Tenn. Ct. App. R. 10 states:

1

This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse or modify the

actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion would have no precedential value. When a case

is decided by memorandum opinion it shall be designated "MEMORANDUM OPINION," shall not be published, and

shall not be cited or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

April 14, 2005 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN’S SERVICES v.

BINTA AHMAD

 Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Coffee County

No. 342-00J Timothy J. Brock, Judge

No. M2004-02604-COA-R3-PT - Filed April 26, 2005

Mother appeals termination of her parental rights to her two minor children. She and her two infant

children immigrated to the United States illegally in 1998 when the children were two and one years

of age, respectively. In 1999, Mother was arrested on felony theft charges. Being unable to make

bond, she remained incarcerated for over a year following which she pled guilty to a felony. She was

then turned over to immigration officials and was detained for an additional two years only to be

deported to Nigeria in December 2002, where she remains. The children have remained in foster

care for more than five years. Mother appeals claiming the evidence to be insufficient to prove

grounds for termination and that termination is not in the children’s best interest. We affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Affirmed

FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which WILLIAM B. CAIN,J., and

DONALD P. HARRIS, SP. J., joined.

Jeffrey D. Ridner, Tullahoma, Tennessee, for the appellant, Binta Ahmad.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; and Joe Shirley, Assistant Attorney General, for

the appellee, State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

The parental rights of the mother and the putative father of each of her two children were

terminated. The putative fathers’ parental rights were terminated on the grounds of abandonment.
Throughout these proceedings, the mother has either been incarcerated on the felony charges, awaited 2

deportation or resided in Nigeria following deportation. She was fortunate to have been ably represented by Jeffrey D.

Ridner who has zealously advocated on her behalf. 

A family friend cared for the children for several months following her incarceration. When it became apparent

3

that the mother was not going to be released from jail, the friend contacted the Department in July of 2000, advising that

he was no longer able to provide constant care for them.

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Neither putative father appeals. The mother’s parental rights were terminated on the grounds of

abandonment and failure to remedy persistent conditions. She appeals, raising four issues: (1)

whether the Department proved grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence; (2)

whether the Department proved that it complied with its mandate to restore the family unit if

possible; (3) whether the Department proved that it made reasonable efforts, and (4) whether

termination was in the children’s best interest. 

2

The genesis of the grounds for termination of mother’s parental rights was when the mother

was incarcerated in May 1999 for felony theft. Ever since then she has been unable to provide for

her children or to remedy the conditions which led to the Department taking custody of her children.3

Following her arrest, the mother remained in jail for over a year because she could not make

bond. After a lengthy incarceration, she pled guilty to a felony theft charge. Due to the fact she was

an illegal immigrant and a convicted felon, she was not released. Instead, she was transferred to

immigration officials who detained her pending deportation. 

The mother and both of her children are illegal immigrants. She was born in Nigeria but

claims she is an Egyptian citizen because her father was Egyptian; however, United States

immigration officials concluded that she was a Nigerian citizen. The mother identified Andrew

Oniha as the father of the older child and Anthony Ukpetnan as the father of the younger child. She

states that she has neither seen nor heard from the children’s fathers since leaving England in 1998.

The putative fathers, whose last known addresses were in London, England, were named as

defendants. Theywere served by publication in London, England; however, neither filed an answer.

Because the mother was unable to prove her citizenship to the satisfaction of U.S.

immigration officials, they informed her that she would be deported to Nigeria. Prior to the

scheduled deportation, the mother was presented with a dilemma no parent should have to face. It

was not unlike the dilemma faced by the mother of an infant child when King Soloman was to decide

which of two women was the mother of an infant. Though we cannot appreciate the difficulties she

would experience attempting to raise two young children in Nigeria without assets, income, shelter

or family, we assume it would be a most difficult, if not almost impossible, task. Her choices were

limited to two heartrending options. She made a decision she believed to be in the best interest of

her children, that they remain in the custody of the Department with the foster family in Tennessee.
It is most tragic that Mother could not prove she was an Egyptian citizen. If she had, then she and her children 4

could have been deported together to Egypt. However, since she did not prove her citizenship, immigration officials

concluded that she was a Nigerian citizen and deported her to Nigeria. Because of concerns for the children’s safety in

Nigeria, she requested that her children not be deported to Nigeria. Her plan was to relocate to a safe country and reclaim

her children.

The two visits were facilitated by the Department and were in the penal facility in Alabama. 5

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Since her deportation to Nigeria, the mother has been unable to remedy the conditions which

necessitated the Department taking custody of her children. The Department has had custody of the 4

children since September of 2000 because there was no family member or friend available to

properly care for the children while she was incarcerated. Due to her incarceration, which was in

Alabama, and her detention by immigration officials, which was in Louisiana, the children have only

been able to visit with their mother twice in the last six years, which is more than half of each child’s

life.5

Parents have a fundamental right to the care, custody and control of their children. Stanley

v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Tenn. 1993). This right

is superior to the claims of other persons and the government, yet it is not absolute. A court may

terminate a parent’s parental rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that one of the

statutory grounds for termination of parental rights has been established and that the termination of

such rightsis in the best interests of the child. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c); Jones v. Garrett, 92

S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tenn. 2002); In re A.W., 114 S.W.3d 541, 544 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003); In re

C.W.W., 37 S.W.3d 467, 475-76 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

In an effort to balance the important, fundamental rights of a parent and the best interest of

a child, our legislature has provided that parental rights may only be terminated for specific, welldefined grounds. In re A.W., 114 S.W.3d at 544. The statutory grounds for termination of parental

rights are set forth within Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g). The existence of any one of the statutory

grounds is sufficient to support a trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights. In re C.W.W.,

37 S.W.3d at 473; In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002). One of those grounds is

failure to remedy persistent conditions. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3). 

The statute provides for termination when the child has been removed from the home of the

parent by order of a court for a period of six (6) months and

(i) The conditions which led to the child's removal or other conditions which in all

reasonable probability would cause the child to be subjected to further abuse or

neglect and which, therefore, prevent the child's safe return to the care of the

parent(s) or guardian(s), still persist;

(ii) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at an early date

so that the child can be safely returned to the parent(s) or guardian(s) in the near

future; and
The statute only requires a minimum period of six months. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A). 6

This is because the mother and the Department could not prove the children were British citizens and England 7

would not permit the children to return to that country. Unless the mother and the Department could prove the parentage

of the putative fathers and that they were British citizens, and therefore the children were too, no amount of efforts,

reasonable or well above and beyond reasonable, would have saved the day.

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(iii) The continuation of the parent or guardian and child relationship greatly

diminishes the child's chances of early integration into a safe, stable and permanent

home.

Tenn. Code Ann. §36-1-113(g)(3)(A). The record provides clear and convincing evidence to support

the finding that the mother has been unable to provide for the children for more than six years, that

she has been unable to remedy the conditions which led to the removal of her children, and that there

is little likelihood, if any, that these conditions will be remedied at an early date. That is sufficient 6

to establish one ground for termination, See State v. Layne, No. M2001-00652-COA-R3-JV, 2002

WL 126320 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2002), and the existence of any one of the statutory grounds will

support a termination of parental rights. In re C.W.W., 37 S.W.3d 467, 473-74 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2000) (citing In re M.C.G., No. 01A01-9809-JV-00461, 1999 WL 332729, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App.

May 26, 1999); Department of Children's Servs. v. Darr, No. 03A01-9706- JV-00213, 1998 WL

128874, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 1998). 

The reasonableness of the efforts of the Department is disputed. Mother claims the

Department did little other than write a few letters and make a few phone calls. She also complains

that there was no continuity of effort due to three different case managers having worked the case.

The Department claims it made reasonable efforts but was thwarted at every front due to

international roadblocks. 

While the Department’s efforts do not appear to be Herculean, they were reasonable under

the circumstances. Moreover, it is most apparent that no matter how zealous its efforts, the

reunification of the family unit, or placement with a family member, were beyond the control of the

Department due to the international constraints over which the Department had no control. The

outcome of this case was predominately affected by matters beyond the control of the Department.

Particularly, the criminal courts of Alabama, the U.S. and British immigration officials, and the

mother’s inability to establish her citizenship and that of her two children. All of these contributed

to determine the outcome of this case. Moreover, the mother was unable to provide current or

accurate information to identifyor locate either father of the children. She had not kept in touch with

either father and had no knowledge of their home address or employment. Furthermore, she could

not provide any information on the citizenship of either father which greatly diminished the efforts

of all involved to relocate the children with the mother’s cousin in England. As a result, the only 7

option was to deport the children with their mother or allow them to remain with the foster parents

in Tennessee. 
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The final issue is whether termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interest

of the children. It is sufficient if the children have been in foster care for more than six months and,

as here, the parent has been and remains unable to provide and maintain stable housing and to

provide adequate support for the children and there is no likelihood that these conditions will be

remedied at an early date. Tenn. Code Ann. §36-1-113(g)(3). Further, it is evident that the children

would suffer emotionally from a change of caretakers because the children have been in a stable

home environment for six years and have only seen their mother on two occasions during this period.

We fully recognize this to be a tragic case; nevertheless, it is most evident that it is in the children’s

best interest to terminate the mother’s parental rights in order to extinguish what has been six years

of purgatory to make the children available for adoption.

Perhaps termination of the mother’s parental rights would not have been necessary had the

mother not migrated illegally to the United States, or had she not committed a felony in Alabama,

or had she been able to prove that she was an Egyptian citizen or that the children were British

citizens. However, putting all the “ifs, ands or buts” aside, what we are faced with is a mother who

was vanquished to Nigeria and who is unable to remedy the conditions that led to the Department

having to take custody of the children, and two minor children whose lives have been in limbo for

six years. 

As tragic as this case is, we are not unmindful of what appears to be a silver lining, that is

the children have been residing this entire time with foster parents who desire to adopt both children.

This silver lining makes it obvious that it is in the children’s best interest to terminate the mother’s

parental rights in order to make the children available for adoption.

In conclusion, we hold that the Department has proven by clear and convincing evidence

grounds for termination, failure to remedy persistent conditions, and that termination of parental

rights is in the children’s best interest. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed and this

matter is remanded with costs of appeal assessed against the Department of Children’s Services.

___________________________________ 

FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., JUDGE