IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs October 2, 2018

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. MARCUS WILLIAMS

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 14-02640 W. Mark Ward, Judge

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No. W2018-00498-CCA-R3-CD

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On March 2, 2018, the Defendant, Marcus Williams, was convicted of two counts of 

identity theft; two counts of theft of property over $500 but less than $1000; one count of 

fraudulent use of a credit/debit card over $1000 but less than $10,000; and two counts of 

fraudulent use of a credit/debit card over $500 but less than $1000. He was sentenced as 

a Range II, multiple offender to a total effective sentence of twenty-four years, to be 

served consecutively to a prior twenty-year sentence, for a combined total of forty-four 

years. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that there is insufficient evidence to sustain his 

convictions and that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to sever the 

offenses. After thorough review, we dismiss this appeal. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dismissed

ALAN E. GLENN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN EVERETT 

WILLIAMS, P.J., and NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., joined.

J. Shae Atkinson (on appeal), and Juni Ganguli (at trial), Memphis, Tennessee, for the

appellant, Marcus Williams.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Zachary T. Hinkle, Assistant 

Attorney General; Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; and Holly Palmer and 

Glenda Adams, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTS

11/29/2018
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On May 20, 2014, a Shelby County grand jury indicted the Defendant for two 

counts of identity theft; two counts of theft of property over $500 but less than $1000; 

one count of fraudulent use of a credit/debit card over $1000 but less than $10,000; and 

two counts of fraudulent use of a credit/debit card over $500 but less than $1000. At 

trial, the State presented evidence that the Defendant had, with the help of a codefendant, stolen personal property and credit/debit cards from multiple restaurants and 

department stores. Though the Defendant moved to sever the offenses, the trial court 

found that the incidents were part of a common scheme or plan and denied the motion. 

Following the jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of all counts as charged and 

sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to 8 years each for counts 1 and 2; 11 months 

and 29 days each for counts 3, 4, 6, and 7; and 4 years for count 5, all to served 

consecutively to each other and to the Defendant’s prior twenty-year sentence, for a total 

effective sentence of forty-four years, to be served in the Department of Correction. 

On May 19, 2018, the Defendant filed a notice of appeal, arguing that there is 

insufficient evidence to sustain his seven convictions and that the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying his motion to sever the offenses. 

ANALYSIS

On August 23, 2018, three months after a notice of appeal was filed and while said 

appeal was pending, the State notified this court that the Defendant was mistakenly 

released from the Shelby County Jail, and a warrant had been issued for his arrest. This 

court ordered the State to provide an update on the Defendant’s status on October 26, 

2018. On October 31, 2018, the State relayed to this court that the Defendant remains out 

of custody, and the warrant for his arrest remains outstanding. 

In Bradford v. State, 202 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1947), our supreme court examined 

the issue of what should happen to a fugitive defendant’s pending appeal or motion for 

new trial. In that case, the court determined that the “general rule” of dismissing a 

fugitive defendant’s pending appeal should also be used in determining his motion for 

new trial. The court stated:

[W]here the appellant has escaped and become a fugitive from justice . . . 

[the court’s] order and judgment may never be enforced because the 

appellant, by escaping, has placed himself beyond the control of the court, 

and therefore has waived his right to be heard either by himself or by his 

counsel.

Id. at 648 (internal citations omitted). 
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The court further opined that the defendant’s conduct “was in legal effect an 

abandonment” of his pending matters with the court. Id. at 649. Accordingly, the court 

found that a fugitive defendant’s appeal should be peremptorily dismissed on motion. Id.

at 648-49. More recently, our supreme court discussed this practice, known as the 

fugitive disentitlement doctrine, in Searle v. Juvenile Court for Williamson County, 188 

S.W.3d 547 (Tenn. 2006). In Searle, the court thoroughly explained the fugitive 

disentitlement doctrine:

The fugitive disentitlement doctrine bars an individual from calling upon 

the resources of the court while at the same time “thumbing his nose” at its 

orders. Because individuals who have fled or escaped have displayed a 

defiance for the judicial system, appellate courts have been reluctant to hear 

their appeals. “The fugitive disentitlement doctrine limits access to courts 

in the United States by a fugitive who has fled a criminal conviction in a 

court in the United States. The doctrine is long-established in the federal 

and state courts, trial and appellate.” 

Id. at 550 (internal citations omitted). 

The Searle court further found that the standard for defining a “fugitive” for 

purposes of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine is broader and less stringent than that for 

other purposes, like extradition cases. Id. at 551. The Searle court specifically cited the 

example of Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365 (1970), in which the United States 

Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of a defendant who had been released on bond but 

failed to surrender himself. The United States Supreme Court has consistently reached 

such a conclusion. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97 (1876); Bonahan v.

Nebraska, 125 U.S. 692 (1887). 

While we are aware that the Defendant did not escape from the Shelby County 

Jail, but was mistakenly released, we find that he is a fugitive for purposes of the fugitive 

disentitlement doctrine. There is an active warrant for his arrest, but he has purposely 

continued to place himself “beyond the physical reach of the court.” See Searle, 188 

S.W.3d at 552. The Defendant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of forty-four 

years, and as such, is aware that his decades-early release was a mistake. We find no 

persuasive reason why this court should adjudicate the merits of his appeal, and we 

accordingly find that, by his fugitive status, he has waived his right to appeal his 

convictions through the resources of this court. 

CONCLUSION
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Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we dismiss the appeal as 

waived.

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 ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE