[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-10619

____________________

CHABAD CHAYIL, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

THE SCHOOL BOARD OF

MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA,

and MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA,

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-21084-RNS

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-10619

Before NEWSOM and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and COVINGTON,∗

District Judge.

COVINGTON, District Judge:

In 2019, following a government investigation into an 

afterschool program run by Plaintiff Chabad Chayil, Inc., 

Defendant Miami-Dade County Public Schools (“MDCPS”) barred 

Chabad from continuing to use its facilities. Chabad sued both 

MDCPS and the investigating authority—Miami-Dade County’s 

Office of Inspector General (“OIG”)—for alleged violations of its 

federal constitutional rights. The district court dismissed those 

claims with prejudice and without leave to amend, and Chabad 

appealed. Following careful consideration and oral argument, we 

affirm. 

I 

According to the amended complaint, Chabad is a non-profit 

organization that runs numerous programs for the Jewish

community and wider community in Miami-Dade County. As part 

of its programming, Chabad operated a popular afterschool 

program—the Community Hebrew Afterschool Program 

(“CHAP”)—from 2008 until the end of the 2018-19 school year. By 

the time it ceased operations in 2019, CHAP had grown to serve

approximately 200 students at two locations, Aventura Waterways 

∗ Honorable Virginia M. Covington, United States District Judge for the 

Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation. 

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21-10619 Opinion of the Court 3

K-8 (“Waterways K-8”) and Virginia A. Boone Highland Oaks 

Elementary School (“Boone Elementary”).

Chabad alleged that when it first saw the need for an 

afterschool program in 2008, its President, Rabbi Kievman, 

approached Dr. Martin Karp, a member of the MDCPS School 

Board. Chabad inquired as to how CHAP could utilize MDCPS 

facilities, and Dr. Karp directed the organization to Luis Bello, the 

principal of Waterways K-8. Bello procured forms from MDCPS’s 

Facility Use Office and forwarded them to Chabad. “At Bello’s 

direction,” Chabad submitted the forms provided, and MDCPS 

approved Chabad’s application for the 2008-09 school year. Chabad 

repeated the same process for the 2009-10 school year. Chabad 

offered the CHAP program at Waterways K-8 for the 2008-09 and 

the 2009-10 school years on a part-time basis.

After obtaining a funding grant, CHAP operated as a fulltime program beginning in the 2010-11 school year and for every 

year thereafter. The year it obtained the funding, Chabad 

approached Bello about expanding CHAP into a full-time 

afterschool program, and Bello gave Chabad a different form to fill 

out: an MDCPS Application for Temporary Use of School Building 

Facilities of the Miami-Dade County Public Schools—Temporary 

Use Agreement (“TUA”). This form was different from the one 

CHAP previously filled out during the first two years of its 

program.

Under MDCPS policy, school administrators may approve 

the temporary use of school facilities for non-school educational, 

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4 Opinion of the Court 21-10619

civic, cultural, recreational, artistic, or charitable programs. The 

renter must submit a TUA and prepay rental charges unless the fee 

is waived by MDCPS officials. MDCPS may waive the rental fee, 

but only if the meeting or program is open to the public and offered 

free of charge.1

According to Chabad, MDCPS never communicated the fee 

waiver policy to Chabad and never informed Chabad that it could 

charge fees to its students and in turn pay rental charges to 

MDCPS. Similarly, Chabad alleged that the principals at 

Waterways K-8 and Boone Elementary requested the yearly fee 

waivers for CHAP, and Chabad was unaware that its use of 

MDCPS facilities free of charge was contingent upon CHAP 

offering its services for free. Nonetheless, Chabad received fee 

waivers each year until 2019.

Beginning in approximately 2017, the OIG began 

investigating Chabad in response to an anonymous complaint. The 

anonymous complaint read in pertinent part:

School board member Dr. Martin Karp and his 

assistant, Gerald Bloomstein[,] have aided a religious 

organization named Chabad Chayil, which they are 

friendly with and participate in their programs by 

helping them gain access to using School [Board] 

[p]roperty for free under the claim that the 

organization does not collect any funds for its services 

1 The parties dispute whether MDCPS has an actual written policy on this 

point.

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of aftercare. In fact, the organization . . . does charge 

[fees] for its services and has been fraudulently filling 

out paperwork submitted and accepted by the 

[S]chool [B]oard indicating that it does not collect 

funds and so gets to use the buildings for no money 

at all.

The OIG investigated the claims, with Chabad’s 

cooperation, and in June 2019 the OIG sent Chabad a 37-page draft 

report of its investigation (the “Draft Report”). Chabad submitted 

a response to the Draft Report in July 2019, and the OIG published 

its Final Report in September 2019.

Chabad claims that both Reports were legally and factually 

inaccurate, biased, misguided, and prejudicial. Namely, Chabad 

takes issue with OIG’s accusations that (1) Chabad made

misrepresentations on its TUAs in order to gain free use of MDCPS 

facilities; (2) Dr. Karp and his chief of staff pressured MDCPS staff 

into approving Chabad’s applications and fee waivers; (3) Chabad 

circumvented the School Board’s process for having an afterschool 

program at a MDCPS facility; (4) Chabad improperly operated 

CHAP without the required state licensing; and (5) it violated state 

law by failing to do background checks on CHAP staff. 

According to the amended complaint, MDCPS allowed 

Chabad to continue using school facilities for free during the 

pendency of the OIG’s investigation. During this time, Chabad 

used the school board’s online reservation system to reserve space 

at Waterways K-8 and Boone Elementary to operate CHAP for the 

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2019-20 school year. Chabad alleged that “one day before the start 

of the 2019-20 school year,” MDCPS Chief Financial Officer Ron 

Steiger informed Chabad that, based on the Draft Report, it would 

not be permitted to use MDCPS facilities for the 2019-20 school 

year. Chabad objected to having its application denied on the basis 

of a Draft Report and before it had the chance to submit a response.

Chabad further alleged that “during this same period, 

Chabad Chayil’s counsel encountered [MDCPS Superintendent 

Alberto Carvalho] at a charitable event and Carvalho assured him 

that MDCPS would work out an accommodation with Chabad 

Chayil.” However, once the OIG issued its Final Report, MDCPS 

formally denied Chabad’s online space reservation and “[d]espite 

numerous assurances by Carvalho that an accommodation for

CHAP would be worked out, MDCPS, through Carvalho and 

Steiger[,] eventually told Chabad Chayil that it would never allow 

Chabad Chayil to use MDCPS facilities because the OIG’s Final 

Report found that Chabad Chayil made misrepresentations on its 

TUAs.”

Based upon these allegations, Chabad brought the following 

claims against MDCPS alone: (1) violation of the “Free Expression 

Clause of the First Amendment” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(Count II); (2) violation of various provisions of the Florida 

Constitution; and (3) violations of Florida state law. Chabad 

brought the following claims against both MDCPS and OIG 

pursuant to Section 1983: (1) violation of its First Amendment right 

to freely exercise its religion (Count I); (2) violation of its equal 

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21-10619 Opinion of the Court 7

protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (Count III);

and (3) deprivation of its right to procedural due process under the 

Fourteenth Amendment (Count IV).2 Chabad also sought 

declaratory and injunctive relief.

MDCPS and OIG filed separate motions to dismiss. The 

district court dismissed all four of Chabad’s federal constitutional 

claims against MDCPS because it had failed to allege facts 

sufficiently demonstrating that any of the identified School Board 

officials had final policymaking authority as required to support 

liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 

658 (1978). The district court dismissed the Section 1983 Free 

Exercise claim against OIG for similar reasons, namely, for failure

to allege facts establishing an official OIG policy or custom that 

would render OIG liable for the alleged constitutional violation. 

The district court further dismissed Chabad’s Equal Protection and 

Due Process claims on the merits.

The district court also denied Chabad leave to further 

amend its complaint, finding Chabad’s request for leave to amend 

“both procedurally deficient and lacking in substantive support.”

Finally, considering its dismissal of the federal claims, the district 

court refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the statelaw claims. Having dismissed the amended complaint in its 

entirety, the district court closed the case. This appeal followed.

2 Chabad also brought a procedural due process claim based on the Florida 

Constitution against both Defendants.

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II 

We review the grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 

12(b)(6) de novo, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true 

and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 

Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 

2004). We review a district court’s denial of leave to amend a 

complaint for an abuse of discretion. Coventry First, LLC v. 

McCarty, 605 F.3d 865, 869 (11th Cir. 2010). 

III 

A. Claims against MDCPS 

MDCPS may only be held liable where “the action that is 

alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy 

statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and 

promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. “[I]t 

is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether 

made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly 

be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the 

government as an entity is responsible under [Section] 1983.” Id. at 

694.

A plaintiff can establish municipal liability under Monell in 

three ways: (1) identifying an official policy; (2) identifying an 

unofficial custom or widespread practice that is so permanent and 

well settled as to constitute a custom and usage with the force of 

law; or (3) identifying a municipal official with final policymaking 

authority whose decision violated the plaintiff’s constitutional 

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21-10619 Opinion of the Court 9

rights. See Cuesta v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 285 F.3d 962, 

966-68 (11th Cir. 2002). Chabad does not contend that MDCPS has 

an official policy or a widespread practice of constitutional 

violations, but rather that the single decision to prevent Chabad 

from using MDCPS facilities violated Chabad’s constitutional 

rights. See Martinez v. City of Opa-Locka, 971 F.2d 708, 713 (11th 

Cir. 1992) (“[A] single decision by an official policymaker can 

establish the existence of an unconstitutional municipal policy.”). 

We have set forth several guiding principles to evaluate whether 

the decision of a single official is sufficient to give rise to municipal 

liability, among them:

(1) Municipalities have section 1983 liability only for 

acts officially sanctioned or ordered by the 

municipality. (2) Only those municipal officials who 

have final policymaking authority may subject the 

municipality to section 1983 liability for their actions. 

(3) The determination of whether or not a particular 

official has final policymaking authority is governed 

by state law, including valid local ordinances and 

regulations. (4) The challenged action must have 

been taken pursuant to a policy adopted by the official 

or officials responsible for making policy in that 

particular area of the city's business, as determined by 

state law.

Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

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10 Opinion of the Court 21-10619

Here, Chabad alleges (1) that Superintendent Carvalho’s

“single . . . decision” to prevent it from using MDCPS’s facilities for 

its after-school programs violated its constitutional rights and (2) 

that Superintendent Carvalho had the requisite “final policymaking 

authority” over school-facility usage. See id. With respect to the 

latter issue, Chabad’s complaint says only that Carvalho was 

“responsible for the administration and management of MDCPS as 

set out in Fla. Stat. § 1001.51 and [was] a final decision maker of 

MDCPS.” Doc. 27 ¶ 14. Neither that conclusory assertion nor the 

embedded statutory citation is sufficient to show that Carvalho had 

final policymaking authority over school-facility usage.

The standard that governs the Monell issue here is 

straightforward and uncontroversial: “[T]his Court’s decisions 

have consistently recognized and given effect to the principle that 

a municipal official does not have final policymaking authority 

over a particular subject matter when that official’s decisions are 

subject to meaningful administrative review.” Morro v. City of 

Birmingham, 117 F.3d 508, 514 (11th Cir. 1997) (collecting cases).

The question, therefore, is whether, as Chabad asserts, Carvalho 

had “unreviewable” authority over school property. Reply Br. at 5. 

Chabad offers no support for that conclusory assertion, and we can

find none in the applicable Florida law. To the contrary, whatever 

property-related policymaking authority a school superintendent 

has is subject to the school board’s “meaningful” review—and, 

accordingly, that it is not “final” for Monell purposes.

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Nothing in either § 1001.51 or its neighboring provisions 

gives local school superintendents “final policymaking authority” 

with respect to school facilities. A review of the statutes confirms 

what courts applying Florida law have long concluded: “By statute, 

the school board is the policy-making body for the school district, 

while the superintendent is the chief executive officer of the school 

board and the chief administrator of the school district.” Greene v. 

School Bd. of Hamilton Cnty., 444 So.2d 500, 501 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 

App. 1984) (emphasis added); see also Fernandez v. School Bd. of 

Miami-Dade Cnty., Fla., No. 15-21915-CIV, 2015 WL 9474616, at 

*4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 29, 2015) (explaining that “the actual School 

Board itself [is] the only entity 

with final policymaking authority for the purposes of stating a 

claim for relief under Monell”); Fla. AGO 96-13 (Fla. A.G. Op.) 

(emphasizing Greene’s “policy-making body” language and 

generally recognizing the school board’s preeminence in schooldistrict governance).

Chabad cites only Fla. Stat. § 1001.51(4), which provides

that, among a superintendent’s other powers, he or she acts for the 

school board “as custodian of school property.” Despite Chabad’s 

reliance on § 1001.51(4), the quoted language suggests that the 

superintendent is effectively the school board’s agent, and that it is 

the board—not the superintendent—that has ultimate (i.e., “final”) 

authority. Cf. Board of Pub. Instruction for Nassau Cnty. v. 

Billings, 15 Fla. 686 (1876) (holding that where a superintendent

purchased land for school purposes without the school board’s 

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consent and approval, the board had the authority to void the deal). 

Moreover, and in just the same vein, § 1001.51 states that in 

carrying out his duties, the superintendent “shall advise and 

counsel with the district school board.” Fla. Stat. § 1001.51. That 

language indicates, at the very minimum, that the superintendent 

must discharge his responsibilities in conjunction with the school 

board—not alone.3

Nearly everything in Chapter 1001 of the Florida Statutes 

undermines Chabad’s contention that Superintendent Carvalho 

has Monell-qualifying “final policymaking authority.” Take, for 

instance, § 1001.33, which states that “[e]xcept as otherwise 

provided by law, all public schools conducted within the district 

shall be under the direction and control of the district school board 

with the district superintendent as executive officer.” Fla. Stat. § 

1001.33. Section 1001.33’s language—particularly its recognition 

that the district is “under the direction and control” of the school 

board—strongly suggests that the board is ultimately in charge of 

school-district policy. 

Working through Chapter 1001’s provisions, we come next 

to § 1001.40. That section flatly states (among other things) that 

3 The final sentence of § 1001.51’s preamble seems to confirm that 

understanding. That provision, which states that “[i]t shall be presumed that

. . . the [superintendent’s] recommendations, nominations, and proposals . . . 

[are] not contrary to the action taken by the district school board,” Fla. Stat. § 

1001.51, at the very least implies that the board retains the authority to reject 

the superintendent’s “recommendations.”

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“[t]he governing body of each school district shall be a district 

school board.” Fla. Stat. § 1001.40. 

Next up, § 1001.41 provides that the “school board, after 

considering recommendations submitted by the district school 

superintendent, shall exercise [an enumerated list of] general 

powers.” Id. § 1001.41. That language—referring to 

“recommendations” that the superintendent makes to the board—

likewise indicates that it is in the board itself that final policymaking 

authority ultimately resides. Section 1001.49 is similar, repeatedly 

stating that the superintendent’s role is to make 

“recommend[ations]” for the board’s consideration and approval. 

See, e.g., id. at § 1001.49(2)–(5). 

Moving on, §§ 1001.42 and 1001.43 are more specific—and 

seemingly in ways that bear on the particular issue in this case. The 

former says, among other things, that the school board “control[s] 

school property and convey[s] the title to real and personal 

property,” and the latter that the board can “adopt policies 

providing for management of the physical campus and its environs 

....” Id. §§ 1001.42, 1001.43. 

Based on the statutory scheme as a whole, it seems clear that

the school board is ultimately in charge of school-district policy and 

that the superintendent acts, in effect, as the school board’s agent—

making recommendations to the board, executing policies that the 

board adopts, etc. It also seems clear that while the superintendent

has day-to-day operational control—including “custodia[l]” control 

of school property under § 1001.51(4)—the school board retains the 

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ultimate authority to review and reverse any of the 

superintendent’s decisions that it disapproves. Accordingly, it is the 

school board—not the superintendent—that has the “final 

policymaking authority” required under Monell. 

The district court determined that Chabad failed to allege 

sufficient facts to allow the court to “infer that any of the 

superintendent’s complained of actions fell within the contours” of 

his final policymaking authority. We agree.4 Because Chabad failed 

to sufficiently allege the elements of Monell liability as to MDCPS, 

we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Chabad’s Section 1983 

claims against MDCPS.

B. Claims against the OIG 

By way of reminder, Chabad asserted Section 1983 claims 

against the OIG for (1) violating its right to free exercise of religion 

(the “Free Exercise claim”); (2) violating its right to equal 

protection when the OIG “singled it out for investigation” (the 

“Equal Protection claim”); and (3) failing to provide Chabad with 

procedural due process throughout the investigation (the “Due 

Process claim”). The district court dismissed the Free Exercise 

claim against OIG because Chabad failed to provide allegations 

that any complained-of free-exercise violation resulted from an 

official custom or policy of the OIG. It dismissed the Equal 

4 For the reasons explained in its dismissal order, the district court was correct 

to conclude that Chabad failed to sufficiently allege that any of the other 

named MDCPS officials exercised final policymaking authority for MDCPS. 

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Protection claim for failing to set forth facts establishing any valid 

comparators whom the OIG treated differently than Chabad. The 

district court dismissed Chabad’s Due Process claim because (1) 

Chabad failed to sufficiently allege any concrete harm associated 

with its alleged reputational injury, and (2) even if it did allege such 

concrete harm, it failed to allege facts showing that the OIG was 

responsible for that harm.

As an initial matter, the parties hotly dispute whether the 

district court properly credited the contents of the OIG’s Draft 

Report and Final Report, which Chabad attached to its amended 

complaint. It is well settled that “[i]n ruling upon a motion to 

dismiss, the district court may consider an extrinsic document if it 

is (1) central to the plaintiff’s claim, and (2) its authenticity is not 

challenged.” Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Ctrs. 

for Disease Control & Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 

2010). And “when the exhibits contradict the general and 

conclusory allegations of the pleading, the exhibits govern.” Griffin 

Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1206 (11th Cir. 2007).

A careful review of the district court’s order, however, 

reveals that, in ruling on Chabad’s claims against the OIG, it relied 

on the Reports only to establish the fact that the OIG initiated its 

investigation in response to an anonymous complaint about 

Chabad and to reference the accusations contained in that 

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16 Opinion of the Court 21-10619

anonymous complaint.5 The district court did not err in doing so 

because Chabad does not dispute either fact and, indeed, cites the 

substance of the anonymous complaint in its own pleading. We 

now address each of Chabad’s Section 1983 claims against the OIG.

1. Free Exercise Claim

The OIG, like MDCPS, is an agency of a political subdivision 

organized under the laws of the State of Florida. Chabad must 

therefore establish that the OIG’s alleged constitutional violations 

resulted from an official policy, a custom so well settled it has the 

force of law, or the decision of an official with final policymaking 

authority. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-94; Cuesta, 285 F.3d at 966, 

968. 

On appeal, Chabad specifically disclaims “using some 

widespread policy standard to prove the OIG’s municipal liability” 

but instead argues that “the institution of the OIG took 

unconstitutional actions.” We agree with the district court that 

Chabad failed to allege facts demonstrating that any particular 

individual is a final policymaker for the OIG. That leaves the 

question of whether Chabad has sufficiently alleged an official 

5 True, the district court seemed to credit in its factual recitation certain other 

facts from the Reports. But any facts beyond the existence and content of the 

anonymous complaint did not impact the court’s analysis. Moreover, in 

analyzing the claims on appeal, we have taken the allegations in the amended 

complaint as true and credited the Reports only to the extent that the OIG 

began its investigation of Chabad in 2017 in response to an anonymous 

complaint and the contents of that anonymous complaint. 

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policy or widespread custom of the OIG that would render it liable

for the alleged violations of Chabad’s right to freely exercise its 

religion. The answer is no.

The amended complaint’s allegations about the OIG’s 

investigation and Chabad’s religion are limited to the following: 

Throughout its investigation, the OIG, in violation of 

the Free Exercise Clause, exhibited bias against 

Chabad Chayil based on its teaching of religion. The 

OIG pressured numerous people that it was 

interviewing to say that the fact that Chabad Chayil 

was teaching Jewish religious topics . . . was violating 

some policy, even though the OIG had no basis to 

believe that anything Chabad Chayil did was against 

any policy. . . .

The OIG had no basis to believe that the religious 

orientation of CHAP violated any MDCPS policy. 

Yet, the OIG repeatedly pushed MDCPS 

administrators and others to say that there was 

something wrong with Chabad Chayil teaching 

religious topics in its CHAP program.

This is insufficient. The unspecified acts of unidentified OIG 

investigators in this single case do not plausibly allege an official 

policy of the OIG, or even a custom that rises to the force of law.

See Craig v. Floyd Cnty., 643 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011) 

(explaining that if plaintiffs cannot plead facts demonstrating an 

official policy, they must plead facts demonstrating a custom that 

is so “longstanding and widespread . . . [it] is deemed authorized by 

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18 Opinion of the Court 21-10619

the policymaking officials because they must have known about it 

but failed to stop it”).

On appeal, Chabad now focuses on the Final Report as proof 

of “OIG’s pervasive First Amendment violations.” We do not 

consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. Access Now, 

Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004) 

(noting our repeated holding that issues not raised before the 

district court and raised for the first time on appeal “will not be 

considered”). What’s more, Chabad never explains how the Final 

Report violated its First Amendment rights nor even what those 

violations are.

The district court properly dismissed the Free Exercise claim

against the OIG.

2. Equal Protection Claim

In its amended complaint, Chabad claims that OIG violated 

the Equal Protection Clause because it investigated Chabad 

“specifically because of its religious nature” and “[s]ingled [Chabad] 

out for investigation, when numerous other organizations . . . 

received fee waivers while charging fees.”

The Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a direction that 

all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of 

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). As 

Chabad concedes, it proceeded here under a “class of one” equal 

protection claim, a “less-developed strand of equal protection 

jurisprudence.” Griffin Indus., 496 F.3d at 1200. In a “class of one” 

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claim, a plaintiff alleges not that it belongs to a protected class, but 

that it is the only entity being treated differently from all other 

similarly situated entities. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 

562, 564 (2000) (per curiam). In order to prevail, a plaintiff must 

show that it “has been intentionally treated differently from others 

similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the 

difference in treatment.” PBT Real Est., LLC v. Town of Palm

Beach, 988 F.3d 1274, 1285 (11th Cir. 2021). 

We apply the similarly situated requirement “with rigor.” 

Griffin Indus., 496 F.3d at 1207. The entities being compared “must 

be prima facie identical in all relevant respects.” PBT Real Est., 988 

F.3d at 1285 (emphasis omitted). A plaintiff must ultimately show 

that it and any comparators are “similarly situated ‘in light of all the 

factors that would be relevant to an objectively reasonable 

governmental decisionmaker.’” Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 

541 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Griffin Indus., 496 

F.3d at 1207); see also Griffin Indus., 496 F.3d at 1207 

(“Accordingly, when plaintiffs in ‘class of one’ cases challenge the 

outcome of complex, multi-factored government decisionmaking 

processes, similarly situated entities must be very similar indeed.” 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).6

6 Chabad argues for the first time on appeal that the complexity of the 

government decisionmaking process should have a direct bearing on the 

similarity showing. Chabad does not provide any legal authority for its 

argument and, in any event, we do not consider issues raised for the first time 

on appeal. See Access Now, 385 F.3d at 1331.

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In analyzing Chabad’s equal protection allegations, the 

district court identified a key problem—the OIG’s investigation 

into Chabad was instigated by an anonymous complaint alleging 

that Chabad was improperly receiving fee waivers from MDCPS. 

Chabad fails to allege that any of the proposed comparators were 

also the subject of such a complaint. This fact alone clearly 

distinguishes Chabad from the other entities that allegedly 

collected monies while also receiving fee waivers from MDCPS. 

See Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1227 (11th Cir. 

2019) (“[A] plaintiff and her comparators must be sufficiently 

similar, in an objective sense, that they cannot reasonably be 

distinguished.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted));

Griffin Indus., 496 F.3d at 1203 (explaining that in evaluating “class 

of one” claims, courts must consider “the full variety of factors that 

an objectively reasonable governmental decisionmaker would 

have found relevant in making the challenged decision”).

Thus, Chabad did not demonstrate that its comparators 

were similarly situated in all relevant respects. See PBT Real Est., 

988 F.3d at 1285. The district court correctly dismissed the Equal 

Protection claim against the OIG.

3. Due Process Claim

Chabad alleged in its amended complaint that the OIG 

thwarted its “liberty interest in its reputation by failing to provide 

Chabad Chayil with due process throughout its investigation.” 

According to Chabad, the OIG refused to provide Chabad with an 

adequate opportunity to respond to the allegations in the Draft 

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21-10619 Opinion of the Court 21

Report and knowingly included false and defamatory statements in 

the Final Report that damaged Chabad’s reputation.

The Supreme Court has held that injury to reputation, by 

itself, does not constitute the deprivation of a liberty or property 

interest protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. Paul v. 

Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701–02, 712 (1976). The Court in Paul

explained that, to invoke the procedural protections of the Due 

Process Clause, a plaintiff would need to establish more than a 

mere defamation claim. Id. at 706; see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 

U.S. 226, 233 (1991) (“Defamation, by itself, is a tort actionable 

under the laws of most States, but not a constitutional 

deprivation.”).

Thus, to establish a valid claim for the deprivation of a 

liberty interest based on reputational harm, a plaintiff must satisfy 

what has come to be known as the “stigma-plus” test. Behrens v. 

Regier, 422 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2005). Under this test, “a 

plaintiff claiming a deprivation based on defamation by the 

government must establish the fact of the defamation ‘plus’ the 

violation of some more tangible interest before the plaintiff is 

entitled to invoke the procedural protections of 

the Due Process Clause.” Cannon v. City of West Palm Beach, 250 

F.3d 1299, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Paul, 424 U.S. at 701–02). 

Therefore, to establish “a liberty interest sufficient to implicate the 

[F]ourteenth [A]mendment safeguards, the individual must be not 

only stigmatized but also stigmatized in connection with a denial 

of a right or status previously recognized under state law.”

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22 Opinion of the Court 21-10619

Behrens, 422 F.3d at 1260; see also Cypress Ins. Co. v. Clark, 144 

F.3d 1435, 1436 (11th Cir. 1998) (“This rule, labeled the ‘stigmaplus’ standard, requires a plaintiff to show that the government 

official’s conduct deprived the plaintiff of a previously recognized 

property or liberty interest in addition to damaging the plaintiff’s 

reputation.”). Actionable deprivation of a property interest 

requires “a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Bd. of Regents v. 

Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). An “abstract need or desire” for, or 

a “unilateral expectation” of, a property interest is not enough. Id.

That legal entitlement must be a “right or status [that] has been 

previously recognized and protected under state law.” Behrens, 

422 F.3d at 1261. 

None of Chabad’s arguments in support of its Due Process 

claim hold water. Chabad first points to Marrero v. City of Hialeah, 

625 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1980), and a line of cases emanating from 

Marrero holding that allegations of harm to business reputation 

alone can sometimes rise to the level of a constitutional 

deprivation. Our Court, however, has expressly disclaimed that 

line of case law in light of Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991). See 

Cypress Ins. Co., 144 F.3d at 1438 (“The Supreme Court’s message 

in Siegert is clear and unmistakable: Section 1983 did not make 

every tort committed by a state official a violation of constitutional 

rights. In particular, damages to a plaintiff’s business reputation are 

only recoverable in a section 1983 action if those damages were 

incurred as a result of government action significantly altering the 

plaintiff’s constitutionally recognized legal rights.”).

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21-10619 Opinion of the Court 23

Changing tactics, Chabad also argues that it had two 

protected property interests: (1) an informal agreement with 

MDCPS that Chabad would be allowed to use school facilities for 

CHAP until the conclusion of the OIG investigation; and (2) the 

right to have Chabad’s applications considered by MDCPS. Neither 

provide Chabad a property right recognized under state law. The 

record reflects that, at the bottom of the TUA Chabad filled out 

each year, was language advising that “[b]efore this agreement 

becomes official it must bear the designated signatures” of both the 

principal of the school and the superintendent. And in Florida, 

contractual rights with a government agency require a written 

agreement that has been approved by the governmental entity. See 

Pan–Am Tobacco Corp. v. Dep’t of Corrs., 471 So. 2d 4, 5–6 (Fla.

1984) (recognizing an exception to sovereign immunity when state 

entities enter into contracts but cautioning that this waiver of 

immunity was “applicable only to suits on express, written 

contracts into which the state agency has statutory authority to 

enter”); City of Orlando v. W. Orange Country Club, Inc., 9 So. 3d 

1268, 1272–73 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (noting that waiver of sovereign 

immunity on contract claims would logically only apply if the 

written contract is “properly approved by or on behalf of the 

governmental entity sought to be held liable”). It is undisputed that 

Chabad does not have a signed, written agreement to use MDCPS 

facilities for the 2019-2020 school year or for any year thereafter. 

Nor has Chabad pointed to any legal authority providing that it has 

a “right” to have a local school board consider its applications. 

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24 Opinion of the Court 21-10619

Thus, Chabad has not demonstrated “stigma plus” a legal 

entitlement.

Moreover, we agree with the district court that even if 

Chabad had properly demonstrated stigma plus another concrete 

harm, it cannot show that the OIG caused that harm. To impose 

liability under Section 1983, the government entity’s actions must 

be the “moving force” behind the deprivation of a constitutional 

right. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 

403–04 (1997); see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 

(1989) (“[O]ur first inquiry in any case alleging municipal liability 

under [Section] 1983 is the question whether there is a direct causal 

link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged 

constitutional deprivation.”). A defendant’s actions cannot be the 

moving force behind a violation where the actions of another, 

independent decisionmaker breaks the chain of causation. Caruth 

v. Bentley, 942 F.3d 1047, 1056 (11th Cir. 2019).

Here, the OIG’s role is to conduct investigations and issue 

reports.7 The OIG does not have the authority to refuse any group 

permission to use school board property–that power lies with 

MDCPS. Thus, even if the OIG did act in accordance with some 

7 The OIG provides inspector general services to MDCPS pursuant to an 

Interlocal Agreement between Miami-Dade County and the county’s School 

Board. Pursuant to that agreement, the OIG possesses the authority to 

“investigate [MDCPS] affairs, including the power to review past, present, and 

proposed programs, accounts, records, contracts and transactions.”

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21-10619 Opinion of the Court 25

official policy or custom, that policy or custom did not cause 

Chabad’s harm. 

The district court properly dismissed Chabad’s Due Process 

claim. 

C. Leave to Amend 

Here, Chabad raised its request to file a second amended 

complaint at the end of its responses to the Defendants’ motions to 

dismiss. This is procedurally improper. “[W]here a request for 

leave to file an amended complaint simply is imbedded within an 

opposition memorandum, the issue has not been raised properly.” 

Newton v. Duke Energy Fla., LLC, 895 F.3d 1270, 1277 (11th Cir. 

2018); see also Long v. Satz, 181 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 1999) 

(explaining that a plaintiff wishing to amend its complaint must file 

a separate motion for leave to amend and either set forth the 

substance of the proposed amendment or attach a copy of the 

amended pleading). The district court was well within its discretion 

to deny Chabad’s perfunctory request to further amend its 

complaint.

IV 

For the reasons stated, we conclude that the district court 

properly dismissed all of Chabad’s Section 1983 claims against the 

MDCPS and OIG, and we affirm the dismissal of those claims 

without leave to amend. 

AFFIRMED.

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