UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-1969

DISCOVERY COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

COMPUTER SCIENCES CORPORATION,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, Chief District 

Judge. (8:12-cv-02894-DKC)

Submitted: March 31, 2014 Decided: May 1, 2014

Before KEENAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Christine Nicolaides Kearns, PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN 

LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. M. Carter DeLorme, JONES 

DAY, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Discovery Communications, LLC (“Discovery”) appeals 

the district court’s order granting Computer Sciences 

Corporation’s (“CSC”) motion to dismiss its complaint, in which 

it alleged that CSC tortiously interfered with its employment 

contract with its chief accounting officer, for failure to state 

a claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

Finding no error, we affirm. 

We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for 

failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Sec’y of State 

for Defence v. Trimble Navigation, Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th 

Cir. 2007). “[W]hen ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, 

a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations 

contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 

94 (2007). However, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to 

raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The complaint must 

contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. 

To state a claim for tortious interference with 

contract in Maryland, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) existence of 

a contract between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant’s 

knowledge of that contract; (3) defendant’s intentional 

interference with that contract; (4) breach of that contract by 
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the third party; and (5) resulting damages to the plaintiff.” 

Fowler v. Printers II, Inc., 598 A.2d 794, 802 (Md. Ct. Spec. 

App. 1991). “It is the successful interference that is the 

tort, not the breach of the contract. The latter is but proof 

of the former.” Lake Shore Investors v. Rite Aid Corp., 461 

A.2d 725, 730-31 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983) (internal footnote 

omitted). 

On review, we conclude that the district court 

properly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. 

In the complaint, Discovery alleged the existence of an 

employment contract between it and Thomas Colan, that Colan 

materially breached the agreement by terminating his employment 

with Discovery prior to the expiration of the contract term, and 

that it sustained damages. Discovery further alleged that it 

put CSC on notice of the employment agreement after CSC offered 

Colan employment but before the effective date of Colan’s 

resignation. Significantly, Discovery failed to allege that CSC 

intentionally interfered with the employment agreement between

the date Discovery put CSC on notice of the contract and Colan’s 

breach of the agreement. Discovery’s complaint alleges that 

CSC’s intentional interference was the act of employing Colan, 

but that act occurred after Colan’s resignation. Discovery did 

not allege that CSC took any earlier actions after being

informed of Colan’s contract with Discovery that constituted 
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intentional interference. Thus, Discovery failed to 

sufficiently allege a claim for tortious interference against 

CSC. 

Discovery further claims that the district court 

should have sua sponte granted leave to amend the complaint. We 

review for abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of a 

motion for leave to amend the complaint. Equal Rights Ctr. v. 

Niles Bolton Assocs., 602 F.3d 597, 603 (4th Cir. 2010). 

Discovery did not, however, move to amend its complaint in the 

district court, and the court’s failure “to grant a motion that 

was never properly made” cannot constitute an abuse of 

discretion. Cozzarelli v. Inspire Pharm., Inc., 549 F.3d 618, 

630-31 (4th Cir. 2008). Thus, we conclude that the district 

court did not err in failing to grant leave to amend sua sponte. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED