,g8Uh

fo. 25íi

opy 1

'>X^vvM^M^3vX^ZvXvMv3vM^MvYvJ^MvXvXvX^

7 V V„V„V V„V V V V V V V V V„V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V

V V V„V„V V„V V V V V V V V Vr,V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V

V V V„V_V V_V V V V V V V V V_,V vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv

„v„v„v„v„v_v„v V v„v„v_v_v_v_v^v v„v„v„v„v„v„v„v„v„v„v„v„v„v„v„v„v„v„v, V„V V V V V V V_V„V„V V V V V V v„V„V V V„V„V„V V V„V V V„V V„V V V v„^ «V„V„V„V„V_V„V_V V_V_V-V_V_V_VüV v_v_v„v„v„v„v„v„v„v„v„v„v„v„v„v„v„v„v, V„V V V V V„v V_V_V_V„V_V V V V v„V„V V V„V„V„V V V V V V v„v v„v v„v„^

vlvlv V V V V v„v v„v V V V V V V v„vlvlvlv„v„vlv„vlv„v„v„v„v„v„v„

vV^v^v^v^v^v^v3v^v^v'='v^v'='v'7vMv'^v^v'7v'='v'='v'7v'7v^v^v^v^v^v^v^v'7v'7v^v^v^^ V V v„v„v V„V V V V V V V V V„V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V v„vlviviv^viv^v^vlvlvlvlvlvlvlv vlvlvlvlvlvlvlvlvlvlvivl

v^v''v'='v^v^v'^v^v^v^v^v^v^v^v'^v^v^v'^v'^v^v'^v'='v^v^v^v'^v''v^v^v^v^v^v'='v^v^v^^ V V V„V„V V„V V V V V V V V V„V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V v

V V V V V V V V„V V V V V V V V„v V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V \

' V V V^V,-.V V^V V V V V V V V Vr^V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V

,V„V_Vr,V„V„V„V„V„v„V„V„V„V„V„V„V_v„V„V„V„V„V„V„V„V„V„V„V„V„V„V„V„V_V_V.

,Vgv7,

„v;'viv^

v_v_v.

y'v'v'v;'v„v„v„v„v„v„v„v„v„v„v„v v'v'^ J,V„V„V V„V„V„V V V—V—V—V—V—V—VrrV v„v_v„v_v„v„v_v„^ y„v„v V V V V v_V_V_V_V_V__V_V_v V v_v„v„v_v_v„v„v,

v^v^v^v^v^v'^v^v^v'^'v'^v'^v^v'^v^vMv^v^v'^v'^v^v^v'^v^v ' V V V„V„V V„V V V V V V V V V„V V V V V V V V V yl7lvlvivivlvXv„v„vlvlvXvlvlvlv vivlylv„vlvlvlviv^^„.„

V V V V V V V V„V V V V V V V "_v vvvvvvvv v_¿v 'Ivlv„v„v„v„v„v V v„v„v„v„v„v„v„v v„v V„V„V„V„V V v^wlv, V v v V V V V V V V V V V V V v_v vvvvvvvv• y w ' V V V^V^V VT-,V V V V V V V V Vr-rV V V V V V V V V v^v^v ,vlvlvlvivivlviv„vlvXvlvXvXvlvlv vlvXvXvXvlvIvlvlvXv^v,

Wv^v^v^v'^v^v^v'^v'^v^v'^'v^v^vMvVv^v'^^v'^v^v^v'^vMv^sz;'..

';vXvv^vVvVv<^X^X^X^v^v^X^X^X<<<^^^^ ' V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V;V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V„V V V V V V V V V V VrV V V ' V V V V V V V V^V V V V V V V„V^V V V V V V V V V V V^V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V„v V V V V V V V V V V V ^

' V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V„V V V V V V V V V V V V Viirf V V V v^v^v V^V V V V V V V V V„v V V V V V V V V V V V V

' V V V V V V V V V V V V V V v„v V V V V V V V V vl,v_v V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V v„v V V V V V V V V v^-^^^^it¿vJl:„ , ,_. ' V V vJlvJlv vJlv V V V V V V V Vr^V V V V V V VJlV„V„V„vJlv V^"V¿.VjkV„V„ V V V V^V V V V V V V V V V V V„v V V V V V V V V V V V V_.V V V V V ' V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V,,V V V V V V V V V V V V V vlv„v„v V V V^V V V^V V V V V V V V V V V V„v V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V

rT7Vz^^^ w^ V V V V V V V v—V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V v_iV v v V V V V^V^V V^V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V v_y V V V V V V V V V V V

r V V V V V V V V V V V V V V v V V V V V V V v^v vJlv V V V V V V V v^v V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V„v V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V ViSvI.^

r V V V V V V V v^v V V V V V v„v v V V V V V V V V V V V V V V vJlv v^v. V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V v„v V V V V V V V V vV V Vi_.V V V ^ VjVJi

rv V V V V V V V V V V V V V V v v v vvvvvvvvvyvvvvvvv

HIDE TO CIVIL DEFENSE MANAGEMENT IN THE FOOD INDUSTRY

y-.v'v'v„v v„v„^ V„V ^7„V„V„V^ ^v„v v„\ V V V V ylv„v„v„^ r,V„V„V„V,

V V V V ^

v„v„v„v„v^ r^Vi^V^V^V^^ V V V V V

x^x^x^x^x^ V V V V V

vXvX^XvXvX^ V V V V V V V V V v^ V V V V V

Vv,V V V v„^ V V V V V

y V VV V X y^Sè^v^^ y^vJvX^

culture Handbook No. 254

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

November 1963

AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE

• . M<x! -< ft:..:i flAfAHf^M nan^vfiMont nf Rofonca
FOREWORD

The history of mankind and the records of his wars clearly demonstrate that food is a prime weapon, a prime target, and the prime element

of survival.

We in this Nation often take agricultural abundance for granted. And

we take for granted, too, the highly complex and efficient food processing,

storage and distribution mechanisms by which the food industry converts

raw farm products into the finest foods available in the world, and puts

them in our markets, stores, and eating places with such regularity.

We can be sure that the food facilities and equipment of the food industry, as well as the highly-trained and specialized know-how to operate

them, would be prime targets that could be substantially damaged or destroyed should we ever have a nuclear attack upon the United States.

The better we understand the dangers and train ourselves to do those

things which will add to our capability for survival, the greater deterrent

we create against a possible enemy's belief that he could destroy our food

industry.

This Guide contains the essence of what the food industry needs to do

to increase its ability to survive and to maintain continuity of food processing and distribution. Many of the things which this booklet points up can

be done with little or no expenditure of funds, but they are actions which

should be taken now.

Our best survival insurance for the food industry is to know the dangers

of a possible attack, to take reasonable precautions to enhance our survival,

and to plan how to get back into operation quickly following an attack.

Orville L. Freeman,

Secretary of Agriculture.
CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION 2

PART I. Orientation to CivU Defense Planning in the Food

Industry 3

Eflfects of Attack by Modern Weapons 3

Attack by Sabotage 5

The National Civil Defense Program 5

Industrial Civil Defense Preparedness 7

Government Plans for Post-Attack Food Processing, Storage, and Distribution 9

PART II. Civil Defense Preparations in the Food Industry 11

Planning 11

Organizing 12

Warning 13

Communications 13

Emergency Shutdown and Start-Up Procedures. . 14

Fallout Shelters in Food Facilities 14

Movement of Employees to Shelters 15

Shelter Management 16

Evacuating the Plant 17

Plant Police Protection 17

Plant Fire Control 18

First Aid and Medical Care 18

Rescue Operations 19

Radiological Defense 19

Employee Welfare 20

Anti-Panic Precautions 21

Industrial Mutual Aid Associations 22

Continuity of Management 22

Alternate Headquarters and Key Office Locations. 23

Employee Reporting Centers 23

Protecting Vital Records 24

Reducing Vulnerability of Food Facilities 24

Protective Construction 25

Planning Availability of Supporting Resources.... 26

Damage Analysis and Reportiijig 27

PART III. Industry-Government Cooperation for Community

Survival 28

Assistance to Government 28

The Role of Trade Associations 28

PART IV. Operations During Survival Period 29

Immediate Post-Attack Actions 29

Economic Stabilization 29

APPENDIX. Industry Defense Checklist 30

References 31
INTRODUCTION

It is impossible to foresee when mankind will be

relieved of the threat of nuclear warfare. The new

dimension of destruction which burst upon the world

in 1945 has grown more imposing through the years.

Masters of defense are hard-pressed to devise antidotes

for the staggering power of nuclear weapons.

The tremendous scope of these weapons and their

multiple effects do not render the cause of survival

hopeless, however. Effective defenses against some of

the effects of nuclear attack are available. Even

though a full-scale attack would cause many casualties,

this Nation and its people have in their hands and

hearts the tools to survive.

The most important tools are an ability to face the

threat squarely, the determination to prepare for it,

and a unity of purpose. Nowhere is it more imjwrtant that these tools be utilized than in the food industry, whose continued operation in an emergency certainly would be one of the most critical ingredients in

the Nation's ability to survive.

Despair would be a natural reaction in the wake of

overwhelming nuclear disaster. But businessmen generally, and food plant operators particularly, could not

afford the luxury of abandoning their responsibilities

under such circumstances. The continuation of postattack food plant operations is essential not only to the

welfare of the owners, employees and their families, but

also to the well-being of the community and the Nation.

Few industries have the opportunity to serve the

national emergency planning effort in as basic a way as

the food industry. In the recovery period following a

nuclear attack, the people would be most concerned

with survival, food and shelter. The ability of the food

industry to recover quickly from the effects of attack

and resume its feeding of the population would be one

of the best assurances for survival and recovery.

It should be obvious, therefore, that there is a pressing need in the food industry for careful survival planning and continuing cooperation with the local. State

and Federal governments in preparing a national survival program. This Guide is designed to encourage

and assist the food plant operator in carrying out those

survival preparations which are essential to his own

welfare, his community's and the Nation's.

Throughout this Guide, references will be made to

"food plants," "food concerns" and "food companies."

These terms mean any concern engaged in the processing, storage, or distribution of food. The information in this Guide is directed at that phase of the food

industry's operations which precedes the retailing of

food products. It is this phase—the processing and

handling of the food from the farm gate through the

wholesaler—that is the concern of the U.S. Department

of Agriculture's Agricultural Marketing Service

(AMS). The emergency distribution of food to consumers will be primarily the States' responsibilities,

with assistance from the Federal Government as

necessary.

While this Guide deals to a great extent

with the concept of sizable emergency

forces in a food facility, it should not be

assumed that it is designed solely for the

large processor with a variety of facilities

and bountiful resources. On the contrary,

the steps outlined are actions which should

be taken in some degree by all food concerns, large and small, regardless of geographic location. Each food plant manager must, in the final analysis, determine

the feasibility and value of each step in his

oH'n operation. If he has a small company—and the majority of the Nation's

food processing firms are small—his preparations will necessarily be less elaborate

than those of a large company operating

many plants throughout the country. However, the principles of preparedness in this

Cuide apply to all companies.

No matter how small or how remote a food plant

may be from a probable enemy target, the manager

should give serious thought to each of the areas of

preparation outlined in this Guide. If his study does

nothing more than convince him that he is well prepared in certain respects, this knowledge will enable f

him to plan more confidently for the future, and to

direct his emergency preparedness efforts to areas

which need further attention.
PART I. ORIENTATION TO CIVIL DEFENSE PLANNING IN THE FOOD

INDUSTRY

EFFECTS OF ATTACK BY MODERN WEAPONS

While fallout radiation from nuclear weaj>ons is

considered to be by far the major threat, the range

and versatility of modern weaponry are greater than

at any time in history. Potential enemies have capability in biological and chemical weajwus as well.

Should all-out war occur, these might be used against

this country in conjunction with a nuclear attack.

In industrial defense planning, consideration should

be given to the full range of possibilities in an attack,

even though such consideration becomes increasingly

difficult as delivery systems grow more eflScient and

penetrating year by year. The fact that such efficiency

does exist makes the planning steps outlined in this

Guide more urgent for the individual and collective

security of the American food industry.

An all-out nuclear attack upon this Nation most

probably would be launched by intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range bombers, and possibly submarine-based missiles. These direct attacks probably

would be combined with subversive or sabotage operations, the possible use of biological or chemical warlare agents and psychological warfare.

Although the dangers of attack from biological or

chemical agents have increased substantially in recent

years because of the increasingly insidious types of

agents available, the means by which food plant managers can protect their personnel and their products

remain standardized.

The new dimension which has added an uncertain

and awesome element to the prospect of fdl-out war is

the threat of nuclear attack. The tremendous damage

created by nuclear weapons, plus the fact that scientists still are learning about the weapHDns and their

effects, underscores the need for organized preparations to defend the Nation's people and industries

against such an attack. An intelligent defense against

the threat of nuclear attack must be preceded by an

understanding of the threat.

A nuclear explosion produces four types of destructive forces—blast, heat, initial radiation, and residual

radiation, generally called radioactive fallout. The

first three occur almost instantaneously at the moment

of explosion. While protective measures can reduce

the area of damage from these phenomena, little can be

done to avoid them at very close range. These initial

effects are devastating, but they are geographically

limited. The delayed effect, radioactive fallout, in an

all-out nuclear attack could blanket much larger areas

of the country. Thus, it i>oses a broader, longer lasting threat to the Nation as a whole. Fallout can be

just as deadly as the initial effects of the bomb, but

a variety of measures can be taken to protect the people

until the hazard has dissipated by the decline of radioactivity with the passage of time.
The area of severe destruction resulting from blast,

heat, and initial radiation will vary with the size of

the nuclear weapon, the height of the explosion, and

to some extent, with the terrain and atmospheric conditions. The size of the weapon is measured in terms

of the amount of energy released, compared with the

energy released by TNT. For instance, a one-kiloton

nuclear bomb produces the same amount of energy as

the explosion of 1,000 tons of TNT. A one-megaton

bomb has explosive power equivalent to 1,000,000 tons

of TNT.

Earlier nuclear weapons were measured in kilotons,

but the power of weapons now goes to bombs of many

megatons. A five-megaton weapon exploded on the

ground would cause severe destruction to residential

buildings for a radius of 6 miles from the point of

detonation. Similar destruction from a 20-megaton

weapon would extend to a radius of nearly 10 miles.

The heat from a ten-megaton bomb exploded on the

ground might set fire to easily-ignitable materials within

a radius of 15 to 20 miles on a clear day. If the bomb

exploded several miles above the surface, the area of

fire damage would be somewhat greater.

A five-megaton weapon exploded on the ground

would leave a crater about half a mile across and 200

feet deep. As the fireball rises, it draws up the thousands of tons of pulverized and some vaporized matter which has been contaminated by the radioactive

residue of the explosion. As this material reaches

the cold upper air, the vaporized portion condenses,

just as rain or snow, and starts falling back to earth

along with the dust-like material. It is called fallout.

From the ground one cannot tell which way the fallout will be blown from the point of explosion. The

contaminated area wUl be determined by the highaltitude winds which may be moving in a different

direction from ground-level winds. The heavier particles of fallout will reach the ground a few mUes from

the explosion about half an hour after it occurs. Fallout will begin on an area 20 miles away in about an

hour, and 100 miles away probably in 4 to 6 hours. A

food plant's distance from the point of nuclear explosion therefore determines to a great extent the amount

of time its employees have in which to take protective

action.

The early fallout, which contains the major radiation danger, descends in less than 24 hours. Less dangerous lighter particles, called delayed fallout, will sift

down at a diminishing rate for years. Those who can

remain in adequately protected shelter areas until the

early, heavy fallout has lost its strength—at least for

a period of 2 days to 2 weeks or longer—will survive.

Fallout loses about 90 percent of its strength in the

first 2 days.

Fallout particles emit several types of radiation, but

the most dangerous ones are gamma rays, like X-rays.

Gamma rays have greater penetration power than other

types, and over-exposure to them can cause sickness

or death.

Radiation exposure is measured in units called

roentgens. During the average lifetime, every human

being receives about 10 roentgens of nuclear radiation

from natural sources. Exposure to more than 300

roentgens over a period of a few days—a dose which

unprotected persons might receive after a nuclear

attack—would cause sickness in the form of nausea,

and possibly death. Death would be certain if a person were to receive an exposure of 1,000 roentgens over

a period of a few days.

The purpose of fallout shelters is to provide shielding

against gamma radiation. Since the rays do have an

enormous penetration ability, the most practical way

to protect against them is to place a sujQScient amount

of mass between the fallout and the people to be protected. This shielding may be furnished by any type

of material that places mass between the source of

radiation and the people, but the more dense the material the better its protection. The OflSce of Civil Defense, Department of Defense, recommends planned

fallout shelters which furnish a protection factor of at

least 40. This means that a person in such a shelter

would be exposed at a maximum to only Y^QUí of the

fallout intensity outside the shelter. Even without

planned fallout shelters, however, there are many ways

to improvise shelter, especially in industrial buildings.

One principle should be kept in mind regarding protection against fallout: Any protection is better than

none.

Raw and finished foods are especially susceptible to

radiation hazards during processing and storage.

While they are not damaged by radioactive rays, as

human cells are, they may be rendered inedible—at

least temporarily—if the radioactive fallout particles

actually become mixed in with them. Food containing a high concentration of fallout particles should

not be eaten until the radioactivity has decreased to

tolerable limits.

Food plant managers should start thinking about

fallout protection immediately, for their people and

their food and food products. Detailed information

on the types of protective measures they can take may

be obtained from local. State or Federal civil defense

oflBcials, or from U.S. Department of Agriculture State

and County Defense Boards.
ATTACK BY SABOTAGE

Because of the characteristics of food manufacturing

processes, and the nature of certain foods and their

ingredients, many segments of the food industry are

extremely vulnerable to introduction of biological

and chemical agents.

In addition to the threat of sabotage to food facilities through fire, explosion or mechanical methods,

company officials should consider the fKDssibility that

chemical, biological, or even radiological agents could

be used to contaminate sufficient food to impair the

health or endanger the lives of large numbers of people

throughout the country. Many quality control procedures in the food industry today are not adequate

protection against chemical, biological, or radiological

warfare.

Although susceptibility to sabotage varies greatly

with the particular aspect of the industry or even the

manufacturer, these generalizations cfin be made:

Processes such as canning may be considered safe

from harmful biological agents unless there is tampering with the process itself. Processes involving use

of open collection, mixing, holding and storage tanks

and sumps are particularly susceptible to sabotage.

Ingredients used in processing such as sugar, water,

shortening, baking powder, leavening agents, chocolate, gelatin, starch and similar substances offer particular hazards as carriers of biological or chemical agents.

Fatty foods present special problems with regard to

chemical warfare. Materials transported in tank cars

or trucks are especially susceptible to sabotage during

transportation. Minor ingredients such as spices, flavors, glutamate, food color, concentrates and preservatives could be used as carriers for chemical agents.

Where large amounts of air are brought into contact with the food, such as in pneumatic transfer of

flour, spray drying or dehydration, that food may also

be vulnerable to sabotage.

Since water is used extensively in most food processes, and since it is frequently susceptible to contamination, special precautions should be taken to guard

against sabotage of water supplies. Plant managers

should assess the vulnerability of their processes, materials and products to sabotage, and take protective

measures.

THE NATIONAL CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM

Intensive studies of enemy attack capabilities and

the effects of direct attack with modern weapons and

sabotage make it clear that a nationwide program of

civil defense preparedness is essential to national survival, and that fallout protection is the best method of

saving more lives at the least cost in event of a nuclear

attack. Also, fallout shelters can be made available in

the shortest time.

The National Civil Defense Program, therefore, is

oriented primarily to one objective—protection of

ßvery American against radioactive fallout. The

priority elements in the program include:

Shelters equipped and provisioned to

furnish fallout protection for every

citizen,

Warning and communication methods

to alert the Nation to attack and to provide emergency information,

A system for detecting and reporting the

intensity of radioactive fallout, and

Organization and training in civil defense techniques with emphasis on shelter management and shelter living.
SHELTERS

The key effort in the National Civil Defense Program

is the establishment of a nationwide system of fallout

shelters. As the first step the Federal Government has

made a national fallout shelter survey to determine the

amount of shelter space which already exists in major

buildings all over the country. This national fallout

shelter survey has uncovered over 104 million shelter

spaces in existing facilities, many of which are located

in business and industrial establishments.

The minimum fallout "protection factor" for public

shelters is 40. This means that the radiation measurement inside the shelter would be ^o^h—or 2% Percent of the radiation measurement outside the shelter.

Also, in order to qualify as a public shelter the space

must accommodate 50 people or more (with a net

space of 10 square feet per person with ventilation of 3

cubic feet per minute per person ; or 500 cubic feet per

person without mechanical ventilation) and have a

storage capacity for supplies and equipment of approximately 11/4 cubic feet per person.

Facilities which are needed and which meet these

minimum requirements and which are licensed wiU be

marked and stocked with shelter supplies by the Federal

Government for use as public shelters.

Therefore, as applies only to existing construction

facilities offering protection factors of 40 to 99 or more

will be approved for marking and provisioning as public shelters by the Federal Government.

Supplies provided by the Federal Government include a special austere food ration of 10,000 calories

per person, metal containers for 14 quarts of water

per person, medical and sanitation items, and radiation

detection and measuring instruments.

Local civil defense directors have the final decision

in determining the need for licensing, marking, and

stocking shelters.

WARNING

The backbone of the civil defense warning system is

the National Warning System (NAWAS), which links

the OCD National Warning Center at NORAD headquarters and seven OCD warning centers at NORAD

regions with 500 warning points in the continental

United States. Once it has been determined that attack is probable or imminent, OCD warning centers

disseminate an air raid warning and supplemental information to the 500 warning points. They, in turn,

relay the warning and the warning time to approximately 3,500 secondary warning points, which pass the

warning to local officials responsible for warning the

public.

There are two civil defense warning signals, the (1)

"ALERT" and (2) "TAKE COVER" sounded on outdoor warning devices. The "ALERT" signal is a 3- to

5-minute steady blast or tone, meaning "attack is probable—^take action as directed by local government."

The "TAKE COVER" signal is a 3-minute wailing tone

or a series of short blasts meaning "attack is imminent—^take cover immediately in the best available

shelter."

RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

Radiological monitoring is an indispensable service

to all civil defense organizations and their operations.

In the event of a nuclear attack, trained monitors

will be required to furnish information essential for

human protection. Monitoring services wiU be required

from the period shortly after a nuclear attack until the

radiological hazard from fallout diminishes to the point

that normal activities may be resumed without

significant danger.

A minimum of 150,000 monitoring stations is required across the United States to provide effective

service at Federal, State and local levels of government.
and rapid progress is being made toward attaining this

goal. An average of four trained monitors is required

for each station.

Radiological detection instruments are being placed

in all public fallout shelters and individuals are being

trained in radiological monitoring for determining

when it is safe for occupants to leave shelters.

TRAINING AND EDUCATION

The Office of Civil Defense maintains three schools

for instructing civil defense officials and training instructors in management of shelters and radiological

defense. Currently six courses are given : Shelter Management (Instructor), Radiological Monitoring for Instructors, Radiological Defense Officer, Civil Defense

Management, Planning and Operations, and Elements

of a Shelter System Capability.

The Federal Government has prepared and packaged

a wide variety of materials and items for use by instructors in training government officials and volunteer

auxiliaries in their home States.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture, in addition to

providing information and guidance to the food industry in preparing for civil defense, provides information

and training for the rural population for survival in a

nuclear attack. Other Federal agencies conduct

courses on subjects for which they are normally responsible. For example, in the Department of Health,

Education, and Welfare the Food and Drug Administration trains in prevention of sabotage of food and

food processing, the Public Health Service provides

training for medical self-help to enable individuals to

meet emergency health needs if professional assistance

is unavailable for prolonged periods, and the Office of

Education conducts a civil defense adult education program designed to develop knowledge and understanding of plans for civil defense and to encourage

participation in civil defense with emphasis on the

fallout sheltei* program. In addition, guidance and

instructional materials have been provided to carry out

civil defense instruction in public schools and colleges.

Special courses in shelter design and analysis are

being given at various schools throughout the country

to acquaint architects and engineers with a new technology. Upon successful completion of the course,

these architects and engineers are certified by the Department of Defense, and are capable of evaluating

shelter in existing structures as well as designing

shelter in new construction.

The National Civil Defense Program is sponsored

by the Federal Government through the Department of

Defense, Office of Civil Defense, and with the cooperation of State and local civil defense officials. The full

participation of all industries is essential. Cooperation

of food plant managers is not only a prudent means by

which they can insure protection of their employees

and plants, but is a serious public responsibility as well.

INDUSTRIAL CIVIL DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS

If the United States is ever attacked by nuclear

weapons, the Nation's survival will depend largely

upon how well our industrial community can survive and recover from the blow. The role of industry

in civil defense and post-attack recovery is intimately

connected with the survival of the people as well as

the survival of our free enterprise system—our way

of life.
Industry cannot survive by instinct and determination alone. The enormous devastation which could

be created by nuclear holocaust demands intelligent

action by all industries to meet the threat to their existence. The program of civil defense for industry was

designed to provide guidance and coordination for

the national industrial preparedness effort.

Although a system of fallout shelters is the foundation upon which civil defense measures are based,

readying fallout shelters is by no means the only preparedness action to be taken. It is clccir that fallout

shelters must be created and made ready before other

civil defense actions will have much meaning.

Every company should develop civil defense plans

in close cooperation with the local civil defense director. It is his job to coordinate emergency planning

among departments of local government, to guide and

help industry in preparing for civil defense, and to

arrange for training of civil defense coordinators and

committee members at OCD schools.

It is clear that there can be no one plan which will

meet the requirements of all companies and plants.

However, with information gathered from Hiroshima

and Nagasaki, from the A-bomb and H-bomb tests,

and from the thinking of many industrial executives

who have already made certain disaster preparations

within their companies and plants, there have evolved

elements of an industrial civil defense program which

can be tailored to fit each company and plant situation.

Ideally, to plan and administer a company civil

defense program, management should designate corporate and plant civil defense coordinators, establish

a civil defense advisory committee composed of representatives of various departments of the company,

issue appropriate policy statements and administrative directives to establish the company civil defense

program, and publish the company civil defense plan

in a manual.

Industrial leaders—planning for civil defense emergencies—in addition to providing shelters for employees and the public, should: plan for the movement

of employees to shelter; train employees in shelter

management; arrange for receipt and dissemination

of warning; establish a control center and communications system; develop emergency shutdown procedures; organize and train the plant protective services

and employees for self-help including radiological

monitoring; enroll the industrial protective services

and other skilled units into appropriate departments

of local government as auxiliaries; protect vital records

and documents ; plan for executive succession and continuity of management—^this may require amendment

of corporate by-laws and regulations; prepare for

emergency repair and restoration of facilities; join

with other plants in the neighborhood to set up an

industrial mutual aid association; establish a security

system for protection against espionage and sabotage;

inform and educate employees in methods of personal

and home survival; and provide leadership, support

and assistance to government in preparing for community survival.

Industries must take the initiative and carry the load

in providing for their survival. Government can, and

will, give technical and other assistance, and will cooperate in every way possible; but industry itself, in

cooperation with government, must make and put into

effect its own civil defense plans.

In a nuclear emergency, the facilities of local governments will be taxed beyond capacity. The ability of

industrial plants to survive will be directly dependent

upon the advance training and preparations which they

have devoted to survival techniques.

Under Executive Order No. 10998 of February 16,

1962, the U.S. Department of Agriculture is r^ponsible for providing civil defense information and assistance to the companies throughout the Nation representative of the food industry.

Preparing for civil defense in industry—saving

lives of employees and protecting corporate property—

is no luxury; it is good insurance. All industries are

urged to participate, for their own welfare and for the

sake of the Nation.

8
GOVERNMENT PUNS FOR POST-ATTACK FOOD PROCESSING, STORAGE, AND DISTRIBUTION

Sufiicient food for survivors probably will be on

hand throughout the Nation following a nuclear attack,

but the principal problem will be moving it from storage or the processing plant to consumer areas where

and when it is needed. Emergency food management

preparedness, therefore, is directed at three basic

objectives:

1. Conservation and orderly use of surviving food supplies.

2. Processing of raw food stocks into

the form suitable for consumption or reduction of perishability.

3. All possible assistance in maintaining

the orderly distribution of food for the

surviving population, our military requirements, and those of our allies.

The responsibility for emergency food management

has been assigned by the Secretary of Agriculture to

USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service. The AMS

job is to work with the food industry in planning

means of conserving food, getting it processed and distributed properly following a nuclear attack, and helping in post-attack maintenance or restoration of processing, storage, handling and distribution facilities to

keep food moving.

The responsibilities of AMS extend from the farm

gate through the wholesaler level in the distribution

chain. By agreement with individual States, a part of

these responsibilities will be shared by some State governments, but States will be primarily concerned with

mass-feeding and with distribution of food at the retail

level, development of consumer rationing programs and

other plans necessary to assure equitable distribution

of consumers' supplies.

As is the case with AMS, other agencies of the U.S.

Department of Agriculture have been assigned emergency duties which parallel their regular functions. In

anticipation of communications diflSculties in a postattack period, USDA State and County Defense Boards

have been established to function independently if necessary. The executive directors of the Agricultural

Stabilization and Conservation Service State oflBces are

chairmen of the USDA State Defense Boards. County

ASCS office managers serve as chairmen of USDA

County Defense Boards. Members of the boards at

both levels include locally situated employees of major

agencies of the Department.

The food industry's role in a national emergency is a

relatively simple one—to continue processing, storing

and distributing food to meet the Nation's needs. The

Government, even with all the facilities at its disposal,

cannot produce, process, store and distribute the food.

These tasks can be accomplished only by determined

and effective efforts of farmers and food processing

and handling concerns. But the Government can help

the food industry to meet the challenges posed by the

emergency, and this is the purpose of the food

management program.

The emergency program will consist of four principles of food management:

1. Conservation. A temporary "freeze" will be

placed on food sales and deliveries in the immediate

post-attack period, to prevent unwise usage while the

Government and food industry take stock of the situation. This freeze may be expected to continue until it

is determined how much food is available, how long it

would last, when and where more can be obtained,

when and where processing materials and services can

be obtained, and what kind of emergency actions have

to be taken to cope with dislocations and stoppages. A

considerable list of foods will be exempt from this principle, particularly foods in imminent danger of spoilage

for which the best conservation would be immediate

use.

2. Using perishables first. Conservation of

canned foods and other non-perishsibles will be emphasized while perishables such as fresh meats, fish, milk

and produce are available. An effort will be made

to preserve perishables which exceed immediate needs,

693-á44 o—Ô3-
so that the drain on other non-perishable stocks will

be eased. Special efforts will be made to conserve

foods which are produced or processed in only a few

locations or are imported.

3. Limiting consumption. It is virtually certain that food consumption will have to be limited, at

least for a time, following an all-out attack. Plans call

for State and local governments to initiate rationing

as soon as distribution is resumed. A tentative National Emergency Food Consumption Standard has been

developed to serve as a guide in food distribution and

consumption. Such limits on distribution are also

essential to prevent hoarding.

4. Alternate marketing and supply systems.

An all-out attack is certain to leave the food industry

with a confusing combination of shortages and excesses.

There may be grain without mills, and elsewhere, mills

without grain. There may be slaughter plants without labor, and labor whose plants are destroyed. One

of the biggest jobs of both Government and industry

will be to match the surviving resources so that they

can be utilized efiSciently.

None of these principles will become actualities automatically. Their realization in an emergency will require diligent planning, and the planning should be

started immediately. There will be no time to plan

when the warning sounds. Those in the food industry, and county and State government oflBcials should

become acquainted with the USDA State and County

Defense Boards and their activities. These boards are

the oflScials from whom the food industry and farmers

will hear most directly and most often in emergency

planning and post-attack operations.

10
PART II. CIVIL DEFENSE PREPARATIONS IN THE FOOD INDUSTRY

PLANNINC

If a food company's disaster preparedness program

is to be effective, its planning and preparation must

be given the same degree of attention as other corporate activities. In a multi-plant operation, planning

should be conducted on both a corporate and a plant

basis. Guidelines for protection of the people and

property should be developed at the corporate level,

with the details worked out by individual plants with

the help of civil defense oflScials in plant communities.

One of the first steps in planning and organizing

should be the appointment of a single individual at

the corporate level to provide coordination and direction of the overall disaster preparedness program, and

a counterpart official in each plant to direct its phase

of the program. In a small plant, the manager may

do his own planning. The civil defense coordinator

must have the administrative and organizational responsibility for making the plan work, for the plan will be

of no value unless the personnel of the company or the

plant are subsequently organized and trained to carry

it out.

The second step should be the appointment of a civil

defense advisory committee, representing both employees and management, to assist the civil defense

coordinator and to insure that the plan and organization receive the active cooperation of all elements in

the company.

Under guidance of the company civil defense coordinator and his advisory committee, company officials

next should assess the vulnerability of the facilities and

the company's capability for meeting a disaster. Such

a survey includes analysis of the probable threats to

plant and personnel, the significance of geographical

location, the industrial processes employed by the company, the capability of plant protective organizations

to minimize damage, and the amount of protection

available for personnel. This analysis will indicate the

proper size and makeup of the company's emergency

organization and the employee training programs

needed.

A key factor in the effectiveness of the civil defense

plan will be the shelter provisions. The kind of shelter

protection needed will depend upon the plant's proximity to likely target areas. How much is provided

may depend upon the budget, the type of present plant

construction, availability of shelter in nearby buildings,

and other variables. Certainly, each company will

want to provide the best shelter for its people that

circumstances will allow.

The emergency plan also should include provisions

for close mutual assistance with neighboring plants

and local civil defense officials. All planning should be

performed in conjunction with the local civil defense

director.

When the plan has been set down on paper, the civil

defense coordinator for the plant should see that it gets

an official stamp of approval. It is best to have it published and distributed to all personnel as a policy directive from the food plant manager, thus assuring

that it will receive the attention it deserves.

11
ORGANIZING

^/A/PUST/?M¿ C/m PfffA/S£ ORGAAÍ/ZAT/OA/X

I

-^H

d¿i¿43¿¿ij]¿

T 4n 1 "

A company's civil defense plan will be no better than

the organization which is to put it into effect. After a

company civil defense coordinator has been designated

and. an advisory committee selected, all companies

should organize and train small groups of employees

for specialized emergency services, such as firefighting,

rescue, police, first aid, chemical and biological defense

and radiological monitoring to safeguard the building

and its occupants in time of attack or other major

disaster. The framework of an effective disaster control or self-help organization is already in existence

in most large buildings and industrial plants. For example, most plants already have organized and trained

fire brigades, guard services, rescue teams, first aid

and welfare groups.

In order to be prepared for self-help the problem

is simply one of enlarging and extending already organized groups. Industrial physicians or nurses become responsible for first-aid and medical self-help,

police responsible for maintenance of order, firemen

for fire control, etc., with the addition of perhaps a

few teams concerned with radiological monitoring,

chemical and biological defense, and rescue.

This organization should be formed in two steps.

The first is preparation of the company's regular plant

protective services to perform emergency duties corresponding to their peacetime responsibilities. Such

services, necessary to both peacetime and emergency

operation, are communications, police, fire, rescue,

health, engineering and welfare services. The second

step is establishment of emergency services for which

there is no normal counterpart. These include warning, radiological monitoring, decontamination, wardens, shelter management, alternate headquarters,

continuity of management, and records protection.

When all of the company's trained specialists have

been assigned to the emergency groups for which they

are best fitted, such groups can be expanded to the

desired strength by auxiliaries—employees selected on

12

the basis of experience and qualifications and trained

in established in-plant training courses to perform specific emergency duties. An inventory of employee

experiences and interests will bring out many skills useful to the protective functions.

In smaller companies, the civil defense organization

wiU need to be adapted to the smaller number of oflScials and organizational units.

Present directors of the regular plant protective services should be given the responsibility for the corresponding emergency services. For the added services,

it will probably be necessary to train new leaders.

Personnel for the posts should be chosen on the basis

of experience and qualifications, then trained at the

various civil defense training schools.

The company's emergency organization should not

replace the normal plant protective forces. It should

be designed so as to expand existing protective groups

to meet large-scale disasters. The extent of the expansion will have to be determined by the study of plant

vulnerability and by special characteristics which may

have a bearing on the makeup of the protective organization. The civil defense coordinator must be sure

that his emergency services are adequate to meet any

special problems which are likely to arise.

The plant's emergency groups should be prepared

to help community civil defense preparations as well

as their own organization. They will be able to serve

as auxiliaries in the local government's emergency organization, thus giving the community a built-in capability for disaster action on a broad scale.

Any plant is capable of organizing for its own

self-protection, provided that management supplies

leadership and a chain of command for emergency

planning and emergency action.

In many ways the average industrial plant is like a

small community. The plant protection or emergency

organization resembles the organization structure of

the local government.
Each of the plant protective groups requires special

training. Every possible use should be made u' civil

defense training courses, and test exercises held periodically to assure the operational efficiency of the groups.

Training will be facilitated if reciprocal agreements

are arranged with the community civil defense director

aiiJ other industrial civil defense organizations in the

area. In this way, one plant might specialize in the

teaching of a certain course, while a second plant

teaches a different specialty. Such an arrangement

reduces the duplication of effort, training materials

and instructor personnel. Local government departments frequently assist by providing instruction and

training for plant protective groups such as police and

fire. Other courses in civil defense skills are offered

by State and local civil defense officials.

Aside from the special training conduicted for specialists in the protective services, all employees should

be trained in such protective techniques as plant shutdown procedures, movement to shelter, firefighting, and

rescue work. Employee training should be conducted

on a regular basis through both demonstrations and

driUs.

All plant media should be used to provide employees

with basic civil defense information. Through a combination of this information and regular training in

emergency functions, the employee will serve as a

source of civil defense education for his family.

WARNING

Since the company's emergency organization will

need all available time in a disaster situation, arrangements should be made for local authorities to give the

plant the civil defense warning by the fastest means

and for disseminating it quickly to all employees.

There are two civil defense warning signals. The

first, a long, steady sound on warning devices is the

ALERT signal—notice that attack is probable. Upon

this warning, employees should take whatever protective actions the company's emergency plans call for.

The second warning signal, a wailing or series of short

blasts on warning devices, is the TAKE COVER signal—notice that attack is imminent. Upon this warning, employees should seek the best available cover.

The most effective means of receiving the warning

can be developed by company officials with the cooperation of the local civil defense office. Many firms use a

"bell and light" system which telephone companies

make available to industrial subscribers and other key

installations.

The plant's next consideration is to relay the warning

to all office buildings, plants, laboratories, and other

places where employees are located. The community

warning system may suffice, but where buildings are

spread over a wide area or located beyond hearing distance, or where the noises of industrial processes obscure the sound of warning devices, a separate inplant

warning system may be needed. In some instances,

public address systems can be used. Or, it may be

necessary to install special bells, whistles, public address system, or other devices to provide a distinctive

sound. Whatever the method, it is essential that civil

defense warnings can reach all employees at all times

while they are in the plant.

Employees need to be told how they will be warned

of impending attack, what the civil defense warning

signals mean and what actions are to be taken upon

receipt of the warning signal.

Warning devices should be tested periodically to

insure that they are in working order, and used in the

plant's civil defense exercises and drills.

COMMUNICATIONS

Along with the warning system, the adequacy of

the company's inplant and outside communication facilities also should be appraised. Ideally, each food

plant should have a control center capable of maintaining constant communication with plant employees,

with other nearby plants, with the nearest government

13
control center, and with the appropriate USDA Defense

Board. Communications should also be provided between the control center and each plant shelter area.

Location of the control center and the nature of the

emergency communications need to be determined on

the basis of the company's attack assumptions. An

underground installation with good fallout protection

and some blast protection makes the best center.

In designing the communications network, consider

the needs of employees during a long period of shelter

occupancy. News of ffmiilies and events in the outside world will be of the utmost importance to confined

employees. The only means they will have of receiving such information is through the company control

center, properly connected with other local informational outlets.

EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN AND START-UP PROCEDURES

KKN S

Emergency procedures to shut equipment down and

start it up again will be of particular concern to food

industry plants in likely target areas. The handling

and storage of raw materials find finished products

which will be desperately needed in the post-attack

period will present special problems.

Orderly, speedy shutdown in an emergency will be

vital. Plans should include procedures for a routine

shutdown in the event time is available. But there

needs to be an alternate plan for a "creish" shutdown

where attack is imminent and shutdown is required

for the safety of personnel. It is the "crash" type of

shutdown that is most likely to involve loss of food

products, raw materials and damage to equipment;

plant managers need to use the utmost ingenuity to

minimize such losses. In some larger industries, it

KKK

11 M 11 I I m

«»I « ft

may be possible to operate some control equipment

from shelter areas.

Attention should be given to particular plant hazards such as ammonia, gas or electric lines which

might start fires or otherwise endanger personnel confined in shelter areas.

The shutdown and start-up plans should define

clearly the responsibilities for emergency procedures.

Post detailed instructions for easy reference, and rehearse all employees involved.

Periodic exercises need not involve actual shutdown

of equipment. A simulated shutdown drill can be devised, with valves, switches and equipment tagged to

denote that they have been closed down. Time studies

of the operation wiU determine how successful it would

have been in an actual emergency.

FALLOUT SHELTERS IN FOOD FACILITIES

Among all of a company's emergency preparations

to save lives, providing effective fallout shelter—a place

to go in the event of a nuclear attack—for its employees

is the most important. The National Civil Defense

Program has placed foremost emphasis on establishing

a nationwide system of fallout shelters. As the result

of a national shelter survey more than 104 million

shelter spaces, many of them located in business and

industrial establishments, have been identified and are

being marked and stocked as official public shelters.

14
Industrial and business leaders should take the initiative in protecting their most productive asset—their

employees. Building owners and food plant managers

should cooperate with Government in the National

Shelter Survey, Marking and Stocking Program by

allowing all buildings to be surveyed, and their shielding capacity (protection factor) assessed by architects

and engineers who are working under contract with

the Army Corps of Engineers or the Navy Bureau of

Yards and Docks. This information is necessary so

the Federal Government may know how much adequate

fallout protection there is throughout the country and

determine how much more is needed.

Food plant managers should enter into agreement to

allow use as public shelter of space in food facilities

which meets Federal protection criteria and is needed,

by signing the "Fallout Shelter License or Privilege"

form.

Shelters in buildings which cannot be opened to the

public in time of emergency cannot be stocked at Federal expense. In this case, equip and stock shelters for

employees with basic essentials—food, water, medical

and first aid supplies, and radiation, sanitation, ventilation, air-filtering, firefighting, emergency power and

conununications equipment.

Buildings that do not offer adequate fallout protection may be improved by modification or by additional

construction to bring them up to the minimum standards. Include fallout shelters in the designs and

specifications for all new plants and structures.

In some cases, specially constructed shelters may

need to be provided at appropriate locations in the

plant for employees who must perform shutdown procedures requiring several hours or days duration.

A directory of architects and engineers qualified in

fallout shelter analysis is available to anyone requiring

technical assistance in achieving the recommended protection factor for additional construction in existing

buildings or in designing shelters in new plants.

Strenuous effort should be made to provide adequate

fallout protection for all employees on the premises of

each plant. If this is not possible, additional shelter

spaces may be found in nearby buildings or facilities.

Make arrangements for using such spaces with local

civil defense officials.

Industry can assist local government authorities in

marking and stocking public fallout shelters. The

finding, marking and stocking of public fallout shelters

is a tremendous nationwide logistical undertaking,

placing a severe burden dn local government authorities. Business and industrial firms can be of great

assistance by obtaining shelter signs from local government and installing such signs in their plants in accordance with specifications provided by the Army

Corps of Engineers or the Navy Bureau of Yards and

Docks.

Local governments are responsible for moving shelter

supplies from Federal warehouses to public shelters.

Business and industrial firms can assist local government in accelerating the movement of these supplies

by picking up sheker supplies at Federal warehouses

and transporting and placing them in their own plant

shelters. In some cities, this has been accomplished

by volunteer services of the trucking industry or by

use of transportation provided by a variety of business

and industrial firms.

Urge employees to arrange shelter for themselves

and their families by preparing home shelters or by

assuring that they and their families have predetermined access to community shelters. This is especially

important if the attack should come at night or on

holidays when they are not at the workplace. Provide

them with guidance and assistance on how to establish

group shelters in their residential areas and in their

homes. Be sure to coordinate your efforts with those

of local governments.

In addition to having a place to go, employees must

know how to live in a shelter, and what to expect and

to do when it is possible to leave shelter. In cooperation with local civil defense officials, food companies

should educate employees in these aspects of survival.

In addition, inform employees about the community

civil defense program so they will know what to do and

be ready to help should an attack occur either while at

work or at home.

MOVEMENT OF EMPLOYEES TO SHELTERS

While fallout shelters are the most practical and

effective way to save lives in a nuclear attack, their

value will be contingent upon the emergency organization's ability to get employees into them in the time

available. The problem may be a simple one in a

small food plant, but it quickly becomes complex as

the size of the operation increases.

Under any circumstances, a plant's civil defense program must include a detailed plan for the movement

of all employees quickly and safely into assigned shelter areas. Effective operation of the movement plan

should be the responsibility of the plant manager,

15
assisted by supervisory personnel, plant police and

wardens, and the civil defense coordinator. The movement must be designed to cope with any special physical characteristics of the plant, with the locations of

employees at various times, and many other variêibles.

Don't overlook the possibility that adjustments or modifications in plant facilities or procedures may greatly

facilitate the movement schedule.

Once the best movement system has been developed,

the process of educating and drilling employees should

begin. Workers must understand that their welfare

hinges directly upon teamwork and that the survival of

each is inseparable from that of his fellow workers.

Drills should be supervised to insure that the movement can be made before fallout is likely to arrive. If

it takes too long, the plan needs still more work.

Although shelter aireas may be occupied by employees

during plant exercises and drills, such plant shelter

areas will be occupied by non-employees only in the

event of a civil defense emergency. They will not be

used for tests or emergency drills involving entrance

into the buildings by the general public.

SHELTER MANAGEMENT

The effectiveness of industrial shelters will depend

largely upon the willingness of management to provide

and equip shelter space for its employees, and the way

in which the shelters are managed. The extended confinement of a large group of diverse personalities in

cramped quarters under trying conditions can lead to

situations requiring unique managerial skills and

training.

Business and industrial leaders should immediately

organize and train for the management and use of

shelters.

A company shelter manager should be designated

and trained to handle staffing and management of shelters throughout the company. In addition, a shelter

manager and deputy shelter manager should be designated for each shelter area in all plants and office

buildings.

Regardless of size, each plant shelter ought to be

staffed with fire prevention and control officers, plant

police, radiological monitors, personnel trained in first

aid and medical self-help, and others who can handle

the rationing of food and water, supervise sanitation

procedures and perform other duties required during

shelter occupancy.

Only those who have shelter management training

should be appointed to the critical position of shelter

manager. In most cases, shelter managers will be

supervisory employees. Assistants should be selected

from the plant protective services. Companies may

contact local or State civil defense officials for advice

as to where jx)tential shelter managers and staff members can receive special training.

Numerous training sessions will allow the shelter

manager and his staff to build a mutual respect for one

another. The stsiffing needed in each shelter will depend upon the size and configuration of the shelter.

Six or eight people could effectively manage a 50-

person, one-room shelter, but much larger staffs are

onrinn

16
necessary to manage shelters comprised of several

rooms or several floors.

As soon as shelters are marked, company ofiScials

should seek the help of civil defense officials in organizing shelter management teams and selecting qualified personnel to receive formal training.

EVACUATING THE PLANT

7^^^

Because of the size and nature of some food processing companies, plant managers may find it virtually

impossible to provide adequate fallout shelter for all

employees. When a plant has no area that can be

adapted for effective protection, then it must make

plans to get its employees quickly and safely to the

nearest public shelter, or to any excess shelter of the

neighboring companies.

Shelter outside the plant will necessarily require

orderly and swift movement of employees. Therefore,

the company's civil defense coordinator should plan

with community officials—or those of nearby plants—

for the necessary shelter space and for the best route

for getting employees to it.

He must make standby transportation arrangements.

If the designated shelter area is nearby, employees may

be able to walk. If vehicles are required, they must be

available in adequate numbers at the proper time.

The procedure for evacuating the plant and moving

employees to designated shelter areas outside of the

plant should, like other employee emergency activities,

be the subject of periodic drills and exercises.

PLANT POLICE PROTECTION

Many food plants have a guard or security force in

existence. Whether the force is composed of one individual or a sizable group, it probably will need to be

expanded for emergencies by the addition of trained

auxiharies. In smaller companies, which have no

peacetime security problems, someone should be

designated to head the police service in emergencies.

The emergency security function includes the protection of personnel and property, protection of food

stocks, prevention of panic and looting, and assistance

in the effective operation of other emergency services.

The food processing industry—because of the characteristics of the manufacturing processes—is extremely vulnerable to chemical or biological warfare.

Hence, one of the major police functions will be the

prevention of subversive operations and infiltration of

the plant by enemy agents. The emergency plan should

call for close attention to effective screening of personnel, control of entrances and exits, protective barriers

and proper lighting. While protection against enemy

agents is primarily the task of the Federal Government,

there is much which the industry can do to protect

itself.

Panic and hysteria may accompany a civil defense

emergency. These can be prevented by firm, confident

leadership. Employees must know what to expect in

an emergency and they must have competent, understanding guidance. This is true in the plant shutdown

17
procedures, movement of personnel to shelters, and

during shelter occupancy itself. At least one person

trained in police functions should be assigned to each

shelter to maintain order, enforce regulations, and

otherwise assist the shelter manager.

Moreover, the entire food industry is vulnerable

from another standpoint—possession of consumable

food which may be the target of looting. Local law

enforcement agencies will do what they can to protect

food supplies, but their forces may be too thinly spread

to meet all needs. Food companies themselves will have

to assume the initial responsibility for protection of

their products as well as their facilities. Therefore,

plans should be made to augment plant police personnel and enroll them as auxiliaries to loical law enforcement agencies.

While other plant protective groups will share the

responsibility for avoiding panic through good organization and effective leadership, they will look to the

plant police to provide the authority and assistance

necessary to keep emergency activities proceeding

smoothly.

PLANT FIRE CONTROL

The plant needs trained personnel to handle fire and

decontamination problems without relying on community firje departments. Demands upon municipal firemen in a damaged area are almost certain to be greater

than they can handle.

Guidance from municipal fire officials regarding acquisition of emergency equipment will be valuable.

The plant's emergency fire personnel should be assigned the responsibility of checking the equipment

periodically and keeping it in working condition.

Firefighting is an activity in which a group of neighboring plants can develop effective industrial mutualaid agreements for civil defense. Combining the

emergency firefighting capabilities of a number of

plants will provide more protection for each of them

and more effective equipment at less cost per company.

One of the best fire control methods, of course, is

fire prevention. The plant's emergency fire service

should establish a companywide fire prevention program, and solicit cooperation of all employees in regular inspections and fire drills. Also, preventive

measures such as storing flammable materials in

underground tanks reduce the likelihood of fires.

The responsibilities of the emergency fire service will

not be limited to minimizing the threat of fire and to

emergency firefighting. The service can be responsible

also for establishing fire regulations in company shelters, and making periodic inspections of them. An

appropriate number of fire-trained personnel should be

assigned to each shelter area to prevent and control fire

during shelter occupancy.

Decontamination of radioactive areas and objects

often can best be accomplished by use of fire equipment and water. Consequently, the fire service also

should be trained and equipped to carry out this

function.

FIRST AID AND MEDICAL CARE

In an industrial disaster, prompt and efficient first

aid and medical attention for the injured transcends

any other activity except preventing the further spread

of the disaster. The plant first aid and medical staff

need a workable plan for dealing with both peacetime

and wartime disasters.

The service should be organized so that its plan for

civil defense emergencies is merely an expansion of its

plan for dealing with peacetime disasters. Plants

which have no disaster plan would do well to provide

a plan for meeting peacetime disasters; then as soon

as possible expand it into a full-scale plan for medical

self-help in a national emergency.

18
Members of the service, especially the auxiliaries,

should receive suitable training in first aid and medical self-help skills, including how to deal with fallout

and biological and chemical warfare agents. New and

improved courses in these skills are available from

local civil defense directors.

The service should be organized in teams to carry

out specific emergency functions. First aid stations

need to be established as treatment centers and assembly points for first aid workers and other medical assistants. "Dry runs" should be conducted periodically

under conditions which are as realistic as possible.

It must be emphasized that the responsibilities of the

first aid and medical personnel do not come to an end

once employees are installed in shelters. Maintaining

health and preventing disease in congested shelter

living will be critical, and the plan must insure that

qualified members of the service are on duty in each

shelter.

The plan should include early inventory of the plant's

medical and surgical supplies, equipment and facilities.

Such items should be increased as necessary to meet

at least the minimum estimated disaster needs.

Cooperation in the first aid and medical plan must

be guaranteed by top management. It must be coordinated with other emergency services, with the community civil defense plan and, if possible, with similar

plans of neighboring plants.

RESCUE OPERATIONS

The function of rescue operations is to be prepared

to save any plant employees who might become endangered by disaster.

A company's most valuable resource is its personnel.

So highly integrated is the work of the first aid and

rescue teams that it is preferable to have these functions combined or members of the teams trained in

both skills.

Rescue teams should be given standard rescue training, augmented by training in special skills which may

be required by the nature of the plant's operation.

There are a number of civil defense rescue schools, and

many community rescue teams are adequately equipped

and trained to provide excellent instructions for a

company's rescue service.

The functions of the rescue service must be coordinated closely with police and fire, as well as first aid

and medical service. In this area also, a plant may

benefit significantly by joining neighboring companies

in industrial mutual aid associations. Regular drills

will be needed to perfect techniques.

RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

Every food plant should have personnel trained in

radiological monitoring and defense. Each plant,

warehouse or oflSce should train one or more radiological monitoring specialists or teams to be responsible

for determining radioactive fallout intensity.

A radiological monitoring team should be assigned

to duty in each shelter area. Public shelters in buildings that have been stocked by the Federal Government

already contain radiological monitoring instruments.

In addition to monitoring fallout for the safety of personnel, the radiological monitoring teams can assist in

insuring the safety of all food products.

If feasible, individuals selected for key radiological

monitoring assignments should be sent to the Office of

Civil Defense radiological defense training schools,

preferably to a school for instructors so that they can

train other radiological monitors in both the plant and

the community.

Civil defense officials will furnish guidance on the

amount and type of equipment which plfmt civil defense coordinators wiU need in order to maintain an

emergency monitoring capability.

Employees selected to be monitors should complete

the monitor training course recommended by OCD, or

its equivalent. All employees should be educated regarding the hazards of fallout, the procedures for individual and collective protection against those hazards,

and, if appropriate, should be informed of the availability of home monitoring equipment, and instructed

in its use.

Food plant managers have a special radiological defense problem not shared by most industries. Contrary to the majority of industries, food processors deal

with raw materials, processes and products that are

19
highly vulnerable to radiological fallout. Most industrial raw materials and products that have become

contaminated by fallout can be decontaminated and

restored to a usable state. But heavy contamiination of

food products or raw materials may leave part of it unfit

for consumption, thus reducing the supply.

Food materials and products which can be kept from

direct contact with radioactive particles will be safe

for consumption. Radioactive rays penetrating food

containers will not damage the food itself. It is only

when radioactive particles become mixed in the food,

that it becomes dangerous to eat or drink.

Canned foods, and foods stored in refrigerated warehouses or in any nonporous containers thus would be

free from radioactivity. But they can easily become

contaminated in the opening of the containers unless

the containers have been decontaminated.

Since cooking does not eliminate radioactivity, the

same amount of protection will have to be provided for

raw food as for processed foods.

Radioactive iodine and strontium, particularly iodine 131 and strontium 90, will present problems to

food planners after a nuclear attack. Determination

of allowable levels in food will be the responsibility

of the Federal Government.

A potentially dangerous source of radioactive intake

post-attack could be from leafy vegetables and similar

foods which might be contaminated by fallout particles.

Food companies engaged in the processing of vegetables, grains and other foods which may have become

contaminated by fallout should be especially careful,

and be prepared to monitor them for radioactive particles adhering to the food surfaces. In many cases,

decontamination can be accomplished by thorough

washing.

Contamination of water supplies is another potential radiological hazard. Water, like food, will not

become contaminated by radiation, but it may become

dangerous to drink if too many radioactive particles

fall into it. While this danger may be only temporary

because radioactive particles tend to sink to the bottom,

it would be far better to take stej>s to insure a safe

water supply, such as from an underground well.

Since there are few food processes that are not dependent upon potable water, food plant managers

should give serious thought to both water storage facilities and emergency water supplies. Civil defense officials have warned that every family and every community shelter should have an emergency water supply

sufficient to last two weeks following an emergency.

If it is possible, food plants should also arrange for

a safe emergency water supply. Those plants with

wells available have a valuable emergency resource if

they provide for power for the operation of pumps.

EMPLOYEE WELFARE

As part of a company's efforts to safeguard its employees, a plant welfare group should be organized to

plan for the workers' needs during and following an

emergency.

Many companies are establishing welfare service

groups and are planning for their emergency use.

Preparations by industry in this area cover the assistance of employees during the time they may be in shelter as well as providing accelerated aid to employees

20

after they emerge from shelter.

Personnel planning must include means for obtaining news from the outside, and spiritual guidance for

those who request it. Other assistance to employees

may include food distribution, rebuilding or repairing

employees' homes, providing clothing, loans, and such

other aid as the company may want to make available.

Virtually all local governments provide welfare services. These are supplemented and strengthened in
emergency by organizations such as the American Red

Cross, the Salvation Army, and many other groups.

The company welfare program can be coordinated

with the community welfare program and those of

neighboring plants. A close working relationship between these groups will not only enhance the training

program for welfare workers but will also allow better

service to employees of all companies concerned and

the citizens of the community in event of an emergency.

It is clear that a plant welfare program will not only

serve to save the lives of employees, but will go far in

building and maintaining an exceptionally high level

of morale in the plant workforce.

ANTI-PANIC PRECAUTIONS

A company that plans only for the physical wellbeing of its employees in an emergency is doing only

half the job. There should also be a positive, organized program for preventing or suppressing panic and

hysteria while people are moving to shelters and during

shelter occupancy.

Panic and hysteria feed upon the unknown and are

sustained by ineffective or uncertain leadership. It is

of basic importance that everyone understands the

risks and the responsibilities individual citizens must

assume so that they will survive and recover. The first

step in the prevention of panic is a workable company

emergency plan and enough trained leaders to put the

plan into operation. The ability of the emergency

services to perform their duties quickly and efiGciently

will automatically create a cooperative, orderly response from other employees.

Crisp, firm and understanding leadership when the

warning sounds, during the shut-down processes and

orderly movement of employees to shelter, and in the

shelter, will tend to minimize the threat of panic. First

aid, medical and police personnel should be schooled

in tactics that will suppress hysteria whenever it arises.

Plans for preventing panic should begin long before

the warning sounds. Begin immediately with a comprehensive indoctrination program to inform and educate aU employees on what to expect in the event of

attack. A thorough understanding of the threat, protective measures which have been taken by the plant's

emergency organizations, and protective measures

which each individual can take for himself both at

work and at home will dispel many of the fears and

doubts which otherwise may be expected to arise in a

civil defense emergency.

Fear for their own safety is one of two thoughts

uppermost in everyone's mind in an emergency. The

other is concern for the safety of their families. Action by the company to inform and educate employees

regcirding the local civil defense plan and how it is

designed to protect employees' families, together with

steps which employees should take to prepare their

families and homes for survival, will be vital in eliminating fear and preventing panic. Insofar as possible,

plans should be made for emergency communication

with shelter areas housing employees' families. Every

possible effort should be made to give confined employees up-to-date information on the welfare of their

own families and the general situation outside the

company's shelters.

21
A continuing flow of news from the world outside

will be a vital morale factor during shelter occupancy.

Equally important will be an organized program of

activities, effectively administered by the shelter manager and his assistants. The program should combine

recreational activities and training to orient employees

to the situation they will meet when they leave the

shelters.

INDUSTRIAL MUTUAL AID ASSOCIATIONS

Reference has been made in many of the planning

sections to the organization of industrial mutual aid

associations with neighboring plants. Few companies

or plants are able to provide all the services and equipment needed to meet a full-scale emergency in peacetime. In wartime disaster, the problem would be magnified. The logical recourse is to join other facilities

in the vicinity—under proper coordination with various departments of local government—in formation

of a mutual aid association which will insure that

emergency training and assistance can be mutually

provided for the benefit of all plants.

A mutual aid association is simply an organization

of industrial facilities in a particular area, united by

voluntary agreement to assist each other in an emergency with equipment and manpower as needed to

save lives and protect property.

Industrial mutual aid associations are not new, but

they are especially applicable to civil defense because

of their value in dealing with peacetime and wartime

problems. Experience gained in working together and

helping each other in peacetime disaster is the best

possible training for a national emergency.

In addition to the interchange of equipment, manpower and other resources in an emergency, mutual aid

associations allow companies to economize in their civil

defense training and planning. For instance, a rescue

course might be taught at one facility, serving personnel of all the companies. In return, all firefighting may

be taught at another plant. Such an arrangement

would greatly reduce the duplication of effort, training

materials and instructor personnel.

Basic to the organization and operation of an industrial mutual aid association is the cataloging of supplies of firefighting materials and equipment, medical

supplies, rescue items, and other emergency supplies

and equipment, so that each member of the mutual aid

group knows what is available.

Since the planning of a mutual aid association is a

significant aspect of the emergency plan of local governments, the proper governmental officials should be

included in all phases of planning. Various governmental departments can assist by providing instruction

and training for plant protective groups.

Companies appropriately located to form a mutual

aid association should consult local civil defense officials

immediately for guidance. It will be one of the best

possible steps they can take to protect themselves in a

national emergency or peacetime disasters.

CONTINUITY OF MANAGEMENT

Next to protecting personnel and property, a food

plant's most important industrial survival measure is

insuring that essential activities will continue after the

emergency. Functions need to be examined in the

light of the assumed threat, and each department head

asked to formulate detailed solutions to the problems

involved in continuing his function in the post-attack

period.

In order that officials have appropriate legal authority to act in an emergency, functions should be reviewed to determine whether they would be essential.

ff

22
While many peacetime functions may be found unnecessary in an emergency, others will become extremely

vital and more complicated in their execution. If necessary, by-laws may need to be amended to provide

authority for executive succession and reestablishment

of the company with substitute officers, pending elections by stockholders.

Plans should include an adequate line of succession

among company officials. Replacements should be

designated in the order of succession for each key position, so that the surviving person highest on the list

could direct the function following an attack. Lines of

succession should have sufficient depth to insure continued leadership under the most severe conditions. If

there are gaps in the leadership, then the entire objective of emergency planning will have been defeated.

ALTERNATE HEADQUARTERS AND KEY OFFICE LOCATIONS

Alternate corporate or plant headquarters should be

established—preferably at two or more remote locations—so that officials will have a safe place from

which to operate the company business. Often it is

possible to establish these alternate headquarters in

existing company installations outside probable target

areas.

The objective of this program is the development of

a capacity to manage the company from any one of these

alternate headquarters by transfer or delegation of

management authority during the survival and early

recovery periods.

The alternate headquarters should have adequate

fallout shelter, stocked and ready, and should be

equipped with communications, essential records, living

quarters and other requirements for prolonged operation under emergency conditions. When the facilities

are completed, selected company officials need to participate in training and drills necessary to develop and

maintain a flexible operating capability.

EMPLOYEE REPORTING CENTERS

All employees need to be told where to report after

an attack, to get information about returning to work

and to receive financial help or special assistance.

Key personnel who live in areas which are likely to

escape severe damage may be designated to provide such

advice. Essential employee records should be maintained at these locations, and arrangements made for

the establishment of priority telephone service in an

emergency.

The cost of this type of planning is trivial compared

23
with the benefits from recovery-planning and rehabilitation activities which can be effectively conducted from

these centers during or after the emergency.

Some companies have stored "disaster checks" in the

emergency reporting centers for use by employees who

report to these centers following an attack. The checks

could be used to reimburse workers for work done, or

provide aid until the plant can resume operations.

When the reporting centers are designated and prepared for emergency operation, the company's emergency information and training program should educate employees on the importance of the centers to their

welfare. Instruct workers how to reach designated centers or alternates, depending upon post-attack conditions.

Such centers will contribute to community survival

and rehabilitation plans as well as to employee welfare.

If properly coordinated with community plans and mutual aid associations, they will serve as rallying points

for available manpower in the community.

PROTECTING VITAL RECORDS

One of the critical factors in the continuity of plant

management and operations will be the establishment

of plans and mechanics for protecting vitcJ documents

such as records of ownership, lists of stockholders, finances, operating procedures, key processes, sources of

prime raw materials and personnel. In view of modern

industrial complexities, the ability of most companies

to rebound from a nuclear attack would be severely

handicapped if the documentary foundation for all activities were lost.

The principal contributing factors to prudent records

protection are alert, trained office personnel, and dispersal of duplicate records in vaults or similar wellprotected areas. Office personnel should be thoroughly

trained in the steps which the company's civil defense

organization has designed for records protection.

Because so many records are needed in day-to-day

operations, duplicate critical records may be stored in

safe locations far removed from the main office. The

size of the records, the volume to be duplicated, the

intervals at which duplication is required, and the cost

will all determine how each food plant will want to

duplicate its records. It should be kept in mind that

storage space in emergency locations may become a

problem, consequently the duplicated records should

be maintained in the most compact form possible. Microfilm is the preferable process for large volumes of

material because it requires the least space. For example, some 5,000 sheets of letter-size paper can be

duplicated on a pocket-sized roll of film. The microfilmed replicas of the documents are also desirable because they have legal value.

Dispersal of the records through storage in one

isolated or several widely separated locations is a simple, yet effective, technique which is practiced by many

companies. The records might be kept in branch offices, out-of-town banks, or even the homes of employees.

A high degree of safety also may be obtained by

storing the records in vaults, or in safes on the premises.

Vault storage furnishes adequate protection in most instances, except in an area of total destruction.

Companies which do not have their own record storage facilities shoidd consider renting suitable space

from record storage companies.

REDUCING VULNERABILITY OF FOOD FACILITIES

Efforts to reduce the vulnerability of a food plant

to attack must be preceded by a careful, informed

assessment of that vulnerability. Such assessment

should take into account the threat posed by nuclear

weapons to the company's facilities and personnel, plus

any specific company processes or characteristics which

might create additional hazards, such as explosion

or fire.

When the vulnerability has been assessed, company

officials should determine what can be done about reducing it. Specific hazards need to be weighed in

relation to the cost of removing them, and their impor24
KKKKH

I I I I T.. m

tance to the plant processes. In the case of food plants,

careful assessment should be made of the vulnerability

of raw and processed materials, and all possible efforts

should be made to protect them against attack.

Actual reduction of vulnerability may be accomplished in several ways. These include eliminating or

minimizing as many hazards as possible, dispersing

new installations, providing protective construction

and special arrangements to shield food materials from

the effects of an attack.

If a company is located in a likely target area, the

plant manager should be alert to relocating at least

certain phases of the operation to less vulnerable areas.

Dispersal may have other advantages since it is likely

that many food plants could operate in non-target

areas without greatly increasing costs.

PROTECTIVE CONSTRUCTION

Protective construction is a major factor in reduction of food plant vulnerability. It might be the means

by which the personnel, plant and equipment survive

the blast, fire and radiological effects of a nuclear

explosion.

The term "protective construction" has been used in

many senses. As used here, the term means certain

design precautions taken to increase the survivability

of occupants and contents of facilities subjected to the

effects of a nuclear detonation. For example, a fallout shelter is a protective structure which protects the

occupants from the effects of fallout radiation. In addition to radiation protection, if the plant manager determines that the nuclear threat includes blast and fire,

then the protective structure should be specifically

designed to resist these effects also.

Even though protective construction may in some

instances involve significant expense, plant oflScials

should consider it in connection with expansion of

existing plants or construction of new facilities. It

will be much easier on the budget if it is incorporated

into the regular construction program.

The OflSce of Civil Defense has sponsored an extensive professional development program to acquaint

architects and engineers with the techniques of protective construction. A directory of those qualified in

fallout shelter design and analysis is available. Any

plant planning an addition, rehabilitation, or new construction should utilize a design firm which has a qualified gmalyst on their staff or available as a consultant.

The OfiSce of Civil Defense has published a number

of technical guides dealing with radiation and blast

protection. It is actively engaged in a number of

studies designed to develop new techniques and to produce cost data for various degrees of protection, both

for new construction and for modifying existing

structures.

25
In modifying existing facilities, a number of measures may be taken to reduce the vulnerability of personnel and the plant to fallout radiation. These include

blocking windows, providing additional wall and roof

mass, selective use of space, and similar measures.

However, modifying existing space to resist blast effects requires very careful study, because of the cost

involved.

There is much evidence that the cost of providing

radiation protection in new construction can compare

favorably with the cost of the same space without protection. For facilities requiring special features to

resist blast and fire, initial costs are higher. Blast and

fire protection often imply underground construction,

however, and long-term savings may be realized

through lowered maintenance, heating, and ventilating

costs.

As a minimum, protective construction should provide officially approved fallout protection for all plant

personnel. It is of vital importance that fallout protection be provided for those who might be required to

remain at certain locations to carry out emergency

functions. Since the most practical and effective shelters are underground, emphasis should be placed upon

underground or partly underground construction.

PLANNING AVAILABILITY OF SUPPORTING RESOURCES

The major concern of the food plant manager after

an attack will be to get his plant back into production

as quickly as possible. Among all of the Nation's

pressing post-attack requirements, food is sure to be

one of the most urgent. The ability of food plants to

continue or resume production will be a significant

contribution to the recovery of their own community

and the Nation.

Attention should be given to the resources necessary

for resumption of production. These will include raw

materials, water, personnel, fuel, power, equipment and

repair parts. The effectiveness of the plant's j>ostattack operations will depend to a great extent upon the

ability of the management to establish reserves—even

stockpiling some of these resources—or to locate

alternate emergency sources.

Non-perishable raw materials should be stockpiled,

if feasible, in any suitable storage space. In addition,

several sources of materials should be asked to plan

for early delivery in the post-attack period. Emergency sources should be selected for their geographical

dispersion so as to increase the possibility that at least

one of them will be in operation following an attack.

ManfK)wer may not be a problem if a company has

provided good emergency protection for its employees.

It must be remembered, however, that there will be

demands for personnel to help with community projects and in other plants. This will be especially true

of specialists whose skills may be vitally needed by

the community. In any event, the food plant manager

must plan for carrying on production with a skeleton

staff, or with untrained workers. He should have in

mind some sources from which personnel could be

recruited in an emergency. If the plant is participating in a mutual aid association, provisions probably

wiU have been made for the interchange of personnel

between plants as necessary. Also consider the probability that working hours in some food plants will have

to be expanded—perhaps around the clock—^to meet

urgent food needs.

Emergency power is likely to be a problem. Damage to power facilities may render many plants inoj>erative. The power companies have organized

interconnecting systems to provide alternate power

sources in an emergency. Plant managers should also

consider the possibility of purchasing standby generating equipment, which would be the best guarantee

of emergency power. Fuel will be urgently needed for

operating generators and emergency heating equipment. There should be an adequate emergency supply

on hand.

The critical nature of water in the food industry

26
has already been discussed. As in the case of power,

water will be essential to emergency operations. Managers should try to develop alternate emergency sources

of water, sources that will be protected from contamination by radioactive fallout. If the plant has storage

tanks, they should always be kept filled. If wells are

available, plant managers should see that there is no

local contamination, since they will be an excellent

source of emergency water.

Another requirement for post-attack operations probably will be emergency funds. Normal banking services may be disrupted. Plant managers should appraise the company's cash position together with the

location of its bank accounts. It may be advantageous

to maintain accounts or establish lines of credit at

scattered locations, to insure the economic stability of

the company in the immediate post-attack period.

All essential industries are urged by the Federal

Government to prepare for survival and continuity of

production and service. All banks are inspected regularly for civil defense preparedness. The communications, power and fuel industries, among others, are

making commendable progress in achieving readiness

for national emergency.

In matters of emergency resources and claimancy,

food companies should remember that USDA performs

a dual role. While it will be a resource agency, passing judgment on food claims, it wiU simultaneously

be a claimant agency for all resources necessary to

food and agriculture's emergency needs.

DAMAGE ANALYSIS AND REPORTING

In order to make the Nation's emergency food plan

efiective, local, State and Federal governments will

have a vital need for all available post-attack information on food stocks, raw materials and productive

capacity. The amount of food that survives and the

immediate production and processing capability of

food plants will form the basis for many critical decisions concerning the processing and distribution of

food, and the priorities which are placed upon rehabilitation and restoration of the industry.

As a part of his emergency plan, the plant manager

should already have established close communication

with local civil defense ofiBcials and with the USDA

County Defense Board. Immediately following an

attack, he should use these channels to report the damage which his plant has suffered, his estimated production capacity, his inventories of processed and

unprocessed food, and his requirements for continuing

or increasing production. He also should consider his

plant's capability for production of commodities which

are not normally included in its production schedule.

The information which individual plant managers

furnish to the USDA County Defense Boards, together

with similar information compiled from other plants in

the area, will be assessed at all governmental levels and

used in making the many decisions regarding food

production and distribution. It will help determine

which plants need to be rehabilitated most rapidly, and

form the basis for allotment of resources and raw

materials.

In small plants, it is likely that thorough damage

analysis and report can be made very quickly, once the

fallout situation permits personnel to leave shelter. In

the larger plants, the damage reporting technique will

require more advanced planning, and the planning and

operational responsibility should be assigned to a team

which is an integral part of the company's emergency

organization.

27
PART III. INDUSTRY-GOVERNMENT COOPERATION

FOR COMMUNITY SURVIVAL

ASSISTANCE TO GOVERNMENT

Since food will be one of the most critical requirements in national recovery following attack, it is apparent that close cooperation between Government and

industry will be necessary to make the emergency food

program work.

For this reason, the responsibility is greater upon

food plants to make prudent emergency plans and

preparations than it is for other less critical industries.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture and other local,

State and Federal agencies have comprehensive emergency plans ready on a standby basis or in the process

of development to deal with emergency food problems.

But these plans cannot succeed without the active cooperation of the food industry which will be in an

emergency—as in peacetime—the Nation's only source

of food.

By following the steps outlined in this Guide, food

plant officials can provide an example of organizational

leadership to other industries in their communities.

Training facilities can be offered to community officials

for use by various groups. Plant personnel who are

trained in special emergency skills can assist community emergency services as instructors or as civil

defense auxiliaries. The food industry's public information media can be offered to civil defense officials

and USDA Defense Boards as channels for dissemination of civil defense information.

In the final analysis, neither the Government nor industry will be able to solve the Nation's emergency

food problems alone. Each must bring special skills

and ability to a joint solution. This means that there

must be a constant two-way flow of information between Government and industry. In the case of the

food industry, it means that each food plant should be

in close communication with both community civil defense officials and USDA State and County Defense

Boards. This liaison should not await an emergency;

it should begin immediately.

THE ROLE OF TRADE ASSOCIATIONS

One of the best mechanisms for facilitating civil defense planning and emergency cooperation between

Government and industry is the trade association, since

one of the trade association's functions is furnishing a

two-way channel of conamunication between Government and industry. This communication channel will

be utilized fully in emergency planning and operations.

Because of the leadership which trade associations

exert in their respective industries, they can facilitate

and encourage emergency planning. This is true in

the food industry associations, as in other industries.

The associations can furnish individual members with

authoritative emergency information from appropriate

government sources. They can furnish governments at

all levels with sources of expertise and special skills in

emergency planning and preparations which are found

among members' firms.

Through the organization of committees to deal effectively with emergency planning and preparedness

problems, the trade associations can encourage and assist their members to begin making individual plans and

preparations. It must be remembered, however, that

trade associations are responsive to the members; thus

it is likely that the association's degree of interest in

civil defense planning will be dependent upon the interest displayed by members.

Food plant managers who are concerned about their

emergency preparations and who feel they need help

should call upon association leaders for assistance. The

results will be beneficial to individual members, to the

industry and to the national welfare.

28
PART IV. OPERATIONS DURING SURVIVAL PERIOD

' 11 I I I

IMMEDIATE POST-ATTACK ACTIONS

It has already been pointed out that no one can feed

the Nation in a national emergency except those who are

in the business of feeding it every day. Even in the

immediate post-attack emergency, normal channels

should be utilized as much as possible to get the job

done. It is obvious, however, that the post-attack situation will be far from normal and that considerable assistance wiU be necessary from local. State and Federal

governments to keep the food supply moving. This is

why there is an emergency food plan.

As its contribution to recovery and rehabilitation of

the Nation, the food industry should activate all of its

emergency plans as soon as possible after the attack.

Food associations, industrial mutual aid groups and

individual plants should be prepared to take steps immediately to resume production in keeping with the

Nation's post-attack needs. Everyone in the food industry is cognizant of the essential nature of various

foods. Some foods which find ready markets in today's

economy may have to give way temporarily to more

essential foods. Sophisticated packaging may need to

give way to crude forms which could more readily fill

post-attack needs.

One of the foremost requirements for the success of

the emergency food program will be an accurate analysis of attack damage by local, State and Federal governments. The analysis will depend directly upon the

information furnished by food plants. Precise assessment of damage and capability to continue production

in the immediate post-attack i>eriod is one of the most

valuable contributions which food plants can make to

post-attack recovery.

Food production and distribution under the stresses

and strains which are certain to be imposed by the

post-attack environment will require strength of will

and ingenuity on the part of farmers, food managers

and personnel. There will no doubt be many instances

in which it will be easier to quit than to continue. But

the stakes are high—the continuation of our free enterprise system—and they should be incentive enough to

keep the industry going even in the face of the tremendous adversities it may face.

Procedures for utilizing and distributing the food

in the post-attack period will be determined by the

emergency food plan. Guidance and assistance in

meeting emergency requirements will be avidlable to

the food plants from local, State and Federal

governments.

ECONOMIC STABILIZATION

An effective national rehabilitation effort will be

dependent to a great extent upon the degree of stability

achieved by the post-attack economy. Insofar as possible, efforts will be made to preserve normal money

and credit systems, and controls are planned for wages,

prices, rents, and utilization and distribution of food.

Food rationing will be the responsibility of State

and local governments, with guidance and counsel

from the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the

Office of Emergency Planning. Guidance for the food

program will come from the USDA and many decisions

will be based on the National Emergency Food Consumption Standard. This standard will furnish the

basis for many post-attack governmental decisions by

food management officials as they continually appraise the post-attack food situation.

Sales of most foods will need to be prohibited temporarily in the early post-attack period. These deci29
sions and others will be made by food management

officials who will maintain direct communication with

the food industry through trade associations at the

national level and through USDA State and County

Defense Boards at the State and local levels.

Food plants can contribute most to a stable postattack economy by making internal preparations which

will insure economic stability for themselves and their

employees. Suggested procedures, as outlined earlier,

include arrangement of emergency company funds or

credit, and providing emergency paychecks or credit

arrangements for employees.

Employees should be encouraged to make prudent

individuad and family preparations for an emergency.

Families who are able to solve their post-attack housing

and subsistence problems will make a significant contribution to a more stable economy.

APPENDIX

INDUSTRY DEFENSE CHECKLIST

Steps Which Food Plant Managers Should Take To Be Prepared for

Survival in a National Emergency

Get in touch with your local civil defense director.

Develop a civil defense plan for your plant.

Establish an effective warning and communication system.

Train employees in emergency shutdovm and start-up procedures.

D Provide adequate, stocked fallout shelter for all employees.

n See that your shelters are staffed by trained shelter managers.

Organize and train your plant's emergency protective services.

Q Give special attention to your radiological defense service.

CH Develop a positive leadership and education program to avoid panic.

O Take steps to protect against sabotage.

Q Take steps to insure the continuity of management in an emergency.

Provide alternate headquarters locations and employee reporting centers.

O Provide protection for vital records.

Tell your employees about the company civil defense plan.

Cooperate with other plants in organizing mutual aid associations.

Plan alternate emergency sources of supporting resources.

!Z1 Be prepared to analyze and report plant damage and capability accurately.

Have a general understanding of emergency food management plans.

Offer your cooperation to governments in the formulation and conduct of emergency food plans.

D When in doubt, consult local, State or Federal civil defense officials and/or USDA State or County

Defense Boards.

30
REFERENCES

Blue Print for Industrial Security.—An 8-page illustrated booklet describing the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey

alternate headquarters, management succession plans, record

preservation, and other aspects of planning for continuing

emergency operation.*

Continuity of Corporate Management in Event of Nuclear

Attack.—OCD, Department of Defense. An 89-page special

report by the American Society of Corporate Secretaries.

Describes continuity of management measures, legal problems, suggested bylaws and board resolutions and a suggested

model Business Corporation Act. Includes a section describing procedures for overall industrial civil defense planning.*

The Economy Can Survive Nuclear Attack.—Fortune, Vol. LXIV,

No. 5, November 1961, 540 North Michigan Avenue, Chicago

11, 111. Comprehensive illustrated article on United States

economy and civil defense. Industrial aspects include Kansas

plan of local businessmen to shelter people and machines in

128-acre leased salt mine, 650 feet underground. Argues for

more fire and blast resistant as well as fallout shelters.

Effects of Nuclear Weapons.—Department of the Army Pamphlet 39-3, April 1962. Description of nuclear explosions

and their effects. Presented for the technically trained and

non-technical reader. Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C., 20402.

Emergency and Disaster Planning for Chemical Industries.—A

50-page manual published by the U.S. Department of Commerce which covers organization of both plant and companywide emergency operations planning. It includes a building

survey report form, emergency shutdown procedures and the

effects, protective measures and estimated damage from

nuclear attacks.

Fallout Protection: What to Know and Do About Nuclear

Attack.—Ofl5ce of Civil Defense, Department of Defense,

December 1961 (H-6), 46 pages. Describes the national civil

defense program, and provides information important to every

citizen regarding methods of developing shelter and other civil

defense techniques. Introduction by the Honorable Robert S.

McNamara, Secretary of Defense.*

Family Shelter Designs.—Office of Civil Defense, Department of

Defense, January 1962 (H-7). Publication of 30 pages.

Contains instructions for building eight types of family fallout

shelters; for use by families not having access to community

shelters, or who prefer shelters in their basements or backyards.*

Food Management in a National Emergency. A Guide for Food

Processors and Wholesalers (PA-572). Agricultural Marketing Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, April 1963. A

6-page summary of industry-Government post-attack responsibilities for transporting, handling, processing, storing and

distributing food.

Forty-jive Rules for Making Your Plant Fire-safe During Shutdowns.—Factory Management and Maintenance, September

1954, McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, Inc., 330 West 42d

Street, New York, N.Y. Outlines measures that should be

taken to prevent fire during emergency shutdowns.

Guide to Developing an Industrial Disaster Medical Service.—

Reprinted from April 1961 issue of Archives of Environmental

Health published by' An^erican Medical Association. A

20-page booklet, illustrated with forms and sketches primarily

developed as a questionnaire to enable industrial medical

departments to evaluate their own organization and readiness

status and to devise plans where inadequacies are disclosed.

It covers such elements as supplies, records, personnel, communications and casualty care.*

Industrial Defense Planning Manual.—1954, 43 pages. American

Iron and Steel Institute, 350 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y.,

50 cents. Methods of pre-attack planning for industrial protection against the hazards of modern warfare.

Industrial Security—I.—Combating Subversion and Sabotage.

Studies in Business Policy, No. 60, and Industrial Security II.

Plant Guard Handbook, Studies in Business Policy, No. 64.

National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., New York, N.Y.

Industrial Security Magazine.—This special issue for July 1962

is the official publication of the American Society for Industrial Security and is devoted exclusively to 39 articles on all

aspects of industrial civil defense. Each article by an industrial executive covers a different aspect of such activities

in the company in which the author is^employed. A 40-point

check list is printed on the inside back cover. This publication

can serve as a guide, handbook or manual for all aspects of

industrial civil defense planning.*

Legal Aspects of Industrial Mutual Aid.—Directorate for Industrial Participation, Office of Civil Defense, Department of

Defense. A 27-page pubhcation giving legal citations, a

guide to organization and operation, and sample articles of

association for such a group in an industrial neighborhood.*

Live.—Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, California. A

69-page handbook for employees of this organization describing plans for protection of employees and families in the SRI

facilities. Also contains excellent instruction for survival in

the home including emergency shelter, supplies, sanitation,

first aid and decontamination.*

Medical Self-Help Training.—An administrative guide to the

civil defense medical self-help training program for professional, civil defense, and educational personnel. Training for

the layman in the application of proper procedures to save

lives in the absence of a physician and gives guidance on

nursing care.*

Nuclear Attack and Industrial Survival.—A 16-page, wellillustrated report published by the McGraw-Hill Publishing

Company as an insert in 39 of their business and professional

magazines. Describes effects of nuclear attack, why and how

industry should plan, organize, provide shelter facilities and

what is included in the recovery plan.*

31
Preparedness Guidelines for Emergency Savings and Loan Associations.—Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Washington,

D.C. A 26-page manual outlining steps for emergency savings and loan operations including shelter, continuity of management, record preservation and alternate headquarters.*

Preparedness Program for Emergency Operation in Banking.—

A 118-page reprint of five booklets prepared by the Advisory

Committee on Commercial Bank Preparedness and the Banking Committee on Emergency Operations, New York, N.Y.

The publication covers Organization and Administration, Personnel Protection, Continuity of Management and Alternate

Headquarters, Physical Property Protection, and Duplicate

or Alternate Records. Includes exhibits and examples of suggested bylaws and resolutions.*

Protection of Food and Agriculture Against Nuclear Attack.—

Agriculture Handbook No. 234, Agricultural Research Service, USDA, 1962, Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C, 20402. 30 cents, 41

pages. Guide for agricultural leaders on defense measures

which can be taken against fallout on agricultural products.

Protection of Vital Industrial Records and Documents.—OCDDOD (TB-16-2). Recommends methods for the protection

of vital records against loss in the event of an attack.*

Standards for Physical Security of Industrial and Governmental

Facilities.—OCD-DOD. A manual of 44 pages which discusses sabotage and espionage, security lighting and fencing,

training, pre-employment investigation, safety measures and

the "how" and "why" of good security standards.*

Survival Plans Your Company Can Use.—A 6-page reprint from

Nation's Business published by the Chamber of Commerce of

the United States. Describes the practical steps industrial

civil defense planners can take and gives actual examples

of what some companies have done to meet the problems of

industrial survival and recovery.*

Underground Plants for Industry.—OCD-DOD. A 109-page

publication prepared by the Department of the Army, Office

of the Chief of Engineers. Describes the importance and

advantage of underground facilities, criteria for site selection

and a list of underground sites by State, town and owner with

information on geological structure, size and method of access.

Costs of construction, operation and maintenance of underground versus surface facilities are discussed.*

Vulnerability of the Food Industries to Chemical, Biological and

Radiological Warfare Agents.—A report to the Food and Drug

Administration, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, by the National Academy of Sciences, National Research

Council, Washington, D.C, November 1955. Reprinted 1961,

156 pages. Comprehensive publication stressing need for industrial management, trade associations and public to understand serious threat to our food industries by chemical,

biological and radiological warfare agents.

* Available from local civil defense offices.

This publication supersedes Agriculture Information Bulletin No. 169,

"Defense Guides for Commercial Food Facilities."

32

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFRCE: t963 O—693-444
INDUSTRY

N/