2018 WI 110

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

CASE NO.: 2016AP85-D

COMPLETE TITLE: In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against Daniel Parks, Attorney at Law:

Office of Lawyer Regulation,

 Complainant-Respondent,

 v.

Daniel Parks,

 Respondent-Appellant.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST PARKS

OPINION FILED: December 13, 2018

SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: September 26, 2018

ORAL ARGUMENT:

SOURCE OF APPEAL:

COURT:

COUNTY:

JUDGE:

JUSTICES:

CONCURRED:

DISSENTED:

NOT PARTICIPATING: 

ATTORNEYS:

For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs filed by 

Peyton B. Engel and Hurley, Burish & Stanton S.C., Madison

For the complainant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 

Brenda K. Sunby and the Office of Lawyer Regulation, Wausau
2018 WI 110

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further 

editing and modification. The final 

version will appear in the bound 

volume of the official reports. 

No. 2016AP85-D

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against Daniel Parks, Attorney at Law:

Office of Lawyer Regulation,

 Complainant-Respondent,

 v.

Daniel Parks,

 Respondent-Appellant.

FILED

DEC 13, 2018

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Supreme Court

ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding. Attorney's license 

suspended. 

¶1 PER CURIAM. Attorney Daniel Parks has appealed a 

report filed by Referee William Eich concluding that Attorney 

Parks committed eight of 14 alleged counts of professional 

misconduct and recommending that Attorney Parks' license to 

practice law in Wisconsin be suspended for 14 months, rather 

than the two-year suspension sought by the Office of Lawyer 

Regulation (OLR). The referee considered Attorney Parks'

objection to costs and recommends we impose the full costs of 
No. 2016AP85-D

2

this proceeding on Attorney Parks. The OLR did not seek 

restitution and the referee did not recommend a restitution 

award.

¶2 In his appeal, Attorney Parks argues that the evidence 

was insufficient to support many of the referee's factual 

findings and all of the referee's conclusions determining 

misconduct. Attorney Parks argues further that even if the 

referee's conclusions are upheld, the violations only support a 

license suspension of, at most, less than six months.1 

¶3 Upon careful review of this matter, we uphold all of 

the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law and 

conclude that a 14-month suspension of Attorney Parks' license 

to practice law is an appropriate sanction for his misconduct. 

We also deny Attorney Parks' objection to costs. We see no 

reason to deviate from our usual custom, which is to require an 

attorney who has committed misconduct to pay the full costs of 

the proceeding, which are $42,226.26 as of July 6, 2018. The 

OLR did not seek restitution and no restitution is ordered.

¶4 Attorney Parks was admitted to practice law in 

Wisconsin in 1991. He has not previously been disciplined. 

¶5 The allegations giving rise to this complaint stem 

from the time Attorney Parks was employed at the firm of 

Zacherl, O'Malley & Endejan (the firm), from 1995 until May 

 

1 A suspension of less than six months does not require the 

lawyer to undergo a formal reinstatement proceeding, which 

includes a character and fitness inquiry. See SCR 22.28.
No. 2016AP85-D

3

2013. He worked in the Ripon office. In April 2013, Attorney 

Parks announced he was leaving the firm. Following Attorney 

Parks' departure, the firm filed a grievance with the OLR, 

stating, among other things, that it had discovered that 

Attorney Parks had performed unauthorized legal work "on the 

side" ("non-firm work") while employed by the firm. 

¶6 On January 12, 2016, the OLR filed a complaint against 

Attorney Parks. Initially, the OLR alleged 19 counts of 

misconduct. As the case proceeded, the OLR's complaint was 

twice amended, ultimately alleging 14 counts of misconduct. The 

first four counts involve allegations of unauthorized fee 

reductions and non-firm work. Counts five through 13 allege 

misconduct related to Attorney Parks' handling of several 

matters related to C.D. and her relatives. Count 14 alleged 

noncooperation with the OLR.

¶7 Attorney Parks filed an answer refuting most of the 

allegations. The parties engaged in extensive discovery. Prior 

to the evidentiary hearing, the parties filed stipulated facts. 

The referee conducted a three day evidentiary hearing in October 

2017 at which some 18 witnesses testified. The referee issued a 

report on February 7, 2018, concluding that Attorney Parks 

committed eight of the 14 alleged counts of misconduct, that OLR 

had failed to prove six counts, and recommending a 14-month 

license suspension. Attorney Parks objected to costs. The 

referee issued a separate ruling, concluding that full costs 

were warranted. Attorney Parks appeals. The OLR did not crossappeal.
No. 2016AP85-D

4

¶8 On appeal, we consider whether the referee's findings 

are clearly erroneous. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against Carroll, 2001 WI 130, ¶ 29, 248 Wis. 2d 662, 636 

N.W.2d 718. We independently review the referee's legal 

conclusions. Id. 

¶9 At the onset we note that the partners at his former 

firm and C.D.'s relatives present a very different account of 

what transpired than Attorney Parks recounts. Attorney Parks 

characterizes the grievances against him as a "vindictive"

collaboration between a partner at Attorney Parks' former law 

firm, Attorney Z., and Attorney Parks' former client, C.D.'s 

daughter, L.E. He contends that L.E. "is resentful over her own 

tumultuous relationship with her mother" and that Attorney Z. 

resents that Attorney Parks left the firm to start his own 

competing practice. This record is replete with accusations of 

lying; many of the issues turn on credibility assessments. 

¶10 Credibility issues are left to the discretion of the 

trial court, or, in the case of a disciplinary proceeding, the 

referee. Gehr v. City of Sheboygan, 81 Wis. 2d 117, 122, 260 

N.W.2d 30 (1977). In this matter, the referee's credibility 

determinations are intertwined with his findings of 

fact. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Charlton, 174 

Wis. 2d 844, 498 N.W.2d 380 (1993). Many of the referee's 

conclusions rest on implicit findings about the relative 

credibility of witnesses. When a court does not make an 

explicit finding, an implicit finding may suffice, but only if 
No. 2016AP85-D

5

the facts of record support it. State v. Echols, 175 

Wis. 2d 653, 672, 499 N.W.2d 631 (1993). 

Non-firm work and fee reductions (Counts One-Four)

¶11 The OLR alleged that that by engaging in self-dealing 

and misappropriating fees from the firm by performing and 

privately billing for non-firm legal work while employed by the 

firm, Attorney Parks violated SCR 20:8.4(c)2 (Count One).

¶12 The referee concluded that the OLR established this 

allegation. Attorney Parks admits in the stipulated facts that 

he performed legal work for approximately 30 clients "on the 

side," collected at least $13,875 in fees, and deposited the 

fees into his personal account. Attorney Parks also admits he 

did not run conflicts of interest checks through the firm's 

client management software. The referee acknowledged but was 

clearly unpersuaded by Attorney Parks' assertion that one of the 

firm's partners gave him permission to handle some estate work 

"off the books." The referee noted that "files found on the 

firm's computer involved, among other things, small claims 

cases, contract and traffic cases, and custody disputes in 

addition to wills, that Parks handled and [Attorney Z.] denies 

giving any such permission."

¶13 Attorney Parks attacks several aspects of the 

referee's findings and his legal conclusion that Attorney Parks 

 

2 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides: "It is professional misconduct 

for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 

deceit or misrepresentation."
No. 2016AP85-D

6

violated SCR 20:8.4(c). As he argued to the referee, Attorney 

Parks maintains that one of the firm's partners, Attorney Z., 

was well aware of Attorney Parks' non-firm work and, indeed, 

approved it. Attorney Parks claims this practice began in 2005,

when one of Attorney Z's own clients could not pay a large legal 

bill so an arrangement was made whereby the client did 

remodeling work on Attorney Parks' home and Attorney Parks, in

turn, paid the firm to reduce the client's outstanding legal 

balance. Attorney Parks claims this bartering plan went awry, 

and Attorney Parks took out a home equity loan to complete the 

project, which Attorney Z. co-signed. 

¶14 Attorney Parks claims that over time, Attorney Z. 

regretted having co-signed the loan and that Attorney Z. 

encouraged Attorney Parks to conduct non-firm estate planning 

work so that Attorney Parks could earn extra money with which to 

accelerate his efforts to refinance the loan.

¶15 Attorney Z. flatly denied that he authorized Attorney 

Parks to engage in non-firm work. The firm's other partner, 

Attorney O., also denied authorizing any non-firm work. 

¶16 Attorney Parks says that the referee's finding that 

files pertaining to outside work were found "on the firm's 

computer" is clearly erroneous. He maintains that all such 

files were kept on a computer belonging to Attorney Parks'

acquaintance, C.D., so there would have been no such files on 

the firm's computer.

¶17 Post-briefing, the referee advised the court and the 

parties in writing that his reference to files on "the firm's 
No. 2016AP85-D

7

computer" was indeed a "minor factual error" and that the report 

should be amended to clarify that the documents in question were 

found on C.D.'s computer, not the firm's computer.

¶18 As corrected, the referee's finding of fact is not 

clearly erroneous. Moreover, we are of the opinion that in 

making this finding, the referee was focused less on where files 

were found (although that is relevant to other allegations) and 

more on noting that even if Attorney Z. had authorized Attorney 

Parks to engage in some non-firm estate work, Attorney Parks 

clearly engaged in other non-firm work that exceeded the scope 

of any authorization. 

¶19 Attorney Parks also complains that the referee made 

only an "implicit" credibility determination and says the facts 

of record do not support it. He maintains that Attorney Z. is 

engaged in "serial dissembling" and points to evidence he 

believes supports this claim.

¶20 For example, Attorney Parks notes that Attorney Z. 

initially told the OLR that Attorney Parks made a deal with a 

client, M.W., to reduce M.W.'s legal fees in exchange for M.W. 

creating a legal website for Attorney Parks. The OLR's first 
No. 2016AP85-D

8

complaint alleged misconduct related to this incident but 

dropped the charge when the complaint was amended.3

¶21 The referee noted that both partners denied giving 

Attorney Parks permission to engage in non-firm work. Although 

Attorney Parks argues that the referee failed to give adequate 

weight to his evidence, the referee clearly weighed the 

credibility of Attorney Parks' testimony and found it wanting. 

We will not reassess Attorney Parks' credibility. We conclude 

that the record supports the referee's findings and conclusion 

pertaining to count one and we accept them. See In re 

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 

Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747. 

¶22 Turning to count two, the referee concluded, based 

primarily on Attorney Parks' own stipulated admission, that by 

earning fees from non-firm legal work, Attorney Parks violated a 

standard of conduct set forth in In re Disciplinary Proceedings 

 

3 The website came to the firm's attention when it tried to 

collect outstanding legal fees from M.W. M.W. indicated that he 

had created a website in an effort to offset his legal fees. 

The website prominently featured Attorney Parks, barely noted 

his affiliation with the firm, and implied Attorney Parks was 

offering financial consulting services at the firm's Ripon 

office. Although Attorney Parks disavowed any knowledge of the 

website, denied asking M.W. to create it, and took steps to 

remove it, this incident clearly sowed seeds of distrust between 

the partners and Attorney Parks.
No. 2016AP85-D

9

Against Shea, 190 Wis. 2d 560, 527 N.W.2d 314 (1995), actionable 

via SCR 20:8.4(f).4 (Count Two). 

¶23 Attorney Parks disputes the referee's conclusion that 

he violated SCR 20:8.4(f) for the same reasons he disputes that 

he committed the misconduct alleged in count one; he maintains 

that Attorney Z. authorized him to perform non-firm work. 

Again, this turned on a credibility determination, albeit an 

implicit one, that we will not disturb. It is sufficiently 

supported by the record.

¶24 Counts three and four of the second amended complaint 

allege that Attorney Parks made unauthorized fee reductions, 

and/or accepted services that benefitted him personally in 

exchange for a reduction of legal fees, at the firm's expense. 

Specifically, the OLR alleged that: (1) in 2012, Attorney Parks 

reduced client M.W.'s legal fee by $3,122.70 without firm 

approval; (2) Attorney Parks agreed to reduce client R.C.'s 

 

4 SCR 20:8.4(f) provides: "It is professional misconduct to 

violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme court order or 

supreme court decision regulating the conduct of lawyers."

In In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Shea, 190 

Wis. 2d 560, 527 N.W.2d 314 (1995), Attorney Shea sent a client 

for whom he had performed legal work two separate bills, one 

payable to the law firm, the other——for $75,000——payable 

directly to Attorney Shea. Both were paid. It appeared to the 

firm that an unbilled balance remained. Attorney Shea then 

represented to his firm that the (apparently) unbilled fees 

should be discounted, implying that the client was unhappy with 

an associate's performance. The court concluded that by 

concealing from the firm that he had personally received funds 

from a client while the firm was not being paid in full for 

legal fees, the lawyer violated SCR 20:8.4(c).
No. 2016AP85-D

10

attorney fees in exchange for R.C. performing remodeling work on 

Attorney Parks' home; and (3) Attorney Parks agreed to credit 

legal fees owed by client H.W. in exchange for H.W. doing body 

work on Attorney Parks' car.5

¶25 The referee concluded, based specifically on the 

testimony of R.C. and H.W., that Attorney Parks engaged in selfdealing in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) (Count Three) by 

collaborating with R.C. and H.W. for them to perform remodeling 

and auto work in exchange for a reduction of legal fees owed to 

the firm. The referee also concluded that Attorney Parks 

violated the standard of conduct set forth in In re Disciplinary 

Proceedings Against Shea, 190 Wis. 2d 560, actionable via 

SCR 20:8.4(f) (Count Four). 

¶26 In alleging count four the OLR referenced three 

incidents: the write down of M.W.'s fee, exchanging fees for 

remodeling services with R.C., and exchanging fees for auto body 

work with H.W. In reaching his conclusion regarding count four, 

the referee focused only on the write down of M.W.'s fee. The 

referee acknowledged Attorney Parks' version of events but 

clearly found credible and relied on the testimony of both 

 

5 Attorney Parks notes that unlike Shea, he was not a 

partner, and he was not subject to an employment contract with 

the firm that provided that "all fees, compensation, and other 

things of value received or realized as a result of the 

rendition of professional legal services by [him] in any 

capacity . . . shall belong to the [firm] whether paid directly 

to [him] or to the [firm]."
No. 2016AP85-D

11

Attorneys Z. and O., that Attorney Parks did not have authority 

to write down a substantial amount of legal fees, and concluded 

that Attorney Parks thus violated SCR 20:8.4(f).6

¶27 Attorney Parks refutes these conclusions and says the 

referee's implicit determination that these witnesses are 

credible is belied by other record evidence. Attorney Parks 

admits that he reduced M.W.'s fee, but maintains he was 

authorized to do so and was transparent about it. He says the 

fee reduction was recorded in the firm's billing system so there 

was no "concealment."

¶28 Attorney Parks contends that although he was not a 

partner, the firm was run——to quote Attorney Parks' former legal 

secretary——like "a group of solo practitioners all housed under 

the same roof." As such, he says that he had discretion over 

the cases he accepted and over fees, and that he had authority 

to authorize fee reductions. He says there was no firm policy 

prohibiting fee reductions. He cites corroborating testimony 

from other firm staff members who also reported reducing fees 

without permission. 

¶29 Moreover, he says that, as a factual matter, he did 

not reduce R.C. or H.W.'s fees in exchange for services. He 

says R.C.'s affidavit is "preposterous" "incoherent and 

incredible" and that the record evidence, namely cancelled 

 

6 The referee did not make a specific finding or conclusion 

as to R.C. and H.W. on count four, but the findings he did make 

are sufficient to establish a violation of SCR 20:8.4(f).
No. 2016AP85-D

12

checks and the testimony of his former wife, shows he paid R.C. 

for the work performed on his home. He alleges that both R.C. 

and H.W. lied in their affidavits, in exchange for fee 

reductions that were offered by the firm, not by him. Again, he 

says that his evidence is more credible than the opposition and 

that the referee improperly focused on whether he had permission 

to write down fees rather than the alleged misconduct, which 

turned on whether he traded fee discounts for personal work 

which, again, he asserts he did not.

¶30 The referee's findings implicitly accept, as credible, 

the testimony of Attorney Z. and Attorney O. and the testimony 

of the two clients, each of whom contradicted Attorney Parks'

account of what transpired. The record evidence indicates that 

Attorney Parks was an associate, the firm paid the overhead, he 

was paid a percentage of his billings, and he needed approval to 

authorize a significant fee reduction. We accept the referee's 

findings and conclusions of law regarding counts three and four.

Counts Five-13: Interactions with C.D. and her relatives

¶31 The OLR alleged nine counts of misconduct relating to 

Attorney Parks' interactions with C.D. and her relatives. The 

referee concluded that Attorney Parks committed the misconduct 

alleged in four of the nine counts. 

¶32 Attorney Parks and C.D. became acquainted in the early 

1990s. Their lives were interconnected until her death in May 

2013. Attorney Parks represented C.D. in a divorce in 1996 and 

in a personal injury claim in 2008. He reviewed documents 
No. 2016AP85-D

13

regarding a loan C.D. made to her daughter, and answered her 

legal questions on occasion. 

¶33 Attorney Parks also occasionally used C.D.'s computer 

for his own work and, although he disputes it, there is record 

evidence that C.D. did some secretarial work for Attorney Parks.7

Attorney Parks was a landlord and rented a home to C.D. 

beginning in 2008 until her death. In 2010, Attorney Parks and 

his then-wife borrowed $35,000 as an unsecured loan from C.D. 

Attorney Parks says that as C.D. became ill, he served as C.D.'s 

Power of Attorney, took her to medical appointments, and visited 

her at home and after she moved to a nursing home. 

¶34 Attorney Parks was also close friends with C.D's 

daughter, L.E., and her husband, T.E. Attorney Parks 

represented T.E. in a personal injury case, wrote two wills for 

the couple, and was the best man at their wedding. Attorney 

Parks says that the relationship between mother (C.D.) and 

daughter (L.E.) was characterized by ongoing conflict and 

tension, in part because of a failed trucking business. 

Attorney Parks was also acquainted with C.D.'s sister, G.S., who 

is L.E.'s aunt. Attorney Parks represented G.S. in a divorce 

proceeding in 2011 and 2012.

The $5,000 "Bonus" (Counts Five and Six)

 

7 C.D.'s medical records indicate that C.D. told three

healthcare professionals that she did work for Attorney Parks until

she entered a nursing home. C.D.'s sister, daughter, and son-inlaw also testified that C.D. did legal work for Attorney Parks. 
No. 2016AP85-D

14

¶35 Attorney Parks represented T.E. in a personal injury 

case. The firm's standard contingency fee agreement provided 

that the firm would receive 33 percent of any recovery for 

attorney fees. The OLR alleged that at the time of settlement, 

without authorization from the firm, Attorney Parks unilaterally 

reduced the attorney fees from 33 percent to 25 percent, a 

$12,000 fee reduction. 

¶36 T.E. and L.E. claim that thereafter, Attorney Parks 

mentioned, on some three occasions, that clients sometimes gave 

him a bonus. Then, during the meeting to obtain their 

settlement money, Attorney Parks asked about "his $5,000 bonus."

There was testimony that the couple had little money at this 

time, but felt compelled to give him the requested bonus. L.E. 

said that she wrote a $5,000 check and handed it to Attorney 

Parks. He handed it back and asked that she write "gift" on the 

memo line, which she did. The fee reduction and "gift" meant 

the firm received $33,000 in legal fees instead of $45,000.

¶37 The referee concluded that Attorney Parks violated 

SCR 20:8.4(c) by unilaterally and without authorization reducing 

the firm's attorney fees, and by seeking and accepting an 

unauthorized $5,000 "gift" from L.E. and T.E. (Count Five). The 

referee concluded further that by engaging in self-dealing after 

seeking and accepting a "gift" from L.E. and T.E. in exchange 

for a reduction of legal fees owed to the firm, Attorney Parks 

violated a standard of conduct set forth in Shea, actionable via 

SCR 20:8.4(f) (Count Six).
No. 2016AP85-D

15

¶38 Attorney Parks appeals these findings and conclusions. 

He reiterates that he had authority to unilaterally reduce legal 

fees especially where, as here, he thought it was necessary to 

facilitate the settlement. He points to an anecdote from a 

legal assistant who once suggested to a partner that Attorney 

Parks should reduce a fee for another client and the partner 

said he would not "force the reduction of fees." Attorney Parks 

says this confirms that he had fee setting authority. He 

insists that the check was an unsolicited gift, as evidenced by 

his own testimony and that of his former wife, who thanked the 

couple. 

¶39 With respect to count six, Attorney Parks suggests 

that unlike the lawyer in Shea, he was not a partner at the firm 

and there was no firm policy to violate, so his only duty to the 

firm was a duty of loyalty. He says he did not violate that 

duty by making a reasonable judgment call to reduce a fee in 

order to facilitate a settlement that might otherwise have 

failed. Attorney Parks maintains that there is no evidence that 

he arranged the gift in exchange or as a quid pro quo for the 

fee reduction. So, Attorney Parks contends that the referee's 

conclusion, that he violated SCR 20:8.4(f), is wrong. 

¶40 A review of the record demonstrates that in this 

instance, the referee clearly believed the testimony of L.E. and 

T.E., noting that they were in "dire financial straits" when 

they received their settlement and that both testified that the 

"gift" was not their idea, they did not offer it, and felt they 

needed to pay it to receive their settlement. Both of the 
No. 2016AP85-D

16

firm's partners testified that the fee reduction was not 

authorized. 

¶41 The referee also rejected Attorney Parks' suggestion 

that counts five and six are duplicative, explaining that count 

five addresses Attorney Parks' misconduct vis a vis his client, 

while count six pertains to his misconduct vis a vis his duty of 

loyalty to his firm. 

¶42 We adopt the referee's findings of fact and 

conclusions of law with respect to these two counts. Although 

mindful of Attorney Parks' defense, we cannot conclude that the 

referee's findings, particularly since they rely heavily on the 

credibility of the witnesses, are clearly erroneous. The 

findings indicate that Attorney Parks unilaterally and without 

authority reduced the legal fees that would be paid to the firm 

then essentially recouped his own portion of that reduction by 

persuading the clients to pay him a bonus. The record is 

sufficient to support the referee's findings and conclusions on 

these counts and we accept them.

Loan from C.D. (Count Seven)

¶43 The referee concluded that the OLR failed to establish 

that Attorney Parks violated SCR 20:1.8(a) and (b)8 when he 

 

8 SCR 20:1.8(a) provides:

(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business 

transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an 

ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary 

interest adverse to a client unless: 

(continued)
No. 2016AP85-D

17

borrowed $35,000 from C.D. without proper disclosures. Attorney 

Parks argued that C.D. was not his client when this transaction 

occurred. The OLR did not demonstrate otherwise and has not 

appealed the referee's conclusion. We therefore conclude that 

the referee's findings with respect to this count have not been 

shown to be clearly erroneous. We accept the referee's findings 

and conclusion and dismiss count seven. 

Confidentiality (Count 8)

¶44 After C.D.'s death, her daughter, L.E., obtained 

C.D.'s computer and discovered that it contained several client 

files and documents that she was able to access without a 

 

(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer 

acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the 

client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in 

writing in a manner that can be reasonably understood 

by the client; 

(2) the client is advised in writing of the 

desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable 

opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal 

counsel on the transaction; and 

(3) the client gives informed consent, in a 

writing signed by the client, to the essential terms 

of the transaction and the lawyer's role in the 

transaction, including whether the lawyer is 

representing the client in the transaction.

(b) A lawyer shall not use information relating 

to representation of a client to the disadvantage of 

the client unless the client gives informed consent, 

excepted as permitted or required by these rules.
No. 2016AP85-D

18

password.9 L.E. gave the computer to the firm, which, in turn, 

notified the OLR. 

¶45 The OLR alleged that, by working on client files on 

C.D.'s computer, Attorney Parks allowed C.D. access to client 

files at a time when C.D. was not working for the firm. The OLR 

further alleged that the clients did not give informed consent 

for non-employees to have access to their files, all in 

violation of SCR 20:1.6(a)10 (Count Eight). 

¶46 The referee concluded that the OLR established by 

clear and convincing evidence that Attorney Parks violated 

SCR 20:1.6(a). The referee rejected Attorney Parks' suggestion 

that the OLR had not shown that C.D. actually looked at the 

unprotected client files.

¶47 Attorney Parks appeals. He acknowledges that leaving 

client files without password protection on a non-firm 

employee's computer was not a proper practice to ensure client 

 

9 The complaint alleged that documents on C.D.'s computer 

included a Healthcare Power of Attorney document for a client we 

refer to as C.S., that included C.S.'s name, address, and the 

names of the client's designated health care agents. It also 

contained a beneficiary designation for a client we refer to 

as B.T., that included the full legal names and social 

security numbers of the client's six designated beneficiaries.

10 SCR 20:1.6(a) provides: "A lawyer shall not reveal 

information relating to the representation of a client unless 

the client gives informed consent, except for disclosures that 

are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the 

representation, and except as stated in pars. (b) and (c)." 

Paragraphs (b) and (c) encompass necessary disclosures that are 

not implicated here.
No. 2016AP85-D

19

confidentiality. However, he reiterates there is no evidence 

that C.D. actually looked at the documents and suggests that the 

fact that L.E. "found" them does not equate with his "revealing 

them." Therefore, he claims the record does not support the 

claim, as alleged. We are not persuaded and agree that the 

facts, as alleged and as found by the referee, are sufficient to 

establish that Attorney Parks violated SCR 20:1.6(a). 

Drafting C.D.'s will (Count Nine)

¶48 The referee concluded that the OLR failed to prove 

that Attorney Parks violated SCR 20:1.7(a)(2)11 by providing C.D. 

 

11 SCR 20:1.7(a)(2) provides:

(a) Except as provided in par. (b), a lawyer 

shall not represent a client if the representation 

involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A 

concurrent conflict of interest exists if: 

(2) there is a significant risk that the 

representation of one or more clients will be 

materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to 

another client, a former client or a third person or 

by a personal interest of the lawyer.

(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent 

conflict of interest under par. (a), a lawyer may 

represent a client if: 

(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the 

lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent 

representation to each affected client; 

(2) the representation is not prohibited by law; 

(3) the representation does not involve the 

assertion of a claim by one client against another 

client represented by the lawyer in the same 

litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and 

(continued)
No. 2016AP85-D

20

with assistance drafting her will when, knowing he was a 

beneficiary, there was a "significant risk that his 

representation was materially limited by his personal 

interests." The referee found that while Attorney Parks gave 

the firm's will template to C.D., there was no evidence Attorney 

Parks actually assisted C.D. in drafting her will. This finding 

has not been shown to be clearly erroneous and we accept the 

referee's conclusion. Count nine is dismissed.

Purchasing C.D.'s car (Count Ten)

¶49 The referee concluded that the OLR failed to prove 

that Attorney Parks violated SCR 20:8.4(c) by using his power of 

attorney to effectuate the transfer of the title of C.D.'s 

vehicle to Attorney Parks, in contravention of the terms of her 

will, while C.D. was allegedly incompetent. The OLR focused on 

the statement of C.D.'s physician that "it is more likely than 

not that C.D. was not competent" when she signed the vehicle

title. The referee, however, observed that this was not "clear 

and convincing" evidence which is needed to establish the 

alleged disciplinary violation. This finding has not been shown 

to be clearly erroneous. We accept the referee's conclusion and 

dismiss count ten.

Rent payment (Count 11)

 

(4) each affected client gives informed consent, 

confirmed in a writing signed by the client.

There is no assertion that SCR 20:1.7(b) applies 

here.
No. 2016AP85-D

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¶50 The referee concluded that the OLR also failed to 

prove that Attorney Parks violated SCR 20:8.4(c) when, the day 

before C.D. died, Attorney Parks used his power of attorney to 

write himself a $1,500 check from C.D.'s account to pre-pay 

himself for upcoming June and July 2013 rental payments.

Relying in part on the expert testimony of Attorney Mark Munson 

regarding the appropriate conduct of a power of attorney, the 

referee was persuaded that on this record, although the conduct 

was "questionable," there was no showing that Attorney Parks'

action adversely affected anyone's interests. C.D.'s belongings 

remained in the rental property during June and July and T.E. 

and L.E. stayed in the property during that time. This finding 

has not been shown to be clearly erroneous and we accept the 

referee's conclusion; count 11 is dismissed.

Release (Count 12)

¶51 The OLR alleged and the referee agreed that Attorney 

Parks committed fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in violation 

of SCR 20:8.4(c) by the manner in which he obtained the 

signatures of L.E. and G.S. on a "release," and the terms of the 

release he drafted relating to C.D.'s will. 

¶52 C.D. designated her sister, G.S., and Attorney Parks 

as the primary beneficiaries of her will. C.D.'s will provided 

that Attorney Parks was to receive 40 percent of her payable on

death accounts and 40 percent forgiveness of the balance of the 

$35,000 loan from C.D. She also left Attorney Parks her "rifle, 

outdoor furniture, tools, air compressor, John Deere tractor, 

push mower, chain saw, and rototiller."
No. 2016AP85-D

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¶53 The will provided that G.S. was to receive 60 percent

of C.D.'s payable on death accounts, C.D.'s vehicle, and what 

was left on Attorney Parks' loan (after the partial forgiveness) 

which was then about $21,351. The will forgave a loan to L.E. 

but otherwise excluded her daughter.

¶54 C.D. died in May 2013. A few weeks later, G.S. and 

L.E. met with Attorney Parks to discuss C.D.'s estate. Both 

G.S. and L.E. testified that they thought Attorney Parks 

represented them in connection with the estate. Attorney Parks 

testified that he told them both, verbally, that he was not 

acting as their attorney, but "regrettably I didn't send them a 

letter."

¶55 On May 24, 2013, the three met at a bank to finalize 

distribution of C.D.'s bank accounts. There, Attorney Parks 

asked them each to sign, and both G.S. and L.E. did sign, a 

document entitled "Full and Final Settlement & Release of All 

Claims." Both testified that they believed the document was 

necessary to close out the bank accounts. The "release" which 

was drafted by Attorney Parks provided that:

 G.S. and L.E. both released and discharged all claims and 

liabilities against Attorney Parks that may exist now or in 

the future regarding all sums that he (and his wife, etc.) 

may have owed to C.D. or her estate in any form known or 

unknown, including, but not limited to, contractual or due 

to his role as power of attorney for C.D.

 They agreed that no probate would be initiated by any of 

them.
No. 2016AP85-D

23

 They agreed that they had divided the personal property and 

that they were satisfied with the division.

 G.S. would receive Attorney Parks' share of C.D.'s payableon-death accounts.

 G.S. had to pay the funeral bill and any other of C.D.'s 

debts.

¶56 Essentially, this document released Attorney Parks 

from all liability, permitted him to keep whatever personal 

property he had received from C.D., and excused him from 

repaying the balance of his loan which was at least $21,351. In 

exchange, G.S. received all of the payable on death money, which 

was some $28,872.19. 

¶57 The OLR alleged that as a result of this document, 

G.S. received $1,261.72 less than she was entitled to receive 

and she did not receive C.D.'s vehicle because that had been 

sold——by Attorney Parks to himself——shortly before C.D. died.12

¶58 The referee found that Attorney Parks failed to tell 

L.E. that he did not represent her or G.S., and failed to tell 

them that they should seek the advice of another attorney 

because he had an interest in the estate. The referee concluded 

that Attorney Parks' conduct pertaining to the release 

constituted misconduct that violated SCR 20:8.4(c).

 

12 Attorney Parks states that he paid $15,000 for the 

vehicle and deposited those funds into C.D.'s accounts which, in 

turn, went to G.S.
No. 2016AP85-D

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¶59 Attorney Parks appeals. He maintains that the release 

reflected the three beneficiaries' agreement among themselves. 

He explained that G.S. wanted a car but did not want C.D.'s car 

so there was no conflict over his purchase of the vehicle. He 

adds that G.S. wanted a lump sum of cash, not years of modest 

monthly loan payments from Attorney Parks, hence the decision to 

forgive his loan but give G.S. all the payable on death 

accounts. 

¶60 As evidence that G.S. and L.E. acceded to this 

agreement, Attorney Parks notes that L.E. brought a death 

certificate to the bank and that he wrote "per agreement" on a 

check he signed over to G.S. He says he did not threaten or 

force anyone and says that he did not tell L.E. she had to sign. 

He claims the fact he gave them copies of the release reflects 

his transparency. He claims that no one suffered any ill effect 

as a result of this document, but concedes that, because he was 

a beneficiary, it was a "poor decision." However, he says that 

there was no deceit, so there was no violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).

¶61 We are not persuaded. The referee clearly accepted 

the testimony of the two women that they neither fully 

understood what the "release" provided nor understood why they 

were signing it. Inducing G.S. and L.E., in the immediate 

aftermath of the death of their sister and mother, to sign a 

patently self-serving document designed to insulate himself from 

liability at the potential expense of G.S. was more than a "poor 

decision." We wholly agree with the referee's conclusion that 
No. 2016AP85-D

25

"Parks' conduct in this regard involved 'dishonesty, fraud,

deceit or misrepresentation' within the meaning of the Rule."

Conflict (Count 13) 

¶62 The referee concluded that the OLR failed to prove 

that Attorney Parks violated SCR 20:1.7(a)(2) based on the 

theory that he was representing G.S. and L.E. in May 2013 when 

they were finalizing C.D.'s estate. While the two women may 

have thought Attorney Parks was representing their interests as 

related to C.D.'s estate, the referee found that there was no 

evidence that Attorney Parks was providing legal services to 

G.S. at that time, and L.E.'s own testimony indicated she did 

not consider him her lawyer at that time. These findings have 

not been shown to be clearly erroneous and we accept the 

referee's conclusion. Count 13 is dismissed.

Non-cooperation (Count 14)

¶63 The referee also concluded that the OLR failed to 

prove that Attorney Parks violated SCR 22.03(2)13 and 

 

13 SCR 22.03(2) provides:

Upon commencing an investigation, the director 

shall notify the respondent of the matter being 

investigated unless in the opinion of the director the 

investigation of the matter requires otherwise. The 

respondent shall fully and fairly disclose all facts 

and circumstances pertaining to the alleged misconduct 

within 20 days after being served by ordinary mail a 

request for a written response. The director may 

allow additional time to respond. Following receipt 

of the response, the director may conduct further 

investigation and may compel the respondent to answer 

questions, furnish documents, and present any 

information deemed relevant to the investigation. 
No. 2016AP85-D

26

SCR 22.03(6),14 enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h)15 by failing to 

cooperate with the OLR (Count 14). The OLR pointed to certain 

issues, such as Attorney Parks' failure to provide certain 

client names or a list of non-firm files on which he worked. 

The referee disagreed, finding that at most "Parks was guilty of 

some inconsistencies in his responses to the committee's 

inquiries . . .." This finding has not been shown to be clearly 

erroneous and we accept the referee's conclusion. Count 14 is 

dismissed.

¶64 We accept the referee's factual findings and 

conclusions of law and agree that Attorney Parks committed the 

professional misconduct alleged in counts one through six, 

eight, and 12 of the OLR's second amended complaint. We dismiss 

counts seven, nine, 10-11, and 13-14. 

Recommended Discipline

¶65 Attorney Parks contends that the recommended 

discipline——a 14-month license suspension——is excessive, even if 

the referee's conclusions relating to misconduct are upheld. 

 

14 SCR 22.03(6) provides: "In the course of the 

investigation, the respondent's wilful failure to provide 

relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 

documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure 

are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted 

in the grievance."

15 SCR 20:8.4(h) provides: "It is professional misconduct 

for a lawyer to fail to cooperate in the investigation of a 

grievance filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required 

by SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), 

or SCR 22.04(1)."
No. 2016AP85-D

27

Attorney Parks argues that his misconduct is not so serious that 

he should be required to petition for reinstatement and prove 

his moral character and fitness to practice law. Attorney Parks

argues that a license suspension of less than six months is 

sufficient. The OLR maintains that "Parks' pervasively 

dishonest conduct merits a lengthy suspension, whether that be 

the two-year suspension it had recommended, [or] the 14 month 

suspension recommended by the referee."

¶66 Ultimately, it is this court's responsibility to 

determine appropriate discipline. See In re Disciplinary 

Proceedings Against Reitz, 2005 WI 39, ¶74, 279 Wis. 2d 550, 694 

N.W.2d 894. This court considers the seriousness, the effect on 

the legal system of repetition of misconduct, the need to 

impress upon the attorney the seriousness of the misconduct, and 

to deter other attorneys from engaging in similar misconduct. 

See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Arthur, 2005 WI 40, 

¶78, 279 Wis. 2d 583, 694 N.W.2d 910.

¶67 Although no two disciplinary cases are exactly alike, 

cases in which lawyers collect fees from clients that they did 

not report to their firm, and multiple violations of SCR 20:8.4 

(Misconduct) typically result in lengthy license suspensions. 

¶68 Recently, we agreed that a one-year suspension was 

appropriate discipline for a lawyer, with no prior discipline, 

who committed two counts of misconduct in violation of 

SCR 20:8.4(c) and 20:8.4(f), for directly accepting compensation 

for consulting services, without notice to her firm. In re 
No. 2016AP85-D

28

Disciplinary Proceeding Against Trupke, 2018 WI 43, 381 

Wis. 2d 136, 911 N.W.2d 361.

¶69 We also deem instructive In re Disciplinary 

Proceedings Against Brown, 2005 WI 49, 280 Wis. 2d 44, 695 

N.W.2d 295. Attorney Brown was suspended 18 months for, inter 

alia, accepting fees from clients totaling some $16,000 while 

advising his firm that he was acting pro bono. See also In re 

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Koenig, 2015 WI 16, 361 

Wis. 2d 16, 859 N.W.2d 105 (imposing two-year suspension for 

taking $39,920 in client fees that were owed to his firm); In re 

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Elverman, 2008 WI 28, 308 

Wis. 2d 524, 746 N.W.2d 793 (imposing nine-month suspension on 

attorney for failing to report substantial co-trustee fees to 

his firm); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Schaller, 2006 

WI 40, 290 Wis. 2d 65, 713 N.W.2d 105 (imposing two-year 

suspension for converting $4,290.85 from firm and failing to 

report income on tax returns). None of these cases resulted in 

discipline less than six months. There is more than sufficient 

support for the imposition of a 14-month license suspension 

here.

¶70 We are not persuaded by Attorney Parks' reference to 

In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Curtis, 2018 WI 13, 379 

Wis. 2d 521, 907 N.W.2d 91. In that case, the OLR initially 

alleged seven counts of misconduct. We concluded that the 

lawyer committed only four counts of misconduct involving trust 

account violations and tax evasion. Attorney Curtis was 

suspended for four months. The facts were quite different; it 
No. 2016AP85-D

29

is not a compelling example. There, in imposing discipline the 

court was mindful that Attorney Curtis had served prison time 

for tax evasion during which he was unable to practice law. 

Also, the court determined that the trust account violations 

were not intentional, did not involve misrepresentation or 

dishonesty, and he did not personally benefit from them. By 

contrast, here Attorney Parks was determined to have committed 

four separate counts of misconduct involving fraud, deceit or 

misrepresentation. We conclude that a 14-month license 

suspension is appropriate. No restitution will be ordered.

Objection to Costs

¶71 Attorney Parks filed an objection to the OLR's preappellate statement of costs and also objected to the OLR's 

appellate costs. Attorney Parks reasons that he was exonerated 

on six of the 14 counts alleged against him and contends that 

the OLR "overcharged" the case. He asks the court to impose 

only 25 percent of the costs upon him. He argues that he should 

not have to "foot the bill" for the OLR's prosecution of conduct 

that didn't violate the supreme court rules. Attorney Parks 

points to In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Arellano, 2013 

WI 24, ¶52, 346 Wis. 2d 340, 827 N.W.2d 877, for the proposition 

that when the OLR drops charges prior to the evidentiary 

hearing, some reduction in costs is warranted.

¶72 It is true that Attorney Parks prevailed on six of the 

14 counts alleged, but this court generally does not apportion 

costs based on the number of counts charged and/or proven. In 

re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Polich, 2005 WI 36, 279 
No. 2016AP85-D

30

Wis. 2d 266, 694 N.W.2d 367 (declining to reduce costs where the 

respondent prevailed on five of the seven counts brought against 

him). 

¶73 While there are exceptions, such as Arellano, this is 

not one of them. Attorney Arellano was charged with 14 counts 

of misconduct and the OLR sought revocation of his law license. 

Before the hearing the OLR dismissed nine counts. Attorney 

Arellano was ultimately determined to have committed only two 

counts of misconduct and received a public reprimand. The OLR 

agreed that a cost reduction was appropriate in that case. 

¶74 In exercising our discretion regarding the assessment 

of costs, we consider the submissions of the parties and the 

following factors: (a) the number of counts charged, contested, 

and proven; (b) the nature of the misconduct; (c) the level of 

discipline sought by the parties and recommended by the referee; 

(d) the respondent's cooperation with the disciplinary process; 

(e) prior discipline, if any; (f) other relevant circumstances. 

See SCR 22.24(1m). 

¶75 Applying these factors, we are not persuaded that a 

reduction in fees is warranted here. We acknowledge that, after 

more than 25 years in practice, Attorney Parks has no prior 

discipline. We consider that the OLR alleged but failed to 

prove that Attorney Parks was uncooperative with the OLR.

¶76 The other factors do not weigh in support of a cost 

reduction. The OLR alleged 14 counts of misconduct. Attorney 

Parks contested them all. The referee ultimately concluded, and 

we agree, that Attorney Parks committed eight counts of 
No. 2016AP85-D

31

misconduct. The OLR sought a two-year suspension while Attorney 

Parks argued that a suspension of less than six months was 

appropriate. The referee recommended and we accept a 14-month 

license suspension. 

¶77 In the Arellano case, we observed that the ultimate 

misconduct found and discipline imposed were not only much less 

than initially sought, but were also of a materially different 

nature. Here, although Attorney Parks was exonerated on a 

number of claims pertaining to his dealings with C.D., he was 

nonetheless deemed to have committed four separate violations of 

SCR 20:8.4(c), involving fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.

¶78 Attorney Parks litigated this case vigorously as is 

his right. That, more than any strategy on the part of the OLR, 

is the reason for the high costs. The referee concluded and we 

agree that Attorney Parks has not established that the amounts 

included for counsel and referee fees, reporting and transcript 

costs, copying, and medical records fees, were either 

"unreasonable," or "unnecessary."

16 We thus find no reason to 

 

16 Attorney Parks specifically objects to the $3,014 in 

expert witness fees paid to the OLR's witness, Attorney Mark 

Munson. He points out that while Attorney Munson testified as 

to eight counts of the original complaint, much of his testimony 

was that he had reached no relevant conclusions on the points at 

issue. Attorney Munson was not called to testify at the 

hearing. The OLR says that its retention of Attorney Munson, 

whether he served as a "testimonial expert" or a "consulting 

expert," was "part and parcel of OLR's overall litigation of 

this case." Supreme Court Rule 22.001(3) specifies that the 

costs of proceedings include "expert witness fees," and 

"compensation and reasonable expenses of experts." The OLR adds 

that it found Attorney Munson's opinions valuable.
No. 2016AP85-D

32

depart from our general practice of imposing full costs on 

attorneys deemed to have committed misconduct. See SCR 22.24.

¶79 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Daniel Parks to 

practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 14 

months, effective January 24, 2019. 

¶80 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 

of this order, Daniel Parks shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 

Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are $42,226.26, 

as of July 6, 2018.

¶81 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Daniel Parks shall comply 

with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a 

person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 

suspended.
No. 2016AP85-D

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