NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

NATHAN WILLIAM KNISLEY, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 23-0338 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2020-115027-002

The Honorable Monica S. Garfinkel, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Celeste Kinney

Alexander Clausen (certified limited practice student)

Counsel for Appellee

Bain & Lauritano, Glendale

By Sheri M. Lauritano

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 06-13-2024
STATE v. KNISLEY

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.

P E R K I N S, Judge:

¶1 Nathan Knisley appeals from his convictions for burglary in 

the second degree, fraudulent schemes and artifices, and forgery. For the 

following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In 2019, Lisa (a pseudonym) listed her home for sale in 

Fountain Hills with a realtor for around $829,000. Lisa did not live in the 

home while it was for sale and previously rented the home for around 

$3,500 a month. A sign on the street stated the home was for sale. 

¶3 On April 10, 2020, Lisa drove to the home to check on it, but 

her garage opener would not open the garage door. Lisa then tried to open 

the door with her key, which failed to work. Lisa also discovered the 

security shutters on her windows were closed, even though she had 

previously left them open. 

¶4 Before Lisa investigated further, the garage door opened and 

co-defendant Julia Carmen Soto-Tatro (who is not a party to this appeal) 

walked out of the house. Lisa asked what Soto-Tatro was doing in her 

house, and Soto-Tatro presented a lease, purportedly with Lisa’s signature,

claiming she moved into the house. The signature on the lease was 

handwritten. Lisa told Soto-Tatro “that is not my signature. . . . This house 

is for sale,” and told her husband to call the sheriff. 

¶5 When police arrived, Knisley gave conflicting accounts about 

the property. Knisley first said he found the property via VRBO, but he later 

claimed to have seen a rental listing on Craigslist. At another point, Knisley 

claimed his cousin found the house for him. When asked to identify his 

cousin, Knisley struggled to remember his name, stating “I believe, 

Thomas.” Knisley also took a significant amount of time to punch in his 

purported cousin’s phone number, and police were unable to contact the 

cousin. Knisley claimed the rent was $950 for a 30-day lease-term. He also 

claimed he paid by money order, which he inconsistently claimed either he 
STATE v. KNISLEY

Decision of the Court

3

or the cousin obtained. Knisley claimed he obtained the money order from 

a Fry’s in Mesa but could neither identify the particular Fry’s nor produce 

a receipt for the order. When asked how he entered the home, Knisley 

claimed a garage opener was left out front. At trial, Lisa testified she never 

left a garage opener out front. 

¶6 While searching the house, police discovered the realtor lock 

box on the front of the door was missing and a handwritten sign on the 

front door stating “Quarentining [sic] 30 days || please do not disturb.” 

Police also found bolt-cutters and a printer in the bedroom that did not 

belong to Lisa, a portable electricity-power box from SRP, and an 

instruction manual for filling out a residential lease in Knisley and SotoTatro’s car. 

¶7 At the conclusion of evidence at his trial, Knisley moved for a 

judgment of acquittal under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”)

20(a), which the court denied. The jury convicted Knisley on all counts.

Knisley appealed, and we have jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-

4031, -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶8 Knisely argues his convictions are not supported by sufficient 

evidence and that the court erred by denying his Rule 20(a) motion. When 

a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we will affirm the 

conviction if there is “substantial evidence” to support the guilty verdict. 

State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293 (1989). Likewise, we review the denial of 

a Rule 20(a) motion for acquittal for “whether the record contains 

substantial evidence to warrant a conviction.” State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 

562, ¶ 14 (2011) (cleaned up). “Substantial evidence is such proof that 

reasonable persons could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a 

conclusion of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. 

Gunches, 225 Ariz. 22, 25, ¶ 14 (2010) (cleaned up). We do not reweigh the 

evidence to decide if we would reach the same conclusion as the trier of 

fact. State v. Salman, 182 Ariz. 359, 361 (App. 1994). Rather, “[a]ll evidence 

will be viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the conviction,” and 

we resolve all reasonable inferences against the defendant. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 

at 293.

¶9 A person commits burglary in the second degree by “entering 

or remaining unlawfully in or on a residential structure with the intent to 

commit any theft or any felony therein.” A.R.S. § 13-1507(A). A person is 

guilty of fraudulent schemes and artifices who, “pursuant to a scheme or 
STATE v. KNISLEY

Decision of the Court

4

artifice to defraud, knowingly obtains any benefit by means of false or 

fraudulent pretenses [or] representations.” A.R.S. § 13-2310(A). And a 

person is guilty of forgery “if, with intent to defraud, the person: [f]alsely 

makes, completes or alters a written instrument; or [k]nowingly possesses 

a forged instrument.” A.R.S. § 13-2002(A)(1)–(2).

¶10 Knisley argues the State failed to prove he intended to commit 

a theft or felony in Lisa’s home because “[n]o evidence was presented that 

the Appellant knew that the lease was false and that he and his girlfriend 

should not have been in the house.” Instead, Knisley argues the plan to stay 

in the property and forge a lease was entirely the idea of Soto-Tatro. Knisley 

next argues the State did not present evidence that he obtained a benefit as 

required to establish fraudulent schemes. And Knisley argues only SotoTatro possessed and presented the lease with intent to defraud, which 

defeats the forgery charge. 

¶11 The evidence, although circumstantial, was sufficient to 

support the convictions. Lisa, the homeowner, testified the home was for 

sale and not for rent, and Knisley had no right to be in her home. Lisa and 

police further testified that a sign in front of the house stated the home was 

for sale, she never left a garage opener outside which became disabled, the 

realtor lock box was missing, and the windows’ security shutters were 

closed. The responding police officer testified Knisley could not produce a 

rental listing, struggled to remember his cousin’s name, and could not 

identify the Fry’s he purportedly obtained the money order from.

¶12 Knisley made conflicting statements regarding his 

involvement in finding and entering the home and paying rent. Based on 

this evidence the jury could find Knisley knew both that he lacked a right 

to be in the home and that the lease was false. See State v. Bustamante, 229 

Ariz. 256, 258, ¶ 6 (App. 2012) (circumstantial evidence may support a 

conviction); State v. Sullivan, 205 Ariz. 285, 287, ¶ 8 (App. 2003) (“An intent 

to defraud may be, and often is, deduced from circumstantial evidence.”).

And when Knisley signed the lease, he exercised physical control and 

thereby possession of the lease. A.R.S. § 13-105(34) (“’Possess’ means 

knowingly to have physical possession or otherwise to exercise dominion 

or control over property.”). Finally, the jury could find Knisley obtained a 

benefit by living in a nearly million dollar home rent-free and that signing 

a false lease was in furtherance of that benefit. See State v. Watson, 248 Ariz. 

208, 213, ¶ 13 (App. 2020) (the crime of fraudulent schemes encompasses a 

wide range of activities). Sufficient evidence supported each of Knisley’s 

convictions.
STATE v. KNISLEY

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶13 We affirm.