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73–119PDF 2012

ASSESSING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES

AMIDST ECONOMIC CHALLENGES: THE

FOREIGN RELATIONS BUDGET FOR

FISCAL YEAR 2013

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 29, 2012

Serial No. 112–132

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, U.S. Department 

of State .................................................................................................................. 5

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton: Prepared statement ............................ 6

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 52

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 53

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 55

Written responses from the Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton to questions 

asked by committee members during the hearing ............................................ 57

Written responses from the Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton to questions 

submitted for the record by: 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Florida, and chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs ............. 75

The Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of California ...................................................................................... 96

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey ................................................................................... 98

The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress from 

American Samoa ............................................................................................... 98

The Honorable Donald A. Manzullo, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Illinois ........................................................................................... 100

The Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California ...................................................................................................... 101

The Honorable Steve Chabot, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Ohio ............................................................................................................... 103

The Honorable Russ Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Missouri .............................................................................................. 103

The Honorable Connie Mack, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida ........................................................................................................... 104

The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas .................................................................................................................. 106

The Honorable Ann Marie Buerkle, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New York ...................................................................................... 109

The Honorable David Cicilline, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Rhode Island ....................................................................................... 111

(1)

ASSESSING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES 

AMIDST ECONOMIC CHALLENGES: THE FOREIGN RELATIONS BUDGET FOR FISCAL 

YEAR 2013

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 29, 2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:30 p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The committee will come to order. Because the Secretary must leave at 4:00, after opening remarks I 

will ask the Secretary to summarize her testimony, and then we 

will move directly to the questions from our members. Given the 

vote situation, the ranking member will be recognized to deliver his 

opening remarks if we are going to be interrupted by votes, but 

here you are and there’s no problem. 

So I am going to give my remarks and then yours, because you 

were going to be——

Mr. BERMAN. You were going to give my remarks? 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. No, I will give my remarks. I don’t 

trust you with my remarks. But without objection, members may 

have 5 days to submit statements and questions for the record. 

Madam Secretary, welcome back to the committee to discuss the 

administration’s foreign relations budget request. All of us have 

great respect for you, Madam Secretary, as well as for the dedicated men and women who promote the interests and values of our 

Nation throughout the world. 

Our Nation faces unsustainable deficits, so we must justify every 

dollar that we spend, especially because 35 cents of every dollar is 

borrowed. I appreciate your restraint with the top-line number in 

your budget proposal, coming in at $5.2 billion below last year’s request, but I disagree with the priorities and programs funded with 

those limited resources. 

In Iraq and Afghanistan, both these governments must be 

pushed to take the necessary steps to be our long-term, reliable 

partners. We are not seeing such a commitment from Karzai or 

Maliki. Too much American blood and treasure have been invested 

in both countries for us to have governments in place that threaten 

American interests. Iran’s belligerent and unhelpful role in Afghanistan and Iraq is worrisome, particularly with reports indicating 

their co-option of those governments at senior levels. So, Madam 

2

Secretary, what additional pressure can we bring to bear to offset 

the Iranian influence in Afghanistan and Iraq? 

In Pakistan, the level of cooperation, as we know, that we get 

from the government continues to fall short. Serious questions persist about whether elements of the Pakistani Government support 

prominent insurgent groups fighting against our troops in Afghanistan. 

In other Middle Eastern countries, I have had concerns from day 

one about the administration’s approach to the Arab Spring and to 

the forces at work there, including radical Islamist groups. The administration appears focused on spending a lot of money in search 

of a policy. Your budget request doubles down on that approach by 

requesting a $770 million Middle East and North Africa Incentive 

Fund, a fund with almost no restrictions on how it can be used. 

Even though press reports indicate that Egypt may have decided 

to lift the travel ban on our NGO workers, we should not reward 

Egypt with aid when it is demonstrating hostility to Western democratic entities and is engaging in an ongoing dance between authoritarians and the Muslim Brotherhood. In contrast, the administration did the right thing by enforcing U.S. law and cutting off 

funding to UNESCO after it undermined peace by admitting the 

nonexistent state of Palestine. 

Your request to now change the law and send $80 million to 

UNESCO would be a grave mistake. Any weakening of U.S. law 

would undermine our credibility and give a green light for other 

U.N. agencies to grant recognition of a Palestinian state. U.S. funding for UNESCO must only be restored if UNESCO votes to unadmit Palestine. 

The budget for the Western Hemisphere, which is not mentioned 

in the prepared testimony, is another example of misplaced priorities. The administration has requested an increase in funding for 

the general budget of the Organization of American States, yet you 

cut U.S. contributions to the OAS Fund for Strengthening Democracy by almost $2 million. 

The administration is proposing increased financial assistance to 

Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Ecuador, three governments that continue 

to undermine U.S. security interests in the hemisphere, disregard 

human rights, and ignore the rule of law. There can be no justification for such an increase in funds to these countries. In Nicaragua, 

State has spent millions to promote free, fair and transparent elections. That money was not used wisely, as the elections in Nicaragua were fraudulent and ran afoul of the Nicaraguan constitution. 

We must not repeat last year’s performance in Ecuador or Bolivia, where State Department spent more money on environmental 

programs than counternarcotics operations or good governance. 

This budget fails to hold abusers of democracy in the region accountable, and cuts support for democracy. Instead of standing in 

solidarity with the Cuban and Venezuelan people in their time of 

need, this budget turns its back on them. 

Repression continues unabated in Cuba. The Castro regime orders its State Security Forces to beat members of the Ladies in 

White, Las Damas de Blanco, as they leave church services on Sundays. Prisoners of conscience die while many worldwide turn a 

3

blind eye to their plight. In Venezuela, the Chavez regime has demolished the authority of the National Assembly and intimidated 

the opposition by leveraging control over the judicial system. 

Turning to the disastrous situation in Syria, this administration 

does not appear to have a coherent strategy. The Russians and the 

Iranians clearly have a strategy, and it could be summarized as 

‘‘actively support the repression by the Syrian Army.’’ The Iranian 

regime defies responsible nations and pursues nuclear weapons capabilities. A nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable, and we must oppose any policy that relies on mere containment as a response to 

this mortal threat. President Obama has said that the United 

States has an ironclad commitment to the security of Israel. So, 

will the U.S. militarily back Israel if it decides to protect itself from 

an Iranian nuclear threat? 

Finally, Madam Secretary, I have grave concerns about today’s 

North Korea announcement, which sounds a lot like the failed 

agreements of the past. While it is good that it mentions the uranium enrichment program whose existence the North Koreans had 

so long denied, we must recall that regime’s constant duplicity. We 

have bought this bridge several times before. 

One troubling new aspect is the discussion of nuclear issues and 

food aid in the same announcement, which blurs the separation of 

humanitarian aid from the nuclear negotiations, which has been 

maintained since 1995. The North Koreans will view this food as 

payment due for their return to the bargaining table, regardless of 

the transparency and monitoring we hope to secure in the future. 

Again, Madam Secretary, thank you so much for making yourself 

available today. I look forward, and the members do as well, to receiving your testimony. 

And now I am pleased to recognize my friend, the gentleman 

from California, the ranking member, Mr. Berman, for his opening 

statements. 

Mr. BERMAN. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

And Madam Secretary, welcome. Thanks for being here. At the outset—there are some differences in our view—I would like to commend you for your hard work on North Korea. Today’s announcement that Pyongyang has agreed to freeze long-range missile 

launches, nuclear tests and uranium enrichment activities, and 

allow the IAEA back into the country appears to be an important 

step on a long and difficult path. You know, the chair knows, I 

know, we all know that we have been down this road before, and 

it does remain to be seen whether the North will keep its promises 

this time. 

But in a more general sense, I would like to recognize the tremendous commitment and dedication you have shown to reestablishing the United States, not just as an indispensable power, but 

as an indispensable partner. You have made it your mission to 

show the world the best of who we are as Americans. 

Eloquently and consistently, you have spoken up for women, for 

the poor, and for those whose human rights and dignity has been 

trampled. You have elevated development alongside diplomacy and 

defense as a pillar of our national security. Within the administration and in the halls of Congress, you have fought to ensure that 

our diplomats and aid workers receive the resources they need and 

4

the respect that they deserve. They risk their lives every day to 

support American interests abroad, and in the face of mounting 

deficits here at home, it is important to remember that these civilian efforts are much less costly than deploying our military. 

Today, we are here to assess how the President’s Fiscal Year 

2013 international affairs budget responds to the threats and priorities we face as a nation. Many people believe, erroneously, that 

foreign aid accounts for 20 percent or more of our budget. The 

truth is, we spend just over 1 percent of our national budget on diplomacy and development. 

Yet, these programs have an outsized impact on our health, prosperity, and security here at home. With one in five American jobs 

dependent on trade, and half our experts going to developing countries, our overseas programs are a critical part of strengthening the 

American economy and getting Americans back to work. 

Our security is threatened if nuclear weapons fall into the wrong 

hands, or if fragile and failing states become training grounds for 

terrorists. Our foreign assistance dollars help counter the flow of 

illicit narcotics and control the spread of organized crime. Nearly 

a quarter of the 2013 Fiscal Year international affairs budget request is dedicated to supporting critical U.S. efforts in the frontline states of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. 

And finally, the principles we cherish are undermined if we allow 

families to go hungry, children to die of easily preventable diseases, 

and girls to be kept out of school. In short, helping countries become more democratic, more stable, more capable of defending 

themselves, and better at pulling themselves out of poverty is just 

as important for us and our national security as it is for them. 

To succeed, we must ensure that our budget resources are allocated wisely, our international programs are carried out in the 

most efficient and effective manner. 

Before closing, I would like to highlight two of my top and somewhat interrelated priorities: Middle East peace and the effort to 

prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability. 

Madam Secretary, for the past 3 years, the Palestinians have 

simply refused to engage seriously in peace talks. My sad conclusion is that Palestinian leaders don’t have the will or the desire to 

make the compromises necessary to achieve peace. They don’t want 

to engage seriously because they know that, in the end, they won’t 

be able to do the deal. 

That is what happened at Camp David in 2000, at Taba in 2001, 

and in the Olmert talks in 2008. And now, nearly two decades after 

Oslo, I see no evidence that the Palestinians have begun in the 

slightest to prepare their public for the prospect that they will have 

to relinquish the so-called right of return and recognize Israel as 

a Jewish state, two critical elements of any peace deal. 

I find that disturbing. Meanwhile, the Israelis continue to say 

they will negotiate any time, any place. If Palestinian leaders really want statehood, they will have to show it both through their 

public commitments and by engaging in serious negotiations with 

Israel. If they try to circumvent negotiations by once again taking 

their case to the United Nations, they will get no recognition from 

the United States and they won’t get the time of day from the U.S. 

Congress. 

5

The only solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that can bring 

peace and security to both parties is a two-state solution, and that 

only can become a reality through direct negotiations. 

Let me turn to another issue, what I consider the greatest security challenge facing both Israel and the United States, namely the 

threat of a nuclear-armed Iran. I believe it was during your first 

testimony before this committee in 2009 that you first said that our 

goal was to impose crippling sanctions on Iran if the regime doesn’t 

suspend its uranium enrichment program and otherwise comply 

with the demands of the U.N. Security Council. 

Now the sanctions are finally starting to have some bite, and 

within a few weeks or so the Congress is likely to pass new legislation for the President to sign—legislation that tightens sanctions 

and that gives the administration new authorities to tighten sanctions still further. The House passed its version of that legislation, 

the Iran Threat Reduction Act, by an overwhelming vote late last 

year. Can you give us a status report on the impact of sanctions 

in Iran and on whether there is any sign that they are starting to 

have the desired effect on the thinking of Iranian decision-makers? 

Thank you, Madam Secretary. I look forward to hearing your testimony. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. I thank the ranking member. It is the 

chair’s intention to continue the hearing during votes. And now, it 

is an honor to welcome the Secretary to our committee today. The 

honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton has served as the 67th Secretary of State for the United States since January 21, 2009: The 

latest chapter in her four decade career of public service. 

She has served previously as a United States senator from the 

State of New York, as First Lady of the United States and of the 

State of Arkansas, as an attorney and a law professor. Madam Secretary, without objection your full written statement will be made 

part of the record. If you would be so kind as to summarize your 

written remarks, we can then move quickly to the question and answer discussion under the 5-minute rule in the hope of getting to 

all of our members before you have to depart. 

So Madam Secretary, welcome again, and the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HILLARY RODHAM 

CLINTON, SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman 

and Ranking Member, and it is very good to be back here. I am 

grateful to your committee and the members for the support and 

consultation that we’ve enjoyed over these past 3 years. I look forward to your questions. I will submit my entire statement to the 

record, and look forward to having a chance to exchange views with 

you today. Thank you. 

[Secretary Clinton’s prepared statement follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. So we can get right to the 

question and answer, Madam Secretary? 

Secretary CLINTON. Yes. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Delish. Thank you so much. So, the 

Chair recognizes herself for her questions. 

Madam Secretary, I have heard from a number of my constituents—as you know, I represent South Florida, the gateway to the 

Americas—who are worried that ALBA countries, led by Chavez, 

continue to pressure to invite Cuba to the Summit of the Americas 

in April, even though the Castro dictatorship does not meet the criteria to join the meeting, as you know. 

Will you pledge here today that if Cuba is invited, that President 

Obama and you, Madam Secretary, will refuse to attend the summit meeting? 

And secondly—and I will ask it all at once, so you can answer, 

Madam Secretary—on Iran in the Western Hemisphere: Just last 

month Ahmadinejad’s tour of tyrants, as I called it—his trip to 

Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba and Ecuador—reaffirmed Iran’s commitment to undermine U.S. national security interests. I am concerned about Iran’s willingness to attack the United States homeland or our critical allies, such as Israel. 

With the rising threat posed by the Quds Force and its Iranian 

proxies such as Hezbollah in our region, will we dedicate more attention to these illicit activities in the annual terrorism report? 

And lastly, what is the administration doing to ensure cooperation from our allies in the hemisphere with respect to Iran, and to 

hold accountable those countries that are supporting and enabling 

Iran’s threatening activities? 

Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you very much. With respect to the 

question about the Summit of Americas, we do not believe there is 

any intention to invite Cuba. We have made our views on that well 

known. They don’t fit the definition of democratic countries and the 

development of democracy in the hemisphere. So at this point, we 

see absolutely no basis and no intention to invite them to the summit. 

Regarding Iran and the Western Hemisphere, obviously Iran, facing these very effective sanctions and their aggressive enforcement, 

is becoming increasingly desperate, looking for friends wherever 

they think they can find them. And they are not getting the kind 

of response—on that tour of tyrants that you referenced, our analysis of what happened is that it fell very far short of what the Iranians had hoped for. 

That said, we are concerned about the activities of Iran and 

Hezbollah in the Western Hemisphere. We continue to monitor the 

situation closely. We will take appropriate action to counter any 

threat that may arise. We are aware of and concerned about allegations that some Latin American drug trafficking organizations are 

linked with Hezbollah and Iran. We have not found information to 

verify a lot of the allegations, but of course the recent incident concerning the attempted assassination of the Saudi Ambassador is a 

very large question mark and wake-up call. 

We are continuing to look for direct links, and we are engaged 

very extensively with our partners in the hemisphere, both to eduVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:10 May 17, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\022912\73119 HFA PsN: SHIRL
12

cate them about the dangers posed by Iran and Hezbollah, and also 

to work with them to heighten our intelligence sharing. Now, we 

did impose sanctions in 2008, and extended them last year, on the 

Venezuelan Military Industries Company for violating a ban on 

technology that could assist Iran in developing weapons. So if we 

find information that we can verify, we are committed to taking action. 

But what we instead are seeing, much to our encouragement, is 

that our partners in Latin America are really understanding the 

threats. Recently at the IAEA Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Chile 

joined us in voting for a resolution calling on Iran to address concerns about the nuclear program. Last year, Chile, Mexico, and 

Brazil voted to create the U.N. Human Rights Council Special 

Rapporteur on Iran. And our close coordination with Mexican authorities actually was instrumental in breaking up the assassination plot against the Saudi Ambassador. 

So I think, Madam Chairman, we are alert to this. We are 

watching it closely. We are building a very strong international and 

hemispheric coalition against any efforts by Iran and Hezbollah in 

our area. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Madam Secretary. I yield 

back the balance of my time. Mr. Berman? 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. Madam 

Secretary, the Obama administration is the first administration to 

use congressionally-mandated sanctions on Iran in a robust way, 

and you deserve considerable praise for that. I know that the President and you, and numerous officials at State, at Treasury, at Defense, have put in literally thousands of hours trying to persuade 

foreign officials and foreign businessmen to respect our sanctions 

and to help isolate Iran, all for the purposes of implementing a policy intended to lead Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program. 

In that regard, I think it would be helpful to put to rest concerns 

of some observers that the administration is resigned to Iran’s becoming a nuclear threshold state. I think it is very important to reassure us on that point. Based on my understanding of the administration’s policy, I think you should be able to do that. 

Three months ago, on December 1st, Secretary of State Burns 

and Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Ayalon issued a joint statement that spoke of ‘‘preventing Iran from developing a nuclear 

weapons capability,’’ and a Pentagon publication last month also 

said that the U.S. seeks to ‘‘prevent Iran’s development of a nuclear 

weapons capability.’’

So when Senator Graham yesterday asked whether the administration seeks to deny Iran the ability to become a nuclear threshold 

state, you responded by saying that, ‘‘It is the position of the administration to prevent them,’’ meaning the Iranians, ‘‘from attaining nuclear weapons.’’ So I think it is important to clarify. 

Is it, in fact, administration policy to prevent Iran’s development 

of a nuclear weapons capability, or is the policy merely to prevent 

Iran from attaining nuclear weapons? And what is the real difference between these two? Does the administration have a red line 

beyond which it will not allow Iran’s nuclear program to progress? 

Can we feel assured that it is the administration’s policy to make 

13

sure Iran remains well short of the ability to produce nuclear 

arms? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Congressman, I think it is absolutely 

clear that the President’s policy is to prevent Iran from having nuclear weapons capability. And that has been the stated position of 

this administration. It has been backed up and reiterated. So let 

there be no confusion in any shorthand answer to any question, the 

policy remains the same. 

And certainly in pursuance of that policy, we have worked closely 

with the Congress to implement the most far-reaching sanctions 

that have ever been imposed. And after 3 years of intensive diplomatic effort, we have developed an international coalition that recognizes the importance of preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear 

weapons capability that is working with us. 

You know, 3 years ago we didn’t have that consensus in the 

international community. There was a lot of unwillingness, and resistance, even, to going along with tougher sanctions. But from the 

beginning, we have had a two-track policy: Pressure and engagement. And as we talk today, the pressure is ratcheting up. We are 

aggressively working to implement the sanctions. 

We have very strong support for this position from the recent report by the International Atomic Energy Agency pointing out all of 

the suspicions and questions about Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, and we have seen, finally, a response from Iran that they are 

willing to discuss their nuclear weapons program with the P5+1. So 

we think that these sanctions are affecting the thinking of the Iranians in the leadership, but we have to remain vigilant and we 

have to keep the pressure on. 

Mr. BERMAN. Well, thank you very much. Do you think I could 

get a question and answer in 44 seconds? 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Or you could yield back and give other 

members more time, as I did. 

Mr. BERMAN. All right. Well, with that appeal to——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. Thank you. And being 

the wise legislator that he is, Dr. Paul elected to stay here, and so 

he gets to ask his question. 

Mr. PAUL. Well, that is wonderful. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Congressman Paul of Texas is recognized. I have learned not to say anything negative about Ron Paul. 

Mr. PAUL. Welcome, Madam Secretary. I do want to get your 

comments a little bit about the stir that was caused by the apology 

over the Qur’an. And the administration has received a lot of criticism about this, and I think you have expressed a point that maybe 

this doesn’t help your job any by stirring up the resentment. But 

the whole issue of an apology, I think, is an interesting one from 

a national level. 

And I recall what happened after McNamara wrote his memoirs. 

And he was apologetic about what happened, and how he orchestrated the Vietnam War. And a reporter asked him if he should 

apologize, and he said, ‘‘What good’s an apology?’’ He says, ‘‘If the 

policies are wrong, you have to learn something from it and change 

the policy.’’

So a lot of emotions come out on this issue of apology, and I keep 

thinking that those who criticize him, I don’t think they criticized 

14

the last administration when the President apologized for using the 

Qur’an as a target. So sometimes they are not—apologies aren’t always all equal. But even that said, there is—there were torture 

photographs before, they were very aggravating. Recently there 

was urinating on bodies, on corpses. We didn’t particularly apologize for those, did we? I mean, there weren’t apologies there. 

But some of these things are emotional, but what about the 

whole idea of invading a country, and occupying a country, and disturbing their country, creating hundreds of thousands of refugees 

and suffering? Does it ever get to a point where apologizing about 

the Qur’an is rather minor to some of the other problems that we 

have created in these countries? And can you comment on that? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Congressman, first I appreciate the 

very measured comments you have made about our Presidents—

not only this one, but prior Presidents—offering apologies when we 

are deeply sorry for unfortunate incidents that occur, that were not 

intentional, and which we know have emotional resonance with 

people. 

The larger question you ask, I think it is also important to put 

into context. President Obama promised to wind down the Iraq 

war. He has done so. He is in the process of transitioning out of 

Afghanistan in a manner that is done appropriately, in keeping 

with the very large decisions that have to be made about helping 

the Afghans defend themselves, working with our partners and allies in that effort. 

And I think the underlying premise is certainly one that can be 

debated among Americans of good faith. I believe that we were justified in going to Afghanistan, which is the——

Mr. PAUL. I want to apologize, because I don’t want to get on 

that subject. 

Secretary CLINTON. Sure. And I accept your apology. Thank you, 

sir. [Laughter.] 

Mr. PAUL. There you go. But I do want to touch on something 

else, to get a little different perspective on the nuclear enrichment 

in Iran. Because we hear different stories. Even in Israel there are 

debates. Tamir Pardo actually said, ‘‘If they get a weapon, it’s not 

an existential threat to Israel.’’ So I am sure there is probably a 

more nuanced debate in Israel than there is here sometimes. But 

isn’t it true that Iran has the right to enrich up to 20 percent for 

peaceful purposes? 

Most people—you know, the way we talk, and you hear the discussion, they have absolutely no right to enrich. Don’t they have 

that protection under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty? But it 

never seems to have a balanced approach to that, and the best I 

can tell from what I read, there is no evidence that they have a 

bomb. There is no evidence that they are on the verge of getting 

it. 

And even the administration, whether it is Panetta or Clamper 

or General Dempsey, they are saying, ‘‘It wouldn’t make any sense 

to have a preemptive attack on there.’’ Could you give us a sense 

of a proper balance here? Because a lot of people are convinced it 

is Syria, and then it is Iran. And I am personally concerned about 

that, because the last thing the American people need is another 

15

war. We don’t have the money. We don’t have the resources. And 

the military is not ready for another war. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. 9 seconds. 

Secretary CLINTON. Congressman, I would direct your attention 

to the most recent Director General’s Report from the International 

Atomic Energy Agency, not an American document, which outlines 

the concerns about the non-peaceful use of civilian nuclear power. 

There is increasing evidence that what the Iranians do is not consistent with—you are right—their right to have the peaceful use of 

nuclear power. And I will be happy to get you a copy of that, because I think you ask a very important set of questions. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Congressman. 

Thank you, Madam Secretary. Mr. Ackerman, the ranking member 

on the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. Welcome, Madam Secretary. Always 

great to have you here. 

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. It is exceptional to me that sometimes you can’t 

win for winning. And even with the unprecedented victories that 

you and the administration have had in the foreign policy area, 

some people continue to look at it—I guess I would call it the 

Goldilocks game, with the three bears: The porridge is always too 

hot, or the porridge is always too cold. I think you got it just right. 

I think, instead of Goldilocks, you are more like the guy on the Ed 

Sullivan show who used to be up there with the 12 bowling pins, 

juggling them all at the same time, bouncing basketballs up and 

down over his knees, and he has these sticks with the plates on 

top that he is twirling in the air, and nothing ever falls to the 

ground. 

And it is more difficult, because you are really twirling somebody 

else’s dirty dishes, but nonetheless, you seem to have everything 

pretty much together—I don’t want to jinx it—with all of the unprecedented problems in the world that we are facing all at the 

same time. And I just want to thank you, and congratulate you and 

the administration. 

Three areas: North Korea, Egypt, and Iran. Hotspots. First, on 

Egypt, congratulations on the announcement that we just received 

within the hour that the flight restrictions on Americans have been 

lifted. I think that is miraculous. I know the great effort and work 

that you have put into this, both behind the scenes as well as publicly, and how delicate this negotiation has been. 

Does this indicate to us some sense of where the power shifting 

and shuffling in Egypt is going, and who is exercising it, at least 

at this very sensitive moment? Or don’t we want to speculate on 

that? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Congressman, we do not have confirmation that the travel ban has been lifted. We hope that it will 

be, and we will continue to work toward that. And the reporting 

is encouraging, but we have no confirmation. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Yes, we always get stuff from the AP first also, 

before we hear that. 

North Korea, congratulations on that as well. I know there is 

never any nexus between humanitarian aid and shifting policies, 

but congratulations on the great coincidence of the 240 metric tons 

16

of humanitarian aid and it’s happening coincidentally at the same 

time that the North Koreans have, at least apparently, agreed to 

a lot more transparency than they have had before, and cessation 

of their nuclear program. 

Were other countries parties or observers at this bilateral discussion that we had with the North Koreans? Did the Russians, or the 

Chinese, or the South Koreans play any role, or was that just us? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, the meeting was held in Beijing. The 

Japanese and South Koreans were intimately involved in the back 

and forth of the negotiations. We also kept all of them informed. 

But no one else was a direct participant, besides the United States 

and North Korea. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. In reading all the reports of that, it says that 

they will allow inspection at Yongbyon. Do we have access to other 

sites, or just that main site? Or isn’t that clear yet? 

Secretary CLINTON. That is not clear yet. I mean, that was our 

principal objective, and we obviously have to continue building on 

what was achieved. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. And like some others that you deal with, you 

know more than others that they are masters at the shell game. 

And lastly, Iran. Congratulations on the biting effect, that the 

sanctions are finally grabbing them and taking effect to a tremendous extent. There seems to be a lot of indication that some of our 

allies—one in particular in the Middle East is very concerned and 

interested in us laying down markers, rather than saying all options are on the table. And I suppose that is going to get more play 

in coming days. 

What are the red lines that the Iranians cannot cross? Are we 

going to make that public, or are we going to continue to do quiet 

negotiations on that? 

Secretary CLINTON. I think it is probably smarter for us to be 

pressing on the sanctions and the negotiations, while we keep our 

objective of no nuclear capability absolutely clear, instead of setting 

other benchmarks at this time publicly. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I want to thank you for not concentrating on 

strutting your stuff, and delivering on the steak and not worrying 

about the sizzle. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. My colleague from Florida, 

Mr. Rivera. Wise man, staying around. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I learned from 

the best, from you. 

Madam Secretary, thank you so much for being here today. As 

you know, recently we marked the 14th anniversary of the February 24, 1996, shoot-down of the Brothers to the Rescue airplanes 

in which, as you know, four Americans were murdered over international airspace by the Castro dictatorship. 

Subsequent to those murders, the U.S. Congress and then-President Clinton passed and signed into law the Helms-Burton Bill, 

which has never been fully implemented, as you well know, because of a provision which allows a waiver, or a suspension, every 

6 months, to that law, for implementation of that law. And that 

suspension, I believe, takes place around every January or February, and mid-year as well. So we probably have just recently 

17

seen the Obama administration suspend the Helms-Burton law, as 

it has been done twice a year, every year, since 1996. 

Now, the rationale allowed in the Helms-Burton law for suspending implementation of the law is twofold. Number one, that it 

serves U.S. interests, and number two, that it would expedite a 

transition to democracy in Cuba. Given what we have seen in the 

last few years during the Obama administration, and what has 

been occurring in Cuba in terms of the wave of repression against 

human rights activists and dissidents, given the deaths of several 

hunger strikers, given the recent persecution against the Ladies in 

White, peaceful activists in Cuba that have been calling for democratic reform, given the stern rebuff that Former Secretary Richardson received in Cuba to his recent overtures or negotiations, can 

you tell us, just in the last few years of the Obama administration 

that the Helms-Burton law has been suspended, how has that expedited a transition to democracy in Cuba? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Congressman, we take a backseat to no 

one in our condemnation of the denial of human rights that is a 

continuing feature of the Castro regime. And the particular instances that you mentioned are ones of great concern to us. We do 

think that increasing people-to-people contact, supporting civil society in Cuba, enhancing the free flow of information, promoting the 

capacity for more independence, economically and politically, from 

the Cuban authorities is in the interest of the Cuban people, and 

is in the interests of the United States. 

Mr. RIVERA. And we may agree to disagree on that, but I am just 

wondering if there is any evidence of results as a result of that policy that the Obama administration has been pursuing. Do we have 

any evidence at all of any inkling of democratic reform, or a movement toward democracy? Is there anything positive that has resulted from the Obama administration policy toward Cuba that we 

have evidence, tangible evidence? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, in the last 3 years, there have been 

considerable changes in Cuba’s economic policies, which we see as 

a very positive development. We think having the Cuban people 

given more economic rights, to be able to open businesses, to have 

more opportunity to pursue their own economic futures, goes hand 

in hand with the promotion of democracy. 

I wouldn’t claim that our movements were a direct cause, but 

they were coincident with. And very often in oppressive regimes 

like Cuba, economic freedom precedes political freedom. 

Mr. RIVERA. Well, then you would agree that if there has been 

economic freedom—and I dispute that, I don’t believe there has 

been any real economic reforms, genuine economic reforms in 

Cuba. But you would agree that if there have been—and we can 

disagree on that—there certainly have been no political reforms, or 

a movement toward democracy, notwithstanding the economic 

movements. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, despite our very strong objection to the 

treatment of Alan Gross, the in our view totally unjustified charge 

and detention, a great number of political prisoners have been released. And again, that in and of itself is not final evidence of anything, but the fact that so many political prisoners were released 

in the last 3 years is, in our view——

18

Mr. RIVERA. Are you aware——

Secretary CLINTON [continuing]. A positive move. 

Mr. RIVERA [continuing]. That those releases were followed by required expulsions from the country? You are aware of that. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well——

Mr. RIVERA. They weren’t released into the country. They were 

expelled from the country. 

Secretary CLINTON. I am aware of that, Congressman. And as I 

look out over the world and take a historic perspective, I see sometimes that political prisoners are released and expelled, where they 

continue to pursue their democracy work and their advocacy on behalf of human rights from outside the country. So I think the fact 

is, letting political prisoners go is a very positive development. 

I wish that they were inside Cuba, continuing to agitate and advocate for freedom and democracy, but their voices are still being 

heard, especially in the new communications environment in which 

bloggers and others exist, so——

Mr. RIVERA. I hope we will continue. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Rivera. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Madam Secretary. Mr. 

Faleomavaega? 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Madam 

Secretary, I have a couple of written questions that I want to submit for your consideration. 

Madam Secretary, that may be one of the last times together, 

and so I want to publicly thank you for reestablishing America’s influence abroad, especially toward the Asia-Pacific region. As you 

aptly stated, and I quote, ‘‘The future of politics will be decided in 

Asia, not in Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States will be 

right at the center of the action.’’

Thanks to your efforts, Madam Secretary, I believe the United 

States will be front and center, so I thank you for bucking tradition 

for your first trip overseas. On your first trip overseas, you visited 

Asia to convey a strong message that America’s relationships 

across the Asia-Pacific region are indispensable. And in your many 

trips since then, from Vietnam to Cambodia, to Myanmar, to 

China, to South Korea, to Japan and beyond, you have been about 

the business of making and keeping economic and strategic commitments that will pay dividends many times over. 

I applaud you for recognizing the importance of the Pacific island 

nations in this multifaceted undertaking, and in the context of this 

hearing, the foreign relations budget hearing, I reiterate what you 

have stated, and I quote, ‘‘Those who say that we can no longer afford to engage with the world have it exactly backward. We cannot 

afford not to. From opening new markets for American businesses 

to curbing nuclear proliferation, to keeping sea lanes free for commerce and navigation, our work abroad holds the key to our prosperity and security at home.’’

I want to also note for the record, Madam Secretary, that when 

American Samoa and the independent State of Samoa were hit by 

the most powerful earthquake in 2009, which set off 30-foot waves 

of a tsunami, which to this day have not yet fully recovered, and 

yet your office were among the first to stand with us. You have 

19

fought to make sure that relief supplies were airlifted to us, and 

your tireless efforts for and on behalf of those did not go unnoticed. 

And I thank personally Assistant Secretary Dave Adams for his 

help in this regard. At my request, Madam Secretary, you personally made it a point to visit my little district, and on behalf of the 

thousands of Samoan men and women who proudly serve in the 

Armed Forces of our country, we are grateful for your recognition 

of their services. My people thank you for remembering us amid 

the many things you have done for our nation. 

Madam Secretary, it has been an honor to serve with you, and 

I commend you for the initiatives you have taken, outlined in this 

budget submission, for the East Asia and the Pacific region. 

I am glad I still have a couple of seconds to ask you a couple of 

questions. Madam Secretary, can you reiterate again, for the 

record, our fundamental policy of engagement with the People’s Republic of China, especially in reference to the crisis we are faced 

with at the South China Sea? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, first, thank you for those very kind 

comments, but it is a great honor to represent the people of your 

district, and to reach out to the South Pacific region on behalf of 

our Government. 

We are working to further a positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship with China. We think that is in the interests of 

the American people, both economically and strategically. We have 

welcomed the peaceful rise of China, and we expect as China continues to develop that it will assume more responsibilities globally. 

With respect to the South China Sea, it has been our position 

that, while we do not take any stand on the rights attached to any 

territorial claim, we strongly support the peaceful resolution of 

such claims in accordance with international law. 

That has been the position we have taken at ASEAN, at the East 

Asia Summit. Because it is not only about the South China Sea, 

which is, as you know so well, a very important part of the world’s 

oceans, through which more than 40 percent of the world’s trade 

passes. But it is also about how we resolve disputes concerning territories in or near bodies of water, whether it is the Arctic or the 

South China Sea. 

So it is very important we stand for the rule of law, and we stand 

for the peaceful resolution of any disputes. And we have made that 

known to our friends in the region, as well as to China. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Madam Secretary. Thank you, 

Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Faleomavaega. And 

Madam Secretary, lacking other members, Mr. Berman and I have 

agreed to share our 5 minutes with you, if that would be all right? 

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you very much. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. I am going to ask about the Keystone 

pipeline, so start the clock. 

Mr. BERMAN. I withdraw mine. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. As gas prices continue to soar, Madam 

Secretary, burdening the American people in this time of economic 

hardship, we must continue to examine avenues to depend less on 

foreign oil from rogue regimes. In October 2010, you mentioned 

that you were ‘‘inclined’’ to sign off of the Keystone project because 

20

the U.S. will either be ‘‘dependent on dirty oil from the Gulf or 

dirty oil from Canada.’’

What was it about the pipeline that led you to change your previous assertion, and can you please explain why an additional, stable source of oil from a democratic ally such as Canada does not 

deserve a national interest determination from the Department of 

State? 

And Mr. Berman, if you would like to ask your question? 

Mr. BERMAN. A very specific question about Syria, the security 

of the chemical and possibly biological weapons in Syria should the 

Assad regime fall. How real is the danger of these horrific weapons 

and substances leaving Syria and falling into the hands of terrorists and terrorist groups? And what about a Nunn-Lugar-type program to secure, dismantle, and remove chemical and biological 

weapons and technology from Syria? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, first, with respect to Keystone, what I 

said in 2010 was that energy security considerations exist and 

needed to be taken into account, but that it had to be part of what 

is the legal and regulatory requirements for evaluating any pipeline application that crosses an international boundary. 

The State Department was in the process of making such a determination, and when it became necessary to make a decision, we 

did not recommend that the President say no, but rather that the 

presidential permit for the project at that time be denied. 

And with respect to the national interest, what we were working 

on was a resolution of the very strong concerns expressed by one 

of the states through which the pipeline would move, a state that 

at that time did not have its own process and needed to pass legislation, figure out what the alternative route would be. 

And then, of course, it fell upon the State Department to evaluate the alternative route. That had not been established when we 

were required to make our decision, therefore it was impossible to 

assess the impact of that new route that had been requested. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Secretary CLINTON. No, just in the last 2 days, TransCanada has 

made a move through a letter indicating their intent to submit a 

new application which crosses the U.S.-Canada border. At the same 

time, they are moving forward with parts of the pipeline, like from 

Oklahoma to Texas, that don’t cross the border and don’t need 

State Department evaluation or decision. 

So I think we have handled this, Madam Chairman, in a way 

that was commensurate with the law and the regulations. I strongly believe we have to increase our energy security. I strongly support the creation of our new Energy Bureau. Just last week, we 

signed an important agreement with Mexico to encourage 

transboundary exploration in the Gulf of Mexico, something that 

was legally in limbo. So we are committed to doing all that we can 

to help Americans get the energy supplies we need. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Madam Secretary. And 

now to Syria, from Canada. 

Secretary CLINTON. Yes, now on to Syria. Well, we are concerned. 

I think that it is an issue that deserves the attention of the international community. Nunn-Lugar, of course, was in a permissive 

environment. It was after the Soviet Union had fallen, the new 

21

Russian Federation came into being. They welcomed our work with 

them, as in Kazakhstan and Ukraine and other countries. 

At this time, there is no permissive environment, but we are 

going to stay very focused on the potential dangers posed by any 

storehouse or depot of such weapons. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary, for your time. Mr. Smith from New Jersey, the chairman of 

the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights, is 

recognized. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Welcome, 

Madam Secretary. Let me associate myself with the remarks of our 

distinguished chairwoman on Cuba. We had a hearing just a couple 

of weeks ago with Dr. Oscar Biscet, who had a 25-year sentence. 

He is now out of prison, but he is not out of prison. 

And he spoke via telephone right here, and the man is unbelievably brave. He is calling for freedom, human rights, and we have 

got to be very hard-lined, I believe, but also very prudent. So I 

would hope—the gentlelady made a very important point about not 

attending, and I hope that will be the case. 

Let me ask you with regards to the Iranian Pastor, Youcef 

Nadarkhani—we will have a resolution on the floor later on today. 

If you could speak to the Iranians, if you would, and to the world—

there is a ratcheting up of persecution against Christians that is 

unprecedented. 

I have held two hearings on the Coptic Christians. The kidnapping of Coptic Christian girls who are forced into Islam as minors 

and then given to a man in Egypt who happens to be Muslim is 

outrageous. It is an act of trafficking, and it is not an isolated incidence. It is a serious, ongoing and pervasive human rights hearing. 

I actually held my first hearing on the global persecution of 

Christians on February 15th, 1996. It was getting worse then. It 

is now awful. In China, North Korea, we all know people are tortured to death simply because they are Christians. If you could 

speak to that. 

I would like to ask you, if you would—and a very specific and yes 

or no answer might suffice—and I thank you for the briefing on 

Bosnia and the work you are doing to try and bring Bosnia into 

NATO, as well as the other countries that are in line. 

Is there any instance, Madam Secretary, or instances, where the 

Obama administration has withheld or has threatened to withhold 

or plans to withhold, or use its voice and vote at international and 

U.N. institutions to reward with debt relief or loans, or to deny 

such, or in any other way provide a retaliatory means based on 

that nation’s policies on abortion, and based on that nation’s support or opposition to resolutions at the U.N. regarding abortion? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, as to that second question, Congressman, I would like to take it for the record, because it had so many 

parts to it and I don’t want to give you an answer that is not as 

accurate as I can make it. So I will certainly get back to you on 

that. 

As to the very troubling case of Pastor Nadarkhani, you are 100 

percent right. His case is particularly egregious, but it is, unfortunately, part of what we see as increasing discrimination and persecution on the basis of religion. In some parts of the world, it is 

22

sects of Islam. In some parts of the world, it is Christians. But 

wherever it occurs, it is deplorable, against freedom of religion, 

against human rights that are universally recognized. 

The United States has condemned the sentence against Pastor 

Nadarkhani. We have pushed very hard, reached out to like-minded countries, international organizations, to get a stay of execution, 

to get him released from prison. He has done nothing more than 

maintain his faith, and it is absolutely contrary to every element 

of the universal basis for human rights that someone like that 

would be condemned to death for being who he is, worshipping as 

he chooses, exercising his freedom of conscience. 

So we call on Iran to honor its own constitutional commitment 

to the protection of religious freedom, and its obligations under 

international law. And they can begin by commuting this death 

sentence and letting this man go free. 

Mr. SMITH. If you could get back on the other question as quickly——

Secretary CLINTON. Yes. 

Mr. SMITH. We hear from U.N. ambassadors that some are fearful they will lose foreign aid if they don’t back the U.S. position on 

abortion at the United Nations. You know, you are shaking your 

head no, so I am happy to hear that, but if you could provide a very 

definitive answer it would be very helpful. 

You probably saw the spate of articles that China is changing its 

policy slogans on the one child per couple policy but not the law 

itself. That was one of the headlines that Yahoo! News had. There 

is a whole spate of articles to that effect. 

I would hope that we would redouble our efforts to combat the 

one child per couple policy. The fact that there are so many missing 

girls—as we all know, the estimates are in excess of 100 million 

missing girls, systematically exterminated simply because they 

happen to be girls. And by 2050—and I had a hearing on this very 

recently. I have had 38 congressional hearings on human rights 

abuse in China—by 2020, 40–50 percent of men won’t be able to 

find wives because they have been systematically eliminated. So 

China is becoming and will increase as a trafficking magnet. 

I am almost out of time, but if you could really speak out strongly against forced abortion, forced sterilization, and for those baby 

girls in China who are suffering immensely, along with their mothers. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Mr. Sherman, 

the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, is recognized. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Madam Secretary, glad to have you back here. I 

want to join so many of my colleagues who have praised your work 

for our country, and how much you have been able to accomplish 

with less than 1 percent of our budget. I have got a lot of topics 

to cover, and would expect that you just want to respond for the 

record, but interrupt me at any point if the spirit moves you. 

The first is to focus on the Javakh region of Georgia. We have 

been very generous to the Republic of Georgia. Javakh is a region 

in Southern Georgia with a large ethnic Armenian population, and 

the Embassy of Georgia is now in support of the idea of the United 

States focusing a good chunk of its aid for Georgia on the Javakh 

23

region. This would help bind Javakh to the Republic of Georgia, 

and would help achieve our goals in the Caucasus. 

Last time you were here, I mentioned the idea of Voice of America broadcasting in the Sindhi language. This committee adopted 

my amendment unanimously to direct the Voice of America to 

spend $1.5 million broadcasting in the Sindhi language. I am not 

sure that that bill will become law, but it does show the wisdom 

of the committee. 

There are elements in the government in Islamabad who would 

prefer to try to impose the Urdu language on the entire country. 

In fact, the idea of imposing the Urdu language on what was then 

East Bengal created, as much as anything, the independent Republic of Bangladesh. And I would hope that in deciding whether or 

not to broadcast in the Sindhi language, we not try to accommodate 

the most extreme nationalistic, or just extreme, position of some 

elements in Islamabad. Because right now we are broadcasting in 

Urdu, and Sindhi is spoken by far more people in Pakistan. And 

we do have a very complicated relationship with the Pakistani Government. We need to reach out to the Pakistani people, particularly 

those in the Sufi-influenced south of Pakistan, where the version 

of Islam is so compatible with American values. 

I know I won’t be the only person up here to talk about Camp 

Liberty and how important it is that we ensure the humanitarian 

safety of everyone who is there. There are certain elements to how 

that camp has been set up that makes it look almost like a prison 

camp. There are reports that the residents have no access to lawyers, their family, no freedom of movement. And obviously, the Iranian Government is going to be pressing the Iraqis to be as inhumane as possible to the residents of that camp, and I hope that we 

will be pressing on the other side. 

And then finally—and this is a propitious day with regard to this 

issue—as you may know, there is the SWIFT system, which is the 

Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications. 

There is an effort to exclude all Iranian banks from that system, 

and earlier today I had a chance to talk to Chairman Bernanke, 

who represents us in the SWIFT system and has a role in supervising that system. 

And he said that he didn’t have a national security advisor over 

at the Federal Reserve, and would want to hear from elements of 

the government that do focus on national security whether it is in 

our interest, not just to exclude some Iranian banks, but all Iranian banks from the SWIFT system, thus further isolating Iran’s 

financial system. And so perhaps you could respond right here as 

to whether you would advise the chairman to do everything possible to exclude all Iranian banks from the SWIFT system. 

Secretary CLINTON. Yes, we certainly would. And we believe that 

using the SWIFT system is a very effective way of further isolating 

Iran, and the Iranian flow of financial transactions. So we will engage with the Federal Reserve in terms of providing such information, and with respect to all of your other issues, Congressman, we 

will get back to you in a timely manner. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. And I hope your advice to Bernanke 

would be all Iranian banks, not just those that have been sanctioned by the EU. 

24

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. Thank you, 

Madam Secretary. Mr. Burton, the chairman on Europe and Eurasia, is recognized. 

Mr. BURTON. Madam Secretary, it is nice seeing you again. I understand that today or yesterday there was an indication that we 

might once again open some kind of dialogue with North Korea, 

and I just checked and we gave North Korea during the Clinton administration over $1 billion in fuel and food aid, as well as money 

we spent building their light water reactor. And of course, they violated the agreement that they made. 

The only reason that I bring that up is, I hope that if we start 

a dialogue with them we realize that their history is one that you 

certainly can’t trust. And even though Kim Jong Il is gone, and we 

have a new leader there, I think it is extremely important that the 

State Department get everything written in blood, so to speak, to 

make sure that we are not shafted again. 

Recently Tom Donilon and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs went 

over to visit Israel, and the tone of the reports that I received—

and of course, all this isn’t in writing, but the tone was that they 

were urging Israel not to take any unilateral action as far as an 

attack on Iran is concerned. And I know that they just recently 

said that they certainly weren’t going to in any way involve, so to 

speak, the United States, to give us some semblance of separation 

from that. 

I wonder why it is that the administration doesn’t give complete 

support to Israel and say, ‘‘If Iran continues with its program, we 

will do whatever is necessary to stop that program,’’ and give Israel 

the support that I think they need. Right now, they are surrounded 

by all of the potential enemies you can count. And they really need, 

I think, in the world of public relations, to know—and the world 

to know—that the United States is with them through thick and 

thin. 

The last thing I talked to you about when you were here—and 

I will give you a chance to respond—was that I have been very concerned about the entire northern tier of Africa and the Persian 

Gulf becoming radicalized. Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, maybe Syria, and 

in the Persian Gulf area I have been talked to by a number of the 

ambassadors and others there. They are all concerned about radicalism taking over. And although we want to get rid of people like 

Muammar Gaddafi and Mubarak—although he was a pretty good 

friend as far as the Camp David accords are concerned—although 

we want to get rid of the bad guys, I would like to know what we 

are doing to guarantee that we are not supporting radical Islamists 

who are going to end up causing a bigger problem than the problem we already had. 

I understand that we want to get rid of people that are persecuting their populations, but we also have to be concerned about 

what it means to the United States as far as energy is concerned, 

and stability in the region, Israel and all those things. And I would 

like to know what guarantees we have that the governments that 

we are supporting over there, or the fledgling governments that we 

are supporting over there, are not going to be radicalized and start 

supporting and implementing Sharia law, and thus we would face 

a more difficult problem down the road than we face right now. 

25

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Congressman, with respect to Israel, I 

can assure you that not only does the Obama administration 

strongly support the defense and security of Israel, but we have 

put more money behind that pledge than has ever been put before. 

We have increased U.S. security assistance to Israel every year 

since FY09. This budget includes $3.1 billion for foreign military financing, a $25-million-increase from the FY12 level. We have a 

very strong support for Israel’s missile defense programs, which are 

an essential aspect of what Israel needs in these very challenging 

times. 

And you know, Prime Minster Netanyahu has called the bilateral 

security cooperation unprecedented, particularly with respect to cooperative missile defense developments and realistic military exercises. So there is an ongoing consultation at the very highest levels 

between our two governments. And we share our assessments with 

the Israelis We listen to their assessments. And I think that the 

Prime Minister’s words really speak for themselves, that it is unprecedented, the level of cooperation and funding that we are providing. 

And I will look forward to providing an answer on the record regarding North Africa. I just returned from a visit to Tunisia, and 

Algeria, and Morocco. I think we have an opportunity there, but I 

am conscious of the risks and dangers you identified. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Madam Secretary. Thank 

you, Mr. Burton. Mr. Meeks, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Madam Secretary, it 

is always a delight to have you before us. And I just want to say, 

on behalf of I believe all of the American people, what a splendid 

job you are doing. 

I have three questions that I am going to try to ask you in the 

time that we have allotted. One about our complex relationship 

with Russia, which I believe presents significant accomplishments, 

challenges and opportunities, and our disagreements are sometimes profound and frustrate multilateral efforts for coordinated action to confront threats of life as in Syria, or global security as in 

Iran. Notably, however, the Cold War is behind us, and the United 

States and Russia are no longer eyeball to eyeball with fingers 

posed over red buttons that would release arsenals aimed at one 

another, and we are often now elbow to elbow at conference tables, 

which I think is a good thing. 

Madam Secretary, will you comment on your priorities and the 

strategy with respect to Russia? You may know, or may not know, 

that I am particularly interested in expanding trade and economic 

relationships with Russia, which in the year ahead I hope will be 

a good news story for the United States. 

Secondly, Turkey, which continues to be a strategically important 

player in a challenging part of the world. In fact, Turkey has demonstrated leadership in supporting change and peace in Syria, and 

receiving the tens of thousands of Syrian refugees who spill across 

the common border. They have stepped into the spotlight, too, regarding events in the Middle East and north Africa, and they facilitate U.S. redeployments from Iraq. Can you speak about Turkey’s 

26

growing prominence and the United States’ relationship with Turkey, including what seem to be rough spots with Israel and Iran? 

And lastly, the U.S. leads the world in promoting racial and ethnic tolerance and gender empowerment, and I want to commend 

you for your personal leadership in these efforts. I would like to 

focus your attention for just a second on the U.S.-Brazil joint action 

plan, as well as the U.S.-Colombia action plan to promote racial 

and ethnic equality, and I would like to hear about your plans for 

continuing these works on these initiatives, especially since I didn’t 

see—I was not clear about the funding of these initiatives in 2013, 

and it is very much a concern to me whether that is going to continue in the Bureau of the Western Hemisphere. 

And when I was in Brussels, now being the ranking Democrat 

on Europe, our European counterparts have expressed a strong interest in concluding such a joint action plan with us also, and so 

I was wondering if the State Department could expand on this initiative and look into negotiating an agreement with the EU. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, thank you very much for that description of a lot of the most important issues that we face. Let me focus 

at the start on Russia, because there will be coming before the 

Congress important work to be done in order for American businesses to benefit from Russia’s membership in the WTO. The 

United States believes that having Russia in the WTO is very 

much in the interests of the kind of rules-based economic system 

that we think benefits Americans, and that we are very keen on 

establishing firmly for the 21st century. 

So we are looking to have the Congress vote to grant permanent 

normal trade relations to Russia, because it is a vote to create 

American jobs. For U.S. businesses, farmers and workers to receive 

the maximum benefit from Russia’s entry into the WTO, we have 

to give unconditional permanent normal trading relations treatment to Russian goods that we provide to all WTO members. 

That commitment requires us to terminate the application of the 

Jackson-Vanik Amendment. And Jackson-Vanik achieved its historic purpose by helping thousands of Jews emigrate from the Soviet Union. And Jackson-Vanik is not any longer the kind of active 

tool that we need to promote universal human rights vis-a`-vis Russia. Because we want to continue to press for human rights inside 

Russia, but failure to lift Jackson-Vanik will put our farmers, our 

manufacturers, American businesses, at a disadvantage. 

So we very much hope that the Congress will grant PNTR to 

Russia, lift Jackson-Vanik, recognize the need to keep pressing on 

human rights inside Russia, and create American jobs as a result. 

And with respect to your other very important questions and 

areas of concern, Congressman, I will just end by saying we strongly support the work we are doing with Colombia and Brazil to promote racial and ethnic equality. We do have the means to continue 

to work on that within the existing budget, and it is a very high 

priority. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Meeks, 

Madam Secretary. Mr. Rohrabacher of California, the chairman of 

the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, is recognized. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, and I too respect the 

good job you are doing. We have some disagreements, but the fact 

27

is, you work hard and you take your job seriously. And probably 

of all the members of the Obama administration, you have more respect here on Capitol Hill than your other colleagues. Sorry, that 

is a backhanded compliment. I shouldn’t have said that. 

But there are many lives that depend directly on the decisions 

you make in your job, and I would like to ask two questions relating directly to people who are now in grave danger, who will be affected by your decision-making. And then, after that, if I have some 

other time, I will ask a couple other questions. 

The first one is about Dr. Afridi in Pakistan. As you are aware, 

it is now illegal for the Government of Pakistan to receive any aid 

money from the United States unless you, as the Secretary of 

State, certify that Pakistan is cooperating with the United States 

in counterterrorism efforts and preventing terrorists from basing 

their operations in Pakistan. 

Well, of course, the one Pakistani who did cooperate with us was 

Dr. Afridi, who was the medical doctor who helped provide the information that led our Navy SEALs to where Osama bin Laden 

was hiding. But he now has been arrested by the Pakistani Government, and is facing a treason charge. His property has been 

confiscated. His office staff has been fired. And he is being called 

a national criminal by that government. 

So can you certify? Are you able to certify that Pakistan is cooperating with us, as long as Dr. Afridi, the man who helped us 

get Osama bin Laden, is in custody and being charged with treason? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Congressman, I agree that there is no 

basis for holding Dr. Afridi or any of his staff. In fact, I think his 

work on behalf of the effort to take down bin Laden was in Pakistan’s interests as well as the United States’ interest, and we have 

made that view very well known. We will continue to press it. And 

it is going to be taken into account as we move forward. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, if they do not let Dr. Afridi go—let me 

just put everybody on notice here—and I believe we are going to 

be watching this closely—there is nothing that could suggest that 

Pakistan is cooperating with us in the fight against terrorism, 

when they have Dr. Afridi, the man who helped us get Osama bin 

Laden, in prison and are treating him this way. That is their decision of non-cooperation. 

About one other group whose lives are in danger, there are 3,000 

Iranian exiles who have been residing in Iraq, who you are fully 

aware of. Because they were enemies and are enemies of the Iranian mullah dictatorship, these exiled members, who are members 

of the MEK, are in great danger. Our designation to their organization as a terrorist organization has been a major stumbling block 

in efforts to resettle them and take them to safety. Are we going 

to wait until there is some kind of another slaughter of these people—they already were slaughtered down there, unarmed—before 

we act to try to get them resettled? Something as easy as trying 

to take that designation off, of the terrorist organization, would 

help dramatically, and we can do that unilaterally. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, first, we are deeply concerned about 

the security and safety of the residents of Camp Ashraf. And we 

have supported the work of the United Nations to find a path forVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:10 May 17, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\022912\73119 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ward to relocate the residents, and that has now begun. We fully 

support the MOU, signed in December, between the United Nations and the Government of Iraq, and it includes commitments 

from the Iraqi Government for the safety and security of the new 

camp where the relocation is taking place. 

As you know, there were 397 residents relocated on February 

18th. There were complications, but it was peaceful. There was no 

violence. The safety so far has been protected, and we are watching 

that very closely. We continue to work on our review of the MEK’s 

designation as a foreign terrorist organization in accordance with 

the DC Circuit’s decision and applicable law. 

And I would note that not every resident relocated to what used 

to be Camp Liberty—it is now Camp Korea—may be an MEK 

member. The organization’s structure and history dictate that we 

take a serious look at each individual, not prejudge membership or 

the conditions of that person’s presence at Ashraf. And you know, 

once again the UNHCR process will be expedited. So no government has raised the FTO issue with the Department of State as 

a bar to receiving individuals. And we are going to continue to 

work to ensure the safety and security, and we think that we have 

a good plan. 

And I would say, Congressman, that given the ongoing efforts to 

relocate the residents, MEK cooperation in the successful and 

peaceful closure of Camp Ashraf, the MEK’s main paramilitary 

base, will be a key factor in any decision regarding the MEK’s FTO 

status. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Engel of New York, the 

ranking member on the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, 

is recognized. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Madam Chair. And welcome, Madam 

Secretary. The United States is proud of you, but in New York we 

are especially proud of you. I want to ask three questions. I will 

try to do them one at a time. I have just come back from a trip 

to Israel, where I have met with people at the highest levels of government. There is a big fear in Israel that the United States is adjusting to the containment of Iranian nuclear weapons, rather than 

stopping them at all costs. And as you, of course, know, we have 

said, ‘‘Let sanctions work,’’ but many in Israel believe that if we 

wait too long we will be at the point of no return, and then Iran 

will not be stopped at all. 

Can you please comment on that, and assure us that we are not 

for a position of containment? 

Secretary CLINTON. Our policy, Congressman, is prevention. Our 

policy is to prevent Iran from attaining nuclear weapons capability. 

We have a two-track policy, pressure and engagement. We are pursuing both simultaneously to that end. 

Mr. ENGEL. Okay. Thank you. I want to speak with you about 

the Balkans. You and I had several discussions in the past week 

or so about Kosovo, and I want to just praise you publicly for guaranteeing that Kosovo’s rights as a sovereign country remain secure 

throughout recent negotiations with the EU and Serbia. 

While I am glad that Kosovo will take its rightful place as a sovereign state in regional negotiations, and I commend Prime MinVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:10 May 17, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\022912\73119 HFA PsN: SHIRL
29

ister Thaci for taking this difficult decision, I am concerned that 

Belgrade is advancing to candidate status before meeting all of the 

EU’s conditions in normalizing relations with Kosovo. And at the 

same time, as you and I discussed, I hope the U.S. will seek additional ways to support Kosovo during this process, including 

through the Millennium Challenge program and by pressing the 

EU to stop dragging its feet on Kosovo’s European future, and to 

make sure that Serbia implements deals to which it agrees. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, I thank you for your constant support 

of Kosovo and the Kosovar people. I agree with you that Prime 

Minister Thaci showed great leadership. The invitation to candidacy that the EU has extended to Serbia has many milestones 

along the way, and resolving border issues, resolving a lot of the 

unfinished business that has to be negotiated between Serbia and 

Kosovo are some of those. 

At the same time, I think it is very important that the European 

Union has reached out to Kosovo and is working to move Kosovo 

closer to European integration as well. This is a difficult piece of 

business. It is a historically complex area, as you know better than 

most, Congressman. But I think we are slowly making progress, 

and I am going to continue to press forward. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Two things about the Western Hemisphere, which the ranking member—the FARC has recently announced that it is going to release some of its political prisoners, 

and want people to believe that they have reformed. 

While I am obviously skeptical about anything that the FARC 

says, I wonder if you can comment? President Santos of Colombia, 

of course, has said that it is a good move in the right direction, but 

not nearly enough. I wonder if we could have your thoughts on 

that. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, I think that President Santos is exactly 

right. It is a good move, long overdue, to end their kidnapping and 

their illegal detention of innocent people, but there is a lot yet to 

be finalized. I think that this Congress and administrations of both 

parties should take a certain amount of credit for Plan Colombia, 

for sticking with it, for providing the Colombian Government and 

the Colombian people with the means to be able to defend themselves against a paramilitary terrorist organization and the drug 

traffickers. So yes, this is a good step, but it is not enough yet. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. And finally, last year this committee 

adopted a bipartisan amendment which I authored supporting the 

establishment of U.S. Embassies in the five Caribbean countries 

where we have none. These Embassies would be similar to the 

posts we have in Grenada, and would show our Caribbean partners 

that we pay attention to their region. And it would, of course, also 

help connect millions of Caribbean-Americans with their ancestral 

homelands. It will be minimal or no cost, because our representation would be established with only five of the hundreds of diplomats returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. And I am wondering 

if you can comment on that. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, of course, we believe strongly in having 

positive diplomatic relations with our eastern Caribbean friends 

and partners. And it is a matter of cost. It is a matter of resources. 

30

I will respond to you in writing, because it is a difficult tradeoff for 

us, Congressman. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. 

Engel, Madam Secretary. And Mr. Royce, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, is recognized. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Madam Secretary, 

you and I have talked about Joseph Kony, who abducted 30,000 

children, the boys he turned into child soldiers, the girls into concubines, and some of the horrible circumstances that we have had 

with some of the worst human rights abusers. And likewise, people 

like Viktor Bout, who is now in custody, but a gun runner supreme 

who, as an arms trafficker, armed both sides of some civil conflicts. 

There is a rewards program the State Department has, and I 

have legislation to expand that, to include transnational organized 

crime, to go after people like Viktor Bout, as well as those engaged 

in the worst human rights abuses, like Joseph Kony. And I know 

that your department is interested in putting a price on the head 

of people like Kony, so that we can find their whereabouts. And I 

know the goal is to take him off the battlefield, and we would need 

that to do that. 

So we will have a hearing next week on this subject. I wanted 

your thoughts, if I could. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Congressman, this is the first time I 

have heard of your legislation, but speaking personally I would 

support it, because I have the responsibility of signing off on rewards that go to people who have helped us apprehend serious 

criminals and terrorists. I think it is a good program. It does provide incentives. So I would be very interested in working with you. 

It is also a lot less expensive than some of the alternatives of trying to track down some of these bad guys. So let us work together 

on that. 

Mr. ROYCE. It is time-tested. 

Secretary CLINTON. Yes. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, again, Madam Secretary, on another subject, 

this morning it was announced that North Korea has agreed to 

suspend its uranium enrichment, and to a moratorium. But that 

was announced in tandem with the Obama administration’s finalizing its details on food aid to North Korea, 240,000 metric tons of 

food aid. 

I had legislation passed last year that prohibited food aid to any 

country that diverted it for unauthorized use. And I will just explain my concern here. The French NGOs told us of monitoring the 

food aid, which ended up on the food exchange in North Korea’s 

capital. And likewise, we have numerous examples of sighting of 

how food aid went to the military in North Korea. 

So the law now would indicate that we would have to verify that. 

And we have been duped a number of times in North Korea, by 

North Korea, on these agreements. Of course, what I am most concerned about is when they sell it on the food exchange for hard currency, it goes into their weapons program, reportedly. So I would 

ask you about that, and get your response. 

31

Secretary CLINTON. First of all, I think you are right to be cautious. We are, too. The provision of humanitarian assistance is 

something that we do because of the concern we have for the welfare and well-being of people, including those who are starving in 

North Korea. And we have done a series of assessments and concluded that a targeted 240,000 metric ton nutritional assistance 

package that targets the key vulnerable groups—mostly women 

and children—is merited. 

But before any assistance program could begin, we have to reach 

agreement on monitoring mechanisms to ensure that the food is 

reaching the people that we intend it for. And that will be our responsibility, to try to set up those mechanisms and to be as sure 

as we can be that it is going to be put to the right use. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Madam Secretary. And within the confines of the new law, because we do have to verify this, I have suggested a crackdown on North Korea’s illicit activities. I have seen 

in the past where that was effective. When they were counterfeiting $100 bills, we had the sanctions on the bank, Banco Delta 

Asia, that they were using to run their illicit activities through. A 

lot of their drug smuggling and cigarettes and other activities, 

when you cut off that kind of currency, you force the regime to 

come to the table. 

And I guess one of my great frustrations was, although we shut 

that down for a number of months, and he couldn’t pay his generals, and the word we were getting back from defectors was that 

they couldn’t get the parts—there was a piece for a satellite that 

they needed, or actually, this was for a missile program. They 

needed a gyroscope. They were trying to buy it on the black market. They didn’t have the money for it, because we had, effectively, 

with sanctions, done this. And then the sanctions were lifted. 

My hope would be that the administration would approach this 

from the standpoint that that could be effective. And I wanted to 

ask about——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Royce. 

Mr. ROYCE [continuing]. Whether the administration was going 

to follow through on the illicit activities. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Royce. Thank you, 

Madam Secretary. Mr. Carnahan is recognized. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Madam Chair. And Madam Secretary, it is great to have you back. I just first want to say thank 

you for following up with co-chair Chris Smith, Chairman Smith 

and I, with the Bosnian Caucus and those concerns that we had 

raised earlier. Given the fact that they have the new government 

in place, we hope that continued U.S. and international support 

can help move the forward. So first of all, thank you for that. 

I also wanted to commend you on the recently announced international partnership, the Climate and Clean Air Coalition to reduce short-term pollutants. It underscores the global nature of the 

challenge, as well as the advantages to working with our partners 

at the U.N. and around the world. I wanted to ask, has that investment paid off in terms of stronger commitments by developing 

countries? And can we count on them to continue to fulfill those 

commitments if we are not honoring our pledges? 

32

Secretary CLINTON. Well, thank you for raising that, Congressman, because we continue to believe that climate change and the 

consequences of climate change pose national security problems to 

us. And so we are looking for ways to try to move forward where 

we can, and take practical steps. The fact is that the short-term climate forcers—things like methane, things like black soot, or black 

carbon and soot—are more easily dealt with than carbon dioxide. 

And I think that what we have put together here, which is the Climate and Clean Air Coalition, has developed countries like Sweden, 

underdeveloped countries like Bangladesh, developing countries 

like Ghana, Canada, and we have had a really positive response 

from countries around the world, asking how they can be involved. 

So we think this is a way to help cut down on about 40 percent 

of what the pollutants in the atmosphere are that affects climate 

change. So we are going to be promoting this issue. It is not as controversial, it is not as far-reaching. We still have to deal with the 

greenhouse gas emissions and try to come to grips with CO2, but 

it gives us something that people can do. 

And I will give you a quick example. We have a Global Alliance 

on Clean Cookstoves. How women cook, about 2 billion of them 

around the world, creates respiratory illnesses, puts a lot of soot, 

black carbon, into the atmosphere. If we can create a market for 

a more clean-burning cookstove, we improve health and we improve 

the environment at the same time. So there are a lot of win/win 

strategies that we are working on here. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you. I also wanted to follow up on the 

SIGIR Audit Report of the police development program, and it revealed issues in Iraq of poor planning, mismanagement, inefficient 

evaluation metrics. So in this current budget, what is being done 

to enhance those monitoring mechanisms in a way that ensures 

that police training is really being ramped up the way that it needs 

to be? It is also ensuring the integrity of our tax dollars. And really 

related to that, as this similar kind of transition is approaching, 

fast approaching, in Afghanistan, the lessons we have learned in 

this transition in Iraq, how can we apply those in Afghanistan as 

well? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, the police development program has 

been operating since October 1, 2011, when the State Department 

became the U.S. lead for police development. Since October, our 

senior police advisors, who are the most experienced group of police 

advisors ever fielded by the U.S. Government, have had approximately 690 total mentoring and advising sessions with over 86 

Iraqi counterparts. And we have recently completed an assessment 

of Iraq’s Ministry of Interior and police services, so that we can 

really refine how we are monitoring and what kind of performance 

measurements we need. 

I think that SIGIR performs a valuable oversight service. We 

welcome helpful recommendations about how to make the police 

development program better. We are implementing the recommendations from the fall audit, and we are going to continue to 

look at opportunities to improve the effectiveness of these programs. We think they are critical to the stability and security of 

Iraq. So we take it very seriously, and we take recommendations 

from SIGIR and others very seriously as well. 

33

Mr. CARNAHAN. And finally, in my remaining time, I just want 

to add my voices to others about our continued effective and full 

engagement at the U.N. Certainly not a perfect body, but one 

that—certainly there have been some successes there, vital for our 

security and economic interests. And I appreciate those continued 

efforts. 

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Mr. Chabot, the 

chairman of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, 

is recognized. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chair. Madam Secretary, because of limited time I would like to raise three issues and then 

give you the remaining amount of my time to address them. First, 

Iran. On the subject of the Iranian nuclear program, the Fiscal 

Year 2013 Congressional Budget Justification notes that, ‘‘The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs will maintain pressure through sanctions to encourage Iran to return to the negotiating table.’’

This policy, however, is essentially the same unchanged Iran policy that the administration has had since it took power back in 

January 2009: Engagement and pressure. On July 12th, 2009, over 

21⁄2 years ago, you stated that, ‘‘We understand the importance of 

offering to engage Iran and giving its leaders a clear choice. The 

opportunity will not remain open indefinitely.’’

As we enter year 4 of this policy, it seems to me to be painfully 

obvious that this administration’s policy is not only the same, but 

that it has failed to achieve the core objective: Persuading the regime in Tehran to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons capability. 

Just this morning, in your testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, you said that you 

believe we are making progress on the sanctions front. My question 

is, how have these sanctions actually altered the Iranian regime’s 

calculation about its nuclear program? And let me say, I don’t 

think merely getting them to the table is enough. We have seen numerous times that the regime in Tehran uses negotiations as a delaying tactic, and that a willingness to negotiate does not equal a 

willingness to make concessions. 

Second, I would like to ask you about Iraq. Within hours of the 

departure of the final U.S. convoy, a political crisis started occurring in Iraq which, if not checked, has the potential to throw the 

entire country back into sectarian civil war that we spent years 

working to resolve. Many Iraqis continue to die in daily attacks 

across the country, and according to one report our influence over 

the Maliki government has diminished significantly. 

The State Department Congressional Budget Justification notes 

that, ‘‘Renewed sectarian conflict or increased interference by malign regional actors seeking to fill a vacuum left by U.S. disengagement would pose a significant threat to U.S. influence in the region.’’ It seems undeniable that the continued presence of even a 

modicum of U.S. troops would have resulted in far more stability 

and security than we are seeing now. 

Given our lack of a military presence and our diminished diplomatic leverage, how does the administration plan to deal with the 

current deterioration on the ground in Iraq? 

34

And finally, Madam Secretary, if I may, I would like to briefly 

touch upon the issue of outstanding claims by American companies 

against the Government of Saudi Arabia. In the last 20 years or 

so, thanks in large part to congressional and executive branch pressure, a number of previously unsettled cases involving more than 

a dozen American firms, totaling somewhere in the neighborhood 

of $500 million, have been resolved. 

I learned last year that at least one such unsettled claim with 

the Saudis remains. Despite continued efforts by the party, Gibbs 

& Hill, the U.S. Government, and repeated encouragement from 

Members of Congress, the claim, resulting from a desalinization 

project in the last ’70s and early ’80s, and totalling, I am told, more 

than $130 million, has still not been settled. 

I discussed this case with the Saudi Petroleum Minister when I 

met with him in Riyadh last year, and I offered an amendment to 

the Foreign Relations Authorization Bill to further encourage the 

Saudis to move expeditiously to resolve this claim. I would be 

happy to work with your office on this issue. This claim is of significant importance to an American company and their workers, 

and it should be of importance to the reputation of the Saudi Government, which I am sure does not want to be known as one which 

does not pay its bills. 

And we have got about 1 minute for all of those, Madam Secretary. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, I will take the last one, because that 

is shorter, and then get back to you on the important questions 

concerning Iran and Iraq. 

The State Department is well familiar with the Gibbs & Hill contract dispute. It has been raised at high levels for a number of 

years. At the request of counsel for Hill International, the State 

Department recently conducted a review of all of our records in this 

matter. We have a standing invitation to officers of Hill International to come in and discuss the results of this review, to bring 

not only representatives but counsel of the company. 

We regularly meet with representatives of Hill International, because they still do business in Saudi Arabia. In fact, they do quite 

a bit of business. And they come in and talk to us about commercial ventures and business climate, so if they wish to come in and 

talk to us about our review of the records, we stand ready to do 

so. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chabot. 

Thank you, Madam Secretary. Mi hermano Cubano-Americano—

now, that was easy enough for everybody to understand—Mr. Sires 

of New Jersey is recognized. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Madam Chair. Madam Secretary, thank 

you for being here and thank you for the service that you give this 

country. You certainly make us proud. And I don’t know how you 

do it, but every time I see you, you are in a different country. It 

is amazing. I also want to commend the administration for standing firm on Cuba not participating in the Summit of the Americas. 

And I also wish to add that, if we could use some of our pull with 

the OAS, maybe they could speak up a little louder about the 

human abuses that are occurring in Cuba currently. 

35

And with that, it brings me to Alan Gross. And I know you mentioned Alan Gross before, but I just want to know that there are 

no negotiations going on for a swap between the Cuban spies that 

are in prison for Alan Gross. And I know that we have two senators who were in Cuba a couple days ago, and I was just wondering if you know anything about any kind of negotiations for a 

swap. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, I have to say that the continuing imprisonment of Alan Gross is deplorable. It is wrong. It is a violation 

of human decency as well as human rights, and at every single 

meeting that we possibly can arrange, we raise this issue. We call 

people around the world to raise this issue, because Mr. Gross deserves to come home. 

At no point, however, has the United States Government been 

willing to give any unilateral concessions to the Castro regime, or 

to ease sanctions as a means to secure Mr. Gross’ release. We think 

this should be done as a matter of humanitarian concern, as evidence that the Castro Regime is willing to demonstrate that it is 

moving in a different direction. But it hasn’t happened yet. So we 

have not had any success in our diplomacy. We would like to see 

Mr. Gross home, but we have made no deals, we have offered no 

concessions, and we don’t intend to do so. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you. And I would also like to associate myself 

with my colleague, Chris Smith, on the human rights abuses, and 

especially what is going on in Egypt with the Coptic Christians. I 

have a big population of Coptic Christians in my district, and they 

are very concerned about the family members that they have back 

home. And I hope that we continue to speak up on their behalf. 

I also—I know you didn’t address this, but if we could use our 

leverage with the OAS to speak up more on human rights abuses, 

that would be great. And one of the things that is my pet peeve, 

I know that the State Department operation funding for Iraq has 

been reduced—I think this year it is going to be $4.8 billion—and 

I know that the Department of Defense also has reduced from 9.6 

to 2.9, almost $3 billion. 

I was just wondering if any of that money is used for infrastructure building in Iraq. We have a situation in America where our 

infrastructure is falling apart, and since I have been here we have 

been giving money to Iraq to build their infrastructure. So I was 

just wondering how this money is going to be used. Do you know? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Congressman, as you know, we have 

dramatically scaled back on what we spend in Iraq, primarily because the military has left in agreements that were negotiated by 

the prior administration. And now what we are focused on is our 

civilian presence. So we don’t fund Iraqi infrastructure any longer, 

and what was funded was primarily on the military side, not the 

civilian side. 

Mr. SIRES. Okay. And getting back to Cuba, my last issue. We 

have a criminal who killed a state trooper in New Jersey, JoAnne 

Chesimard. She has been living in Cuba for over 20 years. She shot 

a state trooper point blank, and every time I am back in the state 

and running through the state troopers, they want me to raise this 

issue, to see if the State Department, when you meet with Cuba, 

or when you do your conversations with some of the Cuban counVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:10 May 17, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\022912\73119 HFA PsN: SHIRL
36

terparts, is the issue of JoAnne Chesimard ever raised, or is it just 

a forgotten issue? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, it will be now raised, if it hasn’t been 

raised. And I thank you for raising it, because I well remember 

that terrible case. And I am confident it has been raised, but I will 

assure you and the state troopers in New Jersey it will continue 

to be raised in the future. 

Mr. SIRES. Okay. Madam Secretary, thank you for your service 

to this country. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. My Florida colleague, Mr. Mack, the chairman of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, is recognized. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I also would like to 

thank the Secretary for being here, and making herself available 

to questions from the committee. I want to go and continue to explore the Keystone XL pipeline, but I first want to—just for a point 

of clarification for everyone, we would much rather, as a policy in 

the United States, buy oil from our friends and allies in Canada 

than we would from Venezuela. Would you agree with that? 

Secretary CLINTON. Yes. And we do buy, as you know, a lot of 

oil from Canada. 

Mr. MACK. If we had the option to stop buying oil from Venezuela and get more oil from Canada, that is also a policy that we 

would pursue, isn’t it? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, obviously, we would rather buy oil from 

friendly countries. And we are doing everything we can to diversify 

our oil supply, including producing more oil here in the United 

States, which is all to the good. 

Mr. MACK. So why the flip-flop on the Keystone XL pipeline? 

Secretary CLINTON. I don’t think there was any flip-flop, Congressman. I think that this was always a matter that had to be 

evaluated in accordance with legal and regulatory standards. Certainly energy security consideration was a key factor, but not the 

only factor. There was a lot of concern on the part of one state 

through which the pipeline traveled——

Mr. MACK. And on that note, your environmental impact statement approved the original route, and now there has been an 

agreement upon another route that the Governor and others have 

come out and supported, correct? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, I think that what the finding was, is 

that there was minimal environmental disruption, but the national 

interest consideration had not yet been finalized, which is why 

State Department representatives fanned out across the states affected, and there were quite large and contentious and emotional 

meetings in Nebraska, and a plea by the Governor and everybody 

else that a different route be considered. 

And once that was requested—and it was complicated because 

Nebraska didn’t have legislation that really got it into the business 

of judging routes before, but they were concerned because of the 

sand hills and the like—once they demanded a different route, and 

then there was an effort to work out a different route, the Congress 

of course, through an amendment to the payroll tax cut said, ‘‘No, 

you have to make a decision right now.’’

37

And legally, there was no alternative but to deny the permit. We 

did not recommend to the President that the answer be no, but 

that the presidential permit for the project be denied at that time, 

because there would have been, I think at a conservative estimate, 

several hundred lawsuits if there had been any other decision 

made, which would have pushed the decision, whatever it might be, 

far into the future. 

Mr. MACK. So are you prepared to do it now, then? 

Secretary CLINTON. We have no pending application now. There 

is no application——

Mr. MACK. If you had an application, would you approve it now? 

Secretary CLINTON. We have to——

Mr. MACK. Have all of the other scenarios been——

Secretary CLINTON. Congressman, we would have to go through 

the process, because it would be a new application. Now, what 

TransCanada is doing is announcing that it is——

Mr. MACK. Because my time is limited, if I can get to——

Secretary CLINTON. Okay. 

Mr. MACK. I mean, even the former President, Bill Clinton, says, 

‘‘Embrace it, and we need to move forward with the Keystone XL 

pipeline.’’

Secretary CLINTON. He is a very smart man. [Laughter.] 

But unfortunately, he is not bound by the laws and regulations 

any longer of the United States to make decisions that follow a certain procedure. And that is what we have to do. 

Mr. MACK. So is it a mistake for the former President to say, 

‘‘Embrace it?’’

Secretary CLINTON. Of course not. I think it is not a mistake for 

people to—this is America. People say they embrace it, people say 

they hate it. Our job is to take a very clear-eyed look at what the 

facts are. There is no pending application. 

Mr. MACK. Did the White House ask you to delay the process? 

Secretary CLINTON. No. Our job was to make a recommendation——

Mr. MACK. Here is where I have the problem. Because in conversations that you and I have had, and also in front of committees, you have led us to believe that it is something that the State 

Department was going to approve, and it just seems a little fishy 

to me that, at the height of this thing, that it seems that the President found a way to wiggle out of it, and wants to make you the 

scapegoat. And I don’t understand why—just, the facts don’t mesh 

up. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, you know, Congressman, that is just 

not how we see it. I think that the people in the State Department—I was fully and regularly briefed on the Department’s review process. I fully support the recommendation that the Department made. This is a difficult decision for the State Department to 

make, because most other pipelines are not within the purview of 

the State Department. We don’t have the kind of staff experience, 

expertise and numbers that you have in other places within the 

United States Government. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Secretary CLINTON. But under the laws, if that pipeline crosses 

an international border, then it is our responsibility. So what 

38

TransCanada is doing is announcing they are going to start building parts of the pipeline that don’t cross the international border. 

But I have to defend the process that the State Department went 

through, which was fully in accord with the laws of the United 

States. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Mack, 

Madam Secretary. Another Florida colleague, Mr. Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Madam Secretary, 

thank you for being here. It is safe to say that, certainly here on 

the Hill and around the world, you are extraordinarily respected 

for the job you do. And I particularly would like to thank you for 

your leadership in the critical areas of stability in the Middle East, 

preventing a nuclear-armed Iran, human rights, and in particular 

your continued strong advocacy for foreign assistance. 

I would like to talk first about Syria. And rather than continue 

the discussion that you have had already on what happens, how 

what is happening in Syria now ultimately ends, I want to talk 

about what is happening right at this moment. And in particular, 

just today it was reported that 23 people were killed when Syrian 

troops ambushed a group trying to smuggle Western journalists 

into the country. I don’t know whether the body of Marie Colvin, 

the American who wrote for the Sunday Times of London, whether 

that body has been recovered. If you have information, I would welcome that. The same with the Frenchman, Remi Ochlik. 

The fact is that, even as we talk about the big picture in Syria, 

the humanitarian situation deteriorates daily. Food and medicine 

are not being delivered to civilians. It is a tragic situation for the 

people of Syria. And I would like you to address that, and specifically what you can do and what we can do to alleviate those concerns now, and to convince the Russians and the Chinese to, notwithstanding their views on the Assad regime, to at least support 

a humanitarian cease-fire and put pressure on Assad to permit a 

humanitarian cease-fire, so that the people of Syria can at least receive the basic foodstuffs and medicine that they desperately need. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Congressman, I share your concern and 

your outrage. Every day that goes by just compounds the crimes 

against humanity committed by this regime and their security 

forces. When we met in Tunisia last Friday, we made three commitments. First, increased humanitarian aid. I announced a $10-

million commitment to assistance projects. Secondly, to keep working with the opposition, so that they get stronger, more effective, 

and that they are inclusive, so they truly represent all Syrians. 

And thirdly, to keep pressing for a political resolution. 

And the Arab League plan, which called for Assad to step aside, 

is the plan that people feel most comfortable pushing. 

You know, the fact is, access is a terrible problem. There is not 

even a willingness on the part of the Assad regime to let the Syrian 

Red Crescent in to pick up bodies, to deliver medical supplies and 

provisions. And they effectively not only block such aid, but they 

target those who are trying to provide it. So we see a brutal use 

of violence against the people of Syria and everyone trying to help 

them. 

39

So we are looking with our allies, particularly in the neighborhood, those who have borders, how do we get this aid in? How do 

we protect people who are trying to put it in? And we are going 

to continue to do everything we can, not only to help get that aid 

in but pressure the Assad regime. And we are working actively to 

persuade the Russians and the Chinese, and at the very least they 

ought to support humanitarian assistance. Put aside the political 

disagreement we have about supporting a leader who has murdered so many of his people with artillery. Let us focus on how we 

help the Syrian people. So that is our goal right now. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I appreciate that. Switching gears in the remaining 

time I have, it had been, I believe, misreported that what was 

going to be the largest joint military exercise between the United 

States and Israel had been cancelled because of the decision made 

by the administration. It was later reported that it was a decision 

made by the Israelis. If you could speak to the reason for that cancellation, what will come next, and whether in terms of security cooperation, that type of joint military exercise—why it is important 

and whether it is consistent with other joint military exercises like 

that that we have engaged in. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well of course, you know, DoD is the agency 

to whom such a question should be directed. But I believe it is either in the process or has already been rescheduled. We have 

upped our security assistance to Israel. As I said earlier, Prime 

Minister Netanyahu calls our bilateral security commitment from 

the Obama administration ‘‘unprecedented,’’ and those include realistic and ongoing military exercises, which we think are very important. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I appreciate that. And Madam Chairman, if I may 

just finally, if I could, Madam Secretary, please just encourage you 

to continue press for information about my constituent, Robert 

Levinson. It is of great importance in my community, and I hope 

that you will continue to press. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Mr. Fortenberry is recognized. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Madam Chair. And Madam Secretary, welcome. Let me start with a question about Egypt. In 

1979, as a young person, I entered the Sinai Desert, in the place 

where there was fighting between Israel and Egypt in 1973. And 

on a twisted pile of rubble and concrete were scrawled the words, 

‘‘Here was the war, here is the peace.’’

I was there in a jubilant time, where there was a celebratory atmosphere of the newfound relationship between the United States 

and Egypt. The United States had successfully brokered that treaty, and the courage of President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin 

to extend their hands in friendship has left us with a stable foundation for peace for the last 30 years between those two countries. 

Now, with the latest event that has occurred, with the change of 

governing structures and a great deal of uncertainty, and an unclear commitment to that path of peace, given the deal that we put 

together and the amount of aid that we have given both to Israel, 

but to Egypt as well, and with the effrontery of the Egyptian authorities holding, arresting Americans who are simply there to help 

40

Egyptians, what is the administration’s position on potentially suspending the aid package? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Congressman, first of all, in all the discussions that we have had and that we are aware of that Egyptian 

authorities have had with other countries, they remain committed 

to the Camp David Accords, which we think is in Egypt’s interests 

and certainly in Israel’s interests. 

So we are mindful of the importance of ensuring the continuity 

of that peace and stability, and we don’t want to pre-judge what 

the new government will do. Because I think it is fair to note, there 

is no government yet. They are in the process of putting in place 

a government, and the people who are still there but not elected 

or appointed by the new authorities can’t really make decisions yet. 

There is no President or Executive authority yet chosen. 

So I counsel patience, because we first have to get to know who 

the government is. And we are working very hard, through many 

different channels, to develop relationships with the people who 

will be in the new Parliament, for example. So right now, I can report to you that there is an ongoing commitment to preserve the 

Camp David Accords. You know, we are having some difficult 

bumps right now. We are hoping to resolve the NGO situation very 

soon. Then, I think, we have to take stock of where we are and 

make a decision based on the facts. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Well, given certain tensions in the past with 

our Egyptian relationship, I have always argued publicly that it 

was better to grab the hand of friendship then grab it tighter to 

work through that. Now, it gets a lot more delicate now when there 

is an unclear pathway to potentially upholding these agreements 

that have worked so well, not only for the Israelis but the Egyptians. And for decades, I am afraid that the international community has taken that Camp David Accord really for granted, but it 

is an important pathway for peace. 

Let me turn quickly to the President’s Lord’s Resistance Army 

Comprehensive Strategy. We voted unanimously in last year’s 

State Department Authorization Act to allow for the deployment of 

military advisors in the region to bring Joseph Kony to justice. I 

am concerned, though, that multilateral interest is potentially dissipating now. I think cooperation among governments in the region 

is critical in this regard. Can you comment on this? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well first, I thank you for authorizing, encouraging, such a comprehensive U.S. strategy to bring this murderer to justice. As you know, small teams of U.S. military advisors 

were deployed in December and January to forward locations in the 

LRA-affected areas. The advisors are working to create more cooperation among regional militaries and enhance their capacity. 

Although there are approximately only 100, we think they are 

force adders to what is already going on, and we have a clear goal, 

which is to enable local forces to end the reign of terror. And we 

think that this small number of U.S. advisors can play an outsize 

role in bringing about that conclusion. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Regional governments must be able to step in 

and assume the challenge moving forward. 

Secretary CLINTON. Yes. And starting with regional militaries, 

but including regional governments. 

41

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Let me turn quickly, before the time is up, to 

urge you as well—and I think this came up earlier—to speak on 

behalf of Pastor Youcef Nadarkhani, who is guilty of the crime in 

Iran for witnessing to his faith. Now, the last time you were here 

you talked very forthrightly about your desire, yet struggles, to talk 

about the need for religious freedom as new democratic ideals arise 

in——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. I will let you finish that thought, Mr. 

Fortenberry, but we are out of time. Go ahead. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Madam Chair. Going back to my 

train of thought, I will try—but to continue to raise his issue as 

an example of how religious freedom is a natural right that is consistent with the ideals of all of humanity. So I just urge you to not 

only try to save his life, but point to that as to how governments 

who are looking for more just human rights, or better human 

rights conditions and more just forms of governance, must treat the 

issue of religious freedom. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Mr. Cardoza is 

recognized. 

Mr. CARDOZA. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you, Secretary Clinton. It is great to have you here again. This will be my 

last year in Congress, and I hear rumors that it may be your last 

year as Secretary of State. I just want to take this opportunity to 

thank you for your tremendous service to our country in so many 

different ways. 

Madam Secretary, I want to raise the issue of our ally, Portugal. 

I represent a number of Portuguese-American residents, and I 

share that heritage. And there are a number of issues with regard 

to the Azores and visas and consulates that I am very concerned 

about. 

The consulate in Ponta Delgada is being rumored to be on the 

list for closure. It is one of the original consulates of our nation, 

and it is something that I would ask that you do everything within 

your power to preserve. Certainly this is a budget discussion today, 

and so it is appropriate to discuss it in the budget. 

The second question that I would have is that there are questions of visas, that members—citizens of Portugal would have to go 

to France in order to obtain certain kinds of immigration visas or 

green cards to the United States. I understand the number may 

only be 150, but the relationship that we have with Portugal is so 

important. When the Gulf War first started, the original summit 

was in the Azores, and Portugal was the host country. There may 

not be a better friend to the United States anywhere in the world. 

And I would just like to have you discuss that, if you can. 

And finally, I will share with you that I was somewhat dismayed 

a while back when the President indicated in the negotiation strategy of a reversion back to the ’67 lines in Israel as part of where 

he thought it might end up. And maybe you can clarify that for me 

and for everyone, because that is something that I happen to have 

been in the country when these statements were made, and I am 

not sure that the ’67 lines are defensible, or the correct—there may 

be adjusted lines, and so I would just like to hear the administration’s position again on that. 

42

Secretary CLINTON. Well, first with respect to Portugal, I share 

your view that Portugal is a wonderful friend, and not only a good 

partner in NATO and in so many other areas, but the source of a 

lot of Portuguese-Americans, culture, food, so much else. I will have 

to take those questions for the record, Congressman, because I 

want to look into the two areas that you raised, but I want to assure you that we highly value our relationship with Portugal and 

will be very careful in making any decisions that would affect the 

free flow of people and trade. 

Secondly, I think if you look at the President’s speeches, first last 

May at the State Department and secondly before AIPAC, there is 

a very clear set of understandings that the President lays out. And 

there was no reference to going back to the exact borders. I mean, 

it would be based on negotiation between Israel and the Palestinians, and it is anticipated that there would be a certain set of decisions that would have to take into account what has happened in 

the years since. 

But certainly from our perspective, looking at those speeches and 

looking at the reaction in Israel, which was very positive, to both 

of them together—and we obviously are pursuing with Israel and 

the Palestinians an effort to get the negotiations restarted. Because 

there is no shortcut. We support the two-state solution. We want 

to see it negotiated by the parties themselves. 

And it has turned out to be quite challenging to do that for a variety of reasons, but our position remains the same, that any final 

status issue ultimately has to be decided by the parties. We and 

others can put forth suggestions, recommendations, and ideas 

about what would work, but it is a negotiation, and the negotiation 

has to be resolved by the two parties most affected. 

Mr. CARDOZA. I totally agree with you, Madam Secretary. Thank 

you for that reclarification, and I appreciate it. I would just like to 

make a notation on my original point about the Azores. There is 

a base there that is of strategic importance to us. It is really more 

important to bring up with the Secretary of Defense, but I will 

share it since I have this opportunity today. 

Our base at Terceira in the Azores is critical, and is being—the 

totality of things that are coming to pass, the potential closing of 

Ponta Delgada, the visa question, and the potential closing of the 

base at Terceira—is having a view within that sphere that we don’t 

care any longer. And I raise the issues in combination because I 

think it will strain relations. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Cardoza. Mr. 

McCaul, the vice chair of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Madam Chair. Welcome, Madam Secretary. Recently I led a delegation to Pakistan, Afghanistan and 

Iraq, and it was very, very interesting. And we had a sit-down 

meeting with President Zardari, a very frank discussion. 

He looked at us in the eye and said he had no knowledge that 

bin Laden was in his country. But we do know it is probably likely 

that lower-level officials knew of his presence in Pakistan. Then we 

had Dr. Afridi, who helped us over there, and now he is in prison 

for treason, as was pointed out earlier. They gave the Chinese access to the helicopter that was left behind at the compound. 

43

And then, finally, the Haqqani Network. We talked about the 

Haqqani Network, and I asked for his support, as you have very 

strongly in the past asked for his support to go after the Haqqani 

Network. And he said he doesn’t play—he goes after all terrorist 

organizations, not just the Haqqani. However, last year we had the 

chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mike Mullen testify that, 

with ISI support, Haqqani operatives planned and conducted a 

truck bomb attack, as well as an assault on our Embassy. We also 

have credible evidence that they were behind the June 28th attack 

against the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul, and a host of other 

smaller but effective operations. 

In short, he said the Haqqani Network acts as an arm of Pakistan’s Interservices Intelligence Agency, which takes me to my next 

question. We are giving all this foreign aid to a country that is 

complicit in working with the terrorists who are killing Americans. 

I understand all the implications. Zardari referred to our relationship as like a bad marriage, but divorce is not an option. 

But when it comes to the funding, we are looking at crafting legislation that would essentially require the State Department to certify that they are not working with these networks, including 

Haqqani. And if that cannot be certified, then the foreign aid will 

be cut off. I would like to get your thoughts on that legislation. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, I think, Congressman, what President 

Zardari told you on behalf of the civilian leadership of the Government of Pakistan is true. He has been a good partner in going after 

terrorism that threatens his country and Afghanistan and our 

troops. We have no evidence of any high-level official knowing 

about bin Laden, but like you I have to assume that lower-level 

people had to have known something. But we haven’t proven that. 

It can be asserted, but not yet proven. 

So this is a complicated, difficult relationship, and what we are 

doing now is making it very clear what our expectations have to 

be going forward. And there is no doubt in my mind that certain 

elements of the Pakistani Government are more ambivalent about 

cracking down on terrorism than other elements. 

You know, when I sit across from the Foreign Minister, or talk 

to the Ambassador, or talk to the Prime Minister and others, I 

think they are very sincere. They know that the scourge of terrorism is killing Pakistanis. Zardari knows that terrorists killed his 

wife. And yet there have been relationships between terrorist 

groups and the military, and the intelligence services, for many 

decades. 

And what is unique now is that this democratically elected government has survived longer than any other democratically elected 

government. For the first time in the Parliament, you have questions being asked of the military and the ISI. You have the Supreme Court asking questions about the actions of the military and 

the ISI. So you see the strains and stresses of trying to have a civilian government in a democracy assert control over all elements 

of the government. 

And we want to continue to support the democratic trend inside 

Pakistan. So walking this line, trying to make sure what the levers 

we can pull are, where we can really put pressure, is basically how 

I spend a lot of my time. And I take seriously the underlying thrust 

44

of your question, and I will carefully evaluate all factors when it 

comes time to make a decision. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Let me just say thank you for—you have been very 

strong about the Haqqani Network. I think Zardari is sincere in his 

efforts, but I don’t think he has a lot of control over his own military and the ISI, and I think that is part of the problem. 

And so I would urge you to continue your efforts to get them to 

fight with us against these terrorists, rather than be complicit with 

them. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Mr. Cicilline is 

recognized. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And welcome, 

Madam Secretary. It is wonderful to have you back before the committee. And thank you for the thoughtfulness of your budget proposal, both in its fiscal responsibility and in its diplomatic priorities. So I thank you for that, and thank and acknowledge all the 

men and women who serve under your leadership at the State Department. You have helped, really, to restore America’s position in 

the world, as our ranking member said, ‘‘as a partner for peace and 

democracy,’’ and we are all grateful and thank you for your service. 

And we have had a lot of discussions today about various parts 

of the world that are of great concern, and particularly unsettled, 

areas of great violence. And I would like to really focus my inquiry 

on two areas really closer to home. And the first is—and I will just 

articulate the questions, then give you the balance of my time. 

The first is really about the sort of events in the Middle East in 

general—in Syria, in Iran, in that region of the world—and its impact on our gas prices here in the United States. And I know that 

we—in my home state we have seen a tremendous increase in gas 

prices, almost 40 cents from a year ago today. 

And I am wondering if you can speak to your perspective on how 

a variety of international events that you are closely monitoring 

might have an impact on fuel prices in the near term, and also 

what we are doing, both diplomatically and in terms of development efforts, in the long term to ensure that gas prices are stabilized, or that at least in the long term they are mitigated. 

Because I think we hear a lot about how this unrest is contributing to our rising gas prices, and some of us also know that a big 

part of it is speculation and gouging, and we are going to take up 

some legislation, hopefully, to address that. But I think that events 

around the world are certainly impacting it, and I would love to 

hear your perspective on that. 

And the second issue I would ask you to speak to is something 

I hear a lot about back at home. As you know, Rhode Island is a 

huge manufacturing state, and we are really engaged in this whole 

make it in America agenda, to rebuild and reinvigorate American 

manufacturing. And one of the challenges we face and I hear from 

Rhode Island manufacturers is about the Chinese and their behavior as trading partners, and their manipulation of currency, and 

their refusal to protect intellectual property, and the challenges of 

their policies of indigenous innovation and technology transfers. 

And so I would like to hear you speak to some of the State Department’s efforts diplomatically to help really even the playing field, 

45

so that we can really rebuild American manufacturing in our country. 

And again, thank you. And I will finally associate myself with 

Congressman Cardoza’s remarks on the Azores and the importance 

of both of those issues. And I will submit a written question related 

to our efforts to ensure that the Turks respect the Christians, and 

are respecting the churches and religious freedom in that country, 

which I will follow up with. Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you, Congressman. With respect to 

gas prices, I think there is room for considering ways to rein in 

speculation and gouging, yes. Are there events that are happening 

in the world that raise questions? Yes. But to the extent that it justifies or can explain the increase in the gas prices? I don’t believe 

so. So therefore, I have long thought that there has to be some 

market mechanism that can be explored to try to break speculation 

that is unrelated. 

Now, if the Iranians close the Strait of Hormuz, that would be 

a real event and we would have to deal with it. And we have said 

we would deal with it, but that would cause the market to obviously react. But right now, there is talk in the air about all kind 

of things, but there is no event. So I do think it is worth exploring 

the legislation that you reference. 

With respect to manufacturing, this administration has brought 

more trade actions against China, against unfair trade practices, 

against the theft of intellectual property, against the use of indigenous innovation, and we will continue to do so. Because we don’t 

fear a level playing field. 

I have great confidence in the workers and businesses of Rhode 

Island to be competitive with anybody. But if a big thumb is on the 

scale, whether it is currency manipulation or indigenous innovation, or the unfortunate theft of intellectual property, that makes 

competition one-sided. And so this administration has taken a very 

aggressive approach on the defensive side. On the offensive side, I 

just hosted a big conference at the State Department where we had 

all the American chambers from around the world come in to talk 

about how we could do a better job helping American businesses, 

how we could really knock down those barriers, cut through that 

red tape. 

And so we want to be deeply involved with our 1,000 economic 

officers around the world in helping to open markets and create 

jobs here at home. We consider that part of what we call economic 

statecraft, and I am very committed to it. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Judge Poe is recognized. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Madam Speaker. I have some questions regarding beef trade with Taiwan, U.S. rice given a fair shot in Iraq, 

and also some questions about Pakistan. I ask unanimous consent 

to submit those for the record. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection. 

Mr. POE. Thank you for being here. I know you have to leave. 

I want to talk about something that we have always talked about 

when we discuss things, and it is the folks that live in Camp 

Ashraf. They are being moved. Some are being moved to Camp Liberty. Camp Liberty now is in a situation where there is not enough 

46

water, the sewage is a tremendous problem, there is no electricity, 

people there are not allowed to see their family members. They are 

not allowed to see lawyers. 

Some have compared Camp Liberty to a prison. Rudy Giuliani 

said, ‘‘It’s not a prison, it’s a concentration camp.’’ So people are not 

being moved from Camp Ashraf to Camp Liberty, and of course the 

goal—and it is my goal, just like it is, I hope, yours, to get those 

people out of Iraq and get them somewhere in the world where 

they can be safe, and they can be free, and they can reunite with 

their families. 

We have two situations going on. We have the designation as an 

FTO. It is still an issue. It has been going on a long time. I have 

worked with your department, trying to find out, on a consistent 

basis, is there new evidence? Is there more evidence why they 

should stay on the FTO? Good evidence, evidence one way or the 

other, just what it is. 

I have been to every briefing that Homeland Security and that 

your office has sponsored regarding the designation and why they 

are on it. And I am not convinced they ought to stay on it, and we 

continue to wait, now so much so that even, I think, yesterday a 

lawsuit was filed again to get the State Department to pick a horse 

and ride it, as I like to say. 

And meanwhile, during this time, there have been two situations 

in Camp Ashraf where people have died, and others have been 

wounded by—regardless of whose fault, that has occurred. And so 

there are no more people moving to Camp Liberty, and to my 

knowledge, as of today, no one has left Camp Liberty to go somewhere else in the world. 

And so as sincere as I can possibly be, I would like to know from 

you a couple of things. First, is the United States prepared to take 

any people from Camp Liberty? Does the FTO designation that 

they still have affect that in any way? 

And I would like to preface that question with one other situation. The last time I was in Iraq, I met with Maliki, and we asked 

him if we could go and visit the folks in Camp Ashraf and see for 

ourself what it was like. And he said absolutely not, but the one 

thing he told all of us, ‘‘The reason they are in Camp Ashraf is because your country designates them as an FTO organization, and 

we treat them like a foreign terrorist organization.’’

So he dumped it back on our designation as the reason he was 

treating them the way he was treating them. He apparently got so 

irritated with us for even asking the question, we learned when we 

left his office that we had been evicted from the country. He asked 

us to leave. Of course, we did what we needed to do. 

So it is a serious matter, and earlier you mentioned that the FTO 

designation is tied to Camp Ashraf, and their being a paramilitary 

group. They don’t have any weapons there. So can you tell us 

where we are, and if we are going to see some resolution about getting this designation removed, getting the people in Camp Liberty 

humane conditions, and moving the process to countries, including 

the United States, so these people can leave the area, which everybody wants to do? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Congressman, I appreciate your deep 

concern. I share it, because we are trying to work to resolve a comVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:10 May 17, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\022912\73119 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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plex situation, avoid bloodshed and violence, and have the people 

from Camp Ashraf move to Camp Korea, and have them processed 

as soon as the United Nations can process them. There were a lot 

of—I would have preferred having them processed at Ashraf. 

That turned out to be impractical for a lot of reasons, and therefore the move now should open up an accelerated process for these 

interviews to be held and decisions made. And you know, we are 

working around the clock. We are seeing improvements in the infrastructure. We have to close Camp Ashraf in order to move this 

process forward, and it will be a key factor in any decision regarding the foreign terrorist organization status. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. And Mr. 

Connolly, I am going to ask your forgiveness, because according to 

the procedures that we set forth, even though you have been a good 

soldier and you have sat here the whole time, Mr. Murphy played 

it well and came here, and he is next on the queue to ask the question. So I don’t—it is the last question. Do you want to share it? 

Mr. MURPHY. I will share. I will ask a quick one. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. A quick one, and then Mr. Connolly, 

too. Thank you. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you very much. Madam Secretary, thank 

you very much for being here with us today, and I will be brief to 

allow Mr. Connolly to jump in as well before you leave. You have 

been generous with your time. I am one of a large number of folks 

here who are skeptical about our current timetable for a withdrawal from Afghanistan. I am frankly surprised we haven’t talked 

more about Afghanistan here today. 

And part of that skepticism comes from the fact that I would like 

to see us spending a lot more time on the diplomatic and economic 

cooperation necessary to get Afghanistan to a place in which they 

can succeed on their own. And so I had a couple of questions related to that economic and diplomatic cooperation, but I will ask 

one of them, and it is on the economic side. 

There are various numbers that come out suggesting that 80–90, 

to perhaps even as high as 97 percent of the Afghan economy is 

dependent right now on international aid. And I would love to get 

an update to you as to how you see the timetable playing out over 

the next 5 years to make sure that as we withdraw our military 

contingent, that we leave behind a stable economy there, and perhaps suggestions that you have for the United States Congress as 

to things that we can do here to make sure that we leave behind 

a stable economy. I would like to see us pull out as quickly as possible on the military side, but I recognize that we have got to make 

sure that we don’t leave an economy that collapses upon our withdrawal. And I think that that is something that we have not talked 

enough about as a Congress, and would love your thoughts on that. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Murphy. Mr. 

Connolly, if you could ask the question? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay. Welcome, Madam Secretary, and let me 

join my colleagues in extending my great admiration for your service to your country. You have been an extraordinary Secretary of 

State, and I have known a lot of Secretaries of State over the last 

30 years, so I thank you for your service. 

48

I wonder if you could just comment a little bit—and I thank my 

colleague from Connecticut’s courtesy—on our diplomatic efforts to 

sort of try to change minds in Russia and China with respect to 

the Syrian situation. I mean, it gets worse by the day. They have 

provided a shield of protection that has, at this point, proved not 

only counterproductive but, frankly, lethal. And I would welcome 

your thoughts about how we are engaging diplomatically and trying to turn that around. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for your courtesy as 

well. 

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you both. Congressman Murphy, we 

do have some very specific ideas and plans about what we could 

do to assist Afghanistan being more integrated into the regional 

economy, developing their own economic assets. 

I would like to take it for the record to give you a broader set 

of responses, because we see this, as you just said, as a critical part 

to really support the transition of our military troops out at the 

end of 2014. They do go hand in hand, which is one of the reasons 

the transition period for a military withdrawal was established. So 

we will follow up with you. 

And Congressman Connolly, we are doing everything we can 

think of to influence the Russians and the Chinese. Particularly 

the Russians. They are the ones with the very deep, longstanding 

relationship with the Assad family, with Syria. They continue to 

sell arms to the Syrian regime. So we know that if we can persuade 

them to work with us, at least on the humanitarian issue, they will 

have access to Assad that hardly anybody else does have. Certainly 

nobody in the West. 

So it is a very troubling and frustrating situation, because the 

Russians continue to say, oh, they are all for humanitarian aid, but 

then they don’t produce any plan that Assad will sign off on. And 

perhaps after their upcoming election they will be able to focus on 

the serious humanitarian situation that is causing so much loss of 

life and suffering inside Syria. 

But we are not waiting. We are trying to work out other ways 

of getting humanitarian assistance into Syria, and also support efforts on the borders. Because people are fleeing. They are coming 

out in Lebanon, in Jordan, in Iraq, and especially in Turkey. So we 

will be there to try to help the people who are coming out as well. 

This is a terrible crisis that demands the entire world’s attention, 

and I hope that Russia will come and work with us to try to resolve 

it. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. And Madam Secretary, if I could yield 1 minute to Mr. Johnson, who has been so 

patiently waiting there, and I don’t want to end the meeting without him having an opportunity. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you so much, Ms. Chairman. It is a real 

quick question, Madam Secretary, and thank you for being here 

today. With its growing economy and vast foreign reserves, it 

would seem that Beijing has more than enough money to deal with 

many of the issues that U.S. foreign aid supports, like its own citizens’ health issues. Borrowing money from the Chinese Government to spend back in China on health programs there seems a 

particularly bad use of U.S. Government funds, especially as AmerVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:10 May 17, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\022912\73119 HFA PsN: SHIRL
49

icans struggle to cover their own rising healthcare costs. Why are 

we proposing $2 million in support of health programs in China, 

when the Chinese hold an estimated $1.2 trillion of U.S. debt? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Congressman, the remaining aid that 

we are asking for goes to what we consider transnational issues in 

which we have a stake. It was United States aid and leadership 

that finally helped China respond to their own HIV/AIDS crisis, 

which does have a positive effect on the epidemic far beyond their 

borders. When we look at communicable diseases, when we look at 

the need to try to help democracy, human rights, good governance 

groups—there are a lot of brave lawyers in cities in China that are 

standing up against coercive practices. 

So I think I will take it for the record and give you a breakdown 

of the kinds of things we have been doing, but I share your general 

point that we are certainly not looking to support the development 

of China’s economy. They are doing that well enough on their own. 

But there are certain key values that we still believe we can further within an aid relationship with China. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, and thank you to Mr. Duncan, Mr. Bilirakis, and Mr. Wilson. You are on my dance card, and 

you will come up first next time. 

Madam Secretary, before we adjourn, I would like to note that 

since you have announced publicly that you do not intend to serve 

beyond the end of this term, this is your final appearance to testify 

on the budget before our committee. I would like to thank you 

again so deeply for making yourself available to answer our questions, today and during the past 3 years. And I hope that we have 

the opportunity to host you again for other testimony prior to the 

conclusion of your exemplary service. I thank you, mi amiga. 

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:06 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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WRITTEN RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, SECRETARY

OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS DURING THE HEARING


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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, 

A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND CHAIRMAN, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WITH WRITTEN RESPONSES RECEIVED FROM THE

HONORABLE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

Question 1: 

Former Chongqing police chief Wang Lijun’s incognito February 6th visit to the 

U.S. consulate in Chengdu has been the subject of significant press and internet 

speculation. Wang reportedly brought with him information on the Chinese leadership succession implying a level of internal infighting not seen since the tumultuous 

days of Tiananmen Square. Wang, if reports of his extensive information are true, 

was an intelligence asset on a scale not seen since the end of the Cold War. Some 

reports say concerns over Sino-American relations and the upcoming visit of the 

Chinese Vice President trumped Wang’s value as an intelligence resource as far as 

Washington was concerned.

• Did Mr. Wang request political asylum while inside a U.S. diplomatic post in 

China? 

• If so, why was he turned away? 

• When will you provide the information I requested by letter dated, February 

10, 2012? 

Answer: 

We are in receipt of your request and, as you know, are working with your staff 

to arrange a briefing on this issue at the earliest convenient time. 

Question 2: 

Late last year, the Department created a new Bureau of Conflict Stabilization Operations (CSO), headed by a new Assistant Secretary. Four months ago, it was justified to Congress as merely a consolidation and replacement of existing resources, 

with no new funding. Yet, now you are requesting an 86% increase in funding for 

2013. Furthermore, the ‘‘principal mandate’’ of CSO is heavy on slogans and light 

on detail: ‘‘to stay ahead of change and play the appropriate operational role in anticipating, preventing, and responding to conflict.’’

• What has the new CSO bureau done to justify a near doubling of its funding 

in FY13? 

• How exactly does its mission differ from what we already pay for under the 

Complex Crises Fund, the Office of Transition Initiatives, and other pre-existing efforts for which the Administration is also seeking increases? 

• If we really are able to anticipate conflict and stay ahead of change, why 

aren’t State and USAID’s regional and programmatic personnel already doing 

that? Isn’t this just a pre-positioned pot of which State can draw on quickly, 

with a minimum of strings? 

Answer: 

The State Department is acutely aware of current fiscal challenges. The Bureau 

of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) was established in February 2012 to 

address the need for greater cohesion and coherence to conflict prevention and conflict response. Although CSO’s FY 2013 request of $56.5 million reflects an increase 

of $26.2 million in new Budget Authority from the levels appropriated in FY 2012, 

in comparison to the total amount available this fiscal year of $60.94 million, the 

FY 2013 request represents an actual decrease of $4.4 million in total program 

funding. Although our budget is decreasing, it is essential that our field teams have 

the flexibility to direct modest amounts of project funding to reinforce their conflict 

and stabilization efforts. We are aggressively reducing Washington overhead to 

focus funds for overseas deployments. Our requested contingency funding would be 

focused on building local capacity to implement solutions so that progress can be 

sustained by local actors. 

CSO brings specialized skills and resources to assist the United States in finding 

creative solutions and approaches to averting or resolving conflicts, along with the 

resources to support a surge effort. The space in which CSO operates is not overcrowded in light of the dynamic challenges the United States faces in preventing 

and responding to conflict in strategic countries and regions. Partner organizations 

like the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) have specific focus and areas of expertise. CSO’s mission and mandate are focused on human and political conflict. CSO will be at the center of complex conflict-related situation supporting joint analysis, creative partnering and integrated strategies that direct foreign assistance (such as the Complex Crises Fund) 

76

to priority needs. In doing so, CSO will ensure USAID and DOD are brought into 

the discussions in the earliest stages. 

Limited State and USAID resources are already overtaxed and constrained from 

meeting the diplomatic and development requirements of our global foreign policy. 

Many programs are tied to existing mandates and are not flexible for averting or 

responding to conflict and crisis situations. CSO funding and resources must be 

flexible, responsive and focused on countries of critical importance to U.S. national 

interests. CSO enables the United States to anticipate and respond more quickly 

and effectively to emerging conflicts around the world and—just as importantly—

to assist in identifying emerging conflicts and outlining prevention approaches to 

channel those conflicts into non-violent resolutions. The United States needs this 

kind of capacity to advance U.S. interests effectively and at least cost to the taxpayer in our rapidly changing and complex world. 

Question 3: 

Last year, the State Department moved the Office of the Coordinator for 

Counterterrorism to the Bureau for Counterterrorism. At the time, the State Department described the move to Congress as a rationalization with no significant 

staff increases. According to the Administration’s request, the staffing for the Bureau will increase by 17%, from 70 to 82 staff positions.

• What new functions has the Bureau taken on that justify this significant increase? Did State miscalculate the need for new resources or does a 17% increase not meet the standards of ‘‘significant’’? 

Answer: 

The transition of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism to the Bureau 

of Counterterrorism was resource neutral. The request for twelve new FTE positions, a 17% increase in FY2013, is unrelated to the transition to a Bureau, and 

would have been made regardless of Office or Bureau status. The twelve positions 

would address growing State Department needs in addressing civilian counterterrorism challenges that include: countering violent extremism; designations of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO’s); terrorist travel and interdiction programs; regional policy coordination and program oversight; strategic planning, monitoring 

and evaluation of CT programs; Homeland Security coordination; and multilateral 

engagement through the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and other bodies. 

Question 4: 

The budget requests an increase of $12 million for the Bureau of European and 

Eurasian Affairs. However, in a March 2011 report, the Office of the Inspector General reported that this bureau, ‘‘lacks standard operating procedures for the fiscal 

management division’s overseas and domestic teams. This shortcoming is longstanding and significant . . . the domestic financial management team does not periodically analyze obligation balances, and there are significant unliquidated obligations for domestic allotments.’’

• Why should we grant this large increase in taxpayer funds for a bureau that 

has ‘‘longstanding’’ and ‘‘significant’’ concerns about its financial management? 

Answer: 

The March 2011 Inspection Report rightly highlighted the need for standard operating procedures, particularly in light of staff turnover in the financial management 

division. Since the report’s publication, the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR) has satisfied the Office of the Inspector General that standard operating 

procedures for financial operations have been documented and are now in place. 

Furthermore, following stabilization of office staffing, the division has completed a 

thorough analysis of obligations for all domestic allotments and now undertakes regular reviews throughout the year. 

The Bureau’s financial management operations adhere to the highest industry 

standards, and the Bureau has set an example within the Department of generating 

cost efficiencies. EUR is at the forefront in regionalizing services, including voucher 

processing, training, position classification, procurement, and warehousing. The Bureau also provides logistical and administrative support to other regions, the most 

recent example being in supporting evacuations from Middle Eastern posts during 

the Arab Spring events, and during NATO support efforts in Libya. We believe the 

marginal increase in the Bureau’s costs to provide these services is dwarfed by overall savings generated by the Department. 

77

Although the request is $12 million above the FY 2012 estimate, the increase 

seeks to maintain service levels from FY 2011, including a further reduction of $2.6 

million in efficiency savings. 

Question 5: 

An Office of Inspector General performs best when there is an appointed Inspector 

General. Permanent Inspector General’s undergo significant vetting that helps to instill confidence among OIG stakeholders such as Congress, whistleblowers and the 

public. The State Department has been without a permanent Inspector General for 

over four years. The FY 2013 State Department CBJ includes a 6% budget increase 

from the FY 2012 level for the State Department OIG.

• How can you justify the 6% increase for the State Department OIG when 

there is no permanently appointed Inspector General? 

Answer: 

The State Department’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducts comprehensive 

oversight of the Department’s operations through inspections, investigations, audits, 

and other reviews. Composed of dedicated professionals, the OIG is fully engaged 

in its important mission. In FY 2011, the number of reports issued annually had 

increased to 153 from 107 in FY 2007. By the close of FY 2011, as compared to FY 

2007, open investigations increased from 36 to 98; and contractor suspension and 

debarment actions increased from 0 to 17. 

In the past three years, OIG has substantially strengthened its oversight of highcost, high-risk Department activities in the Middle East, and South and Central 

Asia. OIG established the Middle East Regional Office (MERO) in 2008 to dedicate 

on-the-ground resources and expertise to oversight of Department programs and 

U.S. interests in the frontline states (Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan or ‘‘AIP’’) and 

other crisis and post-conflict countries. In 2011, OIG further strengthened these operations by merging MERO, as a distinct office, into the Office of Audits. 

Also in the past three years, OIG’s Office of Investigations opened overseas offices 

to strengthen accountability and provide investigative oversight for critical Department operations in the Middle East, and South and Central Asia. The Middle East 

Investigative Branch (MEIB), based in Washington, D.C., has a field office in 

Amman, Jordan, and satellite offices in Baghdad, Iraq, and Kabul, Afghanistan. 

OIG also has taken steps in the past three years to restore its overall investigative capability, which had declined by nearly 60 percent in the preceding decade. 

OIG aggressively recruited staff to rebuild the Office of Investigations and has 

greatly improved its capacity to address allegations of waste, fraud, and abuse. 

The FY 2013 request is $65.6 million, an increase of $3.7 million and includes an 

increase of $1.1 million in current services to maintain the FY 2012 level of activity. 

Program increases of $2.6 million will be required for increased ICASS and in-country support costs associated with activities in the AIP frontline states. This resource 

request sustains critical initiatives in the frontline states and maintains the level 

of oversight required by the size, complexity, and importance of Department programs in these countries. 

Question 6: 

Last year in its report, ‘‘Clearer Guidance Needed on Compliance Overseas with 

Legislation Prohibiting Abortion-Related Lobbying,’’ GAO recommended that, ‘‘To 

help ensure the actions of U.S. officials and implementing partners comply with the 

legislative prohibition against using certain U.S. assistance funds to lobby for or 

against abortion, the Secretary of State and the USAID Administrator should develop specific guidance on compliance . . . indicating what kinds of activities may 

be prohibited, disseminate this guidance throughout their agencies, and make it 

available to award recipients and subrecipients.’’ According to the GAO, State Department agreed that it should inform staff of the legislation prohibiting abortionrelated lobbying but disagreed that it should provide examples of potentially prohibited activities.

• Please describe the actions the State Department has taken to ensure full 

compliance with legislation prohibiting abortion-related lobbying? Why does 

the State Department disagree with the recommendation to provide staff with 

examples of potentially prohibited activities? 

Answer: 

The Department is in the process of issuing guidance to grants and contracting 

officers reminding them of the restriction in the annual appropriations act that 

funds not be used to lobby for or against abortion. In addition, the offices that reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:10 May 17, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00081 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\022912\73119 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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view the uses of appropriated funds for State and Foreign Operations are aware of 

this legal provision. 

The language of the statute itself indicates what is prohibited and, to the extent 

that staff identify an activity which may fall within the scope of the restriction, they 

are advised to seek legal guidance from the Office of the Legal Adviser before proceeding with the obligation of funds. Because specific factual information on what 

activities are proposed would need to be evaluated in making a legal judgment 

under the statute, the Department has chosen to direct staff to seek legal advice 

on all instances where obligations of funds may implicate the restriction to allow 

for decisions a case-by-case basis after a review of any relevant specific facts and, 

therefore, disagreed with the GAO recommendation to provide staff with examples. 

Question 7: 

The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) highlighted the 

military to civilian transition in Iraq and stated that ‘‘our civilian presence is prepared to take the lead . . . for long-term stability.’’ Yet, various concerns have been 

raised regarding the State Department’s ability to take over such a mission and 

oversee hundreds of personnel, most of them contractors. In a Washington Post article, dated October 8, 2011, a report by the bipartisan Commission on Wartime Contracting is cited as stating that ‘‘billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars had been squandered in Iraq . . . and that the State Department had not made the necessary reforms in its contracting operation.’’ Therefore, U.S. taxpayer dollars are at risk and 

‘‘significant additional waste . . . can be expected.’’

• How do you respond to such criticisms? What steps are being taken to ensure 

proper accountability and oversight of U.S. taxpayer dollars of both U.S. and 

non-U.S. contractors? What specific reforms, if any, has the State Department 

made in its contracting procedures? What system is in place to vet such contractors? 

Answer: 

The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) process identified 

improvements to contract oversight that focus on the role of he Contracting Officer 

Representative (COR) as a key to contract oversight. Improvements that have been 

implemented include:

• Link Oversight Duties to Performance Evaluation: In January and April of 

2011, we issued Department notices that provided guidance on work elements 

for supervisors to include in Contracting Officer Representative (COR) and 

Government Technical Monitor (GTM) performance appraisal plans (or Employee Evaluation Reports (EERs)). This ensures that employees performing 

contract administration tasks are graded on that performance and will therefore be motivated to perform these duties more effectively. • Expand Training: The Department launched a revised COR training course 

that is more skills based and adult learning focused. The class provides CORs 

with the tools to more effectively manage contract billing, government property, and trafficking in persons, among other topics. 

• Elevate Accountability for Planning and Oversight of Large Contracts: As part 

of the QDDR process, the Department of State instituted a requirement for 

the Assistant Secretary of a Bureau with a service contract with expenditures 

exceeding $25 million per year to certify that adequate contract administration resources have been identified to manage the contract. These resources 

include both personnel and funding for such things as travel or temporary 

duty assignments. 

• Increased Contract Audits: We have increased the number of audits performed on high dollar-value contracts within the Department by conducting 

audits of four of our major contractors. Additional audits are planned. 

• Elevate the Status of Contract Oversight Personnel: Last year, we created a 

Contracting Officer Representative (COR) award to highlight contract administration achievements by the COR, and published an article in State Magazine highlighting the importance of contract administration and the valuable 

role of the COR.

The Department experiences continuous contingency requirements around the 

world, and our U.S. Government contracting staff is very experienced in dealing 

with these situations. We centralize procurement operations in the Office of Acquisitions Management (A/LM/AQM) and in its subordinate Regional Procurement Support Offices (RPSO), and have found this model to be effective in supporting contingency situations such as Haiti, Japan, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Through internal 

funding mechanisms (a 1% fee charged on all contracting services), the Department 

79

is able to draw upon its own resources, including hiring 103 additional staff over 

the past several years, both U.S. Government direct hires and contractors. Only direct-hire staff serve as Contracting Officers; contractor staff provide only administrative support for our contracting function. 

The Department greatly increased interagency planning, particularly with regard 

to the Iraq transition. Support from DOD is essential to our success, and our cooperative efforts continue unabated. Where it makes sense we use existing DOD support 

to avoid unnecessary duplication. We will continue life support services under 

DOD’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program or LOGCAP. Although the transition 

from a military mission to primarily a diplomatic mission occurred on December 31, 

the Department continues to work closely on contract oversight activities with DOD 

and management personnel at the Embassy in Baghdad via weekly in-depth working groups. For the past 2 years, the Department has worked very closely, every 

day, on an unprecedented level with our Department of Defense (DOD) colleagues 

on implementing the military-led to civilian-led transition in Iraq. 

The Department currently participates in annual audits with the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) of our high risk contracts to ensure the appropriateness 

of contractor’s cost representations and determine whether incurred costs are reasonable, applicable, and allowable. In addition, DCMA provides contract oversight 

for the base life support, core logistics services, equipment maintenance, food, fuel, 

and security services the Department receives under LOGCAP contract. Fifty-two 

DCMA personnel support our Iraq contracting efforts, with 35 DCMA personnel in 

Baghdad and the remainder posted at other locations in Iraq. This cooperation between DCMA and the Department of State has continued the essential oversight 

throughout the transition and maintained superior service provided under LOGCAP 

which is critical to the diplomatic mission in Iraq. Both DCAA and DCMA support 

other federal agencies where it is in the best interest of the government. 

As authorized by Section 835 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization 

Act (NDAA) for FY 2011 (P.L. 111–383), entitled ‘‘Annual Joint Report and Comptroller General Review on Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan,’’ (Joint Report) the 

Department is required to track and report annually contractors and contracting activity in Iraq and Afghanistan. To account for contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

we have implemented the Department of Defense’s Synchronized Pre-Deployment 

Operational Tracker (SPOT) database at Department facilities across Iraq and Afghanistan. Companies with a contract permitting work in Iraq and Afghanistan are 

required to register their contractors in SPOT. Contractor Officer Representatives 

(CORs) and Contracting Officer’s (COs) are required to authorize and approve a Letter of Authorization (LOA) for each contractor. 

As a matter of practice, vendors are vetted throughout the entire acquisitions 

timeline within the Department of State as outlined in the Federal Acquisition Regulation. This includes the solicitation process where well defined program office requirements are developed into statements of work; qualified vendors then respond 

to the statement of work providing the best technical solution and approach they 

would take to resolve the Department’s particular requirement; and then our contracting officers as well as a technical evaluation panel would determine if a vendor 

qualifies based upon their technical and cost proposal, past performance evaluations, and best value for the Department. After award vendors are evaluated regularly by a program office’s Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) for both technical competence in delivering the required product or service as well as adhering 

to the contract terms and conditions that include, among many, deliverable 

timelines, applicable Federal laws, special contract guidelines such as Trafficking in 

Persons (TIP), and adequate housing accommodations. Audits conducted by the Department as well as on site inspections by Contracting Officers who are deployed 

to overseas sites to obtain first hand information on contractor and COR activities, 

are other means of ensuring contract oversight and management of the Department’s contractors. 

Question 8: 

The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) calls for the possible transition of the leadership of the Global Health Initiative (GHI) to USAID at 

the end of FY 2012. The process for determining whether the benchmarks as presented in the QDDR have been achieved is ongoing. However, there are fundamental, practical questions about the implementation of such a transition. For example, U.S. government country teams state that a key to the success of interagency 

coordination of health programming within a country is the involvement and oversight of the Ambassador.

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• If GHI leadership is transferred to USAID, who will be in charge of the global 

health team at the country level—the Ambassador, the USAID mission director, or another official? • If interagency disagreements arise (as they do in the course of country operations), who will have the authority to resolve such disagreements? How will 

such authority be indicated and supported by agencies’ headquarters? 

Answer: 

The QDDR states clearly that the Ambassador is the ‘‘CEO’’ of USG health leadership in country and asks the Ambassador to reallocate time to lead the health team 

to meet GHI goals. The Ambassador has always been and will continue to be the 

lead and final authority on interagency coordination and collaboration in country. 

In most GHI countries, there is also a designated GHI coordinator, under the Ambassador, from either USAID, CDC, or PEPFAR. In some countries, the Ambassador 

or DCM have chosen to take on the GHI coordinator role. The GHI coordinator has 

been the lead in organizing the in-country process to draft GHI country strategies 

that create synergies and reduce duplication in the field. Regardless of any leadership transition of GHI, the Ambassador, as the lead of all USG activities in-country 

per the QDDR, will retain the ultimate authority for USG global health efforts. 

When interagency disputes arise, the Ambassador has the authority and mandate 

to resolve them. Because Ambassadors lead our whole of government efforts across 

a broad spectrum of issues and sectors in each country, they are uniquely qualified 

and experienced in bringing USG agencies together. There are also GHI country liaison teams in Washington made up of representatives from USAID, CDC and 

OGAC and one designated country lead for each GHI country from one of the agencies. These leaders work very closely with GHI country teams in the development 

and implementation of their integrated GHI country strategies, which now number 

over 40. They also work to resolve interagency issues before they rise to the policy 

level and support the Ambassador. Interagency issues and progress in country are 

also addressed at monthly meetings of the GHI Operating Committee, chaired by 

Executive Director Lois Quam, bring together senior leaders from the three core 

global health agencies, USAID, CDC, and OGAC to address. 

Question 9: 

The Executive Summary of the FY13 Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ) requests $850 million in International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) funding 

to support the Iraq Police Development Program (PDP). The CBJ Executive Summary notes specifically that ‘‘The PDP will include approximately 190 advisors’’ 

which, a recent audit by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

(SIGIR) noted is a stark decrease from the initial goal of 350 advisors. Furthermore, 

the SIGIR audit notes that, of the $200 million DOS requested for FY 2011 4th 

Quarter, ‘‘only about 12% of the funds are targeted to hire, train, and deploy police 

advisors and managers. The remaining 88% are for (1) life and mission support for 

the advisors and staff, (2) security for sites and transportation, and (3) operation 

and maintenance of the helicopter air wing. Based on INL’s September 2011 data, 

$75.3 million—virtually all of the $75.5 million in expenditures—has been for security costs.’’ The current formulation breaks down to nearly $4.5 million per advisor 

in FY 2013, not counting money previously spent.

A. How can you justify this program when 88% of the cost is dedicated to life 

support and security? At what point is the benefit not worth the cost? 

B. The State Department manages and implements police assistance programs 

in other parts of the world. What do they cost per advisor per year? Is it 

comparable to the cost of the PDP? 

C. How much money has been spent to date on the air wing and how much 

of the $850 million will be spent on it? 

Answer A: 

The PDP uses shared security, life support and transportation services that support all Mission operations. In Iraq, the State Department operates under extraordinary circumstances that require robust security and support services. Our costs 

are the same for all components of the mission. For these services, INL pays an appropriate percentage of the total costs based on the services our personnel use and 

the INL percentage of residents at shared facilities. As contracts are finalized, security and life support costs have been less than we originally anticipated; therefore, 

program-to-support ratios are improving. 

INL and Embassy Baghdad are currently conducting their first semi-annual review of the Police Development Program. The process is intended to monitor the 

program’s progress and assess whether program adjustments are necessary and/or 

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appropriate. We expect that the program review will be completed in April and will 

look forward to keeping the Congress informed through regular updates, including 

on changes in program-to-support ratios. 

Answer B: 

The support requirements for police assistance programs are unique to each country. Consequently, the associated support costs vary significantly. For example, the 

INL police program in Kosovo costs $235,993 per advisor per year. The cost of our 

program in Iraq is approximately $3,420,000 per advisor. However, a simple peradvisor cost comparison does not accurately portray the extraordinary security and 

life support costs that are unique to Iraq. INL’s costs are commensurate with all 

other mission personnel in Iraq. 

These higher expenses in Iraq are justified because Iraq continues to be strategically important to US foreign policy and to stability in the region. Strengthening 

Iraq’s police forces are an important part of positioning Iraq to be a reliable counterterrorism ally and in ensuring that our objectives in Iraq, which include promotion 

of the Rule of Law, respect for human rights and ensuring that Iraqi government 

is sovereign and stable, are all achieved. A professional and capable police force in 

Iraq, even if imperfect by Western standards, is essential to securing the gains that 

have been made and we believe that police advisors play an essential role in continuing to develop those forces. 

Answer C: 

Since the beginning of the program on October 1, 2011, PDP advisors have used 

the services of the Embassy Air program, along with all other U.S. mission personnel posted in Iraq. After careful review, the Department has decided that the 

PDP will not have its own dedicated aviation support. As with all other mission personnel, INL will pay for air support based on actual usage. INL provided $11.52 

Million from the FY 10 Supplemental for a share of the estimated construction costs 

for the Erbil and Baghdad/Sather aviation facilities. 

Question 10: 

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s October 2011 quarterly report to Congress describes an interview with the Government of Iraq (GOI)’s Senior 

Deputy Minister of Interior (MOI) Adnan al-Asadi on the PDP. In the interview, the 

Senior Deputy Minister stated that al-Asadi had ‘‘grave doubts as to the efficacy of 

the PDP’’ and predicted that it would provide ‘‘very little benefit to the MOI.’’ 

SIGIR’s audit further notes that ‘‘According to INL officials, they do not yet have 

a written cost-sharing agreement with the Government of Iraq on the PDP. However, an INL official said that obtaining a written agreement is neither required nor 

critical.’’

A. Is INL no longer seeking a written cost-sharing agreement with the Government of Iraq? If so, do you expect the American people to foot the full 

bill for a program about which al-Asadi stated: ‘‘I don’t need it. I won’t ask 

for it. But if you provide it, it will be a benefit and will add to our Ministry’’? 

B. What other police training programs worldwide operate without a written 

agreement with the host government? 

C. How should the Congress interpret the comment made that an agreement 

was not necessary? Is this official State Department policy? 

Answer A: 

The PDP is covered by the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA), which 

is the umbrella agreement for all of our cooperation in Iraq. In Section VIII (Law 

Enforcement and Judicial Cooperation) of the SFA the United States and Iraq agree 

to extensive cooperation in the police sector. 

The MOI commitment to the program, including financial participation, is well established. The Embassy has two signed agreements with the Government of Iraq 

that provide use of land for PDP operations at no cost: a December 2011 land-use 

agreement regarding the use of the Baghdad Police College Annex, signed by Senior 

Deputy Minister Adnan al-Asadi; and an August 2011 Memorandum of Understanding regarding land use and logistics operations in Erbil with the Kurdish Minister of Interior, Karim Sinjari. The GOI has also waived the landing fees for all 

USG flights within Iraq. Unlike previous police assistance programs in Iraq, the 

PDP provides only advisory and training assistance and the Government of Iraq 

funds all infrastructure, operational, support, and equipment costs for Iraq’s civilian 

security forces, which total over 400,000 personnel. 

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In a November 2011 meeting with a senior State INL official, in response to questions about his reported statements, Deputy Minister Adnan Al-Asadi emphasized 

that he and the Government of Iraq want and value the PDP. He expressed the 

hope that the United States could reduce security costs, so the program would be 

even more beneficial for Iraq. Al-Asadi reaffirmed that Iraq sees the PDP as a critical tool for helping the relatively new Iraqi law enforcement institutions further 

mature and grow. He also reinforced that message during a trip to the Baghdad Police College Annex, the PDP’s base of operations, where he met with Senior Police 

Advisors and reiterated that MOI and Iraq need their expertise to work better and 

to help better serve Iraq’s people. He made clear that he looks to our advisors to 

be role models for Iraq’s still maturing police force. 

The Iraqi government and the Ministry of Interior (MOI) have made great strides 

in building public security institutions, with help from the United States and other 

partners. However, law enforcement in Iraq was isolated during the Saddam years 

from the critical police reform and modernization efforts undertaken by most developed nations (e.g., in areas such as human rights and gender equality, criminal investigations and forensics, technology). It will take time and help, which we are providing through the PDP, to enable them to catch up and build a capacity to undertake further reform efforts effectively on their own. While building Iraqi law enforcement capabilities, the PDP also reinforces the strong ties between the United 

States and Iraq, particularly in the security and law enforcement sector. This collaborative relationship benefits the United States in important ways—not only contributing to more effective protection of U.S. government and private personnel, facilities, and businesses, but also facilitating our common fight against transnational 

threats such as terrorism, money-laundering, and smuggling of humans and illicit 

materials. 

Answers B and C: 

INL’s policy is to provide assistance through a bilateral agreement with host governments as authorized under Section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 

as amended, for INCLE foreign assistance funds. INL has 122 bilateral agreements 

in countries receiving U.S. foreign assistance for narcotics control, law enforcement, 

and criminal justice sector capacity building programs. The bilateral agreement is 

a key component to State/INL’s strategy of establishing commitment of the host government and ensuring compliance with appropriate foreign assistance statutes. 

While it is usual INL practice to operate police programs through bilateral agreements with host countries, there are a few exceptions. As noted earlier, we 

The PDP is covered by the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement, which is the 

umbrella agreement for all U.S. government cooperation in Iraq. In Section VIII 

(Law Enforcement and Judicial Cooperation) of the Strategic Framework Agreement, the United States and Iraq agree to extensive cooperation in the police sector. 

Question 11: 

The budget request includes $370 million in economic assistance for the West 

Bank and Gaza, as well as $70 million in assistance for the Palestinian Authority 

Security Forces.

• How much of the economic assistance will be direct support for the PA budget? Under what conditions would the Department discontinue that assistance? 

• Given that Fatah and Hamas are on the verge of forming a new PA government, and that Abu Mazen will likely continue to pursue his dangerous Palestinian statehood scheme at the UN, why is the U.S. proposing further assistance to the PA? 

• What are the specific purposes of the $70 million for the PASF? 

Answer: 

Budget Support. Direct budget support to the Palestinian Authority (PA) is among 

the most immediate and efficient means of helping the PA build the foundations of 

a viable, peaceful future Palestinian state. In FY2011, we provided $200M in direct 

budget support to the Palestinian Authority. In FY2012 we have set aside the same 

amount, and in FY2013, we plan to provide $150 million in direct budget support. 

As always, the PA will only be authorized to use funds for purposes approved by 

USAID. Vetting under established procedures is a prerequisite for the disbursements of funds to specific private sector creditors, and we have full audit rights. 

Reconciliation and Enhanced Status Efforts. We continue to monitor the intra-Palestinian reconciliation process which, for now, appears stalled. Mahmoud Abbas remains the President of the PA and Salam Fayyad remains the Prime Minister, and 

no interim government is in the works. If an interim government that includes 

Hamas is formed, we will reevaluate Hamas’ influence and our engagement with 

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that government in accordance with U.S. policy and law. Likewise, our view on Palestinian attempts to enhance their status outside of direct negotiations is clear, and 

we have opposed it in every fora, every time. 

PASF Assistance. The $70 million in Palestinian Authority Security Forces 

(PASF) assistance for 2013 and beyond is intended to provide the PA with the ability to maintain their security forces and infrastructure, as our work in this area has 

been essential to the creation of professional and reliable PASF that both Palestinians and Israelis can trust. The ability to maintain security and fight terrorism is 

a fundamental building block for peace and an essential element for a future negotiated settlement, and benefits Israelis and Palestinians alike. 

Question 12: 

With its growing economy and vast foreign reserves, it would seem that Beijing 

has more than enough money to deal with its own citizens’ health issues. Borrowing 

money from the Chinese government to spend back in China on health programs 

there seems a particularly bad use of U.S. government funds especially as average 

Americans struggle to cover their own rising health care costs.

• Why are we proposing two million dollars in support of health programs in 

China when the Chinese hold an estimated 1.2 trillion dollars of U.S. debt? 

Answer: 

The United States pursues a long-term strategy vis-a`-vis China to protect and 

promote U.S. national interests and values, and a component of this strategy is targeted programs in health to limit the transmission of infectious diseases that pose 

threats throughout the region and the rest of world, including the United States. 

As China transitions from a recipient to a donor nation, our assistance continues 

to decrease. The FY 2013 bilateral request for China includes $2 million for the 

Global Health Program (GHP–State), down from $5 million in FY 2011 and $3 million in FY 2012. 

The focus of the U.S. government HIV/AIDS program for the past five years has 

been to foster nationwide scale-up of activities by the Chinese government and other 

donor agencies. While China provides over 80 percent of the funding for its national 

HIV/AIDS program, U.S. government technical assistance builds capacity in key 

technical areas in select high-prevalence areas for Chinese replication both in country and globally. FY 2011 is the last year in which USAID received bilateral HIV/

AIDS funding for China. With GHP–State support in FY 2012, key USAID programs supporting civil society and their role in the national AIDS response will 

transition to local organizations, and USAID projects will close out by the end of 

September 2013. The Department of State’s $2 million FY 2013 request will continue to support 

the Centers for Disease Control programs addressing HIV/AIDS in China. The goal 

is to assist China in preventing its HIV prevalence from rising in areas with high 

HIV prevalence; mitigate the effect of HIV on the Chinese people; and provide technical assistance and capacity building to assure that Chinese efforts meet internationally accepted best practices. 

Question 13: 

Migration and Refugee Assistance. In contrast to the $462 million increase the 

Administration is seeking for State Department salaries and operations, you propose 

to cut $250 million—a quarter of a billion dollars—from current-year Migration and 

Refugee Assistance, which provides lifesaving help to some of the world’s most vulnerable people, and has long enjoyed bipartisan support in Congress.

• Do you anticipate that refugee protection needs will be that much less in 

2013? 

• What would this reduction eliminate, in terms of specific programs and resettlement numbers, compared to what the United States is doing this year? 

Answer: 

The Administration remains dedicated to providing robust support for humanitarian programs worldwide. The President’s FY 2013 request includes $1.675 billion 

for the Migration Refugee Assistance and the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance accounts. While this represents a decrease in funding available for humanitarian programs supported by these accounts in FY 2012, it represents a $30.3 million increase from the President’s FY 2012 request for these accounts. This increase 

reflects the Administration’s ongoing commitment to humanitarian programs, while 

taking into account the current constrained budget environment. 

Refugee protection needs are not expected to decrease in FY 2013. The request 

will allow the Department to continue to support humanitarian programs for refuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:10 May 17, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\022912\73119 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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gees and conflict victims worldwide, albeit at a lower level than is expected in FY 

2012. 

The State Operating account funds the resources that support diplomatic relations. It will allow us to continue to hire and train foreign service officers and other 

personnel who carry out U.S. foreign policy worldwide, and pay the salaries of our 

44,675 locally hired staff who ably support our embassies and consulates. The request provides resources to promote diplomatic solutions and engage in critical public diplomacy and cultural exchange programs. It also provides tangible and necessary support services such as contracting, security, information technology and 

communications, and medical services to support our staff and our missions. 

Question 14: 

The budget request indicates that almost all health programs under the Global 

Health Initiative (GHI) have received a reduction in funding, except for Family 

Planning and Reproductive Health, and the Global Fund. In fact, the Fiscal Year 

2013 request for the Global Fund is $1.65 billion, an increase of 27% from Fiscal 

Year 2012 and a 120% increase from Fiscal Year 2011.

• How do you justify such a substantial increase to the Global Fund? Could you 

comment on the recent instances of graft that the Global Fund has suffered 

and what steps have been taken to avoid future instances of waste and abuse 

of U.S. taxpayer dollars? 

• In your opinion, does this request reflect the will of Congress as indicated by 

the 2008 Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership 

Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008? 

• With these proposed increases, how do you intend to meet the spending directive for Orphaned and Vulnerable Children (OVC) authorized under the 2008 

Act? 

Answer: 

GLOBAL FUND

PEPFAR and Global Fund-financed programs are complementary. As we move aggressively to a sustainable response to HIV/AIDS, a key principle of the 2008 HydeLantos PEPFAR reauthorization, it is critical that we have a strong Global Fund 

to support our bilateral efforts. PEPFAR, the Global Fund, and partner countries 

are working closely together to eliminate duplicative investments and improve the 

program response to HIV/AIDS—which will ultimately result in an overall decrease 

in PEPFAR’s programming costs at the same time services are expanded to reach 

more people. For Fiscal Year (FY) 2013, we had a unique opportunity to meet our 

PEPFAR goals while also putting additional resources into the Fund, recognizing 

that a strong PEPFAR requires a strong Global Fund. By focusing on proven interventions and continuing to push for greater efficiency and lower costs, PEPFAR continues to meet goals without additional resources. 

The United States takes all allegations of corruption and fraud extremely seriously; we have been a leader in calling for reform of the Global Fund and we remain 

committed to ensuring that the Global Fund maintains the highest standards of 

transparency, accountability, and efficiency to support its core mandate of saving 

lives. In November 2011, we called upon the Global Fund Board and Secretariat to 

develop an action agenda that includes clear timelines and measures progress so all 

parties can be held accountable for the clear steps that must be taken for necessary 

improvements. The United States is working with and through the Global Fund 

Board, Secretariat, and our bilateral programs to strengthen the Global Fund’s internal oversight systems and to increase country-level capacity to comply with Global Fund requirements in order to prevent any future misuse of funds and improve 

capacity to maximize the impact of Global Fund resources. The Fund is working on 

this action plan, which will address issues uncovered by the Global Fund Inspector 

General. The Global Fund’s transition to a more flexible, sustainable and predictable funding model, adopted in November 2011 with strong United States Government support, will also ensure that resources go to high-impact interventions and 

to people with the greatest need. 

The appointment of General Manager Gabriel Jaramillo in February 2012 demonstrates the Fund’s commitment to implement its aggressive reform agenda as 

urged by the United States Government. Mr. Jaramillo is committed to the Fund’s 

reform agenda, having served on the independent High-Level Panel that evaluated 

the Global Fund’s financial oversight systems. Mr. Jaramillo has also emphasized 

strengthening the Global Fund’s grant management and grant impact in country 

during the 12 months that is expected to serve at the Fund. 

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Under the Administration’s FY 13 request, PEPFAR will have the resources to 

continue to meet the 10 percent directive for orphaned and vulnerable children by 

supporting child-centered, family-focused, community-based, and government-supported programming. In addition to direct services for children, PEPFAR programs 

will continue to strengthen families as primary caregivers of children, support capacity of communities to create protective and caring environments, work on household economic strengthening for the sustainable and long term well-being of children, build capacity of social service systems to protect the vulnerable, and support 

life skills training, education and HIV prevention for children and youth. 

A recent external review noted PEPFAR’s role as the largest global funder of programs for orphaned and vulnerable children and found that ‘‘over the last 30 years, 

a unique groundswell of support has emerged from families and communities to protect and support children affected by HIV and AIDS . . . with the funding and technical support of PEPFAR and others, this groundswell has developed into massive 

capacity, with widespread and deep community penetration by community based organizations.’’ PEPFAR leverages its significant resources to bring in other partners 

(e.g. the private sector, governments, and other donors) to support a comprehensive, 

multisectoral approach. This includes an emphasis on promoting a coordinated system of services integrated throughout the continuum of care that includes but goes 

beyond health needs of children and addresses overall vulnerability due to HIV/

AIDS. This approach will be maintained and strengthened with the resources requested in the FY 13 budget. 

In addition to the OVC programs counted toward the directive, it is important to 

note that PEPFAR’s prevention, treatment and care programs benefit children in a 

variety of ways. Children benefit directly from prevention programs such as those 

to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV, as well as pediatric treatment programs for children living with HIV. In addition, children benefit from programs that 

keep their parents and caregivers alive—approximately 4 million orphans have been 

averted through PEPFAR treatment programs for adults alone. 

Question 15: 

I am deeply troubled by the inclusion in your budget request of 39 million dollars 

for a voluntary contribution to the UN Population Fund, UNFPA.

• Why is the Administration requesting an increase in funding to UNFPA even 

though that body assists the Chinese government’s coercive abortion and sterilization programs? • What would UNFPA have to do for the Administration to enforce the KempKasten amendment and cut off funding to UNFPA? 

Answer: 

The Obama Administration strongly supports UNFPA’s goals and programs, 

which provide life-saving assistance to women, children, and families in over 150 

countries. This partnership between the U.S. government and UNFPA is critical to 

achieving the goals of the Global Health Initiative as well as the Millennium Development Goals. In particular, the partnership with UNFPA helps to advance the promotion of sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights, including through 

increased access to voluntary family planning. 

UNFPA is the largest multilateral provider of family planning and reproductive 

health information and services. The USG’s partnership with UNFPA leverages 

funds for these health programs and extends the reach of USG support to a number 

of countries where USAID does not have programs. Currently, UNFPA has programs in nearly 150 countries and is a world leader in efforts to reduce maternal 

mortality and morbidity, end female genital mutilation and cutting, treat obstetric 

fistula, reduce transmission of sexually transmitted infections and HIV/AIDS, and 

ensure access to health care and essential supplies for women and families during 

emergency and humanitarian crises. The partnership between the USG and UNFPA 

is critical to achieving sustained progress in these areas. 

The Obama Administration has routinely expressed opposition to China’s coercive 

birth limitation policies. The White House issued a statement on August 23, 2011 

articulating the Administration’s strong opposition to ‘‘all aspects of China’s coercive 

birth limitation policies, including forced abortion and sterilization.’’ In March 2009, 

based on a review of available facts, Secretary Clinton concluded that the KempKasten amendment does not preclude U.S. funding to UNFPA. We continue to monitor UNFPA’s programs and remain convinced that the available facts show that 

UNFPA does not support or participate in the management of a program of coercive 

abortion or involuntary sterilization, and that UNFPA has been a catalyst for greater acceptance of voluntary family planning and works against practices such as sex 

selective abortion, coercive abortion, and involuntary sterilization in its China counVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:10 May 17, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00089 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\022912\73119 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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try program. The fundamental principle of UNFPA’s work in China is to promote 

programs and policies that are based on a human rights approach to reproductive 

health, an approach they work to promote in countries around the world. 

We are grateful for the support that Congress has shown for UNFPA programs 

and activities over the past three years, including the $35 million Congress appropriated for UNFPA in FY 2012. This important renewal of U.S. leadership in promoting sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights, including through 

increased access to voluntary family planning, has helped UNFPA advance health 

and development programs for vulnerable women and girls around the world. 

Question 16: 

As you are aware, the compensation fund for American victims of Libyan terrorism established pursuant to the Libyan Claims Resolution Act may incur a shortfall. Please describe what efforts, if any, the Department is undertaking to: 1) establish contingency plans in the event of a shortfall; 2) engage in state-to-state negotiations with the new Libyan government to ensure that American victims of Libyan 

state-sponsored terrorism receive full compensation in accordance with awards set 

forth by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission; and 3) use assets belonging to 

Muammar Qaddafi, the Qaddafi family and advisors currently under U.S. control 

to compensate these American victims of terrorism. 

Answer: 

The Department believes that it is premature to determine whether there will be 

a shortfall in settlement funds. The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) 

is still in the process of adjudicating and, in some cases, establishing the appropriate levels of compensation for many of the claims that were referred to it as part 

of the Libya claims program. The FCSC must be allowed to complete more of this 

work before a projection regarding the sufficiency of settlement funds can be made. 

In the event of a shortfall, the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 establishes that each claimant who receives an award from the FCSC will receive a pro 

rata share of the available settlement funds up to the full amount of that award. 

Regarding possible state-to-state negotiations, the 2008 U.S.-Libya Claims Settlement Agreement provided for the ‘‘full and final settlement’’ of terrorism-related 

claims against Libya and its public officials in exchange for the $1.5 billion settlement amount. Given the terms of this agreement, there does not appear to be a 

legal basis for seeking additional compensation from the Government of Libya at 

this juncture. Doing so could well undermine our efforts to secure compensation for 

other U.S. nationals through similar claims settlements with other governments in 

the future. 

Furthermore, frozen Qadhafi family assets would not be an appropriate source of 

additional funds for these claims, which the United States has already settled 

through the 2008 U.S.-Libya Claims Settlement Agreement. This would similarly 

undermine the United States’ ability to conclude similar claims settlements on behalf of U.S. nationals in the future. Moreover, those Qadhafi family assets that are 

in the United States have been frozen pursuant to legally-binding U.N. Security 

Council Resolutions. Those resolutions indicate that any frozen assets shall be used 

for the benefit and in accordance with the needs and wishes of the Libyan people. 

If the United States were to unilaterally decide on an alternative disposition of 

these assets, it would undermine our ability to obtain similar U.N. action in the future and could expose the United States to claims under international law. 

In any event, we are not aware of any Qadhafi family member interest in the assets that comprise the amounts reported publicly by the Office of Foreign Assets 

Control (OFAC) as blocked pursuant to the Libya sanctions program. We understand that the only property reported to OFAC as blocked pursuant to Executive 

Order 13566 that might contain an interest of a Qadhafi family member is non-liquid property regarding which valuation would be difficult to ascertain and that may 

have no significant value. 

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD TO THE HONORABLE HILLARY

RODHAM CLINTON BY THE HONORABLE ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN

Question: 

As you know, Section 47(9) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) defines ‘‘significant military equipment’’ as articles ‘‘for which special export controls are warranted because of the capacity of such articles for substantial military utility or capability’’ and identified on the United States Munitions List (USML). Will the Department provide to the Committee a list of all significant military equipment curVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:10 May 17, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00090 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\022912\73119 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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1 ‘‘Defense article’’ is defined as ‘‘(1) any weapon, weapons system, munition, aircraft, vessel, 

boat, or other implement of war; (2) any property, installation, commodity, material, equipment, 

supply, or goods used for the purposes of furnishing military assistance; (3) any machinery, facility, tool, material, supply, or other item necessary for the manufacture, production, processing, 

repair, servicing storage, construction, transportation, operation, or use of any article listed in 

this subsection; or (4) any component or part of any article listed in this subsection. . . .’’ The 

definition specifically excludes merchant vessels and certain source material as defined in the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 

‘‘Defense service’’ is defined as ‘‘any service, test, inspection, repair, publication, or technical 

or other assistance or defense information used for the purposes of furnishing military assistance, but does not include military educational and training activities under chapter 5 of part 

II.’’

rently on the USML that is proposed for removal from the Munitions List pursuant 

to section 38(f) of the AECA? If so, when? If not, why not? 

Answer: 

The Department notification under section 38(f) of the AECA will identify those 

defense articles designated as significant military equipment proposed for removal 

from the USML consistent with the controls currently enumerated on the USML for 

such articles. 

Question: 

The proposed creation of a ‘‘Commerce Munitions List’’ (CML) within the larger 

Commerce Control List—which as I understand it would include certain lethal firearms, numerous non-weaponized end items, and various parts, components, software (including source code), and production technology specially designed for commodities on the USML or CML—raises a number of questions about the relationship 

of the proposed CML to the authorities governing the provision of U.S. security assistance under Title 22 United States Code (and equally, to those related authorities 

under Title 10 U.S.C.). 

To the extent that articles proposed to be transferred to the Commerce Munitions 

List may be transferred to a foreign country or international organization pursuant 

to authorities for Foreign Military Financing, Foreign Military Sales, the Pakistan 

Counterinsurgency Contingency Fund or any other State Department administered 

security assistance program, would the requirements of section 502 of the Foreign 

Assistance Act—‘‘Utilization of Defense Articles and Services’’—apply to articles controlled on the CML and subject to the Export Administration regulations? Why or 

why not? 

Answer: 

Section 502 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, (FAA) states that 

defense articles and defense services to any country shall be furnished solely for internal security, legitimate self-defense, and certain other specified purposes. For the 

purposes of section 502, the terms ‘‘defense articles’’ and ‘‘defense services’’ are defined in section 644 of the FAA1 and are independent of the USML (unlike the definition of ‘‘defense articles and defense services’’ applicable to section 38 of the 

AECA, which is laid out in section 47(7) of the AECA). Therefore, whether a given 

item is controlled on the USML or is a military item controlled in 600 series ECCNs 

on the CCL has no impact on the question of what constitutes a defense article or 

defense service for the purposes of section 502.

Question: 

Would the limitations of section 502B—‘‘Human Rights’’—apply to CML-controlled 

articles provided under the authority of Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act, the 

Arms Export Control Act, or licensed or otherwise authorized for export under the 

Export Administration Regulations? Why or why not? 

Answer: 

Section 502B(a)(2) states that ‘‘[e]xcept under circumstances specified in this section, no security assistance may be provided to any country the government of which 

engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized 

human rights. Security assistance may not be provided to the police, domestic intelligence, or similar law enforcement forces of a country, and licenses may not be 

issued under the Export Administration Act of 1979 for the export of crime control 

and detection instruments and equipment to a country, the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human 

rights [subject to certain exceptions]. Assistance may not be provided under chapter 

5 of this part to a country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern 

88

of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights [subject to certain exceptions].’’

For the purposes of section 502B, ‘‘security assistance’’ is defined as ‘‘(A) assistance under chapter 2 (military assistance) or chapter 4 (economic support fund) or 

chapter 5 (military education and training) or chapter 6 (peacekeeping operations) 

or chapter 8 (antiterrorism assistance) of [part II of the FAA]; (B) sales of defense 

articles or services, extensions of credits (including participation in credits, and 

guaranties of loans under the [AECA]; or (C) any license in effect with respect to 

the export of defense articles or defense services to or for the armed forces, police, 

intelligence, or other internal security forces of a foreign country under section 38 

of the [AECA].’’ Removal of items from the USML will have an effect on the section 

502B restriction only to the extent that the restriction on licenses is limited to export of defense articles and services under section 38 because the definition of ‘‘security assistance’’ in section 502B incorporates section 38 by reference. The removal 

of items from the USML would have no effect on the application of section 502B 

to security assistance or FMS. 

Question: 

Would the provisions of section 503—‘‘General Authority’’ for military assistance—

apply to CML-controlled articles, including any such articles provided by grant or 

loan? Please explain. 

Answer: 

We do not currently rely on section 503 to provide military assistance. Nor does 

section 503 incorporate section 38 of the AECA, so whether an item is controlled 

on the USML or is a military item controlled in 600 series ECCNs on the CCL is 

not relevant to section 503. 

Question: 

Would the provisions of section 505—‘‘Conditions of Eligibility’’—apply to CMLcontrolled articles provided to a foreign country by grant? Why or why not? 

Answer: 

Section 505 sets forth conditions for eligibility for the furnishing of defense articles, related training and other defense services to foreign countries on a grant 

basis. The question of whether section 505 applies to the furnishing of a given article or service on a grant basis turns on the question of whether such article or service falls within the FAA’s definition of ‘‘defense article’’ or ‘‘defense service,’’ which, 

as noted above, do not relate to whether an item is controlled on the USML or is 

a military item controlled in 600 series ECCNs on the CCL. Thus, any changes to 

the USML are not relevant to the application of section 505. 

Question: 

Would the provisions of section 506—‘‘Special Authority’’—including the Congressional notification requirements therein, apply to the ‘‘drawdown’’ of CML-controlled 

articles still in the inventory of the Department of Defense? Please explain. 

Answer: 

Section 506 authorizes two drawdown authorities. Under the first drawdown authority, the President, upon making certain determinations and reporting them to 

Congress, may direct the drawdown of defense articles from the stocks of the Department of Defense, defense services of the Department of Defense, and military 

education and training. This authority may be relied upon to draw down defense 

articles as defined by section 644 of the FAA, regardless of whether they are included in the USML or is a military item controlled in 600 series ECCNs on the 

CCL. The second drawdown authority authorizes the President to draw down ‘‘articles, services, and military education and training’’ for the purposes and under the 

authorities of FAA part I chapters 8 and 9, part II chapters 8 and 9, and the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, or for other specified purposes. The nature 

of the articles that may be drawn down under this drawdown authority is a question 

of the scope of those underlying authorities, and does not relate to whether the 

items are found on the USML or is a military item controlled in 600 series ECCNs 

on the CCL. All drawdown determinations must be reported to Congress and there 

is an advance notification to Congress of the President’s intent to use such authority. 

Question: 

Would the provisions of section 516—‘‘Authority to Transfer Excess Defense Articles’’—including the Congressional notification requirements therein, apply to CMLcontrolled articles still in the inventory of the Department of Defense? If your anVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:10 May 17, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00092 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\022912\73119 HFA PsN: SHIRL
89

swer turns on a distinction between ‘‘military sales’’ and ‘‘commercial sales’’ in section 644(d)(2) of the FAA and its companion section 47(3)(B) of the AECA, please 

explain how those definitions would apply to the transfer of excess defense articles. 

Answer: 

The question of whether a given item is on the USML or is a military item controlled in 600 series ECCNs on the CCL has no bearing on whether it may be transferred pursuant to section 516. ‘‘Defense article’’ for the purposes of section 516 is 

defined in section 644 of the FAA. 

Section 516(f) requires advance notification to Congress for transfer of excess defense articles that are significant military equipment (as defined in section 47(9) of 

the AECA), or excess defense articles valued, in terms of original acquisition cost, 

at $7,000,000 or more. Section 47(9) of the AECA defines ‘‘significant military equipment’’ as articles ‘‘(A) for which special export controls are warranted because of the 

capacity of such articles for substantial military utility or capability; and (B) identified in the United States Munitions List.’’

Because the definition of significant military equipment in section 47(9) references 

the USML, the advance notification requirements of section 516(f) will not apply if 

an item currently designated as SME is removed from the USML, and if the $7 million threshold is not met for congressional reporting. However, the items will still 

be controlled by the Commerce Department under such statutory authorities as the 

Commerce Department has available to it. 

Question: 

Alternatively, is it your view that CML-controlled articles—such as the approximately 50 C–130Es at the Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group 

(AMARG) at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Tucson, Arizona (which per Air Force 

policy require demilitarization and removal of all crypto and GPS systems prior to 

delivery to a foreign customer)—are ineligible for transfer under section 516 authority? Please explain. 

Answer: 

The question of whether a given item is on the USML or is a military item controlled in 600 series ECCNs on the CCL has no bearing on whether it may be transferred pursuant to section 516. ‘‘Defense article’’ for the purposes of section 516 is 

defined in section 644 of the FAA. 

Question: 

Would the provisions of section 551—‘‘General Authority’’ for support of peacekeeping operations—apply to CML-controlled articles which the U.S. may seek to 

transfer to friendly countries and international organizations in support of United 

Nations peacekeeping operations? Why or why not? 

Answer: 

Section 551 of the FAA authorizes the President ‘‘to furnish assistance to friendly 

countries and international organizations, on such terms and conditions as he may 

determine, for peacekeeping operations and other programs carried out in furtherance of the national security interests of the United States. . . .’’ The question of 

whether a particular item is a military item controlled in 600 series ECCNs on the 

CCL has no bearing on the scope of this authority. The provisions of this section 

apply to the use of funds for PKO activities and those funds may be used for many 

types of material assistance, all of which must be provided consistent with this authority. 

Question: 

Would the provisions of section 552(c)—relating to emergency drawdown authority 

for peacekeeping operations—apply to CML-controlled articles still in the inventory 

of the Department of Defense? Please explain. 

Answer: 

The question of whether a particular item is a military item controlled in 600 series ECCNs on the CCL has no bearing on the scope of the drawdown authority in 

section 552(c). The requirements of that provision would apply to any commodities 

or services drawdown under that authority. 

Question: 

Would the provisions of Chapter 8—relating to anti-terrorism assistance—apply 

to CML-controlled articles? Why or why not? 

90

Answer: 

The question of whether a particular item is a military item controlled in 600 series ECCNs on the CCL has no bearing on the scope of the assistance authority in 

chapter 8 of part II of the FAA. The provisions of this section apply to material assistance provided under that authority of this Chapter, all of which must be provided consistent with this authority. 

Question: 

Would the provisions of section 582 –‘‘Authorization of Assistance’’ for nonproliferation and export control assistance—apply to CML-controlled articles? Please 

explain. 

Answer: 

The question of whether a particular item is a military item controlled in 600 series ECCNs on the CCL has no bearing on the scope of the assistance authority in 

section 582 of the FAA. The provisions of this section apply to material assistance 

provided under that authority of this Chapter, all of which must be provided consistent with this authority. 

Question: 

Would the provisions of section 620A—‘‘Prohibition on Assistance to Governments 

Supporting International Terrorism’’—apply to CML-controlled articles provided 

under the authority of Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act? Why or why not? 

Answer: 

Section 620A(a) of the FAA prohibits assistance under the FAA, the Food for 

Peace Act, the Peace Corps Act, or the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 to any country if the Secretary of State determines that the government of that country has 

repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. This prohibition restricts assistance under specified authorities; it is not structured to apply only to 

specified items. The scope of the restriction is thus unrelated to whether an item 

is on the USML or is a military item controlled in 600 series ECCNs on the CCL. 

Question: 

Would the provisions of section 620G—‘‘Prohibition on Assistance to Countries 

that Aid Terrorist States’’—apply to CML-controlled articles provided under the authority of Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act? Please explain. 

Answer: 

The restriction in section 620G of the FAA restricts assistance under specified authorities; it is not structured to apply only to specified items. The scope of the restriction is thus unrelated to whether an item is on the USML or a military item 

controlled in 600 series ECCNs on the CCL. 

Question: 

Would the provisions of section 620H—‘‘Prohibition on Assistance to Countries 

that Provide Military Equipment to Terrorist States’’—apply to any CML-controlled 

articles provided under the authority of Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act? Why 

or why not? 

Answer: 

The restriction in section 620H of the FAA restricts assistance under specified authorities; it is not structured to apply only to specified items. The scope of the restriction is thus unrelated to whether an item is on the USML or a military item 

controlled in 600 series ECCNs on the CCL. 

Question: 

Would the provisions of section 620I—‘‘Prohibition on Assistance to Countries that 

Restrict United States Humanitarian Assistance’’—apply to any CML-controlled articles provided under the authority of Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act? Please 

explain. 

Answer: 

The restriction in section 620I of the FAA restricts assistance under specified authorities; it is not structured to apply only to specified items. The scope of the restriction is thus unrelated to whether an item is on the USML or is a military item 

controlled in 600 series ECCNs on the CCL. 

91

2For all other sections of the Arms Export Control Act, a ‘‘defense article’’ is defined as (A) 

any weapon, weapons system, munition, aircraft, vessel, boat or other implement of war, (B) any 

property, installation, commodity, material, equipment, supply, or goods used for the purposes 

of making military sales, (C) any machinery, facility, tool, material, supply, or other item necessary for the manufacture, production, processing, repair, servicing, storage, construction, 

transportation, operation, or use of any article listed in this paragraph, and (D) any component 

or part of any article listed in this paragraph . . . Like the FAA, the definition specifically excludes merchant vessels and certain source material as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 

1954. 

A ‘‘defense service’’ is defined in section 47(4) as ‘‘any service, test, inspection, repair, publication, or technical or other assistance, or defense information (as defined in section 644(e) of the 

Continued

Question: 

Would the provisions of section 644—‘‘Definitions’’—apply to any CML-controlled 

articles provided under the authority of Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act? Why 

or why not? 

Answer: 

The ‘‘Definitions’’ section of the FAA defines several terms, none of which relate 

to whether an item is on the USML or is a military item controlled in 600 series 

ECCNs on the CCL. 

Question: 

Would the reporting requirements of section 655—‘‘Annual Military Assistance 

Report’’—apply to any CML-controlled articles provided pursuant to the authority 

of Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act or the Arms Export Control Act, or otherwise licensed or authorized for export to the military or security services of a foreign 

government? Please explain. 

Answer: 

The report called for in section 655 includes any defense articles, defense services, 

and international military education and training activities authorized by the 

United States. 

Section 655(b)(3) provides that the report must specify by category, whether the 

defense articles were licensed for export under section 38 of the AECA. To the extent that such defense articles are a military item controlled in the 600 series 

ECCNs on the CCL, the provisions of section 655(b)(3) would not be applicable to 

those items. 

Question: 

Would the provisions of section 660—‘‘Prohibiting Police Training’’—apply to any 

CML-controlled articles provided under the authority of the Foreign Assistance Act? 

Why or why not? 

Answer: 

Section 660 prohibits the provision of training or advice, or any financial support, 

for foreign law enforcement and internal intelligence forces provided under the FAA, 

subject to a number of exceptions. The scope of the restriction is unrelated to whether an item is on the USML or is a military item controlled in 600 series ECCNs 

on the CCL. 

Question: 

WITH RESPECT TO THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

Will any of the provisions of section 3—‘‘Eligibility’’—including U.S. consent to retransfers (and all retransfer-related notifications to Congress), penalties for misuse 

of U.S.-origin military equipment (and related reporting requirements)—apply to 

CML-controlled articles provided under the authority of the Arms Export Control 

Act, or otherwise licensed or authorized for export? Please explain. 

Answer: 

Section 47(7) of the AECA defines ‘‘defense articles’’ and ‘‘defense services,’’ with 

respect to commercial exports under section 38 of the AECA, as those items that 

the President designates ‘‘as defense articles and defense services for the purposes 

of [section 38] and to promulgate regulations for the import and export of such articles and services. The items so designated shall constitute the United States Munitions List.’’ For all other sections of the AECA, the definition of ‘‘defense articles’’ 

and ‘‘defense services’’ found in section 47(3) essentially mirror the definition found 

in the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), section 644. 2

92

FAA) used for the purposes of making military sales, but does not include design and construction services under section 29 of this Act.’’

Most of the provisions of section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) would 

not be affected by any removal of any item from the United States Munitions List 

(USML) for the purposes of exports pursuant to Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) 

under section 38 of the AECA. Because a ‘‘defense article’’ for purposes of a Foreign 

Military Sale under section 3 is different from a ‘‘defense article’’ under section 38, 

it is immaterial whether an item is controlled by the USML or is a military item 

controlled in 600 series ECCNs on the CCL. 

Section 3(d)(3)(A) is an exception. If an item that is currently controlled by the 

USML is removed from the USML and becomes a military item controlled in 600 

series ECCNs on the CCL, the Congressional notification requirements for transfer 

of such an item would no longer be applicable. The notification requirement is triggered by an ‘‘export . . . licensed or approved under section 38 of this Act,’’ which 

would no longer be applicable. 

Question: 

Will the provisions of section 4—‘‘Purposes for Which Military Sales by the United 

States are Authorized’’—apply to CML-controlled articles provided under the authority of the Arms Export Control Act, or otherwise licensed or authorized for export? Why or why not? 

Answer: 

The provisions of section 4 of the AECA would not be affected by any removal 

of any item from the USML. The provisions of section 4 only pertain to sales or 

leases by the United States Government. Because a ‘‘defense article’’ for purposes 

of section 4 is different from a ‘‘defense article’’ under section 38, it is immaterial 

whether an item is controlled by the USML or is a military item controlled in 600 

series ECCNs on the CCL. 

Question: 

Will the provisions of section 5—‘‘Prohibition Against Discrimination’’—apply to 

CML-controlled articles provided under the authority of the Arms Export Control 

Act, or otherwise licensed or authorized for export? Please explain. 

Answer: 

The provisions of section 5 of the AECA would not be affected by any removal 

of any item from the USML. The provisions of section 5 generally apply to sales, 

credits, or guarantees by the United States Government. 

Question: 

Will the provisions of section 6—‘‘Foreign Intimidation and Harassment of Individuals in the United States’’—apply to CML-controlled articles provided under the 

authority of the Arms Export Control Act, or otherwise licensed or authorized for 

export? Why or why not? 

Answer: 

Section 6 provides, in part, that ‘‘no export licenses may be issued under this Act 

with respect to any country determined by the President to be engaged in a consistent pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment against individuals in the 

United States.’’ This section would not apply to a DCS export of any military item 

controlled in 600 series ECCNs on the CCL since the statutory authority for that 

export is not the AECA, but pursuant to such authorities as the Commerce Department has available to it. 

Question: 

Will any of the provisions of section 21—‘‘Sales from Stocks’’—apply to CML-controlled articles provided under the authority of the Arms Export Control Act, or otherwise licensed or authorized for export? If your answer turns on a distinction between ‘‘military sales’’ and ‘‘commercial sales’’ in sections 47(3) and 47(7) of the 

AECA, please explain how the reference to ‘‘military sales’’ in section 47(3)(B) can 

be construed to apply to all FMS sales. 

Answer: 

Section 47(7) of the AECA defines ‘‘defense articles’’ and ‘‘defense services,’’ with 

respect to commercial exports under section 38 of the AECA, as those items that 

the President designates ‘‘as defense articles and defense services for the purposes 

of [section 38] and to promulgate regulations for the import and export of such articles and services. The items so designated shall constitute the United States MuniVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:10 May 17, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00096 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\022912\73119 HFA PsN: SHIRL
93

tions List.’’ For all other sections of the AECA, the definition of ‘‘defense articles’’ 

and ‘‘defense services’’ are found in section 47(3) and 47(4), which essentially mirror 

the definitions found in section 644 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). 

The provisions of section 21 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) would not 

be affected by any removal of any item from the United States Munitions List 

(USML). Because the definitions of ‘‘defense article’’ and ‘‘defense service’’ for purposes of section 21 of the AECA are different from the definitions of ‘‘defense article’’ 

for purposes of section 38, it is immaterial whether an item is controlled by the 

USML or is a military item controlled in 600 series ECCNs on the CCL. 

Question: 

Will any of the provisions of section 22—‘‘Procurement for Cash Sales’’—apply to 

CML-controlled articles provided under the authority of the Arms Export Control 

Act, or otherwise licensed or authorized for export? If your answer turns on a distinction between ‘‘military sales’’ and ‘‘commercial sales’’ in sections 47(3) and 47(7) 

of the AECA, please explain how the reference to ‘‘military sales’’ in section 47(3)(B) 

can be construed to apply to all FMS sales involving procurement from private parties. 

Answer: 

The provisions of section 22 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) would not 

be affected by any removal of any item from the United States Munitions List 

(USML) for the purposes of exports pursuant to Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) 

under section 38 of the AECA. Because a ‘‘defense article’’ and ‘‘defense service’’ 

under section 22 is different from a ‘‘defense article’’ under section 38, it is immaterial whether an item is controlled by the USML or is a military item controlled in 

600 series ECCNs on the CCL. 

Question: 

Will any of the provisions of section 23—‘‘Credit Sales’’—apply to CML-controlled 

articles provided under the authority of the Arms Export Control Act, or otherwise 

licensed or authorized for export? If your answer turns on a distinction between 

‘‘military sales’’ and ‘‘commercial sales’’ in sections 47(3) and 47(7) of the AECA, 

please explain how the reference to ‘‘military sales’’ in section 47(3)(B) can be construed to apply to FMF transactions (as opposed to military ‘‘sales’’). 

Answer: 

The provisions of section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) would not 

be affected by any removal of any item from the United States Munitions List 

(USML) for the purposes of exports pursuant to Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) 

under section 38 of the AECA. Because a ‘‘defense article’’ and ‘‘defense service’’ 

under section 23 is different from a ‘‘defense article’’ under section 38, it is immaterial whether an item is controlled by the USML or is a military item controlled in 

600 series ECCNs on the CCL. 

Question: 

Will the requirements of section 25—‘‘Annual Estimate and Justification for Sales 

Program’’—apply to any CML-controlled articles provided under the authority of the 

Arms Export Control Act, or otherwise licensed or authorized for export? Why or 

why not? 

Answer: 

Section 25(a)(1) requires the an annual report that sets forth ‘‘all sales and commercial exports under this Act of major weapons or weapons-related defense equipment.’’ The report would therefore include Foreign Military Sales in addition to commercial exports licensed under section 38. Accordingly, to the extent that a ‘‘sale’’ 

by the U.S. pursuant to an FMS case includes ‘‘major weapons or weapons related 

equipment’’ that is a military item controlled in 600 series ECCNs on the CCL, such 

item must be included in the report. For purposes of ‘‘commercial exports under this 

Act,’’ if such items include military items controlled in 600 series ECCNs on the 

CCL, such items will not be included in this report. 

Question: 

Will the provisions of section 29—‘‘Foreign Military Construction Sales’’—apply to 

any CML-controlled articles provided under the authority of the Arms Export Control Act, or otherwise licensed or authorized for export? Please explain. 

Answer: 

The provisions of section 29 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) would not 

be affected by any removal of any item from the United States Munitions List 

94

(USML) for the purposes of exports pursuant to Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) 

under section 38 of the AECA. 

Question: 

Will any of the provisions of section 36—‘‘Reports on Commercial and Governmental Military Exports; Congressional Action’’—apply to CML-controlled articles 

provided under the authority of the Arms Export Control Act, or otherwise licensed 

or authorized for export? Why or why not? 

Answer: 

Some of the provisions of section 36 will be impacted by the removal of items for 

purposes of export from the USML. Congressional Notification procedures for DCS 

exports under sections 36(c) and 36(d) will not apply to those items that are moved 

from the USML to the CCL. The Congressional notification procedures for FMS will 

not be affected by these proposed changes. 

Question: 

Will any of the provisions of section 38—‘‘Control of Arms Exports and Imports’’—

such as those relating to brokering, limitations on license exemptions, ineligibility 

of exporters, and the identification of consignees and freight forwarders apply to 

CML-controlled articles (such as semi-automatic weapons up to 50 caliber, utility 

helicopters, naval vessels, or tactical military transport) that are licensed or otherwise authorized for export? In your explanation, please explain how the absence of 

such limitations or licensing requirements (such as those relating to brokering), are 

consistent with international best practices for the regulation of arms and related 

military equipment? 

Answer: 

The provisions of section 38 will not apply to an item controlled by the Commerce 

Department once that item is removed from the USML. The statutory authority for 

that export is not the AECA, but it will be under such statutory authorities as the 

Commerce Department has available to it. 

The items moving to the Commerce Department will still require authorizations 

consistent with our international regime commitments and statements of understanding (e.g., Wassenaar’s Elements for Effective Legislation on Arms Brokering). 

The details of these arrangements are still being considered. 

Question: 

Will the provisions of section 39—‘‘Fees of Military Sales Agents and other Payments’’—apply to CML-controlled articles provided under the authority of the Arms 

Export Control Act, or otherwise licensed or authorized for export? Why or why not? 

Answer: 

Many of the provisions of section 39, Fees of Military Sales Agents and other Payments, of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) would not be affected by the removal 

of any item from the United States Munitions List (USML) for the purposes of exports pursuant to Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) under section 38 of the AECA. Because a ‘‘defense article’’ and ‘‘defense service’’ under section 39 is different from a 

‘‘defense article’’ under section 38, it is immaterial whether an item is controlled by 

the USML or is a military item controlled in 600 series ECCNs on the CCL. 

To the extent that a provision of section 39 applies to the commercial export of 

a defense article under section 38, such as section 39(a)(2), those provisions will not 

apply to an item controlled by the Commerce Department if that item is removed 

from the USML because the statutory authority for that export is not the AECA, 

but it will be under such statutory authorities as the Commerce Department has 

available to it. 

Question: 

Will the provisions of section 39A—‘‘Prohibition on Incentive Payments’’—apply to 

CML-controlled articles provided under the authority of the Arms Export Control 

Act, or otherwise licensed or authorized for export? Please explain. 

Answer: 

To the extent that a provision of section 39A applies to the commercial export of 

a defense article under section 38, these provisions will not apply to an item controlled by the Commerce Department once that item has been removed from the 

USML because the statutory authority for that export is not the AECA, but it will 

be pursuant to such statutory authorities as the Commerce Department has available to it. 

95

Question: 

Will the requirements of section 40—‘‘Transactions with Countries Supporting 

Acts of International Terrorism’’—apply to CML-controlled articles provided under 

the authority of the Arms Export Control Act, or otherwise licensed or authorized 

for export? Why or why not? 

Answer: 

Unlike other provisions of the AECA, the restrictions laid out in section 40 are 

keyed to the term, ‘‘munitions item,’’ which section 40(l)(1) defines to mean ‘‘any 

item enumerated on the United States Munitions List (without regard to whether 

the item is imported or exported from the United States).’’ Accordingly, the provisions of section 40 will not apply to an item controlled by the Commerce Department if that item is removed from the USML because that item would no longer 

be a ‘‘munitions item.’’

While the items transferred from the USML to the CCL will no longer be subject 

to the restrictions set forth in section 40 of the AECA, they will be subject to the 

restrictions on exports to terrorism sponsoring countries set forth in section 6(j) of 

the EAA as kept in force by Executive Order 13222 issued under the International 

Emergency Economic Powers Act as well as to any restrictions imposed on licenses 

to specific terrorism sponsoring countries (e.g., Syria Accountability and Lebanese 

Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992, 

Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996). 

Question: 

Will the requirements of section 40A—‘‘End-use Monitoring of Defense Articles 

and Defense Services’’—apply to CML-controlled articles provided under the authority of the Arms Export Control Act, or otherwise licensed or authorized for export? 

Please explain. 

Answer: 

Many of the provisions of section 40A, End-use Monitoring, of the Arms Export 

Control Act (AECA) would not be affected by any removal of any item from the 

United States Munitions List (USML) for the purposes of exports pursuant to Direct 

Commercial Sales (DCS) under section 38 of the AECA. Because a ‘‘defense article’’ 

and ‘‘defense service’’ under section 40A is different from a ‘‘defense article’’ under 

section 38, it is immaterial whether an item is controlled by the USML or is a military item controlled in 600 series ECCNs on the CCL. 

To the extent that a provision of section 40A applies to the commercial export of 

a defense article under section 38, those provisions will not apply to an item controlled by the Commerce Department if that item is removed from the USML because the statutory authority for that export is not the AECA, but will be controlled 

under such statutory authorities as the Commerce Department has available to it. 

Question: 

Will any of the provisions of section 47—‘‘Definitions’’—apply to CML-controlled 

articles provided under the authority of the Arms Export Control Act, or otherwise 

licensed or authorized for export? Why or why not? 

Answer: 

The provisions of section 47, definitions, of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) 

will not change, however, the scope of the items that come within the definition of 

‘‘defense articles and defense services’’ in section 47(7) will change since it is keyed 

to the USML. Therefore, once an item is removed from the USML for the purposes 

of exports under section 38 that item will no longer be under the statutory authority 

of the AECA, but under such statutory authorities as the Commerce Department 

has available to it. 

Question: 

Will the provisions of section 51—‘‘Special Defense Acquisition Fund’’—be applicable to CML-controlled articles? Or is it the position of the Department that because 

section 51 refers to the ‘‘acquisition of defense articles and services’’ that any CMLcontrolled article would be ineligible for inclusion among those items procured by 

the Fund? Please explain. 

Answer: 

The provisions of section 51 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) would not 

be affected by any removal of any item from the United States Munitions List 

(USML) for the purposes of exports pursuant to Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) 

under section 38 of the AECA. Because a ‘‘defense article’’ for purposes of section 

96

51 is different from a ‘‘defense article’’ under section 38, it is immaterial whether 

an item is controlled by the USML or is a military item controlled in 600 series 

ECCNs on the CCL. 

Question: 

Will the provisions of section 52—‘‘Use and Transfer of Items Procured by the 

Fund’’—be applicable to CML-controlled articles? Why or why not? 

Answer: 

The provisions of section 52 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) would not 

be affected by any removal of any item from the United States Munitions List 

(USML) for the purposes of exports pursuant to Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) 

under section 38 of the AECA. Because a ‘‘defense article’’ for purposes of section 

52 is different from a ‘‘defense article’’ under section 38, it is immaterial whether 

an item is controlled by the USML or is a military item controlled in 600 series 

ECCNs on the CCL. 

Question: 

Will the provisions of section 61—‘‘Leasing Authority’’—be applicable to any CMLcontrolled articles in the inventory of the Department of Defense? Or is it the position of the Department that CML-controlled articles would be ineligible for lease 

under the authority of the AECA? Please explain. 

Answer: 

The provisions of section 61 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) would not 

be affected by any removal of any item from the United States Munitions List 

(USML) for the purposes of exports pursuant to Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) 

under section 38 of the AECA. Because a ‘‘defense article’’ for purposes of section 

61 is different from a ‘‘defense article’’ under section 38, it is immaterial whether 

an item is controlled by the USML or is a military item controlled in 600 series 

ECCNs on the CCL. 

Question: 

Will the provisions of section 62—‘‘Reports to Congress’’—be applicable to any 

CML-controlled articles leased under the authority of Chapter 2 of Part II of the 

Foreign Assistance Act or of the Arms Export Control Act? Why or why not? 

Answer: 

The provisions of section 62 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) would not 

be affected by any removal of any item from the United States Munitions List 

(USML) for the purposes of exports pursuant to Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) 

under section 38 of the AECA. 

Question: 

Will the provisions of section 63—‘‘Legislative Review’’—be applicable to any 

CML-controlled article leased under the authority of Chapter 2 of Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act or of the Arms Export Control Act? Please explain. 

Answer: 

The provisions of section 63 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) would not 

be affected by any removal of any item from the United States Munitions List 

(USML) for the purposes of exports pursuant to Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) 

under section 38 of the AECA. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE

fHONORABLE HOWARD L. BERMAN, 

A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, WITH WRITTEN

RESPONSES RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

Question 1: 

On December 13, 2011, the House overwhelmingly passed a resolution calling on 

Turkey to return confiscated Christian churches and properties (H. Res. 306). The 

resolution calls on the Secretary of State ‘‘in all official contacts with Turkish leaders and other Turkish officials . . . [to] emphasize that Turkey should (1) end all 

forms of religious discrimination . . . (2) allow the rightful church and lay owners 

of Christian church properties, without hindrance or restriction, to organize and administer prayer services . . . (3) return to their rightful owners all Christian 

churches and other places of worship, monasteries, schools, hospitals, monuments, 

relics, holy sites, and other religious properties.’’ Are you satisfied that Turkey is 

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committed to returning confiscated Christian churches and fully respecting the Armenian and other Christian populations that have lived on these lands since biblical 

times? 

Answer: 

While I recognize religious minority groups continue to face concerning challenges 

in Turkey, I am encouraged by concrete steps the Government of Turkey has taken 

over the past year to return properties to religious communities. 

In August 2011 the government issued a decree allowing religious minorities to 

apply to reclaim churches, synagogues, and other properties confiscated 75 years 

ago. Several properties have already been returned to the 24 religious minority 

foundations that have applied thus far. Separately, in November 2010, the government of Turkey returned the Buyukada orphanage to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, 

in line with a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights. 

Turkish officials at the most senior levels have told me they are committed to reopening the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s Halki Seminary in the near future. In 

March, Deputy PM Bekir Bozdag stated, ‘‘There are no laws in Turkey against opening a seminary to train Christian clerics; the state will also support such a move.’’

The government is redrafting its 1982 military-drafted constitution to fully embrace individual rights, including those of religious and ethnic minorities. Significantly, Parliament speaker Cemil Cicek reached out to Orthodox, Jewish, Armenian 

and Syriac leaders during this process. In response, on February 20, the Ecumenical 

Patriarch addressed the Turkish Parliament for the first time in the history of the 

republic, noting the positive changes taking place in Turkey: ‘‘Unfortunately, there 

have been injustices toward minorities until now. These are slowly being corrected 

and changed. A new Turkey is being born.’’

These steps are encouraging and we are urging the Government of Turkey to continue returning other properties confiscated from minority religious communities to 

their rightful owners, as well as moving forward with needed legal reforms in its 

Constitutional redrafting process. We will continue to remain vigilant of the situation for religious communities and encourage needed reforms in the country. 

Question 2: 

There have been increasing ceasefire violations in Nagorno-Karabakh, with the 

most recent resulting in the death of an Armenian soldier. Azerbaijan’s President 

has repeatedly stated that only the first stage of war is over. In January of this 

year, President Aliyev said, ‘‘It’s not a frozen conflict, and it’s not going to be one.’’ 

The three Minsk Group Co-Chairs have all called the pulling back of snipers as a 

crucial step for decreasing tensions. It has been at least a year since both Armenia 

and Nagorno-Karabakh agreed to this proposal, but Azerbaijan has not. What steps 

is the Administration taking to encourage Azerbaijan’s acceptance of this important 

proposal to prevent war from resuming in this vital area for U.S. interests? 

Answer: 

As a Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, the United States remains deeply committed to helping the sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict reach a lasting and 

peaceful settlement. The U.S. has emphasized that the parties should show restraint in both their public statements and on the ground to avoid misunderstandings and unintended consequences. We reiterate at every opportunity that 

there is no military solution to the conflict and that only a peaceful settlement will 

lead to security, stability, and reconciliation in the region. We regret any loss of life 

and continue to call upon the sides to take steps—including the withdrawal of snipers—to improve the atmosphere for negotiations, prevent unnecessary casualties, 

and strengthen implementation of the ceasefire. 

Question 3: 

Can you give us an update on progress the Administration has made in expanding 

U.S.-Armenia trade and investment in recent years? 

Answer: 

The United States remains committed to expanding our economic relations with 

Armenia. The principle vehicle for addressing issues of trade and investment with 

Armenia is the U.S.-Armenia Joint Economic Taskforce (USATF). Established in 

1999, the USATF meets annually to deepen economic ties between Armenia and the 

United States, advance market reforms in Armenia, and discuss opportunities for 

U.S. assistance to contribute to Armenia’s long-term economic development. The 

task force is an open forum to discuss issues of concern and interest to both countries. 

98

The most recent USATF was held in late September 2011 and focused on promoting trade and investment, protecting intellectual property rights, and enhancing 

the business climate in Armenia. 

The United States continues to seek avenues, through our assistance programming, to promote greater linkages between American and Armenian private sector 

firms with the goal of increasing the volume of bilateral trade and investment. For 

example, in the coming months the U.S. will sponsor a ‘‘Reverse Trade Mission’’ to 

the United States for up to 10 Armenian businesspeople from the information technology sector. This mission will provide Armenian entrepreneurs a chance to explore 

opportunities to buy American products, sell Armenian products, and build mutually 

beneficial relationships with U.S. counterparts. 

Armenia recently completed its five-year compact with the Millennium Challenge 

Corporation (MCC). That program, with its focus on the agricultural sector, laid the 

groundwork for increasing agricultural exports and greater private sector investment in the sector, and will have a significant long-term impact on trade. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE

fHONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, WITH WRITTEN

RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

Is there any instance or are there any instances in which the Obama Administration has withheld, or has threatened to withhold, or plans to withhold, or has used 

or plans to use its voice and vote at international lending organizations to reward 

with debt relief or loans, or to deny such, or has undertaken or plans to undertake 

any other retaliatory or incentivizing measure:

1) based on that nation’s policy on abortion; or 

2) based on that nation’s support or opposition to resolutions at the United Nations regarding abortion? 

Answer: 

Use of the U.S. voice and vote in international lending institutions is based on 

the economic merits of the projects proposed for such lending and the borrower’s 

creditworthiness, and complies with U.S. law. Lending by these institutions aims to 

support economic development. The borrowing countries’ policies on abortion are not 

considered in these lending decisions. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE

f HONORABLE ENI F.H. 

FALEOMAVAEGA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM AMERICAN SAMOA, WITH

WRITTEN RESPONSES RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

Question 1: 

Madame Secretary, Acting Assistant Secretary Rodriquez last year wrote Congress that the Agreement to provide terms for continued free association with the 

former Trust Territory of Palau through 2024 is ‘‘an important element of our Pacific strategy for defense of the U.S. homeland.’’ It ‘‘creates an invaluable security 

zone . . . vital to our national security.’’ Palau also votes with us in the U.N. more 

than any other member. And it took Chinese Muslims from Guantanamo who could 

not safely be repatriated when no other nation would. 

You and others in the Department did a great service to our country by negotiating the Agreement. But, although the Department rushed Palau in 2010 to sign 

an accord that phases out and reduces assistance by 62 percent, it did not submit 

the Agreement to Congress until last year after new offset requirements were in 

place. Then, the Administration’s suggestions for paying for the cost were proposed 

changes in Interior Department programs that had been previously rejected by the 

committees of jurisdiction in both Houses. The leaders of both parties in both committees have reiterated that the offset proposals are not viable as have the appropriations committees, although all have said that they want to approve the Agreement—and no Member of Congress has questioned it. Under Secretary of Defense 

Flournoy last year wrote Congress that ‘‘Failure to follow through on our commitments to Palau, as reflected in the [Agreement approval] legislation would jeopardize our defense posture in the Western Pacific.’’ That sounds like the situation 

created by the Administration’s offset proposals. 

The Nation needs you to try to get OMB to develop congressionally viable offsets. 

Will you do so? 

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Answer: 

The Palau Compact review process resulted in an agreement between the United 

States and Palau that we hope will be passed by Congress this session. Under the 

terms of the Compact Review Agreement, if approved and funded by Congress, 

Palau would receive a package of assistance worth an additional $229 million for 

fiscal years 2010 through 2024. This is an increase of $229 million over the assistance provided for in the Compact. 

Although the Department of State is responsible for U.S. foreign relations with 

Palau and the Department of Defense maintains the defense relationship, the Department of the Interior has always been responsible for implementing the Compacts as well as the source of funding for assistance programs provided under the 

Compacts. It is most appropriate that the Palau Compact Review Agreement be 

funded and implemented in a manner consistent with that of the Compact. The Department of the Interior is the agency responsible for providing assistance and implementing most provisions of the proposed Palau Compact Review legislation. The 

proposed FY2012 budget for the Department of the Interior included sufficient mandatory savings to cover the cost of Compact programs provided for in the legislation. 

The Department of the Interior and the Office of Management and Budget worked 

closely to identify appropriate offsets to cover the assistance. 

Former OMB Director Jack Lew has noted that ‘‘each of these proposals furthers 

an important policy goal, while creating sizable savings to the Treasury that could 

offset the Palau Agreement.’’ OMB Acting Director Jeffrey Zients has stated that 

‘‘The President’s FY 2012 Budget included several legislative proposals with mandatory savings that could offset the $194 million cost over 10 years to extend the 

Palau Compact. For example, the proposal for ‘‘net receipts sharing’’ of energy and 

mineral receipts would provide savings of $441 million over 10 years. This proposal 

would make permanent the current arrangement for sharing the cost to administer 

energy and mineral programs on Federal lands. A form of net receipts sharing was 

in place during the 1990s, and this proposal has been enacted annually through the 

appropriations bills since 2008. The proposal has enjoyed the bipartisan support of 

the majority of Members of Congress and is a viable offset for the Palau Compact.’’ 

The Administration continues to discuss possible offsets with Congress in the hope 

of reaching a resolution to the question of offsets. 

Question 2: 

In 2010, your Department successfully negotiated with the Government of Japan 

to initiate a visitation program to Japan for United States former prisoners of war 

from World War II. What steps, if any, has your Department take to encourage the 

Government of Japan to expand this program to descents and researchers? What 

steps, if any, has your Department taken to ensure that the visitation program becomes an institutionalize and permanent exchange program between the United 

States and Japan that is not subject to the Government of Japan’s yearly budget 

review, and is instead supported by a public-private autonomous fund? 

Answer: 

The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has now successfully completed 

two ‘‘Japanese/POW Friendship Program’’ visits for former Prisoners of War 

(POWs). Participants in the trips have voiced effusive praise for both the opportunity to establish personal contacts in Japan as a step toward personal healing, 

as well as the attention to detail and coordination by MOFA. MOFA has expressed 

its intent to continue the program and has submitted to the Ministry of Finance a 

request for funds to support the trip in 2012. The Lower House of the Japanese Diet 

has approved the Cabinet’s proposed budget, and it is currently pending approval 

by the Upper House. The Department of State continues to voice appreciation to 

MOFA for this program and support for its continuation. We believe, however, that 

the type of funding used to support the program is a matter for the Japanese government to decide. 

As currently designed, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs finances participation in 

the program by seven former POW invitees and a companion of their choosing. 

Former POWs participating over the past two years have selected children and 

spouses of children to accompany them as personal attendants. Moreover, in the 

first year of the program, the Secretary and President of the Descendants Group 

auxiliary of the American Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor, whose fathers were 

POWs, participated as primary invitees. 

The stated purpose of the friendship program is to ‘‘encourage ‘reconciliation of 

minds’ by inviting former American POWs to Japan.’’ As proposed and executed, the 

trips have focused on creating opportunities to build human connections with JapaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:10 May 17, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00103 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\022912\73119 HFA PsN: SHIRL
100

nese citizens and for public speaking by former POWs rather than to conduct historical research. 

The POW reconciliation program was designed specifically to provide an opportunity for personal healing and closure for those who suffered through this painful 

chapter of history. Other programs offer funding for researchers and historians. 

Such programs include but are not limited to: the Japan- U.S. Educational Commission (Fulbright Program), the Japan Foundation Japanese Studies Fellowship Program, and the National Museum of Japanese History (NMJH) Visiting Scholar Program. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE

fHONORABLE DONALD A. MANZULLO, 

A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, WITH WRITTEN RESPONSES RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

Question 1: 

America’s relationship with the Argentine Republic has been under tremendous 

pressure ever since that country suffered the largest sovereign default in recent history. Argentina’s economic woes have led to billions of dollars worth of losses for 

the American taxpayer, investor, and government. Argentina has systematically refused to honor over 100 U.S. court judgments and other rulings ordering the government to uphold its obligations to investors all over the world. Frankly Madam Secretary, I am shocked that Argentina, a member of the G–20 club of nations, is given 

a pass on undermining America’s rule of law. The Treasury Department’s recent decision to vote against loans to Argentina at International Financial Institutions is 

a step in the right direction, but this action alone is not enough. 

Madam Secretary, what steps are you taking to ensure that the Argentine Republic respects American rule of law and makes whole the remaining investors seeking 

equitable treatment? Why isn’t the State Department not doing more to ensure that 

American court judgments are respected and honored abroad? Finally, aren’t you 

concerned that America’s attractiveness as a global financial center will be undermined if Argentina continues to have access to U.S. financial markets while it continues to avoid international obligations? 

Answer: 

On the margins of the Cannes G–20 Summit in November, President Obama discussed with President Fernandez de Kirchner the need for Argentina to normalize 

its relationship with the international financial and investment community, and he 

urged Argentina to take concrete actions with respect to repayment of outstanding 

arrears and complying with final and binding arbitral awards. Senior Department 

of State officials and others in the Administration have followed up with Argentine 

officials to reinforce the President’s message. 

The United States believes that it is in the mutual interest of Argentina and the 

United States, that Argentina resolves its longstanding obligations to creditors and 

arbitral award holders. Failing this, Argentina’s access to U.S. financial markets remains sharply curtailed. 

By meeting its obligations to creditors and investors, Argentina would send a 

strong signal that it welcomes and encourages foreign and domestic investment that 

is crucial for its sustained economic growth. 

Argentina’s arrears to U.S. government agencies total about $550 million, and 

U.S. government effort, including in the Paris Club of official creditor nations, is appropriately focused on recovering full payment on these loans extended on behalf 

of American taxpayers. We also continue to use every opportunity to urge Argentina 

to resolve the claims of private American bondholders and investors. 

Question 2: 

Madame Secretary, Acting Assistant Secretary Rodriguez wrote Congress last 

year that continuing the Compact of Free Association with the Republic of Palau 

through 2024 is ‘‘an important element of our Pacific strategy for defense of the U.S. 

homeland.’’ The Compact ‘‘creates an invaluable security zone . . . vital to our national security.’’ Furthermore, Palau also votes with the U.S. and Israel in the 

United Nations more than any other member state. 

The Compact Agreement has bipartisan and bicameral support in Congress. Congress has requested the Administration on numerous of occasions to provide viable 

offsets for the spending contained in the Compact. It is widely recognized that the 

relationship with Palau is important and that it has evolved into a strong partnership with people who share American values. Given that our national debt now over 

101

$15 trillion, any expenditure must be justified and offsets found to balance the costs. 

At a hearing I held on the Compact in November 2011, witnesses from the Departments of State, Defense and Interior proclaimed Palau’s importance, but yet, still 

did not offer any further options to pay for it, or share the cost. 

Why is the State Department not taking ownership in this issue if it is so important to your strategy in the Asia Pacific, and what will you do to push the Office 

of Management and Budget to identify congressionally viable offsets to get the Compact signed once and for all? 

Answer: 

Although the Department of State is responsible for U.S. foreign relations with 

Palau and the Department of Defense maintains the defense relationship, the Department of the Interior has always been responsible for implementing the Compacts as well as the source of funding for assistance programs provided under the 

Compacts. It is most appropriate that the Palau Compact Review Agreement be 

funded and implemented in the same manner. The Department of the Interior is 

the agency responsible for providing assistance and implementing most provisions 

of the proposed Palau Compact Review legislation. The proposed FY2012 budget for 

the Department of the Interior included sufficient mandatory savings to cover the 

cost Compact programs provided for in the legislation. The Department of the Interior and the Office of Management and Budget worked closely to identify appropriate offsets to cover the assistance. 

Former OMB Director Jack Lew has noted that ‘‘each of these proposals furthers 

an important policy goal, while creating sizable savings to the Treasury that could 

offset the Palau Agreement.’’ In a February 6, 2012, letter, OMB Acting Director 

Jeffrey Zients stated that ‘‘The President’s FY 2012 Budget included several legislative proposals with mandatory savings that could offset the $194 million cost over 

10 years to extend the Palau Compact. For example, the proposal for ‘net receipts 

sharing’ of energy and mineral receipts would provide savings of $441 million over 

10 years. This proposal would make permanent the current arrangement for sharing 

the cost to administer energy and mineral programs on Federal lands. A form of 

net receipts sharing was in place during the 1990s, and this proposal has been enacted annually through the appropriations bills since 2008. The proposal has enjoyed the bipartisan support of the majority of Members of Congress and is a viable 

offset for the Palau Compact.’’ The Administration continues to discuss possible offsets with Congress in the hope of reaching a resolution to the question of offsets. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE

fHONORABLE BRAD SHERMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, WITH WRITTEN RESPONSES RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

Question 1: 

In March 2011 and again in July 2011, Azerbaijan threatened to shoot down civilian airplanes. Would the Administration not waive Section 907 of the FREEDOM 

Support Act, if Azerbaijan followed through with their threats to shoot down civilian 

airplanes and other acts of aggression against Nagorno-Karabakh? 

Answer: 

As a Co-Chair of the Minsk Group, the United States has emphasized that all 

sides should show restraint in their public statements and on the ground to avoid 

misunderstandings and unintended consequences. As we emphasized last year, the 

threat or use of force—including against civil aircraft, which pose no threat themselves—is unacceptable, and runs counter to commitments made by the Presidents 

of Azerbaijan and Armenia to seek a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the conflict 

in Nagorno-Karabakh. The United States has continued to make clear to Azerbaijan 

and Armenia, both bilaterally and through the Minsk Group, that there is no military solution to the conflict. 

Question 2: 

Given Turkey’s and Azerbaijan’s ongoing blockade of Armenia, I have concerns 

about the Administration’s Budget with respect to Armenia and the region. While 

the entire account received an approximately 18 percent cut, I am concerned about 

the economic impact of the dual blockades against Armenia. We should not be reducing aid to Armenia, but rather looking at ways to assist Armenia in overcoming 

the dual blockades. What steps are being taking to press Turkey to end its blockade 

of Armenia? 

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Answer: 

After being essentially straight-lined in FY 2011 and FY 2012, our proposed assistance budget for Armenia compares favorably with the rest of the region, which 

has been reduced by 25 percent between FY 2011 and FY 2013. Comparatively, our 

request for Armenia in FY 2013 represents a reduction of less than $8 million, or 

approximately 17 percent. These reductions reflect the difficult tradeoffs we have to 

make between competing priorities in a difficult budget environment. 

U.S. assistance seeks to enhance Armenia’s position as a stable partner at peace 

with its neighbors, fully integrated into the regional economy, where principles of 

democracy are respected, and the benefits of economic growth are shared by all segments of society. While the proposed budget will require us to make some difficult 

choices between specific programs, we believe the resources requested are sufficient 

to continue robust support to top assistance priorities such as fostering regional stability, promoting economic growth, and advancing democracy and the rule of law. 

U.S. assistance will continue to support confidence-building measures designed to 

build linkages with Azerbaijan and Turkey. We will also support conflict mitigation 

projects and international visitor exchanges to promote mutual understanding between neighboring countries. We will sustain efforts to develop a stable and predictable economic environment that encourages the private sector to make productive 

and growth-enhancing investments. 

We continue to urge Turkey to ratify the 2009 bilateral protocols. We believe normalization carries important benefits for Turkey and Armenia, and will foster increased stability and prosperity in the entire Caucasus region. We will continue to 

work to promote understanding between Turkey and Armenia, including by encouraging people-to-people cultural and economic contacts, and other cross-border and 

regional initiatives. 

Question 3: 

Madame Secretary, Congress has provided aid to the people of Nagorno Karabakh 

over the years, but I remain concerned about whether such assistance is actually 

delivered to Nagorno Karabakh. Do you support ongoing U.S. assistance to help the 

people of Nagorno Karabakh? 

Answer: 

The Administration shares Congress’ view on the importance of aiding those who 

have been affected by the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (NK). Since 1998, the 

United States has provided over $37 million in humanitarian assistance to victims 

of the NK conflict, including food, shelter, emergency and medical supplies, access 

to quality healthcare and water, and demining projects. In addition to the ongoing 

demining project which has thus far cleared 94% of anti-personnel and anti-tank 

mines and 71% of the battle area, we are concluding a potable water project that 

will expand access to clean water in the city of Stepanakert. We intend to continue 

our support to the people of Nagorno-Karabakh in FY 2013. 

Question 4: 

I request that our aid programs in Georgia, while supporting development 

throughout the entire country, focus on the relatively impoverished and under-developed Javakh region in the south of Georgia. We should provide a robust U.S. aid 

package for Georgia that includes targeted assistance to the Javakh region. Do you 

support U.S. aid to the Javakh region of Georgia? 

Answer: 

The United States has, and continues to focus significant assistance resources toward programs that benefit the Samstke-Javakheti region of Georgia. By far, the 

largest U.S. Government investment has been the over $200 million Millennium 

Challenge Corporation (MCC) effort that rehabilitated approximately 222 kilometers 

of a main road linking Tbilisi with Samtskhe-Javakheti to foster economic development in the region through increasing exports of agricultural products. 

Other efforts in the bilateral budget are leveraging the MCC investment, including agriculture development efforts, which have supported various activities including cattle farming, trout farming, potato production, dairy processing, feed production and beekeeping. We are supporting private sector development by promoting 

development of small- and medium-sized enterprises in the tourism sector, increasing the access to long-term finance, and broadening business training opportunities. 

Our programs also target social sector and democratic development. U.S. assistance rehabilitated three public hospitals in the region, and a new primary education 

project includes teaching Georgian language in schools in Samtskhe-Javakheti to 

improve the children’s ability to participate in the Georgian economy and political 

life. U.S. democracy programs are focused on empowering people and organizations 

103

to debate and resolve issues and increasing active citizen participation in the electoral process, both of which are integral to building a cohesive multi-ethnic nation. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE

fHONORABLE STEVE CHABOT, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO, WITH WRITTEN RESPONSE RE- CEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

Question: 

The Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, in November of 2011, held a hearing 

to assess the 15-year renewal of the Compact of Free Association with the Republic 

of Palau. Both Chairman Manzullo and Ranking Member Faleomavaega expressed 

a commitment to enacting legislation approving a revised Agreement. 

As you know, our nations have longstanding ties. Acting Assistant Secretary 

Rodriguez recently wrote continued free association with Palau is ‘‘an important element of our Pacific strategy for defense of the U.S. homeland,’’ creating ‘‘an invaluable security zone . . . vital to our national security. Undersecretary of Defense 

Flournoy has said that ‘‘failure to follow through on our commitments to Palau . . . 

would jeopardize our defense posture in the Western Pacific.’’

It has become apparent that budget offsets proposed to pay for the Agreement by 

the Administration do not meet with the approval of a bipartisan majority in Congress. Will you work with the Committee to identify offsets that can meet with the 

approval of Congress so that we may move forward with enacting legislation? 

Answer: 

Although the Department of State is responsible for U.S. foreign relations with 

Palau and the Department of Defense maintains the defense relationship, the Department of the Interior has always been responsible for implementing the Compacts as well as the source of funding for assistance programs provided under the 

Compacts. It is most appropriate that the Palau Compact Review Agreement be 

funded and implemented in the same manner. The Department of the Interior is 

the agency responsible for providing assistance and implementing most provisions 

of the proposed Palau Compact Review legislation. The proposed FY2012 budget for 

the Department of the Interior included sufficient mandatory savings to cover the 

cost Compact programs provided for in the legislation. The Department of the Interior and the Office of Management and Budget worked closely to identify appropriate offsets to cover the assistance. 

Former OMB Director Jack Lew has noted that ‘‘each of these proposals furthers 

an important policy goal, while creating sizable savings to the Treasury that could 

offset the Palau Agreement.’’ In a February 6, 2012, letter, OMB Acting Director 

Jeffrey Zients stated that ‘‘The President’s FY 2012 Budget included several legislative proposals with mandatory savings that could offset the $194 million cost over 

10 years to extend the Palau Compact. For example, the proposal for ‘net receipts 

sharing’ of energy and mineral receipts would provide savings of $441 million over 

10 years. This proposal would make permanent the current arrangement for sharing 

the cost to administer energy and mineral programs on Federal lands. A form of 

net receipts sharing was in place during the 1990s, and this proposal has been enacted annually through the appropriations bills since 2008. The proposal has enjoyed the bipartisan support of the majority of Members of Congress and is a viable 

offset for the Palau Compact.’’ The Administration continues to discuss possible offsets with Congress in the hope of reaching a resolution to the question of offsets. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE

fHONORABLE RUSS CARNAHAN, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MISSOURI, WITH WRITTEN RESPONSES RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

Question 1: 

International science engagement has become a regular and important part of the 

State Department’s toolbox for working with countries. I have long believed that 

this is an important part of our diplomatic engagement around the world. To that 

end, I am working on legislation to further develop these initiatives. Much of this 

work has been mostly done through science and technology agreements with other 

countries which focus on knowledge exchange and basic scientific research and education. Recently, however, initiatives which focus more on the commercialization of 

science and technology, entrepreneurship, and innovation have become part of the 

104

State Department’s repertoire. Why has there been a shift in priorities, and how is 

this in our diplomatic, security, and economic interests? Further, how does this investment of US tax dollars in this manner help US businesses and companies? 

Answer: 

The Department has expanded, not shifted, its priorities to address commercialization of science and technology, entrepreneurship, and innovation. We continue 

to vigorously support science and technology cooperation in areas such as STEM 

education, basic scientific research, and fact- based decision making. We have over 

fifty umbrella Science & Technology Agreements with countries around the world 

that enhance the exchange of knowledge and promote cooperation among scientists. 

We have expanded our global engagement to include topics that are integral to 

our foreign policy objectives worldwide. Commercialization of science and technology, entrepreneurship, and innovation are essential for the economic growth and 

prosperity of the United States and its foreign partners. When other countries learn 

our processes, value open competition, accept international standards and protect 

intellectual property, the U.S. private sector benefits. 

Through our science, technology and innovation efforts, we are helping our foreign 

partners become more responsive to the needs of their citizens. Our programs create 

economic opportunities for those scientists and engineers who might otherwise be 

tempted to use their knowledge for nefarious purposes. 

In the short term, the Department’s programs have the potential to lead to new 

products and new markets for U.S. and foreign companies. In the long term, these 

programs may contribute to more substantive cultural changes that bolster the 

local, regional, and global economic and security environment. 

Question 2: 

Madam Secretary, as you know, the Republic of Argentina has still not resolved 

issues stemming from its 2001 default, and a significant amount of the sovereign 

debt on which Argentina defaulted was issued by Argentina under U.S. law to U.S. 

investors. This default and accompanying policies have impacted a diverse array of 

Americans, from large investors to farmers to educators’ pensions. I commend you, 

the Department of Treasury, and the White House for taking steps to help resolve 

this in a way that is in the best interests of both of our countries. However, Argentina has still not resolved the issue despite having the means to settle its default. 

I remain concerned that even though Argentina promised to follow U.S. law when 

it issued bonds to Americans in U.S. markets, it has since evaded over one hundred 

judgments against it in U.S. courts leaving Americans with no other legal recourse. 

I believe that it is our government’s role to stand up to Argentina on these Americans’ behalf. 

Would you elaborate on why it is important for the international community, as 

well as in Argentina’s long-term interest, to resolve these issues? Also, what steps 

are being taken by the State Department to address this situation and encourage 

Argentina to meet its international obligations? 

Answer: 

On the margins of the Cannes G–20 Summit in November, President Obama discussed with President Fernandez de Kirchner the need for Argentina to normalize 

its relationship with the international financial and investment community, and he 

urged Argentina to take concrete actions with respect to repayment of outstanding 

arrears and complying with final and binding arbitral awards. Senior State Department officials and others in the Administration have followed up with Argentine officials to reinforce the President’s message. 

We believe it is in the mutual interest of Argentina and the United States that 

Argentina resolve its longstanding obligations to creditors and arbitral award holders. 

In meeting its obligations to creditors and investors, Argentina will send a strong 

signal that it welcomes and encourages foreign and domestic investment that is crucial for the sustained economic growth. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE

fHONORABLE CONNIE MACK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA, WITH WRITTEN RESPONSES RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

Question 1: 

Secretary Clinton, on October 27, 2011 you testified before the House Committee 

on Foreign Affairs that you had ‘‘no record of any request’’ for an export license from 

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the Department of Justice despite the Department causing 2,000 arms to be exported outside of the U.S. and into Mexico during the tragic Operation Fast and Furious. If no license was received, the Department of Justice would be in clear violation of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) which requires a written waiver from the State Department before exporting or causing to export weapons on the United States Munitions List. 

According to the Department of State, ‘‘the U.S. Government views the sale, export, and re-transfer of defense articles and defense services as an integral part of 

safeguarding U.S. national security and furthering U.S. foreign policy objectives.’’

As you know, the authority to control the export of defense articles and services, 

as provided to the President in the Arms Export Control Act, was delegated to the 

Secretary of State through Executive Order 11958, as amended. The ITAR implements this authority. Civil violations of ITAR are punishable by a maximum penalty of $500,000 per 

violation while criminal violations are punishable by a maximum penalty of 

$1,000,000 per violation or up to 10 years imprisonment per violation. 

What steps have you taken to hold accountable those responsible at the Department of Justice for violating the ITAR? 

Answer: 

The Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of the Inspector General is looking into 

the circumstances surrounding this operation. We are awaiting the completion of 

that review. 

Question 2: 

Secretary Clinton, in 2001 the Republic of Argentina defaulted on tens of billions 

of dollars in sovereign debt. Ten years later, Argentina still has not paid what it 

owes U.S. citizens and U.S. corporations. In fact, Argentina has evaded over 100 

U.S. court judgments and has attempted to repudiate the debt altogether. 

What steps have you taken to urge Argentina to meet its legal obligations? 

Answer: 

On the margins of the Cannes G–20 Summit in November, President Obama discussed with President Fernandez de Kirchner the need for Argentina to normalize 

its relationship with the international financial and investment community, and he 

urged Argentina to take concrete actions with respect to repayment of outstanding 

arrears and complying with final and binding arbitral awards. Senior State Department officials and others in the Administration have followed up with Argentine officials to reinforce the President’s message. 

We believe it is in the mutual interest of Argentina and the United States that 

Argentina resolve its longstanding obligations to creditors and arbitral award holders. 

In meeting its obligations to creditors and investors, Argentina will send a strong 

signal that it welcomes and encourages foreign and domestic investment that is crucial for the sustained economic growth. 

Question 3: 

Secretary Clinton, in FY2013 the State Department requested more than 

$500,000 in military training and education assistance to Argentina. 

However, last year, Argentina hijacked and jeopardized sensitive U.S. equipment 

during a training mission and continues to disregard over 100 U.S. court judgments. 

What is the rationale for providing more than a half million dollars to Argentina 

for their military? 

Additionally, it appears that Argentina has implemented import restrictions that 

are in violation of our existing bilateral investment treaty. 

Are you aware of Argentina’s import restrictions and what actions have you taken 

as a result? 

Answer: 

One of the primary objectives of IMET is to develop long-term relationships with 

foreign military officers. IMET funding for Argentina would support aviation-related 

courses, defense resource management training, international law courses, as well 

as sending its senior- and mid-level military officers to professional-military education and management courses as part of their professional development. It is important to continue to sustain a basic relationship between the U.S. and Argentine 

militaries as we work through all issues in our broader bilateral relationship. 

Despite the success of a 22 percent increase in U.S. exports to Argentina in 2011, 

we remain concerned by measures introduced by the Argentine government—measures that create barriers to trade and investment, including increased use of nonVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:10 May 17, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00109 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\022912\73119 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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automatic licenses, requirements that all imports and purchases of dollars to pay 

for those imports be approved by the government, requirements that companies balance imports with exports, and restrictions on remittances abroad of profits and 

dividends. We have engaged Argentina on our concerns, both bilaterally and 

through the WTO, that these new policies pose barriers to trade and investment and 

have a negative effect on both U.S. and Argentine companies. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE

fHONORABLE TED POE, A REPRESENT- ATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS, WITH WRITTEN RESPONSES RE- CEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

Madame Secretary: 

Question 1: 

What is the Administration’s strategy at the summit in Chicago to ensure that 

Georgia is given a clear roadmap and benchmarks for achieving full NATO membership? 

Answer: 

The United States is working closely with NATO Allies on planning for the Summit, which will focus on NATO engagement in Afghanistan in addition to NATO’s 

capabilities and partnerships. Georgia continues to be an important NATO partner 

and significant contributor to ISAF operations in Afghanistan, and we believe the 

Summit should highlight this partnership. 

NATO’s door remains open to all aspirants, including Georgia. The Administration supports Georgia’s NATO membership aspirations, and its Annual National 

Program (ANP) and the NATO–Georgia Commission (NGC) play central roles in this 

regard. The Administration is also working with Allies on ways to acknowledge the 

progress that Georgia has made on democratic, economic, and defense reforms at 

the Summit. 

Question 2: 

In 2007, Taiwan notified the WTO that it would establish maximum residue levels 

for Ractopamine (a substance U.S. beef and pork farmers use to produce lean livestock) so that U.S. beef and pork farmers could export their livestock to Taiwan. 

However, because of political pressure from Taiwan pork farmers, the Taiwan government refuses to implement science-based standards for beef and pork imports. 

U.S. beef and pork exports continue to be subject to unwarranted import restrictions. Taiwan has been a top 5 export market for U.S. beef until recently because 

of these restrictions. Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou announced after his re-election 

in January that resolving outstanding trade issues affecting U.S. beef and pork exports to Taiwan would be one of his main goals for his second term in office. What 

is the State Department doing to keep pressure on the Taiwanese government to 

lift trade restrictions on U.S. beef and pork exports? What are the next steps to resolve this issue? Is the State Department working with affected industries as it 

strives to resolve this matter? 

Answer: 

The Department of State, as part of an interagency team including USTR, USDA, 

the FDA, Commerce, and the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), has worked for 

years to encourage Taiwan to adopt science-based food safety measures, following 

other key trading partners in the region. As part of this effort, we have urged Taiwan to set science-based minimum residue levels MRLs not only for the import of 

products containing trace amounts of feed additives like ractopamine, but also for 

a range of other products. 

The interagency team of experts working on this issue has, on an ongoing basis, 

provided technical information to Taiwan regulators; consulted closely with U.S. 

farmers, ranchers and other stakeholders; briefed key staff on Capitol Hill on developments; and traveled to Taiwan to meet directly with all of the relevant agencies 

to press Taiwan to take action. Senior officials from the State Department, USTR, 

and other agencies have raised the ractopamine issue with Taiwan counterparts 

consistently during bilateral events and visits. 

The AIT team, led by Director Stanton, has met with Taiwan political leaders and 

media to urge action and to correct misinformation about the safety of ractopamine 

and U.S. meat exports. Most importantly, Director Stanton and senior U.S. Government officials have repeatedly made clear to Taiwan that ensuring that its measures 

are based on science is critical to Taiwan acting as a responsible trading partner, 

107

and that Taiwan’s actions regarding ractopamine have undermined confidence in 

the United States that Taiwan will treat U.S. products fairly. Senior U.S. Government officials have further made clear to Taiwan that its actions have become a 

major impediment in our bilateral economic relationship, including our bilateral 

Trade and Investment Framework Agreement talks. 

On March 5 the Taiwan authorities announced a plan to implement a 

ractopamine MRL for beef, subject to several additional conditions. We are currently 

seeking additional information about the plan and how it will be implemented, and 

are closely monitoring developments in Taiwan. 

Question 3: 

The U.S. rice industry exports half of all production each year. Rice farmers have 

suffered in recent months because of increased production costs and lack of access 

to potential markets like Iraq. Iraq imports most of its rice—about 1 million metric 

tons per year. Over the past decade, 10–15% of that total came from the U.S., however Iraq has not purchased U.S. rice since late 2010. The U.S. rice industry would 

benefit from having access to the Iraq market. Have you talked with the Iraqi government about this issue? If not, would you be willing to raise this issue with the 

Iraqi government? 

Answer: 

U.S. rice is well regarded by consumers in Iraq and is always considered an option 

when Iraq makes purchases. Over the past twelve months, lower prices offered by 

other rice suppliers have made those suppliers much more competitive. That is 

changing, however, and as U.S. rice prices are becoming increasingly competitive, 

Iraq is again looking seriously at U.S. rice as an option. 

As our embassies do around the world, our embassy in Baghdad continually and 

vigorously engages with the Iraqi authorities in support of U.S. agricultural exports, 

including rice. We will continue this effort to encourage them to purchase U.S. rice 

this year. 

Question 4: 

Over the last year, 40% of the military reimbursement claims filed by Pakistan 

were ruled fraudulent. After we got Osama bin Laden, Pakistan outed our CIA station chief, arrested a doctor that helped us, and demanded we close our drone bases. 

A month after bin Laden’s capture, the United States identified bomb making factories where IEDs were made to kill American soldiers. Instead of going after the 

militants at the factories, apparently Pakistani intelligence officials tipped off the 

bad guys. To top it off, according to Admiral Mike Mullen, the government of Pakistan supported the killing of Americans. ‘‘With ISI [Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency] support, Haqqani operatives plan and conducted’’ a truck bomb attack that wounded more than 70 U.S. and NATO troops on—get this—September 

11. Given all these events, why do you want to give Pakistan $500 million more in 

FY13 than we did in 2011? 

Answer: 

Our core national security interests in Pakistan are as urgent and compelling as 

ever, and we remain committed to sustaining a productive relationship with Pakistan. As a result, we continue to request robust levels of security assistance to preserve options and flexibility as we move forward with the relationship. Building 

Pakistan’s counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities remain 

critical to U.S. national security interests. Of course, we continue to calibrate and 

evaluate the delivery of security assistance to ensure it is linked to Pakistan’s cooperation and in line with our shared objectives. 

The actual increase in the FY 2013 Administration’s request for security assistance for Pakistan compared to the assistance appropriated in FY 2011 is approximately $56 million. The increase of $50 million is calculated when considering how 

our training and equipping efforts to support the development of Pakistan’s COIN 

and CT capabilities were distributed between the State Foreign Assistance and 

DOD budgets in FY 2011 and FY 2013.

• In FY 2011, State’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military 

Education and Training (IMET) program, and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) plus DoD’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund 

(PCF) totaled approximately $1.1 billion. 

• For FY 2013, the Administration requested $1.156 billion in PCCF, IMET, 

and FMF, a relatively modest increase of approximately $56 million over FY 

2011 enacted levels. In FY 2013, the Administration did not request funding 

108

for PCF but instead requested funding for PCCF as part of State’s Overseas 

Contingency Operations account. • Of this increase, $55 million is in FMF, which brings the total FY 2013 FMF 

request to $350 million, the same level it was requested at in FY 2012. The 

modest increase of $1 million for IMET will enable us to fund increased Pakistan participation in professional and technical military training programs 

here the United States.

It is worth noting that the FY 2013 security assistance request for Pakistan is 

a 21 percent decrease from the FY 2012 request. As such, we consider this to be 

a realistic request that takes into account both budget and implementation constraints. 

Question 5: 

The Senator Paul Simon Water for the Poor Act of 2005 made safe drinking water 

and sanitation a priority of US foreign policy. I am proud to serve as the lead Republican cosponsor of H.R. 3658, the Senator Paul Simon Water for the World Act, 

which would strengthen these efforts to provide safe drinking water and sanitation. 

In the last two years you have made two strong policy speeches on or around World 

Water Day about the importance of this issue. Can you brief us on what changes 

have been made at Department of State and USAID to turn those strong policy 

speeches into strong policy for global water? 

Answer: 

Our efforts to implement the Senator Paul Simon Water for the Poor Act of 2005 

are described in full in our annual reports to Congress (available at http://

www.state.gov/e/oes/water/index.htm). In addition, the Department of State has 

taken a number of steps over the past two years to make water issues a priority 

of our bilateral, regional and global diplomatic engagement and to strengthen the 

capacity of the United States to address these issues internationally. For example:

• We have strengthened our understanding of global water challenges and improved our plans and strategies. We requested a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Global Water Security to better understand the relationship 

between global water challenges and U.S. national security. We will be using 

the recently released unclassified version of the NIE to build international 

support for these issues and to guide our own efforts on water and security. • USAID is in the process of developing a water and development strategy that 

integrates water into USAID supported health, food security and climate 

change efforts. • We have launched a number of partnerships to catalyze greater international 

action and mobilize additional resources. The Shared Waters Partnership was 

established in September 2011 and creates a multi-donor platform for advancing cooperation on transboundary waters in regions where water is, or may 

become, a source of conflict. The Middle East and North Africa Network of 

Water Centers of Excellence was launched in December 2011 and is an alliance of research and educational institutions and civil society to resolve water 

challenges through collaborative research, capacity building, innovation, and 

knowledge sharing. 

• We have established institutional relationships that will greatly leverage U.S. 

expertise and knowledge. In March 2011, we signed a Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and the World Bank to strengthen our 

respective capacities and efforts to improve water security. More than 30 different projects involving over 10 U.S. government agencies have been identified. This March, we launched the U.S. Water Partnership, which will serve 

as a platform to mobilize knowledge, expertise and resources from the U.S. 

private sector, government, non-profit, foundation, academic, and expert communities in support of water and sanitation challenges, especially in developing countries where needs are greatest. 

• And we have engaged diplomatically to build international awareness and 

commitment and to support riparian country efforts to address national and 

transboundary water challenges in a number of regions where water and security are closely linked (e.g., the Nile, Mekong, Pakistan). We have worked 

closely with international partners to support international events such as 

the Bonn International Conference on Water, Food and Energy Security, the 

6th World Water Forum in Marseille, and the Sanitation and Water for All 

High-level meetings) to contribute to meaningful impact.

These are some of our activities from the past two years. More information is 

available at http://www.state.gov/e/oes/c36032.htm. We are grateful for your leaderVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:10 May 17, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00112 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\022912\73119 HFA PsN: SHIRL
109

ship on this important issue and would be pleased to send our experts to provide 

a more detailed briefing if you would like. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE

fHONORABLE ANN MARIE BUERKLE, 

A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK, WITH WRITTEN

RESPONSES RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

Question 1: 

Madam Secretary, I would first like to direct your attention to a matter of importance for many New Yorkers living along the St. Lawrence Seaway and our Great 

Lakes. The International Joint Commission, funded through the Department of 

State and a component of our nation’s foreign policy, recently released a report (the 

BV7 plan) outlining its proposed changes for Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence 

River which could have a dramatic impact on my constituents in Western and Central New York. As a former New York State Senator, you well understand the importance of maintaining and preserving current water levels. It is my hope that as 

the International Joint Commission moves ahead with its efforts, your office will remain an active participant in the process and work with mine to protect New York’s 

waters and protect those who live and own businesses along the shores. 

Answer: 

I continue to appreciate your strong engagement on this important issue and your 

strong commitment to the concerns of your constituents. As I noted in my response 

to your letter of February 2, 2012, the waters of Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence 

River are shared by the United States and Canada and are therefore subject to the 

1909 Treaty and the International Joint Commission, which was established by the 

United States and Canada under that treaty. In 1952, in relation to a reference to 

the IJC relating to construction of a hydroelectric power project on the St. Lawrence 

River, the two federal governments asked the International Joint Commission (IJC) 

to analyze whether the extreme fluctuations of water on the lake could be reduced. 

Recent studies show that the existing management plan has harmed the health 

of the lake and river by degrading wetlands and other habitat. The IJC’s objective 

in modernizing that plan, pursuant to the 1909 Treaty, is to make decisions taking 

into consideration all interests of the basin, using the best available science. The 

proposed plan would substantially improve wetlands, a key indicator for lake and 

river health. Healthy wetlands support birds, fish, and other wildlife, and contribute 

to the quality of life of the basin’s human residents by filtering pollutants and enhancing recreational opportunities. I share your concern, and I know the IJC shares 

your concern, for balancing these important objectives with the needs of people 

whose property borders the lake, and we all remain committed to striking the best 

possible balance. 

Question 2: 

I’m certain you agree that Israel is our most important ally in the Middle East. 

The United States has always strongly supported the nation of Israel, who is truly 

a representative of American values and security interests in the region. For that 

reason, both Democratic and Republican Administrations alike have always nurtured a close alliance with Israel. 

A look back at the previous two Administrations indicates the special relationship 

the United States has had. President Bush and President Clinton, despite being on 

different sides of the aisle, maintained very strong ties with Israel throughout their 

terms. 

During his expansive efforts in the Middle East, the Bush Administration worked 

tirelessly to ensure that Israel’s interests were taken into account. President Bush 

and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice labored to bring about successful negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, drawing up a ‘‘Roadmap to Peace’’ in 

2002. Throughout that process there was never any doubt that the United States 

and Israel were firmly unified. 

President Clinton’s Administration likewise nurtured our relationship with Israel 

while pursuing an ambitious agenda for peace between Israel and Palestine. During 

his time in office, President Clinton, among other things, had a significant role in 

the Oslo Peace Accords and conducted the Camp David Summit in 2000. Many 

would characterize the period during which President Clinton was in office as the 

most promising for creating a lasting peace in the region. 

In stark contrast to these two administrations, President Obama has managed to 

undermine the peace process between Israel and Palestine. He has destabilized our 

110

relationship with Israel perhaps more than any President since Israel gained independence in 1948. It is clear that you, as Secretary of State, have worked to maintain our alliance with Israel. President Obama, however, has weakened your efforts 

with his misguided approach to Middle East policy, as well as in his interactions 

with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. 

Many would not be surprised that President Obama might differ from the Bush 

Administration on Israel Policy. It is not so obvious, however, why he would differ 

so significantly from President Clinton. Like Bill Clinton, Barack Obama is a Democratic president. Also like Mr. Clinton, Mr. Obama’s counterpart in Israel is Benjamin Netanyahu. 

You served in the Senate during President Bush’s two terms and you had a very 

important and influential role during President Clinton’s time in office. Undoubtedly 

you have valuable insight regarding our important relationship with Israel. Perhaps, you would be willing to offer some commentary as to why President Obama 

has taken such an unwise and, in my perspective, irresponsible approach. Why has 

President Obama failed to comprehend the importance of being a strong ally to 

Israel? 

Answer: 

As President Obama has said repeatedly, our longstanding commitment to the security and well-being of Israel—a commitment that is consistent with the history 

of previous occupants of the Oval Office—is unbreakable. During his recent visit, 

Prime Minister Netanyahu reaffirmed the unprecedented level of cooperation this 

Administration has with Israel on a broad range of regional and strategic issues. 

We have a constant high-level security dialogue with key Israeli defense and intelligence officials. In a very tight budget environment, our overall security assistance 

to Israel has increased every year since 2009 to its highest levels in U.S. history. 

Backing up its commitment to Israel’s security with its deeds, this Administration 

has expanded U.S.-Israeli cooperation on security challenges, including counterterrorism, preventing arms smuggling to Gaza, missile defense, and preventing Iran 

from obtaining a nuclear weapon. 

Question 3: 

This week it was reported that Israeli officials said they won’t warn the United 

States if they decide to launch a pre-emptive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. Obviously, this is a rather unsettling report, especially given that it so closely 

precedes Prime Minister Netanyahu’s visit to Washington. What, if anything, does 

this report indicate about our partnership with Israel in facing the threat of a nuclear Iran? 

Answer: 

This Administration has been unequivocal with regard to our policy on Iran. As 

the President has said, we are determined to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear 

weapon, and no options are off the table. A nuclear-armed Iran would further embolden Tehran’s support for terrorism and would constitute a destabilizing threat 

across the region, including to our closest ally in the Middle East—Israel. We continue to have frank discussions with the Israelis on our options regarding Iran, 

which President Obama recently stated include all elements of American power: a 

political effort aimed at isolating Iran; a diplomatic effort to sustain international 

unity and ensure that Iran’s program is monitored; an economic effort that imposes 

crippling sanctions; and a military effort to be prepared for any contingency. This 

Administration firmly believes that an opportunity still remains for diplomacy—

backed by pressure—to succeed. We are in close consultations with Israel and the 

rest of our international partners on maximizing this opportunity to persuade Iran 

to resolve the international community’s concerns regarding the nature of its nuclear program. 

Question 4: 

On a separate note, but keeping on the subject of Iran. There has recently been 

some indication that Iranians would have welcomed American intervention during 

the 2009 uprising. It was reported that members of the Green Party in Iran sent 

a memo to the Obama Administration calling on the West for support. At the time, 

the administration claimed that any support in Iran was unwelcome. Can you confirm the authenticity of this memo? 

Answer: 

We are unaware of any such letter or memo and therefore cannot comment on 

its authenticity. 

111

Question 5: 

(In any case) In retrospect do you believe President Obama should have acted differently during the unrest in Iran in 2009? Do you believe that some of the challenges we are facing in Iran would have been avoided had the President chosen to 

take more decisive steps during that period? 

Answer: 

The most insistent voices we heard from within the Green Movement and their 

supporters outside Iran advised that events happening inside the country could not 

appear to be influenced by the United States. The Green Movement was an organic 

movement by the Iranian people. We were cautioned that fueling perceptions of U.S. 

interference would put people’s lives in danger and discredit their movement. 

We remain committed to helping civil society activists throughout the region acquire the tools to create the space where free thought and expression can flourish. 

This administration is also strengthening activists’ capacity to hold their governments accountable by amplifying their calls for greater freedom, accountability, and 

rule of law. We continue to work with like-minded partners to bring international 

pressure on Iran to respect its citizens’ fundamental rights. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE

fHONORABLE DAVID CICILLINE, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, WITH WRITTEN

RESPONSES RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

Question 1: 

Gas prices—Madame Secretary, we have talked extensively today about current 

events in the Middle East—about unrest and violence in Syria, about increased aggression in Afghanistan, and about whether Iran will demonstrate a greater willingness to cooperate and halt its development of nuclear missiles. Amid all of that hostility and uncertainty, gas prices are rising here in the United States. In my home 

state of Rhode Island, as of February 24th, the average price per gallon of regular 

unleaded gasoline was $3.76—that is an increase of almost 40 cents from the same 

time last year. At a time where states like Rhode Island are struggling to recover 

from the Great Recession, increased energy costs can only serve to hamper that recovery. I am deeply concerned that fuel prices will continue to rise and my constituents are extremely anxious about the effects those rising prices will have on their 

ability to cover basic energy costs, like driving to work or heating their homes. So 

Madame Secretary, I am hoping that you can talk about the ongoing events in the 

Middle East and the effects you expect our diplomatic efforts, as well as potential 

military action, to have on gas prices here at home. For example, the latest spike 

in gas prices is due in part to fears that the Strait of Hormuz will close—according 

to some analysts. What can we expect if it actually does close and how will other 

events in the Middle East exacerbate or mitigate those effects? 

Answer: 

The price of gasoline here in the United States depends on the price of crude oil. 

As you correctly noted, oil is a globally traded commodity and events in one part 

of the world have a clear impact on what we pay for the finished product—gasoline—here at home. 

One of the reasons that I established the Bureau of Energy Resources in the State 

Department is to ensure that energy issues are kept at the forefront of our diplomatic engagements with both energy producers and major consumers. The State Department is in regular dialogue both bilaterally with other countries and through 

multilateral forums, such as the International Energy Agency, to find ways to mitigate the impacts of higher energy prices. 

As the President said, ‘‘the single biggest thing that’s causing the price of oil to 

spike right now is instability in the Middle East—this time around Iran. When uncertainty increases, speculative trading on Wall Street increases, and that drives 

prices up even more.’’ The Administration is addressing both sides of that equation, 

through diplomatic engagement in the Middle East and by seeking to limit speculation here at home. 

With respect to the Strait of Hormuz, under international law and long-standing 

international practice, the Strait of Hormuz is a waterway used for international 

navigation. As such, vessels of all states enjoy ‘‘transit passage’’ rights through the 

Strait of Hormuz. Any attempt by Iran to close the Strait or to require vessels to 

obtain Iranian consent to transit the Strait would be inconsistent with international 

law and would not be recognized by the United States. 

112

Question 2: 

China—As of December, my home state of Rhode Island has the third highest unemployment rate in the U.S. at 11%. Our economy has been slow to recover from 

this Recession and people are really hurting due to this slow economy. One of the 

concerns I hear about very often from my constituents is that some of our trading 

partners don’t play by the rules, thereby creating an unlevel playing field for American businesses. Specifically, many of my constituents are very concerned about 

China and the effects of their trade practices on the ability of our businesses to compete in the global market. I would like to hear about the State Department’s efforts 

to urge the Chinese to trade more fairly, namely, to stop manipulating their currency, end their unfair policies of indigenous innovation and technology transfer, 

and enforce protections for intellectual property rights. 

Answer: 

The Administration will continue to work to assure that our economic relationship 

with China is mutually beneficial. Economic and trade discussions were a major 

part of President Hu Jintao’s visit to Washington last year and were again during 

Vice President Xi’s visit this February. We are also using all available channels, including regular bilateral discussions such as the upcoming Strategic and Economic 

Dialogue and multilateral venues like the G–20, to push for progress on China’s economic policies. 

The United States is committed to ensuring that all of our trading partners, including China, follow the rules set forth in international trade agreements. The 

United States regularly files WTO cases against other WTO members with which 

it has disagreements. This is a natural part of the international rules-based trading 

system, and China is no different. The U.S.-China trade relationship is one of the 

largest and most robust in the world. We seek negotiated solutions to trade disputes 

wherever possible, but do not hesitate to use available enforcement tools, including 

the WTO dispute system, when necessary. The Department of State works closely 

with other U.S. government agencies, including USTR, Treasury, and Commerce, to 

enforce these rules and defend the rights of American businesses in China. 

On the topic of currency, the President has made it clear that this issue remains 

a top priority for our Administration in addressing our economic concerns with 

China. Since China decided in June 2010 to allow its currency to appreciate, China’s 

currency has appreciated by about eight percent in nominal terms, and about 13 

percent in real terms, after taking into account the higher rate of inflation in China 

than in the United States. This represents some progress, but the process remains 

incomplete, and further progress is needed. 

With regard to innovation policies, at the end of the S&ED in 2010, United States 

and China reaffirmed that such policies, consistent with WTO rules, would leave the 

terms and conditions of technology transfer, production processes, and other proprietary information to agreement between individual enterprises. During the Xi visit 

this year, China reiterated that technology transfer and technological cooperation 

shall be decided by businesses independently, and will not be used by the Chinese 

government as a pre-condition for market access. During discussions leading up to 

the S&ED that will take place on May 3–4, we have been asking China to make 

fulfillment of this commitment a top priority. 

The protection of intellectual property rights is a key priority to this Administration and is a major component of the National Export Initiative (NEI) and the Administration’s Innovation Strategy. At the conclusion of the 22nd Joint Commission 

on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) in November 2011, China agreed to make a significant systemic change in its enforcement of intellectual property rights. Through a 

high-level central government enforcement structure led by Vice Premier Wang 

Qishan, China will make permanent its 2010 Special intellectual property rights 

(IPR) Campaign. China will continue high-level involvement that will enhance its 

ability to crack down on intellectual property rights infringement. Additionally, at 

the 2011 Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), China pledged to improve its 

high-level, long-term IPR protection and enforcement mechanism, building on the 

2010–2011 Special Campaign Against IPR Infringement and Fake and Shoddy Products. China also pledged to eliminate all of its government procurement indigenous 

innovation products catalogues and revise Article 9 of the draft Government Procurement Law Implementing Regulations as part of its implementation of President 

Hu’s January 2011 commitment not to link Chinese innovation policies to government procurement preferences. 

Senior U.S. government officials are regularly engaging their Chinese counterparts on the importance of protecting and enforcing intellectual property rights. U.S. 

Ambassador Gary Locke recently led the Ambassador’s IPR Roundtable in Beijing, 

where he said that China’s IPR system makes it difficult for both foreign and ChiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:10 May 17, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00116 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\022912\73119 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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nese companies to compete on a level playing field. The Ambassador went on to say 

that ‘‘the issue of intellectual property rights protection is troubling not just to foreign firms but to Chinese firms in China as well. Stronger IPR enforcement is essential to encourage the enterprises to be innovative.’’

Question 3: 

Churches in Turkey—On December 13, 2011, the House overwhelmingly passed 

a resolution calling on Turkey to return Christian churches and properties (H.Res. 

306). The resolution called on you as Secretary of State ‘‘in all official contacts with 

Turkish leaders and other Turkish officials . . . [to] emphasize that Turkey should 

(1) end all forms of religious discrimination. . . . (2) allow the rightful church and 

lay owners of Christian church properties, without hindrance or restriction, to organize and administer prayer services. . . . And (3) return to their rightful owners 

all Christian churches and other places of worship, monasteries, schools, hospitals, 

monuments, relics, holy sites, and other religious properties. . . .’’ As a cosponsor 

of this resolution, I am hoping you can share with us further details about your recent efforts and conversations with the Turkish government to urge them to cooperate on these matters. And, can you also share with us whether you are satisfied 

with Turkey’s progress in returning stolen Christian churches and fully respecting 

the Armenian population that has lived on these lands since biblical times? 

Answer: 

Christian and other religious minority populations continue to face significant 

challenges in Turkey. However, we are encouraged by concrete steps the government of Turkey has taken over the last year to return some religious properties. In 

August 2011, Prime Minister Erdogan introduced a decree that will allow for the 

return of properties confiscated from religious minority community foundations over 

the last 75 years. The announcement of property returns to the 13 foundations that 

have so far applied continue to occur, with three new returns to Armenian and Rum 

(Anatolian Greek) foundations announced on April 19. 

Separately, speaking to the press on the issue of the re-opening of Halki Seminary, Deputy Prime Minister Bozdag said in February the government would ‘‘support such a move.’’ He went on to say, ‘‘The main debate is on the status of the 

school; it is not about permission.’’ On April 14, the head of the Directorate for Religious Affairs in Turkey said it was inappropriate that Greeks and Armenians in 

Turkey had to study outside of the country to be educated as clergy. 

Other steps respecting minority groups include the government’s recent permission for the re-opening of an Armenian foundation in Istanbul and a new Jewish 

foundation in Izmir; the return of the Buyukada orphanage to the Ecumenical Patriarchate; the lifting of restrictions on religious services for the first time at significant sites of worship that had been converted to museums in 1923; and the granting 

of citizenship to over 20 Greek Orthodox metropolitans to expand the pool of candidates eligible to serve as Ecumenical Patriarch. 

The current constitutional redrafting process is also encouraging an unprecedented dialogue on individual rights and religious freedom. Deputy Prime Minister 

Arinc promoted this dialogue on February 13, noting, ‘‘There are thousands of people in our country from various ethnic groups. Together, we are Turkey . . . We 

draw our strength from them.’’ The Ecumenical Patriarch, who addressed the Turkish Parliament for the first time in connection to the constitution redrafting process 

on February 20, also noted the change taking place in Turkey, stating: ‘‘Unfortunately, there have been injustices toward minorities until now. These are slowly 

being corrected and changed. A new Turkey is being born.’’ Other religious groups 

have also addressed the Turkish Parliament in the context of the constitutional redrafting process, including the Armenian Deputy Patriarch of Constantinople, and 

representatives from the Syriac and Catholic communities. 

The realization of religious freedom for all Turkish citizens is a major priority for 

this Administration, and is an issue we raise at the highest levels of the Turkish 

government on a continuous basis. President Obama, Vice President Biden, and I 

raised the topic of religious freedom with PM Erdogan during their most recent 

meetings. The Ambassador and officers from the U.S. Embassy and Consulate General also engage on this issue on a regular basis. While the developments described 

above are encouraging, the Administration will continue to urge the government at 

all levels to live up to its commitments, allowing Turkey’s ethnic and religious communities to enjoy their rights fully. 

Question 4: 

Nagorno Karabakh—Azerbaijan is increasing its armed aggression against the 

Nagorno-Karabakh Republic with more and more ceasefire violations. What actions 

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has the State Department taken to address Azerbaijan’s repeated calls to resolve 

the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by military means? 

Answer: 

As a Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, the United States remains deeply committed to assisting the sides of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to achieve a lasting 

and peaceful settlement. We have reiterated that the sides should prepare their populations for peace, not war, since only a negotiated settlement can lead to stability 

and reconciliation. We continue to urge the sides to show restraint both in their 

public rhetoric and actions on the ground. 

Question 5: 

Nagorno-Karabakh—Can you provide information as to whether the Government 

of Azerbaijan has been taking demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other 

offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, as required by Section 907 of the FREEDOM Support Act? 

Answer: 

As a Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, the United States has been firm in reiterating that there is no military solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. On January 23, 2012, Armenian President Sargsian and Azerbaijani President Aliyev reaffirmed in a joint statement their commitment to the peace process, and agreed to 

continue developing a mechanism to investigate incidents along the frontlines. 

Question 6: 

Nagorno-Karabakh—Can you please provide information regarding how the Administration is distributing aid to Nagorno Karabakh? 

Answer: 

Since 1998, the United States has provided over $37 million in humanitarian assistance to victims of the NK conflict, including food, shelter, emergency and medical supplies, access to quality healthcare and water, and demining projects. In addition to the ongoing demining project which has thus far cleared 94% of known minefields and 71% of the battle area, we are concluding a potable water project that 

will expand access to clean water in the city of Stepanakert. We intend to continue 

our support to the people of Nagorno-Karabakh in FY 2013.

Æ