IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
N O. 2017-CP-00045-COA

DERRICK STOKES A/K/A DERRICK LEE STOKES APPELLANT

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/09/2016 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JOHN HUEY EMFINGER COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: DERRICK STOKES (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: LAURA HOGAN TEDDER NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 02/20/2018 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND TINDELL, JJ. WESTBROOKS, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. In May 2008, Derrick Stokes pleaded guil t y to g ratif ication of lust and exploitation of a c hild. T he Madison C ounty Circuit Court s entenced Stokes to f if teen y ears in the custody of the Mississippi Departm ent of Corrections f or the g ratif

ication-of -lust con v iction.
Fo r t h e e xploitation-of

-a-child conviction, t he circuit c ourt s entenced Stokes to a consecutive ten-y ear sentence with f

ive y e ars suspended, f

ive y ears to serve, a nd f

i v e y e ars of postrelease supervisio n . S t o kes now appeals the denial of his f if th m otion f

or post-conviction relief (PCR). Finding no error, we af f irm

. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY¶2. To date, S tokes h a s f iled f ive PCR m otions. In Stokes’s f i rst PCR m otion, he alleged that his guilty pleas were involuntary ; he received i nef f ective assistance o f counsel; he f ound newly d i scovered evidence; and h e pleaded guilty based on m isrepresentation a n d duress. Stokes v. State , 66 So. 3d 746, 747 (¶2) (Miss. Ct. A pp. 2011). The c ircuit court denied his
PCR m o tion. Id. Stokes appealed to th i s C o u r t , a rguing that the circuit court erred in deny ing h is m otion without an evidentiary hearing; the circuit court erred by accepting his guilty plea without appointing a s ign-language in t e r p r e ter d uring t he plea hearing because
S t o k es alleged he was legally deaf ; and h e received inef

f ective assistance of counsel. Id. This Court dism issed his appeal because it was untim ely

. I d. at 749 (¶8). ¶3. Stokes f

i led his second PCR m otion o n A pril 8 , 2 013. Stokes v. S tate , 145 So. 3d 1238, 1 239 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014). Stokes argued once again that t he circuit court erred by not appointing a s ign-language interpreter. Id. Stokes asserted t h a t h a d an interpreter been appointed, Stokes would not have entered the guilty pleas. Id. The circuit court held

t h a t his claim s were t im e -barred and successive-writ barred. Id. Stokes appeal e d t o t h i s Court, arguing that the circuit court denied him due process when it di d n o t a p p o i n t a sign-language interpreter during the plea hearing. Id. at (¶5). This C ourt af f irm e d the circuit court’s judgm ent. Id. at 1241 (¶13). ¶4. O n O c t o b e r 2 7, 2014, Stokes f iled a third PCR m otion. S tokes v. State , 199 So. 3 d 745, 748 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2 016). T he circuit c ourt denied t he m o tion as tim e -barred and successive-writ barred. Id. Stokes did not appeal that decision. Id. Instead, he f iled a f ourth PCR m otion prior to the circuit c ourt’s denial o f his third PCR m otion. Id. Again,

2Stokes argued that his guilty pleas were involuntary because of his hearing im pairm ent. Id. Additionally , he requested D NA testing. Id. T h e c i r c u it court d ism issed Stokes’s f ourth
PCR m otion, f

i nding that i t was tim e-barred a nd suc c e s sive-writ barred. Id. Stokes appealed. Id. T his Court af f irm ed the circuit c o urt’s judgm ent and noted that Stokes’s inef f ective-assistance- o f

-counsel claim was barred by res judicata. Id. at 749, 750 (¶¶12, 15). ¶5. Stokes f

iled his f if th PCR m otion on October 12, 2016, m ore than e ight y e ars af ter his guilty pleas. Stokes again argued that his due-process rights were violated because he was
not provided with a sign-language interpreter at the plea hearing. Stokes also claim ed that the indictm e nt was v oid f or the om ission of the word “f eloniously

. ” In support of his
argum ent that he had a h earing im pairm ent, Stokes a t tached his own a f f idavit an d the af f idavit of a f

e llow inm a te. Stokes also attached two p ages of a n uncertif ied transcript f

rom the Mississippi S chool f

or the D e af and an uncertif ied copy of one page of an audiology report. The circuit court dism issed Stokes’s f if t h PCR m o tion because he had not raised any issue that m ight provide an exception to the procedural bars. ¶6. Aggrieved, Stokes a ppeals and presents the f

ollowing a r gum ents: (1) the circuit court erred in dism issing his f if th P CR m otion; ( 2 ) h e w a s denied due p rocess because of an insuf f icient indictm ent; and (3 ) the circuit court should have appointed a sign-language interpreter during the plea hearing.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶7. “W hen reviewing a trial court’s d e c i s i o n to [ dism iss] a petition f or post-conviction relief , this Court w ill not disturb the trial court’s f actual f indings unless they are f

ound to be

3clearly erroneous.” Stokes , 145 So. 3d at 1239 ( ¶6). “However, where questions of law are

raised[ ,] th e applicable standard of review is de novo.” Lambert v. S tate , 9 41 S o. 2d 804, 807 (¶14) (Miss. 2006).
DISCUSSION
W hether the trial court erred in dismissing Stokes’s PCR motion. ¶8. Stokes argues that his f if th PCR m otion is not barred because his due-process rights

were abridged by the absence of a sign-language interpreter at t he guilty -plea hearing. The
State argues that S tokes’s m otion is tim e-barred, s uccessive-writ barred, and barred by res judicata. ¶9. A PCR m otion “is untim ely unless [ it is] f iled within three y ears af

ter [ the] entry

of the judgm ent of conviction.” Smith v. State , 118 S o. 3d 180, 1 82 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013). Additionally an order deny ing or dism issing a P CR m otion is a bar t o a second or successive
PCR m otion. Miss. C ode Ann. § 99-39-23(6) (Rev. 2015). S tokes entered his guilty pleas

m ore than eight y ears a go, and the circ u i t court previously had dism issed f o ur o f Stokes’s
PCR m otions. Thus, Stokes’s f if t h PCR m otion is successive. ¶10. Stokes claim s that the a bridgm ent of his constitutional r i g h t t o d u e p r o cess is an exception to the tim e b ar and the successive-writ bar. Stokes is c orrect that “errors af f ecting
f undam ental c o n s t i t u tional r ights” are exceptions to the procedural bars in the Mississippi Unif orm Post-Conviction R elief Act. See Roland v. State , 42 So. 3d 503, 507 (¶12) (Miss. 2010). Nevertheless, a me r e a s sertion of a c onstitutional-right violation does not
autom atically p reclude t he application of the procedural bars. Sims v
. S tate , 227 So. 3d 1167,

41169 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 20 1 7 )

. To f ind an exception to the statute of lim itation or the successive-writ bar, “ [ t]here m ust at least appear to be som e basis f or t he truth of the claim
. . . . ” Stovall v. State , 873 So. 2d 1056, 1058 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004). ¶11. A f t e r r e v iewing the transcript of Stokes’s plea hearing, w e conclude t h a t S t o k e s understood each question asked by the c ircuit court and answered k n o wingly and intelligently

. W hen he was h es i t a nt regarding a question, the circuit c ourt repeated or rephrased the q

ues t i o n , a n d Stokes quickly responded as though he understood each question. Theref ore, Stokes’s contentions f ail to support an exception to the procedural bar. ¶12. Regarding Stokes’s rem aining issues, the circuit court h as previously ruled on t hem incident to his earlier PCR m otion. Consequently , we decline to address them

. CONCLUSION ¶13. Accordingly , w e af f irm t he circuit court’s judgm ent dism issing S tok e s ’ s f i f th PCR

m otion. ¶14. AFFIRMED

. LEE, C .J., IRVING A ND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, CARLTON, FAIR, WILSON, GREENLEE AND TINDELL, JJ., CONCUR.

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