation in advancing the right for religious freedom. 

I would like to thank my family and extended family, who are 

here with me today. This whole section here represents my family 

and extended family and two sons who have returned to school for 

premed and for law. I would like to thank them for your sacrifice, 

for your love, and for your endurance, and, most of all, your presence today. 

As President Obama so eloquently stated in his historic speech 

in Cairo in 2009, ‘‘People in every country should be free to choose 

and live their faith based upon the persuasion of the mind and the 

heart and the soul.’’

Religious freedom is the birthright of all people everywhere. It is 

a foundation of civil society. It is a key to international security, 

and it must always be a pillar of U.S. foreign policy. 

48

The dramatic events in the Middle East and North Africa remind 

us that the desire for freedom within the human spirit, that inherent desire of all people to live according to their beliefs without 

government interference and with government protection should be 

had. Secretary Clinton has also made clear that we need to do 

much more to stand up for the rights of religious minorities. She 

also said we must speak out more and hold governments accountable. If confirmed, this will be my core mission. 

In my travels, I have found that my experience as an AfricanAmerican woman and faith leader has enabled me to identify with 

other minority communities, both religious and ethnic. AfricanAmericans, as you know, did not enjoy full religious freedom in this 

land for centuries, and religion was used by many to justify slavery 

and segregation. So I am particularly committed to this issue in 

the United States, for people of all faiths around the world. 

Immediately following and since the attacks of 9/11, where I 

served on the front line as the chaplain for the New York City Police Department, I have been called upon to aid many citizens from 

many faiths and diverse national backgrounds. We were tragically 

reminded just weeks ago that the universal value of religious freedom is not embraced by all. The assassination of Shahbaz Bhatti, 

Pakistan’s Minister for Minority Affairs and a courageous champion for religious freedom, is a painful reminder that our challenge 

is not easy. It requires an unwavering commitment to support 

those around the world who are risking their lives to stand up for 

religious freedom. 

If confirmed, I will carry out the full congressional mandate, as 

established in the IRF Act, including serving as the principal adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on religious freedom. I will bring bold and passionate leadership to advance and defend religious freedom abroad. I will ensure the integrity of the annual international religious freedom report to Congress and draw 

on these reports, while engaging governments and societies toward 

safeguarding the right of individuals to believe or not to believe. 

If confirmed, I will press for the timely and appropriate designation of countries of particular concern and Presidential actions, a 

critical tool to motivate progress on religious freedom. And I will 

seek to expand training projects that address systemic issues, including blasphemy, apostasy, and the right to change one’s religion. 

The life and professional background I offer this position is 

unique. My international experiences have particularly shaped my 

perspectives. I have brought people of different faiths together to 

achieve common objectives, including religious freedom and respect 

for people of all faiths and beliefs. 

I have traveled to five continents to engage Muslims, Catholics, 

Orthodox Christians, Protestants, Jews, and those of other spiritual traditions. I have led interfaith delegations to Israel, Jordan, 

and Egypt, and the Caribbean. And I have worked with World Vision in Ruschlikon, Switzerland, in its efforts to combat global poverty. 

In Zimbabwe and South Africa, I met with Zulu faith leaders to 

promote religious freedom and tolerance. And I have worked and 

lived with Operation Crossroads Africa, having participated in a 

49

cross-cultural exchange group with spiritual groups in Ghana, Liberia, and Nigeria. 

Now, if confirmed, I will also engage grassroots faith-based communities, which have enormous impact on cultivating a climate 

more receptive to religious freedom in difficult places. As a religious leader myself, I would bring this perspective to encourage diverse religious communities to jointly defend and advance religious 

freedom and foster a climate of mutual respect. 

America has learned much from our experience with religious diversity. We must share our lessons, stand with the persecuted, and 

encourage all governments to respect and protect the universal 

rights of all people. 

As President Obama said on Religious Freedom Day on January 

14, ‘‘The United States stands with those who advocate for free religious expression and works to protect the rights of all people to 

follow their conscience, free from persecution and discrimination.’’

If confirmed, I will seek to work with all religious groups, as well 

as human rights organizations, think tanks, universities, media 

partners, foreign governments, Congress, and of course, the U.S. 

Commission on International Religious Freedom, or USCIRF. I will 

work with colleagues across our Government to assure that, together, we advance religious freedom. The mission is too important 

to be left to one official or one office in the U.S. Government. 

If confirmed, I especially look forward to working closely with 

you, Congress, in advancing this agenda together on behalf of the 

American people, our national interests, and the values that we all 

hold dear. 

I thank you for considering my nomination. I thank you for this 

opportunity for a hearing, and I look forward to answering any 

questions you may have. 

Thank you. 

And thank you for your introduction. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Cook follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SUZAN D. JOHNSON COOK

Madam Chair and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to 

appear before you today. I am truly grateful for your consideration of my nomination by President Obama as United States Ambassador at Large for International 

Religious Freedom. I am deeply honored by the trust that President Obama and 

Secretary Clinton have placed in me by nominating me to serve our nation in advancing the right to freedom of religion abroad. I would like to take this opportunity 

to thank my family and extended family, who are here with me, for their sacrifice, 

love, and endurance. 

As President Obama so eloquently stated in his historic speech in Cairo in 2009, 

‘‘People in every country should be free to choose and live their faith based upon 

the persuasion of the mind and the heart and the soul.’’ Religious freedom is the 

birthright of all people everywhere; it is a foundation of civil society, it is a key to 

international security, and it must always be a pillar of U.S. foreign policy. I believe 

this in my mind, heart, and soul. Religious freedom is a universal principle, enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and protected in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 

The dramatic events unfolding in the Middle East and North Africa remind us 

that the desire for freedom lies deep within the human spirit. No greater freedom 

exists than the inherent desire of all people to enjoy the freedom to live according 

to their beliefs without government interference and with government protection. I 

am deeply disturbed by the increase of persecution and violence against religious 

minorities in this region and in many other parts of the world. These developments 

belie both our values and our security. 

50

In addition to violence, Christians, Bahais, Jews, Ahmadis, and other religious 

minorities often face social, political, and economic exclusion or marginalization. 

Secretary Clinton has made clear that ‘‘We need to do much more to stand up for 

the rights of religious minorities’’ She also said we have to speak out more and to 

hold governments accountable. If confirmed, this will be my core mission. 

In my travels around the country and around the world, I have found that my 

experience as an African-American woman and faith leader has enabled me to identify with other minority communities, both religious and ethnic. African-Americans 

did not enjoy full religious freedom in this land for centuries, and religion was used 

by many to justify slavery and segregation. So I am particularly committed to this 

issue, in the United States and for people of all faiths around the world. Immediately following and since the attacks of 9/11, as the Chaplain for the New York 

City Police Department, I have been called upon to aid many citizens from many 

faiths and diverse national backgrounds. 

We were tragically reminded just weeks ago that the universal value of religious 

freedom is not embraced by all. The March 2 assassination of Shahbaz Bhatti, Pakistan’s Minister for Minority Affairs, and a courageous champion for religious freedom, is a painful reminder that our challenge is not easy. It requires an unwavering 

commitment to support those around the world who are risking their lives to stand 

up for religious freedom. President Obama paid tribute to Minister Bhatti with 

these words: ‘‘Minister Bhatti fought for and sacrificed his life for the universal values that Pakistanis, Americans, and people around the world hold dear—the right 

to speak one’s mind, to practice one’s religion as one chooses, and to be free from 

discrimination based on one’s background or beliefs.’’

If confirmed, I will carry out the full congressional mandate as established in the 

IRF Act, in letter and in spirit, including serving as the principal advisor to the 

President and the Secretary of State on religious freedom. I will bring bold leadership to advance and defend religious freedom abroad. I will ensure the integrity of 

the annual International Religious Freedom Report to Congress and draw on these 

reports, while engaging governments and societies on the importance of respecting 

and protecting religious communities and safeguarding the right of individuals to 

believe or not believe. If confirmed, I will press for the timely and appropriate designation of Countries of Particular Concern (CPCs) and Presidential Actions, a critical tool to motivate progress on religious freedom. I will seek to expand training 

of diplomats on religious freedom. I will use program resources to implement 

projects that address systemic issues challenging religious freedom—including blasphemy, apostasy, and the right to change one’s religion. 

The life and professional background I offer this position is unique. My international experiences have particularly shaped my perspectives and brought me to 

this point. I have been privileged to enjoy a range of experiences in bringing people 

of different faiths together to achieve common objectives—including religious freedom and respect for people of other faiths and beliefs. I have traveled to five continents to engage Muslims, Catholics, Orthodox Christians, Protestants, Jews, and 

practitioners of several other spiritual traditions. I have led interfaith delegations 

to Israel, Jordan, and Egypt, and throughout the Caribbean. I worked with World 

Vision, in Ruschlikon, Switzerland, in its efforts to combat global poverty. I have 

traveled to Zimbabwe and South Africa to meet with Zulu faith leaders to promote 

religious freedom and tolerance. As a young woman, I worked with Operation Crossroads Africa, and participated in a cross-cultural exchange with spiritual groups in 

Ghana. 

If confirmed, I will engage government and religious leaders, as well as grassroots 

faith-based communities around the world, which have enormous impact on cultivating a climate more receptive to religious freedom in difficult places. As a religious leader myself, I would like to bring this perspective and use my skills and 

experience to encourage diverse religious communities to jointly defend and advance 

religious freedom and foster a climate of mutual respect. 

America has learned much from its experience with religious diversity. We must 

share our lessons, stand with the persecuted, and encourage all governments to respect and protect the universal rights of all people. As President Obama said, on 

Religious Freedom Day, January 14, ‘‘The United States stands with those who advocate for free religious expression and works to protect the rights of all people to 

follow their conscience, free from persecution and discrimination.’’

I have learned important lessons and wisdom from each of my experiences. If confirmed, to serve as Ambassador at Large, I will seek to work with all religious 

groups. And I will work with human rights organizations, think tanks, universities, 

media partners, foreign governments, Congress, and, of course, the U.S. Commission 

on International Religious Freedom. If confirmed, I will seek appropriate resources 

needed both for the IRF Office and for innovative programs and other activities to 

51

advance our priorities. I will work with colleagues at the Department, our Ambassadors overseas, and the White House to ensure that all parts of our government 

are working together to advance religious freedom. This mission is too important to 

be left to one official or one office in the U.S. Government. 

I also want to acknowledge and commend the efforts of the two previous Ambassadors at Large, Robert Seiple and John Hanford. Both embraced the mandate of 

the IRF Act and were responsible for overseeing the Office of International Religious 

Freedom in the Department of State. If confirmed, I pledge to build on their efforts 

as faithful stewards of this congressional mandate and President Obama’s vision of 

focusing U.S. attention on issues of religious freedom and working with persons of 

all faiths to pursue this critical goal. 

If confirmed, I especially look forward to working closely with Congress in advancing this agenda together on behalf of the American people, our national interests 

and the values we hold dear. I look forward to answering any questions you may 

have.

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Dr. Cook. 

And we are having this hearing because a couple of folks wanted 

to hear more about you. And I have got to say, I am so impressed. 

It is impressive. 

And you speak about traveling to five continents, which I think 

is a tremendous education. And is it true you speak Spanish? 

Dr. COOK. Yes; it is. I lived in Valencia, Spain. 

Senator BOXER. That is very good, too. And that, you know, to 

me, you have presented just a wonderful resume and a very strong 

presence here. 

I would like to ask those who came with you, family and extended family, just to stand for a minute. If they would stand? You 

don’t need to introduce them all. I just feel they should be recognized because I know you traveled to be here with Dr. Cook, and 

I just want to thank you for that. 

Because when people come before us like this, they need support, 

and thank you very much for being here. Really, it means a lot to 

her, and I know I am very impressed that you are all here. 

So let me say I am convinced in terms of all that you have done 

in your life that you are ready for this challenge. And I so admire 

Secretary Clinton and Senator Gillibrand, who know you so well. 

And so, I am excited that you are willing to do this. 

I have a couple of questions on topics that I hope you are prepared for. If not, you can just get back to me on the record. 

As you know, violent attacks against Coptic Christians in Egypt 

have increased significantly in recent years. In January 2010, on 

Coptic Christmas Eve, six Coptic Christians and a Muslim security 

guard were killed in a driveby shooting outside a church. 

On New Year’s Day 2011, a suicide bomber killed 23 people in 

an attack on a church in Alexandria, Egypt. And just a few weeks 

ago, violent clashes between Muslims and Coptic Christians in the 

capital of Cairo left at least 13 dead and 140 wounded. 

This violence against Coptic Christians, who make up 10 percent 

of Egypt’s population, is concerning, especially now while the Egyptian people are looking forward to a new lease on life for them. In 

her testimony before the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission 

in January, Nina Shea, a commissioner of the U.S. Commission on 

International Religious Freedom, stated, ‘‘The U.S. and the community of nations have a fundamental obligation to address the violence and protect those religious minorities.’’

52

If confirmed, how will you work to ensure that U.S. prioritizes 

the protection of religious minorities and the prosecution of violators in its discussions with Egypt about its future? 

Dr. COOK. Thank you, Senator. 

I share your concern certainly about the Coptic Christians and 

other minorities in Egypt. Having traveled there and lived there, 

I know many of the religious leaders. It has been disheartening to 

learn of all the institutions that have been forbidden to be built or 

be renovated. So it has been ongoing. 

In this transition, it is important that there be dialogue and engagement with civil society. The U.S. Government high-level officials have had numerous occasions to have dialogue with Egypt, including Secretary Clinton. And if confirmed, I would build upon 

those conversations and draw on the tools that are available to me, 

at my disposal. 

One of the keys that is happening is that religious leaders are 

emerging as voices, and it would be important, if confirmed, to sit 

down with all sectors and begin a dialogue that would include protection for Coptic Christians and others. 

Senator BOXER. So you would agree that this is a moment in 

time that we shouldn’t waste when it comes to religious freedom——

Dr. COOK. Without question. 

Senator BOXER [continuing]. In Egypt particularly, and these 

other countries that are going through this dramatic revolution, 

some peaceful, some not. I would say in that vein, and this would 

not be your portfolio, but I think this is really a moment in history 

where we should look at religious freedom and also equality for 

women because, you know, this is a rare moment. 

The other question I have, and then I will yield to Senator 

DeMint. I have questions for the record on the Congo. If I don’t 

have a chance to answer it and some others, but this one I thought 

I would ask you. 

The spiritual leader of many of my constituents and hundreds of 

millions of Orthodox Christians around the globe is His Holiness 

Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew. As you know, his nearly 2,000-

year-old sacred see is in Istanbul, Turkey, has faced tremendous 

discrimination at the hands of the Turkish Government over the 

better part of the past century. 

Fortunately, Turkey has taken some steps regarding the religious freedom of the Ecumenical Patriarch in recent months, including providing Turkish citizenship to potential successors of the 

patriarch and returning important property to the church. But 

much remains to be done, including reopening an important orthodox seminary that was closed by the Turkish Government in 1971 

and recognizing the title of Ecumenical Patriarch. 

If confirmed, how would you work to significantly improve religious freedom and human rights for the Ecumenical Patriarch and 

for ethnic Greeks living in Turkey? 

Dr. COOK. Thank you for your question. 

A large part of my constituency is also Greek Orthodox. I had the 

pleasure of serving with Father John Poulos in Astoria, Queens, as 

a police chaplain. And so, for many years, that issue has been a 

highlight of my priorities. 

53

I have also had the pleasure of serving with Father Alex and 

Archbishop Demetrios in the New York region. And just Friday at 

the White House, I celebrated Greek Independence Day with them. 

So I am very attuned to the subject matter. 

If confirmed, I would continue to press the government to recognize the Ecumenical Patriarch. We are pleased that 12 

metropolitans were confirmed as citizens, which broadens the pool 

for the next Ecumenical Patriarch. But that would be one of the 

first trips in my priorities that I would like to take, to visit and 

see the Ecumenical Patriarch. Long overdue. 

Senator BOXER. Well, it is music to my ears. I thank you. 

Senator DeMint, the floor is yours. 

Senator DEMINT. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I am sure the State Department would take exception to my comments. But over several administrations, I have seen an unwillingness at the State Department to address seriously religious freedom and religious persecution issues. I think, when pressed, they 

tend to pat you on the head, and I am speaking of my head at this 

point, and saying, ‘‘That is important,’’ rhetorically. But it is, frankly, too messy to compromise a political or economic relationship. 

And that is why I mentioned the importance of a real passion 

and boldness because I don’t expect this administration or the next 

within the State Department culture to really take these issues as 

seriously as they should. Because one of the things that I know is 

important and true, that we are not going to have economic and 

political freedom where no religious freedom exists. 

I just would like to ask your response. As we look at violations 

in Afghanistan, where we have Americans of all faiths fighting, giving their lives, billions of dollars being spent, an Afghani who converted to Christianity was sentenced to death, effectively. And fortunately, because of I think a lot of political pressure, that is not 

going to happen, but that person no longer can live in their home 

country. 

What would you do? How would you deal with this? Because it 

is not just Afghanistan. It is Iraq. It is other places where American blood has been shed, and now we are faced with governments 

we have helped install who are not supporting religious freedom. 

What would you do in Afghanistan? 

Dr. COOK. Thank you for your question, Senator. 

I share the concern deeply because there is a lot of violence and 

persecution, and there are many laws that are written totally 

against those who are religious minorities. If confirmed, I will work 

together with partners, international partners who have been 

working on religious freedom issues for a long time. 

We are heartened by the release of Said Musa, who, although he 

is not able to live any longer in his country, it was the U.S. Government, as well as many of my partners, NGO partners, who have 

worked for his release and his reuniting with his family. So we are 

concerned. And if confirmed, I would continue to press the Afghan 

Government for protection of all of its citizens and to also work 

with them in terms of promoting religious freedom. 

Senator DEMINT. Would you be willing to do that publicly, to 

speak to the media, or I know is the State Department will tell me 

and you, let us do this under the radar. Let us not make any 

54

waves. And so, the international pressure that we would like to be 

there is often not present. 

And I am not saying that some of the behind the scenes work 

does not pay dividends. As in Afghanistan, we did not establish religious freedom, but we saved the person’s life. Frankly, for what 

we are fighting for, I am not sure that that should be our end goal. 

But you have mentioned working with our partners, or I mean, 

can you be more specific? We have that very real situation right 

now where countries where our troops are on the ground, where religious freedom does not exist. How would you work with our Government and those governments? How would you exert the pressure that is needed to get the attention here as well as there? 

Dr. COOK. Thank you for your question. 

The beginning of your question was would I certainly use public 

diplomacy as one of the tools? I would use all of the tools that are 

available to me to elevate religious freedom to the highest level, 

both in our Government and around the world. 

There are times situationally that public pressure and the headlines is important, and there are times, in the case of Said Musa, 

situationally that you need to do it more quietly. And Afghan is a 

very complicated situation, and there are times that you have to 

move quietly for the saving of a person’s life and for the reunification of his family. 

So one of the tools that I am strong at is public diplomacy, and 

when appropriate, certainly I will use that and all the tools that 

are available to me. 

Senator DEMINT. OK. Just one final question. It appears from 

what we see that this position has kind of been lowered in status 

at the State Department. Yet we expect you to be the primary adviser to the President on religious issues, which means, again, 

probably in the pecking order, you would have to use strong personality and a lot of push in order to get some attention. And 

again, that is very important. 

How do you anticipate dealing with that inside the structure 

there at the State Department? 

Dr. COOK. Well, thank you again for your question. 

I bring a 30-year, three-decade-long experience. You asked initially in your opening statement for boldness, courage, and passion, 

and those are three qualities that I have. But I don’t see the position as lowered. I see it as being a premier bureau, the DRL bureau. I see a team of 20 wonderful full-time civil servants and also 

Foreign Service officers who are really on their game, their A 

game, and have worked very hard. 

They are just missing an Ambassador at Large to complete a 

strong team. And so, if confirmed, I would join that team, and we 

would elevate, again, religious freedom to the highest levels possible. 

Senator DEMINT. Thank you, Dr. Cook. 

Senator BOXER. Senator DeMint, thank you for those excellent 

questions. 

Senator Menendez, welcome. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Reverend Cook, thank you for coming again. I was ready to vote 

for you the last time you were here. 

55

Dr. COOK. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And I, having heard some of your answers 

that were preempted by the chair that I had to the questions of the 

Ecumenical Patriarch and the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which is 

something that I am passionate about. Senator Snowe and I, in a 

bipartisan effort, are circulating a letter to the President on this 

issue, which we expect many Senators to join us on. 

And we are concerned that while we have made some progress 

with Turkey on this issue, especially with regard to objecting to referring to his All Holiness as ecumenical and proving some aspects 

of patriarchal succession, but there is a lot more that needs to be 

done. And you and I have had the opportunities in your visits before your nomination or as you were nominated, but before you 

were in the committee, in your responses to me the last time. 

And from what I have heard of your responses to Senator Boxer 

that are in line with the type of advocacy that I would want someone in this position to have, not only as it relates to the Ecumenical 

Patriarchate, but to religious freedom internationally. And I know 

one thing. That until we get someone in this position, there will be 

no advocacy in the world for the religious freedom that we all believe in and espouse passionately. And so, I think it is incredibly 

important to get someone into this position as the Ambassador at 

Large for International Religious Freedom. 

Let me ask you, since I know some of my colleagues have the 

concern about the nature of the position and the structure of it and 

what not, before you took this nomination, I am sure you wanted 

to have a role to be effective. 

Dr. COOK. Yes. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So what understandings did you come to in 

terms of what is going to be your ability, both individually and 

within the State Department and beyond, to be able to be that 

voice and make that case and to have the ear of those who can 

shape policy? 

Dr. COOK. Thank you for your question, Senator. It is good to see 

you again. 

As I came to this position, I read very carefully the IRF Act and 

understand critically that I would be the principal adviser to both 

the Secretary of State and the President of the United States, and 

I would carry out the IRF mandate as it is written fully to its potential. I have no problem doing that. The structure that is in place 

still allows me to do that. 

Again, I share we have a tremendous team of Foreign Service officers and civil service workers who make up or comprise about 20. 

I would head the IRF office and would do that to my full ability. 

I don’t feel the position is diminished whatsoever. What is lacking 

is the person in the post of Ambassador at Large for Religious 

Freedom. 

So I am prepared to do that. I am ready to do that. And certainly, visiting the Ecumenical Patriarch and the Vatican is something this office has not done, and that would be one of my priorities when assuming the post, if confirmed. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate that. Now do you know Secretary Clinton? 

56

Dr. COOK. I know her very well, and I would have access to the 

Secretary. 

Senator MENENDEZ. You have known her since before she was 

the Secretary of State? 

Dr. COOK. I knew her before. I was in the Clinton White House 

when she was the first lady. Also, she was the Senator for my very 

famous State, New York. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And she must have known you during that 

period of time? 

Dr. COOK. Very much so and very closely. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And so, therefore, you know the Secretary in 

a way that maybe some other nominee would not know the Secretary and be able to get her ear. Is that fair to say? 

Dr. COOK. That is very fair to say, sir. 

Senator MENENDEZ. OK. Do you know President Obama? 

Dr. COOK. I know President Obama as well, thank you. And I 

could have his ear also. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Do you know him well enough that you will 

have the wherewithal to be able to, when you feel that it is fitting 

and appropriate and necessary on some issue of religious freedom 

in the world, to be able to make your case to him? 

Dr. COOK. Yes, sir. I do. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, that is ultimately the two main opportunities that we want, for this person who would have this position 

to be able to speak to the Secretary of State and to the President 

of the United States when they feel that it is important, appropriate, fitting, and necessary to promote religious freedom in the 

world and to have the ears of those individuals. 

So I am once again ready and willing to vote for your confirmation. I believe from my conversations with you, not only as it relates to the Ecumenical Patriarch, but other concerns I have in the 

world, that you will be a strong advocate and not a shrinking violet 

in this respect. 

And so, thank you very much for coming once again before the 

committee. 

Dr. COOK. You are welcome, and thank you. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Dr. Cook, my colleagues have tried to help us all 

define your role as Ambassador at Large, and of course, you have 

related responses to questions from Senator Menendez your relationship with the President and the Secretary of State. 

Let me ask a question this way. A Pew Foundation study from 

December 2009 indicated that approximately 70 percent of the population of the world lives in areas where religious freedom is severely restricted. Now I suppose whether it is your own initiative, 

that of the 20 talented persons who are working with you, or even 

on occasion a thought from the President or the Secretary of State, 

how do you go about prioritizing what exactly you are going to do, 

and which countries you will be visiting? 

I ask this question because if you have two-thirds of the world 

where restrictions on religious freedom are very substantial, there 

is, of course, a long list of possibilities. How do you plan to occupy 

your time most profitably? Or, is this a situation where you wait 

57

for a crisis to occur and then head out to the front and see what 

you can do? 

Dr. COOK. OK. Thank you, sir, for your question, Senator Lugar. 

The Pew study goes on to say that not only 70 percent are persecuted daily, but also more than 200,000 million Christians each 

day are persecuted and discriminated against. And in the 20th and 

21st centuries, more people have been killed because of their faith 

than in the other 19 centuries combined. So I am very concerned 

about the lack of this office being filled. 

My priorities would be such that we can’t cover all the 198 countries, but we are mandated by the IRF Act to give a report on those 

countries. I would sit down with our staff and our team and our 

wider partners, NGOs and academy and others who have been 

working on religious freedom, and determine those priorities. 

Certainly the Middle East right now is urgent, and that cannot 

be ignored. I would want to travel immediately to Egypt and to 

Iraq. In Asia, I would love to travel to Vietnam and to Afghanistan 

and Pakistan and certainly China, where we are developing relationships. And then, in sub-Saharan Africa, would love to go to Nigeria, which is also of urgent concern, as well as stopping by Liberia, which is having the same conflict as Nigeria. But they are one 

of what we call a ‘‘promising practice,’’ and I would use that as a 

model perhaps for Nigeria and other countries that are experiencing religious freedom issues. 

So those would be my priorities immediately. Certainly sitting 

down domestically with people who have been working on religious 

freedom for issues. Just as when religious freedom, the IRF Act 

was developed, there was a summit called of the academy scholars, 

NGOs, who were working on religious freedom, I would want to 

have those conversations as well. But those would be my priorities. 

Certainly a visit to the Ecumenical Patriarch and to the Vatican, 

which this office has not done for the last decade, I think, out of 

respect and as a priority. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, you have named some very excellent priorities. But now how do you conduct yourself when you arrive? You 

come on the scene. You have already made a study indicating that 

things are not going well in terms of religious freedom. 

In a concrete sense, what do you actually propose? A plan for better conduct by that government, by the society? In other words, 

specifically what action does an Ambassador at Large take that 

makes any particular difference in the minds of those leaders? 

Dr. COOK. Thank you for your question. 

Certainly the tools that are available to me, first of all, is getting, 

securing the report and reporting on religious persecution in the 

198 countries. But the second tool is diplomacy. We would work 

with the embassies and posts where we have a post on the ground 

as my first point of entry, and then also with the NGOs and civil 

society in those societies. 

Where there are diplomatic relations that are lacking, I would 

work with multilateral fora and also partners who are related to 

those countries. So there will be a strategic plan. I would not go 

without a plan. I would move strategically, not emotionally, and 

certainly work with those partners that are already on the ground. 

58

But wherever we have embassies, we would secure that relationship first. 

Senator LUGAR. How do your responsibilities interact with those 

of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom? Where 

do they fit into the picture? 

Dr. COOK. Oh, they fit very complementarily. We have not had 

a chance to sit down, but that would be part of the conversations 

I would have initially if I am confirmed. That would be one of the 

first conversations with the commissioners, and I would be an ex 

officio member of USCIRF. And so, part of that would be to have 

presence. 

One of the acronyms—this is a city of acronyms, and so I have 

had to learn a new language coming before you. So I have developed one, which is MAP, putting religious freedom on the MAP. 

And the M is for multilateral relationships and meetings that matter. A is for accessibility and availability of the Ambassador. And 

P is for policy, partnerships, and presence and using those tools 

that are available to me. 

So USCIRF would be one of those entities that I would sit with, 

that we, together, would put religious freedom on the map and 

work in a complementary collaborative relationship. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much. 

Dr. COOK. You are welcome. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. 

Senator Lee. 

Senator LEE. Thank you for joining us today, Ms. Cook. 

Dr. COOK. Thank you. 

Senator LEE. I wanted to talk to you for a minute about Iraq’s 

indigenous Christian population. Do you have any thoughts that 

you could share with us about what you would do to help Iraq’s 

Christians? 

Dr. COOK. Yes; thank you, sir, for your question, and welcome. 

It is good to—there has certainly been a lot of violence and a lot 

of discrimination against Iraq’s Christian population. There has 

been a shift certainly in military action there, and so part of what 

is going to be necessary is to also have conversations with General 

Petraeus and the military chaplains who are there. 

Being a religious leader, I also bring that camaraderie of relationship with the chaplains who are on the ground. But also we 

have Ambassador Bodde, who has been assigned to Iraq, and there 

also is Deputy Assistant Secretary Corbin, who has been assigned 

to Iraq. Those would be conversations that I would need to have 

with them as well, because they have been doing the work, and 

also partner with them and build upon the relationships that they 

have built in Iraq. 

Senator LEE. OK. What about in Pakistan, defamation laws? 

Those have proven problematic for religious liberty, as I suspect 

you would agree. Have you given any thought to those and how you 

might deal with those in this capacity? 

Dr. COOK. Well, yes. Pakistan is very complicated. It has some 

societal issues, as well as religious freedom issues. But we are 

thankful that on last Thursday, the antidefamation resolution, an 

alternative was presented by Pakistan, and defamation is no longer 

in the title. The United Nations Human Rights Council met in GeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
59

neva, and an alternative resolution was passed unanimously so 

that it will protect religious minorities. 

We are very concerned certainly about the Ahmadi communities 

there and the Christian communities and other religious minorities. And in our wider group of friends and partners, I have a wonderful friendship with an Ahmadi family, Mr. Nasir Ahmad. And 

so, talking with those persons from those communities which have 

been oppressed is certainly something that we want to continue to 

do. 

But Pakistan represents many complexities, and we will continue 

to work forward. We will certainly—our condolences certainly went 

out to Prime Minister Bhatti’s family and to Governor Taseer’s 

family, and we would hope that as we continue that they will have 

a new champion for religious freedom. But in the meantime, we 

certainly have to build upon the work that they did. 

Senator LEE. Do you feel well equipped to come into a role that 

is still in the process of being defined? 

Dr. COOK. I think the role is very defined, and I feel very 

equipped and compatible with this role. So I think that I am very 

prepared. Courageous and boldness and passion is what Senator 

DeMint asked for, and I bring those qualities to it, as well as a 

wealth of experience. 

Senator LEE. Thank you. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Well, Dr. Cook, I want to thank you and all of your family and 

extended family who came today. I speak for myself in saying you 

are an incredible witness before this committee. You have acquitted 

yourself, I think, magnificently. You have answered every question 

in detail. You never ducked a question. 

And I think you have shown, I hope—I hope—this committee 

that you are ready. I think you are more than ready for this job. 

So I thank you. 

I know Senator DeMint has a few questions. I have a couple of 

questions. Others may. So we will leave the record open for 24 

hours. So stay close to us, and get those answers back. 

Senator BOXER. And then we will work with the Foreign Relations Committee to have your nomination moved forward. 

Again, thank you so very much. 

And this hearing stands adjourned. Thank you, colleagues. 

Dr. COOK. Thank you, Senator. 

[Whereupon, at 3:16 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF SUZAN JOHNSON COOK TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. What level of input will you have in the administration of the Human 

Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF)? How would you ensure that religious freedom 

considerations are taken into account during the programming of HRDF funds?

Answer. Established under President Clinton, the HRDF has funded such projects 

as promoting the rule of law, advancing democratic values, and supporting religious 

freedom efforts and worker rights in over 50 countries. Over the last 3 years, more 

than $10 million of the HRDF has been committed to religious freedom programming. As Ambassador at Large, if confirmed, I would be directly involved in the review and selection process on all proposals related to religious freedom. 

60

Religious freedom programming currently supports such areas as: (1) training religious groups, civil society, and lawmakers to develop legal and policy protections 

for religious freedom, (2) addressing expressions of intolerance, antidefamation, 

anticonversion, and antiblasphemy laws that restrict religious expression; (3) increasing public awareness of religious freedom through media outlets and opinion 

makers; and (4) strengthening capacity of religious leaders to promote faith-based 

cooperation across religious and sectarian lines. 

If confirmed, I will collaborate closely with DRL’s programming office, on HRDF 

programs that are reviewed and approved generally under DRL authority, paying 

particular attention to those proposals where religious freedom is integrated with 

the larger promotion of freedom of expression. For example, programming on Internet freedom has direct and significant benefits for the advancement of freedom of 

religion.

Question. The forces of change in the Middle East may pose a risk to religious 

minorities, particularly in those countries experiencing violent turmoil. What steps 

would you take to protect the religious freedom of minority communities in that region? How would you support moderate voices and encourage dialogue on religious 

freedom among representatives of different faiths?

Answer. If confirmed as a principal advisor to the President and Secretary of 

State on international religious freedom issues, I look forward to promoting religious 

freedom as a core objective of U.S. foreign policy. Religious freedom is a fundamental human right and a pillar of a democratic society. The Middle East must be 

a top priority for promoting religious freedom, especially given recent attacks on religious minorities in the region. I am deeply disturbed by the increase of persecution 

and violence against religious minorities in this region and in many other parts of 

the world. I will impress upon governments that religious freedom enhances stability, and that restrictions on religious communities only serve to encourage more 

sectarian tensions and violence. 

The changes that we are seeing in the Middle East have been dramatic and often 

inspiring, yet violence and intolerance remain sources of concern—particularly for 

religious minorities in this region. We are observing a mixed picture in the region, 

and I would encourage those voices promoting religious freedom among the emerging political leadership and strengthened minority-community voices. Minority religious communities in Middle Eastern countries where they had previously been repressed should have new opportunities for engagement with governments, interfaith 

dialogue, and progress toward greater religious tolerance and religious freedom. It 

will be one of my top priorities to support those voices inside the region using these 

opportunities to increase respect for religious freedom and interfaith dialogue. 

If confirmed, I will lead the U.S. Government’s efforts to press for reform with 

governments that violate religious freedom, work with governments that share our 

views, and reach out to religious leaders worldwide to urge them to work with the 

United States in this region to promote religious tolerance and freedom. The 

Secretary is deeply engaged on religious freedom issues, and the first line of defense 

on religious freedom is our hard-working embassies and missions worldwide. The 

IRF Act provides many tools to advance this agenda. I will use all the tools of diplomacy and engagement, including public and private messaging, pressure, and 

programs. 

I will work with my colleagues in the State Department and with civil society to 

advocate for a change in the Egyptian law to remove severe restrictions on building 

and renovating Christian places of worship. I would also press the Iraqi Government to protect vulnerable religious minorities by taking effective measures to prevent future attacks and to bring to justice the perpetrators of attacks on Christians 

and other minorities. 

If confirmed, I also look forward to engaging political and civic leaders directly 

to encourage greater reforms and protection of religious minorities. I specifically 

hope to travel to Egypt and Iraq soon to meet with my counterparts in the governments to urge them to fulfill their international obligations to respect freedom of 

religion and ensure the safety of its religious minorities. I will work more broadly 

with communities around the region to advance religious freedom by engaging religious leaders and civil society; through programming and exchanges; and by promoting interfaith dialogue, tolerance, and mutual respect through education.

Question. In Uzbekistan, government restrictions on religious freedom have led to 

the arrest and imprisonment of thousands of persons, including many Muslim individuals and registered and unregistered religious groups. What strategy would you 

employ to encourage the Government of Uzbekistan to abide by its international 

commitments on religious freedom, including its commitments under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights?

61

Answer. I am deeply concerned about the Uzbekistan Government’s restrictions 

on and abuses of religious freedom. If confirmed, I intend to build on the important 

work of State Department colleagues and press the Government of Uzbekistan to 

take specific actions to support religious freedom. Uzbekistan has been designated 

a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) since 2006. Since the CPC designation, State 

Department officials have met numerous times with Uzbek officials, both in 

Uzbekistan and in Washington, most recently during the Annual Bilateral Consultations in Tashkent in February 2011. Secretary Clinton also raised religious freedom, 

among other human rights issues, with President Karimov during her December 

2010 visit to Tashkent following the OSCE summit. 

If confirmed, I would work with U.S. colleagues, key international partners, 

USCIRF, and NGOs to advocate for progress and help Uzbekistan improve its practices and legislation. If confirmed, I plan to travel to Uzbekistan to reinvigorate and 

elevate our dialogue on religious freedom. I will press hard for the Uzbek Government to simplify the registration process for religious groups and reduce the requirements for registration, and will also urge the Uzbeks to reduce or eliminate the civil 

and criminal penalties for unregistered religious activity. I will work to ensure that 

advocacy for religious freedom continues to be an integral part of future Annual 

Bilateral Consultations and will work with my colleagues to utilize all diplomatic 

tools to motivate and persuade the Uzbek Government to make improvements. I 

would use appropriate public diplomacy and program assistance toward that goal.

Question. The status of the Rohingya in Burma, Bangladesh, Thailand, and other 

Southeast Asian countries remains precarious. Lacking citizenship, they often face 

restrictions on access to education and other basic services, live in deplorable conditions, and do not enjoy the right to certain fundamental human freedoms, including 

rights to freedom of religion, association, and movement. What role would your 

office play in encouraging greater protections for the Rohingya against policies that 

discriminate on the basis of religion?

Answer. I am very concerned about the plight of the Rohingya, particularly in 

Burma where the government continues to refuse to recognize them as citizens, rendering them stateless, and imposes restrictions on their movement and marriage. 

I am also concerned about the treatment of Rohingya refugees in Thailand and Bangladesh. If confirmed, I will work with our embassies in the region as well as the 

Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration to continue to press for the rights 

of Rohingya in Burma and throughout the region. I will follow this issue closely, 

highlight Rohingya human rights problems in our annual reports, engage governments in the region to end discrimination against the Rohingya, and work toward 

developing regional solutions to address their plight. 

Burma is designated a Country of Particular Concern for its ongoing violations 

of religious freedom. The U.S. Government has a wide array of financial and trade 

sanctions in place against Burma for its violations of human rights. Our Embassies 

also offer support to local NGOs and religious leaders and exchange information 

with otherwise isolated human rights NGOs and religious leaders. 

RESPONSES OF SUZAN JOHNSON COOK TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR BARBARA BOXER

Question. As you may know, DRC has been called the ‘‘rape capital of the world.’’ 

The United Nations estimates that 200,000 women and girls have been raped in the 

DRC over the past 12 years, and that 15,000 women were raped in eastern DRC 

in 2009 alone. This level of brutality is simply incomprehensible and it must be 

stopped once and for all. According to the U.S. State Department’s 2010 Report on 

International Religious Freedom, ‘‘Nearly 90 percent of the population’’ of DRC 

‘‘attends religious services each week.’’ Given that the vast majority of Congolese 

citizens regularly attend religious services, what, in your opinion, is the role of religious communities in raising awareness about violence against women? If confirmed, how will you work to encourage religious communities to take a leadership 

role in stopping violence against women in DRC?

Answer. I know your staff visited the Democratic Republic of the Congo recently 

and applaud your efforts to raise awareness of these human rights issues. I share 

your concern about the broader human rights issues in the country, particularly the 

horrific widespread violence against women. As a religious leader myself, I believe 

that communities of faith, working in concert with traditional leaders, can and 

should play an important role in raising awareness to combat violence against 

women and elevating the role and status of women in society. 

62

If confirmed, I would strongly encourage churches and all religious communities 

to use their combined influence to address this horrific problem. Communities of 

faith can and should have a voice in reducing violence against women. If confirmed, 

I hope to travel to the DRC to help bring together these communities and urge them 

to demonstrate leadership in this important issue.

Question. On Thursday, March 24, the United Nations Human Rights Council 

(UNHRC) passed a resolution on ‘‘Combating Intolerance and Violence Against Persons Based on Religion or Belief.’’ This was widely hailed by many religious groups 

and religious freedom advocates as a victory over a ‘‘defamation of religions’’ resolution that has long been championed by the Organization of the Islamic Conference 

(OIC). Many feared that the ‘‘defamation of religions’’ resolution would be used to 

further criminalize peaceful criticism of religion, including reinforcing blasphemy 

laws in countries such as Pakistan where violations carry the risk of death. As 

noted by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, the new resolution ‘‘properly focuses on protecting individuals from discrimination or violence, instead of protecting religions from criticism.’’

• If confirmed, how will you work to build on this resolution? And how will you 

work to encourage countries to eliminate blasphemy laws, particularly those 

that carry the death penalty such as in Pakistan and Afghanistan?

Answer. The consensus resolution adopted by the U.N. Human Rights Council 

(UNHRC) represents a significant step forward in the global dialogue on countering 

intolerance, discrimination, and violence against persons based on religion or belief. 

The State Department, including staff from the Office of International Religious 

Freedom, worked intensively on developing this new approach. 

If confirmed, working with member states from the Organization of the Islamic 

Conference and the European Union, I will urge robust implementation of the concrete measures outlined in the resolution such as education, awareness building, 

government outreach, service projects, dialogue, and countering offensive speech 

with more speech. I will also partner with governments, civil society, and religious 

leaders on constructive joint initiatives to combat intolerance, discrimination, and 

violence against persons based on religion or belief. 

In countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, I am deeply concerned about 

abuses under the blasphemy laws. In Pakistan, the implementation of these laws 

has resulted in the arrest of, and attacks on, hundreds of Pakistani citizens, both 

Muslim and non-Muslim. If confirmed, I will urge the Government of Pakistan to 

address these problematic laws. I will also actively engage with the country’s religious leadership and civil society actors advocating for tolerance and interfaith 

efforts. Our message is simple: we need to work together to reduce interfaith tensions and violence; blasphemy laws have actually contributed to violence and are 

thus counterproductive to their stated aims. 

In Afghanistan, although in recent years the death penalty has not been carried 

out either by local or national authorities, these kind of discriminatory laws and 

practices are rooted in intolerance that governments should combat. If confirmed, 

I will urge the Government of Afghanistan to uphold its international obligations 

to freedoms of religion and expression, and also work in coordination with the international community, including our European partners, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and other like-minded partners to reinforce 

the importance of freedom of religion, tolerance, and respect. This will be a long 

process and progress will be measured in increments. If confirmed, I will use all of 

the tools at my disposal to engage with religious leaders and civil society—like the 

Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), and I will help develop 

programs and exchanges to support these policies.

Question. The Government of Vietnam has a long history of intolerance to religious freedom despite provisions contained within the Vietnamese Constitution that 

provide for individual belief. 

The government is especially harsh to individuals associated with religious groups 

that are not officially recognized. However, even members of churches that are 

acknowledged by the government, such as the Catholic Church, suffer persecution. 

Security officials interfere with religious gatherings, confiscate religious literature, 

and harass religious leaders with frequent interrogation. 

In some instances, government officials have destroyed churches and religious 

structures. Religious groups and activists are threatened, harassed, and even sometimes imprisoned, such as in the case of former prisoner of conscience, Father 

Nguyen Van Ly, who was sentenced to 8 years in prison in 2007. He was released 

last year on medical parole; an order that expired on March 15, 2011. As a result, 

Father Ly faces possible rearrest by the government.

63

• If confirmed, how would you personally work to protect individuals who are at 

risk of harassment and detainment as a result of their religious activities? • How will you work to more broadly to advance religious freedom in Vietnam?

Answer. If confirmed, Vietnam will be one of my top priorities, and I will use all 

the tools at my disposal to promote true religious freedom there, including reporting, diplomatic engagement, public diplomacy, and targeted programming. While 

there has been some overall progress in religious freedom over the last decade, 

Protestant minorities in the Central and Northwest Highlands, the Catholic Church, 

and individual religious believers of a variety of faiths still face serious problems. 

The State Department already engages regularly with the Government of Vietnam 

in Hanoi and in Washington, including at our annual Human Rights Dialogue, the 

most recent of which was led by Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Assistant 

Secretary Michael Posner in December 2010 in Hanoi. 

If confirmed, I will travel to Vietnam to meet with religious freedom activists and 

with the families of imprisoned activists to consult on how best to advocate for 

them. I will advocate with the Vietnamese Government in Hanoi, and I will engage 

the Embassy of Vietnam in Washington. If confirmed, I will raise individual cases 

and I will address the broad institutional and societal issues that obstruct full freedom of religion. I will also work with my colleagues in the State Department, the 

United States Commission on International Religious Freedom and other NGOs in 

the United States working on these issues, with Members of Congress, Vietnamese 

civil society, and the Vietnamese diaspora in the United States to bring about positive improvement toward full religious freedom in Vietnam. 

RESPONSES OF SUZAN JOHNSON COOK TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JIM DEMINT

Question. Do you believe the international standard for religious freedom protects 

the right of individuals to share their faith publicly (proselytism) and to change 

their faith (conversion)? If so, how will you work with foreign governments that 

have laws that criminalize the peaceful expression, teaching, or sharing of religion? 

Please be specific on how you intend to work with the most egregious government 

violators.

Answer. It is clear to me that international human rights standards protect the 

ability of individuals to change their beliefs and to share their beliefs in public. 

These rights are protected under the freedoms of religion, of expression, and of associations as stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. If confirmed, I will address this 

issue directly through communications with governments that place restrictions on 

the ability to proselytize or convert. The State Department has closely followed the 

development and implementation of anticonversion laws, blasphemy laws, and apostasy laws in South Asia, East Asia, and the Middle East. These laws generally violate human rights law. Moreover, they can often lead to increased societal tensions 

and violence. 

Therefore, in addition to directly pressing governments to bring their laws into 

conformity with international law, I will also engage civil society and religious leaders to hear their concerns and to engage them in building cultures of religious tolerance. I will also engage like-minded partners in the international community and 

raise these issues in regional and international human rights fora. 

In countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, I am particularly concerned about 

abuses under the blasphemy laws. In Pakistan, the implementation of these laws 

has resulted in the arrest of and attacks against hundreds of Pakistani citizens, 

both Muslim and non-Muslim. Last fall these laws led to a death sentence for a 

Christian convert, Aasia Bibi. If confirmed, I will urge the Government of Pakistan 

to address these problematic laws. I will also actively engage with the country’s religious leadership and civil society advocates for tolerance and interfaith efforts. 

In Afghanistan, although in recent years the death penalty has not been carried 

out either by local or national authorities, discriminatory laws and practices that 

ban conversion are rooted in societal intolerance. If confirmed, I will urge the Government of Afghanistan to uphold its international obligations and commitments to 

respect freedom of religion and freedom of expression, and I will also work in coordination with the international community, including our European partners, the 

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and other like-minded 

partners to reinforce the importance of freedom of religion, tolerance, and respect. 

This will be a long process and progress will be measured in increments. If confirmed, I will use all of the tools at my disposal, such as engaging religious leaders 

and civil society, like the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). 

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I will also rely on programming and exchanges, and will promote interfaith efforts, 

tolerance, and mutual respect through education.

Question. Will you recommend sanctions for the most egregious violators? What 

actions will you recommend for Countries of Particular Concern (CPCs) for the most 

egregious violators?

Answer. The IRF Act mandates a Presidential Action for all CPCs, and provides 

specific examples of sanctions. If confirmed, I will recommend for consideration by 

the Secretary sanctions against egregious violators of religious freedom as appropriate to motivate improvement of the country’s respect for religious freedom. The 

President also has the authority to waive the action only if the waiver would ‘‘further the purposes of the Act,’’ or if ‘‘an important national interest’’ is at stake. The 

CPC status remains, even if a waiver is granted. 

Presidential Actions are a critical tool in an effort to push a CPC toward improving conditions of religious freedom. For the most egregious violators, any sanction 

listed in the section 405 (9)–(15) of the IRF Act, or a commensurate action is appropriate. Sanctions are one of a number of tools under the IRF Act. To expect real 

progress on religious freedom, they should be part of a broader engagement strategy 

to address restrictions on religious freedom. The ultimate goal underlying the CPC 

designation process is to realize actual progress and improvements in religious freedom. If confirmed, I will seek as many opportunities and use as many tools as possible to achieve this goal.

Question. Please explain how the Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF) operates. You stated that roughly $4 million in HRDF funding would be at your disposal. Is that figure correct? For what purpose do you intend to use the HRDF? 

What measurable outcomes have there been, related directly to religious freedom, 

as a result of this funding?

Answer. The HRDF supports the U.S. foreign policy goals of defending human 

rights and strengthening democratic institutions. The Bureau of Democracy, Human 

Rights and Labor (DRL) has administered the HRDF to implement innovative 

projects in over 50 countries since the HRDF was established. The HRDF supports 

projects that advance U.S. foreign policy goals such as promoting the rule of law, 

strengthening democratic institutions, and defending religious freedom and worker 

rights. Over the last 3 years, more than $10 million of the HRDF has been committed 

to religious freedom programming. These programs support: (1) training religious 

groups, civil society, and lawmakers to develop legal and policy protections for religious freedom; (2) addressing expressions of intolerance, antidefamation, 

anticonversion, and antiblasphemy laws that restrict religious expression; (3) increasing public awareness of religious freedom through media outlets and opinion 

makers; and (4) strengthening capacity of civil society leaders to promote interfaith 

cooperation. 

For example, the HRDF has funded a group of experts to analyze, identify, and 

eliminate hateful language in textbooks and increase content on tolerance in Israeli 

and Palestinian schools. In Vietnam and Laos, HRDF funds have supported joint 

trainings on religious freedom for government officials and religious leaders from diverse backgrounds. HRDF religious freedom programs are in place to increase discourse on religious freedom in the Middle East, Indonesia, and Pakistan in a wide 

variety of media, through print programming. 

If confirmed, I will work with my colleagues in the International Religious Freedom office, DRL, and throughout the State Department to strengthen the creative 

development, monitoring, and evaluation of this programming.

Question. Will you be responsible for hiring and other employment decisions for 

the Office of International Religious Freedom? Please explain.

Answer. If confirmed as Ambassador at Large, under the mandate of the IRF Act, 

I will head the Office of International Religious Freedom. This mandate includes 

overseeing hiring and employment for the office, within U.S. Government guidelines. 

The Office Director and the Deputy Director, in their supervisory capacities, handle 

the day-to-day responsibilities of personnel management.

Question. Do you intend to meet with all new Ambassadors before they leave for 

their posts? Do you believe that the level of current training is sufficient?

Answer. If confirmed, I would make it a priority to meet with ambassadors appointed to serve in countries where we have concerns about religious freedom. In 

some cases, I would also want to meet with ambassadors going to countries or missions with whom we collaborate to advocate for religious freedom. I will seek opportunities in my travel and when Chiefs of Mission are in Washington to promote 

65

collaborative strategic initiatives to promote religious freedom. Ambassadors and 

their staffs are the critical front line in advancing U.S. religious freedom policy. It 

is crucial that we work together to pursue common goals. If confirmed, my priority 

will be to cultivate constructive working relationships with our embassies. 

If confirmed, I look forward to participating in the new courses being developed 

at the Foreign Service Institute, our National Foreign Affairs Training Center, to 

help officers in Washington and abroad promote human rights and religious freedom. Much of the current training for ambassadors and other State Department 

officers is excellent in focusing on the challenges in the field of promoting religious 

freedom. 

The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor—including the Office of 

International Religious Freedom—together with the National Foreign Affairs Training Center (FSI), are working to create new courses dealing with religious freedom 

issues, for both senior and working levels, and including interagency courses. In a 

recently developed course, religious freedom has been a significant part of training 

on human rights. A new 3-day course in June will be offered with a specific focus 

on Religion and Foreign Policy, and the Office of International Religious Freedom 

is providing significant input on course design. I understand demand for all these 

courses is very high. If confirmed, I will also personally work with FSI, to ensure 

they have the resources and expertise they need on religious freedom issues to prepare diplomats to engage boldly and constructively on issues of religious freedom.

Question. What is the Muslim Brotherhood?

Answer. The Muslim Brotherhood is a transnational Islamic organization founded 

in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna as a religious, political, and social movement. 

It was established to advocate the centrality of Islam to all facets of life—including 

politics—and it argued for the creation of an Islamic state in Egypt based on Islamic 

law (Sharia). In modern times, the organization seeks to implement Islamic law in 

Egypt. Offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood have spread throughout Egypt, Sudan, 

Syria, Palestinian Territories, Lebanon, and North Africa. The Muslim Brotherhood 

in Egypt renounced domestic violence in the early 1970s, although it has defended 

the right to armed jihad in some cases, such as for Palestinians. 

The Brotherhood can also be seen as a broad ideological movement that has given 

birth to political parties in several countries, such as the Islamic Action Front in 

Jordan and Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank. These parties liaise and sometimes 

receive support from the Egyptian Brotherhood but today generally remain operationally independent from Cairo. In Egypt under Mubarak, the group was the frequent target of large-scale campaigns of arrest and intimidation by the government 

and was not allowed to participate legally in the political process, although ‘‘independent’’ candidates aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood were occasionally elected 

to Parliament, most notably in 2005. 

The stated goal of the Egyptian Brotherhood’s current leader or General Guide, 

Muhammad Badie, is to ‘‘show the world the true Islam, the Islam of moderation 

and forgiveness that respects pluralism in the whole world.’’ However, in 2008, 

Muhammad Madhi Akef, then the Brotherhood’s General Guide, said his organization supports democracy, but only the ‘‘right kind . . . one that honors Sharia.’’ 

While the Brotherhood continues to eschew violence and has consistently condemned al-Qaeda, its leadership has generally viewed attacks by groups such as 

Hamas and Hezbollah as legitimate because the Muslim Brotherhood views attacks 

by Hamas and Hezbollah as being categorically distinct from al-Qaeda violence. In 

their mind, Hamas and Hezbollah are using violence in pursuit of legitimate national liberation goals in the face of foreign occupation. They view al-Qaeda attacks 

as indiscriminate, disconnected from any achievable political goals, and guilty of 

killing too many Muslims. In 2007 it released a draft political party platform statement that indicated a broad commitment to democratic norms, although some elements suggested ongoing ambiguity regarding universal civil rights and the status 

of Sharia. The movement’s youth wing, which took part in the demonstrations in 

Tahrir Square, has expressed interest in reforming the Muslim Brotherhood by elevating the role of women within the organization, incorporating religious minorities, 

and placing less emphasis on the direct implementation of Islamic law. 

The Muslim Brotherhood has expressed its intention to participate in the postMubarak political process in Egypt and supported the constitutional amendments. 

A number of other Islamic parties have emerged since Mubarak’s fall, some of which 

have come out of the Brotherhood itself. This reflects the variety of agendas and 

generational differences found today within this broad movement.

Question. Do you believe that past actions by the United States against countries 

labeled by the Department of State as Countries of Particular Concern (CPCs) have 

been effective? If so, how? Please give examples.

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Answer. The effectiveness of past actions against CPCs has varied between countries. I am committed to the use of CPC designations and will use Presidential 

Actions as appropriate. The range of CPCs, the diversity of the abuses and restrictions on religious freedom, and in some cases the restrictions on direct engagement 

(such as North Korea and Iran), require evaluation on a case-by-case basis and targeted strategies. Past actions have yielded significant results in some countries. For 

example, an agreement in 2006 with the Government of Vietnam led to enactment 

of a new legal framework that opened the door to recognition of new religious 

groups and increased registration of Protestant churches. Despite this progress, significant issues remain, and, if confirmed, I will focus on Vietnam as a priority country. Even when CPC designation leads to progress toward religious freedom, we 

must remain vigilant and continue our diplomatic engagement. 

Actions taken by the United States against a country of particular concern must 

be part of a broader engagement strategy with that country to truly realize 

progress. If confirmed, I will develop broad engagement strategies—tailored to each 

country—that complement the important tool of a Presidential Action under the IRF 

Act. This engagement is critical to the IRF Act mandate for the Ambassador at 

Large ‘‘to advance the right to freedom of religion abroad.’’ For example, we can 

complement the threat or use of a Presidential Action through a range of tools, including diplomatic advocacy, working directly with religious and other civil society 

leaders, consulting with diaspora communities in the United States, funding effective and creative programs on the ground, and collaborating with other governments 

and NGOs to advance religious freedom.

Question. What tools will you use other than public diplomacy?

Answer. If confirmed, I will lead the U.S. Government’s efforts to press governments that violate religious freedom, engage governments that share our views, and 

reach out to religious leaders and civil society worldwide to urge them to work with 

me on an agenda in their countries and regions to promote religious tolerance and 

freedom. I would work with my colleagues throughout the U.S. Government, particularly our ambassadors overseas, to develop robust strategies to monitor, promote, and report on religious freedom around the world. The IRF Act provides many 

tools to help advance these goals, including sanctions and other Presidential Actions 

when appropriate. 

We must also leverage multilateral efforts, especially in collaboration with likeminded partners, to reinforce the importance of freedom of religion. I would also 

work with religious leaders and other civil society groups in an effort to increase 

their influence on government policies and assist their efforts to confront societal 

pressures that cause religious persecution. Exchanges are also an important tool, 

bringing government and religious leaders to the United States to experience firsthand our policies on religious freedom and sending speakers from the United States 

to promote religious freedom abroad. In multireligious societies, there are many opportunities for creative programs such as training religious groups, civil society, 

lawmakers, and government officials to develop legal and policy protections for religious freedom; increasing public awareness of restrictions on religious freedom and 

international rights; and promoting interfaith tolerance and mutual respect through 

education, training, and media tools. Each country presents unique challenges and 

opportunities, and almost always will require a multi-faceted approach.

Question. Given the recent unrest in Middle East, what new opportunities for involvement do you see that did not previously exist? Please outline in detail your 

strategy for the region.

Answer. The Middle East must be a top priority for promoting religious freedom, 

especially given recent attacks on religious minorities in the region. I am deeply disturbed by the increase of persecution and violence against religious minorities in 

this region and in many other parts of the world. I will impress upon governments 

that religious freedom enhances stability, and that restrictions on religious communities only serve to encourage more sectarian tensions and violence. 

The changes that we are seeing in the Middle East have been dramatic and often 

inspiring, yet violence and intolerance remain sources of concern—particularly for 

religious minorities in this region. We are observing a mixed picture in the region, 

and I would encourage those voices promoting religious freedom among the emerging political leadership and strengthened minority community voices. Minority religious communities in Middle Eastern countries where they had previously been repressed should have new opportunities for engagement with governments, interfaith 

dialogue, and progress toward greater religious tolerance and religious freedom. It 

will be one of my top priorities to support those voices inside the region using these 

opportunities to increase respect for religious freedom and interfaith dialogue. 

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If confirmed, I will lead the U.S. Government’s efforts to press for reform with 

governments that violate religious freedom, work with governments that share our 

views, and reach out to religious leaders worldwide to urge them to work with the 

United States in this region to promote religious tolerance and freedom. The 

Secretary is deeply engaged on religious freedom issues, and the first line of defense 

on religious freedom is our hard-working embassies and missions worldwide. The 

IRF act provides many tools to advance this agenda. I will use all the tools of 

diplomacy and engagement, including public and private messaging, pressure, and 

programs. 

In Egypt, if confirmed, I would lead U.S. efforts to foster strategic dialogue between Muslims and minority groups who desire a civil state where all people, irrespective of religious identity, share equal rights, duties, and opportunities. I will 

work with my colleagues in the State Department and with civil society to advocate 

for a change in the Egyptian law to remove severe restrictions on building and renovating Christian places of worship. In Iraq, I would work with other U.S. officials 

to continue to press the Iraqi Government to protect vulnerable religious minorities 

by taking effective measures to prevent future attacks and to bring to justice the 

perpetrators of attacks on Christians and other minorities. I would also focus on 

Saudi Arabia, in particular pressing for meaningful reform of educational curriculum, which continue to incite hatred and intolerance toward non-Muslims and 

certain Muslims. I will seek to reinvigorate our dialogue with the Saudis to reduce 

systemic restrictions on religious freedom for all Saudis, including Shia Muslims. 

RESPONSES OF SUZAN JOHNSON COOK TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 established the United 

States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) to review annually the state of international religious freedom and to make policy recommendations to the President, Secretary of State, and Congress. The Commission’s mandate 

is set to expire September 30, 2011. Does the administration support the reauthorization of the Commission? Why or why not?

Answer. USCIRF has played and continues to play an important and positive role 

in advocating for religious freedom throughout the world. The respective roles of the 

Department of State and USCIRF under the International Religious Freedom Act 

(IRF Act) are complementary. Each continues to focus on the mutual goal of promoting religious freedom while fulfilling their statutory mandates, which include 

publishing annual reports. If confirmed I will seek out USCIRF’s input and will welcome their recommendations. I will increase collaboration between USCIRF and the 

Department of States’ Office of International Religious Freedom (IRF Office) toward 

our shared goal of ending religious persecution and advancing freedom of religious 

belief and practice around the world. With regard to a reauthorization, I understand 

that the legislation that has not yet been introduced. Since I am not confirmed, I 

am not yet in a position to speak on legislative matters. 

When enacted 13 years ago, the IRF Act envisioned clear and distinct roles for 

the Ambassador at Large as head of the IRF Office, and USCIRF as an independent 

congressionally funded Commission. Passage of the IRF Act brought heightened emphasis to the cause of religious freedom as a central component in U.S. human 

rights policy and U.S. foreign policy generally. In 1998, as evidenced by the structure of the IRF Act itself, Congress created USCIRF as an additional voice on religious freedom, and to evaluate progress on U.S. religious freedom policy and make 

recommendations accordingly.

Question. In Pakistan, a Christian government official, and the first-ever Federal 

Minister for Minorities, Shahbaz Bhatti, was shot and killed after advocating the 

reformation of local blasphemy laws. This assassination followed on the heels of the 

assassination of Punjab Governor, Salman Taseer in January 2011 who also called 

for the reformation of these laws. What strategy would you employ to combat such 

religious intolerance?

Answer. I am very concerned about the attacks on religious minorities in Pakistan, including abuses under the blasphemy laws; the treatment of Christians, 

Ahmadis, and reform-minded Muslims; and the increase in the number and severity 

of reported high-profile cases against members of religious minorities. 

I am deeply saddened by the brutal killing of Minister Bhatti and Governor 

Taseer and condemn the killings in the strongest possible terms. My deepest sympathies are with their families and friends. Both men gave their lives to defend the 

principles of religious freedom, equality, and human rights for all Pakistanis. The 

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assassination of Minister Bhatti, merely 2 months after the assassination of Governor Taseer, emphasizes the need for aggressive advocacy of religious freedom and 

tolerance in Pakistan. 

I am committed to the same principles Minister Bhatti and Governor Taseer 

fought for, and, if confirmed, I will prioritize and elevate U.S. efforts to promote 

freedom of religion in Pakistan. I will work with Government officials to urge them 

to take the necessary measures to address the serious religious freedom problems 

in the country and to address discriminatory and repressive blasphemy and antiAhmadi laws. These laws have been exploited to harass religious minorities, sectarian opponents, and Muslims, and to retaliate in personal disputes. I will also 

work with civil society, including religious leaders, to encourage voices of tolerance 

and to support their efforts to promote religious freedom and interfaith respect and 

understanding in Pakistan.

Question. A New Year’s Day car bombing in Alexandria, Egypt killed 21 worshippers at a local Coptic church and marked one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in 

Egypt since 2006. Many Coptic Christians worry that religious persecution will escalate given the uncertain political landscape in Egypt at this time. What role, if any, 

would your office play in addressing religious violence in the region and protecting 

religious minorities?

Answer. The Middle East must be a top priority in promoting religious freedom, 

now more than ever, given both the attacks on members of religious minorities in 

the region and opportunities to build upon the common purpose that emerged as 

Muslims and Christians supported each other in Cairo’s Tahrir Square. If confirmed, I will work with my colleagues in the U.S. Government to support those in 

Egypt and throughout the region who seek meaningful progress on religious freedom. If confirmed, I will encourage opportunities that have emerged from calls for 

political reform. I will join forces with my colleagues to combat efforts to exploit sectarian tensions. I remain very concerned about longstanding violence and discrimination against members of religious minorities in Egypt and elsewhere in the 

region. 

If confirmed, I would plan to visit this region soon and press the governments to 

protect religious freedom, and to discourage sectarian violence and societal intolerance. Governments that justify restricting religious freedom out of security and stability concerns only encourage impunity and often lead to more sectarian violence. 

I would emphasize that point to governments in the region. I would work with my 

USG colleagues to press governments to protect members of vulnerable religious minorities by taking effective measures to prevent future attacks and to bring to justice the perpetrators of attacks on Christians, Jews, and members of other religious 

minorities. 

I will also work to strengthen civil society that promotes religious tolerance, and 

programs that promote tolerance and mutual respect between different religious 

communities. If confirmed, I will advocate for increasing U.S. programs and activities to support initiatives in several areas directly related to religious freedom, such 

as funding for programs that work with Coptic and Muslim community groups, reform of official curricula to remove religious bias, as well as support for NGOs that 

monitor the country’s media for occurrences of sectarian bias. 

Regarding Egypt in particular, if confirmed, I will work closely with our Ambassador and other USG officials to advocate for an end to acts of sectarian violence, 

for greater protection of religious freedom and equal rights under the law for persons of all faiths. I will advocate for the removal of laws that discriminate against 

religious minorities and for the adoption of a unified law on places of worship. I will 

also work with the Government of Egypt in its efforts to address concerns of the 

Coptic community. I am heartened to see that the Egyptian Prime Minister has met 

with the leadership of the Coptic community following the recent destruction of a 

Coptic church in Sol. 

I have also been encouraged by calls for unity and mutual respect among Egypt’s 

various religious groups. If confirmed, I will support and encourage our Embassy 

in Cairo in its continuous efforts to promote religious freedom values with government officials, civil society, and political and religious leaders. I will also strongly 

support our Embassy’s efforts to maintain and broaden an active dialogue with leaders of the Jewish, Christian, Muslim, and Baha’i religious communities, human 

rights groups, and other activists.

Question. While religious minorities in Iran face constant persecution and harassment, many members of the Baha’i community have been arrested for proselytizing 

in Tehran, Bam, and Kerman, and seven Baha’i leaders who were sentenced to 20 

years in prison in August 2010. Given the lack of diplomatic relations the United 

69

States has with Iran, what strategies, if any, would your office employ to foster religious freedom in Iran?

Answer. I have been following the persecution of Baha’is and other religious communities in Iran with great concern. I understand that the State Department is 

working closely with representatives of these communities and other like-minded 

countries to develop best strategies for improving both religious freedom in Iran and 

the morale of the persecuted populations. President Obama’s criticism of the Iranian 

Government’s persecution of the Baha’i and Sufis in his March 20 remarks marking 

the Persian holiday Nowruz, got the attention of the Iranian Government and was 

enthusiastically received by Baha’is and other religious minorities in and outside of 

Iran. 

If confirmed, I will continue these efforts of targeted and effective statements, 

partner with like-minded governments and the newly created U.N. Special 

Rapporteur for Human Rights in Iran, and develop additional opportunities to sanction those who continue to persecute Baha’is because of their faith. 

Under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 

2010, the U.S. Government has applied targeted sanctions against Iranian officials 

for serious human rights abuses. Just last month, the Prosecutor General of 

Tehran—who among his many actions against minorities and others, ordered the 

arrest of seven Baha’i—was added to the sanctions list. 

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NOMINATIONS 

TUESDAY, APRIL 5, 2011

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

Mara E. Rudman, of Massachusetts, to be an Assistant Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development 

Robert Patterson, of New York, a Career Member of the Senior 

Foreign Service, Class of Counselor, to be Ambassador to 

Turkmenistan 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert P. Casey Jr., 

presiding. 

Present: Senator Casey. 

Also Present: Senator Reed. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY JR.,

U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA 

Senator CASEY. The hearing will come to order. 

I want to thank everyone for being here this morning. 

The way we will proceed is, I will present an opening statement. 

I will turn to my colleague Senator Reed of Rhode Island. We are 

grateful he is here with us. And then, of course, we will turn to 

our nominees and go from there. 

But first of all, I want to thank everyone for being here. Today, 

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, meets to examine the 

nominations of Mr. Robert E. Patterson to be Ambassador to 

Turkmenistan and Ms. Mara Rudman to be the Assistant Administrator for the Middle East at the U.S. Agency for International Development. 

First, with regard to Turkmenistan, the United States has not 

had an Ambassador in Turkmenistan for nearly 5 years. As the 

country begins to open up to the outside world, it is critical that 

the United States is fully represented to pursue a range of interests, including human rights, energy, and security interests. 

The human rights situation remains of serious concern in 

Turkmenistan. Last May, I signed a letter, led by Senators Durbin 

and Brownback, to Secretary Clinton on behalf of three prisoners 

of conscience detained in Turkmenistan. Just last week, Turkmen 

authorities confined a Radio Free Europe contributor to a psyVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
72

chiatric hospital after he criticized a local government official of 

corruption. This Soviet-era practice of committing political dissidents to psychiatric facilities, unfortunately, continues in 

Turkmenistan. 

As Turkmenistan continues to open more to the outside world, it 

is important for the United States, working with the Organization 

for Security and Cooperation in Europe, to take an active role in 

advancing our interests and our values. I know that Mr. Patterson 

shares these concerns, and I look forward to hearing how he will 

address human rights issues amid our other important interests in 

Turkmenistan. 

Many in the Senate have concerns about Turkmenistan’s energy 

resources and their export abroad. I understand that Turkmenistan 

shares a desire to diversify its energy export routes and has indicated that participating in the Nabucco Project is a possibility, and 

I look forward to hearing from Mr. Patterson on how he will encourage this diversification of Turkmenistan’s energy export routes 

and how this important market can become more open to U.S. companies. 

Turkmenistan has played a positive role with respect to its 

neighbor Afghanistan. The Government of Turkmenistan has built 

hospitals and schools in parts of Afghanistan inhabited by 

Turkmen. We should be working to further encourage this kind of 

activity. 

Recognizing the deep historic ties between Afghanistan and the 

countries of Central Asia, some have expressed concern about the 

level of coordination among our diplomatic assets in the region. As 

the importance of the Northern Distribution Network through Central Asia to Afghanistan has grown, regular coordination among 

our diplomats in South and Central Asia will become even more 

important. I hope that communication and coordination among the 

posts in these countries will be a top priority for the State Department. 

Mr. Patterson is a career Foreign Service officer who has served 

in challenging posts around the world. He currently serves as the 

senior adviser for the Somali diaspora and has served in our embassies in Kenya, Russia, Hungary, Ukraine, and Armenia. His experience in the former Soviet Union will especially serve him well 

in this post, if confirmed. Mr. Patterson has served the United 

States in the U.S. Air Force. 

Mr. Patterson, I want to thank you for your longstanding service 

to the country and for your willingness to take on another challenging assignment. We are grateful. 

Next, to the Middle East. The Middle East is right now experiencing change of historic proportions. That is a dramatic understatement. There is almost no way to capture what we are seeing 

playing out every day in the Middle East on television news or in 

so many other ways that we get information. 

And if confirmed, Mara Rudman will assume a very challenging 

assignment in overseeing USAID’s programs in the Middle East. As 

countries in the region continue to experience unrest, the work of 

USAID will be essential in helping to ensure political transitions 

based upon democratic institutions and economic reforms. 

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USAID has missions in seven countries and two regional missions in the Middle East, for a total FY 2010 budget of $1.6 billion. 

These programs are targeted toward health, education, good governance, and economic development. 

But more important than these statistics is how we calibrate our 

approach to development in a region where the United States foreign assistance has been historically criticized for supporting undemocratic governments. In this new environment, USAID will 

need to be more agile, responsive, and able to engage directly with 

more citizens in places like Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, and Syria, 

more so than it has in the past. 

How we implement these programs and America’s profile in supporting civil society and democratic governance is just as important 

as the programs themselves. During this seminal period in history 

and in the history of the Middle East, the developmental challenges 

in the region seem to grow by the day. I would like to touch on just 

a few. 

As we have transitioned responsibility for enforcing U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 to NATO, the United States will continue to play an active role in providing humanitarian relief to the 

people of Libya. The President has declared as U.S. policy that 

Gaddafi must go. But he has also said that we will not use our 

military to effect this change. 

In this environment, the tools of USAID are all the more essential. Humanitarian and medical support for Libya’s people and 

democratic institution-building for an emerging political class will 

be necessary in preparation for a democratic Libya. 

In Egypt, a political transition continues that will soon produce 

new leadership. Without improvements in Egypt’s economic prospects, the accomplishments of those courageous people who 

marched and demonstrated in Tahrir Square, those activists’ 

progress and accomplishments will be jeopardized. 

The United States has an important role to play in Egypt’s economic development and must also encourage political reforms that 

reflect the democratic aspirations of the Egyptian people. 

Next, to Yemen. Yemen, the poorest country in the region, has 

faced severe development problems ranging from water shortages 

to debilitating poverty. USAID’s ability to conduct assistance in 

this country is critically important, and the deadly protests against 

the government have already had an impact on our ability to do 

that. 

Maintaining our ability to deliver assistance to the people of 

countries like Yemen amid the political turmoil will be increasingly 

important in the months to come. All of this takes place amid a 

challenging budget climate here in Washington. 

Administrator Raj Shah has made serious efforts to reform 

USAID and assure accountability and programmatic efficiency to 

the American taxpayer. And it is important that he is doing that, 

and it is important that we support him in doing that. Dr. Shah 

takes on this task not only in the name of fiscal responsibility, but 

also because our assistance needs to be strategic and targeted in 

order to best take advantage of these transformational openings 

and opportunities in the region. 

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Events in the region demand a smart development approach by 

the United States that takes a long-term view. President Obama’s 

nominee, Mara Rudman, has the experience to fulfill this strategic 

vision for the region. We are fortunate that she has accepted the 

President’s appointment, and if confirmed, she will be a true asset 

during this historic period of change in the region. 

She currently serves as the Chief of Staff for Presidential Envoy 

for Middle East Peace, former Senator George Mitchell, where she 

has a unique perspective on the formulation of United States foreign policy in the region. Her public service at the State Department, at the National Security Council, and here on Capitol Hill 

will serve her well in her new position. 

And because today we don’t have a ranking member with us for 

the hearing, I will turn immediately to our witnesses. But first, to 

my colleague, Senator Jack Reed of Rhode Island. We are honored 

he is here. He is someone that was a mentor to young Senators like 

me when I got here in 2007. 

And I am always grateful that he is with us to provide his perspective on so many important foreign policy challenges we have. 

He is here today in a more limited sense, unless he wants to expound upon his comments about Mara Rudman. But we are grateful, Senator Reed, that you are here, and you have the floor. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED,

U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE ISLAND 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

It is a great pleasure and privilege to have the opportunity to introduce Mara Rudman, the President’s nominee to be the United 

States Agency for International Development’s Assistant Administrator for the Middle East. 

No one is as superbly qualified as Mara to address the critical 

challenges you have laid out, Mr. Chairman. She has an extraordinary background, extraordinary intellect, and extraordinary dedication. 

I first had the privilege to work with her about 15 years ago, 

when Lee Hamilton, the chairman of the House Foreign Relations 

Committee, detailed her to the Task Force on National Security organized by our leader, Dick Gephardt. I was part of that task force 

and extraordinarily impressed by her intellect, by her contribution, 

and by her sincere and absolute dedication to advancing our ideals 

and also good public policy. 

She has an extensive background, as you laid out, in terms of the 

Middle East. It began a long time ago at Dartmouth University, 

and continued at Harvard Law School. Then she went on to clerk 

for Judge Stanley Marcus in the Southern District of Florida, and 

was an associate in a Washington law firm. 

But really, it was on Capitol Hill where she found not only her 

niche, but also had so much of a profound and meaningful impact, 

working first for Gerry Studds and then as chief counsel to Lee 

Hamilton on the House Foreign Affairs Committee. 

She also served on the National Security Council, under both 

President Clinton and President Obama. So she has the experience 

of both the executive, and the legislative, and all of it, indeed, in 

the context principally of Middle East policy. And as you pointed 

75

out, she has served the last few years as the Chief of Staff to 

George Mitchell in his extraordinarily important work as Special 

Envoy in the Middle East. 

She has also been in the private sector. She has worked with our 

former Secretary of Defense, Bill Cohen and the Cohen Group. All 

of this experience underscores how well prepared she is for the 

most challenging assignment I can think of, trying to provide the 

soft power in a region that requires that. 

She is a pragmatist, and a problem-solver. She is going to do a 

great job, and I would urge your immediate consideration and favorable consideration. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CASEY. Senator Reed, thank you very much. 

We are honored that you are here today, and that is quite a significant testimony about a nominee. We are grateful you are able 

to provide that. You are welcome at the Foreign Relations Committee anytime. 

Thank you, everyone, and we will go right to our witnesses now. 

Mr. Patterson, you have the floor. Of course, if you want to submit your statement for the record, both of your statements, will be 

made part of the record in full. 

And of course, if you want to go through your statement, that is 

fine. We will try to keep it roughly to about 5 minutes, if you can. 

Or if you want to just summarize that would be fine also. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT PATTERSON, OF NEW YORK, A CAREER MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS 

OF COUNSELOR, TO BE AMBASSADOR TO TURKMENISTAN 

Mr. PATTERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I am honored to appear before you as President 

Obama’s nominee to become U.S. Ambassador to Turkmenistan. I 

am grateful to the President and to Secretary Clinton for their 

trust in me. If confirmed, I will work with you to advance America’s interests in Turkmenistan. 

The United States recognized Turkmenistan in February 1992 

and since that time has supported its development as a stable, secure, democratic, and prosperous Central Asian state. However, 

Turkmenistan lies in a tough neighborhood bordering Iran and Afghanistan and faces many challenges in building democratic institutions and in fighting corruption. 

A key U.S. priority in Central Asia is to encourage efforts to aid 

in the stabilization of Afghanistan. Turkmenistan shares a long 

border with Afghanistan and is aware of the danger that continuing instability there poses to itself and to other countries in the 

region. 

Turkmenistan has acted in accordance with its policy of positive 

neutrality to provide discounted electricity, housing, hospitals, and 

other forms of humanitarian aid to its Afghan neighbors. President 

Berdimuhamedov’s recent announcement of the intention to increase electricity supplies fivefold to Afghanistan is a welcome sign 

of continued engagement in that important effort. If confirmed, I 

will encourage Turkmenistan to continue to provide all possible 

support to Afghanistan. 

76

Turkmenistan has significant natural gas reserves and is seeking 

to diversify their distribution. President Berdimuhamedov has expressed Turkmen interest in supplying gas to Europe through a 

Trans-Caspian Pipeline. We continue to strongly encourage 

Turkmenistan to send its gas across the Caspian to Europe via the 

Southern corridor. 

Another potential project is the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India, or TAPI, pipeline, which President Berdimuhamedov 

has taken a leading role in promoting. If built, TAPI would 

strengthen economic ties between Central and South Asia by sending needed resources to growing markets. 

U.S. firms have the experience and a demonstrated track record 

in major energy projects. And if confirmed, I would work hard to 

support their efforts to invest in Turkmenistan. 

Of course, our commercial relationship with Turkmenistan goes 

beyond energy. U.S. companies are active in various sectors of the 

Turkmen economy, from agriculture to civil aviation. If confirmed, 

I will actively support U.S. firms and seek to expand economic ties 

with Turkmenistan, particularly in light of the President’s National 

Export Initiative. 

As recent events have yet again demonstrated, respect for human 

rights, the rule of law, and transparent and accountable governmental institutions are essential to peace and long-term stability in 

any country. If confirmed, I will energetically engage the Government of Turkmenistan on the full range of human rights issues, including arbitrary detentions and arrests, limitations on freedom of 

movement and expression, allegations of torture and prisoner 

abuse, and human trafficking. 

A frank and detailed discussion of human rights concerns already has a prominent place in our Annual Bilateral Consultations 

with high-ranking Turkmenistan Government representatives. 

These consultations began in June 2010, and I am certain that we 

will use future such meetings and other contacts to discuss important human rights issues. 

Turkmenistan’s border with Afghanistan and its outlet to the 

Caspian Sea have made it a significant drug transit corridor. In recent years, the United States has had some success in increasing 

cooperation with Turkmenistan on counternarcotics programs, including improved control of its borders and ports. 

Much remains to be done, and if confirmed, I will seek opportunities to strengthen our emerging counternarcotics and border security cooperation with Turkmenistan, with the goal of improving regional stability. A better capacity to combat the drug trade at its 

source ultimately contributes to the well-being of the United 

States. 

Much of my 25 years in the State Department has been spent at 

U.S. missions overseas, and I have come to believe that we make 

our greatest impact on a country through engagement with its people in their own communities. Some of these contacts fall under the 

formal heading of public diplomacy, but much happens when you 

simply get out and live life in the country to which you are assigned. 

In Turkmenistan, the small number of foreign visitors and residents makes such incidental contacts all the more important. And 

77

if confirmed, I will encourage colleagues in our mission to demonstrate American values in their daily interactions with citizens 

of Turkmenistan. 

Finally, I know that, if confirmed, I will ultimately be responsible 

for the welfare of the U.S. mission, my U.S. mission colleagues, and 

their families in a fairly remote part of the world. Their well-being 

and that of other Americans in Turkmenistan will be a top priority. 

Thank you. I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Robert Patterson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT E. PATTERSON

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you 

as President Obama’s nominee to become U.S. Ambassador to Turkmenistan. I am 

grateful to the President and to Secretary Clinton for their trust in me. If confirmed, 

I will work with you to advance America’s interests in Turkmenistan. 

The United States recognized Turkmenistan in February 1992 and since that time 

has supported its development as a stable, secure, democratic, and prosperous Central Asian state. Turkmenistan lies in a tough neighborhood bordering Iran and 

Afghanistan, and faces external and internal challenges in building democratic institutions and civil society, open media, and in fighting corruption. 

A key U.S. priority in Central Asia is to encourage efforts to aid in the stabilization of Afghanistan. Turkmenistan shares a long border with Afghanistan and is 

aware of the danger that continuing instability there poses to itself and to other 

countries in the region. Turkmenistan has acted in accordance with its policy of 

‘‘positive neutrality’’ to provide discounted electricity, housing, hospitals, and other 

forms of humanitarian aid to its Afghan neighbors. President Berdimuhamedov’s recent announcement of the intention to increase electricity supplies fivefold to 

Afghanistan is a welcome sign of Turkmenistan’s continued engagement in that important effort. If confirmed, I will encourage Turkmenistan to continue to provide 

all possible support to Afghanistan. 

Turkmenistan has significant natural gas reserves and is seeking to diversify 

their distribution. In recent statements, President Berdimuhamedov has expressed 

Turkmen interest in supplying gas to Europe through a Trans-Caspian Pipeline. We 

continue to strongly encourage Turkmenistan to send its gas across the Caspian to 

Europe via the Southern Corridor. Another potential project is the TurkmenistanAfghanistan-Pakistan-India, or TAPI, pipeline, which President Berdimuhamedov 

has taken a leading role in promoting. If built, TAPI could strengthen economic ties 

between Central and South Asia by sending needed resources to growing markets. 

U.S. firms have the experience and a demonstrated track record in major energy 

projects, and, if confirmed, I would work hard to support their efforts to invest in 

projects in Turkmenistan, including projects like the Trans-Caspian Pipeline and 

TAPI. 

Our commercial relationship with Turkmenistan goes beyond its prominent energy sector, however. U.S. companies are active in various sectors of the Turkmen 

economy—ranging from agriculture to civil aviation. If confirmed, I will actively support U.S. firms and seek to expand economic ties with Turkmenistan, particularly 

in light of the President’s National Export Initiative. 

As recent events have yet again demonstrated, respect for human rights, the rule 

of law, and transparent and accountable governmental institutions are essential to 

peace and long-term stability in any country. If confirmed, I will energetically engage the Government of Turkmenistan on the full range of human rights issues, including arbitrary detentions and arrests, limitations on freedom of movement and 

expression, allegations of torture and prisoner abuse, and human trafficking. A 

frank and detailed discussion of human rights concerns already has a prominent 

place in our Annual Bilateral Consultations with high-ranking Turkmenistan Government representatives. Those consultations began in June 2010, and I am certain 

that we will use such meetings and other contacts with the Turkmen Government 

in the future, to discuss important human rights issues. 

Turkmenistan’s border with Afghanistan and outlet to the Caspian Sea have 

made it a significant drug transit corridor. In recent years, the United States has 

had some success in increasing cooperation with Turkmenistan on counternarcotics 

programs, including improved control of its borders and ports. Much remains to be 

done, and if confirmed I will seek opportunities to strengthen our emerging counternarcotics and border security cooperation with Turkmenistan with the goal of imVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00085 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
78

proving regional stability. A better capacity to combat the drug trade at its source 

ultimately contributes to the well-being of the United States. 

Much of my 25 years in the State Department has been spent at U.S. missions 

overseas, and I have come to believe that we make our greatest impact on a country 

through engagement with its people in their own communities. Some of these contacts fall under the formal heading of ‘‘public diplomacy,’’ but much happens when 

you simply get out and live life in the country to which you are assigned. In 

Turkmenistan, the small number of foreign visitors and residents makes such incidental contacts all the more important, and, if confirmed, I will encourage colleagues in our mission to demonstrate American values in their daily interactions 

with citizens of Turkmenistan. I believe that ‘‘public diplomacy,’’ promoting more official people-to-people exchanges, should also be a major priority. More than 740 

Peace Corps Volunteers have been actively engaged in this effort in Turkmenistan 

since the start of the program there in 1993, teaching English and promoting health 

education in remote parts of the country. 

Finally, I know that, if confirmed, I will ultimately be responsible for the welfare 

of my U.S. mission colleagues and their families in a fairly remote part of the world. 

Their welfare will be my top priority, as will the well-being and interests of other 

American citizens living in Turkmenistan. 

Thank you. I look forward to answering your questions.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Patterson. 

Ms. Rudman. 

STATEMENT OF MARA E. RUDMAN, OF MASSACHUSETTS, TO 

BE AN ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE UNITED STATES 

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Ms. RUDMAN. Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to appear before you 

today. 

I want to express my appreciation for the trust and confidence 

that President Obama and Administrator Shah have placed in me 

through this nomination. And I am grateful to have the strong support of Secretary Clinton. 

It is difficult to conceive of a more challenging time to be considered for this portfolio. In country after country, the people of the 

region have, in a word, inspired. As the President said last week, 

‘‘We must stand alongside those who believe in the same core principles that have guided us through many storms.’’

If confirmed, I look forward to working with the dedicated 

women and men of USAID and colleagues throughout the U.S. 

Government, laying the foundation for diplomatic and development 

strategies that will serve us and the peoples and countries of the 

Middle East in the months and years ahead. I want especially to 

recognize the dedicated public service of George Laudato, who has 

led the Bureau for the past 3 years. 

This transition and period of regional change are providing a 

rapid-fire chance to operationalize Secretary Clinton and Administrator Shah’s shared goal—to modernize and strengthen USAID, 

reaffirming its status as the premier development agency in the 

world. If confirmed, I can assure you that no one will work harder 

to see that we are responding effectively to the great challenges 

and historic opportunities that we face. 

In that regard, my objectives for the Middle East Bureau go to 

areas that I believe are critical to the sustainability, growth, and 

success of our policy missions. If confirmed, I would focus on managing our relationships with key countries so as to move from assistance to cooperation and partnership. 

I would work to ensure that the best and most innovative initiatives are not only developed, but implemented effectively. And I 

79

would coordinate closely with colleagues at State, Treasury, and 

the White House and Defense to see that we are truly practicing 

smart diplomacy, using development, diplomacy, and defense as 

mutually reinforcing policy platforms to make the objectives of the 

QDDR come alive. 

I focus on the pragmatic, on the details of how to get things done 

and bridge the gaps with a range of actors, across cultures internationally and domestically. I recognize that it is important to have 

a political horizon, a strategic vision. But once we have it, we must 

be able to maintain the vision while we implement programs and 

projects with maximum effectiveness. 

Under the leadership of Administrator Shah, USAID is implementing an aggressive agenda to streamline development work, the 

USAID Forward agenda, which you mentioned. In this context, I 

am excited that the Middle East Bureau is already brokering new 

approaches to development. 

I appreciate the enormity of tasks ahead in this region and in 

this position. I also recognize how fortunate I am to have worked 

with and for people who helped me prepare to take this challenge. 

I would like to specifically thank Representatives Lee Hamilton, 

Howard Berman, and Sam Gejdenson, leaders on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, for the investment they have made in 

guiding me. 

I also owe much to Senator Reed and Senator Shaheen, who have 

been gracious with their counsel to me over the years, and to 

Chairman Kerry. Among other things, Chairman Kerry showed me 

how, by example, to conference a bill in my early days as HFAC’s 

chief counsel. 

I have spent much time deeply involved in the Middle East, from 

my first position as a legislative assistant for my hometown Congressman to my current work as a deputy to Senator Mitchell, 

where, among other things, I coordinate United States efforts to 

support Palestinian institution-building. 

Through my time in Government, I have learned to appreciate 

the dynamics among and between the agencies and actors that play 

a role on foreign assistance and foreign policy. To implement programs effectively and meet foreign policy objectives, it is critical to 

navigate smoothly in this environment. I also value the time I have 

spent working on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, in different 

parts of the executive and with the judiciary. 

When working on governance challenges in other parts of the 

world, it has made a huge difference for me to be able to draw upon 

the experience I have had in our own Government—a contentious 

floor debate, an intricate conference bill negotiation, a complex set 

of jury instructions to be drafted, advising a President, working out 

budget differences with a legislature controlled by the opposition 

party. 

I discovered the magic of how quickly this makes the world a 

much smaller place when I found myself explaining the House 

Rules Committee operations to a group of villagers in a remote part 

of the West Bank when the Palestinian Legislative Council had 

just run its first election in the mid-1990s, and rules that would 

govern its proceedings were at the time heavily debated among its 

citizenry. 

80

This is because, as President Obama described in Cairo nearly 2 

years ago, ‘‘All people yearn for certain things—the ability to speak 

your mind and have a say in how you are governed, confidence in 

the rule of law and the equal administration of justice, government 

that is transparent and doesn’t steal from the people, the freedom 

to live as you choose.’’

As President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and Administrator Shah 

believe, we have the power to create the world we seek if we have 

the courage to embrace opportunity and the willingness to do 

things smartly, sometimes differently, and together. 

I am honored to be considered for this position and fully appreciate the responsibility and challenges it entails. I am deeply committed to the mission of USAID and the role it plays in advancing 

our national security, promoting economic opportunity, and embodying our core American values. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I welcome any questions you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mara E. Rudman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARA E. RUDMAN

Mr. Chairman, ranking member, distinguished members of the committee, it is an 

honor to appear before you today as President Obama’s nominee to be the next 

Assistant Administrator for the Middle East at the U.S. Agency for International 

Development. 

I want to express my appreciation for the trust and confidence that President 

Obama and Administrator Shah have placed in me through this nomination. And 

I am grateful to have the strong support of Secretary Clinton. 

It is difficult to conceive of a more challenging time to be considered for this portfolio. In country after country the people of the region have, in a word, inspired. 

As the President said last week, ‘‘we must stand alongside those who believe in the 

same core principles that have guided us through many storms: our opposition to 

violence directed against one’s own citizens, our support for a set of universal rights 

. . . [and] our support for governments that are ultimately responsive to the aspirations of the people.’’

If confirmed, I look forward to working with the dedicated women and men of 

USAID, and colleagues throughout the U.S. Government, laying the foundation for 

diplomatic and development strategies that will serve us and the peoples and countries of the Middle East in the months and years ahead. I want especially to recognize the dedicated public service of George Laudato, who has led the Bureau for the 

past 3 years, having been called back to USAID from retirement to do so. 

This transition and period of regional change are providing a rapid-fire chance to 

operationalize Secretary Clinton and Administrator Shah’s shared goal: to modernize and strengthen USAID, reaffirming its status as the premier development 

agency in the world. If confirmed, I look forward to picking up the baton as my colleagues are working to make important progress. I can assure you that no one will 

work harder to see that we are responding most effectively to the great challenges 

and historic opportunities that we face. 

In that regard, my objectives for the Middle East Bureau go to areas that I believe 

are critical to the sustainability, growth, and success of our policy missions. If confirmed, I would:

• Focus on managing our relationships with key countries so as to move from 

‘‘assistance’’ to ‘‘cooperation and partnership.’’

• Work to ensure that the best and most innovative initiatives are not only developed, but implemented effectively; that we evaluate the results, and learn from 

and apply those lessons going forward. 

• Coordinate closely with colleagues at State, Defense, Treasury, and the White 

House to see that we are truly practicing smart diplomacy, using development, 

diplomacy, and defense as mutually reinforcing policy platforms to make the 

objectives of the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) 

come alive.

I believe in the importance of focusing on the pragmatic—on the details of how 

to get things done and ‘‘bridge the gaps’’ with a range of actors, across cultures 

81

internationally and domestically. I recognize that it is important to have a political 

horizon, a policy objective, a strategic vision. But once we have it, we must be able 

to maintain the vision while we implement programs and projects with maximum 

effectiveness. 

Under the leadership of Administrator Shah, USAID is implementing an aggressive agenda to streamline development work, the ‘‘USAID Forward’’ agenda, which 

builds on Secretary Clinton’s QDDR and the Presidential Policy Directive on Global 

Development. In this context, I am excited that the Middle East Bureau is already 

brokering new approaches to development. 

I appreciate the enormity of tasks ahead in this region and position. I also recognize how fortunate I am to have worked with and for people who have helped 

prepare me to take on this challenge. I would like to specifically thank Representatives Lee Hamilton, Howard Berman, and Sam Gejdenson, leaders on the House 

Foreign Affairs Committee, for the investment they have made in guiding me. I also 

owe much to Senators Jack Reed and Jeanne Shaheen, who have been gracious with 

their counsel, and to Chairman Kerry. Among other things, he showed me by 

example what it really meant to conference a bill in my early days as HFAC’s chief 

counsel. 

I have spent much time deeply involved in the Middle East, from my first position 

as a legislative assistant for my hometown Congressman, who served on the House 

Foreign Affairs Committee; to a research fellowship in the region; to work as chief 

counsel at the House Foreign Affairs Committee, where I focused among other matters on rule of law efforts and programs. 

When I served President Clinton as a deputy national security advisor and Chief 

of Staff at the National Security Council, I helped to coordinate strategic and budget 

aspects of the Middle East peace negotiations efforts. I explored yet another aspect 

of these issues in my work in the private sector, where I assisted in creating the 

nonprofit economic development oriented Middle East Investment Initiative. Now, 

as a deputy to Senator Mitchell, I have spent the majority of my time focusing on 

coordinating U.S. efforts to support the Palestinian institution-building program, 

across U.S. agencies, in Washington and in the field, and among Palestinian Authority, Israeli, and international actors. 

Through my time in government, I have learned to appreciate the dynamics 

among and between the agencies and actors that play a role on foreign assistance 

and foreign policy matters. To implement programs effectively, and meet policy objectives, it is critical to navigate smoothly in this environment. 

I also value the time I have spent working on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, 

in different parts of the executive, and with the judiciary. Given the critical role of 

the legislative branch in funding and overseeing foreign assistance programs and 

policy, the executive branch in setting and developing policy, and the powerful balancing role of our judiciary, having an insider’s familiarity with these institutions 

has served me well, and will continue to do so in this role, if confirmed. 

When working on governance challenges in other parts of the world, it has made 

a huge difference for me to be able to draw upon experience I have had in our own 

government: a contentious floor debate, an intricate conference bill negotiation, a 

complex set of jury instructions to be drafted, advising a President, or working out 

budget differences with a legislature controlled by the opposition party. I discovered 

this firsthand when I found myself explaining the House Rules Committee operations to a group of villagers in a remote part of the West Bank when the Palestinian Legislative Council had just run its first election in the mid 1990s and rules 

that would govern its proceedings were at the time heavily debated among the 

citizenry. 

Indeed, as President Obama described articulated in Cairo nearly 2 years ago, 

‘‘[A]ll people yearn for certain things: the ability to speak your mind and have a say 

in how you are governed; confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration 

of justice; government that is transparent and doesn’t steal from the people; the 

freedom to live as you choose.’’

In presenting the foreign assistance budget request recently, Secretary Clinton 

noted ‘‘Generations of Americans . . . have grown up successful and safe because 

we chose to lead the world in tackling the greatest challenges. We invested the resources to build up democratic allies and vibrant trading partners. And we did not 

shy away from defending our values, promoting our interests, and seizing the opportunities of each new era . . . the world has never been in greater need of the qualities that distinguish us: our openness and innovation, our determination, our devotion to universal values.’’

As President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and Administrator Shah believe, we have 

the power to create the world we seek if we have the courage to embrace opportunity and the willingness to do things smartly, sometimes differently, and together. 

82

I am honored to be considered for this position and fully appreciate the responsibilities and challenges it entails. I am deeply committed to the mission of USAID 

and the role it plays in advancing our national security, promoting economic opportunity, and advancing our embodying our core American values. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I welcome any 

questions you might have.

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much. 

I wanted to, for the record, just read the heading of a statement 

for the record that Senator Shaheen made available to us. This is 

a statement for the record for today’s nomination hearing in support of the nomination of Mara Rudman to be Assistant Administrator for the Middle East, U.S. Agency for International Development. And that is, of course, dated today. 

I wanted to make sure that Senator Shaheen’s statement was 

made part of the record. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Shaheen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN,

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE

Chairman Casey and Ranking Member Risch, thank you for holding this important nomination hearing. 

I am pleased today to speak in strong support of Mara Rudman’s nomination as 

the next Assistant Administrator for the Middle East at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). At a critical time in the volatile and dangerous Middle East region, President Obama and USAID Administrator Shah have made an 

exceptional choice in nominating Mara to fill this important role. 

I had the great pleasure of traveling with Mara to the Palestinian West Bank on 

NDI election monitoring missions during the historic elections in both 2005 and 

2006. During these missions, I had the opportunity to witness firsthand Mara’s impressive grasp and understanding of this complex region, as well as her sharp intellect and her focused commitment to peace for the people of the Middle East. Mara 

has remained a good friend to my office, and her valued counsel over the years has 

been insightful, prudent, and sound. 

Mara’s impressive background and experience in Middle East issues is substantive and wide-ranging. She is currently the Deputy Envoy and Chief of Staff to 

one of our country’s most prominent and capable diplomats, Senator George Mitchell, the current Special Envoy for Middle East Peace at the State Department. 

Under President Clinton, as a Deputy National Security Advisor, she helped to coordinate U.S. efforts to negotiate Middle East peace. 

Mara has served in distinguished positions throughout government and the private sector—including stints on Capitol Hill, on the National Security Council staff, 

and at the Cohen Group. Her degree from New Hampshire’s own Dartmouth College 

further adds to her impressive resume. Mara will face daunting challenges and 

enormous opportunities, should she be confirmed, but I am confident that Mara’s 

experiences and background have prepared her well to take on these new responsibilities and to succeed at USAID. 

In today’s complex international environment, it is critical for USAID and the 

State Department to recruit and retain America’s best and brightest if we are to 

overcome the difficult security challenges of the 21st century. Mara Rudman is 

clearly one of our Nation’s more capable and experienced foreign policy minds, and 

I am proud to fully support Mara’s nomination for this important position at 

USAID. 

I would urge my colleagues to quickly and positively act on her nomination. I 

want to thank the committee for your time and consideration, and thank you to 

Mara for again returning to public service. I look forward to working with her in 

her new endeavor.

Senator Casey. I want to thank you both for your willingness to 

serve again and again in difficult assignments, and I have a number of questions. I will try to alternate. I will start with Mr. Patterson, just by way of the order of speaking. 

First of all, I wanted to focus on Iran. As much as we have had 

a focus in the region, it seems like every other week, there is a new 

83

country that comes into sharper focus in the region, and that is understandable. We have, I think, an ongoing challenge presented by 

the Iranian regime. And I know that this Sunday, the New York 

Times had a review on that, and I thought it was very helpful. 

One of the strategies that we have employed with regard to Iran, 

and I think it is the right strategy—is to do everything we can to 

isolate the regime. And I think we have made some good progress 

on that, especially as it relates to sanctions. 

As we move down the pathway to further implementation of that 

particular part of our strategy of isolation, we know that the assignment you are about to undertake upon confirmation will have 

some tension with that. Based upon both geography and history, 

Turkmenistan has longstanding ties with Iran, and I guess I would 

ask you, as Ambassador, how you help to manage that in your own 

work, where one of our policy objectives is isolation as it relates to 

the regime. How are you supporting that policy, while not discouraging Turkmen investment and also the cooperation that takes 

place with Iran’s energy sector? 

How do you manage all that in the context of a difficult assignment? 

Mr. PATTERSON. Mr. Chairman, thanks for that question. 

One of the key issues, obviously, is the sanctions regime that is 

in place with Iran. And the State Department, the administration 

has gone out of its way to make sure that the Government of 

Turkmenistan is aware of the sanctions that are currently in place. 

There have been demarches from our Embassy in Ashgabat on a 

number of occasions to the Turkmenistan Government to keep 

them aware of sanctions in place and as they change. 

Last week, a small delegation from the State Department traveled to Ashgabat and met there with American companies that are 

represented in Turkmenistan to brief them on sanctions regimes as 

well and to make sure that in the course of doing business with the 

Government of Turkmenistan and in the region, that they didn’t, 

inadvertently do anything that would contravene the sanction regime in place. 

If confirmed as Ambassador, I would work very hard to make 

sure that the government is aware. I am aware, as are you, Mr. 

Chairman, that Turkmenistan shares a border with Iran, and there 

is a trading relationship in place. Part of it is as the result of people of the same nationality on both sides of the border, and this has 

been going on for centuries. 

But certainly our concerns would be first and foremost in my 

mind as I take up this post, if confirmed, and I would make sure 

that the Government of Turkmenistan was aware of them. 

Thank you. 

Senator CASEY. No, thank you. And I know that probably one of 

the challenges is to be able to encourage leaders to be able to compartmentalize, to be able to understand and appreciate a strategic 

objective we have, but also knowing that we can also have a constructive relationship with Turkmenistan. 

I have another question that relates to energy and, of course, 

natural gas is central to that. I would ask you, if you are confirmed, what efforts would you make to encourage Turkmenistan to 

pursue alternative routes with regard to natural gas exports? 

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Mr. PATTERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Turkmenistan has already taken a few steps in diversifying its 

markets. As you know, it has a relationship with China, and a 

pipeline was built and inaugurated in December 2009 that ships 

significant amounts of natural gas to China. In place at the time 

that the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991 were routes that took natural gas to Russia, of course. 

The administration has been encouraged by President 

Berdimuhamedov and the Turkmen Government’s interest in aggressively exploring the possibility of the TAPI pipeline that I mentioned in my testimony. If built, and there are many challenges in 

building this pipeline, that pipeline would bring natural gas to 

India and to Afghanistan and to Pakistan. 

Much remains to be done, but we have made it clear to the Government of Turkmenistan that American companies are able and 

have the skills necessary to help the government overcome technical challenges as it considers going forward with that project. We 

have also been encouraged by recent statements that have been 

made supporting the Trans-Caspian pipeline, the Southern corridor 

that I mention in my testimony. 

Again, we believe that there are challenges to completing the 

construction of that pipeline, but American companies are in place 

in Ashgabat, as I mentioned earlier, and are more than eager to 

get involved in that kind of a project. So, if confirmed, I would 

work hard to make sure that this process of diversification that has 

already begun continues. 

Thank you. 

Senator CASEY. I have one more question, and then I do want to 

turn to the Middle East. One question I have is just based upon 

your own review of the data and to the extent to which you can 

get a good sense of the economy in Turkmenistan. What is your assessment of their economic situation now? 

Because we know that throughout the world, we have lived 

through a couple of years of pretty fragile economies in many 

places. And of course, energy plays a big role in that. But how 

would you assess the strengths and the challenges in their economy? 

Mr. PATTERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Turkmenistan remains heavily dependent on natural gas resources. Attempts are being made to diversify, but at this point, 

much of the income that comes into the country comes from the 

distribution of natural gas and other such resources. 

It is difficult to find authoritative economic statistics on 

Turkmenistan. The statistics that we do have seem to show a 

major growth in the economy. Much of the basic purchases of the 

population are subsidized in one form or another by the government as a result of these natural gas and other incomes. 

But it seems that since coming to office in 2007, President 

Berdimuhamedov has understood the need to do more than just 

rely on natural gas and has begun looking for other opportunities 

for the economy. This includes in agriculture to a much lesser extent, of course, and manufacturing. 

American companies, again—and I see this as part of my mandate, if confirmed—have played a role in some of the sectors of the 

85

economy that have been explored by the Government of 

Turkmenistan. Agriculture, there are companies like Case, Caterpillar, and construction and others that are in place there. And if 

confirmed as Ambassador, I would make an effort to make sure 

that the expertise that U.S. companies have can help expand this 

process of diversification of the economy. 

Thank you. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. 

I want to turn to the Middle East for a couple of minutes. Ms. 

Rudman, thank you for your testimony, and I know when we were 

talking yesterday, one of the challenges that we discussed was how 

you do your job and how USAID approaches the region in light of 

this remarkable change. 

And again, it is hard in a few words to be able to summarize or 

fully encapsulate what has happened in the Middle East and what 

will happen yet ahead of us. For anyone who has any exposure at 

all to the challenges within the region, that is a difficult assignment. But how do you approach it in terms of rebalancing our priorities and our approach to the region? 

And I realize that you cannot simply think of it as one region, 

as one jurisdiction. You have to approach each country individually, in addition to having a regional strategic vision. But how do 

you approach that as you start down this road? 

Ms. RUDMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question. 

I appreciate the opportunity to look at these issues. I am, obviously, at this point in the position of looking at this from an ‘‘if confirmed’’ perspective, and I have had the opportunity, through the 

briefings I have been going through, to be looking at these issues 

prospectively. 

And so, in responding in that way, I would say that you, Mr. 

Chairman, brought up a number of points in your opening statement that I think are consistent with an approach that would be 

a sensible one here. In other words, to look at the region in a way 

that takes into account both, as you said, a country-by-country perspective, but also requires the U.S. Government as a whole, as well 

as the Agency for International Development, to be agile, to be 

more agile perhaps than the agency has been to date but is getting 

more so. 

To be agile, to be responsive, and to look carefully at how we respond, how the Agency for International Development responds 

and not just where the agency responds going forward as well. I 

would say that USAID has been going through a very thorough review of all of its programs across the board in the region, as well 

as a very significant country-by-country review, and has shown a 

significant degree of flexibility in terms of what it is able to do to 

respond with, I believe, a significant degree of flexibility. I think 

we have seen that. 

You mentioned Libya, for example, and what has been happening 

there in terms of humanitarian response. I know there has been a 

great deal of briefing on Egypt to date. And again, that is a whole 

of government response. 

And so, there is both a need to look at this in a—and we talked 

about this yesterday—in a country-by-country way. There is a need 

to look at it in terms of regional strategic approach, and there is 

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a need to look at it in terms of a response to other countries in the 

region, consistent with some of the questions that you asked of my 

colleague here at the table as well. 

And in each of these cases, we are going to need to apply a variety of filters. We, the U.S. Government, as well as those specifically 

within the Agency for International Development, must be able to, 

from the soft development perspective, do our part for the whole of 

government response and be as agile as possible in doing so. 

Senator CASEY. Yes; I guess in a region like the Middle East 

where you always have tension, that is one of the realities that will 

persist, even in this new environment. You probably have more instability now than you did before, but there are also some opportunities. Because prior to this, depending on the country, USAID 

might have been, in a sense, more limited, because you were dealing with a very strong, authoritarian government that would only 

let you do so much. Now you have opportunities. 

You have a fervor for change and for helping folks on the ground, 

and support for democratic change and human rights and development. These are all positive developments, I think. So you have 

both opportunities, but you also have some uncertainty about the 

institutions you are dealing with—who will be the leader, and how 

you will deliver that aid. 

So in a word, you have to be nimble, and you won’t have as much 

predictability as you might have had before. And I don’t underestimate the change. 

One of the difficulties that USAID will have, is a set of budget 

constraints and, I think, a focus on results and a heightened degree 

of scrutiny on the work that USAID does in this context. Because 

I think that the American people are paying much closer attention 

to the Middle East and to these developments in the context of not 

just what is happening there, but also in the context of budget constraints. 

I mentioned in our meeting yesterday that I was in the region 

in July. And it is just remarkable the difference between then and 

now. We were in Egypt and had a meeting at the Embassy with 

civil society leaders, and their the major focus was on fairness in 

the monitoring of elections. That was the extent, that was the full 

ambit of what they were thinking of at that time and focused on. 

I would have a much different meeting and much different visit 

now. We wouldn’t even be meeting with the same government officials. And I think that is true of other places in the region. 

One of the places we visited was Lebanon. As I mentioned yesterday, the overwhelming and predominant presence of Hezbollah and 

the influence that Hezbollah has in that country is just extraordinary, at least from my own experience. I have never been in a 

place where there was that kind of predominant presence of one organization, in this case a terrorist organization. 

The Lebanese Government officials, as well as the leaders of 

their Armed Forces, were very grateful to the American people for 

helping train their army and their police, and I was happy that 

they recognized that. But of course, now the situation has changed 

in Lebanon as well. And with that change, with the ascendancy of 

Hezbollah and the greater impact and influence that Hezbollah will 

87

have, we have to consider whether or not our strategy will change 

with regard to aid, military and otherwise. 

I know that we have provided that kind of assistance, and the 

President requested $100 million in assistance for Lebanon for fiscal year 2012, the budget that we have not quite begun to debate 

here on Capitol Hill. But given the influence that Hezbollah has, 

I am worried about how we will approach this assistance. 

How do you deal with that as it relates to your work, upon confirmation, at USAID? How do you assess that in the context of all 

the changes, even apart from the region, just within Lebanon 

itself? Because we want to, obviously, continue to be helpful, but 

how do you approach that in your work? 

Ms. RUDMAN. Sure, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the question. I 

appreciate your concerns about it. 

I know that you raised the question with Secretary Clinton as 

well. So I know the depth of your concern on this issue. 

As you know, the government, of course, is still being formed in 

Lebanon. We are watching that very closely, and we will review, 

are in the process of reviewing our assistance closely and are continuing, however, to plan our assistance program so that we can be 

prepared for a variety of different outcomes and possibilities. 

So that for exactly I think what you observed when you were 

over there, that we are prepared to be able to have an impact in 

a variety of different circumstances so that we can have the greatest possible impact, understanding, of course, that we can’t, won’t, 

do not engage with Hezbollah under any circumstances. And so, we 

are watching very closely, obviously, the development of that government. 

That said, the USAID portfolio has been one that has had, we 

believe, a significant and useful impact in the country. USAID 

works in a number of low-income areas in that country, has worked 

in microenterprise, has created jobs, in significant ways has also 

worked in civil society. And so, USAID has had impact in some significant ways and has the opportunity to continue to have and 

build upon that kind of impact going forward, again, nongovernmental opportunities. 

And so, USAID has the ability to continue to do that kind of 

work, and the agency would look to, going forward, do that kind 

of work. And if confirmed, I would hope to have the opportunity to 

engage with you as we see what happens with the development of 

the government as we go forward. 

And we certainly know, are quite cognizant both of the budget 

situation and of the need to consult. We have heard loud and clear 

what your concerns are, and we would share those concerns as we 

see how that government develops. 

Senator CASEY. I should say, are there lines, bright lines, redlines, whatever phrase you use? But I guess I would ask this. Do 

you think the lines will change in terms of how we deal with 

Hezbollah, or is there a kind of standard that you would use to approach how USAID deals with Lebanon with regard to Hezbollah? 

Is there a standard in place now, or is that something that would 

have to develop or be altered based upon the changed circumstances? Because the American people understand that when 

88

we provide aid to a country, sometimes there are figures within the 

government that cause us real concern. 

Hezbollah has, as you know, controlled ministries, and I want to 

get a sense of whether or not you would have to develop new standards or whether you would apply the same set of standards even 

in the aftermath of this change? 

Ms. RUDMAN. Mr. Chairman, the standards that are in place in 

terms of the rules that govern USAID and, in fact, the rest of our 

Government with respect to lack of contact and lack of assistance, 

it would be hard for me to imagine those changing under any circumstances. 

Senator CASEY. I know the President’s fiscal year 2012 budget request includes $400.4 million in economic assistance to the West 

Bank and Gaza to strengthen the Palestinian Authority, and I am 

quoting here, ‘‘To strengthen the Palestinian Authority as a credible partner in Middle East peace and security efforts and continue 

to respond to humanitarian needs in Gaza.’’

And the request also states that the assistance will ‘‘provide significant resources to support Palestinian Authority reform efforts,’’ 

and it goes on from there about what that entails. 

Based on your own significant experience and on what you see 

ahead of us in terms of support for those efforts in the West Bank, 

in regard to the Palestinian Authority. In July, myself, Senator 

Shaheen and Senator Kaufman delivered a message on behalf of 

our government to our counterparts in Saudi Arabia encouraging 

Saudi Arabia, among others, to pay its dues, so to speak, to help 

the Palestinian Authority as we have done. 

But tell us a little a bit about that, and then I will move back 

to Mr. Patterson. 

Ms. RUDMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My challenge in responding to this question is being brief. So I 

will try to take that into account. 

Senator CASEY. We do have a lot of time because I am not going 

to call on anybody unless the staff wants to do some questions. 

Ms. RUDMAN. The effort for the United States Government with 

respect to Palestinian state-building is one where we have a real 

partnership with the Palestinian leadership with respect to President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad and also with respect to 

the Israeli side. And I say this from a position of, as I said in my 

opening statement, in the coordination role that I currently work 

in. 

I work on a regular basis both across our Government with a 

whole of government approach and with the Palestinian leadership 

and the Israeli leadership on a daily, if not sometimes an hourly, 

basis in moving forward with these programs. And so, in this case, 

we have a Palestinian leadership vision in a number of key areas 

from governance to health, education, infrastructure, which focuses 

on water issues; where we are very much focused point right now 

for both the West Bank and Gaza and working in close coordination, again, with the Israeli Water Authority and the Israeli Defense Ministry in moving forward on those key issues, as well as 

road infrastructure, and then also on economic development issues. 

And without close cooperation, again, with the Israeli side, we 

would not be able to advance in any of those issues. And we work 

89

very closely with key leaders of the international community as 

well. 

On all of these issues, I have often said it is a privilege to work 

with the doers, and often it is the doers more than the talkers on 

the state-building, institution-building side of things. And so that 

I do believe a number of real results have been achieved. 

Folks here may hear less about those results than you do, frankly, on the negotiating track side of things, and the United States 

has a dual track approach, on institution-building and on the negotiating side of things. The institution-building side of things has 

been able to achieve a little bit more of late than the negotiating 

side has. We certainly very much hope that the negotiating side is 

able to pick up. 

But both sides are mutually reinforcing. And what we have said 

all along is that they need to be mutually reinforcing, and one ultimately cannot succeed without the other. And both are necessary 

for both Israelis and Palestinians and for the United States ultimately and for our interests in the region. 

And so, to get back to your initial question, the $400.4 million 

request is one that folks should have every confidence is funding 

that is well spent, is money that is going toward tangible benefits 

on the ground for Palestinian people and for Israelis to be able to 

see the results of how that funding is spent. 

Senator CASEY. On our trip, we had a chance to spend some time 

on the West Bank and we sat down with Prime Minister Fayyad. 

He was very focused on specific projects, literally hundreds, if not 

thousands of them. And so, the aid that our Government and a lot 

of governments have provided is bearing fruit. 

I do want to move back to Mr. Patterson for a few questions. I 

wanted to raise a question that I referred to in my opening statement about political prisoners in Turkmenistan. If confirmed, what 

steps would you take to persuade the government to free these 

prisoners, in the interim, to allow for free access for independent 

monitors to include the International Committee of the Red Cross? 

I realize that these kinds of challenges don’t have a textbook that 

is prepared for you, but can you give us a sense of the kind of the 

steps you would take as you begin? 

Mr. PATTERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an important 

question. 

We have in place some mechanisms for discussing human rights 

issues, including those with specific prisoners like the ones you 

mentioned in your opening statement. We compile reports every 

year, as you know, that get the best possible information. Both our 

religious freedom report and our human rights report and our trafficking in persons report cover human rights practices in 

Turkmenistan. 

And we take the information from those and from other sources 

and meet at our newly inaugurated Annual Bilateral Consultations 

where human rights plays a prominent role. The first meeting of 

the ABC was in June 2010. We recently, in February, had a review. 

And at both of those meetings, high-level U.S. Government officials 

discussed with their Turkmen Government counterparts specific 

cases and specific practices and the challenges that they pose. 

90

We saw today perhaps a little bit of very modest progress on that 

agenda. We received—our Embassy in Ashgabat received information from the government about the status of two of the prisoners 

that you mentioned that you had signed a letter about, Mr. 

Amanklychev and Mr. Khadzhiev. The Turkmen Government provided us information about the medical care that they have received, visits they have had from their families, et cetera. 

So this is modest, as I said. But it is, perhaps, a sign that the 

kind of dialogue that we have is beginning to bear some fruit. If 

confirmed, I would hope to go to Ashgabat, build a constructive relationship with Turkmen Government representatives, and use 

that constructive relationship to make human rights an important 

part of the interactions that I have there. 

You mentioned visits to prisoners and the problem with the 

ICRC. It is a difficult nut to crack. The ICRC has felt that the conditions that have been offered it aren’t acceptable. I would do what 

I can to ensure that some access to prisons is made available. It 

is not clear to me at this juncture, to be honest, how I will proceed. 

But certainly, it will be one of my major concerns when I am there. 

Thank you. 

Senator CASEY. And of course, the earlier that you can raise it, 

the earlier you can implement a strategy, the better. But I realize 

as well sometimes we have expectations that can exceed the reality. Upon confirmation, you will be walking into an assignment 

that hasn’t been filled in quite a while, and you will have to develop relationships and build some confidence and trust. But obviously, the earlier that you can move on that, the better. 

Also one question about nongovernmental organizations, NGOs, 

and the restrictions that the government places on them. Can you 

tell us anything about how you will approach that issue? 

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Again, a very good question. 

The Mejlis, the Turkmen Parliament, has been considering 

changes to the public organizations law. We will have to see what 

those changes might produce. Some changes that are contemplated, 

if implemented, might mean a somewhat better environment for 

nongovernmental organizations to operate in. 

In the meantime——

Senator CASEY. Statutory change of some type? 

Mr. PATTERSON. These would be, if implemented, statutory 

changes. Again, adopting the law and implementing the law, as I 

understand it, are two different things. But perhaps there is a possibility here. 

As I mentioned in my opening statement, I would like to focus 

a lot on people-to-people exchanges. I think we have had some 

modest success in building a degree of trust with the Turkmen 

Government about those exchanges, about bringing students and 

others to the United States. I am for having representatives from 

Fulbright programs and other programs go to Turkmenistan. 

I didn’t mention in my statement, but in the part that is for the 

record, we have a Peace Corps that is in place with 31 members 

throughout Turkmenistan. And from what I have heard, their presence has done a good deal toward perhaps trying to erase stereotypes about the United States and giving people some firsthand 

contact with Americans. 

91

So I would foresee an incremental approach to this difficult problem, hope for changes in the law that will create a better environment, but in the meantime, work on the people-to-people front. And 

of course, talk to the Turkmen Government about how more opportunities for participation among more of its citizens ultimately is 

in the interests and engendering stability in the country. 

Thank you. 

Senator CASEY. I will ask you one broad question. If you had to 

point to one or more experiences you have had around the world 

in different places and different assignments, is there one or a combination of experiences you had that you think will be particularly 

helpful in this assignment if you are confirmed? 

Mr. PATTERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I wouldn’t point to one specific experience. Much of my career 

was spent in what was then the Soviet Union, and I had a good 

deal of experience at the times that I was there in working with 

NGOs that were attempting to move their agendas forward in a 

difficult environment. 

I feel that I understand, although this may be a little bit too optimistic before going there, the kind of environment that awaits me 

in Turkmenistan. I hope that some of the experiences that I had 

in the Soviet Union during the Perestroika period and before and 

also experiences that I had in Russia after the Soviet Union fell 

apart will come to my aid as I attempt to grapple with these problems. 

To be sure, Turkmenistan is not Russia, and I don’t mean to 

imply that it is. But it was part of the Soviet Union for some time, 

and there is a certain legacy that it shares. That legacy is fading 

with time, as all things do. But I think, nevertheless, that some of 

the ideas that I had in working with people there and some of the 

practices that I saw might be useful as I approach this new assignment, if confirmed. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. 

Along those same lines, Ms. Rudman, as you have the experience 

of working with Democrats and Republicans in the House and the 

Senate, you are probably prepared for just about anything. And I 

know that experience will help you enormously. 

One of the places that we hear most about when it relates to alQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or when President Saleh might be 

moving to a different chapter in his life, is Yemen. And this is true 

of a lot of countries in the Middle East; we hear most about them 

when there are stories that relate to violence. We hear a lot about 

Yemen in those contexts, but we don’t hear nearly enough about 

the poverty, the water shortage, the human misery that sometimes 

creates the foundation or the wellspring of a lot of the difficulties 

that that country is having. 

In some ways, a place like Yemen is almost ready-made for all 

that USAID does well. And I wanted to get your sense of that in 

light of not just the problems, the horrific poverty and the challenges there, but also in light of both those problems juxtaposed 

with substantial unrest and change at the highest levels of the government. How do you approach that? 

What was a difficult set of circumstances before, but maybe now 

even more difficult in light of what you would be trying to do with 

92

USAID there. What is your sense of that? And I know it is kind 

of a broad, difficult question. But as you know, we have some time 

here. 

Ms. RUDMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the question. 

And USAID has been looking, not surprisingly, at the situation 

in Yemen. It has been working there, USAID, for some time. It has 

been doing capacity-building work in Yemen. It continues to work 

in Yemen, even now with the situation as it is, and has been able 

to continue working there, even with the difficult situation. 

It has been looking at changing some of its programming, obviously, with the situation on the ground. And the work that it has 

been doing in the capacity-building context, some of that work has 

been at the level of technocrats in the government. So it is not that 

all work is—there is a transitional element to it, even with, as you 

say, President Saleh, with some transition going on there, there is 

a level within the bureaucracy that would continue to benefit from 

the types of capacity-building work that has been ongoing. 

But more broadly, the type of negotiation and dialogue and discussion that is very important within Yemen and that has been 

opening up more broadly across a greater part of the population is 

something that USAID has been involved in, continue to be involved in, and is looking help to foster more of and to be able to 

support in broader ways, in addition to the type of economic support with the very poor parts of that population, as you pointed 

out, and in ways that USAID is well situated to be able to do with 

a number of its partner organizations. 

And so, it has—USAID has that kind of outreach within the 

country and will continue to look for opportunities to be able to do 

that work, again through this transition period. 

Senator CASEY. And USAID, like every part of our Government 

now, is under budget constraints and is somewhat limited. In a 

place like Yemen, and I will ask another question because I know 

it is in the news today even more so than it has been in the last 

couple of weeks. But there is certainly a water shortage issue, and 

part of the problem there is true of other countries in the region. 

Regardless of who is in charge, there seems to be an institutionbuilding challenge. 

When you come into a country that has issues of poverty and instability and that kind of turmoil, the institutions often need to be 

either built up or reformed. If you are in Yemen today, where 

would you start in terms of making progress on the institutions? 

I am assuming that the challenges are almost across the board. 

But are there places in Yemen’s Government where the most attention would be warranted, or do you have a sense of that yet? 

Ms. RUDMAN. Well, Mr. Chairman, it is a fair question, and it is 

a good question. 

Where I think that USAID has some opportunities here is the 

fact that there are programs in place that USAID has been working on. So there is the ability to know who different players are, 

and I say this without myself personally having that information. 

But what I would do, if confirmed, is to go and talk to the folks 

who have been running those programs for USAID in the mission 

93

to understand who the technocrats are who have been working the 

different programs. 

So to get a feel for whom USAID has worked with effectively and 

who has been less effective in the different ministries. And again, 

this is at the technocrat working level. But in my experience in 

other places, you can get a pretty good feel pretty quickly about 

who runs programs well and who doesn’t from your partner organizations. And when you have people at missions who are in the 

field, you get that kind of direct information very quickly. 

That is very useful, and you also obviously have an embassy and 

your ambassador and your DCM, and you get a mix of that type 

of information. It helps to inform, obviously, your policy judgments, 

but also your ability to use your precious assistance resources carefully. 

You want to make sure. You have limited dollars to use. You 

want to put it toward the programs that are going to use those dollars most effectively, and you want to make good judgments about 

it. 

And that is where, even if you are going to be shifting those resources, the fact that you have had a mission and that that mission 

has experience, and even if some of the players in that government 

are shifting, you have been working with some of them for a while. 

And so, you should be using the judgments from your people in the 

field to make some of the assessments about how you are going to 

be shifting things. 

I don’t have that data at my fingertips, but I have some sense 

about how to go about getting that data to be able to come back 

and talk with you all and be making those assessments going forward. 

Senator CASEY. Some of the biggest challenges you have involve 

working with and coordinating among the various departments of 

our Government. I know that in your testimony, when you focus on 

your approach, your third bullet point was ‘‘coordinate closely with 

colleagues at State, Defense, Treasury, and the White House to see 

we are truly practicing smart diplomacy using development, diplomacy.’’

Just that coordination alone is difficult. I think that both of our 

nominees will run into that kind of challenge in managing within 

the boundaries of our own Government and our own institutions. 

Well, I think we are coming almost to the close of our hearing. 

I don’t know if there is any further statement either of you would 

want to make or any point you would want to amplify? We won’t 

take audience questions today. [Laughter.] 

But I wanted to give you an opportunity if you had any further 

statement or further information you wanted to give to the committee. And of course, we may send questions that will be for the 

record that you would submit answers to in writing. But if there 

is anything that either of you wanted to add to the record now, I 

can certainly give you that opportunity. 

We don’t need a closing statement, but if there is something you 

wanted to add? 

Ms. RUDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would just thank you, obviously, 

for the opportunity to appear before you. 

94

And on your last point, as with any challenge, including the challenge of coordinating with the rest of my colleagues in Government, 

I actually really do see it as an opportunity because you don’t get 

to solve any problems if you don’t get to use the resources of everyone all together. 

And so, if there is anything I think I have had experience with, 

it is figuring out how to kind of work together with everyone on 

the team. And I fully appreciate that it is not always easy, but if 

you don’t get process right, you don’t get policy right. 

And so, I recognize the challenges, but I really do see it as an 

opportunity to try to get it right in the whole of government way 

of doing things. 

So thank you. Thank you. 

Senator CASEY. Well, thank you. And I appreciate both of you 

putting yourself forward for further and challenging service, especially at this time. 

And as I think I have shared with Ms. Rudman, I could also 

apply to you, Mr. Patterson. You could be doing other things in the 

private sector and making a lot of money, I am sure, and you have 

chosen to serve your country. And we appreciate both of you putting yourself forward for that kind of service, and we are particularly grateful. 

We hope that we can move your nominations as expeditiously as 

possible through the committee and then through the Senate. I will 

never make a prediction or a promise about that because there is 

a great deal of uncertainty about the process here. And we are 

going to try to move it as fast as we can. 

But we are grateful for your service, for your testimony, and for 

your willingness to take on these difficult assignments. 

Thank you very much. 

And we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF MARA RUDMAN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY AND SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. Please describe your responsibilities as an officer for International Commission for Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (ICHEIC) and the ICHEIC Trust from 

2002–09. Please indicate, in particular, what role, if any, you played in the following 

areas:

• Developing or implementing policies or procedures for identifying relevant insurance policy records and publishing names of policyholders; 

• Developing standards of proof or providing guidance to claims arbitrators on criteria to be used in making decisions on or related to claims; and 

• Developing or implementing policies or procedures for responding to requests 

for information from the U.S. Department of State pursuant to Section 704 of 

the Foreign Affairs Authorization Act of 2003 (Public Law 107–228).

Answer.

INTRODUCTION TO ICHEIC AND MY RESPONSIBILITIES AS CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER

I was the Chief Operating Officer (COO) for ICHEIC from 2002 to 2007 (former 

Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger was the Chairman/Chief Executive). As 

COO, my primary responsibility was to do everything possible to carry out the mission of the organization, that is, to help ICHEIC to find previously uncompensated 

claimants and pay them. 

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ICHEIC was created several years earlier, in August 1998. By the late 1990s, the 

question of Holocaust-era asset restitution had reemerged and numerous class action lawsuits were filed. U.S. insurance regulators recognized that given the understandable challenge of documentation, the length of time that had passed, and the 

effort and costs involved, the path of litigation presented significant difficulties. 

Working through state insurance regulators, the National Association of Insurance 

Commissioners (NAIC), identified the companies most likely affected and worked 

with these companies to arrive at a means of resolving the issues presented. These 

issues were identified working with Holocaust survivors, by conducting interviews, 

researching the historical background, and organizing informational hearings across 

the country. ICHEIC was the result. 

I began working with ICHEIC 4 years into this pioneering startup’s efforts. It 

faced many bumps in the road in its early years, with initial high administrative 

costs combined with a lengthy development period for claims forms that led to slower initial outreach and claims processing and awards. In April 2003, several months 

after I had joined, 59,117 claims had been submitted to date, only $38 million had 

been paid to claimants, and a low percentage of claims had been decided overall. 

Critics said ICHEIC would run out of funds long before its member companies made 

decisions on the claims that had been submitted, and that the Commission would 

never make the completion deadlines it had set. 

Four years later, when ICHEIC closed its doors, we had moved more than $500 

million in total for Holocaust-related work. More than $306 million had been paid 

to more than 48,000 Holocaust victims or their heirs for previously unpaid insurance policies (of a total of 91,558 claims submitted and decided), along with nearly 

$200 million distributed for humanitarian purposes. Of the $306 million paid out 

directly to claimants, more than half went to individuals with so little information 

about their potential claim that they were unable to identify even the company that 

may have issued the policy. 

Upon joining ICHEIC, my team and I worked hard to make sure that ICHEIC’s 

mission could be implemented effectively and expeditiously. At Chairman 

Eagleburger’s direct instruction, we were charged with addressing concerns that had 

been raised about the Commission’s operations prior to our coming on board. We 

increased its transparency and outreach; we succeeded in reaching terms of agreement among Commission members with respect to the German Foundation, and the 

French and Swiss insurance companies (AXA, Winterthur, and Zurich) that were 

critical to implement claims decisionmaking timelines and funding structures; and 

we reduced administrative costs, ensuring that overall operating expenses would 

absorb less than 18 percent of the overall ICHEIC budget. 

Additionally, as COO, my work, with my staff, included:

• Transparency/Accessibility:

Æ Redesigning the ICHEIC Web site to make it user friendly and make available information including the final valuation guidelines as well as committee 

structures, claims processing statistics, audit reports, quarterly reports, a 

guide to how the process worked, and annual meeting presentations; 

Æ Working to publicize ICHEIC mission and no-cost procedures to make sure 

potential claimants worldwide knew how to file a claim;

• Costs/Service Quality:

Æ Moving international call center operations (for claimants) from a for-profit 

contractor to the nonprofit Claims Conference, with operators trained by my 

staff, to lower costs and improve quality of service; 

Æ Instituting measures to reduce administrative costs including changing locations for the annual meeting, instituting and strictly enforcing member and 

staff travel reimbursement policies, etc.;

• Service Quality/Effectiveness:

Æ Using the agreed upon audit process to examine insurance company files, and 

ensuring database built which was constructed from research in archives 

across Europe; 

Æ Establishing systems to process the more than 90,000 claims submitted from 

all over the world; 

Æ Administering an independent appeals system presided over by jurists who, 

over the life of the process, reviewed hundreds of appeals that provided every 

claim that named a company the opportunity for review. The relatively small 

percentage of reversals on original decisions underscored the strength of the 

initial system of checks and balances my team constructed. This included internal ICHEIC staff verification of every company decision, as well as outside 

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1The number of policies issued during the period (1920–1945) would be considerable and in 

many cases, records, when available, would not be in a database but on microfiche, film, and 

paper. The prewar proportion of the persecuted population (as determined by ICHEIC’s research) was only a fractional part of the prewar insurance market. 2 ICHEIC’s published lists—as components of ICHEIC’s research database—result from working closely with archival experts in Germany, Israel, the United States, and elsewhere, and 

drawing on information from company policyholder records. During the ICHEIC process, companies had to identify which policyholders might potentially fit the definition of Holocaust victim. 

For companies with many surviving records, this presents a considerable challenge, because in 

most instances, insurance companies did not identify policyholders based on racial, religious, political, or ideological factors. Nor was it possible to filter solely on the basis of ‘‘Jewish’’-sounding 

last names: the name Rosenberg, for example, often believed to be a typical Jewish name, was 

also the name of one of the Nazi party’s highest ranking ideologues. Similarly, Anne Frank 

shares her last name with the notorious governor-general of occupied Poland, Hans Frank, who 

was hanged at Nuremberg. 

independent audits of companies’ records and decisionmaking practices, to 

make sure they complied with ICHEIC rules and guidelines. 

I. Developing/ implementing policies or procedures for identifying relevant insurance 

policy records and publishing names of policyholders 

In addition to these tasks, when I started working with ICHEIC, my team and 

I built upon the work that had been underway since the late 1990s with respect 

to archival research and building a research database and lists of possible policyholders. 

I.A. Research and matching 

Working closely with European insurance companies, I accelerated implementation of the protocols developed by ICHEIC committees prior to my arrival to make 

sure that information provided by claimants was matched to all available and relevant surviving records in the companies’ possession. Since many claimants had little or no information about specific insurance policies, ICHEIC also conducted archival research to locate documents that were relevant to Holocaust-era life insurance 

claims. I ensured that where necessary, we commissioned experts to conduct additional research in public archives and repositories in Central and Eastern Europe, 

Israel, and the United States to collect as much relevant information as possible. 

These efforts augmented the database ICHEIC created that provided a critical tool 

used by companies and ICHEIC to further enhance information provided by claimants and thus the chances of identifying policies on submitted claims. 

Our research spanned 15 countries and included over 80 archives. Researchers 

reviewed three types of records. The first, representing the bulk of the material reviewed, consisted of Nazi-era asset registration and confiscation records. Files pertaining to the post-war registration of losses made up the second category. The third 

category was comprised of insurance company records located in public and regulatory archives. ICHEIC researchers located almost 78,000 policy specific records. 

This research augmented the often limited information provided with claims. This 

research effort had a significant positive impact on the disposition of claims. More 

than half of the total amount awarded to claimants was based on this archival research and went to individuals who were unable to identify a policy or name a company that was the source of their claim. 

I.B. Publishing potential policyholders’ lists 

In my role as COO, I participated in ICHEIC’s work to develop and publish these 

lists, and to maintain the lists on the Yad Vashem Web site after ICHEIC ceased 

operations. Development of lists of potential policyholders’ names was a by-product, 

however, of our efforts to match claim form information with relevant policy information discovered through archival research or in companies’ records. Finding one’s 

name on a list published by the Commission was never intended as necessary to 

file a claim. Our extensive outreach efforts made that clear. 

Consistent with the Commission’s mission of reaching out to the broadest possible 

universe of interested parties, ICHEIC published on its Web site its research and 

the 519,009 potential Holocaust-era policyholder names who were thought likely to 

have suffered any form of racial, religious, or political persecution during the Holocaust.1 In so doing, however, the Web site also carried a clear warning that finding 

a name on the Web site was not evidence of the existence of a compensable policy. 

There were many similar names with spelling variations, policies that might have 

been surrendered or paid out prior to the Holocaust, and some policies that had already been the subject of previous government compensation programs, making 

them ineligible for further payments under the ICHEIC process. The list remains 

accessible through the Yad Vashem Web site (www1.yadvashem.org/pheip).2

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The Commission considered all these factors, and culled out from an overall list of policyholder names that are those most likely to have been persecuted during the Holocaust. The 

Commission’s list also contained many more names of policyholders likely to have been previously compensated on their policies because the majority of policies issued in Germany had 

already been subject to prior postwar compensation programs. 3 Appeals process judges (arbitrators) were to be provided copies of ICHEIC rules and guidelines as part of their initial training; though part of that training also included informing them 

that while they had the use of legal advisors to staff them and help with researching and drafting their decisions, they had absolute discretion and independence in the ultimate determination 

of decision outcome. 4 ‘‘ICHEIC not only facilitated the payments of claims against existing companies, it also paid 

out claims against now defunct companies and funded survivor assistance programs.’’ Eric 

Fusfield, Director, Legislative Affairs, B’nai B’rith International, Letter to Chairman Barney 

Frank and Ranking Member Spencer Bachus, House Financial Services Committee, February 

6, 2008. 

II. Developing standards of proof or providing guidance to claims arbitrators on criteria to be used in making decisions on or related to claims 

I was able to implement ICHEIC’s relaxed standards of proof as criteria to be 

used in making decisions on or related to claims among companies and ICHEIC’s 

claims verification team. I also ensured the distribution of the relaxed standards of 

proof, and all ICHEIC’s rules and guidelines, through all available routes, including 

to claims arbitrators.3 I could do so because these relaxed standards of proof were 

developed by ICHEIC prior to my arrival. Very early on as claims were coming into 

ICHEIC, it became clear that the bulk of the claim forms contained little detailed 

information, that policy documentation was the exception rather than the rule, and 

that many claims did not name a specific company, or named a company that ceased 

to exist before 1945. So ICHEIC worked, through its committee structure—with 

Jewish organization representatives, insurance regulators, and companies—to establish relaxed standards of proof and create valuation standards that could be calculated without the usual policy documentation. This is also when decisions were 

made to develop an extensive research database and matching system. 

Under my tenure, my staff and I created and instituted the separate but related 

humanitarian claims payment process for unnamed unmatched claims, and for Eastern European claims on companies that had been liquidated, nationalized, or for 

which there were no known successors.4 All these elements became part of the critical architecture of the Commission. The audits to which all companies were subjected, conducted by outside independent auditors, proved the effectiveness of this 

architecture; and our ability to carry out our mission depended on it. 

With respect specifically to relaxed standards of proof: during its existence, the 

Commission directly or through its member companies/partner entities offered payment to more than 48,000 of the 91,558 who made inquiries. As noted, only a small 

percent of all the claim forms the Commission received named a specific company 

and far fewer contained policy documents. Survivors who had attempted to recover 

the proceeds of insurance policies during the immediate postwar period had been 

frustrated by companies’ demands for death certificates and proof of entitlement 

that they could not provide. Understanding that expecting such documentation was 

both insensitive and in most cases impossible, the relaxed standards of proof 

adopted by the Commission did not require claimants to submit such evidence to 

make a claim. 

Under ICHEIC’s relaxed standards of proof, the claimant produced whatever evidence the claimant had available. Individuals filling out claim forms were asked to 

provide all information available to them, including copies of existing documents in 

their possession that might be relevant. Sometimes claimants had actual copies of 

policies, but there was no expectation that such would be the case. The relaxed 

standards of proof allowed claimants to provide nondocumentary and unofficial documentary evidence for assessment. 

Companies were similarly required to produce the evidence they had, with the objective of helping claimants to establish sufficient evidence of a contractual relationship. Once the existence of a policy was substantiated, the burden shifted to the 

company to show the status of the contract or to prove the value of the contract 

had been adjusted or the contract had been paid. All parties agreed, however, that 

the relaxed standards of proof were to be interpreted liberally in favor of the 

claimant. 

ICHEIC established independent third party audits for the claims review process 

for each participating company to assess the status of existing records, and to ensure that records were appropriately searched and matched, in accordance with 

ICHEIC rules and guidelines. The ground rules for these audits were dictated by 

written agreements ICHEIC entered with its participating companies and partner 

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entities such as the German Insurance Association and the German Foundation, reviewed and ultimately approved by ICHEIC’s Audit Mandate Support Group, a committee on which regulators and Jewish organization representatives served. 

The relaxed standards of proof adopted by the Commission aimed to ensure that 

every claim, no matter what evidence the claimant could produce, would be reviewed to identify whether evidence could be located sufficient to substantiate the 

existence of a contract. 

Finally, during my tenure we instituted an in-house verification team to crosscheck every company decision. The verification team also conducted a series of 

large-scale exercises to review decisions made by member companies. Discrepancies 

were reported back to the companies for reassessment and, where appropriate, remedial action. At the conclusion of ICHEIC’s work, the verification team also carried 

out major reconciliation exercises, to make sure that all research information in 

ICHEIC’s database conformed to and had been matched against companies’ policyholder information, and that all claims filed had been checked against all companies’ decisions. 

III. Developing/implementing policies or procedures for responding to requests for information from the U.S. Department of State pursuant to Section 704 of the Foreign Affairs Authorization Act of 2003 (Public Law 107–228) 

I worked with staff to make as much information as possible publicly available 

on the ICHEIC Web site at www.icheic.org. ICHEIC also provided the State Department an observer position on the Commission, in addition to the public information 

to which the State Department had easy access. Through ongoing consultation with 

State Department representatives, my team at ICHEIC viewed this cooperative approach as an effective way to ensure that the Department had the most extensive 

possible array of information to report to the Congress pursuant to the obligations 

of the State Department under section 704. In addition, we provided U.S. state insurance regulators with regular updates on claims submitted by claimants residing 

in their states, both through electronic statistical reports and participation in NAIC 

International Holocaust Commission Task Force quarterly meetings and monthly 

teleconference calls. 

IV. Responsibilities as an officer for the ICHEIC Trust 

The final meeting of the ICHEIC board of directors and members on March 20, 

2007, decided that ICHEIC would cease its legal existence at a time to be determined by Chairman Eagleburger. This occurred on July 17, 2007, at which point a 

trust, which became the ICHEIC Trust, undertook the final closedown of ICHEIC’s 

operations. Lawrence Eagleburger, Pat Bowditch, (formerly ICHEIC’s Chief Financial Officer), and I served as the Trust’s officers; I resigned my position early in the 

administration. 

The responsibilities of officers of the ICHEIC Trust include: paying all outstanding obligations and liabilities of ICHEIC as they become due; preparing the 

final financial audit of ICHEIC and causing it to be posted on ICHEIC’s Web site; 

preparing, signing, and filing ICHEIC’s wholly owned U.S. subsidiary, ICHEIC 

LLC’s, final U.S. tax return and other tax reporting; overseeing and controlling defense and disposition, including litigation and settlement, of all claims, lawsuits, 

and other forms of litigation, if any, asserted against ICHEIC, its officers or directors, or any person who has been indemnified by ICHEIC, serving as the notice 

party in all outstanding contracts to which ICHEIC is a party, signing all required 

documents, including tax returns, on behalf of ICHEIC, and providing all required 

administrative functions on behalf of ICHEIC after its legal termination.

Question. Some have questioned the work of ICHEIC, for which you served as 

CEO. It has been reported in the press that, in response to such criticisms, you explained that: ‘‘Everybody expected too much. . . . We at ICHEIC have had a lot of 

ground to make up.’’ (Tom Tugend, Jewish Telegraphic Agency, ‘‘ICHEIC Hit By 

New Broadside,’’ available at http://www.jta.org/news/article/2004/06/15/11639/ 

Inbroadsideoffici2004.) Please provide any additional information concerning this 

statement that you believe would be helpful to the committee in considering your 

nomination.

Answer. I was asked to respond to criticism that we were not going to complete 

our mission, would still be deciding claims in 2011, and would run out of funds. I 

felt confident that we were going to get done in time, though I recognized we had 

considerable work ahead. Events proved me right. In the interview, I explained my 

view that while the critics’ assertions would not prove correct, I also appreciated the 

basis for concern that had led to some of the statements. I understood that when 

the Commission was in its early years, those involved were pioneers. All involved 

had acknowledged to me that they had underestimated the complexity and timeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00106 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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frame for carrying out the centerpiece of ICHEIC’s mission: finding previously uncompensated claimants and paying them. This makes me particularly proud to report that by 2007, when ICHEIC closed its doors, we had moved over $500 million 

directly supporting Holocaust-related purposes. We had processed (decided and 

verified) decisions on more than 91,000 claims, more than $306 million in claims 

had been paid, and we distributed nearly $200 million for humanitarian purposes.

Question. Information has come to the committee’s attention that in 2007, you, as 

ICHEIC CEO, may have announced that certain of ICHEIC’s records would be 

sealed for several decades, or no longer retained. Please provide any additional information concerning this matter that you believe would be helpful to the committee 

in considering your nomination.

Answer. The goal was and remains preserving important historical information, 

making everything publicly available that we possibly could, while appropriately 

protecting the privacy rights of individuals. 

There is evidently confusion with respect to ICHEIC records that were provided 

to the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum and are publicly available there, and personal files of individuals who filed claims with ICHEIC, which were archived at the 

Museum. The terms of the agreement between ICHEIC and the museum were proposed and explained generally at ICHEIC’s concluding meeting on March 20, 2007, 

and are available on the ICHEIC Web site. Under this agreement, the museum 

maintains and hosts the ICHEIC Web site (www.icheic.org); it maintains ICHEIC 

key documents, including all relevant historical and research database in its library, 

and makes them available to visitors to the library. These documents include key 

policy decision memoranda as well as meeting minutes produced over the lifetime 

of the organization, as well as the research information that ICHEIC culled from 

its work in archives across Europe. 

With respect to individual claimants’ files, applications and appeals, the museum 

maintains these in its archives. Given that these documents contain personal and 

sensitive information, this material must be closed to research by third parties for 

a period of 50 years. In reaching this agreement, ICHEIC sought legal guidance 

from privacy law experts, who reviewed the releases that individuals signed when 

they filed with ICHEIC and recommended that based on the strong commitments 

made by ICHEIC regarding data confidentiality and use of data only for the limited 

purpose of investigation/claims processing, combined with relevant data protection 

laws, ICHEIC would need to obtain specific consent from claimants prior to sharing 

of any claimant data with a third party. Given ICHEIC’s 90,000+ claimants, the 

costs in March 2007 of obtaining such specific consent were estimated in the millions, and the more prudent outcome was deemed to be restricting access to this 

data for the 50-year period (recommended given range of ages of individuals filing.) 

There was also a reference made at the March 2007 ICHEIC meeting to ICHEIC’s 

routine financial and administrative records, which would be maintained in storage 

for a period of 5 years; I have been told that the ICHEIC Trust has since determined that those will be maintained for a period of 10 years, consistent with Swiss 

law for corporate entities (since ICHEIC was an unincorporated Swiss verein).

Question. Your 2007 Lobbying Disclosure Form describes certain work that you 

performed on behalf of the American Insurance Association (AIA) as ‘‘supporting 

work done by International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims 

(ICHEIC), including defending against legislative attacks on its efforts and ability 

to carry out its mission.’’

• a. Please provide additional information concerning the nature and scope of the 

lobbying work you performed on behalf of AIA.

Answer. Once ICHEIC closed, there was no one available to do work for the organization. In the transition period after it closed but when it was subject to an organized public attack, I was asked by its members, including European insurance companies, to continue my work for a transitional period. This transitional year was the 

practical next step to ensure that our previous several years’ efforts at ICHEIC were 

not rolled back or undone. I registered under the Lobbying Disclosure Act when 

these efforts involved advocacy on behalf of ICHEIC. ICHEIC’s members believed 

it was important to maintain a clear record on the work it had done, through participation in congressional hearings, briefings, and the like, and responding to ongoing inquiries regarding ICHEIC (including those from Congress and survivor 

groups). The AIA was a membership association for several European insurance 

companies who were ICHEIC participants. It was the available mechanism because 

ICHEIC was no longer in existence. 

This work included preparing draft written testimony for Secretary Lawrence 

Eagleburger to submit to the House Foreign Affairs Europe Subcommittee; preVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00107 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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paring Diane Koken, Vice Chairman of ICHEIC, former Pennsylvania Insurance 

Commissioner and former President of the NAIC, for testimony before the House 

Financial Services Committee and helping with subsequent followup communications; preparing Ms. Koken and Secretary Eagleburger for testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and helping to prepare Anna Rubin, of the Holocaust Claims Processing Office of New York, and Stuart Eizenstat, for testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the same day, as well as helping 

Secretary Eagleburger with drafting initial responses to follow up questions for the 

record from that hearing. I also worked through the latter half of 2007, with Diane 

Koken and Anna Rubin particularly, in following up with European companies to 

gain their written commitments to what they had previously pledged orally at the 

closing ICHEIC meeting: to continue to process individual claims consistent with 

ICHEIC rules and guidelines. We also discussed the extent to which the New York 

Holocaust Claims Processing Office had the capacity to monitor informally the ongoing claims decisionmaking by companies, and communicated with congressional staff 

on these matters.

• b. Please describe the extent, if any, to which you had any responsibility for or 

involvement in matters relating to ICHEIC, Holocaust-era insurance claims, 

and any legislation or litigation related thereto, during your employment by the 

Department of State from 2009 to the present.

Answer. I had neither responsibility for nor involvement in matters related to 

ICHEIC, Holocaust-era insurance claims, and any legislation or litigation related 

thereto, during my employment by the Department of State from 2009 to the 

present.

• c. Please describe the extent to which, if any, you expect to have responsibility 

for or involvement in matters relating to ICHEIC, Holocaust-era insurance 

claims, and any legislation or litigation related thereto, if you are confirmed as 

USAID Assistant Administrator for the Middle East.

Answer. I would not expect to have any responsibility for or involvement in any 

matters related to ICHEIC, Holocaust-era insurance claims, or any legislation or 

litigation related thereto, if I am confirmed as USAID Assistant Administrator for 

the Middle East.

Question. Please provide any further information on your work for ICHEIC or AIA 

that would be useful to the committee in considering your nomination.

Answer. In closing, I appreciate the time and care you have taken in putting together these questions. I have tried to respond with the same attention to detail in 

response. I was and remain committed to the work that the Commission accomplished. Putting together these responses have made me reflect, with some pride, 

at the mission ICHEIC developed in 1998, the disparate stakeholders who were 

brought together, the hurdles that were overcome. It was an organization that almost necessarily was going to be confronted with constant challenges. I knew when 

I stepped in to take on the responsibilities of COO, 4 years into its operations that 

I was taking on a troubled but worthy organization. I am comfortable that my team 

and I were able to accelerate significantly ICHEIC’s ability to achieve its mission. 

In 5 years, we moved more than $500 million in Holocaust-related funds to those 

who deserved them. In the process, we made the organization more transparent and 

accessible to people worldwide. After the organization closed, I made what I considered a practical decision, at the urging of ICHEIC members, to see that the work 

of the organization was not undone. The European insurance companies had provided ICHEIC’s operating funds as well as the funds to compensate claimants and 

for humanitarian purposes. I did this work fully anticipating that I would operate 

in the same manner as I did as ICHEIC’s COO—I would provide my best and most 

forthright advice and guidance on what was most important and necessary to fulfill 

the effort at hand: to support the work done by ICHEIC, and defend it against 

efforts that we viewed as undermining its mission. 

Again, I thank you for your efforts to understand ICHEIC’s work and mission, 

and the work that I did with and for it. As always, I stand ready to respond to any 

additional questions you may have. 

RESPONSES OF MARA RUDMAN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. With dramatic change taking place in countries throughout the Middle 

East on almost a daily basis, what is your view on how USAID programs in these 

countries should be reviewed and recalibrated in order to most effectively promote 

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democratic principles? How will you lead in promoting increased flexibility of 

USAID programs to respond to these changes? How do you plan to work with Mission Directors in these countries in your decisionmaking process for responding to 

these changes?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that every USAID mission in the region is 

maintaining a close watch on local political conditions, engaging in scenario planning and reviewing existing and projected resource flows to anticipate and rapidly 

respond to changing conditions, as well as short and medium opportunities, as they 

arise. This is an unprecedented moment of opportunity for political reform in the 

region—reform necessary for longer term regional stability. Missions need to ensure 

they are agile, so they can work with the broad range of civil society groups that 

are defining and leading the popular movements in each of these countries, consistent with U.S. law and policy. If confirmed, I will work aggressively to ensure 

that USAID utilizes the necessary procurement and personnel instruments to act 

quickly in support of openings in the political environment, including utilizing centrally based rapid response mechanisms. 

It is my understanding that USAID is working to provide assistance as needed 

and requested—to pursue credible transitions to democracy and to meet expressed 

social and economic needs throughout the Middle East. These transition programs 

will be demand-driven, but are expected to cover needs related to the political transition, youth engagement, economic recovery, and rebuilding social networks and 

support institutions. 

If confirmed, I would seek to build on these efforts, specifically by:

• Redirecting ongoing programs and putting in place new programs to respond to 

the rapidly unfolding situations in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen and to be prepared to meet new needs as they emerge; 

• Utilizing contacts with implementing partners and civil society to significantly 

increase direct engagement with a wide range of critical actors, including civil 

society organizations, youth, political party representatives, labor, and others 

who have been mobilized by recent events. 

• Reviewing previous commitments and identifying new ways of partnering 

through a renewed focus on implementation by those most engaged in their own 

transition, while tapping an extensive network of existing programs and relationships.

As for my approach vis-a-vis the Mission Directors, if confirmed, I will maintain 

regular communication with USAID’s Mission Directors to benefit from their on-theground analysis and deep knowledge of local conditions. As we move forward, it will 

also be critical to consult regularly with interagency partners and with Congress. 

USAID is hosting a forum in Morocco later this spring to discuss how missions 

can best support the historic trend toward political liberalization underway in the 

region. I understand that this meeting will be both a brainstorming and a practical 

discussion generating actionable recommendations. It should provide help in revising mission strategies to reflect the evolving environment. If confirmed, I would consider this Morocco discussion a starting point for (1) my ongoing dialogue with Mission Directors; (2) readjustments and reinvigoration as needed on existing programs; 

and (3) implementation of new efforts.

Question. As you are testifying, the U.S. Government’s support for Yemen President Ali Abdullah Saleh has begun to shift. What do you believe should be the highest priority investment for U.S. development assistance in the country at this time?

Answer. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula remains a major threat not only to 

the U.S. homeland, but also to Yemen’s stability and that of the region. AQAP has 

taken advantage of insecurity and poor governance in regions of Yemen that suffer 

from ongoing internal conflicts, resource challenges, insufficient delivery of services, 

and an ineffective security architecture. For this reason, the United States has 

adopted a two-pronged strategy for Yemen—helping the Yemeni Government confront its security concerns in the near term, and mitigating the serious political, 

economic, and governance issues that the country faces over the long term. 

USAID, in conjunction with Embassy Sanaa, supports a peaceful political solution. Existing programs are being reviewed based on their ability to respond to current needs and the extent to which they can take advantage of new openings and 

future opportunities. Since the programs were designed as stabilization projects, 

there is considerable flexibility consistent with the ‘‘stabilization’’ objective. 

Elections and political process reform are clearly a priority at this time of political 

transition. Economic stability programming and fiscal reform will also be necessary 

to address severe economic challenges facing the country. It is my understanding 

that USAID is currently analyzing needs in this regard, and will continue to rigorVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00109 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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ously test the hypothesis that meeting the development needs of underserved communities is causally related to improving political and social stability. If confirmed, 

I would look forward to seeking the Congress’ counsel on USAID’s overall approach 

to development assistance in Yemen.

Question. In addition to significant funding through the new Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Account at the State Department, the administration is 

proposing over $300 million again in FY12 for continued funding for Iraq through 

the Economic Support Fund. What kinds of programs will USAID promote in developing Iraq’s agriculture sector and in building its private sector economy? What 

examples can you provide? What programs will be ending/discontinued? With the 

transition to a civilian-led mission, will the Joint Campaign Plan still be the guiding 

document? Are there any sectors that, despite their problems, will not receive funding from USAID?

• a. What kinds of programs will USAID promote in developing Iraq’s agriculture 

sector and in building its private sector economy?

Answer. USAID is not receiving funding through the OCO account in the FY12 

Iraq request. Rather, USAID’s requested ESF funds are accounted for in the base 

request. USAID/Iraq will implement three existing programs focusing on economic 

growth and agriculture and may consider new programs focused on private sector 

competitiveness contingent on funding and interest from potential Iraqi beneficiaries. The current programs are: 

i. The Provincial Economic Governance program, which supports microfinance, 

small business development centers, access to credit for small and medium size enterprises, and technical assistance to the Iraqi Government on trade and investment 

reforms leading to possible WTO Accession. 

ii. The Financial Sector Development program, which improves the soundness of 

Iraqi private financial institutions by establishing and developing a credit bureau, 

a financial sector training institute, a payments system and modern centralized 

data Repository System, and enhancing the sectors’ ability to advocate for private 

sector investment, growth and development. 

iii. The Agribusiness program, which works to improve the value chain of existing 

Iraqi agribusinesses, farmers, and marketers to improve productivity and marketing, increasing agricultural revenues, incomes, and employment. 

Since the inception of USAID-supported microfinance institutions in Iraq since 

2004, the Provincial Economic Growth program has disbursed more than 257,200 

microloans worth a combined value of $593 million, with the average loan valued 

at $1,400 at 15–18 percent annual interest rates with a repayment rate of over 98 

percent. For the period of April 2008 to February 2011, USAID-sponsored programs 

have generated 206,456 jobs through sustainable microfinance, SME Bank lending, 

its youth initiative and Small Business Development services. 

USAID’s FY12 request for Iraq, as reported in the Congressional Budget Justification, contains a line item on Private Sector Competitiveness intended for a new program to assist the Government of Iraq in leveraging private sector resources to 

improve the delivery of electricity. Effective electricity delivery is critical to Iraq’s 

economic growth and development. 

The Financial Sector Development program started in the summer of 2010. It is 

implementing USAID’s Memorandum of Understanding with the Central Bank of 

Iraq to build its capacity to oversee and promote the private financial sector in Iraq.

• b. What programs will be ending/discontinued? Are there any sectors that, despite their problems, will not receive funding from USAID?

Answer. USAID is no longer engaged in counterinsurgency (COIN) programming 

in Iraq. Programs such as the Community Stabilization Program (CSP) have ended. 

CSP was vital in helping stabilize urban communities in priority areas by creating 

employment opportunities for insurgent-prone Iraqis. However, as conditions have 

improved and with the drawdown of the U.S. military, it is my understanding that 

USAID is now focused on development programs that will help bolster Iraq’s economy, create jobs, restore essential services, and build Iraq’s institutional capacity.

• c. With the transition to a civilian-led mission, will the Joint Campaign Plan 

(JCP) still be the guiding document?

Answer. After the U.S. military departs by December 31, 2011, my understanding 

is that there will be no JCP and all American citizens will be under Chief of Mission 

authority. This means that 2012 will be the first critical year of full civilian leadership of the U.S. bilateral relationship with Iraq. Provincial Reconstruction Teams 

will be fully demobilized and replaced by at least two consulates and two Embassy 

Branch Offices. 

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Additionally, USAID will have at least one regional representative and one locally 

employed specialist in each of the two consulates in Erbil and Basrah. USAID is 

currently determining how security requirements may change for its development 

programs in the absence of a U.S. military presence.

Question. The State Department’s Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) has 

a mission of developing more pluralistic, participatory, and prosperous societies 

throughout this region through economic and political empowerment. How do you 

plan to work with MEPI during this historic time in the region? How do you plan 

to work to prevent duplication in your efforts in individual countries?

Answer. I have a longstanding and excellent working relationship with Tamara 

Wittes, the Deputy Assistant Secretary at the State Department with responsibility 

for MEPI. We have worked together closely in our current responsibilities, and if 

confirmed, I have every expectation that cooperative partnership would continue 

into my next role at USAID. 

MEPI and USAID have worked together since MEPI’s establishment in 2002. 

Their work is both complementary and should be well-coordinated at embassies and 

in Washington. USAID maintains a mission and field presence in seven countries 

in the region, while MEPI operates, in some capacity, in every country in the region, 

except Iran. This allows MEPI and USAID to play to their respective strengths and 

comparative advantages. 

Each NEA embassy has an internal coordination committee chaired by the Deputy 

Chief of Mission. The committee’s core responsibility is to coordinate all USG foreign 

assistance programming in the host country. Broad representation from embassy 

sections, including coordination with public diplomacy and representational activities, assures maximum possible cross-fertilization among programs and projects, 

whether USAID, MEPI, or DRL. 

The committee looks to each embassy’s Mission Strategic Resource Plan (MSRP) 

and to its Democracy Strategy for overarching guidance as it responds to queries 

and proposals from Washington agencies and offices. USAID, DRL, and MEPI participate in the annual review process for each embassy’s MSRP, providing an additional feedback loop in the coordination process. 

MEPI, DRL, and all embassies receiving foreign assistance are required to submit 

an Operational Plan, which is a budget and programmatic proposal for the use of 

new foreign assistance resources. The operational plan contains detailed information 

on how foreign assistance resources are coordinated by various implementers

in each country. After an interagency review designed to resolve any areas of conflict or overlap, each operational plan is approved by the Director of U.S. Foreign 

Assistance. 

Again, if confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the MEPI office, and 

discussing with Mission Directors as well, how the current system is functioning 

and where there may be room for improvement.

Question. Please put U.S. Assistance to the Palestinian Authority into the broader 

political context. With Israeli-Palestinian political negotiations frozen, is U.S. 

budget support for the Palestinian Authority and development assistance in the 

West Bank and Gaza building trust between the parties? Are projects designed to 

increase cooperation, in trade, private sector development, infrastructure, etc? If so, 

please provide examples. Also, please provide current trade figures through the 

Jalameh crossing in the northern West Bank, as compared to the period prior to 

USG reconstruction of that facility.

• a. With Israeli-Palestinian political negotiations frozen, is U.S. budget support 

for the Palestinian Authority and development assistance in the West Bank and 

Gaza building trust between the parties?

Answer. The United States Government is committed to achieving a two-state 

solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as part of the administration’s comprehensive regional peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. U.S. policy is premised 

on the assumption that establishing sustainable peace requires forward movement 

on two simultaneous and mutually reinforcing tracks: political negotiations and the 

hard work of building institutions and the capacities of the future Palestinian state. 

While the political negotiations track is outside the purview of USAID, USAID’s 

efforts with respect to supporting Palestinian Authority (PA) capacity-building and 

institutional reform and economic development efforts regularly show results with 

respect to building trust between the parties. I have seen these results in ways 

small and large: most recently in the resumption of bilateral working-level discussions between Ministries of Finance, similarly in productive working level discussions between justice officials, and with respect to ongoing cooperation on immediate 

and long-term needs on the difficult issues surrounding water resources. 

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USAID programs are designed and implemented to help the PA to become more 

effective and credible partners with respect to governance and institutional capacity. 

Budget support to the PA is the most tangible and direct means of helping the PA 

to build the foundations of a viable, peaceful Palestinian state. U.S. budget assistance helps ensure that the PA remains solvent and thus can be an effective and 

credible partner in Middle East peace efforts and continue progress on reforms and 

capacity-building. 

The United States has made it clear that we will work only with a PA government 

that unambiguously and explicitly accepts the Quartet’s principles: a commitment 

to nonviolence, recognition of the State of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations.

• b. Are projects designed to increase cooperation, in trade, private sector development, infrastructure, etc? If so, please provide examples.

Answer. Facilitating trade into and out of the West Bank and Gaza is critical to 

improving Palestinian economic growth, and it must occur consistent with Israeli security needs. More than 240,000 truckloads of imports and exports crossed through 

the three main West Bank commercial cargo crossings last year; USAID provided 

scanning equipment and other assistance to the Government of Israel to expand the 

capacity of the crossings while addressing Israeli security concerns. 

USAID has supported the tourism sector in Bethlehem by setting up festivals and 

concerts to attract local and international tourists; and is working with the Government of Israel to open up Bethlehem’s three checkpoints for tourist buses, ensuring 

that the Arab-Israeli communities had transport to Bethlehem during the highvolume Christmas period. All three checkpoints are now open for tourist buses and 

the long waiting lines in front of the previously lone access point to Bethlehem have 

disappeared. 

USAID has partnered with international information technology (IT) firms such 

as HP, Apple, Microsoft, and Cisco to help to develop Palestinian IT firms in particular and the IT sector in general to be able to provide world-class services. 

USAID introduced many Israeli high-tech firms to Palestinian counterparts, and the 

Israeli firms have signed several contracts for Palestinians to provide IT services. 

In response to both Israeli and Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) concerns that 

groundwater quality is deteriorating due to the lack of wastewater treatment, the 

United States will focus significant energy and resources in coordinating donor 

efforts to respond. USAID completed an assessment of 10 small-sized wastewater 

treatment plants for several villages in the northern West Bank. Design of these 

facilities began in October 2010 and is expected to be completed by November 2011, 

with permitting and land acquisition to begin once design is complete.

• c. Also, please provide current trade figures through the Jalameh crossing in 

the northern West Bank, as compared to the period prior to USG reconstruction 

of that facility.

Answer. Facilitating trade into and out of the West Bank and Gaza is critical to 

improving Palestinian economic growth. USAID’s assistance helped to reopen the 

Jalameh vehicle crossing between Israel and the northern West Bank. What was 

previously a closed facility without traffic is now a busy crossing with an average 

of more than 8,000 cars and buses entering the West Bank every week. USAID’s 

investment of less than $2 million for upgrades at the crossing has had important 

impacts on commerce, trade, and investment in Jenin and the northern West Bank. 

Last year, Arab-Israeli visitors through the crossing made over $40 million in purchases in Jenin.

Question. There are concerns about anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli incitement in 

Palestinian Authority textbooks. Please provide the latest assessment of the textbooks used by the Palestinian Authority and describe any USG involvement in their 

development or implementation.

Answer. USAID supports the Palestinian Ministry of Education and Higher Education in its efforts to provide quality education for Palestinian youth. USAID 

assistance in education focuses on improvements in teaching methodologies, introducing contemporary approaches to teaching and learning, integrating information 

technology into the classroom, and expanding the impact of early childhood programming throughout the West Bank and Gaza. 

Since 2000, when the Palestinian Authority (PA) began introducing new textbooks 

that included many references to promoting values of reconciliation, human rights, 

religious tolerance, and respect of law, diversity and environmental awareness, a 

succession of studies has found that the new textbooks represent a significant 

improvement and constitute a valuable contribution to the education of young 

Palestinians. 

105

Although not a USAID-funded program, UNRWA has developed an expanded 

human rights curriculum for use in all UNRWA regional schools based on the history and content of the 30 articles that comprise the 1948 Universal Declaration of 

Human Rights. Despite opposition from Hamas in Gaza, the new curriculum is 

being taught in grades 1–6, with plans to roll out a more advanced set of lessons 

for grades 7–9. 

Additionally, the State Department/MEPI’s My Arabic Library program works 

with the PA Ministry of Education to deliver libraries to schools in the West Bank, 

organize teacher training sessions, and provide after-school programming. This program encourages independent reading, thinking, and analytical skills in young 

readers. 

The Palestinian curriculum is transparent, and all textbooks are available for review in Arabic on the Web site of the official Palestinian Curriculum Development 

Center at http://www.pcdc.edu.ps/. 

RESPONSE OF ROBERT PATTERSON TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

Question. As cochairman of the Helsinki Commission, I remain deeply concerned 

over the dismal human rights situation in Turkmenistan. Over the weekend, we 

received a report that an elderly gentleman of 80 years old, Mr. Shapudakov, has 

been detained by Turkmen authorities and confined to a psychiatric facility. Reportedly, his activities in uncovering and reporting on corruption may have prompted 

this apparent reprisal by local officials.

• Has the State Department looked into this case and raised it with Turkmen 

officials?

Answer. The U.S. Government has received reports from RFE/RL and other 

sources that civic activist Amangelen Shapudakov was recently detained and committed to a psychiatric hospital. According to some of these reports, Mr. Shapudakov’s confinement may be linked to a family dispute over property. 

Our Turkmenistan Desk officer in Washington and the Public Affairs Office at 

Embassy Ashgabat are in daily contact with RFE/RL headquarters in Prague regarding the Shapudakov case. We are following the situation surrounding Mr. 

Shapudakov’s detention. DAS Susan Elliott raised Mr. Shapudakov’s case with the 

Turkmenistan Ambassador to the United States and our Embassy is also raising his 

case with Turkmen officials. We have asked the Turkmen government to verify the 

circumstances surrounding the case in order to ensure that it was handled appropriately by local officials, and that Mr. Shapudakov is afforded access to any legal 

counsel or proceedings, consistent with Turkmen law. 

The State Department remains actively engaged with the Government of 

Turkmenistan on human rights through the Annual Bilateral Consultations (ABC) 

process, launched in June 2010 by Assistant Secretary Robert Blake. At the 6-month 

ABC review in Ashgabat on February 16, A/S Blake raised several specific human 

rights concerns by the USG, including the recent uptick in harassment and blacklisting of RFE/RL journalists and family members by Turkmen security services. We 

have also raised issues of government harassment of journalists with the Turkmenistan Ambassador to the United States. 

RESPONSES OF MARA RUDMAN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

Question. For decades, the United States consented to authoritarian Arab regimes’ 

requests not to engage opposition groups in exchange for regime cooperation on security matters. The previous administration started to reverse these policies, but the 

current administration has rolled back or significantly limited many of those initiatives. I believe this practice has severely restricted our influence in many of these 

countries. Can you define the aims and principles that would guide USAID’s programs in the Middle East following the Arab Spring? Have the recent events 

changed our engagement policy with opposition groups in countries like Syria and 

Yemen? How is the U.S. Government preparing for contingencies in Syria and 

Yemen?

• a. Can you define the aims and principles that would guide USAID’s programs 

in the Middle East following the Arab Spring?

Answer. This is an unprecedented moment of opportunity for political reform in 

the Middle East. It is my understanding that USAID is providing assistance as 

needed and requested—to pursue credible transitions to democracy and to meet expressed social and economic needs throughout the Middle East. These transition 

106

programs are demand-driven, but are expected to cover needs related to the political 

transition, youth engagement, economic recovery, and rebuilding social networks 

and support institutions. 

In the short term, I understand, USAID is reviewing its partnerships with government entities and pursuing programs aimed at empowering civil society with democratic transition and governance issues. In the long term, it is my understanding 

that the Agency will focus on addressing those underlying conditions that were a 

catalyst for popular unrest, including unemployment and education. 

As the situation evolves, it is my understanding that USAID will continue reviewing how best to use its assistance to support democratic transition, economic development, and the aspirations of the local population. If confirmed, I will work aggressively to utilize the necessary personnel and procurement instruments to act quickly 

in support of openings in the political environment, including utilizing centrally 

based rapid response mechanisms. 

If confirmed, I would build on USAID’s existing efforts by:

—Redirecting ongoing programs and putting in place new programs to respond to 

the rapidly unfolding situations in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen and to be prepared to meet new needs as they emerge; 

—Utilizing contacts and grants with implementing partners and civil society to 

significantly increase direct engagement with a wide range of critical actors, including civil society organizations, youth, political party representatives, labor, 

and others who have been mobilized by recent events; and 

—Reviewing previous commitments and identifying new ways of partnering 

through a renewed focus on implementation by those most engaged in their own 

transition, while tapping an extensive network of existing programs and relationships.

• b. Have the recent events changed our engagement policy with opposition 

groups in countries like Syria and Yemen?

Answer. It is my understanding that USAID is willing to work with elected, 

peaceful groups, provided they operate through democratic institutions and the rule 

of law, with respect for equal rights, and reject violence as a way to achieve their 

political goals. Additionally, I understand, USAID will also continue to work with 

USG counterparts providing democracy and governance programming to explore appropriate USG assistance opportunities in support of unfolding events in the Middle 

East. 

I am aware that it is USAID’s view that the transitions in the Middle East and 

North Africa must be locally owned processes and that any organization or individual that adheres to the principles of democracy, including the principle of nonviolence, should be able to participate in these processes.

• c. How is the U.S. Government preparing for contingencies in Syria and Yemen?

Answer. It is my understanding that every U.S. Embassy and USAID mission in 

the region is maintaining a close watch on local political conditions and in some instances is engaging in scenario planning. I am aware that USAID also has a Middle 

East Strategic Planning Group conducting a range of strategic and contingency 

planning in USAID presence and nonpresence countries in the Middle East. 

As we face tough fiscal decisions as a nation, the United States will need to be 

creative and flexible in identifying resources to support security and prosperity in 

Syria, Yemen, and other regions of great strategic value. I understand that USAID 

is actively reevaluating its programming and assistance to prepare for contingencies 

and adapt its support to the transitions underway across the region.

Question. As you know, the Department of Defense constantly develops and updates contingency plans on possible U.S. responses to conflicts and crises that may 

arise abroad. Does USAID have a similar process to guide our response in times of 

crisis? If not, would you recommend legislative mandates to help USAID implement 

such practices?

• Does USAID have a similar process to guide our response in times of crisis? If 

not, would you recommend legislative mandates to help USAID implement such 

practices?

Answer. It is my understanding that USAID maintains contingency plans for humanitarian disasters in all overseas missions. Missions in the Middle East are currently reviewing their country programs to identify short- and medium-term needs 

in the region in order to be able to provide assistance as needed and requested. 

Additionally, I understand that USAID also maintains internal processes to regularly develop, review, and update contingency plans for conflicts or crises abroad. 

As a result of this planning, I am aware that USAID is currently engaged with the 

107

Department of Defense in a joint review of stabilization contingencies in the Middle 

East and an interagency ‘‘defense, diplomacy, and development’’ review for steady 

(nonconflict) state planning. 

Finally, I understand that USAID possesses contingency funding capabilities to 

provide the U.S. Government with the flexibility necessary to respond to rapidly developing political, humanitarian, and security scenarios, without forcing the Agency 

to divert funding from other priority programs. 

At this time, I do not believe that additional legislative mandates are needed to 

help USAID implement contingency planning practices. If confirmed, I would assess 

USAID contingency plans in detail to determine more fully whether legislation in 

this regard would be beneficial.

Question. Under the Millennium Challenge Account, American foreign aid is disbursed through Compacts to recipient countries that demonstrate a commitment to 

just and democratic governance, investments in the country’s population, and economic freedom. Going forward, would the administration support applying the policy 

indicators of the Millennium Challenge Compacts to all USAID programs in the 

Middle East?

Answer. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and USAID are intricately 

linked, but their purposes and mission are distinct. The link between the two agencies is codified in the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003. USAID assistance regularly plays a transformative role in countries throughout the world in ways that 

support progress toward consideration for MCC compact eligibility. For example, 

USAID implements almost all of MCC’s threshold programs in countries not quite 

ready for compact assistance. In addition, the USAID Administrator serves as a permanent board member on the MCC Board of Directors and has a voice in MCC policy and selection decisions. USAID’s Office of Development Partners (ODP) supports 

interagency coordination efforts on U.S. Government development policies. 

MCC works in synergy with USAID’s core development policies. MCC was created, in part, by incorporating some of USAID’s best practices and lessons learned 

into its model, but it was not designed to substitute for USAID’s range of development programs. In countries where MCC and USAID are both active, their programs augment and complement each other. 

Most developing countries do not meet the MCC eligibility criteria, since MCC 

was created to work only with a select group of developing countries that meet high 

hurdles in terms of governance in the areas of ruling justly, investing in people, and 

economic freedom. Yet the United States still has a compelling foreign policy and 

national security interest to provide foreign assistance in nonqualifying countries, 

and USAID is the primary agency to provide that assistance. 

MCC compact assistance focuses on economic growth; USAID’s mandate is much 

broader and includes global health, food security, democracy and governance, and 

disaster relief, among other areas. Applying MCC policy indicators to USAID programs in the Middle East would preclude the United States from doing some of our 

most important work.

Question. Since joining the Obama administration, have you had any contact with 

any organizations or persons in connection with the Holocaust-era insurance claims 

issue or the government’s position on the Generali litigation? For the purposes of 

this question, the word contact includes discussion(s) on the Holocaust-era insurance claims issue with any insurance company; lawyer, lobbyist, or representative 

of any insurance company associated with Holocaust-era claims; any federal department or agency concerning Holocaust-era claims; any Member of Congress or staff 

concerning Holocaust-era claims?

Answer. Shortly after joining the Obama administration, I was recused from matters related to World War II Holocaust restitution programs for a period of 2 years 

from the date of my appointment. 

I thus had no contacts of the nature referenced, for this period. However, I did 

have limited contacts with colleagues at ICHEIC Trust, the close-down entity that 

filed taxes and carried out other administrative functions when ICHEIC ceased to 

exist, which were required to complete my administrative responsibilities, prior to 

resigning as an officer. 

As a direct result of the correspondence sent to the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee about me, and this issue, I have since been in touch with several colleagues with whom I worked closely on Holocaust-era insurance claims issues, and 

others who were familiar with the history of its efforts. 

I have not had any contacts related to government’s position on the Generali litigation since joining the Obama administration. 

(109)

NOMINATIONS 

TUESDAY, APRIL 5, 2011

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

Scott Gration, of New Jersey, to be Ambassador to the Republic of 

Kenya 

Michelle Gavin, of the District of Columbia, to be Ambassador to 

the Republic of Botswana 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher A. 

Coons, presiding. 

Present: Senators Coons, Isakson, Inhofe, and Lee. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. COONS,

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE 

Senator COONS. I am pleased to call to order the first Africa Subcommittee nomination hearing of the 112th Congress and will start 

by saying that I am both humbled and honored to assume the chair 

of this subcommittee. Africa is a continent of tremendous strategic 

importance to the United States and the world, and I am extremely 

grateful to our committee chairman, Senator Kerry, and my colleagues on the committee for entrusting me with the gavel. 

I look forward to working with my friend, Senator Isakson, to accomplish our shared vision and strategic goals for the subcommittee and hope to serve as a model for bipartisan cooperation 

on issues pertaining to Africa in the 112th Congress and beyond. 

Before I go any further, I want to just say a few words, if I could, 

about my predecessor in this role, Senator Russ Feingold of Wisconsin, who chaired this subcommittee for 4 years with great integrity and focus and resolve. I only hope to bring to the table the degree of substance, direction, and drive which made Senator Feingold such a well respected chairman of the subcommittee and Senator. 

Today I am honored to chair the confirmation for Ms. Michelle 

Gavin, nominated to be Ambassador to Botswana, and Maj. Gen. 

Scott Gration, nominated to be the Ambassador to Kenya. While 

these are different countries with divergent histories, accomplishments, and challenges before them, the issues we will discuss today 

in the context of these nomination hearings and in the context of 

Botswana and Kenya, issues of governance, of democratic instituVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00117 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
110

tions and elections, of health initiatives, human rights, and trade, 

counterterrorism, U.S. interests, and a broader regional strategy, 

are the larger themes that will serve as focal points for this subcommittee in the year ahead. 

Kenya, as some of you may know, has special meaning for me. 

I developed a deep interest in Africa during my junior year of college when I studied at the University of Nairobi through St. Lawrence University and traveled through Kenya and Tanzania in an 

attempt to immerse myself in African culture. After college, I wrote 

about antiapartheid divestiture strategies while serving as an analyst for a research center here in Washington and subsequently returned to Africa as a volunteer for the South African Council of 

Churches. So my ties to Kenya and Africa are both professional 

and personal. 

And today’s nominees bring to their positions significant and 

meaningful experiences. Ms. Michelle Gavin knows this subcommittee extremely well, having previously served as staff director under Senator Feingold for whom she also served as foreign 

policy advisor. Following her tenure with Senator Feingold, Ms. 

Gavin was legislative director to Senator Salazar and most recently 

served as special assistant to the President and senior director for 

Africa at the NSC. Prior to joining the National Security Council, 

Ms. Gavin was an adjunct fellow for Africa and an international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations where she focused 

on democracy and governance issues. Perhaps most importantly, I 

am extremely proud that she and I and her husband all by coincidence are Truman Scholars. 

Gen. Scott Gration has most recently served as the President’s 

special envoy from March 2009 until, I believe, just last week—special envoy on Sudan when Ambassador Princeton Lyman was appointed to that post. I recently met with Ambassador Lyman and 

look forward to working with him on priorities relating to Sudan 

such as the humanitarian conditions in Darfur and preparations 

for Southern Sudan’s impending independence for which both General Gration and Ms. Gavin have played an instrumental role in 

their immediate past capacities. Today I look forward to hearing 

from General Gration the lessons he learned as the envoy in Sudan 

that may apply or be relevant to Kenya, with a particular focus on 

accountability and human rights and transitions to sustainable democracies. 

General Gration served in the United States Air Force from 1974 

to 2006, began his career as an F-5 and F-16 instructor, including 

a 2-year assignment with the Kenyan Air Force. In 1995, General 

Gration took command of an operations group in Saudi Arabia during the Khobar Towers bombing. The following year, he was transferred to Turkey to oversee Operation Northern Watch, enforcing 

a no-fly zone over Iraq. Since then he has served as deputy director 

for operations in the Joint Staff, director of regional affairs for the 

Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs, 

and commander of the Joint Task Force-West during Operation 

Iraqi Freedom, among many other roles. 

General Gration speaks Swahili and has served as the CEO of 

Millennium Villages, an organization dedicated to reducing extreme poverty, as well as the Safe Water Network, an organization 

111

helping to provide safe water to vulnerable populations in India, 

Bangladesh, and Ghana. 

I look forward to hearing from both of you about how we can advance United States interests in Botswana and Kenya, two strong 

allies which play distinct, yet critical regional roles. Since the 

1960s, Botswana has moved on a path of outstanding governance 

and economic growth. It is a model of stability in Southern Africa 

and a close partner of our country, including in its extraordinary 

battle with HIV and AIDS. I look forward to hearing from Ms. 

Gavin about how we can deepen bilateral ties in a manner that furthers shared diplomatic, political, and economic goals in the region. 

I look forward to hearing from General Gration about the role he 

will play in this critical period as Kenya implements a new constitution and prepares for elections, emerging from the dark period 

of the 2007–08 violence in a manner that holds those responsible 

at the International Criminal Court. As President Obama has recently said, the United States stands with the Kenyan people as 

they continue to reach for a better future, and I hope that brighter 

future is near, especially as it relates to democracy, accountability, 

and national reconciliation. 

I would now like to turn to the distinguished ranking member 

with whom I am honored to serve for his opening remarks. 

Senator Isakson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON,

U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and congratulations to you on your appointment to this committee. And for the 

benefit of all, we have already met on a couple of occasions to discuss the subcommittee and its role in the committee. And I look 

forward to working with Senator Coons, and he will be a great 

chairman, I am confident. 

I am also delighted to see Michelle Gavin and Gen. Scott Gration 

here before the committee today. I fortunately have worked with 

General Gration on a number of occasions before in his role as special envoy to the Sudan, and I appreciate the guidance and help he 

has given to me as I have gone to that region and gone to Darfur 

and tried to work as a supporter of what we all want, which is: liberation, and better health care, and better food, and better accommodations for the people of Darfur, but also a peaceful settlement 

to the split between the North and the South. And I think it should 

be noted that we all realize how dangerous the potential was for 

another civil war in the Sudan. 

I commend General Gration and his support for the comprehensive peace agreement and his ability to see to it that peaceful elections were held, and hopefully between now and, I guess it is—

July—when that takes effect, we can continue to have basically a 

peaceful and respectful division of the Sudan. Hopefully the fledgling South will be a good democracy and a good partner with the 

United States. 

And further, if it is peaceful, it will allow us to really focus on 

Darfur where we need to continue to focus on the humanitarian 

tragedy in that region of the West Sudan. 

112

And I congratulate General Gration on his nomination to be Ambassador to Kenya. Kenya is an equally important country to the 

United States in Africa, and it has some similarities in ways to the 

Sudan. One, it has a refugee area in the northern part, bordering 

on Somalia, the Dadaab, which is going to be an important area 

for us to deal with and to help the Kenyans deal with. And then 

second, I know the ICC is in Kenya investigating post-election difficulties which that country had, and General Gration’s experience, 

I am sure, will help in assisting that to take place. 

And finally, hopefully General Gration will be as committed to 

the NGOs in Kibera as he has been to the NGOs in Darfur. Two 

of the most tragic scenes I have personally ever seen in my life 

were the slum of Kibera in Nairobi, Kenya, and the Darfur situation. And we deserve to support those NGOs with every strength 

that we possibly can. 

For Michelle Gavin, I will simply say, if she sends her daughter 

to all the meetings, she will be the greatest diplomat this country 

ever had. She has got an infectious smile and beautiful eyes, and 

she is a pretty 2-year-old young lady. And I congratulate Michelle 

on her nomination. 

Botswana is a country the United States sees as a real shining 

star in Africa, but like all African countries, it does have its challenges, none greater than the HIV/AIDS epidemic and explosion 

that has taken place there. And I look forward to working with her 

in the role of PEPFAR and the other things we do in that country 

to help bring about a moderation of the infection rate and hopefully 

a decline in years to come. 

I congratulate both of you on your nomination and look forward 

to the question and answer period to follow. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Isakson. 

I am now going to read a statement from Chairman John Kerry. 

It was his specific request to me that rather than simply introducing this into the record, that I read it at the outset of this hearing. 

Senator INHOFE. Mr. Chairman, could I make a special request? 

I am not sure that you are going to be able to get to everyone. I 

have a commitment. I may have to leave a little earlier. Could I 

just make a comment about our two nominees? 

Senator COONS. Certainly. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES INHOFE,

U.S. SENATOR FROM OKLAHOMA 

Senator INHOFE. All right. I appreciate it. 

First of all, I have had the chance and the opportunity to spend 

a long time with each one of you guys, and as you know, the only 

thing I look for with someone going into a position as an ambassador is to have a real heart for Africa. And I talked about that. 

And I did go back and see, Scott. After our visit, I found out that 

the year after I came from the House to the Senate, when you were 

in Saudi Arabia, that is when I first met you because I was over 

there and we looked up our notes. And to think that we have someone with your background who is willing to do this. 

113

And I have to say to you, Michelle, I echo the words about your 

cute, little 2-year-old daughter. When I showed her the picture of 

my 20 kids and grandkids, she picked out the one she thought was 

the prettiest, and I will be calling Jesse Swan to tell her that she 

won. 

But let me just say, in case I do have to leave, that it is very 

rare that we get people who honestly have a heart for Africa, and 

when Joel Starr, back here who is with me, told me that he first 

met you when he was with Tom Campbell, I figured you must have 

been about 12 years old at that time. [Laughter.] 

But it is nice that you have kept your heart for Africa. And after 

116 African country visits, it is showing you my commitment to Africa. I am always really happy when I see someone who has not 

just a formal commitment to a job but a heart for Africa. Both of 

you are high on the list of that. 

So I just thank you for letting me to get that off in case I have 

to leave before it is my turn. 

Senator COONS. Certainly, Senator. 

I am now going to move to reading a statement that Chairman 

John Kerry wanted introduced at the beginning of this nomination 

hearing. 

[The prepared statement of Senator John F. Kerry, as read by 

Senator Coons follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

Today, I would like to express my strong support for the nominations of Scott 

Gration and Michelle Gavin. 

General Gration has spearheaded the Obama administration’s Sudan policy since 

2009. On January 9, 2011, we saw the fruits of those efforts when the people of 

Southern Sudan went to the polls to vote for independence. I had the tremendous 

privilege to be there that day, with General Gration, and to bear witness to that 

historic moment—to the triumph of the forces of peace over those of war. 

Much remains to be done in Sudan to secure long-term peace between North and 

South and to strengthen the ties between what will be two separate but interconnected nations. The status of Abyei must be resolved, and the people of Darfur 

still wait for their peace agreement. It is therefore absolutely critical that we remain 

fully engaged in Sudan, and particularly in Darfur. For that reason, I am glad that 

the President has named Ambassador Princeton Lyman to succeed General Gration 

as Special Envoy. 

But we must recognize the tremendous achievements that have been made to 

date. Just a few months ago, many were predicting that the referendum would not 

even take place. But it did, and both the nominees before the committee this afternoon played a key role in helping to make success possible—General Gration 

through his direct negotiations with the Sudanese and Ms. Gavin through her work 

at the White House. 

This experience will serve them well in their new posts. I have met and traveled 

with both General Gration and Ms. Gavin, and we have worked closely in our 

shared quest to help the peoples of Sudan find a lasting peace. They are both dedicated public servants with deep experience in the region, and I strongly support 

their nominations.

Senator COONS. That having been said, I would like to now turn 

to the nominees for their opening remarks. And if I might, I would 

like to specifically invite you to also introduce your families who we 

have already had the pleasure of meeting but who should be recognized, I think, for the sacrifices they have made to support your 

commitment to public service. If I might first, General Gration. 

114

STATEMENT OF SCOTT GRATION, OF NEW JERSEY, TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA 

Mr. GRATION. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and 

members of the committee. 

It is an honor to appear before you this afternoon to seek your 

approval to be America’s next Ambassador to the Republic of 

Kenya. I am truly grateful to President Obama, to Secretary Clinton for the confidence that they have placed in me for the nomination to represent our country in Kenya. If confirmed, I will work 

with you and other Members of Congress to advance American interests in Kenya, to promote a common understanding between our 

two countries. 

I appreciate the opportunity to introduce my wife Judy, the 

mother of our four children and my full partner in over 35 years 

of public service. If confirmed, Judy will bring a wealth of knowledge to this assignment. She was born in Nairobi. She spent her 

childhood in Kenya as the daughter of missionary teachers. And in 

fact, both of her parents are buried there in Kenya. 

Like Judy, I was also raised in Africa, in Congo and Kenya. I 

learned to speak Swahili as a toddler and developed a lifelong interest in the region. In 1974, I returned to Kenya to do humanitarian work. In the early 1980s, I spent time as an F–5 instructor 

pilot in Kenya for 2 years. And during the last 20 years, I have returned to Kenya numerous times, on military duty, as CEO of Millennium Villages, and with an NGO working to increase access to 

safe drinking water. 

For more than five decades, Kenya has been one of our most reliable partners in Africa. If confirmed, I look forward to leading our 

diplomatic efforts in this next important period of Kenya’s history. 

Since the terrible period of post-election violence in 2007, 

Kenyans have embarked on an ambitious program of reform. Implementing the new constitution, cooperating fully with the ICC, 

and advancing accountability are critical elements that must be in 

place to ensure a peaceful, transparent, and credible Presidential 

election next year. 

As the reform process moves forward, I am committed to working 

privately and publicly to protect human rights, to fight corruption, 

and to promote democratic values, development, accountability, and 

national reconciliation. 

The 1998 attack on our Nairobi Embassy, an attack that killed 

218 people, is a solemn reminder of the constant terrorist threat. 

Furthermore, the conflict in Somalia continues to increase Kenya’s 

security and humanitarian challenges. If confirmed, I will support 

Kenya’s efforts to secure its borders, to protect its citizens, and to 

care for those who seek refuge. 

You can count on me to protect Americans living and traveling 

in Kenya. If confirmed, I will reach out to the estimated 20,000 

Americans in Kenya. We will work together to find ways to 

strengthen the economic and cultural ties between our two countries. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, if approved, I will 

be grateful and exceedingly proud to serve as the next U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Kenya. 

115

And I will be pleased to respond to any questions you may have 

for me. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gration follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SCOTT GRATION

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and members of the committee, it is an honor 

to appear before you this afternoon as you consider my nomination to be our country’s next Ambassador to the Republic of Kenya. I am truly grateful to President 

Obama and to Secretary Clinton for the confidence they have placed in me and for 

the nomination to represent our Nation in Kenya. If confirmed, I will work with you 

and the Congress to advance American interests in Kenya and to promote a common 

understanding between our two countries. 

I would like to introduce my wife, Judy—mother of our four children and my full 

partner in over 35 years of public service. If I am confirmed, Judy will bring a 

wealth of knowledge to this assignment. She was born in Nairobi and spent her 

childhood in Kenya, where both of her parents are buried. 

Like Judy, I was also raised in Africa, in Congo and Kenya, where I learned Swahili and developed a lifelong interest in this region. In 1974, I returned to Kenya 

to do humanitarian work. In the early 1980s, I served as an F–5 instructor pilot 

with the Kenyan Air Force for 2 years. During the last 20 years, I’ve returned to 

Kenya numerous times—on military duty, as CEO of Millennium Villages, and with 

an NGO working to increase access to safe drinking water. 

For more than five decades, Kenya has been one of our most reliable partners in 

Africa. If confirmed, I look forward to leading our diplomatic efforts in this important period of Kenya’s history. 

Since the terrible period of post-election violence in 2007, Kenyans have embarked 

on an ambitious program of reform. Implementing the new constitution, cooperating 

fully with the ICC, and advancing accountability are critical elements that must be 

in place to ensure a peaceful, transparent, and credible Presidential election next 

year. 

As the reform process moves forward, I am committed, if confirmed, to working 

both privately and publicly toprotect human rights, to fight corruption, and to promote democratic values, development, accountability, and national reconciliation. 

The 1998 attack on our Nairobi Embassy that killed 218 is a solemn reminder 

of the constant terrorist threat. The conflict in Somalia continues to increase Kenya’s security and humanitarian challenges. If confirmed, I will support the Government of Kenya’s effort to secure its borders, to protect its citizens, and to care for 

those seeking refuge. 

If confirmed, you can count on me to protect Americans living and traveling in 

Kenya. I will work with the estimated 20,000 Americans in Kenya; to seek ways 

to strengthen economic and cultural ties between Kenya and the United States. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, if confirmed, I will be grateful and 

proud to serve as the next U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Kenya. I would be 

pleased to respond to any questions you might have.

Senator COONS. Thank you, General. 

Ms. Gavin. 

STATEMENT OF MICHELLE GAVIN, OF THE DISTRICT OF 

COLUMBIA, TO BE AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF 

BOTSWANA 

Ms. GAVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Isakson, Senator 

Inhofe. It is a great honor and privilege to appear before you today 

as President Obama’s nominee to be the Ambassador to the Republic of Botswana, and I deeply appreciate the confidence the President and Secretary Clinton have placed in me by putting my name 

forward for your consideration. 

I am also deeply, deeply grateful for the support of my husband, 

David Bonfili; my daughter Clara; and my parents, Michael and 

Jeanette Gavin. 

My own professional background has left me keenly aware of the 

importance of working with this committee and the Congress, if 

116

confirmed, in order to advance U.S. interests in Botswana, including maintaining a strong tradition of democratic governance, encouraging economic diversification, and combating the HIV/AIDS 

epidemic. For many years, as you mentioned, I served on the staff 

of Senator Russ Feingold who focused intensely on African issues 

during his tenure on this committee, and most recently I was a 

special assistant to President Obama and senior director for African affairs at the NSC, a position that gave me new insight on the 

importance of our partnerships on the continent and a rich understanding of the critical role that interagency cooperation plays, 

both in Washington and in the field, as we work to achieve our foreign policy objectives. 

At independence in 1966, Botswana was, by many measures, one 

of the poorest countries on earth. Now it is a middle-income country and an exemplar for the continent, having consistently maintained a democratic government, responsibly managed its natural 

resources, and invested in its people and infrastructure. Botswana 

is an excellent partner and our bilateral relationship is strong, 

grounded in a shared commitment to democracy, good governance, 

and human rights. 

The United States and Botswana also share an interest in ensuring the sustainability of Botswana’s success by deepening economic 

diversification, promoting regional economic growth and development. Botswana aims to strengthen the nondiamond sectors of its 

economy, creating jobs and opportunities for the next generation, 

and supporting this endeavor through partnerships with the 

United States, including increased bilateral trade, will be one of my 

priorities, if confirmed. 

In addition, if I am confirmed, I will serve as the United States 

representative to the Southern African Development Community, 

or SADC. Regional integration and cooperation are essential to the 

long-term stability and prosperity of all of southern Africa’s countries. So I look forward to exploring appropriate opportunities to 

work with SADC to promote these objectives. 

Despite a remarkable commitment on the part of the Government of Botswana to save its citizens from HIV/AIDS, and despite 

strong support from the United States and nongovernmental entities, Botswana still has the second highest HIV/AIDS prevalence 

rate in the world. Much has been done to combat the epidemic, particularly with regard to treatment. And currently, depending on the 

measure you use, either 83 or closer to 95 percent of Botswana who 

need antiretroviral treatment receive it free of charge from the government—of Botswana, not our Government. This success could not 

have been achieved without the $480 million in support provided 

by the United States through PEPFAR since 2004. And if confirmed, I will do my utmost to ensure that taxpayer resources are 

used effectively in combating HIV/AIDS in Botswana, working to 

build on existing successes and focusing critical attention on prevention where more gains must be made. 

In Accra in 2009, President Obama said, ‘‘I do not see the countries and peoples of Africa as a world apart; I see Africa as a fundamental part of our interconnected world, as partners with America 

on behalf of a future we want for all of our children. That partnerVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00124 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
117

ship must be grounded in mutual responsibility and mutual respect.’’

Botswana is a small country but plays an important role both regionally and globally. It has been a strong, clear voice in support 

of human rights around the world. In fact, it was one of the first 

countries in the world to sever relations with Libya when it became 

clear that the regime in Tripoli was prepared to massacre its own 

citizens in order to cling to power. 

In partnership with the United States, Botswana hosts an International Law Enforcement Academy that helps law enforcement 

professionals from around the continent sharpen their skills and 

improve their capacity to combat transnational crime. 

Botswana is an international leader in conservation and has important insight to offer in global discussions regarding environmental issues. 

If confirmed, I look forward to encouraging leadership by Botswana on a range of issues where our interests align. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you so 

much for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I would 

be happy to answer any of your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Gavin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHELLE GAVIN

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a great honor and privilege 

to appear before you today as President Obama’s nominee to be Ambassador to the 

Republic of Botswana. I appreciate the confidence the President and Secretary Clinton have placed in me by putting my name forward for your consideration. I am also 

deeply grateful for the support of my husband, David Bonfili, my daughter Clara, 

and my parents, Michael and Jeanette Gavin. 

My own professional background has left me keenly aware of the importance of 

working with this committee and the Congress. If confirmed, I pledge to work with 

you to advance U.S. interests in Botswana, including maintaining its strong tradition of democratic governance, encouraging economic diversification, and combating 

the HIV/AIDS epidemic. For many years I served on the staff of Senator Russ Feingold, who focused intensely on African issues during his tenure on this committee. 

Most recently, I was a Special Assistant to President Obama and Senior Director 

for African Affairs on the National Security Staff, a position that gave me new insight into the importance of our partnerships on the continent and a rich understanding of the critical role that interagency cooperation plays both in Washington 

and in the field as we work to achieve our foreign policy objectives. 

Upon independence in 1966, Botswana was, by many measures, one of the poorest 

countries on earth. Today it is a middle-income country and an exemplar for the 

continent, having consistently maintained a democratic government, responsibly 

managed its natural resources, and invested in its people and infrastructure. Botswana is an excellent partner and our bilateral relationship is strong, grounded in 

a shared commitment to democracy, good governance, and human rights. 

The United States and Botswana also share an interest in ensuring the sustainability of Botswana’s success by deepening economic diversification and promoting 

regional economic growth and development. Botswana aims to trengthen the nondiamond sectors of its economy, creating jobs and opportunities for the next generation of Batswana, and supporting this endeavor through partnership with the 

United States, including increased bilateral trade, will be one of my priorities. In 

addition, if confirmed, I will serve as the United States representative to the Southern African Development Community or SADC. Regional integration and cooperation are essential to the long-term stability and prosperity of all of southern Africa’s 

countries, and I look forward to exploring appropriate opportunities to work with 

SADC to promote these objectives. 

Despite a remarkable commitment on the part of the Government of Botswana 

to save it citizens from HIV/AIDS, and despite strong support from the United 

States and nongovernmental entities, Botswana still has the second highest HIV/

AIDS prevalence rate in the world. Much has been done to combat the epidemic, 

particularly with regard to treatment. Currently 83 percent of Batswana who need 

118

antiretroviral treatment receive it free of charge from the Government of Botswana. 

This success could not have been achieved without the $480 million in support provided by the United States through PEPFAR since 2004. If confirmed, I will do my 

utmost to ensure that taxpayer resources are used effectively in combating HIV/

AIDS in Botswana, working to build on existing successes and focusing critical attention on prevention, where more gains must be made. 

In Accra in 2009, President Obama said, ‘‘I do not see the countries and peoples 

of Africa as a world apart; I see Africa as a fundamental part of our interconnected 

world, as partners with America on behalf of the future we want for all of our children. That partnership must be grounded in mutual responsibility and mutual respect.’’ Botswana is a small country, but plays an important role both regionally and 

globally. Botswana has been a strong, clear voice in support of human rights around 

the world; in fact it was among the first countries to sever relations with Libya 

when it became clear that the regime in Tripoli was prepared to massacre its own 

citizens in order to cling to power. In partnership with the United States, Botswana 

hosts an International Law Enforcement Academy that helps law enforcement professionals from around the continent sharpen their skills and improve their capacity 

to combat transnational crime. Botswana is an international leader in conservation 

and has important insight to offer in global discussions regarding environmental 

issues. If confirmed, I look forward to encouraging leadership by the Batswana on 

a range of issues where our interests align. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I will be happy to answer any questions you may 

have.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Ms. Gavin. Thank you, General 

Gration. 

We are now going to begin 7-minute rounds with members of the 

committee asking questions. 

General Gration, thank you for your service to our Nation, both 

in the Air Force and as special envoy. 

The U.S. Embassy in Nairobi is the largest in sub-Saharan Africa with roughly 1,400 employees, and as the Sudan envoy, you 

managed roughly 30, obviously in your military experience, much 

larger contingents. 

I would be interested in your overall plan for running an effective and operating an efficient Embassy, what your priorities are 

for that Embassy, and in particular, given there are 86 who are Department of Defense direct hires, comment, if you would, on how 

as a retired general from the Air Force who served both in a military and diplomatic capacity what you view is the relationship on 

unity of effort between our civilian and military representatives in 

Nairobi. 

Mr. GRATION. Thank you very much. It will be a big challenge 

because there are people from many different organizations who 

represent many different agencies. But I believe my job is to orchestrate and to provide a vision where all of these people who represent America do just that: represent America. And I want to create within the Embassy, within the country a team, a strong team 

that is an all-of-Government team, where it is not just the military 

or it is not just USAID or it is not just CDC and other people working independently, but we are working together to further the interests of our great Nation in Kenya and in the region. So there 

are many things that I want to do in terms of establishing the priorities. 

First of all, I think in building the team, we have to make sure 

that it is an inclusive team, a team where everybody can contribute, where everybody is resourced, and where they have a sense 

119

of what the mission is. So I will be creating that very early in my 

time there. 

I have worked on a speech that I plan to give in Swahili within 

the first couple days to all the local employees, so that they are 

part of the team because without them, we really cannot do the 

mission we have in Kenya and in the region. 

So the concept is to start bringing that team together. 

And then I want to put no question in anybody’s mind who works 

for who. I think, as you point out, when you have military people 

and you have other people—that is why I spent a lot of time understanding the NSDD–38, Chief of Mission authorities, and what is 

my responsibility and what I am accountable for, and how I can 

continue on to control and manage those processes. 

As for the military people, I understand that they work for the 

COCOM, but again, it is the communication, the personal relationship that I have with the commanders of the military. I plan to 

work very hard to strengthen those. 

But the concept that I am trying to get to right now is making 

sure that everybody understands the mission, understands our objectives in the country and works as a team to make that all happen. I believe I can do that based on the experience I have had in 

the military and based on my experience that I have had in the 

State Department. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, General. 

You have, as we mentioned, served as President Obama’s special 

envoy to Sudan since March 2009, and in that capacity, you have 

received both criticism and praise for your handling of an array of 

challenges, ranging from the expulsion of humanitarian groups 

working in Darfur in 2009 to the southern Sudan referendum in 

January which Chairman Kerry’s statement lauded you for playing 

a critical role in moving forward. Some have said that you compromised on humanitarian issues while others have lauded your 

ability to be an effective negotiator with the Government of Sudan. 

Some have criticized you in your tenure as special envoy for being 

too close with Khartoum in negotiating with them, and others believe that that was critical to achieving progress on the referendum. 

Do you believe the advocacy groups and other critics have accurately characterized your approach toward Darfur, and what are 

the lessons you might have learned from your experience as envoy 

and how would they inform your approach if confirmed as Ambassador to Kenya? 

Mr. GRATION. When I took this job, the President was very clear. 

He said my primary mission was to save lives, and that was when 

we were facing 1.5 million people at risk in Darfur after the NGOs 

were thrown out. And to do that, it became increasingly clear to 

me, as I thought about how I would conduct this mandate that I 

had, that I had to be able to talk with the Government of Khartoum. As we thought about ending the conflict that displaced so 

many people in Darfur, the conflict with the proxy forces between 

the Government of Khartoum and Chad, it became increasingly 

clear that I had to talk to N’Djamena and I had to talk to Khartoum. When we thought about implementing the comprehensive 

peace agreement and the 12 outstanding issues that had to be neVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00127 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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gotiated, it was clear that I had to have a relationship with Juba 

and Khartoum. And in every situation, it was obvious that I had 

to have a relationship. 

And so it became a question of how do you build that relationship. And I believe that in all relationships, it has to be transparent. There has to be trust, and there has to be respect if you 

want to have influence. I also believe that you have to have both 

a blended application of both incentives and pressures, and that is 

what we tried to achieve in Sudan, using all the tools to achieve 

our national interests and desired results and behavior changes 

that were required by using a blend of both sticks and carrots, as 

some people say. I would say pressures and incentives. 

And that is what I think I will take also to Kenya, an ability to 

look at a situation, to build the relationships that are based on 

trust and respect, to create an atmosphere of transparency where 

we can talk clearly, where we can express opinions in a way that 

are accepted by both sides, and that we can use the appropriate 

mix of pressures and incentives to achieve America’s interests in 

that land. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, General. 

We are now going to move to the first round of questions from 

Senator Isakson. I understand there is a vote underway on the 

floor. And so my suggestion—hopefully this meets the needs of the 

other members of the committee as well—is that we allow Senator 

Isakson to go through his first 7-minute round, and then we will 

recess so that all the members of the subcommittee can go and 

vote, return, and resume the hearing. 

Senator INHOFE. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to speak anyway. 

I am aware of the bipartisan support for both of these nominees 

and the challenges that they face. And I will yield to Senator 

Isakson. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator COONS. Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Gration, I appreciate your answer to the question asked 

by Chairman Coons. Having been to Khartoum myself and then to 

Darfur, but dealing with the Khartoum Government, the comments 

that you were criticized for are understandable comments when put 

in the context of what you were dealing with at the time. And I 

commend you on your effort there and what you did and the fact 

that the results have proven to be a peaceful transition, at least 

as far as it has gone with the election. And I hope you will give 

continuing advice to Princeton Lyman, so that continues through 

July and we can actually get to a point where we resolve the remaining issues. 

Now, to Kenya, are our Somalia efforts still housed in the Kenyan Embassy? 

Mr. GRATION. Yes, sir; they are. There will be, though, some 

changes that are happening right now. 

There will be an ambassador-rank individual that will be part of 

the Somalia unit, and that individual will report directly to Assistant Secretary of State Carson and will be responsible for all policy 

decisions having to do with the Somalia portfolio. 

121

The Kenya Embassy will still have the operators, the people that 

interface on a day-to-day basis, and they will all be housed and be 

the responsibility of the chief of mission. 

And if confirmed, I will stay very closely involved with this new 

ambassador and with all the units to make sure that there is continuity and make sure that everything is taking place in accordance with procedures and policy that have been given to me. 

Senator ISAKSON. But the special mission will report directly to 

Johnnie Carson? 

Mr. GRATION. The Somalia unit that is responsible for policy and 

about nine people will report directly to him. 

And it makes sense that they are located in Kenya because many 

of the TFG members, many of the people that work directly in Somalia are there in Nairobi right now. So it certainly makes sense 

that that organization is there and is sponsored by the American 

Embassy under the Chief of Mission authority. 

Senator ISAKSON. How deep is your knowledge of the refugee 

camp at Dadaab? 

Mr. GRATION. I have never been there, but I want to get more 

knowledgeable, but I have a basic understanding. 

Senator ISAKSON. My understanding is it continues to grow and 

has the potential to be a real problem. 

Mr. GRATION. Yes, sir. There are somewhere between 315,000 to 

350,000 people there, and that number continues to grow. It needs 

more land. I understand the Kenyans’ reluctance to do that because they don’t want it to get too big, but the reality is that we 

have to do a better job not only to help these people with nourishment, sanitation, and health care, but to give them the hope that 

they need to make the adjustment to a normal life and also to life 

after Dadaab. 

So that means we have to have a policy in Somalia that will restore the country and give it some stability so people can return 

because just to house people in Kenya is not the right answer and 

to house them better. The answer is to bring peace, stability, and 

the conditions where they can come back and return to their normal livelihood. 

So I believe that the two-track policy the United States has right 

now is the right approach, but it is going to take a tremendous 

amount of effort because for 20 years there has been unrest. There 

has been so little governance, and we have got to treat Somalia 

with a higher sense of priority in my view to be able to create the 

environment so that there can be governance and there can be the 

stability that they so need to be able to restore the refugee problem 

that is spilling out into Kenya. 

Senator ISAKSON. I appreciate that answer. 

Ms. Gavin, I am sorry your 2-year-old left. She was stunning and 

as pretty as her mother. It is good to have you, and I congratulate 

you on your nomination. 

Botswana is a country that the United States sees as a shining 

star. One of the things that I am most interested in as I have been 

to Africa is: the tremendous Chinese investment that is being made 

on that continent and the challenge between the Chinese extracting 

natural resources with their own workers, and the United States 

investing money and trying to create a climate of United States 

122

business investment. What will you do as Ambassador to try and 

foster that type of investment in Botswana? 

Ms. GAVIN. Thank you so much, Senator. I think that, if confirmed, that will actually be one of my highest priorities. The Government of Botswana is a willing partner in wanting to diversify 

its economy, and there are a lot of positives to that particular investment climate. But it is also a very small market, 2 million people. So one thing that I think is going to be essential is going to 

be to work closely with Ambassador Gips in South Africa and others in the region to take a regional approach to economic development. It is a much more attractive investment, I think, for U.S. 

businesses. There is much more opportunity for the United States 

that would be extremely beneficial to Botswana as well if we address this regionally. 

You are absolutely right. China has been increasing its involvement in Botswana and in the rest of southern Africa largely in extractive industries, but also getting involved on some health issues, 

getting involved with the University of Botswana to increase sort 

of their Asian studies capacity. So I will also look for opportunities 

to work with the Chinese where we do have some shared objectives 

so that I am not reacting in a way that suggests this is always a 

zero-sum game. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, I commend both of you on your nomination and look forward to working with you. 

And I will end where I began in my opening statement. I hope 

both of you will do everything you can to support the NGO efforts, 

in particular, what is happening in Kibera: CARE, USAID, Save 

the Children, Catholic Relief. You saw what they did, obviously, in 

Darfur. Those organizations are doing an awful lot to bring some 

degree of quality of life to very impoverished people, and I know 

in terms of Botswana, I assume there is PEPFAR money in Botswana and CDC, which is based out of Atlanta, and the other volunteers that are there—the support for those volunteers and those 

NGOs is critical to the future of that continent and the betterment 

of those people. 

Again, I congratulate both of you on your nomination. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator. 

We are going to recess for a period of 15 minutes so that members of the subcommittee can vote, and then we will resume. The 

subcommittee stands in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Senator COONS. We are going to resume the nomination hearing 

of the Africa Subcommittee. Thank you for being patient with our 

recess while members of the committee cast their votes. 

The ranking minority member may or may not rejoin us, but he 

urged me to proceed and complimented you both on your statements and answers so far. 

General Gration, if I might. The International Criminal Court 

has recently summoned—I believe it is six individuals from Kenya 

accused of crimes against humanity during the post-election violence of 2007. And I believe they are appearing in The Hague just 

a few days from now. 

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If confirmed as Ambassador, what would be your approach to 

handling these ICC cases in Kenya? 

I noted that the Kenyan Government has called for an Article 16 

delay, arguing instead for local tribunals to address these questions 

of violence, and the AU has endorsed Kenya’s request. What is 

your view of the issue of deferment? 

Do you believe the ICC process threatens peace and stability in 

Kenya as some have claimed? And given your prior experience with 

the ICC in Sudan, how will you handle this in the context of 

Kenya? 

Mr. GRATION. Thank you. Certainly I believe that the underlying 

issues have to be resolved, and I will talk about that in a minute. 

But just to answer your questions directly, in terms of an Article 

16 deferment, I do not support that and neither does our country 

and do not believe that if there was a deferment, that it would 

change the peace and security situation either in Kenya or regionally. And the fact is it may in some way exacerbate the situation. 

There are other processes that the Kenya Government is pursuing. One is asking whether article 17 and article 19 would be appropriate, and that would be where they would appeal to the ICC 

to have the process moved back into Kenya, but the ICC would 

have to approve that process. If indeed they do that and ICC approves the process, that may be one other avenue that the government has, but in terms of article 16, we do not support that. 

But I think the most important element is that we cannot have 

a situation where a culture of impunity, where corruption is not 

curbed, where human rights are at risk, where people are looked 

at as tribesmen and not as citizens of the country. Those issues 

have to be resolved. 

And that is why as a government we support the reform actions 

that have been put in place. On the 4th of August, Kenya put together a new constitution, but that constitution has to be implemented. The fact is there are almost 25 different legislative pieces 

that have to be passed to fully implement it. In addition to that, 

there are committees, courts, commissions, things that have to be 

set up, and then people have to be able to understand and buy into 

this process. And the government has to show that they are committed to making sure that these reform measures become part of 

practice and become part of the process and there is a democratic 

process where people can demonstrate their will through elections 

and that they can do this freely and in a transparent way and a 

peaceful way. This is what we will be aiming for. 

And I think the ICC is part of this, showing accountability for 

those, and if they are not guilty, that will come out. But if folks 

are proven to have been involved in issues, in crimes, then they 

would have to be held accountable for that. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

Ms. Gavin, in the Botswana context, Botswana has often been 

recognized as one of the most stable democracies in all of Africa, 

one of the most transparent, and President Khama has spoken out 

about some of the challenges in Zimbabwe, was one of the first, in 

fact, to come out and recognize President Ouattara as the winner 

of the elections in Coˆte d’Ivoire. 

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Could you just comment on to what do you attribute the stability, 

the predictability, the regularity of elections in Botswana? What actions might we take to strengthen the multiparty nature of electoral democracy in Botswana, and then what are we going to do, 

should you be confirmed as Ambassador, to strengthen their hand 

in being a regional supporter of initiatives that we have taken both 

in questioning the legitimacy of elections in Zimbabwe and in 

strengthening the region as it has to do with civil institutions? 

Ms. GAVIN. Thank you so much. It is an interesting thing to 

think about, why has Botswana been able to achieve so much success, and I think it can certainly be attributed to good leadership, 

some decisions early on particularly when the country’s diamond 

wealth was discovered regarding natural resource management 

that are highly relevant for the rest of the region where there are 

so many mineral-rich economies that have not been managed as 

well. 

There is also a culture in Botswana of open debate and dialogue 

that has existed for a very long time that I think helps to inform 

the democratic culture that has developed there. 

I also think it is important to avoid treating Botswana as the exception to the rule and sort of letting everybody else off the hook 

as if Botswana had some special set of ingredients that other countries do not have, which I think gets to another part of your question about how to help to amplify their voice in the region and 

sometimes globally where we, in fact, have shared interests and 

shared objectives, and that, if confirmed, is certainly something I 

would hope to work on by encouraging the Botswanan Government 

to participate in some global dialogues and discussion, encouraging 

the head of state to come to the U.N. General Assembly, for example, and make sure that their voice is heard. 

I think that as far as strengthening the multiparty aspect of Botswana’s democracy, there are some very encouraging signs that the 

opposition is alive and well. In the last election, the opposition—

well, the ruling party received something like 53.3 percent of the 

vote. So it is not as if no one is out there voting for opposition parties. They recently, in fact, came to some agreement to unify and 

try and rally around the same candidates the next time they take 

a go at this. 

The press is extremely free in Botswana, and sometimes highly 

critical of the government. 

So I think what I could do, if confirmed as Ambassador, is to continue a dialogue with representatives of all political parties in Botswana and continue engaging the Botswanans and particularly 

young Botswanans on issues of just civic participation, civic activism, make sure that as long as everybody is participating in the 

dialogue and the dialogue stays rich, I think that multiparty democracy is likely to remain quite strong. 

Senator COONS. General Gration, to follow up on that, if I might. 

As we go toward the 2012 elections in Kenya, what are the things 

that we can and should be doing to continue to push along the path 

of reform to strengthen democratic institutions in Kenya to ensure 

we do not have a repeat of the 2007 elections and their irregularities? And what do you think should be our major concerns in 

terms of potential flashpoints as we move toward those elections? 

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Mr. GRATION. Certainly we need to encourage all segments of the 

population to become involved in this. In other words, we have to 

have programs that not only help the government itself with the 

implementation programs—and we do need to help those—but we 

need to help people like Patrick Lumumba and folks that are working with corruption. We need to engage again and continuously 

with the civil society to make sure that the people understand the 

process and they understand that democratic reform will give them 

a voice that is clear and that represents exactly what they are saying and that it does that without fear. 

We need to engage the youth because much of the actual violence 

was done by the youth even though they may have been controlled 

by other aspects of the government or individuals. But the youth 

have to become part of the solution. They have understand that it 

is not about bullets. It is about ballots. It is not about machetes, 

but it is about getting out there and making a difference with 

words and votes and concepts. 

So it is going to take an education process, and that is something 

we can do through our USAID grants, through things that we become involved in, things we put our fingerprints on. 

But the bottom line is just to, again, push on accountability, 

push on these wherever we are through all aspects of our Embassy 

so that in my view that should be the highest priority of getting 

from now until whether it is next August or next December when 

the election is held, that we have done everything possible so that 

we can ensure that it is peaceful. And if for some reason it is not, 

we will look back and say we have done everything we could have 

done. 

And that is why in my view, if confirmed, I want to get out there 

as soon as possible to start building the relationships with the government so I can have influence, that I can understand the situation, and that I can do everything I can to prepare not only our 

Embassy to get involved but to bring the rest of the multilateral 

organizations, our international partners, and other people around 

so that we are all going the same way same day on this very, very 

important issue. It is a high priority and I believe that we can 

make a difference. 

But we cannot waste another day. There is so much that remains 

to be done. We saw it in Sudan in both the election and in the referendum. We can, through right training, through right programs, 

and right focus, produce an election that does represent the will of 

the people. That is what we will continue to do, and if I am confirmed, I will put my effort toward this because in my view it is 

one of the highest priorities I have. 

Senator COONS. One concern I have around sort of legitimacy, 

given the recent protests throughout north Africa and the Middle 

East, is transparency and corruption. A recent BBC report projected that maybe as much as a third of the Kenyan national government spending is lost or wasted through corruption. It has not 

ranked high on transparency indices. 

How pervasive do you think a problem or challenge corruption is 

for Kenya? Is it potentially a source of some tension or difficulty 

in the same way that it has been in other countries that have recently seen popular uprisings? What sort of a barrier is it to United 

126

States-Kenya trade, and what can we do to help those elements 

within Kenyan society and leadership that really want to tackle 

and fight corruption within Kenya? 

Mr. GRATION. Exactly right. From what I understand, Kenya is 

rated 154 out of 178 in terms of the corruption index. This is in 

my view has to stop, and it is not going to be able to stop maybe 

even under my tenure. But I think that, if confirmed, this is something that we need to put a big dent in because while the government officials and other people who are in a position to take, while 

they gain, what it is doing is it is just destroying the opportunities 

for creating wealth at the local level. Kenya is suffering with—well, 

they already have about half their population under 18, but if you 

take a look at folks under 30, only about 30 percent really have 

jobs that are producing incomes upon which they can support a 

family and their desired livelihood. 

So when you have corruption, it just hurts, and it also takes the 

motivation out of people. If they see somebody else getting rich by 

not working hard, it undermines the work ethic. So in my view for 

the good of future generations, this has got to be a priority. 

And while I do not know yet all the tools we can use, I think that 

there are a lot of tools that we can. And the first is the whole concept of reform and making sure that as is laid out in the new constitution, that ministers and Cabinet officials, I should say, have to 

get appointed and approved, that there is a new system of representation, a new house, the eight provinces are going into 47 

counties, and they will have representation. And you will not have 

the cronyism, hopefully, as in there right now. 

So it is going to start at the government, but it has got to go 

right down to the individual people because, having lived there—

and I am sure you experienced too—even down at the local level, 

there are elements of corruption and a way of doing business. And 

somehow that has got to change. And I believe we have to use all 

elements to help it change, whether it is the church with JudeoChristian values or whether it is part of the Muslim community 

through their outreach, whether it is through schools and teaching 

ethics from grade school on up. 

I do not know what the right solution is, but I got to tell you this 

is so pervasive and such a big problem and it is keeping Kenya 

from having access to the Millennium Challenge Account. It is 

keeping the people down, and I believe that we need to work together. 

Maybe this is something that we can form a task force among the 

international community to try to figure out how do we all together 

help make a difference because I do not think this is something 

America can solve. I think it is going to have to be done by the government itself, by the people themselves, by the Kenyans themselves, but it is going to take the full support of all the international community to help make this happen because it is going 

to involve that kind of dramatic change for it to be able to make 

a difference and be able to stick. 

Senator COONS. Ms. Gavin, Botswana has often been cited on 

those same rankings as among the most transparent in the world. 

And you previously cited the longstanding cultural traditions of 

openness and debate. I do not have much insight into how BotVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00134 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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swana, an extraction economy that experienced a sudden rise in 

wealth, has managed to avoid the same challenges that many other 

governments of all kinds have fallen into of exactly the sort of 

widespread corruption, large- and small-scale, that has characterized many other developing nations and some developed nations. 

Any advice or insight for us on how in a multilateral way, either 

through the international community or through values and ethics 

changes, we might make progress in nations throughout the region 

and the world? What lessons might we learn from Botswana? 

Ms. GAVIN. Well, I hope to, if confirmed, certainly learn more 

about why the things that work so well in Botswana work that 

way. But I do think there is real value simply in their example of 

a resource-rich country where the rule of law prevails, and in fact, 

government officials, controversial cases—sometimes the courts 

rule against the government. So you have a truly independent judiciary and a police force that protects the citizens rather than preying on them. 

I do think that the International Law Enforcement Academy that 

Botswana hosts and that the United States Government supports 

is an interesting example of trying to highlight Botswana’s reputation for good governance, rule-governed procedures, and respect for 

the rule of law to help build capacity internationally. Some 29 African countries participate in training there, largely focused on different aspects of transnational crime. But simply having the seat 

of this academy in a country with such a low level of corruption, 

I think is a good example of trying to maximize the value of the 

Botswanan story and make it relevant to the rest of the region. 

Senator COONS. Ms. Gavin, one of the biggest challenges, as you 

mentioned in your opening statement, facing Botswana is a very 

high rate of AIDS and HIV infection. There has been significant 

progress made to some large extent because of United States investment, but it is now moving to being one more directly led by 

the Botswana Government but where I understand there might be 

some great progress being made through a partnership between 

Merck and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the nation 

of Botswana. 

What can you suggest about lessons for us and challenges ahead 

to have an adult population that is, I think, at about 25 percent 

infection? It must be an enormous challenge for Botswana. How do 

you see the path ahead in terms of the American role, the multilateral role, and the role for the private sector and the philanthropic 

sector in tackling this greatest challenge for Botswana? 

Ms. GAVIN. I think you are right. There is no single thing that 

the United States Government does in Botswana that is more important than continuing this fight against HIV and AIDS, and I 

think that we probably can extract some valuable lessons for other 

countries hard hit by the epidemic, particularly in the success they 

have had in rolling out treatment and also almost eliminating 

mother-to-child transmission. 

But on prevention, there is still a tremendous amount of work to 

be done, and it will take interagency collaboration. PEPFAR, as 

you know, Senator, works best when the CDC and AID are working 

in a collaborative and complementary way and not engaged in a 

constant tussle for resources. 

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In Botswana, we also have some interesting other elements. 

DOD participates helping to work on HIV/AIDS issues with the 

Botswana defense forces. 

And our Peace Corps Volunteers in Botswana work exclusively 

on health issues. Botswana had graduated out of Peace Corps and 

then invited the Peace Corps back when the pandemic hit and they 

realized the magnitude of the challenge. 

So I think that there are very positive lessons that we can extract on the treatment side, much more to do on the prevention 

side, and I think critical to all this is going to be that interagency 

collaboration, making sure all those interagency elements are 

working together in conjunction then with the nongovernmental 

elements, Merck, Gates, and others, and critically, the most important partner, the Government of Botswana, in trying to address the 

prevention challenge. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

General, Kenya is a major focus for both the Global Health Initiative and the Feed the Future initiative, and both of these are 

signature initiatives for the administration and critical to our role 

in the region. But Congress is facing understandable significant 

pressure to reduce Federal spending, reduce the Federal deficit, 

and there is the very real possibility being discussed literally now 

of significant reductions in spending in the current fiscal year or 

possibly going forward in these areas. 

I would be interested in hearing what role you think there might 

be for urging either the Government of Kenya or other multilateral 

partners to contribute more of the funding, what kinds of changes 

you think there might be in terms of our role in Kenya, our 

progress in Kenya if funding is dramatically reduced, and what you 

see as the contribution that you could make as Ambassador in advancing both the Global Health Initiative and Feed the Future initiative on the ground in Kenya and then regionally. 

Mr. GRATION. In terms of Feed the Future, I think it is a very 

important program, but I think that we have to think about what 

we are trying to accomplish. And in my view, Kenya is too dependent on rain-fed agriculture, and there are a lot of ways you can get 

around that. 

First of all, I think what Feed the Future is doing in terms of 

understanding the lay of the land and the threats that people face 

are very important. 

But second, I think what they are doing in terms of subsistence 

farming is important. With better seed, better fertilizer, natural 

fertilizers, planting legumes, and in addition to nitrogen enrichment and planting of other crops in rotation is important. And so 

those kinds of things are very important. Even in terms of planting, techniques are important. 

But the piece that I believe would really help Kenya is if we 

think more about value chain analysis, what are the right crops, 

and then marketing and banking. If you build banks to where you 

can take the grain and bank it for a year, if it does not rain the 

next year, you can eat it, and if it rains, then you sell it. With fumigation and other techniques, you can store grain for a year very, 

very easily. 

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The second part of banking—it sort of evens out the market. Instead of having a glut of food when the harvests come around and 

then a dearth 4 months later, banking allows you to put food on 

the market in a way that it is stabilized. 

So there is a whole lot of things that I think can be included in 

the Feed the Future initiative so we can actually get more bang for 

the buck and ensure people when it does not rain. 

In terms of the Global Health Initiative, I think you are exactly 

right. We need to think about programs so that they can be absorbed by the government. The problem is that when you infuse a 

lot of capacity, clinics, more people on antiretroviral medicines, 

that kind of thing and then stop the funding and the government 

is not in a position to absorb it, it really creates a lot of problems. 

So I think two things need to happen. 

One is we need to be partnering with the government when we 

put these in so that there is a transition program built into the 

Global Health Initiative program or the Feed the Future program 

such that if there is going to be public sector adoption of this, then 

it is built right in in the beginning, and the governments know that 

they have to produce more nurses, they have to get a way to bring 

more medicines in so they can bring it in, which means that our 

programs may have to be smaller in the beginning or else we have 

to take the risk that we are going to have to fund these for a longer 

period of time. But the reality is build a program so the government can accept it, build a program that helps them accept it. So 

maybe the right answer is in the Global Health Initiative is not so 

much putting in more clinics but building more nurse training programs or more other ways that you can build the capacity for them 

to take this over in a way that allows you not to skip a beat when 

you do the transition. 

So I will be looking at both of these programs. I think they are 

both good programs, but I understand that they should be stopgap 

programs. They should not be programs that are still there 25 

years from now. And if we are not building programs to work ourselves out of that program, then I think there is a mistake. 

If you know anything about me, I am a big believer in affordability, sustainability, self-sustaining ability, and then scalability. 

If the program is really good, it should be able to take off on its 

own. So what I look for in the Feed the Future programs is while 

we put in pilot programs, we ought to be doing this in a way that 

they are self-sustaining or government-sustainable and then that 

they take off by themselves so that you are not always building a 

program, but they will end up growing by themselves. 

So these are the things that I think—those principles—we can 

look at in both the Global Health Initiative and Feed the Future 

to make sure that these programs do last without a constant infusion of U.S. dollars. But then again, bringing the international 

community in and mulilats into the program is also very important. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, General. 

Ms. Gavin, one of the criticisms of the Botswana Government 

that some indigenous people’s advocates have had is that there has 

been a resettlement policy for the San people mostly in the Central 

Kalahari Reserve, and the challenge has been raised that it is 

130

viewed as having been done largely to advance diamond extraction 

and at the expense of a traditional culture. 

If confirmed as Ambassador, what would you do to be involved 

in this issue and what do you see as the opportunities for some 

progress in dealing with the loss of this traditional culture in the 

Kalahari? 

Ms. GAVIN. This has been a longstanding, very difficult issue in 

Botswana, and I think that they have tried to address it both 

through direct dialogue between the government and different representatives of the San people, and sometimes the issue has been 

taken to court. It is a positive indicator that the government is not 

always on the winning side of the court decisions and it shows 

there is merit in seeking redress in the courts certainly. But it is 

not an issue that has been resolved, and I think it will remain very 

difficult. 

I think what the U.S. Government can do is try to determine if 

there are ways we can help facilitate better communication between the community still residing in the Central Kalahari Game 

Reserve which is actually quite small, but there are different elements of the community and different voices in the government 

itself. If there are things that we can do to help facilitate those 

lines of communication, it is certainly I think well worth exploring 

every avenue to see what is the world of the possible there. 

Senator COONS. General, I would be interested in your thoughts 

on Kenya’s role in fighting terrorism. Obviously, there is a significant challenge with piracy off the coast of Somalia and now extending out into the Indian Ocean quite a way and affecting not just 

the horn but the whole region. Also, Nairobi was the scene of one 

of the most horrific attacks on an American installation in the 

bombing of our Embassy. 

Your view on what as Ambassador you can and should be doing 

to be part of our fight against terrorism both within the nation of 

Kenya and in the region. 

Mr. GRATION. I think Kenya can be a very good ally and a partner in this effort. Kenyans understand terrorism. As you pointed 

out, a facility in their country was bombed. But if you take a look 

at the number of people killed, they bore the brunt of that attack 

many, many times over what Americans lost: 218 people and most 

of them Kenyan. 

They are also keenly aware of what happened on the 10th of July 

in Kampala when the al-Shabab bomb went off. Perpetrators of 

that crime, some of them potentially Kenyans. And so they are 

aware of that. 

And they are also aware that every time that one of these attacks happens, they lose income from tourism. Their economy is 

disrupted. 

So I think they are willing and ready to be partners. 

We have put a lot of effort into training police units and also 

military units, and in doing that, we are making sure that we are 

vetting properly to make sure that the people that we train will not 

be perpetrators of crimes of human rights violations and that kind 

of thing. 

Kenya has also proven themselves to be a strong partner in supporting out-of-country operations. They are involved in southern 

131

Sudan, and they have been involved in other contingencies around 

the world. So I think Kenya is a great foundation. 

Now, what do we need to do? I think we need to continue programs but maybe a little bit more specific. So we will take a good 

look at what are the ways that the Kenyans can be used more effectively. 

One area I think that we can do better is in intel. The Kenyans 

have their ear to the ground. They know a lot of things that are 

happening, as do governments throughout that region. And if we 

are going to operate, whether it be in Somalia or whether it be 

against piracy or whether it be in other transnational things that 

are happening in and around Kenya, they are probably going to 

know about it before we know about it. And to develop a relationship with them so that they will share intelligence, number one, 

but to develop a relationship with them and that we can train 

them in the areas where they are deficient so they can become 

more effective in helping us in the global effort, I think that would 

be important. 

So I will take a look and make sure that the training that we 

are doing meets the need not only for Kenyans, but for the rest of 

the international community and then look for areas that we can 

help with areas where they are deficient to improve their capacity 

to help. Kenyans can be and are already strong partners in the war 

on terrorism. 

Senator COONS. Ms. Gavin, what role do you see for the United 

States in promoting bilateral trade with Botswana and what opportunities, if any, are there for them to take advantage of United 

States technology transfer, partners with us for things like alternative energy, for water generation, for pharmaceuticals and otherwise? And what role do you see for yourself as Ambassador in promoting bilateral trade with Botswana? 

Ms. GAVIN. Thank you. If confirmed, I think that will be an absolutely essential part of my role as Ambassador. Particularly because Botswana is a middle-income country, it does not qualify for 

things like Millennium Challenge Initiative. Playing a role in 

bringing investors together with Botswanan businesses, in some 

cases the Botswanan Government, and critically taking a regional 

approach since it is such a small market I think is an absolutely 

essential part of trying to facilitate the economic diversification 

that is such a high priority for Botswana. So I think you have hit 

on a number of sectors that appear to have some real potential. 

Southern Africa has tremendous energy needs. South Africa, 

which provides the lion’s share of energy to the region, is strapped. 

It is clear that there is going to be a growing demand. And so there 

are some interesting small-scale projects in Botswana now around 

solar that probably bear a closer look. And I think that it is going 

to be essential to let people know what kind of investment climate 

Botswana has to offer and also to let people know what kind of regional infrastructure is there and see if we cannot be creative and 

get more done without using a lot of foreign assistance dollars to 

help what has been a very strong partner, sharing a lot of our interests and values, sustain that strength into the future. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

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General—and this will be my last question—how do you see your 

role, if confirmed as Ambassador, in advancing United States-Kenyan bilateral trade ties? We export and import roughly the same 

amounts. Have there been opportunities for Kenya to take advantage of the African Growth and Opportunities Act and are there 

other things we could be doing to promote their adoption of U.S.-

distributed energy generation, for example, or water technologies or 

new developments in seed or grains or other things that you have 

spoken about before? How, as Ambassador, would you advance both 

the development of Kenya and American export opportunities? 

Mr. GRATION. I think there is a great opportunity to create jobs 

in America by increasing trade in Kenya. We already have a great 

process going where we actually have quite a bit of trade. There 

is a surplus and the surplus has been for the last 5 years. Last 

year it was $34 million. 

The issues that you point out are ones that I think we have to 

grapple with. Right now, AGOA is pretty much a textile kind of 

thing. In fact, I believe it is somewhere around 72 percent of the 

products that are exported from Kenya to the United States under 

AGOA would be in the textile. But there are so many other things 

that Kenya could add to this, and to help them diversify and increase their base so they do not take precut and just assemble 

them and ship them off to America, but they actually do things 

that would create jobs for Kenya. And then in return, I think there 

are so many things that can be done in Kenya on the IT side, on 

the energy production side. 

The Kenyans are bright. They are highly educated. The literacy 

rate is extremely high. 

I think that there is a way that we can import in a way that creates jobs, wealth creation opportunities in Kenya but would also 

create jobs back here. And I look forward to being part of that, 

working with our international community, Americans that are 

there. There are almost 20,000 Americans that are involved in private volunteer activities, NGO activities, but also in commercial 

business opportunities. Right now we are going to have to take a 

look at where our competitive advantages are and where we can 

strengthen them. 

The other thing I would say is that I want to make sure that we 

level the playing field. There are some competitions to American 

firms, whether they come from China or other kind of places, 

where we can probably do more to give our products a better shot 

of taking hold in the country. 

So those are the kind of things I will work with and I hope to 

work with the American community to come up with their ideas to 

know how I can help them better. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, General. Thank you, Ms. Gavin. 

Thank you to your families. Thank you for your service. Thank you 

to Clara for her great patience and persistence. She is asleep I 

know. I am grateful for your parents before us and your testimony. 

The record of this hearing will remain open until the close of 

business tomorrow, Wednesday, April 6, in the event there are 

other members of the subcommittee who were not able to join us 

today but who wish to submit additional questions for the record. 

Again, thank you very much. 

133

And with that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:08 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF SCOTT GRATION TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. Previous reports by the Office of the Inspector General described a number of problems within the Africa Bureau, including poorly led posts and particularly notable failures in public diplomacy. In your testimony to the committee, you 

discussed ways you will approach some of the management challenges that result 

from the size and scope of the Embassy in Nairobi. How has your previous experience shaped your views regarding effective public diplomacy and if confirmed as 

Ambassador, how would you seek to approach related issues?

Answer. Effective public diplomacy is a core element of diplomacy, and an exceedingly challenging one. As Special Envoy to Sudan, I saw firsthand how important 

it was to understand the many audiences with whom I was sharing my messages. 

I endeavored to reach out beyond government officials in all parts of Sudan to understand the perspectives of people from all segments of society and to engage in 

a substantive dialogue on their views about their country and about U.S. policy. In 

complex situations such as Sudan, effective public diplomacy builds confidence and 

trust that the policy and actions of the United States are based on an understanding 

and appreciation of the people and history of the host country. Such confidence and 

trust lays the foundation for effectively sharing our values and experiences in a way 

that furthers achievement of mutual interests. If confirmed, I expect to encounter 

that same diversity of background and perspectives in Kenya and plan to mobilize 

all sections of the embassy to support public diplomacy efforts.

Question. Kenya is one of the original focus countries of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and HIV/AIDS funding makes up the largest 

portion of U.S. assistance to Kenya. In your testimony to the committee, you discussed the importance of partnering with the Government of Kenya on these issues. 

What aspects of such cooperation have been most successful and where do you see 

room for improvements?

Answer. The Kenya PEPFAR program, together with other USG health investments there, is one of the U.S. Government’s largest health portfolios. The PEPFAR 

program in Kenya has been very successful since its inception in 2004 and, in many 

ways, serves as a model in terms of success in delivering services, efficient program 

implementation, and country ownership. In 2009, the Government of Kenya (GOK) 

and the U.S. Government signed the Partnership Framework. This 5-year joint strategic agenda was based on the GOK’s National AIDS Strategic Plan, and is organized around its four core pillars: health sector HIV service delivery, mainstreaming 

of the HIV and AIDS response, community-based HIV programs, and governance 

and strategic information. In addition, the U.S. team in Kenya team has worked 

together with the GOK to reform the Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) of 

the Global Fund. The CCM in Kenya is now performing coordination and oversight 

of all donor funding in the health sector for improvements in bilateral cooperation—

not just Global Fund. The committee is assuming accountability for overall health 

sector performance. This is a new model for Africa and promises to be a best 

practice. 

Our joint efforts have delivered strong results. For example, in FY 2010, 410,300 

individuals were receiving antiretroviral treatment thanks to PEPFAR support. In 

addition, 1,384,400 HIV-positive individuals received care and support (including 

TB/HIV) and 673,000 orphans and vulnerable children (OVC) received support services. On the other hand, HIV incidence has remained stable from 2001 to 2009, 

showing that Kenya continues to face challenges in preventing new HIV infections. 

The Kenya PEPFAR program has also been a leader among PEPFAR-supported 

countries in streamlining service delivery and supporting development of Kenyan 

Government disease surveillance and monitoring capacity. As a Global Health 

Initiative (GHI) Plus country, the U.S. team in Kenya, together with the GOK, has 

developed a strategy that exemplifies a whole-of-government approach thereby increasing impact through strategic coordination and integration. 

Moving forward, if confirmed, I will work to strengthen national systems, including the health care workforce, and to build capacity and political will in Kenya for 

134

sustainable, long-term Kenyan-led responses. If confirmed, I expect to be personally 

engaged in the effort to promote these objectives.

Question. In your work on Sudan, you sought to ensure that life-saving assistance 

reached people in Darfur, to support the international peace process, and to help 

North and South navigate their way to a lasting and sustainable peace. While there 

have been setbacks, the January 9 referendum was a great achievement for the people of Sudan and a testament to U.S. engagement. If confirmed, how will your experience in Sudan guide your work in helping Kenya to address its challenges, including implementation of the constitution, and free, fair, and safe elections in 2012?

Answer. There are some general principles that guided my work in Sudan which 

I believe will also help me effectively work with Kenya as it moves through this 

challenging and exciting time in its history. First, I believe that the United States 

needs to be actively engaged throughout the country, talking to all parties and helping to create an environment where they can forge home-grown solutions and lasting reconciliation. Second, these efforts in country need to be supported by sustained, high-level U.S. government attention and commitment to achieving those 

objectives. Third, we must work closely not only with Kenyans but with the international community, including multilateral organizations, regional states and other 

countries providing financial support to ensure a coordinated, coherent, and effective 

approach. 

RESPONSES OF MICHELLE GAVIN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. Previous reports by the Office of the Inspector General described a number of problems within the Africa Bureau, including understaffed, sometimes poorly 

led posts and particularly notable failures in public diplomacy. If confirmed as 

Ambassador, how would you seek to address these issues? How has your previous 

experience prepared you for such a post and shaped your views regarding managing 

an embassy?

Answer. I have consulted extensively with the Africa Bureau and with the U.S. 

Embassy in Gaborone to understand the management challenges that I would face 

at Embassy Gaborone if confirmed as Ambassador. I have reviewed the 2009 Inspector General Report of the Africa Bureau that identified concerns over leadership and 

the need to engage proactively in broader public diplomacy. I have had discussions 

here in Washington about how to address these issues. If confirmed, I will ensure 

solid leadership and recognize that the success of Embassy Gaborone will be founded on a valued and productive mission team that incorporates a whole-of-government approach, which I will be honored to lead. I will ensure we have strong communication among our mission team and the Africa Bureau to deliver consistent 

messages and develop a vibrant public outreach strategy to share our U.S. policy 

goals. Embassy Gaborone is already working closely with government, the media, 

nongovernmental organizations and private citizens in Botswana to ensure that our 

close bilateral partnership continues and remains strong. I would continue ongoing 

Embassy efforts to reach out to key sectors of Batswana youth to expose them to 

U.S. culture, peers, and mentors; build close relationships with Botswana’s media 

outlets and provide opportunities to the media for professional development and exposure to U.S. counterparts; ensure that rising stars in Botswana participate in academic and cultural exchanges to the United States; and I will strive to use social 

media tools to reach a broad segment of Batswana, especially youth, with information about U.S. policies and programs. 

In my position as Special Advisor to the President for African Affairs, I gained 

considerable experience facilitating cooperation and coordination between different 

U.S. Government agencies at the national level. If confirmed, I look forward to 

translating these skills into managing interagency relationships at the country 

level. In my position as legislative director for then-Senator Salazar, I had the privilege of mentoring a staff that was enthusiastic and dedicated but almost entirely 

new to Capitol Hill. I look forward to taking on the role as guide and mentor to 

the hardworking and dedicated staff at the Embassy in Gaborone, particularly the 

entry-level officers.

Question. As you noted in your testimony to the committee, if confirmed you will 

serve as the United States representative to the Southern African Development 

Community (SADC). Given that regional integration and cooperation are essential 

to long-term stability, what are the benefits and challenges to Botswana stemming 

from its membership in SADC and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU)? 

How do you envision your role vis-a-vis SADC?

135

Answer. Botswana has the privilege of hosting the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone. 

Botswana also benefits from its proximity to the regional economic hub of South 

Africa and from shared customs revenues from SACU. Nevertheless, Botswana has 

often been a lone voice in SADC on the peace and security front, particularly regarding Zimbabwe, and SADC itself has had difficulty emerging as an organization that 

is greater than the sum of its parts. With regards to SACU, Botswana may see reduced customs revenue as a result of a South African proposal to change the current 

revenue-sharing formula. 

If confirmed, I would work with Chiefs of Mission in other SADC countries on 

ways to help broaden the U.S.–SADC relationship so that Zimbabwe is only one of 

many issues we have to discuss. I hope to engage where appropriate to encourage 

greater regional integration that would promote U.S. trade as well as further economic diversification in Botswana. I also hope to encourage Botswana to continue 

their advocacy in the region on transparency and good governance in the mining 

sector and beyond. 

(137)

NOMINATIONS 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 6, 2011

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

David Bruce Shear, of New York, to be Ambassador to the Socialist 

Republic of Vietnam 

Kurt Walter Tong, of Maryland, for the rank of Ambassador during 

his tenure as U.S. Senior Official for the Asia-Pacific Economic 

Cooperation (APEC) Forum 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Office Building, Hon. Jim Webb, presiding. 

Present: Senator Webb. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM WEBB,

U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA 

Senator WEBB. This hearing will come to order. 

Today the subcommittee will consider the nominations of Mr. 

David Shear to be the U.S. Ambassador to the Socialist Republic 

of Vietnam and Mr. Kurt Tong to have the rank of Ambassador 

while serving as the U.S. Senior Official to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC). 

I would like to begin this hearing, as chair of the Subcommittee 

on East Asia, by expressing my condolences to the people of Japan 

and commending them for their courage and tenacity in facing the 

recovery from the terrible earthquake and tsunami that occurred 

nearly 1 month ago. Japan is a key security ally, a diplomatic partner and a great friend of the United States. And as these events 

have tragically illustrated, the nations of East Asia and Southeast 

Asia remain of critical importance to our economic, strategic and 

diplomatic interests. 

Following the earthquake and tsunami, the United States military and civilian agencies rapidly offered support to the Japanese 

Government to assist in the search and rescue of civilians. To date, 

the United States has delivered more than 200 tons of food, 2 million gallons of water, 16,000 gallons of fuel, and 186,000 tons of 

other relief commodities. Also, teams from the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission continue to actively 

monitor and support the Government of Japan, as needed, and to 

mitigate the situation at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant. 

138

Japan’s economy and social system face enormous ramifications 

from this disaster, with the World Bank now estimating the cost 

of an economic recovery at more than $230 billion. Our assistance 

and attention to this issue obviously will be for the long term, 

given the close relationship that we have with Japan and the role 

that Japan plays in the regional and global economy. 

It is vital that we remain engaged in this region, even as we balance diplomatic engagement in Asia with other global crises, particularly again in the Middle East. And for this reason, our relationship with Vietnam and our leadership in multilateral organizations such as APEC, will play a key role in promoting stability and 

prosperity in the region. 

I have had the good fortune to have observed and participated 

in United States/Vietnam relations now for more than 40 years. In 

the past 16 years, since the normalization of our relationship, I 

have seen dramatic improvements in the relationship, especially in 

the past 6 or 7 years. Our military effort in Vietnam, during that 

war, was characterized by strongly held and differing views, both 

here and there. Views that were sincerely held by well-meaning 

people across the spectrum. These divisions, the terrible cost of the 

war and its bitter aftermath, have made reconciliation between our 

two countries a long and complicated process. The process of reconciliation has been even more challenging for the 2 million overseas Vietnamese in the United States, many of whom suffered 

greatly under the victorious communist regime and have had to 

build new lives and chart a new course to reconnect with their 

homeland. 

In the years since normalization our governments have carefully, 

but demonstrably, come to communicate openly and positively. We 

have begun to cooperate on bilateral and regional challenges, including sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea and water security challenges along the Mekong River region. 

Last year, in large part due to Vietnam’s successful chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN, we 

saw increasing momentum in our relationship. At the ASEAN regional forum, in July of last year, Secretary Clinton announced a 

new American policy on sovereignty disputes in the South China 

Sea, arguing that the resolution of these disputes and freedom of 

navigation in the South China Sea are American national interests. 

This new policy offers American Government assistance to facilitate a multilateral resolution in these disputes. I will say for the 

record that I have not only supported these initiatives, but also 

suggested them, including while chairing a subcommittee hearing 

on maritime territorial disputes in July 2009. 

In addition to our regional cooperation, our trade relationship 

with Vietnam has grown, from $220 million in 1994 to more than 

$18 billion 2010. The United States was the leading source of foreign direct investment in Vietnam in 2009 and Vietnam is the second largest source of American clothing imports. 

Building off its 2007 entry into the World Trade Organization, 

Vietnam is moving to implement the structural reforms needed to 

modernize and open its economy. Moreover, Vietnam has joined the 

Trans-Pacific Partnership trade negotiations for an agreement, that 

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if successfully implemented, will further open Vietnam’s market 

and allow American trade with Vietnam to grow. 

With these developments there remain challenges to our relationship. The United States continues to encourage Vietnam to protect 

individual freedoms, including religious freedom, freedom of the 

press, expression and labor rights. In this process it is also important for both countries to make efforts to bridge the deep divisions 

affecting both American and Vietnamese societies, some of which 

still languish from the war and from the treatment of those who 

fought alongside Americans in that war. We must continue to push 

forward with an inclusive dialogue that allows for meaningful reconciliation among all sides. 

Just as our engagement with Southeast Asia has grown through 

ASEAN, our participation in APEC has illustrated the benefits of 

expanded American involvement in East Asia multilateral organizations. Our active participation in APEC supports our strategic 

and economic interests and it demonstrates that our commitment 

to this region’s growth is permanent. 

Furthermore, this year the United States will serve as host for 

the annual APEC meetings, including the leaders’ meeting in November. This role will allow us to continue the discussion initiated 

by Japan last year on regional economic integration, development 

and human security. Regional economic integration with 

likeminded trade partners, such as Japan and Korea, will be an 

important step forward in our long-term economic recovery, especially as Japan recovers from the recent earthquake and tsunami. 

This integration is best implemented in a way that maximizes the 

advantages of our respective economies and also protects our workers from unfair competition. And this principle is even more important when considering the growing interdependence of our economy 

with many of the economies of East Asia. 

The 21 member economies at APEC generate more than half of 

global trade. Five of our fifteen top trading partners are in East 

Asia and six of the top fifteen are members of APEC. This demonstrates that the United States is truly an Asia-Pacific nation and 

it is important to recognize that our economic and strategic future 

will be tied to this region. Therefore, I hope American participation 

in APEC can encourage an economic recovery for all members 

based on reduced barriers to trade, sustainable growth, and improved transparency. For our part, fulfilling commitments on free 

trade agreements, such as ratifying the United States-Korea free 

trade agreement and putting forward a comprehensive trade policy 

for the 21st century, can support these efforts. 

I look forward to the testimony of our nominees. I welcome both 

of them. And before we hear their remarks, I would like to briefly 

introduce them and then invite them to recognize those who have 

come with them today to support their nomination. 

And I would also state at this point that Senator Inhofe has an 

opening statement which will be included in the record at this 

point. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR FROM OKLAHOMA

Thank you, Senator Webb, for chairing this full committee confirmation hearing 

today for Kurt Walter Tong and David Bruce Shear to be Ambassadors for the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, respectively. 

Mr. Tong is currently the Economic Coordinator for the Bureau of East Asian and 

Pacific Affairs, organizing bureauwide efforts on economic policy issues. He is also 

U.S. Senior Official for APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation), managing all aspects of U.S. participation in the organization. Mr. Tong has spent 17 years working 

and studying in East Asia, including service at the U.S. Embassies in Manila, 

Tokyo, Beijing, and Seoul. Most recently, he served as Director for Korean Affairs 

at the Department of State from 2008 to 2009. Prior to that, he was Director for 

Asian Economic Affairs at the National Security Council from 2006 to 2008. He was 

a Visiting Scholar at the Tokyo University Faculty of Economics from 1995 to 1996. 

Prior to joining the Foreign Service, Mr. Tong was an Associate with the Boston 

Consulting Group in Tokyo. 

I have met with Mr. Tong and am convinced that his long and distinguished diplomatic record has prepared him well to be the Ambassador to APEC. 

APEC is the premier economic organization in the Asia-Pacific region. It was 

founded in 1989 for the purpose of promoting trade and investment liberalization 

in the Asia-Pacific as a means of fostering sustainable economic growth and prosperity in the region. APEC is one of a few international fora in which both China 

and Taiwan are members. And has made trade facilitation a major priority, something that I strongly support. 

APEC has two distinct features among multilateral trade organizations. First, all 

the liberalization measures taken by its members are voluntary. Members announce 

their liberalization measures via ‘‘Individual Action Plans.’’ Second, these liberalization measures are generally extended to all economies—not just APEC members—

under the concept of ‘‘open regionalism.’’ However, there have also been criticisms 

that the United States is not sufficiently emphasizing U.S. ties to Asia. In 2010, 

plans for a Presidential trip to Australia, Indonesia, and other countries were repeatedly postponed due to domestic events. In addition, while the United States was 

the first nation to announce it would appoint a full-time, resident ambassador to 

the Asian Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), David Lee Cardin was 

not confirmed until March 3, 2011. The delay in appointing a U.S. Senior Official 

for APEC, especially when the United States is hosting the ongoing 2011 APEC 

meetings can be seen by some in Asia as another sign of insufficient prioritization 

of this important region. 

The U.S. is hosting APEC in 2011 for the first time since 1993. The United States 

has chosen for its theme, ‘‘Creating a seamless economy in the Asia-Pacific region 

by strengthening regional integration and expanding trade, promoting a green economy, and better coordinating trade regulations.’’ Mr. Tong commented on the significance of this before House Foreign Affairs Committee in 2009 by stating that, 

‘‘Hosting APEC will be a tremendous opportunity for the United States to promote 

U.S. business and investment opportunities, which will benefit American workers, 

farmers, and businesses of all sizes. It will also be an important opportunity for the 

United States to define a new, 21st century economic policy agenda for the AsiaPacific region.’’ I agree. 

I support the nomination of Mr. Tong, and I believe he will work with Congress, 

the business community, and his colleagues in the executive branch to utilize our 

hosting of APEC this year to the fullest as an opportunity to both restore confidence 

at home and promote new opportunities for our exporters overseas. If confirmed, 

Kurt Tong will work to advance U.S. interests through the Asia-Pacific Economic 

Cooperation (APEC) forum as we strive to create an economic system in the AsiaPacific region that supports growth and job creation here at home. 

Mr. Shear is also a career Foreign Service officer—joining in 1982—and is currently serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He 

has a distinguished overseas career serving in Sapporo, Beijing, Tokyo, and Kuala 

Lumpur. In Washington, he has served in the Offices of Japanese, Chinese, and 

Korean Affairs and as the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Political 

Affairs. He was Director of the Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs in 2008–

09. With this distinguished background, I believe that Mr. David Shear will serve 

honorably and effectively as our Ambassador to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 

Although U.S. relations with Vietnam have become increasingly cooperative in the 

years since political normalization, the freedom to practice religion and to express 

religious thought—an inalienable right to all individuals—is still not fully recognized in Vietnam. I feel that there is a dire need to focus on religious freedom in 

141

Vietnam, and should you be confirmed Mr. Shear, I charge you with taking up this 

dire need. 

In 2005, Vietnam passed comprehensive religious freedom legislation, outlawing 

forced renunciations and permitting the official recognition of new denominations. 

Since that time, the government has granted official national recognition or registration to a number of new religions and religious groups, including eight more 

Protestant denominations, and has registered hundreds of local congregations particularly in the central highlands. As a result, in November 2006, the Department 

of State lifted the designation of Vietnam as a ‘‘Country of Particular Concern,’’ 

based on a determination that the country was no longer a serious violator of religious freedoms, as defined by the International Religious Freedom Act. This decision 

was reaffirmed by the Department of State in 2007, 2008, and 2009. 

Nevertheless, I strongly feel there is room for further progress. The government’s 

slow pace of church registration, particularly in the northwest highlands, and harassment of certain religious leaders for their political activism (especially Father Ly 

Tong), including leaders of the unrecognized United Buddhist Church of Vietnam 

and Hoa Hao faith were an ongoing source of U.S. concern. Violence against the 

Plum Village Buddhist order at the Bat Nha Pagoda in Lam Dong and Catholic 

parishioners in Con Dau parish outside of Danang and outside of Hanoi at

Dong Chiem parish at the hands of the police and organized mobs is particularly 

troubling. 

Thus, there must remain focus on increasing the Vietnamese Government’s respect for human rights and religious freedom. There remains a deep concern about 

the imprisonment of dissidents, restrictions on the media and the Internet, and the 

harassment of religious groups. Vietnam will not realize its full potential without 

greater respect for human rights, and its troubling record in this area could limit 

the growth of our relationship. I believe that if Mr. Shear is confirmed, and I will 

support his nomination, he will make human rights and religious freedom a central 

part of his conversations with Vietnam’s communist leaders. 

Thank you again, Senator Webb, for chairing this full committee nomination hearing for ambassadorial posts in the East Asian and Pacific Affairs region.

Senator WEBB. First I would like to welcome David Shear, the 

nominee to be the Ambassador to Vietnam. He currently serves as 

the Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 

at the State Department. Previously he was Director of the Office 

of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs. His overseas assignments include Sapporo, Beijing, Tokyo, and Kuala Lumpur and he has 

served several assignments here in Washington. 

Deputy Assistant Secretary Shear speaks Chinese, Japanese, and 

is practicing Vietnamese. He just tried some on me when I said 

hello. And has a first degree rank in Kendo Japanese fencing. 

Kurt Tong, who is the nominee for the rank of Ambassador while 

serving as the U.S. senior official to the APEC Forum, is with us 

also. Prior to this assignment, Mr. Tong was the Director for Korean Affairs in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs. He led 

the White House National Security Council’s Asian Economic Affairs Bureau from 2006 to 2008. In his 17 years of work and study 

in Asia, Mr. Tong has completed assignments in Manila, Tokyo, 

Beijing and Seoul and was a visiting scholar at the Tokyo University Faculty of Economics. He speaks Japanese, Mandarin Chinese, 

Korean and Tagalog. 

And again, I welcome both of you here today. I will look forward 

to your testimony. 

And Mr. Shear, why don’t you begin and please feel free to recognize anyone who has come to support you in the hearing today. 

142

STATEMENT OF DAVID BRUCE SHEAR, NEW YORK, TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM 

Mr. SHEAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I introduce my 

family members I would like to make sure that everybody understands that a first degree rank in Kendo is the lowest rank——

[Laughter.] 

Mr. SHEAR [continuing]. Not the highest rank. It took a few years 

to get to——

Senator WEBB. You still swing a bad stick, I am sure. 

Mr. SHEAR. Sir, I have a large family cheering section here and 

I will—I would like to introduce my wife, Barbara, and my daughter, Jennifer, and my sister, Laurel. And I have a whole crowd of 

nieces and nephews here today, too, as well as our family friend, 

Dr. Barry Manning. 

Senator WEBB. Well, we welcome all of you to the hearing today. 

Mr. SHEAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am honored to appear before you as the President’s nominee to 

serve as Ambassador to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. I am 

deeply grateful for the confidence that President Obama and Secretary Clinton have shown in me. And if confirmed, I look forward 

to working closely with Congress to advance U.S. interests in Vietnam. 

Thirty-five years ago our two countries ended a war that left an 

indelible mark on both of our peoples. For Americans of my generation, the experience of that war represents an important juncture 

in our history. Yet today, just 16 years after restoring diplomatic 

relations, we are already seeing the benefits of the commitment, on 

both sides, to move beyond our difficult past and forge a constructive relationship. 

As Secretary Clinton said in Hanoi last year, our two countries 

have reached a level of cooperation that would have been unimaginable just a few years ago. That is why, in her conversations with 

Vietnam’s senior leaders in Hanoi last year, she proposed that we 

consider establishing a strategic partnership with Vietnam. This is 

the logical next step for a relationship that has moved toward increased cooperation and dialogue. 

The range of senior level engagement last year was quite extraordinary. If confirmed, I will continue to deepen our engagement 

in areas such as regional security, nonproliferation, law enforcement, health and climate change. 

I am also committed to increasing educational and other peopleto-people exchanges. These people-to-people connections enrich us 

and strengthen the bonds between our two societies. 

Trade, of course, will remain a lynchpin of our relationship. Our 

two-way trade continues to grow, from $15.7 billion in 2009 to 

$18.5 billion last year. If confirmed, I will do everything I can to 

increase U.S. exports to Vietnam through the President’s National 

Export Initiative. I also look forward to continued negotiations 

what the Vietnamese to advance the Trans-Pacific Partnership. 

Improved military-to-military ties will also contribute to stronger 

bilateral relations. Currently we already cooperate in such areas as 

maritime security, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and 

disaster relief and peacekeeping operations. We have also estabVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00150 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
143

lished a successful record of ship visits including an historic port 

call to Da Nang by the USS John S. McCain last year. 

As we develop a strategy partnership with Vietnam, we must remain focused on increasing the Vietnamese Government’s respect 

for human rights and religious freedom. We remain concerned 

about the imprisonment of dissidents, restrictions on the media 

and the Internet and the harassment of religious groups. Vietnam 

will not realize its full potential without greater respect for human 

rights, and its troubling record in this area could limit the growth 

of our relationship. If confirmed, I will make human rights and religious freedom a central part of my conversations with Vietnam’s 

leaders and with the Vietnamese people. 

Mr. Chairman, while major strides have been made in our relationship, 16 years is still too short to have completely overcome the 

painful legacy of our past. If confirmed, I will continue to strengthen our cooperation with Vietnam on the solemn task of accounting 

for Americans missing from the war. I will work hard to maintain 

our assistance with efforts to remove unexploded ordnance. And by 

January 2012 I expect that we will have broken ground on a major 

effort to remediate dioxin residue from the soil at Da Nang Airport, 

one of several hotspots where the defoliant, Agent Orange, was 

stored during the war. We also continue to provide assistance to 

Vietnam’s disabled citizens, without regard to cause. 

Sir, I have spent my career in the Asia-Pacific region and I am 

personally committed to using all of the knowledge and skills I 

have gained over the past 29 years to pursue the American peoples’ 

interests in Vietnam. If confirmed, I will do my utmost to ensure 

that our relationship with Vietnam is among the strongest in the 

East Asia region. 

There is much work to be done and I look forward to earning 

your confidence. Thank you for your consideration of my nomination and I welcome your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shear follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID BRUCE SHEAR

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you 

as the President’s nominee to serve as Ambassador to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. I am deeply grateful for the confidence that President Obama and Secretary 

Clinton have shown in me and, if confirmed, I look forward to working closely with 

Congress to advance U.S. interests in Vietnam. 

Thirty-five years ago our two countries ended a war that left an indelible mark 

on both of our peoples. For Americans of my generation, the experience of that war 

represents an important juncture in our history. Yet today, just 15 years after restoring diplomatic relations, we are already seeing the benefits of a commitment on 

both sides to move beyond our difficult past and forge a constructive relationship. 

As Secretary Clinton said in Hanoi last year, our two countries have reached a 

level of cooperation that would have been unimaginable just a few years ago. That 

is why in her conversations with Vietnam’s senior leaders in Hanoi last July, and 

again in October, she proposed that we consider establishing a strategic partnership 

with Vietnam. This is the logical next step for a relationship that has moved consistently toward increased cooperation and dialogue. 

The range of U.S. senior-level engagement last year was extraordinary. If confirmed, I will continue to deepen our engagement in areas such as regional security, 

nonproliferation, law enforcement, health, climate change, and science and technology. I am also committed to increasing educational and other people-to-people exchanges. These connections enrich us and strengthen the bonds between our two 

societies. 

Trade will remain a linchpin of our relationship with Vietnam. Our two-way trade 

continues to grow—from $15.7 billion in 2009 to $18.5 billion last year. If confirmed, 

144

I will do everything I can to increase U.S. exports to Vietnam through the President’s National Export Initiative; in addition to continuing negotiations with the 

Vietnamese to advance the Trans-Pacific Partnership. 

Improved military-to-military ties will also contribute to stronger bilateral relations. Currently, there is already cooperation on maritime security, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, peacekeeping operations, defense 

academy exchanges, and military medicine. There is also a successful record of ship 

visits, including a historic port call to Danang by the USS John S. McCain last 

year. 

Additionally, I hope that we will continue to provide funding to strengthen Vietnam’s health systems and to help the country build the capacity it needs to address 

the scourge of HIV/AIDS and emerging pandemic threats. 

As we develop a strategic partnership with Vietnam, we must remain focused on 

increasing the Vietnamese Government’s respect for human rights and religious 

freedom. There remains a deep concern about the imprisonment of dissidents, restrictions on the media and the Internet, and the harassment of religious groups. 

Vietnam will not realize its full potential without greater respect for human rights, 

and its troubling record in this area could limit the growth of our relationship. If 

confirmed, I will make human rights and religious freedom a central part of my conversations with Vietnam’s leaders and with the Vietnamese people. 

While major strides have been made in our relationship, 15 years is still too short 

to have completely overcome the painful legacy of our past. If confirmed, I will continue to strengthen our cooperation with Vietnam on the solemn task of accounting 

for Americans missing from the war. I will work hard to maintain our assistance 

with demining and efforts to remove unexploded ordnance. By January 2012, we 

will have broken ground on a major effort to remediate dioxin residue from the soil 

at Danang Airport, one of several ‘‘hotspots’’ where the defoliant Agent Orange was 

stored during the war. We also continue to provide assistance for Vietnam’s disabled 

citizens, without regard to cause. 

I have spent my career in the Asia-Pacific region, and I am personally committed 

to using all of the knowledge and skills I have gained over the past 29 years to pursue the American people’s interests in Vietnam. If confirmed, I will do my utmost 

to ensure that our relationship with Vietnam is among the most successful in the 

East Asian region. There is much work to be done, and I look forward to earning 

your confidence. 

Thank you for your consideration of my nomination. I welcome your questions.

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Tong, welcome and if there are people you would like to introduce, please feel free to do so. 

STATEMENT OF KURT WALTER TONG, MARYLAND, FOR THE 

RANK OF AMBASSADOR DURING HIS TENURE AS U.S. SENIOR OFFICIAL FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION (APEC) FORUM 

Mr. TONG. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to introduce my wonderful wife, Mika, and daughter, 

Reia. I have another daughter, Mia, and a son, Kyle. They were not 

able to make it today. They are equally wonderful children as well. 

Senator WEBB. Let the record show, you love all your children 

equally. [Laughter.] 

Welcome to those of you who are here. And I know it’s a great 

day for you. 

Mr. TONG. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

I’ve also submitted a written record—written statement for the 

record. 

Senator WEBB. Yes. Both of your full statements will be entered 

into the record of this hearing. 

Mr. TONG. So thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am truly honored to appear before you today to seek Senate 

confirmation as the U.S. Senior Official for APEC with the rank of 

Ambassador. Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I look forward to working 

145

very closely with you and with other Members of Congress to leverage the considerable potential of APEC to build an economic system in the Asia-Pacific region that supports growth and job creation here at home. 

As you know, APEC is the premier economic organization in the 

Asia-Pacific region and a key venue for engaging the most economically dynamic region of the world. APEC’s 21 members, stretching 

from Chile to China, account for more than half of the global economy. They purchase 58 percent of our goods exports and comprise 

a market of $2.7 billion consumers. Through APEC the United 

States aims to tackle a wide range of issues critical to long-term 

prosperity around the Pacific rim. 

Most important, the United States uses APEC to open markets 

in the Asia-Pacific region, and to connect those markets to American exporters. Our focus includes eliminating barriers to trade and 

investment and creating better environments for our citizens to do 

business overseas. APEC initiatives lay the foundation for high 

standard, comprehensive trade agreements such as the TransPacific Partnership now being negotiated, that can help deepen 

America’s economic ties to the region and build a more level economic playing field for Americans to compete successfully. 

At the same time, the United States and the other APEC members recognize that rapid growth is not the sole objective. We must 

also achieve high quality growth to provide widespread benefits to 

society. APEC has undertaken useful initiatives to help promote 

growth that is balanced between and within economies, includes all 

segments of society, and is sustainable in the environmental sense. 

In 2011, as you noted, the United States is hosting APEC for the 

first time since 1993. This is a tremendous opportunity for the 

United States to exhibit leadership by forging a 21st century economic agenda for the Asia-Pacific and by building an enduring economic architecture for the region that is open, free, transparent 

and fair. 

Mr. Chairman, much is at stake. As President Obama has stated, 

if we can increase our exports to APEC countries by just 5 percent 

we can increase the number of U.S. jobs by hundreds of thousands. 

In 2010, a recovery year, U.S. exports to APEC actually expanded 

by 25 percent. American products, innovation and know-how are 

competitive and in high demand in Asia. 

APEC 2011 is a critical chance to showcase our strengths. If confirmed as U.S. Senior Official for APEC with the rank of Ambassador, I pledge to work tirelessly with Congress, the business community and my colleagues in the executive branch to leverage 

APEC to both restore confidence at home and to promote new opportunities for our exporters overseas. If confirmed, I pledge to put 

all of my experience and energy to work to advance our overall economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region. 

During my 21 years as a career Foreign Service officer, as you 

noted, I have handled trade, finance, and development issues at 

our Embassies in Manila, Tokyo, Beijing, and Seoul and have also 

served at the Department of State and in the National Security 

Council. 

Mr. Chairman, it would be a great privilege to serve my country 

as the U.S. Senior Official for APEC with a rank of Ambassador. 

146

The Asia-Pacific regions represents the future of the global economy, but the exact contours of that future have yet to be fully defined. APEC plays a key role in shaping the region and I stand 

ready to help seize this opportunity to promote growth and job-creating opportunities in the Asia-Pacific for American businesses and 

citizens. 

And finally before closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to take 

note of the condolences which you offered to Japan and share those 

condolences and also pledge that we will look for ways to utilize 

our hosting of APEC in 2011 to consider ways that that organization can be of assistance, both to Japan and to future sufferers of 

similar tragedies. 

Thank you for considering my nomination and I look forward to 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tong follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KURT WALTER TONG

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you 

today as the President’s nominee to serve as the U.S. Senior Official for APEC with 

the rank of Ambassador. I appreciate the confidence that President Obama and Secretary Clinton have shown in me and, if confirmed, I look forward to working with 

you to advance U.S. interests through the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 

(APEC) forum as we strive to create an economic system in the Asia-Pacific region 

that supports growth and job creation here at home. 

APEC is the premier economic organization in the Asia-Pacific region and a key 

venue for engaging the most economically dynamic region of the world. APEC’s 21 

members, stretching from Chile to China, account for more than half of the global 

economy. They purchase 58 percent of our goods exports, and comprise a market of 

$2.7 billion potential consumers. 

Through APEC, the United States works to tackle a wide range of issues criticalto long-term prosperity around the Pacific Rim. 

For example, the United States works within APEC to open markets in the AsiaPacific region and connect them to American exporters. Their focus includes eliminating barriers to trade and investment and creating better environments for our 

citizens to do business overseas. APEC initiatives also lay the foundation for highstandard, comprehensive trade agreements—including the Trans-Pacific Partnership—that can deepen America’s economic ties to the region and build a more level 

economic playing field that will help Americans to compete successfully. 

At the same time, the United States and the other APEC members recognize that 

attaining high rates of growth is not enough to ensure meaningful prosperity. We 

must also achieve high quality growth that provides widespread benefits to society. 

This is why efforts have been made to work within APEC to promote growth that 

is balanced between and within economies, sustainable environmentally, fosters innovation, and empowers all citizens with the skills and opportunities to prosper in 

the global economy. 

In 2011, the United States is hosting APEC for the first time since 1993. In early 

March, we successfully held the first APEC Senior Officials Meeting of the year here 

in Washington. Hosting APEC this year presents a tremendous opportunity for the 

United States to exhibit leadership by forging a 21st century economic agenda for 

the Asia-Pacific, and by building an enduring economic architecture for the region 

that is open, free, transparent, and fair. 

Much is at stake. As President Obama has stated, ‘‘if we can increase our exports 

to APEC countries by just 5 percent, we can increase the number of U.S. jobs supported by exports by hundreds of thousands.’’ American products, innovation, and 

know-how are competitive and in high demand in Asia. APEC 2011 is a critical 

chance to showcase our strengths. If confirmed, I will work with Congress, the business community, and my colleagues in the executive branch to utilize our hosting 

of APEC this year to the fullest as an opportunity to both restore confidence at 

home and promote new opportunities for our exporters overseas. 

If confirmed, I will put my experience and energy to work to advance our overall 

economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region. During my 21 years as a career Foreign Service officer, I have handled trade, finance, and development issues at our 

Embassies in Manila, Tokyo, Beijing, and Seoul. I have also served as Director for 

147

Korean Affairs at the State Department and Director for Asian Economic Affairs at 

the National Security Council. 

Mr. Chairman, it would be a great privilege to serve my country as the U.S. Senior Official for APEC with the rank of Ambassador. The Asia-Pacific region represents the future of the global economy, but the exact contours of that future have 

yet to be fully defined. APEC plays a key role in shaping the region, and I am ready 

to help the United States work through the organization to promote growth and jobcreating opportunities in the Asia-Pacific for American businesses and citizens. 

Thank you for considering my nomination. I look forward to your questions.

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much and again both of your full 

statements will be entered into the record. 

And what I would like to do, and I will have some specific questions obviously, but there are a couple of areas that I may ask both 

of you to comment on that I think overlap in where your interests 

are and your future responsibilities will be. 

First, Mr. Shear, you have had a distinguished career in Asia, 

but this will be your first posting to Vietnam. Would you like to 

tell us how you prepared for this position? 

Mr. SHEAR. Well, Mr. Chairman I started to prepare by taking 

Vietnamese language training. And I have got about a month 

under my belt and I’ve got 4 months to go. 

Senator WEBB. [Speaking in Vietnamese] [Laughter.] 

OK. You don’t need to try on that. 

Mr. SHEAR. Thank you very much for that lesson. I started by 

studying Vietnamese with my wife. She will be working with me 

in Hanoi and we both hope to interact very intensively not only 

with the Vietnamese Government but with the Vietnamese people. 

And I hope that what little Vietnamese language I can cram in before that time helps me do that. 

Second, I have done a fair amount of reading, both on attitudes 

toward our history as well as on the international relations of Vietnam and the region since learning of my nomination. 

And third, I think my experience in the region, both in Northeast 

Asia and Southeast Asia as well as with China, will suit me well 

for conducting the kind of intensive diplomacy we need to conduct 

both with Vietnam and in the region to continue pursuing our interests there. 

Senator WEBB. To what extent have you reached out to the Vietnamese community here in the United States? 

Mr. SHEAR. Sir, I have not yet begun to reach out to the Vietnamese community, because I have not been confirmed. But as 

soon as I am confirmed I hope to start doing that. I will——

Senator WEBB. Well, I hope you will. 

Mr. SHEAR [continuing]. The Vietnamese community in the 

United States it plays an important role in this relationship. Their 

support for us during the war was important during that time and 

I recognize that importance. And it is my intention to stay very 

closely connected with the Vietnamese American community here. 

Senator WEBB. I don’t even think you need to be confirmed, quite 

frankly, to do that. But I hope you will take that opportunity before 

you post. 

As you know, this is probably one of the most complex relationships in American foreign policy because, I like to say, there are 

four different components that have had to come together in the 

aftermath of the war: those who fought the war here and those who 

148

opposed it; and those who were with us over there and those who 

opposed us. I have spent a great deal of my adult life, as you know, 

trying to build bridges so that we could move it forward. And the 

biggest hurdle, really, is the people who were with us, inside Vietnam, who remain inside Vietnam and also the involvement of the 

Vietnamese community here, in terms of the policies that we implement. 

In that respect, the issue inside Vietnam, when it comes to 

human rights, is supplemented by the issue of how people who 

were with us and their families are able to be embraced inside 

Vietnam itself. 

Would you comment on that? 

Mr. SHEAR. Well, I think that first of all, with regard to the Vietnamese community here and the four elements you mentioned, I 

agree with you completely. And I would like to stay in touch with 

you as I stay in touch with the Vietnamese community as well 

here, both before I leave for Hanoi and after I have gotten out 

there. 

Certainly continued contacts between the Vietnamese diaspora 

and their home country will be important, I think, for the develop—social—both the social and the economic development of 

Vietnam and I look forward to encouraging those contacts as—if 

confirmed as Ambassador. 

Senator WEBB. Another question with respect to religious and 

other freedoms inside Vietnam today. I would say, first of all, we 

would be remiss if we did not recognize that there has been dramatic improvement in this area over the years. The first time I returned to Vietnam after the war was almost 20 years ago today. 

I was in Hanoi on Easter. I went to Easter Mass at the Cathedral 

in Hanoi and there were maybe 10 people in there and they were 

older people. I went to Christmas Mass in 2008 in that same chapel and there were probably 2,000 people in there. So credit needs 

to be given where it is deserved. 

And, at the same time there are issues that have come up over 

the past several months with respect to religious freedom and others areas and I wonder if you have any comment on that. 

Mr. SHEAR. Mr. Chairman, we agree with you that there have 

been improvements in religious freedom in Vietnam and the government’s treatment of this issue. And that is why we removed 

Vietnam from the countries of concern list in 2006. 

This does not mean that we no longer have concerns about religious freedom in Vietnam, in fact we watch the issue very closely. 

We recognize that there continue to be improvements in religious 

practice in Vietnam, more religious organizations are being registered by the government and thereby made legal, more kinds of 

religious gatherings are being allowed to take place, more priests 

are being ordained. And with regard to Catholicism, the relationship between Hanoi and the Vatican has improved considerably 

over the past year or so. 

So we recognize that improvements have taken place, while at 

the same time, watching for setbacks very closely. And we are particularly concerned about the treatment of religious practices by 

the government in the Central Highlands, among the Montagnards, 

for example. This remains an issue in which frictions continue to 

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be generated. We are also watching land disputes involving several 

church groups, particularly in Northern Vietnam. So while we recognize that improvements have taken place, we also believe that 

much more can be done and I hope to work with the Vietnamese 

Government and people to improve the basis for religious freedom. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. This week a Vietnamese legal scholar, Co Huy Ha Vu, who is a member of a prominent Communist 

family that was revolutionary antecedents—was convicted of propaganda against the State, sentenced to 7 years in prison, and 3 

years house arrest. Are you familiar with this case? 

Mr. SHEAR. I am, sir. 

Senator WEBB. What is the administration’s position? 

Mr. SHEAR. The State Department issued a public statement the 

day after we heard that Dr. Vu had been sentenced. We stated in 

that release that we were deeply concerned by the sentencing and 

we called for the release of Dr. Vu. 

We’ve also noticed that two human—other activists, Pham Hong 

Sun and Le Quoc Quan had been detained since the sentencing of 

Dr. Vu and we are watching that situation very closely as well. 

Senator WEBB. I personally have had strong concerns over many 

years about territorial claims in the South China Sea by the Chinese. Their activities have increased over the past several years, 

and particularly over the last year. And, part of these relate to 

claims by the Vietnamese Government that are in dispute. When 

Secretary Clinton was in Vietnam last year she raised these issues 

and announced that the administration was interested in pursuing 

a strategic partnership with Vietnam with respect to those issues. 

Would you have a comment on what that partnership would entail? 

Mr. SHEAR. The strategic partnership has yet to defined. And I 

expect that one of my main tasks as Ambassador, if I am confirmed, will be to define and implement that strategic partnership. 

I think it will basically consist of four parts: 

First, we hope to intensify and deepen our exchanges at the senior-most levels of government. Last year marked a good start to 

that with two visits, for example, by Secretary Clinton to Hanoi in 

July and October. We hope to continue that trend. 

A second aspect of a strategic partnership would be enhanced 

diplomatic cooperation with Vietnam in regional diplomacy. And 

again, we’ve already seen a good example of how that might work 

in the way in which we coordinated with the Vietnamese in the 

runup to the ASEAN regional forum last July. We think that the 

Secretary’s statement on the South China Sea was very effective 

and since she made that statement the Chinese and the ASEAN 

claimants to the South China Sea have conducted, I believe, two 

or three meetings at the working level to discuss how to move forward, now to manage their conflicting claims and perhaps how to 

conclude a code of conduct for claimants in the South China Sea. 

So we consider the Secretary’s intervention on this subject at the 

ARF last July to have been successful. 

A third area in which we will pursue a strategic partnership will 

be in improving military-to-military ties. As I mentioned in my 

statement, we are already implementing a fairly broad range of activities at the military-to-military level. We hope to further broaden 

those activities and deepen them as well. 

150

And fourth, the economic relationship, of course, will be key. The 

good news about the economic relationship is that we did almost 

$4 billion in export business with Vietnam last year. The bad news 

we have an $11 billion trade deficit and I hope that that trade deficit will narrow during my tenure, if I am confirmed. And I will do 

whatever I can to increase American exports and help create more 

American jobs back here. 

So those, I think, are four essential components to a strategic 

partnership. Of course, as we move forward in those areas we 

would also like to see progress on the human rights piece as well. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. There is another issue with respect 

to sovereignty, if not directly then certainly indirectly, and that relates to Mekong River and other riparian water areas. And actually, I would like to get an answer or an observation from both of 

you. 

I will start with you, Mr. Tong, on this. I have been among those 

here who are very concerned about what is happening in the 

Mekong River Delta. Also, in terms of Vietnam, if you have been 

following what has been happening with the Red River in North 

Vietnam, and north of Hanoi with the impact of hydroelectric damming of these waterways and other environmental concerns, but 

particularly the impact of the hydroelectric dams and the plans to 

do more of them. China, and in particular Laos, which has recently 

indicated it wants to become the battery of Asia with hydroelectric 

dams on the Mekong River. 

My understanding is China is one of the few countries in the 

world that does not recognize downstream water rights of other 

countries, that is riparian water rights. And Laos apparently is intent on moving forward with some of these larger dam projects 

without respect to what is happening downstream. I was in the 

Mekong River area in Vietnam last July, where I was briefed about 

what is happening with the increased salinity moving up as the 

water levels have gone down. Some people say this is simply climate change or industrial pollution. Certainly there may be elements of that, but I would say that the real challenge in the region 

is for a multilateral approach toward trying to resolve these issues. 

There is not one country in the region that has the diplomatic 

power in and of itself to stand up and start talking with the Chinese about the impact of what is going on. 

I introduced, or developed, a piece of legislation that would require environmental standards to be met before moneys from organizations like the ADB would go into the construction of these dam 

projects. 

Mr. Tong, because APEC strongly supports sustainable, green 

growth model, and you mentioned in your own testimony about the 

environmental considerations that were on the table with APEC, is 

this a matter that could be raised in an energetic way in an APEC 

environment? 

Mr. TONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for an opportunity to comment on this problem that is very important to the Lower Mekong 

Region, and as you noted, the Red River, which runs from China 

into Vietnam. 

Exactly as you pointed out, although advocates of hydroelectric 

dams point to the benefits from electricity as well as flood control, 

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these dams can have a major and negative impact on downstream 

residents, in terms of issues like salinity, as you pointed out, and 

also fisheries. There is a natural rhythm to the flood cycle that replenishes the soil for agriculture. And so these are very legitimate 

concerns that residents downstream have regarding the resources 

that come from upstream. 

APEC, I think, would be a good venue to raise this question and 

consider it, and if confirmed I will certainly look into doing so. I 

would also like to point out the Lower Mekong Initiative that the 

State Department has initiated to work with the countries of the 

Lower Mekong on development issues and try to foster a sense of 

shared mission with regard to that river basin. It seems to be having a useful impact on that dialogue and hopefully using that we 

can then work with China to foster a greater dialogue in that region. Certainly it is the view of the United States that that kind 

of upstream/downstream communication needs to be enhanced and 

improved. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. 

Mr. Shear, any comment on that? 

Mr. SHEAR. Senator, you are absolutely right about the strategic 

importance of these rivers and many of these rivers that rise in 

China, including the Red River and the Mekong River. A variety 

of rivers that flow through Southeast Asia and South Asia all rise 

in China. All of the downstream countries have expressed concern 

about possible Chinese damming on the upstream portions of these 

rivers and while the Chinese have disclosed—recently started disclosing more information, for example, about conditions of river 

flow on the Mekong to Lower Mekong countries, certainly we believe that more Chinese transparency in this regard is called for. 

And we would like to see the Chinese interact more intensively 

with those Mekong River Commission, for example, as the Mekong 

River Commission considers future mainstream dams on the Lower 

Mekong. 

The Lower Mekong Initiative is a primary way in which we have 

been interacting with the countries of the Lower Mekong, including 

Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The Vietnamese are particularly concerned about the proposed construction of a dam in 

Xayaburi in Laos, south of Luang Prabang. The Mekong River 

Commission I expect will meet to determine whether or not to 

move forward on this dam project later this month. 

For our part, Secretary Clinton announced at the Mekong River 

summit in October in Hanoi, that we supported a pause in dam 

construction that would allow Mekong River countries to better assess the environmental and economic impacts that damming the 

Lower Mekong will have. We are very sympathetic in this regard 

to Vietnamese concerns, and we will be watching, very closely, in 

the run up to the next Mekong River Commission meeting how this 

decision plays out. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. 

I visited the Mekong River Commission headquarters in Laos 

nearly 2 years ago. First of all, I would point out that the Vietnamese representatives there were very bright and focused on this 

and quite impressive. 

152

But what I did not hear there, and what I wasn’t hearing last 

year when I was visiting the Mekong areas and having discussions 

inside Vietnam, was anybody taking a deep breath and saying this 

is going to have to be a riparian water rights issue. This is, indirectly, a sovereignty issue. Water, that is the availability of water 

in that region, can become a national security issue too if one country or another decides they can shut water off. Seventy million people are in that Lower Mekong area, the Red River, from what I am 

reading, is at the lowest level it has been in decades, at least decades and only through a rational, but multinational approach, are 

we going to be able to get our arms around this. 

Mr. Tong, I would like your thoughts on the situation in Japan 

in terms of the devastation and the clear slowdown impacting other 

countries as a result. There was a figure that I saw the other day 

of about 40 percent slowdown in terms of automobile manufacturing or portions of the automobile industry that will trickle out 

in terms of the impact on other countries. 

What are your thoughts about that, and is there any role that 

APEC could play in assisting this recovery? 

Mr. TONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think that the impact of this natural disaster on the Japanese 

economy and how that impacts other economies plays out in several ways. One is through financial markets, and fortunately to 

date we have not seen that much impact through that channel. 

One is through trade: Japan’s role both as a buyer of goods from 

other nations and an exporter in gross terms of its products. And 

again, in that area there has been, thus far, limited impact. 

This was an enormous natural disaster affecting hundreds of 

thousands of people, however the Japanese economy is very large 

and very resilient and has a strong capacity to, in a macroeconomic 

sense—in the broadest sense of that term—bounce back very quickly. 

The issue of most concern perhaps at this point is with regard 

to specific products where particular Japanese factories produce 

important inputs into other processes around the world, including 

the United States. And the various elements of the U.S. Government, not necessarily the State Department, but a number of them 

have been watching this and with an eye toward seeing if there are 

issues of concern. I would say at this point that the jury is still out 

on that question. It may be that there will be, but it may be that 

these will be only short-term concerns. And so I think we need to 

keep an eye on it. 

The March 11 tragedy happened the day before the last Senior 

Officials’ Meeting here in Washington. And the Senior Officials 

took some special time to consider what we can do as an organization, as a collection of economies, to address this kind of situation. 

Two things happened, really. There was a renewed sense of shared 

mission which is useful and important, and then some discussion 

about whether, through the APEC Emergency Preparedness Working Group, we can implement some projects that help private sector 

businesses, in particular small or medium enterprises, prepare for 

these kind of disasters so that they can recover more quickly in a 

financial sense or in a production sense. 

153

And we hope to, and if confirmed, I hope to continue this work 

and accelerate it. And I believe we have the support of the other 

APEC economies in this regard as well. We did ask that one project 

which had not received APEC funding, be renewed, and Senior Officials agreed to do that on an accelerated basis as a result of the 

events in Japan. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. 

I’m interested in your thoughts with respect to the Trans-Pacific 

Partnership as a concept and how it is evolving and whether and 

how developed economies can also proceed in this arrangement 

with developing economies given the standards and those sorts of 

things. What do you think about that? 

Mr. TONG. Thank you, sir. The Trans-Pacific Partnership really 

is an enormously important initiative for the United States in several respects. And I would refer you to the speech that Secretary 

Clinton gave on this matter on March 9. This agreement, if we are 

able to conclude it, has some very unique characteristics which 

would set up the region very well for a much faster pace of economic integration going forward. And you have pointed to one very 

important aspect of that, which is the fact that TPP includes both 

developed and developing countries. 

So if we can, through that negotiation, come up with ways that 

developing countries find it within their means and their interests 

to sign up to some very tough disciplines as envisioned for this 

agreement, and see that the kind of rapid economic change that 

this sort of agreement will foster is in their interest, then we will 

have made some good progress toward really bringing a very diverse economic region together under this idea of a platform for 

economic activity which is free and open and transparent and fair. 

You know, with my colleague headed to Hanoi here I think we 

should make special mention of the fact that Vietnam, which has 

the lowest per capita income of all the TPP partners, has made a 

very, if you will, courageous decision to pursue a negotiation on 

terms which are quite challenging. 

Senator WEBB. That actually was my next question, with respect 

to Vietnam and the hurdles that it faces in order to participate in 

TPP. 

Mr. SHEAR. I’ll ask my colleague to chime in in the areas in 

which he is much stronger than I am. But, I think the TPP and 

Vietnamese participation in TPP offers the United States an opportunity to further increase our exports and to broadly strengthen 

our economic relationship with Vietnam and to further bring Vietnam into the international economic community. 

In the process, in the course of our negotiations on TPP we of 

course will also be looking at Vietnamese labor and environmental 

practices and we hope that as a result of concluding the TPP that 

those practices in Vietnam will improve. 

Mr. TONG. Well, I certainly share those sentiments and would 

just emphasize again that I do believe that it is a challenging negotiation—we are, collectively, the nine countries of TPP negotiation, 

setting the bar quite high. That is an intentional strategy which 

they have all bought into of establishing a state-of-the-art agreement which other economies in the future can join. We will find out 

this year really, whether this is an achievable objective, but it is 

154

certainly, I believe, a very strategically intelligent objective on the 

part of all nine countries. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. I would like to thank both of you for 

your willingness to serve and wish you both the best in your positions, should you be confirmed and I think you will be confirmed. 

Let me close with just a few thoughts. I have been very, very 

concerned for a number of years, and particularly over the last 10 

or 11 years, that the United States has been ignoring this part of 

the world, as our attention has been so distracted with what happened after 9/11. This was something I was writing about and 

speaking about before 9/11, but it certainly is true today. The future of this country is so inextricably intertwined with this region, 

as both of you know, and as I think everyone in this room appreciates. There is no more vital place for the future of the United 

States than in East and Southeast Asia. 

And I have done everything I can since I have been in the Senate, to reinvigorate—do my part in reinvigorating our relationships 

with this part of the world. I hesitate to say the second tier countries, but the countries that are not China, which I think have fallen off the radar screen here in the Congress. 

I was very proud to have served as a Marine in Vietnam. I believed then that Vietnam was one of the most important countries 

in terms of our relationships in this part of the world, and I continue to believe it today. Vietnam is 86 million people, a country 

larger in population than Germany. 

It has an enormous future and in terms of our own strategic interests I think we need to do everything we can, under the rubric 

of fairness and being loyal to the people who were with us when 

times were different, to strengthen this relationship and others on 

the mainland of Southeast Asia for the stability of the region and 

for the good of our own country. 

And that has been our focus here on this committee. And both 

of you, I think, will play a vital role in doing this. And I look forward to working with you in the future. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF DAVID BRUCE SHEAR TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

SECURITY

Question. Responding to concerns expressed by the United States, Vietnam, and 

many other Southeast Asian countries, China recently entered into multilateral negotiations with other claimants to reach a code of conduct for managing territorial 

disputes in the South China Sea. How do the United States and Vietnam plan to 

coordinate to achieve a successful conclusion to these negotiations?

Answer. Secretary Clinton’s statement on the South China Sea at last year’s 

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Ministerial Retreat in Hanoi was very effective in 

generating action on the South China Sea. Since the Secretary’s remarks, ASEAN 

member countries and China have conducted several working-level meetings to 

discuss how to move forward on implementing guidelines for the 2002 Declaration 

on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. The United States encourages 

the parties to reach agreement on a full code of conduct. The United States is prepared to facilitate initiatives and confidence-building measures consistent with the 

Declaration. 

155

The United States will continue to discuss South China Sea issues, and broader 

maritime security, with Vietnam, as well as the other members of ASEAN and 

China. We will discuss how the United States can be helpful in advancing our 

shared interests and promoting peace and stability in the South China Sea. 

Secretary Clinton made it clear in her ARF remarks that the United States has 

enduring national interests in the South China Sea, including continued peace and 

stability and respect for international law, including freedom of navigation and 

unimpeded lawful commerce. We oppose the use of force or threat of force by any 

claimant to advance its claim. We share these interests with the region, as well as 

other maritime states and the broader international community. 

While the United States does not take sides on the competing territorial disputes 

over land features in the South China Sea, the United States supports a collaborative diplomatic process by the claimants for addressing the territorial disputes 

and finding means to build trust and reduce tensions in the region. 

ENVIRONMENT

Question. Recent U.N. and Asian Development Bank reports—along with Vietnamese Government studies—describe how rising sea levels, increasingly frequent 

and intense typhoons and drought, and salt-water intrusion could affect Vietnam, 

with its heavily populated, low-lying areas. These reports also highlight that the future impacts of climate change will only serve to exacerbate these conditions. I have 

discussed the potentially far-reaching consequences with Vietnam’s leaders, and 

they have expressed a willingness to work together to address this challenge, in 

areas like data collection and dissemination and transitioning to renewable energy 

sources. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to broaden and deepen cooperation 

to enhance climate security?

Answer. If confirmed, I will both build on our existing cooperation and seek new 

opportunities to work with Vietnam to enhance climate security, which is advanced 

by our work on climate change mitigation and adaptation. The U.S.-Vietnam Climate Change Working Group established under the bilateral Science and Technology Agreement is one avenue I will use to promote cooperation on climate change 

adaptation and mitigation. Another program for continued support and possible expansion is the DRAGON Institute, which the U.S. Geological Survey launched with 

Can Tho University to facilitate joint research on climate change and other environmental issues threatening the Mekong Delta. 

In regard to new programs, Vietnam will be one of the first countries worldwide 

to participate in a new Low-Emission Development Strategy (LEDS) interagency initiative, under which the United States will support the development of a long-term 

strategy for robust, low-carbon growth. As part of the Reducing Emissions from 

Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) initiative, the United States will 

offer training and technical cooperation to government agencies and NGOs to improve forest and watershed management capability and to better respond to the impacts of climate change on forests. 

If confirmed, I will also encourage Vietnam’s continued participation in the Lower 

Mekong Initiative, our partnership with the countries of the Lower Mekong Basin, 

to build capacity in tackling regional and global challenges, including adaptation to 

and mitigation of climate change impacts. 

GOVERNANCE

Question. Some observers see the Vietnamese National Assembly assuming a 

greater role in domestic policymaking. How do you assess the National Assembly’s 

evolving role in Vietnam?

Answer. Although the Communist Party of Vietnam exerts ultimate influence and 

control over all governing bodies, primarily through its Central Committee and 

Politburo, the National Assembly, once a mere legislative arm of the Party, has 

taken on a more significant and quasi-independent role in recent years. The 493-

member body, elected to a 5-year term, has a variety of powers, including the ability 

to amend the constitution and elect members of the Council of Ministers. Members 

of the National Assembly have openly debated sensitive political issues and produced original legislation. Over 1,000 candidates, including nonparty members, will 

contest an election in May to seat Vietnam’s 13th National Assembly. Although the 

process falls significantly short of a full-fledged democratic undertaking, it may 

produce a legislative body that better represents the interests of the Vietnamese 

people than in past versions. 

156

HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Question. How will your experience working with the Chinese Government on 

human rights concerns inform your thinking on these issues with respect to Vietnam?

Answer. My work on human rights in China and elsewhere throughout my career 

has underscored for me the importance of human rights in overall U.S. foreign policy. My experience has also demonstrated for me our ability to achieve progress 

when we combine persistence with a well-defined agenda. 

Over the past year, we have seen an increase in suppression of political dissent 

by the Vietnamese Government, a worsening of the respect for rule of law, the imprisonment of dozens of activists, and new restrictions on the media and the Internet. If confirmed, I will seek an active and open dialogue with my Vietnamese counterparts. Vietnam cannot achieve its full potential without greater respect for the 

rights of its citizens. 

If confirmed, I will continue to seek progress on human rights issues, partly 

through the Human Rights Dialogue we have established with Vietnam. In December 2010, Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Assistant Secretary Michael Posner 

led an interagency delegation in a successful 2-day visit to Vietnam to participate 

in the 15th round of the dialogue with the Vietnamese Government. The U.S. delegation expressed its concern about a wide range of human rights issues, including 

freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and Internet freedom. These meetings 

followed up on Secretary Clinton’s July and October visits to Vietnam and yielded 

concrete outcomes and next steps. 

HUMAN RIGHTS

Question. I was disappointed to hear of Cu Huy Ha Vu’s sentencing this week and 

am concerned that Vietnam may be following the example of intolerance being established elsewhere. Cu’s conviction is the latest evidence of a troubling crackdown 

against freedom of expression in Vietnam. If confirmed, what steps will you take 

to encourage greater official tolerance for the views of Vietnam’s people?

Answer. If confirmed, I will regularly engage the Vietnamese Government at the 

highest levels to express our concerns about the country’s recent increase in suppression of political dissent. The bilateral Human Rights Dialogue with Vietnam 

held last December in Hanoi was successful in raising a wide range of human rights 

concerns, including freedom of expression. The Department of State continues to 

press those points with the Government of Vietnam. The long-term success of our 

growing relationship, and the long-term prosperity of Vietnam, depends in large 

part on its people enjoying the freedom to freely express their views.

Question. Can the full potential of this growing bilateral partnership be realized 

in the absence of greater official respect for freedom of expression?

Answer. I strongly believe that the strength of our long-term bilateral relationship 

depends heavily on the ability of the Vietnamese people to freely express their 

views, including political opinions that challenge the policies or positions of the government. If confirmed, I will encourage the government to respect the freedom of 

expression as enshrined in Vietnamese law, bolster the rule of law, end restrictions 

on the media and the Internet, and engage all political voices in Vietnam in meaningful dialogue. 

HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Question. What is your assessment of Vietnam’s progress in enlarging religious 

freedom, including its treatment of Montagnard Christians?

Answer. Since 2006, the overall situation in Vietnam has improved, prompting the 

Department of State to remove Vietnam from the Country of Particular Concern 

list. Nevertheless, freedom of religion continues to be subject to uneven interpretation and protection by the Government of Vietnam. Significant problems remain, especially at the provincial and village levels and for some minority groups, such as 

the Montagnard Christians. The Vietnamese Government can and should do more. 

If confirmed, I will make the promotion of religious freedom one of my top priorities. 

Among the problems that remain on this issue are occasional harassment and excessive use of force by local government officials against religious groups in some 

outlying locations. Specifically, there were several problematic high-profile incidents 

in 2009 and 2010 when authorities used excessive force against Catholic parishioners in land disputes outside of Hanoi at Dong Chiem parish, against the Plum 

Village Buddhist Community in Lam Dong province, and against Catholic parishioners outside of Danang at Con Dau parish. Registration of Protestant congregaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00164 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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tions also remains slow and cumbersome in some areas of the country, especially 

in the Northwest Highlands. 

However, Protestants and Catholics throughout the country continue to report significant improvements in their situation despite occasional setbacks. The government granted national-level recognition or registration to eight new Protestant 

churches, the Baha’i faith, the Bani Muslim Sect, and four indigenous Vietnamese 

religious organizations. Over 1,000 meeting points that had been closed in the Central Highlands were reopened with additional meeting points registered, and hundreds of new pastors were ordained and assigned to newly registered meeting 

points. Over 228 Protestant congregations were registered in the Northwest Highlands. The Catholic Church of Vietnam also continues to report that its ability to 

gather and worship has improved and restrictions have eased on the training and 

assignment of clergy. In January 2011, the Vatican named a nonresident representative as a first step toward full diplomatic relations with Vietnam. 

AGENT ORANGE/DIOXIN REMEDIATION

Question. Last spring, Senators Whitehouse and Kerry, along with seven other 

senators, submitted a letter to Chairman Leahy and former Ranking Member Gregg 

of the Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs of the Senate Committee on Appropriations requesting $26 million for dioxin remediation in 

Vietnam. As you know, $12 million was appropriated to commence cleanup efforts 

at Danang International Airport. What is the status of these efforts, and how do 

you assess their impact on United States-Vietnam relations? What additional efforts 

in Danang would the outstanding sum (that is yet to be appropriated) be able to 

sustain?

Answer. We expect to have contracts in place by the end of this year and excavation to start about January 2012. New data (as of February 2011) show the need 

to excavate roughly 18 percent more soil and sediment than originally planned. 

Because we now have a more comprehensive understanding of site conditions and 

ongoing and future expansion plans at the Danang airport, the project is now anticipated to be completed by the end of 2015 and cost about $43 million. 

FY 2010 funding, including $12 million in supplemental funds, will enable USAID 

to fund contracts for project planning, construction management and oversight, and 

thermal design between now and the end of 2011. However, with the anticipated 

award around November or December 2011 of the excavation and the thermal construction contracts, estimated at $11.5 million and $21.6 million, respectively, the 

FY 2011 requested $18 million would enable us to sufficiently fund these contracts 

initially. Both contracts will have major upfront costs. If the $18 million in FY 2011 

funding is approved, additional funding of between $8 and $9 million would be required to meet total project cost requirements. 

Successful project completion will result in the elimination of the risk of future 

exposure to dioxin due to Agent Orange for the estimated 800,000 Vietnamese living 

near the Danang airport. As we advance to each new project milestone with our 

Vietnamese partners, they continue to express heartfelt appreciation for this U.S. 

assistance. 

RESPONSES OF DAVID SHEAR TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. In 2010, President Obama announced his intention to double U.S. exports in 5 years. If confirmed as U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, what strategy will 

you employ to double U.S. exports to Vietnam by 2015?

Answer. Providing greater opportunities for U.S. companies in Vietnam will be 

one of my core goals, if I am confirmed. U.S. exports to Vietnam in 2010 totaled 

US$3.7 billion, up 19.8 percent compared to 2009. This increase follows equally impressive growth in 2009 when U.S. exports to Vietnam increased by 11 percent. 

However, U.S. exports accounted for just 4.2 percent of Vietnam’s merchandise imports in 2010, indicating a major opportunity to expand our limited share of this 

growing market and deepen our bilateral relationship through trade. 

Under the National Export Initiative (NEI), State Department, U.S. Commercial 

Service, and Foreign Agricultural Service officers at Embassy Hanoi and Consulate 

General Ho Chi Minh City work as a team to support the NEI Country Plan for 

Vietnam, which has been designated as a ‘‘high priority market’’ in Asia under the 

NEI. USAID also provides support for capacity development and technical assistance in establishing new legal mechanisms to facilitate trade and investment. 

158

If confirmed, with support from this strong Country Team, I would work to eliminate both tariff and nontariff barriers to U.S. exports of goods and services as well 

as advocate for implementation of commitments under existing agreements. I would 

also work with Vietnam to encourage them to meet the high standards of the TransPacific Partnership free trade agreement that is currently being negotiated. Helping 

U.S. industry identify new export opportunities would be another key component of 

my strategy, particularly in the areas of energy, information and communication 

technology, education, transportation, infrastructure development, and agricultural 

products. I would also work closely with the American business community in Vietnam to maintain a favorable environment for business and U.S. goods and take 

action on concerns as they arise. I would actively reach out to U.S. companies 

interested in doing business in Vietnam and would advocate for U.S. business at all 

appropriate opportunities.

Question. Several American families, including four from Indiana, have adoptions 

pending for Vietnamese children. This has been a long and laborious process with 

families frustrated by inconsistencies in information received from U.S. authorities 

as well as other challenges, some of which result from an evolving adoption mechanism and process on the part of the Government of Vietnam. 

Although Vietnam recently became a signatory to The Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, U.S. officials indicate it will be several months before a formal agreement is implemented. 

Although the United States is awaiting the formal implementation of a new adoption agreement, it’s my understanding that the two countries had agreed that six 

of the pending adoptions, ‘‘already in the pipeline,’’ could go forward. Your full assessment of this situation would be appreciated. Please inform me how you intend 

to proceed.

Answer. Following the expiration of our bilateral agreement, the United States 

and Vietnam continued to process adoption cases for U.S. prospective adoptive parents who had received an official referral prior to September 1, 2008. The Department of State made every effort to encourage the Vietnamese to expeditiously complete all investigations and seek resolutions as quickly as possible in the best interest of each child. 

The Government of Vietnam took significant time to make a final decision in 

many of the cases in the province of Bac Lieu in part because of delays by the Bac 

Lieu orphanage in providing the government with needed documentation. In order 

to approve each case, the Government of Vietnam had to determine that each child 

was eligible for intercountry adoption and that the dossier could be processed. 

On September 14, 2010, the Ministry of Justice sent the U.S. Embassy in Hanoi 

a diplomatic note denying the remaining pipeline cases because of a lack of sufficient legal grounds on which to approve them. The U.S. Embassy has followed up 

with the Vietnamese Government on these cases and provided available information 

to all of the families. 

In order for intercountry adoptions to resume from Vietnam, Vietnamese law requires that either a new bilateral agreement must be in place between the United 

States and Vietnam, or Vietnam must ratify The Hague Convention on Protection 

of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (the Convention). 

Vietnam has stated its intention to ratify the Convention and in June 2010, the 

Vietnamese legislature passed a new adoption law which took effect January 1, 

2011. Vietnamese officials have recently finished drafting necessary regulations and 

will now need to implement the new law and regulations prior to their ratification 

and compliance with the standards established by the Convention. 

While the Government of Vietnam’s steps toward Hague ratification and implementation are encouraging, we remain concerned that sufficient safeguards may not 

be in place and that the proposed implementation timeline may be too short. Under 

U.S. law, if/when Vietnam becomes a party to the Convention, the U.S. Central 

Authority must be able to certify that procedures leading to the adoption of a child 

in Vietnam conform to both the standards established by the Convention and the 

U.S. Intercountry Adoption Act. This decision, however, cannot be made prior to 

Vietnam’s Hague ratification. 

Following the resolution of all pipeline cases, the Department of Adoptions has 

informed the Department of State that the children previously matched with U.S. 

prospective adoptive parents are now subject to the country’s new adoption law. The 

new law requires that Vietnamese officials follow different procedures from those in 

the past, such as making children available for adoption for 2 months at the communal level, 2 months at the provincial level, and 2 months at the national level. 

If no qualified domestic family successfully completes an adoption of the child, the 

Department of Adoptions (DA) will then determine the eligibility of the child for 

159

intercountry adoption based on Vietnamese laws and regulations. The DA Director 

has expressed willingness to rematch the final remaining group of six children with 

their previously matched U.S. prospective adoptive parents under the new adoption 

law (i.e., that they first be made available for adoption in Vietnam.) 

The DA Director, however, has confirmed that Bac Lieu provincial officials have 

thus far refused to comply with Vietnam’s new adoption law requirements for making the six children whose adoptions were denied in September 2010 available for 

domestic adoption at the provincial level. In addition, officials have refused to correct birth certificates with fraudulent information. The DA Director said he was not 

certain why these officials were unwilling to move forward and noted that he did 

not have authority to compel them to act. He said he will continue to communicate 

with these officials on the requirements of the new law necessary for these children 

to be eligible for intercountry adoption. When Special Advisor for Children’s Issues 

Susan Jacobs was in Vietnam in March, she discussed these cases at length with 

the Director of the Department of Adoptions and urged him to find a way to provide 

these children with permanent homes. Special Advisor Jacobs urged him to rematch 

the children and the parents. The Director said he planned to hold a training seminar on the new law in the Bac Lieu province and he hoped the seminar would 

prompt local officials to comply with the new law’s provisions. 

The Department of State has pressed for a strong regulatory framework and continues to communicate directly with the Government of Vietnam on implementation 

efforts. The U.S. Embassy in Hanoi has also worked closely with other countries in 

the Inter-Embassy Adoption Working Group in addressing concerns within the 

adoption process and regulations. 

The Office of Children’s Issues and Embassy Hanoi continue to communicate directly with all of the Bac Lieu families regarding Vietnam’s efforts to ratify the 

Hague Adoption Convention and to explain the processing of cases under the Convention if/when Vietnam ratifies the Convention.

Question. Within Vietnam, there appears to be decreasing emphasis on matters 

related to human rights. Is this perception correct, and if so, what is the basis?

Answer. The Vietnamese Government increased the suppression of dissent over 

the past year, arresting over two dozen political activists and convicting over a 

dozen more arrested over the last 3 years. The government also increased measures 

to limit privacy rights and tightened controls over the press and Internet. Freedom 

of religion continued to be subject to uneven interpretation and protection; in spite 

of some progress, significant problems remained, especially at the provincial and village levels, including for some ethnic minority residents in the Central and Northwest Highlands. At the same time, the Vietnamese Government continues to engage 

with the United States and other countries in a series of regular human rights 

dialogues.

Question. Some suggest that select Communist Party leaders in Vietnam are in 

large part responsible for limits on political dissent within the country. Is this accurate? Please describe the nature of interaction between the Communist Party leaders in Vietnam and Communist Party leaders in China.

Answer. Vietnam is an authoritarian state ruled by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). Political opposition movements are prohibited and Vietnamese citizens 

cannot change their government. Under Article 4 of the Vietnamese Constitution, 

the CPV assumes the leading role in leadership of the state and society. As such, 

the highest levels of the Vietnamese Communist Party are aware of, and most likely 

approve, the prosecution and imprisonment of high visibility dissidents. We regularly urge the Vietnamese Government to engage all political opinions in a genuine 

dialogue and to respect fundamental human rights, including freedom of expression. 

As the United States and Vietnam celebrated 15 years of normal diplomatic ties 

in 2010, Vietnam and China were celebrating their 60th anniversary of relations. 

Vietnam was among the first countries to recognize the People’s Republic of China, 

and China was the first country to establish official diplomatic ties with Vietnam. 

While China-Vietnam relations have been marked by periods of conflict over territorial and other issues, it appears that the deep historical ties between the CPV and 

the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remain strong. 

Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh famously summarized their friendship ties as ‘‘both 

comrades and brothers.’’ More recently, President Hu Jintao described ChinaVietnam relations as a ‘‘treasure’’ of the two parties. Lines between party and government are blurred in both countries, making it difficult to differentiate between 

official government interaction and party-to-party interaction, but the two parties 

appear to maintain a robust schedule of senior-level visits and consultations.

160

Question. Le Cong Dinh and Nguyen Tien Trung were among political reformers 

arrested in June of last year by Vietnamese officials and found guilty of ‘‘organizing 

to overthrow the State.’’ They received lengthy prison terms. Has the U.S. Government expressed concern regarding those political reformers arrested last June? 

What is the present status of Le Cong Dinh and Nguyen Tien Trung? Both have 

pending invitations from the Indiana University Maurer School of Law to study law 

at the Center for Constitutional Democracy at Indiana University.

Answer. We are aware of the cases of Le Cong Dinh and Nguyen Tien Trung and 

remain very concerned over their continued imprisonment. Dinh and Trung were arrested in June and July 2009, respectively. Both were tried and convicted in January 2010, in a joint trial with two other activists. Dinh received a sentence of 5 

years in prison; Trung was sentenced to 7 years. The U.S. Consul General in Ho 

Chi Minh City sought and was granted permission to attend both trials. 

The State Department has repeatedly condemned the arrests and convictions in 

strong terms, both publicly and privately, including in the form of public statements 

issued at the time of the arrests and convictions. Former Ambassador Michael 

Michalak and current Charge ́ d’Affaires Virginia Palmer have regularly called for 

the release of Dinh and Trung. Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, 

and Labor (DRL) Michael Posner also pressed for their release during the 2009 and 

2010 human rights dialogues with Vietnam. DRL Deputy Assistant Secretary Dan 

Baer just reiterated these concerns during his visit to Vietnam in February, as did 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia Pacific Affairs Joe Yun in March. 

The Embassy and the Consulate General keep in regular contact with family 

members of Dinh and Trung, and officials at the State Department have met with 

both Mr. Trung’s fiance and with Professor David Williams, Director of the Center 

for Constitutional Democracy at Indiana University. 

RESPONSES OF KURT TONG TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. In 2010, President Obama announced his intention to double U.S. exports in 5 years. If confirmed as U.S. Ambassador to APEC, what strategy will you 

employ to double U.S. exports to APEC countries by 2015?

Answer. The Asia-Pacific region is essential to the success of the President’s 

National Export Initiative (NEI) and our goal of doubling U.S. exports by 2015 to 

help create jobs at home. In the first year of the NEI, U.S exports to APEC economies totaled $774 billion, up 25 percent from 2009, while U.S. exports to non-APEC 

member economies grew about 15 percent to reach $503 billion. We need to work 

hard to maintain this momentum. 

This year is particularly important as we host APEC for the first time since 1993. 

If confirmed, I will work with my interagency colleagues to increase the private sector engagement and input into the APEC discussions, and exercise U.S. leadership 

in delivering concrete outcomes through the APEC process to address barriers to 

trade and investment that American companies face and enhance regional economic 

integration. We will leverage APEC 2011 to advance work to make it cheaper, 

easier, and faster to do business in the Asia-Pacific, which will increase export opportunities for our businesses, particularly small- and medium-sized enterprises. 

Specifically, we will address nontariff barriers to trade and work to prevent new 

barriers from emerging; foster greater openness in the trade in green technology; 

and promote regulatory convergence and cooperation to tackle the regulatory issues 

within and between economies that increasingly inhibit trade and investment.

Question. What is your perspective on the United States establishing a long-term 

strategy toward pursuing a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with ASEAN?

Answer. In Asia-Pacific trade negotiations, the administration is currently focusing on developing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as an advantageous pathway 

toward regional economic integration and an eventual Free Trade Area of the Asia 

Pacific (FTAAP) that could include all 21 members of APEC. APEC leaders last year 

endorsed the TPP as one of possible pathways toward FTAAP, and four ASEAN 

member countries, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, and Brunei, are already party to 

the negotiations; others may be interested in joining in the future. 

At the same time, I believe the administration should continue and expand its 

efforts to deepen relations with the ASEAN nations, and ASEAN as an organization, 

on both strategic and economic issues. In particular, on trade policy, it makes sense 

for the United States to make concerted efforts to work with the ASEAN nations 

and the ASEAN Secretariat on issues such as trade facilitation and regulatory reform. Working hard on these matters will help build capacity and accelerate the reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00168 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
161

form and opening of the non-TPP ASEAN economies, increasing their readiness to 

negotiate high-standard free trade agreements with the United States. 

The U.S.–ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) process is 

an especially useful channel in this regard, along with the U.S.–ASEAN Enhanced 

Partnership.

Question. What is your perspective on the so-called ‘‘centrality of ASEAN’’?

Answer. ASEAN, as an organization and as a group of nations, is playing an absolutely critical role in the development of the Asia-Pacific’s emerging regional architecture. ASEAN plays a formative and essential role in each of the ASEAN-centered 

institutions and summits such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN+3, 

ASEAN+6, ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus, the Asia Regional Forum, and 

the East Asia summit. Many of these institutions include the United States. In addition to engaging these institutions, the United States is strengthening its engagement with ASEAN by sending our first Resident Representative to ASEAN, Ambassador David Carden, to Jakarta this month. If confirmed, I look forward to working 

closely with Ambassador Carden and other colleagues to develop new areas of cooperation with ASEAN.

Question. Do you envision a situation whereby the United States could participate 

in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) while concurrently working to develop a 

long-term strategy toward pursuing an FTA with ASEAN?

Answer. Through the Trans-Pacific Partnership process, the United States is 

negotiating a high-standard free trade agreement with four ASEAN members, plus 

four other partners. We will continue to work for the successful conclusion of these 

negotiations on an ambitious timetable. 

At the same time, considering the great strategic and economic importance of 

ASEAN, I do believe it makes sense for the United States to continue to consider 

long-term strategies that would most effectively expand the United States trade and 

investment relationships with the ASEAN member nations, individually and as a 

group. The main issue, of course, is the readiness of partner economies and their 

governments to enter into high-quality, comprehensive trade and investment arrangements with the United States, on terms that would be of benefit to our economy and be acceptable to the U.S. Congress. In order to lay a foundation, we should 

continue to work intensively with the ASEAN Secretariat and the ASEAN governments, including through the U.S.–ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework 

Agreement (TIFA) process, as well as our bilateral TIFAs and other dialogues, to 

help build their capacity, accelerate reform, and create opportunities for realizing 

long-term trade goals. 

(163)

NOMINATIONS 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 4, 2011

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

Daniel Benjamin Shapiro, of Illinois, to be Ambassador to Israel 

Stuart E. Jones, of Virginia, a Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service, Class of Minister-Counselor, to be Ambassador to 

the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 

Hon. George Albert Krol, of New Jersey, a Career Member of the 

Senior Foreign Service, Class of Minister-Counselor, to be 

Ambassador to the Republic of Uzbekistan 

Henry S. Ensher, of California, Member of the Senior Foreign Service, Class of Counselor, to be Ambassador to the People’s 

Democratic Republic of Algeria 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:42 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert P. Casey, Jr., 

presiding. 

Present: Senators Casey, Risch, and Lee. 

Senator CASEY. The hearing will come to order. I know we are 

starting maybe 3 minutes early, but that is not all that bad to do 

once in a while. 

Today the Senate Foreign Relations Committee meets to examine 

the nominations of Daniel Shapiro for the position of Ambassador 

to Israel, Stuart Jones to be Ambassador to Jordan, George Krol 

to be Ambassador to Uzbekistan, and Henry Ensher to be Ambassador to Algeria. 

I would like to, first of all, welcome Senator Bill Nelson of the 

State of Florida. I know we will be joined by Senator Lieberman 

as well, both of whom will provide introductions of Mr. Shapiro. 

But in the interest of keeping the Senate on an efficient path of 

time this afternoon, I am going to forgo my opening statement, 

which is traditionally the start of a hearing, and give the floor to 

Senator Nelson so he can make his introductory remarks. And that 

way we can keep the Senate moving at a good pace. 

But I am grateful to Senator Nelson for his appearance here 

today, and for his willingness to take time to help us have this 

hearing proceed. Senator Nelson, the floor is yours. 

164

STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,

U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA 

Senator NELSON. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your personal 

courtesies. 

I must say that in the 11 years that I have been here, this is 

one of the prouder moments that I have had to introduce a nominee to any of our committees. There are times in life when you 

know that what is about to occur is exactly the right thing, and the 

position of Ambassador to Israel and Dan Shapiro is the right 

thing. 

We have an extraordinary individual that I can commend to this 

committee because I know him very well. Dan was our legislative 

director for the first 6 years, my first term as Senator, and since 

I was then a member of this committee, Foreign Relations, as well 

as Armed Services, we traveled extensively. And of course, whenever we were traveling anywhere in the world, I had a walking encyclopedia with me, but that was magnified once we got anywhere 

into the Middle East and Central Asia. 

Just for starters, he speaks fluent Hebrew and fluent Arabic, not 

a shabby start for an Ambassador to Israel. And his depth of 

knowledge, even back when he was with this little country boy 

from Florida, was extensive in his advice and counsel to me. You 

can imagine what that depth of knowledge is now that he has been 

a member of the National Security Council with the portfolio in 

that council of the Middle East. And so we have someone who is 

uniquely qualified for this position. 

Second, I would point out that among all of the White House 

staff, when it comes to a matter of the Middle East, who does the 

President draw on for his advice, but the fellow who knows the 

Middle East backward and forward in order to give advice? That 

is an important component as well, so that as our representative 

in Israel, when Dan will speak as our Ambassador, everybody 

knows that he has got a direct pipeline to the Oval Office. 

And third, let me say that as he represents America, he will represent all of America. It is true that among the Jewish community, 

he is probably as popular as Benjamin Netanyahu. But I said Dan 

represents all of America. I so well remember how he was so capable of putting the interest of the United States first in whatever 

interest group that it was that came in seeking legislation or a 

change in legislation or having to deal with our foreign policy. And 

I particularly watched Dan as he interacted with a group of our 

Muslim constituents, of which I have a sizable representation in 

the State of Florida, and he was just so adept with such graciousness as he would carry on the affairs of our office. 

And so I give to this committee my unlimited recommendation, 

the highest recommendation, and I would ask that the committee—

and I have already spoken to Chairman John Kerry—that you all 

proceed with this expeditiously so that we can have our new Ambassador in Israel. 

Thank you very much, Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY. Senator Nelson, thank you very much. We are 

welcoming you back to this committee. We appreciate the words 

that you expressed here about the nominee, and you have given us 

an assignment and we appreciate that. 

165

In furtherance of Senate courtesies before my opening, I wanted 

to also turn to Senator Lieberman who, of course, is the chairman 

of the Homeland Security Committee and has been a leader in the 

Senate for so many years. And we are grateful that he is here. We 

are honored by your presence as well, Senator Lieberman, and you 

have the floor. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN,

U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am honored to 

be here to help introduce Dan Shapiro to the committee and also 

to join with our colleague, Senator Bill Nelson, in praising him. 

I cannot say that Dan ever worked for me as Bill could, but I am 

so proud to say that I have known Dan even longer for a much 

more important reason: his wife Julie taught my youngest child 

when she was very young. And we were very impressed with Julie. 

And, you know, Dan was not bad either. [Laughter.] 

Of course, I did get to know Dan when he worked with Senator 

Feinstein before that. As the record will show, he worked with 

Chairman Lee Hamilton in the House of Representatives and then, 

of course, his time with Bill Nelson. 

This is really a superb appointment. I endorse Dan’s nomination 

wholeheartedly. He has an extraordinary background, as Bill said. 

When Bill said that Dan Shapiro was fluent in Hebrew and Arabic, 

I turned to him and wanted him to know that I knew that he was 

not bad in English either, and I know that will help him in his 

work. [Laughter.] 

But more to the point, he brings expertise. He brings a very informed judgment. He also brings—and I want to stress a point that 

Bill Nelson made. At this moment of really extraordinary change 

in the Middle East, which has a tremendous potential for good but 

also creates uncertainty, Dan Shapiro will bring to this position his 

obviously close relationship with President Obama. And this is a 

moment when I think it is more important than ever for there to 

be close and direct communications and a relationship of deep trust 

between the Government of the United States and the Government 

of Israel and really more particularly between the Oval Office here 

in Washington and the Office of the Prime Minister in Jerusalem. 

And Dan Shapiro as Ambassador will guarantee, I think, that 

there is that kind of trust on both sides. 

I always say to groups around the country who are concerned 

about Israel’s security that since the founding of the modern state 

and the very rapid recognition of the State of Israel by then-President Harry Truman, which was so significant to Israel’s immediate 

legitimacy among the nations of the world, that the United States 

has remained Israel’s most steadfast ally and supporter, and it is 

a natural relationship because we are two great democracies. The 

relationship continues strong both from the White House and really 

broad bipartisan support for the United States-Israel relationship. 

I think Dan Shapiro understands all that and will bring all that 

with him. 

I will say, just to echo what Bill Nelson said, that in the proIsrael community in America—and in that community, there is a 

range of opinion. I was quite impressed by the range of endorseVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00173 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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ments for this nomination after it was made, going on one side 

from the Zionist Organization of America to, on the other side, the 

Americans for Peace Now. And that covers quite a lot of real estate 

ideologically speaking. But it is a tribute to Dan’s credibility and 

his accessibility and his personality that he enjoys that support. 

So I know you have a lot of business. I want to leave it to that. 

But I will come back to what I said at the outset. Dan will make 

a great Ambassador and Julie will make a great wife of a great 

Ambassador, and together I know that they will strengthen our already remarkably strong relationship with Israel. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator CASEY. Senator Lieberman, thank you very much. We 

are grateful you are here with us today. 

We will move to my opening statement and then, of course, we 

will go to our nominees. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR,

U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA 

Senator CASEY. Let me speak first about our nominee for the 

post of Ambassador to Israel. 

The United States relationship with Israel is a cornerstone of 

United States foreign policy, as we all know. It is all the more important during the current historic period of upheaval in the Middle East. The United States and Israel have an unbreakable and 

unshakeable bond based upon common values and a commitment 

to democratic institutions, and our strong relationship with Israel 

is in the national security interest of the United States. 

The United States relationship with Israel is more important 

than ever, given the increasing unrest in the region. In recent 

weeks, I and others have voiced concern about the democratic transition process in Egypt, the threat posed by extremism in that 

country, and the prospects for the Camp David Peace Accords. 

Countries like Libya, Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen continue to experience significant unrest. The United States must lead with policies 

that reflect our national security interests as well as our values. 

In light of all of these uncertainties, Israel’s security in the region is of utmost concern. United States assistance to Israel is critical to supporting Israel’s security and maintaining stability in the 

region. United States assistance for Israel’s missile defense system 

has already proved successful in limiting attacks by terrorist 

groups, as demonstrated in Ashkelon last month, with the Iron 

Dome System which struck down eight short-range rockets fired by 

Hamas. In an ever-changing threat environment, the United States 

must ensure that Israel maintains its qualitative advantage over 

potential threats at home and abroad. 

Iran poses a uniquely significant threat to both Israel and United 

States national security as a result of its ongoing pursuit of nuclear 

weapons, failure to abide by its international obligations, and rejection of Israel’s right to exist. We have recently seen disturbing instances of Iranian force projection into the region, including support for terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah which continue to launch attacks on innocent Israeli citizens and civilians. 

The United States must stand firm in its commitment to Israel’s 

security by steadily increasing pressure on the Iranian regime. It 

167

is clear that stronger United States and multilateral sanctions 

have weakened Iran, but we must continue to work with our international partners to limit Iran’s influence in the region. 

The recent announcement of a Palestinian unification agreement 

between Fatah and Hamas has raised serious concerns over the 

fate of the peace process. As we know, Hamas is a terrorist organization committed to the destruction of Israel itself. The United 

States must stand firm in our opposition to any Hamas role in the 

Palestinian Government and discourage Palestinian efforts to work 

outside the parameters of direct peace negotiations. These efforts 

are counterproductive and will only serve to delay the day in which 

we see Israelis and Palestinians living side by side in peace and 

security. 

Given Mr. Shapiro’s extensive experience, I look forward to hearing from him about how he will manage this increasingly challenging environment in the region. 

Mr. Shapiro currently serves as the NSC Senior Director for the 

Middle East and North Africa and has been an adviser to President 

Obama since 2007. 

I would like to welcome Mr. Shapiro’s family members who are 

joining us today, his wife, Julie, and daughters, Leat and Marav 

and Shirak, and parents, Elizabeth and Michael. I do not want to 

embarrass them, but if they would like to stand, we would certainly like to acknowledge their presence. 

Thanks very much. 

I tell you why I do that. Because I know, as a public official, that 

when someone is putting themselves forward to provide public 

service, especially of the kind we are talking about here today with 

our nominees, I know a family serves with them in one way or another. So we are grateful for your commitment as well as members 

of a family. 

Let me just move quickly to our second nominee, Mr. Jones. 

Jordan, as we know, is an important partner in counterterrorism 

and has been a key ally in the Middle East peace process. Since 

signing a peace treaty with Israel in 1994, Jordan has provided a 

strategic buffer to more adversarial neighbors such as Syria. U.S. 

support has been critical to helping Jordan address internal and 

external challenges and, in turn, has helped ensure stability in an 

increasingly unstable region. Jordan has experienced a series of 

prodemocracy protests in recent months with youth-led groups calling for political reforms and criticizing the lack of government response to the demonstrations. As public criticism of the monarchy 

grows and the government crackdown in neighboring Syria worsens, the United States must assess how to best support the Jordanian Government’s efforts to balance political and economic reforms with political stability. I look forward to hearing how Stuart 

Jones will navigate this complex political landscape. 

Mr. Jones is currently serving as Deputy Chief of Mission at the 

U.S. Embassy in Iraq, a tough assignment. He has previously 

served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and 

Eurasian Affairs, Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in 

Egypt, and Director for Iraq at the National Security Council. If 

confirmed, Mr. Jones’ depth of experience in the Middle East will 

serve him well in this position. 

168

And so I now invite Mr. Shapiro to provide his remarks. 

Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Yes, very briefly. 

Senator CASEY. Our ranking member, Senator Risch. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,

U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO 

Senator RISCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, let me associate myself with the remarks of both Senator Lieberman and Senator Casey. We get a lot of publicity here 

about partisan issues, and our relationship with Israel is truly a 

bipartisan affair and has been for some time. And in that regard, 

we are all pulling the wagon together. 

Mr. Shapiro, thank you for taking the time to meet with me and 

with my staff. I sincerely appreciate it. I think this is a good appointment. 

Mr. Jones, let me say this. You are going to a country that is a 

friend of the United States and has been a good partner of ours in 

the region. Probably one of the great success stories that we hear 

very little about in the media is the peace treaty between Israel 

and Jordan. Certainly it is a model, and we obviously support that. 

It has worked very well, and I know that you will work to see that 

it continues to work. Obviously, there are going to be challenges 

with the recent matters that have arisen there. So we look forward 

to hearing from you as to how you are going to do that. 

With that, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Senator Risch. 

We are joined by Senator Lee from Utah as well, and we have 

time now or we can have comments later. But I think we will just 

move to the testimony and then questions. 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL BENJAMIN SHAPIRO, OF ILLINOIS,

TO BE AMBASSADOR TO ISRAEL 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the warm 

welcome. 

I have submitted a written statement which I would ask be made 

part of the record, and in the interest of time, I will summarize my 

remarks. 

Senator CASEY. Your statement and all the statements will be 

made a part of the record. 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Risch, Senator Lee, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

I am humbled and honored by the trust President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton have placed in me with the nomination to 

serve as United States Ambassador to Israel. If confirmed, I will 

do my utmost to meet that trust and responsibility and to promote 

the interests of the United States. 

I also recognize the vital role of this committee in our Nation’s 

foreign policy as well. If confirmed, I look forward to close cooperation with its members and its staff and with the Congress as a 

whole on strengthening our close and unbreakable relationship 

with the State of Israel. 

169

I am grateful, of course, to Senator Nelson for his introduction 

and for his support and guidance over the past decade, and I thank 

Senator Lieberman for his support and introduction as well. 

Mr. Chairman, I have been involved with Israel most of my life. 

I lived in Israel as a young child during the 1973 war. I went there 

twice for university studies, and I worked here in the Congress for 

many years to support Middle East peace efforts, strengthen the 

United States-Israel relationship and combat terrorist threats 

against both our nations. I have gained through those experiences 

a deep understanding both of Israel’s security needs and its people’s justifiable concerns about the threats they face and Israel’s 

strengths, and its people’s dreams manifested in the building of a 

modern state and the unrelenting search for peace. And I have also 

gained a deep appreciation for the importance of the United StatesIsrael relationship for our own national security. 

The United States has stood by Israel as its partner and ally 

since its creation. It is a bipartisan commitment, as Senator Risch 

says, and I have been privileged to serve President Obama as he 

has continued, deepened, and advanced that partnership. Israel 

has been and remains our most dependable ally in the Middle East. 

We share both common strategic interests and the values of open 

democratic societies. Our militaries train together and learn from 

one another. We share critical intelligence to counter terrorist 

threats, and our economic ties continue to grow. 

The United States has an unwavering commitment to Israel’s security and to ensuring Israel’s qualitative military edge. With Congress’ support, we have provided full funding for Israel’s foreign 

military financing under the terms of the 10-year memorandum of 

understanding and helped achieve tangible success in the development of missile defense technologies such as Arrow and Iron Dome, 

and we have seen dramatic evidence of that success, Mr. Chairman, as you mentioned recently with the Iron Dome system. We 

conduct joint exercises and maintain very close, high-level consultations between our civilian and military leaders. 

We coordinate closely with Israel also on the threat posed by 

Iran. President Obama is determined to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Israel is a key partner in that effort, supporting the strong sanctions contained in the U.N. Security Council 

resolution 1929 and the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, and we maintain extremely close consultations with Israel at all times on the nature of this threat. 

We firmly reject all attempts to delegitimize Israel. We consistently oppose anti-Israel resolutions in all U.N. bodies. We withdrew 

from the Durban Review Conference in 2009, and we supported 

Israel’s right to defend itself in the wake of the deeply flawed 

Goldstone Report. 

We also continue to seek a comprehensive peace between Israel 

and all its neighbors. President Obama believes that a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is essential to safeguarding 

Israel’s future as a secure Jewish democratic state, as well as to 

achieving the Palestinian people’s legitimate aspirations for independence in a viable state of their own. It is also profoundly in the 

United States own interests. We also believe that direct negotiations are the only way to achieve this goal, and we oppose unilatVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00177 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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eral actions by any party that would prejudice the outcome of a negotiated settlement. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed by the Senate, I look forward to 

strengthening and deepening the excellent cooperation between the 

United States and Israel. 

Thank you very much. I will be pleased to answer any questions 

you and the committee may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shapiro follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DANIEL BENJAMIN SHAPIRO

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you. I am humbled and honored by the trust President 

Obama and Secretary of State Clinton have placed in me with the nomination to 

serve as United States Ambassador to Israel. If confirmed, I will do my utmost to 

meet that trust and responsibility and to promote the interests of the United States. 

I am truly honored by the opportunity to appear before this committee today. I 

have spent hundreds of hours in this room, but this is my first time in this seat. 

For more than a decade, I worked for Senator Feinstein and Senator Nelson, and 

sat on the staff benches behind the dais. From that experience, I have a deep appreciation for the vital role that this committee plays in the conduct and oversight of 

our Nation’s foreign policy. If confirmed, I look forward to close cooperation and consultation with the members and staff of this committee and with the Congress as 

we pursue our shared commitment to strengthening our close and unbreakable relationship with the State of Israel. 

I am grateful to Senator Nelson for his introduction, and for his support and guidance over the past decade. I owe much of my professional development to the opportunities he gave me. And I thank Senator Lieberman, with whom I have worked 

closely on our shared commitment to the closest of United States-Israel relations. 

I am grateful to him for coming here today and for his support and introduction. 

Mr. Chairman, my own interaction with Israel has taken many forms over the 

years, each of which has helped me gain a greater appreciation of the unique experience and perspective of the Israeli people. I first went to Israel at the age of 4. My 

parents, who were academics, took our family there for a 6-month sabbatical. It was 

1973, and I was there during the Yom Kippur war. There were air raid sirens, followed by hours spent in bomb shelters. I saw soldiers driving through the streets 

on their way to the front. This was very different from my life in Illinois, where 

we never experienced such visible and vivid threats to our security and way of life. 

I remember, at the same time, our family enjoying many examples of the warmth 

and generosity of the Israeli people, from the Israeli schools my siblings and I attended to long hours spent together with other families in our Jerusalem neighborhood. 

I returned to Israel after high school and again during college. In 1988, as the 

country was reeling from the violence of the first intifada, rocks rained down on the 

bus I took to Hebrew University and my Israeli classmates intensely debated the 

meaning of these events for their country’s future. 

As a congressional staffer, I traveled to Israel as the hopes born of the Oslo 

Accords made peace seem within reach, celebrated the signing of the peace treaty 

with Jordan, mourned the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin days after he had returned to Israel from Washington, and worked to address the threats posed to our 

nations by Hamas and Hezbollah. 

As my professional involvement with Israel has deepened, so too has my understanding of Israel’s security needs and its people’s justifiable concerns about Iran’s 

nuclear weapons program, suicide bombers, missile attacks from Hamas and 

Hezbollah, and the ongoing efforts of some to delegitimize the Jewish state. But I 

have also grown more keenly aware of Israel’s deep-rooted strengths and its people’s 

dreams—manifested in the building of a modern state, the flowering of Jewish culture and democracy, the Start-up Nation, and the unrelenting search for peace. 

The United States has stood by Israel as its partner and ally from the first minutes of its creation, and I have been proud to serve President Obama as he has continued, deepened, and advanced that relationship. 

In a region beset by wars, terror, and autocracy, and in which we have much at 

stake, Israel has been our most dependable ally. Our militaries train together and 

learn from one another. We share critical intelligence to counter the threats of terrorist organizations that target the United States and the West, as well as Israel. 

Our economies have grown progressively more intertwined, particularly in the highVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00178 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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tech and renewable energy sectors. And, perhaps most importantly, we share the 

fundamental tenets of open and democratic societies. 

The United States security relationship with Israel has strengthened and deepened under President Obama. Our commitment to ensuring Israel’s Qualitative 

Military Edge is reflected in our security assistance, joint exercises, and an extraordinarily close level of consultation and cooperation at the highest levels of our civilian and military leaderships. The Congress is our partner in this commitment, fulfilling the President’s request to fully fund Israel’s Foreign Military Financing even 

in tight budgetary times. 

As a candidate, President Obama went to Sderot and saw a community damaged 

by rockets and people living in fear of the next attack. As President, he acted to 

see that Israeli defenses were significantly strengthened. With Congress’ full support, there has been tangible and important success in the joint development of missile defense technologies. The Arrow missile defense program provides Israel with 

a significant strategic missile defense capability. More recently, the Iron Dome 

short-range missile defense system successfully intercepted several rockets fired 

from Gaza last month. The additional $205 million the President requested and 

Congress provided for this program will help produce and deploy additional Iron 

Dome batteries to protect Israeli civilian lives in northern and southern Israel. If 

confirmed, I will work to provide continued support for United States-Israeli missile 

defense cooperation. 

Our security relationship also encompasses close coordination on the threat posed 

by Iran’s nuclear program. President Obama is determined to prevent Iran from 

acquiring a nuclear weapon, and has dramatically ramped up pressure on Iran, 

passing in the U.N. Security Council the most sweeping and biting international 

sanctions ever enacted to increase Iran’s isolation and cut off sources of funds and 

resources to advance their missile and nuclear programs. Israel is a key partner in 

that effort, supporting the strong sanctions contained in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929 and the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 

Act. If confirmed, I will seek to intensify our regular consultations, in which we 

share assessments and exchange ideas on ways to increase international pressure 

on Iran. 

Defending Israel’s security also means fighting attempts to delegitimize Israel. 

The Obama administration’s record is one of unshakeable opposition to this campaign. We’ve been steadfast in our opposition to anti-Israel resolutions in the U.N. 

Human Rights Council, the General Assembly, the Security Council and other U.N. 

bodies; we withdrew from the Durban Review Conference in 2009; and we’ve supported Israel’s right to defend itself in consideration of the deeply flawed Goldstone 

report. 

Our agenda with Israel in these international fora is not purely defensive—we are 

working to ensure that Israel receives full and equal treatment in all international 

organizations. Israel has much to offer the world, and the United Nations and other 

international organizations would benefit from Israeli capabilities and expertise. If 

confirmed, one of my goals will be to work with the Israeli Government to identify 

further opportunities for Israeli participation in the international civil service, 

across the U.N. system, and in the governance of the bodies they serve. 

Economic ties between the United States and Israel are also at their highest levels ever. As Silicon Valley taps into the amazing Israeli high-tech talent pool and 

startup culture, we see an astonishing $32.3 billion in bilateral trade, despite the 

global economic slowdown. The Department of Energy and the Government of Israel 

have just renewed the bilateral Agreement that frames our joint research program 

on alternative energy, which promises to further enhance our ties in technology cooperation. If confirmed, I will work hard to expand these successes in areas such 

as energy production, green technologies, and defense and aerospace technologies. 

No commitment to Israel’s security is complete without absolute dedication to 

achieving a comprehensive peace between Israel and all its neighbors. The peace 

agreements with Egypt and Jordan, which have brought so much stability to the 

region, are vital and must be protected and strengthened. The Obama administration believes that a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is essential 

to safeguarding Israel’s future as a secure, Jewish, democratic state, as well as 

achieving the Palestinian people’s legitimate aspirations for independence in a viable state of their own. It is also fundamentally in the United States own interest. 

We have been consistent and clear in our call for direct negotiations as the only 

way to achieve this goal, and we have consistently opposed unilateral actions by 

either side that would prejudice a negotiated settlement. 

We are closely following developments regarding the announced agreement between Fatah and Hamas. Many of the details remain unclear, and its implementation is uncertain. What is clear, however, is that Hamas is a terrorist organization 

172

which targets civilians and calls for the destruction of Israel. To play a constructive 

role in achieving peace, any Palestinian Government that emerges must renounce 

violence, abide by past agreements, and recognize Israel’s right to exist. As we have 

said many times, the United States strongly supports Palestinian reconciliation, but 

it must be on terms that support the cause of peace. 

Mr. Chairman, it has been a deep honor to be part of President Obama’s team 

working on these complex and critically important issues. If confirmed by the Senate to be the United States Ambassador to Israel, I will work to the best of my abilities to further strengthen and deepen the excellent cooperation and communication 

that already exists between our nations, as we work together toward a more peaceful, stable, democratic, and prosperous Middle East. 

Thank you for your attention, and I would be pleased to answer any questions 

you may have.

Senator CASEY. Thanks very much. 

Mr. Jones. 

STATEMENT OF STUART E. JONES, OF VIRGINIA, A CAREER 

MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF

MINISTER-COUNSELOR, TO BE AMBASSADOR TO THE 

HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN 

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Senator 

Risch, and thank you, Senator Lee, for being here. 

It is an honor to appear before you today as President Obama’s 

nominee to serve as Ambassador to Jordan. I am grateful to the 

President for this nomination and to Secretary Clinton for her confidence in me and for her leadership of the Department of State. 

If confirmed, I will do my best to live up to their trust and to work 

as closely as possible with this committee to advance United States 

goals in Jordan. 

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce 

my family. My wife, Barbara, is here, a former Foreign Service officer, and my two sons, Thaddeus and Woody, are here. My daughter, Dorothy, is unable to join us because of school obligations. I am 

grateful for their support, especially during this year while I have 

served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in Baghdad. 

Mr. Chairman, Jordan, as you said, is one of our closest partners 

in the Arab world. We share mutual interests and values. It is well 

known that Jordan has been a powerful agent for peace in the region, as one of only two Arab States to sign a peace treaty with 

Israel. Jordan is committed to a comprehensive peace in the Middle 

East and to a two-state solution. Jordan has also been a valued 

partner on Iraq. It accepted hundreds of thousands of refugees and 

hosted them with dignity, opening its schools and its hospitals, and 

collaborating with the international community in providing humanitarian aid. 

In this Arab Spring, as other countries have faltered, Jordan has 

undertaken important reforms. King Abdullah is a leader who has 

long listened to his people. In November 2010, Jordan held free and 

fair elections under procedures that met international standards. 

In February, we welcomed the new Jordanian Government with an 

ambitious mandate for political reform. 

We support the King’s and the government’s efforts to respond 

to the aspirations of Jordan’s citizens. Our efforts include working 

with Jordanian Government institutions and civil society to expand 

citizen participation in the country’s political and economic systems, strengthen independent media, strengthen the judicial sysVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00180 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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tem and the rights of women and laborers, and increase religious 

tolerance. 

Our economic assistance programs are aimed at addressing 

structural challenges in the Jordanian economy. Our security assistance also strengthens Jordan’s capabilities to support and contribute to Middle East peace efforts, international peacekeeping operations, counterterrorism efforts, and humanitarian assistance 

within the region. If confirmed, I will work with the Jordanian 

Government and people to ensure that all of our assistance advances a sustained and comprehensive partnership and to ensure 

that these programs create genuine benefits in the lives of the people of Jordan. 

We have a large Embassy in Amman. I care deeply about the 

welfare and security of our personnel, American and Jordanian. If 

confirmed, I will also dedicate myself to ensuring efficient and cost 

effective stewardship of our programs. 

I appreciate and value this committee’s oversight of our mission 

in Jordan. If confirmed, I look forward to welcoming this committee’s members and staff to Amman. Your presence and interest are 

a vital element in ensuring that we remain successfully engaged 

with the government and people of Jordan. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, again thank you 

for this opportunity. It is an honor to be here. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STUART E. JONES

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you 

today as President Obama’s nominee to serve as Ambassador to Jordan. I am grateful to the President for his nomination and to Secretary Clinton for her confidence 

in me and for her leadership of our Department. If confirmed, I will do my best to 

live up to their trust and to work as closely as possible with this committee to advance U.S. goals in Jordan. I will also build on the excellent work of my predecessor 

and friend, Ambassador Steve Beecroft, to deepen our partnership with the government and people of Jordan. 

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce my family. My 

wife, Barbara, a former Foreign Service officer, and my two sons, Thaddeus and 

Woody, are here today. My daughter, Dorothy, is unable to join us because of school 

obligations. I am grateful for their support, especially during this year while I have 

served as Deputy Chief of Mission at our Embassy in Baghdad. 

Mr. Chairman, Jordan is one of our closest partners in the Arab world. We share 

mutual interests and values. It is well known that Jordan has been a powerful 

agent for peace in the region. As one of only two Arab States to sign a peace treaty 

with Israel, Jordan is committed to the achievement of comprehensive peace in the 

Middle East and to a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Jordan 

has also been a valued partner on Iraq. It accepted hundreds of thousands of refugees and hosted them with dignity, opening its schools and hospitals and collaborating with the international community in providing humanitarian aid. The Jordanian Prime Minister was the first high-level visitor to Baghdad after Iraq’s new 

government was formed in January. 

As other countries have faltered, Jordan has undertaken important reforms. King 

Abdullah is a leader who has long listened to his people. In November 2010, Jordan 

held free and fair elections under procedures that met international standards according to both international and domestic election observers. In February, we 

welcomed a new Jordanian Government with an ambitious mandate for political 

reform. The King has also established a National Dialogue Commission with a

3-month timeline to enact electoral and political party reform. 

We support the King’s and the government’s efforts to implement a reform agenda 

that responds to the aspirations of Jordan’s citizens. Our efforts include working 

with Jordanian Government institutions and with Jordanian civil society to expand 

citizen participation in the country’s political and economic systems; strengthen 

174

independent media, the judicial system, and the rights of women and laborers; and 

increase religious tolerance. 

Our economic assistance programs are also aimed at addressing structural challenges in the Jordanian economy. Jordan is one of the most water-starved nations 

in the world. The Millennium Challenge Corporation is funding a 5-year program 

on water management in Zarqa which we hope will provide a template for water 

management throughout the nation. Jordan has also been impacted by rising energy 

costs; we are now engaging the Government of Jordan to promote energy efficiency 

and explore the potential for shale gas production. These are just two examples of 

our extensive programs in Jordan. Assistance also strengthens Jordan’s capabilities 

to support and contribute to Middle East peace efforts, international peacekeeping 

operations, counterterrorism efforts, and humanitarian assistance within the region. 

If confirmed, I will work with the Jordanian Government and people to ensure 

that all of our assistance effectively and efficiently advances a sustained and comprehensive partnership and to ensure that these programs create genuine benefits 

in the lives of the people of Jordan. 

We have a large Embassy in Amman. I care deeply about the welfare and security 

of our personnel—American and Jordanian. If confirmed, I will also dedicate myself 

to ensuring efficient and cost-effective stewardship of our programs. 

I appreciate and value this committee’s oversight of our mission in Jordan. If confirmed, I look forward to welcoming the committee’s members and staff to Amman. 

Your presence and interest are a vital element in ensuring that we remain productively and successfully engaged with the government and people of Jordan. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to address the committee. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have.

Senator CASEY. Mr. Jones, thanks very much. I should have provided the opportunity to introduce your family. If they would like 

to stand. I want to make sure that we give them that opportunity. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much. 

I would reiterate what I said before about a family serving with 

you in public service. We appreciate not only their presence here 

but also the work that they do to make it possible for you to serve. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you. 

Senator CASEY. And we commend both of you for your willingness to serve. 

I will start the first round of questions. I wanted to start, Mr. 

Shapiro, with a rather difficult topic related to what has been happening just in the last couple of days and weeks: the decision of the 

Palestinian Authority to form a unity government with Hamas. We 

are aware of all of the difficulties and concerns that that presents. 

As you know, and as most Americans I think have a sense of, we 

have always, and I think the international community has always 

said, that the only way that Hamas could be a legitimate partner 

in any effort is if they do at least three things: that they recognize 

Israel and renounce violence and agree to abide by the previous obligations and agreements of the Palestinian Authority. They have 

not done that yet. 

And I have profound and deep concerns about what is happening, 

and I wanted to get your sense of what our policy is or what it 

should be going forward, making sure that we are adhering to 

those conditions that we have always insisted upon as it relates to 

Hamas, which is a terrorist organization. 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

There is no question that we in the administration share many 

of the concerns that you have just articulated, and I know many 

of your colleagues share as well, about the reconciliation agreement 

that was announced and signed this morning in Cairo. We are 

closely following this in part because we need to learn more about 

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it. There are many details that are as yet unknown about this 

agreement. There are ambiguities in the language of it. There are 

deep uncertainties about its prospects for implementation. And so 

we will be following that very closely and staying in close touch 

with the Congress and also maintaining, as we always do, very 

close consultations with our colleagues and our partners in the 

Israeli Government to ensure that we have the closest possible 

common understanding of the meaning of these events. 

We share the characterization that you provided of Hamas. 

Hamas is a terrorist organization that calls for Israel’s destruction 

and that directs violence against civilians. We have no disagreement about that whatsoever. 

Now, Palestinian reconciliation ultimately is a desirable goal, but 

it must take place on terms that support peace, and I think you 

have articulated them well. Only a Palestinian Government that 

recognizes Israel and renounces violence and abides by previous 

agreements between the PLO and Israel can really be a true partner for peace. 

So those are the considerations. We will be watching very closely 

as we gain further understanding and facts about the agreement 

that was announced. 

Senator CASEY. Well, I just want to reiterate what I know to be 

a bipartisan consensus, as you know, on that issue and want to 

remind—I am not saying it is necessary—but I want to remind

the administration of that commitment that we have to Israel’s

security. 

I have made a number of trips to the region. When I was in 

Israel in July 2010, I had the chance to tour part of Sderot, a community, among others, that has been assaulted for many years, to 

actually see the shrapnel and the results of the rockets that have 

landed there, to the point where children, as you know—and again, 

you know better than I, but it bears repeating—couldn’t play in 

playgrounds. They literally built, as many people here know, a 

bomb-fortified indoor playground. So something as simple as playing in a community playground is virtually impossible, at least at 

various periods in recent history, because of those rockets. There 

have been thousands and thousands that have landed as a result 

of the violence perpetrated by Hamas. 

I note that Hamas’ leader—this is timely and I think it is important for the record—his response to the killing of Osama bin Laden 

referred to the assassination of an Arab holy warrior. I do not 

know what more we can say about the threat that Hamas poses to 

Israel and to the region. 

So let me move to at least one more question before I turn to our 

ranking member, Senator Risch. 

A lot of us have worked long and hard on making sure that we 

do everything possible to hold the Iranian regime in check, especially as it relates to the potential nuclear capability, but also to 

the ever-present and ongoing threat that is posed by the Iranian 

regime’s support for extremists and terrorist organizations in the 

region, not the least of which are Hamas and Hezbollah. I spent 

some time last summer in Beirut, and you do not have to be on the 

ground in that country very long before you feel the overwhelming 

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sense of the power of Hezbollah in Lebanon, not to mention the impact it has on the region as a terrorist organization. 

But because of that support that the Iranian regime has provided, we need to be determined and even more determined, I 

think, than we have been to make sure that the sanctions we have 

applied to the regime work. We are getting some results from that, 

but frankly not enough, and we need to consider tightening up or 

increasing the sanctions in my judgment. 

I wanted to get your thoughts on that in terms of the impact as 

you see it of those sanctions and what other steps we can take to 

hold the Iranian regime in check. 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Mr. Chairman, we share the concern and the assessment about the threat posed by Iran not just to Israel, but to 

the region—and of course, the threat is very real. It is articulated 

openly by the President of Iran who calls for Israel’s destruction. 

It is a threat to the United States and it is a threat to our allies 

and our interests and, indeed, international stability throughout 

the region. It is posed both by Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons 

and by its support for terrorist organizations like Hezbollah and 

like Hamas which it attempts to arm. 

As I said, President Obama is determined to prevent Iran from 

acquiring a nuclear weapon, and the sanctions enacted by the U.N. 

Security Council resolution, additional measures coordinated and 

taken by the European Union and a number of our other partners, 

and the sanctions passed by this Congress have all created several 

layers of economic sanctions against Iran that have had a real impact and that has made Iran struggle in ways economically that it 

has not previously done and begin to feel the pain of the result of 

its continued pursuit of these policies. 

Now, obviously, we will look for additional measures that may be 

available to tighten those sanctions. We are in close consultations 

with a number of international partners about ways that can be 

done, whether it is countries acting on their own or in concert. It 

is something that my colleagues at the State Department will remain in close consultation with this committee about, but I can assure you it has our full and undivided attention. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. 

Mr. Jones, I will get to you in the next round, but Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Shapiro, when you travel over there, you cannot help but be 

struck by the difference between what is happening in the West 

Bank and what is happening in Gaza. So I guess this new reconciliation pact raises the question in my mind—and I would like your 

personal view on this. With that reconciliation or whatever it turns 

out to be, is the population going to move more toward what is 

happening in the West Bank or is the West Bank going to move 

more backward toward what is happening in Gaza? What is your 

personal view on that? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Well, Senator Risch, I think it is hard to judge exactly how public opinion will react to this agreement. I would say 

there is strong support among Palestinians for reconciliation, and 

I think that was a driving factor in this agreement being reached 

at this time. 

177

We agree with you. There have been tremendous gains made in 

the West Bank through an improved economy that is growing rapidly through improved security that is carried out both by the 

Israeli forces and by the Palestinian security forces and an improved governance under the reforms initiated by Prime Minister 

Salam Fayyad. So there is much progress that has been made, and 

it is in our interest, as well as Israel’s interest and the Palestinians’ interest, that it be sustained. 

That will certainly be a priority for us as we again evaluate the 

details of this agreement that has been announced and assess its 

prospects for implementation. We are very mindful of that progress 

and want to see it sustained. 

Senator RISCH. You didn’t really get to your personal view as to 

what you think is going to happen, but if you had to guess, what 

direction are they going to slide? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Senator, it is very hard not being on the ground 

to get a sense of the reaction. I think at least within the West 

Bank we have seen Palestinians appreciating the kinds of changes 

that they have experienced in their lives in the way I have just described. They certainly have other aspirations as well, as I mentioned, for statehood and for reconciliation. But I think we would 

certainly hope the Palestinians would try to support a government 

that would allow that progress to be sustained, and that is what 

we will be working toward. 

Senator RISCH. One cannot help but think that those that live in 

Gaza have to look across and see what is happening in the West 

Bank and say, look, what they are doing is working and what we 

are doing is not working, how can we move more in that direction. 

One would hope that that is the thought process that an intelligent 

person would pursue. 

Mr. Jones, your view, please if you would, about the instability 

in Syria and how that potential is affecting or could potentially affect things on the ground in Jordan. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Senator. 

I think all of us are watching developments in Syria with real 

concern. People of Syria are demonstrating their frustration and 

their lack of satisfaction with the Government in Syria, and the response of the Assad regime has been extremely brutal. It is a 

source of concern from a humanitarian standpoint and, as you said, 

from a political standpoint. 

I think that the situation in Jordan is quite distinct. The King 

has long listened to his people, as I said in my statement. He had 

already put in place a series of reforms to address people’s concerns, and for the relatively minor demonstrations that we have 

seen in Jordan, there has been a completely different relationship 

between the people and the security forces where you see Jordanian security forces actually providing water and juice to the 

demonstrators. 

Any instability in the region, of course, is a cause for concern and 

this is something we are going to have to continue to watch. But 

I think certainly our continued support for Jordan will be essential 

through this period. 

Senator RISCH. I appreciate that. 

178

Back to you, Mr. Shapiro. You are at least modestly an expert 

on Syria. Do you agree with that assessment? We all understand 

the difference between the two governments, but do you agree with 

the assessment that that will carry the day? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. I do. I do, sir. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Senator Risch. 

Senator Lee. 

Senator LEE. Thank you both for coming to join us today, and 

thank you for your willingness to serve your country. 

Mr. Shapiro, I want to echo the comments that have been made 

by my colleagues, and I will echo what Senator Casey was saying 

a minute ago. I have visited that same village, Sderot, and visited 

the same playground. On the outskirts of that city, I visited this 

little lookout point where you could look out and see into Gaza. I 

have it on good authority that within about 72 hours after I visited 

that lookout spot, it was destroyed by rockets coming over from 

Gaza. So I am very sympathetic to the security risks that Israeli 

citizens face every single day and my heart goes out to them. I 

hope that we can be a support to Israel as we acknowledge that 

they are in a very vulnerable position and do everything we can to 

help them maintain defensible, secure borders. 

In light of the involvement of Hamas and the Palestinian Organization, is that something that has caused you to consider whether 

we should withhold United States funding to the Palestinian Organization until such time as it clearly and thoroughly disassociates 

itself from Hamas? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Well, Senator, as I stated earlier, there are a lot 

of details about this agreement that has been announced that are 

still rather obscure, and many of them may not become clear until 

it is implemented or attempted to be implemented. And those details, I think, will bear very much on the question that you have 

raised about assistance. There are clear laws regarding our Palestinian assistance program. I can assure you that the administration will remain in full compliance with those laws, and I have already articulated the kinds of conditions that we think represent 

a Palestinian Authority that is committed to peace. So we will, obviously, be considering that question, but it requires a much greater and better understanding of an agreement that has not yet 

begun to be implemented. 

Senator LEE. Sure, but there does come a point at which we turn 

that off. Do we not? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Well, the law is very clear. There are circumstances under which we would not be able to provide assistance 

to the Palestinian Authority. 

Senator LEE. And so notwithstanding the fact that there is sometimes wiggle room—particularly in laws relating to foreign relations, there is sometimes wiggle room—you stand by the proposition that the law does have limits. This is a law. This is not just 

an aspirational statement. 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Yes, I agree with that. 

Senator LEE. I appreciate a statement made recently by Israel’s 

Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, who said it is clear that an 

Egypt that is anchored in democratic values would never be a 

179

threat to peace, particularly a threat to peace in Israel. I hope that 

he is right. Do you agree with his assessment? 

Mr. SHAPIRO. Well, we certainly support the transition that is 

underway in Egypt and believe it represents an incredible opportunity for the Egyptian people to experience the kind of self-rule 

and democracy and the realization of those aspirations. We think 

it is absolutely critical that Egypt remain, as it goes through that 

transition, the responsible regional leader that it has been, and a 

big component of that is the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt 

which has been not only so important to Israel’s security but really 

an anchor of regional stability and key to our own interests. So we 

have been very pleased that the Egyptian transitional government 

has repeated its commitment to all of Egypt’s international obligations, including that treaty, and we would certainly have the expectation that any Egyptian Government would live up to those obligations and maintain the treaty. 

Senator LEE. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Senator Lee. 

Mr. Jones, I wanted to get back to you. I meant to do that in the 

first round and I ate up all my time and actually took more time. 

So I owe the committee a minute and 22 seconds or something like 

that. 

You have been asked before and your answers, as well as your 

statement, acknowledge the challenge in the region and the impact 

on Jordan and obviously the reaction by King Abdullah, as well as 

Jordanian leaders other than he, have been of marked contrast to 

what we have seen in other places in the region. 

I wanted to develop that a little further in the sense that we 

know that in this fight against terrorism we have had to develop 

new relationships and even stronger relationships. I think it can be 

said without contradiction that Jordan has been a strong 

counterterrorism partner. We appreciate that probably even more 

so in the last couple of days. We know that that fight has been and 

will continue to be against Islamist groups in the Middle East. 

We also know that even as Jordan is a strong counterterrorism 

partner, its peace treaty with Israel has also played an important 

role in the Middle East as well. 

But given the unrest in the region and given the increasing influence of terrorist organizations that I mentioned before like Hamas 

and Hezbollah, what measures should the United States take to 

support King Abdullah’s reform efforts especially at this time? 

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Senator. Thank you, Chairman. 

As you know, the United States is an important provider of assistance to Jordan, both economic support funds and foreign military financing. The economic support funds I think can play a vital 

role in terms of helping grow the economy, helping it address some 

of its structural challenges. Jordan is an importer. It imports 96 

percent of its fuel. We are involved in helping Jordan look for alternative fuel sources and look at nontraditional fuels. 

We are also helping them address their water problem. Jordan 

is one of the most water-starved countries in the world, and 

through the Millennium Challenge Corporation, we have just 

issued a $275 million grant over 5 years to work with the commuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00187 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
180

nity of Zarqa to develop water management techniques that we 

hope will be a model for the rest of the country. 

So I think at this level, helping communities, helping create prosperity—that is a very important way to help combat terrorism. 

Of course, the security side is also very important. Jordan has 

been an outstanding partner with us in the struggle against terrorism, and at all levels we should continue the work that we are 

doing with them, supporting their efforts and working closely with 

them as a partner. 

Senator CASEY. I know we are almost ready to wrap up because 

we are going to move to our second panel, and we have had almost 

50 minutes so far. So I do want to wrap up. 

Senator Risch, do you have any questions? 

Senator RISCH. No. I am going to pass. Thank you very much, 

Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. 

Senator CASEY. I would thank our ranking member for being 

here. 

After we move to our second panel, we may have to adjourn 

briefly because of a potential vote, but that is not certain yet. 

I do, as well, want to offer each of you the opportunity to make 

any closing statement or any point that you want to emphasize 

that we did not ask about or something you did not have a chance 

to cover—not that we encourage closing statements, but if you really feel the need to say something else. 

Mr. SHAPIRO. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to be here. 

Senator CASEY. I do want to mention, which I should have earlier, that Mr. Jones, I am told you are a Pennsylvania native. That 

is what the record shows. You grew up in, and your mother still 

lives in, Lafayette Hill, PA? 

Mr. JONES. Correct. 

Senator CASEY. I want you to know that that will not have any 

impact on your confirmation. [Laughter.] 

But it is possible it will have some impact on me. 

Thank you very much to both of you and we will move to our second panel. 

What I will do, as we are changing seats, so to speak, is I will 

begin a statement so that we can keep the hearing moving. 

We have two more nominees today and I wanted to start with 

our nominee for Uzbekistan. As many people in this audience 

know, Uzbekistan is an important partner in the Northern Distribution Network which is a major strategic priority for the United 

States war in Afghanistan. The airbase in Uzbekistan provides a 

vital supply route for the United States and NATO efforts to defeat 

al-Qaeda and its allies in Afghanistan and western Pakistan. The 

Uzbek Government also cooperates with United States security 

forces on counterterrorism and drug trafficking, two serious international threats. 

The United States, however, must balance our strategic interests 

in Uzbekistan with the need to hold the government accountable 

for serious human rights abuses, including the use of force to oppress its own citizens as demonstrated by the massacre in Andijan 

in the year 2005. According to the State Department’s 2010 Human 

181

Rights Report, the Uzbek Government continues to commit serious 

human rights violations, including arbitrary arrests and detention, 

restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly, and forced child 

labor in the cotton industry. 

I would like to especially acknowledge Senator Harkin’s efforts to 

expose child labor in Uzbekistan, which remains of critical concern. 

I look forward to hearing how Mr. George Krol will encourage 

the Uzbek Government to abide by its international human rights 

commitments while maintaining our important security cooperation. 

Ambassador Krol is Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 

South and Central Asian Affairs. He has served as United States 

Ambassador to Belarus from 2003 to 2006 and has served in several other challenging posts in Poland, India, Russia, and Ukraine. 

I am confident that his broad knowledge and experience working 

in the former Soviet Union will serve him well in this post if confirmed. 

Algeria is an important strategic partner of the United States in 

the fight against al-Qaeda-linked groups in north Africa, most notably Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb, so-called AQIM. The Algerian Government has taken an active leadership role in the African 

Union’s efforts to combat terrorism, and the recently announced 

U.S.-Algeria Bilateral Counterterrorism Contact Group will help to 

expand our existing cooperation to ensure greater security, peace, 

and development in the region. 

Algeria’s protest movement has remained limited compared to 

other countries in the region, but economic factors and longstanding political grievances have contributed to a series of strikes 

and demonstrations. 

Algeria’s decision in February to lift the 1992 state of emergency 

law was a welcomed step, but more needs to be done to address the 

human rights concerns such as freedom of assembly and association, prisoner abuse, and violence against women. 

I look forward to hearing from Henry Ensher about how the 

United States can work with the Algerian Government to promote 

further democratic reforms while also strengthening our security 

relationship. 

Mr. Ensher is currently serving as adviser to the Office of Afghanistan Affairs. He recently returned from southern Afghanistan 

where he served as Senior U.S. Civilian Representative. He has 

also served in our Embassies in Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Oman, 

Syria, Israel, Iraq, and was the Director of Political Affairs for Iraq 

in the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in 2006. 

That is a mouthful. 

I would also like to welcome Mr. Ensher’s wife, Mona, and two 

sons, Henry and Tariq, who are here with us today. And if they do 

not mind, we offer the chance, but we would love to have them 

stand up and be acknowledged. Thank you for being here today and 

thank you for your support for what I know is a family commitment to public service. 

Mr. Krol, would you like to start? Thank you. 

182

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE ALBERT KROL, OF NEW JERSEY, A CAREER MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, 

CLASS OF MINISTER-COUNSELOR, TO BE AMBASSADOR TO 

THE REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN 

Ambassador KROL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Risch. 

I am honored to appear before you today as President Obama’s 

nominee to become Ambassador to Uzbekistan, and I am grateful 

for the trust and confidence the President and Secretary Clinton 

have placed in me with this nomination. 

Unfortunately, my family is not here today. My wife is serving 

our Nation abroad, but she and I think my family are watching on 

the Webcast. So I say hello to them. You can stand up. Right? 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CASEY. That is permitted. I want to give them a few 

minutes to stand up. [Laughter.] 

Ambassador KROL. Since establishing diplomatic relations nearly 

20 years ago, the United States has supported Uzbekistan’s sovereignty and independence and encouraged its development as a 

prosperous, tolerant, internationally responsible, and democratic 

state at peace with its neighbors and the world. And those remain 

our fundamental goals to this day. 

Most recently, as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Central 

Asia, I came to appreciate firsthand Uzbekistan’s unique importance to United States foreign policy interests. 

Uzbekistan has provided crucial assistance to its neighbor Afghanistan and to international efforts to stabilize the situation 

there. Electricity from Uzbekistan keeps the lights on in Kabul. 

And Uzbekistan is also, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, an important 

part of the Northern Distribution Network, a major supply route 

for coalition forces. And if confirmed, I will encourage Uzbekistan 

to maintain this critical support. 

As you also noted, illegal narcotics flows, trafficking in persons, 

terrorism, extremism, and weapons of mass destruction proliferation concerns plague Uzbekistan’s neighborhood. Over recent years, 

our cooperation with Uzbekistan has grown in addressing these 

transnational challenges through engagement and vetted training 

programs, and if confirmed, I would work to strengthen our partnership with Uzbekistan in these areas. 

With the largest population in Central Asia and huge energy and 

mineral resources and its strategic location, Uzbekistan has a great 

economic potential, and if confirmed, I will encourage Uzbekistan 

to take steps to attract United States companies to help develop 

and diversify its economy and to buy American goods and services. 

Mr. Chairman, almost 30 years’ experience in the Foreign Service has taught me that long-term peace and durable stability are 

only possible with respect for human rights, the rule of law, transparent and democratic institutions, a vibrant civil society, and an 

open and free media. If confirmed, I will engage the government 

and the people of Uzbekistan fully and forthrightly on human 

rights issues such as preventing arbitrary arrests, addressing the 

allegations of torture and mistreatment in prisons, ending forced 

child labor, and allowing the free practice of faiths. 

If confirmed, I will encourage the Government of Uzbekistan to 

increase space for civil society in Uzbekistan and for international 

183

and domestic nongovernmental organizations to register and function freely. 

In 2009, the administration established regular bilateral, interagency consultations with Tashkent, and in these high-level meetings, the full range of bilateral and multilateral interests, including 

political, security, economic, and commercial issues, as well as 

human rights, are discussed frankly and comprehensively. And 

flowing from these consultations, an ambitious work plan is being 

developed to make realistic progress in all these areas. 

As Secretary Clinton stressed in Tashkent last December, we desire to move from words to actions. And if confirmed, I look forward 

to applying my energy and experience, creativity and leadership to 

constant, consistent engagement that meaningful action in these 

areas demands. 

I know from past ambassadorial experience that being an Ambassador is not only an honor but a responsibility, and if confirmed, 

I will endeavor to be a responsible and accountable steward of the 

American people’s trust and property, a caring leader for the entire 

embassy community, and a faithful representative of our values 

and word and deed. And I will ensure that our mission looks out 

for the interests of American citizens living and traveling in 

Uzbekistan. 

If confirmed, I will aim not only to develop effective relationships 

with the government but also to get out among the people of 

Uzbekistan and engage all elements of Uzbek society. Public diplomacy is a critical element of our work, and I will encourage all 

members of the mission team to be ambassadors to the people of 

Uzbekistan, helping to increase understanding of American policies 

and values. And fostering greater exchanges and contacts between 

our peoples and communities and not just between our governments will be a major priority. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I know success depends on building and 

leading a strong, dedicated mission team and keeping it fully in 

step with Washington and not only with the executive branch but 

also with Congress, and if confirmed, I will want to work closely 

with Congress, with you and the committee and your staff to advance America’s goals and interests in Uzbekistan, hosting congressional visits and briefing you. 

Thank you, sir, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Krol follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEORGE ALBERT KROL

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,I am honored to appear before you 

today as President Obama’s nominee to become U.S. Ambassador to the Republic 

of Uzbekistan. I am grateful for the trust and confidence the President and Secretary Clinton have placed in me with this nomination. If confirmed, I will work 

with this committee and the entire U.S. Congress to advance America’s goals and 

interests in Uzbekistan. 

Since recognizing Uzbekistan and establishing diplomatic relations nearly 20 

years ago, the United States has supported Uzbekistan’s sovereignty and independence and encouraged its development as a prosperous, tolerant, democratic society 

and internationally responsible state at peace with its neighbors and the world. 

Those remain our fundamental goals to this day. 

Most recently, as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Central Asia, I came to 

understand and appreciate the importance of Uzbekistan to U.S. foreign policy 

interests. 

184

Uzbekistan has provided crucial assistance to its neighbor Afghanistan and to coalition efforts to stabilize the security situation there. Electricity from Uzbekistan 

keeps the lights burning in Kabul. Uzbekistan is also an important part of the 

Northern Distribution Network, a major supply route for coalition forces. If confirmed, I will encourage Uzbekistan to maintain this support. 

Illegal narcotics, trafficking in persons, terrorism and extremism plague 

Uzbekistan’s immediate neighborhood. Over the years, U.S. cooperation with 

Uzbekistan has grown in addressing these transnational challenges through engagement and vetted training programs. If confirmed, I will work to strengthen our partnership with Uzbekistan in these areas. 

Uzbekistan has the largest population in Central Asia and also is a major producer of energy and minerals. If confirmed, I will encourage Uzbekistan to take 

steps to attract U.S. companies to help develop and diversify its economy and to buy 

American goods and services. 

Almost 30 years experience in the Foreign Service has taught me that long-term 

peace and durable stability are only possible with respect for human rights, the rule 

of law, transparent and democratic institutions, a vibrant civil society and an open 

and free media. If confirmed, I will engage the government and people of Uzbekistan 

fully and forthrightly, to increase not only our bilateral security and economic engagement, but also our engagement on human rights issues such as preventing arbitrary arrests, addressing allegations of torture and mistreatment in prisons, ending 

forced child labor, and allowing free practice of faiths. 

If confirmed, I will encourage the government to make space for civil society in 

Uzbekistan and for international and domestic nongovernmental organizations to 

register and function freely. These steps can facilitate Uzbekistan achieving its selfdeclared goal to become a prosperous, tolerant, and stable society in full accord with 

its international commitments and rich heritage as a crossroads of cultures, education, and human values. 

The Obama administration has established an atmosphere and a mechanism of 

constructive dialogue and trust with the government and people of Uzbekistan. In 

February of this year the second series of comprehensive annual bilateral consultations with Uzbekistan were held in Tashkent. Secretary Clinton visited Tashkent 

last December to elevate our engagement with Uzbekistan’s leadership and civil society. In these consultations the full range of bilateral and multilateral interests including political, security, economic and commercial issues, as well as human rights, 

are discussed frankly and comprehensively. 

An ambitious work plan is being developed to make realistic progress in all these 

areas. Many of these issues are not easy to resolve and will require great effort. The 

United States and, I believe, Uzbekistan are committed to this process and to 

achieving results. As Secretary Clinton stressed in Tashkent, we desire to move 

from words to actions. If confirmed, I look forward to applying my energy, experience, creativity, leadership and insight to the constant, consistent engagement that 

meaningful action in these areas demands. 

I know from my past ambassadorial experience that being an American ambassador is not only a great honor but also a great responsibility. If confirmed, I will 

endeavor to be a good steward of the American people’s trust and property, a caring 

leader for my embassy colleagues, and a faithful representative of our values and 

our interests. I will ensure that our mission looks out for the interests of American 

citizens living and traveling in Uzbekistan. 

If confirmed, I will aim not only to develop effective relationships with the leadership and government authorities, but also to get out among the people of Uzbekistan 

and engage all elements of Uzbek society. To me, public diplomacy is a critical element of our diplomatic engagement. I will encourage all members of the mission 

team to be ambassadors to the people of Uzbekistan working to increase understanding of the United States, our policies and our values. Fostering greater exchanges and contacts between our peoples and communities, and not just between 

our governments, will be a major priority. 

Finally, I know success depends on my leadership in encouraging and supporting 

a strong, dedicated mission team and keeping it fully synchronized with Washington, not only with the executive branch, but with the Congress as well. If confirmed, I would look forward to continuing an active dialogue with you as we seek 

to strengthen our relations with the people of Uzbekistan. 

Thank you. I look forward to answering your questions.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I will also note for 

the record that you were born in Pittsburgh. Is that correct? 

Ambassador KROL. Yes, sir. 

185

Senator CASEY. That will have some impact on me. OK. 

Ambassador KROL. And I am a Pirate fan too I have to say. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator RISCH. Do we have any Idaho appointees here, Mr. 

Chairman? 

Senator CASEY. We are going to work on those. We are going to 

make that part of the next hearing. 

Mr. Ensher, we want to welcome you as well and thank you for 

your commitment to public service. You can provide a summary. 

Both your full statements will be made part of the record. 

STATEMENT OF HENRY S. ENSHER, OF CALIFORNIA, A CAREER MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS 

OF COUNSELOR, TO BE AMBASSADOR TO THE PEOPLE’S 

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA 

Mr. ENSHER. This will be just a brief summary, Senator, if that 

is all right with you. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. 

Mr. ENSHER. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch, thank you 

very much for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am 

honored by President Obama’s nomination to be U.S. Ambassador 

to Algeria. I deeply appreciate the confidence he and Secretary 

Clinton have shown by making this nomination. 

If confirmed, my No. 1 goal will be to protect all Americans living 

and working in Algeria. I will work to advance critical United 

States foreign policy and national security interests in Algeria by 

using the full range of our diplomatic tools to promote security and 

economic prosperity. Both the President and the Secretary have 

emphasized the importance of outreach to civil society in countries 

of the region, especially women’s organizations, and if confirmed, 

doing so will be a priority. 

Mr. Chairman, I wanted to thank you very much for acknowledging my family, but I feel I would be remiss if I didn’t add just 

a couple of words. So with permission, I will do that. 

I have been away from the family for much of the last several 

years, 2 years, including time spent in Iraq and Afghanistan, and 

that would not have been possible particularly without Mona’s unwavering love and support. She has done splendidly at home even 

while she was doing a very important job in service to the people 

of the United States. So I wanted to acknowledge that again. 

Thank you, sir, for that. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ensher follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HENRY S. ENSHER

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lugar, members of the committee, I thank you 

for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

I am honored by President Obama’s nomination of me to be U.S. Ambassador to 

Algeria. I deeply appreciate the confidence President Obama and Secretary Clinton 

have shown by making this nomination. If confirmed by the Senate, my No. 1 goal 

will be to protect the people who serve the United States at our mission in Algiers 

and to protect the Americans who live and work in Algeria. I will work to advance 

critical U.S. foreign policy and national security interests in Algeria by using the 

full range of our diplomatic tools to promote security and economic prosperity. Both 

the President and the Secretary have emphasized the importance of outreach to civil 

society in countries of the region and, if confirmed, doing so will be a priority. 

With your permission, I would like to introduce my wife, Mona, and our two sons, 

Henry and Tariq. I would not be here today without their unwavering love and supVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00193 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
186

port. The service to our country in Iraq and Afghanistan that have kept me away 

from them for more than 2 years would not have been possible without Mona’s 

steadiness and grace at home, even while she excelled at her own very important 

job. 

The relationship between the United States and Algeria has never been stronger. 

As the third-most populous country in the Arab world, Algeria is the largest producer of oil and gas on the African Continent, and an important supplier of energy 

to both the United States and Europe. Algeria also plays a critical role on the front 

lines countering violent extremism, and knows firsthand how important it is to 

maintain constant vigilance against those who wish to do us harm. 

Like other countries in the region, Algeria has been impacted by events of the 

‘‘Arab Spring.’’ President Bouteflika has recently announced important reforms of 

the Algerian system, and we look forward to their early implementation. Algerians 

will decide any next steps they wish to take and, if confirmed, I look forward to developing our relations with them as they continue to craft their own destiny. 

Algeria exports nearly 2 million barrels of oil a day. The United States is by far 

Algeria’s largest trading partner, accounting for nearly a quarter of all hydrocarbon 

sales. However, when it comes to Algeria’s imports, the United States doesn’t even 

make it into the top five. While maintaining a constant flow of oil is critical, if confirmed I will work with American companies to develop Algerian partners to help 

them make use of Algeria’s considerable resources for their shared benefit. 

Our relationship with Algeria is built on counterterrorism cooperation. President 

Bouteflika was the first Arab leader to call President Bush following the attacks on 

9/11, which reflected our shared view of the dangers posed by terrorism and led to 

even greater cooperation. Algeria’s fight against violent extremism in the 1990s cost 

tens of thousands of lives, imposing still more sacrifice on the Algerian people, who 

have such a long history of struggle to win and preserve their freedom and sovereignty. Actions of the government caused the level of violence to decrease, but Algeria knows as well as the United States that violent extremism remains a threat. 

To further improve our bilateral cooperation, we recently kicked off a 

Counterterrorism Contact Group. Additionally, Algeria has taken a leading role in 

international cooperation on counterterrorism, and, if confirmed, I will encourage 

them to continue to do so. 

Algeria has long had a significant role in Middle Eastern and African affairs. It 

is a key player in conflict resolution throughout the wider region. It is a leading 

member state of the Arab League, the African Union, and the Organization of the 

Islamic Conference. It is a longstanding member of the Organization of Petroleum 

Exporting Countries and a founding member of the New Economic Partnership for 

African Development. Its mediating role in conflicts in the Sahel will remain vital 

to finding peaceful solutions there. The ‘‘frozen conflict’’ over Western Sahara cannot 

be resolved without Algerian involvement. Not least, Algeria is literally at the confluence of Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Arab world. It would gain from increasing trade within the region, and its willingness to lead in this area will be critical to realizing long-held dreams of regional integration. 

Regarding the Embassy itself, our team has recently moved to a new, more secure 

facility, which is critical to our ability to promote our interests in an environment 

that still has the potential to be dangerous to us. To be clear, there has been a lot 

of improvement in our ability to operate freely in Algiers since I served there 11 

years ago, but some necessary restrictions remain in place. If confirmed, I will have 

no higher priority than the security and safety of the entire American community 

in Algeria. Thank you for this opportunity to address you today. I would be pleased 

to address any questions that you may have.

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much and thanks for offering 

that personal note. That is probably not acknowledged enough in 

this city. 

I wanted to start with Algeria and some of the challenges we 

have with our relationship. We know that we are partners in 

counterterrorism and we know that as Ambassador you would have 

the chance and the opportunity to build on what is the newly 

formed U.S.-Algeria Contact Group, the Counterterrorism Contact 

Group. I guess I would ask you first how you see that part of our 

relationship and how you would build on that foundation. 

Mr. ENSHER. That is a great word, Senator. There is a strong 

foundation there that goes back some time, even into the 1990s, 

187

and takes into account the fact that the Algerians were the first 

to acknowledge and express condolences after the events of 9/11 

from the Arab world. Since then, we have engaged in a number of 

activities designed to improve that counterterrorism cooperation, of 

which the recent beginning of a contact group is only the latest example. 

Sir, if confirmed, I would expect to intensify those relations 

across the full range of activities, including enhanced military cooperation and support for enhanced law enforcement cooperation 

and what can be done by improved relations with civil society as 

well. There are great opportunities here and we would look to exploit them fully, especially the Algerian desire to be a regional 

leader in this area, and we will look to support that in particular. 

Thank you, sir. 

Senator CASEY. I was going to ask you another question that relates to what we have seen play out over the last couple of months 

in the region, starting in Tunisia. I was struck by the contrast, just 

having been to the Middle East in July, and with Egypt being the 

last stop on our trip. We met with civil society leaders and their 

request at that time seemed so limited because of the circumstances that were at work then. In a meeting with three U.S. 

Senators, they requested that we and the U.S. Government provide 

more help for a freer election in Egypt—nothing about regime 

change or the kind of changes we have seen. In every country in 

that region, over many years, there have been civil society leaders, 

many of whom are now among the leaders and the activists for 

change. 

In Algeria, the democratic movement or protest movement has 

been more limited compared to other countries in the region. There 

have been a series of prodemocracy protests and strikes and demonstrations that have their origins in economics. If you are confirmed, how would you work with Algeria’s civil society leaders to 

make sure that the focus is on political reform? It is a two part 

question really. How do you see the reform movement and 

progress, if any, and two, how would you work with civil society 

leaders? 

Mr. ENSHER. Thank you for that, Mr. Chairman. 

It is a two-part response to your two-part question. 

First of all, I could not agree more with my colleague, Ambassador Krol, on the importance of public diplomacy, simply being out 

there, making ourselves available as an embassy team to all aspects of society. We are supposed to be the embassy not just to the 

government but to the entire society, and we will do that under my 

leadership if I am confirmed, Senator. So that is one aspect of it. 

The other is that we have a number of really excellent programs 

under the Middle East Partnership Initiative which enable us to 

help certain parts of civil society and, in fact, even the government 

develop their capacity better to improve their capability to advocate 

effectively for their rights, which already exist under the Algerian 

Constitution. And so I will continue and intensify those. 

I would also point out that the Algerian people have long expressed a desire for broader participation in their own government, 

and we will support that as well. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

188

Senator CASEY. Thank you. 

In my remaining time, I will turn to Ambassador Krol. Mr. Ambassador, like so many places where we have committed brave 

Americans serving in diplomatic posts, there are always tensions 

and conflicts that you have to try to resolve as Ambassador. And 

I do not envy the challenges that Ambassadors like you, and those 

who seek to serve, face. 

You are going to have difficulties balancing two things, at least. 

One of the problems is the Northern Distribution Network. I am 

told that when we move supplies to our troops in Afghanistan, an 

estimated 98 percent of the traffic in that network passes through 

Uzbekistan. So it is a critical route to getting supplies to our troops 

in Afghanistan. 

At the same time, we have got to be very tough and determined 

about making sure that Uzbekistan addresses the significant 

human rights abuses, the concerns that people have regarding a 

persecution of religious minority groups, forced child labor, restrictions on domestic and international nongovernmental organizations, torture, or illegal treatment in the criminal justice system. 

That is a long, long list. 

How do you see that challenge and can you give us some indication about how you will address that priority, in the context of the 

necessity for us to get supplies to our troops through the Northern 

Distribution Network? 

Ambassador KROL. Thank you, Senator. That is a very good 

question and certainly a very important one. It is a basic challenge 

that I will face, if confirmed, as have my predecessors. 

However, I do not view it so much as an either/or. We have to 

pursue both of these matters together, and I would say on the matter of the Northern Distribution Network, which is all part of the 

effort to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan, that it is clearly in 

the interest of Uzbekistan. And in our conversations with the leadership of Uzbekistan, they clearly wish to see Afghanistan, their 

neighbor, stabilized. And so I think they see it very much in their 

interest to facilitate and support the international efforts in Afghanistan for their own merits and for their own security for 

Uzbekistan. So it is not a matter that they are just doing this for 

us. We are doing this together, and they understand it. They live 

in a tough neighborhood, and when we have discussions with them 

at the highest level, as when Secretary Clinton was there last December, this is quite clear that they join us in wishing to see success in Afghanistan, stability on their border so that it does not 

spread into their own country. 

On human rights issues, that too is a security and a stability 

issue. And if confirmed, what I would like to do, as my predecessors have, is to develop an atmosphere of trust and confidence 

with the government and the people of Uzbekistan so that they understand that respect for human rights creates greater stability in 

a country in order to weather difficulties, whether they are economic and the like. And this is not something of simply because we 

like it to be done and simply because it is a matter of their obligations under their international commitments, but that having a respect for human rights in all the areas that you said do create a 

durable stability for a country, which is what is in everyone’s interVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00196 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
189

est, the Uzbek authorities, the Uzbek people, and ourselves. And 

so I would like to be able to encourage them to take steps that 

broaden this sphere, this space for civil society, for broadening the 

choices that people have. 

Another issue in Uzbekistan is that a very large percent of its 

population is young, very young, and they have aspirations. They 

need choices. And a lot of it will be finding jobs, what kind of a 

future that they have, and having a society that can provide those 

choices will stabilize that so you will not have resentments building 

up that could lead to some of the lessons we have seen elsewhere 

in the world of late. 

Thank you, sir. 

Senator CASEY. Thanks very much. 

Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Well, thank you very much. 

Mr. Ensher, let me start with you. My chief of staff was in Algiers for a week during the recent break. So I am modestly informed as to what is going on on the ground there. But I would 

like to get your views generally as to how the popular uprisings, 

for want of a better word, will move forward in Algiers. How will 

that resolve? How do you see it? 

Mr. ENSHER. Thank you very much for that. 

I have to say that because of the activities of your chief of staff, 

sir, you are well ahead of me. It has been 11 years since I have 

been in Algiers. 

But with that in mind, I would say——

Senator RISCH. By the way, there are still sandstorms there in 

case you forgot. 

Mr. ENSHER. There always are, yes. 

It seems to me that there are a couple of ways that this could 

go. One way would be for the government to do, as it is apparently 

trying to do, which is to get out ahead of the demands of the population for greater openness, improved press freedom, broader access 

to the government, all those sorts of things. And they have done 

that by lifting the state of emergency that had been in place for 

18 years and by promising—promising—the type of legislation necessary to achieve those goals to be passed sometime in fall of this 

year. So that would be the good course of action. 

And here I will point out that so far in Algeria, there have been 

very few calls for a change of regime. It all has been about economic and social and political aspirations within the framework as 

it exists, not requiring the departure of any particular leader. That 

is a huge difference I think from some of the other places in the 

region. 

The other way that it could go would be for the security situation 

to get out of control, and to lead to the sorts of things that we have 

seen elsewhere. I frankly do not expect that to happen. Algeria has 

a lot of resources to bring to bear. There is a longstanding demand, 

a tradition of democratic practice and a sense that democracy is already the right way to go. And so I am really quite optimistic about 

the future there. 

Thank you, Senator. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you very much. Appreciate it. 

190

Mr. Krol, you have covered the waterfront I think pretty well. I 

wonder if you could comment a little bit in general terms about the 

terrorism issue in Uzbekistan. We know that there are Islamic extremists there that pose security threats. Can you give us your 

view of that, please? 

Ambassador KROL. Yes, Senator. That is again a very good question, a very pertinent one. 

Unfortunately, Uzbekistan has been the victim of terrorist attacks. There are organizations such as the Islamic Movement of 

Uzbekistan, as well as the Islamic Jihad Union, that are comprised 

in part of people from Uzbekistan who may be operationally working in places further to their south, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the 

like. The Uzbeks are very concerned to keep that threat at bay. 

That is why they wish to maintain strong border controls, as well 

as controls within their country, to prevent these groupings from 

consolidating or taking action in Uzbekistan. 

And it also requires working with their neighboring countries. I 

think they are concerned that the neighboring countries, particularly Tajikistan and Kyrgizstan, that have long borders with 

Uzbekistan, that those countries are able to prevent terrorist 

groups from conducting or having a safe haven in these countries 

in order to have attacks on Uzbekistan or into Uzbekistan or in the 

whole region. This is certainly an area that is of great concern to 

everyone in the region and the United States even though we are 

not of the region, but as you know, we do have significant assets 

in Afghanistan as well. And so it is serious. It demands a great 

deal of attention, and it is certainly one of the areas that we wish 

to cooperate with Uzbekistan to address. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CASEY. Thanks very much, Senator Risch. 

Ambassador Krol, I wanted to go back to the concerns we have 

about human rights, and I know you share these. I wanted to refer 

back to a particular statement you made in 2008, and to get your 

reaction to some of the information that surrounds this issue. 

In a Voice of America interview in Uzbekistan in October 2008, 

you commended the Uzbek Government for ‘‘passing orders to enforce legislation about child labor.’’ During the same year, during 

the 2008 cotton harvest, the School of Oriental and African Studies 

at the University of London found that approximately 2.4 million 

school children between the ages of 10 and 15 were forcibly recruited to harvest cotton. A followup study by the same group released in November 2010 noted that the practice remains ubiquitous. Our own U.S. Department of Labor last year included 

Uzbek cotton on the list of ‘‘goods produced by child labor and 

forced labor.’’

Clearly, it seems that the government has, in a real sense, 

thumbed its nose at the obligations under the ILO Convention 182. 

I want to have you comment on that based upon those studies and 

based upon a previous statement you made. 

Ambassador KROL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It is a serious issue and a problem in Uzbekistan. It is one that 

we raise consistently with the Uzbek authorities, and if confirmed, 

191

I know it will be one of the ones that I will be dealing with with 

them. 

As you had mentioned, the Uzbek Government has acceded to all 

of the ILO Conventions dealing with child labor. The government 

and the President have passed and signed decrees that prohibit 

forced child labor in Uzbekistan. And so we commend them, as we 

say, for those actions that they have taken, at least in passing or 

at least adhering to these international conventions and signing 

the legislation. 

But as you said, we need to move from the words to actually fulfilling the commitments made to the ILO Conventions, as well as 

fulfilling even the decrees of the President. And most recently, one 

could say that there was encouraging news because the Government of Uzbekistan—and their Embassy here passed us the information—has set up an interagency commission across the entire 

government authorities of Uzbekistan for the purpose of implementing these commitments made under the ILO and other things. 

So again, it is welcoming to see that, but again, we will want to 

see that this goes beyond simply creating a commission to actually 

going to the action of addressing the children that are working in 

the fields. And I think our human rights report and other reports 

of our Embassy have made it clear that it does continue. So again, 

I would quote Secretary Clinton again when she was in Tashkent. 

‘‘We need to move from the words which are welcoming and good 

to hear to the actions of actually ending this practice.’’

Senator CASEY. Well, we would urge you to continue to press 

them very aggressively. We appreciate the commitment you have. 

Your statements today are important to that. 

I will have a number of other questions for the record probably 

for both nominees and those that preceded you. 

Ambassador Krol, I did not get to prisoners of conscience, the 

criminal justice system. There is a long list that we do not have 

time to get into today, but we will make sure that the questions 

and the answers are made part of the record of this hearing and 

your nomination. 

We are grateful to both of you for your commitment to public 

service at a tough time internationally, and for the commitment of 

your families as well. 

Unless there is anything else to come before the committee—Senator Risch? 

Senator RISCH. Mr. Ensher, on a personal note, is your family, 

your wife and your children, going with you? 

Mr. ENSHER. They will be back and forth a great deal I suspect. 

Mona does have a very important job. The boys are in school and 

doing other things. But this will be a big change from Iraq and Afghanistan where at least we have the option. Thank you for asking. 

And, Senator, from those two experiences, the one thing that I 

have learned or a thing that I have learned is the absolute criticality of CODELs and STAFFDELs. It is so important to reinforce 

the message that they are getting from we diplomats out there. It 

is so important for them to understand the political environment 

that we operate in and that drives the things that we do. So I cannot urge you strongly enough. I cannot invite you more enthusiastically than to come to the Kasbah if confirmed. 

192

Thank you. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you. 

Senator CASEY. Ambassador Krol, any closing statements? 

Ambassador KROL. I would just echo my colleague Henry and 

welcome you all to Uzbekistan, the Great Silk Road, Samarkand, 

Bukhara, Khiva. It is a fascinating country and a very warm and 

hospitable people with long traditions and culture. I think having 

your staff and everyone coming out there makes a great deal of difference to the people. 

Thank you. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you both very much. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF DANIEL SHAPIRO TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. 2011 has been a year of unprecedented change in the Middle East. How 

have the events in Egypt and Syria affected Israel’s security situation? How do you 

see your role in supporting the Israeli-Egyptian relationship? What can the United 

States do to help ensure the integrity of the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty? What 

can the United States do to ensure that the turbulence in Syria does not spill over 

into Lebanon or threaten Israel?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that we continue our close cooperation and 

consultation with Israel regarding any developments that might pose a threat to 

Israel’s security. 

Egypt is undergoing a period of significant transition. Our relationship with Egypt 

remains strong, and we continue to work constructively and collaboratively with the 

Egyptian Government on a range of issues. We remain encouraged that the current 

Egyptian Government has repeatedly expressed its commitment to adhere to past 

agreements, including its Treaty of Peace with Israel. 

The Department of State fully appreciates the significance of Egyptian-Israeli 

peace to our regional interests and to regional stability. In our discussions with 

Egyptian leadership across the political spectrum, we have and will continue to underscore the importance of upholding this and Egypt’s other international obligations. 

On Syria, our policy is that the abhorrent and deplorable actions of the Syrian 

Government against the Syrian people must end immediately. The Syrian Government must also immediately stop arbitrary arrests, detention, and torture.

Question. What can be done to counter efforts to delegitimize Israel? Are there 

steps that Israel could take that would decrease the popular pressures in Egypt and 

Jordan to recalibrate their relations with Israel?

Answer. In the U.N. system and in many international organizations, members 

devote disproportionate attention to Israel and consistently adopt biased resolutions, 

which too often divert attention from the world’s most egregious human rights 

abuses. We will continue our ongoing effort in the full range of international organizations to ensure that Israel’s legitimacy is beyond dispute and its security is never 

in doubt. 

We will do all we can to ensure that Israel has the same rights and responsibilities as all states in these bodies—including membership in all appropriate regional 

groupings at the U.N. 

The peace agreements between Israel and Egypt, and Israel and Jordan, are fundamental for long-term regional peace and stability in the region. We strongly support Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian efforts ensure productive relations and 

strengthened connections between their governments and peoples in support of regional peace and stability.

Question. What is the administration’s position on the Hamas-Fatah unity government? What factors will it use in determining the future relationship with, and 

financial support for, the Palestinian Authority?

193

Answer. We understand Fatah and Hamas have reached a reconciliation agreement. What is important now is that the Palestinians ensure implementation of that 

agreement advances the prospects of peace rather than undermines them. 

We will continue to seek information on the details of the agreement and to consult with Palestinians and Israelis about these issues. 

We understand the concerns of some Members of Congress. As a new Palestinian 

Government is formed, we will assess it based on its policies and will determine the 

implications for our assistance based on U.S. law. 

We are confident President Abbas remains committed to the principles of nonviolence, recognition of the state of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements 

and obligations between the parties. 

To play a constructive role in achieving peace, any interim Palestinian Government formed in the period before elections must ensure its actions fully implement 

these principles. The U.S. stance toward such a government will be fully consistent 

with U.S. law. 

Our position on Hamas has not changed; Hamas is a designated Foreign Terrorist 

Organization.

Question. In August 2010, the President said that he believed it might be possible 

to reach an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement within a 1-year timeframe, a period 

which roughly corresponds with the end of Palestinian Prime Minister Salam 

Fayyad’s 2-year institution-building program.

• Do you still believe a peace agreement is possible? How do you evaluate Salam 

Fayyad’s program?

Answer. A comprehensive Middle East peace agreement remains a central U.S. 

policy objective. As we have said many times, the status quo between Israelis and 

Palestinians is not sustainable. Neither Israel’s future as a democratic Jewish state, 

nor the legitimate aspirations of Palestinians can be secured without a two-state solution that is achieved through serious and credible negotiations that address issues 

of concerns to both sides. 

The Palestinian Authority has set forth a clear vision for strengthening the institutions of a future Palestinian state, improving delivery of essential services, and 

implementing a reform agenda. Over the past year and a half, the PA has made 

steady progress in putting in place policies to reform the security sector, foster economic growth, expand public services, decrease reliance on donor assistance, effectively manage public expenditures and improve tax revenue collection. However, as 

we have often stated, the Palestinian institution-building program is mutually reinforcing with efforts on the political track; it cannot achieve a Palestinian state absent a negotiated outcome.

Question. On March 16, 2003, Rachel Corrie, an American citizen, was killed by 

an Israel Defense Forces bulldozer in Rafah, Gaza while protesting home 

demolitions. Both the Obama and Bush administrations have affirmed that Israel’s 

investigation into Ms. Corrie’s killing did not meet the standard of being ‘‘thorough, 

credible, and transparent’’ that was assured by the Israeli Government in 2003. On 

June 30, 2010, Department of State spokesperson P.J. Crowley stated, ‘‘We continue 

to stress to the Government of Israel at the highest levels to continue a thorough, 

transparent, and credible investigation of the circumstances concerning her death.’’

• Please provide information on steps taken under the current administration, including the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, to encourage the Government of Israel 

to undertake a thorough, credible, and transparent investigation into Ms. 

Corrie’s death. What specific steps will the administration take to ensure accountability is obtained in the case? What specific steps will you commit to take, 

if confirmed, to encourage a reopening of a credible investigative process?

Answer. Since Rachel Corrie’s death in March 2003, the Department of State and 

the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv have been in close contact with the Corrie family to 

provide them with support and assistance. For 7 years, we have pressed the Government of Israel at the highest levels to conduct a thorough, transparent, and credible 

investigation into the circumstances of her death. The Israeli Government has responded that it considers this case closed and does not plan on reinvestigating the 

incident. In March 2010, an Israeli court began hearing the family’s civil case 

against Israeli authorities. We hope that this venue will finally provide them with 

the answers that they seek. 

We will continue to work with and assist the Corrie family as appropriate. 

194

RESPONSES OF STUART JONES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. On February 20 King Abdullah of Jordan outlined an ambitious program for political and economic reform. What can the United States do to support 

these initiatives?

Answer. The United States enjoys a warm relationship with King Abdullah and 

with the people of Jordan. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting their efforts 

to implement political and economic reform. Maintaining our MOU assistance levels 

is the first priority in supporting the Government of Jordan’s political, economic, 

and social reform agendas. U.S. economic assistance aims to help Jordan on its path 

to growth and development by enhancing private sector competitiveness, trade, employment opportunities, and workforce development to promote economic growth. 

Our USAID programs are providing technical assistance to strengthen Jordan’s tax 

administration and improve efficiencies through results-based budgeting and a more 

effective financial management information system. Democracy and governance 

(DG) programs capitalize on the renewed energy within civil society to promote civic 

participation, judicial independence, legal reforms (including electoral reform), respect for human rights, and anti-corruption measures.

Question. An opening of the Jordanian political system could allow the Islamic 

Action Front to play a more prominent role in Jordanian politics. What is the 

United States policy toward the IAF?

Answer. The Islamic Action Front (IAF), an opposition, Islamist party, has been 

a part of the Jordanian political system since 1992. They are a well-established, 

legal opposition party that participates nonviolently in the mainstream political 

process. In the previous Parliament, the IAF held six seats. The movement boycotted October 2010 parliamentary elections and is therefore not represented in the 

current Parliament. The IAF continues to state its loyalty to the monarchy and allegiance to the system but has called for reforms to the system. The IAF opposed the 

appointment of the new Prime Minister in February 2011, refused to join the new 

Cabinet, and also boycotted the National Dialogue Committee. The IAF’s specific 

statements are generally viewed as not representative of wider Jordanian popular 

opinion. 

The Embassy continues to meet at the working level with IAF officials, however, 

the IAF is often not interested in meeting with Embassy officers.

Question. Jordan has expressed an interest in a bilateral agreement on peaceful 

nuclear cooperation. What is the status of these discussions?

Answer. Negotiations between the United States and Jordan regarding an agreement for civil nuclear cooperation are ongoing. Since Jordan currently imports 96 

percent of its energy needs, it is vulnerable to world energy prices which continue 

to strain its economy. We would like to help Jordan with its energy security by assisting with development of peaceful energy alternatives. 

Beyond the ongoing nuclear cooperation, we are also working on additional energy 

alternatives with Jordan. In order to promote the diversification of energy supply 

and a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, the United States has engaged with 

the GOJ on unconventional natural gas resource development through the Global 

Shale Gas initiative (GSGI). A Jordanian delegation attended the inaugural GSGI 

Regulatory Conference in August 2010, and another GOJ delegation is scheduled to 

visit the United States at the end of 2011. Furthermore, in January 2011, a memorandum of understanding on shale gas development was signed between the United 

States and GOJ on shale gas development. This agreement set forth the framework 

under which the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) plans to conduct a resource assessment of Jordanian shale gas resource potential and help build capacity through 

technical level workshops.

Question. What has been Jordan’s response to the Fatah-Hamas agreement signed 

in Cairo on March 4?

Answer. The Government of Jordan took note of the agreement, is watching its 

implementation closely, and continues to engage in supporting a comprehensive 

peace in the Middle East and remains committed partner to that end. We are confident that the Jordanian Government will continue to play a constructive role in 

emphasizing to all parties the importance of securing a comprehensive peace.

Question. As a result of the Arab Spring, there may be increasing pressure 

throughout the region to align policies more closely with public opinion. In the case 

of Jordan, there may be more pressure to recalibrate Jordan’s relationship with 

Israel. What can the United States do to support this important relationship?

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Answer. Jordan, like the United States, remains committed to the vision of two 

democratic states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security, 

and Jordan has been a critical partner in our efforts to make progress toward comprehensive peace in the Middle East. Jordan is one of only two Arab countries that 

have signed peace treaties with Israel (in 1994), and it considers the achievement 

of comprehensive peace a top priority for the region and one that is crucial to the 

security and well-being of future generations living in the region. King Abdullah 

and successive Jordanian governments have consistently spoken out publicly in support of comprehensive Middle East peace based on a two-state solution. Jordan 

views its peace agreement with Israel as an important component of the comprehensive peace it seeks to achieve. 

The United States will continue to encourage a strong bilateral relationship between Israel and Jordan by engaging both countries’ leaders on the peace process, 

developments in the region, and regional security issues. We will continue to support ongoing programs that foster closer bilateral ties, especially between the two 

private sectors such as the Qualifying Industrial Zones program and encourage multilateral programming and partnership on resources, particularly on water use and 

science and technology. 

RESPONSES OF GEORGE KROL TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. Uzbekistan has assumed an increasingly prominent role in the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), an important series of air and ground routes that 

carry supplies to our troops in Afghanistan. According to recent figures, the United 

States now ships over 1,000 containers each week to Afghanistan through the NDN, 

with an estimated 98 percent of that traffic passing through Uzbekistan.

• How are we balancing the need for reliable access to such routes with our responsibility to address Uzbekistan’s significant human rights concerns, including persecution of religious minority groups, forced child labor, restrictions on 

domestic and international nongovernmental organizations, and torture and illtreatment in its criminal justice system?

Answer. Encouraging Uzbekistan to continue its support for the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) and working with it to improve its respect for human 

rights are not mutually exclusive goals. Both increasing NDN capacity and respect 

for basic human rights are in Uzbekistan’s and America’s national security interests 

as they can lead to greater and more durable security and stability for Uzbekistan 

and the region. Uzbekistan understands that NDN helps address one of its major 

national security concerns: establishing a stable and secure Afghanistan on their 

southern border. On this basis, we seek to maintain Uzbekistan’s support for NDN. 

At the same time, we argue that respect for human rights also establishes greater 

domestic stability and security, which also meets Uzbekistan’s national interest. We 

will continue to encourage Uzbekistan’s authorities at all levels privately and publicly, bilaterally and multilaterally, to meet its international obligations to respect 

the full range of universal human rights, including freeing prisoners of conscience, 

eliminating child labor, and ending torture and mistreatment in prisons. To these 

ends, we will engage multilaterally with other diplomatic missions in Tashkent, the 

European Union (EU) and in international organizations, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the International Labor 

Organization (ILO) to reinforce the message that the Government of Uzbekistan 

meet its human rights obligations. We will continue to vigorously assist, support, 

and take up the cause of civil society and victims of human rights abuses in 

Uzbekistan. We will continue to make clear to Uzbekistan’s authorities that the type 

of partnership we can have with the Government of Uzbekistan and the assistance 

we can provide it under current congressional legislation depends on its respect for 

human rights in accordance with its international obligations. We have and will continue to be constant and consistent in this principled approach.

Question. In its FY 2012 budget, the administration has requested $100,000 in 

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Uzbekistan. What specific conditions will 

Uzbekistan have to meet to be eligible for these funds?

Answer. The administration requested $100,000 in Foreign Military Financing 

(FMF) assistance in the FY 2012 budget to help the Government of Uzbekistan protect the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) supply lines. The FMF request was 

made as a signal of our willingness to cooperate with Uzbekistan on security issues. 

The current conditions on Uzbekistan’s eligibility for FMF assistance are included 

in the FY 2011 State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Act and require 

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progress on respect for internationally recognized human rights and a credible investigation of events in Andijon in 2005. The administration is working with the 

Government of Uzbekistan, through Annual Bilateral Consultations and other processes, to facilitate improvement in the areas related to the conditions currently included in the law and will continue to push for improvements in the government’s 

respect for human rights.

Question. On March 15, Human Rights Watch (HRW) announced that it was 

forced to end its 15-year presence in Uzbekistan after the government revoked its 

Tashkent office permit. HRW had maintained registration in the country after 

Andijan in 2005, but the Government of Uzbekistan constantly denied visas and accreditation for its staff. 

The committee understands that the matter of HRW’s ‘‘liquidation’’ is now before 

the Supreme Court of Uzbekistan. What steps is the administration taking to urge 

the Government of Uzbekistan to allow the organization’s office to operate freely 

and with full accreditation for its staff?

Answer. We are raising the accreditation of Human Rights Watch and the legal 

proceeding to close its office in Tashkent vigorously at all levels of the Government 

of Uzbekistan. This issue, and the return of other reputable nongovernmental organizations supporting human rights in Uzbekistan, is one of the priority matters on 

our bilateral agenda with Uzbekistan, which is raised at our annual bilateral consultations and reviews. We also work with the European Union and in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to reinforce our efforts to 

press the Government of Uzbekistan to open its country to international NGOs and 

to increase space for all forms of civil society.

Question. According to the State Department’s 2010 Country Report on Human 

Rights Practices in Uzbekistan, ‘‘torture and abuse were common in prisons, pretrial 

facilities, and local police and security service precincts.’’ What strategy will you employ to encourage the Government of Uzbekistan to end torture in its criminal justice system?

Answer. We will continue to raise the cases of torture and abuse that occur in 

prisons to all levels of the Government of Uzbekistan privately and, when warranted, publicly. We support programs implemented through the Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to train and educate Uzbekistani prison 

officials on respecting the human rights of prisoners and preventing abuse. We recently began a new USAID rule of law program that will work with defense lawyers 

and prosecutors to improve understanding and implementation of habeas corpus legislation, with the goal of reducing the overall number of citizens placed in pretrial 

detention where a significant portion of abuse occurs. We also are strongly encouraging the Uzbekistani authorities to continue to allow the International Committee 

of the Red Cross (ICRC) access to prisons run by the Ministry of Internal Affairs 

and to extend this access to individuals incarcerated in prisons run by the National 

Security Service. This issue continually is one of the priority agenda items in our 

bilateral consultations with the Uzbekistani Government and one that is part of our 

bilateral work plan. During her visit to Uzbekistan in December 2010, Secretary 

Clinton spoke with President Karimov on a number of human rights issues, including several specific cases of concern and prison conditions in general. She also met 

separately with representatives of Uzbek civil society, including human rights 

activists.

Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to press the Government of 

Uzbekistan to release the growing number of prisoners of conscience, both secular 

activists and religious believers, being held in prison in that country?

Answer. We will continue to vigorously raise the cases of prisoners of conscience 

at all levels of the Government of Uzbekistan both privately and when warranted 

publicly. Past efforts contributed to the release of some prisoners such as Mutabar 

Tadjibayeva; Sanjar Umarov, and Farhod Mukhtarov. We have made clear to the 

Uzbekistani authorities that the unjust imprisonment of religious believers and secular civil society activists severely restricts the extent of cooperation and assistance 

the United States can provide to the Government of Uzbekistan in many areas of 

potential joint endeavor. At the same time, the United States will support and 

champion the victims of unjust imprisonment and work multilaterally with other 

diplomatic missions, the European Union, and through international organizations 

including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the 

U.N. Human Rights Council (UNHRC) for their release and for a change of approach by Uzbekistani authorities. 

197

RESPONSES OF HENRY ENSHER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. Some have been surprised that the wave of unrest that swept through 

North Africa in recent months has been relatively weak in Algeria. Why do you suppose Algerians have been relatively less vocal in demanding change than their Tunisian, Egyptian, and Libyan counterparts? How would you characterize the Algerian 

opposition and civil society?

Answer. While there have been numerous protests in Algeria since January, these 

have been more socioeconomic rather than political in nature, as various groups 

have called for higher wages, better housing, access to education, and stronger employment prospects. Algeria experienced horrific violence in the 1990s, with some estimating nearly 200,000 deaths during a 10-year civil war. Algerian citizens are, 

therefore, treading cautiously as change sweeps through the region, preferring to 

address issues at their own pace. They nevertheless remain committed to demanding improvements along these issues. Specifically, we have not seen widespread 

calls for President Bouteflika to step down, and his government has begun the process of reform. 

In February, Algeria lifted the 19-year-old State of Emergency Law. The United 

States welcomed this action as a positive step and publicly reaffirmed our support 

for the universal rights of the Algerian people, including the freedom of assembly 

and expression. President Bouteflika on April 15 also announced a slate of democratic and economic reforms in response to popular protests, including the appointment of a commission to draw up amendments to the constitution. He proposed to 

submit to Parliament reform legislation on elections, political parties, NGOs, local 

government and women in government, and to revise the media laws so as to 

decriminalize press violations. We encourage the Government of Algeria to move 

swiftly toward the implementation of these measures, as we have encouraged other 

governments, including in Tunisia and Egypt, to do. We are committed to working 

with the Government of Algeria to ensure that it is responsive to the legitimate 

demands of its people.

Question. In February, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika announced the lifting of the 

Algerian emergency law, in place for almost two decades. Please describe the implementation of this and other reform gestures the government has announced. To 

what extent are restrictions on the freedoms of assembly, association, and expression enshrined elsewhere in Algerian law? Has the Algerian Government indicated 

a willingness to initiate a broader reform of these limitations?

Answer. Algeria’s Government has repeatedly stated its commitment to democracy, and its most recent Presidential election in 2009 was certified by international 

observers as being generally free and fair—one of the few elections for a head of 

state in the Arab world to be conducted under such conditions. Algeria’s independent press is also one of the more active and outspoken in the Arab world. That 

said, Algerian democracy would benefit from a more empowered and effective legislature, stronger and more democratically governed political parties, a more independent judiciary, and a more professional and better protected press, including 

electronic media. We have ongoing Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) programs of varying sizes and scopes that target our goals in each of these areas. 

We welcome President Bouteflika’s announced reforms as a significant step forward for Algeria and its people. The proposed measures are wide-ranging and 

address many legitimate concerns of Algerian citizens, including reforming laws 

regulating political parties, NGOs, local government and women in government. 

President Bouteflika also announced that his government will take steps to decriminalize press offenses, which should lead to more open and free media. As both President Obama and Secretary Clinton have said on many occasions, there is a need 

for political, social, and economic reform throughout the region, and President 

Bouteflika’s April 15 speech touched on each of these areas. President Bouteflika 

has announced a September deadline for legislative action on these reforms. We look 

forward to the concrete implementation of these reforms by the Government of Algeria and will closely monitor their effects on the situation in Algeria and the region. 

It is too early to predict how these measures will impact Algeria and its people, but 

we are pleased that the Government of Algeria has begun the process of reform.

Question. How can the United States help foster a more conducive economic environment in Algeria that will successfully attract U.S. businesses to invest in the 

country, beyond the hydrocarbon industry?

Answer. We are encouraged by growing economic ties between our two countries. 

President Bouteflika, during his April 15 speech on reforms, recognized economic 

198

enterprises—public as well as private—as key to job creation, and promised that the 

Government of Algeria would draft a ‘‘national investment program’’ for companies. 

American companies are active in hydrocarbons, banking and finance, services, 

medical facilities, telecommunications, aviation, seawater desalination, energy production, and information technology sectors. Algeria is one of United States largest 

trading partners in the Middle East/North African region. We are supportive of 

Algeria’s efforts to diversify its economy by attracting foreign and domestic investment outside the energy sector. We are working with the Algerian Government to 

help create appealing business conditions in key areas for foreign and domestic investors, including the adoption of clear rules and regulations, streamlining administrative processes, and increasing access to government decisionmakers. Algeria

has much potential, and U.S. firms could play an important role in realizing that 

potential. 

Additionally, an annual international trade fair in Algiers each June draws significant U.S. participation and highlights the U.S. corporate presence very positively. A trade mission this spring is being organized by the U.S.-Algeria Business 

Council which will demonstrate the interest of the Algerian Government and business sectors in working with U.S. businesses.

Question. The Maghreb is arguably one of the world’s least integrated regions. 

What is the potential for Algeria to play a more significant regional role in security, 

economic and political matters? How can the United States foster better regional integration in the Maghreb?

Answer. Algeria has the ability to be a regional leader on a variety of fronts, including on economic, counterterrorism, and political issues. However, this capacity 

to lead is hampered by its cold relationship with its neighbor, Morocco. We consistently urge both Algeria and Morocco to recognize that better relations between their 

two countries will foster deeper regional integration, enable both countries to better 

address key bilateral and regional issues such as terrorism, illegal migration, drug 

trafficking, and trade promotion. While Algerian-Moroccan relations are uneven, we 

welcome the recent exchange of ministers and the signing of a Memorandum of 

Understanding on Agricultural Development. Practical cooperation at the working 

level has often coexisted even with the unhelpful rhetoric at higher levels in the 

past. We have consistently encouraged both Algeria and Morocco to de-link the issue 

of Western Sahara from their bilateral relationship. The launching of the North 

African Partnership for Economic Opportunity at last December’s first U.S.-

Maghreb Entrepreneurship Conference is just one example of the United States 

ability to foster closer regional cooperation among all the countries of North Africa. 

Algerian law also makes certain forms of defense sales very difficult. Their laws 

require payment for items after they have been delivered. Since this goes against 

U.S. law, participating in Foreign Military Sales is not possible. Algeria does buy 

some defense items through Direct Commercial Sales and is negotiating with the 

United States on workarounds to its restrictive laws. They are also increasing the 

number of individuals they send to the United States for training, creating a closer 

relationship between our nations.

Question. In light of the Arab Spring, some observers have noted that American 

diplomats have tended to engage too narrowly on ruling elites and security officials 

in capital cities at the expense of broader civil society. Do you agree with this characterization? If confirmed, will you commit to encourage the Embassy in Algiers to 

engage with a diverse cross-section of Algerian society?

Answer. Through a variety of programs, both within and outside of the State 

Department’s Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), we are working with the 

Algerian Government and civil society to develop key elements of a democratic society such as the media, political parties, and the judiciary, as well as reforming critical systems such as the education, banking and financial sectors. We also work 

closely with independent human rights organizations, journalists, political parties, 

and other nongovernmental organizations. Human rights are a significant part of 

our ongoing dialogue with the Algerian Government, as with all other governments. 

Additionally, while Algeria has traditionally been a country that afforded women 

considerable rights, we are always interested in ways in which we can help to further improve their status. Our educational programming, and in particular a judicial capacity-building program through the American Bar Association (ABA), have 

targeted building on Algeria’s historical openness to equal rights for women. Algeria’s women have an employment rate well above the average for the Arab world; 

several government ministers and leader of a large Algerian opposition party are 

women. 

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RESPONSES OF DANIEL SHAPIRO TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

FATAH-HAMAS UNITY GOVERNMENT

Question. I am very concerned about the announcement that President Abbas has 

conceded to form a unity government with Hamas. Hamas rejects peaceful efforts 

to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and continues to call for the destruction of the 

State of Israel. While I welcome statements from the administration recognizing 

that Hamas is a terrorist organization and requiring that it accept the Quartet conditions of recognizing Israel’s right to exist, rejecting violence, and endorsing previous Israeli-Palestinian peace agreements in order to participate in the transitional 

government and elections, I think this agreement is going to require more than supportive statements.

• What is your view on whether the United States should work with a Palestinian 

Authority government that includes an unreformed Hamas? Do you support, 

pursuant to U.S. law, suspending aid to the Palestinian Authority, if after reviewing the situation it is determined that Hamas will not comply with Quartet 

conditions? 

• Where do you see the peace process heading in light of President Abbas’ decision to reconcile with an unchanged Hamas? Do you really expect Israel to sit 

down and negotiate with a Palestinian Government which includes the terrorist 

group Hamas? 

• Could you also comment on Egypt’s role in bringing about the agreement and 

whether their involvement foreshadows a change in their longstanding relationship with Israel?

Answer. We understand Fatah and Hamas have reached a reconciliation agreement. What is important now is that the Palestinians ensure implementation of that 

agreement advances the prospects of peace rather than undermines them. 

We will continue to seek information on the details of the agreement and to consult with Palestinians and Israelis about these issues. 

We understand the concerns of some Members of Congress. As a new Palestinian 

Government is formed, we will assess it based on its policies and will determine the 

implications for our assistance based on U.S. law. 

We are confident President Abbas remains committed to the principles of nonviolence, recognition of the state of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements 

and obligations between the parties. 

To play a constructive role in achieving peace, any interim Palestinian Government formed in the period before elections must ensure its actions fully implement 

these principles. The U.S. stance toward such a government will be fully consistent 

with U.S. law. 

Our position on Hamas has not changed; Hamas is a designated Foreign Terrorist 

Organization. 

Egypt is undergoing a period of significant transition. Our relationship with Egypt 

remains strong, and we continue to work constructively and collaboratively with the 

Egyptian Government on a range of issues. We remain encouraged that the current 

Egyptian Government has repeatedly expressed its commitment to adhere to past 

agreements, including its Treaty of Peace with Israel. 

The Department of State fully appreciates the significance of Egyptian-Israeli 

peace to our regional interests and to regional stability. In our discussions with 

Egyptian leadership across the political spectrum, we have and will continue to 

underscore the importance of upholding this and Egypt’s other international 

obligations. 

COUNTERING THE DELEGITIMIZATION OF ISRAEL

Question. Over the last several years there has been a noticeable increase in antiIsrael and anti-Jewish sentiment, even by close U.S. allies. As you are aware, there 

has also been a concerted effort at the United Nations to demonize Israel, as well 

as to use U.N. bodies to circumvent the peace process. As U.S. Ambassador to Israel 

it will be important for you to oppose these efforts and to work within the administration to ensure that we do everything we can to blunt these destructive efforts.

• What priority do you give to U.S. diplomatic efforts at the U.N. and on a bilateral basis to draw attention to growing anti-Israel bias and to efforts to jeopardize the peace talks by circumventing the negotiating table? 

• If confirmed, how will you work to promote Israel’s rightful inclusion in the region and more broadly in the international community?

200

Answer. U.N. members devote disproportionate attention to Israel and consistently adopt biased resolutions, which too often divert attention from the world’s 

most egregious human rights abuses. We will continue our ongoing effort in the full 

range of international organizations to ensure that Israel’s legitimacy is beyond dispute and its security is never in doubt. 

We will do all we can to ensure that Israel has the same rights and responsibilities as all states—including membership in all appropriate regional groupings at 

the U.N. As the President said last September before the entire U.N. General 

Assembly, efforts to chip away at Israel’s legitimacy will continue to be met by the 

unshakeable opposition of the United States. 

If confirmed, I will work to promote full and equal Israeli participation in consultative groups throughout the U.N. system as one of our highest priorities across the 

U.N. system. I will work with my Department of State colleagues at the Security 

Council, the General Assembly, and at all specialized U.N. agencies as they work 

closely with their Israeli counterparts to find ways to maximize Israeli participation. 

We strongly support Israel’s continued election to U.N. bodies. With support from 

us and many others, Israel has been elected to all U.N. bodies and leadership positions to which it has sought membership over the last decade. In December 2009, 

for instance, the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in New York succeeded in formally adding 

Israel to the JUSCANZ negotiating group for the U.N. Fifth Committee, which handles budgetary matters. The United States achieved another major step forward 

when the JUSCANZ consultative group at the Human Rights Council in Geneva decided by consensus in January 2010 to include Israel in the group. 

In 2010 Israel chaired the Kimberly Process on conflict diamonds. 

SYRIA

Question. Over the course of the last 2 years you have played a key role in the 

formulation and execution of U.S. policy toward Syria. You have travelled to Syria 

and met with President Assad. Now in the last month we have seen the Assad regime brutally crackdown on the Syrian people. Hundreds of innocent Syrians have 

been killed with many more arbitrarily arrested or beaten.

• Is it time to signal that it is time for Assad to go, as we did with Mubarak and 

Ghadaffi? • How do you foresee events in Syria affecting Israel’s outlook on the region?

Answer. I have been nominated to serve as the Ambassador to Israel. If confirmed, my responsibilities will not cover Syria. That said, the Obama administration’s policy is that the abhorrent and deplorable actions of the Syrian Government 

against the Syrian people must end immediately. The Syrian Government must also 

immediately stop arbitrary arrests, detention, and torture. 

Given the number of variables involved, it would not be prudent to speculate on 

future developments in Syria. 

We are closely monitoring the constantly evolving situation throughout the region 

and consult with our Israeli counterparts on a regular basis on any developments 

that might pose a threat to Israel’s security. 

RESPONSE OF STUART JONES TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. Assistant Secretary Feltman is in Jordan this week to meet with King 

Abdullah and members of civil society to reportedly discuss the Israeli-Palestinian 

peace process, the Libya conflict and Jordan’s domestic reforms.

• Jordan, like many parts of the region has been the scene of protests calling for 

political and economic reform. What steps do you see the Kingdom taking to 

address the protestors concerns? How important will the reform agenda—

supporting civil society actors, human rights activists, and independent journalist, be for you as Ambassador? Are you willing to foster moderate and peaceful communities who are seeking democratic change by providing assistance and 

standing in solidarity with their efforts? Are you concerned about the ambitions 

of extremist elements in Jordan or do you see that concern as a red herring 

being voiced by the King in order to limit reform?

Answer. King Abdullah has been responsive to the demands of the Jordanian 

people. In early February, he dissolved the Cabinet and appointed a new Prime 

Minister. He established a National Dialogue Committee in March with a 3-month 

mandate to write new political parties and elections laws. On April 26, King 

Abdullah formed a royal committee to propose constitutional amendments designed 

to promote political reform. 

201

If confirmed, I hope to continue a strong U.S. assistance program for Jordan. U.S. 

economic assistance aims to help Jordan on its path to growth and development, 

while supporting the Government of Jordan’s political, economic, and social reform 

agenda. Economic support funds promote economic growth/job creation by enhancing 

private sector competitiveness, trade, employment opportunities, and workforce development. Democracy and governance (DG) programs capitalize on the renewed energy within civil society to promote civic participation, judicial independence, legal 

reforms (including electoral reform), respect for human rights, and anticorruption 

measures. DG programs build the capacity of local governments, independent media, 

and political parties. 

RESPONSE OF GEORGE KROL TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. Uzbekistan has emerged as one of the most repressive countries in the 

former Soviet Union. President Karimov has ruled the country with an iron fist for 

over 22 years and has a well-documented track record of persecuting individuals 

perceived to be his critics. Next Friday marks 6 years since forces directly accountable to President Karimov killed hundreds of unarmed people who participated in 

a demonstration on May 13, 2005, without warning as they ran from the square. 

Last year, Uzbek authorities intensified their crackdown on freedom of expression, 

prosecuting a correspondent for the U.S. Government-funded Voice of America news 

service. Well over a dozen human rights defenders, political activists, and journalists—many of whose cases the U.S. Embassy has quietly raised with the Uzbek Government for years—remain in prison. Torture is widely reported to be endemic in 

the criminal justice system. At the end of 2010, the Uzbek Government continued 

to suppress even tiny public demonstrations calling for more democratic freedoms, 

and denied accreditation to Human Rights Watch’s representative, effectively expelling the last independent international NGO from Uzbekistan.

• The United States has raised many of these issues over the years, but has usually opted for private rather than public diplomacy, obtaining few results. What 

specific steps will you take if confirmed to more effectively promote human 

rights in Uzbekistan? 

• Given Uzbekistan’s lack of credibility on human and civil rights, how will you 

ensure that U.S. policy in Uzbekistan is consistent with its public support for 

the aspirations of democracy activists and peaceful protesters across the Middle 

East and North Africa?

Answer. Uzbekistan’s harsh actions against civil society, the media, political, and 

religious figures and its policies restricting media, political, and religious freedoms 

have for a long time greatly concerned the United States. We have severely limited 

our assistance and cooperation with the Government of Uzbekistan since the 2005 

Andijon events and subsequent severe crackdown. But concern is not a policy. We 

will relentlessly raise individual cases of repression both privately and publicly at 

all levels of the Uzbekistani Government and will seek to identify opportunities to 

support and expand space for civil society and human rights activists. We will seek 

out the voices of civil society in the country and we will do all we can to support, 

protect, and expand civil society. We will work multilaterally with diplomatic missions, the European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 

(OSCE), the U.N. Human Rights Council, the International Labor Organization 

(ILO), and other relevant international organizations, institutions, and partners to 

promote human rights in Uzbekistan. We will continue vigorously and strongly to 

encourage the Uzbekistani Government to expand the space for civil society, media, 

political discourse and allow religious freedom for all peaceful believers. We will continue to advance the view that a robust and unfettered civil society and free media 

can provide greater stability and security for Uzbekistan lest popular resentments 

grow as choices become even more limited for the hugely growing youth sector of 

Uzbekistan. Regardless of regional, cultural, and historical differences between Central Asia and the Arab world, this is the major lesson we take from the recent 

events in the Arab world, which infuses our policy toward promoting human rights 

in Uzbekistan. We will continue to remind Uzbekistani authorities that there are, 

and will be, severe bilateral and international consequences for human rights 

abuses such as those maintained in current congressional legislation passed after 

the Andijon events restricting direct U.S. assistance to the Government of 

Uzbekistan and its designation as a Country of Particular Concern since 2006 for 

its restrictions on religious freedoms. At the same time we will continue to engage 

with and, if resources permit, expand our support for embattled civil society and 

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independent media in Uzbekistan and seek creative ways to provide that support 

more effectively under harsh and restrictive conditions. 

RESPONSES OF DANIEL SHAPIRO TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR. 

Question. Events of recent months have highlighted the unique role Israel plays 

in the Middle East as a reliable, stable, and democratic U.S. ally who not only 

shares our interests, but also our values. That said, ongoing unrest in the region 

has raised questions about Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME) and the future 

of longstanding peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan.

• How do you see the unfolding events in the region affecting Israel’s security, 

and what new challenges may Israel face in the months ahead? If confirmed, 

what steps will you take to ensure that Israel’s security remains a top priority 

for U.S. assistance funding?

Answer. Since the Reagan administration, the United States has remained committed to safeguarding Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME). This administration has consistently reaffirmed its unshakable support to Israel’s QME. We have 

expanded the level and frequency of our QME consultations with the Israeli Government. If confirmed, I would continue to fully uphold the U.S. commitment to Israel’s 

QME. 

The United States also protects Israel’s qualitative military edge through the provision of substantial security assistance. For roughly three decades, Israel has been 

the leading recipient of U.S. security assistance through the FMF program. Currently, Israel receives nearly $3 billion per year. 

The United State also grants Israel privileged access to advanced military equipment, such as the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter, to help it deter potential aggressors 

and maintain its conventional military superiority. Israel will be the only state in 

the region flying the F–35. 

We are closely monitoring the constantly evolving situation throughout the region. 

Any developments that in our judgment pose a threat to Israel’s QME will be carefully considered in pending or future sales of arms or services in the region.

Question. The United States has clearly stated that the only path to a two-state 

solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is direct negotiations based on the Quartet 

principles. However, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas continues to 

seek support at the U.N. for recognition of Palestinian statehood, thereby circumventing the direct peace process. These efforts are counterproductive and will only 

serve to delay the day in which we see two states living side by side in peace and 

security.

• Where do you see the peace process heading, particularly in light of President 

Abbas’ decision to form a unity government with Hamas, a designated terrorist 

group? If confirmed, how will you work to discourage the Palestinians from 

working outside the parameters of direct peace negotiations?

Answer. We believe that President Abbas remains committed to peace. He supports PLO commitments renouncing violence and recognizing Israel. He has remained firm in his faith that an independent Palestine living side by side with 

Israel in peace and security is both possible and necessary. 

As we have said many times publicly and privately, we object to attempts to resolve permanent status issues in international bodies like the U.N. The Israelis and 

Palestinians must work out the differences between them in direct negotiations. We 

are working closely with the parties to bring about a negotiated outcome that will 

lead to the establishment of an independent, viable state of Palestine and a secure 

future for an Israel that is fully accepted in the region. 

We understand Fatah and Hamas have reached a reconciliation agreement. What 

is important now is that the Palestinians ensure implementation of that agreement 

advances the prospects of peace rather than undermines them. 

We will continue to seek information on the details of the agreement and to consult with Palestinians and Israelis about these issues. 

We understand the concerns of some Members of Congress. As a new Palestinian 

Government is formed, we will assess it based on its policies and will determine the 

implications for our assistance based on U.S. law. 

We are confident President Abbas remains committed to the principles of nonviolence, recognition of the state of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements 

and obligations between the parties. 

To play a constructive role in achieving peace, any interim Palestinian Government formed in the period before elections must ensure its actions fully implement 

203

these principles. The U.S. stance toward such a government will be fully consistent 

with U.S. law. 

Our position on Hamas has not changed; Hamas is a designated Foreign Terrorist 

Organization.

Question. As Hezbollah gains an increasing amount of political influence in Lebanon in the wake of the government collapse in January, how do you assess the U.S. 

role in Lebanon and what actions can the United States take to ensure that military 

assistance to Lebanon does not fall into the hands of Hezbollah forces?

Answer. I have been nominated to serve as the Ambassador to Israel. If confirmed, my responsibilities will not cover the U.S. relating with Lebanon. The 

Obama administration’s policy is that we will do all we can to avoid a conflict between Hezbollah and Israel. As we saw in 2006, such a war would be devastating 

for civilians in both Lebanon and Israel. 

The Government of Lebanon continues to state its support for the full implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701—our primary security-related goal 

in Lebanon—and to cooperating with UNIFIL to maintain the calm and a weaponsfree zone in south Lebanon. Ending our assistance to the LAF would contradict this 

commitment and be seen as a victory for Hezbollah and Iranian interests in 

Lebanon. 

The Cabinet formation process is still underway in Lebanon. We continue to 

stress, both publicly and privately with the Government of Lebanon, that we expect 

that the next government will continue to meet Lebanon’s international commitments, which include UNSCR 1559 and 1701, and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. 

When the new government is formed, we will review its composition, policies, and 

behavior, including Lebanon’s commitment to its international commitments. Since 

the government has not yet been formed, it is premature to judge it and to make 

any determinations about the future of U.S. assistance to Lebanon. It is important 

that we continue to plan for ongoing assistance through FY 2012 in order to leave 

all options open. 

RESPONSE OF STUART JONES TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR. 

Question. Jordan is an important counterterrorism partner in the fight against 

Islamic groups in the Middle East, and its 1994 peace treaty with Israel has played 

an important role in the Middle East peace process. Given the growing unrest in 

the region and increasing influence of terrorist groups such as Hamas and 

Hezbollah, what measures should the United States take to support King Abdullah 

II’s reform efforts? How might increased U.S. assistance to Jordan serve our interests in the region, particularly in regard to Israel’s security?

Answer. The Secretary has stated that we have no better ally than Jordan in 

countering terrorism and in modernizing the Middle East. Foreign assistance supports the United States-Jordan bilateral relationship, a critical alliance that continues to further U.S. global, regional, and bilateral objectives. Jordan continues to 

be a top recipient of U.S. economic and military assistance. As a sign of the strong, 

continuing U.S. commitment to Jordan, and in an effort to further our strategic 

goals in Jordan and in the region, the U.S. Government signed a Memorandum of 

Understanding with Jordan in September 2008, expressing the U.S. Government’s 

support for providing predictable levels of assistance to Jordan over 5 years beginning in FY 2010. The MOU stipulates the USG will provide $360 million in ESF 

and $300 million in FMF annually, subject to congressional appropriation and the 

availability of funds. The FY 2012 request reflects this commitment. 

U.S. security assistance supports the Jordanian Armed Forces’ (JAF) 5-year plan 

for modernization, readiness, and enhanced interoperability between the JAF, U.S., 

and NATO forces to advance regional and global security. In addition, our security 

assistance will support procurement and installation of technologies to enhance the 

Jordanian Government’s control of its borders. This assistance strengthens Jordan’s 

capabilities to support and contribute to Middle East peace efforts, international 

peacekeeping operations, counterterrorism efforts, and humanitarian assistance 

within the region. 

RESPONSE OF GEORGE KROL TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR. 

Question. A young Uzbek psychologist, Maxim Popov, has been imprisoned for 7 

years for his work distributing a manual on HIV/AIDS and harm reduction. FundVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00211 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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ing for the creation and translation of versions of this manual has come from international donors, including USAID.

• As Ambassador, what will you do to encourage the Uzbek Government to release Mr. Popov and the growing number of prisoners of conscience being held 

in the country’s prisons?

Answer. We will continue to vigorously advocate at all levels of the Uzbekistani 

Government for the release of Mr. Popov. His case has been a priority issue discussed in our bilateral consultations, along with the cases of other prisoners of conscience. We have made clear that continued imprisonment of prisoners of conscience 

like Mr. Popov restricts U.S. cooperation with the Government of Uzbekistan in 

other areas of mutual interest. We also work multilaterally with other diplomatic 

missions, the European Union and through international organizations such as the 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the U.N. Human 

Rights Council to encourage Uzbekistan to release immediately such prisoners of 

conscience as Mr. Popov. 

RESPONSE OF HENRY ENSHER TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR. 

Question. Algeria’s Berber community has experienced significant government discrimination and neglect, particularly in regard to language and cultural rights. For 

example, Berber activists continue to seek official language status for Tamazight, 

a Berber language, but President Bouteflika and other Algerian officials have opposed this change.

• If confirmed, how will you work with the Algerian Government to encourage enhanced respect for the rights of Berbers and other minority groups in Algeria?

Answer. The United States is committed to minority rights and freedom of religion in Algeria and around the world. The freedom of persons belonging to minority 

groups to practice their own customs and traditions, including learning and speaking a language, is a basic right that the United States supports. Algeria has allowed 

and supported the teaching of Tamazight in public schools and universities in Berber areas since 2001. Algeria must ensure that minorities are free to practice their 

religions and customs as they wish. We are in regular contact with a wide variety 

of religious and cultural leaders in Algeria, and maintain an active dialogue with 

the Algerian Government on religious and cultural freedom issues. With both we 

stress the need for the laws governing the operation of religious and cultural organizations in Algeria to be applied in an equal and transparent manner. 

RESPONSES OF DANIEL SHAPIRO TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

Question. A top priority for the government and people of Israel is ensuring Iran 

is not allowed to achieve a nuclear weapons capability. I believe that from a U.S. 

perspective as well, allowing Iran to achieve such a capability would pose an unacceptable risk to the safety and security of the United States, Israel, and our other 

allies. With events unfolding rapidly in the region, with Libya at war, and Syria 

brutally cracking down on its people, it is easy to lose focus on the Iranian threat. 

Do you agree a nuclear weapons capability in the hands of Iran would pose an unacceptable risk to the United States and Israel? As Ambassador, will you ensure 

Israel’s perspective and thinking on the Iranian threat is communicated effectively 

back to Washington?

Answer. A nuclear armed Iran poses an unacceptable risk to the United States, 

Israel, and globally. A strong international partnership including the United States 

and Israel stands united in opposition to Iran’s illicit nuclear program. This coalition is determined to pressure Iran until it changes course. The clear message is 

that the Iranian leadership’s continued defiance results in harsh political and economic penalties. If confirmed as Ambassador, I will ensure that Israel’s perspective 

and thinking on Iran, and its nuclear program, is clearly conveyed to policymakers 

Washington.

Question. Over the course of the last 2 years you have played a key role in the 

formulation and execution of U.S. policy toward Syria. You have travelled to Syria 

and met with President Assad. Now in the last month we have seen the Assad regime brutally crackdown on the Syrian people. Hundreds of innocent Syrians have 

been killed with many more arbitrarily arrested or beaten. Where should the United 

States go from here? Is it time to signal that it is time for Assad to go, as we did 

205

with Mubarak and Ghadaffi? How do you foresee events in Syria affecting Israel’s 

outlook on the region?

Answer. I have been nominated to serve as the Ambassador to Israel. If confirmed, my responsibilities will not cover Syria. That said, the Obama administration’s policy is that the abhorrent and deplorable actions of the Syrian Government 

against the Syrian people must end immediately. The Syrian Government must also 

immediately stop arbitrary arrests, detention, and torture. 

Given the number of variables involved, it would not be prudent to speculate on 

future developments in Syria.

Question. Israel is our strongest ally and the only democracy in the region. What 

is the administration doing to ensure respect for Israel and its security by the 

emerging new governments in Egypt and Tunisia?

Answer. Egypt is undergoing a period of significant transition. Our relationship 

with Egypt remains strong, and we continue to work constructively and collaboratively with the Egyptian Government on a range of issues. We remain encouraged 

that the current Egyptian Government has repeatedly expressed its commitment to 

adhere to past agreements, including its Treaty of Peace with Israel. 

The Department of State fully appreciates the significance of Egyptian-Israeli 

peace to our regional interests and to regional stability. In our discussions with 

Egyptian leadership across the political spectrum, we have and will continue to 

underscore the importance of upholding this and Egypt’s other international 

obligations. 

Tunisia, like most Arab States, does not currently have diplomatic relations with 

Israel. The administration continues to actively pursue the full normalization of relations between Israel and all countries in the region as part of a comprehensive 

peace. 

(207)

NOMINATION 

THURSDAY, MAY 26, 2011

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

Hon. Gary Locke, of Washington, to be Ambassador to the People’s 

Republic of China 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:25 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Kerry, Menendez, Cardin, Webb, Lugar, and 

Risch. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. We are really delighted today to welcome our Secretary of Commerce, the former 

Governor of the State of Washington, and a very good friend, Gary 

Locke, who has been nominated by the President to be our Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China. 

Welcome, Mr. Secretary. We’re happy to have you here, and I’m 

excited about this appointment. 

I’m delighted also to welcome the Secretary’s family. I just met 

Emily, who is 14 years old, who is sitting behind him there; and 

Dylan, who is 12; and Madeline, who is 6, who told me where she 

is going to school and that she would be much happier if the hearing were over and her dad could just leave right now. [Laughter.] 

And Gary’s terrific partner in life and in this effort, Mona. We’re 

really happy to have you all here. 

This nomination is a very important nomination. All of our Ambassadors are important, and we have great respect for the service 

of everybody. But it is without a doubt that the relationship with 

the People’s Republic of China stands as one of the most important 

relationships for our country today, and much of our cooperation 

with China will help to shape this century, in terms of conflicts as 

well as economic opportunities and relationships. 

If confirmed by the Senate, which I fully expect, Secretary Locke 

will join an elite group of distinguished statesmen, from former 

President George H.W. Bush to Winston Lord and Stapleton Roy 

and others who have served in this position. 

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I think it is obvious to all but, nevertheless, worth pointing out 

yet again that Secretary Locke’s story is quintessentially American. 

It’s the American story. A descendent of hardworking immigrants, 

Secretary Locke’s personal integrity, intelligence, and strong work 

ethic led him from Seattle to college in New Haven, Yale University, and then on to Boston University Law School. 

Later, as Governor of Washington, he reached out to China and 

helped to strengthen the trade ties between his State and China. 

It’s clear that that relationship really is a microcosm of the larger 

relationships that we need to develop and work on today. He doubled the State’s exports at that time to over $5 billion per year. 

At the Department of Commerce, Secretary Locke led the administration’s first Cabinet-level trade mission to China, a clean-energy mission. He has also served as the cochair of the U.S.-China 

Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade. 

The President’s latest assignment for Secretary Locke may well 

be his most challenging. The relationship between the United 

States and China is absolutely vital to get right. We need to avoid 

falling into the trap of zero-sum competition, and we need to forge 

a mutually beneficial relationship based on common interests. 

I think it’s safe to say that the recent visit of the Presidents of 

China and the United States here in Washington advanced that effort, but there’s still a lot of work to be done. 

I’m not going to speak at length about the long list of issues that 

we have to work on, but let me mention, particularly, advancing 

human rights; ensuring peace and stability across the Taiwan 

Strait; managing trade disputes; protecting the environment; and, 

most importantly, cooperating jointly to help lead the world out of 

conflicts in other areas where our joint leadership can have a huge 

impact on the course of events. 

I want to make just two overarching points. First, with its newfound economic clout, China, in my judgment, needs to do more 

than simply abide by international norms, although that’s important. We are hoping that China will contribute to strengthening the 

international system that has helped it to prosper. 

Beijing, we believe, can step up and can shoulder more of the responsibility that comes with its growing power. We welcome the opportunity to share the exercise of that responsibility, together with 

other nations that care to step up. 

In the area of nonproliferation, for example, we need China not 

only to enforce U.N. sanctions and abide by Nuclear Suppliers 

Group guidelines, but we want China to be a full partner in efforts 

to secure a diplomatic solution to the nuclear weapons threats that 

are posed by Iran and North Korea. It is our judgment that all of 

our interests are put at risk by their current illicit efforts, to some 

degree. 

Convincing China that its own interests will be served by taking 

on more responsibility for strengthening the international system 

will be one of Secretary Locke’s most important tasks as our Ambassador, and, obviously, it won’t be easy. 

Even though China may have some of the hallmarks of a great 

power, some of its leaders have remained focused more on meeting 

their own domestic challenges rather than taking on new international obligations. 

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This brings me to my second point. Even though China has one 

of the longest and richest histories on the planet, and even though 

it has vast global trading networks today, and it is the world’s second-largest economy, it still lags behind many states, many nations, in its respect for basic human rights. 

In recent months, China’s Government has intensified efforts to 

control access to information, to restrict freedom of speech and assembly, and to interfere in the peaceful practice of religion. This 

crackdown, in our judgment, and we have been clear about this at 

all times in our history, represents a violation of universal rights, 

rights specifically guaranteed under Chinese law. Such violations 

are ultimately contrary to the best interests, in our judgment, of 

any government, as we are seeing in the Mideast and elsewhere 

today. 

As Premier Wen Jia-bao himself pointed out last October: ‘‘The 

people’s wishes and need for democracy and freedom are 

irresistible.’’

Some say that China is not ready for more democracy and freedom, but Premier Wen had his own rejoinder to that. He said, 

‘‘Freedom of speech is indispensable for any country, a country in 

the course of development and a country that has become strong.’’ 

Premier Wen, in our judgment, is absolutely correct about this, but 

it is clear that some in China see things differently. 

Greater tolerance for dissent would, in our judgment, help China 

produce better results across a range of government and privatesector activities. 

Effectively integrating our concern for human rights into every 

facet of our relationship will be one of the Ambassador’s most important and most daunting challenges. 

If confirmed, Secretary Locke will be responsible, obviously, for 

helping to build the kind of candid and cooperative partnership 

that is essential for both countries. 

I’ve had the pleasure of engaging with Chinese leaders on a number of these issues. I think we have made progress in those discussions. I think there has been an increased level of candor and an 

increased level of cooperation on a number of different vital issues 

of concern. And I look forward to Secretary Locke’s ability to continue to help develop that relationship. We want a partnership 

with China. 

There are some, even in our country, who often talk about 

choices that would actually push China into a different relationship. There are some who even want China labeled as something 

other than a partner or a possible friend. I believe, personally, and 

I think others here do, that that would not serve our interests and 

that is not necessary. 

But all of these relationships take work. Countries always organize around and react to their needs. That’s been true all through 

history. It’s not going to change overnight. The art is to try to meld 

those needs into a common effort and to try to find ways to cooperate wherever possible in the greater interests and good of the larger global community, even as we meet our own needs at home. 

Mr. Secretary, I believe that the President has made a good and 

wise choice in nominating you. We certainly look forward to your 

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testimony today and to confirming you. And most importantly, we 

look forward to working with you in this important task. 

Senator Lugar. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming Secretary 

Locke and his distinguished family. The post for which he is nominated is one of the most difficult and complex in the entire Federal 

Government. I appreciate this opportunity to express our views 

about the priorities of the United States-Chinese relationship and 

learn about the nominee’s vision. 

China’s global leverage has increased as it has positioned itself 

as the leading creditor nation with more than 18 percent of the 

world’s current account balance surplus. According to recent data, 

China is the United States Government’s largest foreign creditor, 

holding approximately 25 percent of the almost $4.5 trillion we owe 

to other countries. 

Greater thought must be given to how we work with China to establish a more sensible global balance that depends less on Chinese 

credit. 

China remains an extremely important market for United States 

exports. For example, the American Soybean Association cites 

China as the largest export market for United States soybeans in 

2010, with nearly $11 billion in sales to China. 

But the United States continues to have a severe trade deficit 

with China; the benefits of the Chinese market have not reached 

their full potential for American businesses and workers, in part 

because of impediments to fair competition in China. We continue 

to hear complaints about inconsistent application of rules, requirements for ‘‘indigenous innovation,’’ nontariff barriers to trade, inconsistent market access, and lack of enforcement of intellectual 

property rights. 

Civil society within China continues to face immense challenges 

in promoting the rule of law and human rights reform. 

In addition to economic issues, the next Ambassador to China 

will also have to focus on a wide array of security problems. These 

include obtaining greater Chinese cooperation on issues related to 

North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, Burma, and other nations, as well as 

maintaining the security of Taiwan. 

The Ambassador must confront the Chinese Government on stopping the cyber attacks on the United States Government, American 

companies, and individual Americans that originate in China. 

More broadly, our Government must work for a better understanding of the interaction between China’s military and civilian 

leaders. Earlier this year, during the visit between the Senate leadership and President Hu, his role and relationship to Chinese military leaders were among the points raised by Senators. This topic 

underscores the need for closer communication between the United 

States and Chinese defense establishments, which has been frequently endorsed by Secretary Gates. 

The Ambassador must have a deep understanding of China’s integration strategy for its Southeast Asian neighbors. 

211

China also is dedicating massive financial resources to securing 

and developing natural resources in many parts of the globe including Latin America and Africa. 

Another specific area of concern that has received too little attention is the incongruent reality of our public diplomacy in China. A 

Foreign Relations Committee minority staff report revealed that 

while China has more than 70 ‘‘Confucius Centers’’ operating in the 

United States, only five American Centers exist in China. The 

United States must press this point of equity for the establishment 

of American information outposts within China. 

Finally, the American Ambassador and our Government must 

give consistent attention to human rights deficiencies in China. 

Unfortunately, political and religious freedoms in China continue to 

deteriorate. This committee needs a firm commitment from the 

nominee that he will work to advance the rule of law and human 

rights in China. He must press Chinese leaders regarding the 

growing campaign of censorship, arbitrary detentions, repression, 

and disappearances. 

I look forward very much to today’s hearing to learn more about 

Secretary Locke and his strategy for approaching the Chinese in 

ways that will effectively enhance the economic prosperity of Americans and the national security of our country. 

I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. 

Mr. Secretary, your full statement will be placed in the record as 

if read in full. We look forward to your testimony. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. GARY LOCKE, OF WASHINGTON, TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 

Secretary LOCKE. Thank you very much, Senator Kerry and Senator Lugar and Senator Webb. 

It’s a pleasure to be in front of this committee, and I’m very 

humbled to come before you as President Obama’s nominee to be 

the next United States Ambassador to the People’s Republic of 

China. 

It’s a sign of the importance of the bilateral relationship between 

our two great nations that the President has nominated a current 

member of his Cabinet to serve in this new capacity. I want to 

thank President Obama for his support and his confidence in me. 

I’m proud to be joined today by my family, my beautiful wife, 

Mona, and our three lovely children, Emily, Dylan, and Madeline. 

No matter where public service taken us, whether from the other 

Washington to this Washington, and, if the Senate confirms me, on 

to Beijing, they, and especially Mona, have been the irreplaceable 

constants, providing much love and much support. 

I also know that if my father, Jimmy, were still alive—he passed 

away this past January—he would be proud, that if I am confirmed, to see his son become the first Chinese-American U.S. Ambassador to the country of his and my mother’s birth. 

My father came to United States as a very, very young boy. He 

joined the United States Army before the outbreak of World War 

II and was part of the Normandy invasion and some of the fiercest 

battles in France on their journey to Berlin. And after the war, he 

212

returned to China, where he met and married my mom, and he 

brought her back to Seattle where they started a family. 

China is a nation they would hardly recognize from their childhoods. It’s a country filled with ultramodern cities, where hundreds 

of millions have been lifted out of poverty. 

The administration welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China, but this new status comes with important responsibilities. This administration seeks to engage China on regional and 

global affairs to advance international peace and stability in ways 

consistent with prevailing international norms, rules, and institutions. 

As Vice President Biden said recently, how the United States 

and China cooperate will define, in significant part, how we deal 

with the challenges the world faces in the 21st century. 

If confirmed by the Senate, I pledge to help build the positive, 

cooperative, and comprehensive relationship that Presidents 

Obama and Hu have agreed that our two nations should aspire to. 

For more than a decade, opening markets in China has been a 

focus of mine, as Governor of the State of Washington, as an attorney in private practice, and now as Commerce Secretary. If confirmed, helping United States companies do more business in 

China will be a big part of what I will do every day. Increasing exports to China will help create jobs and economic growth here at 

home, but it will also improve the quality of life of the Chinese people by providing more access to American-made products and services, the best in the world, and help China’s leaders reach their 

goals of modernization. 

At the same time, as Ambassador, I will also work to expand bilateral cooperation on a host of critical international issues, from 

stopping nuclear proliferation, to rebalancing the global economy, 

to combating climate change. We’ve made significant progress on a 

number of those concerns, even as challenges remain. 

And our work together on North Korea and Iran, though we continue to encourage China to do even more, is an important sign 

that we can cooperate to address sensitive issues in the United 

States-China relationship. 

While there are many areas of collaboration, there are also areas 

of vigorous disagreement. That includes human rights, where we 

have very significant concerns about China’s actions in recent 

months, especially the crackdown on journalists, lawyers, bloggers, 

artists, and religious groups. 

The protection and the promotion of liberty and freedom are fundamental tenets of U.S. foreign policy. And if confirmed, I will 

clearly and firmly advocate for upholding universal rights in China. 

And as much as the job of Ambassador is to communicate our position to China’s leaders, I also pledge to reach out to the people 

of China. And my goal will be to directly convey and express the 

values that America stands for and the desire for ever-closer bonds 

of friendship between our two peoples. 

Let me close by saying that, should I be confirmed, I pledge to 

work closely with this committee, and I hope to host each of you 

and your staffs in China. We have an outstanding team of career 

professionals at the Embassy and at the consulates in China. And 

if granted the privilege of serving, I will do my best to honor their 

213

work as they pursue and promote American interests and objectives in China. We have much to do. 

Chairman Kerry and Senator Lugar, Senator Webb, thank you 

for this opportunity to address you, and I welcome your questions 

and your comments. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Locke follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GARY LOCKE

Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, and members of the committee, it is 

humbling to come before this committee as President Obama’s nominee to be the 

next U.S. Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China. It is a sign of the importance of the bilateral relationship between our two great nations that the President 

has nominated a current member of his Cabinet to serve in this new capacity. I 

want to thank him and Secretary Clinton for their support and their confidence in 

me. I am proud to be joined today by my family. No matter where public service has 

taken us—from one Washington to the other, and now on to Beijing—my wife, 

Mona, and our three children, Emily, Dylan, and Madeline, have been the irreplaceable constants, providing love and support. 

I also know that if my father Jimmy were still alive, he would have been proud 

to have seen this day and to reflect on its significance—the first Chinese-American 

nominated to be the U.S. Ambassador to China, the country of his and my mother’s 

birth. 

If confirmed, my family will join me in taking up the charge of representing the 

promise of America as a land of freedom, equality and opportunity. 

Of course, one of the highlights of this endeavor, if confirmed, will be joining a 

brand new family: U.S. Mission China. I know that the outstanding team of career 

professionals at our Embassy and consulates will provide the knowledge and advice 

critical to making this transition a smooth one. If confirmed, I will do my best to 

honor their service, as they pursue and promote American interests and objectives 

in China. We have much to do. 

Should I be confirmed, I will work to build the positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship that President Obama and Chinese President Hu have 

agreed our two countries should aspire to. In doing so, I will support our ongoing 

efforts to expand bilateral cooperation on a host of critical international issues, from 

climate change to stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials. I will 

support enhanced exchanges among our two peoples, especially our youth, which is 

so important to long-term mutual understanding. At the same time, I will be realistic and honest about the many challenges and differences that exist between us, 

including our serious differences on human rights, and will work toward managing 

those differences, while remaining true to our values as Americans. 

Please allow me to expand on these general comments by examining a few issues 

in greater detail. 

Developing commercial cooperation with China has been a focus of mine for more 

than a decade. As Washington State’s Governor, I presided over the doubling of exports to China. As an attorney in private practice, I helped American companies 

navigate the Chinese business environment. And as Commerce Secretary, I have 

traveled to China four times, made it the first stop of the administration’s first 

Cabinet-level trade mission and cochaired two Joint Commission on Commerce and 

Trade sessions in which we’ve won important commitments from the Chinese 

Government. 

If confirmed, helping U.S. companies do more business in China will be a big part 

of what I do every day as Ambassador. It’s a win-win proposition. American workers 

benefit, because the more U.S. firms export, the more they have to produce, and the 

more they have to produce, the more people they have to hire. That means more 

jobs here at home. But the people of China also benefit, because the more access 

they have to American-made products and services—the best in the world—the better the quality of life will be for the Chinese people. China’s 12th Five-Year Plan 

also anticipates the need for a more balanced economic relationship that will require 

continued increases in U.S. exports and ever-broader collaboration with U.S. companies working with their Chinese counterparts. This is good for the United States 

and will help China reach its modernization goals. 

I firmly believe improved United States-China cooperation is critical to the world 

community, and if the Senate grants me the privilege of representing the U.S. in 

China, I will take with me a profound understanding of the promise our relationship 

holds. 

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There is so much we can accomplish when we work together. From the search for 

new, cleaner sources of energy—our companies are working together through the 

Energy Cooperation Program—to our successful Innovation Dialogue—there are 

many issues where cooperation is not aspirational but reality. I have been proud to 

be part of that expanding cooperative relationship during my tenure as Commerce 

Secretary. 

But I am aware of the challenges that exist as well. The Obama administration 

has made frank and honest conversation an important part of our dialogue with 

China, and if confirmed, I intend to seek to engage China’s leaders in the same 

manner. As our relationship continues to expand, candor between the leaders of our 

two countries is necessary to strengthen the bonds of trust. 

Action, of course, will also deepen that trust. That’s why I will, if confirmed, 

closely follow Vice Premier Wang Qishan’s recent pledge to continue China’s campaign to improve intellectual property protection and enforcement, as well as President Hu’s January 2011 commitment to de-link innovation policy from procurement 

preferences. Demonstrating measurable progress on these and other commitments 

is an important element of building trust in the economic and commercial sphere 

between our two countries. 

We also want to see renewed efforts by China to reform state-owned enterprises 

(SOEs). We seek to ensure that large SOEs and other national champions are functioning as commercial enterprises within the Chinese economy. I have previously 

made clear that China’s lack of followthrough on transparency and intellectual property rights protection and enforcement commitments made during previous bilateral 

dialogues has meant that U.S. companies have not seen the benefits of those commitments. Rebalancing our economic relationship will require the type of market 

opening that the implementation of these commitments will bring. The commercial 

relationship between our nations stands at a crossroads, a relationship that can no 

longer be characterized by China making and the United States taking. If confirmed, I will make implementation of existing and future commitments a policy 

priority in my interactions with the Chinese Government 

Should I be confirmed, it will be one among many priorities, as we work to ensure 

our shared goals of regional stability and increased prosperity. 

To that end, I hope to be an able messenger of the Obama administration’s 

policies for the Asia-Pacific region generally and to the Chinese Government specifically, if confirmed. Working through a whole of government approach, the administration seeks to engage China on regional and global affairs to advance international peace and stability—and in ways consistent with international rules, 

norms, and institutions. At the same time, the administration will continue to work 

with allies and partners in Asia to foster a regional environment in which China’s 

rise is a source of prosperity and stability for all its neighbors. 

Along these lines, developing the military-to-military relationship will lead to 

greater strategic trust between the United States and China, and we are working 

to strengthen our existing military-to-military dialogues, The first meeting of the 

civilian-military Strategic Security Dialogue that took place at the S&ED earlier 

this month and the visit of People’s Liberation Army Chief of the General Staff 

Chen Bingde last week were also important steps toward sustained, substantive dialogue to reduce misunderstanding, misperception and miscalculation. 

Given the pace of China’s military modernization, building mutual trust is necessary to defuse tensions that may arise, but also critically important to living with 

each other as fellow Asia-Pacific nations. The United States is an Asia-Pacific 

power, and we have a strong commitment to defending U.S. interests and values 

in the region. 

While the United States and China will inevitably have differences from time to 

time, it is far from preordained that those differences should lead to conflict. As 

President Obama has stated, ‘‘We need to improve communication between our militaries, which promotes mutual understanding and confidence.’’

With regard to Taiwan, the United States has welcomed the progress in crossstrait relations achieved over the past 2 years. The United States remains committed to our one China policy based on the three joint communiques and the 

Taiwan Relations Act. We do not support Taiwan independence. We believe that 

cross-strait issues should be resolved peacefully in a manner acceptable to people 

on both sides of the strait. We oppose unilateral actions by either side to alter the 

status quo across the Taiwan Strait. We urge China to reduce military deployments 

aimed at Taiwan and to pursue a peaceful resolution to cross-strait issues. If confirmed as Ambassador, I will continue to make these views clear to China’s leaders. 

China has also been an important diplomatic player on issues concerning North 

Korea. That has included playing a central role as chair of the six-party talks. 

China has repeatedly stated that it shares our goal of a denuclearized Korean 

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Peninsula. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with China to press the 

DPRK to cease its provocative behavior, take meaningful steps to denuclearize, and 

to ensure full implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874. 

China also has played an important role in the diplomatic efforts to address the 

threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program. The United States has been pleased with 

the unity that China and other P5+1 partners have maintained in our negotiations 

with Iran, and we continue to jointly insist that Iran comply with its international 

obligations. The administration worked closely with China to pass U.N. Security 

Council Resolution 1929 last June, and have called upon China to ensure that this 

resolution is fully implemented and to take additional steps to restrict any new economic activity with Iran that might provide support to its nuclear program, including in the energy sector. Iran’s nuclear program was a key topic of President 

Obama’s talks with President Hu, and we welcomed President Hu’s assurance that 

China is committed to implementing U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929 and 

other resolutions on Iran fully and faithfully. 

The United States ability to work together on issues such as North Korea and 

Iran is an important sign that we can cooperate to address more sensitive issues 

in the relationship. That includes human rights issues. The protection and the promotion of liberty and freedom are fundamental tenets of American foreign policy. 

If confirmed as Ambassador, I will be a forceful advocate for promoting the respect 

of universal human rights in China. We do so not only because of who we are as 

Americans. Rather, we do so because greater respect for human rights is also in 

China’s interest. As Secretary Clinton said at the S&ED earlier this month: ‘‘[W]e 

know over the long arch of history that societies that work toward respecting human 

rights are going to be more prosperous, stable, and successful. That has certainly 

been proven time and time again, but most particularly in the last months.’’

So, the administration is troubled—and I am troubled—by the well-documented 

deterioration of the human rights environment in China. To name just one prominent case, the detention of artist and activist Ai Weiwei raises many issues about 

China’s commitment to building a society based on the rule of law. The United 

States is also very concerned about the increased repression of Tibetans and 

Uighurs, continuing restrictions on religious freedom, and increased efforts to control the Internet and constrain civil society. As my predecessors have, I will raise 

human rights issues and individual cases with Chinese Government officials at the 

highest levels. 

But as much as the job of Ambassador is to communicate the U.S. position to 

China’s leaders, I will also make reaching out directly to the Chinese people a priority. Technology is providing new avenues of communication with ordinary Chinese 

citizens. My goal will be to express as directly as possible the values that America 

stands for and the desire for ever-closer bonds of friendship between our two 

peoples. 

I’ll close by touching on the nuts and bolts of diplomatic work. I bring a personal 

history as a problem-solver and an effective manager. As such, if confirmed, I will 

focus our diplomacy on results. As Secretary of Commerce, I focused on delivering 

more effective and efficient services to American businesses and workers in a way 

that reduced costs and simplified the bureaucratic process. If confirmed, I will approach the U.S. mission in China in much the same way, looking for ways to engage 

in public diplomacy that work best to get our message across to the Chinese Government and out to the Chinese people. 

If confirmed, I also plan to aggressively confront a number of the challenges that 

Mission China faces. I understand that our facilities in Shanghai need to be upgraded to meet the demands that increased visa applications have put on the post 

there. Reduced ability to process visa applications has a concrete cost to our economy in lost travel and tourism exports. For this reason, I will continue the efforts 

made throughout our posts in China to improve visa appointment wait times without losing a focus on security. I have worked closely with the State Department’s 

Bureau of Consular Affairs on visa issues as Governor and Commerce Secretary and 

now look forward to continuing that partnership as Ambassador, should I be 

confirmed. 

I have enjoyed the process of conferring with many of you as the nominee to be 

the next U.S. Ambassador to China. I hope that I have conveyed to you that I am 

prepared to undertake this unique opportunity to continue my service to our Nation. 

As I seek your support for my nomination, I look forward to having the opportunity to continue to learn from your deep experience and knowledge about the Asia 

Pacific region, China, and foreign relations generally. If you and your colleagues do 

vote to confirm me as Ambassador, I pledge to work closely with you and your staffs 

through regular consultation, and I hope I will have the privilege of hosting each 

of you and your staffs in China. 

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Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, and members of the committee, thank 

you for this opportunity to address you. I welcome your questions and comments.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

I neglected, in my opening, to point out, but I think it’s more appropriate that you do anyway, your status as the first American of 

Chinese descent. I think that is really an amazing part of the story, 

and I’m confident it gives you a very special level of credibility and 

capacity to validate a number of issues. I think we’re well-served 

in that regard. 

I would like to ask you—obviously, there are a lot of issues. But 

I want to get your sense of how we manage the economic component at this point in time. There is a degree of anxiety within the 

Congress with respect to the currency issues and the trade practices, some of the procurement practices, et cetera. We’ve had these 

meetings with the Chinese. We’ve discussed these things. 

Some Americans would suggest that this discussion has been 

going on for quite a while without the kind of results that impact 

their perception of the unfairness of the playing field, whether it’s 

intellectual property or other things. The progress seems slow to a 

lot of folks. I wonder if you would comment on whether that’s just 

the way it is going to be? Does that represent a difference of opinion over it? Does it represent the imbalance of negotiating leverage? What’s your take on why it is taking so long to open up a 

greater level of both transparency and accountability with respect 

to those issues and accomplishing progress? 

Secretary LOCKE. Well, thank you very much. I think we would 

all agree that progress has been slow, but, in fact, we are making 

progress. And I think progress has been accelerating in just the 

last few years. 

Obviously, both China and the United States, and the G20 nations, have talked about a rebalancing the world economy, and part 

of that rebalancing includes American consumers being less in 

debt. It also means that we, as a country, have to get our fiscal 

house in order. And the President has very ambitious goals, as evidenced by the budget he has proposed over the next several years 

that will freeze domestic spending. And there’s a lot of discussion 

now on reducing our debt and our deficit. 

But, also, China recognizes that it must export less and must 

focus more on domestic consumption. And we in the United States 

must also export more. 

So these are opportunities of win-win before us that can actually 

have United States companies exporting more to China and, certainly, meeting the needs of both the Chinese leaders and the people of China. 

There’s a great hunger and a great demand for things that are 

made and produced in America, from services to products to agriculture. And just in the last year alone, United States exports to 

China, goods rose by 32 percent, whereas, across the United States, 

exports to other countries grew on average 17 percent. Our exports 

to China are growing at a faster rate, by roughly 50 percent, than 

elsewhere to the rest of the world. 

And we are seeing movement on the currency. China has recognized it needs to allow its currency to float more freely. We, of 

course, think that it should float more and faster. But when you 

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also combine the effect of inflation in China in the last year, we’ve 

seen the movement of the currency by roughly 10 percent. Obviously, we still want more. 

We have a variety of different fora, whether it’s the Strategic and 

Economic Dialogue, as well as the Joint Commission on Commerce 

and Trade, where we address these very specific as well as global 

issues. We have made progress, but we have to make sure that we 

monitor the progress of China, make sure that they adhere to their 

commitments, whether it’s on intellectual property—the Chinese 

have a campaign right now that’s supervised by the State Council 

Vice Premier Wang Qishan. That campaign has been extended to 

really ensure that the Government agencies and state-owned enterprises purchase legitimate software. But we’ve got to monitor that, 

and we’re demanding and insisting on accountability and audits to 

make sure that the Chinese follow through. 

But, still, it’s a very important relationship, and certainly one in 

which we need to convey to the Chinese that it is in their mutual 

self-interests to engage in free and fair trade, and to also, as you 

indicated earlier, not just abide by international norms and institutions, but be a world player and help lead and help solve some of 

the many issues facing the world. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me come to that for a minute. Obviously, everybody understands that the Chinese leadership and people are smart, very analytical, very capable of defining what they 

see as their interests. I wonder, given the fact that you constantly 

hear from them the refrain about, notwithstanding their wealth 

that has been created on one side of the ledger, they still have 450, 

500 million people—perhaps twice the size of the United States 

even, to try to bring into a more urban/industrial standard of living 

out of agrarian roots. That’s the constant challenge. 

There’s a unique focus, as you’re well aware, among Chinese 

leadership on their internal challenges. We talk about their interests, we want to persuade them to see that their interests are also 

served by an outward focus. How do you do that, in your judgment? 

What is it that you think they’re missing, conceivably, when they 

see their interests as being very specifically focused on this internal struggle? 

Secretary LOCKE. Well, their interests, and with respect to some 

of their internal challenges, focus, for instance, on food, feeding a 

growing population, shortages of food, insufficient energy—in recent days, you’ve seen reports of limitations or reductions in electricity available for factories and even households—to the health 

and welfare of their citizens. 

And there is a great desire, given the contact with the West, 

given the ability of the people of China to either visit and see what 

other developing countries are enjoying, to even seeing American 

life on television shows, there is a hunger for greater prosperity 

and a higher standard of living. And the Chinese Government is 

very concerned about making sure that there is stability within the 

country. 

And these are the areas in which the United States companies 

and the United States Government can help meet those needs of 

both the Chinese leaders and the aspirations of the Chinese people 

that can, for instance, help reduce our trade deficit; help American 

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companies sell more of their American-made goods and services, including agriculture, to China; and to meet those objectives of the 

Chinese people and leaders. 

Those are just—we need to convince and inform both the leaders 

of China and the people of China that America stands willing to 

help, and it can result in a mutually beneficial relationship. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me just ask one last question with respect to that, sort of hone in on China’s interests. 

When we met with President Hu here, I raised, and I think some 

other people raised, the question with him about their efforts with 

respect to North Korea. They tell us that they don’t want a nuclear 

North Korea, that North Korea’s current activities are contrary to 

China’s interests, and they voted with us, obviously, in the U.N. to 

impose sanctions. But despite the, sort of, public affirmations of 

being with us in terms of our goals, the methods they adopt, and 

even the enforcement, often takes a very different track. 

A recent U.N. report faulted China for not adequately enforcing 

the sanctions against North Korea. We know that the North Korean leader Kim Jong-il is in Beijing, I think right now, as we’re 

here, focusing on the economic ties between the two countries. 

How do we get China to exert what we believe is greater leverage 

with respect to North Korea’s behavior, particularly their aggressive behavior toward the South, and some of the dangerous moments that have been created in the last few years as a consequence of that? You would sort of think there was a greater ability. Are we misjudging their capacity, or are they judging their interests differently? 

Secretary LOCKE. No, I don’t think that we’re misjudging their 

capacity. In fact, China has been a vital partner in the six-party 

talks, and China has a very unique role, given its influence and its 

ties with North Korea. 

We, obviously, urge China to do more to influence North Korea’s 

behavior. And I think that the recent provocations by North Korea 

and the reaction by the South is giving China pause and causing 

China to realize that it has to step up to diffuse the situation, to 

make sure that no further provocations occur, which could then result in retaliatory actions by South Korea, which would simply destabilize the entire region. 

So I think that there’s a greater urgency and understanding of 

how delicate the situation is, and how North Korea must be 

brought back to the six-party talks, and how, simply, they must 

abandon their nuclear aims and objectives. I think that China understands that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think China can do more? 

Secretary LOCKE. China can definitely and must do more. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Secretary Locke, as I mentioned in my opening 

statement, I remain concerned, as do many Americans, that while 

we have welcomed the building of 70 Confucius Centers in the 

United States, China has authorized only five American Centers to 

be built on Chinese soil. I want to focus for just a moment to get 

your views on public diplomacy as it pertains to our relationship 

with China. 

219

In addition to this problem, recent budget prioritization efforts 

have rendered it likely that we are to see the Voice of America ending its effort to jam shortwave radio broadcasts but with a refocus 

on the Internet instead. Additionally, I’m pleased the Broadcasting 

Board of Governors received an additional $10 million recently to 

help circumvent what’s known as the Great Firewall. 

The administration’s efforts to get more American students to 

China through the 100,000-strong program are certainly laudable 

but remains very badly underresourced. Meanwhile, China’s largest 

state-run media, Xinhua, opened its new office in Times Square 

just last week. 

These are just fragments of the problem, but nevertheless,how do 

you perceive American diplomacy being pushed, so that we are able 

to get an audience with the Chinese people themselves, in addition 

to the conversations we’ve been having with the Chinese leadership? 

Secretary LOCKE. Well, I think it’s very important that we engage with the Chinese people directly. It’s not enough just to talk 

with the Chinese leaders, because the appetite for more freedom 

and democracy among the Chinese people rests with the people 

themselves. The more exposure we can give them to American values, freedoms, democracies, the more interaction they have with 

Americans, whether it’s American tourists, American students in 

China, or even Chinese tourists and Chinese businesspeople coming to the United States, will I think promote those democratic reforms and the appetite for greater liberties and freedom. 

Obviously, the State Department would welcome more funding 

for many of these programs of diplomacy, but I think we also need 

to be aware of the new methods by which people communicate with 

each other over the Internet. And so we will continue what Ambassador Huntsman did in terms of blogging and messages over the 

Internet to the Chinese people. 

But I also believe that, as I have experienced as Governor, we 

want to continue reaching out to the Chinese people using radio 

and television shows, and their versions of almost like Oprah, 

which reach hundreds of millions of people, which are repeated 

over and over and over again. 

And so those are the types of mechanisms and media strategies 

that we would like to deploy. 

Clearly, we need to—I believe that there is a growing interest 

among America’s young people to study in China. We need to encourage more exchange programs by American colleges, universities, and just encouraging more semesters and years abroad. And 

that’s how we can also help fulfill the President’s goal of having at 

least 100,000 American students studying in China. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, when you become our Ambassador and you 

have boots on the ground over there, I hope you will stay in touch 

with our committee and with those of us who are deeply interested 

in this, because, as you say, there are going to be budget problems. 

These are problems that Congress must face, as well as our Embassy in Beijing. I’m just hopeful that this will be a major focus of 

yours, as you’ve outlined very cogently this morning. 

I would also hope that you will be a champion for intellectual 

property rights. This issue challenges many American companies in 

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China, as well as American individuals. What new lessons do you 

believe you’ve learned in improving the property rights situation 

during your time as Secretary of Commerce as these issues have 

come before you in that forum. And how do you think we might 

make progress, if you are in China? 

Secretary LOCKE. I think we certainly need to interact with not 

just the leaders of China but also businesses of China and especially the young people of China, the students in the colleges and 

universities there. Because as they begin to innovate, as they begin 

to engage in cutting-edge research, they also need to understand 

that, without intellectual property rights protection, their discoveries, their hard-earned work, could be for naught. 

I believe that we simply must convey the message that it is in 

the economic self-interests of the Chinese people and the Chinese 

Government to have strong intellectual property rights. And without strong IPR, innovation will either occur elsewhere or not at all 

within China. 

And with state-owned enterprises or with government support of 

R&D, if there’s not a strong intellectual property rights regime, 

those investments could be stolen, could be appropriated by others. 

And that’s not in the self-interests of either Chinese entrepreneurs, 

Chinese companies, or the Chinese Government. 

We’re already beginning to see some increase in enforcement and 

strengthening of intellectual property rights. And we have many 

exchanges through Commerce Department, Justice Department 

and even American Bar Association groups traveling to China to 

help develop a rule of law. 

But we must continue to push these issues, as we have in the 

Strategic and Economic Dialogue, and even in our Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, cochaired by the Commerce Secretary and our U.S. Trade Representative, Ambassador Kirk. 

I can tell you that in this most recent JCCT meeting, the Chinese agreed to extend their campaign on legitimate software among 

government agencies, national and at the subregional level. We 

need to hold their feet to the fire. We need to make sure that there 

are audits that we can all depend on. And, in fact, the Chinese 

president, Hu Jintao, reiterated that support in his visit to the 

United States this past January. 

It is a very important, high-priority topic for the U.S. Government as a whole. It has been for me as Commerce Secretary and 

will continue to be a top priority as the Ambassador to China. 

Senator LUGAR. Let me just ask one further question, without 

speculation that is undue, but many believe that inflation in China 

is picking up steam—at least many Chinese leaders seem to indicate that, in fact, a so-called bubble might form in the Chinese 

economy. This has many greater dangers than bubbles forming 

elsewhere, because of the enormity and the credit position we 

talked about earlier today, in which the Chinese are financing 

through sovereign funds a good part of our budget, as well as other 

countries’. 

What role, in your view as potential Ambassador to China, do 

you believe we can play in being helpful in that situation? Because 

this could be of great consequence to us, to Europe, and to the 

world, if for some reason the Chinese do have an inflationary bubVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00228 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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ble and a recession that markedly changes the current trends in 

international matters. 

Secretary LOCKE. I think that, clearly, there—we need to help 

open up the Chinese market to some of our services, whether it’s 

in insurance, whether it’s in pensions and other areas of the financial services market. We also need to help lend our expertise to 

China as they deal with some of these economic issues. 

But I really believe that the key is the rebalancing of the world 

economy, in which they are not so dependent on exports but also 

focusing more on domestic consumption. 

Of course, if they have a recession, that could have an impact on 

that type of domestic consumption. But it’s something that we’re 

going to have to watch very, very carefully, and we are going to 

have to encourage even more exchanges and deliberations between 

our top financial services sector, as well as our financial institutions and our Government officials. Secretary Geithner has a whole 

host of collaborations and exchanges with his counterparts in 

China. 

Let me just also add that 70 percent of Treasuries are actually 

held by domestic companies; 70 percent of our Treasuries are held 

by domestic entities. And of the 30 percent remaining held by other 

entities, China has about a third of that. And so China’s hold on, 

or ownership of, our securities really is only 8 percent of our total 

debt, and in no way does China’s position in any way influence 

U.S. foreign policy. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much. 

Senator Webb. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Locke, I would like to congratulate you on your nomination, and I know how great a moment this must be—not only for 

you—but for your family. We wish you the best in this assignment. 

I want you to know that I appreciate your having come by my office 

for the extensive discussions that we were able to have. 

I have three questions that I would like to get your thoughts on 

today. The first is: I held a hearing, in my capacity as the chair 

of East Asia Subcommittee on this committee regarding the consistency and, lack thereof, in our characterization of governmental 

systems rather than human rights, per se. 

We talk about human rights. ‘‘Human rights’’ is something of an 

amorphous term when you’re looking at relations with different 

countries. It’s important, but for instance you could characterize, 

even in a country like the United States with a free and open governmental system, someone could allege that a first amendment 

violation is a human rights violation, or an eighth amendment violation is a violation of someone’s human rights. But when you get 

to countries such as China, what we really have is a fundamental 

difference in governmental systems that rarely gets discussed when 

we’re in hearings like this. They do not have democratic systems 

and they don’t have elections, as we understand them. 

The Freedom House evaluations of freedom of the press rate 

China at the bottom among the 40 countries in the Asia-Pacific, 

other than Burma and North Korea, in terms of basic freedoms of 

the press. 

222

So we are, on the one hand, in an environment where we do 

want to push our economic interests forward, and we do want to 

ensure that there aren’t misunderstandings in terms of security 

issues. And we want to work toward a time when those can be resolved for the stability of the region. But we’re still talking about 

two completely different systems of government. 

What are your thoughts about the challenges of that, and what 

the future holds? 

Secretary LOCKE. Well, obviously, there are major differences between our histories as countries; our cultures, our values; and, certainly, our governmental systems. 

As you note, there’s been much criticism of human rights issues 

and freedom of the press issues in China. Notwithstanding that, I 

believe that there’s a great appetite and a hunger by the Chinese 

people for information as to what’s happening all around the world. 

And the Chinese people are able to obtain much of that information. And what we must do as a country is to engage with the Chinese people directly and to convey the values that America stands 

for and our views on various issues. 

And while much of the press is controlled by China, there is also 

a growing movement for greater freedom among the press. I think 

that it’s incumbent upon the Ambassador and other American Government officials who operate in China, whether it’s from our Embassy or even visiting Members of the Congress, to take advantage 

of those different mechanisms of talk shows, radio shows, meeting 

with students, using the Internet to communicate and to express 

the values for which we stand. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. My second question relates to the 

concern that I and many people have regarding the role that the 

Chinese Government should be playing in assisting in the resolution of challenges—a role that is more at a level of its emerging 

power around the world. You mentioned some cooperation in the 

areas of Iran, Burma, and North Korea in your opening remarks. 

There are other issues where I think we could encourage the Chinese to become more visible and proactive in the international environment as we reach towards solutions. 

I’ve held two hearings on sovereignty issues, different kinds of 

sovereignty issues, both of which, I believe, we really could benefit 

from a more overt participation from the Chinese. 

The first are the sovereignty issues in the South China Sea—the 

Spratly Islands, the Senkakus, the Paracels—where the position of 

China has been that they will only negotiate in a bilateral environment, which makes it impossible to solve those issues, quite frankly. 

The other hearing, as I discussed with you when you visited my 

office, was on the issues of downstream water rights—the Mekong 

River particularly, but also the Red River that goes into the north 

of Vietnam. China is one of the few countries in the world that 

does not recognize riparian water rights downstream. With these 

hydroelectric dams being built, there are serious potential environmental consequences in the Lower Mekong and also in the northern part of Vietnam. 

223

What can we and you do to encourage the Chinese to participate 

in finding solutions to these sovereignty issues in other than a bilateral environment? 

Secretary LOCKE. I think that we need to impress on China that 

stability of the Asian region is, obviously, in the interests of not 

just the other countries but also China; and that, therefore, engagement on these issues is in its self-interest as well, dealing with 

water, dealing with disputed territorial claims; and that they 

should be addressed in a peaceful, collaborative way that adheres 

to international norms and rules. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. The final question I have is with respect to China’s continued status as a developing country in terms 

of per capita income, which allows their Government to receive billions of dollars in multilateral assistance and concessional lending 

for a lot of their development projects at a time when they’re sitting on trillions of dollars of surplus, because of their trade balances. What would your comment be on that? 

Secretary LOCKE. Well, I think that there needs to be a more 

frank recognition that while China is considered a developing country, it is more developed than most other countries, and that various international mechanisms must recognize that. 

For instance, that’s the position of the United States in the current negotiations over the Doha Round. There are degrees of developing countries, many that are more developed than others, and 

that not all should be lumped in the same categories. And I think 

that applies with some of these same issues that you’ve just raised. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much. 

Senator LUGAR. Senator Webb, Chairman Kerry has asked that 

the gavel be handed to you, as chairman of the subcommittee, at 

this juncture, and I’m pleased to yield that gavel to you to continue 

the hearing. 

Senator WEBB. All right, I will continue on. Thank you very 

much, Senator Lugar. 

Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you for your service to our country. It’s 

been exceptional, and I appreciate it very much. 

This is an incredibly important position that you have been nominated to, and I have three lines of questioning that I will pursue: 

one is on Taiwan; one is on Iran; and the other is intellectual property issues. 

I cochair the Senate Taiwan Caucus, and I am extremely concerned about the military imbalance in the Taiwan Strait. Successive reports issued by both Taiwanese and U.S. defense authorities 

clearly outline the direct threat faced by Taiwan as a result of China’s unprecedented military buildup. And experts in both our country and in Taiwan have raised concerns that Taiwan is losing the 

qualitative advantage in defense arms that has served as its primary military deterrent against China. To counter this buildup, the 

Taiwanese have sought to modernize their fighter fleet, which I believe, in terms of Taiwan’s defense and deterrent capacity, is in the 

U.S. national security interest, as well as is promoted and compelled by the Taiwan Relations Act. 

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Later today, I’ll be sending a letter to the President, along with 

44 Members of the United States Senate, requesting that the administration accept Taiwan’s letter of request and move quickly to 

notify Congress of the sale of F–16s. 

Could you share with me your view on the question of the military balance in the Taiwan Strait? And do you believe that the 

United States should proceed with the sale of 66 F–16s to Taiwan? 

Secretary LOCKE. Let me first say that the United States remains committed to our one-China policy based on the three joint 

communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act. We believe that the 

cross-strait issues must be resolved peacefully, in a manner that is 

acceptable to the people on both sides of the strait. And the administration will continue to follow the Taiwan Relations Act and make 

available to Taiwan defense articles and services necessary to enable them to have a sufficient self-defense capability. We also believe that China must reduce its military deployments aimed at 

Taiwan. 

Having said that, no decision has been made with respect to further sales of defensive items to Taiwan. That is under review, and 

that is being evaluated by both others within the Defense Department and the State Department. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I expected that formal answer. Let me go 

further, since you are going to be the United States Ambassador 

to China. I understand the one government policy, but you can be 

devoured if you do not have the ability to defend yourself. Is it 

going to be very clear, from your position, should you be confirmed, 

that Taiwan has, within the one China structure, the continuing 

right to exist and to make its own self-determinative efforts there? 

Secretary LOCKE. Well, that is a fundamental part of our oneChina policy, that the United States stands with Taiwan to ensure 

that it can defend itself and that its self-defense capabilities are 

never eroded. 

Senator MENENDEZ. The problem is that Taiwan has been seeking this help since 2006, which precedes this administration. We 

are going to close down the F–16 line, if we do not make this sale, 

leaving Taiwan in a position that is indefensible, at the end of the 

day. And to me, that will only exasperate matters for the oneChina policy. 

So I do hope that, within the administration, you’ll advocate for 

making sure that balance is retained, which ultimately is in our 

collective interest. I mean, it is very rare that we get 44 Members, 

in a bipartisan way, of the U.S. Senate to join together to send a 

message to the administration. 

Second, on Iran, there is a long history of Sino-Iranian relationship and nuclear cooperation. And both parties remain keen on enhancing their political and economic relationships. My concern is 

that the Chinese continue to share sensitive ballistic missile, chemical, and nuclear weapons technology with Iran. 

As a matter of fact, last month, Jane’s Defense Weekly reported 

that the Chinese inaugurated a missile plant in Iran. Given this 

history, what steps will you take, as Ambassador, to address with 

the Chinese Government the serious concerns held by the United 

States, as well as the international community, about its support 

and engagement with Iran? 

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Secretary LOCKE. Well, first of all, we note that China has actually played a very important role in diplomatic efforts to address 

the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program and was instrumental 

in helping craft the U.N. resolution. But we’ve also said that we’re 

very concerned that China and Chinese companies not backfill, especially in the energy sector where other companies from around 

the world are leaving or departing Iran, because we know that, certainly, if other companies from China are engaged in helping develop Iran’s energy sector, that will provide income, which can then 

be used to help develop and further develop Iran’s nuclear capability, and that we very much oppose. 

So we very much believe that China can and must do more. And, 

of course, we have, in the United States, passed our own set of 

sanctions and legislation. And I want to inform you and reiterate 

that on Tuesday, the State Department announced various proliferation-related sanctions against several companies and individuals from around the world, including three Chinese companies 

and one Chinese individual. 

So we take what China is doing and what Chinese companies are 

doing very, very seriously. Any proliferation and additional work by 

Iran on nuclear arms is of paramount importance and of concern 

to the United States. And we believe that China can and must do 

more to not only abide by the U.N. resolution but help enforce it, 

and also to understand the position of the United States, even with 

respect to our sanctions policies. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So you will do that robustly as the Ambassador? 

Secretary LOCKE. Very much so, sir. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Finally, intellectual property infringement—

you have been at the forefront of trying to promote America’s opportunities to send its products and services abroad. But I know 

that you know that the U.S. International Trade Commission just 

released a 332-page report on IPR infringement and its effect on 

U.S. competitiveness. That report suggests that the losses to U.S. 

industry are valued at $48 billion, resulting in over 2 million lost 

jobs. 

When President Hu visited President Obama in early January, 

there were high hopes that the special intellectual property rights 

campaign would yield results, but we haven’t seen any dramatic 

changes in China. One aspect of this issue that hits close to home 

in New Jersey, is the online journal piracy conditions that have not 

improved on the ground—we have a company in New Jersey with 

50,000 workers in the United States and over 3,000 in my home 

State, that consistently finds itself with direct IPR violations where 

Chinese libraries consume the intellectual property rights of its 

medical and other journals. 

Will you vigorously, as our Ambassador, impress and pursue the 

Chinese to seek enforcement of these intellectual property issues, 

both in the online context and in the broader context? 

Secretary LOCKE. That was one of my top priorities as Commerce 

Secretary, and, perhaps, once a Commerce Secretary, always a 

Commerce Secretary. It’s certainly a top priority for the United 

States Government, period. And that includes my work as Ambassador, if I’m confirmed. 

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Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Webb, you can continue to chair. I’m 

here just for a few minutes. I have another meeting to go to, so I 

apologize. I wanted to come back and tell Secretary Locke I wasn’t 

racing away, but we have competing Finance Committee and a couple other things going on. I apologize. 

Senator WEBB [presiding]. All right. 

Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, you certainly have a challenging job in front of 

you. There are lots and lots of different issues, and a lot of them 

have been aired here, and I’m not going to go over all of them. 

But one of the things that is important to me, and I think important to all Senators, and this is particularly true for my service on 

the Intelligence Committee and on this committee, is that the 

United States has a policy of trying to contain both Iran and North 

Korea, and contain their nuclear ambitions. 

And, of course, the only way countries like this can pursue their 

nuclear ambitions is to have very sensitive and highly technical 

materials that they buy from somewhere. And we all know that the 

United States is very diligent in containing the products that are 

produced here from winding up in the hands of either the Iranians 

or the North Koreans. 

Unfortunately, we do find that there are Chinese products that 

wind up there. And China says the right things. It, publicly, takes 

the position that they don’t support that. And yet, it is Chinese 

companies that are doing business through the back door, or the 

black market, or what have you, that do allow certain technological 

equipment to get in the hands of both North Korea and to Iran. 

And so, I want to encourage you, in the strongest terms, to reinforce with the Chinese our concern about that, and how you can’t 

talk about it in one setting and yet turn a blind eye in the other 

setting, as your companies profit from helping arm these particular 

countries. So that’s as much a statement as it is a question, and 

I know you’ve talked about it a little bit, but I’d appreciate, perhaps, if you could enhance your testimony in that regard. 

Secretary LOCKE. Well, again, in both North Korea and in Iran, 

China played a very constructive role in helping pass and formulate the U.N. resolutions——

Senator RISCH. And we appreciate that. 

Secretary LOCKE [continuing]. That imposed sanctions on both 

North Korea and Iran. But it’s important, as you indicated, that 

those obligations be enforced throughout the world. 

And that’s why, for instance, on Tuesday the State Department 

announced proliferation-related sanctions against several companies, including Chinese companies and Chinese individuals, in addition to entities from elsewhere around the world. 

Stopping proliferation is the utmost priority of the United States 

Government, and that includes the Ambassador to China. And we 

need to convey to the Chinese people and to the leaders of China 

that it’s also in their national security interests to avoid proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the nuclear capability of 

both North Korea and Iran, and that whatever commercial benefits 

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some of their companies may obtain by continuing to sell or transfer technology to North Korea or Iran, that the risks and the potential destabilizing order in the world are not outweighed, that peace 

and security for the entire world outweigh any potential commercial advantages gained by few companies or individuals. 

Senator RISCH. And I think that’s an important point to make, 

is that the profits are very modest compared to the harm that can 

be done internationally and overall, by putting these highly sensitive products that have been developed by a very sophisticated 

people into the hands of those who want to use it not for good. So 

I think that’s a very important argument, and I appreciate that. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

Thank you. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Senator Risch. 

Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Do you——

Senator WEBB. I have a follow-on question. I’m acting now in my 

capacity as chair of the East Asia Subcommittee. I know you outrank me. If you want the gavel, you got it, but I’ve still got one 

more question. [Laughter.] 

Senator CARDIN. No, I——

Senator RISCH. Maybe we can have an election over there. You 

know, I can help. [Laughter.] 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that 

very much, Chairman Webb. 

I want to follow up on a couple points that were raised by my 

colleagues. 

And, Secretary Locke, it’s a pleasure to have you here, and I just 

personally want to thank you for your willingness to allow your 

name to come forward for this position. Your background and training is what we need representing our Nation in China. And your 

record in Commerce I think will be very valuable to your role as 

Ambassador. So I thank you, and I thank your family, for your 

willingness to continue in this role. 

I want to follow up on points raised by several of my colleagues 

on commerce issues, starting first with intellectual property. I 

know Senator Menendez just questioned on that. 

I just want to underscore the importance to American manufacturing and to American production that we impress upon the Chinese their international responsibilities on enforcement of intellectual property issues. It’s in the manufactured products; it’s in creative products; it’s in so many different areas that China has been 

a major abuser of allowing products to be manufactured or stolen 

in their country, violating U.S. intellectual property issues. 

I just really wanted to underscore that point. And I heard your 

response to Senator Menendez, and I just want to encourage you 

to make this a very high priority. 

I want to talk a little bit about China as it relates to, also, the 

currency manipulation issue. You and I have had a chance to talk 

about that. But if there is one issue that probably is the most dominant, as far as a level playing field for U.S. manufacturers and producers and farmers, it’s having a level playing field on currency. 

And I would hope that you would make that also a top priority on 

your portfolio. 

228

China has made some progress recently, only because they felt 

it was in their direct economic interest to do that. That seems to 

be the way that they move forward. They don’t do it because of respect for a level playing field. And I would hope that our policy 

would be very clear that they must allow their currency to float, 

reaching its economic balance and not an arbitrary balance. 

Those two, I guess, are my principal economic issues that I would 

hope that you would take forward and move forward on, and I 

would be glad to get your response. 

Secretary LOCKE. Again, intellectual property rights in China remains very problematic. It’s a top priority for the United States 

Government. It was a top priority for me in all of my discussions 

with Chinese officials as Commerce Secretary and even before joining the United States Government, even as a lawyer on behalf of 

U.S. companies helping open markets for U.S. companies in China. 

It will be a top priority for me as Ambassador to China, if confirmed by the Senate. 

And we know that the inability or the lack of China’s currency 

floating and being set by market forces puts American companies 

at a disadvantage and at an unfair position. 

All of our work at the Department of Commerce, which will continue as Ambassador to China, if confirmed, is to ensure that 

American companies have fair and open access to China. And that 

includes nontariff barriers. It includes currency. It includes a level 

playing field. It also includes intellectual property rights, because 

as the recent report that Senator Menendez indicated, U.S. companies are losing tens of billions of dollars because of violations of intellectual property rights. That’s of great concern to us in the 

United States Government and will continue as Ambassador to 

China. 

Senator CARDIN. One final point and that is that China is becoming a more interesting country, as it relates to our policies in the 

Middle East. We’ve seen recent events between Pakistan and 

China indicating that they’re becoming more interested in that region. China, of course, holds one of the permanent seats in the 

United Nations and, obviously, we have to work with China in that 

regard. 

I would just like to get your assessment as to where we think 

we can make advancements in China’s help as it relates to our policies in Iran or Pakistan or Afghanistan, in the region, as to how 

China could be a more constructive partner for the United States. 

Secretary LOCKE. The United States and China actually have collaborated on a whole host of issues, including countering terrorism. 

And, of course, that’s of great interest and of particular importance 

in Afghanistan and Pakistan. And so we share interests in stability 

in that region, and in countering terrorism. 

And we, therefore, are encouraging China, given its alliances 

with, for instance, Pakistan, to do more in the area of countering 

terrorism. And I believe that because Afghanistan and Pakistan 

are so close and part of the region bordering China that they have 

deep interests in ensuring stability in that region as well. 

So we need to really partner with them and urge China to do 

even more in helping promote and using the alliances that they 

have to promote that stability. 

229

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you. I know they since you have 

taken on the position in the Cabinet, you have been living in the 

State of Maryland. We welcome you in Maryland any time. We 

hope that you will come back soon, and we’re very proud of your 

nomination. 

Secretary LOCKE. We’ve been very, very pleased to live in Maryland. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Senator WEBB. As a Senator from Virginia——

[Laughter.] 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. Let me just say, we have pretty nice 

neighborhoods in Virginia as well. 

Senator CARDIN. He made the right choice. 

Secretary LOCKE. Let me just say, it was a tough choice——

[Laughter.] 

Secretary LOCKE [continuing]. No, honestly—between the great 

school systems in Virginia and in Maryland. 

Senator WEBB. The thing I learned in politics is, quit while you 

are ahead. [Laughter.] 

Maryland has good places, too. 

Let me first just say, as a quick follow-on to something Senator 

Cardin said. I mentioned in a hearing about a week ago, when we 

had General Jones, that, in context of what we were discussing a 

little while ago, and then Senator Cardin raising it with the Afghanistan region, we tend to examine and debate the Afghanistan 

situation moving laterally out into Afghanistan to Pakistan, and 

Pakistan to India. But, I believe the movement toward resolution 

in that part of the world could give China a major opportunity to 

demonstrate that it can assume some leadership with a country 

that it has had a special relationship for a long time. And I would 

hope that you would find a way to encourage that. 

I want to ask you a question about the transshipment of arms. 

This is particularly troubling with respect to China’s relationship 

with North Korea, and some allegations that have been made. 

Last week, China blocked the release of a United Nations report 

by a seven-member panel tasked with monitoring sanctions against 

North Korea. The report concludes that North Korea has been exporting missiles and technology in violation of U.N. sanctions, with 

diplomats saying that these shipments were transiting China to 

Iran. 

We have other allegations over the past year or so with respect 

to Burma, Congo, and Burundi. All of them go back to that fact 

that at some places in China there were transshipments, usually 

from North Korea, but not exclusively. 

One commentator a couple days ago said: ‘‘Many analysts argue 

that China is committed to upholding its U.N. obligations, but it 

has a problem of lax export-control enforcement. But while China 

cannot marshal the resources to prevent the transshipment of 

North Korean weapons, it can commit 300,000 Internet police to 

monitor online traffic and stifle free speech.’’

What is the State Department’s policy on this issue, and to what 

degree do you believe it is a priority issue in terms of our future 

relations? 

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Secretary LOCKE. Well, we’re very, very concerned about these allegations of transshipment, and we believe that the reports should 

be released so that there can be greater transparency and scrutiny 

on what is happening by North Korea. 

And getting back to the issue of the region itself, and the special 

relationships that China has developed with several of these countries, we believe that China should use its influence as a source for 

stability and security and prosperity for the entire region. And we 

will be encouraging China to use that special relationship to increase that security and stability of the region. 

That also applies to North Korea. We’re very, very deeply concerned about transshipment of weapons systems material from 

North Korea to other parts of the world. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. Could you provide us with the State 

Department policy on this issue of the transshipment? We’ve had 

some difficulty getting a clear statement from the State Department on transshipment, per se. 

Secretary LOCKE. I will try to do that, sir. 

[The written information from Secretary Locke follows:]

Stopping the transshipment of North Korean weapons is a high-priority issue. The 

United States has strongly urged all member states, including China, to implement 

U.N. Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs), 1718 and 1874 in a full and transparent manner. We have regularly communicated our concerns to the Chinese Government that North Korea may seek to use Chinese airports or seaports to transship items and technology that are banned for transfer to other states under 

UNSCRs 1718 and 1874 and reminded China that UNSCR 1874 calls upon States 

to inspect all cargo to and from North Korea in their territory, including seaports 

and airports, where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains 

items that are banned for sale or transfer under the resolutions. 

We have ample ground for concern that these sorts of transactions have occurred. 

For example, the May 2010 report of Panel of Experts set up to advise the UNSCR 

1718 (North Korea) Sanctions Committee stated that a shipment of T–54/T–55 tank 

parts and other military goods bound for the Republic of Congo and seized by South 

African authorities was transshipped via the port of Dalian in China. 

The United States has urged China to be more vigilant in its enforcement of both 

UNSCR 1718 and UNSCR 1874, as well as its own national export control laws, including through greater scrutiny of North Korean cargoes transshipping via Chinese 

ports. We continue to urge China to inspect North Korean cargoes and, if items prohibited under these UNSCRs are found, to seize and dispose of those items as required by UNSCR 1874. We routinely raise these concerns in our regular dialogues 

with China, and we have also offered to provide technical assistance to Chinese authorities to improve customs and other export control enforcement activities. 

Most recently, during the Dubai Transshipment Conference, Acting Assistant Secretary of State Vann Van Diepen announced a series of 10 best practices that we 

would urge all states, including China, to adopt in order to better regulate the 

transshipment of sensitive items. As China is a key transshipment hub, we will continue to encourage China to adopt these measures and to increase its vigilance 

against North Korea proliferation activities.

Senator WEBB. Thank you. And with respect to your comment, 

and my follow-on to Senator Cardin on Pakistan, I again reiterate 

that I think this is a major opportunity for United States-China relations. If the Chinese were able to step in, given their history with 

Pakistan, to assist in a solution in that part of the world that 

they’re going to benefit from it, quite frankly, with the increased 

stability in the region and their economic interests. It would be a 

great signal to be able to send in terms of cooperation between our 

two countries. 

Senator Risch, did you have a follow-on question? 

Senator RISCH. Thank you very much. 

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Senator WEBB. I am instructed by Chairman Kerry to indicate 

that the hearing record will remain open for 48 hours for any Senator who wishes to make a further statement or ask questions for 

the record. 

Other than that, I, again, would congratulate you on your nomination, and I know what a special thing this must be for your family and also for those who went before you. It was very touching 

to hear about your father during your testimony this morning. And 

I wish you the best of luck. 

And the hearing is now closed. 

Secretary LOCKE. Thank you very much, Senator. 

[Whereupon, at 11:39 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF GARY LOCKE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. North Korea.—North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and longrange ballistic missiles represents a critical test of our ability to work together on 

matters critical to the security of both nations.

• Over the past 2 years, what specifically has China done to help restrain North 

Korea and maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula?

Answer. China is an important partner in regional diplomacy and in maintaining 

regional stability. Given its unique history and relationship with North Korea, 

China is well positioned to use its influence with North Korea. The administration 

has discussed with China on a regular basis the steps it can and should take to reduce provocations by North Korea. In June 2009, China’s vote was critical for the 

adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874, which imposed additional sanctions on North Korea. The United States has called on all members of the U.N. 

Security Council and all U.N. Member States, including China, to fully and transparently implement U.N. sanctions and to urge North Korea to refrain from further 

provocations. 

We have been disappointed by China’s insufficient reaction to provocative and 

irresponsible North Korea behavior in the past, but welcomed the progress made on 

North Korea during the January 2011 summit between President Obama and 

Chinese President Hu Jintao. During the summit President Obama told President 

Hu that North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile program is increasingly a direct 

threat to the security of the United States and our allies and expressed appreciation 

of China’s role in reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, in the 

Joint Statement issued by both countries during President Hu’s visit to Washington 

in January 2011, the United States and China ‘‘expressed concern regarding the 

DPRK’s claimed uranium enrichment program,’’ ‘‘opposed all activities inconsistent 

with the 2005 Joint Statement and relevant international obligations and commitments,’’ and ‘‘called for the necessary steps that would allow for the early resumption of the six-party talks process to address this and other relevant issues.’’ We 

welcome these statements and continue to look to China to take similar and additional positive steps to help maintain stability and prevent provocative actions by 

North Korea.

Question. If confirmed, how would you seek to convince China that its own desire 

for stability on its borders requires it to do more to rein in its unruly neighbor?

Answer. The United States and China share common goals of peace and stability 

on the Korean Peninsula and its denuclearization. We have continually discussed 

with China how it can and should best use its influence with the North, including 

during President Hu’s January 2011 state visit and the recently concluded Strategic 

and Economic Dialogue. During President Hu’s state visit, the United States and 

China emphasized the importance of achieving an improvement in North-South relations and agreed that sincere, constructive inter-Korean dialogue is an essential 

step. The United States and China also expressed concern regarding North Korea’s 

claimed uranium enrichment program. Both sides oppose all activities that are inconsistent with the 2005 Joint Statement and relevant international obligations and 

commitments. We will continue to make North Korea one of the top items on the 

United States-China agenda and to press China to work toward advancing our 

shared goal of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula.

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Question. Does China’s growing economic support for North Korea undercut U.N. 

sanctions designed to put pressure on the government of Kim Jong-il? What is the 

rationale behind China’s investment?

Answer. U.S. officials have repeatedly discussed with Chinese counterparts the 

importance of full and transparent implementation of U.N. Security Council resolutions related to North Korea. Despite a common concern with North Korean nuclear 

activities, China continues to give North Korea a significant role in its regional strategic security calculus. As such, ensuring North Korea does not collapse and maintaining regional stability appear to remain top priorities for Beijing, and China’s ongoing economic aid and investment support those goals. I cannot speak on behalf 

of China, but Chinese officials have stated that they believe North Korea’s economic 

development is a key step toward stabilizing the region.

Question. Role in Afghanistan.—China is playing an active role in Central Asia 

through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, expanding trade and security ties 

with nations that used to be under the shadow of the former Soviet Union. Next 

door in Afghanistan, China has focused on the narrow objective of extracting raw 

materials and minerals, despite the concerted efforts of Special Envoy Holbrooke 

and others to convince the Beijing Government to do more to promote peace and 

sustainable development.

• If confirmed, what steps would you take to encourage China to invest not only 

in Afghanistan’s resources, but also the country’s long-suffering people?

Answer. The administration believes that there is a role for China to play in helping the international community deal with the challenge of peace and stability in 

Afghanistan and in addressing the economic challenges that country faces. We have 

already discussed with the Chinese the importance of generating local employment 

in Afghanistan that creates self-sustaining economic development to replace aid 

with trade. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary’s Representative for 

Afghanistan and Pakistan to promote effective United States-Chinese cooperation in 

the region.

Question. Human Rights.—I am troubled by China’s recent crackdown against dissidents, lawyers, artists, bloggers, and democracy advocates—seemingly anyone who 

dares to criticize the government or question the Communist Party’s supremacy. 

Some dissidents have simply disappeared after being taken into custody by plainclothes security personnel. China’s security services tightly control access to information and the use of the Internet, including new social media. China’s leaders 

seem determined to preempt any move toward a ‘‘Jasmine’’ democracy movement. 

At the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) and the U.S.-China Human Rights 

Dialogue last month, the United States made it clear that China is ‘‘backsliding’’ 

on human rights.

• If confirmed, will you make human rights a clear high-level priority with 

China? What steps will you take to integrate this issue into other aspects of 

this vast relationship such as economics, the environment, and consumer product safety, to name just a few areas?

Answer. Promoting human rights—including freedom of religion, speech, and 

assembly—is a central objective of U.S. diplomatic engagement with China. If confirmed, I will make it a top priority to continue to urge China to uphold its internationally recognized obligations to respect universal human rights, including the 

freedoms of expression, association, assembly, and movement. 

The U.S. Government believes that by adhering more closely to international 

human rights standards, creating greater access to justice, and strengthening rule 

of law, the Chinese Government would help create the conditions necessary for 

greater long-term social stability. To emphasize that message, the administration 

has incorporated human rights into discussions with Chinese officials on a range of 

issues, including economic and environmental issues. If confirmed, I will ensure that 

U.S. human rights concerns are raised regularly, broadly, and at all levels.

Question. What impact do you think the Arab Spring might be having in China? 

What is your assessment of the risk of major social unrest?

Answer. The Arab Spring demonstrates to the world the universal desire for freedom and opportunity. The United States continues to stress to our Chinese counterparts that by adhering more closely to international human rights standards, 

creating greater access to justice, and strengthening rule of law, the Chinese 

Government would help create the conditions necessary for greater long-term social 

stability. 

Our message is simple: A nation must respect its citizens’ fundamental rights, 

just as prosperous modern economies require rule of law, open information flows, 

233

and a vibrant civil society. Expansion of civil and political rights would ultimately 

be a source of stability in Chinese society.

Question. What should the United States do to support greater Internet freedom 

in China? Do you support U.S. Government investments in circumvention technologies? What about broadcasting?

Answer. The U.S. Government remains deeply concerned by China’s efforts to censor the Internet. Last month’s announcement that a new ‘‘State Internet Information Office’’ has been established to direct, coordinate, and supervise online content 

management, as well as to investigate and punish illegal Websites, runs counter to 

our view that Internet freedom is an extension of the freedoms of speech, assembly, 

and expression. 

Governments that use security as a pretext for clamping down on free expression 

are making a mistake. In the long run, they are limiting their political and economic 

development. Censorship is ultimately unsustainable. 

The U.S. Government strongly supports increased freedom of expression in China, 

including on the Internet. As part of our ongoing dialogue with China, we have 

emphasized to the Chinese Government our view on the importance of an open 

Internet. The ability to operate with confidence in cyberspace is critical in a modern 

society and modern economy. 

The administration speaks out clearly and presses China to cease its censorship 

of its people. U.S. officials regularly urge China to respect internationally recognized 

fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, and the human rights of all 

Chinese citizens. The Internet should be available to all, and the administration will 

continue to push China to expand opportunities for its citizens to connect online domestically and globally. 

The State Department supports a number of organizations committed to Internet 

freedom. Enabling access for citizens in closed societies is a priority for the Department.

Question. How will you approach individual cases of political dissidents such as 

Nobel Laureate Liu Xiaobo, respected human rights lawyer, Gao Zhisheng, and artist, Ai Weiwei? What are your views on the case of U.S. geologist, Xue Feng, who 

as you know, has been imprisoned under China’s expansive ‘‘state secrets’’ law?

Answer. The U.S. Government is deeply concerned by the trend of extralegal detentions, arrests, and convictions of lawyers, activists, and other individuals for exercising their internationally recognized human rights. The President and Secretary 

Clinton have specifically called for the release of Liu Xiaobo; U.S. officials have also 

urged the release of other political prisoners in China, including those under house 

arrest and those enduring enforced disappearances, such as Gao Zhisheng. Regarding Ai Weiwei, the United States continues to be deeply concerned by his detention, 

which is inconsistent with China’s commitments to respect the fundamental freedoms and human rights of all Chinese citizens. 

If confirmed, I will continue to press for the individual release of Liu Xiaobo, Gao 

Zhisheng, Ai Weiwei, and other individual prisoner cases of concern. I will also engage with the Chinese people directly to convey the human rights values for which 

America stands. 

The U.S. Government has been closely involved in Dr. Xue’s case since he was 

detained more than 3 years ago. The Embassy has conducted 40 consular visits to 

Dr. Xue to monitor his welfare and deliver messages from his family, with the most 

recent visit on May 19, 2011. If confirmed, the Embassy under my leadership will 

continue to visit Dr. Xue regularly and press China to release him on humanitarian 

grounds and immediately return him to the United States.

Question. Tibet.—A visit to Tibet by staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign 

Relations last year found a mixed picture: Economic development has improved the 

lives of many Tibetans. But they are also often discriminated against in employment 

and economic opportunities. Moreover, economic development is occurring against a 

backdrop of political repression, with intrusive Chinese controls on freedom of 

speech, freedom of association, and freedom of religion. China resists any effort by 

the United States to take an interest in Tibetan affairs. But it seems to me that 

it must be possible for us to find a way to work together on this issue as we do 

on other sensitive matters.

• How can we work with China to ensure that the Tibetan people can enjoy the 

benefits of economic development while protecting their fragile environment and 

preserving their rich culture?

Answer. The administration has not shied away from seeking opportunities to 

raise candidly with China’s leaders our concerns about the poor human rights situaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00241 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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tion in Tibet, while at the same time recognizing there are benefits of economic development in Tibetan areas. If confirmed, I will continue to support further dialogue 

between China and the representatives of the Dalai Lama to resolve concerns and 

differences, including the preservation of the religious, linguistic, and cultural identity of the Tibetan people. 

RESPONSES OF GARY LOCKE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

ADDRESSING POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Question. Prior to your service as Secretary of Commerce, you led the China practice of a major U.S. law firm. What steps do you intend to take to avoid any appearance of favoritism or conflict of interest with respect to former clients of yours if 

confirmed as Ambassador to China?

Answer. If confirmed as U.S. Ambassador to China, I will strictly adhere to all 

ethics requirements and regulations. In all that I do, I will also behave in way that 

this committee, the White House, and the American people expect that I should. 

With regard to my former employer and clients before government service, I resigned from Davis Wright Tremaine LLP in March 2009 when I was confirmed by 

the U.S. Senate to serve as Secretary of Commerce. I severed all connections with 

the firm, financial and otherwise, upon my appointment. 

As Secretary of Commerce, I complied not only with the 1-year regulatory recusal 

period but also with the 2-year recusal period of the President’s ethics pledge during 

which I was prohibited from participating in certain particular matters related to 

my former employers or former clients. If confirmed as U.S. Ambassador to China, 

on an ongoing basis I will continue to recuse myself from any particular matters 

involving the firm or a former client if I believe that to act otherwise would give 

rise to an appearance of partiality or impropriety in the eyes of a reasonable person. 

TRADE AND COMMERCE

Question. As Secretary of Commerce, what is the process by which you have evaluated the effectiveness of the International Trade Administration related to the promotion of U.S. exports?

Answer. The Department of Commerce, particularly the International Trade 

Administration (ITA), has been leading implementation of President Obama’s 

National Export Initiative (NEI). Expanding U.S. exports is important to our 

Nation’s economic recovery and long-term economic growth. 

Exports contributed greatly to growing our economy in 2010, and supported over 

9 million U.S. jobs. U.S. exports of goods and services in 2010 increased nearly 17 

percent over 2009—the largest year-to-year percentage change in over 20 years. 

This puts us on pace to achieve President Obama’s goal of doubling exports by the 

end of 2014. 

ITA supports the NEI by directly working with U.S. companies to expand their 

exports overseas, address trade barriers, and ensure a level playing field for U.S. 

exporters through trade enforcement and compliance. As Chair of the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee, I have also worked to strengthen interagency cooperation between the multiple federal agencies engaged in trade promotion. I am 

pleased to report that the National Export Strategy, which will be delivered to Congress shortly, will include for the first time cross-cutting NEI metrics to better 

evaluate the Federal Government’s efforts as a whole to expand U.S. exports. 

The reality is that only 1 percent of U.S. companies are currently exporting and, 

of that 1 percent, 58 percent are exporting to one overseas market only. As Secretary of Commerce, I directed ITA to focus their efforts on helping this 58 percent—typically small- and medium-sized companies—export to additional countries. 

ITA’s effectiveness is measured by the Government Performance Results Act, 

which includes the priority goal of increasing the number of small- and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs) that ITA assists in exporting to a second or additional 

country by 40 percent from 2009 to 2011. In addition to these measures, I receive 

quarterly updates on the effectiveness of our core trade promotion programs-trade 

missions, the International Buyer Program, and advocacy.

Followup Question. How did you evaluate how effectively ITA promoted U.S. 

exports?

Followup Answer. Working with ITA, I set annual goals and received quarterly 

updates on the effectiveness of our core trade promotion programs-trade missions 

(including the number of participants and value of exports), the International Buyer 

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Program (including the number of foreign buyers recruited to the United States and 

the number of U.S. companies participating in matchmaking activities with foreign 

buyers and value of U.S. exports facilitated), and advocacy (focused on the value of 

U.S. export content facilitated through government-led advocacy on behalf of U.S. 

companies competing for foreign procurements). Results from these evaluations are 

discussed in my original response to your third question for the record. 

In addition, to promote U.S. exports to China, it was the first country on my May 

2010 clean energy trade mission, the first cabinet-level trade mission of the Administration. On a trade mission, I act as a force multiplier for ITA’s efficacy as an 

export promotion agency.

Question. According to the evaluation process, what are the strong points of 

present U.S. trade promotion efforts through the Commerce Department and what 

are areas where additional attention should be focused?

Answer. ITA continues to deliver high-value export promotion services and counseling to U.S. businesses, allowing them to take advantage of the 95 percent of consumers located outside the United States. Businesses often report that ITA’s global 

footprint is important to ITA’s effectiveness in ensuring access to overseas markets 

and proximity to local U.S. companies. ITA is located in 108 offices in the United 

States and over 125 offices in over 75 countries. 

During calendar year 2010, ITA helped over 5,500 U.S. companies export for the 

first time or expand their exports overseas, 85 percent of which were SMEs. ITA’s 

Advocacy Center, which helps level the playing field for U.S. companies competing 

for foreign government procurement contracts, was particularly successful. In 2010, 

the Advocacy Center helped U.S. companies export $18.7 billion of U.S. content 

overseas, a 212-percent increase over 2009. ITA’s International Buyer Program also 

performed well, recruiting nearly 13,000 foreign buyers to attend trade shows in the 

United States, a 43-percent increase over 2009 resulting in sales by U.S. companies 

of $818 million. This program is particularly important for small- and medium-sized 

companies who are export-capable, but do not have the resources to travel overseas 

to connect with foreign buyers. 

While our trade missions team had a strong year recruiting over 400 companies 

to participate in 35 trade missions, the value of export successes achieved fell short 

of our goal. To address this issue, I have asked the team to increase the followup 

they do with participating U.S. companies to better understand and evaluate our 

services. 

To maximize limited resources to assist U.S. companies to expand their exports 

and create jobs here at home, the Department of Commerce is focusing on 

leveraging technology and expanding partnerships. Export.gov is the Federal Government’s Website to provide U.S. companies access to all export information from 

market research and export financing to addressing issues of intellectual property 

rights protection and understanding foreign regulations. While I am proud of some 

initial steps we have taken to ensure that information is more accessible and userfriendly, additional focus on strengthening and customizing content will help the 

Department of Commerce deliver relevant information to U.S. companies seeking to 

export. Similarly, additional attention to expanding and strengthening our partnerships with state and local governments, trade associations, and the private sector 

will help ensure that more U.S. companies can compete and win in the global 

marketplace.

Question. What specific steps will be included in your efforts to double U.S. exports to China as part of President Obama’s initiative? What is the base line export 

figure (and date of its issuance), used by the Department of Commerce which must 

be doubled to meet the President’s initiative as relates to China?

Answer. We are actively engaged in helping U.S. exporters to China through advocacy, commercial diplomacy, policy discussions, and trade promotion. We participate with China in the Strategic & Economic Dialogue (S&ED) and Cochair the 

Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT). Our policy efforts aim to open 

China’s market to U.S. exports and reduce the incidence of intellectual property 

rights infringement. In the United States, we work closely with State and local partners and support trade missions hosted by the Department of Commerce’s commercial section in the U.S. Embassy in China. In China we also recruit delegations of 

buyers to attend major trade shows held in the United States. We also work with 

other Department of Commerce units, such as the Patent and Trademark Office 

(PTO), which are colocated in the commercial section. 

Ensuring that U.S. companies and workers have the opportunity to compete on 

a level playing field is critical to advancing business competitiveness in the United 

States and abroad, and is a key component of the NEI. The goal of the NEI is to 

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double the annual value of U.S. exports of goods and services from the baseline level 

of $1.57 trillion in calendar year 2009 to $3.14 trillion in calendar year 2014. The 

baseline number comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ estimate of Trade 

in Goods and Services available at: http://bea.gov/international/index.htm#trade. In 

2010, exports to China rose nearly 32 percent, almost double the rate of increase 

for the rest of the world. As a result of last year’s strong performance by U.S. exporters, we are on track to meet the goal of doubling exports. 

Accordingly, a key focus of our efforts in the Department of Commerce is strong 

enforcement of our unfair trade laws. Foreign government subsidies can also have 

a debilitating effect on U.S. exporters’ competitiveness abroad. ITA’s subsidies enforcement activities help prevent or remedy the harm that foreign government subsidies cause to U.S. businesses and workers. The Department of Commerce also regularly advocates on behalf of U.S. exporters that are subject to foreign trade remedy 

(antidumping, countervailing duty, or safeguard) actions, in part by ensuring that 

the nations that pursue these actions do so in accordance with their WTO 

commitments.

Question. As Commerce Secretary, you are most familiar with intellectual property right challenges for U.S. companies in China. What specific lessons have you 

learned which will assist in improving the IPR situation with China?

Answer. During my tenure at the Department of Commerce, I believe that our 

progress on IPR issues has come from persistence and consistent pressure. On key 

issues, such as software legalization, we have made progress by consistently raising 

the issue at every opportunity, including this year’s S&ED, President Hu’s state 

visit, and at the JCCT. Apart from these high-level bilateral engagements, we maintain consistent pressure through the work of the International Trade Administration 

and U.S. Patent and Tradmark Office. ITA maintains a Website that provides live 

and archived webinars on important Chinese IPR issues affecting U.S. businesses 

and a China specific toolkit. PTO has two IPR attache ́s stationed in China, with a 

third on their way. Additionally, the JCCT IPR Working Group, cochaired by PTO, 

regularly discusses IPR challenges with the Chinese Government.

Question. What progress in China, if any have you observed in the areas of data 

protection and counterfeiting?

Answer. The Department of Commerce has been actively engaged in addressing 

counterfeit medicines and pharmaceutical data protection with the China State Food 

and Drug Administration (SFDA) and other ministries under the U.S.-China JCCT. 

The United States continues to advocate for effective pharmaceutical data protection in bilateral discussions with China under the JCCT. Over the past few years, 

China has increased its engagement in these discussions. In September 2009, the 

Department of Commerce and SFDA organized a workshop on pharmaceutical data 

protection to exchange views and information on how China and several other trading partners, including the EU, Japan, and the United States, protect pharmaceutical data against unfair commercial use. SFDA recently commissioned a study 

and is expected to amend Chinese data protection regulations in the coming years. 

As part of its JCCT commitments, China agreed to hold further discussions on pharmaceutical data protection in 2011. The Department of Commerce is working with 

other agencies and industry to advance progress on improving the data protection 

system in China. 

Although much remains to be done, China has made some progress in addressing 

the production, distribution, and export of counterfeit medicines. In 2009, China set 

up the Interagency Coordination Conference for Fighting the Production and Sale 

of Counterfeit Drugs (ICC) comprised of 13 Chinese ministries. Surveillance of counterfeit pharmaceutical ingredients sold on the Internet and advertised at trade 

shows has been elevated. In 2009, SFDA and the Public Safety Bureau reported concluding over 20 major counterfeiting cases with seized goods valued at over 250,000 

RMB (US$38,600) and 231 suspects apprehended. China has increased penalties 

and punishment for counterfeiting and begun exposing persons or organizations involved in counterfeit medicines activities in the media. SFDA has also set up a 

Counterfeit Medicines Complaint Center, which is expected to be fully operational 

this summer. In addition, China has increased its technical capacity for detecting 

counterfeits, such as investing in mobile drug detection laboratories.

Question. How are China’s restrictions on the Internet affecting the operation of 

U.S. business related to China?

Answer. U.S. companies have reported to the Department of Commerce a number 

of restrictions on the Internet that affect their business operations in China, including Website blocking and mandatory installation of Internet filtering software. 

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A number of U.S. companies have reported that their Websites are inaccessible 

to Web users from within China, and they are frustrated by the loss of potential 

online business. Google, for instance, reported experiencing technical blocking of access to an entire Website service (e.g., search engine, online store). In July 2010, 

Google announced that the Beijing Government had renewed its license to operate 

a Website in mainland China, allowing them to offer products that do not require 

any censorship. Under the new arrangement, Google users on the Chinese mainland 

must deliberately click on a link to the Hong Kong search engine in order to access 

the uncensored Hong Kong domain. The U.S. Government will continue its efforts 

to engage the Chinese Government to allow U.S. companies to compete effectively 

in China’s growing online service market. 

In June 2009, the U.S. information technology industry raised concerns regarding 

the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology’s Circular 226, mandating all 

computers sold in China be preinstalled with Green Dam Internet filtering software 

as of July 1. Industry reported on the software’s numerous technical problems as 

well as the adverse competitive impact of the technology mandate. Mandating the 

software risked the loss of billions of dollars of immediate and future revenue to 

U.S. computer manufacturers, because the technically flawed Green Dam software 

would have led to computer crashes, including screen blackouts, and sullied the reputation of major U.S. brands. After a 3-week period of escalating high-level U.S. 

Government engagement with China, MIIT indefinitely postponed the implementation of Circular 226.

Question. The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 was established to protect trade 

secrets including proprietary information of U.S. companies. Based upon your tenure as Commerce Secretary would you recommend changes to the original legislation to enhance its intended effectiveness?

Answer. As Commerce Secretary I am committed to protecting the U.S. economic 

sector, including U.S. businesses working in China, and to ensuring that the United 

States has implemented the strongest possible safeguards to prevent economic espionage. If confirmed, I will work diligently with my staff at the Embassy to ensure 

that everything possible is being done in this important area. It is most important 

that we use all the tools at our disposal to prevent economic espionage, including 

those set forth in the Economic Espionage Act. I defer to the Department of Justice, 

which can conduct prosecutions under the act, as to whether or not the act could 

be changed to enhance its intended effectiveness.

Question. What are the primary sector targets of economic espionage originating 

in China directed at U.S. business and industry?

Answer. Foreign collectors continued to target a wide variety of unclassified and 

classified information and technologies in a range of sectors. With regard to China, 

the FBI has reported that in 2010 they prosecuted more Chinese espionage cases 

than at any time in our Nation’s history. 

Today, foreign intelligence services, criminals, and private sector spies are focused 

on American industry and the private sector. Their efforts compromise intellectual 

property, trade secrets, and technological developments that are critical to national 

security. If confirmed, I will work diligently with my staff at the Embassy to ensure 

that we use all the tools at our disposal to prevent economic espionage.

Question. It is essential that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) contain strong 

intellectual property provisions, including those in the pharmaceutical area. As you 

know, the TPP will be viewed as a model on IP by some countries. Have you had 

opportunity as Commerce Secretary to provide input on this topic to U.S. officials 

involved with the TPP discussions?

Answer. The Department has provided and continues to provide input on the intellectual property provisions of the TPP, including providing expert technical advice 

to the U.S. Trade Representative, who is the lead negotiator.

Question. On May 10, 2011, in closing remarks made after the conclusion of the 

2011 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue with Secretaries Clinton and 

Geithner, Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan stated ‘‘The United States commits 

to accord China fair treatment in a reform of its export control regime, [and] relax 

high-tech exports control towards China [.]’’

• What specific commitments have been made by the administration to the PRC 

and in connection with which technologies under the accord announced by Vice 

Premier Wang?

Answer. In the U.S.-China S&ED Economic Track Joint Outcomes Document, the 

United States and China agreed to the following statement: ‘‘The United States 

commits to give full consideration to China’s request that it be treated fairly as the 

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United States reforms its export control system. The United States will continue 

discussions, including technical discussions, on the export control status of designated parts, components, and other items of interest. Both sides agree to work 

through the U.S.-China High Technology Working Group (HTWG) to actively implement the Action Plan for U.S.-China High Technology Trade in Key Sectors 

Cooperation, hold U.S.-China fora on high-tech trade on a regular basis, and discuss 

high-tech and strategic trade cooperation through the HTWG.’’

The United States has not committed to relax high-tech export controls toward 

China, nor has the United States made any other commitments beyond those in the 

Joint Outcomes Document.

• What specific commitments have been made by the administration to the PRC 

and in connection with which technologies under the accord announced by Vice 

Premier Wang? How does the administration’s export control reform initiative 

take into account existing and future risks of diversion of U.S. technology and 

data to Chinese military end uses, particularly in space-related technologies, to 

include each of the following:

Æ (a) Chinese development of counter-space systems, including anti-satellite 

weapons (ASAT); Æ (b) Chinese development of area-denial weapons; Æ (c) Chinese development of offensive space capabilities; Æ (d) Chinese development of improved capabilities to limit or prevent the use 

of U.S. space-based assets during times of crisis or conflict; Æ (e) Enhanced Chinese C4ISR, including space-based sensors, which could 

enable Beijing to identify, track, and target military activities deep into the 

western Pacific Ocean.

Answer. In the U.S.-China S&ED Economic Track Joint Outcomes Document, the 

United States and China agreed to the following statement: ‘‘The United States 

commits to give full consideration to China’s request that it be treated fairly as the 

United States reforms its export control system. The United States will continue 

discussions, including technical discussions, on the export control status of designated parts, components, and other items of interest. Both sides agree to work 

through the U.S.-China High Technology Working Group (HTWG) to actively implement the Action Plan for U.S.-China High Technology Trade in Key Sectors 

Cooperation, hold U.S.-China fora on high-tech trade on a regular basis, and discuss 

high-tech and strategic trade cooperation through the HTWG. 

The United States has not committed to relax high-tech export controls toward 

China, nor has the United States made any other commitments beyond those in the 

Joint Outcomes Document. 

HUMAN RIGHTS

Question. China continues to imprison Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo and 

harass his wife. Former colleagues have been arrested. Human rights lawyer Gao 

Zhisheng has also been detained. These are only two of so many individuals who 

disappeared or been detained. Likewise, China has the dubious distinction of being 

tied with Iran for the number of journalists imprisoned.

Answer. I am deeply concerned by the trend of extralegal detentions, arrests, and 

convictions of lawyers, activists, and other individuals for exercising their internationally recognized human rights. President Obama and Secretary Clinton have 

specifically called for the release of Liu Xiaobo; the administration has also urged 

the release of other political prisoners in China, including those under house arrest 

and those enduring enforced disappearances, such as Gao Zhisheng. Chinese Government actions against family members and associates of activists are also very 

troubling. The State Department remains concerned that Liu Xiaobo’s wife, Liu Xia, 

is being confined to her home in Beijing and her movements are being restricted. 

The Department has called on the Chinese Government to respect her rights, in accordance with Chinese law and international norms, and to allow her to move freely 

without harassment. 

The Department of State has urged China to respect internationally recognized 

conventions that guarantee freedom of the press and freedom of expression and has 

called for the rights of journalists to report in China to be respected and protected. 

If confirmed as Ambassador, I will continue to press the Chinese Government on 

these issues and to urge China to respect the universal right to freedom of expression and to freedom of association and assembly.

Question. Religious leaders are routinely detained and services disrupted by security forces. Internet freedom activists and even ordinary citizens find themselves 

jailed for even the most innocuous statements regarding their government. With all 

239

of this, which cases will you be placing as a priority and how will you raise them 

with the Chinese Government? It has not been uncommon in the past for U.S. Ambassadors to publicly stand with dissidents living under repressive regimes. If confirmed, do you view yourself as having a similar role in China?

Answer. Promoting human rights—including freedom of religion, expression, and 

assembly—is a central objective of our diplomatic engagement with China. The U.S. 

Government’s priority is to ensure that China respects the rights of all of its citizens 

in accordance with its own constitution and international norms. Our message is 

simple: a nation must respect its citizens’ fundamental rights, just as prosperous 

modern economies require rule of law, open information flows, and a vibrant civil 

society. Expansion of civil and political rights would ultimately be a source of stability in Chinese society. If confirmed as Ambassador, one of my key roles would 

be that of a spokesman for America and America’s values, including the freedoms 

that are the foundation of our great Nation. I will raise human rights at every 

opportunity and continue to raise specific cases with Chinese officials. I will also 

support and promote our human rights agenda in the many dialogues we maintain 

with China, such as the Human Rights Dialogue and the Strategic and Economic 

Dialogue.

Question. Xue Feng is an American businessman unjustly convicted of trafficking 

in state secrets. His case has been repeatedly raised by senior administration officials, including the President, and by many Members of Congress, to no avail. Your 

predecessor, Ambassador Huntsman, made it a practice for either he or his Deputy 

Chief of Mission to pay monthly visits to Xue.

• If confirmed will you continue this practice? What other steps will you take to 

make sure Mr. Xue is released and returned to his family in Houston at the 

earliest possible date?

Answer. The U.S. Government has been closely involved in Dr. Xue’s case since 

he was detained more than 3 years ago. We have no higher priority than the protection of American citizens’ rights. The Embassy has conducted 40 consular visits to 

Dr. Xue to monitor his welfare and deliver messages from his family, including the 

most recent visit of May 19, 2011. If confirmed, I will ensure that Embassy officials 

continue to visit Dr. Xue regularly and will press China to release him on humanitarian grounds and immediately return him to the United States.

Question. The United States and China have been holding human rights dialogues 

since 1991. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has shown itself to be increasingly 

unwilling to discuss cases of individuals jailed for the nonviolent expression of their 

political and religious beliefs. The Ministry has also refused to provide information 

on them, insisting that the cases like those of Liu Xiabao and detained artist Ai 

Weiwei ‘‘have nothing to do with human rights.’’

• If in fact China is unwilling to address our concerns over what is happening 

to these people do you favor continuing the policy of holding human rights dialogues with China? Are you concerned that by continuing this policy we are providing cover to the Chinese Government in its relentless crackdown on activists, 

journalists, artists, lawyers, and worshipers in house churches?

Answer. Promoting human rights is a central objective of our diplomatic engagement with China. We used the most recent Human Rights Dialogue to express our 

deep concerns about the deteriorating human rights situation in China, press for 

systemic changes, and raise individual cases. Although I am concerned about China’s crackdown and the recent escalation in human rights cases, I also favor continuing our human rights dialogues. These dialogues provide the U.S. Government 

with an opportunity to engage in an in-depth dialogue on key human rights issues 

with a large number of Chinese ministries. This provides an important opportunity 

to advocate that China adhere to international human rights standards, create 

greater access to justice, and strengthen rule of law in order to create the conditions 

necessary for greater long-term social stability. But this is just one forum in which 

we raise our concerns over human rights. The U.S. Government raises such concerns regularly and at high levels. For example, the Secretary and Vice-President 

Biden also raised our human rights concerns at the Strategic and Economic Dialogue in May 2011.

Question. Since October 2010, a Protestant house church leader, Fan Yafeng and 

his family have been subjected to house arrest while being denied access to legal 

counsel. Have U.S. officials expressed concern to Chinese authorities about this 

case? What is their response?

Answer. The Department of State and Embassy Beijing are well aware of the case 

of Dr. Fan, and many others who, like him, have been subjected to extrajudicial 

240

punishments for exercising their universal rights. U.S. officials regularly raise our 

concerns about these cases with our counterparts, both in Beijing and in Washington. Unfortunately, to date, the Department has not received satisfactory answers from our interlocutors regarding the reasons or legal basis for these actions.

Question. In addition to Falun Gong and Christian practitioners in China, what 

are other groups, organizations or religions that are targeted by the Government of 

China for ongoing harassment and persecution?

Answer. There are several known groups of religious practitioners that are subject 

to official harassment based on their beliefs. These include several groups that, like 

Falun Gong, are designated ‘‘illegal’’ by the Chinese Government, including the 

Guan Yin (also known as Guanyin Famin or the Way of the Goddess of Mercy) and 

the Zhong Gong (a qigong exercise discipline). The government also considers several Protestant Christian groups to be ‘‘evil cults,’’ including the ‘‘Shouters,’’ Eastern 

Lightning, the Society of Disciples (Mentu Hui), Full Scope Church, Spirit Sect, New 

Testament Church, Three Grades of Servants (or San Ban Pu Ren), Association of 

Disciples, Lord God Sect, Established King Church, Unification Church, Family of 

Love, and the South China Church. If confirmed, I will continue to urge the Chinese 

Government to respect its citizens’ right to religious freedom. In the Xinjiang 

Uighur Autonomous Region and Tibetan areas, government authorities conflate separatism and religious extremism with peaceful religious practice and place severe 

religious restrictions on Uighur Muslims and Tibetan Buddhists. We express our 

concerns that these restrictions are unacceptable, alienating, and have a destabilizing effect.

Question. Chinese authorities continue to use the children and grandchildren of 

Rebiya Kadeer as pawns in an effort to silence her criticism for their continuing persecution of the Uyghur people. Chinese authorities cut off her family phone lines 

so she can no longer contact her children and grandchildren who are not in prison. 

Ms. Kadeer also believes she is under active surveillance of the Chinese Government in the United States.

• Will you press within the State Department for high-level engagement with 

Rebiya Kadeer and would you make raising the cases of her sons a priority in 

your engagement with the Chinese Government?

Answer. Department of State officials regularly hold meetings with individuals 

whose work supports enhanced freedom of expression, expansion of civil society, and 

democratic development, including Ms. Kadeer. The State Department continues to 

raise the cases of Ms. Kadeer’s two incarcerated sons, most recently at the U.S.-

China Human Rights Dialogue in April 2011. If confirmed, I will raise these cases 

and other cases of prisoners of conscience. 

NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES

Question. In the past, North Korean refugees have approached U.S. Government 

facilities in China, seeking asylum, protection, or resettlement to the United States. 

If confirmed, what will be your instructions to all U.S. officials in China should they 

be approached by North Koreans seeking assistance? What is the guidance? Will you 

issue any other instructions?

Answer. The Department of State annually issues formal guidance to all overseas 

posts regarding individuals presenting themselves at a U.S. Government facility 

seeking asylum. The Department has also issued specific guidance for North Korean 

asylum seekers; this guidance is regularly updated and reissued to all relevant 

posts. I have been briefed by the Department’s experts on the situation of North 

Korean refugees in China, on the Department’s guidance on handling North Korean 

asylum seekers, and on the role of Mission China as it pertains to these issues. If 

confirmed, I will ensure that all Mission China employees are aware of this guidance and follow it carefully. If confirmed, I will also review the guidance with my 

staff upon arrival in China. I would be happy to ask the Department to schedule 

a classified briefing for you or your staff on the details of the guidance.

Question. What will be your recommendations to officials of U.S.-related nongovernment interests in China; e.g., schools or corporations in the event they are 

approached by North Korean refugees seeking assistance? What is the guidance? 

What would you say to Americans (a U.S. company, for instance) in China if NK 

refugees seek assistance from them?

Answer. The Department of State annually issues guidance to all overseas posts 

regarding individuals presenting themselves at a U.S. Government facility seeking 

asylum. The Department has also issued specific guidance for North Korean asylum 

seekers; this guidance includes provisions for U.S.-related nongovernment property. 

241

I have been briefed by the Department’s experts on the situation of North Korean 

refugees in China, on the Department’s guidance on handling North Korean asylum 

seekers, and on the role of Mission China as it pertains to these issues. If confirmed, 

I will ensure that all Mission China employees are aware of this guidance and follow it carefully. If confirmed, I will also review the guidance with my staff upon 

arrival, including how Mission China works with nonofficial Americans and American institutions on these sensitive issues. I would be happy to ask the Department 

to schedule a classified briefing for you or your staff on the details of the guidance.

Question. Chinese officials have rejected a recommendation to allow the United 

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to establish an operation within 

China to receive North Korean refugees for resettlement to a third country. Will you 

encourage Chinese officials to allow UNHCR to establish a presence within their 

country for this purpose?

Answer. China is one of the only Asian parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention 

and its 1967 Protocol. We encourage China to fulfill its obligations under the Convention and to cooperate with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 

and enable it to exercise its mandate without undue interference. We urge the Chinese Government to uphold the principles of international protection and to allow 

UNHCR to exercise its mandate fully, and free from government influence or pressure. We will continue to support efforts by the UNHCR to establish a presence in 

China, especially in the northeastern provinces. 

UNITED STATES-CHINA PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Question. As mentioned earlier, I remain deeply concerned by the Chinese Government’s refusal to allow us to open more American Centers in China while they 

have more than 70 ‘‘Confucius Centers’’ here. Why have U.S. officials not pressed 

the Chinese more on allowing equal consideration?

Answer. The State Department also shares your concern about the obstacles we 

face in establishing American cultural centers in China. The barriers to the establishment of ‘‘American Corners’’ at public and university libraries—which the 

United States enjoys in almost every other country in the world—have effectively 

prevented us from similar operations in China. There are, however, alternative 

methods of creating places for Chinese audiences to learn about the United States 

and several options are being vigorously pursued. Recently, a number of U.S. universities such as Arizona State University, New York University, and University of 

Southern California, have entered into partnerships with Chinese universities to establish university-sponsored American cultural centers on Chinese campuses. This 

is an encouraging trend. The Department hopes to see the establishment of additional American cultural centers in China. 

Discouraging Confucius Institutes in the United States would not lead to progress 

on our own cultural spaces in China. Confucius Institutes are the result of agreements between the Hanban, a quasi-private entity with close ties to the Chinese 

Ministry of Education, and individual U.S. universities and answer a growing demand from Americans to learn Chinese.

Question. Please provide a list, by all State-owned news outlets, of the number 

of journalists working for state media presently accredited to work in the United 

States. Please identify in which city or media market they are working. How many 

Voice of America and Radio Free Asia reporters have the Chinese Government 

granted visas to and where do they work?

Answer. A total of 209 accredited Chinese journalists have voluntarily registered 

with the State Department’s Foreign Press Centers in Washington, DC, New York, 

and Los Angeles. There are 101 registered in New York, 89 in Washington, and 19 

in Los Angeles. Because registration with the Foreign Press Center is voluntary, the 

list is not necessarily exhaustive for the entire United States. 

Voice of America currently has two fully accredited journalists working in Beijing: 

one from VOA Mandarin and one from VOA’s news room. There are no RFA journalists accredited to work inside China. Most of the major privately owned U.S. and 

international media organizations have correspondents accredited to work in China; 

we estimate that there are 200 correspondents and producers in China. We have 

raised our concerns regarding the VOA’s difficulty in obtaining visas with the Chinese, and intend to continue doing so in the future. 

The following is a list of accredited Chinese journalists by media outlet.

242

Accredited Chinese Journalists by Media Outlet Registered with the Foreign Press Centers 

Organization Media type 

New York: 

1. 21st Century Business Herald ................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

2. 21st Century Business Herald ................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

3. Beijing Review ............................................................................................................................ MAGAZINE 

4. Beijing Review ............................................................................................................................ MAGAZINE 

5. Beijing Review Magazine ........................................................................................................... MAGAZINE 

6. Caijing Magazine ....................................................................................................................... MAGAZINE 

7. CCTV ........................................................................................................................................... TV 

8. China Business News ................................................................................................................ NEWSPAPER 

9. China Central Television ............................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

10. China Central Television (CCTV) .............................................................................................. TV 

11. China Central Television (CCTV) .............................................................................................. TV 

12. China Central TV ...................................................................................................................... TV 

13. China Daily ............................................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

14. China Daily USA ....................................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

15. China Economic Daily .............................................................................................................. NEWSPAPER 

16. China News Service ................................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

17. China News Service ................................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

18. China News Service ................................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

19. China News Service ................................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

20. China News Service ................................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

21. China News Service ................................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

22. China Radio International ........................................................................................................ RADIO 

23. Economic Daily ......................................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

24. Economic Daily ......................................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

25. Jiefang Daily ............................................................................................................................. NEWSPAPER 

26. Jiefang Daily ............................................................................................................................. NEWSPAPER 

27. New Tang Dynasty .................................................................................................................... TV 

28. People’s Daily ........................................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

29. People’s Daily ........................................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

30. People’s Daily ........................................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

31. People’s Daily ........................................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

32. Phoenix Satellite Television (US) Inc. ...................................................................................... TV 

33. Science & Technology Daily ..................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

34. Shanghai Oriental Morning Post .............................................................................................. NEWSPAPER 

35. Sina .......................................................................................................................................... WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

36. Sing Tao Chinese Radio/Daily .................................................................................................. NEWSPAPER 

37. South China Morning Post ....................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

38. Wen Hui Daily ........................................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

39. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

40. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

41. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

42. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

43. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

44. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ NEWSPAPER 

45. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

46. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

47. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

48. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

49. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

50. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

51. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

52. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

53. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

54. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

55. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

56. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

57. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

58. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

59. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

60. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

61. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

62. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

63. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

243

Accredited Chinese Journalists by Media Outlet Registered with the Foreign Press Centers—

Continued

Organization Media type 

64. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

65. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

66. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

67. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

68. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

69. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

70. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

71. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

72. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

73. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

74. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

75. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

76. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

77. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

78. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

79. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

80. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

81. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

82. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

83. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

84. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

85. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

86. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

87. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

88. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

89. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

90. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

91. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

92. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

93. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

94. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

95. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

96. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

97. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

98. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

99. Xinhua News Agency ................................................................................................................ WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

100. Xinhua News Agency .............................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

101. Xinhua News Agency .............................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY

Los Angeles: 

102. Caijing Magazine ................................................................................................................... MAGAZINE 

103. China Central Television (CCTV) ............................................................................................ TV 

104. China News Service ............................................................................................................... WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

105. China News Service ............................................................................................................... WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

106. China Television Company (CTV) ........................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

107. Economic Daily ....................................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

108. Geo TV .................................................................................................................................... TV 

109. People’s Daily ......................................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

110. People’s Daily / Global Times ................................................................................................ NEWSPAPER 

111. Sing Tao Daily ........................................................................................................................ NEWSPAPER 

112. The China Press ..................................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

113. TTV - Taiwan Television ......................................................................................................... TV 

114. TVBS ....................................................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

115. TVBS; Radio Free Asia ........................................................................................................... TV 

116. Xin Min Evening News ........................................................................................................... NOT DETERMINED 

117. Xin Min Evening News ........................................................................................................... NOT DETERMINED 

118. Xinhua News Agency .............................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

119. Xinhua News Agency .............................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

120. Xinhua News Agency .............................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY

District of Columbia: 

121. 21st Century Business Herald ............................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

122. 21st Century Business Herald ............................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

123. Beijing Daily ........................................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

244

Accredited Chinese Journalists by Media Outlet Registered with the Foreign Press Centers—

Continued

Organization Media type 

124. Beijing Youth Daily ................................................................................................................ NEWSPAPER 

125. Caixin Media .......................................................................................................................... MAGAZINE 

126. Caixin Media .......................................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

127. China Business News ............................................................................................................ NEWSPAPER 

128. China Central Television (CCTV) ............................................................................................ TV 

129. China Central Television (CCTV) ............................................................................................ TV 

130. China Central Television (CCTV) ............................................................................................ TV 

131. China Central Television (CCTV) ............................................................................................ TV 

132. China Central Television (CCTV) ............................................................................................ RADIO 

133. China Central Television (CCTV) ............................................................................................ TV 

134. China Central Television (CCTV) ............................................................................................ TV 

135. China Central Television (CCTV) ............................................................................................ TV 

136. China Central Television (CCTV) ............................................................................................ TV 

137. China Central Television (CCTV) ............................................................................................ TV 

138. China Central Television (CCTV) ............................................................................................ TV 

139. China Central Television (CCTV) ............................................................................................ TV 

140. China Central Television (CCTV) ............................................................................................ TV 

141. China Central Television (CCTV) ............................................................................................ TV 

142. China Central Television (CCTV) ............................................................................................ TV 

143. China Central Television (CCTV) ............................................................................................ TV 

144. China Central Television (CCTV) ............................................................................................ TV 

145. China Central Television (CCTV) ............................................................................................ TV 

146. China Central Television (CCTV) ............................................................................................ TV 

147. China Central Television (CCTV) ............................................................................................ TV 

148. China Central Television (CCTV) ............................................................................................ TV 

149. China Central Television (CCTV) ............................................................................................ TV 

150. China Central TV America ..................................................................................................... TV 

151. China Central TV America ..................................................................................................... TV 

152. China Central TV America ..................................................................................................... TV 

153. China Daily ............................................................................................................................. NEWSPAPER 

154. China Daily ............................................................................................................................. NEWSPAPER 

155. China Daily ............................................................................................................................. NEWSPAPER 

156. China News Service ............................................................................................................... WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

157. China News Service ............................................................................................................... WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

158. China Radio International ...................................................................................................... RADIO 

159. China Radio International ...................................................................................................... RADIO 

160. China Radio International ...................................................................................................... RADIO 

161. China Radio International (CRI) ............................................................................................ RADIO 

162. China Youth Daily .................................................................................................................. NEWSPAPER 

163. China Youth Daily .................................................................................................................. NEWSPAPER 

164. China Youth Daily .................................................................................................................. NEWSPAPER 

165. Economic Daily ....................................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

166. Feature Story News (FSN) ...................................................................................................... TV 

167. Global Times .......................................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

168. Guang Ming Daily .................................................................................................................. NEWSPAPER 

169. Guang Ming Daily .................................................................................................................. NEWSPAPER 

170. Humphrey Fellow .................................................................................................................... MAGAZINE 

171. Legal Daily ............................................................................................................................. NEWSPAPER 

172. Legal Daily ............................................................................................................................. NEWSPAPER 

173. Liberation Daily ...................................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

174. People’s Daily ......................................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

175. People’s Daily ......................................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

176. People’s Daily ......................................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

177. People’s Daily ......................................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

178. People’s Daily ......................................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

179. People’s Daily ......................................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

180. People’s Daily ......................................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

181. Science & Technology Daily ................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

182. Science & Technology Daily ................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

183. Shanghai Media Group .......................................................................................................... TV 

184. Shanghai Wenhui Daily .......................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

185. Shanghai Wenhui Daily .......................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

186. The China Press ..................................................................................................................... NEWSPAPER 

245

Accredited Chinese Journalists by Media Outlet Registered with the Foreign Press Centers—

Continued

Organization Media type 

187. The Economic Observer .......................................................................................................... MAGAZINE 

188. Xinhua News Agency .............................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

189. Xinhua News Agency .............................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

190. Xinhua News Agency .............................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

191. Xinhua News Agency .............................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

192. Xinhua News Agency .............................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

193. Xinhua News Agency .............................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

194. Xinhua News Agency .............................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

195. Xinhua News Agency .............................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

196. Xinhua News Agency .............................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

197. Xinhua News Agency .............................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

198. Xinhua News Agency .............................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

199. Xinhua News Agency .............................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

200. Xinhua News Agency .............................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

201. Xinhua News Agency .............................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

202. Xinhua News Agency .............................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

203. Xinhua News Agency .............................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

204. Xinhua News Agency .............................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

205. Xinhua News Agency .............................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

206. Xinhua News Agency .............................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

207. Xinhua News Agency .............................................................................................................. WIRELESS NEWS AGENCY 

208. Xinhua News Agency .............................................................................................................. NEWSPAPER 

209. Xinhua News Agency .............................................................................................................. TV 

ADOPTIONS

Question. As you are aware, many Americans are interested in international adoptions. China has reduced the number of children available for adoption internationally, leading to wait times of 5 years or more. Is this change due in part to the consequences of China’s one-child policy? Also, there are reports that China may be 

making it more difficult to relinquish children resulting with more children being 

abandoned often leading to their death. Are you familiar with these issues and will 

you raise these points with Chinese officials if confirmed?

Answer. China is party to the ‘‘Hague Convention on Protection of Children and 

Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption.’’ Therefore, all adoptions between 

China and the United States must meet the requirements of the Convention and 

U.S. law implementing the Convention. For example, the Convention requires that 

China attempt to find a permanent family in-country before determining that a 

child is eligible for intercountry adoption. China’s rapid economic development and 

other socioeconomic factors, including the one-child policy, have led to greater availability of domestic options for adoption. This may contribute to longer wait times 

for parents seeking an intercountry adoption of children without special needs from 

China. The United States has an excellent working relationship with the Chinese 

Central Authority, the China Center for Children’s Welfare and Adoptions and will 

continue to work to facilitate adoptions from China pursuant to the requirements 

of the Hague Intercountry Adoption Convention. 

If confirmed, I will examine these issues in more depth with Embassy consular 

affairs officers to determine how we may best work with the Chinese to facilitate 

ethical and transparent adoptions by American parents. I will be sure to discuss 

American interest in adopting from China as opportunities arise. 

This is an area of personal interest for me, as well. When I was Governor of 

Washington State, I helped several families from the Pacific Northwest navigate the 

adoption process so they could adopt children from China. 

TIBET

Question. Have you read the bipartisan committee staff report on Tibet that was 

published earlier this year? Do you agree with all the recommendations for administration action and will you endeavor to carry them out? Will you commit to travel 

to Tibetan areas, including outside of Lhasa, to seek accurate information about 

these areas, which are among the few in China where foreigners do not have free 

access?

246

Answer. The Department of State, including the Special Coordinator for Tibetan 

Issues, has reviewed and briefed me on the contents of the report. I welcome its 

analysis and recommendations for action. The Department continues to work steadily to help sustain Tibet’s unique religious, linguistic, and cultural heritage. Among 

the report’s recommendations, and consistent with the Tibet Policy Act, the Department continues to urge the Chinese Government to engage in a substantive dialogue 

with the representatives of the Dalai Lama that will achieve actual results. In addition, Department officials also have urged China to relax restrictions on movements 

of U.S. Government officials, journalists, and Tibetan pilgrims to and from Tibetan 

regions. Travel to Tibetan areas, including outside of Lhasa, is an important priority 

for our Embassy in Beijing, and if confirmed I look forward to continuing to press 

for the opportunity to travel to the Tibet Autonomous Region and other Tibetan 

areas.

Question. Currently there is great concern over the events at Kirti Monastery, in 

the Tibetan part of Sichuan province, where a young monk immolated himself earlier this year. This prompted an unprecedented crackdown in April, when the Monastery was forcibly taken over by security forces; 25 monks remain in detention; 300 

other monks have reportedly been taken away for ‘‘patriotic education’’; and two 

laypeople were reportedly killed by security forces. How will you respond to this situation if you are confirmed?

Answer. The Department of State is closely following developments at Kirti Monastery. Department officials have expressed deep concern about reports that Chinese 

authorities forcibly removed 300 monks from the Kirti Monastery, sentenced two 

other monks to 3 years of imprisonment without due process, and that the whereabouts of 25 detained monks and laypeople are still unknown. Assistant Secretary 

Posner discussed our concerns about Kirti Monastery and China’s counterproductive 

policies in Tibetan areas of China during the most recent Human Rights Dialogue. 

If confirmed, I will continue to raise our concerns with the Chinese Government and 

urge China to respect the human rights, including religious freedom, of the members of the Kirti community and all Chinese citizens. 

CHINA AND DEVELOPMENT

Question. What steps is the United States taking, or should additionally take, to 

encourage China to disclose its lending to developing countries? Following years of 

debt relief from the multilateral financial institutions and bilateral donors for poor 

countries, many are concerned that those same poor countries are becoming increasingly indebted to China.

Answer. For developing countries, China’s assistance is welcomed as additional resources to complement those from other donors. However, over the past decade, China’s ‘‘foreign assistance’’—a mixture of trade, loans, investment and aid—has raised 

governance and sustainability concerns, from both the traditional donor community 

and aid recipients. In addition, China remains reluctant to engage energetically on 

global development issues with the United States and other key donors. 

In order to improve the transparency and effectiveness of China’s development activities in third countries, USAID has been engaging China in dialogue on overseas 

development assistance and is seeking to create a number of cooperative development projects with China in several African countries. 

If confirmed, I will continue to support and encourage more collaborative efforts 

and call for China to join multilateral groups of donor nations in devising and 

adopting best practices that address development challenges aimed at benefiting the 

poorest of the poor in developing countries. 

SANCTIONS

Question. Earlier this week, the Department of State announced sanctions on four 

Chinese firms and individuals over trade links with Iran, Syria, and North Korea 

in goods or technology that may be used for missiles or weapons of mass destruction. How does the administration view Chinese cooperation on sanctions implementation, particularly since the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929 last 

June?

Answer. The prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons and related technologies 

is one of the Obama administration’s highest priorities. Iran and North Korea were 

key topics of President Obama’s talks with Chinese President Hu Jintao during his 

January 2011 visit. The administration will continue to uphold U.S. law and impose 

sanctions as necessary and warranted. Most recently, the United States imposed a 

number of sanctions under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act 

247

(INKSNA) against Chinese firms and individuals that engaged in proliferationrelated transfers with Iran. 

China has played an important role in the diplomatic efforts to address the 

threats from Iran and North Korea. China, as part of the P5+1 and U.N. Security 

Council, contributed to the crafting of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929 and 

plays an important role in efforts to reach a resolution of the international community’s serious concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. In the January 19, 2011, 

United States-China joint statement, both sides called for full implementation of all 

relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions. We have been pleased with the unity 

that China and other P5+1 partners have maintained in our negotiations with Iran, 

and we continue to jointly insist that Iran comply with its international obligations. 

China has stated that it is committed to implementing Resolution 1929 and the 

other resolutions on Iran fully and faithfully, but China has stated that it does not 

support sanctions beyond those contained in UNSCR 1929 and previous UNSCRs 

on Iran. China agrees with the United States that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose 

a grave regional and international threat; however, we do not necessarily agree on 

the timeframe or method to solve the problem. We have worked closely with the 

Chinese on this issue, and will continue to raise this issue at all levels in meetings 

with Chinese officials. 

As Secretary Clinton has said, if we have information about technology transfers 

that we believe is inconsistent with Security Council resolutions and Chinese laws, 

we bring such information to the attention of the Chinese Government and request 

that it investigate and take appropriate action to prevent any prohibited transfers. 

Furthermore, we will not hesitate to enforce our sanctions laws, as the most recent 

imposition of sanctions against Chinese entities and individuals under INKSNA 

demonstrates. Chinese controls over such transfers remain inhibited by an as yet 

underdeveloped export control apparatus and an apparent continued lack of political 

will to develop a comprehensive control system. 

During their January 2011 meetings with President Hu, President Obama and 

Secretary Clinton both stressed the need for continued Chinese restraint in Iran’s 

energy sector, by slowing existing activities and by not concluding any new deals. 

The administration has also pressed China not to ‘‘backfill’’ by assuming the business of other firms that have responsibly departed Iran’s energy sector. We have 

seen some evidence in open sources that China has exercised some restraint in this 

area, but we continue to monitor closely China’s activities in the energy sector. As 

Secretary Clinton has said, this administration will enforce the law with respect to 

Chinese firms. The United States and China share the same goal, and we need to 

work together to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state. 

The administration also discusses on a regular basis with China how it can and 

should best use its influence with North Korea, given its unique history and relationship with the DPRK. In June 2009, China voted in favor of adoption of U.N. 

Security Council Resolution 1874, which imposed additional sanctions against the 

DPRK. The United States has called on all members of the U.N. Security Council 

and all U.N. Member States, including China, to fully and transparently implement 

these sanctions and to refrain from further provocations. 

RESPONSES OF GARY LOCKE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

Question. Over the years, China’s support of both conventional weapons transfers 

and Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs have caused concern. Recently, China 

has reached out to Pakistan to offer deeper relations as an alternative to the West. 

Given the instability in Pakistan, do you believe these overtures are helpful? What 

will you do to help the Chinese understand that instability in a nuclear-armed Pakistan does not promote stability?

Answer. The administration believes that there is a role for China to play in helping the international community deal with the challenge of peace and stability in 

Afghanistan and in cooperating to allow Pakistan to strengthen its democracy and 

to deal with the economic challenges that country faces. If confirmed, I will work 

closely with the Secretary’s Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan to promote 

effective United States-Chinese cooperation in the region.

Question. Recently, in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee Lieutenant 

General Carlisle said: ‘‘You need only look across the Pacific and see what [China] 

is doing, not just their air force capability, but their surface-to-air [missile] capability, their ballistic missile capability, their antiship ballistic missiles. All of those 

things are incredibly disturbing to us for the future.’’

248

• Do you believe China’s military buildup is benign or should it be cause for U.S. 

concern? Do you agree with General Carlisle’s assessment?

Answer. China has embarked on a comprehensive effort to transform its military 

into a modern force capable of conducting a growing range of military operations. 

The administration is mindful of China’s military modernization plans and, in particular, the lack of transparency surrounding them. We monitor carefully China’s 

military developments and, in concert with our allies and partners, will adjust our 

policies and approaches as necessary. 

Both President Hu and President Obama have stressed that a healthy, stable, and 

reliable military-to-military relationship is an important component of our overall 

bilateral relationship. President Obama told President Hu that we need to develop 

a military-to-military dialogue that is ongoing and sustainable even in the face of 

the inevitable ups and downs of the overall relationship. We have now made 

progress in resuming military-to-military dialogue, which we believe can help to 

build trust and reduce misunderstanding, misperception, and miscalculation.

Question. China’s neighbors are deeply concerned about China’s assertion of sovereign control over the entire South China Sea. How should the United States deal 

with this issue? Do you think we could see another ‘‘Mischief Reef’’ scenario by the 

Chinese to assert its control over the sea? What should we do about similar Chinese 

assertions in the East China Sea?

Answer. As Secretary Clinton stated in Hanoi at the Association of Southeast 

Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) last year, the United States shares 

a number of national interests with the international community in the South China 

Sea. These interests include regional peace and stability, freedom of navigation, respect for international law, and unimpeded commerce under lawful conditions. We 

urge that all claimants exercise restraint in dealing with these competing claims. 

We support a collaborative and peaceful diplomatic process by all claimants to resolve the various territorial and maritime disputes without coercion, and we call on 

all claimants to conform all of their claims—both land and maritime—to international law. To advance these goals, the United States supports the ASEAN-China 

declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea and encourages the 

parties to reach a full code of conduct. With regard to a Mischief Reef scenario, I 

would not want speculate about hypothetical situations. We believe territorial 

claims in the East China Sea should also be resolved peacefully and in accordance 

with international law. We oppose the use or threat of force by any claimant. The 

United States does not take sides in territorial disputes in the South China Sea or 

East China Sea.

Question. Given how much U.S. debt is owned by the Chinese, will you let these 

economic issues, become an obstacle to addressing issues like human rights, political 

reforms, Chinese military buildup, or other substantive issues?

Answer. Approximately 70 percent of U.S. Treasury securities are held by domestic investors or the U.S. Government, with only 30 percent of U.S. debt held by foreign entities. Externally owned U.S. debt is held by a diversified group of countries, 

and we are not overly reliant on any one overseas holder of U.S. Treasury securities. 

China’s holdings represent only about 8 percent of U.S. Treasury securities outstanding. 

While China has a strong interest in the stability of our debt, as a creditor 

China’s holdings of Treasury securities have no effect on any U.S. foreign policy 

decisions.

Question. Your predecessor Ambassador Huntsman set a good standard with 

human rights outreach in China. He spoke publicly and privately about these 

issues, met with dissidents and families, cultivated independent Chinese media outlets, and took other critical steps to create a climate of support for these issues within the Embassy and reiterated the importance to Chinese interlocutors.

• Do you see this as a floor or a ceiling in terms for ambassadorial human rights 

advocacy?

Answer. The protection and the promotion of liberty and freedom are fundamental 

tenets of American foreign policy. Promoting human rights—including freedom of religion, speech, and assembly—is a central objective of our diplomatic engagement 

with China. U.S. officials will continue to make very clear both publicly and privately our concerns about the deteriorating human rights situation in China. If confirmed, I will be a forceful advocate with the Chinese Government and the Chinese 

people for promoting the respect of universal human rights in China.

Question. Will you continue the practice of meeting with dissidents in and outside 

of China? What other kinds of initiatives do you envision taking to engage directly 

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with Chinese people and promote universal values? Will you attend any part of dissident trials like other ambassadors?

Answer. The Embassy maintains a wide variety of contacts within Chinese society, including with activists who work on a range of issues, and if confirmed I intend to continue such meetings but also to engage in broad outreach to both Chinese 

officials and the Chinese people to convey the human rights values for which America stands. Promoting human rights—including freedom of religion, speech, and assembly—is a central objective of our diplomatic engagement with China. Although 

the Embassy has submitted requests for permission to attend the trials of known 

activists, none has been granted to date. If confirmed, the Embassy under my leadership will continue to press for permission to attend such trials.

Question. A number of U.S. NGOs work in China or provide financial support to 

Chinese NGOs working on areas considered sensitive by the Chinese Government, 

such as human rights NGOs and those working in Tibet. In recent years, many of 

these groups and their domestic partners have come under pressure from the Chinese Government, particularly those who have a U.S. Government funding source, 

such as organizations that work with the National Endowment for Democracy and 

its affiliates, and U.S. NGOs working in Tibetan areas.

• Will you be willing to meet and consult with the U.S. NGOs doing sensitive 

work in China on how the Embassy can best support their efforts?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will consult with a wide range of American citizens 

and organizations that deal with the many aspects of United States-China relations, 

including human rights. The State Department’s Bureau for Democracy, Human 

Rights, and Labor supports many active and important programs in the rule of law 

and civil society development, among others. I have already met with Assistant Secretary Michael Posner to discuss his views on human rights in China, and if confirmed, will continue to conduct further consultations, including with NGOs, to learn 

more about programs and how to promote our common objectives in China. 

RESPONSES OF GARY LOCKE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR. 

Question. Under the Obama administration, China’s record of blatant disregard 

for World Trade Organization (WTO) rules has remained abysmal, if not worsened.

• Secretary Locke, can you explain how your leadership at Commerce has helped 

address any of the major trade problems we continue to have with China, including currency, rampant intellectual property rights (IPR) theft, and massive 

industrial subsidies?

Answer. I fully appreciate your concerns regarding the currency practices of 

China. This is an important issue for me and the Obama administration. As you 

know, the authority to monitor and report on currency manipulation is delegated 

by law to the Department of Treasury. However, in all my meetings with Chinese 

officials I have repeated the administration’s call for reform of Chinese currency 

practices. As the Secretary of Commerce, I have been steadfast in my commitment 

to vigorously enforce the U.S. trade remedy laws to ensure that U.S. workers and 

industries have the opportunity to compete on a level playing field. In every instance that a domestic industry filed an antidumping duty (AD) or countervailing 

duty (CVD) petition that met the statutory requirements for initiation, we initiated 

investigations. While the Department of Commerce has yet to receive a CVD allegation regarding China’s currency that has met the statutory requirements for initiation, the Department has countervailed a variety of subsidy programs involving a 

wide range of imports from China and have placed duties to offset these unfair subsidies. Based on 2010 trade data, roughly $11.6 billion, or 3.2 percent, of imports 

from China were covered under orders in effect that year. At the end of 2010, there 

were 108 orders in place against Chinese products. 

On IPR, we have made significant progress with China during my tenure, but we 

must continue to push China to do more. At the 2009 Joint Commission on Commerce & Trade (JCCT), China committed to clamping down on Internet piracy, 

strengthening the protection of IPR at state-run libraries, and addressing concerns 

over a Ministry of Culture circular relating to online music distribution. 

During the 2010 JCCT, China announced that it would take significant steps to 

ensure that software used on government computers is legitimate and promote legal 

software use in enterprises, while the judiciary would undertake a study that would 

lead to a judicial interpretation on Internet infringement liability. Also, cooperation 

between the United States and China would continue on strengthening IPR protecVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00257 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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tion at libraries and discussions would continue on patents and standards issues. 

Furthermore, China would clarify the responsibilities of market managers and landlords, and China would not adopt or maintain measures that make the location of 

the development or ownership of intellectual property a direct or indirect condition 

for eligibility for government procurement preferences for products and services. 

At the 2010 JCCT and during President Hu’s state visit to Washington, DC, in 

January 2011, we pushed China to commit to announcing more specific plans on 

software legalization and eliminating discriminatory innovation policies that take 

into account where IPR is developed when making government procurement decisions. China’s commitments are only credible if they deliver results. We will be holding a JCCT midyear review to press for full implementation of China’s 2010 JCCT 

commitments. 

Regarding industrial subsidies, the administration is committed to vigorously 

challenging any Chinese subsidies that are inconsistent with China’s WTO obligations, whether through multilateral action at the WTO or the strong enforcement 

of U.S. trade laws to remedy unfairly subsidized and injurious Chinese imports. 

Addressing unfair and harmful Chinese Government subsidies has been a key priority during my tenure at the Department of Commerce. Indeed, trade compliance 

and enforcement are key components of the administration’s National Export Initiative. One of the ways we have pursued these efforts is through the Department of 

Commerce’s strong enforcement of the CVD law which provides U.S. industries and 

workers with a reliable process to obtain effective relief from the injurious effects 

of imports from China benefiting from Chinese Government subsidies. Moreover, the 

Department of Commerce has a strong subsidies enforcement program which 

devotes considerable resources to identifying and addressing potentially harmful 

Chinese Government subsidies that may impact our exports abroad. We are thus engaged in a wide range of activities that seek to confront harmful Chinese Government subsidies, and thereby promote a level playing field for American companies 

and its workers.

Question. Senator Wyden and his staff estimate that only 1 percent of all countervailing and antidumping duties are collected, with the majority of evasion coming 

from China. What has the Commerce Department done under your leadership to 

deal with this problem?

Answer. The Department of Commerce’s role in detecting and deterring circumvention of antidumping and countervailing duties is addressed in section 781 of 

the Tariff Act of 1930 (the Act). If the Department of Commerce determines that 

an order is being circumvented, Commerce directs U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to suspend liquidation of the entries and require a cash deposit of estimated duties on all unliquidated merchandise determined to be circumventing the 

order. 

The Department of Commerce is currently investigating six allegations of circumvention of Chinese antidumping and countervailing duty orders. These include 

orders on steel wire garment hangers, laminated woven sacks, small diameter 

graphite electrodes, glycine, tissue paper, and cut-to-length carbon steel plate. 

In the tissue paper inquiry, for example, the Department of Commerce recently 

made a preliminary determination that certain tissue paper processed and exported 

to the United States by a Vietnamese company was circumventing the AD order on 

tissue paper from China. Commerce directed CBP to suspend liquidation and collect 

cash deposits at a rate of 112.64 percent for all exports from the Vietnamese company retroactive to the date we initiated the circumvention inquiry. We will be considering comments from interested parties prior to making a final determination in 

this case in August. 

In addition to the authority to address circumvention that is specifically prescribed to the Department of Commerce by statute, Commerce works in close cooperation with CBP, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Department of Justice to assist them in responding to allegations of duty evasion, transshipment, and fraud that fall with within their jurisdiction. 

Over the past several years, Commerce and CBP have been working to improve 

communications between the two agencies in order to strengthen enforcement of the 

AD/CVD laws. Cooperation among IA, CBP, ICE, and the Department of Justice has 

resulted in indictments, convictions, and prison sentences for evaders of AD/CVD 

orders. To cite just one example, our interagency cooperation led to the indictment 

in 2010 of Alfred L. Wolff Gmbh, a German food conglomerate, and 10 executives 

for conspiracy to illegally import more than $40 million of honey from China between 2002 and 2009 and avoid paying nearly $80 million in AD duties. 

The Department of Commerce is committed to robustly enforcing the trade remedy laws in order to ensure that American businesses and workers have the opporVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00258 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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tunity to compete on a level playing field against their foreign competitors. The 

Department of Commerce will continue to work intensively to ensure the AD and 

CVD orders are not circumvented and will actively coordinate with its sister agencies to minimize evasion of AD and CVD duties.

Question. Do you support Senator Wyden’s bill, ‘‘The Enforce Act,’’ introduced last 

Congress, to enhance Custom’s ability to enforce duty collection?

Answer. The administration has taken no official position with respect to Senator 

Wyden’s bill. Nevertheless, we stand ready to work with you and other Members 

of Congress—as well as with the Department of Homeland Security—to take appropriate measures that ensure all countervailing and antidumping duties imposed are 

properly collected and duty evasion schemes are rightfully prosecuted.

Question. China’s currency manipulation practices remain of serious concern. The 

Treasury Department’s February 2011 report on international economic and exchange rate policies of U.S. major trading partners cited the need for greater flexible 

from China, noting that the Chinese currency remains ‘‘substantially undervalued.’’ 

However, diplomatic efforts to push China to allow the Chinese yuan to appreciate 

more quickly have achieved little progress to date.

• As Ambassador to China, what ‘‘creative diplomatic’’ steps will you take to 

encourage the Chinese Government to end the unfair manipulation of its 

currency? 

• What impact do you foresee potential currency manipulation legislation having 

on U.S. efforts to address this serious concern?

Answer. As President Obama and Treasury Secretary Geithner have clearly 

stated, China’s decision to increase flexibility of its exchange rate will help safeguard global recovery in the wake of the financial crisis, and contribute to a balanced global economy. If confirmed, I will continue to press China to move forward 

in implementing an exchange rate policy that will be beneficial to both the global 

and domestic Chinese economy.

Question. Most trade experts believe that China is in the process of backsliding 

from the commitments it has made since joining the WTO.

• Do you agree with this assessment? If so, how will you use your new role as 

Ambassador to work to defend what is left of the U.S. manufacturing base?

Answer. China’s efforts to implement its WTO commitments since its 2001 accession have led to increased exports and opportunities for U.S. companies. However, 

in some areas, China has yet to fully implement some of its commitments. We have 

also been seeing a troubling trend in recent years toward increased government 

intervention in China’s economy. While bilateral trade with China continues to 

grow, a number of American businesses continue to face significant market access 

barriers and preferential policies that favor Chinese firms, especially SOEs. China 

must address these concerns, and if confirmed, I will work in concert with USTR 

to press the Government of China to fully implement and adhere to its WTO commitments. If dialogue fails, I am fully supportive of the administration using the full 

range of enforcement options, as it has been doing. We have been by far the most 

active—and successful—WTO Member in bringing WTO dispute settlement cases 

against China.

Question. The Strategic and Economic Dialogue has failed to create any meaningful progress on important trade and economic issues in our relationship with China. 

As Ambassador, how will you work to boost the effectiveness of this dialogue?

Answer. As Secretary Clinton has stated, the Strategic and Economic Dialogue is 

the premier forum in a bilateral relationship that is as important and complex as 

any in the world. 

The three rounds of the S&ED demonstrate the importance of this forum for advancing our most important policy objectives with China. We use the S&ED to expand the areas where we cooperate and to narrow the areas where we diverge, 

while holding firm to our values and interests. We also employ the S&ED to form 

habits of cooperation that will help us work together more effectively to meet our 

shared regional and global challenges and also to weather disagreements when they 

arise. 

This year’s S&ED produced 48 concrete outcomes on the Strategic track. We announced, among other outcomes, the creation of the new U.S.-China Strategic Security Dialogue, the U.S.-China consultation on the Asia/Pacific, and announced new 

areas of cooperation in areas ranging from energy and environmental cooperation 

to scientific cooperation and people-to-people exchange. In the Economic Track, the 

United States secured important commitments to level the playing field for U.S. 

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companies and workers, shift the orientation of China’s economy toward domestic 

demand-led growth, improve IP protection, and, in the process, promote greater U.S. 

exports to the large and rapidly growing Chinese market. We are already working 

to make sure China implements these important commitments in an effective and 

decisive manner. If confirmed, I will do my utmost, working with my colleagues at 

the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce and other agencies, to continue to 

utilize the S&ED to make further progress on critical issues.

Question. In a letter to President Obama in January, I outlined the very real 

difficulties many Pennsylvania companies and workers face due to China’s lack of 

enforcement of intellectual property rights. For example, C.F. Martin & Co.—

a world-renowned Pennsylvania guitar manufacturer—has been fighting to register 

its mark with the Chinese Government since 2005. According to the company, a Chinese individual has been illegally registering the mark in order to produce and sell 

counterfeit guitars of low quality. The lack of protection on the part of the Chinese 

harms not only C.F. Martin & Co., but also countless other Pennsylvania companies 

and workers—and American exports more broadly. I have urged the administration 

to work with the Chinese to address concerns over intellectual property rights 

infringement.

• As Ambassador, how will you address the very real threat that Chinese intellectual property infringement poses to American businesses and workers?

Answer. Improving the protection and enforcement of IPR remains a top priority 

for this administration. U.S. trade losses due to counterfeiting and piracy in China 

remain unacceptably high. In addition, a strong intellectual property regime is critical to ensuring safe products for both U.S. and Chinese citizens. 

At the December Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, we made progress 

in ensuring the use of legitimate software in Chinese Government agencies and 

delinking the source and origin of IP from Chinese Government procurement preferences. During the January visit by President Hu, China further agreed to 

strengthen its efforts to protect IPR, including by conducting audits to ensure that 

government agencies at all levels use legitimate software and by publishing the auditing results as required by China’s law. 

The specific case you mention with C.F. Martin & Co. is an example of trademark 

‘‘squatting.’’ Unlike laws in most other countries, including the United States, Chinese law has a ‘‘first to file’’ system that requires no evidence of prior use or ownership, leaving registration of popular foreign marks open to third parties. Under Chinese law, these third parties (squatters) may then bring an infringement action or 

seek payment from the true brand owner if the owner attempts to use its brand in 

China. If confirmed as Ambassador, I will work with Chinese officials to update 

their laws to conform to international norms and alleviate this problem. 

More broadly, I am committed to protecting U.S. business interests and will continue to work within established fora such as the Joint Commission on Commerce 

and Trade (JCCT) and the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) to engage the 

Chinese on protecting and enforcing intellectual property rights in accordance with 

internationally recognized standards and their World Trade Organization (WTO) 

commitments.

Question. I believe a top priority in our relationship with China should be the 

Chinese Government’s enforcement of international sanctions against Iran. It is no 

secret that while China eventually supported U.N. sanctions on Iran, it did so reluctantly and only after it succeeded in significantly watering down the sanctions. 

According to the State Department’s Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms 

Control, Bob Einhorn, Iran continues to use Chinese companies to procure proliferation-sensitive equipment for its nuclear and missile programs.

• What diplomatic tools does the United States have to press China to reduce its 

relationship with Iran? As Ambassador, how will you encourage timely responses from the Chinese Government to U.S. requests to stop specific shipments of proliferation concern? As Ambassador, how will you work to convince 

China to implement stricter export regulations to prevent the proliferation of 

sensitive items to countries of concern? What steps will you take to convince 

relevant Chinese companies to sever business ties with Iran?

Answer. The prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons and related technologies 

is one of the Obama administration’s highest priorities. Iran and North Korea were 

key topics of President Obama’s talks with Chinese President Hu Jintao during his 

January 2011 visit, and we continue to raise the issue at the highest levels. We will 

also continue to uphold U.S. law and impose sanctions as necessary and warranted. 

Most recently, the United States imposed a number of sanctions under the Iran, 

North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) against Chinese firms and 

253

individuals that engaged in proliferation-related transfers with Iran. In addition, we 

will continue to implement the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and 

Divestment Act (CISADA), and in that regard, we have urged China to exercise restraint and refrain from making any investments in Iran’s energy sector. 

China shares the international community’s serious concerns about Iran’s nuclear 

program, and has played an important role in the diplomatic efforts to address this 

threat. China, as part of the P5+1 and U.N. Security Council, contributed to the 

crafting of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929. In the January 19, 2011, U.S.-

China joint statement, both sides called for full implementation of all relevant U.N. 

Security Council resolutions. We have been pleased with the unity that China and 

other P5+1 partners have maintained in our negotiations with Iran, and we continue to jointly insist that Iran comply with its international obligations. China has 

stated that it is committed to implementing resolution 1929 and the other resolutions on Iran fully and faithfully, but China has stated that it does not support 

sanctions beyond those contained in UNSCR 1929 and previous UNSCRs on Iran. 

China agrees with the United States that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose a grave 

regional and international threat; however, we do not necessarily agree on the timeframe or method to solve the problem. We have worked closely with the Chinese 

on this issue, and we will continue to raise it at all levels in meetings with China. 

We continue to emphasize the need for greater urgency in responses to this threat.

Question. The United States has sanctioned 21 Iranian banks for providing financing for Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. However, as Acting Treasury Undersecretary David Cohen noted, ‘‘Iran has a well-established practice of migrating illicit 

financial activities from one bank to another to facilitate transactions for sanctioned 

banks.’’ As international banks throughout Europe are severing their ties with Iranian financial institutions, Iran has turned to Turkish, Emeriti, and Chinese banks 

to evade international sanctions—and there are ongoing reports that Chinese banks 

knowingly continue to do business with Iran likely in violation of U.S. sanctions.

• What is your assessment of reports that Chinese banks continue to facilitate 

Iranian financial transactions, in violation of U.S. sanctions? As Ambassador, 

what will you do to encourage the Chinese financial industry to sever its ties 

with Iranian firms?

Answer. As Secretary Clinton has said, if we have information about technology 

or financial transfers that we believe is inconsistent with Security Council resolutions and Chinese laws, we bring such information to the attention of the Chinese 

Government and request that it immediately investigate and take appropriate action to prevent any prohibited transfers. Furthermore, we do not hesitate to enforce 

our sanctions laws, as the most recent imposition of sanctions against Chinese entities and individuals under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act 

(INKSNA) demonstrates. Chinese controls over such transfers remain inhibited by 

an as yet underdeveloped export control apparatus, weak financial industry controls, 

and an apparent continued lack of political will to develop a comprehensive control 

system. President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and other administration officials regularly stress to the Chinese the need for continued Chinese restraint in Iran’s energy sector and urge that they slow down existing activities and not conclude any 

new deals. The administration has also pressed China not to ‘‘backfill’’ by assuming 

the business of other firms that have responsibly departed Iran’s energy sector. We 

have seen some evidence in open sources that China has exercised some restraint 

in this area, but we continue to monitor China’s activities in the energy sector. As 

Secretary Clinton has said before, this administration will enforce the law with respect to Chinese firms. If confirmed, I will continue to press these issues in my discussions with Chinese officials.

Question. According to human rights activists in Washington, the Chinese Government’s recent crackdown on dissidents is the biggest they have seen in more than 

20 years. I welcomed Secretary of State Clinton’s May 10 statement denouncing China’s human rights abuses and brutal crackdown on antigovernment protesters, 

which is in large part a response to the wave of unrest that has spread across the 

Middle East and North Africa. Beijing’s detainment of lawyers, artists, and activists 

serves to highlight the government’s ongoing lack of commitment to upholding internationally recognized human rights.

• If confirmed, what steps will you take the encourage China to uphold its human 

rights commitments and end its brutal crackdown on prodemocracy activists? 

How does this fit in with the broader United States-China relationship, given 

China’s important role as a trade partner and main holder of U.S. debt?

Answer. The administration has made clear that we have a fundamental commitment to the universal rights of all people, including those in China. Human rights 

254

is a central part of our United States-China bilateral relationship. The United 

States and China can cooperate on critical global challenges, such as producing balanced global growth, as well as on our bilateral economic and trade concerns, while 

having candid and direct discussions about the issues where we do not see eye to 

eye, such as human rights. If confirmed, I will forcefully advocate for the Chinese 

Government to respect the universal human rights of all its citizens, including those 

who advocate peacefully for reform.

Question. What signals can the United States send to Chinese dissidents to assure 

them of our steadfast commitment to universal human rights?

Answer. The U.S. Embassy in Beijing maintains a wide variety of contacts within 

Chinese society, and if confirmed I intend to engage in broad public outreach to both 

Chinese officials and the Chinese people and to convey the human rights values for 

which America stands. Promoting human rights—including freedom of religion, 

speech, and assembly—is a central objective of our diplomatic engagement with 

China. If confirmed, I will be a forceful advocate for promoting the respect of universal human rights in China. 

RESPONSES OF GARY LOCKE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND HOUSE CHURCHES

Question. The persecution of ‘‘House Churches’’ has recently come to our attention. 

Chinese house churches are a religious movement of unregistered assemblies of 

Christians in the People’s Republic of China. They are also known as the ‘‘Underground’’ Church or the ‘‘Unofficial’’ Church. They are called ‘‘house churches’’ because as they are not officially registered organizations, they cannot independently 

own property and hence they meet in private houses, often in secret for fear of 

arrest or imprisonment. Because house churches operate outside government regulations and restrictions, their members and leaders are frequently harassed by local 

government officials. This persecution may take the form of a prison sentence or, 

more commonly, reeducation through labor. Heavy fines are also not unusual.

• Do you believe that the opposition of house churches by government officials 

arises from an ideological opposition to religion and support of atheism or more 

out of fear of potential disturbances to orderly society from mass mobilization 

of believers, similar to the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, and mass protests of Falun Gong members in Beijing in 1999? Do you believe the administration has taken a strong enough approach in integrating religious rights at a systematic and structural level or will our current approach only lead to antipathy 

and further delays in cooperation on other issues?

Answer. With respect to religious freedom in China, the Secretary of State has 

designated it a ‘‘country of particular concern’’ every year that such designations 

have been made. We continue to engage China on its poor religious freedom record, 

including during the most recent U.S.-China Human Rights Dialogue and the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. The State Department raises cases of concern, including about individual incidents like the Shouwang Church in Beijing, on a regular 

basis at senior levels in both Washington and Beijing. If confirmed, I will continue 

to press the Chinese Government to respect all of its citizens’ right to religious freedom, including for House church practitioners.

Question. If confirmed what will you do to ensure that freedom of religion is assured for Chinese citizens?

Answer. If confirmed, one of my primary roles would continue to be that of a 

spokesman for America and America’s values, including the freedoms that are the 

foundation of our great Nation. That includes religious freedom. I will continue to 

advance the administration’s policy of pressing China to improve its record on religious freedom and to respect the right to religious freedom of all its citizens. 

CHINA AND TAIWAN RELATIONS

Question. Presently China has over 1,400 short-range missiles pointed at Taiwan. 

This explicit threat from the Communist Chinese mainland was foremost in my 

mind when I addressed a letter to the administration, prior to the visit of President 

Hu Jintao early this year. In this bipartisan letter, signed by myself and 25 other 

Senators, I reminded the President of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s defense 

under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979.

255

• What assurances can you give me that will ensure that the Communist Chinese 

Government fully understands not only the legal ramifications but the moral 

commitment the United States has to guarantee the ability of Taiwan to defend 

itself?

Answer. First let me note that this administration welcomes the impressive steps 

both sides of the Taiwan Strait have taken in improving relations. We hope these 

efforts will continue and expand. The U.S. Government is committed to our one 

China policy based on the Three Joint Communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act. 

Our one China policy has been consistent for the past eight U.S. administrations 

and will not change. If confirmed, I will continue to advance that policy in my interactions with Chinese officials. 

The United States has consistently told our Chinese counterparts that, in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States makes available to Taiwan 

defense articles and services necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient 

self-defense capability. We have also consistently said that cross-strait issues should 

be resolved peacefully in a manner acceptable to people on both sides of the strait 

and that we oppose unilateral actions by either side to alter the status quo. We urge 

China to reduce military deployments aimed at Taiwan and to pursue a peaceful 

resolution to cross-strait issues.

Question. There are rumors that the present Taiwan Government may not fully 

purchase all items previously agreed for sale by the United States. Should this sale 

go through to completion however, how will this affect the United States-China relationship, since the Chinese Government reacted so negatively when the arms sales 

list to Taiwan was announced last year?

Answer. I would prefer not to speculate on the hypothetical. I would simply note 

that China and Taiwan have made considerable progress in improving cross-strait 

relations and that we support these efforts and encourage both sides to continue 

these discussions, and that in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, the United 

States makes available to Taiwan defense articles and services necessary to enable 

Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. That policy has provided a 

basis for maintaining security and stability across the Taiwan Strait for decades. 

Decisions to make available to Taiwan defensive arms and services are considered 

through an interagency process based solely upon an evaluation of Taiwan’s defensive needs. 

CHINA AND AFRICA

Question. Africa is the world’s second-largest and most-populous continent. Comprised of 53 nations and over 900 million people, it is both rich in minerals and oil. 

This has not gone unnoticed by the Chinese Government. China has stepped into 

somewhat of a vacuum, currying favor in both political and strategic alliances across 

the African Continent

• To what extent do you see China furthering its exploration into the African 

Continent and to what ends?

Answer. China’s overall trade with Africa exceeded $100 billion last year, with 

about 89 percent of its imports from Africa consisting of oil, minerals, and other raw 

materials. With our Chinese counterparts, we have discussed how to diversify and 

sustain trade, which would not only help Africa but also serve China’s own interests.

Question. Is the Chinese interest in Africa purely for the survival and economic 

interest of the Chinese and not the economic emancipation of Africa?

Answer. China’s presence in Africa reflects the reality that it has important and 

growing interests in Africa including access to resources and markets and development of diplomatic ties. These objectives are not inherently incompatible with U.S. 

priorities. As the President and Secretary Clinton have both made clear, we do not 

see power and influence in zero sum terms, and that is true in Africa as well. The 

United States and other donors are concerned, however, that China’s foreign assistance and investment practices in Africa have not always been consistent with generally accepted international norms of transparency and good governance. Despite 

differences of opinion on certain issues, we believe it is important that our two governments remain engaged and work together to meet the development objectives of 

African countries. Our approach has been to demonstrate that, through greater cooperation on a wide range of issues affecting Africa, China can meet its responsibilities as a Security Council member in the U.N. while also meeting its economic 

goals. 

256

CHINA AND AFRICA

Question. Use of soft power diplomacy will continue to be a key driver of China’s 

strengthened relations with Africa and likely to propel China to higher global economic and military influence than it currently commands. The outcome of the growing China-Africa relations is the construction and reconstruction of infrastructure 

especially roads, water works, and hospitals. China is hand cementing and expending its relations with Africa.

• How far do you think the use of soft power can propel China?

Answer. China enjoys a degree of influence which one might expect from a major 

trading nation with significant economic ties to most of sub-Saharan Africa. The 

United States and China have sought to increase our dialogue about Africa in order 

to improve understanding and seek tangible ways to cooperate through our Africa 

subdialogue under the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED). We have also instructed our missions in Africa to reach out to their Chinese colleagues to explore 

potential areas of cooperation and assess China’s overall role in their respective 

countries.

Question. Does China support African led efforts to develop sound governance and 

sustainable development throughout the continent?

Answer. The United States and other donors have concerns that China’s ‘‘no 

strings attached’’ practices in Africa have not always been consistent with its commitment to adhere to international norms of transparency and standards of good 

governance. China adheres to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and Accra 

Agenda for Action. We have made these concerns known to China, including 

through our Africa subdialogue under the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED). 

HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINA

Question. I am concerned about the worsening human rights situation in China. 

In light of the ongoing crackdown on Chinese journalists, dissidents, and intellectuals, I remain disappointed that the administration has failed to integrate these 

issues into its policy at a systemic and structural level. It is often in the area of 

economics that human rights concerns are marginalized. Your background gives you 

a unique opportunity to help broaden the discourse with Chinese interlocutors on 

the need for political reform.

• What is your view of the language that the administration has used to discuss 

human rights issues?

Answer. I fully support the administration’s candid discussion of the inadequacies 

that we see in China’s human rights record. Both publicly and privately, the administration has been consistent in stating our concerns about the deteriorating human 

rights situation in China, pressing China to respect its citizens’ fundamental rights, 

and stating that expansion of civil and political rights would ultimately be a source 

of stability in Chinese society.

Question. How will you contribute to efforts to incorporate human rights concerns 

into the relationship across the board, including on economic issues?

Answer. I am committed to pursuing a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive 

relationship with China that is grounded in reality, focused on results, and true to 

our principles and interests. To keep our relationship on a positive trajectory, however, we must be honest about our differences. We can cooperate on critical global 

challenges such as producing balanced global growth, while having candid and direct discussions about the issues where we do not see eye to eye, including human 

rights. If confirmed, I will address sensitive issues in the bilateral relationship and 

will raise human rights issues and individual cases with Chinese Government officials at the highest levels. If confirmed, I will also be a forceful advocate for promoting the respect of universal human rights in China.

Question. How will you bring other agencies into this discussion?

Answer. Human rights played an important role in both our public and private 

meetings during the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in May, which 

included nearly every element of the interagency community. If confirmed, I will 

continue to support the administration’s efforts to make very clear across all the 

agencies our concerns about the deteriorating human rights situation in China.

Question. Will you work with like-minded governments on these issues, particularly our European and Asian friends and allies?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work with allies and partners to address 

the inadequacies that we collectively see in China’s protection of human rights.

257

Question. Your predecessor Ambassador Huntsman set a good standard in terms 

of human rights outreach in China. He spoke publicly and privately about these 

issues, and met with dissidents and their families, cultivated independent Chinese 

media outlets, and took other critical steps to both create a supportive climate for 

these issues within the Embassy and reiterate the importance of these issues to Chinese interlocutors. It should be done even when it seems futile and seems to invite 

repercussions. Chinese Government intimidation should not cause you to substitute 

your judgment for that of Chinese dissidents regarding the dangers they are willing 

to expose themselves to.

• Will you commit to continuing the practice of meeting with dissidents in China 

and outside of China?

Answer. The U.S. Embassy in Beijing maintains a wide variety of contacts within 

Chinese society, including with activists who work on a range of issues, and if confirmed I intend to continue such meetings but also to engage in broad outreach to 

both Chinese officials and the Chinese people to convey the human rights values for 

which America stands. Promoting human rights—including freedom of religion, 

speech, and assembly—is a central objective of our diplomatic engagement with 

China. If confirmed, I will be a forceful advocate for promoting the respect of universal human rights in China.

Question. What other initiatives do you envision taking to engage directly with 

Chinese people and promote universal values?

Answer. If confirmed, one of my top priorities will be to engage in direct outreach 

to the Chinese people, including to underscore the importance of respect for universal rights and freedoms. The objective of our public diplomacy is to reach out directly to the Chinese public to promote universal values. If confirmed, I will work 

closely with the Department’s Bureau for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and 

our Mission China officers to ensure that our message reaches the widest possible 

range of Chinese society.

Question. I am concerned about the dozens of individuals who have disappeared 

or been detained and sentenced to political crimes because they advocated that the 

Chinese people should enjoy universally accepted freedoms. There are several cases 

that have come to my attention, because of the nature of the accused or the charges 

against them, should be given particular attention. In addition to Nobel Prize winner Liu Xiaobo and artist Ai Weiwei.

• Will you raise the following cases in your testimony before the committee and 

when you meet with Chinese officials as examples of individuals of concern?

Æ Hada: http://en.rsf.org/china-authorities-holding-hada-s-wife-10-05-2011,402

53.html 

Æ Shi Tao: http://en.rsf.org/china-information-supplied-by-yahoo-06-09-2005,

14884.html 

Æ Huang Qi: http://en.rsf.org/china-cyber-dissident-huang-qi-kidnapped-12-06-

2008,27465.html 

Æ Tan Zuoren: http://en.rsf.org/china-as-china-justifies-online-10-06-2010,377

06.html

Answer. State Department officials raise individual cases of concern frequently 

and at all levels, in both Washington and at our Embassy in Beijing and our Consulates General throughout China. The Department urges the Chinese Government 

to treat detainees and prisoners humanely and in accordance with international 

standards and to release those detained unjustly. We press upon China the importance of affording all prisoners the protections of due process and transparent and 

fair legal proceedings. If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize the administration’s message calling for the release of prisoners of conscience. I will also speak directly to Chinese leaders and call for the individual release of prisoners such as Liu 

Xiaobo, Gao Zhisheng, Ai Weiwei, and others such as those mentioned above. I will 

also engage with the Chinese people directly to convey the universal values for 

which America stands. 

CHINA AND TIBET

Question. Tibetans have been enduring an intensifying crackdown since March 

2008, exemplified by the crisis at Kirti Monastery in Sichuan province. Last month, 

the monastery was forcibly taken over by security forces; 25 monks remain in detention; 300 other monks have been taken away for ‘‘patriotic education’’; and two 

laypeople were killed by security forces.

258

• Will you commit to travel to Tibetan areas, including beyond Lhasa, to seek accurate information in these closed-off areas, and to advocate for the religious, 

cultural, and human rights of Tibetans?

Answer. The Department of State has urged China to relax restrictions on movements of U.S. Government officials, journalists, and Tibetan pilgrims to and from 

Tibetan regions. Travel to Tibetan areas, including outside of Lhasa, is an important 

priority for our Embassy in Beijing, and, if confirmed, I will continue to press to 

have an opportunity to do so.

Question. Will you continue efforts to establish a U.S. consulate in Lhasa, which 

was established by the State Department as a priority in 2008?

Answer. The United States and China currently have six diplomatic posts in the 

other’s country. Future post openings are subject to host government agreement, per 

the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and our bilateral agreement with 

China. 

The Department sent diplomatic notes in 2008, expressing reciprocal interest in 

expanding U.S. diplomatic presence in China, with Lhasa at the top of the U.S. list. 

To date, the Chinese have not responded. The Department remains committed to 

pursuing a post in Lhasa as a priority, and if confirmed I will continue to work on 

this objective.

Question. Will you work with the Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues and her 

office to ensure that U.S. policy and communications to the Chinese Government are 

consistent and respect the longstanding two-track U.S. policy of (1) supporting dialogue between the Chinese Government and the Dalai Lama and his representatives; and (2) supporting efforts to preserve the unique cultural, religious and linguistic heritage of the Tibetan people?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Special Coordinator for Tibetan 

Issues and her office to ensure that Tibetan issues are raised frequently and candidly with China’s leaders. The Department of State is deeply concerned by the 

human rights situation in Tibetan areas and by the lack of progress during nine 

rounds of talks between the Chinese Government and the Dalai Lama’s representatives. If confirmed, in consultation with the Special Coordinator, I will support further dialogue between China and the representatives of the Dalai Lama to resolve 

concerns and differences, including the preservation of the religious, linguistic and 

cultural identity of the Tibetan people. 

CHINA AND TRAVEL

Question. I am troubled with the across-the-board restrictions and policy of selective access that China has applied to travel within China by U.S. diplomats and visiting U.S. Chinese officials have the ability to travel anywhere they want in the 

United States, and have the freedom to engage in a broad range of Chinese cultural 

promotion activities on American soil.

• Will you push for greater freedom of movement for U.S. diplomats in China, including travel to ‘‘sensitive’’ areas such as Tibetan areas and East Turkestan?

Answer. I will continue to advocate for greater freedom of movement for U.S. diplomats everywhere in China. The United States can only generate accurate information on developments in China by traveling frequently to all parts of the country 

and engaging with the people there. With the notable and unfortunate exception of 

Tibet and some Tibetan areas at ‘‘sensitive’’ times, Embassy officers generally face 

few restrictions on travel within China. However, they are generally unable to meet 

with provincial and local Chinese officials or institutions (including universities) unless they obtain approval from the Foreign Ministry and its local offices. U.S. 

diplomats regularly visit the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and Tibetan 

areas outside of the Tibet Autonomous Region to advance the full range of U.S. interests in those areas—particularly the safety and welfare of U.S. citizens. Charge ́

d’Affaires Robert Wang visited Xinjiang in May. None of these visits were officially 

approved, and hence U.S. diplomats could not engage with provincial and local officials or universities during their visits. 

Travel to the Tibet Autonomous Region is restricted by the Chinese Government, 

and our official visits are approved on a case-by-case basis and then only rarely. 

Although then-Ambassador Huntsman was allowed to travel there in September 

2010, many other requests have been denied. Visits to Tibetan areas of Sichuan are 

often denied on the ground by local police although the area is open in principle. 

This is a serious problem that I will seek to address. The U.S. Government has long 

pressed for free and full access to the Tibet Autonomous Region for American dipVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00266 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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lomats and also for Members of Congress and foreign journalists. If confirmed, I will 

continue to raise this issue at high levels.

Question. How do you plan to push back on Chinese restrictions on legitimate U.S. 

cultural and educational activities in China?

Answer. Despite some opening up over the last few decades, China remains a 

challenging environment for the United States to conduct public diplomacy, due in 

large part to the Chinese Government’s ongoing attempts to control the dissemination of information in China. In particular, in recent months, various Chinese authorities cancelled certain planned U.S. mission outreach activities. The Department 

of State has expressed our objections to these measures to senior Chinese officials 

on multiple occasions, and has emphasized how such actions impede our stated intention to improve people-to-people ties between our two countries. There has been 

a resumption of some of these activities in recent weeks. 

To address these challenges, the State Department has been pushing for greater 

access and programming, using the opportunities we find, and protesting obstacles 

we encounter. 

The Embassy has raised this issue repeatedly in meetings with Chinese leaders 

and other officials, including in both sessions of the U.S.-China High-Level Consultation on People-to-People Exchange (in May 2010 and April 2011). I would also 

encourage congressional leaders to raise this issue in contacts with Chinese officials 

as well. If confirmed, I will ensure that we continue to raise the issue. But just as 

important, I will continue promoting the development of new and innovative programming tools and platforms for reaching out to the Chinese people. 

CHINA AND NGOS

Question. There are a number of U.S. NGOs that work in China or provide financial support to Chinese NGOs working on areas considered sensitive by the Chinese 

Government, such as human rights NGOs and those working in Tibet. In recent 

years, many of these groups and their in-country partners have come under pressure from the Chinese Government, particularly those who have a U.S. Government 

funding source, such as organizations that work with the National Endowment for 

Democracy and its affiliates, and U.S. NGOs working in Tibetan areas.

• Will you be willing to meet and consult with the U.S. NGOs doing sensitive 

work in China on how the embassy can best support their efforts?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will consult with a wide range of American citizens 

and organizations that deal with the many aspects of United States-China relations, 

including human rights. The State Department’s Bureau for Democracy, Human 

Rights, and Labor supports many active and important programs in the rule of law 

and civil society development, among others. I have already met with Assistant Secretary Michael Posner to discuss his views on human rights in China, and if confirmed, will continue to conduct further consultations, including with NGOs, to learn 

more about programs and support our common objectives in China .

Question. Should you be confirmed, will you meet with American organizations 

and individuals that work on human rights in China before you take up your post 

in Beijing?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will consult with a wide range of American citizens 

and organizations that deal with the many aspects of United States-China relations, 

including human rights. 

CHINA, THE MACAU SPECIAL AUTONOMOUS REGION AND THE EXPROPRIATION OF U.S.-

OWNED VIVA MACAU AIRLINES BY THE GOVERNMENT OF MACAU ON MARCH 28, 2010

Question. The Chinese Communist Government has taken steps over the last decade to encourage the Macau Special Autonomous Region to open itself to foreign investment, to diversify its local economy, and serve as a platform for trade between 

China and the West. As a result of these initiatives, Macau has received billions 

of dollars in foreign investment and expertise from the United States, the largest 

source of foreign direct investment for Macau. This has all helped Macau expand 

its economy beyond the gaming industry. 

However, actions taken in recent months by the Macau Government appear to signal a troubling downward trend in the treatment of U.S. investors. This raises serious questions about the Macau Government’s attitude toward foreign investors and 

the ability of foreign companies to protect their investments. Most glaring among 

these is the expropriation of U.S.-owned Viva Macau Airlines by the Government 

of Macau on March 28, 2010. 

260

This expropriation, apparently the first by the Macau Government against property owned by American investors, was recognized in the State Department’s March 

2011 Report on U.S. Citizen Expropriation Claims and Certain Other Commercial 

and Investment Disputes and represents not only a serious downward turn for the 

treatment of investors from the United States in Macau, but also a disregard for 

international aviation norms. 

Viva Macau was denied legal recourse for over 11 months, but Macau’s Court of 

Last Instance has finally ordered a hearing on the merits of Viva Macau’s case 

against the Macau Government; though a fair trial is far from guaranteed. During 

those 11 months, I along with other Members of Congress have pushed the Chinese 

Central Government in Beijing and the Government of Macau to respect the rule 

of law and ensure that such expropriations not occur with such impunity. 

Although the United States has limited leverage over the Government of Macau, 

the Chinese Communists Government obviously does. They oversee Macau’s affairs 

through the State Council’s Office of Hong Kong and Macau Affairs and the Foreign 

Ministry. In particular, I understand that Wang Guangya, the newly appointed 

Director of the State Council’s Office of Hong Kong and Macau Affairs and China’s 

former Ambassador to the United Nations, is the key policymaker with day-to-day 

responsibility for Macau. 

In my letter of February 10, 2011, to Secretary Clinton on this matter, I asked 

that Ambassador Huntsman raise the Viva Macau cause with Wang Guangya to ensure that American interests in Macau are protected. I believe several other Members of Congress interested in protecting the interest of U.S. businesses and seeking 

to promote a mutually beneficial United States-China trade relationship have sent 

similar letters.

• In your potential new role as U.S. Ambassador to China, will you be vigilant 

in protecting the commercial interests of U.S. businesses injured by Chinese 

and Macau Government action, including ensuring those U.S. entities seeking 

remedies before local courts are given a fair trial?

Answer. Developing commercial cooperation with China has been a focus of mine 

for more than a decade. If confirmed, helping U.S. companies do more business in 

China and ensuring that Chinese Government policies and actions create a level 

playing field for U.S. businesses will be a major part of what I do every day as 

Ambassador. 

As the second largest foreign investors in Macau after Hong Kong, U.S. busi- nesses have invested more than $8 billion in Macau over the past 6 years. As a 

result, protecting U.S. business interests in Macau is one of the U.S. State Department’s top priorities. Regarding Viva Macau, State and Commerce Department officials have met with MKW Capital Management’s (MKW) partners and their Washington-based legal advisors Patton Boggs (PB) on numerous occasions since April 

2010. U.S. diplomats at our Consulate General in Hong Kong continue to raise the 

matter with Macau Government officials on a regular basis, including with Macau’s 

Chief Executive. In all such meetings, we have stressed the importance of transparency and due process for U.S. investors in Macau. 

The State Department continues to monitor developments in this case closely and 

understands that Macau’s Court of Final Appeal ruled in Viva Macau’s favor on 

February 23 by returning the case to the Court of Second Instance. That Court will 

have to decide whether there was an administrative act from the government instructing Air Macau to revoke Viva Macau’s air operator certificate and, if so, if 

such an act was legal. State Department officers have explained to MKW that Viva 

Macau should continue to pursue all local remedies available. 

Longstanding U.S. policy toward the Macau Special Administrative Region of the 

People’s Republic of China is to support ‘‘one country, two systems’’ and Macau’s autonomy under the Basic Law. Under the Basic Law, Macau has jurisdiction over 

commercial/economic, legal, and all other matters outside national security and foreign affairs.

Question. Will you commit to raising the Viva Macau issue with the Chinese Government, including with Wang Guangya, and communicating the U.S. Government 

and Congress’ interest in ensuring that Viva Macau is treated fairly by the government and courts of Macau?

Answer. Protecting U.S. business interests in Macau is one of the U.S. State 

Department’s top priorities. Nonetheless, involving the Government of the People’s 

Republic of China in Beijing in the Viva Macau case would, in our view, run counter 

to longstanding U.S. policy toward Macau, which is to support ‘‘one country, two 

systems’’ and Macau’s autonomy under the Basic Law. Under the Basic Law, Macau 

has jurisdiction over commercial/economic, legal, and all other matters outside national security and foreign affairs. Therefore, we continue to believe that the best 

261

channel for expressing U.S. concerns to the Government of Macau is through the 

U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong, which has responsibilities for Macau. U.S. 

diplomats at our Consulate General in Hong Kong continue to raise the viva Macau 

case with Macau Government officials on a regular basis, including Macau’s Chief 

Executive.

Question. Will you ensure that a representative of the U.S. Government attends 

any future court hearings related to this case to help further stress our interest in 

this matter?

Answer. State Department officials have met with MKW Capital Management’s 

(MKW) partners and their Washington-based legal advisors Patton Boggs (PB) on 

numerous occasions since April 2010. U.S. diplomats at our Consulate General in 

Hong Kong continue to raise the matter with Macau Government officials on a regular basis, including with Macau’s Chief Executive. In all such meetings, officers 

have stressed the importance of transparency and due process for U.S. investors in 

Macau. 

The State Department continues to monitor developments in this case closely and 

understands that Macau’s Court of Final Appeal ruled in Viva Macau’s favor on 

February 23 by returning the case to the Court of Second Instance. That Court will 

have to decide whether there was an administrative act from the government instructing Air Macau to revoke Viva Macau’s air operator certificate and, if so, if 

such an act was legal. State Department officers have explained to MKW that Viva 

Macau should continue to pursue all local remedies available.

Question. Should you be confirmed, would you be willing to meet with representatives of Viva Macau Airlines before you depart for Beijing in order to receive a better understanding of its case?

Answer. Longstanding U.S. policy toward the Macau Special Administrative 

Region of the People’s Republic of China is to support ‘‘one country, two systems’’ 

and Macau’s autonomy under the Basic Law. Under the Basic Law, Macau has 

jurisdiction over commercial/economic, legal, and all other matters outside national 

security and foreign affairs. The U.S. Consul General in Hong Kong, Ambassador 

Stephen Young, has chief of mission authority for Macau and is the appropriate person to address issues concerning Viva Macau. 

RESPONSE OF GARY LOCKE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN BARRASSO

Question. As you know, many U.S. industries have expressed a wide variety of 

concerns surrounding China’s trade practices. Wyoming’s soda ash and beef producers are prime examples of industries that have been battered by unfair trade 

policies. 

China continues to provide a 9 percent rebate on its 17 percent value-added tax 

(VAT) for soda ash exports in an attempt to give their producers an advantage in 

the international marketplace at the expense of U.S. producers. As a result, I would 

like to see the Department of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative’s Office 

raise this specific issue at the highest levels with Chinese officials at the JCCT 

meetings this year. 

In addition, China’s continued ban on U.S. beef imports has allowed Australia to 

take our place as the leading foreign beef supplier to China by value. The market 

that was once the 10th-largest for U.S. beef exports has disappeared.

• If confirmed, will you work with the U.S. Trade Representative, Secretary of 

State, and Chinese Government officials to address these issues?

Answer. I share your concern about the potential detrimental effects of China’s 

export promotion practices. 

Soda ash is one of the United States more significant chemical exports, and the 

issues you have raised are important ones. I concur that these Chinese VAT rebate 

policies can adversely affect the ability of our producers to compete in third-country 

markets. Moreover, I appreciate that natural soda ash production processes, such 

as those that dominate in the United States, are more environmentally friendly and 

less energy-intensive than the processes used in some countries such as China. 

Regarding beef, China’s restrictions on U.S. beef are inconsistent with the recommendations of the World Organization for Animal Health. The U.S. Government 

is in dialogue with the Chinese Government to agree on a beef protocol that is consistent with international standards and is commercially viable. Reopening beef 

trade with China is a top priority for U.S. ranchers, and we continue to work on 

resolving this issue. 

262

If confirmed, I will work closely with the U.S. Trade Representative, the Secretary 

of State and Chinese officials to resolve our concerns with China’s export policies 

and to support the interests of U.S. exporters, including soda ash and beef 

producers. 

(263)

NOMINATIONS 

TUESDAY, JUNE 7, 2011

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

Jeanine E. Jackson, of Wyoming, to be Ambassador to the Republic 

of Malawi 

Geeta Pasi, of New York, to be Ambassador to the Republic of 

Djibouti 

Donald Koran, of California, to be Ambassador to the Republic of 

Rwanda 

Lewis Lukens, of Virginia, to be Ambassador to the Republic of 

Senegal and to serve concurrently as Ambassador to the 

Republic of Guinea-Bissau 

Ariel Pablos-Me ́ndez, of New York, to be Assistant Administrator 

of the United States Agency for International Development 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher A. 

Coons, presiding. 

Present: Senators Coons and Isakson. 

Also present: Senators Michael B. Enzi and John Barrasso. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. COONS,

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE 

Senator COONS. I’d like to call the subcommittee to order. I’m 

honored to chair this hearing for the nominees to serve as United 

States Ambassadors to Rwanda, Djibouti, Malawi, Senegal, and 

Guinea-Bissau, and the USAID Assistant Administrator for Global 

Health. 

Today’s nominees bring to the table a vast array of experience, 

specifically in Africa and serving our Nation around the world, and 

I look forward to hearing their vision for advancing U.S. interests 

and policy priorities. 

Before we begin, I’d like to reflect briefly on my very recent trip 

to West Africa with Senator Isakson. Traveling in Nigeria, Ghana, 

and Benin over the past week, we witnessed first-hand the implementation of critical food security, global health, and development 

programs, in addition to United States policy aimed at making critical improvements in governance, transparency, and sustainable 

economic growth. 

264

At each step, we met with elected officials, the U.S. Ambassadors, Embassy teams, Peace Corps Volunteers, and representatives from USAID, and I am proud and grateful for their service 

and commitment to diplomacy and impressed more than ever with 

the central role that our ambassadors play around the world. 

As Senator Isakson noted during our trip, Africa’s vast array of 

potential opportunities makes it the continent of the 21st century 

for the United States. During this nomination hearing, I look forward to continuing that conversation. I was grateful to Senator 

Isakson and his staff and the staff of this committee for putting together a very, very meaningful trip for all of us to West Africa. 

Our first nominee today is Donald Koran to be Ambassador to 

Rwanda, which has emerged from the shadows of the genocide of 

1994 to make progress in economic reform and health. Today 

Rwanda has one of the fastest growing economies in Africa, and 

United States policy encouraging economic liberalization while focusing on needed improvements to democracy and governance is essential to its future. 

Mr. Koran is a career Foreign Service officer currently serving as 

the Director of Africa Analysis in the Bureau of Intelligence and 

Research at State, and his previous relevant assignments include 

Division Chief for West and Southern African Affairs in the Bureau 

of Intelligence and Research; Deputy Chief of Mission in Kigali, 

Rwanda; and desk officer for the DRC, Cameroon, and Equatorial 

Guinea. 

Geeta Pasi is the nominee to be Ambassador to Djibouti, a key 

strategic ally in the region and home to the U.S. Combined Joint 

Task Force–Horn of Africa at Camp, I believe, Lemonnier. Djibouti 

is a valuable partner when it comes to combating piracy and other 

sources of instability in Somalia and the Horn, and I look forward 

to hearing from Ms. Pasi on balancing U.S. strategic interests in 

Djibouti with a broader set of regional concerns, including promoting democracy, good governance, and human rights. 

Ms. Pasi is a career member of the Foreign Service and currently 

serves as Director of the Office of East African Affairs in the Bureau of African Affairs. Her other relevant experiences include 

posts as political-economic and international relations officers in 

Ghana, Cameroon, and West African Affairs. 

Ms. Jeanine Jackson is the Ambassador nominee for Malawi. Malawi has made recent progress combating corruption and developing its largely agriculturally based economy, though many challenges still remain. In April, our country signed a $350 million Millennium Challenge Corporation compact with Malawi. I look forward to hearing about what steps are being taken to ensure the 

government does not pursue deeply concerning new laws aimed at 

restricting human rights and media freedom. 

Ms. Jackson is a career member of the Foreign Service, currently 

serving as the Minister Counselor for Management at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, and in addition to several posts coordinating 

diplomatic activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, Ms. Jackson previously served as U.S. Ambassador to Burkina Faso. 

Lewis Lukens is the nominee to be U.S. Ambassador to Senegal 

and, concurrently, Guinea-Bissau. He’s a career member of the Foreign Service, currently serving as Executive Director of the SecreVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00272 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
265

tariat of the State Department. He previously served as Consul 

General in Vancouver, Executive Secretary in Baghdad, and Senior 

Director for Administration at the National Security Council in addition to tours in Cote d’Ivoire, China, and Australia. 

Senegal is a moderate and largely secular democracy, which has 

experienced economic growth over the past decade but still faces 

challenges alleviating poverty and disease. And I look forward to 

hearing from Mr. Lukens about how the United States can promote 

growth in Senegal, including through the MCC, while combating 

drug trafficking in the region, in particular Guinea-Bissau. 

Finally, we will hear from Dr. Ariel Pablos-Me ́ndez, the nominee 

to be Assistant Administrator for Global Health at USAID. Dr. 

Pablos-Me ́ndez currently serves as managing director of the Rockefeller Foundation, where he works to develop initiatives to address 

the global challenge of health systems, including the role of the private sector in health systems in the developing world. 

His work in global health spans two decades, including as a researcher and physician focusing on multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis, developing public-private partnerships to combat disease, 

and delivery mechanisms for HIV/AIDS treatments to mothers and 

families. 

And I look forward to hearing from him about his plans for integrating global health programs, and transitioning authority for 

GHI, the Global Health Initiative, from State to USAID, as envisioned in the QDDR, or the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. 

This is a critical moment for USAID to demonstrate leadership 

over U.S. health programs globally, and Dr. Pablos-Me ́ndez will sit 

at the helm of this historic and important change. 

I look forward to hearing about plans for meeting the benchmarks in the QDDR and to better integrating GHI, so we can effectively promote global health. 

I’m very pleased to, thus, welcome all of today’s distinguished 

nominees. I look forward to your opening statements. But first, I 

will turn it over to Senator Isakson for his opening statement and 

then to Senators Barrasso and Enzi, who have joined us to introduce Jeanine Jackson. 

Senator Isakson. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON,

U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to 

Senator Enzi and Senator Barrasso. 

Ms. Jackson, you’ve been bragged about extensively in some of 

the meetings I’ve had with both these gentlemen already, so you 

do not come unnoticed, and you’re very welcome to have you today, 

as we are all of the nominees for ambassadorship and USAID. 

I’ve had the privilege of being in both Rwanda and Djibouti, both 

of which are significant countries for the United States of America. 

President Kagame in Rwanda has done a remarkable job in 

transforming a nation from genocide to democracy, and in improving the health and the future of those people. And Djibouti is one 

of the most significant unknown investments of the United States 

of America there probably is on any continent in the world. And 

266

having visited our troops there, and the many things they do there 

on the Persian Gulf and on the East African coast are very much 

appreciated. 

I have not been to Guinea-Bissau, but, as the chairman said, we 

just returned from Benin and Ghana and from Nigeria, and many 

of the things that are going on in those three countries are pretty 

much germane to Guinea-Bissau, in particular with USAID. 

We had the privilege of participating in a signing of a memorandum of understanding where a United States NGO, through 

USAID, is developing a critical maternity ward in the largest maternity hospital in Accra, Ghana, and really going to develop a better chance for babies born at risk to actually survive. And it’s a 

great investment of private United States money coordinated by 

USAID and the people of Ghana. 

We also had the privilege to work with USAID on a project in 

northern Ghana, or the north of capital, in their biggest agricultural asset, which is pineapple. Because of what’s happened with 

Millennium Challenge investment and the assistance of USAID, 

we’ve turned some difficult situations for the farmers to actually 

make a living to where they now have a cooperative, like many in 

the United States. And through the investment of Millennium 

Challenge, we are working ourselves out of foreign assistance, because they are now profitable and productive in that product. And 

we’re grateful for what USAID does in on a day-in-day-out basis, 

in terms of coordinating those events in Africa. 

But I do welcome all of you, and thank you very much for your 

willingness to serve in some very difficult parts of the world. 

And again, as the chairman has said, welcome Senator Enzi and 

Senator Barrasso to our hearing. 

Senator COONS. Thank you very much, Senator Isakson. 

And we’d now like to invite both of the Senators from Wyoming 

to make some introductory comments about Jeanine Jackson, the 

nominee to serve as Ambassador to Malawi. 

Following their comments, I’ll invite Ms. Jackson to give her 

opening statement, if I might. 

Senator Barrasso. I’m sorry, Senator Enzi. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL B. ENZI,

U.S. SENATOR FROM WYOMING 

Senator ENZI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s my privilege and 

honor to be able to recommend to you the nomination of Jeanine 

Jackson to be the United States Ambassador to Malawi. I strongly 

support her nomination. She’s an excellent candidate for this important diplomatic position, and she has the distinction of being 

from Sheridan, WY, where Diana, my wife who is also here today 

in support, and I graduated from high school along with Jeanine, 

although I graduated quite a while before Jeanine did. 

But my wife and Jeanine were classmates. They were best 

friends. They were fellow church members and fellow American Legion Girls State delegates. 

I’m proud that an outstanding Wyoming native, who I’ve known 

for decades, has been nominated to contribute to this important foreign-policy goal of the United States in Africa. 

267

I introduced Jeanine to this committee 5 years ago when she was 

nominated to be the Ambassador to Burkina Faso. That was also 

a country that, with her help, got a Millennium Challenge grant. 

And at this post she’ll be able to work with a country that has one 

as they complete the tasks on that. 

She excelled in her role in Burkina Faso, and she had the distinction at that time of being Wyoming’s first career Foreign Service officer to be an ambassador. Today I introduce her as the first 

Wyomingite ever to have a second ambassadorship. 

Ambassador Jackson’s experience is extensive. She’s a career 

senior Foreign Service officer and also served 30 years in the military and retired as a full colonel. She and her husband, Mark, have 

served together in the Army and the Foreign Service. Mark is now 

retired and will serve in an unpaid role of ambassador spouse, 

which also benefits our country and Malawi, so you could say we’re 

going to get two for the price of one. 

Ambassador Jackson has served our country with the military in 

Vietnam, Germany, and Korea, and in the Foreign Service, she’s 

been in Switzerland, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Hong Kong, Kenya, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Burkina Faso. 

Currently, she’s completing 26 months as the Senior Management Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, by far the largest, most complex embassy in the world. She’s leading all supportrelated planning and implementation to continue the efficient functioning of our Embassy in Iraq after the U.S. military completes its 

drawdown later this year. 

You can tell that Ambassador Jackson doesn’t shirk hard assignments. We watched through her eyes and through her explanation, 

as she’s lived around the world. She’s helped us to understand the 

world and around the world. In 2001, she became the first senior 

U.S. diplomat to serve in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban. 

In Kenya, in the years after al-Qaeda bombings, she played a major 

role in rebuilding the staff, operations, and infrastructure. In Hong 

Kong, she protected the interests of the U.S. Government agencies 

and employees at the time of the reversion to Chinese sovereignty. 

And here’s one of the most fascinating ones to me, when the Soviet 

Union dissolved, she managed the establishment of U.S. embassies 

in 14 new countries. 

The United States faces diverse and dynamic challenges and opportunities in Malawi. Promoting development includes an emphasis on the elimination of poverty, transparent governance, economic 

reform, anticorruption practices, and greater political and economic 

participation. 

She was able to do those things in Burkina Faso, where she had 

to speak French. Here she gets to speak English. 

Individuals like Jeanine Jackson understand these complexities, 

and they’ll help the United States to achieve its goal. Because of 

her diverse experience, she can evaluate and persuade. She understands cultural differences and can adapt her approach. 

Ambassador Jackson and Mark have taken on some very challenging assignments around the world and often enjoy driving to 

their new posts, once even driving from their post in Switzerland 

to the new post in Nigeria across the Sahara Desert. Nearly every 

weekend when I’m in Wyoming, I drive hundreds of miles across 

268

the State to visit my constituents. Ambassador Jackson probably 

has driven close to 20,000 miles across Africa. The deserts and 

mountains of Wyoming are a long way from Malawi, but I know 

that Ambassador Jackson’s childhood in Wyoming has prepared her 

for the adventures and challenges of serving in Africa. 

It’s a proud day for Diana and I. It’s a proud day for Sheridan. 

It’s a proud day for the State of Wyoming. And I want to enthusiastically endorse Jeanine Jackson on her nomination for Malawi. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COONS. Thank you very much, Senator Enzi. 

Senator Barrasso. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN BARRASSO,

U.S. SENATOR FROM WYOMING 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and 

Senator Isakson. And I, too, want to add my congratulations as 

well as my support, along with that of Senator Enzi. 

And I want to take just a moment to speak in recognition and 

support of the nomination of Ambassador Jeanine Jackson to be 

the United States Ambassador to Malawi. She is an excellent nominee. She will bring a tremendous amount of knowledge, experience, 

and energy to this position. 

As you know, she’s a native of Sheridan, WY, and I’m really 

pleased to have such a highly qualified, skilled individual from Wyoming to be nominated to serve the United States in this important 

diplomatic position. 

She’s currently serving as Minister Counselor for Management at 

the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq. And I’ve had the pleasure of 

meeting with her, as well as her husband, at the Embassy in Baghdad during visits there. She’s demonstrated to me her knowledge, 

her focus, and her determination. So I’m very grateful for her willingness, as well as that of her husband, to serve our country and 

provide strong leadership in implementing the foreign-policy goals 

of the United States. 

Based on our discussions together and her extensive background 

in Africa, I’m confident that she grasps the opportunities and the 

challenges facing both Africa as well as Malawi. It is clear that she 

will make her family, as well as the people of Wyoming and our 

Nation, very proud. So I add with Senator Enzi my wholehearted 

endorsement and recommendation of her nomination to the committee and the full Senate. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COONS. Thank you very much, Senator Barrasso. 

I think Senator Isakson would also like to add a comment. 

Senator ISAKSON. Senator Enzi, is Diana in the room? 

Senator ENZI. Yes. 

Senator ISAKSON. Where is Diana? 

Diana, stand up, would you? Don’t sit down yet. 

You know, an awful lot of times, the spouses of U.S. Senators get 

no attention at all. I have traveled with Diana to India and to Sri 

Lanka to see a demonstration of the mine-sniffing dogs that she 

has provided to countries around the world to save children from 

losing limbs or losing their lives. 

269

So a lot of times, we get all the pictures and the publicity and 

the attention, but this lady is exemplary of the other wives and 

spouses of Members of the Senate who also do their part to make 

this country a better country and the world a better world, and I 

commend you, Diane, for what you do. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator. 

And thank you, Diane, for being with us. 

And Senator Enzi and Senator Barrasso, thank you very much 

for joining us today. Understanding your schedules may require 

you to be at other events, I’d welcome you to excuse yourselves at 

this point, if that’s more convenient for you. 

Ms. Jackson, if I might encourage you to begin with your opening 

statement, and then we’ll go through the rest of the nominees. 

And I would encourage all of the nominees to introduce your 

families, who should be recognized along with you for the great sacrifices they have made to support your commitments to public service, whether the military, the State Department, AID, or elsewhere. 

Ms. Jackson. 

Ambassador JACKSON. Mr. Chairman——

Senator COONS. I’m sorry, and I’ll invite the other nominees to 

come forward to the table as well at this time. 

Forgive the interruption, Ms. Jackson. 

Thank you. Ms. Jackson. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JEANINE E. JACKSON, OF WYOMING, TO 

BE AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF MALAWI 

Ambassador JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Isakson, it is a great 

honor and privilege to appear before you today as President 

Obama’s nominee to be the United States Ambassador to the Republic of Malawi. 

I appreciate the confidence the President and Secretary Clinton 

have placed in me by putting my name forward for your consideration. I’m also deeply grateful for the support of Senator Enzi; his 

wife, Diane; Senator Barrasso; and my husband, Mark; as well as 

the terrific support of the State Department’s Africa Bureau. 

Having served as Ambassador to Burkina Faso, I’m aware of the 

importance, if confirmed, of working with this committee and the 

Congress in order to advance United States interests in Malawi, including strengthening its democratic institutions, encouraging economic diversification, and building its health and education capacity. 

Since joining the Foreign Service in 1985, I have held numerous 

positions overseas and in Washington. This experience, in addition 

to my military service, impressed upon me a clear understanding 

of the critical role that interagency cooperation plays, both in U.S. 

missions and here in Washington, in developing and implementing 

U.S. foreign policy. 

My expertise with U.S. Government agencies is invaluable in my 

current assignment as Management Counselor of the United States 

Embassy in Baghdad. I lead large teams of U.S. Government civilians and military personnel to provide, in a hostile environment, 

the support platform for the world’s largest embassy and the 35 

U.S. Government agencies represented in our country team in Iraq. 

270

Malawi, from its independence in 1964 until 1994, was a oneparty state under authoritarian rule. Since 1994, when the people 

of Malawi voted in their first democratic, free, and fair elections, 

Malawi has strengthened its democratic institutions and has undergone peaceful transfers of power among political parties. The 

people of Malawi are proud that women comprise 22 percent of 

Parliament. 

The economy of this small, landlocked country is heavily dependent on agriculture. This creates challenges, but the Malawian Government has taken steps to greatly increase productivity. Mineral 

deposits were recently discovered, which may present opportunities 

for Malawi to diversify its economy. 

If confirmed, I look forward to assisting Malawi in addressing 

some of its most pressing needs with a focus on strengthening its 

health systems, providing quality education, and further developing 

democratic processes. The United States has active U.S. Agency for 

International Development, Centers for Disease Control, and Peace 

Corps programs, many of which are supported through PEPFAR. 

Malawi was the first country to sign a PEPFAR partnership framework and was selected to be one of eight Global Health Initiative 

Plus countries. 

This year, the Millennium Challenge Corporation signed a $350 

million compact with Malawi to improve access to electrical power 

and which should enable further economic gains. 

Malawi maintains good relations with the United States. It was 

the first southern African nation to receive United States-sponsored peacekeeping training and recently contributed troops to the 

U.N. operation in Cote d’Ivoire. 

Malawi’s cooperation on many issues is welcome, but we still 

have concerns. We are sensitive to the need for individual freedoms, including individual preferences. And we support a political 

space that is open to all. 

If confirmed, I would work to support such a space for all 

Malawians. 

Although Malawi is a small country, it remains one of the most 

underdeveloped. It is, nonetheless, a strategic partner of the United 

States. Despite ongoing challenges, Malawi holds great promise. If 

confirmed, I would look forward to working with the Government 

of Malawi and its people on mutual goals of a healthier, better educated, more prosperous citizenry that embraces democratic values. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I will be happy to answer questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Jackson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JEANINE E. JACKSON

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a great honor and privilege 

to appear before you today as President Obama’s nominee to be the United States 

Ambassador to the Republic of Malawi. I appreciate the confidence the President 

and Secretary Clinton have placed in me by putting my name forward for your consideration. I am also deeply grateful for the support of my husband Mark, a retired 

Foreign Service officer. 

Having previously served as Ambassador to Burkina Faso, I am aware of the importance, if confirmed, of working with this committee and the Congress in order 

to advance U.S. interests in Malawi, including strengthening its democratic institutions, encouraging economic diversification, and building its health and education 

capacity. 

271

Since joining the Foreign Service in 1985, I have held numerous positions overseas and in Washington. This experience, in addition to my military service, 

impressed upon me a clear understanding of the critical role that interagency 

cooperation plays both in U.S. missions and here in Washington in developing and 

implementing U.S. foreign policy. My expertise with U.S. Government agencies is 

invaluable in my current assignment as Management Counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. I lead large teams of U.S. Government civilians and military personnel to provide, in a hostile environment, the support platform for the world’s 

largest Embassy and the 35 U.S. Government agencies represented on its country 

team. 

From its independence in 1964, Malawi was a one-party state under authoritarian 

control. Since 1994, when the people of Malawi voted in their first democratic, free, 

and fair elections, Malawi has strengthened its democratic institutions and has 

undergone peaceful transfers of power among political parties. The people of Malawi 

are proud that women comprise 22 percent of the Parliament. 

The economy of this small, landlocked country is heavily dependent on agriculture. This creates challenges but the Malawian Government has taken steps to 

greatly increase productivity. Mineral deposits were recently discovered which may 

present opportunities for Malawi to diversify its economy. If confirmed, I look forward to assisting Malawi in addressing some of its most pressing needs with a focus 

on strengthening its health systems; providing quality education; and further developing democratic processes. The United States has active U.S. Agency for International Development, Centers for Disease Control and Peace Corps programs, 

many of which are supported through PEPFAR. Malawi was the first country to 

sign a PEPFAR Partnership Framework, and was selected to be one of eight Global 

Health Initiative Plus countries. This year, the Millennium Challenge Corporation 

signed a $350 million compact with Malawi to improve access to electrical power, 

which should enable further economic gains. 

Malawi maintains good relations with the United States. It was the first southern 

African nation to receive U.S.-sponsored peacekeeping training and recently contributed troops to the U.N. Operation in Cote d’Ivoire. 

Malawi’s cooperation on many issues is welcome, but we still have concerns: we 

are sensitive to the need for individual freedoms, including individual preferences, 

and we support a political space that is open to all. If confirmed, I would work to 

support such a space for all Malawians. 

Although Malawi is a small country and remains one of the most underdeveloped, 

it is nonetheless, a strategic partner of the United States. Despite ongoing challenges, Malawi holds great promise. If confirmed, I would look forward to working 

with the Government of Malawi and its people on mutual goals of a healthier, better 

educated, more prosperous citizenry that embraces democratic values. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I will be happy to answer any questions.

Senator COONS. Thank you very much, Ms. Jackson. 

Now if we might go to the other end of the panel and work our 

way down. 

Ms. Pasi. 

STATEMENT OF GEETA PASI, OF NEW YORK, TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF DJIBOUTI 

Ms. PASI. Thank you, Chairman Coons, Ranking Member 

Isakson, members of the committee. It’s an honor to appear before 

you today as the nominee to be the next United States Ambassador 

to the Republic of Djibouti. 

I’m grateful for the confidence the President and Secretary of 

State have shown by nominating me to this position and for the 

support of Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Johnnie Carson. 

First, Mr. Chairman, please allow me to acknowledge my family 

members who are here today. My sisters, Usha Pasi and Rita Pasi; 

my brother, Peter Pasi; and his wife, Halley Lewis, have all joined 

me this morning. 

Mr. Chairman, please allow me to tell you a little bit about myself. My career has included challenging assignments that required 

272

me to adapt to rapidly changing environments. I’ve served in several countries in transition and was in Ghana during its first 

democratic elections and Romania shortly after the fall of Nicolae 

Ceausescu. During a state of emergency, I helped steer Bangladesh 

toward democratic elections. 

In Washington, I served in several positions, including as the Afghanistan desk officer, where I was working on September 11, 

2001. 

I currently serve as office director for East African Affairs and 

have policy and program responsibility for 11 countries in East Africa. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I look forward to leading Embassy 

Djibouti in advancing U.S. interests. Our main interests in Djibouti 

are peace and security, good governance, and economic development. 

Mr. Chairman, as you know, we share important interests and 

goals with Djibouti, an area of relative calm in a turbulent region, 

and an important partner in the fight against terrorism. Djibouti 

is surrounded by Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia, and is less than 

18 miles from Yemen. It has a strategic position at the Bab el 

Mandeb Strait, which joins the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, and 

through which some 40 percent of the world’s shipping passes. 

If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I will continue to reinforce our bilateral relationship, as well as contribute to efforts to promote a stable, functioning, and peaceful Somalia, in coordination with our 

mission in Nairobi. 

Djibouti hosts the only United States military forward-operating 

site in sub-Saharan Africa, Camp Lemonnier, the headquarters for 

the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa, or CJTF–HOA, and 

approximately 3,000 troops. I understand that you, Senator 

Isakson, and Senator Inhofe have visited Camp Lemonnier. If confirmed, I will continue to expand cooperation and coordination between Embassy personnel and Camp Lemonnier and its tenant 

commands. 

If confirmed, I will also ensure that CJTF–HOA programming in 

Djibouti fits within the framework of U.S. Government priorities to 

advance our key interests. 

Mr. Chairman, Djibouti’s Presidential election in April underscored the importance of democracy and governance reforms, including enlarging space for media and civil society. If confirmed, I 

commit to work with our Djiboutian partners on these issues. 

On the economic front, Djibouti’s leadership has privatized its excellent deepwater port and airport, reducing corruption and increasing revenue flows. Construction of a new port facility is underway and will dramatically increase capacity. 

Djibouti remains very poor, however, ranked 149 out of 177 countries on the UNDP Human Development Index. In addition, less 

than 5 percent of the land is arable. Our small USAID mission in 

Djibouti focuses on governance and democracy; health and education, particularly to combat low life expectancy; maternal and 

child mortality; and infectious disease. The United States also responds to food insecurity needs. If confirmed, I will make these programs a priority. 

273

Finally, Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, my highest priority will be 

the protection of Americans and American business interests, including mission personnel living and traveling in Djibouti. In the 

fall, the mission will move to a new Embassy compound, meaning 

that all mission personnel will work in the safest and most secure 

facilities available. I am committed to good stewardship of this significant U.S. Government investment. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe my prior experience in the Foreign Service has prepared me to serve as Ambassador to Djibouti. If confirmed by the Senate, I look forward to working closely with you 

and other members of the committee, and would hope to welcome 

you during my tenure. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the honor to appear before 

the committee today. I would be happy to take any questions you 

may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Pasi follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEETA PASI

Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, Members of the Committee, it is an 

honor to appear before you today as the nominee to be the next United States Ambassador to the Republic of Djibouti. I am grateful for the confidence the President 

and Secretary of State have shown by nominating me to this position, and for the 

support of Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Johnnie Carson. 

First, Mr. Chairman, let me acknowledge several family members and colleagues 

here today. My sister, Rita Pasi, brother, Peter Pasi, and his wife, Hallie Lewis, 

have all joined me. I am pleased to appear before you on this panel with my three 

colleagues, Don Koran, Lewis Lukens, and Jeanine Jackson. 

Mr. Chairman, please allow me to tell you about myself. My career has included 

challenging assignments that required me to adapt to rapidly changing environments. I have served in several countries in transition and was in Ghana during 

its first democratic elections and Romania shortly after the fall of Nicolae 

Ceaucescu. During a state of emergency, I helped steer Bangladesh toward democratic elections. In Washington, I served in several positions, including as the 

Afghanistan Desk Officer where I was working on September 11, 2001. I currently 

serve as Office Director for East African Affairs and have policy and program 

responsibility for 11 countries in East Africa. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I look forward to leading Embassy Djibouti in advancing U.S. interests with our team of Foreign and Civil Service personnel, military staff , and local employees. Our main interests in Djibouti are peace and security, good governance, and economic development. 

Mr. Chairman, as you know, we share important interests and goals with 

Djibouti. An area of relative calm in a turbulent region and an important partner 

in the fight against terrorism, Djibouti is surrounded by Eritrea, Ethiopia, and 

Somalia, and is less than 18 miles from Yemen. It has a strategic position at the 

Bab el Mandeb Strait, which joins the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, and through 

which some 40 percent of the world’s shipping passes. If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, 

I will continue to reinforce our bilateral relationship as well as contribute to efforts 

promoting a stable, functioning, and peaceful Somalia in coordination with our mission in Nairobi. 

Djibouti hosts the only U.S. military forward operating site in sub-Saharan Africa, 

Camp Lemonnier, the headquarters for the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of 

Africa (CJTF–HOA) and approximately 3,000 troops. I understand that you, Senator 

Isakson, and Senator Inhofe have visited Camp Lemonnier. If confirmed, I will continue and expand coordination and cooperation between Embassy personnel and 

Camp Lemonnier and its tenant commands, including the CJTF–HOA contingent. 

If confirmed, I will also ensure that CJTF–HOA programming in Djibouti fits within 

the framework of U.S. Government priorities to advance our key interests. 

Mr. Chairman, Djibouti’s Presidential election in April underscored the importance of democracy and governance reforms—including enlarging space for media 

and civil society groups that face constraints. If confirmed, I commit to work with 

our Djiboutian partners on these issues. 

On the economic front, Mr. Chairman, Djibouti’s leadership has privatized its excellent deep-water port and airport, reducing corruption and increasing revenue 

274

flows. Construction of a new port facility is underway and will dramatically increase 

capacity. Making Djibouti an attractive place for investment and center for regional 

and international trade is essential for its economic development. Djibouti remains 

very poor, ranked 149 out of 177 countries on the UNDP Human Development 

Index. Less than 5 percent of its land is arable. The small USAID mission in 

Djibouti focuses on governance and democracy, health and education, particularly 

to combat low life-expectancy, maternal and child mortality, and infectious disease. 

The United States responds to food insecurity through support for the Famine Early 

Warning Network office in Djibouti, as well as through USG-funded Food for Peace 

and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance programs. The United States has also 

been the leading donor in the area of democratic reform and good governance. If 

confirmed, I will continue to make these programs a priority. 

Djibouti’s sole troubled relationship in the region is with Eritrea. Although 

Qatar’s mediation efforts alleviated the conflict, the countries have not yet addressed the substantive issues of border demarcation. If confirmed, I will support 

international efforts to resolve this conflict peacefully and restore the border to the 

status quo ante. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, my highest priority will be the protection of 

Americans and American business interests, including mission personnel, living and 

traveling in Djibouti. With only a few private Americans in-country, I would, if confirmed, remain in frequent contact with them, on consular and security issues but 

also to benefit from their wisdom. In the fall, the mission will move to a new Embassy compound, meaning that all mission personnel will work in the safest and 

most secure facilities available. Maintaining this technologically advanced building 

in Djibouti will be a challenge, but I am committed to good stewardship of this significant USG investment. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe my prior experience in the Foreign Service has prepared 

me to serve as Ambassador to Djibouti. If confirmed by the Senate, I look forward 

to working closely with you and other members of the committee, and would hope 

to welcome you during my tenure. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the honor to appear before the committee 

today. I would be happy to take any questions you may have.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Ms. Pasi. 

Mr. Koran. 

STATEMENT OF DONALD KORAN, OF CALIFORNIA, TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA 

Mr. KORAN. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is 

an honor to have been nominated by President Obama to be the 

next United States Ambassador to Rwanda and to appear before 

you today. 

Here with me today are my wife, Cindy, and my daughter, 

Laura. 

Rwanda is known by most Americans for the 1994 genocide, 

which left the country and its people ravaged. I saw this legacy 

firsthand when I served there from 1999 to 2001. Since then, 

Rwanda has made great strides in rebuilding the country, as well 

as playing a positive role in the region and beyond. The United 

States works closely with Rwanda to advance these positive endeavors. 

With the assistance of the United States and other donors, the 

Rwandan Government has made remarkable progress in improving 

the living standards of its people, primarily through education and 

infrastructure development. It has improved the business climate, 

as evidenced by Rwanda’s dramatic improvement in the World 

Bank’s ease of business doing business index. 

If confirmed, I plan to promote economic development in Rwanda, as well as opportunities for American trade and investment. 

The United States and Rwanda signed a bilateral investment treaty in 2008, now pending advice and consent of the Senate, which 

275

would further improve the investment climate and provide additional protection to United States investors. 

We also support Rwanda’s leadership in the East Africa community and its efforts to promote development and economic integration. Development assistance can have a great impact in Rwanda, 

due to the government’s strong track record in implementing programs. That strong track record, along with remarkable results, 

contributed to its selection as a Global Health Initiative Plus country. 

The United States has been at the forefront of combating HIV/

AIDS and malaria, and helping improve food security in Rwanda 

through the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the President’s Malaria Initiative, and the Feed the Future Initiative. Peace 

Corps returned to Rwanda in 2009 and currently has some 130 volunteers working in health and education programs. 

The advancement of democracy and human rights are important 

components of our policy toward Rwanda, and one which the 

United States and Rwanda are committed to working closely together to achieve. We believe it is important for Rwanda to continue to develop and strengthen its democratic institutions to ensure political space for the opposition and to promote a strong, 

independent media. 

In this context, I look forward, if confirmed, to build on and expand our mutual efforts with Rwanda on these important issues. 

Through our USAID mission, we have funded democracy and governance programs to strengthen the justice sector, media, and civil 

society. 

My past experience in Rwanda, and as desk officer for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, has given me a deep appreciation for 

the importance and complexity of the relationship between those 

two countries. Their rapprochement in 2009, which put an end to 

years of conflict by proxy, has been the cornerstone of recent improvements in regional stability. Peace and security in the eastern 

Congo remain elusive, however, and we believe that Rwanda continues to have a critical and proactive role to play in stabilizing the 

region. 

We strongly support the International Conference on the Great 

Lakes Region’s recent declaration committing the DRC, Rwanda, 

and the Congo’s other neighbors to addressing the illegal trade in 

minerals, and we commend the steps Rwanda is undertaking to ensure the trade continues only through legal and certified channels. 

The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, or FDLR, remains a violent threat to civilians in eastern Congo, though Rwanda continues to provide for the reintegration of FDLR members 

who demobilize. 

Rwanda is an increasingly important partner internationally. It 

has over 3,000 peacekeepers in Darfur and some 250 troops elsewhere in Sudan who have benefited from U.S. military’s Africa 

Contingency Operations and Training Assistance program. It also 

has almost 200 police assigned to the peacekeeping mission in 

Haiti. 

President Kagame was among the strongest voices in the international community supporting action to prevent a massacre in 

Libya earlier this year. 

276

If confirmed as Ambassador to Rwanda, I will continue United 

States efforts to support economic and political progress. Rwanda’s 

development and stability are essential for its citizens and critical 

to the stability of central Africa. 

I look forward to working closely with you, Mr. Chairman, and 

with the committee in this important endeavor, should I be confirmed. Thank you again, Chairman Coons and members of the 

committee, for the opportunity to appear before you today. I welcome any questions you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Koran follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DONALD W. KORAN

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is an honor to have been nominated by President Obama to be the next United States Ambassador to Rwanda and 

to appear before you today. 

Rwanda is known by most Americans for the 1994 genocide, which left the country and its people ravaged. I saw this legacy first-hand when I served there from 

1999 to 2001. Since then, Rwanda has made great strides in rebuilding the country, 

as well as playing a positive role in the region and beyond. The United States works 

closely with Rwanda to advance these positive endeavors. 

With the assistance of the United States and other donors, the Rwandan Government has made remarkable progress in improving the living standards of its people, 

primarily through education and infrastructure development. It has improved the 

business climate, as evidenced by Rwanda’s dramatic improvement in the World 

Bank’s ease of doing business index. If confirmed, I plan to promote economic development in Rwanda, as well as opportunities for American trade and investment. 

The United States and Rwanda signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty in 2008, now 

pending advice and consent of the Senate, which would further improve the investment climate and provide additional protections to U.S. investors. We also support 

Rwanda’s leadership in the East African Community and its efforts to promote development and economic integration. 

Development assistance can have great impact in Rwanda due to the government’s strong track record in implementing programs. That strong track record, 

along with remarkable results, contributed to its selection as a Global Health Initiative Plus country. The United States has been at the forefront of combating HIV/

AIDS and malaria, and helping to improve food security in Rwanda through the 

President’s Emergency Plan For Aids Relief, the President’s Malaria Initiative, and 

the Feed the Future Initiative. Peace Corps returned to Rwanda in 2009 and currently has some 130 volunteers working in health and education programs. 

The advancement of democracy and human rights are important components of 

our policy toward Rwanda, and one which the U.S. and Rwanda are committed to 

working closely together to achieve. We believe it is important for Rwanda to continue to develop and strengthen its democratic institutions, to ensure political space 

for the opposition and to promote a strong independent media. In this context, I look 

forward, if confirmed, to build on and expand our mutual efforts with Rwanda on 

these important issues. Through our USAID mission we have funded democracy and 

governance programs to strengthen the justice sector, media, and civil society. 

My past experience in Rwanda and as desk officer for the Democratic Republic 

of the Congo has given me a deep appreciation for the importance and complexity 

of the relationship between those two countries. Their rapprochement in 2009, 

which put an end to years of conflict by proxy, has been the cornerstone of recent 

improvements in regional stability. Peace and security in the eastern Congo remain 

elusive, however, and we believe that Rwanda continues to have a critical and 

proactive role to play in stabilizing the region. We strongly support the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region’s recent declaration committing the 

DRC, Rwanda, and the Congo’s other neighbors to addressing the illegal trade in 

minerals, and we commend the steps Rwanda is undertaking to ensure the trade 

continues only through legal and certified channels. The Democratic Forces for the 

Liberation of Rwanda, or FDLR, remains a violent threat to civilians in eastern 

Congo, though Rwanda continues to provide for the reintegration of FDLR members 

who demobilize. 

Rwanda is an increasingly important partner internationally. It has over 3,000 

peacekeepers in Darfur and some 250 troops elsewhere in Sudan who have benefited 

from U.S. military’s Africa Contingency Operations and Training Assistance 

(ACOTA) program. It also has almost 200 police assigned to the peacekeeping misVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00284 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
277

sion in Haiti. President Kagame was among the strongest voices in the international 

community supporting action to prevent a massacre in Libya earlier this year. 

If confirmed as Ambassador to Rwanda, I will continue U.S. efforts to support economic and political progress. Rwanda’s development and stability are essential for 

its citizens and critical to the stability of Central Africa. I look forward to working 

closely with you, Mr. Chairman, and with the committee in this important endeavor, 

should I be confirmed. 

Thank you again Chairman Coons and members of the committee for the opportunity to appear before you today. I welcome any questions that you might have.

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

Mr. Lukens. 

STATEMENT OF LEWIS LUKENS, OF VIRGINIA, TO BE AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL AND TO SERVE

CONCURRENTLY AS AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF

GUINEA-BISSAU 

Mr. LUKENS. Mr. Chairman, Senator Isakson, I’m honored to appear before you today. I wish to thank President Obama and Secretary Clinton for the trust and confidence they have placed in me 

as their nominee for Ambassador to the Republic of Senegal and 

the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce my family. My wife, 

Lucy, and our daughters, Lallie and Leeza, have lived on five continents with me and have been exceptional representatives of the 

United States overseas. My Aunt Emily and my mother-in-law, 

Anne Buxton, are here today, and my parents, Alan and Susan Lukens, are here. 

My father served this country for 36 years as a diplomat, mostly 

in Africa, including in Dakar. In fact, he appeared before this subcommittee 27 years ago as nominee for U.S. Ambassador to Congo 

Brazzaville. 

For the past 22 years, I’ve dedicated my career to serving the 

United States through various positions at the White House, the 

State Department, and overseas. If confirmed, it would be a great 

honor and privilege to serve our country in this important post. 

The United States and Senegal share a long, bilateral relationship. As a critical partner in Francophone Africa, Senegal is a key 

ally in the fight against terrorism and narcotics, and has been an 

important player on regional and international issues. 

Senegal is one of the few African countries to have never experienced a coup d’etat and prides itself as a religiously tolerant nation. However, Senegal does face economic, governance, and press 

freedom challenges that threaten its democratic and development 

future. Senegal suffers from a crippling energy crisis that causes 

frequent power outages and has weakened economic growth. Senegal would like to emerge as a regional economic hub. And, if confirmed, I will work with the government to encourage enactment 

of economic reforms necessary to attract investment and expand 

market access. 

Senegal will host Presidential and legislative elections next February. These elections are important to the country’s democratic future. Concerns about democratic backsliding and corruption have 

tarnished Senegal’s longstanding democratic reputation. 

278

If confirmed, I will work with President Wade and the Government of Senegal in their efforts to prepare for transparent, fair, 

and credible elections. 

Senegal is a recipient of U.S. foreign assistance programs, most 

notably a $540 million Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact. The United States Government must be accountable to American taxpayers, and, especially in this difficult economic client, we’ll 

ensure that every dollar is effectively used. 

If confirmed, I will work closely with our strong partners in Senegalese civil and religious society and with the government to ensure that Senegal continues to improve on all of its indicators. 

The small, former Portuguese colony of Guinea-Bissau is one the 

world’s poorest countries with an economy based on almost entirely 

on cashew production. Its poverty, its geography, and its historic 

instability have contributed to a flourishing narcotics trade that 

has compromised many elements of its military and civilian leadership. 

U.S. law enforcement agencies have identified, and are currently 

working closely with, credible government counterparts. Through a 

memorandum of understanding signed with Portugal, we will have 

a United States diplomat placed in the Portuguese Embassy in 

Guinea-Bissau. This will help us increase our knowledge of the 

narcotics-trafficking situation and encourage the host government 

to raise its profile on this important issue. 

U.S. goals there are to promote sustainable democratic political 

development, combat narcotics trafficking, and lay the foundations 

for economic growth. We are currently running successful, cost-effective programs that feed 50 percent of this country’s school-aged 

children and that destroy unexploded ordnance and landmines laid 

since Bissau’s war for independence. 

To its credit, Guinea-Bissau recently held free and fair elections, 

is working to stabilize its economy, and recently qualified for debt 

relief by implementing fiscally sound policies. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your continued interest in the 

United States relations with Africa. If confirmed, I look forward to 

working with you, your committee, and other Members of Congress 

in representing the interests of the American people in Senegal and 

Guinea-Bissau. I would be happy to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lukens follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DONALD W. KORAN

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is an honor to have been nominated by President Obama to be the next United States Ambassador to Rwanda and 

to appear before you today. 

Rwanda is known by most Americans for the 1994 genocide, which left the country and its people ravaged. I saw this legacy first-hand when I served there from 

1999 to 2001. Since then, Rwanda has made great strides in rebuilding the country, 

as well as playing a positive role in the region and beyond. The United States works 

closely with Rwanda to advance these positive endeavors. 

With the assistance of the United States and other donors, the Rwandan Government has made remarkable progress in improving the living standards of its people, 

primarily through education and infrastructure development. It has improved the 

business climate, as evidenced by Rwanda’s dramatic improvement in the World 

Bank’s ease of doing business index. If confirmed, I plan to promote economic development in Rwanda, as well as opportunities for American trade and investment. 

The United States and Rwanda signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty in 2008, now 

pending advice and consent of the Senate, which would further improve the investVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00286 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
279

ment climate and provide additional protections to U.S. investors. We also support 

Rwanda’s leadership in the East African Community and its efforts to promote development and economic integration. 

Development assistance can have great impact in Rwanda due to the government’s strong track record in implementing programs. That strong track record, 

along with remarkable results, contributed to its selection as a Global Health Initiative Plus country. The United States has been at the forefront of combating HIV/

AIDS and malaria, and helping to improve food security in Rwanda through the 

President’s Emergency Plan For Aids Relief, the President’s Malaria Initiative, and 

the Feed the Future Initiative. Peace Corps returned to Rwanda in 2009 and currently has some 130 volunteers working in health and education programs. 

The advancement of democracy and human rights are important components of 

our policy toward Rwanda, and one which the U.S. and Rwanda are committed to 

working closely together to achieve. We believe it is important for Rwanda to continue to develop and strengthen its democratic institutions, to ensure political space 

for the opposition and to promote a strong independent media. In this context, I look 

forward, if confirmed, to build on and expand our mutual efforts with Rwanda on 

these important issues. Through our USAID mission we have funded democracy and 

governance programs to strengthen the justice sector, media, and civil society. 

My past experience in Rwanda and as desk officer for the Democratic Republic 

of the Congo has given me a deep appreciation for the importance and complexity 

of the relationship between those two countries. Their rapprochement in 2009, 

which put an end to years of conflict by proxy, has been the cornerstone of recent 

improvements in regional stability. Peace and security in the eastern Congo remain 

elusive, however, and we believe that Rwanda continues to have a critical and 

proactive role to play in stabilizing the region. We strongly support the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region’s recent declaration committing the 

DRC, Rwanda, and the Congo’s other neighbors to addressing the illegal trade in 

minerals, and we commend the steps Rwanda is undertaking to ensure the trade 

continues only through legal and certified channels. The Democratic Forces for the 

Liberation of Rwanda, or FDLR, remains a violent threat to civilians in eastern 

Congo, though Rwanda continues to provide for the reintegration of FDLR members 

who demobilize. 

Rwanda is an increasingly important partner internationally. It has over 3,000 

peacekeepers in Darfur and some 250 troops elsewhere in Sudan who have benefited 

from U.S. military’s Africa Contingency Operations and Training Assistance 

(ACOTA) program. It also has almost 200 police assigned to the peacekeeping mission in Haiti. President Kagame was among the strongest voices in the international 

community supporting action to prevent a massacre in Libya earlier this year. 

If confirmed as Ambassador to Rwanda, I will continue U.S. efforts to support economic and political progress. Rwanda’s development and stability are essential for 

its citizens and critical to the stability of Central Africa. I look forward to working 

closely with you, Mr. Chairman, and with the committee in this important endeavor, 

should I be confirmed. 

Thank you again Chairman Coons and members of the committee for the opportunity to appear before you today. I welcome any questions that you might have.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Mr. Lukens. 

Dr. Pablos-Me ́ndez. 

STATEMENT OF ARIEL PABLOS-ME ́ NDEZ, OF NEW YORK, TO

BE ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE UNITED STATES 

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Dr. PABLOS-ME ́ NDEZ. Chairman Coons, Senator Isakson, good 

morning, and thank you for the opportunity to testify before you 

today and for your longstanding, bipartisan support for global 

health. It is an honor to appear before you as President Obama’s 

nominee for the position of Assistant Administrator for Global 

Health at the United States Agency for International Development. 

If confirmed, I will have the even greater privilege of serving the 

American people in fostering a healthier, safer, and more prosperous world. 

USAID makes a profound statement about what America stands 

for. I am humbled by the trust and confidence that President 

280

Obama and Administrator Shah have placed in me, and I’m grateful to have the support of Secretary Clinton. 

If confirmed, it will be a privilege to work under their leadership 

and with USAID’s talented and dedicated staff to reaffirm the 

agency’s status as the premier development institution in the 

world. 

I would like to recognize USAID’s Susan Brems, the Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, and Amie Batson, the Deputy Assistant Administrator, for their leadership to date in the Bureau for 

Global Health and the Global Health Initiative. 

I also wish to acknowledge the support and love of my family and 

friends, including my wife, Mercedes, and three of my children, 

Ariel, Fernando, and Alejandra, who are with me here today. 

I am a physician. Over the last 25 years, my career in academic 

medicine has been inspired by the lives of my patients, and the potential of the medical students and residents that I had the opportunity to teach. I am also a public health professional who, through 

research on tuberculosis, entered into the exciting arena of global 

health. I have dedicated my professional career to science and humanity, working with Columbia University, the New York City Department of Health, the United Nations, and the Rockefeller Foundation. My engagement with the Federal Government has until 

now been in an advisory capacity. If confirmed, I very much look 

forward to the opportunity to serve actively. 

I grew up in Mexico in the 1960s, in an area where green revolution research, supported by USAID and the Rockefeller Foundation, 

transformed agricultural production and directly improved the lives 

of millions, my family included. 

I trained in internal medicine in New York in the late 1980s. 

During those years, I watched young lives ravaged by HIV/AIDS 

before the advent of life-saving treatment and saw the threat of tuberculosis reemerge and intensify through multidrug resistance. 

These experiences made a strong impression on me and have 

shaped my career. 

Recognizing that infectious diseases do not respect borders and 

that effective responses here at home largely depend on what happens in other countries, I ventured into global health. In this 

sphere, I have been fortunate to work in a range of initiatives, including the development of innovative public-private partnerships 

for new drugs and vaccines for the poor, like the Global Alliance 

for TB Drug Development; mobilizing a research coalition together 

with the NIH and other partners to scale up full treatment of HIVpositive mothers and their families—a prelude to PEPFAR; working with the World Health Organization to bridge the ‘‘know-do’’ 

gap with information technology or e-Health; and since returning 

to the Rockefeller Foundation, leading the initiative on the transformation of health systems in Africa and Asia. 

If confirmed, I will draw upon these diverse experiences to provide leadership for evidence-based innovations, public-private partnerships, and interagency collaboration to promote access to proper 

health services at an affordable cost, especially for the world’s poorest and most vulnerable people. 

As we enter the second decade of the new millennium, global 

health has never been more central to the development agenda, 

281

and the United States is a leader in both. Thanks to the foresight 

and leadership of members from both sides of the aisle, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the President’s Malaria Initiative, and the Global Alliance on Vaccines and Immunization, as 

well as working in women’s health, we have saved millions of lives 

and reestablished hope for the future, especially in Africa. 

I have been a witness and a partner to this work, which is having an impact similar to the agricultural green revolution three 

generations ago. The American people can be very proud of these 

accomplishments. 

President Obama’s Global Health Initiative, GHI, signals the 

next phase of American leadership in world health and charges 

USAID to work with other agencies and partners to crystallize that 

vision. GHI will consolidate the fight against diseases of poverty 

while strengthening country-led health systems, with a focus on 

women and children. We expect by the year 2016 to contribute to 

save the lives of 3 million children, prevent more than 12 million 

HIV infections, and avert 700,000 malaria deaths. This is an ambitious agenda, commensurate with the extraordinary challenges 

faced by poor and vulnerable people in the world, and requiring 

both our commitment and new ways to solve problems. 

Mr. Chairman, there cannot be a better time to join USAID and 

serve the American people. I am humbled to be considered for this 

position. If confirmed, I will be honored and excited to contribute, 

under the guidance of Congress, to realizing these mandates and 

those in the future fitting a changing world. Thank you very much 

for your consideration, and I look forward to your questions and 

recommendations. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Pablos-Me ́ndez follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ARIEL PABLOS-ME ́ NDEZ

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished members of the committee, 

good morning and thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today and for 

your longstanding, bipartisan support for global health. It is an honor to appear before you as President Obama’s nominee for the position of Assistant Administrator 

for Global Health at the United States Agency for International Development. If 

confirmed, I will have the even greater privilege of serving the American people in 

fostering a healthier, safer, and more prosperous world. 

USAID makes a profound statement about what America stands for. I am humbled by the trust and confidence that President Obama and Administrator Shah 

have placed in me and am grateful to have the support of Secretary Clinton. If confirmed, it will be a privilege to work under their leadership and with USAID’s talented and dedicated staff to reaffirm the Agency’s status as the premier development agency in the world. 

I would like to recognize USAID’s Susan Brems, the Senior Deputy Assistant 

Administrator, and Amie Batson, the Deputy Assistant Administrator, for their 

leadership to date in the Bureau for Global Health and the Global Health Initiative. 

I also wish to acknowledge the support and love of my family and friends, including 

my wife and children, who are with me here today. 

I am a physician. Over the last 25 years, my career in academic medicine has 

been inspired by the lives of my patients and the potential of the medical students 

and residents I have had the opportunity to teach. I am also a public health professional who, through research on tuberculosis, entered into the exciting arena of 

global health. I have dedicated my professional career to science and humanity, 

working with Columbia University, the New York City Department of Health, the 

United Nations and the Rockefeller Foundation. My engagement with the Federal 

Government has until now been in an advisory capacity. If confirmed, I very much 

look forward to the opportunity to serve actively. 

I grew up in Mexico in the 1960s, in an area where green revolution research—

supported by USAID and the Rockefeller Foundation—transformed agricultural proVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00289 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
282

duction and directly improved the lives of millions, my family included. I trained 

in Internal Medicine in New York in the late 1980s. During those years, I watched 

young lives ravaged by HIV/AIDS before the advent of life-saving treatment and 

saw the threat of tuberculosis reemerge and intensify through multidrug resistance. 

These experiences made a strong impression on me and have shaped my career. 

Recognizing that infectious diseases don’t respect borders and that effective responses here at home largely depend on what happens in other countries, I ventured 

into global health. In this sphere, I have been fortunate to work in a range of exciting initiatives, including: (1) developing innovative public-private partnerships for 

new drugs and vaccines for the poor, like the Global Alliance for TB Drug Development; (2) mobilizing a research coalition together with the NIH and other partners 

to scale up full treatment of HIV-positive mothers and their families—a prelude to 

PEPFAR; (3) working with the World Health Organization to bridge the ‘‘know-do’’ 

gap with information technology or e-Health; and (4) since returning to the Rockefeller Foundation, leading the initiative on the transformation of health systems in 

Africa and Asia. 

If confirmed, I will draw upon these diverse experiences to provide leadership for 

evidence-based innovations, public-private partnerships, and interagency collaboration to promote access to appropriate health services at an affordable cost, especially 

for the world’s poorest and most vulnerable people. 

As we enter the second decade of the new millennium, global health has never 

been more central to the development agenda—and the United States is a leader 

in both. 

Thanks to the foresight and leadership of Members from both sides of the aisle, 

the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the President’s Malaria Initiative, 

the Global Alliance on Vaccines and Immunization and work in women’s health 

have saved millions of lives and reestablished hope for the future, especially in 

Africa. Public-private partnerships are no longer seen as optional, but rather as 

essential to achieving long-term strategic goals. 

I have been a witness and a partner to this work, which is having an impact similar to the agricultural green revolution two generations ago. The American people 

can be very proud of these accomplishments. 

President Obama’s Global Health Initiative, GHI, signals the next phase of American leadership in world health and charges USAID to work with other U.S. Government agencies and partners to crystallize that vision. 

GHI will consolidate the fight against diseases of poverty while strengthening 

country-led health systems, with a focus on women and children. At a time of financial constraint, GHI calls for better evidence, game-changing innovation, integrated 

services and novel partnerships to take on grand challenges. 

As stated by Administrator Shah, by building country-led health systems, harnessing new technologies and improving the efficiency of our efforts, we can save 

the lives of 3 million children, prevent more than 12 million HIV infections, and 

avert 700,000 malaria deaths by 2016. We can also ensure 200,000 pregnant women 

give birth safely, prevent 54 million unintended pregnancies and cure nearly 2.5 

million people infected with tuberculosis. 

This is an ambitious agenda, commensurate with the extraordinary challenges 

faced by poor and vulnerable people in the world, and requiring both our commitment and new ways to solve problems. 

Mr. Chairman, there could not be a better time to join USAID and serve the 

American people. I am humbled to be considered for this position. If confirmed, I 

will be honored and excited to contribute, under the guidance of Congress, to realizing these mandates and those in the future fitting a changing world. 

Thank you very much for your consideration. I look forward to your questions and 

recommendations.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Doctor. 

And I’d like to thank all five of our nominees for your concise, 

yet broad opening statements that give both of us a strong sense 

of your background and skills, and the challenges that you will face 

in your countries or areas of appointment. 

I’d like to begin our first round of questions, if I might. I’m going 

to ask a very broad question and then invite each of the five of you, 

in turn, to answer, to the extent it’s directly relevant to your service. 

As you know, we in Washington and in our country face unprecedented budgetary challenges. We have record deficits and a record 

283

national debt, and are making some very tough choices going forward about spending. What, in your view, are the principal goals 

of U.S. assistance in your country of appointment or in your area 

of intended work? And how can we report back to the people we 

represent that these investments make good sense for the United 

States, from a strategic perspective, a humanitarian perspective, a 

development perspective? 

And then if I could, just a subquestion: We just visited the West 

Africa Trade Hub in Ghana—2 days ago? I’ve lost track of time. 

And economic development and the potential of trade was an issue 

in all three countries. To what extent has your country of potential 

appointment taken advantage of AGOA? There’s about to be another AGOA conference. And what more could we be doing to encourage trade and trade as a means towards development? 

So what impact do you believe our investment in U.S. assistance 

in your country of appointment may make? What role do you see 

development playing in that? 

If I might invite Ms. Pasi to begin and then the members of the 

committee, for the rest of my time. 

Ms. PASI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As far as the budget is concerned, the money that we’re spending 

in Djibouti on assistance is really very targeted on quality of life, 

life expectancy, and is being put to excellent use. The U.S. Government is leading the way in providing food assistance to rural areas 

in Djibouti. We feed about 40,000 or 50,000 Djiboutians every day. 

The population is about 850,000 people, so that’s quite significant. 

Second, the life expectancy in Djibouti is very low, only about 56 

years for women, 53 for men. And many of the projects that we’re 

involved in through USAID focus on maternal health, child health. 

Also, interestingly, as I mentioned in my opening statement, 

Djibouti has an excellent port, and that port serves Ethiopia, primarily for food aid and other products that are headed to Ethiopia. 

Truck drivers who come from Ethiopia drive up a corridor toward 

the port, and that area has now become an area where HIV has 

become increasingly prevalent. 

So the money we receive, which is fairly limited, goes both to 

provide education to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS, as well as to 

treat those who are affected. And Djibouti has the highest HIV-infection rate in the Horn, including the Arabian Peninsula. 

As far as AGOA and trade, Djibouti has very little in terms of 

agriculture, because of the lack of arable land. Where their economic strength actually lies, I think, is extending services through 

the port. The port is doing an excellent job, and the Government 

of Djibouti hopes to expand it. 

So our focus, in addition to democracy and governance, is on 

basic support for people to ensure they have a reasonable life, to 

try to assist them to get an education, and then to help them find 

employment in a country which has limited natural resources but 

has an extremely strategic location. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Ms. Pasi. 

Mr. Koran. 

Mr. KORAN. Thank you. Rwanda has an aid program of roughly $210 million for fiscal 2010. The bulk of that, by far, is in health, 

about $164 million. And there’s been remarkable success in a numVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00291 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
284

ber of areas. I think Dr. Pablos-Me ́ndez could probably address it 

better than I could, but let me just give you one statistic, that from 

2005 to 2008, the infant mortality rate was reduced from 86 to 62 

per thousand live births, so that’s a pretty dramatic and concrete 

effect of our assistance. 

The next big chunk of our assistance is in education. Rwanda has 

aspirations to move to middle-income status within a generation, 

and, to do that, they need an educated population. And both 

USAID but also Peace Corps are working in that area. 

Your question about the development of trade is particularly pertinent because Rwanda just recently has received substantial U.S. 

investment related to the export of coffee and tea by U.S. companies. And as I mentioned in my statement, there’s a bilateral investment treaty pending before this committee—I believe there’s 

actually going to be a hearing on it this afternoon—which would 

provide legal protections to United States companies and help foster greater United States investment in Rwanda. Thank you. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

Mr. Lukens. 

Mr. LUKENS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Most of the aid that 

goes from the United States to Senegal is focused on two areas: 

health and agricultural development. 

The $540 MCC compact is being spent to develop road networks 

and also irrigation in both the north and south of the country to 

enable Senegal to boost its agricultural production. Senegal currently imports 70 percent of its food needs, which is a higher level 

than any other country in sub-Saharan Africa, so a lot of our development assistance is aimed at helping them to become more selfsufficient in the area of food. 

The other part of our assistance falls under the health category. 

We have a very strong program there helping them combat malaria, and we have also developed health clinics to assist with prenatal and then mother and infant health care. 

On trade, there’s not a lot of Senegalese trade coming to the 

United States. Where we have worked with the Senegalese Government—and if confirmed, I’ll continue to work with them—is to ensure that they develop trade policies that allow for transparency of 

trade and for businesses doing business there. That allows them to 

have a good sense of what the situation is there. 

Thank you. 

Dr. PABLOS-ME ́ NDEZ. Thank you very much. 

The goal of the Global Health Bureau at USAID is to save lives, 

particularly the poor and most vulnerable people in the world, and 

to strengthening country-led health systems, both to contribute to 

a safer and more prosperous world. 

The Global Health Initiative, as a whole-of-government initiative, 

is indeed trying to find efficiencies across the many health programs in the U.S. Government through interagency collaboration, 

through procurement reforms and harmonization, through smart 

service integration, game-changing innovation such as eHealth–

Rwanda’s going to be a fantastic laboratory for eHealth in coming 

years—as well as a relentless pursuit of results through proper 

learning and evaluation. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Doctor. 

285

Ms. Jackson. 

Ambassador JACKSON. Thank you, Senator. The assistance programs in Malawi really need to stay the course in that very poor 

country. 

If our goal is a stable and democratic world, we need to stay the 

course in education and health, as a country that has better educated, healthy people is more likely to be democratic and treat its 

citizens with great respect. 

As with the other countries, our programs there are focused on 

health and education. I’m very excited about the Global Health Initiative, because it integrates all the different health programs and 

better uses resources. 

Our PEPFAR program has made an impact, and it has decreased 

the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, particularly in the group of ages 15 

through 26, which is a significant group. And the education has focused on girls. 

Malawi has exported a lot of goods through AGOA. It’s anxious 

to do more. I intend, if confirmed, to work with them on their strategic plan to develop other ideas for exports, but also to encourage 

policies and actions that will encourage private investment, that 

will allow for that. The Millennium Challenge Corporation energy 

sector reform project will help a long way toward economic growth 

in Malawi. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Ms. Jackson. 

Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, I’m going to follow the same line that the 

chairman started with, because the biggest challenge we’re going 

to have as a committee is to be able to sustain United States investment in foreign assistance at a level where it makes sense and 

it makes a difference. 

Ms. Jackson made a statement in her opening statement about 

the importance of coordinating interagency roles in foreign countries, and I think coordination of that and the funding that funds 

those rules is a part of that program. 

And, Dr. Pablos-Me ́ndez, you’ve been published a couple of times 

talking about the importance of integration of global health initiatives. You talk about coordination and you talk about integration; 

to me, that says you’re looking at things in a global perspective and 

trying to prioritize the money that’s spent, and make sure we don’t 

have duplication or redundancy in terms of programs. 

So let me start by asking Ms. Jackson first, and then Dr. PablosMe ́ndez, what have you done, such as your role in the Baghdad 

Embassy, or what you have done in terms of health, to maximize 

the return of invested dollars and find savings, or coordination of 

those dollars to increase the benefit to the people it’s intended? 

Ambassador JACKSON. Senator, thank you. There are two parts 

to that question: one is operations; one is programs. My expertise 

at this time is on administrative operations. And both in Malawi 

and in Embassy Iraq, and throughout the world, the State Department has integrated administrative services at embassies, and that 

has provided significant savings. Additionally, we have done a lot 

of off-shoring of administrative services that allows for fewer people 

to be at an embassy at any given location, and particularly in 

Baghdad. 

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In terms of health, the Embassy in Malawi has already begun 

the process of integrating its programs, and I look forward to working with USAID, CDC, and Peace Corps in doing that. I think it 

has a lot of potential for making a bigger impact at the local level, 

and it’s really at the local level that it is accountable. 

Thank you. 

Dr. PABLOS-ME ́ NDEZ. Thank you. There are many specific opportunities that are taking place as we speak. Duplication and waste, 

certainly we don’t want any of that. The portfolio review process 

that the Global Health Initiative is conducting is allowing us to see 

exactly who is doing what where, to make sure that we are maximizing the value of our dollars. 

When it comes to the integration, the smart integration of services, a couple of examples may be illustrative. In Mali, the distribution of vitamin A, as well as the fight against neglected tropical 

diseases, deworming parasites, intestinal worms, have been put together now. And this has allowed the Government of Mali to scale 

up nationally with the same resources that they were doing before 

in just a couple of districts. 

In Kenya, the integration of HIV/AIDS services with maternalchild services has also allowed the Government of Kenya, with the 

same resources invested by USAID, to scale up from three to eight 

provinces. 

So there are many opportunities in working with our mission 

staff to look exactly at how we can bring that about. It’s not automatic. It has to be really put together, but I’m very, very confident 

of the resourcefulness we have seen already. And we would like to 

make this systematic throughout all of our investments. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, I think the stewardship of the United 

States taxpayers’ money, in terms of foreign assistance and foreign 

service, is going to be—not that we haven’t been good stewards, but 

it’s even more important now, given the difficult pressure on the 

budget, that we demonstrate how we are finding savings or efficiencies, and improving the return on our investments, such as Millennium Challenge. 

The second thing I’ll talk about real quickly, for Mr. Lukens, Mr. 

Koran, and Ms. Pasi, after you get past that importance, the second biggest challenge for all of us is to get our arms around corruption in Africa and the importance of those governments to reduce 

corruption. 

Chairman Coons and I saw a demonstration. I’m not going to get 

into which country; all the countries we visited had ports, so that 

won’t identify them. But we saw one country where you had to pass 

through 17 checkpoints to get from the port to the next country, 

and at each checkpoint, you had to pay somebody off to get to the 

next checkpoint. 

That type of situation is a great depressant, in terms of U.S. investment and, for that matter, European investment or any other 

investment in a foreign country. So I’d like to know from the three 

of you, to the extent that you’re familiar with it or would want to 

work on it, what will you do to help raise the importance of reducing corruption in the countries you’ll go to in Africa? 

Mr. Lukens. 

Mr. LUKENS. Senator Isakson, thanks for that question. 

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This is an issue that we follow very closely in Senegal, and I will 

just say that I think the MCC has been a very effective tool in raising the awareness of the local population on corruption issues. 

As you know, countries have to meet certain standards to qualify 

for MCC. And in the case of Senegal, those standards, their 

rankings on international lists has been slipping, and it’s created 

a great deal of attention in Senegal because we hold them to these 

standards. 

The way that we run the MCC there, we run it through programs that require strict accountability and transparency and 

serve as a role model for government dealings in the rest of country. So it’s certainly an issue that we’re aware of and that we will 

continue to follow, and use MCC as an example to promote transparency and anticorruption efforts. 

Mr. KORAN. Rwanda rates as generally one of the least corrupt 

countries in Africa. It ranks, as I mentioned, very high or very favorably on the transparency international index. As I mentioned, 

it’s made dramatic improvement in the World Bank ease of doing 

business index. 

That said, obviously, it could do better, as any country could. 

And I think, if confirmed, some of the areas I would look at in particular are building strong institutions, fostering rule of law, and 

good governance. 

One area that I think is particularly interesting in Rwanda is 

USAID would like to do more programs through the government, 

provide the government money in order to build a road as opposed 

to directly contracting with it. And as part of this, USAID would 

work with the Rwandan Government to improve its government 

procurement system, so it meets international standards. Obviously, you can’t run our tax dollars through the government if 

you’re not confident that it’ll be done correctly and with minimal 

or no corruption. And so this will be an interesting test case, I 

think one of the first in the world, that will be piloted in Rwanda. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you. 

Ms. Pasi. 

Ms. PASI. Thank you, Senator Isakson. 

In a way, I feel that Djibouti has made a very positive step in 

the area of dealing with corruption by modernizing and improving 

the port and putting the port under management that is considered 

world-class. It’s an excellent port. 

Of course, much remains to be done, and corruption continues to 

be an issue there. If confirmed, it would certainly be something I 

would follow closely. 

And another angle of looking at it, I think, would be coordinating 

with other donors. This gets back to the earlier question about how 

we’re going to manage our limited funds to make sure that all the 

funds that are being given to Djibouti, whether by us or other partners, are being used efficiently and effectively. Thank you. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Isakson. 

I have a whole series of questions here now that are individual 

to your specific countries and roles, so please, if we could keep—

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I’ll try to keep the questions short. If you can keep the answer 

short, that would be constructive as well. 

Ms. Pasi, if I could, if confirmed as Ambassador, what steps 

would you take to ensure better coordination with the commander 

at Camp Lemonnier, and what degree of oversight will your post, 

in particular, require, given you’ve got 3,000 DOD personnel on the 

ground. 

Ms. PASI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

There is already an excellent working relationship between the 

current Ambassador and the head of Camp Lemonnier, something 

I would plan to continue. 

The Horn of Africa contingent of CJTF–HOA has representatives 

all over East Africa in each of our embassies. So I would see my 

role, if confirmed as Ambassador, to coordinate on regional projects, 

since there bilateral coordination going at each embassy, and to 

make sure that we are working closely and collaboratively. That is 

going on now, and I would plan to continue it. 

Thank you. 

Senator COONS. In the most recent elections, I think they were 

in April, President Guelleh was elected for another term. But there 

were some real questions about whether those elections were really 

fair and open, given the arrest of opposition figures and the expulsion of some U.S.-funded monitors in the lead-up. What could you 

do, what could the post do, what can the Nation go, to more effectively advocate for democratic reform within the Guelleh administration or in partnership with them? 

Ms. PASI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You’re right that President Guelleh was elected with 80 percent 

of the vote in April. The opposition figure received 20 percent of the 

vote. That said, we’re working toward and continue to use our limited funding for democracy and governance to create space for the 

opposition, to ensure a level playing field so that in the future, the 

opposition members will feel comfortable running, will have access 

to media. It’s something that we continue to work on. 

The issue of democracy and governance is a top priority for us 

in Djibouti and we work closely with the Djiboutians. 

The government did invite Democracy International, a U.S. Government NGO, to leave over what they——

Senator COONS. They invited them to leave or they told him to 

leave? 

Ms. PASI. They told them to leave, yes. 

Senator COONS. Very diplomatic. 

Ms. PASI. They told them to leave, because they explained that 

they were dissatisfied with the actions of a fairly junior member of 

Democracy International. 

We were, naturally, disappointed, but we were very pleased that 

Djibouti agreed to welcome any other U.S. NGO to work in 

Djibouti, and we’re currently looking to find another NGO that 

would be able to continue the work. 

We view our involvement—it’s going to take time in Djibouti. I 

think democracy is not made in a day, but it’s certainly a top priority. Thank you, sir. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Ms. Pasi. 

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Mr. Koran, what’s your assessment of the state of democracy in 

Rwanda? And do you consider the Rwandan Government tolerant 

of dissent? And what’s your assessment of their elections? I think 

they were in August 2010. 

Mr. KORAN. The elections were peaceful and orderly. But as the 

White House statement on the elections highlighted, there were a 

number of issues with the registration of political parties, arrests 

of journalists, arrests of political party leaders. So I think, if confirmed, one of my top priorities would be working with the Rwandan Government to ensure that both local and international NGOs 

and the media are allowed to operate freely. 

Senator COONS. There are also two last things, if I might. There 

was some leadership taken by Rwanda in the U.N. on some difficult issues around tolerance and orientation. How do you plan to 

encourage that? It’s rare on that continent. And then last, the relationship with the DRC is very complex, as you referenced in your 

opening statement. And what do you see as the path forward in 

terms of strengthening Rwanda’s role in stabilizing the DRC. 

Mr. KORAN. Your first question, I think, refers to the Human 

Rights Council in Geneva discussions on LGBT rights. 

Senator COONS. That’s right. That’s correct. 

Mr. KORAN. Rwanda has stood out on the continent to some as 

advocating a very tolerant position on that. And as far as I can tell 

in my research, there’s no issue in Rwanda with LGBT rights. 

They’re quite in contrast to some of their neighbors on that. I’m not 

sure what motivates it, but it’s certainly a positive development. 

On the Congo, I think relations are probably better now than 

they have been any time in the last probably 17, 18 years. When 

I served in Rwanda before, it was occupying about a third of the 

Congo. As I mentioned in my statement, Rwanda and Congo have 

now reached a rapprochement, and they’re working very well together to deal with common security threats in the eastern Congo. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

Mr. Lukens, thank you to you and your extended family, your 

wife and your father, for apparently two generations of service to 

our Nation. 

There have been some real concerns, as you mentioned, about the 

gradual erosion of good governance and transparency in Senegal. 

What are your assessments of these trends? And what would you 

do, if confirmed as Ambassador, in terms of advancing tolerance 

and the strength of democratic institutions in Senegal? 

Mr. LUKENS. Thank you, sir. 

If confirmed, I’ll continue to work with our agencies at post and 

with the Government of Senegal to encourage them to stay on the 

path that they really have been on for over 4 years of a moderate, 

democratic nation. 

There are elections, as you know, in February, coming up in February. While no candidates have officially declared yet, there are 

many testing the waters, and there’s great expectation that President Wade will run again. There are currently 166 opposition parties in Senegal, so it’s a very thriving democracy, but that poses its 

own challenges. 

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So we will continue to work with the Government of Senegal, 

with civil society to ensure voter registration, and really work altogether to encourage free and transparent elections. 

Thank you. 

Senator COONS. I’ll simply mention, as I wrap up and hand the 

microphone over to Senator Isakson, that in Nigeria, in particular, 

I was quite impressed with the chairman of their national electoral 

commission, and with the constructive role that SMS technology 

played in allowing a rapid vote tabulation that was then deemed 

an independent and fair way of evaluating the effectiveness of the 

voting process. 

We also saw a demonstration, I think it was Ghana, if I’m not 

mistaken, of SMS technology assisting smallholder farmers in getting access to information about market conditions and pricing. It’s 

really striking what technology is doing for both economic development as well as democracy. 

I will continue with a few more questions, but I’ll defer to Senator Isakson at this point. 

Senator ISAKSON. Mr. Koran, when I was in Rwanda a few years 

ago, I guess it was 2008, I was struck by the things that President 

Kagame did to take that nation from genocide to democracy and 

stability. One of the things that impressed me was, I believe I’m 

right, it’s pronounced Umuganda Sunday. Are you familiar with 

what that is? 

Mr. KORAN. It’s a voluntary workday. 

Senator ISAKSON. Right, where you had one Sunday a month, 

they shut down the roads. They close everything and everybody 

works on community projects that they jointly decide are necessary. 

In fact, Senator Corker and I helped dig up a stump in a village 

somewhere in Rwanda. I still don’t remember the name of the village today. 

But he did a lot of things to bring people together and get a 

sense of community. With that said, I read recently of some arrests 

of journalists, and difficulties in terms of opposition leaders and 

things of that nature, that are little inconsistent with the Rwanda 

that I saw when I was there. Is there any deterioration in terms 

of that, or were those just isolated instances? 

Mr. KORAN. Well, certainly areas of concern, but, obviously, 

Rwanda, as you said, has come a long way since 1994. It’s remarkable what they’ve done. 

I think President Kagame, in particular, has focused quite correctly on the economy, with the idea that if you can have a growing 

economy, opportunities for everybody, you’re going to reduce these 

ethnic and political tensions. And Rwanda has been quite successful at that, enjoying real gross domestic product growth rates of 5 

to 6 percent over the last 15 years. 

But there have been incidents in the past. I wouldn’t say it’s necessarily a trend getting worse, because you’re seeing incidents happening on occasion, going back for 10 or 15 years. And it’s obviously something we’re concerned about. 

I think one of the issues which, if confirmed, I would hope to 

work with Rwanda on, or continue working, because I think the 

Embassy is doing quite a job on it already, are the laws against 

divisionism or genocide denial, which are somewhat ambiguous. 

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And while I appreciate the logic behind the laws, their interpretation is sometimes vague and ambiguous and can at times be used 

to stifle legitimate political discourse. 

So I think it’s a question of clarifying those laws, so that they 

address the very real issues of concern but without going beyond 

those issues. 

Senator ISAKSON. Mr. Chairman, I really don’t have another 

question. If I have anything specific, I’ll submit it for the record. 

But I do have a comment to make to each of you. Each of you 

has accepted a responsibility to go to a place few Americans will 

ever see, and many Americans have never even heard of, but are 

very important in terms of our country and the future of our country. So when you’re on duty in a place that few people are paying 

attention to back home, remember that the chairman and I on this 

committee are a line of communication. If there’s some way that we 

can help and support your effort, or get information to the attention of people higher than ourselves, we consider that part of our 

responsibility and hope you will keep in contact with our offices 

throughout your terms of service in each of the countries and, in 

your case, in terms of USAID. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator. 

I just have one more question each for the remaining three, if I 

could, and then I think we’ll conclude. 

I just want to associate myself with Senator Isakson’s comments, 

in terms of our being available to you as a resource. I think it is 

very challenging service on which you embark. We noted, in our 

most recent trip, as I have in another trip I’ve taken as a Senator, 

just the critical role that Ambassadors play, and how difficult, at 

times, it can be to have clarity of direction, to have unity of effort, 

across many different agencies. And what a difference it makes 

when there is a well-functioning and well-led Embassy. 

So I’m grateful for your service and appreciate your willingness 

to stay in touch with us, to the extent there are things that we 

need to be informed about. 

If I might, Mr. Lukens, I just wanted to also ask about GuineaBissau. I’m very concerned about what I read in the backgrounder 

about narco-trafficking and emerging criminality, and the real 

challenges at the very highest level of government, in terms of our 

engagement with them. And I’d be interested in how you see the 

challenge of the limitations of our engagement with Guinea-Bissau; 

how having an officer in the Portuguese Embassy is going to work; 

and then what sort of additional resources, training, skills you’re 

going to need to reach out to from other agencies in order to be effective in this sort of malleable structure, where you’re an Ambassador in Senegal, in charge of Senegal and so forth, but also responsible for our relations with a country that poses some real 

threats to our interests in the region and the world. 

Mr. LUKENS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I intend to fully engage 

on the issues to do with Guinea-Bissau and travel there frequently. 

As you mentioned, and as I mentioned in my statement, having a 

full-time State Department officer actually living and working in 

Guinea-Bissau will help us tremendously, as we try to learn more 

about the situation there and how we might better help the governVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00299 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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ment there, and help us to identify factions within the government 

that we can trust, and work with them to solidify rule of law and 

antinarcotics trafficking efforts. 

The agreement we have is that the diplomat, our Foreign Service 

officer, will live and work out of the Portuguese Embassy. We also 

have leased office space there that is used for temporary visitors, 

and there’s a continual flow of visitors from different government 

agencies that have a stake in the economic development and 

anticorruption efforts in Guinea-Bissau. So our officer there will be 

able to assist other agency temporary duty personnel as they come 

through. I think that’ll give us much greater insight than we have 

had up until now into the key players in the government and the 

situation on the ground, and also help us to—quarterly visits by 

the U.S. Ambassador can help. But I think having someone there 

full time, really getting to know people in the government, will 

really help us to send a strong message of what our values and priorities are. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. Good luck on that very difficult mission. I look forward to hearing back from you about some of the 

challenges. 

Dr. Pablos-Me ́ndez, as I referred to in the opening, the QDDR 

suggests that GHI should be transferred largely from State to AID. 

And this is, I think, in some ways may be a challenging undertaking. How do you assess USAID’s ability to meet the benchmarks 

that are outlined in the QDDR and what do you think are the challenges in continuing this sort of dual role, where there is still oversight from State’s Office of Global AIDS Coordinator and yet actual 

execution through USAID on the overwhelmingly majority of the 

actual funds and activity under PEPFAR, for one example? 

Dr. PABLOS-ME ́ NDEZ. Thank you. As you point out, the QDDR already specifies a transition of the leadership of the Global Health 

Initiative to USAID. This is specified over a period of 18 months 

to conclude in September 2012, after meeting a set of benchmarks, 

a set of 10 or so of them, including program reviews by areas, country plans, evaluation plans, and so on, that already crystallize the 

vision of GHI as a whole-of-government integrated approach to 

global health. 

These exercises are being conducted already, and, indeed, half of 

them are already quite along the way. I feel very confident of the 

teams involved across the U.S. Government to crystallize these in 

the remainder of the time. During this transitional period, Secretary Clinton has appointed Lois Quam as executive director to facilitate the coordination in this transition period. 

If confirmed, this is one of my priorities. I know that this has 

created some confusion or lack of clarity, but there’s, I think, an 

understanding among all the parties involved, all the agencies, to 

get there, and the sooner, the better. As a priority for USAID, if 

we can accelerate this process of benchmarks in the next 12 to 15 

months, we will do so. 

The final determination, of course, is that of Secretary Clinton, 

and we will be working closely with the Secretary of State, in this 

regard. PEPFAR, itself, which is another whole-of-government initiative that has been quite successful in the last 10 years or so, and 

a large percent of that already is implemented through USAID. To 

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some extent, many of the major initiatives are already implemented through USAID across the U.S. Government and in an integrated fashion in country missions. 

So I feel very confident, if confirmed, that we can get there. If 

we can do it faster than specified, I’ll be very happy. 

Senator COONS. And so would we. 

Ms. Jackson, thank you for your service, and your husband’s. 

And I was intrigued by the trip across the Sahara, as we were 

speaking before. 

As you know, the United States recently signed a $350 million 

MCC pact with Malawi, but it was delayed for several months over 

concerns about press freedoms, and basic human rights respect, 

and the criminalization of homosexuality, among other things. But 

this is a critical investment, as you referenced in your opening, in 

the electricity sector, and could contribute dramatically to Malawi’s 

economic development. 

What steps do you intend to take to ensure that those issues 

don’t reemerge as major problems in Malawi, that they’re not sort 

of backsliding on human rights or democracy? And what do you see 

as the major challenges to successfully implementing the MCC? 

Ambassador JACKSON. Thank you, Senator. 

The $350 million compact for the energy sector is a very important one for Malawi. It was put on hold due to amendments to two 

of 197 penal codes in the Malawi Constitution, the first one dealing 

with the government potentially being able to stop publication of 

material that was contrary to public interest. The Government of 

Malawi publicly and repeatedly reaffirmed its constitutional press 

freedoms, and I will, if confirmed, continually remind them of that. 

They do have a very vibrant media. 

The second related to the threat of the rights to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered individuals has caused a vibrant and 

very public debate, which, heretofore, has not occurred in Malawi. 

So just the press freedom and being allowed to express people’s 

opinions on that particular issue validates that MCC’s stand on the 

case was very, very important. 

Malawi truly understands that if there is a criminal punishment 

against an individual, that MCC will immediately take action to investigate for suspension or termination of the MCC compact. 

I carry with me the MCC indicators, and I’m constantly using 

those as a means to remind governments—I did this in Burkina 

Faso, and I intend to do in the Malawi—that the MCC indicators 

are a representative of U.S. Government values, and that we are 

very serious about them. 

Thank you. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Ms. Jackson. 

I’d like to thank all five of our nominees who testified today. 

Senator Isakson, you have no further questions? 

Senator ISAKSON. No. 

Senator COONS. I will state that we’re going to leave the record 

open until the close of business tomorrow, Wednesday, June 8, to 

the extent there are other members of the committee who were not 

able to join us here today but wish to submit additional questions, 

or if there are any additional amplifications you choose to submit. 

294

But I am grateful for your testimony. I’m grateful for your service. And I think Senator Isakson and I both expressed our enthusiasm for finding opportunities to come visit you in the field and 

to be a resource to you, should there be challenges that arise in 

your service. 

Thank you very much. This concludes today’s hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 11:26 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF DR. ARIEL PABLOS-ME ́ NDEZ TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. Please differentiate between your role, if confirmed, and that of the 

Executive Director of the Global Health Initiative (GHI).

Answer. As set forth in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review 

(QDDR), pursuant to the direction of the Secretary of State and the GHI Operations 

Committee (USAID Administrator, Global AIDS Coordinator, and Director of the 

Center for Disease Control and Prevention), the Executive Director of GHI was appointed by the Secretary of State to facilitate the coordination of agency programs 

to meet GHI goals, including the transition of GHI leadership to USAID upon completion of the benchmarks, and support the objectives for global health. 

If confirmed, I look forward to working with Administrator Shah, the other members of the Operations Committee and the GHI Executive Director to meet GHI 

goals. My unique role is to ensure that all USAID’s work embraces GHI’s seven 

principles and that USAID’s programming contributes optimally to achieving GHI’s 

ambitious health targets in a whole-of-government mode. 

If confirmed, I will also work to ensure the effective transition of GHI leadership 

to USAID within the next year, as mandated in the QDDR. I will do this by ensuring that USAID is poised to lead GHI inclusively. I will continue to implement and 

strengthen USAID processes for broad evidence-based consultations to ensure that 

our investment portfolio, funding decisions and country health plans are aligned to 

achieve maximum health impact.If confirmed, I will also ensure that USAID is leading an effective GHI interagency communications strategy, and streamlining information management to focus on accountability for performance. I will promote a culture in USAID of interagency collaboration that leverages domestic government 

capacity to achieve global health impact; and work to ensure country ownership of 

USAID’s efforts under GHI. To do this, I will work closely with the Executive Director and the members of the GHI’s Operations Committee. 

RESPONSES OF DR. ARIEL PABLOS-ME ́ NDEZ TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. Next week, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI) 

will hold their first ever pledging conference. The United States has played a huge 

role in the creation of GAVI. As a strong supporter of vaccines, I have closely followed the rollout of the pneumococcal vaccine. Should the United States make a 

multiyear pledge to GAVI; and if so, how much should the United States commit?

Answer. On June 13, 2011, at the GAVI Pledging Conference in London, USAID 

Administrator Rajiv Shah announced a $450 million commitment from the United 

States over 3 years (FY 2012–14), subject to congressional appropriation. With this 

pledge, the United States surpassed $1 billion in commitments to GAVI for the purchase of vaccines. In his statement, Dr. Shah said ‘‘I am pleased to announce that 

the United States will continue one of the best, most cost-effective life-saving investments we have ever made. Over the next 3 years, subject to congressional approval, 

we will devote $450 million to GAVI’s mission, which seizes upon the opportunity 

to save 4 million lives by 2015 . . . This multiyear commitment leverages the billions of dollars that other donors have committed to GAVI, multiplying the impact 

of our funding more than eightfold. At a time when budgets around the world are 

being scrutinized, this partnership with donor and host country governments, civil 

society and private sector partners ensures our development dollars have the greatest impact. Not only is our commitment inspiring the generosity of other donors, it 

helps ensure the quantities of vaccine needed to obtain lower prices, allowing us to 

save even more lives.’’ USAID plays a critical leadership role on the GAVI Board 

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of Directors and the GAVI Executive Committee. If confirmed, I will ensure that 

USAID continues to work closely with GAVI so that this investment is implemented 

effectively, efficiently, and sustainably.

Question. With USAID being the lead agency on the Administration’s Global 

Health Initiative, how does it work that the bulk of the funding comes through the 

global HIV/AIDS under the jurisdiction of the State Department? Also, what role do 

you envision playing in the implementation of the program with the director of GHI 

being housed within State?

Answer. Upon meeting the requirements laid out in the QDDR, USAID will be 

tasked with being the lead agency of GHI. However, USAID will not lead alone. 

USAID will lead inclusively with its partner agencies, building consensus and forging ahead with mutual respect and a reliance on the expertise of each agency. 

Effectively implementing the GHI principles will require thinking beyond purely 

budgetary terms. Through GHI, USAID, the State Department and CDC are all constantly looking at ways to gain synergy and efficiency by linking their programs. 

USAID relies on a deep institutional capacity to respond to dynamic conditions and 

on an expertise throughout U.S. programmatic focus areas. USAID implements a 

large proportion of PEPFAR with the State Department, and the President’s 

Malaria Initiative with CDC, giving USAID strong institutional links across GHI. 

The Executive Director of GHI was appointed by the Secretary of State to facilitate the coordination of agency programs to meet GHI goals and support the objectives for global health set forth in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development 

Review (QDDR), pursuant to the direction of the Secretary of State and the GHI 

Operations Committee (USAID Administrator, Global AIDS Coordinator, and Director of the Center for Disease Control and Prevention). 

If confirmed, I look forward to working with Administrator Shah, the other members of the Operations Committee and the GHI Executive Director to meet GHI 

goals. My unique role will be to ensure that all USAID’s work embraces and drives 

GHI’s principles and that USAID’s programming contributes optimally to achieving 

GHI’s ambitious health targets in a whole-of-government mode.

Question. In his annual letter, Bill Gates spoke of vaccination programs and polio 

eradication as being a priority of his foundation for the coming year. At the World 

Economic Forum meetings earlier this year in Davos, Switzerland, Mr. Gates announced an additional $102 million commitment to polio eradication efforts. Rotary 

International and UNICEF are also active in this area. What is the United States 

role in the polio eradication, especially in Pakistan and Afghanistan where the 

United States has such a large economic investment?

Answer. Since the launch of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) in 

1988, the global number of polio cases has reduced by over 99 percent. The United 

States is the largest donor to the GPEI, contributing over 30 percent of the overall 

$7.5 billion effort. In Pakistan, the United States plays a low visibility but highly 

important role in polio eradication. I understand the objective is to ensure that this 

is seen as a Pakistani-led and implemented program—building local ownership, providing safe passage for vaccinators, and avoiding sparking antivaccination rumors 

often linked to the United States. Through the World Health Organization and 

UNICEF, the United States provides funding and technical support for the implementation of the Emergency Action Plan. This focuses on improved Union Council 

level surveillance, immunization campaign planning, monitoring and evaluation, 

and communication to increase community participation and demand for polio and 

other vaccinations. Currently, the United States supports cross-border immunization 

posts at 11 formal border crossings between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Further, the 

United States provides technical support through surveillance training, CDCdetailed personnel, USAID participation on interagency committees, and USAID 

and CDC participation technical advisory groups and program evaluations. 

In Pakistan, between 1995 and 2000, polio incidence fell tenfold. Success in many 

areas demonstrates that the country has the technical capacity to complete national 

eradication. However, polio in Pakistan is being fueled by a small number of geographic areas and by migrant groups. So far in 2011, there have been 49 cases reported—which is more than double the number reported in the same period of 2010. 

The United States plays a similar low visibility but highly important role in 

Afghanistan. Again, the objective is to ensure that polio eradication is seen as an 

Afghan-led and implemented program. Through WHO and UNICEF, the United 

States provides funding and technical support for the implementation of the 

National Polio Eradication Plan and 13 district high-risk plans. USAID supports 

improved immunization campaign planning, monitoring and evaluation, and communication to increase community participation and demand for polio and other 

296

vaccinations. Through the Basic Primary Health Services (BPHS) NGOs USAID 

supports, polio campaigns are implemented in the high-risk areas. USAID participates on interagency committees, and USAID and CDC participation technical advisory groups and program evaluations. President Karzai has often launched the polio 

campaigns and has a dedicated Special Advisor on Polio Eradication who facilitates 

with the Ministry of Health and Partner organizations, including the U.N., Canada, 

ICRC, and BPHS NGOs. Most importantly, USAID is the lead agency for negotiating ‘‘Days of Tranquility’’ or ‘‘De-conflicting’’ (the terminology preferred in Afghanistan) with NATO/ISAF and U.S. Special Forces and Afghan National Army and 

Police. In February 2011, the USAID Polio Coordinator provided a briefing at the 

daily Commander’s Update Briefing and highlighted the success of this coordination 

in reaching more children in previously security-inaccessible areas and received renewed commitment to continue the collaboration in the future. As of June 8, 2011, 

Afghanistan has only four confirmed cases of polio. 

RESPONSES OF DR. ARIEL PABLOS-ME ́ NDEZ TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. Dr. Ariel Pablos-Me ́ndez, with your impressive medical and leadership 

credentials, you are expected to boost USAID’s profile on the Global Health Initiative. The U.S. global health approach has suffered from a lack of coordination, which 

affects patients’ ability to access treatment at the clinic level. We have heard a lot 

of officials say the right things about a whole-of-government approach. But the 

Global Health Initiative has 15 agencies involved, and no one seems to be in charge. 

The QDDR claims that USAID will take the lead in coordinating the GHI starting 

in 2012. Can you attest to how you will ensure this transition takes place?

Answer. Appendix 2 of the QDDR outlines the proposal to transition the leadership of the GHI to USAID upon its achievement of defined benchmarks aimed at 

ensuring USAID has the capacity and structures to lead a coordinated, inclusive, 

whole-of-government effort. The Secretary of State will make the final determination on transitioning the Global Health Initiative to USAID, drawing on the assessment and recommendation of the GHI Executive Director and Operations Committee. I understand that USAID has undertaken a comprehensive program to 

successfully meet the 10 benchmarks within the defined period. USAID has made 

significant progress. For example, USAID has conducted inclusive portfolio reviews 

of its major health programs with the participation of experts from sister agencies, 

research centers, foundations and other partners. The extensive discussions in this 

process, among outside experts, stakeholders, and USG staff engaged in health programs, are being documented in reports on the adjustments being made in USAID 

strategies and plans, and in coordination with partners. Another criterion is being 

actively pursued through interagency planning and review of GHI strategies for 

country programs, eight of which have been approved. In addition, through an effort 

called BEST, USAID has prepared 25 and reviewed 17 5-year integrated action 

plans for family planning, maternal and child health, and nutrition to ensure that 

under the Global Health Initiative, USAID will focus on state-of-the-art, evidencebased programming. The joint State-USAID efforts to streamline information flows 

have resulted in several recent, concrete changes consistent with the QDDR criteria. 

The recent USAID policy on Monitoring and Evaluation also addresses a QDDR requirement. If confirmed, I will continue the drive to meet the benchmarks and demonstrate USAID’s readiness to lead the whole-of-government approach to health in 

development.

Question. Noting the recent cuts to U.S. foreign assistance and the fact that procuring and delivering vaccines to the developing world is a proven, cost-effective 

way of meeting a number USAID’s global health goals, how do you plan to work 

with mechanisms such the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) 

to leverage and extend their impact?

Answer. On June 13, 2011, at the GAVI Pledging Conference in London, USAID 

Administrator Rajiv Shah announced a $450 million commitment from the United 

States over 3 years (FY 2012–14), subject to congressional appropriation. With this 

pledge, the United States surpassed $1 billion in commitments to GAVI for the purchase of vaccines. In his statement, Dr. Shah said ‘‘I am pleased to announce that 

the United States will continue one of the best, most cost-effective life-saving investments we have ever made. Over the next 3 years, subject to congressional approval, 

we will devote $450 million to GAVI’s mission, which seizes upon the opportunity 

to save 4 million lives by 2015 . . . This multiyear commitment leverages the billions of dollars that other donors have committed to GAVI, multiplying the impact 

297

of our funding more than eightfold. At a time when budgets around the world are 

being scrutinized, this partnership with donor and host country governments, civil 

society and private sector partners ensures our development dollars have the greatest impact. Not only is our commitment inspiring the generosity of other donors, it 

helps ensure the quantities of vaccine needed to obtain lower prices, allowing us to 

save even more lives.’’

The cost-effectiveness of vaccines becomes especially important in a constrained 

budget environment. In addition, the USG is committed to certain child mortality 

reductions under the Global Health Initiative, and vaccines must be an essential 

part of our strategy in attaining those goals. GAVI’s structure as an alliance of the 

public, social, and for-profit private sector partners means that global vaccine supply 

efforts are appropriately coordinated. Moreover, the dialogue with the for-profit private sector has resulted in innovative financing mechanisms that provide the right 

incentives to develop the right vaccines at the right prices for use in the developing 

world. Finally, GAVI’s approach actively serves several of the GHI principles, including coordination and leveraging of partner resources. 

It is my understanding that USAID will continue to use its voice on both the 

GAVI Executive Committee and the GAVI Board to ensure that there is alignment 

of the Board, the new CEO, and the new Board Chairman to ensure quality, costeffective programs are implemented, and that GAVI continues to conduct business 

in a transparent, responsible, and efficient manner. It is also my understanding that 

USAID will continue to work with its GAVI partners across sectors so that vaccine 

policy is correctly formulated, strategies make sense, good pricing is obtained, and 

efforts are coordinated. Finally, they will ensure that their maternal and child 

health work within USAID properly supports GAVI where there are efficiencies or 

economies of scale to be found through strengthened immunization programs. If confirmed, I will support and ensure USAID continues these endeavors, to maximize 

our impact.

Question. Past experience has shown that the most effective way to increase accountability and prevent corruption is to support the efforts of local civil society. For 

example, between 2008 and 2009, civil society groups in Malawi were able to bring 

down the rate of medicines going missing from 70 percent to 25 percent. They did 

it by asking community members to send a SMS text message when basic medicines 

weren’t available at the clinic. In countries like Malawi and Uganda, civil society 

watchdogs are having great success in preventing corruption and ensuring the supply of key medicines. How is the Global Health Initiative planning to leverage civil 

society to be not just service deliverers, but advocates for better health care?

Answer. One of USAID’s most important contributions to improving health in developing countries is the engagement of civil society through both local governance 

mechanisms and civil society organizations. The GHI principle to encourage country 

ownership and invest in country-led plans explicitly includes civil society organizations among the partner country components in which the USG should invest. 

Numerous USAID programs currently embrace this principle and assist civil society 

to advocate for improved health care. 

One example has been the systematic involvement of women’s groups and the 

‘‘women’s panchayat’’ (the one-third of local government in India seats reserved for 

women) to push for health services in rural communities. In Nigeria, in support of 

that country’s democratic transition, USAID has actively promoted the engagement 

of citizen’s groups to work with authorities in Local Government Areas to improve 

health services. In Guatemala, USAID has supported the formation and activity of 

both women’s advocacy groups and groups of indigenous women. Both these groups 

are organized from community to national level, and have been a major force in getting the national government to provide a budget line item and assure services for 

reproductive and maternal health. The indigenous women’s groups operate under 

the oversight of the national Procurator of Human Rights; in this capacity, they are 

authorized to enter health facilities and identify problems of care and service quality 

for indigenous women. These examples show the power of mobilizing the nonhealth 

civil society sector in support of better health services for women, children, and vulnerable populations. 

Family planning and reproductive health: USAID assistance for family planning 

and reproductive health routinely engages civil society groups and individual actors 

to promote improved gender norms, increased access to services, and accountability 

from service providers. 

Some of the civil society engagement activities focus specifically on enabling 

women to be effective champions for family planning. Following an advocacy skillsbuilding workshop, one champion from Nigeria pioneered the creation of a contraceptive security revolving fund and oversight committee within the Usmano 

298

Danfodiyo University Teaching Hospital and sits as first chair of the committee. In 

Uganda, a champion successfully advocated to reduce the cost of injectable contraceptives from 80 Ksh to 50 Ksh. 

HIV/AIDS: As leaders shaping community values and behaviors, community-based 

organizations can promote healthy behavior, reduce stigma, and motivate communities to support and utilize HIV/AIDS services. USAID has a longstanding history 

of working with civil society organizations to advocate for and shape community 

knowledge of HIV prevention, care, and treatment services. USAID, through 

PEPFAR, supports Partnership Frameworks to support and strengthen national 

HIV/AIDS strategies and focus on building strategic partnerships with both government and civil society to secure long-term sustainability of HIV/AIDS programs. 

In Malawi’s Partnership Framework, USAID is helping to build capacity of professional and lay counselors and organizations in public sector and civil society implementing the National AIDS Framework. The Government of Malawi intends to partner with PEPFAR, the U.N. family, and others to build the technical, financial, and 

management capacity of civil society and the private sector. USAID will continue 

to provide capacity-building technical assistance to grant-recipient organizations implementing the National AIDS Framework, as well as to grantmaking organizations. 

Additionally, the Government of Malawi will build capacity of leaders and communities to speak against harmful practices and norms. Among other linkages, referrals will be strengthened, diverse and include linkages to civil society organizations. 

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NOMINATIONS 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 8, 2011

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

D. Brent Hardt, of Florida, to be Ambassador to the Co-operative 

Republic of Guyana 

James H. Thessin, of Virginia, to be Ambassador to the Republic 

of Paraguay 

Jonathan D. Farrar, of California, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Nicaragua 

Lisa J. Kubiske, of Virginia, to be Ambassador to the Republic of 

Honduras 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:36 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez, 

presiding. 

Present: Senators Menendez, Rubio, and Inhofe. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

Senator MENENDEZ. Good afternoon, everyone. The hearing will 

come to order. 

Today the Senate Foreign Relations Committee considers four 

nominations: Jonathan Farrar to be the Ambassador to Nicaragua, 

James Thessin to be the Ambassador to Paraguay, D. Brent Hardt 

to be the Ambassador to the Co-operative Republic of Guyana, and 

Lisa Kubiske to be the Ambassador to the Republic of Honduras. 

Let me welcome all of the nominees and their families 

I will make some brief introductory remarks before I turn to Senator Rubio who is on his way from a vote on the floor, and then 

we will have an opening statement from each of you and time for 

questions. 

Let me first say that the work that you are being asked to do, 

should you be confirmed, is of vital importance to the U.S. Government. If confirmed, you will not only be the representative of the 

President in your country of assignment, but of the American people. And that is why we take our task of advice and consent very 

seriously. 

The range of countries you are being called to represent is as diverse as the challenges and opportunities in the Western HemiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00307 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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sphere, and I am one of those who remains hopeful, while at the 

same time concerned about the future of Latin America. 

Economic growth in the hemisphere and declining poverty indicate that the hemisphere’s trajectory is positive. At the same time, 

sustained income inequality threatens to disenfranchise the many 

who are not sharing in these economic gains, and fuels the plagues 

that keep the hemisphere from reaching its full potential—drug 

trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, and corruption. 

As we celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Inter-American 

Democratic Charter, which celebrates the victory of democracy 

throughout the hemisphere in all but one notable country, I am 

concerned about a trend toward autocracy that threatens many nations in the hemisphere under which there is a guise of political 

and democratic elections, but elections in and of themselves are not 

the fulfillment totally of democracy. 

In November, Nicaragua will hold Presidential and parliamentary elections under a cloud of suspicion about its adherence to the 

democratic principles enshrined in the Inter-American Democratic 

Charter. President Ortega seems determined to subjugate the country’s courts and constitution to the will of one man, whose desire 

for power exceeds his interests in a stable, democratic future. 

Honduras, which after overcoming challenges to its democracy, 

was last week welcomed back to the Organization of American 

States. They face enormous challenges from organized crime, drug 

traffickers, and others who have capitalized on political uncertainty 

to grow their trade. The homicide rate in Honduras is now an astounding 75 per 100,000 people, the highest in the world outside 

of war zones. 

In Guyana, we engage a regime that is as much Caribbean as it 

is South American, and that continues to seek its place in the politics and economy of the region. And in Paraguay, people face their 

own challenges in strengthening their democratic form of government, combating corruption, and growing their economy. Like other 

governments in the region, they also face a growing narcotics problem highlighted by last week’s seizure of $131 million in cocaine. 

So, the challenges each of you face vis-a-vis your host governments will be unique. If confirmed, you will play a vital role in the 

work that builds on our common successes and works to combat 

some of today’s most pressing challenges. 

I will give a moment to Senator Rubio and recognize him at this 

time. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO,

U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. I apologize. I still get lost in the hallways here, but we found our way over. And I appreciate it very 

much. 

Congratulations to all of you. I look forward to learning more 

about you all in today’s hearing. 

And at an important time, as we look to the United States vision 

toward the region, a critical time in the region as we see decisions 

being made across the region about which direction they want to 

go, both economically and politically. 

301

I think that obviously the United States has been preoccupied 

with some pretty important issues around the world over the last 

10 to 12 years. But what happens in the Western Hemisphere is 

of critical importance to our future, not from a defensive standpoint, but from an offensive standpoint, from an opportunity standpoint. 

We have the ability, if there is more development and growth 

economically in the Western Hemisphere, to have more clients for 

the things we make and sell, and vice versa. And so, the development and growth of democratic institutions, but also of upward mobility and economic progress is of great promise to the United 

States with regard to the Western Hemisphere. And anything we 

can do to promote that is important. 

So, each of you will be traveling to your posts at a key moment 

in our Nation’s history with regard to the Western Hemisphere in 

general and many of these nations in specific. 

So, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding these hearings. I think 

this is our third hearing already, which is as many as this committee had over a 2- or 3-year period before you took over. 

And with that, I look forward to hearing from the nominees. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Rubio. 

I am going to introduce each of you now, and then in the order 

in which I introduce you, I would ask you to start your statements. 

So, Mr. Farrar is well known to those of us who follow Cuban 

issues. He is the chief of mission of the U.S. Interest Section in Havana. He is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, having 

begun with the State Department as an economic officer in 1980. 

In addition to serving as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and 

as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, he has also served in a variety of 

posts in Latin America, including Mexico, Belize, Uruguay, and 

Paraguay. 

Mr. Farrar has a B.A. from California State Polytechnic University, an M.A. from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and 

today we review his nomination to be Ambassador to Nicaragua. 

Ms. Kubiske is the deputy chief of mission in Brasilia. She was 

the deputy chief of mission of the Dominican Republic, has served 

in Mexico, Shanghai and Hong Kong. At the Department of State, 

she has served as the Western Hemisphere Economics Director in 

the Operations Center on the Secretariat staff. She has also served 

as an investment director and negotiator at the Office of the United 

States Trade Representative. 

She has a bachelor’s degree from Brandeis University, a master 

of science in Foreign Service from Georgetown. 

Mr. Thessin is the Acting Legal Advisor to the Department of 

State. He provides advice to the policy officials of the Department 

and other government agencies on international issues and on 

other legal aspects of the Department’s work, including requests by 

Congress. He has been with the Department of State since 1982 

when he served as attorney/advisor for Political Military Affairs. 

He received a J.D. cum laude from Harvard Law School in 1974, 

worked for the Federal Trade Commission, worked as counsel for 

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and was the senior litigaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00309 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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tion attorney for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission before 

joining the Department of State. We welcome you back to the committee and to this hearing. 

Mr. Hardt is a career Foreign Service officer currently serving as 

charge ́ d’affaires at the Embassy for Barbados in the eastern Caribbean. His other postings include Berlin, The Hague, and the Holy 

See. 

Mr. Hardt has a bachelor’s of history degree from Yale University, master’s and doctorate degrees from the Fletcher School of 

Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. And given his wide range 

of assignments, he speaks Italian, Dutch, German, and French. 

Perhaps it is befiting that he be called upon as our envoy to Guyana, a country surrounded by Dutch, Portuguese, and Spanish 

speakers. But we look forward to your testimony today in English. 

So, with that, in the order I have introduced you, Mr. Farrar, you 

are up first. 

STATEMENT OF JONATHAN D. FARRAR, OF CALIFORNIA, TO 

BE AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA 

Mr. FARRAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Distinguished members of the Senator Foreign Relations Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to appear before you as the President’s nominee to be the next United 

States Ambassador to Nicaragua. I am deeply grateful to the President and to the Secretary of State for their trust and confidence. 

I would like to introduce the members of my family who are with 

me today and mention those who are not. First, my wife, Terry, 

who has been with me every step of the way through 30 years of 

Foreign Service life, and who has made innumerable personal sacrifices along the way. Also with us today are my daughter, Melissa, 

and our son-in-law, Jason; our son, Jonathan, and our daughter-inlaw, Leigh. Our youngest son, Nathaniel, is studying in Nanjing, 

China, and could not join us today. 

As a career member of the Foreign Service, I have had the privilege to serve my country in various capacities, covering the Western Hemisphere over the past 30 years. My career has taken our 

family throughout the Americas—North America, Central America, 

South America, and the Caribbean. 

In Washington, I have had the opportunity to work on Latin 

American policy and programs, on human rights, democracy, law 

enforcement, trade, investment, nonproliferation, and other areas. 

But my interest in Latin America truly began in 1973 in Jalapa, 

Veracruz, on a sister city student exchange program. It was a lifechanging experience for me. Today, 38 years later, I still am in 

touch with the family who took me in and taught me more about 

Mexico than I ever could have learned in a textbook. 

If confirmed as Ambassador of the United States to Nicaragua, 

I would be a credit to the government. But the most important ties 

between our countries are those forged between our citizens. If confirmed, I would bring to our mission my experience working with 

civil society in Latin America and an unwavering commitment to 

finding avenues to connect with the Nicaraguan people, to advance 

United States interests, and reflect United States values. 

303

If confirmed, my highest priority will be the protection of U.S. 

citizens, including the Embassy community. I would work diligently with U.S. businesses to promote their exports and protect 

their investments. I will bring to that challenge my experience 

from three assignments as an economic and commercial officer 

overseas. 

Bilateral trade between the United States and Nicaragua has 

grown by two-thirds in the 5 years since the Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement went into effect. Yet, 

Nicaragua has a more than $1 billion trade surplus with the 

United States. If confirmed, I will work with U.S. business, small, 

medium, and large, to increase U.S. exports to help redress that 

imbalance. 

Nicaragua’s Presidential elections are scheduled for this November. The United States and others in the international community 

have encouraged Nicaragua to facilitate observation of those elections by credible, domestic and international organizations. If confirmed, I would look forward to working with members of this committee and your colleagues in the Congress to shape appropriate 

U.S. policies, both in the lead up to those elections and afterward. 

Along with the rest of Central America, Nicaragua faces considerable challenges in combating illegal drug trafficking. Our Central 

America Regional Security Initiative and other bilateral programs 

offer tools to work with the Nicaraguan Government, private sector, and NGOs to combat these challenges. 

In a prior assignment, I had the honor of participating in the 

signing of our Bilateral Agreement to establish the International 

Law Enforcement Academy in El Salvador. If confirmed, I will 

bring my experience with law enforcement and counternarcotics 

programs in Latin America and adapt it to the particular environment in Nicaragua. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the honor of appearing before 

the committee today. Should I be confirmed, I pledge to serve our 

country to the best of my ability, and thus repay in at least a small 

way the many benefits which it has bestowed upon me and my 

family. 

I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Farrar follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JONATHAN D. FARRAR

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you as the President’s nominee to be the next United States Ambassador to Nicaragua. I am deeply grateful 

to the President and to the Secretary of State for their trust and confidence. 

I would like to introduce the members of my family who are with me today, and 

mention those who are not. First my wife, Terry, who has been with me every step 

of the way through 30 years of Foreign Service life, and who has made innumerable 

personal sacrifices along the way. Also with us today are our daughter, Melissa, and 

son-in-law, Jason, and our son, Jonathan, and daughter-in-law, Leigh. Our youngest 

son, Nathaniel, is studying in Nanjing, China and could not join us. 

As a career member of the Foreign Service, I have had the privilege to serve my 

country in various capacities covering the Western Hemisphere over the past 30 

years. My career has taken our family throughout the Americas. In Washington, I 

have had the opportunity to work on Latin American policy and programs on human 

rights, democracy, law enforcement, trade, investment, nonproliferation, and other 

areas. 

304

My interest in Latin America truly began in 1973 in Xalapa, Veracruz, on a 

sister-city student exchange program. It was a life changing experience. Today, 38 

years later, I still am in touch with the family who took me in and taught me more 

about Mexico than I ever could have learned in a textbook. 

If confirmed as Ambassador of the United States to Nicaragua, I would be accredited to the government. But the most important ties between our countries are those 

forged between our citizens. If confirmed, I would bring to our mission my experience working with civil society in Latin America and an unwavering commitment 

to finding avenues to connect with the Nicaraguan people to advance U.S. interests 

and reflect U.S. values. 

If confirmed, my highest priority would be the protection of U.S. citizens, including the Embassy community. I would work diligently with U.S. businesses to promote their exports and protect their investments, and would bring to that challenge 

my experience from three assignments as an economic and commercial officer overseas. Bilateral trade between the United States and Nicaragua has grown by twothirds in the 5 years since the Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade 

Agreement went into effect, yet Nicaragua has a more than $1 billion trade surplus 

with the United States. If confirmed I would work with U.S. businesses—small, medium, and large—to increase U.S. exports to help redress that imbalance. 

Nicaragua’s Presidential elections are scheduled for this November. The United 

States and others in the international community have encouraged Nicaragua to 

facilitate observation of those elections by credible domestic and international organizations. If confirmed, I would look forward to working with members of this committee and your colleagues in the Congress to shape appropriate U.S. policies in the 

leadup to those elections and afterward. 

Along with the rest of Central America, Nicaragua faces considerable challenges 

in combating illegal drug trafficking. Our Central America Regional Security Initiative and other bilateral programs offer tools to work with the Nicaraguan Government, private sector, and NGOs to combat these challenges. In a prior assignment, 

I had the honor of participating in the signing of our bilateral agreement to establish the International Law Enforcement Academy in El Salvador. If confirmed, I 

would bring my experience with law enforcement and counternarcotics programs in 

Latin America and adapt it to the particular environment in Nicaragua. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the honor of appearing before the committee 

today. Should I be confirmed, I pledge to serve our country to the best of my ability 

and thus repay in at least a small way the many benefits which it has bestowed 

upon me and my family. 

I would be pleased to answer any questions which you may have.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. 

Ms. Kubiske. 

STATEMENT OF LISA J. KUBISKE, OF VIRGINIA, TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF HONDURAS 

Ms. KUBISKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the 

committee. Thank you for granting me the opportunity to appear 

today as President Obama’s nominee to be the next Ambassador to 

Honduras. It is a tremendous honor and responsibility, and I, like 

my colleagues, I am deeply grateful to the President and to Secretary Clinton. 

If confirmed, of course, I look forward to working closely with you 

and with your colleagues to advance the interests of the United 

States. 

I would also like to take a moment, Mr. Chairman, to acknowledge my family, my husband, Dan. They are all on the third row 

on this side. My husband, Dan, our boys, Philip and Adam, my 

stepdaughter, Jessica, and her husband, Kevin, and my sister, 

Alex. And I also have a friend here as well—Ann Sacclaris. Each 

of these people has been a deep source of love and support during 

my diplomatic career, or as you said, our diplomatic career. 

I would also like to acknowledge my parents who, in addition to 

offering me love, have been hugely influential in providing the valVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00312 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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ues I hold today, and in encouraging me to pursue my professional 

dreams. 

I have spent my career serving the United States in the Department of Agriculture and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, and in the Department of State. Many of my overseas postings 

have been in Latin America, most recently in Brazil where we have 

a 1,100-person mission, and working with relations with Brazil at 

a very interesting, important time. I have also worked, as you mentioned, in the China area. 

As I have understood since I studied in Peru as an undergraduate, Latin America, including Honduras, is a region that has 

a tangible impact on United States domestic interests, be it via the 

flow of people, or trade, or illicit activities. And this makes it a core 

interest for us. 

Our economic relationship is very important. We have some 200 

companies in Honduras. Almost half the Honduran imports come 

from the United States. And we have a trade surplus with Honduras, or at least we did based on data in 2009. 

Having served as the State Department’s Western Hemisphere 

Economic Policy director and as a negotiator at USTR, I am very 

aware, as Senator Rubio mentioned, that expanding our economic 

relationship can help Honduras develop and grow while creating 

jobs in the United States. 

And one promising area, just as an example, is Honduras’ alternative energy sector. In January, Honduras began construction on 

the largest windfall in Central America. And it will bring cheap, 

clean energy to a very poor country. And I am very happy to be 

able to say that the turbines are being manufactured in Pennsylvania, and that means jobs. 

I also hope to build on the strong cultural and bilateral ties between our countries. We have 15,000 American citizens in Honduras. There are 100,000 Americans who visit Honduran beaches 

and Mayan ruins every year. In the United States—depending on 

the statistics you read—almost a million residents of Honduran origin. And the money that those residents of Honduras—Hondurans 

send back to Honduras accounts for fully a quarter of Honduras’ 

economy. 

U.S. Government investments in Honduras are also transformative. Honduras’ Vice President called the Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact that completed in September the most 

successful development project in Honduras’ history. 

Honduran governments, including the current Lobo administration, have recognized the value of our close ties. Beyond the economic area, we are working to address an alarming rise in gang 

activity that has burdened Honduras with one of the highest homicide rates that the chairman mentioned earlier. Gang activity is a 

threat to U.S. national security, and so working to reverse its 

growth would be one of my priorities. 

I also look forward to assisting our joint effort to address the underlying causes of insecurity, building on the work of U.S. Government agencies, like the Peace Corps, USAID, and nongovernmental 

organizations that demonstrate every day the generosity of the 

American people. 

306

Two years ago, Honduras was racked by a political crisis that resulted in its suspension from the Organization of American States, 

or OAS. And just a week ago, as you mentioned earlier, a special 

session of the OAS lifted that suspension, which was a tribute to 

President Lobo’s effort to promote national reconciliation. 

Our continued engagement remains essential to strengthen Honduras’ democratic institutions, and to—continuing to support the 

Honduran government’s efforts to strengthen the respect for 

human rights, their efforts having included creation of a ministry 

of justice and human rights and the establishment of a police unit 

aided by the United States for victims of human rights violations. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I deeply value the 

potential opportunity to serve the United States in this capacity, 

and I thank you again. I would be pleased to answer any questions 

you and your colleagues may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Kubiske follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LISA J. KUBISKE

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for granting me the opportunity to appear before you today as President Obama’s nominee to be the next 

United States Ambassador to Honduras. This is a tremendous honor and responsibility for which I am deeply grateful to President Obama and Secretary Clinton. If 

confirmed, I look forward to working closely with you and your colleagues to advance the interests of the United States. 

I would like to take a moment, Mr. Chairman, to acknowledge my husband, Dan, 

our boys, Philip and Adam, my stepdaughter, Jessica, and my sister, Alex. Each has 

been a source of love and support during my diplomatic career. I’d also like to acknowledge my parents, who have been hugely influential in providing the values I 

hold today and encouraging me to pursue professional opportunities. 

After studying in Massachusetts and here in Washington, I have spent my career 

serving the United States, in the Department of Agriculture, the U.S. Trade Representative’s Office, and the Department of State. Many of my postings have been 

in Latin America, most recently in Brasilia, where I served as deputy chief of mission at a mission with over 1,100 employees at a pivotal moment in U.S. relations 

with Brazil. I have also worked in Shanghai and Hong Kong. 

As I have understood since I studied in Peru as an undergraduate, Latin America 

is a region of core interest to the United States, where the domestic impact of our 

foreign policy is tangible. Our actions have a direct impact on the lives of United 

States citizens, and the flows of migrants and illegal drugs to our borders. 

Having served as the Department of State’s Western Hemisphere economic policy 

director and as a negotiator at the United States Trade Representative’s Office, I 

am acutely aware of the economic opportunities in Latin America for the United 

States. Our economic relationship is especially important with Honduras. To date, 

200 U.S. companies operate in Honduras. Nearly half of Honduran imports originate 

in the United States. Our trade surplus with Honduras was $60 million in 2009. 

We can strengthen our economic ties while helping Honduras develop and grow. 

One promising area is Honduras’ alternative energy sector. In January, Honduras 

began construction on the largest wind farm in Central America, which will bring 

cheap, clean energy to a very poor country. I am proud to report that the turbines 

are being manufactured in Pennsylvania, helping to create jobs in the United 

States. 

I also look forward, if confirmed, to building on the strong cultural and bilateral 

ties between the United States and Honduras. Fifteen thousand American citizens 

live in Honduras, and 100,000 Americans visit Honduran cities, beaches and Mayan 

ruins every year. In the United States, there are nearly 1 million residents of Honduran origin. The money they send back to their families accounts for one-quarter 

of Honduras’ gross domestic product. U.S. Government investments in Honduras are 

similarly transformative. Honduras’ Vice President has called the $205 million Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact, completed last September, the most successful development project in Honduras’ history. 

Honduran governments, including the current administration headed by President 

Porfirio Lobo, have recognized the value of close ties. Together, we are helping address the alarming rise in gang activity that has burdened Honduras with one of 

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the world’s highest homicide rates. At our Embassy in Tegucigalpa, officials from 

the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice work side by side with 

the Honduran Government to disrupt the operations of drug trafficking organizations. Reversing this trend, a threat to U.S. national security, would be one of my 

top priorities. If confirmed, I would also look forward to assisting our joint efforts 

to address the underlying causes of insecurity, building on the work of U.S. Government agencies such as the Peace Corps, USAID, and nongovernmental organizations 

that daily demonstrate the generosity of the American people. 

Two years ago, Honduras was wracked by a political crisis that resulted in Honduras’ suspension from the Organization of American States (OAS). Just a week 

ago, a special session of the OAS lifted that suspension, a tribute to President Lobo’s 

efforts to promote national reconciliation. Our continued engagement remains essential to strengthen Honduras’ democratic institutions and to continue supporting the 

Honduran Government’s efforts to strengthen respect for human rights, which has 

included the creation of a Ministry of Justice and Human Rights and the creation 

of a police unit, aided by the United States, for victims of human rights violations. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I deeply value the potential opportunity to serve the United States in this capacity, and I thank you again for granting me the privilege of appearing before you today. I would be pleased to answer 

any questions you and your colleagues may have.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. 

Mr. Thessin. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES H. THESSIN, OF VIRGINIA, TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF PARAGUAY 

Mr. THESSIN. Mr. Chairman, Senator Rubio, I appreciate very 

much the opportunity to appear before this committee. 

When in years past I was a staffer for this committee sitting on 

your side of the dais, I did not expect that someday I would be here 

as the President’s nominee to be the United States Ambassador to 

the Republic of Paraguay. Having served the committee for several 

years, I continue to have the greatest respect for this institution, 

and will carry that with me in my new job if confirmed. 

I would like first to introduce my family. With me is my wife of 

38 years, Marcia, our son, Jonathan, and his spouse, Rebecca. Our 

daughter, Rachel, and her spouse, Will, are out of town on business, and unfortunately not able to be with us today. 

I am proud of my wife and our children in so many ways, including that all five have been working daily to make this country 

stronger now and into the future. My wife, son, and daughter are 

in public service, and our daughter-in-law and son-in-law in universities. 

I am very grateful and humbled that President Obama has nominated me for this position and asked me to serve. You have my 

commitment that if confirmed I would work tirelessly to live up to 

the high standards that the administration has set for its appointees, standards that I know this committee and the American 

people expect as well. 

I come before you today as a lifelong public servant in a career 

that has spanned more than 35 years, working in two branches of 

government and in various departments and agencies. If confirmed, 

I will draw upon all the wisdom, knowledge, and experience that 

I have learned during my government experience in an effort to advance United States interests and our important relationship with 

Paraguay. And if confirmed, I look forward to working with the 

committee in this effort. 

The relationship between the United States and Paraguay is 

strong and mutually beneficial. The United States has a strong inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00315 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
308

terest in supporting Paraguay’s efforts to deepen its democratic 

structures, to advance human rights, to counter narcotics trafficking and terrorism, to combat corruption and the misuse of intellectual property, and to promote an effective, transparent government and judicial system. 

The people of the United States believe that these principles are 

important, and, therefore, we have a strong interest in their adoption by other countries. We benefit directly when other countries 

make these principles their own. Not only do our citizens receive 

fair treatment when abroad and find a safe and welcoming environment there, but our businesses are able to invest in trade in a marketplace that is fair and predictable, placing United States firms in 

a better position to contribute to the economic prosperity of the 

United States as well as that of Paraguay. 

Paraguay stands at an important juncture where the United 

States can help make a difference. Paraguay is less than 25 years 

away from a period when one person ruled the country for some 35 

years. And there is significant work yet to do. 

During this historic period of its bicentennial, Paraguay is looking at the lessons of its past and is working to design the blueprint 

for its future, especially as it approaches Presidential and legislative elections. 

For its part, the United States has established programs to help 

Paraguay institute democratic reforms, disrupt criminal organizations, develop its counter terrorism capabilities, fight corruption, 

and promote good governance and economic development. 

If confirmed, I would give the highest priority to ensuring the 

well-being and safety of Americans living and traveling in Paraguay. I would also seek opportunities for trade between the United 

States and Paraguay, specifically promoting United States exports 

to Paraguay as well as advocating for United States firms doing 

business in that country. 

If confirmed, I look forward to working with you, your distinguished colleagues, and your staffs to advance our priorities with 

the Republic of Paraguay. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear today. I welcome 

any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thessin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES H. THESSIN

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate very much the opportunity to appear before this committee today. This is a great honor for me. When 

in years past I was a staffer for this committee, sitting on your side of the dais, 

I did not expect that someday I would be here as the President’s nominee to be the 

United States Ambassador to the Republic of Paraguay. Having served the committee for several years, I continue to have great respect for this institution and will 

carry that with me in my new job if confirmed. 

I am very grateful and humbled that President Obama has nominated me for this 

position and asked me to serve. You have my commitment that, if confirmed, I will 

work tirelessly to live up to the high standards that the administration has set for 

its appointees; standards that I know this committee and the American people expect of nominees as well. 

With the chairman’s permission, I would first like to introduce my family. With 

me is my wife of 38 years, Marcia. We are delighted at the prospect of working to 

advance U.S. interests in Paraguay, if I am confirmed. Also with us are our son, 

Jonathan, and his spouse, Rebecca. Our daughter, Rachel, and her spouse, Will, are 

not able to be with us, being out of town on business. I am proud of my wife and 

our children in so many ways, including that all five have been working daily to 

309

make this country stronger now and into the future. My wife, son, and daughter 

have been in public service, working respectively as a demographer, an attorney, 

and an engineer. Our daughter-in-law and our son-in-law have been working in universities to help build a stronger foundation in this country for tomorrow, one training educators, the other advancing science. 

I come before you today as a lifelong public servant. My career with the Federal 

Government has spanned more than 35 years working in two branches of government and in various departments and agencies, most recently as the Deputy Legal 

Adviser at the Department of State. Before beginning with the Department in 1982, 

I had worked for this committee for some 3 years in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 

I have learned much during my government service, particularly while at the Department and on the committee staff. If confirmed, I will draw upon all this wisdom, 

knowledge, and experience in an effort to advance U.S. interests in our important 

relationship with Paraguay. And if confirmed, I look forward to working with this 

committee in this effort. 

The relationship between the United States and Paraguay is strong and mutually 

beneficial. The United States has a strong interest in supporting Paraguay’s efforts 

to deepen its democratic structures, to advance human rights, to counter narcotics 

trafficking and terrorism, to combat corruption and the misuse of intellectual property, and to promote an effective, transparent government and judicial system. 

The people of the United States believe that these principles are important, and 

therefore we have a strong interest in their adoption by other countries. We benefit 

directly when other countries make these principles their own. Not only do our citizens receive fair treatment when abroad and find a safe and welcoming environment there, but our businesses are able to invest and trade in a marketplace that 

is fair and predictable, placing U.S. firms in a better position to contribute to the 

economic prosperity of the United States as well as Paraguay. If confirmed, I look 

forward to continuing the productive dialogue between the United States and Paraguay and will work diligently to advance these goals. 

Paraguay stands at an important juncture where the United States can help 

make a difference. Paraguay is less than 25 years away from a period when one 

person ruled the country for some 35 years, and there is significant work yet to do. 

During this historic period of its bicentennial, Paraguay is looking at the lessons 

of its past and works to design the blueprint for its future, especially as it approaches Presidential and legislative elections. To help, the United States has established programs to help Paraguay institute democratic reforms, disrupt criminal organizations, develop its counterterrorism capabilities, fight corruption, and promote 

good governance and economic development. If confirmed, I look forward to working 

with President Lugo, Foreign Minister Lara Castro, the Paraguayan Government, 

the private sector, and civil society as we seek to advance bilateral relations and 

strengthen the political, commercial, and cultural ties that exist between our two 

countries. 

If confirmed, I would also give the highest priority to ensuring the well-being and 

safety of Americans living and traveling in Paraguay. I would also seek opportunities for enhanced trade between the United States and Paraguay, specifically, promoting U.S. exports to Paraguay as well as advocating for U.S firms doing business 

in Paraguay. 

If confirmed, I look forward to working with you, your distinguished colleagues, 

and your staffs to advance our priorities with the Republic of Paraguay. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear today. I welcome any questions 

you may have.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you very much. In typical legal fashion, you have a full minute left. So, you synthesize very well. 

Mr. THESSIN. I cede it back to the chair. [Laughter.] 

Senator MENENDEZ. The chair is grateful to you. 

Mr. Hardt. 

STATEMENT OF D. BRENT HARDT, OF FLORIDA, TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE CO-OPERATIVE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA 

Mr. HARDT. Mr. Chairman, Senator Rubio, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today as President Obama’s nominee as the next United States Ambassador to the Co-operative Republic of Guyana. I am grateful for the trust and the confidence 

that the President and Secretary of State have placed in me. 

310

If confirmed by the Senate, I look forward to working closely 

with this committee and your colleagues in Congress to advance 

our Nation’s many interests in Guyana and the broader Caribbean 

region. 

Before I proceed, I would like to acknowledge the unflagging love 

and support throughout my career of my wife, Saskia, and my 

three sons, who are unfortunately preparing to leave post next 

week and could not be here with me today. But they have supported me in the United States in many capacities over the course 

of my career. 

I would also like to acknowledge the care and nurture of my 

mother, who awakened my curiosity in the world around me. 

Mr. Chairman, I have had the privilege of serving our country 

as a career Foreign Service officer for the past 23 years. This journey has taken me to the Western Hemisphere and Europe, including four previous postings in the Caribbean. I have worked with 

friends and allies to strengthen security combat drug trafficking, 

promote democratic values and human rights, combat HIV and 

AIDS, and encourage the exchange of people and ideas. 

In my current position as charge ́ d’affaires in the eastern Caribbean, I have led our Embassy team to rebuild confidence in the 

United State as the region’s partner of choice. I believe these experiences have prepared me well to lead the U.S. mission in Georgetown should I be confirmed. 

Mr. Chairman, Guyana is a country of tremendous potential with 

vast rain forests, productive agricultural lands, proven mineral resources and potentially large oil and natural gas reserves. But it 

is also a country facing considerable challenges with poverty and 

HIV/AIDS epidemic, ethnic and racial divisions, drug trafficking, 

and violent crime. 

The United States has a strong interest in working with Guyana, 

working in partnership to meet these challenges and fulfill this potential. 

If confirmed, I will work with the government and people of Guyana to solidify gains in democratic governance, bolster economic 

growth, and promote opportunity, especially for women and young 

people. 

The United States also has an interest in Guyana as a key partner in strengthening regional security. Through the President’s 

Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, we are intensifying our cooperation to counter threats of transnational crime and terrorism. 

That security for the citizens of the Caribbean is indispensable 

both to the region’s future and to our own interests. If confirmed, 

I will work with all United States agencies active in the region to 

strengthen our security cooperation with Guyana. 

Guyana is a nation of enormous economic potential, but with a 

per capita GDP of only $2,500, it is also one of the poorest countries in the hemisphere. That is why USAID has been working with 

the government and private sector to diversify the economy and 

create new opportunities and in agribusiness, aquaculture, wood 

products, and eco-tourism. 

If confirmed, I look forward to continuing our mission’s efforts to 

strengthen Guyana’s competitiveness, build its trade capacity, and 

reduce constraints to doing business. 

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Guyana is also a leader in efforts to address global climate 

change through its low carbon development strategy, which seeks 

to preserve its rain forests. To support Guyana’s efforts, our Embassy is helping to develop sustainable forestry and host country 

governance capacity. 

In the face of a debilitating AIDS epidemic in Guyana, the 

United States has made major investments in combating this disease through the President’s emergency plan for AIDS relief. Our 

$145 million investment since 2004 has paid clear dividends in 

meeting this challenge. Guyana’s prevention and care programs, its 

lab, and its state-of-the-art logistics system are models for HIV programs in the region. If confirmed, I will work with the government 

and other health partners to achieve enduring country ownership 

and sustainability of these life-saving advances in public health. 

Mr. Chairman, Guyana is poised for elections later this year that 

can build on progress it has made as an emerging democracy. 

International observers deemed its 2006 Presidential elections to 

be free, fair, and transparent, and for the first time independence, 

they were also peaceful. It is important that Guyana continue 

along this path in the elections scheduled to take place later this 

year. If confirmed, I will work with the government and civil society to help strengthen democracy and governance, promote constructive political dialogue, and encourage greater citizen participation in the political process. 

The United States has a special link to Guyana through the 

many Guyanese who live in our country. I will look to work with 

this talented and hardworking diaspora to find ways that they can 

contribute to building a more stable and prosperous Guyana. 

Mr. Chairman, these are some of the opportunities and challenges that await the next United States Ambassador to Guyana. 

They are challenges and opportunities I welcome. If confirmed and 

entrusted with this office, I look forward to working with you and 

your colleagues in Congress to forge a close and productive partnership between the United States and Guyana. I assure you that I 

will seek to represent the President and the American people with 

creativity, with dedication, and with dignity. 

Thank you, and I would be pleased to answer any questions you 

may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hardt follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF D. BRENT HARDT

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to 

appear before you today as President Obama’s nominee to serve as the next United 

States Ambassador to the Cooperative Republic of Guyana. I am grateful for the 

trust and confidence President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton have placed 

in me. 

If confirmed by the Senate, I look forward to working closely with this committee 

and with your colleagues in Congress to advance our Nation’s many interests in 

Guyana and the broader Caribbean region. 

Before I proceed, I would like to acknowledge the unflagging support throughout 

my career of my wife, Saskia, and my three sons, who have served the United 

States in many capacities during our many overseas assignments. 

Mr. Chairman, I have had the privilege of serving our country as a career Foreign 

Service officer for the past 23 years. This journey has taken me to the Western 

Hemisphere and Europe, including four previous postings in the Caribbean. I have 

worked with friends and allies to strengthen security, combat drug trafficking, promote democratic values and human rights, combat HIV and AIDS, and encourage 

312

the exchange of people and ideas. In my current position as Charge ́ d’Affaires in 

the Eastern Caribbean, I have led our Embassy team to rebuild confidence in the 

United States as the region’s partner of choice. I believe these experiences have prepared me well to lead the U.S. mission in Guyana, should I be confirmed. 

Mr. Chairman, Guyana is a country with tremendous potential, with vast pristine 

rain forests, productive agricultural lands, proven mineral resources, and potentially 

large oil and natural gas reserves. It is also a country facing considerable challenges 

from poverty, an HIV/AIDS epidemic, ethnic and racial divisions, drug trafficking 

and violent crime. The United States has a strong interest in working in partnership with Guyana to meet these challenges and fulfill this potential. If confirmed, 

I will work with the government and people of Guyana to solidify gains in democratic governance, bolster economic growth, and promote opportunity, particularly 

for young people and women. 

The United States also has an interest in Guyana as a key partner in strengthening regional security. Through the President’s Caribbean Basin Security Initiative 

we are intensifying our cooperation to counter the threats of transnational crime 

and terrorism. Together we are strengthening maritime interdiction capabilities, 

professionalizing law enforcement agencies, reforming the juvenile justice sector, 

and providing new opportunities for at-risk youth. Better security for the citizens 

of the Caribbean is indispensible both to the region’s future stability and prosperity 

and to our interests. If confirmed, I will work with all U.S. agencies active in the 

region to strengthen our security cooperation with Guyana. 

Guyana is a nation of enormous economic potential. Its natural resource endowment includes gold, bauxite, diamonds, and timber. Experts estimate a 50-percent 

probability that the Guyana-Suriname Basin holds 15 billion barrels of oil and 42 

trillion cubic feet of natural gas. With exploratory drilling anticipated later this 

year, we are helping prepare the ground for sound development of these resources 

through technical assistance of the Energy Governance Capacity Initiative (EGCI). 

With a per capita GDP of only $2,500, Guyana is also one of the poorest countries 

in the Hemisphere. That is why USAID has been working with the government and 

private sector to diversify the economy and create new opportunities in agribusiness, 

aquaculture, wood products, and ecotourism—a program singled out by the President of Guyana as a model for other donors. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing our mission’s efforts to work with the government and private sector to 

strengthen Guyana’s market competitiveness, build its trade capacity, and reduce 

legal constraints to doing business. 

Guyana is also a leader in efforts to address global climate change through its 

low carbon development strategy, which is helping to preserve its vast, untouched 

rain forest. To support Guyana’s interest in utilizing the country’s abundant forests 

as a development tool, our Embassy is engaged in developing sustainable forestry, 

ecotourism, and host country capacity to implement the Reduced Emissions from 

Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) initiative. 

In the face of a debilitating AIDS epidemic in Guyana, the United States has 

made a major investment in combating this disease through the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Our $145 million investment since 2004 has 

paid clear dividends in responding to Guyana’s HIV/AIDS epidemic. Guyana’s prevention and care programs, central laboratory, and state-of-the-art logistics system 

are models for other HIV programs in the region. Life-saving antiretroviral treatment has been provided to 89 percent of HIV positive patients in need of treatment—a sixfold increase. HIV testing among pregnant women has increased by 360 

percent, and treatment of HIV-positive women increased from 57 percent in 2006 

to 93 percent by the end of 2010. PEPFAR has also had a profound impact on Guyana’s health systems, enhancing the country’s laboratory capacity, ability to store 

and distribute medicines, and management of broader health services. As a result 

of these U.S. Government investments, Guyana now is able to take on more of the 

responsibility for this response. If confirmed, I will work with the government and 

other health partners to achieve enduring country-ownership and sustainability of 

these important life saving advances in public health. 

Mr. Chairman, Guyana is poised for elections later this year that can build on 

progress it has made as an emerging democracy. International observers deemed its 

2006 Presidential elections to be free, fair and transparent and, for the first time 

since independence, they were also peaceful. It is important that Guyana continue 

along this path in the elections scheduled to take place later this year. If confirmed, 

I will work with the government and civil society to help strengthen democracy and 

governance, promote constructive political dialogue, and encourage greater citizen 

participation in the political process. To this end, I will also encourage the government to hold local elections, which have not been held since 1994. 

313

The United States has a special link to Guyana through the many Guyanese who 

live in our country, many of whom are dual nationals and who maintain close ties 

with family in Guyana. In fact, over 70 percent of Guyana’s citizens have family living in the United States. If confirmed I will look to work with this talented and 

hard-working diaspora to find ways that their creativity can contribute to building 

a more stable and prosperous Guyana. 

As a Caribbean country geographically in South America, Guyana is emerging as 

a bridge between the two regions. It hosts the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 

headquarters, and is currently serving as the chair for UNASUR, which seeks 

greater integration of South American nations. If confirmed, I will also be accredited 

to the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), which brings together 15 Caribbean 

states to promote regional integration and cooperation. CARICOM has a vital role 

to play in building a secure and prosperous Caribbean, and, if confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretary General and CARICOM members to advance 

our common interests in trade, investment, development, and citizen security. 

Mr. Chairman, these are some of the opportunities and challenges that await the 

next United States Ambassador to Guyana. They are opportunities and challenges 

I welcome. If confirmed and entrusted with this office, I look forward to working 

with you and your colleagues in Congress to forge a close and productive partnership between the United States and Guyana. I assure you that I will seek to 

represent the President and the American people with creativity, dedication, and 

dignity. 

I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have. Thank you.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Hardt. Thank you all for 

your testimony. I welcome your family members and thank them 

for being here. 

Let me start off with a round. 

Mr. Farrar, tell me about the situation in Nicaragua from your 

perspective, as you approach the possibility of representing the 

United States there. What is the political landscape? 

Mr. FARRAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would start by saying 

that it is very clear that the United States and Nicaragua have 

some significant differences in the area of democratic governance 

and human rights. We and others in the international community 

have joined in trying to encourage strongly Nicaragua to allow 

international and domestic observation of the upcoming elections. 

We are awaiting still the outcome of our entreaties and those of 

others in the international community. 

There are also areas in which we are working together. I would 

mention counternarcotics where the United States is cooperating 

with certain entities in the Government of Nicaragua that have a 

proven track record on interdiction, particularly the Nicaraguan 

Navy. 

And finally, as I mentioned in my opening statement, we are 

working together under the Central America Free Trade Agreement and NAFTA—excuse me, CAFTA—CAFTA–DR to—and trade 

has expanded considerably. 

But our No. 1 concern going forward would be the situation domestically for the upcoming elections and whether or not international and domestic observers will be allowed to observe those. 

Thank you. 

Senator MENENDEZ. What is your view of Mr. Ortega’s ability to 

run a second time? 

Mr. FARRAR. Yes. As you know, the Supreme Court in 2000—of 

Nicaragua in 2009 issued a decision allowing reelection. I was not 

working in Nicaraguan issues at that time, so I am not privy to all 

of the considerations and background that went into formulation of 

U.S. policy at that time. But it is my understanding that the State 

314

Department issued a statement following that decision pointing 

specifically at the lack of transparency and the decisionmaking 

process that led to that, and that that position was also echoed by 

our Embassy in Managua. 

Going forward, I think if confirmed, it would be important for me 

and for Washington to be consulting closely so that as the situation 

evolves on the ground, we would speaking with one voice directly 

to the Government of Nicaragua to express our concerns. Thank 

you. 

Senator MENENDEZ. This is what concerns me. Ambassador Callahan had a very clear view. He said it was unconstitutional. And 

since President Ortega got elected in 2006, he has methodically and 

shrewdly consolidated his political power by subverting his country’s democratic institutions and his people’s basic human rights, 

including freedom of assembly. Now, he is in violation of the country’s constitution. He is pursuing a second consecutive and third 

overall Presidential terms in national elections. 

His electoral machination suggests he is taking no chances. He 

and the Sandinista supporters are thwarting peaceful demonstrations, silencing the business community, taking over media outlets, 

politicizing government offices, and expropriating public funds. In 

what is the second poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, Ortega has clearly put his own personal enrichment and empowerment over the welfare of the Nicaraguan people. 

Now, that is my view, but it is a far different view than the one 

you expressed to me. And I am concerned, as I was hoping to hear 

something different today. I am concerned that if the major political view that you have on the landscape is the question of election 

transparency and having observers, there’s far more than that 

going on here. And for my own sake in terms of being supportive 

of a nominee to go to this post, I want to see someone who is going 

to make sure that civil society has the support of the U.S. Government in a way that protects them from this regime and gives the 

wherewithal, the space, the openness, to be able to choose a really 

transparent democratic opportunity for their country. 

And that is why I gave you an open question, to get a sense of 

what your view is. My concern also stems also from your time at 

the U.S. Interest Section in Cuba, because Cuban dissidents have 

said to me that during the time you have been the Interest Section 

there, it has been the least open to their cause and concerns. And 

now you are going to a country that ultimately has a lot of issues 

that are also about democracy and human rights. 

Can you assuage my concerns? 

Mr. FARRAR. Mr. Chairman, first of all, let me say that it is essential for the United States to stand up for our democratic principles, whether we are talking about Nicaragua, Cuba, or anywhere 

else in the world. And as we do that, it is essential as well that 

we speak with one voice, whether it is from Havana or in Managua, with Washington, so that our message is clear, and it is one 

message and one message only. We have to be able to do that directly and clearly. 

We also have to be able to defend the programs that we run that 

stem from our principles. And over the past 3 years in Havana, I 

have had the opportunity to develop, implement, and carry forward 

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a broad range of programs to support civil society and the free flow 

of information to, from, and within Cuba. Facing at times substantial obstacles, we have managed to implement some very innovative programs to support civil society in Cuba. And if given the opportunity, we would certainly—I would certainly make that my top 

priority as well. 

I am looking forward to serving in Nicaragua because I recognize 

that in the runup period to the election and then afterward, the 

role of civil society is going to be crucial. And our programs can be 

a limited, but significant, part of protecting civil society, protecting 

its role, and preserving democratic institutions. And that is something that has been a top priority of mine in Havana, and if confirmed, would be in Managua as well. 

Senator MENENDEZ. One final followup before I turn to Senator 

Rubio. Do you share any of the concerns that I expressed a minute 

ago in Nicaragua? 

Mr. FARRAR. Yes. I think we are quite concerned with the trends 

in Nicaragua. If you look at last year’s human rights report, for example, it says that respect for human rights has deteriorated in 

Nicaragua, and it focuses particularly on some of the concerns that 

you mentioned—freedom of assembly, freedom of the press, respect 

for independent media. Yes, on a personal level and as an administration, we share some of those concerns. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Farrar, let us 

begin. I have been in the Senate now 5 months. I was not here during most of your role in Havana. And I want to study that a little 

bit because I think you are going into a potentially similar situation in Nicaragua. 

I would start by just asking, what is your view or what was your 

view going in to your post in Havana, the role of the U.S. Interest 

Section in Cuba? What did you see as the mission statement for 

the Interest Section? 

Mr. FARRAR. I would say going in, our No. 1 priority was support 

for civil society and to expand freedom in Cuba. Together with 

that, it would be protecting American citizens, which is our No. 1 

priority, around the world. 

Before going to Havana, I did extensive consultations here up on 

Capitol Hill. The one area of consensus that I found was that the 

Interest Section also needed to expand its contact with all levels of 

Cuban society. And we have tried to implement programs to carry 

that out as well. 

Senator RUBIO. As you I am sure are aware, before you were at 

that post, the Interest Section had developed in a very different direction. Decisions were made that you undid. There was the infamous news ticker, the Christmas decorations. In addition to that, 

there were numerous complaints from dissidents and others about 

your reluctance to interact with them. I know in September 2009, 

you hosted a reception where there were regime personnel who attended, yet members of civil society in Cuba were excluded. 

Were those the decisions that you made, and what was the 

thought process behind some of those decisions, because it took the 

Interest Section in a different direction than it had been going preVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00323 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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viously. What led to those decisions? How were they made? Were 

you involved in making them? What was the rationale? 

Mr. FARRAR. Thank you, Senator. Over the past 3 years, I would 

say what we have done is build upon some of the programs that 

were already in place and expand them and implement new ones. 

As an area where we built upon existing programs, I would cite the 

training program for independent journalists. It is run by Florida 

International University, where we recently graduated our 500th 

student from those courses. 

We run two Internet resource centers, one of which we rebuilt 

from the ground up last year. They are the largest sources of uncensored free Internet in Cuba. 

We have gone beyond that by instituting basic computer courses 

for Cuban civil society, classes in blogging. Once we received permission from the Department of Commerce, we began preparing 

and distributing DVDs with free software and monthly updates to 

help people be able to connect. 

We created a distance learning center. We had no facility. We 

constructed this distance learning center using a railroad shipping 

container that we have converted into a center that now has DVC 

capability, Internet stations, computers, so that students in Havana can take college level courses in Spanish at our distance 

learning center. 

The reason we did that was shortly after I arrived in 2008, we 

tried to begin a scholarship program for Cuban students to study 

in the United States, two programs, one a leadership program in 

the summer and the second a year at a community college. We advertised that program as you only can in Cuba, through word of 

mouth, by passing out leaflets on the street, giving leaflets to other 

people to pass on to friends and acquaintances. We had over 700 

students apply for those scholarships from around Cuba. We selected the 27 best. None of them received exit permits to depart 

Cuba from the government, so we had to find other ways to connect, which we did. 

We have begun training classes for English teachers and English 

language students. The median age of learning English language 

classes is 23. We are connecting with college level students in Cuba 

today, I would say, for the first time. 

In the past year, we have nominated and she won the prize as 

one of the International Women of Courage, Yoani Sanchez. We recently nominated the Damas de Blanco, and they received the 

Global Human Rights Defenders Award from the State Department 

for 2010. When it came time for both to receive their awards, none 

of them received permission to leave Cuba to accept those rewards. 

So, we put on ceremonies for them in Havana so that they could 

receive their prizes. 

Last month’s ceremony with Damas de Blanco was the first time 

that the 12 75ers who were released over the past year were all 

gathered together. And since that time, we have gathered them together again several other times, and they have met on their own. 

Senator RUBIO. I apologize. I do not want to interrupt because 

this is a list of accomplishments, and those are significant, and we 

can talk about those. I think we will have a second round and however else the chairman wants to proceed. But I think the question 

317

was really related to the nature of the Interest Section and its mission. 

Before you arrived, the Interest Section was viewed as having a 

more adversarial—would you concede that it was considered more 

adversarial by the regime before your arrival? 

Mr. FARRAR. I don’t want to characterize how it was before I arrived, but what I would say is the Interest Section has, is——

Senator RUBIO. The Interest Section changed after you arrived. 

And the changes that you made, specifically some that I outlined, 

but its view, its mission statement, would you not concede that its 

mission changed, the way it conducted business changed in terms 

of its interaction with the government? 

Mr. FARRAR. I think the mission statement support for civil society and in democratic progress did not change. What changed was 

we tried to expand the ways that we go about doing that. 

Senator RUBIO. OK, the way that you went about doing that, 

right. And so, would you characterize the way they used to do 

things before as more aggressive? You know, obviously the ticker, 

the Christmas decorations, things that clearly antagonized the 

Cuban Government. You took the Interest Section in a different direction in terms of its tactics. My question is, What was the 

thought process behind using these different tactics? Well, why did 

you decide to go in that direction after the Interest Section had 

been going in the other direction? I just want to know the thought 

process behind it, the justification. You know, what prompted you 

to go that route? 

Mr. FARRAR. Yes. I would say that our goal was to support civil 

society in Cuba and to expand the Interest Section’s contacts with 

all levels of Cuban society. And in order to do that, we had to come 

up with new programs that we could use to reach out, to reach out 

more broadly than we had done in the past. And that is the direction that we went. 

Senator RUBIO. But was it your view that by taking down some 

of these programs that antagonized the regime that you would 

have more space to carry out these programs? Was the thought 

that if we do not go over the top—if we do not offend or try not 

to offend the regime, we will have more space to carry out our mission. Was that your view? 

Mr. FARRAR. No. I think we were looking for the programs that 

would be most effective. If I could go back for just a second to the 

distance learning program. We did not have any facility in order 

to implement such programs. We had to get this shipping container 

moved on to the premises of the Interest Section, which took a long 

time, but we were able to do. 

Subsequent to that, I have been called into the Foreign Ministry 

four times for their presentations on how this program violates the 

Vienna Conventions, a view with which we completely disagree. 

But our No. 1 concern is not what the possible effect might be on 

the Government of Cuba. It is what will be most effective in terms 

of supporting civil society and expanding the free flow of information to, from, and within the island. 

Senator RUBIO. OK. You know, there were—and I know I have 

gone over time, so we can come back to this or we can move on in 

a second. But your relationship and your description of dissidents 

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and the dissident movement on the island has been described as 

reluctance and disinterest. What is your view and what was your 

thought process regarding dissidents on the island and your relationship with them in comparison to that of your predecessors at 

the mission? 

Mr. FARRAR. I think we—and I—have a long and deep relationship with civil society in Cuba. And if anything, it is a broader relationship than it has been in the past. Civil society in Cuba knows 

that the Interest Section is the bulwark of support, that we have 

the interests of the Cuban people at heart. And the programs we 

have, the outreach that we do, is all aimed at that. 

I think events, such as the one that I described, where we gave 

the award to the Dames de Blanco for the global human rights defenders. And we brought together in one room them and their relatives who had been released, and provided a venue frankly for 

them to begin to talk with one another and to see how, now that 

they have reincorporated themselves into daily life, how they want 

to go about promoting civil society in Cuba. That is something that 

the Interest Section can offer and probably there is no other institution in Havana that can do so. 

Senator RUBIO. My last question on this round, and it goes directly to this point. There is a press report that on April 2009 and 

dispatch that you signed, you said that Cuba’s pro-democracy activists and their focus on human rights did not resonate with Cubans, 

who are more concerned about having greater opportunities to travel freely and live comfortably. Does that remain your view, that 

Cuba’s pro-democracy activists and their focus on human rights 

does not resonate with Cubans? 

Mr. FARRAR. Yes. I am not sure of the source of that quote. If 

it is—has to do with WikiLeaks, we of course cannot comment on 

the validity or not of a source such as that. 

I have said many times that our No. 1 objective in Havana has 

been support for civil society, expanding their operating space, and 

trying to improve the information flow and out of the island. At 

other times I have said that they are the conscience of Cuba, and 

I stand on that. Thank you. 

Senator MENENDEZ. We will do a second round here. I will get 

to some of you. I do not want you to feel left out of the process. 

I know you would rather have questions than not have questions. 

But I just have one more followup, Mr. Farrar. This is the nature 

of the challenge here. When I hear you respond to Senator Rubio, 

you talk about broader civil society, and that is admirable. But 

every time our questions are about human rights activists and political dissidents, your responses are of broader civil society. Why 

is it that human rights activists and political dissidents inside 

Cuba who I have talked to, including during a recent trip to Spain 

where I met 50 of those who were released from Cuban jails, say 

they feel that there was less engagement, less access from the Interest Section during your tenure. 

I do not believe having your political affairs director smoking a 

cigar with a narcotics trafficker is reaching out to civil society. If 

you were going to some other country, maybe this would not be an 

issue. But many of us on this committee, and certainly I as the 

319

chairman of the subcommittee, have serious concerns about where 

Nicaragua is headed. 

So the ability to engage not just with civil society, but with 

human rights activists and political dissidents languishing inside of 

their country to create the space that is necessary for the proper 

democratic process to take place is very important. That is why it 

is critically important for us to understand where you came from 

so we can know what to expect of you in your next post. 

I want to give you the chance to give me some sense of how you 

will engage differently in Nicaragua. And maybe your answer is 

there is no difference, in which case, you know that would be it. 

Mr. FARRAR. Senator and Mr. Chairman, I share your concern 

about strengthening and supporting civil society. That is what we 

have endeavored to do over the past 3 years. 

If I may go back to the example of Damas de Blanco, after our 

ceremony presenting them with the Global Human Rights Defenders Fund Award, 2 weeks later we brought back the former 75ers 

to give them 2 days of intensive training on computers, on the 

world that had passed them by during their 8 years in Cuban prisons. 

We are engaged in looking for practical ways that we can help 

human rights activists, civil society members, get their message 

out and engage better to advance the cause of democracy and 

human rights. And it is that same mission of trying to find ways 

that will work that I would, if confirmed, look to carry forward in 

Nicaragua. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you for your answer. Ms. Kubiske, let 

me ask you, President Zelaya has returned to Honduras. That was 

part of the condition for Honduras’ return to the OAS, along with 

assurances of the government that his political allies would be allowed to participate in politics. 

Can you comment on what you view as the political climate in 

Honduras and the meaning of Zelaya’s return for the stability of 

the Lobo government? 

Ms. KUBISKE. I think in the first instance, it was quite a triumph 

that Honduras, with the help of neighbors in the hemisphere, were 

able to get to the point where Honduras could be brought back into 

the OAS. And so, they are now in a position to move forward. 

Having said that, I understand that the atmosphere continues to 

be fragile and polarized. There is no question about that. 

As part of the project of national reconciliation as you mentioned, 

Mr. Chairman, there was a condition of Zelaya’s return. And so, we 

hope and we urge—I hope and I urge—if I were confirmed, that he 

would play a constructive role. 

Senator MENENDEZ. What do you think is the stability of the 

Lobo government? 

Ms. KUBISKE. I think they have—I am going to answer it indirectly to be frank. They have taken many important steps forming 

a unity government that has opposition members in it and establishing a truth and reconciliation commission to go over what happened in the past and to try to make recommendations for how to 

prevent it. 

I think I would see my role as putting a lot of priority on 

strengthening democratic institutions because there is an issue of 

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having a system that will avoid a political crisis, such as the one 

that occurred in 2009. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me ask you a question that is local in 

nature, but I would like to get your commitment should you be confirmed to work with me on this. 

In May of last year, a constituent of mine, Joe Dunsavage disappeared off the coast of Honduras in his boat, and despite extensive efforts, neither he nor his boat were recovered. His brother, his 

wife, and his kids have been seeking a certificate of presumptive 

death from the Department for more than a year to no avail. Will 

you work with me in trying to help this family come to a conclusion 

so that we can have them have a measure of closure and be able 

to deal with the challenges of their estate? 

Ms. KUBISKE. The short answer is absolutely. The longer answer 

is what happens to American citizens is a core objective of our foreign policy and taking care of people. I know that the Embassy and 

the State Department both have worked hard on the case, but I 

would welcome the opportunity, if I were confirmed, to take a closer look and see if there is anything more we can possibly do. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate that. We look forward to doing 

that with you. 

Mr. Thessin, with reference to Paraguay, I mentioned that it captured an enormous amount, in monetary terms, of cocaine, 875 

kilos. What do you view as the nature of our counternarcotics cooperation with Paraguay? And how committed do you think the 

Paraguayans are to a strong bilateral relationship with the United 

States to control illicit activity of that and other sorts in the TriBorder region? 

Mr. THESSIN. Counternarcotics is an area that is obviously a high 

priority for the United States Government—the President, the 

Drug Enforcement Administration, and the country. And DEA has 

a very close working relationship with the Paraguayan authorities. 

They have been training units to go out and look for and seize narcotics that might be transiting the country. They have reported to 

me that they have been receiving good cooperation. 

If confirmed, I would continue to make counternarcotics a high 

priority. This is important to the United States. Beyond that, the 

Tri-Border Area is an area of particular concern for United States 

and Paraguayan law enforcement. The area is notorious for corruption, for money laundering, for smuggling. And whenever you have 

that kind of money floating around from illicit gains, there is also 

concern then that it is used to—some of it is going to fund terrorism in the Middle East, for example. 

There is no corroborated evidence that there is an active terrorist 

cell in that area. But it is an area that we have clearly in our focus, 

as do the Paraguayans, and the Argentines, and the Brazilians. So, 

if confirmed, this is an area we will give tremendous attention. We 

will work with the Paraguayan government to build its democratic 

institution to deepen its roots so that the government can deliver 

services and be trusted by the people. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Mr. Hardt, let me just ask you, I know we often overlook Guyana 

in the panoply of Latin American nations, but on the economic 

front it has resources that are a basis for growth and development. 

321

And I understand it has agricultural, aquacultural, eco-tourism, 

mining, wood products, as well as possible oil reserves offshore that 

could be as extensive as those that are found in Angola. 

What would you do if confirmed to help track U.S. foreign investment to help develop these resources? 

Mr. HARDT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If confirmed, I would certainly look to continue the programs that we have ongoing in Guyana already to foster economic growth and opportunity. The areas 

you mentioned do have a lot of potential, but they also have a number of obstacles. And through USAID programs, we have been 

working to try to identify new markets, develop institutions within 

each of these sectors to strengthen their outreach to potential markets, and to create more opportunity for these sectors, certainly on 

the oil and gas front, which is a potential game changer in many 

ways for Guyana. 

We are working through an energy governance capacity initiative 

to build the government’s ability, should this oil prove to be as our 

geological surveys anticipate that they would have the ability to 

manage it, to regulate it, and to ensure that the oil goes to the development of the country and the people of Guyana in a way that 

will raise them out of their current level of poverty. 

Senator MENENDEZ. We are closing our USAID mission—in Guyana. And we have programs like PEPFAR that we are closely engaged in there. Since you are in Barbados now, do you think that 

the mission in Barbados can be as effective in monitoring the 

progress and coordination of those programs that we have going 

with USAID? 

Mr. HARDT. Well, I know that the mission in Barbados can be 

very effective. I am pleased——

Senator MENENDEZ. It was not a trick question——

[Laughter.] 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. I am sure they are effective in 

Barbados. The question is, Can they be as effective in operating 

and overviewing what is going on in Guyana? 

Mr. HARDT. Well, certainly I do not think it can ever be said that 

you can be more effective than being on the ground. That is going 

to be the most effective way to manage a program. But obviously 

AID is making—is facing budget limitations, and in the context 

they are seeking to reutilize some of their efforts. We have excellent working relationships within the region. We are working regionally on the PEPFAR program in the partnership framework. 

We are working regionally on the Caribbean Basin and Security 

Initiative. So, we have a pattern of working regionally, and I think 

we can continue that. And, you know, I look forward to engaging, 

you know, with our Embassy in Bridgetown—when I am Georgetown, if confirmed, and believe we can continue the good programs 

that we have ongoing already. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. And just to wrap up, Mr. Farrar, and 

then I want to move to some other questions. First of all, I did not 

thank you for your service to our country, a long career, and to 

your family as well for doing that. And you and I have never met. 

We have not spoken before on these issues, and I look forward to 

talking to you more about these in the future. 

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I just want to leave on the record what my concerns are, not just 

specifically about the nomination, but in general about the situation in Nicaragua. You have a government there that’s conducting 

an all-out assault on the constitutional order and on the independence of government institutions. You have a—Daniel Ortega, who 

is using his relationship with Hugo Chavez not just for personal 

enrichment, but to create an alternative basically government in 

terms of funding mechanisms, for many things that are happening. 

You have a government that is openly supporting Moammar 

Gadhafi, openly supported Russia’s invasion of Georgia, and the 

creation of states out of that invasion. 

And in the face of that, we have to send someone to be the face 

of the United States in Managua. And I think that should be someone who is going to be forceful. You are not going to Luxembourg. 

It is not Lichtenstein. This is a place that is headed in the wrong 

direction in a hurry, and America needs a forceful presence there. 

And I have to be honest. We do not know each other well. I have 

only known about your record from what I have read in preparing 

for this hearing today. But I am concerned about some of the decisions that you made at the Interest Section in Havana. We have 

complaints—numerous complaints from dissidents and human 

rights activists. We have instances of invitations to Castro regime 

officials at the expense of others in civil society to be at certain 

events. Some other decisions—you know, some of the things, talking about the Christmas tree and the Christmas stuff that was 

taken down, the ticker. And these may be symbolic, but they were 

certainly part of a forceful presence in the area. 

And then to top it all off, we have State Department officials visiting Havana, and instead of staying at the Interest Section, and 

maybe there is a good reason why they did not stay there, they 

stayed at the Hotel Nacional, which in addition to being an expropriated property, appears to me to be a security risk to stay in a 

place like that in a country like that. 

Suffice it to say that it is my opinion, just from the little I know, 

and I could be dissuaded—I mean, that is what I want to hear 

today—that the strategy that you adopted at the Interest Section 

was not to offend or to try to avoid offending or being abrasive with 

the Castro government because you felt perhaps it would give you 

more space to function and carry out your mission. 

Obviously you have the right to respond to that, and maybe you 

view it very differently. But I am concerned about that because it 

is not what I think I would like to see as the strategy in Managua. 

And maybe there are distinctions, and maybe you will handle that 

post differently. I would give you the opportunity to respond to 

that. I do have questions for all four panelists as well. But if you 

would like to respond to that. 

Mr. FARRAR. Yes. Thank you, Senator I think I have a 30-year 

record of service to the United States. My previous position before 

going to Havana was as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor where I 

worked with civil society around the world. While I was in the Bureau there, we developed some of the very programs that we were 

then able to take advantage of and use in Havana. I am talking 

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about programs such as the Global Human Rights Defenders Fund, 

which was created while I was in the Bureau. 

Civil society, human rights, is near and dear to my heart. It has 

been part of my career for almost 30 years now. In Havana, we 

have been trying to find the most effective ways to communicate, 

to expand space for civil society. 

The world changes, and we come up with new programs in order 

to be able to connect. Some of those new programs are ones that 

I described—the blogging classes, the computer classes, distributing free software. We still do some of the old methods as well. 

In the first 8 months of this fiscal year, we distributed 21,000 copies of the El Nuevo Herald in Cuba. Some of the old methods work, 

but we need to be innovative and creative in trying to work with 

civil society, whether it is in Cuba or whether it is Nicaragua or 

anywhere else around the world. And that is truly what I have 

dedicated my time to. Thank you. 

Senator RUBIO. OK. I have the same question for all four panelists. 

We are facing, as you all well know, fiscal constraints and a 

great debate going on in this city about what America should be 

spending money on, particularly when it comes to foreign aid and 

foreign programs. Have you given thought to one investment—if 

you were prioritize and come up here in your new post a year from 

now, 6 months from now, make a recommendation on one investment that you think would give us, for lack of a better term, the 

most bang for our buck, in your particular assignments, have you 

identified such a program? Have you given some thought to which 

one program would give us the highest rate of return on our investment in each of your respective countries? It does not have to be 

a specific program. I mean, it could be area of expenditure. Where 

should our focus be basically when we spend money on foreign aid 

or other presences in the different countries? And, I guess, Mr. 

Hardt, we will hear from you. 

Mr. HARDT. Certainly. Over the past few years I have been working in the Caribbean to implement the President’s Caribbean Basin 

and Security Initiative. And I think that program is ideally suited 

to the needs of the region. When we developed it, it was based on 

listening to people in the region, hearing what their concerns and 

priorities are, and trying to respond to that. And it combines a nice 

mix of traditional support for capacity building among law enforcement and military groups, but also efforts to look at the root causes 

of crime in the region and to support at risk youth and educational 

programs for young people. And I think this balance is clearly what 

we need to be doing. We need to obviously go after the drug traffickers and the criminals, but we also need to deal with the fertile 

ground that creates them. And certainly I would hope that we 

would be able to keep that program strong. 

Mr. THESSIN. Senator, that is a very good question that I have 

given a lot of thought to. 

My procedure for doing—for looking at something like this would 

be to talk to the country team and to talk more with Washington 

about their experience on the programs because I am not as familiar with them as they are. 

324

But I think, though, when you look at what Paraguay needs 

right now, it is to help institutionalize its democracy. That is the 

kind of programs that the President in Paraguay has asked for our 

help. And that includes things like helping to fight corruption, 

helping to train the police, helping to make the government deliver 

its services more effectively to the people. And those are programs 

that I think pay off because that may be the engine for starting a 

country that is less corrupt, that has less corruption in it, that has 

better government services, where the government is trusted, 

where democracy takes deeper root. And I think that is very much 

in our interests, and that is the first place that I would look to try 

to protect. 

Mr. FARRAR. Thank you, Senator. I would cite areas that I do not 

think would actually cost any more money. The first would be looking ahead to the run up to the election in November and beyond. 

I think we should examine the mix of civil society programs for 

Nicaragua to make sure, together with the Congress, that we have 

the right mix moving forward, depending upon what the situation 

is on the ground there at that time. 

The second I would mention would be in the area of counternarcotics, to look at the agencies that we are working with in Nicaragua, make sure we have the right ones there, but also to encourage Nicaragua to take advantage, to use the opportunity to train 

officials at the International Law Enforcement Academy in El Salvador. They have access to that. They are not using it. That is a 

space that could be utilized. Thank you. 

Ms. KUBISKE. Senator, you have asked a very fair question. I 

think the problems in Honduras interrelate. If you ask Hondurans 

what is their top concern, it is insecurity and the culture of impunity, and that is obviously an area that we need to focus on. 

If you look from the narrowest, most hard-nosed United States 

perspective, you can say that we need to support helping 

Hondurans have opportunities in Honduras so that they do not, as 

somebody has pointed out, have choices between joining a cartel 

and drugs or going illegally or sometimes legally to the United 

States. 

I cannot tell you one area because I think the way to answer that 

question is to see what kind of assistance cannot be provided from 

another source. But I would be happy to talk with you later and 

to talk with others and give you a much more specific, concrete example if that would help you. 

I do have a very strong view that to have a successful economy, 

you need to have opportunities for poor people. And so, a big part 

of what I would like to see more of is support for the kinds of programs that provide job-related skills to Hondurans, or that connect 

Hondurans to markets. Hopefully, those things would be win-win 

for both of us. 

But as I said, it is very hard to disentangle the citizen security 

part from the economic part. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, thank you all for your appearance and 

your answers. Thank you for your service to our country, each and 

every one of you, and for your willingness to serve. Senator Inhofe 

has asked unanimous consent for a series of questions to be included in the record. Without objection, they are so ordered. 

325

The record will remain open for 48 hours. During those 48 hours, 

I can assure you that there will be a series of questions that will 

come forward, and I would urge each of you to answer as quickly 

as possible since it will expedite the consideration of your nomination. 

Senator MENENDEZ. With that, the committee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:16 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF D. BRENT HARDT TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. In November, Guyana will host Presidential and parliamentary election. 

The election board, however, has expressed concern that 49,000 voters have not 

claimed the registration cards that allow them to cast ballots.

• What steps is the government taking to address this issue? 

• What role will the United States and international community play in ensuring 

that the elections are free and fair—both in the lead up to the election and on 

election day?

Answer. Although the date for the 2011 national elections has not been set, they 

are expected to be held between October and December. As of June 4, 46,687 

registration cards were unclaimed according to the Public Relations Officer of the 

Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM). The GECOM has a systematic plan to distribute the cards, which includes advertising the availability of the cards on the 

radio and distributing lists of individuals who have unclaimed cards to all political 

parties. GECOM will soon begin delivering unclaimed cards to residents in remote 

areas of Guyana via a network of temporary field offices. The Government of Guyana intends to invite observers from the Caribbean Community and the Organization of American States to monitor the elections, but at this time, no formal invitations have been extended. 

The Embassy, through USAID, is the most visible international elections donor. 

It is working actively to ensure that the elections are free and fair through technical 

assistance to GECOM, grants to civic organizations and NGOs to promote voter participation and open dialogue, including a program addressing first time voters, and 

a grant to facilitate the participation of disabled persons in the election.

Question. Closure of USAID mission in Guyana. Last fall, USAID announced 

plans to close its AID mission in Guyana. USAID’s presence has allowed it to coordinate PEPFAR programs in coordination with the Centers for Disease Control. 

USAID has also been a key factor in coordinating our aid with donors like the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB), the British Department for International Development (DFID), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the 

European Union.

• What kind of message do we send to Guyana and to the Caribbean region as 

a whole when we withdraw coordination of much-needed programs in health 

care and disease prevention? 

• Will the mission in Barbados be as effective in monitoring the progress and coordination of these programs?

Answer. In order to achieve its global sustainable development objectives, USAID 

is consolidating resources in priority countries and sectors. As a cost-saving measure, USAID plans to manage its Guyana projects from its regional office in Barbados. USAID has determined that it can manage and coordinate these activities 

from Bridgetown and achieve cost savings. 

USAID’s Office in Barbados is a regional platform that already manages an extensive and robust HIV/AIDS program in the Caribbean and has a strong professional 

staff. Despite the pending closure of our USAID office in Guyana, we have sought 

to assure the Government and other health and civil society partners that USAID 

will remain active in Guyana implementing our HIV/AIDS, CBSI, and economic 

growth programs. 

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RESPONSES OF JAMES H. THESSIN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. Tri-border Region—International Terrorism: We don’t hear much about 

Paraguay. It’s the size of California and has a population of 61⁄2 million people. It’s 

tucked away between Bolivia, Argentina, and Brazil. We share in interest with 

Paraguay in ensuring that this Tri-Border Area does not become a nesting ground 

for narcotics or, even worse, terrorist activities. There continue to be reports linking 

the tri-border region to international terrorist groups, such as Hamas and 

Hezbollah. A 2009 RAND study examined how Hezbollah has benefited from film 

piracy proceeds in the tri-border and the State Department terrorism report maintains that the United States remains concerned that Hezbollah and Hamas sympathizers are raising funds among the sizable Middle Eastern communities in the region. Hezbollah is also linked to two bombings in Argentina: the 1992 bombing of 

the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires that killed 30 people and the 1994 bombing 

of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires that killed 85 

people. 

Is it your sense that Paraguay is committed to a strong bi-lateral relationship 

with the United States and to controlling illicit activity in the triborder region? If 

confirmed, what priority would you place on addressing the proliferation of illicit 

activities in the region and in encouraging the regional governments to seriously 

address the panacea of criminal activity that is known to occur in this area?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to make it a high priority of Embassy Asuncion to work to counter terrorism, violent extremism, and narcotics trafficking while 

addressing illicit activity in the Tri-Border Area, including corruption, money laundering, and piracy of intellectual property. 

It is my sense that Paraguay is committed to a strong bi-lateral relationship and 

to controlling illicit activity in the Tri-Border Area. I will work with the Government 

of Paraguay to maintain this strong relationship and to continue to support Paraguay’s efforts in this area. However, poverty, corruption, and the limited capacity 

of Paraguay’s security services all challenge its law enforcement efforts. 

This is where the United States has the potential to do much to help Paraguay 

strengthen its democratic institutions, including through the continuation of our 

efforts in the areas of counternarcotics, money laundering, law enforcement training, information-sharing, and counterterrorism. As Ambassador to Paraguay, I will 

work hard to do just that. I will also work with our country’s leading experts in 

Washington and our Ambassadors to Brazil and Argentina on how the United 

States can best coordinate its work with Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay to control 

illicit activities in the Tri-Border Area.

Question. Counternarcotics: Last week, Paraguay captured a record haul of 875 

kilos or $131 million in cocaine. U.S. drug enforcement agents were reportedly 

called in after workers at the private Phoenix river port grew suspicious about rice 

from the Tri-Border region. What is the nature of our counternarcotics cooperation 

with Paraguay and other countries in the region? Are these countries sufficiently 

trained and equipped to cope with those growing problem? To what extent is corruption, particularly by officials, an issue with respect to the trafficking of narcotics?

Answer. The recent seizure of 875 kilograms of cocaine in a container of rice at 

a Paraguayan river port illustrates one of the biggest law enforcement challenges 

facing Paraguay: the use of the country as a transit route for Andean cocaine 

headed to Argentina, Brazil, Europe, and elsewhere. Paraguay is also a source of 

marijuana for neighboring countries. 

Counternarcotics responsibilities are shared by Paraguay’s Anti-drug Secretariat 

(SENAD) and the Paraguayan National Police (PNP). The leadership of both institutions strongly supports law enforcement cooperation with the United States and regards illicit narcotics trafficking as one of the most serious threats facing Paraguay. 

The recent cocaine seizure you mention took place as a result of the fine cooperation 

that exists between U.S. and Paraguayan authorities. 

Corruption is a significant factor hampering Paraguayan law enforcement, but 

progress is being made. Both SENAD and the PNP receive financial and operational 

support from the U.S. Government. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration 

supports sensitive investigative units (SIUs) in both SENAD and the PNP, and 

those units have had several successes in recent months, including the 875 kilogram 

seizure. 

If confirmed, I would make it a high priority to support U.S. counternarcotics 

efforts, including DEA’s efforts to counter illicit trafficking by land, air, and water 

and to improve controls in Paraguay’s container ports. 

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I appreciate your question regarding regional efforts to combat narcotics trafficking. As with Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina have cooperated effectively with 

the United States on counter narcotics matters. All three countries have had successes against narcotics trafficking; all three have policies and programs designed 

to confront official corruption. We believe that all three countries are committed to 

advancing their ability to counter this serious problem. 

RESPONSES OF JONATHAN FARRAR TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. In many Latin American countries, there seems to be a tendency toward 

autocracy and longevity in office. Different countries handle the temptation differently. Mexico has one 6-year term. They proclaim ‘‘Suffragio Efectivo—No 

Reeleccio ́n’’ or Effective Suffrage—No Reelection. It was adopted in their constitution as a result of 30 years of dictatorial rule and a revolutionary struggle that last 

over 10 years. 

Many nations have held constitutional referendums or used other means to remove limits on Presidential terms—to extend it to two terms, in some cases three 

terms. In the case of Venezuela under Chavez, term limits have been removed completely.

• What is your sense of this trend toward autocracy?

Answer. The region’s commitment to democratic development is widespread and 

strong. This commitment gives Latin Americans a special role in helping support 

other nations making the difficult transition to democracy today. As Secretary 

Clinton has noted, ‘‘This hemisphere can do much more to guard against threats 

and challenges to democracy closer to home. In some countries, insecurity and a lack 

of opportunity remain real obstacles. In others, democracy is being rolled back 

rather than strengthened. Cuba remains a glaring exception to the democratic convergence. That is something that all of us have to face up to and work toward dealing with.’’ I share Secretary Clinton’s commitment to protecting fundamental freedoms and, if confirmed, I will work to promote democracy and respect for human 

rights in Nicaragua. 

The United States has expressed its concerns in Nicaragua regarding the 

Supreme Court decision which cleared the way for President Ortega to run for reelection. As Ambassador to Nicaragua, I would commit my efforts and those of the 

Embassy to engaging with civil society, which often serves as a bulwark against the 

future undermining of democratic institutions.

Question. Since his reelection in 2006, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega has 

methodically and shrewdly consolidated his political power by subverting his country’s democratic institutions and his people’s basic human rights, including the freedom assembly. Now, in violation of the country’s constitution, he is pursuing a second consecutive and third overall Presidential term in national elections this 

November. His electoral machinations suggest he is taking no chances. He and his 

Sandinista supporters are thwarting peaceful demonstrations, silencing the business 

community, taking over media outlets, politicizing government offices, and expropriating public funds. In what is the second poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, Ortega has clearly placed his own enrichment and empowerment above the 

welfare of the Nicaraguan people. 

I hope that you will agree that the deteriorating political situation in Nicaragua 

is alarming and likely to worsen without greater international engagement. With 

Nicaragua’s opposition party fractured, civil society is the only meaningful check 

against this increasingly authoritarian Ortega regime, and yet, civil society organizations are operating with few resources and under constant threat from Sandinista 

forces. Prodemocracy activists valiantly fighting to protect democracy need greater 

U.S. support—both moral and financial.

• Can you assure the committee that you will be an ally and advocate for those 

brave men and women defending human rights in Nicaragua, and in what ways 

do you believe we can step up our support for civil society groups in Nicaragua?

Answer. I can assure the committee that I share its concerns about the erosion 

of democratic institutions in Nicaragua. If confirmed, I will continue to be a passionate advocate for human rights and democracy and work with human rights defenders. I will be outspoken about the importance of protecting fundamental freedoms and democratic institutions, and urging greater respect for human rights, 

transparency, and separation of powers. I have worked closely with civil society in 

Latin America during a career that spans three decades. Additionally, I will bring 

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to bear my experience to ensure that our efforts are the most effective possible in 

the environment which prevails in Nicaragua today. 

I will continue to advocate for the engagement of civil society at the local and national level, a viable independent media, an informed citizenry, strengthened local 

government, and effective political party participation. All of the programs that 

further these goals are crucial to building a sustainable democratic foundation in 

Nicaragua and must be protected in the face of declining resource levels for U.S. 

assistance.

Question. Mr. Ortega is illegally seeking another Presidential term. What do you 

believe U.S. policy should be toward his candidacy?

Answer. The U.S. Government expressed its concern in 2009 about the manner 

in which the Nicaraguan Supreme Court made its decision allowing the reelection 

candidacy of President Ortega. The United States and others in the international 

community are concerned that the upcoming elections be a valid expression of the 

true will of the Nicaraguan people. We must speak up in defense of our democratic 

principles and convey our concerns about threats to democratic institutions as they 

arise. For that reason, the United States has pressed for the presence of credible 

domestic and international observers to enhance prospects that the elections will be 

carried out in a free, fair, and transparent manner and to provide effective witness 

if they are not. 

We must be prepared to discuss our concerns directly with the Nicaraguan Government, both in Washington and in Managua, in a coordinated manner. If confirmed, I would do so vigorously.

Question. Mr. Ortega is not only seeking reelection; he is also looking to secure 

56 seats in the National Assembly—a supermajority that would allow him to rule 

without any real checks on his power. Understanding that time is running out for 

an effective domestic and international election observation initiatives, what can the 

U.S. Government and the international community do to persuade Mr. Ortega to immediately accept independent election observers?

Answer. The administration has said clearly that the manner in which the upcoming elections are held and observed will inevitably affect Nicaragua’s relationship 

with the international community, including the United States. Allowing credible 

and timely domestic and international observation of the upcoming elections would 

demonstrate whether they represent a valid expression of the will of the Nicaraguan 

people and assuage concerns of the international community.

Question. The current Government in Nicaragua, and the Government in Cuba, 

where you served as chief of mission, are similar in many respects, including their 

strong alliance with Hugo Chavez and their hostility toward the United States. How 

would you describe U.S. policy toward Cuba, before and after you becoming chief 

of the U.S. mission in Cuba?

Answer. U.S. policy toward Cuba has consistently been to advance the national 

interests of the United States by assisting the people of Cuba to freely determine 

their own future. The policies and programs that the Obama administration has put 

in place aim to advance those vital objectives. 

In January 2011, President Obama directed changes be made to regulations governing travel, nonfamily remittances, and U.S. airports providing licenses to charter 

flights between the United States and Cuba. These measures were taken to support 

civil society in Cuba, reduce the dependence of the Cuban people upon the state, 

and enhance the free flow of information to, from, and within Cuba. President 

Obama has stated that these steps, combined with the continuation of the embargo’s 

controls over trade and investment with Cuba, are important steps in reaching the 

widely shared goal of a Cuba that respects the rights of all of its citizens. These 

latest measures were undertaken to build upon the President’s April 2009 actions 

to help reunite divided Cuban families, to facilitate greater communication between 

the United States and Cuba, and to increase humanitarian flows to the people of 

Cuba.

Question. Could you share with the committee the lessons you learned in Cuba 

about how to deal with the Castros’ regime and how you would apply those lessons 

to your post in Managua, if confirmed?

Answer. My experience over the past 3 years in Cuba has reaffirmed my conviction developed over 30 years in the Foreign Service with regards to the essential 

role which the United States must play in supporting those who are helping to build 

an independent civil society in the face of severe government reprisals. This includes 

our support for pro-democracy activists, human rights defenders, independent 

media, and other courageous men and women who peacefully demand greater reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00336 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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spect for universal and basic rights such as freedom of association, expression, and 

information. In Cuba, I have been persistent and vocal in standing up for these 

rights and those who demand them, and creative in supporting them, while responding to the evolving needs of those on the ground who are leading the fight to exercise these fundamental freedoms. 

The position of the United States on the release of political prisoners in Cuba has 

been clear and consistent: all political prisoners should be released and be able to 

decide for themselves whether to remain in Cuba. In the ceremony I held at the 

Interest Section presenting the State Department Annual Human Rights Defenders 

award to the Damas de Blanco, my remarks highlighted our common commitment 

to see the day when there are no more political prisoners in Cuban jails for nothing 

more than peacefully exercising their basic rights. 

In addition to the Damas, whom I nominated for the 2010 Human Rights Defender Award, I also proposed that the Department recognize Dr. Darsi Ferrer in 

2009 for that year’s award, and Yoani Sanchez for the 2010 International Women 

of Courage Award. Sanchez won, while Dr. Ferrer was one of the three runners up. 

I nominated these individuals because I felt that publicly recognizing the valor and 

legitimacy of independent activism, regardless of the Cuban Government’s reaction, 

is critical and an important element for promoting human rights and democracy, 

particularly in countries which systematically violate human rights like Cuba. 

Moreover, during my 3 years at the Interest Section, I focused on ensuring our 

commitment to human rights and democracy at the Interest Section truly is 

missionwide, and I have not budged from our principled stance, both in Havana and 

in Washington, even when those with whom we work have come under attack. Our 

Foreign Service officers have been harassed by government-sponsored mobs and 

media when carrying out their duties of observing peaceful protests. In close coordination between the Interest Section and Washington, we have answered our critics 

and resisted Cuba’s pressure to curtail our outreach activities and human rights observation. Our Interest Section engages directly with civil society activists, including 

members of Cuba’s political opposition, former political prisoners, human rights activists, and broader civil society activists. 

As noted in our most recent ‘‘Human Rights Report,’’ the United States has serious concerns with the deterioration of the respect for human rights and democratic 

institutions in Nicaragua, especially in the areas of freedom of assembly, freedom 

of speech, and respect for independent media. Similar to what I did in Cuba, I will 

work with friends and allies in the international community on the ground who 

share our commitment to strengthening democratic institutions and be ready to 

speak up in defense of our democratic principles and to convey our concerns, both 

directly to the Government of Nicaragua and more broadly, about any threats to 

democratic institutions. 

At the same time, we must sustain consistent efforts to help protect those who 

may be persecuted for their peaceful dissent and to strengthen democratic institutions in Nicaragua regardless of the outcome in November. If confirmed, I would 

look forward to working with the committee and other Members of Congress in 

adopting the appropriate policies for both the preelectoral period and beyond in 

order to ensure that Nicaraguans don’t follow the same lamentable fate as their 

Cuban counterparts. 

As I have noted elsewhere, the Interest Section recently began Digital Video Conferences to connect human rights activists in Cuba with their counterparts elsewhere in the region. One of our first conferences linked Cuban human rights defenders with their counterparts in Nicaragua. Helping to create such linkages is a vital 

part of the mission of the Interest Section and of Embassy Managua, and one upon 

which if confirmed I would seek to build in Managua.

Question. Do you believe that it is possible for U.S. policy to embolden rather than 

discourage hostile actions by anti-American regimes? Could you tell us what has 

been achieved by a policy of ‘‘engagement’’ with Havana? Do you think a similar 

policy of ‘‘not giving offense,’’ in other words of curtailing U.S. efforts found objectionable by the regimes, to be the proper formula in dealing with Managua and 

Havana?

Answer. The administration has consistently stood up for democratic principles in 

our policy toward Cuba, and the activities of the Interest Section have been in pursuance of those principles. We have made it clear to Havana that this is our guiding 

and nonnegotiable stance, and that we will not waver under any circumstance in 

the defense of democratic principles. 

President Obama has made it clear that advances in bilateral relations are not 

possible absent significant changes in Cuba. However, the United States has engaged with Cuba in specific areas where it is in our national interest to do so. In 

330

2009, the United States resumed biannual talks with Cuba on migration to ensure 

that migration from Cuba is conducted in a safe, legal, and orderly manner. Without 

exception, I have brought USG representatives together with Cuba’s most prominent and active human rights defenders, pro-democracy activists, and other dissidents to learn from their experiences and to demonstrate to the international community that Cuba’s civil society is an important interlocutor. We were unequivocal 

that we would not budge from these activities, even if it led to the cancellation of 

the discussions. This is the type of work that I had the honor of directing while in 

the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and in which the United 

States engages around the world. Cuba is no exception, and neither would be 

Nicaragua. 

The United States has implemented a broad range of strategies to strengthen civil 

society, including human rights defenders, pro-democracy activists, independent 

journalists and others in Cuba and to defend those persecuted for their beliefs or 

for peaceful protest. We have done so in the face of unrelenting Cuban harassment 

and propaganda attacks, both in print and in television and radio, which have singled out private Cuban citizens seeking to exercise their individual freedoms, and 

the Interest Section and members of its staff for supporting them. The staff of the 

Interest Section has been targeted especially when observing peaceful protests in 

Havana, despite the fact that such observation is a practice fully in accordance with 

diplomatic practice under the Vienna Conventions. In coordination with Washington, the State Department and the Interest Section have pushed back vigorously 

and directly with the Cuban Government against such abuses. 

As Ambassador to Nicaragua, I would continue to stand up for the democratic 

principles of the United States as I have done throughout my 30-year career in the 

Foreign Service. Working with Washington, and in consultation with Congress, I 

would endeavor to put in place in Embassy Managua the most effective policies possible to advance U.S. national interests and strengthen democratic institutions in 

Nicaragua. Working in coordinated within the administration, I would address directly with the Nicaraguan Government, and more broadly with the international 

community when appropriate, bilateral disagreements as they arise from our vital 

engagement on these issues.

Question. What do you see as the primary mission for the U.S. Embassy in Nicaragua at this time? Is support for civil society actors part of that mission? If yes, 

what is your specific plan to reach out to and support civil society? What Embassy 

resources will you dedicate to supporting civil society?

Answer. The primary mission for the U.S. Embassy in Nicaragua is to promote 

U.S. national interests by assisting with Nicaragua’s long-term development as a 

democratic, prosperous, and stable partner for the United States, to the benefit of 

the citizens of both countries. The mission is focusing its efforts on assisting Nicaragua in developing democratic governance, sustainable and broad-based economic 

growth, and law enforcement. A vibrant civil society is vital to these goals, which 

I would seek to engage fully, if confirmed. 

During my time in Havana, we have found creative means to support civil society 

in Cuba. Given the inability of many Cuban activists to gain permission to travel 

outside the country, the Interest Section uses Digital Video Conferences and other 

technology to help them build relationships with their counterparts in the United 

States and elsewhere in the hemisphere. Just recently we hosted digital video conferences between human rights activists in Cuba and their counterparts in other 

countries. 

Unfortunately, most civil society groups in Nicaragua are woefully short of resources, and many of the international donors on which those organizations rely 

have pulled out of Nicaragua. We must endeavor to maintain active and creative 

engagement with a beleaguered Nicaraguan civil society. Embassy Managua has 

brought Nicaraguan journalists to the United States on International Visitors 

Programs. 

If confirmed, I will be outspoken about the importance of protecting fundamental 

freedoms, democratic institutions, and urging greater respect for human rights, 

transparency, and separation of powers. I will bring my experience from years of 

work in the region to lead Embassy Managua in its search for innovative means to 

engage with civil society, and to continue efforts at the local level in Nicaragua to 

engage with the development of a new generation of leaders.

Question. Are you concerned about efforts by the Government of Nicaragua to undermine the integrity of the elections? Will you demand, as forcefully as possible, 

the presence of international election observers preceding and during the forthcoming elections? What Embassy resources will you commit to monitoring direct and 

indirect efforts by the Government of Nicaragua to undermine the integrity of the 

331

elections? Will you work with other foreign embassies to observe the elections and 

report on irregularities, including reporting to international media on any such 

irregularities?

Answer. For elections to be truly democratic, they must be a valid expression of 

the will of the people. For that reason, the United States has pressed for the Nicaraguan Government to invite credible domestic and international election observers 

to enhance prospects that the elections will be carried out in a free, fair, and transparent manner and to provide effective witness if they are not. If confirmed, I would 

commit the entire Embassy, in coordination with our international partners, to be 

actively engaged in monitoring and reporting on the November elections. Such monitoring and reporting must cover not just the election day and its aftermath but also 

the critical period leading up to the actual voting. As always, I will be ready to 

speak up in defense of our democratic principles and to convey our concerns, both 

directly to the Government of Nicaragua and more broadly, about any threats to 

democratic institutions.

Question. When President Carter visited Cuba he met with some dissidents. Did 

you or your staff help with the list of invitees? Was Martha Beatriz Roque, the 

former political prisoners and opposition leader invited? If not, why not?

Answer. My USINT team and I welcomed and briefed President Carter and his 

staff during his March 2011 visit to Cuba. Per requests from President Carter’s 

team, we shared a list with them of Cuba’s most prominent and effective civil society leaders that included former political prisoner Martha Beatriz Roque. President 

Carter and his staff organized their two meetings with civil society entirely on their 

own and without USINT participation, and they selected those they wished to meet. 

No USINT official was present at the meetings. Consequently, I cannot verify 

whether Ms. Roque received an invitation to attend, or attended, either of those 

meetings.

Question. Soon after you became chief of mission in Havana, some dissidents 

made it known that their access to the USINT became more limited? Was that your 

decision? How frequently did you personally invite dissidents to the USINT?

Answer. My staff and I meet with Cuban civil society daily, individually and in 

groups, both inside and outside the mission. In FY 2010, USINT officials held over 

600 meetings with human rights activists alone, many of them at USINT. In that 

same period, Cubans made more than 13,000 visits to USINT’s Internet centers to 

exercise their right to freedom of information. 

I frequently host representatives from Cuba’s civil society in my home, as do other 

officers in the mission. Members of Cuban civil society know that they can count 

on our support for their efforts to expand civil liberties and disseminate accurate 

information on activities in Cuba. Representatives of civil society, including many 

dissidents, are active participants in the various distance learning and on-site 

courses USINT offers, including training for independent journalists, librarians, and 

bloggers.

Question. How many U.S. diplomats work at the U.S. Interest Section? How many 

Cuban nationals work there? How are they hired? Does the Cuban Government play 

a role in who works at the Interest Section? Does the Cuban Government receive 

payment for those workers? How much? In your estimation are there any of those 

workers Cuban intelligence officers? In addition to them, how many of the Cuban 

workers working at the USINT are susceptible to pressure by the Cuban authorities 

to gather information at the USINT?

Answer. The United States Interest Section (USINT) is limited by the Cuban Government to no more than 51 permanent U.S. Government employees. Similar to U.S. 

missions around the world, USINT also employs local nationals, third-country nationals and eligible family members (EFMs). Because of the limitation on permanent 

U.S. Government employees, USINT employs relatively more EFMs and third-country nationals than would other U.S. missions of similar size. USINT currently contracts 297 local Cuban nationals. As is the case for all foreign missions operating 

in Cuba, the Cuban Government Agency Palacio de Convenciones (PALCO) must approve any Cuban national USINT plans to hire. USINT pays a fee to PALCO for 

every Cuban employee. We paid PALCO $988,867 in fees in fiscal year 2010 for this 

purpose. The strict security procedures followed by USINT take into full account the 

operating environment in Cuba, including the process by which local nationals are 

hired.

Question. In both Cuba’s and Nicaragua’s case, did you meet with a broad spectrum of the Cuban American and Nicaraguan communities in the United States?

332

Answer. Prior to my arrival at the U.S. Interest Section in July 2008, I was serving as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL). In that capacity, I personally met with a 

broad spectrum of NGOs working to bolster human rights, democracy, and the free 

flow of information to, from, and within Cuba. My meetings included representatives 

of those NGOs who were grantees of DRL programs and those who worked with 

USAID and its programs, many of whom were leaders from the Cuban American 

community. I also met with a broad spectrum of human rights organizations, policy 

foundations, and academics working on issues of human rights and democracy in 

Cuba. 

Because I am still in my post as the chief of mission of the U.S. Interest Section, 

I have not yet had the opportunity to undertake similar consultations with the community in the United States engaged on such issues regarding Nicaragua. If confirmed, I would look forward to such consultations as a vital element in preparing 

myself to be the next United States Ambassador to Nicaragua.

Question. One symbolic, nevertheless important efforts in previous years were the 

Christmas decorations and the lights on the USINT building in Havana that stood 

as a sign of hope in the mostly dark oceanfront of the city. Why were those lights 

turn off? Were the Cuban authorities pleased with the blackout? Did you try to turn 

the Christmas lights back on during your time there?

Answer. Throughout my assignment in Havana, the U.S. Interest Section has featured illuminated Christmas decorations on our grounds and at my residence. Indeed, consistent with U.S. support for religious freedom, I expanded USINT’s holiday decorations to include lighted displays honoring Chanukah and Ramadan. All 

of these displays remain clearly visible at night from Havana’s oceanfront during 

the appropriate holidays. Reactions, or potential reactions, from the Cuban authorities play no role whatsoever in these manifestations of the support of the United 

States for religious freedom. 

I take extremely seriously the promotion of international religious freedom and 

strive to set a personal example. My wife and I have attended religious services at 

75 Catholic parishes, churches, and chapels within the travel limits imposed upon 

the personnel of the Interest Section by the Cuban authorities. I also have attended 

religious services at various churches at the invitation of five Protestant denominations as well as interfaith ecumenical services. 

RESPONSES OF LISA KUBISKE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. In many Latin American countries, there seems to be a tendency toward 

autocracy and longevity in office. Different countries handle the temptation differently. Mexico has one 6-year term. They proclaim ‘‘Suffragio Efectivo—No 

Reeleccio ́n’’ or Effective Suffrage—No Reelection. It was adopted in their constitution as a result of 30 years of dictatorial rule and a revolutionary struggle that last 

over 10 years. 

Many nations have held constitutional referendums or used other means to remove limits on Presidential terms—to extend it to two terms, in some cases three 

terms. In the case of Venezuela under Chavez, term limits have been removed completely. What is your sense of this trend toward autocracy?

Answer. I am committed to protecting fundamental freedoms and, if confirmed, 

I would continue to work to promote freedom and democracy throughout the hemisphere. In Honduras, the constitution limits the President to a single, 4-year term. 

The Honduran Congress has taken steps that would permit amendments to that restriction through a public consultation. Additionally, members of the Honduran 

Resistance are advocating significant changes to the constitution. Ultimately, these 

decisions rest with the Honduran people. From the U.S. Government perspective, 

it is important that any reform process be transparent and consistent with Honduran law, and that potential reforms adhere to democratic principles.

Question. In May 2010, a constituent of mine—Joe Dunsavage disappeared off the 

coast of Honduras in his boat. Despite extensive search efforts neither he nor his 

boat were recovered. His brother, wife, and kids, have been seeking a certificate of 

presumptive death from the Department for more than a year to no avail. What assistance can you provide to this grieving family? The Department has told the family that they must file a request through the Honduran court system, which will 

take at least another year to process. What reasonable steps can be taken to expedite this process?

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Answer. Assisting American citizens overseas is a core objective of our foreign policy. At my June 8 hearing, I committed to working with you to help this family. 

I stand by this commitment to take a closer look to determine if there is anything 

more we could possibly do. If confirmed, I would review the correspondence on this 

issue and consult with U.S. and Honduran authorities to help this family obtain the 

necessary document as quickly as possible.

Question. Honduras still has one of the highest murder rates. Press reports have 

the official 2010 homicide total pegged at 6,236 deaths. That would be a homicide 

rate of 75.6 per 100,000 people. Honduras has also one of the highest rates of inequality in Latin America. With a Gini coefficient rate of 53.8 in 2008, it is not far 

behind Haiti, which was at 59.2 before the earthquake. As we make inroads in the 

fight against drugs in Mexico, Honduras is one of the countries of the northern triangle in Central America that is assaulted by drug-trafficking organizations. How 

deficient are the resources and institutional capacity of the government to counter 

the well-established drug trade? What are the most important steps we can be taking to help the government fight the narcotics trade? 

Do you believe that we are presently investing sufficient resources through CARSI 

to address the escalating citizen security and narcotics issues in Honduras?

Answer. Threats to citizen security in the region are a serious and growing problem, and the Honduran Government needs support in many areas. 

The U.S. Government appropriately buttresses the efforts of the Government of 

Honduras to fight transnational organized crime by strengthening the capabilities 

of the police and rule of law institutions, while encouraging respect for human 

rights. It also provides support to specific counternarcotics operations. Additionally, 

U.S. Government programs supplement Honduran efforts to address the root causes 

of crime, including the lack of economic opportunities, because it is impossible to 

disentangle citizen security from economic development. The U.S. Government also 

works with others in the international community to identify who else can provide 

expertise and resources in support of these efforts. It is vital to the security of the 

Honduran people and to the United States that we do all we can to continue to work 

in these areas.

Question. Presently in Latin America the Millennium Challenger Corporation has 

just one compact in El Salvador. The Honduras compact closed at the end of last 

year and the MCC board decided against a second Honduras compact because Honduras did not meet the MCC’s controlled corruption indicators, based largely on the 

political events in the country. Do you anticipate that the resolution on the political 

crisis and Zelaya’s return to Honduras will allow funding for a new compact to proceed? Are you aware of any other reasons that MCC would now decline to consider 

a new compact for Honduras?

Answer. Honduras performed admirably in implementing its 5-year compact. 

However, it did not meet the selection criteria for a second compact this year, having received a score on the Control of Corruption indicator that fell just below the 

median for its peers. 

The Government of Honduras is working to address this concern, and the MCC 

is assisting Honduras in monitoring its reforms to provide supplemental information 

for the MCC Board to consider at its next meeting on country selection in December. 

For our part, the U.S. Government is helping Honduras improve governance 

through programs managed by several agencies, including USAID and the Departments of the Treasury, Defense, and State. If confirmed, I would continue to support 

this robust assistance to Honduras, including efforts to improve respect for human 

rights, so that it might achieve its goal of qualifying for a second compact.

Question. The State Department recently released a report that lists those countries where U.S.-owned businesses have investment disputes and, in some cases, expropriation claims against the host government. Honduras is on that list. If confirmed, what kind of priority will you devote to ensuring those claims are processed 

and cleared?

Answer. Both at USTR and the Department of State, I have been exposed to a 

number of investment disputes, and I developed a deep respect for the enforcement 

of treaty obligations in this area. 

There are several outstanding investment disputes in Honduras involving American citizens. If confirmed, I would make appropriate efforts to ensure the prompt 

resolution of these cases. This is not only a question of basic fairness; if Honduras 

wants to succeed in attracting foreign investment, it is imperative that it establish 

a positive investment climate. 

334

RESPONSES OF JONATHAN FARRAR TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

Question #1. A series of measures were taken during your time as chief of mission 

in Havana—for example, taking down the news ticker that ran across the facade 

of the U.S. Interest Section—that significantly shifted U.S. policy in the island.

• What was the reasoning behind the decision to end this creative method of 

bringing uncensored information to the Cuban people? 

• Were you asked for advice on this decision? If so, what was your advice?

Answer. U.S. policy remains focused on the need for democratic reforms and improved human rights conditions in Cuba. There has been no shift in U.S. priorities 

with regard to our efforts to increase the flow of uncensored information to, from, 

and within the island in order to support the ability of the Cuban people to freely 

determine their future. 

The billboard was installed in January 2006 because of the Cuban Government’s 

restrictions on the free flow of information. By summer 2009, it had become evident 

that the electronic billboard had outlived its usefulness. The billboard suffered numerous breakdowns and required significant maintenance, and new and more effective outlets of information for Cuban citizens had emerged. The Cuban Government 

placed numerous obstacles in front of USINT to impede the ability of Cubans to 

read the billboard. As a result, when the billboard became only partly operational 

in June 2009, the administration decided to focus its efforts to expand the free flow 

of information for Cubans in other, more effective areas. 

Since 2006, we have seen an increased flow of independent information to and 

from Cuba as a result of USG training of independent journalists and the emergence 

of bloggers in Cuba. Increased family travel to Cuba and the increased availability 

of cell phones and other communications devices in Cuba has contributed to improved access to information. The administration announced new measures on Cuba 

on April 13, 2009, and again on January 14, 2010, including measures intended to 

increase the free flow of information to Cuba. 

Other, more effective methods of bringing uncensored information to the Cuban 

people include more than 13,000 subscribed sessions at USINT’s two Internet centers; more than 30 courses and workshops offered to groups such as independent 

journalists hosted by USINT; regular DVCs with off-island interlocutors; the distribution of CDs, DVDs, flash drives, laptops, and cameras, some loaded with free 

(licensed) software, and the distribution of nearly 15,000 copies of the Nuevo Herald 

and 16,000 copies of USINT’s news clippings in FY 2010 alone. We also distribute 

thousands of books, magazines, and our own newsletters to independent libraries 

and journalists throughout the island.

Question #2. Prior to your assignment to Havana, a symbolic, but nevertheless 

meaningful initiative, had been the Christmas decorations that adorned the U.S. 

Interest Section building in Havana and stood as a sign of hope in the mostly dark 

oceanfront of the city.

• What policy considerations went into the decision to end this initiative? 

• Did the State Department consider the potential reaction from Cuban authorities? 

• If so, has the United States received any indication of the reaction of the Cuban 

authorities to the blackout?

Answer. Throughout my assignment in Havana, the U.S. Interest Section has featured illuminated Christmas decorations on our grounds and at my residence. Indeed, consistent with U.S. support for religious freedom, I expanded USINT’s holiday decorations to include lighted displays honoring Channukah and Ramadan. All 

of these displays remain clearly visible at night from Havana’s oceanfront during 

the appropriate holidays. Reactions, or potential reactions, from the Cuban authorities play no role whatsoever in these manifestations of the support of the United 

States for religious freedom. 

I take extremely seriously the promotion of international religious freedom and 

strive to set a personal example. My wife and I have attended religious services at 

75 Catholic parishes, churches, and chapels within the travel limits imposed upon 

the personnel of the Interest Section by the Cuban authorities. I also have attended 

religious services at various churches at the invitation of five Protestant denominations as well as interfaith ecumenical services.

Question #3. As far as the end of distribution of shortwave radios, was that the 

result of a recommendation from the U.S. Interest Section, or an order from the 

Department? What was your advice on that policy shift?

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Answer. USINT’s distribution pattern for material support to Cuban civil society 

reflects a variety of factors, including available funding for procurement; our ability 

to import materials; and a shifting technological environment. Perhaps more importantly, our material support for independent civil society is driven by the demands 

of civil society itself. 

The number of shortwave radios distributed has decreased in recent years primarily due to changes in technology, which have changed the way in which Cuban 

society accesses and disseminates information on events on the island and abroad. 

These days, shortwave radios are not as frequently requested as in the past. As a 

result, I have focused on expanding the free flow of information for Cubans in other, 

more effective and innovative ways. Instead, our contacts are making use of the 

free, uncensored Internet access we provide through two Information Resource Centers to exercise their rights of information and expression, and to connect with 

larger audiences in real time and in two-way exchanges. Independent journalists 

and other key elements of civil society also appreciate our help in accessing the electronic tools of today’s journalistic trade. We offer daily news clippings and copies 

of the Nuevo Herald, and monthly CDs and DVDs filled with software updates, 

news, and other valuable information. We maintain Web sites and Facebook pages 

in both English and Spanish on which we post daily updates on U.S. policy and 

other initiatives. We also provide distance learning courses in Spanish which offer 

information on technology, civil organization, English teaching, and communication 

skills.

Question #4. During a September 2009 visit to Cuba by then-Acting Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of State Bisa Williams, the U.S. Interest Section in Havana 

hosted a reception where officials from the Cuban regime were invited, but representatives of independent civil society were excluded.

• What role, if any, did you have in planning this event? 

• How many other events were held during your tenure in Havana that followed 

this pattern of exclusion? What was their purpose?

Answer. During her September 2009 visit to Cuba, Acting DAS Williams cohosted 

with me a roundtable with independent civil society members that included some 

of Cuba’s best-known political dissidents. In addition, she and a USINT official visited blogger Yoani Sanchez’s home, where Ms. Williams held discussions with Ms. 

Sanchez and other prominent Cuban bloggers. During the visit, USINT also hosted 

a reception for 55 members of civil society, including many dissidents. 

USINT has maintained a robust civil society outreach strategy during my tenure. 

We are the only foreign mission in Havana that invites independent civil society 

representatives, including political dissidents, to our national day celebration. Our 

last Fourth of July official event, in 2010, included over 75 opposition activists, as 

well as dozens of other representatives from broader independent civil society. Every 

high-level State Department visitor to Cuba during my assignment has had the opportunity to meet with and seek the views of independent civil society members, including dissidents, despite threats from Cuban Government officials to shut down 

the visits. I frequently host these meetings, either at USINT or in my residence. 

In addition, I have hosted numerous targeted events for other sectors of civil society, such as for Cuba’s religious and cultural communities, a Human Rights Day/

Nobel Peace Prize event, a Human Rights Week film festival, and charity events for 

an independent NGO that helps children with cancer, to name a few examples. I 

also hosted a reception honoring the Damas de Blanco as the winners of the 2010 

Human Rights Defenders Award, a luncheon honoring Yoani Sanchez as a 2010 

International Woman of Courage, and a 2009 reception honoring Dr. Darsi Ferrer 

as the winner of an honorable mention for the 2009 Human Rights Defenders 

Award—all independent civil society members who were nominated by USINT during my assignment in Havana.

Question #5. Information from surveys done by internationally recognized NGOs 

inside Cuba show that more than three-in-four Cuban adults have expressed support for voting for fundamental political change if given the opportunity.

• As chief of mission, what was your assessment and advice to the State Department regarding the relevancy of Cuban pro-democracy organizations in relation 

to the views and priorities of the Cuban population? 

• How did you arrive to these views? 

• Would you provide to the committee copies of any and all communications you 

had with the State Department on this topic? 

• Given your experiences in Cuba, do you agree that a post-Fidel Castro scenario, 

in which Raul Castro and the current leadership of the Cuban regime maintains 

firm control of, is against U.S. interests?

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Answer. The past 3 years in Cuba has reaffirmed my experience from 30 years 

in the Foreign Service, including service during the prior administration as the 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 

and Labor, of the vital role played by civil society in building the elements of a 

democratic society. Pro-democracy groups and human rights activists are the conscience of Cuba, and deserve our support and that of the international community. 

I have been outspoken about the important role these groups play and the need to 

publically promote greater respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. At 

the Interest Section, we have worked closely to support the work of all elements of 

Cuban civil society, including pro-democracy groups, human rights activists, independent journalists, and many others working to expand freedoms and increase the 

flow of information and reporting from Cuba. In doing so, we have built upon existing programs and begun many new ones to reach out to additional audiences, 

especially to the youth of Cuba. 

As outlined in the response to question #7, the Interest Section in a very challenging environment has undertaken a variety of programs, such as Distance Learning courses, blogging courses, free software distribution, and many others to reach 

out to new audiences and serve long-time participants eager to learn new skills. At 

the same time, we rebuilt from the ground up one of our two Internet Resource Centers and have carried forward the Florida International University training program 

for independent journalists which is held in our DVC facilities. We recently graduated the 500th student from that successful program. 

The President has stated clearly that major changes would be necessary in Cuba 

for there to be a significant change in our bilateral relations. The continued denial 

of the ability of the Cuban people to freely determine their own future clearly would 

not meet that standard. The administration’s policies and programs aim to support 

the aspirations of the Cuban people to freely and democratically determine their 

own future. As the chief of mission of the Interest Section, the successful development and implementation of the democracy programs at USINT has been and remains my priority.

Question #6. The Cuban Government requires Cubans to obtain an exit permit, 

in addition to a valid Cuban passport and a foreign visa, before allowing Cubans 

to travel abroad.

• Are there Cuban families who have been granted U.S. visas, stranded in 

Havana awaiting the Cuban regime exit permit? • How many are they, how long have they been waiting?

Answer. Yes. We track this issue closely and raise it with the Cuban Government 

(GOC) during the Migration Accords Talks held semiannually. The practice of denying exit permits denies these families the right to leave any country, including their 

own, and generates additional workload for USINT because we must reissue travel 

documents to persons whose original documents expired due to denials. 

Documented cases of exit permit denials continue to decline since FY 2009, where 

USINT recorded 797 reported instances of exit permit denials. In FY 2010, USINT 

documented 443 cases of exit permit denials. We expect the downward trend to 

continue based on numbers so far this fiscal year. In FY 2011 YTD, we have 

documented 155 new cases of exit permit denials to principal and derivative visa 

applicants. At the same time in FY 2010, we had documented 259 cases of permit 

denials. Thus in FY 2011 YTD, we have witnessed an almost 40 percent drop in 

exit permit denials over the same time in FY 2010.

Question #7. Following the detention and subsequent sentencing by the Cuban regime of a USAID subcontractor in Cuba, the administration has placed severe restrictions on U.S. democracy programs.

• Have these restrictions improved the regime’s record on human rights or in any 

way encouraged it to directly engage Cuba’s independent civil society and prodemocracy organizations in a dialogue toward greater political freedoms?

Answer. The U.S. Interest Section has not retreated from democracy programs 

since the indefensible arrest and imprisonment of Mr. Alan Gross. On the contrary, 

since December 2009, under hostile conditions the Interest Section has successfully 

undertaken new initiatives and expanded our existing programs including the 

following:

• After the refusal of the Cuban authorities to give exit permits to students chosen for scholarships to study in the United States, the Interest Section constructed and inaugurated a new Distance Learning Center to provide collegelevel courses taught by U.S. professors in Spanish to students in Cuba. 

• The Interest Section began new programs to teach courses in computing, 

blogging, the English language and other subjects. After receiving clearance 

337

from Washington, the Interest Section also began distributing free software 

with monthly updates to assist Cubans to communicate with the outside world 

and among themselves. • After soliciting volunteers from other American embassies in the hemisphere, 

the Interest Section recently began Digital Video Conferences to connect Cuban 

human rights activists with their counterparts in other Spanish-speaking 

countries. • When one of our two Internet Resource Centers showed serious signs of deterioration, we rebuilt it from the ground up into a new facility to house this vital 

program. • The Interest Section remains firmly committed to the Florida International University training program for independent journalists which is held in our DVC 

facilities. We recently graduated the 500th student from that successful program.

Cuba’s human rights record remains poor, as evidenced in the Department’s most 

recent ‘‘Human Rights Report.’’ Programs such as those described above are a vital 

part of our overall effort to assist the Cuban people to prepare for the day when 

they can freely determine their own future. 

Following the arrest of Mr. Gross and the completion of GAO audits which found 

weaknesses in the awarding and oversight of Cuba grants and contracts in Washington, the administration strengthened its oversight and management of those programs in close consultation with Congress.

Question #8. Remittances and travel are among the most important sources of 

hard currency for the regime.

• What would be the regime’s response to a suspension of U.S. remittances and 

travel until this American citizen is allowed to return home, and every Cuban 

with a U.S. visa is allowed to leave the country?

Answer. We have no way of predicting the response from the Cuban regime to 

any number of variables. It has shown from its beginnings that maintaining power 

is its paramount priority, and that all other considerations, including actions taken 

by the United States, are subordinate to this overriding objective. 

We continue to call on the Cuban Government to immediately and unconditionally 

release Alan Gross. We are deeply concerned about his and his family’s well-being. 

He should be reunited with his family to bring an end to their long ordeal. 

We also call on the Cuban Government, including during face-to-face meetings at 

the Migration Talks, to respect the rights of its citizens to leave any country, including their own.

Question #9. The current governments in Nicaragua and Cuba are similar in 

many respects, including their strong alliance with Hugo Chavez and their hostility 

toward the United States.

• How would your experience in Cuba inform your work in Nicaragua?

Answer. My experience of more 30 years in the Foreign Service, including my tenure as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Democracy, 

Human Rights, and Labor, underlies my core belief in the critical role played by 

civil society in expanding and defending democratic freedoms. My experience over 

the past 3 years in Cuba only serves to reaffirm that belief, and the important role 

which U.S. programs can play in building, strengthening, and defending civil society. In developing such programs, we must be persistent and creative, and listen 

to the needs of those on the ground leading the fight to expand space for civil society 

and to increase the free flow of uncensored information. As we have over the past 

3 years, we must be ready at all times to defend our policies and programs, both 

in-country and in Washington, and to speak with one voice to our critics when we 

do so. 

I am as committed to engage the Nicaraguan civil society as I have been with 

their Cuban counterparts during the last 3 years. If confirmed, I will be outspoken 

about the importance of protecting fundamental freedoms, democratic institutions 

and urging greater respect for human rights, transparency, and separation of 

powers. 

Unlike Cubans, Nicaraguans have been able to elect and openly support the candidates of their choice. The role of civil society in the 2011 elections and beyond will 

be crucial in sustaining Nicaragua’s democratic institutions. The United States has 

urged the Government of Nicaragua to facilitate international and domestic observation of the November elections, including during the registration and campaign periods. In taking this stand, the United States is working with friends and allies in 

the international community who share our commitment to freedom and democracy. 

At the same time, we must take a longer view and sustain consistent policies and 

338

programs that will help to nurture and defend civil society in Nicaragua and 

strengthen democratic institutions there regardless of the outcome in November. If 

confirmed, I would work with the committee and other Members of Congress in 

shaping the appropriate policies and programs for both the preelections period and 

beyond.

Question #10. In Nicaragua, President Ortega continues to aggressively undermine fragile Nicaraguan institutions to extend his grip on power.

• What is the administration’s strategy to persuade Nicaraguan officials to respect the constitutional order and the independence of government institutions 

in Nicaragua? 

• What is your assessment of civil society groups within Nicaragua? 

• If confirmed, what specific measures would you take to actively work with civil 

society organizations in Nicaragua to foster respect for independent, democratic 

institutions?

Answer. The administration is concerned about the apparent erosion of democratic 

institutions in Nicaragua and is working with other donors to coordinate international support for credible domestic and international observers to monitor the 

preparations for and conduct of the November elections. We are strong supporters 

of independent media and civil society, including human rights organizations, and 

through U.S. assistance we support technical assistance and training for emerging 

democratic leaders and citizen groups in order to bolster civil society engagement, 

and improve local governance. U.S. assistance also strengthens the capabilities of 

the media to professionally and accurately report about Nicaragua’s deteriorating 

human rights and democracy climate. 

During my time in Havana, we have found creative means to support civil society 

in Cuba. Given the inability of many Cuban activists to gain permission to travel 

outside the country, the Interest Section uses Digital Video Conferences and other 

technology to help them build relationships with their counterparts in the United 

States and elsewhere in the hemisphere. Just recently we hosted digital video conferences between human rights activists in Cuba and their counterparts in other 

countries. 

• Unfortunately, most civil society groups in Nicaragua are woefully short of resources, and many of the international donors on which those organizations rely 

have pulled out of Nicaragua. We must endeavor to maintain active and creative engagement with Nicaraguan civil society. Embassy Managua has brought 

Nicaraguan journalists to the United States on International Visitors Programs. 

• If confirmed, I will be outspoken about the importance of protecting fundamental freedoms, democratic institutions, and urging greater respect for human 

rights, transparency, and separation of powers. I will bring my experience from 

Havana to lead Embassy Managua in its search for innovative means to engage 

with civil society, and to continue programs at the local level in Nicaragua to 

engage with the development of a new generation of leaders. 

RESPONSES OF LISA J. KUBISKE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

I have written a letter to Honduran President Lobo Sosa and to Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) CEO Yohannes on behalf of CEMAR, a cement company 

owned by American citizen Oscar Cerna that was illegally expropriated by the Honduran Government in 2004. I share a deep concern for the actions taken by the Honduran Government during the Maduro Presidency, and perpetuated by subsequent 

Honduran Governments regarding CEMAR and its legitimate claim to seek compensation for this expropriation. To date, there has been no substantive progress to 

compensate CEMAR’s owner for this illegal taking. 

I have urged the Honduran Government and our State Department to take action 

to ensure that this claim is satisfied. I am convinced that if our Ambassador to Honduras addresses this claim with the Honduran Government and makes it one of her 

highest priorities, Honduran officials will settle this claim.

Question. Should you be confirmed by the Senate, will you make the settlement 

of this claim one of your highest priorities?

Answer. I view the protection of U.S. investments as a core function of the job. 

If I were confirmed as U.S. Ambassador to Honduras, resolution of investment disputes would be one of my highest priorities. 

Although the U.S. Government does not take a position on the merits of investment disputes, I would be happy to meet with Mr. Cerna upon his request. If conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00346 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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firmed, I would monitor this case closely and encourage the Honduran Government 

and Mr. Cerna to resolve their dispute.

Question. Should you be confirmed, will you pledge that within 60 days of your 

arrival at post you will notify President Lobo Sosa and his advisors that I, as a 

Member of both the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, will 

make it a priority to prevent MCC funding and other types of funding to Honduras, 

unless his government reaches a settlement of the CEMAR claim?

Answer. If confirmed, I would convey your message to President Lobo. 

(341)

NOMINATIONS 

TUESDAY, JUNE 21, 2011

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

Hon. Anne W. Patterson, of Virginia, to be Ambassador to the Arab 

Republic of Egypt 

Michael H. Corbin, of California, to be Ambassador to the United 

Arab Emirates 

Matthew H. Tueller, of Utah, to be Ambassador to the State of

Kuwait 

Kenneth J. Fairfax, of Kentucky, to be Ambassador to the Republic 

of Kazakhstan 

Susan L. Ziadeh, of Washington, to be Ambassador to the State of 

Qatar 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room SD–

419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry (chairman 

of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Kerry, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Shaheen, 

Coons, Udall, Lugar, and Corker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing will come to order. Thank you all 

for being here. 

I need to go to the floor at about 10:15 on Libya with Senator 

McCain. And during the time I’m not here, Senator Lugar will continue the hearing. I hope to get back here as soon as I can. 

We’re here this morning to consider the ambassadorial nominations to five important countries, and we’re going to divide the 

hearing into two panels, beginning with Anne Patterson, the President’s choice to represent the United States in Egypt. 

As all of us know, Egypt has historically been the region’s most 

important incubator of ideas, and now it is at the forefront of the 

new Arab Awakening. How Egypt manages its transition from dictatorship to democracy, and how it restructures its economy, will 

affect not only the country’s 80 million citizens, but it’s also going 

to affect millions of others throughout the region. 

I’ve said a number of times in various speeches and other public 

fora that the fact that Egypt represents a quarter of the world’s 

Arab population, and that it is not as torn apart by sectarian diviVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00349 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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sions as some other countries in the region, and also has always 

had a very strong civic society, has always been a place where even 

under the Mubarak regime there was this current of civic engagement, discussion, all of those things, I think, contribute significantly to the possibilities for Egypt’s contribution as we go forward. 

Needless to say, its importance to regional strategic issues, particularly to the peace process with Israel and Palestine, can’t be 

overstated. And so it is very, very important that this process go 

forward as effectively as possible. 

Anne Patterson is one of our Nation’s finest public servants, and 

I’ve had the privilege of working with her very, very closely when 

she served as Ambassador to Pakistan. Many late-night meetings 

with various hot issues on the table, and I watched her calm, professional approach to those challenges on many different occasions. 

I am greatly encouraged that the President has nominated somebody of her caliber for the critical assignment of Ambassador to 

Egypt at this obviously critical moment. 

Egypt does face significant challenges as it tries to build a new 

political order that is democratic and tolerant. I was there about 

a month and a half ago now, I guess. I held a town meeting. I was 

quite struck by the diversity of the people who came to the town 

meeting: young women in traditional covered garb and some in 

much more Western dress. Men in traditional garb, men in Western suits. Some bearded, some not. Very different backgrounds, but 

all with a very common sense of the possibilities of this moment 

and of the future, all wanting to express their citizenship and to 

be able to enjoy their rights and freedom. 

So this is an exciting moment, but a very, very challenging one. 

I think when I was there, there was 2 percent occupancy in the 

hotel we were in. I think that was true of almost every hotel in the 

city. So there’s been an enormous retrenchment with respect to one 

of the main sources of revenue and currency in the country. 

There’s little time to organize political parties before this fall’s 

elections. And those elections, obviously, need to be fair and carefully monitored, or we may see a return to Tahrir Square anyway, 

unless there is positive progress. But certainly, the lack of a fair 

and accountable election would be cause for such a redux. 

The Egyptian Government needs to become more transparent yet 

and more responsive to its citizens’ needs. And questions remain 

about the role of religious parties in Egyptian politics, the stability 

of Muslim-Christian relations, and the future of Egypt’s approach 

to Israel. 

Egypt is also wrestling with considerable economic hardship. 

Forty percent of Egyptians live below the poverty line, and the revolution has dealt a serious short-term blow to the economy in other 

sectors than just tourism. One person there mentioned to me how 

many businesspeople have simply not returned or have left, some 

for fear of retribution, and that affects the flow of capital. 

Food and oil prices are up. Foreign investors have yet to sense 

the confidence necessary to come back and invest. And the Government has significantly depleted its reserves of hard currency. 

There is news, however, on the upside. There’s positive news. Assistance from the World Bank and the IMF, and the United States 

and other countries, is starting to arrive. And Egypt’s economy acVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00350 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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tually does, notwithstanding these challenges, appear to be beginning to stabilize. With prudent policies, a return to higher GDP 

growth is possible in the near term, certainly in the next year or 

two. 

But the policies that are put in place need to benefit all Egyptians. And as Egypt changes, our approach to aid must change also. 

Promoting economic recovery is not enough. International assistance needs to also address Egypt’s socioeconomic divisions, expand 

its political space, and promote transparency, legitimacy, and accountability. 

To that end, the Obama administration has provided funds to 

spur economic growth and assist with political transition. I’ve introduced legislation with Senators McCain, Lieberman, and Lugar 

that will promote entrepreneurship and job creation by channeling 

investment directly to the private sector. 

I’ve also been working with Senator McCain and others to develop a creative public-private partnership that would encourage 

United States corporations and others to invest in Egypt. 

In fact, this weekend, Senator McCain and I will travel to Egypt, 

together with Jeff Immelt, the CEO of GE, and a group of other 

chief executives, and we will meet with Egyptians in an effort to 

try to help further develop this initiative. 

And I appreciate Ambassador Patterson’s help, which has been 

significant leading up to this initiative. And certainly, the sooner 

we can get her on the ground to help implement, the better. 

Obviously, we need to be realistic. Consolidating Egypt’s democratic advances and addressing its economic woes is probably going 

to take a generation or so. But a recent poll found that nearly 90 

percent of Egyptians think their country is headed in the right direction. And during my visit in March, as I mentioned, the spirit 

of ordinary Egyptians that I met in Tahrir Square and at other 

places was really contagious. I hope that spirit can propel them 

through what may be turbulent, difficult times ahead. 

Ambassador Patterson, I’d like to just raise one last issue with 

you before I recognize Senator Lugar. 

Nearly 2 years ago, a Massachusetts constituent of mine, Colin 

Bower, who I believe is somewhere here at this hearing, had his 

sons, Noor and Ramsay, abducted from the United States, from 

Massachusetts to Egypt, abducted by their mother, even though he 

had full legal custody of those children, even though our courts had 

already ruled, and, I might add, were abducted with false visas, 

false passports, entered their country, Egypt, under false pretense. 

He has not even been able to see his children, Ambassador, and 

he’s had a couple of visitations prior to the Tahrir Square. Since 

Tahrir Square gatherings, he has not seen them. 

And I will tell you, I have raised this at any number of levels 

with the Egyptians. It’s no small fact that the last conversation I 

had with President Mubarak, a relatively lengthy conversation, 

was almost exclusively on this topic. 

And I raised with him the legalities, the inhumanity, the unfairness of what has happened, that a father would be separated from 

his children, that a country would not care enough to allow the father to be able to be part of those children’s lives. And I think all 

344

of us, you know, can understand the frustrations that Colin and a 

lot of his friends and family and others are feeling. 

So my hope is that you can do what you can when you get there 

to emphasize the importance of this. In a new Egypt, hopefully the 

attitudes that allowed Colin to be stiffed, literally, time and again, 

and to be maltreated and those kids to be deprived of a father, I 

think, hopefully, can achieve a higher order of priority. 

So this morning we also welcome a second panel of nominees. 

And I don’t mean in any way to diminish the importance of any 

of their countries in the time that we have spent on Egypt. Each 

of them is going to be representing areas that are of enormous consequence to the United States, where we have critical relationships. 

Michael Corbin, nominated to serve as Ambassador to the United 

Arab Emirates, critical to a whole set of relationships that we have, 

some of which will have an impact on Egypt and some of which 

have an impact on our strategic presence in the region. 

Matthew Tueller, nominated to serve as Ambassador to Kuwait, 

again a key player in our relationships and our strategic interests 

in other countries in the region. 

Susan Ziadeh, nominated to serve as Ambassador to Qatar. The 

Emir was here recently. We had good meetings with him, and he 

is deeply involved in these efforts with respect to Egypt. And we 

hope to have positive things to announce with respect to that in the 

short term. In fact, we may be stopping in Qatar Sunday night 

with Senator McCain in order to discuss these prospects. 

And finally, Kenneth Fairfax, nominated to serve as Ambassador 

to Kazakhstan. 

All four extremely qualified nominees, and we congratulate each 

of you and welcome you here today. 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, may I have your permission to 

yield briefly to Senator Corker? 

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely. 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And, Mr. Ranking 

Member, I appreciate it. 

I’m here out of total respect for the nominee and just to thank 

her for her commitment to public service. I don’t know of a Foreign 

Service person who I respect more than the nominee for this position. And I welcome her and look forward to her doing great work 

in Egypt, as she has in so many other countries. 

And with that, I’m going to go do something else. 

Thank you. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming Ambassador Patterson and our second panel of distinguished nominees. 

Americans were moved by the power and speed of Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution and by the resolve of Egyptians to change the 

course of their history. 

We celebrated the calls for greater political participation, the protection of basic human rights, and a more inclusive economy. We 

345

were heartened that protests in Tunisia and Egypt had such an impact in many parts of the Middle East. 

At the same time, it is clear that decisive improvements in governance in the Middle East will not be simple or automatic. The 

past few months have demonstrated that the countries of the region are all on very different paths and timelines. 

We should not overgeneralize about what is occurring in Middle 

Eastern societies or expect changing attitudes to solve American 

national security problems in the region. We should recognize that 

the genuine opportunities in the long run for the advancement of 

democratic values and the broadening of prosperity are accompanied by short-term risks and dangerous uncertainties. 

We are witnessing civil war in Libya and ongoing suppression of 

popular upheaval in Syria. In Yemen, we have seen a highly fractured society that appears to lack national institutions or a common identity around which to coalesce. In Bahrain, we have seen 

sectarian tensions and violence against peaceful protesters. 

The challenge for our nominees is to protect and advance American interests in the midst of this rapidly changing and diverse 

landscape. It is essential that we redouble our efforts to engage in 

the Middle East. We must be creative in using the full scope of 

American power and influence to support a more peaceful future 

for the region. 

This is important to our own fundamental national security, the 

global economy, and the security of our close ally, Israel. 

Recognizing the diversity of the region does not mean shying 

away from promoting real reform and more inclusive government—

even if that process looks different in Egypt than it does in the 

United Arab Emirates. 

We have been encouraging more representative and tolerant governance throughout the region for many years. As Americans, we 

should honor those in the region who are speaking out in defense 

of values that we hold dear. 

I believe that a key part of this process must be the encouragement of more transparent and inclusive economies that are more 

securely tied to the global market. We need to build more meaningful trade and investment relationships in the region. 

Our nominees also should leverage the leadership of American 

universities, cultural institutions, and civil society to generate 

deeper and more sustainable linkages. 

Protests started in Tunisia, but it seems clear that the test of 

this process will be in Egypt. We have a shared interest with the 

people of Egypt to build a more secure and prosperous future. This 

will not be a short process. But I believe Americans now expect a 

different relationship with this and future Egyptian governments. 

We respect what was born in Tahrir Square and want to see it 

flourish into a partnership that goes beyond the top levels of our 

governments. 

It is vital that the transition in Egypt not be hijacked by extremist groups who would undermine the fundamental civil liberties at 

the heart of the revolution and threaten U.S. and allied interests 

in the region. 

In addition, during this moment of turmoil, the desire for more 

inclusive government must not be manipulated by those seeking to 

346

deflect attention from their own failures, including the regimes in 

Iran and Syria. 

I appreciate the commitment of our nominees and their willingness to take on these difficult assignments for our country. 

We welcome you, again, Ambassador Patterson, and ask for your 

testimony at this point. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ANNE W. PATTERSON, OF VIRGINIA, TO 

BE AMBASSADOR TO THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Lugar, Senator Casey, and members of the committee. Thank 

you for the honor of appearing before you today. 

I wish to thank the President for nominating me as Ambassador 

to Egypt and the confidence he and the Secretary have shown in 

me. 

With your permission, could I introduce my family? 

Senator LUGAR. Yes, that would be very, very nice of you. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. My husband, David, who is retired from 

the Foreign Service. 

Senator LUGAR. Welcome. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. And my stepdaughter, Jessica, who is 

on her way to Afghanistan. 

Senator LUGAR. Jessica. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. And my son, Andrew, who is about to 

be commissioned in the Marines. And our other two children, unfortunately, aren’t here today. 

If confirmed, I look forward to leading the professionals from all 

agencies who serve in Cairo. Serving with so many dedicated people over the years, often under difficult circumstances, has been the 

highlight of my career. 

Should I be confirmed, I am under no illusions about the responsibility and challenges of serving as Ambassador to Egypt, which 

is now the epicenter of enormous promising changes in the Arab 

world. 

People everywhere were inspired by the events of Tahrir Square 

and Egyptian citizens’ desire for freedom and democracy. But we 

should remember that transitions to democracy are difficult and 

long, that there will be reverses and surprises along the way, and 

that the Egyptians will find their own unique path. 

When thinking about Egypt, I think we should be heartened by 

what has taken place in Latin America and Eastern Europe over 

the past 40 years. While in Latin America, the path to prosperity 

and democracy has hardly been a straight one, this hemisphere 

now has democratic governments in most countries and a degree of 

economic prosperity unimaginable 40 years ago. The Arab world 

will be no different. 

If confirmed, I will be firmly committed to backing Egypt’s democratic transition, which will reinforce much-needed respect for 

human rights, with all the support the United States Government 

can muster. 

Let me outline the strategy that the administration has developed and which, if confirmed, I will pursue in Cairo. The first priority will be to encourage and support, to the extent that Egyptians 

desire it, an election process which is free and fair. 

347

Polling suggests that many Egyptians will have the first opportunity in their lifetimes to vote in a free election, so enthusiasm is 

understandably high. And as we do in hundreds of other countries, 

the United States will support nongovernmental and civil society 

organizations who wish to enhance their organizational skills and 

play a more prominent role in public life. These groups are always 

essential ingredients in a successful political system. 

The strengthened democratic process should lead to increased respect for human rights in Egypt since newly empowered citizens 

will demand it. We welcome the commitment of the interim Government to repeal the emergency law. We are concerned about arbitrary arrests, overly rapid and nontransparent trials, and attacks 

on religious groups. 

Some particularly disgusting abuses against women demonstrators have taken place, and we have called on the authorities to 

prosecute those who committed them. 

Second, it is clear that the need for a job was just as strong a 

motivator for demonstrators in Tahrir Square as the desire for freedom and justice. Egypt has to generate over 750,000 jobs a year to 

absorb young people into its labor force. These young people are 

often not well-prepared with skills needed for a modern economy, 

yet they have high expectations. 

In fact, the International Republican Institute has just come out 

with a poll which indicates that Egyptians overwhelmingly believe 

that next year they will be better off economically. The current economic trends are headed in the other direction, and most Egyptians 

are barely making ends meet. 

Egypt’s military leadership has played a key role in stabilizing 

the situation, but Egypt’s economy has suffered from the unrest, 

tourism has declined, and investors are sitting on the sidelines. So 

expectations for the new government will be unrealistically high. 

As a result, a key part of our strategy, both bilaterally and working with the international community, will be to strengthen Egypt’s 

private sector so that it can generate jobs and broaden the benefits 

of economic growth. Increased economic engagement with Egypt 

will also offer opportunities for American businesses to invest in 

and export to Egypt. 

All Americans should be proud of what United States assistance 

has achieved in Egypt over the past 30 years, but we are now refocusing our assistance on projects that are directly linked with private sector growth and sustainable jobs. 

As the President said in his May 19 speech, we are leading the 

effort in the international community to provide short-term stabilization for Egypt’s economy. Egypt is discussing a program with 

the IMF and the World Bank, and other international lenders will 

provide the short-term resources that Egypt needs. We are seeking 

legislation which will allow us to forgive $1 billion of Egypt’s debt 

and ask Egypt to invest the local currency equivalent in an activity 

we mutually select. 

The Overseas Private Investment Corporation is working to expand lending to small- and medium-size businesses. 

Senator Kerry and, you, Senator Lugar have introduced legislation to authorize an enterprise fund for Egypt to spur private sector growth. 

348

Our third priority is to ensure that Egypt plays a strong and 

positive role in the region. As one of only two Arab States to sign 

a peace treaty with Israel, Egypt has been a powerful ally for a 

two-state solution and a comprehensive Middle East peace agreement. Egypt has also been a valuable partner in fighting terrorism, 

reintegrating Iraq into the region, and providing assistance to refugees fleeing Libya. 

Egyptian officials have said repeatedly that they will abide by 

the peace treaty with Israel. We take these commitments seriously. 

The vast majority of Egyptians have no interest in regional conflict 

and want to move forward on their own democratic path. Our close 

defense cooperation with Egypt serves United States interests and 

promotes regional security. 

Let me say that democracies can often be loud and bumptious, 

and I am sure that Egypt will be no different. During Egypt’s transition, we will hear many voices that are not to our liking, and 

Egypt’s democratic process will be difficult at times, because of the 

newness and fragility of its democratic institutions. 

If confirmed, I will do everything I can to support the aspirations 

of the Egyptian people during this period of transition. A credible 

transition in Egypt matters to the United States and our allies, 

and it will serve as a model for the rest of the Arab world. 

Let me say in closing that I am particularly grateful for the critical role that members of this committee played in my last post. If 

confirmed, I know that members of this committee will play a similar role in the months ahead in Egypt. 

Thank you very much. And I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Patterson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR ANNE W. PATTERSON

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lugar, and members of the committee, thank 

you for the honor of appearing before you today. I wish to thank the President for 

nominating me to serve as Ambassador to Egypt, and for the confidence that he and 

the Secretary have shown in me. 

I would also like to recognize my husband, David, who is retired from the Foreign 

Service, my stepdaughter, Jessica, who is off to Afghanistan soon, and my son, 

Andrew, who is shortly to be commissioned in the Marines. Our other children, 

Edward and Rachel, are not here today. 

If confirmed, I look forward to leading the professionals from all agencies who 

serve in our mission in Cairo. Serving with so many competent and dedicated people, over the years, often under difficult circumstances, has been the highlight of 

my career. 

Should I be confirmed, I am under no illusions about the responsibility and challenges of serving as Ambassador to Egypt. This 5,000-year-old society that has been 

a cradle of civilization and a longstanding regional leader is now the epicenter of 

enormous, promising changes in the Arab world. People everywhere were inspired 

by the events of Tahrir Square and Egyptian citizens’ desire for freedom and democracy. But we should remember that transitions to democracy are difficult and long; 

that there will be reverses and surprises along the way; and that the Egyptians will 

find their own, unique path. 

When thinking about Egypt, I think we should be heartened by what has taken 

place in Latin America and Eastern Europe over the past 40 years. While in Latin 

America the path to democracy and prosperity has hardly been a straight one, this 

hemisphere now has democratic governments in most countries and a degree of economic prosperity unimaginable 40 years ago. 

I am sure the Arab world will be no different. So let me say at the outset of

this hearing that, if confirmed, I am firmly committed to supporting Egypt’s democratic transition, which will reinforce much-needed respect for human rights, with 

all the moral, economic, and political support that the United States Government 

can muster. 

349

Let me outline the strategy that the administration has developed and which I 

will pursue in Cairo, if confirmed. 

The first priority will be to encourage and support, to the extent that Egyptians 

desire it, an election process which is free and fair. Polling suggests that many 

Egyptians will have the first opportunity in their lifetimes to vote in a free election, 

so enthusiasm is understandably high. Just as we do in the United States, we anticipate that the Egyptian Government would invite international observers to witness this historic occasion. And as we do in hundreds of other countries, the United 

States will support nongovernmental and civil society organizations who wish to enhance their organizational skills and play a more prominent role in public life. 

These groups are always essential ingredients in an open and successful 

participatory political system. 

The strengthened democratic process should lead to increased respect for human 

rights in Egypt, since newly empowered citizens will demand it. We welcome the 

commitment of the interim government to repeal the emergency law, which has 

been used for years to justify widespread human rights abuses. We are concerned 

about arbitrary arrests, overly rapid and nontransparent trials, and attacks on religious groups, primarily but not exclusively, against Christians. Some particularly 

disgusting abuses against women demonstrators have taken place, and we have 

called on the authorities to prosecute those who committed them. 

Second, it is clear that the need for a job was just as strong a motivator for demonstrators in Tahrir Square as a desire for freedom and justice. Egypt has to generate over 750,000 jobs a year to absorb young people coming into the labor force. 

These young people are often not well prepared with skills needed for a modern 

economy, yet they have high expectations. Many of these young people have historically been employed by the public sector, but this is no longer practical given 

Egypt’s shortage of resources. 

In fact, the International Republican Institute has just come out with a poll which 

indicates that Egyptians overwhelmingly believe that next year they will be better 

off economically. But current economic trends are headed in the other direction, and 

most Egyptians are barely making ends meet. During this critical transition period, 

the military leadership has played a role in stabilizing the situation, but Egypt’s 

economy has suffered from the unrest; tourism has declined; and investors are sitting on the sidelines as attacks on the private sector seem to have proliferated in 

the aftermath of the revolution. So, expectations for the new government will be unrealistically high. 

As a result, a key part of our strategy, both bilaterally and working with the 

international community, will be to strengthen Egypt’s private sector so that it can 

generate economic stability and broaden the benefits of economic growth to all Egyptians. It is keenly in our interests to promote economic recovery in Egypt. Young 

people who have jobs are more likely to be productive members of society and contribute fully in the democratic transition. Importantly, increased economic engagement with Egypt will also offer opportunities for American businesses by investing 

in and exporting to Egypt. 

All Americans should be proud of what United States assistance has achieved in 

Egypt over the past 30 years, particularly dramatic advances in reducing infant and 

maternal mortality and promoting education. USAID built the Cairo sewage system, 

the world’s biggest construction project at the time, with predictable results for developing professional skills in Egypt and sharply increasing health conditions in one 

of the most crowded cities on the planet. We are now refocusing our assistance on 

projects that are directly linked with private sector growth and sustainable jobs. Let 

me describe some of this to you. 

As the President said in his May 19 speech, we are leading the effort in the international community to provide short-term stabilization for Egypt’s economy. Egypt 

and the IMF have reached staff-level agreement on new financing and the World 

Bank and other international lenders will provide short-term resources that Egypt 

needs. 

We are seeking legislation which will allow us to forgive $1 billion of Egypt’s debt 

and ask Egypt to invest the local currency equivalent into an activity we mutually 

select. We intend it to be a major project that makes clear America’s contribution 

to the Egyptian people. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation is working to 

expand lending to small- and medium-size businesses, which in any economy are the 

engine of job growth. OPIC is building on a very successful model in the West Bank. 

Chairman Kerry has introduced legislation to authorize enterprise funds for Egypt 

and the United States is working to reorient the EBRD to enable lending to Egypt. 

These have spurred private sector growth in Eastern Europe, and they will also 

spur private sector growth in Egypt. So, I believe that we have a sound plan going 

350

forward, along with other members of the international community, to encourage 

stability in Egypt by widening opportunities for both American and Egyptian firms. 

Our third priority is to ensure that Egypt plays a strong and positive role in the 

region and that our interests continue to align. As one of only two Arab States to 

sign a peace treaty with Israel, Egypt has been a powerful ally for a two-state solution and a comprehensive Middle East peace agreement. Egypt has also been a valuable partner in fighting terrorism, reintegrating Iraq into the region, and providing 

assistance to refugees fleeing Libya. Egyptian officials have said repeatedly that 

they will abide by the peace treaty with Israel. We take those commitments seriously. The vast majority of Egyptians have no interest in regional conflict and want 

to move forward on their own democratic path. Our close defense cooperation with 

Egypt serves United States interests and is influential in promoting regional security. 

Let me say that democracies can often be loud and bumptious, and I am sure that 

Egypt will be no different. During Egypt’s transition we will hear many voices that 

are not to our liking, and Egypt’s democratic process will be difficult at times because of the newness and fragility of its democratic institutions. If confirmed, I will 

do everything I can to support the aspirations of the Egyptian people during this 

period of transition. A successful, democratic transition in Egypt matters to the 

United States strategically; it matters to our allies; and it will serve as a model for 

the rest of the Arab world. 

Let me say in closing that I am particularly grateful for the critical role members 

of this committee played in my last post. If confirmed, I know that this committee 

will play a similar role in maintaining our bilateral relationship with Egypt and in 

ensuring a credible democratic transition. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Ambassador. We’ll 

have a round with 7 minutes for each Senator. 

And I’ll commence the questioning by simply commenting how 

much admiration I have not only for your performance in your last 

assignment, but also your remarkable career on behalf of our country. 

We also appreciate the members of your family being here. They 

exemplify, likewise, the service to our country that’s a part of your 

family. 

Let me start by saying that the Washington Post on June 19 

talked about a problem that has been often discussed in this committee as to what role the United States ought to play in support 

of the political transition in Egypt. It’s been suggested, for example, that perhaps the election that is now scheduled for September 

should be delayed. This is a point of contention, obviously, in 

Egypt, quite apart from our discussions going on here in the United 

States. 

The dilemma comes down to the fact that those who are trying 

to put together political parties find themselves involved in a 

lengthy enterprise. This would include not only those who were in 

Tahrir Square, but other people in Egypt. Thus, the fear is that the 

Muslim Brotherhood, which is apparently better organized than 

most other political movements, might play a dominant role in the 

upcoming election, with results that would not exemplify the best 

in terms of Egyptian democracy or Egypt’s relationship with the 

United States. 

In the past 2 or 3 days, there was a story in the press of a young 

Egyptian who was one of those who was attempting to rally for democracy in Tahrir Square, and who has subsequently gone out into 

the countryside to try to encourage people to sign a petition to establish a new political party, which apparently requires 5,000 signatures. He had gotten up to 1,000 signatures but was finding it 

to be very difficult going, because the citizens he encountered wantVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00358 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
351

ed to talk primarily about fundamental issues such as their lack 

of food and their lack of employment. 

They, to use our political jargon presently, were involved in the 

jobs issue, and were not as interested to discuss what seemed to 

them to be more abstract issues such as the political transition or 

the formation of a political party. 

What is your general comment on this? Because as you accede, 

and I think you will be confirmed for this role, you’re going to be 

there during much of this formative period, prior to September, in 

which there are going to be intense discussions regarding the need 

to ensure there are competitors in a free and fair election that really makes some difference. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar, 

and thank you for the kind words about me and my family. 

Let me first address what we’re doing as the U.S. Government 

to try and advance this process. And I think I, for one, am very 

heartened at the receptivity of some of our groups, like the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute and IFES, have had in Egypt, because their job is precisely 

the one that you have suggested, which is try and teach politicians, 

nascent politicians who have very little experience in a democratic 

political system, how to do basic things like organize and hold debates and do polling. 

And so we have invested quite a few resources, close to $40 million, in these organizations over the past few weeks. And they’re 

very active on the ground in Egypt, and, as I mentioned, have been 

very well received. 

We’ve also tried to support smaller organizations. And through 

our Middle East Partnership Initiative, we’ve given out, I think, 35 

grants since the unrest in Tahrir Square to small civil society organizations, and many of them in rural areas who are doing just 

what you say, trying to connect the people’s grievances with their 

political desires. 

And we’re not alone in this process, Senator. Other members of 

the international community are doing the same. 

But certainly with the fragility of institutions, it’s going to be a 

long, hard slog. 

And as you mentioned, the issue of the timing of the elections 

has been a controversial one in Egypt, and I think there are voices 

on many sides of that issue. But we will do our best in whatever 

time remains before the election to promote this democratic transition through our organizations, to the extent that Egyptians are 

willing to engage with us. 

Senator LUGAR. We have had some difficulty, as I understand, 

not just with our assistance pertaining to the elections, but likewise with economic assistance. 

Some in the Egyptian Government—I wouldn’t characterize this 

more broadly—have protested that somehow their sovereignty is 

being compromised by our economic assistance. At the same time, 

it’s been noted that around USAID headquarters there, there are 

long lines of people trying to avail themselves of our assistance programs. 

What is your reading, as you prepare for this assignment, of how 

our aid is being accepted? And to what extent will you be able to 

352

monitor our assistance on behalf of the taxpayers in the United 

States, who may fear that our assistance is going to uncooperative 

or corrupt governments who fail to use it for its stated intent even 

as we are attempting to do good? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Yes, Senator Lugar. I think on what we call the money to promote democracy, which is about $65 million, 

and the money to promote economic growth, there has been a very 

large outpouring from the public. And hundreds of people, I think 

something like 600 organizations, came to the information sessions 

for how to apply to these grants. And so there is a lot of interest 

on the part of Egyptian civil society. 

Let me take this opportunity to say that by no means is this an 

affront to Egyptian sovereignty. We do these programs, as you well 

know, sir, in hundreds of countries in the world. And they’re always, almost always, well received by the governments as support 

for their own democratic institutions. 

On the monitoring issue, Senator Lugar, monitoring of small 

grants is always problematic. And I have already looked into this 

issue with the Middle East Partnership Initiative, and I think they 

have a good auditing program on the ground. 

And regarding our larger aid program, there is an office of the 

AID inspector general in Cairo, and I think they have long-established controls and rigorous procedures in effect. 

But please rest assured that this will be a very high priority for 

me, to be sure that our money is used for the best value for the 

taxpayer. 

Senator LUGAR. That’s an important reassurance. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Yes, thank you. 

Senator LUGAR. I’d like to recognize Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much. 

Ambassador Patterson, it’s great to see you. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you, sir. 

Senator CASEY. And let me say, I think I can speak for a lot of 

people, but for purposes of today, just speak for myself in thanking 

you for taking on yet another difficult assignment. And I really 

can’t say enough about your extraordinary work in Pakistan, along 

with your other postings over many years. 

I thought when you appeared before us for your next assignment 

that it would be kind of an easy one, that you’d be assigned to the 

Sea of Tranquility, but you’ve decided to take on another tough assignment. 

We are grateful, because you’ve been so effective and so capable, 

but also, I think, in a word, a great patriot. And we’re eternally 

grateful for that. 

And I want to thank your family, as well. We often note that 

families help the public official or the Ambassador or whoever else 

comes before our committee. And this is an extraordinary commitment by a family. But in this case, I guess, individually, they’re 

doing their own public service of one kind or another. And we’re 

grateful, grateful for that commitment. 

So we’ll miss you in Islamabad and other places in the country, 

but we’ll look forward to seeing you in Egypt. 

I wanted to ask you about the recent approach that Egypt broadly—and this is generalizing a bit, but I think more broadly—what 

353

I would argue is a more confrontational approach now to Israel, 

whether it’s the opening up of the Rafah border crossing; whether 

it’s the Hamas-Fatah unity government, the work that was done 

there and Egypt’s role in that; and then finally the question of the 

gas lines to Israel. 

When you think about those three examples, and more broadly, 

I wanted to get your sense of that, just in terms of the approach 

itself, but also in terms of our policy. What are the United States 

redlines, so to speak, as it relates to how Egypt will approach its 

relationship with Israel? I think it’s an issue that not just the 

Israelis are concerned about, but we are as well. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you. Thank you. And, again, 

thanks for the kind words about my family, particularly. 

Let me sort of take this in sequence, Senator Casey. 

Let me first say that Egypt is the bedrock of our regional policy. 

And Egypt has been at peace with Israel for many years, and the 

current Government has committed to abiding by all international 

agreements with Israel. And, as I said, we take those commitments 

seriously, and we do not think it’s in Egypt’s interest to promote 

confrontation with Israel in any way. 

And if I might mention these specific issues, on the Rafah border 

crossing, that’s for people and limited humanitarian goods. There 

are security incidents there. The smuggling is of very considerable 

concern to us. We know that the Israeli and Egyptian security authorities have been working together on this and have been in close 

contact, and that the Egyptians, with Israeli permission, have put 

additional military forces into the Sinai to address some of these 

issues. But there certainly have been increased law and order 

issues out there. We understand the police are beginning to return 

now. 

On the Hamas-Fatah agreement, Egypt served as a facilitator. 

Our understanding is it was at the instigation of Hamas, who, perhaps because of other activities, incidents in the region, was anxious to come to some kind of arrangement with Fatah. We’re not 

necessarily opposed to reconciliation; what we are very concerned 

about that, that it promote regional peace and the two-state solution. Our understanding is that the reconciliation has sort of 

slowed at this point, because President Abbas is very concerned 

about it and very concerned that the assistance for the West Bank 

and the support that’s been given to the P.A. continue. 

And, finally, the gas lines to Israel, we certainly know that this 

has been a concern. The gas has started to flow again. The pipeline 

was attacked twice in recent months, again because of lack of law 

and order out there and banditry. But it has started to flow again. 

And there are some pricing disputes that will be addressed between the vendor and the purchaser. 

But, yes, Senator, these are issues of concern to us. And, again, 

nothing is more important to the United States than regional peace 

and Egypt’s peace with Israel. And we’ll do everything we possibly 

can to pursue that. 

But if I might conclude, again, the Government has reiterated at 

every turn its respect for these peace agreements, and we know 

that on many of these issues that the Israelis and the Egyptians 

are talking directly. 

354

Senator CASEY. Thank you. And I want to ask you about some 

of the economic relief promises that have been made. 

Egyptian officials emphasize the need for that kind of relief. And as you know, our President—President Obama announced $1 billion in debt relief and $1 billion in U.S.-backed loan guarantees. 

But there have been calls for conditioning that kind of assistance, and I wanted to get your sense on how do we—if there is a 

commitment to somehow conditioning that aid or at least taking 

their actions into consideration as it relates to our aid, what are 

the benchmarks that we should use, if we can just simply call them 

democratic benchmarks or democratic reform benchmarks? How do 

you approach that as an incoming Ambassador? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Yes, thank you. 

On the debt relief, sir, we’ll be presenting legislation shortly to 

the Hill that will build on previous legislation for some of these 

debt relief and debt swap, I think—let me say that one of our goals 

and the reason it has taken awhile to develop is we’re trying to 

find a worthy recipient for the local currency that will be generated 

by these funds, and one that is transformational and addresses 

some of Egypt’s underlying problems. The Secretary feels very 

strongly that we should have a transformational project. 

But certainly, the draft legislation that we’ve considered that 

builds on some of this previous legislation does have—I wouldn’t 

call it ‘‘conditions.’’ There would be the standard issues that are in 

this legislation about democracy, about various human rights observations, observation of human rights. And again, we would expect them, as we do in all economic agreements, to abide by the 

provisions of the IMF agreement. And most aid agreements contain 

quite specific conditions on health reform or education reform that 

aren’t too onerous, but we expect our aid to be used to promote a 

reform process. 

So I would certainly, if confirmed, expect to continue that tradition and enhance it. 

Senator CASEY. Thanks very much. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Senator Casey. 

Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And let me join in not only welcoming, but thanking Ms. Patterson for your service, and thank your family for your continued willingness to help our country. 

This is a critically important position, as my colleagues have 

pointed out. And we all wish you well representing the United 

States in this transitional country, as well as in a part of the world 

where there’s great hope for democracy. 

We have found, by the Arab Spring, that the desire for human 

rights and democracy is universal, and the United States is looked 

upon as a facilitator to bring that about. And your role will be very 

important in that regard. 

Egypt, obviously, is a critically important country to United 

States strategic interests, their role in regards to the Middle East, 

as Senator Casey has pointed out. They’re important for moving 

forward with Israel, and one of the key points is whether they will 

continue to honor the agreements reached with Israel. They’re very 

important in our campaign against extremists. 

355

But here’s the dilemma we face. There are some who believe that 

we have to be bolder in our development assistance in Egypt, that 

the main trigger for the revolution was basically economics, that 

the people were being denied the basic economic growth of their 

country, and they wanted to do better for their families. That will 

require more attention by the international community to make 

significant progress in Egypt’s economic growth. 

There are others that believe that we have to make sure that 

there’s accountability on U.S. aid. I fall into both camps. I think 

we have to be bolder, and we have to have accountability. We have 

responsibility to make sure that aid is used for its intended purpose. And to me, there is a requirement that that aid go to nations 

who support our basic goals with peace with Israel and will maintain that relationship with Israel, that they will fight extremists, 

and that they’ll provide basic human rights to its citizens. 

But there have been some disturbing trends in Egypt. We’re not 

clear as to whether Hamas is getting a stronger footing within that 

country. We don’t know whether there is effort being made to fund 

extremists through Egypt. We’re not exactly clear on the trafficking 

of weapons that may very well end up being used to attack Israel. 

And we look to you as our eyes and ears in Egypt to be able to 

give us the best advice as we have to sort through these issues. I 

would like to get your general view as to how you see your role advising us as to how we can move forward with the strategic partnership with Egypt, but using the tools at our disposal to make 

that more of a reality. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you, Senator Cardin. 

First of all, let me say that I would entirely expect and, frankly, 

look forward to interaction with members of this committee, if I am 

confirmed as Ambassador to Egypt. And if confirmed, I would also 

look forward to visits on the ground, where you could see for yourself how we’re progressing on these issues. So I would very much 

look forward to working with members of this committee and keeping you advised. 

Let me say that I think the dilemma that you’ve laid out is a real 

one and one we’re going to have to struggle with over the next few 

months. 

Now I think on the stabilization and have we been bold enough, 

let me say that I think we’ve tried to take a leadership role in the 

international community and encourage burden-sharing, where 

other members and other countries and other organizations can 

come forward with the short-term resources that Egypt needs, because there’s no question that this big youth bulge, this unemployed youth bulge and all these kids getting out of colleges with 

essentially no skills and second-rate educations, and soaring food 

prices, and declining tourism, these are all going to be very difficult 

issues to maneuver over the next few months. 

But we’ve tried. The IMF is working with the Government. The 

World Bank is prepared to lend very considerable funds. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and some of 

Egypt’s allies in the gulf that Senator Kerry has been working with 

are also prepared to provide short-term stabilization funds. So I 

think that will begin to stabilize in a few months. 

356

From our standpoint, we’re going to focus on democracy in governance and private-sector growth, because that’s where the future 

is in Egypt, I think. This youth bulge could turn into a very significant demographic dividend, as they have a lot of young people in 

productive jobs. And as I mentioned, we will do everything possible 

through AID and through various inspectors general to monitor 

this aid and to be sure that it’s usefully used. 

And I was, as I mentioned earlier, we certainly share your concern about Hamas and some of these other—there’s no evidence, I 

might add, Senator, that Hamas has a closer relationship with the 

Egyptians. They have facilitated this reconciliation with Fatah. 

But I think, to reiterate again, we are going to hold Egypt to its 

commitments about peace with Israel. And those commitments are 

in Egypt’s interest. There seems to be certainly no inclination within the current government to do anything to undermine these commitments that they’ve made. 

Senator CARDIN. Let me just underscore one point in regards to 

the normalization of the relationship between Israel and Egypt. 

It was very frustrating under the Mubarak administration to see 

the government condoning such anti-Semitic activities, particularly 

in their schools with the textbooks, et cetera. We brought that to 

the attention frequently of the Egyptian Government. 

And I would hope that we’ve learned a lesson that, if there’s 

going to be lasting stability in the region, that democracy, human 

rights, and understanding need to be part of that, which means 

that we should have expectations that the Egyptians will facilitate, 

rather than fuel discriminatory-type views. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Sir, this issue of textbooks is, frankly, 

an issue in many Islamic countries. It was certainly an issue in my 

previous post, and it’s one we work on. And it’s sort of, if I might 

say, below the radar a little in many countries. 

And I was very interested to read some of the conditions on our 

assistance program in Egypt, and one of them is to transform these 

textbooks into something that is more broadly acceptable. 

But, yes, the anti-Semitism, actually, Senator, seems to have increased recently, because they’ve sort of taken the lid off a lot of 

this in Egypt. But again, it’s critically important. This is why the 

building of democratic institutions is so critically important, so people have a voice. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Senator Cardin. 

Senator Coons. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

I’d like to join the other members of the committee in saying that 

I’m thrilled to welcome Ambassador Patterson. I’ve had a number 

of conversations with you before about your service in Islamabad 

and was very impressed with your grasp of the political nuances 

and the intricacies of diplomacy. Over your nearly four decades of 

service to our Nation, you’ve clearly amassed a remarkable background in many challenging posts in El Salvador and Colombia and 

Pakistan. 

357

And I’d like to join other members of the committee in thanking 

David and Jessica and Andrew for your willingness to serve this 

Nation in the past and in the future. 

I’ll remark that my predecessor in this seat, Senator Kaufman, 

chose to highlight your service to our Nation by recognizing you as 

a great Federal employee on the Senate floor, something which he 

did with great effect and enthusiasm. And I know I’ve come to 

share his respect and admiration for you and for your service. 

I think, if I could, I’d like to start by focusing on that recent experience in Islamabad and your understanding of the difficulties of 

sort of the rough and tumble of a relatively new democracy. You 

mentioned in your testimony that, during Egypt’s transition, you’re 

sure that we will hear many voices that are not to our liking, and 

that Egypt’s democratic process will be difficult at times because of 

its newness and fragility. 

I’ll just associate myself with Senator Casey’s expressed concerns 

about the Israeli-Egyptian relationship, the security at the border, 

the relationship with Hamas, recent incidents in terms of bombing 

the gas pipeline, and security is really one of my principal concerns 

as well. 

Senator Cardin referenced history of incitement and some challenges there, and I appreciate your reassurance to the committee 

that this is a primary concern for you. 

Senator Casey raised the question about putting conditions on 

assistance, possibly. And as someone who was charged with overseeing the first round of Kerry-Lugar-Berman assistance to Pakistan, and who saw how difficult and uneven that process has been, 

particularly as at times unwelcome voices caused reactions in this 

Chamber, I’d be interested in your views. 

Should we condition assistance to Egypt? How can we be most 

effective in encouraging private sector development and growth? 

Should we look at a similar multiyear structure that has sustained 

investment in a sort of primary area of engagement? 

And we have great confidence in you. How do we retain confidence in the commitments of the Egyptian Government as it 

changes and evolves to recognizing the Camp David Accords, and 

being determined to stay on course in terms of respecting Israel’s 

right to self-defense and right to existence, and continuing to be a 

constructive force in the recognition of Israel? 

A brief and focused question, I know. [Laughter.] 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you. 

On conditioning assistance, yes, certainly in Pakistan that was 

a huge issue with the assistance there. But, first of all, there are 

already conditions in the Foreign Assistance Act across a broad 

range. 

And I think my own view is that conditions are sometimes useful 

to focus the attention of the host government on what they need 

to do. And that’s why it’s very important, also, for government officials to meet with you when they come here and for you to meet 

with them when you travel abroad, to reiterate this. 

So I don’t think we can sort of give out the taxpayers’ money 

willy-nilly without demanding certain conditions, not the least of 

which is the money be used for the purpose for which it was appropriated. 

358

On private sector growth, Senator, we’re going to have to refocus 

a lot of our aid program to promote this. I think, again, we should 

be very proud, particularly in the health and education field, for 

what aid has achieved. But we have a lot less money than we used 

to in Egypt. And so to begin to focus this on something that builds 

up the private sector, we have, for instance, a little program on entrepreneurship, which engages young people and promotes angel 

investing. 

That sort of thing we need to do a lot more of over the next few 

years, and generally to encourage trade with the U.S. through 

trade facilitation and other things like this. 

On retaining confidence in the Camp David Accords and peace 

with Israel, again, the Government so far—and our military assistance over the years, which is very substantial, $1.3 billion a year, 

has certainly, I think, enhanced regional stability. And we have a 

program, a multiyear program for that military assistance. 

And, yes, generally speaking, I think it would be good to have 

multiyear programs for civilian assistance as well, because it gives 

more certainty and more steadiness to our planning and our disbursements. 

But we’ll have to see what the new elected government does. I 

mean, I don’t really have any better answer than that. We’ll have 

to see how this evolves with an elected government. 

Again, there is no evidence that people in Egypt—there’s no evidence that Egyptian Government officials or the leading politicians 

don’t see peace with Israel is in their interest. Many of them want 

to get on with their own democratic and economic path, and I think 

the politicians to be elected will have to focus on these burning economic issues. 

Certainly, in Tahrir Square, we saw no anti-Americanism and no 

anti-Israeli statements. It was all about Egypt’s domestic politics. 

Senator COONS. Last question, in terms of path forward. I’m 

chair of the African Affairs Subcommittee, and Egypt has played 

a role in Sudan, sometimes constructive, sometimes not so much. 

They’ve received a lot of Sudanese refugees. Egypt is one of the 

continent’s largest, fastest growing economies, populations, has a 

lot of potential. 

How do you think we can encourage a constructive role that 

Egypt might play in the future in Sudan? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Yes, I think that’s a very accurate characterization. Sometimes they’ve played a positive role, and sometimes they haven’t. But we’ll just have to engage with them on all 

levels. 

And one of the reasons we’re having these outreach programs 

with the nascent political parties is not only to engage on political 

party formation, but also to discuss—and our Embassy has been 

very active in this—also to discuss the issues of the day, which 

would include issues like Sudan, regional engagement, economic reform. So we’ll be talking these issues up over the next few months. 

Senator COONS. Thank you very much. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Senator Coons. 

Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Chairman Lugar. 

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And I think all of our Senators on this panel have done a brilliant job here at outlining your remarkable career, and I’d just like 

to thank you for your remarkable service to our country and thank 

your family members. Each of them, I think, are serving or have 

served at key places around the world, and we also appreciate that 

service. 

Ambassador, you hit on one of the things that is so prevalent 

throughout the Middle East, this whole issue of jobs. And there is 

a young population and a need to create significant jobs. And I 

think you highlighted in your testimony 750,000 jobs a year, which 

is a big feat to be able to do that. 

And we all know, and I think we feel, that the lack of jobs then 

creates a fertile ground for violence and for terrorism and things 

like that. 

So my question I wanted to ask goes to—and you’ve touched on 

this a bit, in terms of how we’re using our money. But I understand 

recently that Secretary Clinton has done reprogramming, in terms 

of the funds that were available for Egypt, and she’s moving funds 

from one category to the other. And I was wondering if you could 

outline for us where we’ve taken money away from, and then why 

we’re doing that, and then what areas we’re targeting. 

I know that you mentioned angel investors and other kinds of 

programs, but I think it would be helpful to the committee to kind 

of have an idea of where do we think are the key—with the scarce 

resources we have, where do we think are the best places to invest? 

And I know you’ve said in a broad, general way that it’s important to invest in good governance and also in the development of 

the private sector. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you, Senator. 

Let me say this job creation and, frankly, these youth bulge 

issues are really rather frightening, but they can have a huge upside. Pakistan, for instance, had to generate 2 million jobs a year 

for new entrants to the labor force. 

But in Latin America, what happened was that this became a 

huge demographic benefit, because there were all these people in 

the labor force that had fewer children and didn’t have to support 

the elderly, like many of our developed societies, so it was a huge 

impetus for economic growth. And I don’t see any reason that, 

properly handled, that Egypt’s economy can’t do the same thing. 

But let me outline more specifically what we’re trying to do. The 

Secretary did reprogram funds, and she took it what I would call 

out of Egypt’s pipeline, economic assistance pipeline, which was not 

disbursing very rapidly, because Egypt had not met the conditions 

for disbursement of this pipeline. So we took $150 million out of that pipeline, and we allocated $65 million of it to democracy and governance, and that’s the funding source, as I mentioned, for some of our prestigious organizations. 

And we’re going to put $100 million in, essentially, job creation, 

issues like, in the short run, cash for work, which is not sustainable but will, I think, solve some short-term problems. 

So we have, Senator, we have the Overseas Private Investment 

Corporation, which has a very sophisticated program for lending. 

We have our debt swap programs. Again, the whole AID program 

360

will be refocused to promote economic reform and to do such varied 

things as work with think tanks and political parties to help them 

develop platforms on economic reform, to do job creation, to do 

trade facilitation. 

There are issues, and this was actually a very important issue 

in my other post. To increase trade, you need a certain amount of 

infrastructure. What’s the infrastructure that you can build that 

will most efficiently promote trade flows? And as we go into more 

trade liberalization with Egypt and North Africa, this will be important, too. 

So we’re looking at that. That’s a fairly high-cost and long-term 

project, but that’s the sort of thing we’re looking at to promote jobs. 

Senator UDALL. Ambassador, when you say cash for work, how 

does that program work? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Essentially, and we’re trying not to do 

too much of this, because it’s not sustainable, but it takes young 

people, mostly young men, off the streets, and it pays them to do, 

basically, manual labor. 

And we try not to do very much of this in our assistance programs, because it’s not sustainable. But sometimes it’s necessary in 

some of these countries, because it does put cash in people’s pockets. 

Senator UDALL. Yes, and it’s showing that I think there’s a feeling that we’re kind of in an, maybe not to put it too dramatically, 

emergency situation. But we are in a situation where there’s serious unemployment, and that creates all of the other problems. 

If I could, just shifting direction, just briefly here, on water usage 

and increasing concerns about the Nile River and water shortages 

in the region, I know that many countries are increasingly concerned about Egypt’s especially upstream users of the high rate of 

water usage. 

What role can the United States play and what role will you help 

to play to facilitate water conservation, so the region avoids conflicts over the water resource? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Yes, and then related to your previous 

question, I should have mentioned this, that we do have projects, 

certainly, to promote agricultural efficiency, because most of these 

countries are rather—they don’t have very good water management 

systems, so we are working on that, too, as part of our agricultural 

project. 

But on the Nile Basin Initiative, the department has been very 

active in trying to encourage the countries to come together, as has 

the World Bank, and work out a settlement among themselves. 

Senator UDALL. Great. Thank you very much, and thank you 

again for your service. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Senator Udall. 

Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador, thank you for your long service to our country. 

You’ve had a distinguished career, and you have been nominated 

for an exceptionally important assignment at this time in history. 

In between my meetings, I was glancing at the TV in my office 

trying to capture your answers to Senator Casey’s questions, but I 

want to pursue them a little bit more. 

361

I want to know your views on what we will tell Egypt about the 

state of relations between our countries, in terms of its adherence 

to the Camp David peace treaty with Israel? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Senator Menendez, I don’t think there 

could be the slightest doubt about our views about Egypt’s adherence to the Camp David peace treaty with Israel. 

And, as I mentioned before, I think the Egyptian Government at 

all levels has made utterly clear its commitment to that treaty, 

which is in its interests. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And yet, there are a series of actions that we 

have seen that are unsettling to some of us who believe that that 

is a cornerstone of United States foreign assistance to Egypt. 

Is Egypt’s adherence to its international obligations, including 

the peace treaty with Israel, a prerequisite for United States assistance? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, let me put it this way, Senator: 

We entirely anticipate that Egypt will abide by its international 

agreements, and the assistance to Egypt is, of course, based on 

those agreements from many years ago. 

Senator MENENDEZ. If we were to come to the conclusion that we 

do not believe that Egypt is pursuing its international obligations 

to that agreement, then we would expect that we would not be 

forthcoming in terms of the $1.5 billion that we give Egypt? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Senator, I don’t think we have any reason to expect that Egypt is not going to abide by its commitments 

with Israel. But, again, as I said, I think this is widely known, that 

the assistance to Egypt is essentially as a result and tied for many 

years to the Camp David Accords. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So the reopening of the Rafah border crossing, which has been closed since 2007, due to concerns about 

Hamas using that to bring weapons and fighters into Gaza; some 

of the gas disruptions that have taken place, and additional actions, you’re not concerned? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. I didn’t say that, Senator Menendez. I 

think what I told Senator Casey was, in fact, we were concerned 

about these issues and, in fact, that the Egyptians and Israeli security forces are working on these issues, that there is a very serious 

concern about smuggling, of course. And the Egyptians with Israeli 

concurrence have put additional troops into the Sinai to confront 

this. 

The gas is flowing again. There were two attacks on the pipeline. 

The law and order situation is bad there, but the gas is flowing 

again. 

There are some pricing disputes, but this is an issue that we 

think the Egyptians and Israelis can work out between themselves. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Many of us have and had and have still high 

hopes for a transition in Egypt that is both more democratic and 

continuingly secular, but many of us also have concerns about recent actions and where we’re headed. 

And our support, certainly this Senator’s support, for assistance 

to Egypt at the levels that we have been supporting it is predicated 

on a continuing relationship with a major ally of the United States 

important to our national security and our national interest. And 

so I hope you understand that there are those of us here who are 

362

not ready to sign a blank check because of a long-term relationship, 

and we will be expecting our next U.S. Ambassador to make that 

very clear. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Senator, I don’t think anyone expects 

the Congress of the United States to write a blank check anymore. 

Our financial conditions would not permit it. 

And I think the military assistance, in particular, as well as the 

civilian assistance, but particularly the military assistance, the 

very significant amount that you all have appropriated over the 

years, has really been a source for stability and encourages stability in the region. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, financial circumstances certainly create pressures on all of our assistance abroad. But, in my mind, this 

relationship, in terms of whatever continuing assistance the United 

States might produce, is beyond even the financial circumstances 

of the country. It is also about whether or not Egypt is living up 

to our expectations, for which we are willing to assist it in moving 

in the right direction. 

So I think I’ve made my case. I will leave it at that. 

I want to talk about one other thing, and it is something I am 

seriously concerned about. It’s how Coptic Christians are treated 

inside of Egypt. It is totally unacceptable. You know, we have seen 

an Egyptian court have 16 suspects that were found not guilty. The 

two who were convicted were released on bail. 

I heard of a recent peaceful sit-in by Coptic Christians trying to 

get churches reopened that was attacked by a group of men using 

firearms, knives, stones, Molotov cocktails. Over 78 people were 

wounded. 

What progress do you see being made by the military council to 

end sectarian violence and tension? And what are the prospects for 

constitutional changes in laws that would address sectarian violence and ease restrictions, for example, on building churches? 

I have a tremendously productive Coptic Christian community in 

my State of New Jersey, and they are a very peaceful people. 

They’re very entrepreneurial. 

I don’t understand this continuing violence against them. And I 

would hope the United States makes it very clear to Egypt that the 

continuing attacks on people, simply because of the altar that they 

choose to worship at, is not acceptable. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Yes, thank you, Senator Menendez. 

Yes, we’ve made this absolutely clear to the Egyptian Government on many levels. And this has certainly flared up after the unrest in Tahrir Square, and I think it’s gotten worse. I don’t think 

there is any question about that. 

That said, the military government has reconstructed the church 

that was destroyed and has arrested people that have attacked 

Coptic Christians. There was just a draft law the other day, and, 

frankly, we’ve gotten very mixed reports on this about the construction of these churches or mosques. It may not be satisfactory to the 

Coptic community. We just don’t know yet. 

But we certainly expect this Government and the new Egyptian 

Government to observe freedom of religion, which is in their constitution and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, of 

which, of course, Egypt is a signatory. 

363

So that is certainly one of our expectations of this Government 

and any new government. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And my final question, as the next Ambassador, can I rely upon you to vigorously raise this question with the 

Egyptian Government? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. You certainly can, Senator Menendez. 

Absolutely. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Senator Menendez. 

If there are no more questions of Senators, we thank Ambassador 

Patterson once again for her testimony and wish you well. And I 

know the committee will be taking action very soon. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Thank you, members. Thank you. 

Senator LUGAR. The chairman has asked Senator Casey to chair 

the second panel, and I’m delighted to relinquish the chair to my 

colleague. And we’ll call the second panel to come forward, please. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY,

U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA 

Senator CASEY [presiding]. Well, thank you. We want to welcome 

our second panel. 

I’ll have a brief opening statement, then I’ll turn the microphone 

over to our ranking member, Senator Lugar, and then we’ll go with 

each of the witnesses’ opening statements. 

Let me say first, with regard to the United Arab Emirates, the 

UAE sits at a strategic location in the Persian Gulf and has taken 

an active role in the region during the unprecedented period of political change that we’re living through today. 

The UAE has been constructive in the Gulf Cooperation Council’s 

mediation effort in Yemen, and has taken positive steps to monitor 

and combat terrorism and extremism in the region. 

The UAE is also an important partner in Afghanistan. Since 

2004, it has deployed 250 troops to southern Afghanistan, making 

it the only Arab country to contribute combat forces to the NATO 

mission. The Government has also pledged $323 million in economic assistance to Afghanistan. 

There are concerns, however, about the UAE’s ongoing relationship with Iran. While the government has been responsive to some 

United States concern over the reexport of U.S. technology to Iran, 

we need to encourage—or, I should say, need to continue to encourage the UAE to vigorously enforce international sanctions on Iran. 

I look forward to hearing how Mr. Corbin intends to work with 

the UAE Government to address these serious concerns. 

Mr. Corbin is a career senior Foreign Service officer currently 

serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near-Eastern 

Affairs. His experience working in our Embassies in Iraq, Syria, 

and Egypt will undoubtedly serve him well in this position, if confirmed. 

Welcome, sir. 

Kuwait is another key ally in the gulf region and has been pivotal in 2 decades of United States efforts to reduce the threat posed 

by Iraq. With Iraq largely stabilized, Kuwait now serves as the key 

364

route for the drawdown of United States troops and equipment. 

Thousands of United States soldiers continue to pass through 

Camp Arifjan, a military logistics hub south of Kuwait City, whose 

importance I witnessed firsthand during a visit to Kuwait in 2010. 

While Kuwait has been a leader in the gulf on democratization 

issues, as evidenced by the election of four women to Parliament 

in 2009, there is still progress to be made, particularly in human 

trafficking. And for the fourth year in a row, the U.S. Trafficking 

in Persons Report ranked Kuwait as a ‘‘Tier Three’’ country, the 

lowest level, for failing to make sufficient efforts to comply with 

minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. 

The United States must continue to engage Kuwait on this serious issue, including the full prosecution—full prosecution—of all 

cases, including Kuwaiti citizens. 

Mr. Tueller is a career senior Foreign Service officer currently 

serving as Deputy Chief of Mission in Egypt. If confirmed, he will 

bring a total of 6 years of experience in Kuwait, first as a political 

counselor from 1991 to 1994; then as Deputy Chief of Mission from 

2004 to 2007. 

And I’d also like to take this opportunity to welcome Mr. 

Tueller’s two sisters, Dianne and Betsy, and his nephew, Eli, who 

have traveled here from Belmont, MA, today. 

That just happens to be my wife’s hometown, so I’m happy to be 

able to mention that. My mother- and father-in-law would want me 

to mention Belmont in this hearing today. [Laughter.] 

Kazakhstan has played a key role in the transportation of nonlethal supplies for our troops in Afghanistan through its participation in the Northern Distribution Network, the so-called NDN. As 

Pakistani supply lines have become increasingly precarious, the 

NDN has become even more vital to our security interests in the 

region. 

Kazakhstan can also play a key role in European energy diversification efforts, particularly through its participation in the 

Nabucco pipeline. 

Despite hope that Kazakhstan’s 2010 OSCE chairmanship would 

usher in long-awaited democratic reforms, serious human rights 

abuses persist, including severe limits on free speech and assembly, 

discrimination against women, and the ongoing detention of political activists. 

The United States must continue to encourage democratic openness and respect for human rights through engagement with civil 

society and ongoing diplomatic exchanges. 

I welcome Mr. Fairfax’s insight into these complex set of issues. 

Mr. Fairfax is a career senior Foreign Service officer who has 

served in challenging posts around the world. He currently served 

as Minister Counselor for Economic Affairs at the United States 

Embassy in Iraq and has served in our overseas posts in Vietnam, 

Poland, Ukraine, Canada, and South Korea. 

I’d also like to welcome his wife, Nyetta, who is here with us 

today. 

So we’re grateful for your work and for her presence here. 

And finally, Qatar is another important United States partner in 

the gulf and host to the former headquarters of U.S. CENTCOM. 

It has taken an active role in response to the recent unrest in the 

365

region, and it was the first Arab State to recognize Libya’s Transitional National Council, one of two Arab countries to do that, along 

with the UAE, to contribute military aircraft to NATO’s Operation 

Unified Protector in Libya. 

Its policy of engagement with Iran and Hamas has been a cause 

for great concern for the United States and Israel, and there are 

reports that Hamas may be seeking to relocate to Doha due to political turmoil in Syria. 

Human rights groups continue to criticize Qatar’s ban on political parties and restrictions on freedom of speech, press, assembly, 

and religion. Moreover, its large population of foreign residents and 

temporary laborers enjoy no political rights, and unskilled laborers 

continue to live in hazardous conditions. 

Ms. Ziadeh is a career senior Foreign Service officer as well, currently serving as Deputy Chief of Mission in Saudi Arabia. Prior 

to this, she was Deputy Chief of Mission in Bahrain from 2004 to 

2007, and has also served at our Embassies in Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan, and Israel. 

I’d like to welcome her sister, Rhonda, who is here with us today. 

With that, I would turn to our ranking member, Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Chairman Casey. I 

appreciate very much the tributes that you have given to each of 

our four distinguished nominees. I join you in welcoming them, and 

we look forward to their service. 

I really want to take this opportunity, as a point of personal 

privilege, to make some comments about Kenneth Fairfax, who has 

been nominated by President Obama to serve as United States Ambassador to Kazakhstan. 

I was encouraged to read in a recent piece in Foreign Policy magazine by David Hoffman, entitled, ‘‘The Loose Nuke Cable That 

Shook the World,’’ details based on declassified cables of Mr. Fairfax’s long history in observing and reporting on very disturbing nuclear security threats in parts of the former Soviet Union during 

his service in Moscow in the mid-1990s. 

These same concerns prompted my own involvement in these 

matters, having worked with Senator Sam Nunn to craft the NunnLugar legislation in 1991, which continues to safeguard WMD materials and components throughout the former Soviet Union and 

now worldwide. 

I expect that Mr. Fairfax’s background will serve him well in 

Astana, given Kazakhstan’s central role in nonproliferation endeavors over the past decades. 

The United States and Kazakhstan have been cooperating closely 

on nonproliferation matters now for over 18 years through the 

Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. At the time of 

the collapse of the U.S.S.R. in December 1991, Kazakhstan possessed 1,410 nuclear warheads. On December 13, 1993, the Government of Kazakhstan signed the Safe and Secure Dismantlement 

Act and five Nunn-Lugar implementing agreements with the 

United States. 

Upon the removal of the last nuclear warhead from Kazakhstan 

in 1995, Kazakhstan acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

Treaty in 1995 as a nonnuclear weapon state. 

366

Other successes in Kazakhstan include the closure of the former 

Soviet Union’s nuclear test site; the elimination of a biological 

weapons production facility; and the securing of dangerous nuclear, 

biological, and radiological materials. This past year, the United 

States and Kazakhstan completed a major nonproliferation program to provide secure storage for the spent fuel from 

Kazakhstan’s BN–350 plutonium production reactor. 

In a large-scale effort over the last year, the spent fuel, enough 

material to fabricate 775 nuclear weapons, was transported in a series of 12 secure shipments over 1,800 miles from Aktau near the 

Caspian Sea to a secure location in eastern Kazakhstan. 

The completion of this decade-long effort to secure the BN–350 

spent fuel provides yet another example of the progress on nuclear 

security and nonproliferation through concerted United States diplomacy and global security engagement. 

I look forward to working with Mr. Fairfax, and I look forward 

to working with each of the nominees on the panel, should they be 

confirmed, and we have some confidence that you will be. We are 

grateful for your service. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Ranking Member Senator Lugar. 

And we’ll now do opening statements. We’ll plead with you to 

stay within the limits of your time. 

And, of course, if you want to summarize your testimony as best 

you can, that would be preferable, and your full statements will be 

made part of the record. 

I think we’ll start with Mr. Corbin. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL H. CORBIN, OF CALIFORNIA, TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 

Mr. CORBIN. Thank you very much, Senator Casey, Senator 

Lugar. 

I’m honored to appear before you as the President’s nominee to 

be the United States Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates. I’m 

extremely grateful to President Obama and to Secretary Clinton for 

their confidence in me. And if confirmed, I look forward to representing the American people and to working with this committee 

and other interested Members of Congress to advance U.S. goals in 

the UAE. 

It has been an honor to serve as a Foreign Service officer since 

1985, mostly in the Arab world, and to use regional experience and 

the Arab language in a wide variety of assignments. 

The Foreign Service brought my Foreign Service spouse, Mary 

Ellen Hickey, and me together. As a tandem couple, we have been 

blessed to serve together in most of our assignments. My two children have learned much from living overseas, and I’m gratified 

they have joined me here today, along with my parents, my mother-in-law, and my extended family. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, the UAE plays an influential and growing role in the Middle East and is a key partner 

for the United States in areas such as defense, nonproliferation, 

trade, law enforcement, energy policy, and educational and cultural 

exchange. 

367

Regionally, the UAE is a leader. For example, the UAE has had 

troops in Afghanistan since 2004, actively participates in the Libyan Operation Unified Protector, and is a founding member of the 

Friends of Democratic Pakistan, with over $300 million in direct 

assistance. 

Our bilateral cooperation is strong. On defense, the Port of Jebel 

Ali in Dubai is the United States Navy’s busiest overseas port of 

call, and the UAE is our largest Foreign Military Sales cash customer. 

On nonproliferation, we work together. The UAE takes its international obligations seriously and has fully implemented international sanctions targeting Iran and North Korea. Most recently, 

in May, the UAE coordinated with us on the sanctioning of two 

UAE-based entities for supplying Iran with prohibited amounts of 

refined fuel. 

The UAE seeks to prevent use of its open trade environment and 

is implementing a comprehensive export control law. Our trade cooperation is excellent, and for the past 2 years, the UAE has been 

the largest export market for U.S. goods in the Middle East. 

For example, Dubai’s Emirates Airlines is the single largest customer for Boeing’s 777 aircraft, and more than 700 United States 

companies have regional headquarters in the UAE. 

The UAE is a partner in building UAE’s law enforcement capabilities, particularly to counter money laundering and terrorist financing, and we work with the UAE on energy policy. 

Holding nearly 8 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves and 

nearly 5 percent of its proven gas reserves, the UAE supports U.S. 

energy goals, and joined other GCC states on June 8 in pushing for 

an increase in OPEC oil production in line for U.S. goals for the 

global economy. 

Finally, in cultural and educational cooperation, the UAE has 

partnered with major U.S. institutions, such as the Guggenheim 

and New York University, on major programs in that country. 

The United States is focused on human rights, trafficking in persons, and the rights of women in the UAE. For example, this year 

the UAE established a special court in Dubai to hear human trafficking cases and is taking steps to train its police and customs officials to aid trafficking victims. But more must be done, particularly 

with regard to labor issues. 

Our comprehensive dialogue with the UAE has included a frank, 

productive discussion on historic changes brought about by the 

Arab Spring. If confirmed as United States Ambassador, I would 

work to see that the UAE’s legitimate interest in trade with its 

neighbors is not put to inappropriate uses, especially with respect 

to Iran. I would work to strengthen our trade relationship, promote 

U.S. exports, and assist the U.S. businesses using the UAE as a 

hub. 

We have a clear dialogue with the UAE on the universal right 

of free expression, and Secretary Clinton has demonstrated the priority we place on this with her Internet Freedom Initiative. 

If confirmed as Ambassador, I will continue to highlight our commitment to this principle and work with our partners in the UAE. 

With 36 different United States Government agencies and departments in the UAE, my first priority, if confirmed, would be to 

368

the safety and security of our personnel, as well as all Americans 

living and working or traveling to the United Arab Emirates. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, if confirmed, I would 

welcome your views and insights on the UAE and the region and 

welcome any questions you might have for me today. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Corbin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL H. CORBIN

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you 

as the President’s nominee to be the U.S. Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates. 

I am extremely grateful to President Obama and to Secretary Clinton for their confidence in me. If confirmed, I look forward to representing the American people, and 

to working with this committee and other interested Members of Congress to advance U.S. goals in the UAE. 

It has been an honor to serve as a Foreign Service officer since 1985, mostly in 

the Arab World, and to use regional experience and the Arabic language in a wide 

variety of assignments. The Foreign Service brought my Foreign Service spouse, 

Mary Ellen Hickey, and me together. As a tandem couple we have been blessed to 

serve together in most of our assignments. My two children have learned much from 

living overseas and I am gratified to have my family, parents, and extended family 

here in the audience today. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the UAE plays an influential and 

growing role in the Middle East, and is a key partner for the United States. The 

United States and the UAE enjoy strong bilateral cooperation on a full range of 

issues including defense, nonproliferation, trade, law enforcement, energy policy, 

and cultural exchange. 

As a member of the International Security Assistance Force, the UAE has had 

troops in Afghanistan since 2003. It has been a leader as current president of the 

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Yemen mediation; participates in the Libya 

Operation Unified Protector; provided several million dollars in humanitarian aid to 

assist those affected by the Libyan crisis; contributed almost $50 million in 2010 to 

rebuilding Afghanistan; and is a founding member of the Friends of Democratic 

Pakistan with over $300 million in direct assistance. 

Defense cooperation is a central pillar of our partnership and is reflected in regular bilateral strategic security discussions. The port of Jebel Ali in Dubai is the 

U.S. Navy’s busiest overseas port-of-call and the UAE is our largest Foreign Military Sales cash customer. The UAE has actively participated in international operations to police the gulf, and organized an international conference on countering 

piracy March 18–19 of this year. 

In the area of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the UAE takes its 

international obligations seriously and has fully implemented international sanctions targeting Iran and North Korea for their pursuit of nuclear weapons. Our active dialogue with Abu Dhabi on these and other nonproliferation issues supports 

the enforcement of U.S. laws and most recently, in May, the UAE coordinated with 

us on the sanctioning of two UAE-based entities for supplying Iran with prohibited 

amounts of refined fuel. The UAE seeks to prevent use of its open trade environment to import and export items and funds that assist in the development of weapons of mass destruction and is implementing a comprehensive export control law to 

take action against noncomplying companies. The UAE participates in the U.S. 

Export Control and Border Security program, hosts a bilateral Counter Proliferation 

Task Force, and is a member of the multilateral Proliferation Security Initiative. 

The UAE’s Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with the United States (signed in May 

2009) is a positive example for the peaceful development of a nuclear energy 

program. 

For the past 2 years the UAE has been the largest export market for U.S. goods 

in the Middle East, and 21st in the world. It has developed a leading role in business services, including finance and logistics, and has emerged as the preeminent 

business hub between Asia and Europe. Dubai’s Emirates Airlines is the single largest customer for Boeing’s 777 aircraft. With its infrastructure and business and 

logistical services, the UAE has become the regional headquarters for over 700 

American companies active in the petroleum, defense, services, education, and 

health care sectors. 

The United States is a partner in building UAE’s law enforcement capabilities, 

particularly to counter money laundering and terrorist financing and to provide 

training to enable the UAE to disrupt illicit cash flows. 

369

The UAE is also a partner on energy policy. Holding nearly 8 percent of the 

world’s proven oil reserves and nearly 5 percent of its proven gas reserves, the UAE 

joined other GCC states on June 8 in pushing for an increase in OPEC oil production. The UAE has sought U.S. assistance to pursue renewable energy and plays a 

leadership role on renewable energy technologies. Finally, on cultural and educational exchange, the UAE has partnered with major U.S. institutions such as the 

Guggenheim and New York University. 

The United States works closely with the UAE on human rights, trafficking in 

persons, and the rights of women. The UAE is committed to the education of its people and is working to ensure that the female half of its citizenry receives a complete, 

high-quality education. This year, the UAE established a special court in Dubai to 

hear human trafficking cases and is taking steps to train its police and customs officials to aid trafficking victims. As these policies develop, we are continuing to work 

closely with the Emirati leadership to improve its response to forced labor, particularly among the foreign migrant worker population the country hosts. Finally, the 

UAE and the United States have maintained a productive dialogue throughout the 

recent historic changes brought about by the ‘‘Arab Spring.’’

If confirmed as U.S. Ambassador I would work to see that the UAE’s legitimate 

interest in trade with its neighbors is not put to inappropriate uses, especially with 

respect to Iran. I would work to continue to strengthen our trade partnership, promote U.S. exports and assist U.S. businesses using the UAE as a hub. 

We have a clear dialogue with the UAE on the universal right of free expression 

and Secretary Clinton has demonstrated the priority we place on this with her 

Internet Freedom Initiative. If confirmed as Ambassador, I will continue to highlight our commitment to this principle in my work with our partners in the UAE. 

At a U.S. mission comprising employees from 36 different U.S. Government agencies and departments, my first priority, if confirmed, would remain at all times 

protecting the safety and security of the dedicated men and women at our mission 

as well as of all Americans living and working or traveling in the United Arab 

Emirates. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, if confirmed, I would welcome your 

views and insights on the UAE and the region and welcome any questions you 

might have for me today. Thank you.

Senator CASEY. Thanks, Mr. Corbin. You had time left. You had 

40 seconds. [Laughter.] 

Ms. Ziadeh, thank you. 

STATEMENT OF SUSAN L. ZIADEH, OF WASHINGTON, TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE STATE OF QATAR 

Ms. ZIADEH. Senator Casey, Ranking Member Lugar, members of 

the committee, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today. 

I’m honored to be President Obama’s nominee to serve as United 

States Ambassador to Qatar. I deeply appreciate the confidence 

President Obama and Secretary Clinton have shown in me by making this nomination. 

If confirmed by the Senate, I will exercise the full range of our 

diplomatic tools to promote regional security cooperation, expand 

commercial ties, and develop stronger educational partnerships between the United States and Qatar. 

With your permission, I’d like to introduce my sister, Rhonda, 

her husband, George, and their daughter, Gihan, here today representing their Ziadeh family. 

I would also like to thank my family for their encouragement as 

I’ve pursued graduate studies in Egypt and Lebanon, where Middle 

East issues became my lifelong intellectual and professional pursuit. Through seven tours in the Middle East, including Iraq, their 

support continues. 

The United States and Qatar enjoy an excellent military-to-military relationship. Qatar’s Al Udeid Air Base hosts the United 

370

States Air Force’s 379th Air Expeditionary Wing, as well as the 

Combined Air Operations Center, critical to United States military 

operations in the CENTCOM AOR, including Afghanistan. 

If confirmed, I will work to expand our counterterrorism and regional security cooperation with Qatar. 

From the United Nations to the Gulf Cooperation Council, Qatar 

has played an active and helpful role in multilateral diplomacy. In 

Libya, Qatar was the first Arab country to dedicate military 

sources to the international coalition and has pledged significant financial support to the Transitional National Council. 

In Egypt, Qatar has announced plans to invest $10 billion to 

strengthen the economy. The Emir of Qatar has set a positive example by reinforcing the need for political, social, and economic reforms across the Arab world, and he has also focused on the need 

for better and inclusive governance. 

Qatar recently held municipal council elections and has pledged 

to hold advisory council elections soon. These are important steps 

and demonstrate Qatar’s commitment to representative government. 

Recognizing that each country will follow its own particular form 

of representative democracy, if confirmed, I pledge to work with 

our Qatari friends and speak out for the core values and principles 

that define America. 

Qatar also represents tremendous economic opportunity for 

American business. With the third-largest proven gas reserves in 

the world, Qatar is the leading supplier of liquified natural gas. Oil 

and gas account for more than 60 percent of GDP and 70 percent 

of Government revenues. Qatar is using these revenues to invest 

in its infrastructure and its people, while diversifying its economy. 

If confirmed, I will advocate aggressively for U.S. companies competing for the more than 70 billion dollars’ worth of major infrastructure projects to be awarded between now and 2022. I will also 

work tirelessly to find new export opportunities for American goods 

and services in Qatar. 

Qatar has made great strides in education, overhauling its 

schools. Through the Qatar Foundation and initiatives such as 

Education City, Qatar is building the intellectual infrastructure 

necessary for Qataris to compete in a knowledge-based economy. 

U.S. universities are at the forefront of this process, cooperating 

on educational services. As a former Fulbright Scholar myself, I 

know firsthand the value of educational exchanges. If confirmed, I 

will strongly support these growing institutional ties and promote 

long-term partnerships. 

A top priority as Ambassador will be, if confirmed, to protect the 

welfare, security, and interests of American citizens, as well as our 

personnel at Embassy Doha. 

If confirmed, I will dedicate myself to supporting the American 

community and helping it to succeed in Qatar. If confirmed, I look 

forward to welcoming the committee’s members and staff to Doha. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to address the committee. I would be pleased to respond 

to any questions you may have. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ziadeh follows:]

371

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUSAN L. ZIADEH

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lugar, members of the committee, I thank you 

for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

I am honored to be President Obama’s nominee to serve as U.S. Ambassador to 

Qatar. I deeply appreciate the confidence President Obama and Secretary Clinton 

have shown in me. If confirmed by the Senate, I will exercise the full range of our 

diplomatic tools to promote regional security cooperation, expand commercial ties, 

and develop stronger educational partnerships between the United States and 

Qatar. 

With your permission, I would like to introduce my sister, Rhonda, here today 

representing the Ziadeh family. I would like to thank my family for their encouragement as I pursued graduate studies in Egypt and Lebanon, where Middle East 

issues became my lifelong intellectual and professional pursuit. Through seven tours 

in the Middle East, including Iraq, their support continues. 

The United States and Qatar enjoy an excellent military-to-military relationship. 

Qatar’s Al Udayd Air Base hosts the U.S. Air Force’s 379th Air Expeditionary Wing 

as well as the Combined Air Operations Center, critical to U.S. military operations 

in the CENTCOM AOR, including Afghanistan. If confirmed, I will work to expand 

our counterterrorism and regional security cooperation. 

From the United Nations to the Gulf Cooperation Council, Qatar has played an 

active and helpful role in multilateral diplomacy. In Libya, Qatar was the first Arab 

country to dedicate military resources to the international coalition and has pledged 

significant financial support to the Transitional National Council. In Egypt, Qatar 

announced plans to invest $10 billion to strengthen the economy. The Amir of Qatar 

has set a positive example by reinforcing the need for political, social, and economic 

reforms across the Arab world. 

He has also focused on the need for better and inclusive governance. Qatar recently held municipal council elections and has pledged to hold advisory council elections soon. These are important steps and demonstrate Qatar’s commitment to representative government. Recognizing that each country will follow its own particular 

form of representative democracy, if confirmed, I pledge to work with our Qatari 

friends and speak out for the core values and principles that define America. 

Qatar presents tremendous economic opportunity for American business. With the 

third-largest proven gas reserves in the world, Qatar is the leading supplier of Liquid Natural Gas. Oil and gas account for more than 60 percent of GDP and 70 percent of government revenues. Qatar is using these revenues to invest in its infrastructure and its people while diversifying its economy. If confirmed, I will advocate 

aggressively for U.S. companies competing for the more than 70 billion dollars’ 

worth of major infrastructure projects to be awarded between now and 2022; I will 

also work tirelessly to find new export opportunities for American goods and services in Qatar. 

Qatar has made great strides in education, overhauling its schools. Through the 

Qatar Foundation and initiatives such as Education City, Qatar is building the intellectual infrastructure necessary for Qataris to compete in a knowledge-based 

economy. U.S. universities are at the forefront of this process, cooperating on educational services. As a former Fulbright scholar, I know firsthand the value of educational exchanges. If confirmed, I will strongly support these growing institutional 

ties and promote long-term partnerships. 

A top priority is to protect the welfare, security, and interests of American citizens 

as well as our personnel at Embassy Doha. If confirmed, I will dedicate myself to 

supporting the American community and helping it succeed in Qatar. 

If confirmed, I look forward to welcoming the committee’s members and staff to 

Doha. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to 

address the committee. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may 

have. Thank you.

Senator CASEY. Thanks very much. 

Mr. Tueller. 

STATEMENT OF MATTHEW H. TUELLER, OF UTAH, TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE STATE OF KUWAIT 

Mr. TUELLER. Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to appear before you 

today as President Obama’s nominee to serve as Ambassador to the 

State of Kuwait. 

372

I’m grateful to the President for the nomination and to Secretary 

Clinton for her confidence in me and for her leadership of the Department of State. 

If confirmed by the Senate, I will do my best to live up to their 

trust and to work closely with this committee and others in Congress to continue to advance the vital interests of the United States 

in Kuwait. 

Senator Casey, you very kindly welcomed my two sisters. With 

your permission, I’d like to note that my wife, Denise, and son, 

Christian, had to remain in Cairo while I came here. 

But my two sisters, who represent eight of my sisters and my 

one brother, with whom we grew up in the Foreign Service, were 

kind enough to join me today. And my five children refer to those 

aunts as ‘‘the entourage,’’ so I’m happy to have their support here. 

Mr. Chairman, the State of Kuwait has been a reliable partner 

and friend in a region of utmost importance to U.S. interests. Since 

1991, U.S. military forces and our coalition partners have relied 

heavily on Kuwait’s support for our regional policy priorities. If 

confirmed, I would work to expand that support into broader political, social, and economic arenas. 

If confirmed, I will seek to focus intensively on ensuring that Kuwait continues to act as a full partner with the United States in 

regional security efforts. 

Kuwait is playing an essential role in the repositioning of our 

forces from Iraq. Continuing to foster improved Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations in coordination with Embassy Baghdad will help speed Iraq’s 

regional reintegration and create an atmosphere in which political 

and trade ties can prosper. 

We share with the Government of Kuwait a common interest in 

combating the spread of extremist ideology and rooting out terrorist elements. If confirmed, I will seek to build strong 

counterterrorism cooperation, to include increased information 

sharing and intensified training efforts. 

As states in the region today face popular demands to close the 

often yawning gaps between governments and the people, Kuwait’s 

traditions of open political discourse and constitutional sharing of 

power have put the country in a relatively advantageous position 

to meet the challenges of this new era in the Middle East. 

Recent parliamentary elections have led to a gradually increasing role for women in parliamentary and political life. If confirmed, 

I will endeavor to help Kuwait to consolidate and expand those 

democratic gains. 

Mr. Chairman, I have had the privilege of serving my country as 

a Foreign Service officer for more than 25 years, most recently as 

Deputy Chief of Mission at our Embassy in Cairo during the turbulent, but inspiring events of the January 25 revolution. My Foreign 

Service career has included overseas service in Baghdad, Riyadh, 

London, Doha, Amman, and Yemen. 

As you noted, I’ve served twice before in Kuwait. The Ambassadors under whom I served in Kuwait were Edward Gnehm, Ryan 

Crocker, and Richard LeBaron. Under their leadership, I was able 

to play some part in laying the foundation upon which the United 

States-Kuwaiti relationship rests today. 

373

If confirmed, I believe I can make a substantial contribution of 

service to the American people as the next United States Ambassador to Kuwait. 

If confirmed to this position, I will work to protect American citizens and promote U.S. interests, while consolidating and augmenting the close ties between our governments’ leaders and our 

peoples. 

Again, I’m honored, Mr. Chairman, by this nomination and the 

opportunity to appear before you today, and look forward to your 

questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tueller follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MATTHEW H. TUELLER

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you 

today as President Obama’s nominee to serve as Ambassador to the State of Kuwait. 

I am grateful to the President for the nomination and to Secretary Clinton for her 

confidence in me and for her leadership of the Department of State. If confirmed 

by the Senate, I will do my best to live up to their trust and to work closely with 

this committee, and others in Congress, to continue to advance the vital interests 

of the United States in Kuwait and in the region. 

Mr. Chairman, the State of Kuwait has been a reliable partner and friend in a 

region of utmost importance to U.S. interests. Since Kuwait’s 1991 liberation from 

Saddam Hussein’s brutal occupation, U.S. military forces and our coalition partners 

have relied heavily on Kuwait’s support for our policy priorities in Iraq, Iran, and 

Afghanistan, and in countering terrorist threats. If confirmed, I will work to expand 

that support into broader political, social, and economic arenas to build and sustain 

a partnership that will advance key American interests in a region that today is 

undergoing rapid and profound change. 

If confirmed, I will seek to focus intensively on ensuring that Kuwait continues 

to act as a full partner with the U.S. in regional security efforts. Sustaining and 

further strengthening our security partnership will be important to meeting our 

shared broader regional strategic objectives. Kuwait is playing an essential role in 

the repositioning of our forces from Iraq. Continuing to foster improved KuwaitiIraqi relations in coordination with Embassy Baghdad will help speed Iraq’s regional reintegration and create an atmosphere in which political and trade ties can 

prosper. 

We share with the Government of Kuwait a common interest in combating the 

spread of extremist ideology and rooting out terrorist elements that threaten peace 

and security in the region. If confirmed, I will seek to build strong counterterrorism 

cooperation to include increased information-sharing and intensified training efforts 

to ensure the best possible force protection for our troops in Kuwait, as well as our 

mission employees, family members, and the larger American community while continuing to build on the cooperation essential to countering terrorist threats. 

As states in the region today face an unprecedented wave of popular demands to 

close the often yawning gaps between governments and the people, Kuwait’s traditions of open political discourse and constitutional sharing of power have put the 

country in a relatively advantageous position to meet the challenges of this dawning 

era in the Middle East. Parliamentary elections in 2009 once again gave opposition 

voices a significant platform from which to influence and oversee government policies. The participation of women in elections since 2005 has led to a gradually 

increasing role for women in parliamentary and political life. Four women were 

elected to seats in Parliament in 2009. If confirmed, I will endeavor to help Kuwait 

consolidate and expand those democratic gains, to include supporting the development of grassroots women’s organizations, civil society groups, youth and other activists, and advancing the rights and protections of vulnerable populations living 

within Kuwait’s borders. 

In addition to deepening our security cooperation and advancing the strength of 

civil society, we must seek with our Kuwaiti partners to create new opportunities 

for economic partnership, both within and beyond the energy sphere. Kuwait’s objective to become a regional commercial center, including passing a 5-year $104 billion 

development plan, will create commercial opportunities for U.S. companies and provide us the opportunity to work with the Kuwaiti Government and with the private 

sector to promote economic reform and private sector growth, and create opportunities for aspiring entrepreneurs. The potential for dynamic synergies between Kuwait 

374

and the United States, combining capital, technology, and expertise to advance 

global development, is enormous. Constructive bilateral engagement on trade and 

investment-related issues, through tools such as the Trade and Investment Framework (TIFA), will help support needed reforms and cement our partnership. If confirmed, I will pursue ongoing policies that promote increased investment, trade, and 

project development between our two countries. 

Finally, if confirmed, I will work energetically in reaching out to Kuwaiti youth 

via U.S.-sponsored exchange and English language programs and through Middle 

East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) programming to highlight common interests and 

emphasize strong bonds of friendship based on shared core values. Forty-five percent of Kuwait’s population is under the age of 25, and many Kuwaiti youth have 

no direct experience regarding the U.S. role in the 1991 liberation of Kuwait. While 

heavily exposed to commercial Western media and cultural influences, the United 

States must play an active role in exposing them to the fundamentals of 

participatory civil society with values of tolerance and nonviolence. This will ensure 

stronger bilateral ties and thus counter the negative extremist influences found all 

too often in regional media. 

Mr. Chairman, I have had the extraordinary privilege of serving my country as 

a Foreign Service officer for more than 25 years, most recently as Deputy Chief of 

Mission at our Embassy in Cairo during the turbulent but inspiring events of the 

January 25th Revolution. I was in Egypt as a graduate student taking advanced 

Arabic classes in October 1981 when President Sadat was assassinated and President Mubarak began his 29 years of rule. My first exposure to the Middle East was 

as a dependent of a Foreign Service officer when my father was assigned to study 

Arabic in Tangier from 1965–67 followed by his assignment as Consul in Tangier 

from 1967–69. My Foreign Service career has included service in Washington as 

Egypt desk officer and Deputy Director of the Office of Northern Gulf Affairs. Overseas I have served in Baghdad, twice in Riyadh, in London, Doha, Amman, and 

Yemen. I have served twice before in Kuwait, first as Political Counselor following 

the reopening of our Embassy in 1991 and then more recently in 2004–07 as Deputy 

Chief of Mission. The Ambassadors under whom I served in Kuwait include Edward 

Gnehm, Ryan Crocker, and Richard LeBaron and, if confirmed, I would strive to live 

up to the examples they set as outstanding U.S. diplomats. Under their leadership, 

I was able to play some part in laying the foundation upon which the United StatesKuwaiti relationship rests today. I believe I can make a substantial contribution of 

service to the American people as Ambassador to Kuwait. 

If confirmed as Ambassador, I will work with persistence, enthusiasm, and stamina to protect American citizens and promote U.S. interests, while consolidating and 

augmenting the close ties between our governments’ leaders and our peoples. Again, 

I am honored, Mr. Chairman, by this nomination and the opportunity to appear before you today. I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Senator CASEY. Thanks very much. 

Mr. Fairfax. 

STATEMENT OF KENNETH J. FAIRFAX, OF KENTUCKY, TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN 

Mr. FAIRFAX. Mr. Chairman, first, I want to thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before you today. And I would like to thank 

Senator Lugar for his very kind words. 

I am deeply honored by the confidence that President Obama and 

Secretary Clinton have shown in me by nominating me as the 

United States Ambassador to Kazakhstan. 

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank my wife, 

Nyetta Yarkin, who is with me here today, as she has been continuously for the last 25 years, including during my current assignment at United States Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq. 

Last year, President Obama and Kazakhstan President 

Nazarbayev reaffirmed the strategic partnership between our two 

countries, declaring our commitment to a shared vision of stability, 

prosperity, and democratic reform in Central Asia and beyond. 

375

If confirmed by the Senate, I will work faithfully to deepen this 

strategic partnership and I look forward to working with Congress 

in pursuit of this goal. 

United States interests in Kazakhstan can be grouped into three 

strategic areas. 

First, we seek to advance sound democratic and economic reforms. Kazakhstan has had consistently outstanding economic performance. While it took a short hiatus due to the 2008 financial crisis, already by 2010, growth had returned to 7 percent, and this 

year it looks to be even stronger. 

This economic growth also means that Kazakhstan is a growing 

market for American goods and services. And if confirmed, I intend 

to lead a concerted effort to cooperate with and support United 

States businesses as they expand their presence in Kazakhstan. 

Despite these positive economic achievements, democratic political institutions in Kazakhstan remain underdeveloped. The Presidency dominates the political system and the President’s party is 

the only party represented in Parliament. 

The 2010 Human Rights Report highlights other problematic 

issues relating to rule of law, freedom of speech, freedom from arbitrary detention, and other universally recognized human rights. 

If confirmed, I will work with all branches of the United States 

Government, as well as with the international community, to address these issues and to ensure that Kazakhstan fulfills its commitments to political reform as it prepares for the 2012 parliamentary elections, the first that will result in multiparty representation. 

The second area of United States strategic interest in 

Kazakhstan is strengthening global and regional security. With its 

courageous decision to renounce nuclear weapons shortly after the 

breakup of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan demonstrated its commitment to international security and nonproliferation, a commitment 

that it continues to build upon today through its active participation in the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the IAEA, and 

other international organizations. 

The United States and Kazakhstan also share a common interest 

in bolstering Central Asian security, fighting terrorism, and stemming narcotics trafficking. 

Kazakhstan is supporting efforts in Afghanistan through expanded overflight rights and through active participation in the 

Northern Distribution Network. 

Kazakhstan is also dedicating its own resources to the effort in 

Afghanistan through a $50 million program to educate the next 

generation of Afghan leaders, as well as through humanitarian assistance. 

Our third area of strategic focus in Kazakhstan is world resource 

security, particularly energy and food. With a potential to rank 

among the world’s top 10 oil exporters within the next several 

years, Kazakhstan plays an important role in advancing international energy security at the same time it builds a basis for its 

own economic future. 

Similarly, Kazakhstan ranks as the world’s sixth-largest grain 

exporter and is, thus, critical to food security. Cooperating to further improve Kazakhstan’s performance in these and other areas 

376

represents a win-win-win situation for the United States, 

Kazakhstan, and the world community. All three sets of interests—

democratic and economic development, our joint security cooperation, and our shared commitment to world resource security—are 

interrelated and must advance together. 

Mr. Chairman, I have spent nearly my entire career serving in 

countries in transition, from centrally planned to market economies, and from authoritarian to representative governments. I believe that there is an inextricable link between the growth of an 

open democratic system of government and the development of an 

open, market-based economy. Both are fueled by the universal desire of people to build a better, safer, and more prosperous future 

and together they constitute the best route toward long-term security and stability. 

If confirmed, this belief in the power of an open, democratic system will guide me as I work to ensure that the already strong 

United States-Kazakhstan partnership continues to growth and 

strengthen. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fairfax follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KENNETH J. FAIRFAX

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to 

appear before you today. I am deeply honored by the confidence with which President Obama, by nominating me for the post of Ambassador of the United States to 

Kazakhstan, and Secretary Clinton have entrusted me. I would also like to take this 

opportunity to thank my wife, Nyetta Yarkin, who is here with me today, as she 

has been with me continuously for the past 25 years as my work has taken me 

around the globe, including to my current posting in Baghdad, Iraq. 

If confirmed by the Senate, I will work diligently and faithfully on behalf of the 

American people to pursue U.S. foreign policy goals and to deepen the strategic 

partnership between the United States and Kazakhstan. If confirmed, I look forward 

to working with the Congress in pursuit of those goals. 

Mr. Chairman, Central Asia is a region of significant importance to U.S. national 

interests. U.S. policy in the region supports the development of independent, stable, 

democratic nations, integrated into the world economy, that cooperate with one another, the United States, and our partners to advance regional and global security. 

Kazakhstan is an important regional and international partner. It is geographically strategic, ethnically diverse, and resource rich. It is the ninth-largest country 

in the world by land mass, or roughly the size of Western Europe. The population 

is 15.6 million people, 59.2 percent of whom are ethnically Kazakh, 25.6 percent 

ethnically Russian with the remainder divided among many ethnic minorities. The 

largely secular population is 65 percent Muslim, 30 percent Russian Orthodox with 

the remainder divided among many smaller faiths. Located at the crossroads of 

Europe and Asia and bordered by Russia, China, and the Caspian Sea, 

Kazakhstan’s size, location, and resources make it strategically important and key 

to regional stability. If plans are approved to expand production at its three largest 

oil fields, Kazakhstan’s hydrocarbon reserves should, by 2018, rank it as one of the 

top 10 world oil producers. 

As the first country to renounce its nuclear weapons voluntarily following the 

breakup of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan established early its commitment to international security and credentials for leadership. Since that debut on the international stage, Kazakhstan has continued to pursue a policy of active engagement 

with the global community, with chairmanships of the Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 

2010 and Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 2011, as well as hosting 

the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit on June 14–15 of this year. 

Kazakhstan is providing significant support to our stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. The United States and Kazakhstan have had an overflight agreement in place since 2001 that has facilitated over 9,000 overflights and 

over 85 diverts. Kazakhstan actively participates in the Northern Distribution Network—which entails commercial shipment through Kazakhstan of supplies for U.S. 

377

and international forces in Afghanistan. The recent expansion of the 2001 overflight 

agreement to include new polar routes will significantly increase the efficiency of 

operations. In addition to facilitating U.S. and international efforts to stabilize and 

strengthen Afghanistan, Kazakhstan is directly investing in Afghanistan’s future 

development through a $50 million program to educate the next generation of 

Afghan leaders in Kazakhstan’s universities. Over time, we hope Kazakhstan will 

be part of a revitalized regional economic system encompassing Central Asia, 

Afghanistan, and South Asia. 

Starting with its voluntary renouncement of nuclear weapons, Kazakhstan has 

been and continues to be a key partner on nonproliferation. Through the NunnLugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, Kazakhstan has cooperated extensively with the United States for over a decade on a host of projects to eliminate 

its Soviet-legacy Weapons of Mass Destruction infrastructure, secure materials of 

proliferation concern, and redirect former Weapons of Mass Destruction scientists 

to peaceful purposes. In 2009, Kazakhstan ratified a 7-year extension to the umbrella agreement for our bilateral Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. 

The United States provided significant assistance to decommission a Soviet-era nuclear reactor designed to produce weapons-grade plutonium and to manage the safe 

and secure disposal of fuel from that reactor in 2010. Ongoing CTR program activities include the construction of a state-of-the-art Central Reference Laboratory to 

consolidate Kazakhstan’s collection of pathogens. The Kazakhstani Government continues to seek opportunities to remain actively engaged in nonproliferation cooperation, both bilaterally and via its pursuit of a more active role in the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 

Economically, Kazakhstan has laid a solid foundation for its market economy and 

future prosperity. Financial reform has created a modern, full-service banking system. Kazakhstan’s natural resource-driven economy averaged over 9 percent annual 

growth during the 2001–07, before dropping to 3 percent in 2008 and 1 percent in 

2009 amid the global financial crisis. Kazakhstan’s economy rebounded strongly in 

2010, however, posting 7 percent growth, and growth in 2011 is predicted to be between 7 and 10 percent. Thanks to its strong economic policies and oil wealth, 

Kazakhstan has dramatically reduced the percentage of its population living below 

the level of subsistence from 28.4 percent in 2001, to 13.8 percent in 2007. 

Thanks to Kazakhstan’s tremendous natural resource wealth, Customs Union 

with Russia and Belarus, and imminent accession to the World Trade Organization, 

U.S. companies are recognizing Kazakhstan’s potential. We have the opportunity to 

export more with the assistance of the U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service Office 

in Almaty. U.S. oil companies, including Chevron, ExxonMobil, and ConocoPhillips, 

hold major stakes in Kazakhstan’s largest oil and gas projects, Tengiz, 

Karachaganak, and Kashagan. U.S. companies do face difficulties, however, including aggressive tax audits and work permit restrictions. Despite these concerns, it 

is clear that U.S. companies and the Government of Kazakhstan are committed to 

a long-term partnership. 

Exchange programs are effectively strengthening the core of the United StatesKazakhstan strategic partnership. Via the free exchange of information and ideas, 

academic, cultural, and professional exchanges are one of the most effective tools to 

promote long-term relations, as well as economic and social development, and to increase mutual understanding between citizens of the United States and 

Kazakhstan. To promote these exchanges, we have 11 American Corners throughout 

the country, which currently reach over 50,000 people annually. In addition, the 

Future Leaders Exchange, Hubert Humphrey Fellowship, Muskie Graduate Fellowship and Fulbright Fellowship programs all support students from Kazakhstan to 

pursue studies in the United States. The Government of Kazakhstan also understands the strategic importance of both education and exchanges. Since 1994, 

Kazakhstan’s Presidential Scholarship Program, ‘‘Bolashak,’’ has sent almost 8,000 

students to universities in the United States and many other countries around the 

world. The newly inaugurated Nazarbayev University, which will have a Westernstyle curriculum taught in English, is partnering with several American universities, including Duke, University of Wisconsin, Carnegie Mellon, University of 

Pennsylvania, University of Pittsburgh, and Harvard Medical School. 

In 2010 the United States and Kazakhstan concluded a new Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement. Both President Barak Obama and Secretary of State 

Clinton have advocated the inclusion of science in diplomacy and ‘‘science diplomacy’’ has become an important component of U.S. foreign policy. Through the 

Bolashak program and Kazakhstan’s investments in research and education 

Kazakhstan has adopted the goal of building an innovation focused economy and 

will broaden its cooperation areas with the United States. 

378

Democratic political institutions, civil society, and the independent media remain 

underdeveloped in Kazakhstan, the Presidency dominates the political system, and 

the Parliament elected in 2007 has representation from only one political party—

the President’s. The 2010 Human Rights Report highlights other problematic isues, 

including arbitrary arrest and detention, lack of an independent judiciary, restrictions on freedom of speech, the press, and assembly. We regularly encourage the 

government to move forward by taking concrete steps toward reform, and we have 

assistance programs that promote democratic reform and the development of civil 

society and independent media. 

If I am confirmed, I will work with Kazakhstan’s Government and civil society 

partners as the nation prepares for parliamentary elections scheduled in 2012; the 

first elections that will be governed by a new law guaranteeing that at least two 

parties will be represented in the Parliament. It remains to be seen how representative this new party system will be, and we will work to encourage a comptetitive, 

pluralistic party system. Kazakhstan has expressed its commitment to reform its 

election and media laws and to liberalize its political party registration requirements. It has also committed to reform the media law in line with recommendations 

from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Freedom of Media 

Representative, which include, among others, to reduce criminal liability for defamation in the media and to liberalize registration procedures for media outlets. We will 

hold Kazakhstan to these commitments. 

Recognizing Kazakhstan’s important role in Central Asia, in April 2010, President 

Obama and Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev reaffirmed the strategic partnership 

between our two countries, declaring our commitment to a shared vision of stability, 

prosperity, and democratic reform in Central Asia and the broader region. 

If confirmed, I would continue to promote the United States-Kazakhstan strategic 

partnership’s three primary interests. First, we seek to advance democratic and 

market economic reforms through diplomacy and development, including an innovative partnership model with the Government of Kazakhstan. Economic reform attracts and sustains foreign investment while democratic reforms will improve opportunities for Kazakhstanis to participate openly in civic life. Together these are the 

only reliable ways to establish long-term stability. Second, our common security interests include bolstering Central Asian sovereignty and independence, fighting terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and stemming narcotics 

trafficking. Third, we have a strategic interest in fostering the development of Central Asia’s very significant natural resources. The region’s resources can substantially advance international energy security, provided they have a reliable path to 

global markets via multiple routes that avoid geographic chokepoints or transportation monopolies. Energy can also form the basis of long-term economic growth and 

prosperity. Kazakhstan has the potential to be an agricultural power, and, as the 

world’s sixth-largest exporter of grain, is critical to global food security. All three 

sets of interests—democratic development, security cooperation, economic reform 

and energy—are interrelated and must advance together. 

Mr. Chairman, I have spent nearly my entire career serving in countries in transition from centrally planned to market economies and from authoritarian to representative government. From more than two decades of experience working in 

countries in Asia, the former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe and, most 

recently, Iraq, I firmly believe that there is an inextricable link between the growth 

of an open, democratic system of government and the development of an open, 

market-based economy. Both are fueled by the universal desire of people to build 

a better, safer and more prosperous future. If confirmed, I will draw on my many 

years of experience in countries in transition to work with the Government of 

Kazakhstan and to reach out to the people of Kazakhstan to ensure that the already 

strong United States-Kazakhstan partnership continues to grow and strengthen. 

Kazakhstan is an important country with a promising future. 

Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

Senator CASEY. Thanks very much. Each of you stayed within 

your limits, and that’s a record, maybe, for our committee. Thanks 

very much. 

I’ll try, in the time that we have, which is about 20 minutes, to 

get in as many questions as we can. And of course, I and other 

members will likely submit questions for the record, and that 

should be said at the outset. 

379

Mr. Corbin, I wanted to start with you. One of the major concerns that our Government has had, and I think it’s shared widely 

in the region, is the threat posed by the Iranian regime. 

Last summer, when I was in the Middle East on a great trip 

where we got to see a lot of places in about 9 or 10 days, my perception of the consensus in that region at the time was a real consensus and focus on Iran, and in particular, obviously, the threat 

posed by the Iranian regime, even in the absence, but especially in 

light of, the potential nuclear threat. 

But just the activity of Iran in the region supporting and being, 

in my words here, the banker for bad guys in the region. And that 

consensus I thought was very helpful to our own strategy, because 

even countries that were disagreeing on other things could come 

around to agree on the threat posed by the regime. 

In my judgment, that consensus, or at least that focus, has been 

degraded because of the changes taking place. People’s attention is 

focused elsewhere and other crises and issues have arisen, and that 

is not good when we take our, in my judgment, when we take our 

focus off of Iran. 

So I wanted to ask you, with regard to a question about export 

controls in the UAE, we know that the UAE’s record on preventing 

reexport of advanced technology to Iran is reportedly mixed, and 

get your thoughts about that. But we know that numerous Iranian 

entities involved in Iran’s energy sector and WMD programs have 

offices in the UAE, and the Iran-Dubai trade is currently estimated 

at $10 billion per year. 

There are reports that the UAE-based companies Crescent Petroleum, Dragon Oil, and National Petroleum Construction Corporation continue to engage in business with Iran, in potential violation 

of United States sanctions. 

I’d ask you first, as Ambassador, what steps you’d take to encourage the UAE to improve its export controls and to take action 

against their companies who continue to engage in business with 

Iran, in potential violation of United States sanctions. 

Mr. CORBIN. Thank you, Senator. 

And I think our strong dialogue with the UAE, including most 

recently the visit of the crown prince to meet with President 

Obama earlier this month, provides an opportunity for the kind of 

dialogue on Iran that’s so important to our Middle East policy. 

On the specifics on export control, the UAE has a law that they 

are implementing that seeks to protect their open economy, which 

is their hallmark and is a positive indicator for the region, from 

being exploited by those who would transship prohibited items to 

Iran. We have a strong U.S. agency presence in the UAE that is 

cooperating with the Emirati Government in many areas, including 

the financial aspects of this transshipment, and we have strong cooperation on many levels. 

If confirmed as Ambassador, I would work to support those agencies, to support the dialogue that we have on these issues, and to 

look for every opportunity to increase the technical capacities of the 

Emirati services as they work against this threat. 

Senator CASEY. And I’d say the obvious concern we have broadly 

in the United States Government, with regard to the Iranian regime, has a particular significance, I think, within the Congress. 

380

We’ve worked very hard—I have and others have worked very 

hard—to develop consensus around sanctions, to pass legislation, to 

improve what we’ve passed, to add to it, and to encourage the administration to aggressively enforce them. So we need all the help 

that we can get, and obviously those export controls are part of 

that. 

And I know there’s more to explore, but I want to try to move 

to as many questions as we can. 

Moving next to Kuwait, Mr. Tueller, the past 4 years, as I mentioned in my opening, Kuwait has been ranked a ‘‘Tier Three’’ 

country, the lowest level in United States Trafficking in Persons, 

in that report, for failing to make sufficient efforts to comply with 

minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. 

I’d ask you why you believe that’s the case, why Kuwait has 

failed to make progress? And what steps can you take and can we 

take to encourage the Kuwaiti Government to enact the appropriate reforms to deal with this problem? 

Mr. TUELLER. Senator, thank you very much for the question. I 

appreciate that you’ve raised this issue. I believe it’s important 

that our allies around the world understand the importance of 

antitrafficking to Members of Congress and to the U.S. public. 

As you note, Kuwait has a record that falls far short of what it 

should be. Secretary Clinton and other previous administrations 

have made clear how important it is to the United States that we 

combat this evil. 

In Kuwait, the system of employment for guest workers lends 

itself to the possibility that employers can exploit workers. And 

this becomes particularly the case when it involves domestic workers who are inside a home, and if not sufficiently protected, can be 

deprived of wages, forced to work long hours, even subjected to 

physical and sexual abuse. 

I know that the current Prime Minister and the Government of 

Kuwait abhor these practices and seek to try to counter them. At 

times, however, their system of laws has not proved up to the challenge. 

So if confirmed as Ambassador, I will work both with the Kuwaiti Government and with Kuwaiti partners, NGOs, who have 

been very effective in advancing public awareness of this problem 

and seeking improvements in two specific areas. 

One is taking the existing laws and ensuring that they are actually implemented, that there are prosecutions of the most egregious 

cases as an example and deterrent to others. 

Second, ensuring that there is a more robust system of sheltering 

and protecting victims once they’re identified, providing them safe 

places where they can be free from threat so that they can present 

testimony. They can be freed from whatever exploitation has taken 

place. 

So with the support of Congress and the administration, I believe 

progress is possible, because I know that there are many Kuwaitis 

who understand the importance of making advances in this area. 

Thank you. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. 

And one other question about democracy. Some of us observe 

that Kuwait has often been considered further along than some 

381

other countries on democracy itself. But the recent demonstrations 

in the region and, therefore, the reaction by Kuwait has been the 

subject of some review. Reports of beatings of protesters, detentions 

of journalists, raise questions about the commitment to human 

rights and to the rule of law. 

What can you tell us that you’ll do to encourage a full commitment to those basic rights and those basic principles that we expect 

any government to not just respect, but to enforce? 

Mr. TUELLER. Thank you, Senator. 

As you note, I believe Kuwait starts from a relative position of 

strength, and that it has a long tradition of open debate, of tolerance for different opinions. And Kuwait has a constitution that 

genuinely provides for sharing of power. 

The recent events in the Middle East have clearly had an impact 

on Kuwait. I believe they’ve had an impact on every country and 

will continue to have an impact as governments recognize the need 

to do better, to provide more opportunities for freedom of assembly; 

for freedom of opinion; and for people to have a stake in their futures politically, socially, and economically. 

If confirmed, I will seek to work with the partners that we’ve already identified in Kuwait, in some cases members of Kuwaiti society, political figures, but also with nongovernmental organizations. 

Through our MEPI, Middle East Partnership Initiative, that we 

have been able to assist in training women candidates and promoting civic activism and creating greater civil society organizations. 

So I’ll be committed to working with those existing institutions 

and maintaining a close and candid dialogue with the Government 

about how Kuwait can build on its already great strengths in tolerance and openness in order to set a standard for the rest of the region. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much. 

I move next to Ms. Ziadeh. 

In the April 2011 visit to the White House, the Qatari Emir signaled support for President Obama’s position on a two-state solution for Middle East peace. The country earned criticism in the 

West for its policy of engagement with Hamas, and there’s been 

speculation—and it may just be, at this point, speculation—that 

Hamas might be seeking to establish a permanent office in Doha, 

due to the ongoing unrest in Syria. 

How might the role of Qatar in the negotiations change the political situation and change—I should say change given the political 

situation in Egypt, as well as the unrest in Syria? 

Can you speak to that? I know it’s a broad and difficult question, 

but if you can speak to that, to the extent that you’re able at this 

stage? 

Ms. ZIADEH. Thank you very much for the question. With regards 

to Hamas, it is true that Qatar has had relations with Hamas. And 

in fact Hamas, at one point, did have an office with members of 

their leadership in Doha. And that relationship does continue, although that office is no longer there. 

However, I would certainly, if confirmed, use my good offices as 

the Ambassador to encourage the Qatari Government to use their 

position as the Chair of the Arab League Peace Initiative followup 

382

committee to call for more direct engagement between the parties, 

between the Palestinians and other parties, with Israel, in terms 

of solving the Israeli-Palestinian issue. 

Make no mistake: We, as the U.S. Government, consider Hamas 

a terrorist organization. And, therefore, we would want to be able 

to push on the Qatari Government to work in its capacity as the 

Chair to look for direct engagement, direct negotiations, to bring a 

just and peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict. 

Senator CASEY. And I would hope—you’ve pointed to this in what 

you’ve said, but I would hope you would reiterate in your direct discussions with the Qatari Government, when it comes to the conditions that we expect to be applied to any engagement with Hamas, 

that they renounce violence, that they recognize Israel’s right to 

exist, and that they abide by agreements. 

And that three-part test is conjunctive. And they should be reminded of that, that they’ve got to meet every condition. 

And I know it’s particularly complicated, as you would be assuming this position, but I would urge to you reiterate that as often 

as you can. 

Ms. ZIADEH. Absolutely. That would have to be part of the discussion. Absolutely. 

Senator CASEY. Do you have any sense of the—and I mentioned 

that it was speculation, but do you have anything you can report 

on that speculation? 

Ms. ZIADEH. We have not heard any developments in that regard 

to date. 

Senator CASEY. I would also ask, with regard to relations with 

other Gulf Cooperation Council states, what concerns, if any, does 

Qatar have about Iran’s response to the regional unrest? 

Because, as I mentioned before, the focus that we want to have 

on the Iranian regime’s threat in the region, that focus, I think—

or that consensus in the region has been, if it hasn’t been degraded, it’s at least not been as sharply focused as I would hope 

it would be because of the changes in the region. 

But do you think they have concerns about Iran’s response, or do 

you have any sense of that yet? 

Ms. ZIADEH. Yes. Well, first of all, Qatar is very much a regional 

player, in terms of the GCC and the GCC overall assessment of regional security. And they have played a very important and leading 

role in that. 

So they’re part of the team effort in looking at the role of Iran 

in the region. I would note that the Qataris did send troops as part 

of the Peninsula Shield Force that went to Bahrain, in the face of 

unrest there and of threats from Iran on Bahrain. So that was indicative of their position. 

It is true that Qatar has a unique relationship with Iran, due in 

part, obviously, to the geographic proximity, but more importantly 

their economic interests. Iran and Qatar share the North Dome/

South Pars gas field, which is the world’s largest non-associated 

gas field, and so, therefore, they have economic interests. 

That said, I would note that the work on the fields and the derivative of the gas there is done independently. There are no joint 

ventures. 

383

And in fact, when you look at the relationship in other economic 

terms, the amount of trade that Qatar has with Iran is less than 

2 percent of its annual trade. It’s negligible. And Iran, in terms of 

banking and other issues, it’s also negligible where Qatar is concerned. 

The flip side of that, I would note that they host a large U.S. 

military contingent there at Al Udeid, with over 10,000 uniformed 

service personnel. And they certainly do look to us as an important 

guarantor in terms of their regional security, along with other 

members of the GCC. 

So that’s how I would characterize the relationship with Iran. 

But, for sure, if confirmed, I would take every opportunity to impress to the Government of Qatar the importance of our concerns 

on the issue of Iran and their growing aggressive role in the region. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much. 

I know our time is limited now, but, Mr. Fairfax, I wanted to 

focus a little bit on the Northern Distribution Network, which we 

know has the key role of transit for nonlethal supplies to Afghanistan. 

How would you work, if confirmed, to ensure that Kazakhstan’s 

continued military cooperation with the U.S. and NATO is ensured? And if you can assess that broadly and specifically as well? 

Mr. FAIRFAX. As you know, Kazakhstan has already started playing a role through the Northern Distribution Network, as well as 

through expanded overflights. 

They key issue, if confirmed, I would plan on working with going 

forward is to work on this in a regional basis along with the other 

countries. One of the fundamental facts we face is that Kazakhstan 

does not border on Afghanistan, and so, it requires a multiple-step 

process of moving through Russia, moving through Kazakhstan, 

and then helping the process of Kazakhstan reaching agreement 

with its neighbors, which it has recently done, for example, with 

Uzbekistan, in opening up a second border crossing there, in order 

to facilitate the movement of goods through the Northern Distribution Network down into Afghanistan. 

And I think this is an area where increased cooperation among 

the countries themselves and among U.S. missions in the region 

can play an important role in pushing forward U.S. interests. 

Senator CASEY. One of the difficulties, not just with regard to 

Kazakhstan and our relationship there, but also in plenty of other 

places throughout the world, is getting that balance right, when 

we’ve got a strategic interest or a strategic priority like the distribution network is, but also balancing that with the concerns we 

have about human rights and so many other concerns. 

With regard to Kazakhstan, that balance is basically between 

that strategic priority or interest and respect for universal human 

rights. 

How do you approach that as an incoming Ambassador, to make 

sure that we ensure that we get that balance right? 

Mr. FAIRFAX. Thank you, Senator, for that question, because, 

particularly, that’s one that’s personally important to me because 

of my belief that, ultimately, these are not two separate issues, but 

simply a question of short-term and long-term interests that need 

to be aligned. 

384

As I said in my statement, I believe there is a strong relationship 

between security and stability, economic development, and political 

development. 

Thus far, Kazakhstan’s economic development and its cooperation with the United States on security have certainly been in the 

lead, but I think in order for that to continue in the decades in the 

future, the democratic development is important. And we have to 

continue, both through short-term actions, such as arguing on behalf of jailed activists, such as Mr. Zhovtis, but also long term, 

through public outreach, educational exchanges, and other efforts 

that help to bring Kazakhstan into the mainstream of world thinking and respect for human rights. 

And I think this is actually a hopeful picture in Kazakhstan, if 

you look, not just at their willing acceptance of programs such as 

the Humphrey program or other exchange programs, but the fact 

that they finance, through Bolashak, 3,000 college students to go 

overseas, many to the United States, to learn about how the rest 

of the world operates; the fact that they are financing Nazarbayev 

University with participation of multiple leading U.S. universities 

and other international universities. 

There is a long-term trajectory toward movement into internationally accepted norms, and I think those include not just economic norms but, ultimately, political and human rights. And 

that’s what I would try to work for as Ambassador, if confirmed. 

Thank you. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. And I want to thank every nominee 

for your testimony, the answers you gave to questions, the answers 

you’ll provide by way of response to written questions that will be 

submitted. 

We’re out of time. One of the reasons is I have to vote in a few 

minutes, and I won’t be able to do both, both stay and vote at the 

same time. 

But one question I was going to ask and I’ll submit it, a question 

for the record, because it’s so significant, but we tend to overlook 

it when we’re dealing with foreign policy, is just the basic question 

of the economy of the place within which you serve. 

You could be a very capable diplomat, and we could have the 

right policy in place, but sometimes the economies of these places 

and the economic security of their people can be as important as 

any other consideration. So we’ll ask you about that in writing. 

But let me conclude on a note of gratitude for your public service 

already; your willingness to commit yourselves to a new assignment, and difficult assignments; and the commitment of your families at so many levels and at such a great sacrifice. We’re grateful 

you’re doing that, especially at a time of tension and danger 

throughout the world, but especially in many of the places that you 

serve. We’re grateful for that. 

And I wish we had more time, but we’re limited. And we hope 

to see each of you not just confirmed, but also on the road somewhere, either in the places you’ll serve or back here on Capitol Hill. 

But thanks again for your service. 

And we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF ANNE W. PATTERSON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question #1. While the Egyptian revolution has opened up political space, there 

is clearly a serious short-term economic problem. You said in your opening statement that Egypt must create 750,000 jobs a year just to keep up with the population growth.

• Can you elaborate on how U.S. assistance has been reoriented to address 

Egypt’s current political and economic challenges? 

• How can the United States best deploy its economic development assistance to 

meet the stated goals of the Egyptian people of creating sustainable jobs and 

beginning the process of long-term economic reform?

Answer. Our goal is to help Egypt’s transitional government meet short-term economic stabilization requirements as well as longer term economic modernization 

needs. These two objectives are not mutually exclusive—rather we can direct our 

support now to help meet the future needs of the Egyptian people. 

The United States has made available $165 million of bilateral assistance to support Egypt’s immediate needs. President Obama announced on May 19 that the administration will seek congressional authorization to provide Egypt up to $1 billion 

in debt relief under a debt swap arrangement. The United States would implement 

this in three tranches over 3 years, forgiving about $330 million of Egypt’s debt each 

year. As principal and interest payments come due, we will work with the Government of Egypt to direct the equivalent amount of Egyptian pounds to mutually 

agreed projects that are high-impact, visible, and benefits Egyptians from all segments of society. This major effort will require reorienting previously appropriated 

funds to cover the budget cost. 

Egypt will need to build a stronger private sector, which will increase entrepreneurial activity and generate new jobs. Developing Egypt’s private sector will 

require that (1) small businesses have access to capital in order to start and expand; 

(2) firms adopt entrepreneurial approaches and take advantage of new opportunities; (3) workers’ skills meet the actual needs of private sector employers;

(4) the business and regulatory environment is conducive to small businesses and 

entrepreneurs; and (5) the U.S. and international private sector is engaged in this 

process. 

To improve access to finance, we are working with Congress to establish an enterprise fund for Egypt which would be initiated with up to $60 million from existing 

bilateral assistance funds to stimulate private sector investment, promote projects 

that support competitive markets, and encourage public/private partnerships. We 

are supporting the expansion of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to help catalyze Egypt’s private sector during its transition. In addition, the 

Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) will create a 10-year loan guarantee facility in Egypt which could provide up to $700 million in loans to small and 

medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), supporting over 50,000 local jobs. OPIC will also 

seek to provide up to $1 billion in guarantees and/or loans to public/private partnerships in order to promote growth in mutually agreed-upon sectors of the Egyptian 

economy. 

To aid in the development of an entrepreneurial ‘‘ecosystem,’’ the State Department’s Global Entrepreneurship Program is pursuing multiple initiatives, including 

a USAID-funded, Cairo-based Entrepreneur-in-Residence (EIR). The EIR, in turn, is 

leading intensive educational modules—entrepreneur boot camps—that will teach 

promising entrepreneurs, women and men, the critical aspects of starting a new 

company. It is also facilitating angel capital networks in Egypt to ensure entrepreneurs, including women and minorities, have the means to get their ideas off the 

ground. Finally, the program is planning to help arrange temporary job placement 

for students and new entrepreneurs in U.S.-based startups, to help develop skills 

matched to market needs. 

To encourage commercial networking, USTDA just concluded its ‘‘Egypt: Forward’’ 

forum and facilitated trade missions for the Egyptian delegates to cities across the 

United States. We are seeking every opportunity to leverage private sector activities 

for their public diplomacy value and their ability to interest more American companies in doing business with Egypt. One successful example of this sort of publicprivate partnership that is already paying dividends is Partners for a New Beginning (PNB). 

To develop a local chapter for PNB in Egypt, the Aspen Institute PNB Secretariat 

will be working with the Egyptian counterparts of our PNB Steering Committee, 

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such as Cisco, Intel, ExxonMobil, Coca-Cola, Morgan Stanley, Dow Chemical, and 

others. The Aspen Institute PNB Secretariat is meeting with local leaders in Egypt 

about developing a locally driven, self-operational committee that will identify local 

priorities and implement targeted PNB projects to address those needs. 

We will offer the Egyptian people concrete support for economic policy formulation 

alongside our democratization efforts. We have been using and will continue to use 

bilateral programs to support economic reform, including outreach and technical assistance from our government, universities, and think-tanks to individuals, and 

NGOs in Egypt. We are also prepared to begin robust discussions with Egypt and 

Tunisia and their regional counterparts on a set of strategic trade initiatives, including the possible expansion of Egypt’s Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs).

Question #2. It is clear that corruption and a lack of transparency about the Egyptian economy were among the engines of the January 25 revolution.

• a. How can our assistance efforts be designed to ensure that they promote 

transparency and the rule of law? • b. What lessons have we learned from our previous experience in Egypt in tackling corruption? What lessons have you learned from your time in Pakistan and 

elsewhere about the effective provision of foreign assistance?

Answer. It is a high priority to ensure U.S taxpayer dollars are used wisely. 

USAID’s Inspector General has an office in Cairo and there are controls and rigorous procedures in effect to ensure our funds are not wasted or diverted for other 

purposes. We will ensure that the monitoring procedures on all our grants are 

meticulous. 

Tackling the issue of societal corruption was difficult during the Mubarak government. USAID/Egypt has run a number of rule of law and human rights, but political 

will to address corruption issues has been the key factor that determined whether 

our programs could translate to broad societal change. Experience in other transitional situations indicates that a newly elected government may be highly motivated 

to act on campaign promises and address grievances. We will work with the 

Egyptians to advance their goals to curb corruption, improve transparency, and 

strengthen the judicial system. Our efforts will benefit from Egypt’s status as a 

party to shared international anticorruption standards in the U.N. Convention 

against Corruption, and the Convention’s expert peer review process to assess compliance and implementation, which will bolster political will and guide reform. With a portion of the $165 million in transition assistance, we are already supporting reform in this area, primarily by focusing on how civil society can broaden 

public awareness of corruption and build demand for transparency and accountability. Transparency International, for example, is building a grassroots anticorruption network in Egypt, utilizing the U.N.’s checklist on implementation of the U.N. 

Convention against Corruption. We are also working with Egyptian and international organizations to focus on anticorruption campaigns and awareness, media 

reporting on transparency and corruption, and business ethics. A recent U.S.-sponsored regional conference in Rabat, with Egyptian participation, stressed the importance of these approaches and on the importance of engaging the full range of stakeholders—citizens, businesses, NGOs, government officials, the media—in reform. We 

will also leverage our regional and global anticorruption efforts to enhance the impact of our assistance in Egypt. For example, the State Department has supported 

the development in recent years of an Arab-led regional network of anticorruption 

officials and bodies, which will be a very useful, ‘‘locally owned’’ channel to share 

good practices with Egyptian officials and to engage in policy dialogue at the regional level on key anticorruption reform issues. 

In Pakistan, we confronted multiple challenges in our own system and with the 

Government of Pakistan in implementing the assistance program. It required too 

much time to focus the program on specific projects. We did not develop quickly 

enough a convincing narrative about the meaning of our assistance. While I strongly 

believe that we made the right decision to funnel assistance money through the government—and thus build capacity within the government and encourage citizens to 

look to their government for services—it slowed implementation. Nonetheless, the 

long-term American commitment indicated by the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation 

was recognized by a broad range of Pakistanis, who realized it was a sea change 

in our bilateral relationship. 

I am determined to avoid the same mistakes in Cairo. We will undertake a review 

of the program quickly and focus it on a limited number of activities, namely support for the private sector, economic growth, and democracy and governance. I have 

heard from think-tank experts that while we have made astonishing advances in 

(for instance) maternal and child health with U.S. assistance in Egypt, the capacity 

of the Egyptian Government to implement these programs without donor financing 

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and technical assistance is still limited. This is an issue I will look at carefully. I 

look forward to working with the committee on this issue.

Question #3. In the past, USAID funding has generally been allotted to NGOs registered with the Egyptian Government, thereby excluding many civil society groups 

that the government did not recognize, some of which played a role in the January 

25 revolution. USAID representatives have said that this policy is being reevaluated 

and that going forward USAID and other USG granting institutions will work with 

both registered and nonregistered organizations. What is the status of that reevaluation and how do USAID and the Department of State plan to engage differently 

with Egyptian nongovernmental actors in the future?

Answer. We do not distinguish between registered and unregistered NGOs in our 

funding decisions. The United States provides funding to both types of organizations 

as a policy.

Question #4. What is the status of the initial $150 million reprogrammed on February 17 to assist with transition and economic recovery in Egypt? What effects of 

and responses to that assistance have you seen thus far?

Answer. In addition to the $150 million reprogrammed on February 17, the USG also repositioned $15 million of previously appropriated democracy and governance 

funds designated for Egypt. Of the $165 million, we have reserved $65 million for 

democracy and governance and $100 million for economic growth projects. We have awarded $59 million of the democracy funds, focusing on elections, labor 

rights, media freedom, and human rights. For example, the Middle East Partnership 

Initiative (MEPI) has programmed $4.5 million in small grants to Egyptian, Washington, DC-based, and international organizations working closely with Egyptian 

partners. These grants have provided support to Egyptian organizations in the 

preelection environment in the areas of human rights, inclusion, transparency, and 

networking/coalition-building. Thirty-two million dollars was provided to NDI and 

IRI; and $5.6 million to IFES to support election administration, political party development strengthening, voter education, and election observation. Other activities 

supported by the democracy funds include:

• Support for expanding women’s participation in the political and decision making processes. 

• Building the capacity of independent worker organizations to advocate for workers’ rights and participate in the democratic transition. 

• Training to journalists to serve as a watchdog in the elections, including support for blogging, for female and youth citizen journalists.

For the economic growth funds—focusing on private sector, entrepreneurship, and 

job growth—we have awarded about $15 million, with more proposals in negotiations. Another $10 million of the economic growth funds were recently notified to 

Congress for transfer to OPIC to support a small and medium enterprise lending 

facility.

Question #5. Women protested alongside men during the revolution in Tahrir 

Square and played a key role in organizing the protests. How do U.S. assistance 

policies address the inclusion of women and minorities into mainstream decisions 

in a post-Mubarak Egypt?

Answer. Regrettably, the committee to draft revisions to Egypt’s Constitution in 

March did not include any women, and the Ministry of Women’s Affairs was abolished soon after the interim government was formed. Although some women have 

taken prominent roles in activist groups, more needs to be done to ensure women’s 

voices are part of Egypt’s transition. We will continue pressing the Egyptian Government to promote the participation of women in government and political parties. 

The United States promoted a conference on June 2 in Cairo, cosponsored by International IDEA and U.N. Women, to raise the profile of women’s rights in democratic 

transitions. Chaired by U.N. Women Executive Director Michele Bachelet, this event 

advocated for robust women’s political participation and empowerment, with special 

attention on Egypt, and has likely laid the groundwork for a ministerial-level gathering on the subject on the margins of the U.N. General Assembly. 

Many of the civil society programs we support aim to empower women politically 

and economically, and we will monitor the drafting of Egypt’s new constitution to 

ensure women’s rights are protected. Support for women as political leaders and 

candidates will be an important part of the work NDI and IRI will undertake with 

U.S. funding. Additional programs under the $165 million assistance package with 

America’s Development Foundation, Vital Voices, and six Egyptian NGOs specifically aim to increase women’s participation in elections, democratic processes and 

women’s rights advocacy—whether as citizens, activists, or candidates. 

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Through its local grants program, the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) 

is funding 10 Egyptian NGOs to carry out innovative projects to break down barriers for women in the legal profession, raise awareness of women’s rights among 

female students in Upper Egypt, train ordinary Egyptian women to become community leaders and business owners, and carry out voter education and corruption 

awareness campaigns targeting women, including in lesser developed regions of 

Egypt. MEPI also is preparing to fund new Egyptian local grants that focus on women’s rights, economic opportunity, and participation during the transition. 

Economic opportunity for women is a parallel theme, along with political participation. We will ensure our assistance provides women with economic opportunities 

and access to capital, as financial independence for women sets the groundwork for 

greater opportunity in other spheres of life as well. OPIC’s projects in Egypt will 

give particular focus to women, and the Global Entrepreneurship Program will increase the number of women participants and match women entrepreneurs with 

women mentors. PNB member Coca-Cola is partnering with the MENA Businesswomen’s Network to provide training and skills development courses for young professional women. 

Looking forward, we will also focus more of our International Visitor Leadership 

Programs (IVLPs) on women, putting together projects in the fields of governance, 

sciences, business, and in economics. These include sectors in which women are 

underrepresented. In the 4th quarter of FY 2011, Egyptian women will take part 

in IVLP projects such as ‘‘Youth Leaders,’’ ‘‘Women as Political Leaders’’ and 

‘‘Science and Technology.’’ In FY 2012, Egyptian women will participate in IVLP 

projects including ‘‘Global Economic Cooperation and Recovery,’’ ‘‘Women’s Innovations in Science and Engineering,’’ ‘‘U.S. Political System: Background for Journalists,’’ ‘‘Women as Political Leaders,’’ ‘‘Women and Entrepreneurship,’’ and ‘‘Small 

Business Development.’’ In addition, State/ECA will expand programs like 

TechWomen, in which we provided six Egyptian women and colleagues from other 

parts of the NEA region the opportunity to participate in a professional mentorship 

exchange program for women engaged in technology. Additionally, in 2011, two 

Egyptian women leaders participated in the Fortune/ U.S. State Department Global 

Women’s Mentorship Program, in which State/ECA offers emerging women leaders 

from around the world the opportunity to develop their leadership, management, 

and business skills through mentorships with senior female executives from the Fortune Most Powerful Women Summit.

Question #6. Many human rights groups have expressed concerns about ongoing 

human rights abuses in post-Mubarak Egypt. What is the most pressing human 

rights issue in Egypt today?

• What steps are being taken to enhance legal protections and access to due process, particularly in light of ongoing trials of civilians in military courts? What 

is the capacity of the civilian courts to handle the caseload? 

• What is your interpretation of the tensions and in some cases, violence, between 

Copts and Muslims? What efforts are being made to foster collaboration and 

reconciliation between different religious groups within Egyptian society? 

• In your assessment, how, if at all, have press freedoms changed in post-Mubarak Egypt and do you think that laws criminalizing certain journalistic acts will 

remain in place?

Answer. Despite the fact that the Egyptian Government is committed to carrying 

out a democratic transition, serious concerns about human rights remain. We have 

raised at the highest levels the need for Egypt’s military leadership to address 

transparently and inclusively the grievances of the Egyptian people, including lifting the state of emergency, protecting freedom of expression and assembly, reforming security institutions, investigating allegations of abuse by security forces, conducting trials in civilian, not military, courts, and transitioning to civilian control 

of the government through free and fair elections. Specifically regarding military 

courts, we have made clear to the Egyptians our belief that in spite of ongoing security concerns, criminals can and should be tried in civilian courts. The Egyptian 

Government has generally argued that the emergency law is necessary to maintain 

security during a volatile period, but in fact, the persistence of the state of emergency and the use of military courts have been key factors driving protesters to the 

streets on multiple occasions. We also believe that elections held under the emergency law may not be perceived as free, fair, and credible, particularly if the government attempts to restrict political parties and free expression. Although Egypt’s 

court system could be made more efficient in terms of processing cases, capacity constraints are not the reason that suspects continue to face trial in military courts. 

Sectarian violence remains a troubling problem in Egypt, and there is a gap between official statements and the security situation on the ground, as evidenced for 

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example by the violence that erupted in the Cairo neighborhood of Imbaba. On May 

7, riots against two churches in Imbaba killed 15 and injured 232. Other incidents 

include the January 1 bombing of a church in Alexandria and the burning of churches in the village of Sol on March 4. On May 17, Field Marshal Tantawi, the head 

of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) issued a strongly worded, public condemnation of sectarian attacks. The SCAF also stated that it would investigate and prosecute those responsible for the May 7 Imbaba clashes, and has 

referred 48 individuals to trial in conjunction with his case. On June 7, Prime 

Minister Sharaf attended the formal reopening of the Holy Virgin Church, one of 

two churches damaged during the May 7 riots. The Egyptian transitional government has also allowed the construction and repair of 17 churches that had previously not been granted permission to be built or repaired. Unfortunately, the 

Egyptian Government rarely refers perpetrators of sectarian violence to courts, but 

rather has sought to resolve sectarian tensions through extra-judicial reconciliation 

sessions between perpetrators and victims of violence. We have raised the issue of 

reconciliation sessions repeatedly with the Egyptian Government, and again have 

urged the Egyptian Government to abide by due process of law. 

On May 14, Prime Minister Sharaf announced the formation of a National Justice 

Committee to draft an antidiscrimination law and consider a ‘‘unified places of worship law’’ within 30 days—two key Coptic Christian demands. On June 1, the Egyptian Cabinet announced that it had approved a draft ‘‘Unified Law for Organizing 

the Construction of Places of Worship.’’ This draft law, which governs the building 

and renovation of churches and mosques, is currently under public review, and some 

Coptic leaders and human rights activists have raised concerns during this review 

process that the draft law does not free the approval process for church construction 

from political influence that has allowed for discrimination. We are closely following 

the development of this legislation and urging the Egyptian Government to pass and 

implement it, taking into account the concerns raised by religious leaders and 

human rights groups as the law moves forward. 

We remain very concerned about incidents of sectarian violence in Egypt and will 

continue to monitor this issue closely. We will continue to impress upon the Egyptian Government the importance of taking steps to confront sectarian violence, including steps to reverse discriminatory laws and treatment, of holding perpetrators 

of violence accountable, and of fostering an environment that promotes religious tolerance. Following parliamentary elections in September, Egyptians will draft a new 

constitution, and we are working to ensure that the final document fully respects 

the rights of religious minorities. 

We are aware of recent interrogations of journalists, bloggers, and judges critical 

of the SCAF and military and have made our concerns regarding such cases clear 

to the Egyptian Government and the SCAF. Freedom of expression is a critical component of any democratic state, and we have repeatedly stated that attempts to silence political opposition in Egypt are unacceptable. Following the revolution, many 

new television stations and newspapers have emerged, but the military remains 

highly sensitive to how it is depicted in the media. It is too soon to tell whether 

laws on freedom of expression will change once Egypt has completed its transition 

back to civilian rule.

Question #7. Has the State Department received any response or signal from the 

Egyptian Government regarding the presence of international monitors at the upcoming election? In your assessment what technical support is necessary to foster 

a robust electoral process and strong political parties? How might the United States 

and the international community address those needs, particularly in light of ambivalence in the face of democracy and governance assistance?

Answer. On July 20, 2011, the press reported that Major General Shahin, spokesman for the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), announced that international observers would not be invited to monitor Egypt’s elections. We have 

expressed disappointment that Egypt’s transitional government has chosen not to 

invite international observers, but continue to encourage Egypt to accept monitors 

as it is a standard practice among democratic states. 

The SCAF has begun clarifying procedures for September’s parliamentary elections but much remains to be decided. Egypt’s youth leaders and new political parties face the challenge of quickly organizing campaigns. Among the issues that the 

Egyptian Government must address are setting up and securing polling sites, safeguarding the transfer of ballot boxes, training poll workers, and educating the many 

new voters who will likely turn out in September. U.S. Government programs are 

helping to address some of these issues, and we are working with the Egyptian Government and international partners to provide additional assistance in this important area.

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Question #8. Noor and Ramsay Bower, 8 and 10 years old respectively, were abducted by their Egyptian mother, Mirvat El Nady, in August 2009 and taken to 

Egypt without the knowledge or consent of their American father, Colin Bower. 

On December 1, 2008, a U.S. court granted Mr. Bower sole legal custody and joint 

physical custody of the children. United States courts ruled again on August 28, 

2009, granting Mr. Bower sole legal and physical custody of the children. A federal 

warrant and an Interpol Red Alert have been issued for the mother on charges of 

kidnapping.

• If confirmed, what will you do to ensure that Mr. Bower once again acquires 

custody of his children? • In accordance with the ‘‘Memo of Understanding on Consular Cooperation in 

Cases Concerning Parental Access to Children,’’ the U.S. Embassy in Cairo has 

liaised with the appropriate officials in Egypt in attempts to facilitate regular 

visitations for Mr. Bower, but to date, only three such visits have taken place. 

The most recent visit took place in early December 2010, and to my knowledge 

the mother has been unresponsive to requests for visitations since the January 

25 Revolution. If confirmed, will you offer Colin the support of the U.S. Embassy to ensure that regular visitations resume as soon as possible and that 

they continue with necessary frequency until Noor and Ramsey return to their 

father?

Answer. Secretary Clinton and the Department have been in direct contact with 

Egyptian authorities at senior levels concerning this matter. I have met Mr. Bower 

and we will continue to raise this case with appropriate Egyptian authorities in the 

hope of seeing Noor and Ramsay returned to Mr. Bower. Both the Special Advisor 

for the Office of Children’s Issues, Ambassador Susan Jacobs, and the U.S. Consul 

General in Cairo have, on multiple occasions, worked directly with Mr. Bower on 

this difficult matter. The Office of Children’s Issues is very engaged on Mr. Bower’s 

behalf. We will continue to press the Egyptian Government to sign the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. 

We will also continue to work with the Egyptian Ministry of Justice in order to 

support Mr. Bower in his efforts to visit with his children. A meeting between Mr. 

Bower and his children is currently scheduled in Cairo for July 9. An Egyptian court 

granted visitation rights to Colin Bower to see his children on the second and fourth 

Friday of each month. Mr. Bower’s inability to visit regularly with the children has 

been exacerbated since the events of January 25. We will do all that we can to assist with Mr. Bower’s efforts to obtain consistent access to his children. 

RESPONSES OF MICHAEL H. CORBIN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. How has the recent regional political change and unrest of the Arab 

Spring affected the views of the leadership of the United Arab Emirates about their 

country’s political system, including power-sharing between Emirates and the partially elected Federal National Council? What challenges, if any, has the recent 

political upheaval created for U.S.–UAE relations?

Answer. The UAE was as surprised as we all were by the suddenness of the popular uprisings and the speed with which they spread across the region. They have 

sought to maintain stability at home and abroad. Generally speaking, the UAE has 

remained stable and cohesive in the face of protests in surrounding countries. 

The FNC serves in an entirely advisory capacity but is an important feature of 

the Emirati political landscape. The Emirati leadership recently announced various 

reforms expanding the electoral college vote in the FNC election ninefold, but this 

still amounts to only a small percentage of the citizenry. The UAE Government is 

gradually introducing reforms aimed at increasing political participation; most recently, the leadership announced it was developing plans to move toward universal 

suffrage as early as 2019. 

We engage with the Emirati Government regularly and at all levels regarding the 

universal principles of freedom of expression, assembly, and association. The UAE 

and the United States do not always see eye to eye on the popular uprisings of the 

Arab Spring, but we have maintained a robust and productive dialogue throughout 

this period of historic change.

Question. What is the administration’s view of the UAE’s participation in the 

Peninsula Shield force deployed by the GCC to Bahrain during the recent unrest 

there? How does the UAE population view their involvement?

Answer. The Government of Bahrain invited the UAE to deploy forces and the 

UAE responded affirmatively to that request. 

391

There has been no evidence of backlash within the Emirati population regarding 

the deployment of Peninsula Shield forces.

Question. How would you assess the strengths and weaknesses of the UAE economy? What prospects are there for increasing bilateral trade and investment flows? 

What is the status of Dubai’s economy, 21⁄2 years into the global economic crisis? 

How has the relationship between Dubai and Abu Dhabi shifted, if at all, since the 

beginning of the economic crisis?

Answer. The strengths of the UAE economy are its location, innovative leadership, 

and natural resources. In addition to having large natural gas and oil deposits, it 

is a transshipment hub and has made open trade and transport its hallmarks since 

before it existed as a nation. It is the No. 1 destination for U.S. exports in the Middle East, 2 years running. 

The leadership of the UAE is acutely aware of the fact that its hydrocarbon resources will eventually run out. It has been seeking to diversify its economic base 

and compete in international markets in order to mitigate possible future negative 

economic effects. The UAE has become the regional headquarters for over 700 American companies active in the petroleum, defense, services, education, and health care 

sectors. It has developed a leading role in business services, including finance and 

logistics, and has emerged as the primary business hub between Asia and Europe. 

It is also seeking a leading role in the research and development of renewable 

energy. 

Bolstered by strong oil revenues, Abu Dhabi has contributed significantly to stabilizing the Dubai economy following a real estate crash triggered by the 2008 global 

financial crisis. The Abu Dhabi leadership continues to work with the authorities 

in Dubai to strengthen the UAE’s economic standing following the global financial 

crisis. Several of Dubai’s Government-linked real estate development firms have 

successfully restructured debt and developed repayment plans for contractors, including a number of American companies.

Question. What is the perspective of the administration on the recent arrests of 

figures calling for political reform by the Emirati authorities?

Answer. We engage the Emirati Government regularly and at all levels regarding 

the universal principles of freedom of expression, assembly, and association. Our 

Embassy and senior Department officials have been reaching out to the Emirati 

Government regarding our concern that any trials be conducted in a transparent 

and open manner in accordance with international standards of due process. If confirmed, I will continue to make these points. We understand the lawyers for the five 

defendants have asked that the trial be closed to the public and the press. We will 

continue to monitor the situation to the best of our ability.

Question. How would you assess the UAE’s level of cooperation in implementing 

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929, which imposes sanctions against Iran? 

Please describe any U.S. efforts to cooperate with the UAE on implementation of 

Iran sanctions.

Answer. The UAE takes seriously its international obligations to enforce sanctions 

against Iran. We have had excellent cooperation with the UAE on implementation 

on UNSCR 1929 and look forward to our continuing close efforts. The UAE has a 

strong track record of disrupting or preventing transfers to Iran of items of proliferation concern. It has also taken good steps in the area of proliferation finance. 

The UAE has a national strategy to protect the reputation of its historically open 

trade environment against abuse by proliferators. In August 2007, the UAE passed 

comprehensive strategic trade control legislation providing the basis for an enforceable export control system. The law is currently being enforced and we have been 

working in close partnership with UAE authorities to halt attempts to divert sensitive dual-use technology, including U.S.-origin goods, from the UAE. With respect 

to enforcement and counter proliferation issues, the UAE is an active participant 

in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and hosted, in January 2010, a major 

multinational PSI exercise, LEADING EDGE. They also cohosted with the United 

States a Global Transshipment Conference in March 2011 designed to focus international attention on the problems of illicit transshipment and ways to address 

them. 

If confirmed, I will continue to advance our policy of working with the UAE to 

ensure our continued cooperation as we seek the full implementation of sanctions 

on Iran. This has been a top priority and will continue to be one under my tenure, 

if confirmed. I will also continue our efforts to prevent the sale of refined petroleum 

products to Iran, with a focus on monitoring of and reporting on efforts by commercial entities to evade international and U.S. sanctions, including the CISADA refined petroleum sanctions.

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Question. The UAE was listed as a Tier 2 country in the State Department’s 2010 

Trafficking in Persons Report. What are the most concerning aspects of government 

policy on this issue and what steps will you take as Ambassador to address the 

widespread problem of human trafficking, particularly on the issues of sex and labor 

trafficking? What steps has the government taken to regulate and protect its migrant domestic workers? Please describe any opportunities for public diplomacy activities related to trafficking in persons and any technical cooperation or other partnership initiatives being undertaken on this issue.

Answer. UAE’s human trafficking problem is serious. We have witnessed strong 

efforts to tackle sex trafficking through punishing traffickers and expanding victim 

protection services. Over the past year, the UAE established a special court to hear 

human trafficking cases in Dubai and opened two new shelters for victims of trafficking. However, challenges remain for the UAE to combat its considerable and 

multifaceted problem of forced labor, including among its population of migrant domestic workers. 

Our concerns about the forced labor of migrant workers and the trafficking of 

women and girls for prostitution in this region have been highlighted many times 

and at many levels—to governments, civil society, source countries, the media, and 

to victims. If confirmed, I will continue to urge the UAE to focus their attention on 

these serious issues and continue to prosecute trafficking offenses; identify and provide protection for victims of trafficking; and end labor practices such as the withholding of passports by employers that make foreign workers vulnerable to abuse.

Question. Can you describe the range of ways in which the UAE has supported 

and continues to support the Libyan Transitional National Council since the conflict 

in Libya began? What has been the UAE’s role in supporting the temporary funding 

mechanism established by the Libya contact group?

Answer. The UAE is a key partner in NATO-led operations in Libya, and is providing pilots and aircraft to assist with the no-fly zone and civilian protection mission. The UAE is a leader in working to protect the Libyan people and stabilize the 

situation in that country, and has disbursed several million dollars in humanitarian 

aid to those affected by the crisis. 

On June 9, the UAE hosted the most recent Libya Contact Group meeting in Abu 

Dhabi and is cochairing the July 15 meeting in Istanbul. The Abu Dhabi meeting 

built on the previous Contact Group meetings in Doha and Rome to solidify international resolve in ensuring the departure of Qadhafi from power. The Contact 

Group in Abu Dhabi also issued a statement which stressed that Qadhafi has lost 

legitimacy and must go, the use of force against civilians must cease, regime forces 

must withdraw from cities they have occupied, and a political transition must be 

based on the Transitional National Council’s (TNC) inclusive approach expressed in 

its ‘‘Roadmap on Libya.’’ Under UAE leadership, the Contact Group meeting in Abu 

Dhabi also announced the establishment of a temporary financial mechanism to 

channel financial support to the TNC. In the runup to that meeting, the UAE offered concrete suggestions that helped structure the Temporary Financing Mechanism (TFM) and build consensus in support of its establishment. 

The UAE recognized the Transitional National Council on June 12 as ‘‘the sole 

legitimate representative for the Libyan people’’ on the occasion of an official visit 

to Abu Dhabi by TNC leader Mustaf Abdul Jalil. UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah 

bin Zayed noted in the wake of the visit that the UAE would ‘‘work toward helping 

our Libyan brothers out of this difficult situation.’’ On June 13, the UAE expelled 

the pro-Qadhafi Libyan Ambassador from Abu Dhabi and committed to opening a 

representative office in Benghazi in the near future, which the Foreign Minister 

pointed to as a sign that it wanted to establish ‘‘government-to-government relations’’ with the TNC.

Question. How would you characterize the UAE’s approach to Hamas and to the 

Israeli-Palestinian conflict more broadly?

Answer. The UAE supports a two-state solution as well as the dual-track strategy 

of pursuing a vigorous political negotiation along with an equally vigorous and 

mutually reinforcing institution-building track. They have also helped shape the

Arab League position on supporting direct negotiations between Israel and the 

Palestinians. 

Among Arab partners, the UAE has a history of strong financial support to the 

Palestinian Authority’s development of responsible institutions, which is imperative 

to maintaining a viable partner for peace talks: the UAE provided $134 million in 

2008, $173 million in 2009, $42 million in 2010, and thus far has contributed an 

additional $43 million in 2011. 

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While the UAE supported Fatah-Hamas reconciliation, it shares our concerns 

about Islamist extremist groups such as Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Question. What is the status of U.S.–UAE defense cooperation? What are the 

major priorities of each side?

Answer. Cooperation on defense is a central pillar of our strategic partnership and 

is reflected in regular bilateral strategic security discussions. The port of Jebel Ali 

in Dubai is the U.S. Navy’s busiest overseas port of call and the UAE is our largest 

Foreign Military Sales cash customer in the world. The Emirati Air Force annually 

hosts the United States and other air forces for ‘‘Iron Falcon,’’ a training exercise 

at the UAE Air Warfare Center. The UAE has worked with international partners, 

including the United States, to limit illegal, destabilizing activities in the gulf and 

organized an international conference on countering piracy March 18–19 of this 

year. On May 19 the North Atlantic Council approved the establishment of a separate UAE mission to NATO making the UAE, along with Japan, one of the first two 

non-Partnership for Peace partner missions and the United States was highly supportive of this effort. 

The major priorities of both the UAE and the United States are to continue our 

close security partnership and to promote peace and security in the region. 

RESPONSES OF MATTHEW H. TUELLER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. How has the regional political change and unrest of the Arab Spring 

affected the political situation in Kuwait? To what do you attribute the fact that 

Kuwait has not been faced, to date, with mass popular unrest?

Answer. Kuwait is in a unique position, having long been one of the countries in 

the Middle East where political freedoms are embraced and upheld by the government and society. Well-defined democratic principles are enshrined in Kuwait’s constitution, and reflected in free competitive legislative elections, a fully elected and 

empowered Parliament, a vibrant civil society, and relatively open press environment. Kuwait’s Government also ensures that Kuwaiti citizens benefit from the 

country’s wealth by subsidizing education and health care and at times taking steps 

to offset for citizens increases in the cost of living. 

Kuwait has witnessed some peaceful, organized rallies this spring. Ongoing tensions between elements within Parliament and the Kuwaiti Government led to the 

Cabinet’s decision to resign earlier this spring. There were some rallies in the 

leadup to that period, and also following the swearing in of the new Cabinet. 

Kuwait’s bidoon or ‘‘stateless’’ residents also organized several rallies this spring to 

bring attention to the demands of their population, including in areas such as better 

access to health care, education, and job opportunities.

Question. Kuwait has been listed as a Tier 3 country in four consecutive State 

Department Trafficking in Persons Reports. Why, in the administration’s view, has 

Kuwait failed to make progress to curb trafficking in persons? What are the most 

concerning government failures on this issue? Migrant workers working in domestic 

service face particular hardships that in some cases have caused them to flee back 

to their countries of origin. What is Kuwait doing to prevent these types of abuses? 

Please describe how you intend to press this issue as Ambassador.

Answer. The situation for migrant workers remains particularly precarious in 

light of the restrictive sponsorship system, which effectively gives sponsors power 

over the movement and activities of the migrants, making foreign workers extremely vulnerable to forced labor. Domestic workers are particularly vulnerable 

given their isolation within private homes. 

Kuwait’s victim protection structure and law enforcement efforts are fundamentally weak. While the GOK operates a shelter for victims of trafficking, it has not 

developed a procedure to identify and refer victims to the facility. 

Currently, draft legislation prohibiting trafficking is stalled in the legislature. Although the Department has encouraged Kuwait for years to use existing laws to 

punish traffickers, the government remains reluctant to prosecute Kuwaiti citizens 

for trafficking offenses. 

If confirmed, I would like to see and will encourage the Kuwaiti Government to 

actively prosecute and punish acts of forced labor, including against employers who 

use violence, threats, or restrictions on movement (such as withholding of passports 

and exit permits) to compel labor. Additionally, if confirmed, I would like to see and 

will encourage the Kuwaiti Government institute a formal identification procedure 

to adequately find and protect victims of TIP.

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Question. How would you assess Kuwait’s level of cooperation in implementing 

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929, which imposes sanctions against Iran? 

Please describe any U.S. efforts to cooperate with Kuwait on implementation of Iran 

sanctions.

Answer. Kuwait, which is increasingly concerned about Iran’s disruptive influence 

in the region, is committed to full implementation of UNSCR 1929. Kuwait is 

alarmed by Iran’s continued refusal to comply with its United Nations Security 

Council obligations and with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The Kuwaiti Government has publicly urged Iran to abide by IAEA and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations. Kuwait fears that the development 

of an Iranian nuclear weapons capability would have a destabilizing effect on the 

region as a whole and in particular for Kuwait, given the geographic proximity of 

the two countries, and therefore has urged Tehran to work with the international 

community to ensure full transparency of Iran’s nuclear program. If I am confirmed 

as Ambassador, I will continue our candid dialogue with the Kuwaiti Government 

to use sanctions and other measures increase pressure on Iran and encourage it to 

engage on the nuclear issue.

Question. On January 12, 2011, the Prime Minister of Kuwait became the first 

Kuwaiti Prime Minister to visit Iraq since the August 2, 1990, invasion. To what 

extent has progress been made on Iraqi-Kuwaiti issues such as border demarcation, 

reparations, diplomatic and economic normalization, and the status of the missing 

Kuwaiti state archives? What role, if any, might the United States play in support 

of normalization between Iraq and Kuwait?

Answer. There have been positive developments in the Iraq-Kuwait relationship 

over the past several years, including the reestablishment of diplomatic ties. Kuwait 

sent an ambassador to Baghdad in 2008, and Iraq sent an ambassador to Kuwait 

in 2010. These steps reflect a shared desire to strengthen the bilateral relationship, 

and rebuild the trust that was destroyed by Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. 

We were encouraged to see Iraq and Kuwait launch a joint ministerial commission 

earlier this year. This commission provides a useful forum for the two sides to discuss cooperation and steps forward to achieve progress on all outstanding issues in 

the bilateral relationship. 

Going forward, additional issues must be discussed. Iraq needs to quickly fulfill 

its remaining obligations under the relevant Chapter VII Security Council resolutions pertaining to the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, including the resolutions 

on the Iraq-Kuwait border and efforts to locate Kuwaiti nationals and Kuwait’s national archives missing from the first gulf war. This will create a more positive atmosphere in which to address other outstanding issues. 

Given the United States unique relationship with both Iraq and Kuwait, we are 

in an advantageous position to play a positive role in achieving progress on this 

issue. If confirmed, I will work toward strengthened dialogue between Iraq and 

Kuwait, utilizing existing channels such as the ICRC-led Tripartite Commission and 

Tripartite Subcommittee, and the newly established Iraq-Kuwait Joint Ministerial 

Commission.

Question. What is the view of the Kuwaiti Government on the Peninsula Shield 

operation? What are the views of the Kuwaiti people? How was the rejection of a 

Kuwaiti medical team in Bahrain in March perceived by the government? What is 

the potential for Kuwait to play a mediating role in the ongoing conflict in Bahrain?

Answer. Both the Government of Kuwait and Kuwaiti civil society have been playing an active role in trying to mediate between the Government of Bahrain and the 

opposition to find a political solution to the crisis. When the Government of Bahrain 

appealed to other GCC member states for assistance, the Government of Kuwait, 

concerned by a possible Iranian role in the unrest, responded to what it saw as its 

treaty obligations under the GCC mutual defense pact by deploying naval ships to 

protect Bahrain from external aggression. Kuwait’s role in the Peninsula Shield 

intervention has been the subject of vigorous debate in the local media, within political society, and in the National Assembly, with some factions calling on the government to send ground forces to Bahrain and others urging their government not to 

participate at all. On March 31, the Cabinet—which was facing a number of interpellation motions, including some related to the Peninsula Shield operation and the 

Government of Bahrain’s decision earlier that month to refuse entry to a team of 

Kuwaiti medics—resigned en masse. The Prime Minister himself, who was reappointed in early May, stood for interpellation on June 14 to defend his government’s action on Bahrain; though some opposition MPs subsequently filed for a noncooperation motion against him, the Prime Minister defeated that vote on June 23.

395

Question. Some Kuwaiti women viewed it as a major breakthrough that four 

women were elected to the National Assembly in 2009, without any quotas or setasides. What is your assessment of their influence in the National Assembly and 

more broadly of women’s political participation in Kuwait?

Answer. Kuwait’s female parliamentarians, all of whom hold doctoral degrees 

from American universities, have proven to be among the most active and productive of all National Assembly members. In so doing, they have secured the admiration of some who were previously skeptical of women’s abilities to succeed in this 

environment, and have even on occasion formed alliances with them on issues of 

cross-cutting concern. With the female MPs’ assistance, the Cabinet and National 

Assembly have continued to chip away at legislation that discriminates against 

women, particularly in terms of benefits allocations. Now 6 years after gaining suffrage, women continue to play an important role in Kuwait, both inside and outside 

of Parliament. Traditionally, at least one woman has served in the Cabinet (currently, the Minister of Commerce and Industry, Dr. Amani Khalid Buresli, is a 

woman) and women hold leadership positions in both the public and private sectors. 

Women also continue to play their historically active role in Kuwaiti civil society, 

advocating not only for women and children’s rights, but for human rights more 

generally. 

RESPONSES OF SUSAN L. ZIADEH TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. What impact does the recent Arab Spring have on Qatar’s domestic politics and process of political liberalization? Has Qatar’s economic situation helped the 

country weather the wave of popular unrest sweeping the region? If so, how? And 

how can the U.S. incentivize the Qataris to open up their political system more?

Answer. Qatar has not experienced domestic demonstrations or protests. The 

country’s small, homogenous population and wealth insulate it from many of the factors that are driving protests in other countries. Qatar’s unemployment rate is extremely low, it has the world’s highest per capita GDP, and the country ranked 19th 

in the Transparency International’s 2010 Corruption index. Nevertheless, Qatar has 

taken small but important steps to increase citizen participation in government. It 

held municipal council elections in May 2011 and announced that it will hold elections for its advisory council soon. This would be an important step forward and 

demonstrate Qatar’s commitment to implementing meaningful reform. It is U.S. policy that governments need to be transparent, accountable, and responsive to their 

citizens. If confirmed, I will encourage Qatar to build on the steps it has already 

taken and advocate for government transparency, accountability, responsiveness 

and greater citizen participation in governance.

Question. What role does Qatar play in the Peninsula Shield forces sent to Bahrain in light of the ongoing unrest there?

Answer. Qatar is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the 

United States understands that Qatar contributed a small number of people to the 

Peninsula Shield Force. According to the GCC and the Government of Bahrain, the 

Peninsula Shield Force was used to protect government installations and critical infrastructure. The Government of Saudi Arabia has announced that some of their 

Peninsula Shield troops are leaving Bahrain; we have no reason to believe there are 

any Qatari forces currently in Bahrain.

Question. Please comment on Qatar’s cooperation in implementing U.N. Security 

Council Resolution 1929, which imposes sanctions against Iran. How has the decision to participate in the Peninsula Shield force deployed to Bahrain affect Qatar’s 

bilateral relationship with Iran?

Answer. Qatar is an active participant in the Gulf Cooperation Council and it 

shares the same concerns as other gulf countries regarding Iran’s interference in regional issues and its nuclear program. Qatar enforces U.N. sanctions on Iran. It 

does not appear that Qatar’s decision to participate in the Peninsula Shield Force 

has had any effect on its bilateral relationship with Iran.

Question. Can you describe the range of ways in which Qatar has supported and 

continues to support the Libyan Transitional National Council since the conflict in 

Libya began? What has been Qatar’s role in supporting the temporary funding 

mechanism established by the Libya contact group?

Answer. Qatar has taken an important leadership role in Libya. It was the first 

Arab country to join the coalition and provide military assets to Operation Unified 

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Protector. Qatar has sent significant amounts of humanitarian assistance to Libya. 

It helped establish an independent Libyan TV station to counter Qadhafi’s propaganda and is marketing oil for the Transitional National Council (TNC). Qatar has 

also recognized the TNC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people. 

Qatar has coordinated closely with several international partners, including the 

United States, France, and the U.K., to establish a Temporary Financing Mechanism (TFM) to facilitate contributions to the TNC. Qatar pledged $100 million to 

the TNC at the June Libya Contact Group meeting in Abu Dhabi.

Question. The Qatari-funded Al Jazeera media outlet has received criticism for 

being selective in its coverage of the unrest across the Arab world. What impact 

does Al Jazeera have in the projection of Qatar’s soft power in the region? How 

much influence does the Government of Qatar have on Al Jazeera’s coverage?

Answer. Al Jazeera’s coverage of the Arab Spring, especially in Tunisia and 

Egypt, has had a profound impact on events in the region. Al Jazeera’s reach extends beyond the Arab world. The network, through its Arabic and English channels, has established itself as a global media platform that broadcasts across the 

world—from the Western Hemisphere to Europe, Asia, and Africa. The Qatari Government provides significant funding for Al Jazeera but has long maintained that 

Al Jazeera operates independently.

Question. Relations between Qatar and Egypt under President Mubarak were cold 

and tense. How do you see relations between the two countries evolving now that 

there is new leadership in Egypt? What is the status of Qatar’s pledged financial 

assistance of $10 billion to Egypt? How are the United States and Qatar coordinating efforts to offer Egypt financial assistance?

Answer. Qatar has welcomed the transition in Egypt and expressed interest in investing several billion dollars in Egypt. Qatari officials have made several trips to 

Egypt to explore areas for cooperation and investment. The United States is coordinating with Qatar and Egypt to identify investment opportunities, and to reduce duplication our effort and to maximize support for Egypt’s economic recovery. The 

United States will continue to encourage Qatar to support Egypt as it undergoes its 

transition to democracy.

Question. Qatar has in recent years enjoyed close relations with Hamas, leading 

to some speculation that Hamas might relocate to Doha. How would you characterize Qatar’s approach to Hamas and to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict more 

broadly?

Answer. The Government of Qatar (GOQ) has a relationship with Hamas and 

there have been press reports that Hamas will relocate its headquarters. Doha has 

been mentioned as a possible location, but there have not been any announcements 

by Hamas or the GOQ about relocation of Hamas’ headquarters to Doha. The 

United States considers Hamas a terrorist organization, and we continue to raise 

our concerns about Hamas with the GOQ. As head of the Arab League Peace Initiative Follow-Up Committee, Qatar can play a positive role in encouraging Middle 

East peace efforts. The committee issued a statement that welcomed President 

Obama’s May 19 speech calling for a two-state solution.

397

The U.S. goal is to encourage direct engagement by the parties on the basis of 

President Obama’s May 19 speech in order to try to reach an agreement that resolves the permanent status issues and brings an end to the conflict.

Question. Qatar was listed as a Tier 2 Watch List country in the State Department’s 2010 Trafficking in Persons Report. What are the most concerning government failures on this issue and what steps will you take as Ambassador to address 

the widespread problem of human trafficking, particularly on the issues of sex and 

labor trafficking? What steps has the government taken to regulate and protect its 

migrant domestic workers? Please describe any opportunities for public diplomacy 

activities related to trafficking in persons and any technical cooperation or other 

partnership initiatives being undertaken on this issue.

Answer. Trafficking in persons (TIP) remains a serious problem in Qatar. The 

State Department continues to engage the Government of Qatar (GOQ) on the issue 

and helped push the GOQ to develop a comprehensive action plan to address TIP. 

In addition, the GOQ is close to enacting a TIP law that will significantly strengthen its ability to investigate and prosecute TIP. We have recommended to the Qataris 

that it improve its antitrafficking policies by increasing law enforcement against 

trafficking offenders and enhancing procedures to identify victims to ensure that 

they receive protection services. The current U.S. Ambassador to Qatar recently 

published an op-ed in a Qatari newspaper to highlight the 2011 Trafficking in Persons report. If confirmed, I will engage a variety of stakeholders, including the GOQ 

and civil society, to advocate for increased efforts to prosecute traffickers, protect 

victims, and prevent trafficking. 

RESPONSES OF HON. ANNE W. PATTERSON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. What instructions do our representatives at the World Bank and the 

International Monetary Fund have with regards to the need for political and economic reform ‘‘conditionalities’’ as part of any additional lending or assistance programs to Egypt?

Answer. We support ambitious reform benchmarks for international financial 

institution (IFI) assistance that reinforce the homegrown agenda of Egyptian reformers and civil society, including support for the democratic transition and a macroeconomic program that promotes economic stability and growth. Egyptian citizens 

are demanding greater accountability and equity, so we are supporting conditionality that fosters transparency and a level playing field, targets key measures that 

can be credibly implemented, and creates conditions for future reforms by catalyzing 

domestic pressures for good economic governance and sustainable and inclusive 

growth. 

The Government of Egypt recently revised its budget to reduce public spending 

and external financing needs. We therefore believe it is unlikely that Egypt will 

begin a new lending program with the IMF prior to elections.

Question. I believe it is critical, given the dramatic changes in the Middle East, 

that the NEA bureau is able to staff all of its positions, both domestically and overseas, with at-grade personnel. This is particularly important with regard to senior 

positions at our Embassies. I am concerned, for instance, that there has been no 

Ambassador at post in Bahrain during this critical period, nor is there a nominee 

from the administration before the committee. I also note that at a number of 

critical posts, both the Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission are changing this 

summer. 

Please provide details about staffing in your Embassy. What percentage of positions are filled with at-grade personnel, with the appropriate language ability? 

Please list any position in the Political or Economic sections of your Embassy that 

has been vacant for more than 6 months as of June 1, and indicate whether an officer has been paneled for the position, and if so when he or she will arrive at post.

Answer. Ninety-three percent of personnel at Embassy Cairo are at grade or 

above. The percentage of personnel with minimum or higher language qualifications 

is 60 percent. No positions in the Economic and Political Section of Embassy Cairo 

have been vacant for more than 6 months as of June 1.

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Question. Please identify any position at post which has been vacant for 3 months 

or longer over the past 2 years due to the incumbent’s departure for service in 

Afghanistan, Iraq, or Pakistan.

Answer. The table that follows details individuals who departed for service in 

Afghanistan, Iraq, or Pakistan, and the length of time their positions at Embassy 

Cairo were vacant:

Office Country (TDY) From To Arrival date GAP/vacant 

RSO/WSU ................ Baghdad, Iraq ....................... Aug-09 .............. Jun-10 ............. Apr-10 .............. 8 months.

RSO/WSU ................ Baghdad, Iraq ....................... Oct-09 ............... Mar-11 ............ Jul-10 ............... 9 months. 

RIMC ...................... Baghdad, Iraq ....................... Nov-09 .............. Nov-10 ............. .......................... Vacant. 

PAO ........................ Baghdad, Iraq ....................... Jun-08 ............... Jun-09 ............. Sep-09 ............. 15 months. 

IMO ........................ Baghdad, Iraq ....................... Sep-08 .............. Sep-09 ............. Mar-10 ............. 18 months. 

HR .......................... Kabul, Afghanistan ................ Jun-10 ............... Dec-10 ............. Apr-11 .............. 10 months. 

OBO ........................ Kabul, Afghanistan ................ Aug-09 .............. Aug-10 ............ .......................... Vacant. 

ECPO ...................... Kabul, Afghanistan ................ Aug-09 .............. Aug-12 ............ Jul-10 ............... 11 months. 

ECPO ...................... Baghdad, Iraq ....................... Mar-11 .............. Present ............ .......................... Vacant. 

Question. If the Ambassador and DCM positions at your Embassy are 

transitioning simultaneously this transfer cycle, please indicate steps taken to mitigate the potential for this to be necessary in future years.

Answer. It is the policy of the Department and the NEA Bureau to try and schedule the transfer of Ambassadors and DCMs so that transitions do not occur at the 

same time. Transfers are coordinated based on the needs of the service, foreign policy priorities, and the needs of our Foreign Service families. Given these often competing factors, it does happen that employees depart prior to the arrival of their replacements, and Ambassadors may not overlap for accreditation reasons. In most 

cases, either the Ambassador or the DCM is present at all times. Egypt is a foreign 

policy priority. As such, DCM Tueller will remain at post to have a few weeks of 

overlap with me if I am confirmed before taking up his new position (pending his 

own confirmation) in Kuwait. The staff in Cairo is very experienced. The Economic 

and Political Minister, the USAID Director, and the heads of other important agencies will not be transferring this summer. 

RESPONSES OF MICHAEL H. CORBIN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. Since the initiation of the NATO operation to enforce the arms embargo 

against Libya on 22 March, and the decision to initiate no-fly zone enforcement operations on March 24, please describe all U.S. transfers, sales, grants or leases of 

defense articles, defense services or technical data to the United Arab Emirates 

under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, direct commercial sales (DCS), or 

any other relevant authority or authorization to transfer, sell, grant or lease U.S. 

defense articles, defense services and technical data. Please provide aggregate dollar 

values, and provide a summary of the particular defense articles, defense services 

or technical data transferred, sold, granted or leased to date.

Answer. Arms Transfers to UAE since March 22, 2011: 

FMS 

UH–60 Blackhawks: On June 23, DSCA notified Congress of a possible FMS sale 

of five Blackhawk helicopters and associated equipment, parts, training and 

logistical support for an estimated cost of $217 million. The UAE will use these helicopters for intracountry transportation of UAE officials to militarily critical training 

and operation sites. 

F–16 Program Support: On May 24, DSCA notified Congress of a possible FMS 

sale of support and maintenance of F–16 aircraft and associated equipment, parts, 

training and logistical support for an estimated cost of $100 million. The UAE Air 

Force and Air Defense have operated the F–16 Block 60 aircraft for over 10 years, 

including in current coalition operations in Libya. Munitions are not part of this 

possible sale, although the UAE continues to purchase munitions for these aircraft. 

AIM–9X–2 Sidewinder missiles: On April 18, DSCA notified Congress of a possible 

$251 million FMS sale of 218 AIM–9X short-range air-to-air missiles, which the 

UAE will use on its aircraft to support coalition operations in Libya and contingency 

operations with the United States. 

399

In addition DOD has $4.8 billion in total Foreign Military Sales for UAE pending. 

The bulk of this total reflects the offer for the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area 

Defense) missile system, a $3.5 billion previously notified FMS case. These sales 

also include 54 GBU–12s (Guided Bomb Unit—12) for UAE’s F–16s. 

DCS 

From March 22 to June 27, the U.S. Government adjudicated and approved or approved with provisos 375 direct commercial sales (DCS) licenses for defense articles 

and services involving the UAE, for an estimated value of $1.3 billion. These figures 

do not necessarily represent actual exports, but the value of the approved licenses 

for potential sales and deliveries.

Question. Iran was viewed by many Gulf States as a counterweight to Saddam 

Hussein’s regime in Iraq, although that view has shifted now that Iraq has a representative government and Saddam is gone. What is your assessment of the threat, 

if any, posed by Iran to the UAE?

Answer. The UAE shares our concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and has 

taken a strong stance on its obligations under UNSCR 1929 in recognition of Iran’s 

pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. The UAE also shares our concerns about 

Iranian meddling in the region. The UAE has a strategic interest in regional stability and is an active participant in the Gulf Cooperation Council. The UAE takes 

its national security very seriously and is building a strong military partnership 

with the United States and other Western partners. 

The UAE maintains diplomatic and commercial ties with all its immediate neighbors, including Iran. This is necessitated by the UAE’s geographical proximity, its 

historical ties with Iran that go back centuries, and the approximately 500,000 Iranians live in the UAE (about half the number of Emiratis).

Question. Each of the Gulf States have seen some political unrest, and each monarchy has dealt with it in a different manner. Each regime clearly prioritizes survival often at the sacrifice of human rights and democratic values we hold dear. 

What lessons do you take from Tunisia and Egypt going into your posting?

Answer. We regularly engage the Emirati Government at all levels regarding the 

universal principles of freedom of expression and association. While the UAE and 

the United States have not always seen eye to eye on the popular uprisings of the 

Arab Spring, we have maintained a robust and productive dialogue throughout this 

period of historic change. Following the events in Tunisia and Egypt, this engagement is more as important as ever. 

As with any country in the region, we will continue to support and empower the 

democratic and reformist voices. And we will continue to do this by speaking honestly about the need to respect human rights and the legitimate aspirations of the 

people. We support the right to free expression, political participation, confidence in 

the rule of law, and governments that are transparent and responsive and accountable to their people.

Question. I believe it is critical, given the dramatic changes in the Middle East, 

that the NEA Bureau is able to staff all of its positions, both domestically and overseas, with at-grade personnel. This is particularly important with regard to senior 

positions at our Embassies. I am concerned, for instance, that there has been no 

Ambassador at post in Bahrain during this critical period, nor is there a nominee 

from the administration before the committee. I also note that at a number of critical posts, both the Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission are changing this summer. 

Please provide details about staffing in your Embassy. What percentage of positions are filled with at-grade personnel, with the appropriate language ability? 

Please list any position in the Political or Economic sections of your Embassy that 

has been vacant for more than 6 months as of June 1, and indicate whether an officer has been paneled for the position, and if so when he or she will arrive at post.

Answer. In UAE—Abu Dhabi the percentage of at-grade or above personnel is 72 

percent, and the percentage of minimally or higher language qualified personnel is 

73 percent. In UAE—Dubai the percentage of at-grade or above personnel is 86 percent, and the percentage of minimally or higher language qualified personnel is 70 

percent. 

There a total of 22 Political and Economic positions in Mission UAE. Seventythree percent of these positions are filled with at-grade personnel with the appropriate language ability. No positions have been vacant for 6 months as of June 1.

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Question. Please identify any position at post which has been vacant for 3 months 

or longer over the past 2 years due to the incumbent’s departure for service in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Pakistan.

Answer. The mission has one position which will be vacant for 3 months or longer 

due to the incumbent’s departure for service in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Pakistan. 

Dubai ECON FS–03 Departed 6/2011 replacement due 7/2012.

Question. If the Ambassador and DCM positions at your Embassy are 

transitioning simultaneously this transfer cycle, please indicate steps taken to mitigate the potential for this to be necessary in future years.

Answer. It is the policy of the Department and the NEA Bureau to try and schedule the transfer of Ambassadors and DCMs so that transitions do not occur at the 

same time. Transfers are coordinated based on the needs of the service, foreign policy priorities, and the needs of our Foreign Service families. Given these often competing factors, it does happen that employees depart prior to the arrival of their replacements; and, in the case of Ambassadors, they may not overlap for accreditation 

reasons. In most cases either the Ambassador or the DCM is present at all times. 

In the case of UAE, the DCM position is transferring this summer but the incoming 

DCM will arrive the end of July and will be in place prior to my arrival if I am 

confirmed. 

RESPONSES OF SUSAN L. ZIADEH TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. Since the initiation of the NATO operation to enforce the arms embargo 

against Libya on 22 March, and the decision to initiate no-fly zone enforcement operations on March 24, please describe all U.S. transfers, sales, grants or leases of 

defense articles, defense services or technical data to Qatar under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, direct commercial sales (DCS), or any other relevant authority or authorization to transfer, sell, grant or lease U.S. defense articles, defense 

services and technical data. Please provide aggregate dollar values, provide a summary of the particular defense articles, defense services, or technical data transferred sold, granted, or leased to date.

Answer. Foreign Military Sales: Since March 22, DOD has $4.8 million in total 

Foreign Military Sales pending for Qatar. There have been no congressionally notified FMS cases for Qatar. 

Direct Commercial Sales: From March 22–June 27, the U.S. Government adjudicated and approved or approved with provisos 102 direct commercial licenses 

(DCS) for defense-related technical data and spare parts to Qatar, for an estimated 

value of $2.1 billion. These sales include four C–130 aircraft. These figures do not 

necessarily represent exports approved, but the value of the approved licenses for 

potential sales and deliveries.

Question. Iran was viewed by many Gulf States as a counterweight to Saddam 

Hussein’s regime in Iraq, although that view has shifted now that Iraq has a representative government and Saddam is gone. What is your assessment of the threat, 

if any, posed by Iran to Qatar?

Answer. Qatar maintains a relationship with Iran primarily because of geographic 

proximity and shared economic interests. Qatar and Iran share the world’s largest 

nonassociated gas field, and although Qatar develops its side of this field independently, maintaining a nonconfrontational relationship with Iran remains a priority 

for the Qatari Government. Qatar has a strategic interest in regional stability and 

it views any action that threatens regional security as a threat. Qatar is an active 

participant in the Gulf Cooperation Council and it shares the same concerns as 

other gulf countries regarding Iran’s interference in regional issues and its nuclear 

program. Qatar enforces U.N. sanctions on Iran. Qatar’s strong military partnership 

with the United States demonstrates its commitment to promoting regional security 

and countering regional threats.

Question. Each of the Gulf States have seen some political unrest, and each monarchy has dealt with it in a different manner. Each regime clearly prioritizes survival often at the sacrifice of human rights and democratic values we hold dear. 

What lessons do you take from Tunisia and Egypt going into your posting?

Answer. The Government of Qatar (GOQ) has reacted positively to the Arab 

Spring, and Qatar’s leadership has publicly announced its support for reforms in the 

Middle East. Qatar has not experienced demonstrations or protests at home. The 

country’s small, homogenous population and wealth insulate it from many of the facVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00408 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
401

tors that are driving protests in other countries. Nevertheless, the GOQ has taken 

small, but important steps to increase citizen participation in government. Qatar 

held municipal council elections in May 2011. The GOQ also announced that it will 

hold elections for its advisory council soon. This would be an important step forward 

and demonstrate Qatar’s commitment to implementing meaningful reform. It is U.S. 

policy that governments need to be transparent, accountable, and responsive to their 

citizens. If confirmed, I will advocate for government transparency, accountability, 

responsiveness and greater citizen participation in governance. I will also emphasize 

the need to uphold universal rights.

Question. I believe it is critical, given the dramatic changes in the Middle East, 

that the NEA Bureau is able to staff all of its positions, both domestically and overseas, with at-grade personnel. This is particularly important with regard to senior 

positions at our Embassies. I am concerned, for instance, that there has been no 

Ambassador at post in Bahrain during this critical period, nor is there a nominee 

from the administration before the committee. I also note that at a number of 

critical posts, both the Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission are changing this 

summer. Please provide details about staffing in your Embassy. What percentage of positions are filled with at-grade personnel, with the appropriate language ability? 

Please list any position in the Political or Economic sections of your Embassy that 

has been vacant for more than 6 months as of June 1, and indicate whether an officer has been paneled for the position, and if so when he or she will arrive at post.

Answer. The Percentage of positions filled by at-grade or above personnel is 85 

percent. The percentage of minimally or higher language qualified personnel is 80 

percent. There have been no positions in the POL/ECON Section that have been vacant for more than 6 months as of June 1.

Question. Please identify any position at post which has been vacant for 3 months 

or longer over the past 2 years due to the incumbent’s departure for service in 

Afghanistan, Iraq, or Pakistan.

Answer. There are no positions that have been vacant for more than 3 months 

due to AIP in the last 2 years.

Question. If the Ambassador and DCM positions at your Embassy are transitioning simultaneously this transfer cycle, please indicate steps taken to mitigate 

the potential for this to be necessary in future years.

Answer. It is the policy of the Department and the NEA Bureau to try and schedule the transfer of Ambassadors and DCMs so that transitions do not occur at the 

same time. Transfers are coordinated based on the needs of the service, foreign policy priorities and the needs of our Foreign Service families. Given these often competing factors, it does happen that employees depart prior to the arrival of their replacements; and, in the case of Ambassadors, they may not overlap for accreditation 

reasons. In most cases either the Ambassador or the DCM is present at all times. 

In the case of Doha, the DCM is not transferring this summer. 

RESPONSES OF MATTHEW H. TUELLER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. The most recent U.S. State Department reports on terrorism criticize 

Kuwait for not enacting specific laws against terrorism support or terrorism financing. The State Department also reported in May 2010 that, ‘‘the provision of financial support to terrorist groups, both by charities and by individuals utilizing cash 

couriers continues to be a major concern.’’ What is preventing enactment of such 

laws? To what extent would clear laws help the government reduce the potential 

for terrorist attacks in Kuwait? What is Embassy Kuwait advocating in this respect?

Answer. If confirmed, I will be fully committed to strengthening United StatesKuwait counterterrorism cooperation, including cooperation on combating the ability 

of terrorist networks to finance terrorist activities from Kuwaiti soil. Kuwait’s relatively permissive environment renders the country vulnerable to exploitation by 

terrorist networks, who may find Kuwait to be a more attractive environment for 

raising and transmitting funds in comparison to other countries in the region. The 

fact that Kuwait does not have a law criminalizing the financing of terrorism is a 

serious impediment to the Kuwaiti Government’s ability to pursue and prosecute individuals suspected of financing terrorist activities. However, over the past several 

years, there have been several encouraging examples of the Kuwaiti Government 

charging and prosecuting suspected terrorist financiers on related crimes, such as 

plotting an attack against a foreign country. 

402

If confirmed, I will continue the U.S. Embassy’s sustained engagement on this 

issue, pressing the Kuwaiti Government and Kuwait’s Parliament to prioritize passage of an amended antimoney laundering/counterterrorism finance law. Last year, 

Kuwait’s Parliament considered a draft amendment that would have specifically 

criminalized terror financing and returned it to the executive branch to draft two 

separate laws: an antimoney laundering law and an antiterror financing law. 

Additionally, in 2010 Kuwait underwent a mutual evaluation by both the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) the international body for countering money laundering and terrorist financing, and the Middle East North Africa FATF, the regional 

body in the FATF network. The mutual evaluation and related discussions highlighted the vulnerabilities and reputational damage Kuwait faces without robust 

legislation in place criminalizing terrorism finance. If confirmed, I will lead strong 

U.S. engagement on this important issue, working closely with relevant U.S. Government agencies, and with international bodies such as the FATF to leverage the 

role of the international community in raising Kuwait’s awareness of the need for 

progress in this area.

Question. Kuwait’s relationship with Iraq remains rocky 20 years after you served 

there and helped reopen the Embassy in 1991, and 8 years after Saddam. Heading 

to Kuwait for now your third tour, and having served in Baghdad in the interim, 

what do you believe are the keys to putting that relationship on solid footing, what 

are the impediments, and how can the United States best facilitate a resolution of 

the deep-seated mistrust?

Answer. If confirmed, I will be fully committed to encouraging continued progress 

on rebuilding the relationship between Iraq and Kuwait. Having served in Kuwait 

directly following the liberation, I recognize the challenges associated with achieving 

progress on what are very sensitive, emotional, issues for both sides. I am encouraged by the positive developments we have seen over the past several years, including the restoration of diplomatic relations and several high-level visits in 2011, 

which I take as encouraging signs that both sides are committed to rebuilding the 

bilateral relationship. 

Given the United States unique relationship with both Iraq and Kuwait, we are 

in an advantageous position to play a positive role in achieving progress on this 

issue. If confirmed by the Senate, I will lead sustained engagement by the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait, working in close coordination with the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, 

the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and Member States of the U.N. Security 

Council. I am confident that Iraq and Kuwait recognize that both countries stand 

to benefit from closer ties between their two countries, particularly in areas such 

as trade and investment. 

If confirmed, I will work toward strengthened dialogue between Iraq and Kuwait, 

utilizing existing channels such as the ICRC-led Tripartite Commission and Tripartite Subcommittee, and the newly established Iraq-Kuwait Joint Ministerial 

Commission. The United States, along with the United Nations, will continue to call 

on Iraq to abide by its U.N. obligations with regards to Iraq-Kuwait issues, which 

will create a more positive atmosphere in which to address other outstanding issues.

Question. Iran was viewed by many Gulf States as a counterweight to Saddam 

Hussein’s regime in Iraq, although that view has shifted now that Iraq has a representative government and Saddam is gone. What is your assessment of the threat, 

if any, posed by Iran to Kuwait?

Answer. In recent years, the Kuwaiti Government has maintained mostly correct 

but not close relations with Iran. Ongoing concerns about disruptive Iranian influence in the region were exacerbated by the discovery of an Iranian spy ring in Kuwait and what they believe were clear signs of Iranian efforts to exploit the subsequent political unrest in Bahrain. Kuwait is also concerned about Iran’s refusal to 

cooperate with international nuclear energy regimes, and the Kuwaiti Government 

has publicly urged Iran to abide by IAEA safeguards. Kuwait fears that any attack 

on Iranian nuclear facilities would have disastrous consequences for Kuwait, given 

the geographic proximity of the two countries, and therefore urges Iran to cooperate 

with the international community on ensuring full transparency of Iran’s nuclear 

program. Kuwait has also enforced U.N. sanctions on Iran.

Question. Each of the Gulf States have seen some political unrest, and each monarchy has dealt with it in a different manner. Each regime clearly prioritizes survival often at the sacrifice of human rights and democratic values we hold dear. 

What lessons do you take from Tunisia and Egypt going into your postings?

Answer. I believe Kuwait is in a uniquely advantageous position amidst the wave 

of unrest sweeping across the region, having long been one of the countries in the 

Middle East where political freedoms are embraced and upheld by the government 

403

and society. Kuwait’s well-defined democratic principles are enshrined in its constitution, and reflected in free competitive legislative elections, an elected and empowered Parliament, a vibrant civil society, and relatively open press environment. 

Kuwait’s Government also ensures that Kuwaiti citizens benefit from the country’s 

wealth, by subsidizing health care and education through the university level. 

Kuwaitis enjoy a relatively high degree of freedom of expression. Kuwaitis are 

free to—and do—criticize senior members of the ruling family. In a move unique to 

the region, the Prime Minister has submitted to parliamentary questioning three 

times in the past 2 years, providing for parliamentary oversight of the government. 

Other ministers have also faced parliamentary questioning. 

If confirmed, I am committed to strengthening U.S. support for Kuwait’s democratic traditions and practices, including by supporting Kuwait’s vibrant civil society 

through MEPI programming. Over the years, MEPI-sponsored activities have made 

notable contributions in Kuwait by encouraging and training women to be effective 

candidates, activists, and voters in future elections, and strengthening civil society 

organizations so that they can play a more positive role in Kuwait’s political and 

democratic process.

Question. I believe it is critical, given the dramatic changes in the Middle East, 

that the NEA Bureau is able to staff all of its positions, both domestically and overseas, with at-grade personnel. This is particularly important with regard to senior 

positions at our Embassies. I am concerned, for instance, that there has been no 

Ambassador at post in Bahrain during this critical period, nor is there a nominee 

from the administration before the committee. I also note that at a number of 

critical posts, both the Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission are changing this 

summer. 

Please provide details about staffing in your Embassy. What percentage of positions are filled with at-grade personnel, with the appropriate language ability? 

Please list any position in the Political or Economic sections of your Embassy that 

has been vacant for more than 6 months as of June 1, and indicate whether an officer has been paneled for the position, and if so when he or she will arrive at post.

Answer. a. Staffing at Embassy Kuwait:

• Sixty percent at grade or above personnel. 

• Eighty percent minimally or higher language qualified personnel. 

• Twenty-one percent of Political and Economic positions are filled by employees 

one grade below the grade of the position (43 positions total, nine stretches). 

All are language qualified. 

• All Political and Economic positions are filled.

Question. Please identify any position at post which has been vacant for 3 months 

or longer over the past 2 years due to the incumbent’s departure for service in 

Afghanistan, Iraq, or Pakistan.

Answer. Post vacancies due to due to the incumbent’s departure for service in 

Afghanistan, Iraq, or Pakistan:

• RSO departed April 2011, successor arrives August 2011. 

• A/RSO departed April 2011, successor arrives July 2011. 

• Facilities Maintenance departed April 2010, successor arrived January 2011.

Question. If the Ambassador and DCM positions at your Embassy are 

transitioning simultaneously this transfer cycle, please indicate steps taken to mitigate the potential for this to be necessary in future years.

Answer. It is the policy of the Department and the NEA Bureau to try and schedule the transfer of Ambassadors and DCMs so that transitions do not occur at the 

same time. Transfers are coordinated based on the needs of the service, foreign policy priorities and the needs of our Foreign Service families. Given these often competing factors, it does happen that employees depart prior to the arrival of their replacements; and, in the case of Ambassadors, they may not overlap for accreditation 

reasons. In most cases either the Ambassador or the DCM is present at all times. 

In the case of Kuwait, foreign policy priorities as well as family needs played a significant factor in the transition schedule. While both the Ambassador and the DCM 

positions will be vacant for a few weeks, we have full confidence in the designated 

Charge ́. The incoming DCM will arrive in late August. 

404

RESPONSES OF KENNETH J. FAIRFAX TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. Kazakhstan’s cooperation on nonproliferation has been a model example 

of U.S. security engagement. What do you see as the next steps in our relationship 

with Kazakhstan in the realm of nonproliferation and cooperative threat reduction?

Answer. Cooperation on nonproliferation has been a pillar of the United StatesKazakhstan bilateral relationship and is a model for U.S. security engagement. 

Kazakhstan has cooperated extensively with the United States to eliminate its 

Soviet-legacy weapons of mass destruction (WMD) infrastructure, secure materials 

of proliferation concern, and redirect former WMD scientists to sustainable, nonmilitary employment. The shutdown of the BN–350 reactor and shipment of enough 

nuclear material for 775 nuclear weapons to a secure location made a significant 

contribution to global security. Kazakhstan continues to build upon its commitment 

to international security and nonproliferation through its active participation in the 

Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, the IAEA, and more than 25 U.S. 

nonproliferation initiatives and programs currently active in Kazakhstan. 

Cooperation on nonproliferation and cooperative threat reduction will remain a 

focus of our bilateral relations with Kazakhstan. Through our Biological Threat 

Reduction program, the United States is working with Kazakhstan to improve biosafety and bio-security by consolidating and securing dangerous pathogen collections, and we continue to fund the redirecting of underemployed biological weapons 

experts to careers with peaceful purposes. We are also supporting Kazakhstan’s efforts to combat bioterrorism and are enhancing its ability to detect, diagnose, and 

respond to disease outbreaks. Through Kazakhstan’s participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Export Control and related Border Security assistance program, the United States is strengthening Kazakhstan’s ability to prevent 

proliferation of WMD and related materials across its borders and reducing the risk 

of proliferation through training for and provision of equipment to licensing officials, 

border guards, and customs officials. 

Our Annual Bilateral Consultations have provided another important mechanism 

through which to further our engagement with Kazakhstan on nonproliferation 

issues, including its interest in a more prominent role in the IAEA and its offer to 

host the IAEA low enriched uranium fuel bank.

Question. Kazakhstan could play an increasingly important role as a supplier to 

the development of a Southern Energy Corridor and already participates in transCaspian shipments to Azerbaijan. Do you see any prospect for Kazakhstan to enlarge its role in this project through trans-Caspian shipments?

Answer. As its oil production increases, Kazakhstan could increase its delivery of 

crude oil across the Caspian, most likely through enhanced tanker shipments. At 

this point, it is not clear that Kazakhstan will have substantial volumes of gas 

available for delivery into the Southern Energy Corridor. Most gas currently produced in Kazakhstan is utilized domestically or reinjected to enhance oil production. 

We also understand that Kazakhstan believes trans-Caspian oil and gas pipelines 

will be difficult to build without a five-country agreement on delimitation of the 

Caspian Sea.

Question. With regard to United States-Kazakhstan energy cooperation, what additional steps do you believe the United States should take to enlarge our relationship?

Answer. We have an ongoing and productive dialogue with Kazakhstan on ways 

to deepen energy cooperation. Our engagement with Kazakhstan has largely focused 

on the country’s investment climate and its planning to increase oil production in 

the coming decade. The United States has a strategic interest in Kazakhstan’s production moving forward and additional Kazakhstani crude reaching world markets. 

Our engagement occurs during the U.S.-Kazakhstan Annual Bilateral Consultations and U.S.-Kazakhstan Energy Partnership. The second Annual Bilateral Consultation, which took place March 24–25 in Astana, included discussion of investment climate issues related to Kazakhstan’s energy sector. We expect to have an 

ABC review session with the Kazakhstani Government in Washington in September 

2011, where we will continue the discussion of deepening our economic and energy 

partnership. The Annual Bilateral Consultations include meetings with representatives of American and Kazakhstani energy companies. 

The U.S.-Kazakhstan Energy Partnership has been active for 8 years and is an 

essential part of our relationship with this hydrocarbon-rich nation. The next U.S.-

Kazakhstan Energy Partnership meeting is scheduled for November 2011 in Washington, and will include a visit by the Minister of Oil and Gas Sauat Mynbayev. 

405

I also plan to work closely with private American companies active in the energy 

field in Kazakhstan, as well as those who would like to become involved in emerging 

markets such as alternative energy in Kazakhstan, in order to facilitate and encourage the growth of a long-term, mutually beneficial commercial relationship that benefits both Kazakhstan and the American people.

Question. In what areas do you believe Kazakhstan could expand its participation 

in the Northern Distribution Network?

Answer. Kazakhstan is providing significant support to our stabilization efforts in 

Afghanistan through its active participation in the Northern Distribution Network. 

We are also working with Kazakhstan’s Government and private sector to increase 

local procurement of construction materials, supplies, and food products to support 

our operations in Afghanistan. Kazakhstan plays an important role in our efforts 

to build a stable, economically prosperous Afghanistan, reconnected with its region. 

Kazakhstan’s participation in NDN demonstrates the potential for trade linking 

Central and South Asia via Afghanistan, and we are working with Kazakhstan to 

enact policies to speed the flow of trade through the region. 

RESPONSES OF ANNE W. PATTERSON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. An Egyptian court convicted two people for attacking a Coptic sit-in in 

Cairo last month, but 16 suspects were found not guilty. The two convicted men 

were reportedly released on bail. The court was reviewing accusations related to last 

month’s attacks on a Coptic sit-in, which was staged in front of the state radio and 

television building. A group of unidentified men attacked the people participating 

in the sit-in, using firearms, knives, stones, and Molotov cocktails. At least 78 people were wounded. The protesters decided to end their sit-in 5 days later after authorities agreed to open three churches. Copts have faced discrimination, even on 

governmental levels, as their churches are sometimes closed, or require special permits for even minor renovations.

• What progress is being made by the military council to end sectarian violence 

and tension and what are the prospects for constitutional changes and laws that 

would address sectarian violence and ease restrictions on building churches? 

Can Egypt achieve a secular government that (1) respects the rights of its religious minorities; and (2) fosters the full integration of religious minorities in all 

levels of government?

Answer. Sectarian violence remains a troubling problem in Egypt, as evidenced 

by the May 7 violence that erupted in the Cairo neighborhood of Imbaba. On

May 17, Field Marshal Tantawi, the head of the Supreme Council of the Armed 

Forces (SCAF) and de facto leader of Egypt during this transition period, issued a 

strongly worded, public condemnation of sectarian attacks. The SCAF also stated 

that it would investigate and prosecute those responsible for the May 7 clashes, and 

has charged 48 individuals in conjunction with his case. On June 7, Prime Minister 

Sharaf attended the formal reopening of the Holy Virgin Church, one of two 

churches damaged during the May 7 riots. The Egyptian transitional government 

has also allowed the construction and repair of 16 churches that had previously not 

been granted permission to be built or repaired. 

On May 14, Prime Minister Sharaf announced the formation of a National Justice 

Committee to draft an antidiscrimination law and consider a ‘‘unified places of worship’’ law within 30 days—two key Coptic Christian demands. On June 1, the Egyptian Cabinet announced that it had approved a draft ‘‘Unified Law for Organizing 

the Construction of Places of Worship.’’ This draft law, which governs the building 

and renovation of churches and mosques, is currently under public review, and some 

religious and civil society leaders have raised concerns during this review process 

that the draft law does not sufficiently depoliticize the construction process. 

We remain very concerned about the prospects of sectarian violence in Egypt and 

will continue to monitor this issue closely. We will also continue to impress upon 

the Egyptian Government the importance of taking steps to confront sectarian violence, including steps to reverse discriminatory laws and treatment, of holding perpetrators of violence accountable, and of fostering an environment that promotes 

religious tolerance.

Question. Your service in Cairo coincides with a unique moment on world history—a potential political sea change in the Middle East and North Africa. Egypt 

has many challenges and opportunities—this year will see parliamentary and PresiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00413 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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dential elections and early next year we expect Egyptians to begin drafting a new 

constitution.

• In the context of these changes, are you concerned about an erosion of the relationship between Israel and Egypt? Do recent actions, the facilitation of the 

talks that led to the declaration of Fatah-Hamas unity government—a step that 

may prove fatal to the negotiation process—and the reopening of the Rafah border crossing, which has been closed since 2007 due to concerns about Hamas 

using the crossing to bring weapons and fighters into Gaza foretell a different 

relationship between Egypt and Israel? 

• If confirmed, will you make clear to Egypt that the state of relations between 

our countries is directly linked to its adherence to the Camp David Peace 

Treaty with Israel? 

• The Egypt-Israel peace treaty formed the basis of our foreign assistance program to Egypt. Is Egyptian adherence to its international obligations, including 

the peace treaty with Israel, a prerequisite for U.S. assistance, including possible debt relief?

Answer. The current Egyptian Government has repeatedly expressed its commitment to adhere to past agreements, including its Treaty of Peace with Israel. The 

Department of State fully appreciates the significance of Egyptian-Israeli peace to 

our regional interests and those of our ally, Israel. In our discussions with Egyptian 

leadership across the political spectrum, we have and will continue to underscore 

the importance of upholding this and other international obligations. It is important 

that Egypt and Israel continue to strengthen their bilateral relationship and their 

lines of communication, particularly as Egypt moves through its transition. Egypt 

has maintained direct diplomatic and security engagement with Israel throughout 

the transition, and we continue to encourage such cooperation. 

With regard to the reconciliation agreement between the Palestinian Authority 

and Hamas, we want the agreement to be implemented in a manner that moves us 

closer to our common goal of comprehensive peace. We will work with Egypt toward 

this objective, as Egypt continues to play a leadership role in the peace process.

Question. Earlier this month Secretary Clinton said, ‘‘We are also troubled by reports of sexual violence used by governments to intimidate and punish protesters 

seeking democratic reforms across the Middle East and North Africa. Rape, physical 

intimidation, sexual harassment, and even so-called ‘virginity tests’ have taken 

place in countries throughout the region. These egregious acts are violations of basic 

human dignity and run contrary to the democratic aspirations so courageously expressed throughout the region.’’ The virginity tests utilized by security forces in 

Egypt are the most blatant violation of women’s rights, and a worrying sign that 

one of the goals of the Egyptian revolution—to secure civil liberties for women—is 

not being met. In contrast to the democratic transition in Tunisia, where women 

have been guaranteed parity with men in the party lists for the upcoming Constituent Assembly, women in Egypt have not been largely integrated into the transition process. Since the ‘‘Million Woman March’’ on March 8 in Cairo, most of the 

main complaints women have have not been addressed: 

(1) Women’s participation in the constitutional, legislative, and political 

future of Egypt; 

(2) A new civil constitution which respects citizenship, equality and cancels 

all forms of discrimination; 

(3) A change to all laws, including the personal status law to guarantee 

equality; 

(4) Fundamental policy and legal changes to impose significant penalties on 

all forms of violence toward women.

• How will you continue to raise the issue of women’s rights with the military 

council in Egypt and the new government that will emerge this fall? What 

leverage does the United States have to pressure the integration of women into 

the democratic transition, and ensure women’s equality is safeguarded in 

Egypt?

Answer. We are disgusted by allegations of torture and ‘‘virginity tests’’ by military police in the Egyptian Museum on March 9. At the highest levels, we have 

called on the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) to investigate these reports and prosecute those who are culpable. The SCAF has publicly vowed to investigate allegations that protesters detained by the military on March 9 were tortured. 

We share your concerns about the involvement of women in the political transition. Regrettably, the committee to draft revisions to Egypt’s Constitution in March 

did not include any women, and the Ministry of Women’s Affairs was abolished soon 

after the interim government was formed. Although some women have taken promiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00414 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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nent roles in activist groups, more needs to be done. If confirmed, I will continue 

pressing the Egyptian Government to promote the participation of women in government and political parties. The United States also promoted a conference on June 

2 in Cairo, cosponsored by International IDEA and U.N. Women, to raise the profile 

of women’s rights in democratic transitions. Chaired by U.N. Women Executive 

Director, Michele Bachelet, this event advocated for robust women’s political participation and empowerment, with special attention on Egypt, and has likely laid the 

groundwork for a ministerial-level gathering on the subject on the margins of the 

U.N. General Assembly. 

Many of the civil society programs we support also aim to empower women politically and economically, and we will monitor the drafting of Egypt’s new Constitution 

to ensure women’s rights are protected. As part of the $165 million we have made 

available to meet urgent Egyptian needs, USAID is providing $20 million in funding 

to support political party development through NDI and IRI, civil society development, election monitoring, and voter education. Support for women as political leaders and candidates will be an important part of these projects. In its regular assistance portfolio, USAID provides direct grants to enhance women’s and girls’ civic and 

political rights and participation, improve the operation of family courts, provide 

psychological counseling services to women and children, and combat violence 

against women by improving the capacity of Egypt’s National Council for Women 

and National Council for Childhood and Motherhood to advocate for policy changes 

and provide services and legal assistance for battered and trafficked women. 

Through its local grants program, MEPI is funding 10 Egyptian NGOs to carry 

out innovative projects to break down barriers for women in the legal profession, 

raise awareness of women’s rights among female students in Upper Egypt, train ordinary Egyptian women to become community leaders and businessowners, and 

carry out voter education and corruption awareness campaigns targeting women, including in lesser developed regions of Egypt. MEPI also is preparing to fund new 

Egyptian local grants that focus on women’s rights, economic opportunity, and participation during the transition.

Question. Our government has stated and restated the importance of peaceful, 

democratic transition in Egypt that includes respect for human rights, including expression, association and assembly, freedom of the press. However, recent reports 

from Egypt have estimated that between 5,000 and 10,000 people have been tried 

in military courts over the past 3 months. Activists believe the prosecutions are a 

scare tactic by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to intimidate Egyptians 

off the street, as they often specifically target protesters.

• How is the administration addressing this failure with the military council, to 

ensure that the transitional government is not backsliding and reverting to tactics reminiscent of the Mubarak era?

Answer. We have raised at the highest levels the need for Egypt’s military leadership to address transparently and inclusively the grievances of the Egyptian people; 

including lifting the state of emergency; protecting freedom of expression and assembly; reforming security institutions; trying civilians in civilian, not military, 

courts; and transitioning to civilian control of the government through free and fair 

elections. 

We are aware of recent interrogations of journalists, bloggers, and judges critical 

of the SCAF and military and have made our concerns regarding these cases clear 

to the Egyptian Government and the SCAF. Freedom of expression is a critical component of any democratic state, and we have made clear that attempts to silence 

political opposition in Egypt are unacceptable.

Question. Ambassador Patterson, I have been following Chairman Kerry’s effort 

with respect to the Bower children who were wrongfully removed from the United 

States by their mother. As you are aware, their father, Colin Bower, has been trying 

unsuccessfully to secure the return of his children, Noor and Ramsay, to the United 

States. Pursuant to a 2008 decision by Probate and Family Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Mr. Bower has sole legal custody of Noor and Ramsay and 

joint physical custody with Mirvat El Nady. That ruling stipulated Mirvat el Nady 

was not to remove Noor and Ramsay from the Commonwealth. There are no international or bilateral treaties in force between Egypt and the United States dealing 

with international parental child abduction, and Egyptian law does not consider the 

removal of a child by the noncustodial parent to or within Egypt to be a crime.

• What efforts is the Department undertaking with the interim government to secure the return of Mr. Bower’s children? What pressure do you believe would 

be helpful to motivate the Military Council or a future Egyptian Government 

to resolve this case favorably? In your role as Ambassador, what actions will 

408

you take to encourage Egypt to sign the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects 

of International Child Abduction?

Answer. Secretary Clinton and the Department have been in direct contact with 

Egyptian authorities at senior levels concerning this matter. We will continue to 

raise this case with appropriate Egyptian authorities in the hope of seeing the children returned to Mr. Bower. Both the Special Advisor for the Office of Children’s 

Issues, Ambassador Susan Jacobs, and the U.S. Consul General in Cairo have, on 

multiple occasions, worked directly with Mr. Bower on this difficult matter. The Office of Children’s Issues is very engaged on Mr. Bower’s behalf. We will continue 

to press the Egyptian Government to sign the Hague Convention on the Civil 

Aspects of International Child Abduction. 

RESPONSES OF MICHAEL CORBIN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

HUMAN RIGHTS/DEMOCRACY

Question. Five prodemocracy activists have been detained in the United Arab 

Emirates since April 18 without bail. According to Human Rights Watch, the activists were charged with ‘‘peaceful use of speech to criticize the UAE Government.’’ 

The UAE Government said they were charged with harassment after the activists 

and other UAE nationals signed a petition in March that demanded constitutional 

and parliamentary changes in the Emirates, and free elections for all citizens. The 

detainees include a leading human rights activist and university lecturer. In his address on the Middle East and North Africa last month, President Obama declared 

that ‘‘it will be the policy of the United States to promote reform across the region, 

and to support transitions to democracy.’’

• With the trial date of these prodemocracy activists set for July 18, how will the 

administration follow through on its promise of promoting reform and democracy including in the UAE? How will you as Ambassador pressure the Emirati 

Government to conduct the trial in a transparent and open manner, and preserve freedom of speech and assembly?

Answer. We engage the Emirati Government regularly and at all levels regarding 

the universal principles of freedom of expression and association. Our Embassy and 

senior Department officials have been reaching out to the Emirati Government regarding our concern that any trials be conducted in a transparent and open manner 

in accordance with international standards of due process. If confirmed, I will continue to make these points. We understand the lawyers for the five defendants have 

asked that the trial be closed to the public and the press. We will continue to monitor the situation to the best of our ability. 

RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN

Question. The relationship between the United States and the UAE is multifaceted and reflects many complex issues that both countries face. At the top of our 

agenda for the past several years has been the issue of Iran and the important role 

the UAE must play in enforcing international sanctions. While we have seen a dramatic and positive shift in the UAE’s behavior toward Iran in the past year, it can 

and must do much more. For example, the UAE should stop refined petroleum exports to Iran; they should further clamp down on illicit re-exports to Iran; and they 

should do more to cut banking ties with Tehran.

• Can you describe the UAE’s compliance with international sanctions on Iran? 

• If confirmed, will you make it a top priority to press the Government of the 

UAE, including the individual Emirates, to fully comply with U.N. and U.S. 

sanctions on Iran? 

• The State Department recently sanctioned two UAE firms for their role in the 

export of refined petroleum products to Iran. If confirmed, will you ensure Embassy personnel investigate and report to Washington on companies involved in 

the export of refined petroleum to Iran in violation of U.S. law?

Answer. The UAE takes seriously its international obligations to enforce sanctions 

against Iran. To this end, it has a track record of disrupting or preventing transfers 

to Iran of items of proliferation concern. The UAE has a national strategy to protect 

the reputation of its historically open trade environment against abuse by 

proliferators. In August 2007 the UAE passed comprehensive strategic trade control 

legislation providing the basis for an enforceable export control system. The law is 

currently being enforced and we have been working in close partnership with UAE 

authorities to halt attempts to divert sensitive dual-use technology, including U.S.-

409

origin goods, from the UAE. With respect to enforcement and counterproliferation 

issues, the UAE is an active participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 

and hosted, in January 2010, a major multinational PSI exercise, LEADING EDGE. 

They also cohosted with the U.S. a Global Transshipment Conference in March 2011 

designed to focus international attention on the problems of illicit transshipment 

and ways to address them. 

If confirmed, I will continue in our policy of pressing the UAE including each of 

the Emirates, as we do all our partners, to fully comply with U.N. and U.S. sanctions on Iran. This has been a top priority and will continue to be one under my 

tenure, if confirmed. 

If confirmed I will ensure that post continues our efforts on refined petroleum 

products to build on the work done so far. I will work to focus on monitoring of and 

reporting on efforts by commercial entities to evade international and U.S. sanctions, including the CISADA refined petroleum sanctions. 

RESPONSE OF MATTHEW H. TUELLER TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Question. You have surely been briefed about the Kuwaiti detention without bond 

of a U.S. citizen in his seventies, Aliyar Dehghani. His family is deeply concerned 

that he is not being afforded normal, due legal process, and that his continued detention poses risks to his health given his age and heart condition. 

Even though the circumstances surrounding the case are controversial, it is especially troubling if one of our allies ever were to single out an American citizen for 

discrimination, in violation of its own legal standards and process.

• Should you be confirmed, will you raise this case—and potentially any others 

like it—to ensure fair treatment under the law of American citizens in Kuwait?

Answer. If confirmed by the Senate, I will be fully committed to ensuring the protection and well-being of all U.S. citizens in Kuwait, including securing fair treatment under the law. I assure you that, if confirmed as Ambassador, I will raise with 

the Kuwaiti Government any cases in which we believe an individual is being discriminated against or mistreated because of his or her U.S. citizenship. 

Regarding the specific situation of Mr. Aliyar Dehghani, a U.S.-citizen resident in 

Kuwait for many years, I understand that Mr. Dehghani was released from the 

Kuwait Central Prison on May 29 after he posted bond. The case is pending the outcome of the ongoing investigation into his role in connection to the 2009 failure of 

the Mishref Sewage Pumping Station. 

The U.S. Embassy in Kuwait informs me there is no indication Mr. Dehghani is 

being targeted, disadvantaged, or discriminated against in any way because of his 

U.S. citizenship. After Mr. Dehghani was detained by Kuwaiti authorities on May 

10, representatives of the Consular Section of the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait visited 

Mr. Dehghani on several occasions and were in regular contact with members of

his family. The Department of State and the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait continue to 

closely follow Mr. Dehghani’s situation and will continue to provide appropriate consular assistance. 

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NOMINATIONS 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 29, 2011

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

Derek J. Mitchell, of Connecticut, to be Special Representative and 

Policy Coordinator for Burma, with the rank of Ambassador 

Frankie Annette Reed, of Maryland, to be Ambassador to the 

Republic of the Fiji Islands, and to serve concurrently as 

Ambassador to the Republic of Nauru, the Kingdom of Tonga, 

Tuvalu, and the Republic of Kiribati 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jim Webb presiding. 

Present: Senator Webb. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM WEBB,

U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA 

Senator WEBB. Good morning. The hearing will come to order. 

Today the committee will consider the nominations of Derek J. 

Mitchell to be U.S. Special Representative and Policy Coordinator 

for Burma; and Frankie A. Reed to be U.S. Ambassador to the Fiji 

Islands, and the Republic of Nauru, the Kingdom of Tonga, Tuvalu, 

and the Republic of Kiribati. 

In 2008, the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act established 

the position of the Special Representative and Policy Coordinator 

for Burma. The Special Representative is charged, among other responsibilities, with promoting a comprehensive international effort 

to support democracy in Burma and address the humanitarian 

needs of its people. 

I believe this position can play a key role in bringing together the 

various voices on Burma policy in striving to develop a more coherent, effective policy. However, to date, the position has not been 

filled, and we should not delay this any longer. 

In 2009, after a great deal of coordination, I became the first 

Member of Congress to travel to Burma in 10 years. There I had 

the opportunity to meet with Aung San Suu Kyi, and was also the 

first and only American official ever to meet with General Than 

Shwe. 

Following this visit, there were, in my view, many opportunities 

for follow-on activities by others in our Government and in theirs 

that could bring about a change in our policy toward Burma. 

412

Our sanctions-led approach had produced no meaningful results 

in the country, except to further isolate the people, and I believe 

that we need to find a way to break this cycle. 

Soon thereafter, following its own policy review, the administration agreed with this position and announced a new dual-track policy guided by direct engagement with the Government in Burma 

and the continued policy of economic sanctions. 

Since this shift, the administration has taken some limited steps 

toward direct engagement, but given the strategic importance of 

Burma and the critical humanitarian needs in that country, more 

can and should be done. 

Fixed between two powers—India and China—and bridging two 

subcontinents, Burma has been wrecked by internal conflict, led in 

part by the desire of the previous military government to enforce 

national unity among a diverse ethnic population. In the past few 

weeks, this conflict has flared up in a serious way, particularly in 

the Kachin areas near the Chinese border. 

Despite this enduring violence, the Burmese people have steadily 

pursued a transition toward civilian government and, hopefully, toward eventual democracy. 

On November 7, 2010, Burma held its first election in 20 years. 

With limited international observation, most will argue that the 

election was neither free nor fair, with the military-backed Union 

Solidarity and Development Party, USDP, winning the majority of 

open seats in the new Parliament. 

Coupled with the military’s automatic holding of 25 percent of 

the seats in Parliament, this bloc will carry a supermajority. 

Yet numerous independent reports indicate that the election 

process has created the potential for a new political dynamic in the 

country, with candidates participating from more than 37 different 

political parties. The National League for Democracy did not register as a political party and, therefore, was unable to participate 

in the election. But other democratic and ethnic minority parties 

did participate, and their candidates won seats in the national and 

regional Parliaments. 

This was a step—albeit an incomplete one—toward forming a 

representative government, and it is a greater step than many 

other countries in the region can claim. 

This spring, we have observed the convening of the Parliament 

and the appointment of new government officials. By all indications, a transition of some sort is occurring. My colleague, Senator 

John McCain, in his visit to Burma earlier this month, noted that 

‘‘this new government represents some change from the past,’’ and 

that the new government wants a better relationship with the 

United States. 

The release of Aung San Suu Kyi after the election was an important benchmark in this process, and her continued freedom of 

movement may serve as a bellwether for the development of a more 

vibrant civil society. 

I believe these changes yield promise for improving accountability and transparency in Burma. The International Crisis 

Group, a well-respected nonprofit organization committed to preventing conflict, concurs. Their March 2011 report notes ‘‘this moment of relative change in a situation that has been deadlocked for 

413

20 years provides a chance for the international community to encourage the Government to move in the direction of greater openness and reform.’’

However, it also important to realize that this transition is not 

guaranteed, either domestically or because of foreign influence. 

China, the second largest economy in the world with a decidedly 

nondemocratic political system, wields a great and continuing influence in Burma. With the construction of gas and oil pipelines, hydropower development, and additional assistance, China has attempted to purchase influence through investments that support 

the Burmese Government and provide China with strategic access 

to the Indian Ocean. Chinese leaders may be concerned with the 

ethnic conflict on their border, but they have yet to take constructive steps to encourage a meaningful political reconciliation with 

Burma. 

Even more troubling has been China’s role as a transshipment 

point for illicit exports from North Korea, which many observers 

believe may be bound for Burma. While there are legitimate concerns about Burma’s relationship with North Korea, the administration has yet to question China’s role in these exports. 

I believe we should be more consistent and responsible in our 

rhetoric, particularly on an issue of such importance. 

With this political and regional complexity, the Special Representative faces a difficult task. Yet this position has the opportunity to play a positive and continuing role in ending the isolation 

of the Burmese people and promoting democratic development 

through deeper, more sustained direct engagement with the Government and civil society. 

Historian and scholar Thant Myint-U testified in 2009 before this 

committee that ‘‘there can be no grand strategy on Burma from the 

outside, only efforts to use and build on opportunities as they come 

along. And seeing these opportunities depends on being more 

present on the ground, in direct contact with the Burmese people.’’ 

And I encourage our nominee today to consider this approach. 

Today we are also considering our policy toward Fiji, Nauru, 

Tonga, Tuvalu, and Kiribati. That distance that spans these locales 

is a challenge, only to be matched by the requirement that our Ambassador represent the United States simultaneously to five different countries with varied political systems and domestic challenges. 

The largest among these, Fiji, is an important political, educational, and economic center in the western Pacific. It is also a 

country of significant ethnic tensions—particularly between indigenous Fijians and Fijians of Indian ancestry—that have affected its 

political stability. 

In 2006, Fiji’s military chief sponsored a coup that nullified contentious elections in the name of national unity. Since this time, 

United States relations with Fiji have been strained. 

The military chief, now interim Prime Minister, has further postponed elections until 2014. It is interesting to note that our response to this undemocratic action has appeared softer than our response to other military coups in Asia, such as those in Burma. 

For example, while we cut bilateral military assistance to Fiji following the coup, the U.S. Agency for International Development 

414

will be opening an office there this year. I look forward to examining this decision and exploring the prospects for United StatesFiji relations as we go forward. 

In closing, I look forward to the testimony of our nominees, and 

before their remarks, I would like introduce them and invite them 

to recognize those who have come to support their nomination 

today. 

And to begin the introductions, I would like to welcome Congressman Faleomavaega, the U.S. Representative from American 

Samoa and ranking member on the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. 

Congressman Faleomavaega is a fellow veteran and has recently 

been reelected to his twelfth term in the Congress this year. 

Throughout his service, he has been a vital voice on the importance 

of the Asia Pacific region and the value of our relationships there. 

And he’s joined us today to introduce Frankie Reed, our nominee 

to be U.S. Ambassador to Fiji. 

And, Congressman, welcome, and the floor is yours, sir. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, U.S. 

DELEGATE FROM AMERICAN SAMOA 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

With due respect, I did not have the opportunity to meet Mr. 

Mitchell, but I’m sure that President Obama has made a very wise 

decision in terms of this position that is going to be so important 

to establish a bilateral dialogue between us and the state of 

Myanmar. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you very much for the opportunity that I have. I voluntarily offered myself to come here not 

only to introduce my very dear friend, but someone whom I have 

respected over the years. I would say among the very few Foreign 

Service officers who knows anything about the Pacific region. And 

I felt it so important that I wanted to come here to do this and to 

share with you some of my observations in the 20 years that I’ve 

served as a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, specifically also as a member of the Asia Pacific Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs for the past 20 years. 

If I may, Mr. Chairman, it’s a real honor and a humbling experience for me to introduce a dear friend. Although I don’t represent 

her and her constituency in the great State of Maryland, I feel like 

I know her, and in terms of the close working relationship that 

we’ve had and her efforts as she had served previously as the Deputy Chief of Mission in the Independent State of Samoa. 

I’m sure you already have the biography of Ms. Frankie Reed, 

Secretary Reed. And I just wanted to reiterate some of the highlights of her career and how much to the extent that I totally support President Obama’s nomination of her to serve as our Ambassador not only to Fiji but to the Republics of Kiribati, Tuvalu, 

Nauru, and also the Kingdom of Tonga. 

Ms. Reed is a graduate of Howard University and got her degree 

in journalism. And then she also received her law degree at the 

University of California, Berkeley; became a Peace Corps Volunteer; served also as a member of the California Bar; and before becoming a Foreign Service officer, she was initially assigned as a 

415

desk officer for the Bureau of African and Western Hemisphere. 

She later held posts Kenya and also in Cameroon and Senegal, and 

then became the deputy director of the Office of Australia and New 

Zealand and the Pacific Islands. 

She then became the Deputy Chief of Mission to the Independent 

State of Samoa for about 3 years. Then she went off again to Guinea and then later became Consul General and Deputy U.S. Observer to the Council of Europe and the European Council for 

Human Rights in Strasbourg, France. 

And returning from that assignment, she became a diplomat in 

residence at her alma mater at U.C.-Berkeley and lectured there 

and conducted several outreach programs to universities in the Pacific Northwest. 

She was then assigned as Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of East Asian Affairs and Pacific Affairs. And then to this 

point now in her brilliant career, she is nominated by President 

Obama to serve as Ambassador. 

And my reason for wanting to do this very much, Mr. Chairman, 

is the fact that we do have some very serious issues and problems 

affecting the Pacific region. I think I’ve been very vocal for all these 

20 years. As I recall, when I first became a member of the House 

Foreign Affairs Committee, interestingly enough, nobody wanted to 

talk about Asian-Pacific issues 20 years ago. I think the entire 

mentality here in Washington, DC, was Europe and the Middle 

East. And if we talked about any issue affecting the Asian-Pacific 

region, it was really nothing that we could really take interest in. 

And I wondered myself why we have not really taken a more serious interest in this very important region of the world. 

I do want to say that I honestly believe that Secretary Reed will 

do a fantastic job for the simple reason that she knows the Pacific. 

I’ve often said that President Obama is the first President of the 

United States that at least knows where the Pacific Ocean is. For 

the simple reason that when we talk about Asian Pacific, it’s almost like a foreign language to many of our policymakers here in 

Washington, DC. 

I say this with interest, Mr. Chairman, because both you and I 

as Vietnam veterans, I know we’ve taken a lot deeper understanding of the fact that many times the policies that we enunciate 

toward Asian-Pacific region have not been very positive, out of the 

fact that I think we don’t know the complexity of the region, and 

for the simple reason that we just have not had a very positive experience in dealing with the peoples of the Asian-Pacific region. 

I do appreciate the fact that this administration and President 

Obama and Secretary Clinton, in the initiatives that they’ve taken 

for the past 2 years, I think it’s positive. And yet, we need to do 

more. 

And I believe that you have hit it right on the nail in terms of 

the challenges that Secretary Reed is going to have when she becomes Ambassador to these five different countries. Even though by 

way of population that seems to be sometimes the way we operate 

as a matter of policy—if the country is not heavily populated, we 

don’t seem to take much interest in it. And we see this in the Pacific region as a classic example. 

416

And my basic criticism, Mr. Chairman, of our policy toward the 

Pacific region is that we have no policy. Our policy toward the Pacific region has only been toward Australia and New Zealand, and 

all the other countries are only incidental to this policy. 

And I sincerely hope that Secretary Reed, and I know from her 

given experience, that it’s going to become a lot more positive, more 

engaging, and I really believe that we ought not neglect the needs 

of these 14 island countries, sovereignties, and we should pay more 

attention to the problems of the Pacific. 

And you and I could not agree more of the fact that we should 

pay more attention to Asia, as well. Despite the fact that President 

Obama has taken the initiative—a lot of meetings, a lot of conferences, a lot of this, but we need to be a little more substantive 

in terms of what we really mean we should do, we ought to do, 

when dealing with the Asian-Pacific region. 

So with that, Mr. Chairman, again, I want to thank you for giving me this opportunity to comment on the distinguished nominees 

that we have here, especially my good friend Secretary Frankie 

Reed. And I sincerely hope that the committee will approve her 

nomination as Ambassador to Fiji. 

I will not go into the crisis or the problems we’re dealing with 

Fiji at this point in time. Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, if you have questions, I would be more than happy to assist in that regard. But 

again, I want to thank you for this opportunity and I yield back. 

Senator WEBB. Congressman, thank you very much for taking 

the walk to the other side of the Capitol and being with us this 

morning, and for your long years of service to our country and to 

Congress. We very much appreciate you coming and expressing 

your support for Ambassador-to-be Reed. 

Thank you again for being with us. And I know you probably 

have things waiting for you on the House side this morning. 

At this time, I’d like to introduce Derek Mitchell, who has been 

nominated to be Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for 

Burma, with the rank of Ambassador. Currently, he is Principal 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. Prior to this position, Mr. Mitchell was a senior fellow 

at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; special assistant at the Department of Defense; and a senior program officer 

at the National Democratic Institute. He has a master’s degree 

from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, a bachelor’s degree from the University of Virginia. 

Welcome, Mr. Mitchell. I know you would like to introduce those 

who are here today to support your nomination, and please do that. 

We welcome your wife. I had a chance to say hello to her before 

we came up here, but please do so, and then we’ll look forward to 

your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF DEREK J. MITCHELL, OF CONNECTICUT, TO 

BE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND POLICY COORDINATOR 

FOR BURMA, WITH THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR 

Mr. MITCHELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me, indeed, introduce my wife first, Min Lee, who is right behind me. She is a reporter. We used to work in Taiwan. She’s originally from Taiwan and now works for a cable station in Hong 

417

Kong. But I want to welcome Min, who is sitting right behind me, 

so thank you very much for the opportunity. 

Senator WEBB. Welcome. 

You may proceed. 

Excuse me, I neglected to say that Senator Kerry has a statement he would like to have introduced into the record, and it will 

be included at this point. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Kerry follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY, CHAIRMAN, SENATE FOREIGN RELATIIONS COMMITTEE

Today, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee convenes to consider the nominations of Derek Mitchell to be Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for 

Burma, with the rank of Ambassador, and Frankie Reed to be Ambassador to the 

Republic of the Fiji Islands, the Republic of Nauru, the Kingdom of Tongo, Tuvalu, 

and the Republic of Kiribati. 

Both the nominees before the committee today have distinguished records, and 

they are well qualified to represent the United States overseas in these important 

posts. 

Given the moral imperative of fashioning a wise policy that benefits Burma’s longsuffering people, I would like to take a moment to discuss the opportunities and 

challenges that await one of our nominees: Mr. Mitchell, our current Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, and the 

President’s deserving choice to be his special envoy for Burma. 

If confirmed, I have every confidence that Mr. Mitchell will faithfully implement 

the Obama administration’s ‘‘dual-track’’ approach toward Burma. After years of a 

one-sided, ‘‘sanctions only’’ policy that did not produce change, the administration 

is seeking to combine pressure with principled engagement to encourage the Burmese Government to embrace reforms and make a genuine transition to civilian, 

democratic rule. Let me be clear: The special envoy position’s mandate is to undertake a comprehensive international effort that includes both engagement with Burma’s leaders and working with Burma’s neighbors and international organizations 

to coordinate more effectively pressure for change. This holistic approach holds the 

best chance of achieving real results. 

When he arrives in Naypyidaw for the first time early in his tenure, the President’s envoy will need to assess the implications of recent developments in Burma, 

including the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, the controversial 

2010 elections, and the formation of a government led by a former top regime general and now President, Thein Sein. 

Many questions linger about Burma’s new Parliament and its ‘‘civilian’’ government. The elections that produced them reflected a deeply flawed process with highly restrictive rules that excluded the main opposition party, the National League for 

Democracy (NLD). All the while, the NLD’s longstanding leader Daw Suu remained 

sidelined under house arrest. Members affiliated with the old regime and military 

appointees occupy almost 90 percent of all positions in the legislatures. While many 

former military officers now wear civilian clothes, Senior General Than Shwe’s role 

in daily affairs is not readily apparent. It is similarly unclear how much power 

various institutions such as the Presidency, Vice Presidencies, the Cabinet, the 

Parliament, the United Solidarity and Development Party and the Tatmadaw (the 

military) will wield over time. 

If confirmed, I expect Mr. Mitchell will test and probe in principled ways to understand the new political dynamics inside Burma and see if there is a possibly changing environment that is more amenable to calls for reform. This will require him 

to consult broadly with various stakeholders, including the government; Daw Suu 

and other current and future NLD leaders; other legitimate democratic groups; civil 

society; ethnic groups; and, of course, the international community. While creatively 

exploring how best to encourage political change, our envoy will also need to search 

for ways to help Burma’s people today, including through more effective implementation of humanitarian programs that can empower them. 

The Burmese Government could take some tangible steps to show it is sincere 

about making real progress: Releasing political prisoners, easing media and speech 

restrictions, making good on President Thein Sein’s recent promises of economic reforms, devoting more resources to education and health, as well as allowing greater 

space for international and nongovernmental organizations to help meet the critical 

needs of the Burmese people would be a good start. Minimal concrete steps to date 

418

in these areas combined with deeply troubling reports of sensitive military technology transfers from North Korea and renewed violence in Kachin state and other 

ethnic regions make fair-minded observers wonder whether Burma is still conducting ‘‘business as usual.’’

I believe the administration is prepared to improve ties with Burma’s Government 

if it breaks from the policies of the past. For their part, Burmese diplomats have 

repeatedly expressed a desire for better relations. In fact, they recently asked for 

a few modest U.S. measures to build confidence such as calling the country by its 

current name—Myanmar—and removing travel restrictions on visitors to its United 

Nations Mission in New York, who have to adhere to a 25-mile limitation. Yet, there 

has been very little progress by Naypyidaw on either core human rights concerns 

or an inclusive dialogue that leads toward national reconciliation. 

In the months ahead, both sides should explore taking carefully calibrated measures independent of each other to begin a process that encourages constructive 

change inside Burma and could lead to serious talk on tough issues. Burma could 

grant the ICRC access to prisoners, for example, while the United States could allow 

it observer status in a signature, new U.S. program focused on environmental, 

health, education, and infrastructure development in mainland Southeast Asia 

called the Lower Mekong Initiative. 

Make no mistake, U.S. efforts to encourage democratic reform and progress on 

human rights will get more traction if our envoy is able to forge greater multilateral 

cooperation on all facets of U.S. Burma policy. Other Southeast Asian countries can 

send a message about their own expectations by linking Burma’s chairmanship of 

ASEAN in 2014 to tangible political progress. Burma’s giant neighbors, China and 

India, are also indispensable partners in this equation. 

My experience working to improve relations with Vietnam taught me that cleareyed diplomacy, combining elements of pressure and engagement, can encourage 

even an authoritarian regime to change course, particularly if Washington works in 

concert with like-minded members of the international community. 

I and others will be watching closely to see whether Burma’s Government is interested in a path toward peace and democracy or whether it remains anchored to the 

failed policies of the past. 

The appointment of a U.S. Presidential envoy dedicated to Burma will afford its 

leaders an important, new opportunity to pursue policies that benefit their people, 

can improve relations with the United States, and begin to repair their international reputation.

Senator WEBB. Go ahead, Mr. Mitchell. 

Mr. MITCHELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I am honored to appear before you today as President Obama’s nominee to serve as the Special Representative and 

Policy Coordinator for Burma with the rank of Ambassador. I am 

truly humbled by the confidence that President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton have shown in me by this nomination. 

As you are well aware, Mr. Chairman, Burma is a nation rich in 

history, rich in culture, and rich in possibility. At the crossroads of 

South and Southeast Asia, Burma sits on sea lanes, natural resources, and fertile soil that create the conditions for potentially 

unlimited development. 

It is, therefore, particularly unfortunate that while much of 

Southeast Asia has become more free, prosperous, and globally 

interconnected in recent decades, Burma has been the outlier. 

Burma remains a country at war with itself and distrustful of 

others. With a Government that has chosen for several decades to 

distance itself from the outside world, Burma now is the poorest 

country in Southeast Asia and a source of great concern and potential instability in the region. 

Although rich in natural and human resources, nearly a third of 

Burma’s population lives in poverty. Hundreds of thousands of its 

citizens are internally displaced and thousands more continue to 

seek refuge and asylum in neighboring countries, largely due to the 

419

central authority’s longstanding conflicts with and systematic repression of the country’s ethnic minority populations. 

Over 2,000 political prisoners languish in detention, even as Burma’s military continues to routinely violate international standards 

of human rights. 

And although the Burmese Government has claimed a successful 

transition to a ‘‘disciplined, flourishing democracy,’’ a political system that exhibits anything close to recognizable standards of representative democracy remains to be seen. 

As a result, United States relations with Burma have been 

strained. Over the past 2 decades, however, international policies 

of either pressure or engagement, as you have suggested yourself, 

Mr. Chairman, alone have not produced the change in Burma that 

we and the rest of the international community seek. 

In September 2009, the Obama administration completed its 

Burma policy review and announced its intention to pursue a more 

flexible U.S. policy approach that integrated both sanctions and engagement, a dual-track approach fully consistent with President 

Obama’s call for ‘‘principled engagement’’ with nations around the 

world. 

Congress’ establishment of a Special Representative and Policy 

Coordinator for Burma was meant, in my view, to enable a more 

focused, sustained, coordinated, and ultimately effective attention 

on Burma by the U.S. Government. 

Although United States policy toward Burma has evolved, the 

overriding objective has and, I believe, should not: The United 

States still seeks a peaceful, prosperous, open, and democratic 

Burma that respects the rights of all its citizens and that adheres 

to its international obligations. The United States remains prepared to establish a positive relationship, based on mutual respect 

and mutual benefit, with a Burmese leadership that adheres to and 

advances these principles. 

If I am confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I will seek opportunities for direct and candid dialogue with the regime concerning a path forward for our relationship with Burma that is consistent with our 

values and broader national interests, and contributes to Burma’s 

own development as a secure and prosperous nation at peace with 

itself. I will report regularly, including to the U.S. Congress, on the 

results of this engagement, so we may calibrate our dual-track policy appropriately. 

I believe we should be prepared to respond flexibly and with agility to opportunities as they arise in Burma, according to evolving 

conditions on the ground. 

If confirmed, I will also conduct extensive consultations with key 

stakeholders inside and outside government, at home and abroad. 

My objective will be to implement U.S. law faithfully and coordinate efforts to advance our common objectives. 

To date, in my view, the inability of key members of the Burmainterested community around the world to coordinate their approach to Burma has only undermined the effective realization of 

our shared objectives. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe I have the right mix of skills, experience, and regional expertise to carry out fully the congressional 

mandate for this position. I currently serve, as you said, as the 

420

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, where I have been responsible for overseeing U.S. security policy and strategy throughout East, Southeast, South, and 

Central Asia. 

I have more than 20 years of experience studying and working 

on Asia from various perspectives, both inside and outside of government, from within the United States and in Asia itself. 

Mr. Chairman, I know you take a particularly keen personal interest in the situation in Burma, as do many others in Congress, 

throughout our country, and around the world. It is a country of 

unique interest to me as well. It would be a great privilege to serve 

my country as the first Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma. 

If confirmed, I will bring the full weight of my diverse experience, personal contacts, understanding of Asia, and strategic instincts to this position. I will consult closely with you and other 

members of this committee in Congress to fulfill the mandate of 

this position in the interests of the United States and toward the 

betterment of the people of Burma. 

Thank you for considering my nomination. I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mitchell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DEREK MITCHELL

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you 

today as the President’s nominee to serve as the Special Representative and Policy 

Coordinator for Burma with the rank of Ambassador. I appreciate the confidence 

that President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton have shown in me by this 

nomination. 

As you are well aware, Burma is a nation rich in history, rich in culture, and rich 

in possibility. At the crossroads of South and Southeast Asia, Burma sits on sea 

lanes, natural resources, and fertile soil that create the conditions for potentially 

unlimited development. 

It is therefore particularly unfortunate that while much of Southeast Asia has become more free, prosperous, and globally interconnected in recent decades, Burma 

has been the outlier. Burma remains a country at war with itself and distrustful 

of others. With a government that has chosen for several decades to distance itself 

from the outside world, Burma now is the poorest country in Southeast Asia and 

a source of great concern and potential instability in the region. Although rich in 

natural and human resources, nearly a third of Burma’s population lives in poverty. 

Hundreds of thousands of its citizens are internally displaced and thousands more 

continue to seek refuge and asylum in neighboring countries largely due to the central authority’s longstanding conflicts with and systematic repression of the country’s ethnic minority populations. Over 2,000 political prisoners languish in detention, while Burma’s military continues to routinely violate international human 

rights. 

Overall, the average Burmese citizen lacks fundamental freedoms and civil rights. 

Although the Burmese Government has claimed a successful transition to a ‘‘disciplined, flourishing democracy,’’ a political system that exhibits anything close to 

recognizable standards of representative democracy remains to be seen. I am encouraged that the new President of Burma speaks of reform and change, but the 

pathway to real national reconciliation, unity among its diverse peoples, and sustainable development requires concrete action to protect human rights and to promote representative and responsive governance. 

As a result, U.S. relations with Burma have been strained. Over the past two 

decades, international policies of either pressure or engagement alone have not produced the change in Burma that we and the rest of the international community 

seek. In 2008, Congress directed the establishment of a Special Representative and 

Policy Coordinator for Burma to enable more focused, sustained, and coordinated 

attention on Burma by the U.S. Government. Consistent with this directive, in 

September 2009, the Obama administration completed its Burma policy review and 

announced its intention to pursue a more flexible U.S. policy approach that inteVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00428 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
421

grated both sanctions and engagement to achieve results in Burma. This dual-track 

approach is fully consistent with President Obama’s call for ‘‘principled engagement’’ 

with nations around the world. 

Although U.S. policy toward Burma has evolved, our overriding objective has not: 

the United States still seeks a peaceful, prosperous, open, and democratic Burma 

that respects the rights of all its citizens and adheres to its international obligations. The United States remains prepared to establish a positive relationship, 

based on mutual respect and mutual benefit, with a Burmese leadership that 

advances these principles. 

If I am confirmed, my role as ‘‘Special Representative and Policy Coordinator’’ will 

be to work closely with and build upon the excellent foundation established by 

Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 

Joseph Yun in implementing Burma policy. I will seek opportunities for direct and 

candid dialogue with the regime concerning a path forward for Burma that promotes 

our values and broader national interests, and contributes to Burma’s own development as a secure and prosperous nation. Of course, engagement is not an end in 

itself or the single measure of success: engagement must be time-bound, resultsbased, and accompanied by meaningful progress. If confirmed, I will report regularly 

to the White House, Secretary of State Clinton, and the U.S. Congress on the results 

of our dialogue and evidence of such progress so we may calibrate our dual-track 

policy appropriately. I believe we should be prepared to respond flexibly and with 

agility to opportunities available in Burma and according to evolving conditions on 

the ground. 

If confirmed, I will also conduct extensive consultations with key stakeholders 

both inside and outside government, at home and abroad. My objective will be to 

implement U.S. law faithfully and coordinate efforts to advance the common international objectives of bringing about in Burma the unconditional release of all political prisoners, respect for human rights, an inclusive dialogue between the regime 

and the political opposition, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and ethnic groups that 

would lead to national reconciliation, and Burma’s adherence to its international obligations, including all U.N. Security Council resolutions on nonproliferation. To 

date, in my view, the inability of key members of the international community to 

coordinate their approach to Burma has undermined the effective realization of our 

shared objectives. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe I have the right mix of skills, experience, and regional 

expertise to carry out fully the congressional mandate for this position. My first job 

in Washington was in the foreign policy office of the late Senator Ted Kennedy, 

where I learned the importance of congressional oversight, particularly on international issues of unique interest to Members and the American people. I have more 

than 20 years of experience studying and working on Asia from various perspectives 

both inside and outside of government, from within the United States and in Asia 

itself. For 8 years, I led the Asia division at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) International Security Program and established CSIS’ 

Southeast Asia Initiative. I currently serve as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, where I have been responsible for 

overseeing U.S. security policy and strategy throughout East, Southeast, South, and 

Central Asia. 

My first visit to Burma was in 1995, when I traveled to Rangoon with the 

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and met with government officials, international NGO representatives, and political party leaders, including the 

remarkable Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. I made subsequent visits, which solidified my 

appreciation for the richness of the country’s history and culture as well as the tragic limitations of its political and economic development. I retained a keen interest 

in Burma’s affairs in the years since, and cowrote an article in the journal Foreign 

Affairs in 2007 that outlines a new U.S. policy approach to the country not dissimilar to results of the Obama administration’s 2009 policy review. 

Mr. Chairman, I know you take a particularly keen personal interest in the situation in Burma, as do many others in Congress, throughout our country, and around 

the world. It is a country of unique interest to me as well. It would be a great privilege to serve my country as the first Special Representative and Policy Coordinator 

for Burma. If confirmed, I will bring the full weight of my diverse experience, personal contacts, understanding of Asia, and strategic instincts to this position. I will 

consult closely with you and other members of this committee and in the Congress 

to fulfill the mandate of this position in the interest of the United States and toward 

the betterment of the people of Burma.

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much, Mr. Mitchell. 

And, Ms. Reed, welcome. 

422

Let me first mention that, as the congressman noted in his introduction, Frankie A. Reed is a career Foreign Service officer. She 

served in Cameroon, Kenya, Senegal, Samoa, Guinea, and France. 

Currently, she’s Deputy Assistant Secretary of East Asian and Pacific Affairs for Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands. 

She has a law degree from the University of California at Berkeley, 

a bachelor’s degree in journalism from Howard University. Prior to 

joining the Department of State, Ms. Reed practiced law, worked 

in print journalism, spent 2 years as a Peace Corps Volunteer. 

And I know that you have people who have come to support your 

nomination, so I’d like to give you the chance to welcome them, and 

then we’ll go to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF FRANKIE ANNETTE REED, OF MARYLAND, TO 

BE AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE FIJI ISLANDS, 

AND TO SERVE CONCURRENTLY AS AMBASSADOR TO THE 

REPUBLIC OF NAURU, THE KINGDOM OF TONGA, TUVALU, 

AND THE REPUBLIC OF KIRIBATI 

Ms. REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have my cousin, Susan 

Reed Slocum, and her husband here today. 

Senator WEBB. Welcome. 

You may take such time as you care. 

Ms. REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am deeply honored that the President has nominated me to be 

the United States Ambassador to the Republic of the Fiji Islands, 

the Republic of Kiribati, the Republic of Nauru, the Kingdom of 

Tonga, and Tuvalu. I want to thank the President and Secretary 

Clinton for nominating me for this position, and thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before you and this committee today. 

The United States Ambassador resident in Fiji, as we have 

noted, is responsible for the bilateral relationships with five independent nations. 

Embassy Suva is a busy hub of American activity in the Pacific. 

The staff collaborates with multilateral organizations, including the 

Pacific Island Forum. In addition, the Embassy also has consular 

and commercial responsibilities for French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and Wallis and Futuna, making it the largest geographic 

consular district in the world, one which attracts over 150,000 

Americans annually. 

Fiji, in the heart of the Pacific region, is a diverse country of 

some 850,000 people. It is a regional transport and communications 

hub, as well as the site of the University of the South Pacific and 

the regional headquarters of many foreign aid organizations. 

In December 2006, as we also noted, the Fijian military, led by 

Commodore Bainimarama, overthrew the country’s lawfully elected 

government. This event has created a prolonged political and economic crisis in Fiji. 

In accordance with the foreign operations assistance act, the 

United States suspended military and other foreign assistance programs in Fiji and will maintain these sanctions on Fiji until a return to a civilian government. That return must be signaled by a 

transparent, inclusive process that includes all elements of Fijian 

society. 

423

We look forward to working with the Fijian Government on continued law enforcement training with police and port security officials, however. And, if confirmed, we also look forward to a deepened cooperation on disaster preparedness with the Pacific Command Center for Excellence. 

If confirmed, I will work with the Fijian people, the government, 

and other regional partners to push for early elections, elections restoring Fiji to the path of democracy. 

The Pacific Islands face many of the same global issues that 

other countries face, but in this particular region, the repercussions 

can be more acute. 

These countries, many of them low-lying atolls, will be the first 

to experience the effects of climate change and environmental degradation. 

Tuvalu, one of the world’s smallest nations, has nine atolls only 

a few feet above sea level. Nauru’s once bountiful phosphate mines 

are almost exhausted. The problem of overfishing and threatened 

marine resources hits hard in the Pacific, since island states are 

dependent upon fish stocks not only for the sustenance of their people, but also as a major source of government revenue. 

If confirmed, I will work with these nations and regional partners like the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, as well as our 

Australia and New Zealand partners, to address these pressing 

global issues. 

Despite these challenges at home, these Pacific islands are our 

partners in fostering both regional and global stability. Tonga and 

Tuvalu became early members of the coalition to liberate Iraq. 

Tongan troops are currently serving in Afghanistan. Fiji contributes 600 soldiers to peacekeeping operations in Iraq, the Middle 

East, Sudan, and Liberia. 

Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, and Tuvalu occupy a strategically 

important part of the Pacific. They are our partners in addressing 

critical global and regional issues. 

If confirmed, I will do my best to continue to strengthen relations 

between the United States and each of these five countries. Working together, we can achieve our common goals for a stable, peaceful, and prosperous region. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Reed follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRANKIE REED

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am deeply honored that the 

President has nominated me to be United States Ambassador to the Republic of the 

Fiji Islands, the Republic of Kiribati, the Republic of Nauru, the Kingdom of Tonga, 

and Tuvalu. I want to thank the President and the Secretary for nominating me 

for this position and thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

Currently, I serve as the Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of East Asian 

and Pacific Affairs responsible for relations with Australia, New Zealand and the 

Pacific Island posts (Fiji, Tonga, Kiribati, Samoa, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, and 

Palau), the Consul General and Deputy U.S. Observer to the Council of Europe and 

the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France, the Deputy Chief of 

Mission in Guinea and in Samoa, and as the Deputy Director in the Office of Australia, New Zealand and Pacific Island Affairs. My service outside of the Department of State includes that of Diplomat in Residence at the University of California 

and as a Pearson Congressional Fellow. 

424

The U.S. Ambassador resident in Fiji is responsible for the bilateral relationships 

with five independent nations. Embassy Suva is a busy hub of American activity 

in the Pacific. Some 26 American employees and 80 Foreign Nationals work to advance U.S. interests over a stretch of the Pacific Ocean. The dedicated staff members collaborate with multilateral organizations, and promote regional public diplomacy activities, environmental programs and policies, the National Export Initiative, and defense-related relationships on a daily basis. If confirmed, I will engage 

closely with the Pacific Islands Forum continuing the good work of my predecessor, 

who was designated as the first U.S. Representative to the PIF. The Embassy also 

has consular and commercial responsibilities for French Polynesia, New Caledonia, 

and Wallis and Futuna, making this geographically the largest consular district in 

the world, spanning across 3,000 miles and attracting approximately 55,000 Americans annually. 

Fiji, located in the heart of the Pacific region, is an ethnically and religiously diverse country of 850,000 people. It is a regional transport and communications hub, 

as well as the site of the University of the South Pacific and the regional headquarters of many foreign aid organizations, NGOs, and multilateral organizations, 

including the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. The New Embassy Compound in 

Suva, opened in June this year, serves four other U.S. Embassies in the region as 

the hub for our Regional Environmental, Labor, Law Enforcement, Public Diplomacy, and Defense offices. 

Fiji’s unique position in the Pacific makes it a key focal point for our larger regional engagement with the South Pacific. In comparison with other small Pacific 

Island nations, Fiji has a fairly diversified economy. It remains a developing country 

with a large subsistence agriculture sector, and Fiji is rich in natural resources including gold, timber, and marine fisheries. For many years, sugar and textile exports drove Fiji’s economy. However, neither industry is currently competing effectively in globalized markets. Additionally, remittances from Fijians working abroad, 

and a growing tourist industry—with 400,000 to 500,000 tourists annually—are the 

major sources of foreign exchange. However, Fiji’s tourism industry as well remains 

damaged by the coup and continues to face an uncertain recovery time. 

In December 2006, the Fijian military, led by Commodore Voreqe (Frank) 

Bainimarama, overthrew the country’s lawfully elected government creating a prolonged political and economic crisis in Fiji. Fiji’s coup leaders have not taken any 

credible steps to restore democratic institutions. The public emergency regulations 

remain in place; the press remains heavily censored and the right to assembly is 

severely restricted. The United States has consistently advocated for the Fijian regime to take steps to return democracy to the Fijian people by holding free and fair 

elections and an end to Fiji’s Public Emergency Restrictions (PER). A promise to 

hold in 2009 did not materialize and the government has now said it will hold elections in 2014. 

A key feature of our engagement with Fiji is close consultation and coordination 

with Australia, New Zealand, and other regional players. We seek more direct engagement with Fiji’s Government and encourage it to take the necessary steps to 

restore democracy and freedom. By taking credible steps toward an increased civilian role in government, lifting of the PERs and other democratic reforms, Fiji can 

work toward reintegrating into international institutions and restoring its former 

international role. Assistant Secretary Campbell is in the region now continuing our 

engagement with our friends in the Pacific; and if confirmed, I will do the same. 

Also, we look forward to discussing Fiji at the upcoming September Pacific Island 

Forum Leaders meeting in Auckland. 

Following the 2006 coup, the United States suspended military and other assistance to Fiji under section 7008 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. This 

suspension applies to foreign military financing, International Military Education 

and Training grants, peacekeeping operations, and military aid that falls under section 1206 of the of the 2006 Defense Authorization law. The United States will 

maintain these sanctions on Fiji until a return to civilian government, signaled by 

a transparent, inclusive, open-ended process including all elements of Fijian society. 

U.S. foreign assistance to Fiji has been suspended due to the coup. If it resumes 

due to a return to a democratically elected government, assistance will remain focused on security for Fiji. 

On occasion the United States cooperates with civilian police authorities and, if 

confirmed, I will continue to work with the Fijian Government on law enforcement 

training with police and port security officials. The United States also plans to provide substantive technical assistance toward an elections process once Fiji’s Public 

Emergency Restrictions are lifted and credible democratization timetables are implemented. Fiji’s Strategic Framework for Change envisions a timeline for elections 

in 2014, but inclusive national dialogue and concrete steps to restore a democratic 

425

process should begin as early as possible. If confirmed, I am prepared to meet with 

all levels of government, civil society, and other regional partners, to push for early 

elections and restoring democracy in Fiji. 

Pacific Island nations face many of the same global issues that other countries 

face, but in this particular region, the repercussions can be more acute. These countries, many of them low-lying atolls, will be the first to experience the effects of climate change and environmental degradation. Tuvalu, one of the world’s smallest 

nations, has nine atolls only a few feet above sea level. Nauru’s once bountiful phosphate mines are almost exhausted. HIV/AIDS, drug smuggling, and human trafficking are also growing concerns. The problem of overfishing and threatened marine resources, another global problem, hits hard in the Pacific, since Island states 

are dependent upon fish stocks not only for the sustenance of their people, but also 

as a major source of government revenue. Non communicable diseases like diabetes 

and heart disease among the Pacific Island population are also an area of increasing 

concern. Kiribati participates in regular consultations based on our 1979 Treaty of 

Friendship. 

The challenges are many, but these small states are open to working with us, and 

we have learned that focused, timely engagement can have a large impact. If confirmed, I will work with all members of the U.S. Government and private sectors, 

as well as regional partners like Australia and New Zealand to try to address these 

pressing issues. Historically, Pacific Island nations have been our friends but others 

are increasing their profile in this strategic region, and we want to ensure that 

nothing gets in the way of our close mutually supportive cooperation. 

Despite these challenges at home, these Pacific Islands are our partners in fostering both regional and global stability. In the recent November 2010 elections, 

Tonga has shown its commitment to the region in being consistent in its vision toward democratization in that country. Tonga and Tuvalu were early members of the 

coalition in Iraq. Tongan troops are currently serving in Afghanistan. Fiji contributes approximately 600 soldiers toward peacekeeping operations in Iraq, the Middle 

East, Sudan, and Liberia. 

Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, and Tuvalu occupy a strategically important portion 

of the Pacific. They are our partners in addressing critical global and regional 

issues. If confirmed, I will do my best to continue to strengthen relations between 

the United States and each of these five countries. Working together, we can 

achieve our common goals for a stable, peaceful and prosperous region.

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much. 

And I should point out that your full statements, if they vary at 

all from what you said, will be entered into the record at the conclusion of your oral statements. Also that there may be other members of the committee who have questions, and the record will be 

held open until tomorrow evening, in case they would like to submit those questions in writing and have them included as part of 

the record. 

Let me start, Mr. Mitchell, with some questions for you. 

First a technical one: Have you been informed as to how your position is going to fit into the hierarchy of the State Department? 

Who’s going to be the lead person for policy toward Burma? And 

how are you going to fit into that? 

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, it is the first time someone will have this 

position, so it will need to be worked out over time and in practice. 

I have been told that I will take a lead role on Burma policy but, 

obviously, in consultation with East Asia-Pacific office there, with 

Kurt Campbell, with Joe Yun, and obviously in close consultation 

with the Secretary. But I’ve been told that I’ll be taking a leading 

role in consultation, in essence. 

Senator WEBB. We haven’t had an ambassador to Burma since 

1990, how do you feel about this in terms of affecting your ability 

to engage the Government and the diplomatic representatives of 

other countries in Burma? 

Mr. MITCHELL. I think we can engage effectively. This has been 

a longstanding issue. We haven’t had an ambassador for a couple 

426

decades now. But I think it’s a matter of what we say and how we 

say it, as well. We need to take this a step at a time. 

But I think we can engage effectively with the charge ́ there and 

with my position and other channels. 

Senator WEBB. A key part of your role as defined by the JADE 

Act is to consult with regional partners and others to coordinate 

policy. What is your view of ASEAN’s current policy toward 

Burma? 

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, ASEAN has traditionally taken a different 

approach. They have their ASEAN way of noninterference and very 

strict notions of sovereignty and such. 

Things are changing. Things are evolving within ASEAN. There 

are some key members, including Indonesia, that have made the 

transition from a Burma-like system to a democracy. 

So things are shifting there. They want to hold together, though, 

so there is a kind of consensus approach that limits the ability to 

take a more hard-line toward Burma. 

They have sought engagement. They’ve pursued the constructive 

engagement approach for some time. I think they realize, as we 

have, as I said in my statement, that pure engagement, pure pressure is not necessarily getting the results we want. 

And a key aspect of my job, a central aspect of my job, is going 

to be coordinating with ASEAN, coordinating with ASEAN nations 

to find a coordinated approach that gets us further down to where 

we both want to be. 

Senator WEBB. As you know, there is some serious discussion 

that Burma may chair ASEAN in 2014 and that this prospect could 

actually incentivize the Government toward more rapid change. 

What is your view or has the State Department taken a view on 

this as of yet? 

Mr. MITCHELL. I don’t think the State Department has taken a 

view. This is for the ASEANs to determine themselves. 

But I’m sure there’s diplomatic outreach to ASEAN talking about 

this issue, but I can’t comment about where they stand on that. 

Senator WEBB. What are your thoughts about that prospect? 

Mr. MITCHELL. About chairing ASEAN? I think, frankly, where 

Burma is today—I mean, ASEAN recognizes that Burma is an 

outlier, that Burma is somewhat of an embarrassment to the organization, that it is not moving in the direction that they want it 

to, even with the so-called elections and such that have happened 

late last year and the government now in Naypyidaw. 

So I think they’re wondering, they’re debating themselves, 

whether this is the right time and whether Burma itself needs to 

prove that it deserves that kind of position within ASEAN, to be 

basically the face of ASEAN for a year. That’s pretty substantial. 

I mean, Burma has some work to do in order to make ASEAN 

nations comfortable with that, and the rest of the international 

community, I should say. 

Senator WEBB. You mentioned something a minute ago about Indonesia having evolved from a military system. Vietnam and China 

have never held democratic elections, yet have opened up their 

economies to the outside world, have spurred regional economic development, and have transformed their domestic societies a great 

deal through that process, which is obviously not perfect. 

427

But Indonesia was a system viewed as corrupt and controlled by 

the military. But over the course of decades, it’s evolved into a fairly successful democracy and a leader in Southeast Asia. 

What type of model do you see for Burma’s political and economic 

transition? 

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, every country has its own model. There’s no 

perfect cookie-cutter approach for countries. Burma will have its 

own path to development and progress. 

Indonesia I think clearly provides a very, very useful model. 

They used to actually want to model themselves after Indonesia, 

before Indonesia changed. I would hope they would continue that 

talking point today, given how Indonesia has changed from being 

a military-dominated society to a democracy that is more stable 

than not and developing. 

Burma hasn’t made the choice that China and Vietnam have in 

terms of opening up, and economic reform and such. So I think 

they’re very different situations, but we’ll see how Burma proceeds. 

Senator WEBB. Well, wouldn’t you agree that one of the reasons 

that Burma hasn’t made that choice is that they’ve had sanctions 

on them, and once sanctions were lifted—for instance, in Vietnam, 

once the trade embargo was lifted in 1994, it enabled a different 

type of interaction from the outside world, not only economic but 

on many different levels. 

Mr. MITCHELL. I think Burma, traditionally, it’s paranoia and it’s 

xenophobia, and it’s isolation. It’s isolated itself for many decades. 

And there’s still that old thing there. There is a lot of concern 

about what this all will mean for the people in control of the system, including the economic system. They did that to themselves, 

and I think the sanctions were put in place in part because the 

sense was that the elites were doing well and the rest of the people 

were not. This was not a country that was seeking real change. It 

was maybe only enough change to benefit the few. 

But we should watch how they develop. We should watch how 

they proceed and see if development can assist the people of 

Burma. 

Senator WEBB. You would agree, would you not, that sanctions 

from the outside affect the ability of a country to evolve economically and in other ways? You can’t just say that Burma did this to 

itself. I’m not defending the Burmese regime, but just the reality 

of how sanctions policies work. 

Mr. MITCHELL. Sanctions certainly does affect our business investment and trade. There’s no question about that. 

But I think, fundamentally, the problem is not sanctions, when 

it comes to their economic development or where they are economically. I think, fundamentally, they have to make decisions about 

how they want to order their system in a way that really benefits 

the people of Burma. 

Senator WEBB. Well, at a time when we have had these sanctions 

in place, Beijing has made well more than $5 billion in direct investment without asking for any sort of political change inside the 

country. 

And I know from personal experiences of American businesses 

that were in Burma that had to leave once the sanctions were put 

into place. And the comment at the time, this was 2001, was that 

428

we were going to cut off our ability to help effect change inside the 

country. 

So wouldn’t you agree that a two-step approach, similar to what 

we have in place but taking advantage of signals from this newly 

formed government, would possibly include lowering sanctions? 

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, as I said in my testimony, as well, I think 

we do need to be flexible. We need to evolve according to conditions 

on the ground, if we see things are fundamentally changing. 

I mean, I don’t think there’s an ideology of sanctions—it is the 

law, of course. I’m going to fulfill the law and it’s up to Congress 

to lift these restrictions. It won’t be up to me, necessarily. 

But clearly, we need to watch what’s going on there, and if we 

do find, as in our humanitarian assistance, that we are able to get 

in and help the people of Burma, truly help the people of Burma 

through our engagement in that way, then we ought to be considering that. 

But right now, we’re not necessarily seeing those signals, and I 

don’t think we’re seeing the change from the Burmese Government 

that makes that productive. 

Senator WEBB. I hope you get your feet on the ground over there 

and maybe you can come back and have another discussion about 

what the signals are. Thant Myint-U, who I think is one of the 

most thoughtful and balanced observers of what’s going on in 

Burma, is saying pretty strongly that there’s a window here that 

could be taken advantage of, for the benefit of the United States 

position in that part of the world and also for the ability of the people inside the country to be able to reconnect with the international 

community. 

And so, let’s see if we can’t get a really clear look at the signals 

that are being given off. And again, one of his comments to me was 

that this was a window. If we don’t take advantage of it, it could 

very well go back the other way, and we certainly wouldn’t want 

to see that. 

Mr. MITCHELL. I should say, Mr. Chairman, he’s a friend of mine. 

I’ve talked to him several times about this, and I’ve heard the same 

from him. And I certainly will keep my eyes and ears open. I’m not 

coming in with any preconceived notions in that regard. 

Senator WEBB. You wrote an article in Foreign Affairs in 2007. 

One of the quotes was, ‘‘All parties have good reasons to make concessions. None of them can afford to watch Burma descend further 

into isolation and desperation and wait to act until another generation of its people is lost.’’

What are your thoughts about that now? 

Mr. MITCHELL. I continue to believe that. That’s why this position is meant to go out and coordinate and discuss with other partners around the world, with ASEAN, with India, with China, with 

Europe, and Japan, Korea, and others, about how we get a coordinated approach, where strict sanctions or strict engagement, which 

hasn’t worked uncoordinated—maybe I think we can find ways that 

we can come together on a more coherent approach, even if we 

have different impulses. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. 

Ms. Reed, I’d say, listening to the Congressman’s introduction, 

and talking about this part of the world, I’ve had the pleasure of, 

429

I’d guess I would say bouncing around Pacific Asia over the years 

and wearing different hats. I worked in Guam and Micronesia, at 

one point, as a military planner. I was out in different spots as a 

journalist. Also had the very emotional opportunity to visit Kiribati 

and the Solomon Islands when I was Secretary of the Navy. And 

Kiribati, as you know, was the site of one of the bloodiest battles 

in Marine Corps history, the Battle of Tarawa. 

It was an incredible experience to stand on that narrow beach 

and look out at the amphibious vehicles that were still in the 

water, and think about all the sacrifices that went on in that remote place. 

And so there are some of us up here who actually have, at some 

level, been involved in those issues. I worked pretty hard on this 

Trust Territory of the Pacific transition into the political divisions 

that are now Micronesia. 

I wish you the best, and the one thing I think about when I am 

in that part of the world or remembering it, I was back in Guam 

and Tinian just a couple months ago, is what the Australians call 

the tyranny of distance. 

And of course, I’d be interested in your thoughts in terms of challenges of your position, with the remote locations of these different 

countries that you’re going to represent, represent us to. 

Ms. REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate your comments, particularly I had the opportunity to listen to some of your 

discussion on Federated States of Micronesia a little over a year 

ago, when we were here for a confirmation hearing for our Ambassadors to Australia, New Zealand, and the Federated States of Micronesia. 

As we are speaking, we have a group led by the Assistant Secretary. This is an interagency group with Admiral Walsh. They are 

visiting nine islands in the Pacific and just left Kiribati and are 

participating in memorial ceremonies also at each of the stops. I 

believe they are just leaving Tonga, also, now. 

But the tyranny of distance is exactly that. I just came back from 

Papua New Guinea, where we were launching a women’s conference, Pacific women leaders. And having missed all of the connections, it was about 29 hours. And that is the challenge. 

I think what is important, in terms of U.S. engagement, is an understanding of the economics of that engagement and why it does 

necessarily cost more in terms of time and people power to undertake this. 

It’s also important in understanding what the economies of these 

island states are like and why it may take a bit more in terms of 

generating strong economies. 

But certainly, not only the historical connection, in terms of regional security, the role that some of these island states, all of 

them, in supporting the United States and the United Nations, it’s 

a very valuable investment. 

Senator WEBB. We have a term in military planning called strategic denial. There are two different ways you look at territories. 

One is strategically where you need to be involved, and the other 

is strategically where you don’t want somebody else to be, because 

it will affect your ability to do things. And the Pacific Ocean area, 

particularly Micronesia, but also Kiribati, these areas, have always 

430

been a concern to United States military planners, in terms of how 

other countries might operate in the region and affect our ability 

to communicate. 

What do you see as the involvement of other major nations in 

this region right now that we should look at, whether it’s economic 

or otherwise, just involvement of larger countries in this region? 

Ms. REED. I guess in formulating my answer to that, I was recently here with the Energy and Resources Committee discussing 

Palau and we talked about strategic denial. And while the impact 

of U.S. resources is probably, and I’m phrasing this carefully, a bit 

more apparent in the freely associated states, for historical reasons, 

and the compacts, of course, it is closely watched by those others. 

Again, another recent trip I made where one of the countries that 

does not have a compact said they wish they did, OK? 

I find in the Pacific, in particular in the small island states, because of the tyranny of distance, there’s a lot of room for other powers to come in, if there’s a void. And in my view, and having spent 

a lot of time out there—we lived in Samoa, Apia, Samoa, western, 

for 3.5 years, a lot of investment that has come in, in between that 

period of time, from other powers, and a lot of that, in my view, 

has to do with the absence—and when I say absence, the United 

States didn’t leave the Pacific, but sometimes we are not as physically present as many of these countries would like. 

Senator WEBB. I would strongly agree with your summation on 

that. 

And what is it, in the areas that you’re going to represent, the 

most important for the United States Government to be doing? 

Ms. REED. These five countries present an opportunity, an almost 

unique opportunity, in terms of the ability for the United States to 

make a big difference in support for democratic reform, not only in 

Fiji, but in the other four. 

Some of these systems have made great headway, Tonga, for example. But at the same time, it’s an occasion to show our support 

through various support for civil society. 

Because of the distance, it’s important to have a physical presence. Engagement means much more than being able to access 

electronic media, some of which is almost nonexistent in many of 

these places. 

When we talk about economic empowerment, this is a place 

where small investment can make a difference, support for smallbusiness institutions, exactly what the U.S. Agency for International Development is so good at. 

The Peace Corps is very present in some of these countries but 

has withdrawn from three. And again, a missed opportunity. You 

have island leaders who still talk about their Peace Corps teachers 

from 30 years back. And it has one of the more successful re-upping rates; that is, Peace Corps Volunteers who decide to do a third 

year or fourth in these island states. 

And in terms of simply regional stability, I think U.S. presence, 

much of what the Pacific Command has been able to do out there, 

Pacific Partnership bringing medical clinics to the outer islands of 

many of these states, many people who have never had an opportunity to see a U.S. physician or nurse, setting up clinics. 

431

That just touches on it just briefly, but I think there’s room for 

quite a bit. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. 

Mr. Mitchell, in several instances over the past year, the State 

Department has issued statements calling for Burma to fulfill its 

nonproliferation obligations, particularly with regard to North 

Korea. 

Last May, Assistant Secretary Campbell made the comment, ‘‘We 

have urged Burma’s senior leadership to abide by its own commitment to fully comply with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874. 

Recent developments call into question that commitment.’’

Do we have evidence that Burma is noncompliant with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874? 

Mr. MITCHELL. I can’t comment on that, personally. I don’t know 

if we have that. 

Senator WEBB. As policy coordinator, what steps do you intend 

to take to examine Burma’s military relationship with North 

Korea, in particular China’s role as an enabler in terms of a point 

of transshipment in this relationship? 

Mr. MITCHELL. This is an absolutely critical issue. This is a core 

concern of ours, because there are reports and there seems to be 

some evidence of this relationship at a number of levels between 

North Korea and Burma. And it’s one reason for engagement, is to 

be very frank and up front face to face, and tell them what’s at 

stake if we get evidence that there is this relationship and they’re 

violating U.N. Security Council resolutions. It will have substantial 

impact on any possibility of a betterment of certainly our bilateral 

relationship and their relations with the outside world. 

Senator WEBB. There’s a recent news report regarding possible 

shipments from North Korea to Burma. And Gary Samore, Special 

Assistant to the President, stated in the Wall Street Journal that 

Burma was among the countries that agreed to apply pressure on 

North Korea, and that contrary to initial press reports implying the 

ship was bound for Burma, the final destination of the North Korean ship was not known. This was the Wall Street Journal report 

of a comment by the Special Assistant to the President. 

What is your view of this? Is this a positive development? Do you 

think it portends anything for future cooperation on nonproliferation? 

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I’d have to defer. I don’t know about that 

report. I can’t substantiate it. I don’t know anything about that, so 

I’d refer to the State Department and the White House on that. 

But if there is evidence, then——

Senator WEBB. If it were correct, you would view that as a positive development? 

Mr. MITCHELL. If correct, obviously very positive. 

Senator WEBB. OK. 

As I said, any questions for the record from other members of the 

committee can be submitted until close of business tomorrow. 

I thank both of you for your testimony today and for your willingness to continue serving our country and for this very useful exchange. 

This hearing is now closed. 

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[Whereupon, at 11 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF DEREK MITCHELL TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. You made clear in your prepared remarks that the Obama administration policy you will pursue, if confirmed, is based on a more flexible approach that 

integrates sanctions and engagement to achieve results in Burma. This ‘‘dual-track’’ 

policy, as you noted, is reflective of President Barack Obama’s broader call for ‘‘principled engagement’’ with countries worldwide. Thus far, the administration’s engagement with Burma has yielded only modest results, as U.S. officials themselves 

point out. But it was also understood that this process would require some time and 

patience. While U.S. policy has evolved, the goal of a more open, democratic, peaceful, and prosperous Burma remains much the same. How will you approach the Burmese Government to advance these principles, and what will be your message to 

senior Burmese officials when you first arrive in Naypyidaw?

Answer. If confirmed, I will engage in a direct dialogue with senior Burmese officials in Nay Pyi Taw—as well as a full range of other leading players in the country—to listen to their perspective on the future direction of Burma, plans for democratic change, national reconciliation, economic reform, and protection of human 

rights, and frankly relay the perspectives and principles of the U.S. Government as 

they will affect our Burma policy going forward. My message to the Government and 

people of Burma will be that the United States harbors no animosity toward Burma 

but rather is committed to advancing Burma’s own stated goal to become an open, 

just, democratic, and prosperous nation that adheres to international laws and 

principles, and serves as a responsible and respected member of the international 

community.

Question. Following last November’s highly controversial elections, Burma’s first 

Parliament in over 20 years completed its inaugural session from January to March 

2011. Notwithstanding the fact that it is early and you have not had a chance to 

have first-hand conversations with relevant actors on the ground, what are your initial observations about how that institution is functioning? If confirmed, what principles would inform your consultations with opposition leaders, and based on those 

principles, with whom in the opposition would you most likely consult in addition 

to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi?

Answer. I was disappointed by media reports that noted Burma’s parliamentary 

sessions were short and scripted and that members had to submit questions in advance. A true democratic legislature should serve as a forum for genuine debate and 

a check on executive branch power. 

If confirmed, my consultations with opposition leaders would affirm these principles while ensuring that I consult with a full range of stakeholders, including civil 

society leaders, ethnic minority representatives, and political parties, in addition to 

Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy and other groups, to enable me to understand the full range of thinking about Burma’s future.

Question. Allegations have recently resurfaced that the Tatmadaw is seeking to 

obtain assistance from North Korea to develop nuclear weapons and missile technology. How do you view such claims and, more generally, the political-military relationship between Burma and North Korea? What might be motivating any Burmese 

efforts to acquire sensitive technologies from overseas?

Answer. I am troubled by reports of military-to-military ties between Burma and 

North Korea. If confirmed, I will monitor closely any reports or questions about 

illicit North Korea-Burma interaction and consult with the committee on any findings in an appropriate classified venue. 

I will also raise our concerns about these reports in Nay Pyi Taw and urge the 

Burmese to be transparent in any dealings they have with North Korea and to comply with their international obligations, including full and transparent implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874.

Question. Burma’s Ministry of National Planning Development reports Burma received $20 billion in inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in the fiscal year ending 

March 11, compared to $302 million in fiscal year 2010. The claim, if reasonably 

accurate, would seem to point to the challenges of coordinating international efforts 

to apply pressure on Burma. If confirmed, how would you try to address the growing 

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importance that Burma’s neighbors seem to be placing on the country as an investment destination?

Answer. Burma is a country that is rich in natural resources, and I have seen 

reports that investment in the country is increasing, particularly in extractive industries. If confirmed, I will engage interested nations about the full range of interests and equities we share in genuine political and economic reform Burma, and our 

potential role in promoting that reform through coordinated and principled engagement. In addition, I would call upon the governments of Burma’s neighboring countries to urge Burmese authorities to comply with international environmental, labor, 

and human rights norms.

Question. One of the responsibilities of the Special Representative is to consult 

with regional and international organizations and other countries to coordinate policies toward Burma. As you know, Burma is scheduled to chair ASEAN in 2014. 

Understanding that ASEAN’s membership must ultimately reach their own decisions, how will you coordinate with them to leverage the ASEAN chairmanship to 

achieve improvement on human rights and more responsive governance?

Answer. If confirmed, I will coordinate and consult closely with ASEAN members 

individually and as an institution to encourage consideration of Burma’s potential 

chairmanship in a manner consistent with ASEAN’s own interests and reputation, 

and the ideals of ASEAN’s own charter with respect to democratic principles, good 

governance, and respect for human rights. I believe the countries of ASEAN will 

have an essential role to play in assisting movement toward reform in Burma.

Question. If recent high-profile visits are instructive, China continues to exert considerable political and economic influence over Burma. China’s ongoing practice is 

to shield Burma from criticism over its human rights record in global fora and to 

thwart international efforts to apply pressure on the Burmese Government that are 

intended to produce improvements in human rights and good governance. If confirmed, how would you approach China to coordinate our activities in ways that 

produce positive changes in Burma? Are there particular areas, for example, that 

you view as potentially ripe for cooperation with China?

Answer. If confirmed, I will pursue dialogue with Chinese officials to identify 

areas of shared concern and potential cooperation, and encourage China to consult 

not only with officials in Nay Pyi Taw but with a wide array of stakeholders. China’s interest in stability on its borders provides an incentive for a common approach 

that encourages national reconciliation through dialogue with, rather than violence 

against, Burma’s ethnic minorities. Likewise, China should understand that only 

through real political and economic reform will Burma achieve true stability, which 

in turn serves China’s interests in the region.

Question. In recent years, India has shifted its approach on Burma to put a much 

greater emphasis on engagement with the Burmese Government. In New Delhi’s 

view, a policy focused principally on engagement is more consistent with India’s interests. Are there ways in which we can encourage India to conduct its engagement 

going forward so that it benefits a more diverse set of stakeholders in Burma and 

better prepares Burma for a transition to a more open, inclusive, and responsive political and economic order?

Answer. India could play a unique role in promoting genuine democratic reform 

in Burma, particularly as the largest democracy in the world and key regional player, but also due to close historical ties with Burma and a shared background as a 

former British colony. India’s free press, flourishing civil society, and ethnic diversity offer a useful example for Burma’s future. India has a wide range of national 

interests in Burma that affect its calculations in dealing with the country. I am convinced, however, that India and the United States have a mutual interest in national reconciliation, reform, and true stability in Burma based on democratic principles. If confirmed, I will consider it an important part of my job to engage India 

to determine how we can leverage our respective strengths and interests toward a 

coordinated international approach to Burma that achieves our common goals, promotes reform, and benefits the people of Burma. 

RESPONSES OF DEREK MITCHELL TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. The Governments of Thailand and Burma have a reciprocity agreement 

to return military personnel of the other country who have fled their country of origin. During the last 4 years, over 100 Burmese military personnel who fled to Thailand were reportedly returned to Burma. Some of these individuals were hoping to 

434

defect to the United States. Will you work within the Obama administration to develop a strategy for approaching Thailand officials to reconsider the policy of returning fleeing military personnel from Burma, especially those who desire relocating to 

the United States?

Answer. If confirmed, I will consult closely with administration officials as well 

as Thai Government officials to help ensure appropriate protection for all Burmese 

fleeing the country, including former members of the military. We need to continue 

to emphasize to Thai authorities that any return of Burmese nationals to Burma 

be voluntary and in line with international norms. We will continue to work closely 

with UNHCR to assist Burmese refugees needing protection and durable solutions 

to their refugee circumstances, including through resettlement in the United States.

Question. Why have economic sanctions targeting Burma’s junta not been fully 

implemented by the U.S. Government? For example, the U.S. Treasury Department 

has not terminated correspondent relationships between overseas financial institutions holding assets of key junta officials and U.S. financial institutions, as allowed 

under present U.S. law. When asked about this, Treasury officials advised that such 

action would require the approval of the Department of State, and was unlikely to 

be received.

Answer. Our sanctions against Burma are comprehensive and target senior government officials and their cronies, among others. As warranted by conditions on 

the ground and new information, our ability to tighten sanctions is an extremely 

important lever of pressure on the regime. We appreciate the authorities Congress 

has provided through the JADE Act. 

If confirmed, I intend to thoroughly review implementation of all existing sanctions, including those authorized and imposed under the JADE Act, to ensure that 

our sanctions regime complies with the law and is implemented as effectively as 

possible.

Question. In 2009, a Burmese military official seeking to defect to the United 

States was turned away at the American Embassy in Bangkok. What are the instructions provided to U.S. embassies on how to respond to persons from Burma 

seeking asylum?

Answer. The Department issues annual guidance to all embassies on procedures 

for handling foreign national walk-ins. We have confirmed that our embassies in the 

region follow these procedures for any Burmese military personnel who may approach the embassy. Embassies are instructed to coordinate with UNHCR regarding 

persons seeking asylum. We will continue to monitor these types of situations closely and coordinate with the appropriate entities to respond to the needs of any Burmese asylum seekers, including military personnel, who may approach an embassy 

in the region.

Question. Please provide the dates and details of communications since 2008 inclusive, when U.S. officials based in the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon approached Burmese officials asking that officials of the International Red Cross be allowed to visit 

with imprisoned political prisoners?

Answer. At every opportunity, we call on the Government of Burma to release all 

political prisoners immediately and unconditionally. We are concerned by the International Committee of the Red Cross’ lack of access to prisons in Burma. I am unable to address the specifics of this question at this time. However, if confirmed, I 

will do all I can to facilitate this inquiry and provide information through a classified briefing if you are still seeking this information at that time.

Question. What steps have been taken by the U.S. Government to encourage countries neighboring Burma to accommodate child soldiers seeking to escape from their 

forced service in Burma’s military?

Answer. We consistently call on Burma’s neighboring countries to provide safety 

and protection to all Burmese fleeing the country, including children seeking to escape involvement in military activities. We work with the international community, 

including at the United Nations, to continue to shed light on the deplorable human 

rights situation in Burma and to urge the Government of Burma to cease this practice and respect basic human rights of all its citizens. Together with the international community, we are urging the government to grant the United Nations access to areas where children are recruited.

Question. If confirmed, will you support Secretary Clinton’s call for a Commission 

on Inquiry related to Burma?

Answer. If confirmed, I will fully support Secretary Clinton’s commitment to seek 

accountability for the human rights violations that have occurred in Burma by 

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working to establish an international Commission of Inquiry through close consultations with our friends, allies, and other partners at the United Nations.

Question. In addition to the export of missiles to Burma from North Korea, are 

North Koreans assisting with the manufacture of missiles inside Burma?

Answer. I would refer you to the intelligence community for an answer to this 

question. If confirmed, I will monitor closely any reports or questions about illicit 

North Korea-Burma interaction and consult with the committee on any findings in 

an appropriate classified venue.

Question. What are the projected annual numbers of MANPADS exported to 

Burma from North Korea and what are the projected numbers of MANPADS reportedly manufactured inside Burma on an annual basis?

Answer. I am unable to provide answers to these questions at this time and would 

refer you to the intelligence community. If confirmed, I will do all I can to facilitate 

this inquiry and provide answers to the committee through a classified briefing, if 

you are still seeking this information at that time.

Question. What is the status of the nuclear reactor reportedly under construction 

in Pakokku Township, Magway Division, Burma? How many North Koreans are estimated to be working at this facility?

Answer. I am unable to provide answers to these questions at this time and would 

refer you to the intelligence community. If confirmed, I will do all I can to monitor 

reports of questionable Burmese activities and ensure the committee receives answers to its questions on this account in the appropriate classified venue.

Question. Is the reported collaboration between Burmese and North Korean officials in Pyin Oo Lwin connected to Burma’s efforts to develop a nuclear weapons 

program?

Answer. I would refer you to the intelligence community for an answer to this 

question. I can say, however, that if confirmed I will monitor closely any reports of 

collaboration between Burma and North Korea, including but not limited to those 

that may violate U.N. Security Council resolutions, and will consult with the committee on this matter in the appropriate classified venue. 

RESPONSES OF FRANKIE REED TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. Please describe the objectives and efforts of U.S. IMET programs in the 

Pacific, particularly in countries that do not have their own defense forces.

Answer. IMET is an important component of the administration’s broader commitment to strengthen our engagement with the Pacific region at a time when other 

countries are intensifying their interactions with the Pacific Islands. Modest U.S. 

security assistance to the Pacific Islands provides local security personnel the necessary technical training to enhance their maritime security capabilities while improving their professionalism. The links we develop between our respective security 

forces have an important people-to-people component that help us maintain close relations across the generations and at all levels of society. 

In particular, Tonga, despite its small size and isolated geography, has been a valuable and regular contributor to U.S. and international security—with deployments 

to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Solomon Islands. Nauru and Kiribati also support the 

Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands.

Question. What is the nature of the relationship between U.S. officials in Fiji and 

Commodore Bainimarama? Please provide the committee with a copy of his biography.

Answer. The U.S. Ambassador has had over the past 3 years a cordial but distant 

working relationship with Commodore Bainimarama. Commodore Bainimarama has 

not always accepted the Ambassador’s requests for meetings and one-on-one meetings between the two have been limited. Bainimarama has not welcomed the 

Ambassadors’s overtures to discuss specific ways that the United States could help 

Fiji return to civilian government and democracy. However, the Ambassador and 

Embassy officials have had an excellent working relationship with the Minister of 

Foreign Affairs and his staff. Embassy officials work with Fiji Government officials 

at all levels and on areas of mutual concern, particularly law enforcement cooperation, disaster response and votes in the United Nations.

Question. During the last 2 years, what has been the nature of communication 

between U.S. and Chinese officials in Fiji?

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Answer. Embassy officials have a friendly and constructive relationship. Embassy 

officials periodically meet to discuss possible mutual cooperation on development 

and humanitarian assistance as well as consular affairs to ensure better disaster 

preparedness for overseas American citizens and Chinese citizens.

Question. Please outline in detail, the U.S. export strategy for the Republic of the 

Fiji Islands and the other areas where you will represent the United States.

Answer. The Embassy seeks to use the National Export Initiative as a mechanism 

to increase exports from the United States to the region. Pacific Island countries 

would benefit from using U.S.-generated bioengineered agricultural products and 

techniques to increase food production. Exporting green technologies, particularly to 

reduce the burden of high fossil fuel costs, also would expand U.S. markets. Favorable exchange rates currently provide opportunities to export poultry, meat, and 

vegetables. The establishment of a Web-based American-Pacific Chamber of Commerce would strengthen trade ties and bolster economic activity. In addition, labor 

mobility strategies for Pacific Island countries largely dependent on wage remittances would greatly enhance their purchasing power.

Question. Please outline and compare U.S. and Chinese foreign assistance to the 

Republic of Fiji.

Answer. The United States does not provide traditional foreign assistance to Fiji. 

On occasion, our efforts focus on capacity-building, training, and technical assistance, particularly in law enforcement, disaster management, and leadership training for civilians. China still supports significant ‘‘brick and mortar’ projects, such 

as roads, housing, and other facilities, using Chinese companies. Both countries 

allow for small numbers of Fijian students to attend colleges and universities in 

their respective countries. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DEREK MITCHELL TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

REPORTING LINES AND STAFFING PATTERN

In order for this position to be effective, the Special Representative and Policy 

Coordinator will need to be able to work across bureaus at State and across agencies, particularly with regard to the policy coordination mandate of the position. As 

the person in this position will be working on such complex interbureau and interagency efforts as the Commission of Inquiry, the disposition of banking and other 

targeted sanctions, and questions of aid and investment policy, it is important that 

they have the imprimatur of a direct reporting line to the Secretary of State and 

the interagency convening authority that comes with it. At the same time it is important to understand where the Special Representative/Coordinator will fit within 

the existing hierarchy and policy processes dealing with Burma, and what mechanisms will be put in place to ensure that the Special Representative’s role is integrated effectively into those processes.

Question. Would you please provide all information regarding the expected reporting lines for the Special Representative and the Department’s justification for its 

proposed arrangement; and additional information on the proposed reporting lines 

between the Special Representative and the EAP front and Burma offices, Embassy 

Rangoon, and other relevant officers?

Answer. We expect that the Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for 

Burma will report to East Asia and Pacific Affairs Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell and through him to the Secretary of State. The Department believes this reporting line will ensure that U.S Burma policy is integrated with our overarching policy 

in Southeast Asia and East Asia more broadly. The Special Representative will consult closely with our Embassy in Rangoon and all offices in the Department that 

have equities in Burma, as well as across the interagency, to ensure that our policy 

on Burma is comprehensive and coordinated.

Question. Would you please provide the committee with additional information regarding the proposed staffing pattern for the office, including the anticipated number and type of staff that the Special Representative’s office will be allocated to 

carry out its work?

Answer. The Special Representative will be supported by a Special Assistant and 

an Office Management Specialist. As needed, the East Asian and Pacific Affairs 

Bureau will work to ensure that the Special Representative is adequately supported 

to ensure he can fulfill his mandate. 

437

ASSISTANCE POLICY AND PROGRAMS

You noted that the U.S. Government has recently broadened the scope of its assistance programs inside Burma to assist directly the Burmese people through aid 

interventions. We are also seeing some other key donors moving to increase the 

nominal value of their aid programs in Burma and expand the types of activities 

in which they are engaged. Also, investment and aid from China in Burma varies 

widely. Some commentators have noted the deleterious effects of Chinese assistance 

to the Burmese Government as undermining the efforts of other donors to provide 

more responsible assistance.

Question. Could you elaborate on the current U.S. Government policy on humanitarian and development assistance in Burma, including examples of the types of 

activities that we consider to be possible at this time as well as those areas that 

remain outside the scope of current policy?

Answer. Current U.S. Government policy is to ensure all of our assistance programs are humanitarian or focused on democracy-building. Our assistance in Burma 

is designed to address the core problem of governance by empowering civil society 

to demand more responsive and democratic government, while also tackling the 

more immediate humanitarian issues that impede a democratic transition. 

Burma is the poorest country in Southeast Asia and approximately one-third of 

Burma’s people live in poverty. Our humanitarian assistance inside Burma combats 

public health threats, helps meet basic needs of refugees and migrants along Burma’s borders, and addresses critical transnational challenges including infectious 

disease. Our democracy-building activities aim to develop and empower Burma’s 

fragile civil society through training, education, and other civic capacity-building 

programs. The U.S. Government provides all humanitarian, health, and democracy 

assistance to Burma through U.N. agencies, international nongovernmental organization partners and local civil society organizations. 

Any assistance activities that are outside of humanitarian or democracy assistance, flow through or to the Government of Burma at the national or local level, 

or support the Government of Burma are outside the scope of current policy. I believe that until we see evidence of genuine change inside Burma, we must continue 

to carry out our assistance programs independent of the government.

Question. Could you detail how assistance programs inside Burma are related to 

longstanding U.S. programs to assist refugees and political activists working from 

exile to support political reform in Burma, as well as how changes in European policies and programs have impacted USG policy and funding decisions in this area?

Answer. The overarching U.S. interest in Burma is a peaceful, prosperous, democratic country that respects human rights and the rule of law. Our assistance contributes to this objective by strengthening civil society; meeting the basic needs of 

the most vulnerable Burmese inside the country, along the Thai-Burma border, and 

elsewhere in the region; and addressing critical transnational issues. Assistance programs inside Burma complement ongoing programs to assist refugees and political 

activists working from exile to support political reform in Burma. To help meet the 

needs of people on both sides of the border, our assistance programs operate from 

both inside Burma and from the border regions. 

In FY 2010, we provided significant cross-border assistance, totaling $25.5 million 

for vulnerable Burmese along the Thai-Burma border and roughly 150,000 refugees 

residing in nine refugee camps in Thailand. In addition to humanitarian assistance 

programs inside Burma, democracy programs also operate from both sides of the 

border. Current programs inside Burma, for example, improve the operational 

ability of nascent civil society organizations, and provide grants for scholarships to 

Burmese citizens who return from overseas to provide social work within their communities. We have strict monitoring requirements in place to ensure none of our assistance flows to or through the government or military in any way and is delivered 

directly to the people of Burma. 

The European Union’s continued support for humanitarian assistance in Burma 

and Thailand is welcomed. In March 2011, the EU Commissioner announced its 

commitment to provide 22.25 million Euros in support of vulnerable Burmese communities in Burma and Burmese refugees in Thailand. We coordinate closely with 

the EU and other donor governments to ensure that adequate funding is sustained 

in order to meet the humanitarian needs of vulnerable Burmese.

Question. Would you please explain how you propose to engage both our fellow 

donors, multilateral aid agencies, and others like China on developing and implementing appropriate standards for assisting Burma? Is this an area where the 

438

United States can engage directly with the National League for Democracy and others outside the ruling party to effect better programs and outcomes?

Answer. The U.S. Government has consistently sought to coordinate with and 

influence other countries and multilateral organizations on the provision of assistance to Burma. Our goal has been to ensure that any assistance, from U.S. taxpayer 

dollars or anoth sources, benefits the people of Burma and does not enrich the Government of Burma or its supporters. This engagement has taken place not only with 

partners such as Australia and the European Union, but also with countries and 

organizations such as China, Japan, Canada, the Republic of Korea, the Association 

of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the U.N. and its agencies. 

In addition to advocating appropriate parameters for assistance programs with 

the international community, we have engaged with an array of civil society groups 

including the National League for Democracy (NLD) and its leader, Aung San Suu 

Kyi, to solicit their views on assistance and effective methods to promote democracy 

and the growth of civil society inside the country. 

Our engagement with the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi and other nongovernment 

entities has taken place both through our Embassy in Rangoon as well as through 

senior-level visits and correspondence from Washington officials. If I am confirmed, 

I will ensure that we continue the provision of assistance with the same philosophy 

and goals and that we remain focused on the betterment of the Burmese people. 

(439)

NOMINATIONS 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 13, 2011

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

Paul D. Wohlers, of Washington, to be Ambassador to the Republic 

of Macedonia 

William H. Moser, of North Carolina, to be Ambassador to the 

Republic of Moldova 

John A. Heffern, of Missouri, to be Ambassador to the Republic of 

Armenia 

Thomas M. Countryman, of Washington, to be Assistant Secretary 

of State for International Security and Non-Proliferation 

Jeffrey DeLaurentis, of New York, to be Alternate Representative 

of the United States of America for Special Political Affairs in 

the United Nations, with the rank of Ambassador, and Alternate Representative of the United States of America to the 

Sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3 p.m., in room SD–

419, Dirksen Office Building, Hon. Jeanne Shaheen presiding. 

Present: Senators Shaheen, Menendez, Barrasso, and Risch. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN,

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE 

Senator SHAHEEN. Good afternoon, everyone. We have a full 

house. I hope that means we have lots of relatives and it’s not just 

because there’s nothing else going on in the Senate this afternoon. 

Welcome to all of you. 

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is here today to consider the nominations of: Paul Wohlers, to be Ambassador to the 

Republic of Macedonia; William Moser, to be Ambassador to the 

Republic of Moldova; John Heffern, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Armenia; Tom Countryman, to be Assistant Secretary of 

State for International Security and Non-Proliferation; and Jeffrey 

Delaurentis, to be Alternate Representative of the United States of 

America for Special Political Affairs in the United Nations, with 

the rank of Ambassador, and Alternate Representative of the 

United States of America to the Sessions of the General Assembly 

of the United Nations. I’m sure we have an acronym for that title. 

[Laughter.] 

440

We will do these nominations in two panels, and today we will 

examine a wide variety of posts and positions with responsibilities 

spanning regions and institutions across the globe. Each of them 

is important in strengthening U.S. influence and in safeguarding 

American interests. I want to congratulate each of you on your 

nominations and welcome you and your families and friends as we 

discuss the challenges and opportunities that you face should you 

be confirmed. 

In the interest of time, I’m going to submit my full statement for 

the record and point out that three of our nominees have been 

named for ambassadorial posts in important countries in the strategic regions of southern and Eastern Europe. Macedonia seeks full 

European integration, including by joining the EU and NATO. Its 

full integration can’t be achieved, however, until the Macedonians 

and the Greeks resolve the lingering impasse over the country’s 

name. Separately, Macedonia faced a parliamentary crisis earlier 

this year, due largely to complaints of media oppression. 

Moldova is Europe’s poorest country, according to the World 

Bank. It faces low living standards and a weak economy, but has 

shown a real commitment to reform and expanding democratic values. 

We’ve maintained close ties with Armenia since the dissolution 

of the Soviet Union, due to Armenia’s promotion of democratic principles. Unfortunately, the quality of recent elections and the failure 

to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh issue have not been encouraging. 

Today we also examine the United States relationship with the 

United Nations. In particular, we will look at the role of the U.N.’s 

peace and security functions, including peacekeeping operations. 

Finally, the committee will examine the role the United States 

should be taking to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction, particularly nuclear weapons and materials. The proliferation of such weapons and materials threatens not only U.S. 

security, but global stability. 

I want to thank each of you for your willingness to take on these 

important and challenging posts, and I look forward to hearing 

your views. 

I want to take a moment to briefly introduce our first panel before turning it over to you for your opening statements, and I will 

also turn it over to Senator Barrasso to make a brief statement. 

But first up today is Paul Wohlers, the nominee to be Ambassador 

to Macedonia. Paul has a distinguished record in the Foreign Service, serving multiple tours in Europe and the Department’s Executive Secretariat. He is a graduate of the Naval Academy and currently serves as the Deputy Executive Secretary at the State Department. 

Next is William Moser, who has been nominated to serve as Ambassador to Moldova. William is also a Foreign Service officer, having served in a wide range of management officer positions. He currently serves as the Department’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for 

Logistics Management. 

Finally, we have John Heffern, nominated to be Ambassador to 

Armenia. A career member of the senior Foreign Service, John has 

a wide range of experiences, including extensive service in Asia and 

Europe. He additionally spent time on the Hill, first with Senator 

441

Danforth and later as a State Department Pearson Fellow. He currently serves as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. mission to 

NATO. 

As each of you give your opening statements, I hope you’ll feel 

free to introduce your family or any friends who are here to support you. Now I’d like to turn it over to Senator Barrasso before 

we ask the panel to begin. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Shaheen follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is here today to consider the nominations of Paul D. Wohlers to be Ambassador to the Republic of Macedonia; William 

H. Moser to be Ambassador to the Republic of Moldova; John A. Heffern to be Ambassador to the Republic of Armenia; Thomas M. Countryman to be Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation; and Jeffrey 

DeLaurentis to be Alternate Representative of the United States of America for Special Political Affairs in the United Nations, with the rank of Ambassador, and Alternate Representative of the United States of America to the Sessions of the General 

Assembly of the United Nations. 

Today, we will examine a wide variety of posts and positions with responsibilities 

spanning regions and institutions across the globe. Each of them is important in 

strengthening U.S. influence and in safeguarding American interests. I want to 

congratulate each of you on your nominations, and welcome you and your families 

as we discuss the challenges and opportunities that you may face should you be 

confirmed. 

Three of our nominees have been named for ambassadorial posts in important 

countries in the strategic regions of Southern and Eastern Europe. We will examine 

a wide range of issues regarding these countries today. 

Macedonia seeks full European integration, including by joining the European 

Union and NATO. Its full integration cannot be achieved, though, until the Macedonians and Greeks resolve the lingering impasse over the country’s name. Separately, 

Macedonia faced a parliamentary crisis earlier this year, due largely to complaints 

of media oppression. 

Moldova is Europe’s poorest country, according to the World Bank. It faces low 

living standards and a weak economy, but has shown a commitment to reform and 

extending democratic values. Moldova is taking significant steps to create a transparent legal system, to fight corruption, and to end human trafficking, but much 

work remains. Further, the unresolved status of Transnistria hinders Moldova’s 

ability strengthen its institutions and economy. 

We have maintained close ties with Armenia since the dissolution of the Soviet 

Union, due to Armenia’s promotion of democratic principles. Unfortunately, the 

quality of recent elections and failure to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh issue have 

not been encouraging. 

Today, we also examine the United States relationship with the United Nations. 

In particular, we will look at the role of the U.N.’s peace and security functions, including peacekeeping operations. In recent years, numerous conflicts have led to an 

escalation in the use of U.N. peacekeepers. This expansion of operations has drawn 

attention to weaknesses and failures of the United Nations in these activities. 

Finally, the committee will examine the role the United States should be taking 

to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear 

weapons and materials. The proliferation of such weapons and materials threatens 

not only U.S. security, but global stability. We face a great number of challenges, 

including stopping illicit networks, countering North Korean and Iranian nuclear 

programs, and implementing existing nonproliferation regimes. Additionally, we 

must look at how nuclear energy programs are being implemented globally. 

I want to thank each of you for your willingness to take on these important and 

challenging posts, and look forward to hearing your views. I want to take a moment 

to briefly introduce our first panel before turning it over to you for your opening 

statements. 

First up today, is Paul Wohlers, the nominee to be the Ambassador to Macedonia. 

Paul has a distinguished record in the Foreign Service, serving multiple tours in 

Europe and the Department’s Executive Secretariat. He is a graduate of the Naval 

Academy, and currently serves as the Deputy Executive Secretary at the State 

Department. 

442

Next, is William Moser, who has been nominated to serve as Ambassador to 

Moldova. William is also a Foreign Service officer, having served in wide range of 

Management Officer positions. He currently serves as the Department’s Deputy 

Assistant Secretary for Logistics Management. 

Finally, we have John Heffern, nominated to be Ambassador to Armenia. A career 

member of the Senior Foreign Service, John has a wide range of experiences, including extensive service in Asia and Europe. He additionally spent time on the Hill, 

first with Senator Danforth, and later as a State Department Pearson Fellow. He 

currently serves as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Mission to NATO. 

As each of you give your opening statements, feel free to introduce any family or 

friends here to support you. 

First on our second panel is Thomas Countryman, who has been nominated to be 

the Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation. 

Tom is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, serving most recently as the 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, specifically 

focusing on Balkans issues. Tom has a great deal of experience working on International Security issues, previously serving in the Bureau of Political-Military 

Affairs, as Foreign Policy Advisor to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and on 

the National Security Council Staff. 

Finally, we will consider the nomination of Jeffrey DeLaurentis to be Alternate 

Representative of the United States of America for Special Political Affairs in the 

United Nations, with the rank of Ambassador, and Alternate Representative of the 

United States of America to the Sessions of the General Assembly of the United 

Nations. As a Foreign Service Officer, Jeffrey has served in a number of positions 

in the State Department, especially focused on Western Hemisphere and United Nations issues. He currently serves as Deputy Assistant Secretary for South America 

As each of you give your opening statements, feel free to introduce any family or 

friends here to support you.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN BARRASSO,

U.S. SENATOR FROM WYOMING 

Senator BARRASSO. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I just want to join you in congratulating each of the nominees 

who are here today as the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 

meets to consider these very important nominations. Each post is 

important to fostering vital relationships, addressing important 

problems, and securing United States national interests. 

So I also want to extend a warm welcome to all the friends and 

the family who are with you and I look forward to them, as you 

had suggested, introducing the family and friends that are here. So 

with that, thank you very much, Madam Chairman, and it is indeed a warm welcome to each of these nominees. [Laughter.] 

Senator SHAHEEN. You can’t really appreciate how warm it is because it’s usually freezing in this room. So it’s either feast or famine. 

Mr. Wohlers, would you like to begin? 

STATEMENT OF PAUL D. WOHLERS, OF WASHINGTON, NOMINATED TO BE AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA 

Mr. WOHLERS. Yes. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Madam 

Chairman, members of the committee, it’s a privilege to appear before you today as President Obama’s nominee to be the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Macedonia. It’s a great honor to have 

this confidence placed in me by the President and by Secretary 

Clinton. If confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee and with the Congress in advancing U.S. interests in Macedonia, building on the excellent work of my predecessors. 

443

I’m delighted today to be accompanied by my family and I’d like 

to introduce them briefly, if I may: first my wife, Mary Jo, who’s 

a registered nurse and has held our family together through many, 

many moves over 27 years in the Foreign Service. 

Senator SHAHEEN. We’re going to ask her if she would stand up 

and be recognized. 

Mr. WOHLERS. My three daughters, Rachel and Julia and Jessica. Also I’m pleased today to be accompanied by my niece, Marion, who’s also the daughter of a Foreign Service family. 

So as you can see, I have great pride in being part of a Foreign 

Service family. I think Foreign Service families are true unsung heroes and diplomats themselves. I know that my three daughters 

and my wife—and I know Marion—have served much of their lives 

living, working, and going to school overseas, serving as examples 

of American values to the people around them, and sometimes even 

bearing the sting of criticism from people at their schools who did 

not agree with American policies. So I’ve been delighted to have 

them by my side all my life, and my life would have been empty 

without them. 

As you’re aware, I have served previously in Macedonia, an experience which I believe will enhance my effectiveness as Chief of 

Mission should you decide to confirm me. If confirmed, I will return 

to Macedonia during an important period. On September 8, Macedonia will mark the 20th anniversary of its independence, and August 13 will be the 10th anniversary of the Ohrid Framework 

Agreement, which ended the country’s civil conflict in 2001. The 

framework agreement, concluded with United States and European 

Union help, remains the foundation for Macedonia’s peaceful and 

democratic development. The agreement ended the conflict by addressing the ethnic grievances of the people through principles of 

equal rights for all citizens regardless of ethnicity. 

Today, 10 years from Ohrid and after 20 years of independence, 

Macedonia is working toward becoming a stable, multiethnic democracy. However, there is much more to be done in Macedonia. 

First, though, I think the citizens of Macedonia are to be congratulated for the June 5 election, in which people turned out in great 

numbers and behaved peacefully and with dignity. 

Following this accomplishment, now this is the time for the people of Macedonia and the leaders of Macedonia to refocus on moving toward greater prosperity, stability, security, and Euro-Atlantic 

integration. While democratic structures are in place in Macedonia, 

full respect for the rule of law and independent institutions remains a problem. An independent judiciary, free and independent 

media, and strong civil society are vital cornerstones for all democracies, and we have concerns about Macedonia’s development in 

these areas. 

The United States is a partner with Macedonia in confronting 

these challenges. Macedonia’s continued reform and integration 

into the Euro-Atlantic community remains a priority. Macedonia 

became a European Union candidate country in 2005. In December 

2009, the European Commission recommended setting a start date 

for accession negotiations. 

Macedonia also has made strides in defense reform in order to 

meet NATO’s performance-based standards for membership. At the 

444

November 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon, allies reaffirmed that 

Macedonia will receive an invitation to join the alliance as soon as 

the dispute with Greece is concluded. We will continue to support 

the U.N. process to help Macedonia and Greece find a mutually acceptable solution to this question. 

Macedonia has proven itself as a net provider of security, as evidenced by its contributions both regionally and globally. Macedonian troops have served honorably in both Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Indeed, Macedonia has been one of the highest per capita contributors to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. 

These contributions to regional and global stability reflect our 

shared values and the depth of our partnership with Macedonia. 

If I am confirmed, my foremost priority as Ambassador would be 

promoting United States interests in Macedonia, while working to 

advance Macedonia’s own internal transformation on the path to 

full Euro-Atlantic integration. I will continue to pursue the U.S. 

goals of strengthening the rule of law, fighting corruption, promoting economic growth and prosperity, and reinforcing democratic 

institutions. 

Madam Chairman and members of the committee, thank you 

again for this opportunity to appear before you. I stand ready to 

answer any questions you might have later on. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wohlers follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PAUL WOHLERS

Madam Chairman and members of the committee, it is a privilege to appear before you today as President Obama’s nominee to serve as the United States Ambassador to the Republic of Macedonia. I am honored by the confidence placed in me 

by the President and Secretary Clinton. If confirmed, I look forward to working with 

this committee and the Congress in advancing U.S. interests in Macedonia. 

I am delighted and proud to be accompanied today by my family: my wife, Mary 

Jo, who has held our family together during multiple moves over almost 27 years 

in the Foreign Service; my three daughters and one son-in-law—first, Rachel and 

her husband Ryan; then Julia and Jessica. Foreign Service families are unsung heroes and true diplomats themselves—my wife and daughters have been living, working, and going to school overseas for much of their lives, serving as examples of 

American values to their friends and colleagues, and sometimes, even at school, feeling the sting of criticism from those who did not agree with U.S. policies. My life 

would have been empty without my family, and I am thankful that they have always been by my side as we pursued a Foreign Service life together. 

As you are aware, I have served previously in Macedonia, an experience which 

I believe will enhance my effectiveness as Chief of Mission, should you decide to confirm me. If confirmed, I will return to Macedonia during an important period. On 

September 8, Macedonia will mark the 20th anniversary of its independence, and 

August 13 will be the 10th anniversary of the Ohrid Framework Agreement that 

ended the country’s civil conflict in 2001. The Framework Agreement, concluded 

with U.S. and EU help, remains the foundation for Macedonia’s peace and democratic development. The Agreement ended the conflict by addressing ethnic grievances through principles of equal rights for all citizens irrespective of ethnicity. 

Today, 10 years from Ohrid and after 20 years of independence, Macedonia is working toward becoming a stable, multiethnic democracy. 

There is much more to be done in Macedonia. The citizens of Macedonia deserve 

congratulations for the June 5 election in which the people turned out in high numbers and behaved peacefully and with dignity. Now is time for the people of Macedonia, along with their leaders, to focus on moving toward greater prosperity, security, stability, and Euro-Atlantic integration. While democratic structures are in 

place, full respect for the rule of law and independent institutions remains a problem. An independent judiciary, free and independent media, and strong civil society 

are vital cornerstones for all democracies, and we have concerns about Macedonia’s 

development in these areas. 

445

The United States is a partner in confronting these challenges. Macedonia’s continued reform and integration into the Euro-Atlantic community remains a priority. 

Macedonia became a European Union candidate country in 2005 and in December 

2009 the European Commission recommended setting a start date for accession negotiations. Macedonia has also made strides in defense reform in order to meet 

NATO’s performance-based standards for membership. At the November 2010 

NATO summit in Lisbon, allies reaffirmed that Macedonia will receive an invitation 

to join the alliance as soon as the dispute with Greece over the name is resolved. 

We will continue to support the U.N. process to help Macedonia and Greece find 

a mutually acceptable solution. 

Macedonia has proven itself as a net provider of security as evidenced by its contributions both in the region and globally. Macedonian troops have served honorably 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, Macedonia has been one of the highest per capita 

contributors to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. These 

contributions to regional and global stability reflect our shared values and the depth 

of our partnership with Macedonia. 

If I am confirmed, my foremost priority as Ambassador will be promoting U.S. interests in Macedonia while working to advance Macedonia’s own internal transformation on the path to full Euro-Atlantic integration. I will continue to pursue the 

U.S. goals of strengthening the rule of law, fighting corruption, promoting economic 

growth and prosperity, and reinforcing democratic institutions. 

Madam Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity 

to appear before you. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may 

have.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Moser. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. MOSER, OF NORTH CAROLINA, 

NOMINATED TO BE AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF 

MOLDOVA 

Mr. MOSER. Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Barrasso, it 

is an honor and a privilege to appear before you today as the President’s nominee to the Republic of Moldova. I deeply appreciate the 

confidence and trust that President Obama and Secretary Clinton 

have placed in me and if confirmed I look forward to working closely with Congress to promote United States interests in Moldova. 

First of all, though, I think it would only be right for me to introduce my wife and my three children, if I could get them to stand 

as you requested, Senator Shaheen. My wife, Marie, my son, Stephen, my daughter, Rebecca, and my son, Daniel. I’m very proud 

to have them here because they too, as Paul noted in his remarks, 

have grown up in the Foreign Service and I think that they are 

very happy to be here to witness this process today. 

I was born and raised in North Carolina and, as you noted, Senator Shaheen, I still have that accent that doesn’t go away. I visited my family there over the Fourth of July holiday. The State of 

North Carolina and Moldova have a very strong partnership. If 

confirmed, I hope to play a role in maintaining and expanding this 

partnership. If confirmed, I will work to strengthen our relations 

and to support Moldovan efforts to strengthen democratic and free 

market reforms and further integration with Europe. 

Vice President Biden delivered this message in his recent trip to 

Moldova when he stated: ‘‘The American people have watched your 

struggle and celebrated your successes, and we are determined to 

help you build on your achievements. We strongly support your 

commitment to political and economic reforms and taking on hard 

issues.’’

446

As Moldova prepares to celebrate the 20th anniversary of its 

independence, the United States will continue to support the 

Moldovan people in their efforts to build a democratic, prosperous, 

and secure European state. 

Moldova continues to make strides in its economic and political 

development and its integration into Europe. The United States 

wants to assist Moldova on this journey, not just because of our 

longstanding friendship between our peoples, but also because a 

democratic, peaceful, and prosperous Moldova would contribute to 

our longstanding objective of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. 

Moldova deserves our continued support and encouragement. 

Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Barrasso, I thank you 

again for the opportunity to share my thoughts about the relationship with Moldova, and if confirmed I look forward to working 

closely with you and with the committee. I would also be happy to 

answer any questions you have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Moser follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. MOSER

Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Barrasso and members of the committee, it 

is an honor and a privilege to appear before you today as the President’s nominee 

to be Ambassador to the Republic of Moldova. I deeply appreciate the confidence and 

trust that President Obama and Secretary Clinton have placed in me. If confirmed, 

I look forward to working closely with Congress to promote United States interests 

in Moldova. 

I want to introduce my wife, Marie, and two of my three children, Daniel and 

Stephen. I was born and raised in North Carolina and visited my family there over 

the recent July 4th holiday. The State of North Carolina and Moldova have a strong 

partnership. If confirmed, I hope to play a role in maintaining and expanding this 

partnership. 

If confirmed, I will work to strengthen our relations with Moldova and to support 

Moldovan efforts to strengthen democratic and free market reforms at home and 

further integration with Europe. Vice President Biden delivered this message in his 

recent trip to Moldova, when he stated, ‘‘the American people have watched [your] 

struggle and celebrated your successes, and we are determined to help you build on 

your achievements. We strongly support your commitment to political and economic 

reforms and taking on hard issues.’’ As Moldova prepares to celebrate the 20th anniversary of its independence, the United States will continue to support the 

Moldovan people in their efforts to build a democratic, prosperous, and secure European state. I would like to take a moment today to touch upon the strategic focus 

areas in our relationship with Moldova: democratic development, free market development, and security. 

FIRST: DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT

Moldova’s parliamentary elections in 2009 and 2010 met most international commitments and were generally well administered and offered voters genuine choice. 

However, the international election observer mission fielded by the Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe noted that ‘‘further effort is needed to improve 

public confidence in Moldova’s democratic process.’’ If confirmed, I will look for new 

ways to support the efforts of the Moldovan people to further their nation’s democratic development and to continue to expand our dialogue with all responsible elements of the political spectrum. Moldova’s governing coalition has an ambitious reform agenda, based on a widespread recognition that much remains to be done to 

reach to its stated goal of good governance. Judicial reform, greater transparency 

and other efforts to reduce corruption are among the governing coalition’s top priorities, priorities which we support through our assistance programs. Moldova has 

taken steps to combat trafficking in persons, which remains a significant problem, 

and we are cooperating closely with Moldovan authorities to address this issue. 

Moldova’s chosen foreign policy of European integration is one that the United 

States strongly supports. Moldova’s steps toward association with the European 

Union involve meeting European standards and norms for democracy, good governance, free trade and in many other areas. If confirmed, I will work closely with my 

European counterparts in Chisinau to advance our shared agenda in Moldova. 

447

SECOND: FREE MARKET DEVELOPMENT

Moldova remains one of Europe’s poorest countries with per capita GDP of less 

than $3,000 a year; many of its citizens, unable to find adequate work at home, 

work abroad. Thanks in part to a nearly $600 million IMF stand-by agreement, 

Moldova’s economy is beginning to recover, but more reform is required to achieve 

sustained economic growth. Moldova seeks a diversified, export-oriented economy; 

improvements to the investment climate are key to attracting the investment that 

could increase exports. If confirmed, I plan to work with Moldova on these issues. 

The United States has been helping to bolster private sector competitiveness and 

improve the legal and regulatory environment. We have dramatically increased our 

investment in Moldova’s future through the Compact with the Millennium Challenge Corporation signed last year. The $262 million package provides assistance for 

irrigation and road infrastructure improvements intended to support Moldovan 

farmers in their transition to high value-added agriculture and to help them get 

their produce to market. 

THIRD: SECURITY

Molodova’s number one security challenge remains the unresolved conflict with 

Transnistrian separatists. Moldova has been a divided land for the past 19 years 

after the brief armed conflict ended between government forces and the separatists. 

The United States is committed to a peaceful resolution of the Transnistria conflict 

that guarantees Moldova’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. I am 

convinced that this longstanding conflict can and should be resolved. The United 

States remains committed to the 5+2 process, involving the two parties to the conflict, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Russia and 

Ukraine, with the EU and the United States serving as active observers. The United 

States has repeatedly called for the immediate resumption of official negotiations, 

which have been stalled since 2006. Recent discussions among the 5+2 participants, 

which have facilitated confidence-building initiatives and explored conditions for the 

resumption of formal talks, have shown some progress. If confirmed, I intend to do 

what I can to move this process forward, including outreach throughout Moldova, 

as well as the Transnistria region. Beyond the Transnistria conflict, the United 

States provides assistance to Moldova through various programs to help create a 

modern, sustainable, military force, led by a Ministry of Defense and Joint Staff 

that are compatible with Euro-Atlantic structures and can integrate into multinational structures and missions. Moldova currently receives $750,000 in International Military Education and Training funds (IMET) and $750,000 in Foreign 

Military Financing (FMF). These funds are used to support Moldova’s efforts to 

achieve its NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) objectives, enhance 

Moldova’s capacity to conduct peace and stability operations in support of multinational coalition operations, and strengthen Moldova’s cooperation with other partners to enhance regional security and stability. 

Moldova continues to make strides in its economic and political development and 

its integration into Europe. The United States wants to assist Moldova on this journey, not just because of the longstanding friendship between our peoples, but also 

because a democratic, peaceful and prosperous Moldova would contribute to our 

longstanding objective of a Europe whole, free and at peace. Moldova deserves our 

continuing support and encouragement. 

Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Barrasso, I thank you again for the opportunity to share my thoughts about the relationship with Moldova. If confirmed, I 

look forward to working closely with you and this committee. 

I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Moser. 

Mr. Heffern. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN A. HEFFERN, OF MISSOURI, NOMINATED 

TO BE AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA 

Mr. HEFFERN. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Madam Chair and 

distinguished members of the committee, for me as well, it’s an 

honor to be before you as President Obama’s nominee for next Ambassador to the Republic of Armenia. I’d also like to introduce my 

family. I’m delighted that they can be here today. My wife, my wife 

of 32 years, Libby. I would just add a note on Foreign Service 

448

spouses, Senator. I know you know this already, but Foreign Service spouses do play a really important role overseas in projecting—

helping U.S. image overseas, working with the community, the U.S. 

community at the Embassy, and the local community, and certainly 

Libby has done that for the 29 years that we’ve been doing this together. 

Then I’ve got—we have five children. We have—where are we? 

We have Lisa—we have Lisa and her husband, Ryan Waters; we 

have Lucy—Lucy; and then Sarah, Sarah and her boyfriend, Jamie 

Pett is here with us today; and we have Woody and we have Alley. 

And thank you very much for making it possible for our families 

to be here, to join us for this special occasion today. Thank you. 

My 88-year-old mother, though, Madam Chairman, is not able to 

be here with us today. She’s a naturalized American from India, 

and I really owe it to her and to my deceased father. My interest 

in foreign affairs and the Foreign Service comes from them. My father was in World War II, a World War II veteran, and met her 

in India, and was briefly a Foreign Service officer himself. It’s from 

that experience that I developed my interest in foreign affairs and 

in Asia. So I’m sorry she was not able to be here with us today. 

Madam Chair, again I’m honored to have been nominated by 

President Obama and Secretary Clinton for this important post, 

and if confirmed I will build upon the fine work of my predecessors 

to deepen and strengthen our relationship with Armenia. 

The Obama administration has greatly strengthened our relations with Armenia. In April 2010 the Presidents of our two countries held their first bilateral meeting in 10 years, and when Secretary Clinton visited Yerevan last year it was the first time that 

an American Secretary of State has visited Armenia in 19 years. 

The administration has expanded development assistance to Armenia into key areas of governance, of economic growth and market competitiveness, and has been able to maintain overall funding 

levels for Armenia despite budget cuts elsewhere in Europe and 

Eurasia. If confirmed, I would also work to expand United StatesArmenia trade and investment, building on the strong connections, 

existing connections, between the American and Armenian people. 

On the political front, the United States has encouraged Armenia 

to improve its human rights and democracy record, and we’ve actually seen some positive results on that front this year, which we 

can talk about, Madam Chairman. Armenia will hold important national elections next year and in 2013, and we see these elections 

as opportunities for the government to demonstrate its commitment to democracy. 

The administration supports Armenia’s courageous steps to begin 

a process with Turkey to address their history and to find a way 

to move forward together toward a shared future of security and 

prosperity. Through the OSCE’s Minsk Process, the United States 

also supports Armenia and Azerbaijan as they work toward a 

peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 

There is still a lot to do in all these areas, Madam Chair, but 

I believe my 29 years as a Foreign Service officer has prepared me 

for this important assignment. During this time I have served 

faithfully both Democrat and Republican administrations. Following my instructions from Washington, I’ve done my best to adVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00456 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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vance U.S. interests and to uphold American ideals. In addition, I 

pledge to the committee that if confirmed I will report candidly and 

objectively to Washington on my views and my recommendations 

from the field. 

Madam Chair and members of the committee, President Obama 

has recognized and deplored the horrific events that took place in 

the final days of the Ottoman Empire. He has publicly called the 

massacre of 1.5 million Armenians at that time one of the worst 

atrocities of the 20th century. The President has urged Turkey and 

Armenia to work through their painful history to achieve a full, 

frank, and just acknowledgment of the facts. If confirmed, I will do 

my best to fulfil the President’s vision in this sensitive area. 

Madam Chair, thank you for your time today. If confirmed, I look 

forward to working with you, other members of the committee and 

staff and with Congress as a whole as I represent the United 

States in Armenia. Thank you and I look forward to your questions 

and comments today. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Heffern follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN A. HEFFERN

Madam Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, it is an honor to 

appear before you as the President’s nominee to be the United States Ambassador 

to the Republic of Armenia. I am pleased to be joined today by my wife, Libby, and 

our children, Lisa (and Ryan), Lucy, Sarah, Woody, and Alley. We welcome this opportunity to again serve our Nation overseas. 

My mother, a naturalized American from India, could not be here today, but I 

would note that I owe my interest in the Foreign Service to her and to my deceased 

father, who was a WWII veteran and, briefly, an FSO as well. 

Madam Chairman, I am honored that President Obama and Secretary Clinton 

have nominated me for this important post. If confirmed, I will build upon the fine 

work of my predecessors to advance our bilateral relationship with Armenia in all 

its facets: diplomatic, political, economic, trade, and in our deep people-to-people 

ties. 

The Obama administration has strengthened U.S. relations with Armenia. In 

April 2010, the Presidents of our two countries held their first bilateral meeting in 

10 years and, when Secretary Clinton visited Yerevan last year, it was the first visit 

by a Secretary of State to Armenia in 19 years. 

We have expanded development assistance to Armenia in several areas, especially 

in governance, economic growth, and market competiveness, and maintained overall 

funding levels despite budget cuts in Europe and Eurasia. Specifically, including FY 

2011, we have invested more than $38 million since 2009 in democracy and governance programming, including over $16 million for civil society development. During 

this period, we have also devoted over $17 million to promote better access to health 

care and launched a new 5-year, $22 million on enterprise development and market 

competitiveness. Over the past 5 years, the Millennium Challenge Corporation has 

invested almost $180 million in Armenia to improve irrigation infrastructure, provide technical and financial assistance to farmers and agribusinesses, and improve 

rural roads. If confirmed, I would like to work on expanding the United StatesArmenia trade relationship, building on the already strong connections between 

Americans and Armenians, to foster more trade and investment between our 

countries. 

On the political front, the U.S. has encouraged Armenia to improve its human 

rights and democracy record, and we have seen some positive developments this 

year, with the government releasing those still detained from the protests after the 

Armenian elections in 2008. Armenia will hold important national elections in 2012 

and 2013, which are opportunities for the Government of Armenia to demonstrate 

its commitment to democracy. The administration supports Armenia’s courageous 

steps to begin a process with Turkey to address their history, and to find a way to 

move forward together in a shared future of security and prosperity. Through the 

Minsk Process, the U.S. supports Armenia and Azerbaijan as they work toward a 

peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 

There is still a lot to do. If confirmed, I would continue the efforts of my most 

able predecessor, Ambassador Masha Yovanovitch. I will seek, as she did, opportuniVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00457 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
450

ties to enhance our relationship with Armenia, should the Senate confirm me for 

this position. 

My 29 years as an FSO have prepared me for this assignment. During this time, 

I have served faithfully in both Democratic and Republican administrations. Following my instructions from Washington, I have done my best to advance U.S. interests and uphold American ideals. In addition, I pledge to the committee that, if 

confirmed, I will report candidly and accurately to Washington my views and 

recommendations from the field. 

My work at NATO with Armenia and other Caucasus partners has introduced me 

to this complex and fascinating region. I look forward to enhancing my understanding of the country and the region by working with the Armenian Government, 

the Armenian people, and the Armenian-American community. 

Madam Chair and members of the committee, President Obama has recognized 

and deplored the horrific events that took place in the waning days of the Ottoman 

Empire. He has publicly called the massacre of 1.5 million Armenians at this time 

one of the worst atrocities of the 20th century. The President has urged Turkey and 

Armenia to work through their painful history to achieve a full, frank, and just 

acknowledgement of the facts. If confirmed, I will do my best to fulfill the President’s vision. 

Madam Chairman, I would like to thank you for your time today. I want to assure 

you that, if confirmed, I look forward to working closely with you, with members 

of this committee, and with the Congress as a whole in representing my fellow 

Americans as the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Armenia. 

Thank you and I welcome your questions.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much, and thank you to each 

of you for your testimony today. 

I think they finally got the air conditioning working, so hopefully 

it will cool off, probably not in time for you to finish your questioning. 

Mr. Heffern, I would like to begin with you. You mentioned in 

your testimony the history between Armenia and Turkey. The Armenia-Turkey Protocols of 2009 were I think a very positive step 

toward improving relations between the parties, but unfortunately 

the protocols have not been ratified. Can you talk about what the 

prospects are for reviving reconciliation talks between Turkey and 

Armenia and what other steps might be possible to encourage the 

two countries to address their mutual past? 

Mr. HEFFERN. Senator, yes. The administration strongly supports 

and we welcomed and congratulated both governments, the Government of Turkey and the Government of Armenia, for their courageous decision to sign the protocols in Zurich in October 2009. 

Secretary Clinton had a major part in that. She was there for the 

signing ceremony. And we remain committed to doing whatever we 

can to encourage the two parties to get the protocols back on track. 

The Secretary has talked to both parties regularly. The Secretary 

has made it clear; Secretary Clinton has said the ball is in Turkey’s 

court and that we hope and expect that they will be able to work 

to find a way to work together to resume that. 

For me, if I’m confirmed at the Embassy, I would work with our 

Embassy in Ankara to devise effective and hopefully constructive 

confidence-building measures for cross-border exchanges and other 

things to try to build trust from the bottom up, in addition to the 

Secretary and the President’s work with the leaders to try to get 

the protocols back on track. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

You also mentioned Nagorno-Karabakh, which is another of the 

issues facing Armenia. You pointed out the Minsk Process, which 

unfortunately ended without any agreement on the basic prinVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00458 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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ciples. So can you elaborate a little more on the status of these 

talks, what steps can be taken to help move them forward and to 

encourage the parties to reach some sort of a negotiated resolution 

to the Nagorno-Karabakh question? 

Mr. HEFFERN. Senator, the President and Secretary have been 

also deeply involved in this. We remain committed to the Minsk 

Process as sort of the only game in town to try to resolve this dispute. The purpose, as you know, of the Minsk Process is to find a 

lasting, peaceful, and just solution to this conflict that will help the 

parties, help the people of Nagorno-Karabakh, and help bring some 

stability and prosperity and peace to the South Caucacus region. 

That’s the purpose of it, as you well know. 

The United States participates as one of the cochairs. Ambassador Bradtke is our representative and he was at the Kazan meetings that you referred to. Indeed, the parties were not able to agree 

on the basic principles there, but they did issue a statement with 

President Medvedev that they have made some progress on some 

of the issues and they remain committed to the process. 

Foreign Minister Lavrov recently visited the capitals with some 

additional proposals from President Medvedev and I’m not briefed 

on what those proposals are. I don’t know what the prospects are 

for the next steps. But we are working—we the United States are 

working as cochair with the other cochairs and with the two parties 

and with the authorities, the de facto authorities in NagornoKarabakh, to find a solution. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I will point out, as you know, I just returned 

from Serbia and the OSCE’s Parliamentary Assembly, where they 

appointed a special representative to help address NagornoKarabakh. So hopefully that may be helpful as well in moving the 

discussions forward. 

Finally, you pointed out that there will be elections held again 

in 2012, a Presidential election in 2013. I had the interesting fortune to be in Armenia in 2003 for an international observation mission to their parliamentary elections and those were not free and 

fair elections, and unfortunately there have been—elections have 

been plagued by accusations of fraud and abuse for too long. 

So what are the prospects for that to be turned around by 2012 

and 2013? Are there measures in place? Is there an independent 

election commission that is moving forward in a way that holds 

some prospect that the upcoming elections will be freer and fairer 

than those in the past? 

Mr. HEFFERN. Senator, I’m not well briefed on the 2003 elections. 

On the 2008 elections, they also were flawed elections and we’ve 

said so publicly, that they were not the kind of elections that meet 

international standards. Then in the aftermath of the elections 

there were some protests and some detentions and violence in response to those protests. It was not a great situation in 2008. 

In the last 6 months, though, Senator, there have been some 

positive signs. Ambassador Yvonovich has made this one of her top 

priorities and worked very much, very closely with the parties and 

the government to find a way forward to work with them on democracy and human rights. 

Some useful things have happened. They have reopened the 

square for freedom of assembly. They’ve allowed some of the oppoVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00459 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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sition groups and parties to actually have rallies and assemblies in 

the Freedom Square, so that’s a good thing. They have—the government has released finally, after much prodding, all of the detainees from the post-2008 unrest, and they have assured the Armenian people that they will launch a full investigation of the 

events post-election 2008. 

So they have made some useful steps in the last 6 months that 

have been helpful in giving us some indication that the next elections in 2012 and 2013 will hopefully be better in meeting international standards. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. That’s very encouraging. 

Senator Barrasso. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Heffern, following up, if I could, on Senator Shaheen’s questioning, the administration has requested funding in fiscal year 

2012 in order to focus on economic growth as well as democratization in Armenia. The U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation I 

think, as you know, has expressed concerns about freedom of the 

press, about democratization in Armenia. 

Due to these concerns, a portion of the Millennium Challenge 

Corporation’s compact with Armenia was ended. How would you 

characterize the current status of democratization in Armenia and 

what efforts an we take to kind of improve that? 

Mr. HEFFERN. Senator, there’s a couple of elements to your question. Not only the democracy side, but also the governance side I 

think is important. What we’re trying to do through our bilateral 

assistance program, and since their independence the United 

States has been the largest bilateral donor to Armenia. So what 

we’re trying to do through our bilateral assistance is to work on 

governance, increase, improve the business climate, investment climate, to encourage western investment and trade, to keep them focused on the West. 

Part of that, of course, involves governance and rule of law and 

democracy and human rights. I mentioned to Senator Shaheen the 

three or four useful steps they’ve made in the last 6 months. If confirmed, I’ll go and I will build—I will try to build on what Ambassador Yvonovich has done and work with the people and the parties and the government there to see what we can do to make the 

next round of elections meet international standards. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you. 

Mr. Moser, talking about Moldova, the poorest nation in Europe, 

continues to face serious problems, including corruption, crime, and 

human trafficking as well, as you know. In the 2011 Trafficking in 

Persons Report, actually, the Department of State highlighted concerns with Moldova. While some progress has been made, the report states that the Government in Moldova does not fully comply 

with even the minimum standards for elimination of trafficking. 

Can you tell me what efforts are currently being taken to fight 

the problem of human trafficking and what’s the United States currently doing to assist Moldova on this issue? 

Mr. MOSER. Senator Barrasso, thank you very much for that 

question. One of the focuses of our democracy-building programs is 

of course to strengthen the rule of law, because in the Trafficking 

in Persons Report of this year, even though Moldova went up a 

453

step from a tier 2 watchlist to a tier 2 country, we still said that 

there were real problems in the judiciary and in the independence 

of the judiciary and in arresting corrupt officials. 

Now, we do a couple things. Through our International and Law 

Enforcement Bureau, we’re working on training police officials and 

strengthening the judiciary, and also with our AID programs we’re 

also doing further judicial training in technical assistance to build 

up prosecutorial capacity. 

I realize that the Moldovans have a long way to go, particularly 

on the corruption issue, and one of the things that I think that has 

to be drawn together is that for the Moldovans to really make the 

steps toward European integration and toward economic development that they themselves profess that they want to make, that 

they are going to have to make a business climate that is free of 

corruption, so people will want to invest there. 

So this is a whole complex of issues, that you don’t get the economic development without having the correct and corruption-free 

democratic development that Moldova really needs. That’s what I 

think that, if confirmed, that I would like to work on as Ambassador. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you. 

Mr. Wohlers, the United States has supported Macedonia’s candidacy for NATO as well as for the European Union membership. 

But, as you know, Greece has blocked Macedonia’s accession to 

NATO and the European Union due to a dispute actually, I think, 

over its name. While there have been many efforts to reach a solution to the dispute, really they haven’t found a solution yet. 

Can you tell us what progress, if any, has been made between 

Macedonia and Greece on solving this dispute, and what is your 

view of the prospects of finding a solution? 

Mr. WOHLERS. Thank you, Senator. You’re correct that this is a 

20-year-old dispute which has not been resolved, and it goes to the 

heart of our desire to have Macedonia fully integrated into the 

Euro-Atlantic community, because that can’t happen until we resolve this name dispute. We fully support the U.N. process under 

the auspices of Matthew Nimetz to resolve this issue and we also 

support direct engagement between Athens and Skopje. We have 

encouraged both sides to show maximum flexibility, compromise, 

sense of respect for each other’s history and traditions, in moving 

forward on this issue. We have made it clear that whatever mutually acceptable solution they arrive at we will accept. We’re not 

going to impose a solution on this. 

This goes back to our major goal of stability in Southeastern Europe, of which we think the integration of Macedonia into the EuroAtlantic community will be a key part. But integration can’t move 

forward until the name issue is resolved. So this is an issue that 

needs strong leadership by both sides. It’s not going to be easy. Obviously, if it were easy it would have been done long ago. It’s going 

to require painful compromises on both sides, and that’s why they 

need to have strong leadership to move this forward. 

If confirmed, I will work very diligently with the Macedonian authorities to encourage them to show maximum flexibility, maximum cooperation and respect, and hopefully we can move forward 

on this. 

454

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Congratulations to all of you on your nominations. 

Let me start with you, Mr. Heffern. In your opening statement 

you said that ‘‘President Obama has recognized and deplored the 

horrific events that took place in the waning days of the Ottoman 

Empire.’’ And you went on to say, I noted, that ‘‘he’’—I assume that 

was the President—‘‘publicly called the massacre of 1.5 million Armenians at the time one of the worst atrocities of the 20th century.’’

I welcome that statement, but I’d like to explore it a little bit 

more with you. Do you agree that there were mass killings, ethnic 

cleansing, and forced deportations of over 1.5 million Armenians 

during the period that the Ottoman Empire existed? 

Mr. HEFFERN. Senator, yes. As the President has said, the massacres and the forced deportations leading to the deaths of 1.5 million Armenians is acknowledged and recognized and deplored by 

President Obama. And yes, sir, I believe it as well. 

Senator MENENDEZ. OK. And those were conducted at the time 

by the Ottoman Empire; is that true? 

Mr. HEFFERN. Those were conducted at the time, in the final 

days of the Ottoman Empire, yes, sir. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Now, we as a country and I assume this administration recognizes the Turkish Republic as a successor state 

to the Ottoman Empire, is that true? 

Mr. HEFFERN. Senator, I assume that’s true. I don’t know that 

that’s true. I assume that’s true. I mean, it has to be true, so yes, 

sir. I’m going to just take that as true, but I have to say I don’t 

know that specifically. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me ask you this. Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 

which the United States has both signed and ratified, states: ‘‘In 

the present convention, ‘genocide’ means any of the following acts 

committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group as such: [a] killing members of the group; [b] causing serious bodily or mental harm to 

members of the group; [c] deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in 

whole or in part.’’ And it goes on to other elements. 

Those are from a convention which we the United States have 

signed. Now, if that is a convention the United States is willing to 

be a signatory to, would not the facts that you acknowledge in your 

opening statement during the period of 1915 to 1923 and that, in 

furtherance of the answers to my questions, meet the definition of 

article 2? 

Mr. HEFFERN. Senator, you have accurately described article 2, 

the definition of genocide in the convention. So yes to that part of 

the question. And yes to the facts that were in my statement and 

that you’ve repeated. But the characterization of those events, Senator, is a policy decision that is made by the President of the 

455

United States, and that policy is enunciated in his April 24 Remembrance Day statement. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Are you aware of cables that exist from 

former Ambassador Henry Morgenthau, who was the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, from 1913 to 1916; from the U.S. consul in Aleppo, 

from the U.S. consul in Harput; from Ambassador Morgenthau, 

who was succeeded by Abraham Elkus, who served as Ambassador 

from 1916 to 1917? Have you had an opportunity to read any of 

those? 

Mr. HEFFERN. Senator, yes, I’ve seen the compilation that Mr. 

Sarafian has put together of documents from the time. So yes, sir, 

I have seen a large number of them. 

Senator MENENDEZ. You have no reason to dispute what those 

dispatches were? 

Mr. HEFFERN. Those Foreign Service officers at the time, sir, reported what they saw and how they perceived events at the time, 

yes, sir. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I just want to say, Madam Chair, this is a 

difficult set of circumstances. 

And I appreciate your answers. 

This is an inartful dance that we do. We have a State Department whose history, full of dispatches, cites the atrocities committed during this period of time. We have a convention we sign 

that clearly defines these acts as genocide. We have a historical 

knowledge of the facts which we accept that would amount to genocide. But we are unwilling to reference it as genocide. 

If we cannot accept the past, we cannot move forward. So I find 

it very difficult to be sending diplomats of the United States to a 

country in which they will go, and I hope you will go, as some of 

your predecessors have gone, to a genocide commemoration, and 

yet never be able to use the word ‘‘genocide.’’ It is much more than 

a question of a word. It is everything that signifies our commitment to saying ‘‘never again.’’ Yet we can’t even acknowledge this 

fact, and we put diplomats in a position that I think is totally untenable. 

Nevertheless, I appreciate your straightforward answers to my 

questions. I have one other set of questions for you, Mr. Wohlers, 

and only caught the tail end of my colleague’s questions, so I hope 

they are not redundant. This whole issue of Macedonia; it’s more 

than a name. There are historical realities here. There is concern 

of irredentism, as well as concerns with the fact that one of the 

first acts of the new Prime Minister was to erect a 72-foot high 

bronze statue of Alexander the Great in the central square of the 

city of Skopje, a monument challenging Alexander’s Hellenic roots, 

costing $13 million in a country with 32 percent unemployment; 

and teaching children what is greater Macedonia and making 

claims of a greater Macedonia, when we know that 52 percent of 

that land mass is in Greece. 

Some people say, why are they fighting over a name? This has 

real significant consequences. Do you go into this assignment fully 

appreciating that? 

Mr. WOHLERS. Yes, Senator; I believe I do. You’re correct, completely correct, in saying this is more than just a name. This is an 

issue of identity. We have worked in the past and, if confirmed, I 

456

will continue to do so, with the Macedonian authorities, as we have 

also in Athens with our Embassy there, to impress upon both sides 

the need to move forward on this issue with a great sense of compromise, a great sense of respect for each other’s histories and traditions, a willingness to make the painful compromises that are 

necessary to resolve this very delicate issue. 

As you said, it’s an issue which is very emotional for both sides. 

We want to make sure also, and I would do so if confirmed, that 

neither side is engaging in any kind of provocative or inflammatory 

rhetoric or actions, which can only make the process even more difficult. It’s hard enough as it is. Otherwise, as I said earlier, we 

would have resolved this long ago. But it requires real leadership 

on both sides to move forward on this very difficult issue. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I know that the previous government 

had rejected U.N.-offered names that described solely FYROM’s 

sovereign territory. Such names included ‘‘Northern Macedonia’’ 

and ‘‘Upper Macedonia,’’ which Greece accepted. 

I always worry when we refer to some issues in the world as 

emotional issues. Sometimes that characterizes it in a way that 

makes them seem irrational. Senator Rubio and I, who sit on this 

committee, have a very strong stance on U.S. Cuba policy. Some 

people like to describe that as emotional. We have a very significant view as to what U.S. foreign policy should be. 

In this case, I hope when we ascribe the word ‘‘emotional’’ to it, 

it is not trivializing that. Because for both of these countries, and 

certainly Greece, this is far more than a name. This is questions 

of territory, identity, and a concern of those who have aspirations 

of getting territory that is clearly within the Hellenic Republic possibly being desired and sought after by its neighbor. 

Mr. WOHLERS. Well, I agree completely, Senator. Emotionalism 

is not irrationalism. I didn’t mean to equate those. If confirmed, I 

would work very closely with the Macedonian authorities, as I said, 

to make sure there are no movements of irredentism. I think we’re 

trying to make sure that does not happen. The policy of the Macedonian Government has been that they do not have any 

irredentist claims on Greece. But should there be anything like 

that, I would request that you would let me know so we can work 

with the authorities to make sure it does not continue. There’s no 

place for that. That will only make the issue more difficult. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Madam Chair, for your courtesy. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Heffern, I have an issue I’d like to bring up with you about 

Armenia as it affects Idaho, believe it or not. Certainly it doesn’t 

rise to the level of the issue concerning the Ottoman Empire or 

whether Alexander the Great was a Macedonian or a Greek. Those 

are things that have been around a long time. 

But we have—every year in Rexburg, ID, which is in eastern 

Idaho, there is an international dance festival and I wind up sometimes, I guess, refereeing the issuance of the visas for the people 

there. I have to tell you, working with the State Department is a 

real pleasure. A lot of us are critical of various agencies of the Federal Government, but the State Department really tries hard to acVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00464 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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commodate people. I’ve personally been present on some of the visa 

interviews and watched, personally observed how they’re done, and 

those people do a great job of that. 

But let me tell you what’s going on. One of the groups that they 

like to participate in this dance festival—and it’s a dance and folk 

festival that memorializes and celebrates the various cultures 

around the world, and Armenia is important in that regard. They 

have—in the past they’ve applied for visas and have had difficulty 

with the State Department, being told they need one kind of visa 

and then it doesn’t work out. 

Because of the bureaucratic difficulties last year, they weren’t 

able to attend last year. We’re having issues again this year on it. 

It’s in late August, so it probably won’t be on your watch. But I 

want to put this on your radar screen so that when you get a call 

from me in 2012 you’ll know what this is all about. 

Having said all of that, again I really compliment the State Department on how they handle these. You know, I think Americans 

don’t really realize, out of the 7 billion people on the face of this 

planet, how many of them want to come here for one reason or another, many of whom who want to come here and not leave here. 

They’ve got to sift through all these, and they really do a great job. 

But in any event, we’re having difficulties with it. We’re still 

having difficulties with it. We’re going to continue to work on it, 

and after you confirmed I hope that you remember this and if it 

comes across your desk I hope you remember this country boy from 

Idaho telling you that we need some help in that regard. 

To your wife, I have to tell you that it isn’t just the spouses of 

the Foreign Service people. Senate spouses make a lot of difference, 

too, as I’m sure Senator Shaheen will confirm. They’re very important to us. And that’s particularly true when we are traveling 

internationally with our spouses. 

So thank all three of you for your service to America. Thank you 

for willing to take on these positions, particularly in the difficult 

times that the world is in right now. 

Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Senator Risch. 

I want to go back, Mr. Wohlers, to Macedonia. I think we do appreciate how deeply felt the name issue is for people on both sides 

of the border, whether it’s Macedonia or Greece. But as you point 

out, this is an issue that really cries out for resolution. In your 

statement you pointed out that Macedonia received candidacy status for the EU in 2005, ahead of most of its neighbors, several of 

whom now have surpassed it. Croatia has now been accepted. Serbia is well on the road to candidacy status. And both of those countries are undertaking the difficult challenges that they need to in 

order to be accepted into the EU. 

As you pointed out, the future for Macedonia clearly is with the 

Euro-Atlantic institutions. It’s with the EU, it’s with NATO. And 

their lack of a resolution to this question is having a significant impact on their economic status and on their ability to move forward. 

So I do appreciate your commitment to doing everything that we 

can from the U.S. perspective to encourage them to go to the table 

and to help find a resolution to this difficult issue. 

458

Can you talk about what the current state of interethnic relations is in Macedonia, and are all of the parties who have—many 

of whom have been in the news in the last year or so, committed 

to continued territorial integrity, or do you think that the country 

could eventually break down along ethnic lines? 

Mr. WOHLERS. Well, Senator, I think that the basis for movement forward on the ethnic issues there is the framework agreement, the Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001. As I said, August 

13 will be the 10th anniversary of that event. They have made considerable progress in those 10 years in terms of interethnic relations. There is considerably more local government, where the 

areas and municipalities with minority populations have much 

more control of their daily lives. They have considerably improved 

the hiring of ethnic minorities, both in the government and in staffing in the military. There is greater use of the minority languages 

and symbols, and the largest ethnic Albanian party is the junior 

partner in the most recent government and will be in the new government as well and will have significant positions of power in that 

government. 

So there has been considerable progress since 2001. That having 

been said, that progress has slowed recently and we’re concerned 

about that. We have made that clear to the authorities, the Macedonian authorities, that there needs to be continued and further 

progress on this. 

A number of laws have been passed but not implemented. Of 

course, it’s easy sometimes to pass laws; it’s something else to implement them and to move forward. So we will be encouraging 

them to move forward on many of these issues to continue the improvement in the ethnic relationship. 

One of the problems, as you pointed out, is integration into the 

Euro-Atlantic community, of which the ethnic Albanians in particular are very supportive, and the longer that doesn’t take place 

the more uncertainty they have. 

But I don’t see any indications at this point that there’s any desire to break off or to split the country apart. I think they’re committed to a unified Macedonia. They’re working in the government. 

They’re working in all the ministries. Certainly we will continue to 

work there, should I be confirmed, to continue that process. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. That’s encouraging. 

So finally, what in your view can the United States and the EU, 

for that matter, do to encourage the Macedonians to solve their 

current political crisis over the opposition’s boycott of Parliament 

and the prospects for new elections? 

Mr. WOHLERS. Well, they had elections in June and they’re moving forward toward a new government. So we’re hopeful now with 

this newly developed parliament that we won’t have that issue. Obviously, if you’re not in Parliament you can’t—if you don’t play, you 

can’t affect things. 

We’ve never been, obviously, in favor of boycotts. They need to 

be involved in the governmental process. But they’ve got a new 

Parliament starting shortly. I believe that they will be playing constructive roles, all the parties. We’ll certainly be encouraging them 

to do that, and I would do that should I be confirmed. 

459

So I think we’re moving forward. There are still, obviously, many 

issues to be resolved, and we will be working closely with the Macedonian authorities through our assistance programs, through our 

public outreach, to do just that. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Great. Thank you. 

Finally, Mr. Moser, on Moldova. There have been informal talks 

under way to resolve the Transnistria conflict. Do you have any assessment of where those informal talks are and whether there’s 

more that we can or should be doing to try and encourage those 

talks and a resolution? 

Mr. MOSER. Well, I will say the first thing that you have to be 

happy about is that we had a set of informal talks. The good news 

is on this that we’re scheduled to have another set in the fall, that 

the parties did not agree to break off negotiations, but to agree to 

get together again in the fall, although the United States stands 

firmly committed that official talks will begin again, and that is the 

goal that we’re pressing for. 

Now, if confirmed, I will be the Ambassador to Moldova and I 

will try to work extensively with outreach both to the officials in 

Chisinau and also the officials in Tiraspol to try to press them toward bringing this conflict toward resolution, because I do believe 

that in my role of being in the country that people-to-people contact 

can help them to get to talk to each other. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Are there other regional players who are playing a role in this, both positive and negative? Has Russia’s support 

for the separatists exacerbated the issues there? 

Mr. MOSER. Well, I would put it this way, is we have to first of 

all praise Ukraine for its efforts to try to work toward resolution. 

In fact, the Russians have made very clear in their statements that 

they want to work toward a resolution of this conflict. So I think 

at this point all the other actors in the equation are working toward a positive resolution. We just need to get the parties that are 

really involved—and that is the officials within the country—to 

really come to serious negotiations. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Several times during this afternoon’s discussions we’ve pointed 

out that Moldova is one of the most economically depressed countries in Europe. Has it been hit even harder by the global economic 

downturn and are there plans under way in the government to help 

reform their economy? I think you mentioned some of those. Have 

they made any positive progress? 

Mr. MOSER. Well, at the time in 2010 the IMF gave a $600 million stabilization fund to the Moldovans, and they’ve been helping 

the Moldovans take the right measures economically. Now, one 

positive report I recently read in the Moldovan press, that in the 

first quarter of 2011 reports are that their economy grew by 8.4 

percent. Now, that is probably a rebound from a previous period of 

depressed growth, but this is actually a very positive development. 

But if confirmed, one of my goals is to really work with them to 

really work toward the real goal, which is to make a business climate that is conducive to international investment. This is something in our long-term stake. We really are—I am really seriously 

committed to our policy of a Europe whole, free, and at peace, and 

you can’t get there unless you take a country that borders on the 

460

European Union and make sure that it shares in the economic 

progress. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Senator Risch, do you have any other questions? 

Senator RISCH. No, thank you very much. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Well, then I will again thank all of you. I look forward to a 

speedy confirmation. Hopefully that will happen. And I think we’ll 

move to the next panel. Hopefully we will be able to get them out 

before too late this afternoon. 

First on our second panel is Tom Countryman, who has been 

nominated to be the Assistant Secretary of State for International 

Security and Nonproliferation. Tom is a career member of the senior Foreign Service, serving most recently as the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, specifically 

focusing on Balkan issues. I can tell you in that capacity I have 

had a chance to work with him and he is very knowledgeable and 

his expertise will be very much missed on that issue. 

Tom has also a great deal of experience working on international 

security issues, previously serving in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs as foreign policy adviser to the Commandant of the 

Marine Corps and on the National Security Council staff. 

Finally, we will consider the nomination of Jeffrey DeLaurentis 

to be Alternate Representative of the United States of America for 

Special Political Affairs in the United Nations, with the rank of 

Ambassador, and Alternate Representative of the United States of 

America to the Sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations. 

As a Foreign Service officer, Jeffrey has served in a number of 

positions in the State Department, especially focused on Western 

Hemisphere and United Nations issues. He currently serves as 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for South America. 

Again, as each of you give your opening statements feel free to 

introduce any family or friends who are here to support you. So I’ll 

ask you to begin, Mr. Countryman. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS M. COUNTRYMAN, OF WASHINGTON, 

NOMINATED TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR 

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Thank you, Chairman Shaheen, and good 

afternoon. I appreciate you making time to consider my nomination. 

I thank you also for the kind words that you and other Senators 

and my colleagues have said about the Foreign Service family. It 

applies with the deepest gratitude also to my family. Let me introduce first my wife, Dubravka, and my son, Andrew. My elder son, 

Stefan, is away studying physics at Columbia University. They are 

my strength, they are my joy, they are what propels me to give the 

best possible effort to creating a more secure future for them. 

I’m sincerely humbled by the honor of appearing before you and 

asking for your confidence and by the honor of being President 

Obama’s choice to serve as Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation. I’m grateful for the confidence the President and Secretary Clinton have shown in nomiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00468 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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nating me and I’m fully aware of the important responsibilities 

that I will undertake on behalf of our country should I be confirmed. 

While managing the ISN Bureau will be a new responsibility for 

me, I’m not a new face at the State Department and I’ve worked 

with you, your staff, and many on the Hill in my previous positions. I believe my experience in Washington and in building international partnerships abroad will serve us well if you choose to 

confirm me. I’m also keenly aware of the importance of consulting 

with Congress early and often. My hope, if confirmed, is that we 

will have a close relationship that will allow us to communicate, 

not only when we face a national security crisis, but in the quieter 

times in between, so that we can better prepare for the future. 

As you know, in his April 5, 2009, speech in Prague, the President committed the United States to seeking the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons and committed us to take 

concrete steps toward that end. His remarks laid out an ambitious 

nonproliferation agenda that includes working to strengthen the 

global nonproliferation infrastructure regime, including by 

strengthening compliance with these obligations, working toward a 

new framework for civil-nuclear cooperation, ensuring that terrorists never acquire a nuclear device, and securing all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world within 4 years. 

This agenda is ambitious, but I believe it is essential. I believe 

it is achievable, and if confirmed I will work vigorously to make it 

a reality. 

ISN’s agenda, of course, is not only nuclear-related. Nonproliferation in today’s context also includes addressing biological, chemical, 

missile, and destabilizing conventional weapons capabilities. Here 

also we have much important work before us. The Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference will occur later this year. At 

this important multilateral gathering, we will have a chance to 

build global capacity to combat infectious diseases, prevent biological terrorism, and promote confidence in the biological nonproliferation regime. 

The world looks to our leadership in areas involving export controls, bio, chemical, and nuclear safety and security, and dealing 

with the proliferation challenges of Iran, North Korea, and Syria. 

If confirmed, I will pursue these tasks vigorously. The government’s work in this area is vital to keeping America and our partners secure. 

I’ve barely scratched the surface of the critical work to which I 

will be committed if confirmed. The continued growth and success 

of programs and initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program, the 

United States Security Council Resolution 1540, and the Global 

Threat Reduction Program are all essential pieces of our effort. 

These cooperative initiatives reflect positive and concrete steps 

that we’ve already taken on the road to increased international security and nonproliferation. They also highlight the singular work 

that the State Department does in cooperation with other agencies, 

building long-term capacity to stem proliferation and serving as the 

connective tissue among agencies tackling this threat overseas. 

462

If confirmed, I will contribute my energy and dedication to the 

work of many professionals in the Department, across the government, and in Congress already engaged in these important endeavors. Together we will continue to ensure that the United States is 

up to the task of realizing the ambitious and bold vision laid out 

by the President in Prague. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman, for your time and your attention, 

and of course I’m happy to answer all of your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Countryman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS M. COUNTRYMAN

Good afternoon, Chairman Shaheen, Ranking Member Barrasso, and members of 

the committee. Thank you for making time to meet with me today to consider my 

nomination. 

Madame Chairman, before I begin my testimony, please allow me a moment to 

recognize members of my family who have joined me today for this important occasion: my wife, Dubravka, and my son, Andrew. My elder son, Stefan, is away studying physics at Columbia University. 

Their support strengthens my resolve and furthers my commitment to work each 

day toward a safer and more secure world not only for all of us, but for generations 

to come. 

I am sincerely humbled by the honor of appearing before the committee, and by 

the honor of being President Obama’s choice to serve as Assistant Secretary of State 

for International Security and Nonproliferation. I am grateful for the confidence 

that the President and Secretary Clinton have shown in nominating me for this position, and I am fully aware of the important responsibilities that I will undertake 

on behalf of our country should I be confirmed. 

While managing the ISN Bureau will be a new responsibility for me, I am not 

a new face at the State Department, and I have worked with many of you and your 

staff in my previous positions. I believe that my experience both in Washington and 

in building international partnerships abroad will serve me well if you chose to confirm me. I am also keenly aware of the importance of consulting with the Congress 

early and often. My hope, if confirmed, is that we will have a close relationship that 

will allow us to communicate not only when we are facing a national security crisis, 

but also in the quieter times in between, so that we can better prepare for the 

future. 

As you know, in his April 5, 2009, Prague speech, the President committed the 

United States to seeking the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, 

and to taking concrete steps toward that end. His remarks that day also laid out 

an ambitious nonproliferation agenda that includes: working to strengthen the 

global nonproliferation regime, including by strengthening compliance with nonproliferation obligations; working toward a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation; 

ensuring that terrorists never acquire a nuclear device; and securing all vulnerable 

nuclear materials around the world within 4 years. This agenda is ambitious but 

I believe it to be both essential and attainable. If confirmed, I will work vigorously 

to make it a reality. 

ISN’s agenda is not only nuclear-related. Nonproliferation in today’s context also 

includes addressing biological, chemical, missile, and destabilizing conventional 

weapons capabilities. Here too there is much important work before us. 

As one example, the Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference will take 

place at the end of this year. At this important multilateral gathering we will have 

a chance to build global capacity to combat infectious diseases, prevent biological 

terrorism, and promote confidence in the biological nonproliferation regime. 

Similarly, the world looks to our leadership in areas involving export controls; biological, chemical, and nuclear safety and security; and dealing with the proliferation 

challenges of Iran, Syria, and North Korea. If confirmed, I will vigorously pursue 

these tasks. Indeed, the government’s work in this area is vital to keeping America 

and our partners secure. 

I realize that I have barely scratched the surface of the critical work to which I 

will be committed, if confirmed. The continued growth and success of programs and 

initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance 

Program, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, and the Global Threat 

Reduction Program are all essential to our efforts. These cooperative initiatives reflect positive, concrete steps we have already taken on the road to increased interVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00470 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
463

national security and nonproliferation. They also highlight the singular work that 

the State Department does, building long-term capacity in partner countries to stem 

proliferation and serving as the connective tissue between other agencies tackling 

this existential threat overseas. 

If confirmed, I look forward to contributing my energy and dedication to the work 

of the many professionals in the Department, across the government, and in Congress who are already engaged in important nonproliferation endeavors. Together, 

we will continue to ensure that the United States is up to the task of realizing the 

bold and ambitious vision laid out by the President in Prague. 

Thank you, Madame Chairman, Ranking Member Barrasso, and members of the 

committee for your time and attention today and for your consideration of my nomination. At this time, I am happy to answer your questions.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. DeLaurentis. 

STATEMENT OF JEFFREY DELAURENTIS, OF NEW YORK, NOMINATED TO BE ALTERNATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR SPECIAL POLITICAL 

AFFAIRS IN THE UNITED NATIONS, WITH THE RANK OF 

AMBASSADOR, AND ALTERNATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE SESSIONS OF THE 

GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 

Mr. DELAURENTIS. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member 

Barrasso, and other distinguished members of the committee, I am 

honored to appear before you today as President Obama’s nominee 

to be the Alternate Representative for Special Political Affairs at 

the United Nations. I am grateful to the President, Secretary Clinton, and Ambassador Rice for this opportunity and for their confidence in me. 

I should say up front that unfortunately my wife, Jennifer, is 

traveling overseas for professional reasons, so is not here with me 

today. 

In his March speech dedicating the Ronald H. Brown Building, 

the new home of the United States Mission to the United Nations, 

President Obama said, ‘‘The world is more secure and the interests 

of the United States are best advanced when we act collectively.’’ 

That basic truth underlies the very purpose of the United Nations, 

as well as the broader commitment of the United States to provide 

energetic and sustained global leadership at the U.N. to deepen our 

security. 

If confirmed, I will work to advance America’s interests and values at the United Nations as we work with the international community to forge common responses to common problems. As Ambassador Rice has noted, ‘‘America can’t police every conflict and 

every crisis and shelter every refugee.’’ We live in an interwoven 

age of threats that pay no heed to borders. Now more than ever, 

American security and well-being are inextricably linked to those 

of people everywhere. So our security depends on our ability to 

work together with others to confront these threats. 

Now more than ever, the U.N. provides a crucial venue for countries to come together, shoulder their responsibilities, and carry together the costs of upholding peace and security. Of course, the 

United Nations is far from perfect. We must continue to be clear 

about the U.N.’s shortcomings. But let us also remember the indispensable role the U.N. plays in tackling the threats and challenges 

of the 21st century: preventing conflict, helping halt the spread of 

464

nuclear weapons, isolating terrorists and human rights abusers, 

and advancing American values. 

I have had the privilege of spending nearly half of my Foreign 

Service career in multilateral diplomacy. Each assignment has reinforced my view that our efforts at the U.N., although challenging 

at times, unquestionably advance American interests and values. If 

confirmed, I will work to bolster U.N. peacekeeping and political 

missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Haiti, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and elsewhere. I will seek to strengthen peacekeeping mandates, prevent abuses by peacekeepers, and give the 

U.N. what it needs to more effectively protect civilians. I will work 

to ensure full and rigorous implementation of Security Council 

sanctions on Iran and North Korea, as well as other council sanctions targeting individuals and companies associated with terrorism, atrocities, and transnational crime. I will strongly encourage the U.N.’s efforts to advance democracy and human rights in 

the Middle East and elsewhere and press for equality and women’s 

rights, and I will support the administration’s efforts to lead the 

charge for comprehensive reform of the U.N. and to help the U.N. 

fulfill its potential. If confirmed by the Senate, I’ll be a strong advocate for American interests and values. 

Madam Chairman, I am grateful to this committee for considering my nomination and, if confirmed, I will look forward to working closely with the members and staff on these critical issues. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. DeLaurentis follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JEFFREY DELAURENTIS

Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Barrasso, and other distinguished members 

of the committee, I am honored to appear before you today as President Obama’s 

nominee to be the Alternate Representative for Special Political Affairs at the 

United Nations. 

I am grateful to the President, Secretary Clinton, and Ambassador Rice for this 

opportunity and for their confidence in me. 

Before proceeding further, let me introduce my wife, Jennifer, who is with me 

today. 

In his March speech dedicating the Ronald H. Brown Building—the new home of 

the United States Mission to the United Nations—President Obama said, ‘‘The 

world is more secure and the interests of the United States are best advanced when 

we act collectively.’’ That basic truth underlies the very purpose of the United 

Nations—as well as the broader commitment of the United States to provide energetic and sustained global leadership at the U.N. to deepen our security. It is also 

the tenet that has shaped a good part of my own career at the State Department 

over the last 20 years. If confirmed, I will work to advance America’s interests and 

values at the United Nations, as we work with the international community to forge 

common responses to common problems. 

As Ambassador Rice has noted, ‘‘America can’t police every conflict, end every crisis, and shelter every refugee.’’ The U.N. brings 192 countries together to share the 

cost of providing stability, aid, and hope in the world’s broken places. 

We live in an interwoven age of threats that pay no heed to borders—from terrorism to pandemic disease, from criminal networks to environmental degradation. 

Now more than ever, Americans’ security and well-being are inextricably linked to 

those of people everywhere. So our security depends on our ability to work together 

with others to confront these threats. Now more than ever, the U.N. provides a crucial venue for countries to come together, shoulder their responsibilities, and carry 

together the costs of upholding peace and security. 

Of course, the United Nations is far from perfect. Progress sometimes comes too 

slowly. It is all too easy to find examples where the U.N. could be more efficient 

and effective, and where it has stumbled in the past. We must continue to be clear 

about the U.N.’s shortcomings. But let us also remember the indispensable role the 

U.N. plays in tackling the threats and challenges of the 21st century, preventing 

465

conflict, helping halt the spread of nuclear weapons, isolating terrorists and human 

rights abusers, providing desperately needed medicine and shelter, combating global 

poverty, promoting democracy, and advancing American values. 

I have had the privilege of spending nearly half of my Foreign Service career in 

multilateral diplomacy, including two assignments at the U.S. Mission to the U.N. 

in New York and one at the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in Geneva. Each assignment 

has reinforced my view that our efforts at the U.N., although challenging at times, 

unquestionably advance American interests and values. At the U.N., we react to today’s crises while trying to avert those to come. At the U.N., we pursue actions that 

will make us more secure. And because of the U.N., the international community 

does not always look to America to solve every problem alone. 

Madam Chairman, I would welcome the opportunity to return to multilateral 

work if confirmed. Under the leadership of President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and 

Ambassador Rice, our entire approach toward multilateral diplomacy is being reinvigorated—and it has produced results for the United States at the U.N. The State 

Department’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review noted that the 

United States must partner with other countries to better address issues of shared 

concern and to reform and reshape international organizations so they can effectively confront 21st century challenges. It recommended that we update our approach to multilateral diplomacy, expand the ranks of diplomats skilled in multilateral diplomacy and improve links between our multilateral and bilateral diplomacy, 

especially with respect to our engagement with the United Nations. It would be my 

highest honor to pursue these goals in order to better advance our country’s interests at the U.N. 

U.S. national security depends on a more effective approach to fragile states, an 

approach that is comprehensive enough to prevent us from having to intervene multiple times in a country emerging from conflict. Fostering security and reconstruction in the aftermath of conflict is a central national security objective. The United 

Nations plays a leading role here by organizing, directing, and promoting peacekeeping and stability operations, and setting the stage for peace-building and development. In today’s difficult fiscal environment, if confirmed, I will work to ensure 

that U.N. peacekeeping resources are deployed efficiently, effectively, and within the 

parameters of approved mandates. 

If confirmed, I will work, in particular, to bolster lifesaving U.N. peacekeeping 

and political missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Haiti, the Democratic Republic 

of Congo, and elsewhere. I will seek to strengthen peacekeeping mandates, prevent 

abuses by peacekeepers and give the U.N. what it needs to more effectively protect 

civilians. I will work to ensure full and rigorous implementation of Security Council 

sanctions on Iran and North Korea as well as other Council sanctions targeting individuals and companies associated with terrorism, atrocities, and transnational 

crime. I will strongly encourage the U.N.’s efforts to advance democracy and human 

rights in the Middle East and elsewhere, and press for equality and women’s rights. 

And I will support the administration’s efforts to lead the charge for comprehensive 

reform of the U.N. and to help the U.N. fulfill its potential. 

If confirmed by the Senate, I’ll be a strong advocate for American interests and 

values. 

Madam Chairman, I am grateful to this committee for considering my nomination, 

and if confirmed, I will look forward to working closely with the members and staff 

on these critical issues. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you both very much for your statements. 

Dr. DeLaurentis, as you as a representative of the United States 

look at America’s role at the U.N. and concerns that we have with 

respect to the U.N., can you elucidate on what you think the biggest challenges that we face there are? Does it have to do with the 

organization of U.N. operations? Does it have to do with particular 

issues that are before the U.N. right now? Are there other things 

that we’re especially concerned about? 

Mr. DELAURENTIS. Madam Chairman, thank you for that question—it’s a broad one. 

Senator SHAHEEN. It is. 

Mr. DELAURENTIS. First and foremost, in these difficult budget 

times, it’s important to remember that the U.N. maintains interVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00473 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
466

national sanctions regimes, deploys peacekeepers in Sudan, the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Haiti, and of course U.N. 

missions support our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

We’re constantly working with the U.N. to improve its budgets, 

become more cost effective, make peacekeeping better, include 

benchmarks in the mandates of peacekeeping missions, and also 

improve the logistic and other kinds of support for peacekeeping 

missions. 

We’re always looking for ways to improve the operations of U.N. 

peacekeeping and, of course, throughout the U.N. system. Thank 

you. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Since you mentioned peacekeeping, how would 

you characterize the U.N.’s record on peacekeeping for the last decade? 

Mr. DELAURENTIS. Of course, peacekeeping has grown over the 

past decade, but I think it’s been very good and it’s getting better. 

The U.N. has 120,000 troops all around the world, as I mentioned, 

working on many missions that are important to the United States. 

The U.N. has actually managed to close a couple of missions in the 

last decade in Chad and Nepal. We are constantly reviewing every 

mission with each mandate renewal, looking again to improve operations as they continue. 

Senator SHAHEEN. What’s our position on reform of the Security 

Council? 

Mr. DELAURENTIS. Madam Chairman, thank you for that question. It’s a difficult issue, one that the U.N. has been at work on 

for a long time. But I think it’s important that the Security Council 

be relevant and efficient to address the challenges of the 21st century. As a result, we are open in principle to a modest expansion 

of both permanent and nonpermanent members. 

For the permanent members, in particular, they need to be 

strong advocates and players in the maintenance of international 

peace and security. They should be strong advocates for the promotion and protection of human rights. They should be democracies 

and again large players in the activities of the Security Council. 

There are discussions under way at the U.N., which we participate in. There aren’t any proposals so far that have garnered widespread support among the membership, so I suspect that we’ll be 

at this for some time to come. 

Senator SHAHEEN. As we’re looking at a potential expansion of 

the Security Council, are we assuming that any potential permanent member should also have a veto? 

Mr. DELAURENTIS. No, the administration would be opposed to 

any expansion of the veto beyond those members who already have 

it. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Can you talk about what steps we’re taking 

to discourage the effort at the U.N. to seek recognition of an outside peace deal with Israel between the Palestinian Authority and, 

for that matter, to recognize Palestine as an independent state? 

Mr. DELAURENTIS. Senator, the administration’s position on this 

is very clear. Symbolic actions to isolate Israel at the U.N. in September will not lead to the creation of a Palestinian state. All our 

efforts at this moment are focused on bringing about direct negotiations between the parties. That’s where we believe all the attention 

467

should be and any efforts at the U.N. will not be helpful in that 

regard. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Let me just point out that a number of us on the committee had 

the opportunity to meet with former Chilean President Michele 

Bachelet, who is now heading the Office of Women at the U.N. 

Mr. DELAURENTIS. Yes. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I think we applaud the consolidation of programs affecting women under that office. I think her leadership 

has been very impressive and I think—I hope it’s an indication 

that the U.N. will continue to recognize what has become a more 

important part of American foreign policy, and that is that if we 

can ensure and improve the role of women in communities and in 

countries around the world that that’s a stabilizing factor, it’s an 

important economic factor in terms of how the countries do, and 

that that will continue to be a very important priority for the U.N. 

Mr. DELAURENTIS. Thank you, Senator. I couldn’t agree with you 

more, and if confirmed, I will certainly work hard toward that effort. It’s been very clear that increasing women’s participation in 

conflict resolution and peace processes has been enormously helpful, and American leadership has contributed very much to the 

number of very strong U.N. Security Council resolutions that are 

a good framework and base to proceed with these issues and 

strengthen them further. So I actually look forward very much to 

working on these issues. Thank you. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Countryman, you talked about Iran, North Korea, and Syria. 

Can you talk about how you will work in your new role, should you 

be confirmed, to strengthen the nonproliferation regime and how 

we prevent those countries or discourage those countries from moving forward with weapons of mass destruction? I suppose Syria is 

not yet on that path, but certainly Iran and North Korea are. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Thank you, Chairman Shaheen. The effort to 

prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction requires us to 

use a variety of different instruments, including diplomatic, political, economic, intelligence, and military strengths, all the different 

strengths that this government can bring to the table. 

In order to strengthen those efforts, I would first focus on ensuring that the State Department, and particularly the ISN Bureau, 

if I’m confirmed, is doing the maximum to coordinate with the 

other agencies of the U.S. Government; and second, to ensure that 

we are being consistent with our friends around the world who 

share our goals, that we demonstrate a coherence and a consistency 

in our policy, that gives them every reason to join with us in continuing the pressure on Iran, on North Korea, and on others who 

are seeking to proliferate and create weapons of mass destruction. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Some of us from this committee had the opportunity to meet with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov yesterday 

and one of the things that he suggested was that Iran might be 

ready to come back to the table on negotiations around developing 

a nuclear weapon. Do we have any indications that that in fact 

might be the case? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Both Jeff DeLaurentis and I worked with Ambassador Lavrov in New York and if you have an indication from 

468

Minister Lavrov that’s an indication that it is so. We do, of course, 

seek——

Senator SHAHEEN. An indication it’s an indication? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. It’s an indication that—he’s well informed, a 

very capable diplomat, and we have really excellent cooperation in 

the P5+1, the five permanent members plus Germany, in devising 

a strategy that makes clear our determination to have Iran come 

back into compliance with its international obligations. 

That effort proceeds well. Whether this is the moment to resume 

negotiations, at a time when Iran is increasing defiance of its obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency and its obligations to the U.N. Security Council is a tough question. But we are, 

of course, prepared, as the President has been throughout this administration, both to engage with Iran to work out a new relationship, but at the same time to make clear that we expect Iran to 

come into full compliance with its obligations. 

Senator SHAHEEN. So as you pointed out, the President in his 

Prague speech talked about the importance of moving the world in 

the direction of ending our nuclear weapons at some point in the 

future, and the administration has said that it ‘‘will lead a global 

effort to negotiate a verifiable treaty ending the production of 

fissile nuclear materials for weapons purposes.’’

Can you talk about how the administration will include unrecognized nuclear weapons states like Iran in a cutoff treaty? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Thank you, Senator. I can only talk in the 

most general terms because the obligation to lead the negotiation 

of such a treaty will fall to who I hope will be my future colleague, 

Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller in the Arms Control and 

Verification Bureau. It is a goal that we are determined to pursue. 

We believe that the P5, the five permanent members of the Security Council, must lead this effort. 

But the question you put your finger on, how to bring in nonrecognized nuclear-capable states, is not one that’s resolved and I’m 

afraid I won’t be the one to resolve it. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Can you talk about how we’ll work to overcome Pakistan’s objections to proceeding with negotiations in the 

Conference on Disarmament? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Again, only in general terms. I would be 

happy to come back with colleagues in order to get into more detail, 

but in general we have done everything we can to promote a productive agenda of cooperation with Pakistan in the many specific 

areas that nonproliferation encompasses, from border security to 

security of nuclear materials. 

In our strategic dialogue with Pakistan and in the nonproliferation part of that dialogue with Pakistan, which I would support if 

confirmed, we are seeking to convince them of the advantages to 

Pakistan and world security of such an approach. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Is there any indication of the extent to which 

the recent announcement that we’re going to be discontinuing a 

portion of our aid to Pakistan is going to have any impact on the 

ability to negotiate with Pakistan on those other issues of nuclear 

proliferation? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Very good question, Senator. I think the only 

part of that that I’m really qualified to speak to is to reaffirm that 

469

the assistance that we give to Pakistan for programs related to 

nonproliferation in the fields I mentioned, such as border control, 

we provide that money because it is in the United States interests, 

because it contributes directly to our security. 

I think that Pakistan has recognized that it shares that interest 

with us and we certainly hope to continue that cooperation. 

Senator SHAHEEN. The final document of the 2010 NPT treaty review conference also called for India and Pakistan to accede to the 

NPT and to abandon their weapons programs. What steps, if any, 

are we taking to persuade India and Pakistan to do that? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. As I noted, Senator, we have a nonproliferation and a strategic dialogue with both India and Pakistan. In this 

dialogue and in our ongoing contact with each, we seek to have 

them take steps that improve the security of nuclear materials and 

that do not encourage additional proliferation in both countries. We 

hope that gradually we can create the conditions under which they 

will seriously consider joining the NPT. I think we must conclude 

that it’s realistic that we won’t reach that goal in the immediate 

future, but we continue to work toward it in our bilateral cooperation with both states. 

Senator SHAHEEN. We announced, or the administration announced, its intention to support India’s full membership in the 

Nuclear Suppliers Group in November 2010, as well as the Missile 

Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, the Wassenaar 

Arrangement. Are we also expecting that India will bring its export 

control regimes in conformity with these groups’ guidelines before 

it joins? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Thank you, Senator. We are working both 

with India and with the existing members of those four export control regimes toward the goal that we promised in November 2010. 

It is our expectation that India would meet the standards of those 

regimes prior to joining. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Good. 

I don’t have any further questions for right now, but I would be 

remiss, Dr. DeLaurentis, if I didn’t go back and ask you a final 

question about Libya, since that has been so much of the part of 

the national discussion here. Do you expect any further action on 

Libya at the U.N. and is there any reason to be optimistic about 

the U.N.’s further engagement in Libya that will help provide a 

resolution to the conflict there? 

Mr. DELAURENTIS. Thank you, Senator. It’s a very good question, 

unfortunately, I was not a part of the negotiations in New York. 

Of course, the two Security Council resolutions provided the framework for the current action with respect to the protection of civilians clearly in harm’s way, the arms embargo, and so forth. 

I think there is reason for optimism. We’re beginning to see an 

international consensus that comes closer to our position that 

Qadafi has to go, has to step down, and we need to move toward 

a democratic transition. Of course, there’s a U.N. envoy involved 

and things are changing on a daily basis. But I think in general 

we can be optimistic, and I think we can be proud that we averted 

a humanitarian catastrophe. 

Thank you. 

470

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, thank you both very much again for 

your testimony here today, for your willingness to serve. I hope 

that we can move forward with speedy confirmations of both of you 

so that you can start your new positions as soon as possible. 

I will point out that the record will stand open for 48 hours until 

the close of business on Friday July 15 for any further comments 

or statements. 

Thank you all. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:27 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF PAUL WOHLERS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. In your view, should Macedonia’s accession to NATO continue to depend 

on resolution of its name dispute with Greece? What other measures, besides resolution of the name dispute, must Macedonia undertake to accede to NATO?

Answer. The United States supports Macedonia’s membership in NATO. Macedonia has fulfilled key criteria required of NATO members and will receive an invitation to join as soon as the dispute with Greece over its name is resolved. Heads 

of State and Government concluded at NATO’s 2008 Bucharest summit—and 

reaffirmed at the Strasbourg-Kehl and Lisbon summits—that ‘‘an invitation to the 

former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will be extended as soon as a mutually 

acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached.’’

Macedonia participates in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) process and continues to be an active participant in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and its Planning and Review Process (PARP). With 163 site protectors, army mentors, and medical personnel, it maintains one of the highest per capita contributions to NATO’s 

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Macedonia has implemented key defense reforms in support of its NATO aspirations and should continue to enhance 

the deployability of its armed forces and improve its interoperability with NATO 

forces.

Question. What effect would Macedonia’s accession to NATO have on regional 

stability?

Answer. Regional stability in Southeast Europe is a foreign policy priority of the 

United States, and we support the full integration of Macedonia into Euro-Atlantic 

institutions to further that priority. As a NATO aspirant country, Macedonia has 

become a valuable contributor to regional security. It provides small contingents in 

support of the EU peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and provides support to the 

KFOR mission through a Host Nation Support Coordination Center. 

The Euro-Atlantic integration process results in domestic reform not only in the 

area of security but also in rule of law, democratization, and the development of 

civil society. By fulfilling NATO membership criteria, Macedonia is reinforcing its 

ability to withstand internal and external crises, thus aiding in the stabilization 

process throughout the region. Assuming the name issue is resolved, Macedonia’s 

successful accession to NATO would serve as an example to other NATO aspirants 

in the region, demonstrating that the necessary reforms can be accomplished, membership is in fact achievable, and NATO’s open door policy is true and unwavering.

Question. Please describe Macedonia’s energy security situation. What steps would 

you advocate as Ambassador to promote its energy security?

Answer. Macedonia imports a significant amount of electrical power, which underscores both the importance of Macedonia’s participation in the Energy Community 

and the need for increased energy efficiency and use of renewable sources. The key 

for Macedonia’s energy security is diversification. Of domestic production, roughly 

30 percent comes from hydroelectric sources and about 70 percent comes from coal. 

It is estimated that the capacity for hydroelectric power generation can be increased 

with several projects that are in the development stage. 

Through USAID assistance programs, the United States has helped Macedonia realize its Energy Community commitments to ensure a rational energy market and 

has funded the development of the Energy Efficiency Strategy and Action Plan, as 

well as the Action Plan for the Renewable Energy Strategy and demonstration 

projects to encourage more energy efficiency. Likewise, we have assisted in the 

471

development and passage of a new comprehensive energy sector law and are supporting the development of the key required secondary legislation to encourage investment in renewable sources such as wind and solar. If confirmed, I will continue 

to support programs that lead to energy diversity and help reduce Macedonia’s import dependency.

Question. What sectors of the Macedonian economy are in most need of foreign 

investment? How would you seek to increase U.S. investment in Macedonia?

Answer. Macedonia lags behind other countries in the region in attracting foreign 

direct investment, yet there are real opportunities. For instance, two U.S. companies 

have invested in production facilities near Skopje for the production of auto parts 

and electronics. The companies investing in these facilities are using them to expand into markets in Europe and elsewhere. In addition to small manufacturers, investment opportunities exist in agriculture and technology. 

Lack of progress on NATO and EU integration and the inability of the judiciary 

to provide reliable, impartial, and timely settlement of disputes are obstacles to 

attracting more investment. If confirmed, I would continue to support our mission’s 

efforts to address these obstacles through our assistance, public engagement, and 

in meetings with the Government, so that we can help Macedonia realize its full 

potential as an economic partner. 

RESPONSES OF WILLIAM MOSER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. Several seizures of uranium have occurred in Moldova over the past 

year. Could you please provide a list of U.S. programs in Moldova for the past two 

fiscal years that advance U.S. nonproliferation objectives?

Answer. Members of the interagency Nuclear Trafficking Response Group 

(NTRG), which is chaired by the Department of State, have been working closely 

with the Government of Moldova in recent months to break up nuclear trafficking 

networks. The NTRG coordinated the USG response to the recent law enforcement 

operations in Moldova, including the seizure of uranium-238 in August 2010 and the 

June 2011 seizure of highly enriched uranium (HEU). The NTRG continues to facilitate followup actions with Moldova and other countries as we work together to investigate the smuggling networks involved. 

U.S. programs in Moldova focused on nonproliferation include:

• The State Department’s Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) 

Program, which restarted in Moldova in November 2010, has coordinated with 

other federal agencies to organize seminars and tabletop exercises to enhance 

Moldovan capabilities in detecting and interdicting smuggling of weapons of 

mass destruction. 

• The Department of State’s Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI) initiated a dialogue with Moldova in 2010 on combating the smuggling of illicit nuclear material. On July 19, the U.S. Ambassador to Moldova signed the ‘‘Joint 

Action Plan between the Government of the United States of America and the 

Government of the Republic of Moldova on Combating Smuggling of Nuclear 

and Radioactive Materials.’’ This Joint Action Plan expresses the intention of 

the two governments to take steps to enhance the capabilities of the Republic 

of Moldova to prevent, detect, and respond effectively to any attempts to smuggle materials that could be used to make an improvised nuclear device. 

• The Department of State’s Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program (PNSP) 

plans to fund projects that are part of the NSOI Joint Action Plan, starting in 

the autumn of 2011. PNSP plans to help Moldova build specialized Counter Nuclear Smuggling Teams, host a workshop to review Moldova’s laws on nuclear 

smuggling, and help Moldova further strengthen its national response plan to 

ensure effective coordination in responding to incidents of trafficking in nuclear 

or radioactive materials. 

• On July 19, the U.S. Ambassador to Moldova signed the ‘‘Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of Energy of the United States of America 

and the Customs Service under the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of 

Moldova Concerning Cooperation to Prevent Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and 

Other Radioactive Material.’’ The memorandum of understanding will allow the 

Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to 

provide radiation detection systems at strategic locations at Moldova’s borders, 

to thwart nuclear smuggling and prevent illicit movement of nuclear and radioactive materials. 

472

• The Department of Defense’s Cooperative Threat Reduction’s Proliferation Prevention Program (CTR PPP) is discussing with Moldovan officials possible 

projects to enhance WMD detection and interdiction capabilities on the borders 

with Ukraine and around the region of Transnistria. Moldovan officials have 

welcomed possible assistance. CTR officials anticipate further discussions in the 

coming months. 

• On nonnuclear proliferation risks, the United States has cooperated with the 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in the destruction 

of Soviet-era rockets and cluster munitions left in the territory of Moldova 

under control of the central authorities.

Question. Please describe how the programs mentioned above are coordinated 

with U.S. programs in Ukraine. Do you believe that these programs could be better 

coordinated? If so, please describe.

Answer. The Department of State’s Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative Joint 

Action Plan on nuclear smuggling to be signed with Moldova is modeled after a 

similar plan established with Ukraine in 2006. The Joint Action Plan specifically 

calls for Moldova to bolster its cooperation on countersmuggling efforts with international partners, including Ukraine. 

The legal review and national response plan workshops that the Department of 

State’s Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program plans to host in Moldova are modeled after similar workshops it hosted in Ukraine. The Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program is planning a visit to Moldova, Ukraine, and Slovakia this fall to help 

develop Counter Nuclear Smuggling Teams in all three countries. One of the goals 

of these teams is to foster cooperation among law enforcement counterparts in the 

region. 

The Department of Energy’s work in Moldova to provide radiation detection systems on the border and to upgrade physical security at Moldovan facilities parallels 

such work in Ukraine. Assistance for border security in both countries will be mutually reinforcing, as both countries share a border known to be a popular route 

among smugglers. 

Those responsible for the State Department’s Export Control and Related Border 

Security (EXBS) programs in Chisinau and Kyiv communicate regularly regarding 

their work, and the programs share the same regional EXBS Advisor, who is posted 

at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv. The two EXBS programs plan closer cooperation in 

coming years to assist in training Moldovan and Ukrainian border guards and other 

law-enforcement authorities via joint exercises in both countries.

Question. Is the U.S. Government aware of the origins of the seized uranium? If 

so, please describe.

Answer. Detailed analysis of the uranium seized by Moldovan police on June 28, 

2011, has not been completed. Since this case is still open, all of the information 

on this matter is highly sensitive as Moldova continues its investigation in cooperation with the United States.

Question. A bill to repeal Jackson-Vanik for Moldova has been pending for the last 

several years. Please describe administration efforts to push for passage of this bill 

(S. 334 and its House companion) in 2011, including meetings held with House and 

Senate committee staff and House and Senate leadership staff on this issue.

Answer. Since 1997, the United States Government has found Moldova to be in 

compliance with Jackson-Vanik emigration requirements, and the Obama administration has extended to Moldova conditional normal trade relations status. The 

Obama administration supports terminating the application of Jackson-Vanik and 

extending Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) to Moldova, because the 

country has satisfied all the freedom of emigration requirements of Jackson-Vanik, 

and because U.S. exporters to Moldova will not enjoy WTO benefits and protections 

until the application of Jackson-Vanik is lifted. During his March visit to Chisinau, 

Vice President Biden delivered a message of support for granting PNTR to Moldova, 

both publicly and privately. Administration officials have also discussed the termination of the application of Jackson-Vanik with House and Senate staff . 

The administration’s top trade priorities with Congress include trade agreements 

with Korea, Colombia, and Panama, Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA), and renewal of trade preference programs (e.g., Generalized System of Preferences and the 

Andean Trade Preference Act). We look forward to working with Congress on lifting 

Jackson-Vanik’s application to Moldova as our trade agenda advances.

Question. What tangible steps will you take as Ambassador to increase U.S. investment in Moldova?

473

Answer. If I am confirmed as U.S. Ambassador to Moldova, I will enhance our 

trade and investment promotion efforts and build upon them. The key to making 

Moldova more attractive to U.S. investors and exporters is improving Moldova’s 

overall business and investment climate, and the USG has been actively working 

on this priority with the Moldovan Government. For example, the U.S. Agency for 

International Development has two programs dedicated to this effort:

• The Business Regulatory and Tax Administration Reform Project works with 

the Moldovan Government to reduce the administrative burdens on the private 

sector, streamline tax administration, reduce opportunities for corruption, improve access to government information, and strengthen public-private sector 

dialogue. • The Moldova Rapid Governance Support Program, provides rapidly implemented, short-term expert assistance to Moldovan Government ministries and 

offices to support implementation of key reforms in the areas of judicial administration, agricultural subsidies, customs, fiscal decentralization, internal government communications, and implementation of an e-government strategy.

As a result of these efforts, over 17,000 businesses now save an average of 4 

hours/month using the rapid tax declaration system developed under the Business 

Regulatory and Tax Administration Reform Project. Moldova’s State Licensing 

Chamber recently launched its one-stop shop, which allows businesses to combine 

what used to require four or more separate applications, presented by hand to different agencies, into a single filing. Meanwhile, changes in construction laws have 

shaved 70 days and over $1,000 in fees from the process of acquiring permits. 

If confirmed, I will continue to focus on improving Moldova’s investment climate, 

because foreign direct investment and two-way trade can play an important role in 

boosting exports and employment and reducing poverty. 

RESPONSES OF JOHN HEFFERN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR BARBARA BOXER

Question. As you know, countless experts have documented the horrific atrocities 

of the Armenian Genocide of 1915 to 1923, when more than 1.5 million Armenians 

were marched to their deaths in the deserts of the Middle East, murdered in concentration camps, drowned at sea, and forced to endure unimaginable acts of brutality at the hands of the Ottoman Empire—now modern-day Turkey. 

That is why it is so hard to understand how Turkey continues its state-sponsored 

denial of this terrible crime.

• How is the administration working to urge Turkey to finally acknowledge the 

Armenian Genocide? What efforts have been undertaken to date?

Answer. The President has said that a full, frank, and just acknowledgement of 

the facts is in all our interest. In his April 23, 2011, statement, he noted that history teaches us that our nations are stronger and our cause is more just when we 

appropriately recognize painful pasts and work to rebuild bridges of understanding 

toward a better tomorrow. With this in mind, he strongly supports efforts by the 

Turkish and Armenian peoples to work through their painful history in a way that 

is honest, open, and constructive. The U.S. Government supports the efforts of individuals in Armenia and Turkey to foster a dialogue that acknowledges their history, 

sponsoring programs that foster contacts between the Armenian and Turkish 

peoples. 

Over the last decade, the United States has provided approximately $3.5 million 

to support activities aimed at strengthening relations between the people of Armenia and Turkey. These include initiatives to increase people-to-people connections 

such as research projects, conferences, documentary production, and exchange and 

partnership programs with the goal of increasing cross-border dialogue and cooperation. These programs are focused on bringing together Armenian and Turkish 

NGOs, think-tank researchers, academics and business leaders at the grassroots 

level by creating opportunities for them to work together on common projects that 

will benefit both countries. If I am confirmed, I will continue to promote not only 

government-to-government discussions, but also people-to-people cultural and economic contacts and partnerships, and other cross-border and regional initiatives.

Question. Recently, the Government of Azerbaijan threatened to shoot down civilian airplanes if Nagorno Karabakh goes ahead with plans to reopen its civilian airport that has been closed since 1991. 

According to news reports, the head of Azerbaijan’s Civil Aviation Administration 

said that ‘‘the law on aviation envisages the physical destruction of airplanes landing in’’ Nagorno Karabakh.

474

• How has the United States Government responded to these threats? Is there 

an effort underway with the Government of Azerbaijan to encourage it to back 

down? How will the United States respond once the airport is open?

Answer. U.S. officials have made clear repeatedly that the threat or use of force, 

including against civilian aircraft that pose no threat themselves, is unacceptable, 

and runs counter to commitments made by the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia to seek a peaceful, negotiated settlement. 

The United States Government has urged both sides to work together to resolve 

all issues of commercial aviation safety prior to the planned opening of the proposed 

airport. On April 1, the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry declared that ‘‘Azerbaijan will 

not use force against civil facilities.′′ Also, the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan 

have both confirmed to the Minsk Group cochairs in early April that they will not 

use force against civil aircraft.

Question. Can you please provide your views on the following statements made 

by President Obama? Do you disagree with them? If so, why?

‘‘Nearly 2 million Armenians were deported during the Armenian Genocide, which 

was carried out by the Ottoman Empire from 1915 to 1923, and approximately 1.5 

million of those deported were killed.’’—Senator Obama, Question for the Record to 

Ambassador Yovanovitch, June 19, 2008.

‘‘The occurrence of the Armenian genocide is a widely documented fact supported 

by an overwhelming collection of historical evidence.’’—Senator Obama, Statement 

Commemorating the Armenian Genocide, April 28, 2008.

‘‘The Armenian Genocide is not an allegation, a personal opinion, or a point of 

view, but rather a widely documented fact supported by an overwhelming body of 

historical evidence.’’—Senator Obama on the importance of U.S.-Armenia Relations, 

January 19, 2008.

Answer. In his April 23 Armenian Remembrance Day statement, the President 

solemnly remembered as historical fact that 1.5 million Armenians were massacred 

or marched to their deaths from 1915–1923. The President’s views on this subject 

are well known; they have not changed. 

Like all executive branch officials, I have a responsibility to represent the policy 

of the President on this and all other issues. If I am confirmed as the personal representative of the President to Armenia, I will continue to do so.

Question. Does the United States Government support the inclusion of the 

Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in the Minsk Group process? If not, please provide a 

detailed explanation.

Answer. The United States supports the current format of negotiations for the 

Minsk Group process, which has been agreed to by both the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides. At this stage in the negotiation, the USG believes it is best to continue 

on this basis. Any final settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) conflict must be 

acceptable to the Karabakhi communities. The Minsk Group cochairs travel regularly to NK to meet with the de facto NK authorities.

Question. In 2010, trade between the United States and Armenia totaled approximately $189 billion (both imports and exports). What steps are being taken by the 

administration to increase trade between our two countries?

Answer. The U.S. and Armenian governments have a robust dialogue focused on 

trade and investment issues between our two countries as part of the U.S.-Armenia 

Joint Economic Task Force (USATF)—which has been meeting regularly since 1999. 

We are committed to using this forum to enhance bilateral trade opportunities and 

improve the business climate in Armenia. As part of that effort we are using the 

USATF to encourage business-to-business contacts, identify sectors for reform, and 

to advocate for U.S. companies who want to expand their business with Armenia. 

The next USATF meeting is scheduled for September of this year. 

Over the past several years, our countries have concluded agreements that advance greater cooperation. In November 2008, the U.S. Government and the Government of Armenia concluded a comprehensive Open Skies agreement to expand and 

liberalize bilateral civil aviation relations between the two countries. In 2009, Armenia and the United States signed an agreement that will facilitate science and technology cooperation in numerous areas of mutual interest including information technology, intellectual property, earth sciences, and others. This year we signed an 

MOU to jointly analyze Armenia’s potential conventional and unconventional energy 

resources. 

In order to increase bilateral trade and investment, we intend to organize a trade 

mission in the coming year that will bring Armenian business people on a sectorVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00482 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
475

specific trip to the United States. They will have the chance to attend trade shows 

and connect with U.S. businesses interested in export, as well as having the opportunity to develop markets for Armenian exports. While this idea is still in the development phase—we are considering how we might fund it—if I am confirmed this 

would be one of my first orders of business upon arriving in Yerevan. 

Our diplomatic engagement and assistance programs continue to address the underlying impediments to doing business in Armenia. The USG is actively working 

with the Armenian authorities to create a more favorable trade and investment environment, including through reform of its tax administration and customs procedures, improving its legal system, and addressing corruption that stifles investment 

in Armenia. USAID’s Mobilizing Action Against Corruption (MAAC) project is now 

providing input to the Armenian Government’s efforts to develop a revised 

anticorruption strategy. Armenian Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) specialists attend U.S. Patent Office training to improve Armenian patent and copyright law, improving IPR protection in Armenia and making the country more attractive to U.S. 

businesses. 

Other U.S. Government programs work directly with Armenian entrepreneurs 

and companies: USAID’s Competitive Armenian Private Sector (CAPS) and Enterprise Development and Market Competitiveness (EDMC) projects aim to enhance 

business and management skills, increase access to financial services for Armenian 

businesses, and encourage enterprise collaboration and joint ventures. Our Business 

Advisory Services program provides technical and consulting services to Armenian 

companies, helping them to improve their operations and enter new markets. U.S. 

Government assistance moneys have supported the Civilian Research and Development Fund in Armenia since the 1990s. This project identifies and funds technological innovations that have promising commercial applications, and pairs 

Armenian scientists and businesspeople to develop these innovations. 

Should I be confirmed, I intend to work to provide U.S. businesses with information about opportunities in Armenia, and to provide Armenian businesses insight 

about how American businesses operate. Promotion of trade and business cooperation between the United States and Armenia will require greater awareness of 

Armenia and the Caucasus as a whole by U.S. businesses. Some sectors, such as 

information technology, already have significant U.S. investment. But others, financial services and insurance for example, hold largely untapped potential. 

Finally, I believe that the key to unlocking Armenia’s economic potential—and 

opening up more opportunities for U.S.-Armenian business cooperation—lies in the 

resolution of regional conflicts. If confirmed, I will support the USG’s continued 

efforts to open the land border with Turkey and to achieve a peaceful solution to 

the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Armenia’s economic integration into the wider region remains an important U.S. policy objective.

Question. If confirmed, will you commit to comprehensive engagement with the 

Armenian Community in California and throughout the United States on a regular 

basis? For example, will you commit to holding public community forums with 

Armenian Americans throughout the United States?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would look forward to visiting and meeting with 

members of the Armenian American community in California, throughout the 

United States, and in Armenia, as my predecessors have done. It would be a valuable opportunity to understand their concerns, update them on the status of the 

U.S.-Armenia relationship, and to discuss a host of relevant issues.

Question. In a July 29, 2008 letter to then-chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Joseph Biden, Acting Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs 

Matthew Reynolds wrote of ‘‘the mass killings and deportations of Armenians committed by Ottoman soldiers and other Ottoman officials in 1915’’ and noted that ‘‘the 

administration recognizes that the mass killings, ethnic cleansing, and forced deportations of over 11⁄2 million Armenians were conducted by the Ottoman Empire. We 

indeed hold Ottoman officials responsible for those crimes.’’ Does the administration 

ascribe to this policy statement?

• Do you agree that U.S. diplomats serving in the Ottoman Empire during the 

Armenian Genocide documented a systematic, government-sponsored campaign 

‘‘with intent to destroy, in whole or in part’’ the Armenian population?

Answer. In his April 23 Armenian Remembrance Day statement, the President 

solemnly remembered as historical fact that 1.5 million Armenians were massacred 

or marched to their deaths from 1915–1923. The President’s views on this issue are 

well known; those views have not changed. The administration mourns this terrible 

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476

ple of Armenia, and for all those who believe in the dignity and value of every 

human life. 

I have read the statements of Ambassadors Morgenthau and Elkus, the statements of other U.S. officials in Turkey at the time, as well as a number of books 

on this subject. I am acquainted with the history of the tragic massacres and deportations that occurred at the end of the Ottoman Empire, and with U.S. policy in 

that regard. The individual stories are heartrending; the magnitude of these terrible 

acts—over 1.5 million killed or forcibly deported—defies comprehension. 

RESPONSES OF JOHN HEFFERN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. In your opening statement you state that ‘‘President Obama has recognized and deplored the horrific events that took place in the waning days of the 

Ottoman empire’’ and note that he has ‘‘publicly called the massacre of 1.5 million 

Armenians at the time one of the worst atrocities of the 20th century.’’ I welcome 

that statement, but note that it refrains from laying blame for these events.

• Do you or does the administration agree that the mass killings, ethnic cleansing, and forced deportations of over 1.5 million Armenians were conducted by 

the Ottoman Empire? 

• Does the administration recognize the Turkish Republic as the successor state 

to the Ottoman Empire? Who then was responsible for the murder of over 1.5 

million Armenians from 1915–1923?

Answer. In his Armenian Remembrance Day statement on April 23, the President 

solemnly remembered the horrific events of 1915, when 1.5 million Armenians were 

massacred or marched to their deaths in the final days of the Ottoman Empire. 

With his statement, the President honors the victims of these events and expresses 

American solidarity with the Armenian people; his views on this subject have not 

changed. 

This was an atrocity that we and the world must never forget, so that it is never 

repeated. We mourn this terrible chapter of history and recognize that it remains 

a source of great pain for all those who believe in the dignity and value of every 

human life. 

The President has said that the achievement of a full, frank, and just acknowledgement of the facts of what occurred in 1915 is in all our interests.

Question. Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 

Crime of Genocide, of which the United States has both signed and ratified, states:

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed 

with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious 

group, as such: 

‘‘(a) Killing members of the group; 

‘‘(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 

‘‘(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 

about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 

‘‘(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 

‘‘(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.’’

Therefore, would not the facts that you acknowledge in your opening statement, 

during the period of 1915–1923, meet the definition under Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide?

Answer. In his April 23 Armenian Remembrance Day statement, the President 

solemnly remembered as historical fact that 1.5 million Armenians were massacred 

or marched to their deaths from 1915–1923. The administration mourns this terrible 

chapter of history and recognizes that it remains a source of great pain for all those 

who believe in the dignity and value of every human life. 

The President has said that the achievement of a full, frank, and just acknowledgement of the facts of what occurred in 1915 is in all our interests. He strongly 

supports the efforts of Turkey and Armenia to normalize their bilateral relations. 

The President believes that together, Armenia and Turkey can forge a relationship 

that is peaceful, productive, and prosperous. 

I have a responsibility to represent the policy of the President. The President’s 

views on this issue are well known; those views have not changed. If I am confirmed 

as the personal representative of the President to Armenia, I will carry out this responsibility.

477

Question. Please describe the facts or circumstances, including historical instances, that constitute the act of genocide as described in Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

Answer. The United States became a State Party to the Convention on Prevention 

and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1989. When ratifying the Convention, 

the United States set forth an understanding with respect to the definition of genocide provided in Article II. Article II provides:

‘‘In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed 

with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national ethnical, racial or religious 

group, as such: 

‘‘(a) Killing members of the group; 

‘‘(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 

‘‘(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 

about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 

‘‘(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births in the group; 

‘‘(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.’’

The U.S. ratification instrument set forth several reservations and understandings to the Convention, including: 

Reservations: 

‘‘(1) That with reference to article IX of the Convention, before any dispute to 

which the United States is a party may be submitted to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under this article, the specific consent of the United States 

is required in each case. 

‘‘(2) That nothing in the Convention requires or authorizes legislation or other action by the United States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the United 

States as interpreted by the United States.′′

Understandings: 

‘‘(1) That the term ‘intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group as such’ appearing in article II means the specific intent to 

destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 

group as such by the acts specified in article II. 

‘‘(2) That the term ‘mental harm’ in article II (b) means permanent impairment 

of mental faculties through drugs, torture or similar techniques. 

‘‘(3) That the pledge to grant extradition in accordance with a state’s laws and 

treaties in force found in article VII extends only to acts which are criminal under 

the laws of both the requesting and the requested state and nothing in article VI 

affects the right of any state to bring to trial before its own tribunals any of its nationals for acts committed outside a state. 

‘‘(4) That acts in the course of armed conflicts committed without the specific intent required by article II are not sufficient to constitute genocide as defined by this 

Convention. 

‘‘(5) That with regard to the reference to an international penal tribunal in article 

VI of the Convention, the United States declares that it reserves the right to effect 

its participation in any such tribunal only by a treaty entered into specifically for 

that purpose with the advice and consent of the Senate.′′

In his April 23 statement, the President solemnly remembered as historical fact 

that 1.5 million Armenians were massacred or marched to their deaths from 1915–

1923. The President has said that the achievement of a full, frank, and just acknowledgement of the facts of what occurred in 1915 is in all our interests.

Question. The U.S. State Department chronicled the effort to exterminate Armenians in the early 1900s—The Honorable Henry Morgenthau, U.S. Ambassador to 

Turkey from 1913–16 wrote in July 16, 1915, telegram to the Secretary of State, 

‘‘Deportation of and excesses against peaceful Armenians is increasing and from 

harrowing reports of eye witnesses it appears that a campaign of race extermination 

is in progress under a pretext of reprisal against rebellion.’’

The U.S. Consul in Aleppo, Jesse Jackson, reported to Ambassador Morgenthau 

on June 5, 1915, ‘‘It is without doubt a carefully planned scheme to thoroughly extinguish the Armenian race.’’

The U.S. Consul in Harput, Leslie Davis, reported to Ambassador Morgenthau on 

July 24, 1915, ‘‘It has been no secret that the plan was to destroy the Armenian 

race as a race, but the methods used have been more cold-blooded and barbarous, 

if not more effective, than I had at first supposed.’’

Ambassador Morgenthau was succeeded by the Honorable Abram I. Elkus, who 

served as Ambassador from 1916–17. On October 17, 1916, Elkus telegrammed the 

Secretary of State about the extreme measures sanctioned by the Turks, stating ‘‘In 

478

order to avoid opprobrium of the civilized world, which the continuation of massacres [of the Armenians] would arouse, Turkish officials have now adopted and are 

executing the unchecked policy of extermination through starvation, exhaustion, and 

brutality of treatment hardly surpassed even in Turkish history.’’

• Are you aware of these cables and the well-documented history of the events 

that took place during this time? Do you believe that the atrocities that took 

place and the deaths of 1.5 million Armenians fit the Genocide Convention’s definition of acts that constitute genocide?

Answer. I have read these cables, the statements of Ambassadors Morgenthau 

and Elkus, the statements of other U.S. officials in the Ottoman Empire at the time, 

as well as a number of books on this subject. I am acquainted with the history of 

the tragic massacres and forced exile that occurred at the end of the Ottoman Empire, and with U.S. policy in that regard. The individual stories are heartrending; 

the magnitude of these terrible acts—over 1.5 million killed or forcibly deported—

defies comprehension. 

In his April 23 Remembrance Day statement, President Obama has solemnly remembered the horrific events of 1915–1923. His views on the issue are well known; 

they have not changed. I have a responsibility to represent the policy of the President. If I am confirmed as the personal representative of the President to Armenia, 

I will carry out this responsibility.

Question. The history of the Armenian genocide is well documented by our own 

diplomats. Is today’s State Department and are our diplomats constrained from acknowledging the historical record that was developed by their predecessors?

Answer. No, Senator; neither the State Department nor its diplomats are constrained from acknowledging that these diplomatic accounts from that period exist, 

or that they make the references you have detailed. As I noted previously, I have 

read these historical accounts and other sources. Like all executive branch officials, 

I have a duty to represent the policy of the President on this and all other issues. 

If I am confirmed as the personal representative of the President to Armenia, I will 

do so. 

The President’s position on this issue is stated in his April 23 Armenian Remembrance Day statement, wherein he has solemnly remembered the events of 1915, 

and noted that 1.5 million Armenians were massacred or marched to their deaths.

Question. Do you dispute any of the documented records I’ve described [in questions 2–4] above?

Answer. I am familiar with, and do not dispute, the authenticity of the records 

you have described from that era.

Question. Are you aware that in 1981, President Ronald Reagan issued a proclamation acknowledging the ‘‘genocide of the Armenians’’?

Answer. I am aware of and have read President Reagan’s 1981 proclamation.

Question. In addition to Ronald Reagan’s proclamation, I would also direct your 

attention to the U.S. Government’s filing before the International Court of Justice 

in 1951, wherein the United States stated that: ‘‘the Turkish massacres of Armenians, the extermination of millions of Jews and Poles by the Nazis are outstanding 

examples of the crime of genocide.’’

• Are you familiar with this filing and the references therein? Do you dispute its 

accuracy?

Answer. I am familiar with the U.S. Government’s filing before the ICJ in 1951. 

The U.S. Government acknowledges and mourns the mass killings and forced deportations that devastated over 1.5 million Armenians at the end of the Ottoman Empire. The administration also understands that many Americans and many Armenians believe that these horrible acts should be called ‘‘genocide.’’ President Obama’s 

views on this subject are well known; they have not changed. 

In his April 23 statement on Armenian Remembrance Day, the President solemnly remembered the events of 1915–1923, and stated that a full, frank, and just 

acknowledgement of the facts is in all our interests. He strongly supports the efforts 

of Turkey and Armenia to normalize their bilateral relations. The President believes 

that together, Armenia and Turkey can forge a relationship that is peaceful, productive, and prosperous.

Question. The United States has never denied the fact of the Armenian Genocide—wouldn’t you agree? And former Senators Barack Obama, Joseph Biden, and 

Hillary Clinton each acknowledged the fact of the Armenian Genocide during their 

tenure as Senators—wouldn’t you agree?

479

Answer. The administration has never denied the horrific events of 1915. These 

were atrocities that we and the world must never forget, so that they are never repeated. 

In his April 23 Armenian Remembrance Day statement, the President solemnly 

remembered as historical fact that 1.5 million Armenians were massacred or 

marched to their deaths from 1915–1923. The President’s views on this subject are 

well known; they have not changed. The views of Vice President Biden and Secretary Clinton during their tenures in the Senate are also well known.

Question. You are aware, are you not, that the International Association of Genocide Scholars, the preeminent body that specializes in genocide and holocaust studies has repeatedly and unequivocally affirmed the fact of the Armenian Genocide? 

Do you disagree with the International Association of Genocide Scholars?

Answer. I am aware of the conclusions of the International Association of Genocide Scholars. 

Like all executive branch officials, I have a duty to represent the policy of the 

President on this and all other issues. The President’s position on this issue is stated in his April 23 Armenian Remembrance Day statement, wherein he has solemnly 

remembered the events of 1915, and noted that 1.5 million Armenians were massacred or marched to their deaths. If I am confirmed as the personal representative 

of the President to Armenia, I will carry out this duty.

• Do you then agree that genocide took place against the Armenian people?

Answer. Yes, Senator; I am familiar with the work of the International Association of Genocide Scholars and, as I noted previously, with the historical reporting 

by State Department officials at the time. Like all executive branch officials, I have 

a duty to represent the policy of the President on this and all other issues. The 

President’s position on this issue is stated in his April 23rd Armenian Remembrance 

Day statement, wherein he has solemnly remembered the events of 1915, and noted 

that 1.5 million Armenians were massacred or marched to their deaths. If I am confirmed as the personal representative of the President to Armenia, I will carry out 

this duty.

Question. Were you instructed not to use the term genocide when referring to the 

Armenian Genocide of 1915?

Answer. No; I received no such instructions. 

I have a responsibility to represent the policy of the President. The President’s 

position on this issue is stated in his April 23 Armenian Remembrance Day statement, wherein he solemnly remembered the events of 1915, and noted that 1.5 million Armenians were massacred or marched to their deaths. If I am confirmed as 

the personal representative of the President to Armenia, I will carry out this responsibility.

Question. How can we expect Turkey to come to terms with its past when we, as 

Americans, are unwilling to speak honestly about the Armenian Genocide?

Answer. The President has said that a full, frank, and just acknowledgement of 

the facts is in all our interest. In his April 23, 2011, statement, he noted that history teaches us that our nations are stronger and our cause is more just when we 

appropriately recognize painful pasts and work to rebuild bridges of understanding 

toward a better tomorrow. With this in mind, he strongly supports efforts by the 

Turkish and Armenian peoples to work through their painful history in a way that 

is honest, open, and constructive. The U.S. Government supports the efforts of individuals in Armenia and Turkey to foster a dialogue that acknowledges their history, 

sponsoring programs that foster contacts between the Armenian and Turkish peoples.

Question. Does the United States have military or economic interests in Turkey 

that influence its decision on whether to use the word ‘‘genocide,’’ when discussing 

the massacre of 1.5 million Armenians from 1915–1923?

Answer. Turkey is a longstanding NATO ally of the United States, an important 

partner in promoting peace and stability in the broader Middle East, and one with 

which we share democratic values. We seek to maintain strong United States-Turkey relations, just as we seek to maintain strong United States-Armenia relations. 

We believe our partnership will deepen with Turkey as it reconciles with its past 

and with Armenia. We continue to encourage Turkey to engage productively with 

Armenia on the normalization protocols, and clear the way to open its shared border, reinstitute transportation, communication, and utility links between the two 

countries, and establish diplomatic relations.

480

Question. In the June 23, 2011, readout of President Obama’s calls with the Armenian and Azerbaijani Presidents, the President told both leaders that ‘‘now is the 

time to resolve the Nagorno Karabakh conflict’’ and to ‘‘offer the people of Armenia, 

Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh a better future for themselves and for their children.’’ Does the administration support the reinstatement of the elected representatives of the people of Nagorno Karabakh to the Minsk Group process? Both the Armenian and Nagorno Karabakh Republic Governments have called for Karabakh’s 

reinstatement into the process, considering the Karabakh Government was a signatory to the cease-fire agreement and was a party to the Minsk Group negotiations 

until 1998.

Answer. The United States supports the current format of negotiations for the 

Minsk Group process, which has been agreed to by both the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides. At this stage in the negotiation, the U.S. Government believes it is 

best to continue on this basis. Any final settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) 

conflict must be acceptable to the Karabakhi communities. The Minsk Group cochairs travel regularly to NK to meet with the de facto NK authorities.

Question. Azerbaijani officials, including President Aliyev, have indicated they are 

looking to return to war with Armenia. President Aliyev has repeatedly stated that 

‘‘only the first stage of war is over,’’ and the Defense Minister stated in February 

2011 that Azerbaijan is ‘‘seriously preparing’’ for war. In the meantime, the State 

Department is considering granting an export license for Azerbaijan to buy its first 

ever satellite. In a recent Eurasianet article, U.S. Air Force officials state that even 

if the satellite is only for communications purposes, it will give Azerbaijan a military advantage. In light of Azerbaijan’s repeated threats to renew its aggression in 

the region, which Turkey, a NATO member could join, is the administration concerned about the signal the sale of such technology would send to Azerbaijan? 

Wouldn’t it make more sense to wait on this sale until we are certain that the 

Azeris are committed to real action on the Basic Principles for peace?

Answer. The proposed sale has been notified to Congress. DOD and State have 

analyzed the proposed sale and are prepared to license the export of the satellite, 

associated ground support equipment and simulators to Azerbaijan, having taken 

into account political, military, economic, human rights, and arms control considerations. 

The Department of State understands that Ex-Im Bank performed a thorough examination of all aspects of the transaction. This examination, which included a review of the satellite supply contract as well as the operating characteristics of the 

satellite, determined that, based on the information provided, the representations 

made by the Government of Azerbaijan and in accordance with Ex-Im Bank’s policies and procedures, the satellite was designed and is intended for commercial operations. In addition, the Government of Azerbaijan signed a covenant stating that 

they would only lease the use of the satellite to civilian, nonmilitary entities, both 

within and outside of Azerbaijan. 

The administration has determined that the operating characteristics of the satellite are designed and produced for commercial communications only. With these 

understandings, and the additional covenant given to Ex-Im bank during financing 

negotiations, the U.S. Government does not object to the sale.

Question. Previous Ambassadors to Armenia have held public community forums 

with Armenian Americans around the country throughout their tenure. Will you 

commit to regularly hold such forums throughout your term, which will be on the 

record and open to the community in large in cities, such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, Boston, Chicago, and Washington, DC, where there are large Armenian American communities?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would look forward to visiting and meeting with 

members of the Armenian American community both in the United States and in 

Armenia, as my predecessors have done before. It would be a valuable opportunity 

to understand their concerns, update them on the status of the United States-Armenia relationship, and to discuss a host of relevant issues. 

RESPONSES OF THOMAS COUNTRYMAN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

Question. Article IV of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 

1968 (‘‘NPT’’) affirms ‘‘the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to 

develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.’’ However, 

481

given the NPT’s overriding provisions to promote nonproliferation—that is, Articles 

I, II, and II—the operative meaning of this provision remains a subject of deep 

debate.

• (a) With regard to the research, production and use of sensitive nuclear fuelmaking technologies, what do you understand to be the limits in a state’s exercise of this right? Does a state have a right to any nuclear technological activity 

short of inserting fissile material into a nuclear explosive device?

Answer. Article IV affirms this ‘‘inalienable right,’’ but with that right come important Treaty-prescribed responsibilities to demonstrate to the international community that nuclear activities are exclusively for peaceful purposes. To that end, the 

NPT provides that non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) Parties to the NPT must 

conduct any nuclear activities in compliance with Articles II and III. Article II prohibits manufacturing or acquiring nuclear weapons, or other nuclear explosive devices, and seeking or receiving assistance in their manufacture, a clear treaty limit 

on the use of nuclear technology. Article III requires that NNWS Parties accept 

IAEA safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear 

activities within their territories or under their jurisdiction or control. Bilateral 

IAEA safeguards agreements underpin NNWS Article II obligations, with a view to 

preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or 

other nuclear explosive devices. 

The 2010 NPT Review Conference agreed by consensus to a number of actions 

that will strengthen the IAEA’s ability to verify compliance with safeguards agreements, and thereby deter noncompliance, and the United States and other Parties 

are working vigorously to carry these actions out. These actions include the following: all cases of noncompliance should be resolved; all NPT Parties should have 

safeguards agreements required by Article III; all Parties should ensure that the 

IAEA has all political, technical, and financial support to enable it to apply safeguards as required by that article; and all states should bring into force the IAEA’s 

Additional Protocol.

• (b) To what extent should the exercise of this right be conditioned by a state’s 

full compliance with its Article III-required safeguards obligations with the 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)? Please relate your answer to the 

case of Iran, which is in noncompliance with its international obligations to the 

IAEA and U.N. Security Council.

Answer. Non-nuclear-weapon states that are Party to the NPT have a clear legal 

obligation to accept IAEA safeguards, as required by Article III. That they may 

suffer consequences for not doing so is demonstrated by the fact that Iran’s noncompliance with its international nuclear obligations has led the UN Security Council to prohibit Iran from such nuclear fuel-cycle-related activities as enrichment and 

reprocessing and to prohibit the international community from assisting or cooperating with Iran on such activities.

Question. Under the U.S.-U.A.E. ‘‘123’’ civil nuclear cooperation agreement, the 

United Arab Emirates obliged itself not to develop or possess in its territory 

uranium enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, or other nuclear fuel-making 

technologies.

• Should the United States make the U.S.-U.A.E. ‘‘123’’ civil nuclear cooperation 

agreement’s prohibition against nuclear fuel-making technologies the standard 

for all future U.S. civil nuclear cooperation agreements in the Middle East? If 

so, then what would you do to promote that standard throughout the region?

Answer. As we proceed to contemplate nuclear cooperation with other potential 

partners, the United States will continue to seek to limit the spread of enrichment 

and reprocessing technologies through whatever mechanisms are most appropriate 

and have the greatest chance of success, including consideration of UAE-type 

commitments. 

(483)

NOMINATIONS 

TUESDAY, JULY 19, 2011

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

David S. Adams, of the District of Columbia, to be Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs 

Joyce A. Barr, of Washington, to be Assistant Secretary of State for 

Administration 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room SD–

419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Tom Udall presiding. 

Present: Senators Udall and Webb. 

Also present: Representative Gary L. Ackerman 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TOM UDALL,

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO 

Senator UDALL. Thank you for coming this morning. Great to 

have you all here. We will bring the committee to order. 

We meet this morning to consider two important nominations to 

the State Department: Ambassador Joyce Barr to be Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, and David S. Adams to be Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs. 

I think it’s safe to say that without the important work of the 

Bureau of Administration, the Department of State would not be 

able to accomplish the multitude of missions our country requires 

it to accomplish. I’m sure that like our individual Senate offices, 

the administrative work is often little noticed when things go well 

and heavily scrutinized when there are any issues, no matter how 

small, that don’t go so well. 

So I try to tell my administrative staff that I appreciate the hard 

work they do in my office. I believe that the same appreciation 

should be given to the State Department Bureau of Administration, 

which, if confirmed, you will lead. 

Your hard work is appreciated by the millions of Americans and 

foreign nationals it serves both in country and overseas. 

The Bureau of Administration’s multitude of tasks include support for the Department of State programs, embassies, and consulates. Some of these programs include logistical management, 

utilizing small and disadvantaged businesses for contracting, supporting FOIA requests, managing commercial services, and making 

sure the Department of State meets goals for strengthening FedVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00491 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
484

eral environmental, energy, and transportation management, and 

increasing the use of alternative fuel vehicles in the Department of 

State’s vehicle fleet. 

One of the most important items that the Bureau of Administration is responsible for is procurement. It is also one of the areas 

in which the Department of State receives the most scrutiny. In recent years, there have been reports from the Office of Inspector 

General (OIG) which have called into question some of the Bureau 

of Administration’s Office of Procurement Executive practices, as 

well as highlighting areas for improvement. 

For example, a 2006 Office of Inspector General report found 

that ‘‘oversight is the most important function for which OPE’’—the 

Office of Procurement Executive—‘‘is responsible and also its most 

problematic.’’

In addition to procurement, the Bureau of Administration’s Office of Acquisitions Management is another vitally important office 

for the Department of State. The same 2006 OIG report described 

the Office of Acquisitions Management as follows, ‘‘While OPE is 

the office and oversight arm of the department’s procurement and 

Federal assistance functions, AQM is the operational workhorse responsible for 80 percent of the Department’s worldwide acquisitions. The Office provides a full range of professional contract management services, including acquisition planning, contract negotiations, cost and price analysis, and contract administration to all the 

Department’s domestic bureaus and overseas posts.’’

I believe that Ambassador Barr is well-qualified to take on this 

important assignment. Ambassador Barr currently serves as the 

international affairs adviser and deputy commandant for the Industrial College of the Armed Forces at the National Defense University. Prior to this assignment, Ms. Barr served as executive director for the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau at the Department of State from 2007 to 2009, and as U.S. Ambassador to Namibia from 2004 to 2007. 

Since joining the Foreign Service in 1979, Ms. Barr has held numerous assignments both in Washington and abroad. 

In addition to the nominee to be Assistant Secretary of State for 

Administration, we will be considering the nominee to be Assistant 

Secretary for Legislative Affairs. The Assistant Secretary of Legislative Affairs is the principal liaison between the Department of 

State and the Congress. 

Communicating with Congress is the most important mission of 

the Assistant Secretary of Legislative Affairs. In addition, the Assistant Secretary of Legislative Affairs staff on the Hill is almost 

always the first point of contact for Senate staffers working on behalf of their respective Senators and Representatives. 

For example, as the Arab Spring gained momentum, it was the 

Bureau of Legislative Affairs who worked to keep our staff up to 

date regarding events on the ground and who helped us provide 

vital assistance to constituents who were in the region. 

I hope to hear more from both nominees. 

Ambassador Barr, I hope to hear more about what you will do 

as Assistant Secretary of State for Administration to continue the 

good work that is already being done at the A Bureau. You will be 

485

leading dedicated and talented individuals who carry out the important work of the Department of State. 

And, Mr. Adams, I also look forward to hearing from you about 

how much you will work to continue and improve the important 

line of communication between Congress and the Department of 

State. 

But before we get started with your testimony, I would like to 

recognize a former colleague of mine from the House of Representatives, Representative Gary Ackerman, from the Fifth District of 

New York. 

Representative Ackerman would like to introduce Mr. David 

Adams. 

Representative Ackerman, please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF HON. GARY L. ACKERMAN, HOUSE OF 

REPRESENTATIVES, U.S. CONGRESS 

Representative ACKERMAN. Thank you very much, Chairman 

Udall. 

I’m delighted today to be able to introduce Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for House Affairs, David S. Adams, who the President has nominated to serve as Assistant Secretary of State for 

Legislative Affairs. 

David is up to this job, and I know that he will do it extremely 

well. I know this because over the course of 24 years of working 

for me that that’s the only way that David ever did anything. 

I met David in 1985, when along with the gavel for the House 

Post Office and Civil Service Subcommittee on Human Resources, 

I inherited a young man from Connecticut. Even though David was 

only a couple years out of college, he immediately showed a remarkable capacity for effective legislative work, attention to detail, 

and professionalism far in excess of his actual age and experience. 

I hired him on the spot. 

Over the years, David moved with me to the House Committee 

on Foreign Affairs, as I moved from subcommittee to subcommittee, 

and region to region, one gavel after another, he moved from professional staff to staff director, while also serving for a time as the 

legislative director in my personal office. 

Though I’ve watched him get older, his maturity, judgment, and 

discretion have been consistent from day one. In every role in 

which I’ve placed him, David was superb. Quietly, efficiently, and 

without fail, David got things done with T’s crossed, i’s dotted, and 

with perfect pitch. 

Even while working his way at night toward a master’s degree 

in political science from American University and later a master’s 

in business administration from Loyola College, David’s work, 

whether in the preparation of statements, constructing legislative 

deals, negotiating conference reports, arranging hearings, it was always thorough and reliable, always timely, always true to my guidance and intentions. 

He knows what you do, and he knows how important that is. 

I can tell you from long experience that David understands the 

Congress. He understands the legislative process inside and out. 

And most of all, he understands the duties and needs and the pressures that face those of us honored to be elected to serve here. 

486

He knows the legislative branch was put first in the Constitution, and that Congress is a separate and equal branch of government, not an afterthought or a box to be checked off. 

David’s honesty, integrity, and patriotism, in my mind, is simply 

beyond question or doubt. He is completely trustworthy and truthful, incapable of misleading or betraying any trust or confidence. 

He simply couldn’t do that. He always delivers. 

He is exactly the kind of person we want in a position of trust 

and responsibility in the United States Government. And I’m not 

surprised, first, that Secretary Clinton stole him and, second, that 

she now wants to promote him. 

She is a very smart person. 

If you want to do something good for our country, increase David’s responsibilities at the State Department. The more you ask of 

him, the more pleased you will be with the results. 

I would urge the committee to forward his nomination to the 

Senate, and that you urge your colleagues to confirm him as Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator UDALL. Congressman Ackerman, thank you very much 

for that very strong statement in support of Mr. Adams. 

We very much understand you are on a very busy schedule and 

that you have taken time to be here to weigh in on his behalf. And 

you’re welcome to stay here as long as you like, but please feel free 

to leave if you have other commitments. We very much appreciate 

that. 

And, Mr. Adams, why don’t we start with you? 

I know that you may have friends and family members that you 

would like to introduce that are here to support your effort. 

And let me say, as far as family, I know these positions are a 

tremendous commitment on your part, and it’s usually the family 

that backs all of us up I think in public service. So we very much 

appreciate the sacrifices that they make. 

And why don’t you introduce your family members or friends, 

and then proceed with your testimony? 

And then we’ll proceed to Ambassador Barr. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID S. ADAMS, OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS 

Mr. ADAMS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’m here today with my wife, Andrea, and my mother and father, 

John and Cindi Adams. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it’s an honor to appear before you today as President Obama’s nominee to serve as 

the next Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs at the Department of State. 

I’m grateful for and humbled by the confidence the President and 

Secretary Clinton have demonstrated in me by this nomination. I 

must admit that after my 24-year career as a congressional staffer, 

I am far more accustomed to sitting in the seats behind members 

rather than testifying before them, but I want to assure you that 

my experience as a staffer will inform my work, if confirmed. 

487

I consider myself a creature of the institution and am proud to 

have spent most of my career working in the Congress. It is this 

deep appreciation and respect for the role of Congress that I will 

take with me to this new job, if confirmed. 

With the committee’s indulgence, I’d like to take this opportunity 

to thank my mother and father, John and Cindi, whom I just introduced, for all of the support they provided to me over the years. 

The foundation they established during my childhood gave me the 

tools to get here. 

I’d also like to thank my wife, Andrea, whose love, support, and 

encouragement is with me at all times. 

Last, I’d like to thank Congressman Ackerman for his very generous introduction and, frankly, for giving me a chance back in 

1985. 

As you’re well-aware, this year has been an especially challenging one for the State Department, the administration, and the 

Nation. The challenges and opportunities presented to us by the 

Arab Spring, in addition to our ongoing work in the frontline states 

of Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, require the department to be 

in ever-closer communication with the Congress. 

The magnitude of such change means that if we are to be successful, there must be a true partnership with the Congress. It is 

a responsibility I take very seriously, and I commit to you that I 

will do everything that I can to continue the close working relationship between the Department and the Congress, if confirmed. 

The Department of State’s Bureau of Legislative Affairs is not a 

policy bureau, but rather is a place where the executive and legislative branches interact. 

If confirmed, I see my role as more than just a messenger between the State Department and the Congress. I see my role as a 

facilitator, an interpreter, if you will, to help Department officials 

understand the views and the needs of the Congress, while providing the Congress with clear and concise information about the 

Department and its policies. 

The Bureau is also a constituent service operation, a role with 

which you are all familiar. The State Department has two offices 

on Capitol Hill, including one in the Senate Russell Building, ready 

to assist you and your staff. 

You can count on the bureau to help constituents with lost or stolen passports, sort out visa issues, provide travelers with up-to-date 

information about countries around the world. You can also rely on 

the bureau to assist when constituents need help overseas in emergency situations. 

If confirmed, I will continue to ensure this bureau provides a 

ready resource whenever your constituents require assistance. 

As a former Member of this Chamber, the Secretary understands 

and appreciates the shared constitutional responsibilities in the 

oversight and execution of U.S. foreign policy. She places a high 

priority on the Department’s relationship with the Congress, and 

I pledge to you, if confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Congress has the timely and accurate information it needs to carry out 

its role effectively. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today, 

and I look forward to answering any of your questions. 

488

[The prepared statement of Mr. Adams follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID S. ADAMS

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you 

today as President Obama’s nominee to serve as the next Assistant Secretary for 

Legislative Affairs at the Department of State. I am grateful for and humbled by 

the confidence the President and Secretary Clinton have demonstrated in me by this 

nomination. 

I must admit that after a 24-year career as a congressional staffer, I am far more 

accustomed to sitting in the seats behind members rather than testifying before 

them. But I want to assure you that my experience as a staffer will inform my work, 

if confirmed. I consider myself a creature of the institution and am proud to have 

spent most of my career working in the Congress. It is this deep appreciation and 

respect for the role of Congress that I will take with me to this new job, if 

confirmed. 

With the committee’s indulgence, I would like to take this opportunity to thank 

my mother and father for all the support they have provided to me over the years. 

The foundation they established during my childhood gave me to tools to get here. 

I would also like to thank my wife, Andrea, whose love, support, and encouragement 

is with me at all times. 

As you are well aware, this year has been an especially challenging one for the 

State Department, the administration and the Nation. The challenges and opportunities presented to us by the Arab Spring, in addition to our ongoing work in the 

frontline states of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, require the Department to be 

in ever closer communication with the Congress. The magnitude of such change 

means that if we are to be successful, there must be a true partnership with the 

Congress. It is a responsibility I take very seriously, and I commit to you that I will 

do everything I can to continue the close working relationship between the Department and Congress, if confirmed. 

The Department of State’s Bureau of Legislative Affairs is not a policy bureau, 

but rather, is the place where the legislative and executive branches interact. If confirmed, I see my role as more than just a messenger between the State Department 

and the Congress. I see my role as a facilitator; an interpreter, if you will, to help 

Department officials understand the views and needs of the Congress while providing the Congress with clear and concise information about the Department and 

its policies. 

The Bureau is also a constituent service operation, a role with which you are all 

familiar. The State Department has two offices on Capitol Hill, including one in the 

Senate Russell Building, ready to assist you and your staff. You can count on the 

Bureau to help constituents with lost or stolen passports, sort out visa issues, or 

provide travelers with up-to-date information about countries around the world—

you can also rely on the Bureau to assist when constituents need help overseas in 

emergency situations. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure that the Bureau provides a ready resource whenever your constituents require assistance. 

As a former member of this Chamber, the Secretary understands and appreciates 

the shared constitutional responsibilities in the oversight and execution of U.S. foreign policy. She places a high priority on the Department’s relationship with the 

Congress, and I pledge to you, if confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Congress 

has timely and accurate information it needs to carry out its role effectively. 

Thank you again for opportunity to appear before you today, and I look forward 

to answering your questions.

Senator UDALL. Thank you very much for your testimony, Mr. 

Adams. 

And we will first proceed with Ambassador Barr’s testimony, and 

then questions to both of you. 

Ambassador Barr, welcome. Great to have you here. 

And please, as Mr. Adams did, introduce your family or friends 

that are here before you begin your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF JOYCE A. BARR, OF WASHINGTON, TO BE 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ADMINISTRATION 

Ambassador BARR. I’m joined today by a close personal friend, 

Alexey, who is sitting here to my right. 

489

Senator UDALL. Great. Thank you. 

Welcome. 

Ambassador BARR. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today as the President’s 

nominee to serve as the Assistant Secretary for Administration. 

I want to thank President Obama and Secretary Clinton for their 

trust and confidence in nominating me for this position. 

The rest of my family could not be here today, but I want to express deep appreciation for their love and guidance throughout my 

career. 

This is the second time that I’ve had the privilege to appear before this committee for confirmation. I thank the Members and the 

Senate for their support for my previous nomination as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Namibia. 

For the past 32 years, I have served the American people as a 

Foreign Service officer at the State Department. If confirmed, it 

would be an honor and a privilege to continue that service as Assistant Secretary for Administration. 

The mission of the Bureau of Administration is to provide effective and efficient global support for U.S. diplomacy. The Bureau’s 

wide variety of programs and services provide the platform to advance America’s interests and values. 

The Department meets urgent national security challenges by developing and focusing the country’s civilian power. The Bureau is 

on the frontline of this effort, supporting this growing and changing 

mission. 

One of the Department’s strategic goals is to effectively manage 

transitions in the frontline states. The Bureau of Administration is 

heavily involved in this transition through its coleadership of our 

effort to transition Department of Defense support in Iraq to the 

Department of State. Providing the tools America’s diplomats need 

to get the job done in difficult environments, while making sound 

and prudent decisions over the use of taxpayers’ funds is a highly 

visible part of this mission. 

As a service organization, the Department of Administration responds not only to its internal customers, but to Congress and the 

American people as well. If confirmed, I would take this responsibility seriously. 

As a former Ambassador and a regional executive director, I 

learned the value of maintaining consistent and transparent processes so that others trust you and maintain their support for the 

system. I will keep this lesson in mind, if confirmed. 

Accountability and efficiency are critical to leading the Bureau of 

Administration. The Department is developing and implementing 

training to improve the performance of contracting officer representatives throughout the Department. Ensuring that the department gets good value for dollars spent is vital to maintaining confidence in the State Department’s stewardship of taxpayer funds. 

I look forward, if confirmed, to working with Congress and oversight agencies to maintain appropriate management controls. Technology allows the Bureau to measure what it does and provides the 

data to generate good decisionmaking. It has successfully implemented solutions that help personnel to work smarter and more 

cost-effectively. 

490

If confirmed, I will drive that process forward and continue efforts to become more efficient. 

Finally, collaboration is important to ensuring accountability and 

reducing costs in an interagency environment. The relationships 

I’ve built throughout the U.S. Government in the course of my career should help me focus on these outcomes. 

If confirmed, I look forward to working with you, your distinguished colleagues, and your staffs. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

I welcome any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Barr follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOYCE A. BARR

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you 

today as the President’s nominee to serve as the Assistant Secretary for Administration. I want to thank President Obama and Secretary Clinton for their trust and 

confidence in nominating me for this position. My family could not be here with me 

today but I want to express deep appreciation for their love and guidance throughout my career. 

This is the second time that I have the privilege to appear before this committee 

for confirmation. I thank the Members and the Senate for their support of my previous nomination as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Namibia. 

For the past 32 years I have served the American people as a Foreign Service officer at the State Department. If confirmed, it would be an honor and a privilege to 

continue that service as Assistant Secretary for Administration. 

The mission of the Bureau of Administration is to provide effective and efficient 

global support for U.S. diplomacy. The Bureau’s wide variety of programs and services provide the platform to advance America’s interests and values. The Department meets urgent national security challenges by developing and focusing the 

country’s civilian power. The Bureau is on the frontline of this effort, supporting 

this growing and changing mission. 

One of the Department’s strategic goals is to ‘‘Effectively manage transitions in 

the frontline states.’’ The Bureau of Administration is heavily involved in this transition through its coleadership of our effort to transition Department of Defense support in Iraq to the Department of State. Providing the tools America’s diplomats 

need to get the job done in difficult environments, while making sound and prudent 

decisions over the use of taxpayer funds is a highly visible part of the mission. 

Ongoing efforts to strengthen and sustain all of the Department’s domestic and 

overseas activities are a fundamental part of Bureau operations. By employing successful management practices, and encouraging innovation, the Bureau built a reputation for effectiveness and transparency. 

As a service organization, the Bureau of Administration responds not only to its 

internal customers but to Congress and the American people. If confirmed, I would 

take this responsibility seriously. I served overseas in challenging environments, 

was responsible for the management operations of 45 overseas posts as Executive 

Director for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs and was U.S. Ambassador 

to Namibia. From these experiences I learned the value of maintaining consistent 

and transparent processes so that others trust you and maintain confidence in the 

system. I will keep this lesson in mind if confirmed. 

Accountability and efficiency are critical to leading the Bureau of Administration. 

The Department of State is developing and implementing training to improve the 

performance of Contracting Officer Representatives throughout the Department. 

The Department’s ability to ensure that it gets exactly what it pays for is vital to 

maintaining confidence in our stewardship of taxpayer funds. I look forward, if confirmed, to working with Congress and oversight agencies to maintain appropriate 

management controls while further refining our processes to meet increasingly complex needs. To overcome the many challenges the Department faces while operating 

worldwide, we must continue our focus on oversight and accountability. 

Technology allows the Bureau to measure what it does and provides the data to 

generate good decisionmaking. It has successfully implemented solutions that help 

personnel to work smarter and more cost effectively. If confirmed, I will drive that 

process forward and continue efforts to become more efficient. The Bureau is deeply 

committed to advancing the Department’s efforts to ‘‘go green.’’ Technology investments enabled the Department to save money, cut energy use, and reduce its carbon 

491

footprint. If confirmed, I intend to actively support that work. The Bureau developed 

a consolidated information system that significantly streamlined the Department’s 

global logistics operations and tightened management controls. These investments 

pay significant future dividends for the USG. If confirmed, I intend to actively pursue similar projects. 

A collaborative approach is important to ensuring accountability and reducing 

costs in an interagency environment. The relationships I built throughout the U.S. 

Government in the course of my career should help me focus on these outcomes. If 

confirmed, I look forward to working with you, your distinguished colleagues, and 

your staffs. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I welcome any 

questions you may have.

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Ambassador Barr, for your testimony, and I’ll start my questions with you. 

Previous OIG reports have stated that there has been an intense 

amount of pressure due to the increased procurement and contracting workload at A Bureau. 

How will proposed budget cuts impact your ability to perform 

contract oversight? And do you currently have sufficient personnel 

to perform proper oversight? 

Ambassador BARR. Well, one thing that we’ve done within the 

past 2 years, while working with the Department of Defense to provide security for our frontline states, is to adopt a working capital 

fund by actually charging other bureaus a procurement fee, so that 

we have the flexibility to surge toward priorities. This way we’ve 

been able to hire more contracting professionals to increase our 

oversight, and it also gives us the flexibility to move our effort toward contingency operations. 

Another thing that we’ve done is basically increased training not 

only of our contracting officers, but of our contracting officer representatives as well. Contracting officer representatives are the 

people that have the eyes on the ground overseas, that can monitor 

the contract and make sure that taxpayers do get good value for 

their money that we spend. 

Senator UDALL. So in your opinion, you believe you do have sufficient personnel to do this oversight? 

Ambassador BARR. Yes, I do believe that. But of course, if we do 

face significant cuts, we are going to have to reprioritize in order 

to make sure that we do our high-priority missions, and this could 

affect other operations. 

Senator UDALL. The Office of Inspector General’s January 2011 

report cited a number of issues pertaining to contract management 

and risks of trafficking in persons in the Middle East. I’m hopeful 

that you will work to help remedy many of these problems and 

move the Bureau forward after these OIG findings. 

What was especially disconcerting for me was the finding in the 

OIG report that ‘‘more than 70 percent of workers interviewed’’—

these are contract workers—from the host country doing work for 

the Department of State reported ‘‘they live in overcrowded, unsafe, 

and unsanitary conditions . . . Workers’ housing facilities range 

from shared apartment buildings with common areas to labor 

camps and converted commercial lots. Two-thirds of the housing 

OIG observed fell within the space parameters of a U.S. minimumsecurity prison cell. However, 20 contract workers occupying the 

quarters OIG visited had less personal space then a U.S. minimum-security prison cell.’’ And that I just quoted from the report. 

492

As you can tell by these descriptions, they are not descriptions 

of how the United States aspires to treat those workers who work 

on behalf of the American people, doing contract work for the embassies overseas. I’m confident that you will address these issues, 

but I would like to hear specifically from you about how you plan 

to make progress in contracting to help alleviate and improve the 

conditions of these contract workers. 

Ambassador BARR. Thank you for the question. 

First of all, I used to be a human rights officer earlier in my career, so I’m very sensitive to issues like trafficking in persons. And 

these are things that are very near and dear to the American public, and not activities that we want to foster in any way. 

In that inspection report, the inspector general did not find any 

incidents of trafficking in persons, but we of course have taken this 

to heart. We include training about trafficking in persons for our 

contracting officers and contracting officer representatives. We 

have also instituted a number of changes in how we oversee these 

contracts, making sure that we have someone from Diplomatic Security that is housed either on the compound or very close to the 

compound. We have taught people what to look for. There’ve been 

changes in the camps themselves—no alcohol. We have provided 

training in cultural sensitivity for people that have oversight of 

those contracts. 

And I can guarantee you that the State Department does take 

this very seriously. It is a public perception issue for us, and we 

are working very hard to make sure that these conditions are improved. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Ambassador. 

The International Law Enforcement Academies help train foreign 

law enforcement to combat international drug trafficking, criminality, and terrorism. The ILEA Web site states that a major goal 

of the academy is to enable foreign law enforcement to ‘‘efficiently 

combat crime in their respective countries, and at the same time, 

prevent the movement of transnational criminal elements to the 

United States and throughout the world.’’

Most of these law enforcement academies are located overseas, as 

you know. However, one is located in Roswell, NM. I believe this 

academy has served the goals of the Department of State well. 

However, I have become concerned about the program because of 

delays with issuing a request for proposals and contract issues 

which resulted in the cancellation of class at the academy. 

What can your office do to make sure this issue does not repeat 

itself, and that ILEA in Roswell, NM, can continue to offer the 

courses needed to train foreign law enforcement? 

Ambassador BARR. I’m very familiar with that program. When I 

was U.S. Ambassador in Namibia, I did have the opportunity to 

visit ILEA in Botswana. So I recognize and personally appreciate 

the very good work that they do. 

Right now, we actually have two different contracts that are active and that we’re working on for the institution in New Mexico. 

One part, which I think deals with operations and maintenance, 

is controlled by the Bureau of Administration. That contract is out 

for request for proposals, and we hope to have those responses in 

by the end of this week. 

493

I think there’s another contract that has been released by the 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau. And I don’t 

have all the details on that, but I think that they were trying to 

see if there were some parts of that contract that might be workable for the Small Business Administration. 

But I will be glad to take your concerns back, and see if we can 

get more information for you. 

[The written information provided by Ambassador Barr follows:]

The 2010 training schedule, which ended in mid-December 2010, included delivery 

of 10 sessions, the typical number of training sessions each year for International 

Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Roswell. All 10 sessions planned for 2010 

were completed as planned and funds were made available to New Mexico Tech for 

this purpose. 

The Office of Acquisition Management (AQM) and the Bureau of International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) are diligently working on two procurement actions for the ILEA Roswell program—one for maintenance of the facility and 

one for law enforcement training. INL and AQM conducted a preproposal conference 

for the facility maintenance contract at the ILEA on June 28, 2011, and proposals 

for this contract, which is handled by AQM, are due on July 21, 2011. Proposals 

for the law enforcement training contract, handled by INL, are due on August 8, 

2011. INL intends to have the program running as soon as practicable after both 

contracts have been awarded.

Senator UDALL. Thank you very much. 

And I see Senator Webb is here, and I would like to recognize 

him for questioning or any opening statement he might have. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I wanted to come down, first, to express my best wishes and congratulations to the two nominees. I’m clearly going to support 

them, and I wish them the best in carrying out their responsibilities. 

But I would like to take this opportunity to hopefully get some 

clarification on a policy that has been taking place from the Office 

of Legislative Affairs as it relates to its relations with individual 

Members of the Senate. 

Let me begin, Mr. Adams, by saying that I have worked in different capacities up here for a long time. I was committee counsel 

in the House at one point. I spent years in the Pentagon, and then 

of course, my work over here. 

I have never seen a situation where substantive letters that go 

to a policymaker in the Department have been answered by the Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs or the Acting Assistant 

Secretary of Legislative Affairs, rather than an individual who is 

clearly in a line position to be responsible for policy. 

I’m not the only Member of the Senate who has had some concerns about this. Senator Corker, when we were discussing an 

issue of substance with respect to Libya, made a comment in the 

Congressional Record. I’m going to quote from his comment, because I agree with it. He said, ‘‘Today, 1 day shy of 8 weeks later, 

I finally received a response’’ to a longer letter he had sent to Secretary Clinton. ‘‘This response did not come from Secretary Clinton. 

It did not come from Secretary Gates. This response came from the 

Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs and only 

paid lip service’’ to the original letter. 

That’s not an isolated situation, and it’s, quite frankly, very frustrating. 

494

I watched your opening statement from my office before I came 

over here. You made the comment to the effect that the principal 

responsibilities of your position are to serve as an interpreter of 

policymakers, and I would strongly agree with you that is among 

your principal responsibilities. In this position you do not develop 

the policies that you communicate. Would you agree with that? 

Mr. ADAMS. Thank you, Senator. 

Yes, this is not a policymaking bureau. 

Senator WEBB. Right. So, it’s a little disconcerting when Members of the Senate write very specific policy-oriented letters asking 

for the positions of the Secretary of State or the key person in a 

line function, and receive a response from your office. It’s not personal; it’s just a question of structure here. 

Would you agree that that is a rather unusual situation? It 

doesn’t happen at the Pentagon. 

Mr. ADAMS. Well, Senator, thank you very much for the question. 

First, let me assure you that the Department takes all of our correspondence that we receive from members of the committee and 

Members of the Congress generally very seriously. 

You should be assured that letters that we get are tasked to the 

relevant bureaus, so that the policy experts who know the substantive answers to the questions are the ones who actually draft 

the responses. 

The second point that I would make is that the Bureau of Legislative Affairs, as you noted, and under the direction of the Secretary, is responsible for maintaining the Department’s relationships with the Congress. And part of that responsibility includes 

ensuring that we provide timely and thorough answers to the Congress. 

I’d also point out that it is our role in addition to make sure that 

the senior policymakers in the Department know what Members 

are thinking about, what they’re talking about, so when correspondence comes in to the Bureau from the Congress, we make 

sure that senior policymakers see it, including the Secretary and 

others. 

The last thing that I would say, in terms of who actually signs 

the letters, is that we have conceived of this in a similar way to 

requests that the Secretary gets for hearings and for briefings. She 

often can’t accommodate all of those, and so she relies on members 

of the various bureaus who have responsibility for the subject matter to come and brief the Congress, or to testify, as the case may 

be. And in a similar way, she has delegated the responsibility for 

ensuring that correspondence comes back to the Hill, to the Bureau 

of Legislative Affairs. 

Senator WEBB. Well, having been on the other end drafting those 

letters as a staffer many, many years ago, and I know the coordination involved. But, I also recognize that it doesn’t always get up to 

the person at the top. 

But I think you would agree that there are differences between 

responses generated directly from your office, even though they’re 

coordinated, on something like when a committee hearing is scheduled, and the responses that relate to the development of policy. 

Whether it’s just in some of the letters that I have forwarded to 

495

you, or signed and moved to the Secretary—on Burma, on a TIP 

report, on Libya—there’s a list of them. I’m not alone here. 

And the question becomes one of accountability. Since you are 

not a policymaker, and you are signing a letter, there’s no real indication that the official in charge is accountable for what is in the 

letter. It doesn’t have to be the Secretary of State. 

So I’m raising this, and I’m hopeful, perhaps, with Secretary 

Burns moving into the Deputy Secretary position, that we can resolve it. 

But it’s a matter of real concern when we’re trying to figure out 

what the exact policies are in our executive branch, and where the 

changes might appropriately be made. 

Mr. ADAMS. Well, Senator, I certainly appreciate the sentiment. 

And I would just like to assure you again that the responses that 

come for the Bureau of Legislative Affairs reflect the Department’s 

policies. 

Senator WEBB. I understand what you’re saying, but let me reemphasize that there’s no accountability, true accountability, in 

that process, as there is when an individual who is responsible for 

the policy will sign the letter and take accountability. 

Mr. ADAMS. Well, Senator, I’m happy to take this back to the Department and review the policy in terms of who signs the letters. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. 

And I would agree with Senator Webb. I think it’s very important when the Congress is overseeing policy, and trying to inquire 

into the areas of development of policy, that we have policymakers 

speak out and answer those questions, whether it’s in a hearing 

format or a letter format. So I think Senator Webb makes a very, 

very good point. 

Ambassador Barr, one of the recommendations from a 2006 OIG 

report was that, ‘‘The Bureau of Administration in coordination 

with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security should establish a plan to 

progressively consolidate local guard contracting in the Office of 

Acquisitions Management.’’

The 2006 OIG report also stated that, ‘‘few of the areas of procurement call so obviously for reform as local guard contracting estimated to cost the Department approximately $218 million in fiscal year 2006. Budgetary pressures appear to be forcing change, 

and the cost of savings could total millions if professional contracting officers are used rather than less experienced Embassy 

personnel. The result should be essential protective services at the 

most cost-effective price.’’

I could not agree with this finding more. I believe that our Embassy and consulate personnel must have the best protection possible, but that the protection must be cost-effective. I believe that 

A Bureau has already made great strides toward improving contracting in this area. 

What more will you do to continue this progress? And what else 

needs to be done to improve contracting in this area? 

Ambassador BARR. Thank you. 

We’ve made significant progress in this area. We have approximately 105 contracts that protect about 160 different consulates 

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and embassies. And most of them have been consolidated here in 

Washington and are handled back here, where we have the expertise. 

I think right now we have less than 20 contracts that are being 

administered overseas. As you pointed out, this does help us to provide more effective oversight. It helps us to reduce costs. And when 

we have to make changes in contractors at the last minute, it’s 

easier to put somebody else in to make sure that the Embassy has 

the security it needs. 

We will continue to press toward consolidation. It is a bureau 

priority. I’m very aware of this one in particular. I’ve had a briefing 

on it already, so it’s something that is on my plate, if I’m confirmed. 

Senator UDALL. Great. Thank you. 

Ambassador Barr, the State Department intends to hire nearly 

5,500 private security contractors for Iraq security after the U.S. 

military leaves at the end of the year. In addition, it is estimated 

that nearly 84 percent of the State Department’s personnel in Iraq 

will be contractors. How many of these contractors will be doing inherently government work? And what is State doing to reduce the 

number of contractors and increase the State Department personnel? 

Ambassador BARR. First of all, we do not use contractors to do 

inherently government work. This is our starting point. We try to 

use contractors where it makes sense, where the jobs do not require discretion or judgment on behalf of the U.S. Government, and 

where it helps us to reduce costs. 

One of the things that we’ve done in general with regard to contracting security services for Iraq and Afghanistan is we’ve let a 

very large contract and selected eight different contractors and 

they bid on individual task orders. For example, they can bid on 

a task order to provide static guard services in Afghanistan. 

This way we get a very good price because they compete against 

one another, but we’ve already taken a good look at who they are 

and what their business practices are. 

We’ve worked very closely with the Department of Defense, who 

has a lot of expertise in contracting, to upgrade our services. We’ve 

also hired about 200 more Diplomatic Security agents, many of 

whom who have oversight of our contracting in the frontline states, 

so that we have people on the ground who understand what we’re 

trying to do, and make sure that the quality remains high. 

Senator UDALL. Ambassador, it’s good to hear that you don’t 

have contractors doing inherently governmental work, and I hope 

that you will continue that practice within the State Department. 

Shifting to another area here, the Department of State has been 

recognized as a leader on utilizing small businesses for contracting. 

What will you do to continue these efforts? And do you agree that 

the continued utilization of small businesses, including minority 

and women-owned business, will help the United States develop 

and maintain the entrepreneurial spirit needed to compete in the 

21st century? 

Ambassador BARR. Well, we find that this is one way for the 

State Department, who is normally focused overseas, to have an 

impact here in the United States. It’s a very high priority with us. 

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The person that has primary responsibility for that function is located in my front office. I’ve already started to become familiar 

with the program. 

When we look at contracts, it’s one of our first considerations, is 

to see if this is the type of work that small businesses might be 

able to do. 

Also it helps us to build expertise, so that we have a wider pool 

of potential partners to get things done. We feel this is our part in 

developing professionalism, getting people used to working with the 

Federal marketplace, and just widening knowledge of some of the 

things that the U.S. Government does. This is how we interact in 

a different way with the American people. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Ambassador Barr. Thank you for 

that answer, and thank you very much for your testimony. 

Mr. Adams, you already have extensive experience working with 

the legislative branch, and what I’m wondering, and this is along 

the lines that Senator Webb also questioned, what should be done 

to improve communication with the House and the Senate, to make 

sure that Congress receives the information needed to effectively 

make legislative decisions? 

Mr. ADAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that question. 

I think all of the courtesy calls I did with Senators and staff in 

the runup to the hearing, I heard a consistent message from people 

about the nature of communication and the frequency of communication. So I think that one of the things that I will try to do, if 

confirmed, is to have the Department be much more visible up here 

on the Hill in a variety of different ways, and to try to think creatively about forums that are different than simply the usual hearing forum or briefing forum. And maybe there are other ways 

where we can get senior officials and mid-level officials up here 

more frequently to talk to members and to talk to staff, and do so 

on the broad range of topics that the Department covers. 

So I think, in that way, I would try to broaden what the Department does up here, so that senior officials are seen more frequently, and mid-level officials are seen more frequently, with staff, 

and the communication is better. 

Senator UDALL. I think that would be a very welcome change, 

and we look forward to that. 

Should reporting to Congress be reduced, increased, or kept at 

current levels? I know the QDDR stated that the State Department 

has an onerous reporting requirement, and that the work to issue 

reports to Congress is having an impact on other essential functions of the Department of State. 

In what areas can reporting to Congress be reduced or streamlined, in your opinion? 

Mr. ADAMS. Thank you, Senator. 

I do think it’s a consistent position of the Department that reporting requirements can be become burdensome and over time. 

I think where we would want to look at this is reports that have 

been required for a very long period of time, so reports that are 5 

years old, 10 years old. So the question I think should be, are those 

reports still necessary? Is that information still required by the 

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Congress? Has the issue matured or moved on, so that the report 

itself is not as relevant? 

So I think those are the areas that we would look to, in terms 

of trying to reduce the reporting burden. 

Senator UDALL. One of your other responsibilities, I think, is 

working with other agencies, the USAID and others that have responsibility for international issues. What will you do to work with 

USAID staff to ensure that State and USAID effectively work together to carry out the policies of the United States? 

Mr. ADAMS. Thank you for that question. 

Sort of in the role of Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, 

if confirmed, I think I would want to try to bring both State and 

USAID and other sort of national security agency Legislative Affairs offices together, so that we have, as the Secretary has said, 

whole-of-government approach, so that the Congress can see that 

the agencies are coordinated, that we’re interlocked, that we talk 

to each other, and that the policies and programs that we present 

to the Congress are coordinated in an effective fashion. So I would 

work hard at that, if confirmed. 

Senator UDALL. That concludes my questions to all of you. Not 

having other Senators, except Senator Webb come, we will keep the 

record open for 24 hours for any questions or statements for the 

record. We would ask both of you, if you get those questions, to 

promptly get them back, so that we can move forward with your 

nomination. 

We very much appreciate your public service. Appreciate you 

being here today. 

And with that, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:46 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

Additional Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record

RESPONSES OF JOYCE BARR TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. The State Department’s Inspector General in 2010 found that several 

problems identified in earlier years remained unresolved. In particular, the OIG 

found that some contract files were incomplete, lacked key documentation, and 

sometimes could not be located in the absence of a contract specialist. How are these 

problems being addressed?

Answer. In October 2010, the Office of Acquisitions Management (AQM) issued a 

Memorandum to AQM personnel that all contract files shall be in accordance with 

Federal Acquisition Regulation Subpart 4.8, Government Contract Files. The Florida 

Regional Procurement Support Office of AQM has implemented e-filing for all contract files. AQM is evaluating that system and is in the early planning stages of 

implementing a similar e-filing system for all other AQM offices and divisions. If 

confirmed, I will work to ensure that the processes put in place to address problems 

identified in the inspection are completed and effective.

Question. The OIG in 2010 called for another comprehensive review of the Office 

of Acquisitions Management in accordance with the Government Accountability 

Office’s framework for assessing federal agencies’ acquisition functions. Has such a 

review been conducted? If so, what were the results? Do you concur with the OIG’s 

assessment? If so, what would you do to ensure that recommendations are fully 

implemented?

Answer. The Office of the Procurement Executive conducted a review of the Acquisitions Management Office in 2010. Among the findings were:

• The percentage of dollars competed increased from 58 percent in FY 2006 to 82 

percent in FY 2009; 

• Bid protests and Board of Contract Appeals activity was not significant; 

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• Online reverse auctions resulted in cost savings and excellent small-business 

participation; • The Department achieved excellent results in meeting socioeconomic contracting 

goals for contract awards to small business, small disadvantaged businesses and 

woman-owned businesses; • Contracting Officers should document review of the Excluded Parties List to 

avoid debarred and suspended contractors; • The Department should improve accuracy of contract data reporting; • Action should be taken to track contract expiration dates to improve follow-on 

acquisition planning; • Internal controls to ensure approval of service contracts extending beyond 5 

years needed to be strengthened; • Market research should be improved; • To ensure compliance with Federal Acquisition Regulation requirements, all 

contractors with delivery order contracts should be provided a fair opportunity 

to compete.

I concur with the assessment of the OIG that file documentation needs to be improved and the OPE review recommendations discussed above. If confirmed, I will 

make the completion of these recommendations a priority.

Question. In February 2010, the OIG recommended that the Bureau of Administration review its Web site content and revise it to ensure the organization charts 

are explicit and fully detail the authorities and responsibilities for the offices within 

its purview. Also, they recommended that the Bureau should update its Web site, 

at least quarterly, to ensure OpenNet customers and outside visitors know who to 

contact and how to do business with its offices and divisions. Have these two items 

been implemented?

Answer. Based on the February 2010 OIG inspection, the Bureau of Administration reviewed its Web site content and ensured an organization chart existed for 

each major directorate. The Bureau’s main Web portal allows for OpenNet customers and outside visitors to access an ‘‘Organizations’’ tab. The ‘‘Organizations’’ 

tab lists every directorate in the Bureau, with a direct link to their respective organization chart. Each organization chart then lists each director by office and name. 

To ensure accuracy, each directorate maintains and updates its own organizational 

charts. 

To ensure we meet the quarterly update requirement, the Executive Director will 

chair a meeting of all the Bureau Web site content managers quarterly. Furthermore, the Executive Office has assigned a permanent Bureau Webmaster who will 

disseminate requirements to all Bureau content managers and will conduct quality 

control reviews at least quarterly as well.

Question. Does the Bureau have sufficient resources and personnel to provide 

effective oversight of contracts? Do contract specialists receive adequate training for 

their jobs?

Answer. The Department of State Acquisition Human Capital Plan outlines the 

staffing strategy for the Acquisitions Management Office (AQM). With implementation of a working capital fund, AQM now has appropriate resources to adequately 

staff contract specialists. AQM is on track to achieve the staffing goals of the 

Human Capital Plan. 

Bureaus such as International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) and Diplomatic Security (DS) have also significantly increased resources devoted to contract 

administration. 

Contract Specialists receive all training required by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP). Training requests are centrally managed in AQM to ensure 

training is obtained in a timely manner. 

The Department devoted significant effort this past year on improving the Contracting Officer Representative (COR) function. Training has been revised to focus 

on skill building and providing practical examples. Functional experts and experienced CORs were used as Subject Matter Experts to build the training. Detailed 

guidance on complex issues such as trafficking in persons was issued. Guidance was 

issued requiring appraisal factors on contract administration to be included in COR 

performance appraisals. A COR award was created to recognize the significant contributions of CORs to the goals of the Department. A standing COR working group 

was formed to continue the focus on improving the COR function. 

I recognize the critical role the COR plays in contract oversight. If confirmed, I 

intend to continue to build on these foundations to strengthen that function.

Question. In recent years, the Administration and Diplomatic Security Bureaus 

have worked to consolidate local guard contracting in the Acquisitions Management 

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Office’s Worldwide Operations Division. Is that office—or is Diplomatic Security—

going to be responsible for contract administration for guards in Iraq? If so, will it 

include all the contracted personnel providing security? The State Department intends to hire approximately 5,500 private security contractors for Iraq after the U.S. 

military leaves.

Answer. The Office of Acquisition Management (AQM) is the Department’s authority for contracting security services supporting our mission in Iraq, as well as 

our other posts worldwide. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security’s Office of Overseas 

Protective Operations (DS/IP/OPO) is the program office responsible for managing 

and overseeing the fulfillment of contract security services in Iraq. AQM and DS/

IP/OPO work closely together to award, oversee, and ensure contract compliance of 

all Department security contracts in Iraq in accordance with the standards set forth 

in the Department’s Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) base contract and the 

overarching Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). The Department views contract 

administration as a joint responsibility between DS and the A Bureau. 

The WPS base contract is the mechanism through which the Department awards 

task orders for both static and movement security services in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Four security task orders have been released for Iraq. The task orders will be completely stood up by spring 2012, and the Department will have approximately 5,100 

security contractors providing guard and movement security services.

Question. With 84 percent of the State Department’s projected 17,000 personnel 

in Iraq slated to be contractors (of all kinds)—according to Secretary Clinton’s 

March 10 testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs—how is the Department going to ensure 

adequate administration and oversight of such large contracts?

Answer. With approximately 14,000 contractors projected to be in place in January 2012 in Iraq, the Department recognizes the need for robust oversight of the 

vital life support, security, and medical services they will provide. The Department’s 

contracting oversight plan for Iraq is attached.

IRAQ—CONTRACT MANAGEMENT/OVERSIGHT PLAN

Much of the U.S. Government’s success in Iraq will depend on an effective contracting effort as the mission transitions from military-led to civilian-led. Unlike 

other U.S. embassies, the Department is not operating in a permissive environment 

in Iraq. Such a nonpermissive environment means that we cannot depend on local 

services such as a static guard force or a cleaning crew made up of host-country nationals, nor can we patronize markets, gas stations, or local shops. This is why the 

U.S. Government is so heavily dependent on contractors—at least until the security 

environment improves. To ensure we meet this critical goal, the Department has developed a contracting strategy that takes into account life support, security, transportation, communications, and facilities. 

Our primary Contracting Team is located in Washington, DC, where it can draw 

on headquarters expertise. In Iraq, there are multiple levels of technical oversight, 

depending upon the complexity of each contract. In February 2008, the Office of 

Acquisition Management converted to a fee-for-service organization, charging a 1-

percent fee on all procurements. Since that time, we have hired 102 additional staff 

for contract administration. 

In conflict zones such as Iraq, the Department’s Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs) are required to maintain special vigilance against trafficking in persons, and awareness of the practices of labor brokers and recruiters. CORs must 

brief contractor program management to ensure there is no trafficking of persons 

or other unethical conduct. Programs with a significant in-country contractor presence require COR review and documentation of the adequacy of contractor employees living conditions. 

Additional information about the Department’s significant contracts follows. 

Police Development Program 

Since 2006, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) 

has continued to enhance its contract oversight, which for Iraq includes a Washington-based COR, COR support staff, contract administration personnel in the 

field, and an entire program office to assist with contract accountability. 

Currently, INL has 10 contract administration personnel deployed in Iraq, and 

two more personnel in the pipeline. 

During the next year, INL will adjust the contract administration staffing level 

at post and at headquarters commensurate with the reduction in INL administered 

contractual services. 

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INL has made several improvements for contract oversight, including (1) using 

the Quality Assurance Surveillance Plans (QASP) for contractor accountability; and, 

(2) implementing standard operating procedures for further specificity in oversight 

roles and responsibilities. 

In addition, INL has planned a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) program to be 

staffed by four M&E subject matter experts in Baghdad, Basrah, and Erbil. The 

more senior of the four M&E advisors will report to the Deputy Director of the INL 

Office at Embassy Baghdad. The M&E program will provide ongoing monitoring and 

regular evaluations of INL programs in Iraq. 

To prepare for the M&E program, INL is conducting an institutional assessment 

of Iraq’s criminal justice system. Assessments will be completed of the police, corrections, and courts sectors over the course of the next several months. These assessments will permit INL to gauge the performance of its Iraq programs and to better 

direct resources to areas of greatest need and potential improvement. 

Private Security Contractor Management Plan 

The State Department uses private security contractors (PSCs) to help meet the 

extraordinary security requirements in critical threat and nonpermissive environments. Through operational changes already implemented and an examination conducted during the Department’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review 

(QDDR) process, State is ensuring proper management, oversight, and operational 

control of the private security contractors we deploy overseas. The Department institutionalized many of these changes through the new Worldwide Protective Services 

(WPS) contract awarded in September 2010, which incorporates lessons learned to 

ensure that private security contractors perform their requirements in a professional, responsible, culturally sensitive, and cost effective manner. 

The Department currently employs approximately 2,700 PSC personnel in Iraq, 

including 900 supporting protective security details in Baghdad, Erbil, and Tallil 

and 1,800 providing static guard services to facilities under Chief of Mission (COM) 

authority in Baghdad. Following the transition in Iraq, there will be 100 direct-hire 

special agents and 106 security specialists to manage approximately 7,000 contractors to protect U.S. Government employees and facilities under COM authority in 

Baghdad, Erbil, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Basrah. 

DS’s plan for management, oversight, and operational control of PSC personnel 

includes:

• Ensuring professionalism and responsibility through improved direct oversight 

of security contractor personnel:

Æ DS agents at each post will serve as managers for the Static Guard and 

Personal Protective Security programs; Æ DS agents at each post will also serve as Contracting Officer’s Representatives (CORs) and Assistant CORs (A/COR) for the direct management and 

oversight of the WPS contract; Æ DS personnel at each post will be assigned as Government Technical Monitors (GTMs) to assist the COR and A/COR in the oversight of the WPS 

contract. Æ Direct-hire Diplomatic Security personnel (DS agents or SPS officers) provide direct operational oversight of all protective motorcades. Æ Diplomatic Security personnel will continue to conduct frequent, unannounced health and welfare after-hours visits to WPS housing compounds. 

Collocation of contractor life support areas on Embassy, consulate, or EBO 

compounds will enhance after-hours oversight of contractor personnel; Æ Revised mission firearms policies strengthen rules on the use of force and 

new less-than-lethal equipment fielded as a means to minimize the need for 

deadly force; Æ Video recording systems and tracking systems installed in vehicles to enhance oversight and contractor accountability; and Æ All incidents involving a weapons discharge and other serious incidents are 

thoroughly investigated by the Regional Security Office.

• Improving the image of the security footprint through enhanced cultural sensitivity:

Æ Mandatory country-specific cultural awareness training for all security contractors prior to deployment to Iraq; 

Æ Revised standards of conduct, including a ban on alcohol; and 

Æ Interpreters included in protective security details.

• Achieving greater efficiencies through new contract terms:

Æ One set of terms and conditions, enhancing the ability to provide appropriate and consistent oversight; 

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Æ Reduced acquisition timelines; 

Æ Larger number of qualified base contract holders, thereby increasing competition and controlling costs; 

Æ Timely options in the event a company fails to perform; 

Æ More efficient program management compared to multiple, stand-alone contracts; and 

Æ Computerized tracking of contractor personnel to aid in reviewing personnel rosters used to support labor invoices.

As the security environment improves, the Department will transition to a more 

traditional mode of operation. This transition has begun in Erbil, where our static 

guard force includes a significant number of local nationals. As the Department 

transitions in Iraq, roughly two-thirds of the guard force in Erbil will be comprised 

of local nationals. 

Contract oversight for PA&E, LOGCAP IV, and the Linguist/Subject Matter Expert 

Contracts 

A&E works exclusively on the Embassy compound where they perform Operations 

and Maintenance services. Their Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) is the 

Deputy Facilities Manager. Between the Facilities Manager and the Deputy, all 

work performed by PA&E is visible and verifiable on a daily basis and a detailed 

review is conducted on at least a weekly basis with critical work being checked more 

frequently. Billing and staffing levels are reviewed monthly with the Financial Management Officer where reconciliation of differences in billing can be researched. All 

problems, if any, are immediately reported to the Contracting Office in Washington 

for immediate appropriate action. 

All residents of the Embassy compound are customers. They are quick to observe 

and report any work that has not been performed in accordance with the contract 

requirement. 

Linguist/Subject Matter Expert (L/SME) contracts are reviewed by a COR in 

Washington, DC, for the offices served in Iraq. The contractor’s timesheets are 

verified, by an individual designated by the contracting officer as Government Task 

Managers (GTM) and, who has firsthand knowledge of the contract requirements, 

contractor employee’s attendance and deliverables. This is the person to whom the 

L/SME reports to on a daily basis. An erroneous entry on a timecard would be readily noticed and a timely correction made. Government managers at this level are 

experienced and very detailed in their review. 

The COR is a recognized expert in technical areas of the contract requirements 

and it would be difficult to imagine a scenario where a contractor could exploit lack 

of oversight. Further, while comprehensive in nature, the L/SME contract is not 

physically large. From experience, one COR with a responsive base of Government 

managers is more than adequate to verify contractor performance as well as secure 

adequate internal controls. 

While it is most effective for the State Department to use its own competitive 

process to award most contract actions, the Department is also leveraging DOD resources where DOD has superior capabilities in theater. LOGCAP has been a success story since State inherited the Task Order from the Coalition Provisional 

Authority in 2004. The DOD Program Manager for LOGCAP publicly stated in 2006 

that State was the only organization that ‘‘gets’’ LOGCAP. He meant that State was 

the only LOGCAP customer that was holding the line against abuse of LOGCAP 

services while maintaining a perfect life/health/safety record while carefully expanding the capability of the Task Order to facilitate other nongovernment organizations 

as deemed necessary by the Chief of Mission (COM) and ensuring that reimbursement were paid to LOGCAP promptly. 

The ‘‘charter’’ for LOGCAP was direct and strictly dictated by DOD and State—

one COR from the Department of State and one Administrative Contracting Officer 

(ACO) from the Department of Defense. There was, as well, close coordination between LOGCAP Rock Island Contracting Command (RICC) and State. 

Issues that were prevalent at other DOD Task Order sites did not occur under 

the COM Task Order. Electrical grounding safety, always problematical, was constantly reviewed and tested. Food production remained at the highest standard. No 

abuse of vehicle dispatch or fuel operations was ever observed and the LOGCAP 

Contractor took steps to reduce numbers of vehicles on several occasions to further 

COM policy. 

State has been served by two LOGCAP Task Orders. One is the COM Task Order 

in the International Zone (IZ). The other task order is the DOD task order that supported State when a State organization was resident on the other task order’s site. 

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This arrangement was approved by the RICC as a Quid Pro Quo arrangement 

after analysis indicated that DOD entities were also being serviced by the COM task 

order and in roughly even amounts. 

Standard arrangement for LOGCAP Task Orders is to have oversight and administration performed by the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA). DCMA 

remains critical to the performance of LOGCAP Task Orders and the LOGCAP Program Manager has assured State that DCMA will remain on the State/DOD team 

for both LOGCAP IV and any follow-on replacement for LOGCAP. The caveat is 

that DCMA wants to see the size and level of effort before stating their specific requirements for an administration team and cost for providing the team. 

The policy remains in place that there is a single COR and ACO. While it is unavoidable that the contractor and State managers talk, nothing official can take 

place until the COR provides review and concurrence and the ACO approves and 

directs. DCMA requests the Quality Assurance Representatives (QAR) to perform 

periodic checks to test and report deficiencies and concerns to the ACO and COR. 

Weekly cost and program review meetings chaired by the ACO provide near realtime information in a manner that the ACO can identify problems and provide 

course correction if the contractor performance varies from a standard. 

State fully expects to continue its successful relationship with DCMA and 

LOGCAP. The technical success is proven. Costs are contained because oversight 

shows that work is being accomplished on time and within budget. 

The Office of Acquisitions Management has a dedicated, qualified team of Contracting Officers and Contract Specialists assigned to manage the Department of 

State contracts as well as to provide any assistance to the LOGCAP program supporting the U.S. Mission in Iraq. There are currently two Department of State employees located at the Embassy who provide the COR responsibilities for the 

LOGCAP program. We believe these two positions are adequate to provide the necessary oversight enforcing contractor performance and internal controls. If, on occasion, it becomes necessary to temporarily increase this number, the Office of Acquisitions Management is prepared to deploy TDY employees to Post to provide the 

necessary support. 

Facility Construction 

For the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations’ (OBO) construction projects, 

there is a Washington-based Contracting Officer, and the onsite project manager is 

the COR. There is significant scrutiny of both contractors and subcontractors, as 

well as their employees. Contractors for the construction of new office and other 

buildings must name all subcontractors at the time of proposals, and they are part 

of the proposal evaluation. When we construct buildings, foreign firms receive local 

checks for adverse information. Contractor and subcontractor employees going on to 

a construction site must have name and other records checks performed by the 

Regional Security Officer (RSO) in advance and in consultation with local officials. 

For OBO construction projects, onsite ‘‘man camps’’ (living and dining quarters) 

are expected to meet strict health and safety standards. When OBO Project Managers become aware of quality of life issues, on or offsite, they first notify the Site 

Security Manager (a trained DS specialist), then the RSO, who will then notify appropriate authorities. OBO ensures that emergency medical services are provided 

(by the embassy medical team if necessary) and that evacuations are handled 

appropriately.

Question. In September 2007, Blackwater personnel accompanying a State 

Department convoy shot and killed several Iraqi civilians. What changes, if any, 

were made to the acquisition process as a result of this incident?

Answer. Contract administration processes were strengthened as a result of the 

Blackwater incident. Direct-hire government personnel now accompany protective 

details. Tracking devices and video equipment in each motorcade provide a record 

of incidents to allow for a better analysis of what occurred. Contractor reporting of 

incidents has been improved. Also, DS has increased the number of contracting 

officer’s representatives and government technical monitors to work in theater 

where Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) task orders are being performed so that 

overall contract oversight is enhanced, including the contractor staffs’ adherence to 

contract required standards of conduct. I have attached a list of further actions undertaken to strengthen management and oversight of the WPS contract. 

For the DS Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) contract, DS has increased staffing to more than 200 direct-hire personnel to administer the contract and its task 

orders to ensure contract compliance of approximately 5,100 contractor employees. 

Other key elements include:

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• Ensuring appropriate levels of professionalism and responsive operational responsibility through direct operational control and oversight of security contractor personnel:

Æ DS Special Agents at each post serve as managers for the Static Guard and 

Personal Protective Security programs; Æ DS Special Agents at each post serve as Contracting Officer’s Representatives (CORs) and Assistant CORs (ACORs) for the direct management and 

oversight of the WPS contract to assist the Contracting Officer; Æ DS personnel at each post are assigned as Government Technical Monitors 

(GTMs) to assist the COR and ACOR in the oversight of the WPS contract. Æ Direct-hire DS personnel (DS Special Agents or Security Protective Specialists) provide operational control of protective motorcades. Æ Collocation of contractor life-support areas on Embassy, Consulate, or Embassy Branch Office compounds will enhance after-hours oversight of contractor personnel; Æ Revised mission firearms policies further strengthen post’s rules on the use 

of force, and less-than-lethal equipment has been fielded as a means to 

minimize the need to employ deadly force; Æ Video recording and tracking systems are installed in each motorcade; Æ All incidents involving a weapons discharge or other serious incidents are 

thoroughly investigated by the Regional Security Officer (RSO); and 

Æ The Office of Acquisitions Management has a dedicated, qualified team of 

contracting officers and contract specialists assigned to administer PSC 

contracts. They will make regular field visits to each post to conduct reviews of PSC contracts.

• Improving the image of the security footprint through enhanced cultural sensitivity:

Æ Mandatory country-specific cultural awareness training for all security contractors prior to deployment to Iraq; 

Æ Revised standards of conduct, including a ban on alcohol; and 

Æ Interpreter support provided for protective security details.

• Achieving greater efficiencies through new contract terms:

Æ One set of terms and conditions enhances the ability to provide uniform, 

appropriate, and consistent oversight; 

Æ Reduced acquisition timelines; 

Æ Larger number of qualified base-contract holders, thereby increasing competition for each task order while controlling costs; 

Æ Timely options in the event a company fails to perform; 

Æ More efficient program management compared to multiple, stand-alone contracts; 

Æ Computerized tracking of contractor personnel to aid in reviewing personnel rosters used to support labor invoices; and 

Æ Regional auditors from the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) will be 

assigned to each company receiving a WPS task order.

Question. What sort of agreement have the State Department and Defense 

Department worked out so that the diplomatic missions in Iraq continue to receive 

life support services under the LOGCAP IV contract? Please describe the key provisions of the agreement. How have the payments for the services been worked out, 

and who will be responsible for quality control and contract administration?

Answer. The State Department and Defense Department have concluded an interagency agreement utilizing authority provided under the Economy Act (21 U.S.C. 

1535) to ensure that State will continue to receive life support services under the 

LOGCAP IV contract. Key provisions include basic life support and core logistics 

services with a reimbursable method under specific task orders. LOGCAP IV is a 

DOD contract administered by the Army Contracting Command-Rock Island (ACC–

RI) with ACC–RI delegating oversight to Defense Contract Management Agency 

(DCMA), and the Department of State provided Contracting Officer Representatives.

Question. How is the Office of Procurement Executive balancing its oversight of 

overseas procurement and its oversight of the Acquisitions Management Office?

Answer. The Office of the Procurement Executive has two Divisions focused on 

procurement oversight. The Evaluation and Assistance Division focuses on oversight 

of overseas procurement operations through staff assistance visits to overseas posts, 

desk officer oversight by geographic region, and model contracts and documentation 

to assist contracting personnel with transaction support. Overseas post procurement 

reviews are scheduled to cover every geographic region annually. Three to four posts 

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are visited per region. Desk Officers are in daily contact with procurement officials 

at overseas posts to offer assistance. 

The Policy Division conducts regular reviews of domestic procurement operations 

such as the Acquisition Management Office, Library Services, Language Services 

and the Foreign Service Institute. Special Topic Reviews, such as an examination 

of Award Fee Contracts, are scheduled when the Procurement Executive determines 

the need to look more closely at a specific topic.

Question. How will you ensure that current practices and procedures for managing, operating and maintaining the Department’s real estate holdings are costeffective?

Answer. The Department has a long history of comprehensive management and 

oversight of its real estate portfolio, both overseas and domestic. It has aggressively 

engaged the General Services Administration (GSA) and other service providers to 

ensure competitive prices on rents, operating costs, utilities, and other real estate 

and construction requirements. As the portfolio stands today, space utilization 

meets or exceeds GSA standards, operating costs reflect our best efforts to manage 

costs while providing appropriate levels of service, and strategic planning encompasses the real property goals of this administration and the Congress. 

If confirmed, I will ensure the continued use of aggressive performance standards 

for office space utilization, workstation-to-office ratios, and the many modern mobile 

workforce initiatives beginning to be utilized by Federal agencies. I will continue to 

evaluate the Department’s real estate portfolio, looking for opportunities to relocate 

‘‘back office’’ operations to lower cost locations, as we have done successfully with 

our finance and visa processing operations. I will continue efforts to consolidate 

warehouse and other logistics operations, Automated Data Processing, similar Information Resource Management functions, and bureaus that currently are spread out 

in multiple locations throughout the Washington metropolitan area. 

Finally, if confirmed, I will insist that future GSA leases on the Department’s 

behalf include purchase options to the extent practical, and continue the Department’s practice of working with GSA to seek opportunities to purchase leased buildings where we have made substantial investments, and to look for other existing 

federal properties where initial investments could yield long terms savings of rental 

payments.

Question. The State Department’s Inspector General in 2009 was critical of inadequate management controls over the work performed by operations and maintenance contractors.

• What sort of management controls exist, and what steps will you take to 

strengthen these controls? Do you have sufficient personnel—both in terms of 

numbers and expertise—to perform contract oversight? 

• Does the Bureau still rely on labor-hour contract staffing? If so, is this necessary, and what are you going to do to address the costly nature of such contract work?

Answer. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) focused on three issues in its 

2009 review: (1) project file documentation; (2) staff training; and (3) questions regarding District of Columbia taxes on some construction/ renovation work orders. 

The A Bureau’s Office of Operations’ (A/OPR) action plans on all three issues have 

been reviewed, approved, and validated by the OIG subsequent to that review. 

All project files are now maintained by Contracting Officer’s Representatives 

(CORs) and Project Managers, including an appropriately detailed scope of work, an 

independently derived government cost estimate (IGE) using appropriate estimating 

tools for the work, documentation of at least three competitive bid solicitations, a 

reconciliation of any IGE-to-bid cost discrepancies, and a best-value selection. 

Project Managers are required to document any changes in scope as the work proceeds, all inspections and commissioning as the work is completed and final closeout 

of costs and invoices. Quality assurance staff, which is independent of the project 

staff, are responsible for periodic reviews of project files to ensure compliance with 

this requirement. 

All CORs receive required training and must maintain their COR certifications. 

In addition, all building/project managers overseeing work performed under contract 

are required to receive similar training. After initial COR training is completed, all 

staff involved with any work using contractors must complete 40 hours of additional 

training every 2 years. This training is consistent with governmentwide guidance 

issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Federal Acquisition 

Regulations (FAR). 

Regarding D.C.-user tax issues, A/OPR, on the advice of the Office of Acquisition 

Management and the Office of the Legal Adviser, has clarified conditions under 

506

which D.C. tax rules apply to services rendered by operations and maintenance contractors. Language has been written into the new contracts spelling out how taxes 

are to be/or not to be invoiced. Payments are scrutinized to ensure precedence is 

not established that would be detrimental to the Department. 

The Office of Facilities Management Services (FMS) continues to utilize laborhour contract staffing. This will continue to be necessary at some level to meet mission requirements until additional Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) staff is authorized. 

However, since the OIG report, OPR/FMS has been gradually reducing its reliance 

on labor-hour contracting staffing by using part-time government employees where 

possible and by reallocating existing staff based on an organizational analysis conducted by the Department of State’s Office of Resource Management Analysis 

(RMA).

Question. What will you do to ensure that the Office of Authentications responds 

to requests by the public, businesses, and other government agencies in a timely 

manner? Does the office have sufficient personnel and resources to handle its workload?

Answer. Due to the increased workload in the Office of Authentications, turnaround time on document processing has increased over the last 2 years. To address 

this issue, the office has allocated two additional staff positions from the Bureau of 

Administration’s allotment. The new employees are expected to be on board this 

summer. In the meantime, the Bureau has detailed other Bureau staff on a parttime basis to help address the Office’s increased work-load. An e-mail address for 

Members to inquire about the status of authentication requests on behalf of constituents was also recently established. The Department gives the highest priority 

to customer service and is working hard to deal with the increased demand.

Question. What is the status of Fly America provisions?

Answer. The Department’s policies and regulations (14 FAM 583) are consistent 

with the guidelines of the General Accounting Office and mirror the Federal Travel 

Regulations (FTR) used by other agencies government wide. Information and reminders are provided to employees on a regular basis regarding the provisions of 

the Fly America Act. Two levels of management controls are in place to ensure the 

provisions are complied with: (1) To fly on a foreign carrier, employees must provide 

approved written certification that no American air carriers are available to provide 

the requested service or a reasonable alternative, and (2) bookings on foreign carriers by the Department’s Travel Management Centers are reported to the Contracting Officer’s Representative for the travel contract. 

(507)

NOMINATIONS 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 20, 2011

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

Hon. Earl Anthony Wayne, of Maryland, to be Ambassador to 

Mexico 

Arnold Chacon, of Virginia, to be Ambassador to the Republic of 

Guatemala 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez, 

presiding. 

Present: Senators Menendez, Udall, Lugar, and Rubio. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

Senator MENENDEZ. Good morning. This hearing will come to 

order. 

Today the Senate Foreign Relations Committee considers two 

nominations, Ambassador Earl Anthony Wayne to be the Ambassador to Mexico and Mr. Arnold Chacon to be Ambassador to Guatemala. 

First, let me welcome the nominees and their families and 

friends. I will have some brief introductory remarks, and then I 

will turn to Senator Lugar. I believe Senator Rubio is on his way. 

And then we will turn to our nominees. 

Let me congratulate you on your nominations. If you are confirmed, you will serve as the President’s representative and be 

called upon to implement the policies of the United States Government, and protect and advance the interests of the American people. 

The countries you are being called to represent are countries that 

share a strong historical relationship with us and with one another. Both countries face challenges in the areas of governance, 

citizen security, human rights, and impunity issues, civilian/military relations, and judicial and security sector reform. 

Organized crime, including trafficking of drugs, weapons and 

people, threatens the stability of both nations, and has resulted in 

a serious threat to the security of the citizenry. And in the case of 

Guatemala, the survival of its nascent democracy. 

508

In Mexico, nearly 40,000 people have died as a result of drug-related violence in the last 4 years, and in Guatemala, 36 years of 

civil war and fragile democratic institutions have provided a haven 

for traffickers and gangs seeking new territory from which to expand their trade. However, I also recognize that this is a joint battle, a two-way street, in which the United States is part of sharing 

the responsibility to meet the challenge, and, therefore, also part 

of sharing the burden. We must reduce domestic demand, find the 

political will to curtail the flow of weapons and money going southward, and focus our political attention and resources on impeding 

this growing threat to regional stability. 

I was encouraged by Secretary Clinton’s attendance at a Central 

American Security Conference in Guatemala last month. I am also 

encouraged by the Justice Department’s decisions last week to enhance reporting requirements for gun dealers in four southwest 

border states; California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas, that 

make sales of two or more semiautomatic rifles in a 5-day period 

of guns greater than .22 calibers, with the ability to accept a detachable magazine. Those are all steps in the right direction. 

However, this is a relationship that is far more than about narcotics trafficking. Our economic relationship with the region and 

Mexico particularly is very important. The United States-Mexico 

goods trade totaled $393 billion in 2010, with United States exports 

exceeding $160 billion a year. 

Mexico is a major export market for United States machinery, 

cars, mineral fuel, oil, plastics, grains, meat, and soybeans. We are 

fortunate to enjoy a strong political and economic relationship with 

Mexico from which we derive mutual benefits. It is a relationship 

that goes back to the very essence of the founding of our country. 

And the number of United States citizens of Mexican descent is one 

of the largest of any given country in the world. Therefore, we have 

a very deep and important relationship. To me, as the chair of the 

Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, this is one of the most important relationships we have. 

Our Ambassador to Mexico is the custodian of this important 

multifaceted relationship, and it is a position which demands 

knowledge of the region, the ability to simultaneously manage multiple portfolios, and a respect for the independent political and cultural traditions of our nations. 

The challenges each of you face vis-a-vis your host governments 

will be unique. Rest assured that we are vested in your success. If 

confirmed, you will both play a vital role in the work that will build 

upon our common successes and combat some of the most pressing 

challenges. We look forward to your testimony. 

With that, let me turn to Senator Lugar, the distinguished ranking member of the full committee, for his comments. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would 

like to defer to Chairman Rubio in the event he has any comments 

before my opening. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD LUGAR,

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. I join the chairman in welcoming our distinguished nominees this morning. I appreciate this opportunity to exVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00516 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
509

amine not only their credentials, but also current United States 

policy toward Mexico and Guatemala. 

Over many decades, we have taken for granted the benefits of 

peaceful relationships with bordering countries. 

Our neighbors have been among our most important trading 

partners, with Canada currently ranking first in overall trade with 

the United States, and Mexico ranking third. 

Historically, few great powers have enjoyed the type of sustained 

regional stability that we have experienced. But in recent years, 

that regional stability has been shaken as Mexico has struggled 

with criminal violence, debilitating corruption, and drug financed 

cartels. 

In January, the Mexican Government pegged the number of people killed during its 4-year military-led crackdown on organized 

crime at more than 34,000. Those murdered, included government 

officials, police officials, military personnel, and others who were 

deemed a threat to the cartel’s business interests or leaders. Mexico’s insecurity and cartel violence, spilling into Central American 

countries, was exacerbating security challenges. 

Concern is particularly acute in Guatemala, and it appears that 

the burgeoning presence of Mexican drug traffickers is adding another layer of violence to a country already burdened by crime and 

corruption. Senior Guatemalan officials have warned that the Guatemalan security forces need a major overhaul to keep the Mexican 

drug gangs in check. 

Guatemala is seen as an ideal transit point for the cocaine traveling from Colombia through Mexico to the United States. Guatemala has a large unguarded border with Mexico. 

It has ports on the Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico. It has 

hundreds of grass airstrips near large plantations that are suitable 

for light aircraft, and the security forces are under resourced relative to the drug gangs. 

Events in Mexico and Guatemala have clear security implications 

for the United States, Americans traveling in the region and the 

United States/Mexican border. But this instability has also commercial consequences. Hopes for much stronger trade relationships 

that can help the United States and the entire Western Hemisphere compete with China, Japan, and the EU are suffering as a 

result. 

And given U.S. interest in the stability and prosperity of our 

southern neighbors, the United States has been working with these 

countries to confront lawlessness. The Merida Initiative, a 

multiyear Federal partnership, provides equipment and training 

and support of law enforcement efforts to curb the flow of illegal 

narcotics to the United States, Mexico, and Central America. It is 

the framework for this relationship. 

Though much remains to be done, the Merida Initiative has 

opened a new era of United States/Mexican law enforcement cooperation. It is far more extensive than previously attempted. 

The stakes are high for both countries. Sustained lawlessness in 

large areas of Mexico complicate the United States efforts to combat drug smuggling and illegal immigration, and to generate increasing drug-related violence on our side of the border. For MexVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00517 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
510

ico, degrading the capacity and influence of the cartels in Mexico 

is a near existential national security objective. 

Today I look forward to the nominees’ perspectives on the Merida 

Initiative and on efforts by Mexico and Guatemala to fight corruption within their own ranks. How can we enhance our cooperation 

with these governments in ways that benefit the United States security? These are basic questions for our session today, and I thank 

the chair for recognizing me. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Lugar. 

Senator Rubio. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO,

U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the ranking 

member. And I’ll be brief because I think everything that I wanted 

to say has been covered by your statements, which I think both 

have touched upon all the key issues. 

The only things I would add are, first, that it is important to remind ourselves of the importance of our relationship with Mexico. 

There are a lot of important things happening all over the world, 

but there are few, if any, relationships around the world more important than the one we have with our neighbors in Mexico. 

Prosperity and security in Mexico is a positive for the United 

States and vice versa. And this relationship that we have is critical 

on a number of fronts. 

On the economic front, it is about having a trading partner with 

an expanding economy, both, as a manufacturer for things that we 

use for our companies, but also as a consumer hopefully as our 

economy begins to grow. 

On the security side, I think just to state the obvious that the 

issues that are going on in Mexico are inextricably linked with 

issues that are happening across the border here in the United 

States. And so, the relationship between Mexico and the United 

States is a critically important one, perhaps as important as virtually any other relationship we have anywhere else in the world. 

And I hope we will continue to give it the importance that it deserves in this committee. I know certainly the subcommittee has. 

Guatemala is important as well. First of all, the promise in Guatemala now for over two and half decades, moved away from autocratic rule and toward an electoral democratic process. And that is 

a net positive that we should continue to encourage. 

The democratic institutions in Guatemala have survived for two 

and a half decades, but they are still fragile and will require us to 

continue to invest in them and be a partner with them in that regard. This is particularly important in light of the challenges that 

Guatemala faces, as does all of Central America. As we have increased the pressure on drug trafficking in the Caribbean, more 

and more of the trafficking has moved toward the Central American corridor, and we see the results of that all throughout Central 

America. It is critically important the United States continue to 

have a strong partnership. 

I personally am deeply engaged in the future of both of these 

countries because we have close family friends, relatives, and plenty of constituents in the State of Florida that have deep personal, 

511

family, and business links to both of these countries. And so, the 

assignment that both of you are going to have are critically important. As I said to you when we met, I intend to be in touch with 

you both personally on a number of issues, hopefully mostly good 

news, and every now and then some challenges. 

So, thank you for your service to our country and your willingness to serve in these very important posts. And we look forward 

to working with you in the years to come, and are interested in 

your testimony here today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Rubio. 

Before we hear your testimony, let me briefly introduce each of 

our nominees. 

Ambassador Earl Anthony Wayne, nominee as the Ambassador 

to Mexico, is a career ambassador. Since 2009 he has served as the 

Deputy Ambassador to Afghanistan and coordinating director for 

Development and Economic Affairs. 

In 2006 through 2009, he served as U.S. Ambassador to Argentina. 

Ambassador Wayne has also served in the Department of State’s 

Economic and Business Affairs Bureau and the Bureau of European Affairs, as well as the National Security Council. 

He holds degrees from Harvard University, a more distinguished 

university, Princeton in New Jersey, from Stanford University, and 

the University of California at Berkeley. Ambassador, we look forward to hearing from you today. 

Arnold A. Chacon is the nominee to be the Ambassador to Guatemala. He is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service and currently serving as the Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in 

Madrid where I recently had the opportunity to meet and work 

with him in my role as the chairman of the U.S.-Spain Business 

Council. And you did an excellent job. We appreciate your engagement with us. 

Mr. Chacon has a long history with the Bureau of the Western 

Hemisphere Affairs, having held, amongst others, the positions of 

Director of Andean Affairs, Deputy Director of Central American 

Affairs, Deputy Chief of Mission in Ecuador, political counselor in 

Peru, political officer in Chile, and staff assistant to the Chief of 

Mission in Mexico. 

Mr. Chacon received a B.A. in international affairs from the University of Colorado at Boulder. 

So, let me welcome both of you. If you have family or friends you 

want to introduce, please do so to the committee. We understand 

they’re an important part of your commitment to public service. 

And with that, I’ll start with Ambassador Wayne. We ask you to 

summarize your testimony to about 5 minutes or so. We will include your full testimony in the record. 

STATEMENT OF HON. EARL ANTHONY WAYNE, OF MARYLAND, 

TO BE AMBASSADOR TO MEXICO 

Ambassador WAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, Ranking Member Rubio. Thank you for your statements with which I found probably total agreement, I would say, 

in all your points. And we welcome your interests. 

512

Senator MENENDEZ. That is a good start in your confirmation. 

[Laughter.] 

Ambassador WAYNE. Very much welcome your interest in Mexico 

and Guatemala and the region. 

It is an honor to be here before you as President Obama’s nominee to serve as United States Ambassador to Mexico. I am grateful 

to both the President and to Secretary Clinton for their trust and 

confidence. 

I am very humbled to be sitting here and thinking about helping 

to guide bilateral relations with Mexico as Ambassador. The United 

States relationship with Mexico is unique, and its enormous and 

depth and in its direct impact on American security and prosperity, 

as each of you said. 

Our complex bilateral relations affect many Americans throughout the country in their daily lives. Our two economies and societies are indispensably interconnected, giving us a shared responsibility for challenges both nations face. More than $1 billion in trade crosses the United States-Mexico 

border each day, and almost 1 million people cross that border legally each day. 

If confirmed, I will need the advice and the wisdom and the partnership of many, including the United States Congress, to help me 

carry out my responsibilities and to manage creatively our vital relationship with Mexico. 

I believe my 36 years in America’s diplomatic service provide experiences that will help me perform this mission well. Let me give 

a couple of examples. 

My 6 years as Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and 

Business Affairs gave me the opportunity to deal with the full 

range of U.S. economic interests issues and agencies. My work underscored the special role which Mexico plays as our partner, and 

I worked closely with the United States agencies which are essential to managing relations with Mexico. 

My many years working with the European Union and its members were a practical lesson in building and deepening cooperation 

with a major U.S. partner on many difficult and complex issues. I 

learned the benefits of investing and building the mechanisms and 

the structures of cooperation. They helped us tackle difficult bilateral issues, and they provided the basis to take on cooperatively 

the broader challenges in the world. 

Helping to oversee United States-Canada relations let me experience directly our relations with our close neighbors, touch American lives, and how problem-solving requires that we consult closely 

and coordinate closely with many actors on both sides of the border. 

Serving as Ambassador to Argentina provided excellent experience in using our public diplomacy tools to address misperceptions 

about the United States. And I also learned firsthand how supporting and expanding people-to-people relationships and exchanges, whether they involve education, or music, or business, or 

even the fight against trafficking in persons, really helped improve 

perceptions of the United States. 

In both Argentina and Afghanistan, I worked closely with United 

States law enforcement agencies and host government officials in 

513

fighting drug trafficking, and in supporting host government efforts 

to strengthen rule of law institutions. 

In my 2 years in Afghanistan, helping to oversee our massive assistance programs, underscored the key role which effective interagency teams and close engagement with host government teams 

play in providing assistance to a partner nation. Building frank 

and trusting dialogue was essential both within the U.S. teams and 

with our partners. 

In addition, my experience managing a huge Embassy in Kabul 

and the hundreds of civilians that we have in the provinces seasoned my ability to guide a large and complex set of operations, 

such as we have in Mexico. 

At present, issues related to security, crime, and law enforcement 

dominate the headlines about Mexico, but the interests we share 

and the common challenges we face with Mexico are much broader. 

If confirmed, I pledge to work closely with you, Mr. Chairman, and 

your colleagues in Congress to further strengthen this multifaceted 

relationship. 

Central to U.S. efforts over the last 3 years, as several of you 

noted, has been the Merida Initiative. Although our cooperation 

under Merida began by addressing the need to combat and weaken 

transnational criminal organizations, it has expanded to include 

longer term objectives to strengthen justice sector institutions, to 

reinvigorate border management, and to reinforce Mexico’s efforts 

to create strong, resilient communities in areas impacted by the 

heightened violence. The strong support of Congress for the Merida 

Initiative has been and remains essential. 

As of late June, the U.S. Merida team has delivered a cumulative 

total of $465 million in equipment, technical assistance, and training since the Initiative began in 2008. 

The United States plans to achieve a cumulative total of almost $900 million delivered by the end of this year. 

One of my principle objectives if confirmed will be to work with 

Mexican and United States colleagues to assure that we successfully accelerate Merida implementation, and that we are achieving 

our Merida objectives. 

While United States assistance is vital, the Government of Mexico and the Mexican people bear most of the burden financially, politically, and in terms of human lives in this fight against 

transnational organized crime. Of the estimated 40,000 or so 

deaths attributed to narco-violence since December 2006, nearly 

2,000 were members of the Mexican Security Services. And the 

2011 Mexican budget allocates over $10 billion for security. 

United States Government personnel in Mexico have been victims of criminal violence also, and the safety of our personnel serving in Mexico must be a top priority. 

Over the last two decades, the economic relationship between the 

United States and Mexico has been transformed. Our economic ties 

are now among the deepest in the world. Trade, for example, has 

quadrupled to reach nearly $400 billion in 2010, making Mexico 

our second-largest export market and our third-largest trading 

partner. 

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimates that trade with Mexico supports more than 6 million United States jobs, and for 26 

514

States, Mexico is the largest or second-largest export destination. 

In fact, we do not merely trade with Mexico and Canada; we make 

things together. This kind of mutual integration helps the United 

States be more competitive in the world. If confirmed, I will work 

to support the mutual benefit and strength of our economic ties. 

But it is the ties between our people that help make the relations 

with Mexico so unique. One in ten Americans are estimated to be 

of Mexican descent, while more than 1 million Americans call Mexico home. Tourism brings 10 million more to Mexico each year, and 

there are countless people-to-people exchanges and links between 

our two societies. If confirmed, I will work to support the many 

benefits that come from these people-to-people ties and exchanges. 

The future security and well-being of the United States is rooted 

in a vibrant partnership with a stable, prosperous, and competitive 

Mexico, that shares the values of democracy, rule of law, and open 

markets at home and abroad. Such a partnership requires a whole 

of government approach by both partners and a spirit of good faith 

and trust between us. If confirmed, I will do my very best to help 

this partnership prosper and achieve the mutual benefits possible 

for the peoples of the United States and Mexico. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Wayne follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR EARL ANTHONY WAYNE

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rubio, and members of the committee, it is an 

honor to be here today before you as President Obama’s nominee to serve as the 

next United States Ambassador to Mexico. I am grateful to both the President and 

Secretary Clinton for their trust and confidence. 

I am humbled by the thought of helping to guide our bilateral relationship with 

Mexico as Ambassador. The United States relationship with Mexico is unique in its 

enormous breadth and depth and in its immediate, direct impact on American security and prosperity. This complex, multifaceted bilateral relationship affects Americans in their day-to-day lives and involves virtually every department of the Federal 

Government and a host of State and local authorities whose interests are closely 

linked to what happens in Mexico. Our two economies and societies are indispensably interconnected, giving us a shared responsibility for the challenges both 

nations face. More than a billion dollars of trade crosses the United States-Mexico 

border each day, providing jobs and resources to people across both countries, and 

almost one million people cross the border legally each day in the course of their 

daily routines. 

If confirmed, I will need the wisdom, advice and partnership of many, including 

the U.S. Congress, to help me carry out my responsibilities and to manage creatively our vital relationship with Mexico. I believe my 36 years in America’s diplomatic service offer experience and tools which will help me perform this mission 

well. Let me share a few examples.

• Serving 6 years as Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business 

Affairs has provided me intensive experience dealing with the full range of U.S. 

economic interests and issues, including many involving Mexico and Latin 

America. Those years underscored for me that very special role which Mexico 

plays as our economic partner bilaterally and in our ability to compete globally. 

I also learned well the importance of a ‘‘whole of government’’ approach to managing international policy and the vital role played by the private sector and 

civil society in achieving America’s economic well-being. 

• My many years working on U.S. relations with Europe, and especially the European Union, taught me the importance of patiently building and strengthening 

international partnerships despite the time and investment needed to establish 

trust and prove the value of cooperation. In the case of the EU, our cooperation 

covers a tremendously wide range of issues, including some which are very technical but have enormous impact. My work with Europe also made clear that our 

partnerships are vital not only for bilateral issues but also for the work we can 

undertake together on broader international challenges. 

515

• Helping to oversee United States-Canada relations taught me how relationships 

with our close neighbors touch American’s lives and demand very close consultations with a wide range of U.S. institutions (Federal, State and local) to 

find solutions. • My years as Ambassador to Argentina taught me the importance of addressing 

how others view the United States, for good or otherwise. Our public diplomacy 

and efforts to strengthen people-to-people relationships via education, the 

media, culture, tourism, and partnerships among civil society organizations can 

make a big difference for good in relations between nations. • My service in Argentina and Afghanistan also helped me to live the importance 

of building strong cooperation against crime and drug trafficking and the dedication needed to bolster rule of law institutions. 

• And my 2 years in Afghanistan underscored the key role which effective interagency teams and regular, close engagement with host government teams play 

if we are to successfully provide effective assistance to meet urgent needs of our 

partner nation. Frank and open dialogue in designing and implementing programs, in monitoring and evaluating the results, and in solving problems is 

essential.

If confirmed, I hope my experience will help guide our multidimensional relationship with Mexico. At the present, issues related to security, crime and law enforcement tend to dominate the headlines, but I want to emphasize that the interests 

we share and the common challenges we face are much broader and our interaction 

with Mexico must reflect this. I would hope to try to make this point often with my 

words and actions, if confirmed. 

Our bilateral ties have never been stronger, despite the challenges of relations as 

complex as we have with Mexico. If confirmed, I pledge to work closely with you, 

Mr. Chairman, and your colleagues in Congress to maintain and deepen these ties. 

In particular, with your continued support, we have the opportunity to strengthen 

the institutions and mechanisms to manage creatively the full range of issues the 

United States and Mexico share as we move forward. 

MERIDA AND THE SECURITY DIMENSION

Central to our efforts over the last 3 years has been the Merida Initiative. 

Although our cooperation under the Merida Initiative began by addressing the immediate need to combat and weaken Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs), 

we have expanded these efforts to include longer term Rule of Law institutional objectives (augmenting the capacities of civilian law enforcement and security entities, 

strengthening judicial and other state institutions to resist corruption and improve 

the administration of justice); reinvigorating border management; and reinforcing 

Mexico’s efforts to create strong, resilient communities in areas impacted by narcoviolence. 

This overall strategy remains sound. The strong support of the Congress for the 

Merida Initiative has been, and remains, essential to its success. As of late June, 

the Merida Initiative team has delivered a cumulative total of $465 million in equipment, technical assistance, and training since the Merida Initiative began in December 2008. One of my principal objectives, if confirmed, will be to work with my Mexican and United States colleagues to accelerate the implementation of the activities 

and to assure that we are achieving our Merida objectives. 

The Merida Initiative has sparked remarkable progress in our law enforcement 

cooperation. The Cabinet-level Merida High Level Consultative Group, which last 

met on April 29, under the chairmanship of Secretary Clinton, brings the leaders 

of the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security and Justice, among others, together with their Mexican counterparts to review progress and guide the work agenda of our enhanced engagement. In Mexico City, U.S. and Mexican colleagues work 

together daily to develop, design, carry out and evaluate our cooperative activities. 

While U.S. assistance is a vital contribution, the Government of Mexico and the 

Mexican people bear most of the burden—financially, politically, and in terms of 

human lives—of this fight against Transnational Organized Crime. Of over 40,000 

deaths attributed to narco-violence since December 2006, nearly 2,000 were members of the Mexican security services. The Mexican budget for 2011 allocates over 

$10 billion to security spending. In addition to the costs that Mexico has borne, U.S. 

Government personnel in Mexico have also been victimized by the violence perpetrated by the cartels and criminal gangs. The safety of all U.S. Government officials serving at our mission in Mexico must be a top priority. The U.S. Government 

employs a range of equipment and techniques to keep them safe, and maintains an 

ongoing dialogue with the Mexican Government regarding the safety of our personnel and their families as they serve our Nation in Mexico. If confirmed, I am 

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committed to continuing and intensifying this engagement, and our support for the 

Mexican Government’s struggle against these criminal gangs. 

Building Resilient Communities 

Building strong and resilient communities in areas most affected by narcoviolence is a key part of the joint Merida strategy. Under the Todos Somos Juarez 

(‘‘We are all Juarez’’) program, the Mexican Government has engaged local community groups on priorities to keep kids out of crime, create new role models, and lure 

others from a world of violence. New initiatives under Merida will support the Government of Mexico in Juarez and give greater emphasis to work with state and local 

governments who have jurisdiction over the majority of the crimes committed in 

Mexico. This is a huge task but an imperative one, and, if confirmed, I will give 

these efforts every attention. 

As the President and Secretary Clinton and others have said, we recognize that 

the problem of illicit drugs and trafficking is a shared one and that we in the United 

States bear shared responsibility for the problem as well as the solution. If confirmed, I will work to strengthen our efforts to impede illegal weapons trafficking 

and increase efforts to control money laundering and bulk cash transfer of illicit 

drug money to Mexico. 

As I stressed in my opening, our bilateral agenda with Mexico is too expansive 

and too important to allow the relationship to be defined exclusively by a single 

component part. We cannot ignore the important economic partnership we have 

with Mexico. 

THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION—FACILITATING TRADE AND ENHANCING COMPETITIVENESS

In the last 20 years, the economic relationship between the United States and 

Mexico has been transformed, in magnitude and quality. The resulting economic ties 

between our two countries are now among the deepest in the world. 

There are many different signs of this transformation. Trade, for example, has more than quadrupled in the last 20 years to reach nearly $400 billion in 2010, 

making Mexico our second-largest export market and third-largest trading partner. 

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimates that trade with Mexico supports more 

than 6 million U.S. jobs. Those workers know that Mexico is one of our best customers—it is a middle-income country with a growing middle class that wants to 

buy a lot of the same products that Americans do. That gives our companies a natural advantage in serving the Mexican market, as their success in sending exports 

there makes clear. 

Mexico is a neighboring country but the benefit of its market extends far beyond 

the border. For 26 U.S. States, in fact, Mexico is the largest or second-largest export 

destination. Apple growers in Washington, cattle ranchers in Colorado, and electronics manufacturers in California all benefit from the demand of Mexican consumers, among dozens and dozens of other American industries. But the data shows 

even the smallest American businesses—the small and medium-sized enterprises—

are most likely to trade with the markets that are the closest to home: Mexico and 

Canada. All around the country, in businesses big and small, Mexico is an important customer for American products. 

In today’s globalized economy, business activities are linked across countries like 

never before. Mexico is no exception. Much of our bilateral trade takes place within 

the same industry or even within the same firm, as a result of cross-border investments that have facilitated multinational production systems and supply chains. In 

fact, we don’t merely trade with Mexico and Canada. It’s much more than that: we 

make things together. Indeed, each country has invested heavily in each other with 

about $8 billion of Mexican investment in the United States and $95 billion of U.S. 

investment in Mexico. This kind of mutual integration helps make the United States 

more competitive in the world, and it puts American workers at the center of the 

regional economy. That is a new and different dynamic than was at work 20 years 

ago, and it is a positive one that positions us to compete more effectively against 

commercial rivals from around the world. 

Our economic partnership with Mexico is vital to our own prosperity. If I am confirmed, nurturing this component of our bilateral relationship will be a central element of my job in Mexico City. 

Building a 21st Century Border 

Our security agenda and our economic agenda with Mexico meet at our common 

border, one of the busiest borders in the world. Nearly 1 million legitimate travelers 

and more than a billion dollars’ worth of goods legally cross each day. The U.S.-

Mexico Bilateral Executive Steering Committee (ESC) was established to formulate 

and implement joint concrete steps designed to enhance our economic competitiveVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00524 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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ness and ensure that the border can meet the increasing demands put upon it and 

enhance the use of its untapped economic potential. Improvements in border-crossing infrastructure and operations are necessary to facilitate legitimate trade and 

travel, keeping our trade flows secure, reducing congestion, and lowering business 

costs. 

Facilitating Secure and Efficient Transportation Linkages 

Managing the flow of legitimate travelers and goods across the border also depends on getting them to the border or port of entry efficiently. The ESC is working 

with stakeholders on both sides of the border to see that regional infrastructure 

plans are coordinated and consistent, so trade and travel can smoothly flow to and 

through the border areas of both countries. A new pilot project designed to improve 

the efficiency of cross-border long-haul trucking, which will lower the cost of commercial traffic even as it ensures that U.S. safety standards are met—will benefit 

American consumers, workers, and exporters. 

Removing Unnecessary Regulatory Differences 

Cumbersome and unnecessary regulatory differences raise costs for consumers 

and businesses and make it more complicated to protect the environment, health 

and safety of our citizens. The U.S.-Mexico High Level Regulatory Cooperation 

Council is examining ways to increase regulatory transparency, strengthen the analytic basis of regulations, and help make regulations more compatible. 

Ensuring Access to Clean and Reliable Energy 

Mexico is our second-largest oil supplier, and expanded cooperation, including on 

clean and renewable energy, can be crucial to the energy security that makes our 

economy go. Mexico has significant wind, solar, and geothermal energy production 

potential and has set a specific greenhouse gas reduction target of 50 percent from 

2002 levels by 2050. Under the Bilateral Framework on Clean Energy and Climate 

Change, there are initiatives to limit greenhouse gas emissions, promote the development and use of clean energy technologies, and improve energy efficiency and reliability. Mexico and the United States also share stewardship of the Gulf of Mexico 

and are committed to developing its offshore energy resources safely, responsibly, 

and equitably. 

PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE TIES

One in ten Americans is estimated to be of Mexican descent, while more than a 

million Americans call Mexico home, and tourism brings more than 10 million more 

to Mexico for short stays. Indeed, the U.S. consular operation in Mexico is the largest in the world in terms of workload and staff. More broadly, Mexicans and Americans have access to each other’s TV programs and movies, we watch and cheer each 

other’s athletes, we enjoy each other’s music and cuisine, and we send our children 

to each other’s schools for exchanges and study. These people-to-people ties deserve 

to be cherished and strengthened by cooperation between our governments. The 

strength of these human ties can help us overcome problems that arise. If confirmed, I will work to these ends. 

CONCLUSION

The future security and well being of the United States is rooted in a vibrant 

partnership with a stable, prosperous, and competitive Mexico that shares the values of democracy, rule of law, and open markets at home and abroad. Such a partnership requires a ‘‘whole of government’’ approach by both partners and a spirit 

of good faith and trust between us. We have made great strides toward building 

that kind of partnership in recent years. Despite the evident challenges, the U.S.-

Mexico partnership is replete with promise. If confirmed I will do my very best to 

help this partnership prosper in order to achieve the mutual benefits possible for 

the peoples of the United States and of Mexico.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. 

Mr. Chacon. 

STATEMENT OF ARNOLD CHACON, OF VIRGINIA, TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUATEMALA 

Mr. CHACON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, and 

Senator Rubio. Thank you for granting me the opportunity to appear before you today as President Obama’s nominee to serve as 

518

United States Ambassador to Guatemala. I am grateful to President Obama and to Secretary Clinton for the trust and the confidence they have shown in sending my nomination to you for advice and consent. 

With your permission, I would like briefly to introduce my family 

who is here. They have provided much love and support throughout 

my career, and I am deeply grateful. My wife, Alida Chacon, is also 

a member of the U.S. Foreign Service. Two of my three children 

are here, Sarah and Jonathan. My eldest is unable to be here. She 

is studying law at Stanford in California. I also have my cousin, 

Berta Romere Fonte; her husband, Michael; and their son, Gabriel, 

with me today. And finally, my dear friend and mentor, Ambassador Vincenzo Arcos, is here joining us today, as well as our dear 

friend, Ms. Eli Ledahowsky. 

Mr. Chairman, as a career member of the Foreign Service, I have 

had the privilege to serve my country at home and abroad, including five tours in Latin America. Most recently, as you noted, I 

served as the Deputy Chief of Mission in Madrid. And should you 

choose to confirm me, I will draw upon these experiences in an effort to advance United States goals in Guatemala. 

Guatemala faces a number of grave challenges, including trafficking in drugs, weapons and people, high rates of violence, impunity and corruption, limited access to education, and employment 

for the nation’s burgeoning youth population, and chronic malnutrition—child malnutrition. 

As Secretary Clinton said during her June 22 conference of support for the Central American security strategy in Guatemala City, 

‘‘No single country can overcome such daunting challenges on its 

own.’’ If confirmed, I commit to promoting respect for human rights 

and economic and social inclusion for all members of society 

through full partnership with the governmental and people of Guatemala, which seek to define and implement long-term solutions 

that address the underlying causes of insecurity. 

Strengthening security requires a whole of society effort, and 

civil society must be a full partner in this endeavor. The Central 

American Regional Security Initiative, or CARSI, will be an important tool allowing us to focus assistance where it is needed most. 

Guatemala’s Presidential, legislative, and local elections will take 

place this September. The United States is supporting an Organization of American States electoral observation mission, and we 

hope for free, fair, and nonviolent elections. If confirmed, I welcome 

the opportunity to consult with members of this committee and 

your colleagues in Congress to shape appropriate U.S. policies leading up to and following the elections. 

Guatemala has made important strides toward reconciling with 

its past. This year in a precedent-setting step forward, President 

Colon’s Declassification Commission facilitated the public release of 

nearly 12,000 documents dating back to the internal armed conflict. I look forward, if confirmed, to working with the Guatemalan 

Government, civil society, and the private sector, to foster further 

transparency and dialogue. 

I am keenly aware of the critical role Guatemala’s dynamic private sector must play in shaping Guatemala’s future. If confirmed, 

I will encourage the private sector to support efforts to create deVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00526 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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cent jobs for working people. I will reiterate to both the government and the private sector the need for Guatemala to uphold its 

commitments under the Dominican Republic, Central America, and 

U.S. Free Trade Agreement, including the imperative of effective 

enforcement of labor laws. 

Most importantly, Mr. Chairman, I will work to ensure the protection of American citizens in Guatemala. And this begins with 

the safety of our Embassy staff and their families. 

Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, if confirmed and entrusted with this office, I look forward to working with you and 

your colleagues in Congress to address the opportunities and challenges that await the next United States Ambassador to Guatemala. 

I thank you again for granting me the privilege of appearing before you today, and I would be pleased to answer any questions you 

and your colleagues may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Chacon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ARNOLD CHACON

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for granting me the opportunity to appear before you today as President Obama’s nominee to serve as the 

United States Ambassador to Guatemala. I am grateful to President Obama and 

Secretary Clinton for the trust and confidence they have shown in sending my nomination to you for advice and consent. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely 

with you and your colleagues to advance the interests of the United States. 

With the chairman’s permission, I would like to take a moment to introduce my 

family and to thank them for their love and support. With me today are my wife, 

Alida, also a member of the U.S. Foreign Service, as well as two of my three children, Sarah and Jonathan. My brother, Michael Chacon of Denver, CO, is also here. 

Unfortunately, my eldest daughter, Helen, a student at Stanford Law School, could 

not be with us today. 

As a career member of the Foreign Service, I have had the privilege to serve my 

country at home at the Department of State and abroad, including five tours in 

Latin America in Honduras, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Ecuador. Most recently, I 

served as the Deputy Chief of Mission in Madrid. Should you choose to confirm me, 

I will draw upon these experiences in an effort to advance U.S. goals in Guatemala. 

And if confirmed, I look forward to consulting with this committee in this effort. 

Guatemala today faces a number of grave challenges, including trafficking in 

drugs, weapons, and people; high rates of violence; impunity and corruption; limited 

access to education and employment for the nation’s burgeoning youth population; 

and chronic child malnutrition. As Secretary Clinton said during the June 22 Conference of Support for the Central American Security Strategy in Guatemala City, 

no single country can overcome such daunting challenges on its own. If confirmed, 

I commit to promoting respect for human rights and economic and social inclusion 

for all members of society. Through full partnership with the government and people of Guatemala, we seek to define and implement long-term solutions that address 

the underlying causes of insecurity. If confirmed, I will work with Guatemalan leaders, including the President and his or her ministers, the Attorney General and the 

Police Reform Commissioner, as well as members of civil society and the international community, including the International Commission Against Impunity in 

Guatemala, to support efforts to reform rule of law and justice sector institutions. 

Strengthening security requires a whole-of-society effort, and civil society must be 

a full partner in this endeavor. The Central America Regional Security Initiative, 

or CARSI, will be an important tool, allowing us to focus assistance where it is 

needed most. CARSI will continue to build the capacity of civilian law enforcement 

personnel and institutions, assist the government in maintaining an effective state 

presence throughout the country, strengthen the capacity of investigators, prosecutors, and judges to prosecute cases to conviction, and work to mitigate the root 

causes of crime and insecurity that lead to youth membership in gangs. 

Guatemala’s Presidential, legislative, and local elections will take place this September. The United States is supporting an Organization of the American States 

electoral observation mission, and we hope for free, fair, and nonviolent elections. 

If confirmed, I welcome the opportunity to consult with members of this committee 

520

and your colleagues in the Congress to shape appropriate U.S. policies leading up 

to and following the elections. 

Guatemala has made important strides toward reconciling with its past. In a 

major step forward this year, President Colom’s declassification commission facilitated the public release of nearly 12,000 documents dating back to the internal 

armed conflict. This was a precedent-setting, long-awaited step, and reflects a commitment to transparency. I look forward, if confirmed, to working with the Guatemalan Government, civil society, and the private sector to foster further transparency and dialogue. 

The United States is Guatemala’s top trading partner and largest foreign investor 

with two-way trade of $7.7 billion and U.S. investment of over $960 million, particularly in the manufacturing, wholesale trade, finance, and insurance industries. If 

confirmed, I will focus on our valuable trade and investment relationship and seek 

to increase business opportunities for U.S. companies in the Guatemalan market. 

One way I will specifically work to strengthen economic ties with Guatemala, if confirmed, will be to advocate for transparency and the rule of law in business transactions as Guatemala improves its business environment and strengthens its economy. If confirmed, I also intend to engage with Guatemala’s dynamic private sector, 

as I am keenly aware of the critical role they must play in shaping Guatemala’s 

future. I will seek opportunities for enhanced trade leading to job creation in both 

the United States and Guatemala, and encourage the private sector to support 

efforts to create decent jobs for working people. At the same time, if confirmed, I 

will reiterate to both the government and the private sector the need for Guatemala 

to uphold its commitments under the Dominican Republic-Central America-United 

States Free Trade Agreement, including the imperative of effective enforcement of 

labor laws. 

Most importantly, if confirmed, I will work to ensure the protection of American 

citizens in Guatemala. This begins with the safety of our Embassy staff and their 

families. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, if confirmed and entrusted with 

this office, I look forward to working with you and your colleagues in Congress to 

address the opportunities and challenges that await the next U.S. Ambassador to 

Guatemala. 

I thank you again for granting me the privilege of appearing before you today. 

I would be pleased to answer any questions you and your colleagues may have.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you very much. 

We will start off with rounds of 7 minutes, and then see where 

we go from there. 

Ambassador Wayne, you were the Deputy Ambassador and coordinating director for Development and Economic Affairs in Afghanistan. As such, did you have oversight of USAID’s programs 

in Afghanistan? 

Ambassador WAYNE. Yes, sir, I did. 

Senator MENENDEZ. OK. 

Ambassador WAYNE. It was a new position created to look over 

all of our assistance programs, USAID, also the law enforcement 

agencies. Anyway, we were helping to build capacity for the Afghan 

Government. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Did you do any audits? Were there any audits conducted while you were there? 

Ambassador WAYNE. There were a whole range of inspections 

done when I was there, both internal inspections by the AID. There 

were some—there was GAO work done. We had, as you know, a 

special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction. So, there 

were multiple inspections that have been done. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I ask that question because obviously we 

have a very significant presence in Mexico with the Merida Initiative and other engagements. In Afghanistan, my understanding is 

that we have powerplants we have built to the tune of $250 million 

which cannot be operated because the Karzai government cannot 

521

afford diesel fuel to operate them. Hence, we build a plant, we 

spend a quarter of a billion dollars, and they are not operational. 

Ambassador WAYNE. Well, there is a powerplant near Kabul, and 

there was a critical inspection report done that was critical making 

those points that this plant was built to run on diesel fuel, and the 

plant is perfectly operational, and does operate. But the point was 

made that the diesel fuel is very expensive, and that now there is 

energy coming down from Uzbekistan, electricity, that is the primary source of energy for Kabul. 

The plant was constructed—begun a number of years ago, including before I got there. But the notion, as I understand it, at the 

time that they began constructing the plant was that it was not 

clear that there was going to be electricity coming from Uzbekistan, 

and that it was only over a several year period while this plant was 

being built that the electric connection was made and the agreements were reached with Uzbekistan. 

And the arrival of electricity in Kabul has made a tremendous 

difference. So, in part, yes, the plant was constructed as what has 

turned out to be a secondary——

Senator MENENDEZ. It is my understanding we are doing the 

same thing in Kandahar. My point here is not to go through an 

Iraq thing, I will do that a different time and in a different location. But if we are going to spend $250 million on a plant that at 

the end of the day, for whatever reason, is operational, but not 

being operated, I question the long-term thinking of our investment 

decisions in terms of assistance. 

So, I turn now to Mexico and look at the Merida Initiative. And 

I say to myself, we are doing something that I have supported, that 

is incredibly important. And I believe it speaks to shared responsibility with the Mexican people and the Mexican Government. But 

are we making the right investments in Merida to achieve our mutual goals, to help the Mexican Government both fight the narcotics 

traffickers and, at the same time, build the institutions that are 

necessary for long-term justice and transparency in Mexico? 

Ambassador WAYNE. Well, you pose exactly the right questions, 

Senator. And those were the same questions that we were posing, 

say, in Afghanistan also as we looked at our programs. 

I think in my initial review of what we are doing in Merida, it 

does seem that we are moving in the right direction to provide that 

kind of outcome. There has been a mix, I think as you know, of 

equipment delivered, but also training and technical assistance, 

which is training by the specialized people working together. And 

that really has touched a large number of Mexican officials. For example, there have been about 13,000 federal police prosecutors, correction staff, that have received rule of law and capacity building 

training over the past 3 years, and another 23,000 have received 

training on the transformation that is going on between the inquisitorial justice system to an oral accusation based system in 

order to reform the whole set of rule of law institutions in that 

country. These are efforts to actually teach the practitioners how 

to learn from best practices around the world. And, of course, we 

are doing this in full support and with the full cooperation of the 

Government of Mexico to pursue their objectives. 

522

Equipment has been delivered—11 helicopters, new computer 

systems, and immigration related systems to allow for better biometric tracking and other tracking of immigrants coming in and 

out of the country. But all of this, as far as I have been able to 

tell so far in preparing for this, is directed at achieving the objectives that you supported in funding this. 

One of the things that I want to be sure about if I am confirmed 

is that we are really moving toward, in a measurable way, achieving these objectives. We owe it to ourselves and to you and to the 

American people to have credible proof that there is progress being 

made. There has been some success. As you know very well, the 

Government of Mexico has taken out of operation 29 or so of the 

leaders of the cartels during this period. I think at least some of 

that is due to the good information-sharing mechanisms and structures that have been built up. But there is a lot more to do. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I certainly applaud President 

Caldero ́n. I mean, I believe he is the first Mexican President that 

has really taken on the drug traffickers; and as he has taken them 

on, increased violence has ensued. I worry, however, when I listen 

to some of the voices here in the United States and in the Congress 

that want us to fight the drug traffickers but constantly speak 

about the violence. Unfortunately, you cannot fight the drug traffickers and not have violence ensue as a result of it. 

And so, they use that as an aspersion about what is happening 

in Mexico, when in fact, had the Mexican President not taken on 

the cartels in a very frontal and decisive way, then there would not 

have been the ensuing violence. So, it is a complex concern that 

people in the United States portray in a certain way, but at the 

end of the day, is the very essence of what we want to see in one 

dimension. 

I have many other questions about economics and whatnot, but 

my time has expired, and I will turn to Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chacon——

Senator MENENDEZ. Senator Lugar, if I may, just one moment. 

Senator LUGAR. Yes. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I want to welcome Ambassador Arcos back 

to the committee. He has been here many times in the past. From 

when I first came to Congress, he has been an insightful voice on 

much of what we do in the Western Hemisphere and beyond. And 

it is great to see him looking so well. There is life after the State 

Department I see. [Laughter.] 

I am sorry. Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chacon, I want to inquire about the hundreds of American 

families who are attempting to adopt children in Guatemala, and 

those adoptions have been in limbo now for the better part of 4 

years with endless delays. And this has caused, it seems to me, suffering by children who would have had many years of emotional, 

intellectual development here with those dedicated families. 

I commend my colleague, Senator Mary Landrieu, who recently 

visited Guatemala with a delegation in hopes of prodding the government to resolve these issues. 

523

I want to know, first of all, are you aware of the dilemma, and 

do you pledge to try to work tirelessly to resolve these situations 

so that this will benefit Guatemalan children as well as our relationship with Guatemala? 

Mr. CHACON. Thank you, Senator Lugar. Yes, I am well aware 

of this problem that is a heart wrenching issue, to be sure. It involves hundreds of America families, prospective adoptive parents. 

I understand at this point there is some 350 to 400 pending cases. 

To be sure, this is down from the thousands that there were originally. If confirmed, you can count on me committing my support to 

American families during this trying time. I will urge the Government of Guatemala to put in place a Hague compliant process, and 

to address these issues as soon as possible. 

Senator LUGAR. I appreciate very much that testimony, and I am 

certain that will be reassuring to the many families who have 

spent countless thousands of dollars, as well as their own personal 

efforts to help resolves these cases. 

Let me ask likewise with regard to Guatemala, that there currently is a ban on United States international military education 

and training funds in Guatemala. Would you discuss the reasons 

for that and how this might be resolved so that Guatemala has better ability to work with the United States in terms of border security and the drug trafficking, which we have commented on in our 

opening statements? 

Mr. CHACON. You are correct, Senator, in that there is a ban 

against providing assistance to Guatemalan army, IMET and FMF 

assistance per congressional mandate. 

We provide lots of assistance to the Guatemalan army corps of 

engineers, to the Guatemalan navy, and the Guatemalan air force. 

We also provide peacekeeping training assistance as well. All of our 

training is vetted in accordance with Leahy amendment provisions, 

and we are very scrupulous on that front. 

The challenge in Guatemala, of course, is standing up a civilian 

law enforcement capacity. They should have the primary role, and 

our programs are directed in that effort. 

We do provide the military with assistance from our International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Fund and from 

counternarcotics assistance from the Department of Defense because they play an important secondary role in supporting the civilian law enforcement effort in Guatemala. 

The situation hopefully is evolving. It takes a whole of society effort to deal with this problem of narco-trafficking and crime. And 

if confirmed, I will pay close attention to what is needed, evaluate 

our programs for their efficacy, and look to see how we might be 

able to expand our assistance in this regard. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, what do you think will be needed for the 

lifting of this specific ban on U.S. military education and training 

at this point? 

Mr. CHACON. As you know, I am just reading into Guatemala. I 

have a lot to learn yet. I hope to consult with my country team on 

the ground if confirmed to find out where we can best place our assistance. And, as I said, we are open to looking at every avenue of 

assistance that Guatemala needs, because this is certainly a dire 

situation that they are facing. 

524

Senator LUGAR. Ambassador Wayne, let me ask, it has been a 

long-time discussion with Mexico about its oil industry. And sometimes in our hearings, as oil has been mentioned, it raises enormous emotions. I can remember going to conferences in Mexico in 

which people equated oil almost the same as our blood, the equivalent, and, therefore, touching any part of this was really out of the 

question. 

On the other hand, the oil industry has been in decline now for 

some time. This has meant loss of income for Mexico and loss of 

energy security really for the Western Hemisphere because of the 

Mexican-United States relationship. This should be very important 

for us. 

Do you see any possibilities in this circumstance of the relationship evolving in a different way in which the nationalistic monopoly might really lead to some degree of foreign investment, some 

refurbishing of the vitality of the oil industry of Mexico? 

Ambassador WAYNE. Well, Senator, you correctly described the 

sensitivity of the energy issues in Mexico. And clearly any evolution in their policies will have to come out of a domestic consensus in Mexico. 

What I can say is that we have been having a regular dialogue 

on these important energy issues. Mexico is our second supplier for 

oil. We have been exploring also alternative energy sources and 

how we can support that, including such things as wind energy in 

Baja, CA, and how that can be helpful, both for Mexico and potentially for the United States. 

We have been looking intensely at a number of the technical 

issues on the electricity grid that crosses the border and to make 

sure there is more efficiency and more consistency in that. And we 

have talked about delineating our maritime border, which is also 

very important in the gulf for these questions. 

But I think that, to come back to your main question, there will 

have to be an evolution in thinking in Mexico. And, of course, it 

is a very important topic. And I know they are coming into an electoral year. My guess is that the election of the new President will 

be the primary thing being debated in this upcoming year. But, of 

course, we are ready to work constructively with our partners on 

this very important topic. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, sir. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Chairman Menendez. 

We just recently—and I am directing my question here to Mr. 

Wayne. Mr. Wayne, we just had a recent meeting of the MexicoU.S. Interparliamentary Group. Senator Menendez was there, and 

I think spoke to some of the issues. We had participation by, I 

think, 8 to 10 Mexican parliamentarians, and then pretty good participation on our side. And it was really obvious that there are a 

lot of challenges that we have with Mexico. 

And one of them has to do with the North American Development Bank, which I think you are probably familiar with, that 

grew out of NAFTA. And we discussed that at this meeting. And 

according to multiple economic studies, including studies by the 

525

World Bank, ecological services also provide economic benefits to 

the people. 

And with regard to reforms of the North American Development 

Bank, I believe there is still work that needs to be done to improve 

basic services, such as clean water and clean air in the region. And 

I think that was really the thrust of this bank being put into place. 

Do you believe there is a way to continue this mission while also 

opening the North American Development Bank to reforms, which 

can improve economic development, such as allowing the NAB 

Bank to be used as a funding source to help renewable energy companies get off the ground? And would the administration support 

such negotiations in the future? 

Ambassador WAYNE. Senator, first, welcome. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. 

Ambassador WAYNE. It is a pleasure to have you here. And, second, I am very happy that there is a lively interparliamentary exchange going on with Mexico. In my experience, where we have a 

good exchange between Parliaments and Congresses, we really 

have a good relationship. So, thank you for doing that. Thank you, 

Senator Menendez, also for participating in that exchange. 

On the NAB Bank itself, I am going to have to say I will need 

to go back and study that a bit. When I last left NAB Bank activities, the NAB Bank was struggling to get going on its basic mission. I now understand that they have been quite successful in 

launching and supporting projects related to the environment in 

many areas within its domain of responsibility. 

I would be very happy to take back and work with my colleagues 

and talk with them about possibilities for that future mandate, in 

addition to consolidating and continuing the very important role 

that it has right now. 

And I know it is making—I am really happy that it is making 

a difference on both sides of the border. That was its intention 

when it was established, and it took a few years to get going. But 

I am happy that it is now fully active and engaged. 

Senator UDALL. Great. Well, that is good to hear. Changing direction and focusing a little bit on what I believe Senator Menendez focused earlier on the Merida Initiative, do you think we 

should be worried as a country with Mexico headed into this 2012 

Presidential election about possible changes or change in position 

by their government on the Merida Initiative? We heard from the 

parliamentarians, and they seem to be very strong on the fact that 

they thought whoever was elected based on positions already 

taken, that there would be solid support. 

But I am wondering what your thoughts are on this, and do you 

see changes in the making? Are you going to be going to Mexico 

with the idea of influencing the process so that we have—obviously 

not getting involved in the Presidential election, but doing what 

you can to make sure that we have solid support there from any 

administration? 

Ambassador WAYNE. Well, certainly if confirmed, Senator, I will 

look forward to meeting with the range of political leaders and actors in Mexico and discussing as the primary point that will come 

up, of course, our ongoing cooperation, and the importance of that 

526

cooperation, the good that has been done in that, and the challenges ahead. 

I have heard the same thing in my initial consultations that you 

heard from your Mexican congressional colleagues, that there is a 

strong consensus that this effort needs to continue. There has been 

criticism, as I understand, of course, of the level of violence, but I 

have not heard of any alternative strategies that have been put forward. 

I think that if confirmed, I will very much try to do is to maintain and strengthen the consensus for our cooperation in this battle 

against transnational criminal organizations. And I think there, of 

course, since Mexico is really on the front line here in this shared 

effort, that is a very strong interest across the political spectrum 

in continuing this effort. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. And just a quick question here to 

Mr. Chacon. 

As you are aware, the Guatemalan people have a chronic malnutrition problem with their children, and it is persistent, and it 

has a strong ethnic and geographic dimensions. The relative level 

is 69 percent in indigenous populations and 35 percent nonindigenous. 

How will proposed cuts to USAID impact the efforts to combat 

hunger and poverty in Guatemala? 

Mr. CHACON. Thank you, Senator. You are so right about the 

shocking statistics about chronic child malnutrition in our hemisphere, worse than even in the African Continent. This is an area 

that our USAID mission targets very, very carefully and seriously. 

We have some $97 million devoted to assistance to such programs 

so that we can attack the underlying problems that really account 

for many of Guatemala’s issues. 

Three Presidential initiatives. One is Feed the Future, a very important and effective and well-funded program. Obviously we would 

love to have more resources, but the resources that we have, I 

think we are able to make an important impact. We do have an 

international global health initiative as well that affects and serves 

this population. But if confirmed, I will ensure that our taxpayer 

dollars are spent very effectively in this most important area. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. And sorry for running over a bit. Appreciate your courtesies. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. And, again, thank you both for your 

willingness to do this. 

Let me touch upon something I talked about with both of you 

when we met individually, and that was trafficking in persons, 

which I think is a global problem. It is not an issue just in Mexico, 

Guatemala, or the Western Hemisphere. It is a global problem. 

What I am concerned about, and I know you have shared that 

as well, is that this demand for trafficking in persons is combined 

with the dysfunctional immigration policy that we have in this 

country, and the presence of transnational criminal organization in 

the region that facilitate this. I hope this will be a priority for both 

of you. 

527

First, is that something you think could be a cornerstone of our 

involvement and our engagement with these governments? And, 

second, any ideas you may have now or in the future—I know you 

mentioned in your opening statements about people-to-people contacts and the implications that has had on human smuggling. But 

any thoughts you could share with us about what we can do on this 

end of the equation to make that a priority issue. 

Ambassador WAYNE. Senator, thank you very much. I fully agree 

with the priority that you have suggested on trafficking in persons. 

When I was Ambassador to Argentina, this was one of my highest 

priorities, and I was very, very pleased that working with Argentine officials and civil society, we did make some significant 

progress in that country in taking on this problem. 

It is a very, very serious problem for Mexico, for its Central 

American neighbors. The Government of Mexico recognizes that 

trafficking is a serious problem. It has taken steps to stop traffickers, to prosecute them, to assist victims. But there is more 

clearly that needs to be done. 

Right now, the capacity needs to be bolstered in Mexico. There 

is very good will, and there are very good individuals. Secretary 

Clinton recently recognized a prosecutor from Mexico for her efforts 

to get the first convictions in trafficking cases. 

What I can say is that we need to continue to be good partners. 

Sometimes that is providing technical assistance, training, sometimes equipment, and encouragement. But the real efforts, of 

course, has to be on the part of the Mexican officials to strengthen 

their practices to get all of their law enforcement people, really to 

give this the priority that it deserves. And it is going to be an ongoing effort, and if confirmed, it will be a priority for me. 

Mr. CHACON. Senator, I would echo Ambassador Wayne comments about this being a high, high priority for me if confirmed. 

Guatemala has come a ways in improving their record. They were 

on a Tier Two Watch List, and they are now at a Tier Two. And 

that is because the government financed shelter for adults and primarily women that they constructed in the last year that has gone 

a long way to addressing this problem. 

Too often when we look at security initiatives, I think we overlook the gender perspective. And I am grateful to our Congress that 

has encouraged legislative reforms in Guatemala to bring Guatemala into line with international standards regarding discrimination, violence against women. 

Guatemala is under funding the units necessary for investigating 

these horrible crimes, and in particular child sex tourism is something they need to pay more close attention to. 

Again, if confirmed, this is an area that my team and I will be 

actively engaged in. 

Senator RUBIO. Interrelated to that is the issue that, or course, 

I think domestically often dominates the conversation with regards 

to Mexico, but I think all of Central America, and that is these 

issues regarding migration. Obviously the border issue is an important one, but what we have in the region more than just a border 

is a corridor, a migration corridor, that extends throughout Central 

America. 

528

I want to put aside the legal aspects of it for a moment, and 

these are all very important. Border security is important. Adherence to the law is important. The economic impacts of immigration, 

positive and negative, are important. 

I want to focus for a second on the human aspect of it and the 

humanitarian aspect of it, because the things that are happening 

in that corridor, along that desert on both sides of that border from 

a human perspective, are atrocious. You have individuals that are 

dying in the desert, people that are being preyed upon by gangs 

and others in the region. 

I recently read a couple of reports that cite something that just 

chills up my spine where right before making the journey, some 

women stop and get access to birth control medication because they 

expect to be raped in that transition point. Whether it ends up happening or not, that is the expectation. This is a humanitarian issue 

of extraordinary proportions, and I think it will be a major issue 

we will both confront. 

An honest assessment of it is that both sides of the border have 

contributed to this problem. I wanted to see any insight you have 

right now on what are the drivers behind this, because for someone 

to submit themselves to this sort of horrifying process, the drivers 

behind it have to be significant. 

And I understand what the domestic drivers are here on this end 

of it, and we have to focus on those in an honest way. I am interested in any perspective you have now, or maybe you can share in 

the future once you are in your posts, because this has to be confronted. The humanitarian aspect of this has to be confronted holistically. And I was hoping you could share any thoughts you have 

on that because I do think that will be an important point moving 

forward. 

Ambassador WAYNE. Senator, obviously you are correct, the humanitarian costs and suffering that go on both from Mexican immigrants and from Central American immigrants trying to pass 

through Mexico and come into the United States deserve our full 

attention. 

The drivers of these movements I want to get in place in Mexico, 

if you confirm me, first before giving you a full view. But clearly 

there is economic opportunity. There is not seeing the prospect for 

your future in your home area that really does drive people to try 

and make this long, and as you say, they often know it is going to 

be a perilous journey. 

I have read several studies in preparing for this hearing that 

have noted how the flows from Mexico have actually dropped off 

over the past several years. And they have cited three or four different reasons for that: one, the economic downturn in the United 

States; two, the steps that we have taken to reinforce a presence 

at the border; three, the challenges of the dangers along the way; 

and then, four, some of the alternative opportunities that are available in Mexico for education and for jobs. 

And I think this needs to remain a priority area of attention for 

us, and I will be very happy after I have been on the ground for 

a while, if you all give me the nod, to share some more thoughts 

with you about that. 

529

Mr. CHACON. Senator, you raise a very, very important issue. I 

think some of the drivers, certainly with respect to Guatemala, is 

the fact that it has one of the most unequal income distributions 

in the world, I think number 12. Fifty-one percent of the country 

lives in poverty, and 74 percent of that number involve the indigenous. 

This is why we are seeking to have an integrated strategic approach, regional approach to this problem. As you know, Secretary 

Clinton was recently in Guatemala for an important security conference. But in addition to the seven Central American Presidents, 

you had the President of Mexico and the President of Colombia 

there. I think that was an important signal that there is a shared 

responsibility, and that the countries need to work together to promote the respect for human lives and the rule of law. And if confirmed, I will ensure that our programs are targeted for those that 

are the most affected by the poverty in Guatemala. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. Let me return to you, Ambassador. 

First of all, is it your view that the border between the United 

States and Mexico is a shared responsibility? 

Ambassador WAYNE. Yes, sir. There is a northward and southward flow. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And in that respect, to what extent has the 

controversy surrounding ATF’s Fast and Furious operation created 

challenges in our bilateral efforts, particularly to combat firearms 

trafficking? 

Ambassador WAYNE. Well, I have been, of course up until now, 

an observer, as you are, or even less than you are because you are 

an elected Member of the Senate. But clearly there has been a critical reaction in Mexico to the reports about this operation. And 

clearly there is a controversy in the United States upon the reports 

of this operation. But all I know about it, very honestly, is what 

I have read in the press. 

Senator MENENDEZ. If you are confirmed by the Senate, would 

you tell this committee that you will take control at your Embassy 

of ensuring that you are informed of any operations that take place 

by ATF or any other entity as it relates to such operations like 

Fast and Furious? 

Ambassador WAYNE. Yes, sir. I am a strong believer in Chief of 

Mission authority. I am a strong believer that there needs to be 

transparency on any operations by U.S. Government agencies with 

the ambassador within the country of responsibility. And not only 

because of the ambassador’s responsibility, but for the effectiveness 

of these operations. There needs to be transparency. There needs 

to be an understanding of what is planned and a discussion of the 

possible pros and cons of any said operation before it is undertaken. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Turning to a different page—this is part of 

your expertise—how do we strengthen what are already very 

strong economic ties with Mexico? Mexico’s growth rate is something we would like to see actually take place here. How do we 

strengthen those ties and enhance upon, at the same that we have 

all of these border issues, including cross border commercial traffic? 

530

Ambassador WAYNE. Well, one of the priorities under the Merida 

Initiative is creating a 21st century border. And as part of that initiative, we have set up several mechanisms actually to start looking at the border from the point of view of increasing efficiency in 

addition to increasing security. And looking at the plans for improving infrastructure, looking at ways in which you might not 

have 2-hour delays by having different procedures that can allow 

certain kind of goods that might be precleared, passed through in 

a faster way. 

That work is going on right now precisely with one of the goals 

being increasing the efficiency, the competitiveness, of that border 

for both partners. 

Of course, in addition, the dialogue that we have Mexican officials and between private sectors with the American and Mexican 

investors on both sides of the border, to get their perception as to 

what things could help our competitiveness. 

There is a regulatory dialogue, for example, that is now going on 

to look at regulations on both sides that may be impeding travel, 

and is there a way to make those regulations more harmonious so 

that businesses on both sides can function more efficiently? And I 

think it is these kind of dialogues to identify the specific steps that 

we can take that can help increase efficiencies. 

And once you have these dialogues going on, also you start picking up what are the key issues that need to be addressed, even if 

they cannot be fixed in the next 6 months? What do you need to 

have as your agenda over the several years ahead? And I look forward to participating and encouraging that kind of dialogue also. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And one final question before I turn to Mr. 

Chacon. I do not want you to feel as if no attention it’s being paid 

to you. 

Let me ask you, even as we applaud the Mexican Government’s 

efforts to take on the narcotics cartels, the reality is, there is always potential for abuses of human rights. In that respect, the 

Mexican military, the federal police have become primary recipients of U.S. security assistance. And yet, there is an alarming, 

growing volume of human rights complaints, of abuses, that include arbitrary detention, torture, and unlawful killings allegedly 

committed by members of the Mexican military. 

Will you as the Ambassador pay significant attention to these 

issues working with Mexican authorities? 

Ambassador WAYNE. Yes, sir, I will, definitely. Human rights has 

to be a high priority. I believe it is a high priority for many in Mexico also. And I know that we do have a vibrant and regular dialogue with Mexican officials when these allegations come forward. 

And I certainly will have that as a priority if I am confirmed. 

Thank you. 

Senator RUBIO. Mr. Chacon, I have been very interested in the 

reality that as we support Merida we sort of like squeeze the balloon at one end, and then it pops out at the end. That means Central America and, of course, Guatemala at the forefront of that. 

I am worried that, notwithstanding CARSI, that capacity to be 

able to deal with the challenge by Central American governments 

certainly, and Guatemala as a prime example of it, is challenged. 

How do we help the Guatemalans build up its capacity to confront 

531

the threat that is already within its midst, and do it in a way that 

makes a significant difference? 

If you were there, what would you view as priorities and recommendations to the committee to be able to effectuate this in a 

more powerful way? 

Mr. CHACON. Thank you, Senator. I think fundamentally the 

challenges to create safe streets so that Guatemalans can live in 

their neighborhoods, their children can go to school, they can take 

public transportation without, you know, facing, you know, these 

horrible criminal acts against them. And to do that, we need to 

continue to work on many different fronts. 

As you know, the effect of the balloon requires an integrated regional strategy. We cannot just look at Guatemala in a vacuum. We 

are paying particular attention to the northern triangle countries 

of Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala because the threat is 

transnational in nature. They are very similar and have similar 

challenges. 

That means getting at the networks and the nodes of the criminals and the contraband that have effected these countries. It 

means supporting government accountability. There are a couple of 

successful projects in Guatemala of community policing where you 

have the input of community, and it’s working well in a couple of 

the areas where it has been tried. Again, it is a matter of giving 

the Guatemalan people confidence. 

To be sure, Guatemala needs to reestablish a state presence in 

areas that are vulnerable, and that can be both in Guatemala City 

neighborhoods, urban neighborhoods, as well as in remote areas. 

But they need to do a better job of projecting and improving their 

security so that in fact they can provide the social services to these 

areas that need them so much. 

And finally, again, they need to coordinate and cooperate with 

their neighbors. And this is a shared responsibility. They need to 

devote more resources themselves because we are a partner in this 

effort, and without their political will, we cannot accomplish what 

we need to. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I appreciate those answers, particularly the statements about having and working with the Guatemalans to have their access toward all of their whole country. I 

note unfortunately in the northern Peten region of Guatemala, 27 

laborers on May 14 were slaughtered and decapitated by members 

of the international criminal band known as Las Zetas. And this 

is an example unfortunately of the challenge that exists. 

So, if confirmed, I would really appreciate your input as to what 

are the capacity issues and our ability to strengthen capacity. I am 

totally for working in the regional context in Central America, but 

working regionally without capacity individually is a problem. And 

so, I look forward to hearing your insights when you are on the 

ground as it relates to that. 

Mr. CHACON. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me ask you two other questions, and 

then I will stop. Human rights has been an issue here. Outgoing 

Ambassador McFarland has been vocal in his support for human 

rights and for victims of human rights violations, even accompanying victims to their trials. And his active engagement has been 

532

very highly acclaimed and valued by Guatemalan civil society organizations. Would you continue to make that a priority of your ambassadorship should you be confirmed? 

Mr. CHACON. Absolutely, Senator. That is what distinguishes us 

from the world, the fact that we promote sincerely respect for 

human rights and rule of the law. And that will be my highest priority to continue in that tradition. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Finally, we have presidential elections coming up, and to me as one observer, both of them raise some concern 

about Guatemala’s democracy moving forward. Otto Perez Molina 

was a general during the counterinsurgency campaign in the 

1980s, and he was director of military intelligence in the 1990s. 

Human rights groups have raised questions about his ties to death 

squads and his pledge to combat crime with a mano dura (an iron 

fist). At the same time, he is also known for efforts to advocate for 

legal and security reform and for his role as a military negotiator 

for the peace accords. So, I look at an individual with two different 

trajectories, and I wonder which one is going to appear should he 

be elected president. 

On the other hand, Sandra Torres, who is in a—I do not know 

whether she will be a candidate or not based upon the supreme 

court’s decisions. But what does the message of the election of either candidate send about the country’s commitment to democracy, 

security, and human rights? 

Mr. CHACON. Senator, since Guatemala’s return to democracy in 

1985, they have had some six elections that were characterized as 

free and fair. In a country with a troubled past, I think that is a 

significant accomplishment. I think it speaks to their commitment 

to democracy. It is imperfect. 

We urge the candidates to run responsible campaigns, to abstain 

from inflammatory rhetoric that could incite violence, and to abide 

by all of the applicable rules of the electoral process. Underpinning 

our support for democracy, there again, is making very clear, reiterating time and again the importance of respect for human rights 

in whatever that they do. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Yes, Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Ambassador Wayne, finally, the long-standing 

trucking dispute between the United States and Mexico has been 

resolved. If you can, describe what problems remain there with the 

resolution. Has the truck situation flowed freely, or are there obstructions that you will need to work on? 

Ambassador WAYNE. Well, Senator, you are correct that this has 

been a longstanding and difficult issue. And I was very happy to 

see on July 6th the signing of an agreement to move toward resolving these differences. 

As you know, Mexico had put a number of retaliatory tariffs in 

place, in fact, more than 2 billion dollars’ worth of tariffs. And as 

part of the agreement, they will remove those tariffs on U.S. goods, 

including, I believe, probably some agricultural goods from your 

State. So, we are very happy with that. They will be cut in half 

immediately, and they will disappear within a few months. 

The new program is still a limited program, and it has specific 

conditions on it. And this was designed, I am told, after consultations with Members of Congress, with safety advocates, with indusVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00540 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
533

try representatives, and others who raised a wide range of concerns. 

So, for example, the trucks will be required to comply with all 

Federal motor vehicle safety standards, and they must have electronic monitoring systems to track compliance. 

The Department of Transportation will review the complete driving record of each driver and require drug testing with samples to 

be analyzed by the Department of Health and Human Services at 

certified laboratories in the United States. 

The Department will also require drivers to undergo an assessment of their ability to understand the English language and read 

our traffic signs. And the agreement assures that U.S. carriers can 

have reciprocal rights in the United States. 

I think the need right now is to just start implementing the 

agreement to see that it works well in practice, and helps address 

the concerns that have been expressed in the United States from 

some sectors. But it is, I think, an important step forward, and it 

should be, I hope, if all goes well, a boost to our bilateral economic 

relationship. 

Senator LUGAR. I appreciate your explaining that in detail as a 

part of our hearing record because it is very important that we 

work closely, and that will be your responsibility if confirmed to 

make certain that all of these details and requirements are met, 

likewise, that that tariffs are reduced. And so that much we have 

hoped for in terms of our trade with Mexico will not be obstructed. 

Ambassador WAYNE. Exactly. 

Senator LUGAR. But I join you in relief that some progress has 

been made and that an agreement is important. 

Without getting into difficulties here, and this may be an issue 

essentially for you to discuss. But what can be done really to bridge 

differences that were caused by the expulsion of Ambassador 

Pascual from Mexico? What lingering issues lie from that situation? 

Ambassador WAYNE. Well, I think what is essential is that we 

do have a relationship where we can be frank and that we have 

confidence in each other. And what I can report, it is my understanding that a kind of cooperation on a range of issues has continued during this period of time, and has continued with good results, as is evidenced by the trucking agreement. 

It will certainly be my intention, if confirmed, to work to build 

that kind of a relation of confidence with President Calderon and 

his administration, with other political actors in the country, with 

civil society, and to reach out in as many ways as possible to have 

a good dialogue with key members of Mexico’s society, and to use 

that to strengthen the relationship that we have between us. 

Very fortunately, the relationship is so big and so strong and so 

important that it does continue. But as you well know, even in 

these big strong relationships, it needs good tending along the way 

by many different people. And I look forward, with your approval, 

to being one of those good tenders. 

Senator LUGAR. Finally, in addition to an election that will be 

held in the United States for the Presidency in 2012, there will be 

an election held in Mexico in 2012. 

Ambassador WAYNE. Right. 

534

Senator LUGAR. And at least initially, in some of the campaign 

oratory, if one can project that far along, there have been at least 

some fears in the United States that the contenders would take the 

Merida Initiative less seriously or somehow move away from the 

intensity of leadership in this area that President Calderon has exemplified. Is this the case, or do you have any feel for electoral politics and the trend of affairs, because clearly if there was some 

downplaying of this cooperation with regard to gang warfare and 

so forth, that would be very, very sad for both of our countries. 

Ambassador WAYNE. Senator, I agree with you. As you know 

much better than I, once you get into an election, you are not sure 

where the issues will take you and where the candidates will place 

themselves. 

In my understanding so far, certainly there has——

Senator MENENDEZ. That is a very diplomatic way of saying that. 

[Laughter.] 

Ambassador WAYNE. That is 36 years of training in there, sir. 

[Laughter.] 

Ambassador WAYNE. My understanding so far, there has, of 

course, been criticism as well as support for the current efforts. But 

I have not, in my queries to date, have not seen anybody who has 

put forward an alternative plan to the good cooperation that is 

going on and the basic strategy that is going on. There will no 

doubt be some candidates that will be critical. 

I think the job of all of us, partially me as Ambassador and all 

of us who care about the relationship and have dialogued with 

Mexican officials and members of that society, in the months ahead 

will be to stress the importance of this cooperation. And then try 

to determine where the basis of consensus is across the spectrum 

for this important cooperation. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, your efforts in this respect will be tremendously important. 

I just wanted to conclude by saying that I appreciate the service 

that both of you have given to our country, and likewise to the relationships between the United States and the nations in which you 

have served. And I look forward to supporting both of you very 

strongly as diplomats of stature and people who I believe will have 

the confidence of the American people, and should likewise have 

the confidence of Mexicans and Guatemalans. 

Thank you for your appearance today. 

Ambassador WAYNE. Thank you very much. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Lugar. Let me just finish off on a point Senator Lugar made. 

Of course we recognize the sovereign right of Mexico’s people to 

decide their country’s course and future. I would say, however, that 

regardless who controls a majority in Mexico after the next elections, Mexico’s sovereignty is challenged not from the outside, but 

from within. And it would be an enormous setback to see an effort 

that would allow the cartels to act with impunity inside of Mexico, 

and of great concern to many of us in the United States Congress. 

But I trust that at the end of the day, the great leaders in Mexico 

will understand that their country’s future will either be determined by its people or determined by the drug lords. And I think 

it will choose their people instead. 

535

I appreciate both of your testimonies. 

The record will remain open for another 48 hours for any member who wishes to ask questions in writing. If you do receive a 

question, I would urge you to answer it expeditiously so the committee can move forward in the process of your confirmation hearing. 

And seeing no other members, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR EARL ANTHONY WAYNE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RICHARD LUGAR

Question. Please explain how, if confirmed, you intend to monitor the use of 

Merida Initiative resources to ensure that programs funded under the initiative are 

not used for military activities, which may be viewed as inconsistent with the promotion of human rights in Mexico.

Answer. The Merida Initiative supports Mexico and the Mexican Government’s 

commitment to improving respect for human rights. The United States and Mexico 

regularly discuss human rights concerns at all levels of government. 

In addition to the human rights components that are integrated into Merida Initiative training, other U.S. agencies also support programs to promote human 

rights. For example, the United States conducts human rights training and education for police, prosecutors, and other officials to promote implementation of international human rights standards. This program includes participation in a master’s 

program in human rights for 300 police officials, with the curriculum structured for 

law enforcement. Additionally, security assistance has been used to train mid- and 

senior-level Mexican military leaders on human rights while operating against a 

nontraditional foe. 

The U.S. Government is committed to continuing to work with Mexico to make 

sure that efforts to improve respect for human rights in the military and police are 

institutionalized. For example, the U.S.-Mexico Bilateral Human Rights Dialogue 

meets periodically to discuss the promotion of human rights in Mexico’s security 

forces. In this dialogue, the United States provides expertise and shares lessons 

learned on issues such a military justice reform, codes of conduct and rules of engagement, and transparency and public information-sharing techniques. For the 

United States, the U.S. Chief of Mission and Under Secretary for North America 

chair meetings, with the participation of senior DOD civilian and uniformed 

officials. 

As required by U.S. law, the Department of State vets security force personnel 

receiving U.S. assistance or training to ensure there is no credible allegation of 

human rights violations committed by those individuals. The U.S. Government will 

continue to do so. 

The Office of Defense Cooperation at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City is responsible for monitoring the equipment provided to the Mexican military as part of its 

normal interaction with their counterparts. 

Additionally, if it were alleged that programs funded under the Merida Initiative 

were used for military activities, which may be inconsistent with the promotion of 

human rights in Mexico, U.S. authorities would follow up immediately to ensure 

proper use of U.S.-supported programs. 

If confirmed, I would remain committed to the promotion of human rights through 

our Merida Initiative programs to both the military and civilian sectors of the Mexican Government.

Question. Please explain your views regarding accusations that the Calderon administration has not been as tough on the Sinaloa Cartel as with other cartels.

Answer. President Calderon has publicly stated that the Mexican Government 

will aggressively pursue and bring to justice all transnational criminal organizations 

operating within Mexican borders. 

Under President Calderon’s leadership, 29 drug cartel bosses and numerous lower 

level criminals have been removed, including Sinaloa cartel leaders Ignacio Coronel 

Villareal, in July 2010, Hector Eduardo Guajardo Hernandez, ‘‘El Guicho,’’ in May 

2011, and Martin Beltran Coronel, ‘‘The Eagle,’’ in May 2011. The Mexican Government continues to investigate and combat transnational criminal organizations. 

536

We admire the work and determination of President Calderon and are doing what 

we can to support the brave efforts of his government and the Mexican people to 

combat all transnational criminal organizations operating in Mexico. 

The United States and Mexico have intensified law enforcement cooperation and 

we remain committed to supporting the Mexican Government’s efforts to disrupt 

and dismantle criminal organizations in Mexico. 

This unprecedented level of cooperation between our two governments has made 

an important contribution to Mexico’s ability to apprehend leaders of transnational 

criminal organizations and to counter the transnational criminal threat to Mexico 

and the United States. It is a fundamental part of the U.S. commitment to meet 

its coresponsibility for the threats of transnational crime. 

This intense level of cooperation is in the interests of both the United States and 

Mexico, and we intend to sustain it.

Question. Please explain your views regarding allegations that Mexico’s Secretary 

of Public Security Genaro Garcia Luna is linked to organized crime.

Answer. The Department of State takes all allegations of links to organized crime 

seriously. If confirmed, I will also take such allegations very seriously and the U.S. 

Embassy team will follow up appropriately. 

President Calderon is leading Mexico’s courageous efforts to combat transnational 

criminal organizations and their brutal violence. He has mobilized his entire government on this effort and has demonstrated a strong commitment to anticorruption 

and professionalization initiatives. 

The United States and Mexico have expanded our bilateral cooperation to combat 

organized crime significantly. A central player in President Calderon’s efforts is the 

Public Security Secretariat (SSP) headed by Secretary Garcia Luna. Secretary Garcia Luna is a career law enforcement officer, under whose leadership, the SSP has 

become a more effective and professional civilian law enforcement institution. Cooperating with the U.S. Government through the Merida Initiative, Garcia Luna has 

welcomed U.S. training for a new generation of college-educated federal police investigators at the SSP academy in San Luis Potosi. The United States has worked with 

Garcia Luna’s team to provide advanced IT systems support to Plataforma Mexico, 

the SSP’s national crime database. We have transferred helicopters and other nonlethal materiel that SSP has used to prosecute its frontal assault against the 

Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs). In August 2010, Garcia Luna purged 

one-tenth of all federal police officers (3,200 out of 34,500) for failing lie-detector, 

toxicology, and other exams. 

Mexico is overhauling many parts of its law enforcement and judicial systems to 

fight corruption, improve transparency, ensure respect for human rights and the 

rule of law, and increase civilian involvement. 

Internal controls across the Government of Mexico’s federal agencies are being implemented to help minimize corruption and improve government effectiveness. 

These long-term reforms will strengthen a culture of lawfulness able to thwart corruption and improve governance.

Question. Mexico decreased the value of its retaliatory tariffs by half on July 8, 

after the United States and Mexico signed an MOU to implement the new crossborder trucking pilot program. Mexico has promised to lift the remaining 50 percent 

of the tariffs when the pilot program actually begins (i.e., when the first Mexican 

trucking company gets provisional authority to operate under the pilot program). 

Administration officials have said this would not happen before the ‘‘first weeks of 

August 2011’’ but there are still a lot of procedural steps that have to complete before then. Is the administration still on track to meet that goal of mid-August, or 

is there a new estimate of when the pilot program would become operational (and 

the tariffs completely suspended)?

Answer. Shortly after the signing of the MOU on July 6, the U.S. Federal Motor 

Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) received and is now evaluating several applications from Mexican long-haul carriers to participate in the new cross-border 

trucking pilot program. There are several administrative actions that must take 

place before FMCSA can grant authority to a Mexican carrier. These include: the 

Department of Transportation’s Inspector General concluding a review of FMCSA’s 

preparations for the pilot program; FMCSA issuing a Report to Congress outlining 

steps it is taking to address any issues identified in the Inspector General’s report; 

FMCSA conducting an extensive preauthority safety audit (PASA) to verify an applicant’s suitability for expanded operations on U.S.roads; and FMCSA providing public notice of the results of the audit. We are told by FMCSA that these actions are 

expected to take approximately 60 days. 

537

According to the terms of the MOU signed with Mexico, the remaining 50 percent 

of the retaliatory tariffs against U.S. products will be removed once FMCSA approves the first Mexican company for participation in the program. Decisions on the 

first group of applicants are expected by early September. If one of the applicants 

passes the preauthority safety audit and is approved for participation in the program, the tariffs would be suspended at that time, even if actual trucking operations 

do not begin immediately. 

RESPONSES OF ARNOLD CHACON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RICHARD LUGAR

Question. For the past 4 years, the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala has been involved 

in assisting families who were in the process of adopting Guatemalan children when 

the Government of Guatemala changed its international adoption law. While a large 

number of these ‘‘transition families’’ have successfully completed their adoptions, 

there are approximately 400 U.S. citizens whose adoptions have not yet been completed. These families have undergone considerable burden and expense in trying 

to complete these adoptions and even worse, the children they had hoped to adopt 

have spent an additional 4 years in an orphanage. Can you explain how you might 

lead the U.S. Embassy in resolving these cases?

Answer. If confirmed, I commit to leading the Embassy’s efforts to urge Guatemalan authorities to resolve pending cases. I would do so by supporting and encouraging the Guatemalan Government’s continued but expeditious investigation of 

pending adoption cases and by calling for specific measures toward case resolution. 

I would urge Guatemalan authorities to separate ongoing investigations into criminal rings from individual adoption cases wherever possible and focus Guatemalan 

resources on concluding the cases. Resolving these pending cases will be one of my 

top priorities, if confirmed.

Question. During her most recent visit to the United States, the head of the Guatemalan central authority, the CNA, shared that she would like to explore implementing a pilot program that would allow international adoption to resume in Guatemala, but only for those children who are unable to find a home in Guatemala. 

She shared that there are approximately 300 cases of older, special needs children 

and children who are members of larger sibling groups which international adoption 

could find homes for. Can you explain what the U.S. position would be on the development of such a program?

Answer. In November 2009, the CNA announced a limited 2-year pilot program 

that would have resumed intercountry adoption of a small number of identified 

older children, groups of siblings, and children with special needs, under a new 

Hague-compliant process. The United States submitted a letter of interest in the 

program in December 2009. However, the United States withdrew our letter of interest on October 5, 2010, due to continuing concerns about fraud and corruption 

in the Guatemalan adoption process, a lack of information regarding controls and 

safeguards in place for the pilot program, and the lack of a Hague-compliant system. 

Since then, the CNA has demonstrated no progress toward implementing a pilot 

program with a Hague-compliant process. The Department of State would welcome 

movement toward the development of a transparent Hague Adoption Convention 

compliant pilot program, and stands ready to work with the CNA toward that goal, 

in the best interest of the children. 

While the Department of State would welcome implementation of a Haguecomplaint pilot program in the future, the remaining pending transition cases are 

our top priority. We continue to call for the prompt resolution of the remaining 

pending cases. We support the Guatemalan Government’s continued and thorough 

investigation of pending adoption cases, and we have urged Guatemalan authorities 

to focus resources on concluding them, and to separate the criminal investigations 

of adoption fraud from the evaluation of the children’s eligibility for adoption wherever possible.

Question. According to news reports, the United States and Guatemala are negotiating a ‘‘labor action plan’’ to address U.S. claims that Guatemala has failed to adequately enforce its labor laws, which Guatemala is required to do under CAFTA. 

Why is the United States pursuing this action plan instead of seeking binding arbitration under CAFTA?

Answer. As you know, the United States Government requested consultations 

with the Government of Guatemala in July 2010 regarding its apparent failure to 

effectively enforce its labor laws as required by the CAFTA–DR. Throughout conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00545 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
538

sultations, the United States has urged Guatemala to take significant and concrete 

actions to address what the United States considered to be systemic weaknesses in 

its enforcement of labor laws. While Guatemala has taken some positive steps over 

the past several months, its actions and proposals have been insufficient to resolve 

our concerns. 

In May 2011, the United States took the next step in the dispute settlement process by invoking a meeting of the Free Trade Commission under Chapter 20 of the 

CAFTA–DR. 

The Free Trade Commission meeting was held on June 7, and discussions continue with the Government of Guatemala about the significant and serious steps 

Guatemala needs to take to improve its labor law enforcement. If the Government 

of Guatemala fails to take these steps and our concerns are not resolved, the United 

States may pursue the matter further under the CAFTA–DR by requesting the establishment of a dispute settlement panel to consider the matter. If confirmed, it 

will be a priority of mine to continue to work with the government to ensure that 

workers’ rights are fully respected. 

RESPONSE OF AMBASSADOR EARL ANTHONY WAYNE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR. 

Question. Many supporters of NAFTA argued that its passage 16 years ago would 

improve the conditions for Mexican workers. The International Labor Organization 

and other labor groups continue to criticize conditions in Mexico, especially the repression of the National Union of Mineworkers. As Ambassador, what will you do 

to promote fundamental labor rights in Mexico?

Answer. Strengthening respect for worker rights around the world is critical to 

achieving the U.S. foreign policy goals of promoting democracy, human rights, free 

trade, and international development. In Mexico, the U.S. Government employs a 

number of tools to realize progress on worker rights and employment policy. 

Through consistent labor-related diplomacy, including by Embassy Mexico City’s 

Labor Officer, the United States advocates for worker rights directly with the Mexican Government. The administration engages with governmental and nongovernmental actors to monitor the protection of collective bargaining rights; use by 

employers of protection contracts negotiated between management and nonrepresentative unions; union organizing efforts; labor trafficking, especially of women, 

youths, and migrants; conditions for workers in Mexico’s large informal sector; and 

other issues. U.S. Ggovernment-supported programming in Mexico includes a labor 

rights strengthening program undertaken by the AFL–CIO’s Solidarity Center and 

an International Labor Organization initiative to improve efforts to combat child 

labor, especially in agriculture. The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) provides a mechanism for the United States (and Canada) to work 

regularly with Mexico on labor matters of mutual interest. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Embassy gives priority to promoting fundamental labor rights in Mexico using all of these tools, mechanisms, and contacts. 

(539)

NOMINATION 

THURSDAY, JULY 21, 2011

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

Sung Y. Kim, of California, to be Ambassador to the Republic of 

Korea 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:33 a.m., in Room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jim Webb presiding. 

Present: Senator Webb. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM WEBB,

U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA 

Senator WEBB. Good morning. The hearing will come to order. 

Today the committee will consider the nomination of Ambassador 

Sung Y. Kim to be the United States Ambassador to the Republic 

of Korea. 

As all of you will notice, I took the liberty of putting a map of 

Asia up here today. And I do this because sometimes when we look 

at different countries in Asia, we forget to think of them in the context of how they fit together politically, economically, and especially 

geographically. 

I’ve often said that Northeast Asia is the only place in the world 

where the interests of China, Russia, Japan, and the United States 

directly intersect. And in the middle of this is a divided Korean Peninsula with an erratic, volatile regime on one end, and a key strategic ally, economic partner, and democratic nation on the other. 

It’s important to remember that South Korea is the focal point 

for maintaining stability in this region, even as we work together 

to bring a lasting peace to this entire area. 

If we do not have stability in Northeast Asia, you cannot have 

stability anywhere else in Asia. And that underlines the vital importance of the relationship that the United States shares with 

South Korea. 

Last year, the United States and Korea commemorated the 60th 

anniversary of the start of the Korean war. I was fortunate to have 

had the opportunity to participate in remembrance activities here 

and in Korea that symbolized the incredible devotion of both countries to democracy, peace, and stability. 

Sixty years ago, East Asia was a vastly different region than it 

is today. Struggling to reorganize itself following World War II and 

540

the departure of major colonial powers, East Asia found itself at 

the nexus of the cold war competition between communism and 

democratic rule. 

The region held a great deal of uncertainty. The United States 

provided an important service in maintaining stability so that nations could recover from conflict, just as it provides an important 

service today in maintaining a strategic balance in this vital 

region. 

In 1950, when North Korea invaded South Korea, the United 

States and the rest of the international community faced a critical 

decision: To become involved or to lose the stability we had gained 

and allow a nascent democracy to fail. 

In the end, more than 33,000 American soldiers paid the ultimate price and another 100,000 were wounded during this 3-year 

conflict in an international but largely American effort to bring 

peace to the Korean Peninsula. These sacrifices forged a bond with 

the South Korean people that has not been forgotten and instead 

has flourished. 

Today, South Korea is one of the United States most important 

security allies and economic partners. We currently station 28,000 

American soldiers in Korea as a deterrent to aggression. South 

Korea contributes more than 40 percent of the cost of hosting these 

troops. 

It’s important to understand that these troops are deployed not 

only in defense of South Korea, but also to ensure America’s larger 

security needs as the most important stabilizing influence in East 

Asia. 

North Korea’s inventory of ballistic missiles currently exceeds 

800 airframes, which are capable of reaching targets not only in 

Korea, but also in Japan, the United States territory of Guam, and 

even the Aleutian Islands. The regime continues to research an 

intercontinental ballistic missile capability, in addition to its pursuit of nuclear weapons. 

Our close relationship with South Korea has demonstrated its 

value time and again in response to North Korean provocations, including last year’s sinking of the South Korean naval ship, the 

Cheonan, and its artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island. Our coordination with South Korea and our coordinated show of strength prevented further escalation of these incidents. 

Even as we look for openings to resume dialogue with North 

Korea, given that country’s unpredictability and opaqueness, this 

joint approach is essential to maintaining stability on the Korean 

Peninsula, ensuring that North Korea is not allowed to act with 

impunity. 

For this reason, I have supported resumption of food aid and 

other humanitarian assistance to North Korea only in strict coordination with our allies in the region—South Korea and Japan. This 

approach is also important for demonstrating to China, as North 

Korea’s closest diplomatic ally and largest trading partner, that it 

should exert its influence to bring about more responsible behavior 

from North Korea and to take positive action to bring about North 

Korea’s eventual denuclearization. 

Our security concerns and the strength of this alliance transcend 

the peninsula itself. South Korea, a country with a population of 

541

only 48 million, has transformed itself into a global economic power 

and a highly developed society. South Korea is now the world’s 

13th-largest economy. In 2010, our bilateral trade topped $86 billion, making South Korea the United States seventh-largest trading partner. 

Unfortunately, the success of this economic relationship has been 

tempered in recent years by our inability here in Washington to 

complete a free trade agreement with South Korea. Our two governments signed an agreement in 2007. Four years later, it has yet 

to be ratified. 

It should be emphasized that this is an agreement between two 

mature economies. New export opportunities in the agreement can 

generate good-paying American jobs and contribute to our economic 

recovery. 

Just as importantly, this agreement demonstrates our ability to 

follow through on commitments to free trade and to cement our 

role as a guarantor of stability in East Asia. 

Upon returning from a visit to Korea last June, I called for a 

swift resolution of outstanding concerns with this agreement. The 

administration resolved those concerns in December. 

At this point, the agreement is in the hands of Congress. In my 

view, we should set aside minor differences and work together to 

gain swift passage of this vital trade agreement. And without passage, we, the United States, risk falling behind our trade competitors, losing economic benefits, and weakening an important strategic alliance. 

Ambassador Kim, I would like to welcome you today and point 

out the obvious: If confirmed, you will be representing the United 

States in South Korea at a critical time. 

Next year, South Korea will have National Assembly and Presidential elections, just as we will. China’s leadership will be undergoing a generational change. And North Korea has declared that 

2012 will be ‘‘a year of prosperity,’’ marking the 100th anniversary 

of the birth of Kim Il-sung. 

I look forward to hearing the testimony of our nominee, and welcome you, again, here today. 

And before receiving the testimony, I’d like to take a moment to 

introduce Ambassador Kim. And at this point, I’d also like to introduce, for the record, a statement that Senator Kerry, as chairman 

of the full committee, has submitted. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Kerry follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY, CHAIRMAN,

SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

Today, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee convenes to consider the nomination of Sung Kim to be the next U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea (ROK). 

Mr. Kim, our current Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear program, is a wise and deserving choice to be our country’s chief diplomat in 

South Korea. 

Over the course of his distinguished career in the Foreign Service, Mr. Kim has 

served in many positions that have prepared him well for this job, including the 

Director of the Office of Korean Affairs, Political-Military Unit Chief in Embassy 

Seoul, and Economics Officer there. A Korean American who speaks fluent Korean, 

Mr. Kim will be able to interact confidently with the South Korean Government and 

people. If confirmed, he would be the first American of Korean heritage to serve our 

country in this post—a testament to the success of Korean immigrants who first 

began coming to the United States roughly 150 years ago. 

542

Mr. Kim’s deep expertise in Korean affairs will allow him to make a seamless 

transition with outgoing Ambassador Kathy Stephens. This is critically important, 

as alliances, like all relationships, need constant nurturing. If confirmed, Mr. Kim’s 

tenure as Ambassador will span elections and political transitions in South Korea 

and its neighbors. As South Korea prepares for National Assembly and Presidential 

elections next year, issues such as the reported release of ‘‘Agent Orange’’ dioxin on 

U.S. military bases in South Korea could threaten to derail cooperation, if not handled in a prompt, transparent manner and with proper humility. I am glad that Mr. 

Kim seems to fully appreciate this reality. 

His near-term, to-do list will be full of tasks vital to advancing U.S. economic interests, as well as promoting regional peace and stability. Arguably job one will be 

to help facilitate the passage and implementation of the Korea-U.S. (KORUS) Free 

Trade Agreement. Congress should send Mr. Kim to Seoul with a ratified KORUS 

FTA. That would deliver a powerful message that the United States and South 

Korea are long-term strategic partners who are deeply invested in each other’s futures, and that the United States intends to remain a Pacific power. KORUS will 

create tens of thousands of new jobs in both our countries, lay the groundwork for 

further U.S. trade and investment in the most economically dynamic region on 

Earth, and reverse a disheartening trend where America’s regional rivals have been 

prospering at our expense. South Korea’s FTA with the European Union went into 

effect earlier this month, so U.S. companies are now effectively at a competitive disadvantage. We are running out of time. Congress must act now or leave South 

Korea’s own legislature with little time to pass the FTA before its April elections. 

At stake is nothing less than our national competitiveness and our national security. 

On the security front, the good news is that the U.S.–ROK alliance is as strong 

today as it has ever been. But the goal of building a lasting peace on the Korean 

Peninsula remains elusive. We must, on an urgent basis, explore steps that can reduce the threat posed by North Korea and return the North to a path toward 

denuclearization. Make no mistake: Given North Korea’s recent irresponsible conduct, staying in a diplomatic holding pattern invites a dangerous situation to get 

even worse. Apart from the security challenge posed by North Korea, we must also deal with 

an evolving humanitarian crisis there, as chronic food shortages threaten to morph 

into widespread famine. In consultation with Seoul, the United States should join 

with the European Union and other donors to fashion a carefully targeted aid program to feed the most vulnerable populations, provided that the DPRK permits robust monitoring. 

Finally, Mr. Kim will be charged with helping to build the global partnership envisioned by Presidents Obama and Lee Myung-bak in June 2009. South Korea is 

emerging as an important global actor, making valuable contributions to reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and the greening of our planet. Seoul’s hosting of the 

G20 summit last year, and the Nuclear Security Summit in 2012 shows that South 

Korea has arrived as a diplomatic force on the world stage. Its recent pledge to triple its overseas development budget by 2015—in an age of austerity no less—exemplifies South Korea’s growing global role. If confirmed, I hope Mr. Kim will work 

to continue this positive trend. 

I congratulate Sung Kim for being nominated to serve his country in this important role, and I commend the President for making such a wise choice. I urge my 

colleagues to speed Mr. Kim on his way to Seoul.

Senator WEBB. Ambassador Sung Kim is a career member of the 

Foreign Service, presently serving as a special envoy for the sixparty talks, leading the day-to-day engagement with the other sixparty countries. 

He has extensive experience with United States-Korean relations, serving as director of the Office of Korean Affairs at the 

State Department, political military unit chief at the U.S. Embassy 

in Korea, and as an economic officer at that Embassy. In addition, 

he has served in Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Japan. 

He graduated from the University of Pennsylvania and from Loyola University Law School, and also from the London School of Economics with a master of law. And prior to joining the Foreign Service, he was deputy district attorney in Los Angeles. 

Ambassador Kim brings a distinguished record to this position. 

There’s, I think, a great deal of enthusiasm for his confirmation. 

543

And, Ambassador, I welcome you, and I know you have some 

very special family members who are with you today. And if you’d 

like to introduce them and anyone else, friends or family, before 

you begin your testimony, we would be grateful to you for doing 

that. 

So, welcome and the floor is yours, sir. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SUNG Y. KIM, OF CALIFORNIA, TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 

Ambassador KIM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I’m deeply honored to be here before you as President Obama’s 

nominee to be the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea. I’m 

deeply grateful to the President and Secretary Clinton for the confidence they have shown in me. 

And if confirmed, I look forward to working very closely with this 

committee to strengthen our alliance and very special partnership 

with the Republic of Korea. 

Mr. Chairman, many people are responsible for me being here 

today. Throughout my public service, I have benefited greatly from 

distinguished mentors, generous colleagues, and smart and dedicated subordinates. I’m grateful that many of them are here with 

me today. 

As he has done throughout my life, my older brother is here to 

watch over me, to support me, and I’m grateful that he’s here. Most 

importantly, I want to express my special gratitude to my wife, 

Jae, and our two daughters, Erin and Erica. 

Diplomatic service is a special privilege, but it is not always easy 

for the family. And even though my daughters sometimes tell me 

to go out and get a real job, so that they can stop moving around, 

they’re always there for me, and I’m grateful. 

When my parents brought me to the United States over 35 years 

ago, they could not have imagined that I would have the opportunity to serve as the first Korean-American Ambassador to the 

Republic of Korea. But I do recall that from the very early days, 

my parents encouraged me to go into public service. They were 

very proud when I joined the Foreign Service and thrilled when I 

chose to focus on East Asia, especially South Korea. 

Having dedicated much of my professional life to the U.S.–ROK 

partnership, my hope is that, if confirmed, I will be able to draw 

on my experience and expertise to expand and enhance the bond 

between our two countries. 

In the space of a few decades, the Republic of Korea has emerged 

from a half-century of occupation, division, and war to join the top 

ranks of free and prosperous nations. This stunning achievement 

is testimony to the talent, determination, and sacrifices of several 

generations of Koreans. As a Korean-American, I deeply respect 

and appreciate what they have been able to accomplish. 

Part of this amazing success story, of course, is due to the strong 

and constructive partnership between our two countries. As we reflect on our shared history of sacrifice and success, and as we examine opportunities and challenges facing us, we are convinced 

that it is more important than ever to continue to strengthen our 

countries’ relationships. 

544

As President Obama said recently, ‘‘Our alliance has never been 

stronger than it is today.’’ But it can be better. And we are working 

on a number of initiatives to make it stronger and more balanced, 

with the ROK military assuming more responsibility for South Korean defense. 

We’re also realigning our basing arrangements to ensure that we 

are best able to meet the challenges of the 21st century. We want 

a smaller footprint that creates less of an impact on ROK civilians, 

but which provides the robust deterrent necessary to maintain 

peace and stability on the peninsula. 

I was personally involved in many of these initiatives in my earlier assignments, and, if confirmed, I will work very closely with 

the new U.S. Forces Korea Commander, General Thurman, to ensure smooth implementation. 

Our economic relationship with Korea is one of our most important. As you pointed out, Chairman, Korea is a trillion dollar economy and our seventh-largest trading partner. The U.S.-Korea Free 

Trade Agreement, pending passage by Congress and Korea’s National Assembly, will provide significant economic and strategic 

benefits for both countries. 

For the United States, this agreement will create substantial export opportunities for U.S. goods and services and support tens of 

thousands of export-related jobs in the United States. It will 

strengthen our economic partnership and lay an important foundation for the United States and Korea to work together to address 

regional and global challenges in the future. 

If confirmed, I will work closely with Korea, with Congress, and 

with U.S. Government agencies to ensure smooth implementation 

of the agreement, so that both countries can seize the important 

benefits that the agreement is to provide. 

Another central part of the U.S.–ROK partnership is our cooperation on challenges posed by North Korea. Having focused on this 

much of the past few years, I hope to continue to contribute to our 

common efforts to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and better lives for the long-suffering people of 

North Korea. 

Our two countries are also finding ways to cooperate on a wide 

variety of issues not directly related to trade or Korean Peninsula 

security. We work together in such diverse areas as counterpiracy 

operations off the coast of Somalia and post-conflict and disaster 

stabilization efforts in places like Haiti and Afghanistan. We also 

cooperate on green growth efforts to promote environmentally sustainable economic growth. 

These are the kinds of activities that bring solutions to common 

challenges facing the global community and the types of initiatives 

I hope to advance, if I’m confirmed. 

I also look forward to contributing to the already strong peopleto-people ties between our two countries. Just last year, nearly 

500,000 South Koreans took advantage of the Visa Waiver Program 

and traveled to the United States. In total, nearly 900,000 South 

Korean tourists and businessmen visited the United States last 

year, a 38-percent increase over the previous year. These recordbreaking numbers make Korean tourists the seventh-largest tourist 

group in the United States. 

545

As a Korean-American, the importance of these everyday contacts between Koreans and Americans has special resonance for 

me. 

Mr. Chairman, it would be the highest honor for me to serve our 

country as the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea. If confirmed, I will lead a complex and multiagency diplomatic mission 

consisting of 575 employees. I will do my very best to ensure that 

all members of that community and their families have the leadership, security, and support they need to get their jobs done. 

Thank you for considering my nomination. I look forward to your 

questions, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Kim follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUNG Y. KIM

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you 

as President Obama’s nominee to serve as Ambassador to the Republic of Korea 

(ROK). I am deeply grateful for the confidence that the President and Secretary 

Clinton have shown in me and if confirmed, I look forward to working closely with 

this committee to strengthen our alliance and very special partnership with the 

Republic of Korea. 

Many people are responsible for me being here today. Throughout my public service, I have benefited greatly from distinguished mentors, generous colleagues, and 

smart and dedicated subordinates. I am grateful that many of them are here with 

me today. Most importantly, I want to express my special gratitude and appreciation to my family—my wife, Jae, and our two daughters, Erin and Erica. Diplomatic 

service is a special privilege, but it is not always easy for the family. I am extremely 

grateful for their patience and support. 

When my parents brought me to the United States some 35 years ago, they could 

not have imagined that I would have the opportunity to serve as the first KoreanAmerican Ambassador to the Republic of Korea. But I do recall that from the very 

early days, my parents encouraged me to go into public service. They were so proud 

when I joined the Foreign Service and thrilled when I chose to focus on East Asia, 

especially Korea. Having dedicated much of my professional life to the U.S.–ROK 

partnership, my hope is that, if confirmed, I will be able to draw on my experience 

and expertise to expand and enhance the bond between our two countries. 

In the space of a few decades, the Republic of Korea emerged from a half-century 

of occupation, division, and war to join the top ranks of the world’s free and prosperous nations. This stunning achievement is testimony to the talent, determination, and sacrifices of several generations of Koreans. As a Korean-American, I 

deeply respect and appreciate what Koreans have been able to accomplish. Part of 

this amazing success story, of course, is due to the strong and constructive alliance 

and partnership between our two countries. 

Last year marked the 60th anniversary of the start of the Korean war. As we reflect on our shared history of sacrifice and success, and as we examine the regional 

and global opportunities and challenges, we are convinced that it is more important 

than ever to continue to strengthen and nurture our two countries’ partnership. 

As President Obama said recently, ‘‘our alliance has never been stronger than it 

is today.’’ But it can be even better. We are working on a number of initiatives to 

make it stronger and more balanced, with the ROK military assuming more responsibility for South Korean defense, including wartime operational control in 

2015. We are also realigning our basing arrangements to ensure that we are best 

able to meet the challenges of the 21st century. We want a smaller footprint that 

creates less of an impact on ROK civilians, but which provides the robust deterrent 

necessary to maintain peace on the Peninsula. I was personally involved in many 

of these initiatives during earlier assignments, and, if confirmed, I will work closely 

with the new U.S. Forces Korea Commander General Thurman to ensure smooth 

implementation. 

Our economic relationship with Korea is one of the world’s most important. Korea 

is a trillion dollar economy and our seventh-largest trading partner. The U.S.-Korea 

Free Trade Agreement, pending passage by Congress and Korea’s National Assembly, will provide significant economic and strategic benefits for both countries. For 

the United States, this agreement will create substantial export opportunities for 

U.S. goods and services and support tens of thousands of new export-related jobs 

in the United States. It will strengthen our economic partnership and lay an imporVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00553 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
546

tant foundation for the United States and Korea to work together closely to address 

regional and global economic challenges in the future. If confirmed, I will work 

closely with Korea and with Congress and other U.S. Government agencies to ensure smooth implementation of the agreement so that both countries can seize the 

important benefits the agreement is to provide. 

Another central part of the U.S.–ROK partnership is our cooperation on challenges posed by North Korea. Having focused on this much of the past few years, 

I hope to continue to contribute to our common efforts to achieve the verifiable 

denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and better lives for 

the long-suffering people of North Korea. If confirmed, I look forward to coordinating closely on negotiating strategy as well as efforts to deter provocative actions 

by North Korea. 

Our two countries are also finding ways to cooperate and collaborate on a wide 

variety of issues not directly related to trade or Korean Peninsula security. We work 

together in such diverse areas as counterpiracy operations off the coast of Somalia, 

post-conflict and disaster stabilization efforts in places like Haiti, where a ROK company is developing an industrial complex that will bring tens of thousands of jobs 

to Haiti, and Afghanistan, where the ROK runs a Provincial Reconstruction Team 

working to train local Afghans and strengthen peace and civil society. We also cooperate on green growth efforts to promote environmentally sustainable economic 

growth. These are the kinds of activities that bring solutions to common challenges 

facing the global community and the types of initiatives I hope to advance, if I am 

confirmed. 

I also look forward, if confirmed, to contributing to the already strong people-topeople ties between our two countries—in educational exchange, the arts and culture, sports, and in other fields. Last year, nearly 500,000 South Koreans took advantage of the Visa Waiver Program and traveled to the United States. In total, 

nearly 900,000 South Korean tourists and business travelers visited the United 

States in 2010, a 38-percent increase over 2009. These recordbreaking numbers 

make Korean tourists the seventh-largest tourist group to the United States. As a 

Korean-American, the importance of these everyday contacts between Koreans and 

Americans has special resonance for me. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it would be the highest honor for 

me to serve our country as the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea. If confirmed, I will lead a complex, multiagency diplomatic mission consisting of 575 employees, including staff at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul and the American Presence 

Post in Busan. I will do my very best to ensure that all members of that community 

and their families have the leadership, security, and support they need to get their 

jobs done. 

Thank you for considering my nomination. I look forward to your questions.

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much, Ambassador Kim. 

And let me just first say that you danced pretty quickly over the 

special members of your family who are here today, so I’d just like 

to point out your parents who have come here from Korea to be at 

this hearing. Is that correct? 

Ambassador KIM. No. Actually, my parents could not make it. 

My father passed away some years ago and my mother is in California. She’s here in spirit, though, sir. 

Senator WEBB. OK. 

Well, you have a whole row of family members here that I would 

like to introduce. If you all would just stand up and say hello. 

Ambassador KIM. They’re a bit shy. 

Senator WEBB. I know. That’s fine. [Laughter.] 

You are too. That’s why I’m saying this. 

Stand up and say hello. 

I think you’ve got a lot of people here who are very proud of you 

today. We want to give them some recognition. 

Ambassador KIM. Stand up. [Laughter.] 

Senator WEBB. OK. 

Ambassador KIM. Mr. Chairman, if I could start with, at the end 

is my wife, Jae; my niece, Sarah; my older daughter Erin; the 

younger one, Erica; my nephew, Nam-Gu; and my brother, Jun. 

547

Senator WEBB. Welcome to all of you. I know how proud you 

must be. 

You mentioned, again, the nature of this special relationship. 

And I’d like to point something out from my own visits. 

This is a unique relationship, I think, in terms of the overt value 

that the people in South Korea place on what the American military members did after 1950, I say as someone who’s been around 

the military since the day I was born, who had what I view as the 

honor and the privilege of serving my country in the war in Vietnam. Many, many family members have served. 

I was really moved, I have to say, when I visited Korea and was 

taken to the war memorial in Seoul, where they not only remember 

the sacrifices of the Korean soldiers, but they have the name of 

every American who gave the ultimate sacrifice during that war. 

It’s very, very moving to see that. 

Then when I met with the director of veterans from the government, I learned that the Korean Government actually sets aside 

money every year to bring American veterans back to Korea with 

their families to thank them. 

So a lot of people can talk the talk, but that’s just a tremendous 

amount of credibility in the gratitude that’s shown to the special 

relationship that we have. 

Let me ask you about another piece of this. We’re going to get 

into more substantive areas, but you mentioned the ties between 

the greater American community and Korea, South Korea. Could 

you give us a breakdown on the Korean-American community in 

the United States, where they are and the types of activities that 

they do to make sure this relationship is cemented? 

Ambassador KIM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

If I could just make one comment on your comments regarding 

Korea’s appreciation for Korean war veterans. One of the most 

meaningful and touching experiences I experienced as a political officer in Seoul was to participate in events commemorating the 50th 

anniversary of the end of the Korean war. And as you suggested, 

Mr. Chairman, the Korean Government had used its funds to bring 

Korean war veterans to Seoul to express appreciation. 

And I was moved and touched, because I also benefited from the 

sacrifices made by American soldiers who participated in the Korean war. So to see the Koreans’ actual appreciation for that was 

a very important experience for me. 

Regarding Korean-American communities, there are approximately 2 million Korean-Americans in the United States. As a 

rough breakdown, I think California has the most. And that’s 

where I grew up. New York also has a huge South Korean community. And growing numbers are coming to this area as well. 

In Virginia, Annandale is the home of the Korean-American community in this area. I don’t know the exact number. And I’d be 

happy to get you the exact breakdown, but those are sort of the 

major areas. 

Chicago also—Chicago and Atlanta are also home to huge Korean-American communities. 

Senator WEBB. May I ask you for your views on the free trade 

agreement? And actually, let me put it in this context: What do you 

548

think the implications would be if we fail to pass the free trade 

agreement? 

Ambassador KIM. Mr. Chairman, the President and the Secretary 

have both made very clear our commitment to getting the free 

trade agreement done. 

The administration would like to see the Korea-U.S. Free Trade 

Agreement, along with the other two pending free trade agreements and TAA, get done as quickly as possible. And I believe the 

administration is in conversations with congressional leaders about 

getting it done. 

I think the numbers are compelling. Just tariff cuts alone would 

lead to an increase of 11 billion dollars’ worth of exports from the 

United States to Korea, which would equate to tens of thousands 

of jobs being created in the export-related areas. 

Additional exports and additional jobs will be created from nontariff cuts through the FTA. We’ll also have access to the huge 

service market in Korea. 

So I think the numbers are compelling. I very much hope that 

we’ll be able to get it done as quickly as possible. 

I think, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the implication is that 

it will have to send a signal about our ability to follow through on 

our commitments. This agreement was negotiated through a very 

difficult process. It’s an agreement that stands to provide huge benefits to both countries. And I think it would serve our interests to 

get it done as quickly as possible. 

Senator WEBB. Would you characterize the South Korean economy as a mature economy, in the same sense as the United States? 

Ambassador KIM. Yes, I would, Mr. Chairman. 

It is a vibrant economy. It continues to enjoy substantial growth. 

I’d like to use the anecdote that if you go to electronic shops 

these days, South Korean products are at the very top of display 

areas. You see LG, Samsung, et cetera. I think that’s a small indication of the growth of the South Korean economy, and I would 

definitely consider it to be a mature economy. 

And this is why I think, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, this 

is an agreement between two mature economies, and there’s no 

reason why it should not be done. 

Senator WEBB. I’m going to say I have a view on this that because these economies are mature economies this is not the same 

type of a trade agreement that people have been concerned about 

in the past, when you have truly emerging economies with very low 

wage scales running the risk of pulling American jobs away from 

this country because of artificially low wage scales. 

In my examination of this and consideration of it, is that the 

threat to the American workforce it is not of any magnitude that 

should cause American workers concern. I’d like to hear your 

thoughts on that. 

I’m not preaching to the choir here, but I think people need to 

hear the views of those who are going to be implementing it. 

Ambassador KIM. I would very much agree with that assessment, 

Mr. Chairman. 

This is an agreement that was carefully negotiated. It is an 

agreement between two mature economies, and it stands to provide 

substantial benefits to both countries. 

549

As I mentioned earlier, just tariff cuts alone would result in tens 

of thousands of jobs being created in the United States in the export arena. 

Without getting into a detailed comparison of this agreement 

versus other free trade agreements, I would say that there is really 

no reason why we should not implement this agreement. 

Senator WEBB. Is it correct to say that the E.U. just signed an 

agreement, or recently signed, and is ready to implement an agreement that’s very similar to this one? 

Ambassador KIM. That is my understanding as well, Mr. Chairman. 

The E.U. agreement is complete and is already being implemented. 

Senator WEBB. You mentioned in your testimony that you had 

some involvement in the issue of the relocation of the American 

military in Korea. Would you describe what you worked on in that 

area? 

Ambassador KIM. Yes, sir. 

As the political military unit chief at our Embassy in Seoul, I 

had the opportunity to participate in negotiations on base relocations. That was both on the Yongsan relocation to move the 

Yongsan base away from downtown Seoul down south to 

Pyeongtaek, and also the land partnership plan related realignments in other parts of Korea. 

I think what we want to try to accomplish is to have a base or 

military presence that makes sense, that makes sense in terms of 

minimizing impact on Korean civilians, but also in terms of maximizing deterrent capability to make sure that we are able to defend 

South Korea against any aggression. 

I am a strong supporter of those initiatives, and, if I’m confirmed, I will do my very best to make sure that they’re implemented in a timely manner. I think it’s good for the alliance, it’s 

good for the South Korean public, and I think it makes a lot of 

sense in terms of our strategic ability to defend the peninsula. 

Senator WEBB. There’s been some concern over here in the Congress, and I’m one of those who has articulated this concern, with 

the way in which this relocation has been approached in terms of 

lack of what the Armed Services Committee called a business case 

for some parts of the relocation, including what’s now called tour 

normalization, but also the basic momentum that has taken place 

because of the funding streams for different parts of the relocation. 

As I’m sure you’re aware, there have been three different funding 

streams that have gone into construction programs and these sort 

of things. 

And one of them is command discretionary funds where the 

American commander can just divert money into projects without 

the oversight of the Congress, which is money on hand for programs. 

And the other has been South Korean burden-sharing programs 

where you had trade-for-trade different pieces of property, and as 

a result construction of facilities and those sort of things have 

taken place, again, without the Congress having been able to see 

the clear plan and the strategic concept. 

550

And then third, there’s the money that comes from the Congress 

itself. And we have asked for greater justification, particularly on 

this concept of tour normalization where they’re proposing to bring 

up to 50,000 family members into Korea. You think about the infrastructure that goes into that: housing, schools, medical, et 

cetera. 

This is an area of concern I want to hear from you about, and 

I want, hopefully, for you to bring this concern to Korea when you 

take on your post. The concern being that Congress does not want 

to be in a position of being forced by the momentum of these other 

two funding streams to have to make decisions that may not be the 

best-case solution. 

Are you familiar with these different funding streams? Have you 

worked in that area? 

Ambassador KIM. I’m generally familiar, Mr. Chairman. I had a 

chance to read the report you issued with your colleagues, and, of 

course, we understand the important points you raised. 

My colleagues in the Department of Defense are obviously wellaware of the budgetary constraints and the need to be prudent in 

pursuing any aspects of this. I had the chance to speak to Under 

Secretary Flournoy just a couple days ago about the tour normalization issue. And what I understand is that the matter is still 

under consideration at the Pentagon and that no decisions have 

been made, but that my colleagues in the Pentagon are well-aware 

of your concerns, of course. 

Senator WEBB. We may be in further touch on that. 

If you could just walk us through this, because you’ve been very 

involved in your present position, how do characterize the motivations behind the North Korean attacks on the Cheonan and 

Yeonpyeong Island? Do you see this in a larger scale? Or do you 

see these as separate items that aren’t connected to something 

larger? 

Ambassador KIM. Mr. Chairman, what I’ve discovered over the 

years in working on North Korea is that it is very difficult to determine what exactly they are thinking. 

The events last year, the attack on the Cheonan and the shelling 

on Yeonpyeong Island, were horrible, irresponsible acts. And frankly, it is difficult to come up with a rational explanation for the 

North Korean decision to launch those attacks. 

We, of course, as you pointed out earlier, sir, stood by our allies 

during this very difficult period. 

If the North Koreans believe that such provocative, irresponsible 

actions will bring them concessions from us or the ROK, they’re 

mistaken. We abhor those attacks, and we called on North Korea 

to refrain from all such provocative actions in the future. 

There is, of course, the theory that North Korean behavior often 

comes in cycles, that, having gone through a round of negotiations 

through the six-party process in 2007–08, that they were prepared 

to enter into a cycle of provocations, and that in fact, now, they’re 

ready to return to diplomacy and negotiations. 

Well, we’re not convinced that they really are ready to return to 

serious diplomacy and negotiations, and this is why I think Seoul 

and Washington both have been very cautious in not just rushing 

back to the negotiating table. Because, in light of what has hapVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00558 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
551

pened in the past 2 years, I think that the North Koreans need to 

prove that they will in fact be a serious partner when the negotiations resume. 

Senator WEBB. There are two schools of thought on these incidents that I’d like to hear your views on. One is that they’re providing something of a testing time during this potential for change 

of leadership in the North as to the possible successors of the current leadership. Second is that the United States could be encouraging China to do a great deal more with the relationship that it 

has with North Korea in a more overt way, in order to encourage 

more positive behavior. 

What do you think about those two schools of thought? 

Ambassador KIM. We understand that the succession process is 

moving forward. 

I’m familiar with the theory that the actions last year were related to the succession process. Frankly, it would be very disappointing if in fact they believe that their succession process 

would somehow be helped by such provocative and irresponsible actions. 

It’s difficult to say how quickly they will move forward with the 

succession process, but I think our advice to Pyongyang would be 

that, if they want the succession process to move forward smoothly, 

they should focus on responsible behavior, living up to international obligations and commitments, refraining from provocative 

actions, and beginning a meaningful dialogue with the South. 

Attacks against the Cheonan and the shelling on Yeonpyeong Island will not help their process. 

With regards to China’s role, Mr. Chairman, as Secretary Clinton 

pointed out on many occasions, we do believe that China has a 

unique responsibility, given their status as the chair of the sixparty process, given their unique relationship with North Korea, 

that China has a special responsibility to make sure that North 

Korea lives up to its obligations and commitments, refrains from 

provocative actions, and returns to the path for negotiations and diplomacy in a much more forthcoming manner than it has in the 

past. 

Senator WEBB. This past year and a half, from my perspective 

here in the Senate, has resulted in the potential for much stronger 

relations between South Korea and Japan. We’ve seen that demonstrated not only in the visits that I’ve made to the region but the 

frequent discussions that we have with representatives of both governments here in Washington. 

I’m wondering what you think about that? 

And also, about what might be done with this very emotional 

issue—to assist the Japanese in these very emotional issues of the 

Japanese citizens who were abducted by North Korea, where 

they’re looking for accountability? 

Ambassador KIM. Mr. Chairman, we applaud President Lee 

Myungbak’s commitment to improving relations with Japan. Japan 

is one of our closest friends, as is Korea. 

We believe it makes sense strategically, and on many other levels, that Japan and Korea maintain strong, positive relations. And 

we’re encouraged that both President Lee and the Japanese Prime 

Minister are committed to improving their relations. 

552

The Japanese abductee issue is one of the more difficult issues. 

We have a great deal of sympathy for the Japanese public on this 

tragic issue, and we have continued to support their efforts to 

reach resolution of that issue. 

It appeared that we had a small window of opportunity to make 

some progress, because in the summer of 2008, Japan and North 

Korea reached an agreement outlining a path forward on investigations and findings related to the abductees situation. But unfortunately, with the collapse of the six-party process in December 2008, 

they have made no progress on that agreement. 

And I think if and when we resume dialogue with the North Koreans, whether in a bilateral setting or in the six-party process, we 

will again remind the North Koreans of the need to address Japan’s concerns on that difficult issue. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. 

What is the current line of thinking in the State Department 

with respect to the food aid issue to North Korea? 

Ambassador KIM. Sir, we have made no decision on the food aid 

request from the World Food Programme. You know, we do have 

a great deal of concern about the humanitarian situation in North 

Korea, but there are a number important factors that need to be 

considered before we can make a decision on whether to provide 

food assistance to North Korea. 

No. 1 is, of course, the extent of the need, just how urgently they 

need it. 

No. 2, we need to consider competing needs. I mean, our resources are not unlimited, and I think we have to carefully take 

into consideration what other needs are out there. 

No. 3, and this is particularly relevant to the North Korean situation, is our ability to monitor delivery of food assistance. North 

Korea, as you know, has a mixed record in this regard. And so before we make any decision on food aid, we would want to be sure 

that we would have in place a robust and intrusive food aid monitoring protocol, so that we can be sure that the food will actually 

go to those who need it and not diverted to the military. 

Senator WEBB. What are your thoughts about the principal 

issues, any that I have not addressed, that would be high on your 

priority list in terms of our relations with South Korea? 

Ambassador KIM. Thank you very much for that question, Mr. 

Chairman. 

You know, the United States-Korea relationship has so many important dimensions that I actually have a very long list of things 

that I would like to accomplish, if I’m confirmed by Congress. 

If I could just highlight a couple that are dear to me. Obviously, 

we need to strengthen the alliance. It’s one of the most important 

security relationships. The trade relationship is greatly important 

to both countries. 

But I also want to focus on our cooperation beyond economic relations and security of the Korean Peninsula. I mean, Korea is becoming a major player on issues of great regional and global significance. I think it’s a wonderful development, and I think this trend 

is irreversible. 

And, for example, the Secretary, based on the signed memorandum of understanding regarding development assistance, Korea 

553

is becoming a major donor in that area. I think that policy reflects 

Korea’s economic growth, but it also reflects Korea’s understanding 

that they have something to give to the global community. 

And we welcome this trend, and we look forward to being a very 

strong partner with them on things like development assistance, 

environmental issues, et cetera. 

Another area that I would like to focus on is something that I 

mentioned at the conclusion of my testimony, which is people-topeople ties. It really does have special meaning for me because I’m 

a Korean-American. 

And on the depth of our relationship in the people-to-people area 

and cultural exchanges, academia, arts, sports, it is wonderful. And 

I hope that, if confirmed, I will have an opportunity to really bring 

that to a new level. 

Senator WEBB. Well, we thank you very much for your testimony 

today, and for your continued willingness to serve our country. 

The committee hearing record will be open for potential questions from other Senators until close of business tomorrow. You 

may receive other written questions. 

But, I wish you the best. I’m obviously going to support your 

nomination, and I know how proud your family members must be. 

And with that, the best of luck. This hearing is closed. 

[Whereupon, at 11:13 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSE OF SUNG Y. KIM TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

Question. At a time when the United States and the Republic of Korea are seeking to further strengthen our trade and economic relationship, I would like to get 

your thoughts on a matter involving a U.S. investment firm in Korea. 

In short, Lone Star Funds, a U.S. private equity firm whose investors include 

charitable organizations, educational endowments, and public and private investment funds, is for a third time attempting to sell its controlling stake in the Korea 

Exchange Bank (KEB), one of the largest banks in Korea. Over the past 5 years, 

Lone Star has made two previous attempts to sell KEB but those sales were terminated due to political and bureaucratic delays in Korea. Recent media reports confirm further bureaucratic delays on a decision on Lone Star’s latest effort to sell the 

bank—a decision that risks the sale of the bank and billions of dollars for Lone 

Star’s investors. 

I understand the current U.S. Ambassador to Korea, Ambassador Stephens, has 

raised this matter on a number of occasions with her counterparts in Seoul.

• What measures would you take to encourage the Korean Government to resolve 

the delays affecting the regulatory approval necessary for Lone Star to sell 

KEB?

Answer. I am familiar with the Lone Star case, and, if confirmed, I will continue 

to raise our concerns about the case with Korean officials. The State Department 

and other agencies have conveyed our concerns about this case on numerous occasions, urging Korean authorities to rule on Lone Star’s application to sell its KEB 

stake strictly on its merits, in a transparent and timely manner. We have pointed 

out that delays in approving the sale of Lone Star’s stake in KEB lead to uncertainty among international investors and can harm Korea’s efforts to attract foreign 

investors. Our Embassy in Seoul has been following this case closely and has discussed our concerns with senior levels of the Korean Government. 

The Financial Services Commission (FSC) is currently waiting for the Seoul High 

Court to resolve some outstanding matters, including a criminal case against Lone 

Star’s former head in Korea, before approving the sale of Lone Star’s KEB stake 

to Hana Bank of Korea. I understand Lone Star and Hana Bank have recently extended their contract till the end of the year. The Department and the Embassy will 

continue to monitor developments and raise Lone Star’s concerns. If confirmed, I 

will engage relevant senior Korean officials at the earliest possible opportunity and 

554

seek their cooperation on facilitating an expeditious resolution of this case. More 

broadly, if confirmed, I plan to work closely with the American business community 

in Korea and become an energetic advocate for their efforts. 

(555)

NOMINATIONS 

TUESDAY, AUGUST 2, 2011

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

Hon. Francis Joseph Ricciardone, Jr., of Massachusetts, to be 

Ambassador to the Republic of Turkey 

Hon. Norman L. Eisen, of the District of Columbia, to be Ambassador to the Czech Republic 

Hon. Robert S. Ford, of Vermont, to be Ambassador to the Syrian 

Arab Republic 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jeanne Shaheen 

presiding. 

Present: Senator Shaheen, Menendez, Casey, Coons, and Lugar. 

Also present: Senator Joseph Lieberman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN,

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE 

Senator SHAHEEN. This hearing will come to order. Good afternoon, everyone. 

Today we have two panels of nominees, but we’re doing this a little differently today. So we’re actually going to hear from all three 

nominees in the first panel, and then we’ll do questioning of Mr. 

Ford in the second panel. 

We’re fortunate to have Senator Lugar here with us, and we 

want to try and accommodate his schedule, as well as Senator 

Lieberman’s schedule. 

So on our first panel we will consider the nominations of Norman 

Eisen to be Ambassador to the Czech Republic and Francis 

Ricciardone to be Ambassador to the Republic of Turkey. And on 

our second panel, we will be considering the nomination of Robert 

Ford to be Ambassador to Syria. 

Senator Casey from Pennsylvania will be here. He chairs the 

Subcommittee on Near Eastern Affairs, and he will chair Ambassador Ford’s questioning portion of the second panel. 

All of the posts being considered today are critical in strengthening U.S. influence in safeguarding American interests around the 

globe. I look forward to discussing the challenges and opportunities 

the United States faces in these three important countries. 

556

Now, as I said, we’re doing this a little bit differently today. And 

one of the differences is that both of our nominees on the first 

panel were nominated last year to serve in these same positions. 

I think I chaired one of those nomination hearings last year. 

But both nominations were thoroughly considered and approved 

by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and both were held up 

on the Senate floor and were not ultimately confirmed by the full 

Senate. 

Seeing the importance of having an Ambassador in these critical 

countries, the President chose to recess appoint both Ambassador 

Ricciardone and Ambassador Eisen to their positions. As a result, 

the two men have been serving as Ambassadors in Prague and Ankara over the course of the last 7 months. 

As many of you know, a recess appointment by the President 

lasts for only 1 calendar year. So these two men have been renominated and the committee will reconsider their nominations. 

As the subcommittee chair on European Affairs, I was supportive 

of those nominations last year, and I intend to support their nominations once again. Since both men have already been serving in 

these roles, we’ll have an excellent chance to hear from them directly about the challenges they’ve already seen and their plans for 

the future. 

So welcome back to the committee, gentlemen. Thank you both 

for being willing to go through the nomination process again and 

to continue to take on these difficult responsibilities at a very important time for our country. 

So first today, we will consider the U.S. relationship with the 

Czech Republic. As an important ally of the United States in Central Europe, the Czech Republic has demonstrated exceptional 

leadership in Europe, particularly with respect to engaging the region’s eastern neighborhood and pressing for further European integration. 

The Czech Republic has made some impressive contributions to 

international peacekeeping efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 

Kosovo. In addition, the country’s unique experience with democratic transitions should provide some lessons for the United States 

as we navigate the ongoing transitions in the Middle East and 

North Africa. 

Today we also consider the U.S. relationship with Turkey. Turkey remains a critical NATO ally with a predominantly Muslim 

population in a volatile and geopolitically strategic region of the 

world. Recent events throughout the Middle East and North Africa 

have increased Turkey’s strategic importance as a center of power 

in this complex region. 

There is little doubt that Turkey will continue to play an influential role in many of the national security threats facing the United 

States. I remain a proponent of a strong bilateral relationship with 

Turkey and its continued integration into Europe. However, it’s 

also important to recognize where we have differences. 

Turkish troops continue to occupy the Island of Cyprus, and the 

Turkish Government needs to do more to support a just solution 

in Cyprus. 

In addition, Turkey’s vote against a fourth round of sanctions on 

Iran in the U.N. Security Council raises concerns that the United 

557

States and Turkey do not share the same threat assessment with 

respect to Iran’s nuclear weapons program. 

So I want to just briefly introduce our two nominees, and I know 

that Senator Lieberman is here to provide an introduction for Ambassador Eisen, so I will let him do most of that introduction. 

And as I mentioned previously, Senator Casey will be introducing 

our second panel nominee, Ambassador Ford, when he gets here. 

I want to welcome Ambassador Ricciardone, who is a highly distinguished, long-time career Foreign Service officer. He is the 

former Ambassador to Egypt, the former Deputy Ambassador to Afghanistan, and he served previously in Turkey and throughout the 

Middle East. He speaks a number of languages, including Turkish 

and Arabic. And finally, and most importantly, from my perspective, he is a graduate of Dartmouth College in New Hampshire. 

So again, congratulations to all of you on your nominations, and 

I appreciate your willingness to come before the committee. 

As I said, we’re fortunate to have Senator Lugar, who is the 

ranking member of this committee here with us this afternoon, and 

I know that he would like to make a statement. 

Senator Lugar. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. I am very pleased to join you, Madam Chairman, 

in welcoming our nominees to three very important countries. 

Our relationships with these countries are excellent, and we appreciate this opportunity to review events in each of the three as 

we welcome Ambassador Ricciardone, Ambassador Eisen, and Ambassador Ford to this committee once again. 

Turkey is at the center of several critical issues, underscoring its 

importance as an ally. In particular, I hope to hear Ambassador 

Ricciardone’s perspective on the recent resignations of Turkey’s top 

military leaders and the effect this will have on political stability. 

Moreover, we will be interested to hear more about dynamics related to upheaval in Syria, Turkey’s expanding participation in regional diplomacy, and its ongoing role in the creation of a southern 

energy corridor. 

The Czech Republic remains a very important ally in Central Europe. I will be interested to hear from Ambassador Eisen about 

ramifications of Prague’s recent announcement that it will not participate in the current plan for the European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense. 

Regional energy interconnections and diversification in the Czech 

Republic also remain fundamental to the United States and European efforts to improve energy security for the region. 

Finally, this hearing is an important opportunity for the committee to review events in Syria. The Syrian regime appears committed to the use of violence to suppress the will of its people. 

In the last few months alone, more than 1,700 people have been 

killed with more than 10,000 imprisoned. The toll on Syrian civilians—including children—gets worse by the day. 

Despite the regime’s efforts to cut off the Internet, cell phones, 

and other forms of communication, the images continue to get out 

and the world has borne witness to these brutalities. The causes 

558

of peace, stability, and economic advancement would benefit from 

a swift transition to a new leadership and a more representative 

government for all the Syrian people. 

The alternative is almost certainly a cycle of ever-widening violence and the prospect of sectarian conflict. 

The regime, of course, seems intent on playing up the prospects 

of sectarian strife, and has sought the aid of Tehran, as a means 

to hold on to power. 

We must explore ways to work with our allies to present a clear 

and unequivocal message to President al-Assad and those around 

him that the violence must stop and that a credible political transition must begin immediately. 

I note that the Government of Turkey has taken a strong stance 

in this regard, given the potential for increasing refugee flows. Syria’s Government and business elite must understand that the current path will only deepen their isolation and intensify consequences for the regime and its leaders. 

I look forward to our discussion with the nominees. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. 

And, Senator Lieberman, we’re delighted to have you with us to 

introduce Mr. Eisen. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN,

U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Madam Chair and Senator Lugar. It’s an honor to be here. 

I should express my appreciation to you on behalf of the nominees that you did not join the herd leaving Washington after the 

vote at noon. And thank you for convening this hearing. 

I’m here to introduce Ambassador Eisen. I’d be remiss if I didn’t 

simply say that I have had the opportunity to get to know Ambassador Ricciardone and Ambassador Ford, and these are two extraordinary public servants, great, courageous, informed representatives of the United States in the countries on which they have 

served and are serving now. 

I’m really honored to be here to introduce Norm Eisen. This is 

not a political duty. It’s really a personal pleasure, because Ambassador Eisen and his wife, Lindsay, and his daughter, Tamar, are 

personal friends of mine and my family. And as you mentioned, I 

guess the reason I’m asked is that Norman is one of those stateless 

people who lives in Washington, DC, so I occasionally do double 

duty by introducing such people. 

As you mentioned, Senator Shaheen, Ambassador Eisen was 

nominated and given a recess appointment to this point at the end 

of last year. Prior to his nomination, he had a distinguished career 

as a lawyer here in Washington, and then was special counsel for 

ethics and governmental reform in the White House. 

I regret that it was necessary for the President to make a recess 

appointment in this case, but perhaps there is a silver lining here 

in that we can now judge Ambassador Eisen based on his performance over the past 6 months. And that, from all that I have heard, 

has been really exemplary. 

Since arriving in Prague, Ambassador Eisen has been a whirlwind of activity, winning plaudits from everyone from the Czech 

559

Government to the American Chamber of Commerce, whose leader 

has said, ‘‘In your short time in the country, you have already 

made a significant impact and you have proven to be one of the 

most effective Ambassadors to hold this post.’’

He has been a tireless advocate for America’s national interests 

in the Czech Republic, whether with regard to imposing sanctions 

against Iran or winning contracts for American companies. 

And with your permission, I would like to insert in the record a 

list of essentially thank you’s and testimonials from American companies who have been doing business in the Czech Republic. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Without objection. 

[The information referred to follows:]

Ambassador Eisen—Our Washington grapevine delivered the news this week that 

you might be undergoing your confirmation in the near future. If this is so, I would 

like to express our fervent hope that it is successful, because your presence in the 

Czech Republic has been and will be essential to our common efforts to advance the 

interests of U.S. business and to improve the standing of our country in the crucial 

region of Central Europe. In the months since you have taken the leadership role 

here, you have not only invigorated our community and increased the stature of our 

country in the eyes of Czech citizens, but you have also contributed substantially 

to the reform of public procurement and to the promotion of scientific education—

two top priorities of the business community. Furthermore, your endeavors on behalf of Westinghouse and other U.S. companies have expanded their export possibilities, which should add much needed jobs in the U.S. manufacturing sector. In 

your short time in the country, you have already made a significant impact, and you 

have proven to be one of the most effective ambassadors to hold this post. We sincerely hope that the Senate will allow us to continue our common work here, and, 

again, you have both our best wishes and strongest support during the confirmation 

process.—WESTON STACEY, American Chamber of Commerce in the Czech Republic. 

I would like to say loud ‘‘Thank You’’ for organizing the e-health event last week 

in the Ambassador’s residence. The event was beyond our thoughts or expectations—perfect location, perfect audience, and overall level of the event was unprecedented. It turned out to be who is who in Czech health care with representation 

from MoH, VZP, other insurance funds and hospitals. Thank you so much for having 

this opportunity and have support and help from you and Veronika. The fact that 

we had presence of his Excellency, the Ambassador himself was taking the meeting 

on another level. Please let me know how we can express our thanks and gratitude—I believe this was the support of the U.S. commercial programs at its best. 

Thank you so much Stu and have a great coming Easter.—MATEJ ADAM, IBM 

Healthcare. 

You and your U.S. Commercial Service team members all did much more than 

an outstanding job. This was the best and most amazing business trip of my life! 

I believe that this trip has opened many doors that no other business development 

tool could have. All of the exchanges were of the most professional and of an extraordinarily competent level. The U.S.C.S. Representatives in Frankfurt, Prague, 

and Vienna are consummate professionals and true U.S. Ambassadors. Thanks so 

much to everyone for this major career and law practice milestone.—WILLIAM N. 

HULSEY III, ESQ., HULSEY, P.C., Senior Research Fellow, IC2 (Innovation, Creativity & Capital) Institute, University of Texas at Austin. 

I am writing you to thank you for the work your team, specifically Mrs. 

Obrusnikova, performed in support of my short visit to Prague last week. Hana’s 

knowledge of the Czech Republic’s aerospace industry and her enthusiasm in assisting Industrial Metals is to be highly commended. As before, Hana was able to secure appointments on short notice, and rearrange for an alternative meeting lastminute when one of the planned visits was cancelled. During a 2009 Gold Key visit 

for Industrial Metals, Hana arranged meetings with different companies, two of 

which have become regular customers (Aero Vodochody and Jihostroj). In light of 

the growth of the regional aerospace industry, we are now renewing our efforts in 

560

Czech Republic and with Hana’s continuing support hope to expand the sales to 

these and other customers.—MARCEL ZONDAG, Industrial Metals. 

Great job on the call this afternoon with Robert for Mathnasium! It means a lot 

to us trade specialists in ODO to be able to transition our clients to knowledgeable 

and capable commercial specialists in OIO, and to know they will get excellent service. I look forward to continuing to work with you to make something good happen 

for Mathnasium in the Czech market!—BRENT E. OMDAHL, Atlanta Export Assistance Center. 

I just wanted to send a quick not to thank you for the visit last week. I think 

it went extremely well thanks to your efforts. Thanks again for all your hard work, 

and I look forward to working together in the future as we move forward in the 

Czech Republic. Excellent!! I would highly recommend using this service. Not only 

were they very effective through the initial phases of the activity, but have continued to provide support and guidance through the followup phase. Outstanding service!!—ZACH SORRELLS, European Operations–Eureka Research International. 

I’ll write ANOTHER e-mail to you praising all the meetings you set up on behalf 

of Publish on Demand global and Strategic Book publishing. This e-mail is ONLY 

about my own publishing company participating in your FREE offer for the U.S. 

Commercial service catalogue show. I want to thank you for including our catalogue 

and our titles in your presentation! It was great to see you at the Business Centre. 

You were always busy with meetings and your materials were well-done. I think it’s 

GREAT that you’re having the followup event in early June. I will send you a couple 

more sample books for you to display. Thanks so much! It was so great to meet you, 

Jana, and to have all your help. My week in Prague was a totally positive experience and I will be doing lots of e-mail, mail, and even some phone call followup so 

hopefully we will see LOTS of sales that I can share with you for both companies!

—JAN YAGER, Publish on Demand. 

Just a note to let you know that our participation in the Prague Book Fair was 

helpful and provided at least one very good lead for us. Hana Whitton from the 

Oxford Literary Agency, which specializes in translation rights sales into various 

Eastern European markets, asked to be put in touch with us via the U.S. Commercial Service’s stand at Prague. The U.S. Commercial Service has been a tremendous 

asset for our Press. Thank you and your colleagues for your capable assistance!

—KATHERINE MCGUIRE, University of Pennsylvania Press. 

The offered service was beyond our expectations. Very efficient, fast service and 

extremely experienced and qualified staff. Very highly recommended to any other 

U.S. company looking for a rep. in the Czech Republic. Extremely satisfied with the 

service and the outcome. Thank you so much and keep up the good service. The 

services that you provided are beyond our expectations. I am really thankful to accommodate our request and research the market within such a short period. The 

data and all the candidates you recommended are very efficient and professional 

companies in our field. Thank you for your ongoing support and for organizing all 

these 4 meetings within such a short notice.—PIERRE HATEM, American Foodservice 

Concepts Corp. 

The Commercial Service is an exception resource. My contact in the Czech Republic, Veronika, was very friendly and accommodating—even providing more resources 

after the completion of our project. I wasn’t extremely satisfied with the results of 

the service, but that is more likely a result of the Czech Republic not having a readiness for our products than it is a reflection on the Commercial Service. I would still 

surely recommend this service to any and all!—STEPHANIE JOHNSON, Mirabella 

Beauty. 

The assistance from both the Arizona and Prague offices was exceptional.—SCOTT

MEEHAN, Positron Public Safety Systems/Intrado. 

561

Veronika Novakova was amazing to work with . . . She did a lot of work on our 

behalf and it turned out to be very successful. Also would like to thank Mr. Chris 

Damm from San Jose office for his continued hard work and time in helping set up 

all our IPS.—LEIGH LINDENBAUM, Universal Exports Limited (UXL).

Senator LIEBERMAN. For more than 2 years before Ambassador 

Eisen arrived in Prague, the United States had no Ambassador in 

the Czech Republic, which spurred doubts and fears among our 

Czech allies—and as you said, they have really been great allies—

about our commitment to their country. This is not a situation that 

we, in our national interests, should repeat. 

So I hope that we can give a full confirmation to Ambassador 

Eisen this time. The Czech Republic has been an extraordinary 

partner and ally of the United States, from the wars in Iraq and 

Afghanistan to the promotion of democracy worldwide. The Czechs 

are really now among our best friends and allies in Europe, and 

they deserve to have an Ambassador from our country that is confirmed by the full Senate. 

Finally, as you may know, Norman Eisen has a deep personal 

connection to the Czech Republic, his mother having been born 

there. Both and she and his father survived the Holocaust, and it 

is indeed a profound historical justice, an act of justice, that the 

Ambassador’s residence in Prague, which was originally built by a 

Jewish family that was forced to flee Prague by the Nazis, and 

which in turn the Nazis took over as their headquarters, now 70 

years later, is occupied by Norman and his family. 

And I might, on a point of personal privilege, add that they observe the Sabbath there every Friday night and Saturday. So if you 

need any evidence that there is a God, I offer that to you. 

The story of Norm Eisen and his family and their path back to 

Europe is a classic American story, a reflection of what our country 

is about at its very best. And that is also precisely why the Ambassador has proven such an effective representative of our Nation, 

our interests, and our values; and, again, why I hope the committee 

can lead the Senate in sending him back to Prague as our Ambassador as quickly as possible. 

Thank you very much for this opportunity. 

Senator LUGAR. Madam Chairman, are there members of the 

families here? 

Senator LIEBERMAN. They are. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Yes, I think we should ask, as you’re giving 

your testimony, Ambassador Eisen and Ricciardone, that you 

should feel free to introduce your families and let us welcome them 

as well. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Madam Chair and Senator 

Lugar. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. Thank you especially for sharing the last story about the residence for the Ambassador. 

As I said, we are going to begin the panel with Ambassadors 

Ricciardone and Eisen. And we will also be hearing the opening 

statement from Ambassador Ford, and then we will save his question and answer period for the second panel. 

So I will ask you if you could begin, Mr. Eisen. And again, feel 

free to introduce family or friends who are here with you. 

562

STATEMENT OF HON. NORMAN L. EISEN, OF THE DISTRICT OF 

COLUMBIA, TO BE AMBASSADOR TO THE CZECH REPUBLIC 

Ambassador EISEN. Madam Chair, Senator Lugar, Senator 

Coons, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity 

to be here again in connection with my nomination by President 

Obama to continue serving as the United States Ambassador to the 

Czech Republic. 

I am honored to have the confidence and the trust of the President, of Secretary Clinton, in representing our country. 

Since you asked, I would like to introduce my wife, Lindsay 

Kaplan, an associate professor of English at Georgetown University, and our daughter, Tamar. 

Representing the United States in Prague is a family effort, and 

I believe that the Czech people have come to appreciate my family 

as much as I do—well, almost as much as I do. 

When I was last before the committee, I reflected upon my extraordinary good fortune as a first-generation American. From the 

vantage point of our small fast-food restaurant in Los Angeles, 

where I grew up, my mother, a Czechoslovak Holocaust survivor, 

and my father, an immigrant from Poland, could never have imagined that their son would someday serve as a United States Ambassador. 

As Senator Lieberman noted, and as my mother put it recently, 

just a little more succinctly, ‘‘The Nazis took us away in cattle cars, 

and now my son has returned representing the mightiest nation on 

Earth.’’

As that sentiment suggests, my mission in the Czech Republic is 

strongly informed by my deep sense of obligation to this country, 

to the United States. 

Since my arrival in Prague in January, I have worked with a talented Embassy team in three principal areas. First, the defense 

and security relationship between the two countries; second, commercial and economic ties; and third, shared values, particularly 

the shared values of good governance and of civil rights for all. 

In each area, the relationship was good. But we have worked 

with the Czech Government, with officials across the political spectrum, with Czech civil society, and with the Czech people to make 

it great. 

In the defense and security realm, the Czechs are staunch allies. 

Over the past year, they increased their contributions in Afghanistan to over 700 soldiers and civilians. Czech personnel operate in 

some of the most dangerous parts of the country, and they have 

suffered numerous casualties there. 

When I recently visited Afghanistan to thank Czech and United 

States personnel for their service, U.S. soldiers that I met with 

gave the Czechs high praise. That included General Petraeus, who 

explained the critically important responsibilities that our Czech 

allies are carrying out side by side and day by day with their U.S. 

partners in Afghanistan. 

The Czechs are also a staunch friend of Israel and a strong supporter of United States policy toward Iran. They are one of our 

very best allies in Europe on those issues and across the board. In 

their own neighborhood, the Czech Republic is a leading advocate 

within the European Union for countries like Georgia, Ukraine, 

563

and Moldova, through the EU’s Eastern Partnership Initiative. 

Elsewhere, from Cuba to Burma to Belarus to North Korea, the 

Czechs are champions of human rights. 

We in Embassy Prague are proud to work with our Czech partners on these issues. 

Looking ahead to the future of our defense and strategic partnership, we are broadening our security cooperation, developing an approach that goes beyond any single narrow focus to one with multiple areas of specialized cooperation where the Czechs excel. The 

Czechs are world-class strategic partners in areas ranging from 

helicopters; to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear mitigation; to PRTs, Provincial Reconstruction Teams. 

In the economic and commercial area, Embassy Prague has actively advocated for American business during my tenure. We have 

an open door for U.S. firms, and I have met with dozens of American companies, from the very largest to the smallest. 

When they have concerns in the Czech Republic, we vigorously 

work to resolve them, engaging all the way up to the highest levels 

of government, if necessary. I’ve also encouraged Czech investment 

in the United States, traveling with government officials and Czech 

businesses to scout business opportunities here that will generate 

good, high-paying jobs in the United States. 

In our commercial and economic work, we have particularly emphasized civil nuclear cooperation. The Czechs have six operating 

nuclear reactors and are planning an expansion worth up to $27.5 

billion. It is one of the largest opportunities for U.S. businesses of 

its kind anywhere in the world. 

If Westinghouse, the U.S. competitor, wins that bid, it will mean 

an estimated 9,000 new, good jobs in the United States, across the 

United States. To support that bid, we have adopted a whole-ofgovernment approach here in the United States and with Embassy 

Prague to establish a broad civil nuclear strategic partnership between our two countries. 

So from fostering new relations between United States and Czech 

R&D facilities, to making regulatory exchanges, to working together to improve nuclear safety, our two nations are building a 

model civil nuclear relationship for the 21st century. 

My third area of emphasis has been the shared values that bind 

our two countries together. Czech and Slovak national aspirations 

in the 20th century were first realized by the Pittsburgh and 

Washington declarations signed right here in the United States 

after World War I by President Wilson’s great friend and Czechoslovakia’s first President, a revered name in my home growing up, 

Tomas Masaryk. 

The United States helped liberate Czechoslovakia from the 

Nazis, supported the resistance against communism, and then 

helped transform the goals of the Velvet Revolution into reality. 

I have carried that message of friendship the length and breadth 

of the country, visiting almost 20 cities and regions outside of 

Prague in just about 6 months on the job. 

My message is one of warm friendship but also candor. I have 

supported the initiatives of those in the Czech Government, the opposition, NGOs, business, and the Czech public who are working 

for good government and against corruption. I believe we are buildVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00571 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
564

ing a model in Prague of how to respectfully but forcefully engage 

on those issues. 

We have also worked with the Czech Government to promote 

equal rights and opportunities for all Czech citizens, irrespective of 

their origin or faith, including the Roma. My presence in Prague 

as the child of a Czechoslovak victim of Nazi persecution is by itself 

a powerful message in the fight against extremism and for human 

rights. Working with the talented interagency team at Embassy 

Prague, I have taken every opportunity to engage with the Czech 

people and their government to advance our common goals and values. 

I am so, so honored to be asked to represent our country and our 

government. 

Madam Chair, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you. I welcome any questions you may 

have. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Eisen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR NORMAN L. EISEN

Madam Chair and members of the committee, it is a privilege to be here again 

in connection with my nomination by President Obama to continue serving as the 

United States Ambassador to the Czech Republic. I am honored to have the confidence and trust of the President and Secretary Clinton in representing our country. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I would like to introduce my wife, Lindsay Kaplan, an associate professor of English at Georgetown University and our daughter, Tamar. Representing the United States in Prague is a 

team effort and I believe the Czech people have come to appreciate my family as 

much as I do. 

When I was last before the committee, I reflected upon my extraordinary good fortune as a first-generation American. From the vantage point of our small fast-food 

restaurant in Los Angeles where I grew up, my mother, a Czechoslovak Holocaust 

survivor, and my father, an immigrant from Poland, could never have imagined 

their son would someday serve as a United States ambassador. As my mother put 

it recently, ‘‘the Nazis took us away in cattle cars, and now my son has returned 

representing the greatest nation on earth.’’ As that anecdote suggests, my mission 

in the Czech Republic is strongly informed by my deep sense of obligation to 

America. 

Since my arrival in Prague in January, I have worked with a strong Embassy 

team—Americans and Czechs—in three principal areas: defense and security; commercial and economic; and shared values, particularly the shared values of good 

governance and civil rights for all. In each area the relationship was good—and we 

worked with the Czech Government across the political spectrum, and with Czech 

civil society and the Czech people to make it great. 

In the defense and security realm, the Czechs are staunch allies. Over the past 

year, they increased their contributions in Afghanistan to over 700 soldiers and civilians. Czech personnel operate in some of the most dangerous parts of the country, 

and have suffered numerous casualties there. When I recently visited Afghanistan 

to thank Czech and U.S. personnel for their service, U.S. soldiers gave the Czechs 

high praise and General Petraeus explained the critically important responsibilities 

our Czech allies are carrying out. 

The Czechs are also a staunch friend of Israel and strong supporter of U.S. policy 

toward Iran; they are one of our very best allies in Europe. In their own neighborhood, the Czech Republic is a leading advocate within the European Union for countries like Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova through the EU’s Eastern Partnership Initiative. Elsewhere, whether in Cuba, Burma, Belarus, or North Korea, the Czechs 

are champions of human rights and we in Embassy Prague are proud to work with 

them on those issues. 

Looking ahead to the future of our defense and strategic partnership, we are 

broadening our security cooperation and developing an approach that goes beyond 

any single narrow focus to one with multiple areas of specialized cooperation where 

the Czechs excel. The Czechs are world-class strategic partners in areas ranging 

from training Afghan helicopter pilots and crews to Chemical Biological Radiological 

and Nuclear (CBRN) mitigation to Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. 

565

In economic and commercial ties, Embassy Prague has actively advocated for 

American business during my tenure. We have an open door for U.S. firms, and I 

have met with dozens of American companies, from the largest to the smallest. 

When they have problems, we vigorously work to resolve them, engaging all the way 

up to the highest levels of government. I have encouraged Czech investment in the 

United States, traveling with government officials and Czech businesses to scout 

business opportunities here that will generate jobs. 

We have particularly emphasized civil nuclear cooperation. The Czechs have six 

operating nuclear reactors and are planning an expansion worth up to $27.5 billion 

that is one of the largest opportunities for U.S. business of its kind in the world. 

If the U.S. competitor wins the bid, it will mean an estimated 9,000 new, highpaying jobs in the United States. To support that, we have adopted a whole-of-government approach to establish a broad civil nuclear strategic partnership between 

our two countries. From fostering new relations between U.S. and Czech R&D facilities, to regulatory exchanges, to working together to improve nuclear safety, we are 

building a model civil nuclear relationship for the 21st century. 

My third area of emphasis has been the shared values that bind our two countries 

together. Czech and Slovak national aspirations in the 20th century were first realized by the Pittsburgh and Washington declarations signed in the United States 

after WWI by President Wilson’s great friend and Czechoslovakia’s first President, 

Tomas Masaryk. The United States helped liberate Czechoslovakia from the Nazis, 

supported the resistance against communism, and helped transform the goals of the 

Velvet Revolution into reality. I have carried that message the length and breadth 

of the country, visiting almost 20 cities and regions outside of Prague in just 6 

months on the job. 

My message is one of warm friendship and also candor: I have supported the initiatives of those in the Czech Government, the opposition, NGOs, business and the 

public who are working for good government and against corruption. I believe we 

are building a model in Prague of how to respectfully engage on those issues. 

We have also worked with the Czech Government to promote equal rights and opportunities for all Czech citizens, irrespective of their origin or faith, including the 

Roma. My presence in Prague as the child of a Czechoslovak victim of persecution 

is by itself a powerful message in the fight against extremism and for human rights. 

Working with the talented interagency team at Embassy Prague, I have taken every 

opportunity to engage with the Czech people and their government to advance our 

common goals and values. 

I am so honored to be asked to represent our country and our government. 

Madam Chair and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you. I welcome any questions you may have.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much. 

Before we go on to Ambassador Ricciardone, I want to just recognize—I understand the Ambassador from the Czech Republic to the 

United States is in the audience. So I want to recognize him. 

Very nice to have you join us. 

And I don’t know if there are any other members of the diplomatic corps here, but welcome to all of you. 

So, Ambassador Ricciardone. 

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANCIS JOSEPH RICCIARDONE, JR., OF 

MASSACHUSETTS, TO BE AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC 

OF TURKEY 

Ambassador RICCIARDONE. Madam Chair, members of the committee, I am very honored to appear before you today as President 

Obama’s nominee as Ambassador to the Republic of Turkey, having, as you mentioned, served in that capacity as a recess appointee since this past January. 

I am grateful to the President and to Secretary Clinton for their 

trust and confidence in me. 

And with me today is my wife and life partner, Marie, whom I 

married in Enfield, NH, almost 4 decades ago, who has been my 

partner throughout our Foreign Service adventures in Turkey, and 

566

long before in Iran and everywhere. So she is with me, and our 

daughters were unable to join us, but we all have family connections to Turkey and a great fondness for that country. Marie has 

studied and taught there as well. 

During my 33-year career in the Foreign Service, I have had the 

pleasure and the privilege of having served in Turkey previously 

three times. And through this period, I have observed Turkey’s continuing transformation into a more democratic and more open and 

more economically vibrant, modern state, and as a player with 

growing influence on the world stage. 

Throughout this change and development, has been one constant, 

and that has been Turkey’s continued commitment to its partnership with the United States and the NATO alliance. It is also a 

member of the G20 now and has one of the fastest growing economies in the world. 

And noting Turkey’s history as a majority Muslim nation and as 

a secular democracy that respects the rule of law, President Obama 

has cited Turkey’s critical role in helping to shape the mutual understanding and stability not only in its neighborhood, but around 

the world. 

If confirmed, I will continue to do everything I can to reinforce 

Turkish-American cooperation in support of our common goals, 

which are rooted in the security alliance and our shared democratic 

values. 

For decades, Turkey and the United States have cooperated intensively to promote regional stability, including by countering terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; resolving regional conflicts; promoting energy security; expanding trade, 

investment, and economic development; and, essential and integral 

to all of those, strengthening democracy, human rights, and the 

rule of law. 

Several such strategic priorities merge in the cases of particular 

and immediate consequence, including in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 

quest for peace between Israel and all its neighbors, and Iran’s evident pursuit of nuclear weapons. 

Other conflicts, as you’ve mentioned, Madam Chair, with historical antecedents require no less sustained and intensive joint attention and cooperation, including the unresolved issues of Cyprus and 

the normalization of relations with Armenia. 

I have been privileged to serve in Ankara during the Arab 

Spring, during which I have strived to enlist Turkish support for 

the NATO role in Libya, for a successful transition to democracy 

in Egypt, and in collaboration with my colleague and friend next 

door in Syria to pressure the regime in Syria to cease its brutal repression and to heed the will of its people. 

And just as the Turkish Government has played an important 

role in promoting these political transitions, its government and 

private sector are also keen to support economic development in 

Egypt and Tunisia that are so critical to long-term stability in the 

region by increasing their trade and investment in those countries. 

And wherever possible, Turkey as a government and Turkish firms 

are looking for partnerships with American firms. 

While we share many goals with Turkey, one of the most important is countering global terrorism and networks, and Turkey has 

567

been one of our strongest partners in that pursuit. Just last month, 

Turkish security officials arrested an alleged al-Qaeda cell that was 

plotting to bomb Western interests in Turkey, including the United 

States Embassy. 

We support Turkey’s own foremost security objective of defeating 

the terrorist violence, which the PKK continues to perpetrate, and 

which has led to the deaths of over 30,000 Turks since the 1980s. 

We strongly support Turkey’s efforts to improve the human 

rights and economic situation for the Kurds, and their democratic 

participation as full citizens, and the rights also of other communities of vulnerable groups in Turkey. 

As the United States maintains its longstanding support for Turkey’s aspirations to join the European Union, we will continue to 

press for the reforms required for accession. It’s important to note 

the Turkish citizens themselves are demanding further progress on 

promoting human rights and the rule of law, most certainly including freedom of speech and religious freedom. 

And in my return to Turkey, it has been my privilege to meet 

with the heads of each of the religious minorities, the ancient Jewish community of Istanbul; His All Holiness Bartholomew II, whom 

I had first met over a couple of decades ago with the then-First 

Lady, Secretary Clinton, and met again 2 weeks ago with the Secretary; the head of the Syriani Church; and the head of the Armenian Church as well; as well as the Baha’i community leader. 

The United States supports a transparent and inclusive constitutional reform process to strengthen Turkey’s democracy. We regard 

freedom of expression as central to democracy, and we believe the 

reform process offers a unique opportunity to strengthen the protections afforded to journalists, to nongovernmental organizations, 

and to minorities. 

The President and the Secretary have established economic cooperation with Turkey as a strategic priority and have emphasized 

the importance of supporting American firms and promoting Turkish-American trade and investment. During the President’s April 

2009 meeting with Turkish President Gul, both leaders agreed to 

elevate our economic relations to the level of our already strong political and military relations. So Turkey is a leading focus in the 

President’s new export initiative to double United States exports 

globally in 5 years. 

It has been a special privilege to return to Ankara over these 

past 6 months to strengthen the communications and the friendship between our two peoples in all fields of private as well as official endeavors, including the fields of education, science, and 

health. 

I know this committee and this Senate have strongly supported 

public diplomacy, and I have tried to make a special effort to communicate with the Turkish people and bring private American 

groups and Turks together. 

I believe that increasing contacts and communications between 

Americans and Turks must be a primary means of advancing our 

interests on all of the issues we face together today. 

So, Madam Chair, ranking member, Senator, if confirmed to continue my service as Ambassador in Ankara, as in my service in all 

other posts in the past, I will trust to your support and advice, and 

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that of your colleagues and constituents who are interested in the 

interests the United States has at stake in Turkey. 

Thank you so much for this hearing. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Ricciardone follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR FRANCIS J. RICCIARDONE

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you 

today as President Obama’s nominee to serve as Ambassador to the Republic of Turkey, having served in that capacity as a recess appointee since January 20, 2011. 

I am grateful to President Obama and Secretary Clinton for their trust and confidence in me. With me today is my wife, Marie, who both studied and taught in 

Turkish universities. During my 33-year career in the Foreign Service, I have had 

the pleasure of having previously served three times in Turkey, most recently as 

the Deputy Chief of Mission and Charge ́ d’Affaires from 1995 to 1999. Through more 

than three decades I have observed Turkey’s continuing transformation into a more 

democratic, more open, and more economically vibrant, modern state and a player 

with growing influence on the world stage. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing 

to work with you and your colleagues, as well as with the many private American 

organizations with a strong interest in Turkey and throughout the region, to advance United States interests in this critically important and complex relationship. 

Turkey remains as ever a key ally and strategic partner of the United States and 

an important member of the NATO alliance. It is also a member of the G20 with 

one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Noting Turkey’s history as a majority Muslim nation and as a secular democratic state that respects the rule of law, 

President Obama has cited Turkey’s ‘‘critical role in helping to shape mutual understanding and stability not only in its neighborhood, but around the world.’’ If 

confirmed, I will continue to do everything possible to reinforce Turkish-American 

cooperation in support of our common goals. 

For decades, Turkey and the United States have cooperated intensively to promote regional stability, including by countering terrorism and the proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction; resolving regional conflicts; promoting energy security; 

expanding trade, investment, and economic development; and, essential and integral 

to all of these, strengthening democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Several 

such strategic priorities merge in cases of particularly immediate consequence, including in Iraq and Afghanistan, the quest for peace between Israel and all its 

neighbors, and Iran’s evident pursuit of nuclear weapons. Other conflicts with historical antecedents require no less sustained and intensive joint attention and cooperation, including the unresolved issues of Cyprus and normalization of relations 

with Armenia. I have been privileged to serve in Ankara during the ‘‘Arab Spring,’’ 

during which I have strived to enlist Turkish support for the NATO role in Libya, 

for a successful transition to democracy in Egypt, and pressure on the regime in 

Syria to cease its brutal repression and to heed the will of its people. Just as the 

Turkish Government has played an important role in promoting these political transitions, the Turkish Government and private sector are keen to support economic 

development in Egypt and Tunisia that are so critical to long-term stability in the 

region, by increasing their trade and investment in these countries. Wherever possible, they are looking for partnerships with U.S. companies. 

Let me describe Turkey’s role in relation to our foreign policy priorities. If confirmed, my continued responsibility will be to strengthen Turkey’s cooperation with 

us in all of these areas, as a key bilateral partner and also as an essential NATO 

ally. 

United States-Turkey cooperation in Iraq and Afghanistan has been robust and 

critical to our success. Turkey shares our vision of a stable Iraq and actively helps 

the Iraqi people develop a sovereign state that is at peace with itself and its neighbors. This requires progress in Iraq’s security, political, and economic infrastructure, 

and in each of these areas Turkey has been an essential partner for our mission. 

Turkey’s high-level strategic dialogue with the Government of Iraq and its outreach 

to the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government have contributed to the stability of 

Iraq. Turkey also is contributing to Iraq’s progress by hosting regional meetings on 

political and economic cooperation, and through trade and investment that promote 

Iraq’s reconstruction and help develop Iraq’s oil and electricity infrastructure. 

Additionally, Turkey is a crucial logistics hub, supporting U.S. forces in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. Nearly 70 percent of the air cargo for our mission in Iraq transits 

Incirlik Air Base, which is also the primary refueling stop for flights to Afghanistan. 

Turkey provides blanket clearance for U.S. aircraft supporting these operations and 

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tion operations in Iraq, as well as the retrograde of U.S. forces from Iraq over the 

course of 2011. The Habur Gate border crossing serves as a key line of communication to Iraq; through it, 25 percent of our fuel and 40 percent of other sustainment 

requirements enter Iraq. There are more than 1,700 U.S. military personnel stationed in Turkey. Turkey has a long tradition of hospitality to our service men and 

women, including hosting the USS Eisenhower in January. 

Turkey is one of our strongest partners in the fight against international terrorism. Turkey and the United States are working together to fight the regional 

transit and support of international terrorists, and last month arrested an alleged 

al-Qaeda cell plotting to bomb western interests in Turkey, including the U.S. Embassy. I have urged the Turkish Government and Parliament to pass stronger legislation against terrorist financing, and hope the Parliament will pass the Government’s bill when it reconvenes this autumn. 

We support Turkey’s foremost security objective of defeating the terrorist violence 

which the PKK continues to perpetrate, which has led to the deaths of over 30,000 

Turks since the 1980s. We support Turkey’s operations against the PKK; we cooperate with EU partners to cut off PKK facilitation efforts in Europe; and we support 

the growing cooperation between Turkey and Iraq, including the Kurdistan Regional 

Government, against the PKK elements that find refuge in Iraq. We are in consultations with Turkey to step up law enforcement cooperation against terrorism. Turkey’s leaders also recognize the need for political, economic and cultural measures 

to counter PKK terrorism. Turkey’s ‘‘National Unity Project’’ or ‘‘Democratic Opening’’ aims to improve the human rights and economic situation for Kurds and other 

communities of vulnerable groups in Turkey. We believe that further pursuit of this 

initiative can help not only to undermine the terrorism still conducted by the PKK, 

but it will also advance and strengthen Turkish democracy and the human rights 

of all Turks. A record number of Kurds were elected as independents to Parliament 

in June and we commend their professed commitment to participation in a nonviolent, lawful political process to secure the full rights of all Turkey’s Kurds as 

Turkish citizens. 

From my current service in Ankara as well as my tenure as Deputy Ambassador 

in Kabul, I can attest that Turkey has also been an essential partner in Afghanistan, where it has longstanding cultural and historical ties and has been a leading 

proponent of Afghanistan’s unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Turkey 

shares our goal of a stable Afghanistan that can protect itself from al-Qaeda and 

any other terrorists who would use that country as a base for international terrorist 

attacks. Turkey has some 1,600 troops serving in the International Security Assistance Force, commands the Regional Command for Kabul, and this year has sent 

still more civilian humanitarian relief and development assistance experts to establish its second Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Jowzjan province. It is also 

a leader on training the Afghan National Security Forces. Turkey has pledged to 

train a brigade’s worth of Afghan National Army troops. Just last week, I was proud 

to participate in the opening of Turkey’s special training center in Sivas for the Afghan National Police. Turkey has also pledged $300 million for development projects 

in Afghanistan, built schools and clinics, and invested in the repair or construction 

of bridges and roads and the drilling of new wells, as well as facilitated economic 

development through support to the agriculture, marble and carpet sectors. In addition to our cooperation with Turkey through NATO/ISAF and our two Embassies 

on the ground in Kabul, we see Turkey undertaking an influential and highly positive role in rallying international support for Afghanistan’s economic development, 

and in fostering political reconciliation of its violent conflict with the Taliban. In 

support of cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Turkey has hosted trilateral summits in Turkey with the participation of both the Afghan and Pakistani 

Presidents, and later this year will host another summit of Afghanistan and its 

neighbors. 

Turkey and Israel are both important partners of the United States. The two 

countries have shared vital political, economic, security, and military ties for many 

years. The strains in their relations since the May 2010 Gaza flotilla incident, risk 

setting back the vitally important interests of both those countries, and of the 

United States, in regional peace and stability. Therefore we have underscored to 

both countries the importance to them, to us, and their region of repairing their mutually beneficial relationship. Secretary Clinton continues to urge both sides to find 

a way to put the flotilla incident behind them, and we hope that efforts toward this 

goal over the past year will soon meet with success. 

On Iran, we work closely with Turkey on a range of the challenges we face with 

Iran. Turkey shares a long border and history with Iran. Turkey has said that it 

shares the international community’s concerns about the prospect of a nucleararmed Iran, and repeatedly has reaffirmed its commitment to upholding U.N. SecuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00577 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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rity Council resolutions in this regard. But we have not always agreed on tactics 

regarding Iran, particularly with regard to sanctions. Turkey shared our disappointment that Iran failed to engage meaningfully in the talks hosted by Turkey in 

Istanbul last January between Iran and the U.N. Security Council’s permanent five 

members plus Germany. If confirmed as Ambassador, I will continue to urge Turkey 

to persuade Iran to engage directly and seriously with the IAEA and P5+1 on the 

international community’s concerns about its nuclear program. On sanctions, we 

continue to urge Turkey to fully enforce U.N. sanctions, which Turkey has publicly 

pledged to implement. We also are engaging vigorously with Turkey to ensure that 

the CISADA (Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act) 

sanctions are fully respected and to educate Turkish entities of the consequences 

should Iranian companies attempt sanctioned transactions via Turkey. 

The United States continues its longstanding support for Turkey’s aspirations to 

join the European Union. The prospect of EU accession has been a strong impetus 

for Turkish reform. Over the past few years, Turkey has implemented meaningful 

political and economic reforms necessary for EU membership, but more needs to be 

done. Turkish citizens themselves are demanding further progress on promoting 

human rights and the rule of law, including freedom of the media and religious freedom. They seek, for example, the rights of minority religious institutions freely to 

own their property and operate their institutions. There could be no more powerful 

modern testimony to Turkey’s historic legacy of religious tolerance than reopening 

the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s Halki Seminary. Just this past month, I was privileged to join Secretary Clinton in advocating for the reopening of Halki Seminary 

and protecting the rights of the Ecumenical Patriarchate during her recent visit to 

Istanbul, and I will continue my advocacy until this is addressed. If confirmed, I 

look forward to celebrating the reopening of Halki Seminary with His All Holiness 

Bartholomew, and the leaders of the Government of Turkey (including the democratic opposition) who, I dare hope, will show the courage and foresight needed to 

redress a historical wrong. 

The division of Cyprus has gone on far too long. The United States encourages 

the negotiations between the two communities under the auspices of the U.N. Secretary General, and we urge the leaders of the two communities to seize the moment to negotiate a settlement that reunifies the island into a bizonal, bicommunal 

federation. Turkey and Greece can play a constructive role in helping the Cypriot 

parties toward a lasting solution to their differences, and we continue to urge them 

to do so. 

Facilitating regional integration is a high priority for the United States. Rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia will foster increased stability and prosperity in the entire Caucasus region. We commended the governments of Turkey 

and Armenia on signing the historic protocols on normalization of relations on October 10, 2009, in Zurich. During her visit last month, Secretary Clinton again urged 

Turkey to ratify the protocols, and we will continue to support programs that build 

understanding between Turks and Armenians. Last year, the Government of Turkey 

permitted Armenians to celebrate religious services at the ancient Akhtemar 

Church in Lake Van, for the first time in decades. I was glad to see increasing numbers of private Turkish citizens turn out this past spring in five cities across Turkey 

to protest the 2007 murder of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, and to call 

for justice against the perpetrators. Last week, the courts convicted and sentenced 

the murderer to 22 years in prison, and we understand that official investigations, 

urged by President Gul himself, continue into the conspiracy that reportedly supported the heinous assassination. 

The President and Secretary Clinton have established economic cooperation with 

Turkey as a strategic priority, and have emphasized the importance of supporting 

American firms and promoting U.S.-Turkish trade and investment. During President Obama’s April 2009 meeting with Turkish President Gul, the two leaders 

agreed to elevate our economic relations to the level of our already strong political 

and military relations. To follow through on this commitment, the United States 

and Turkey launched a Cabinet-level dialogue—the Framework for Strategic Economic and Commercial Cooperation—during Prime Minister Erdogan’s visit to 

Washington in December 2009. In addition to our official dialogues, we have 

launched a public-private sector U.S.-Turkey Business Council to advise the U.S. 

and Turkish Governments on strategies for increasing trade and relationships, improving the business climate, and eliminating impediments to trade and investment. 

Turkey is a leading focus in the President’s New Export Initiative to double U.S. 

exports globally in 5 years. Turkey’s economic role has only grown in importance 

since 2009, as its booming economy is increasingly important to the global economy 

and to propelling regional growth. Turkey has set an ambitious goal of becoming a 

top-10 economy by 2023, which will triple the size of the economy and create more 

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opportunities for U.S. firms. The Turkish Government and private business associations enthusiastically have supported our Global Entrepreneurship Program, and 

our ‘‘Partnership for a New Beginning,’’ both intended to foster a culture of entrepreneurship, especially among the young. 

Building on our close cooperation in the 1990s that helped make Baku-TbilisiCeyhan (BTC) a reality, the United States and Turkey are working together to bring 

Caspian gas to European markets for the first time through a new route called the 

‘‘Southern Corridor.’’ We welcomed the June 2010 agreement signed by Turkey and 

Azerbaijan on the gas purchase and transit of Azerbaijani gas to Turkey as an important milestone in laying the foundation for the Southern Corridor. The corridor 

would provide commercial benefit for the countries of the Caucasus and Central 

Asia and also create a long-term partnership based on mutual interests with Europe. Overseeing the safe passage of oil through the Bosporus Straits and the transport of oil through the BTC pipeline, which pumps nearly a million barrels of oil 

a day to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, Turkey plays an important role in world energy markets. 

Many Americans, including my family and I, have had wonderful experiences living and working in Turkey. It has been a special privilege to return to Ankara over 

these past 6 months to strengthen the communications and friendship between our 

two peoples in all fields of private as well as official endeavors, including the fields 

of education, science, and health—in which my wife has practiced while on previous 

service in Turkey. Led by this committee, the Senate has formally recognized the 

importance of public diplomacy. Increasing contacts and communications between 

Americans and Turks must be a primary means of advancing our interests on all 

issues we face today. If confirmed, I pledge that all members of U.S. Mission Turkey 

will continue warmly to welcome the advice and support of the American people, 

both through our elected representatives and through direct and continuous contact 

and communication. In particular, I would pledge the highest standards of service 

to the American community and American travelers, whether for business or for the 

private advocacy of the cause of freedom and human rights supported by our administration and our Congress. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, if confirmed to continue my service 

as Ambassador, in my service in Ankara as in my past service at other posts, I will 

trust to your support and advice, and that of your colleagues. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward 

to your questions.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Ambassador Ford. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT S. FORD, OF VERMONT, TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC 

Ambassador FORD. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Madam Chair, Senator Lugar, Senator Coons, I’m really honored 

to appear before you today, and I’m grateful for the trust and confidence placed in me by President Obama and Secretary Clinton in 

renominating me to serve as the United States Ambassador to the 

Syrian Arab Republic at a time when it is more critical than ever 

that our voice be heard clearly by the Syrian regime and, more importantly, by the Syrian people themselves. 

Under the President’s recess appointment, I have been working 

in Syria since late January. I have to say it has not been an easy 

job, but the strategic stakes and the strategic opportunities for us 

that we have in Syria now are quite dramatic. And there is a 

hugely important story about the struggle for human dignity now 

under way in Syria. 

I arrived in Syria about a month before the protests started. In 

the past 5 months, those protests have grown slowly in size, and 

they now extend across all of Syria. The protesters demand respect 

for their basic rights, freedom of speech, freedom to march peacefully, and they demand an end to corruption, and above all they demand that their government treat them with dignity. 

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I want to emphasize here, we talk about the Arab Spring in 

Washington. The key word is dignity—treating people with dignity. 

But government’s response has been brutal. It has been outrageous. Nearly 2,000 people have been killed by the Syrian security forces and thousands more arrested and held in barbaric conditions. One cannot have but admiration for the protesters’ courage 

and also their ingenuity, and that they have stayed generally 

peaceful despite bullets, beatings, and the constant risk of arrest 

and torture. 

In my 6 months, I have seen two principal tasks in front of me. 

First, to insist to the Syrian officials, and to convince them, that 

opening more space for the Syrian people to express themselves is 

vital for the credibility of those officials, for the credibility of that 

government, and for Syria more largely. 

There have been a few small positive steps taken by the government. They have released many political prisoners. They have allowed some meetings by the political opposition. 

However, as I said, in general, their behavior has been atrocious. 

And their recent actions that we read about in the newspaper these 

days only underline again that the Syrian Government is unwilling 

to lead the democratic transition that the Syrian people themselves 

demand. 

My second vital function in Damascus is to work with the Syrian 

opposition. I have spent enormous amounts of time discussing with 

them their ideas for the future and discussing with them the kinds 

of questions that other Syrians and the international community 

will ask about them. 

It’s really important now to give Syrians an ear and to amplify 

their voices, especially when the international media is barred from 

Syria. 

I have been trying to draw the attention of the Syrian regime 

and the attention of the international community to the legitimate 

grievances the Syrian people have with their government. The Syrian people want to be heard. 

I wish the members of this committee could have seen how enthusiastic the protesters in Hama were to have a chance to talk to 

the American Ambassador. 

The crisis in Syria, however, is not about the United States directly. As I said, it offers us opportunities to promote respect for 

our principles and our ideals. The Syrian crisis offers us opportunities eventually to reinforce stability and peace in the Middle East. 

But Syrians must resolve the crisis. The manner in which the 

crisis is resolved has to be a Syrian one. 

My job is to help establish the space for Syrian activists and for 

Syrian thinkers, for Syrian business people, and for the Syrian people generally to develop and organize the political transition that 

must occur if Syria is to be stable again. 

Syria’s 23 million people are already thinking about what happens when Assad is no longer President of Syria. I believe that we 

and the Syrian people share a vision of what Syria could be, an 

open and democratic country where governance is based on consent 

of the governed, a unified and tolerant country where Arabs and 

Kurds, Sunnis and Alawites, Christians and Druze see themselves 

as Syrians first, and they celebrate Syria’s rich cultural diversity; 

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a strong country at peace with its neighbors and exercising a stabilizing influence in the region; a strong country that plays a responsible role in the broader international community; and a country 

that does not support Iranian efforts to destabilize the region or 

give support to terrorist groups like Hezbollah. 

As the President said on July 31, Syria will be a better place 

when a democratic transition goes forward. I and my team in Damascus, my colleagues at the Department of State and throughout 

the U.S. Government, and, most importantly, the Syrian people are 

working to make that vision a reality. 

Madam Chair, thank you for this opportunity to address the committee, and I look forward to responding to questions at the appropriate time. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Ford follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR ROBERT S. FORD

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you 

today. I am grateful for the trust and confidence placed in me by President Obama 

and Secretary Clinton in re-nominating me to serve as United States Ambassador 

to the Syrian Arab Republic at a time when it is more critical than ever that our 

voice be heard clearly by the Syrian regime and, more importantly, the Syrian 

people. 

I last testified before this committee on March 16, 2010. Almost 1 year to the day 

later, the Syrian regime sparked what has become a nationwide uprising when it 

responded with deadly force to a peaceful protest over the arrest of a handful of 

youths in Dara’a. Since March 2011, over 1,600 people have been killed and more 

than 10,000 arrested in a ruthless attempt to cow the Syrian people into submission—an attempt that has failed. The Secretary reiterated on August 1 that President Assad has lost his legitimacy with the Syrian people. And the President on 

July 31 laid out my instructions: to stand with the Syrian people, increase our pressure on the Syrian regime, and work with other countries to isolate the Assad government. 

I want to salute the courage of the Syrians who risk bullets or vicious beatings 

or arrest and torture but who will not be intimidated from demanding their government respect their basic rights. They are demanding nothing outlandish. They demand simply that the Syrian Government respect the basic rights laid out in the 

United Nations Charter of Human Rights—a charter that the Syrian Government 

signed. They want their government to respect the freedoms of speech and assembly, the right to just and fair governance, and freedom from the fears and wants 

that have resulted from decades of corrupt, incompetent, and brutal rule at the 

hands of an unaccountable clique. They want to be treated like human beings—with 

respect and dignity. 

My team and I see it as an integral part of our mission to give these people an 

ear and a voice. To amplify their hopes and legitimate grievances so that the international community and most importantly the Syrian regime pays attention. I am 

convinced that my French colleague and I were welcomed in Hama because after 

weeks of fearless and peaceful protest, and on the verge of a potential crackdown, 

someone from outside Syria took notice. I wish you could have seen the eagerness 

of the Hama people to talk to me about their experiences with the Syrian intelligence services and how they were determined to push their demands for respect 

and dignity from their government no matter what the pressure from the Syrian 

Government. 

When I return to Syria in a couple days, I will continue through my actions and 

my presence to demonstrate solidarity with the Syrian people and our rejection of 

the regime’s empty promises, senseless violence, and sectarian fear-mongering. 

Assad and his circle will not endure forever, but it is not entirely clear who or 

what will follow. An additional focus of my work on the ground, which I do not advertise widely, is getting to know the leading activists and assessing their needs and 

opportunities for the United States to help. They are independent. They do not want 

American military involvement. 

The crisis in Syria is not about the United States directly. It does offer us opportunities to promote respect for our principles and ideals. It offers us opportunities 

eventually to reinforce stability and peace in the Middle East. But Syrians must resolve the crisis. The manner in which it is resolved must be a Syrian one. I see my 

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job as helping establish the space for Syrian thinkers, political activists, and those 

who lead the street protests to organize their plan for the political transition that 

must occur if Syria is to know stability again. We have had some success in establishing that space through my frank discussions with elements in the Syrian leadership who claim to want a political solution to the crisis. And the Syrian opposition 

is slowly becoming an effective, broad-based opposition. 

While the regime has generally dismissed new U.S. sanctions as ‘‘business as 

usual,’’ President Obama’s decision to take the unprecedented step of designating 

Bashar Assad personally, and our efforts to coordinate that step with the Europeans, absolutely stung. Our coordination on multilateral steps, such as at the 

United Nations, also stung. And new sanctions, coupled with the regime’s own violence and mismanagement, have signaled to markets that Syria is increasingly ‘‘radioactive.’’ Trade, tourism, investment, and foreign reserves are down, and the economy is hurting badly. Some of Assad’s close business associates have contacted us 

to plead their cases. Another part of my job in Damascus is to identify how we can 

apply unilateral American actions to boost pressure and how working with our partners on multilateral actions we can help bring this crisis to a quicker and less 

bloody end. A new U.N. Security Council resolution would be useful in that effort. 

As we mull our steps, we aim to ensure that we neither harm the Syrian people 

nor prejudice their ability to recover economically, socially, and politically. 

It is time for us to start thinking about the day after Assad. Syria’s 23 million 

citizens already have. I believe that we and they share a vision of what Syria could 

be: an open and democratic country where governance is based on consent of the 

governed. A unified and tolerant country where Arabs and Kurds, Sunnis and 

Alawis, Christians and Druze see themselves as Syrians first and celebrate their nation’s diversity. A strong country at peace with its neighbors and exercising a stabilizing influence in the region. A strong country playing a responsible role in the 

broader international community. A country that does not support Iranian efforts 

to destabilize the region or give support to terrorist groups like Hezbollah. As the 

President said on July 31, Syria will be a better place when a democratic transition 

goes forward. 

I, my team in Damascus, my colleagues at the Department of State, and throughout the U.S. Government and most importantly the Syrian people are working to 

make this vision a reality. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to address the committee. I would 

be pleased to respond to any questions you may have.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you all very much for your testimony. 

As I indicated in introducing Ambassadors Eisen and 

Ricciardone, you were both recess appointments, so I would really 

like to begin this afternoon by asking you each to address the situations that required your recess appointments, and why you believe 

the Senate should confirm you this year? 

And I’ll ask you to begin, Mr. Eisen. 

Ambassador EISEN. Madam Chair, as you noted, the Czechs are 

some of our closest allies in the region and in the world, and an 

Ambassador was needed after a hiatus to work on critical issues 

like Afghanistan, Iran, Israel, and the potential $27.5 billion civil 

nuclear export opportunity worth thousands of United States jobs. 

It is my understanding that my nomination was held over concerns about a personnel matter handled by my office when I 

worked in the White House. We attempted to resolve those concerns, but were unable to do so. And given the important security 

and economic issues on which we worked with the Czechs, the 

President determined that a recess appointment was appropriate 

and, indeed, was necessary. 

Since my arrival in Prague, we have made strong progress on all 

those issues, Afghanistan, Iran, Israel, the nuclear contract, and 

many other important areas in the relationship. Those remain as 

vital as ever. 

And I believe that progress, the energy that not only I have put 

in, but the entire Embassy team in Prague together have put in, 

575

and the good work that they and we have done, I think, is the best 

case for the continued presence of an Ambassador in the Czech Republic. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Ricciardone. 

Ambassador RICCIARDONE. Madam Chair, thank you for the opportunity to address that question. 

As you pointed out yourself, and as Senator Lugar has pointed 

out, Turkey is a pivotal country at a critical place geographically, 

in a very tense moment of conflict throughout the region. It has influence in all of those issues that are of strategic concern to the 

United States, moreover, internally is going through a hugely important and deliberate process of change, the Turkish people deciding their own direction and their future. 

And they do look to us as they go through this. They care about 

what we think. 

We have an extraordinarily talented Embassy team that I found 

on arrival in January, and there is one now, even through our summer transition. They do the heavy lifting of diplomacy every day, 

and they do a lot without an Ambassador, in fact. 

But the fact is that having an Ambassador present improves the 

United States access and the ability to speak every day with people 

at the top of government and the different institutions of government, including the military as well as the civilians and with the 

public in a way that cannot be done otherwise. 

So I am very grateful that the President appointed me. I am 

grateful to have been there in particular throughout this period of 

the Arab Spring with so much going on in the region, where Turkey has swung in and helped play a stabilizing role in those transitions. 

I regret I was unable to resolve the concerns of an individual 

member of the Senate, a former member of the Senate. I will be 

honored and grateful to address any concerns from any member regarding my past service or my current service in Turkey or anywhere else. 

And I thank you for the opportunity to get at some of that today, 

if there are any concerns. Thank you. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

As I understand, part of the questioning or questions that were 

raised had to do with your tenure in Iraq and as Ambassador to 

Egypt. Were there any particular concerns that you would like to 

address today that were raised? 

Ambassador RICCIARDONE. I was very proud of my service in 

Iraq. Before Saddam Hussein went down, I worked with the Iraqi 

opposition, the democratic opposition to Saddam Hussein, under 

President Clinton and Secretary Albright. 

My job was to help organize, support, and invigorate the Iraqis 

who were working for a post-Saddam future, and it was really a 

privilege to be part of that. I did that to the best of my ability and 

closely worked with Members of the Congress who were keenly interested. 

If there are particular questions, I am not entirely sure what 

they are. I’m sure I must have antagonized some members of the 

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Iraqi opposition. I was upholding American policy, not necessarily 

what all Iraqis wanted. 

I worked very closely in Egypt with not only the government but 

very much with civil society. The theory of the case we had was 

we had to press on all fronts, starting with a very stubborn President Mubarak, who was committed and set in his ways; and with 

the people around him, with his government, with his state, and 

very much with civil society. 

I was privileged to go to the headquarters of opposition movements to continue the flow of funding provided by the United 

States through USAID to civil society groups. I understand that remains an issue with the Government of Egypt, but I was proud to 

continue to do that, and I took up the issue with President Mubarak himself and told him we were determined to keep doing that. 

Again, I’m glad to answer to any particular questions that may 

come up. 

I made it a point to meet with all of the religious community 

leaders. It was one of the great experiences of my life to have a 

Passover Seder in Cairo while the imprecations against the pharaoh were being called down. 

I met with His Holiness Pope Shenouda many, many times, and 

sought his advice on how best to advance the cause of freedom for 

Egypt’s Christians. I met with the Greek patriarch. I met with the 

Russian Orthodox patriarch. 

I took up the cause of the Baha’is with Mubarak himself and had 

a small success on that front. 

I worked hard and won some and lost others, but that is the nature of our business. 

Glad, again, to address any particular questions on that. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. Thank you for the effort to clarify 

some of those concerns that had been raised. 

I was very surprised, as I am sure a lot of other people were, to 

see so many of Turkey’s generals step down over the weekend. And 

I just wondered if you could give us your assessment of what that 

means for the civilian government, what it means in terms of the 

military, how do we interpret what happened? 

Ambassador RICCIARDONE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

As to what this means for Turkey, its democracy, its civilian government, the Turks themselves are analyzing all of that and debating it and deciding what it means. And we’re asking them. 

For what it means for the United States and our security relationship with them, I am very, very confident that it has not 

caused a setback in any way. On the contrary, this time of the 

year, there is always a turnover in the leadership, in any case. This 

turnover happened in a different way, by means of a resignation 

under evident protest for particular reasons articulated by General 

Kosaner. We look forward to working with the new leadership. 

The security relationship, though, goes beyond individuals. It is 

based on institutions. Turkey is a state of law and strong institutions that are durable even though they’re dynamic and in change. 

I have every confidence that our security relationship will continue 

to be strong, that our military leaders will meet with the new 

Turkish military leaders. 

577

I look forward on getting back to Ankara to meeting with the 

new military leadership. I am very confident things will be just 

fine. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. My time is up. 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Ambassador Eisen, the Czech Republic was expected to host missile defense radar under the Bush administration’s missile defense 

plan for Europe, but that plan was scrapped in 2009 in favor of the 

so-called phased adaptive approach. 

Even though Prague recently announced it was not interested in 

the administration’s current proposal for participation in the 

phased adaptive approach, it appears open to considering future 

participation in projects. 

What do you see as the lay of the land there? Has the discussion 

in any way disrupted our relationship? And how would you propose 

we proceed? 

Ambassador EISEN. Thank you, Senator Lugar. 

It has not. This has not disrupted the relationship. This has been 

an active subject of conversation. 

And I am pleased to tell you that the government is strongly supportive of the NATO missile defense plan, the phased adaptive approach as adopted at Lisbon. 

You are, of course, quite right that an earlier conversation that 

we had with the Czech Government about the shared early warning system, which was prior to the adoption of a NATO missile defense strategy at Lisbon, was overtaken by events. 

The Czechs felt that the limited data that they would receive 

under the SEW system, the Shared Early Warning, was no longer 

necessary today, although we previously made the offer because of 

the broader adoption of the phased adaptive approach. 

But part of the result of the good conversations, the good partnership between the Czech Government and United States, including the Unites States Embassy in Prague, has been strong, strong 

embrace of the phased adaptive approach as adopted by NATO at 

Lisbon. So it’s full-steam ahead. We’re in as good a place as ever 

on that. 

Senator LUGAR. Let me say, you’ve noted that a key priority for 

the United States policy in the Czech Republic is to enhance regional energy security through means including diversification. In 

your view, what are the most pressing areas for cooperation in this 

sphere? 

Ambassador EISEN. There is a critical energy security issue in 

the Czech Republic. One hundred percent of the Czech Republic’s 

nuclear fuel is supplied by Russia, 70 percent of their oil, 65 percent of their gas. We’ve made diversification a priority of our engagement. 

The greatest single opportunity to achieve energy security is 

through the expansion of the Czech civil nuclear capacity. They 

have six outstanding high-functioning nuclear reactors now, and a 

very strong regulator. Unlike other nations, they have a very 

strong national commitment, not just a government commitment, 

but strong public support, for this critical alternative energy source 

in the 21st century. 

578

And we’ve really focused there not just on the Westinghouse bid 

to expand Temelin, which has such a high dollar value, almost $28 

billion potentially, and so many U.S. jobs. But that’s really just one 

part of this partnership, and we have worked very hard in Embassy Prague, and, indeed, throughout the United States Government on the whole partnership. One of the first things I did was 

come back to talk to all of the interlocutors and work on a wholeof-government approach to build a 21st century partnership between our two countries that goes beyond just that bid. 

So we’re working on R&D together. We’re working on education, 

on regulation together in both our countries. And that has been an 

important part of our work. 

I traveled recently with the Foreign Minister of the Czech Republic to Texas to sign an agreement under our Joint Declaration on 

Civil Nuclear Cooperation, which we have between the Czechs and 

Texas A&M University, a leading provider of degrees in civil nuclear engineering, and the Czech CENEN, the Civil Nuclear Engineering Network in the Czech Republic, so our two nations can 

build in this area in the 21st century. 

Senator LUGAR. Is there public support in the Czech Republic? 

That is, do ordinary citizens understand this problem? 

Ambassador EISEN. There is, Senator Lugar. 

One of the most gratifying moments for me in returning to my 

mother’s homeland was the rational and the calm approach that 

the Czech Republic took post-Fukushima to their energy needs, the 

need for energy security, to diversify energy sources. There is 

strong national consensus in favor of expanding nuclear, and a 

strong government consensus. 

And some of the risks factors that one sees elsewhere, whether 

it’s tsunamis or earthquakes, are not present there. So it is a very, 

very good location for that expansion. 

We are very pleased to work, again, not just on that bid, which 

is certainly important, but on a broad partnership for civil nuclear 

energy security that is a model of how our two nations can work 

together. 

Senator LUGAR. Ambassador Ricciardone, I have two parts of 

this. 

First of all, Turkey remains central for the United States and 

European efforts, including the Nabucco pipeline project and other 

initiatives, to vie for greater European energy independence. I 

would like your views on what progress has been achieved recently, 

and where the Nabucco project might stand, as opposed to rival 

pipeline projects? 

Second, Turkey has been in negotiation with the United States 

and NATO on Missile Defense Radar for several years with no 

agreement finalized, which as I understand is due to several outstanding Turkish concerns related to intelligence-sharing with 

Israel. How close are we to concluding that deal? 

Can you make a comment on Nabucco, as well as the intelligence-sharing situation? 

Ambassador RICCIARDONE. Senator, on the southern energy transit corridor, of which the Nabucco is one very good option, I can say 

that we are intensively engaged. Diplomats always say that, and 

579

we always say we’re optimistic and there is progress. I believe 

there actually is. 

It is complicated. There are several governments involved. There 

are several companies involved. We are in touch with all of them 

at top levels. 

I can tell you, without betraying any confidences, that Secretary 

Clinton raised this issue with the Prime Minister and the Foreign 

Minister of Turkey just 2 weeks ago. Ambassador Morningstar was 

along. She also raised it with President Gul. 

We’ve been pushing. Prime Minister Erdogan went on to Azerbaijan since then. I have not had a readout of his discussions there, 

but I know he was intending to talk about this issue. 

A key, of course, is getting gas from the Caspian to fill whatever 

pipeline is going to come down there. That is the next step. 

We’re hoping within the next month there will be an agreement 

by the companies concerned, to fill the pipeline, come to terms on 

transit fees, and all those technical issues. We’re seized with it. 

We’re working on it, and we’re hoping. 

On missile defense, Turkey did support, of course, the NATO 

statement at Lisbon. They support the NATO effort to have the 

phased adaptive approach radar system. We’ve moved well beyond 

that generality to have detailed technical discussions and legal discussions with the government of Turkey. Naturally, they want to 

understand what this will mean for Turkey in all its technical, political, legal, and certainly security aspects, how it will make Turkey more secure, as well as the rest of NATO. 

And we believe we are addressing those questions in full and 

substantive detail. We hope that the Turkish Government will feel 

it has enough information to make a decision very soon. I will be 

racing back to Ankara to try to find out more in regard to that. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Madam Chairlady. 

Congratulations to both of you on your nominations. 

Ambassador Ricciardone, I enjoyed the last conversation we had, 

and I want to pursue some items that have developed since we 

spoke. One of them is with reference to Cyprus. 

As we know, the parties are engaged in pretty intense talks facilitated by the United Nations Secretary. I look at the developments, and what’s happened with the military in Turkey, which 

has, in my view, been part of the challenge in getting to a solution 

in Cyprus. And I look at this new development and wonder how 

that affects the possibility of making real progress. 

On the flip side, I look at Prime Minister Erdogan’s recent statements, which is to forget about what we were negotiating in the 

past. This is now a two-state solution, which is different than a bizonal, bicommunal federation, and urging Turkish Cypriots to multiply in greater numbers or expect to have more settlers from 

Anatolia. That doesn’t seem to be in line with moving toward a solution. 

So can you give me an update on your perspective, since Turkey 

is a key player, as to whether or not we’re going to be able to 

achieve a resolution to the division of Cyprus? Are those facts complicating opportunities? How do you see it? 

580

Ambassador RICCIARDONE. Senator, I wish I could do the diplomatic thing and say I am optimistic and there is progress, but I 

don’t want to mislead. 

On the first part of your question, I don’t believe the changes in 

the military leadership in Turkey will make any difference one way 

or the other in terms of the prospects for the solution we’ve been 

after for so long in Cyprus. I just don’t think it is entirely germane. 

The military is not calling the shots on this policy of the government of Turkey. 

As to the Prime Minister’s statements, I would rather not parse 

his statements and say anything here that makes it any harder 

than it already is for the United Nations Secretary General’s Special Representative Downer. He has succeeded in getting President 

Christofias and the Turkish community leader, Eroglou, to commit 

to meeting with some frequency, I believe twice a week, from now 

into the fall to press, press, press, for the only shape of the solution 

that anyone has ever considered possible, certainly that we have, 

which is a bizonal, bicommunal federation. We continue to uphold 

that, support it. 

Again, the Secretary of State and Assistant Secretary Gordon 

raised this when they were in Istanbul with the Turkish leadership 

just a couple of weeks ago. 

Senator MENENDEZ. But you really do not believe that Eroglou 

could make his own decisions notwithstanding what the Turkish 

Government’s views are? Do you believe that he could make independent decisions notwithstanding what the Turkish Government 

believes? 

Ambassador RICCIARDONE. I think what the Turkish Government 

wants and believes is extremely salient. 

I would point out, though, and even since I have been back to 

Turkey this time, there have been some tensions in the relationship between the community in Northern Cyprus and Ankara that 

have come out; there have been protests, even, back and forth. 

So they identify themselves as Cypriots, from my understanding, 

Turkish Cypriots to be sure, but Cypriots. And that is a distinct 

identity. 

Beyond that, I wouldn’t wish to comment or to hazard a guess 

as to how far Mr. Eroglou would go in making decisions that would 

be at variance from Ankara. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Yes, I wasn’t asking you so much about 

Eroglou as much as your assignment in Turkey, and its influence 

in this decisionmaking process. 

I have been following this for almost 20 years now, and it is clear 

to me that Turkey has a very significant influence on whether or 

not this issue is resolved in a way that it is acceptable both to 

Greek and Turkish Cypriots, as well as to the international community. 

And I just get a sense, based upon the Prime Minister’s most recent statements, that it has become more, not less onerous, to try 

to achieve that goal. 

Let me turn to another issue, which I’m sure you will want to 

be diplomatic about, and that is the question of Turkey’s relationship with Armenia. From your view, has the United States ever denied the fact that there was an Armenian genocide? 

581

Ambassador RICCIARDONE. I stand behind President Obama’s 

characterization of the Yedz Meghern, as the Armenians themselves call it, the tragic massacre, murder of a million and a half 

men, women, and children marched to their deaths in 1915. 

I stand behind our characterization of that, and our efforts of 

what we’re trying to do now. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Would you disagree with President Obama’s 

statements as Senator Obama? 

Ambassador RICCIARDONE. I would not disagree with my President and his characterization of this, of course not. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Would you disagree with Vice President 

Biden’s characterization as Senator Biden? 

Ambassador RICCIARDONE. They are both now my superiors, and 

I certainly would not disagree with their comments, with their——

Senator MENENDEZ. Would you disagree with the Secretary of 

State’s characterization of the Armenian genocide as Senator Clinton? 

Ambassador RICCIARDONE. I certainly would not disagree with 

my Secretary of State. 

Senator MENENDEZ. You are wise beyond your years. [Laughter.] 

Each of these individuals, the President of the United States, the 

Vice President of the United States, and the Secretary of State, at 

the time they were Senators, acknowledged the fact of the Armenian genocide. 

And I appreciate, Ambassador, your responses, but here we are 

again, playing an incredibly difficult set of circumstances, where 

we have nominees to Armenia going to Armenian genocide commemorations and never being able to use the word genocide. We 

have our Ambassador to Turkey, which is an important party in 

trying to get beyond this and moving toward the future, but if you 

can’t recognize the historical facts, you can’t move forward. 

And we have our President, Vice President, and Secretary of 

State, all who very clearly as members of this body recognized that 

there was an Armenian genocide. 

It is very difficult to understand how we move forward in that 

respect, and a very difficult situation we put our diplomats in in 

that respect. But I appreciate your answers. 

And I have other questions, but I see Mr. Ford is coming back, 

I guess, at some point? 

Senator SHAHEEN. He will be here for the second panel. 

Senator MENENDEZ. All right. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. 

And I want to thank both of the nominees for your public service 

and for your testimony here today. I know that the time is short, 

and we are limited in the topics we can cover, but I do want to 

start with Ambassador Ricciardone, as we are going to be talking 

later at some length about Syria and the massacre that is going on 

there. 

It’s been my sense, and I think it is a widely shared view, that 

over a number of years, if not for more than a generation, Turkey 

has been able to play significant role as a regional balancer of 

power. Turkey’s influence in the region has been very constructive 

at times. 

582

And this is one of those times when the world needs the help 

that Turkey can provide as it relates to Syria. These acts of violence against the people of Syria are unacceptable. The Syrian regime no longer has legitimacy because of those acts of violence. 

I know that Prime Minister Erdogan has been pretty clear, and 

I think pretty strong, in his statements regarding what has been 

happening in Syria. But I would ask you to reflect upon and give 

us your sense of what Turkey’s perspective is on this violence, what 

Turkey can do in the near term to put pressure on the Syrian regime, and how Turkey can be a constructive force within the region 

on this central question. 

Ambassador RICCIARDONE. Senator, thank you for that question. 

In fact, we have been engaged with Prime Minister Erdogan directly. I personally have taken a message to him from President 

Obama. The President has spoken with him personally. The Secretary did just a couple of weeks ago. 

He, President Gul, and the Foreign Minister have all had Syria 

very high on their scope, because, as they point out, as important 

as Egypt and Tunisia and Libya all are in their transitions, Turkey 

shares an 850-kilometer border with Syria. 

There are family relationships. There is an important trading relationship. Any instability in Syria could have direct security and 

economic repercussions on Turkey’s vital national interests. 

As you pointed out, Senator, the Prime Minister back in June 

had spoken out against what he called the barbarity of the Fourth 

Brigade action against Jisr al-Shughour in northern Syria. 

Just yesterday, President Gul spoke, I think for all Turks, responding to the images on Turkish televisions of what was going 

on in Hama by saying that he was horrified and shocked. And he 

even noted that, if necessary, sanctions may be on the table. 

This was moving very forward. It’s one thing when Western 

countries express our outrage and talk about these things, but 

when a neighbor as powerful as Turkey says these things, I have 

to hope that the Syrian Government will pay attention. 

I don’t think I’d be betraying a confidence: I think the Prime 

Minister has made very clear in public a conversation with a Senate delegation just about a month ago where, among other times, 

we pressed to find out what the Turks were thinking, the Prime 

Minister. 

He made clear that he was very upset, worried, and concerned, 

but he believed that Turkey had to exhaust every other avenue to 

induce change and reform in Syria and get them to stop the violence against their own people, to listen to their people. He admitted that they had been trying hard, and they had not been very 

successful. 

The United States, we find ourselves in the same position. We’ve 

tried everything to encourage, press, pressure for reform. My colleague will speak to those efforts in a few minutes. And we heard 

President Gul yesterday expressing Turkey’s sense that perhaps 

they had reached something like the end of that patience. We’ll 

have to see. 

Senator CASEY. I know there’s more we could talk about with regard to Syria, but I wanted to move to the question of Iran. We 

know that the Iranian regime has been the subject of a broad array 

583

of sanctions during the past year, and that this has been a very 

positive step in the right direction. 

There’s a lot of unanimity in the region, and well beyond the region, about sanctions against the Iranian regime. How do you think 

the Government of Turkey can become a constructive force in urging Turkish companies and other businesses in the region to comply with those Iranian sanctions? 

Ambassador RICCIARDONE. Thank you, Senator. 

The Turkish leadership at all levels, whenever we speak about 

Iran, are emphatic that they oppose any Iranian effort to acquire 

weapons of mass destruction. They point out that they’d be the first 

victims not only of such a special weapon but of a race for such 

weapons in the region, which they do not want to see Iran unleash. 

They assert that they are firmly enforcing United Nations Security Council sanctions, including under 1929, for which they didn’t 

vote. 

Beyond that, we have asked for specific help. They say that the 

United States laws, specific U.S. sanctions, the CISADA, in particular, does not apply to Turkey. But they acknowledge that Turkish firms can be affected. And Turkish firms will have to make a 

choice under our law, as to whether to deal with America and 

American companies or Iranian ones. 

We’ve asked them to go beyond that and help publicize what that 

means in technical detail, and if banks or other companies want to 

do business with Iran, help them understand. We’re putting out 

this information. We at the U.S. Embassy are glad to spread that 

information. And we asked Turkish regulators and government entities to point out and remind their companies the choices they’re 

going to have to face, and make the information further available 

in Turkish to their companies. We’re working with them. 

Senator CASEY. Let me just say in conclusion, with regard to Cyprus, I’d associate myself with Senator Menendez’s comments 

about that subject. 

And I know, Ambassador Eisen, we don’t have time to ask you 

a question, but we’ll submit something in writing. I think you are 

aware of the high regard I have for you as well. And we have a 

lot of mutual friends in Pennsylvania. Thank you. 

Ambassador EISEN. Thank you, Senator Casey. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Senator Coons. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

I want to thank Ambassadors Ricciardone, Eisen, and Ford for 

your service over the past year. I clarify that, in my view, you all 

three have served with distinction and advocate for your confirmation, so you can continue in the strong leadership roles. 

I won’t stay for the second panel, so I wanted to particularly 

commend Ambassador Ford for demonstrating real leadership and 

resolve in the face of very difficult circumstances in Syria by both 

personally going to and meeting with demonstrators and protesters 

in some very difficult circumstances, and in advocating for our values and our interests as a nation. 

I hope it is clear that many in this body share Secretary Clinton’s statement that President Assad has lost legitimacy to lead 

and very grave concern about the path forward in Syria. 

584

And as it relates to Turkey, I’m very concerned about recent 

events about what this weekend’s resignation of military leadership 

really means, about the tension between the secular military traditions and foundations in the modern Turkish state, and the increasingly Islamist tendencies of some in the current administration. And I’m very concerned about Turkey’s relationship with 

Israel. 

To Ambassador Ricciardone, you’ve chosen a particularly interesting post to return to, as the questions from other members of 

the panel suggested, whether it’s the relations with Cyprus, with 

Greece, the ongoing challenges in Iran, in Syria, the relationship 

with Israel. 

There’s plenty we could dedicate our time to, and I mean no disrespect to Ambassador Eisen, who serves with one of our closest 

and best allies, but Turkey presents a rich menu of potential questions to pursue. 

Your last comment there about the choice that Turkish companies must make between facing sanctions under CISADA is something I strongly support, and I appreciate Senator Casey, raising 

the issue. 

I think it is very critical that we engage Turkish business. So I’m 

grateful for your leadership in the U.S.-Turkey Business Council in 

promoting entrepreneurship and opening United States markets. 

But I would also urge your aggressive engagement to the extent 

appropriate in clarifying our very strong concerns as a nation about 

Iran and its development. 

I was pleased to hear in response to previous questions your view 

that Prime Minister Erdogan is being engaged and effective in advocating for I think what is a very broadly shared multinational 

concern over the tragic events in Syria and over the, I would view 

it, as crimes against humanity by the Assad regime in murdering 

their own people. 

I also want to associate myself with Senator Menendez’s questions about Cyprus and ask you two questions, if I could, briefly. 

The first would be, what have you been able to do in order to 

promote religious freedom? You referenced to meeting with His Holiness Bartholomew. What path forward do you think there might 

be for restoring the property and the Halki Theological Seminary? 

And what could we be doing to be a more effective partner with you 

in advocating for religious tolerance and openness in Turkish society? 

And then second, what’s your assessment of the state of TurkishIsraeli relations? Turkey, for a very long time, was a vital ally of 

Israel, and it’s my hope that the recent changes in military leadership may open a window for improved relations. 

I recognize this is a very difficult moment and getting past the 

difficulties of last year’s flotilla incident are quite difficult. 

So given the limitations of your role as a diplomatic representative of the United States, I would welcome any insights you’d had 

for us in how we strengthen business ties and recognize that they 

are a wonderful ally in a conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq, and have 

stood by us in NATO and in many contexts, while pressing forward 

religious freedom and the importance of our strategic relationship 

with Israel. 

585

Ambassador RICCIARDONE. Senator, thank you for all those questions. 

Let me start with religious freedom first and then go on to Israel, 

and if you wish to pursue Cyprus and CISADA, we can do that as 

well. 

On religious freedom, I have raised this question with all the 

leaders I’ve been privileged to see, and I made it a point to call on 

the community leaders as well. 

I wanted the community leaders’ perspective, not only on the 

property issues. And it’s not only with the Greek Orthodox of 

course, the senior patriarchate, but also the Armenian community, 

the Syrians, have their own parallel sorts of issues, and I’ve gone 

into some detail with them. 

We’ve learned the legal questions. They all have legal cases at 

one level or another in the Turkish courts, which they’re prepared 

to take on to international courts. 

I don’t want to betray any of their confidences in these legal 

things, but they are encouraged by the first-ever contacts they’re 

having with high leaders of the state, both substantive ones regarding their issues, and in things that really matter in that part of the 

world in particular, and that is honor and dignity and respect. 

The religious community leaders have had the first-ever visits by 

high officials of the state to them—not by themselves to the offices 

of the Prime Minister and the Governor, but Governors and the 

Prime Minister coming to them. That has not happened before, or 

in anyone’s memory at least, in the modern history of the republic. 

When I’ve raised these with high officials of the state, they say, 

why should you be surprised? We are not afraid of religion. 

And very interestingly, they follow our debates about personal 

freedom and religious freedom. And they say, ‘‘here’s how you can 

understand this, American Ambassador. In your country, you have 

in recent years made a distinction between freedom of religion and 

the concept of freedom from religion. And for too long in our modern republic, we focused on preventing the intrusion of religion in 

our national life and political life. We’re quite comfortable to be observant Muslims. Please don’t call us Islamists, by the way,’’ they 

tell us. ‘‘But to the extent, someone is praying as a Christian or a 

Jew, it really doesn’t bother us at all. Why should it? It’s no threat 

to the state. On the contrary, we’re rather proud of our diversity, 

and we’re happy to have them do it.’’

‘‘As to the property issues, let us take a fresh look at this and 

make sure that they get justice.’’

I’m very hopeful. Again, I don’t want to betray any confidences. 

I don’t want to overpromise. But I dare be hopeful that Halki Seminary in particular will be resolved. It’s His All Holiness’s anniversary of ordination this year, his 40th year as a priest, and I know 

he would very much like to see that resolved this year. We would, 

too. 

On Israel, I can’t speak for Israel—I’ve spent time there. I have 

Israeli friends. I don’t claim expertise. But I feel very certain, having discussed this at length with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, certainly the military leadership, that all these 

Turks, whatever their feelings, misgivings, and irritation over the 

terrible flotilla incident of last year and, over events in Gaza, they 

586

understand that to influence events in the region, to be part of a 

more peaceful and prosperous region, which is in their vital national interest, they need to have a normal, fruitful, respectful, and 

full diplomatic dialogue with Israel. And they want to get back to 

that. 

We’ve worked very much with both sides. We’ve reminded each 

side of the stake they have in the relationship with the other. And 

neither side really needs any reminding; they know the importance 

of it. 

The Secretary of State, again, has been working on this personally through her recent visit and otherwise. 

I dare to hope that Turkey and Israel will figure this out, and 

I certainly hope to see a Turkish Ambassador back in Tel Aviv 

very, very soon. 

Let me end there, if I may. 

Senator COONS. Thank you very much for your hard work, Mr. 

Ambassador. It’s a vital strategic relationship, and I’m grateful for 

your advocacy on behalf of the people of the United States with the 

Republic of Turkey. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Senator Coons. 

I have to go to preside over the Senate in just a few minutes, but 

I did want to raise one more question for Ambassador Eisen before 

I go. 

Critics of the Obama administration’s reset policy with Russia 

have suggested that engagement with Russia would come at the expense of our allies in Central and Eastern Europe. I wonder if you 

could speak to the Czech Republic’s view of the administration’s 

reset efforts with Russia. 

Ambassador EISEN. I think that the Czech Republic has come to 

understand and appreciate the spirit of the reset with Russia and 

the benefits that that confers, not just for the United States-Russian relationship but in the region. 

Of course, the President has made Prague a centerpiece of these 

issues, going to Prague twice, including—I had the privilege to accompany him last year for the signing of the START Treaty with 

President Medvedev. 

I was very pleased. I think it is a token of the—and indeed, more 

than a token, a recognition of the importance of these issues that 

my Czech government colleagues affirmatively embrace the socalled Prague Agenda, and took the bull by the horns and scheduled a conference, an international conference, on the Prague Agenda not long after I arrived in the Czech Republic, to commemorate 

the 1-year anniversary and the 2-year anniversary of the President’s speeches there. 

We had representatives from Russia, from the United States, and 

from around the world come, including Dr. Gary Samore from the 

White House, one of the principal advisers to the President on 

these matters, to think about what the long-term benefits can be 

for the region and for the world. 

So I think we’ve made good progress. I could give other examples, but I think we’ve made good progress on these grounds. It is 

important to have an Ambassador there to help convey communicaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00594 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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tions in both directions on this subject and I am very pleased with 

where we are on the reset now. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Casey or Senator Coons, do either of you have any other 

questions for this panel? 

I have a few other questions that we will present in writing for 

each of you and the record will stay open until close of business on 

Friday for any further questions from members of the committee. 

So hearing no further questions, I will thank you both again for 

your service and your willingness to continue to do this, and hope 

we can get swift action from the Senate and close this hearing, and 

turn the gavel over to Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY [presiding]. We will start our second panel. 

And, Mr. Ford, I know that you gave an opening statement before I arrived here. I will present an opening statement, and then 

we can then go right to questions. Am I correct in saying that you 

did present? 

Ambassador FORD. Yes, Senator, that is correct. 

Senator CASEY. I want to make sure. Thank you very much. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR.,

U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA 

Well, thank you, everyone, for being here. I know we’re moving 

to our second panel on a very busy day, but I want to get right into 

these critically important issues. 

Over the past few days, scores have been killed in Hama, the 

same location of a devastating attack by government forces in 1982 

which killed an estimated 10,000 Syrian civilians. 

Despite the sustained assault by government forces, Syrian activists continue to demonstrate in very large numbers, a testament to 

their courage, their cause, and their desire for the most basic elements of human rights and human dignity. 

The horror taking place in Syria today has led me, and I know 

many others in this body, the United States Senate, to be very 

clear about the conclusion that we’ve reached: This is a regime that 

is not capable of real reform. It has lost all legitimacy. 

We must be direct and, I believe, unequivocal in our message to 

the dictator of Damascus. Bashar al-Assad must step down. The 

Syrian people should not have to bear the brutality of this regime 

any longer. 

Let’s not forget how these demonstrations in fact started. These 

demonstrations started with children. 

On March 6 of this year, the Syrian authorities arrested 15 

school children in the city of Dara for spray painting 

antigovernment slogans. These children were reportedly tortured 

while they were in custody. 

Their parents and members of the community demonstrated and 

called for their release. The police used force on the parents and 

community leaders and, within a week, had killed 55 people. 

Today, after months of courageous demonstrations—and, of 

course, that’s a dramatic understatement, there is no other way to 

adequately convey the courage and the valor of these people. 

After all of the demonstrations, some estimates indicate that the 

death toll has reached as high as 2,000, and is at least more than 

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1,600. Some say, of course, that even 2,000 would be too low an estimate. We don’t know for sure. But it is unacceptable for us to 

stand by any longer and just watch this. 

The terrible reach of this regime has directly affected constituents in my home State of Pennsylvania. Dr. Hazem Hallak is a naturalized American citizen from Syria and a respected oncology researcher who lives in Merion Park, PA, just outside of Philadelphia. 

In May, his brother Sakher, who was also a doctor, visited the 

United States to attend a medical conference. Upon his return to 

Syria, Sakher went missing. His wife contacted the authorities, 

who confirmed that he was in their custody but would be released 

shortly. 

The next day, Sakher’s wife and daughter were interviewed by 

the authorities who again confirmed that he would be released. 

Two days later, his body was discovered in a village 20 miles south 

of Aleppo. 

The authorities then denied that he was ever in their custody 

and claimed that they found his body in a ditch by the side of the 

road. Sakher’s body was subjected to brutal torture. His bones were 

broken and his body was mutilated in unspeakable ways. 

Sakher was not a political activist. He was not involved in the 

demonstrations. His sole offense appears to have been his trip to 

the medical conference and his visit with his brother in the United 

States of America. 

We honor Sakher’s memory, and the memories of hundreds of 

others, by calling for democratic change in Syria. 

We know that our allies across the Arab League and in Turkey, 

as I raised during the first panel, have a unique and critical role 

to play here in pressure the Assad regime. 

These countries have economic and diplomatic ties with Syria 

that the United States does not have. I support their efforts to leverage these relationships for a comprehensive regional approach 

to this crisis, and I applaud our allies who have already rejected 

the Assad regime. 

In addition to strong messages from Washington and a concerted 

diplomatic push, more can be done to pressure Syria at international bodies. We need to maintain pressure on Syria at the 

United Nations Human Rights Council. We should also continue to 

pursue a resolution at the U.N. Security Council, condemning the 

Syrian Government’s behavior. 

On Monday of this week, Germany called for a Security Council 

meeting on Syria, which I hope will result in a strong resolution. 

Though some Security Council members remain resistant, especially in the wake of recent violence, it is unacceptable for the 

United Nations to continue ignoring the courage of the Syrian people and the carnage brought about by the Syrian regime. 

We must also continue to pursue efforts to constrict the ability 

of this regime to conduct business abroad. 

I welcome the new European Union sanctions on Syria announced this week, which imposed asset freezes and travel bans on 

five more military and government officials. We must also be willing to examine expanded sanctions on the banking and energy sectors. 

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I also want to applaud the courageous work done by our diplomats in Damascus, led by Robert Ford, who is with us today. 

Ambassador Ford’s recent trip to Hama was a testament to his 

commitment to representing the interests and the values of the 

United States. Due to the draconian measures imposed on the 

media by the Assad regime, Ambassador Ford has been one of the 

few people who has traveled within Syria and borne witness to the 

truth of the terrible crimes taking place across that country. 

President Obama was right to send Ambassador Ford to Syria 

last year. I look forward to supporting his confirmation when it 

comes before the full Senate. 

Mr. Ford has shown that an American Ambassador is not a gift 

to host countries, but a representative who will actively pursue 

American interests and American values. The most basic American 

value, the right to democratic representation, is at stake in Syria. 

And I know that Ambassador Ford has been a stalwart advocate 

for this principle of democratic representation while he has served 

in Damascus. 

Ambassador Ford, welcome back to the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee. I know this is your second welcome today, but I thank 

you for your decades of service and the remarkable efforts that you 

and your team have undertaken in Damascus. And I look forward 

to the answers you’ll provide to our questions. 

I wanted to open up by asking for your assessment of the violence, and anything you can tell us about the opposition. I would 

also like to hear your opinion of how the United States Congress 

can be most effective and most helpful. 

Ambassador FORD. Thank you very much, Senator. It’s nice to 

see you again. 

Senator Casey. Thank you. 

Ambassador Ford. First if I may, I am very fortunate to work 

with a small but very dedicated team at the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, both Americans and Syrians, and one of my team is here. 

She actually interrupted her vacation to help me during these few 

days of meetings I have in Washington. So I’d like to introduce Joanne Cummings, who is wearing red. 

Joanne works on economic and political issues in Damascus. She 

lives in Damascus without her husband, who was evacuated because of the deteriorating security situation. All of our American 

staff there live without their families, and it’s a really super team, 

and it is a team effort. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you as well on our behalf. 

Ambassador FORD. Senator, with respect to the violence, it’s getting worse. The Syrian Government’s constant brutality, its refusal 

to allow peaceful marches, its insistence on widespread arrest campaigns, and its atrocious torture—the reports you read about the 

detention conditions are just ghastly. They are, in turn, fostering 

more violence. 

We saw that in the third-largest city of the country, Homs, 2 

weeks ago. We’re seeing at this weekend too, I think. 

But I want to be clear, I visited Jisr al-Shughour on a government-sponsored trip in June. I heard what they said, and I wandered away from the crowd and talked to some other people. And 

it’s very clear what happened up there. 

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There was a peaceful protest on a Friday. Syrian security forces 

shot some of the protesters. At the funeral on Saturday, the next 

day, the people got quite emotional because they had lost loved 

ones, and they then attacked and killed a lot of Syrian security 

people. 

That paradigm, that cycle, is repeated over and over again. The 

cycle starts with Syrian Government violence against peaceful protest. 

We need to be very clear. The Syrian Government was saying 

there are armed groups up in Hama. I went there. I didn’t see a 

single gun. The most dangerous weapon I saw was a slingshot. 

We need to be clear about what the nature of the violence is and 

where it comes from. The responsibility lies with President Assad 

and his government. 

And let me again reiterate the call by the President on July 31, 

the Secretary yesterday, the Syrian Government needs to stop that 

slaughter. 

Would you like me to discuss briefly, Senator, the opposition? 

Senator CASEY. Yes, thank you. 

Ambassador FORD. I spent a fair amount of my time getting to 

know them inside Syria. The Secretary today met a group of Syrian 

opposition members that are living outside Syria, and I was able 

to join that meeting as well. 

A couple of things I would say about them. It’s a diverse group. 

They’re not very well-organized. That is not surprising. 

The Syrian Government for decades would not allow any opposition party to exist, much less meet and much less organize. They 

are trying to do that now. Very frankly, they have a long way to 

go. 

It is important for the Syrian opposition to develop their ideas, 

Syrian ideas, about how the democratic transition in Syria, which 

we think is underway. I mean, the street protests, as I said in my 

opening statement, are growing. 

The democratic transition is underway. The Syrian opposition 

needs to identify how that transition should proceed. That should 

not be an American responsibility. This is a Syrian issue that Syrians should decide. 

How about if I hold there, Senator? 

Senator Casey. Thank you very much. 

I know that Americans are outraged by this violence but when 

you open up the newspaper day after day, you see instability and 

change in a lot of places in the Middle East. In this context, the 

level of outrage toward the Syrian regime might be more muted. 

The Middle East is always a volatile region. You know better 

than I, but lately it’s been that much more difficult. So I think it’s 

difficult sometimes for many Americans to sustain their focus. 

But it’s my opinion that not only should Mr. Assad step down, 

but he should stop trying to deliberately mislead the world. His 

forces engage in acts of violence which are always followed by 

fraudulent promises of reform, and then this cycle is repeated. 

I know that part of the impediment here is developing a broad 

enough coalition of nations and governments to support us, and I 

know that we’re trying to get an even broader coalition. And one 

of the challenges we have is engaging Russia and China. And they 

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are two of the most vocal opponents. I don’t know why. I can’t understand it. I don’t agree with it, but we have to acknowledge it. 

They’re two of the most vocal opponents against any kind of resolution in the Security Council. 

What can you tell us about efforts to engage there, and what the 

latest is? 

Ambassador FORD. Senator, there have been intense discussions 

today up in New York, again, about some kind of U.N. Security 

Council action. My understanding from colleagues up in New York 

a couple of hours ago was that the most recent Syrian Government 

repressive measures in places like d’Azur out in the east and in 

Hama in the West have had an impact, and that the members of 

the Security Council who had opposed Security Council action are 

potentially now more open to some kind of action. 

Discussions are underway. My understanding is, even as we 

speak here, we think it is important, I want to underline this, we 

think it is important that the United Nations Security Council take 

action. We think it is important that the international community 

recognize the courage and the efforts of the Syrian people to effect 

change, to push for freedom and dignity, and that the international 

community should support them. 

Senator CASEY. I mentioned that sometimes it’s hard for Americans to sustain a focus on violence, even violence at this level of 

brutality, because of the confluence of several events that interfere 

or prevent our focus from being intensified. One of the challenges 

we face with Syria is a lack of information because of the Syrian 

Government’s ability to censor or limit information. 

I spoke earlier of the estimates of the number killed, which we’re 

never sure is accurate. You obviously have concerns about this but 

let me ask you, are there ways that we can circumvent the censors 

that are in place now, or limit the ability of the Syrian Government 

to prevent the free flow of information? 

Ambassador FORD. Senator, one of the big topics that I’ve had in 

my discussions with officials of the Syrian Government over the 

last several months is the importance of allowing in international 

media. I do not know how many times I have raised that with the 

Foreign Minister, with the Vice Foreign Minister, with close advisers to President Assad himself. 

The Syrians have a refrain, which I hear all the time, which is 

media coverage is unfair, to which I have told them, well, then you 

need to have the media come in and look at it and let them draw 

their own judgment. 

I will say that after my last conversations about that, CNN was 

invited in. National Public Radio, Deb Amos, was invited in. And 

we got a couple of British news agencies in. 

They were still kind of tracked and monitored in the country. 

They didn’t have nearly the kind of freedom that I would have 

liked to see, that we would have liked to have seen. And I think 

NPR just got back in again. 

But you’re right that the censorship is a huge problem. And one 

of the reasons that I have moved around the country is to get a 

sense myself of what’s going on. 

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It’s terribly frustrating to not really understand. I mean, you can 

watch YouTube videos, but there is a certain utility to having your 

own eyes to see things. 

I have been encouraging my colleague Ambassadors in Damascus 

to get out of Damascus and to visit parts of the country. Some are 

quite active, the French Ambassador, for example. 

And I think we then also need to help the Syrian people themselves, the activists, learn how to make the best use of technologies, so that they too can use the Internet to get the word out. 

And I have to say they’re quite ingenious doing this. 

In fact, colleagues of mine at the Embassy tell me that the Syrians understand a lot of the Internet G-chat and such things better 

than some of us do. So there’s a lot of ingenuity there, Senator. 

But the fundamental problem is that the Syrian Government will 

not allow the free flow of information, and that should stop. 

Senator CASEY. Well, that’s one of the ways I would make a determination about the regime’s legitimacy. That’s one of the measurements. If you’re not allowing the free flow of information, I 

think that, at a minimum, questions arise about the implications 

of that. 

I wanted to return to our earlier discussion about the opposition. 

I know this is difficult to do, especially considering that you’re in 

the vortex of this, much more so than I am or people here in Washington. 

But to the extent that you can step back a little bit and provide 

a perspective based upon recent events, one of the most significant 

factors in how the transition took place in Egypt, in my opinion, 

was the fact that the military showed some measure of forbearance. 

And there were a number of people in the ruling elite who also 

showed some forbearance, or at least were measured in the way 

they responded. And that allowed a kind of transition which, compared to some other places, we might now be hoping would replicate itself. 

In Syria, is there any element within the government at a high 

level or within senior leadership of the military, where you see 

some even unrealized potential for forbearance? Someone at the 

top, in essence, saying, this has gone too far, we’ve got to at least 

stop and pause, and recognize a certain boundary? I’m not expecting anyone at the highest levels to agree with me about Mr. 

Assad’s stepping down. 

But is there any potential for someone to, at the highest level of 

civilian or military leadership, to show that kind of forbearance in 

the near term? 

Ambassador FORD. Senator, I’m going to be very frank. I have 

heard from a number of officials in Damascus messages of good intent. 

I have to tell you that what matters is change on the ground, an 

end to the shooting of peaceful protesters, an end to these sweeps 

where hundreds of young people are rounded up without any kind 

of judicial process and held for months, often in barbaric conditions, the release of political prisoners. There are still political prisoners not been released. Change on the ground. 

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And I have listened to these messages of good intent, and when 

I come back to them and say, what about changing this and changing this today or tomorrow, I don’t get much back. 

A few things here and there, Senator, but not very much. And 

our conclusion is that this regime is unwilling or unable to lead the 

democratic transition that the Syrian people are demanding now. 

And in a sense, unwilling or unable doesn’t really matter, because what we are interested in, what the Syrian people are interested in, what the international community is interest in, is that 

change on the ground, the positive change on the ground. 

And the incidents just over the past few days, leading up to 

Ramadan and then since the start of the month, show that there 

is no positive change on the ground. 

Senator CASEY. I was afraid your answer would be very much 

the way you just articulated. And I think if anything, that testimony should be ‘‘exhibit A’’ as to why we’ve got to maintain pressure and think of other ways to impose even greater pressure on 

the Syrian regime by developing and strengthening alliances 

through engagement and through efforts in the way of sanctions or 

other pressure. 

Because my sense, and I think you just confirmed it, is that this 

not a regime that’s going to get tired of doing this, unless there is 

a countervailing force that is pushing for change. 

I want to explore some of those other pressure points. There are 

some commentators, some with a significant degree of experience, 

who think that we should be turning up more pressure and imposing more economic pressure by way of the energy sector. 

I wanted to get your thoughts on that as another possible approach here. 

Ambassador FORD. Senator, it’s an excellent question. 

On the energy sector, we have for years had sanctions against 

American companies doing business there. And so unilaterally, additional American measures, unilaterally, probably are not going to 

have that big of an impact. 

The big companies that are working in the Syrian energy, petroleum oil and gas sector in Syria right now, are mostly European 

and Canadian. And so we would look to find ways to work with our 

partners to enhance those sanctions. And frankly, we have had discussions about that and that’s underway. 

European and Canadians, too, are watching what’s going on in 

Syria, and I think the Syrian Government’s latest actions will help 

trigger action, frankly speaking. 

Senator CASEY. Often a lot of what drives fervor for change is 

rooted as much in economics as it is in anything else. How would 

you assess the Syrian economy prior the beginning of this year 

versus the way it looks now in terms of its significance as an issue 

in this conflict? 

Ambassador FORD. The violence and the unrest in Syria, the lack 

of stability, is really hurting the Syrian economy. It started off 

slow, but it is snowballing. 

Let me give you just a couple of examples. Tourism represented 

a growing part of the economy. The tourism sector is completely 

dead. The hotels in places like Aleppo and Damascus, which norVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00601 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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mally would have occupancy rates of 80 to 90 percent, are down to 

0 to 10 percent right now. Hotels are laying off staff. 

The country is draining slowly but steadily its foreign exchange 

reserves. Business throughout the economy has slowed dramatically, whether it be production of pharmaceuticals or textiles, whatever it is. 

The demand among Syrian consumers has dropped off the table. 

People, in a sense, are afraid to buy because the times are so unsettled. 

And so companies are really hurting. Banks are also hurting. Joanne just did a very good assessment of the financial sector in the 

way it is suffering because of the current situation. 

One of the things that we’re trying to do, Senator, and this is I 

think quite important—Joanne and I both worked in Iraq. We do 

not want our sanctions to devastate the broader Syrian economy, 

because in the period after Assad, it will be important for Syria to 

be a strong country, and a strong economy will be part of that. So 

we have really worked in the United States Government and with 

our partners abroad to target sanctions against specific companies 

and against specific individuals that are involved in the repression, 

without targeting the broader Syrian economy and making the people of Syria suffer. 

It is a different kind of sanction regime from what we have in 

Iraq, say. It’s much more specifically targeted with the goal of sparing the Syrian people themselves great suffering. 

Senator CASEY. And I know that’s always the challenge, to make 

such sanctions targeted enough and impactful enough on the regime. 

As often happens in these situations, we’ve seen an out-migration, in this case, most of it or the majority of folks fleeing northwestern Syria into Turkey. 

Can you give us any report on that? And a related question, obviously, maybe the bigger question is, how do you assess the role 

played by the Turkish Government? What role can the Turkish 

Government play in creating more pressure and more impact on 

the Syrian regime? 

Ambassador FORD. First, Senator, may I just follow up on a little 

part on that, the economic sanctions you mentioned——

Senator CASEY. Sure. 

Ambassador FORD [continuing]. And the challenge of getting targeting that works and has an impact? 

We really do spend a lot of time on this, and let me just give you 

a couple of success stories that may not have made the news here. 

One of President Assad’s cousins is named Rami Makhlouf. He 

is very well known in Syria. He is probably the richest man in 

Syria. He’s a very, shall I say, unscrupulous businessman. 

And we have targeted him very specifically as well as his companies because we know he helps finance the regime. 

He applied for citizenship to Cyprus. He didn’t get it, because 

working with the E.U., we made sure that he couldn’t get to Cyprus and he couldn’t get Cyprian citizenship. 

That’s strike one against him. Strike two, one of his biggest companies is called Cham Holding, so we targeted that specifically. It 

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had a board of directors. We went after a couple of them specifically. 

Their board members’ term expired at the end of April, and they 

were too afraid to have another board meeting. So they finally, the 

government insisted that businessmen come together and have a 

board meeting in July, and all they were able to do was come up 

with half of a board and one vice chairman. No one would agree 

to even be the chairman of Cham Holding. 

So the sanctions do bite, maybe not in ways that are always on 

the headlines. But what we do see is more and more business people, and especially Sunni business people, which is an important 

pillar of the regime’s support, we do see them slowly but surely 

shifting sides, and that’s important. 

So I do think our sanctions are having an impact. 

With respect then, Senator, to your question about refugees going 

into Turkey and the Turkish role more generally, a couple of things 

I would say. 

First, we appreciate that the Turks did offer refuge to people 

fleeing the Government of Syria campaigns in northwestern Syria. 

People fled in the thousands—we estimate somewhere around 

12,000—fled mainly because they were terrified of army and Syrian 

intelligence service retaliation against them. The army and especially—especially—the intelligence service have a fearsome reputation, and we have seen plenty of videos on Arabic satellite TV of 

how they beat and torture people, and some of them quite gruesome. 

So people fled in real fear. That’s what happened in Jisr alShughour, the town I visited up in the north in June. 

So we appreciate the role that the Turks have played. My understanding now is that some refugees who went to Turkey are beginning to trickle back into Syria. They think that they will be safe. 

The Syrian Red Crescent has extended promises that they will 

watch over people coming back, that there’s not mistreatment. I 

think most of the refugees are still in Turkey; somewhere around 

8,000 are still there. So plenty of people are still afraid and don’t 

trust their own government in Syria. 

But the Turkish role in this has been, I think, very good, and we 

appreciate it. 

With respect, Senator, to your question more broadly about what 

can Turkey do, I think Turkey has a very, very important role. And 

I’m often in touch with my colleague Ambassador Ricciardone up 

in Ankara. 

The Turks have a very deep commercial relationship that they 

have been building up for years. They had personal relations between the Turkish leadership and the Syrian leadership that they 

had consciously fostered. They wanted to build influence. 

I think it is fair to say that the Turks—even yesterday, President 

Gul was very critical of the latest Syrian measures. 

The Turks have perhaps a unique capability, both to talk to the 

Syrians on several levels, because over the years they’ve built those 

contacts, and also were they to adopt sanctions, for example, I 

think those, too, would bite. 

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Senator CASEY. Well, that’s something I hope we can continue to 

foster, because that kind of help in the region could be very significant. 

I was in the region last in July of 2010, and our second to last 

stop was in Beirut in Lebanon. And I could sense, almost feel, the 

heavy presence of Hezbollah in Lebanon. And I wanted to get your 

sense about the implications of the unrest and the violence in Syria 

for Lebanon. How has Hezbollah responded to that? 

Ambassador FORD. Senator, when I appeared before the Foreign 

Relations Committee in March 2010, we spoke a long time about 

Hezbollah in that hearing, I recall. 

We have a real opportunity with change in Syria to see both Iranian influence and Hezbollah influence in the region diminish. 

That would be a real gain for us. 

It would also be a real gain for the Syrian people, since the Iranians are helping right now with the repression in Syria. 

With respect to Hezbollah specifically, the Syrian support to 

Hezbollah has continued. It has not stopped. At the same time, I 

think the leadership of Hezbollah at first was very outspoken in its 

support of the Syrian Government. More recently, they have been 

quiet. And my sense is that they have seen enough Hezbollah flags 

burned in Syrian protests, especially in places like d’Azur and 

Hama and Daraa, that they realized that their support for the Syrian Government is not garnering them any long-term friendship 

with the Syrian people. 

Senator CASEY. And can you explain that? Just walk through 

that in terms of the——

Ambassador FORD. The protesters, and I think Syrians more generally, understand that Iran and Hezbollah are supporting Syrian 

Government repression against them. 

Senator CASEY. And I know that when you were getting out of 

Damascus, and I think with a lot of valor and a lot of commitment, 

to bear witness to the truth it had to be in some ways harrowing. 

But what did you draw from it mostly? I mean, I know you saw 

a lot, and you had a better sense of what was happening, as you 

said, on the ground. But what did you draw from it, other than 

what has to be the remarkable inspiration provided by these brave 

people? What else can you tell us about that journey you took? 

Ambassador FORD. It was a fascinating experience, Senator. I’ve 

had a lot of interesting trips during my time in the Peace Corps, 

and then in the Foreign Service. But that one would rank up near 

the top. 

I came away with a couple of conclusions, which I shared with 

the Department of State and also with the media. 

First of all, the protesters there are peaceful. As I think I mentioned, the one weapon I saw was a slingshot. These are not gunmen. 

When we came up to the first checkpoint, very frankly, the local’s 

checkpoint, not a government checkpoint, we weren’t sure they 

were going to be armed or not, and we were a little nervous. 

But the second point I came with was, they are not against foreigners. We told them we were American diplomats. They said, oh, 

America, great, go ahead, please pass, you know, whatever. 

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We got kind of lost in Hama. We should have had a map, but 

we didn’t. So we had to stop and ask for directions, and they actually got in the car and took us to where we wanted to go. They 

were very nice, invited us to lunch, et cetera. 

They’re not anti-American at all. In fact, I think they appreciated 

the attention that the United States showed to their cause, and 

that they were peaceful. 

When they asked who I was, and I said I’m the American Ambassador, several of them said, oh, come on, who are you really? 

So they didn’t believe me until I gave them some business cards. 

And the third thing I came away with, Senator, is their incredible commitment. And I get that whenever I meet opposition people 

in any city in Syria. The commitment they have to change and to 

freedom and to dignity, they are not going to stop. They underline 

that over and over, and we have seen that. 

We were talking about Egypt a little while ago. Roughly 900 

Egyptians died in the first phase of that Egyptian revolution out 

of a country of 80 million people. Syria has only 23 million people, 

and nearly 2,000 have died. So the scale of killing in Syria is way 

beyond what it was in Egypt. 

But the people in Hama and elsewhere are quite committed to 

change. And I don’t think they’re going to stop. 

And so I think we owe it to them to remain supportive and to 

try to build that support wisely, carefully, but to build that support. 

Senator CASEY. And I know we have to wrap up, and we’ve covered a good bit, not nearly enough. 

And I’m sure I’ll have questions for the record. We’ll try not to 

overload you with too many written questions. You’ve got work to 

do, and we don’t want to burden you with that. But I’ll leave the 

record open until Friday for other members to submit questions or 

for witnesses to amplify their testimony or their responses. 

I’ll ask in conclusion one broad question, but I think an important one. I think I know what your message to the American people 

is about solidarity and about focus on this horror that we’re seeing. 

But what specifically would you or the administration hope that 

the Congress would do by way of action—legislative or otherwise—

that would be constructive in helping, not just show solidarity, but 

to continue the focus that should be brought to bear on what these 

brave citizens of Syria are trying to accomplish? 

Ambassador FORD. Senator, I’ve been working in the Middle East 

since 1980, when I went out as a Peace Corps Volunteer, and I 

really liked the President’s speech on the Arab spring, the speech 

that he gave on May 19th, because I think he laid out for the 

American people why change in the Arab world matters for us and 

what it means for our own national security. 

And the point that the President stressed that I really appreciated was that the democratic transitions underway from Morocco 

to the Persian Gulf do matter to us. We have big interest in that 

part of the world. And it can be positive change, and we should be 

supporting democratic transitions throughout the region. 

And there may be times when our assistance is needed directly 

and our assistance is only needed indirectly, but we should look to 

be supportive. 

598

What I would hope from the Congress is that it works with the 

administration to make sure that resources are available when we 

need them to support those transitions. 

I’m going to be very frank again, Senator, if you don’t mind. I 

was in Algeria during the civil war there in the mid 1990s. There 

was a very brave Algerian opposition at the time, and we had nothing really that we could offer them. There was no access to the 

Democratic Institute and the kinds of programs they do, or the Republican Institute. 

Those kinds of programs actually do matter a lot, and we work 

with civil society and we work with political parties. Those programs do help, and we have clawed and scratched for gains in 

places like Iraq, and the resources that we commit help. 

It’s still up to the local people, whether it be in Iraq, or Syria, 

or Egypt, or whatever, but we can help. And I hope we, the American people, will understand the value to our national security of 

supporting those democratic transitions. 

Senator CASEY. We want to thank you for your testimony, and 

express our gratitude and commendation on a much larger scale for 

your commitment on the ground, which is a noteworthy and very 

significant act of public service. 

We appreciate that, and we’ll work with you. And I know that’s 

a bipartisan sentiment in a town bipartisanship is all too rare. 

Ambassador, thank you very much for your testimony, and we’re 

adjourned. 

Ambassador FORD. Thank you, Senator. 

[Whereupon, at 4:41 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF ROBERT FORD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

THE FOLLOWING SENATORS

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. What is the practical impact of the U.N. Security Council decision to 

condemn ‘‘widespread violations of human rights and the use of force against civilians by the Syrian authorities?’’ The Security Council also called on the Syrian 

authorities to allow aid agencies, which have been prevented from entering the 

country, ‘‘unhindered access’’ for humanitarian relief. How should the United States 

respond if the Syrian Government ignores this edict?

Answer. We assess that any U.N. Security Council action condemning the Syrian 

authorities’ widespread and gross violations of human rights would have a practical 

impact with the regime as well as the opposition in Syria. We cannot overstate the 

importance of international solidarity to isolate the Assad regime and signal global 

support for the Syrian people. Human rights activists and oppositionists often tell 

us that many Syrians are looking for a unified international response. While the 

UNSC Presidential Statement was helpful, we believe a U.N. Security Council resolution will go further to increase domestic and international pressure on the regime 

to cease its security crackdown and take steps such as allowing humanitarian aid 

agencies into Syria. I believe the United States should continue to pressure the regime in various and creative ways to impact the regime’s inner coterie and undermine the regime’s remaining pillars of support inside Syria. Of course, we must be 

careful to do this in such a way so that our actions have minimal effects on the 

Syrian public—we are targeting the Assad regime, not the Syrian people.

Question. What steps can the international community take to put further pressure on the Assad regime to refrain from using violence against its own population? 

What role do you see for the United States and specifically the U.S. mission in Syria 

in such an initiative?

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Answer. We believe that action taken by the United Nations Security Council may 

be an important factor that can impact the regime’s calculus on using violence. The 

United States continues to lead the international community and work multilaterally to highlight the regime’s brutality and unremitting human rights violations in 

order to force the Assad regime to step aside. We also will look for ways to increase 

bilateral pressure through our bilateral sanctions. 

In this regard, regional outreach is critical. I meet regularly with the ambassadors 

from other key nations, either to influence their assessments and strategies or, if 

we are in agreement, to coordinate our approaches. It is also important for the U.S. 

Government to work in concert with our allies in order for targeted sanctions to 

have greater effect. I do much of this coordination in Damascus. Given that most 

Syrian officials have far more assets in the EU, Turkey, and the Arab Gulf than 

they do in the United States, working with our allies is critical for sanctions’ success. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our EU allies and partners in the 

region to do everything possible to bring an immediate end to the brutal violence 

the Assad regime is perpetrating against peaceful protesters. 

Furthermore, the staff members of the U.S. Embassy in Damascus continue to 

meet with activists, observers, and oppositionists in support of a peaceful transition 

to a pluralistic and inclusive democracy. We will also speak out publicly, whether 

directly to the Arabic media or through the Embassy Facebook site.

Question. How effective have the intensification of sanctions been in the course 

of the last few months, particularly those that target individuals within the alAssad regime? What, if anything, can be done to render them more effective?

Answer. The effects of our sanctions will become more apparent as time goes on. 

We have begun to see prominent business figures and regime supporters express 

concern over sanctions. We believe the targeted nature of the sanctions will allow 

many regime supporters to rethink their support of the ongoing brutality. We will 

continue to reach out to all possible partners and work with our allies on targeted 

sanctions and diplomatic measures at the U.N. to increase pressure on the Assad 

regime and press for the space for a Syrian-led democratic transition. I meet regularly with the ambassadors from other key states either to influence their assessments and strategies or, if we are in agreement, to coordinate our approaches. The 

more countries implementing such targeted sanctions, the more effective the sanctions will be. If confirmed I will make the sanctions as effective as possible.

Question. Which international actors do you see as having the most leverage over 

the Assad regime? How can the United States work with them to try to broker an 

end to the violence? How is the ongoing violence affecting Syria’s relationships with 

other governments in the region?

Answer. The Assad regime has shown its willingness to turn on its allies in the 

face of criticism; the most obvious example is that of Turkey. However, we still 

assess that the Turkish Government does have leverage over the Assad regime and 

is greatly respected by the Syrian street as well. Unfortunately, the regime has not 

listened thus far to calls by the Turkish leadership for the Assad regime to stop its 

brutal crackdown. The Arab League and Saudi Arabia in particular should also be 

able to leverage their regional and cultural ties to help pressure the Assad regime, 

especially by influence regime supporters over whom they yield influence. We are 

in consistent contact with the Arab League, EU nations, and the rest of the international community, and at the ambassadorial level we often meet to discuss how 

to better coordinate our efforts. I believe that the ongoing violence is alienating Syria’s relationship with other governments. With the exception of Iran, we are seeing 

many more in the international community voice increasing frustration with the regime’s brutality .

Question. In October, 2010, Issa Al-Aweel was arrested in Syria. A Christian born 

in Latakia, Al Aweel is a U.S. Green Card holder with Syrian citizenship and a 

Massachusetts resident. It is my understanding that, since his arrest, Mr. Al Aweel 

has been held in prolonged detention without a hearing.

• Please update the committee on Mr. Al Aweel’s status and whereabouts. What 

steps are being taken to secure his release and safe passage home to Boston?

Answer. Because Mr. Al Aweel is not a U.S. citizen, the Vienna Convention on 

Consular Relations does not require the Government of Syria to provide notification 

to the United States of his arrest nor provide access to him while he is detained. 

The Embassy’s understanding, based upon discussions with the family, is that Mr. 

Al Aweel may have been detained shortly after his arrival in Syria in relation to 

the Syrian requirement that male Syrian citizens over the age of 18 complete compulsory military service. The U.S. Embassy provided Mr. Al Aweel’s family with a 

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list of private attorneys who might be able to provide legal assistance to Mr. Al 

Aweel. The Embassy also advised the family that they may wish to contact the Syrian Embassy in Washington, DC, directly, since Mr. Al Aweel is a Syrian citizen. 

The U.S. Embassy offered to maintain contact with whichever attorney they selected. The U.S. Embassy has not heard yet from the family concerning any additional steps they may have taken concerning Mr. Al Aweel, and stands ready to provide whatever limited assistance is possible.

Question. How has the United States reached out to countries hosting refugees 

fleeing the conflict in Syria? How has the United States ensured that refugees and 

asylees are well-treated and what humanitarian aid has been provided?

Answer. The brutal actions of the Syrian Government produced an international 

crisis which has resulted in significant refugee flows and threatened regional stability. This crisis requires a unified response from the international community condemning the atrocities taking place and calling for an end to the violence. We stand 

ready to provide assistance to nations hosting Syrian refugees, as required. Embassy Damascus is in constant contact with UNHCR and UNRWA, and our Embassies in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey are in touch with the respective governments 

hosting refugees. We have offered our assistance to the Turkish Government to provide humanitarian aid to the thousands of Syrian refugees in Turkey. To date, the 

Turkish Government has informed us that they are able to handle the situation 

themselves, but they are aware that we stand ready to help. Furthermore, we have 

encouraged the Government of Lebanon to protect Syrian refugees that have fled 

into Lebanon and avoid taking positions that would align themselves with the 

Assad’s regime and its ongoing crackdown.

Question. I am a strong supporter of your candidacy to be Ambassador to Syria. 

I believe that your visit on July 7 to Hama was an important demonstration of 

United States support for the Syrian people and likely saved Syrian lives. I invite 

you to explain why it is important for the United States to have an ambassador in 

a country in which a government is cracking down on its people so brutally. How 

do you respond to those who say we should recall our Ambassador?

Answer. It is a privilege for me and my team to serve in Syria. I see it as an 

integral part of my mission to give the Syrian people an ear and a voice. My presence is one of the most effective tools of pressure we have on the Syrian Government. I convey our tough messages to the Assad regime and am also in constant 

contact with the Syrian opposition. If confirmed, I would continue to fulfill these 

roles for as long as necessary . 

By maintaining a high-level presence we are able to support the demands of the 

Syrian people and promote respect for their basic human dignity. As I mentioned 

in my prepared statement, my presence helps draw attention to the legitimate grievances of the peaceful protestors so that the international community and, more importantly, the Syrian regime pays attention. The Syrian people want to be heard. 

My visit to Hama showed that a high-ranking U.S. official can help them be heard. 

Regional outreach is critical. I meet regularly with the ambassadors from other 

key nations, either to influence their assessments and strategies or, if we are in 

agreement, to coordinate our approaches. It is also important for the U.S. Government to work in concert with our allies in order for targeted sanctions to have greater effect. I do much of this coordination in Damascus. Given that most Syrian officials have far more assets in the EU, Turkey, and the Arab Gulf than they do in 

the United States, working with our allies is critical for the sanctions’ success. I personally recommended a series of diplomatic initiatives with partner countries, as 

well as specific steps we and partners could take inside of Syria to weaken the 

Assad government and compel it to change its repressive policies. Some of this has 

involved my convincing other countries’ ambassadors to make particular recommendations to their own capitals. For example, the Turks can play an extremely 

important role, and I regularly exchange ideas with the Turkish Ambassador in Damascus who has direct access to the senior Turkish leadership. It is important that 

the Turks and we first agree in our assessments of what is happening on the 

ground, and then decide how best to press the Syrian Government. 

I have also been able to encourage and work with the Syrian opposition. Syrians 

have been denied the opportunity to participate in politics for 40 years, and the Syrian Government still refuses to allow them the space and security to openly organize. In such a short period of time, however, they have made much progress. We 

support calls by the Syrian opposition to unite around the principle of a representative, inclusive, and pluralistic government that respects the rights of all of Syria’s 

citizens. Furthermore, by supporting a pluralistic and inclusive opposition we aim 

to prevent sectarian violence. More Syrians are joining the opposition despite the 

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risk of government retaliation. Indeed, the opposition’s ranks now include Alawi, 

Druze, and Christian Syrians, as well as businessmen, merchants, and even military servicemen. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. What are you seeing in Damascus about how this regime is functioning 

and perhaps more importantly, how are different elements of Syrian society reacting? How close is President Assad to actions of his regime?

Answer. In Damascus itself, the regime is functioning more or less normally, 

although there are more security elements deployed in restive neighborhoods, such 

as Medan and Rukn ad-Din. If a demonstration erupts in Damascus—and there are 

now usually one or two in the evenings—these security elements intervene immediately, beating and arresting protesters. In central Damascus, life is normal 

although shops and restaurants do less business than they did at the start of the 

year. The merchant class is very unhappy about the economic situation and scared 

about the future. Many Damascenes tell us that the mood of Ramadan this year is 

much less festive than in years past. 

Many in the Damascus Christian community fear that an Islamic fundamentalist 

government would follow if the current regime falls. They, along with many in the 

Damascus Allawi community, remain generally supportive of the regime, afraid that 

the next government will persecute minorities and thus they hold fast to the Assad 

regime. The regime’s shocking brutality over the past 5 months and opposition figures’ outreach to these communities is eroding that support, especially as the regime has not followed up on promises, like ending the emergency law, and thus 

there has been no real improvement on the ground. What the Secretary has said 

still holds true—Syrian Government actions, not words, are what matter. 

Ultimately, President Assad is the head of state and he is responsible for the actions of those beneath him. We do not know if there were times when elements of 

the security forces stepped outside the boundaries of their orders. However, we do 

know that, at the end of the day, Assad is responsible. President Assad is the one 

who has created an environment in which violence, repression, and human rights 

violations can occur without anyone being held to account.

Question. How do you see this playing out? Particularly if it draws out for another 

6 months?

Answer. The breadth and endurance of the street protests shows that a transition 

is underway in Syria, and I strongly doubt that the Syrian people will go back to 

where they were before all of this started. Assad’s reputation and legitimacy are 

permanently destroyed for most Syrians, even among many who fear Islamic fundamentalists. Who or what will replace Bashar Assad is unclear, although the Syrian internal opposition is working to develop a transition plan. With regard to a 

timetable for Syria’s transition to democracy, I cannot say for sure. Day after day 

for months now, the Syrian people have taken to the streets peacefully demanding 

an end to the violence and a change of government. They have organized themselves, they have acted as journalists to ensure the entire world is able to witness 

what is taking place there, and they have refused to be intimidated. They have 

shown intense resolve and so I am confident that with the continued support and 

pressure of the international community, they will see this transition through. The 

regime’s use of Allawi-dominated security units in residential areas has boosted sectarian tensions and at times sparked incidents of sectarian violence. If the struggle 

on the streets continues for a long time, the risk of broad sectarian violence will 

rise. For this reason, the United States is boosting unilateral pressure on the Assad 

regime to stop its repression, and we are working closely with foreign partners to 

boost international pressure on the regime as well.

Question. How do you balance support for the opposition (would you call it a unified movement yet?) with our longstanding concerns about terrorism, proliferation, 

and regional security?

Answer. The Assad regime, not the Syrian people demonstrating for democracy, 

is responsible for fomenting regional instability, supporting terrorist organizations, 

and attempting to develop nuclear bombs. The Assad regime has denied the people 

of Syria the opportunity to participate in politics for 40 years, and it continues to 

deny them the space and security to openly organize or work politically. Frequent 

government harassment slows development of a coordinated and strong opposition. 

My Embassy team and I have encouraged the Syrian opposition to unite around the 

principle of a representative, inclusive, and pluralistic government that respects the 

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rights of all of Syria’s citizens equally. We have underlined consistently to the opposition that we oppose political violence and they have in response stressed to us 

their goal of keeping the opposition to the Assad regime peaceful. Meanwhile, we 

also are pressing the Syrian Government to allow the opposition to meet and organize. We have had some success, such as the June 27 opposition conference held in 

Damascus. Our support has to be done carefully, however, as the Syrian Government propaganda machine frequently blames American intervention for the country’s problems, and this point plays well with those still support the Assad regime. 

That being said, there is absolutely nothing being done in support of the Syrian opposition that goes against the administration’s concerns and policies with regard to 

terrorism, proliferation, and regional security.

Question. Describe the dynamics in neighboring countries as this violent repression goes on; with the recently unveiled Hariri indictments, the Turkish Military 

Staff resignations as we discussed with Ambassador Ricciardone, et cetera? How has 

Hezbollah responded? Hamas? Our Israeli friends?

Answer. We are closely monitoring developments in Lebanon, which, thus far, remains stable despite the unrest in Syria. We have encouraged the Government of 

Lebanon to protect Syrian refugees that have fled into Lebanon and avoid taking 

positions that would align themselves with Assad’s regime and its ongoing crackdown. Lebanon retains a complex and unbalanced relationship with Syria, which 

now tests Lebanon’s ability to maintain its independence and good standing in the 

international community. We have received reports of Syrian protestors burning 

Hezbollah (and Iranian) flags. Frankly, we are not surprised that demonstrators are 

angered by Hezbollah’s apparent support for the Assad regime’s brutal use of force 

and violence against its own citizens. And we have also seen demonstrations by the 

Lebanese people in support of the Syrian protestors. 

Prime Minister Netanyahu has said that Israel will not intervene in the unrest 

in Syria and that the Syrian people ‘‘deserve a better future.’’ Clearly Turkey is concerned about what is taking place in Syria—they are neighbors and have spoken 

out forcefully against the violence. With regard to the recent military resignations 

in Turkey, our military ties to Turkey are longstanding and robust. Turkey remains 

a strong U.S. ally. A change in personnel will not affect our longstanding ties and 

deep tradition of military cooperation. Turkey has a long border and many ties to 

Syria; they have significant interests in Syria. While the Turkish Government wants 

to pursue its own foreign policy as a sovereign state, it also understands the utility 

of coordinating with the United States and the EU.

Question. Some have suggested that EU oil sanctions on Syria, and Sytrol in particular, would have a significant impact. An op-ed in the Huffington Post yesterday 

stated: ‘‘An EU ban on commercial activity by a handful of Syrian oil companies 

could deprive the Assad regime of the foreign exchange they critically need to fund 

the repression of protests. If the regime ran out of money to pay its security forces 

and there was a run on the Syrian pound, loss of business confidence in the Assads 

would accelerate. Brussels, unusually, is in a position to make a major unilateral 

contribution and be on the right side of history in the Arab Spring.’’

• (a) What is your assessment of the effects of such an action? • (b) Are there further unilateral efforts that might have teeth? • (c) What more can be done to broaden the list of participants in multilateral 

sanctioning efforts?

Answer (a). EU sanctions on the Syrian oil sector, or on the exclusive marketer 

of Syrian crude oil, Sytrol, would have an impact on the Assad regime. According 

to the Energy Information Administration, Syria currently exports 117,000 barrels 

per day (bpd) of crude oil. The majority of these exports are purchased by refineries 

in EU countries pursuant to long-term contracts. EU sanctions would make it difficult for Sytrol to market this oil to other refineries and would likely result in revenue losses as the company sought out new purchasers in countries not participating in an EU sanctions regime. Sanctions would constrict demand for Syrian 

crude oil and would likely further reduce what Sytrol is able to charge. The impact 

on government revenues would be substantial, and this at a time already of significant economic stress. We can expect that the Syrian Government would claim that 

Western pressure is ruining Syria’s economy and hurting the Syrian population, and 

we will need to craft and target our own public messaging carefully. We also will 

need to encourage prominent Syrians to explain the utility of energy sector sanctions to a largely uncomprehending Syrian public.

Answer (b). The oil sector is Syria’s largest export sector and a significant source 

of Syrian Government revenues. There are few other export categories that would 

have as significant of an impact.

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Answer (c). We will continue to reach out to all possible partners and work with 

our allies on targeted sanctions and diplomatic measures at the U.N. to increase 

pressure on the Assad regime and press for the space for a Syrian-led democratic 

transition. I meet regularly with the ambassadors from other key states either to 

influence their assessments and strategies or, if we are in agreement, to coordinate 

our approaches. 

What is taking place in Syria is an international crisis which has resulted in significant refugee flows and threatened regional stability. This crisis requires a unified response from the international community condemning the atrocities taking 

place and calling for an end to the violence.

Question. You indicated that these protestors are aware that Iran and Hezbollah 

are backing the government in their repressive tactics, and that Hezbollah flags are 

being burned. What is the impact within Lebanon of the activity?

Answer. We are aware of these reports. It is not surprising that demonstrators 

are angered by Hezbollah’s apparent support for the Assad regime’s brutal use of 

force against its own citizens. We are closely monitoring developments in Lebanon, 

which, thus far, remains stable despite the unrest in Syria. We have encouraged the 

Government of Lebanon to protect Syrian refugees that have fled into Lebanon and 

avoid taking positions that would align themselves with Assad’s regime and its ongoing crackdown. Lebanon’s unbalanced relationship with Syria is testing Lebanon’s 

ability to maintain its independence and good standing in the international community. For example, Lebanon agreed to the U.N. Security Council Presidential Statement condemning the Syrian regime’s use of violence against demonstrators but 

later disassociated itself from the statement. We will continue to encourage Lebanon 

to meet its international obligations and work toward a politically independent 

Lebanon. 

RESPONSES OF ROBERT FORD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY THE FOLLOWING SENATORS

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. There is growing consensus among experts that Assad’s downfall depends on losing support from the military. What actions can the United States take 

to siphon support from the military? At the same time, what actions are you taking 

to persuade Assad and other senior government officials to embrace reform? What 

steps have you recommended to the State Department and White House? Is the 

United States working with the EU to formulate additional sanctions, such as a ban 

on the purchase of Syrian oil? What role are other countries and leaders playing 

in this dialogue, such as Prime Minister Erdogan in Turkey?

Answer. It is very important for the Syrian people to be the leaders and the drivers of the transition currently underway in Syria. The United States has taken numerous steps to help move this process forward, including coordinating international 

support for action at the United Nations and coordinating with partners to target 

regime finances through sanctioning individuals who help the Assad circle as well 

as government entities and private companies involved in the repression or the financing of this repression. These designations have included commanders—but not 

the rank and file soldiers—of elements of the Syrian military and intelligence services.We are in conversations with our allies to explore additional targeted economic 

sanctions, including in the energy and financial sectors, to deny the regime resources to continue its brutality against the Syrian people. 

The United States also led an international effort that resulted in a unanimous 

United Nations Security Council Presidential Statement condemning the abuses of 

the Syrian Government. The United Nations Human Rights Council also issued a 

statement condemning the regime atrocities. We are working multilaterally to put 

pressure on the Assad regime by isolating it and depriving it of resources to continue its brutal repression. 

I personally recommended a series of diplomatic initiatives with partner countries, as well as specific steps we and partners could take inside Syria to weaken 

the Assad government and compel it to change its repressive policies. Some of this 

has involved my convincing other states’ ambassadors to make particular recommendations to their own capitals. The Turks could play an extremely important 

role, and I regularly exchange ideas with the Turkish Ambassador in Damascus who 

has direct access to the senior Turkish leadership. It was important that the Turks 

and we first agree in our assessments of what is happening on the ground, and then 

decide how best to press the Syrian Government.

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Question. Assad continues to retain some support from minority groups that are 

concerned about sectarian violence post-Assad. These groups are concerned that 

their situation will degenerate in the turmoil of a transition. How are you working 

(unilaterally or multilaterally) to reassure minorities fearful of a transition?

Answer. The U.S. Government is reaching out to the Syrian opposition and encouraging it to ensure that the freedoms and dignities of all ethnic and religious 

groups in Syria are respected and to underscore the opposition’s commitment to this 

end. My team and I have encouraged the opposition to reach out to Syrian minority 

leaders to reassure them that a democratic Syria would not retaliate against minorities, and we have had positive reactions from elements of those minorities. 

We also are working to support the free flow of information, both inside of Syria 

so that Syrian citizens can obtain a true picture of what is taking place, and outside 

of Syria so that the world can bear witness to the Assad regime’s atrocities, especially the fact that it is the Assad regime itself that is stoking many sectarian fears. 

Last, Syria has a long history of peaceful coexistence among its various ethnic and 

religious groups, and the United States is confident this tradition will outlive the 

Assad regime.

Question. What can you tell us about your meetings with civil society and opposition figures? Have you been able to identify credible leadership structures, and what 

are the defined goals and strategies for consolidating a democratic state should 

Assad fall? What is the capacity and readiness of the opposition to guide a democratic transition in post-Assad Syria, and how are you working to build this capacity 

in the interim? Is there a need or a role for enhanced U.S. democracy assistance?

Answer. Syrians have been denied the opportunity to participate in politics for 40 

years, and the Syrian Government continues to deny them the space and security 

to openly organize. The Syrian opposition has made some progress, but it has far 

to go. Frequent government harassment slows development of a coordinated and 

strong opposition. We continue to encourage all members of the Syrian opposition 

to unite around the principle of a representative, inclusive, and pluralistic government that respects the rights of all of Syria’s citizens. We also are pressing the Syrian Government to allow the opposition to meet, and we have had some success, 

such as the June 27 opposition conference held in Damascus. Our support has to 

be done carefully, however, as the Syrian Government propaganda machine frequently blames American intervention for the country’s problems, and this point 

plays well with those who still support the Assad regime. 

The United States is encouraging the development of a robust civil society in 

Syria. We are listening to a range of Syrian voices both inside and outside the country. It is important that the Syrian people decide for themselves what will happen 

inside Syria. The opposition is slowly developing into a substantive and credible 

force. Additional information can be provided through briefings.

Question. Over the weekend, as many as 121 people were killed in Syria as a result of the military crackdown on protesters, the majority in Hama. These events 

are eerily reminiscent of the 1982 crackdown on Hama, during which tens of thousands of Syrians were killed by President Assad’s father to retain control and repress dissent. What is the United States doing to prevent a repeat of the 1982 massacre and subsequent stamping out of democratic aspirations in Syria? How can the 

United States reassure protesters of its support, and prevent Assad from committing 

mass atrocities to retain control?

Answer. I traveled to Hama in order to relay to the people of Hama and to the 

Syrian people that the United States supports the Syrian people and demands that 

the regime immediately stop its violent repression of peaceful protesters. My travel 

to Hama helped draw international attention to the efforts of the Syrian people to 

effect peaceful change in their own country. They have a right to hold peaceful demonstrations and to demand that their fundamental rights be respected. There is no 

going back to the status quo. Assad’s regime cannot continue to use torture and killing to break the will of the Syrian people. Try as he might, Assad can’t stop change 

from coming to Syria. I have spoken out vigorously to the Arabic and Western media 

about the recent brutal government actions in Hama and elsewhere. I have helped 

design a set of new sanctions that the administration is readying. Even as the regime’s security forces killed dozens of people in Hama, the protests continued 

throughout Syria. The people of Syria have shown that they are no longer afraid 

and will not be cowed by the regime’s brutality. 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN

Question. In your opening statement, you mention that the Syrian opposition ‘‘is 

slowly becoming an effective, broad-based opposition.’’ What is the U.S. Embassy 

doing to support and engage the opposition to help them become a more effective 

political entity?

Answer. Syrians have been denied the opportunity to participate in politics for 40 

years, and the Syrian Government is still not allowing them the space and security 

to openly organize. In such a short period of time, however, they have made some 

progress. We are encouraging all of the various players in the Syrian opposition to 

unite around the principle of a representative, inclusive, and pluralistic government 

that respects the rights of all of Syria’s citizens. We also are pressing the Syrian 

Government to allow the opposition to meet, and we have had some success, such 

as the June 27 opposition conference held in Damascus. The regime’s reflex, however, is to repress and arrest. Our support has to be done carefully, as the Syrian 

Government propaganda machine frequently blames American intervention for the 

country’s problems, and this government line plays well with those still supporting 

the Assad regime. 

The United States is encouraging the development of a robust civil society in 

Syria, as we do in all countries. The United States is also listening to a range of 

Syrian voices both inside and outside the country. It is important that the Syrian 

people decide what will happen inside of Syria.

Question. In your opening statement, you say, ‘‘It is time for us to start thinking 

about the day after Assad.’’ In your opinion, what more should the United States 

be doing to prepare for the ‘‘day after Assad?’’ What plans are in place to prepare 

for this outcome?

Answer. The best way we can help now and in the future is by supporting the 

Syrian people’s right to freedom and dignity and to work with the international 

community to press the Syrian Government to allow space inside of Syria for the 

opposition to work. The United States remains committed to seeing violence end. 

The Syrian people will decide what a democratic transition will look like.

Question. How much influence might countries like Turkey, Russia, and Saudi 

Arabia have on the situation in Syria? What steps is the U.S. Government taking 

to engage these countries on Syria?

Answer. Syria’s neighbors and major trading partners can have a significant impact on changing the behavior of the Assad regime. We will continue to reach out 

to all possible partners and work with our allies on targeted sanctions and diplomatic measures at the U.N. in order to increase pressure on the Assad regime and 

press for the space for a Syrian-led democratic transition. I meet regularly with the 

ambassadors from other key states either to influence their assessments and strategies or, if we are in agreement, to coordinate our approaches. 

What is taking place in Syria is an international crisis which has resulted in significant refugee flows and threatened regional stability. This crisis requires a unified response from the international community condemning the atrocities taking 

place and calling for an end to the violence. 

It cannot be stressed enough, however, that the greatest influence on Syria is the 

influence that the Syrian people have on their own country.

Question. What is the regional impact of the ongoing crackdowns in Syria? In particular, what is the impact on stability with regard to Lebanon, as well as Turkey, 

Jordan, and Israel?

Answer. The regime’s violence against its own people has resulted in over 12,000 

refugees fleeing Syria to other neighboring countries and over 30,000 Syrians internally displaced by the violence. The continuing abuses by the Syrian Government 

will inevitably lead to greater instability in the region. We do believe that Assad’s 

regime could try to foment instability in the region in an effort to retain power and 

distract the international community. This has already taken place. For example, 

on June 5, 2011, pro-Palestinian protestors supported by Assad’s regime attempted 

to enter parts of the Golan Heights, which led to at least 23 deaths. It is important 

for us to work with Syria’s neighbors and act together to stop the instability outside 

of Syria and to help the Syrian people gain the dignity and freedom they deserve.

Question. Have you found that your presence in Damascus has had a greater impact than the U.S. Government could have with a lower-ranking official leading Embassy operations?

Answer. I have been able to help secure the release of U.S. citizens and Syrian 

political prisoners. We have been able press the Syrian Government to allow some 

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limited access to international media, such as CNN and NPR. I have also been able 

to encourage and work with the Syrian opposition. 

I have been trying to draw the attention of the Syrian regime and the attention 

of the international community to the legitimate grievances the Syrian people have 

with their government. The Syrian people want to be heard, and a high ranking 

U.S. official can help them be heard. I believe that it is in our best interest as well 

as the Syrian’s people’s best interest to keep a high-ranking U.S. official inside of 

Syria so that we can have the strongest possible impact on change in Syria. If confirmed, I hope to be able to continue this work.

Question. What is your assessment of international sanctions on Syria? Are they 

having an effect on Syria’s Government and its key leaders?

Answer. The sanctions against Assad’s regime are causing economic impacts and 

damaging parts of regime, especially the regime’s source of funding. Let me share 

some success stories. One of President Assad’s cousins, Rami Makhlouf, is very well 

known in Syria and is probably the richest man in the country. He is a very unscrupulous businessman and a financial supporter of the regime. We have targeted him 

very specifically, as well as his companies, because we know he helps finance the 

regime. By working with the EU, we made sure that he could not get to Cyprus 

and he could not get Cypriot citizenship. 

Furthermore, Cham Holding is one of Makhlouf’s biggest companies, so we targeted it specifically. We targeted certain individuals on its board of directors. When 

the board members’ terms expired at the end of April, they were too afraid of being 

individually designated by our sanctions and they refused to hold another board 

meeting. The government finally insisted that businessmen come together and have 

a board meeting in July. At the conclusion of the meeting, they were only able to 

come up with half of a board and one vice-chairman, but no one agreed to be the 

chairman of Cham Holding. 

U.S. sanctions do bite, but it is important that it is not just our bite. We are coordinating sanctions and encouraging other countries to use targeted sanctions 

against Assad’s regime. If the violence continues, we will expand our use of targeted 

sanctions on banks, companies, and individuals who support Assad’s regime. The 

United States will continue to seek ways to increase pressure on Assad and his regime while simultaneously attempting to shield the Syrian people from economic 

harm.

Question. In your opinion, should the situation in Syria be referred to the International Criminal Court? Should President Assad be indicted on charges of committing crimes against humanity?

Answer. The killing and torture of peaceful demonstrators is unacceptable and 

must be stopped. The U.S. Government has expressed our disgust with the ongoing 

violence and has called for a democratic transition in Syria that will bring freedom 

and dignity to the Syrian people. We are exploring options with respect to the International Criminal Court. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

Question. While Secretary Clinton has recently declared that Assad has no legitimacy to rule, the administration still has not called for his departure. While the 

administration called for President Mubarak’s departure in Egypt, it has not called 

for Assad’s departure. When can we anticipate the administration call for Assad’s 

departure?

Answer. The administration believes that it is up to the Syrian people to decide 

what happens inside of Syria. We have for many years vigorously condemned Syrian 

human rights abuses and, since the intensification of the government’s repression 

in late March, we have spoken out forcefully and condemned the Assad regime’s 

shootings of peaceful demonstrators and the mass arrest campaigns. As the Syrian 

protest movement grew stronger, we declared publicly that Assad had lost his legitimacy. Each country is different, and therefore our policy toward Syria cannot be 

a replica of our policy toward Egypt, Libya, or anywhere else. We have had a longstanding partnership with Egypt, while we have long been adversaries of Syria. As 

we have less unilateral leverage in Syria, we have worked closely with other partners to boost not just American pressure but also international pressure on the 

Assad regime. 

We have made clear our view that Assad cannot lead a democratic transition, that 

we have no American interest in the continuation of his government, and that his 

government will be left in the past as the democratic transition moves forward. We 

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have also stressed that the Syrian people, not foreign states, will decide what will 

happen in Syria and we will be there to support them. 

President Assad must stop the killings now, remove his security forces from residential streets, release political prisoners and detainees, and permit access to the 

U.N. Human Rights Council’s fact-finding mission. The international community 

has the responsibility to speak out against violence toward peaceful protestors and 

threats to international peace and security. We have done so and will continue to 

do so.

Question. What message do you believe is sent to the Syrian people by not calling 

for his departure? Do you believe there should be a role for any member of the 

Assad family in Syria’s future?

Answer. The message we are sending to the Syrian people is that this movement 

is a Syrian movement, and that the United States and the international community 

stand behind them in their aspiration for freedom, democracy, and peace. We are 

working hard to get this message out through our Embassy outreach and programming, public statements, and work at the various multilateral organizations. The 

Syrian public’s reactions to my visit to Hama in July demonstrated that it understands that we support immediate political change and an end to repression in 

Syria. As to whether or not there is any role for a member of the Assad family in 

Syria’s future that is up to the Syrian people. We have stated publicly that we do 

not believe Assad will implement reforms, that his regime will soon be part of the 

past and that we have no interest in the regime’s continuation. What we are advocating for is a peaceful transition to democracy where all Syrians are free to choose 

leaders who are responsive to their demands. Most Syrians are, however, suspicious 

of American intent in Syria because of our close ties to Israel, and therefore we also 

stress that Syrians alone must decide Syria’s political future.

Question. Can you think of a symbolic action the United States might realistically 

take that would more clearly demonstrate our break with Assad and his clan, and 

would more clearly show that we want him out, besides recalling our Ambassador?

Answer. We have taken, and continue to take, concrete steps to demonstrate to 

the Assad regime the cost his government will pay for the atrocities being committed. For the first time ever, the Obama administration in May 2011 specifically 

sanctioned Bashar Assad and his brother Maher. The administration extended sanctions to other members of his family, members of the Syrian Government, private 

businessmen who have bankrolled the regime, and corrupt government institutions, 

among others. We have condemned Assad at the United Nations as well as at the 

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. We will continue taking steps 

to pressure Assad into ending the bloodshed and this is where I believe our focus 

should be—on concrete actions, not on symbolic measures. Visibly standing up to 

the Assad regime, as I did when I went to Hama, and mobilizing international support in an unprecedented fashion against the Assad regime, have shown the Syrian 

public that for us Assad’s regime soon will be in the past. We have also kept the 

focus throughout on the Syrian people being in the lead in this transition so that 

the regime cannot justify its repression by saying it is standing up to an ‘‘AmericanZionist conspiracy.’’

Question. In the wake of your visit to Hama, which was one of the most effective 

actions you have taken while in Syria, how much freedom of movement do you now 

have in Syria?

Answer. The Syrian Government has attempted to put in place travel restrictions 

on me and other diplomats. These travel restrictions were in place prior to my travel to Hama and are still in place today. Movement is not easy, frankly, and there 

are new security ‘‘issues’’ in the wake of my Hama visit. Regardless of these restrictions, I will continue to move around the country as necessary and meet with 

Syrians from all walks of life and to show our support for respect of the Syrian people’s right to express themselves freely, march peacefully, and organize themselves 

politically.

Question. I assume your every movement is covered by the Syrian secret police 

and every visitor to the Embassy is noted by them, with this type of surveillance 

how effectively can you engage with the opposition? Has it become too dangerous 

for them to meet with you?

Answer. In spite of the various methods used by the Syrian Government to intimidate democracy advocates in Syria and members of our mission in Damascus, we 

regularly talk to and meet members of the opposition. We and they are careful obviously. That said, the reductions in our mission staff because of security considerations more than Syrian Government intelligence service actions have hindered our 

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contacts. Nonetheless, the mission is in touch with dozens of different Syrians 

weekly. The United States is listening to a range of Syrian voices both inside and 

outside the country. The Syrian people decide what will happen inside of Syria, but 

we seek to understand what government constraints are most noxious and then 

weigh in with the Syrian authorities, often in coordination with other countries’ ambassadors, to extract space for the opposition and activists to work. If I am confirmed, I will be able to continue this important work. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

I commend your initiative in visiting Hama to demonstrate American support for 

the Syrian people’s demands for an end of the Assad regime and a more democratic 

future, and the President’s decision to extend U.S. sanctions against President 

Assad and other senior Syrian officials for their role in suppressing peaceful demonstrations in Syria.

Question. What else could we do to lead our friends in Europe, Turkey, and the 

Arab Gulf in adopting strict economic sanctions and visa restrictions against Syrian 

officials?

• How soon could the Syrian regime replace these relations with Chinese and 

Russian connections?

Answer. The United States has led the international community and forcefully 

spoken out against the abuses of the Assad regime from the start of this crisis. We 

believe that by working with our allies targeted sanctions will have the greatest 

impact. It is important for the U.S. Government keep up the coordination with our 

allies in order for targeted sanctions to have greater effect. I do some of this coordination in Damascus. Given that most Syrian officials have more assets in the EU, 

Turkey, and the Arab Gulf than in the United States, working with our allies is 

critical for sanctions regime success. To date the EU has sanctioned 35 Syrian entities and individuals, in addition to imposing travel bans on those individuals and 

embargos on sales of arms and equipment that can be used to suppress demonstrations. We continue to encourage Turkey and the Arab States to take all steps possible to bring an immediate end to the Assad regime’s repression. For example, we 

are discussing with our partners sanctions in the oil and gas sector and additional 

sanctions on Syrian businesses and individuals involved in helping the government 

repress its people. 

In addition, what is taking place in Syria is an international crisis which has 

resulted in massive refugee flows and threatened regional stability. Such a crisis 

requires a unified response from the international community condemning the atrocities taking place and calling for an end to the violence. 

We will continue working with all nations, including Russia and China, in an 

effort to isolate the Assad regime and clearly articulate the international community’s condemnation of its actions and decisions. Russia and China’s decision to 

allow the U.N. Security Council to adopt a Presidential statement was a positive 

sign.

Question. How much freedom of movement is the Syrian Government granting 

you after your visit to Hama?

Answer. The Syrian Government has put in place travel restrictions on all diplomats serving in Damascus. These travel restrictions were in place prior to my 

travel to Hama and are still in place today. Regardless of these restrictions, I will 

continue to move around the country as necessary and meet with Syrians from all 

walks of life. Such movements could cause additional friction with the Syrian 

authorities. 

Statement: The Assad regime’s use of the army to murder hundreds of unarmed 

demonstrators proves that Bashar is no reformist but rather a continuation of his 

father’s reign of terror.

Question. To what extent has the regime sought to play out ethnic and religious 

differences to suppress the demonstrations? Are there any indications that the regime has reinforced or accelerated efforts to fuel sectarian strife as protests have 

grown in organization and size?

Answer. Syria has a unique history of peaceful coexistence between religious communities that long predates the Assad regime and the Baath Party system. Syrians 

have a proud and strong national identity and the opposition has made clear its intention to preserve it. The Syrian regime, unfortunately, is cynically manipulating 

sectarian tensions in an effort to divide the Syrian people. Its use of predominantly 

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Alawi gangsters (called ‘‘shabeeha’’) to repress some demonstrations and make arrests has aggravated sectarian tensions in cities like Homs and Lattakia. 

Despite the regime’s actions, minority participation in the opposition is growing. 

As the regime’s violence and oppression continues to create divisions and exacerbate 

economic conditions, more Syrians will eventually view the regime as the source of 

the problem, rather than a guarantor of stability. 

Statement: The President justified the NATO military effort in Libya on Qadhafi’s 

threats to slaughter thousands of innocent Libyans. In Syria, we are actually seeing 

such massacres, now at about 2,000 people and climbing very fast.

Question. How do you explain the administration’s hesitation to clearly call for 

Assad’s departure? When would the President clearly and unmistakably call for 

Assad to step down from power? What are you hearing from Syrians regarding our 

hesitation to definitely call for Assad to step down and for the Assad family to have 

zero role in Syria’s future?

Answer. The administration believes that it is the right of the Syrian people to 

decide what happens inside of Syria. We have for many years vigorously condemned 

Syrian human rights abuses and since the intensification of the government’s repression in late March we have spoken out forcefully against the shootings of peaceful demonstrators and the mass arrest campaigns. As the Syrian protest movement 

grew stronger, we then declared publicly that Assad has lost his legitimacy. 

The President will decide if and when to call for Assad to step down. We already 

have publicly declared that he cannot lead a democratic transition, that we have no 

American interest in the continuation of his government, and that his government 

will be left in the past as the democratic transition moves forward. We also stress 

that the Syrian people, not foreign states, will decide what will happen in Syria and 

we will be there to support them. 

Syrian opposition members have asked the U.S. Government to call on Assad to 

depart Syria, but at the same time they have clearly stated that they do not want 

foreign military intervention. President Assad must stop the slaughter now, remove 

his security forces from the streets, release political prisoners and detainees, and 

permit access to the U.N. Human Rights Council’s fact finding mission. He must 

stop the massive campaign of arrest, torture, and intimidation. The international 

community has the responsibility to speak out against violence toward peaceful 

protestors and threats to international peace and security. We have done so and will 

continue to do so.

Question. Can you think of a symbolic action the United States might realistically 

take that would more clearly demonstrate our break with Assad and his clan, and 

would more clearly show that we want him out?

Answer. We have taken real actions, which are far more important than symbolic 

ones, in order to demonstrate our break with the Assad regime. This administration 

for the first time designated Bashar al-Assad and his brother Maher under our 

sanctions regime, and we carefully coordinated this with international partners for 

maximum effect. American officials have been forceful in recent weeks stating that 

Assad has lost his legitimacy. In addition, the administration issues a new Executive order designating those complicit in violating the human rights of the Syrian 

people and sought and obtained a U.N. Security Council Presidential Statement condemning the actions of the regime, as well as the U.N. Human Rights Council’s authorization of a fact-finding mission to Syria—all concrete steps to pressure the 

Assad regime. The Assad regime’s time is limited—a democratic transition is underway and it cannot be stopped. It is time for the Syrian people to be free and live 

their lives with dignity.

Question. According to news reports in late April, an American diplomat was detained, hooded, and ‘‘roughed up’’ despite his diplomatic immunity. How did the 

United States respond to this?

Answer. It is true that one accredited Embassy personnel was detained and later 

released by Syrian authorities. He was briefly blindfolded but not physically abused. 

We protested this action with senior officials in Damascus and Washington. The 

Syrian Foreign Minister told me it would not happen again, and it has not. It is 

important that the Syrian Government allows the free flow of information so that 

the international community and the Syrian people can receive independent 

verification of events on the ground. Lifting the bar on visits by more foreign journalists would be welcome, and I am working hard to do just that.

Question. What can the United States do to prevent Assad from provoking sectarian violence?

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Answer. We must remember that Syria has a long history of people from various 

ethnic and religious groups living and working side by side in peace. We are confident that this tradition will continue long after Assad is gone. Where we have seen 

attempts by the regime to incite religious and ethnic tensions, the Syrian people 

have quickly spoken out against such incitement and in favor of a united Syria. We 

have sought to highlight instances where the Syrian authorities have stirred sectarian fears, as we did publicly in Embassy press comments after the start of the 

latest Hama fighting and in my public testimony in front of the Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee. Furthermore, by supporting a pluralistic and inclusive opposition we can help prevent sectarian violence.

Question. What can we do to reassure Christians, Druze, Kurds, and Alawites 

that they will not be targeted if a Sunni-led government wins power, or persuade 

Sunni groups to offer many more and more persuasive reassurances?

Answer. Syria has a long history of being a secular society and it will continue 

to be one once Assad is no longer in power. By supporting a broad and inclusive 

opposition we can help assure that Syria will always be a country that respects religious rights and beliefs. My team and I have encouraged the opposition to reach out 

to Syrian minority leaders to reassure them that a democratic Syria would not retaliate against minorities, and we have had positive reactions from elements of 

those minorities. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MIKE LEE

Question. Ambassador Ford, thank you for your willingness to serve in Syria, a 

nation that is in turmoil. In light of the recent violence and attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, do you feel it is safe and prudent to have a U.S. Ambassador 

stationed in Syria? Please share a few of the specific benefits you have observed of 

having a U.S. Ambassador present in Syria.

Answer. It is a privilege for me and my team to serve in Syria. While there are 

risks associated with my service in Syria, we assess the risk to be manageable. I 

travel with a security detail and strongly believe that the benefits to having an ambassador in Damascus far outweigh the mitigated risks. I see it as an integral part 

of my mission to give the Syrian people an ear and a voice. My presence is one of 

the most effective tools of pressure we have on the Syrian Government. The Syrian 

Government’s unhappiness with much of my work, which we see reflected in angry 

government-controlled media coverage, shows that my work is getting their attention and resonating with segments of Syrian society. I convey our tough messages 

to the government, and am also in constant contact with the Syrian opposition. If 

confirmed, I would continue to fulfill these roles into the future. 

By maintaining a high-level presence, we are able to support the demands of the 

Syrian people and promote respect for their basic human dignity. As I mentioned 

in my prepared statement, my presence helps draw attention to the legitimate grievances of the peaceful protestors so that the international community and, more importantly, the Syrian regime pays attention. The Syrian people want to be heard. 

My visit to Hama showed that a high-ranking U.S. official can help them be heard. 

Regional outreach is critical. I meet regularly with the ambassadors from other 

key nations, either to influence their assessments and strategies or, if we are in 

agreement, to coordinate our approaches. It is important, for example, that the U.S. 

Government to work in concert with our allies in order for targeted sanctions to 

have greater effect. I do much of this coordination in Damascus. Given that most 

Syrian officials have far more assets in the EU, Turkey, and the Arab Gulf than 

they do in the United States, working with our allies is critical for the sanctions’ 

success. I personally recommended a series of diplomatic initiatives with partner 

countries, as well as specific steps we and partners could take inside of Syria to 

weaken the Assad government and compel it to change its repressive policies. Some 

of this has involved my coordinating with other countries’ ambassadors on particular recommendations to their own capitals. For example, Turkey plays an 

extremely important role, and I regularly exchange ideas with the Turkish Ambassador in Damascus who has direct access to the senior Turkish leadership. It remains important for us to consult with the Turks on what is happening on the 

ground, and then decide how best to press the Syrian Government. 

I have also been able to encourage and work with the Syrian opposition. Syrians 

have been denied the opportunity to participate in politics for 40 years, and the Syrian Government still refuses to allow them the space and security to openly organize. In such a short period of time, however, they have made some progress. We 

encourage all of the various players in the Syrian opposition to unite around the 

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principle of a representative, inclusive, and pluralistic government that respects the 

rights of all of Syria’s citizens equally. Furthermore, by supporting a pluralistic and 

inclusive opposition we aim to prevent sectarian violence. More Syrians are joining 

the opposition despite the risk of government retaliation. Indeed, the opposition’s 

ranks now include Alawi, Druze, and Christian Syrians, as well as businessmen, 

merchants, and even military servicemen. 

Additionally, I have been able to help secure the release of U.S. citizens and Syrian political prisoners. We have been able press the Syrian Government to allow 

some limited access to international media, including CNN and NPR.

Question. In light of recent events in Syria, would you classify the Obama administration’s strategy of engaging the Assad regime a success or failure? Please 

explain.

Answer. Having an ambassador in Damascus has been a success even if we have 

not achieved all that we had hoped for. It is important that high-level members of 

the regime fully understand the position of the United States before they act. On 

some occasions, including the government’s release of several detained Americans, 

and the government’s allowing an opposition conference in late June, they have responded to our discussions. Obviously, we are entirely dissatisfied with the government’s brutal handling of the protests which is why the President and the Secretary 

have urged that Assad step aside. In this time of upheaval, it is doubly important 

that we have the ability to coordinate our efforts throughout the region, and to provide Washington policymakers with a clear and detailed picture of what is happening in the country. This is particularly helpful given that the Assad regime has 

restricted international media and human rights monitors.

Question. Moving forward, how do we responsibly communicate with a Syrian 

Government that, as Secretary Clinton has stated, ‘‘has lost all legitimacy?’’

Answer. What the United States supports is a Syria that is democratic, just, and 

inclusive. We will support this outcome by pressuring President Assad to get out 

of the way of this transition and by standing up for the universal rights of the Syrian people. We have two goals in communicating with the Syrian Government going 

forward. First, we will deliver one clear and consistent message: Assad’s calls for 

dialogue and reform ring hollow, he refuses to lead a genuine democratic transition 

and he should step aside. We have another goal which is to bring more and more 

of the international community to join us in sending that message. We have had 

success with EU states, Canada, Japan and a few others. One of my efforts in 

Damascus is to explain our perception of events on the ground in Syria to other ambassadors and visiting journalists and help bring them to share our understanding 

of the way forward and how other countries can help communicate that to Syrians 

as well. 

It is up to the Syrian people to choose their own leaders, not foreigners. Our role 

is to support them. After a growing chorus of condemnations from all corners of the 

region and globe, Assad can have no doubt that he faces great isolation both at 

home and abroad.

Question. Compare the regime of Bashar al-Assad to that of Syria’s neighbors in 

the region. Do you feel that Assad’s regime is a greater threat to security in the 

region than Qadaffi’s regime in Libya? Why or why not?

Answer. No two countries in the region are the same, and the violence in Syria 

and Libya has manifested itself in different ways. Without a doubt both Assad and 

Qadaffi are brutal dictators that continue to threaten international peace and security. So, while the objectives of protecting civilians and supporting universal rights 

are similar in these two countries, we do not believe the same means employed in 

Libya would work at the current time in Syria. Therefore, we are actively pursuing 

a range of nonmilitary options to increase pressure on the Syrian regime. 

The Assad regime’s violence against its own people has resulted in over 2,000 

deaths, 12,000 refugees fleeing Syria to neighboring countries, and over 30,000 Syrians internally displaced by the violence. The continuing abuses by the Syrian Government will inevitably lead to greater instability in the region. We do believe that 

Assad’s regime could try to foment instability in the region in an effort to retain 

power and distract the international community. In fact, this has already taken 

place. For example, on June 5, 2011, pro-Syrian protestors supported by the Assad 

regime attempted to enter parts of the Golan Heights, which led to at least 23 

deaths. It is important for us to work with Syria’s neighbors and act together to stop 

the instability outside its borders and to help the Syrian people gain the dignity and 

freedom they deserve. Moreover, Syria’s longstanding support to terrorist groups, 

such as Hezbollah and Hamas, harms stability in Lebanon and harms efforts to 

reach an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. In addition, Syrian supVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00619 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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port for extremist networks in Iraq over the past 7 years has lead to the deaths 

of thousands of U.S. and Iraqi servicemen and Iraqi civilians. The Syrian Government is, therefore, a major source of instability in the region, and American interests, and those of the Syrian people, will be better served when Assad steps aside. 

RESPONSES OF FRANCIS RICCIARDONE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

THE FOLLOWING SENATORS

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BARBARA BOXER

Question. Can you assure members of the Foreign Relations Committee that you 

will oppose any ‘‘historical commission’’ or similar group that studies, examines, 

researches, debates, or otherwise calls into question the fact of the Armenian 

Genocide?

Answer. The President has said that a full, frank, and just acknowledgement of 

the facts is in all our interests. In his April 23, 2011, statement, he noted that history teaches us that our nations are stronger and our cause is more just when we 

appropriately recognize painful pasts and work to rebuild bridges of understanding 

toward a better tomorrow. With this in mind, the administration strongly supports 

efforts by the Turkish and Armenian peoples to work through their painful history 

in a way that is honest, open, and constructive. The U.S. Government supports the 

efforts of individuals in Armenia and Turkey to foster a dialogue that acknowledges 

their history, sponsoring programs that foster contacts between the Armenian and 

Turkish peoples. If confirmed, I will continue to abide by the policies of the administration.

Question. President Barack Obama has said repeatedly that he has ‘‘consistently 

stated my own view of what occurred in 1915.’’ President Obama’s personal views 

are clearly laid out in a number of public comments and statements including:

(1) ‘‘Nearly 2 million Armenians were deported during the Armenian Genocide, 

which was carried out by the Ottoman Empire from 1915 to 1923, and approximately 1.5 million of those deported were killed.’’ (Senator Obama, Question for the 

Record to Ambassador-designate Marie Yovanovitch, June 19, 2008.) 

(2) ‘‘The occurrence of the Armenian genocide is a widely documented fact supported by an overwhelming collection of historical evidence.’’ (Senator Obama, statement commemorating the Armenian Genocide, April 28, 2008.) 

(3) ‘‘[T]he Armenian Genocide is not an allegation, a personal opinion, or a point 

of view, but rather a widely documented fact supported by an overwhelming body 

of historical evidence.’’ (Barack Obama on the importance of U.S.-Armenia relations, 

January 19, 2008.)

• Do you dispute or disagree with any of the above statements? If so, which statements and why?

Answer. In his April 23 Armenian Remembrance Day statement, the President 

solemnly remembered as historical fact that 1.5 million Armenians were massacred 

or marched to their deaths from 1915–1923. The President has also said that the 

achievement of a full, frank, and just acknowledgement of the facts of what occurred 

in 1915 is in all our interests. The President noted that the best way to advance 

that goal is for the Armenian and Turkish people to address the facts of the past 

as a part of their efforts to move forward. He strongly supports the efforts of Turkey 

and Armenia to normalize their bilateral relations. 

My responsibility as an American diplomat is to represent the views of the U.S. 

Government, on this and all subjects. We strongly support efforts by the Turkish 

and Armenian peoples to work through their painful history in a way that is honest, 

open, and constructive. We continue to encourage Turkey to engage productively 

with Armenia on the normalization protocols and clear the way to open its shared 

border, reinstitute transportation, communication, and utility links between the two 

countries, and establish diplomatic relations.

Question. At a press breakfast on April 13, 2011, you quoted Secretary of State 

Clinton stating that, ‘‘the United States will stand with those who seek to advance 

the cause of democracy and human rights wherever they may live.’’ If confirmed, 

will you take part in April 24 observances organized in Turkey by civil society 

groups that openly call for a truthful and just resolution of the Armenian Genocide?

Answer. The United States strongly support efforts by the Turkish and Armenian 

peoples to work through their painful history in a way that is honest, open, and constructive. We continue to encourage Turkey to engage productively with Armenia on 

the normalization protocols and clear the way to open its shared border, reinstitute 

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transportation, communication, and utility links between the two countries, and establish diplomatic relations. I would participate in any event whose spirit and intent 

was consistent with the views of the U.S. Government and supported the reconciliation of the Turkish and Armenian peoples.

Question. On June 20, 2011, the House Foreign Affairs Committee voted 43–1 to 

approve an amendment to the FY 2012 State Department Authorization bill expressing the Sense of Congress that the Secretary of State should urge Turkey to 

return Christian churches and other religious properties. How will you work to secure the Turkish Government’s return of Christian churches and other religious 

properties to their rightful owners?

Answer. We continue to raise our concerns regarding the restoration of confiscated 

religious property to minority communities with Turkish authorities at the highest 

levels. The Government of Turkey’s decision to return the Buyukada orphanage to 

the Ecumanical Patriarchate and, more recently, a church and cemetery to Kimisis 

Greek Orthodox Foundation on Bozcaada, are positive moves. I believe the Government of Turkey understands the importance of this issue and has determined that 

it must do more to protect the religious freedoms of all its citizens. There are some 

legal obstacles that must be overcome, but I am hopeful that as Turkey writes a 

new constitution, these issues will be addressed.

Question. As Ambassador to Turkey, what steps have you taken—in addition to 

meeting with religious leaders—to address the alarming finding in the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom Annual Report 2011 that: ‘‘The Turkish 

Government continues to impose serious limitations on freedom of religion or belief, 

thereby threatening the continued vitality and survival of minority religious communities in Turkey’’?

Answer. We continue to stress the importance of religious freedom in Turkey at 

the highest levels of the Turkish Government. We also continue to raise our concerns regarding the restoration of previously confiscated property to religious minority communities with Turkish authorities at the highest levels. 

The Government of Turkey’s recent decision to extend citizenship to 12 Orthodox 

metropolitans [one step below Patriarch in the Orthodox hierarchy with regional ecclesiastic responsibilities], which widens the pool of candidates eligible to serve as 

the next Ecumenical Patriarch was a positive development, as was the decision to 

return the Buyukada orphanage to the Patriarchate and more recently a church and 

cemetery to Kimisis Greek Orthodox Foundation on Bozcaada. It has also given permission for Christians to perform religious ceremonies in sites where previously this 

was prohibited, such as the Armenian church on Akdamar Island, and the Greek 

Orthodox monastery at Sumela in Trabzon. An Armenian church in Iskenderun will 

reopen soon. Given these and other positive steps, I believe the Government of Turkey appreciates our concerns on these issues and has itself determined that it must 

do more to protect the religious freedom of all its citizens. In some circumstances, 

legal obstacles must be overcome. Turkey’s efforts to reform its constitution creates 

an opportunity to address the issue of legal protections of citizens’ freedoms, including religious freedom.

Question. Will you commit to meeting with the Armenian American, Greek American, Assyrian American, and Kurdish American communities on a regular basis?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to warmly welcome to our Embassy and consulates in Turkey Americans of all origins who have an interest in the policies of 

the administration on Turkey. Likewise, I will be very pleased to meet with such 

fellow citizens on my visits back to the United States. In January 2011, following 

my recess appointment and before leaving the United States to assume my office, 

I met with a number of diaspora groups, including the American Hellenic Institute 

(AHI) and the American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association (AHEPA). In 

April, I was privileged to host the Archons of the Ecumenical Patriarchate at my 

official residence in Ankara. I have met with leaders and members of the Armenian, 

Greek, Assyrian, and Kurdish communities in Turkey, and our officers from the 

Embassy in Ankara and our consulates in Istanbul and Adana have done likewise, 

responding to the concerns of their diasporas about their welfare. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. Human Rights/Freedom of Expression.—There has been much concern 

over Prime Minister Erdogan’s authoritarian tendencies, particularly in terms of 

freedom of expression and media freedom. On her recent trip to Istanbul, Secretary 

of State Clinton stated that backsliding in this area was ‘‘inconsistent with all the 

614

other advances that Turkey has made.’’ This was also one of the first issues you 

raised when you first arrived in Turkey, prompting sharp rebukes from the Prime 

Minister and other Turkish officials. Moreover, in recent years the AKP has seemed 

to abandon its commitment to EU-inspired reforms. After the AKP’s resounding victory in the recent parliamentary elections, do you think that the Turkish leadership 

will return to its reformist agenda and help consolidate democracy in Turkey?

Answer. The June 12 parliamentary elections were an opportunity for the Turkish 

people to reaffirm their commitment to democratic processes and choose their leadership. The next major test for democracy in Turkey is whether and how to proceed 

with reform of their constitution. We will follow closely that process and urge that 

Turkish political leaders, courts, and civil society continue to work through issues 

tied to constitutional reform in a manner that reflects a commitment to universal 

values of democracy and the rule of law. The United States supports a transparent 

and inclusive constitutional reform process to strengthen Turkey’s democracy and 

its respect for universal rights, including freedom of expression and other fundamental freedoms, human rights, and the protection of minorities.

Question. Religious Property.—The U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee voted 

43 to 1 on July 20, 2011 to call on Secretary Clinton to urge Turkey to return Christian churches and other religious properties. How will you work to secure the Turkish Government’s return of Christian churches and other religious properties to 

their rightful Armenian, Greek, Assyrian, Pontian, Syriac and other Christian 

church and lay owners?

Answer. We continue to raise our concerns regarding the restoration of confiscated 

religious property to minority communities with Turkish authorities at the highest 

levels. The Government of Turkey’s recent decision to extend citizenship to a dozen 

Orthodox metropolitans [one step below Patriarch in the Orthodox hierarchy with 

regional ecclesiastic responsibilities], which widens the pool of candidates eligible to 

serve as the next Ecumenical Patriarch, was a positive move, as were the decisions 

to return the Buyukada orphanage to the Patriarchate and more recently a church 

and cemetery to Kimisis Greek Orthodox Foundation on Bozcaada. I believe the 

Government of Turkey understands the importance of this issue and wants to see 

continued progress. There are some legal obstacles that must be overcome, and I 

am hopeful that as Turkey writes a new constitution, these issues will be addressed.

Question. To the best of your knowledge, approximately how many of the more 

than 2,000 Christian churches functioning prior to 1915 on the territory of presentday Turkey are still operating today as churches?

Answer. Most of the Christian churches functioning prior to 1915 are no longer 

operating as churches. Christian community contacts in Turkey report that a total 

of 200–250 churches that date to 1915 and before offer Christian worship services 

at least once a year. Many churches do not offer services every week due to insufficient clergy or local Christian populations. Some churches of significance operate as 

museums, others have been converted into mosques or put to other uses. Still others 

have fallen into disrepair or may have been totally destroyed.

Question. Cyprus.—With respect to Cyprus—the parties are currently engaged in 

intense talks, facilitated by U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon—in a concerted 

effort to resolve the Cyprus question before Cyprus assumes the presidency of the 

EU. The Cyprus situation, however, remains intractable so long as Turkey refuses 

to remove its troops from Cypriot soil and to permit the parties to achieve a workable agreement. What is Prime Minister Erdogan’s position on Cyprus? What impact 

will the rift between the Erdogan government and the Turkish military have on current negotiations given the military’s well-known objection to withdrawal from the 

island?

Answer. The Government of Turkey and Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan support 

the reunification of Cyprus in a bizonal, bicommunal federation. The United States 

has long encouraged the Government of Turkey to support the Cypriot-led negotiations under the auspices of the U.N. Good Offices Mission to reach a comprehensive 

settlement. 

U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon convened Turkish-Cypriot and GreekCypriot leaders on July 7 where the parties agreed to intensify their efforts to reach 

convergence on all core issues. The resolution of outstanding issues, including the 

removal of Turkish troops, is most likely to occur in the context of comprehensive 

settlement negotiations. 

The recent resignation of senior military officials is an internal Turkish matter. 

We do not see this development as significantly impacting the negotiation process.

615

Question. Iran.—I am very concerned about Iran’s continuing efforts to acquire 

nuclear capacity and with respect to Turkey I remain concerned with Iran’s use of 

foreign bank branches to circumvent sanctions. Open source reporting has raised 

concerns about Turkish banks, specifically about Turkish branches of Iran’s Bank 

Mellat. News sources also recently reported that Indian refiners will pay Iran for 

crude oil bought from the Persian Gulf nation through a Turkish bank. Are you concerned that Turkish banks and foreign bank branches in Turkey are being used as 

conduits for Iran to conduct international transactions? As Ambassador, what steps 

have you taken to educate, inform Turkish officials and banks about the U.S. sanctions laws on Iran and to secure their compliance?

Answer. The Turkish leadership has made very clear its opposition to a nucleararmed Iran and has affirmed both publicly and privately its commitment to implement all UNSCR sanctions against Iran. We are engaging vigorously with both the 

Turkish Government and the Turkish private sector to ensure that CISADA sanctions are both understood and implemented. Turkey has been a strong partner on 

nonproliferation, and if confirmed, I will continue to work to maintain close cooperation on these issues and work with the Government of Turkey to share international 

best practices in implementation of the U.N. sanctions.

Question. Turkish Blockage of Armenia.—In March 2009, Assistant Secretary of 

State Phil Gordon, in response to a question I asked at his confirmation hearing 

before the Foreign Relations Committee, expressed his hope that the Turkey-Armenia border would be opened by October 2009. Today, nearly 2 years later, Turkey 

has refused to end its blockade of landlocked Armenia. In the past year, what adjustments has the executive branch made to its approach and policies to accomplish 

our repeatedly stated interest in seeing Turkey open this border? What progress can 

you report on this issue?

• Do you consider the Turkish blockade of Armenia a violation of international 

law? 

• Do you believe that Turkey’s nearly 20 year strategy of blockading Armenia has 

been effective?

Answer. We strongly believe an open border between Turkey and Armenia is in 

the best interests of both countries. We continue to encourage Turkey to engage productively with Armenia on the normalization protocols and clear the way to open 

its shared border, reinstitute transportation, communication, and utility links between the two countries, and establish diplomatic relations. 

Over the last decade, the United States has provided approximately $3.5 million 

to support activities aimed at strengthening relations between the people of Armenia and Turkey. These include initiatives to increase people-to-people connections 

such as research projects, conferences, documentary production, and exchange and 

partnership programs, with the goal of increasing cross-border dialogue and cooperation. These programs are focused on bringing together Armenian and Turkish 

NGOs, think tank researchers, academics, and business leaders at the grassroots 

level by creating opportunities for them to work together on common projects that 

will benefit both countries. If I am confirmed, I will continue to promote not only 

government-to-government discussions, but also people-to-people cultural and economic contacts and partnerships, as well as other cross-border and regional initiatives.

Question. United State Record on the Armenian Geneocide.—Former Senators 

Barack Obama, Joseph Biden, and Hillary Clinton each acknowledged the fact of the 

Armenian Genocide during their tenure as Senator. The history of the Armenian 

Genocide is also well documented by our own diplomats. Yet, this administration 

and prior administrations continue this inarticulate word dance. Do you agree with 

the administration’s wordsmithing policy? 

What do you think would happen if you articulated the historical truth and referred to the genocide of the Armenian people as genocide? What, in your estimation, would be the Turkish Government’s most likely reaction to an open and 

honest recognition by the United States of the Armenian Genocide?

Answer. In his April 23 Armenian Remembrance Day statement, the President 

solemnly remembered as historical fact that 1.5 million Armenians were massacred 

or marched to their deaths from 1915–1923, and has also said that the achievement 

of a full, frank, and just acknowledgement of the facts of what occurred in 1915 is 

in all our interests. The President also noted that the best way to advance that goal 

is for the Armenian and Turkish people to address the facts of the past as a part 

of their efforts to move forward. He strongly supports the efforts of Turkey and 

Armenia to normalize their bilateral relations. 

616

My responsibility as an American diplomat is to represent the views of the U.S. 

Government, on this and all subjects. The horrific events of 1915 were atrocities 

that we and the world must never forget, so that they are never repeated. We 

strongly support efforts by the Turkish and Armenian peoples to work through their 

painful history in a way that is honest, open, and constructive. We continue to encourage Turkey to engage productively with Armenia on the normalization protocols 

and clear the way to open its shared border, reinstitute transportation, communication, and utility links between the two countries, and establish diplomatic relations. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BEN CARDIN

Question. Turkey maintains effective control over occupied northern Cyprus, 

maintaining tens of thousands of Turkish troops on Cypriot soil in violation of that 

country’s sovereignty and numerous principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act. 

What is the United States doing to press Ankara to withdraw its troops from 

Cyprus consistent with numerous U.N. resolutions adopted since the 1974 invasion?

Answer. Talks between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities to reunify the island as a bizonal, bicommunal federation have been ongoing for nearly 

3 years. The United States has long encouraged the Government of Turkey to support the reunification of Cyprus in a bizonal, bicommunal federation. The administration believes such an outcome is in the interest not only of Cyprus, but of Turkey, 

Greece, and the region. 

U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon convened Turkish-Cypriot and GreekCypriot leaders on July 7 where the parties agreed to intensify their efforts to reach 

convergence on all core issues. The resolution of outstanding issues, including the 

removal of Turkish troops, is most likely to occur in the context of comprehensive 

settlement negotiations. 

If confirmed, I will continue to engage Turkey on this vital issue.

Question. Today, indigenous Turkish Cypriots are outnumbered by settlers from 

Turkey. Please address this matter and relevant policies of the Government of Turkey that permit and promote this movement.

Answer. Issues of citizenship and residency are being addressed through the U.N.-

facilitated reunification talks—the best format to address these and all other issues 

related to a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem. 

Turkey at present has no official policy on resettlement. Following the events of 

1974, some Turkish nationals migrated to Cyprus. Many have since been granted 

citizenship by the ‘‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.’’

There is a shortage of commonly agreed statistics on how many people are living 

in the Turkish Cypriot community. The 2006 census undertaken by the Turkish 

Cypriot authorities put the number of ‘‘TRNC citizens’’ at more than half of the total 

population in the north, but some observers, on both sides of the ‘‘Green Line’’, question these statistics. The Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities are each 

currently undertaking a census expected to be completed by the end of the year 

within the framework of the reunification talks. It is hoped that this work will help 

clarify these issues as part of a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR. 

Question. I have serious concerns about Turkey’s commitment to religious freedom, including limitations on the rights of Christians to practice their faith freely 

and the destruction of Christian religious heritage sites and churches. The U.S. 

Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has placed Turkey on its 

‘‘watch list’’ for the last 3 years. Moreover, Bartholomew I, the Ecumenical Christian 

Orthodox Patriarch, has reported that Turkey’s Christians are treated as secondclass citizens.

• What steps is the United States taking to address these serious concerns over 

the rights of religious minorities in Turkey, including Orthodox Christians?

Answer. We continue to stress the importance of religious freedom in Turkey at 

the highest levels of the Turkish Government. We also continue to raise our 

concerns regarding the restoration of previously confiscated property to religious 

minority communities with Turkish authorities at the highest levels. I understand 

that the current Government of Turkey has not engaged in the destruction or confiscation of religious sites. The Government of Turkey’s recent decision to extend citizenship to 12 Orthodox metropolitans [one step below Patriarch in the Orthodox 

hierarchy with regional ecclesiastic responsibilities], which widens the pool of canVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00624 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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didates eligible to serve as the next Ecumenical Patriarch was a positive development, as was the decision to return the Buyukada orphanage to the Patriarchate 

and more recently a church and cemetery to Kimisis Greek Orthodox Foundation 

on Bozcaada. It has also given permission for Christians to perform religious ceremonies in sites where previously this was prohibited, such as the Armenian church 

on Akdamar Island, and the Greek Orthodox monastery at Sumela in Trabzon. An 

Armenian church in Iskenderun will reopen soon. Given these and other positive 

steps, I believe the Government of Turkey understands our concerns on these issues 

and has itself determined that it must do more to protect the religious freedoms of 

all its citizens. In some circumstances, legal obstacles must be overcome. Turkey’s 

efforts to reform its constitution creates an opportunity to address the issue of legal 

protections of citizens’ freedoms, including religious freedom.

Question. Cyprus’s strategic location and shared tradition of democratic values 

makes it an important U.S. ally in the region. While it is important for the United 

States to take a balanced approach toward the Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots 

in the ongoing settlement negotiations, more can be done to help Turkey understand 

that its ongoing troop presence in northern Cyprus is a hindrance to any final unification agreement.

• How is the United States engaging with Turkey to urge an end to the Turkish 

troop presence in northern Cyprus in order to help promote a fair and lasting 

peace settlement in Cyprus?

Answer. Talks between the Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot communities to reunify the island as a bizonal, bicommunal federation have been ongoing for nearly 

3 years. The United States has long encouraged the Government of Turkey to support the reunification of Cyprus on this basis. The administration believes such an 

outcome is in the interest not only of Cyprus, but of Turkey, Greece, and the region. 

U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon convened Turkish-Cypriot and GreekCypriot leaders on July 7 where the parties agreed to intensify their efforts to reach 

convergence on all core issues. The resolution of outstanding issues, including the 

removal of Turkish troops, is most likely to occur in the context of comprehensive 

settlement negotiations. 

If confirmed, I will continue to engage Turkey on this vital issue. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN

Question. Cyprus.—Prior to and during his recent visit to Cyprus, Prime Minister 

Erdogan stated that returning territories would not be part of reunification talks, 

nor would removal of 40,000 Turkish troops. Additionally, he stated his support for 

freezing relations with the European Union if Cyprus assumes the EU presidency.

• Do you believe the Turkish Government is willing to productively engage in 

talks based on a bizonal, bicommunal Cyprus? 

• What steps have you taken to promote U.S. policy toward Cyprus, and to push 

the Turkish Government toward satisfactory talks?

Answer. The administration strongly supports the Cypriot-led negotiations under 

the auspices of the U.N. Good Offices Mission to reach a comprehensive settlement 

reunifying the island as a bizonal, bicommunal federation. We believe that direct 

talks between the two sides is the best way to reach a just and lasting settlement. 

We are prepared to be helpful in any way that both parties desire, but the negotiations must be Cypriot-led to achieve an outcome satisfactory to both sides. 

We would like to see a settlement reached sooner rather than later, but we recognize just how difficult the process is. We are encouraged that the personal intervention of U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in June compelled both sides to intensify talks and we remain hopeful that a solution may be reached. 

We continue to urge both parties on Cyprus to make the tough compromises necessary for a solution. We also regularly underscore with our Greek and Turkish 

interlocutors the importance of the reunification negotiations and emphasize that 

everybody benefits from a settlement: Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus.

Question. Iran.—What role do you see for Turkey with regard to Iran’s nuclear 

program? Noting prior differences with Turkey on sanctions and enrichment plans, 

how should we move forward with Turkey to ensure that Iran does not develop a 

nuclear weapon?

Answer. Turkey shares our goal of preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. While Turkey has a long history of cultural, political, and economic ties to Iran, as well as 

a long common border and shared populations, Turkey strongly supports the efforts 

of the international community to encourage Iran to engage with the P5+1 toward 

618

a diplomatic resolution of concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. The Turkish Government and private sector have been cooperative in addressing specific concerns on 

various export control and sanctions issues. We will continue to encourage Turkey, 

as we encourage all states, to impress upon Iran the importance of complying with 

its international nuclear obligations as part of the necessary path to resolving all 

concerns with Iran’s nuclear program.

Question. Has Turkey, in your view, adequately enforced Iranian sanctions? If not, 

what steps do you intend to take to push for increased enforcement?

Answer. The Turkish leadership has made very clear its opposition to a nucleararmed Iran and has stated both publicly and privately that it will fully implement 

all UNSCR sanctions against Iran. We are also engaging vigorously with both the 

Turkish Government and the Turkish private sector to ensure that CISADA sanctions are both understood and implemented. Turkey has been a strong partner on 

nonproliferation and if confirmed, I will continue to work to maintain close cooperation on these issues and work with the Government of Turkey to share international 

best practices in implementation of the U.N. sanctions.

Question. European Union.—Do you believe Turkey can still find a path forward 

for eventual EU membership? What do you believe are the most important unresolved issues in Turkey and in Europe for Turkey in the European Union?

Answer. The United States believes that Turkey’s full accession into the European 

Union would benefit both the EU and Turkey, and we have made this clear to the 

EU, its members, and Turkey. As the President has said, ‘‘the most important thing 

we can do with Turkey is to continue to engage, continue to hold out the advantages 

for them of integration with the West, while still respecting their own unique qualities.’’

Ultimately, the decision rests with both the EU and with Turkey to move forward 

with the accession process, which entails progress on the remaining 20 chapters in 

the Acquis Comunitaire process. 

To advance this process forward, the administration continues to encourage and 

support the Turkish Government and civil society as they strive to implement reforms, particularly involving democracy, human rights, and rule of law. Turks themselves want to see a more democratic Turkey and the Turkish Government continues to pledge its commitment to the EU accession process. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

Question. According to the 2011 State Department Trafficking in Persons Report, 

Turkey is a Tier 2 source, destination, and transit country for men, women, and 

children subjected to sex trafficking and forced labor. The report notes that human 

trafficking in Turkey affects women and children from Eastern Europe and former 

Soviet Union States, but also Turkish women who are subject to trafficking within 

their own country. At the same time, Turkey has taken positive measures, such as 

providing grants for the operation of its national IOM antitrafficking hotline.

• If confirmed, what would be your strategy to encourage the Turkish Government to aggressively combat trafficking within Turkey, including trafficking affecting its own citizens? 

• How will you encourage the justice system in Turkey to use their antitrafficking 

laws properly and provide proper punishment of traffickers?

Answer. We recognize that trafficking cases are inherently difficult to prosecute 

and we all must improve efforts to uncover victims of forced labor and sex trafficking. No country has established a truly comprehensive response to the crime of 

human trafficking, and the United States and Turkey share common challenges in 

addressing and making progress in combating TIP. 

We were pleased to note in the Department’s 2011 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) 

Report that the government improved its recognition of forced labor and domestic 

trafficking and provided grants for the operation of its national IOM antitrafficking 

hotline. The Turkish Penal Code prohibits both sex trafficking and forced labor 

under which 28 offenders were convicted and received sentences ranging from 2 to 

24 years’ imprisonment. While Turkey demonstrated some progress in protecting 

trafficking victims, it did not address critically needed improvements to achieve a 

more victim-centered approach to TIP. 

If confirmed, I am committed to continued partnership with the Government of 

Turkey to address this important issue. When it comes to the prosecution of TIP, 

I will continue to urge the government, if confirmed, to finalize draft legislation that 

prohibits internal trafficking in Turkey and improve witness protection measures 

619

that give witnesses greater incentive to cooperate with law enforcement officials. If 

confirmed, I will also stress with the government the importance the U.S. attache ́s to providing NGOs with sustainable funding for NGO shelters that in turn extend 

critical comprehensive care to victims as well as stepping up its efforts to 

proactively identify victims of this inherently hidden crime.

Question. Good relations between Armenia and Turkey are particularly important 

to stability in the Caucasus and our Nation’s interests. In June, the Turkish people 

democratically elected Prime Minister Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party to 

a third consecutive term as the majority in the Turkish Parliament.

• In your view, what are the prospects of Turkish ratification of the 2009 Zurich 

Protocols to normalize relations with Armenia, given the results of the June 

parliamentary elections?

Answer. We commend the Governments of Armenia and Turkey on their signing 

of the historic protocols on normalization of relations on October 10, 2009, in Zurich. 

Officials from the Government of Turkey continue to state their commitment to the 

protocols. Normalization between Turkey and Armenia remains a feature of our dialogue with both countries. Secretary Clinton and other senior officials continue to 

raise ratification of the protocols with Turkish leaders. Facilitating regional integration is a particular priority for the United States. We believe that rapprochement 

between Armenia and Turkey will foster increased stability and prosperity in the 

entire Caucasus region. We are encouraged that both sides remain committed to the 

process, and we will continue to actively urge all parties to take steps to move the 

process forward.

Question. Turkey has been an invaluable NATO ally, and the hope is that their 

economic success and democratic consolidation will strengthen that role.

• Is Turkey still considering hosting the radar in southeastern Europe as part of 

the European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense, and, if so, when is 

a decision expected?

Answer. On September 19, 2009, President Obama announced the European 

Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense, which will provide for the defense of 

U.S. deployed forces and our allies in Europe sooner and more comprehensively than 

the previous plan. This approach is based on a new assessment of the missile threat, 

and a commitment to deploy technology that is proven, cost-effective, and adaptable 

to an evolving security environment. At the Lisbon NATO Summit in November 

2010, allies agreed to develop a territorial missile defense capability for the full coverage and protection of all NATO European territory, populations, and forces 

against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles. Allies 

also welcomed the EPAA as the U.S. national contribution to this essential NATO 

task. We welcomed Turkey’s support as well as the support of all allies for the success of this important mission. 

The administration has made substantial progress in implementation of the 

EPAA. We are in discussions for the deployment of an AN/TPY–2 radar to southern 

Europe. A forward-based radar will provide additional sensor coverage to enhance 

the existing U.S. homeland missile defense architecture. While no decision has been 

made, we expect to meet our goals for deployment beginning in 2011. 

The administration has held regular discussions with all NATO allies about the 

EPAA and NATO Missile Defense, including Turkey. We look forward to continuing 

such discussions with Turkey and other allies. 

RESPONSE OF NORMAN EISEN TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

Question. According to the 2011 State Department Traffic in Persons Report, the 

Czech Republic is a Tier 2 source, destination, and transit country for human trafficking. Despite meaningful antisex trafficking measures, the Czech Republic is 

struggling to address labor trafficking cases, especially trafficking through their private labor recruitment agencies.

• If confirmed, what would be your strategy to work with the Czech Government 

to reinforce their antitrafficking laws to more effectively combat this scourge?

Answer. As you point out, the Czech Republic has a strong program for preventing 

and combating sex trafficking and protecting its victims. Government engagement 

is backed by an energetic nongovernmental sector that ensures that victims’ rights 

remain on the public agenda. However, the Embassy identified significant shortcomings in preventing labor trafficking last year, which I took up with senior government officials. The concerns we identified resulted in the Czech Republic being 

downgraded to Tier 2 in the 2011 Trafficking in Persons Report. 

620

I and my staff are actively engaged with our Czech counterparts in government 

and NGOs on improving the labor trafficking situation and we have a strong relationship with the antitrafficking interlocutors in the country. The Czech Government has dedicated an interministerial committee to coordinate the government’s 

response to trafficking in persons, and the Embassy has participated in this body’s 

discussions. We have submitted an action plan to the Czech Government on addressing the concerns you raise, and the government is already actively working 

with us to achieve results. For example, the Czech Government has introduced legislation to fund the hiring of more labor inspectors and a law enacted in January 

makes disreputable labor agencies more difficult to establish and maintain. The action plan, developed with experts at the Department of State, is specifically aimed 

at improving regulation of labor agencies; prosecution of labor traffickers; and education of law enforcement officials to better identify victims. 

(621)

NOMINATION 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 2011

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

Hon. Wendy R. Sherman, of Maryland, to be Under Secretary of 

State for Political Affairs 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin 

presiding. 

Present: Senators Cardin, Menendez, Casey, Shaheen, Coons, 

Udall, Lugar, Risch, DeMint, Barrasso, and Lee. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,

U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND 

Senator CARDIN. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will 

come to order. Good morning, everyone. We are gathered today in 

regards to the nomination of the Honorable Wendy R. Sherman of 

Maryland to serve as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. 

First, I want to thank Senator Kerry for allowing me to chair 

this hearing. Senator Kerry has a statement for the record and 

without objection that will be made part of the record. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Kerry follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY

I am pleased that this morning the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is welcoming Ambassador Wendy Sherman, an exceptional public servant whom the 

President has nominated to be Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. 

Ambassador Sherman brings a tremendous depth of foreign policy and political 

experience to this position. She served as Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative 

Affairs, as well as Counselor to the Secretary of State, during the Clinton administration. She is also familiar with Capitol Hill, having served as chief of staff to Senator Barbara Mikulski. There is no doubt in my mind that, if confirmed, she will 

do a tremendous job in this critical diplomatic post. 

We need diplomats of her caliber to guide us through the challenges we face 

today. In the past months alone, we have all been captivated by the incredible wave 

of change sweeping the Middle East. We have been inspired by the people in Tunisia and Egypt who demanded freedom and dignity and an end to repression and corruption. And we have been moved by the courageous uprising in Libya that has led 

to the downfall of Moammar Qaddafi. 

But we have also watched with increasing horror as the Syrian Government uses 

violence and brutality against its own people. And we need to beware of the downward spiral taking place in Yemen, and the dangerous implications for the region 

if the government in Sanaa were to leave a power vacuum in its wake. Clearly, it 

622

is a time of great possibility, but also of great danger, in a region that is vital to 

U.S. interests. 

Amid these challenges in the Middle East, we still have to manage our involvement in many other regions. This spring, for example, the committee held a series 

of hearings on how to approach our engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan. We 

will spend $120 billion in Afghanistan this fiscal year alone. We must be sure that 

scarce resources are being used effectively and constructively, and we must also be 

aware that large expenditures can constrain our ability to act elsewhere. 

As the world has seen in the past several weeks, our budgetary constraints are 

forcing increasingly painful tradeoffs. We cannot afford to be the world’s first responder whenever a crisis arises—we need strong multilateral partners who can 

help us shoulder this burden. At the same time, I take very seriously the notion 

that no other country in the world has our resources, capabilities, or expertise to 

save lives, mitigate disasters, and prevent catastrophes. We have managed to accumulate tremendous wealth, power, and influence—and with that comes equivalent 

responsibility. When we fail to act, the world all too often is silent as well. Even 

as we work to address the budget crisis facing our country we must not shortchange 

our ability to conduct foreign policy—the money we spend abroad is not a gift to 

foreign nations. It is an investment in our national security. 

And, make no mistake: going forward, we will face an incredibly wide range of 

foreign policy challenges, including the growing economic and political potency of 

China, India, and Brazil, as well as that of a host of emerging powers, like South 

Africa, Indonesia, and Turkey. More than ever, our national security interests are 

closely interconnected with our economic interests. 

What this time demands from our leading diplomats is not only remarkable commitment and skill, but remarkable versatility. And I am very gratified that the 

President has nominated someone with all of those talents to such an important 

position. 

Ambassador Sherman, we thank you for your continued dedication to public service and to helping lead the Department of State through such a decisive period in 

our foreign policy. I look forward to your testimony.

Senator CARDIN. I would also announce that the record will remain open until close of business today in regards to this hearing. 

This is a unique pleasure for me, to be able to chair a hearing 

for Ambassador Sherman. Senator Mikulski and I are very proud 

of Ambassador Sherman and her incredible history of public service 

to our country. We’re very proud of her and we’re proud that she 

hails from Maryland, and we thank her for being willing to step 

forward for this very important assignment that President Obama 

has asked her to fulfill. 

I also want to acknowledge her husband, Bruce Stokes, who’s in 

attendance, as well as her daughter, Sarah Sherman Stokes, and 

her husband, Chris Richards. This is a family sacrifice, public service. I think we all understand that. And although we appreciate 

very much Ambassador Sherman’s willingness to serve, we know 

that it involves a very understanding family. So we thank you all 

for being willing to share your wife, your mother, with us in public 

service and with your Nation. 

Ambassador Sherman brings a wealth of foreign policy and political experience to what is a critical position at State, particularly 

at this pivotal time in world events. We continue to find ourselves 

in the midst of a singular time period in history. It’s hard to recall 

another era characterized by so much turmoil, but also by such 

great possibilities. 

Many have been captivated first and foremost by the wave of 

change sweeping the Middle East. We have been inspired by the 

people of Tunisia and Egypt, who have demanded freedom and dignity, an end to repression and corruption. We have been moved by 

the courageous uprising in Libya. But we’ve also watched with inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00630 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
623

creasing disgust the Syrian Government’s indiscriminate use of violence and brutality against its own people. 

Of course, there are foreign policy challenges in all parts of the 

world. We are still actively engaged in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. All these present challenges for the United States and for the 

position that Ambassador Sherman has been nominated to. We also 

have significant economic and political challenges stemming from 

China, India, and Brazil, as well as from a host of emerging powers. 

As we experienced firsthand this summer, our budget constraints 

are forcing increasingly painful tradeoffs. We cannot afford to be 

the world’s first responders whenever a crisis arises. We need 

strong multilateral partners who can help us shoulder this burden. 

At the same time, my colleagues and I take very seriously the 

notion that no other country in the world has the resources, the capabilities, and the expertise to stabilize, mitigate disasters, and 

prevent catastrophes as the United States. We have managed to accumulate tremendous wealth, power, and influence, and with this 

comes a high moral responsibility. 

Today I have the pleasure of welcoming Ambassador Sherman. 

She’ll be formally introduced by my colleague Senator Mikulski, 

but I just really want to point out to the committee the incredible 

record that Ambassador Sherman brings to this nomination. She 

attended Smith College, graduating with honors from Boston University. Sherman earned a master’s degree in social work from the 

University of Maryland, launching her on a career path of public 

service at the community, State, national, and international levels, 

including a stint right here on Capitol Hill, having served as chief 

of staff for the senior Senator from Maryland, Senator Mikulski. 

I remember very well her as chief of staff and the way that she 

not only managed Senator Mikulski’s Senate office, but the way 

that she worked with all of us to make sure that we were all well 

informed. 

Her responsibilities in senior positions at the State Department 

beginning in the early 1990s, combined with her considerable experience in the private sector, have prepared her well to assume the 

tasks associated with the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the position to which she has been nominated. I would note 

that Ms. Sherman will be the first woman to serve in this position 

once she is confirmed. 

Ms. Sherman’s past policy experience will be especially helpful as 

she assists the Secretary and Deputy Secretary to formulate a foreign policy at this critical time in relationship to our allies and adversaries alike. 

With that, let me turn to Senator Lugar. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join you 

in welcoming Ms. Sherman. I appreciate her experience and her 

willingness to rejoin public service at a very challenging moment 

for United States foreign policy. 

Soon after taking office, Secretary of State Clinton initiated the 

first-ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, the 

624

QDDR, modeled after a long-standing Pentagon strategic assessment process. What emerged last December, after 18 months, was 

largely a blueprint for improving coordination of America’s existing 

foreign policy and foreign aid operations, and an agenda for future 

reforms. 

But that exercise did not prioritize policy goals, nor did it take 

account of the rapidly changing domestic budget environment. For 

many months Congress and the President have been involved in 

deliberations on the budget that are focused on reducing massive 

Federal deficits in the short run and constructing a long-term 

strategy for dealing with a national debt that is approaching $15 

trillion. 

This governmentwide budget focus will continue this fall, with 

the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction holding its first 

meetings this week. If the Super Committee process does not 

produce a viable budget reduction plan, agencies and programs will 

face automatic sequestrations. 

In this context, the State Department must be planning how to 

perform its important national security, economic, consular, and 

diplomatic missions in a declining resource environment. This planning should proceed far more rapidly than the QDDR, in part because at its heart, it is not just a management exercise, it is a policy imperative. 

Even apart from budget dynamics, I remain concerned that our 

national security policy is being driven without sufficient planning 

or strategic design. The expansion of the Afghanistan mission and 

the intervention in Libya, in particular, have occurred with limited 

reference to strategic goals or vital interests. As I noted in our 

hearing series on Afghanistan several months ago, it is difficult to 

see how the current level of United States expenditures in that 

country can be squared with a rational allocation of national security resources. 

Undoubtedly, global emergencies will occur that require an 

American response. The State Department has often been adept at 

moving existing funds around to address urgent contingencies. We 

also have seen recent efforts to trim civilian projects in Afghanistan or elongate their timeframe to reduce the rate of spending. 

But if resources for national security contingencies decline, as most 

observers expect, U.S. policy will require a much more defined set 

of priorities and the strategic discipline to stick to them. 

The State Department and the White House should be working 

with Congress to articulate a set of priorities to be funded that are 

based on vital national security interests. Within the State Department, the impetus for such planning must come from the highest 

levels. I will be interested to hear the nominee’s views of United 

States national security priorities, the State Department’s response 

to intensifying budget limitations, and the prospects for improving 

strategic planning at the State Department and throughout our 

government. 

We welcome Ms. Sherman and I thank the chair and look forward to our discussion. 

Senator CARDIN. I thank you very much, Senator Lugar. 

It’s now my privilege to introduce my colleague in the U.S. Senate, Senator Barbara Mikulski. 

625

STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA MIKULSKI,

U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND 

Senator MIKULSKI. Good morning, Senator Cardin, Senator 

Lugar, Senator DeMint. It is with a great deal of pride and enthusiasm I come before you today to unabashedly lend my support for 

Wendy Sherman to be the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. I believe that Secretary Clinton has chosen wisely because 

Ambassador Sherman brings to this post an exceptional background and a great deal of skill. She has unique abilities that she 

wants to put to work in the public service for our country. 

As you stated, Senator Cardin, I’ve known Wendy Sherman for 

25 years. I’ve known her as a friend, a chief of staff, and she continues to be a close adviser. I do know Wendy Sherman and therefore that’s why I’m so clear that this would be an outstanding nomination and hope the committee confirms her. 

She brings competence, intelligence, and integrity. Wendy will be 

an invaluable member of our foreign policy team, advancing the 

global interests of our country, a safer country, a stronger economy. 

She is a strategic thinker, a seasoned diplomat, and an experienced 

manager and negotiator, and knowledgeable of the world and the 

issues that the United States faces. 

She understands and respects the important role of Congress in 

foreign policy. As Assistant Secretary of State for Legislation under 

President Clinton and then-Secretary Warren Christopher, she 

knew how to listen to us, made sure our voices were heard at the 

State Department, and was truly bipartisan in her approach and 

in her work. 

She played a role, working with Secretary Albright, on every 

major foreign policy issue. She managed very special assignments 

at the request of the Secretary, including negotiations on nonproliferation. She also has extensive experience in the private sector. That doesn’t usually happen at the State Department. They 

usually come from academia, a good place to come from, from Congress—some might say an even better place to come from—and 

then the private sector, which we cannot have a safer country and 

a stronger economy unless we know how it all works together. 

Ambassador Sherman in her role, having left government, has 

worked with iconic American companies to expand and compete in 

the global economy, to make sure we had a presence over there 

while we kept jobs here. It is her unique ability to understand the 

world, but understand the people of the United States of America 

that she serves, and also the constitutional requirement that the 

executive branch must consult with Congress on important affairs 

of state. 

She has an incredible background and one that might be unique, 

as I’ve outlined. Senator Cardin talked about how she went to 

Smith, was an honors graduate from Boston, and then we both 

went to the University of Maryland School of Social Work. I was 

a couple of yearbooks away from Ambassador Sherman, but we did 

go to that outstanding school, where we learned community development and social strategy. 

What we learned there was to accomplish a goal you have to organize based on a felt need, around a goal, a noble idea, and build 

the support to do it. She will work at her job to build support, both 

626

within our own country and within the world, to advance our vital 

interests. 

One of the important things I think also about Ambassador Sherman is her incredible commitment to public service. It is in her 

DNA. She comes from a wonderful family. Senator Cardin, you and 

I know her parents very well, Mel and Mimi Sherman, who were 

prominent in the Baltimore business community, in the real estate 

community, and they were known for their high principles of integrity, their commitment to social justice, and they knew that you 

could do well while doing good. 

It is there that they had—and I know that Ambassador Sherman 

learned first about foreign affairs trick or treating for UNICEF to 

help the little kids of the world, and now she’s going to be a big 

kid on the block helping the little children of the world. 

Her husband Bruce is a distinguished journalist and international economist. Her daughter Sarah is a recent law school 

graduate, again committed to public service and her husband, Dr. 

Chris Richards. 

So I think the committee would do well to take the executive 

branch’s nomination and to move her forward. I look forward to 

working with you should the committee decide to vote to advance 

this on the agenda. 

Thank you for your kind attention and I know you want to hear 

from Ambassador Sherman. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, Senator Mikulski, let me thank you for 

your comments. I join you in presenting to the committee, Ambassador Sherman, strongly support her confirmation, and just want 

to underscore the personal aspects that you did. I’ve known the 

Sherman family all my life and I’ve known Wendy all my life, and 

they’re an incredible public family in that they have given back so 

much to our community, and we’re very proud of your record and 

very proud of your willingness to step forward for this important 

assignment. 

Ambassador Sherman. 

STATEMENT OF HON. WENDY R. SHERMAN, OF MARYLAND, 

NOMINATED TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR 

POLITICAL AFFAIRS 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Good morning, Senator Cardin, chairman 

for today, and Senator Lugar, whom I’ve had the distinguished 

honor to work with for many, many years, and to all of the members of the committee, Senator DeMint, Senator Udall, and others 

who may join. 

I’m very honored to be here. I want to begin by thanking President Obama and Secretary Clinton for their confidence and, with 

your support, for the opportunity once again to serve our country. 

Senator Mikulski and Senator Cardin, I am so very grateful for 

your friendship, your support, your wonderful words, and for your 

leadership and service to all of us who are Marylanders and to all 

Americans. I’m very humbled by your introductions this morning. 

If I may, thanks as well to my husband, Bruce, and all of my 

family—I’m so delighted that my daughter, Sarah, and her husband, Chris, can be here today—to all of my family, as Senator 

Cardin said, who are willing once again to have the phone ring in 

627

the middle of the night and to welcome me home after yet another 

trip abroad. 

None of us can contemplate these responsibilities without a 

mighty support system of family, friends, and colleagues, several of 

whom are with me here today. 

This is the third time I have come before this panel seeking confirmation. In 1993 the chairman was Senator Claiborne Pell, who 

always carried a copy of the United Nations Charter in his pocket, 

proudly pulling it out and reminding us all how we must all work 

for peace and prosperity. My own parents, in fact, were at the 

founding meeting of the U.N. in 1945 in San Francisco. My father, 

an Active-Duty Marine, stateside after being wounded at Guadalcanal, helped to organize veterans to advocate in support of the 

world body. He was determined to do all that he could to save future generations from the trauma that his own generation had experienced. 

In 1997 when I appeared before the committee for the second 

time, the chair was Senator Jesse Helms. It will not surprise you 

to learn that he and I did not always agree. But I never doubted 

his love for our country, and he never doubted mine, either privately or publicly. Those who knew him know that he was a true 

gentleman. When I had surgery, he called me at home. And when 

we failed to see eye to eye on an issue, there was never any questioning of sincerity or motives. 

Today, under the leadership of Chairman Kerry and Ranking 

Member Lugar, the committee is at the forefront of debate about 

America’s position in a world of constant change. But what has not 

changed is the professional and dedicated manner in which the 

committee conducts the Nation’s business. 

I am grateful for your courtesy and look forward, if confirmed, 

to working with you in the future, just as I have worked with many 

of you in prior years. 

I’m also humbled by the knowledge that the job of Under Secretary for Political Affairs has been filled in the past by people for 

whom I have enormous respect, including most recently Ambassador Bill Burns, an outstanding member of the Foreign Service 

who continues his service as Deputy Secretary. 

If I had to write a job description for the position, it would begin 

and end with a willingness to take on whatever assignments are 

deemed necessary by the Secretary of State. If confirmed, I will 

bring to this new assignment years of experience as a staff member 

on Capitol Hill, as Assistant Secretary and counselor at the Department of State, and as the President’s Special Adviser on North 

Korea. In recent years I have gained valuable additional experience 

in the private sector. This background has enabled me to develop 

skills as a negotiator, strategist, troubleshooter, and problem solver. 

I think you will find also that I’m a good listener. As chief of staff 

of then-Congresswoman Mikulski and later as Assistant Secretary 

of State for Legislative Affairs, I had a good deal of practice. Listening is important, not only in meeting with foreign officials, but 

in consulting with you, the representatives of the American people, 

and our citizens. 

628

My old boss and current business partner, Secretary Albright, 

used to say there is nothing foreign about foreign policy. What the 

State Department does and what this committee does is intimately 

related to the health of our economy, the demands made on our 

military, the safety of our people, and the future of our children. 

It is vital that we communicate these connections to the public. 

Mr. Chairman, I expect during the course of this hearing that we 

will cover many of the specific countries and controversies that 

presently concern us across the globe. Rather than try to address 

those in this brief opening statement, I thought I would summarize 

very quickly the attributes of American foreign policy that I intend 

to stress if confirmed to the position of Under Secretary of State. 

The first is persistence. I think we make a mistake when we look 

for quick answers to hard problems. It’s always tempting to seek 

instant gratification, but that is generally, unfortunately, not how 

the world works. We owe it to ourselves, to the public we serve, 

and to our allies to persevere in our strategies, maintain our commitments, and finish the jobs we begin. 

Second, we need to take advantage of the full range of foreign 

policy tools. These extend from the simple art of persuasion to the 

persuasive impact of military force, and include in between a variety of carrots and sticks. When possible, we should act with others. 

When necessary, we should not hesitate to act alone. Our military 

must be strong, versatile, and ready, but the same is true of our 

civilian resources. 

Third, American foreign policy must reflect a blend of idealism 

and realism. A decisionmaker has no choice but to begin with the 

world as it is, but our decisions would have no purpose if not to 

shape the world as we would like it to be. We cannot claim to represent the American people if we do not explore every opportunity 

to support freedom, prosperity, and justice. 

In pursuing our interests and our values, we must also reach out 

in the broadest possible way to governments, opinion leaders, 

young people, women and girls, the private sector, and civil society 

in all its dimensions. We must also take advantage of the opportunities presented by the information technologies and networking 

capabilities of the 21st century. 

Finally, in all that we do we must keep in mind on whose behalf 

we serve and in whose interests we labor. The Department of 

State, like this committee, exists not to represent the world to the 

United States, but to enhance American influence across the globe. 

We may disagree on occasion about how best to do that, but there 

should be no confusion about the nature of our purpose. 

Certainly no one understands better than Secretary Clinton and 

this committee’s members the importance of investing our dollars 

very wisely, of tieing our diplomatic initiatives to the best interests 

of our country, of making sure that our policies reflect and uphold 

American values. At the same time, as an optimist I see a convergence, a growing convergence, between our interests and those of 

other peaceloving and law-abiding countries. The art of diplomacy 

is to mobilize others to coordinate with us in pursuit of shared 

goals, whether we have in mind the further degradation of alQaeda, a halt to nuclear proliferation, or the strengthening of stability and democracy in every corner of the world. 

629

In closing, I want to once again thank the President and Secretary of State for their support, to say how very much I look forward, if confirmed, to working closely with the members of the 

committee and your colleagues in Congress, and to express my 

gratitude for the opportunity, with your blessing, to devote my full 

energies to serving the country we all love. 

I thank you again for your hospitality and would be pleased to 

respond to your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Sherman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR WENDY R. SHERMAN

Good morning, Senator Cardin, Senator Lugar and members of the committee, I 

am honored to be here and want to begin by thanking President Obama and Secretary Clinton for their confidence, and with your support, for the opportunity once 

again, to serve our country. 

Senator Mikulski and Senator Cardin, I am very grateful for your friendship, your 

support, and for your leadership and service to all of us who are Marylanders—and 

Americans. I am humbled by your introductions this morning. 

And, if I may, thanks as well to my husband, Bruce, and all of my family who 

are willing once again to have the phone ring in the middle of the night and to welcome me home after yet another trip abroad. None of us can contemplate these responsibilities without a mighty support system of family, friends, and colleagues. 

This is the third time I have come before this panel seeking confirmation. 

In 1993, the chairman was Senator Claiborne Pell, who always carried a copy of 

the United Nations Charter in his pocket, proudly pulling it out and reminding us 

how we all must work together for peace and prosperity. 

My own parents, in fact, were at the founding meeting of the U.N. in 1945 in San 

Francisco. My father, an Active-Duty Marine, stateside after being wounded at Guadalcanal, helped to organize veterans to advocate in support of the world body; he 

was determined to do all he could to save future generations from the trauma that 

his own generation had experienced. 

In 1997, when I appeared before the committee for the second time, the chair was 

Senator Jesse Helms. 

It will not surprise you to learn that he and I did not always agree, but I never 

doubted his love for our country and he never doubted mine either privately or 

publicly. 

Those who knew him know that he was a true gentleman; when I had surgery, 

he called me at home; and when we failed to see eye to eye on an issue, there was 

never any questioning of sincerity or motives. 

Today, under the leadership of Chairman Kerry and Ranking Member Lugar, the 

committee is at the forefront of debate about America’s position in a world of constant change—but what has not changed is the professional and dedicated manner 

in which the committee conducts the Nation’s business. 

I am grateful for your courtesy and look forward, if confirmed, to working with 

you in the future just as I have worked with many of you in prior years. 

I am humbled by the knowledge that the job of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs has been filled in the past by people for whom I have enormous respect, 

including most recently Ambassador Bill Burns, an outstanding member of the Foreign Service, who continues his service as Deputy Secretary. 

If I had to write a job description for the position it would begin and end with 

a willingness to take on whatever assignments are deemed necessary by the Secretary of State. 

If confirmed, I will bring to this new assignment years of experience as a staff 

member on Capitol Hill, as Assistant Secretary and Counselor at the Department 

of State, and as the President’s special advisor on North Korea. In recent years, I 

have gained valuable additional experience in the private sector. 

This background has enabled me to develop skills as a negotiator, strategist, trouble-shooter and problem-solver. I think you will also find that I am a good listener. 

As Chief of Staff to then-Congresswoman Mikulski, and later as Assistant Secretary 

of State for Legislative Affairs, I had a good deal of practice. Listening is important 

not only in meetings with foreign officials; but in consulting with you—the representatives of the American people and with our citizens. 

My old boss, Secretary Albright, used to say that there is nothing foreign about 

foreign policy. What the State Department does, and what this committee does, is 

intimately related to the health of our economy, the demands made on our military, 

630

the safety of our people, and the future of our children. It is vital that we communicate these connections to the public. 

Mr. Chair, I expect, during the course of this hearing, that we will cover many 

of the specific countries and controversies that presently concern us across the 

globe. Rather than try to address those in this opening statement, I thought I would 

summarize very quickly the attributes of American foreign policy that I intend to 

stress if confirmed to the position of Under Secretary of State. 

The first is persistence. I think we make a mistake when we look for quick answers to hard problems. It is always tempting to seek instant gratification, but that 

is generally not how the world works. We owe it to ourselves, to the public we serve, 

and to our allies, to persevere in our strategies, maintain our commitments, and finish the jobs we begin. 

Second, we need to take advantage of the full range of foreign policy tools. These 

extend from the simple art of persuasion to the persuasive impact of military force 

and include in between a variety of carrots and sticks. When possible, we should 

act with others; when necessary, we should not hesitate to act alone. Our military 

must remain strong, versatile, and ready, but the same is true of our civilian 

resources. Third, American foreign policy must reflect a blend of idealism and realism. A decisionmaker has no choice but to begin with the world as it is; but our decisions 

would have no purpose if not to shape the world as we would like it to be. We cannot claim to represent the American people if we do not explore every opportunity 

to support freedom, prosperity, and justice. 

In pursuing our interests and our values, we must also reach out in the broadest 

way possible—to governments, opinion leaders, young people, women and girls, the 

private sector and civil society in all its dimensions. We must also take full advantage of the opportunities presented by the information technologies and networking 

capabilities of the 21st century. 

Finally, in all that we do, we must keep in mind on whose behalf we serve and 

in whose interests we labor. The Department of State, like this committee, exists 

not to represent the world to the United States, but to enhance American influence 

across the globe. We may disagree on occasion about how best to do that, but there 

should be no confusion about the nature of our purpose. Certainly, no one understands better than Secretary Clinton and this committee’s members the importance 

of investing our dollars wisely, of tying our diplomatic initiatives to the best interests of our country, and of making sure that our policies reflect and uphold American values. 

At the same time, I see a growing convergence between our interests and those 

of other peace-loving and law-abiding countries. The art of diplomacy is to mobilize 

others to coordinate with us in pursuit of shared goals—whether we have in mind 

the further degradation of al-Qaeda, a halt to nuclear proliferation, or the strengthening of stability and democracy in every corner of the world. 

In closing, I want once again to thank the President and Secretary of State for 

their support, to say how much I look forward, if confirmed, to working closely with 

the members of the committee and your colleagues in Congress, and to express my 

gratitude for the opportunity—with your blessing—to devote my full energies to 

serving the country we all love. 

I thank you again for your hospitality and would be pleased to respond to your 

questions.

Senator CARDIN. Once again, thank you for your appearance here 

and your testimony. 

I want to start off with a point that I raised in my opening statement, and Senator Lugar also did, and that is the fiscal realities 

that we’re finding ourselves in. The United States has a security 

budget that includes not only the Department of Defense, but our 

civilian efforts of diplomacy within the State Department. We 

spend more than any other nation in the world by far in regards 

to our defense issues. On the diplomacy civilian side, we spend a 

lot of money, but as a relative part of our budget it’s relatively 

small. 

The Obama administration has made the point over and over 

again that we have a national security budget, that we need to be 

able to use all resources, whether they’re military or civilian or diplomacy, in regards to our national security interests. 

631

I would ask you to share with us how you would go about making priority recommendations to the administration. There are a lot 

of demands out there. We’re still involved, obviously, in Afghanistan and Iraq. Pakistan is a huge challenge for the United States 

and could become an expensive operation for us, already is an expensive operation for us. In addition, there are opportunities, new 

opportunities in Egypt. We have Libya that is emerging. 

So how will you go about—will you share to us the standards you 

will use in trying to make priority judgments. You know we are 

faced with the possibility of across-the-board cuts if the Congress 

is unable to reduce the deficit further, which could obviously bring 

in tough decisionmaking challenges to the Department of State. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Cardin. 

This is a very tough question that we’re beginning the hearing 

with, and I know that for every member you’ve just come back from 

recess and talking with your constituents and being back in communities. And American families are worried about everything 

from the floods in their neighborhoods to, quite importantly, whether they or loved ones are going to have a job to be able to support 

their families and have the kind of future that we all hope for our 

children. 

So when we think about foreign policy priorities, I’m sure you 

hear from many constituents, why are we spending a single dollar 

abroad? We need every dollar we have in our budget, particularly 

as we need to deal with our deficit, and we need to create opportunities for jobs for people at home. We need every dollar at home. 

At the same time, I know that the American people are well 

aware that on Sunday we will memorialize 10 years since 9/11 and 

the tremendous threat of terror that came across an ocean we 

thought would never reach our homeland, and the terrible cost in 

lives, in the way we go about our civil society, in the ways we face 

our future. 

So I think Americans understand that in order to have the economic future we want we are inexorably connected to the world. 

We are connected to the world’s economy. We are connected to 

events that take place in the world that are going to have an impact on what happens to us here at home. 

So we have to find the right balance. Most Americans believe 

that we spend 40 percent of our budget on foreign policy. When we 

ask them how much we should spend, they say 20 percent. As I 

think all the members of this committee know, we spend less than 

1 percent of the Federal budget on foreign policy priorities. 

Even with that 1 percent, as you say quite rightly, we are going 

to have to be very thoughtful about what we do. President Obama, 

Secretary Clinton, have really I think led the way, as Secretary 

Clinton and Secretary Gates did, in putting forward a national security budget, at looking holistically at all of the tools—our military tools, our civilian tools, our diplomatic tools, and the tools of 

our private sector—in trying to advance American vital national security interests around the world. 

So I think we’re going to have to be very smart about how we 

move forward. I think President Obama is looking quite carefully. 

As we know, we’re winding down the war in Iraq. That will be 

quite crucial. He has a glide path for moving troops out of AfghaniVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00639 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
632

stan, which will have an enormous budget savings between now 

and 2014, when that will be accomplished. 

We are looking at the new challenges that we have, both in 

terms not of what we alone can do, but what we can do with others. The efforts in Libya were not led so much by the United 

States, though we played an invaluable role in what the Libyan 

people themselves have done, but it has been led by NATO, so that 

the burden is shared. 

So I think we are going to have to look at all of the stakeholders, 

all of the resources we have. I think the building of public-private 

partnerships will be quite crucial. But I think Secretary Clinton 

and Secretary Gates and now Secretary Clinton and Secretary Panetta will lead the way in marshalling the resources we have in the 

best way we have, with I think the fundamental premise, what is 

in America’s vital national security interest, and that has to set the 

priorities for where we will head. 

Senator CARDIN. You were a major player in the Clinton administration as it developed policies toward North Korea. Could you 

share with us what lessons you believe were learned by that experience that could be helpful as we continue to develop a strategy 

as it relates to a country that presents serious challenges to the 

United States? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Thank you, Senator. I think that during 

the time that I worked on that very, very tough problem for President Clinton and Secretary Albright, it began really in 1998 when 

North Korea launched a Taepodong missile that overflew Japan, 

and it failed, but it raised great concerns, not only in the Clinton 

administration, but up here on Capitol Hill. There was a suspect 

underground site and we didn’t quite know what was going on 

there. 

So, with bipartisan support from the United States Congress, the 

former Secretary of Defense William Perry was designated to be a 

North Korea policy coordinator and to do a review, which went on 

for 11 months, and at the same time undertake some new diplomacy. I was the person inside government who worked with Secretary Perry and then replaced him as North Korea policy coordinator. 

I think we learned what every administration since has learned. 

Working with North Korea is very frustrating, exceedingly difficult. 

They are elusive. They do not keep their commitments. They are 

often hostile. They are oppressive to their people; and that solving 

this problem is very, very tough, takes enormous persistence; and 

that there are no good choices. 

We were able to get a significant dialogue started, make some 

small progress, but those gains turned out to be elusive. President 

Bush tried some new efforts, including the development of the sixparty talks, continuing what was called the TCOG, which was a 

trilateral coordinating mechanism with South Korea and Japan, 

which was very important. He started a policy of interdiction of 

possible and suspect efforts on the high seas, which I think was an 

important tool. 

Secretary Obama—Secretary Clinton and President Obama have 

continued with the six-party talks and continued really with the 

two-prong approach that Secretary Perry first put on the table. 

633

That was that North Korea had a choice. It could eliminate in an 

irreversible fashion its nuclear weapons program and its long-range 

missile program, improve its human rights record, and give its people a future and join the international community and see some 

normalization of relations, or they could continue their isolation as 

a weak and failed state and get the wrath of the international community visited upon them. 

So far, North Korea has pretty much chosen the second path. 

The Obama administration, Secretary Clinton, have worked with 

the U.N. and with allies around the world to place additional very 

serious sanctions on North Korea. They’re probably among, if not 

the most, sanctioned country in the world. 

It has created some pressure on North Korea. They have recently 

had talks with South Korea. They have had some talks with the 

United States, but Secretary Clinton has been quite clear and I 

think quite wisely has said that it makes no sense to have talks 

just for the sake of talks, that North Korea must keep its commitments that it made in 2005 to really move forward to the 

denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; and if they show that in 

fact they want to proceed in that way then talks may have some 

serious purpose. 

But I’m quite clear this is one tough, difficult, thorny problem. 

We learned some things, but we are in a new environment, in 

many ways a much tougher environment, and the choices the 

President and the Secretary have to make are probably even tougher than the ones that we made in the late 1990s. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Sherman, following up on the chairman’s earlier question, I 

would simply note that the Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House of Representatives recently passed a 

budget for the State Department for fiscal year 2012 in the amount 

of $39 billion. This figure is $8.6 billion, or some 18 percent, below 

the fiscal year 2011 enacted level and 22 percent below what the 

administration requested for the funding level for 2012. 

I raise this because I just want to get some insight as to how you 

perceive your role as Under Secretary for Political Affairs. You 

would obviously serve as a close adviser to the Secretary of State—

but would it be your responsibility to rearrange the deck? The $39 

billion may not be the final figure. It may go up or down. In the 

event that the Committee of 12 does not reach a decision regarding 

deficit reduction, the State Department has been included along 

with the Defense Department to shoulder 50 percent of the $1.2 

trillion in mandated automatic spending cuts. Already there’s discussion about what the State Department and the Defense Department would lose relative to one another should these cuts occur. 

So I’m trying to define in my own mind’s eye, as well as for those 

who are witnessing our hearing, what is your job? Is it your role 

to prioritize who is going to do what in an environment where resources are limited? Or do you simply advise somebody else who 

makes these decisions? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Well, thank you for that question, Senator. Many years ago, then-Chairman Howell Rodgers, a RepubVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00641 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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lican in the House, put in the State authorization bill language to 

create a second Deputy Secretary of State for Resources and Management, and this committee and the Senate were quite wise to recently confirm Deputy Secretary Tom Nides to that position. 

Secretary Clinton is the first Secretary of State to fill that role, 

because she understood, I think, the point, at least one of the 

points you’re trying to make, Senator. And that is dealing with the 

budget priorities of the State Department is complex, it’s difficult, 

it’s a competitive environment, it’s a challenging environment. So 

Secretary Nides has the principal responsibility of working with 

the Secretary of State to work with OMB and the White House in 

establishing those budget priorities and working in the whole of 

government approach to a national security budget. 

The role of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs is 

a more political and diplomatic role, of course offering as part of 

the Secretary’s team advice and thoughts and recommendations 

and helping to illuminate the many priorities that are in front of 

the United States as it tries to extend its interests around the 

world. So I will certainly do all that the Secretary asks me to do 

to support that effort. 

I think the Secretary has already made clear that if the House 

bill were to move forward to the President’s desk, she would personally recommend a veto of that bill, not only on the basis of the 

deep cuts to the bill, but many of the provisions that are within 

that bill. 

I certainly understand the House’s actions in these difficult 

times, but I remain hopeful, as I know the Secretary and the President does, that we can all work together to find something that will 

help truly meet the vital interests of the United States. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much for clarifying the 

work of Secretary Nides and the role of the Under Secretary of 

State for Political Affairs. Given that role, it is relevant to mention 

that the General Assembly of the United Nations will be meeting 

very soon. It’s anticipated that we’re going to have a real problem 

with the Palestinian Authority suggesting that a Palestinian state 

be recognized at the U.N. 

What are we going to do about that? What is the program of the 

administration as it approaches the U.N. and this ongoing problem, 

which has been perceived a long way down the trail, but now is 

pretty close at hand? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Senator, the administration has been 

very clear that all of us hope for a two-state solution in Middle 

East peace, a viable Palestine and a secure Israel with clear borders. We do not believe that a U.N. resolution will get us to that 

place, and the Secretary of State and the President are doing everything they can to make it clear to the world that we think that 

this is not a positive step forward should a resolution come to pass. 

My understanding from the briefings I’ve had at the State Department is there has been a very broad and very vigorous demarche of virtually every capital in the world, that this is high on 

the agenda for every meeting the Secretary has with every world 

leader. Today I understand that both Special Envoy David Hale 

and Ambassador Dennis Ross are in the region having conversaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00642 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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tions with all parties to see if there is not a better way forward to 

resolve this issue. 

But there is no question that the President, the Secretary of 

State, and, if confirmed, I will do everything possible to see that 

this does not move forward. 

Senator LUGAR. Now, the United States will oppose Palestinian 

Authority President Abbas in his motion, but specifically what can 

we do? If the General Assembly has a majority vote, what is our 

next step? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. I think the next step, Senator, to the best 

of my understanding is the discussions that are going on in the region as we speak to see if there is not a more viable path forward. 

I think my understanding is that the Palestinian Authority has not 

yet decided exactly what it will put forward. So I think there are 

ongoing discussions and I think it’s incumbent upon everyone in 

the administration to do everything we possibly can to see if there 

is any possibility that this not proceed. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARDIN. Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Sherman, thank you very much for your long service to our 

country. I appreciate it and look forward to your role at the State 

Department. 

There are many questions I would like to ask you, but two that 

I’ll pursue in my 6 minutes. One is Libya. I welcome the political 

change in Libya, to bring about the aspirations of the Libyan people, and am certainly proud to have been the sponsor of the Senate 

no-fly resolution in the early stages of this challenge. So I’m very 

much in support of an opportunity for the Libyan people to start 

anew and for the successor government to embrace democratic reforms and rehabilitate Libya’s reputation in the world community. 

At the same time, I have, as you may know, for some time followed the case of the Pan Am 103 bombing, which claimed 189 

American lives, including 34 from my home State of New Jersey, 

and I have never believed that Mr. Megrahi alone was the beginning and the end of the mastermind of Pan Am 103’s bombing. I 

think people generally believe that that is not true. We still do not 

know who ordered the bombing, who collected the intelligence to 

carry out the plan, who made the bomb, and who in addition to 

Megrahi bears responsibility for this heinous attack. 

So it is my hope that the follow-on Libyan Government will be 

responsive. Certainly when Mr. Jabril met with me, he made certain direct commitments about the TNC’s engagement. 

But I am somewhat dismayed by the news reports that I have 

seen coming from the TNC since, whether they relate to Mr. 

Megrahi or other pursuits of information that would give us the 

wherewithal to understand who was involved in this bombing. So 

to that end, I’ll introduce later today the Pan Am 103 Accountability Act, which would require the President to consider the cooperation of the TNC and any successor government in Libya when 

making decisions about U.S. assistance, and would limit the distribution of Libyan frozen assets until the President could certify 

636

that the new Libyan authorities are fully cooperating with the U.S. 

investigation and requests for information. 

What inquiries to your knowledge, since I’m sure you’ve been 

briefed in preparation of this hearing, has the State Department, 

our government, made with the TNC in respect to gaining first access to Megrahi to determine what his state is, and also what inquiries has our government made with the TNC in reference to cooperation in getting access to both individuals and documents in 

pursuit of finding out all of those who were responsible for this 

bombing? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Senator, when I was counselor of the Department of State I had the privilege, the sad privilege, of meeting 

with the families of Pan Am 103 as the Scottish court was getting 

under way. I heard firsthand what I know you have heard many 

times, which is the horrible grief of the families of the victims of 

Pan Am 103 and their sense that justice had not been served, and 

I know those feelings continue today. It was a very tough and very 

painful meeting. So I do understand quite directly what those families have gone through, or have heard at least. 

Secretary Clinton understands as well and she has said from the 

start that the administration does not believe that al-Megrahi 

should have been returned to Libya in the first place. In the last 

few days, when she has been in Paris in meetings with the TNC 

and the leaders of the TNC, she has had direct conversations on 

this subject, both on her concerns that al-Megrahi be brought to 

justice and that, further, that all that needs to be done to seek justice for these families is a priority for the TNC. 

She and the administration certainly understand that the TNC 

has much on its plate at the moment, including the security and 

governance of their country. But she wanted to be clear that this 

was a very important issue for the United States of America. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And what response did she get? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. The response was that this was very 

much understood by the TNC, knew how important this was for 

the United States, and that they would continue their conversation 

and dialogue. 

I am not aware, in part because I have not been briefed, Senator, 

more recently, whether any specific commitments were made other 

than to continue the dialogue and pursue that justice, which is an 

important commitment that justice indeed be pursued. 

Senator MENENDEZ. This is what my concern is. I appreciate continuing the dialogue, but this is a transitional government for 

which the United States has played a major role, from establishing 

and being the advocate for a no-fly zone, getting NATO to be engaged, and providing considerable assets, to unlocking frozen assets 

for humanitarian purposes. 

I am concerned that dialogue, while desirable, will not lead to 

the conclusions that we want. So I would hate to give all the leverage away before we have more than a dialogue, before we have a 

commitment. So I am looking for the Department to pursue a commitment. I’m looking to find whether the Department has had the 

opportunity to get access to its former foreign and external security 

minister, Moussa Koussa. 

637

I would hate to see us release all of the assets while in the midst 

of a dialogue. So I just want to press that point, and I will continue 

to press that point. I’ve made this point with the Secretary as well. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. I certainly understand. I do believe, Senator, that there is an absolute commitment to justice. I take your 

point about the specificity of that commitment to justice and I’m 

sure that the Secretary will continue to pursue this, because it is 

a very high priority for her. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Finally in the time that I have left, the issue 

of a U.N. vote on the Palestinian Authority’s request has been 

raised. Is it the Department’s position that a resolution recognizing 

a Palestinian state could stall the peace talks for the foreseeable 

future? And what message has the Department—I heard about the 

demarches, which I applaud, and certainly Secretary Rice has done 

an extraordinary job in her advocacy. But what has our government said to Abbas about the impact that this vote will have on 

United States-Palestinian relations? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. The administration has been very clear 

that this resolution is not positive for the peace process, that leaders should hear what the United States Congress and other leaders 

are saying about what impact might result, that that is a serious, 

serious reality for the future of the region and for the Palestinian 

people. 

Indeed, today, as I mentioned, both David Hale and Dennis Ross 

are in the region having those very direct discussions. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Senator Menendez. 

Senator DeMint. 

Senator DEMINT. Thank you, Senator Cardin. 

Thank you, Ambassador Sherman. I appreciate you being here 

and I very much appreciate your many years of service and sacrifice, as well as the sacrifice I know your family’s been a part of. 

So my questions are not at all directed at character, integrity, or 

your commitment to our country. We very much appreciate it. 

But I do want to ask you about what I see as two different philosophies in our foreign policy, not just this administration, but 

maybe across the board. There’s one philosophy that the United 

States needs to deal very firmly, with strength and a lot of 

verification with other countries in the world. And I think there’s 

another philosophy that perhaps through friendliness, even appeasement and trust, that we can accomplish much more. Certainly 

that approach with friends and allies is the preferred approach. 

But behind closed doors over the years, as I’ve talked to some of 

our allies, I think there’s a perception the United States maybe 

uses more carrots than sticks and there’s maybe a degree of naivete in our State Department, that our friendliness and willingness to trust is seen in many parts of the world as weakness rather 

than a genuine desire to work with others. 

As I look at your work with North Korea, it does suggest to me 

perhaps a willingness to work with countries that we know cannot 

be trusted, almost maybe as a peer, and dealing with them in a 

way that suggests that friendliness and appeasement and trust 

might be more your philosophy. I liked a lot of what you said in 

638

your opening statement, but I am concerned as we approach other 

countries—China, Russia, Iran, Syria, the Palestinians—that these 

countries respect power and that clarity of purpose is very important for us. 

I’d just like to hear you discuss maybe how you see the world in 

that respect and, moving forward, how do you see the role of the 

United States in dealing with other countries? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Thank you, Senator. I think it’s a very 

important question, and I think that my own philosophy probably, 

in the way you’ve set up the question—I might not set it up quite 

that way—is on the side of strength and verification. Where I think 

we may see it slightly differently, Senator, is that I don’t believe 

engagement is the antithesis of strength and verification. I believe 

that engaging with leaders is a way to test them, to see if in fact 

the commitments they’ve made they’re going to keep. 

In the case of North Korea, we engaged with North Korea to see 

if they would not only make commitments, but if they would keep 

them in a verifiable and irreversible way. They did not. We did not 

conclude the agreement with North Korea. Sanctions not only remained on North Korea, but have increased over the years. 

We know during the Bush administration that there was difference of opinion about how they would proceed on North Korea. 

In the Obama administration there has been great clarity: A twopronged approach, but, as Secretary Clinton has been very clear, 

we will not talk for the sake of talks. North Korea has to demonstrate that it is going to keep the commitments it made in 2005, 

and the talks make no sense until they show in a verifiable way 

that they have kept those commitments. 

So I believe absolutely in clarity, in strength, the importance of 

sticks as well as carrots, of putting all the pieces on the table. The 

reason—it was interesting, when Secretary of Defense was asked 

to be the North Korea policy coordinator, the suggestion came actually initially from a Republican staff member working for thenchairman of the Appropriations Committee, Mr. McConnell. The 

reason was because in 1993 when North Korea threatened to leave 

the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and we thought that we might 

be a moment at military power and military force, Secretary Perry 

did not hesitate to begin to flow troops out of Japan if in fact we 

had to take military action. So we knew that the person who was 

leading that effort the North Koreas knew was a tower of strength 

and purpose and clarity and toughness. 

Senator DEMINT. Thank you for that answer. 

Another question related to philosophy, because I think a lot of 

us are grappling with this now as we look at situations around the 

world, and some of the other questions have suggested this. It appears, particularly with our financial situation in our own country, 

the sense that perhaps we’re spread too thin—does America as we 

look at our foreign policy need to be the city on the hill, be the 

model for the world, be the example, or the other philosophy, which 

I think various administrations and Congresses have pursued for 

years, is promoting our ideas, sometimes forcing our ideas, in other 

parts of the world, transplanting democracy and our way, which 

seems theoretically a good idea, but as we look at our track record 

639

of success there is some question if perhaps we should begin to look 

at things a different way. 

Are you—as you think of our role in the world, which side of that 

equation would you be on? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Senator, I think that what we must be is 

who we are. I think the advance of our vital national security interests, which include the values that we hold dear, is very important, 

but I absolutely believe that we cannot impose those values on 

other countries. We show by who we are what people might aspire 

to be. 

The people who fomented change in Egypt, in Libya and Yemen, 

throughout many parts of the world back during the fall of the Soviet Union, did not do so to live under another dictatorship. They 

did so to have prosperity and freedom, to be able to build a future 

for their families, just like all of us want to do. 

So I think the United States is at its best when we live our values and live our interests, try to influence others to meet our national security priorities, but not do so in a way that tries to impose upon other people what we believe, because, quite frankly, as 

I think you’re implying in your question, that is often a costly enterprise and often an enterprise that does not have the results that 

we desire. 

So I think we have to be very thoughtful and very careful about 

how we do it. 

Senator DEMINT. Thank you, Madam Ambassador. 

And thanks for the little extra time, Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Certainly. 

Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY. Thanks very much. 

Ambassador Sherman, great to see you again and thank you for 

your willingness to serve again. I want to thank you and your family as well for this commitment. Senator DeMint mentioned that 

and it bears repeating, because I know you don’t serve alone. Your 

family serves with you in more ways than one. 

I also want to thank you for a long commitment to public service 

in a whole variety of positions, starting with those in the State of 

Maryland and other places where you were an advocate for children, and now in your work that has worldwide impact at a time 

of real tension and danger for our country. 

I wanted to ask you about two issues. One is in relation to a trip 

that I just took during the month of August, and then second about 

something very specific as it relates to a constituent of mine. First 

of all with regard to both Afghanistan and Pakistan, I was just in 

both countries, 3 days in Pakistan, 2 days in Afghanistan, in August with Senator Whitehouse, Senator Bennett, and Senator 

Blumenthal. The main purpose of our trip—and we were, I think 

appropriately, a nagging broken record—was to push first and foremost the Pakistanis to help us on the question of calcium ammonium nitrate, the so-called fertilizer that comes in from Pakistan 

in amounts that allows the bad guys to be able to construct IEDs 

that are killing so many of our troops and, if not killing them, 

grievously and irreparably wounding them. 

Here’s what we got from them. We got a presentation, as the 

State Department knows and others know, of a strategic approach 

640

to this, to be able to track it better, to be able to regulate it and 

interdict it. Then in addition to the strategy, an implementation 

plan of the strategy. So they’re two for two. But what we haven’t 

seen yet is the implementation itself and the real hard work at various levels of their government to be able to just help us protect 

our troops and also to protect their own people. One of the reasons 

I think the Pakistani leadership is willing to engage in this is because their own people are being adversely impacted, thousands of 

people being impacted, by IEDs. 

I’d ask you two questions: No. 1, your assessment of that commitment that they’ve made to me personally and to the other Senators 

and to our government—and I know Secretary Clinton has worked 

very hard on this, insisting that they make this commitment. Second, not just your assessment of the commitment, but what will 

happen if they don’t fulfill that commitment in terms of our relationship with them, which I know is a very tense relationship to 

begin with? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Thank you, Senator. First, your travel 

with the other Senators to Afghanistan and Pakistan is tremendously important. I know that Members of Congress often get a lot 

of grief for traveling abroad, even to places as not wonderful as Afghanistan and Pakistan. But I cannot begin to tell you, as someone 

who travels the world quite a bit in my business life and before 

when I was in public service, when Members of Congress, when 

U.S. Senators, travel to these areas and work on these very crucial 

issues, it makes a phenomenal difference, because it not only 

echoes what an administration might be able to say, but it is a 

point of leverage to really try to get action. 

So I thank you tremendously for having made that very difficult 

trip. I also want to thank you for your leadership on this very crucial issue. Calcium ammonium nitrate, which is the precursor for 

production of IEDs, is a very crucial problem, and you have led on 

encouraging and pushing Pakistan to move in the direction it needs 

to to stop the production and the transit and to work with Afghanistan to do so. 

I’m very glad to hear that you heard what I heard in briefings, 

which was that the Pakistanis are taking this quite seriously, have 

a strategic approach, an approach with Afghanistan as well, to control the borders and to stop this from coming across, and have an 

implementation plan as well. This in part arose out of one of the 

working groups that we have with Pakistan that’s a very successful 

working group, working on these kind of very tough issues. 

This is a priority for the administration because, as you point 

out, IEDs are a horrible, horrible reality for the members of our 

military who risk their lives for us every day. So it is a high priority for us. I understand the Department intends to stay on this, 

to make sure that that implementation plan is successful, to continue to let the Pakistanis know what a high priority this is. 

This is doable, and a lot of things we are trying to do are even 

tougher than this, and we should be able to get this done. 

Senator CASEY. I appreciate that. And I know in the limited time 

I have I wanted to ask you about one other issue, and some of this 

we can do by way of followup. The hikers. Of course, two now just 

641

receiving an 8-year sentence, which is an abomination. It’s a mockery of justice. But they’re faced now with a long prison term. 

One of them, of course, is a Pennsylvanian, Josh Fattal, whose 

family has been remarkable. His mom and his brother have been 

just remarkable, remarkably effective at making his case and reminding all of us of this. 

Can you give me a sense of where you see this case and what 

the State Department can do to keep pushing to make sure that 

we get them out of the prison? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Senator, I know that the Secretary believes that we must take every opportunity we can to push this, to 

work with the Swiss Protecting Authority, which represents us in 

Iran, to try to get consular access to them, to push for their release. 

The administration quite agrees with you that this is an abomination, that these hikers do not belong in prison, do not belong having this sentence, ought to be released immediately. And I know 

that the Secretary is absolutely committed to using every opportunity she can in the Department to do everything that it possibly 

can, and if confirmed I will do everything I possibly can, using 

every relationship we have with Iran through third countries, if not 

directly, to get their release. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much. 

Senator CARDIN. Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Senator Cardin. 

Ambassador, thank you so much for coming today. I have one 

issue I wanted to focus on just a little bit, and that is one of the 

real successes in the Middle East, and of course there aren’t many, 

but one that is there and has existed for 30 years is the peace between Egypt and Israel, and particularly the line on the Sinai that 

separated the two countries and has been successfully maintained, 

even in light of the fact that there is almost daily disputes there 

over the last 30 years. 

So those of us who—I’ve been there. I’ve seen what’s happened. 

Those of us who’ve watched that over the years are concerned after 

the change in Egypt with the potential for what could happen 

there. It appears that some of our fears have been founded. 

We all know that the Sinai is not nearly what it was during the 

last administration in Egypt. Can you give me your thoughts on 

that and what you think the Multilateral Force can do to restabilize that line and restabilize the Sinai? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator. This is a 

very important issue. It is our understanding, my understanding 

from the briefings I’ve had, that the transitional government in 

Egypt has reaffirmed its commitment to the Camp David Accords, 

that they are in dialogue with Israel to not only ensure that there 

is a transition that maintains a strong and positive relationship between Egypt and Israel, but that the issues on the Sinai are addressed, that the Multilateral Force does get back to the posture 

that it had, where there are not an increased number of incidents. 

As you said, there have been incidents over a number of years from 

time to time, but that there has certainly been an increase of late, 

that is of great concern. Assistant Secretary Jeff Feltman very 

much has his eye on this issue, and I know that our new Ambassador, Ambassador Anne Patterson, whom this committee and the 

642

Senate very wisely confirmed and is now in place, very much has 

this on her agenda. 

Senator RISCH. I appreciate that. Are you personally convinced 

that the new administration in Egypt will do what’s necessary on 

their side in the Sinai to try to get control again of what I think 

any observer would say is the growing lawlessness on the Sinai 

itself? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Senator, I have not met directly with the 

leaders in the new transitional government, but my understanding 

from briefings is that the State Department believes that there is 

a commitment to maintaining and strengthening the historical relationships here. But it is clearly something that has to be front 

and center as we go forward in our diplomacy and our discussions 

with the Egyptians and as they develop their governance structure 

in the weeks and months ahead. 

So, although today I believe the State Department has confidence, it’s not something that anyone should take their eye off of. 

Indeed, we need to continue our vigilance to support that in fact 

things head in that direction. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Ambassador. I think we all share 

that view. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARDIN. Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Sherman, I want to echo my colleagues in expressing my appreciation for your past work within the State Department and for your willingness to consider taking on such a difficult 

post at such a dangerous and critical time in our foreign relations. 

So thank you very much. I hope we can move quickly to consider 

your nomination on the floor and I look forward to voting for you. 

Like Senator Casey, I had the opportunity over August with Senator Levin and Senator Merkley to travel to Afghanistan and Pakistan. One of the things that we heard in our meetings with the civilian leadership in Pakistan was a commitment to try and improve 

relations with India. The news this morning, we heard not just 

about bombing in Quetta of the Pakistanis, but also about a bomb 

in a courthouse in New Delhi, and reports suggest that it was an 

al Qaeda-linked group in Pakistan and Bangladesh that’s claiming 

credit for the attack in India. 

I wonder if you can—obviously, part of the effort is to try and 

discourage those efforts, to improve relations between the two 

countries. I wonder if you can talk about what more we might be 

able to do to try and encourage that effort to keep the two countries talking and to continue to work on improving relations. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Thank you, as I said to Senator Casey, 

for your travel to Afghanistan and Pakistan. It’s always hard for 

members to do this travel, but very crucial in world affairs. 

I think that the administration is heartened by the fact that 

there have now been three very significant meetings between India 

and Pakistan, commerce secretaries, foreign ministers, cricket diplomacy, and that in fact there are followup meetings with home 

and interior secretaries coming up; and that that kind of dialogue 

between the two countries is absolutely essential. 

643

The United States has always supported that dialogue. The pace 

and scope and character of it is up to, of course, India and Pakistan 

and we can’t prescribe for them exactly how to proceed. But it is 

crucial to both of their security, to the future of their countries, 

that that take place. 

In addition, it’s my understanding that Prime Minister Singh is 

in Bangladesh today, taking on even more of what Secretary Clinton spoke about in her recent trip to India, and that is seeing India 

as really a central player in South and Central Asia, taking on 

more and more of a leadership role in the region. I think that’s important, not only for India, but for all of us in terms of the security 

of the region. 

So I think your conversations to encourage better relations is 

very important. It is something that the administration has done. 

In my sort of life over the past few years both in the private sector—I’ve been to India and Pakistan both as a businesswoman and 

as part of track 2 dialogues, and I know that there is a desire in 

both countries to move forward, as difficult as their domestic politics sometimes make that. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Another report today suggests that we are moving toward a 

drawdown of our troops in Iraq, possibly down to as few as 3,000 

to 4,000, who would be there to continue training security forces 

in Iraq. I know that plans have always been to significantly draw 

down our American troops there, but there have been some reports 

that the Iraqis might consider asking us to leave a larger contingent than the 3,000 there. 

Again, I appreciate that this has been a contentious issue in 

Iraq. But to what extent is the Iraqi political situation making 

planning difficult for the drawdown, and do we have any indication 

that the Iraqis are going to ask us to stay beyond the end of this 

year? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Senator, my understanding is that the 

Iraqis have said they might have some interest in some ongoing 

presence, particularly, as you note, in the area of training, continued training of their military. It is also my understanding that the 

administration has taken no decision in this regard, even though 

I read the same report you did in this morning’s paper, that the 

Defense Department is considering 3,000 or 4,000 military to remain as trainers past the point of departure. I am sure that the 

administration will have, continue to have, extensive consultations 

and conversation with Congress before a final decision is made. It’s 

my understanding as of this morning no final decision has been 

made. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Another corollary of that is concern about the 

State Department operation that will continue in Iraq once our 

troops are drawn down and how we continue to maintain security 

with that increased role throughout the country. Can you talk a little about how you see that transition happening and what we 

might need to do to ensure that we can maintain that diplomatic 

presence even while we may not have the military security to protect those State offices around the country? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Senator, in the briefing that I had with 

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agement, and with Deputy Secretary Nides, they are both very 

much focused on what in fact the pattern should look like to provide the kinds of consular services we need to have a presence in 

Iraq, but do so in a way that is secure for our diplomats and for 

our civilians. They are working on those plans and I’m sure will 

continue their conversations with the Congress as they are finalized, but it is very much something that preoccupies them, for all 

of the reasons that you stated. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARDIN. Senator Lee. 

Senator LEE. Thank you, chairman. 

Ambassador, thank you for joining us. It’s good to see you again. 

I want to return to an issue that you addressed briefly with Senator Lugar a few minutes ago in relation to the push announced 

recently by the Palestinian National Authority through President 

Mahmoud Abbas about possible efforts to seek recognition outside 

of direct negotiations with Israel, by taking the issue to the United 

Nations. 

Now, President Obama recently described those efforts as purely 

symbolic, and I think he also used the word ‘‘failure’’ to describe 

the likely outcome. I can see why he might use those words to describe that. I want to believe that he’s right. I hope that he’s right. 

I can also foresee some scenarios in which that might not turn 

out to be right, in which that characterization could perhaps have 

proven to be a little bit too optimistic. Do you share that view, that 

it’s not absolutely certain? I’m not asking you to disagree publicly 

with your boss. I would never do that. I’m just saying, do you foresee scenarios in which that could have—we could later look back 

on that and say perhaps that was a little bit too optimistic? And 

if so, are there things that you think the administration can be 

doing right now to sort of protect against that? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. The President, Senator, has been very 

clear that a U.N. resolution to recognize Palestine will not get us 

to the two-state solution that both parties seek and that most of 

the world seeks. And he has been unrelenting in saying that such 

a resolution is not in our interests or in the interest of the world 

or the two parties. 

Secretary Clinton has used every opportunity she’s had with 

leaders to make it clear, as has the President, that this is not a 

positive outcome should such a resolution go forward. As I mentioned to Senator Lugar, indeed Special Envoy David Hale and Ambassador Dennis Ross are in the region today having conversations 

to see if in fact there isn’t another path forward that can meet the 

needs of the parties, but, more important, to get them back to direct negotiations, which is really the solution here. 

A resolution at the United Nations is not really going to get us 

to the solution everybody is seeking. Direct negotiations will and 

are the only path to that resolution. So I think that the administration is doing everything it possibly can, from demarching virtually 

every capital in the world to sending very high-level envoys to the 

region for discussions. And I know that our Ambassador at the 

U.N., Susan Rice, is working with all of her colleagues as well. 

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The administration has been very clear as well, and I don’t expect this to occur, but that if it did occur, if any such resolution 

were put in front of the Security Council, that we would veto it. 

So our expectation is that will not occur. But the General Assembly 

is still a concern and so there is very urgent work going on to try 

to see if there is not another way forward. 

Senator LEE. So it sounds like you’re very confident that the 

United States would remain committed with great resolve to the 

veto threat? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. The United States is very resolved to a 

veto threat in the Security Council. What we are very resolved 

about as well is urging the parties to enter into direct negotiations. 

Again, the Quartet, which is very crucial to the Middle East peace 

process, is also pressing in that direction, and I know that their 

envoy, former Prime Minister Blair, is also very engaged in representing the Quartet in trying to move to a more positive direction. 

Senator LEE. So do you see there being a coalition of countries 

that will build from there, or do you think we largely know who 

is with us and who is against us on that? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Well, we are working on that. It’s my understanding, Senator, that there is obviously a core of the Quartet, 

including the United States, and that we are working outward and 

increasing the number of countries who understand that to really 

have a viable Palestine, a secure Israel, will require direct negotiations between the parties, not a resolution at the United Nations. 

Senator LEE. Thank you. 

Now, Deputy Secretary Burns during his time as Under Secretary, if I’m not mistaken, was a key negotiator with Iran and 

amongst the P5+1 countries. Do you expect to take on that role if 

confirmed? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. I expect to do whatever the Secretary of 

State asks me to do, and we haven’t had that discussion because 

I’m not in the job yet. Hopefully, I will be confirmed, voted out by 

this committee and confirmed by the Senate, and if she were to ask 

me to do that I would be honored to, as difficult as it is, to do my 

very best. 

Senator LEE. If you were confirmed, and assuming that this fits 

within your area of assignments, would you be inclined to recommend additional sanctions against Iran to discourage Iran from 

developing its nuclear weapons program? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. I think, Senator, if she asked me to take 

on this assignment, which has traditionally been at the Under Secretary level, I would want to understand all of the facts of the situation, be briefed on both the classified as well as the unclassified 

information, which I have not yet done, and then talk with the Secretary, with the rest of the administration, see what the best way 

forward is. 

There is no question that the sanctions are tremendous on Iran. 

They have begun to bite Iran in spite of the high price of oil, which 

gave them some relief. There have been other actions that have occurred that we’ve all read about in the newspaper, which has degraded their capability. But there is no question that it is a serious, 

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serious national security problem for the United States and for the 

world, and we have to approach it with that seriousness of purpose. 

Senator LEE. Great. Thank you very much, Ambassador Sherman. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARDIN. Senator Coons. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank 

you for convening this. 

To Ambassador Sherman, thank you for your tremendous experience and your service to our Nation that you bring to bear today, 

to your husband, Bruce, and your family for their willingness to 

continue supporting you in the sacrifice. 

I was struck, in your opening statement, your reference to your 

relationship with Senator Helms when he was the chair. Even 

though you may have disagreed on some substantive foreign policy 

matters, your ability to sustain a constructive and respectful relationship I think is a good reminder of the long tradition of bipartisanship that has long sustained American foreign policy. 

In that spirit, I’ll pick up exactly where Senator Lee just left off. 

I think you will hear from both sides, from Senator Lugar and Senator Menendez, from Senator Risch, myself, Senator Lee, strong 

concern about the efforts by the Palestinians to achieve some sort 

of recognition in the United Nations. I was pleased with your response about the intention and focus and sincerity of the administration in resisting that and finding all possible ways to move the 

parties back to responsible negotiations. 

On the question of Iran, I just would be interested, after the announcement by the IAEA just last week that they’ve increased 

their enrichment activities, what further actions do you think 

might be necessary or might be taken by the administration to 

strengthen CISADA, to strengthen other sanctions, and what else 

do you think we in the Senate might be doing to continue to enforce a multilateral approach toward preventing the Iranians from 

achieving what I think are their aims, which, as you put it, are a 

grave threat to our security, to Israel’s security, and to the world? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Thank you, Senator. I share your concern 

about Iran. I think as I’ve been getting briefings at the State Department to prepare for this hearing and hopefully to prepare for 

the job, I’ve been struck by the progress we actually have made. 

If you had asked me just a couple of years ago whether the European Union would have put on unilateral sanctions to the extent 

that it did, I probably would have said it might not be an easy 

thing to get done because they had so many of their companies, 

particularly their energy companies, that were in Iran. Now most 

of those energy companies are gone. The number of companies that 

have left Iran is quite significant. 

I think the kind of diplomacy that the administration’s engaging 

in, including having Special Adviser Robert Einhorn travel the 

world trying to get other countries to not only put on unilateral 

sanctions, but to enforce the U.N. Security Council resolutions, has 

been crucial, because sanctions are only as good as the enforcement 

of them. 

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So it’s not always a need for more and more and more sanctions. 

It’s really about using all the tools we have at our disposal, including the Treasury Department’s actions that have been quite crucial 

where Iran is concerned in terms of financial assets and financial 

transactions. 

So I think, again as I just said to Senator Lee, if I—and hopefully I will be confirmed by the Senate—and the Secretary asks me 

to spend some time on this very, very tough problem, I would want 

to have a greater understanding than I do today of how far we are, 

what else we need to do to encourage enforcement of the existing 

sanctions, and to assess whether in fact any further sanctions 

would really move us forward. 

Obviously, the sanctions are having some bite because we’re beginning to see folks in Iran, as we saw in David Sanger’s article 

yesterday, trying to throw proposals on the table. I’m skeptical 

today, as I’m sure the administration is, of those proposals. But 

usually when countries begin to put those ideas on the table sanctions are beginning to bite. 

So I’d want to make sure that we encourage as much biting as 

we possibly can, because this is a very tough issue. 

I also want to thank you, Senator, for your mention about the 

importance of bipartisanship. I quite agree. I know that for me and 

this committee, I always think about Nunn-Lugar, Kerry-LugarBiden, Kerry-Lugar-Berman. There are many pieces of legislation 

that have emanated from this committee that have set a standard 

for bipartisanship, that have moved our national security priorities 

forward. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Ambassador. And I do hope that 

you’ll have a central role in ensuring that we do enforce the sanctions that we’ve got in place. I want to commend the administration for continuing to stay on this issue, but I know many of us 

share a grave concern about the speed with which the Iranians 

have moved and are eager to see more thorough and effective engagement and enforcement on this issue. 

Let me turn, if I could, to a related and challenging situation, the 

full-blown humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa. Senator 

Isakson and I held a hearing just after the debt ceiling vote and 

as many Members of the Congress were going home for work period, and I was grateful that he stayed with me. We had a hearing 

about the difficulty. The Office of Foreign Asset Control required 

to enforce sanctions and al-Shabab is critically preventing aid from 

getting to those most severely affected areas of southern Somalia. 

We’ve just had another report that an additional 300,000 people 

are in critical need of emergency assistance, raising the number to, 

I think, 12.7 million. USAID predicts this may be one of the worst 

famines in modern history. 

What further progress, if you can speak to it, has been made in 

resolving some of the Treasury sanctions barriers to delivering effective assistance, and what else do you think we can do to reduce 

al-Shabab’s influence and to deliver humanitarian assistance in an 

effective way in the Horn of Africa? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator, for raising this just horrific, horrific situation, where, as you say, over 12 

million, almost 13 million, people have been affected, not only in 

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Somalia, but a refugee camp in Kenya that was meant for maybe 

90,000 people has now maybe 400,000 people who are seeking help 

and assistance. 

I know that OFAC [Office of Foreign Assets Control], the office 

in Treasury that issues licenses when waivers are needed in a situation, as Somalia does, with al-Shabab’s interference, has in fact 

created a license waiver for AID to provide some assistance and is 

looking at the potential for other waivers for NGOs that might be 

appropriate to try to bring in that humanitarian relief, understanding that of course we want to do so in as secure a situation 

as possible. 

I know that the administration is working with AMISOM [African Union Mission in Somalia] and with the transitional government in Somalia to see what our other options there are, to see if 

in fact what we can do in areas outside of Mogadishu to bring relief. But it is a truly horrific situation, working closely with the 

U.N., which obviously is key to the relief efforts. 

I must say, one of the things I’ve been doing as a private citizen 

is I’ve been chair of the board of Oxfam America, and the outpouring by Americans to provide funds, to provide relief in Somalia, is incredibly heartening. Americans are a very generous people 

when it comes to these humanitarian disasters. But I know Assistant Secretary Johnny Carson, with whom I met yesterday, is doing 

everything he possibly can do to work internationally to bring relief 

both with the private and the public sector to those families and 

to the people of Somalia. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Ambassador. I see my time has expired. I’m grateful that you bring both that experience and that 

perspective to these very difficult issues in Iran, in the Horn, and 

around the world. I look forward to supporting your nomination on 

the floor of the Senate. Thank you. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator CARDIN. Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Chairman Cardin. 

Let me also echo, Ambassador Sherman, the appreciation for 

your long public service and also your family’s sacrifice. One of the 

things that hasn’t been noted is you have served the public in a 

number of positions dedicated to children and children’s issues, and 

that’s something that’s very close to my heart and I very much appreciate that. 

If Iraq were to make the request to retain United States troops 

in Iraq—and I note today there’s a big front-page article on the 

New York Times about various parts of this—to retain—if Iraq 

makes a request to retain United States troops past the December 

2011 deadline, how would it change the plan to transition the lead 

of U.S. engagement from Defense to State, if at all, and how would 

it affect the State Department’s ability to operate in Iraq and the 

preparations being made for the transition? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Senator, I read this in the paper this 

morning along with you, and so I don’t know all of the answers to 

the question, but certainly will ask the State Department to make 

sure that you get a full answer. My understanding is that this may 

be a request for military trainers and, if so, it would be other than 

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ian workers in Iraq after the drawdown of our military, and that 

the Iraqi Government has long had discussions with us of some 

kind of continued presence and this may be what they are seeking. 

But I am quite certain that no decision has been made on this 

yet, but would be glad to ask the State Department to get more information to you. 

[The written information provided by the State Department follows:]

The Government of Iraq has authorized negotiations with the U.S. on a possible 

post-2011 U.S. security training mission. We are currently discussing this request 

with Iraqi leaders. Those discussions are ongoing and no final decision has been 

reached. 

Regardless of the outcome of these discussions, State will be in the lead for the 

U.S. mission in Iraq after 2011. The Department of State, the Department of Defense, and other agencies and departments have undertaken unprecedented levels 

of coordination and planning to accomplish this transition to civilian leadership, and 

we are moving forward.

Senator UDALL. Thank you. I very much appreciate that. 

The article noted that if there is the withdrawal that there is 

still going to be a significant State Department presence in Iraq. 

One of the things that was highlighted is the $3.2 billion request 

from the overseas contingency operating fund moved from military 

to the civilian mission there in Iraq. This mission is expected to be 

the largest State Department mission in the world, there in Iraq. 

This will also include not only employment of State Department 

personnel, but the hiring of numerous contractors to do the work 

the military’s leaving behind. 

Now, with reports that contracting money in Afghanistan has 

funded the Taliban and led to corruption, I’m worried about a similar outcome in Iraq. From your standpoint, what does State need 

to do to ensure that the transition is smooth and that the United 

States taxpayer funds are well spent in Iraq? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Thank you very much for that question, 

Senator. I know that Secretary Clinton has asked Deputy Secretary 

Nides and Under Secretary for Management Pat Kennedy to pay 

special attention and to take special responsibility for exactly that, 

and that is to make sure that the civilian presence in Iraq is well 

protected, that the contracting is done in a transparent and accountable and auditable manner, and to ensure that taxpayer 

money is well spent. 

I know that over the years there have been times, not only in the 

State Department but throughout the U.S. Government, concern by 

Congress about contracts, whether they are let appropriately, 

whether dollars are well spent, whether we put all the monitoring 

systems in place to ensure as little corruption as possible, hopefully 

none. And I know that Secretary Nides and Under Secretary Kennedy are very focused on exactly that. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. 

Shifting a little bit to your role that you played on the Commission for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, as a member of that commission you played an important role in making 

findings and recommendations for action to prevent the spread of 

weapons of mass destruction. One of the recommendations had to 

do with the global ideological engagement. Recommendation No. 12 

stated, and I quote: ‘‘U.S. counterterrorism strategy must be more 

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effectively’’—‘‘must more effectively counter the ideology behind 

WMD terrorism. The United States should develop a more coherent 

and sustained strategy and capabilities for global ideological engagement to prevent further recruits, supporters, and facilitators.’’

Then the commission went on: ‘‘The U.S. foreign policy community needs to alter its culture and organization so that it can work 

across agency lines to make soft power an option just as viable and 

effective as hard power. This change is essential. It should be a top 

priority of the next President’s foreign policy team.’’

Since your commission has made these recommendations, we’ve 

had a new President, two new Congresses. How would you assess 

the progress of the administration in employing soft power and do 

you believe that some of the proposed House budgets could threaten these initiatives and endanger the State Department’s soft 

power capabilities and our overall ability to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Thank you, Senator. Your question actually harkens back to Senator Lugar’s opening comments, in that 

when Secretary Clinton came in she set up the first Quadrennial 

Review of Diplomacy and Development (QDDR). Part of the impetus for doing so was to look at this very question: How could we 

have a whole of State Department and a whole of government approach to our national security and foreign policy, to make sure 

that all stakeholders are engaged, that our foreign service officers 

not only talk to members of governments around the world, but 

talk to people in civil society, talk to the press, talk to business 

people, talk to young people, talk to women and girls, talk to students, really understand all of the stakeholders that make up what 

people do in their day to day lives, and to really understand what’s 

going on in societies, and to create a better understanding of what 

America is about and what America seeks for its own security. 

I think the QDDR was a crucial step in that process. In the 

meetings that I’ve had in the State Department since I was there 

10 years ago, I’ve already seen an enormous change. People have 

an understanding of the breadth and depth of communication. 

There’s certainly a consciousness of technology and information 

technology that wasn’t there the last time I was there. The last 

time I was there, we only had classified computers. We couldn’t 

even go on the Internet. That’s changed substantially and people 

understand the value, both positive and negative, of social media. 

So I think there’s been a tremendous change, but it still has to 

be harnessed. It still has to be made use of, and there is no question that having sufficient resources to do so is part of the solution. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you very much, Ambassador, for those answers. You’re obviously very well qualified for this position. I intend to vote for you and I hope that the Foreign Relations Committee acts quickly on this nomination. 

With that, Chairman Cardin, thank you very much for allowing 

me to run over a little bit in my questions. 

Senator CARDIN. Senator Udall, thank you for your questions. 

You questioned about the accountability of our foreign assistance, 

which I think is an extremely important point. Tomorrow the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will be holding a hearing on Afghanistan and the effectiveness of the U.S. participation in that 

651

foreign assistance program. So it’s a continuing issue for our committee. 

Senator Lugar whispered to me when Senator Coons was mentioning the bipartisan initiatives, and the one that the two of us 

worked together, with the strong support of Secretary Clinton, 

bringing transparency to extractive industries. Ambassador Sherman, we will be working with you to implement that policy, not 

just here in the United States as far as the legislation that was enacted as part of the Dodd-Frank bill, but also as it relates to actions taken by our allies that can help bring transparency to gas 

and oil contracts and mineral contracts that have such an impact 

on the stability of developing nations. So that’s an important initiative that we will be working closely with you as we move forward. 

It was interesting that many of our members talked about the 

pending vote or possible vote in the United Nations as it relates 

to the Palestinians. I just really want to applaud your efforts and 

Secretary Clinton’s efforts to let leaders of other countries know 

how important this vote is, because it seems to me if it just becomes a popularity vote within the United Nations the numbers 

are not going to go well for a General Assembly vote. 

The United States has invested a lot into the peace process and 

the United States understands the negative consequences of a U.N. 

vote. I think that needs to be transmitted to the leaders of other 

countries and I’m glad to see that the administration’s taking a 

very active role to let the capitals of the world understand that this 

is an important vote and that you support an independent Palestinian state side by side with the state of Israel; the best way to 

pursue that is through direct negotiations; The only way to pursue 

that is through direct negotiations; and that a vote in the United 

Nations, even though its legality may have some question, a vote 

within the United Nations would be counterproductive to that end. 

And I applaud you for your strong statements in that regard. 

I just also wanted to bring up the case of Alan Gross, in Cuba, 

imprisoned. I know we have a difficult time in communications 

with our neighbor, Cuba. But I think it’s important that we continue to advocate for justice in regards to Alan Gross and to bring 

him back to the United States, and we’ll be asking your help as we 

develop the best strategies to bring that about. 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. No, thank you. 

Senator CARDIN. With that, again I thank you for your patience 

here today in answering all of our questions. As I said in the beginning of the hearing, the record of the committee will remain open 

until the close of business today. 

With that, the committee stands adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF HON. WENDY SHERMAN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you advocate to address the issue of 

unexploded ordnance in Southeast Asia in general and Laos in particular? What 

steps do you believe should be taken to help clear Laos of deadly antipersonnel 

652

devices, nearly all of which is the result of American bombing during the Vietnam 

war era?

Answer. The State Department has been assisting Southeast Asia with humanitarian demining from the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related 

Programs (NADR) account for over a decade, providing millions of dollars annually 

for humanitarian demining, unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance, and survivor’s 

assistance to states in the region. 

Reducing the impact of UXO is one of the State Department’s most important priorities in Laos, a country where bilateral cooperation and engagement continues to 

expand. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the United States remains a leading supporter of UXO clearance (including unexploded submunitions), risk education, and 

survivors’ assistance projects in Laos. In FY 2010, the State Department provided a total of $5.1 million from the NADR 

account to Laos for mine and UXO clearance and in FY 2011, the Department allocated $5.0 million toward this effort. If resources are available, annual funding for 

these programs would continue at least at the $5 million level. Since 1995, the 

United States has contributed more than $30 million toward this humanitarian 

effort to clear UXO in Laos, per capita the most heavily bombed nation in the world. 

Laos has made very good use of the U.S. assistance it has received for UXO clearance. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to ensure that UXO 

clearance remains a top priority in Laos and throughout Southeast Asia.

Question. North Korea.—I have repeatedly encouraged the Obama administration 

to raise the issue of American POWs and MIAs from the Korean war in communications with North Korea as well as the resumption of the joint recovery operation 

related to the remains of American personnel. What is your perspective on these 

points?

Answer. I agree that recovery of Korean war POW/MIA remains one of the more 

important goals in our interactions with North Korea. We owe our military personnel and the POW/MIA families nothing less than to make every effort to recover 

the remains of their loved ones. The administration considers remains recovery operations to be an important humanitarian mission and priority. The Department of 

Defense and the Department of State closely coordinate actions related to Korean 

war remains recovery operations. This important humanitarian mission is not 

linked to any political or security issues, and the administration has consistently 

urged North Korean officials to be responsible stewards of U.S. remains.

Question. With respect to the recent HEU seizure in Moldova, what conversations 

has the administration had with Russian officials concerning apprehension of the 

perpetrators, some of whom are reportedly residing in Russia?

Answer. The United States continues to support Moldovan efforts to prosecute the 

traffickers who were caught with highly enriched uranium (HEU) in June and to 

work with other appropriate and willing partners to investigate the original theft 

of the uranium. The Department can provide additional information in a classified 

setting. 

One of the critical tools Moldova and other governments have used to successfully 

investigate nuclear smuggling networks is Counter Nuclear Smuggling Teams. 

Through the Nuclear Security summit and other mechanisms like the Department’s 

Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative, the United States is promoting use of this 

powerful investigative tool. Counter Nuclear Smuggling teams focus on investigative 

actions like detecting nuclear smuggling activity, securing and analyzing seized nuclear or radioactive material, and obtaining evidence to prosecute smugglers.

Question. What has prevented the Nunn-Lugar WMD–PPP program from conducting a border security walk in Moldova?

Answer. The WMD–PPP border security walk is scheduled for November 1–11, 

2011. The Department and U.S. Embassy Chisinau have consistently supported 

WMD–PPP and in June 2011 facilitated successful introductory meetings between 

the Moldovan interagency and the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) to get WMD–

PPP off the ground in-country. I am told the administration looks forward to the 

results of the border security walk as the results of the walk will also inform a number of nonproliferation assistance programs.

Question. As the administration considers advocating repeal of Jackson-Vanik 

trade restrictions with respect to Russia, do you believe that alternative initiatives 

should be developed in place of Jackson-Vanik? Please explain.

Answer. The administration supports lifting Jackson-Vanik prior to Russia’s joining the WTO to ensure that U.S. workers, ranchers, and farmers enjoy the full benefits of Russia’s accession. If Congress does not act on Jackson-Vanik before Russia 

653

joins the WTO, as it has done for so many other countries, Americans would be seriously prejudiced—not quickly enjoying those benefits associated with WTO membership, but our trading competitors will do so at our expense. The Jackson-Vanik 

amendment long ago fulfilled its key purpose: to support free emigration, particularly Jewish emigration, from the Soviet Union. Lifting Jackson-Vanik would be in 

keeping with the USG’s approach to other qualifying countries by granting Russia’s 

goods most-favored-nation tariff treatment on a permanent basis. That decision 

would also give the United States additional tools to deal with Russia to help ensure 

that it lives up to its trade commitments. 

On the nontrade broader issues, the administration has a strategy in place for advancing democracy and human rights in Russia. The administration will absolutely 

continue to consult with Congress going forward on how best to promote democratic 

rights and institutions in Russia. President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and other officials in the U.S. Government have been outspoken in their frank advocacy for 

democratic progress and will continue to raise publicly and privately concerns with 

human rights issues and shortcomings in democratic standards (See http://

www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/c41670.htm.) As an example, the Department of State, consistent with the President’s proclamation on human rights violators, took decisive 

action to bar entry to the United States of those Russian Government officials 

credibly linked to the wrongful death in pretrial detention of Sergei Magnitsky. In 

addition, this year, the U.S. government is providing over $38 million in assistance, 

primarily to non-governmental organizations, to advance democracy in Russia. 

These programs support independent media and the rule of law, create and 

strengthen links between U.S. and Russian civil society groups and leverage the 

latest in technology and social media to create optimal conditions for democratic 

advances.

Question. Since June 2004, Brazil has been in charge of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), thus commanding over 7,000 men on the 

ground—including an average of 1,300 Brazilians—in an effort to provide some stability in Haiti. Brazil is now officially planning an exit strategy for its extensive 

military contingent. Please provide your views regarding the reduction of Brazilian 

troops in Haiti. Please explain how the effectiveness of MINUSTAH, and of U.S. assistance to Haiti will be affected by this action and what steps you believe the 

United States should take in light of Brazil’s announced plans.

Answer. The United States supports renewal of MINUSTAH’s mandate for another year when it expires in October 2011, under broadly the same terms as the 

current mandate but with a heavier emphasis on the need for the United Nations 

(U.N.) and the Government of Haiti (GOH) to work to reform the Haitian National 

Police (HNP) through improved capacity-building efforts, improved vetting procedures, and strengthened Haitian domestic financing. 

The U.N. Secretary General’s August 25 report on MINUSTAH recommended renewing the mandate for another 12 months with a reduction during that period of 

some of the forces authorized after the January 2010 earthquake: specifically two 

infantry battalions (1,600 personnel) and 1,150 authorized (but not deployed) formed 

police unit personnel. 

The administration understands that, in light of the Secretary General’s positive 

security assessment, and call for troop reductions, the Brazilian Government has 

voiced its support for reductions in the overall MINUSTAH force strength. As the 

largest supplier of personnel to the post-earthquake troop ‘‘surge,’’ Brazil would like 

to see some of its troops brought home. We do not, however, have indications that 

they will significantly reduce their military contribution, except gradually over time, 

as conditions allow, and in coordination with the United Nations. 

The United States also supports the Secretary General’s recommended reduction 

in MINUSTAH force strength, but notes that strong rules of engagement for the remaining MINUSTAH forces will be important to deal with a stable but fragile security situation in Haiti.

Question. Recent events in Ecuador demonstrate the continuing deterioration and 

political subjugation of the justice system there:

—After a leading Ecuadorian newspaper, El Universo, ran an opinion column critical of President Rafael Correa, an Ecuadorian judge—at Correa’s insistence—sentenced three newspaper executives and the columnist to jail for 3 years and fined 

the newspaper $40 million. 

—According to The Economist, ‘‘It took Juan Paredes, replacing the intended judge 

who was on holiday, less than two days to read through the case’s 5,000-page file’’ 

and issue the ruling. President Correa personally attended the hearing, ‘‘accompanied by a small crowd of supporters that pelted the defendants and their lawVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00661 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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yers with eggs and bottles outside the courthouse. The media were barred from 

attending.’’ International observers, including Human Rights Watch, called the 

ruling ‘‘a major setback for free speech in Ecuador.’’

—President Correa’s Legal Secretary, Alexis Mera, issued an official proclamation, 

‘‘by order of the Constitutional President of the Republic,’’ requiring Ecuadorian 

Government ministries to immediately file suits for damages holding any judge 

who enjoins Government projects personally liable if their injunctions are subsequently overturned by a higher court.

Please explain your views regarding the rule of law in Ecuador.

Answer. Immediately following the El Universo ruling, the Department issued a 

public statement expressing serious concern over the court’s decision. The Department underlined the role of an independent press as essential to a vibrant and wellfunctioning democracy—a concept noted, among other places, in the Inter-American 

Democratic Charter. President Obama and Secretary Clinton have made this point 

in their conversations with Ecuadorian President Correa. The Department understands that the defendants are appealing the decision, and that judicial processing 

of the case is being investigated. The outcome of this case will be carefully noted 

by the international community because of its implications for freedom of expression 

in Ecuador. 

Separately, Ecuador’s judicial oversight council was dissolved following a May 

2011 referendum, pending a restructuring of the entire judicial system. The political 

opposition and Ecuadorian and international civil society observers have expressed 

concern that, because the transition judicial council includes representatives from 

branches of government controlled by the ruling party, independence of the judiciary 

could be compromised. As a matter of principle and long-standing policy, the United 

States believes that representative democracies require vibrant, independent, and 

coequal branches of government in order to function effectively. It is for these reasons that implementation of the referendum deserves careful scrutiny and analysis 

within Ecuador, by other nations in the hemisphere, and by civil society in general. 

A key objective of U.S. policy in the hemisphere is to support the development 

of democratic government institutions, an independent judiciary, and a vibrant civil 

society. The United States implements this policy through diplomatic engagement, 

public diplomacy, and specific programs carried out by the Department, USAID, and 

nongovernmental organizations.

Question. As the Libyan revolution continues and military gains by rebel forces 

of the Transitional National Council increase, thought must be paid to Libya’s 

future post-Qadhafi. As we have seen in other countries in the region, the risk of 

factionalism comes with the transition from authoritarian regimes to democracy.

• a. What is your assessment of the prospects of the TNC maintaining consolidated leadership role to oversee the transition to Libya’s democratic future?

Answer. There appear to be a number of positive signs for a transition to a new, 

democratic Libya though clearly, given its newness, the TNC faces a lot more to be 

done. The TNC has made strong progress in building support across Libyan society, 

but the core of its leadership, known as the Executive Committee, is still largely 

comprised of Libyans from the East. TNC PM Jibril and Chairman Jalil have publicly stressed the importance of inclusiveness and reconciliation. They have sought 

to avoid reprisals and to remain open to rank and file Qadhafi loyalists who renounce their support for the former regime. 

There will, of course, be challenges. There are several anti-Qadhafi militias that 

remain outside of the TNC’s command structure. The TNC leadership has 

prioritized integrating civilian militias into new national institutions, but will need 

to demonstrate that it can pay salaries quickly in order to solidify these efforts. The 

TNC has taken steps to address these challenges. They established a Tripoli Military Committee shortly after taking over Tripoli in late August to bring all of the 

factional commanders in the capital under the control of the TNC ministries of Interior and Defense. 

If confirmed, I will do everything in my power to support the democratic aspirations of the Libyan people and the efforts of the TNC, as appropriate.

• b. In light of our current budget constraints and the availability of Libyan national assets and the support of other donors, what role, if any, do you believe 

the United States should play in funding the costs of Libya’s transition?

Answer. I understand Libyan stabilization experts told international partners in 

Paris September 2 that since Libya is regaining access to its financial reserves 

around the world, it will not need emergency aid for long. The TNC is looking instead for technical expertise and experience to rebuild its infrastructure and institutions. Following the lead of the Libyans and the U.N. Mission, the administration 

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believes the United States can play an important role in helping prepare Libya for 

a future reconciliation and transitional justice process, bolstering emerging government institutions and political parties, and in helping Libya identify and secure the 

previous regime’s stockpiles of chemical weapons and conventional weapons, to include man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).

• c. How many USG personnel are currently working in Libya? Where are they 

working? What diplomatic facilities are available to the United States in Tripoli? What are the approximate costs required to make such facilities a secure 

and viable workspace?

Answer. I am told the Department of State is currently exploring options for 

facilities to house a reconstituted Embassy in Tripoli. Our previous compound was 

completely overrun, looted, and burned in May. The team that is already in Tripoli 

hopes to be able to identify and acquire suitable facilities, at least for a temporary 

arrangement, in the near future. It is a positive sign that Deputy Chief of Mission 

Joan Polaschik returned to Tripoli on September 10. The administration looks forward to an early return by Ambassador Cretz and other key personnel as soon as 

a suitable security platform can be established and more accommodations can be 

brought on line. Special Envoy Chris Stevens’ team is also in Benghazi and I am 

told the Department plans to keep the team in place for at least several months. 

This seems to make a good deal of sense, given the importance of the city during 

the revolution and the need to interact with remaining TNC leadership in the city.

Question. In your testimony, you noted current efforts by Dennis Ross and David 

Hale in the region and of our embassies worldwide to forestall unilateral attempts 

by the Palestinian Authority to seek statehood recognition at the U.N. in the coming 

weeks. President Obama and others in the administration have made clear that 

unhelpful attempts by the PA, however symbolic, are no replacement for negotiations with Israel. Negotiations have stalled.

• a. What steps do you believe the administration should take to mitigate the consequences in the immediate term of unilateral PA action at the U.N. to raise 

its status from ‘‘entity’’ to ‘‘nonmember state’’—with the rights and privileges 

pertaining to that status?

Answer. The administration has been absolutely clear both with the parties, and 

with our international partners, that direct negotiations remain the only effective 

way for Palestinians and Israelis to deal with the difficult issues they face and 

achieve a lasting peace. The administration therefore continues to work intensively 

and strategically to avoid a showdown at the United Nations that will not be good 

for anyone—not the United States, not Israel, and certainly not the Palestinians. 

The administration has and continues to underscore with the parties and with 

international partners that we strongly oppose efforts to address final status issues 

at the U.N. rather than in direct negotiations. One-sided actions in international 

fora like the U.N. will do nothing to achieve statehood for the Palestinian people. 

In fact, such initiatives at the U.N. will make it harder to achieve progress. Onesided actions will serve to drive the parties further apart, heighten the risk of violence on the ground that could claim innocent lives on both sides, and risk hardwon progress in building Palestinian institutions. There is simply no substitute for 

the difficult give-and-take of direct negotiations. The international community cannot impose a solution. A viable and sustainable peace agreement can come only from 

mutual agreement by the parties themselves. 

As part of the effort, the administration has made the position on such initiatives 

unequivocally clear in capitals around the globe, and regularly in U.N. Security 

Council consultations, and is urging other member states not to support one-sided 

Palestinian action at the United Nations. U.S. ambassadors have engaged, at the 

Secretary’s instruction, at the highest political levels in capitals worldwide where 

our outreach would be the most productive. Secretary Clinton, National Security 

Advisor Donilon, Ambassador Rice, Deputy Secretary Burns, Assistant Secretary 

Feltman and Special Envoy Hale and other senior U.S. officials have also been 

working intensively with their counterparts at the most senior levels for months. 

Going forward, the administration will continue to work vigorously and strategically 

to reach out to countries to express and explain our firm opposition to any one-sided 

actions at the U.N., including a Palestinian state declared outside of the framework 

of negotiations.

• b. How do you believe the administration’s immediate plan to counter any PA 

action at the U.N. will serve the broader policy of a negotiated settlement resulting in a two-state solution?

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Answer. At the same time, the administration continues to work vigorously and 

determinedly to reach a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As President Obama made clear in his May remarks, the priority is for the 

parties to return to direct negotiations—the only effective way for Palestinians and 

Israelis to deal with the concerns they are facing and forge a viable peace agreement. The administration therefore continues to work intensely with the parties and 

Quartet partners on ways to overcome the current impasse and resume talks on the 

basis of the President’s May remarks. 

The administration’s long-term strategic vision for peace has not changed. The administration remains committed to working along two mutually reinforcing tracks: 

creating a viable negotiating alternative on the basis of the President’s May 2011 

remarks for the parties to resume direct negotiations and avert a confrontation at 

the U.N. and, simultaneously, continuing our support for the Palestinians in their 

efforts to prepare for statehood through creation of robust government and security 

institutions and a viable economy. The administration strongly believes that these 

parallel efforts serve the national security interests of the United States and are essential for a sustainable peace, the security of both Israel and the Palestinians, and 

the stability of the region.

Question. Relations with Pakistan have experienced considerable discord in recent 

months: What is your assessment of the status of the relationship with the civilian 

government officials and the prospects for progress in improving governance in 

Pakistan while the military leadership in Pakistan maintains policy control?

Answer. This is not always an easy relationship, but it is an important one for 

both countries. Ultimately, the administration assesses that U.S. assistance in 

building Pakistan’s stability and prosperity and establishing a partnership over the 

long-term is the best way to achieve a more effective civilian government and at the 

same time support U.S. national security interests. The elected government consults 

with the military on national security. 

The United States supports the elected government through assistance and a strategic relationship, coordinated through the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, which 

consists of civilian government-led working groups. Similarly, the administration is 

engaging actively with Pakistan’s civilian leadership in promoting Afghan reconciliation, a key strategic interest for both Pakistan and the United States. Since the 

passage of Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation in October 2009, the U.S. Government 

has spent just under $2 billion in civilian assistance to Pakistan. That includes investing in high-visibility, high impact projects such as dam construction that puts 

more energy on Pakistan’s grid; supporting reform and private sector led economic 

growth; and contributing to the Citizens’ Damage Compensation Fund to help floodaffected families. All of this is intended to increase the capacity of civilian institutions and improve their ability to serve and support the people of Pakistan. 

At its core, the United States-Pakistan relationship is about building a long-term 

partnership with the Pakistani people. As President Obama has said, it is in the 

U.S. national interest to support their efforts to develop democratic institutions, foster economic growth, and reject violent extremism.

Question. What impact has devolution of powers in Pakistan had on military influence in Pakistan governance?

Answer. While the devolution process, embodied in the 18th amendment, continues, the administration does not believe that it has increased the influence of the 

Pakistan military in civilian affairs. Indeed, it does not shift the balance of power 

in favor of the military or civilian powers. The administration also believes the 18th 

amendment, if correctly implemented, demonstrates the potential for improving 

services to the people provided by the civilian government. 

The 18th amendment should be viewed as an ongoing process—one that will require careful attention and time to transfer significant executive and legislative 

power to the provinces. Overall, the devolution of powers can be an opportunity for 

the United States to more effectively distribute aid to Pakistan by focusing on the 

needs of the individual provinces rather than a one-size-fits-all program.

Question. How can the United States best participate in improving South Asia relations given the many political, security, and economic challenges evident in the 

current U.S.-Pakistan relationship?

Answer. The key to improving stability and prosperity in South Asia lies in working with Afghanistan, Pakistan and other regional partners to promote regional 

peace and economic integration. The administration consults regularly with the two 

countries, their regional neighbors, and with other international partners and donors who can contribute to regional stability, prosperity, and peace. In her July 20 

speech in Chennai, Secretary Clinton laid out the ‘‘New Silk Road’’ vision of regional 

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economic integration: an international web and network of economic and transit 

connections. The administration has a diplomatic strategy in place to promote this 

vision of the countries of the region working together to attract private-sector investment to create enabling infrastructure and remove barriers and other impediments to the free flow of goods and people. These ties will help bind the region together to serve as a foundation for providing sustainable investment and jobs for 

its people. 

The region also has a critical role to play in facilitating Afghan economic growth, 

such as in supporting investments in Afghanistan that create the foundations for 

growth over the long-term. The vision of the New Silk Road will help Afghanistan 

draw value out of its natural assets and geography, with the goal of becoming a stable, prosperous, peaceful country embedded in a stable, prosperous, peaceful region. 

In June, Afghanistan and Pakistan concluded an historic Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA). The new agreement will reduce smuggling and increase the transparency of cross-border trade. For the first time, it will allow goods to transit from 

the borders of Central Asia to the Indian Ocean. The United States also welcomes 

the agreement by President Karzai and Prime Minister Gilani to expand this transit 

trade zone to Central Asia as part of a vision for regional prosperity. Doing so would 

create further incentives for regional cooperation. 

It is also important to note that countries in the region are expanding economic 

ties on their own initiative. The administration was very encouraged economic engagement has featured prominently in latest round of India-Pakistan dialogue. The 

two sides have made some progress toward reducing barriers to trade and commerce.

Question. Do you believe the United States should consider removing the ‘‘Major 

non-Nato ally’’ status should current trends in Pakistan continue? How would that 

affect our assistance efforts?

Answer. Given the importance of the U.S. relationship with Pakistan and its joint 

efforts against extremists and especially against al-Qaeda, the administration does 

not recommend removing the ‘‘Major non-NATO Ally’’ designation. 

Pakistan remains a key ally in the shared fight against terrorists who threaten 

both our countries. Without significant cooperation, the United States would not 

have accomplished as much as it has to date. As President Obama has stated, ‘‘We 

have been able to kill more terrorists on Pakistani soil than just about any place 

else. We could not have done that without Pakistani cooperation.’’ The importance 

of this fact cannot be overstated. 

Since 9/11, Pakistan has been a strong counterterrorism partner of the United 

States. Although Pakistan has not undertaken every action we would like it to take, 

particularly against groups that do not target the Pakistani state, it has demonstrated sustained commitment and taken concrete steps against groups such as 

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (the Pakistan Taliban) and al-Qaeda, whose leadership 

is under enormous pressure in western Pakistan. This is in large part a result of 

the Government of Pakistan’s policies and cooperation. 

The administration was pleased that Pakistan and the United States were able 

to work jointly on a mission in early September that led to the arrest of senior alQaeda operative al-Mauritani and two accomplices. Such joint action demonstrates 

our two countries can work together to achieve common interests. 

The Pakistani people and security forces have also suffered tremendously from 

terrorism. It is in the national security interests of both the United States and Pakistan to eliminate the threat posed by violent extremism. Pakistan remains a key 

ally in the shared fight against terrorists that threaten both our countries. 

There has been no major policy change in the administration’s assistance to Pakistan, and it does not believe now is the time to change course. Civilian assistance 

continues to move forward and meet the needs of both countries. The U.S. ‘‘pause’’ 

in some military assistance does not signify a shift in policy but underscores the 

fact that United States-Pakistan partnership depends on cooperation. 

RESPONSES OF WENDY SHERMAN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. The political change in Libya is an opportunity for the Libyan people 

to start anew and for the successor government to embrace democratic reforms and 

rehabilitate Libya’s reputation in the world community. 

As you know, I have followed the Pan Am case for many years and with the recent events in Libya has come a new hope that we can finally learn how this horrific 

act, which claimed 189 American lives, came to pass. 

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It is my hope that the new Libyan Government will be forthcoming with their cooperation, but I also believe that we need to make clear to them the importance and 

intensity of our interest in the Pan Am bombing so that this issue is not overlooked 

as they begin the work of rebuilding a new government. Reconciliation must be part 

of the Libyan rebuilding process—internally and in Libya’s external relations. To 

that end:

• What inquiries has the U.S. Government made with the TNC with respect to 

gaining access to Megrahi? Have we asked for his extradition to the United 

States?

Answer. I share your deep concern about delivering justice to the families of the 

victims of the Pan Am 103 bombing. I understand from the State Department that 

Chris Stevens, special envoy to the TNC in Benghazi, and Ambassador Cretz have 

raised the al-Megrahi case with TNC authorities many times. As the Secretary said 

in Paris September 1, we have always disagreed with and condemned the decision 

to release al-Meghrai and return him to Libya. He should be behind bars. 

The TNC leadership has assured the administration that they will review all aspects of the case after they assume full authority in the country. I look forward, if 

confirmed, to pursuing the full range of options for finally bringing the perpetrators 

of this attack to justice.

Question. What inquiries have we made formally or informally with respect to 

access to Libyan files or to persons that may have information about Qaddafi’s 

terrorist activities?

Answer. The administration has encouraged the TNC to protect all documents of 

the former regime so that full investigations can be made of Qaddafi’s activities. The 

administration will continue to press diplomatically for full cooperation with its investigation, but I would refer you to the Department of Justice for details about specific inquiries.

Question. Has the United States had the opportunity to discuss the Pan Am case 

with Qaddafi’s former director of external security and former Foreign Minister 

Mousa Koussa?

Answer. There are serious questions for former regime officials, including Mousa 

Koussa, and justice must be done. As the United States has an ongoing investigation of the Pan Am bombing, I refer you to the Department of Justice for any specific information.

Question. If the TNC or successor government is not willing to cooperate with U.S. 

inquiries and investigations, is the Department willing to condition U.S. assistance 

or the provision of remaining frozen assets?

Answer. The United States takes very seriously every nation’s obligation to cooperate with terrorism investigations. The situation in Libya remains fluid and unsettled. But as normalcy returns and as new Libyan authorities assume full authority in the country, the United States will expect them to live up to those obligations 

when they are able to do so. From the administration’s interactions, it has every 

reason to believe the TNC or their successor will honor those obligations. But the 

administration would certainly consider appropriate measures if they did not.

Question. (a) If confirmed, your area of responsibility will be very broad. Where 

on the agenda is Iran? What more will the administration do to stop Iran—what 

additional sanctions would you recommend and what should we expect to see in the 

near future? 

(b) What do you make of Iran’s announcement this week that it is willing to place 

its nuclear program under IAEA supervision? What does this mean and what effect 

would you expect such a change to have on U.S. sanctions?

Answer (a). If confirmed, I will work actively to increase the pressure on Iran as 

part of the dual-track policy of pressure and engagement to resolve the international 

community’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. This is a top priority for the 

State Department. The administration has expressed both publicly and privately 

concerns about Iran, including about the installation of advanced centrifuges and 

the increase in production of uranium enriched to near 20 percent. 

Since the adoption of Security Council resolution 1929, the administration has 

worked actively to build a broad international coalition of countries willing to implement 1929 by putting in place their own national sanctions measures. These measures have had a substantial impact on Iran’s financial, energy, transportation, and 

commercial sectors and have increased the difficulty for Iran of procuring the equipment, materials, and technology it is seeking for its nuclear, missile, and other 

WMD programs. 

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In the Security Council, the United States works closely with other Council members, including Russia and China, to ensure that the 1737 Committee remains active, fully implements its work plan, assists States with implementation, and effectively responds to reported sanctions violations. The United States also maintains 

a frequent and vigorous dialogue on Iran with Russia and China, both bilaterally 

and in the context of the P5+1 group. 

The administration is committed to pursuing sanctions against Iran as long as it 

continues to defy the international community by failing to meets its obligations 

under U.N. Security Council and International Atomic Energy Agency resolutions. 

I understand that the administration continues to review its options for stepping up 

pressure against Iran, including possible new sanctions, possible new designations 

under the existing sanctions regime, and improved implementation of existing sanctions by U.N. member states.

Answer (b). According to media reports, Iran reportedly offered to allow the IAEA 

to exercise ‘‘full supervision’’ of its nuclear program for 5 years on the condition that 

sanctions against Iran will be lifted. Iran’s full cooperation with the IAEA should 

not be time-bound or conditional. Moreover, Iran is already bound, by U.N. Security 

Council resolutions and its own safeguards obligations, to provide such cooperation 

on a permanent basis. U.N. Security Council resolutions make clear that sanctions 

should only be lifted when Iran cooperates and meets its obligations.

Question. I am very concerned about the lack of coordination and accountability 

for U.S. funds expended on Afghan reconstruction and development. In addition to 

reports about the inability of the United States to oversee these projects, account 

for project expenditures, and limit funding to sustainable projects, the most recent 

SIGAR (SI–GAR) report indicates that U.S. assistance may be making its way into 

the hands of Afghan insurgents. 

If confirmed, how do you intend to integrate SIGAR’s recommendations into 

project oversight? Can you point to specific recommendations that have already been 

implemented? 

The SIGAR report stated that the lack of cooperation by Afghan ministries and 

the Central Bank has limited the oversight of U.S. funds flowing through the 

Afghan economy. Will Afghan cooperation, particularly by President Karzai and senior Afghan leaders, by a factor in determining the scale of U.S. assistance as we 

enter into the civilian surge?

Answer. The administration takes very seriously the allegations of corruption and 

waste in Afghanistan and likewise takes seriously the important role it plays as 

steward of the U.S. taxpayers’ funds. Providing effective oversight of our work in 

Afghanistan has been and is a priority for the U.S. Government. The administration 

has closely reviewed the July 20, 2011, SIGAR report you cite in your question and 

is currently assessing how to comply with the report’s recommendations although 

it has already begun implementation of some recommendations as indicated below. 

Agencies implementing assistance in Afghanistan have already taken a number 

of steps to increase oversight of U.S assistance programs in Afghanistan. The administration has increased its participation in international task forces designed to 

strengthen oversight including TF 2010, ISAF COIN Contracting Executive Steering 

Committee, and the Interagency Combined Joint Logistics Procurement Support 

Board. 

USAID is fully implementing its Accountable Assistance for Afghanistan (A3), developed in 2010 and designed to prevent U.S. funds from falling into the hands of 

malign groups. The A3 initiative is working to achieve its goals by increasing the 

use of cost reimbursable agreements, strictly limiting subcontracting, more closely 

vetting all recipients of U.S. assistance funds, and implementing more stringent 

financial controls. Improved financial controls include the preferential use of electronic funds transfers, as recommended by the SIGAR report, and a commitment to 

ensure 100 percent of all locally incurred costs under USAID projects undergo financial audits. 

In addition, the U. S. Government has significantly increased the number of 

trained oversight staff in the field and has developed innovative monitoring techniques to empower field staff oversight efforts. USAID has tripled the number of its 

oversight staff in Afghanistan since 2007 and is working to further increase its 

numbers this year. The Department of State’s Bureau for International Narcotics 

and Law Enforcement also recently increased its full-time oversight staff in Afghanistan to a total of 18 including four contracting officer representatives and 14 technical monitors. 

USAID and DOD also established comprehensive contractor vetting systems, and 

the Department of State plans to standing up its own capability this year. As recommended by the General Accountability Office (GAO), DOD and USAID now share 

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their vetting results. In February 2011, USAID created the new Compliance and 

Oversight of Partner Performance Division (COPP) in D.C. to work closely with 

Kabul to investigate fraud. The division has already completed more than 40 suspension and debarment actions agencywide, based largely on referrals from the inspector general. 

The administration is working also with our partners within the Afghan Government to ensure accountability of assistance programs. In 2010, the United States 

committed with other donors at the Kabul conference to move toward putting 50 

percent of our assistance through Afghan institutions by 2012. However, the United 

States insists on full transparency for all projects run through the Afghan Government and has rigorous processes in place to guarantee that every entity receiving 

funds has the capacity to transparently and effectively handle U.S. funds. As a result, the administration is very selective in which institutions it will fund directly, 

having approved a few and rejected many more.

Question. Pakistan—Pakistan Cooperation and Civilian Aid Oversight.—Pakistan 

is currently the third largest recipient of U.S. security assistance after Afghanistan 

and Israel, Pakistan received a total of $2.7 billion in security assistance and reimbursements in FY 2010 alone—a staggering 140 percent increase since 2007. This 

includes $1.5 billion in direct reimbursements to Pakistan’s Treasury through the 

Coalition Support Fund—an amount that is double the amount provided the previous fiscal year. 

Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States in addressing the terrorist threat 

in the Afghan border region is abysmal and the disdain for the United States evident. Is the United States, as news reports indicate, considering conditioning U.S. 

assistance to Pakistan on its cooperation in four areas:

• Cooperation in exploiting the bin Laden compound; 

• Cooperation with the war in Afghanistan; 

• Cooperation with the United States in conducting joint counterterrorism operations; 

• Cooperation in improving the overall tone in bilateral relations.

Is this new framework in fact in place and when do you expect the first assessment to be made? Do you expect that all U.S. assistance will be subject to these 

conditions? How much assistance are you currently withholding? Under what conditions will you release that assistance?

Answer. While not always easy, the relationship with Pakistan is very important 

to the United States. The administration works with the Government of Pakistan 

in many ways, including identifying shared interests and the actions we can jointly 

take to achieve them. The United States remains committed to doing that and to 

strengthening and deepening our long-term relationship. 

There has been no major policy change in the administration’s assistance to Pakistan, and it does not believe now is the time to change course. Civilian assistance 

continues to move forward and meet the needs of both countries by strengthening 

Pakistan’s economy and civilian institutions that better the lives of the Pakistani 

people. The U.S. ‘‘pause’’ in some military assistance does not signify a shift in policy but underscores the fact that the partnership depends on cooperation and tangible responses from Pakistan. 

The administration has communicated to Pakistani officials on numerous occasions that the United States requires their cooperation in order to provide certain 

assistance, including most recently in connection with Foreign Military Funding for 

Pakistan for FY 2011. The administration will continue to be clear about the need 

for Pakistan to take certain steps with regard to U.S. military aid. The United 

States-Pakistan partnership must be supported by the efforts of both sides, and both 

countries have reaffirmed their commitment to shared interests and acting on those 

interests jointly. 

Over the long term, the United States seeks to support the Pakistani people as 

they chart their own destiny toward greater stability, economic prosperity, and 

justice.

Question. Taiwan.—On August 24, the Pentagon released its annual report, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011, cataloging China’s cruise missiles, fighter jets and growing, modernizing army. It described the pace and scope of China’s military buildup as ‘‘potentially destabilizing.’’

It reported that the Chinese military remains focused on Taiwan and has deployed as many as 1,200 short-range missiles aimed in its direction. Moreover, it 

is developing antiship ballistic missiles, potentially capable of attacking American 

aircraft carriers. 

661

As cochair of the Senate Taiwan Caucus, on May 26 I led a letter to President 

Obama urging the sale of 66 F–16 C/D aircraft to address the military imbalance 

in the Taiwan Strait, the deteriorating condition of Taiwan’s aging fleet, and the 

fact that the ideal aircraft for Taiwan, the F–16, must be procured by 2013 before 

the production line closes. Forty-four Senators joined me in this bipartisan effort. 

The Obama administration has committed to making a decision on the sale prior 

to October 1, but the fact that this date falls between Vice President Biden’s trip 

to China and President Hu’s trip to Hawaii, not to mention that it is 2 months before President Hu’s expected successor visits the United States, makes me worried 

that the administration will not stand up to China on behalf of our strategic relationship with Taiwan. This concerns me as Taiwan’s defense and deterrent capacity 

are in the U.S. national security interest, as well as promoted and compelled by the 

Taiwan Relations Act.

Question. Could you share with me your view on the question of the military balance in the Taiwan Strait? And do you believe that the United States should proceed with the sale of 66 F–16s to Taiwan?

Answer. Consistent with long-standing U.S. policy, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are 

guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and based on an assessment of Taiwan’s 

defense needs. Meeting Taiwan’s defense needs is a deep commitment of the United 

States and the administration is committed to following through on the terms of the 

TRA under which the United States makes available to Taiwan items necessary for 

its self defense. 

In accordance with that policy, the United States is cognizant of the security challenges Taiwan faces and its need to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, including for air defense. The administration continues to evaluate Taiwan’s defense 

needs, including air defense, and its requests as part of usual Foreign Military Sales 

(FMS) process. It is my understanding that as of this time, no decision has yet been 

made on the sale of any particular items to Taiwan.

Question. Do you agree that the Congress, pursuant to the Taiwan Relations Act, 

has the authority to compel this sale?

Answer. The United States and Taiwan have been well-served by the Taiwan 

Relations Act (TRA). The TRA serves as the basis for the vibrant economic, cultural, 

educational and other ties between the people of the United States and the people 

on Taiwan. 

The question of the interpretation of the TRA presents complex legal issues that 

would require consideration by a number of offices and agencies within the executive branch.

Question. Critics, myself included, have expressed concern about this administration’s lack of vision for and attention to the Western Hemisphere. This pertains to 

both the opportunities presented by the hemisphere—which has largely experienced 

positive economic growth in the midst of our economic crisis—as a market for U.S. 

exports, as well as the growing security crisis in the region resulting from 

transnational criminal organization.

• What is your vision for the hemisphere? 

• Where does the hemisphere rank in the context of the many priorities faced by 

the Department? 

• Do you feel that the budget laid out by the administration in the FY 12 

budget—showing a real and percentage decrease in development and narcotics 

assistance for the hemisphere—is sufficient to meet the needs of the region?

Answer. The Obama Administration’s vision for the hemisphere is one of positive 

partnerships seeking more inclusive growth and democratic development. The administration has focused on four overarching priorities critical to this vision: building effective institutions of democratic governance; promoting social and economic 

opportunity for everyone; securing a clean energy future; and ensuring the safety 

and security of all of our citizens. The administration’s efforts are structured as both 

bilateral partnerships, including strategic dialogues, and working to strengthen 

multilateral and regional institutions. Importantly, some of the most successful and 

democratic nations in the hemisphere explicitly share this vision, enabling the administration to create positive synergies and work together in areas never before 

possible and which have global implications (such as renewable energy). 

The administration’s vision remains manifestly inclusive and seeks points of convergence even in addressing difficult issues. The administration recognizes that the 

most successful approaches to challenges will be both comprehensive—addressing 

all facets of the problem—and regional, including governmental, private, and nongovernmental partners. A practical example is our effort to enhance citizen safety 

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through the Merida Initiative in Mexico, Central America Regional Security Initiative, Colombia Strategic Development Initiative, and the Caribbean Basin Security 

Initiative, all designed to break the power, violence, and impunity of the region’s 

drug, gang, and criminal organizations by strengthening law enforcement and justice sector institutions and by helping to identify, empower, and build resilient civil 

societies and entrepreneurial communities. 

The administration agrees that the region’s growing prosperity is creating an important new market for American goods, which is why they remain strongly committed to the approval of pending trade agreements with Colombia and Panama, 

along with TAA and the extension of Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and 

ATPDEA. In addition, the United States continues to prioritize economic growth 

programs that leverage the emerging leadership potential and resources of many 

Latin American and Caribbean countries. Collaborative platforms like Pathways to 

Prosperity and the Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas, which invite 

partner governments and the private sector to join in a broader coalition to address 

key elements of the hemispheric agenda, are central to the administration’s strategic vision. 

The administration remains steadfast in its commitment to core principles and 

recognition of key values such as human and labor rights, press freedom, and the 

importance of robust and independent democratic institutions, upon which many of 

those values depend. 

The Western Hemisphere remains a top priority for the United States. The 

Obama administration has demonstrated in word and deed from the beginning that 

the United States has important national interests at stake in the Western Hemisphere, and the best way to advance these interests is through proactive engagement. It has also amplified the ways in which key allies in the Western Hemisphere 

will be our partners confronting common global challenges. 

President Obama’s visit to Brazil, Chile, and El Salvador in March highlighted 

every one of the themes outlined above, building on the pledge that he made at the 

Summit of the Americas to create a relationship of ‘‘equal partners’’ based on mutual interests and shared values. The President’s message, and the dozens of agreements completed during the trip, underscored how significant the region is for the 

United States on issues including our economic competiveness, our global strategic 

interests, our core values of democracy and human rights, and the richness and 

diversity of our society and culture. 

The U.S. foreign assistance request for FY 2012 responds to continued threats to 

citizen safety that jeopardize U.S. national security interests; reinforces democratic 

gains; leverages the region’s emerging economic opportunities and strengths; and 

supports the Americas’ emerging potential for global leadership. The administration 

believes this request will help it meet the challenges and opportunities we face. At 

the same time, it is lean and responds to the fiscal constraints that we all face. If 

confirmed, I will work with the Department to advance these priorities, particularly 

as we approach the Summit of the Americas in Colombia in 2012. 

RESPONSES OF WENDY SHERMAN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JIM WEBB

Question. Various press reports have intimated that, as a global strategist and 

principal of the Albright Stonebridge Group, you have represented or advised U.S. 

and other firms seeking to do business in China. Given the unique responsibility 

of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs for managing the full range of issues in 

our day-to-day bilateral relationships, please provide a specific description of the nature of your private sector activities in China. In particular, please describe the 

level and nature of any contacts you may have had with Chinese Government officials in this capacity.

Answer. Albright Stonebridge Group has an active China practice and as a principal of ASG, I have participated in helping clients, largely American multinationals, meet their business objectives in China. In that role, I have met with a 

variety of officials in Beijing, Shanghai, and in some of the provinces at a variety 

of levels. In addition, I have participated as part of delegations sponsored by The 

Aspen Institute and the Center for American Progress (CAP) that conducted United 

States-China dialogues and in that capacity have also met with a variety of officials.

Question. While you are not registered as a lobbyist or a representative of a foreign government, many of the clients you advised at Albright Stonebridge Group engage separate staff to lobby the State Department and Congress on a variety of 

issues. Can you confirm that neither you, nor the Albright Stonebridge Group, 

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which continues to hold the promissory note for the divestment of your interests in 

the firm, retain any private interests in China that may compromise your ability, 

if confirmed, to represent the full range of U.S. interests in our bilateral relationship with China?

Answer. Under the Ethics Undertakings agreed to with the Office of Government 

Ethics and White House Counsel, I will be recused for 2 years from participating 

personally or substantially in any particular matter that involves any clients I 

served while a principal of Albright Stonebridge Group or in any particular matter 

that involves Albright Stonebridge Group. I will also be recused from participating 

personally or substantially in any particular matter that has a direct and predictable effect on the ability or willingness of Albright Stonebridge Group to pay the 

note, until the note is paid in full. Given the nature of the job of Under Secretary 

of State for Political Affairs, these recusals should have little if any effect on my 

ability to fulfill the duties of the position.

Question. More broadly, I remain concerned that the United States lacks a coherent strategy to address the impact of China’s rise on our own economic and security 

interests. Within the U.S. Government, agencies continue to advocate for competing 

priorities. While some agencies push to broaden our business opportunities and engagement with China, reports from the Department of Defense and the intelligence 

community document persistent concerns with sensitive technology transfers, the 

abuse of U.S. intellectual property rights, cyber attacks originating in China, and 

China’s continued aggressive naval activities in the South China Sea. 

If confirmed, how will you balance the competing priorities of expanding our economic and political ties with China while also holding China more accountable in 

these areas?

Answer. The administration is committed to pursuing a positive, cooperative, and 

comprehensive relationship with China grounded in reality, focused on results, and 

true to our principles and interests. If confirmed, I will work to advance those objectives and to uphold American political, economic, and national security interests in 

my interactions with Chinese counterparts. 

The administration engages the Chinese leadership to strengthen cooperation on 

shared goals of regional stability and increased prosperity. The administration also 

encourages China to play a greater role internationally in ways supportive of international development and stability—and in ways consistent with prevailing international rules and institutions. 

U.S. engagement with China includes three main pillars:

1. Work with allies and partners in Asia to foster a regional environment in which 

China’s rise is a source of prosperity and stability for the entire region. 

2. Build bilateral trust with China on a range of issues. The Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) represents a ‘‘whole of government’’ dialogue with the 

participation of hundreds of experts from dozens of agencies across both of our governments to achieve that goal. Additionally, the United States engages in broad outreach to broad elements of Chinese Government and society, including building a 

healthy, stable, continuous, and reliable military-to-military relationship and increasing people-to-people exchanges between our countries. 

3. Expand cooperation with China to address common global and regional challenges, ranging from Iran and North Korea to climate change, and including economic issues and multilateral initiatives.

While seeking cooperation with China on a range of international issues, the 

administration recognizes the obstacles and differences that continue to exist. 

The administration has raised difficult issues and areas of disagreement in discussions with China. Those topics include human rights, unfair procurement preferences, violations of intellectual property rights, and currency manipulation. 

The administration also recognizes that China has been engaged in an ambitious 

military modernization effort since the mid-1990s, seeking to create a modern force 

capable of fighting high-intensity conflicts along its periphery. In discussions on China’s military intentions, administration officials have urged the Chinese to provide 

greater transparency into the capabilities they are developing and the intentions behind their modernization effort. 

Those discussions emphasized our shared interest in ensuring peace and prosperity in the region. Although continuing to build a comprehensive relationship with 

China, the administration carefully monitors China’s military developments and, in 

concert with our allies and partners with whom we consult regularly on China’s 

military modernization, will make adjustments to current policy as necessary. 

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RESPONSES OF WENDY SHERMAN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

Question. North Korea.—In your testimony before this committee, you said: ‘‘It 

makes no sense to have talks just for the sake of talks. North Korea must keep its 

commitments that it made in 2005 to really move forward to the denuclearization 

of the Korean Peninsula.’’

• Do you believe North Korea has kept the commitments it made in 2005?

Answer. No. North Korea has not kept its commitments. 

In the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, the DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and to 

returning, at an early date, to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Since then, the DPRK has 

continued its nuclear-related activities, including its uranium enrichment program 

(UEP) and light water reactor construction activities, and announced it conducted 

nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009.

Question. Do you believe the talks Secretary Clinton invited North Korea’s Vice 

Foreign Minister to have in New York were productive? Why?

Answer. The State Department has provided the following read out on those talks: 

U.S. officials met with the DPRK in New York July 28 and 29 to reiterate that, 

while the United States remains open to direct engagement, we are not interested 

in talks for the sake of talking. The United States underscored that before serious 

negotiations can resume, the DPRK must take demonstrable steps to show that it 

is prepared to meet its international commitments to achieve the goal of the 2005 

joint statement: the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. The United States also emphasized that international sanctions on the 

DPRK will remain in place until Pyongyang complies with its obligations under 

U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874, under which the DPRK must 

abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, 

verifiable and irreversible manner, and suspend its ballistic missile program. 

Based on this read out, the talks were very important because the administration 

was able to drive home directly to the DPRK that it must take concrete steps to 

meet its international commitments.

Question. The Obama administration has stated that North Korea must demonstrate a ‘‘concrete indication’’ of Pyongyang’s commitment to denuclearization 

prior to resuming multilateral negotiations. Do you agree with this position? What 

do you consider to be an acceptable ‘‘concrete indication’’?

Answer. North Korea must demonstrate a change in behavior, including improving North-South relations, ceasing provocative actions, taking concrete steps toward 

irreversible denuclearization, and complying with its commitments under the 2005 

Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and its obligations under the U.N. Security 

Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874. 

As the the administration has stated repeatedly, they are open to talks with 

North Korea, but do not intend to reward the North just for returning to the table. 

The administration will not give them anything new for actions they have already 

agreed to take and the administration has no appetite for pursuing protracted negotiations that will only lead us right back to where we have already been.

Question. There has been a great deal of turmoil in the Middle East over the last 

6 months but, with all the potential for change, a constant is the danger posed by 

Iran’s nuclear program. Despite the President’s commitment to deprive Iran a nuclear weapons capability, the IAEA confirmed just last week that the Iranian program continues and that they are loading P–2 Centrifuges at Qom. 

What new steps is the administration willing to take to stop Iran—would you recommend pursuing additional sanctions in the near future? President Obama has 

said that it is unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapons capability. What 

does that mean? Does it mean we’ll do everything and anything we can to ensure 

Iran does not acquire that capability?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work actively to increase the pressure on Iran as part 

of the dual track policy of pressure and engagement to resolve our national security 

concern and the international community’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. 

The administration is committed to sanctions against Iran as long as it continues 

to defy the international community and fails to meet its obligations under U.N. 

Security Council and International Atomic Energy Agency resolutions. I understand 

that the administration continues to review options for stepping up pressure against 

Iran, including possible new sanctions, possible new designations under the existing 

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sanctions regime, and improved implementation of existing sanctions by U.N. member states.

Question. A central tenet of the U.S.-Israel relationship from administration to administration has been the close working relationship between the two countries and 

that differences of opinion are dealt with behind closed doors.

• Do you agree that the United States should work more closely with Israel and 

ensure our differences stay private? 

• Do you believe U.S. policy in the region is best advanced through a close working relationship with Israel? 

• How would you characterize the U.S.-Israel strategic dialogue? In spite of the 

current turmoil and instability in the region, does the United States remain absolutely committed to Israel’s qualitative military edge?

Answer. As President Obama said in his speech on May 22, 2011, ‘‘the bonds between the United States and Israel are unbreakable and the commitment of the 

United States to the security of Israel is ironclad.’’ The U.S.-Israel bilateral relationship is stronger than ever, and the administration is taking full advantage of the 

robust and frequent senior-level consultative and political mechanisms currently in 

place to share views and analysis of the unprecedented changes underway in the 

region. The administration is also working together to ensure that these changes do 

not negatively impact Israel’s security. 

During the past year, there have been an unprecedented number of bilateral defense and strategic consultations, high-level discussions and visits, and less highprofile consultations at senior levels between U.S. and Israeli leaders and government officials. 

As in any close friendship, there are times when the United States and Israel do 

not share the same views. The administration works productively and practically to 

resolve such differences quickly and quietly. 

The administration has been clear in its absolute commitment to maintaining and 

supporting Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME). The United States will respond 

quickly and carefully, in close consultation with the Government of Israel, to any 

development that might affect it.

Question. Over the past 2 years, the Palestinian leadership has repeatedly refused 

to enter direct negotiations with Israel. Instead, Palestinian Authority President 

Abbas has embarked on an effort to push for recognition at the U.N. These efforts 

hurt the chances for peace and run counter to long-standing U.S. policy in favor of 

direct negotiations. President Obama has called the Palestinian initiative purely 

‘‘symbolic’’ and said that efforts to delegitimize Israel will end in ‘‘failure.’’

• What are we doing to encourage other countries to oppose the effort as well, 

both in the Security Council and the General Assembly? How many countries 

has the State Department demarched on this issue? Have we engaged diplomatically across the board to make it clear that a vote on Palestinian statehood or upgrading their status is strongly opposed by the United States?

Answer. In May, President Obama delivered in two speeches his vision of how to 

move forward toward Middle East peace, and laid out principles and goals of the 

negotiations needed to resolve the difficult ‘‘final status’’ issues between the parties. 

He also made clear his opposition to efforts to determine final status issues outside 

of negotiations, including through initiatives at the United Nations. He said, ‘‘For 

the Palestinians, efforts to delegitimize Israel will end in failure. Symbolic actions 

to isolate Israel at the United Nations in September won’t create an independent 

state.’’

I will—if confirmed—wholeheartedly support the efforts underway to make this 

position absolutely clear at the U.N. and in capitals around the globe. The United 

States is urging other member states not to support any Palestinian action at the 

U.N. that would serve to prejudge final status issues or isolate Israel, in whatever 

form such action might take. 

U.S. ambassadors have engaged, at Secretary Clinton’s instruction, at the highest 

political levels in close to 100 capitals worldwide where outreach would be most productive. Secretary Clinton, National Security Advisor Donilon, Ambassador Rice, 

Deputy Secretary Burns, Assistant Secretary Feltman and Special Envoy Hale and 

other senior U.S. officials have also been working intensively with their counterparts in key capitals for months to underscore our concerns and views. 

Going forward, the Department of State will continue to work vigorously and strategically to reach out to select countries and organizations to express and explain 

our firm opposition to any one-sided actions at the U.N., including a Palestinian 

state declared outside of the framework of negotiations.

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Question. President Abbas has ignored the President’s request that he not pursue 

a U.N. Security Council Resolution seeking recognition. What impact will Palestinian efforts at the U.N. have on the United States-Palestinian relationship? Is the 

administration willing to suspend foreign aid to the Palestinian authorities or other 

Palestinian entities if they do not forgo these efforts?

Answer. I know that at every turn, the administration has told the Palestinian 

leadership clearly and consistently that only direct negotiations can produce the outcome they seek: a real and lasting peace with Israel, and the creation of a Palestinian state. These outcomes will serve the interests of the United States and Israel 

as well, and are vital to a comprehensive peace and regional stability. 

The administration has been equally clear and unequivocal that it would vigorously oppose any U.N. Security Council or General Assembly resolution that seeks 

to predetermine any ‘‘final status’’ issue that must be resolved through direct negotiation, including creation of a Palestinian state. 

The United States remains committed to a dual-track strategy in pursuing IsraeliPalestinian peace, a vigorous political negotiating effort focused on renewing direct 

negotiations and moving forward toward a comprehensive peace, and an equally vigorous institution-building track to prepare Palestinians for eventual statehood, including maintaining security and continuing to support the growth of accountable 

and professional security forces, and providing transparent and efficient services for 

the Palestinian people. 

It has been the position of successive administrations that support for Palestinian 

Government institutions and a viable Palestinian economy serves the interests of 

the United States, and is essential for peace, the stability of the region, and the security of both Israel and the Palestinians. 

Cutting off assistance to the Palestinian Authority would put these gains at risk, 

send a very negative signal to the broader region at a time of intense change, and, 

most immediately, risk dramatically undermining security—outcomes that hurt both 

the interest of the United States and the interests of Israel and the Palestinians. 

Building the institutions of a stable, prosperous Palestinian state with an accountable and transparent government and professional security forces also is a 

strong and vital bulwark against radicalization. These efforts are and will remain 

critical to U.S. national interests even in the face of difficulties on the political 

track.

Question. Recently, the European Union and the United States announced sanctions on the Syrian regime. What assistance is Turkey providing, or has offered, to 

help enforce sanctions on Syria?

Answer. Turkey and the United States have coordinated closely on Syria. Turkey 

has issued strong, unambiguous statements condemning the Syrian Government’s 

violent attacks against civilians. The Turkish Foreign Minister and other Government of Turkey officials have traveled to Damascus to identify the kinds of measures the Syrian Government needed to take to address the international community’s concerns. 

The Turkish Government has provided humanitarian assistance to over 7,000 displaced Syrians residing in seven camps administered by the Turkish Red Crescent 

in the Hatay province bordering Syria. 

Turkey has not enacted unilateral sanctions against Syria but has enforced U.N. 

sanctions. For example, Turkey has taken action to prevent illicit materiel from arriving in Syria via Turkey.

Question. Is the United States committed to the territorial integrity and defense 

of the Republic of Georgia?

Answer. The United States remains steadfast in its strong support for Georgia’s 

sovereignty and territorial integrity. The United States continues to call on Russia 

to fulfill its obligations under the 2008 cease-fire agreement, including withdrawal 

of its forces to preconflict positions and free access for humanitarian assistance. The 

continued militarization of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions by the Russian 

Federation is inconsistent with its cease-fire commitments and threatens the stability in the region. The administration is an active participant in the Geneva discussions, working with the cochairs and others in pursuit of a resolution to the conflict. The United States also continues to voice concern directly to Russia at every 

opportunity and at high levels regarding its actions in Georgia, including during 

Secretary Clinton’s meetings with Russian FM Lavrov. In addition, the administration will continue to speak out in support of Georgia’s territorial integrity, as it did 

recently in our statement regarding the so-called August 29 ‘‘elections’’ in the separatist region of Abkhazia.

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Question. Is the United States willing to provide all necessary support to help 

Georgia formulate its defense doctrines, including the drafting of a capabilities and 

threats assessment and defense white paper?

Answer. The United States continues to have a broad and deepening relationship 

with Georgia in a number of sectors. The administration’s security assistance and 

military engagement with Georgia is currently focused in two areas. The first is 

comprehensive assistance to support Georgia’s defense reform and modernization 

along Euro-Atlantic lines. In particular, the United States is focused on building institutional capacity, supporting personnel and doctrine reform, and contributing to 

professional military education modernization. The administration has also consulted with the Georgian Government as it drafts a National Security Concept. Second, the United States continues to provide the necessary training and equipment 

to Georgian troops in support of their interoperability and effective participation in 

ISAF operations in Afghanistan. 

RESPONSES OF WENDY SHERMAN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Question. Protocol on Cluster Munitions to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW): A proposed Sixth Protocol to the Convention on Conventional Weapons 

(CCW) is currently being negotiated in Geneva. This protocol would establish sensible controls on the production, stockpiling, and use of cluster munitions. The negotiations which produced the current draft protocol have been ongoing for several 

years with the active involvement of the U.S. delegation to the CCW. The current 

draft is widely supported within the CCW, and would significantly advance global 

efforts to minimize the risks to civilian populations of modern warfare while simultaneously preserving the ability of the United States and its allies to utilize munitions that will limit American casualties in future conflicts. The draft is opposed by 

some NGOs, however, and several governments participating in the CCW may block 

approval of the protocol at the CCW Review Conference in November, thereby killing it.

• Does the Obama administration support the proposed CCW protocol on cluster 

munitions? 

• Does the Obama administration have in place a strategy for preventing a small 

group of countries from killing the proposed CCW protocol on cluster munitions? 

If so, please describe that strategy. 

• If confirmed, will you work actively to support approval of the cluster munitions 

protocol, and to raise this issue in your discussions with foreign counterparts?

Answer. The administration supports concluding a comprehensive and binding 

protocol to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) that addresses all aspects of cluster munitions, to include use, transfer, stockpiling, and destruction and 

that will have a significant humanitarian impact on the ground while preserving an 

important military capability. The draft protocol presented by the CCW Group of 

Governments Experts Chair provides the basis for such a protocol. 

The Department is currently engaging CCW High Contracting Parties to urge 

these states to seize the opportunity to conclude a new protocol regulating cluster 

munitions at the CCW Review Conference in November. This includes targeted 

ministerial-level engagement with key detractors. If confirmed I will join Secretary 

Clinton and the rest of the Department in these efforts, as appropriate.

Question. Foreign Boycotts of U.S. Defense Firms.—There is an aggressive campaign underway, led by foreign NGOs, and apparently abetted by some foreign governments, to boycott U.S. companies involved in the manufacture pursuant to contracts with the U.S. Department of Defense of weapons systems that they don’t 

think the United States should have. This campaign is currently focused on manufacturers of landmines and cluster munitions, but can easily be expanded to manufacturers of nuclear weapons-related items, depleted uranium weapons, etc. The 

campaign has made surprising headway in dissuading foreign banks from doing 

business with some key U.S. defense contractors, and is clearly aimed at dissuading 

these companies from continuing to supply the United States with these weapons.

• Are you aware of this campaign? 

• Does the Obama administration believe that this campaign is exclusively driven 

by NGOs, or are some foreign governments also complicit in it? If so, which 

ones? 

• What is the policy of the Obama administration with respect to foreign boycotts 

of U.S. defense contractors? 

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• If the Obama administration opposes foreign boycotts of U.S. defense contractors, what specific steps has the State Department taken to resist this campaign 

and support U.S. defense contractors that have been targeted by it? 

• If the Obama administration opposes foreign boycotts of U.S. defense contractors, what steps do you intend to take if confirmed as Under Secretary for Political Affairs to resist this campaign and support U.S. defense contractors that 

have been targeted by it? Are you committed, for example, to raising this issue 

with foreign government officials? 

• Do you believe the United States Government should continue to do business 

with foreign banks and other foreign businesses that are engaged in boycotts 

of U.S. defense contractors?

Answer. The State Department is committed to ensuring fair treatment of U.S. 

companies and their goods, services, and investments in the global marketplace. It 

is my understanding that the Department is aware of one NGO campaign advocating for a ban on investments in cluster munitions pursuant to the Convention 

on Cluster Munitions (CCM), to which the United States is not a State party. To 

the Department’s knowledge, the campaign is driven by NGOs and not foreign governments. While a handful of states party to the CCM (Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, and New Zealand) have chosen to criminalize investment in production of 

cluster munitions, the Department is not aware of any foreign governments or businesses boycotting a U.S. defense contractor owing to its production of defense articles for U.S. Government contracts based on their belief that the United States 

should not possess said articles. If notified of such a boycott, it is my understanding 

that the Department would be willing to raise it with foreign officials. If confirmed, 

I will join in the Department’s efforts to engage foreign governments on such issues, 

as appropriate. It is also my understanding that the Department will review allegations of discrimination against an American company, if notified of specific information of such discrimination. 

(669)

NOMINATIONS 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 2011

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

Robert A. Mandell, of Florida, to be U.S. Ambassador to Luxembourg 

Hon. Thomas Charles Krajeski, of Virginia, to be U.S. Ambassador 

to the Kingdom of Bahrain 

Hon. Dan W. Mozena, of Iowa, to be U.S. Ambassador to the People’s Republic of Bangladesh 

Michael A. Hammer, of the District of Columbia, to be Assistant 

Secretary of State for Public Affairs 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jeanne Shaheen, 

presiding. 

Present: Senators Shaheen, Barrasso, and Risch. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN,

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE 

Senator SHAHEEN. Good morning, everyone. Today the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee meets to consider the nominations of: 

Mr. Robert Mandell, to be the U.S. Ambassador to Luxembourg; 

Ambassador Thomas Charles Krajeski, to be the U.S. Ambassador 

to the Kingdom of Bahrain; Ambassador Dan Mozena, to be confirmed to be—I’m sorry, I misread that—Ambassador Dan Mozena, 

to be the U.S. Ambassador to the People’s Republic of Bangladesh; 

and Mr. Michael Hammer, to be the Assistant Secretary of State 

for Public Affairs. Welcome, everyone. 

I want to congratulate each of you on your nominations, and I 

also want to welcome all of your families and friends who are here 

today. I look forward to hearing from each of you about the unique 

challenges and opportunities you face in your new position upon 

your confirmation. I’m going to begin by making an opening statement and then I will turn it over to each of you to make a statement, and then we will do some questions. 

Luxembourg is a small but influential member of the European 

Union and the eurozone economy, as well as a founding member 

of NATO. As one of the wealthiest countries in the world, Luxembourg is highly dependent upon trade and investment and has 

played an active role in deepening European economic integration, 

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which gives Luxembourg a particularly unique view with respect to 

the ongoing eurozone debt crisis. 

As perhaps the most critical issue facing Europe and the transatlantic space, the ongoing sovereign debt crisis in Europe continues to affect global financial markets around the world and is 

having spillover effects on economic and financial confidence here 

at home. How Europe responds to this crisis will have dramatic implications, not only for the future of Europe, but also across the 

broad spectrum of U.S. interests. 

There is a path forward and Europe does have the economic capacity to manage these very difficult challenges. However, a credible solution will require some very tough decisions and bold, coordinated actions from Europe’s leaders. I look forward to hearing 

your thoughts, Mr. Mandell, on the role Luxembourg can play on 

this important effort. 

Ambassador Krajeski, as you know, Bahrain is a long-time U.S. 

ally in a very difficult neighborhood. As the headquarters of the 

U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet and designated as a major non-NATO ally 

in 2001, Bahrain shares a wide range of regional security interests 

with the United States, including the threat of increasing Iranian 

influence across the Persian Gulf. 

Today our bilateral relationship is at a pivotal point, as Bahrain 

struggles in the face of ongoing protests linked to the Arab Spring 

which erupted in February 2011. In response to largely peaceful 

demonstrations, Bahrain declared a state of emergency and invited 

security assistance from neighboring gulf countries. Continued protests, detentions, and arrests have increased ethnic and religious 

tensions and reduced prospects for a sustainable political solution 

in Bahrain. 

In May, President Obama declared that mass arrests and brute 

force are at odds with the universal rights of Bahrain’s citizens, 

and that, ‘‘You cannot have a real dialogue when parts of the 

peaceful opposition are in jail.’’

The committee will be interested to hear how the administration 

intends to follow up on that strong declaration and how we will encourage real dialogue and a peaceful solution for all of Bahrain’s 

citizens, Shia and Sunni alike. 

Ambassador Mozena, Bangladesh is an overwhelmingly Muslim 

country with a relatively moderate secular and democratic government, located in a strategically important northern region of the 

Bay of Bengal in South Asia. As relationships between China, 

India, and the rest of South Asia continue to evolve, Bangladesh, 

with its energy reserves and important trade routes, will play an 

increasingly significant role in the region. 

Finally today, we will assess how the State Department communicates its message around the world, Mr. Hammer. In an extremely fast-paced, open and interconnected global marketplace of 

ideas, it’s not enough to simply create and implement sound policies any more. Now we must also be able to quickly and effectively 

broadcast those policies around the globe. 

Communications strategy and winning hearts and minds is a 

critical component of any effective foreign policy and national security strategy. We must also be on the cutting edge of communications technology, utilizing modern social media tools, including 

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texting, Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. I will be interested to 

hear how the Department intends to keep up in this complex environment. 

Again, I want to thank each of you for your willingness to take 

on these important and challenging posts. I will briefly introduce 

each of our nominees before turning it over to you for your opening 

statements. But first I want to see if Senator Barrasso, who’s the 

ranking member on the subcommittee, has an opening statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN BARRASSO,

U.S. SENATOR FROM WYOMING 

Senator BARRASSO. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chairman. Today the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations meets to 

consider four very important nominations. Each of these posts is 

important to fostering vital relationships and promoting U.S. national interests, and there are truly real challenges ahead. It’s important that the United States continues to be a strong leader 

across the globe. 

So I join you, Madam Chairman, in congratulating each one of 

our nominees. In addition, I want to extend a warm welcome to all 

of their friends and families. I see Senator Nelson here and I don’t 

want to delay him at all. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Senator Nelson is here to introduce Robert Mandell, so I will let 

you do that introduction, Senator Nelson, before I go on to introduce our other nominees this morning. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,

U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA 

Senator NELSON. Madam Chairman, I want to thank you for 

your personal consideration of having this hearing and for particularly speeding up the consideration of our friend from Florida, 

Bobby Mandell. 

I want to at this moment just thank all of these people at the 

table for their public service. You all are going to some very critical 

parts of the world. In addition to the administration of the State 

Department, I have been to most of these critical parts of the world 

and I can tell you that my impression of the Foreign Service is that 

we are very fortunate to have the quality of the Foreign Service officers that represent us around the country—around the world. As 

a result, in this new world in which we live the Foreign Service becomes all the more important, because as we are projecting soft 

power representing the interests of the United States that clearly 

involves all the agencies of government and certainly the Foreign 

Service. 

So, Madam Chairman, I come with an eye that’s cocked on quality and that’s why I wanted to come here today, because I have 

seen that a political ambassador, as opposed to a career Foreign 

Service officer, if that ambassador is a good one, can be one of the 

most effective tools of representation for the United States of 

America. I’ve seen that in Republican and Democratic administrations. I’ve seen that, the ambassador be all the more effective with 

a strong DCM because of the political connection, if you will, back 

672

to the administration of the ambassador having been all the more 

effective. 

I think of, for example in the Bush administration, one of our 

more effective ambassadors was a former partner in the Texas 

Rangers of George Bush. He first went to the Czech Republic. He 

was so good—he learned Czech. He was so good, in the second 

Bush administration he went to Paris, and he became fluent in 

French. I could go on and on with a number of the ambassadors. 

That’s why I wanted to come here to tell you about Bobby 

Mandell. He is my friend. He’s a personal friend. He and his family 

and his wife, Julie, his mom and dad, Lester and Sunny, are here 

in the front row. They’ve been personal friends of mine for years 

and years, so I know Bobby and I know the family, and this is the 

kind of person that we want representing our country. 

Although Luxembourg’s a little-bitty country, it’s right in the 

middle of a fire storm of activity that is critically important to the 

United States. So we need a representative there that is going to 

stand tall and make us proud. 

Now, they’ve had some problems in the past. That’s why you 

need somebody of the quality of Bob Mandell to come in and represent the country. I can tell you a lot about—he’s a lawyer, he is 

a businessman par excellence. He took over the business that his 

dad had started from humble beginnings, made that business 

multi, multi hundreds of millions of dollars of value. He has sold 

that business and so he has the opportunity now for public service. 

I give you my highest recommendation, Madam Chairman, Mr. 

Ranking Member, and the Senator also that’s here for this committee. I had the privilege of sitting on this committee for 6 years, 

and I thank you all for the service that you render. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson, and 

thank you for being here for that introduction. 

Next we have Ambassador Thomas Charles Krajeski, to be the 

U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of Bahrain. Ambassador Krajeski 

is a career member of the senior Foreign Service and currently 

serves as the senior vice president at the National Defense University in Washington. He has served in posts around the world, including Iraq, Egypt, India, and Yemen, where he served as U.S. 

Ambassador. A fluent Arabic speaker, he is also the recipient of the 

Presidential Distinguished Honor Award for his work in Iraq and 

Yemen. 

We also have today Ambassador Dan Mozena, the nominee to be 

the U.S. Ambassador to Bangladesh. Ambassador Mozena is a longtime senior Foreign Service officer and currently a professor at the 

National War College. He has served in a variety of posts around 

the world, including as Ambassador to Angola, Deputy Chief of 

Mission in Zambia, and as a former counselor in Bangladesh. 

Finally, we have Michael Hammer, who has been nominated to 

be the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. Mr. Hammer 

is currently the Acting Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs and 

previously served as the senior director for Press and Communications and the spokesperson for the National Security Council. He 

has a long, distinguished career at the State Department and in 

the White House dealing with a wide variety of issues and regions 

around the world. 

673

As each of you give your opening statements, I hope you will feel 

free to introduce any family of friends who are here to support you. 

And we’ll begin with you, Mr. Mandell. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. MANDELL, OF FLORIDA, 

NOMINATED TO BE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO LUXEMBOURG 

Mr. MANDELL. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Madam Chairman 

and members of the committee, good morning. I am honored to appear before you today as President Obama’s nominee to serve as 

the next Ambassador to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. I am 

grateful to the President and Secretary Clinton for their support 

and for the confidence that they have placed in me. If confirmed, 

I look forward to working with this committee and working with 

the Congress to continue and nurture the strong relationship that 

exists between the United States and Luxembourg. 

I’m especially grateful to a distinguished public servant, Senator 

Bill Nelson, for his friendship and his introduction and support 

today. Even though he’s not present today, I would also like to 

thank my long-time friend, former Senator, Mel Martinez, who has 

been very encouraging from the very start of this process. 

I would also like to introduce and publicly thank my dear wife, 

Julie, who has provided me support throughout my career. I would 

also like to introduce our children, Zachary and Xan, and my parents, Lester and Sonia Mandell, and Julie’s parents, Gilbert and 

Joyce Walker. Several more of our family members have joined us 

this morning, but we don’t want to take up the total committee’s 

time for that. 

Senator SHAHEEN. It’s great to have a big family. 

Mr. MANDELL. It’s great to have a big family, thank you. 

But Julie and I are very blessed to have both of our parents 

share this day with us. Starting from the end is my mother-in-law, 

Joyce Walker, and my father-in-law, Dr. Gilbert Walker, and my 

dad, Lester Mandell, my mother, Sonia Mandell, and my wife Julie, 

and my children, who are right back there, Zachary and Xan, sitting behind Julie. 

My experience of over 20 years as the leader of my own and my 

family’s business has taught me the value of human relationships 

in achieving success. After practicing law for more than a decade, 

I started over as a laborer in my family’s business, the homebuilding business, and worked my way up the ladder over the 

course of several years. Starting in the field significantly affected 

my approach to business. It meant that I would wear a bright yellow shirt that had ‘‘Bobby’’ written over one side of my pocket and 

on the other side it had ‘‘Greater Homes’’ written. So I knew who 

I was and where I worked. I also got to drive a 6-year-old pickup 

truck with three on the column and no air conditioning. That way 

my dad knew that I wouldn’t be sitting in the truck during the long 

hot days of summer. It also didn’t have a radio because he thought 

that work should be entertaining enough. 

This early experience taught me that it was essential to treat 

people fairly, build the right relationships, and by doing the right 

thing for the right reasons engender the trust of those around you, 

especially the ones you work with. 

674

After all was said and done, our company built over 10,000 

houses all in the Central Florida area. The same leadership and relationship skills have served me well in my roles at the local, statewide, and Federal level, having served for the past 2 years on 

President Obama’s Export Council. If confirmed, I hope to bring 

these same skills to bear as the Ambassador to Luxembourg. 

The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg is a longstanding ally of the 

United States. It is a founding member of NATO, the United Nations, and the European Union. Thanks to the enormous sacrifices 

of the United States Armed Forces which liberated Luxembourg in 

World War II, there is a deep reservoir of goodwill toward the 

United States in Luxembourg. Our bilateral relationship with Luxembourg is emphatically positive. 

If confirmed, I will strive to continue our strong and productive 

relationship by maintaining effective outreach programs and developing relationships with the government, the business community, 

youth, Luxembourg citizens, and the residents of every background. 

I have worked to develop the President’s National Export Initiative and our Nation’s economic expansion by my service on President Obama’s Export Council over the past 2 years. If confirmed, 

I plan to continue working to increase American exports to Europe. 

Luxembourg is a major financial center in Europe, second only to 

the United States worldwide in the mutual fund industry, managing over $3 trillion in net assets. Financial services comprise 

about 25 percent of Luxembourg’s GDP. Accordingly, the United 

States works closely with the Government of Luxembourg to combat the financing of terrorism and money laundering. 

Embassy Luxembourg has been engaged in negotiations to sign 

an agreement with Luxembourg on preventing and combating serious crimes and guard against the involvement of the financial industry in global criminal activity. If I am confirmed by the Senate, 

I will make the conclusion of these negotiations and signing this 

agreement one of my first priorities. In addition, if confirmed I will 

encourage Luxembourg to continue to increase the transparency of 

its banking system. 

As part of my public diplomacy strategy, if I am confirmed I intend to reach out to a new European generation that has grown up 

since the end of the cold war and the division of Europe into two 

opposing camps. I hope to work with them and with other Luxembourg citizens to develop a stronger transatlantic alliance that 

looks forward to a generation of peace, security, and prosperity. 

Should I be confirmed, I plan to pursue opportunities to encourage new technologies using the resources of both the United States 

and Luxembourg in medical diagnostics and health care, based 

upon our respective leading roles in these fields. For the past 20 

years I have gained experience in this area by serving on the board 

of directors of Florida Hospital, one of our Nation’s largest hospitals, and on the board of directors of the Sanfred Burnham Institute for Medical Research for the last 5 years. 

I’m excited by this chance to serve our country and very grateful 

for this opportunity. Madam Chair, members of the committee, if 

confirmed it would be my greatest honor to represent the United 

States in Luxembourg. Thank you for your consideration. I would 

be happy to answer any questions that you might have. 

675

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mandell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. MANDELL

Madam Chairman and members of the committee, good morning. I am honored 

to appear before you today as President Obama’s nominee to serve as the next Ambassador to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. 

I am grateful to the President and Secretary Clinton for their support and for the 

confidence they have placed in me. 

If confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee and with the Congress to continue and to nurture the strong relationship that exists between the 

United States and Luxembourg. 

I am especially grateful to a distinguished public servant, Senator Bill Nelson, for 

his friendship and his introduction and support today. Even though he is not 

present today, I would also like to thank my longtime friend, former Senator Mel 

Martinez who has been very encouraging from the very start of the process. 

I would also like to introduce and publicly thank my dear wife, Julie, who has 

provided me support throughout my career. 

I would also like to introduce our children, Zachary and Xan, and my parents, 

Lester and Sonia Mandell, and Julie’s parents, Gilbert and Joyce Walker. Several 

more of our family members have joined us this morning, which we really appreciate. Julie and I are very blessed to have our parents share this wonderful day with 

us. My experience of over 20 years as the leader of my own and my family’s business 

has taught me the value of human relationships in achieving success. 

After practicing law for more than a decade, I started over as a laborer in my 

family’s home-building business and worked my way up the ladder over the course 

of several years. Starting in the field significantly affected my approach to business. 

It meant that I would wear a bright yellow shirt that had ‘‘Bobby’’ written over the 

pocket and ‘‘Greater Homes’’ on the other side of the shirt, so I knew who I was 

and where I worked. I also got to drive a 6-year-old pickup truck with no air conditioning. That way, my dad knew that I wouldn’t be sitting in the truck during the 

long hot days of summer. It also didn’t have a radio because he thought work should 

be entertaining enough. 

This early experience taught me that it was essential to treat people fairly, build 

the right relationships, and by doing the right thing for the right reasons, engender 

the trust of those around you, especially the ones you worked with. After all was 

said and done, our company built over 10,000 houses, all in the central Florida area. 

These same leadership and relationship skills have served me well in my roles at 

a local, statewide, and federal level, having served for the past 2 years on President 

Obama’s Export Council. 

If confirmed, I hope to bring those same skills to bear as Ambassador to Luxembourg. 

The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg is a longstanding ally of the United States and 

a founding member of NATO, the United Nations, and the European Union. 

Thanks to the enormous sacrifices of U.S. Armed Forces which liberated Luxembourg in World War II, there is a deep reservoir of goodwill toward the United 

States in Luxembourg. 

Our bilateral relationship with Luxembourg is emphatically positive. 

If confirmed, I will strive to continue our strong and productive relationship by 

maintaining effective outreach programs and developing relationships with the government, the business community, youth, and Luxembourg citizens and residents of 

every background. I have worked to develop the President’s National Export Initiative and our Nation’s economic expansion by my service on the President’s Export 

Council over the past 2 years. If confirmed, I plan to continue working to increase 

American exports to Europe. 

Luxembourg is a major financial center in Europe, second only to the United 

States worldwide in the mutual funds industry, managing over $3 trillion in net assets. Financial services comprise about 25 percent of Luxembourg’s GDP. 

Accordingly, the United States works closely with the Government of Luxembourg 

to combat the financing of terrorism and money laundering. Embassy Luxembourg 

has been engaged in negotiations to sign an agreement with Luxembourg on Preventing and Combating Serious Crime to guard against involvement of the financial 

industry in global criminal activity. If I am confirmed by the Senate, I will make 

conclusion of these negotiations and signing this agreement one of my first priorities. 

In addition, if confirmed, I will encourage Luxembourg to continue to increase the 

transparency of its banking system. 

676

As part of my public diplomacy strategy, if I am confirmed, I intend to reach out 

to a new European generation that has grown up since the end of the cold war and 

the division of Europe into two opposing camps. I hope to work with them and with 

other Luxembourg citizens to develop a stronger transatlantic alliance that looks 

forward to a generation of peace, security, and prosperity. 

Should I be confirmed, I plan to pursue opportunities to encourage new technologies, using the resources of both the United States and Luxembourg in medical 

diagnostics and health care, based on our respective leading roles in these fields. 

For the past 20 years, I have gained experience in this area by serving on the Board 

of Directors of Florida Hospital, one of our Nation’s largest hospitals, and on the 

Board of Directors of The Sanford Burnham Institute for Medical Research for the 

last 5 years. 

I am excited by this chance to serve my country and grateful for this opportunity. 

Madam Chairman, members of the committee, if confirmed, it would be my greatest honor to represent the United States in Luxembourg. Thank you for your consideration. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Mandell. 

Ambassador Krajeski. 

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS CHARLES KRAJESKI, OF VIRGINIA, NOMINATED TO BE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN 

Ambassador KRAJESKI. Madam Chairman and members of the 

committee, I’m honored to appear before you today. I want to thank 

President Obama and Secretary Clinton for nominating me to be 

Ambassador to the Kingdom of Bahrain. 

Madam Chairman, I would like to take a moment to acknowledge 

my family members and colleagues here today, most especially my 

wife, Bonnie, who has served with me for my 32 years in the Foreign Service. 

For 32 years I’ve served proudly the United States Government 

and the American people in the Middle East and Washington. If 

confirmed, I look forward to leading the Embassy Manama team as 

we advance U.S. interests in the region and strengthen our bilateral relationship with Bahrain. The United States and Bahrain 

have a long history of cooperation and partnership based on mutual 

interests in regional security. If confirmed, I will make it a top priority to continue this partnership while encouraging and supporting reforms that meet the needs and aspirations of Bahrain’s 

citizens. 

I believe that these priorities are mutually reinforcing. Bahrain’s 

long-term stability depends on addressing domestic grievances, not 

through repression, but through genuine reform and reconciliation. 

If confirmed, I will be working with our Bahraini partners to develop their ability to respond to external threats to the nation’s security and ensure interoperability with our forces in the region. An 

increasingly aggressive Iran makes this effort critically important. 

Political reform and respect for human rights are vital to Bahrain’s stability and to the protection of U.S. interests in the region. 

Bahrain has a long history of reform, championed by King Hamad 

following his accession to the throne in 1999. 

Given Bahrain’s progressive record on democratic reform and in 

the context of strong partnership, the U.S. remains deeply concerned by the events that followed demonstrations in February and 

March of this year. Initially the Bahraini Government, led by the 

crown prince, called for dialogue with all parties. But as protests 

turned increasingly confrontational, the government declared emerVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00684 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
677

gency law, requested the deployment of Gulf Cooperation Council’s 

forces, and began an internal security crackdown. 

During this period of widespread arrests and trials of detainees 

before the so-called National Safety Courts, there were many credible reports of serious human rights abuses by security forces. The 

U.S. Government has repeatedly emphasized to Bahrain’s leadership the importance of taking steps to address these violations, restore public trust, and promote national reconciliation. Toward this 

end, King Hamad has taken steps to foster reform and resolve political differences. Among these was a month-long national dialogue 

concluded at the end of July. On July 29 the king declared his support for all matters on which the dialogue had reached consensus 

and he ordered legislative and executive authorities to implement 

the dialogue’s recommendations for reform. 

We believe that these are important first steps in bringing together Bahrainis from across ideological and sectarian lines. 

Another initiative has been the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, led by internationally recognized legal experts. It 

has a broad mandate to investigate reports of violations of civil and 

human rights. The commission will release a public report next 

month. We expect the Government of Bahrain to give serious consideration to the commission’s recommendations and take necessary action to ensure accountability for abuses and to prevent 

any recurrences. 

Madam Chairman, if confirmed one of my top priorities will be 

to support and encourage these initiatives and others to advance 

the process of democratic and economic reform. This will strengthen Bahrain and it will strengthen our partnership. 

Finally, Madam Chairman, if confirmed my first priority will be 

the safety and security of all U.S. citizens who live, do business, 

and vacation in Bahrain. Our countries have benefited enormously 

from these exchanges and I plan to encourage them. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Krajeski follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS C. KRAJESKI

Madam Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before 

you today. I want to thank President Obama and Secretary Clinton for nominating 

me to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Bahrain. 

Madam Chairman, I would like to take a moment to acknowledge my family members and colleagues here today. 

For 32 years, I have served proudly the United States Government and the American people in the Middle East and Washington. If confirmed, I look forward to leading the Embassy Manama team, as we advance U.S. interests in the region and 

strengthen our bilateral relationship with Bahrain. 

The United States and Bahrain have a long history of cooperation and partnership, based on mutual interests in regional security. If confirmed, I will make it a 

top priority to continue this partnership, while encouraging and supporting reforms 

that meet the needs and aspirations of Bahrain’s citizens. I believe that these priorities are mutually reinforcing. Bahrain’s long-term stability depends on addressing 

domestic grievances not through repression, but through genuine reform and reconciliation. 

If confirmed, I will be working with our Bahraini partners to develop their ability 

to respond to external threats to the nation’s security and ensure interoperability 

with our forces. An increasingly aggressive Iran makes this effort critically important. 

678

Political reform and respect for human rights are vital to Bahrain’s stability and 

to the protection of U.S. interests in the region. Bahrain has a long history of reform 

championed by King Hamad following his accession to the throne in 1999. 

Given Bahrain’s progressive record on democratic reform, and in the context of 

strong partnership, the United States remains deeply concerned by the events that 

have followed demonstrations in February and March of this year. Initially, the 

Bahraini Government, led by the Crown Prince, called for dialogue with all parties. 

But as protests turned increasingly confrontational, the government declared emergency law, requested the deployment of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s forces, and 

began an internal security crackdown. 

During this period of widespread arrests and trials of detainees before the socalled National Safety Courts, there were many credible reports of serious human 

rights abuses by security forces. The U.S. Government has repeatedly emphasized 

to Bahrain’s leadership the importance of taking steps to address these violations, 

restore public trust, and promote national reconciliation. Toward this end, King 

Hamad has taken steps to foster reform and resolve political differences. 

Among these steps was a month-long National Dialogue, concluded at the end of 

July. On July 29, the King declared his support for all matters on which the Dialogue reached consensus, and ordered legislative and executive authorities to implement the Dialogue’s recommendations for reform. We believe these are important 

first steps in bringing together Bahrainis from across ideological and sectarian lines. 

Another initiative has been the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, led 

by internationally recognized legal experts. It has a broad mandate to investigate 

reports of violations of civil and human rights. The Commission will release a public 

report next month. We expect the Government of Bahrain to give serious consideration to the Commission’s recommendations and take necessary action to ensure accountability for abuses, and to prevent any recurrences. 

Madam Chairman, if confirmed, one of my top priorities will be to support and 

encourage these initiatives and others to advance the process of democratic and economic reform. This will strengthen Bahrain and strengthen our partnership. 

Finally, Madam Chairman, if confirmed, my first priority will be the safety and 

security of all U.S. citizens who live, do business, and vacation in Bahrain. Our 

countries have benefited enormously from these exchanges, and I plan to encourage 

them. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I would be 

pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much. 

Ambassador Mozena. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DAN W. MOZENA, OF IOWA, NOMINATED 

TO BE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 

BANGLADESH 

Ambassador MOZENA. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I am honored to appear today as President Obama’s nominee as United 

States Ambassador to Bangladesh. I am grateful to the President 

and Secretary Clinton for their confidence in me. I am grateful also 

to the Senate for confirming me 4 years ago as Ambassador to Angola and for allowing me to present myself today. 

With your permission, Madam Chairman, I wish to introduce my 

wife of 40 years, Grace. She and I have traveled together on a journey that has taken us far from our roots in rural Dubuque County, 

Iowa, where I was raised on a 120-acre dairy farm and where we 

both attended one-room country schools. 

Thirty-seven years ago we began our public service as Peace 

Corps Volunteers in Zaire, where we helped villagers raise chickens. That grassroots experience taught us that the rarified air of 

diplomacy is far removed from the life of ordinary folks. 

During my overseas postings I traveled widely, taking America 

to the people. If confirmed, I propose to do the same in Bangladesh 

by visiting all 64 districts. 

679

Having served in Dhaka from 1998 to 2001, I know that America 

has profound interests in Bangladesh, the world’s seventh most 

populous country and fourth-largest Muslim population. Bangladesh offers a moderate, secular, democratic alternative to violent 

extremism. Through improved relations with India, Bangladesh 

has deepened counterterrorism cooperation with its biggest neighbor, thus fostering stability in a troubled region. 

Bangladesh bolsters global stability as the world’s largest contributor to international peacekeeping. The country is critical to 

global stability, global food security. Although its population of 160 

million lives in an area the size of my home State of Iowa, Bangladesh could indeed feed itself. Other U.S. interests include promoting democracy and respect for human rights, bolstering U.S. 

trade and investment, and advancing humanitarian interests, especially disaster preparedness. 

I believe that we can best advance U.S. interests by promoting 

a Bangladesh that is democratic, that is peaceful, that is secure, 

prosperous, and healthy. 

In some respects, Bangladesh is the little engine that could. The 

people are resilient and entrepreneurial. The economy has grown 

annually at about 6 percent, reducing the poverty rate from 40 percent to 31.5 percent over the past 5 years, thus lifting millions out 

of poverty and creating opportunities for American exports. 

The country is reining in its population growth rate and achieving Millennium Development goals, especially maternal and child 

health. Civil society is dynamic. Witness Grameen Bank and 

BRAC, which are translating grassroots democracy into development. Women are more empowered, the press is vociferous, and 

Bangladesh actively combats terrorism. The nation pulses with optimism. 

Nonetheless, Bangladesh’s challenges are daunting. Its democratic institutions are weak. Relations between the leading political 

parties are deeply polarized. Corruption is a serious challenge. Government’s intentions toward civil society are unclear and the nation 

is threatened by natural disasters and rising seas caused by climate change. 

America is a strong partner of Bangladesh. We can be proud of 

helping Bangladesh confront its challenges, especially in health 

and disaster preparedness. Given Bangladesh’s strategic importance and its prospects for a better future, Bangladesh is the beneficiary of the President’s three major development initiatives: Feed 

the Future, the Global Health Initiative, and Global Climate 

Change. Bangladesh is an important partner as we build on President Obama’s commitment to forge new relations with the Muslim 

world. 

If confirmed, I will advance America’s interests by implementing 

these initiatives while helping Bangladesh confront serious governance, human rights, and poverty concerns. I will also partner with 

the Bangladeshi American community to achieve these shared objectives. 

I believe Bangladesh is a good partner for the United States in 

building a better world. If confirmed, I will do everything in my 

power to build on the success of my predecessors to strengthen this 

partnership. 

680

Madam Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to appear 

before you today. I would be pleased to answer any questions you 

may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Mozena follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DAN W. MOZENA

Madam Chairman, members of the committee, I am honored to appear today as 

President Obama’s nominee as United States Ambassador to Bangladesh. I am 

grateful to the President and Secretary Clinton for their confidence in me. I am 

grateful also to the Senate for confirming me 4 years ago as Ambassador to Angola, 

and for allowing me to present myself today. 

With your permission, Madam Chairman, I wish to introduce my wife of 40 years, 

Grace. She and I have traveled together on a journey that has taken us far from 

our roots in rural Dubuque County, IA, where I was raised on a 120-acre dairy farm 

and where we both attended one-room country schools. 

Thirty-seven years ago, we began our public service as Peace Corps Volunteers 

in Zaire, where we helped villagers raise chickens. That grassroots experience 

taught us that the rarefied air of diplomacy is far removed from the life of ordinary 

folks. During my overseas postings I traveled widely, taking America to the people. 

If confirmed, I propose to do the same in Bangladesh by visiting all 64 districts. 

Having served in Dhaka from 1998–2001, I know that America has profound interests in Bangladesh, the world’s seventh most populous country and fourth-largest 

Muslim population. Bangladesh offers a moderate, secular, democratic alternative to 

violent extremism. Through improved relations with India, Bangladesh has deepened counterterrorism cooperation with its biggest neighbor, thus fostering stability 

in a troubled region. Bangladesh bolsters global stability as the world’s largest contributor to international peacekeeping. The country is critical to global food security; 

although its population of 160 million lives in an area the size of my home State 

of Iowa, Bangladesh could feed itself. Other U.S. interests include promoting democracy and respect for human rights, bolstering U.S. trade and investment, and advancing humanitarian interests, especially disaster preparedness. 

I believe that we can best advance U.S. interests by promoting a Bangladesh that 

is democratic, peaceful, secure, prosperous, and healthy. 

In some respects, Bangladesh is ‘‘The Little Engine that Could.’’ The people are 

resilient and entrepreneurial; the economy has grown annually at about 6 percent, 

reducing the poverty rate from 40 percent to 31.5 percent over the past 5 years, thus 

lifting millions out of poverty and creating opportunities for American exports; the 

country is reining in its population growth rate and achieving Millennium Development Goals, especially maternal and child health; civil society is dynamic, witness 

Grameen Bank and BRAC, which are translating grassroots democracy into development; women are more empowered; the press is vociferous; and Bangladesh actively 

combats terrorism. The nation pulses with optimism. 

Nonetheless, Bangladesh’s challenges are daunting. Its democratic institutions are 

weak; relations between the leading political parties are deeply polarized; corruption 

is a serious challenge; government’s intentions toward civil society are unclear; and 

the nation is threatened by natural disasters and rising seas caused by climate 

change. 

America is a strong partner of Bangladesh. We can be proud of helping Bangladesh confront its challenges, especially in health and disaster preparedness. 

Given Bangladesh’s strategic importance and its prospects for a better future, Bangladesh is the beneficiary of the President’s three major development initiatives: 

Feed the Future, the Global Health Initiative, and Global Climate Change. Bangladesh is an important partner as we build on President Obama’s commitment to 

forge new relations with the Muslim world. If confirmed, I will advance America’s 

interests by implementing these initiatives, while helping Bangladesh confront serious governance, human rights, and poverty concerns. I will also partner with the 

Bangladeshi-American community to achieve these shared objectives. 

I believe Bangladesh is a good partner for the United States in building a better 

world. If confirmed, I will do everything in my power to build on the success of my 

predecessors to strengthen this partnership. 

Madam Chairman and members of the committee, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I would be pleased to answer any questions you 

may have.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Hammer. 

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STATEMENT OF MICHAEL A. HAMMER, OF THE DISTRICT OF 

COLUMBIA, NOMINATED TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 

STATE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS 

Mr. HAMMER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. It is an honor to 

appear before this committee as President Obama’s nominee as the 

next Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs at the State Department. I am deeply grateful and humbled by the confidence 

President Obama and Secretary Clinton have shown in me with 

this nomination. 

I would like to recognize my partner, staunchest supporter, and 

wife of 22 years, Margaret Bjorgulfsdottir, as well as our wonderful 

three children, Monika, Mike Thor, and Brynja, who have tagged 

along to all our postings through some difficult times on occasion, 

adjusting to new environments, but in their own right becoming 

junior American representatives. 

I would like to also mention my parents, Mike and Magdalena, 

who set the foundation for who I am today. In my formative teen 

years, my father gave his life for our great country. It was his sacrifice and his commitment to public service that set me on the path 

that brings me here today. 

For the past 23 years serving as a Foreign Service officer, it has 

been my duty and honor to work to advance America’s interests 

abroad. If confirmed, I look forward to directing the State Department’s public affairs efforts to aggressively and innovatively communicate our foreign policy to our fellow Americans and the world 

using every available media platform and tool. My approach would 

be to echo Secretary Clinton’s: How can we do better? As she says, 

let’s use smart power and 21st century statecraft. 

The Public Affairs Bureau has an extremely challenging and important mission, to engage domestic and international media in 

order to communicate timely and accurate information, with the 

goal of furthering U.S. foreign policy and values. This task is carried out in the face of a dynamic and rapidly changing environment. 

When I was called upon to serve as National Security Council 

Spokesman at the outset of the Obama administration, I realized 

how much the world had changed in the media environment from 

the time that I had served just a few years prior during the Clinton 

and Bush administrations. So it is clear that events today are getting instant coverage and social media is a prime competitor to 

mainstream media. 

For communicators, this is surely a challenge. I would like to 

view it as an opportunity, an opportunity for reaching new and 

larger audiences and for engaging people on a broader scale. In today’s highly competitive international media environment, we must 

be the ones that present America’s foreign policy and not leave it 

to others to define us or shape our narrative. We do this by telling 

the truth about our policies, explaining the logic and values that 

guide us, and aggressively countering misrepresentation and distortion. This requires rapid response and constant engagement by 

our people in Washington and our public affairs officers in the 

field. We do this with daily press briefings and we run six regional 

media hubs with communicators who engage with foreign press in 

their languages. 

682

The Public Affairs Bureau also has an important responsibility 

in connecting directly with the American people. It arranges for our 

foreign policy experts to speak to schools and universities, engage 

citizen groups across the country, and reach out to diaspora communities inside the United States. We field their inquiries, respond 

to their concerns, and listen to their opportunities. 

The Bureau of Public Affairs is committed to using all of its communications resources, the tools and the people behind them, to 

promote who we are as a country and stand up for our beliefs, including speaking out for universal rights and basic freedoms, like 

the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press. 

If confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee and 

Congress to ensure America’s message is as vibrant and dynamic 

as it can be to move our country and the world forward. If confirmed, I would welcome your ideas and suggestions on how we can 

even more effectively present America’s foreign policy, our history, 

and our amazing story. 

Thank you and I’d be very pleased to take any questions you may 

have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hammer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL A. HAMMER

Thank you Chairman Shaheen and members of the committee, it is an honor to 

appear before you today as President Obama’s nominee to serve as Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs at the Department of State. I am deeply grateful and humbled by the confidence the President and Secretary Clinton have shown in me by 

this nomination. 

I would like to recognize my partner, staunchest supporter, and wife of 22 years, 

Margret Bjorgulfsdottir, as well as our three wonderful children; Monika, Mike 

Thor, and Brynja, who have moved with us, as part of my Foreign Service career 

from country to country, becoming in their own right junior American representatives. I would also like to mention my parents, Mike and Magdalena, who set the 

foundation for who I am today. In my formative teen years, my father gave his life 

for our great country. It was his sacrifice and the commitment to public service that 

he had instilled in me, that set me on the path that brings me here today. 

For the past 23 years, serving as a Foreign Service officer, it has been my duty 

and honor to work to advance and promote America’s interests abroad. If confirmed, 

I look forward to directing the State Department’s public affairs efforts to aggressively and innovatively communicate our foreign policy to fellow Americans and the 

world through every media platform and tool available, 24 hours a day/7 days a 

week/365 days a year. My approach would be to echo Secretary Clinton’s vision in 

presenting the first ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: ‘‘How 

can we do better?’’

In my prior position as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Public Affairs 

Bureau and since I was named Acting Assistant Secretary in March, I have spent 

time with every office and met with the fine civil servants, Foreign Service officers, 

political appointees, contractors, student hires, and interns who make up the public 

affairs team at the State Department. It would be a great privilege to lead this talented, dedicated, and hard-working group. The Public Affairs Bureau has an extremely challenging and important mission—to engage domestic and international 

media to communicate timely and accurate information with the goal of furthering 

U.S. foreign policy and values, as well as national security interests. This task is 

carried out in the face of a dynamic and rapidly changing media environment. 

When I was called upon to serve as the National Security Council spokesman at 

the outset of the Obama administration, it was striking how much the media world 

had evolved since my prior stint at the NSC during the Clinton and Bush administrations. Events anywhere in the world now get instant coverage and social media 

is a prime competitor to the mainstream media. For communicators, this is surely 

a challenge. But, Secretary Clinton, the Public Affairs Bureau, and I view it more 

as an opportunity for reaching new and larger audiences and for engaging people 

on a broader scale. 

683

At the State Department, with Secretary Clinton’s strong leadership and call for 

‘‘smart power’’ and use of ‘‘21st century statecraft,’’ we are adapting to the ongoing 

communications revolution and making better and increasing use of all available 

platforms, while ensuring all these platforms work in concert with each other. It is 

vitally important that we not only conduct diplomacy between governments, but 

that we also use all the tools at our disposal to reach people around the world directly. Audiences globally are increasingly using the Internet as a primary means 

of consuming and sharing information breaking down barriers to information. The 

communications revolution has fundamentally transformed how information moves 

through networks and how rapidly it can penetrate societies. We must ensure that 

our messages and people are aggressively engaging on all key platforms—new and 

old. 

This spring, as the dramatic events in the Arab world were beginning to unfold, 

the Public Affairs Bureau launched nine foreign language Twitter feeds in Arabic, 

Chinese, Farsi, French, Hindi, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, and Urdu. We are listening, communicating our views, and participating in the conversations that will 

shape this century. The State Department is committed to using technology effectively and creatively. This effort includes the creation of a new Digital Division 

within the Bureau and placing all of our digital content under unified leadership. 

The Digital Division recently launched ‘‘State Department Live!’’, a new interactive 

online video briefing platform that already has allowed hundreds of foreign journalists around the world—many of whom have never before interviewed an American 

official—to speak with our policymakers and get their news directly. 

In today’s highly competitive international media environment, we need to 

present America’s foreign policy and not leave it to others to define for us or shape 

our narrative. We do this by telling the truth about our policies, explaining the logic 

and values that guide us, and aggressively countering misrepresentation and distortion. This requires rapid response and constant engagement by public affairs officers 

in the field and in Washington, in a variety of languages. Our approach needs to 

align with and enhance that of the White House, the Pentagon, other national security agencies, and our USAID press office. I believe my time at the National Security Council, as well as my time within the Public Affairs Bureau at the Department, have prepared me for this challenge, if I am confirmed. 

The Public Affairs Bureau runs six regional media hubs with communicators who 

engage foreign media in their languages throughout Africa, Asia, the Arab world, 

Europe, and the Western Hemisphere. The State Department is also working to better integrate our policy formulation with our public diplomacy efforts, thereby creating a synergy that better informs our policies and more effectively presents them. 

And, as we address the pressing questions from each day at our daily press briefings 

and across all our other platforms, we are thinking strategically about communicating our message and harnessing the power of technology to reach the broadest 

audiences possible. Our Web engagement must put the audience first and we need 

to communicate directly with networked individuals on their platforms in order to 

better promote understanding and support of our policies. 

The Public Affairs Bureau also connects directly with the American people. We 

arrange for our foreign policy experts to speak to schools and universities, engage 

citizen groups across the country, and reach out to diaspora communities inside the 

United States. We field their inquiries, respond to their concerns, and listen to their 

opinions. We are also charged with bringing to life an interactive museum and visitor center that will tell the story of American diplomacy and run a Hometown Diplomat program that enables us to inform communities across America about the 

work we do in service of United States interests abroad. The American people are 

also benefiting from the Public Affairs Bureau with initiatives such as, the new mobile travel application that provides quick and easy access to relevant Department 

travel information informing them of fast breaking international developments like 

the evacuations in Egypt and Libya, as well as the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear 

incident in Japan earlier this year. We are also working to improve our crisis communications capabilities and are developing fly-away public affairs teams that bolster our Embassies’ efforts on the ground when serious international events warrant 

it. In fact, we have already deployed effectively to Cairo, Tokyo, Juba, and Tripoli. 

Furthermore, everyone can learn about our diplomatic history in the Foreign Relations of the United States series published by our historian’s office. 

The United States plays a singularly vital role around the world promoting stability and prosperity. The Bureau of Public Affairs is committed to using all of its 

communications resources—the tools and the people behind them—to promote who 

we are as a country and stand up for our beliefs, including speaking out for universal rights and basic freedoms like freedom of speech and of the press. If confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee and Congress to ensure 

684

America’s message is as vibrant and dynamic as it can be to move our country and 

the world forward, and if confirmed I would welcome your ideas and suggestions on 

how we can even more effectively present America’s foreign policy, history and 

amazing story. 

Thank you.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you all very much for your statements. 

We have lost, for the time being anyway, the other two members 

of the subcommittee who were here. But fear not. I have lots of 

questions, so all of your work will not have gone in vain. Besides, 

as I like to say, it’s always a good sign when nobody shows up to 

ask questions, right? [Laughter.] 

Ambassador Krajeski, I’m actually going to start with you. We 

both talked about in our statements the importance that Bahrain 

has played as an ally to the United States in a very critical region 

of the world. We share a wide range of security interests. But, as 

you pointed out, the country continues to struggle with the demonstrations and unrest within its borders. It has been strongly 

criticized by the United States and the international community for 

the crackdown against protesters. 

I was interested that in your statement you talked about Bahrain’s history of working to provide more freedom for the people of 

the country. So can you talk about why you think the reaction has 

been so—the crackdown against the protesters was so strong, and 

why, given that history, the country has not responded in a way 

that indicates more flexibility and appreciation for some of the 

issues that were being raised by the protesters? 

Ambassador KRAJESKI. Thank you, Senator. When King Hamad 

became king in 1999, one of his first efforts was to expand political 

representation, to open political life. He even noted that he wanted 

to move Bahrain along a path toward a model of a constitutional 

monarchy. To that end, he established, the government established, 

a more representative lower body of Parliament and increased I 

guess we would call it civil society and civil freedoms. 

We were working very closely with him in that effort, as were 

others, and were very encouraged by it. Bahrain was considered a 

leader in the region in these efforts. 

All the more shocking the events of February and March, to Bahrainis themselves as well. I think the situation got out of hand. The 

government overreacted. We have, as you said, Senator, criticized 

quite strongly at the very highest levels of the U.S. Government 

these actions. 

If confirmed, I will continue to criticize where criticism is warranted. I will also urge the government to continue its current efforts to try to recover from that shock, including continuation of 

such events as the national dialogue, to try to bring different factions of the country together to discuss the political future, as well 

as watching very carefully, closely, the reaction of the Bahraini 

Government to the release of the commission’s report that will detail allegations of abuses and, most importantly, what the government will do about those accusations. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Can you talk a little bit more about how the 

national dialogue has been received in the country? Has it included 

prominent members of the opposition who were raising concerns 

during the demonstrations? 

685

Ambassador KRAJESKI. When the national dialogue was established, representatives of all factions of society were invited to participate. It was a fairly large conference, including representatives 

of the major and minor opposition parties, most of whom agreed to 

participate at the start. 

During the conference the major opposition group, called Wefaq, 

decided to withdraw. They criticized the way the conference was 

set up and they withdrew from the dialogue. We think that was a 

mistake. We urged them to remain and we urged them to continue 

to participate in what we hope will be future efforts to bring the 

political society together again. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

On another issue very important to us, as you pointed out one 

of the reasons our security relationship with Bahrain is so critical 

is because of the Fifth Fleet’s being based there. I wonder if you 

can talk about how strong you believe that security relationship is 

and how the people of Bahrain feel about the base being in their 

country? 

Ambassador KRAJESKI. Thank you, Senator. This is a very important issue and if confirmed it will be one of my top priorities, to 

do everything I can to increase the strength of that relationship, 

because this is a region that confronts very real threats. Bahrain 

has been a steadfast partner, a strong partner to us. 

You mentioned the Fifth Fleet port there. We have had U.S. 

Navy in Bahrain since 1947. It’s one of our longest-standing security relationships in the gulf. I think that both governments and 

both countries recognize the value of this relationship and support 

joint efforts in the gulf, including the presence of the Fifth Fleet. 

It has been a very productive and a very valuable relationship, and 

it is mutually valuable. 

I would also make one final point, Senator, that others in the region, our friends in the region, as we continue our operations in Afghanistan, as we confront terrorism and smuggling and, as you 

mentioned, Senator, as we confront the very real challenges and 

threats that Iran poses in the region, this partnership is increasingly important to all countries in the region. 

Thank you, Senator. 

Senator SHAHEEN. So you don’t—you’re not seeing that the political unrest in Bahrain has affected the relationship that we have, 

the security relationship that we have with the country? 

Ambassador KRAJESKI. Senator, during the worst of the demonstrations, the worst of the confrontations, America was not an 

issue. We were not targeted. We were not part of that, of that 

event. Our Navy—personnel at the Navy facility there have their 

families with them. We live out in the community along with the 

families from the embassy and others. There are American businesses that have been there for many, many years. 

We have no indication of any hostility toward Americans. Certainly a discussion of our policies, as there are in many places. 

Thank you, Senator. 

Senator SHAHEEN. To what extent were there signs that Iran was 

behind some of the political unrest? 

Ambassador KRAJESKI. Thank you, Senator. The events in February and March in our view were clearly begun by Bahrainis, who 

686

were expressing what I think is their right to gather, to express 

their views. We saw no evidence of Iranian instigation. 

However, we’re concerned about Iranian exploitation, as they will 

exploit every situation where they can. We have seen it in other 

countries and we are concerned about Bahrain as well. But this 

was a Bahraini-generated movement. 

Thank you, Senator. 

Senator SHAHEEN. As you think about your role as Ambassador 

and we think about the U.S. relationship, how can we continue to 

promote meaningful reform in the country? 

Ambassador KRAJESKI. Senator, if confirmed that will be one of 

my top priorities. As I have said, we will encourage at every instance the continuation of a national dialogue, if you will, whatever 

form that might take. We will encourage all parties to participate 

in it. 

We have indeed increasingly since 1999 and the beginning of 

these reforms under King Hamad partnered closely with them in 

civil society, working with human rights organizations, women’s 

rights organizations, working on the political processes, free media, 

press. Our Middle East Partnership Initiative, MEPI, began back 

in 2003, conducts many programs with these nongovernment civil 

groups, as well as with government organizations. I if confirmed, 

I very much want to continue and increase that effort. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Mandell, you pointed out that financial services account for 

a large sector of Luxembourg’s GDP and, although Luxembourg is 

a small country, it still has an important role to play in Europe, 

especially given the financial sector. So can you talk a little bit 

about how the ongoing crisis in Europe has affected that financial 

sector in Luxembourg and what steps or what involvement it might 

be having as Europe struggles with how to address this financial 

crisis? 

Mr. MANDELL. Madam Chairman, thank you so much for that 

question. Yes, the financial sector in Luxembourg is about 25 percent of the GDP. Out of the 225,000 workers that work in Luxembourg, probably half of them work in the financial sector. 

What’s happened is that as the sector—of course, the eurozone 

issues have dampened the financial sector. But other sectors have 

begun to evolve. The biotech sector has begun to evolve, e-commerce has begun to evolve. The satellite systems that are housed 

in, based in, Luxembourg, as well as the Cargolux, which is one of 

the very major employers and does a terrific job in Luxembourg 

and employs 5,000 people, has just done a $3 billion order with 

Boeing for more jets. 

So other sectors are taking up the slack. I feel absolutely certain 

that the financial sector will rebound as the economy rebounds. I 

was told that the Cargolux expect that in 2012 their profits will rebound as well. So they’ve managed. 

Senator SHAHEEN. So given that impact, what role are they playing in the discussions, if any, around how the EU should be responding to the challenges in Greece and some of the other EU 

countries? Are they on the side of Germany, or some in Germany, 

who think that it would be better not to continue to bail out countries who are in trouble? Or do they have a different point of view? 

687

Mr. MANDELL. Senator Shaheen, thank you for that question. I 

can say that Prime Minister Junker is the leader of the eurozone 

currency and I know that he and Secretary Geithner have been in 

significant conversations in Poland over the past 2 weeks. I’m not 

privy to those conversations and I’m not exactly sure how the discussions went, other than to say that I know that Luxembourg is 

a staunch ally of the United States and has been and certainly, as 

one of the founders of the EU and as one of the founders of the 

eurozone, I feel sure that it’s one of their primary opportunities. 

We really strongly support the efforts of our partner in the 

eurozone. It’s going to be difficult and they’re going to have to take 

some necessary measures, I’m sure, to restore growth and competitiveness. But I look forward to working collaboratively with Prime 

Minister Junker and trying to establish a reasonable solution to 

these problems. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

You mentioned in your opening statement the work that’s going 

on right now to try and combat the financing of terrorism and 

money laundering and the effort to get an agreement signed on 

that issue. Can you talk about how close we are to getting that 

kind of an agreement and how seriously it’s being taken by the 

Government of Luxembourg? 

Mr. MANDELL. What I can certainly talk about is the bank secrecy laws in Luxembourg. There was a period of time in 2009 

where there was an issue with the bank secrecy laws by the OECD. 

That issue was resolved in a very short period of time by Luxembourg to make sure that their laws were transparent and according 

to the requests of the OECD. 

Currently there is a protocol that is being dealt with in Luxembourg, which is to allow the Treasury Department of the United 

States to be able to look at the banks and the potential for tax revenues from Luxembourg and the Luxembourg reciprocally will be 

allowed to deal with the people in the United States. 

I am told that that has been signed by the Luxembourgers and 

by the United States and is awaiting ratification by the Senate. 

Senator SHAHEEN. So is it your view that the government is taking very seriously the concerns that have been expressed about 

money laundering and tax evasion? 

Mr. MANDELL. Yes, ma’am. It’s very clear to me that they have 

taken that extremely seriously. They are awaiting signature by the 

Senate, passage of the treaty by the advice and consent of the Senate. When that occurs, I know there will be rules and regulations 

which we’ll have to work out as to exactly what it means and how 

it applies in Luxembourg. But I’m confident that, in collaboration 

with Prime Minister Junker and the finance ministry, we’ll be able 

to work out a successful and an appropriate alternative. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

You point out that that treaty, it’s been passed out of this committee, it is awaiting action on the floor of the Senate. I am hopeful 

that we will get it to the floor and that we’ll see positive action in 

the near future. 

Mr. MANDELL. We’ll will be glad to help in any way that we can, 

ma’am. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Great. Thank you. 

688

Ambassador Mozena, one of the controversies that has generated 

a lot of reporting here in the United States has to do, that affects 

Bangladesh, has to do with Nobel laureate economist Mohamed 

Younis. As you know, he was removed from his position at the 

Grameen Bank by the Bangladesh Government, and of course there 

have been allegations that that was a political move, that there 

were not any real reasons for removing him beyond that. 

I wonder if you could give us your assessment of that situation 

and what’s currently going on with respect to Mr. Younis? 

Ambassador MOZENA. Thank you, Madam Chairman. If I may, 

I’d like first to reflect a bit on my past experience in Bangladesh. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Please. 

Ambassador MOZENA. I made a point as I traveled extensively 

throughout the country to visit Grameen Bank borrowers groups, 

and I must say there’s nothing more inspiring than joining a group 

of 10, of 12, of 14 women—not entirely women; there would be the 

odd man, but generally women—discuss how they can work together to help themselves improve their quality of life and, most 

importantly, to improve the quality of life of their children. 

That was the most inspirational thing I did during my 3 years 

in Bangladesh, and I made a point of doing it over and over, and 

I intend to do that again if I am confirmed. 

So you can well imagine that as I learned of government actions 

against the founder of Grameen Bank, the then-managing director 

of Grameen Bank, Mohamed Younis, you can well imagine how 

deeply troubled I was by that development. 

That said, in May of this year Mr. Younis resigned as managing 

director. The focus now is to ensure that Grameen Bank, the institution, the philosophy, continues to function effectively in promoting the welfare of the people of Bangladesh, especially the 

women. I am pleased that Mohamed Younis continues on as the 

leader of the Younis Center. I am pleased that he continues on to 

play leadership roles in many of the associated companies with 

Grameen. I hope that he will be very much a part of ensuring that 

the new bank leadership will continue the good work that he created and sustained for these past years. 

Senator SHAHEEN. So no formal charges have been brought 

against him by the government; is that correct? 

Ambassador MOZENA. That’s correct. He was effectively forced 

out of his position on the basis of the fact that he was older than 

the mandatory retirement age for Government of Bangladesh and 

other organization leaders. So on the basis of that, he was forced 

out of the position. 

That’s unfortunate, but Mr. Younis and all of us now are very 

much focused on sustaining the work that he created. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Currently there are war crimes trials that are being conducted, 

aimed at what happened when Bangladesh split from Pakistan. I 

remember that period very well because I did my graduate work 

on what was happening at the time. As you know, 3 million people, 

an estimated 3 million people, were killed, 10 million were displaced during that 1971 war. 

Not very many people have been arrested for war crimes charges 

at this time. There has been some criticism of whether these trials 

689

are politically motivated, whether they should be going on at all. 

Can you talk about whether the trials are being politicized or 

whether this is something that’s being viewed in the country as 

helpful to moving forward? 

Ambassador MOZENA. From a philosophical point of view, I support, the United States supports, accountability. But such accountability must be done in a transparent fashion, must be done in a 

fashion that protects the rights of the accused. 

In that regard, I’m encouraged that the Government of Bangladesh has reached out to the United States to request our assistance in how best to conduct these trials, which have not yet begun. 

In response to that, Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, 

Ambassador Stephen Rapp, has twice this year visited Bangladesh, 

in January and again in May. 

In response to the request of the Bangladeshi authorities, he provided a long list of suggestions. In March of this year, he provided 

a list of suggestions for the Bangladeshis to consider in how to ensure that the war crime trials that they were planning were in fact 

consistent with Bangladeshi and international standards. I’m 

pleased that the Government of Bangladesh has taken many of 

those suggestions on board and has folded them into their procedures. I hope they will continue to review those suggestions. I hope 

they will in fact adopt more of them to ensure that any war crimes 

are in fact carried out transparently and up to international standards. 

Ambassador Rapp remains available to be helpful in whatever 

fashion he can. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. That sounds encouraging. 

You mentioned in your opening statement that Bangladesh is a 

prime candidate for President Obama’s forward-looking foreign policy, and you pointed out that looking at how to help with the effects of climate change is one of the things that’s very important 

in Bangladesh. Can you talk about the preparation that’s going on 

there to help address this? I know that we’re already beginning to 

see some changes, both in terms of weather patterns and sea levels 

there that are affecting people. 

So how quickly are they responding in ways that they will need 

to in order to address the climate change that is being expected? 

Ambassador MOZENA. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Bangladesh 

is one of the most vulnerable countries in the world to the effects 

of climate change. Dhaka, for example, which is over 100 miles 

away from the coast, is at an elevation of 26 feet. I remember one 

time visiting an airport in the far northwest section of the country 

and noting that the elevation, at this point about as far away as 

you can get from the Bay of Bengal and still be in Bangladesh, elevation was 57 feet. 

That gives you a suggestion of the vulnerability of Bangladesh. 

In this context, you would not be surprised to learn that the Government of Bangladesh, the people of Bangladesh, are very, very focused on climate change and its impact on Bangladesh. We, the 

United States, working through President Obama’s Global Climate 

Change Initiative, are working with the Bangladeshis to adapt to 

and to mitigate the effects of climate change. 

690

Some very exciting things are happening. For example, we’re 

working with the Bangladeshis successfully to create strands of 

rice that can grow in increasingly saline water. This is working and 

those areas, those districts closest to the bay, where the water is 

increasingly saline, you will see rice growing today. 

We’re working very effectively with the Bangladeshis to create 

new strands of other crops as well that will grow in this changing 

climate. We’re working with the Bangladeshis to create embankments to elevate their fields. They have a practice of digging out 

one field and creating a fish pond and using that soil to raise another area. It’s a very effective traditional way of dealing with this 

challenge and we’re supporting that as well. 

We are working a new initiative, working with the Bangladeshis 

on clean and efficient cookstoves. That may not sound like a big 

deal. It is a huge deal because these highly efficient cookstoves, 

which are made out of basic materials, out of clay that costs the 

equivalent of between $5 to $8, can reduce fuel consumption by 40 

to 50 percent and thereby reduce the carbon output. 

We’ve just signed a memorandum of understanding with the 

Bangladeshis to reduce their carbon footprint, which they’re very 

interested in doing for the obvious reasons. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. Actually, Secretary Clinton talked 

about the work that we’re doing around the cookstoves when she 

was before this committee. So it’s a very interesting and important 

initiative. 

A final question. You again mentioned in your opening statement 

that Bangladesh is the fourth-largest Muslim country in the world. 

Obviously, they are experiencing some terrorist activity from terrorist groups in the country. Can you talk about what kind of a 

threat that represents, either to the Government of Bangladesh 

and security in the country as well as to other regional interests 

or to the United States? 

Ambassador MOZENA. Thank you. The Government of Bangladesh has been a very effective partner in addressing the threat 

of terrorism. They have moved resolutely, effectively, against domestic terrorism and against foreign-based terrorism. They have 

signed an accord with India, so the two neighboring countries are 

now cooperating in a fashion that they did not before to address 

the terrorist challenge, which is a challenge to both of them. 

Nonetheless, the threat remains. It’s a real threat. I’m pleased 

that the United States has partnered, continues to partner, with 

the Government of Bangladesh in dealing concretely with this 

threat. We have worked with the Government of Bangladesh in 

drafting and now enacting antimoney laundering legislation, 

antiterrorist financing legislation. We have worked with them to 

establish a financial intelligence unit. 

We are working with their maritime security forces, their version 

of the Navy SEALs. We’re working with the Army paracommandos 

to increase land border security. Through these and other steps, 

we’re helping Bangladesh in a very real way take on the terrorist 

challenge. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much. 

691

Mr. Hammer, can you talk about how effectively the State Department and our diplomatic efforts are incorporating the new 

media tools? 

Mr. HAMMER. Yes, Madam Chairman. Thank you very much for 

your question. I can tell you that in the time that I’ve been acting 

as the Assistant Secretary I’ve had the opportunity to work with 

the team at Public Affairs and they’re very energetic, creative, and 

always looking for opportunities how we can best use social media. 

This spring during the happenings in the Middle East, we launched 

nine foreign language Twitter feeds, including Arabic, Farsi, Urdu, 

Hindi, Spanish, French, Russian, Chinese, and Portuguese, as part 

of another one of our efforts to use social media to connect and to 

be part of the conversation that is taking place around the globe. 

We also just recently launched a digital platform through the 

Internet, state.deplive, which allows our officials to be interviewed 

by foreign press around the globe through the Internet. We are in 

fact reaching hundreds of press who had previously not had an opportunity to interact with our officials. 

So we are constantly looking to see what new emerging technologies are out there. We know we need to be the ones presenting 

our foreign policy. We need to know, need to be sure that we are 

part of the conversation. But we know that we face a challenge because it is moving, the media world, is moving at an incredible 

pace. So I know that’s challenging for our professionals. We need 

to continue to train and bring in new expertise, and for that I’m 

looking forward, if confirmed, to leading the public affairs efforts 

at the State Department to do everything we can to advance our 

interests, because we believe public affairs is a critical component 

of the smart power that Secretary Clinton talks about. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I was interested; not too long ago there was 

an interchange, an article in the New York Times, that reported on 

an interchange with the Taliban in Afghanistan on a blog, I believe. It was, I think, members of our military responding to what 

the Taliban were posting about what had happened in a particular 

incident in Afghanistan. 

Is the State Department working with the military on those 

kinds of efforts in Afghanistan and other places around the world? 

Mr. HAMMER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Yes, in fact we are. 

I had the privilege of serving before taking this position at the National Security Council as the spokesman there, and our job was 

really to work through the interagency with the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, with the other national 

security agencies, to work precisely on issues relating to this and 

social media, and using all available tools to be out in the field and 

monitoring what is happening. 

Now, obviously, in my new position, if confirmed, we would continue to promote that interagency cooperation. In fact, Secretary 

Clinton announced in New York on 9–9 during her terrorism 

speech at the John Jay School that we have established a center 

for countering terrorism communication at the State Department, 

CSCC, and in fact that unit is working with the interagency to address some of the things that appear in blogs and to counter negative messaging against the United States. So we are very much enVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00699 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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gaged and, if confirmed, will continue to work on these critical 

issues to our national security. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I assume that that’s a huge challenge just in 

terms of having somebody who can decipher what’s being said on 

blogs, but then having the capacity on the part of whether it’s our 

State Department or whoever to respond to some of what’s out 

there. Can you talk about how you address that? How do you assign people to respond, particularly on a sensitive issue like what’s 

happening in Afghanistan? 

Mr. HAMMER. Well, Madam Chairman, that is a very good question. It is not currently within the domain of the Bureau of Public 

Affairs to address this issue. Our colleagues, as I mentioned, at the 

CSCC are working on that every day, if you’d like to get more information on exactly how we’re doing this. 

But it is a challenge to identify what we need to do and who can 

do it. Obviously, we need linguists that are able to participate in 

these blogs and to counter the messaging. But we’re very well 

aware that it’s critically important to be out in the blogosphere and 

to counter this very hateful and negative messaging that we see 

out there. 

So it is something the State Department is working at and I’d 

be happy, if you’d like even more information, to provide that to 

you. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I would. I’d be very interested in that. I probably should have asked my question a little differently, and that 

is: To what extent will you, should you be confirmed, will your office interact with that effort that goes on? 

Mr. HAMMER. Well, Madam Chairman, if confirmed we would be 

coordinating, but not running, that effort. They keep us informed 

and let us know of their activities and solicit our views in terms 

of how best to communicate, so that we’re doing it in an effective 

way and a coordinated way. But we certainly work very closely 

hand in hand. In fact, we’re all under the same family of the Under 

Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, so we do have 

meetings in which these issues are discussed and coordinated. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

As a spokesperson, as you pointed out, one of your responsibilities is to try and put the best face forward for the Department and 

for American foreign policy. But you’re also responsible for trying 

to report accurately on what’s happening. So can you talk about 

how you balance those two challenges, which don’t always work 

hand in hand with each other? They are sometimes at odds. 

Mr. HAMMER. Well, Madam Chairman, we definitely as 

spokespeople are committed to the truth and to explaining to the 

American people and the world our policies. So we do, obviously, 

try to cast things in the best way that promotes American interests, but we’re always truthful to the information as we know it, 

and in our engagements we do make the best case possible for advancing our interests around the world and explaining the logic 

and reasoning behind our policies. 

We know sometimes they’re not well received, but we still feel 

that it is important to be communicating these. In fact, the more 

that people sort of understand our thinking and our reasoning, the 

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more likely they are to appreciate our policies, and perhaps we can 

bring them around to even supporting them. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

One of the challenges that we face is how we continue to engage 

the youth of the world. About 85 percent of the world’s youth live 

in developing countries and as we look at—I mean, we saw the role 

that they played in the Arab Spring and are still playing. So are 

there ways in which the State Department can better engage the 

world’s youth? 

Mr. HAMMER. Absolutely, Madam Chairman. You raise an excellent point and something that we are very focused on. We have, 

Secretary Clinton has, appointed a youth ambassador and we work 

very closely with him and many other offices throughout the State 

Department to try to figure out how we can connect better with tomorrow’s future, our youth and the world’s youth. 

So that’s why it is critical that we engage in social media and 

we are in the areas of communication where they communicate, 

whether that’s Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, texting, as you pointed 

out. It’s important that we are part of that conversation, that they 

understand us. There are other elements, obviously, in the State 

Department that promote cultural exchanges and student exchanges, and that also is important because then the youth come 

and learn about the United States and our values firsthand. Those 

that can’t, we obviously are trying to do that virtually, and more 

and more through our—we have our domestic program, the Home 

Town Diplomats program, where we’re doing that, communicating 

to communities around the United States about the work that we 

do. But we’re now moving to do that digitally, and perhaps we can 

also expand that even further to try to have these kinds of, if you 

will, town halls with more youthful audiences with people abroad. 

The state.deplive that I mentioned before, that media platform 

actually is reaching out to, if you will, less experienced or up-andcoming reporters who might not otherwise have access. So we are 

trying to branch out and to reach as broad an audience as we can; 

realizing the world is so interconnected, we want to make sure we 

take full advantage of those opportunities. And if confirmed, that’s 

what I’d be committed to do. 

Senator SHAHEEN. When I was at the Kennedy School I took part 

in a State Department program that brought a number of young 

women from the Middle East over to the United States and then 

periodically did Web casts with them in the countries that they 

were from to continue that relationship. It seemed to be very effective. 

Mr. HAMMER. Yes, Madam Chairman. In fact, if I may, our Foreign Press Center here, based in Washington, not too long ago conducted a blogger tour, in other words invited bloggers from around 

the world, including the Middle East, to come to the United States 

and meet their blogger counterparts. The reporting that came out 

of that was fascinating, and it’s exactly the kind of thing that we 

need to be doing more of. We open ourselves up, people understand 

us better, and I think the net result over time is greater understanding for our country and for our policies. 

Senator SHAHEEN. In your opening statement you mentioned the 

work that is done with various country diasporas that exist in 

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America. Can you talk about the kinds of things that you do with 

those communities? 

Mr. HAMMER. Absolutely, Madam Chairman. We try to—for example, we had not too long ago, about a week ago, a meeting with 

the Haitian diaspora. What we’re trying to do is to convey to those 

Haitian Americans or the different diaspora groups in the United 

States what the United States is doing in terms of our bilateral relationships, to develop even tighter bonds between the communities 

here in the United States and their original home countries. 

Part of it is to promote sort of the kind of investment that helps 

those countries. Secretary Clinton is very eager to see that there’s 

a connection, for example, with the Tunisian diaspora in the 

United States, so that we can help Tunisia in this moment when 

they need to be looking for foreign investment and connections. 

So we have a fairly robust program. We focus it—I think in New 

York this week we did an outreach event as well with a variety of 

diaspora groups, to inform them of what the State Department is 

doing in terms of our policies and to leverage their connections to 

better inform us as well as to better connect with their home countries or their countries of origin. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much. 

I have one final question for Mr. Mandell before I conclude. I 

missed this and I think it’s very important, because it has to do 

with Luxembourg’s involvement in NATO. In 2009 Luxembourg 

spent about .6 percent of its GDP on defense, which was under the 

2 percent which is sort of the NATO informal benchmark. It’s not 

alone in failing to meet that NATO benchmark, and this has been 

a topic of some consternation among some of the larger members 

of NATO. 

So I wonder if you can address whether you believe or whether 

we have an official position on whether Luxembourg should be contributing increased financial resources to defense and to NATO and 

whether you have had or you know of any conversations in the 

country about that issue? 

Mr. MANDELL. Madam Chairman, thank you for that question. 

Since I’ve not been to post and I’ve not been briefed on the NATO 

alliance as it relates to Luxembourg and the United States, I’m 

really unfamiliar with the answer to your question. But I would be 

glad to make sure that you receive an answer in a very short period of time. It just hasn’t come up for me. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Sure. Well, and I will call it to your attention 

because I think it’s something that should be raised, particularly 

with a country like Luxembourg that is a relatively wealthy country in Europe and that has benefited very much from the defense 

of NATO or the defense that NATO provides, the security that it 

provides. This will be I think an increasingly important and challenging issue as we go forward and think about NATO’s continuing 

role in the future. 

Mr. MANDELL. Thank you. I’ll be glad to talk to the people at the 

State Department about that and get an answer back to you as 

quickly as we possibly can. I appreciate your comment. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Mr. MANDELL. Yes, ma’am. 

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Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you all very much. Thank you for your 

willingness to continue to serve this country. As I said, we hope 

that your nominations will go forward and be quickly confirmed by 

the full Senate. 

Let me also point out that we will keep the record of the committee open until the end of business on Friday for any additional 

comments or questions that are presented. 

Again, thank you all very much. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF THOMAS C. KRAJESKI TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. During the crackdown in Bahrain, over a thousand protesters were detained. There have been credible reports of severe mistreatment of detainees, including medical personnel, and trial of civilians taking place in military courts.

• What steps will you take as Ambassador to try to urge the Bahraini Government to cease these practices and restore the rule of law? 

• How has the administration sought to influence the Bahraini Government’s response to the unrest?

Answer. The United States remains firmly committed to the principles of freedom 

of association, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and medical neutrality, 

which requires that health care professionals be allowed to treat any individual regardless of background and identity. 

We are deeply concerned by reports of violations in Bahrain this spring and 

beyond. There is well-founded information from human rights organizations and 

others alleging that security forces mistreated detainees, arrested patients while in 

treatment, and instructed medical personnel not to treat those who may have been 

injured during protests. We condemn the violation of these rights wherever they 

occur. 

These and other alleged incidents fall under the purview of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, a fact-finding mission convened by the government 

and led by international commissioners of excellent reputation. I will urge the Government of Bahrain to take the report’s recommendations seriously and take action 

as necessary and appropriate.

Question. Section 620J of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 imposes restrictions 

on assistance to any unit of a foreign country’s security forces for which there is 

credible evidence that the unit has committed gross violations of human rights. U.S. 

embassies are heavily involved in ensuring compliance with this requirement.

• If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that the Embassy effectively 

implements section 620J? 

• In particular, what actions will you take to ensure, in a case in which there 

is credible evidence that a gross violation of human rights has been committed, 

that assistance will not be provided to units that committed the violation? 

• What steps will you take to ensure that the Embassy has a robust capacity to 

gather and evaluate evidence regarding possible gross violations of human 

rights by units of security forces? 

• Please provide a detailed account of how section 620J has been applied to the 

Bahraini security forces in 2011. This account may be provided in a classified 

format. 

• In recent years Bahrain has received approximately $20 million per year in Foreign Military Financing. What changes, if any, have been contemplated to the 

program in light of the recent events in Bahrain?

Answer. The United States continually evaluates its military assistance to all 

countries. Foreign security force units and candidates proposed for assistance, including such forces from Bahrain, undergo a thorough section 620J review process 

to confirm that there is no credible evidence that the recipient has committed gross 

violations of human rights. This vetting is conducted with the INVEST (International Security Vetting Security Tracking) system, which assists us in conducting 

thorough checks of the human rights records for nominated candidates. Leahy vetting is initiated at the USG Embassy in the home country of the candidates, and 

696

completed in Washington using all available sources of information. Use of the 

INVEST system has improved the vetting process, and is allowing the Department 

to maintain and expand a human rights vetting database. In accordance with legal 

requirements, the United States will not deliver training or assistance in cases 

where there is credible evidence that a unit or individual has committed a gross violation of human rights. 

Our Embassy in Manama and the Department of State continue to gather information on the conduct of Bahraini forces surrounding the events of February, 

March, and beyond. The late October report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, a body with a broad mandate to investigate human rights violations 

during the demonstrations and security crackdown, will assist us in the vetting 

process as we incorporate its findings into our review of proposals to provide assistance to specific forces. 

If confirmed, I plan to discuss our military assistance program with Bahraini officials and remind them of our firm commitment to carrying out our security assistance programs in a manner consistent with our legal obligations and policy concerns 

regarding respect for human rights.

Question. Bahrain is home to over 400,000 migrant workers, many of them from 

South and Southeast Asia, working in the construction and service industries as 

well as in the domestic service sector. According to the Department of State Trafficking in Persons Report of 2011, some of these workers have been subjected to 

practices such as the unlawful withholding of passports, restriction on movement, 

contract substitution, nonpayment of wages, threats and physical or sexual abuse 

as well as human trafficking and forced prostitution.

• If confirmed, what will you do to address these issues? 

• In recent years, Bahrain’s Ministry of Labor has indicated it would move to end 

the sponsorship (‘‘kafala’’) system that leaves migrant workers vulnerable to 

trafficking. What progress has been made to date in abolishing the ‘‘kafala’’ 

system?

Answer. We are concerned about reports, discussed in the 2011 State Department 

Trafficking in Persons Report, that describe abuses migrant workers suffer at the 

hands’ of their employers in Bahrain. As a Tier-2 country, Bahrain does not fully 

comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it 

is making significant efforts to do so. The government continued to investigate and 

prosecute forced prostitution cases and convicted nine trafficking offenders in 2010–

2011. In addition, the government assisted 17 victims of forced prostitution. Nonetheless, there were no reports of government efforts to punish forced labor crimes, 

nor any indication that the Government of Bahrain took steps to institute a formal 

victim identification procedure or otherwise improve victim protection efforts during 

this period. 

The government’s lack of efforts to acknowledge and address forced labor remains 

a key gap in its antitrafficking response. If confirmed, I will encourage the Bahraini 

Government to vigorously pursue trafficking cases, expand protection for victims of 

trafficking, and prevent incidents of forced labor as they have pledged.

Answer. According to the General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions, thousands 

of Bahrainis have lost their jobs in the aftermath of the government crackdown. On 

August 19, the Christian Science Monitor reported that firings were ongoing and 

that while the government had pledged to rehire workers, progress had been slow.

• How do you view the situation and what can be done to speed up the rehiring 

process? 

• What can be done to return students who were expelled because of their involvement in the protests, to their classrooms? 

• Over the last few months, the Bahraini Government has barred foreign journalists, human rights workers, and foreign trade unionists from entering the country. What can the U.S. Embassy do to promote open access by these groups to 

the country?

Answer. We have closely followed reports of violations of worker rights, restraints 

on union activity, and ongoing unfair dismissals. We believe that returning workers 

to their jobs and students to their classrooms is the single most important step the 

Government of Bahrain can take to reintegrate the broader Shia community and reassure them of the Government of Bahrain’s commitment to the economic well-being 

and education of all Bahrainis. In April, the AFL–CIO submitted a petition to the 

Department of Labor asserting that Bahrain had failed to uphold its commitment 

to protect labor rights under the U.S.-Bahrain FTA. The Department of Labor is 

investigating this claim and will release a report in December with its findings. If 

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confirmed, I will call on the government to move quickly and transparently on reinstatements as a way to build confidence. 

We were disappointed that foreign journalists, human rights workers, and foreign 

trade unionists were denied visas in certain instances. If confirmed, I will raise 

these visa issues with the Government of Bahrain.

Question. On June 29, 2011, the His Majesty King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa announced the establishment of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry led 

by M. Cherif Bassiouni. What is your assessment of the prospects for the success 

of the Bassiouni Commission and other paths to reconciliation? What steps will the 

United States take to help the Bahraini Government build the trust necessary 

among all sides to enable a credible national dialogue to move forward?

Answer. We support the important work of the Bahrain Independent Commission 

of Inquiry. It has a broad mandate to investigate the events of February onward 

and report on human rights violations during this period. The presence of five internationally recognized experts with considerable human rights experience on the 

Commission is a positive sign, and we have urged the Government of Bahrain to 

cooperate fully with the Commission’s investigation. 

We will continue to urge all parties, across the political spectrum, to engage constructively in an ongoing process of political accommodation in order to achieve 

meaningful reform. 

In July, the government initiated a National Dialogue as one mechanism to begin 

the reform process. We believe that more can be done. Genuine reform will allow 

Bahrain and its citizens to enjoy a more stable and security future. 

RESPONSES OF DAN W. MOZENA TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

UNITED STATES-BANGLADESH RELATIONS

Question. I am glad to witness the recent positive trajectory in U.S.-Bangladesh 

relations. The United States has a number of important priorities in Bangladesh, 

including strengthening its democracy, promoting development, and denying space 

to terrorists. Washington is partnering with Dhaka to advance signature U.S. global 

initiatives on climate change, food security, and global health, as well as outreach 

with the Muslim world, to name just a few issues where we are working together.

• What specific areas do you consider to be most ripe for further U.S.-Bangladesh 

cooperation, and how can Congress contribute to building this increasingly important relationship?

Answer. I believe that the United States has strategic interests in Bangladesh as 

follows:

• Global Security: Bangladesh is the seventh most populous country in the world; 

it has the fourth-largest Muslim population. Bangladesh is a moderate, secular, 

and democratic Muslim-majority country that offers an alternative to violent 

extremism. 

• Regional and Global Peace and Stability: Located in one of the world’s most 

troubled regions, Bangladesh fosters regional peace and stability through its improving relations with its neighbors, especially India. Bangladesh is also the 

world’s largest manpower contributor to international peace support operations. 

It currently has over 10,000 peacekeepers in the field, a number it seeks to increase to 15,000. 

• Global Food Security: As the world’s seventh most populous nation, Bangladesh 

is critical to the world’s ability to feed its growing population, which is projected 

to reach 9 billion within my lifetime. With good policies and targeted technical 

assistance, Bangladesh could feed itself. 

• U.S. Trade and Investment: U.S.-Bangladesh trade will reach a record $5 billion 

this year; this amount includes over $1 billion in U.S. exports, exports that create needed jobs and wealth in America. A U.S. company (Chevron) is Bangladesh’s largest foreign investor. With a growing middle class as its poverty 

rate drops (from 40 percent to 31.5 percent over the past 5 years), Bangladesh 

offers increasing opportunities to U.S. exporters and investors. 

• U.S. Values: Bangladeshis like America and are open to our ideas. Core U.S. 

values, such as democracy and respect for human rights, find fertile soil in 

Bangladesh. 

• Humanitarian Interests: Bangladesh is highly vulnerable to natural disasters. 

Reflecting Americans’ basic decency and care for other people, the United States 

698

can help Bangladesh prepare for disasters and mitigate the impact after disaster hits.

I believe that the best way to advance these key American interests in Bangladesh is to promote a Bangladesh that is peaceful, secure, prosperous, healthy and 

democratic. If confirmed, I would lead Mission Dhaka to this end. 

Congress can help nurture the U.S.-Bangladesh partnership by ensuring adequate 

resources for those programs that advance America’s interests by promoting a Bangladesh that is peaceful, secure, prosperous, healthy, and democratic, and by maintaining its already robust interest in this bilateral relationship to the mutual best 

interests of both countries. As a former Peace Corps Volunteer, I know well the 

benefits that a Peace Corps program in Bangladesh would offer in terms of both advancing America’s interests in Bangladesh and building a better informed and internationally aware citizenry at home. Peace Corps would like to return to Bangladesh, 

but lacks the resources to launch a renewed program there. 

DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

Question. In December 2008, Bangladesh held what some U.S. observers consider 

the fairest and most credible parliamentary elections since independence. Those 

elections created the hope that the Government of Bangladesh (GOB) would use its 

popularity to strengthen democratic institutions and national reconciliation. But 

there are unfortunately signs that this government has not distanced itself from the 

previous zero-sum, highly centralized politics of the past that at times has prevented Bangladesh from realizing its full potential.

• What are your observations with regard both to the strength of Bangladesh’s 

democratic institutions and recent developments in Bangladesh’s politics?

Answer. Bangladesh is fortunate to have a strong tradition of democratic governance. During my travels in Bangladesh 10 years ago when I served there as 

Political/Economic Counselor, I saw firsthand the people’s strong commitment to democracy, and believe that the Bangladeshi people themselves are the strongest 

guardians of their democratic rights. Nonetheless, those rights are being challenged. 

Earlier this year, the current Awami League-led government abolished the Caretaker Government system that it had helped to create to protect the electoral system from political interference; the opposition Bangladesh National Party has 

strongly opposed this action. The United States has called upon both major parties 

to work together to develop mutually agreed mechanisms for ensuring that the next 

elections are free and fair. If confirmed, I will urge leaders of both major parties 

and civil society to work together in the best interests of the Bangladeshi people 

to ensure that the next national elections are as free and fair as those of 2008. 

Drawing from my own experience in Bangladesh a decade ago as Bangladesh 

headed into the 2001 elections, I would work to ensure that the United States plays 

a constructive role in helping Bangladesh strengthen its electoral and other democratic institutions. Already, the mission has begun preparations to support the Bangladesh Election Commission in concert with other donors through the United National Development Program framework. 

Although Bangladesh’s press has traditionally been one of the freest in the South 

Asian region, I am concerned about recent trendlines, including the arrests of editors and reports of pressure on news organizations to self-censor. If confirmed, I will 

continue to emphasize to the Government of Bangladesh my belief that a free press 

is vital to a fully functioning and mature democracy. 

I am encouraged that Bangladesh’s Parliament is playing a more active role in 

governance and oversight. For example, the parliamentary standing committee on 

the Ministry of Home Affairs recently expressed concern over the amount of force 

the government used against opposition activists during a nationwide demonstration, and ordered an internal investigation. Additionally, the parliamentary standing committee on the Ministry of Information rejected a draft policy from the Ministry on private broadcasters that would limit media freedom. We urge constructive 

engagement in Parliament between the government and opposition political parties 

and emphasize the need for a strong Parliament working with robust democratic 

institutions. 

I am also encouraged that governance in Bangladesh is being increasingly decentralized, a process the United States has supported. Elected local government and 

creation of local funding sources are important steps in bringing governance closer 

to the people. If confirmed, I would continue to support the decentralization of 

governance. 

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INTERNATIONAL CRIMES TRIBUNAL OF BANGLADESH

Question. The International Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh (ICT) has begun trying persons accused of committing atrocities during the 1971 war. Many observers 

have been encouraged by the fact that the GOB is taking steps toward achieving 

accountability for very serious crimes. However, the ICT has also been subject to 

some criticism. Among other things, international observers have raised concerns 

about interrogations without counsel present, lengthy precharge detentions, the inability to challenge the jurisdiction of the tribunal or make interlocutory appeals, 

the lack of the presumption of innocence, the lack of protection for victims and witnesses and the potential for self incrimination.

• a. Has the administration raised similar kinds of concerns with the GOB, and 

if so, how has it responded to suggestions?

Answer. At the invitation of the Government of Bangladesh, Ambassador at Large 

for War Crimes Issues Stephen J. Rapp visited Bangladesh twice this year. During 

these visits he engaged with the government as well as those involved with the 

prosecution, defense and NGOs, underscoring the importance of due process and adherence to international standards, including in regard to the rights of the accused, 

excessive detentions, and defendants’ access to counsel, among other matters. After 

his first visit, Ambassador Rapp wrote a letter to the Minister of Law offering a 

number of suggestions for the International Crimes Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure. 

The Government has implemented some of these suggestions, and I hope that it will 

consider adopting more of them. Ambassador Rapp and Embassy Dhaka continue 

to engage on this matter with the Bangladesh Government, which I believe remains 

open to further changes that would strengthen the process.

• b. What steps has the administration taken to assist the GOB in ensuring the 

ICT is consistent with widely accepted practices and standards?

Answer. Ambassador Rapp’s engagement with the Bangladeshis and his extensive 

list of suggested changes to rules of procedure are important elements in our efforts 

to help ensure that these trials meet international standards. Ambassador Rapp’s 

office and Embassy Dhaka have conducted assessments of the capacity of the various parties to the process, including the offices of the judges, prosecutors, investigators, and the registrar of the International Crimes Tribunal. We have shared best 

practices and sample material with the investigators’ office at their request. We 

hope the Bangladeshis will take fullest advantage of this support.

• c. All of the accused sit in opposition to the ruling party. Are you concerned that 

the proceedings’ impartiality could be put into question by political considerations?

Answer. The International Crimes Tribunal could provide a means to hold accountable those Bangladeshis who committed atrocities during the nation’s liberation in 1971. However, the fact that all of the accused are members of opposition 

parties places an especially heavy onus on the Tribunal to ensure transparency, due 

process, and thorough adherence to the highest standards of equitable justice, especially in regard to protecting the rights of the accused. It will be critical for the ICT 

to engage the public and provide the maximum possible transparency and access to 

ensure that it is perceived as independent, impartial and fair while striving to 

achieve justice for the victims of the atrocities in question. Ambassador Rapp’s office 

and Embassy Dhaka remain engaged with the Government of Bangladesh at the 

highest levels to urge transparency and adherence to international standards. 

GRAMEEN BANK

Question. I am deeply troubled by the efforts to pressure Muhammad Yunus that 

concluded in his resignation as managing director of the Grameen Bank (Grameen) 

earlier this year. Institutions like the Grameen Bank make a significant contribution to Bangladesh’s development and democracy, and Professor Yunus’s life-long 

work to reduce poverty and empower women through microloans has deservedly 

received worldwide attention and respect. I hope he will continue to play a leadership role in the Yunus Centre and entities associated with Grameen without undue 

interference.

• What steps is the U.S. Government taking to emphasize the importance of 

Grameen’s future autonomy and effectiveness given its historic role in improving the lives of millions of Bangladeshis?

Answer. When I served in Bangladesh a decade ago as Political/Economic Counselor, I frequently visited Grameen Bank projects in the field and saw firsthand the 

impact that Grameen microfinance projects have on the poor, especially the women. 

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Grameen is about more than project financing; it is about taking responsibility for 

improving one’s own quality of life and nurturing the children so theirs can be a 

better life. Inspired by the Grameen philosophy and its real impact on improving 

the lives of millions of Bangladeshis, I was understandably troubled to learn of government pressure to remove Grameen founder and Managing Director Muhammad 

Yunus, culminating in his resignation from Grameen Bank on May 12. Like Dr. 

Yunus and many of Bangladesh’s other international supporters, the United States 

Government is focused on preserving the integrity and effectiveness of Grameen 

Bank as an institution so that it can fulfill its commitment to its over 8 million poor, 

mostly female, beneficiaries. If confirmed, I would continue USG efforts to underscore to the Government of Bangladesh at the highest levels the importance with 

which we view the Bank’s continued success, and urge that the Bank’s new Managing Director be fully qualified to lead this critically important institution. The 

Government, for its part, has affirmed its commitment to the continued success of 

the Bank. The case of Grameen Bank also has broader implications for Bangladesh’s 

vibrant civil society, which plays a crucial role in Bangladesh’s development. If confirmed, I would support a strong, energized, effective, independent civil society 

COUNTERTERRORISM

Question. The GOB has made significant inroads in fighting extremism under the 

Awami League. Bangladesh’s strong national identity, its relatively recent liberation 

struggle, and the legacy of a moderate Islam are factors that inhibit radicalism. The 

country appears to be moving beyond a lack of political will that conspired with the 

country’s porous borders, ungoverned spaces, and capacity constraints in the past 

to allow transnational and domestic terrorists to operate. Nevertheless, the threat 

still remains.

• a. If confirmed, what steps would you take to strengthen the U.S.-Bangladesh 

partnership in fighting terrorism and build on the progress to date in this area?

Answer. The Government of Bangladesh is a committed partner in combating terrorism. The GOB has maintained pressure on domestic and transnational terrorist 

groups, including the capture of members from Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami-Bangladesh 

(HUJI–B) and Lashkar-e-Tayiba (LeT). However, Bangladesh remains a potential 

safe haven and transit hub for transnational terrorists because of its porous borders 

and large swaths of internal ungoverned/poorly governed space. Much of its land 

border with India can be crossed undetected; huge gaps exist in patrolling Bangladesh’s remote Bay of Bengal coast; airport security is lax; and there are no secure 

identification documents available as a basis for issuing Bangladeshi passports. 

Lashkar-e-Tayiba continues to have a presence in Bangladesh. If confirmed, I would 

work with the Government of Bangladesh to build capacity among its relevant security agencies. I would also engage the government on the importance of respecting 

human rights while conducting counterterrorism programs and maintaining law and 

order.

• b. In recent years, the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) has received considerable attention for masterminding attacks like the one that took place in 

Mumbai, India, in November 2009. What is the nature and scope, if any, of 

LeT’s activities in Bangladesh?

Answer. If confirmed, I would support continued USG engagement with Bangladesh to combat terrorism. For example, the Embassy, especially its Department 

of Justice office, played a key role in advocating Bangladesh’s 2009 passage of new 

antimoney laundering and new antiterrorism laws (the latter addressed 

antiterrorism finance for the first time). In 2010, the ministerial-level National 

Coordinating Committee Against Money Laundering was established under the 

leadership of the Finance Minister to encourage government bodies to fulfill their 

commitments under the National Action Plan to address Anti-Money Laundering 

(AML)/Counter-Terror Finance (CTF). The United States also helped Bangladesh establish a Financial Intelligence Unit. 

I would also support ongoing U.S. military assistance to Bangladesh in standing 

up a naval special operations unit (the Special Warfare and Diving Salvage unit—

SWADS), which has defense of maritime borders and combating terrorism as core 

missions. Training continues and the unit is expected to be officially commissioned 

by the end of the year. In 2010, SWADS and other Bangladesh security elements 

participated in the largest combined joint counterterrorism exercise in Bangladesh 

history. The exercise, sponsored by PACOM, involved over 600 Bangladesh 

counterterrorism personnel and over 200 U.S. Special Operations forces. The Embassy also participated in the exercise and provided a liaison team to the combined 

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joint task force’s forward headquarters in Chittagong. If confirmed, I would hope to 

foster and deepen such cooperation. 

‘‘LEAHY AMENDMENT’’ VETTING

Question. Section 620J of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 imposes restrictions 

on assistance to any unit of a foreign country’s security forces for which there is 

credible evidence that the unit has committed gross violations of human rights. U.S. 

embassies are heavily involved in ensuring compliance with this requirement.

• a. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that the embassy effectively 

implements section 620J?

Answer. Embassy Dhaka, in coordination with the Department of State, runs an 

effective Leahy amendment vetting process. As required by the Leahy amendment 

and other law, all Bangladeshi security force personnel who receive training supported by U.S. funds are vetted by the Department of State. In cases where credible 

evidence exists that an individual has committed a gross violation of human rights, 

U.S.-funded training is denied. If confirmed, I would continue discussions on the requirements of the Leahy amendment and U.S. insistence on respecting human 

rights with the Government of Bangladesh and, more specifically, the leadership of 

the Bangladesh security services.

• b. In particular, what actions will you take to ensure, in a case in which there 

is credible evidence that a gross violation of human rights has been committed, 

that assistance will not be provided to units that committed the violation?

Answer. If confirmed, I would work directly with all Embassy elements to ensure 

that when there is credible evidence of a gross violation of human rights, the Embassy would deny the candidate training and record a negative hit against the name 

to preclude the candidate from consideration for any future training.

• c. What steps will you take to ensure that the Embassy has a robust capacity 

to gather and evaluate evidence regarding possible gross violations of human 

rights by units of security forces?

Answer. If confirmed, all individuals and units of Bangladeshi security services 

selected for training will continue to be scrutinized by a vigorous vetting process. 

I would bolster Embassy Dhaka’s comprehensive database of credible human rights 

reporting and its strong network of sources; both are critical to vetting every candidate proposed for U.S. Government-funded training or assistance. The Embassy’s 

human rights officer is responsible for coordinating Leahy amendment vetting; this 

officer maintains good contacts with both local and international human rights organizations to ensure proper quality control on information used for vetting training 

candidates. The requirements of the Leahy amendment are a regular part of our 

discussion of human rights with the Government of Bangladesh and especially the 

leadership of the Bangladesh security services. If confirmed, I would continue this 

dialogue. 

ROHINGYA ETHNIC MINORITY

Question. I am very concerned by the plight of the Rohingya ethnic minority that 

has fled deprivations in neighboring Burma and settled in large numbers in the 

Cox’s Bazaar region of Bangladesh. While seeking to do what they can, GOB officials in Dhaka sometimes have also shown weariness over having to address the difficulties created by the massive migration of Rohingya in an area that has poverty 

rates significantly above that of the rest of the country.

• a. What is your understanding of current conditions in the official and unofficial 

camps housing Rohingya?

Answer. Ten years ago when I served in Bangladesh, I visited the Rohingya 

camps and found the conditions deplorable. Earlier this year, Assistant Secretary 

of State for Population, Refugees and Migration Eric Schwartz and his deputy, Kelly 

Clements, visited the camps as well. They told me that many Rohingya, particularly 

those living outside the official camps, continue to suffer greatly, especially from 

malnutrition and lack of access to basic services such as health care and education. 

The United States remains most concerned by the situation of the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. The U.S. Government supports the U.N. High Commission for 

Refugees, the International Organization on Migration, and several NGOs working 

to improve conditions for the refugees.

• b. How would you characterize the GOB’s ongoing response to this challenging 

situation?

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Answer. The USG appreciates that the GOB has allowed up to 500,000 Rohingyas 

to seek refuge in Bangladesh. We remain engaged with the GOB to find ways to 

improve the living conditions of these refugees, many of whom are undernourished 

and lack access to basic services. I am pleased that when Assistant Secretary 

Schwartz visited the refugee camps several months ago, the GOB agreed to consider 

resuming limited third-country resettlement for the most vulnerable cases and to 

allow international NGOs to resume some assistance activities. If confirmed, I would 

engage robustly with the GOB, other donors, and multilateral organizations to address the plight of the Rohingya. The long-term solution to the problem, of course, 

lies in Burma, which must create conditions whereby the refugees could voluntarily 

return to their homes in a dignified manner.

• c. Are humanitarian groups able to receive adequate access to Rohingya settlements, and are they encountering any difficulties in obtaining the necessary official permissions to carry out their important work?

Answer. International NGOs have faced some challenges in receiving permission 

to provide services to the Rohingya. However, they continue to provide assistance 

where possible in the official refugee camps and in the surrounding villages of Cox’s 

Bazar District. I hope that Assistant Secretary Schwartz’s visit will result in these 

NGOs getting greater access to the refugees. 

REINTRODUCTION OF PEACE CORPS

Question. The Peace Corps program in Bangladesh was suspended in March 2006 

due to safety and security concerns. At the time of the program’s suspension, 70 Volunteers were operating in the country. Historically, more than 280 Peace Corps Volunteers have served in Bangladesh since the program’s inception in the 1960s (in 

what was then East Pakistan). The Government of Bangladesh has expressed interest in reopening a Peace Corps program. As the world’s seventh most populous 

country and fourth-largest Muslim community with a sizeable youth bulge, this 

moderate, secular democracy would seem to be a strong candidate for the reintroduction of the Peace Corps.

• a. Are the security concerns that led to the Peace Corps program’s suspension 

still present today?

Answer. Peace Corps closed its Bangladesh program in 2006 for prudent security 

reasons. Since then, however, the security environment in Bangladesh has dramatically improved, thus allowing, in my view, for the return of Peace Corps Volunteers. 

Bangladesh’s deepened security relationship with the United States and with India, 

among others, has enabled Bangladesh to make important progress in improving 

the country’s security environment.

• b. What are the benefits, from your perspective, of reopening a Peace Corps program in Bangladesh?

Answer. Bangladesh is a developing country undergoing rapid change. Over 80 

percent of the population is under the age of 40; about 65 percent is under the age 

of 25. This young and enterprising population pulses with optimism. This new generation is eager to learn how to improve their own lives, and the older generation 

has helped to make Bangladesh one of our most successful recipients of development 

assistance by achieving substantial progress in reducing poverty and improving a 

wide range of development indicators. Opinion polls show that Bangladeshis have 

a largely positive view of the United States, and that Bangladeshis like America 

more as they know it better. As a former Peace Corps Volunteer, I believe Bangladesh is a quintessential Peace Corps country. I am a firm believer in the power 

of Peace Corps to advance U.S. interests by bringing some of America’s best and 

brightest to conduct people-to-people diplomacy in the towns and villages, where 

most of Bangladeshis live. These Volunteers could advance America’s interests by 

supporting key programs in the sectors of food security, civil society strengthening, 

health, education, and the environment, among others. The Government of Bangladesh has requested that Peace Corps return to their country, where over 250 

Americans have served with distinction.

• c. If sufficient funds were available in what we all know is a tight budgetary 

environment, would you support a resumption of programming in Bangladesh?

Answer. Reopening a Peace Corps program in Bangladesh would be one of my top 

goals as Ambassador, if confirmed. I would argue that, despite a tight budgetary environment, Peace Corps is a program that would bring high returns on a modest 

investment by strengthening the relationships and bonds between the people of our 

two countries and our two governments. A Peace Corps program would also pay rich 

dividends in building a better informed and internationally aware citizenry at home. 

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TRAFFICKING-IN-PERSONS

Question. In the State Department’s ‘‘Trafficking in Persons Report,’’ Bangladesh 

has been designated as a Tier-2 Watch List country for the last 3 years following 

its Tier-2 designation in 2008. The country remains a major source and transit 

country for sex trafficking and forced labor. 

Men are recruited for work overseas under fraudulent employment offers and subjected to debt bondage, while some women who willingly migrate to find work outside of their country find themselves forced into prostitution. Children also face such 

exploitation, sometimes being sold into bondage by their parents. 

The GOB has drafted comprehensive antitrafficking legislation that would, among 

other measures, combat trafficking through criminal prosecutions and provide protection services to the populations vulnerable to trafficking and forced labor. Bangladesh, however, has yet to enact the legislation into law.

• a. If confirmed, what steps would you take to encourage the GOB to address 

effectively and constructively the exploitation of its citizens and foreign nationals that are trafficked in and through Bangladesh? In particular, what are your 

views on the draft antitrafficking law that was recently submitted to the Cabinet?

Answer. Our Embassy in Dhaka, the Department’s Office to Monitor and Combat 

Trafficking in Persons, and the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs assisted 

the Government of Bangladesh in the drafting process of this countertrafficking legislation, which we believe is strong, effective legislation. This legislation was bolstered by several rounds of local and national consultations involving experts, law 

enforcement, returning migrants and trafficking victims. If confirmed, I would work 

to ensure that Bangladesh enacts this countertrafficking legislation, preferably before the end of the year. I would also work with the government to help them draft 

and operationalize regulations and policies needed to effect the new legislation. The 

Bangladeshi Cabinet has approved the draft legislation, and it now awaits formal 

passage by Parliament, which reconvenes in October.

• b. If Bangladesh succeeds in passing the antitrafficking law, what capacityrelated challenges does it face in enforcing these measures, and how might the 

United States be helpful in this area?

Answer. If confirmed, I would engage on trafficking issues with Bangladesh 

through the recommendations and rankings in the TIP Report, action plans, foreign 

assistance, and diplomatic relationships. I would urge Bangladesh to criminalize the 

activities of fraudulent labor recruiters and to ensure that its embassies, particularly in the gulf, adequately protect Bangladeshi citizens. If confirmed, my aim 

would be for Bangladesh to show such progress that it would move from the Tier2 Watchlist to Tier 2 and eventually to a Tier-1 designation. 

Bangladesh’s principal capacity-related challenge in enforcing these measures is 

a need for technical and foreign assistance. The U.S. Government, through the Department’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, USAID’s Actions 

for Combating Trafficking in Persons program, and the Department of Justice’s programs, has a number of capacity-building projects underway in Bangladesh. These 

programs, which played a central part in helping the Government of Bangladesh 

draft this antitrafficking legislation, would also help Bangladesh in crafting policies 

and regulations to ensure effective implementation of the legislation. 

LABOR

Question. In the last year, Bangladesh has witnessed many protests by garment 

workers arising out of perceived mistreatment and low wages. The government increased the minimum wage in response but the increase fell short of worker expectations, prompting more demonstrations. We have received reports that human 

rights defenders and labor leaders have been targeted by authorities.

• Human rights and labor organizations state there are three pending cases 

against the leadership of the Bangladesh Center for Worker Solidarity, an internationally respected, nonpartisan labor rights NGO. These individuals reportedly face unsubstantiated criminal charges, and the organization has been 

deregistered. We understand that the U.S. Embassy in Dhaka is closely monitoring this case, the outcome of which could have significant ramifications for 

human and labor rights in Bangladesh. If confirmed, what steps would you take 

to encourage a resolution that defends labor rights?

• There are in some in the GOB and civil society who are calling for genuine 

union rights for garment workers. Unfortunately, inadequate development and 

deficiencies in human rights go hand in hand, one reinforcing the other. How 

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would you work to strengthen voices for labor rights, and protect those who defend workers’ rights in Bangladesh?

Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that Embassy Dhaka regularly engages with 

the Government of Bangladesh on the important role of labor rights in building a 

robust, sustainable economy, one that can participate effectively in the global marketplace. The 10 cases pending against the three leaders of the Bangladesh Center 

for Workers’ Solidarity (BCWS) are especially important as they also concern the 

Government of Bangladesh’s commitments to due process and equitable treatment. 

The Embassy regularly attends hearings on these cases, and the Government of 

Bangladesh at all levels is aware of our continuing interest in these cases. 

The Embassy continues to work with the BCWS and the Government of Bangladesh to get the organization reregistered with the Ministry of Social Welfare. The 

Ministry’s decision was not final, and we are encouraging BCWS to utilize the option of a judicial appeal. 

Protection of core labor rights is a standard of U.S. foreign policy around the 

world, especially in Bangladesh, where the booming ready-made garment industry 

and a decidedly mixed record on labor rights makes this issue particularly resonant. 

Progressive actors inside and outside the Government of Bangladesh have long 

called for genuine union rights. USAID’s Global Labor Program funds the American 

Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS) in Bangladesh, and ACILS is 

working to strengthen union capacity by identifying and supporting honest actors 

in the movement. Recently, the Government of Bangladesh registered a new readymade garment union, the country’s second in 4 years, in the port city of Chittagong. 

Embassy Dhaka and ACILS are working with other nascent unions to capture the 

momentum and build on this success. Embassy Dhaka regularly engages with the 

Government of Bangladesh through the Ministry of Labor and the Prime Minister’s 

Office to encourage positive attitudes toward union creation. 

The Embassy also urges the International Labor Organization to move expeditiously in implementing what will be its largest ever program to improve labor conditions, the Better Work Bangladesh program. This program will use financial incentives to encourage companies to adhere to core international labor standards. 

RESPONSES OF THOMAS C. KRAJESKI TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. While the Arab Spring has seen calls for reform, political inclusion, and 

human rights across the region, it seems clear that the movement is not monolithic, 

and that each country that has sought democratic change has done so for unique 

reasons and in different circumstances. What leverage can the administration 

employ to ensure that calls for reform in Bahrain are taken seriously by its government?

Answer. The United States and Bahrain have a longstanding partnership and we 

speak frankly with one another. We will continue to urge all parties, across the 

political spectrum, to engage constructively in an ongoing process of political accommodation in order to achieve meaningful reform. 

Bahrain has introduced reforms to address some of the protesters’ demands. The 

government initiated a National Dialogue and an Independent Commission of 

Inquiry as mechanisms to move forward on reconciliation and begin the process of 

genuine reform. We believe, however, that more can be done. Genuine reform will 

allow Bahrain to enjoy a more stable and security future.

Question. The Government of Bahrain launched a national dialogue in July to 

bring together the people of Bahrain to discuss demands for reform. Key members 

of the opposition and the labor movement, however, were excluded, and Bahrain’s 

main Shia opposition, Al-Wefaq, pulled out of the dialogue after initially only being 

offered nominal participation. In your testimony you highlighted the importance of 

the national dialogue. If confirmed, what can you do as Ambassador to ensure a 

more meaningful, inclusive, and credible dialogue process?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support and encourage initiatives the Government of 

Bahrain takes toward reconciliation and reform. We have welcomed recent steps to 

promote reconciliation and political dialogue, but more needs to be done. The 

National Dialogue that took place in July was the first formal step in what I hope 

will be a broad and comprehensive reform initiative. We expect that future dialogues will bring a wider range of Bahraini stakeholders to the table to discuss the 

way forward. As President Obama said in May, it is difficult to have a dialogue 

when several of the main opposition leaders are in jail. It is also difficult, however, 

when the main opposition group refuses to participate. Facilitating genuine, conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00712 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
705

certed and energetic effort toward reconciliation, dialogue, and reform in Bahrain 

will be one of my highest priorities.

Question. The State Department has reported that Bahrain’s Shia majority faces 

discrimination by the Government of Bahrain. If confirmed, will you make this issue 

a priority in your discussions on reform with Bahraini officials?

Answer. If confirmed, I will urge the Government of Bahrain to confront concerns 

that Shia citizens face discrimination as evidenced by lower socioeconomic indicators 

and less access to the political decisionmaking process than the Sunni minority. As 

noted in my testimony, it is important that all communities in Bahrain play a role 

in determining Bahrain’s future.

Question. You noted in your testimony that there has been no evidence of instigation by Iran in the unrest in Bahrain but that there is concern of Iran exploiting 

it. How is this influence likely to manifest itself in the coming months and what 

preparations is the administration making to mitigate Iran’s influence in Bahraini 

affairs?

Answer. We do not see evidence that Iran instigated protests in Bahrain. The initial protests were called by Bahrainis for Bahrainis demanding reforms and greater 

political participation. However, we have seen and expect we will continue to see 

Iran attempting to exploit and exacerbate unrest to advance its agenda in neighboring countries and undermine peace and stability in the region. 

One of the greatest bulwarks against Iranian influence is a strong and stable 

Bahrain that is inclusive and respects the rights of all its people. Recent efforts by 

the Bahraini Government to restore confidence and promote reconciliation are good 

first steps. Meaningful reforms have the potential to lessen sectarian tension, thus 

denying Iran the ability to exploit unrest to its gain. 

RESPONSES OF MICHAEL A. HAMMER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. In what ways do PA’s activities overlap with the public diplomacy 

activities of the other Bureaus under the organization of the Under Secretary for 

Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs? How does the Bureau of Public Affairs coordinate with those public diplomacy bureaus? How does PA coordinate with PA offices 

in other ‘‘non-R’’ bureaus?

Answer. Organizationally, the Bureau of Public Affairs (PA) falls under the Under 

Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (R) along with three other entities: 

the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), International Information 

Programs (IIP), and the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications 

(CSCC). The mission of the R-family according to the Strategic Framework for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs is to advance national interests and national security by informing and influencing foreign publics by expanding and strengthening 

the relationship between the people and government of the United States and citizens of the rest of the world. Each bureau contributes to this with its own specific 

mission. 

PA is charged with engaging domestic and international media to communicate 

timely and accurate information with the goal of furthering U.S. foreign policy and 

national security interests and broadening understanding of American values. In 

carrying out our mission, the Public Affairs Bureau employs a wide range of media 

platforms, provides historical perspective and conducts public outreach. 

PA is committed to an effective use of resources, avoiding overlap or duplication 

of effort between bureaus, and streamlining when possible under R’s leadership and 

supervision. The Public Diplomacy Strategic Framework lists as an imperative the 

need to ‘‘deploy resources in line with current priorities . . . [and to] strengthen 

structures and processes to ensure coordinated and effective Public Diplomacy.’’

PA coordinates with our public affairs colleagues in each bureau on a regular and 

daily basis. Among the efforts we coordinate are: formulating and deploying press 

guidance for the daily press briefings; pitching and organizing press interviews and 

briefings on topical foreign policy matters; and executing strategic communications 

planning based on the Secretary’s and the Department’s priorities.

Question. The Bureau of Public Affairs oversees the Office of the Historian which 

is tasked with preparing the ‘‘Foreign Relations of the United States’’ (FRUS) historical series.

• Since placing the FRUS online, how has public use of the information increased; 

are bound volumes still being produced? 

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• FRUS is currently behind schedule with the post-30-year inclusion requirement—why is that, how far off schedule is it? • How many staff work to produce each volume? • What are the next five volumes scheduled for publication and what are their 

publication dates?

Answer. The Office of the Historian produces bound volumes for the Federal 

Depository Library Program (FDLP), since ‘‘Foreign Relations’’ has been deemed by 

the FDLP to be an ‘‘essential title for public use.’’ The Office is also committed to 

making FRUS available to a much broader audience by placing all volumes on the 

Office Web site. By placing FRUS online the Office has facilitated the further dissemination of volumes in the series to scholars and other interested parties around 

the world. In the most recent month, we have received more than 29,000 online visits from 173 countries. 

The Office is constantly commended both at home and abroad for making critical 

documentation on the history of U.S. foreign relations both widely and readily available. For many in the international community, online FRUS volumes represent the 

only access they have to records concerning the relations between their countries 

and the United States. 

In spite of the overwhelmingly positive response to the Web site, there is still a 

large demand for FRUS print volumes. In the past 2 years, for example, the Government Printing Office (GPO) has had to double the number of FRUS volumes printed 

for public sale. While all of the 28 volumes covering the Carter administration will 

be placed online, roughly half of those volumes will also be printed and delivered 

to Federal Depository Libraries. More than half of the 46 volumes planned for the 

Reagan administration, which we have begun researching, will be printed and all 

will be published online. 

The law under which the Office of the Historian produces the ‘‘Foreign Relations 

of the United States’’ series (PL 102–138) mandates ‘‘comprehensive documentation 

of the major foreign policy decisions and actions’’ based on access to all foreign policy related files, and that the series be published at the 30-year line. Since 1991, 

the Office of the Historian has struggled with the tension inherent in these competing requirements, and has only partially met the 30-year publication timeframe. 

FRUS is currently behind schedule for several reasons. The Office recently completed two studies that examined the compiling, declassification, and publishing 

timeframes for FRUS. These studies suggest that the length of the declassification 

process, the steadily expanding scale of the work necessary to document U.S. foreign 

relations during the 1970s and 1980s, and staffing level and retention challenges 

(now resolved) that disrupted the Office have contributed to the delay in the publication of FRUS volumes. The Office of the Historian is committed to trying to 

achieve its goal of publishing at the 30-year line in the near term without jeopardizing the quality of the series. 

Because of the unique nature of the ‘‘Foreign Relations’’ series, producing a single 

volume requires the work of up to five historians to perform various complex production and declassification tasks. One historian conducts archival research, compiles the documentation, and annotates the manuscript for clarity. Supervisors 

review the manuscript to ensure that it meets the congressionally mandated requirement to provide a ‘‘thorough, accurate, and reliable record’’ of United States 

diplomatic activity. The Declassification staff coordinates the declassification review 

of the manuscript, referring documents to the appropriate agencies and ensuring 

that all declassification decisions and excisions are accurately rendered to protect 

all classified national security information. The editing staff performs all tasks associated with preparing the volume for publication including, technical editing, proofreading, and the creation of electronic files for the office Web site. 

The next five volumes scheduled for publication are: 

September 2011: Vol. XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–September 1971; 

October 2011: Vol. XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972; 

October 2011: Vol. XXXVI, Energy Crisis, 1969–1974; 

October 2011: Vol. XV, Soviet Union, 1972–1974; 

January 2012 Vol. XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976.

Question. The Department, through a public-private partnership, is planning a 

new museum and visitor’s center for the U.S. Diplomacy Center, to be housed in 

the Truman Building. What is the status of the U.S. Diplomacy Center’s new museum and visitor’s center? How much money has been raised and how much more 

is needed? Please provide a fuller update regarding the status of the Center.

Answer. A key project the Bureau of Public Affairs is working to realize is the 

establishment of the United States Diplomacy Center (USDC), which will be dedicated to telling the story of American diplomacy and the Department of State, past, 

707

present, and future, through a dynamic, interactive education center. The USDC 

has received commitments of nearly $18 million in private donations toward its $50 

million capital campaign. 

The Bureau of Public Affairs recently released funds to issue a Reimbursable 

Work Authorization (RWA) contract for 65 percent Design Development of the 

USDC. As contract administrator, General Services Administration (GSA) receives 

the funds and issues the contract to project architect Beyer Blinder Belle. The U.S. 

Commission of Fine Arts has officially approved the design for the center. 

We believe that the USDC will offer an opportunity to better educate the American public and foreign visitors about the important work of U.S. diplomacy and the 

sacrifices that American diplomats make in service to the United States and to address the world’s challenges. 

RESPONSES OF THOMAS C. KRAJESKI TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR. 

Question. According to human rights activists in Bahrain, the Bahraini Government’s National Dialogue process has failed to produce concrete results or a credible 

path forward on political reform. In his May 19 speech on the Middle East, President Obama stated that ‘‘the [Bahraini] government must create the conditions for 

dialogue, and the opposition must participate to forge a just future for all Bahrainis.’’ The President also underscored that ‘‘you cannot have a real dialogue when 

parts of the peaceful opposition are in jail.’’

• I agree with the President on the need for a real political dialogue in Bahrain. 

What leverage does the United States have to encourage meaningful democratic 

reform in Bahrain based on the precondition set out by President Obama?

Answer. The United States and Bahrain have a longstanding partnership and we 

speak frankly with one another. We will continue to urge all parties, across the 

political spectrum, to engage constructively in an ongoing process of political accommodation in order to achieve meaningful reform. 

Bahrain has introduced reforms to address some of the protesters’ demands. The 

government initiated a National Dialogue and an Independent Commission of 

Inquiry as mechanisms to move forward on reconciliation and begin the process of 

genuine reform. We believe, however, that more can be done. Genuine reform will 

allow Bahrain and its citizens to enjoy a more stable and security future.

Question. The United States has been criticized for not effectively engaging with 

Bahraini human rights activists when the initial crackdown against peaceful 

protestors began in February. Eight months later, 34 people have been killed, more 

than 1,400 have been arrested, and as many as 3,600 people have lost their jobs 

as a result of the Bahraini Government’s continued repression of its own citizens.

• What specific steps will you take to ensure that the United States is proactively 

and visibly reaching out to Bahraini civil society? 

• Will you make an effort to reach out to civil society members beyond the Embassy’s traditional interlocutors?

Answer. Bahrain’s vibrant civil society has played an indispensible role in setting 

the country on a path to greater reform and inclusiveness. If confirmed, I plan to 

support their important work. As Secretary Clinton has said, ‘‘Civil society holds 

governments accountable, keeps them honest, and helps them be more effective.’’ I 

will engage all elements of Bahraini society and engage the Bahraini Government 

on the need to protect associational freedom. I hope to meet with many of them faceto-face and engage with new technology such as online townhalls and Facebook. If 

confirmed, I will work to protect the universal rights of all people to organize, gather peacefully, and speak freely without fear of retribution. I share Secretary Clinton’s view that ‘‘If we’re going to take advantage of this historic moment, we have 

to tap the expertise, experience, and energy of civil society’’.

Question. There have been reports of possible Iranian intervention in Bahrain’s 

internal political situation. Iranian leaders have criticized the Bahraini crackdown, 

and Bahrain and Iran have withdrawn their ambassadors from each other’s 

capitals.

• What is your assessment of Iran’s role in supporting the Shia opposition movement in Bahrain?

Answer. We do not see evidence that Iran instigated protests in Bahrain. The initial protests were called by Bahrainis for Bahrainis demanding reforms and greater 

political participation. However, we have seen and expect we will continue to see 

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Iran attempting to exploit and exacerbate unrest to advance its agenda in neighboring countries and undermine peace and stability in the region. 

One of the greatest bulwarks against Iranian influence is a strong and stable 

Bahrain that is inclusive and respects the rights of all its people. Recent efforts by 

the Bahraini Government to restore confidence and promote reconciliation are good 

first steps. Meaningful reforms have the potential to lessen sectarian tension, thus 

denying Iran the ability to exploit unrest to its gain.

Question. Crown Prince Shaikh Salman bin Hamad has long been considered a 

proponent of democratic reform and has taken steps to accommodate Bahrain’s 

Shiite majority. However, in recent months the Crown Prince has been publicly sidelined by the more conservative Sunni hard-liners, including Interior Minister Rashid 

bin Abdulla Al Khalifa.

• What role do you see the Crown Prince playing in the future of Bahraini politics, and how might the United States engage with him to support democratic 

reform and stability?

Answer. We welcome efforts by all members of the Bahraini Government, political 

associations, and civil society that foster greater inclusion, dialogue, and tolerance. 

As Ambassador, I plan to work with all parties who are striving for reform in Bahrain, including the Crown Prince, who has demonstrated genuine leadership and 

vision.

Question. There are serious concerns about the state of religious freedom in Bahrain. According to the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, the Bahraini Government 

has destroyed 43 Shia mosques and religious structures since the protests began in 

February, and, despite assurances from the government to rebuild destroyed 

mosques, no such construction has begun. Moreover, the State Department’s recently released International Religious Freedom Report noted that the Sunni Muslim population enjoys favorable status in the government, while the Shia population 

continues to face systematic discrimination in employment, housing, and military 

service.

• How will you work to protect religious freedom for the Shia majority in Bahrain, including the rebuilding of mosques and Shia religious sites that were destroyed during the government crackdown?

Answer. We take violations of religious freedom seriously and continue to be concerned by reports of discrimination against the Shia community. If confirmed, I will 

raise the issue of the alleged destruction of sites of religious worship in Bahrain and 

urge the Government of Bahrain to comply with its international obligations under 

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which it is a signatory. 

I will also urge Bahrain to refrain from any violations of religious sites or impede 

the personal practice of religion. If confirmed, I will expect the Government of Bahrain to allow the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, a body with a broad 

mandate to investigate recent alleged abuses, to conduct thorough and transparent 

investigations into any human rights violations that may have been committed and 

to take appropriate steps to redress these violations.

Question. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress on 

September 14 of a possible Foreign Military Sale (FMS) to Bahrain worth an estimated $53 million. The proposed sale includes Armored High Mobility MultiPurpose Wheeled Vehicles, TOW Missiles and associated equipment, parts, training 

and logistical support. Given credible reports of human rights violations by Bahraini 

security forces, I am concerned that this proposed sale could send the wrong signal 

to the Bahraini people at a time of increasing government repression.

• In your view, should the United States reexamine its military assistance to 

Bahrain in light of the ongoing government crackdown? 

• What specific steps will you take to ensure the effective implementation of the 

Leahy Law (section 620J of the Foreign Assistance Act) to ensure that Bahraini 

military, police, and other security units receiving U.S. assistance are not 

credibly alleged to have committed a human rights abuse? Will you raise the 

importance of this legal requirement directly with the Bahraini Government?

Answer. The United States continually evaluates our military assistance to all 

countries. Every new assistance program and sale undergoes a thorough section 

620J review process that ensures that there is no credible evidence that the recipient has committed gross violations of human rights. Bahrain is no exception. Our 

Embassy in Manama and the Department of State in Washington continue to gather 

information on the conduct of Bahraini forces surrounding the events of February, 

March, and beyond. The Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, a commission 

with a broad mandate to investigate human rights violations during the crackdown, 

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will also assist in this process. All new information is considered during the vetting 

process and informs any determination on security assistance or training. If confirmed, I plan to discuss our military assistance program with the Government of 

Bahrain and remind them of these legal requirements.

Question. The Bahraini Government continues to commit systematic human rights 

abuses, including the denial of medical services, while simultaneously targeting 

medical providers as evidenced by the arrests of 23 doctors and 24 nurses from the 

Salmaniya Medical Complex earlier this year. As recently as September 15, human 

rights groups reported the detention of individuals seeking medical care for injuries 

sustained from the excessive use of tear gas by riot police.

• As Ambassador, how will you prioritize the protection of medical neutrality to 

ensure Bahraini compliance with its international obligations under the Geneva 

Conventions, which offer special protections to medical facilities and personnel 

who assist the wounded during times of conflict?

Answer. The United States remains firmly committed to the principle of medical 

neutrality, which requires that health care professionals be allowed to treat any individual regardless of background and identity. 

We are deeply concerned by reports of violations of medical neutrality in Bahrain 

during this spring’s unrest. Human rights organizations have alleged that security 

forces arrested patients while in treatment and instructed medical personnel not to 

treat those who may have been injured during protests. We condemn the violation 

of medical neutrality, a right enshrined in the Geneva Conventions. 

These alleged incidents fall under the purview of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, a fact-finding mission convened by the government and led by 

international commissioners of sterling reputation. I will urge the Government of 

Bahrain to take the report’s recommendations seriously and take needed action on 

medical neutrality concerns and the many other issues raised during this period. 

RESPONSES OF DAN W. MOZENA TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR. 

Question. For decades, Bangladesh has borne witness to gross human rights 

abuses including war crimes committed during the 1971 war of independence. According to the State Department’s 2010 Human Rights Report, Bangladeshi security 

forces continue to commit extrajudicial killings and are responsible for custodial 

deaths, torture and arbitrary arrest. Although it has been effective in combating 

militant extremism, there are particular human rights concerns regarding the Rapid 

Action Battalion’s activities.

• a. What is the U.S. assessment of the Rapid Action Battalion?

Answer. The Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) has a dismal human rights record, as 

detailed in the State Department’s annual Human Rights Report. According to credible sources, members of the Rapid Action Battalion have committed extrajudicial 

killings and other serious human rights violations with impunity and little, if any, 

accountability. 

Because of the Rapid Action Battalion’s poor human rights record, the United 

States has limited its engagement with the RAB to efforts to improve the RAB’s 

record on respecting human rights. On September 20, a retired U.S. DEA agent arrived in Dhaka to be ‘‘embedded’’ with the Rapid Action Battalion for 3 months to 

help it establish and operationalize an independent internal affairs unit that would 

investigate allegations of misconduct and, I hope, improve the organization’s record 

for respecting human rights. The Rapid Action Battalion’s success (or lack of) in 

utilizing this internal affairs unit to rein in its members will be a litmus test for 

assessing whether and, if so, how we will further engage with the Rapid Action 

Battalion.

• b. What specific steps will you take to ensure the effective implementation of 

the Leahy Law (section 620J of the Foreign Assistance Act) to ensure that 

Bangladeshi military, police, and other security units receiving U.S. assistance 

are not credibly alleged to have committed a human rights crime? Will you raise 

the importance of this legal requirement directly with the Bangladeshi Government?

Answer. As required by the Leahy amendment and other law, all Bangladeshi security force personnel who receive training supported by U.S. funds are vetted by 

the Department of State. In cases where credible evidence exists that an individual 

has committed a gross violation of human rights, U.S.-funded training is denied. If 

confirmed, I would continue discussions on the requirements of the Leahy amendVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00717 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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ment and U.S. insistence on respecting human rights with the Government of Bangladesh and, more specifically, the leadership of the Bangladesh security services.

Question. The ruling Awami League (AL) has achieved significant gains in the 

fight against Islamic extremism, including the arrest of the militant leader Maolana 

Sheikh Farid in April. However, serious concerns remain over the opposition Bangladesh National Party’s (BNP) longstanding ties to Islamist parties such as 

Jamaat-i-Islami, which led a countrywide protest earlier this week that resulted in 

50 people injured and 480 detentions.

• How do you assess the current Bangladeshi Government’s commitment to fighting Islamic extremism? • As Ambassador, what steps will you take to address the roots causes of terrorism in Bangladesh?

Answer. The Government of Bangladesh is strongly committed to combating violent extremism, including regional and transnational terrorism. Bangladesh is 

cooperating with its neighbors, most importantly India, to fight terrorism. This 

cooperation has resulted in the arrest of terrorist suspects who were hiding in Bangladesh. The Bangladeshi Government has also taken increasingly more aggressive 

actions against regional and domestic terror organizations. Our growing 

counterterrorism engagement with Bangladesh has supported the government’s 

campaign against violent extremism. 

If confirmed, I would increase our support of Bangladeshi efforts to counter violent extremism through programs such as our ‘‘Leaders of Influence’’ program, 

which taught local imams how to work with the NGO community to bring development to their people. This program focused on those areas of Bangladesh most susceptible to radicalization. More than 20,000 local religious and secular leaders, over 

10,000 of whom were imams, participated in this program, which offered alternative 

paths to increasing opportunities for development. Our programs would also include 

a significant youth component, targeting the very group that tends to be the most 

easily manipulated by extremist factions. Embassy Dhaka also uses English instruction as a platform for engagement, development, and countering violent extremism 

in Bangladesh. Students and teachers from governmental (alia), nongovernmental 

(qaumi) religious schools/madrassas, and community religious leaders/imams are engaged through English language training. As an added effect, students, teachers, 

and influence makers share their training with nonparticipants as well as the positive perceptions about the U.S. developed during their participation in the training. 

A U.S.-funded community-based policing program is improving public trust and 

cooperation between local police and the communities they serve. This program, too, 

is focused in an area considered especially vulnerable to extremist ideologies. In addition, Embassy Dhaka is also working to improve Bangladesh’s counterterrorism 

capabilities through military-to-military engagement. U.S. experts have provided 

training to Bangladesh’s nascent Special Warfare and Diving Salvage Unit (its 

version of the Navy Seals), Coast Guard, and select army units to enhance their capacities to combat terrorism. 

If confirmed, I would further address the root causes of violent extremism by redoubling efforts to promote economic prosperity through both development programs 

and expanded U.S. trade and investment in Bangladesh. By working to encourage 

entrepreneurship and increase economic growth, we would reduce space for violent 

extremists to recruit unemployed and underemployed youth who are frustrated by 

limited economic opportunities.

Question. I have serious concerns about the Bangladeshi Government’s ability to 

combat human trafficking. Bangladesh is a Tier-2 human trafficking watch country 

and a major source and transit country for men, women, and children subjected to 

forced labor and sex trafficking. While I welcome the Bangladeshi Government’s recently introduced comprehensive antitrafficking legislation, more needs to be done 

to protect the rights of innocent Bangladeshi and foreign citizens.

• As Ambassador, how will you support the Bangladeshi Government’s efforts to 

fully and effectively implement its comprehensive antitrafficking legislation? 

• How is the United States engaging with other source countries in the region, 

particularly in the gulf, to combat human trafficking?

Answer. Our Embassy in Dhaka, the Department’s Office to Monitor and Combat 

Trafficking in Persons, and the South and Central Affairs Bureau helped the Government of Bangladesh draft effective, countertrafficking legislation. If confirmed, I 

would work to ensure that Bangladesh enacts this countertrafficking legislation, 

preferably before the end of the year. I would also work with the Government to 

help them draft and operationalize regulations and policies needed to effect the new 

legislation. 

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The Department of State engages on trafficking issues with Bangladesh through 

the recommendations and rankings in the TIP Report, Action Plans, foreign assistance, and diplomatic relationships. The Department urges Bangladesh to criminalize the activities of fraudulent labor recruiters and to ensure that its embassies 

in the gulf adequately protect Bangladeshi citizens. The Department urges the destination countries in the gulf to reform their sponsorship systems (which contribute 

to labor trafficking) to ensure that migrant workers can obtain legal redress, to 

criminalize passport withholding (or to enforce those laws, if already passed), and 

to prosecute human traffickers.

Question. Demographic pressures and environmental challenges pose a serious 

threat to Bangladesh’s food security. Rising sea levels and increased salinity in lowlying areas have led to lower crop yields at a time of increasing population growth, 

with some estimates predicting the population could double to 300 million by 2050.

• What steps is the United States taking to help mitigate the adverse effects of 

climate change to ensure Bangladesh’s future food security? 

• As Ambassador, how will you work to promote the long-term sustainability of 

U.S. and international assistance programs in Bangladesh, such as Feed the 

Future, the Global Health Initiative, and the Global Climate Change Initiative?

Answer. The U.S. Government climate change strategy in Bangladesh is aligned 

with the Government of Bangladesh’s Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan, 

which recognizes that the adverse effects of climate change are a major development 

challenge. Through the Feed the Future, Global Health and Global Climate Change 

Initiatives, the United States is working to improve the management of natural resources while diversifying livelihood opportunities, managing climate risk and enhancing capacity for low emission development, so Bangladesh can mitigate the adverse effects of climate change while also providing sustainable economic benefits 

and clean energy resources. 

For example, under the Feed the Future Initiative, the United States is supporting efforts to develop and apply innovative technologies to increase agricultural 

productivity while helping farmers adapt to the effects of climate change. Accounting for 48 percent of the actively employed labor force and 21 percent of gross domestic product, agriculture plays an integral role in the lives of the people of Bangladesh. The USG is supporting research efforts to develop pest and climate shockresistant crop varieties with higher yields and increased nutritional content. Once 

these improved varieties have been developed and tested, they will be scaled up to 

benefit farmers across Bangladesh. The USG is also introducing best practices in 

agricultural management such as conservation agriculture using minimum tillage, 

fertilizer deep placement and alternative wet-dry irrigation. 

The USG is also focusing on improving fisheries and aquaculture production 

through improved brood stock, disease-free seed and the introduction of cage production technologies. These technical efforts will be complemented by capacity-building 

programs for farmers, business and government representatives, as well as efforts 

to improve the business enabling environment and overcome production and marketing bottlenecks. 

USAID has embarked on an ambitious procurement reform effort that aims to 

channel significant portions of our development funding through local organizations. 

Thus, USG programs in key sectors are increasingly implemented by local experts 

and organizations. These reforms build capacity and technical skills in addition to 

advancing USG objectives in food security, agriculture, health and climate change. 

All activities have sustainability plans that focus on our ultimate goal of ‘‘working 

ourselves out of a job.’’

If confirmed, I would continue to coordinate with the Government of Bangladesh 

and other donors to ensure that our collective efforts are complementary and aimed 

at achieving sustainable results. The GOB has developed national strategic plans 

in key sectors that correspond with our Feed the Future, Global Health and Global 

Climate Change Initiatives. The USG is a member of the local consultative group, 

a mechanism for donor coordination that is led by the GOB Ministry of Finance. By 

coordinating with other donors and aligning our programs with GOB strategic planning, Embassy Dhaka ensures the sustainability of USG development programs.

Question. I have been impressed by the administration’s stated intention to engage more deeply with civil society around the world. It is imperative that the 

United States forge broad coalitions across all sectors of civil society, including political activists, academics, business leaders, faith-based communities and NGOs.

• What specific steps will you take to engage with civil society in Bangladesh? 

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• Will you make a special effort to reach out to civil society members beyond the 

Embassy’s traditional interlocutors? Will you travel to all regions of the country 

to ensure a broad-based approach to the Embassy’s civil society outreach?

Answer. Nowhere is engagement with civil society more important than in Bangladesh. Civil society in Bangladesh has led and sustained much of the progress 

Bangladesh has made in recent decades on many fronts, including maternal and 

child health, women’s empowerment, disaster preparedness and management, and 

education. Pioneering civil society organizations include BRAC and the Nobel Peace 

Prize-winning Grameen Bank, which revolutionized the concept of microfinance by 

providing millions of poor people, especially women, with access to capital through 

microloans. Civil society also encompasses hundreds of smaller organizations outside the international limelight, including some that partner with USAID on a number of foreign assistance projects. If confirmed, I would work tirelessly to ensure 

that foreign and local NGOs are able to continue their good works without undue 

restriction, helping Bangladeshis to help themselves, while bolstering democratic institutions and fostering economic development. I would continue my predecessors’ 

tradition of consulting regularly with civil society leaders as I seek to build on and 

expand Embassy Dhaka’s already robust engagement with Bangladeshi civil society 

groups. 

I know from personal experience, especially my Peace Corps service in then-Zaire 

over 35 years ago, that engaging with civil society leaders is important not only in 

capitals, but in towns and the countryside, where, in the case of Bangladesh, most 

of the people live. Though many of these places may be remote and difficult to get 

to, if I am confirmed as Ambassador, I would visit all 64 of its districts. Harkening 

back to my Peace Corps days, I’m not afraid of getting my hands dirty, and I want 

to meet and hear from the people doing the hard work of development at the grassroots level. 

RESPONSE OF ROBERT A. MANDELL TO QUESTION SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN

Question. In 2010, Luxembourg spent approximately 0.6 percent of GDP on defense, which is well below the 2.0 percent of GDP that is the NATO target. Should 

Luxembourg contribute more to NATO?

Answer. The Luxembourg Army is the sole military force for the Grand Duchy, 

which has no air force, navy, or air defense force. The Luxembourg Army has an 

approximate strength of 1,000 troops. A founding NATO member, Luxembourg contributes troops to nine international missions, including 23 troops to the Kosovo 

Force (KFOR) and 9 troops to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 

in Afghanistan, which are embedded with Belgian troops in Kabul. Luxembourg also 

contributes a troop contingent to NATO, as well as territorial facilities and logistic 

support, with the NATO Maintenance and Support Agency (NAMSA) headquartered 

in Capellen and U.S. Air Forces in Europe Central Region Storage Facility in 

Sanem. Recognizing the limitations of direct military contributions due to its small 

size, Luxembourg has sought other avenues to make meaningful contributions. Luxembourg has made a long-term commitment to purchase A400M heavy cargo aircraft to address strategic lift shortfalls in NATO, which will be based in Belgium 

and maintained by the Belgian Air Force. Luxembourg also provided overseas development assistance in 2010 in the amount equal to 1.05 percent of GDP, which is 

well above the international target norm of 0.7 percent of GDP. The Government 

of Luxembourg believes that consideration should be given to its overall contributions, as well as to its defense contributions on a per capita basis, since the population of Luxembourg is approximately 500,000. 

We recognize Luxembourg’s strong contributions given its size, and we continue 

to encourage all NATO allies to commit 2 percent of GDP to defense. If confirmed, 

I will work closely with the Government of Luxembourg to ensure that it continues 

to support NATO and its burden-sharing responsibilities within the alliance. 

(713)

NOMINATIONS 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 5, 2011

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

Susan Denise Page, of Illinois, to be Ambassador to the Republic 

of South Sudan 

Adrienne S. O’Neal, of Michigan, to be Ambassador to the Republic 

of Cape Verde 

Mary Beth Leonard, of Massachusetts, to be Ambassador to the 

Republic of Mali 

Mark Francis Brzezinski, of Virginia, to be Ambassador to Sweden 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher A. 

Coons, presiding. 

Present: Senators Coons, Lugar, Inhofe, and Isakson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. COONS,

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE 

Senator COONS. Good morning. I would like to call this nomination hearing to order. 

I am honored to chair this hearing for the ambassadorial nominees to South Sudan, Mali, Cape Verde, and Sweden. All four 

nominees have impressive records of accomplishment in international affairs, and I very much look forward to hearing their priorities for advancing our national interests and goals. 

If confirmed, all three nominees for Africa will serve at an exciting, critical, and challenging time as we seek to deepen our economic ties and investments, promote essential development and 

health initiatives, expand our security cooperation in counterterrorism and counternarcotics, and broaden our conversations 

about our shared values and priorities for the future of Africa. 

In Europe, we expect, we hope, to continue our long tradition of 

close cooperation with Sweden as it works through the United 

Nations, the EU, and NATO on shared international priorities. 

Our first nominee this morning is Susan Page, nominated to be 

the United States very first Ambassador to the new nation of South 

Sudan. This nomination recognizes the central role the United 

States played in the birth of that country and the importance of 

our longstanding relationship with the people of South Sudan. 

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The jubilation surrounding the July 9 independence has subsequently been somewhat tempered by the sobering realities of the 

challenges facing the world’s newest country. Many issues with 

Sudan remain unresolved, including the status of Abyei, arrangements on oil transit and revenues, the demarcation of disputed borders, and many others. Fierce fighting in the regions of South 

Kordofan and Blue Nile has resulted in death, displacement, and 

a lack of access for humanitarian workers. South-south violence is 

also significant. Poverty is endemic. Health and education infrastructure are all seriously inadequate. 

And despite these challenges, South Sudan is a place of hope for 

millions of residents who have waited decades for their freedom. 

The south has significant oil reserves and, with the proper agricultural assistance, the potential to be a regional bread basket. 

Ms. Page is no newcomer to Sudan, having served from 2002 to 

2005 as the legal advisor to the Sudanese mediation process where 

she helped negotiate and draft key provisions of the CPA, or the 

Comprehensive Peace Agreement. She also served as Director of 

the Rule of Law and Prison Advocacy at the U.N. peacekeeping 

mission to Sudan in Khartoum. Ms. Page has worked previously for 

the State Department and USAID in Botswana, Rwanda, and 

Kenya, and currently serves as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 

for African Affairs at the State Department. 

Moving westward, we consider the nomination of Mary Beth 

Leonard to be Ambassador to Mali, a poor, land-locked nation 

which has emerged as a model of democratic governance in the 

past 2 decades and has developed vibrant economic sectors in gold 

mining and cotton production. After decades of dictatorship, Mali’s 

transition to democracy in the 1990s led to unprecedented civil 

liberties for their people and resulted in their first-ever democratically elected President turning over power peacefully to his successor after serving two terms. 

The United States has had excellent relations with Mali and 

found it a committed partner in fighting terrorism in the Sahel. We 

remain deeply concerned about the activities of AQIM and the possible spillover of arms from the current conflict in Libya and concerned about Mali’s low standards of living as evidenced by its 

rankings near the bottom of the world in indicators of health and 

education. 

Ms. Leonard is well placed to answer these challenges, having 

served previously as Deputy Chief of Mission at our Embassy in 

Mali and currently serving as Director of West African Affairs at 

the State Department. Her other Foreign Service postings include 

Surinam, South Africa, Togo, Namibia, and Cameroon, as well as 

a number of tours here in Washington. 

Adrienne O’Neal is Ambassador-nominee for Cape Verde, a small 

island nation off of Africa’s West Coast with historic ties to Portugal and a striking record of economic growth in recent years with 

an average per capita income of $3,000, a literacy rate of 84 percent, high rates of immunization, and low rates of maternal death. 

Cape Verde’s average standard of living is much higher than many 

of its regional neighbors, and in 2010, it successfully completed a 

5-year MCC compact focused on improving the investment climate 

and upgrading infrastructure. Cape Verde’s sandy beaches bring 

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tourists to its shores, and its fishing industry provides important 

employment as well as export revenue. U.S. interests in Cape 

Verde include a large expatriate diaspora community in the United 

States, particularly in New England, as well as maritime security 

and counternarcotics cooperation with the government. 

Ms. O’Neal brings to her position experience as a senior Foreign 

Service officer currently serving as director in the Office of Career 

Development. She is a Portuguese speaker who served as Deputy 

Chief of Mission in Lisbon and held positions in Mozambique, 

Rome, Rio de Janeiro, and Buenos Aires, and in the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs. 

Finally, we welcome a nominee to a country far from Africa, 

Mark Brzezinski, to be Ambassador to Sweden. Sweden is a strong 

ally of the United States, supporting NATO and the U.N. and participating in critical multilateral military missions in both Libya 

and Afghanistan. Sweden is well known in the developing world as 

a generous and effective donor in the fields of humanitarian and 

development work. 

Sweden’s responsible management of its own economy spared it 

from the fiscal woes currently facing many of its European neighbors and I might dare say our own Nation, but even Sweden faces 

critical challenges in the future. The rise of the Sweden Democrats 

as a political party with supremacist and racist, arguably, roots signal wider discontent among the younger and unemployed and raise 

questions about the direction they might take. 

Mr. Brzezinski brings to this challenge of serving in Sweden significant experience and background. He is an attorney currently at 

McGuire Woods, focusing on international law. He made a name 

for himself as an expert in Russian affairs, worked at the NSC in 

the Clinton administration as Director of Southeastern European 

Affairs, serves on the Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board, and 

has worked at Columbia University School of International Affairs 

where he has taught. 

I welcome all four of today’s distinguished nominees and look forward to hearing from each of you in turn. 

I will now turn the floor over to Senator Isakson for his opening 

statement. 

Senator Isakson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON,

U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to all 

of you and congratulations on your nomination. And thank you for 

your willingness to serve the United States of America. 

I particularly want to welcome Mr. Brzezinski. I will have to 

show a little preference here. I am a second generation Swedish 

American. So when I learned today that you would be here for confirmation, I got here promptly on time——

[Laughter.] 

Senator ISAKSON [continuing]. Because, A, I wanted to meet you 

and, B, I wanted to share with all my relatives I had talked to the 

new Ambassador who is on the way to Stockholm. 

But Sweden is a great country. My grandfather emigrated here 

in 1903. He was a stone mason who built the first post office in 

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George West, TX, and later came to Atlanta, GA. Fortunately for 

me, he and his wife, Josephine, had a young son, who was my 

father, and I became a second-generation American when I was 

born here in 1944. 

But Sweden is a great country and a great partner and a great 

visionary in terms of clean energy and green energy and a lot of 

things that they have taken a real leadership role in. So you will 

enjoy your stay in Sweden and we appreciate very much your 

accepting the nomination. 

To Ms. Leonard, Ms. O’Neal, and Ms. Page, thank you very 

much. You are all going to some very challenging places. You are 

going to a place where you will have to work overtime and do a 

lot of things probably no other ambassador would ever think they 

had to do. But all of you are going to places that are critical to the 

United States of America and critical to our relationship with the 

African Continent. 

I have said on many occasions I think Africa is the continent of 

the 21st century for the United States of America. I think it is 

critical that we continue to do what we have done there in terms 

of PEPFAR and MCC, but also in building democracies, doing away 

with corruption, and elevating the economy of the African 

countries. 

And, Ms. Page, I have been to the Sudan. I have been to Darfur. 

I worked with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement team, led by 

the U.N. team. And I know you worked with the U.N. leading up 

to some of the laws that are currently being implemented now in 

a free South Sudan. So we have many challenges in the next 2 

years and we are going to go one way or another. I hope it goes 

to new heights for that country, but there are lots of challenges and 

your leadership is going to be critical in seeing to it that neither 

terrorism nor corruption end up dominating a new fledgling nation 

in the South Sudan. 

But to all of you, thank you very much for your willingness to 

serve your country, and thank you for being here today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Isakson. 

I would now like to invite the ranking minority member of the 

full committee, Senator Lugar, to make an opening statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I join my colleagues in welcoming each of the nominees today. I 

have reviewed your credentials. I believe that each of you is well 

qualified to represent the United States at embassies in Africa and, 

in the case of Mr. Brzezinski, in Europe. 

I appreciate the willingness of each of you to serve at this critical 

time to undertake the family sacrifices that often accompany such 

an ambassadorial post. 

Somewhat like my colleague, Mr. Isakson, I want to offer a special welcome to Mark Brzezinski who is a near neighbor and has 

been nominated to be Ambassador now to Sweden. We were, many 

of us, in the House of Sweden last evening, state persons from all 

over the world celebrating the 10th anniversary of the Nuclear 

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Threat Initiative, and we appreciate very much the hospitality of 

the Swedes. They are looking forward to having you aboard representing our country, Mark. 

I have known Mark personally for many years. He possesses a 

first-rate intellect, a talented communicator who would be adept at 

framing United States interests for the people and the Government 

of Sweden. His extensive knowledge of European history, culture, 

and politics are informed both by his scholarship and his personal 

experience. His academic and legal credentials are impressive, having earned a law degree from the University of Virginia, a doctorate in political science from Oxford University. 

As he has pursued his legal practice, he has made foreign policy 

analysis and civic involvement a central part of his career. In addition to his service on the National Security Council, he has written 

prolifically about U.S. foreign policy, the Atlantic alliance, Middle 

East dynamics, and many other topics. 

Beyond his outstanding credentials, he is a serious and thoughtful individual of high character, demonstrating a keen sense of responsibility to lead a life of achievement and service to our Nation. 

I am confident he will make an excellent Ambassador to advance 

our interests in Sweden. 

I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to 

make this statement. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Lugar. 

Senator Inhofe, also a member of the committee and whose interest and engagement with Africa is legendary, also would like to 

make an opening statement. 

Senator Inhofe. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE,

U.S. SENATOR FROM OKLAHOMA 

Senator INHOFE. I will make it very brief because I may have to 

leave before the conclusion of this meeting. 

But I support all four nominees, and I have met personally with 

three of the four. I think I recall saying to Ms. O’Neal, having visited Cape Verde on numerous occasions, I might consider swapping 

jobs with you. [Laughter.] 

And I want to say to Ms. Page 4 days ago I was in South Sudan. 

It is so exciting to see a new country to develop intimate relations 

with the leadership of that country. We had 20 Members of Parliament and five members of the ministry in one room for over 2 

hours, getting to know each one of them individually, as I told you 

in my office we were planning to do. Well, that happened. 

And I can see the challenges are incredible there. I mean, just 

the fact that it is a new country. 

So I think you are the right one to do this, but I wanted you to 

know that we broke them in for you. So they will be waiting for 

you when you get there. And I will look forward to spending some 

time with you and with those 25 that we have met and gotten to 

know on a personal basis. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

We will now hear in order, if we might, from each of our four 

nominees, our witnesses today. Please start, if you would, by also 

718

introducing your families. As each of us has commented, we recognize the significant sacrifice that taking on these posts will mean 

for you and for your extended families. So we are grateful for their 

willingness to join with you, work with you, and support you in 

undertaking these missions as well. 

So if we might first, Ms. Page. 

STATEMENT OF SUSAN DENISE PAGE, OF ILLINOIS, TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN 

Ms. PAGE. Thank you very much, Chairman Coons, Ranking 

Member Isakson, and members of the committee. It is an honor to 

appear before you today as the nominee to be the first United 

States Ambassador to the Republic of South Sudan. I am grateful 

for the confidence the President and Secretary of State have shown 

by nominating me to this position and for the support of Assistant 

Secretary for African Affairs, Ambassador Johnnie Carson. 

First, let me acknowledge my family members as you have invited me to do. My husband, Damien Coulibaly, and my son, 

Marius. And I have extended family and friends who have been 

longstanding supporters of me both professionally and personally, 

and I really thank them for being here. My parents, although they 

are not with us here today—they are hopefully watching on TV. 

But I would like to thank them especially for their support and instilling in me a desire to serve and my love of foreign affairs. 

Let me turn to South Sudan and also acknowledge the presence 

of members from the Government of South Sudan who are here 

today, and it is a pleasure to see them in the audience. 

Mr. Chairman, as the newest member of the international community and the 193rd country admitted to the United Nations, the 

Republic of South Sudan is home to American Embassy Juba, the 

newest U.S. mission in the world. If confirmed, I would be honored 

to lead Embassy Juba in advancing U.S. interests with our growing 

team of mission personnel. The work Embassy Juba will do in 

South Sudan will represent a new chapter and a deep history 

between the United States and the people of South Sudan. And I 

am delighted that already Senator Inhofe has made his way and 

made things easier for me if I am confirmed. 

Mr. Chairman, our main interests in South Sudan are stability, 

strengthening democracy, economic viability, and internal and 

regional peace and security. As the largest bilateral donor since 

2005, the United States will need to multilateralize our approach 

as we work with the South Sudanese on meeting its development 

needs, enabling prosperity and success for all South Sudanese. 

Mr. Chairman, as you know, our focus will remain on promoting 

a peaceful relationship between the Republic of South Sudan and 

the Republic of Sudan, particularly in Abyei Area and in the two 

Sudanese states of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. The avoidance of a return to war between Sudan and South Sudan and the 

speedy resolution of the remaining CPA issues will remain a 

priority. 

We also remain concerned by the regional threat posed by the 

Lord’s Resistance Army. The United States will need to assist the 

south in navigating these challenges, maximizing civilian protection, individual human rights, and fundamental freedoms. The 

719

United States will need to continue to promote the professionalization of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, the SPLA, under civilian control with respect for human rights. 

Mr. Chairman, the establishment of a strong economic and development foundation is critical to the long-term success of South 

Sudan. If confirmed, I will work closely with USAID to help South 

Sudan provide basic services to its citizens, diversify its economy, 

and accelerate the development of critical infrastructure, human 

capacity, investments in the agricultural sector, and strong regional economic relationships. 

South Sudan will receive an estimated $4 billion to $5 billion in 

oil revenues annually and will have the necessary resources to invest in building strong institutions run by capable individuals. This 

is a unique opportunity to get it right by managing its resources 

efficiently, creating fiscal transparency, ending corruption, and 

avoiding the pitfalls that beset so many resource-rich nations. The 

United States has been the leading donor in the area of democratic 

reform and good governance, and if confirmed, I will work to ensure the effective financial oversight of these programs. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, my highest priority will be 

the protection of American citizens and the promotion of American 

business interests. We will need to expand opportunities and trade 

for American companies by emphasizing that South Sudan is free 

from sanctions and is open for business. 

Currently assignment to Mission Juba is unaccompanied, and I 

like everyone else at post will leave behind my family. As the U.S. 

Embassy expands in South Sudan, the mission will need to consider its current infrastructure and footprint, as well as future 

needs, ensuring that we have the safest and most secure facilities 

available. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed as the first U.S. Ambassador to the 

Republic of South Sudan, I will draw upon my experience negotiating and drafting the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, my time 

living and working in Khartoum and in Juba, and my current management experience as the Deputy Assistant Secretary in the 

Bureau of African Affairs at the State Department. 

If confirmed by the Senate, I look forward to working closely 

with the members of this committee and I would hope to welcome 

you to Juba during my tenure. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the honor to appear before 

the committee today. I would be happy to take any questions you 

may have. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Page follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUSAN D. PAGE

Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, and members of the committee, it is 

an honor to appear before you today as the nominee to be the first United States 

Ambassador to the Republic of South Sudan. I am grateful for the confidence the 

President and Secretary of State have shown by nominating me to this position, and 

for the support of Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Ambassador Johnnie 

Carson. 

First, Mr. Chairman, let me acknowledge my immediate family members who are 

here today. I am truly grateful for the love and support of my husband, Damien 

Coulibaly, and my son, Marius, who is a freshman in high school. They have endured numerous separations from me, particularly as I worked for nearly 3 years 

away from home on the mediation team to negotiate and draft what turned into the 

720

Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) for Sudan. Their understanding and encouragement have meant more to me than they can possibly know. I would also like to 

thank my colleagues and friends who are present today. They have offered me wisdom, guidance, and friendship on a wide range of subjects—both professional and 

personal—throughout the years. I’m delighted that they could be here today. While 

my parents, Dr. and Mrs. Harold Page, are not here in person today, they deserve 

much of the credit for my accomplishments and for instilling in me a desire for service and the love of foreign cultures and international travel. 

Mr. Chairman, as the newest member of the international community, and the 

193rd country admitted to the United Nations, the Republic of South Sudan is home 

to American Embassy Juba, the newest U.S. mission in the world. If confirmed, I 

would be honored to lead Embassy Juba at this unique moment in history, in advancing U.S. interests with our growing team of Foreign and Civil Service personnel, military staff, and locally engaged employees. The work Embassy Juba will 

do in South Sudan will represent a new chapter in a deep history between the 

United States and the people of South Sudan. 

Mr. Chairman, our main interests in South Sudan are stability, strengthening the 

nascent democratic state that came about through a historic self-determination referendum this past January, economic viability, and internal and regional peace and 

security. As you know, the United States has long been a steadfast partner to South 

Sudan; we are its largest bilateral donor, having providing its people more than $10 

billion in humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and security assistance since 

2005 when the CPA was signed. However, given shrinking budgets, the United 

States will need to work hard to expand the number of countries and organizations 

involved in South Sudan to ensure its long-term political and economic success moving forward. As the South begins to address its capacity-building and development 

needs, the United States will need to be prepared to work more closely, collaboratively, and creatively with a wide range of actors to build on previous and ongoing 

local and international efforts to assist the Republic of South Sudan, enabling the 

achievement of its goals of prosperity and success for all South Sudanese regardless 

of ethnicity, political affiliation, or origin. 

Mr. Chairman, as you know, our focus will remain on taking the necessary steps 

to ensure a peaceful relationship between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic 

of South Sudan, particularly with the unresolved status and borders of Abyei Area, 

and the ongoing violent conflicts in the two Sudanese states of Southern Kordofan 

and Blue Nile being waged between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan 

People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM/A–N). The avoidance of a return 

to war between Sudan and South Sudan and the speedy resolution of the remaining 

CPA issues will remain a priority in these nations, and, if confirmed, I will work 

closely with colleagues at Embassy Khartoum, as well as through multilateral organizations like the African Union and the United Nations to secure a peaceful future 

for the citizens of South Sudan. If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I will continue to reinforce our bilateral relationship as well as contribute to efforts promoting a stable, 

functioning, and peaceful South Sudan. 

Mr. Chairman, South Sudan remains confronted with internal conflict and violence incited by former military commanders and political actors who seek to destabilize the south. The actions of militia groups and ethnic disputes continue to create 

instability in regions of South Sudan, and could have devastating consequences for 

the newly formed country. We also remain concerned by the regional threat posed 

by the Lord’s Resistance Army. The United States will need to continue to assist 

the Republic of South Sudan in navigating these challenges, in a manner that maximizes civilian protection and individual human rights and fundamental freedoms. 

To this end, the United States is actively engaged in supporting international partner efforts to help transform the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) into a sustainable and professional military that operates under civilian control and respects 

human rights. 

Mr. Chairman, the establishment of a strong economic and development foundation also will be critical to the long-term success of South Sudan. If confirmed, I will 

work closely with our USAID colleagues to help the South Sudanese deliver on their 

promises to end corruption, provide basic services to its citizens, and accelerate the 

development of critical infrastructure, human capacity, investments in the agricultural sector, and strong regional economic relationships with neighboring countries 

and organizations. I look forward to working with our South Sudanese partners on 

these issues and firmly believe that inclusiveness, good governance, diversification 

of the economy, access to basic social services, (including adequate health care and 

education), as well as the development of all of the people of South Sudan, are the 

cornerstones of the country’s future success and internal and external peace. 

721

South Sudan is recovering from decades of war and will require continued support 

and assistance to develop strong institutions. South Sudan also will receive an estimated $4–$5 billion in oil revenues annually, and will have the necessary resources 

to invest heavily in building strong institutions run by capable and strong individuals. South Sudan is now faced with a unique opportunity to manage its resources 

efficiently, ensuring effective budgeting, and taking the necessary steps to create fiscal transparency to avoid the pitfalls of corruption that beset so many resource rich 

nations. While the CPA timeline has ended, critical agreements must still be 

reached between the new country and the Government of Sudan. While part of the 

promise of the CPA was realized by allowing the people of South Sudan to chart 

their own future, some of the broader goals, albeit intended for a united Sudan, 

should continue to apply for the new Republic of South Sudan: democratic governance; fair and equitable distribution of resources and revenue between the center 

and the peripheries; and the right of all people to participate in the running of the 

affairs of the country. The United States has been the leading donor in the area 

of democratic reform and good governance and, if confirmed, I will continue to make 

these programs a priority. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, my highest priority will be the protection of 

American citizens, including mission personnel, living and traveling in South 

Sudan, and the promotion of American business interests. With only a few private 

Americans in-country, we will need to work hard to welcome American companies 

and expand opportunities and trade, by emphasizing that South Sudan—having 

emerged as an independent state, and free from the sanctions that still plague its 

northern neighbor, Sudan. 

Currently, assignment to Mission Juba is unaccompanied, and I, like everyone 

else at Post, will leave my family behind. As the U.S. Embassy expands in South 

Sudan, the mission will need to consider its current infrastructure and footprint as 

well as future needs. We will need to carefully consider both the living and working 

environment to ensure that the Embassy compound will provide the safest and most 

secure facilities available. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed as the first U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of South 

Sudan, I will be drawing upon my prior experience negotiating and drafting the 

CPA and my time living and working in Khartoum and Juba from 2005 to 2007 

while heading up the U.N. peacekeeping mission’s (UNMIS) Rule of Law and Corrections Advisory Unit. I also expect my current management experience as the 

Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of African Affairs, my previous work as 

a State Department legal adviser and Foreign Service officer, as well as my work 

as regional director for Southern and East Africa at the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, will serve me well, if confirmed as U. S. Ambassador 

to South Sudan. If confirmed by the Senate, I look forward to working closely with 

the members of this committee, and would hope to welcome you to Juba during my 

tenure. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the honor to appear before the committee 

today. I would be happy to take any questions you may have.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Ms. Page. 

Ms. O’Neal. 

STATEMENT OF ADRIENNE S. O’NEAL, OF MICHIGAN, TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF CAPE VERDE 

Ms. O’NEAL. Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, and 

members of the committee, I am here today as President Obama’s 

nominee to be the next U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Cape 

Verde. I am honored and grateful to President Obama and Secretary Clinton for this tremendous vote of confidence and for this 

opportunity to appear before you. 

I have no family members here this morning. However, I did receive very early text messages from my son, Quincy, and my sister, 

Deborah. Welcome to the 21st century. 

But I do have here today with me two of my oldest and dearest 

friends, Professor Patricia Aufderheide who is the director of the 

Center for Social Media at American University and many other 

722

things, and Dr. Robin Madrid who was recently one of NDI’s most 

successful program officers in Yemen. 

I will also claim the support of Ambassador Johnny Young, who 

was a tremendous role model to me throughout my career and is 

here today also to support me, as well as others. 

The 10 islands that compose the Republic of Cape Verde lie just 

300 miles from the coast of West Africa. In stark contrast to the 

countries in its neighborhood, Cape Verde boasts an unbroken 

tradition of civilian rule since its independence in 1975. It is a wonderful African success story of progress toward lasting political stability and the creation of functional democratic institutions. 

Cape Verde’s relationship with the United States has been strong 

since we opened our first consulate there in 1818. Today, with more 

than 450,000 Americans of Cape Verdean origin, we can truly say 

that Americans from Cape Verde participate fully in our most 

treasured traditions and safeguard our most heartfelt values. One 

of the most salient examples of this is the late George Lima, an 

American of Cape Verdean descent, who was among the ranks of 

the celebrated Tuskegee Airmen in the Second World War. 

From the platform of the deep affinity between our two countries, 

the United States engages with Cape Verde on a number of serious 

challenges. Among them, maritime security and transnational 

crime are key. The country’s vast territorial waters and its strategic position to north-south sea routes made it a natural to host 

NATO’s first live military exercise in Africa in 2006. The Government of Cape Verde has strongly supported counternarcotics maneuvers and is a willing host to U.S. ship visits. In this regard, 

Cape Verde is a model in the region for strategic partnership. If 

confirmed, it is my goal to maintain and enhance this multilateral 

and interagency collaboration. 

U.S. engagement in support of Cape Verde’s economic and commercial development has yielded encouraging results. Cape Verde’s 

first Millennium Challenge Compact was successfully completed

in 2010, producing significant gains in all three of its projects, 

namely, improvements in transportation networks facilitating integration of internal markets; improvements in water management 

and soil conservation which promoted increases in farms’ profits 

and incomes; and support to Cape Verdean microfinance institutions. Cape Verde’s continued strong governance has resulted in its 

selection as the first country to qualify for a second Millennium 

Challenge Compact. It is my hope, if confirmed, to engage Cape 

Verde in consolidating these gains. 

Peace Corps activities have contributed to strengthening Cape 

Verde’s civil society since 1988. The 50-plus volunteers currently 

serving across seven islands work with the Cape Verdean Government to enhance the teaching of English as a second language, 

train English language instructors, and develop small enterprise 

and entrepreneurship. If confirmed, I intend to build upon Peace 

Corps successes to encourage higher education opportunities and 

stimulate small business development with U.S. partners. 

Mr. Chairman, prior assignments to United States missions in 

Lusophone nations, Brazil, Portugal, and Mozambique, have 

equipped me with a cultural knowledge and language skills to connect smoothly with the Cape Verdean Government and with the 

723

Cape Verdean people. Similarly, if confirmed, I will draw upon expertise gained in positions of leadership I have held throughout my 

28-year tenure in the Foreign Service to address the peculiar challenges entailed in managing the U.S. mission in Cape Verde. These 

include a small and crowded workplace and the mentoring of entrylevel officers who staff the majority of the Embassy’s positions. In 

addition, if confirmed, I intend to uphold and execute the primary 

responsibility of every United States Embassy which is to promote 

the safety and welfare of American citizens abroad. 

I would be pleased to take your questions now. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. O’Neal follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADRIENNE S. O’NEAL

Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, and members of the committee, I am 

here today as President Obama’s nominee to be the next United States Ambassador 

to the Republic of Cape Verde. I am honored and grateful to President Obama and 

Secretary Clinton for this tremendous vote of confidence and for this opportunity to 

appear before you. 

The 10 islands that compose the Republic of Cape Verde lie just 300 miles from 

the West Coast of Africa. In stark contrast to the countries in its neighborhood, 

Cape Verde boasts an unbroken tradition of civilian rule since its independence in 

1975. It is a wonderful African success story of progress toward lasting political stability and the creation of functional democratic institutions. 

Cape Verde’s relationship with the United States has been strong since we opened 

our first consulate there in 1818. Today, with more than 450,000 Americans of Cape 

Verdean origin, we can truly say that Americans from Cape Verde participate fully 

in our most treasured traditions and safeguard our most heartfelt values. One of 

the most salient examples of this is the late George Lima, an American of Cape 

Verdean descent who was among the ranks of the celebrated Tuskegee Airmen in 

the Second World War. 

From the platform of the deep affinity between our two countries, the United 

States engages with Cape Verde on a number of serious challenges. Among them, 

maritime security and transnational crime are key. The country’s vast territorial 

waters and its strategic position to north-south sea routes made it a natural to host 

NATO’s first live military exercise in Africa in 2006. The Government of Cape Verde 

has strongly supported counternarcotics maneuvers and is a willing host to U.S. 

ship visits. In this regard, Cape Verde is a model in the region for strategic partnership. If confirmed, it is my goal to maintain and enhance this multilateral and interagency collaboration. 

U.S engagement in support of Cape Verde’s economic and commercial development has yielded encouraging results. Cape Verde’s first Millennium Challenge 

Compact was successfully completed in 2010, producing significant gains in all three 

of its projects, namely: (1) improvements in transportation networks facilitating integration of internal markets; (2) improvements in water management and soil conservation, which promoted increases in farms profits and incomes; and, (3) support 

to Cape Verdean microfinance institutions. Cape Verde’s continued strong governance performance resulted in its selection as the first country to qualify for a second 

Millennium Challenge Compact. It is my hope, if confirmed, to engage Cape Verde 

in consolidating these gains. 

Peace Corps activities have contributed to strengthening Cape Verde’s civil society 

since 1988. The 50-plus Volunteers currently serving across seven islands work with 

the Cape Verdean Government to enhance the teaching of English as a second language, train English language instructors, and develop small enterprise and entrepreneurship. If confirmed, I intend to build upon Peace Corps successes to encourage higher education opportunities and stimulate small business development with 

U.S. partners. 

Mr. Chairman, prior assignments to U.S. missions in Lusophone nations, Portugal, Brazil, and Mozambique, have equipped me with the cultural knowledge and 

language skills to connect smoothly with the Cape Verdean Government and people. 

Similarly, if confirmed, I will draw upon expertise gained in positions of leadership 

I have held throughout my 28-year tenure in the Foreign Service to address the peculiar challenges entailed in managing the U.S. mission in Cape Verde. These include a small and crowded workspace and the mentoring of entry-level officers who 

staff the majority of the Embassy’s positions. In addition, if confirmed, I intend to 

724

uphold and execute the primary responsibility of every United States Embassy, 

which is to promote the safety and welfare of Americans citizens abroad. 

I would now be pleased to answer any of your questions.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Ms. O’Neal. 

Ms. Leonard. 

STATEMENT OF MARY BETH LEONARD, OF MASSACHUSETTS, 

TO BE AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF MALI 

Ms. LEONARD. Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today as 

the nominee to be the next United States Ambassador to the 

Republic of Mali. I am grateful for the confidence the President and 

Secretary of State have shown by nominating me to this position 

and for the support of Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, 

Johnnie Carson. 

First, Mr. Chairman, let me acknowledge family and friends and 

colleagues who are like family who are here today. I am accompanied by my sister Ann Marie Stroika and her husband David; 

and behind them, by a cousin, Matthew Kerry. I am also delighted 

to welcome Ambassador Johnny and Mrs. Angelina Young, as well 

as valiant Mali Desk Officer, Manuela Borges, and other colleagues 

from African Affairs. 

I would also like to acknowledge and signal my gratitude for the 

presence of Ambassador Toure who is Mali’s Ambassador to the 

United States. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I look forward to leading Embassy 

Bamako and advancing U.S. interests in Mali, a constitutional 

democracy rooted in principles of free expression and tolerance that 

offers an example for West Africa and beyond. These qualities 

make Mali a valued partner for the United States. 

Our main interests in Mali lie in consolidating that democracy, 

furthering economic development, and countering the incursion of 

terrorism that threatens Mali’s physical security as well as its most 

cherished ideals. 

Mali is poised to enter a new era in its democratic journey. President Amadou Toumani Toure has made clear his intention to leave 

office at the end of his second term next June as prescribed by the 

constitution. If confirmed, I would look forward to shaping U.S. 

activities to encourage constructive popular participation in the 

2012 elections and to support ongoing democratic consolidation. 

Mr. Chairman, the environment for addressing security challenges in the Sahel, notably the threat posed by al-Qaeda-linked 

terrorists, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, is also 

evolving. Events in Libya pose delicate challenges for Mali as it 

ponders the possible impact of combatants and weaponry leaking 

into an already uncertain Sahel. This prospect provides a powerful 

impetus for cooperation among Mali and its neighbors to safeguard 

the Sahel. This regional counterterrorism cooperation is an important counterpart to United States efforts to build the capacity of 

Mali’s military, and I would be honored to further hone these 

activities to Mali’s needs and plans, if confirmed. 

Mr. Chairman, U.S. development efforts bring well focused interventions in health, education, agriculture, and governance to what 

remains a desperately poor nation. These programs are closely inteVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00732 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
725

grated with our democracy and counterterrorism goals in a wellcoordinated interagency effort. In decentralizing the provision of 

health and education services, we also help Mali amplify the message at the heart of the essential contract of democracy, that a government exists to serve its people. In the remote north of Mali, an 

area that faces terrorist incursions, development reinforces the tolerant Malian people’s rejection of extremism and strengthens the 

ties that bind the state with even its farthest flung citizens. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, my highest priority will be 

the protection of Americans and American business interests, including mission personnel, living and traveling in Mali. I would 

look forward to engaging U.S. businesses and nongovernmental 

organizations on consular and security matters. 

The mission is fortunate to have occupied a new embassy compound nearly 5 years ago. One of the most impressive structures 

in Bamako, it is an important symbol of our long-term commitment 

to Mali. If confirmed, I would be closely engaged in ensuring the 

good stewardship of this significant U.S. Government investment. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe my Foreign Service experience to date 

has prepared me to serve as Ambassador to Mali. Should the Senate’s confirmation permit me to return to Bamako where, as you 

noted, I previously served as Deputy Chief of Mission before becoming West African Affairs Director, I hope that my familiarity with 

Malian issues and contacts would serve our interests well. Many of 

Mali’s finest citizens make up the locally employed staff at our 

Embassy, and it would be an honor to work with them again as 

Ambassador to Mali. 

If confirmed by the Senate, I look forward to working closely 

with you and other members of the committee and would hope to 

welcome you to Bamako during my tenure. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the honor to appear before 

the committee today, and I would be happy to take any questions 

you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Leonard follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARY BETH LEONARD

Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, members of the committee, it is an 

honor to appear before you today as the nominee to be the next United States Ambassador to the Republic of Mali. I am grateful for the confidence the President and 

Secretary of State have shown by nominating me to this position, and for the support of Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Johnnie Carson. 

First, Mr. Chairman, let me acknowledge several family members and friends and 

colleagues who are like family here today. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I look forward to leading Embassy Bamako in advancing U.S. interests in Mali, a constitutional democracy rooted in the principles 

of free expression and tolerance that offers an example for West Africa and beyond; 

these qualities make Mali a valued partner for the United States. Our main interests in Mali lie in: consolidating that democracy; furthering economic development; 

and countering the incursion of terrorism that threatens Mali’s physical security as 

well as its most cherished ideals. 

Mali is poised to enter a new era in its democratic journey. President Amadou 

Toumani Toure ́ has made clear his intention to leave office at the end of his second 

term next June as prescribed by the Constitution. If confirmed, I would look forward 

to shaping U.S. activities to encourage constructive popular participation in the 

2012 elections and support ongoing democratic consolidation. 

Mr. Chairman, the environment for addressing security challenges in the Sahel—

including, but not limited to, the threat of al-Qaeda-linked terrorists—is also evolving. Events in Libya pose delicate challenges for this near-neighbor, as it ponders 

the possible impact of combatants and weaponry leaking into an already uncertain 

726

Sahel. This prospect provides a powerful impetus for cooperation among Mali and 

its neighbors to safeguard the Sahel. This regional counterterrorism cooperation is 

an important counterpart to U.S. efforts to build the capacity of Mali’s military, 

which I would be honored to further hone to their needs and plans if confirmed. 

Mr. Chairman, U.S. development efforts bring well-focused interventions in 

health, education, agriculture, and governance to what remains a desperately poor 

nation. These programs are closely integrated with our democracy and counterterrorism goals in a well-coordinated interagency effort. In decentralizing the provision of health and education, we also help Mali amplify the message at the heart 

of the essential contract of democracy—that a government exists to serve its people. 

In the remote north of Mali—an area that faces terrorist incursions—development 

reinforces the tolerant Malian people’s rejection of extremism as espoused by AQIM, 

and strengthens the ties that bind the state with even its farthest flung citizens. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, my highest priority will be the protection of 

Americans and American business interests, including mission personnel, living and 

traveling in Mali. I would look forward to engaging U.S. businesses and nongovernmental organizations on consular and security matters. The mission is fortunate to 

have occupied a New Embassy Compound nearly 5 years ago. One of the most impressive structures in Bamako, it is an important symbol of our long-term commitment to Mali. If confirmed, I would be closely engaged in ensuring the good stewardship of this significant U.S. Government investment. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe my Foreign Service experience to date has prepared me 

to serve as Ambassador to Mali. Should the Senate’s confirmation permit me to return to Bamako, where I previously served as Deputy Chief of Mission before becoming West African Affairs Director, I hope that my familiarity with Malian issues 

and contacts would serve our interests well. Many of Mali’s finest citizens make up 

the Locally Employed Staff at our Embassy, and it would be an honor to work with 

them again as Ambassador to Mali. If confirmed by the Senate, I look forward to 

working closely with you and other members of the committee, and would hope to 

welcome you to Bamako during my tenure. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the honor to appear before the committee 

today. I would be happy to take any questions you may have.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Ms. Leonard. 

Mr. Brzezinski. 

STATEMENT OF MARK FRANCIS BRZEZINSKI, OF VIRGINIA,

TO BE AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, 

Senator Lugar, and distinguished members of the Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee, thank you for the privilege of appearing 

before you today. I am deeply grateful to President Obama and 

Secretary Clinton for their support and confidence in nominating 

me to be the United States Ambassador to the Kingdom of Sweden. 

If confirmed by the Senate, I pledge to devote all my energy to 

represent the United States to the best of my ability. 

Let me add my heartfelt thanks to you, Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, and Senator Lugar, for the words that you 

said at the outset of this hearing. It is one of the proudest days of 

my life. 

I want to also acknowledge that Swedish Ambassador Hafstrom 

is here today. 

If you will permit me, I would like to introduce to the committee 

my wife, Natalia Brzezinski. We are the very proud parents of 

Aurora Emilie, a rambunctious and wonderful little girl, aged 2 

and a quarter. Life is a team sport and our little family is the 

source of so much pride, love, and support. 

My wife and I are both children of immigrants from Eastern 

Europe. My father and mother, immigrants from prewar Poland 

and Czechoslovakia respectively, instilled in me the belief that pubVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00734 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
727

lic service is the highest calling and that America is a beacon for 

the world. 

As a Fulbright grantee in Eastern Europe just after the collapse 

of the Berlin Wall, I witnessed how important American leadership 

is for democratic development and free market growth. This lesson 

has informed my experiences in international affairs since then, 

from my service on the National Security Council in the 1990s to 

my private legal practice where I counsel companies on anticorruption compliance. If confirmed, I will bring these experiences with 

me to Sweden, which is such an important partner in promoting 

democracy, human rights, and economic growth around the world. 

Sweden has risen to the global security challenges of our time 

and joined with the United States and other countries as an active 

contributor in international security missions. For example, Sweden contributes to the NATO missions in Afghanistan and Libya. 

Sweden understands, as does America, that military and diplomatic efforts are not the only tools for combating instability. Development plays a very important role. If confirmed, I pledge to 

advance the United States-Swedish cooperation on democratic development from Belarus to Ukraine to the Middle East and North 

Africa and beyond. 

America and Sweden are committed to combating terrorism and 

preventing violent extremism. In the last year, the suicide bombing 

in Stockholm, the horrific attacks in Norway, and the arrests of 

terrorist cells in the region highlight that counterterrorism is a 

common focus in our bilateral and regional relationships. 

The United States and Sweden share a strong commitment to political participation of women. This is personified by the inclusion 

of Sweden’s former Minister of Enterprise and Energy, Maud 

Olofsson, on Secretary Clinton’s International Council on Women’s 

Business Leadership. If confirmed, I pledge to advance our collaboration with Sweden to promote women in politics and business. 

The United States and Sweden share an important trading partnership and a commitment to green energy. If confirmed, I will 

build on the close cooperation our Embassy has forged with Sweden 

on alternative energy and environmental sustainability. 

This year, Sweden took over the rotating chairmanship of the 

Arctic Council. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Sweden 

to advance our common goals of protecting the environment and 

conserving the Arctic’s biological resources while promoting economic cooperation and protecting Arctic communities with other 

Arctic Council members. 

As a former Fulbright recipient, I appreciate the value of international exchange programs. If confirmed, I envision fostering further support for exchange programs, especially those that advance 

green energy and clean technology. 

Let me close with a personal story. My grandfather, Tadeusz 

Brzezinski, served as Poland’s consul general in Leipzig, Germany, 

from 1931 to 1935. As consul general, he provided Polish passports 

to Jews, even if they were not Polish citizens, so they could be 

freed from imprisonment or leave Nazi Germany. His story is part 

of what informs my belief that public service is the highest calling. 

In 2012, Sweden will celebrate the 100th anniversary of the birth 

of Raoul Wallenberg, a diplomat whose efforts to save Hungarian 

728

Jews from the Holocaust clearly demonstrate what a difference one 

person can make. If I am confirmed, it will be my mission to 

advance the American-Swedish relationship in a way that honors 

the spirit of Wallenberg’s legacy. 

Thank you for your time, and I look forward to your questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brzezinski follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARK F. BRZEZINSKI

Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, and distinguished members of the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, thank you for the privilege of appearing before 

you today. I am deeply grateful to President Obama and Secretary Clinton for their 

support and confidence in nominating me to be the United States Ambassador to 

the Kingdom of Sweden. If confirmed by the Senate, I pledge to devote all my energy to represent the United States to the best of my ability. 

If you will permit me, I would like to introduce to the committee my wife Natalia 

Brzezinski. We are the very proud parents of Aurora Emilie—a rambunctious and 

wonderful little girl—age two and a quarter. Life is a team sport, and our little family is the source of so much pride, love, and support. 

My wife and I are both children of immigrants from Eastern Europe. My father 

and mother, immigrants from prewar Poland and Czechoslovakia respectively, instilled in me the belief that public service is the highest calling and that America 

is a beacon for the world. As a Fulbright grantee in Eastern Europe just after the 

collapse of the Berlin Wall, I witnessed how important American leadership is for 

democratic development and for free market growth. 

This lesson has informed my experiences in international affairs since then, from 

my service on the National Security Council in the 1990s to my private legal practice, where I counsel companies on anticorruption compliance. If confirmed, I will 

bring these experiences with me to Sweden, which is such an important partner in 

promoting democracy, human rights, and economic growth around the world. 

Sweden has risen to the global security challenges of our time and joined with 

the United States and other countries as an active contributor to international security missions. For example, Sweden contributes to the NATO missions in Afghanistan and Libya. 

Sweden understands, as does America, that military and diplomatic efforts are 

not the only tools for combating instability—development plays a very important 

role. If confirmed, I pledge to advance United States-Swedish cooperation on democratic development, from Belarus and Ukraine, to the Middle East, and North 

Africa. 

America and Sweden are committed to combating terrorism and preventing violent extremism. In the last year, the suicide bombing in Stockholm, the horrific attacks in Norway, and the arrests of terrorist cells in the region highlight that 

counterterrorism is a common focus in our bilateral and regional relationships. 

The United States and Sweden share a strong commitment to political participation of women. This is personified by the inclusion of Sweden’s former Minister of 

Enterprise and Energy, Maud Olofsson, on Secretary Clinton’s International Council 

on Women’s Business Leadership. If confirmed, I pledge to advance our collaboration with Sweden to promote women in politics and business. 

The United States and Sweden share an important trading partnership and a 

commitment to green energy. If confirmed, I will build on the close cooperation our 

Embassy has forged with Sweden on alternative energy and environmental sustainability. 

This year Sweden took over the rotating chairmanship of the Arctic Council. If 

confirmed, I look forward to working with Sweden to advance our common goals of 

protecting the environment and conserving the Arctic’s biological resources while 

promoting economic cooperation and protecting Arctic communities with other Arctic 

Council members. 

As a former Fulbright recipient, I appreciate the value of international exchange 

programs. If confirmed, I envision fostering further support for exchange programs, 

especially those that advance green energy and clean technology. 

Let me close with a personal story. My grandfather, Tadeusz Brzezinski, served 

as Poland’s consul general in Leipzig from 1931 to 1935. As consul general, he provided Polish passports to Jews, even if they were not Polish citizens, so they could 

be freed from imprisonment or leave Nazi Germany. His story is part of what informs my belief that public service is the highest calling. In 2012, Sweden will celeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00736 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
729

brate the 100th anniversary of the birth of Raoul Wallenberg, a diplomat whose 

efforts to save Hungarian Jews from the Holocaust clearly demonstrate what a difference one person can make. If I am confirmed, it will be my mission to advance 

the American-Swedish relationship in a way that honors the spirit of Wallenberg’s 

legacy. 

Thank you for your time and I look forward to your questions.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Mr. Brzezinski, and thank you to all 

four of our witnesses today both for sharing with us your professional background, your familial and professional supporters who 

are present with us, and your views about the challenges and 

opportunities you face in the nations to which you will be going, 

should the Senate confirm you. 

We are now going to begin rounds of 7-minute questions. My first 

question is for Ms. Page, Ambassador-nominee to South Sudan. 

Ms. Page, you mentioned in your testimony that South Sudan 

has unique oil wealth, yet enormous development challenges, and 

that the United States has carried much of the development assistance burden or opportunity in the last decade with this region of 

Sudan. How will you accomplish the goal of, as you put it, multilateralizing development investment in South Sudan, and how do 

you strike a balance on two issues, sanctions that were previously 

imposed on Sudan but do not apply to South Sudan, but much of 

South Sudan’s oil must go through the north? How do we manage 

through our own sanctions and then, second, what is going to be 

the most effective tool for you in dealing with corruption, fighting 

corruption? Several of you referenced your work in transparency 

and anticorruption, and I am particularly interested in what you 

view as the major resource you need to be successful in that. 

Ms. Page 

Ms. PAGE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

In terms of multilateralizing our assistance, one of the areas that 

we plan to work on quite soon is an international engagement conference. This will provide the Republic of South Sudan the opportunity to show off what it has in terms of resources, to explore with 

the international community at large what it would be like to invest in Sudan, what their own priorities are for development, for 

support to companies and businesses. We are planning to host that 

conference with both Turkey, as well as with the assistance of our 

troika partners, our traditional partners that helped with the peace 

agreement. That is Norway and the United Kingdom. We are hoping to host that before the end of the year. So it would be really 

not a pledging conference but more like an investment conference, 

an opportunity for South Sudan to provide its vision for development and assistance, as well as for investors to see what the opportunities are. 

In that light, it is important that people understand that while 

the sanctions do not formally apply to South Sudan, that it does 

have a clean slate, it is important that they know that we are exploring opportunities with the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control to make it clear to people—they have put out 

some new explanatory regulations that make it clear what U.S. 

persons and U.S. businesses have to do. But there is still the likelihood that they would have to apply for a license. And I think what 

we are hoping to have in the near future would be some companies 

730

apply for licenses so that we have something to actually act upon. 

So those are some of the ways that we hope to go forward. 

With respect to corruption, I believe it is important to note what 

President Salva Kiir has recently said both before the United 

Nations General Assembly as well as at independence during the 

inauguration of the South Sudan Legislative Assembly, and he has 

pledged to root out corruption. Of course, we need more than just 

words. But one of the steps that he has taken is to allow the AntiCorruption Commission to have prosecutorial powers. So as lawyers ourselves, we know how important that is to be able to provide 

accountability and to bring people to justice when these types of incidents occur. I think good governance is going to be key to that, 

and the South Sudanese will need to make sure that the legislature, especially with the development of the new constitution, provides for those opportunities to strengthen the legislative regime to 

be able to have oversight of the bodies that are doing procurement, 

making sure that there is accountability. So these would be some 

of the areas that I would be looking to work with them on. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Ms. Page. 

I also want to specifically thank your husband, Damien, and son, 

Marius, for their willingness to have you go to this post that will 

be, I know, quite a challenge. 

I am going to jump, if I might, to Mr. Brzezinski around those 

same questions about anticorruption, something you have worked 

on professionally. A development partnership is something you 

mentioned in your testimony. Sweden is renowned for its effective 

engagement in development assistance, particularly in the energy 

field, and a number of Scandinavian countries, most principally 

Norway, have a great record of having been good stewards of their 

mineral and petroleum resources in a way that they have shared 

with African nations. 

Please, if you would, share with us, Mr. Brzezinski, how you 

hope to build on our relationship with Sweden as effective development partners in ways that might advance United States interests 

both in counterterrorism and in stabilizing nations which we hope 

to see move toward peace and security. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Thank you, Senator, for the question. 

You are right. Sweden has a remarkable record of generosity 

when it comes to development assistance and has a standing policy 

of devoting 1 percent of its GDP annually to overseas development 

assistance. So in real numbers in 2011, that means $5.7 billion 

from a country of 9 million people being devoted to development 

assistance outside its borders. And it has done so very constructively. 

Within the region of, say, north central Europe, you take a look 

at the way Sweden is engaged in promoting energy diversification 

in the Baltic States, human rights in Belarus, rule of law in 

Ukraine, and through the EU leading the Eastern Partnership to 

expand Europe. 

In Africa, its engagement in the Horn of Africa in Somalia is in 

the many millions of dollars, and in this age of austerity here in 

America, there are ample opportunities to explore with the Swedes 

ways that we can collaborate to advance our shared objectives, 

731

whether it is antipoverty, environmental protection, rule of law, 

and the like. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Mr. Brzezinski. I was pleased to 

hear Ambassador Hafstrom has joined us today. As I mentioned to 

you, he was with me in Wilmington, DE, the first site of the landing of Swedes in America, at a celebration of that just 2 weeks ago. 

And I am also grateful to your wife, Natalia, and your daughter, 

Aurora, for her rambunctiousness——

[Laughter.] 

Senator COONS [continuing]. And her willingness to serve like 

you. I know that public service is a team sport. 

With that, Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Page, I have read that there is some conversation about 

some in the South Sudan wanting to move the capital from Juba. 

Do you have an opinion on that? Is that movement growing? 

Ms. PAGE. Yes, thank you, sir. 

Actually they have talked about moving the capital to a location 

where they would have more space, but my understanding is that 

that would be a move that is more like 20 years away as opposed 

to something immediately. So that, I hope, will not preclude us 

from moving forward with a new embassy compound which I think 

is really going to be very critical as we increase our staffing and 

our footprint in South Sudan. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you. 

You know, the chairman and I traveled to West Africa in May 

and June, and it occurs to me, based on listening to your testimony, that there are two people you might use as a resource as you 

deal with the developments in the Government in South Sudan. 

One is Commissioner Jega in Nigeria, who was the commissioner 

of elections who really conducted the first democratic elections that 

the public accepted in the history of Nigeria. The chairman and I 

had the chance to meet with him. He is probably one of the most 

competent people I think I have ever had the privilege of meeting 

with. And the other is President Mills in Ghana. President Mills 

probably has done a good, if not the best, job in West Africa in 

terms of rooting out corruption, both in his government, as well as 

in the business community. And both of them are big on democracy 

and I am sure would be supportive. So if you get the chance to 

meet with them, I think they would be of help to you. 

One other question regarding South Sudan. The north Sudan is 

pretty much Muslim. South Sudan is more Christian. Is that not 

correct? 

Ms. PAGE. Correct. 

Senator ISAKSON. Other than the oil issue in Abyei, was the 

proximity of Muslims and Christians to each other in Abyei also a 

part of the problem? 

Ms. PAGE. Thank you, sir. 

No, not so much. It is less of a religious issue over Abyei and 

more—not even so much oil really. It is ancestral territory and people have been using Abyei to transit the north and the south. It 

has really always acted as a bridge, not so much between Muslims 

and Christians as much as between the north of the country and 

the south of the country. So I think the recognition that it is ancesVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00739 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
732

tral territory for the Ngok Dinka, as well as an important place for 

the nomadic ethnic groups, notably the Misseriya, but there are 

many others as well who transit through the area to graze their 

cattle. So this will be something that will be important as they 

resolve the boundaries and the border dispute to make sure that 

people still have access even if they are crossing partly an international border so that they can continue to have feed livestock 

that is fed and watered. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, Abyei probably is the single biggest challenge to South Sudan and north Sudan developing a peaceful 

future. That is going to be a big challenge for you and we wish you 

the best of luck. 

Ms. PAGE. Thank you very much, sir. 

Senator ISAKSON. Mr. Brzezinski, I have never seen anybody who 

has been published as much as you have been published. It’s about 

eight pages of titles. And as I am looking through the titles, I noticed that you probably ought to be a part-time consultant to these 

three ambassadors because you have written extensively on corruption and even written on the state sanctions against north Sudan 

with regard to terrorism, if I am not mistaken. Is that correct? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. That is right. 

Senator ISAKSON. So you all ought to use him as a part-time advisor because he has written extensively on both of those subjects. 

And on the subject, the article you wrote about North Korea and 

South Sudan in 2006—I do not know if you recall it, but I think 

that was about the sanctions we imposed on north Sudan in terms 

of state sponsorship of terrorism. Is that not correct? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Right. 

Senator ISAKSON. I think it is important to note that we leveraged that to get the north Sudanese to actually come to the table, 

turn around what they were doing, and in fact they will be going 

off that state sponsorship as a part of the deal to get these elections conducted peacefully. So I am sure you had no idea in 2006 

you would be testifying here in 2011, but I think Ambassador Page 

would recognize that was probably one of the keys to pulling off the 

Comprehensive Peace Agreement. And your knowledge of that 

might also be a good consulting knowledge as far as they are concerned as well. 

Last, when you go to Sweden, I want you to go to Ostersund, and 

when you go to Ostersund, you go to my grandfather’s farm. His 

heirs are still there. It is the geographic center of Sweden. It is the 

last stop before the Arctic. So be sure and go by and visit them and 

give them my regards, if you will. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Senator, my wife and I will commit to going to 

Ostersund. We cannot wait to get there. 

Senator ISAKSON. You will love it when you get there. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. On sanctions, if I could just build on your highly 

accurate words, one of the things that we have seen Sweden join 

us in is on sanctioning countries that we have sanctioned like Iran 

and Syria. Sweden has joined the U.N. sanctions on Iran, the EU 

sanctions on Iran, and I think it sends an important and global 

message to the Iranians through that tool. 

On Syria, particularly given recent developments in Syria, the 

Swedes have refused to purchase and have stopped the purchase 

733

of Syrian petroleum, and they have sanctioned high-level Syrian 

officials, including President Assad, which also sends a key message at a key time. 

So thank you, Senator, for your point on sanctions. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, and thank you for referring to the 

Swedes in the U.N. and with their aid in Afghanistan. I think they 

are No. 1 in terms of accepting refugees from Iraq in that conflict. 

It is a great country and they have been a great partner with the 

United States in trying to seek out peace in the Middle East and 

will be a key to that as it is ongoing in Sweden, and your help will 

be tremendously valuable as well. So thank you for mentioning 

that. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Thank you, Senator. And as you know, Sweden 

is not a member of NATO, but they have joined NATO missions 

and operations in Kosovo, in Afghanistan, 500 troops in Afghanistan. They lead a PRT in Mazar-i-Sharif and in Libya where they 

contribute reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft. So even though 

they are not a formal member of NATO, they have joined us in 

deed. And I think that that is very important. 

Senator ISAKSON. And they have recently made additional commitments of financial investment in Afghanistan in terms of women’s education and other areas as well, which is greatly appreciated. 

Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Isakson. 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. O’Neal, you have described the number of Americans in 

Cape Verde or those who have come from Cape Verde to the United 

States. Give some background as to why these relationships occur 

and why so many citizens are coming and going from the two 

countries. 

Ms. O’NEAL. Thank you, sir, for that question. 

There has always been a strong relationship between America 

and Cape Verde, but the consequence of two seasons of drought 

really inspired a strong exodus of Cape Verdeans to America and 

to other places. Americans of Cape Verdean descent have always 

kept close ties with Cape Verdeans on the island, and remittances 

from Americans of Cape Verdean descent are about 15 percent of 

the economy. And so it has always been a very strong relationship 

and it continues to grow. 

I understand that there have been a lot of conversations about 

whether or not a second MCC compact for Cape Verde, and I would 

just like to interject in that context that Cape Verde is a country 

whose relative size and population does not adequately reflect the 

magnitude of its accomplishments and of its potential to be a role 

model in the region. Cape Verde, since 1975 when it was liberated 

from the Portuguese, has demonstrated strong democratic governance. And additional aid from us would allow Cape Verde to hone 

its already burgeoning institutions to levels of efficiency that are 

unprecedented in the developing world. 

Cape Verde is one of two countries in Africa that has managed 

to move its economy from a lower income classification to a lower 

middle-income classification. With a little bit more assistance from 

734

us, it could be that Cape Verde could move its economy toward an 

economy that is not donor-driven solely but that is based on private 

sector revenues and enjoy those underpinnings as well. 

Finally, the location of Cape Verde makes it a natural partner 

for us in terms of maritime security and in terms of combating 

illicit drugs and other products that might be coming through the 

islands to Africa and to Europe. The United States Coast Guard 

has acknowledged that Cape Verde is its strongest partner in the 

region, and I think with added assistance, a bit more assistance 

from us, this partnership can become much larger and can be a 

leader in terms of training other West African countries in these 

types of activities. 

So if I am confirmed, I will support Cape Verde in all of these 

areas, and in the event that there would be a second MCC compact 

awarded to Cape Verde, as Senator Obama’s representative on the 

ground, I would engage with the Cape Verdean Government and 

with Cape Verdean institutions to ensure that each of the collateral 

projects of that compact would be executed with efficiency, with 

productivity, and with transparency. 

Thank you. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much for that information. 

It was very comprehensive. 

Ms. Page, we have had testimony before this committee within 

the past year, as affairs in Sudan as a whole evolved, that independence for South Sudan was probable. Then it became reality. 

But at the same time, as you have mentioned in your testimony, 

the independence is not necessarily threatened but under stress as 

you go to this new state. At least we have had some testimony that 

the boundaries, even the independence of some sections of the 

country may be in some jeopardy. What is your own view of this? 

And what should the United States position be? How will you react 

and how will you lead in this situation? 

Ms. PAGE. Thank you, Mr. Senator. 

I believe it is very critical that we encourage strongly the partners to return to the negotiating table. There are outstanding 

issues. There has been some progress made, but on oil revenues 

and at least sharing whatever kind of pipeline arrangement that 

they make really needs to be solidified and quite quickly. Right 

now, both sides are allowing the oil to continue to flow and to be 

exported, but without something solid pretty quickly, both countries will really face some serious economic stresses. 

Already the north, Sudan, has lost a significant portion of its oil 

revenues, but economically prices are increasing, people are starting to feel the pinch of the loss of a third of their territory. Crossborder trade is being hindered. Some of that is partial. Some of 

that is purposeful I believe. And it is important that they make 

sure that those links continue. 

Special Envoy Lyman has been in negotiations with the parties, 

with both Khartoum and Juba, or with the Sudan and South 

Sudan, to try to encourage at least the central bank governors to 

develop a partnership so that they can work out some of these 

details and the arrangements because so much of it depends on the 

kind of relationships. And the longer these crises go on between the 

SPLM-North in Sudan and the National Congress Party or the 

735

Sudan armed forces, the more the likelihood is that things will not 

be resolved quickly. So I think negotiations are really critical and 

I think we need to continue to support the AU High-Level Implementation Panel, Special Envoy Lyman, and the U.N. Special Representative, Haile Menkarios, to try to continue to carry out these 

negotiations. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Lugar. 

I would like to turn, if I could, in our second round of questions 

first to Ms. Leonard and to thank your professional supporters for 

being here as well and encouraging you. 

You made reference to the Tuareg, to the sort of remote corners 

of the far north of Mali and to the real threat opposed to the 

Malian tradition of tolerance and central government by AQIM. 

Speak, if you would, just in a little more detail about what is the 

scope and nature of the threat posed by al-Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb, and how do you think the Government of Mali will be 

most effectively able to counter armed terrorists in the vast and 

fairly remote northern part of the country. And then how does the 

historic dynamic with the Tuareg who have often felt disenfranchised and lacked security and at times engaged in active rebellion 

against the central government—how can development assistance, 

how can security assistance from the United States—how can you 

in your role, should you serve as our Ambassador, help the nation 

of Mali address these core challenges? 

Ms. LEONARD. Thank you, Senator, for that question. 

I think the Government of Mali is acutely aware of the negatives 

associated with the presence of AQIM in its uncontrolled territories. It is a threat to their ability to carry out development activities in the north, which is very closely related to the political 

accommodations that have helped resolve past Tuareg rebellions. 

So that is a very important linkage there. It has been a big threat 

and it has really decimated tourism in many areas. And it is also 

a threat to their international reputation in the sense that people 

wonder why the problem has not already gone away. 

I would characterize the presence of AQIM in Mali very much

as an incursion onto their territory. No one in the north of Mali or 

hardly anyone in the north of Mali—the extremist message of 

AQIM does not find purchase among Malians, whether they be 

Tuareg, Barabeesh, or from southern areas in Mali are not 

attracted by that sort of extremist ideology. So it is rather an incursion onto a territory than a case of actually converting people 

in Mali to that cause. 

I think it is safe to say that AQIM aspires to become something 

much more threatening than it is now, but that is not a reason to 

be complacent. That is a reason to prevent them from attaining 

those aspirations. 

In order for Mali to successfully combat and make ineffective the 

presence of AQIM on their territory, I think that they need three 

or four things. They need assistance in developing the capacity of 

their military. They need equipment for the logistics of such operations, and most importantly, they need the cooperation of all of 

736

their neighbors because no one military in that region is, in fact, 

capable of combating it. It needs to be a joint effort. 

In terms of U.S. assistance, we are involved very much not only 

on those first two areas of military capacity and equipment provision, but also in the development side of it. You are trying to bring 

development to the north of Mali so that, for example, you do not 

disappoint the hopes of the Tuareg people who accepted that sort 

of as the basis of the political accommodation and cause an internal 

distraction that would make it difficult for Mali to participate in 

activities against AQIM. You engage in, for example, community 

radio training and programmings to reinforce the ties between the 

state and the people to reinforce the inherent tolerance. 

I think on the last point of regional cooperation, events in Libya 

have very much sharpened the focus of attention of the various 

regional partners in that cooperation. 

Over time, the cooperation has sometimes faltered because of 

domestic diversions for individual partners or trying to come to a 

common strategy. I think as they view the increasingly scary place 

that the Sahel can become as combatants and arms come into the 

area, you are seeing a much more acute awareness of the need to 

cooperate quickly as evidenced most recently by a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Bamako and also a meeting in September in 

Algiers which also invited the outside donors and participants. 

If I am confirmed, I would look forward to further honing and 

refining not only with Mali but with my colleagues in the region 

about how we might best support those efforts to ensure that 

AQIM does not become the much more dangerous thing that we 

would all fear and ceases to threaten the security and the development of northern Mali. 

Thank you. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Ms. Leonard, for that thorough

and thoughtful answer about the regional potential solutions to 

security. 

Ms. O’Neal, if I might, I would like to turn back to the conversation that Senator Lugar started about the second MCC opportunity 

that Cape Verde faces. My father was long active in the fishing 

industry in Rhode Island and Massachusetts, and so the size and 

scope of the Cape Verdean diaspora population in New England is 

familiar to me. 

One of the things I am trying to urge that we take greater 

advantage of is the opportunity posed by a large African diaspora 

community in the United States which often is involved not just in 

remittances but also in possible entrepreneurial activity, building 

bridges between the United States, our institutions, and their 

nations of origin, much as many other nationalities historically in 

the United States have played that bridging role, whether United 

States-Sweden or elsewhere. 

So if you would, please, comment just two things. Should there 

be a second Millennium Challenge Compact with Cape Verde, what 

would be its principal areas of focus? Would they be the same as 

the first and simply continue them and strengthen them, or would 

there be different priority areas? And help me understand how we 

best justify. You have made a good start. But questions have been 

raised given the relative size of Cape Verde of why a second comVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00744 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
737

pact there when there are so many other nations on the continent 

that have such great development needs. 

And then, second, if you had any comment on how we might 

strengthen trade relations with the United States under AGOA or 

other ways that we might take advantage of the diaspora community and strengthen the economy of Cape Verde in partnership 

with the United States. Please. 

Ms. O’NEAL. Thank you for that question, Senator. 

I think you are absolutely right that the presence of the strong 

diaspora community here has not been profitably exploited. Secretary Clinton has recently set up a program in which the Department of State can engage diaspora communities and where the 

Department can actually help to make the ties and to inspire the 

types of commercial activities between them that would be profitable for the country. So if I am confirmed, I would like to engage 

in that program and go with the Cape Verde Ambassador up to 

New England to meet some of the players and sit down and establish a game plan as to how that would proceed going forward. 

In terms of the MCC compact, it is definitely not always evident 

if you look only at Cape Verde’s size and population, the strong role 

that it can play in the region in terms of being a partner to the 

United States in terms of upholding the goals and values and the 

foreign policy priorities that we have and in terms of being a model 

for its neighbors because Cape Verde has become a country that is 

looked to in terms of practices and techniques and capability for 

maritime security, for example. 

The economy in all of this is key, and the substantial gains that 

have been made in the economic growth because of the first compact truly need to be bolstered and reinforced. The Millennium 

Challenge Corporation has upped the ante this time, I understand, 

with this second compact in requiring Cape Verde to show strong 

signs and evidence of becoming a private sector-based economy. 

And so things that have already been in discussion—there is actually a Cape Verdean Government commission to prepare for what 

would be done in terms of regulation and in terms of economic 

reform in the second compact. 

We would need to strengthen, for example, the capacity of Cape 

Verdeans to have credit. They have an outline to opening a credit 

bureau. They have already integrated microcredit into the practice 

of the central bank, but if they were able to establish this credit 

bureau, that would be a key component of making available funding for more entrepreneurship and for institutions to be able to get 

credit. 

We also have made strong strides in infrastructure reform so 

that the way that you navigate the islands—and you know, managing a 10-island archipelago is more than a notion, but making 

sure that the roads and the ports are more viable and can support 

more activity would be another activity that would be addressed by 

the second compact. 

So I think the second compact is key in getting over a major 

hump for Cape Verde to become a country that can manage its own 

open economic practices rather than depend on other countries and 

other donors to pick up the slack. 

738

I would also like to assert that when the MCC compact projects 

begin, there is always some buy-in from other countries who are 

our allies, and this is something that the MCC corporation has also 

made as a requirement for Cape Verde for the second compact to 

include a more multilateral approach to their development. 

Senator COONS. Thank you very much, Ms. O’Neal. 

Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Mr. Chairman, unfortunately I have an 11:15 

commitment that I must make. So rather than ask a question, let 

me just congratulate each of you on your nomination. I intend to 

support each one of the nominees for their confirmation. 

Let me also add particularly to the three who are going to Africa, 

a lot of times when you go to places, like where you are going, you 

become out of sight, out of mind. We want you to know that this 

subcommittee wants to be a resource of support for each of you, 

especially in a fledgling country like the Sudan where resources are 

going to be important. So we hope you will feel free to call on the 

chairman, myself, and all the members. Obviously, the same to Mr. 

Brzezinski, but Sweden and Africa are two entirely different places. 

All of you have important roles, and we congratulate you on your 

nomination. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COONS. Thank you so much, Senator Isakson. 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Brzezinski, let me just note that some in Sweden have 

become concerned about the Nord Stream natural gas pipeline that 

will run from Russia to Germany and will reportedly cross part of 

Sweden’s maritime exclusive economic zone. In particular, some are 

concerned with disturbances to the Baltic Sea bed where chemical 

weapons and ammunition have been resting since World War I. 

How do you see the nature of this problem both in terms of environmental and energy security consequences for Sweden and its 

neighbors? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Thank you, Senator, for that question. 

It is important to note that Sweden in May took over the chairmanship also of the Arctic Council which has an important environmental and biological stewardship role as well. And the country 

is very motivated and focused on environmental protection, sustainability, climate issues, and the like. 

On the energy side of the question that you asked, I am pleased 

to note that Sweden supports our objectives in promoting European 

energy security by promoting diversification of sources and transport corridors. And that is seen in their support of the southern 

corridor to bring Caspian gas through Turkey to Europe, of the 

electric cable from Sweden to Lithuania. 

With regard to the specific concerns that you asked about the 

subseabed environmental damage and so forth, if it is OK with you, 

I would like to come back to your office with a more complete and 

thorough answer to that question. 

Senator LUGAR. Very good. 

Let me just add this thought that I attended 2 years ago, I think, 

a meeting of the European Union people boosting the so-called 

Nabucco pipeline. The idea obviously, just following your reasoning, 

739

was to have an independent source of oil or natural gas or both 

that were not involved with Russia and offered, therefore, a competitive element. It did not exclude the Russian natural gas or

oil coming into other countries, but it would obviate the cutoffs and 

the disruption of service that has occurred in some European 

countries. 

And so I am curious whether—the Nabucco pipeline is, of course, 

much more of a southern European phenomenon, although it will 

come up to Austria and the Czech Republic and what have you. Is 

Sweden involved at all in those conversations? It is not clear, in 

fact, whether Nabucco ever will occur, but as with many of these 

alternatives, they are important at least to European countries. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Senator, you are right. And energy diversification, diversification of sources, and transport corridors is a conversation that we are having with the Swedes and with other European partners. To me it is good that they join with us in terms of 

these shared common energy security goals. 

With regard to their specific involvement in Nabucco, if it is OK 

with you, I would love to come back to your office with a more complete and thorough answer to that question because I want to be 

absolutely spot on in terms of my response. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COONS. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. I am 

grateful you were able to join us today in this confirmation hearing. Your questions always add breadth and depth to the questioning we are able to conduct. 

Like Senator Isakson, I also have commitments to which I need 

to turn. 

I also serve on other committees and would look to a sustained 

relationship with each of you. On the Judiciary, we are considering 

some possible revisions to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. On 

the Energy Committee, the possibility of deploying clean energy 

throughout West Africa in particular but throughout the Continent 

of Africa, hopefully in partnership with our technology partners in 

Sweden, is of genuine interest to me. 

And of course, on this committee, I just wanted to echo Senator 

Isakson’s invitation to you as you serve as Ambassadors in some 

particularly remote and challenging places and in some particularly beautiful and welcoming places. We know that each of you 

face various challenges in terms of your staffing, your security, 

your physical site at the Embassy, and we hope that you will communicate with us regularly, allow us, hopefully, to be a resource to 

you. It is our hope to continue to travel together regularly to visit 

the continent and to contribute what we can to supporting your 

endeavors. I am grateful for your willingness to appear before the 

committee and to answer all of our questions today. 

Did you have any further questions you wanted to raise today? 

I did want to say that we will keep the record open until the 

close of business Friday, October 7, should any of the committee 

members who were not able to join us today have questions for you 

they would like to submit in writing. 

That having been said, we now conclude this hearing. 

Thank you very much. 

740

[Whereupon, at 11:16 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF SUSAN D. PAGE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. What are the particular challenges involved with serving as the first 

Ambassador to South Sudan? Your experience in Sudan and with the CPA will 

clearly be assets in this new position, if confirmed. How has your background prepared you to take up the management challenges of this post, including the need 

to begin construction on a new Embassy, high turnover of staff with most serving 

in 1-year postings, and other potential issues in this challenging environment?

Answer. If confirmed as the first U.S. Ambassador to South Sudan, I believe the 

challenges will be many; however, this is a unique, once in a lifetime opportunity 

to work closely with the world’s newest nation. As the Government of the Republic 

of South Sudan works to stand up its ministries, and build internal capacity, I welcome the opportunity to work collaboratively on strengthening a democratic state 

that promotes inclusiveness and good governance. I will also work to reinforce accountability and transparency while helping the South Sudanese deliver on their 

promises to end corruption, diversify and develop their economy, and improve access 

to basic social services. 

Facing these challenges is a tall order, and as you noted, I will be drawing upon 

my prior experience negotiating and drafting the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 

(CPA) and my time living and working in Khartoum and Juba from 2005 to 2007 

while heading up the U.N. Peacekeeping Mission’s (UNMIS) Rule of Law and Corrections Advisory Unit. As the first director for the Rule of Law Unit at the thennewly stood up UNMIS, I created the Unit, established all three offices (Khartoum, 

Juba, and Darfur) and recruited all personnel. I then supervised and directed a multinational, multilingual staff of 35 (mostly senior lawyers and corrections officers) 

in three locations. Key to staffing the offices was an ability to understand the hardships employees suffered in a nonfamily duty station in difficult conditions. For instance, in Juba, employees lived for the first year in tents, most without fans, and 

with shared bathroom and other facilities on a compound with staff from numerous 

backgrounds, customs, and cultures. 

As a Deputy Assistant Secretary, I am responsible for overseeing the work of two 

of the nine offices in the Bureau of African Affairs and managing the work of 23 

ambassadors and their missions, ensuring careful coordination as well as the formulation of strategies and implementation of policies. In representing the Bureau at 

the Kimberley Process diamond certification meetings, I served as a key advisor to 

the Assistant Secretaries in resolving key disputes between the African block and 

Western countries, articulating and negotiating solutions. Along with the Chief of 

Mission, Africa Bureau and other Department senior leadership, I encouraged the 

leadership of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to hold military and civilian officials accountable for sexual- and gender-based violence, mineral exploitation, and 

other atrocities, leading to the recent detention and trial of several military officers 

and the implementation of the beginnings of a process to better ensure clean mineral trading and protection of civilians. Finally, while in Kenya serving as a regional 

legal adviser, I served as a key member of the task force in the evacuation of U.S. 

citizens from Rwanda at the beginning of the genocide and conducted the first USG 

fact-finding mission on behalf of State and USAID to post-genocide Rwanda. I will 

draw on each of these experiences, and they will inform and contribute to my ability 

to navigate the unique set of challenges that both the mission and South Sudan will 

undoubtedly face. 

As the mission footprint grows, so will its needs. The former USAID office building is being reconfigured to meet State’s needs, including consular services, on an 

interim basis. A New Embassy Compound (NEC) is planned for FY 2013. We have 

sufficient housing to meet current needs. If staffing increases, we will address that. 

We are examining the possibility of designating Juba as an accompanied post and 

extending its tour of duty to 2 years; it is currently a 1-year, unaccompanied post, 

separating families and loved ones. As such, it is more important than ever that we 

identify land so that we can move forward with the planned New Embassy Compound (NEC), which includes a residential area scheduled for FY13 according to 

OBO’s Capital Security Construction Program list. The exciting opportunities, and 

challenges, of working with the newest nation in the world are attracting highly 

741

professional and dedicated Foreign Service officers and South Sudanese staff, with 

immense regional and technical expertise, and morale at post is good. 

An extension of the length of tour would help increase continuity and add further 

depth to the already formidable knowledge base of U.S. Government staff. It would 

also require a thorough review of the current security environment as well as programmatic planning to address the growing need for both office and residential 

space for USG employees and staff. As I move forward to face these challenges, I 

will work closely with my colleagues in the State Department, and you, Members 

of Congress, to address these issues that will strengthen Embassy Juba.

Question. Section 620J of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 imposes restrictions 

on assistance to any unit of a foreign country’s security forces for which there is 

credible evidence that the unit has committed gross violations of human rights. U.S. 

embassies are heavily involved in ensuring compliance with this requirement.

• a. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that the Embassy effectively 

implements section 620J?

Answer a. If confirmed, I will personally ensure that this is incorporated into the 

work requirement statements for all relevant officers and I will further stress to 

those staff the personal importance I place on the mission’s full compliance with 

620J. As a lawyer who has spent the past 15-plus years focused on democracy, rule 

of law, and human rights issues, I will continue to push all sectors of the South 

Sudanese Government to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. In 

Washington, the Bureaus of African Affairs and Democracy, Human Rights, and 

Labor each conduct vetting procedures, and I will direct the staff of Embassy Juba 

to coordinate with U.N. agencies; including the Office of the High Commissioner for 

Human Rights, that are doing human rights monitoring to ensure we have as much 

information as possible. My personal commitment and integration of 620J implementation into the work requirement statements of relevant officers will create a 

‘‘fail-safe’’ that will ensure compliance and effective implementation of 620J.

• b. In particular, what actions will you take to ensure, in a case in which there 

is credible evidence that a gross violation of human rights has been committed, 

that assistance will not be provided to units that committed the violation?

Answer b. Consistent with section 620J of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, in 

situations where there is credible evidence of gross human rights violations, I will 

send immediate notice to the State Department. The State Department will subsequently notify the Secretary of Defense of the findings, so that assistance can be 

halted if the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights, unless all necessary corrective steps have been taken.

• c. What steps will you take to ensure that the Embassy has a robust capacity 

to gather and evaluate evidence regarding possible gross violations of human 

rights by units of security forces?

Answer c. If confirmed, I will expect relevant staff of Embassy Juba to monitor 

the performance of those security forces we have trained, investigate incidences as 

necessary, and make available the relevant embassy resources, and relationships to 

fully and robustly bring resolution to outstanding allegations of gross violations of 

human rights by units of security forces. Furthermore, relevant staff of Embassy 

Juba will be assigned responsibility for recording findings in the International Vetting and Security Tracking (INVEST) system, as well as reporting their findings to 

the COM without delay. 

RESPONSE OF MARY BETH LEONARD TO QUESTION SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. As you noted in your testimony to the committee, one of the U.S. Government’s main interests in Mali lies in furthering economic development in that 

country. What do you see as Mali’s key economic policy goals and challenges and 

why do you think Mali is not expected to meet most of the Millennium Development 

Goals?

Answer. Mali is one of the poorest countries in the world, ranking 163 out of 164 

countries evaluated on the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Index in 2010. Life expectancy is only 48 years; infant mortality remains extremely high at 102.5 per 1,000 live births. The population is undernourished at 

rates most often seen in war zones and emergencies, with almost 40 percent of children permanently stunted and 85 percent anemic. Mali’s literacy rate is only 26.2 

percent, and primary school completion rates, especially for girls, are extremely low. 

742

The low base from which Mali starts is one explanation for the country’s challenge 

in meeting the Millennium Development Goals. Nevertheless, Mali is making 

progress toward the goals. The Malian Government’s emphasis on health and education demonstrates its commitment to improving human capital, and thus the ability of its people to participate productively. 

Agriculture is the main occupation of Malians, therefore it is the basis for the government’s emphasis on the agricultural sector in its economic growth strategy. The 

Millennium Challenge Corporation compact, with its focus on improving agricultural 

lands and roads as well as upgrading the airport, points to opportunities in valueadded agricultural production. Meantime, Mali has steadily improved its business 

climate. In the 2011 World Bank’s Doing Business report, the country ranked 

among the top 10 most improved economies (153 of 183 economies) due to improvements in procedures for procuring constructing permits, reduction of property transfer taxes for firms, and reducing the time for trading across borders. 

RESPONSES OF ADRIENNE O’NEAL TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. In your testimony to the committee, you also highlighted the importance 

of consolidating Mali’s constitutional democracy and expressed your hope to shape 

U.S. activities to encourage constructive popular participation in the 2012 elections. 

How would you assess the Malian Government’s preparations for the 2012 elections 

and what are your expectations for the constitutional reforms that should precede 

those elections?

Answer. A constitutional and multiparty democracy since 1991, Mali is one of 

Africa’s most stable and progressive democracies; in 2011, it was one of only a handful of countries in the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation to be ranked by Freedom House as politically free. It is currently preparing for its fifth national election 

and second peaceful transfer of power. All four previous elections have been judged 

generally free and fair, and expectations are that the 2012 elections will continue 

to meet international standards. Major challenges to organizing fair elections remain, including the establishment of a reliable electoral list and disagreements over 

the distribution of seats to opposition party members on the country’s Independent 

Electoral Committee. Malian society embraces dialogue and compromise, and there 

is no reason to believe these issues cannot be reconciled. USAID has obligated over 

$2 million for election assistance and is developing a plan for technical assistance 

and voter outreach prior to and during the 2012 elections. Public diplomacy programs provide ample opportunity to engage the Malian public on issues of civic participation and the value of open public debate. 

In the runup to the elections, President Amadou Toumani Toure ́ has embarked 

on a plan to reform key government institutions, with an eye to increasing transparency and strengthening anticorruption efforts. This plan also includes constitutional amendments recently approved by the National Assembly that would streamline the electoral system and add an upper chamber. These measures will be 

subjected to a national referendum, most likely paired with either the Presidential 

or legislative elections in 2012. Some observers have expressed concern about the 

Malian Government’s ambitious plans to hold a national referendum just prior to 

an already ambitious electoral calendar. In order to prepare for this, the government 

will need to educate Malian voters on the key reforms. Generally, this concerted 

attention to issues of transparency and accountability is to be congratulated and 

efforts to bring them to fruition encouraged.

Question. While Cape Verde is eligible for tariff preferences under the African 

Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), trade under the program remains very limited. What do you see as the main barriers and are there ways that Cape Verde 

can increase trade under the program?

Answer. A key barrier to Cape Verde’s ability to increase trade under AGOA has 

been its lack of economic diversity. While Cape Verde has experienced recent economic success, much of that success has been driven by Cape Verde’s tourism sector, 

which accounts for approximately 75 percent of GDP. 

There are several strengths which Cape Verde can rely on in its efforts to further 

increase trade under AGOA. For instance, Cape Verde was recognized by the World 

Bank as sub-Saharan Africa’s second-most-improved economy on the overall regulatory ease of doing business. Cape Verde should use its open business environment 

to attract international investment.

Question. One of Cape Verde’s main transnational security challenges is the 

threat of narcotics trafficking and you stated in your testimony that the GovernVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00750 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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ment of Cape Verde has strongly supported counternarcotics maneuvers and is a 

willing host to U.S. ship visits. What is the extent and nature of the reportedly 

growing problem of cocaine transshipment through Cape Verdean territory and are 

there ways that you would recommend improving aspects of United States-Cape 

Verde cooperation on these issues?

Answer. Cape Verde’s location off the coast of West Africa makes it vulnerable 

to narcotics trafficking, especially cocaine, from South America to Africa and on to 

Europe. Cape Verde’s capacity and political willingness to seize and search vessels 

are strong signals for us to engage with them on maritime security. In June 2011, 

Cape Verdean vessels seized a shipment of marijuana, demonstrating its willingness 

to be a strong partner in combating narcotics trafficking. 

We will continue to develop the partnership with Cape Verde through a Bilateral 

Law Enforcement Agreement already under negotiation and I would encourage Cape 

Verde’s participation in joint maritime partnership programs with Portugal, Spain, 

France, and others. 

In 2010, the State Department provided an interagency Fusion Center that 

equipped Cape Verde’s security forces with a system of maritime transponder monitors. Once fully operational, this unit, called ‘‘COSMAR’’ in Portuguese, will enable 

Cape Verde to track and share information about ships operating off its coasts. 

If confirmed, I will continue to support INL, AFRICOM, and the U.S. Coast Guard 

to enhance programs to upgrade Cape Verde’s capacity to patrol its territorial 

waters. 

RESPONSES OF MARK F. BRZEZINSKI TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. As Ambassador to Sweden, what would you indentify as your top 

priority for Swedish Relations? And why would that issue be more important than 

others?

Answer. Sweden is a key partner for the United States in addressing global challenges. My top priority, if confirmed, will be to deepen and strengthen the SwedishUnited States partnership in order to advance the President’s agenda. If confirmed, 

I will work to deepen our ties and keep our relationship strong including by focusing 

on: international security, democracy and development, the Arctic, energy and 

climate.

Question. In the last election, the Swedish Democrats won 20 seats in Parliament. 

To what do you attribute their relative success? What effect have they had on Swedish policymaking over the past year? Is there any reason to believe that Swedish 

Democrats will gain more influence in the future?

Answer. The Sweden Democrats gained seats in Parliament for the first time in 

2010 and were particularly successful in getting votes from the unemployed, laborers, men, and those between 18 and 30 years old. The Sweden Democrats describe 

its main priority as protecting Swedish culture and values, mostly by reducing immigration to Sweden. Commentators note they are widely seen as having a minimal, 

indirect impact on policy since other parties are often unwilling to work with them. 

Given that the next parliamentary elections are expected in 2014 it is difficult to 

predict how many seats the party may lose or gain at that time. 

RESPONSE OF MARK F. BRZEZINSKI TO QUESTION SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. Many countries, including Sweden, have become concerned about the 

Nord Stream natural gas pipeline that will run from Russia to Germany and reportedly cross part of Sweden’s maritime Exclusive Economic Zone. In particular, there 

have been concerns with potential disturbances to the Baltic seabed where chemical 

weapons and ammunition have been resting since World War I. How do you see the 

consequences of this pipeline, both in terms of the environmental effects for Sweden 

and its neighbors and in terms of regional energy security?

Answer. The United States neither supports nor opposes the Nord Stream natural 

gas pipeline. In general, U.S. policy is to support transparent and commercially viable pipeline projects that meet environmental safety standards. 

With respect to Sweden, Sweden has been supportive of the Nord Stream pipeline 

and has been an advocate for diversifying Europe’s natural gas sources and energy 

supply routes. The Government of Sweden approved the pipeline’s construction in 

November 2009, following an environmental impact assessment and offered assurVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00751 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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ances that the Baltic Sea environment is a high government priority. In announcing 

approval for the pipeline, then-Swedish Environment Minister Carlgren emphasized 

that Sweden’s Government set strict requirements for Nord Stream that addressed 

both environmental and munitions-related concerns. 

Sweden shares our belief that Europe can better serve its energy needs by diversifying its natural gas sources and energy supply routes. Moreover, if confirmed, I will 

build on the close cooperation our Embassy has forged with Sweden on alternative 

energy and environmental sustainability issues. 

(745)

NOMINATION 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 12, 2011

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

Dr. Michael Anthony McFaul, of California, to be Ambassador to 

the Russian Federation 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:37 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jeanne Shaheen, 

presiding. 

Present: Senators Shaheen, Menendez, Lugar, Rubio, and 

DeMint. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN,

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE 

Senator SHAHEEN. Good afternoon, everyone. Good afternoon, Dr. 

McFaul. 

Senator Lugar and I were at the business meeting of the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee, so please excuse us for being tardy, 

but I think that is probably an excused absence. 

This afternoon the Senate Foreign Relations Committee meets 

today to consider the nomination of Michael McFaul to be the U.S. 

Ambassador to Russia. I want to welcome Dr. McFaul and his family here and congratulate him on his nomination. Thank you for 

choosing to take on this new responsibility at such an important 

time for our country. 

It has been over 3 years since the summer of 2008 when the Russian invasion and occupation of Georgia led to perhaps the lowest 

point in United States-Russian relations since the fall of the Soviet 

Union. The deteriorating relationship threatened to plunge our two 

nations back into a new cold war marked by mutual distrust and 

escalating tensions. 

In response, the Obama administration sought to define a new 

direction, one based on cooperation over confrontation. The ‘‘reset,’’ 

as this new policy has come to be known, was founded on the 

notion that the United States and its allies had more to gain from 

a more cooperative relationship with Russia. 

It has now been nearly 21⁄2 since the reset button was first 

pushed in March 2009, and there is little doubt that the shift has 

produced some significant, concrete progress for the United States, 

our allies, and the world. The New START treaty is perhaps the 

746

most high profile example of success. Because of New START, the 

United States and Russia have the fewest deployed warheads 

aimed at each other since the 1950s. In addition, onsite inspections 

and data exchanges instituted under New START are providing the 

United States with a transparent, detailed picture of Russian strategic forces. 

We have seen significant cooperation between the United States 

and Russia in Afghanistan, rather remarkable considering that just 

over two decades ago our two countries were engaged in a proxy 

war in that country. 

Russian cooperation was critical in passing a fourth round of 

sanctions against Iran in the U.N. Security Council, and its decision to cancel the delivery of a missile system to Iran was welcomed by the international community. 

Some early critics of the reset argued that these efforts would 

come at the expense of our allies abroad. The facts, however, have 

proven these concerns unfounded, as our allies in Central and 

Eastern Europe, for the most part, have been some of the strongest 

proponents of the shift in our relationship. 

One has to see the reset and the concrete benefits it has produced as a success to date. However, the real test of the reset still 

lies in front of us, not behind us. Whether or not we are able to 

sustain these initial successes and expand progress on much more 

difficult, yet still mutually beneficial issues remains to be seen. 

Areas for further cooperation include missile defense, follow-on 

arms control agreements to include tactical nuclear weapons, Russia’s WTO accession, and additional efforts to stop Iran’s nuclear 

weapons program. 

Each of these areas can be a win-win for the United States and 

Russia, but they are fraught with difficulty. Complicating these

efforts is the recent decision by Prime Minister Putin to return to 

the Presidency of Russia in 2012. Though the White House has 

said that the reset is about interests and not personalities, there 

is little question that a Putin Presidency will change the dynamics 

of the relationship. 

And finally, though we do share mutual interests with Russia on 

a number of critical issues, it is important to remember that we 

have a significant number of deep disagreements with Russia 

which cannot be papered over by a shift in tone. Russia vetoed a 

resolution at the U.N. Security Council condemning the Syrian 

Government’s actions and continues to protect its dictator. Russia’s 

record on human rights and the rule of law is deplorable and by 

most accounts getting worse. Corruption is rampant and the state 

of democracy in Russia can only be seen as a failure to date. Russia 

remains in violation of the 2008 cease-fire agreement with Georgia 

and continues to illegally occupy Georgian territory. In addition, 

Russia falsely maintains its right to spheres of influence on its 

borders, with Prime Minister Putin most recently calling for a 

Eurasian union of ex-Soviet states. 

Despite the improved relationship, we have seen little progress 

on these disagreements since the beginning of the reset, and so I 

am going to be very interested, Dr. McFaul, in hearing your 

thoughts about how the United States can be more effective in 

finding progress on each of these important areas. 

747

The relationship between the United States and Russia is a complex one with a long and convoluted history. We have been allies 

fighting side by side against fascism in World War II and bitter 

enemies threatening nuclear destruction throughout the cold war. 

It is a relationship marked at times by mutual interests and at others by diametrically opposed values. 

But we simply cannot turn our back on this relationship. We will 

need our strongest, most capable civil servants in Moscow to balance these difficult responsibilities and represent American interests. I believe, Dr. McFaul, that you are up to this challenge, and 

I intend to support your nomination and hope that we can move 

forward quickly to confirm you. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Shaheen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee meets today to consider the nomination 

of Michael McFaul to be the U.S. Ambassador to Russia. I want to welcome Dr. 

McFaul and his family here today and congratulate him on his nomination. Thank 

you for choosing to take on this new responsibility at such an important time for 

our country. We look forward to hearing from you about the challenges and opportunities you may face in Moscow. 

It has been over 3 years since the summer of 2008 when the Russian invasion 

and occupation of Georgia led to perhaps the lowest point in United States-Russian 

relations since the fall of the Soviet Union. The deteriorating relationship threatened to plunge our two nations back into a new cold war, marked by mutual distrust and escalating tensions. 

In response, the Obama administration sought to define a new direction—one 

based on cooperation over confrontation. The ‘‘Reset,’’ as this new policy has come 

to be known, was founded on the notion that the United States and its allies had 

more to gain from a more cooperative relationship with Russia. 

It has now been nearly 21⁄2 years since the ‘‘reset’’ button was first pushed in 

March 2009, and there is little doubt that the shift has produced some significant 

concrete progress for the United States, our allies, and the world. 

The New START Treaty is perhaps the most high-profile success. Because of New 

START, the United States and Russia have the fewest deployed warheads aimed at 

each other since the 1950s. In addition, onsite inspections and data exchanges instituted under New START are providing the United States with a transparent, 

detailed picture of Russian strategic forces. 

We have seen significant cooperation between the United States and Russia in 

Afghanistan—a rather remarkable turn considering that just over two decades ago, 

our two countries were engaged in a proxy war in the country. We have seen the 

successful implementation of the Northern Distribution Network into Afghanistan 

through Russia, which becomes even more important as United States-Pakistan relations have deteriorated. 

Russian cooperation was critical in passing a fourth round of sanctions against 

Iran in the U.N. Security Council, and its decision to cancel the delivery of a missile 

system to Iran was welcomed by the international community. We have also seen 

Russian cooperation on other less high-profile joint efforts, like science and technology, nuclear security, counterterrorism, health initiatives, and human trafficking. 

Some early critics of the reset argued that these efforts would come at the expense of our allies abroad. The facts, however, have proven those concerns unfounded, as our allies in Eastern and Central Europe have been some of the strongest proponents of the shift in the relationship. NATO allies were unanimously in 

support of the New START agreement, and have lobbied for a more cooperative approach in NATO-Russian relations. A new missile defense program is rapidly being 

developed in Europe with sites in Poland, Romania, Spain, and Turkey. Further, 

NATO has increased its visibility in key regions, including the Baltic States, and 

is expected to make a high-level visit to Georgia led by the NATO Secretary General 

in November. 

One has to see the reset and the concrete benefits it has produced as a success 

to date; however, the real test of the reset still lies in front of us—not behind us. 

Whether or not we are able to sustain these initial successes and expand progress 

on much more difficult, yet still mutually beneficial, issues remains to be seen. 

748

Missile defense is one area for further cooperation; however, Russia remains 

mired in the false cold war belief that the program is aimed at them. Further arms 

control agreements are also possible, but any agreement must include the tactical 

nuclear weapons advantage the Russians have in Europe. Russia’s WTO accession 

is closer than it has ever been; however, significant issues evolving from its continued occupation of Georgian territory need to be resolved. In addition, further Russian support will be needed if we are to stop Iran from its continued pursuit of a 

nuclear weapons capability. Each of these areas can be win-win for the United 

States and Russia but are fraught with difficulty. 

Complicating these efforts is the recent decision by Prime Minister Putin to return to the Presidency of Russia in 2012. Though the White House has said that 

the reset is about interests and not personalities, there is little question that a 

Putin Presidency will change the dynamics of the relationship—likely in a more 

confrontational direction. 

Finally, though we do share mutual interests with Russia on a number of critical 

issues, it is important to remember that we have a significant number of deep disagreements with Russia, which cannot be papered over by a shift in tone. 

Russia vetoed a resolution at the U.N. Security Council condemning the Syrian 

Government’s actions and continues to protect its ruthless dictator there. Russia’s 

record on human rights and the rule of law is deplorable and by most accounts, getting worse. Corruption is rampant, and the state of democracy in Russia can only 

be seen as a failure to date. Russia remains in violation of the 2008 cease-fire agreement with Georgia and continues to illegally occupy Georgian territory. In addition, 

Russia falsely maintains its right to spheres of influence on its borders—with Prime 

Minister Putin most recently calling for a ‘‘Eurasian Union’’ of ex-Soviet states. 

Despite the improved relationship, we have seen little progress on these disagreements since the beginning of the reset. I will be interested in hearing from Dr. 

McFaul today about his thoughts on how the United States can be more effective 

in finding progress on each of these important areas. 

The relationship between the United States and Russia is a complex one with a 

long and convoluted history. We have been allies fighting side-by-side against Fascism in World War II and bitter enemies threatening nuclear destruction throughout the cold war. It is a relationship marked at times by mutual interests and at 

others by diametrically opposed values. 

We simply cannot turn our back on this relationship, and we will need our strongest, most capable civil servants in Moscow to balance these difficult responsibilities 

and represent American interests. I believe Dr. Michael McFaul is up to this challenge. I will strongly support his nomination, and I hope the full Senate will quickly 

confirm him and send him to Moscow.

Senator SHAHEEN. I will officially do an introduction, but I would 

like at this time to turn the microphone over to the ranking member of the full Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Lugar. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, and I 

join you in welcoming Dr. Michael McFaul to our committee. 

The United States relationship with Russia remains, as you 

pointed out, critical to many foreign policy priorities, including nuclear nonproliferation, counterterrorism and global energy security, 

and numerous regional issues in Eurasia. Common interests and 

economic conditions have created openings for cooperation in specific areas, but we must proceed according to a realistic assessment 

of what is possible and we should avoid rationing our attitude 

toward Russia between severe disappointments and excessive 

expectations. 

Last year, the Senate approved the New START treaty for ratification which preserved the foundations of certainty in the United 

States-Russian strategic relationship. One does not have to abandon skepticism of the Russian Government or dismiss contentious 

foreign policy disagreements with Moscow to see value in the pracVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00756 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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tical enterprise of nuclear verification and transparency. In fact, it 

is precisely the friction in our broader relationship that makes continued engagement on nuclear issues so important. The only 

nations that would benefit from less nuclear cooperation between 

the United States and Russia are those such as Iran and North 

Korea that operate outside international nuclear controls. 

The ongoing risks posed by Moscow’s nuclear weapons complex 

were underscored recently when Moldovan authorities interrupted 

a sale of weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium that reportedly 

originated in Russia. 

Russian-American cooperation through the Nunn-Lugar program 

and associated efforts has greatly improved controls and security 

related to WMD materials. The threat that one day weapons or 

materials of mass destruction will be transferred out of the former 

Soviet Union remains very real, and such a transfer could have catastrophic results for the United States and the global community. 

We must make certain that all weapons and materials of mass 

destruction are identified and continuously guarded and the destruction programs proceed on schedule. 

A major challenge for United States policymakers will be to convince Russia to bring transparency to its tactical nuclear weapons 

arsenal. In the resolution of advice and consent to the New START 

treaty, the Senate was unequivocal that the next round of arms 

control negotiations should include Russia’s tactical nuclear 

weapons. 

Despite some concrete achievements, we must deal with the reality that United States-Russian relations are likely to be difficult 

for some time. Russia remains in noncompliance with its 2008 

cease-fire obligations in Georgia. Russia’s heavy-handed use of its 

energy predominance over Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and the Baltic nations demonstrates that Moscow has not altered its hard-line 

on regional issues. We frequently face Russian roadblocks in the 

United Nations Security Council, and the orchestrated transfer of 

power taking place in Moscow suggests that the civil and political 

liberties of Russians will remain severely restricted in the years 

ahead. 

We should understand that the outcome of most issues affecting 

the United States-Russian relationship depends on geopolitical 

leverage, not simply on our willingness to negotiate. With this in 

mind, we should continue to strengthen our economic and security 

relationships with nations in Eastern Europe and Central Asia and 

the Caucasus. We should also intensify our efforts to open a southern corridor that will circumvent Russia for direct natural gas 

trade between the Caspian region and Eastern Europe. The next 

6 months will be critical in determining which routes, if any, can 

be constructed to deliver gas to our allies, some of which are overwhelmingly dependent on Russia for their energy. 

The United States should also seek to create more ballast in the 

relationship by broadening the base of stakeholders. American corporate leaders often have functioned as effective advocates for 

democracy and rule of law overseas. One recent study cited by the 

Financial Times estimates that Russia will experience more than 

$70 billion in capital flight this year and that Russia asset values 

are devalued by up to 30 percent due to political risks created by 

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Russia’s leadership. Russia must meet all technical requirements 

for accession to the World Trade Organization, an event that could 

be an important step in locking in economic reforms. In the coming 

years, negotiation of the U.S.-Russian Bilateral Investment Treaty 

can provide the United States investors with reliable dispute resolution mechanisms that are currently absent. 

I thank the chair again for holding this hearing. I look forward 

to our discussion of these and many other issues with our witness. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. 

Dr. Michael McFaul currently serves as the President’s top White 

House advisor on Russian policy and the Senior Director for Russia 

and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council where he 

has served since 2009. 

A distinguished academic by trade and a renowned Russian expert who speaks the language, he is widely respected on both sides 

of the aisle here on Capitol Hill. 

He is currently on leave from Stanford University where he is a 

professor of political science and a senior fellow at the Hoover 

Institution. 

Dr. McFaul has a strong background in democracy promotion 

and as the former director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law at Stanford and the former codirector of the 

Iran Democracy Project at Hoover. 

Dr. McFaul’s background will prepare him well for the challenges 

and opportunities in Moscow, and we certainly look forward to 

hearing from him today. 

So I hope, Dr. McFaul, that you will take a moment in your 

opening statement to introduce any family members who are here 

with you today. 

So thank you very much and we will turn it over to you to hear 

your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL ANTHONY MCFAUL, OF CALIFORNIA, TO BE AMBASSADOR TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 

Dr. MCFAUL. Thank you, Madam Chair. I have a longer statement I would like to submit for the record, but I would like to 

make oral remarks now. 

Madam Chair, Ranking Member Lugar, Senator DeMint, other 

members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you 

today, this time, as President Obama’s nominee to be Ambassador 

to the Russian Federation. I am grateful for the confidence that 

President Obama and Secretary Clinton have shown in me, and if 

confirmed, I look forward to working with your committee closely. 

I am also delighted that my wife, Donna, and my two sons, Cole 

and Luke—Cole is the bigger one—are here today. Having hosted 

dozens of democratic activists from around the world at our home 

in California, Cole and Luke have heard me talk a lot about democracy over the years. So I thought it would be appropriate for them 

to be here today to witness a democratic process that might have 

a direct impact on their personal lives. 

Senator SHAHEEN. That was ‘‘democratic’’ with a small D. 

Dr. MCFAUL. A small D. Correct, correct. Thank you. 

Unlike my sons, I grew up in Montana and had never met somebody from another country until I went to college. But in debate 

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class in Bozeman Senior High, I did develop, ironically, an interest 

in United States-Soviet relations, and in particular, in a simple 

idea that more direct talk with the Soviets could diffuse tensions 

and make us and the world more secure. 

Stints of study in the U.S.S.R., Communist Poland, and 

Zimbabwe taught me that sometimes talk alone cannot overcome 

ideological differences or competing interests and that democracies 

are America’s most reliable partners. Therefore, ‘‘Advancing 

Democracy Abroad,’’ the title of my last book, is not only the right 

thing to do, it is the smart thing to do. 

And yet, even when some differences cannot be overcome, greater 

communications between countries allows for cooperation on 

mutual interests in other areas and lessens dangerous misunderstanding. 

On January 21, 2009, President Obama gave me the opportunity 

to test these theories in the real world. The President called for a 

reset with Russia, animated by the belief that greater engagement 

with Russia could produce security and economic benefits to the 

American people. Two additional principles have guided our reset 

strategy. First, we will not seek cooperation with Russia at the 

expense of our allies and partners. Second, as we engage with the 

Russian Government, we also seek deeper engagement with Russian society. 

The strategy has produced results. Let me highlight a few. 

We dramatically expanded the Northern Distribution Network, 

as you already noted, which supplies our troops to Afghanistan. 

We signed and you ratified the New START treaty. 

We passed a new U.N. Security Council resolution this spring, 

which expanded sanctions against Iran. Russia then canceled the 

sale of S–300 surface-to-air missiles to Iran. 

We have continued to fulfill Senator Lugar’s vision of reducing 

threats from weapons of mass destruction, including an agreement 

this year to dispose of the equivalent of 17,000 nuclear weapons’ 

worth of plutonium in Russia and the United States. 

We also have helped to create more trade and investment opportunities in Russia for American farmers and American manufacturers, including pushing for terms of Russia’s WTO accession that 

will benefit our economy while also making sure that countries like 

Georgia have their interests addressed. 

But the reset is not finished, as you have already observed. Two 

issues, in particular, require more resetting. 

First, European security. We have made progress. In the last 3 

years, there have not been gas wars, cyber wars, or military wars 

in Europe. And yet, Russian soldiers still occupy Georgian territory. Tensions between Russia and Georgia remain too high, and 

that is why we continue to give this issue our highest priority. 

Second, democracy and human rights. President Obama and 

Secretary Clinton have engaged regularly with their Russian counterparts on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. And our 

administration has already issued over 80 statements expressing 

our concern about democratic erosion and human rights violations 

in Russia. We have taken actions so that human rights abusers 

cannot travel to the United States. We have deepened our engageVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00759 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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ment with Russian civil society, and we continue to provide robust 

support to Russian human rights defenders. 

And yet, trends in Russia suggest that more needs to be done. 

As someone who has worked on these issues for over two decades 

now, as the first representative of the National Democratic Institute in Moscow in 1992, as a teacher and writer on democracy at 

Stanford and at the Hoover Institution, or as a member of President Obama’s National Security staff, I have the experience necessary to add vigor to our efforts in Russia on these sets of issues. 

President Obama believes that we can pursue our security and 

economic interests and promote universal values at the same time. 

If confirmed, I look forward to the challenge of executing his vision 

as the next U.S. Ambassador to Russia. 

Thank you for allowing me to appear here today. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. McFaul follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL A. MCFAUL

Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Lugar, and distinguished members of the 

committee, it is a great honor and a privilege to appear before you again today, this 

time as President Obama’s nominee to be Ambassador to the Russian Federation. 

I am grateful for the President’s confidence and for the support as well from Secretary Clinton. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the members of 

this committee to advance and defend U.S. interests in Russia. 

I am also delighted that my wife, Donna Norton, and my two sons, Cole and Luke, 

could be here today with me. For many years, Cole and Luke have heard me talk 

about the virtues of the democratic process, since I have taught courses on democracy at Stanford for many years and have hosted many democratic activists at our 

home in California. I thought they should be here to witness a democratic process 

that might have a direct effect on their personal lives. 

Unlike my sons, when I was their age, I had never met an MP from Zimbabwe 

or a blogger from Iran or discussed the merits of different systems of government. 

In fact, as someone who grew up in Montana, I had never even met a foreigner until 

I went to college. But strangely, even while still living in Montana, I did develop 

an interest in international affairs, and in particular an interest in ending the cold 

war. In my debate class at Bozeman Senior High School in 1979, I developed the 

argument that if we could just figure out a way to talk more honestly and directly 

to the Soviets, we could defuse a lot of tension and make both countries more secure. I took that conviction with me to Stanford University, and in the fall quarter 

of my freshman year, began to study Russian. Two years later, I went abroad for 

the first time, not to London or Paris, but to Leningrad. My mother thought I was 

crazy. She considered California a foreign country. 

Several stints of studying in the Soviet Union and then Communist Poland compelled me to adjust my hypotheses about diplomacy developed as a kid in Montana. 

Sometimes, ideological differences between countries make it impossible to find common ground. Sometimes national interests collide. Regimes, like the U.S.S.R., which 

repress their citizens are less reliable partners for the United States than democratic allies. And therefore, ‘‘Advancing Democracy Abroad’’—the title of the last 

book I wrote before joining the Obama administration—is not only the right thing 

to do but the smart thing to do. 

And yet, while developing these new ideas about the centrality of universal values 

over time as a student, activist, and scholar, I never completely abandoned my original thesis about the importance of understanding other countries and communicating with their people. Even when some differences cannot be overcome, greater 

communication between countries allows for cooperation on mutual interests in 

other areas. And clarifying those disagreements can be useful. Misunderstanding 

never benefits anyone. 

On January 21, 2009, President Obama gave me the opportunity to apply these 

convictions in the real world. Even before his inauguration, President-elect Obama 

called for a reset in our relations with Russia. His premise was that through engagement with the Russian Government, we could develop cooperation on some 

issues that would benefit American security and prosperity. Rather than framing all 

interactions between the United States and Russia as zero sum contests for power 

and influence, President Obama proposed that we look for ways to produce win-win 

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outcomes. As we have looked for such opportunities, the reset has been guided by 

two additional principles. First, we will not seek cooperation with Russia at the expense of relations with other allies and partners. Second, as we seek broader engagement with the Russian Government, we also have pursued in parallel deeper 

engagement with Russian society. Borrowing a page from one of my mentors, 

George Shultz, we call this strategy dual-track engagement. 

This new strategy has yielded results. 

First, through greater engagement with the Russian Government, we have expanded our northern supply routes into Afghanistan. This complex network of railways, flight routes, and roads known as the Northern Distribution Network, now 

accounts for more than half of all the supplies that we send to our soldiers in 

Afghanistan. Since signing a military transit accord with Russia in 2009, we have 

flown more than 1,500 flights transporting more than 235,000 personnel through 

Russia. These transit arrangements are a matter of vital importance to our troops 

as the transit route through Pakistan becomes more problematic. 

Second, the President signed and the Senate then ratified the New START treaty. 

This treaty reduces our nuclear arsenals, but importantly also provides robust 

verification and transparency measures that will build confidence and predictability 

on both sides. We thank this committee for all of your efforts in getting this treaty 

ratified in a timely manner that made sure that our verification efforts experienced 

no serious disruptions. 

Third, on Iran, we worked closely with Russia to craft United Nations Security 

Council Resolution 1929, which significantly expanded the multilateral sanctions regime. Shortly thereafter, Russia took a very important step by unilaterally canceling 

a sale of S–300 surface-to-air missiles to Iran. We continue to work closely with 

Russia to develop additional measures to stop Iran’s development of a nuclear weapons program. Most recently, we held constructive meetings with Russia in New York 

in the ‘‘P5+1’’ format during the United Nations General Assembly on getting Iran 

to satisfy our common concerns about its nuclear program. 

Fourth, on North Korea, we worked together to adopt Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874, and we remain committed to denuclearization as our ultimate 

goal. 

Fifth, on Libya, Russia abstained on U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973, 

which gave international support for NATO successful campaign to protect Libyan 

civilians. 

Sixth, we have continued to work with Russia to follow through on the vision of 

Senator Lugar and former Senator Nunn to enhance the physical security at Russia’s chemical, biological, and nuclear research, production and storage facilities. 

Last year, Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov signed the Plutonium 

Management and Disposition Agreement, which will transparently dispose of the 

equivalent of 17,000 nuclear weapons worth of plutonium. Russia and the United 

States have worked closely through a well-documented series of bilateral and trilateral programs to improve Russian, U.S., and worldwide nuclear security and have 

also joined forces to thwart nuclear smuggling as cases arise. 

Seventh, with your support, the 123 Agreement with Russia entered into force in 

January. This agreement provides a solid foundation for long-term United StatesRussia civil nuclear cooperation; commercial opportunities for U.S. industry in Russia; and enhanced cooperation on important global nonproliferation goals. 

Eighth, we have worked closely with the Russian Government to create the permissive conditions for more trade and investment between our two countries. Most 

importantly, the administration has been actively supporting Russia’s accession to 

the World Trade Organization, since Russia’s membership in the WTO will create 

new markets for U.S. exports and increase opportunities for U.S. companies, farmers, ranchers, investors, and workers. As a WTO member, Russia will have to lower 

tariffs, liberalize the conditions under which American services can be sold in the 

Russian market, and comply with more transparency rules. There are two key outstanding issues related to Russia’s accession: Georgia and Jackson-Vanik. As you 

know, the WTO operates by consensus. That means Georgia must agree to Russian 

accession, something it has yet to do. The Government of Switzerland has helpfully 

volunteered to serve as a mediator helping Russia and Georgia resolve their traderelated issues. We have made it clear to Russia that there is no way to go around 

Georgia: the two countries must resolve their differences through the mediation 

process. We believe the Swiss have formulated a fair, creative, and balanced proposal that can work, but the parties themselves must find that it is in their interest 

to come to agreement. 

In order for U.S. businesses, farmers, and workers to receive the maximum benefit from Russia’s WTO accession, however, we will need to give the same unconditional permanent normal trading relations treatment to Russia’s goods that we proVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00761 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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vide to those of all other WTO members. That commitment requires us to terminate 

the application of the Jackson-Vanik amendment and extend permanent normal 

trading relations to Russia. We look forward to working with you closely to terminate the application of Jackson-Vanik to Russia before Russia joins the WTO. Jackson-Vanik long ago achieved its historic purpose by helping thousands of Jews emigrate from the Soviet Union. Four decades after Jackson-Vanik was passed, a vote 

to grant Russia PNTR is a vote to help our economy and create jobs. At a time when 

we need to increase exports to preserve and create American jobs, we cannot afford 

to put our farmers, manufacturers, and workers at a disadvantage when competing 

against other WTO members for market share in Russia. 

In addition to supporting Russia’s WTO membership, the Obama administration 

has actively supported several major trade and investment deals completed in the 

last 3 years. For instance, Boeing has secured several major sales to Russian airlines in the last 2 years, worth roughly $11 billion, and securing tens of thousands 

of American jobs. ExxonMobil, GE, Caterpillar, John Deere, GM, Ford, Nike, International Paper, FedEx, Pepsi, Procter and Gamble, Cisco, and Visa are just a few 

of the many American companies successfully doing business in Russia and supporting job creation here in the United States. They all report to us that the reset 

has created a better environment for their businesses. If confirmed, I will continue 

to do all that I can to support the growth of this economic activity. 

As a means for enhancing our engagement of both the Russian Government and 

society, the administration created the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission, which now has nearly two dozen working groups working on everything from 

trade and investment to energy efficiency to basketball. In fact, President Obama 

even took a few shots at the White House with a visiting Russian high school basketball teams last year. He also attended a summit between American and Russian 

civil society leaders in Moscow in 2009, underscoring that government actors—

including even the President of the United States—must not only facilitate contacts 

between Russian and American civil society organizations, but also interact directly 

with these nongovernmental leaders, even when they have critical messages to 

convey. 

This comprehensive list represents a positive record of achievement for the 

Obama administration regarding security and economic issues of the highest importance to our country. Supplying our troops in Afghanistan, reducing the number of 

nuclear weapons in the world, preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, creating jobs in America—these are all core national interests for the United States. 

Moving forward, however, we still seek to reset our relations with Russia on other 

issues. 

For instance, European security. We have made progress, but more needs to be 

done. Russia’s relations with its neighbors had been deteriorating at an alarming 

pace. There were gas wars, cyber wars, and most tragically, a military war in August 2008. From the very beginning of the administration, we sought to reverse this 

dangerous trend, first by reassuring and strengthening our security ties with our 

NATO allies, and second by deepening our relations with Russia as a way to give 

Russia more to lose from coercive behavior. 

Our strategy has yielded dividends. While there is much more to be done, wars 

of any kind in Europe today, including renewed conflict between Russian and Georgia, are much less likely today than 3 years ago. 

And yet, while the probability of conflict between Russia and Georgia has decreased, the potential still remains. There are clearly issues on which the United 

States and Russia are not going to agree—and Georgia is one of them. Whether in 

bilateral meetings with the Russians, at international organizations or in multilateral settings, we have consistently and adamantly defended Georgia’s territorial integrity, while also providing critical political, economic, and defense-related support 

to the Georgian Government. President Obama, Vice President Biden, and Secretary 

Clinton have been clear with the Russian Government on the need to meet its obligations under the 2008 cease-fire agreement and our serious and ongoing concern 

over the Russian military presence in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and 

Abkhazia. There are no military solutions to this impasse, only diplomacy, and we 

have participated in multiple rounds of talks moderated by the EU, the U.N., and 

the OSCE in Geneva to encourage dialogue between the parties. If confirmed, I will 

continue to make progress on this issue one of my highest priorities. 

We also have far more work to do to get Russia to join the growing international 

consensus on Syria. The Russian veto of the U.N. Security Council resolution on 

Syria on October 4 was a big disappointment. We cannot allow the Security Council 

to lose its moral voice when the human rights of innocent people are so grossly 

violated. 

755

Resetting our relations on issues of democracy and human rights also requires 

more work. Since 2009, the Obama administration has developed and executed a 

new approach for advancing democracy and defending human rights in Russia. 

First, we have elevated these issues in our interactions with Russian Government 

officials. President Obama has regularly engaged with President Medvedev on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The same is true for Secretary Clinton 

when she meets with Foreign Minister Lavrov and other senior Russian Government officials. Moreover, U.S. Government officials have spoken out publicly and 

consistently about democratic erosion and human rights abuses in Russia. We created a Web site to catalogue our public pronouncements, which now contains over 

80 statements related to democracy and human rights issues in Russia http://

www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/c41670.htm). Under the Bilateral Presidential Commission, 

we created a special working group in civil society, which I personally cochaired, to 

establish a formal venue for discussing these issues. Sometimes those sessions have 

been testy, but we continue to believe that dialogue—even tough dialogue—is better 

than no contact at all. 

Second, for those in Russia who abuse human rights, we have taken measures to 

ensure that they cannot travel to the United States. We have done so both for government officials implicated in the wrongful death of Russian lawyer, Sergey 

Magnitsky, but also in other cases in which gross violations of human rights 

occurred. 

Third, U.S. Government officials actively engage with Russian nongovernmental 

leaders and encourage peer-to-peer engagement between American and Russian civil 

society leaders. During his trip to Russia in July 2009, President Obama met with 

hundreds of civil society leaders as well as opposition political figures. Vice President Biden, Secretary Clinton, and other senior U.S. Government officials have 

made it a practice of meeting with civil society leaders and opposition political figures during their visits to Russia. Russian and American NGOs organized two civil 

society summits in 2009 and 2010 in which our administration participated. Under 

a new initiative, these annual United States-Russian civil society summits will continue annually. 

Fourth, the Obama administration—working with the U.S. Congress—has continued to secure funds to support civil society, rule of law, human rights, independent 

media, and good governance in Russia. We have prioritized support for small, direct 

grants to Russian civil society organizations. Working with Congress, we continue 

to seek new ways to generate greater support for civil society organizations in Russia. For the upcoming parliamentary and Presidential votes in Russia, we have allocated $9 million—$1 million more than spent for the previous round of national 

elections in 2007–2008—to support activities designed to strengthen free and fair 

elections. 

The sum of these efforts constitutes a robust strategy for supporting democratic 

change and civil society development in Russia. And yet, the limited results regarding democratic development in Russia over the last several years suggest that we 

must do more. As someone who has worked on these issues for over a quarter century—be it as the first representative of the National Democratic Institute in Russia 

in 1992, as a professor teaching and writing on democracy at Stanford University 

and the Hoover Institution, or as a member of President Obama’s National Security 

Staff—I have the experience necessary to add vigor to our efforts in Russia, if confirmed by you. 

President Obama believes that we can pursue our security and economic interests 

and promote universal values at the same time. If confirmed, I look forward to accepting a new challenge presented to me by President Obama and Secretary Clinton 

of trying to pursue this vision as the next U.S. Ambassador to Russia. 

I am humbled by the President’s decision to nominate me to this position, and 

I am grateful to the committee for inviting me to appear before you today and for 

considering my nomination. 

I look forward to answering your questions.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much. 

I want to start with where you ended, and that is, what do we 

do to address democracy promotion in civil society? As you point 

out, more does need to be done. And so if confirmed as Ambassador, how would you take on that issue? 

Dr. MCFAUL. As I mentioned in my remarks, the Obama administration has developed a strategy. We call it a dual track engagement strategy. And let me tell you honestly we stole it from Ronald 

756

Reagan and my mentor and colleague, George Schultz, at the 

Hoover Institution. The idea is a simple one, that we are going to 

engage with the Russian Government on our national interests, 

and it would be wrong of us to not engage with them when we have 

serious security interests and economic interests at stake. In parallel, we are going to engage with Russian civil society. 

Now, in both tracks we have tried to raise democracy and human 

rights in both the governmental track and the civil society track. 

So, for instance, President Obama, from the very first meeting he 

ever had with President Medvedev, actually discussed the beating 

of a human rights activist. Lev Ponomarev is his name, an old 

friend of mine, by the way. The night before their meeting, he was 

beaten, and in the first meeting that the two Presidents ever had, 

President Obama raised the issue and has continued to do so, and 

not just the easy issues, by the way, very difficult issues including 

criminal cases against people like Mr. Khodorkovsky. The two 

Presidents have discussed that at length. 

Second, as I said in my opening remarks, we continue to speak 

publicly, not just privately, about these issues, and we talk about 

the wide range of issues when we see instances of democratic erosion or human rights abuses. 

Third, as I have stated in my opening remarks, we have made 

sure that human rights abusers do not come to this country. 

With respect to Russian civil society, we have done a number of 

new things in that area as well. We engage directly with Russian 

Government officials, with Russian civil society leaders. So, for instance, when President Obama traveled to Moscow, he met with 

President Medvedev. He met with Prime Minister Putin. And then 

he spent the entire second day of his time in Moscow meeting with 

civil society leaders, business leaders, and members of the opposition. We support something that we call peer-to-peer engagement 

between American civil society leaders and Russian civil society 

leaders, and we support that with bilateral assistance, roughly $40 

million, that goes directly to this kind of support, of course, with 

your support as well. 

We need to do more. We need to create the space for those organizations to do their job. And if confirmed as Ambassador, I look 

forward to that challenge to do that personally, given the long ties 

I have to that community in Russia. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Other than preventing violators from coming 

into the United States, most of what you have described has been 

on the carrot side. Are there other sticks that we should be looking 

to employ to provide incentives or disincentives for Russian behavior in this area? 

Dr. MCFAUL. In the Obama administration, we have a firm belief 

that we should listen to the activists on the ground, those who are 

on the front line. It is easy to sit here and say they should do this, 

they should do that. It is a lot harder to be in Russia or harder 

even yet Udmurtia or Siberia or places that do not get as much 

attention. 

When we talk to these people, they have asked us to do two 

things, and I would say these are familiar themes. One is speak 

out when their rights are violated and, two, provide support to 

what they are trying to do. And by that support, they want rhetorVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00764 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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ical support, but they also want financial support, to be very blunt, 

and without that, that support that comes from the United States 

and other European countries, there are not other places for them 

to go for that kind of support. So I would emphasize that this could 

be an issue that we should work on with Congress to find new avenues and new ways to support those people more directly. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I do not know if Senator Cardin is going to 

be here, but I know that he has discussed his legislation with you, 

The Sergey Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act. And I wonder if you could talk about whether that kind of legislation is effective in moving the Russians or not. 

Dr. MCFAUL. Well, first, if he does not show up, please pass on 

my applause to Senator Cardin for the leadership that he has 

focused on this particular case, the wrongful death of Sergey 

Magnitsky but more generally, I would say, for raising this issue 

as something where action should be taken. 

I have to say personally as a U.S. Government official, the hardest day of my life, without question, was the day that I met 

Sergey’s mother in Moscow and brought public attention from the 

United States, from President Obama, to what happened to her 

son. And I was also honored that Senator Cardin invited me to 

speak at the premiere of the documentary film on Sergey 

Magnitsky that you hosted up here. I say all that to point out and 

to underscore that we take very seriously what happened to Sergey 

Magnitsky and remind everybody that the attention that he has 

received because of Senator Cardin’s good work is fantastic. These 

kinds of human rights abuses happen every day. 

So we did take action, prodded by the legislation. We now have 

in place, through the authorities that Secretary Clinton already 

had, denial of visas to human rights abusers from Russia. And I 

would add they are not just affiliated with this case. 

Moreover, we have taken more action than that. Last August, 

President Obama signed Presidential Proclamation 8697 which, in 

effect, internationalizes what Senator Cardin was seeking to do in 

his legislation. And we are very proud of that fact that we have 

done this, that this is not just an issue for Russia. This is an issue 

that unfortunately happens in many countries around the world. 

And with that Presidential proclamation, Secretary Clinton and the 

State Department have new authorities now to do the same for violators around the world. 

And finally, I would say we have raised these concerns privately 

and publicly. I have been with President Obama when he has 

raised these issues. I know Secretary Clinton has. I have been with 

her when she has raised them with Foreign Minister Lavrov and 

will continue to do so. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much. 

I should point out that I am also a cosponsor of that legislation. 

Since my time is almost expired, I am going to turn it over to 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Fifteen years ago, Senator Nunn and I created or helped create 

the International Science and Technology Center in Russia to prevent the proliferation of WMD know-how and technology from the 

former Soviet Union. The ISTC has peacefully reemployed thouVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00765 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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sands of former weapons technicians for WMD destruction and 

become a center for technology cooperation with more than 70 U.S. 

companies. 

Now President Medvedev recently signed a decree that would 

terminate Russian participation in the ISTC. At a time when institutional cooperation is as important as ever, what has been your 

response to Russia’s withdrawal from the ISTC and what further 

action can we take? 

Dr. MCFAUL. Well, let me start, Senator Lugar, by again thanking you for the vision that you have given to this set of issues over 

the last 20 years. You may not remember, but I was a young Ph.D. 

student working for a fellow by the name of Bill Perry before he 

was Secretary Perry. I remember meeting you back then. And 

when I think about over the last two decades what you have done, 

what Senator Nunn has done, what various administrations have 

done in terms of making the world safer through Cooperative 

Threat Reduction and its sister programs at the Department of 

Energy and the State Department, it is a remarkable, innovative 

program, that we are all safer as a result of that. So I want to start 

with that. 

Second, you know better than most, but I think he has made 

very clear how seriously President Obama takes this set of issues. 

He laid out an ambitious agenda in his Prague speech. He then 

hosted the first nuclear security summit here in Washington last 

year, and we are now making preparations for the Seoul summit 

next year. I hope you can attend. 

And I would say two things with respect to Russia and then get 

to the ISTC that you mentioned. 

Although we made tremendous progress, I want to remind the 

committee that there is still a lot more work to be done in Russia. 

I think sometimes we think, well, this is no longer an issue: we 

need to move on to third countries and other issues. It is not. There 

is still a lot of work to be done, and the vast majority of these 

weapons of mass destruction are in our two countries and the security of them in Russia still remains a top priority for our administration. 

Second, with your guidance, we also seek to cooperate with Russia in third areas, and I think we will hear more about that when 

we meet in Seoul next year. 

With respect to the ISTC, again I think the historians will judge. 

I used to be a historian, and I have talked to people who have written about this. I think it was a fantastic achievement at a very 

important time when you remember what was going on with the 

collapse of the Soviet Union. I know you remember that. I do not 

know if my boys over here remember, but it was a very scary time 

when I was living there when you thought about all the stuff that 

was there not locked down, insecure, and you did not know what 

the future of the Russian state was going to be. We now know in 

retrospect this has been a relatively peaceful collapse of the Soviet 

Union, but at the time when you were initiating our thinking about 

this, we did not know that. And ISTC ensured that some dangerous 

things that could not happen did not happen. And I know it is 

always hard to document as a social scientist the events that do 

759

not happen—right—the dogs that do not bark. But I think on this 

particular set of issues, we have to remember that. 

With respect to the center, our administration has been involved 

now for 2 years in active negotiations seeking to preserve it. We 

still think it should be preserved. We have not been able to reach 

agreement with Russia yet. We continue to do so, and in particular, 

we continue to try to think about new ways to frame the agenda 

that more appropriately meets the challenges that we have today. 

But I want to be honest. Right now we have not reached agreement 

with the Russians yet. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, I appreciate your response very much because I am hopeful as Ambassador you will be able to work in

behalf of the center and/or other ways in which the dangers are 

decreased because clearly many people, as you have pointed out, 

say, well, the real problem now is Iran potentially or North Korea 

and so forth. The Russians. This is old hat. But the facts of life are 

that the bulk of nuclear weapons are still in our country and in 

Russia. That will be the case for a long time. And the danger is 

not only of that but the personnel involved with that and the proliferation of ideas or leadership or what have you is really critical 

for both of our countries. So I am hopeful you will be able to make 

headway there, and we look forward to working with you. 

On another issue that you have worked on very hard. The Senate 

made clear in the resolution of advice and consent of the New 

START treaty, the next round of arms control negotiations would 

have to address Russia’s excessive and opaque tactical nuclear 

weapons arsenal. Russia has refused to negotiate over these weapons. Why in your view has Russia taken such an intransigent view 

over the next round of negotiations? What is your hope as to when 

this next round might occur and under what circumstances? 

Dr. MCFAUL. Well, Senator, we have made very clear to our Russian counterparts that the next round of negotiations has to include 

the weapons you just mentioned, nonstrategic weapons. We have a 

kind of general agreement that these negotiations have to take 

place and, obviously, in consultation with our allies because this 

affects European security. 

To answer the question, to explain, because you asked me to 

explain why Russia has resisted, I would say right now the answer 

they give to us is we want to have a holistic view. And in particular, they want to discuss issues of missile defense. They have 

made that clear, that without some progress in a pretty profound 

disagreement we have with them right now about missile defense, 

on certain aspects of that, they are not going to move forward with 

those negotiations. 

We continue to negotiate. We have a team over there right now 

in Moscow negotiating on these set of issues. We have started 

something that we call ‘‘strategic stability talks,’’ and per our commitment to you during the ratification of the New START treaty, 

we fully expect that the next round will include those weapons. 

Senator LUGAR. I would mention, as you well know, this is of 

great interest to many of our friends in Europe. The new Ambassador to the United States from Germany mentioned this in a 

conversation we had yesterday and Volkarua who is back in Washington visiting with some. In fact, the Germans have tactical 

760

nuclear weapons. They are not unique but they are an important 

country. So that the question is not simply a bilateral one, but it 

is one of total European security or world security for that matter. 

But as you point out, the missile defense situation, which obviously 

the Germans and others are also involved, is either a complicating 

factor or one that has to be taken into consideration. So I am hopeful that during your tenure there, you will be able to help make 

progress and to inform the administration as to how the arms 

negotiators might do so. 

I thank you. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I would like to pick up on the missile defense 

question because it is an area—as I know you remember, that was 

a big point of contention during the New START treaty debate. As 

you point out, as Senator Lugar pointed out, the Russians continued to express their concerns with NATO’s phased adaptive 

approach. 

So maybe you could talk about what the status of discussions on 

missile defense cooperation are currently and whether, given our 

historical differences on this issue, it is realistic to think that we 

can reach agreement. 

And then if you could comment on the statement by the current 

U.S. Ambassador to Russia earlier this month when he said he was 

confident that Russia and NATO would reach a cooperative agreement by the NATO summit in Chicago in May 2012. Do you agree 

that that is realistic? So if you could address all of those. 

Dr. MCFAUL. Thank you, Senator. 

Let me first start by reminding everyone that we very militantly 

kept out any discussion of missile defense from the New START 

treaty negotiations. Having been personally involved in that from 

the beginning to the end, I can tell you that at every stage of the 

way, including when President Obama himself personally was involved in the negotiations—and he probably was more than he 

wanted to be, by the way. But that was never an issue, and there 

were no side deals done and there are no constraints in that treaty 

whatsoever. Let us also be honest. The Russians wanted that and 

we resisted that to the very end. 

Second, we have continued to roll out and deploy EPAA, as you 

mentioned, in a rather rigorous and vigorous way as we had committed. It started in March 2011 with the deployment of the USS 

Monterrey, an Aegis missile ship. September 13, we signed a deal 

with the Romanians. The 14th, we signed a deal with the Turks 

about a radar. September 15, we extended our agreement with 

Poland. And then just last week, the Spanish agreed to host other 

Aegis ships. So we are moving forward with or without Russian cooperation on missile defense, and I think it is important for people 

to understand that we are going to do what is necessary to protect 

ourselves and our allies with or without the Russians. 

With respect to Russia, we believe that our security, the security 

of our allies, and the security of our partners in Europe can be 

enhanced through cooperation with Russia. That is our working 

assumption. And in particular, tracking data that Russia has better access to, or earlier, and the sharing of that data could make 

both Russia, NATO, and our partners in Europe more secure. And 

761

so that is why we have had a very vigorous program of trying to 

negotiate to get that started. 

Last fall in Lisbon, I think we had a very productive exchange 

with President Medvedev at the NATO-Russia Council where we 

committed to seeking some kind of an agreement. 

But of late, the negotiations have been difficult. In particular, 

they have broken down over a Russian demand that we sign a 

legally binding agreement that we will not undermine their strategic deterrent. And what we have responded to that is our missile 

defense systems are not aimed at Russia, and we do not seek to 

undermine strategic stability. And at the same time, we are not 

going to sign any legally binding agreement that would in any way 

constrain our missile defense systems. Because Russia believes, 

wrongly in our view, that phase 4 of the EPAA would be a threat 

to their ICBMs, we are at an impasse right now on those negotiations. 

We will continue to work it. We will continue to talk to them. 

After all, a lot of this is about physics. This is not about perceptions. And we will see what we have as we prepare for the summit 

next May. I am not optimistic right now, but we are going to continue to work this issue. 

Senator SHAHEEN. So it is not likely, based on what we know 

now, that we will have an agreement by the time of the summit 

next May. 

Dr. MCFAUL. I would put it this way. We want to maintain 

progress, and I think it is important for everyone to remember how 

neuralgic this issue has been for decades in United States-Soviet 

and United States-Russia relations. So no one should be surprised 

that after one meeting in Lisbon, that we have not been able to 

find missile defense cooperation with Russia in the last several 

months. I most certainly am not surprised by that. I think it is 

going to take a lot of hard work. I think it will take work by experts and track 2 folks to help educate our societies about what is 

a real threat and what is not a threat. And so our objective, as the 

Obama administration, is to continue to find progress, however incremental, as we move toward the NATO summit and well beyond 

that because I suspect we will be working this issue not just for 

the next month but for years and years to come. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

As a cochair of the Atlantic Council’s Georgia Task Force, tomorrow I am going to be among those who release a new policy report 

providing recommendations for the United States, Europe, and 

Georgia on how we can advance Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration. And as I know you are aware, one of the big stumbling blocks 

remains Russia’s occupation of Georgian territory, and we have 

seen little progress on this issue. In fact, some would say that 

things have gotten worse since the cease-fire agreement was 

signed. 

So how can we take on Russia’s continued occupation of South 

Ossetia and Abkhazia, and how can we make progress with Russia 

on this issue? And if you could also speak to how you see your role 

as Ambassador in addressing this issue. 

Dr. MCFAUL. Well, thank you. 

762

Obviously, we consider this to be a very serious issue. That is the 

reason I mentioned it in my opening remarks. We reaffirm, whenever we can, Georgia’s territorial integrity, and strengthening 

Georgia’s security remains a top priority for the Obama administration. We do that in a multifaceted way, and if I may, let me tell 

you about some of these. 

First, on the diplomatic front, we do several things and we continue to do so. We seek to dissuade other countries from recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and in the spirit of the dogs 

that do not bark, those are important achievements that that has 

not gone forward further than it should. Here we radically disagree 

with the Russians, and we do when the Presidents meet. We do 

when Secretary Clinton meets with Foreign Minister Lavrov, and 

I will continue to do so if confirmed as Ambassador to Russia. 

Second, we affirm Georgia’s territorial integrity in multilateral 

negotiations, whether that is over the CFE regime or the WTO 

accession. We are very persistent in those multilateral forums. 

Third, we support Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations. We continue to do that. 

Fourth, we continue to press Russia to adhere, as you rightly 

pointed out, to the 2008 cease-fire agreement which we believe they 

are not respecting. 

Fifth, we continue to push for international monitors and greater 

humanitarian access to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 

And sixth, we work directly with Moscow to try to reduce the 

pressure and sometimes coercive pressure that they put on Georgia. Part of our argument and part of what we have tried to do is 

to develop a substantive relationship with Russia so that the costs 

of coercive behavior in that part of the world are higher to Russia 

than they may have been 3 years ago. President Obama has personally engaged President Medvedev on these sets of issues, and 

we will continue to do so throughout. 

Second, it is not just diplomatic but it is in our economic assistance working with you all here at the U.S. Congress to try to support what Georgia is trying to do internally. We believe, like you 

do—I have a copy of the report—as you note on page 2, that supporting Georgia’s consolidation of liberal democracy is actually a 

very important part of making Georgia more secure. And second, 

as you also note in this report, supporting economic growth in 

Georgia we think is also an important component of making Georgia more secure. 

And third, I would add, especially given some recent events in 

the region, we need Georgia to succeed as a democracy because at 

a time when other countries that we had greater hopes for—there 

are some very troubling things happening, including just in 

Ukraine yesterday. When a democracy in the post-Soviet world can 

succeed, that sends a very powerful message, again, to the small 

‘‘D’’ democrats throughout the region. So that is why it is important 

that we do that on the second front. 

And third, in terms of military terms, we seek broad cooperation 

especially in two fronts. First, on the comprehensive reforms that 

Georgia is undertaking to modernize its ministry of defense, and 

second, in the training and equipping of Georgian soldiers that are 

serving with us in Afghanistan. And let me just mention that inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00770 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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cludes military service and it includes training of soldiers that are 

very important to us. They have lost 11 soldiers now; 50 have been 

wounded. We consider these very important contributions to the 

way we look at security and what we are trying to do in Afghanistan. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. I would like for you to consider a couple of issues 

sort of side by side. One is that in 2007, Russia suspended implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and 

has not provided any CFE data since that time. Despite the 

attempts by the United States to revive the treaty, these have been 

rejected by the Russians. 

Now, at the same time, France recently concluded an unprecedented sale of military equipment to Russia in the form of Mistral 

amphibious assault ships. Subsequently other NATO allies, including Spain, Italy, and Germany, have reportedly contemplated comparable sales. 

Now, on the one hand, there are reports that Russia has an 

ambitious modernization plan for its conventional forces. This is 

one reason for asking for the CFE data so that they—we, and the 

Europeans have an idea. At the same time, there are also reports 

that things have not have progressed quite so rapidly as Russians 

might have suggested, that the conventional forces have not grown 

that dynamically. 

How does the weapons purchase business fit together with whatever is occurring, and what is your judgment of, in fact, where the 

conventional forces are, quite apart from whether we can revive, 

for the sake of transparency and international reassurance, the 

CFE Treaty? 

Dr. MCFAUL. Thank you, Senator. There are a lot of complex 

issues here that you have mentioned. 

With respect to the CFE Treaty, we initiated earlier this year—

Ambassador Nuland was our negotiator—a very rigorous and comprehensive set of diplomatic interactions with our allies and with 

Russia to try to come up with a framework agreement to try to 

enhance and expand the CFE regime. 

Frankly, the talks have broken down with Russia despite the 

efforts of Ambassador Nuland. There are some smaller issues, but 

the main issue of where Russia could refuse to accept the definition 

that every other signatory to the CFE Treaty accepted was over the 

issue of host nation consent. And here, obviously, we are talking 

about Georgia. 

So we are not optimistic that there will be a way forward right 

now, and before the next set, the planned set of exchange of information this December, as you well know, occurs, we are now consulting with our allies about how best to form a unified policy 

about what to do before that December deadline. And I expect you 

will be hearing from us very shortly on that. 

With respect to other bilateral sales and the modernization, I 

think you are right in your assessment that the modernization inside Russia has not gone as fast as some would like. It is a debate 

in Russia, just so you understand. In fact, the Finance Minister of 

Russia recently resigned just a few days ago over a dispute that 

764

he had with President Medvedev over how much of their budget 

should go to these efforts and to expanding Russia’s military. So 

there is not a firm agreement on that. It is a real domestic issue 

in Russia. 

With respect to other countries’ sales, I do not think I should 

comment on that other than to say we noted what President 

Sarkozy said when he was in Tbilisi just a few days ago affirming 

many of the same things that I just said about our joint project to 

affirm Georgia’s territorial integrity and to enhance Georgia’s 

security. 

Senator LUGAR. This is an oversimplification, but some analysts 

have indicated that as oil and natural gas increased in price worldwide, economic problems that were severe for Russia began to dissipate. And as a matter of fact, during President Putin’s regime 

when much of this happened, there became general approval of the 

central government because the military could be paid, so could 

civil servants, so could most Russians achieve some degree of prosperity. Others have noted what goes up can come down. 

Therefore, I am curious as a student of Russia, as you have been, 

to what extent is the Russian budget really dependent still upon 

these external sources in that it does not appear, given President 

Medvedev’s leadership, there has been the kind of dynamic or even 

large investment from abroad in what was hoped to be a Silicon 

Valley type situation or various other ways in which Russians 

could make money. The dependence upon these resources still 

seems to be there and as you mentioned, the conventional forces 

and their defense budget, as we are having this debate in our country, how much our defense budget depends upon how our own 

budget business works out. This must be a more severe problem for 

Russians given the huge cyclical changes in these energy prices. 

Dr. MCFAUL. Well, Senator, I have learned in 3 years working 

at the White House, that I am no longer allowed to be just a student of Russia. I am an administration official before you. I look 

forward to the freedom of Stanford and Hoover some day in my 

future. 

But let me give you a more serious answer. I think your analysis 

is absolutely right. I think the coincidence of the rise of oil prices 

over the last 10 years before 2008 and the rise of Russia’s economy 

was not a coincidence. That correlation is firm. And by the way, 

that correlation goes back further. You can see the rise and fall 

with the Soviet Union as well. 

Russia did experience an economic crisis like the rest of the 

world in 2008 and 2009, and that sparked a very serious debate inside Russia that continues to this day. And I would just oversimplify to say—it is exactly along the lines you just described, 

which is some realize that just relying on the export of oil and gas 

is not a future to the 21st century or the 22nd century. And some 

day that will run out. That is cyclical. And if Russia just does that, 

they are going to fall off the charts in terms of the largest economies and their place in the world. 

President Medvedev believes that. He has made that very clear. 

And as you noted, he has talked about economic modernization 

and, in particular, trying to capture—which after all are some of 

the most educated people still in the world, especially in math and 

765

physics. And he has initiated this idea that we need to have our 

own Silicon Valley too. He traveled to Stanford. He traveled to 

Silicon Valley when he was here last year, and we encouraged that 

because I think spending a little time there, having lived there for 

the last three decades, there is nothing like experiencing the place 

as opposed to reading about it. 

And having visited their Silicon Valley with Vice President Biden 

earlier this spring, I can tell you they have a long ways to go. Right 

now it is just an idea. But the idea is the correct one because in 

the long run, that is where Russia’s future is, and encouraging people to invest both where they live and where they invest intellectually and also financially. That will not happen without better institutions to protect property rights, including intellectual property 

rights, in Russia. 

And moreover, I would say it will not happen without a modern 

political system as well. I think history has shown that you can 

have economic modernization at low levels of economic development, and we know of lots of countries, including the Soviet Union 

in the early periods of its development, where you can do that. But 

at higher levels of economic development, it does not work that 

way. You have to have political modernization as well. 

Let us take one issue that is a really big issue in Russia today: 

corruption. Well, there are some ways to fight that with a stronger 

state, but as we know, again history has shown and our own country has shown, by the way, another important mechanism for fighting corruption is democracy. It is independent media. It is a real 

opposition party. It is a real Congress that holds the executive 

branch accountable right as we are doing right here today. It is an 

independent judiciary. Those are very important mechanisms for 

fighting corruption and helping to support economic modernization. 

I have spoken about these issues as a Government official, and 

as Ambassador I hope to engage in these debates with the internal 

debate that is happening in Russia today on this set of issues. 

Senator LUGAR. I would just say parenthetically President 

Medvedev chose to visit Stanford and Silicon Valley first when he 

came last year and those of us in Washington second in terms of 

priorities, which are probably in terms of Russia’s consideration. 

But when I asked him directly how can you anticipate this investment given the climate of corruption and judicial difficulties, he 

only responded: Well, that is a very interesting question. And here 

is the dilemma I think. 

Thank you. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Madam Chairlady. 

Dr. McFaul, I am enthused by your nomination for this post. Not 

only have you been a scholar of the region, but you have also lent 

your expertise and time to organizations such as NDI and Freedom 

House that promote human rights and democracy. A commitment 

to sustaining democracy, supporting indigenous efforts to expand 

civil society and enhancing respect for human rights are issues I 

feel passionately about. I am sure that if you are confirmed, you 

will continue to hold those views as the U.S. Ambassador to 

Russia. 

766

Now, I do have a line of questioning that is very important to 

me, and I just want to reflect a moment on your yearning for academic freedom. And as I have said in the past to other nominees 

that have come before the committee, if you are confirmed, you will 

take an oath of office and that oath is to the Constitution of the 

United States. That oath means a constituted government that is 

both the executive and the legislative branch. And while the President may nominate you, it is the Congress, particularly the Senate, 

confirms you. So I hope that you will not view yourself only as an 

administration witness, but more as the nominee. 

So with that to preface where I am coming from, I want to talk 

to you about Russia’s relationship with Iran. As the former codirector of the Iran Democracy Project at the Hoover Institution, I 

think you are very aware of Russia’s continued support for Iran’s 

nuclear ambitions. When I served in the House, I had legislation 

aimed at terminating the IAEA and Russia’s support for the building of the Bushehr nuclear facility. As you know, with Russia’s 

support, that facility is now on line, and to me that is a setback 

in our multilateral efforts as it relates to isolating Iran as it pertains to its drive for nuclear weaponry. 

I understand that the administration has sought to reset relations with Russia at least in part to get Moscow’s assistance in isolating Iran or dealing with Iran’s nuclear threat. Yet, as part of the 

assistance to Iran in building the Bushehr nuclear facility, Russia 

has trained approximately 1,500 Iranian nuclear engineers. There 

is also evidence that Russia, at least Russian companies, may be 

helping Iran with a nuclear delivery system. And then I see the latest set of events that has taken place with Iran, I ask myself what 

it will take to get the Russians to understand that they need to cooperate with us and much of the world in having a different attitude toward Iran—both for its own interest as well as ours. 

As the United States Ambassador to Russia, what will you be 

saying to the Russians and what do you think can be done to move 

them to a better place? 

Dr. MCFAUL. Thank you, Senator, for the question. 

I think it is fair to say that Iran is right now and has been for 

the last 3 years if not the most important issue in United StatesRussian relations, definitely one of the most important. And President Obama, as I think about the meetings that he has had with 

President Medvedev, which I have attended every single one and 

I have briefed him and been part of the conversations on the 

phone—this issue gets more attention than anything else. 

The proposition that we have tried to make to President 

Medvedev and other Russian Government officials is that we want 

to make our bilateral relationship between the United States and 

Russia more important geopolitically to Moscow and more important over the long term economically to Moscow and, at the same 

time, make the argument that the old pattern of supporting Iran 

has deleterious consequences for Russia’s standing in the world. 

I think we have made progress on that. Most certainly you see 

it in our efforts at the U.N. Security Council and the P5+1 negotiations where time and time again over the last 3 years, Russia has 

been with us as opposed to against us. And for me and for our 

administration, most importantly, with U.N. Security Council ResoVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00774 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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lution 1929, which went farther than any other resolution before in 

terms of sanctions against Iran, including heavy weapons, that has 

a direct affect on Russia’s bottom dollar, bottom ruble, or whatever 

you want to call it where the economic effects of 1929 were real to 

Russia in a way—for obvious reasons were not real for us because 

we do not do that kind of trading. And I would remind you that 

1929 also prohibits any cooperation with ballistic missile programs 

in Iran as well. 

Moreover, Russia then took an action, which we considered to be 

very important, to cancel a contract that they signed with Iran, by 

the way, before the Obama administration. They signed it before 

we came to office—the transfer of S–300s, which we believe, had 

that contract gone forward, would have been highly destabilizing to 

security in the Middle East. 

So we think we have made real progress in terms of having Russia be part of the international community, being part of the P5+1 

as opposed to being on the outside. 

Now, with respect to Bushehr, as you rightly mentioned, this was 

a compromise that was done before us, before we came along. The 

history—whether it should have been or not—I will leave to those 

that write about previous administrations. 

What I do think is important to acknowledge here, however, is 

one important piece of an argument that we want to make to the 

rest of the world, that the regime that Russia has set up with 

Bushehr to provide the fuel and then to take out the fuel undermines Iran’s argument for the need for them to enrich uranium indigenously. We think that practice, if it succeeds, demonstrates to 

the rest of the world that Iran’s argument that they need to enrich—actually there is another way around to do that. So we are 

going to work with our Russian counterparts to make sure that it 

does succeed, and we will continue to try to show unity before Iran 

that will have to include Russia. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So these reports of Russian companies helping Iran with a nuclear delivery system would be high on your 

priority list? 

Dr. MCFAUL. Absolutely. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And what is it that you think is necessary? 

You talked about having a relationship that is more important geopolitically to Russia than it is to have with Iran. What is that we 

need to do to move them even further in that direction? 

Dr. MCFAUL. It is a big, long-term proposition. I want to make 

that clear. It is not going to happen overnight. But the idea is that 

the weapons that they were selling before, the heavy weapons they 

were selling before—they have argued to us, well, that hurts our 

bottom dollar. They said that to the President very directly. Why 

should we support that? And they point out arms sales that we 

make in other places. We want to make the argument to them that 

being part of the international community—and by the way, this 

is not just a bilateral piece. This is an international piece. We can 

enhance your economic development along other dimensions, including trade and investment with the United States and Europe. 

That is the proposition. 

And I want to be blunt about it. It is not a proposition that 

everyone in Russia accepts. It is a debate inside Russia right now, 

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and it is a debate between different factions that have different interests that see the world differently. Therefore, we have to engage 

that debate and work closely with those that see ultimately 

Russia’s future as part of Europe and part of that community as 

a part of being—and to defend and then fight against those that 

see Russia’s future in this different dimension. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So, a final question. I appreciate the chair’s 

indulgence. 

Hearing you answer that question, it sounds to me like the geopolitical relationship we are talking about is a bottom-line-oriented 

one as it relates to its economy. 

Dr. MCFAUL. With its economy, yes, but also with its geopolitical 

position, that we want Russia to be a responsible member of the 

international community, to not be trading with proliferators, to 

not be supporting those kinds of countries. We were very disappointed, for instance, when Russia vetoed the resolution on Syria 

last week at the U.N. Security Council. That to me and to the 

Obama administration was not a demonstration—that it was not 

an affirmation of this different kind of world we are seeking to 

have that has Russia with us as opposed to against us. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Madam Chairlady. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Congratulations. Thank you for your service and congratulations 

on your nomination. 

I want to take off from the point you just touched upon which 

is the veto of the resolution. I also read where they said, however, 

that it is not a blank check. I think I am correct. 

What are the parameters? And I know I am asking you to guess 

or maybe not. Maybe you know. Where are the outlines of how far 

they are willing to let this go in Syria before they take a more 

Turkey-like attitude toward what is happening? Do you have any 

sense of that? 

Dr. MCFAUL. Thank you, Senator. 

I have a sense from the negotiations and the conversations we 

have had with senior Russian officials. Most recently Foreign Minister Lavrov met with Secretary Clinton in New York a couple 

weeks ago. I attended that meeting. And we had a pretty lengthy 

and tough discussion about Syria where Secretary Clinton made 

very clear what we intended to do in New York and why we are 

doing it. 

My assessment would be the following, that Russia understands 

and takes seriously the violations of human rights in Syria as well. 

And I would note that just 2 days after they vetoed the resolution, 

President Medvedev went out of his way to basically suggest that 

if this continues, Assad has to go. That had not been said. I could 

be mistaken, but I do not remember the President of Russia ever 

saying it that boldly. That was a good sign. 

Where we had disagreements in the U.N., just to explain, not to 

excuse, was some nervousness on the part of some of the Russian 

Government that if we approve this resolution, that will end up 

like a situation in Libya. And as you will recall, in Libya with U.N. 

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port them, but Russia abstained and were with us in much closer 

agreement about the violations of human rights there. They worry 

about a precedent. We have made that very clear that that is not 

the way we see it and we are going to continue to work with them. 

I suspect we will be working with them in New York in the coming 

weeks for another resolution of where we can show agreement. 

Senator RUBIO. You are generally optimistic that at some stage 

here in the near future, there is a point at which they can be partners on some sort of international measure with regards to that. 

Dr. MCFAUL. I want to be careful about the word ‘‘optimistic.’’ I 

want to say that we are going to work this very hard. 

Russia has to understand the long-term implications of disunity 

at the U.N. Security Council. We cannot lose our moral voice there. 

And I think they have to understand that to get on the right side 

of history as to what is happening in Syria. 

It is hard to judge and I want to emphasize when I say Russia, 

there is no one Russia. There are many Russian voices on this 

right now. There is a healthy debate inside Russia. There are some 

officials, for instance, that met and hosted leaders of the Syrian 

opposition not too long ago in Moscow, and one of those Syrian 

opposition leaders is an old colleague and friend of mine, and he 

reported to me a very productive conversation that they had. So I 

do not want to predict the future. Let me predict our future, which 

is that we are going to continue to work this very hard. 

Senator RUBIO. This may have already been covered. I apologize 

if it was, but obviously yesterday’s developments with the announcement of a plot to assassinate the Saudi and Israel Ambassador and its ties to the Iranian Government—what impact do you 

think that will have in terms of Russia’s role on the Security Council and our search for potentially greater sanctions with regards to 

Iran and their nuclear ambitions? 

Dr. MCFAUL. Senator, as I did say before, we consider our new 

and more robust cooperation with Russia on Iran to be one of the 

signature achievements of what we have done with Russia and the 

reset over the last 3 years. And in particular, U.N. Security Council 

Resolution 1929, which went farther than ever before in terms of 

new sanctions, including sanctions against the delivery of heavy 

weapons that Russia was a principal exporter to Iran and then 

after that when they took the action to cancel the sale of the

S-300s which we consider to be very important. 

My prediction. Secretary Clinton called Foreign Minister Lavrov 

today to brief him on what occurred and the activities we have 

taken. We have a pretty robust cooperation with Russia already on 

these kinds of issues and in many areas, by the way, not just

vis-a-vis Iran but on preventing and working to thwart other terrorists and terrorist organizations. My prediction is that this will 

strengthen our cooperation on these kinds of issues. 

Senator RUBIO. My last question is a little broader but it has to 

do with China and Russian relations. Obviously, they have a complicated history and a large border. Just looking at it, I think some 

have made this argument that if you look at some of the strategic 

challenges that Russia may face in the region, it ultimately may be 

coming from China, not from the United States. Is that perceived—

I mean, obviously, they are aware that they have large territories 

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that happen to be rich in natural resources, are not heavily populated, and that a growing China would—you know, growing military ambitions or growing military capacities and growing energy 

needs and so forth—this could pose some conflict down the road. 

Is there an awareness of that, that China poses a real potential 

strategic challenge for Russia not today but in the next 5 to 10 

years in terms of regional influence? 

Dr. MCFAUL. Senator, your question is very timely because 

Prime Minister Putin is in China today, and he has made some remarks about their cooperation and trying to enhance their cooperation. China is a very important economic partner for Russia most 

directly right now in terms of the export of raw materials, energy 

resources. But as Prime Minister Putin just mentioned today, they 

want to expand that to other areas of cooperation, and they have 

announced some pretty big deals during his visit. 

That said, I think there is an awareness of what you described, 

and I think the awareness—there is a divide. There is a debate 

about China not unlike the debate that we have here in our country about the rise of China and how to manage that. I think the 

Russians see that the management of China’s rise in a way that 

is good for them and enhances their security is a central foreign 

policy challenge looking out not just in the years to come but in the 

decades to come. They do not want to have a confrontation with 

China, but they want to manage that, and yet they realize that 

that will be a central challenge to their security. Particularly, as 

you rightly pointed out, if you look at the demographics and the 

populations and the way they are growing out there in Siberia, 

that will be a real challenge for Russia in the coming decades. 

Senator RUBIO. I want to talk briefly about our partnership with 

Russia in space which is critical now in the aftermath of the shuttle program. I mean, obviously, at the NASA level, we get reports 

about the professional relationships between our space program 

and their space program. At the policy level, do they view our partnership in space as a leverage point for them on us? Do they view 

it as an important—what is their view of that partnership from the 

political standpoint for them? 

Dr. MCFAUL. Well, Senator, it has been a very important area of 

cooperation for a long, long time, as you know well. Through that 

cooperation, we have developed—in terms of the policy sense, you 

asked the right way to frame it. I would put it this way. Russia, 

and even before that, the Soviet Union—we competed, you know, 

obviously, but they saw themselves as one of the few countries in 

the world that could make contributions to space exploration, to 

those areas of your economy which required high technological 

sophistication. So they are very proud of what they have done in 

space, and they see that as a place for cooperation with the United 

States. They see that as an instance, if we can cooperate there, 

that can lead to other opportunities in the high-tech dimensions. 

We were talking about the Silicon Valley, for instance, pharmaceutical industries, where their brain power can be leveraged with 

our brain power and our innovative power and I would say our creativity when it comes to venture capitalism, which they do not 

have. They see that as areas of cooperation. And I think the 

cooperation in space can be a kind of analogy for these other kinds 

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of cooperations that they are now seeking. Nanotechnology is 

another area, for instance. If we can cooperate in space, on this 

hard stuff that we have done before, let us see if we can find it in 

these other places, particularly that would be of commercial benefit 

to Russian scientists, Russian companies in the high-tech industry 

and American companies as well. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

I have two other areas that I would like to explore before we 

close today. 

The first is WTO accession. Obviously, Russia’s continued occupation of Georgian territory is a complicating factor for their accession to the WTO. I wonder if you could speak to what is happening 

with current talks that are going on and the likelihood of success 

and talk about what the impact of Russia joining the WTO would 

be. 

Dr. MCFAUL. Thank you, Senator. 

Let me start by making an obvious point, but it is sometimes 

misunderstood. The Obama administration is supporting, and vigorously supporting, Russia’s accession to the WTO because we believe that it is a good deal for the United States of America. It is 

in our national interest, particularly our economic interest. And let 

me just elaborate a little bit because sometimes it is somehow 

framed as a gift to Russia. We are not in the business of giving 

gifts to Russia. We are in the business of advancing our national 

interests. 

So, first, lower and predictable tariffs. That is what we get if 

Russia joins the WTO. By the way, they already have those benefits with us because of the most-favored-nation status. 

Second, Russia will accept international food safety standards 

that will make it harder for them to manipulate these things that 

in the past have prevented us from exporting poultry and pork in 

particular. And by the way, President Obama has spent a great 

deal of time negotiating with President Medvedev over our poultry 

exports and pork exports. We want to bring Russia into the international community where they adhere to international standards 

so that we do not have to be using Presidential time to do what 

should be something that they have to do because of their obligations before the WTO. 

Third, Russia will have to accept new obligations for intellectual 

property rights, not just new laws but new enforcement. 

Fourth, the WTO has a dispute resolution mechanism which will 

offer recourse for American firms that sometimes suffer through 

some of these shenanigans we just were talking about. Now, it

is not a silver bullet. I do not want to overplay what that can do, 

but it is another leverage. It is another tool, if you will, for our 

companies. 

Fifth, it will open up a whole new set of opportunities for services, particularly banking and insurance, that right now is constrained because Russia is not in the WTO. 

And more generally, having Russia in a rules-based international 

economic regime we think is good for the United States and good 

for the world economy. And in particular, it will constrain some of 

the bad actors in Russia, the bad economic actors, and will help the 

772

reformers in Russia that are pushing to see Russia to become a 

more open and market-oriented economy. 

We also believe, most importantly, that because of those things 

I just mentioned, we will increase American exports to Russia. 

Some estimates say that it will double our exports to Russia over 

the next several years, and that means jobs in America. That 

means maintaining jobs and creating new jobs here in America. 

And it will not have some of the negative repercussions of other 

agreements in other countries that have joined the WTO because 

of the nature of our bilateral trade. And in particular, just to 

underscore, Russia does not export finished goods to the United 

States. It is principally raw materials, and that is not going to 

change. But what will change will be greater access for our consumer goods, including food exports to Russia. 

Now, with respect to Georgia, this issue has not been resolved. 

The WTO works by consensus, and without Georgian agreement to 

Russia’s WTO membership, it will not move forward. The Swiss 

Government has been leading a very active mediation process between Russia and Georgia, and we are supporting that. We think 

that the Swiss have come up with some very creative ideas, and 

we are urging both sides to take those negotiations very seriously. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And is that the role that you envision that the 

United States should be playing at this point? Is there more we 

should be doing? 

Dr. MCFAUL. Well, from time to time, various Russian officials—

and in the press maybe you have read there has been talk about 

votes, talk about, you know, it is our job to roll the Georgians so 

that Russia can get into the WTO. That is firmly not our view and 

we have made that very clear to Russian Government officials, including just recently when First Deputy Prime Minister Igor 

Shuvalov was here just last week. He met with many of us, including the Vice President. And we have made very clear that that is 

not a road to accession. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

And finally, obviously, the change in the Presidency and the return of Putin is going to affect our future relationship. Can you 

talk about whether you see any significant change and what the relationship will be? How will he view the reset compared to how 

Medvedev has worked with us over the last several years? 

Dr. MCFAUL. Madam Chair, I would say first that from the very 

beginning, as I outlined in my opening remarks, the reset has 

always been about advancing American national interests. The 

President was very clear to us. We had a debate about this, and 

some said, well, we need some symbolic actions to create a better 

atmosphere, and if we have a better atmosphere, then that will 

help us on these other things. The President’s view was the exact 

opposite. Let us do real business together that is good for the 

United States and we presume would be good for Russia because 

we would not be able to do it otherwise. And through concrete 

achievements, that will create better atmospherics. And we believe 

that that strategy has succeeded. It was not a strategy about individuals as it was a strategy about American national interests. 

I will remind you that Prime Minister Putin has been Prime 

Minister for the whole reset. It is not like he has been some sideVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00780 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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line person. He has been present at every step of the way. We have 

talked to him directly as the President did when we were there 2 

years ago. The Vice President met with Prime Minister Putin when 

we were there in the spring. And we will continue to engage with 

him if, indeed, he is elected President next year. 

But the policy has never been about personalities. It has been 

our interests. And I would say at this point we will have to wait 

and see. It is very clear what our policy is, and we look forward 

to seeing what President Putin brings to the table. 

The last thing I would say is just to underscore President Obama 

did develop and has developed and continues to work with President Medvedev. They do have a good working relationship. They 

meet frequently because of the nature of international diplomacy. 

They meet at various international settings. We have found that to 

be a very productive relationship, and I think we should be proud 

of the fact that we developed that because, after all, it is through 

relationships that you advance your interests. And we are going to 

continue to do so whoever is the next President of Russia and the 

rest of the Government of Russia as well. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And certainly I appreciate that the reset was 

about how we can address our national interests, but nevertheless, 

personalities do play a role. At least reading the reporting about 

how particularly some of the Russian human rights activists feel 

about Putin’s return to the Presidency, there is some concern about 

what that means for the state of democracy and for the openness 

for civil society and freedom of the press, all of those things. So 

how do we expect to address the changes that might occur with a 

returned President Putin from what we have been dealing with 

over the last several years? 

Dr. MCFAUL. I think we stick to our policy, which is to say we 

are going to engage with the Russian Government on mutual interests, and in parallel and at the same time, we are going to continue 

to engage. And I hope, if confirmed, I will be a part of this as 

Ambassador to deepen our engagement with Russian civil society. 

And we are not going to allow some false trade that says because 

you are dealing with us on issue X in the government channel, you 

cannot do this with Russian civil society. We have firmly rejected 

that kind of linkage that has been presented before us in the earlier periods of our administration. And again, if confirmed, I see 

that as a central challenge and a central responsibility that I will 

have as U.S. Ambassador to Russia. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Senator Lugar, any other questions? 

I think that is the end of my questions and Senator Lugar’s as 

well. 

So I just want to point out that we will keep the record open here 

on the hearing until noon tomorrow. So there may other questions 

that come in from members of the committee. 

Again, I want to thank you very much for the service that you 

have already provided to the country and for your willingness to 

take on this very significant job ahead and hope that we will see 

a speedy confirmation on the part of the Senate. 

Thank you all and the hearing is closed.

[Whereupon, at 4:00 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF MICHAEL MCFAUL TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. The administration has sought to cooperate with Russia on U.S. missile 

defense programs in Europe. Last fall, the committee learned that the Russian Federation rejected a draft Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement and Ballistic 

Missile Defense Cooperation Agreement presented by the United States.

• a. Why did Russia reject these draft agreements?

Answer. The United States and Russia have been negotiating a U.S.-Russia 

Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement since 2004. This is a broad agreement 

that, once concluded, would address the Parties’ responsibilities and rights with respect to a broad range of defense-related cooperative research and development activities, including missile defense. The administration decided to propose a more 

limited form of the Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement that would only address missile defense cooperation issues—a Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation 

Agreement. The latter would establish a framework to allow for bilateral ballistic 

missile defense cooperation, including: transparency and confidence-building measures, BMD exercises, data-sharing, and research and development. Details about 

how to cooperate would need to be negotiated subsequent to a Ballistic Missile 

Defense Cooperation Agreement. The proposed agreement does not specify any missile defense cooperation measure in particular; instead, it would serve as an umbrella agreement under which future individual technology agreements could be considered. In 2010, the Russian Government indicated that it did not wish to negotiate 

a Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Agreement at that time. 

Russia has expressed interest in developing missile defense cooperation, but has 

asked for legally binding guarantees that U.S. missile defense systems will not 

threaten Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent prior to engaging in practical missile 

defense projects. The United States will continue to discuss possible missile defense 

cooperation with Russia, but will not accept any limits or constraints on our ability 

to effectively defend the United States, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners from the ballistic missile threat.

• b. What is the status of these or related agreements?

Answer. The Obama administration continues to engage Russia on developing an 

appropriate political and legal Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement framework that would enable substantive missile defense cooperation while protecting 

U.S. technology and information. These discussions are taking place in the U.S.-

Russia Presidential Commission’s Arms Control and International Security Working 

Group, led by Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher and Deputy Foreign Minister 

Sergey Ryabkov, and the Defense Relations Working Group’s Enhanced Missile 

Defense Sub-Working Group, led by Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

for Policy, James Miller, and Deputy Minister of Defense, Anatoliy Antonov. The 

Department of Defense continues to negotiate a Defense Technology Cooperation 

Agreement with the Russian Ministry of Defense and the most recent round of negotiations took place in September 2011.

• c. Was there a Circular 175 issued for either of these agreements?

Answer. Yes. A Circular 175 was issued for both of these proposed agreements. 

Authority to negotiate the Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement derived from 

a blanket Circular 175 authorization provided to the Department of Defense in 1999 

and the Circular 175 authority to negotiate the Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Agreement was signed by Under Secretary for Arms Control and International 

Security Affairs, Ellen Tauscher, in 2010.

• d. Will you share the text of these agreements with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee?

Answer. The administration is committed to keeping Congress informed of our 

missile defense efforts. These proposals were briefed in detail to Senate staff members in December 2010 during Senate consideration of the New START Treaty. In 

keeping with the longstanding practice of this and past administrations, the administration would be pleased to provide a classified briefing on the Defense Technology 

Cooperation Agreement, including developments from the latest round of United 

States-Russia meetings.

• e. In your view, how could Russia assist with U.S. missile defense plans in 

Europe?

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Answer. The administration is committed to working with Russia to find an approach and configuration for missile defense cooperation that is consistent with the 

security needs of both countries, maintains the strategic balance, and addresses the 

potential ballistic missile threats that we both share. Effective cooperation with 

Russia could enhance the overall effectiveness and efficiency of our combined territorial missile defenses. Russian sensors and interceptors could reinforce and augment our ability to detect, track, and destroy missiles launched by potentially hostile countries, especially from the Middle East. 

Irrespective of how cooperation with Russia develops, the NATO alliance alone 

bears responsibility for defending NATO’s members, consistent with our treaty obligations for collective defense. The administration has been clear with Russia that 

it cannot accept any agreement that would limit or constrain the deployment of 

United States missile defenses—no nation will have veto power over U.S. missile 

defense efforts—and that NATO will be responsible for the defense of NATO territory, while Russia will be responsible for the defense of Russian territory.

• f. Does Russia share the same assessment of the threat that U.S. missile defense programs are designed to counter?

Answer. Russia recognizes that ballistic missile proliferation significantly affects 

regional and global security and Russia actively supports international missile nonproliferation efforts. In May 2011, the United States and Russia completed a classified expert-level exchange on ballistic missile threats. This process showed some 

areas of agreement, as well as important differences, in each others’ perceptions of 

the ballistic missile threat.

• g. If yes, please describe. If no, how does this affect your answer to (e)?

Answer. Russia is a supporter of international missile nonproliferation efforts and 

is an active participant in the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Hague 

Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. Russia has also supported 

a series of United Nations Security Council Resolutions related to Iran’s nuclear and 

ballistic missile programs. 

In May 2011, the United States and Russia finished the joint threat assessment 

work outlined in the joint statements of President Obama and President Medvedev 

dated April 1 and July 6, 2009. The 2-year process entailed expert-level exchanges 

between U.S. and Russian security experts. This process was chaired by Acting 

Assistant Secretary of State Vann Van Diepen, and by Deputy Secretary of the Security Council, Valeriy Nazarov, and Assistant to the Secretary of the Security 

Council, Yevgeniy Lukyanov. 

Even in the absence of full agreement on ballistic missile threats, ballistic missile 

defense cooperation with Russia is still possible and desirable. Effective cooperation 

with Russia could enhance the overall effectiveness and efficiency of our combined 

territorial missile defenses. Russian sensors and interceptors could reinforce and 

augment our ability to detect, track, and destroy missiles launched by potentially 

hostile countries, especially from the Middle East.

Question. In 2007, Russia suspended implementation of the Conventional Armed 

Forces in Europe Treaty and has not provided any CFE data since. Recent attempts 

by the United States to revive the treaty without sacrificing the principles of hostnation consent and reciprocity were also rejected by Moscow.

• a. What countermeasures has the United States executed after 4 years of Russian noncompliance?

Answer. The United States has not yet taken countermeasures in response to 

Russian noncompliance with its CFE Treaty obligations, although the administration continued to cite Russian noncompliance in the Treaty Joint Consultative 

Group and in our national compliance documents, the ‘‘2011 Report on Adherence 

to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments’’ and the ‘‘Condition (5)(C) Report: Compliance With The 

Treaty On Conventional Armed Forces In Europe.’’ During the last 4 years, the 

United States has led efforts by NATO allies to address the issues raised by Russia 

and bring it back into CFE compliance. The United States and its NATO allies believed strongly that we needed to demonstrate our commitment to conventional 

arms control by continuing full implementation of CFE obligations despite Russian 

noncompliance. The United States and our NATO allies have repeatedly emphasized 

that this situation cannot continue indefinitely, most recently at the September 29 

CFE Review Conference. The administration is discussing with our allies the available legal options with regard to Russia while continuing to implement CFE with 

regard to the other state parties to the treaty.

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• b. Should we be concerned about the lack of transparency surrounding Russia’s 

ambitious modernization plan for its conventional forces?

Answer. The current impasse with respect to CFE does not help increase transparency on Russian force modernization plans, but full CFE implementation would 

not completely address U.S. concerns on this issue. The CFE Treaty was intended 

to provide information about existing force structure, rather than provide insights 

into future organization and force modernization. Russia has provided some information on the goals of its reorganization through our bilateral defense dialogue, and 

the U.S. Government has received similar information through contacts in NATO 

and the OSCE. While this information is useful, it does not provide the level of detail about specific locations that could be afforded by restarting CFE on-site inspections.

• c. Do you believe that nonlegally binding disclosures through the Vienna Document are sufficient for the United States to gain an understanding of the disposition of Russian conventional forces?

Answer. The disclosures and military observation visits available through the 

Vienna Document provide some insight into the disposition of military forces in 

order to increase confidence among participating states, but they do not allow the 

same level of intrusive verification and inspections afforded by the legally binding 

CFE Treaty. The Vienna Document and the CFE Treaty are complementary, not 

interchangeable. Each has a specific purpose and distinct contribution to overall stability in Europe. As became evident several years ago when an attempt was made 

to ‘‘harmonize’’ the regimes, there is no simple way to adjust the provisions of the 

Vienna Document to incorporate all the elements of the CFE Treaty.

Question. France recently concluded an unprecedented sale of military equipment 

to Russia in the form of the Mistral amphibious assault ship. One senior Russian 

military official noted that the ship could be useful in military operations in the 

Black Sea. Subsequently, other NATO allies, including Spain, Italy, and Germany, 

have reportedly contemplated comparable sales. What is your view of these military 

sales to Russia and what effect do these sales have on regional stability and NATO 

cohesion?

Answer. Decisions about such sales are a matter for sovereign states taking into 

account a host of factors, including international law and regional stability. All 

countries should exercise judgment and restraint when it comes to deploying military equipment that could exacerbate tensions in any conflict region. NATO is an 

enduring alliance that has weathered more than 60 years of sweeping change. The 

administration remains committed to NATO, and to our mutual obligations to build 

a safe and secure Euro-Atlantic region.

Question. The U.S. Senate made clear in its Resolution of Advice and Consent to 

the New START Treaty that the next round of arms control negotiations would have 

to address Russia’s excessive and opaque tactical nuclear weapons arsenal. Russia 

has refused to negotiate over these weapons until a binding agreement is reached 

on conventional, missile defense, and space capabilities, a condition that appears to 

merely prevent discussion on Russian tactical nuclear systems. Do you believe that 

Russia’s position is constructive?

Answer. As President Obama outlined in Prague in 2009, the United States is 

committed to continuing a step-by-step process to reduce the overall number of nuclear weapons, and to the pursuit of a future agreement with Russia for broad reductions in all categories of nuclear weapons—strategic, nonstrategic, deployed, and 

nondeployed. Russian officials have stressed that further reductions in nuclear 

forces are connected to a substantial number of other issues. Developing a mutual 

understanding with Russia of the relevant issues is the first step to achieving a future agreement. As such, the administration has proposed holding broad policy discussions with Russia on issues of stability, security, and confidence-building. The 

administration sees discussions on strategic stability as an opening that will allow 

for engagement on future reductions in all categories of nuclear weapons, in a way 

that will meet the Senate’s requirement in the Resolution of Advice and Consent 

to the New START Treaty that the next round of arms control negotiations address 

Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons arsenal.

Question. The OSCE recently announced that it would acquiesce to Russia’s demand that only 200 election observers be allowed to monitor the Duma elections in 

December 2011.

• a. What conversations have you had with Russian officials on this matter?

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Answer. The United States has urged Russia to permit international and independent domestic observation of its electoral processes, both in the campaign and 

on election day. The administration has also made it clear that it supports the integrity of the OSCE’s Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) 

and the OSCE’s election observation standards. 

Russia’s Central Election Commission issued an invitation on October 7 for an 

Election Observation Mission from ODIHR and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. 

The United States has welcomed the invitation, which represents an improvement 

from the situation in 2007 and 2008. 

The administration understands that ODIHR intends to send 60 long-term election observers (LTOs), and plans to have them on the ground in Russia for 5 weeks 

before and after election day on December 4. It also plans to send 140 short-term 

observers (STOs). The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly also plans to send observers. 

The administration has urged Russia to grant all observers the necessary visas and 

any other required accreditation in a timely manner. The United States will continue to observe the electoral process in Russia, and looks forward to ODIHR’s 

assessment of the process.

• b. How do the conditions imposed on the OSCE compare to the conditions imposed in 2007, which led to the OSCE’s cancellation of its monitoring of the 

Russian Duma elections?

Answer. In 2007, Russian authorities delayed sending an invitation to ODIHR, 

and when they finally issued the invitation, they imposed unprecedented restrictions 

on the observation mission. When ODIHR requested to deploy 70 election experts, 

Russia denied them visas. 

This year, Russian authorities issued a timely invitation letter that did not contain restrictions on the number of observers. ODIHR has confirmed that 60 LTOs 

will be on the ground in Russia for 5 weeks before and after election day on December 4, and that it will send 140 STOs. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly also 

plans to send observers. The administration has urged Russia to issue all observers 

visas and any other accreditation required in a timely manner.

• c. Do you believe that Russia’s demands will impel the OSCE to again cancel 

its monitoring activities?

Answer. OSCE/ODIHR has confirmed that it will send 60 LTOs and 140 STOs. 

The administration understands that the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly also plans 

to send a significant number of observers. The administration has urged Russia to 

grant all observers visas and any other required accreditation in a timely manner. 

The administration strongly supports the integrity of OSCE election observation 

and, as elections near and events unfold, it will take ODIHR’s assessment very seriously as to whether Russian authorities will permit them and other observers to do 

their work without obstruction.

Question. What conversations have you had with Russian officials about allowing 

a full contingent of international election observers to monitor the Russian Presidential election in spring 2012?

Answer. The administration has regular discussions with Russian officials in 

which it raises a full range of human rights and democracy issues, including Russia’s OSCE commitments to holding free and fair elections and to allowing international and independent domestic election observation, both in the December 2011 

elections for the Duma and the March 2012 Presidential elections. Most recently, 

Assistant Secretary of State Michael Posner raised these issues with senior Russian 

officials in Moscow the week of October 10. 

The United States has welcomed the October 7 invitation by Russia’s Central 

Election Commission for international observers, including an Election Observation 

Mission from OSCE’s Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) 

and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, for the December 4 parliamentary elections. This represents an improvement from the situation in 2007 and 2008. ODIHR 

Long Term Election Observers will be on the ground in Russia for 5 weeks before 

and after election day on December 4, which will enable them to assess the political 

climate and ascertain whether parties are granted a level playing field in the runup 

to the elections.

Question. During your tenure in the White House, what conversations have you 

had with Russian authorities regarding the death of Alexander Litvinenko, who was 

poisoned with a radioactive substance in London in 2006? Have you pressed Russia 

to extradite the suspected perpetrator(s), who are residing in Russia?

Answer. The administration coordinates closely with the British government on 

all aspects of our Russia policy, including ongoing criminal investigations and reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00785 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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ports of human rights abuses. Most recently, we held consultations with our British 

counterparts on this case and other issues on the eve of Prime Minister Cameron’s 

September visit to Russia. I agree with the position outlined by then-Secretary of 

State Rice in December 2006, soon after Litvinenko’s death, ‘‘We’ve been clear to 

the Russian Government that all of these issues need to be investigated and investigated thoroughly . . . and our principal role is to try to be supportive of the British Government in any way we can.’’ In 2007, the United States also publicly called 

for Russia’s full cooperation in the request for Andrey Lugovoy’s extradition, and 

this is a position I will maintain: ‘‘Russia should honor the extradition request and 

Russia should cooperate fully, because it is not in anybody’s interest that we can 

have a crime committed of this kind and nothing is done about it.’’

Question. How much material has been transported via the Northern Distribution 

Network in 2009, 2010, and to date in 2011? Please include numbers for lethal (if 

any) and nonlethal equipment.

Answer. Russia is a critical partner supporting U.S. and coalition efforts in 

Afghanistan through its participation in the Northern Distribution Network and its 

support of U.S. military overflights. Since the fall of 2009, under our bilateral air 

transit agreement, 1,500 flights carrying 240,000 troops have transited Russian airspace en route to the Afghanistan area of operations. Over 51,000 cargo containers 

have transited the Northern Distribution Network, nearly 34,000 of which have 

transited over land through Russia under the NATO-Russia ground transit arrangement. There is an agreement in place permitting the two-way surface shipment 

through Russia of specific categories of wheeled armored vehicles, but no lethal 

equipment or cargo has yet transited Russia via the Northern Distribution Network 

in support of U.S. operations in Afghanistan.

Question. What rate does the Russian Federation charge, if any, for the transport 

of this material across its territory? How do these rates compare to those of other 

distribution routes utilized?

Answer. The U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) oversees the flow of 

cargo in support of coalition forces in Afghanistan. USTRANSCOM does not contract 

for container movement directly with Russian contractors or pay fees directly to the 

Russian Government. USTRANSCOM contracts with U.S.-approved contractors at 

competitive rates to transport cargo from the continental United States to Afghanistan. When contractors transport containers through the Northern Distribution Network to Afghanistan, they may subcontract with various companies for surface 

transportation or pay fees to transit countries. The 2009 U.S.-Russia air transit 

agreement is cost-free to flights transporting U.S. personnel and material aboard 

U.S. military aircraft; commercial flights operated by contractors are responsible for 

the payment of air navigation fees.

Question. How much in total has the United States paid to Russia from 2009 to 

2011 for the transportation of goods across its territory?

Answer. The U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) oversees the flow of 

cargo in support of coalition forces in Afghanistan. USTRANSCOM does not contract 

for container movement directly with Russian contractors or pay fees directly to the 

Russian Government. USTRANSCOM contracts with U.S.-approved contractors at 

competitive rates to transport cargo from the continental United States to Afghanistan. When contractors transport containers through the Northern Distribution Network to Afghanistan, they may subcontract with various companies for surface 

transportation or pay fees to transit countries. The bilateral U.S.-Russia air transit 

agreement concluded in 2009 is cost-free to U.S. military aircraft; however, commercial charter flights are responsible for the payment of air navigation fees.

Question. What do you perceive to be Russian interests in assisting with the U.S./

NATO mission in Afghanistan? What types of cooperation has Russia provided during your tenure in the administration?

Answer. Russia’s cooperation with the United States in Afghanistan is based on 

a shared interest in building security, stability, and prosperity for Afghanistan and 

within the region. 

U.S.-Russian cooperation on Afghanistan is one of the achievements of the ‘‘reset’’ 

policy and continues to expand, particularly in the areas of transit cooperation, 

counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and regional diplomatic efforts to help facilitate 

Afghan-led reconciliation. Thanks to Russia’s agreement to allow the transit of U.S. 

personnel and equipment across Russian territory in support of the ISAF mission 

in Afghanistan, almost 1,500 flights and over 225,000 military personnel have 

transited this corridor, while Russia’s ground transit arrangement with NATO has 

resulted in the shipment of nearly 34,000 containers of supplies to Afghanistan. To 

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help build the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces, Russia has announced a generous contribution of training and parts to the NATO-Russia Council 

Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund. This donation, combined with donations from 

the United States and NATO allies, will meet a critical training goal for Afghanistan. Russia has also announced publicly its support for Afghan-led peace and reconciliation efforts. Russia joined the United States and other U.N. Security Council 

members in unanimously supporting reforms of the U.N. 1267 sanctions regime requested by the Afghan government. U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and 

Pakistan Grossman engages frequently with his Russian counterpart on political 

and diplomatic efforts to support stability in Afghanistan, and the administration 

looks forward to Russia engaging positively at the Istanbul and Bonn conferences 

later this year. 

With regard to counternarcotics, Russia and the United States have expanded law 

enforcement cooperation through joint investigations, including in support of our 

Afghan law enforcement partners, and the sharing of financial intelligence to fight 

drug smugglers and their illicit financing. Last year, in coordination with the U.S. 

Drug Enforcement Administration and the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan’s 

DEA-mentored units, Russian Federal Counter-Narcotics Service personnel participated in a successful joint operation inside Afghanistan, which resulted in the seizure of 930 kilograms of heroin. The United States and Russia are actively engaged 

in the NATO-Russia Council counternarcotics program, through which more than 

1,600 law enforcement officers from Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan have 

received training in Russia.

Question. Russian President Medvedev has stated with respect to the U.S. Transit 

Center at Manas, Kyrgyzstan, that, ‘‘This base, and this is my position and I say 

it openly: It shouldn’t exist forever.’’ Do you believe that Russia has any role in determining the duration of the existence of the U.S. presence at Manas?

Answer. No. The terms of operation of the Transit Center are a bilateral matter 

between the United States and Kyrgyzstan. The Transit Center has operated without major interruption for nearly a decade. The administration also has an open, 

transparent, and continuous dialogue with Russia about operations in and around 

Afghanistan, as well as our military and political goals going forward. This dialogue 

is not always easy, but it takes place in a context of partnership rather than rivalry. 

Although the question of Russia’s opinion of American military presence in Central 

Asia has attracted a great deal of media attention, the results of Russia’s cooperation with us in the region have been largely positive. Russian air and land transport 

corridors are vital components of the allied logistics network.

Question. You have noted the need to move beyond ‘‘zero-sum’’ thinking in the 

U.S.-Russian relationship. Russian troops, however, are still present in several nations, including Moldova and Georgia, without those nations’ consent. Additionally, 

Russia has reportedly pressured many countries throughout the region to withhold 

defensive military assistance to Georgia. To what extent has this ‘‘zero-sum’’ thinking taken hold in Moscow?

Answer. The administration has been consistent and forthright with Russia about 

our differences. The United States has consistently rejected the notion of ‘‘spheres 

of influence’’ and is firmly committed to upholding the principle of host-nation consent for the stationing of foreign forces, a point the administration makes regularly 

in its meetings with Russian officials, and which I will continue to do if confirmed. 

As President Obama said in a July 2009 speech in Moscow, ‘‘the days when empires 

could treat sovereign states as pieces on a chessboard are over.’’

Over the past 21⁄2 years, real progress has been made toward putting the United 

States relationship with Russia and Russians on a more positive footing. In Afghanistan for example, Russians are providing unprecedented access to its airspace and 

transportation networks, helping to train and equip Afghan forces, and cooperating 

with us on antinarcotics operations in the region. 

That progress is also reflected in public opinion polls. The respected social research organization Levada conducted a poll in May 2011 and found that 54 percent 

of Russians hold a positive view of the United States. The All-Russian Center for 

Public Opinion Research confirmed this trend in September with a poll finding that 

55 percent of Russians hold positive views of the United States. By contrast, in 

November 2008, only 31 percent of Russians had a positive view of the United 

States, while 55 percent had a negative view. 

While historic patterns of thinking continue to influence Russian policy in some 

areas, this is a legacy that must be overcome if Americans and Russians are to realize the full benefits of the relationship’s potential.

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Question. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter states that ‘‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed 

attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations . . . ’’ Do you assess that 

the nation of Georgia has the capacity to provide for its self-defense?

Answer. All sovereign countries have the right to self-defense in response to an 

armed attack. The United States has a broad and deepening relationship with Georgia in a number of areas, including security and defense reform. The administration’s security assistance and military engagement with Georgia is currently focused 

in two areas. The first is comprehensive assistance to support Georgia’s defense reform and modernization along Euro-Atlantic lines. In particular, the administration 

is focused on building institutional capacity, supporting personnel and doctrine reform, and contributing to professional military education modernization. The administration has also consulted with the Georgian Government on its National Security 

Concept. Second, the United States continues to provide the necessary training and 

equipment to Georgian troops in support of their interoperability and effective participation in ISAF operations in Afghanistan.

Question. Under the ‘‘brains before brawn’’ policy, the United States has been assisting Georgia with doctrine, training, and military reform efforts. When do you 

foresee that Georgia will be ready for defensive military equipment procurements?

Answer. Per standard practice, the administration reviews all requests for export 

licenses and arms transfers individually, assessing legal, technical, and policy considerations. The United States also continues to have a broad and deepening relationship with Georgia in a number of sectors. Our security assistance and military 

engagement with Georgia are currently focused on two areas. The first is comprehensive assistance to support Georgia’s defense reform and modernization along 

Euro-Atlantic lines. Second, the United States provides training and equipment 

suitable to the Afghan counterinsurgency environment in conjunction with Georgia’s 

generous contribution of troops to ISAF operations in Afghanistan.

Question. During your tenure, has any assistance been provided to Georgian Special Forces?

Answer. The administration’s security assistance and military engagement with 

Georgia are currently focused on two areas. The first is comprehensive assistance 

to support Georgia’s defense reform and modernization along Euro-Atlantic lines. In 

particular, the administration is focused on building institutional capacity, supporting personnel and doctrine reform, and contributing to professional military 

education. Second, the United States continues to provide the necessary training 

and equipment to Georgian troops in support of their interoperability and effective 

participation in ISAF operations in Afghanistan. Assistance to the Georgian Special 

Forces is not currently an element of these two areas of our security assistance and 

military engagement with Georgia.

Question. During your tenure, have you made progress in reinstating an international monitoring mission on the ground in Abkhazia or South Ossetia?

Answer. The administration continues to call on Russia to fulfill its obligations 

under the 2008 cease-fire agreement, including the return of international monitors 

to the separatist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The administration believes that an international monitoring presence in these territories remains essential, and hopes that Russia—which has also said it sees a need for monitors—will 

accept a return of international monitors. The administration also continues to press 

for full access to the separatist regions by the European Union Monitoring Mission 

and international organizations like the OSCE to address ongoing humanitarian 

and human rights concerns. A positive and concrete step has been the establishment 

of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs) for Abkhazia and 

South Ossetia, which meet regularly to address security and humanitarian issues 

on the ground.

Question. Have you had any conversations with other NATO allies to caution 

against arms sales to Georgia?

Answer. The administration has neither opposed nor advised against other governments’ sales of defense articles, including arms, to Georgia.

Question. Public reports have linked Russian officers to the recent bombings in 

Georgia, including one near the gates of the U.S. Embassy compound in Georgia.

• When did you learn about the reported links to Russian officers? 

• What was your response? 

• Are you satisfied that Russia has conducted a thorough investigation of the allegations?

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Answer. The administration takes very seriously any threats against U.S. facilities overseas and is concerned about any threats to peace and security in the 

Caucasus. The administration coordinated closely with Georgian law enforcement on 

the investigation into the incident that occurred near the U.S. Embassy. The U.S. 

Government also raised the allegations by Georgian authorities of Russian involvement directly with the Russian Government at high levels and urged the avoidance 

of any actions in Georgia that could impact regional stability and security. The administration has urged the Government of Russia to cooperate directly with the 

Government of Georgia to investigate the incidents. The Government of Georgia’s 

investigation continues.

Question. Do you believe that Russia has an interest in resolving Moldova’s frozen 

conflict in Transnistria? If so, please describe those interests.

Answer. Russia is a participant, along with the European Union, the OSCE, 

Ukraine, and the United States, in the 5+2 process that seeks to find a comprehensive negotiated settlement to the Transnistria conflict. The September 22 announcement by 5+2 participants in Moscow to relaunch official 5+2 negotiations after a 6-

year hiatus was a positive development, and at that time, Russian Deputy Foreign 

Minister Karasin reiterated Russia’s support for the 5+2 process. In June, Russian 

Foreign Minister Lavrov publicly urged both parties to the conflict to compromise 

and he made clear that Transnistria’s special status within Moldova, not independence, was the issue on the table. The administration will continue to work closely 

with Russia and other participants in the 5+2 process to try to resolve the 

Transnistria conflict.

Question. Do you believe that Russia has been constructive as a negotiator in the 

5+2 talks over Transnistria? Do you believe that Russia has leverage over 

Transnistria in the 5+2 negotiations? What points of leverage exist?

Answer. Russia joined the European Union, Ukraine, and the United States this 

year in supporting the resumption of official 5+2 negotiations in an effort to reach 

a comprehensive settlement to the Transnistria conflict. Under the OSCE Chairman-in-Office’s leadership, the parties to the conflict and the international participants in the 5+2 process agreed in September to the relaunch of official 5+2 negotiations after a 6-year hiatus. The administration looks forward to working with Russia 

and the other 5+2 participants to develop a comprehensive agenda and to hold an 

initial round of negotiations in the coming months. 

Transnistria continues to rely on political and financial support from Russia. At 

the same time, Foreign Minister Lavrov has publicly supported Moldova’s sovereignty and stated that Russia supports a negotiated settlement that provides for 

a special status for Transnistria within Moldova.

Question. Moldovan officials recently interdicted weapons-grade highly enriched 

uranium in Chisinau. Reports suggest that a Russian national, currently in Russia, 

was involved.

• a. What conversations have you had with Russia on this matter?

Answer. The United States supports ongoing Moldovan efforts to prosecute the 

traffickers who were caught in June with uranium and to work with Russian and 

other partners to investigate the original theft of the uranium. The United States 

has raised this case with Russia. If confirmed, I will continue our robust cooperation 

with Russia on nuclear smuggling matters.

• b. Are you satisfied with the level of cooperation the United States and Moldova 

have received from Russia?

Answer. The administration believes that Moldovan, Russian, and other authorities are taking appropriate action on this case and the United States will continue 

to offer its assistance. The administration routinely works with Russia in this area 

through, for example, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which is 

cochaired by Russia and the United States.

• c. Are you confident that the alleged perpetrator will be brought to justice?

Answer. The investigation into this case is ongoing, and for that reason we prefer 

not to comment publicly on the details of this case at this time.

Question. Belarus has announced that a Russian company may soon construct a 

nuclear power plant near its border with Lithuania.

• a. Are you confident that the proper international safeguards and transparency 

measures are being complied with thus far?

Answer. The administration is aware that Belarus is moving forward with plans 

to build a nuclear power plant. The United States has clearly stated that Belarus’ 

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plans should include a competitive, commercial process for the design and construction of a safe, secure plant operating under the International Atomic Energy Agency’s safeguards and built to the highest international standards. The administration 

has also made clear that Belarus—like all countries pursuing nuclear power—

should do so in a transparent manner that takes into account the concerns of neighboring countries, as appropriate. The administration supports efforts by Lithuania 

and other European states potentially affected by the construction of a nuclear 

power plant in Belarus to seek additional clarifications on Belarus’ plans.

• b. Have you raised this issue with Russian officials?

Answer. The United States regularly engages with Russia on issues of nuclear security, including the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The administration continues 

to urge all parties involved to ensure that the design and construction of a safe, secure plant operating under the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) safeguards would be built to the highest international standards. Russia, like the 

United States, is a charter member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and has committed to export nuclear materials and technology only to those countries that have 

agreements with the IAEA on the full scope of the Agency’s safeguards. Moreover, 

Russia has an IAEA Additional Protocol in force, which requires disclosure of nuclear related exports, including to Belarus. Russia has also taken part in efforts by 

the United States and other G8 countries to encourage Belarus to adopt the Additional Protocol.

Question. Reports suggest that Russia has conditioned a loan to Belarus on the 

acquisition of equity in Belarusian state-owned enterprises. What is the status of 

this deal and what enterprises have been or will be affected in your estimation?

Answer. The Government of Belarus continues to search for solutions to its economic problems, including a $3 billion, multiyear loan from the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Community Stabilization Fund. 

The Eurasian Economic Community Stabilization Fund disbursed $800 million 

dollars in June, but the loan requires that the Government of Belarus privatize at 

least $2.5 billion of state assets before more funds are released. One possible target 

for privatization is Beltransgaz, the state-owned gas pipeline monopoly in Belarus. 

Russia’s Gazprom, which already owns 50 percent of Beltransgaz, has indicated its 

desire to purchase the remaining shares of Beltransgaz for $2.5 billion, but no deal 

has been concluded.

Question. Russia has traditionally been a major supplier of arms to Syria. Has 

Russia withheld pending arms sales to Syria in light of the recent violence Syrian 

forces have perpetrated against their own citizens?

Answer. The administration is concerned about reports of continued Russian 

weapons transfers to Syria. The administration frequently expresses concern to the 

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and senior Russian officials regarding Russian 

arms sales to actors of concern, including Syria. Secretary Clinton publicly urged 

Russia to cease arms sales to Syria on August 12, 2011. The administration will 

continue to press Russia to cease pending and future arms sales that threaten regional stability, contribute to the Syrian regime’s violent crackdown, or could be diverted to Hezbollah. The administration can provide additional details on this issue 

in a classified format.

Question. What is the status of the Russian Navy’s use of a Syrian naval base 

at Tartus? Has Russian-Syrian naval cooperation subsided since the recent unrest 

in Syria?

Answer. Russia has had facilities at the Syrian port of Tartus since 1971. The 

facility is used primarily as a maintenance and resupply point for Russian warships 

transiting the Mediterranean. The most recent visit of a Russian fleet unit was a 

3-day visit in late September by the destroyer Severomorsk, which was returning 

home after a counterpiracy patrol in the Gulf of Aden.

Question. As a result of U.S. diplomacy, Russia has cancelled the sale of the

S–300 missile defense system to Iran. However, when other disagreements in the 

U.S.-Russian bilateral relationship have arisen, some Russian officials have threatened to reinitiate the sale. Has Russia cancelled the S–300 because it is in Russia’s 

national security interest or because of a linkage to other bilateral issues?

Answer. Russia has informed the administration that, in its view, its cancelation 

of the contract for the provision and transfer of S–300 air defense system to Iran 

was in line with its obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution 

1929 (2010) and it will not deliver these weapon systems. Foreign Minister Lavrov 

recently stated, ‘‘[Russia has] returned the prepayment to [Iran], and we believe the 

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issue should be closed.’’ The administration appreciates the restraint that Russia 

has demonstrated over the course of several years in not transferring the S–300 system to Iran. The administration hopes that Russia’s continued restraint will serve 

to encourage other potential arms suppliers to adopt a rigorous approach to implementing U.N. sanctions pertaining to Iran.

Question. Against which Russian entities have sanctions been placed, removed, or 

waived during your tenure for the proliferation of goods, services, or technology to 

Iran, North Korea, or Syria listed on:

• I. The Missile Technology Control Regime Equipment and Technology Annex? 

• II. Wassenaar Arrangement list of Dual Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions list of July 12, 1996, and subsequent revisions?

Answer. The United States has not imposed nonproliferation sanctions against 

Russian entities since January 1, 2009. 

As published in the Federal Register, the administration lifted E.O. 12938 penalties against the Baltic State Technical University, Glavkosmos, D. Mendeleyev 

University of Chemical Technology of Russia, and Moscow Aviation Institute in 

2010. The administration also lifted Lethal Military Equipment sanctions against 

the Tula Instrument Design Bureau and sanctions pursuant to the Iran, North 

Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act against Rosoboronexport in 2010. On May 21, 

2010, the administration provided a classified briefing on the details of the lifting 

of the above-mentioned sanctions to the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee. 

The details concerning the lifting or waiver of sanctions for transfers of controlled 

equipment are classified. The administration would be pleased to arrange a briefing 

in an appropriate setting to provide this information.

Question. Is it the policy of the Russian Federation to cease the proliferation to 

Iran of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles?

Answer. Russia is a key partner in American and international efforts to prevent 

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles to Iran. Russia is an 

active participant in the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, 

and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. 

Russia, as part of the P5+1 and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, has supported and contributed to the crafting of all Security Council 

resolutions pertaining to Iran: 1696 (2006), 1737 (2007), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 

1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010). The administration expects all states, including Russia, to fully comply with the United Nations sanctions regime on Iran, as well as 

Security Council resolutions preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including Security Council Resolution 1540.

Question. How do you view what the United States Government has called a 

‘‘mixed’’ record on Russian missile technology controls’ enforcement and compliance 

with regard to Iran? With regard to any other countries?

Answer. The United States continues to closely monitor transfers of proliferationsensitive technology from Russia to Iran and other countries of concern. Nonetheless, Russia has made significant contributions to international efforts to combat 

missile proliferation. The administration works closely with the Russian Government to further our shared nonproliferation goals and to prevent Iran and other 

countries of concern from obtaining missile-related goods and technologies from Russian entities. 

Although past assistance of Russian entities helped move Iran toward self-sufficiency in the production of ballistic missiles, over the last two decades, the Russian 

Government has enacted laws and decrees to implement export controls on complete 

missile systems and dual-use items. Since 2006, the Russian Government has supported a series of United Nations Security Council resolutions designed to prevent 

transfers of equipment and technology that could benefit Iran’s nuclear-capable ballistic missile programs. 

Russia is an active participant in international arrangements to prevent the proliferation of missile delivery systems, including the Missile Technology Control 

Regime, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and the Hague Code of Conduct 

Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. 

The United States expects all states, including Russia, to abide by the terms of 

all U.N. Security Council resolutions pertaining to Iran, including 1737, 1747, 1803, 

and 1929, and Security Council resolutions against the proliferation of weapons of 

mass destruction, including 1540. The administration has raised with the Russian 

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Government issues of weapons-related transfers to actors of concern and has continued to press Russia to abide by its international obligations and commitments.

Question. What is the status of the State Department’s delinquent submission of 

reports required under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Proliferation Act?

Answer. As you are aware, the Department submitted the 2008 Iran, North 

Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act report to Congress on May 23, 2011. The 

Department will submit the 2009 and 2010 Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act reports to Congress once it has assembled and evaluated all of the 

reporting information required by the act. Currently, the Department is working to 

finalize the 2009 report and is simultaneously reviewing cases that meet the criteria 

for reportability for the 2010 report. The Department expects to submit the 2009 

report by the end of this year.

Question. Has Russia executed a facility-specific safeguards agreement with the 

IAEA for the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Iran?

Answer. Russia is not required to complete a facility-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA for the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. Under its existing NPTmandated safeguards agreement, Iran is required to place all nuclear facilities, including Bushehr, under IAEA safeguards. In his most recent report to the IAEA 

Board of Governors, the IAEA Director General noted that ‘‘the Agency continues 

to verify the nondiversion of declared material’’ at 16 declared nuclear facilities, including Bushehr. The IAEA Director General has not noted any issues or irregularities with respect to Bushehr in his reports.

Question. What avenues of cooperation is Russia currently seeking with North 

Korea, particularly after the visit of North Korean President Kim Jong-il to Russia?

Answer. Kim Jong-il’s meeting with President Medvedev reportedly included discussions on energy deals and economic aid. Press reports of that meeting also mentioned North Korea’s reported willingness to refrain from nuclear tests and missile 

launches. 

The administration views these reports as a sign of Russia’s shared commitment 

to abide by obligations mandated by United Nations Security Council resolutions. 

Russia voted with the United States in the Security Council to adopt Resolution 

1874, which expanded sanctions against North Korea by broadening the embargoes 

on trade and financing that could assist its prohibited weapons programs. Russia 

remains a committed partner in the six-party process, which seeks to accomplish the 

peaceful and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Russia and the 

United States continue to urge North Korea to comply with its commitments under 

the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, the terms of the Armistice Agreement, and obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions. 

North Korea’s disclosure last November of a uranium enrichment facility remains 

a matter of serious concern for the administration. This is a clear violation of North 

Korea’s obligations under Resolutions 1718 and 1874 and contrary to its 2005 joint 

statement commitments. Russia publicly called on North Korea to comply with Resolutions 1718 and 1874, notably during a visit by North Korean Foreign Minister 

Pak Chui Un to Moscow on December 13, 2010. In the Deauville G8 Summit Declaration of May 27, President Medvedev joined President Obama and their counterparts in condemning North Korea’s provocative behavior, as well as its continued 

nuclear weapons, ballistic missile, uranium enrichment, and light-water reactorconstruction activities; and urging North Korea to take concrete action to demonstrate its readiness to return to the six-party talks.

Question. At the Peterson Institute on April 15, 2011, you spoke about the possible repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment with respect to Russia. According to 

the transcript, you stated: ‘‘ . . . [L]et’s have another act. Call it the Jackson-Vanik 

Act of 2011.’’ Do you believe that, should Jackson-Vanik be repealed, another piece 

of legislation should be passed in its place? Please describe.

Answer. Jackson-Vanik served its historic purpose by helping thousands of Jews 

emigrate from the Soviet Union. Since a 1994 Presidential Determination and subject to ongoing reporting requirements, successive U.S. administrations have certified that Russia is in compliance with the emigration provisions of Jackson-Vanik, 

satisfying a requirement for an annual finding to continue providing normal-traderelation tariff treatment to imports from Russia. If Jackson-Vanik is not terminated 

before Russia joins the WTO, U.S. workers, manufacturers, ranchers, and farmers 

will be prevented from joining their competitors in enjoying the full benefits of Russia’s accession. 

The administration’s commitment to pursuing a robust human rights policy regarding Russia is strong, and this will continue after the proposed termination of 

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Jackson-Vanik. The administration discusses human rights concerns openly with 

Russian officials, including with regard to freedom of assembly, ongoing human 

rights abuses in the North Caucasus, and murders and violent attacks on journalists and human rights activists. The administration also engages Russian civil society and political opposition directly, and fosters contacts between American civil 

society and Russian civil society. I have raised these issues in my official meetings, 

as have Secretary Clinton and President Obama, and we will continue to do so. Senior U.S. officials have delivered more than 80 public statements on human rights 

in Russia since President Obama took office. 

Since FY 2009, the Obama administration—working closely with the U.S. Congress—has provided over $108 million in bilateral assistance to support civil society, 

rule of law, human rights, religious freedom, independent media, and good governance in Russia. The administration has prioritized support for small, direct grants 

to Russian civil society organizations. Working with Congress, and recognizing today’s difficult budget environment, the administration continues to seek new ways 

to generate greater support for civil society and human rights in Russia.

Question. You have spoken widely on the need to support civil society and the rule 

of law in Russia. However, the administration’s request for the ‘‘Governing Justly 

and Democratically’’ Account for the Russian Federation for the last 3 years has 

been approximately the same ($35,900 for FY 2012, $35,190 for FY 2011, and 

$35,900 for FY 2010). Why has the administration’s request remained nearly constant, in light of the deterioration of democratic standards in Russia?

Answer. The administration remains steadfast in its commitment to strengthen 

democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in Russia, while also recognizing our 

deeply constrained budget. Funding for ‘‘Governing Justly and Democratically’’ in 

Russia remains constant at approximately $35 million each year even though the 

FY 2012 total request for Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia 

(AEECA) represents an approximate 10-percent decrease relative to FY 2011 and 

a 16-percent decrease relative to FY 2010. That figure represents over two-thirds 

of the total request for AEECA resources for Russia programs in FY 2012, and is 

over 25 percent larger than the funding requested for this sector for any other country in the region.

Question. How much in grants have been provided directly to local civil society 

and NGO groups in Russia during this administration?

Answer. Since FY 2009, the United States has provided a total of over $46 million 

in bilateral assistance to support civil society in Russia. This assistance includes 

grants provided directly to Russian civil society groups to implement initiatives in 

areas such as human rights, the rule of law, and government transparency, as well 

as technical assistance and training to help those groups more effectively carry out 

their work. Last year, the United States provided nearly $6 million in small grants 

directly to Russian organizations to carry out targeted civic initiatives, and the administration intends to increase the proportion of U.S. assistance funds used to support such grants in future years. Additionally, nearly half of the funds managed by 

USAID in Russia are allocated to programs implemented by Russian organizations, 

among the highest percentages in the world. This direct support for Russian organizations works both to promote democracy and assist in the sustainable development 

of Russian civil society.

Question. Have Russian or U.S. groups receiving money for civil society-related 

work come under pressure or harassment from Russian authorities during your tenure? If so, please describe your responses.

Answer. Over the years, Russian and American private organizations receiving 

U.S. assistance have experienced pressure or harassment. In each case, the United 

States has been proactive in raising concerns with the Russian authorities. For example, last year when Russian law enforcement authorities made additional 

requests for financial and other information from nongovernmental organizations 

receiving foreign funding, the administration raised concerns with government officials and stayed in contact with civil society actors. Authorities subsequently 

dropped their inquiries. U.S. assistance includes programs to improve the regulatory 

environment for Russian civil society, to help Russian civil society groups ensure 

that they are in compliance with Russian law, and to provide legal defense when 

necessary.

Question. Reports have indicated that representatives of the National Democratic 

Institute have come under particular pressure from Russian authorities. If this is 

accurate, please describe the administration’s particular response.

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Answer. Over the years in Russia, NDI staff members have experienced harassment ranging from visa problems to intimidation. In each case, the United States 

has been proactive in ascertaining what happened, raising our concerns with the 

Russian authorities, and showing solidarity with NDI staff by meeting them 

frequently, inviting them to our public events, and seeking resolution to their problems. The administration remains committed to strengthening democratic institutions and processes in Russia, including through support for NDI’s work. The 

administration continues to consult and coordinate with NDI leadership in Washington and NDI staff on the ground in Russia.

Question. In your testimony, you note that $9 million will be set aside for election/

civil society work in the runup to the Russian elections. From what account will this 

money come?

Answer. The United States is committed to encouraging free and fair processes 

for Russia’s December 2011 parliamentary elections and March 2012 Presidential 

election. This is demonstrated by the administration’s robust package of over $9 million in nonpartisan programs. This package supports domestic monitoring of the 

campaign environment and conduct of the elections, encourages professional and unbiased coverage by independent media, and assists civil society initiatives to promote civic participation in the electoral process. These programs are supported 

through approximately $8 million in Assistance to Europe, Eurasia, and Central 

Asia (AEECA) account resources and over $1 million in Democracy Fund (DF) account resources.

Question. Do you believe that the current Russia-Georgia WTO dispute has legitimate trade components or is it purely a political dispute?

Answer. The Russia-Georgia WTO negotiation does have a legitimate trade component. The focus of the current Swiss-led mediation process is on facilitating a 

transparent flow of trade across the internationally recognized Russia-Georgia border. The administration believes that the Swiss-led efforts to address these issues 

can succeed in a way that is fully consistent with Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, which it has and will continue to support.

Question. Do you believe that Russia is negotiating with Georgia constructively 

and in good faith over the customs issues on Georgia’s internationally recognized 

border?

Answer. Both Russian and Georgian negotiating teams have been meeting under 

Swiss-led mediation since late 2010 in an effort to reach an agreement on trade 

across Georgia’s internationally recognized border with Russia. Although the United 

States is not directly involved in these talks, the administration strongly supports 

Switzerland’s efforts and encourages both Russia and Georgia to deal with these 

issues in good faith and in a flexible and constructive manner. The fact that the 

two countries continue to meet and negotiate leads us to believe that Russia and 

Georgia can reach a workable solution.

Question. You have noted the benefits to U.S. businesses of Russia’s WTO accession. Will Russia’s WTO accession have any effect on the embargoes it currently has 

against its neighbors, including against Georgian water and Moldovan wine?

Answer. Once Russia is a member of the WTO, it will be required to comply with 

the WTO Agreement on Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS 

Agreement). Thus, Russia will have to either remove or justify the SPS measures 

that it currently applies to Georgian water according to WTO standards (there is 

no longer a ban against Moldovan wine). If Russia does not take one of those steps, 

Georgia, like all other WTO members, will be able to raise the issue in the WTO 

SPS Committee, and, if necessary, make use of WTO dispute settlement procedures. 

While the WTO will not solve all trade-related disputes between Russia and its 

neighbors, such disputes will no longer be just bilateral ones, but multilateral ones 

involving the full membership of the WTO.

Question. Please describe the role that the Russian Government is playing in trying to sway investment decisions in the Shah Deniz II fields, future Turkmen natural gas exports, and the Nabucco, ITGI, and TAP pipeline proposals. Do you believe 

that the Russian Government will be a roadblock to the creation of a Southern 

Energy Corridor from the Caspian to Central and Eastern Europe?

Answer. Russia has offered to purchase all of the Shah Deniz II gas from Azerbaijan. The administration has no indication the Shah Deniz consortium is seriously 

considering this offer since it is committed to exporting its gas through the Southern 

corridor. The Russian Government also has expressed its objections to construction 

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of a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, which could bring Turkmen gas across the Caspian 

without using the existing Russian pipeline network. 

The Shah Deniz consortium is reviewing the proposals it received from the 

Nabucco, Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy, and Trans Adriatic Pipeline ventures, 

and hopes to make a decision on which route to select by the end of the year. The 

biggest remaining obstacle is finalizing a gas transit agreement between Azerbaijan 

and Turkey, without which none of the projects can proceed. The administration is 

hopeful that will happen in the near future. 

The administration supports any commercially viable Southern corridor option 

that will deliver Caspian gas to Europe, as long as it is designed in a way to accommodate future gas production as it becomes available.

Question. Do you believe that other pipelines being considered as alternatives to 

Nabucco (ITGI and TAP) provide the same benefit to U.S. strategic interests as the 

Nabucco pipeline?

Answer. The administration recognizes that Nabucco may have greater strategic 

importance than the alternative pipelines since it would deliver larger volumes of 

gas to a larger number of countries. However, it is not clear that there is adequate 

gas supply available to make a full scale Nabucco pipeline commercially viable. The 

administration has made it clear that we support any commercially viable Southern 

corridor option that will deliver Caspian gas to Europe, as long as it is designed 

in such a way as to accommodate future gas production as it becomes available. 

That could include a scalable Nabucco, ITGI, TAP or the Southeast Europe pipeline 

(which would use existing Turkish infrastructure, upgraded as necessary, and with 

new pipelines in Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary, to deliver all of Azerbaijan’s 

Shah Deniz gas to the Balkans).

Question. Please describe partnerships between Gazprom or other Russian energy 

companies and the partner companies in Nabucco, ITGI, and TAP.

Answer. Gazprom has commercial relationships with most of the companies who 

are partners in the competing Southern corridor projects: Nabucco, ITGI, and TAP. 

For example, Gazprom supplies gas to and has a joint venture with Austria’s OMV; 

this joint venture operates the gas hub at Baumgarten, through which much of the 

gas from Nabucco would flow. Gazprom also supplies gas to and is considering a 

power plant joint venture with German utility Rheinisch-Westfa ̈lisches 

Elektrizita ̈tswerk (RWE). Gazprom is a supplier of gas to Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Turkey, all of whom are partners in Nabucco. Regarding ITGI, Gazprom 

is a supplier of gas to DEPA (Greek partner in ITGI) and Edison (Italian partner 

in ITGI); in addition, the French company EDF, which now effectively controls Edison, recently joined Gazprom’s South Stream project. Regarding TAP, Gazprom supplies gas to E.ON Ruhrgas (Germany), one of the TAP partners, while Statoil, another of the TAP partners, is a partner of Gazprom in the Shtokman gas project 

in Russia.

Question. What is your view on the European Commission’s recent examination 

of anticompetitive practices by Gazprom?

Answer. The administration supports the EU in its efforts to apply its regulatory 

regime to the energy sector. This includes examination of possible anticompetitive 

actions by both domestic and foreign companies operating in the EU on a nondiscriminatory basis.

Question. What are the chief obstacles for U.S. energy companies investing in 

Russian energy production, local distribution, and export? If confirmed, what will 

you do to improve the domestic investment climate for Russia?

Answer. State dominance, the tax structure, and corruption in the energy sector 

are major obstacles for U.S. companies investing in Russia. The Russian mineral tax 

system makes the development of new fields economically unviable for Russian companies and foreign investors alike. Of every dollar earned from the sale of a barrel 

of Russian oil, 75 cents go to the state, and taxes are assessed on gross revenues, 

not profits. Russia has recently lowered duties on crude oil exports to encourage the 

development of new fields, but much more needs to be done to attract investment. 

In order to maintain current production levels, Russia would benefit from collaboration involving sophisticated U.S. technology, particularly in developing Arctic 

fields, deep-water offshore drilling, and unconventional oil extraction in its Siberian 

tight oil fields. ExxonMobil’s recent $3.2 billion joint venture with Rosneft is consistent with our goals of promoting U.S. trade and investment with Russia, particularly in areas where the United States has a comparative advantage in technical 

and management expertise. 

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If confirmed, I would continue to seek better protection for all U.S. investors in 

Russia. The administration has begun exploratory discussions with Russia on a bilateral investment treaty. If confirmed, pursuing this and other initiatives to afford 

high levels of legal protections for U.S. investors in Russia will be one of my top 

priorities. A bilateral investment treaty would provide dispute resolution mechanisms for U.S. firms, as well as other legal protections. The administration will also 

continue to support programs—and bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts 

such as encouraging Russia to ratify and implement international treaties in this 

area—to encourage better protection of investor rights and more effective combating 

of corruption, particularly as Russia proceeds with plans to join the World Trade 

Organization. The administration has begun to see positive developments in this direction, such as important amendments to Russia’s laws last year that enabled it 

to join the Working Group on Bribery of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 

and Development (OECD). Russia is now on track to ratify the OECD Anti-Bribery 

Convention early in 2012.

Question. Please characterize the transparency of the Russian energy sector in 

terms of ownership of key companies and management of revenues to the government.

Answer. Russia’s energy sector is still dominated by large state-owned companies 

and 40 percent of the state’s tax revenue comes from the energy sector. Rosneft, the 

state-owned oil company, accounts for over a quarter of Russia’s oil production, and 

Gazprom, the state-owned gas company, accounts for almost 85 percent of Russia’s 

natural gas production. The vast size of Russia’s energy sector makes the Russian 

economy and the state’s budget heavily dependent on the international price of oil 

and gas. Russia’s leadership is keenly aware of this vulnerability and is striving to 

diversify and modernize its economy. The administration, together with U.S. investors in Russia, is engaging with Russia on a number of fronts, including in innovation and small business development, in order to help Russia diversify its economy, 

and at the same time, create more opportunities for American firms. 

In addition, Russia has taken the important step of endorsing the Extractive 

Industries Transparency Initiative in the G8 and the United Nations. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, to which it is trying to accede, has 

also endorsed the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.

Question. If confirmed, what will you do to promote smooth implementation of 

rules around the extractive industries disclosure currently being written by the SEC 

and under consideration in the European Commission?

Answer. Section 1504 of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 

signed by President Obama last July is a critical element in U.S. global leadership 

in promoting transparency. The United States encourages other countries to develop 

similar disclosure requirements. For example, the administration has encouraged 

other participants in the global energy market to participate in the Extractive 

Industries Transparency Initiative, a coalition of governments, companies, civil society groups, investors, and international organizations that supports improved governance in resource-rich countries through the verification and full publication of 

company payments and government revenues from oil, gas, and mining. The President’s announcement in September in New York that the United States, working 

together with industries and civil society, will implement the Extractive Industries 

Transparency Initiative domestically, also provides a major boost to U.S. efforts to 

advance transparency globally. 

Russia has endorsed the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative in the G8, 

the United Nations, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. If confirmed, I will place a high priority on engagement with Russia on implementing these and other transparency efforts as a critical step to improve global energy security and to encourage more U.S. trade and investment in Russia’s energy 

sector.

Question. How do you assess the potential of shale gas resources in Central and 

Eastern Europe to provide for greater energy independence for this region?

Answer. Shale gas development could have a significant impact on energy security 

for Central and Eastern Europe, but it should represent only one element of a larger 

sustainable energy security strategy for the region. A larger strategy should include 

the development of renewable energy resources, the diversification of natural gas 

supply through pipeline and liquefied natural gas networks, energy market reforms, 

and movement toward a more integrated regional energy network. 

According to a recently released U.S. Energy Information Agency study on global 

shale gas resources, there is considerable potential for shale gas development in 

Central and Eastern Europe. Specifically, the report noted significant technically reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00796 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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coverable shale gas resources in Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania, 

and Bulgaria. All these countries are in the very early stages of shale gas resource 

assessment and development. Among them, Poland has made the most progress in 

this area. 

Not enough exploration has been done yet to understand the real potential of 

shale gas to bolster the region’s long-term energy security. Poland, in particular has 

attracted considerable company interest. There have been positive results from the 

limited exploration that’s been done, but questions remain about the extent of the 

country’s recoverable shale gas resource base. 

Unconventional energy development, especially shale gas, could play a key role in 

helping some Central and Eastern European countries increase energy security and 

reduce carbon emissions. However, there are other issues that must be considered. 

These include environmental concerns, especially related to potential impacts on air 

and water, as well as possible technological, political, regulatory, and financial constraints.

Question. What U.S. initiatives are underway to assist Central and Eastern 

Europe in developing its shale gas resources?

Answer. The U.S. Agency for International Development is planning to fund an 

initial environmental and regulatory assessment for unconventional gas development in Ukraine. Specific technical counterparts have been established and the required Environmental Scoping Statement is being prepared. This is under consideration as a model through which engagement on shale gas development issues could 

be expanded to other Central and Eastern Europe countries. 

The State Department’s Global Shale Gas Initiative has signed agreements to cooperate on shale gas development with Armenia, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine. 

This government-to-government program works with participant countries through 

a whole-of-government approach to help them better understand the myriad environmental, regulatory, legal, and financial issues involved in shale gas development. 

Engagement with Central and Eastern Europe has included visitor programs, briefings, field trips and site visits on both sides of the Atlantic, and dissemination of 

important information regarding the ongoing domestic efforts on environmentally 

sound shale gas development. 

The U.S. Geological Survey is engaging with Central and Eastern European countries, in particular Poland, Ukraine and Armenia, by conducting technical shale gas 

resource identification and assessment workshops. Poland has participated in a 

State Department visitor program that included 10 days of meetings with U.S. government agencies and state regulators, with a focus on safe and environmentally 

sound shale gas development. There will be a similar Baltic Regional visitor program at the end of October which will include representatives from Estonia, Latvia, 

and Lithuania, as well as a second visit of stakeholders from Poland in December. 

The administration is consulting with Polish officials on the next phase of our cooperation on this issue. 

In February 2011, the United States and Ukraine signed a Memorandum of 

Understanding on unconventional gas resources, and the administration has worked 

closely with Chevron and ExxonMobil to help them conclude production sharing 

agreements with Ukraine. Most recently, in October, Richard Morningstar led a 

meeting of our U.S.-Russia Energy Security Working Group, which focused on concluding a confidentiality agreement between the U.S. Geological Survey and 

Ukraine’s Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources, to assist Ukraine in evaluating its potential shale gas resources.

Question. My understanding is that NATO has not conducted an Article Five exercise in nearly a decade. Russia, on the other hand, conducts annual Zapad exercises, 

some of which have reportedly simulated a nuclear attack on its neighbors to the 

west. Have you had conversations with your Russian counterparts on the Zapad exercises and the detrimental impact they have on regional security?

Answer. NATO exercises are conducted on a regular basis to ensure the alliance 

is capable and prepared to address the range of security challenges we may confront. The United States is an active contributor to NATO’s exercises and supports 

the participation of partners, as is appropriate. 

The United States routinely stresses to Russia the importance of increased transparency on military exercises and activities. Following Russia’s Zapad exercise in 

2009, the United States and its NATO allies expressed concern to Russia in the 

NATO-Russia Council about the exercise’s provocative scenario and lack of transparency. 

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Russian Chief of the General 

Staff have recently agreed to enhance military transparency (including with regard 

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to exercises) within the context of their Military Cooperation Working Group. This 

should provide an excellent venue for discussing exercise objectives and the need for 

such exercises to reflect improved political realities.

Question. U.S. investors lost an estimated $12 billion in the expropriation of 

Yukos last decade. Because no U.S.-Russian bilateral investment treaty is in force, 

these investors are left with few remedies.

• Are you confident that these investors have access to a remedy apart from the 

prospect of the United States Government espousing their claims? • Are the remaining hurdles for espousal issues of law or issues of policy? Please 

explain.

Answer. The administration has raised the issue of American shareholders’ claims 

with the Russian Government, both in public and in private. In addition, U.S. officials have met several times with representatives of American investors to discuss 

their claims and the options for seeking to have them addressed. The administration 

is still in the process of determining if espousal is a legally available option, but 

it is also not clear that espousal would be the most effective option. The Yukos 

shareholder claims involve complex legal and financial matters, and raise detailed 

questions of Russian tax law. The effectiveness of any particular option—including 

potential remedies in Russia, in international arbitration, or through settlements—

will depend principally on Russia’s commitment to resolving the claims of the American and other foreign shareholders in Yukos. 

In connection with these issues, the U.S. Government is closely watching the 

international court and arbitration proceedings concerning the significant claims 

brought by Yukos investors from other countries and the Yukos Corporation itself, 

including the September 20 decision from the European Court of Human Rights. 

Future decisions in that court and in arbitral tribunals will continue to inform our 

position on many of the complex legal and factual issues at stake in this matter. 

These international courts and arbitration panels, made up of experts in international law, receive the benefit of full briefings, the parties’ participation in a hearing, and expert opinions. Before making any final decisions on the best way to address the claims of American investors, the U.S. Government believes it should 

allow these proceedings to fully run their course. Please be assured that the administration will continue to coordinate with the representatives of American investors 

in this case.

Question. Do you support the negotiation of a U.S.-Russian bilateral investment 

treaty? What has prevented progress on this issue in the current administration?

Answer. The administration is continually working to seek better protection for 

U.S. investors in Russia, and negotiation of a new bilateral investment treaty is one 

of our goals. The United States and Russia negotiated and signed a bilateral investment treaty in 1992, but it never came into force because the Russian Duma never 

ratified it. The administration has begun exploratory discussions on a new treaty, 

and if I am confirmed, pursuing this and other initiatives to afford high levels of 

legal protections for U.S. investors in Russia will be one of my top priorities. 

In any bilateral investment treaty concluded with Russia, the administration 

would want a strong, high-standard agreement that would level the playing field for 

U.S. companies in Russia, ensuring that they are treated fairly and according to the 

rule of law. Such a treaty would provide benefits for U.S. investors, including: (1) 

strong investor protections, such as protections against discrimination and uncompensated expropriation; (2) new market access commitments, which would allow 

U.S. firms to establish operations in Russia on the same terms as domestic Russian 

investors; and (3) a robust investor-state arbitration mechanism to ensure that U.S. 

companies in Russia have direct recourse to resolve investment disputes with the 

Russian Government through binding international arbitration. The administration 

believes that this type of agreement would simultaneously benefit U.S. companies 

and help advance many of Russia’s own policy objectives, including improving its 

investment climate, stimulating innovation, and reducing corruption. 

MISSILE DEFENSE AGREEMENT WITH MOSCOW

During your testimony before the committee on October 12, you stated:

[W]e very militantly kept out any discussion of missile defense from the 

New START Treaty negotiations. I [was] personally involved in that from 

the beginning to the end[.] But that was never an issue and there were no 

side deals done. And there are no constraints in that treaty whatsoever. 

. . . So, we’re moving forward with or without Russian cooperation on missile defense. And I think it’s important for people to understand that. . . . 

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With respect to Russia, we believe that our security, the security of our 

allies and the security of our partners in Europe can be enhanced through 

cooperation with Russia. That is our working assumption. And in particular 

tracking data that Russia has better access to or earlier and the sharing 

of that data could make both Russia, NATO, and our partners in Europe 

more secure. And so, that’s why we’ve had a very vigorous program of trying to negotiate to get that started. . . . But of late, the negotiations have 

been difficult. In particular, they have broken down over Russian requirements—Russian demands that we sign a legally binding agreement that we 

will not undermine their strategic deterrent. And what we have responded 

to that is our missile defense systems are not aimed at Russia and we did 

not seek to undermine strategic stability. And at the same time, we are not 

going to sign any legally binding agreement that would in any way constrain our missile defense systems. And because Russia believes wrongly in 

our view, that phase four of the EPAA would be a threat to their ICBMs, 

we’re at an impasse right now on those negotiations. We’ll continue to work 

it. We’ll continue to talk to them about its—after all, a lot of this is about 

physics. This is about perceptions. And you know we’ll see what we have 

as we prepare for the [NATO] summit next May. I am not optimistic right 

now. But we’re going to continue to work this issue.

In her remarks before the Atlantic Council’s Missile Defense Conference in Washington, DC, on October 18, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Ellen O. Tauscher, stated ‘‘The missile defense system we are 

establishing in Europe is not directed against Russia. We have said that publicly 

and privately, at many levels. We are prepared to put it in writing.’’ 

On October 19, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced at meeting with 

his supporters that he would be making a statement on missile defense. In so stating, he said ‘‘certain conditions must ripen for me to make a relevant statement. 

. . . But I will make it and I will do this quite soon.’’

Separately, I am informed by my colleagues that the United States may be prepared to offer Russia the ability to, in some manner, observe missile defense tests.

Question. What missile defense talks with Moscow transpired between your 

appearance before the committee on October 12 and Under Secretary Tauscher’s 

remarks on October 18?

Answer. On October 12–13, Under Secretary Ellen Tauscher and Deputy Foreign 

Minister Sergey Ryabkov met in Moscow as cochairs of the Arms Control and International Security Working Group of the U.S.-Russian Presidential Commission to 

continue discussions on missile defense cooperation.

Question. Were you aware of the apparent agreement within some portion of the 

U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission regarding Russian participation in 

U.S. tests of its missile defense system(s)?

Answer. The administration believes that missile defense cooperation is the best 

way for Russia to gain the assurance it seeks that the European Phased Adaptive 

Approach (EPAA) is not a threat to Russia’s strategic deterrent. For this reason, 

U.S. officials have invited Russia to observe a test being carried out as part of the 

EPAA program. Russian participation would be strictly governed by the U.S. 

National Disclosure Policy.

Question. If you were not [aware of the apparent agreement within some portion 

of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission regarding Russian participation in U.S. tests of its missile defense system(s)], are you now, and what agreement 

was reached, if any, and what did the United States offer, regardless of the outcome?

Answer. U.S. officials have invited Russia to observe certain tests of the European 

Phased Adaptive Approach. This is not a new development; this invitation was extended several months ago to Russia and all other members of the NATO-Russia 

Council. Russia has not yet responded.

Question. Please specify the content, legal significance and means (diplomatic 

notes, memoranda of conversations, etc.) through which the United States would 

provide ‘‘in writing’’ to Moscow that missile defenses in Europe are ‘‘not directed’’ 

against Russia beyond the myriad such statements already issued by this administration, and would they differ in any way from any of those previous statements.

Answer. The administration has consistently stated that it cannot, and will not, 

agree to legally binding restrictions or limitations on U.S. or NATO missile defenses. The administration has stated, publicly and privately, that the missile deVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00799 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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fense system being established in Europe is not directed against Russia. The administration is prepared to put the same statement in writing as part of a political 

framework that would open the way for practical cooperation with Russia on missile 

defense. There are a variety of ways to establish such a political framework. No 

agreement has been reached on the content, and no decision has been made on a 

format. The political framework would not be a legally binding agreement.

Question. Would any agreement with Moscow permit or assist, in any manner, 

Russian observation, monitoring, or collection of data on U.S. missile defense tests, 

and if so, would it be done outside any relevant provisions of the New START 

Treaty?

Answer. The New START Treaty provides for the exchange of telemetric information on an equal number of launches of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) 

and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), up to five launches each calendar year. This does not include launches of missile defense interceptors, because 

these are not ICBMs or SLBMs. The United States will not provide missile defense 

interceptor telemetry to Russia under the New START Treaty. If Russia accepts the 

invitation to observe a missile defense test, it would use its own equipment. The 

U.S. National Disclosure Policy would strictly govern any Russian observation of a 

missile defense test.

Question. Please specify how Russia, per Under Secretary Tauscher, ‘‘would continue to be able to confirm that the system is directed against launches originating 

outside Europe and not from Russia.’’ Is the United States offering to assist Russian 

monitoring of American missile defense tests?

Answer. The administration continues to believe that the best way for Russia to 

gain confidence in our stated intentions on missile defense in Europe is through the 

missile defense cooperation the administration has proposed bilaterally and in the 

NATO-Russia Council. We believe that through day-to-day cooperation Russian experts would be able to confirm that the European Phased Adaptive Approach 

(EPAA) is not directed at Russia and that we do not plan EPAA operations against 

Russia. The United States does not consider Russia an adversary, and cooperation 

is the best way for Russia to gain transparency and reassurance that this is the 

case. Missile Defense Agency Director LTG O’Reilly offered Russia—as well as any 

NATO member—the opportunity to observe U.S. missile defense tests. The U.S. 

National Disclosure Policy would strictly govern any Russian participation in a missile defense test.

Question. Please confirm that the administration will not assist Russian monitoring or collection of information on (a) any missile defense interceptor, as defined 

in paragraph 44 of Part One of the Protocol to the New START Treaty; (b) any satellite launches, missile defense sensor targets, and missile defense intercept targets, 

the launch of which uses the first stage of an existing type of United States ICBM 

or SLBM listed in paragraph 8 of Article III of the New START Treaty; or (c) any 

missile described in clause (a) of paragraph 7 of Article III of the New START 

Treaty. If it would do so, then please specify why and how.

Answer. The administration believes that missile defense cooperation is the best 

way for Russia to gain the reassurance it seeks that the European Phased Adaptive 

Approach (EPAA) is not a threat to Russia’s strategic deterrent. For this reason, 

U.S. officials have invited Russia to observe a test being carried out as part of the 

EPAA program. Missile Defense Agency Director LTG O’Reilly offered Russia—as 

well as any NATO member—the opportunity to observe U.S. missile defense tests. 

U.S. National Disclosure Policy would strictly govern any Russian observation of a 

missile defense test.

Question. Under Secretary Tauscher also stated ‘‘We welcome an opportunity to 

continue and expand the sharing of technical information on the EPAA with Russian experts on an interagency basis, to demonstrate what it can and cannot do.’’

• a. Please specify all technical data (i) shared with Moscow regarding the EPAA; 

(ii) that would be shared; and (iii) that the United States would not share; or 

(iv) would not need to share with Moscow regarding the EPAA to confirm what 

any element of any phase of the EPAA ‘‘cannot do.’’

Answer. U.S. officials have shared unclassified technical information on the EPAA 

with Russian counterparts over the past 2 years, in order to demonstrate that the 

EPAA does not threaten Russian deterrent forces or undermine strategic stability. 

In May 2011, U.S. officials presented an unclassified briefing to Russia explaining 

why U.S. missile defenses are not a threat to Russia, using physics and realistic unclassified performance parameters. U.S. officials also presented a similar briefing in 

793

June to the NATO-Russia Council. The administration is prepared to continue to 

pursue this dialogue, within the bounds of U.S. National Disclosure Policy.

• b. The Under Secretary specified such data would be shared on an ‘‘interagency 

basis.’’ Could technical data be shared with Moscow outside of any form of 

license or authorization under relevant statutes and regulations even if the 

Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement (DTCA) with Moscow has not entered into force?

Answer. Exchanges with Russia based on unclassified information on the European Phased Adaptive Approach began 2 years ago, shortly after the program was 

announced. These exchanges could be expanded following conclusion of a Defense 

Technology Cooperation Agreement. Negotiations on a Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement began during the previous administration and are continuing.

Question. With regard to any element of the EPAA or the two-stage Ground-Based 

Interceptor, is the United States prepared to allow Russian access or observation 

of any flight tests? If so, under what conditions and at which sites would such 

access and observation be permitted?

Answer. The United States has invited Russia to observe an EPAA flight test in 

the Pacific. Russia would use its own equipment. Russian participation would be 

governed by U.S. National Disclosure Policy.

Question. Under Secretary Tauscher further stated ‘‘through cooperation we can 

demonstrate the inherent characteristics of the system and its inability to undermine Russian deterrent forces or strategic stability.’’

• a. Please specify which ‘‘inherent characteristics’’ of each element of the EPAA, 

including those yet to be developed or tested, such as the SM-3 Block IIB, would 

confirm that such systems do not undermine Russian deterrent forces or, more 

broadly, strategic stability.

Answer. The mission of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) is to 

counter launches from the Middle East. It is not designed to counter Russian strategic forces, nor is it capable of doing so. This is true of all four phases, and the 

administration believes that through day-to-day cooperation Russian experts would 

be able to confirm that the EPAA is not directed at Russia and that we do not plan 

EPAA operations against Russia. The United States does not consider Russia an adversary, and cooperation is the best way for Russia to gain transparency and reassurance that this is the case.

• b. In your opinion, would it be unwise to provide any additional, written assurances to Moscow before the operational capabilities and characteristics of any 

element of the EPAA are known?

Answer. The way for Russia to gain the assurance it seeks is to engage in missile 

defense cooperation with the United States and NATO. 

As the President stated in his December 18, 2010, letter to Senators Reid and 

McConnell, ‘‘ . . . as long as I am President, and as long as the Congress provides 

the necessary funding, the United States will continue to develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect the United States, our deployed forces, and our allies 

and partners.’’

If confirmed, I would work with my colleagues in the administration to seek a political framework that would open the way for missile defense cooperation with Russia, without any limits on our ability to develop and deploy missile defenses, so that 

U.S. missile defenses are free to keep pace in response to the evolution of the threat.

Question. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was quick to dismiss 

Under Secretary Tauscher’s remarks, according to Russian press. An October 19 

Interfax report quoted an MFA official stating ‘‘We need reliable legal guarantees[.]’’ 

The Senate made clear (and the President certified) that American missile defense 

systems, including all phases of the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defenses 

in Europe, the modernization of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system, and 

the continued development of the two-stage Ground-Based Interceptor as a technological and strategic hedge, will not threaten the strategic balance with the Russian 

Federation under Condition 14 of the resolution of advice and consent to the New 

START Treaty. 

Russia is unwilling to accept both cooperation and assurance, seeking only legally 

binding limitations on American missile defenses. 

Since Russia has apparently rejected all efforts to date, and if the most recent reports from Moscow are true, then what is the administration willing to do to further 

reassure Moscow regarding each of the following: 

(a) All phases of the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defenses in Europe; 

794

(b) The modernization of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system; and 

(c) The continued development of the two-stage Ground-Based Interceptor as 

a technological and strategic hedge.

Answer. The missile defense system being established in Europe is not directed 

against Russia, nor is it capable of countering Russian strategic forces or undermining strategic stability. Senior officials of the Department of Defense have extensively briefed Russia on why U.S. missile defenses are not a threat to Russia, using 

physics and realistic unclassified performance parameters. A similar briefing has 

been presented to the NATO-Russia Council. The administration is prepared to continue to pursue this dialogue, within the bounds of U.S. National Disclosure Policy. 

In addition, Missile Defense Agency Director LTG O’Reilly offered Russia—as well 

as any NATO member—the opportunity to observe certain U.S. missile defense 

tests. 

The best way for Russia to gain the assurance it seeks is through the missile defense cooperation we have proposed bilaterally and in the NATO-Russia Council. As 

I stated at my hearing, continued Russian calls for legally binding assurances, such 

as those cited in the question, are grounds for pessimism.

Question. In a White House Press Briefing after the bilateral meeting between 

President Obama and President Medvedev, in Deauville, France, you were asked for 

details about a potential political agreement on missile defense cooperation between 

the two countries, to which you responded: ‘‘we got a new signal on missile defense 

cooperation that as soon as I’m done here I’ll be engaging on that with the rest of 

the U.S. Government.’’

• What was the nature of that agreement or ‘‘new signal,’’ and what are, in fact, 

the plans for missile defense cooperation and/or data sharing with the Russian 

Federation?

Answer. During the meeting between President Obama and President Medvedev 

on the margins of the G8 summit in Deauville, the two Presidents agreed to signal 

to their respective teams their continued commitment to missile defense cooperation. They committed to working together so that the United States and Russia can 

find an approach and configuration that is consistent with the security needs of both 

countries, maintains the strategic balance, and deals with the potential ballistic 

missile threats that we both share. The administration is committed to continuing 

to work with Russia, in full accord with our NATO allies, to explore areas of missile 

defense cooperation that are in our mutual interests.

Question. In your testimony, you stated before the committee that: ‘‘For the upcoming parliamentary and Presidential votes in Russia, we have allocated $9 million—$1 million more than spent for the previous round of national elections in 

2007–2008—to support activities designed to strengthen free and fair elections.’’

• a. Are these funds specifically set aside for the parliamentary and Presidential 

votes, or does this money include general rule-of-law and civil society funding?

Answer. The United States is committed to supporting those in Russia pressing 

for free, fair, and participatory electoral processes, including through over $9 million 

in assistance programs. Over $8 million of this total was set aside for political process programs, and the balance of approximately $1 million was set aside for civil 

society programs with components related to these elections. An additional $10 million in FY 2011 programs are dedicated to strengthen the rule of law and promote 

human rights, and these programs do not have specific elections components.

• b. When was this $9 million allocated?

Answer. Approximately $8 million was allocated for programs related to the upcoming elections that were developed in early 2011. Recognizing the importance of 

these elections, in the summer of 2011, the administration allocated another $1 million in additional resources for programs targeted to fill gaps in assistance.

• c. How, specifically, will this money be used (or has this money been used) ‘‘for 

the upcoming parliamentary and Presidential votes in Russia’’?

Answer. These funds will be used to support long-term observation of the 

preelection environment by independent Russian civil society groups in 48 regions. 

The intent is for these groups to monitor issues such as the use of administrative 

resources and bias in media coverage during the campaign. The United States will 

also support short-term election monitoring in 40 regions by 3,000 Russian observers. U.S.-supported seminars will encourage professional and unbiased press coverage of the elections. The administration is also committed to supporting public 

awareness campaigns, roundtables, internet platforms, documentaries and other 

civil society initiatives that promote public debate and engagement in the electoral 

795

process. The administration will also support public opinion polls that will help to 

identify the electorate’s preferences and track trends over time. 

RESPONSES OF MICHAEL MCFAUL TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

Question. Having worked for the National Democratic Institute, you are well 

aware that they pioneered the election observation methodology that became the 

OSCE’s methodology and the international gold standard for observing elections. 

This methodology and the OSCE’s Office of Democratic Institutions and Human 

Rights are under a constant and cynical attack from Russia with the tired cry of 

double standards. What can be done at this stage and under these circumstances 

to improve the dynamic between Russia and the ODIHR? Is it too late to influence 

Russia’s coming polls for the better? If so, what can be done to effectively and 

credibly document gaps between the reality on the ground and Russia’s myriad commitments in the area of democratic elections?

Answer. The United States continues to encourage Russia to conduct free and fair 

elections and to focus American assistance to strengthen democratic institutions in 

Russia. The United States strongly supports the work of the OSCE’s Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. President Obama has publicly and privately 

stressed the importance for Russia’s future of transparent, accountable, democratic 

government. In the administration’s view, it is in Russia’s interest to address those 

challenges, and it’s in the interest of Americans to support political and economic 

modernization in Russia. 

Domestic and international election monitors play a critical role in this process, 

and the United States has welcomed the invitation by Russia’s Central Election 

Commission to international observers, including an Election Observation Mission 

from OSCE’s Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the OSCE 

Parliamentary Assembly, for the December 4 parliamentary elections. This indicates 

an improvement from the situation in 2007 and 2008; ODIHR Long Term Election 

Observers will be on the ground in Russia for a total of 5 weeks before and after 

election day on December 4, which will enable them to assess the political climate 

and ascertain whether parties are granted a level playing field in the runup to election day. 

While the administration welcomes the invitation to ODIHR election observers, it 

is disappointed that the authorities denied registration to the Party of People’s Freedom (PARNAS), which prevents this party from participating in the elections and 

thus makes the elections less competitive from the very start. The administration 

will continue to observe the electoral process in Russia, and looks forward to 

ODIHR’s assessment. 

In addition to American support for the ODIHR observation mission, the United 

States is providing over $9 million in nonpartisan assistance to encourage free and 

fair elections. This includes support for domestic monitoring of the campaign environment and the conduct of the elections in 40 regions by 3,000 Russian observers. 

In tandem with international observers, these domestic monitors will document the 

extent to which Russia fulfills its international commitments to democracy.

Question. Now that the United States has implemented targeted visa sanctions 

in the Magnitskiy case, what steps has the administration taken to encourage our 

European allies to take similar steps in this and other cases? What about asset 

freezes?

Answer. The administration has made its concerns about the Magnitsky case clear 

at the highest levels of the Russian Government, and has demanded that those responsible for his death and detention be held accountable. As you are aware, the 

administration has identified grounds of visa ineligibility under U.S. law to bar the 

entry into the United States of persons responsible for the death and detention of 

Sergey Magnitsky. In addition, Presidential Proclamation 8697 issued this August 

provides additional authority to bar admission to serious human rights abusers. The 

proclamation specifically lists arbitrary detention as a serious human rights 

violation. 

The administration regularly discusses the human rights situation in Russia—

including the Magnitsky case—with our European allies and in meetings with the 

European Union. 

The administration has procedural concerns about requirements that would potentially freeze assets in the absence of a strong evidentiary standard and limited corroborated information.

796

Question. As a native of Montana and a resident of California, you have grown 

up and lived in some of America’s most beautiful landscapes. Russia also has 

breathtaking natural beauty and a budding environmental movement including 

those struggling to keep Lake Baikal’s waters pure and those fighting to save the 

Khimki Forest in suburban Moscow. What ideas do you have for sharing our rich 

environmental tradition, including its art such as the Hudson Valley School, literary 

figures like John Muir, Theodore Roosevelt, and Aldo Leopold, or activists from the 

Sierra Club to Earth First?

Answer. The United States support for environmental activism and community 

participation is vital to supporting shared environmental and conservation goals 

with Russia. The administration has worked together with Russia on issues from 

tiger conservation to protecting against invasive species with nongovernmental and 

governmental partners. The Environment Working Group under the U.S.-Russia 

Bilateral Presidential Commission has raised the profile of these issues on our 

bilateral agenda and increased policy support, dialogue, and, in some cases, project 

funding. 

Recent activities of the Environment Working Group include a U.S. Forest Service 

initiative to set up mobile fire brigades in the Russian Far East that protect the 

habitats of endangered species like the Amur tiger and leopard. U.S. Forest Service 

specialists also have traveled to the Lake Baikal area to share expertise and best 

practices on ecotourism, and Russian academics visited Lake Tahoe to exchange information with American specialists on water management and economical use of 

water basins with similar climatic and physical conditions. Department of Justice 

experts conducted a seminar in Khabarovsk on illegal logging and the U.S. Lacey 

Act combating trafficking in illegal wildlife, fish, and plants. The National Park 

Service also supports scientific and cultural exchanges across the Bering Strait each 

year. 

Through the Environment Working Group, the administration has sought to find 

ways to share our culture of deep environmental preservation. For example, a recent 

U.S. Forest Service exchange brought Russian Forest Service professionals to Pennsylvania’s Grey Towers, the ancestral home of Gifford Pinchot, the first chief of the 

U.S. Forest Service, where they learned about Roosevelt and the legacy of Mr. Pinchot in forest management and the establishment of the U.S. Forest Service. 

RESPONSES OF MICHAEL MCFAUL TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

Question. What does Prime Minister Putin’s announcement that he will once 

again seek the Presidency in 2012 say about the statements made by yourself and 

others, including Vice President Biden, that the ‘‘reset’’ was aimed at building up 

President Medvedev? How will Putin becoming, in effect, president-for-life affect the 

‘‘reset’’?

Answer. This administration’s policy has always been first and foremost about advancing U.S. interests. Since being elected in 2008, President Obama has developed 

an excellent working relationship with President Medvedev, who is his direct counterpart as head of state. Putin has served as Prime Minister and head of government during the entire tenure of the Obama administration. He has been a key part 

of the Russian Government’s policy process, and our approach to Russia throughout 

this period has recognized this fact. President Obama and Vice President Biden 

each met with Prime Minister Putin during their visits to Russia. 

The question of who will serve as President of Russia is one that the Russian people should decide for themselves. The administration will continue to build on the 

progress of the reset regardless of who serves as the next President of Russia because it is in the interest of the United States to do so, and because the policy is 

also directed more broadly at strengthening the ties between our countries’ institutions and societies.

Question. How would you describe the harassment of U.S. Embassy personnel by 

Russian security services? Can you provide a list of harassment claims against U.S. 

personnel committed by Russian security services since 2006?

Answer. The safety of U.S. citizens abroad—including that of personnel serving 

at our diplomatic missions—is of the utmost importance to the United States. The 

administration remains troubled by harassment of U.S. mission personnel by Russian security services, and has repeatedly expressed these concerns to the Russian 

Government. 

The details of these incidents are considered classified under U.S. law. We would 

welcome the opportunity to provide a briefing in a classified setting.

797

Question. Do you believe the supervisor positions in the Foreign National Guard 

Force at U.S. Embassy Moscow should be U.S. citizens or Russian nationals? What 

steps will you take to ensure that the supervisors are from the United States?

Answer. Both the current administration and the previous administration have 

considered the option of American guard supervisors to provide 24-hour onsite supervision for the local guard force stationed at the outer perimeter of the U.S. Embassy Compound in Moscow. The Embassy Compound houses not only the Chancery 

but housing units, the motorpool, cafeteria and other unclassified administrative 

and technical offices. Twenty-four hour access to the Chancery itself is controlled 

exclusively by U.S. Marine Security Guards. The classified section of the Chancery 

has an additional U.S. Marine Security Guard post and one of the most robust layered security systems of any U.S. diplomatic mission abroad. The U.S. Embassy in 

Moscow has one of the largest U.S. Marine Security Guard presences of any U.S. 

diplomatic mission abroad. The costs and benefits of cleared American guard supervisors have been discussed previously with congressional committees and the administration is ready to provide a briefing and engage in a dialogue on this issue. If 

confirmed, upon my arrival, I will review the option of American guard supervisors 

for the local guard force.

Question. What is your reaction to the recent Telegraph article entitled ‘‘Russia 

‘Gave Agents License To Kill’ Enemies of the State.’’ There have been claims that 

Russian security services murdered Alexander Litvenko in London. What is your 

take on the situation and would they commit a similar act in the United States?

Answer. As then-Secretary of State Rice said in December 2006, soon after 

Litvinenko’s death, ‘‘We’ve been clear to the Russian Government that all of these 

issues need to be investigated and investigated thoroughly . . . and our principal 

role is to try to be supportive of the British Government in any way we can.’’

The murder of Mr. Litvinenko was a horrible crime. Those responsible for the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko must be brought to justice. British authorities are 

currently investigating the case and have requested the extradition of Andrei 

Lugovoi from Russia. 

The administration continues to follow developments in the case. The administration is aware of the referenced article in the Telegraph but cannot speak to the authenticity of any of the documents referenced or comments made in the press.

Question. What is your opinion of the Russian policy toward Grozny?

Answer. The human rights situation and level of terrorist activity in Chechnya 

and throughout the North Caucasus remain a cause for continuing concern. 

Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria have experienced insurgent violence and terrorist attacks. Russian security forces’ operations in Chechnya 

have led to noncombatant deaths and human rights violations. The human rights 

record of Chechen authorities under Ramzan Kadyrov’s leadership is especially poor, 

as the State Department’s annual Human Rights Report has noted. 

The Russian Government has announced ambitious plans to support the economic 

development of the North Caucasus as a means to countering violent extremism. 

The region remains poor and underdeveloped with a high unemployment rate. 

While the regional economy needs attention, it is equally important that the Russian Government address the human rights situation, particularly rule of law, corruption, and religious freedom. 

The United States overall assistance package for Russia includes an $8 million 

portfolio of programs targeting conflict mitigation, health, and democracy and governance activities in the North Caucasus. These programs include efforts to increase 

opportunities for the region’s youth, monitor and protect human rights, promote entrepreneurship, fight corruption, and support journalists.

Question. How will the upcoming Sochi Olympics impact Russian policy to the 

Caucasus?

Answer. Preparations for the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi present Russia 

with an array of political, economic, and security challenges. The Krasnodar Krai 

(region) where Sochi is located will see an unprecedented inflow of capital, workers, 

and international visitors during the preparatory period and during the Games 

themselves. This region borders the North Caucasus Federal District, and the security situation there will clearly influence Russia’s decisions on a wide array of issues 

in the months leading up to the Olympics. 

The administration is in close contact with Russian authorities as the preparations go forward to ensure the safest possible environment for the American and 

international athletes, staff, and spectators who will be present. In the context of 

those discussions, we consistently represent to the Russian Government our concern 

798

that security measures be proportional to the threat and respectful of human rights 

and fundamental freedoms. 

If I am confirmed, I will pay close attention to issues involving the safety and security of Americans traveling to the Sochi Olympics.

Question. Recently, the Georgian military suffered from a shortage of spare parts 

(brake pads) for military vehicles, which undermined the safety of U.S. military personnel training with the Georgians.

• a. What is the reason that the U.S. Ambassador in Georgia needed to personally 

intervene in getting Washington to authorize the sale of spare parts for military 

vehicles in Georgia?

Answer. The Ambassador routinely communicates with his counterparts throughout the executive branch on the full range of issues on the U.S.-Georgia bilateral 

agenda. The administration works closely with Georgia to ensure that it has the 

necessary materials and equipment to support the International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

• b. If Russia can provide advanced nuclear technology to Iran, what is the logic 

behind the U.S. unwillingness to sell Georgia basic military equipment?

Answer. The administration reviews all requests for export licenses and arms 

transfers individually, assessing legal, technical, and policy considerations on a 

case-by-case basis. Our security assistance and military engagement with Georgia 

is currently focused on two areas. The first is comprehensive assistance to support 

Georgia’s defense reform and modernization along Euro-Atlantic lines. Second, the 

United States provides training and equipment to enable Georgian forces to operate 

effectively alongside U.S. and NATO forces in the Afghan counterinsurgency environment in conjunction with Georgia’s generous contributions to ISAF operations in 

Afghanistan.

• c. Will you provide for the committee all military Letters of Request (LOR) put 

forward by the Georgian Government, as well as the responses provided by the 

U.S. Government?

Answer. The information you have requested is an internal executive branch communication. The State Department’s longstanding practice is to consider release of 

internal executive branch communication documents when requested by the chair 

of a committee of jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, we respectfully ask that 

you channel your request through the chair of a committee of jurisdiction, at which 

point we would be pleased to respond. The Department is committed to providing 

Congress with the information it needs to fulfill its legislative duties.

• d. If the Republic of Georgia requested access to antitank, antiair, and antipersonnel weapons tomorrow for the defense of its territory, would you support 

the approval of licenses for the sale of those weapons?

Answer. In keeping with standard practice, the administration reviews all requests for export licenses and arms transfers individually, assessing legal, technical, 

and policy considerations.

• e. Will you provide to the committee all National Security memos on arms sales 

to Georgia that you either drafted and/or approved/disapproved, especially those 

based on cables from Ambassador Beyrle in Moscow?

Answer. The document that you have requested is an internal executive branch 

communication. The State Department’s longstanding practice is to consider release 

of internal executive branch communication documents when requested by the chair 

of a committee of jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, we respectfully ask that 

you channel your request through the chair of a committee of jurisdiction, at which 

point we would be pleased to respond. The Department is committed to providing 

Congress with the information it needs to fulfill its legislative duties.

Question. As part of congressional action allowing for Russian admission to the 

WTO, would you support a legislative provision requiring the President certify that 

Russia is not militarily occupying territory of another WTO member?

Answer. The United States remains firmly committed to its support for Georgia’s 

territorial integrity and sovereignty and to its position that Russia should adhere 

to its 2008 cease-fire commitments and to withdraw its forces to preconflict positions. The administration, both in bilateral meetings and in multilateral fora, continues to raise Russia’s militarization and lack of transparency in the separatist regions, including the construction of military bases in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 

A consensus decision on the terms of accession to the WTO of any country made 

by WTO member states is based on whether or not that country’s trade regime is 

799

in compliance with WTO rules, or the country’s government has made the necessary 

commitments to bring its regime into compliance. The administration has based its 

‘‘reset’’ policy with Russia in part on the premise that problems in one area of our 

relationship should not preclude progress in others. The United States has disagreements with Russia on a variety of issues, including Russia’s military occupation of 

Georgia’s separatist regions, but the administration has tried to pursue each of 

these issues on its own merits.

Question. How much time passed between when you learned that a bomb was 

placed in the vicinity of the U.S. Embassy in Georgia and when Congress was first 

briefed?

Answer. The administration has held a number of discussions with Congress on 

this issue, including classified intelligence briefings. 

Immediately after the incident that occurred near the U.S. Embassy, the administration coordinated closely with Georgian law enforcement to support their investigation. The administration has also raised the allegations by Georgian authorities 

of Russian involvement directly with the Russian Government at high levels and 

urged the avoidance of any actions in Georgia that could impact regional stability 

and security.

Question. In a White House Press Briefing after the bilateral meeting between 

President Obama and President Medvedev, in Deauville, France, you were asked for 

details about a potential political agreement on missile defense cooperation between 

the two countries, to which you responded: ‘‘we got a new signal on missile defense 

cooperation that as soon as I’m done here I’ll be engaging on that with the rest of 

the U.S. Government.’’ Despite efforts to understand the nature of that ‘‘new signal’’ 

we still do not know what was agreed to by the two Presidents.

• a. Please explain the nature of that agreement or ‘‘new signal,’’ and what are 

the plans for missile defense cooperation and/or data-sharing with the Russian 

Federation? Can you provide us a record of this discussion?

Answer. During the meeting between President Obama and President Medvedev 

on the margins of the G8 summit in Deauville, the two Presidents agreed to signal 

to their respective teams their continued commitment to missile defense cooperation. They committed to working together so that the United States and Russia can 

find an approach and configuration that (1) is consistent with the security needs of 

both countries; (2) maintains the strategic balance; and (3) deals with the potential 

ballistic missile threats that both nations face. The administration is committed to 

continuing to work with Russia, in full accord with our NATO allies, to explore 

areas of missile defense cooperation that are in our mutual interests.

• b. Please inform the committee when we can have access to the Defense Technical Cooperation Agreement (DTCA) that the administration is negotiating 

with Russia on U.S.-Russia missile defense cooperation.

Answer. The Obama administration is committed to keeping Congress informed 

of our missile defense efforts. In keeping with the longstanding practice of this and 

past administrations, the Obama administration would be pleased to provide a classified briefing on the Defense Technical Cooperation Agreement, including developments from the latest round of U.S.-Russia meetings.

Question. What is the status of NATO-Russia cooperation on missile defense and 

will the administration pledge to share any proposed language for the Chicago summit statement regarding such cooperation with Congress prior to the summit?

Answer. At the 2010 NATO-Russia Council (NRC) summit in Lisbon, NATO and 

Russia agreed to resume theater missile defense cooperation and develop a comprehensive Joint Analysis of the future framework for missile defense cooperation. 

Irrespective of how this cooperation develops, the alliance alone bears responsibility for defending NATO’s members, consistent with our treaty obligations for 

collective defense. The administration has been clear with Russia that we cannot 

accept any agreement that would limit or constrain the deployment of our missile 

defenses—no nation will have veto power over U.S. missile defense efforts—and that 

NATO will be responsible for the defense of NATO territory, while Russia will be 

responsible for the defense of Russian territory. 

To date, no agreement has been reached to hold a NATO-Russia summit in Chicago in May 2012. In keeping with longstanding practice, the administration would 

welcome the opportunity to provide a briefing on missile defense cooperation between NATO and Russia.

Question. How would you characterize the state of U.S.-Russian cooperation on 

Iran, especially given Moscow’s recent proposal to Tehran, not approved by the 

800

United States, or other P5+1 partners, to begin to remove sanctions if Iran took several small steps to slow its nuclear program, all short of suspension of enrichment.

Answer. The United States and Russia are committed to the dual track approach 

of sanctions in support of diplomacy to resolve our serious concerns over Iran’s nuclear program. Russia has proven over an extended period of time to be an important partner in the development and implementation of international sanctions on 

Iran. In September in New York, the P5+1 (including Russia) made clear in the 

statement released by EU High Representative Ashton that we remain ‘‘determined 

and united in our efforts to work toward a comprehensive, negotiated, long-term solution.’’ The international community will not lift sanctions until Iran has fulfilled 

its international obligations.

Question. Given that nine parties were denied access to the ballot for the December 4 Russian parliamentary elections, does the administration view these elections 

and their results as legitimate?

Answer. The administration has expressed its strong disappointment both publicly 

and privately in meetings with senior Russian officials that the Russian Central 

Election Commission denied registration to these parties, thereby preventing them 

from fielding candidates in the upcoming elections. Access to the ballot is a key part 

of the democratic process, and this makes Russia’s parliamentary elections less competitive than they could be. 

Russia’s Central Election Commission has issued an invitation for international 

observers, including an Election Observation Mission from OSCE’s Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the OSCE Parliamentary 

Assembly, for the December 4 parliamentary elections. ODIHR Long-Term Observers will be on the ground in Russia for 5 weeks before and after the elections, which 

will enable them to assess the political climate and whether the elections process 

and the elections themselves meet international standards. The administration 

looks forward to ODIHR’s assessment, as well as the assessments of other international and domestic observers. The United States is providing over $9 million in 

nonpartisan assistance to encourage free and fair election processes in Russia. This 

includes support for domestic monitoring of the campaign environment and the conduct of the elections in 40 regions by 3,000 Russian observers.

Question. What will you do to assist the Russian political opposition and if 

confirmed, will you use your platform as U.S. Ambassador to meet with leading opposition figures and to hold the regime accountable when political parties are not 

allowed to register, journalists threatened, and activists imprisoned?

Answer. In my current job at the White House, I meet regularly with leaders of 

Russia’s political opposition and civil society. The Obama administration has raised 

publicly and privately our concerns about democratic violations and human rights 

abuses. If confirmed, I will ensure that the United States continues to use all of the 

tools at its disposal to support those seeking to strengthen democracy in Russia. 

This will include meeting with the full range of political figures, raising concerns 

under the Bilateral Presidential Commission and in other fora regarding democratic 

deficiencies, and promoting civil society development, rule of law, human rights, 

independent media development, and good governance through U.S. assistance programs. As someone who has worked on these issues for more than a quarter century, I have the experience necessary to add vigor to our efforts in Russia, and if 

confirmed, I would use my role as U.S. Ambassador to make further progress on 

democratization and rule of law.

Question. What do you believe the arrest, detention, and two trials of 

Khodorkovsky, as well as the dismantling of Yukos reveal about the rule of law in 

Russia? Should the United States care about cases like this?

Answer. The United States has closely followed the trials of Mikhail 

Khodorkovsky and the dismantling of Yukos. President Obama, Deputy Secretary 

of State William Burns, and Ambassador John Beyrle have spoken about the case 

in public interviews in Russian media, stressing our government’s concerns over 

rule-of-law issues and interest in seeing the claims of American investors addressed. 

U.S. officials have also raised the case on multiple occasions in private with senior 

Russian officials. 

Secretary Clinton noted in December that the Khodorkovsky case raises serious 

issues about selective prosecution and the independence of the judiciary in Russia. 

The Russian Government cannot nurture a modern economy without also developing 

an independent judiciary that serves as an instrument for furthering economic 

growth, ensuring equal treatment under the law and advancing justice in a predictable and fair way. These basic tenets are not only important to the Russian people 

801

and their country’s development, but also to Americans who want to know that their 

investments in Russia are protected as well.

Question. In December 2010, before a Russian court announced its verdict in 

Khodorkovsky’s second trial, Prime Minister Putin called for the conviction of 

Khodorkovsky. President Medvedev said statements like this were improper, but it 

also seems to have affected the verdict when one judicial assistant later admitted 

the verdict was ‘‘directed from elsewhere.’’ Do you believe the trial was fair and the 

verdict just?

Answer. The administration has noted the allegations by individuals closely involved in the court proceedings that the process was not a proper one. As Secretary 

Clinton said on December 27, 2010, the guilty verdict in the second trial of Mikhail 

Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev on charges of embezzlement and money laundering raises serious questions about the apparent selective application of the law 

to these individuals. The administration is troubled by the use of the legal system 

to silence the voices of political opposition, and those calling for fair dealings and 

accountability in the Russian economy.

Question. You mentioned in your testimony that you believe those involved in the 

murder of Sergey Magnitsky should be barred from travel to the United States; do 

you also support freezing their assets?

Answer. The United States has made its concerns about the Magnitsky case clear 

both publicly and at the highest levels of the Russian Government, and demanded 

that those responsible for his death and detention be held accountable. As I noted 

during my confirmation hearing, the administration has identified grounds of visa 

ineligibility under U.S. law to bar the entry into the United States of persons responsible for the death and detention of Sergey Magnitsky. In addition, Presidential 

Proclamation 8697 issued this August provides additional authority to bar admission to serious human rights abusers and the proclamation specifically lists arbitrary detention as a serious human rights violation. 

The administration has procedural concerns about requirements that would potentially freeze assets in the absence of a strong evidentiary standard and limited corroborated information.

Question. I understand on October 12, 2011, during a visit to Moscow, Assistant 

Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Posner gave an interview with Radio Ekho Moskvy during which he questioned the right of Congress to 

set conditions for visa denials. Does the administration share the view of Assistant 

Secretary Posner that Congress does not have the constitutional and legal authority 

to set conditions for visa approval or denial? Could you please clarify what Assistant 

Secretary Posner said, and whether you agree with his statement?

Answer. Assistant Secretary Posner has been a strong proponent of sanctioning 

those involved in Sergey Magnitsky’s death. When asked about the proposed 

Magnitsky legislation during the Ekho Moskvy interview, Assistant Secretary 

Posner noted that the administration, under existing authority provided by U.S. 

law, has taken appropriate measures to bar entry into the United States of individuals involved in the wrongful death of Sergey Magnitsky—thus enactment of the 

proposed legislation is not necessary. 

Assistant Secretary Posner, along with other administration officials, is in regular 

contact with Members of Congress to discuss our shared concerns about the lack of 

accountability in the Magnitsky case, and the general human rights situation in 

Russia, and to consider how the U.S. Government can better advance human rights, 

the rule of law, and democratic development in Russia. 

During his recent trip to Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod and Kazan, Assistant Secretary Posner met with government officials as well as also civil society activists 

and opposition leaders and discussed the full range of our human rights and democracy concerns in Russia. 

RESPONSE OF MICHAEL MCFAUL TO QUESTION SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Question. Before Yukos Oil was seized, American investors collectively owned approximately 15 percent of Yukos Oil—or $12 billion in value today. The American 

investors in Yukos included several public pension funds and more than 70 institutional investors in at least 17 States. There were also over 20,000 individual American investors who owned Yukos shares directly, in addition to the hundreds of 

thousands who owned shares indirectly through mutual funds. 

802

The United States has no bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with Russia, leaving 

Americans with no other means to be compensated. Other foreign owners of Yukos 

have been able to initiate BIT claims, and a U.K. investor recently won such a case. 

It is my understanding that only through the legal mechanism of espousal by the 

United States can an appropriate and fair resolution be obtained for these U.S. 

investors. 

In June 2008, American investors formally petitioned the State Department to undertake government-to-government negotiations with Russia to resolve these Yukos 

claims.

• What do you believe the administration should do with this petition?

Answer. U.S. officials have raised and will continue to raise the matter of American shareholders’ claims with the Russian Government, both in public and in private. Ambassador Beyrle and Deputy Secretary of State Burns have spoken about 

the case in public interviews in Russian media, stressing our government’s interest 

in seeing these claims addressed. U.S. officials have also met several times with representatives of American investors to discuss their claims and the options for seeking to have them addressed. 

The administration is closely watching the international court and arbitration 

proceedings concerning the significant claims brought by Yukos investors from other 

countries and the Yukos Corporation itself, including the September 20 decision 

from the European Court of Human Rights. Future decisions in that Court and in 

arbitral tribunals will continue to inform the administration’s position on many of 

the complex legal and factual issues at stake in this matter. These international 

courts and arbitration panels, made up of experts in international law, receive the 

benefit of full briefings, the parties’ participation in a hearing, and expert opinions. 

Before making a decision on espousing the claims of American investors, I believe 

the U.S. Government should allow these proceedings to fully run their course. 

The administration will continue to seek better protection for U.S. investors, including in Russia. The administration has begun exploratory discussions with 

Russia on a Bilateral Investment Treaty and, if confirmed, pursuing this and other 

initiatives to afford the highest level of legal protections for U.S. investors in Russia 

will be one of my top priorities. 

RESPONSES OF MICHAEL MCFAUL TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOHN BARRASSO

Question. Do you believe that Russia’s continued militarization of the Abkhazia 

and South Ossetia regions is inconsistent with its cease-fire commitments?

Answer. Yes. Such actions are inconsistent with Russia’s 2008 cease-fire commitments and undermine regional security and stability. The United States, both in bilateral meetings and in multilateral fora, objects to and expresses concern about the 

continued Russian militarization and lack of transparency in the separatist regions, 

including the construction of Russian military bases in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 

At every opportunity, the administration restates its commitment to Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and calls on Russia to adhere to its 2008 cease-fire 

commitments.

Question. Have there been any sanctions or other actions taken against Russia by 

the United States due to Russia’s continued occupation of parts of Georgia?

Answer. Since the Obama administration took office, it has continued to call on 

Russia to fulfill its obligations under the 2008 cease-fire agreement, including withdrawal of its forces to preconflict positions, and has publicly expressed its support 

for Georgia’s territorial integrity and political sovereignty. The administration also 

continues to voice concern directly to Russia at every opportunity and at the highest 

levels regarding its actions in Georgia, including during President Obama’s visit to 

Moscow and Secretary Clinton’s regular meetings with Russian Foreign Minister 

Lavrov. Since the 2008 war, the United States has not levied sanctions in response 

to Russia’s occupation of Georgian territory.

Question. What specific efforts has the United States taken to support Georgia’s 

sovereignty and territorial integrity?

Answer. Immediately following the 2008 conflict with Russia, the United States 

pledged $1 billion to aid Georgia’s recovery and ensure its security. The majority 

of the post-conflict pledge targeted immediate stabilization and reconstruction needs 

such as supporting reintegration of internally displaced persons, and restoring peace 

and security through support for law enforcement and enhanced border security. 

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nomic and democratic reforms of the past 6 years, with the ultimate goal of anchoring Georgia in the Euro-Atlantic community. 

In addition to our direct assistance to Georgia, the administration continues to 

call on Russia to fulfill its obligations under the 2008 cease-fire agreement, including withdrawal of its forces to preconflict positions. The United States is an active 

participant in the Geneva discussions, working with the cochairs and others in pursuit of a resolution to the conflict. The administration continues to voice concern 

directly to Russia at every opportunity and at the highest levels regarding its 

actions in Georgia, including during President Obama’s visit to Moscow and during 

Secretary Clinton’s meetings with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov. The administration will continue to speak out in support of Georgia’s territorial integrity, as it 

did most recently in its statement regarding the August 26 ‘‘elections’’ in the separatist region of Abkhazia. The administration will continue to urge other countries 

to maintain their current nonrecognition of the separatist regions.

Question. How can Russia be held accountable for its violations of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity?

Answer. President Obama, Vice President Biden, and Secretary Clinton have been 

clear with the Russian Government on the need to meet its obligations under the 

2008 cease-fire agreement and our serious and ongoing concern over the Russian 

military presence in the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The 

administration has also been clear, both publicly and privately, that it supports 

Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. There are no military solutions to 

this impasse, only diplomacy, and the administration has participated in multiple 

rounds of talks moderated by the EU, the U.N., and the OSCE in Geneva to encourage dialogue between the parties. If confirmed, I will make progress on this issue 

one of my highest priorities.

Question. Reports indicate that despite the United States expressed request that 

Russia halt their sale of arms to Syria, Russia is committed to selling weapons to 

Syria.

• What is the status of Russia’s arms sale to Syria? • What type of weapons has Russia sold to Syria this year? • What efforts are being taken by the United States to prevent the sale of arms 

to Syria by Russia?

Answer. The United States is always concerned about reports of weapons transfers to countries of concern, including Syria. Secretary Clinton publicly urged Russia 

to cease arms sales to Syria on August 12, 2011. The administration is pressing 

Russia to cease pending and future arms transfers that threaten regional stability, 

contribute to the Syrian regime’s violent crackdown, or could be diverted to 

Hezbollah. The administration can provide additional details on this issue in a 

classified format.

Question. How would you characterize Russia’s record on adherence to international treaty obligations?

Answer. While there are areas of concern, Russia takes its legal obligations with 

regard to international treaties seriously. The United States concerns regarding 

Russia’s arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament commitments remain the 

subject of ongoing bilateral discussions. These concerns are detailed in the 2010 and 

2011 reports to Congress on ‘‘Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments’’ as well as other 

submitted compliance reports on arms control agreements. 

Over the past 21⁄2 years, the administration has made progress in laying a solid 

foundation in our engagement with Russia on these issues, identifying and expanding areas of common ground, and dealing with our differences. Our objective is a 

strong strategic relationship with Russia that is based on transparency, openness, 

and predictability. The administration expects our constructive relationship to 

continue and to work together with Russia on a range of international security 

challenges.

Question. What have been the most recent examples of Russia’s violations to 

international treaty obligations?

Answer. Administration concerns regarding Russia’s arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament commitments, are the subject of ongoing compliance discussions between the United States and Russia. Examples of unresolved compliance 

issues include specific issues relating to Russia’s adherence to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 

and the Chemical Weapons Convention, which are detailed in the 2010 and 2011 

reports to Congress on ‘‘Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, NonVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00811 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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proliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments’’ as well as other 

submitted compliance reports on arms control agreements. 

Despite these concerns, the administration has made real progress in laying a 

solid foundation in our engagement with Russia on these issues, identifying and expanding areas of common ground, and dealing with our differences. The objective 

remains a strategic relationship with Russia that is based on transparency, openness, and predictability. The administration’s renewed focus on improving our relations with Russia, including the negotiation and entry-into-force of the New START 

treaty, has led to a greater understanding and increased cooperation between the 

United States and Russia in a number of areas, including a joint effort to diplomatically engage Iran and North Korea on compliance issues. The administration expects our constructive relationship to continue and to work together on a range of 

international security challenges.

Question. In the Department of State’s ‘‘Country Report on Human Rights Practices’’ for 2010, the report indicates that violations of rule of law and due process 

remain a problem in Russia.

• What is your assessment of Russia’s commitment to the rule of law today?

Answer. As the 2010 ‘‘Country Report on Human Rights Practices’’ in Russia 

points out, violations of rule of law and due process are serious problems in Russia. 

There are reported cases of arbitrary detention and politically motivated 

imprisonments; lengthy pretrial detentions and trial delays; endemic corruption 

throughout the executive, legislative, and judicial branches; and governmental restrictions on nongovernmental organizations. 

The administration recognizes that rule of law is critical to Russia’s economic and 

political modernization. Promoting democracy and rule of law are an integral part 

of our bilateral dialogue with Russia. President Obama has regularly engaged with 

President Medvedev on democracy, human rights, and rule of law issues. The same 

is true for Secretary Clinton when she meets with Foreign Minister Lavrov and 

other senior Russian Government officials. Moreover, U.S. Government officials 

have spoken out publicly and consistently about the erosion of democratic institutions, human rights abuses, and rule of law issues in Russia, including the arrests 

of Strategy 31 demonstrators, lack of justice and accountability in the Sergei 

Magnitsky case, and the apparent selective application of the law and serious due 

process violations in the Khodorkovsky and Lebedev trials. 

The majority of U.S. bilateral assistance to Russia is dedicated to advancing 

American values by promoting democracy, good governance, human rights and the 

rule of law. The Obama administration—working with Congress—has continued to 

secure funds to support civil society, rule of law, human rights, independent media, 

and good governance in Russia. The administration has prioritized support for 

small, direct grants to Russian civil society organizations. Working with Congress, 

the administration will continue to seek new ways to generate greater support for 

civil society organizations in Russia that promote rule of law. 

In May 2011 Presidents Obama and Medvedev announced the establishment of 

a Rule of Law Working Group under the Bilateral Presidential Commission. The 

Working Group will be chaired by U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder and Russian 

Minister of Justice Konovalov. Through the Civil Society Working Group, our two 

countries are also working together to address the problem of corruption.

• Since the WTO is a rules-based global trading system, how confident are you 

that Russia will abide by the rules, should it become a member of the WTO, 

given its continued lack of respect for the rule of law?

Answer. Should Russia become a WTO member, all members applying the WTO 

agreement to Russia would have recourse to WTO mechanisms to raise issues regarding Russia’s implementation of its obligations. These would include raising 

issues within WTO committees and, if appropriate, recourse to the WTO’s dispute 

settlement procedures. Should Russia become a WTO member, the administration 

will use all available mechanisms under the WTO agreement to ensure that Russia 

fully implements its obligations.

Question. For years, the United States poultry, pork, and beef exports to Russia 

have faced significant obstacles due to Russia’s use of sanitary and phytosanitary 

measures as nontariff trade barriers. A tremendous amount of uncertainty remains 

concerning Russia’s adoption of internationally accepted protocols.

• How do you plan to engage Russian veterinary authorities on sanitary and 

phytosanitary issues?

Answer. The administration has repeatedly expressed concern with Russia’s use 

of non-science-based requirements as nontariff barriers to U.S. agricultural exports, 

805

but has lacked effective tools to address these barriers. One of the many reasons 

the administration has supported Russia’s WTO accession is that when Russia becomes a WTO member, it will be required to comply with the WTO Agreement on 

Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures as well as other SPS-related 

commitments. Moreover, in the context of its membership in the Customs Union 

with Kazakhstan and Belarus, Russia has adopted a new legal framework to comply 

with its international obligations on SPS measures. WTO members that apply the 

WTO agreement to Russia will be able to raise concerns about Russia’s implementation of its SPS obligations and specific measures that are applied to imports. This 

includes recourse to WTO dispute settlement procedures where appropriate.

• What assurance do we have that Russia will comply with WTO obligations 

should it become a member of the WTO?

Answer. When Russia is a WTO member, all other members already applying the 

WTO agreement to Russia will have recourse through WTO mechanisms to raise 

issues regarding Russia’s implementation of its obligations. These include raising 

issues within WTO committees and, if appropriate, recourse through the WTO’s dispute settlement procedures. The administration will actively engage Russia using 

all available mechanisms under the WTO agreement, to ensure that Russia fully implements its obligations.

• What recourse does the United States have when Russia doesn’t abide by the 

rules? How effective are those options in requiring Russia to abide by its commitments?

Answer. The United States addresses trade disputes with Russia through bilateral diplomatic and technical discussions. Should Russia become a Member of the 

WTO, and the executive branch with congressional support decides to apply the 

WTO Agreement to Russia (which is only possible if the United States terminates 

the application of the Jackson-Vanik amendment to Russia), the United States will 

have many more tools to support American producers and help ensure Russia’s compliance with its WTO obligations. Russia will be subject to WTO sanitaryphytosanitary rules and, most importantly, the United States will have recourse to 

the WTO’s dispute-settlement procedures if Russia fails to comply with those rules 

and other obligations. The United States has been one of the world’s most frequent 

users of WTO dispute-settlement procedures and has obtained favorable settlements 

and favorable rulings in virtually all sectors, including manufacturing, intellectual 

property, agriculture, and services. These cases cover a number of WTO agreements 

involving rules on trade in goods, trade in services, and protection of intellectual 

property rights, which affect a wide range of sectors of the U.S. economy. Should 

Russia join the WTO, Russia will be part of a rules-based system that includes an 

enforcement mechanism—a mechanism not currently available to the United States 

on matters involving Russia. Russia’s WTO accession will also give our companies, 

farmers, ranchers, and exporters increased and more predictable market access to 

a large and growing market that we can defend under mutually agreed rules. 

(807)

NOMINATIONS 

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 2011

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

Hon. Roberta S. Jacobson, of Maryland, to be an Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs 

Hon. Mari Carmen Aponte, of the District of Columbia, to be

Ambassador to the Republic of El Salvador 

Adam E. Namm, of New York, to be an Ambassador to the Republic of Ecuador 

Elizabeth M. Cousens, of Washington, to be Representative of the 

United States of America on the Economic and Social Council 

of the United Nations, with the rank of Ambassador; and, to 

be an Alternate Representative of the United States of America 

to the Sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 

during her tenure of service as Representative of the United 

States of America on the Economic and Social Council of the 

United Nations 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez 

presiding. 

Present: Senator Menendez, Cardin, Rubio, Risch, and DeMint. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

Senator MENENDEZ. Good morning. This hearing of the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee will come to order. 

Today the Senate Foreign Relations Committee considers four 

nominations: the Acting Assistant Secretary, Secretary Roberta 

Jacobson, to be the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Western 

Hemisphere Affairs will be our first panel. 

The other nominees are Ambassador Mari Carmen Aponte to be 

the Ambassador to El Salvador, Mr. Adam Namm to be the Ambassador to Ecuador, and Ms. Elizabeth Cousens to be the U.S. Representative to the Economic and Social Council of the United 

Nations. 

So let us welcome all the nominees and their families. 

I have some brief introductory remarks, and I’ll ask Senator 

Rubio for his remarks. 

808

We’ll give each of you an opportunity to make a brief opening 

statement and please feel free to introduce any family members 

you have with you at that time. We certainly would like to welcome 

them. 

Let me congratulate you all on your nominations. If you are confirmed, you’ll serve the United States and will be called upon to 

implement the policies of the U.S. Government and protect and 

advance the interests of the American people. 

I would encourage you to respond expeditiously to any questions 

that you may receive either through the course of the nomination 

hearing or subsequently from other members, for the record, so 

that the committee can act on your nominations as soon as possible. The deadline, for the submission of questions for the record 

for members, is noontime on Wednesday. 

Three of today’s nominees are being considered for positions related to the Western Hemisphere. The bureau and embassies you’re 

being called upon to lead are in the forefront of our relationship 

with the hemisphere, a relationship that because of its geographic 

proximity to the United States and our history, our economic and 

social ties, and even our shared problems, demands as much attention and resources as those places that seem to dominate the front 

page of the New York Times and the Washington Post. 

The Western Hemisphere is our hemisphere, and its nations are 

our friends, our neighbors, our allies, and our economic partners. 

While America’s relationship with our neighbors in the region 

hasn’t always been superlative, today I’m pleased to describe our 

relationship as a partnership. It is, in fact, a partnership in which 

the United States has as much to gain from its relationship with 

the region as the region does from its relationship with the United 

States. 

The issues that concern the people of Latin America are the 

same issues that concern the people of the United States—organized crime, including trafficking in drugs, weapons and people; 

terrorism; environmental degradation; economic challenges; high 

unemployment; health issues. All are challenges that we have common cause in seeking to meet. 

March marked the 50th anniversary of President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress. At this milestone, most of the countries in Latin 

America, with one very notable exception, are free with representative democracies. 

At the Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago last year, 

the President proclaimed a policy of partnership with the Americas, 

which he began to fulfill during his visit to Brazil, Chile, and El 

Salvador. The President’s initiative reflects the maturing of our 

evolving relationship with Latin America. 

For Ambassador Aponte and Mr. Namm, the challenges each of 

you face vis-a-vis your host governments will be unique. If confirmed, we are very interested and invested in your success. 

In El Salvador, we see a country that has made great economic 

stride but still faces high levels of poverty and violence, often exacerbated by the growing problems of narcotrafficking. 

In Ecuador, the political challenges between our countries are 

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trafficking and cooperating in Ecuador’s strong economic development must lead us to continue to strengthen our ties. 

And Ms. Cousens, if confirmed, would have a very important 

position as the U.S. Representative to the Economic and Social 

Council. The council is responsible under the authority of the General Assembly for the economic and social programs of the United 

Nations. Its functions include promoting higher standards of living, 

improving conditions of economic and social progress, solutions to 

international economic, social, health and related problems, and 

universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for 

all. 

I also understand from Ambassador Rice that she would very 

much like you to be in position in New York at the U.N. to address 

other issues that threaten the peace and stability that the U.N. 

seeks to achieve. So we are glad we were able to get you on to 

today’s agenda. 

I look forward to all of your opening remarks and to our dialogue. 

Let me turn to Senator Rubio for his opening comments. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO,

U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you, Chairman. 

And I want to thank the nominees for their continued service to 

our Nation and for their testimony today. I am very interested in 

hearing your perspectives on the countries that you’ve been 

assigned to and the administration’s next step to advance U.S. interests in the region and the Western Hemisphere. There’s no 

doubt that a prosperous, democratic, and stable Western Hemisphere is crucial to the United States, to our own safety and to our 

own prosperity. 

In the past three decades alone, we’ve seen remarkable success 

stories that underscore the undeniable benefits of a greater democracy and transparency. We’ve seen promarket economic policies 

and security cooperation against transnational organized crime. 

But the progress is not evenly spread, unfortunately. There are 

still some nations that have made great strides in some or all of 

these areas, but others have still an uphill climb. 

And today we’ll hear about two different nations that, in some 

ways, have headed in opposite directions, in El Salvador and 

Ecuador. 

El Salvador remains a close friend and ally. Its leaders have chosen to overcome its governance challenges and the legacy of the 

cold-war-era civil conflict by investing and trying to strengthen 

their democratic institutions, and embracing and trying to embrace 

the benefits of a free and open market. 

On the other hand, in Ecuador, its President, Rafael Correa, is 

following a different, more ominous path. He’s cultivated ties with 

antidemocratic forces found in the ALBA group, particularly Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Cuba, and international pariahs 

such as Iran. Additionally, individual freedoms and property rights 

are being steadily eroded there while the government shuns 

economic policies that would foster prosperity through free and 

open markets. 

810

American leadership is needed now more than ever to advance 

the forward-looking solutions that strengthen democratic values 

and provide for good governance. If we stick to America’s principles 

and follow through on our promises, we really do have an opportunity to promote and foster positive change in this region. 

The work that we are doing now can and should be laying the 

groundwork for the Western Hemisphere to become the first to be 

wholly led by working democracies, something that will truly be a 

great part of our national legacy. 

So I look forward to hearing today’s testimonies, and I hope to 

learn more about some of the specific initiatives and the challenges 

that lie ahead. Thank you. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. 

So let me recognize Roberta Jacobson, the nominee to be the 

Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. 

She is currently Acting Assistant Secretary and Principal Deputy 

Secretary of the Bureau at the Department of State. She previously 

served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Canada, Mexico, and 

NAFTA; Director of the Office of Mexican Affairs; Deputy Chief of 

Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Lima. 

She received a B.A. from Brown University, M.A. from Tufts 

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. 

And with that, we look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERTA S. JACOBSON, OF MARYLAND, 

TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WESTERN 

HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Rubio, members of the committee. 

I am honored by the confidence that President Obama and Secretary Clinton have shown in nominating me to serve as Assistant 

Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs. If confirmed, I 

look forward to working with Congress, and in particular this committee, to advance our interests throughout the hemisphere. 

I am also very grateful to the members of my family who are 

here today: my husband, Jonathan, my sons, Gil and Daniel, my 

sister, Caryn, and brother-in-law, Richard. 

I am the daughter of parents who believed there was no higher 

calling than public service and who would be enormously proud 

today. 

Mr. Chairman, when I entered the State Department in 1986, I 

could never have imagined I would be asked to lead the 8,000 men 

and women serving in 50 posts in the Western Hemisphere, but I 

am so proud of them. They are among the finest public servants 

and colleagues in the world. I have also been lucky to have had 

remarkable mentors at the State Department. 

Secretary Clinton has noted that although responding to threats 

will always be central to our foreign policy, it cannot be our foreign 

policy. Our foreign policy is also about opportunities for the United 

States in engaging with the world, perhaps nowhere more so than 

in the Western Hemisphere. It is vital to our economic interests, 

to our security and global strategic interests, to our core values, 

and to our society and culture. 

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This administration has outlined four strategic priorities in this 

hemisphere: effective institutions for democratic governance, 

strengthened citizen security, expanded economic and social opportunity, and a clean energy future. 

To advance each of these, we have forged pragmatic partnerships 

with demonstrated results. Strong partnerships in the Americas 

will be essential to meeting the global challenges we confront 

today. Whether in NATO or U.N. peacekeeping, climate change 

negotiations, tackling global hunger or helping Haiti rebuild, countries in this hemisphere are leading the way. 

Mr. Chairman, democracy and security are fundamentally linked 

to the strength of institutions, particularly the judiciary and the 

police. If I am confirmed, among my highest priorities will be to 

help increase the capacity of those democratic institutions and to 

strengthen the rule of law against threats posed by corruption, 

impunity, and transnational criminal organizations. 

Our policy in the hemisphere is firmly rooted in our values of 

democracy and human rights. We condemn actions that limit freedom of expression or weaken institutions of democratic governance, 

and we remain steadfast in protecting free and fair elections 

throughout the hemisphere. 

We have expressed our clear concerns with irregularities related 

to the Nicaraguan elections, and we are committed to enabling the 

Venezuelan people to fully express their democratic will. 

In Cuba, we are keeping faith with human rights activists and 

dissidents who continue their fight for basic rights, and we will 

never waver in supporting the right of the Cuban people to freely 

determine their own future. 

Despite the progress of millions rising into the middle class, 

Latin America remains one of the most unequal regions in the 

world. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the United States 

remains at the forefront of promoting economic and social inclusion 

in the hemisphere. 

Our Pathways to Prosperity initiative has identified successful 

models for expanding opportunity that we can adapt elsewhere in 

the Americas. 

Achieving progress in the hemisphere also requires a commitment to energy security. Our hemisphere has abundant hydrocarbons, and we are advancing the President’s Energy and Climate 

Partnership of the Americas to strengthen energy security and 

address the challenges of climate change. 

As you know, Mr. Chairman, many of the citizens of the hemisphere lack the skills to take advantage of global opportunities. To 

address this education gap, the President has challenged us to 

expand student exchanges with the 100,000 Strong for the Americas program. 

The youth demographic also requires that we develop more agile 

and tech-savvy diplomacy, and we are complementing our official 

engagement with NGO outreach and the smart use of social media. 

Mr. Chairman, I am confident that the new partnerships we are 

forging are the best way to work with a region where many countries now have both the will and the capacity to be equal partners. 

These times demand a different kind of U.S. engagement, one that 

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is broader and more direct, younger and more global than ever 

before. 

Thank you very much, and I look forward to answering your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Jacobson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERTA S. JACOBSON

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Rubio, members of the committee, it is an 

honor and privilege to be here today as President Obama’s nominee to be Assistant 

Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs. I am grateful for the confidence 

that President Obama and Secretary Clinton have shown in nominating me to serve 

in this position. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Congress, and in 

particular this committee, to strengthen our ties with, and advance our interests 

throughout, the Western Hemisphere. 

I am also very grateful to the members of my family who are here today: my husband, Jonathan; sons, Gil and Daniel; and sister, Caryn, and brother-in-law, Richard. I am the daughter of parents who believed deeply in public service, and who 

would be enormously proud today. As a member of the Senior Executive Service who 

has truly come up through the ranks, I have also been lucky to have had a series 

of remarkable mentors at the State Department, to whom I am deeply indebted. I 

am particularly grateful to Arturo Valenzuela for selecting me as his deputy. 

Mr. Chairman, I entered the State Department in 1986 as a Presidential Management Intern and have spent my entire career focused on this hemisphere. I am so 

proud to have been asked to lead the Foreign Service and Civil Service employees—

and Locally Employed Staff who represent the United States here in Washington 

and overseas—they are among the finest public servants and colleagues in the 

world. The Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs is the second-largest of the regional bureaus with over 8,000 employees serving in 50 posts. Of course, our work 

in the Americas is done hand in hand with dedicated colleagues from USAID, DOD, 

DOE, DHS, DOJ, Treasury, USTR and many other agencies. This ‘‘whole of government’’ approach reflects our increasingly broad engagement in the Americas and is 

critical to advancing our core national interests in the region. And among the most 

important of those interests is protecting Americans, whether at home or abroad. 

I have worked on U.S policy in the Western Hemisphere for more than a quarter 

century, and I remain passionate about this hemisphere, our leadership in it, and 

the great things we can achieve together. As Secretary Clinton has said, the Western Hemisphere is more vital than ever to our fundamental interests as a nation. 

To our economic interests, as we rebuild our economy and our competitiveness for 

a new era; to our security and global strategic interests; to our core values, as we 

work to advance democracy and human rights everywhere; and to our society and 

culture, as the profound connections among our people make us more vibrant and 

innovative. Secretary Clinton has called this the power of proximity—and she does 

not just mean geographic proximity, but the proximity of our basic interests and 

challenges and what it will take to overcome them. 

This administration has outlined four strategic priorities in this hemisphere that 

guide our policies: effective institutions for democratic governance; strengthened citizen security; expanded economic and social opportunity for all; and a clean energy 

future. To advance in each of these areas, we have forged pragmatic, flexible partnerships with demonstrated results. 

As both the President and Secretary have made clear, we also welcome the global 

engagement of countries across the Americas, and constantly work to leverage our 

regional engagement on a wide range of global priorities. First, I would like to start 

with the global context before turning to our current efforts in the hemisphere and 

the results they have yielded. Finally, I want to emphasize the primacy of improved 

education—in both quality and opportunity—as the sine qua non of all our policies. 

GLOBAL ISSUES

Strong partnerships in the Americas will be essential in meeting the global challenges we confront today. While our diplomats must build more robust bilateral ties, 

they must also construct effective multilateral relationships that enable us to work 

within and across regions on complex global issues. The range of hemispheric contributions to issues of global importance is striking. Canada provided leadership for 

the NATO effort in Libya; Uruguay is the largest per capita contributor to United 

Nations peacekeeping operations in the world; Mexico’s astute diplomacy advanced 

global climate change negotiations; Brazil is sharing best practices on conditional 

cash transfer programs and providing assistance in Africa. Within the region as 

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well, we have developed innovative partnerships for the common good. These include South American leadership in Haiti, including in MINUSTAH, after the devastating earthquake, and Colombia offering its security expertise to Central America in coordination with our efforts to address transnational crime. 

Two key events in the space of a month, thousands of miles apart, will highlight 

the Americas’ growing global role. The President traveled to France for the G20, and 

he and Secretary Clinton will soon travel to Hawaii to participate in the Asia-Pacific 

Economic Cooperation forum and North American Leaders Summit. In these fora, 

our leaders work to expand economic opportunity for the United States by increasing the exports and trade opportunities that will create more jobs for Americans. 

Argentina, Brazil, Canada, and Mexico attended the G20; Canada, Mexico, Peru, 

and Chile will be at APEC to promote free trade and economic expansion throughout the Pacific rim. Secretary Clinton believes that these countries will ‘‘accept the 

responsibility that comes with the new influence . . . and that they will be fully integrated into the international order.’’ This is why we engage in such robust dialogues with Canada, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and others. And it is why, in addition 

to the Department’s regular exchanges with the European Union, we are engaging 

an increasing number of Asian partners—including China, Korea, Japan, and, soon, 

India—in dialogues on issues related to Latin America and the Caribbean. 

As the countries of the Americas enhance their global profile—a trend we support 

and encourage—and make important strides at home, we cannot lose sight of the 

serious challenges that remain. Transnational crime threatens citizens throughout 

the hemisphere. Continuing inequality and poverty limit opportunity. Inadequate 

education systems continue to handicap our most vulnerable citizens. To varying degrees, a minority of countries abrogate their citizens’ fundamental rights. 

DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY: THE IMPORTANCE OF INSTITUTIONS

I see democracy and security as being fundamentally linked to the strength of 

hemispheric institutions. Electoral democracy can only flourish if citizens and their 

leaders respect the basic rule of law, and pervasive violence and insecurity inevitably threaten fundamental freedoms and civil liberties. Achieving both freedom and 

security depends upon the establishment of stronger institutions. This has been a 

core priority of my role as the Bureau’s coordinator for Citizen Security and will 

continue to be a priority for me if I am confirmed as Assistant Secretary. 

In my current role, I am responsible for coordinating our security initiatives in 

the Western Hemisphere with other bureaus in the Department, with our interagency partners, with host nations, and with donors. Through this work, it is increasingly clear to me that for our efforts to succeed, democratic institutions must 

be strengthened—particularly the judiciary and the police. Democracy requires that 

all citizens can seek and find justice as equals before the law. This is why we place 

such importance on programs that aid Honduran law enforcement to create task 

forces to solve and deter crimes against journalists, woman, LGBT persons, and 

human rights activists, and our programs in Mexico that support alternative dispute 

resolution mechanisms so that suspects do not spend years awaiting trial. Similarly, 

in Guatemala we are supporting community councils where local leaders—often 

women—channel their concerns about security to government leaders, who can then 

be held accountable. 

If I am confirmed, among my highest priorities will be to increase the capacity 

of law enforcement and judicial institutions and to strengthen the rule of law 

against the threats of corruption and impunity. We know that this is a fight we 

must win for all the citizens of the hemisphere, including Americans at home. 

Of course, we recognize that not all countries in the hemisphere welcome our policy of pragmatic partnerships. In cases where cooperation remains difficult, we will 

seek areas of convergence and remain open to a more positive relationship, within 

the context of our fundamental values on democracy and human rights. That is why, 

should I be confirmed as Assistant Secretary, I will speak out clearly and without 

hesitation when fundamental democratic principles are threatened and work closely 

with our partners in the hemisphere to stand together against those threats. 

We condemn governments that limit freedom of expression, weaken institutions 

of democratic governance, centralize power in the Executive, and limit the legitimate rights of the political opposition. In celebrating the 10th anniversary of the 

Inter-American Democratic Charter, Deputy Secretary Burns noted that ‘‘the obligation to democracy neither begins nor ends at the ballot box. Even democratically 

elected governments can threaten democracy if they do not respect its safeguards, 

institutions, rules and values.’’ Protecting democracy is a hemispheric value. When 

democracy is threatened, we must all speak up. Although we are ready to provide 

leadership, and will not hesitate to do so, the United States can defend democracy 

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in the hemisphere most effectively when we are joined by our hemispheric partners, 

including multilateral organizations such as the OAS. 

In Cuba, we are working to expand the connections between U.S. and Cuban society and open the way for meaningful support of Cubans who are striking their own 

path, while we keep faith with human rights activists and dissidents who have 

fought for basic rights for years. With our efforts, more Cubans have access to information and independent connections to the American citizens who are the best ambassadors of our values. We have never wavered in our support of the right of people in Cuba to freely determine their own future—rights far too long denied to them. 

We also continue to seek the unconditional release of American citizen Alan Gross, 

a dedicated development worker who has been unjustly imprisoned in Cuba for 

nearly 2 years. 

Cuba clearly departs most fundamentally from the region’s core democratic values 

and elections alone do not constitute a democracy, but we remain steadfast in protecting free and fair elections throughout the hemisphere. Together with a broad 

range of partners we worked to ensure that Haiti’s elections accurately reflected the 

will of the Haitian people. We have expressed our clear concerns with the irregularities related to the recent electoral process in Nicaragua, in keeping with the InterAmerican Democratic Charter, and we are committed to doing what we can, in partnership with others in the region, to promote the ability of the Venezuelan people 

to fully express their democratic will. 

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INCLUSION

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the United States remains at the forefront 

of promoting economic and social inclusion in the hemisphere. The economic story 

of many nations in the hemisphere is extraordinarily positive: the combined economies of Latin America grew 6 percent last year, and millions of people are rising 

out of poverty and into the middle class. The passage of the free trade agreements 

with Colombia and Panama represents a major diplomatic milestone and they will 

be an important tool in furthering integration and creating the jobs that will offer 

opportunity and higher standards of living. As the State Department focuses on 

what Secretary Clinton calls economic statecraft, the Americas will be a priority, for 

as she said, ‘‘We believe in the power of proximity to turn growth across the Americas into recovery and jobs here in the United States.’’

Despite the progress we have seen, Latin America remains one of the most unequal regions in the world, where millions of citizens are struggling to escape poverty. A key priority of U.S. policy is to ensure that the benefits of economic growth 

are broadly shared throughout these societies. Free trade agreements are among the 

tools being harnessed to achieve this. 

In October, the U.S. joined another dozen countries along with the OAS, IDB, and 

others, in the Dominican Republic for the Fourth Ministerial for Pathways to Prosperity, our signature initiative to share best practices and facilitate economic growth 

that is more socially inclusive, by empowering small business, facilitating trade, 

building a modern workforce, and promoting sustainable business practices and environmental cooperation. To promote social and economic inclusion, we are also actively engaging with women, persons with disabilities, LGBT persons, youth, and 

members of Afro descendant and indigenous communities to ensure that they benefit from this process. 

Nowhere in the hemisphere do our efforts on security, democracy, and economic 

and social inclusion come together more clearly than they do in Haiti—one of the 

President and the Secretary’s highest priorities. Last year’s devastating earthquake 

did not just reveal geological fault lines. Today, as President Martelly’s government 

sets about the enormous challenge of creating accountable, transparent institutions, 

and rebuilding to reduce poverty and disease in Haiti, our leadership has accomplished a great deal, although there is still much more to be done. From rubble removal to increased agricultural yields, to the opening of a new industrial park, our 

regional partners have joined with us and the international community to answer 

the call and demonstrate just how much these partnerships can accomplish for the 

people of Haiti. 

ENERGY

Advancing social and economic progress in the hemisphere will also require a renewed commitment to energy security. This is especially important in the Americas, 

which supplies over half of our imported oil. Not only is the region home to abundant hydrocarbons, but many countries are leading in the development of renewable 

energy, and leaders are committed to working together to strengthen energy security and address the challenges of climate change. In recognition of this reality, the 

815

President created the Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas (ECPA) at 

the last Summit of the Americas. It promotes clean energy technologies, low carbon 

development, reduced emissions from deforestation, and climate-resilient planning. 

ECPA also serves as a vehicle for public-private partnerships including the promotion of promising, innovative, clean, and renewable energy projects, and financing 

mechanisms that bridge the gap among investors, clean energy entrepreneurs, and 

project developers. Beyond ECPA, we maintain energy dialogues with Brazil, Canada, and Mexico. We also have bilateral discussions with important regional electricity suppliers, like Colombia, which is working to link electricity grids with Panama and its Andean neighbors, and increase exports of clean power to its neighbors. 

All the themes I’ve mentioned will be highlighted in the objectives that the United 

States will seek to advance at the upcoming Summit of the Americas, scheduled to 

take place next April in Cartagena, Colombia. The summit is an opportunity to reaffirm, reinvigorate, and drive our common agenda. The theme of the summit is ‘‘Connecting the Americas: Partners for Prosperity’’ and this gathering will enable us to 

solidify our achievements over the last 3 years and launch new initiatives with partners in the region to achieve our goals. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to highlight one final topic in particular that is central to so much of our strategy in the hemisphere: education. Just as judicial systems are central to strong democratic institutions, expanding the quality and reach 

of education is also critical to advancing the ambitious project of a prosperous and 

democratic hemisphere. 

The hemisphere’s children will grow up in a region that has witnessed the rapid 

proliferation of global business opportunities. But many of its citizens lack the education, skills, and training to take advantage of this historic shift. Addressing this 

education gap will be crucial to the future competitiveness of the Americas. During 

his visit to Chile in March, President Obama announced a new goal, ‘‘100,000 

Strong in the Americas,’’ to increase the number of U.S. students studying in Latin 

America and the Caribbean to 100,000, with the reciprocal number of students from 

the region studying in the United States. President Rousseff launched her ‘‘Science 

without Borders’’ program to give more Brazilians opportunities, especially in the 

critical fields of science, technology, engineering, and math. We are asking the private sector to support exchange programs, finance scholarships, and offer internships, training, and mentoring for exchange students. 

Through USAID programs, the United States is supporting literacy education and 

increasing access to education opportunities for disadvantaged groups. Even our citizen security programs support education to provide training and internship opportunities for youth to ensure they have alternatives to violence and crime. 

The youth demographic in the Americas will also require the United States to develop more agile and tech-savvy diplomacy. We must be as good at NGO outreach, 

citizen-to-citizen exchange, and using social media as we are at delivering traditional diplomatic messages. We are working with social media leaders to leverage 

technology to solve real world problems. We have organized TechCamps in Santiago 

and Montevideo and are planning another in conjunction with the Summit of the 

Americas. These are examples of government, private sector, and civil society coming together to develop innovative ways for technology to broaden educational opportunities. If we are to meet the challenges we face as a hemisphere, we must fully 

harness new technologies. 

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, during my 25 years working on this region at the State Department, I have witnessed this hemisphere undergo dramatic and positive changes. I 

am confident that the new partnerships we are forging and leading are the best way 

to work with a region that is rapidly coming into its own, where many countries 

now have both the will and the capacity to be equal partners. These times demand 

a very different kind of U.S. engagement—an engagement that is broader and more 

direct, younger, and more global than ever before. 

Mr. Chairman, this committee has invested heavily in supporting our priorities 

in the Western Hemisphere in recent years and I want to thank you for that support. All of you have been among the most important advocates for these vital issues 

and relationships. Engagement between the executive and legislative branches is essential to achieving our shared objectives. If confirmed by the Senate, I would be 

honored to work with you, your staffs, members of this committee, and the Congress, to advance the goals we all share in the Americas. Thank you and I look forward to answering any questions you and the committee may have.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, thank you. 

816

So we’ll start our 7-minute rounds, and we’ll see how far we go. 

I have consistently raised the concern, and certainly the position 

for which you are nominated for would be important in making this 

concern less of a concern, and that is the funding decreases for 

Latin America. 

We have seen Secretary Clinton focus on the tension in the hemisphere in the last months, certainly with her visits to El Salvador 

and Guatemala, which is great. But funding for the region suggests 

that it is not a priority for this administration and that we haven’t 

yet made the connection between poverty, citizen security, transnational crime, narcotics trafficking, and U.S. interests. 

And I see as an example of that a 14-percent decline in our 

assistance to the hemisphere. And I understand the challenge of 

money, but there is just a question of priorities within the existing 

resources. 

I see that the lack of exertion by State and Treasury on behalf 

of a capital increase for the Inter-American Development Bank, the 

only—only—regional bank to not receive the full amount of its 

requested capital increase. 

So I look at the confluence of that funding decrease, the only regional bank in the world not to receive its requested capital increase, and then I look at our whole area of a 43-percent decline 

in counternarcotics. I put some of that toward Merida moving 

along, but not all of it. 

And so I say to myself, where is the importance given to this 

hemisphere? And what will you do, if confirmed, sitting on the seventh floor, to play a role in making sure that the appropriate allocations commensurate with the importance of the hemisphere take 

place? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And you have always 

been a stalwart supporter of efforts in this hemisphere, for which 

we’re grateful. 

In funding the programs in the hemisphere, we know that, in 

some cases, expenditures are going down because programs are 

proceeding, as you said, in Mexico with Merida. In Colombia, we 

are moving toward nationalization of programs that we have supported for a long time. 

But there are many areas in which we’ve been able to continue 

funding at the same levels or actually increase them, such as in the 

Caribbean and in Central America. And so the priority areas that 

we think need funding, we’ve been able to try and maintain even 

in an era of very tight budgets. 

Let me also address the IDB issue. The Secretary has been very 

clear with us and working with our colleagues at Treasury that we 

think it’s critically important that the IDB get full funding, and 

that overall the President’s request under the GCI be fully funded. 

The IDB is a partner in so many areas in the hemisphere, most 

critically perhaps in Haiti, but frankly also in the efforts we’re 

making on citizen security in Central America. 

Senator MENENDEZ. But you didn’t step up to the plate—not you 

personally—but the Department did not step up to the plate. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Well, we’re working——

817

Senator MENENDEZ. The only regional bank that did not receive—everybody—I heard the voices of the Department as it related to everybody else. I didn’t hear it about the IDB. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Well, I think that if it wasn’t made as loudly or 

as clearly as it should have been, we’re working with our colleagues 

in Treasury to overcome that, because we do feel strongly about 

that funding. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So if you are to be confirmed——

Ms. JACOBSON. Senator, that will be——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. You’ll do what? 

Ms. JACOBSON. That will be an extremely high priority, and I will 

be working both with colleagues in other agencies, but also with 

my own seventh floor, as you note, to be a passionate advocate for 

this hemisphere and to ensure that we get all of the resources 

requested by the President and are able to advance those arguments within the U.S. Government and here with our colleagues in 

Congress. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Let’s turn to a different topic, authoritarian 

trends in the hemisphere. 

You know, I want an Assistant Secretary in charge of the Western Hemisphere who is going to make it very clear in her work and 

with our ambassadors in the hemisphere that democracy, human 

rights, free press are critical elements and a significant part of the 

mission of those who are our ambassadors in the hemisphere. 

And I look at a resurgence of authoritarianism combined with a 

tolerance for corruption and resulting weak institutions and judiciaries threatening democratic processes, of course, in Venezuela, 

in Bolivia, in Ecuador, in Nicaragua, and even Belize and to some 

degree in Argentina. 

So what role do you see the United States playing in providing 

support to civil society organizations, the independent media, and 

other grassroots groups advocating for government transparency, a 

free press, and judicial reform? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you, Senator. I think that you have well 

stated the importance of those efforts. 

We are undertaking a number of programs to work with independent journalists, to support journalists who are under threat, 

whether that be from transnational criminal organizations or from 

government restrictions. 

And all of the U.S. Ambassadors in the hemisphere have the 

mandate of strengthening civil society and working with civil society just as they work with governments or try and work with governments to advance our interests. Because in the end, it is not 

just the institutions of government that provide for a democracy, 

it is strong civil society institutions and the ability of people to 

organize and to convey their views to their governments that are 

critical. 

In some countries, we will work more with civil society than we 

do with governments, depending on the circumstances. So that is 

an incredibly important priority for our ambassadors and for me 

personally. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I just want to close on that note, and 

in terms of what I increasingly sense is a targeting of the media. 

818

And this is incredibly important if people in the hemisphere are to 

be able to understand what is happening in their own countries. 

And I think it is reflective of a sense of crisis, a sense of urgency, 

which I don’t sense that we share. But it is expressed in an October speech by the president of the Inter American Press Association, Gonzalo Marroquin, who said, ‘‘We are in a war between 

authoritarianism and democracy. The free press is under increasing attacks, and governments are resorting to political prosecutions, restrictive media laws and economic pressure to censor 

independent media outlets.’’

That to me is the beginning of a demise of the essence of democracy in those countries. And I hope that we will have a heightened 

sense of that with our embassies in the hemisphere, in terms of 

them both speaking out when it is appropriate, and engaging those 

entities when it is appropriate, in a much more robust way. And 

I would hope that you, as the Assistant Secretary, would lead that 

effort. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

I want to start in Nicaragua. 

Good morning, by the way. Congratulations on your nomination. 

We had elections over the weekend in Nicaragua, and the Associated Press reports where there was complaints from international 

observers that raised questions about the margin of victory. For 

example, an observer for the OAS said that he was blocked from 

10 polling stations midway through the voting. 

A European Union team said they faced sometimes inexplicable 

obstacles. My understanding is the Carter Center didn’t even 

cooperate in this on the outset. 

What do we know about the elections? What do we know about 

the process? What are we prepared to say, right now? And what 

are we prepared to say ultimately in terms of the validity of how 

it was conducted? 

I think that’s critical in terms of—as we move forward in our 

first objective, which is having democratic institutions that function. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you, Senator. 

In Nicaragua, we have been watching with great concern the 

processes leading up to this election and through the events of the 

weekend. For that reason, frankly, we put out a statement on October 31, before the elections, noting our concerns in the process and 

hoping that the election day itself would take place freely, fairly, 

without harassment. 

We were particularly concerned with the rules under which electoral observation missions would operate. We were concerned with 

the distribution of identification cards for voters. And we have been 

concerned with the events of November 6 and the inability of some 

of the observers to fully mount their missions. 

But in particular, we were concerned about the inability of some 

very important domestic observation groups to observe as well in 

Nicaragua, and that was not overcome as of the day of the election. 

So we are, at this point, waiting for the results of both the OAS 

and the E.U. observer missions. We’re consulting closely with those 

819

missions. And we will speak out unequivocally about the situation 

in Nicaragua and the processes, which we are very concerned 

about. 

Going forward, I don’t know exactly what our statement will be. 

I don’t want to preclude the results of those groups. But I do know 

that we’ve spoken out clearly up to this point, and we intend to 

continue to do so. 

Senator RUBIO. Along those lines, Venezuela is scheduled to have 

elections next year, and there’s a lot of back and forth going on 

about who’s qualified to run. And apparently, one of the candidates 

is qualified to run, but he’s not qualified to take office according 

to the—if he wins. 

That being said, what is our vision in terms of the role we intend 

to play in terms of speaking out on the validity of those elections 

and how those elections need to be respected as well. I think potentially next year’s elections in Venezuela have the potential to be 

perhaps one of the most important events of this decade in the 

hemisphere, depending on the outcome of that election, but more 

importantly depending on how it’s conducted. 

So what are our general thoughts about how that’s progressing, 

how the opposition seems to be attempting to coalesce, the opposition to Chavez that seems to be coalescing, and trying to present 

an alternative on the ballot in 2012? 

We saw them make significant gains in the last election cycle. 

What are your thoughts on where we’re headed electorally in Venezuela in 2012? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you, Senator. 

I think we would agree with you that the elections next year in 

Venezuela have the potential to be an incredibly important event 

for the people of Venezuela and in the hemisphere. And we have 

certainly been clear on the importance of the process, a process 

that led to an increased number of opposition members in the 

national assembly in the last election, and a process that we hope, 

moving forward, will truly allow for free and fair elections to take 

place in 2012. 

We did speak out publicly after the Inter-American Court of 

Human Rights made its decision recently on a Venezuelan, and 

we’ll continue to do so. We try and work with groups, in a nonpartisan way, on ensuring that the processes are fair. We’ll work 

with partners through the OAS, if possible. 

But we agree that those elections are critically important, and 

the process leading up to them just as important. 

Senator RUBIO. Over the last 9 months, you’ve also served as the 

Western Hemisphere Security Coordinator, right? And obviously, I 

know that that involves a lot of transnational groups, human trafficking, drug trafficking, et cetera. One of the security concerns we 

should have about the region, however, is an increased P.R. offensive at minimum and actual presence, in the worst-case scenario, 

by Iran in the region. 

Can you describe briefly kind of what the threat of that is? How 

would you best describe kind of Iran’s attempt at growing presence 

in the Western Hemisphere, and, in particular, kind of the thought 

processes behind what are the consequences of that, in terms of our 

820

relationship with these countries that appear at least to be increasingly embracing pariah states like Iran? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Senator, Secretary Clinton has been very clear in 

our vision that Iran’s presence in the hemisphere is neither positive nor benign. Comments that she made in 2009, in some ways, 

look very prescient these days. 

And we certainly take very seriously Iran’s activities in the hemisphere, so seriously that we have taken action in a number of cases 

where Iranian action with countries in this hemisphere has violated either U.S. sanctions or international sanctions. 

As you know, earlier this year we took action against PDVSA, 

the Venezuelan oil company, for trade with Iran that fell under our 

CISADA sanctions. We renewed sanctions against Venezuelan military industries. 

And we will continue to pay the utmost attention to Iranian 

actions in the hemisphere and to act when we believe it is in our 

interest to do so, to sanction, to speak out, obviously, as most 

recently noted, in the plot against the Saudi Ambassador here in 

Washington. 

And so this administration is committed, and I am personally 

committed, to continuing to make that issue an extremely high priority for us. 

Senator RUBIO. Just as a segue on that, I know my time is about 

to expire, but concerned, in particular I am personally, about reports of flights between Tehran and Caracas. And I’ll tell you primarily the concern is that the countries in the hemisphere, particularly Venezuela, but maybe others, are helping Iran to potentially 

evade international sanctions. Obviously, that’s of concern, I would 

imagine, to the administration as well. 

Any progress on that, anything you could share with us with 

regard to the efforts we are making now or are willing to make in 

the future to ensure that those in the hemisphere are not somehow 

aiding Iran in evading these international sanctions? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Yes, Senator. I think that one of the things that 

we’ve been very careful is to continue to monitor the situation with 

Iran. We note that since the sanctions were announced earlier this 

year against Venezuela, against PDVSA, for violating United 

States sanctions in trade in oil products with Iran, we have not 

seen a repeat of that activity. And so, obviously, all of our efforts 

are aimed at changing behavior to ensure that countries abide by 

international and U.S. sanctions. 

And we will continue to try and monitor most closely and to act 

if we need to, including not taking off of the table any of the 

options available to us for further sanctions should they be 

warranted. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. 

Let me just have a few other questions since you have the whole 

hemisphere, so it’s a little difficult to accomplish in a few minutes. 

The Keystone XL pipeline, I gather you have not been working 

on that, but will that be part of your portfolio? Or is that at a different level, should you be confirmed? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you, Senator. 

821

As you know, I am recused from that at this time. But if I am 

confirmed, I do expect that to be a high priority—a high priority 

for me and my colleagues in the Department. 

Senator MENENDEZ. If that is the case, would you commit to 

come back to the committe to testify about critical issues that have 

surfaced with the pipeline question? Could we depend upon you, if 

confirmed, to come back to the committee? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Absolutely, Senator, at any time. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me ask you about Haiti reconstruction. 

The current status of recovery and reconstruction efforts as we 

approach the second anniversary of the January 2010 earthquake, 

what’s the status of that, and what effect has the political infighting had on President Martelly’s ability to form a government and 

begin to address the political and legal roadblocks to reform such 

as land titling? Where are we at? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you, Senator. 

I think that, as you imply, certainly, the difficulties that President Martelly has had in creating a government, in getting his 

nominees through his Parliament, have certainly slowed down 

some of the areas of reconstruction, in particular working on governance issues. And we’re extremely pleased that he now has a 

Prime Minister and his ministers in place, and believe that, at this 

point, things will move ahead much more smoothly in that area. 

However, in other areas, I think that there has been a great deal 

accomplished in the past year, certainly in areas such as rubble 

removal, where we have now more than 50 percent of the rubble 

removed, which is a huge undertaking; one of the largest in the 

world. 

In the issue of agricultural yields, where USAID has been 

present, we’ve seen a dramatic increase in the issue of agricultural 

yields. 

And obviously, land titling is still an area in which there is a 

great deal of progress that needs to be made, but is a high priority 

and one that we now feel has the attention of the Haitian Government. 

Senator MENENDEZ. OK. One final set of questions, Cuba. 

Since the Obama administration has eased restrictions on travel 

and remittances in April 2009, the Castro regime has doubled its 

hard currency deposits in foreign banks. The Bank for International Settlements reported banks in 43 countries held $5.76 billion in Cuban deposits as of March of this year. That’s compared 

with $4.2 billion at the close of 2009 and $2.8 billion at the close 

of 2008. 

So hard currency is entering Cuba without limits, being exchanged for Castro’s worthless currency and whisked abroad by the 

regime. 

Meantime, repression has spiked. Political arrests have more 

than doubled in the last year. We see a policy that results in trips 

featuring salsa dancing, cigar factory tours, baseball games, and 

even visits with Castro’s regime’s neighborhood repression committees, the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, which is 

pretty outrageous—all while an American sits unjustly in prison. 

Can you explain to me how this policy, in any sense, makes 

sense? 

822

Ms. JACOBSON. Senator, our goal in changing the regulations was 

to, and is to, expand the ability of average Cubans to have contact 

with Americans not through their government, to have people-topeople contacts. 

In doing so, we certainly recognize that there may be economic 

benefits to the regime, but we believe that they will be outweighed 

by the benefits to individual Cubans of having that greater access 

to information and to Americans. 

In the issue of tourism, let me be very clear about that. Tourism 

is still prohibited even under the regulatory changes that the 

administration has implemented. And the Office of Foreign Assets 

Control at the Treasury Department has reviewed and rejected and 

taken action against some proponents or some promoters of activities that do not fall under the regulatory changes, including in 

areas where they have been pointed to activities by the State 

Department. And we’ll continue to make sure that’s understood. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Do you think helping a regime that is 

oppressive of its people; that violates every principle that not only 

we, as Americans, have, but the International Charter has; that 

doubling—doubling—its reserves to $5.7 billion, which only gets 

used in its security apparatus; and that permits—permits—interchanges with the Committee to Defend the Revolution, which ultimately is a block watch organization that oppresses every Cuban 

in every village, in every hamlet, that’s good policy? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Senator, nothing in our policy is intended to help 

the Government of Cuba in those activities——

Senator MENENDEZ. Whether it is intended or not—excuse me, 

for interrupting you. But whether it is intended or not, the hard 

facts are, before our policy changes, Cuba had X amount in reserves. After our policy changes, it has doubled its amount to $5.6 

billion in reserves. That’s a hard fact. We can say that wasn’t our 

intention, but that’s the hard fact. 

The second hard fact is, is that we have all types of visits going 

on, including with elements of the Committee to Defend the Revolution, which in essence is the people who oppresses the Cuban 

people. How is that people to people? 

Explain to me how that’s people to people? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Well, that certainly does not fall under what we 

would consider people-to-people exchanges and the benefits that 

Cuban citizens may have of increased access to information and the 

ability to interact with humanitarian groups or church groups or 

academic institutions, which is what the regulations are intended. 

Senator MENENDEZ. How do we explain greater repression, unimaginable that it could be more repressive, but nonetheless that’s 

the reality. And I could introduce into the record a whole host of 

names that are publicly known that have been arrested or harassed simply because of their human rights activism. 

How do we look at a set of facts in which we double the reserve 

of the Cuban regime, we actually permit visits with Committees to 

Defend the Revolution, there is greater repression, and we do all 

of this while an American is sitting in jail unjustly? 

I don’t understand how you reward a regime for imprisoning an 

American citizen. I don’t get it. I don’t get it. And I hope someone 

at the State Department is going to wake up and say, ‘‘You know 

823

what, you don’t get anything, and certainly not until you release 

that American!’’

Ms. JACOBSON. Senator, I certainly agree that Alan Gross has 

been unjustly imprisoned for almost 2 years now, and we will do 

whatever we can through diplomatic means to try and get him 

home with his family where he deserves to be. And we certainly 

agree that the repression that has taken place, and human rights 

activists and others who have been detained recently, is unconscionable. 

And I would hesitate to be able to understand the Cuban Government’s actions any further. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I don’t want to belabor it. I raise it 

because you are going to be the Assistant Secretary. That is part 

of your charge in the Western Hemisphere. 

I just simply say, it seems to me very elemental. You stop the 

money; the regime gets the message. The regime has only changed 

those things that we have found negative for the Cuban people, not 

even in our interests but in the Cuban people’s interests, out of 

necessity, not ideological change. They have not changed ideologically. It’s only when they have necessity that they change. 

We double their reserves. We let all types of people go. We have 

an American sitting there. And we don’t use all of our resources—

forget about diplomacy—all of our resources to say, you will have 

nothing to do with us until you release that American. 

He’s a hostage. They took him particularly because he is, in essence, a hostage. 

He is there simply as a tool. Unfortunate for Alan Gross, but he 

is there as a tool, as a pawn, to try to be used. And it’s pretty 

amazing to me that we continue a policy that ultimately lends 

itself to that. 

So I hope that when you get confirmed, you know, you take this 

message back to the State Department, that certainly for myself I 

have a very different strong view about you don’t double their 

reserves, you don’t permit visits for the CDR—the Committee to 

Defend the Revolution. And you certainly do everything you can. 

Diplomacy has many tools to it, and it seems to me that a whole 

bunch of those tools aren’t being used to have Alan Gross freed. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

You outlined in your statement that there are four strategic priorities in the hemisphere, the first being—and I’m glad to see the 

first being—effective institutions for democratic governance. 

On the issue of Cuba, my hope, and I think the answer is ‘‘Yes,’’ 

that our real goal there is to ultimately have Cuba become a 

democracy——

Ms. JACOBSON. Absolutely. 

Senator RUBIO [continuing]. A functional democracy with institutions where people get—so our policies toward Cuba should be 

geared toward accomplishing that. 

And the administration has made a decision that one of the ways 

it wants to do that is it wants to allow Americans both, you know, 

Cuban-Americans traveling back to see families, but Americans, 

through academic institutions, church-based groups, and others, 

824

travel to Cuba under the notion that access to Americans will 

somehow provide information to the average Cuban, and, therefore, 

further the cause of ultimately creating some sort of political opening and a democracy. 

Is that an accurate reflection of our goals as a result of the——

Ms. JACOBSON. I think that’s correct. We believe that kind of purposeful travel is in aid of what we completely agree on, which is 

a free and open Cuba. 

Senator RUBIO. But as you’ve conceded today, there is a costbenefit analysis. We understand that the cost of doing that is that 

it provides hard currency to the regime. The regime uses that hard 

currency not just to further their own economic interests as individuals, but also to fund the repressive arm of the government. 

We know that political repression has increased. We know that 

there’s been an emerging resistance. It’s no longer just human 

rights activists or dissidents. There’s an open resistance in Cuba 

now; a resistance which is being oppressed by political police, basically, and they’re funded. And I don’t think anyone would argue 

that some of the funding for that comes from the hard currency 

that they now have access to as a result of this increased travel. 

That’s the cost of doing it, which you’ve conceded. 

In exchange, though, the administration’s position is that the 

benefit of having Americans travel to Cuba outweigh the hard currency that’s now available to the Castro regime as a result of this 

travel. Is that right? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Certain very clearly defined travel, yes. 

Senator RUBIO. So, for example, what specific groups have traveled to Cuba, say, in the last year that we think have helped further the cause of democracy. For example, what particular trips or 

actual missions to Cuba can we point to that, for example, have 

met with some of these resistant leaders or have deliverables in 

terms of actually making progress? 

I’m looking for signs that somehow this travel has led to advances that we can point to and say this is something that’s contributing toward democracy being closer for the Cuban people. Do 

we have any groups like that? Do we have any specific travel like 

that, that we think has made that kind of progress? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Senator, I would have to take a look at which 

specific groups have gone to Cuba very recently. I know that since 

the regulatory changes were made at the end of January, and it 

took us a while to get specific guidelines in place, and, obviously, 

groups are beginning to apply, it’s my understanding that there 

have not been a huge number of groups that have gone under the 

new regulations. But, obviously, I’ll take that back to look at specifically what organizations. 

But we do know that some church organizations and religious 

groups are interested in doing missions, humanitarian work, as 

well as academics who would like to travel to Cuba. 

Senator RUBIO. But if our policy, ultimately, is to foster democracy, shouldn’t these groups be evaluated on the basis of what they 

would do to foster democracy? If a ballet wants to go perform in 

Cuba, if a sports team wants to go play, shouldn’t we analyze that 

at least to try to figure out what does this do to help foster democracy? Who are you going to get to see, where are you going to get 

825

to express yourself, what are you going to do when you’re there 

that actually fosters our foreign policy toward Cuba, which is the 

hope of a creation of the underpinnings for a democratic transition? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Right. Well, certainly, Senator, I think that the 

goal in any of these groups going to Cuba is to expose average 

Cubans to as much about the United States and its culture, its 

efforts to assist them individually without the intervention of the 

Cuban Government, as possible. And that may take various forms 

in the travel of groups that go to Cuba. And hopefully, all of that 

would aid in getting information, culture, educational materials to 

the people of Cuba. 

Senator RUBIO. But again, and I understand that’s the theory behind it, but I would just advocate that if indeed we’re going to 

allow people to travel to Cuba, and our hope is that somehow this 

travel to Cuba will help foster democracy, that somehow there’ll be 

a nexus established between the trip that they’re taking—because 

we already have conceded that every time they go over there 

they’re turning hard currency over to a repressive regime. 

So we’ve already conceded, the administration has, that there’s 

a price to be paid, that we recognize that these trips are providing 

hard currency for a repressive regime. 

So we should at least try to, in each one of these trips, establish 

that at a minimum the cost that we’re paying by allowing this 

money to be available to the repressive regime is offset by the benefit of that specific trip. 

And I would hope that we would establish a policy that clearly 

creates a nexus between the trips and our foreign policy toward the 

island, which is the hope of advancing democracy. 

My hope would be that if, in fact, people are going to travel there 

and organizations are going to travel there, that they could somehow show us how traveling there, in addition to filling some curiosity, is going to actually provide some assistance that will contribute toward the creation of democracy in Cuba. 

And my other concern is that Alan Gross was on the island for 

the purpose of fostering access to information. I’m really concerned 

about that, because it shows that there are limits—in fact, it 

proves that there are limits as to what the Cuban regime is going 

to tolerate in terms of trip—in essence, they’re not going to allow 

people into the island that they think are going to undermine their 

standing. 

It appears to me that they have a filter process in place where 

they’re going to deny access. That’s the other part of this equation 

that I think has been forgotten. Not anyone can just travel to 

Cuba. If tomorrow someone announced they want to travel to Cuba 

for the purpose of meeting with five of the leading resistance members, you’re not going to get in. They’re only going to allow in those 

people that they think do not undermine their activities. 

And we now have evidence of an American citizen that they believe undermined them, and the result, he’s now sitting in jail. I 

think that has to be a major concern, as well, because even though 

on this side of the equation, things may be very well-intentioned, 

we can’t forget that the other side of the equation is the Cuban 

regime. And the Cuban regime is not going to openly allow people 

to come into Cuba that are somehow going to undermine them. 

826

They’re going to select and only allow those in that they think don’t 

undermine them. 

Isn’t that something we’re concerned about? 

Ms. JACOBSON. That’s certainly something that we are concerned 

about. We’re concerned about it, for example, in the democracy programs that we have, which are designed, and our foreign assistance 

programs, are designed to increase contact or promote information 

in Cuba. 

We certainly make clear to all Americans going to Cuba in all of 

our public information what the circumstances are in Cuba and the 

risks they may be taking by traveling. 

Senator RUBIO. So we make clear to people who are traveling to 

Cuba for people-to-people contact, we make clear to them that if 

they go too far in advocating for democracy or regime change that 

they could go to jail? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I think we have a balance and a responsibility to 

American citizens to be clear on what the circumstances are in 

Cuba and what the circumstances of others have been. 

Senator RUBIO. Right. No, and I think that’s the right thing to 

do, to warn them. But my point is that if we tell people, ‘‘Hey, if 

you go to Cuba and you speak out in favor of democracy and 

against the regime, you may go to jail, so really the only safe way 

to go to Cuba is to travel there and not really do anything more 

than, you know, cultural stuff, but really don’t talk about politics 

because that could get you in trouble.’’

I mean, doesn’t that defeat the purpose of the people-to-people 

contact that we’re trying to—if indeed the purpose of people-topeople contact is to further democracy? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I think, Senator, that we would probably agree 

that there are lots of different ways we can help the Cuban people 

determine their own future. And we are going to use all of the tools 

that we can to try and give Cubans a larger aperture on the world 

that helps enable them to determine their own future, in particular 

politically. 

Senator RUBIO. OK, my last question. 

There were press reports recently about a trip taken by Governor 

Richardson to Cuba. And in that press report, it claimed that the 

United States had made some sort of unilateral offers to Cuba in 

exchange of the release of Alan Gross, that we’d offered to, you 

know, walk away from democracy programs, that there have been 

offers. 

Could you comment on that? Did that happen? Has the United 

States been involved in any unilateral-type negotiations promising 

changes in Cuba policy in exchange for the release of Mr. Gross? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Senator, we have never offered unilateral concessions to the Cuban Government in exchange for Mr. Gross. As 

badly as we would like Mr. Gross returned home, that should be 

unconditional, so he can be with his family. 

Governor Richardson traveled to Cuba as a private citizen, and 

he was not authorized to present any proposals on behalf of the 

U.S. Government. 

Senator RUBIO. So just to be clear, we have never offered changes 

in Cuba policy in exchange for the release of Mr. Gross? 

Ms. JACOBSON. That is correct. We have not. 

827

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. 

Just before I turned to Senator Cardin, who I know was very interested in this, let me just make one point that we’d like to follow 

up at a later time. 

The problem with the whole issue with travel, in terms of your 

own stated purpose, is that you are using a general license. So 

there is no real way to track after the initial license what it is that 

people are doing. So they could be meeting Comite ́s de Defensa de 

la Revolucio ́n. You don’t know. 

So that is a fundamental flaw in the issue of purposeful travel. 

Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me first, if I might, ask consent that a letter addressed to 

the committee from elected officials in Virginia and Maryland in 

support of Ms. Mari Carmen Aponte as U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, including signatures from Ana Sol Gutierrez, who is a State 

representative; Victor Ramirez, a state senator; and William 

Campos, a Prince George County councilman, in support of that 

nomination be made part of our record. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Without objection. 

[The letter referred to follows:]

NOVEMBER 3, 2011. 

Senator JOHN F. KERRY, 

Chairman, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 

Dirksen Senate Office Building, 

Washington, DC.

Reference: Nomination of U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador: Mari Carmen Aponte

DEAR SENATOR KERRY: As Salvadoran-American elected officials representing 

state and local governments in Maryland and Virginia, we are writing a joint letter 

to express our very strong support for the nomination of U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, Mari Carmen Aponte. 

Since she was appointed as ambassador to El Salvador by President Obama. Ambassador Aponte has clearly proven her extraordinary ability to represent the best 

interests of the United States while carrying out the challenging duties of her office 

and exemplifying the highest level of diplomatic professionalism, effectiveness, and 

leadership. During her brief service to-date, she has established excellent working 

relationships with the Salvadoran government as well as with all key sectors of El 

Salvador’s economic, political, and civil society. But more importantly, as El Salvador’s first Latina ambassador, she has won the hearts, minds, and utmost respect 

of the Salvadoran people, both those in El Salvador as well as the thousands of Salvadoran-Americans living in the United States. 

As you may be aware, according to the 2010 Census, Salvadoran-Americans now 

comprise the third largest Hispanic national group in the United States. In Maryland and Virginia, Salvadoran-Americans far out number all other Hispanic national groups in the area, and contribute significantly to the growth and well being 

of our States. The Salvadoran-American communities that we represent are keenly 

interested and will be closely watching the upcoming confirmation process. 

It is very important to all Salvadoran-Americans to know that the United States 

reaffirms its long-standing commitments and seeks to maintain a strong and stable 

relationship with the government and people of El Salvador. 

These are indeed challenging times for El Salvador as it must confront difficult 

problems of poverty, security, growing violence, recent natural disasters, stalled economic development, among others. Now more than ever, it is critically important to 

allow Ambassador Aponte to continue with her valuable work towards strengthening the long–term, close partnership that has been forged between El Salvador 

and the United States. 

We therefore urge you and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to act 

promptly and positively on behalf of the Administration and the American people 

828

to confirm Ambassador Aponte so she is able to continue her extraordinary diplomatic services. 

Sincerely, 

Hon. ANA SOL-GUTIE ́ RREZ, 

MD State Delegate, District 18, 

Montgomery County, MD.

Hon. VICTOR R. RAMIREZ, 

Maryland State Senator, District 47, 

Prince Georges County, MD.

Hon, WILLIAM CAMPOS, 

County Councilmember, 

Prince Georges County, MD.

Hon. J. WALTER TEJADA, 

County Board Member, 

Arlington County, VA.

Senator CARDIN. And, Ms. Jacobson, let me welcome you to the 

committee. Thank you for your public service. Thank your family 

for your willingness to continue to serve our country. 

We are particularly proud, because you come from the State of 

Maryland, so we very much welcome you here. 

I want to underscore the message of my two colleagues as it 

relates to Alan Gross. He’s also a Marylander. And we have tried, 

through various means, to get the attention of the Cuban Government for the release of Mr. Gross, who is being held—I think Senator Menendez says, as a hostage. That may very well be the case. 

The concern we have is that it looks like we’ve been trying very 

diplomatic means in a quiet way to get him released, and that 

hasn’t worked. I think it’s time to elevate this issue. 

This is a gross violation of human rights. Alan Gross should be 

released. There should be no conditions on his release. There 

should be no compromises made by the United States that would 

be inappropriate, because this is a one-sided problem. And Cuba 

needs to recognize that, and there needs to be consequences, not 

just in U.S. policy, but in how America handles international issues 

as it relates to Cuba. 

So I guess my question to you is, Will you assure this committee 

that, if confirmed, the case of Alan Gross will remain a very high 

priority of yours, and that you will work with many of us who are 

prepared to put a spotlight on this issue in many of our international participations as well as our bilateral relationship with 

Cuba? 

Many of us hold positions in international organizations. We intend to make this case one that is known throughout the world, 

that Cuba is violating the rights of an American, and it appears to 

be solely for trying to get leverage over America, which we will not 

tolerate. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Senator, the short answer to your question is, 

yes, absolutely. 

I think that we have always taken our cue from the Gross family, and we’ll continue to do that. But we do think that it is time 

to speak out very loudly. 

I hope that I am doing that here today, that this is absolutely 

unjustified, that Mr. Gross should be home with his family. There 

are illnesses in his family. His own health has deteriorated while 

held by the Cubans, and he deserves to be home immediately. 

829

So we are grateful for your support and that of the other members of the committee. 

Let me also just add that I’m very proud of my adoptive State 

of Maryland, but I do have to mention my New Jersey roots, 

because my New Jersey contingent is here with me today. 

Senator CARDIN. I assume you visit Florida every once in a while. 

[Laughter.] 

Ms. JACOBSON. I try, sir. 

Senator MENENDEZ. That’s why she got nominated. [Laughter.] 

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you for that answer, and I appreciate that. And I think this is what we need to do as a nation. 

Let me just ask one other question, if I might, on a different subject. As the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Affairs, you are the coordinator for citizen security initiatives 

in Latin America. Will you share with the committee the challenges that you’ve had in regards to that and where you think we 

need to make additional progress? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you very much, Senator. 

This has been an enormous preoccupation of myself, my predecessor, and, frankly, of Secretary Clinton. When we look at polls 

across the hemisphere, 90 percent of the respondents in polls in the 

hemisphere say citizen security is their No. 1 priority, their No. 1 

concern. 

And so we have a series of coordinated efforts in the hemisphere 

that run from Mexico, through Central America, to Colombia, and 

include the Caribbean, that we think work together really well and 

are critically important efforts to try and strengthen institutions to 

resist those transnational criminal organizations, whether they are 

dealing in drugs, whether they are gangs, other forms of contraband. 

And, frankly, this is a fight that is not a quick one. It’s one that 

we have seen remarkable success on in Colombia, but after many 

years, and one that in some ways is just under way in Mexico with 

very strong efforts by President Calderon, and we hope to continue 

to support that. 

But in Central America and the Caribbean, smaller countries 

have an even tougher time in resisting these criminal organizations. And so we need to work in an integrated way across the U.S. 

Government on building up the law enforcement and judicial capacity, building civil society, as I mentioned before, to resist those 

organizations and to cooperate with the United States in ways that 

serve both our interests and serve our interests on both sides of the 

border. 

Senator CARDIN. I thank you for that response. I look forward to 

working with you. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I’ll yield back the balance of my time. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Cardin. 

Madam Secretary, thank you for your forthright responses. I 

hope you understand those of us who sought to be on this subcommittee, particularly, and as well as the full committee, have a 

passion for the hemisphere. So I’m sure you heard the passion 

through the questions. 

But we appreciate your engagement. And we look forward to, if 

any member has any written questions, you’ll respond to it quickly. 

830

And from my own personal view, I look forward to supporting 

your nomination and working with you in the days ahead. 

With that, we’re going to excuse you. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MENENDEZ. You’re welcome and thank your family for 

being here. 

And we’re going to call up our next panel, starting with Mari 

Carmen Aponte. I’ll read these as you come forward, so as we can 

save some time. 

Ambassador Aponte was sworn as Ambassador of the United 

States to El Salvador on September 22, 2010. She previously 

worked as an attorney and consultant with Aponte Consulting and 

served on the board of directors of Oriental Financial Group. 

She was the executive director of the Puerto Rican Federal 

Affairs Administration. She has a B.A. in political science from 

Rosemont College, an M.A. from Villanova, and a J.D. from Temple 

University. 

So, welcome, Ambassador, once again before the committee. 

Adam Namm is the director of the Bureau of Overseas Buildings 

Operations of the Department of State. A career member of the 

Senior Foreign Service, Mr. Namm joined the Department of State 

in 1987. 

He has served overseas as a management counselor in 

Islamabad, human resources officer in Bogota, a general services 

office in Santo Domingo, and consular officer in Bogota and Santo 

Domingo. 

He holds a B.A. in international relations from Brown University, an M.S. in national security strategy from the National War 

College. And we welcome him. 

Elizabeth Cousens is the Principal Policy Adviser and Counselor 

to the U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N., Ambassador 

Susan Rice. At the U.N., she has served as the Chief of Staff for 

the U.N. Mission in Nepal and as the Chief of the Donor Coordination Unit in the Office of U.N. Special Coordinator for the Middle 

East Peace Process. 

Past experience also includes director of strategy for the Centre 

for Humanitarian Dialogue in New York and senior associate and 

vice president of the International Peace Academy in New York. 

She received advanced degrees in international relations from 

the University of Oxford, and a B.A. in history from the University 

of Puget Sound. 

Welcome all. 

In the interest of time we ask that each of you limit your testimony to 5 minutes. Your full written testimony, will be included 

in the record. 

And we will proceed with Ambassador Aponte as our first 

nominee. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARI CARMEN APONTE, OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, TO BE AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF EL SALVADOR 

Ambassador APONTE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Senator Rubio, I am very 

pleased and grateful for the opportunity to appear before you. 

831

With me today I have my family, my sister, Tere; and my brother-in-law, Arturo; as well as my mother; and two very good friends, 

Felix Rodriguez from Miami, who is a veteran of the Bay of Pigs 

invasion in Cuba, as well as former President of El Salvador, 

Alfredo Cristiani; and some friends from the Salvadoran community, from all segments of the Salvadoran community. 

I’m very honored and grateful for the trust and confidence placed 

in me by President Obama and Secretary Clinton in nominating me 

to serve as the United States Ambassador to the Republic of El 

Salvador. 

El Salvador is a country with significant ties to the United 

States. One quarter of all Salvadorans live and work here in the 

United States. 

There are very strong economic links between our two nations, 

CAFTA and the free trade that it facilitates between the United 

States and El Salvador, a dollarized Salvadoran economy, and the 

presence of many prominent U.S. companies engaged in business 

in El Salvador. 

El Salvador has also sent troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, and 

presently is the only Latin American country to have sent troops 

to Afghanistan. 

This is significant progress from 20 years ago when a bitter 12-

year civil war ended and the country began a successful transition 

to a stable democracy. It is vital to continue to build on that 

progress with this important regional ally and, if confirmed, I will 

further the efforts that we have made in the last year. 

The administration’s priorities and the efforts of our mission are 

centered on the complementary objectives of security and economic 

growth. 

El Salvador has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. 

Drug trafficking through El Salvador continues to increase. Gang 

violence is a daily threat to much of the population. The activities 

of the 18th Street and MS–13 gangs extend to the cities and communities of the Americas. As a result, helping El Salvador to combat these gangs directly impacts our own national security. 

In the economic arena, the transition from 20 years of a conservative rule to a new left-leaning administration has presented both 

opportunities and challenges. I have made it my priority to build 

bridges between the government and the private sector, to encourage cooperation in helping El Salvador to reach its economic potential. And I am proud to say that the Ambassador’s residence has 

become a place where both sides feel comfortable discussing issues 

of importance on neutral ground. 

I believe that an important part of diplomacy is creating positive 

conditions which lead to increased understanding and cooperation, 

and I have tried to position the mission as a very honest intermediary. If confirmed, I will continue to be an advocate and architect for these important bridges to foster public/private dialogue. 

In both our key priority areas, security and economic growth, 

President Obama’s Partnership for Growth has been a key focus of 

our efforts over the past year. El Salvador was the first country to 

sign a joint action plan with the United States in a ceremony in 

El Salvador just last week. And we look forward to continuing to 

832

realign our priorities to push forward on both of these important 

issues. 

I believe this is a critical time for U.S. diplomacy. We have and 

we’ll continue to reach out to the complete spectrum of Salvadoran 

society, not just government leaders and the nation’s elite, but to 

opinion leaders, community leaders, youth, and all facets of the 

civil society. 

We have hosted several joint military exercises with the Salvadoran military and sponsored events for local artists and women’s 

groups. All this has been with the goal of strengthening bilateral 

ties. 

Diplomacy is critical, and as we face increasing dangers throughout the world, I am humbled by the confidence the administration 

has placed in me. During my tenure as Ambassador in El Salvador, 

I have represented the strategic interests of the United States to 

the utmost of my abilities. If confirmed, I will continue to do so as 

I strive to further strengthen the ties between the government and 

people of the United States and El Salvador. 

I thank you again for your time and would be pleased to respond 

to any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Aponte follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MARI CARMEN APONTE

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored and grateful for the 

trust and confidence placed in me by President Obama and Secretary Clinton

in nominating me to serve as United States Ambassador to the Republic of El 

Salvador. 

El Salvador is a country with significant ties to the United States. One quarter 

of all Salvadorans live and work here in the United States. There are strong economic links between our two nations: CAFTA and the free trade that it facilitates 

between the United States and El Salvador, a dollarized Salvadoran economy, and 

the presence of many prominent U.S. companies engaged in business in El Salvador. 

El Salvador has also sent troops to Iraq and Afghanistan—and is the only Latin 

American country to have sent troops to Afghanistan. This is significant progress 

from 20 years ago, when a bitter 12-year civil war ended and the country began a 

successful transition to a stable democracy. 

It is vital to continue to build on that progress with this important regional ally 

and, if confirmed, I will further the efforts that we have made in the last year. 

The administration’s priorities and the efforts of our mission are centered on the 

complementary objectives of security and economic growth. President Obama has 

placed a high priority on citizen security in the region and thus our number one 

priority in El Salvador has been, and will continue to be, security. El Salvador has 

one of the highest homicide rates in the world. Due to its location in the region, 

drug trafficking through El Salvador continues to increase. Gang violence is endemic and a daily threat to much of the population with the activities of the 18th 

Street and MS–13 gangs extending to the cities and communities of America. Criminal elements in El Salvador have been linked to violent crimes committed in the 

United States. 

President Obama’s signature development initiative, Partnership for Growth, has 

identified security as a binding constraint to economic growth. As part of this initiative, which has been introduced in only four countries worldwide, we are engaging 

the government and people of El Salvador in a dialogue on how the United States 

and El Salvador can work together to improve security, which represents a significant constraint to growth and prosperity in many sectors of the economy. 

Partnership for Growth will enhance the way in which the U.S. manages its foreign assistance to El Salvador, better supporting USG policy interests and fostering 

more rapid economic growth in El Salvador. A collaborative effort, Partnership for 

Growth, has involved a rigorous assessment by a team of economists from both the 

U.S. Government and the Government of El Salvador. The framework requires El 

Salvador to make commitments that will complement the U.S. assistance being 

offered in the areas that have been identified as obstacles to growth such as comVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00840 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
833

plementary citizen security programs being implemented in El Salvador under the 

Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). 

In the area of enhanced citizen security cooperation with the Government of El 

Salvador under CARSI, we have made significant headway on establishing an electronic monitoring center that will be an important tool in combating organized and 

transnational crime. For the past year, I have worked in close coordination with our 

law enforcement agencies to engage the Salvadoran Government to move this 

project forward and am pleased to note that the new facility is scheduled to open 

by the end of the year. 

Another key administration priority has been economic growth. As I mentioned 

previously, our mission is embracing the opportunity for transformation presented 

by the Partnership for Growth. My team and I have worked with the Government 

of El Salvador, many U.S. agencies represented in El Salvador and their counterparts in D.C. to formulate a joint action plan with a mix of programs and technical 

exchanges to foster economic growth. If confirmed, I will continue to be an advocate 

and architect for this important initiative and ensure its implementation. 

As part of our efforts to encourage more inclusive and effective government to 

achieve broad strategic goals in El Salvador, I made it my priority to build bridges 

between the private sector and the government. The transition from 20 years of conservative rule to a new left-leaning administration in El Salvador has at times 

presented both opportunities and challenges for the private sector, which has traditionally identified with the former ruling party. 

Building trust between the government and the private sector to work in partnership for the future of El Salvador is essential. The Ambassador’s residence has been 

a place where both sides can feel comfortable on neutral ground to discuss issues 

of importance—yet where significant divergence of opinion and approach exists 

within Salvadoran society. We have been able to create a political space in the middle for different factions to come together. I believe that an important part of diplomacy is creating positive conditions which lead to increased understanding and 

cooperation, and I have tried to position the mission as an honest intermediary. 

Another focus has been developing and empowering the staff of the Embassy. 

There are over a dozen agencies represented within the Embassy, all with different 

bureaucratic cultures and specific missions, but each with the same overarching 

goal of advancing the interests of the United States. One of my goals in the last 

year has been to develop mission personnel into a more effective and cohesive team. 

I have invited every member of the mission to meet with me and with each other 

at the Ambassador’s residence. Likewise, I have stressed the importance of investing 

in human capital by promoting training and a strong sense of community, both with 

our Direct Hire American staff and Locally Engaged personnel. These efforts have 

increased mission unity, fostered a positive and collegial work environment, and created a more effective team. 

I believe this is a critical time for U.S. diplomacy. We have and will continue to 

reach out to the complete spectrum of Salvadoran society, not just government leaders, and the nation’s elites, but to opinion leaders, community leaders, youth, children and all facets of civil society. We have hosted several joint military exercises 

with the Salvadoran military and sponsored events for local artists and women’s 

groups. All this has been with the goal of strengthening bilateral ties. 

Diplomacy is critical, and as we face increasing dangers throughout the world, I 

am humbled by the confidence the administration has placed in me. During my tenure as Ambassador in El Salvador, I have represented the strategic interests of the 

United States to the utmost of my abilities. If confirmed, I will continue to do so 

as I strive to further strengthen the ties between the government and people of the 

United States and El Salvador 

I thank you again for your time and hospitality and would be pleased to respond 

to any questions you have.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Namm. 

STATEMENT OF ADAM E. NAMM, OF NEW YORK, TO BE AN 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR 

Mr. NAMM. Well, thank you very much and good morning, Mr. 

Chairman, Ranking Member Rubio. 

I am honored to appear before you today as the President’s nominee for United States Ambassador to the Republic of Ecuador. I am 

834

grateful to President Obama and Secretary Clinton for the trust 

and confidence they have placed in me. 

I would like to recognize members of my family that have joined 

me today: my wife, Mei Huang; my daughter, Rebecca Namm; my 

mother, Susan Spencer, a resident of Jupiter, FL; my stepmother, 

Joan Namm; and my sister-in-law, Wei Huang, all of whom are 

great sources of great joy and support. 

On this day, I’m also thinking of my father, Arnold Namm, who 

left us last year, but is still very much with me. 

During my 24-year Foreign Service career, I’ve been privileged to 

represent our Nation in a diverse group of countries—the Dominican Republic, Saudi Arabia, Colombia, and Pakistan—as well as 

serving in multiple positions in Washington. 

For the past 2.5 years, I’ve had the honor of leading the State 

Department’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations. During my 

tenure in that Bureau, we opened 16 new diplomatic facilities 

around the world, with another 33 facilities under design and in 

construction. 

In 2008, I had the pleasure of cutting the ribbon on our new 

Embassy compound in Quito, and I am pleased to report that the 

Department will open a new consulate general compound in 

Guayaquil in 2012. 

The United States ties with Ecuador date back to that country’s 

independence from Gran Colombia in 1830, and we sent our first 

envoy to Ecuador in 1848. The close links between our two countries are evident in the interchange of people. As many as 2 million 

Ecuadorians live in the United States, and Ecuador maintains consular offices in 17 U.S. cities. 

For Americans, Ecuador is a popular destination for tourism, an 

attractive place to retire, and a place of opportunity for commerce 

and study. More than 200,000 Americans visit Ecuador each year 

and some 25,000 U.S. citizens reside in Ecuador. If confirmed, my 

top priority will be to ensure the well-being of U.S. citizens living 

in and visiting Ecuador. 

Another priority will be to promote U.S. business interests. The 

United States is Ecuador’s largest trading partner. In 2010, the 

United States supplied 25 percent of Ecuador’s imports with a 

value of $5.4 billion, and was the destination for 35 percent of 

Ecuador’s exports valued at $7.5 billion. 

Our energy relationship is also vigorous. With the fourth-largest 

proven oil reserves in Latin America after Venezuela, Brazil, and 

Mexico, and as a consumer of U.S. petroleum products, Ecuador 

represents an important partner in this vital economic sector. 

As this committee knows, our relationship with Ecuador has 

been difficult in recent months, marked by Ecuador’s regrettable 

expulsion of our Ambassador. I believe, however, that this trying 

period has only underscored for everyone the importance of reinvigorating our countries’ bonds. 

By nominating a new Ambassador to Ecuador, the President and 

the Secretary are demonstrating their commitment that the United 

States and U.S. interests be represented at the highest level. 

If confirmed, I will be a forceful advocate for our interests and 

values, including democracy, trade, and countering the scourge of 

narcotics trafficking and other illicit activity. In advocating for our 

835

interests, I will engage both the Ecuadorian Government and Ecuadorian civil society. 

We have shared commitments on which to build. Ecuador and 

the United States are both signatories to the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and so are bound to respect and protect fundamental democratic rights and institutions. 

Secretary Clinton, on the 10th anniversary of the charter, took 

note of its first article, saying, ‘‘The peoples of the Americas have 

a right to democracy, and our governments have an obligation to 

promote and defend it.’’

If confirmed, one of my core tasks will be to promote and defend 

the democratic freedoms the peoples of both the United States and 

Ecuador hold dear. 

Thank you for giving me the honor of appearing before you 

today, and I look forward to any questions you may have, and to 

working with you if confirmed. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Namm follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADAM E. NAMM

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you 

today as the President’s nominee for United States Ambassador to the Republic of 

Ecuador. I am grateful to President Obama and Secretary Clinton for the trust and 

confidence they have placed in me. 

I would like to recognize family members that have joined me today: My wife, Mei 

Huang; my daughter, Rebecca Namm; my mother, Susan Spencer; my step-mother, 

Joan Namm; and my sister-in-law, Wei Huang, all of whom are sources of great joy 

and support. On this day I am also thinking of my father, Arnold Namm, who left 

us last year but is still very much with me. 

During my 24-year Foreign Service career, I have been privileged to represent our 

Nation in a diverse group of countries—the Dominican Republic, Saudi Arabia, 

Colombia, and Pakistan—as well as serving in multiple positions in Washington. 

For the past 21⁄2 years, I have had the honor of leading the State Department’s 

Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations. During my tenure in that Bureau, we 

opened 16 new U.S. diplomatic facilities around the world, with another 33 facilities 

under design and construction. In 2008, I had the pleasure of cutting the ribbon on 

our New Embassy Compound in Quito, and I am pleased to report that the Department will open a New Consulate General Compound in Guayaquil in 2012. 

The United States ties with Ecuador date back to that country’s independence 

from Gran Colombia in 1830, and we sent our first envoy to Ecuador in 1848. The 

close links between our two countries are evident in the interchange of people: As 

many as 2 million Ecuadorians live in the United States, and Ecuador maintains 

consular offices in 17 U.S. cities. For Americans, Ecuador is a popular destination 

for tourism, an attractive place to retire, and a place of opportunity for commerce 

and study. More than 200,000 Americans visit Ecuador each year and some 25,000 

U.S. citizens reside in Ecuador. If confirmed, my top priority will be to ensure the 

well-being of U.S. citizens living in and visiting Ecuador. 

Another priority will be to promote U.S. business interests. The United States is 

Ecuador’s largest trading partner. In 2010, the United States supplied 25 percent 

of Ecuador’s imports, with a value of $5.4 billion, and was the destination for 35 

percent of Ecuador’s exports, valued at $7.5 billion. Our energy relationship is also 

vigorous; with the fourth-largest proven oil reserves in Latin America after Venezuela, Brazil, and Mexico, and as a consumer of U.S. petroleum products, Ecuador 

represents an important partner in this vital economic sector. 

As this committee knows, our relationship with Ecuador has been difficult in recent months, marked by Ecuador’s regrettable expulsion of our Ambassador. I believe, however, that this trying period has only underscored, for everyone, the importance of reinvigorating our countries’ bonds. By nominating a new Ambassador 

to Ecuador, the President and the Secretary are demonstrating their commitment 

that the United States and U.S. interests be represented at the highest level. If confirmed, I will be a forceful advocate for our interests and values, including democracy, trade, and countering the scourge of narcotics trafficking and other illicit activity. In advocating for our interests I will engage both the Ecuadorian Government 

and Ecuadorian civil society. 

836

We have shared commitments on which to build. Ecuador and the United States 

are signatories to the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and so are bound to respect and protect fundamental democratic rights and institutions. Secretary Clinton, 

on the 10th anniversary of the Charter, took note of its first article, saying, ‘‘The 

peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy, and our governments have an 

obligation to promote and defend it.’’ If confirmed, one of my core tasks will be to 

promote the democratic freedoms the peoples of both the United States and Ecuador 

hold dear. 

Thank you for giving me the honor of appearing before you today. I look forward 

to any questions you may have, and to working with you if confirmed.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Cousens. 

STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH M. COUSENS, OF WASHINGTON, TO 

BE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

ON THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL OF THE UNITED 

NATIONS, WITH THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR; AND, TO BE AN 

ALTERNATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF 

AMERICA TO THE SESSIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 

OF THE UNITED NATIONS, DURING HER TENURE OF SERVICE AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL OF THE 

UNITED NATIONS 

Ms. COUSENS. Thank you very much. 

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Rubio, thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before you today as President Obama’s nominee to be the United States Representative to the Economic and 

Social Council of the United Nations. I am honored by the confidence and support that President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and 

Ambassador Rice have shown in nominating me for this position. 

Let me briefly acknowledge and thank my family, my parents, 

Frank and Sandy, who unfortunately could not be here, but whose 

love and support I value every day; my husband, Bruce, who is 

here today; and our 2-year-old son, Wyatt, who you might have 

heard earlier this morning and has promised to be on his best 

behavior. 

Senator MENENDEZ. We’re family-friendly here, so it’s OK. 

[Laughter.] 

Ms. COUSENS. We are living in an era of global interconnection. 

The threats we face—nuclear proliferation, terrorism, organized 

crime, environmental degradation, infectious disease, to name just 

a few—cross borders and continents freely. But so, too, do our opportunities, from open markets and free trade, to the ability of citizens around the world to support each other’s struggle for dignity, 

freedom, and equality. 

U.S. leadership to strengthen and expand our tools for international cooperation will be essential to meeting these tests and 

promoting U.S. interests and values in the 21st century. And the 

United Nations is critical to that task. 

The United States gains from an effective U.N. When U.N. 

peacekeepers help stabilize conflict zones in Sudan, the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo, and Haiti, they do so at a fraction of what 

it would cost to send American troops, and they bolster our own security. When UNICEF vaccinates 40 percent of the world’s children, it contributes to the health of our own. 

837

When the World Food Programme, UNHCR, and other humanitarian agencies deliver life-saving assistance to the tens of millions 

ravaged by flood, famine, or displacement, they strengthen our 

common humanity. 

I have worked around the U.N. for most of my professional life. 

This has given me a concrete appreciation for the U.N.’s potential 

to advance critical U.S. priorities and values, as well as a practical 

insight into the U.N.’s strengths and its limitations. As I have seen 

firsthand throughout my career, the U.N. is far from perfect. Much 

more needs to be done to improve its efficiency, transparency, fiscal 

discipline, integrity, and impact. Key reforms spearheaded by this 

administration, especially in the areas of human resources, ethics, 

oversight, conduct, and discipline, and basic business practices, 

need to be advanced. And no reform agenda is complete without 

addressing the institution’s credibility gap, particularly with regard 

to the unfair and disproportionate targeting of Israel throughout 

the U.N. system. 

However, I’ve also seen firsthand remarkable displays of ingenuity, commitment, and courage from U.N. personnel in the service 

of values we all espouse: a peacekeeping battalion in Haiti that 

used sweat equity and spare parts to rebuild schools and roads for 

the community; a civil affairs officer in Bosnia who dreamed up the 

idea of ethnically neutral license plates to enable Bosnia’s fractured 

communities to move safely throughout the country without fear of 

reprisal; and the courage of U.N. personnel who go to work in conflict zones every day despite being targeted. 

I have been proud to serve as Ambassador Rice’s Principal Policy 

Adviser and Chief of Staff in New York for the past 3 years, during 

which U.S. leadership at the United Nations has produced significant, tangible victories for the United States; winning important 

votes condemning the human rights records of Iran, Burma, and 

North Korea by the largest margin ever in the General Assembly; 

securing Israel’s inclusion in key consultative groups in New York 

and Geneva; gaining new access to audits from U.N. development 

agencies; and leading the establishment of U.N. Women and creation of an office to combat sexual violence in situations of armed 

conflict. 

If confirmed, I will seek to build on these and other achievements 

as U.S. Representative to ECOSOC. Drawing on my own U.N. 

experience, I will work to ensure that U.N. humanitarian agencies 

deliver for those at greatest risk, such as in the Horn of Africa 

where famine threatens millions and the United States has provided generous life-saving assistance, much of it through U.N. partners. I will work with the leadership of U.N. agencies, funds and 

programs, and member states to press for concrete development results, from reducing child mortality and combating extreme poverty 

to supporting women entrepreneurs. I will continue to fight for the 

victims of human rights abuse, including through clear and strong 

condemnation of violators. And I will work to strengthen the contribution of U.N. agencies to countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, 

South Sudan, and Cote d’Ivoire, as they rebuild after war and 

claim a brighter future for their people. 

838

And I will work closely with my colleagues leading the administration’s reform agenda to advance comprehensive and meaningful 

reform at the U.N. 

The United Nations has an indispensable role in promoting U.S. 

priorities for which U.S. leadership is essential. If confirmed, it 

would be an honor and a privilege to serve my country in this new 

capacity, to join my colleagues in working to extend U.S. leadership 

at and through the United Nations. 

And I would look forward to working with the Congress, and this 

committee specifically, to advance our shared priorities. 

Thank you very much, and I look forward to answering your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Cousens follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH M. COUSENS

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Rubio, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today as President 

Obama’s nominee to be the United States Representative to the Economic and 

Social Council of the United Nations. I am honored by the confidence and support 

that President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and Ambassador Rice have shown in 

nominating me for this position. 

Let me also acknowledge and thank my family, my parents Frank and Sandy who 

unfortunately could not be here but whose love and support I value every day, my 

husband Bruce, who is here today, and our 2-year-old son, Wyatt, who has promised 

to be on his best behavior. 

We are living in an era of global interconnection. The threats we face—nuclear 

proliferation, terrorism and organized crime, environmental degradation, and infectious disease, to name just a few—cross borders and continents freely. But so too 

do our opportunities, from open markets and free trade to the ability of citizens 

around the world to support each other’s struggle for dignity, freedom, and equality. 

U.S. leadership to strengthen and expand our tools for international cooperation will 

be essential to meeting these tests and promoting U.S. interests and values in the 

21st century. The United Nations is critical to that task. 

The United States gains from an effective U.N. When U.N. peacekeepers help stabilize conflict zones in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Haiti, they 

do so at a fraction of what it would cost to send American troops and bolster our 

own security. When UNICEF vaccinates 40 percent of the world’s children, it contributes to the health of our own. When the World Food Programme, UNHCR, and 

other humanitarian agencies deliver life-saving assistance to the tens of millions 

ravaged by famine, flood, or displacement, they strengthen our common humanity. 

I have worked around the U.N. for most of my professional life. This has given 

me a concrete appreciation of the U.N.’s potential to advance critical U.S. priorities 

and values as well as practical insight into the U.N.’s strengths and limitations. 

As I have seen firsthand throughout my career, the U.N. is far from perfect. Much 

more needs to be done to improve its efficiency, transparency, fiscal discipline, integrity, and impact. Key reforms spearheaded by this administration, especially in the 

areas of human resources, ethics, oversight, conduct and discipline, and basic business practices need to be advanced. And no reform agenda is complete without addressing the institution’s credibility gap, particularly with regard to the unfair and 

disproportionate targeting of Israel throughout the U.N. system. 

However, I have also seen firsthand remarkable displays of ingenuity, commitment, and courage from U.N. personnel in the service of values we all espouse—

a peacekeeping battalion in Haiti that used sweat equity and spare parts to rebuild 

schools and roads for the community, a New Zealand civil affairs officer in Bosnia 

who dreamed up the idea of ethnically neutral license plates to enable Bosnia’s fractured communities to move safely throughout the country without fear of reprisal, 

an inventive Nepalese interpreter who created a computer program to improve management systems, and the courage of U.N. personnel who go to work in conflict 

zones every day despite being targeted. 

I have been proud to serve as Ambassador Rice’s Principal Policy Advisor and 

Chief of Staff in New York for the past 3 years during which U.S. leadership at the 

United Nations has produced significant tangible victories for the United States: 

winning important votes condemning the human rights records of Iran, North 

Korea, and Burma by the largest margin ever in the General Assembly; securing 

839

Israel’s inclusion in key consultative groups in New York and Geneva; gaining new 

access to audits from U.N. development agencies; and leading the establishment of 

U.N. Women and creation of an office to combat sexual violence in situations of 

armed conflict. 

If confirmed, I will seek to build on these and other achievements as U.S. Representative to ECOSOC. Drawing on my own U.N. experience, I will work to ensure 

that U.N. humanitarian agencies deliver for those at greatest risk, such as in the 

Horn of Africa where famine threatens millions and the United States has provided 

over $600 million in life-saving assistance, much of it through U.N. partners. I will 

work with the leadership of U.N. agencies, funds, and programs and member states 

to press for concrete development results, from reducing child mortality and combating extreme poverty to supporting women entrepreneurs. I will continue to fight 

for the victims of human rights abuse, including through clear and strong condemnation of violators. I will work to strengthen the contribution of U.N. agencies 

to countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, South Sudan, and Cote d’Ivoire as they rebuild 

after war and claim a brighter future for their people. And I will work closely with 

colleagues leading the administration’s reform agenda to advance comprehensive 

and meaningful reform at the U.N. 

The United Nations has an indispensible role in promoting U.S. priorities for 

which U.S. leadership is essential. If confirmed, it would be an honor and a privilege 

to serve my country in this new capacity, and join my colleagues in working to extend U.S. leadership at and through the United Nations. I would look forward to 

working with the Congress, and this committee specifically, to advance our shared 

priorities. 

Thank you. I look forward to answering your questions.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. 

Thank you all, for your service and your testimony. We welcome 

your families and friends. 

And certainly, we want to acknowledge President Cristiani who 

is with us. Thank you very much for joining us. 

Let me start with you, Ambassador Aponte. I personally think 

you’ve done an extraordinary job in El Salvador. I want to ask you 

about something that we learned yesterday, that El Salvador’s 

Public Security Minister, Manuel Melgar, who the United States 

believes was involved in the murder of four U.S. Marines in June 

1985, resigned. This is something that I think we would applaud. 

What effect will his resignation have on our bilateral cooperation 

now on security issues? 

Ambassador APONTE. Senator, thank you very much for the

question. 

Definitely, I think it would strengthen and it would make much 

smoother the working relationship between the security elements 

of the two countries. 

While any ministerial changes are an internal matter for El Salvador, this change really demonstrates the commitment from this 

government to transformational change in the areas of security and 

economic growth. It has been stated in the negotiations that have 

been undergoing with the United States in the Partnership for 

Growth. And this relationship should now take off, and we should 

do very well. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me ask you, in September, President 

Obama included El Salvador in a list of countries designated as 

major drug-producing or drug-transit countries. This is the first 

time that El Salvador has been so designated. 

How would you assess the current level of bilateral antidrug 

coordination and cooperation, and the adequacy of a U.S. program 

in El Salvador? 

Ambassador APONTE. The coordination is very good. The law

enforcement community and the mission work very well with law 

840

enforcement in El Salvador, especially at the level of narcotrafficking. There is a vetted unit within the police that we work 

very closely with in pursuing narcotraffickers. And we have had 

very, very good success. 

The location of El Salvador makes it a corridor for transit. All 

the narcotrafficking comes from south into the north, so their geographical location does not help. However, their cooperation has 

been very good. 

Senator MENENDEZ. One last question. 

I had the opportunity to meet with the First Lady and the Secretary of Social Inclusion, Dr. Pignato, last week. She came to talk 

about the flooding consequences in El Salvador. 

What are the implications of the damage for the Salvadoran 

economy and the displacement of people? Can you give me a sense 

of the consequences? 

Ambassador APONTE. Senator, I want to preface this by saying 

that the Government of El Salvador did a very good job in damage 

mitigation during the tropical depression, which lasted 10 days. 

And they minimized, fortunately, loss of life. 

However, the damage to the roads and the infrastructure is significant. It is important. The government has estimated hundreds 

of millions of dollars in damages. 

I think the assessment is still ongoing, but I think they will suffer losses, especially in crops, with the loss of most of their bean 

crop and their corn crop. And those assessments are still ongoing, 

but they are——

Senator MENENDEZ. We look forward hearing from you as it gets 

finalized, as to what our assistance might be. 

Mr. Namm, you and I had a chance to talk a little bit. You have 

served in a distinguished capacity in your time in the Foreign Service. You haven’t had a senior political position in the hemisphere. 

And I’m wondering, this particular assignment, the expulsion of 

Ambassador Hodges, when her honest assessment of corruption in 

Ecuador was made public through Wikileaks, it caused her expulsion. We haven’t had an ambassador since. You’d be the person to 

go there, in the light of that set of circumstances. 

Do you feel prepared to enter this highly political atmosphere? 

And, two, do you feel constrained in commenting on the government’s actions or in defending civil society in the media, in the 

light of her expulsion and the consequences present in the environment you’ll be entering? 

Mr. NAMM. If I could, Mr. Chairman, let me take the second part 

first. 

I will feel, if confirmed, absolutely no constraint about speaking 

out for U.S. interests and U.S. values. The President and the Secretary seek to send a new Ambassador to Ecuador precisely to elevate U.S. engagement to the highest diplomatic level in Ecuador. 

Let me also say that I will absolutely not shy away from criticizing the Government of Ecuador, when warranted, simply 

because our last Ambassador, Ambassador Hodges, was expelled. 

And more than that, I would, if confirmed, reach out and dialogue not only with the government, but with civil society, with 

human rights groups, with the full range of actors in Ecuador. And 

841

I would absolutely speak with a full-throated voice and represent 

U.S. interests and U.S. values. 

As to the question about my qualifications, the President and the 

Secretary believe I am qualified for this job. During the last 21⁄2

years, I’ve run an organization with 1,200 employees with an annual budget in excess of $2 billion, with many challenges, both internal to the State Department bureaucratic challenges, but also 

policy issues outside of the State Department dealing, for example, 

with private contractors, dealing in some cases with foreign governments. 

As you know, I have experience in the region, two tours in Latin 

America, two tours working in Washington on Western Hemisphere 

issues. I speak excellent Spanish, and have a real passion for Latin 

America, having sent my daughter, Rebecca, who is sitting behind 

me, to a bilingual Spanish elementary school, which she attended 

for 6 years. So this is an area where I do have passion. 

I feel that the experience I’ve gained through my career and 

especially the last 21⁄2 years running an organization the size of the 

Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, with all of the issues 

there, has given me excellent preparation for an assignment as 

Ambassador. 

Senator MENENDEZ. OK. 

We’ll talk to Rebecca later and check her Spanish. [Laughter.] 

Just kidding. [Laughter.] 

But if she wants to, it’s OK. 

Let me ask you, Ms. Cousens, you are not only going to be the 

ECOSOC Representative, but you’re also going to be an Alternative 

Representative to the General Assembly. In that regard, I would 

expect that you would be cooperating with Ambassador Rice in that 

portfolio with respect to the Palestinians’ efforts to obtain membership in the U.N. and its affiliated bodies. 

One, can you verbalize for me what we are telling our fellow 

members of the U.N. about that? 

And second, I saw on ECOSOC that several countries that are 

nondemocratic, including Cuba, have been elected. And I am concerned about accreditation of legitimate NGOs being stopped by 

such entities. 

Can you talk to me about those two issues, please? 

Ms. COUSENS. Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I’m 

happy to. 

The Palestinian issue is not presently among my responsibilities, 

but, if confirmed, it certainly would be. I would join my colleagues 

in working very actively on this issue. 

The administration’s position has been extremely clear on this 

issue from the time this situation started. There is absolutely no 

shortcut to a Palestinian state. The only path to a Palestinian state 

is through direct negotiations between the parties to resolve all 

permanent status issues. 

Any action that is taken in New York or Paris or anywhere else 

is a distraction and undermines the prospects for peace, and the 

administration has been extremely clear on that point. 

We’ve also taken immediate and swift action to adhere to the legislation following the vote in UNESCO and ceased all funding to 

UNESCO as a result of that vote. 

842

Senator MENENDEZ. Can you talk to me about the NGO issue 

that you——

Ms. COUSENS. On the NGO committee that you referenced, the 

administration has been, in fact, extremely effective in recent years 

in working to get democratic and diverse NGOs accreditation to the 

U.N. 

The NGO committee is one of the principal venues in which we 

advance our interests and values, and fight very aggressively, 

working with as many partners as we can, to try to see a wide and 

diverse range of NGOs get access to U.N. debates and proceedings. 

In just the last year, we managed successfully to overturn a decision to bar three NGOs that we felt deserved access to the U.N., 

and actually won their accreditation through ECOSOC and saw 

that as a real victory. 

There was a democracy promotion NGO; one that dealt with Syrian human rights issues; and one that dealt with lesbian, gay, 

bisexual and transgender issues. That was seen, and I think widely 

understood, to be a significant victory for both the United States 

and countries who joined us in seeing that happen. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you very much. 

Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, I’m going 

to allow Senator DeMint to go, because he needs to get to a meeting, if that’s OK. 

Senator DEMINT. Thank you, Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

I do want to thank all the witnesses for being here today, all the 

nominees. But I’m going to focus all of my comments on the nomination of Ms. Mari Carmen Aponte. 

Last year, every Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee voted against moving this nomination forward. The 

White House continually denied reasonable requests from Senators 

on this side of the aisle for access to information, forcing Senators 

to consider a nomination without a clear picture of the nominee’s 

background. 

Rather than resolve the issue, President Obama gave Ms. Aponte 

a recess appointment to circumvent the Senate confirmation 

process. 

After being forced to withdraw her first nomination under President Clinton and failing to be confirmed last year for a second nomination, Ms. Aponte is now before this committee a third time. 

The White House again declined to provide information to 

Senators. 

I appreciate Senators Menendez and Kerry’s efforts to allow me 

to be briefed on the background summary. However, the summary 

that I reviewed generated more questions than answers, and it did 

not address the fundamental questions that have arisen from these 

hearings. 

I appreciate that the White House has committed to get back to 

me with some additional answers, but the fact that they could not 

answer my questions is disturbing. Instead, what we have seen are 

a series of red flags. 

843

I would like to ask unanimous consent to submit for the record 

an opinion piece published in El Salvador by Ambassador Aponte 

in June of this year. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Without objection. 

[The op-ed article referred to follows:]

Senator DEMINT. In her op-ed, Ms. Aponte, presuming to represent the views of all Americans and strongly promoting the 

homosexual lifestyle, wrote that everyone has a responsibility to 

inform our neighbors and friends about what it means to be lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender. 


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844

The op-ed upset a large number of community and pro-family 

groups in El Salvador, who were insulted by Ms. Aponte’s attempt 

to impose a pro-gay agenda in their country. 

I would also like to ask unanimous consent to submit for the 

record a response to the op-ed from a coalition of more than three 

dozen groups and a letter from Salvadoran groups to the United 

States Senate, asking the Senate to oppose Ms. Aponte’s confirmation, and I quote, ‘‘We respectfully request that Ms. Aponte be removed from post as soon as possible, so that El Salvador may enjoy 

the benefits of having a better person as a government representative of your noble country.’’

Senator MENENDEZ. Without objection. 

[The letters referred to follow:]

845


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846

Senator DEMINT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to apologize to the Salvadoran people on behalf of 

the United States and reassure them that most Americans share 

their values. 

Ms. Aponte’s personal, professional, and political contact over 

many years raises numerous questions of judgment. 

I will vote no on Ms. Aponte’s confirmation and strongly recommend my colleagues do the same. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I’ll just ask one question of Ms. Cousens, if 

I might. 

Ms. Cousens, when you were, I think, making a presentation 

about climate change to the General Assembly, you said that the 

outcome should also substantially scale up financial assistance to 


aponte3.eps
847

developing countries and promote technological development and 

dissemination. 

It seems reasonable, except for given our fiscal realities that our 

own country is facing, including high unemployment and record 

Federal deficits, do you believe that substantially scaling up financial assistance to other countries for climate change is still the 

appropriate policy to advocate? 

Ms. COUSENS. Thank you very much, Senator DeMint. 

I appreciate the question and it obviously raises a very complex 

series of issues that are at stake in international climate change 

negotiations and on the broader climate change agenda. 

Although I did deliver that statement, in fact, climate change is 

not one of the issues that I work on presently in detail, but it 

would obviously fall, to the extent that it arises in New York, 

under my portfolio if I were confirmed. 

The question of financial assistance to assist countries in meeting either mitigation targets or some of the adaptation challenges 

that they face, particularly the poorest countries in the world, is 

one that is part of the ongoing agenda of climate discussions and 

among the ongoing issues that the administration addresses in the 

context of those discussions. 

The results of the last Conference of Parties in Cancun was seen 

to be a significant achievement in taking a more balanced approach 

to the overall issue of climate change, which included this issue 

and efforts to start to address it, and also a more balanced 

approach to commitments from a full spectrum of countries to take 

action that historically they have not always been willing to do. 

This is an issue that I would be happy to work on closely and 

consult closely with you going forward, if I were confirmed. I’d seek 

to have a very open line of communication on it going forward. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. 

Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

I have a similar question for all three of the nominees, and it

involves trafficking in persons. I’ll start in El Salvador with Ms. 

Aponte. 

As you know, El Salvador is a tier-two country, which means it’s 

a source, destination, and transit country for human trafficking. 

It’s taken many antitrafficking measures, but it’s struggling to 

address a lot of the complicated aspects of it, in particular the

involvement of MS–13 in those efforts and others. 

I want to focus on two things. One is the strategies that we 

would pursue with them in terms of helping them, because I think 

they want to get it right. And in particular, I’ve identified a subproblem that—it involves their penal code. 

In those countries, they have the laws, and we praise them, but, 

for example, serious offenses like rape carry up to 20 years’ punishment, whereas human trafficking only has penalties of 4 to 8 years. 

So have we had any conversations or—obviously, as you’ve outlined, your ability to communicate with the government there as 

measured by how the mission has become kind of a place where 

they all meet. And obviously, President Cristiani being here today 

shows the kind of broad range of people you’ve been able to talk 

to. 

848

What efforts do we have, what thoughts do we have, about helping them confront the human trafficking problem that they face? 

Ambassador APONTE. Senator, thank you very much for the

question. 

Partnership for Growth, which is a new initiative that we have 

implemented and signed as recently as last week, is a massive 

transformation effort working in partnership with the Salvadoran 

Government to transform the problems of security and to address 

the issue of economic growth in a very different way. 

Over the last 6 months, we have negotiated 20 lines of actions, 

and 14 of them are in the area of security. Among those areas, we 

are taking a look at their penal code, their courts, and at issues 

of transparency. So we’re going to be working with them in addressing issues such as these to see how we can partner with them 

and help them be more efficient in addressing their own priorities. 

Senator RUBIO. Mr. Namm, the issue in Ecuador is a little bit 

different. They’re also a tier-two watchlist country, particularly the 

focus there is on sex trafficking of girls. It’s become a major issue 

in Ecuador. But all forms of trafficking, including sex trafficking of 

boys and adults and forced labor, all these are increasingly rampant in Ecuador. 

So the general question is, What thoughts do you have or bring 

to the job in terms of making that a priority of our engagement 

there, a national priority in terms of our policy and our diplomatic 

mission? 

And in particular, something that’s concerning, the TIP report, 

and State Department explicitly states that Ecuador needs to improve its prosecutions and convictions of traffickers, but particularly public officials who are complicit in trafficking crimes. 

We have had trafficking victims testify that the police in Ecuador 

inform brothel owners of impending raids and in some cases engage 

in sexual exploitation of the victims. 

And so, two things I’d like to get from you today. No. 1 is a clear 

understanding of whether this is going to be a priority for us there. 

And second, whether given our history with the country and the 

expulsion and so forth, whether that would be an impediment to 

us if evidence is available and present of calling out the fact that 

there are governmental institutions like the police who are either 

protecting brothel owners or in fact participating in them themselves. 

Mr. NAMM. Well, thank you, Senator. I appreciate the question, 

and I very much appreciate the issue. 

Human trafficking is not only a nasty business, it also has the 

potential to affect our national security. And if confirmed, combating human trafficking would be one of my top priorities in 

Ecuador. 

Ecuador, you are correct, isn’t enforcing the laws that it has on 

the books. My understanding is that there are laws that are good 

laws, but they are not being enforced. 

I am pleased to say that Ecuador last year set up a special police 

unit to combat human trafficking and that special police unit has 

made some gains. There have been a number of arrests in human 

trafficking. 

849

However, on the prosecutorial side, Ecuador has not done 

enough. And if confirmed, I would work with the Ecuadorian Government, and I will also work with civil society, to raise the pressure so that more of these human trafficking cases are prosecuted 

and prosecuted successfully. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

And finally, Ms. Cousens, I would say that as we read through 

the background of the jurisdiction, so to speak, of the Economic and 

Social Council, it’s pretty broad. But in particular, it focuses on 

promoting respect for human rights, but also the social, cultural, 

educational, health and related matters of the nations. 

Clearly, human trafficking preys on two things. And the first 

thing it preys upon or the first thing it relies upon is kind of an 

environment where people are vulnerable, where, in essence, life is 

bad, and they’re looking to be taken somewhere else with the promise of a better life. And so some of it is just a real lack of information at the victim level of what’s happening. 

And the second thing that it involves, tragically in many places, 

is a government or governmental institutions that are cooperative, 

that basically look the other way, participate in a criminal enterprise, tolerate it within their borders. 

And I guess my question in general is, is this an issue that we 

have raised in the past or look forward to raising in the future? 

Not just in the General Assembly, but as part of our human rights 

agenda, that we continue to raise what an important issue this is, 

and offer our hand and our assistance in terms of helping countries 

that want to deal with this, and at the same time being very clear 

the United States is going to be a clear voice condemning this practice and calling out those nations and those governments that tolerate this or, worse, actually participate in this. 

Ms. COUSENS. Thank you very much for the question, Senator. 

As my colleagues have just noted, human trafficking is a grotesque practice and something against which the administration, 

and the United States for many years, has been a leader in speaking out and trying to identify ways to stop human trafficking in all 

its forms. 

This is an issue that would be in my portfolio, if I were confirmed in this position, and I would welcome the opportunity to 

make it a priority and to speak out loudly and clearly. 

There are some new mechanisms in the U.N. system that give 

us an opportunity to be even more forceful as an advocate on these 

issues, including the creation of an important new body to deal 

with women’s rights around the world. They can be an important 

new partner for us in this. 

But I would very much welcome the opportunity to make this 

issue one of my priorities going forward. 

Senator RUBIO. Just as a side note, and much time has expired, 

and I know that others are waiting. 

Just briefly, I would ask you that, in the process of doing this, 

you’ll encounter—obviously, the United States has this problem as 

well, and there are issues in our policies, be it our immigration 

policies or law enforcement policies, that may be contributing 

unwittingly to some of this. 

850

And so as you encounter this issue on the global stage, I would 

also encourage you to bring back to us any suggestions that you 

may have as to how, you know, how some of our policies may in 

an unintended way be contributing to this problem. We’ve heard 

testimony about that in the last few weeks, about kind of how 

workers fall prey to some of these foreign worker agencies that go 

out and recruit workers to come in to the United States. Obviously, 

these are groups that are participating overseas and recruiting people to come here under false pretenses. 

So any suggestions that you would have from your post as to 

what we can do internally would be welcome, because what gives 

us credibility on this issue is the fact that we are addressing it in 

an open and frank way, that we recognize any shortcomings we 

may have on this end of the equation. And if we address those in 

an open and frank way, it gives us more credibility to urge and ask 

others to address it as well. 

So I encourage you to bring that back as well. 

Ms. COUSENS. Thank you. I welcome the opportunity to do so. 

Thank you. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Aponte, when is your term up, the interim appointment—the 

appointment that the President made while we were in recess? 

When does that expire? 

Ambassador APONTE. It expires at the conclusion of this congressional session. 

Senator RISCH. So that’s this year, on December 31? 

Ambassador APONTE. Yes. 

Senator RISCH. OK. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Namm, you undoubtedly are aware of the important role 

that Ecuador plays as a stepping stone for narcotics into the 

United States, and also that we have gotten, I would say, less than 

full cooperation from the government, particularly where they have 

refused to renew a lease that we needed to operate the counternarcotics efforts from that country. 

What are your thoughts in that regard? What are your plans, as 

far as attempting to address that? 

Mr. NAMM. Senator, thank you for the question. 

Narcotics trafficking, along with human trafficking, would be one 

of my highest priorities. 

About 30 percent of the cocaine produced in Colombia, Peru, and 

Bolivia transits Ecuador, so it is a very large problem, the transit 

of narcotics in Ecuador. 

The United States has good cooperation with Ecuador. The Ecuadorian authorities, both the police and the military, are good partners of the United States. 

Seizures, for example, of cocaine are up in 2011 over 2010. There 

have been some other successes. 

You mentioned the closure of our Forward Operating Location in 

Manta, Ecuador. The Ecuadorians did not renew the lease, the 10-

year lease that we had on that Forward Operating Location, which, 

frankly, was a disappointment to the United States. However, as 

a sovereign country, Ecuador had the right not to renew that lease. 

851

Although we no longer have the Forward Operating Location in 

Manta, we go forward with the programs that we have, including 

some assistance to the Ecuadorian Government in this regard. 

There are now also vetted units again in Ecuador. 

So, through these mechanisms of cooperation, we will work 

together. And if confirmed, I will work with the Government of

Ecuador to increase our effectiveness in the fight against narcotic 

trafficking. 

Senator RISCH. Well, I appreciate that. 

I guess I’m not quite as dismissive or understanding as you are 

about canceling that lease. I mean, the simple answer that while 

they’re a sovereign nation, they have the right to do that, they certainly do. Having said that, it demonstrates a less than enthusiastic support of our efforts to try to reduce the—I think they say 

about 220 metric tons of cocaine are going to the country, and 

about 60 percent of it headed for the United States. That is a tremendous amount of drugs that are trafficking through there. 

And when you have a country that size, it would seem to me that 

it would be a really appropriate place to try to net this down. And 

their refusal to cooperate with us, if you would, to me is more serious than simply an exercise of their sovereign rights. 

So I hope you’ll carry the message that at least some of us up 

here are substantially more aggravated than just disappointed in 

what they’ve done. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Risch. 

Let me return to Ambassador Aponte. 

First of all, I want to make a statement for the record. 

In March 2010, I chaired your first nomination hearing before 

this committee. I want to reiterate what I said then today, for the 

record, that I’m convinced that issues raised by some of my colleagues about matters in your personal history are a nonissue. 

I went to the extraordinary measure—there has been a historical 

pattern in which only one Democrat and one Republican get to 

review the file of any nominee. I forewent my own right to do so 

based upon a previous review, so that my colleague could have that 

opportunity. 

I read that, and as a Member of the United States Congress for 

nearly 20 years now, I take a backseat to no one in terms of my 

advocacy on the question of promoting human rights and democracy in Cuba, and certainly in my concerns of the Castro regime’s 

effort to proselytize and infiltrate the United States Government. 

And if I thought there was a scintilla of an issue there, I’d be 

the first to oppose your nomination. 

And the reality is that there is not. So, I’ll stake my 20-year history of fighting on this issue on that reality. 

Second, while I respect every colleague’s view of any given work, 

I had an opportunity to review the opinion piece you wrote which 

has been submitted to the record, and it has various elements to 

it. 

No. 1, it quotes President Obama who declared June 2011 as the 

month of gay pride. Two, it quotes the Secretary of State, who talks 

about gay rights as human rights. And, three, most importantly, it 

talks about the Human Rights Council of the United Nations, the 

852

United States, and El Salvador, who with 83 other countries signed 

a declaration for the elimination of violence against the LGBT community, and particularly talks about President Funes’ signing of 

Decree 56, which prohibits all forms of discrimination by the 

Government of El Salvador on the grounds of sexual orientation or 

identity. 

It seems to me a description of the views of the Government of 

the United States, at least in the executive branch, and the 

Government of El Salvador, as well as that of the Human Rights 

Council of the United Nations. But I would be remiss at this point 

in the record if I didn’t give you an opportunity to make any statement that you want to respond to that statement. 

Ambassador APONTE. Thank you very much, Senator Menendez, 

for the opportunity. 

Precisely, I just wanted to underline that this op-ed piece just 

mirrored the policy of the Obama administration and the Salvadoran Government, as well as that of 63 other countries. 

It was not meant to insult anyone. It was calling for the end of 

prejudice wherever it existed. And I thought this is a very American value, and that’s why I decided to do the op-ed. 

I have done other op-eds during the course of my year there, one, 

for example, when President Obama visited the country. So this 

was not unusual that I would write an op-ed. 

I also would like, if I may, to address the issue of my withdrawal 

from a previous nomination. In 1987, I was honored to have been 

nominated by the Clinton administration to serve as Ambassador 

to the Dominican Republic. I was thoroughly vetted and I received 

the top-secret security clearance at that time. 

However, my nomination got stalled. When it became clear that 

my record was going to be distorted to embarrass the administration, I voluntarily withdrew. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. 

Ambassador APONTE. Thank you. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I ask unanimous consent that a letter from 

the president and CEO of the National Council of La Raza in support of the nomination of Mari Carmen Aponte be included in the 

record. 

Without objection so ordered. 

[The letter referred to follows:]

853

Senator MENENDEZ. Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Just briefly, just for the record, I have also reviewed that file, 

Mr. Chairman, and I have nothing to add to what you’ve already 

said. 

The second thing I would ask, because it might just help in 

terms of—some people in the audience or even watching may 

wonder what we’re all talking about, so let me just—I think this 


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854

might help. And it may sound weird to people, I’m asking you this 

when you’re going to El Salvador, but let’s just do this. 

What are your views of the role Cuba plays in the hemisphere 

and the Cuban Government plays in the hemisphere? What are 

your views of the Cuban Government, its nature, and the role that 

it plays in the hemisphere? 

Ambassador APONTE. I think the Cuban Government is a totalitarian government. I think that it has sought to influence other 

governments in the hemisphere to follow suit. 

The Government of El Salvador has certainly not done that, even 

though some elements of the FMLN in power have sought to 

radicalize the President and some people in his Cabinet. 

We have worked very hard to make sure that we exert influence 

in support of democracy and stability in El Salvador. 

I have publicly called for President Funes to have a conversation 

with Castro on the issue of the type of democracy that elected him 

and brought him into power. 

Senator RUBIO. And just as a followup, in the interest of fairness, 

and I don’t want to get into a lot of detail. I just don’t want to 

make it more uncomfortable and more difficult for anyone. 

Earlier this year, Ambassador Aponte was helpful in our efforts 

to assist someone who was within El Salvador who had escaped the 

Cuban regime, and the Cuban regime was trying to get them back 

and was advocating to the Government of El Salvador that this 

individual be returned to Cuba. And the Embassy, under her 

watch, and her in particular, were very helpful in ensuring that 

that gentleman reached freedom. So I want to put that on the 

record, because I want to be fair. 

The last thing I need to ask you was about the op-ed, just kind 

of elaborate a little bit more as to why you felt it was necessary 

to write that. Why did you feel—it is not—maybe it’s usual. I 

haven’t seen that in other posts. But why did you feel it was necessary to write that, to make that something associated with our 

diplomatic mission in El Salvador? 

Ambassador APONTE. As part of the messages that are conveyed 

in the region, there are certain messages on certain issues that ambassadors write about; for example, citizen security and human 

rights. That’s how it came about, the human rights op-ed. I wrote 

about the human rights. 

Senator RUBIO. Is there anything in Salvadoran society, for example, that prompted you to do that? Was this an issue that was 

going on within El Salvador? Was this an issue that was being 

debated publicly? Was it a controversial issue before you wrote it 

or——

Ambassador APONTE. It became a controversial issue after I 

wrote it. It provoked public debate and——

Senator RUBIO. And here’s what I’m trying to get at. I’m just trying to deduce your judgment as to why you felt it was necessary 

to write an op-ed about that, as opposed to write an op-ed about 

some other issues. You could write about human trafficking, 

too——

Ambassador APONTE. It was human rights, and I felt strongly 

about human rights. 

Senator RUBIO. OK. 

855

Ambassador APONTE. And it was human rights month. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Ambassador APONTE. Thank you. 

Senator MENENDEZ. You wrote this in June 2011. The President 

proclaimed in June 2011 the recognition of the rights of individuals 

of people who are gay and lesbian. So did that instigate you to follow suit? 

Ambassador APONTE. Yes, that and Secretary Clinton’s proclamation as well. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And the fact that President Funes signed 

Decree 56, which prohibited all forms of discrimination by the Government of El Salvador on the grounds of sexual orientation or 

identity, was that a motivating factor for you as well? 

Ambassador APONTE. Absolutely, it was. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. 

Ambassador APONTE. Thank you. 

Senator MENENDEZ. If there are no other questions from members of the committee, we thank all of the nominees. If there is a 

question that comes for the record for any of you, we ask you to 

answer it expeditiously, so your nominations could be considered. 

And with that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF ROBERTA S. JACOBSON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATORS JOHN F. KERRY AND RICHARD G. LUGAR

Your response to Question A.8 of the committee questionnaire indicates that since 

2007, you have held the following positions in the Department of State:

2007–2010 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere 

Affairs 

2010-present Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Western 

Hemisphere Affairs

In your ethics undertakings letter, you commit that you and your spouse will divest of your interests in the following entities within 90 days of your confirmation 

to the position to which you have been nominated:

Cenovus Energy, Inc. 

Ecopetrol, S.A. 

ARC 

Calfrac Wells Services Ltd. 

Crescent Point Energy Corp. 

Franco Nevada Corp. 

Spectra Energy Corp. 

Sociedad Quimica Minera de Chile S.A.

Please respond to the following questions with respect to your interests in these 

entities:

Question #1. Please indicate the date on which you and/or your spouse first 

acquired an interest in each entity.

Answer. Cenovus Energy, Inc.—4/30/11, $29,218. Ecopetrol, S.A.—1/19/10, $9,133; 

3/19/10, $1,481. ARC—8/28/09, $5,615; 9/28/09, $2,082. Calfrac Wells Services Ltd.—

1/19/10, $8,618; Sold in full on 1/12/11 and 5/16/11. Crescent Point Energy Corp.—

12/04/09, $1,843. Franco Nevada Corp.—9/08/09, $5,635; 11/4/09, $2,168. Spectra 

Energy Corp.—1/19/10, $9,133; 3/19/10, $1,481. Sociedad Quimica Minera de Chile 

S.A.—11/17/08, $6,320.

Question #2. Please indicate the dates and amounts of any purchases or sales you 

and/or your spouse made of shares in any of these entities between 2007 and the 

present. You may omit transactions involving the reinvestment of dividends.

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Answer. Cenovus Energy, Inc.—Purchased: 4/30/11, $29,218. Ecopetrol, S.A.—Purchased: 1/19/10, $9,133; Purchased: 3/19/10, $1,481. ARC—Purchased: 8/28/09, 

$5,615; Purchased: 9/28/09, $2,082. Calfrac Wells Services Ltd.—Purchased: 1/19/10, 

$8,618; Sold in full on 1/12/11 and 5/16/11. Crescent Point Energy Corp.—Purchased: 12/04/09, $1,843. Franco Nevada Corp.—Purchased: 9/08/09, $5,635; Purchased: 11/4/09, $2,168. Spectra Energy Corp.—Purchased: 1/19/10, $9,133; Purchased: 3/19/10, $1,481. Sociedad Quimica Minera de Chile S.A.—Purchased: 11/17/

08, $6,320.

Question #3. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 208(a), a federal employee is generally prohibited from participating personally and substantially in an official capacity in any 

particular matter in which, to his knowledge, he or any person whose interests are 

imputed to him under this statute has a financial interest, if the particular matter 

will have a direct and predictable effect on that interest. 

Please describe the steps you have taken to ensure your compliance with 18 

U.S.C. 208(a) with respect to the relationship between your and your spouse’s interests in these entities and the performance of your official duties.

Answer. I am very aware of my outside financial interests, including those imputed to me, and am diligent in recusing myself from working on any particular 

matter in my official work having an effect on those entities. 

In reviewing my calendar and upcoming travel, I pay close attention to the private parties involved in any particular meeting or event to avoid any actual or appearance of a conflict. In cases where a meeting or event could create an actual or 

appearance of a conflict, I have recused myself. 

While this system has worked well to date, given the greater responsibilities of 

the Assistant Secretary position, within 90 days of confirmation, I will divest my 

financial interest in the above list of companies. I will also continue to be diligent 

about my remaining financial interests and will recuse myself as appropriate from 

any matter at work. My executive assistant also helps me screen my activities for 

conflicts purposes.

Question #4. Please indicate whether you have participated in any particular matter affecting your interests in any of these entities during the time you have been 

an official of the Department of State. Please describe any such matters in which 

you have participated, and the basis on which your participation was consistent 

with relevant federal ethics law and regulations.

Answer. As indicated above I have recused myself from participating in any matter at work affecting my personal financial interests.

Question #5. Please indicate whether you consulted with relevant federal ethics 

officials before your initial decisions to invest in these entities for advice on whether 

these investments could create a conflict of interest with the performance of your 

official duties. Please describe any guidance you received in any such consultations.

Answer. While I did not consult with ethics officials before investing in these entities, I have been actively aware of the legal requirement to recuse myself from participating in any matter that could affect my personal financial holdings and have 

diligently done so throughout my career. With respect to the eight specific holdings 

noted in the question above, both the decision to invest and the actual purchases 

were made independently by my financial portfolio manager and not by me personally. I was not consulted prior to the purchases. This financial manager handles 

such purchases for all the accounts held by myself and two siblings.

Question #6. Please indicate whether you consulted with relevant federal ethics 

officials at any point subsequent to your initial investments in these entities for advice on whether these investments created a conflict of interest with the performance of your official duties. Please describe any such consultations and any guidance 

you received.

Answer. Yes. As required by federal ethics rules, I have always reported all holdings and transactions on my annual financial disclosure forms since their initial investment. I have on several occasions discussed my holdings with relevant federal 

ethics officials at the Department of State as part of their review process. 

I estimate that I have had three consultations with relevant ethics officials in the 

Office of the Legal Adviser since joining the Western Hemisphere Affairs front office. The substance of these consultations included whether my investments created 

a conflict of interest with the performance of my current duties. Up until my nomination to be Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, it has 

always been concluded that I could maintain my investments—given the low likelihood of my ability to directly affect the financial interests of these companies or the 

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sector—provided that I recuse myself on a case-by-case basis from any matters that 

could affect my holdings. 

Per the above discussions, I have always been extremely careful to recuse myself 

whenever necessary. For example, I have recused myself from any matter involving 

the Keystone pipeline, given my investments in the region. Similarly, during my 

September 2011 trip to Brazil, I chose not to hold a meeting with U.S. oil and gas 

companies operating there. Additionally, since becoming a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in 2007, as a matter of personal policy I almost always hold meetings 

with Chambers of Commerce when I travel, rather than with one particular industry or company. 

Finally, between July 2011 and September 2011 and prior to my nomination, I 

consulted with relevant federal ethics officials regarding these entities on approximately 10 occasions. These discussions led to the decision to divest these holdings 

upon confirmation.

Question #7. Please explain why you chose to invest in these entities during a 

period in which you held senior positions responsible for formulating and implementing U.S. policy with regard to the Western Hemisphere. Please indicate 

whether you believe these investments created the potential for an appearance of 

a conflict of interest with the performance of your official duties.

Answer. As I noted in my response to question 4, the initial investment in these 

entities was made by my personal financial portfolio manager. I did not direct the 

purchase of these entities. Based on previous years financial disclosure reviews, I 

was actively operating under a recusal approach to any investments I held. Prior 

to my nomination to the Assistant Secretary of State position, and as outlined 

above, I participated in a number of consultations with relevant ethics officials and 

ultimately it was determined that it would be best if I divested in full those entities 

given the heightened responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary position. 

Furthermore, along with my divesting the entities that I have outlined to the committee, I have instructed my financial manager moving forward to not purchase individual securities with significant operations in the Western Hemisphere, with a 

strong preference for diversified mutual funds in the future. 

RESPONSES OF ROBERTA S. JACOBSON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Despite the recent passage of free trade agreements with Colombia and Panama, 

U.S. engagement with Latin America has struggled from perceptions that our government has neglected the region. Although these perceptions may, in some cases, 

be an oversimplification, U.S. involvement with Latin America over the last 2 years 

has missed important opportunities to advance our mutual interests. 

Many Latin American countries, beset in the past by debt defaults, currency devaluations and the need for bailouts from industrialized countries, are experiencing 

economic growth. Strong demand in Asia for commodities like iron ore, tin, and gold, 

combined with policies in several Latin American economies that help control deficits and keep inflation low, are encouraging investment and fueling much of the 

growth. The World Bank forecasts that the region’s economy will grow by 4.5 percent this year. 

The United States is being displaced in South America as the preferred and logical trading partner. U.S. market share is being lost to China, Brazil, Canada, and 

other countries that understand that Latin America is a fast moving, competitive 

environment. With this loss of market share, we are simultaneously losing influence 

in the region and jobs here at home. 

The delay in concluding trade agreements with Panama and Colombia has 

already resulted in significant loss of U.S. market share in those countries. In Panama, large-scale projects, such as the $5.25 billion Panama Canal Expansion, the 

$1.5 billion Panama City Metro, and hundreds of millions of dollars in highway 

expansion contracts have been awarded to non-American firms. 

The United States recently lost its position as Colombia’s No. 1 agricultural supplier. Total U.S. agricultural exports to Colombia decreased from $1.8 billion in 2008 

to $827 million in 2010. 

Now that the free trade agreements with Colombia and Panama are concluded, 

the President should be accelerating the priority of much broader trade initiatives 

like the Trans-Pacific Partnership and a revival of the Doha round. If he does not 

commit the prestige of his office to an aggressive campaign to open markets, he will 

be weakening chances for sustained economic growth in our own country. 

858

In the region, President Obama should propose that we initiate negotiations on 

a market access agreement with MERCOSUL, the Southern Common Market, 

which is led by Brazil. The export potential of such a landmark agreement could 

create enormous job growth in the United States and help solidify our political and 

strategic relations in South America. In addition, the President should work toward 

congressional ratification of a Bilateral Tax Treaty with Brazil and Chile that could 

greatly expand our economic links with the region. 

The administration should also consider a free trade agreement with Caribbean 

Nations and Uruguay, and an enterprise fund for Haiti, among other important 

commercial priorities. 

To do this, we must articulate a clear sense of our interests and develop a more 

effective means for advancing those policies. 

I am optimistic about the potential for our relationship with countries in the 

Western Hemisphere. But to be successful, broadly speaking, the administration 

must move beyond rhetoric to construct a bold trade, commerce, security and energy 

agenda with countries in the Western Hemisphere. 

With sustained attention, we can work with countries in the region to make the 

most of the mutual opportunities that are emerging in the hemisphere to create jobs 

and safeguard our security. To that effect, please respond to the following questions 

regarding Western Hemisphere affairs.

Question. Over the past 17 years, the United States has entered into six free trade 

agreements covering 11 Latin American countries. The following Caribbean countries do not have a free trade agreement in force or under consideration with the 

United States: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cayman 

Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and 

Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and 

Tobago. 

In South America, these countries include: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Are there any plans to enter into any of the following trade and investment 

arrangements with the above listed countries: free trade agreements (FTAs), unilateral preferential tariff arrangements, bilateral investment treaties (BITs), and trade 

and investment framework agreements (TIFAs)? If yes, which countries are being 

targeted and why? Broadly speaking, what is the administration’s agenda for trade 

expansion in the Western Hemisphere?

Answer. In 1991, the United States entered into an Agreement Concerning a 

Council on Trade and Investment with the Member States of CARICOM. USTR is 

leading negotiations with CARICOM to update this agreement. The Caribbean 

Basin Initiative (CBI) provides unilateral trade preferences to 17 beneficiary 

countries. 

The United States and Jamaica have a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), which 

entered into force on March 7, 1997. The United States and Trinidad and Tobago 

have a BIT, which entered into force on December 26, 1996. 

The United States and Uruguay have a BIT, which entered into force on November 1, 2006. In January 2007 the United States and Uruguay signed a Trade and 

Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), followed by substantive annexes on the 

environment and trade facilitation signed in October 2008. 

The United States and Argentina have a BIT, which entered into force in 1994. 

We have a U.S.-Paraguay Joint Commission on Trade and Investment, established 

in 2004. 

USTR has the lead on trade policy, with strong support from the State Department and other U.S. agencies. The State Department sees the recently concluded 

free trade agreements with Panama and Colombia as moving us closer to a hemispheric trade partnership reaching from the Arctic to the tip of South America. 

USTR is working to complete the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, which involve two Western Hemisphere countries, Chile and Peru. Other countries may seek 

to join the TPP process as well. We also continue to explore ways to deepen regional 

integration through our existing bilateral trade agreements.

Question. Similarly, a market access agreement with MERCOSUL, the Southern 

Common Market, would create a key market for U.S. exports, which would strengthen regional ties and promote job growth in the United States. Does the administration plan to negotiate a market access agreement with MERCOSUL? Why or why 

not? If so, at what stage in the process are negotiations?

Answer. USTR has the lead on trade policy issues, with support from the Department of State and other agencies. 

The United States has significant trade engagement with the MERCOSUL countries. We have Bilateral Investment Treaty (BITs) with Argentina and Uruguay. In 

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addition, the United States and Uruguay signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) in 2007, and subsequently agreed to substantive annexes 

on environment and trade facilitation. With Paraguay, we have a Joint Commission 

on Trade and Investment. During his visit to Brazil in March 2011, President 

Obama announced the creation of the U.S.-Brazil Commission on Economic and 

Trade Relations, under the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation. This 

Commission replaced the U.S.-Brazil Bilateral Consultative Mechanism, and will 

facilitate future cooperation on trade and energy issues, among others, opening up 

additional possibilities for closer economic ties. 

We will continue working with our partners in MERCOSUL to deepen existing 

agreements as well as pursue cooperation in areas of mutual interest through established mechanisms such as the Commission on Economic and Trade Relations and 

the Economic Partnership Dialogue with Brazil. 

MERCOSUL has been pursuing free trade agreements with the EU and Canada, 

but both negotiations have stalled over many of the same issues that we would 

likely encounter if MERCOSUL and the United States were to seek an agreement—

notably, market access and agriculture.

Question. On March 18, 2011, I introduced a Senate resolution calling for a U.S.-

Brazil tax treaty to strengthen investment relations between the two countries. 

Brazil is the largest economy with which the United States does not currently have 

a bilateral tax treaty. 

A tax treaty based on OECD Model Tax Convention principles would provide a 

solid basis for investment between these two countries because these principles 

would apply to transfer pricing, information exchange, tax dispute resolution, and 

withholding rates. Overall, a bilateral tax treaty would strengthen investment relations and increase economic output in both nations. Does the administration plan 

to establish a bilateral tax treaty with Brazil? If not, what is the reasoning for not 

pursuing a tax treaty at this time? If so, what are the next steps to be taken in 

the tax treaty process?

Answer. I appreciate your leadership on this issue. The administration remains 

interested in concluding a bilateral tax treaty with Brazil that would be consistent 

with international standards and provide meaningful tax benefits to cross-border investors. The United States and Brazil have held a number of consultations since 

2006 to determine the feasibility of concluding such an agreement, and will continue 

these discussions. In addition, the United States signed a Tax Information Exchange 

Agreement (TIEA) with Brazil in 2007. The TIEA was approved by Brazil’s House 

of Representatives in February 2010 and is awaiting approval by Brazil’s Senate, 

which is required in order to bring the agreement into force.

Question. Similarly, a bilateral tax treaty with Chile based on OECD Model Tax 

Convention principles would improve investment relations between the United 

States and Chile and make U.S. businesses more competitive in Chile. The United 

States and Chile signed a tax treaty in February 2010, but President Obama has 

not yet submitted it to the Senate for advice and consent. Why hasn’t the administration submitted the Chile tax treaty to the Senate for advice and consent? When 

does it expect to do so? Are there any additional Latin American countries with 

which the United States is considering a tax treaty?

Answer. Bringing the U.S.-Chile tax treaty into force is an important U.S. policy 

objective, and we look forward to transmitting this tax treaty to the Senate for its 

advice and consent to ratification. The administration continuously evaluates the 

possibilities to conclude comprehensive bilateral tax treaties with our significant 

Latin American trading partners that would follow international standards and provide meaningful tax benefits to cross-border investors.

Question. In May 2011, I introduced legislation that would lead to the establishment of the Haitian-American Enterprise Fund to strengthen the private sector, to 

create jobs, and to establish sustainable revenue streams to ensure long-run economic progress in post-earthquake Haiti. The Haitian-American Enterprise Fund is 

modeled after successful post-cold-war enterprise funds that were originally introduced by Senator Lugar over 20 years ago. At my request, six former directors of 

enterprise funds for Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union traveled to Haiti 

in April 2011 to assess the status of the private sector and to determine if an enterprise fund model would work in Haiti. Following their trip, these former directors 

unanimously agreed that Haiti would benefit from an enterprise fund. Do you support the Haitian-American Enterprise Fund model to spur private sector growth in 

Haiti? Why or why not?

Answer. Thank you for your constant support for Haiti recovery efforts and for 

your focus on the long-term challenge of economic development in Haiti. We are 

860

directly supporting several promising efforts to spur private sector growth by helping Haitian banks increase access to credit for micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs); promoting agricultural value chains; and opening a new opportunity for light industry at the Carocol Industrial Park. The administration would 

welcome the authority to further promote private sector growth in Haiti—including 

authority to establish a Haiti Enterprise Fund.

Question. Given Brazil’s status as the largest economy in Latin America and one 

of the largest democracies in the world, U.S.-Brazilian relations are important to 

Western Hemisphere economic and security issues, especially. Nevertheless, during 

the course of the last 2 years the United States and Brazil have failed to agree on 

several key issues, from trade to narcotrafficking cooperation, to climate change. 

And, seemed to be working at cross-purposes regarding policies relating to Iran, 

Honduras, and Venezuela, among others. In some regards, Brazil has become a 

contrarian to the U.S.’s role in Latin America and the world, and seems to aspire 

to minimize U.S. influence.

• Please assess the current U.S. relationship with Brazil and explain our foreign 

policy to Brazil. How is the United States working with Brazil throughout Latin 

America and the world? What is the administration’s view regarding Brazil’s 

global ambitions? Does Washington regard Brasilia as a partner in regional 

affairs and global affairs?

Answer. The United States and Brazil enjoy a close, rapidly expanding, and deepening partnership. President Obama’s visit to Brazil in March highlighted the depth 

of the relationship between Brazil and the United States, which is based on shared 

values and the ties of friendship. Our countries reached a series of important agreements and understandings during the visit, including an Agreement on Trade and 

Economic Cooperation, an Agreement on Air Transportation and associated Memorandum of Consultations on Air Transportation, and a Memorandum of Understanding on programs that will promote decent work conditions in third countries. 

Our bilateral and multilateral cooperation with Brazil is advanced through three 

Presidentially mandated dialogues—the Global Partnership Dialogue, Strategic 

Energy Dialogue, and Economic and Financial Dialogue—as well as other ministerial dialogues, including the U.S.-Brazil Commercial Dialogue, Economic Partnership Dialogue, Political-Military Dialogue, Defense Bilateral Working Group, Bilateral Consular Dialogue, U.S.-Brazil CEO Forum, and U.S.-Brazil Commission on 

Economic and Trade Relations. 

In addition, we partner with Brazil on a host of regional and global issues. We 

engage with Brazil in development and food security cooperation in Africa and have 

excellent ongoing cooperation in Haiti where Brazil leads the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. We jointly cooperate on renewable energy, including on 

biofuels research, standards, and the promotion of clean biofuels’ use in third countries. We collaborate on sustainable urban development and planning issues and 

promote educational and scientific exchanges, and we share a commitment to combat racial discrimination, advance the empowerment of women, and fight exploitative child and forced labor. In these and other areas, the U.S.-Brazilian partnership 

can have a major positive global impact.

Question. Brazil reportedly will make local content rules stricter in regard to 

development of its offshore energy production. According to one estimate, such a 

rule could reach 95 percent by 2017. What is your view on the risks and benefits 

of such a strategy? If confirmed, what will you do to promote U.S. participation in 

the energy sector supply chain? 

In the 1990s, Petrobras was part-privatized, a crucial step that has facilitated 

Petrobras rise as a prominent global oil and gas producer. In development of the 

pre-salt oil production, however, the Government of Brazil seems to have reversed 

position, establishing Pre-Sal Petroleo and requiring that Petrobras be the operator 

of all development. If confirmed, what message would you deliver to the Government of Brazil on foreign company access to new oil developments?

Answer. We appreciate, and have shared our view with Brazilian authorities, that 

excessive local content requirements run the risk of hampering efficient exploration 

and development and reducing the overall capacity for the safe extraction of oil and 

gas. Brazilian officials say the intent of such a policy is to help the economic and 

industrial growth of Brazil while creating opportunities for oil development. If confirmed, I intend to support the Department’s involvement in key energy cooperation 

mechanisms with Brazil, notably the Strategic Energy Dialogue. The dialogue provides an excellent opportunity to ensure the best possible communication with the 

Brazilian Government on energy matters, including to express our concerns about 

increased local content requirements. We also intend to use the dialogue and other 

861

opportunities for engagement with public and private sector stakeholders to find 

more ways to provide opportunities for U.S. businesses. 

It’s important to note that while the Government of Brazil has designated PreSal Petrolero and Petrobras as the primary drivers of pre-salt oil development, the 

implementation and implications of the law are still being determined. Regardless 

of such advantages, Petrobras can and often does partner with other foreign and domestic oil and gas companies to develop oil and gas blocks. In addition to the potential for partnership and for service-provision, there are considerable opportunities 

for U.S. companies to bring their technical expertise to Brazil. Several collaborative 

technology centers-of-excellence are being established in Rio de Janeiro by leading 

international firms, including notable U.S. companies. These projects aim to address 

safety, accelerate deepwater field development, optimize production from mature 

fields, and develop cost-effective technology for drilling and geosciences. If confirmed, I will convey to the Government of Brazil the view that participation from 

a variety of highly competent and experienced entities, including American firms, 

will be important to the long-term success of the oil and gas industry in Brazil and 

the expeditious development of oil production, which will help supply global oil markets over the medium term.

Question. Is the administration interested in seeking congressional support to devise a comprehensive framework regarding trade, energy, and cooperation to fight 

drug trafficking in South America and Africa, with Brazil?

Answer. We welcome and deeply appreciate congressional views and collaboration 

with respect to policies and programs in the region. If confirmed, I look forward to 

continued support in this regard from Members of Congress and their staff. 

During the President’s trip to Brazil in March, he and President Rousseff laid out 

a framework for our bilateral relationship composed of dialogues, which both countries coordinate at the ‘‘Presidential level,’’ though Presidents have delegated the 

responsibility for the meetings to the appropriate Cabinet members. These include, 

the Global Partnership Dialogue, led by the Department of State; the U.S.-Brazil 

Economic and Financial Dialogue, led by the Department of the Treasury; and the 

U.S.-Brazil Strategic Energy Dialogue, led by the Department of Energy, and are 

all considered Presidential under this rubric. 

The Global Partnership Dialogue (GPD), which last occurred on May 31 and June 

1 and which was chaired by Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Patriota, reflects the increasingly global nature of the U.S.-Brazil relationship and provides for 

engagement on economic cooperation, energy, counternarcotics, multilateral and trilateral cooperation, innovation, human rights, and hemispheric issues. 

There were a number of significant outcomes from the productive discussions during the last GPD, including:

• Both sides welcomed progress on the Memorandum of Understanding to advance biofuels cooperation, including the aviation biofuels partnership, sustainability indicators for bioenergy under the Global Bioenergy Partnership, and the 

provision of a $3 million grant through the Organization of American States to 

deepen cooperation with third-country partners. 

• The United States and Brazil committed to advancing technical collaboration on 

science, technology, innovation, the environment, and natural disaster response. 

• The United States and Brazil also discussed political and security issues, including counternarcotics cooperation in Bolivia, the Central American Citizen 

Security Initiative, and law enforcement training.

Question. With both the Olympics and World Cup being held in Brazil in coming 

years, myriad commercial opportunities exist to build infrastructure in Brazil and 

create U.S. jobs. What steps has the State Department taken, if any, to facilitate 

American entrepreneurs interacting with Brazilian interlocutors to build this infrastructure?

Answer. Although Brazil has had experience with major events such as the Pan 

American Games, the world sporting events that Brazil will host every year from 

2011 to 2016 will present unprecedented challenges, particularly with respect to infrastructure development and creation of complex systems, areas in which U.S. 

firms excel. The steps Brazil is taking to successfully surmount these challenges will 

offer numerous trade and investment opportunities for U.S. companies in a wide 

variety of sectors, including construction and engineering, advanced technologies (including green technologies), services (such as financial and legal services, insurance, 

and leasing) and security systems. 

Tenders related to the Olympic Games are still in their initial stages and thus 

procurement directly related to the Olympic Games has not yet begun full-force. In 

addition to procurement by the Brazilian Olympic Public Authority, Rio de Janeiro’s 

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city and state governments, and the Brazilian arm of the International Olympic 

Committee will also issue public tenders to procure goods and services. These 

projects, many of which will be public-private partnerships, are still in the planning 

phase and must be approved by the International Olympic Committee. Tenders for 

these projects and activities are expected to open after the 2012 London Olympic 

Games. Along with our colleagues at the Department of Commerce’s Foreign Commercial Service, with the support of the White House, the Department of State is 

starting now to ensure that U.S. companies get the access, information, and exposure they need to tap into this market in formation. 

To set the stage for bilateral cooperation in preparation for the games and for 

U.S. companies’ investments, during President Obama’s March visit to Brazil, a 

memorandum of understanding was signed on cooperation was signed on the upcoming global sporting events hosted by Brazil, aimed at intensifying bilateral cooperation, particularly on infrastructure, safety, and security. During that visit our 

governments also signed an ‘‘Open Skies’’ agreement which expands international 

commercial air transport services between our two countries, which could be 

advantageous for U.S. airlines in the context of anticipated greater flows of individuals to attend the games. 

The Department of State is also collaborating closely with other agencies on initiatives that foster cooperation with Brazil on the upcoming Major Events. With the 

support of the Department of State and in support of the Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas, the Environmental Protection Agency is leading for the 

U.S. Government the Joint Initiative on Urban Sustainability, an ambitious effort 

in collaboration with the Government of Brazil to encourage that games-related infrastructure investments are sustainable, which creates new opportunities for U.S. 

companies in the energy-efficient technologies and green building materials sectors. 

Additionally, the Department of Commerce’s Foreign Commercial Service and Mission Brazil are participating in National Export Initiative events in the United 

States to promote investments in Brazil in preparation for the games and are organizing numerous State-level trade missions. 

Finally, the Department and other U.S. agencies are supporting the trade promotion activities of U.S. States. In October, the Governor of Florida led a delegation 

of more than 200 companies to Sao Paulo to explore commercial opportunities and 

contacts. Mission Brazil will host additional trade missions from Maine, Massachusetts, and Idaho before the end of 2011.

Question. Please explain your views regarding the domestic security challenges 

that Brazil must overcome to ensure that the Olympics and World Cup occur 

smoothly and that U.S. and international visitors to Brazil do not face robberies, 

petty crime, or personal injury. How is the United States working with Brazilian 

security forces in the security preparations for these events?

Answer. We believe that the Government of Brazil takes seriously its responsibility to provide safe and secure venues for the increasing number of international 

events held in Brazil. To enhance security arrangements for the major sporting 

events, Brazil has established a Security Secretariat for Special Events to serve as 

a hub for national, state, and local security efforts. At Brazil’s request, U.S. security 

officials are in direct and regular contact with the Secretariat to share best practices 

and real-time information regarding potential threats to the safety of players, organizers, audience members, travelers to Brazil, and the general public. 

The U.S. Government has developed a robust strategy to help Brazil prepare for 

events such as the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games. Through the State 

Department’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance program, Brazilian Federal and State 

Police Officers attended seven courses on major security events in FY 2011. The 

courses cover topics such as Quality Control in Civil Aviation Security, Preventing 

Attacks on Soft Targets, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, & Nuclear HospitalBased Management of Mass Casualty Incidents, Critical Incident Management, VIP 

Protection, Fraudulent Document Recognition and Tactical Management of Special 

Events, Police Leaders Role in Combating Terrorism, and Senior Crisis Management. 

In addition, we have developed a Voluntary Visitor Exchange Program and three 

International Visitor Leadership Programs for officials tasked with planning and 

providing security at major events. These programs provide opportunities for senior 

officials from the Brazilian State Security Secretariats that will host World Cup 

matches to meet, liaise, and share best practices with U.S. Federal, State, and local 

law enforcement authorities experienced in providing security for major events.

Question. It is my understanding that the Government of Argentina has recently 

become the first country in the 30-year history of the ICSID Convention—the most 

widely used international arbitral body in the world—to refuse voluntary payment 

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of ICSID awards. Argentina’s actions are not only harming U.S. companies that 

have invested in Argentina, the Argentines are establishing a dangerous precedent 

that other countries may follow. What actions has the U.S. Government taken, to 

encourage Argentina to abide by the ICSID Convention?

Answer. The United States has repeatedly raised the final and enforceable International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) awards against 

Argentina with Argentine Government officials at the highest levels, and will continue to do so in the future. The United States will continue to remind the Government of Argentina of its international obligations, stress the importance of maintaining a fair and transparent investment climate that includes functional dispute 

resolution mechanisms, and underscore the extent to which foreign investment is 

critical to Argentina’s economy. In addition, the administration is now reviewing 

two petitions filed by U.S. companies that seek the removal of Argentina’s eligibility 

from the Generalized System of Preferences based on the Argentine Government’s 

alleged failure to act in good faith in recognizing as binding or in enforcing arbitral 

awards owed to the petitioners. 

In September 2011, due in part to these concerns, the Treasury Department 

began instructing the U.S. Executive Directors at the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank to vote against all loans to Argentina. The Treasury Department may make exceptions when programs effectively target very poor and vulnerable populations, because the administration does not believe these populations 

should be denied assistance as a result of their government’s policy choices. As 

noted, this new policy responds to serious concerns about Argentina’s failure to resolve pending ICSID arbitral claims and take the necessary steps to fully and conclusively normalize relations with its creditors.

Question. During the September 21st House Financial Services Committee hearing on multilateral development banks, Marisa Lago, Treasury’s Assistant Secretary 

for international markets and development, announced that the administration will 

oppose all loans from multilateral development banks to Argentina. This policy was 

adopted by the Department of Treasury in response to Argentina’s repeated failure 

to respect more than 100 U.S. court judgments in favor of U.S. creditors against 

Argentina. Does the State Department share the Treasury Department’s concerns? 

In what ways will the State Department implement this policy?

Answer. The Treasury Department has the lead on U.S. Government policies toward the Multilateral Development Banks. In September, Treasury instructed U.S. 

Executive Directors at the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank 

to vote against all loans to Argentina. The Treasury Department may make exceptions when programs effectively target very poor and vulnerable populations, because the administration does not believe these populations should be denied assistance as a result of their government’s policy choices. 

The Department of State shares the serious concerns about Argentina’s failure to 

pay outstanding final International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes arbitral awards and take the necessary steps to fully and conclusively normalize relations with its creditors. For our part, we continue to use diplomatic channels to encourage the Government of Argentina to address these issues.

Question. It was reported that during President Kirchner’s recent meeting with 

President Obama at the G20 summit (November 4, 2011), President Kirchner expressed that she only intends to offer the ‘‘holdout’’ bondholders the same deal 

Argentina offered in the April 2010. Are these reports correct? If so, what is the 

Department of State’s reaction to this news?

Answer. In the November 4 meeting, President Obama underscored the importance of Argentina addressing its outstanding issues with international creditors. 

There was no discussion of specifics of how Argentina should do that. 

The United States will continue to raise this issue with Argentine officials at the 

highest levels, stressing that reaching agreement with its creditors is an important 

step in creating a favorable climate for attracting foreign investment.

Question. How concerned should Americans be of the fact that Venezuela seems 

to have developed all the characteristics of a narcostate? Seeing the everyday violence throughout Mexico, do you think Venezuela might, in the near future, exhibit 

the patterns of drug-propelled violence we are witnessing in Mexico?

Answer. Since 2005, and in every subsequent year, the United States has found 

that Venezuela has failed demonstrably to meet its international counternarcotics 

obligations. The United States has also taken action by identifying senior Venezuelan officials as having assisted narcotrafficking efforts. The Department of the 

Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) designated four high-level VenVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00871 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
864

ezuelan officials, including an army two-star general, in September 2011 for materially assisting the narcotics trafficking activities of the FARC. These four join other 

former and current Venezuelan officials previously designated by OFAC. 

Venezuela has engaged in some limited cooperation on counternarcotics matters, 

including increasing its dialogue with Colombian authorities and, on some occasions, 

deporting members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the 

National Liberation Army (ELN) back to Colombia. Venezuela has also coordinated 

the deportation of fugitives wanted for drug trafficking to the United States and has 

participated in occasional maritime interdictions with the U.S. Coast Guard. 

We have clearly stated for years that we are open to increasing cooperation with 

the Venezuelan Government to fight the increasing flow of illegal drugs in the 

region and globally.

Question. According to reports, President Chavez has an aggressive form of cancer 

which many speculate will compromise his ability to govern Venezuela in the near 

term. Is the United States Government prepared for the aftermath of his rule in 

Venezuela? Is the United States prepared to deal with the implications of President 

Chavez having welcomed narcotraffickers and foreign agents from countries with 

motives contrary to law abiding, democratic countries to operate freely in Venezuela, 

and in countries who share the interests and aspirations of the Bolivarian Movement?

Answer. We do not have any specific information about President Hugo Chavez’ 

health condition beyond what the Venezuelan Government has publicly reported. 

We closely monitor the situation in Venezuela and stand ready to calibrate our policy as appropriate. As stated in the Inter-American Democratic Charter, the people 

of Venezuela, like those of other hemispheric nations, have a right to democracy. 

This commitment to democracy forms a critical foundation of our foreign policy 

throughout the hemisphere and, if confirmed, it will be a central focus of my efforts 

with respect to our policy toward Venezuela. 

The United States has expressed our concern about Venezuelan policies with respect to support for international efforts to confront terrorism and narcotrafficking. 

Every year since 2006, the President has determined that Venezuela is ‘‘not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts,’’ a determination made under section 40A 

of the Arms Export Control Act. Each year since 2005, we have determined that 

Venezuela has ‘‘failed demonstrably’’ to meet its international counternarcotics obligations, a determination made under section 706 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act. We will continue to monitor Venezuela for activities that would indicate 

a pattern of support for acts of international terrorism, narcotrafficking, or other activities that might harm U.S. national interests, and take appropriate action when 

warranted. 

We have been able to work effectively with many nations in the hemisphere who 

share our vision of inclusive growth, strong commitment to democratic values, and 

a cooperative combined effort to provide for citizen security.

Question. Technology (‘‘Tech’’) companies are interested in training the world’s 

best ‘‘Tech’’ talent in U.S. universities, but are tired of seeing the individuals that 

receive this training being forced to work for foreign competitors because they have 

been denied H1–B visas. In the Western Hemisphere, as illegal immigration to the 

United States diminishes what will the administration do to ensure that sufficient 

legal opportunities to work and live in the United States, such as H1–B visas and 

formal immigration options, remain open to the many skilled workers from the 

region who are so critical to the growth of the U.S. economy?

Answer. The Department of State works hard to ensure the prompt issuance of 

employment visas to all qualified applicants in accordance with immigration law. 

H–1B visas are numerically limited based on the law, capped at a maximum of 

65,000 per year, with an additional 20,000 above the cap for recipients of a U.S. 

master’s degree or higher. There is also unlimited H–1B availability for workers employed by or at a higher education or research institute. The numerical limits are 

worldwide and not specified for specific geographical regions. 

All U.S. embassies and consulates have established procedures to expedite interview appointments for business travelers, including H1–B applicants. We will continue to explore ways to improve those procedures at our embassies and consulates 

throughout the hemisphere. U.S. officials work closely with American Chambers of 

Commerce in more than 100 countries around the world, and in each of our 50 missions in the hemisphere, to streamline the visa process for business travelers. We 

are continually working with interagency partners to improve and make more efficient the process to ensure it best serves the interests of the United States.

865

Question. Much has been made about reports of Chinese commercial, energy, and 

security investments in Latin America. Please describe these interests. What are 

they? Please explain the motivation for Chinese interests in the region. Is an enhanced presence of China in the Western Hemisphere a threat to U.S. interests?

Answer. China’s economic engagement in the hemisphere is not necessarily a 

cause for friction between the United States and China. The United States remains 

the region’s largest trading partner. China’s trade, mainly from commodity purchases and exports of manufactured goods, reached $178 billion with Latin America 

in 2010 compared to $661 billion in trade between the United States and Latin 

America. China’s trade presence and investment are focused mainly on satisfying 

its domestic demand for fuels, mineral resources and agricultural products. We recognize that China’s growing economic influence has become important to many 

countries in the region, but the United States trade with the region remains far 

larger, more diverse, and is also growing rapidly. The recent passage of the Colombia and Panama Free Trade Agreements will help to maintain U.S. economic leadership in the hemisphere. 

The primary goal of U.S. policy is to encourage a responsible role of China in the 

development of the region’s economic prosperity.

Question. Currently the United States and Mexico are negotiating an agreement 

to cooperate on offshore transborder oil and natural gas production. Such an agreement is touted as facilitating joint production operations between PEMEX and U.S. 

energy companies. 

If such an agreement is successful, please describe what, if any, additional constitutional, legal, or regulatory steps will be necessary for PEMEX to be able to participate in production sharing agreements with U.S. companies. What steps has the 

Government of Mexico committed to in fulfilling those steps? 

Given that PEMEX is reportedly suffering from inadequate capital for investment, 

why is it to the benefit of the United States enable joint ventures instead of simply 

allowing leasing on the U.S. side of the border? 

Please characterize the current state of technical information on economically accessible oil and natural reserves along the U.S.-Mexico offshore border.

Answer. On June 23, 2010, the Governments of the United States and Mexico 

jointly announced their intention to negotiate an agreement governing the disposition and regulation of hydrocarbon reservoirs that cross our international maritime 

boundary. Since that time, negotiating teams have carried out issue-specific workshops, informal consultations, and several rounds of formal negotiations. Work on 

the agreement is ongoing, and a final text is not yet agreed upon. 

Mexico’s Constitution places restrictions on the ability of Mexico’s national oil 

company, Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), to enter into business relationships with 

foreign companies. While there has been no change to the constitutional restriction 

on foreign investment in the oil sector, reforms undertaken in 2008 did open the 

possibility that hydrocarbon reservoirs that crossed the maritime boundary could be 

exploited in accordance with the provisions of a bilateral treaty that the Mexican 

Government could negotiate and submit to the Mexican senate for ratification. One 

of the objectives of the bilateral agreement we are currently negotiating, if concluded and brought into force by each side’s respective ratification procedures, is to 

give PEMEX greater flexibility in carrying out cooperative transboundary projects 

with U.S. companies. 

Leasing on the U.S. side of the maritime boundary has occurred, and some commercial activity has taken place in those lease blocks. This agreement, if concluded 

and brought into force, would establish an international legal regime to govern activities in the boundary area. 

No transboundary reservoir has yet been discovered. Some technical information 

does exist regarding potential economically recoverable oil and natural reserves 

along the boundary. Should cooperative projects become more likely, we anticipate 

that additional exploration in the region would produce more and higher quality 

technical information on potential transboundary deposits.

Question. From a standpoint of transatlantic economic and energy security, especially considering likely nuclear power phaseouts in Germany, Belgium, and possibly additional nations, would trade in liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports from 

the United States to Europe be in the national interest and support of U.S. foreign 

policy toward Europe? Absent any LNG exports from the United States, what nations in the Western Hemisphere are likely to supply natural gas to European 

nations? Please describe the State Department’s interaction with the Department of 

Energy in consulting on LNG export license applications.

866

Answer. The diversification of energy sources is vital as a means to protect consumers from price volatility, ensure adequate and secure supplies and, to mitigate 

climate change by increasing the use of lower carbon fuel sources. Additional global 

LNG, whether exported from the United States or from any other source, would advance a pillar of the U.S.’s Eurasian foreign policy objective to promote new, diversified, and clean sources of energy supplies for Europe. Domestically, potential future 

exports of LNG could create much needed jobs in our own country. 

In the Western Hemisphere, Trinidad and Tobago and Peru currently export LNG 

to Europe, but most gas imports going to European markets come from Eurasia, 

North Africa, and the Middle East. Gas rich nations in the Western Hemisphere 

potentially looking to export LNG in the future include Colombia, Venezuela, and 

Bolivia. 

Authorization to grant LNG export licenses is the sole responsibility of the 

Department of Energy’s Office of Fossil Energy.

Question. Recently the Inspector General of the State Department announced an 

inquiry related to the Keystone XL pipeline permit application.

• Please describe the scope of that investigation. Specifically, will it examine the 

merits of the permit application itself? 

• Will the decision on the Keystone XL permit application be delayed to wait for 

the outcome of the inspector general’s investigation?

Answer #1. Given my current recusal from participation in matters that affect 

Keystone XL and the oil industry in Canada and to avoid even the appearance of 

partiality, I regret that I am unable to respond to this question. As I stated during 

my hearing, if I am confirmed, it would be my intention to resolve my recusal and 

I would then be available to address the committee’s concerns to the extent possible. 

Another Department of State official will address this question promptly.

Answer #2. (Response by OES on behalf of the Department of State): On the scope 

of the investigation, I would refer you to the Department of State’s Office of the 

Inspector General.

Question. Tight oil, or oil shale, production in the North Dakota region is rapidly 

expanding. Several reports have indicated logistical challenges in exporting production from North Dakota to refineries in the United States.

• Please describe the proposed ability of the Keystone XL to also transport oil 

from the northern U.S. Great Plains. What economic benefit would that have 

in those U.S. areas of production?

Answer #1. Given my current recusal from participation in matters that affect 

Keystone XL and the oil industry in Canada and to avoid even the appearance of 

partiality, I regret that I am unable to respond to this question. As I stated during 

my hearing, if I am confirmed, it would be my intention to resolve my recusal and 

I would then be available to address the committee’s concerns to the extent possible. 

Another Department of State official will address this question promptly.

Answer #2. (Response by OES on behalf of the Department of State): Since 2008, 

the Department has been conducting a transparent, thorough, and rigorous review 

of TransCanada’s application for the proposed Keystone XL Pipeline project. As a 

result of this process, given the concentration of concerns regarding the environmental sensitivities of the current proposed route through the Sand Hills area of 

Nebraska, the Department has determined it needs additional information and will 

undertake an in-depth assessment of potential alternative routes in Nebraska. 

After obtaining the additional information, the Department will determine, in consultation with the eight other agencies identified in Executive Order 13337, whether 

the proposed pipeline was in the national interest, considering all of the relevant 

issues together. Among the relevant issues that will be considered are environmental concerns (including climate change), energy security, economic impacts, and 

foreign policy. 

Because this National Interest Determination process has not been completed, the 

administration has not yet completed its analysis of the issues raised by your specific questions and is therefore unable to provide authoritative answers at this time. 

The Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) included information indicating that 

the proposed Keystone XL pipeline would provide up to 100,000 barrels per day of 

shipping capacity for crude oil produced in North Dakota and Montana. Based on 

information from the North Dakota Pipeline Authority, the projections of combined 

shipping capacity by pipelines and rail out of the Bakken region of North Dakota 

and Montana is greater than the projections of production, even without the proposed Keystone XL pipeline. This information is summarized in Figure 3.14.2–2 of 

the final EIS. 

867

We remain committed to engaging with you and your staff as the process unfolds 

and to keeping you informed as the integrity of our regulatory process permits.

Question. Executive Order 13337 requires the State Department to offer other 

U.S. Federal agencies a 90-day period to comment as part of a National Interest 

Determination process and a further 15 days to issue a permit decision.

• Is it your opinion that the procedures elaborated in the E.O. 13337 are binding 

on the State Department? 

• Is the current review period and decision process on track to meet those deadlines? 

• If the permit review process is not on schedule meet the time requirements of 

Executive Order 13337, what are the obstacles and how are they justified within the bounds of applicable Executive orders and statute?

Answer #1. Given my current recusal from participation in matters that affect 

Keystone XL and the oil industry in Canada and to avoid even the appearance of 

partiality, I regret that I am unable to respond to this question. As I stated during 

my hearing, if I am confirmed, it would be my intention to resolve my recusal and 

I would then be available to address the committee’s concerns to the extent possible. 

Another Department of State official will address this question promptly.

Answer #2. (Response by OES on behalf of the Department of State): As an executive branch agency, the Department is required to follow procedures laid out by the 

President under E.O. 13337. The Executive order does not set a time limit as to 

when the Department must make a decision on a permit application once it has received the recommendations of at least the eight named agencies in the order. Our 

review process is currently being conducted in conformity with the provisions of the 

Executive order.

Question. Recent press reports have indicated a confused decisionmaking process 

on the Keystone XL permit application at the State Department vis-a-vis the White 

House. White House spokesman Jay Carney has reaffirmed that the decision lies 

at the State Department, whereas it is reported that President Obama indicated to 

Nebraska reporters that he will be taking a personal role: ‘‘. . . I’ll be measuring 

these recommendations when they come to me.’’

• What roles are White House officials playing in the Keystone XL permit application review process? 

• Have White House officials identified a position on Keystone XL or otherwise 

given guidance to the State Department beyond procedures in existing Executive orders as to how a national interest determination and final decision shall 

be made? 

• Will the Secretary of State issue a permit decision under authority delegated 

to her, which may or may not subsequently be reviewed by the White House, 

or will the Secretary of State make a recommendation to the President for his 

decision?

Answer #1. Given my current recusal from participation in matters that affect 

Keystone XL and the oil industry in Canada and to avoid even the appearance of 

partiality, I regret that I am unable to respond to this question. As I stated during 

my hearing, if I am confirmed, it would be my intention to resolve my recusal and 

I would then be available to address the committee’s concerns to the extent possible. 

Another Department of State official will address this question promptly.

Answer #2. (Response by OES on behalf of the Department of State): The review 

of the Keystone XL permit application is being conducted in accordance with the 

procedure outlined in Executive Order 13337. The Executive order authorizes the 

Department (the Secretary of State or her designee) to determine whether granting 

a Presidential Permits authorizing a petroleum pipeline at the border is in the 

national interest. The Executive order outlines a procedure that requires the Department to seek the views of at least eight other federal agencies before making 

a proposed determination. Under the Executive order, a permit determination is 

only referred to the President for decision if one of the eight listed agencies objects 

to the Department’s proposed determination. There has been no change to the process outlined in that Executive order.

Question. The negative national security impacts of overdependence on oil imports 

from unstable regions and difficult governments are well established and reaffirmed 

by the Secretary of State and President.

• Please describe how oil trade with Canada fits into the State Department’s 

strategy to diversify and reduce geopolitical risks inherent to the current oil import portfolio. 

868

• What potential do oil sands imports from Canada have to reduce need for oil 

from Venezuela? 

• What would be the energy security, economic, and foreign policy implications 

of halting all future oil sands import growth from Canada?

Answer #1. Given my current recusal from participation in matters that affect 

Keystone XL and the oil industry in Canada and to avoid even the appearance of 

partiality, I regret that I am unable to respond to this question. As I stated during 

my hearing, if I am confirmed, it would be my intention to resolve my recusal and 

I would then be available to address the committee’s concerns to the extent possible. 

Another Department of State official will address this question promptly.

Answer #2. (Response by OES on behalf of the Department of State): Since 2008, 

the Department has been conducting a transparent, thorough, and rigorous review 

of TransCanada’s application for the proposed Keystone XL Pipeline project. As a 

result of this process, given the concentration of concerns regarding the environmental sensitivities of the current proposed route through the Sand Hills area of 

Nebraska, the Department has determined it needs additional information and is 

undertaking an in-depth assessment of potential alternative routes in Nebraska. 

After obtaining the additional information, the Department will determine, in consultation with the eight other agencies identified in Executive Order 13337, whether 

the proposed pipeline was in the national interest, considering all of the relevant 

issues together. Among the relevant issues that will be considered are environmental concerns (including climate change), energy security, economic impacts, and 

foreign policy. 

Because this National Interest Determination process has not been completed, the 

administration has not yet completed its analysis of the issues raised by your specific questions and is therefore unable to provide authoritative answers at this time. 

However, we remain committed to engaging with you and your staff as the process 

unfolds and to keeping you informed as the integrity of our regulatory process 

permits.

Question. The Government of Canada has clearly stated their support for approval 

of Keystone XL.

• In your view, what impact would approval or disapproval of Keystone XL have 

on the bilateral relationship between Canada and the United States? 

• How is a rejection of the Keystone XL permit likely to be perceived by the 

Canadian Government?

Answer #1. Given my current recusal from participation in matters that affect 

Keystone XL and the oil industry in Canada and to avoid even the appearance of 

partiality, I regret that I am unable to respond to this question. As I stated during 

my hearing, if I am confirmed, it would be my intention to resolve my recusal and 

I would then be available to address the committee’s concerns to the extent possible. 

Another Department of State official will address this question promptly.

Answer #2. (Response by OES on behalf of the Department of State): Since 2008, 

the Department has been conducting a transparent, thorough, and rigorous review 

of TransCanada’s application for the proposed Keystone XL Pipeline project. As a 

result of this process, given the concentration of concerns regarding the environmental sensitivities of the current proposed route through the Sand Hills area of 

Nebraska, the Department has determined that it needs additional information and 

will undertake an in-depth assessment of potential alternative routes in Nebraska. 

After obtaining the additional information, the Department will determine, in consultation with the eight other agencies identified in Executive Order 13337, whether 

the proposed pipeline was in the national interest, considering all of the relevant 

issues together. Among the relevant issues that will be considered are environmental concerns (including climate change), energy security, economic impacts, and 

foreign policy. 

Because this National Interest Determination process has not been completed, the 

administration has not yet completed its analysis of the issues raised by your specific questions and is therefore unable to provide authoritative answers at this time. 

However, we remain committed to engaging with you and your staff as the process 

unfolds and to keeping you informed as the integrity of our regulatory process 

permits.

Question. Robust and expanding trade is a longstanding pillar of our bilateral relationship with Canada. Energy trade is a fundamental part of that relationship, including oil as well integration of our electric grids. Energy trade was deemed to be 

of sufficient importance to also have a special and protected status within NAFTA.

869

• (a) Please elaborate on the criteria by which the United States may block energy trade with Canada. • (b) In your view, would rejection of Keystone XL be a setback to longstanding 

trade promotion with Canada?

Answer #1. Given my current recusal from participation in matters that affect 

Keystone XL and the oil industry in Canada and to avoid even the appearance of 

partiality, I regret that I am unable to respond to this question. As I stated during 

my hearing, if I am confirmed, it would be my intention to resolve my recusal and 

I would then be available to address the committee’s concerns to the extent possible. 

Another Department of State official will address this question promptly.

Answer #2. (Response by OES on behalf of the Department of State): USTR is the 

lead on trade issues and I would defer to that agency. Regarding part (b), this question requests information that may be relevant to the Department’s National Interest Determination under Executive Order 13337, and therefore, in order to protect 

the impartiality and integrity of the Department’s deliberative process under the 

Executive order, the Department is not in a position to address this question at this 

time.

Question. Americans benefit from robust market-driven trade in global oil markets, which gives supply flexibility that can help smooth price volatility. Unfortunately, many governments and in particular OPEC members engage in cartel behavior to limit supply and boost prices. The U.S. Government through the IEA and 

bilaterally promotes freer trade in energy. Rejection of free energy trade within 

North America could be seen as hypocritical and dampen our efforts elsewhere.

• In your view, how important is it to ‘‘practice what you preach’’ in energy trade?

Answer #1. Given my current recusal from participation in matters that affect 

Keystone XL and the oil industry in Canada and to avoid even the appearance of 

partiality, I regret that I am unable to respond to this question. As I stated during 

my hearing, if I am confirmed, it would be my intention to resolve my recusal and 

I would then be available to address the committee’s concerns to the extent possible. 

Another Department of State official will address this question promptly.

Answer #2. (Response by OES on behalf of the Department of State): The specific 

question posed addresses an issue that may be relevant to the Department’s 

National Interest Determination under Executive Order 13337, and therefore, in 

order to protect the impartiality and integrity of the Department’s deliberative process under the Executive order, the Department is not in a position to address this 

question at this time. 

Since 2008, the Department has been conducting a transparent, thorough, and 

rigorous review of TransCanada’s application for the proposed Keystone XL Pipeline 

project. As a result of this process, given the concentration of concerns regarding 

the environmental sensitivities of the current proposed route through the Sand Hills 

area of Nebraska, the Department has determined it needs additional information 

and is undertaking an in-depth assessment of potential alternative routes in 

Nebraska. 

After obtaining the additional information, the Department will determine, in consultation with the eight other agencies identified in Executive Order 13337, whether 

the proposed pipeline was in the national interest, considering all of the relevant 

issues together. Among the relevant issues that will be considered are environmental concerns (including climate change), energy security, economic impacts, and 

foreign policy. 

Because this National Interest Determination process has not been completed, the 

administration has not yet completed its analysis of the issues raised by your specific questions and is therefore unable to provide authoritative answers at this time. 

However, we remain committed to engaging with you and your staff as the process 

unfolds and to keeping you informed as the integrity of our regulatory process 

permits.

Question. The share of U.S. oil imports coming from Canada has increased as oil 

sands production has increased, and Canada is now the single largest foreign oil 

supplier to the United States. IHS CERA consultants have estimated that this proportion could increase to 36 percent of imports.

• How would the decision to permit Keystone XL affect the ability to reach this 

potential growth in secure imports from Canada?

Answer #1. Given my current recusal from participation in matters that affect 

Keystone XL and the oil industry in Canada and to avoid even the appearance of 

partiality, I regret that I am unable to respond to this question. As I stated during 

my hearing, if I am confirmed, it would be my intention to resolve my recusal and 

870

I would then be available to address the committee’s concerns to the extent possible. 

Another Department of State official will address this question promptly.

Answer #2. (Response by OES on behalf of the Department of State): The specific 

question posed addresses an issue that may be relevant to the Department’s 

National Interest Determination under Executive Order 13337, and therefore, in 

order to protect the impartiality and integrity of the Department’s deliberative process under the Executive order, the Department is not in a position to address this 

question at this time. 

Since 2008, the Department has been conducting a transparent, thorough, and 

rigorous review of TransCanada’s application for the proposed Keystone XL Pipeline 

project. As a result of this process, given the concentration of concerns regarding 

the environmental sensitivities of the current proposed route through the Sand Hills 

area of Nebraska, the Department has determined it needs additional information 

and is undertaking an in-depth assessment of potential alternative routes in 

Nebraska. 

After obtaining the additional information, the Department will determine, in consultation with the eight other agencies identified in Executive Order 13337, whether 

the proposed pipeline was in the national interest, considering all of the relevant 

issues together. Among the relevant issues that will be considered are environmental concerns (including climate change), energy security, economic impacts, and 

foreign policy. 

We remain committed to engaging with you and your staff as the process unfolds 

and to keeping you informed as the integrity of our regulatory process permits.

Question. In many of the world’s largest oil production countries, such as Russia, 

Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Venezuela, state-controlled firms (or quasi-state controlled 

firms) dominate oil production. The United States and Canada are also among the 

largest oil producers in the world, but those governments allow publicly traded 

firms, many of which are listed on U.S. stock exchanges, and private firms to engage 

in production.

• Has Canada in any way restricted access to U.S. investment in oil sands 

production? 

• What magnitude of economic benefit to U.S. companies and their shareholders 

would you estimate for existing and planned future oil sands production? 

• Approximately how much tax revenue does the U.S. Government receive from 

profits repatriated from oil and gas production in Canada?

Answer #1. Given my current recusal from participation in matters that affect 

Keystone XL and the oil industry in Canada and to avoid even the appearance of 

partiality, I regret that I am unable to respond to this question. As I stated during 

my hearing, if I am confirmed, it would be my intention to resolve my recusal and 

I would then be available to address the committee’s concerns to the extent possible. 

Another Department of State official will address this question promptly.

Answer #2. (Response by OES on behalf of the Department of State): The specific 

question posed addresses an issue that may be relevant to the Department’s 

National Interest Determination under Executive Order 13337, and therefore, in 

order to protect the impartiality and integrity of the Department’s deliberative process under the Executive order, the Department is not in a position to address this 

question at this time. 

Since 2008, the Department has been conducting a transparent, thorough, and 

rigorous review of TransCanada’s application for the proposed Keystone XL Pipeline 

project. As a result of this process, given the concentration of concerns regarding 

the environmental sensitivities of the current proposed route through the Sand Hills 

area of Nebraska, the Department has determined it needs additional information 

and is undertaking an in-depth assessment of potential alternative routes in 

Nebraska. 

After obtaining the additional information, the Department will determine, in consultation with the eight other agencies identified in Executive Order 13337, whether 

the proposed pipeline was in the national interest, considering all of the relevant 

issues together. Among the relevant issues that will be considered are environmental concerns (including climate change), energy security, economic impacts, and 

foreign policy. 

Because this National Interest Determination process has not been completed, the 

administration has not yet completed its analysis of the issues raised by your specific questions and is therefore unable to provide authoritative answers at this time. 

However, we remain committed to engaging with you and your staff as the process 

unfolds and to keeping you informed as the integrity of our regulatory process 

permits.

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Question. The current United States unemployment rate is 9.0 percent.

• Please characterize estimates of job creation in the United States that could be 

attributed to construction of the Keystone XL pipeline? • If completed, are these jobs likely to be filled by Americans or filled offshore? • What is the estimated value of piping and other durable materials that would 

be required to construct the pipeline? • What quantity of these materials is estimated to be sourced in the United 

States?

Answer #1. Given my current recusal from participation in matters that affect 

Keystone XL and the oil industry in Canada and to avoid even the appearance of 

partiality, I regret that I am unable to respond to this question. As I stated during 

my hearing, if I am confirmed, it would be my intention to resolve my recusal and 

I would then be available to address the committee’s concerns to the extent possible. 

Another Department of State official will address this question promptly.

Answer #2. (Response by OES on behalf of the Department of State): Since 2008, 

the Department has been conducting a transparent, thorough, and rigorous review 

of TransCanada’s application for the proposed Keystone XL Pipeline project. As a 

result of this process, given the concentration of concerns regarding the environmental sensitivities of the current proposed route through the Sand Hills area of 

Nebraska, the Department has determined it needs additional information and is 

undertaking an in-depth assessment of potential alternative routes in Nebraska. 

After obtaining the additional information, the Department will determine, in consultation with the eight other agencies identified in Executive Order 13337, whether 

the proposed pipeline was in the national interest, considering all of the relevant 

issues together. Among the relevant issues that will be considered are environmental concerns (including climate change), energy security, economic impacts, and 

foreign policy. 

The Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) includes information relevant to the 

questions asked. Section 3.10 of the EIS notes that the construction workforce for 

the proposed Keystone XL pipeline would consist of approximately 5,000 to 6,000 

workers over the 2–3 years required to construct the pipeline. EIS 3.10–55. The EIS 

also notes that the total project cost (in the United States and Canada) is approximately $7 billion, with approximately $6.58 to $6.65 billion being spent on materials, supplies, easements, engineering, and other costs. EIS 3.10–58. 

Because this National Interest Determination process has not been completed, the 

administration has not yet completed its analysis of the issues raised by your specific questions. As part of the National Interest Determination process, the Department has been and will be consulting with other agencies to further consider the 

information from the EIS, as well as information from other sources (particularly 

comments received from the public during the National Interest Determination comment process). Therefore unable to provide authoritative answers at this time. However, we remain committed to engaging with you and your staff as the process 

unfolds and to keeping you as the integrity of our regulatory process permits.

Question. Previous pipeline permit applications have been relatively routine and 

uncontroversial, but the Keystone XL pipeline has become highly politicized.

• Please compare the timeline for consideration of the Keystone XL permit application to similar projects previously approved or rejected to the State Department. 

• How frequently are oil and gas pipeline permit applications rejected by the 

State Department? What have been the principle reasons for their rejection? 

• Please identify all opportunities for public comment that have been established 

by the State Department in consideration of the Keystone XL pipeline permit 

application. 

• How does the public comment process for Keystone XL compare to earlier pipeline permit comment periods?

Answer #1. Given my current recusal from participation in matters that affect 

Keystone XL and the oil industry in Canada and to avoid even the appearance of 

partiality, I regret that I am unable to respond to this question. As I stated during 

my hearing, if I am confirmed, it would be my intention to resolve my recusal and 

I would then be available to address the committee’s concerns to the extent possible. 

Another Department of State official will address this question promptly.

Answer #2. (Response by OES on behalf of the Department of State): The application for a Presidential permit for the original Keystone pipeline was submitted on 

April 19, 2006; the Department issued a permit for this pipeline on March 11, 2008. 

The application for a Presidential permit for the Alberta Clipper pipeline was submitted on May 15, 2007; the Department issued a permit for this pipeline on August 

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20, 2009. The application for a Presidential permit for the Keystone XL pipeline was 

submitted on November 4, 2008; the matter is still pending. 

Since 2000 the Department has not approved both previous applications for new, 

major, cross-border oil facilities. Because there has been significantly more public 

interest and participation in the process for the Keystone XL review, the public comment procedures for this permit application were more extensive than than previous 

recent applications. The Department issued the following Federal Register notices 

regarding the process for consideration of the Keystone XL application: 73 Fed. Reg. 

65713; 74 Fed. Reg. 5019, 6687, and 12172; 75 Fed. Reg. 19969, 20653, 22890 and 

33883; 76 Fed. Reg. 8396, 22699, 22744, 53525, 54767, 55155, 55157. The Department held a total of 50 public meetings, both in states through which the pipeline 

would pass, if approved, as well as in Washington, DC. The various comment periods and public meeting times were also noted on the Web site the Department 

maintains on this issue: 

HTTP://WWW.KEYSTONEPIPELINE-XL.STATE.GOV/CLIENTSITE/KEYSTONEXL.NSF?OPEN

The Web site also provides information about the project (including the final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS)) and a mechanism for submission of comments 

over the Internet and other means. 

The timeframes for the Keystone XL review compared to the two most recent 

pipeline reviews are as follows:

Keystone I—Application: April 19, 2006; Permit Issued: March 11, 2008. 

Alberta Clipper—Application: May 15, 2007; Permit Issued: August 20, 2009. 

Keystone XL—Application: November 4, 2008; Still under consideration.

Question. In evaluating permit applications such as that by Keystone XL, rigorous 

environmental analysis is necessary to make an informed judgment of risks inherent to any project and steps needed to help mediate those risks to an acceptable 

level.

• Please describe the process by which the environmental impact assessment was 

conducted. • Please describe any environmental and safety precautions in excess of those 

required by U.S. law that the Keystone XL pipeline would implement.

Answer #1. Given my current recusal from participation in matters that affect 

Keystone XL and the oil industry in Canada and to avoid even the appearance of 

partiality, I regret that I am unable to respond to this question. As I stated during 

my hearing, if I am confirmed, it would be my intention to resolve my recusal and 

I would then be available to address the committee’s concerns to the extent possible. 

Another Department of State official will address this question promptly.

Answer #2. (Response by OES on behalf of the Department of State): These issues 

are addressed in the final Environmental Impact Statement, particularly the Introduction, Section 3.13, and Appendix U, available at: http://www.keystonepipelinexl.state.gov/clientsite/keystonexl.nsf?Open. 

RESPONSES OF ROBERTA S. JACOBSON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. U.S. Development Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: Assistance fell from almost $421 million in FY 2010 to an estimated $362 million 

in FY 2011, a 14 percent decline. U.S. assistance to Latin America is declining and 

proportionally, the region is receiving less and less of the total assistance pie. In 

2006, Latin America received 11 percent of the regional distribution of U.S. Foreign 

Assistance, by 2011 that percentage had shrunk to 8 percent of the pie. The Western Hemisphere is the region of the world with the greatest potential to affect our 

Nation—positively, through enhanced trade relations, and negatively through undocumented immigration feed by social unrest, insecurity, and lack of opportunity.

• How does the administration prioritize funding by regions? What role will you 

play in 7th-floor decisions about regional allocations? • Do you anticipate further decreases in U.S. assistance to the region based on 

overall decreases in U.S. foreign assistance?

Answer. In the current lean budget environment, we have carefully coordinated 

our requests for foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean with our 

embassies, USAID missions, and the U.S. interagency. While funding in Latin 

America and the Caribbean has been reduced at a slightly faster rate than other 

regions, some of this reduction was made possible by the real successes achieved in 

the region, notably our efforts with Colombia to nationalize security programs. Our 

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assistance programs are designed to enhance our partnerships in the region and 

spread the responsibility for success. Our request levels reflect a recognition of the 

emerging global leadership of countries like Colombia, Brazil, and Chile, which complement U.S. priorities and are increasingly contributing foreign assistance in the 

region and around the world. We have concentrated our assistance in those regions 

of the hemisphere where it is most effective and advances U.S. interests—especially 

in Central America and the Caribbean. Our cooperation with Mexico reflects its 

strategic position along our southern border. 

My familiarity and long experience with U.S. foreign assistance in the hemisphere, and my role in the Department’s internal assistance allocation process 

allows me to influence these decisions, and to have a seat at the table as global level 

decisions are made. I can assure you that with my deep understanding of the region 

and my passion for its importance to the United States, if confirmed, I will be a 

forceful advocate for robust and productive engagement, including with respect to 

assistance. Our conversations with the Secretary and other Department and U.S. 

Government leaders are continuous, and always aimed at achieving an assistance 

level for the Western Hemisphere that is consistent with our interests, takes into 

account the needs of our partner nations, as is cognizant of the difficult budget environment we face. 

If confirmed, I will continue to advocate for resources that advance our stated 

goals of citizen security, strong institutions of democratic governance, reducing social inequality and increasing economic opportunity, securing a clean energy future 

and mitigating the effects of climate change.

Question. U.S. Counternarcotics Spending: As outlined in the State Department’s 

FY 2012 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, U.S. counternarcotics aid to Latin America amounted to almost $747 million in FY 2010 while 

the FY 2012 request is for $424 million. I presume the 43 percent decline in counternarcotics assistance for the region reflects past funding for substantial equipment 

sales to Mexico as a part of Merida, but I’m also wondering why there is such a 

precipitous decrease when the needs in Central America are still so significant?

Answer. Countering the threats posed by drug trafficking and transnational crime 

remains a high priority area for U.S. foreign assistance to the Western Hemisphere, 

particularly Mexico, Colombia, Central America, and the Caribbean. 

In Mexico, our Merida Initiative assistance is shifting toward relatively lower cost 

capacity and institution-building efforts that we and our Mexican partners believe 

are critical to address the underlying causes of the challenge facing Mexico. In 

Colombia, substantial savings are realized as we nationalize some counternarcotics 

programs in a gradual and predictable way. Colombia’s ability to take over these 

programs reflects the success of our prior year investments and is a concrete demonstration of the growing capacity and effectiveness of our Colombian partners. For 

Central America and the Caribbean, we have maintained or increased citizen security funding levels consistent with prior years, particularly for the Central America 

Regional Security Initiative and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, to respond 

to sustained security threats to those regions and to increase partner nation capacity to administer the rule of law.

Question. Colombia: What effect will last Friday’s death in combat of the FARC 

leader, Alfonso Cano, have on the FARC’s ability to function? Is this a major setback 

for FARC or is there a secondary or tertiary leader who can step in?

Answer. At the time of his death, Alfonso Cano was the leader of the terrorist 

organization the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Since taking over 

the FARC in September 2010 after the death of Mono Jojoy, Cano increasingly 

turned the FARC to asymmetrical warfare, including the use of assassinations, kidnapping, and IEDs. 

The stated goal of the FARC is the violent overthrow of the Government of Colombia. Cano’s death is an important victory for Colombia and represents a major blow 

against the largest terrorist organization in this hemisphere. The FARC engages in 

narcotics trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion, and there are regular clashes between the FARC and Colombian security forces. Cano is the fourth member of the 

FARC’s General Secretariat to have been killed in the past 3 years, and the second 

Supreme Commander to die in that time period. 

Cano’s death could demoralize the FARC, and disrupt its decisionmaking, at least 

in the short term. However, the FARC has several senior ranking members available to step in as leader. At this moment, we cannot predict who that will be and 

therefore cannot speculate as to how this might affect the FARC’s ability to function. 

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The Santos administration has stated on numerous occasions that it is prepared 

to consider negotiations with the FARC, once the FARC releases all hostages, agrees 

to a cease-fire, and terminates illicit activities.

Question. Inter-American Development Bank: What is the Department’s position 

on funding the capital increase for the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)? 

What impact will a partial increase—25 percent of the request—have on the Bank’s 

lending portfolio? On contributions from other countries? Do you anticipate the 

Bank being able to maintain its commitment to Haitian reconstruction and development if the Bank’s capital increase is short-changed?

Answer. The Department strongly supports the President’s request and the U.S. 

commitment to the IDB General Capital Increase (GCI). We believe that failure to 

honor our full obligations to the IDB would seriously weaken U.S. influence in Latin 

America and the Caribbean at the same time that other emerging donor countries 

like China are increasing their presence. 

We are in close contact with the Treasury Department, which is the lead agency 

on multilateral development bank policy, to coordinate and support our efforts to secure funding for the GCI request. 

Full funding of the President’s request for multilateral development banks would 

allow the United States to proceed with the full subscription of callable capital and 

a partial contribution of our paid-in capital commitments, and therefore allow the 

GCI to proceed. 

The IDB is a key partner for the United States in the region, in our efforts on 

citizen security in Central America, and particularly in Haiti, the poorest country 

in the hemisphere. After the 2010 earthquake, the IDB cancelled all of Haiti’s outstanding debt and converted undisbursed loan balances into grants. At the urging 

of the U.S. Government, the IDB also pledged to provide Haiti $2 billion in grants 

over the next decade to fund its recovery efforts and long-term development plans 

as part of the GCI. Although a temporary shortfall in the United States paid-in capital contribution should not affect the IDB’s financial capacity to meet the commitment to Haiti, there is risk that the IDB’s Board of Governors, which must approve 

the transfer of funding for Haiti on an annual basis, would reject the transfer if the 

United States falls short of its GCI contribution.

Question. Authoritarian Trends in the Hemisphere: While democracy has been solidly consolidated in many countries in the region, a resurgence of authoritarianism, 

combined with tolerance for corruption and resulting from weak institutions and 

judiciaries threatens democratic progress in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, 

and even Belize and Argentina. What role do you see the United States playing in 

providing support to civil society organizations, the independent media and others 

grassroots groups advocating for government transparency, free media, and judicial 

reform?

Answer. Our commitment to democracy and protection of human rights forms the 

foundation of our foreign policy throughout the hemisphere. As a matter of principle 

and longstanding policy, the United States believes that representative democracies 

require strong institutions, a robust and authentically independent judiciary, 

vibrant civil society, and free and independent media. 

Our diplomats engage constantly with governments, addressing issues of democracy and human rights both publicly and privately. In bilateral and regional meetings, we press all governments to fulfill their commitments under the Inter-American Democratic Charter and other international conventions and treaties to which 

they are signatories. We have spoken out strongly, both in international fora and 

directly to governments, against corruption, lack of justice, and election irregularities in Nicaragua; against severe restrictions on civil society and freedom of expression in Venezuela, and in defense of media freedom in Ecuador and elsewhere. 

We also engage consistently with grassroots civil society organizations and independent media that seek to promote and protect fundamental freedoms. Our democracy and human rights programs support civil society by providing them with the 

knowledge base and the tools to lay the groundwork for a better future. 

If confirmed, this strong and longstanding commitment to democracy and protection of human rights will continue to guide my approach to relations with these 

countries and support for civil society. I intend to be a strong advocate for the democratic principles that guide our Nation and that are at the heart of the hemisphere’s 

vision for governance.

Question. Freedom of the Press: In which countries are freedom of expression 

most at risk and what are main factors accounting for the deterioration of press 

freedom in several Latin American countries in recent years? To what degree have 

executive abuse of power and organized crime and violence been factors in the deteVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00882 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
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rioration of freedom of expression? How does U.S. policy call attention to concerns 

about freedom of expression, and what can be done to counter the deterioration of 

freedom of expression in some countries in the hemisphere?

Answer. We are concerned about recent trends that present risks to media freedom in the Western Hemisphere. Department of State Country Reports on Human 

Rights practices, NGO reports, and other data document challenges to open media, 

including crime-driven violence and intimidation directed at journalists; government-instigated pressure, ranging from physical violence to legal and administrative 

harassment; excessive government use of privately owned media to carry government propaganda; and, the creation of government-controlled media to compete with 

independent voices. 

Government control of traditional media in Cuba (press, television, radio) is complete, leaving Cubans isolated and eager for unfiltered news from outside the island, 

and for unbiased information about events on-island and worldwide. Cuba has one 

of the lowest levels of Internet penetration in the world, and the Cuban Government 

continues to create legal and technical obstacles preventing the vast majority of the 

populace from gaining unfettered access to the Web. Moreover, the level of selfcensorship among the Cuban population is extremely high due to real and perceived 

threats if they speak candidly and on the record. Some Cuban activists who are also 

independent journalists have been imprisoned for their activities. 

Venezuela’s Government routinely harasses and threatens media organizations 

and journalists which present coverage deemed by the government to be in opposition to its policies or in support of the democratic opposition. Over the last several 

years, it has used administrative procedures to close 34 radio stations, as well as 

RCTV, the nation’s oldest television network, in 2007. Venezuela uses the threat of 

withdrawing broadcast licenses from remaining media and a stringent media law 

to constrain media outlets and journalists, contributing to a palpable culture of selfcensorship. These practices are inconsistent with the hemispheric vision of freedom 

of expression. For example, in October, Venezuela’s telecommunications regulator 

fined independent news broadcaster ‘‘Globovision’’ the equivalent of more than $2 

million for covering a prison riot, claiming the coverage made an ‘‘apology for crime’’ 

and fomented ‘‘the anxiety of the citizenry.’’

In countries as diverse as Ecuador, Guyana, Nicaragua, and Panama, government 

attempts to influence media, and to silence media outlets deemed hostile to the government, concern us. Among the techniques used are denunciation of purported 

antigovernment posture of media outlets, the creation of restrictive legal frameworks and the denial or suspension of licenses to broadcast or publish. In July, an 

Ecuadorian court ruling in a civil case lodged by the President sentenced the editor 

and two directors of the newspaper El Universo to 3 years in prison and levied $30 

million in fines for libeling the President. This case, which has drawn expressions 

of deep concern from press freedom organizations, is on appeal. In Nicaragua, President Ortega has called on his supporters to stop media from working to ‘‘wear down 

his administration’s image.’’ The government has used harassment, censorship, and 

arbitrary application of libel laws to suppress reporting, and withholds government 

advertising contracts from independent media. 

Violence related to organized crime, particularly in Mexico and Central America, 

has taken a heavy human toll on journalists, and has a chilling effect on media 

coverage of crime, as well as on efforts to galvanize public support for anticrime 

programs. 

Through diplomatic engagement, work with civil society, and public statements, 

the Department of State calls attention to the obstacles to freedom of expression and 

conveys support for those who strive to protect it. This engagement is in accordance 

with the Secretary’s strong commitment on freedom of expression, including the 

Internet. It is also part of our commitment to hemispheric instruments, including 

the Inter-American Democratic Charter, as Deputy Secretary Burns noted in September at the Charter’s 10-year anniversary. The United States actively supports 

the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and sponsored an Organization of American States General 

Assembly resolution, adopted in El Salvador in June 2011, related to promotion of 

freedom of expression in the Americas. 

Our embassies engage deeply and continuously with media organizations, human 

rights groups, and governments wherever and whenever freedom of expression is 

under threat. We are enhancing our public diplomacy programs and exchanges 

focused on journalist education and safety, and on social media’s capacity to buttress 

freedom of expression. We emphasize professional development for journalists to 

help them develop skills such as investigative reporting so they can move beyond 

official government pronouncements and develop broad-based, balanced coverage. 

U.S. human rights promotion programs seek to strengthen independent media and 

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increase awareness of the importance of freedom of expression. The U.S. Interests 

Section in Cuba uses distance learning and technology channels to offer independent 

journalists professional development and opportunities to disseminate their stories. 

Our support for freedom of expression reflects deep values our people hold, because it reflects our strong conviction that a vibrant and free media is essential to 

the development of fully effective representative democracy in the Americas.

Question. In October, the Venezuelan Government imposed on outrageous fine on 

Globovision for coverage of last summer’s prison riots—a fine up to 7.5 percent of 

its gross earnings for 2010, which could amount to $2.1 million. A fine clearly intended to put the company out of business. Has the State Department contacted the 

Venezuelan Authorities regarding this issue?

Answer. Venezuela’s Government routinely harasses and threatens media organizations and journalists which present coverage deemed by the government to be in 

opposition to its policies or in support of the democratic opposition. Over the last 

several years, it has used administrative procedures to close 34 radio stations, as 

well as RCTV, the nation’s oldest television network, in 2007. Venezuela uses the 

threat of withdrawing broadcast licenses from remaining media and a stringent 

media law to constrain media outlets and journalists, contributing to a palpable culture of self-censorship. Venezuela’s media laws also create vague categories of impermissible coverage, further contributing to an aura of uncertainty about reportage 

which is inconsistent with the hemispheric vision of freedom of expression. In response to the October fine made by Venezuela’s telecommunications regulator, 

against independent news broadcaster, Globovision, for covering a prison riot, claiming the coverage made an ‘‘apology for crime’’ and fomented ‘‘the anxiety of the citizenry,’’ the Department of State publicly urged the Venezuelan Government to uphold its obligations under the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC), including 

the principle that freedom of expression is essential for representative democracies. 

If confirmed, I will continue to urge the Venezuelan Government to uphold its obligations under the IADC.. Media outlets must be guaranteed the freedom to independently cover important news stories, including controversial stories, without fear 

of government reprisal. Freedom of expression is a fundamental freedom vital to the 

health and proper functioning of any democracy.

Question. Citizen Security in the Americas: Looking ahead, what are the most significant challenges for Citizen Security Initiatives in the region in the next few 

years? Do you anticipate shifting greater attention and resources toward Central 

America and the Caribbean to address the immense organized crime and security 

crisis in Central America and the overflow into the Caribbean? Do you share A/S 

Brownfield’s concerns that drug cartels will ramp up their transit routes through 

the Caribbean?

Answer. Weak rule of law institutions will continue to be at the center of our citizen security challenges in the region. The inability of governments to exercise the 

rule of law and provide services to citizens, beginning with security, will slow their 

efforts to improve citizen security, reduce inequality, and foster development in the 

region. We will continue to work with regional governments as they strengthen their 

institutions and secure their streets, waters, remote regions, and vulnerable populations. Stronger communities with vibrant civil society organizations that can resist 

the transnational criminal organizations are also critically important—especially as 

partners with governments against crime. 

While we have made good initial progress, there is much to be done, and we must 

ensure that the progress made by our partner governments becomes more systematic and institutionalized. 

We are urging our partners in Central America—which have some of the lowest 

tax collection rates in the world—to invest more in their own security. We are continuing to provide critical targeted assistance through the Central American 

Regional Security Initiative and the Caribbean Basin Regional Security Initiative. 

Central America and the Caribbean are already high priorities, as evidenced by the 

Secretary’s frequent travel to both regions and our assistance within both programs—which we hope to maintain at consistent levels in the coming years. As drug 

trafficking organizations have repeatedly demonstrated their adaptability, we will 

continue to be particularly alert for any ‘‘balloon effect’’ increasing the flow of drugs 

through Central America and/or the Caribbean as Colombia and Mexico continue to 

pressure drug trafficking organizations and current trafficking patterns. We must 

not allow success in one part of the hemisphere to increase the threat to other parts 

of the hemisphere.

Question. Barriers to Market Access in Argentina and Brazil: USTR’s 2011 

National Trade Estimate maintains that both Argentina and Brazil have barriers 

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that can impede U.S. imports. Since 2008, Argentina has imposed a growing number 

of customs and licensing procedures and requirements that make importing U.S. 

products more difficult, including nonautomatic import licenses, minimum pricing, 

and import-export swap arrangements, in addition to intentionally slow processing 

virtually all imports. Argentina has now applied these restrictions to imports of virtually all U.S. products. Meanwhile, Brazil has started to follow in the footsteps of 

its southern neighbor, starting in 2009 with increased import tariffs on hundreds 

of industrial products and application of a variety of federal and state taxes on imports that effectively double the cost of imported products. Recently, Brazil has expanded the number of new restrictions a wide range of imports of U.S. goods, including additional import monitoring, enhanced inspections, and delayed release of 

targeted goods. Brazil also recently imposed new increases in customs fees on imports a wide range of products.

• What efforts are being made with Argentina and Brazil to address barriers to 

U.S. exports to these countries and to ensure that these countries are living up 

to their bilateral and international trade commitments?

Answer. The Department and our Embassy in Buenos Aires speak directly to the 

Argentine Government to register concerns with Argentina’s import licensing procedures which restrict imports of U.S. goods. We also work closely with USTR, the 

lead U.S. agency at the WTO Committee on Import Licensing Procedures at the 

Council for Trade in Goods. In these meetings, the United States, joined by other 

WTO members, have raised concerns regarding Argentina’s practices, including the 

legal basis under the WTO for its use of these import licensing procedures. We have 

also sought further clarification regarding the time period for approving licenses, 

and the reported requirement that companies commit to exporting or establish production facilities in Argentina in order to obtain an import license. We continue to 

insist that the Government of Argentina explain how such requirements are consistent with WTO rules. 

We agree that Argentina’s import licensing procedures are hurting U.S. companies’ ability to export to Argentina. Not only are our companies concerned about the 

added costs and uncertainty associated with these measures, they are also concerned about the negative effects of products being sold increasingly on the gray 

market due to distortions created by Argentina’s import procedures. 

With respect to Brazil, we monitor closely what appears to be an increase in import duties on foreign goods and the promotion of products manufactured in Brazil 

through trade-distorting measures. We have broached this in our bilateral discussions with Brazil and we are working closely with USTR to advocate our interests 

in WTO negotiations. 

We have established high-level trade, economic, and commercial dialogues with 

Brazil to promote the free flow of goods, services, and investment between the two 

countries. As a result, U.S. exports to Brazil are booming. 

Our discussions include private sector input which is essential for identifying 

areas of opportunity for greater cooperation, as well as impediments to a level playing field for international trade. Business groups in both countries discuss opportunities to foster understanding and advance commercial priorities between the two 

countries. Trade missions also provide important channels for U.S. companies to 

meet with Brazilian Government officials to discuss and better understand the business climate.

Question. China’s Interest in Latin America. China’s linkages with the region, including trade, investment, and political relations, have grown significantly over the 

past several years. What are China’s reasons for expanding its economic and political linkages with Latin American and Caribbean countries? What are the implications of China’s engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean for U.S. policy 

toward the region?

Answer. China’s economic engagement in the hemisphere is not necessarily a 

cause for friction between the United States and China. The United States remains 

the region’s largest trading partner. China’s trade, mainly from commodity purchases and exports of manufactured goods, reached $178 billion with Latin America 

in 2010 compared to $661 billion in trade between the United States and Latin 

America. China’s trade presence and investment are focused mainly on satisfying 

its domestic demand for fuels, mineral resources, and agricultural products. We recognize that China’s growing economic influence has become important to many 

countries in the region, but the United States trade with the region remains far 

larger, more diverse, and is also growing rapidly. The recent passage of the Colombia and Panama Free Trade Agreements will help to maintain U.S. economic leadership in the hemisphere. 

878

The primary goal of U.S. policy is to encourage a responsible role of China in the 

development of the region’s economic prosperity.

Question. Haiti Reconstruction: What type of international support would be 

needed to improve Haiti’s economic development prospects over the long term? 

Other than France, what countries are still providing disaster assistance to Haiti? 

Job creation is vitally important for Haiti’s economic recovery to take hold, but are 

you concerned that U.S. development projects like the North Industrial Park will 

have negative effects on those companies that are already in Haiti? What is the status of President Martelly’s ability to address the political and legal roadblocks to 

reform, such as land titling?

Answer. Haiti will need sustained international donor attention over the next decade not only to provide development assistance, but also to advocate for the reforms 

that will enable sustainable economic growth. Several nations contribute to disaster 

assistance in Haiti. The Office of the U.N. Special Envoy provides the most regularly updated and comprehensive information about the contributions of donors to 

Haiti at www.haitispecialenvoy.org—specifically the data sheet under the section 

labeled ‘‘assistance tracker.’’

The North Industrial Park is part of a comprehensive northern region development initiative ably coordinated by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). 

Joint efforts in the north are designed to improve the conditions for all companies 

in the region—enhancing the infrastructure, including roads, shelter, and electricity 

generation, and providing workforce vocational training that will ultimately benefit 

not just one industrial park, but several industries throughout the region. 

President Martelly has shown an early commitment to systemic reforms—including by strengthening a working group to deal with land titling issues, bringing together NGOs, donors, and the various government agencies that have some responsibility for housing in Haiti. With respect to judicial reform roadblocks, President 

Martelly has filled three long-vacant positions at Haiti’s Supreme Court, enabling 

that key branch of government to finally begin to play its constitutional role.

Question. Following several years of political animosity, yesterday, the United 

States and Bolivia signed a framework agreement, pledging to work together in the 

areas of trade, development assistance, and counternarcotics. What does the United 

States hope to get out of the framework? Do you expect to see a decrease in antiAmerican rhetoric by the Bolivians and enhanced cooperation, particularly in the 

area of counternarcotics?

Answer. The signing of the Framework Agreement is the first step toward more 

normal relations between the United States and Bolivia. We believe increased dialogue, resulting in part from the forums established by the agreement, will help 

achieve concrete improvements in counternarcotics cooperation, development assistance, and trade. However, both governments recognize that successful implementation will require substantial engagement and dialogue. 

In addition to discussions in the working groups established by the Framework 

Agreement, our governments will work toward the restoration of diplomatic representation at the ambassadorial level. The exchange of Ambassadors will permit 

the United States to engage the Bolivian Government, and wider Bolivian civil society, at the highest level. 

By channeling both nations’ desire to return to a functional relationship based on 

our mutual interests, the agreement sends a powerful signal as to the desired direction of the bilateral relationship, which includes effective counternarcotics cooperation. 

RESPONSES OF HON. MARI CARMEN APONTE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. Flooding: Last week, the First Lady of El Salvador and the Secretary 

of Social Inclusion, Dr. Vanda Pignato, met with a number of Senators to discuss 

U.S. flood assistance to the country. What will the United States be doing down the 

road to assist the Salvadoran people? What are the implications of the damage for 

the Salvadoran economy? Are you concerned that this event might increase undocumented immigration to the United States if jobs become few and food becomes too 

expensive?

Answer. In response to tropical depression 12-E, the U.S. Government has provided $409,231 in disaster assistance. Humanitarian assistance included funds from 

USAID and the Defense Department for transportation support, toolkits, medicine, 

food, hygiene kits, and supplies for emergency relief projects and rescue operations. 

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USAID continues to coordinate closely with the Government of El Salvador and the 

international donor community to identify areas in which we can further assist El 

Salvador in disaster recovery, including infrastructural and agricultural needs. 

USAID is reviewing its programs to determine if funds can be redirected to meet 

recovery priorities identified by the Government of El Salvador.

Question. Counternarcotics Cooperation: On September 16, 2011, President 

Obama included El Salvador on the list of countries designated as ‘‘major’’ drug-producing or ‘‘drug-transit’’ countries, the first time the country has received such a 

designation. What evidence supports El Salvador’s designation as a major drug transit country? How would you assess the current level of bilateral antidrug cooperation and the adequacy of U.S. counternarcotics assistance to El Salvador (both bilateral aid and assistance provided through CARSI)?

Answer. The countries of Central America are increasingly used for trafficking of 

cocaine and other drugs primarily destined for the United States. As a result, crime 

and insecurity are increasing throughout the region. El Salvador forms part of the 

‘‘Northern Triangle’’ along with Guatemala and Honduras, where international 

criminal syndicates are transiting illegal drugs headed to the United States from 

South America. 

El Salvador and the United States enjoy close cooperation on counternarcotics 

issues. Bilateral counternarcotics cooperation funded under the Central America 

Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) focuses on projects designed to reduce the flow 

of illegal narcotics and other contraband through El Salvador’s territory and its littoral waters. Projects include support for police professionalization, assistance for 

interdiction efforts at borders and checkpoints, and equipment and technical assistance for the country’s police, immigration, and security services. 

Additional CARSI assistance is being provided to the Government of El Salvador 

to support the implementation of recently passed legislation related to wiretapping, 

electronic intercepts, and asset forfeiture. These laws, and related U.S. assistance, 

will enable the Government of El Salvador to more effectively investigate complex 

transnational crimes, including narcotics trafficking, and to seize, sell, and monetize 

property and assets seized in conjunction with narcotics arrests and to use the profits for counterdrug efforts. 

To enhance the delivery of U.S. Government counternarcotics and related citizen 

security assistance to the Government of El Salvador, the Department has decided 

to open a full-fledged Narcotics Affairs Section within the Mission, which will bring 

additional management, procurement and planning resources to bear in support of 

our engagement.

Question. Violence/Gangs: How has the Funes government’s approach to addressing gangs and other public security challenges differed from that of previous 

ARENA governments? How likely is it that the government will be able to implement some sort of security tax to increase funds for efforts to deal with gangs and 

crime? How well is U.S. assistance (both bilateral aid and assistance provided 

through CARSI) supporting those efforts and how might that assistance be targeted 

more effectively?

Answer. Across the political spectrum in El Salvador, there is agreement that 

gangs operating in El Salvador, whether transnational in scope, such as the 18th 

Street Gang or MS–13, or not, represent one of the most visible, pressing threats 

to the citizens of El Salvador. As such, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation 

Front (FMLN) government of President Funes has continued the efforts of former 

ARENA governments to investigate and dismantle these criminal organizations, including by prosecuting gang members. 

President Funes took the additional step of allocating military resources to supplement the police in June of 2010, and up to half the military remains engaged 

in street patrols, border security, and guarding the prisons. This move has been 

widely supported by a public concerned with rising crime; polls show the military 

is the most highly respected government institution. 

The Funes government has welcomed collaborative antigang efforts with the U.S. 

Government, aimed at dismantling those gangs which have a nexus to the United 

States. Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) funded cooperation 

supports the FBI-led Transnational Anti-Gang Unit (TAG) in San Salvador, and an 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement Vetted Unit that addresses gang-related 

smuggling activities, and provides assistance to segregate gang members incarcerated in El Salvador’s prisons. CARSI also provides funding for USAID programs to 

identify youth and communities at-risk to provide educational, training, and related 

services to mitigate risks in these affected areas, in coordination with the Government of El Salvador. 

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Additional CARSI assistance is being provided to the Government of El Salvador 

to support the implementation of recently passed legislation related to wiretapping, 

electronic intercepts, and asset forfeiture. These laws, and related U.S. assistance, 

will enable the Government of El Salvador to more effectively investigate gang activities, to seize, sell, and monetize property and assets seized in conjunction with 

gang arrests, and to use the profits for gang and citizen security efforts. 

President Funes has sought additional national funds for this effort. He has been 

negotiating with the private sector over a security tax that would generate additional resources to be directed at improving citizen security. So far, that effort has 

not achieved consensus. Consequently, President Funes did not include a security 

tax in the FY 2012 budget he submitted to the legislature on September 30. The 

U.S. Government supports efforts in El Salvador and throughout the region to generate resources that would bolster the capacity of law enforcement institutions to 

combat criminal gangs and drug cartels and reduce reliance on foreign assistance. 

To enhance the delivery of U.S. Government citizen security assistance to the 

Government of El Salvador, the Department has decided to open a full fledged Narcotics Affairs Section within the Mission, which should bring additional management, procurement, and planning resources to bear in support of our engagement. 

The Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

also maintains a Regional Gang Advisor in San Salvador to coordinate antigang 

assistance being provided to the Government of El Salvador.

Question. Economic Issues: A joint U.S.-Salvadoran assessment published in July 

2011 as part of the Partnership for Growth (PFG) Initiative identified the two greatest constraints on growth in the country as crime and insecurity and a lack of competitiveness in the ‘‘tradables’’ sector of the economy. To what extent have those barriers inhibited El Salvador from receiving the full benefits of its participation in 

DR–CAFTA Agreement? To what extent, if at all, has dollarization inhibited El Salvador’s ability to remain competitive with other countries? How much support are 

government reform efforts receiving from the private sector? What type of U.S. support could be useful?

Answer. The two constraints identified by the joint analysis do limit El Salvador’s 

ability to fully benefit from the DR–CAFTA. The World Bank estimates the costs 

associated with mitigating the effect of crime and insecurity add at least 10 percent 

to the cost of doing business for firms in El Salvador. The joint U.S.-Salvadoran assessment indicates that El Salvador may be losing 8 percent of its GDP, compared 

to other CAFTA countries, due to the productivity constraint in tradables. Relieving 

these constraints will allow El Salvador to more fully benefit from the opportunities 

created by the DR–CAFTA. Dollarization has protected El Salvador from inflationary shocks that were common with the Colon, and it prevents speculation 

against the local currency, which can put pressure on the government’s reserves and 

cash flow. Dollarization also benefits Salvadorans living in the United States by 

making their remittance transfer costs cheaper. 

The private sector is playing a constructive role in support of reform efforts. For 

example, banks and power distribution companies worked together with the Salvadoran Government to restructure natural gas subsides. Under the Partnership for 

Growth, the private sector also makes up one-half of the newly installed Council for 

Growth, which will work to address competitiveness issues in El Salvador. Continued strong U.S. support through the Partnership for Growth will help El Salvador 

overcome obstacles related to sustained broad-based economic growth. Funding the 

various lines of action and accelerating the development of our PFG and other programs will help us apply maximum political and diplomatic tools in support of President Funes and his government. 

RESPONSES OF ELIZABETH M. COUSENS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. Palestinian U.N. Membership: In addition to serving as the U.S. Representative to ECOSOC, you are also nominated to serve as an alternative representative to the General Assembly and in that context you are a part of our USUN team 

in New York, advocating for the broad spectrum of U.S. interests. With respect to 

the Palestinians’ efforts to obtain membership in the U.N. and its affiliated bodies, 

what is the latest state of play? What is the earliest date that UNSC will have to 

take up this issue? Have the Palestinians communicated through official channels 

that they do not intend to apply for membership at any other U.N. bodies, as has 

been reported in the press? Has the mission made clear to other countries and to 

General Secretary Ban Ki-moon that the United States will not pay its contribution 

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to UNESCO? Is USUN privy to any discussions to continue U.S. contributions to 

UNESCO by other means, for example, by paying for related programs in countries 

where UNESCO is currently working?

• With respect to the Palestinians’ efforts to obtain membership in the U.N. and 

its affiliated bodies, what is the latest state of play?

Answer. With respect to the Palestinian application for U.N. membership, the 

U.N. Security Council Admissions Committee is currently reviewing a draft report 

circulated by Portugal as the chair. Consistent with longstanding precedent, the report summarizes the discussions of the Admission Committee over the last several 

weeks, including the various positions of the committee members. We anticipate the 

committee will adopt the report on November 11 and that it will be submitted to 

the Security Council. If a member of the UNSC, at the behest of the Palestinians, 

calls for a vote, such a vote could be held as early as the week of November 14. 

The United States has made clear it will not support any such initiative in the 

Council, vetoing it if necessary. Our view is that Palestinian moves to join U.N. bodies undermine the prospects for peace, delay their quest for an independent state, 

and damage the U.N. entities they seek to join—and as a result undermine U.S. security interests.

Question. What is the earliest date that UNSC will have to take up this issue?

Answer. A member of the Council could introduce a draft resolution recommending Palestinian admission and call for a vote at any time after November 11.

Question. Have the Palestinians communicated through official channels that they 

do not intend to apply for membership at any other U.N. bodies, as has been reported in the press?

Answer. The Palestinians have indicated publicly that they won’t pursue membership in other U.N. entities for the time being.

Question. Has the mission made clear to other countries and to Secretary General 

Ban Ki-moon that the United States will not pay its contribution to UNESCO?

Answer. We have been very clear in public, in all our exchanges with the Palestinians, and in senior-level engagement with governments worldwide that Palestinian 

membership as a state in UNESCO triggers longstanding provisions of U.S. law 

that prohibit the United States from making assessed or voluntary contributions to 

UNESCO.

Question. Is USUN privy to any discussions to continue U.S. contributions to 

UNESCO by other means, for example, by paying for related programs in countries 

where UNESCO is currently working?

Answer. We have already withheld contributions to UNESCO following the vote 

to approve the Palestinian application. I am not aware of any consideration of plans 

to continue contributions to UNESCO by other means. 

RESPONSES OF ADAM E. NAMM TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. Freedom of Expression: What do you believe will be the impact on Ecuador’s press from the government’s successful lawsuit and judgment against the leading opposition newspaper? What are the repercussions of a new communications law 

in Ecuador as the law is environed pursuant to the May referendum? What steps, 

if any, would you take to encourage freedom of the press in Ecuador if appointed 

Ambassador?

Answer. As a matter of principle and longstanding policy, the United States upholds freedom of the press as a vital element of a representative democracy. All signatory nations to the Inter-American Democratic Charter, including Ecuador, are 

committed to uphold the democratic practices and institutionality. 

In July, an Ecuadorian court ruled in favor of Ecuador’s President Correa in a 

civil suit, convicting the editor and two directors of the second-largest national daily, 

El Universo, of libel, for an editorial criticizing President Correa for the events surrounding police protests of September 30, 2010. Immediately following the verdict, 

we joined the Inter-American Press Association, the Committee to Protect Journalists, and others in expressing concern over the sentence. We understand the case 

is under appeal, and are following that process closely. 

The May Referendum, approved by popular vote, included a proposal for a new 

Communications Law, which is still under debate in Ecuador’s National Assembly. 

The implementation of these revisions, including the Communications Law, deserves 

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careful scrutiny and analysis within Ecuador, by civil society, and by other nations 

that, like Ecuador, are signatories to the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which 

commits them to uphold strong democratic principles. 

U.S. engagement with and assistance to Ecuador include an important and enduring focus on strengthening democratic institutions, including a free press, an independent and vigorous judiciary, and vibrant civil society organizations. If confirmed, 

I will speak out publicly and forcefully on these points, engage with the Ecuadorian 

Government at the highest levels, and work with Ecuador’s civil society to further 

these U.S. policy priorities.

Question. Investment Climate: Private companies have long experienced problems 

in Ecuador’s oil and mining industries. How would you describe the current investment climate in Ecuador and how might it be improved? How would you assess the 

Correa government’s efforts to attract much-needed foreign investment and how 

might they be improved? To what degree are U.S. companies welcome to invest and 

operate in Ecuador?

Answer. The United States and Ecuador have maintained a strong commercial relationship in Ecuador dating that country’s independence from Gran Colombia in 

1830. The United States remains Ecuador’s largest trading and an important investment partner. The Ecuadorian Government and private sector have expressed interest in strengthening the bilateral commercial relationship with the United States. 

Taking into consideration specific areas for improvement in attracting foreign investment, we will look to engage with Ecuador to promote U.S. interests and protect 

U.S. investments. 

Ecuador’s investment climate includes a number of contrary factors, not least of 

which is the task of implementing provisions precipitated by Ecuador’s 2008 constitution which could impact investment. Ecuador’s stated intention to withdraw 

from bilateral investment treaties, including with the United States, has increased 

uncertainty. 

Despite these challenges, Ecuador is relatively open to foreign investment, including from the United States, and is cognizant of the need to attract foreign investment as it looks to expand its petroleum and mining sectors. The Ecuadorian 

Government announced that it plans to make available new oil concessions in the 

southwestern portion of the country. It is currently negotiating large-scale mining 

contracts with a number of foreign investors to move the sector from exploration to 

production in order to exploit the country’s untapped yet substantial reserves. In addition, the government has sought to generate investment in small and mediumsized firms through a newly adopted ‘‘Production Code,’’ which includes tax incentives to encourage investment in key sectors. 

The Ecuadorian Government has expressed hope for an improved commercial relationship with the Unites States in the future. The United States funds assistance 

programs aimed at aiding Ecuadorian efforts to fight corruption, address rule of law 

and overall security concerns, and in general improve the judicial system. Such 

steps could be helpful in terms of the investment climate. If confirmed, I would commit my efforts and those of the Embassy to engage with the Ecuadorian Government and with the private sector to raise any concerns about the business and 

investment climate, to seek U.S. investment in Ecuador, and to ensure that U.S. 

investors are treated fairly and equitably under the law.

Question. Non-Tariff Barriers/WTO: Ecuador maintains a number of WTO-illegal 

safeguards measures against imports of U.S.-made and U.S.-branded products including textiles, tires, windshields, apparel, footwear, and television sets as well as 

very restrictive and nontransparent tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) on imports of most 

U.S. agricultural products. What efforts are being made with Ecuador to address 

barriers to U.S. exports, especially as the World Trade Organization plans its next 

biennial Trade Policy Review of Ecuador later this month?

Answer. USG officials in Washington, Quito, and elsewhere have raised concerns 

with the Ecuadorian Government that a number of its trade policies may not be consistent with its WTO obligations. We continue to urge Ecuador to comply fully with 

its WTO commitments, and are working to mitigate the adverse impact of Ecuadorian trade restrictions on U.S. interests by engaging with the Ecuadorian Government directly through frank discussions on these issues. We also plan to raise our 

concerns at the next World Trade Organization biennial Trade Policy Review of 

Ecuador and utilize all other mechanisms at our disposal to address concerns of barriers to U.S. exports. 

Despite these restrictions, the Department, USTR, and our Embassy in Quito 

have been instrumental in successfully advancing and promoting U.S. economic and 

commercial interests in Ecuador. In July 2010, as a result of our Embassy and 

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USTR efforts, the Government of Ecuador eliminated balance of payments safeguards that had negatively affected U.S. exports. In addition, the Ecuadorian Government lifted its Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary agreement ban on poultry imports 

from West Virginia and Arkansas. In 2010, the United States registered a 30-

percent increase in exports to Ecuador. 

Among the Embassy’s advocacy successes is the New Quito International Airport 

project, which was successfully renegotiated and includes $264 million in lending 

from U.S. Government agencies and $685 million in U.S. exports of goods and services over the project life. 

If confirmed, it will be a priority for me to engage, along with my colleagues from 

the Foreign Commercial Service and USDA, with Ecuador’s Coordinating Ministry 

for Production, Ministry of Industries, Ministry of Agriculture, National Customs 

Service, and Foreign Trade Committee to facilitate imports of U.S. products and 

services. Likewise, if confirmed, I will work to advance further the Embassy’s 

Economic and Commercial sections’ efforts with Ecuador’s Intellectual Property Institute to promote awareness of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) issues through 

educational campaigns and to promote increased IPR enforcement. 

RESPONSES OF ROBERTA S. JACOBSON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

Question. For more than three decades, the State Department has designated 

Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. Last month, there were troubling reports 

that the administration could be considering removing Cuba from the list in 

exchange of Mr. Alan Gross’ release.

• Can you confirm whether the administration has ever considered removing 

Cuba from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list in exchange for Mr. Gross’ 

release? 

• Under what conditions would the administration consider removing Cuba from 

this list? 

• Do you envision brokering any additional deals with the Government of Cuba 

that involves their status as a terrorist supporting state?

Answer. At no time has the administration considered removing Cuba from the 

State Sponsors of Terrorism list in exchange for Mr. Alan Gross’ release. There is 

an established series of requirements necessary for a country to be removed from 

the State Sponsors of Terrorism list, and the Government of Cuba is well aware of 

these requirements. 

The conditions/requirements under which Cuba could be considered for removal 

from the State Sponsors of Terrorism are as follows: 

In the absence of a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the 

Cuban Government, in order to rescind Cuba’s designation as a State Sponsor of 

Terrorism, the law requires the President to first submit a report to Congress justifying the rescission and certifying that:

• The Government of Cuba has not provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding 6-month period, and, 

• The Government of Cuba has provided assurances that it will not support acts 

of international terrorism in the future.

We have not brokered any deals with the Government of Cuba that involve their 

status on the State Sponsor of Terrorism list, and we do not envision brokering any 

such deals at this time.

Question. I understand that our policies in Cuba are based on a cost-benefit analysis that balances accomplishments in democracy promotion versus the financial 

resources that will go to the Castro regime and indisputably enhance the regime’s 

capacity for repression. We now know that since the Obama administration eased 

restrictions on travel and remittances in April 2009, the regime has doubled its hard 

currency deposits in foreign banks. The Bank for International Settlements reported 

banks in 43 countries held $5.76 billion in Cuban deposits as of March of this year, 

compared with $4.285 billion at the close of 2009 and $2.849 billion at the close of 

2008.

• Can you provide detailed examples of what has been achieved in terms of democracy promotion in Cuba since April 2009 that outweigh the financial gains 

to the regime? 

• Political repression by the regime has more than doubled this year, reaching the 

worst documented level of repression in 30 years. How is this increase in funds 

helping the regime’s repressive apparatus?

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Answer. The increase in Cuban bank account balances from 2008–2011 is most 

likely the result of substantial third-country lines of credit, petroleum subsidies, import reduction efforts, and remittances from other countries. We do not believe it 

is likely the direct result of increased U.S.-based remittances or travel activities to 

the island. 

Regulatory changes announced in April 2009 and January 2011 were designed to 

enhance the free flow of information to, from, and among the Cuban people and promote their independence from the Cuban state. These measures do not allow for 

tourist travel, which is against the law and will not be authorized under these regulations. We work very closely with the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign 

Assets Control (OFAC) to prevent the misuse of these measures to promote tourism. 

We believe the Cuban people’s gain through the people-to-people measures outweigh 

any potential benefit to the Cuban regime. 

In addition to expanding people-to-people contact, our democracy and human 

rights programs complement our efforts to support the Cuban people by providing 

them with the knowledge base and the tools to gain greater freedom. Our Interests 

Section in Havana meets frequently with dissidents and we have trained hundreds 

of independent journalists whose work has appeared in major international news 

outlets. Human rights groups trained by our grantees have also documented human 

rights abuses for submission to international human rights bodies at the United 

Nations and Organization of American States and our diplomats work tirelessly to 

keep attention focused on Cuba’s human rights record.

Question. Over the last 9 months, you have also served as the Western Hemisphere Security Coordinator at the State Department, coordinating U.S. security cooperation across the region and U.S. Federal agencies.

• How often did you hold coordination meetings with agencies outside of the State 

Department? • What concerns and complaints did U.S. federal agencies express to you regarding coordination of State Department projects? • How could U.S. cross-agency coordination better work to address the increased 

security challenges in this complex environment along our southern border? • As Western Hemisphere Security Coordinator, how often did you brief the U.S. 

Congress on the interagency and interprogram coordination strategy and developments? • How often did you brief other agencies on delays or coordination challenges that 

arose in relation to any of the security programs in the region? Please list date 

and general content of discussion. • Are there examples of successful cross-agency coordination for State Department led initiatives that were carried out by the Under Secretary for Political 

Affairs? What is the benefit to having a high-level career officer hold this role?

Answer. The coordinator on citizen security initiatives is responsible for ensuring 

necessary coordination among our citizen security initiatives in the hemisphere, and 

among the agencies that execute them. In this capacity, it has been my responsibility to ensure that the appropriate WHA offices were in regular contact with their 

interagency interlocutors. I facilitated coordination within WHA, with partner 

bureaus in the State Department, and throughout the interagency community. During the period in question, I chaired or cochaired large, high-level interagency meetings on April 1 and on May 26, 2011, and attended at least a half dozen interagency 

policy committee meetings during which such coordination took place. While these 

larger meetings are of significant value, I would also note the very intense coordination on the citizen security initiatives in the Western Hemisphere that take place 

every day in smaller, more informal meetings and at the working level. 

Interagency discussions focused not only on the implementation of State Department programs but more importantly also on the critical effort to ensure the best 

possible coordination among the various programs executed by our interagency partners. For example, security programs and development programs often had to be 

sequenced to ensure maximum effectiveness. 

As one example, through our broad engagement with Mexico on the full range of 

important security, economic, and border management issues, we are enhancing 

U.S. interagency coordination and information sharing to address the increased security challenges along our southern border. For example, the ‘‘National Southwest 

Border Counternarcotics Strategy’’ was updated by the Office of National Drug Control Policy on July 7, 2011, to better guide national efforts focused on reducing the 

flow of illicit drugs and drug proceeds across the Southwest border. Other mechanisms to improve coordination include the Executive Steering Committee on 21st 

Century Border Management and the Mexico Merida High Level Consultative 

Group. 

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Alone, and with other State Department officials from multiple bureaus, I have 

briefed Members of Congress and their staff on our citizen security initiatives, our 

budget requests, and overall strategy on many occasions, as requested. I testified 

before the U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control on May 25, 2011, 

on our Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) in a hearing titled 

‘‘Combating Drug Violence in Central America.’’ Our efforts to improve coordination 

were both integrated into the initiatives themselves and regular briefings and conversations regarding the initiatives between WHA and Congress. 

On the matter of coordinating delivery of U.S. assistance, I and my staff were in 

constant coordination with the Bureaus of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and Political-Military Affairs (INL and PM), our embassies, interagency colleagues, and host governments concerning the details of implementation, 

seeking the best possible information, and to ensure an integrated and effective 

effort. These meetings occurred virtually every day. We developed improved mechanisms to speed the delivery of assistance and developed best practices to help to 

alleviate future delays and coordination challenges. For example, as a result of 

interagency coordination and the intervention of the most senior levels of the State 

Department, we were able to overcome early challenges in the delivery of UH–60 

helicopters to the Mexican Navy and accelerate the manufacturer’s schedule to meet 

the initiative’s requirements. 

Various Under Secretaries have very effectively coordinated Department-led initiatives. The Under Secretary for Global Affairs will become the Under Secretary 

for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, and will have a key role in 

coordinating and overseeing civilian security efforts, including by ensuring coordination of cross-cutting initiatives and global or multiregion initiatives. That said, we 

take advantage of the enormous expertise involved in coordinating implementation 

of bilateral and subregional citizen security initiatives which exists within State’s 

regional bureaus. The relationship between the Western Hemisphere Bureau and 

the functional experts within INL, PM, DRL and other Bureaus continues to be extremely positive and results-oriented.

Question. Regarding Daniel Ortega’s reelection in Nicaragua. What are the implications of his reelection—and the process leading up to it—for the democratic consensus in Central America and the broader Western Hemisphere?

Answer. The Nicaraguan elections were marred by irregularities and lack of 

transparency. The government failed to accredit some credible domestic organizations as observers, voters faced difficulties in obtaining proper identification, and 

Nicaraguan authorities declared that electoral candidates could be disqualified after 

the elections. 

We view this as an exception rather than the rule in Central America and in the 

hemisphere more broadly. The region’s commitment to democratic development is 

widespread and strong. The Organization of American States can help support the 

hemisphere’s democratic progress, especially as we work to implement fully the 

unique Inter-American Democratic Charter which enshrines the duties of our governments to protect and promote our citizens’ right to democracy. 

Through our statements, our bilateral diplomacy, and our multilateral diplomacy, 

if confirmed, I will remain committed to defending democratic processes and universal human rights, during electoral processes and beyond, and addressing threats 

to democratic institutions as they arise.

Question. What measures has the administration taken to lead a robust debate 

at the OAS on the irregularities and violations of the Nicaraguan Constitution that 

took place leading up to the November 6 election?

Answer. We have spoken out publicly about the elections, agreeing with the European Union electoral mission that the Supreme Electoral Council did not operate 

in a fair and impartial manner, including in a public statement on November 10. 

We also share the concerns of the OAS electoral mission regarding irregularities in 

the electoral process, and we join the OAS in calling upon Nicaraguan authorities 

to investigate acts of violence perpetrated on election day. 

The United States—and other member states—also expressed concern with the 

initial press release issued by the OAS which spoke of democracy advancing through 

the elections. This quote was later removed by the OAS. 

In our ongoing discussions with OAS Secretary General Insulza, Chief of Mission 

of the OAS Electoral Mission Dante Caputo, OAS member states, and other donors, 

we have underscored the importance of ensuring that the OAS take into consideration preelectoral issues impacting democratic institutions in Nicaragua. We will 

continue to raise our concerns on these points when the preliminary report of the 

OAS Electoral Mission is presented to the OAS Permanent Council. 

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The United States remains committed to defending democratic processes and universal human rights in the OAS. This is fully consistent with our common commitment to representative democracy, as expressed in the Inter-American Democratic 

Charter.

Question. What steps is the administration taking or is prepared to take to ensure 

the constitutional and electoral irregularities that have taken place in Nicaragua receive a robust response at the OAS, consistent with previous decisions regarding 

constitutional disruptions elsewhere in Central America?

Answer. The administration is working tirelessly with our partners in the region 

to ensure that the OAS addresses the irregularities observed in the Nicaraguan 

election, consistent with the shared commitment of all OAS member states to representative democracy, as expressed in the Inter-American Democratic Charter. As 

Article One of the Charter clearly states, ‘‘the peoples of the Americas have a right 

to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it.’’

The United States is committed to defending democratic processes and universal 

human rights and continues to urge the OAS to take steps to address the irregularities in a transparent and open manner. The United States has been working closely 

with the OAS Secretary General, Chief of Mission of the OAS Electoral Mission 

Dante Caputo, and other donors to review the irregularities in the Nicaraguan elections and ensure appropriate followup by the OAS Permanent Council. A preliminary report will be made to the OAS Permanent Council in the coming days by Mr. 

Caputo, and we look forward to a robust discussion of the findings. 

The mission’s report will address concerns regarding the identity card process, the 

makeup of the polling committees or ‘‘Juntas Receptoras de Votos,’’ the accreditation 

of political party observers (‘‘testigos’’) and the fulfillment of procedures related to 

the activities of international observers. The OAS Electoral Mission has also expressed concern regarding irregularities in the electoral process, as well as different 

acts of violence perpetrated on election day. We fully support the Electoral Mission’s 

call on Nicaraguan authorities to fully investigate and clarify these events. 

We will continue to press the OAS to take all necessary steps to promote free and 

fair elections in all countries in the hemisphere. We remain steadfast in our commitment and will continue to raise our concerns at the highest levels of the OAS.

Question. As you know, the administration has announced that it will oppose all 

loans from multilateral development banks to the Government of Argentina until 

the Argentine Government respects its obligations under the International Centre 

for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention. I understand that the 

administration is also considering the prohibition of trade benefits to Argentina currently granted under the Generalized System of Preferences, until that country 

comes into compliance with its ICSID obligations.

• When do you expect a decision on the GSP measures? Are there other steps that 

the U.S. Government can take to protect American investors affected by Argentina’s behavior on this matter?

Answer. The Department of State is pleased that the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program was recently reauthorized. 

The Department of State is one of several executive branch agencies on the GSP 

Subcommittee of the Trade Policy Staff Committee, led by USTR. The subcommittee 

has two petitions under review seeking Argentina’s removal from the GSP program 

based on alleged nonconformance with certain GSP eligibility criteria. Each of the 

petitions alleges that the Argentine Government has failed to act in good faith in 

recognizing as binding or in enforcing an arbitral award owed to the petitioner. On 

September 28, 2010, the GSP Subcommittee held a public hearing on these two 

petitions. 

Following the hearing, the subcommittee undertook a review of the hearing testimony, public comments, and other information in order to consider whether the circumstances warrant any changes to Argentina’s GSP eligibility. When authorization 

for the GSP program expired, on January 1, 2011, review of this and other petitions 

was suspended, pending reauthorization of the program. In October 2011, Congress 

passed, and the President signed into law, legislation reauthorizing the GSP program. As a result, the GSP Subcommittee has resumed its review and is now considering next steps with respect to the petitions. Any change to the list of GSP beneficiaries would require a determination by the President. 

The United States has repeatedly raised Argentina’s final and enforceable International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) awards with 

Government of Argentina officials at the highest levels and will continue to do so 

in the future. The United States will continue to remind the Government of Argentina of its international obligations, stress the importance of maintaining a fair and 

887

transparent investment climate that allows for effective dispute resolution, and underscore the extent to which foreign investment is critical to Argentina’s economy. 

The new multilateral development bank lending policy responds to serious concerns about Argentina’s failure to pay outstanding final ICSID arbitral awards and 

also to take the necessary steps to fully and conclusively normalize relations with 

its creditors. 

RESPONSES OF HON. MARI CARMEN APONTE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

Question. Mexico has had some success in combating how the cartels and Drug 

Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) finance themselves by limiting one-time cash 

deposits into a Mexican bank account to $10,000. This has driven the DTOs into 

Guatemala and El Salvador, where regulations are much weaker and they can open 

bank accounts with huge sums of cash.

• Can you describe your work with Salvadoran authorities to encourage banking 

regulations and reforms that will target the cartels and DTOs that are bringing 

violence into Central America?

Answer. U.S. agencies are currently working with the National Civilian Police to 

create a vetted unit that will focus on money laundering and other related criminal 

activities. Under President Obama’s Partnership for Growth, we will also create a 

committee comprised of experts from El Salvador and the United States to encourage the approval and implementation of a complete asset forfeiture law as well as 

improvements to legislation to combat money laundering. The committee will use 

a portion of the forfeited assets to fund crime prevention programs. Additionally, we 

will work with the Salvadoran Government to strengthen units in charge of financial investigation in the Police Force and Attorney General’s Office.

Question. Our cooperation with Mexico has been affected by bureaucratic delays 

in the delivery of key equipment. Have you identified similar delays affecting the 

timely and efficient delivery of our security cooperation programs in El Salvador?

Answer. Mexico had significant national resources available to support, sustain, 

and expand upon the equipment purchased through our security programs. Central 

American nations, including El Salvador, lack the capacity to provide similar levels 

of support for large equipment purchases, such as helicopters, planes, and advanced 

nonintrusive inspection equipment (NIIE). Therefore, CARSI’s focus is heavily oriented toward training, mentoring, and professionalization versus the acquisition of 

equipment. As required, and based upon assessments of El Salvador’s needs and capabilities, we are supporting the acquisition of limited quantities of equipment for 

El Salvador that is easy to maintain, requires little additional host-nation maintenance to sustain the capability, and require limited training. Examples of this 

equipment include bullet proof vests, communications equipment, and hand-held 

nonintrusive inspection equipment, such as fiber optic scopes. 

To enhance the delivery of citizen security assistance to the Government of El Salvador, the Department has decided to open a full-fledged Narcotics Affairs Section 

within the Mission, which should bring additional management, procurement and 

planning resources to bear in support of our engagement. To ensure that we are providing a whole-of-U.S. Government approach to citizen security in El Salvador, the 

Mission coordinates all citizen security efforts of all U.S. agencies involved in delivering prevention, law enforcement, rule of law, and security assistance (relevant 

agencies include Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosive, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, the Military Group, and U.S. Agency for International Development). 

To increase the impact of our efforts, the mission is also leading a ‘‘Group of 

Friends of El Salvador’’ with like-minded donors, international financial institutions 

and multilateral organizations to avoid duplicative programming and seek 

leveraging opportunities to collaborate with other partners on El Salvador’s most 

pressing citizen security challenges. 

RESPONSES OF ADAM E. NAMM TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

Question. What is your assessment of the current state of democratic institutions 

in Ecuador, specifically regarding government controls over the media, government 

regulations over civil society, and the consolidation of legislative and judiciary power 

under the executive branch?

888

Answer. The Ecuadorian Constitution of 2008 and a May 2011 referendum mandated a substantial restructuring of a number of Ecuadorian governmental institutions. Both measures were approved by popular vote. The referendum directed 

changes to Ecuador’s judicial system and a new Communications Law. Both the 

judicial restructuring and the new Communications Law are still under debate in 

Ecuador’s National Assembly. 

Ecuadorian and international civil society have expressed concern about the referendum, particularly the possibility that the judicial reform would result in effective executive control over the judiciary. Similarly, a civil suit lodged by President 

Correa against the El Universo newspaper that resulted in a very large fine being 

assessed to El Universo has raised concerns about media freedom. The State 

Department expressed similar concerns. 

As a matter of principle and longstanding policy, the United States believes that 

representative democracies require strong democratically established institutions, a 

robust, independent judiciary, and vibrant and independent media. It is for this reason that implementation of these revisions deserves careful scrutiny and analysis 

within Ecuador, by civil society, and by other nations that, like Ecuador, are signatories to the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which commits them to uphold 

strong democratic principles. 

Secretary Clinton has stated publicly that free press, freedom of expression, and 

a vibrant civil society are critical elements of democratic governance. If confirmed, 

I will continue to communicate the importance of these irreplaceable democratic values and universal human rights to the Ecuadorian Government and ensure that we 

follow closely any restructuring of Ecuador’s institutions.

Question. What are your greatest concerns regarding the growing ties between the 

government of Rafael Correa and Iran?

Answer. We are fully aware of the Iranian Government’s flouting of international 

standards, including defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions. Secretary Clinton said in 2009 that Latin American nations should therefore ‘‘think 

twice’’ about engaging with Iran. 

The focus of the Ecuador-Iran relationship has largely focused on diplomatic and 

some commercial ties. Both governments have discussed closer cooperation and have 

signed a number of agreements, but to date, there have been few concrete results, 

if any, from such projects. 

For our part, we carefully monitor Iranian activities in Latin America to ensure 

that violations of U.S. law or international sanctions are quickly detected and appropriate actions taken. The United States, when merited, has taken specific and effective actions concerning other countries in the region to address violations of U.S. 

statute or regulation with respect to dealings with Iran. We would do the same in 

the case of similar violations involving Ecuador or any other country in the region. 

We have expressed to the Ecuadorian Government our concerns over Iran’s support for terrorism, human rights violations and nonproliferation activities, U.S. policy designed to address this threat, and the importance of complying with international sanctions intended to deprive funding for entities involved in these activities. In 2009, the Export Development Bank of Iran, which was and is designated 

by Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Controls, indicated publicly that it had 

reached agreement to operate in Ecuador. At the time, and since, we have continued 

to reiterate the risks that financial institutions, both private and public, run, should 

they engage in transactions with U.S.-sanctioned entities, such as the Export Development Bank of Iran. 

RESPONSES OF ELIZABETH M. COUSENS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JOHN BARRASSO

Question. In your speech on November 19, 2009 at the Informal Meeting of the 

General Assembly on Climate Change, you stated that ‘‘one of mankind’s greatest 

challenges’’ is ‘‘sustainable, climate-friendly development.’’

• You also stated, ‘‘We have in Copenhagen the opportunity to reach a deal that 

can spur us on this path immediately and speed the transition to a low-carbon 

global economy.’’

• If confirmed, will you promote sustainable, climate-friendly development over 

all other forms of development? 

• Do you believe U.S. taxpayers should pay billions in climate change adaptation 

assistance to developing countries?

Answer. The new Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) on Global Development recognizes that development is vital to U.S. national security and a strategic imperaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00896 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
889

tive for the United States. It calls for a new focus on sustainable outcomes and a 

more strategic approach to development policy and assistance. The strategic approach focuses on the key drivers of broad-based economic growth and democratic 

governance, innovative solutions to longstanding development challenges, stabilization of countries emerging from crisis or conflict, and a new emphasis on holding 

all recipients of U.S. assistance accountable for development results. Climate change 

considerations are integrated in this policy as one important factor for countries’ 

long-term economic growth prospects and resilience. 

As I have understood from colleagues in the Office of the Special Envoy for Climate Change, part of what made the Copenhagen and Cancun agreements possible 

was a commitment, in the context of meaningful mitigation commitments and transparency by developing countries, to assist poor countries—particularly the least developed countries who are some of the most vulnerable to climate change impacts—

in both their adaptation to the effects of climate change and in their own efforts 

to limit carbon emissions. There was also an understanding that resources for adaptation assistance would need to be mobilized from a wide variety of sources, including the private sector. I believe that such a balanced approach to climate change 

is very much in U.S. national interest and bolsters U.S. leadership. It can also contribute to our own economic growth and help build a clean-energy world that is 

more resilient to the challenges presented by climate change, helping to decrease 

the costs of disaster assistance in the future. 

Many countries around the world, from least developed countries to some of our 

longest standing allies see climate change as one of the fundamental challenges facing their populations. It is vital to U.S. diplomatic leverage generally, and to longterm U.S. interests, to remain internationally engaged on these issues. 

Our programs are already making a difference on the ground. For example, in 

northern Uganda, we have worked to replace costly and inefficient diesel-powered 

water pumps at schools and health centers with solar energy systems. In the country of Georgia, the United States is promoting energy efficiency and renewable energy demonstration projects in sectors and buildings typically short of funding and 

lacking in donor support for energy improvements, such as hospitals. These kinds 

of programs, along with those of our partners around the world, make a difference 

not only in the effort to address climate change, but also in the lives and economies 

of the communities in which we work.

Question. India and China are growing rapidly as a result of affordable power, primarily from coal. Broader economic improvements in poor countries have been 

bringing real living improvements to people.

• Given your previous statement in support of sustainable, climate-friendly development, do you believe poor countries should not be allowed to improve their 

standard of living by using affordable power derived from coal?

Answer. Every country has unique energy needs and energy options. A clean and 

secure energy future that allows for sustained economic growth over the long-term 

must therefore include many options and incorporate a diversity of energy sources 

over time. In many contexts, traditional energy sources such as coal will remain an 

important part of a country’s energy portfolio in the short and medium term. However, the administration’s energy policy is focused on diversifying sources beyond 

traditional fossil fuel energy as part of a comprehensive, long-term strategy for energy independence. This includes expanding cleaner sources of electricity, including 

from renewable resources, nuclear power, and cleaner fossil fuels, such as natural 

gas, as well as energy efficiency measures. 

Through the Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCI), the United States will integrate climate change considerations, as appropriate, into other considerations of 

law and policy guiding foreign assistance to foster low emissions development strategies and enable developing countries to explore energy solutions path that are commercially viable as well as environmentally sustainable. 

(891)

NOMINATIONS 

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 8, 2011

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

Tara D. Sonenshine, of Maryland, to be Under Secretary of State 

for Public Diplomacy 

Earl W. Gast, of California, to be an Assistant Administrator of the 

United States Agency for International Development 

Anne Claire Richard, of New York, to be Assistant Secretary of 

State for Population, Refugees, and Migration 

Robert E. Whitehead, of Florida, to be Ambassador to the Togolese 

Republic 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, 

presiding. 

Present: Senator Cardin. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,

U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND 

Senator CARDIN. Well, good morning, everyone. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will come to order. 

I want to thank Senator Kerry for allowing me to chair this particular hearing on the nominees. 

I noticed Senator Corker was here a little bit earlier and greeted 

our nominees. 

And I am going to apologize in the beginning because there is a 

scheduled vote at 10:30 this morning which may require us to take 

a brief recess. But we will try to get this hearing done as efficiently 

as possible. There may be additional questions that are asked for 

the record, and I would just encourage the nominees to respond to 

those questions submitted for the record as promptly as possible. 

So let me welcome you all here. It is nice to have Mr. Earl Gast, 

who has been nominated to the Assistant Administer of the United 

States Agency for International Development; Ms. Tara Sonenshine, to be Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and 

Public Affairs; Ms. Anne Richard, to be Assistant Secretary of State 

for Population, Refugees, and Migration; and Mr. Robert Whitehead, to be United States Ambassador to Togo. 

We thank all of you for your willingness to serve in these public 

positions during these extremely challenging times, and we thank 

892

not only you, but we thank your families because we know this is 

not something that you can do without the support of your families. 

And we do thank you for this and we appreciate very much your 

willingness, in many cases, to continue in public service. 

Mr. Gast and Mr. Whitehead have over a half a century of public 

service between the two of you. Both will work on critical issues in 

Africa, including economic development, human rights, and support 

of democracy. 

Mr. Gast, as USAID’s Assistant Administrator for Africa, you 

will be responsible for nearly 40 percent of the USAID’s budget. As 

you know, this is a continent that suffers from food insecurity and 

mounting humanitarian crises, staggering gender inequalities, 

epidemics, extremism, crippling poverty, and climate change, just 

to mention a few of the challenges that we will be expecting you 

to deal with in this new position. 

Our development assistance works with people and governments 

of Africa to strengthen democratic institutions, foster broad-based 

and sustainable economic growth, combat disease, and improve 

public health, promote the rights of women, prevent, mitigate, and 

resolve armed conflict, and address transnational threats and 

challenges. 

There are some in the Congress today who question the utility 

of this aid and often imply that perhaps it is not in America’s strategic interest to provide this assistance. I could not disagree more. 

We must never forget, or let others forget, that our development 

assistance constitutes less than 1 percent of the Federal budget. 

Disproportionate cuts in these programs will not solve our budget 

crisis but will have a catastrophic result in the pursuit of our 

national security and our economic goals. 

Mr. Whitehead, as U.S. Ambassador to Togo, if confirmed, you 

will represent the President in West Africa among an ally who has 

a mixed record on democratic rule. I urge you to do your utmost 

to encourage stability in economic development, improve health 

care and personal freedoms to the government so that the Togolese 

themselves can begin to fully enjoy the fruits of democracy. 

I also expect that you will make a concerted effort to engage the 

ministers who will represent Togo at the United Nations Security 

Council so they are fully informed about the consequences of their 

votes as it relates to international events and U.S. interests. 

And now for our two Marylanders. The two Marylanders will 

have an easier time today. [Laughter.] 

I am very proud of both of our Maryland residents who are here 

today. Ms. Sonenshine, you bring an impressive qualification to 

this role of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public 

Affairs. Certainly your years of experience at ABC, including 10 

Emmy Awards, Newsweek, and most recently the U.S. Institute of 

Peace have exposed you to both the intricacies of the press and a 

broader peace agenda. I look forward to hearing more about your 

ideas as to how to adapt our traditional methods of messaging to 

today’s increasingly connected world and how you plan to expand 

not only the use of new technology, but also good, old-fashioned 

people-to-people exchanges. 

Under your jurisdiction will be many important functions, including the educational and cultural affairs. I have found, from my own 

893

experience, most of the foreign leaders with whom I have had the 

most rapport often are those who have studied or visited the 

United States. The programs that come under your role allow for 

that type of contact to continue. I can tell you that this is money 

well spent, but we want to make sure that we get the maximum 

benefits from these types of public investments. 

Ms. Richards, I have to tell you that the bureau that you will 

lead, if confirmed, has a mighty task. You will be deeply involved 

in the politics of your issue but also have programmatic responsibility to address individual needs. With your extensive background 

in previous State Department roles and at the International Rescue 

Committee, you know that this role for which you are nominated 

will put you as one of the champions of the world’s most vulnerable 

population. The Population, Refugees, and Migration Bureau deals 

with the plight of refugees worldwide, as well as conflict victims, 

those displaced by natural disasters, and populations of concern to 

the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 

In your new role, you will also provide a range of services 

addressing basic needs, community services, tolerance-building, 

and dialogue initiatives and take the lead on refugee protection 

and resettlement in the United States. Your staff members are 

often among the first Americans to come into contact with refugees 

who, in time, will also become Americans. The humanitarian 

nature of your work has got to be among the most fulfilling tasks 

of the State Department, in an area that is very close to my heart 

and the priorities that I have proposed as U.S. Senator. 

Once again, I thank all four of you for being willing to serve in 

critically important public positions, but ones which get a lot of 

attention and are not always well understood. We appreciate that 

willingness and we look forward to hearing your testimony today. 

With that, we will start. Mr. Gast, you can start. I will be glad 

to hear your comments, and we will follow that up with some 

questions. 

STATEMENT OF EARL W. GAST, OF CALIFORNIA, TO BE AN 

ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE UNITED STATES 

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. GAST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to start 

by saying that I was born in Maryland. [Laughter.] 

And I am very thankful that my family is here today and they 

are all Marylanders as well. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, that is very good. Do you want to make 

any confessions here about your connections? [Laughter.] 

Mr. GAST. It is an honor to appear before you today as the nominee to be USAID’s next Assistant Administrator for Africa. 

I want to express my appreciation for the trust and confidence 

that President Obama has placed in me by nominating me for this 

very important position and for the strong support of Secretary 

Clinton and Administrator Shah. I would also like to thank Sharon 

Cromer, a dedicated senior Foreign Service officer and a good colleague of mine, who has ably led the Bureau over the past year. 

And finally, I would like to recognize my predecessor in the Africa 

Bureau, Kate Almquist, whose expertise gave me an invaluable initiation to the region. 

894

After more than 20 years in the Foreign Service, I have seen 

development improve people’s lives and help countries grow, but I 

have also seen it fail to live up to our expectations and our hope. 

Nowhere does development show more promise, yet pose such challenge than it does in Africa today. 

Many Americans see only Africa’s seemingly intractable problems, but the remarkable progress on the continent is the often 

untold side of the story. Ghana and Tanzania are leading their own 

development plans that we contribute to, not direct. Liberia and 

Sierra Leone are quietly reaping the dividends of peace after a brutal civil war. Our response to the crisis in the Horn of Africa is providing emergency food, health care, and other lifesaving services to 

millions, and perhaps most extraordinary, millions of South Sudanese citizens came together to vote against war in favor of a peaceful independence from Sudan. 

U.S. support helped to create the environment where the Sudanese people were able to make their voices heard. This is a powerful illustration of what we can achieve in Africa and how continued 

United States involvement is critical to supporting African progress. There is no denying Africa’s importance to the United States, 

both for our moral imperative to help solve the world’s biggest development challenges and for the imperative to protect the United 

States own national security and economic growth. USAID Forward 

is improving the impact, the cost-effectiveness, and sustainability 

of our programs. And if confirmed, Senator, I am eager to advance 

this new approach to doing business. 

I would also look forward to deepening our relationship with 

Congress whose bipartisan support and commitment to Africa has 

provided the foundation for our programs and the springboard for 

our success. 

I am honored to be considered for this position, and if confirmed, 

I look forward to advancing the United States interests to help 

build a better future for all Africans. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I welcome any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gast follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EARL W. GAST

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished members of the committee, it is 

an honor to appear before you today as the nominee to be the next Assistant Administrator for Africa at the United States Agency for International Development. 

I want to express my appreciation for the trust and confidence that President 

Obama has placed in me by nominating me for this important position, and for the 

strong support of Secretary Clinton and Administrator Shah. I would also like to 

thank Sharon Cromer, an extremely dedicated senior officer who has ably led the 

Bureau for Africa across the past year. Her leadership has been invaluable, especially as the Agency began implementing key foreign assistance reforms. 

My own professional life has been devoted to improving the lives of others. In the 

aftermath of the People Power Revolution, I went to the Philippines to support the 

restoration of democratic values and economic opportunity. I worked in Russia, 

Ukraine, and Georgia after the collapse of the Soviet Union to help build new nations, and I served in Kosovo and Iraq during conflict and war to help implement 

our reconstruction efforts. During 2 years as Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator 

and then Acting Assistant Administrator for USAID’s Africa Bureau, I got to know 

the complex fabric that makes up the continent’s 48—now 49—countries. And most 

recently, I completed a tour in Afghanistan, where I led USAID’s efforts during the 

U.S. Government’s civilian surge. All of my assignments have been challenging—

895

some more than others. But I have always willingly committed myself to serving 

the U.S. Government’s efforts to confront those challenges. 

If confirmed, another important challenge awaits me. After more than 20 years 

in the Foreign Service, I’ve seen development improve people’s lives and help countries grow, but I’ve also seen it fail to live up to our hopes and expectations. Nowhere does development show more promise yet pose such challenge than it does 

today in sub-Saharan Africa, and nowhere can we more effectively apply the lessons 

we’ve learned from both our successes and our failures. If confirmed, I look forward 

to working with my talented colleagues at USAID, our partners throughout the U.S. 

Government, the private sector, multilateral and nongovernmental organizations, 

and our counterparts in Africa to address critical development and humanitarian 

needs on the continent. I also look forward to deepening our relationship with Congress, whose long-time bipartisan commitment to the African people has provided 

the foundation for our programs and the springboard for our success. Whether meeting with you here in Washington or at our missions overseas, we always value the 

opportunity to discuss our work with you and demonstrate how our investment 

there is making a difference in people’s lives. 

Africa’s future is bright. Our investments in its future are paying off, and the 

administration has plotted a path for our long-term support that capitalizes on the 

region’s emerging opportunities. 

Many Americans see only Africa’s seemingly intractable problems. But the remarkable progress on the continent is the often untold side of the story. Ghana and 

Tanzania are stable democracies leading their own development plans that we contribute to, not dictate. Kenya, in its recovery from post-election violence, has created 

a coalition government that is working to reconcile differences that stretch back decades before 2007. Liberia and Sierra Leone are quietly reaping the dividends of 

peace after their brutal civil wars, building sustainable institutions that provide 

their people with social services. Our response to the crisis in the Horn of Africa 

is providing emergency food, health care, and other lifesaving services to millions 

of people suffering from the region’s historic drought. And perhaps most extraordinary, millions of South Sudanese citizens came together to vote against war in 

favor of a peaceful independence from Sudan. 

U.S. support helped to create that environment in which the Sudanese people 

were able to conduct a free and fair referendum. This is a potent illustration of what 

diplomacy and assistance can achieve in Africa and how continued U.S. involvement 

is critical to supporting African progress. There is no denying Africa’s importance 

to the United States, both for our moral imperative to help solve the biggest development challenges on the planet, and for the imperative to protect the United States 

own national security and economic growth. Through USAID Forward, Administrator Shah’s comprehensive reform agenda, the Agency is improving the impact, 

cost-effectiveness, and sustainability of development programs. Our work with local 

organizations is helping to build home-grown capacity that will continue to thrive 

long after USAID achieves its goals. USAID is also committed to collaborating with 

other donors, private sector partners, and faith-based organizations to leverage our 

relative strengths and amplify the effect of U.S. investments in development. These 

efforts are already having an effect on our work in Africa, and if confirmed, I am 

eager to advance this new approach to doing business. 

On a personal note, I am honored to be considered for this position and to contribute to the goal of improving democratic systems, security, economic opportunity, 

health, food security, and education for Africans. I am deeply committed to USAID’s 

goals and the integrated role that it plays with the Department of State and the 

Department of Defense in advancing U.S. policy and national security objectives, 

and if confirmed, I will work diligently toward advancing these goals. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I welcome any questions you might have.

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you very much. 

Ms. Sonenshine. 

STATEMENT OF TARA D. SONENSHINE, OF MARYLAND, TO BE 

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND 

PUBLIC AFFAIRS 

Ms. SONENSHINE. Thank you, Senator. And it is with great respect and humility that I come before you and the committee seeking your support for my nomination as Under Secretary of State for 

Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. I thank my family members—

896

my husband, Gary Friend, and my sons, Jordan and Yale—for their 

constant support. I thank President Obama and Secretary of State 

Clinton for the confidence in me. And I thank this committee for 

its steadfast support of public diplomacy. 

Much of my career has been at the intersection of foreign policy 

and communications; that intersection of public diplomacy. 

Let me stress at the outset that I view public diplomacy as a profession, and I view public diplomacy skills as vital to advancing our 

national interests. As we sit here today, all around the world 

Americans and their host country partners are working to support 

public diplomacy in embassies, in consulates, at missions, at bases. 

Their work and the work of American citizen diplomats and volunteers are helping to build strong civil societies through engagement. Public diplomacy practitioners wherever they are, virtual or 

physical, deserve our leadership and support. 

Public diplomacy is a shared means to a shared goal of extending 

America’s reach and security by influencing how individuals 

around the world come to know us and understand us. It is about 

the advancement of our foreign policy goals through people-topeople connections in a complex, global networked society. 

So what does it take to succeed at public diplomacy today? One 

starts with fundamental notions. 

First, public diplomacy today is inextricably linked to national 

security. It is a critical part of 21st century statecraft because how 

safe we are at home and abroad is a reflection of a global community’s shared interests and values, and it leads to a common understanding of shared burdens and responsibilities. 

Two, public diplomacy increases economic security through global 

engagement because it keeps us competitive in the marketplace of 

ideas. We live in a world of transactions not just in goods and services, but in ideas and innovation, and we can use public diplomacy 

exchanges, engagement, and dialogue to advance scientific, health, 

and development policies, to spark discoveries, to open markets, to 

unleash the economic power of young people and women, to spur 

entrepreneurism, to encourage professional and private sector 

exchanges, and to diffuse conflicts. 

Third, public diplomacy today must be agile and adaptive in 

using state-of-the-art information technologies, for information 

today is like oxygen; it is part of how a society breathes. We are 

important players in the global public square where information

access is still, in parts of the world, restricted or restrained. There 

are still barriers to information for some. Control of information 

abused by others. Restrictive governments will still try to control 

information, but citizens are proving the power of information in 

the public square. 

So for public diplomacy to succeed in the 21st century, it must 

be strategic in how it engages stakeholders and tactical in the use 

of new tools. Public diplomacy must be like America, robust and 

resilient, consistent, transparent, and resourceful. Especially at a 

time when global resources are tight, tied to foreign policy goals 

and priorities, integrated into a strategic whole of foreign affairs, 

it is critical that public diplomacy show results through monitoring 

and evaluation. 

897

Technology is powerful, but so is human capacity, and there is 

no substitute for having that student from another country at your 

dinner table, in a classroom, or seeing our institutions at work. We 

need exchanges that make connections with civil society across 

many fields and to identify the next generation of leaders. 

I am fortunate. My predecessors in this job laid a strong foundation, including a strong strategic framework developed by my immediate predecessor, Under Secretary Judith McHale. I am fortunate because, if confirmed, I will be working with Secretary of 

State Clinton who truly understands smart power and public diplomacy. As the Secretary has said, ‘‘we must be out there in as many 

ways as possible and at every hour of every day.’’

I look forward, if confirmed, to working with you and the committee, and I look forward to any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sonenshine follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TARA DIANE SONENSHINE

Thank you, Senator Cardin, Senator Corker, and members of the committee. It 

is with respect and humility that I come before you seeking your support for my 

nomination as Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. I 

thank my family members, my husband, Gary Friend, and my sons, Jordan and 

Yale, for their constant support. I thank President Obama and Secretary of State 

Clinton for their confidence in me. And I thank this committee for its steadfast support of public diplomacy. 

Much of my career has been at the intersection of foreign policy and communications—that intersection of public diplomacy. 

Let me stress at the outset that I view public diplomacy as a profession, and I 

view public diplomacy skills as vital to advancing our national interests. As we sit 

here today, all around the world Americans and their host country partners are 

working to support public diplomacy in embassies, in consulates, at missions, at 

bases. Their work and the work of American citizen diplomats and volunteers are 

helping to build strong civil societies through engagement. Public diplomacy practitioners wherever they are—virtual or physical—deserve our leadership and support. 

Public diplomacy is a shared means to a shared goal of extending America’s reach 

and security by influencing how individuals around the world come to know and understand us. It is about the advancement of our foreign policy goals through peopleto-people connections in a complex, global networked society. 

To succeed at public diplomacy one starts with fundamental notions: 

1. Public Diplomacy today is inextricably linked to national security—it is a critical part of 21st century statecraft because how safe we are at home and abroad 

is a reflection of a global community’s shared interests and values that lead to a 

common understanding of shared burdens and responsibilities. 

2. Public Diplomacy increases economic security through global engagement because it keeps us competitive in the marketplace of ideas. This is a world of transactions—not just in goods and services, but in ideas and innovation. We can use 

public diplomacy exchanges, engagement, and dialogue to advance our scientific, 

health, and development policies, to spark discoveries, to open markets, to unleash 

the economic power of young people and women, to spur entrepreneurism, to encourage professional and private sector exchanges, and to diffuse conflicts. 

3. Public diplomacy today must be agile and adaptive in using state of the art 

information technologies. Information today is like oxygen—it is part of how a society breathes. We are important players in the global public square where information access is still, in parts of the world, restricted or restrained—where there are 

still barriers to information for some—or where control of information is abused by 

others. Restrictive governments will still try to control information—but citizens are 

proving the power of information in the public square. 

For public diplomacy to succeed in the 21st century, it must be strategic in how 

it engages stakeholders and tactical in the use of new tools. Public diplomacy must 

be like America—robust and resilient—consistent, transparent, and resourceful especially at a time when global resources are tight. Tied to foreign policy goals and 

priorities, integrated into a strategic whole of foreign affairs—it is critical that public diplomacy show results through monitoring and evaluation. Technology is powerful but so is human capacity. There is no substitute for having a student from 

898

another country at your dinner table, in a classroom, seeing our institutions at 

work. We need exchanges that make connections with civil society across many 

fields and help us identify the next generation of leaders. 

I am fortunate. My predecessors in this job laid a strong foundation, including a 

very strong strategic framework developed by Under Secretary Judith McHale. I am 

fortunate because, if confirmed, I will be working with Secretary of State Clinton, 

who truly understands smart power and public diplomacy As the Secretary has said, 

‘‘We must be out there in as many ways as possible and at every hour of every day.’’

Twenty-first century statecraft demands that we stay current and that our public 

diplomacy match our policies, priorities, and values of open access to information 

including unfettered access to the Internet. The Secretary of State has made it clear 

how committed she is to Internet Freedom and to working with the private sector 

on solutions to prevent countries from jamming our broadcasts or blocking Internet 

access. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Broadcast Board of Governors and others on this vital challenge of advancing the freedom of information 

and open access to information. 

Part of 21st century statecraft is using information tools like social networking 

to understand what is happening on the ground in societies around the world so 

that we can better predict trends and analyze events—because often what happens 

in the public square determines what happens at the highest levels of diplomacy. 

I will pay close attention to the world’s newest democracies and emerging powers 

as information is critical to building tolerance and understanding with other 

countries. 

If confirmed, I will also be mindful of resources. There is no doubt that public 

diplomacy, like every facet of American Government and American life, will have 

to do its work in ways that save costs. The former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Judith McHale, did groundbreaking work in leading a comprehensive strategic review of Public Diplomacy resources to ensure alignment 

among resources, planning and current foreign policy objectives. This includes shifting base resources to higher priority countries and issues as well as monitoring and 

evaluation of public diplomacy to make sure that we can show results. It means 

working with our embassies and missions, our cultural affairs officers and public 

affairs experts, and it means working with universities and organizations in the 

public square. Long-range planning, matching programs with resources tied to our 

policies and priorities, and tracking results will be critical aspects of my approach 

to the position. 

Public diplomacy is about facilitating direct contact with people. Part of my job 

will include looking at our various types of American spaces overseas and ensuring 

they are effective. I plan to build teams to shape how we convey ideas and express 

ourselves, and create greater mutual understanding through such important means 

as educational and cultural exchanges and international programs. I would like, if 

confirmed in this new role, to focus on a few important areas. 

First, as I said at the outset, it is important to stress the importance of public 

diplomacy as a profession and to garner respect for its mission and for those who 

carry it out. We need a strong, diverse, robust corps of public diplomacy officers to 

succeed. 

Second, I will continue to focus on how public diplomacy can help to counter violent extremism, including outreach to young people as their ideas fully take shape. 

One of the most important jobs of American Public Diplomacy is to contribute to 

the security of the people of the United States. By highlighting the inherent flaws 

in the extremist message, and by telling America’s story, we can help to discourage 

new recruits to organizations committed to violence. Their message of hate and destruction is resonating less and less as millions of people around the world demand 

full participation in their societies through genuine democratic structures. I look forward to working closely with the interagency Center for Strategic Counterterrorism 

Communications, a key instrument for realizing this goal. As my predecessor emphasized, public diplomacy must be integrated into the whole of government, 

through interagency coordination of strategy, messaging, communications—it is 

about team-building and cooperative ventures to reach across departments, agencies, and to work with all branches of government and civil society on better coordination of global messaging. 

Third, I will help to further a youth and democracy Public Diplomacy Initiative—

getting more young people positively engaged as the youth bulge around the world 

continues to challenge us. I hope to build on the great work that State is doing now 

with programs that engage youth from sports to culture to academic exchanges including the Kennedy-Lugar YES program. 

I also remain committed to the issues facing global women. Women are half the 

world and they need more resources, training, and engagement. Our public diploVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00906 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
899

macy must include messaging to them and engagement with them. They are part 

of the future of a more secure world. If confirmed, I hope to build on the strong work 

throughout the government to ensure that women throughout the world continue to 

get support in the economic, cultural, social, and foreign policy arenas. Indeed, all 

of the work of public diplomacy can support America’s economic statecraft agenda. 

There is great potential in the nexus between business and public diplomacy—

having government use its convening power to open doors so that individuals can 

invest in one another’s ideas and businesses to spur innovation and entrepreneurism and help identify a new generation of leaders. 

This is a time of incredible transition and opportunity for the work of public diplomacy, to leverage the power of technology and increase understanding of America’s 

values around the world. As nations and people, we are more dependent on each 

other than ever before and what happens in one part of the world affects another 

and ultimately affects our way of life. This is a historic time for public diplomacy. 

If confirmed, I will seize the moment.

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you very much for your testimony. 

Ms. Richard. 

STATEMENT OF ANNE CLAIRE RICHARD, OF NEW YORK, TO BE 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POPULATION, REFUGEES, AND MIGRATION 

Ms. RICHARD. I am honored to appear before you today as the 

President’s nominee to be Assistant Secretary of State for the

Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, or PRM. I thank 

the President and Secretary of State Clinton for their trust and 

confidence. If confirmed by the U.S. Senate, I will bring to this position years of practical experience in Government and in a leading 

relief agency, and an absolute dedication to my country and to the 

life and death humanitarian issues that are the responsibility of 

this Assistant Secretary. 

I am joined this morning by my husband, Will Davis; my children, Ellie and Max, who are so sad to be missing out on a day 

in Montgomery County schools. [Laughter.] 

And I am also joined by my sister, Christine Palmer, her husband, Tim, and their children, and my cousin, Beth Dugan, in addition to several longtime friends. I have a caring extended family 

that has taken an interest in and supported my professional career, 

and I understand my mother, brother, and other relatives are 

watching this morning over the Web. 

The United States provides humanitarian aid to tens of millions 

of people whose lives hang in the balance due to persecution, oppression, and conflict, thus expressing our highest American values 

and demonstrating our global leadership. 

I have been involved in these issues for much of my professional 

life. Over the past decade, I have traveled to countries suffering 

from conflict and its aftermath, including South Sudan, Afghanistan, Burma, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, and Liberia. I have talked to refugees where they have sought safe haven, 

meeting Somalis in Kenya, Burmese in Thailand, Iraqis in Jordan 

and Syria, and Afghans in Pakistan. In trips abroad, I am repeatedly impressed by the courage and resilience of refugees and other 

uprooted people. Despite all that they have endured, most of them 

long to regain control of their lives and become self-sufficient again. 

They ask only for a little bit of help and a small share of our attention. And I have seen how modest investments of our know-how 

and resources can, indeed, bring about major improvements in 

their lives. 

900

Secretary Clinton has consistently demonstrated over the past 3 

years that meeting the world’s humanitarian challenges is a 

Department priority. The Bureau I have been nominated to lead 

supports protection measures which seek to maintain safe places of 

refuge and prevent and respond to gender-based violence. PRM aid 

also includes clean water, sanitation, immunization and other 

health care, shelter, and items like bedding, pots and pans, and 

seeds and tools to grow food. It includes services such as treatment 

of HIV/AIDS, counseling on voluntary family planning, and other 

measures to reduce maternal mortality. PRM works through well 

regarded and highly accountable multilateral and nongovernmental 

organizations to reach millions and protect them from diverse 

threats, ranging from armed militias to cholera. It also promotes 

best practices in humanitarian response and ensures that humanitarian principles are integrated into U.S. foreign and national security policy. 

If confirmed, I would place special emphasis on three PRM 

responsibilities. These are described in my written statement, and 

I would be happy to expand on them during the question and answer part of this hearing. But they can be summarized as: first, 

persistent humanitarian diplomacy to yield results in crisis zones 

such as needed now in the Horn of Africa; second, working with 

other parts of the U.S. Government to ensure that our country sustains a vibrant refugee admissions program while carrying out effective security screening; and third, continuing to emphasize the 

need to protect vulnerable populations, particularly women and 

girls. 

In conclusion, the staff of the PRM Bureau brings extraordinary 

dedication and expertise to assisting people in distress and advocating on their behalf. If confirmed, I will seek to bring to the 

Bureau all the knowledge and insights gained during my career, 

including an understanding of the importance of U.S. assistance 

and diplomatic engagement. 

I am thankful to the President for nominating me to lead this 

Bureau, grateful for the opportunity to serve under Secretary Clinton, and appreciate the Senate’s careful consideration of my nomination. Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Richard follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANNE C. RICHARD

I am honored to appear before you today as the President’s nominee to be Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration or 

‘‘PRM.’’ I thank the President and Secretary of State Clinton for their trust and confidence. If confirmed by the U.S. Senate, I will bring to this position years of practical experience in government and in a leading relief agency, and an absolute dedication to my country and to the life-and-death humanitarian issues that are the 

responsibility of this Assistant Secretary. 

I am joined this morning by my husband, Will Davis, and our two children, Ellie 

and Max. I am also joined today by my sister, Christine Palmer, her husband, Tim, 

and their children and my cousin, Beth Dugan, in addition to several long-time 

friends. I have a caring extended family that has taken an interest in and supported 

my professional career, for which I am profoundly thankful. Friends and professional colleagues also join us here today and I thank them. 

The United States provides humanitarian aid to tens of millions of people whose 

lives hang in the balance due to persecution, oppression, and conflict. Our Nation’s 

helping hand to refugees, victims of conflict, the uprooted, and the stateless 

expresses our highest American values and demonstrates our global leadership. 

901

I have been involved in these issues for much of my professional life. Over the 

past decade, I have traveled to countries suffering from conflict and its aftermath, 

including South Sudan, Afghanistan, Burma, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 

Uganda, and Liberia. I have talked to refugees where they have sought safe haven, 

meeting Somalis in Kenya, Burmese in Thailand, Iraqis in Jordan and Syria, and 

Afghans in Pakistan. In trips abroad, I am repeatedly impressed by the courage and 

resilience of refugees and other uprooted people. Despite all that they have endured, 

most of them long to regain control of their lives and become self-sufficient again. 

They ask only for a little bit of help, and a small share of our attention. And I have 

seen how modest investments of our know-how and resources can indeed bring 

about major improvements in their lives. 

Secretary Clinton has consistently demonstrated over the past 3 years that meeting the world’s humanitarian challenges is a Department priority. The Bureau I 

have been nominated to lead is central to that effort as its mission is ‘‘to provide 

protection, ease suffering, and resolve the plight of persecuted and uprooted people 

around the world on behalf of the American people.’’ PRM supports protection measures which seek to maintain safe places of refuge, address gender-based violence, 

ensure that refugees have appropriate documentation of their status, and that their 

newborn children are registered. PRM support includes clean water, sanitation, immunization and other health care, shelter, and items like bedding, pots and pans, 

sanitary supplies, and seeds and tools to grow food which increases self-sufficiency. 

It includes services such as treatment of HIV/AIDS, counseling on voluntary family 

planning, and other measures to reduce maternal mortality. PRM works through 

well-regarded and highly accountable multilateral and nongovernmental organizations to reach millions and protect them from diverse threats, which range from 

armed militias to cholera. It also promotes best practices in humanitarian response 

and ensures that humanitarian principles are integrated into U.S. foreign and 

national security policy. That is an ambitious agenda and a weighty responsibility 

that I would embrace without reservation. 

If confirmed, I would place special emphasis on three PRM responsibilities. First, 

I salute the vigorous humanitarian diplomacy practiced by the Bureau’s most recent 

Assistant Secretary, Eric Schwartz. He recognized that PRM has a valuable perspective: it is deeply involved in the delivery of aid through partners while also sending 

U.S. teams to engage with other governments on crucial issues to resolve crises and 

to find solutions. Because of this, it has a unique vantage point—at the intersection 

of humanitarian, human rights, and political issues—from which to inform and help 

shape U.S. foreign policy and the policies of foreign governments and international 

bodies. We know that persistent humanitarian diplomacy can eventually yield 

results. In the Balkans, for example, the State Department’s efforts have helped to 

facilitate a landmark agreement this year which, when fully implemented, will provide housing solutions for as many as 74,000 refugees and internally displaced 

persons. This is a major step forward to bringing a permanent resolution to the 

Balkans’ protracted refugee and IDP problem. We should continue to engage in 

humanitarian diplomacy that holds governments accountable for fulfilling their 

international obligations and emphasizes the hard truth that complex humanitarian 

emergencies ultimately require political solutions. 

Nowhere is this truth more painfully evident in today’s world than in Somalia, 

where tens of thousands have died and hundreds of thousands are at risk of death. 

Even as Somalis flee, there is no quick humanitarian solution to a famine being 

fueled by conflict and political instability. If confirmed, I would work with the 

Bureau of African Affairs, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and others in the U.S. Government to address the crisis in the Horn of Africa. 

Second, the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program annually welcomes a fraction of the 

world’s refugees into our country for resettlement. This is a great American tradition that not only saves lives and lets families thrive but also enriches the fabric 

of our Nation. This program, like others PRM oversees or manages, is a publicprivate partnership with organizations working at the local level. During the past 

decade it has been my privilege to visit refugees resettled in cities from Baltimore 

and New York to San Francisco and Salt Lake City. I never fail to be impressed 

by the hospitality and support new arrivals receive from local communities and by 

the energy refugees bring to their new lives in the United States. You may know 

that delays related to new security checks, unrest in Syria, and insecurity in Yemen 

have resulted in fewer refugees arriving in the United States over the past fiscal 

year. If confirmed, I will work with other parts of the U.S. Government to ensure 

that our country sustains a vibrant refugee admissions program while carrying out 

effective security screening. 

Third, if confirmed, I will continue to emphasize the need to protect vulnerable 

populations, particularly women and girls. Protection of the vulnerable is the core 

902

principle of international refugee law and should always be PRM’s primary goal. 

Refugee women and children are particularly in danger of sexual violence, physical 

abuse and exploitation, and separation from families—among other threats. Secretary Clinton has long championed women’s rights worldwide, and PRM’s programs 

have helped hundreds of survivors of gender-based violence in places like Colombia 

and Kenya. More followthrough is needed so that our best practices in protecting 

and empowering women and girls are employed every time they should be. 

In conclusion, I have been a fan of the PRM Bureau for many years. Its staff 

brings extraordinary dedication and expertise to assisting people in distress and 

advocating on their behalf. If confirmed, I will seek to bring to the Bureau all the 

knowledge and insights gained during my career, including an understanding of the 

importance of U.S. assistance and diplomatic engagement, and will be steadfastly 

committed to fulfilling the responsibilities entrusted to the Assistant Secretary. I am 

thankful to the President for nominating me to lead this Bureau, grateful for the 

opportunity to serve under Secretary Clinton, and appreciate the Senate’s careful 

consideration of my nomination. 

Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Whitehead. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT E. WHITEHEAD, OF FLORIDA, TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE TOGOLESE REPUBLIC 

Mr. WHITEHEAD. Thank you, Chairman Cardin. It is a great 

honor to appear before you today as the nominee to be the next 

United States Ambassador to the Togolese Republic. I am grateful 

for the confidence the President and Secretary of State have shown 

in me through this nomination, as well as for the support of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Johnnie Carson. If confirmed by the Senate, I will do my utmost to uphold this trust. 

Mr. Chairman, please allow me to acknowledge family members 

who are here today, especially my wife, Agathe, who, along with 

our children, has over the course of 30 years borne the sacrifices 

and separations required by this profession. I would also like to 

thank colleagues and friends present today who have offered both 

encouragement and counsel that have smoothed the course of both 

my professional career and my personal life. 

Finally, I would like to mention two individuals who could not 

be here in person: my mother, Lucretia, who was unable to make 

the trip, and my son, Wesley, who is currently deployed in Afghanistan. 

Mr. Chairman, with a population of more than 6 million inhabitants, the Togolese Republic lies north of the Bight of Benin in the 

middle of a region of Africa that is important to the energy security 

of the United States and with which the United States has longstanding cultural ties. If confirmed, I would count it a great privilege to lead the Embassy in Lome and its interagency team of 

Foreign Service, civil service, locally employed staff, and family 

members as we seek to advance U.S. bilateral and regional interests. I am confident that my previous experience as charge ́

d’affaires in Khartoum; consul general in Juba, Southern Sudan; 

and deputy chief of mission in Harare, Lusaka, and Bangui, in all, 

a total of more than 2 decades on the ground in sub-Saharan 

Africa, will serve me well. 

Mr. Chairman, our principal concerns in Togo are the welfare of 

Americans located there, the promotion of democracy and good governance, the improvement of basic health services, maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, human rights, and the advancement of 

903

economic prosperity. To achieve these goals, the United States has 

a range of modest programs supporting democracy, economic development, security sector reform, and peacekeeping. Given budget realities overlaid on global priorities, I realize that we will need to 

work collaboratively and creatively with other countries and international organizations involved in Togo to leverage progress in all 

of the areas listed above. If confirmed, I commit to work closely 

with our international partners to help the Togolese Republic promote empowerment and prosperity for all Togolese regardless of 

ethnic, religious, regional, or political affiliations. 

Mr. Chairman, as you know, Togo passed through a period of internal upheaval from which it began to emerge just a few years 

back. The country is presently at peace. Democratic legislative and 

Presidential elections, held respectively in 2007 and 2010, were 

judged credible by both local and international observers. Legislative elections and perhaps local ones are scheduled to take place in 

2012, and should I be confirmed, one of the Embassy’s top priorities will be to support a peaceful, transparent, and fair electoral 

process, thereby consolidating and expanding on the democratic 

gains of the past 5 years. 

A healthy economy provides fertile ground in which democracy 

and good governance can flourish, and the growth of the Togolese 

economy over the past decade is a positive portent. If confirmed, I 

will take advantage of available initiatives to support this trend, 

including identification of public-private partnerships that include 

American companies and that enjoy U.S. Government guarantees. 

The Embassy will look to use regional USAID programs to 

strengthen the Togolese Republic’s role as a regional trade hub and 

help ensure that the country makes the most of Lome’s deepwater 

port and can better manage land transportation infrastructure. All 

of these are important to efficient trade and shipping with landlocked Sahelian countries to the north. If confirmed, I will encourage the Togolese Government and Togolese entrepreneurs to take 

greater advantage of the opportunities the American Growth and 

Opportunities Act affords. 

If confirmed, I will look to employ existing initiatives, including 

the multilateral partnership of the Global Fund, to assist the Togolese Ministry of Health in improving basic public health programs 

and treating and eradicating disease. The Embassy in Lome will 

look to continue to support a robust Peace Corps presence in the 

country with a programmatic focus on health, especially on HIV/

AIDS awareness and prevention. 

A stable, prosperous, and healthy Togolese Republic serves 

American values and interests and expands Togo’s ability to contribute to stability on the African Continent. If confirmed, I look 

forward to collaborating with the Togolese authorities through regional initiatives to strengthen their capacity to police and to regulate Togolese waters in the Gulf of Guinea. The U.S. Embassy will 

look to use existing programs to help protect Togolese maritime resources, to regulate legitimate licensed trade, to combat the scourge 

of narcotics smuggling into and transshipment through Togo, and 

to prevent trafficking in persons. If confirmed, we will look to continue to encourage and support expanded Togolese Government’s 

participation in U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa through the 

904

Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance Program, which 

has been active in Togo since 2009, and which has assisted with 

training and deployment of Togolese peacekeeping forces to Cote 

d’Ivoire, Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I would be pleased to answer any questions you 

may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Whitehead follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT E. WHITEHEAD

Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Corker, and members of the committee, it is 

a great honor to appear before you today as the nominee to be the next United 

States Ambassador to the Togolese Republic. I am grateful for the confidence that 

the President and Secretary of State have shown in me through this nomination, 

as well as for the support of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie 

Carson. If confirmed by the Senate, I will do my utmost to uphold this trust. 

Mr. Chairman, please allow me to introduce family members who are here today, 

especially my wife, Agathe, who, along with our children, has over the course of 30 

years borne the sacrifices and separations required by this profession. I would also 

like to thank colleagues and friends present today, who have offered encouragement 

and counsel that have smoothed the course of both my professional career and my 

personal life. Finally, I would like to mention two individuals who could not be here 

in person, my mother, Lucretia, who was unable to make the trip, and my son, Wesley, who is currently deployed in Afghanistan. 

Mr. Chairman, with a population of more than 6 million inhabitants, the Togolese 

Republic lies north of the Bight of Benin in the middle of a region of Africa that 

is important to the energy security of the United States, and with which the United 

States has longstanding cultural ties. If confirmed, I would count it a great privilege 

to lead the Embassy in Lome and its interagency team of Foreign Service, civil service, locally employed staff, and family members as we seek to advance U.S. bilateral 

and regional interests. I am confident that my previous experience as Charge ́

d’Affaires in Khartoum, Consul General in Juba, and Deputy Chief of Mission in 

Harare, Lusaka, and Bangui—in all, a total of more than two decades on the ground 

in sub-Saharan Africa—will serve me well. 

Mr. Chairman, our principal concerns in Togo are the welfare of Americans 

located there, the promotion of democracy and good governance, the improvement 

of basic health services, maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, human rights, and 

the advancement of economic prosperity. To achieve these goals, the United States 

has a range of modest programs supporting democracy, economic development, security sector reform and peacekeeping. Given budget realities overlaid on global priorities, I realize that we will need to work collaboratively and creatively with other 

countries and international organizations involved in Togo to leverage progress in 

all of the areas listed above. If confirmed, I commit to work closely with our international partners to help the Togolese Republic promote empowerment and prosperity for all Togolese, regardless of their ethnic, religious, regional or political 

affiliations. 

Mr. Chairman, as you know, Togo passed through a period of internal upheaval 

from which it emerged just a few years back. The country is presently at peace. 

Democratic legislative and Presidential elections, held respectively in 2007 and 

2010, were judged credible by international observers. Legislative elections, and potentially local ones, are scheduled to take place in 2012, and, should I be confirmed, 

one of the Embassy’s top priorities will be to support a peaceful, transparent, and 

fair electoral process, thereby consolidating and expanding on the democratic gains 

of the past 5 years. 

A healthy economy provides fertile ground in which democracy and good governance can flourish, and the growth of the Togolese economy over the past decade is 

a positive portent. If confirmed, I will take advantage of available initiatives to support this trend, including identification of public-private partnerships that include 

American companies and that enjoy U.S. Government guarantees. The Embassy will 

look to use regional USAID programs to strengthen the Togolese Republic’s role as 

a regional trade hub and help ensure that the country makes the most of Lome’s 

deepwater port, and can better manage land transportation infrastructure; all are 

important to efficient trade and shipping with landlocked Sahelian countries to the 

north. If confirmed I will encourage the Togolese Government and Togolese entrepreneurs to take greater advantage of the opportunities AGOA affords. 

905

If confirmed, I will look to employ existing initiatives, including the multilateral 

partnership of the Global Fund, to assist the Togolese Ministry of Health in improving basic public health programs and treating and eradicating disease. The Embassy 

in Lome will look to continue to support a robust Peace Corps presence in-country 

with a programmatic focus on health, especially on HIV/AIDS awareness and 

prevention. 

A stable, prosperous, and healthy Togolese Republic serves American values and 

interests and expands Togo’s ability to contribute to stability on the African Continent. If confirmed, I look forward to collaborating with the Togolese authorities 

through regional initiatives to strengthen their capacity to police and regulate Togolese waters in the Gulf of Guinea. The U.S. Embassy will look to use existing 

programs to help protect Togolese maritime resources, to regulate legitimate 

licensed trade, to combat the scourge of narcotics smuggling into and transshipment 

through Togo, and to prevent trafficking in persons. If confirmed, we will look to 

continue to encourage and support expanded Togolese Government’s participation in 

U.N. Peacekeeping Missions in Africa through the Africa Contingency Operations 

Training Assistance program, which has been active in Togo since 2009, and which 

has assisted with the training and deployment of Togolese peacekeeping forces to 

Cote d’Ivoire, Sudan, Chad, and the Central Africa Republic. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I would be pleased to answer any questions you 

may have.

Senator CARDIN. Well, once again, let me thank all four of you 

for your being here, your testimony, and for your service, and I 

want to underscore the importance of the families that are here. 

We will write the necessary notes to the Montgomery County 

school system to take care of it. [Laughter.] 

We think we can take care of that today. 

You are each seeking different positions, but there is a lot of 

common agenda items in the four positions that are being nominated to be filled here today. I want to talk about an area of personal interest to me and part of my responsibilities. I not only 

serve on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I chair the Subcommittee on International Development Assistance which, Mr. 

Gast, you and I have had a chance to talk about that. I also am 

the Senate chair of the U.S. Helsinki Commission which deals with 

a variety of issues, but it is best known, I think, for its human 

rights basket. 

So I want to ask all four of you a common question, and that is, 

how do you intend to make the advancement of human rights a top 

priority of your office? 

I might point out that President Obama has made it clear, internationally, that the United States in its international bilateral and 

regional relations will insist upon basic human rights advancements. 

Secretary Clinton has been extremely articulate particularly on 

gender equality issues but also on broader human rights issues and 

I noticed in this morning’s paper getting the wrath of President 

Putin because of her support for the legitimate protests of the 

people of Russia with the fraud that was committed in their most 

recent elections. 

On the refugee issue, human rights is critically important. We 

know a lot of the trafficking matters come out of the migration 

issues, and I would be interested in that. And of course, the bilateral with Togo—it has gone through a transition, but its record on 

human rights is far from clear. 

So I would welcome your thoughts how you would use public 

diplomacy to advance these issues knowing that there have been 

906

efforts made in many of the countries around the world to block 

international access to how human rights are viewed. So, Ms. 

Sonenshine, we will start with you this time and just work your 

way down as to how you would make human rights advancements 

a priority in the office. 

Ms. SONENSHINE. Thank you very much for the question. 

I share the concern that we really advance the democracy agenda 

and human rights as a cornerstone of that. 

There are three things, Senator, that if confirmed, I would want 

to work on. One is strengthening the American narrative and 

weaving human rights into, as the Secretary has done, the tapestry 

of all of our messaging overseas. The second is to continue the support for media on the ground. The training of local indigenous 

media is critical to an open society. The third is, I think, what we 

are doing in nonpermissive environments such as Iran where we do 

not have a presence, but we can create a virtual embassy. We can 

leverage technology today such that the electronic curtain that is 

often put up around citizens—that we can get around it. 

So I think the continuation of these values through our programs, through our assistance, through our messaging, and 

through our narrative, that this will be an important part of my 

responsibilities, and I would look forward to working with you and 

the committee on that. 

Senator CARDIN. Mr. Gast, we will just work our way down. 

Mr. GAST. Senator, I had the pleasure of working with the Helsinki Commission on issues related to Belarus in the past, and I 

know the good work of the commission quite well. 

Supporting human rights is a critical component of our development assistance programs. President Obama has made it clear. 

Secretary Clinton and Administrator Shah have all made it clear 

that it is to be a critical component. 

With regard to development assistance, we support civil society 

organizations throughout the continent of Africa, and we will continue to intensify those efforts. But they are also critical components, not stand-alone activities of some of the major initiatives 

that we have now. So, for example, the Global Health Initiative, is 

making sure that we are supporting women’s rights, rights to 

health care, persons living with HIV/AIDS, et cetera. So I would 

see, if confirmed, Senator, that we would intensify those efforts. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Ms. Richard. 

Ms. RICHARD. Thank you for your question, Senator. 

You will notice that when staff from the Population, Refugees, 

and Migration Bureau speak about the services that are undertaken by PRM, it is not just aid and it is not just the delivery and 

distribution of things, but it is also protection. And when we talk 

about protection, we mean physical protection, but we also mean 

protection of rights. And in terms of rights, we are talking about 

refugee rights, but also human rights, the most basic and fundamental human rights. 

I can commit to you that I will work very hard, if confirmed, to 

pursue an agenda that fosters and preserves human rights around 

the world. And one reason I feel so confident in saying that is that 

I know already the work of colleagues like Michael Posner, who is 

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the Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 

and Harold Koh, with whom I met recently, who is the Secretary’s 

legal adviser and who is himself a great human rights leader. 

And I also will continue to have, as I do now, good relations with 

leading experts from human rights nongovernmental organizations 

such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Human 

Rights First, and Freedom House. And so I would continue the pattern set by the most recent Assistant Secretary, Eric Schwartz, in 

having a very vigorous dialogue with leading experts in human 

rights in the United States. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Whitehead. 

Mr. WHITEHEAD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think you hit the nail right on the head when you got to human 

rights. As you know, Togo from about 1990 to 2005 went through 

a very difficult period, a lot of internal turmoil, instability; 2005 

with the change of the head of state. It began in a rather awkward 

fashion with a sort of an extra-constitutional promotion of a President. Since then, however, the trend lines have been encouraging. 

There has been a concerted effort in reform in a number of areas. 

In terms of human rights, I would probably pick four areas as priorities that I would focus on, were I confirmed. 

The first one I mentioned already, which is the democratic selection of a government, that it will be key in 2012 that the legislative 

elections are perceived to be free and fair. There are a number of 

issues surrounding them, including the need for redistricting based 

upon the most recent census, what have you. And I would commit, 

if confirmed, to work carefully and closely with the government to 

see that we make progress in these areas. 

Another area of importance is the freedom of the press. I think 

this ties again into our public diplomacy, and it is a basic right. 

Recently, in fact, the press in Togo has sort of come out of its catatonic state. You have over 20 newspapers, probably 50 radio stations, several private television stations. The media has been 

confident enough to be critical of the various institutions, the President, the judiciary. None has been intimidated physically. No journalists are in prison. However, it is still very weak in terms of 

training, financing, what have you. The Embassy has provided programming to train and to improve the quality of journalism. If confirmed, I would commit to continue with that. 

Another specific area is child labor. Togo has been identified as 

a country that has a problem with this, a large number of young 

children involved, about half of them in agricultural pursuits, 

about a quarter in domestic within the country. The Togolese Government has taken steps to form a national plan to work and try 

to resolve these issues. The Department of Labor has provided 

some grants to work with them. And I would commit again to work 

in this area. 

Thank you. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you for that—all four of you for 

those answers. 

We are going to take a brief recess, approximately 15 minutes, 

so that we will reconvene in 15 minutes. There is a vote on the 

floor of the Senate dealing with the confirmation of a nominee. So 

908

I think it is important for me to go over and vote, and I will be 

back in about 15 minutes.

[Recess.]

Senator CARDIN. Once again, I apologize for the inconvenience of 

the recess, but that is the way the Senate schedule operates. The 

hearing will come back to order. 

I am going to follow up a little bit on the human rights issues. 

So if I might start again with Ms. Sonenshine. One of the challenges of your position is that for public diplomacy to work, people 

have to be able to communicate, and modern communications are 

through the Internet in which many of the countries that we have 

incredible interest in try to block the access to that type of information. It has had limited success. We have seen during Arab Spring 

and during now what is happening in Russia that people find a 

way to get their information out. But under the responsibilities of 

the agency that you would head, it is critically important to use, 

as you pointed out in your statement, modern ways of communicating. 

So what do you do about those countries who are trying to block 

access to their citizens of getting information not just from the outside world, but from their own people? 

Ms. SONENSHINE. Thank you very much for the question. 

I honestly believe that public diplomacy’s first mandate is to stay 

in it for the long haul. It is very easy to recede during difficult information periods from a country. I think Burma is the most recent 

example of if you stay with something long enough. The extension 

of our values now include the right to connect, and that is sort of 

a new human right, the right to be informed, the right to connect, 

the right to have open access to information. In very closed regimes, Cuba in particular, we have to continue to try SMS texting, 

sometimes reverting to DVD’s and more traditional means of getting information in. And where we are stymied as again in Iran, 

one has to believe that individuals—and we saw this yesterday 

with the virtual embassy—find a way around these blockades. The 

amazing thing about the Arab Spring is that despite all attempts 

to block information, individuals are very resourceful. And so if we 

have the staying power, if we have the sustainability, we can actually rely on new technologies to circumvent technology and we can 

rely on the willpower of individuals to find us if we are out there. 

If we are not out there with the information, then sadly others will 

fill the void that we leave behind. 

Senator CARDIN. I agree with that. You mentioned Cuba. Of 

course, there is another Marylander, Alan Gross, who is in prison 

in Cuba working for our Government. Although all the facts are 

not exactly understood, we believe that it was an effort so the people of Cuba could get information, making the position that you 

seek to fill a little bit easier, and yet he is in prison today and it 

is a major human rights violation. So there are clearly challenges 

to open up the channels of communication, but I do think that public diplomacy very much depends upon an aggressive, long-term 

commitment to make sure that it is easier rather than more difficult for people to get access to information. 

Mr. Gast, we have talked frequently about the fact that 40 percent of the aid of USAID is in Africa. Most of that funds go toward 

909

humanitarian health-related type programs. We need to get more 

involved in economic development issues. But Africa has a huge 

problem on human rights. I have gone over the mineral extractive 

industry issues and whether those funds are used for finance corruption rather than for the people of the country itself. The gender 

issues there are huge. Land rights. You can do all the type of agricultural reforms. If you do not have the land reform, it is not going 

to work. 

So how do you leverage what is a significant part of our foreign 

assistance budget, but a relatively modest amount of money generally? How do you leverage that to advance the basic sustainability of African countries putting in place the basic rights, try to 

avoid corruption, and make it clear that gender equality is mandatory? 

Mr. GAST. Senator, we have shared in Africa’s success over the 

last 15 to 20 years, and as you rightly point out, the gains that we 

have made working with African institutions and states and civil 

society organizations in democracy and governance, in health indicators, in education—they can only be sustained through economic 

growth. And so one of our first priorities, of course, will be to emphasize economic growth throughout the continent, equitable economic growth because in the end, that will lessen their dependence 

on assistance. 

But what is also very critical to our efforts in Africa is supporting good governance. All three of the major initiatives that we 

have in Africa—and as you rightly point out, most of the resources 

are going into health. We also have the Feed the Future initiative 

and also the climate change initiative. They all contain elements of 

good governance, and that means building institutions, making 

sure that those institutions are accountable, that they are transparent, and then also building up the capacity of civil society to 

hold government accountable for the spending of resources and for 

delivering services to the people. So you have my assurance that 

as we move forward and if I am confirmed, that good governance 

will be at the forefront of our development efforts. 

Senator CARDIN. And we would also ask you to keep us informed 

as to the progress we are making on extractive industry transparency. Senator Lugar and I have offered a change in U.S. law 

that now is the law supported by the administration to put a focus 

on the mineral companies to make sure that those revenues are 

held accountable to the country in which these minerals reside. 

You can play an important role in making this a priority as you 

develop strategies on the continent, and we would ask that you 

make this a priority and you keep us informed. 

Mr. GAST. You have my assurance. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Ms. Richard, there is an area of great interest to us that we have 

worked on for a long time, the special immigrant visas. Congress 

on two occasions has passed laws to provide special visas for those 

who helped us in Iraq. These are people whose lives are at risk because they helped us. And we are not satisfied with the progress 

that has been made to date. Let me just make that conclusive 

statement first. It is taking too long. It appears like restrictions are 

being imposed so that if there are other potential alternatives, that 

910

they are being used to delay the safe exit of individuals whose lives 

are at risk. There is a different standard being used for those who 

helped us through third parties than directly. We do not quite understand that distinction quite frankly. But we do know that come 

the end of this year, the U.S.’s ability to protect those who helped 

us in Iraq will become much more marginalized. So time is of the 

essence. And I said Congress has acted on several occasions making it clear that we want this policy implemented. 

How can you help us or what can you do, if confirmed, to move 

this process forward? 

Ms. RICHARD. Thank you, Senator, for raising this question. 

I, like you, am very interested in the situation that Iraqi refugees 

are facing. I have met with Iraqi refugees in the United States in 

Baltimore and in San Francisco, and elsewhere around the United 

States, and also in Jordan and in Syria. 

As part of my briefings, I asked about the special immigrant visa 

program which, as you know, was set up to help Iraqis who had 

worked for U.S. forces or the U.S. Government—and yet were 

under threat because of that service—and get them a swift entry 

into the United States. So in looking into the situation, it may be 

that the SIV program is not being fully used because there is a 

complicated applications process. I will, if confirmed, work very 

closely with the Consular Affairs Bureau at the State Department 

to examine that and consider if that is part of the reason for the 

holdup. 

Another aspect of this is that if one comes to the United States 

as a refugee, one can bring more family members than under the 

current SIV program. 

So it is not completely clear to me what the problem is, but if 

confirmed, I would definitely commit to working on this problem. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you. I appreciate that. 

The information we have—the concerns are more of the complicated application process and review process not the number and 

family under the different status of refugee or special program. So 

I would welcome your assessment of that. Our bottom line is that 

it is getting more and more difficult to protect those who helped us. 

You have visited the refugees and I have too. I have been in 

Syria and I have been in Jordan, and I have visited Iraqi refugee 

facilities in those countries and know the numbers that have been 

dislocated as a result of the war and look at what different countries have done in accepting Iraqi refugees and then look at the 

numbers in the United States. Since we were the principal player 

in this campaign, the numbers in America are so small compared 

to the total numbers. Here we are talking about people who put 

their lives on the line to help America’s mission in Iraq. 

And Congress, again, does not always agree on policy rapidly. 

This is one time we did. So I would just urge you to give this the 

highest priority because of the timing issue here. 

Mr. Whitehead, Togo is going to be on the Security Council of the 

United Nations. At least that is the information that we have. That 

changes the composition of the Security Council. And to say the 

least, there have been a lot of disappointing votes in the United 

Nations as it relates to U.S. positions. And at times, we think that 

is mainly because of the populist sentiment of a particular issue. 

911

When you are dealing with the Middle East, it sometimes appears 

to be more populist to be with the multitude of Arab States rather 

than the state of Israel, which has caused many countries to feel 

like this is just a free vote. You might as well vote the populist 

sentiment. 

The Obama administration developed a strategy in the Security 

Council as it related to the most recent problems of the unilateral 

efforts for declaration of statehood by the Palestinians and was 

able to maintain the necessary votes on the Security Council so 

that could not move forward. And there are many other issues, 

Iran sanctions. The list goes on and on and on where the Security 

Council becomes a dominant player in international diplomacy. 

It is important that countries understand that the United States 

has a strong interest in a particular issue. It is not to say that 

countries will not exercise their independent judgment. They will 

exercise their independent judgment. But they need to know the 

U.S. position and know how we feel about certain matters and the 

consequences of U.N. action as it relates to U.S. policy. 

Can you assure this committee that as the United States representative in Togo, should you be confirmed, that that message 

will be unambiguous and clear to the Togolese Government about 

the importance of their role on the Security Council? 

Mr. WHITEHEAD. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have my 

unambiguous commitment that, if confirmed, one of my top priorities, of course, is going to be to identify who the key policymakers 

are in the various decisions that come before the United Nations 

Security Council and being certain that they understand clearly 

our position, why we are taking that position, and the stakes that 

are involved. I will give my utmost to do this on whichever issue 

should happen to come up during the 2 years in which Togo has 

the seat. 

Senator CARDIN. I thank you for that. You are going to be hearing from us on this, and I really do applaud the Obama administration and Secretary Clinton particularly, because the issue of the 

U.N. votes have been on a lot of bilateral agendas of meetings taking place between the United States and other countries, not just 

those who are members of the Security Council, but the General 

Assembly as well. So it is becoming more and more relevant that 

we think that we can make progress. But it depends upon all of 

our assets being focused on letting other governments know how 

important this is. So we appreciate your making the points known, 

should you be confirmed. 

Mr. WHITEHEAD. Thank you, sir. 

Senator CARDIN. I want to get back, Ms. Richard, to an issue 

that is also of great interest to the Helsinki Commission, but the 

Congress of the United States as well, and that is the trafficking 

issue and how it affects the migration and the agenda that you 

deal with. The United States has been the leader internationally 

in dealing with this form of modern slavery. As you know, we have 

the TIP reports, the Trafficking in Persons annual report, that is 

done by the State Department. We have invested a great deal of 

resources into having zero tolerance. It is not just the countries of 

origin. It is the transit and the receiving countries. 

912

How do you intend to deal with this issue, should you be confirmed? 

Ms. RICHARD. Thank you for shining a light on this important 

issue, Senator. 

I have some familiarity with the issue because the International 

Rescue Committee is partnered with the U.S. Government in our 

Miami office and in our Phoenix office trying to help people who 

have been trafficked and trying to get to them and make sure they 

know that they can step out of the exploitive situations they are 

in. 

The other thing I am aware of with this issue is that there is a 

great deal of bipartisan support for doing something about it. I 

guess it is a scarce word these days. So from my way of thinking, 

when you have the attention of both sides of the aisle for such an 

important human rights issue, we need to move with alacrity to 

build on that and to do a lot about it. 

I am glad to tell you that in my courtesy calls on different regional bureau assistant secretaries, almost every one of them has 

mentioned the problem of trafficking in persons. So, if confirmed, 

I will work very closely with these colleagues in the State Department, as well as colleagues in other U.S. Government agencies, to 

tackle this problem. But a big piece of that I think will be staying 

in touch with Congress about it, given that we are pushing on an 

open door up here. There is so much interest. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Gast, would you want to fill us in on what you think we 

should be doing in the Horn of Africa where opportunities are? The 

humanitarian crisis there continues. What can we do to be a 

responsible international player and leader in this area? 

Mr. GAST. Senator, as a result of the drought, close to 13 million 

persons are in dire need of emergency food assistance. It could 

have been much worse than it is. Fortunately, the U.S. Government, with your support, with the support of Congress, as well as 

the administration, understood more than a year ago that the region was facing a severe drought and, as a result, took measures. 

Some of the measures included prepositioning food in various areas 

located close to the Horn of Africa so that if the emergency were 

to arise, we would be able to respond very, very quickly. And as 

a result, we were able to do that. 

But one of the priorities, Senator, will be to support resiliency 

strategies in the Horn of Africa. We know that drought has been 

a problem for years. It will continue to be a problem. But what we 

have seen in some of the resiliency strategies that we have implemented in Ethiopia over the past few years is that the Ethiopian 

Government has led them itself with support of other donors. By 

their productive safety net program, some 7.5 million persons who 

previously were receiving emergency assistance no longer require 

that. And so we are in the process now, I understand, and if confirmed, you have my assurance that I will be very much involved 

in developing resiliency strategies throughout the Horn of Africa, 

similar to the success that we have had in Ethiopia. 

With regard to Somalia, it is extremely difficult, and the situation is very dire. And one does not know when al-Shabaab will 

allow emergency food assistance to enter the country, and as a reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:13 May 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00920 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~1\2011NO~1\2011NOM.TXT BETTY
913

sult, significant numbers of Somalis are suffering and many are 

trying to flee the country. 

Senator CARDIN. Are you up to date as to the current status of 

border crossings as to whether Somalians are able to get out of 

Somalia? 

Mr. GAST. I do not have the up-to-date information on that, Senator. 

Senator CARDIN. That has been one of the areas that we have 

been able to effectively provide some relief. It is really a challenge. 

I mean, it is a dilemma we face. You know, I have talked about 

this. You have got to be able to effectively provide help when you 

have a humanitarian crisis, and if you do not have the cooperation 

of the host government, it becomes extremely challenging. We have 

been able to do some work through NGO’s, but at times even that 

becomes a matter of great risk and uncertainty. So we have a responsibility to make sure there is accountability. So we welcome 

your honest assessments of these types of challenges. We obviously 

will not abandon the people in that region. It is a desperate need. 

Ms. Sonenshine, we talked a little bit about the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. You talked about it in glowing terms. 

I strongly support the program. 

What can we do to make sure that these programs are more 

beneficial and safe for the participants? There have been some concerns expressed. Do you have thoughts as to what we should be 

looking at? 

Ms. SONENSHINE. Yes. Thank you for the references to the security and safety of students. 

First, in my view anytime an international student is coming to 

the United States on whatever program—and there are many programs—we have a responsibility to make sure that it is a positive 

cultural engagement experience and that that student is safe, 

secure, educated, and that we are responsible for their welfare 

here. 

I have looked into—I know some of the issues around the summer work travel program. I am very heartened to see that the 

State Department and the Secretary are looking at that particular 

program with great seriousness and great urgency, and there are 

reforms underway. 

What I would also say is we always have to go back to the spirit 

and purpose and mission of these programs. We are exposing our 

students overseas and international students here to our way of 

life, our values, and our democracy. I also think we have to remind 

each other that the real values are sometimes not quantitative; 

they are qualitative. Although there is data, more and more now—

700,000 students came here last year from overseas. That international education contributed over $20 billion to the U.S. economy. So for those who suggest that there are not real numbers 

attached, there are. 

I am also inspired by the fact that of the Nobel laureates in this 

world, 40 of them came from Fulbright programs. So we have 

invested many heads of state, many officials, many Nobel Prize 

winners around the world with those exchanges and we have to tell 

that story. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

914

Ms. Richard and Mr. Gast, we have talked about this, but I just 

want to put a spotlight on this for a moment. When there is a 

humanitarian crisis, women are more vulnerable. We have seen 

that. We have seen that with refugees. Women are more likely to 

be abused and could be subject to trafficking. We see that in the 

health and food crisis around the world. Women are generally more 

vulnerable. 

So how do we take that into consideration in our strategies? 

What do we do about that? Either one. 

Ms. RICHARD. Well, Senator, you will have seen in my testimony 

that I put down the welfare of women and girls in refugee and displaced situations as one of my top priorities should I be confirmed 

and undertake the job of Assistant Secretary. 

There already is a great deal of thought that has been given to 

this by leaders at the State Department and leaders among the 

humanitarian community. And I think the particular challenge we 

have now is not to realize the problem, because I think it has been 

very well articulated by Secretary Clinton and others, but I think 

what we have to do now is to follow through in the field and make 

sure that our operations live up to the best standards and practices 

to protect and aid women and girls. So that means working very 

closely with our partners. As you probably know, the Population, 

Refugees, and Migration Bureau works very closely with the U.N. 

High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organization 

for Migration, the International Committee of the Red Cross. And 

through those relationships, I think we have to make sure that our 

best intentions are followed through with and that the best practices, that we know now what they are, take place on the ground. 

Mr. GAST. Senator, in areas where women are abused during

humanitarian crises, we need separate strategies to protect women. 

So, for example, in the early period of Darfur, I traveled there and 

heard the abuses of many women, and it was very clear that we 

needed to develop separate programs and separate strategies to 

protect them, even some things as basic as providing them with 

more fuel-efficient stoves, for example, because the women frequently traveled outside of the camp to gather wood and that is 

when they were abused. 

It also requires all the tools of government and international 

organizations. Certainly PRM is a valued partner with USAID. So, 

for example, in eastern DRC, Congo, where women are being 

abused to this day, it is making sure that the security forces, the 

MONUSCO, are trained in how to deal with women’s issues, that 

the government’s own security forces are trained, that we assist the 

government to bring into the police and military trained female 

officers, and that we provide direct services to women and also try 

to support prevention. And we try to support prevention through 

public education and public information. 

Senator CARDIN. I was impressed by all four of your resumes and 

background and references before today’s hearing, and I tell you, 

it has only been reinforced by your statements and your response 

to questions. So I look forward to supporting your nominations and 

hopefully to move them as promptly as we can through the Senate. 

Now, moving promptly through the Senate is always relative. 

[Laughter.] 

915

Senator CARDIN. So we will do the best we can to bring these up 

in a timely fashion. 

The committee record will remain open until close of business 

tomorrow. As I indicated earlier, some of our colleagues may have 

questions for the record, and we would encourage you to respond 

to them as quickly as possible. 

And with that, if there is no further business, the committee will 

stand adjourned. Thank you all very much. 

[Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF ANNE RICHARD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration coordinates efforts 

with USAID to provide assistance to people in emergency conflict situations. What 

are some actions you would take to improve and increase coordination and a clear 

delineation of responsibilities?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to strengthen coordination between the Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) and USAID. I will be 

in regular, often daily, contact with the USAID Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) Nancy Lindborg, whom I know 

well and respect immensely, and other members of her team. I will encourage State/

PRM’s Refugee Coordinators in the field to continue to consult closely with USAID/

DCHA’s overseas humanitarian and food aid advisors on programmatic and policy 

issues. I am also eager to explore the possibility of staff exchanges between State/

PRM and USAID/DCHA and to build upon existing opportunities for reciprocal staff 

training. 

Global humanitarian needs are far greater than what State and USAID collectively can address. For this reason, State and USAID personnel must work closely 

together to ensure U.S. Government resources are used effectively to address top 

priorities, consider neglected aspects of crises, and fill gaps. State/PRM and USAID/

DCHA adhere to written ‘‘Coordination and Funding Guidelines’’ that have helped 

to facilitate an effective division of funding responsibilities to meet critical needs 

throughout the world. Regional offices within State/PRM confer regularly with regional counterparts within USAID in Washington and in the field. 

In recent large-scale crises, I understand that State/PRM has coordinated closely 

within the Interagency, including through active participation in daily Interagency 

calls and/or video conferences among field staff, the Department, USAID, the Pentagon and combatant commands, National Security Staff, and other agencies. This 

has proven to be enormously useful to share the latest information from the field, 

flag emerging policy issues, and resolve operational challenges using whole-ofgovernment resources. 

During the past year, State/PRM, USAID/DCHA, and the State Department’s 

International Organization Affairs Bureau have established a Humanitarian Policy 

Working Group (HPWG). The HPWG meets monthly at senior levels to address 

high-priority humanitarian policy issues, such as U.S. Government advocacy on 

U.N. humanitarian reforms, outreach to emerging donors, and guidelines for improved civil-military coordination in humanitarian response, in a collective and strategic manner. If confirmed, I look forward to participating in this group and ensuring that it moves key humanitarian policy issues forward. I will make strengthened 

coordination with USAID a top priority.

Question. During your nomination hearing, you mentioned your focus on the protection of women and girls in the refugee context. If confirmed, what steps would 

you take to address and ensure the protection of women, who are considered most 

vulnerable in such scenarios? Despite the strong advocacy by operational organizations on the need to plan emergency response with the specific needs of women and 

girls in mind, we continue to see camps hastily arranged, resulting in a situation 

where women and girls are at risk. How would you improve this?

Answer. The protection of women and girls in conflict settings is a priority for the 

Obama administration, and if confirmed, I would ensure that the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration’s (PRM) leadership on this front remains strong. 

Refugee women, children, and youth populations have special protection needs that 

916

we are committed to addressing not only through funding support, but also through 

advocacy and diplomacy. Since State/PRM began its special initiative for prevention 

and response to gender-based violence (GBV) in 2000, State/PRM has contributed 

more than $62 million worldwide in countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, 

Colombia, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Thailand. 

If confirmed, I will ensure that PRM continues to strongly encourage international 

and nongovernmental organizations to develop and implement programs and policies that protect and assist refugee women, children, and youth. For example, State/

PRM has urged the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Office of the U.N. High 

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and their implementing partners to involve 

women and children in the programming and delivery of supplies to refugees, especially food. State/PRM has also encouraged partners to include gender issues in 

their programs and policies as a matter of course, because involving women in the 

design of camps and assistance programs can help reduce protection risks. 

State/PRM works closely with USAID, NGO, and IO partners to develop best 

practices, guidelines, and training to strengthen the humanitarian community’s 

capacity to address GBV and other gender issues throughout the humanitarian 

response. State/PRM actively engages with NGO partners to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse, encouraging partners to implement policies and procedures, rather 

than simply signing a code of conduct. State/PRM also emphasizes the importance 

of education in emergencies as a critical protection tool. The Bureau works closely 

with USAID and the Center for Disease Control, as well as UNHCR and UNFPA, 

to promote access to reproductive health care in emergencies. And PRM will continue to play a critical role in the Department of State in developing and implementing the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security. 

If confirmed, I intend to build on the experiences and lessons learned over the 

past years to strengthen our efforts to better protect women and girls, working 

closely with colleagues across the U.S. Government, civil society, and international 

organizations. I will devote special attention to these matters during visits to the 

field and will ask PRM colleagues to do the same. I will also engage with other senior policymakers and leaders to ensure that they make protecting women and girls 

a top priority.

Question. With the U.S. military drawdown from Iraq, what challenges will arise 

with respect to addressing the needs and concerns of Iraqi refugees? As you know, 

the number of Iraqis coming to the United States through the Special Immigrant 

Visa (SIV) program is very low, as are the numbers of refugees. You mentioned in 

your confirmation hearing that this would be of utmost importance to you. Please 

describe the efforts you would take, if confirmed, with other U.S. agencies to improve the resettlement to the United States of eligible Iraqi refugees and SIVs.

Answer. Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons will require continued 

support from the United States and the international community as solutions to displacement are identified—voluntary return to their former communities, local integration in areas of displacement, and resettlement elsewhere. Countries in the region hosting Iraqi refugees continue to offer asylum to Iraqis, and we do not expect 

the withdrawal of U.S. troops to affect their continued generosity. If confirmed, I 

will work to maintain our diplomatic engagement with the Government of Iraq and 

refugee-hosting countries and to sustain humanitarian support for Iraqi refugees 

and internally displaced persons. 

I am also committed to maintaining the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and 

Migration’s refugee resettlement programs that serve Iraqi refugees, those who have 

assisted the U.S. Government as well as other vulnerable Iraqis in need of resettlement. Since 2007, the United States has resettled more than 62,000 Iraqis as refugees, including over 7,800 from the U.S. facility in Baghdad. A new security check 

implemented in late 2010 caused a slow-down in refugee arrivals in FY 2011 to the 

United States, particularly for Iraqi refugees. This security check, a fundamental 

safeguard for our country, has equally affected the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) 

program managed by the Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs. While I understand the Departments of State and Homeland Security, along with numerous intelligence agencies, are already reviewing this new check in order to gain efficiencies, 

it is one of my top priorities to engage at senior levels to resolve processing impediments caused by this new check while ensuring an effective system of security 

checks.

Question. I read with some alarm that the Governments of Bangladesh and 

Burma are in discussions regarding the possible return of Rohingya refugees currently residing in Bangladesh. As you know, this population is of great concern to 

me. The Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration and the U.S. Embassy in 

Dhaka have both worked hard to champion the rights of the Rohingya. What will 

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you do, if confirmed, to restart the resettlement of Rohingya from Bangladesh to the 

United States and to improve their conditions in Bangladesh?

Answer. The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) is closely following the situation of the Rohingya in Bangladesh and elsewhere in the region. 

There has been no progress by the Government of Bangladesh on the formation of 

a coherent national refugee policy since the October 2010 interministerial meeting, 

which placed all Rohingya-related issues on hold for a policy review. Third-country 

resettlement of the most vulnerable people from camps is still suspended and international NGOs continue to face difficulty obtaining legal permission to operate and 

provide life-saving humanitarian assistance. The U.S. Government and UNHCR 

have engaged in humanitarian diplomacy and advocacy at senior and working levels 

on numerous occasions since October 2010. 

During the recent official visit by Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to 

Burma, she announced that Burma President Thein Sein agreed to the repatriation 

of Rohingya. Embassy Dhaka has been reassured that only willing refugees will be 

considered for repatriation and there is no established timeline. UNHCR is engaged 

with both governments and has a role in determining voluntariness and appropriate 

conditions in Burma for return. The eventual voluntary repatriation of Burmese refugees in safety and dignity, when conditions allow, is a solution which the U.S. Government and international community support. 

If confirmed, I will work with the international community to press both Burma 

and Bangladesh to improve conditions for the Rohingya and will reiterate U.S. support for long-term solutions, if and when appropriate. I will emphasize our commitment to work with Bangladesh to provide assistance to and identify durable 

solutions for the Rohingya, including resettlement of the most vulnerable. Our 

humanitarian assistance is part of the U.S. commitment to seek a comprehensive 

solution for refugees from Burma in Bangladesh and the Southeast Asian region. 

RESPONSES OF TARA D. SONENSHINE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. I commend the State Department for implementing reforms for the 

Summer Work and Travel J1 visa program, and look forward to working with the 

Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs as your monitoring efforts move forward. On secondary school exchanges, both grants-based and private sector, what 

reforms do you feel are necessary to ensure that international students who come 

to the United States have a safe, educational, and fun experience?

Answer. ECA’s senior leadership has made it a top priority to strengthen and enforce regulatory oversight of all youth exchange programs. I intend to follow through 

on the current initiatives. The health, safety, and welfare of international students 

in the United States are top priorities for the State Department, and I will work 

energetically to ensure that it remains so. 

ECA has increased staff in its Youth Programs Division, hired participant monitoring specialists and dramatically increased the number of visits and interviews 

with exchange students, host families, schools, and local coordinators. 

In October 2010, ECA published new and more stringent regulations, including 

tighter family screening that includes: photographs of the host family home; an annual criminal background check; and a check of the National Sex Offender Registry 

for all host family adults and local coordinators. 

Local Coordinators are now required to pass a training course and test on the program’s purpose and regulations. Over 15,000 local coordinators have taken and 

passed the course. 

In fall 2010, ECA/EC staff completed on-site inspections of the 39 largest feecharging program sponsors and followed these inspections with sanctions of 15 sponsors and termination of 1.

Question. The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy traditionally represents the 

Secretary of State at meetings of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, liaising between the BBG and the State Department.

• What will be your top priorities regarding your role with the BBG? What efforts 

will you promote? 

• In your assessment, what challenges does the BBG face in the field of public 

diplomacy as it competes with similar efforts of other countries, including but 

not limited to China? How would you address these challenges? 

• How will you reduce the overlap and redundant programming between BBG 

and public diplomacy?

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Answer. The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs is the Secretary’s designated representative to the BBG. In that role, as in all others, I would 

give top priority to working across agencies in a whole-of-government approach that 

creates synergies, leverages talent and makes the most of limited resources. 

The State Department and the BBG share a commitment to promoting freedom 

of the press and open access to information around the world as a fundamental 

tenet of our democratic values. I would seek to foster ongoing dialogue between the 

Department and the BBG to ensure that we are reinforcing those messages while 

being respectful of the ‘‘firewall’’ that safeguards the independence of U.S. international broadcasting. I also would look forward to drawing upon my 25 years of 

media experience—including with ABC NEWS, Newsweek, and other outlets—to 

contribute ideas to the BBG on its reform efforts. 

These efforts have been geared in part toward increasing U.S. international 

broadcasting’s audience in an ever-growing global media marketplace. The ascendancy of government-supported international media on multiple platforms in other 

countries, including China, has created new competition for audiences—a point to 

which Secretary Clinton spoke earlier this year in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Concerns have been raised in particular over media 

backed by governments with views that are at odds with those of the United States. 

If confirmed, I will strongly support the BBG’s work to improve its competitive edge. 

Additionally, in a number of countries the BBG and its grantee organizations face 

challenges of government-restricted audience access to broadcast programs and 

products through signal jamming, as well as barriers to Internet usage and the distribution of content. The State Department has worked with the BBG to help overcome these restrictions, and if confirmed, I will ensure that this interagency coordination receives all the institutional backing that it needs. 

The situation involving broadcasting and China is exacerbated by limits that the 

Chinese Government places on the number of visas granted to journalists working 

for U.S. international broadcasting entities. The State Department frequently raises 

this issue with the Chinese Government—via their Embassy in Washington, the 

U.S. Embassy in Beijing, and at various high-level meetings. As Under Secretary 

for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, I would lend my full support to finding a 

solution to this challenge. 

With respect to any redundancies in programming, I will look to eliminate needless duplication, particularly given the tight budget environment in which the U.S. 

Government operates, by reviewing any areas where BBG and State Department activities appear to overlap. But I would also work to create synergies drawing on the 

strengths of public diplomacy and BBG programming to ensure that we reach the 

broadest possible audience using a range of tools that complement one another, such 

as opinion research and audience metrics.

Question. Online exchanges, or ‘‘Exchange 2.0’’

a. Online exchanges, or ‘‘Exchange 2.0,’’ are heralded by some as low-cost and 

effective means for advancing intercultural and international engagement.

• In a period of fiscal austerity and dwindling resources, what steps would you 

take to strengthen the efficacy of online exchanges and increase both Americans’ and other nationals’ use of such programs?

b. Others say ‘‘Exchange 2.0’’ cannot substitute for traveling to other countries 

and directly experiencing other cultures. The State Department has many programs 

through which foreign professionals and students come to the United States for 

immersion and cultural exchange purposes. But it is also very important for Americans of all demographics to explore other countries and serve, however indirectly, 

whether through volunteer or teaching programs, as citizen ambassadors of the 

United States.

• If confirmed, keeping in mind the economic climate, what measures might you 

take to encourage more Americans to travel overseas and learn about other societies? How would you envision your role in this, and how would you work 

throughout government on this issue?

Answer. Online or virtual exchange offers a cost-effective, meaningful, and scaleable complement to in-person exchanges, especially among youth. However, they are 

not a substitute for direct people-to-people exchanges. That said I will work on exploring how to support more of these sorts of exchanges around the world. 

Impact and sustainability is increased by adding virtual exchange programs to 

currently funded activities. The projects are able to further educational reform 

through project-based learning, interdisciplinary education, and student teamwork. 

Also, virtual exchanges between international students and American students help 

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share American values through selected activity themes, such as freedom of the 

press or human rights, as the students research and report on the themes. 

I am a strong advocate for the importance of Americans engaging in meaningful 

experiences abroad, and will work with colleagues across government as well as 

educators, artists, scientists, business leaders and others in the nongovernmental 

community to convey this message. In order for the United States to compete and 

lead, we must ensure that our people are equipped with the skills and understanding necessary to succeed in a global environment. The Department of State’s 

international exchange programs fulfill the nation’s priorities and serve as models 

in their emphasis on increasing participation by underserved populations, fostering 

language learning, and supporting career-relevant experiences and exchanges that 

promote leadership development.

Question. Over the last few months, we have witnessed the slow but hopeful liberalization of Burmese politics. Should Burma takes further steps to become a more 

open society, how do you envision increasing cooperation with that country to enhance people-to-people exchanges?

Answer. People-to-people exchange has been and will continue to be an important 

part of U.S. efforts to bring about political reform in Burma. Initiatives such as 

English teaching and other programs for Burmese citizens organized by the American Center in Rangoon, visits by journalists and other important figures from 

Burma to the United States in State Department exchange programs, have all contributed to the gradual development of civil society in Burma. Should Burma take 

further steps to become a more open society, the State Department will use the full 

range of public diplomacy tools at our disposal to expand people-to-people ties with 

Burma, including increasing youth, student, and professional exchanges.

Question. During your nomination hearing you said that public diplomacy is something for which engagement requires being ‘‘in it for the long haul.’’ You also mentioned as an example of public diplomacy the recently launched U.S. Virtual 

Embassy in Iran. There are reports that already the Iranian Government has 

blocked Iranian citizens from accessing the Virtual Embassy Web site.

• What are all the tools available to the U.S. Government committed to public 

diplomacy in the long haul, to address challenges, such as blocked Internet 

access and hampered communication, as it pursues several mediums by which 

to engage people around the world and explain or demonstrate to them what 

America is about? How would you prioritize those tools?

Answer. Virtual Embassy Tehran has not been shut down. In fact, it has gone 

viral, rapidly approaching 1 million page-hits within the first week. After the site 

was ‘‘blocked’’ inside Iran, many of the Persian-language page-views originated from 

countries where the Persian-speaking community is negligible or nonexistent—

a strong indicator that Iranians are using proxy software and/or Virtual Private 

Networks (VPNs) that mask IP addresses. 

While we cannot exactly quantify the number of hits from inside Iran, Iranians 

have long found creative ways to get around the regime’s attempts to stop them 

from controlling the information they see. ‘‘Blocking a site’’ does not equate to ‘‘making that side inaccessible.’’

While Facebook has never officially confirmed the number of Iranian users, the 

Iranian Government itself has estimated that more than 17 million Iranians have 

Facebook accounts—despite the fact that Facebook is one of those blocked Web sites. 

Secretary Clinton has made clear that Virtual Embassy Tehran is just one step 

in what will be a sustained U.S. effort to pierce the ‘‘Electronic Curtain’’ Iran is attempting to place around its people. As part of this effort, we are increasing our 

communication efforts in the Persian-language through all available media (online, 

broadcast, print, etc.) to counter disinformation and persistent myths about the 

United States and our policies. We are exploring additional ways to make broadcast 

content available to Iranian audiences by countering Iranian jamming of foreign 

broadcasts. We will continue to explore innovative ways to put hardware, software, 

and expertise in the hands of Iranian citizens and assist them in bypassing their 

own government’s censorship. 

Finally, we are raising greater awareness for Iran’s systemic efforts to deny information to its people. These efforts to control what the Iranian people see, hear, 

think, and feel are both a significant human rights violation and an approach that 

runs counter to the historical role successive Persian empires have played as a 

crossroads of civilizations. 

We share internally best practices and employ similar tactics in other countries 

where systematic censorship and control of information challenge our diplomacy.

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Question. With the U.S. military drawdown in Iraq, how would you increase public diplomacy efforts in that country to build on and improve America’s relationship 

with Iraq and its citizens?

Answer. There is currently in place and underway a wide-ranging transition plan 

to enhance our public diplomacy efforts in Iraq. It includes both expanded communications with the Iraqi people and expanded educational and cultural programs to 

enhance direct engagement between Iraqis and Americans. If confirmed, I pledge to 

work with the Congress to extend the full range of our Nation’s substantial public 

diplomacy abilities and tools to broaden understanding in Iraq of the new U.S.-Iraq 

civilian partnership, enshrined in the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA). 

The past decade has seen a major expansion of media outlets in Iraq and the 

arrival of broadly available cellular phone communications and open Internet access. 

If confirmed, I will work with our mission to vigorously leverage broadcast and new 

media—as well as press engagement—to project a bilateral partnership based on 

mutual interests and values, consistent with the evolving relationship. Our team of 

Arabic-speaking officers will be asked to conduct regular radio and TV interviews 

on Iraqi and pan-Arab television and will seek other creative means of leveraging 

the reach of television, the most common news source for Iraqis, to reinforce key 

themes. Embassy Baghdad will utilize its growing Facebook and YouTube presence 

to highlight the many partnership bilateral partnership activities under the SFA. 

I am a strong advocate for the effective use of social media and outreach programs 

that will include regular discussions with youth, women, and young professionals 

on a wide range of topics. 

Our public diplomacy activities will support no less than six elements of the Strategic Framework Agreement. It is my hope to see that our engagement with Iraq 

effectively underscores the shared values and goals of our bilateral partnership. 

The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs currently operates a broad range 

of academic and professional exchanges with Iraq, including the ones with which 

you are most familiar—the Fulbright Program, International Visitor Leadership 

Program (IVLP), Hubert H. Humphrey Fellowships. These and other exchanges 

focus on education, English teaching, rule of law, entrepreneurship and economic 

growth, urban planning, public health, scientific research, and human rights. 

We must do as much as we can to promote deep engagement between Iraqi and 

American educational institutions as a way of nurturing stronger people-to-people 

relations. Our public diplomacy program oversees seven university linkage programs 

that support exchanges between American and Iraqi universities. We will be continuing to make substantial investments in English teaching programs in Iraq to 

facilitate communication with and understanding of the United States. Our academic advising programs will promote U.S. study by Iraqis—a growing number of 

whom are funded by the Iraqi Government. 

The United States has earned much good will through our efforts to support the 

preservation of Iraq’s cultural and artistic legacy. Cultural heritage initiatives, including improved professional capacity in object conservation, historic preservation, 

and archaeology, continue to be an important part of our bilateral dialogue and will 

be supported to the best of our ability. 

RESPONSES OF ROBERT E. WHITEHEAD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. Given your previous experience as Chief of Mission in Khartoum and 

Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) in Zimbabwe, Zambia, and the Central African 

Republic, what lessons have most significantly shaped your approach to managing 

a post like Togo?

Answer. As Charge ́ d’Affaires in Khartoum and as DCM in Zimbabwe and the 

Central African Republic, I learned to anticipate what issues might arise in a very 

fluid political and social environment characterized by negative trend lines. During 

my tenure in these three countries, crisis management of unanticipated situations 

was often the rule. The situation in Togo, on the other hand, is more akin to what 

I experienced in Zambia, where the trend lines were largely positive. Togo currently 

appears well positioned to achieve a general improvement of the political, social,

and economic environment. If confirmed, I will work with the Embassy country 

team, and through our bilateral and multilateral relationships, to harness the possibilities for improved governance, strengthened rule of law and accelerated economic 

liberalization.

Question. In your testimony, you noted that maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea is one of our principal concerns in Togo and that the U.S. Embassy will look to 

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use existing programs to help assist Togolese efforts. Piracy off the coast of Somalia, 

which has had a much larger economic impact and received far more attention, 

tends to be viewed often as primarily a naval problem, but its origins—and likely 

resolution—are found on land. How would you approach the question of piracy and 

maritime security, if confirmed?

Answer. Banditry, piracy, and armed robbery at sea are a crucial concern in the 

region and especially for a country like Togo, which benefits greatly from the port 

revenue from the transshipment of goods to the land-locked Sahelian countries to 

the north. Maritime insecurity is a threat not only to economic growth, but also 

national and regional security and stability. The maritime domain in the Gulf of 

Guinea is vulnerable to a wide array of threats that have significant land-based 

dimensions, whether related to the origin of the threat, the locus of its effects, or 

the land-based capabilities required for preventive or enforcement interventions. As 

a result, land-based actors and capabilities are as important to maritime security 

as the sea-based actors and capabilities. Most attacks at sea against maritime commerce in the Gulf of Guinea do not meet the definition of piracy, since they largely 

occur within national or territorial waters. As such, the problem requires a different 

approach than that employed in the Gulf of Aden. We must invest in smart and targeted engagements that capitalize on local political will and nationally owned initiatives with regional consequences. If confirmed, I will work with the Togolese 

authorities to strengthen their capacity to patrol the coastline and police Togolese 

territorial waters. The United States has provided two Defender patrol boats to aid 

the Togolese Navy in these efforts. I will continue to use existing programs such 

as Africa Command’s African Partnership Station to build the capacity of Togo and 

neighboring littoral states in this domain. Understanding that this is a regional 

issue, I will encourage President Faure to engage in consultations with neighboring 

coastal countries of the Economic Community of West African States to develop a 

joint plan to respond to this growing threat. 

RESPONSES OF EARL GAST TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY JOHN F. KERRY

Question. As you know, we are currently in a very difficult fiscal situation. If the 

global foreign assistance budget is subject to cuts in FY 2012 and FY 2013, how will 

USAID approach this process in terms of its Africa programming? What priorities 

would guide the agency’s thinking, particularly with regard to development outcomes and bilateral relationships?

Answer. Although the budget climate is challenging, USAID, in collaboration with 

our interagency partners, will prioritize implementing the Obama administration’s 

Presidential Initiatives, combating major humanitarian crises and assisting those 

recovering from serious conflict, and advancing regional security, democracy and 

governance, and economic growth. By focusing our programming on these priorities, 

measuring outcomes, and working collaboratively with host governments, civil societies and private sector partners on the ground, we will help to resolve conflict, 

maintain stability, and promote development. 

In particular, Africa’s democratic gains cannot be taken for granted as democratic 

institutions across the continent have not been fully consolidated and remain fragile 

and vulnerable to authoritarian leaders and unconstitutional changes of government. In addition to supporting strong democracy programs throughout Africa, the 

Agency has a special focus on strengthening elected municipal-level governance and 

civil society counterparts in relatively well-performing African countries in order to 

deepen democratic governance and build systems of accountability.

Question. In your testimony, you noted that USAID is currently improving the impact, cost-effectiveness, and sustainability of development programs. What are the 

best ways to measure aid effectiveness and what mechanisms are currently in place 

or being considered in order to measure the medium- or long-term impact of completed U.S. programs?

Answer. USAID’s newly adopted evaluation policy offers a comprehensive approach designed to set the standard for measuring the results and impact of our 

programming on the ground. These efforts focus not just on the imputs that are provided or even the outputs achieved, but on accountable measures of development 

outcomes. Through the implementation of this policy—a key pillar of Administrator 

Shah’s USAID Forward reform agenda—the Agency will more effectively determine 

where we are seeing results and intensify or scale up interventions as appropriate, 

as well as those areas where we need to modify or scale back our investments. The 

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policy will improve the quality of our monitoring and evaluation agenda and guide 

our program strategies, program design, and resource allocation decisions.

Question. During your nomination hearing, you discussed the importance of supporting good governance in Africa. In countries where we have not seen progress 

in democracy and human rights, and particularly in countries where we’ve seen a 

backsliding in critical elements of good governance, how should this affect U.S. aid 

funding and in what ways would you recommend re-thinking existing assistance 

programs?

Answer. U.S. support for democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) is central to protecting our national security, promoting our national values, and furthering U.S. interests (including economic) in Africa. Failed or authoritarian states 

pose a threat to the physical security of the United States through potential trafficking in drugs, persons, and weapons, and providing safe haven to those who wish 

our harm. 

During the past decade, Africa has made significant progress in democratization, 

including the birth of a new democratic state of South Sudan, recent democratic 

elections in Zambia, and democratic transitions in Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, and Niger. 

Since 1998, dozens of African countries have embraced democratic rule. This is a 

remarkable achievement given that 30 years ago military dictatorships and oneparty states dominated the landscape. However, significant challenges remain, including persistent instability in Somalia, restrictions on civil society in Ethiopia, 

and the continued political crisis in Madagascar. 

Strategic investments in DRG can make a big difference in whether a country progresses or backslides. Our assistance targets windows of opportunity for strengthening representative and responsive governance and civil society institutions, and 

to work across sectors—agriculture and food security, in education, in health, and 

in climate change—in increasing African partners’ capacity for transparent and accountable governance. 

In countries where engagement with central governments remains unproductive 

or not possible, efforts at the grassroots level to foster citizen demand for better governance and to facilitate tangible gains in local service delivery are important. 

USAID plays an important role in supporting civil society organizations delivering 

health, education, and other services while also supporting human rights and democratic activists outside of government and, when possible, reformers within government. Democracy, human rights, and governance programs have also been refocused 

more directly on promoting democratic principles in the delivery of services by integrating these principles through civil society support across several development 

sectors to build understanding of and demand for democratic governance at the local 

level.

Question. Please highlight what you consider to be three of USAID’s most significant programming successes in Africa in recent years. What made these programs 

successful?

Answer. Among the many USAID success stories in Africa, three stand out as 

potent illustrations of what U.S. foreign assistance and priorities can accomplish: 

progress in addressing the scourge of HIV/AIDS, improved food security in Ethiopia, 

and the peaceful secession of South Sudan. 

For over 20 years, one of the most significant health challenges facing Africa has 

been the rise and spread of the HIV epidemic. In addition to dire health consequences on affected individuals and families, the disease also places considerable 

demands on community resources and stunts economic growth. But according to a 

recent U.N. report, in 2010, new HIV/AIDS infections worldwide had dropped to 

their lowest levels since the peak of the epidemic, and treatment mobilized by the 

international community has saved the lives of 2.5 million people in poor countries 

worldwide since 1995. In 22 African countries, the rate of new HIV infections fell 

by more than 25 percent and AIDS-related deaths have dropped 21 percent between 

2001 and 2009, largely as a result of international investments and coordination. 

Through the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), USAID 

and its interagency partners have worked together to make major strides in 

addressing and mitigating the effects of the disease. Today, PEPFAR is providing 

life-saving antiretroviral drugs to more than 3.8 million HIV-positive Africans, and 

care and treatment to over 10 million. USAID is the major implementer of PEPFAR 

throughout the world. PEPFAR is increasingly trying to link its efforts to other 

health programs in order to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of their 

programs, It has also targeted efforts toward women, who comprise the majority of 

people infected by HIV, and preventing mother-to-child transmission, which has 

allowed millions of babies to be born HIV-free. 

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In Ethiopia, USAID is partnering with the World Bank and other organizations 

to support the Government of Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program. For the 

last 5 years, the Agency’s programs have worked to shift Ethiopia away from dependence on emergency food aid and toward long-term self-sufficiency and food security. This involved resiliency programs that introduced drought-resistance seeds, 

constructed wells and catchment areas, strengthened livestock health, and promoted 

good sanitary practices. We have seen striking results of these efforts this year, 

when, despite Ethiopia’s experiencing its worst drought in 60 years, more than 7.5 

million fewer Ethiopians required emergency food assistance than did during the 

country’s last drought. 

USAID has prioritized investments in the Productive Safety Net Program—implementing market-driven approaches to diversify livelihoods, build markets, and build 

stronger links among farmers, markets, and financial services. Additionally, the 

President’s Feed the Future initiative is capitalizing on the lessons learned through 

this program and others to build country-led approaches in Africa that increase food 

security, improve household incomes and nutrition, and reduce poverty by investing 

in the main engine of Africa’s economies: agriculture. 

This past year, South Sudan emerged as the world’s newest nation following a 

peaceful, transparent, and open referendum process stipulated by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the country’s 22-year civil war. While 

South Sudan’s challenges hardly ended with independence, the Government of 

South Sudan (GOSS), with USAID support, has built roads to facilitate trade with 

its neighbors; established systems to provide health care and education for its people; installed checks that ensure transparent management of its resources; and developed policies to protect its extraordinary natural resources. USAID continues to 

work with its institutions at all levels to sustain and deepen these accomplishments, 

including through the recent U.S.-sponsored international engagement conference 

for the Republic of South Sudan. USAID has been a strong partner of the GOSS 

since its inception, and that partnership continues today. 

As you know, millions of Sudanese came together to vote against war for a peaceful independence. U.S. support helped to create the environment that led up to that 

extraordinary moment—a potent illustration of what diplomacy and development 

can achieve in Africa and how continued U.S. involvement is critical to supporting 

African progress. If confirmed, I look forward to working with my interagency partners to strengthen our relationship with South Sudan and assist the Sudanese people in meeting the various challenges impacting our newest democracy.

Æ