GAO-12-293R Afghanistan Security

February 23, 2012

Congressional Committees

Subject: Afghanistan Security: Department of Defense Effort to Train Afghan Police Relies on 

Contractor Personnel to Fill Skill and Resource Gaps

The U.S. strategy in Afghanistan depends in part on building that country’s capacity to provide 

for its own security by training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces, which 

includes the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police (ANP).1 Since 2002, the 

United States has allocated over $43 billion to train, equip, and sustain the Afghan National 

Security Forces, which includes about $14 billion to train, equip, and sustain the ANP. The 

ANP training program is intended to create and sustain a professionally-led police force that is 

accountable to the Afghan people and is capable of enforcing laws and maintaining civil order. 

Currently, U.S., coalition, and Department of Defense (DOD) civilian contractor personnel 

assist the Afghan Ministry of Interior in training the ANP at 23 North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) training sites and in mentoring ANP units in the field.2

 

From 2002 through 2010, the Department of State (State) was involved in the ANP training 

program. During this time, State contracted with DynCorp International (DynCorp) to provide 

police mentors and trainers and to develop and execute the ANP training program. DOD 

became involved in ANP training in 2004, working in conjunction with State, DynCorp, and 

others. In 2009, DOD became the lead U.S. agency for helping Afghanistan reform the ANP 

and the Afghan Ministry of Interior, which oversees the ANP.3 In December 2010, DOD 

awarded DynCorp a new contract for ANP training, mentoring, maintenance, logistics, and 

security support. The contract has a potential value over $1 billion, if all options are exercised. 

In a June 2010 report, the Senate Committee on Armed Services expressed concern about 

problems with the ANP training program, including lapses in oversight and management of the 

contract that were identified by the DOD and State Inspectors General.4 In January 2011,

Congress required that we report on the use of U.S. government (USG) personnel, rather than 

contractor personnel, to train the ANP.5

 

1

For more information on the Afghan National Army, see GAO, Afghanistan Security: Afghan Army Growing, but 

Additional Trainers Needed; Long-term Costs Not Determined, GAO-11-66 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 27, 2011).

In response, this report describes (1) the roles and 

2

The United States is a member of an international coalition that conducts security operations in Afghanistan. The 

coalition is led by NATO. The coalition includes non-NATO member countries, such as Sweden and Australia.

 

3

DOD manages the ANP training program through the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security 

Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A). NTM-A/CSTC-A is an integrated NATO and U.S. command, 

currently led by a U.S. Army Lieutenant General, with the mission of generating and developing the Afghan National 

Security Forces. 

4

S. Rep. 111-201, at p. 210, June 4, 2010.

5

Pub. L. No. 111-383, §1235(b), Jan. 7, 2011. 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO-12-293R Afghanistan Security

responsibilities of USG and contractor personnel in the ANP training program; (2) the extent to 

which DOD has assessed (a) the advantages and disadvantages of using USG or contractor 

personnel for ANP training and (b) the potential impact of transferring responsibilities for ANP 

training from contractor to USG personnel; and (3) lessons learned from other DOD foreign 

police training programs that directly relate to the advantages and disadvantages of using 

USG personnel or contractors.

To describe the roles and responsibilities of USG and contractor personnel, we reviewed DOD 

and State documents and prior GAO work, as well as USG audit reports by the Special 

Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction, the DOD Inspector General, and the State Inspector General. For the 

purposes of this report, “USG personnel” refers to DOD military and civilian personnel 

supporting the ANP training program, while “non-USG coalition personnel” refers to personnel 

from other coalition countries supporting the ANP training program. We interviewed DOD and 

State officials in Washington, D.C.; and Kabul, Khandahar, and Konduz, Afghanistan; and 

DynCorp officials in Falls Church, Virginia; and Khandahar and Konduz, Afghanistan.6 We also

visited three ANP training sites in Afghanistan to further develop information found in 

documents and provided via interviews. We obtained data on the numbers of USG and nonUSG coalition trainers and mentors, DOD contractor personnel operating under the December 

2010 contract, and the location of USG and DOD contractor personnel at NATO ANP training 

sites. While we assessed the data's reliability and determined they were sufficient for our 

purposes, we did not independently verify this information. 

To describe the extent to which DOD assessed (a) the advantages and disadvantages of 

using USG or contractor personnel for ANP training and (b) the potential impact of transferring 

responsibilities for ANP training from contractor personnel to USG personnel, we reviewed 

relevant contract documents, including DOD’s acquisition plan and strategy, statement of 

work, and contract performance reports and obtained information from DOD officials in

Washington, D.C., and in Kabul, Afghanistan. 

To describe the lessons learned from the execution and oversight of other DOD foreign police 

training programs regarding the relative advantages and disadvantages of using USG or 

contractor personnel, we obtained information from DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and in 

Afghanistan. We also interviewed two retired USG officials with expertise in U.S. foreign police 

training efforts.7 In addition, we reviewed several reports on recent U.S. foreign police training 

efforts published by research organizations based in Washington, D.C., and by the Center for 

Army Lessons Learned in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

We conducted this performance audit from July 2011 to February 2012 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives.

 

6

We also spoke with officials from the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice to obtain information on their 

roles and responsibilities in the ANP training program. These departments provide mentoring and training in 

counternarcotics, customs and border issues, weapons, procedures, crime scene protocols, investigations, crime 

scene management, and financial crime.

7

We contacted these individuals based on our prior police training work. We used their views to assess the 

statements of current DOD officials. These officials may not be the only individuals with relevant information to offer.
Page 3 GAO-12-293R Afghanistan Security

Results in Brief

U.S. government (USG), non-USG coalition, and DOD contractor personnel perform various 

roles in the ANP training program. These roles include: (1) serving as advisors and mentors to 

build ministerial capacity in areas such as financial and human resource management at the 

Afghan Ministry of Interior; (2) serving as mentors and trainers to develop Afghan 

commanders’ abilities to operate training sites and provide training to ANP recruits in areas 

such as criminal investigation, weapons, survival skills, and physical fitness; and (3) serving as 

embedded mentors to help deployed ANP units develop civilian policing skills. DOD 

contractor personnel also provide maintenance, logistics, and security support at training sites.

As of November 2011, about 778 USG, non-USG coalition, and DOD contractor personnel

provided ANP training and mentoring at 23 NATO-managed sites. Approximately 66 percent of 

these trainers and mentors were non-USG coalition personnel, 21 percent were USG 

personnel, and the remaining 13 percent were DOD contractor personnel. In addition, about 

2,825 DOD contractor personnel provided maintenance, logistics, and security services at 12 

NATO-managed training sites. 

After assuming program responsibility from State in 2009, DOD did not assess the advantages 

or disadvantages of using USG or contractor personnel for the ANP training program and has 

not assessed the potential impact of transferring responsibilities to USG personnel for the ANP 

training program since awarding the contract to DynCorp in 2010. Prior to awarding the 

DynCorp contract, DOD officials considered the use of government personnel to perform the 

mission and found that the ANP training program did not include any inherently governmental 

functions.

8 We did not find any additional information in the contract files underlying their 

decision. DOD policy officials told us that DOD had “implicitly” approved State’s previous 

decision to use contractor personnel when DOD assumed responsibility. DOD officials told us 

they did not assess the impact of transferring ANP training responsibilities from contractors to 

USG personnel because USG agencies do not have sufficient personnel with the needed skills 

in civilian policing available to provide all the trainers and mentors needed by the ANP training 

program. DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and Afghanistan agreed that contractor personnel 

were used to fill skill and resource gaps. For that reason, these officials informed us, the ANP 

training program cannot fulfill its mission without using contractor personnel. 

DOD officials reported that they were not aware of any lessons learned from other DOD-led 

foreign police training programs that directly address the advantages and disadvantages of 

using USG or contractor personnel to carry out the ANP training program. While we did not 

identify any such lessons, we reported in March 2009 that the United States lacked sufficient 

personnel to carry out the ANP training mission. We also identified several reports that

focused on broader issues concerning the use of contractor personnel in a wartime 

environment. For instance, we reported in April 2011 that DOD faces a number of longstanding and systemic challenges that hinder its ability to achieve more successful acquisition 

outcomes. In addition, the bipartisan Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and 

Afghanistan reported on deficiencies in several areas of wartime contracting, including 

competition, management, and enforcement.

 

8

Activities are considered to be inherently governmental when they are so intimately related to the public interest as 

to mandate performance by federal government employees. 31 U.S.C. § 501 note. See 48 C.F.R. § 7.503(c) for 

examples of functions considered to be inherently governmental. 
Page 4 GAO-12-293R Afghanistan Security

USG, Non-USG Coalition, and DOD Contractor Personnel Perform Various Roles in the 

ANP Training Program

USG, non-USG coalition, and DOD contractor personnel perform various roles in the ANP 

training program. These roles include: (1) serving as advisors and mentors to build ministerial 

capacity in areas such as financial and human resource management at the Afghan Ministry of 

Interior and ANP Training General Command Headquarters; (2) serving as mentors and 

trainers to develop Afghan commanders’ abilities to operate training sites and provide training 

to ANP recruits in areas such as criminal investigation, weapons, survival skills, and physical 

fitness; and (3) serving as embedded mentors to help deployed ANP units develop civilian 

policing skills. According to NATO, the United States and 12 other NATO coalition countries 

provided 325 police mentoring and liaison teams (consisting of 15 to 20 personnel each) as of 

January 2012. In addition, over 3,400 DOD contractor personnel provided mentoring, training, 

maintenance, logistics, and security support to the ANP training program. 
Page 5 GAO-12-293R Afghanistan Security

Figure 1: Roles of USG, Non-USG,a and DOD Contractor Personnel within the Afghan National Police 

Training Program

a

Non-USG Personnel refers to personnel from coalition countries other than the United States. 

USG, non-USG, and DOD contractor personnel advise and mentor Afghan officials at the 

Ministry of Interior and the ANP Training General Command Headquarters to build ministerial 

capacity in areas such as logistics, financial, and human resources management. According to

DOD and contractor officials, about 166 of these advisors and mentors are USG personnel 

and 177 are DOD contractor personnel. 

USG and non-USG coalition personnel manage 23 NATO-led ANP training sites.9

 

9

According to DOD documents, as of October 2011, 37 training sites in Afghanistan provided police training. NATO 

coalition personnel operated 23 of these 37 sites. The Afghan Ministries of Interior and Justice and their bilateral 

partners, such as Germany and the Czech Republic, operated the remaining sites. Since these other sites are not 

NATO-led, we did not include them within the scope of our review.

 A 

designated NATO country manages each site and provides training site mentors for the 
Page 6 GAO-12-293R Afghanistan Security

Afghan training site commander, who oversees the administrative responsibilities for the 

training site.10 The United States manages 8 of the 23 NATO training sites. Figure 2 shows the 

sites managed by USG and non-USG coalition personnel.

Figure 2: Location of USG Personnel and DOD Contractor Personnel at NATO-Leda ANP Training Sites 

a

NATO training sites include sites operated by NATO coalition partners, including Sweden and Australia.

b

Regional training site. 

c

National training site. 

d

Central training site. 

At the 23 NATO-led ANP training sites, USG, non-USG coalition, and DOD contractor 

personnel serve as trainers and mentors. These trainers and mentors work with the Afghan 

site commanders and staff to develop their ability to (1) operate the training sites and (2) 

provide training to ANP recruits in areas such as criminal investigation, weapons, survival 

skills, and physical fitness. As of November 2011, USG personnel comprised about 21 

percent of the 778 trainers and mentors at these training sites, non-USG coalition personnel 

 

10Sweden and Australia are not NATO countries, but they are part of the NATO-led coalition in Afghanistan. For the 

purposes of this report, the 23 ANP training sites led by NATO include those led by Sweden and Australia. Sweden 

serves as the lead for the Shaheen training site and Australia is the lead for the Tarin Kowt training site. See 

enclosure I for more information.
Page 7 GAO-12-293R Afghanistan Security

comprised approximately 66 percent, and DOD contractor personnel comprised about 13 

percent (see fig. 3). Of the 267 total USG and DOD contractor personnel involved in training 

and mentoring at the NATO-led sites, about 61 percent (163) were USG personnel, and about 

39 percent (104) were DOD contractor personnel. USG personnel, DOD contractor personnel, 

or both provided training and mentoring at 19 of the 23 NATO-led sites (see encl. I for more 

details).11

Figure 3: USG, Non-USG Coalition, a and DOD Contractor Personnel Trainers and Mentors at 23 NATO ANP 

Training Sites

a

Non-USG coalition Personnel refers to personnel from coalition countries other than the United States. 

Also at the training sites, approximately 2,825 DOD contractor personnel provided support 

services. These services included maintenance, logistics, and security. As a result, most DOD 

contractor personnel at the training sites—more than 80 percent—were not directly involved in 

the training and mentoring of ANP personnel. As of November 2011, DOD contractor 

personnel provided these support services at 12 of the 23 sites, according to DOD documents 

(see fig. 2 and encl. I for locations). 

USG, non-USG, and DOD contract personnel serve as embedded mentors to deployed ANP 

units. According to DOD and contractor officials, 319 USG personnel and 329 DOD contractor 

personnel serve as embedded mentors that work directly with deployed ANP units to help 

develop civilian policing skills (see fig. 4).

 

11DOD documents show that DOD contractor personnel were also involved in providing training and mentoring 

services at two additional non-NATO ANP training sites managed by the Ministry of Interior.
Page 8 GAO-12-293R Afghanistan Security

Figure 4: DOD Contractor Personnel Employed, by Type of Service Performed (as of November 2011) 

Note: The figure’s percentages do not add to 100 percent due to rounding. 

DOD Did Not Assess the Advantages or Disadvantages of Using Contractor Personnel 

or the Impact of Transferring Responsibilities to USG Personnel for the ANP Training 

Program 

DOD did not assess the advantages or disadvantages of using USG personnel rather than 

contractor personnel for the ANP training program after assuming responsibility for the 

program from State in 2009. DOD policy officials informed us that DOD had “implicitly” 

approved State’s previous decision to use contractor personnel when DOD assumed 

responsibility for the contract. In reviewing the contract file, we found that DOD officials in 

Afghanistan had considered the use of USG instead of contractor personnel in June 2010 but 

decided that the requirements for the contractor did not include inherently governmental 

functions.12 Our review of the contract files and our discussions with DOD officials in 

Afghanistan did not provide any additional information or support for the decision. We also 

found that Army contracting officials had noted concerns in the acquisition strategy regarding 

the wartime environment in Afghanistan (including the regular rotations of USG personnel in 

and out of the country) in justifying the need for contractor personnel to train the ANP. 

DOD officials also stated that they had not assessed the impact of transferring contractor 

responsibilities for the ANP program to USG personnel after DOD awarded the contract in 

2010. DOD officials informed us that transferring contractor ANP training responsibilities is not 

 

12The officials were required to prepare a request for services contract approval form under Army Federal 

Acquisition Regulation Supplement Subpart 5107.503. The regulation does not require the officials who signed the 

form to include an assessment or analysis to support the request for contract services. 
Page 9 GAO-12-293R Afghanistan Security

feasible because the U.S. government does not have sufficient personnel with the right skills 

available to fulfill the multiple requirements of the mission.13 DOD officials in Washington, D.C., 

and Afghanistan agreed that contractor personnel are used to fill skill and resource gaps. 

According to these officials, DOD needs contractor personnel to provide training and 

mentoring in civilian policing skills, as well as in more advanced areas of expertise such as 

criminal investigation, interrogation, and forensic crime scene analysis. DOD officials stated 

that the U.S. government lacks available personnel to train the ANP and perform all the 

support roles that DOD contractor personnel fill.14 

None of the Lessons Learned from DOD Police Training Efforts Directly Address the 

Use of Contractor Personnel Instead of USG Personnel to Train ANP 

DOD officials reported that they were not aware of any lessons learned from other DOD-led 

foreign police training programs that directly address the advantages and disadvantages of 

using USG or contractor personnel to implement the ANP training program. Additionally, we 

spoke with former USG officials with considerable foreign police training experience, 

specifically a retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General who was in charge of the police training 

mission in Iraq and a former Department of Justice official who led the department’s 

international police training efforts. These retired officials also indicated that they were 

unaware of any specific lessons from Iraq or other DOD foreign police training missions that 

directly address the relative advantages and disadvantages of using USG or contractor 

personnel for the ANP training program. 

While we did not identify any lessons learned that directly address the advantages and 

disadvantages of using USG rather than contractor personnel for the ANP training program, 

we reported in March 2009 that the United States lacked sufficient personnel to carry out the 

ANP training mission.15 We recommended that DOD and State provide more personnel to 

support the ANP training program, and the President responded by authorizing an additional 

4,000 troops. Also, an August 2011 joint audit by the Inspectors General of DOD and State 

reported that additional personnel were needed for program management and contract 

oversight for the ANP training program.16 Other reports have focused on broader issues 

concerning the use of contractor personnel in a wartime environment. For instance, in 

February 2010, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction issued a report on 

applying lessons learned from Iraq that included a section on contract and acquisition 

management.17

 

13In 2009, GAO reported that the lack of personnel to serve on police mentor teams constrained expansion of the 

ANP training program. For additional information, see GAO, Afghanistan Security: U.S. Programs to Further Reform 

the Ministry of Interior and National Police Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan Cooperation, GAO09-280 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2009). 

We reported in April 2011 that DOD faces a number of long-standing and 

14Similarly, DynCorp was contracted by State to provide police advisors and logistical support in Iraq. See Special 

Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Long-Standing Weakness in Department of State Oversight of DynCorp 

Contract for Support of the Iraqi Police Training Program (Arlington, VA: January 2010).

15GAO-09-280. 

16Inspectors General of the Department of State and Department of Defense, Afghan National Police Training 

Program: Lessons Learned During the Transition of Contract Administration, Department of Defense Report No. D2011-095, DOS Report No. AUD/CG-11-42 (Washington, D.C., and Arlington, VA: Aug. 15, 2011). 

17Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons to the Reform of Stabilization 

and Reconstruction Operations (Arlington, VA: February 2010).
Page 10 GAO-12-293R Afghanistan Security

systemic challenges that hinder its ability to achieve more successful acquisition outcomes in 

contingency operations like Iraq and Afghanistan.18 DOD generally agreed with our 

recommendations and has taken steps to implement them (see encl. II for a list of other 

related GAO reports). In August 2011, the bipartisan Commission on Wartime Contracting in 

Iraq and Afghanistan reported that (1) U.S. government agencies have not institutionalized 

acquisition as a core function for operations such as Afghanistan police training and that (2) 

contract competition, management, and enforcement are ineffective.

19 

We are not making any recommendations in this report. 

We provided the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and State a draft of 

this report. DOD and State provided technical comments on our draft, which we have 

incorporated as appropriate. The Departments of Justice and Homeland Security had no 

comments. We provided DynCorp with portions of the draft report describing the roles of DOD 

contractor personnel. DynCorp had no comments on these portions.

- - - - - 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and the 

Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and State. In addition, the report will be 

available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff members have questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 

512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations 

and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report 

are listed in enclosure III. 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.

Director, International Affairs and Trade

Enclosures – 3 

 

18GAO, Contingency Contracting: Observations on Actions Needed to Address Systemic Challenges, GAO-11-580

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2011).

19Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling 

Costs, Reducing Risks (Washington, D.C.: August 2011).
Page 11 GAO-12-293R Afghanistan Security

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman

The Honorable John McCain

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable John Kerry 

Chairman

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar

Ranking Member

Committee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman

Chairman

The Honorable Susan M. Collins

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security 

 and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Chairman

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy

Chairman

The Honorable Lindsey Graham

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, 

 and Related Programs

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives 
Page 12 GAO-12-293R Afghanistan Security

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen

Chairman

The Honorable Howard L. Berman 

Ranking Member

Committee on Foreign Affairs

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Darrell Issa

Chairman

The Honorable Elijah Cummings

Ranking Member

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

House of Representatives 

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Kay Granger

Chairwoman

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, 

 and Related Programs

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Enclosure I

Page 13 GAO-12-293R Afghanistan Security

Roles of USG Personnel and DOD Contractor Personnel at 23 NATO ANP Training Sites

Table 1 identifies the lead NATO coalition country that serves at each of NATO's 23 ANP

training sites. It also shows where USG and DOD contractor personnel serve as trainers and 

mentors and where DOD contractor personnel provide maintenance, logistics, and security. 

Table 1: Roles of USG Personnel and DOD Contractor Personnel at 23 NATO ANP Training Sites

Training site name 

(alphabetical)

Lead NATO 

coalition country

USG military 

trainers and 

mentors

DOD contractor 

trainers and 

mentors

DOD contractor 

maintenance, 

logistics, and 

security

ANP Academy Germany

Bamyan United States  

Gardez (Regional) United States  

Ghazni Poland

Herat (Regional) Italy   

Kabul (Central) Italy 

Kandahar United States  

Kandahar (Regional) Romania  

Khowst United States  

Konduz (Regional) Germany   

Laghman (Regional) United States 

Lashkar Gah United Kingdom  

Mazar-e-Sharif (Regional) France  

Nangarhar (Regional) United States  

Pacheragram United States  

Paktika Poland 

Shaheen Swedena 

Sherberghan Turkey  

Shouz United States   

Spin Baldak Romania 

Staff College Germany

Tarin Kowt Australiaa 

Wardak (National) France 

Total 12 sites 12 sites 12 sites

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

a

Sweden and Australia are not NATO countries, but serve in the NATO-led coalition in Afghanistan. For the purposes of this 

report, the 23 ANP training sites led by NATO include those led by Sweden and Australia. 
Enclosure II

Page 14 GAO-12-293R Afghanistan Security

Related GAO Products

Afghanistan Governance: Performance-Data Gaps Hinder Overall Assessment of U.S. Efforts 

to Build Financial Management Capacity. GAO-11-907. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 

2011.

Afghanistan: Actions Need to Improve Accountability of U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan 

Government. GAO-11-710. Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2011. 

Multiple U.S. Agencies Provided Billions of Dollars to Train and Equip Foreign Police Forces.

GAO-11-402R. Washington, D.C.: April 27, 2011. 

Afghanistan Security: Afghan Army Growing, but Additional Trainers Needed; Long-term 

Costs Not Determined. GAO-11-66. Washington, D.C.: January 27, 2011.

The Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan. GAO-10-655R. Washington, D.C.: 

June 15, 2010.

Afghanistan’s Security Environment. GAO-10-613R. Washington, D.C.: May 5, 2010.

Afghanistan’s Security Environment. GAO-10-178R. Washington, D.C.: November 5, 2009.

Afghanistan Drug Control: Strategy Evolving and Progress Reported, but Interim Performance 

Targets and Evaluation of Justice Reform Efforts Needed. GAO-10-291. Washington, D.C.: 

March 9, 2010.

Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight. GAO-09-473SP. Washington, D.C.: 

April 21, 2009.

Afghanistan Security: U.S. Programs to Further Reform Ministry of Interior and National Police 

Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan Cooperation. GAO-09-280. Washington, 

D.C.: March 9, 2009.

Afghanistan Security: U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face 

Challenges and Need a Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help Ensure Accountability. GAO08-883T. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008.

Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion 

of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces. GAO08-661. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008.

Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional 

Oversight. GAO-07-801SP. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2007. 

Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, but Future 

Plans Need to Be Better Defined. GAO-05-575. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005.
Enclosure III

Page 15 GAO-12-293R Afghanistan Security

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. at 202-512-7331, or johnsoncm@gao.gov

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the individual above, Pierre Toureille, Assistant Director; Timothy J. DiNapoli; 

Hynek Kalkus; Rhonda M. Horried; Christopher Mulkins; Angie Nichols-Friedman; 

David Schneider; Jennifer Zakarian; Ashley Alley; Melissa Hermes; David Dayton; 

Cindy Gilbert; and Etana Finkler made key contributions to this report.

(320860)
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