GERMS, VIRUSES, AND SECRETS: GOVERNMENT 

PLANS TO MOVE EXOTIC DISEASE RESEARCH 

TO THE MAINLAND UNITED STATES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND 

COMMERCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 22, 2008 

Serial No. 110–120 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

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GERMS, VIRUSES, AND SECRETS: GOVERNMENT PLANS TO MOVE EXOTIC DISEASE 

RESEARCH TO THE MAINLAND UNITED STATES 

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GERMS, VIRUSES, AND SECRETS: GOVERNMENT 

PLANS TO MOVE EXOTIC DISEASE RESEARCH 

TO THE MAINLAND UNITED STATES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND 

COMMERCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 22, 2008 

Serial No. 110–120 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

energycommerce.house.gov 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan, Chairman 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York 

FRANK PALLONE, . R., New Jersey 

BART GORDON, Tennessee 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

ANNA G. ESHOO, California 

BART STUPAK, Michigan 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

Vice Chair 

LOIS CAPPS, California 

MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

JANE HARMAN, California 

TOM ALLEN, Maine 

JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

HILDA L. SOLIS, California 

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas 

JAY INSLEE, Washington 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

JIM MATHESON, Utah 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana 

JOHN BARROW, Georgia 

BARON P. HILL, Indiana 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

Ranking Member 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

FRED UPTON, Michigan 

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida 

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

CHARLES W. ‘‘CHIP’’ PICKERING, 

Mississippi 

VITO FOSSELLA, New York 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

STEVE BUYER, Indiana 

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

MARY BONO MACK, California 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

LEE TERRY, Nebraska 

MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey 

MIKE ROGERS, Michigan 

SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

PROFESSIONAL STAFF

DENNIS B. FITZGIBBONS, Chief of Staff 

GREGG A. ROTHSCHILD, Chief Counsel 

SHARON E. DAVIS, Chief Clerk 

DAVID L. CAVICKE, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

BART STUPAK, Michigan, Chairman 

DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado 

CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana 

Vice Chair 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

JAY INSLEE, Washington 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan (ex officio) 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

Ranking Member 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

JOE BARTON, Texas (ex officio) 

(II) 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hon. Bart Stupak, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 1 

Hon. John Shimkus, a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 3 

Hon. John D. Dingell, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, opening statement ....................................................................................... 5 

Hon. Charles W. ‘‘Chip’’ Pickering, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Mississippi, opening statement ............................................................. 6 

Hon. Gene Green, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, 

prepared statement .............................................................................................. 196 

WITNESSES

Nancy R. Kingsbury, Ph.D., Managing Director, Applied Research and Methods, U.S. Government Accountability Office; accompanied by Sushil 

Sharma, Ph.D., D.R.P.H., Assistant Director of Applied Research and Methods, U.S. GAO ....................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 11 

Tim E. Carpenter, Ph.D., Professor and Co-director, Center for Animal Disease Modeling and Surveillance, University of California, Davis .................... 44 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 47 

Ray L. Wulf, President and Chief Executive Officer, American Farmers and 

Ranchers ............................................................................................................... 81 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 85 

Howard Hill, D.V.M., Chief Operating Officer, Iowa Select Farms ..................... 97 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 99 

Leroy Watson, Legislative Director, The National Grange of the Order of 

Patrons and Husbandry ....................................................................................... 109 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 111 

Gary Voogt, President-elect, National Cattlemen’s Beef Association .................. 124 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 126 

Bruce I. Knight, Under Secretary, Marketing and Regulatory Programs, U.S. 

Department, U.S. Department of Agriculture ................................................... 141 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 142 

Jay M. Cohen, Under Secretary, Science and Techology Directorate, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security ..................................................................... 148 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 150 

Larry Barrett, D.V.M., M.S., D.A.C.V.P.M., Director, Plum Island Animal 

Disease Center ..................................................................................................... 164 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 167 

SUBMITTED MATERIAL

Letter of June 2, 2008, from American Farmers & Ranchers to Chairmen 

Dingell and Stupak .............................................................................................. 197 

Photograph of Plum Island ..................................................................................... 198 

Comments by Senator Pat Roberts on Senate Armed Services Committee 

Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, hearing of March 

14, 2003 ................................................................................................................. 199 

Subcommittee exhibit binder .................................................................................. 201 

(1) 

GERMS, VIRUSES, AND SECRETS: GOVERNMENT PLANS TO MOVE EXOTIC DISEASE 

RESEARCH TO THE MAINLAND UNITED 

STATES 

THURSDAY, MAY 22, 2008 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

2123 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bart Stupak 

(chairman) presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Stupak, Green, Inslee, Dingell 

(ex officio), Shimkus, Whitfield, and Pickering. 

Also present: Representatives Moran and Boyda. 

Staff present: Scott Schloegel, John Arlington, John Sopko, Lisa 

Cody, Kyle Chapman, Alan Slobodin, and Krista Carpenter. 

Mr. STUPAK. This meeting will come to order. 

Today we have a hearing entitled ‘‘Germs, Viruses and Secrets: 

Government Plans to Move Exotic Disease Research to the Mainland United States.’’ Each member will be recognized for a 5- 

minute opening statement. I will begin. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BART STUPAK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 

Mr. STUPAK. Good morning. This is the second in a series of 

hearings on biomedical research laboratories this committee has 

held. The first hearing was on the proliferation of high-containment 

bio labs in the United States. In future hearings, we expect to look 

at the proliferation of high-containment labs outside the United 

States including the role of government funding these labs. 

Today’s hearing will focus on the Department of Homeland Security’s, DHS, proposal to close Plum Island Animal Disease Center 

and build a new, much larger high-containment lab which DHS 

calls the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility, or NBAF. 

For 50 years, the Plum Island laboratory was owned and operated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and was this country’s 

leading foreign animal disease research laboratory. In June 2003, 

operational responsibility for Plum Island was transferred to DHS 

under the Homeland Security Act. While the research staff continued to be employed by Department of Agriculture. The majority of 

research carried out at Plum Island is concentrated on foot-andmouth disease, which is a very highly contagious disease. 

2 

The Plum Island lab was built on Plum Island in order to isolate 

this extraordinarily hazardous virus and other diseases handled at 

the lab. The natural barrier of water surrounding the island along 

with its remoteness at the far eastern end of Long Island were seen 

as an effective buffer zone between Plum Island and farming activities in the rest of the country. 

Now the Department of Homeland Security wants to close Plum 

Island and build a new facility on the mainland. This proposal is 

embodied in H.R. 1717, which would do three things: authorize the 

building of the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility, NBAF, 

which as proposed by DHS would be the world’s largest animal disease research center and include the world’s largest Biosafety Level 

4 laboratory—the BSL-4 labs handle the most deadly diseases for 

which there is no cure; delegate to DHS broad new authority over 

animal disease research and zoonotic disease research, including 

their human health effects; and move live virus of foot-and-mouth 

disease to the mainland United States for the first time in history. 

In summary, DHS proposes to become the primary agency for 

animal disease research and take over zoonotic disease research, 

which is now carried out by the Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention and the National Institutes of Health. DHS seems to 

have given inadequate consideration to the risk of transferring footand-mouth disease to the mainland, which prompted this committee to examine this issue ourselves. 

As part of this subcommittee’s investigation, we looked at prior 

accidental releases of foot-and-mouth disease to see what the economic consequences might be. A 2001 outbreak in the United Kingdom was estimated to cost a little over $16.3 billion and nearly 

brought down their government. One of our witnesses testifying 

today has estimated that a major outbreak on the mainland United 

States could cost as much as $40 billion. 

In 1978, there was an accidental release of foot-and-mouth disease from the Plum Island lab, which infected animals kept on the 

island. Fortunately, the virus never spread any further, due in part 

to the fact that the lab is buffered by water. In the investigative 

report that followed the 1978 outbreak, the Plum Island director at 

the time, Jerry Callis, concluded that the water barrier surrounding the island was instrumental in containing the spread of 

the disease. 

What the report did not say, however, was even more significant. 

The Committee staff interviewed Dr. Callis and he revealed that at 

the time of the 1978 outbreak, he and others on the staff were able 

to persuade the World Animal Health Organization, known as OIE, 

not to issue an embargo of American meat products because the 

foot-and-mouth had not escaped from the island. Had the OIE declared an embargo, as it would today if such an outbreak occurred 

on the mainland, it would have halted the export of all American 

meat products for at least 6 months and the cost to the livestock 

industry would have been enormous. We will be interested to hear 

today how DHS and USDA would seek to balance devastating consequences of this magnitude with the convenience of opening a lab 

on the mainland. 

We will also be interested in examining the costs of the proposed 

NBAF. The official DHS estimate is that NBAF will cost approxiVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:02 Sep 21, 2010 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CWELLS1\HEARINGS\110-120 SCOM1 PsN: JIMC
3 

mately $450 million to build but the Committee has learned that 

DHS engineers have also raised the estimate to between $600 and 

$750 million. Moreover, this does not include the cost of demolition, 

decontamination, and environmental cleanup of the existing facility 

at Plum Island if it is abandoned. 

Earlier this year, DHS assured us that they had broad support 

for their proposal from the private sector. To test that theory, we 

sent letters to more than 100 livestock associations asking their 

views of moving this disease to the mainland. Today we will have 

with us representatives from some of the larger associations which 

responded. These are the farmers who have much to lose if something goes wrong, and I understand they have strong opinions on 

the subject. 

Let me be clear: I do not oppose the creation of a National Bioand Agro-Defense Facility, NBAF, but I do oppose moving the research of this devastating foot-and-mouth disease to the mainland 

United States. For more than 50 years, foot-and-mouth disease has 

been researched safely on Plum Island and moving it to the mainland would be a foolish tempting of fate that could cause countless 

farmers and ranchers their livelihoods and cause billions of dollars 

should a foot-and-mouth disease release occur. 

I want to thank the witnesses appearing here today. I know that 

some of you have come a long way to testify, and I want you to 

know that we appreciate you taking the time to be here with us. 

That concludes my opening statement. 

Mr. STUPAK. I would next turn to my ranking member, my 

friend, Mr. Shimkus, for an opening statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN SHIMKUS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for convening this important hearing. 

Today’s hearing will expose several issues surrounding the proposal and construction of the new National Bio- and Agro-Defense 

Facility. We all agree that it is our responsibility to protect the 

American public’s health while ensuring the safety of our agriculture and food infrastructure by maintaining an up-to-date biocontainment facility capable of researching and developing cures 

for deadly and contagious zoonotic and animal diseases. The witnesses today will discuss the costs associated with this facility and 

whether this new facility should remain on Plum Island or be 

moved to the mainland. 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred ownership of 

Plum Island Animal Disease Center, a small island off the coast of 

New York owned by the Federal Government where current research on both domestic and foreign animal diseases takes place, 

to the Department of Homeland Security. Since the transfer, DHS 

has been the lead agency for the center supported by the U.S. Department of Agriculture researchers and employees. The main 

issues surrounding the creation of a new NBAF include ensuring 

that the Department of Homeland Security and the United States 

Department of Agriculture have adequately assessed the health 

and economic risks and costs-benefits associated with the construcVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:02 Sep 21, 2010 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CWELLS1\HEARINGS\110-120 SCOM1 PsN: JIMC
4 

tion, operation, and maintenance of this new biocontainment facility. 

Today we want assurance from the government and industry experts that the American public will remain safe independent of 

where the new facility is located. We want Americans to know that 

the proper precautions will be taken if a new biolab facility is created in their community. Several witnesses, including DHS, USDA, 

and livestock associations, will explain how that safety is to be ensured. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses about the advances in modern technology and the importance of proper training 

in relation to the construction and operation of a biocontainment 

facility of this magnitude. In fact, the new NBAF would be the 

world’s largest animal disease research center and include the 

world’s largest BSL-4 laboratory. DHS estimates the cost of this facility to be between $450 and $750 million. 

Of particular interest to DHS and USDA and the livestock industry is the continued research of the highly contagious animal disease, foot-and-mouth disease. By statute, for the past 60 years the 

research on live foot-and-mouth disease has been limited to Plum 

Island. Releases of foot-and-mouth disease in England led to an 

outbreak in 2001 that cost England’s economy an estimated $15 

billion. The Government Accountability Office will discuss its evaluation of DHS’s evidence supporting its decision that conducting 

foot-and-mouth disease research on the mainland is as safe as conducting it on an island. Under Secretary Cohen from DHS and 

Under Secretary Knight from USDA are here to explain how the 

agencies determined that the transfer of foot-and-mouth disease 

and other animal disease research to the mainland is safe and 

what the next steps in the NBAF process entail. 

Today we are here to examine the facts, hear from government 

officials, the industry insiders and the outside experts that can explain the scope and needs for a new facility and examine the advantages and disadvantages of creating this facility on an island or 

on the mainland. I am not here to advocate a particular site. I am 

here to support this bipartisan oversight examination of the NBAF 

process and to gain clarity on the issues surrounding the construction of the facility while ensuring that we as lawmakers help protect the U.S. agriculture and human health. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back my time. 

Mr. STUPAK. I thank you, Mr. Shimkus. 

As you can see, there is a lot of interest in this issue. I expect 

Mr. Dingell will be here momentarily for an opening statement. 

Mr. Pickering is a member of the Energy and Commerce Committee, not of this subcommittee. At his option, we would allow 

him, if he wants to give an opening statement, we would allow 

that. Mr. Moran is not a member of this committee but is a valuable member of this Congress. If you would like to stay and at the 

end maybe have an opportunity to ask some questions, you are welcome to. Ms. Boyda is also not a member of this committee but is 

very interested in this issue, and I expect there will be other members who are not part of this committee who would come and we 

will show them the same courtesy and respect afforded to all members. 

5 

Of the full committee, Mr. Dingell, chairman, for an opening 

statement and then we will go to Mr. Pickering if he chooses. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. DINGELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, this is a very important hearing, 

and I congratulate you for shining much-needed light on the hidden 

world of bioresearch. I especially look forward to shining some of 

that light on the bio research activities of the Department of Homeland Security, DHS, today. It is a curious body. They appear to be 

much concerned about the efficiency of the agency but to care very 

little about the safety of the American public with regard to movement of diseases of animals into our society. 

As I said at the first hearing on bio-labs, the DHS proposal to 

close the Plum Island Animal Disease Center and move the live 

foot-and-mouth virus to the mainland of the United States is not 

only baffling but dangerous. Following extensive investigation by 

the Government Accountability Office, GAO, and the committee 

staff, 7 months later the DHS proposal remains most curious. It 

also manifests significant, not only incompetence but arrogance and 

secrecy, something which should not be permitted by government 

agencies. 

Foot-and-mouth is one of the most contagious diseases in the 

world. We know from recent incidents in the United Kingdom that 

it can escape from even a high-level biosafety lab. We know that 

an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease could have a catastrophic effect on the livestock industry here in the United States just as it 

did in the United Kingdom in 2001. In fact, the U.S. Department 

of Agriculture told the committee staff just 2 days ago that an accidental outbreak in the United States could cause as much as $57 

billion in damages. 

Equally troubling, it appears that DHS is out of step with the 

rest of the world. GAO investigators visited major labs across Europe and found that in other developed countries, the trend is to 

do just the opposite of what DHS has proposed. Germany has built 

its new lab on an island. Denmark has built its new lab on an island. The Parliament in the U.K. is debating the relocation of its 

land to an island. Why? Because of safety concerns and preventing 

escape of the agents that bring these kinds of diseases into the 

broader world. 

Why then would DHS propose to move live virus of foot-andmouth disease from Plum Island to the American mainland? GAO 

was unable to find a scientific reason for the move. They found apparent agreement that the current Plum Island lab needs substantial renovation and it should be renovated, but they found no justification for moving the lab to the mainland. They also found no 

cooperation from DHS, which has refused to make available to 

GAO the information that it needs to properly carry out its responsibilities or to serve this committee or to assist in this inquiry. Indeed, DHS has refused to make available important parts of information sought by this committee on the grounds that it is ‘‘proprietary.’’ I look forward to hearing an explanation as to why that information is proprietary at DHS. 

6 

In the end, DHS assures us that modern technology will make 

it perfectly safe to handle foot-and-mouth disease in a high-tech 

biolab in the heart of livestock country. I wonder if history will confirm their judgment or will make them look like a source of danger 

to the society. Mr. Chairman, on that score I would note that history is littered with the smoking, stinking wreckage of impregnable, indestructible, and unsinkable. 

Given the potentially catastrophic effects that a release of footand-mouth could have on our livestock industry and on the national economy and on the national budget, it seems to me that 

DHS has the burden of showing to us why this is necessary and 

why it is in the public interest and why they cannot be open in answering the questions that this committee lays upon them. 

In that regard, I must regrettably point out that DHS has not 

been forthcoming in providing the records and information requested by the Committee as I mentioned earlier. In several instances, the Committee has only been provided copies of certain 

key records after the committee staff discovered their existence despite the fact that the Committee has specifically requested all 

such records. At this late date there are still a number of relevant 

documents outstanding and missing after being requested by the 

Committee including the statement of work for the environment 

impact statement for Plum Island and the proposed National Bioand Agro-Defense Facility, NBAF. I would note that the National 

Environmental Policy Act, of which I am author, requires that this 

process be open and that the public be included in the process. We 

want to know why it is that DHS presumes itself above the law on 

this particular matter and what question of national security here 

says that that information and that process may be suppressed to 

meet the convenience of DHS. Clearly this is unacceptable and 

grossly improper. 

Finally, I am interested in the testimony from ranchers who own 

the livestock in this country on how they view the DHS proposal. 

All the consultants and technical experts that DHS can hire may 

stand behind this idea but it will still be the farmers and ranchers 

who bear the risk and suffer the consequences of they are wrong 

and the taxpayers will be called upon to make whole the American 

people who are put at risk or hurt by the follies of DHS. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman Dingell. 

Your option, Mr. Pickering as a member of this committee, the 

option of giving an opening statement if you would like or waive 

it. 

Mr. PICKERING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. You will be recognized for 5 minutes then. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES W. ‘‘CHIP’’ PICKERING, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE 

OF MISSISSIPPI 

Mr. PICKERING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to make 

a brief statement. I want to thank you for allowing me to participate in the subcommittee and for this hearing. It is of critical importance that we get this right and I believe that we can get it 

right. 

7 

I believe that there is agreement that we need to have a new facility. The Plum Island facility is outdated. It is not modern and 

we can do a better job of this vital research and a new facility I 

believe is in everyone’s best interest and there is agreement to do 

so. So the question becomes, should we do this on the mainland or 

should we continue to do it on an island? The new biocontainment 

facilities that we currently already do in places like Atlanta in the 

heart of Atlanta close to Emory where the CDC’s BSL-3 and BSL4 facilities are already studying the same type of pathogens, very 

dangerous diseases, very high risk to human health, and doing so 

safely. So we have modern facilities that are doing similar research 

in mainland facilities and around the world that is also the case, 

and as we look at why we should do this, one, that it is more economical, it can be done safely. This makes sense for the taxpayer 

and it makes sense for animal and human health. 

The Farm Bill that we just passed, in fact that we just overrode 

the President’s veto on, a majority of Republicans and a majority 

of Democrats on that committee called for the establishment of the 

new NBAF facility on the mainland, strong bipartisan support, 

overrode the President’s veto to do so. I think the Congress has 

spoken very clearly in a very strong political bipartisan consensusbased approach that this should be the policy and it affirmed the 

policy that we have been taking over the last 3 years to do so. 

There is also strong support from the scientists and those most affected by this research. The American Veterinary Medical Association has sent a letter to both Congressman Stupak and Congressman Shimkus, and this is what they say: ‘‘The American Veterinary Medical Association supports DHS’s decision to build a National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility. A modern, well-designed and 

operated facility does not present an unacceptable risk to animal 

or human health and would be more economical to build, maintain 

and operate on the mainland.’’ The chief health official in Mississippi makes the point that all the organisms to be studied at the 

new NBAF are already being safely studied in other biocontainment laboratories in the continental United States including CDC’s 

BSL-3 and -4 laboratories located in the heart of a densely populated residential area of Atlanta and adjacent to Emory University’s main campus. 

So it is being done today and it is being done safely. It can be 

done more economically. We all agree a new facility needs to be 

built. Those most closely associated, the cattlemen and the farmers 

in the region of Mississippi and Louisiana, and I am sure Mr. 

Moran will say that the farmers and the ranchers and the scientists in Kansas believe that this can be done safely, and we believe very strongly that Mississippi is a better site. I think Mr. 

Moran may differ with that but we agree that a facility can be done 

on the mainland and that this is the wise and right policy of the 

United States that we have undertaken over the last 3 years and 

just yesterday overwhelmingly endorsed in the override veto of 

President Bush. 

So I look forward to this hearing. There is strong scientific and 

political support for the policy to establish on the mainland a new 

NBAF, and I look forward to the testimony today. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

8 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Pickering. 

Ms. Boyda is here from Kansas as well as Mr. Moran. They are 

not members of the committee. Therefore, they would not be allowed to do an opening statement under the Rules of the Committee in this House. However, when we get to our questioning 

rounds, both Mr. Moran and Ms. Boyda, if they would like to 

speak, I would with the unanimous consent of the Minority allow 

questions. 

However, I am going to caution everyone right now, we are not 

here today to make a decision where NBAF should go. We have 

had requests from Mississippi, Texas, Kansas, Georgia, North 

Carolina. They all want to sit in the hearing today and they all 

want to advocate for their State. We are not here advocating for 

any one State. We are here talking about NBAF, should it be built 

or not built, and whether foot-and-mouth disease should be moved 

to the mainland. That is the purpose of this hearing. So I just want 

to put that forth so everybody understands why we are here and 

what we are doing. This is an investigative and oversight subcommittee. We want to make sure if we are going to do this, it is 

done right. 

So with that caution, we have our first panel before us. Let me 

introduce them. Dr. Nancy Kingsbury, who is the Managing Director of Applied Research and Methods at the Government Accountability Office. Dr. Kingsbury is accompanied by Dr. Sushil Sharma, 

who is the Assistant Director of Applied Research and Methods at 

the Government Accountability Office, and Dr. Tim Carpenter, who 

is Professor and Co-Director of the Center for Animal Disease Modeling and Surveillance at the University of California, Davis. We 

welcome you to our committee. 

It is the policy of this subcommittee to take all testimony under 

oath. Please be advised that witnesses have the right under the 

Rules of the House to be advised by counsel during their testimony. 

Do any of you wish to be represented by counsel at this time? Everyone is indicating no. Therefore, I would ask you to please rise 

and raise your right hand to take the oath. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. STUPAK. Let the record reflect that the witnesses replied in 

the affirmative. They are now under oath. We will begin with their 

opening statements, 5 minutes for an opening statement. 

Dr. Kingsbury, if you don’t mind, we will start with you, please, 

and thank you for being here. 

STATEMENT OF NANCY R. KINGSBURY, PH.D., MANAGING DIRECTOR, APPLIED RESEARCH AND METHODS, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; ACCOMPANIED BY SUSHIL 

SHARMA, PH.D., DRPH, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF APPLIED 

RESEARCH AND METHODS, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Dr. KINGSBURY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very 

much for your invitation to appear at this hearing. As you know, 

in response to your request, we have been reviewing the evidence 

that the Department of Homeland Security says it relied on to 

make the decision to relocate NBAF on the mainland and in particular foot-and-mouth disease research on the mainland. 

9 

We recognize that there have been significant advances in the 

technologies of modern biocontainment laboratories and that some 

BSL-4 laboratories have operated without significant incidents on 

the mainland, indeed, in center cities. However, the research undertaken at Plum Island is unique in at least one respect and poses 

a special set of challenges because it includes, among others, research on the live virus strains that cause foot-and-mouth disease. 

Foot-and-mouth disease is the most highly infectious animal disease that is known. Infection can occur from exposure to a small 

number of virus particles and nearly 100 percent of exposed animals become infected. The virus can spread from infected animals 

in various ways. In some circumstances, the wind can spread the 

virus. The traditional response once an infection is confirmed is to 

depopulate infected and potentially infected herds, usually resulting in the slaughter of tens of thousands of animals or more. From 

the research perspective, FMD poses special challenges because of 

the need to manage large numbers of large animals within biocontainment. 

You asked us to evaluate the evidence DHS used to support its 

decision that research on live foot-and-mouth disease viruses can 

be done safely on the U.S. mainland, whether an island location 

provides any additional protection over and above that provided by 

modern high-containment laboratories on the mainland, and the 

economic consequences of an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease on 

the mainland. 

To address these questions, we interviewed officials from DHS 

and USDA, and visited Plum Island. We obtained and reviewed relevant legislation, regulations, literature on foot-and-mouth disease 

and the economic effects of outbreaks, and other documents including the study that DHS identified as the source of evidence for its 

decision. We also talked to experts on animal diseases and highcontainment laboratories dealing with animal, zoonotic, and human 

pathogens including the directors of other facilities that do research on foot-and-mouth disease viruses in Europe and Australia. 

We also met with representatives of the American Society for 

Microbiology, the National Grange, the National Cattlemen’s Beef 

Association. and the National Pork Producers’ Council. 

We found that DHS has not conducted or commissioned any 

study to determine whether foot-and-mouth disease research can be 

done safely on the U.S. mainland. Instead, DHS based its decision 

that work with FMD virus can be done safely on a 2002 USDAsponsored study that addressed a different question. We found that 

the study was selective in what it considered, and it did not assess 

the history of releases of FMD virus or other dangerous pathogens. 

It also did not address in detail the issues of containment related 

to research involving large animals such as cattle. In addition, the 

study was inaccurate in comparing other countries’ experience with 

foot-and-mouth disease with the situation in the United States. 

Most of the experts we consulted during this work agree that 

while location in general confers no advantage in preventing an initial release of an infectious agent such as FMD, location can help 

prevent the spread of pathogens and thus a resulting disease outbreak if there is a release. The history of work at biocontainment 

facilities suggests strongly that there will always be some risk of 

10 

a release because of failure of technology or, more likely, human 

error. Thankfully, these events are rare. While it may be possible 

to engineer a facility to minimize that risk, the study that DHS 

told us it relied on to reach the conclusion that the risk is acceptable does not provide evidence of how that could be done successfully. More recently, DHS told us that it plans to also rely on the 

results of the environmental impact statements it has commissioned for each of the six potential sites it has identified to provide 

further evidence about the safety of conducting FMD research on 

the mainland. As Mr. Dingell mentioned, DHS would not provide 

us information about the requirements for the environmental impact statements it has commissioned so we cannot comment on 

whether the statements will, for example, assess the risk of technical or human error and the potential impact of the release of a 

dangerous virus outside the facility. 

The 2002 study that DHS has relied on describes several facilities in other countries that do research on foot-and-mouth disease 

as evidence that it is safe to do so on the mainland setting. Some 

of the statements in the study about these facilities are not correct. 

The Pirbright facility in the United Kingdom is on the British 

mainland in an area of small farms. As recently as last summer, 

however, FMD virus escaped the facility and infected nearby animals. Both Denmark and Germany have recently built new agricultural and human pathogenic research centers but both countries 

chose to do so on an island because of the additional layer of safety 

that location provides. Australia has recently opened a facility on 

the mainland that is recognized as the most advanced in the world 

for research on dangerous pathogens, but at the present time live 

foot-and-mouth disease cannot be used there so Australia 

outsources its FMD research to Thailand. And Canada has built a 

facility in Winnipeg that is to conduct research on foot-and-mouth 

disease but the facility is located in an urban area away from farmland and has a very small capacity to conduct tests on large animals. 

With respect to the potential economic impact, it is important to 

note that the United States has been free of foot-and-mouth disease 

since 1929. A single outbreak of the disease on the U.S. mainland 

could have significant economic consequences. Not only would it result in the slaughter of a large number of animals, it would likely 

result in a ban on imports of American beef by many countries. The 

value of U.S. livestock sales was $140 billion in 2007 without about 

10 percent of those sales accounted for by export markets. Accordingly, this sector of the economy could be dramatically affected 

should an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease occur. 

In summary, Mr. Chairman, we believe that more evidence is 

needed to clearly demonstrate that research on live FMD viruses 

can be conducted as safely on the mainland as on an island. Release of a pathogen as infectious as FMD is likely to have significant consequences that need to be explicitly taken into account in 

making a location decision. 

With that, I welcome any questions that you and the members 

may have. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kingsbury follows:] 

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Mr. STUPAK. Thanks, Dr. Kingsbury. 

Dr. Sharma, did you wish to make an opening statement? 

Mr. SHARMA. No. 

Mr. STUPAK. Dr. Carpenter, your opening statement, please, sir. 

STATEMENT OF TIM E. CARPENTER, PH.D., PROFESSOR, CO-DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR ANIMAL DISEASE MODELING AND 

SURVEILLANCE, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS 

Dr. CARPENTER. Thank you for the invitation, and what I wanted 

to do is a little bit different. I am going to be talking from some 

slides, and based on what I am hearing, I think you have a fairly 

good knowledge of the disease but I would like to walk through 

some of these to give you some background for the modeling outputs ultimately. 

[Slide shown.] 

You know about the virus. It is highly contagious, survives in 

meat, milk, et cetera, in the environment and it affects cloven 

hoofed animals, so beef, cattle, et cetera. Its lesions and clinical 

signs, it can be detected fairly easily if they are obvious or it may 

not. It may be relatively unapparent in sheep and goats and may 

be missed. It depends. It can be confused with other diseases as 

well, diseases that are endemic in the United States. Transition, 

there are four routes: direct contact, animals moving, contacting 

one another, being shipped across the country; indirect contact, 

maybe human vehicles contacting infected environments or animals; airborne spread, it has been shown that possibly it can be 

spread for over 100 miles; and local area spread is a relatively obscure way of transmission to a neighbor close by. 

[Slide shown.] 

OK. These numbers, you have heard about FMD has not been in 

the United States for about 80 years and it has been in the U.K. 

a number of times. What I wanted to point out here is how variable 

it can be. In the United States, we had two outbreaks in the 1920s. 

The size of those outbreaks ranged from over 130,000 animals 

being killed to 3,000 or 4,000. In the U.K., there are four outbreaks 

that I have there. The most recent we have been talking about, it 

only affected eight farms. Previous to that in 2001, there were over 

2,000 infected premises and a total of about 9,000 to 10,000 affected animals slaughtered. So the range of animals slaughtered 

ranges from 1,500 or so to over 6.5 million, same disease, a different serotype possibly but same disease. 

[Slide shown.] 

Geographically, going from left to right here, shows the 1967, 

2001 and 2008 epidemics. You can see the 2001 in the center is 

much larger, extends up into southern Scotland, into Wales, compared with the western part of England in 1967, and in the most 

recent 2008, this area here is the area that was infected and that 

is where Pirbright is and that is where the eight farms occurred, 

and that was a very, very short-lived epidemic. 

[Slide shown.] 

Here is the devastation. In March of 2001, there were, I believe, 

about 3 million animals slaughtered, or about 80,000 a day in various ways: burial, burning. None of them, I don’t think, are satisfactory. 

45 

[Slide shown.] 

Economic impact, we have heard a lot of talk about that in the U.S. and in California. In the U.S., maybe $40 billion. These are 

old estimates, updated in 2001 dollars. In California, maybe it is 

around $8 to $10 billion estimated. And in the U.K., it was estimated about $15 billion U.S. 

[Slide shown.] 

OK. Here is what we are doing at Davis. We have got a model 

we have been working on for about 10 years and we are still going 

to keep working on it. We have collected data from different organizations around the country and collected information from the 

USDA on locations of premises. We have talked with experts to get 

their impression or subjective opinion of potential for transmission, 

for instance, or effectiveness of control strategies and we have collected information on animal movements, where do they go, how 

frequently are they moved and how many animals are moved. We 

put all that information in the model and do simulations, and that 

is what I want to show you some examples of now. 

[Slide shown.] 

And what I am showing you is focusing in California but at the 

end I have got a movie of what might happen if FMD were introduced into Kansas. So in California, I think the important points 

here are, it depends where the index, the first case is. If we are 

looking at a small backyard of beef, it is going to be a relatively 

small impact. If we are looking at an intensive dairy, it is going 

to be large. If we are looking at a sales yard, it is going to be very 

extensive. These are results that we did for California and I think 

the important point is that we estimated that if there were FMD, 

we would have approximately 400,000 or more animals infected. 

That could be reduced dramatically by a statewide movement ban, 

which would mean shutting down movement of animals within the 

State. Also, it could be reduced dramatically by vaccination. The 

important here I want to show is in the bottom slide with the figure with the little dots there, what they represent is number of carcasses that would have to be disposed on a daily basis, and it peaks 

there around 10,000 or 12,000, which is an incredibly large number 

of animals, much, much smaller than what they saw in the U.K. 

but these are cattle as opposed to sheep. OK. Time for the movie. 

[Movie shown.] 

Now, what I have got here is, when we do a simulation, we do 

maybe 1,000 of these runs. We try and recreate 1,000 epidemics, 

and this is just one and it is not meant to be a big one or a small 

one. It is just a random one, with the exception that it simulates 

that four animals being shipped to a sales yard and then dispersed. 

If it were a backyard, we may not ever see it. So here we go. We 

start off, and you can’t really appreciate the coloring but it is showing the spread down to Texas, up to Nebraska, and it is going to 

be spreading out to Idaho, and then the black represents, we have 

got movement control. So we are not really sure what is going to 

happen with movement control. It could be on a statewide basis. 

It could be nationally for the first few days. That is one problem 

the U.K. had. They waited 3 days until they put in the movement 

ban, but we can evaluate that if it were on a nationwide level or 

on a statewide level. So that is what I have got. 

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Mr. STUPAK. Thank you. We will start with questions. I will 

begin. We will go 5 minutes so we can get through this. 

Dr. Kingsbury, if I may, you indicated that in Winnipeg, Canada, 

they were going to do it at a lab in a somewhat isolated area. Is 

that correct? They were going to put a hoof-and-mouth disease lab 

in Winnipeg, Canada? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. Yes. 

Mr. STUPAK. And it was going to be small? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. Well, we understand that they have relatively 

small capacity to handle animals like one or two at a time, so that 

is in comparison to what I understand is the plan for NBAF where 

that would be tens of animals managed at the same time. 

Mr. STUPAK. All right. Did GAO find with regard to its investigation that DHS has conducted or commissioned any study to determine whether foot-and-mouth disease work can be done safely on 

the mainland? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. They rely on a 2002 study that was originally 

commissioned by the Department of Agriculture that looked at the 

question of whether it was technically feasible to have foot-andmouth disease research conducted on the mainland. That is a very 

different question from whether it can be done safely, and none of 

the actual evidence that is presented in that report goes directly 

to the question of how they assure the safety under these conditions. We talked—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, did they do a risk assessment? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. There is nothing in this study that looks like a 

risk assessment. 

Mr. STUPAK. Did they do anything like a—by ‘‘they’’ I mean the 

Department of Homeland Security—cost-benefit analysis, something like Dr. Carpenter did, where—— 

Dr. KINGSBURY. Not that we are aware of. 

Mr. STUPAK. In your research, you can still do NBAF without 

having foot-and-mouth disease as part of that program. Is that correct? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. Certainly. 

Mr. STUPAK. DHS and Department of Agriculture both say that 

thanks to modern technology, the location of a high-containment 

laboratory performing foot-and-mouth disease research is no longer 

important. Do you agree with that? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. I am not sure I understood that question. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. The way I understand it, DHS and Ag say that 

location of a high-containment lab performing foot-and-mouth disease is no longer important, you can do it anywhere because of 

modern technology. 

Dr. KINGSBURY. Well, modern technology certainly reduces the 

risk and the comparisons that have been made including even here 

this morning between BSL-4 laboratories in the heart of Atlanta 

and the risks associated with foot-and-mouth disease research I 

think are not quite comparing apples and apples. The risk of a release from a facility is non-zero. It may be very, very small. The 

question is, is it smaller or larger if you are doing research on large 

numbers of animals inside a biocontainment zone. It may be possible to do that. We are not saying it is not. We are just saying, 

we have not seen any evidence that that has been fully evaluated. 

64 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, your testimony also seems to indicate that 

other countries have moved back or moved their research on footand-mouth disease to an island. I think you mentioned Germany 

and Denmark. Is the U.K., which we both highlighted, Dr. Carpenter, are they looking at any other way of doing their foot-andmouth disease research, Dr. Sharma or Dr. Kingsbury or anybody? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. I don’t think we know that, although there may 

be some debate about that going on. I think the case of Germany 

is instructive because the original island facility was built in East 

Germany, and when East and West Germany came together, they 

built one on the mainland, but now that—rather West Germany 

built one on the mainland. When East and West Germany came together, they made a conscious decision to put it back on the island. 

Mr. STUPAK. Dr. Sharma, do you want to add anything on that? 

Mr. SHARMA. No. 

Mr. STUPAK. Dr. Carpenter, if I may, you talk about the statewide movement. Who is responsible for the restrictions of a movement if there is a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak? Is it the State 

or would it be the Federal Government? 

Dr. CARPENTER. That is a good question. Actually, when I was 

watching some of the hearings on the Commerce Committee, I was 

thinking maybe it was the committee that was in charge of that. 

But as I understand it, and others can correct me, it is the State 

until they call in the Federal Government, and if it is a nationallevel emergency, it would be the national government, I assume. 

Mr. STUPAK. What would the effect of a major foot-and-mouth 

disease outbreak be on our exporting? 

Dr. CARPENTER. The only numbers I have seen on that were from 

the Parlberg study, and the estimate was 13 percent decrease in 

exports. 

Mr. STUPAK. Because it seems to me we have trouble trying to 

get our beef into Japan and some of these other Asian countries 

now. If there is any—— 

Dr. CARPENTER. Yes, and if there are any politics involved in import-export, I think it would be a very good excuse to stop the importation of U.S. meat. We are doing that with other countries that 

cannot export to the United States because they have FMD. 

Mr. STUPAK. The pictures you showed us in your presentation of 

animals slaughtered that took place in England in 2001, those 

weren’t isolated instances, were they? Isn’t it true that they had to 

kill millions of cattle, pigs and sheep and it took days to accomplish 

this? 

Dr. CARPENTER. Right. It is estimated 6 to 10 million. 

Mr. STUPAK. Let me ask you this. In the Senate Armed Services 

Committee, this was ‘‘Emerging Threats’’ on the Senate Armed 

Services Committee. The title of the hearing was ‘‘Emerging 

Threats,’’ March 14, 2003, Senator Roberts indicated, and he said 

the ‘‘Crimson Sky’’ study, are you familiar with that? 

Dr. CARPENTER. Yes, I am. 

Mr. STUPAK. And he said that if we had a hoof-and-mouth disease put forth in this country, we could end up losing as many as 

50 million head of livestock, would have to be terminated, and he 

went on to say that he would actually have to extend, if you are 

going to bury it or even if you burn it, you have to have like that 

65 

of a football field 25 miles long just to take care of Kansas. Is that 

correct? Are you familiar with his testimony? 

Dr. CARPENTER. I have no idea. I know that when we first started working on this in 2001, one of the first meetings was with people interested in carcass disposal and there were a lot of novel 

ideas, but there is a real problem associated with foot-and-mouth 

disease and moving animals that have been condemned, slaughtered, because of the potential for spreading the pathogen that 

way. So disposing of them onsite would be very difficult to do, and 

there would be major problems, I am sure, with EPA and the alternatives. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. I will submit for the record that Senator Roberts, when he said that if we had to terminate 50 million head of 

livestock just in Kansas, there would be a ditch 25 miles long and 

half a football field wide in Kansas alone just to handle the herds. 

That is if you are burying them. Does that sound realistic? 

Dr. CARPENTER. Again, I really can’t. I think the 50 million 

might be a bit of a higher number but—— 

Mr. STUPAK. I will move for the Senate Armed Services Committee Emerging Threats subcommittee, March 14, 2003, be part of 

the record. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. No objection, Mr. Chairman. 

[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.] 

Mr. STUPAK. Questions, Mr. Shimkus? 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am going to start with you, Dr. Carpenter, for the first question. I noticed that when you talked about exports and you said if 

politics were in the equation. I always tell folks politicians are the 

most honorable profession because we readily admit there is a political equation in everything we do. So you are at the right place 

if you want to talk about, are there political equations. We definitely have them here. And so I like that grin that you had on your 

face. But to the point of your presentation, we know foot-andmouth disease is very contagious, we got that. What do you want 

me to extract from your presentation with respect to Plum Island? 

Dr. CARPENTER. I don’t want you to extract anything really. Seriously, I have never been to Plum Island and I don’t really know 

that much about it. I do know basically what they are doing. You 

know, it sounds like there is always potential for escape, but personally, I would be more concerned with accidental introduction of 

contaminated meats or intentional introduction through terrorism. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. So you are going to take a pass on this? 

Dr. CARPENTER. Yes, I can’t comment on Plum Island. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Because if I looked—and I am going to go to Dr. 

Kingsbury, but on your testimony, I have not been to Plum Island 

either, the chairman and I were talking. I have been to New York 

so it would probably be easy to get over there. But if you look at 

the picture in the GAO report, you have a picture of Plum Island 

and you have, there is another little land mass in that photo that 

looks very near. Because pathogens travel 100 miles. Dr. Carpenter, is that what you said? 

Dr. CARPENTER. Right. 

66 

Mr. SHIMKUS. So Dr. Kingsbury, in the report, there is just a picture, and maybe that is Long Island. And how far is Plum Island 

from Long Island? Three miles? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. Yes. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. So, I mean, if we are talking about pathogens traveling, yes, I guess the issue is, if the pathogens travel over water, 

is that making any damage to the pathogens that they will expire 

over saltwater or something? 

Dr. CARPENTER. And that was the cause of the 1981 outbreak in 

the U.K. It traveled, I don’t know, over 100 miles up to an island 

actually, the isle of Wight. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Yes, so I mean, that is kind of the debate. I want 

to go back to the Germany facility. How far is the German facility 

off the mainland, the German island? Do we know? 

Mr. SHARMA. About the same distance. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Three miles? 

Mr. SHARMA. Yes. What I would like to comment on is how far 

travel is a function of many different things. From a modeling perspective, the temperatures, the humidity, daytime, nighttime, all of 

these factors affect how far the virus or the bacteria is going to 

move; also, about their survivability if it is during the daytime. The 

island does offer some advantages in that respect because there is, 

especially in Plum Island, we know a lot about the direction in 

which the air flows. We have been doing a lot of studies, monitoring of the air flow, and it typically flows toward the ocean rather 

than toward Long Island. The second factor is, if it escapes to the 

mainland, the location of the susceptible animal population. While 

we have not presented that information but we have looked at the 

number of animal data by county that USDA collects, Plum Island 

has the least number of animals in the immediate surrounding 

counties, whether it is the Connecticut side, the New Jersey side 

or Long Island. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And let me end with this. I am probably more concerned—we can never engineer a facility that human error will not 

undo. I mean, you can have all the failsafes you want. I believe we 

are a sinful human world and we make mistakes and some are— 

most of them are unintentional. Some are intentional. You look at 

data breaches and stuff, it is most people stealing data. 

So let me just end with this. Dr. Kingsbury, would you respond? 

Is there a comparison between the CDC facilities in Georgia and 

Plum Island? Can we equate the two equally, being that the CDC 

is in the Atlanta area? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. We don’t believe they are equivalent because 

while both have high-containment areas, Plum Island deals with 

numbers of large animals that become infected, that become 

slaughtered at the end, that have to be disposed of and the like, 

and all of the research done with animals, as I understand it, at 

CDC are small animals inside containers. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. That is all my questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you. 

Mr. Pickering for questions. 

Mr. PICKERING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Kingsbury, you said that Australia contracts out foot-andmouth disease research to Thailand. Is that correct? 

67 

Dr. KINGSBURY. Yes. 

Mr. PICKERING. And what is your research on the Thailand facility? Where is it located and have there been any breaches of disease? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. We haven’t looked into that. 

Mr. PICKERING. Have you ever heard of any outbreak in Thailand? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. There have been outbreaks in a number of 

Southeast Asia countries. 

Mr. PICKERING. But you don’t know if there is—— 

Dr. KINGSBURY. But we have not studied the details of them. 

Mr. PICKERING. Now, in the German island scenario, it is connected by a road. Is that correct? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. A causeway, yes, sir. 

Mr. PICKERING. A causeway, and so that really, there is no distinction between the mainland site and an island site—— 

Dr. KINGSBURY. It is still—— 

Mr. PICKERING [continuing]. As far as the road connection? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. It is still largely surrounded by water. 

Mr. PICKERING. Yes, but it is connected by a road and so you 

would agree that it is a mainland connected site? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. It is connected to the mainland by a causeway, 

yes, sir. 

Mr. PICKERING. And the possible outbreak scenarios, if it is connected by a road, are really not that much different. Is that correct? I mean, one of your concerns is that an individual or a car 

would be a carrier of a disease, but in the German example, do you 

have any examples of that occurring? 

Mr. SHARMA. The only area where the road would affect would 

be the movement of people and transportation so yes, they have— 

if there is an epidemic or an outbreak—— 

Mr. PICKERING. But there is not—— 

Mr. SHARMA [continuing]. There is a risk. 

Mr. PICKERING. But your study has shown in that case that has 

never occurred. Is that correct? 

Mr. SHARMA. That is correct. 

Mr. PICKERING. Now, you said that Germany constructed a facility at the end of the Cold War when East Germany and West Germany reconciled, and that was a mainland site. That would have 

been around 1990. Is that—or when was the other site in Germany? 

Mr. SHARMA. After World War II when Germany got divided, the 

West Germans had to make a decision where to locate. They located on the mainland but in an urban area where they were not 

in close proximity to the susceptible animals. 

Mr. PICKERING. Were there any outbreaks in the German facility? 

Mr. SHARMA. I think there was one but they could not associate 

it with the lab. 

Mr. PICKERING. So a fairly extensive period of time in Germany 

where a mainland site operated safely? 

Mr. SHARMA. Correct. 

Mr. PICKERING. Thank you. The Canadian site, remote, do we 

have any examples of the Canadian site having any outbreaks? 

68 

Mr. SHARMA. Two things. First of all, they are, relatively speaking, new, and their scale is small. 

Mr. PICKERING. So they are new, kind of like the new NBAF 

would be new? 

Mr. SHARMA. Yes. 

Mr. PICKERING. And modern. 

Mr. SHARMA. The scale is very small, not comparable to even the 

current work, and—— 

Mr. PICKERING. Any outbreaks in Canada? 

Mr. SHARMA. No. 

Mr. PICKERING. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Carpenter, your concern over terrorism—really, terrorism, 

whether it is on an island or mainland, there is really no distinction or difference, is there? 

Dr. CARPENTER. Well, actually I am not thinking terrorism of a 

facility. I am thinking terrorism of somebody infecting livestock on 

the mainland. 

Mr. PICKERING. So the terrorism risk is really not an issue here 

of whether we have a mainland site or a Plum Island site? 

Dr. CARPENTER. That is what I was talking about. Right. 

Mr. PICKERING. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield 

back. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Pickering. 

Mr. Dingell for questions, please. Mr. Dingell? 

Mr. DINGELL. Yes, and thank you for your courtesy. 

These are all questions that I would appreciate a yes or no answer to, Dr. Kingsbury and Dr. Sharma, as I go through because 

we have very limited time here. Foot-and-mouth disease is one of 

the most highly infectious and dangerous animal diseases known, 

and nearly 100 percent of exposed animals become infected. Is that 

so, yes or no? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. Isn’t it also true that you found from your research 

that a single outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease on U.S. mainland 

could cause significant economic consequences to our economy with 

possible losses of as high as $30 billion to $50 billion? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. Yes to there being significant economic consequences. We didn’t actually try to quantify it. 

Mr. DINGELL. Now, isn’t it true that the cost to our economy 

would not only be the thousands of animals that would have to be 

killed but the devastating effect upon the Nation’s transportation 

system, exports, not only in meats but also other food products because protective embargoes would be imposed by other countries on 

U.S. farm goods? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. And isn’t it true that you found that since we 

moved all of the research of this dangerous disease to Plum Island, 

we have not had an outbreak like other countries? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. Isn’t it true that your research found that the 

United Kingdom, which has a lab on their mainland, has had numerous outbreaks costing billions of dollars including one last year 

that was linked to their own government research laboratory? 

69 

Dr. KINGSBURY. In general, there have been outbreaks. I 

wouldn’t use the word ‘‘numerous.’’ I think it is more likely several, 

but the statement is correct. 

Mr. DINGELL. Now, as a matter of fact, your research documented release of foot-and-mouth disease from labs in the United 

Kingdom, Denmark, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Germany, Spain, 

and Russia, to name a few. Is that true or false? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. Yes, true. 

Mr. DINGELL. And didn’t you also find that Germany and Denmark have moved their foot-and-mouth research to islands because 

of safety concerns at the same time DHS is contemplating moving 

our lab to the mainland? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. And isn’t it also true that you talked to the Australian officials who have one of the newest and most advanced 

labs for the study of animal diseases, that their government refuses 

to let them do live virus foot-and-mouth research in it but requires 

them to have some other country to take the risk for them? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. Now, let me understand your testimony. When you 

asked DHS for any reports on cost-benefit analysis that justified 

their decision to move live virus research on foot-and-mouth disease to the mainland of the United States being done on Plum Island for almost 50 years they had none? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. We have seen no cost-benefit analyses and we 

have asked for everything they have. 

Mr. DINGELL. Now, Dr. Kingsbury, let us talk about the 2002 

SAIC study that DHS claims justifies this risky move. Isn’t it true 

that you analyzed it and talked to its authors and concluded that 

it did not support DHS’s risky decision for a number of critical reasons? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. Now, let me highlight your findings about this 

SAIC report. You concluded this report could not support the conclusions that this research could be done safely on the mainland 

because it, one, addressed a different question; two, was selective 

in what it considered; three, did not assess the history of releases 

of foot-and-mouth disease virus or other pathogens either in the 

United States or elsewhere; four, did not address the issues of containment related to large animal work; and five, was inaccurate in 

comparing other countries’ foot-and-mouth disease work experience 

with the situation in the United States. 

Dr. KINGSBURY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. Dr. Kingsbury, isn’t it true that rather than supporting moving Plum Island to the mainland, the authors of the 

SAIC study actually concluded that if you included the cost of 

cleaning up the Plum Island site, it made economic sense to keep 

the research on Plum Island? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. Yes. 

Mr. DINGELL. So the bottom line is that someone at DHS either 

never read the report or is not being forthcoming and truthful in 

reporting to this committee or the Congress when they say the report justifies this move? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. I am not going to speak for DHS, sir. 

70 

Mr. DINGELL. And I can assume that you are of the view that 

this is a risky move. Is that correct? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. Yes. 

Mr. DINGELL. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe I have about exhausted my time. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Would the chairman yield for one second? 

Mr. DINGELL. I will be happy to yield. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Just to follow up on this, when did GAO share this 

report with DHS and USDA? 

Mr. SHARMA. Tuesday. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Tuesday? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. Yes. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. That is all my questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. Let me just ask a question, Dr. Kingsbury or Dr. 

Sharma. The committee was disturbed to learn, as Mr. Dingell alluded to in his opening, that DHS was refusing to provide you with 

documents such as the statement of the work for the environmental impact statement. What excuses do they give for not providing you the documents you requested to do your analysis for this 

committee? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. I believe they said that they were not going to 

give them to us because the documents were not yet public, but as 

you know, our access allows us to get access to that kind of information. We just haven’t had the time to fully have the argument 

yet. 

Mr. STUPAK. So there are still documents you would like to have 

from DHS? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. If you want us to continue to look at this matter, 

yes, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. We may go another round of questions, but without 

objection, I will turn to Mr. Moran for questions. 

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Thank you for 

the courtesy that is being extended to me and Ms. Boyda for the 

opportunity to join you on this panel today, and I fully understand 

the desire of the Chair and the nature of this hearing to limit our 

discussion to the idea of moving the facility from Plum Island to 

the mainland. 

Dr. Carpenter, the risks that you describe, what caught my attention, of course, was the episode that begins in the 1st Congressional district in Kansas in your slide presentation. 

Dr. CARPENTER. Oops. 

Mr. MORAN. But the reality, it seems to me, would be that the 

risks are minimized at a high-tech new facility and that when you 

do the model as if there is going to be an episode of hoof-and-mouth 

disease, the implication is that the risks are increased by the presence of a new facility located on the mainland, and it seems to me 

that the risks are actually higher from the natural or intentional 

introduction of hoof-and-mouth disease and so I just want to make 

sure that the suggestion is not, at least I would hope the suggestion is not that the facility would be the cause and effect or increasing the risk of hoof-and-mouth disease in cattle country as compared to hoof-and-mouth disease occurring naturally or—— 

Dr. CARPENTER. Right. Absolutely not. I went to my program and 

I said select a place in Kansas, so there was no intention to say 

71 

that there was a release from a facility. It was just if it were there 

and it were in four or five animals, what might happen. 

Mr. MORAN. And I don’t know that that is an appropriate question for you but just common sense tells me that the risk is higher 

for a natural occurrence or for intentional introduction of hoof-andmouth disease for nefarious reasons than it is for its escape from 

a facility? 

Dr. CARPENTER. One would think based on history, but based on 

history, there has been no intentional introduction that we know 

of in the United States, which is surprising but fortunate. 

Mr. MORAN. So that assumption, is my suggestion correct, that 

the risks are not increased necessarily by a facility? There are 

other factors that may introduce hoof-and-mouth disease to the 

continental United States? 

Dr. CARPENTER. Right, there are definitely other factors. As I 

said earlier, until 2007 I wasn’t really thinking about the potential 

of a leak. More so, I think it is important for contaminated food 

coming into the country or intentional actions. 

Mr. MORAN. It is sad that we would have to talk about the possibility of intentional introduction. And then finally, I know that the 

State of Kansas including colleagues of yours at the Kansas State 

University have done extensive studies on the introduction of hoofand-mouth disease to our State, have done modeling and scenarios 

and actually have acted out the—I just was wondering if you are 

familiar with those studies and included them in your analysis or 

discussion? 

Dr. CARPENTER. Yes, I am familiar with them. I didn’t include 

those in the analysis though. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me this opportunity. 

Mr. STUPAK. Ms. Boyda for questions. 

Ms. BOYDA. Thank you very much, and thank you for letting Mr. 

Moran and me join this hearing. 

I am from Kansas as well, and, all of the ‘‘It’s What’s for Dinner’’ 

commercials, that is Kansas. You are seeing Kansas. So all of the 

discussion about how dangerous this is, we find to be something 

that certainly we all are very, very, extremely cognizant of. And I 

think what Mr. Moran was talking about and asked if you had 

taken into account, we have a procedure set up if anything happens 

in Kansas to get it to be under control within hours, not days, because again, this is something that we deal with. If you are in California, you know what you are going to do in the case of some kind 

of a disaster there. So we live and breathe this everyday. And having this whole discussion about how dangerous hoof-and-mouth is, 

I am glad everybody in the country knows about it, but I hope everybody hear understands that Kansas lives and breathes this danger every day. We export more beef than anybody in the country. 

We are the beef producer. So everything that you are talking about 

is nothing we haven’t considered. It is what we consider each and 

every day, and keeping our herds safe is the most important thing 

that many of us would wake up and say is very important to Kansas. 

So when we hear that Plum Island is 3 miles away and the virus 

can easily spread for 100 miles, it doesn’t, and knowing that Plum 

72 

Island has not been well taken care of or maybe it is taken care 

of. It is old; it puts fear in our hearts knowing that in fact there 

could be a release from Plum Island and it could very, very easily 

get over to the mainland. And I just again very quickly would like 

you to address what, we all understand that there could be some 

politics playing with this. Is there a chance that putting it in some 

island is more for political reasons so that people feel some sense 

of safety because some way or another there is some water between 

the mainland, but in fact, is that a false sense of security for people 

and maybe that in fact might have some political edge to it? 

Dr. CARPENTER. Is that a question? 

Ms. BOYDA. Yes. 

Dr. CARPENTER. Yes. Well, I am sure it would make people feel 

safer if they see a body of water out there. As far as the airborne 

spread, I am not sure of this but I know about the spread in 1981 

in the U.K., that pigs are very effective producers of the virus, 

shedders of the virus in the air and that cattle are very good receptors. So if you have infected pigs producing the virus and shedding 

it and you have receptive cattle receiving it, that is a real problem. 

But airborne spread from a few infected cattle, I don’t think would 

be a major problem. 

Ms. BOYDA. I am talking about a release from Plum Island, and 

I only have a couple of minutes. I would like to ask just another 

question or two. In Kansas we are deeply concerned. We haven’t 

had an outbreak since 1929, but if there were, then what do you 

do with those carcasses and how do you get them? Do they need 

to be transported off to Plum Island so that there can, in fact, be 

some research done on them? What are the risks of actually having 

to transport animals that are infected out to an island in New York 

versus being able to have an immediate chance to take these animals into a laboratory? Is there any benefit in that? 

Dr. CARPENTER. No, but I—— 

Ms. BOYDA. And this is for Dr. Kingsbury as well. 

Dr. CARPENTER. I couldn’t visualize transporting 5,000 or 10,000 

cows—— 

Mr. BOYDA. No, no, no, but would you need to transport some of 

the animals affected into the laboratory to see if there is any—— 

Dr. CARPENTER. I would assume that they would just take samples from the animals for confirmation. 

Ms. BOYDA. But you are still having to take those samples, which 

are still going to house that and take them off to New York. I just 

wonder if there is any advantage in saying the laboratory is right 

there. If you needed to do anything, you would be within an hour 

of being able to begin a study in this country. 

Dr. CARPENTER. Actually, that is a very good point that I forgot 

to make, that I think there would be a good move to put facility 

wherever it is that is doing the diagnostics in a location that is easily accessible because we are looking at millions of dollars for every 

hour of delay that—— 

Ms. BOYDA. That is right, my point being minutes. This is an instant. Kansas understands that this isn’t about days, it isn’t even 

about hours. It is about minutes and being able to react so quickly 

and making sure that you are containing things. 

73 

Let me just finalize by saying, Mr. Chairman, I am deeply appreciative of what you are saying about DHS, and from a political 

standpoint versus just making a good decision, ultimately Kansans 

want the right decision made here. We have so much at stake here 

that we want the right decision made, and if DHS is not forthcoming with things, that will cause everyone so much trouble politically but in making the best decision as well. And I certainly am 

very, very appreciative of hearing what you are saying DHS is. We 

need the transparency to make sure that the best decisions really 

are being made but that the American people and the cattlemen in 

Kansas also know that this process is something that was open and 

transparent and the best possible decision. 

So I certainly appreciate what you are doing in that regard. I 

yield. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Dingell, questions? 

Ms. BOYDA. Oh, I am sorry. I have a letter from the delegation 

that I would like to give to the Committee, if that is all right. This 

is from the Kansas delegation, Chairman Stupak. Thank you. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Dingell. 

Mr. DINGELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You alluded to a proceeding involving my good friend, Pat Roberts, who held a hearing 

with Admiral Jembresky and G.M. Bastiani and it occurred on 

March 28, 2003. I would like to read from it. Here are comments 

coming from Senator Roberts. He said, ‘‘I played the President 

under an exercise called Crimson Sky with the Department of Agriculture. Now, Crimson Sky was the misnomer label of what would 

happen if Iraq had launched a hoof-and-mouth disease infestation 

in the United States in 7 States. Now, that doesn’t sound like much 

on the surface of it but if you have an infestation period of 6 days 

and on the 7th you have got to make some decisions and we didn’t 

do it very well. We ended up with 50 million head of livestock that 

had to be terminated. Now, how do you do that? Just on the surface of it, how on earth do you do that and what do you do with 

the carcasses? Well, obviously it was the National Guard, and then 

obviously the National Guard couldn’t handle it, so it was all active 

duty. And then we found we didn’t have enough ammunition, and 

we found that you don’t burn the carcasses because that we 

learned in Great Britain, that is not what you do. So you had to 

bury them, and there was a ditch 25 miles long and half a football 

field wide in Kansas alone just to handle the herds there. Then we 

had to put up a stop order on all shipments because you were having states and National Guards being activated by all the governors to stop other states and transportation of livestock, all export stock. The market went nuts and the people in the cities finally figured out that their food did come from farms, not supermarkets, and they rioted in the streets and there was a mess. And 

it was not only for 1 year but for several years. Then add in the 

problem of food security, that if you put a little anthrax in some 

milk, you have really got a problem on your hands. Now, I want 

to know, I know that at that particular time when different events 

happen, that DOD will be there. They are going to have to be there 

because they are the only outfit that can do it. I prefer the National Guard because people know them, trust them. They are the 

home forces and they are working toward it.’’ 

74 

Now, I want to understand one thing, and this is a question to 

any of our panel, particularly to our two witnesses from GAO. You 

told the DHS that you were conducting an official congressional investigation for this committee. Is that correct? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. And that Under Secretary Cohen or other members 

of his staff told you that you could not have the documents until 

after it was made public. Is that correct? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. Yes, referring specifically to the statement of 

work for the environmental impact statement. 

Mr. DINGELL. What did you just say? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. We were asking for the statement of work for 

the ongoing environmental impact statement, and that is what 

they said was not public. 

Mr. DINGELL. What was the reason they told you you could not 

have those documents? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. They said they were going to be released at the 

end of the month, and when they were public we could have them. 

Mr. DINGELL. But you couldn’t have them before? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. That is what they said. 

Mr. DINGELL. Did they set forth a reason why you could not have 

that information or those documents? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. I think I just said everything they said. 

Mr. DINGELL. What was the reason? Was there a statutory reason or constitutional reason on which they set forth that they could 

deny you access to those documents? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. OK. Dr. Sharma has just clarified that the argument that the statement of work could not be given to us was that 

it was proprietary and—— 

Mr. DINGELL. Why was it proprietary? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. They did not say. 

Mr. DINGELL. They did not cite any reason why those were proprietary? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. No, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. Can you tell us why they are proprietary? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. No, sir, and under our rules of access, I don’t 

think there is any reason for them to deny them. 

Mr. DINGELL. Is GAO denied any documents on grounds that 

they are proprietary? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. Occasionally that issue arises, but once we have 

time for our lawyers to discuss the matter, we usually—— 

Mr. DINGELL. Why are these documents proprietary? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. I am sorry, sir. I don’t believe they are. But—— 

Mr. DINGELL. Well, is it because a contractor is doing it? The 

contractor has got some proprietary interests in the work that he 

is doing for the government? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. I don’t know why that word was used. It is not 

appropriate to deny GAO access. 

Mr. DINGELL. We will ask those folks to explain their secretary. 

Now, isn’t it true that you had other problems getting records 

from DHS and USDA and that they even delayed your trip to Plum 

Island until this committee sent a letter threatening them with 

contempt? 

75 

Dr. KINGSBURY. It is true that it took us 6 weeks to arrange the 

trip to Plum Island and there have been occasional delays in getting documents. The most recent issue over the environmental impact statement statement of work is the most recent case in point. 

Mr. DINGELL. Now, isn’t it true that while our own DHS is delaying giving GAO documents and access to the Plum Island facility, 

you were having no problem getting information from foreign countries and visiting their facilities? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. That is correct. 

Mr. DINGELL. And you were received with courtesy and given full 

assistance and cooperation by Germans, Danes, and British as well 

as other countries? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. Germans, Danes, and British, and the organization in France, yes, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your courtesy. 

Mr. STUPAK. I thank the gentleman. 

Let me ask a question if I may, Dr. Kingsbury or Dr. Sharma or 

Mr. Carpenter; maybe I will start with you, Dr. Kingsbury. The exhibit book right there in front of you, tab number 12, you alluded 

to in your testimony, Dr. Kingsbury, and others have referred to 

it, the SAIC report, that is Science Application International Corporation, and it is tab 12 in our exhibit binder. And I understand 

you had concerns about this report, but I want to ask you, if I may, 

on page 16, second full paragraph, it says, ‘‘Biosafety lapses at any 

facility location likely have an equal risk of occurrence.’’ Would you 

agree with that? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. The document at tab 12, sir, only has about 5 

pages in it. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Page 16 is not included in that? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. Not that I can see. It is just a table of contents. 

Mr. STUPAK. All right. Let me ask you this then from it. My 

binder had it. I thought yours had it. ‘‘Biosafety lapses at any location have an equal risk of occurrence.’’ Would you agree with that 

statement or not? In other words, the risk occurs really from lapse 

in biosafety practices resulting in the release of an agent or intentional removal by someone with access to the facility. That is how 

security lapses occur. 

Dr. KINGSBURY. That is how these things occur. I wouldn’t say 

it is the same at every facility because different facilities would 

have different levels of training and concern about the matter. 

Mr. STUPAK. Correct. And let me ask Dr. Carpenter this question. When you showed your map up here, the United States and 

the animal populations, it looked like about the only place you 

could do it, and I just took a quick look at it while you had it up 

there, was basically Nevada. That is the only place in the United 

States, correct? 

Dr. CARPENTER. Well, they have livestock in Nevada. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Well, it looks pretty bare in your picture there. 

Dr. CARPENTER. Right. I think what was happening was you 

didn’t see infected premises because animals were not shipped 

there. 

Mr. STUPAK. A way for this to occur, foot-and-mouth disease, either it is intentionally introduced or we have a lapse in safety, and 

76 

this committee has done enough oversight and investigations at the 

labs, whether it is the nuclear labs, Los Alamos, wherever, or Lawrence Livermore as we have an issue going on today with them; 

those are mistakes. They occur. Is it the key to your testimony 

then; since we know there is human error and these things occur, 

you would want foot-and-mouth disease where there is the least 

amount of animal population to infect, if there is a release, however it occurs. Is that fair to say, Dr. Carpenter? 

Dr. CARPENTER. That makes sense. 

Mr. STUPAK. And in all the sites we have seen, Plum Island, because they do not have animals in the immediate area, is probably 

about the safest spot we have in this country for the past 50 years 

for hoof-and-mouth disease research. Is that correct? 

Dr. CARPENTER. I don’t know. I don’t know if there is access of 

animals to the island. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Dr. Sharma, Dr. Kingsbury, you were both at 

Plum Island. Is that fair to say? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. Dr. Sharma was there, yes. 

Mr. SHARMA. There are no animals on the island other than the 

animals that are brought there for specific experiments. DHS has 

told us that occasionally, we don’t know the frequency and the 

numbers, that deer swim from Long Island to the island and they 

shoot them. 

Mr. STUPAK. Sure, to keep them off Plum Island? 

Mr. SHARMA. Correct. 

Mr. STUPAK. So you don’t have spread of disease, correct? 

Mr. SHARMA. Correct. 

Mr. STUPAK. In my home State of Michigan, we have bovine TB, 

and Dr. Carpenter, it is in the small northwest part of lower Michigan, but all of Michigan, we are not allowed to transport dairy 

without numerous inspections, and some states still won’t accept 

our dairy from Michigan because of bovine TB. So if you have an 

outbreak, and I think I asked you this before, who is responsible 

then for determining. In Michigan, it is bovine TB, but if it is hoofand-mouth disease, who would make that determination? Since 

this is under the jurisdiction of DHS, is it going to be Department 

of Homeland Security, United States Department of Agriculture, 

State Department of Agriculture? Where would it be? 

Dr. CARPENTER. I believe to a point it is the State, then it is the 

USDA, and we have the same situation happening in California 

with our second herd of TB. 

Mr. STUPAK. Very good. Mr. Shimkus, then we will go around to 

the members who have just come in who would like to ask questions. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be short. 

I just want to follow up on just some of the details, and Dr. 

Kingsbury or Dr. Sharma or Dr. Carpenter, it doesn’t really matter 

who answers as long as it is consistent. What are the details of the 

last foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in the United States, the 

1929 outbreak? And what I am looking at, how did it happen, did 

it involve human error, did it involve a laboratory, what the cause 

of the outbreak determined and where did it occur? Can anyone update me on the 1929—— 

77 

Dr. CARPENTER. I will embarrassingly say California, and I don’t 

know the rest of the answer to that. It is in a document that I 

could look up but I don’t know offhand. 

Dr. KINGSBURY. We haven’t gone back that far. We do report on 

some incidences in our testimonial statement but we didn’t go back 

to the 1929 event. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Well, my colleague, Jerry Moran, is here from 

Kansas, and Congresswoman Boyda kind of mentioned Kansas. 

Were you guys involved with the 1929 outbreak at all? I am just 

asking. I am not trying to be goofy. 

Mr. MORAN. I appreciate Mr. Stupak, the chairman’s courtesy, 

extended to me. I am less enamored with yours, Mr. Shimkus. 

Thank you. 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, I would have to put Jerry under oath and we 

don’t want to do that. 

Dr. KINGSBURY. I think it is fair to say there were no laboratories at that time so it had to have been a naturally occurring outbreak. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. OK. I yield back my time. Thank you. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Inslee for questions. 

Mr. INSLEE. Thank you. 

This GAO report is very disturbing to me in concluding that 

there really has been no study done of the safety. It is kind of mind 

boggling to me, frankly, because obviously you lose a degree, another series of barriers if there is a release and we know there are 

releases on occasion from these facilities, try as we might. So I am 

kind of flummoxed as to why this decision has gone on. 

Let me just ask you at the table, what type of cost-benefit analysis has been done. For instance, has there been any assessment 

of any additional costs for operating on an island compared to the 

costs to the U.S. economy if in fact there is a hoof-and-mouth outbreak in the United States? What is the ratio of those two numbers? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. As far as we know, that study has not been 

done. 

Mr. INSLEE. Now, if you are going to remove a pathological laboratory like this and remove one barrier of protection of Americans, 

which is the water, which works really, really well if there is a release, wouldn’t you want to have that kind of assessment before 

you make a decision like this? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. I think the point of our testimony is that there 

should be more analysis done before this decision is made. 

Mr. INSLEE. And what additional costs were there in construction 

or operation that were considered? Did anyone present any ballpark figures? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. There have apparently been estimates of what it 

would cost to build a facility although those estimates appear to be 

changing, and the costs of closing down the facility on Plum Island 

seem not to have been included in that analysis. 

Mr. INSLEE. Which is a huge mistake, given the enormous costs 

for closing facilities like this, particularly with toxic material involved. I live on an island. I am an islander. I live on Bainbridge 

Island, Washington, so I have some sense of what it is like to live 

on an island, and I can tell you, life goes on on an island. You get 

78 

your business done. You get across the water. It is just stunning 

to me that without a real solid assessment of the costs that we 

would remove a layer of protection for Americans given the enormous economic consequences of an outbreak including apples from 

Washington State. You know it could even involve the apple products. We don’t think of that in those terms. 

So what would you recommend, if you could, to a department to 

really thoroughly evaluate this issue? You have told us that they 

need to evaluate whether or not they can safely do this, number 

one, but number two, what would you suggest on a full-scale evaluation involving costs or benefits? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. Well, clearly, in our view, there needs to be more 

assessment of the specific risks involved, and then once you assess 

and estimate what the risks are, then you have to look at the consequences, and the consequences get at the economic issues that 

you raised. We are not in the position to say how such an analysis 

would come out. I can imagine an analysis and a particular laboratory structure and all that could be deemed to be sufficiently safe. 

Our point is, those analyses have not been done. 

Mr. INSLEE. Was this island at one time used as a quarantine facility of some sort? I have this weird historical memory that this 

island was involved in this. Does that ring a bell? 

Mr. SHARMA. No, but I think it will be very illustrative to talk 

about the 1978 outbreak and that would shed some light onto what 

you are asking. At the time Plum Island had a practice of keeping 

animals in the holding areas, and when the release occurred, these 

animals became infected, and this point is extremely important. 

There are two things that happened. The virus didn’t escape to the 

mainland, and we were able to convince OIE that island is serving 

as the second recontainment. It is an extension of the lab and 

therefore OIE did not impose any sanctions on our exports. We 

asked them if there is a single case of an outbreak in the United 

States, would OIE impose a ban, and their answer was yes. So it 

is a matter of taking risks, but OIE’s position is that an outbreak, 

if contained on the island, would not lead to a ban on our exports. 

Mr. INSLEE. Well, given that enormous impact on the U.S. economy should that occur, I certainly would hope that somehow we 

put this decision off until there is a full cost-benefit analysis and 

we do have access to the environmental study. Would any of you 

disagree with that? 

Dr. CARPENTER. No. 

Mr. INSLEE. Then we are all of like minds. Thank you very much. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Whitfield for questions, please. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I am sorry I was late 

getting here. But it seems to me, and I think our friend from Washington State pointed this out, the GAO in their report says very 

emphatically that the Department of Homeland Security has neither conducted nor commissioned any study to determine whether 

FMD work can be done safely on the U.S. mainland and instead 

they have looked at a study about is it technically feasible. So it 

seems to me that until Homeland Security has a more comprehensive look at this, that it is really premature for us to be discussing 

this issue. 

With that, I will yield back the balance of my time. 

79 

Mr. STUPAK. I thank the gentleman. 

Let me just ask one question, we will let this panel go, and I 

think we are going to have votes on the Floor here pretty quickly. 

We mentioned, and it has been placed in the record, Mr. Dingell 

read from it, this statement from Senator Roberts in which he 

played the President of the United States. So let me have each of 

you play that role for a moment and let me ask you this question. 

If you were the President of the United States, they came to you 

and said we are going to do this NBAF, part of it is going to be 

hoof-and-mouth disease, we have Plum Island or we can move it to 

the mainland. In your personal or professional opinion, would you 

move, the foot-and-mouth disease part from Plum Island, Dr. 

Kingsbury? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. I would not want to answer that question without more analysis than we have seen today. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Dr. Sharma? 

Mr. SHARMA. Same. 

Mr. STUPAK. Dr. Carpenter? 

Dr. CARPENTER. Well, when we were trying to get it to Davis, I 

was in favor of it and I live right next to where the lab would be. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Mr. Chairman, can I—— 

Dr. CARPENTER. I feel comfortable with it. 

Mr. STUPAK. Where it is now, you mean? 

Dr. CARPENTER. In Davis, California. 

Mr. STUPAK. You do hoof-and-mouth there? 

Dr. CARPENTER. No, no. They were—Davis was one of the sites 

that was talked about early on. 

Mr. STUPAK. Right. OK. 

Mr. Shimkus. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. If I can just follow up, would you advocate outsourcing, as Australia does, since Australia does have BSL-3 and 

-4 and they are highly—that they outsource? I mean, is that an option? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. Having our work done in Australia? 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Well, I am just—outsourcing like they do in Australia. 

Mr. SHARMA. We had talked to some experts, and they had analyzed this issue and there are certain aspects of this work which 

are more risky than others. The riskier parts are if you are working with large animals, doing some challenging studies, they obviously are shedding a lot of virus, and that kind of work, if you want 

to minimize, you can outsource it. The diagnostic capabilities, 

present lower level of risk. That is the kind of expertise you want 

to have in-house because you need to diagnose as soon as possible. 

So there are aspects. It is not total or all. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Pickering, any questions before I leave this 

panel? 

Mr. PICKERING. Just a couple brief questions. 

Dr. Kingsbury, to sum up your testimony, tell me if this is correct. You are not saying that the decision to put a facility on the 

mainland is riskier than keeping one on Plum Island. You are simply saying that more analysis needs to be done to determine that 

risk. Is that accurate? 

80 

Dr. KINGSBURY. It is close. Most of the experts that we have 

talked to have said that an island provides an additional level of 

protection. The risks would be the same of a release but it is the 

risk, the downstream risk of an actual outbreak that the island 

provides a further layer of protection for 

Mr. PICKERING. Dr. Carpenter, Plum Island is, I think, 3 miles 

from Long Island, 6 miles from Connecticut. Airborne pathogens 

can travel over 3 and 6 miles, can they not? 

Dr. CARPENTER. Yes. 

Mr. PICKERING. So really, Plum Island is a false sense of security, isn’t it? So maybe if we had an island 20 miles or 50 miles 

offshore, that might be correct, Dr. Kingsbury, but the close proximity to shore, Plum Island really does give little, if no, additional 

protection. Would that be—and Dr. Carpenter, you said that you 

are in support of it. You live within minutes. There is no—and this 

is very, very important. There is a risk, an economic risk to our 

animal health and the economy based on that but there is no risk 

at all to human health. Isn’t that correct? 

Dr. CARPENTER. Virtually no risk, yes. 

Mr. PICKERING. And again, there is not much difference between 

a site that is 3 to 6 miles offshore than one that would be at UCDavis a few minutes from your home, and the other thing that I 

think that is important, Dr. Kingsbury, is that the U.K. facility 

where you had an outbreak, is you have apples and oranges comparisons. The U.K. facility is outdated, similar to the Plum Island 

facility, and as you look at modern facility to modern facility, probably the closest example would be Canada where there has been 

no outbreak, so I think from a policy point of view, a modern facility is most important. Plum Island is a false security because it 

really is close to population centers. 

Dr. KINGSBURY. The issue is not population centers. The issue is, 

how close is it to susceptible populations of the animals that become diseased, and in addition to being an island, and we have to 

say, there has been no spread of the virus from that island in its 

history—— 

Mr. PICKERING. But you could also find other facilities, mainland 

facilities in countries where there have been no outbreaks as well. 

Dr. KINGSBURY. That is correct. 

Mr. PICKERING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Moran, any questions? 

Mr. MORAN. No. 

Mr. STUPAK. Let me ask just one. You used false sense of security. It is really not a false sense of security, it is a proven sense 

of security, is it not, that you have had an outbreak there and it 

never spread to the mainland? 

Dr. KINGSBURY. There have been releases on Plum Island. They 

have not left the island and therefore they haven’t spread to animal populations, and as Dr. Sharma said earlier, part of that has 

to do with the prevailing winds in that area. 

Mr. STUPAK. Sure, it blows it out and—— 

Dr. KINGSBURY. And those have been studied and understood, so 

I think it is not quite false that it is safe. 

Mr. STUPAK. Now, Dr. Kingsbury, you have not gone to Plum Island but—— 

81 

Dr. KINGSBURY. I have not, no, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. And Dr. Sharma, you have? 

Mr. SHARMA. Yes, I have. 

Mr. STUPAK. Dr. Carpenter, have you? 

Dr. CARPENTER. No, I haven’t. 

Mr. STUPAK. Then Dr. Sharma, do you know, having been there, 

is there any reason why you could not build the new NBAF on 

Plum Island? Is there any reason why you cannot build a new research facility for foot-and-mouth disease on Plum Island? 

Mr. SHARMA. Well, there is plenty of land. As a matter of fact, 

the islands in Denmark and Germany are significantly smaller in 

size. In addition to that, there are some assets on the island that 

would lower the costs and DHS since 2002 has invested significant 

amount of money, in particular, things like they have power generators, backup power generators. They are expensive. They are assets that can be used if they decide to build a new facility there. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you. That will conclude questions of this 

panel. I want to thank the three doctors for being here and thank 

you very much for your testimony. You are welcome to stay for the 

rest of the hearing. 

I would like to call up our second panel of witnesses. We have 

Mr. Ray Wulf, who is President and CEO of the organization American Farmers and Ranchers; Dr. Howard Hill, who is Chief Operating Officer of Iowa Select Farms; Mr. Leroy Watson, who is Legislative Director for National Grange of the Order of Patrons of 

Husbandry; and Dr. Gary Voogt, who is President-Elect of the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association. 

It is the policy of this subcommittee to take all testimony under 

oath. Please be advised that witnesses have the right under the 

Rules of the House to be advised by counsel during their testimony. 

OK. We have been asked to hold for a minute for Mr. Voogt. We 

will hold for a minute or two until he comes back. 

As I was saying, Mr. Voogt, it is the policy of this subcommittee 

to take all testimony under oath. Please be advised that you have 

the right under the Rules of the House to be advised by counsel 

during your testimony. Do any of our witnesses wish to be advised 

by counsel during their testimony? Everybody is indicating no. 

Therefore, I am going to ask you to please rise and raise your right 

hand to take the oath. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. STUPAK. Let the record reflect that the witnesses replied in 

the affirmative. You are now under oath. Mr. Wulf, I am going to 

start with you, but I am going to ask you to wait 30 seconds because I think they are going to call us for a number of votes here. 

All right, Mr. Wulf, go ahead, start, your opening statement, 

please, 5 minutes. If you have a longer one, please submit it for the 

record. 

STATEMENT OF RAY L. WULF, PRESIDENT AND CEO, 

AMERICAN FARMERS AND RANCHERS 

Mr. WULF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Shimkus and the rest of the Committee. I am Ray Wulf, President 

and CEO of American Farmers and Ranchers. We are based in 

Oklahoma City. 

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Mr. STUPAK. Go ahead. 

Mr. WULF. We are a general farm organization. 

Mr. STUPAK. Our timing is not good today. All right, sir. Let us 

try it again. 

Mr. WULF. American Farmers and Ranchers Insurance Company. 

We do business in 24 States, and as I said, we are located in Oklahoma City. Running through the questions that were posed to us, 

we are absolutely against and opposed to movement of the Plum 

Island Animal Disease Center to the mainland United States. As 

you may know, already we have heard, this is the only facility 

where certain highly infectious foreign animal diseases are studied, 

such as the foot-and-mouth disease. Foot-and-mouth disease is a 

highly contagious virus that affects cloven-hoofed animals such as 

cattle, sheep, pigs, goats and deer. 

Foot-and-mouth disease can be carried by wind, clothing, footwear, skin, through nasal passages and any equipment. As a matter of fact, I am not aware of anything that this will not adhere 

to and can be transmitted. There are simply too many possibilities 

for error, either by negligence or accident, and could impose extreme economic impacts on U.S. agriculture, U.S. agriculture producers and our consumers. When dealing with this particular type 

of risk, it is better to deal with a known probability of an occurrence than to move a facility to a new location where you have no 

history and an unknown probability of an occurrence that can happen. Any event with or without history, there is a probability that 

can be assessed to a particular outcome and one certainly needs to 

be assessed here. 

United States infrastructure for moving livestock, second to 

none. We allow livestock to move rapidly across the United States. 

As a matter of fact, in 5 days, cattle trucking out of Oklahoma City 

National Livestock Market arrive in 39 States. Infrastructure is 

really good here in the United States, in a matter of days livestock 

can be transported hundreds of thousands of miles and intermingled with other livestock. If we move the facility we have the 

potential risk of an outbreak inside the mainland United States, 

whereas currently it is not a high risk of probability of transporting 

at Plum Island. 

The economic impact for AFR members would no doubt be severe, devastating, and reach far beyond the livestock industry. Direct economic losses would result from lost production, the cost of 

destroying disease-ridden livestock, as we have already heard, indemnification and costs of disease containment measures such as 

drugs, diagnostics, vaccines, veterinary services, and more. Indirect 

costs and multiplier effects from dislocations in agriculture sectors 

would include the feed and inputs industry, transportation, retail 

and certainly loss of our export markets, which is already a very, 

very sensitive issue. 

A foot-and-mouth outbreak would not only be a problem in agriculture but in Britain in 2001, as we have already heard with that 

outbreak, and I have a CD disc, Mr. Chairman, that I would like 

to leave that documents that one-on-one account of that outbreak 

for you and the other members to view at your convenience. 

Mr. STUPAK. Without objection, it will be accepted. 

83 

Mr. WULF. Thank you. Outbreak in 2001, as we know, resulted 

in postponing a general election for one month, cancellation of 

many sporting events, leisure activities, cancellation of large events 

likely to be attended by those from the infected areas. 

And we talked about dollars and impacts from that alone. In an 

Oklahoma 1979 study that we saw, the economic impact could be 

anywhere from $2.4 billion, and that B as in bill—I have to put it 

that way for me because I am cowboy and don’t count that high— 

anywhere up to $27.6 billion, as in B. California, we have already 

heard testimony about that alone, could be anywhere from $8.5 billion to $13.5 billion. We have had a lot of conversation regarding 

Kansas and those studies up there. Three scenarios were considered on the economic impacts of a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak 

in Kansas alone, and one was where the disease was introduced to 

a single, small cow-calf operation; another one, a medium-sized 

feedlot, 10,000 to 20,000 head. We had another one with five large 

feedlots, and there are a lot of feedlots in Kansas, Oklahoma and 

Texas. As a matter of fact, there are some 6 million head of cattle 

in Kansas, some 5 million head of cattle in Oklahoma, and 14 million cattle when we get into Texas. Under those scenarios, the 

small calf scenario, 126,000 head of livestock were infected and 

needed to be destroyed. In the medium-sized operation, 407,000 

head in 39 days had to be put down. In five large feedlots, we had 

1.7 million head of livestock that needed to be destroyed in the 

event of an outbreak that would last nearly up to 3 months. For 

the State of Kansas as a whole, those numbers could climb somewhere to the cost-economic benefit and loss of $945 million. 

Other things—livestock markets are not the only impact from 

the outbreak. Feed and grain, potential feed mills would also be 

impacted. We know half of all of our grain goes toward U.S. feed 

for animal consumption. Total trade impact certainly has to be 

looked at here. Over 94 percent of our consumers for our livestock 

markets are outside the United States. We certainly cannot afford 

to lose that. Japan, Mexico, Canada, Korea already account for 75 

percent of all the U.S. exports, 10 percent total production. Footand-mouth certainly is a trade disease that needs to be seriously 

looked at with the probability of occurrence. Global competition is 

fierce, as we all know, in agriculture, for dollars. In the event a 

foot-and-mouth outbreak occurred in the United States, life as we 

know it would cease to exist, not to mention the already highly sensitive trade issues that I mentioned earlier in regards to Korea and 

Japan alone with our beef. 

In any outbreak of any magnitude, as I previously mentioned, 

there is a drastic drop in consumption. We only know that too well 

when we look at the episode with Food Lion, when we look at what 

has happened with trying to describe to the soccer mom with the 

12-year-old out there the difference between mad cow disease and 

hoof-and-mouth disease and E. coli. Now, what does that do to the 

economic impact of an outbreak of any kind? You are looking at a 

barrier somewhere in the neighborhood of 20 miles and everything 

being destroyed within that 20 miles in the event that there is an 

outbreak and then another buffer zone outside of that 20-mile area. 

Nobody is going in and nobody is going out. And then you are going 

to inject with vaccine outside of that buffer, and once the disease 

84 

has been totally eradicated, you then are going to have to destroy 

those animals that were also vaccinated at that point in time to totally eradicate it. It is serious. 

When you look at the map on my testimony—— 

Mr. STUPAK. May I ask you to summarize, please? We are way 

over. 

Mr. WULF. OK. I appreciate the opportunity. I am sorry. I was 

trying to find a clock here and I didn’t see it. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wulf follows:] 

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Mr. STUPAK. I will tell you what. We have got 5 minutes before 

we have to go down and vote. That is when the bells are going to 

go off here in about 20 seconds, so we are going to go down and 

vote. We will be back in, we have 3 votes, approximately; let us 

shoot for 30 minutes so that will give you time to stretch your legs. 

We will be back here at 12:25. We will be in recess until 12:25. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. STUPAK. The meeting will come to order. 

Dr. Hill. 

STATEMENT OF HOWARD HILL, D.V.M., PH.D., CHIEF 

OPERATING OFFICER, IOWA SELECT FARMS 

Dr. HILL. Good afternoon, Chairman Stupak, Ranking Member 

Shimkus, and members of the subcommittee, my name is Howard 

Hill. I am a doctor of veterinary medicine and I spent more than 

30 years in the pork industry researching animal diseases. I have 

spent the past 7 years as a chief operating officer for Iowa Select 

Farms and was on the faculty at Iowa State University for 20 

years. I am testifying today on behalf of the National Pork Producers Council, an association of 43 State pork producer organizations that represents the country’s 67,000 pork producers. 

The U.S. pork industry represents a significant value-added activity in the agricultural economy and the overall U.S. economy, 

adding nearly $30 billion of gross national product and supporting 

more than 550,000 mostly rural jobs. 

The Plum Island Animal Disease Center on Long Island has long 

been a centerpiece for the country’s foreign animal disease diagnostic system and it is our understanding that the proposed NBAF 

will continue to fulfill this mission. The U.S. pork industry believes 

that NBAF should be located on the mainland. In its current state, 

the facility on Plum Island cannot continue its mission of foreign 

animal disease research, diagnostics, and education. While Plum 

Island is thought to be ideal from a risk mitigation standpoint, 

there are serious drawbacks to having the facility there. Constructing a new facility on the island would be prohibitively more 

expensive than on the mainland. It also has been difficult to recruit 

high-caliber scientists to Plum Island because of the area’s high 

cost of living and inconvenience of boating to work every day. 

NBAF will require world-class scientists to conduct research and 

diagnostic work so the location needs to be appealing to these individuals. 

Five sites for the new NBAF are now under consideration excluding Plum Island. The area for the new facility must be picked 

based on an assessment of risk which would include the following 

four areas: the existence of susceptible animal populations that 

could be exposed to an outbreak should disease organisms escape 

from the facility; two, the ability of the Federal and State governments to quickly control and eradicate a disease; three, the environmental consequences and impact on wildlife populations of an 

outbreak; and four, the economic consequences to the livestock industry if an outbreak were to occur. 

Most of the current debate is focused on location and cost of the 

facility but very little has been said about the anticipated scope of 

work to be carried out at the NBAF. From our industry’s perspecVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:02 Sep 21, 2010 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00103 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CWELLS1\HEARINGS\110-120 SCOM1 PsN: JIMC
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tive, it seems more prudent to define the capacity needed for the 

kinds of research and diagnostic work to be completed and to build 

the facility to meet those needs and objectives. The U.S. pork industry would request that DHS work with the animal agriculture 

industry to define the scope of work. 

NBAF’s mission is multidisciplinary and focusing on human and 

animal health, particularly zoonotic diseases. While we support the 

need for a high-containment Biosafety Level-4 facility for researching zoonotic diseases in large animals, the swine industry is concerned that the animal health portion of this mission will be subordinated to the more publicly supported human health agenda. Our 

industry needs assurance that USDA and DHS will work together 

to allocate to the NBAF the resources necessary to achieve and enhance its mission to protect U.S. animal industries and meat export against catastrophic economic losses caused by foreign animal 

diseases. To illustrate the importance of this to the U.S. pork industry, it is estimated that a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak 

would cost the U.S. livestock producers between $40 and $60 billion. Such an outbreak would immediately shut down our export 

markets. 

In summary, we believe the location of NBAF must be based on 

assessed risk rather than on which entity is willing to build such 

a facility. Locations need to be reexamined to see if the island effect can be recreated by siting the facility in an area with low densities of livestock and wildlife, and we need the new facility to enhance the capabilities of our industry with regards to research, 

diagnostics, and treatment for all foreign animal diseases. 

Thank you for the opportunity to share the views of the U.S. 

swine industry. I would be happy to take any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hill follows:] 

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Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Dr. Hill. 

Mr. Watson, your opening statement, please, sir. 

STATEMENT OF LEROY WATSON, LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR, 

THE NATIONAL GRANGE OF THE ORDER OF PATRONS OF 

HUSBANDRY 

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Shimkus, members of the Committee, the National Grange would like to commend 

the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations for holding this 

hearing on proposals by the U.S. government to relocate the Plum 

Island Animal Disease Center to a location on the mainland United 

States as part of the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility, 

NBAF. We appreciate the opportunity to present our views opposing the development of an animal disease research facility on the 

U.S. mainland that will work with live strains of foot-and-mouth 

disease as well as other virulent foreign animal diseases anywhere 

near existing concentrations of commercial livestock. 

While there are many scenarios for economic, social, and environmental damage from the outbreak of animal diseases, few come 

close to the nightmare of an outbreak of FMD. According to a 2004 

USDA paper entitled ‘‘Economic Impact of Foreign Animal Disease 

Outbreak,’’ the paper calculated that the direct cost to the domestic 

livestock industry of an FMD outbreak would exceed $60 billion. 

We believe those costs would come much higher when we add in 

all of the costs to the rest of society. 

America’s family farmers and ranchers have become unfortunately accustomed to the fact that after 9/11, our operations are 

considered soft targets for terrorist attacks. In 2006, the National 

Institute of Justice, which is the research arm of the Department 

of Justice, published a research and policy brief entitled 

‘‘Agroterrorism: Why We’re Not Ready,’’ that identified FMD as the 

greatest agroterrorist threat facing our Nation today. For a number 

of years, the National Grange has called on government to address 

this threat. We commend DHS and USDA and other Federal agencies for moving to upgrade our Nation’s bioresearch capacity but we 

are puzzled as to why the introduction of these dangerous pathogens on the mainland should be facilitated by Federal policy, especially in light of the successful record of research and containment 

that the existing geographically isolated Plum Island facilities have 

demonstrated for 50 years. 

First of all, the National Grange is worried that the bioresearch 

facility management procedures that will be built into NBAF will 

be insufficient to guarantee that FMD is not accidentally or incidentally released into the environment. A better course, we believe, 

would be to combine all of the bio facility and management procedures and protocols, all the lessons learned from domestic and foreign operations of these types of facilities into the design and operation of an NBAF with significant geographic isolation such as the 

existing Plum Island facility. However, even if we accept that FMD 

can never be accidentally released from an NBAF, we remain concerned that the facility will become an inviting target for espionage, terrorists or criminal attacks aimed at getting those pathogens out of the laboratory and into the environment. We are also 

concerned that a mainland NBAF would become an inviting vicinVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:02 Sep 21, 2010 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00115 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CWELLS1\HEARINGS\110-120 SCOM1 PsN: JIMC
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ity for the criminal release of FMD. Not every terrorist takes public 

credit for their action. If FMD was released in the vicinity of 

NBAF, the assumption would be that the release came from the facility. Investigations could disrupt or delay research activity indefinitely. It would divert resources from apprehending those responsible and it would call into question DHS’s management of the facility all in a dynamic political and media climate of economic and 

environmental disaster. 

The National Grange has a high degree of respect for our Nation’s counterespionage, antiterrorist, and law enforcement agencies. Our concern, however, is that a mainland NBAF facility will 

attract an extremely broad universe of potential terrorists or criminal organizations who could use an attack against this facility to 

advance their goals. The National Grange believes that geographic 

isolation of NBAF at a location such as Plum Island would add security to the facility and the vicinity. It would remove significant 

incentives to make the facility an active target. The National 

Grange is also concerned that NBAF will discourage private investment around the facility and reduce the viability of family farm 

and ranch operations in the vicinity as well as the social and economic fabric of local farming communities. 

Perceived risks arise from general preparedness from FMD outbreaks. As the 2006 NIJ report points out, the laws in most States 

would place the responsibility for coordinating primary first response on State and local law enforcement. When, however, a Federal facility becomes the focal point for the outbreak, there will be 

inevitable jurisdiction and responsibility issues related to investigating the outbreak. 

In summary, Mr. Chairman, we appreciate the opportunity to 

testify. We believe that the site selection process for NBAF has 

underappreciated the need for geographic isolation of this facility 

and it would be a prudent and cost-effective security measure to incorporate that that would assure our Nation that we can have a 

world-class bio- and agro-research facility and the assurance that 

this facility will not pose an undue risk potentially to tens of thousands of family farmers and ranchers. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Watson follows:] 

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Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Watson. 

Mr. Voogt, am I saying that right? Voogt? 

Mr. VOOGT. Voogt. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Mr. Voogt, time for your opening statement, 

please, sir. 

STATEMENT OF GARY VOOGT, PRESIDENT-ELECT, NATIONAL 

CATTLEMEN’S BEEF ASSOCIATION 

Mr. VOOGT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Gary Voogt 

and I am a cattle producer from Michigan. I appreciate the opportunity to visit with you about what has been known today as 

NBAF. 

The introduction of foreign animal diseases, whether by accident 

or intentionally, is a huge threat to the U.S. cattle industry. We 

talked about foot-and-mouth disease. It is the most contagious animal disease known. An outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in the 

United States could devastate the cattle industry. Our figures show 

a cost of $10 billion to $34 billion with an outbreak. There is an 

indirect cost that we haven’t talked about here today and that is 

if the livestock industry is lost in this country, how are we going 

to feed our people? This country cannot afford to rely on foreign 

countries for our food. Oil is teaching us that lesson. 

The need for diagnostic activities, prevention, and treatment research and the development of effective countermeasures is critical 

to the health and welfare of the domestic cattle herd. It is critical 

to cattle producers and it is critical to national security. This is 

why the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association supports the construction and, as importantly, the ongoing maintenance of a stateof-the art foreign animal disease research center. 

NCBA has had more than 100 years of experience working closely with local, State and Federal animal health officials to control 

and eradicate animal diseases and to prevent the introduction of 

foreign animal diseases into the United States. Facilities such as 

Plum Island have created strong barriers to foreign diseases. Because of that work, the United States has been free from foot-andmouth disease for more than 70 years. The Federal Government is 

a vital partner in combating foreign animal disease but you should 

appreciate, we are not relying solely on the government to protect 

our industry. We have incident planning for disease outbreaks all 

over the country. Take many farms in Kansas, for example, and I 

know my home State of Michigan involves the FBI, the state police, 

the highway department, the sheriff department, livestock markets, anybody. We practice what would happen if there is an incident, and this plume does not go across the country unchecked. 

There is a virtual lockdown of all transportation facilities immediately. We don’t have to call somebody. It is ready to go today. It 

is in place. 

Now, Plum Island is old and worn out. We have established that. 

Over the years funding has not been adequate to keep up with today’s technologies or today’s research needs. Incidentally, we believe Plum Island is not the fortress many people think it is. The 

island has always had a problem with wildlife swimming over from 

the mainland at low tide. Boaters can get far too close without 

warning or consequences. It is critical that the United States have 

125 

a state-of-the-art large animal biologically secure lab to conduct research on all the foreign diseases that could sicken or destroy the 

food animal population. We believe modern biocontainment technology is adequate to protect our industry and to allow for safe research and diagnostics on the mainland. The Canadian center in 

Winnipeg is a good example of how mainland facilities can be safe. 

In conclusion, NCBA supports and encourages the construction of 

this new facility. We have not, however, and we are not going to 

take a position on where the facility should be built. Our support 

for the new facility is contingent on two things. First, we need a 

commitment from the Congress and the Administration that this 

facility will be properly funded and maintained for the long haul. 

The United States cannot afford to let this facility become run 

down like Plum Island. The second contingency of our support is, 

we encourage your committee to work with the House Committee 

on Agriculture and the House Committee on Homeland Security. It 

is imperative that the needs of the agricultural community not be 

lost in the expanding focus of homeland security. Homeland security must curb their mission creep. They should not be doing animal research. We would be more comfortable with USDA doing animal research. USDA, on the other hand, must be retained and supported to continue their responsibility of conducting research on all 

foreign animal diseases. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Voogt follows:] 

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Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Voogt. 

We will begin questions. Mr. Wulf, let me start with you, if I 

may. In your testimony, you state your organization is opposed to 

moving the foot-and-mouth disease from Plum Island to the mainland. Does this mean that you are opposed to building a modern 

lab on Plum Island? 

Mr. WULF. We certainly support the research and additional dollars for research there on Plum Island. It certainly needs to be 

done. 

Mr. STUPAK. Let me ask all of you this one. In 2003, the Department of Homeland Security took over the operational responsibility 

for Plum Island and is now proposing a broad expansion of its responsibilities for animal disease research. In your view as representatives of your organizations, should DHS be leading this 

country’s animal research or do you think your members would be 

more comfortable if the responsibility for this research was conducted by Department of Ag. as opposed to the Department of 

Homeland Security? Let us just go down right down the line. Mr. 

Wulf, we will start with you and go right down the line. 

Mr. WULF. Obviously, we would love to see the Department of Ag 

highly involved in this particular type of research. My opinion on 

DHS, I don’t know that I had an opinion prior to coming here to 

the question, Mr. Chairman. However, due to the questions that 

were raised earlier in the first panel, I have serious concerns. 

Mr. STUPAK. So you would rather see it stay with Department of 

Ag, the research on disease? 

Mr. WULF. Yes. 

Mr. STUPAK. Dr. Hill? 

Dr. HILL. I am confident that our members would be more comfortable with the research being done by the Department of Agriculture. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Watson? 

Mr. WATSON. Grange policy has historically supported keeping 

this type of research under the purview of the Department of Agriculture. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Voogt? 

Mr. VOOGT. That was my testimony as well. 

Mr. STUPAK. Let me ask you this, Mr. Voogt, because you lost me 

a little bit there. On page 3 of your written testimony, you say you 

believe that modern technology is adequate to protect the livestock 

industry no matter where the lab is located, but on the 5th page 

of your written statement, you then say, and I am quoting now, 

‘‘We have not and will not take a position on where the facility is 

to be built.’’ So does your organization support the transfer of hoofand-mouth—I keep calling it hoof-and-mouth because I am old 

guy—foot-and-mouth virus to the mainland or do you prefer to see 

it stay on Plum Island? 

Mr. VOOGT. We prefer that a modern facility be built with all the 

safeguards in it. If the decision is to leave it on Plum Island, we 

are OK with that, but we are very comfortable that it can be 

brought to the mainland, but we are not going to make that evaluation. 

Mr. STUPAK. A little bit of confusion comes in, in the exhibit 

book; take a look at tab number 17. There is a Jay Truitt writing 

135 

a letter on behalf of your organization indicating they have concerns about foot-and-mouth disease being moved. So I guess I am 

a little confused. It sounds like you are unwilling to move it but 

it looks like Jay Truitt sort of doesn’t feel that way. 

Mr. VOOGT. If I am looking at the right page, the question was, 

does your organization support moving foot-and-mouth disease 

from Plum Island. The answer was yes. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. And then when you go on to it, other parts of 

it, we get the impression they are not in the same position you are, 

like it is neutral almost. All right. Let me ask you this question. 

GAO testified earlier about the risk assessments not being done. 

Are you still comfortable with moving foot-and-mouth disease off 

Plum Island onto the mainland? 

Mr. VOOGT. Yes, I am. 

Mr. STUPAK. Do you think those studies should be done first before we move foot-and-mouth disease off Plum Island? 

Mr. VOOGT. Well, there are a lot of studies that have to be done 

first before we are ready to go. The risk assessment, I learned this 

morning, has not been done, but that doesn’t mean that when it 

is done it will prove that it is a bad idea. So we don’t have that 

answer yet. 

Mr. STUPAK. You don’t have the answer yet so I guess that is 

where my confusion comes in between Mr. Truitt’s letter and your 

testimony. Even without knowing the end results of a cost-benefit 

analysis, the environmental impact statement, the risk assessment, 

your organization, the cattlemen’s association, is in favor of moving 

the foot-and-mouth to the mainland? 

Mr. VOOGT. We are not going to tell you where to put it but we 

are not afraid of moving it to the mainland. That is the testimony. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. You mentioned the deer swimming across. Did 

you ever see deer swimming across to Plum Island, or did someone 

just tell you that? 

Mr. VOOGT. I have heard that. I have not been to Plum Island, 

Mr. Chairman, but I have been to Mackinaw Island, so have you, 

and it happens to be exactly the same distance. 

Mr. STUPAK. Sure, but the deer usually come across on the ice. 

Mr. VOOGT. And they cross on the ice. I also live on Beaver Island, and there are animals there that came across and so that is 

why I said, I don’t believe an island by itself is the fortress that 

we thought it was, especially if the carrier is the wind. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Dr. Hill, let me ask you this question, because 

on page 30—tab 30, I am sorry—we have a letter from your organization there, a Jill Appell, immediate past president, National Pork 

Producers Council. On page 2, while they support the immediate 

building of an NBAF, its location should be determined through assessment of potential risk with disease spread to susceptible livestock and wildlife population. The risk assessment of the six remaining sites should be conducted as part of final selection process. 

So on behalf of pork producers, are you saying we can move forward with it before we do these assessments or—— 

Dr. HILL. Absolutely not. The pork producers are very adamant 

about the fact that risk analysis needs to be done for any site including Plum Island. And in regards to the deer, deer have swum 

across and have multiplied on the island, and there has been deVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:02 Sep 21, 2010 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00141 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CWELLS1\HEARINGS\110-120 SCOM1 PsN: JIMC
136 

populations. At one point there were over 50 deer that were depopulated. So that is a major concern. 

Mr. STUPAK. If the risk assessment came back and said that footand-mouth should stay on Plum Island, would your organization 

have a problem with that? 

Dr. HILL. If the risk assessment came back and it said that it 

wasn’t safe to put it on the mainland, I don’t believe that our organization would oppose putting it on Plum Island. The problem we 

have is that we have had 25 years of not really being able to fund 

Plum Island to the extent that it needs to be funded to be a firstclass operation. I have been on Plum Island. I have seen the facilities. The facilities are in very, very bad repair. I know there has 

been money spent recently since I have been there but we had a 

delegation of pork producers that were there and the researchers 

were talking about water dripping onto the lab bench. 

Mr. STUPAK. Any reason why you couldn’t build a new facility at 

Plum Island? 

Dr. HILL. Cost. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. 

Dr. HILL. A major problem is cost. 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, isn’t the cost going to be the same on Plum 

Island or Georgia or Kansas? 

Dr. HILL. No. 

Mr. STUPAK. What is the difference in cost? 

Dr. HILL. Everything there has to be boated across. I am not an 

expert on building costs but I have heard figures as much as 25 

percent increase to operate the operation and as high as 35 percent 

to 40 percent increase to build the operation because it all has to 

be boated across, cement, lumber, everything. 

Mr. STUPAK. But it has worked well for 70 years, I think one of 

you said, since we have had an outbreak of hoof-and-mouth disease. And I think your testimony was it might be $40 to $60 billion. Isn’t that cheap insurance for the possible outbreak they could 

have for this country’s livestock? 

Dr. HILL. It would be cheap insurance if you assume that we 

were going to have an outbreak from a mainland facility, but I 

think we can build a mainland facility that is just as secure or possibly even more secure than Plum Island. 

Mr. STUPAK. I don’t disagree. I mean, Plum Island is in bad disrepair. I agree with you. Anything you build is going to be better 

than Plum Island. The issue is where should it be, the safety and 

the risk assessment and the environmental impact statement, costbenefit analysis, and if you build a new one on the mainland, you 

still have to clean up Plum Island, take down the buildings, environmental assessment. I think those costs would be greater than 

anything we can imagine. No one has given us an estimate on that 

yet. 

Dr. HILL. And we need that estimate. 

Mr. STUPAK. Sure. OK. 

Dr. HILL. The other point which I make in my testimony is that 

we need first-class researchers and it is very, very difficult to attract people to that area. 

137 

Mr. STUPAK. But you also said in your testimony too, and I wrote 

it down. You said to recreate island effect with low animal population nearby, right? 

Dr. HILL. Exactly. We wouldn’t want to put it in Kansas right 

next to a big feedlot, for example. There are places in the States 

that are up for the possible location that would be isolated from 

large populations of livestock. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you. 

Mr. Shimkus. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My staff did just a little work on historical outbreaks in the United States: in 1924 in 

Texas, sailors from ships carrying live animals; 1924 in California 

due to ships’ garbage; the last outbreak in 1929 due to Argentine 

meat scraps from cruise ships that docked in California. Because 

we want safety. We all have different views now as to how we are 

going to be safe. Obviously there is opinion on both sides. I think 

my opening statement says I am not weighing in on one side or the 

other but I am trying to get an understanding of the whole debate. 

I think what we haven’t talked about is, I think we get the idea 

that Plum Island has been successful, it has been isolated. The 

question is, can you use something on the continental United 

States, not an island, that would be as safe? People are saying yes. 

Some people are saying no. Let us talk about the timeliness debate. 

Now, I would have asked the one who did the—Dr. Carpenter 

about the exponential aspects of the disease and once it gets to a 

herd, how quickly it spread and how quickly it grows. The question 

would be transportation of the virus, isolating it and location, is it 

quicker for that—is there a quicker response because of a new facility within the continental United States. I guess that the island 

would be considered CONUS, but I am an old military guy so I use 

those terms. 

But can you address that, the timeliness of a Plum Island versus 

a facility in Kansas or a facility in Texas? Mr. Wulf, I will just go 

right down the line. 

Mr. WULF. We look at it from technological advances that we 

have in communications today. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. But I am talking about testing and getting the— 

and just getting it to the location. I said before, I know we are 

going to take a sample and we are going to send it to a location. 

Even with corporate jets or the Lear jet, it is still going to—in cattle country, it is going to still take some time, is it not? 

Mr. WULF. I agree with you, and I agree with your comment. 

However, we are approaching it from the standpoint of, it is not a 

question that there is never going to be a leak from any of these 

facilities. We are approaching it as a matter of when and then assessing that probability—— 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Let me segue into that, but that is that whole debate of whether there is going to be a release from a facility wherever it is versus an intentional activity by—or a mistake like garbage on a cruise ship or something to that effect or nefarious activity by enemies of our country to insert this, so why don’t we go to 

Dr. Hill, just the same, your response to that—— 

Dr. HILL. I worked in a diagnostic lab for 20 years. I am a virologist by training. We sent samples to Plum Island. We never had 

138 

to send a priority one when I was there but when you have a priority one sample you have clinical signs that could be foot-andmouth or it could be some other disease. Those are either couriered 

by an individual, USDA, state individual, state health regulatory 

individual, or they are flown with a National Guard jet or whatever 

and taken to Islip Airport and transported out to the island. I don’t 

know that the timing is a big difference. If we did have a facility 

in the central part of the United States. The timing would be obviously less than if it was in California and the sample had to get 

all the way to the tip of Long Island. Is that answering your question? 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Yes. Timeliness in a vector or a disease that is exponential in growth, I am assuming based upon the analysis of the 

first panel, that is a lot. 

Dr. HILL. Well, that all depends on what is the index case. Let 

us just take an example of air carrying the virus from Plum Island 

to a sale facility in New York, and if those animals got dispersed 

to 50 different farms the explosion is huge. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Yes, I am more concerned—I think we have established that a release from a facility may happen, but I am more 

concerned about intentional by enemies of the state going to beef 

production areas, and Illinois is part of that, and going to a feedlot 

or going to a large sector and then how do you control that as fast 

as possible? It would probably speak to not a Plum Island site. 

Dr. HILL. The key to that, which you have made the point very 

well, I think, is the timeliness of the diagnosis because there are 

a lot of things that kick in once that diagnosis is made. We stop 

movement of the animals immediately, all that kicks in. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Who makes that call and how does that happen? 

Dr. HILL. That is a good question, and is probably something 

that we need to work on in the animal health communities. But the 

State veterinarian has the jurisdiction first. He can stop all movements. If it becomes a foreign animal disease, the Federal Government, USDA, and Homeland Security get involved immediately. So 

there is a little bit of difference there of whether it is diagnosed or 

if it is a suspect. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Mr. Watson? 

Mr. WATSON. Sure, and I think if I understand your question correctly, time is of the essence in sort of being able to control the vector process. As testimony we have heard this morning indicates, is 

that once the disease sort of presents and manifests itself, the possibilities of what it is fall fairly quickly, particularly for veterinary 

professionals who have a pretty good idea of recognizing what this 

is. Eventually there will be important necessity to do analysis on 

tissue and things like that. One of the things that we have learned 

in more discussion of FMD, one of the reasons it is so dangerous 

is because it mutates so fast. It is like the common cold. The reason 

we always have the common cold is because it is always changing. 

Flus are always changing. FMD is always changing and there are 

a number of strains, not just one strain but a number of strains, 

which is under confinement right now at Plum Island. And so eventually we would be looking at trying to figure out what strain we 

were dealing with, determining vaccination protocols and things 

like that, whether or not those vaccinations were available would 

139 

be necessary. But in almost any transportation of a biohazardous 

material like this, you are going to have to have a series of protocols built in. That means you are not just going to sort of throw 

it in the back of a car and drive it out to wherever you are going 

to be. So you have a time of the essence issue also related to protocols in making sure that you don’t inadvertently spread the pathogen in your attempt to try and get it to the research facility, and 

that is going to be—— 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Yes, and then you—— 

Mr. WATSON [continuing]. Whether or not you go to the mainland 

or an island facility. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Just because of time constraints, let me go to Mr. 

Voogt real quick. 

Mr. VOOGT. I think the answer is that if you are going to have 

a heart attack, you want to have it close to the hospital, and I 

think people in the cattle, in hog country are more sensitive than 

somebody offshore in New York to be ready and prepared for a 

lockdown. This analysis takes a while, but if there is lockdown, the 

people that have the most to risk are going to be most attendant 

to that. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And the disease itself, since I am not familiar, I 

am not a veterinarian, do you have it when—we saw the slides of 

the hooves that were scarred and broken open. We saw the tongue. 

We saw the lesions. How long does it take for an animal to get the 

virus and then for an outward sign? 

Dr. HILL. I have never dealt directly with foot-and-mouth. They 

are excreting virus during the incubation period before they show 

clinical signs and then it is probably 3 or 4 days, or 5 days before 

they show the blisters. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And I see a lot of heads shaking so there is a lot 

of people that know that, and again, that ties into the timing factor. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Shimkus. 

Mr. Watson, I want to get this point. In your testimony on page 

2, you refer to a 2004 research paper by USDA that estimated footand-mouth outbreak on the mainland United States would cost the 

livestock industry as much as $60 billion. 

Mr. WATSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. And that would just be the direct costs; that is not 

the indirect costs, right? 

Mr. WATSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. When we asked USDA for studies like that, 

they said they didn’t have any. Do you have that study? 

Mr. WATSON. I can see if we can find it. That actually was a reference material in the National Institute of Justice’s policy program. They had reference directly to that. They had referenced 

their estimate to the USDA study in 2004. But I can—— 

Mr. STUPAK. So you took it from a Department of Justice report? 

Mr. WATSON. Right. The Department of Justice is laying out 

their criteria, and it is somewhat interesting that again we are trying to point out that those who think they understand what the 

Federal Government or what the government response is going to 

be, this particular Department of Justice report, which is designed 

140 

to advise local and state law enforcement. They are basically telling 

local and state law enforcement as of 2006, if you see this, treat 

it as a crime, treat it as a terrorist attack, do not treat this as an 

incidental event or something like that. And that is one of the reasons they are trying to provide this education to local law enforcement, saying if we see it, we need to move as if this is a crime. 

So they go back and say important this is and the—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, I was just curious about—— 

Mr. WATSON [continuing]. Citation in that report was to this 

USDA—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Right. I was curious about the validity of the USDA 

report because they claim there isn’t such a report. 

Mr. WATSON. Well, we will go back and I will see if I can—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Let me ask you this. You all talked about costs; Mr. 

Voogt, I think you said that the costs and all this is inadequate and 

Congress has to pay for it and adequately fund it year after year 

in the future. Should your industries pay part of it since you seem 

to benefit from that? Should the cattlemen, should the pork and 

the Grange and all that, should—— 

Mr. VOOGT. Well, our industry is the consumer. That is who we 

are working for and so the consumer is either going to pay for it 

in the price of the meat or in support of the government, but it is 

not free. So that is not important. As to cost, I do have some experience. I built approximately $5 million worth of stuff on Beaver Island with Federal funds, airports, and the cost was approximately 

40 percent more than it was on the mainland. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Watson, any comments on costs to your organization to pay part of it? 

Mr. WATSON. We don’t have any estimates on that, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. We have a couple votes on the Floor. We are going 

to have to recess again. We will recess until quarter to. We will dismiss this panel. Thank you for coming. Sorry to interrupt this 

hearing again with votes. It is one of these days and a lot of crazy 

stuff is going on on the Floor. So we will stand in recess for approximately 30 minutes. 

[Recess] 

Mr. STUPAK. We have our third panel of witnesses. On this 

panel, we have the Hon. Bruce Knight, Under Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs at U.S. Department of Agriculture; the Hon. Jay Cohen, Under Secretary for the Science and 

Technology Directorate of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and Dr. Larry Barrett, Director of Plum Island Animal Disease Center. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here. We will start with opening 

statements. Mr. Knight, if you would like to go first, 5-minute 

opening—oh, I have to swear you guys in. It is the policy of this 

subcommittee to take all testimony under oath. Please be advised 

that witnesses have the right under the Rules of the House to be 

advised by counsel during their testimony. Do any of you wish to 

be represented by counsel? All are indicating no. All right. Then I 

am going to ask you to rise and raise your right hand, please. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. STUPAK. Let the record reflect that the witnesses replied in 

the affirmative. You are now under oath. Mr. Knight, if you would 

141 

like to start with your opening statement, please, 5 minutes. Your 

full statement will be part of the record. 

STATEMENT OF BRUCE I. KNIGHT, UNDER SECRETARY, MARKETING AND REGULATORY PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF AGRICULTURE 

Mr. KNIGHT. Good afternoon, Chairman Stupak, members of the 

committee, my name is Bruce Knight. I am Under Secretary for 

marketing and regulatory programs at USDA and I want to thank 

you for the opportunity to share USDA’s views on the importance 

of establishing the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility, NBAF. 

Agriculture, as we have heard repeatedly today, is vital to the 

U.S. economy. We expect record exports of $101 billion this year 

along with increase in imports that have already risen from $58 

million in 2005 to an estimated $76.5 billion this year. As goods 

move back and forth across the border, we must remain vigilant to 

safeguard U.S. agriculture from unwelcome pest and disease 

threats which do not respect State or national borders. Intentionally or unintentionally contaminated products could quickly 

spread a pest, disease or other agent that could not only devastate 

our agriculture industry but also cause numerous animal casualties. 

While I appreciate the focus today on the laboratories, I do want 

to note that USDA has many activities to prevent the introduction 

of FMD into the United States. We share import policies that ensure that we trade safely both in products and in live animals. We 

have a rigorous process to evaluate disease risks with the countries 

we trade with. We work with our colleagues at DHS to ensure port 

inspections and passenger traffic is safe. Historically, we know 

worldwide that outbreaks of FMD have been primarily traced to 

meat importations, mishandling of garbage, livestock importation, 

and that has been the primary focus. 

Now, today, we are talking mostly about the need for NBAF and 

how vital it is to us being able to move forward. To guard against 

new diseases and potential bioterrorist releases, USDA must continually conduct research and diagnostics to better understand 

those pathogens. We recognized, even before the Department of 

Homeland Security was created, that there was a need for additional space and upgraded biosecurity measures to work on foreign 

and emerging animal diseases. 

The current research facility located on Plum Island is aging, inadequate, and outdated. Since the Plum Island facility was transferred to DHS in 2003, we have developed a strong collaborative 

partnership with DHS that enables both departments to achieve 

our similar goals while making the most of each other’s specialized 

expertise. More than 50 years ago, the Plum Island facility was 

built on an island to create physical separation from susceptible 

livestock. Today, with more advanced technologies including 

redundancies and the latest biosecurity and containment systems, 

coupled with employee training and monitoring, NBAF could safely 

operate on the mainland. A mainland facility would be less expensive to operate, more easily accessible than an island location, better enable quick response to potential disease threats, and offer the 

142 

opportunity for innovative collaboration if located near an established research community. 

Although DHS is ultimately responsible for the selection of an 

NBAF site, USDA has been closely involved throughout this process. We support the criteria used to select the sites and are committed to the next steps in the process. DHS is currently preparing 

an environmental impact statement for the six site alternatives including Plum Island and the mainland locations. We need to move 

forward in a timely manner on NBAF to develop the diagnostics 

and the tools needed to protect U.S. agriculture from the threats 

of dangerous foreign animal diseases. 

Lastly, I would like to mention that the Administration included 

in our Farm Bill proposal a suggestion of an authorization for 

USDA to conduct research and diagnostics for highly infectious disease agents on the U.S. mainland. This provision is included in the 

recently passed Farm Bill. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to discuss this important 

issue with the Committee today. We believe the planned NBAF is 

necessary to replace the aging Plum Island facility and protect U.S. 

agriculture and American citizens against foreign animal diseases. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Knight follows:] 

STATEMENT OF BRUCE KNIGHT

SYNOPSIS

• Agriculture is vital to the U.S. economy. We expect record exports of $101 billion 

this year along with increasing imports that have already risen from $58 billion in 

2005 to an estimated $76.5 billion this year. 

• As goods move back and forth across the border, we must remain vigilant to 

safeguard U.S. agriculture from unwelcome pest and disease threats. Intentionally 

or unintentionally contaminated products could quickly spread a pest, disease, or 

other agent that could not only devastate our agricultural industry but also cause 

numerous casualties. 

•To guard against new diseases and potential bioterrorist releases, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) must continually conduct research and diagnostics 

to better understand these pathogens. We recognized, even before the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS) was created, that there was a need for additional space 

and upgraded biosecurity measures to work on foreign and emerging animal diseases. The current research facility located on Plum Island is aging, inadequate, and 

outdated. 

• In response to Presidential Homeland Security Directive 9, USDA is working 

closely with DHS to develop the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) 

to replace the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), after a construction and 

transition period of 7–10 years. NBAF would provide the facility we need to carry 

out BSL-4 activities not currently possible at PIADC, such as addressing diseases 

like Nipah and Hendra, as well as Rift Valley Fever (which requires vaccinated personnel; however vaccine is in short supply). 

• Since the Plum Island facility was transferred to DHS in 2003, we’ve developed 

a strong, collaborative partnership with DHS that enables both Departments to 

achieve our similar goals while making the most of each other’s specialized expertise. 

• More than 50 years ago, the Plum Island facility was built on an island to create 

physical separation from susceptible livestock. Today, with more advanced technologies, including redundancies and the latest biosecurity and containment systems, coupled with employee training and monitoring, NBAF could safely operate 

on the mainland. 

• A mainland site would be less expensive to operate, more easily accessible than 

an island location, better enable quick response to potential disease threats, and 

offer the opportunity for innovative collaboration if located near an established research community. 

143 

• A 2002 study completed by the Science Applications International Corporation 

and commissioned by USDA concluded that there was a valid USDA need for a 

BSL-4 facility, and that a BSL-4 facility for large animal work could be safely located on the mainland. • Although DHS is ultimately responsible for the selection of a NBAF site, USDA 

has been closely involved throughout this process. We support the criteria used to 

select the sites and look forward to the next steps in the process. • DHS is currently preparing an environmental impact statement (EIS) for the six 

site alternatives, including Plum Island and mainland locations. We need to move 

forward in a timely manner with NBAF to develop the diagnostics and tools needed 

to protect U.S. agriculture from the threats of dangerous foreign animal diseases. •The Administration included in our Farm Bill Proposal an authorization for 

USDA to conduct research and diagnostics for highly infectious disease agents on 

the U.S. mainland. We recognize DHS’ interest in the Secretary being directed, via 

statute, to issue a permit for live foot-and-mouth disease virus at the NBAF. We 

believe this direction will provide clarity as DHS moves forward in selecting a site 

and constructing the NBAF. 

TESTIMONY

Good afternoon. I am Bruce Knight, Under Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs at the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before the Committee today to present the Department’s 

views on the establishment of the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). 

Today, the Committee raises a timely and important issue—agriculture security— 

that we at USDA consider essential to our mission, which is to provide leadership 

on food, agriculture, natural resources, and related issues based on sound public policy, the best available science, and efficient management. 

Agriculture is a vital component of our Nation’s economy. Of particular importance to homeland security is the significant increase in agricultural trade. This 

year, we expect agriculture exports to reach approximately $101 billion, making it 

the highest export sales year ever in our history—and significant to our balance of 

trade. Agriculture imports are rising as well—increasing from nearly $58 billion in 

2005 to an estimated $76.5 billion this year. 

We face many challenges in protecting this important infrastructure. As goods 

move back and forth across the border, we must remain vigilant to safeguard U.S. 

agriculture from unwelcome pest and disease threats. Our sector is particularly concerned about security because food production is not constrained by political boundaries, and as we all know, diseases and pathogens do not respect state or national 

borders. The interconnected nature of the global food system is our strength and allows us to feed the world, but it is also a disadvantage in the event of attack or 

natural disease outbreak. Additionally, one of the agricultural sector’s greatest contributions to the quality of life is the fact that products flow quickly through interstate commerce—one of our greatest assets is also one of our greatest concerns because intentionally or unintentionally contaminated products could quickly spread 

a pest, disease, or other agent. 

USDA works diligently to protect U.S. agriculture from the potential introduction 

of human and animal disease agents, whether unintentionally or through 

agroterrorism. Many of these pathogens such as the Nipah and Hendra viruses are 

zoonotic, that is, they cause both human and animal disease, and can pass from animals to humans. If a significant zoonotic or animal disease were to penetrate our 

borders, it could devastate the agricultural industry, cause numerous casualties, and 

harm the economy. 

We’ve seen just how disastrous the effects of a foreign animal disease outbreak 

can be in the 2001 foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) outbreak in the United Kingdom. 

In that case, over 6 million pigs, sheep, and cattle were destroyed, with the epidemic 

costing the U.K. economy an estimated $13 billion. This example highlights the 

need for the best tools and diagnostics to safeguard the U.S. livestock industry from 

significant foreign animal disease threats such as FMD. At the same time, the 2007 

suspected release of live FMD virus from the Pirbright campus in England amplifies 

the balance needed in undertaking such work. This is why USDA and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will use the most modern biosafety practices and 

procedures, and stringent and rigorous safety measures within NBAF. 

Because of the continued emergence of new animal diseases, the leaping of dangerous animal diseases across species, and the possibility of a bioterrorist release, 

it is even more essential that USDA have a sufficient understanding of these diseases and be well prepared to protect the U.S. livestock industry from their damage. 

To achieve this, USDA works through its Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and 

144 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to meet its responsibilities in 

animal health. ARS is the primary intramural science research agency of USDA, operating a network of over 100 research laboratories across the nation that work on 

all aspects of agricultural science. APHIS is responsible for safeguarding U.S. agricultural health from foreign pests and diseases of plants and animals. 

In order to be able to rapidly identify, respond to, and control outbreaks of foreign 

animal and zoonotic disease, USDA needs secure, state-of-the-art biocontainment 

laboratories with adequate space for advanced research, diagnostics, and training. 

Recognizing this need, the President directed USDA and DHS, via Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9: ‘‘Defense of the United States Agriculture and Food,’’ 

to develop a plan to provide for such facilities. As I will explain further, USDA is 

working closely with our partners in DHS to fulfill this important need. 

PLUM ISLAND ANIMAL DISEASE CENTER

In 1954, USDA began work at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) 

in research and diagnostics on foreign animal diseases that, either by accidental or 

deliberate introduction to the United States, pose significant health and/or economic 

risks to the U.S. livestock industry. The Plum Island Animal Disease Center has 

served U.S. agriculture well. It’s no accident that this country has the healthiest 

and most abundant livestock populations in the world. Producers and all of us at 

USDA work hard every day to keep this up. 

An integral part of maintaining animal health is preventing the entry of exotic 

pest and disease threats. The Plum Island Animal Disease Center, through its diagnostic, research, and reagent production and distribution activities, has stood as 

American agriculture’s bulwark against potentially devastating foreign animal diseases. Each working day since the facility opened over 50 years ago, the dedicated 

and highly skilled Plum Island Animal Disease Center staff has equipped veterinarians, scientists, professors, and other animal health professionals here and around 

the world with the tools they need to fight exotic disease incursions that threaten 

livestock. In addition to FMD and classical swine fever, other livestock diseases that 

our scientists have studied at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center include African swine fever, rinderpest, Rift Valley fever, West Nile fever, vesicular stomatitis, 

and Capri pox (sheep pox and lumpy skin disease). 

As you know, in June 2003, operational responsibility for the Plum Island Animal 

Disease Center transferred from USDA to DHS under the Homeland Security Act 

of 2002. Since the transfer, we’ve developed a strong, collaborative partnership with 

DHS and put in place an interagency agreement to clarify roles and responsibilities. 

A Board of Directors and Senior Leadership Group were created to facilitate decision-making regarding facility operations and policies, while also allowing the three 

agencies to focus on accomplishing their specific missions and goals. I believe our 

relationship with DHS is a very positive one that allows both Departments to 

achieve our similar goals while making the most of each other’s specialized expertise. 

After the Plum Island Animal Disease Center transfer, USDA remained responsible for conducting basic and applied research and diagnostic activities at the Plum 

Island Animal Disease Center to protect U.S. agriculture from foreign animal disease agents. DHS, in turn, assumed responsibility for coordinating the overall national effort to protect key U.S. resources and infrastructure, including agriculture. 

Science programs at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center now include the 

APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (FADDL), ARS’ Foreign Animal Disease Research Unit, and DHS’ Targeted Advanced Development Unit. 

APHIS’ work at the FADDL aims to protect the U.S. agricultural system by providing the capabilities for early detection and diagnosis of foreign animal diseases. 

The FADDL is also the custodian of the North American FMD Vaccine Bank (owned 

by Canada, Mexico and the United States), which stores concentrated FMD antigen 

that can be formulated into a vaccine if a FMD introduction occurs. As such, 

FADDL employees are responsible for performing safety testing of new antigen lots 

and periodically testing the quality of stored antigen. 

APHIS scientists perform diagnostic testing of samples collected from U.S. livestock that are showing clinical signs consistent with an exotic disease, as well as 

testing animal products and live animals being imported into the United States to 

ensure that unwanted diseases are not accidentally introduced through importation. 

APHIS scientists at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center have the capability to 

diagnose more than 30 exotic animal diseases, and perform thousands of diagnostic 

tests each year. They also prepare diagnostic reagents and distribute them to laboratories throughout the world, and test the safety and efficacy of vaccines for selected foreign animal diseases. Other APHIS activities include improving techniques 

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for the diagnosis or control of foreign animal diseases and validating tests for foreign animal diseases that are deployed to the National Animal Health Laboratory 

Network (NAHLN). Through the use of these tests in surveillance, the NAHLN provides for early detection and the surge capability needed in the case of an outbreak. 

In addition, FADDL staff, in conjunction with APHIS’ Professional Development 

Staff, train veterinarians, scientists, professors, and veterinary students on recognition of clinical signs and pathological changes caused by foreign animal diseases. 

This training provides the backbone of APHIS’ animal disease surveillance and safeguarding programs. These foreign animal disease diagnosticians trained by FADDL 

are located throughout the country, and can be on-site to conduct an investigation 

and collect samples within 16 hours of receiving a report of a suspect foreign animal 

disease. Based on their assessment of the situation and prioritization of the threat, 

APHIS can then take appropriate steps if necessary to protect the U.S. livestock industry. 

Through its involvement in the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, ARS develops new strategies to prevent and control foreign or emerging animal disease 

epidemics through a better understanding of the nature of infectious organisms, 

pathogenesis in susceptible animals, host immune responses, and the development 

of novel vaccines and diagnostic tests. The ARS Foreign Animal Disease Research 

Unit focuses on developing vaccines that can be produced safely in the United 

States and used safely on U.S. farms, diagnostic techniques to differentiate between 

a vaccinated and an infected animal, and methods for identifying carrier animals. 

Currently, ARS’ work at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center includes active research programs working with FMD, Classical Swine Fever, and vesicular stomatitis viruses. 

ARS scientists have recently carried out extensive work on FMD, including early 

development of a FMD vaccine that is safe to produce on the mainland; discovery 

of an antiviral treatment that prevents FMD replication and spread within 24 

hours; and determination of many key aspects of FMD virus structure, function, and 

replication at the molecular level, leading to highly specific diagnostic tests. 

MEETING THE NEEDS OF AMERICAN AGRICULTURE

The Plum Island Animal Disease Center has played a critical role in developing 

the tools and expertise needed to protect the country from the deliberate or unintentional introduction of significant foreign animal diseases. However, much has 

changed since the Plum Island Animal Disease Center was first built, and we are 

even more cognizant of the threat from foreign animal diseases due to the increasingly interconnected world we live in. This need is echoed by our American livestock 

industries that could be devastated by the introduction of a significant foreign animal disease. Groups such as the United States Animal Health Association and National Institute for Animal Agriculture have appealed for accelerated research to 

protect their industries. Also, the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association, Animal Agriculture Coalition, and National Milk Producers Federation have written to Congress, to show their support for NBAF. 

To continue providing U.S. agriculture with the latest research and technological 

services, as well as world-class approaches to agricultural health safeguarding and 

foreign-animal disease diagnostics, USDA needs additional space and upgraded biosecurity measures to work on those animal-borne diseases that pose the greatest 

risk to U.S. livestock industries, and those that can also be transmitted to humans. 

The Plum Island Animal Disease Center is aging and nearing the end of its 

lifecycle, and the state of current facilities has created a backlog of needed space 

for important experiments, diagnostic development, and training efforts. 

In particular, USDA is in need of enhanced research and diagnostic capabilities 

for animal diseases, particularly zoonotic diseases of large animals that require agriculture BSL-3 and BSL-4 capabilities. However, since we cannot currently carry out 

BSL-4 activities at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, the Nation is left lacking a large animal facility to address high-consequence animal diseases that can be 

transmitted to humans, such as Nipah and Hendra, as well as Rift Valley Fever 

(which requires vaccinated personnel; however vaccine is in short supply). 

Specifically, USDA would utilize the BSL-4 space to develop diagnostic assays for 

Rift Valley Fever and Nipah and Hendra viruses, using specimens collected from 

animals in the BSL-4 lab. In addition, in the event of an emerging pathogen, it 

would often be necessary to inoculate animals in a BSL-4 suite in order to determine the clinical course of the disease, determine appropriate diagnostic specimens, 

isolate the agent, and develop diagnostic tools. 

In order to protect U.S. agriculture and human health, it is critical that USDA 

have the capability of diagnosing and working with the disease agents I have menVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:02 Sep 21, 2010 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00151 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CWELLS1\HEARINGS\110-120 SCOM1 PsN: JIMC
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tioned, as well as any new highly infectious pathogen that may emerge. In response, 

our agencies have begun planning for the next generation facility which we call the 

NBAF, to replace the current structures at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center. 

NBAF will integrate research, development, and testing in foreign animal diseases 

and zoonotic diseases, which will support the complimentary missions of USDA and 

DHS. NBAF will address USDA needs that are currently not being met by the facilities at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, including inadequate lab space for 

processing diagnostic samples, limitations in diagnostic capability for BSL-4 agents, 

and lack of space to expand to include the development, feasibility testing, and validation of new and emerging technologies for detection of exotic and emerging diseases. In addition, it will provide room to grow as we further enhance our abilities 

to respond to increasing threats to the U.S. livestock industry. 

The NBAF will also have a synergistic effect, to the benefit of each of our agencies, by utilizing the expertise of the academic and scientific community in the area. 

In addition, we expect that by sharing a well-equipped core facility, we will see a 

more cost effective utilization of funding. This will also continue to provide a number of opportunities for enhanced interaction among the three agencies. For example, research done by ARS and DHS may identify possible new diagnostic tools that 

APHIS can use; APHIS’ repository of foreign animal disease agents obtained from 

outbreaks around the world will provide a resource for ARS and DHS research and 

bioforensics; and APHIS’ diagnostic investigations and surveillance will help identify 

emerging or re-emerging diseases in the field, in turn helping set research priorities 

for ARS and DHS. 

SITE SELECTION

At the time Plum Island was built, biosecurity was much different than it is 

today. Agriculture biosecurity was defined by biological isolation, so that if there 

was a problem at the laboratory, there was physical separation from susceptible 

livestock populations and any breaches were localized. Today, with much more advanced technologies, the ability to manage effective biosecurity and biosafety practices is not dictated by location or physical barriers. 

We recognize that there is concern about building the NBAF on the mainland. 

Since the determination was made over 60 years ago to build the Plum Island Animal Disease Center on an island, assessments have shown that technological advances would allow for safe research and diagnostics of foreign animal diseases to 

take place on the U.S. mainland. A 2002 study completed by the Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) and commissioned by USDA found that the 

FMD virus and other exotic foreign animal diseases of concern to the Department 

could be fully and safely contained within a BSL-3 laboratory, as was being done 

in other countries at the time including Canada, Germany, and Brazil. A second 

SAIC study also concluded that there was a valid USDA need for a BSL-4 facility, 

and that a BSL-4 facility for large animal work could be safely located on the mainland. 

In planning for the NBAF, we recognize the absolutely essential need for stateof-the-art biosafety practices and procedures, including stringent and rigorous safety 

measures within the laboratories themselves, to prevent disease organisms from escaping into the environment. Situations such as the recent suspected release of live 

FMD virus from the Pirbright campus in England only serve to highlight this importance. We can use that example as a learning opportunity and make sure that the 

design and maintenance of the NBAF facility enables us to carry out the essential 

activities needed to protect the Nation from foreign animal diseases while ensuring 

the highest level of biosafety. 

This is why the NBAF will utilize the redundancies built into modern research 

laboratory designs and the latest biosecurity and containment systems, coupled with 

continued training and monitoring of employees, to effectively minimize any risks. 

Personnel controls for the NBAF will include background checks, biometric testing 

for lab entry, and no solitary access to BSL-4 microorganisms. The NBAF will also 

feature biological safety cabinets in the wet labs designed to meet the needs of BSL3 labs, while in BSL-4 labs, these biological safety cabinets will include additional 

security measures or be used in combination with full-body, air-supplied personal 

protective suits. 

In terms of facility design, the BSL-4 lab at the NBAF will employ a box-in-box 

principle with a pressure-controlled buffer. All water and air leaving the lab will be 

purified-that is, no research microorganism will enter the sewage system or outside 

air. All critical functions will have redundant systems. The design of the BSL-4 laboratories and animal space will comply with the appropriate recommendations and 

147 

requirements of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institutes 

of Health, Department of Defense, and National Research Council. 

I would also like to note some potential advantages to locating the NBAF on the 

mainland. For example, the lower cost of living, as compared to that in the communities surrounding the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, would likely make recruiting personnel easier for our agencies. This would also eliminate the costs of 

moving people on and off an island every day, as we currently do. A mainland facility would be more accessible if air traffic is shut down due to weather conditions 

or an emergency situation, and would not be subject to the occasional wind closures 

that we experience at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center due to rough waters. 

And, as I mentioned earlier, locating the facility near an established research community would facilitate innovative collaboration. 

A key advantage to locating NBAF on the mainland would be the ability to quickly respond to a potential foreign animal disease threat. Placing the NBAF on the 

mainland could eliminate the need for additional transport of samples to the island 

via boat or aircraft, as is currently done at Plum Island. Having a more accessible 

location, where diagnostic capabilities could be utilized within the first 24 hours of 

an emergency, is essential. For example, in June 2007, APHIS conducted an investigation into swine showing signs consistent with a significant foreign animal disease. In such a situation, every hour counts when it comes to being able to quickly 

rule out major diseases. Incidents such as this can have a significant impact on the 

economy, stop movement and trade in multiple species of livestock, and spread fear 

throughout the industry. 

Although DHS is ultimately responsible for the selection of a NBAF site, USDA 

has been closely involved throughout this process. APHIS and ARS have provided 

detailed program requirements to DHS, and have representatives on the site selection committee and site inspection team. We support the criteria used to select the 

sites: proximity to research capabilities linked to the NBAF mission requirements, 

site proximity to a skilled workforce, as well as acquisition/construction/operations, 

and community acceptance, and look forward to the next steps in the process. 

DHS is currently preparing an environmental impact statement (EIS) looking at 

the six sites, which include Plum Island and five mainland locations. The EIS, on 

which USDA and DHS are working, will consider the risk and potential consequences of an accidental release of a foreign animal disease, and will be integral 

to moving forward with a sound NBAF site selection. 

It is important that we move forward in a timely manner with planning and construction of NBAF so that we can develop the diagnostics and tools needed to protect U.S. agriculture from the threats of dangerous foreign animal diseases. Just as 

the science behind bioterrorism has advanced in recent years, and new and changing diseases continue to emerge, so too must we arm ourselves with more sophisticated ways of preventing harm to the U.S. livestock industry. If we don’t, then bioterrorists will continue to find innovative ways to attack our livestock, new diseases 

will continue to emerge, and U.S. agriculture will be left vulnerable to these dangers. This is why USDA is committed to working with DHS to move forward with 

plans for NBAF, after a thorough analysis of the options and development of plans 

to ensure the utmost biosafety and biosecurity. 

AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT FMD RESEARCH ON THE MAINLAND

Lastly, I would like to briefly mention recent legislative activity related to live 

FMD virus. Current statute (21 U.S.C. 113a) restricts research involving live FMD 

virus and other animal diseases that present a significant risk to domestic U.S. livestock to laboratories on coastal islands separated from the mainland United States 

by deep water. Research involving live FMD virus is carried out at the Plum Island 

Animal Disease Center under this statute, which dates back to the 1950s. The statute was amended by the 1990 Farm Bill to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture, 

when necessary, to allow the movement of live FMD virus, under permit, to research facilities on the U.S. mainland. 

USDA recognizes DHS’ interest in the Secretary being directed, via statute, to 

issue a permit for live FMD virus at the NBAF. This direction will provide clarity 

in this important area as DHS moves forward in selecting a site for the NBAF and 

then in contracting for the construction of the facility. For these reasons, the Administration included in our Farm Bill Proposal an authorization for USDA to conduct 

research and diagnostics for highly infectious disease agents, such as FMD and rinderpest, on the U.S. mainland. Consistent with the Administration’s proposal, section 7524 of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 directs the Secretary 

to issue a permit for live FMD virus at NBAF, while preserving the Secretary’s disVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:02 Sep 21, 2010 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00153 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CWELLS1\HEARINGS\110-120 SCOM1 PsN: JIMC
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cretion and ensuring that all biosafety and select agent requirements are being met 

at the facility. 

CONCLUSION

Thank you again for the opportunity to discuss this important issue with the 

Committee today. We believe the planned NBAF is necessary to replace the aging 

Plum Island Animal Disease Center and provide additional capacity for much needed animal disease research, diagnostics, training, and countermeasures development. The NBAF will play a crucial role in protecting against the future introduction of foreign animal and zoonotic diseases, and ensuring the continued health and 

vitality of our agricultural industries. We are committed to continuing our work in 

partnership with DHS in planning the NBAF and making the facility a reality. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you. 

Mr. Cohen, your opening statement, please. 

STATEMENT OF JAY M. COHEN, UNDER SECRETARY, SCIENCE 

AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. COHEN. Chairman Stupak and members of the committee 

and staff, I have had the privilege of being here from the start of 

the hearing and so Chairman, I wanted to thank you for your stated support for the NBAF facility. It is an honor to appear before 

this committee, and I thank the committee for bringing these very 

important issues before the American public. 

I especially appreciate the testimony of the first two panels and 

I can assure you, we will incorporate, as we have been, their concerns as we move forward with this important NBAF initiative, the 

purpose of which is to make the Nation safer. 

I am very pleased today to be joined not only by Under Secretary 

Knight representing the U.S. Department of Agriculture, who has 

already addressed the partnership that we enjoy, the productive 

partnership, but also Dr. Larry Barrett, who is the director of Plum 

Island. I look forward very much to your questions. 

I would like to just add, if I may, there have been discussions 

relative to the age and the condition of Plum Island. I had the 

privilege of going up there and having an all-hands with the good 

people, the scientists, the animal workers, et cetera, on Plum Island. The Department of Homeland Security has put tens of millions of dollars into that facility. When we are done, it will be over 

$50 million, and in a recent morale survey conducted within the 

Department of Homeland Security, I am here to tell you that of all 

my laboratories, the Plum Island laboratory facing possible closure 

had the highest morale, and in two areas, including job satisfaction, all of the workers ranked Plum Island 100 percent. So the legacy of Plum Island will be, and we hope it will be, an efficacious 

vaccine to prevent foot-and-mouth disease, which is what we are 

talking about today. 

I am so pleased that Chairman Dingell is here, and Chairman, 

I just wanted to say, as a member of the greatest generation, and 

my mother-in-law was a World War II Navy nurse, she was just 

up here for the 100th anniversary of the Navy Nurses Corps, and 

Senator Inouye and Senator Cleland had a chance to speak. I 

thank you so much for your service. It is a special privilege to be 

here in front of your subcommittee, and we thank you also for the 

NEPA legislation, which is the overriding legislation by which we 

149 

are conducting the environmental impact as we go forward, and 

has been indicated by the panels, this is a work in progress, and 

so this is an important hearing. 

For Chairman Dingell, I know you know that words matter and 

for 42 years I had the privilege of serving in the United States 

Navy and then was asked to serve in Homeland Security, and public service, like you, is a great calling. We don’t get rich in this 

business but words do matter, and the words ‘‘incompetent,’’ ‘‘arrogant,’’ and ‘‘secretive’’ were used. In the Department of Homeland 

Security, if I were to allow those to go unanswered, the 180,000- 

plus government service workers who are dedicated to making the 

Nation safer would believe that I either hadn’t heard those or I 

agreed with them. And so sir, if at a convenient time you would 

just share with me who you think is incompetent, arrogant or secretive, I will certainly root them out because that is unacceptable 

in public service. 

So Chairman, thank you so much and I look forward to your 

questions. 

Mr. DINGELL. Happy to do so. 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir, I know you will. 

Mr. DINGELL. I think I will enjoy that discussion more than you 

will. 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir. Thank you, Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen follows:] 

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Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Cohen. 

Dr. Barrett, your opening statement, please. 

Dr. BARRETT. I was asked to be a witness, not to provide an 

opening statement. 

Mr. STUPAK. So you have no opening statement then? 

Dr. BARRETT. I have no written opening statement. I can make 

a statement. 

Mr. STUPAK. It is entirely up to you. It is at your discretion, you 

are under oath, and if you would like to make one, fine. 

STATEMENT OF LARRY BARRETT, D.V.M., M.S., D.A.C.V.P.M., 

DIRECTOR, PLUM ISLAND ANIMAL DISEASE CENTER 

Dr. BARRETT. I would like to make a few comments. Good morning, Chairman Stupak and Ranking Member Whitfield, I am 

pleased to be here before you today to discuss the important mission of Plum Island Animal Disease Center, which is to protect the 

U.S. livestock from the accidental or deliberate introduction of 

high-consequence foreign animal diseases. 

I was raised on a cattle ranch in Oklahoma and I became a veterinarian due to my desire to protect public health and animal 

health. I have worked as California’s state public health veterinarian and as a program manager for the State’s food safety programs. I also served on active duty in the military as a veterinarian and just retired as a reserve colonel. I applied for the position of director of PIADC due to my strong support for protecting 

the Nation’s livestock from high-threat foreign animal diseases 

with vaccines and biological countermeasures, and today we are 

working on a vaccine that next year hopefully we will have the first 

licensed vaccine that we can use in the United States, manufactured in the United States and with the ability to tell infected from 

vaccinated animals. This will hopefully move on to where we can 

put it in the national stockpile and the USDA will have the option 

then to vaccine animals in this country to live and not be slaughtered. 

As Center director, I support USDA on a daily basis in its important mission. It is an important mission to protect the Nation from 

foreign animal diseases. As an example, if foot-and-mouth disease 

is suspected in the United States, the samples are shipped to Plum 

Island for confirmatory testing by the USDA Animal and Plant 

Health Inspection Service. What we do is provide operational support from DHS for these activities. We want to ensure the testing 

is conducted immediately. In addition, we support the Animal and 

Plant Health Inspection Service of the USDA in training its over 

200 veterinarians a year in the Nation’s only foreign animal disease diagnostic training classes. These are the veterinarians who 

would be the Nation’s first responders in a foot-and-mouth disease 

or other foreign animal disease outbreak. 

I also support USDA Agriculture Research Services at Plum Island, which is involved in basic and applied research on foreign 

animal diseases including classical swine fever and foot-and-mouth 

disease. As an example of their important work, ARS conducted research in early development of a new foot-and-mouth vaccine that 

does not use live virus as part of its production and can therefore 

be manufactured in the United States, as I mentioned previously. 

165 

The one thing that we also do in addition to providing operational support to the USDA to allow them to focus entirely on 

their mission now is, we are able to provide the additional support 

in taking vaccine products developed by the USDA and moving 

them onto manufacturing, and we have a Targeted Advanced Development unit established there of DHS scientists who now have 

the expertise for vaccine development. This is something unique 

that we didn’t have before DHS came to the island. We are working 

with industry, USDA, ARS, and APHIS and the U.S. Center for 

Veterinary Biologics for obtaining licensing for this vaccine. It is an 

important step for this Nation and critical in responding to the 

things that we saw today because I totally agree, this is a highly 

contagious disease and probably the most catastrophic disease that 

is facing our animal industry. 

DHS is committed to maintaining positive proactive relations 

with our surrounding communities too. We established a community forum with 28 members from the local New York and Connecticut communities, which meets on a quarterly basis. We use 

this method to keep the public informed of the important scientific 

work and other activities we do. We also just recently scheduled a 

Plum Island community day where we are having 25 people from 

the local community come out, and we want to explain to them the 

important things we do at Plum Island. It is time that we stopped 

having secrets and let the community know the important work 

that we are doing. 

In addition, we have an industry stakeholders working group 

that I put together with representatives from agencies and organizations such as the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association, which 

you heard speakers here today from, and the National Milk Producers Federation. I provided presentations to these organizations 

and communicated with other stakeholder working groups to keep 

them apprised of the important work we do at Plum Island. 

At Plum Island, we also have a senior leadership group which, 

besides myself, is comprised of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service’s director of the Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Lab and also the chief of research from USDA ARS. We work 

closely on a daily basis and meet regularly to ensure communication and partnership in supporting our important scientific activities. We also elevate issues as appropriate to our Plum Island 

board of directors, which is comprised of the administrator of Agriculture Research Services and APHIS, and a senior representative 

from the Department of Homeland Security S&T also sits on that 

committee. Senior leadership is conducting—right now we are 

doing strategic planning, working together in our senior leadership 

group at Plum Island identifying our current research strategies 

and how we are going to address future needs with the facilities 

we have but also moving into the future, and we will report these 

and coordinate those with the Board too. 

We also have made many other improvements addressing other 

GAO findings of security violations, which we have corrected now. 

We have memorandums of understanding with local communities 

for support, and on a daily basis I work closely with the USDA. 

In summary, Plum Island plays a critical role in the daily protection of our Nation against foreign animal diseases. As director, I 

166 

am committed to providing support to the USDA in fulfilling their 

important mission at Plum Island as well as providing a sense of 

urgency and support for the Department of Homeland Security and 

USDA’s development of a new, improved foot-and-mouth vaccine 

for the protection of this Nation’s livestock and nothing is more important to me, coming from a cattle ranch, than having that. Thank 

you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Barrett follows:] 

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Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Dr. Barrett. Dr. Barrett, I will need you 

to submit that. It looks like you read a written statement there so 

I will need you to submit that for the record. Kyle will make a copy 

and give it back to you. Thank you. 

Mr. Dingell, do you wish to go first? 

Mr. DINGELL. Thank you. 

Mr. Cohen, I want to thank you for your kind words. Please tell 

me where is the environmental impact statement and when are 

you going to make it available to this committee at the request of 

this committee and at the request of GAO? 

Mr. COHEN. I will be pleased to make it available to this committee, as I have made all other information—— 

Mr. DINGELL. Pardon me? 

Mr. COHEN. I say again, I will be pleased to make it available 

to the Committee, as I made all other—— 

Mr. DINGELL. We would like to see first of all the state of this 

and we would like to see the statement of work that goes into that. 

When will that be made available to the Committee? 

Mr. COHEN. It is my understanding that the statement of work 

was provided to the Committee either late last year or early this 

year. 

Mr. DINGELL. I am informed that that is not true, and I am informed that GAO has been denied this because that is a proprietary document. Is that statement true? 

Mr. COHEN. The statement of work is not a proprietary document, and I will find out why the Committee and the GAO does 

not have it. As to the draft environmental statement, while we are 

not required to conduct this selection for the NBAF location under 

the Federal acquisition regulations, I felt as the responsible individual that the closest we could come to those processes would give 

the most transparency and fairness and so in doing that—— 

Mr. DINGELL. This is all fine, but let me just repeat my question 

so that you understand it. When are you going to make available 

to us the statement of work? When are you going to make available 

the environmental impact statement? When are you going to make 

it available to GAO? Why have you refused it to GAO? Why have 

you stated that this is a proprietary document? 

Mr. COHEN. I will see that the statement of work is delivered to 

your committee and the GAO this afternoon and then we will determine whether they had it—— 

Mr. DINGELL. Why have you withheld it from the GAO and why 

have you withheld it from this committee? 

Mr. COHEN. I don’t have—— 

Mr. DINGELL. You are the witness on behalf of the Department 

and said this is a proprietary document. Is it a proprietary document, and if so, what is a proprietary document and why it is a 

proprietary document not available to GAO and to this committee? 

Mr. COHEN. Chairman, I have no personal knowledge that the 

word ‘‘proprietary’’ was used. I will accept the GAO—— 

Mr. DINGELL. You have heard—— 

Mr. COHEN. I will accept the GAO’s testimony that they did to 

that effect, but the GAO nor did the Congressional Research Service at any point request to see me as part of their studies. 

172 

Mr. DINGELL. Dear friend, they are asking to have the document. 

I have 2 minutes and 26 seconds so I don’t want to get into a long 

argument over this. I just want you to tell us why you have been 

withholding this from us at this committee and why you have withheld it from GAO and which is functioning at our request. 

Mr. COHEN. We have not withheld a statement of work. I will 

make sure you have a copy on the draft environmental statement. 

We will make that available to the Committee. We will make it 

available to the public just as if it were a contract action. 

Mr. DINGELL. We want the document now. We don’t want it at 

some future time. 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. And if you have a reason for withholding it from 

us, I want you to tell us what that is and why you are withholding 

it from us, and we want to know why we have to wait and why 

you are treating it as a contract action rather than seeing to it that 

it is made available to us forthwith and why did you not make this 

available to GAO on their request? Now, what are the answers to 

my questions? You mentioned the word ‘‘arrogant’’ and it sounds 

rather arrogant to me. 

Mr. COHEN. It sounds arrogant to me that neither the Congressional Research Service nor the GAO would show me, the deciding 

official, the courtesy to even visit with me. We have heard testimony from the GAO that they couldn’t get onto Plum Island, and 

who did they contact to get into Plum Island? 

Mr. DINGELL. They had to wait 6 weeks. 

Mr. COHEN. Me? 

Mr. DINGELL. Please explain why they had to wait 6 weeks to get 

on the island. 

Mr. COHEN. Because Dr. Sharma, I am informed, contacted the 

wrong people. Your staff has been on the island. In fact, my staff 

and your staff have bathed together on the island. 

Mr. DINGELL. This sounds to me as if almost anybody in that department of yours is the wrong people. It sounds like you are 

speaking on behalf of the most profound disorganization and confusion. Why is it that the wrong people couldn’t refer him to the right 

people? Is that incompetence or is that arrogance? 

Mr. COHEN. As I said, if Dr. Sharma will share with me who he 

contacted, if we have a problem with customer service, I can assure 

you I am committed to improving the customer service. 

Mr. DINGELL. On February 21, I had to send this letter to Secretary Chertoff: ‘‘Your failure to make complete response to our 

records request is troubling. Despite assurances of cooperation from 

Under Secretary Jay Cohen in a letter to this committee dated October 25, 2007, we continue to discover the existence of records directly related to our requests but which are not included in your 

response. For example, it was in the course of a visit to Plum Island by the committee investigators in November we became aware 

that DHS possessed two studies performed by SAIC analyzing 

Plum Island and NBAF issues. Similarly, it was only as a result 

of this committee staff interviews of certain DHS officials that we 

became aware of a study on Plum Island performed by the Homeland Security Institute in 2007. The SAIC studies have now been 

provided but despite staff requests, the HSI study has not yet been 

173 

produced.’’ Why is it not produced and where is it and when are 

we going to get it? 

Mr. COHEN. Well, Chairman, I am pleased, and Chairman Stupak, these are all of the studies that I have and I am glad to give 

them. I believe you will find that the staff already has those. 

Mr. DINGELL. Let me inform you, Mr. Secretary, that the delivery 

of lots of paper is not the delivery of the specific requested documents, and I expect better cooperation from your department. You 

are not giving it, and it may be that you can treat other committees with arrogant disregard for their requests but you are sure not 

going to do it here because I am going to see to it, and I am sure 

Mr. Stupak, our chairman, will see to it that we lay subpoenas on 

you so that we get your cooperation willingly or otherwise. 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir, and to the extent I control the documents, 

I have directed their release in a timely manner to the Committee. 

To the extent that they are shared amongst departments, as you 

have heard today earlier, USDA, Department of Justice, et cetera, 

it is appropriate that I ask those departments for clearance because 

I did not generate them. But I have nothing to hide here. This 

process is being done in an open and fair manner to the best of my 

ability, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. Well, I have to say that you are giving me quite 

a different impression, and you are giving this committee quite a 

different impression. 

Mr. Chairman, my time is expired. I hope we will have a second 

opportunity to raise these questions. 

Mr. STUPAK. I thank the chairman. 

Mr. Cohen, you brought up this study on the economic impact of 

an outbreak in this country that the last panel brought up, and 

why wasn’t that supplied to the Committee? Why wasn’t that study 

supplied to the Committee? 

Mr. COHEN. I am sorry. Is this the 2002—— 

Mr. STUPAK. The 2004 USDA estimate of what an outbreak 

would cost this country. Direct cost was $60 billion from the last 

witness. Why wasn’t that report supplied our committee? 

Mr. COHEN. I will refer that to Under Secretary Knight. It is a 

USDA study. 

Mr. KNIGHT. I have had staff scrambling since the testimony to 

find that because I do know earlier this week—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Yes, they should scramble when we write letters 

though and ask for those reports, not when you come to the Committee. So where is the report and when can we have it? 

Mr. KNIGHT. My best knowledge right now is that that study was 

in fact a PowerPoint presentation given by the chief economist’s office. I am working to get confirmation on that. When I have got 

that tracked down, I will provide that fully to the Committee. 

Mr. STUPAK. We want it, and we want it soon. 

Let me ask you this. Have you done any risk assessment on 

Plum Island, Mr. Cohen? 

Mr. COHEN. Well, we have done numerous studies. 

Mr. STUPAK. I am talking about risk assessment on Plum Island. 

Have you done one, yes or no? 

Mr. COHEN. Risk assessment is being done under NEPA as part 

of the environmental impact statement. 

174 

Mr. STUPAK. Has risk assessment been done in the State of 

Texas on the proposed site, State of Kansas—— 

Mr. COHEN. It is being done as part of the environment impact 

statement for the San Antonio site as is the case in all six sites. 

Mr. STUPAK. All right. So it is being done. When is it going to 

be done? 

Mr. COHEN. Well, the draft environmental impact statement 

should be out no later, in my opinion, than mid-June, and the final 

environmental impact statement should be out this fall, either October or November. 

Mr. STUPAK. Does it include economic impact as to what happens 

when foot-and-mouth disease would hit this country? 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir, it does. 

Mr. STUPAK. All right. How about the cost-benefit analysis? Have 

you done that? 

Mr. COHEN. We will do that as part of the economic—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Have you done it? 

Mr. COHEN. It is in progress as part of the environmental impact 

statement. Many of these issues are very site-specific and require 

knowledge of the community. We couldn’t even start these until we 

had down-selected to the six most probable sites. 

Mr. STUPAK. And when did you narrow it down to six probable 

sites? 

Mr. COHEN. Last July. 

Mr. STUPAK. So it has been over a year? 

Mr. COHEN. And we have been in progress with town halls, public hearings. We have over 2,000 documents that have been submitted by various interested parties including some of the representatives from panel number two. 

Mr. STUPAK. All right. You indicated that the morale is very high 

at Plum Island. Do you have trouble recruiting scientists to go 

work at Plum Island? 

Mr. COHEN. I will refer that to Dr. Barrett since he is the responsible individual. 

Dr. BARRETT. When we recruit scientists at Plum Island, we usually go out and try to get post-docs and other people like that, like 

we recently hired one of our scientists—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Sure, but do you have trouble recruiting qualified 

people? 

Dr. BARRETT. As senior-level scientists, we are trying to hire a 

research veterinarian now. That is difficult, and I know ARS is too. 

But most positions we can fill. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Well, we have been told that your scientists are 

among the best in the world in their field. Is that correct? 

Dr. BARRETT. Yes. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. And your scientific missions and goals are 

being accomplished at Plum Island, are they not? 

Dr. BARRETT. Yes. 

Mr. STUPAK. So there is not a concern then that if we put the 

new foot-and-mouth disease facility on Plum Island, you would 

have trouble recruiting people to work there? 

Dr. BARRETT. No. 

Mr. STUPAK. You indicated you grew up on a cattle farm or a 

ranch? 

175 

Dr. BARRETT. A ranch. 

Mr. STUPAK. Do you still have family in—— 

Dr. BARRETT. Yes. I go back and visit my father and we go out 

and look at the cows, and one of the things that I am so interested 

in getting this vaccine out is because they are registered heifers 

and he can tell me, the mother for every cow and I have to listen 

to it every time. 

Mr. STUPAK. Did you ever talk to him about moving foot-andmouth research off Plum Island? 

Dr. BARRETT. Yes. 

Mr. STUPAK. What did your father say to that? 

Dr. BARRETT. He didn’t think it was a good idea. At the same 

time, I didn’t have time to—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, let me ask you this. How many releases of 

foot-and-mouth disease have been from Plum Island? 

Dr. BARRETT. Releases? We have only had the one release in 

1978. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. DHS—and maybe Secretary Cohen or Director 

Cohen would like to answer this. DHS can either renovate the existing facility on Plum Island or build a new facility there, correct? 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. And is Plum Island being considered as one of those 

sites? 

Mr. COHEN. Absolutely. 

Mr. STUPAK. DHS could still build NBAF but leave foot-andmouth disease on Plum Island. That is another option, right? 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. A new NBAF would include animals that would 

be kept on the property, right? 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. No matter where it is at? 

Mr. COHEN. No matter where it is at, but those animals would 

be kept within the facility, not outside the containment. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. In 1991, 13 years after the 1978 outbreak, 

Plum Island stopped keeping animals outside the lab on the island. 

Isn’t that correct? 

Mr. COHEN. I was up there on Monday. I spoke with Dr. Callis, 

who was the director in 1978, and both Dr. Barrett and I tried to 

get an exact date, and Dr. Callis indicated that it was about that 

time. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. So you stopped keeping animals on the outside, 

and that was after 1978? 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir, somewhere between 1978 and 1991. I think 

it was progressive. 

Mr. STUPAK. Do you know how many outbreaks since 2004 of the 

biolabs 3 and 4? Do you know how many outbreaks there have 

been since 2004 through 2007? 

Mr. COHEN. I will take for the record, but there have been—you 

are talking more than just—— 

Mr. STUPAK. I am talking accidents—— 

Mr. COHEN. BSL-3, BSL-4? 

Mr. STUPAK. Yes. 

Mr. COHEN. There have been a handful and they are documented. 

176 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Well, actually with accidents and outbreaks, 

there have been 103. Would that surprise you? 

Mr. COHEN. No. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. And—— 

Mr. COHEN. I assume you are talking worldwide? 

Mr. STUPAK. No, I am talking about here in the United States. 

Mr. COHEN. I don’t have knowledge of that number. That would 

come under CDC and HHS and NIH and—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Sure. Let me give you one right there. There were 

103 outbreaks since January 2004 through halfway through 2007. 

That is 31⁄2 years, 103 of them. Ninety are caused by human error. 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. So the issue here is not necessarily human error, 

but once the outbreak happens, how will it spread? Is that fair to 

say? 

Mr. COHEN. I just didn’t hear the—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Sure. If 90 percent of the errors or outbreaks or 

mistakes are human errors at these BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs, you are 

going to have that whether it is on Plum Island or Texas or North 

Carolina. 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. And the critical issue then is how quickly it could 

spread to a surrounding population. Isn’t that correct? 

Mr. COHEN. If it would spread, and then at what speed, yes, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. If you had an outbreak that got out, one of the previous panelists said that you had to cordon off 20 miles; then there 

is another buffer, and then you might have to vaccinate the outer 

area. So the less impact, the less risk there would be in areas 

where there is less of an animal population to be infected. Is that 

fair to say? 

Mr. COHEN. I don’t know the basis for the 20 miles. Obviously 

people have shared with you, Plum Island is 11⁄2 miles off the eastern end of Long Island and so that is viewed as the customary barrier. But certainly proximity, as was stated with a feed house or 

whatever, is certainly a consideration. 

Mr. STUPAK. Sure, and in the books there, in fact, I think you 

handed some of those SAIC reports to Mr. Dingell. You were indicating in the one on tab 12, if you will, that is that SAIC report 

of August 15, 2002, and for the record, SAIC means Science Applications International Corporation. On page 16, third paragraph, it 

talks about biosafety lapses at any facility location likely to have 

an equal risk of occurrence, and I think you would agree with that 

statement, would you not? 

Mr. COHEN. I do, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. It goes on and says, ‘‘In this respect, not all locations can be considered equal, that is, facilities located where significant animal populations exist that are susceptible to agents 

under investigation have a greater degree of risk.’’ Is that true? 

Mr. COHEN. I agree with that, and that is exactly why under 

NEPA we are doing the EIS at all of the six sites. 

Mr. STUPAK. Right, and even though this is a faulty report, according to GAO, because you only looked at limited circumstances, 

they still concluded, did they not, in the next paragraph that Plum 

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177 

lease from an agent from the facility occur in part because of its 

island location but mainly due to lack of commercial livestock farming in Long Island and surrounding areas. Is that true? 

Mr. COHEN. As you have heard in prior panels, we have had—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Isn’t that what it says? Isn’t that what this report 

says, that paragraph right there? 

Mr. COHEN. It does say that, and—— 

Mr. STUPAK. So it sounds like Plum Island would be the preferred location because of the island location and the lack of livestock to be infected if there is a contagious outbreak when you 

have had 103 in the last 31⁄2 years. 

Mr. COHEN. I certainly, Chairman, will stipulate that Plum Island is an island, it is remote, it is separated by water, but as you 

have heard from prior panels, there are deer that swim. I am a 

New York City boy. I was brought up in Manhattan Island. I 

thought wildlife was squirrels, rats, and pigeons. Then I moved to 

Long Island, close to Plum Island. So deer are susceptible to footand-mouth. Now, I was just out there on Monday—— 

Mr. STUPAK. And have we had any deer come back with hoofand-mouth disease and infect the area? Even if they did, according 

to this report that you paid for, there is less chance of an infection 

because there is not enough livestock in that area to have a significant impact. 

Mr. COHEN. Well, Chairman, you know I was just—— 

Mr. STUPAK. So your risk-benefit analysis, I think we just did it 

for you. 

Mr. COHEN. I was just on eastern Long Island on Monday and 

I found out that their economy has changed and they are now 

doing an awful lot of shrubbery, decorative shrubbery because of 

the construction that is going on, and there is a real, just like in 

Maryland and other states, a deer population boom, and so deer 

can transmit this as well as any other of the cloven-hoof animals. 

So this will all be part of the EIS. I agree with you, it is an island 

and it makes sense from the testimony, as you have heard—— 

Mr. STUPAK. I am just trying to help you because apparently you 

have been having trouble getting it done and getting the documents to us, and your own documents sort of indicate Plum Island 

is the preferred place from a risk-benefit analysis. 

Mr. COHEN. If those documents were the end-all, I would not 

have been working on this with a team of government service, 

DHS, USDA, and HHS—— 

Mr. STUPAK. It is not the end-all. 

Mr. COHEN [continuing]. Going to every site for the last year and 

a half and continuing this for the next 9 to 10 months. 

Mr. STUPAK. It is not the end-all. That is why we want these 

other reports. 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. Even as flawed as it is, they still came with the conclusion. 

Mr. Shimkus for questions. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To both secretaries, 

welcome, and I appreciate you sitting in to observe the other panels. We have learned—I have learned a lot and you all have been 

involved a lot in this process. Let me ask both of you, and SecVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:02 Sep 21, 2010 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00183 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CWELLS1\HEARINGS\110-120 SCOM1 PsN: JIMC
178 

retary Knight, I would like you to answer first and then Secretary 

Cohen, just because left to right, kind of easy, Dr. Hill from the 

National Pork Producers gave testimony today stating that the location of the facility on the mainland should be based on an assessment of risk and that an assessment of the proximity of susceptible 

animal populations that could be exposed to an outbreak should be 

one of the factors considered when calculating that risk. Is that 

risk examined in the EIS, and if not, why? 

Mr. COHEN. That is my responsibility, and the answer is yes, it 

is considered, absolutely. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Was it a consideration on picking the five finalists? 

Mr. COHEN. It was not as direct a consideration as it is now that 

we are with the finalists and have a full-blown environmental impact statement. We have listed the public criteria by which we did 

that down-select and we used both numerical and adjectival scoring, and the Committee has been provided with that record of decision for their review. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Did either you, Secretary Knight, or Secretary 

Cohen, either from USDA or DHS, consult with or ask for input 

from the livestock associations when selecting the final sites for the 

NBAF? 

Mr. COHEN. We took again in a very public way with public hearings, et cetera—— 

Mr. SHIMKUS. We like public hearings. 

Mr. COHEN. We took input from everybody including people with 

protest signs on the side of the road when we visited the consortia 

proposed sites. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Secretary Knight? 

Mr. KNIGHT. We were in a supporting role with DHS in that and 

everything was done in as open a process as possible with public 

participation. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. As the process moves forward, will we continue to 

be in consultation with the industries affected? 

Mr. COHEN. Absolutely, and I would say based on the information I received today and we continue to learn that we will to be 

more closely involved with them because under the economic impact, they know best. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Dr. Barrett, also welcome to you. As director for 

the past year, what have been the most common complaints made 

by current USDA employees at Plum Island about the facility and 

its location? 

Dr. BARRETT. The most common complaint is about space. We 

just had our last senior leadership group. We spent the entire 

meeting talking about how we were going to be sharing one room 

because we only have one room to hold 26 animals for the large 

studies and we spent a lot of the meeting deciding which of the 

three of us would get to use it. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And obviously I walked in late, I missed some 

questions. Was there a follow-up question by the chairman about 

the assertion made about the inability to get qualified people at 

Plum Island versus other locations around the country? I mean, is 

that a—— 

Dr. BARRETT. I responded to that and I said that we do work just 

like any other scientific institution. We bring in post-docs and build 

179 

our own. At the same time, we do have difficulty in hiring senior 

scientists as you would at other locations. One of the things is because it would be nice if we were closer to a research institution 

so that you could do cooperative projects. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And a research institution, you are referring to associated with a major university? 

Dr. BARRETT. Yes. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Mr. Chairman, that is all I have right now. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Dingell. 

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your courtesy. 

Mr. Secretary, where is the cost-benefit analysis for this move? 

Mr. COHEN. It is in process with the environmental impact statement. 

Mr. DINGELL. You do not have it now? 

Mr. COHEN. I do not have it now. 

Mr. DINGELL. Will that be made available to the Committee as 

soon as it is available? 

Mr. COHEN. Absolutely, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. Thank you. Now, let us talk about the SAIC study. 

Where in the SAIC study does it support the move of Plum Island 

to the mainland? What is the language? Where is it in that study? 

Mr. COHEN. I have not memorized that study so I will take for 

that record, but that study was done under the auspices of the Department of Agriculture. 

Mr. DINGELL. Where in the study is that language? 

Mr. COHEN. I will take it for the record, sir. I will get back to 

you. 

Mr. DINGELL. All right. Please submit it for the record with great 

specificity. 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. Now, you have referred to HSPD-9 as supporting 

the move. What language in that study supports this move? 

Mr. COHEN. As I read HSPD-9, it does not specify a move. It requires in coordination with the U.S. Department of Agriculture 

that we establish suitable facility in order to mitigate or prevent 

bioterrorism in this area. 

Mr. DINGELL. Does it say that that should be moved, that Plum 

Island should be moved to the mainland? 

Mr. COHEN. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. DINGELL. OK. Now, where does the study that in the 2003 

White House Blue Ribbon Panel on Bioterrorism show either a 

cost-benefit analysis or a reason for moving Plum Island to the 

mainland? 

Mr. COHEN. I have read that blue ribbon study. I appreciate the 

work that went into it, and as I read it, it specifies neither of those, 

sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. So it doesn’t show that. Now, what document do 

you have at the Department which justifies the move of this facility 

from Plum Island to the mainland? 

Mr. COHEN. I do not have a document because we have not made 

the decision to move from Plum Island. 

Mr. DINGELL. But you will have obviously decisionmaking documents which will be presented to you. Do you have any such—— 

Mr. COHEN. As they—— 

180 

Mr. DINGELL. Please. 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. Do you have any such documents that you can 

present to the Committee today? 

Mr. COHEN. We have presented to the Committee the record of 

decision—— 

Mr. DINGELL. I am asking—— 

Mr. COHEN [continuing]. The five plus Plum Island that shows 

the methodology—— 

Mr. DINGELL. Reply, if you please, to my question. 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. Do you have any documents which support this 

move? Any—— 

Mr. COHEN. The document that I have submitted—— 

Mr. DINGELL. Pardon? 

Mr. COHEN. The document I have previously submitted, which is 

the record of decision, which shows the methodology that got us to 

the existing six. I will give you the—— 

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Secretary, you are not being very helpful. 

What I want from you is any documents which you have which justifies the move. 

Mr. COHEN. Sir, I am not presuming that there will be a move. 

I am in the process of the down-select of which Plum Island is one 

of the six finalists. 

Mr. DINGELL. All right. Now, this question then to the witness 

from the U.S. Department of Agriculture. What documents do you 

have anywhere in the Department of Agriculture which justify or 

support the movement of this facility from Plum Island to some onshore position? 

Mr. KNIGHT. I do not believe we have any documents other than 

what have already been provided. 

Mr. DINGELL. What studies do you have that support that move? 

Mr. KNIGHT. We have some experience in the logistical difficulties associated with testing in the event of a potential disease 

trace-back which has shown that there are logistical hurdles associated with getting samples to Plum Island in a timely manner. 

Mr. DINGELL. Please present that study to the Committee, and 

please see to it that it is annotated to show where you have anything in that study which supports the move. And please also tell 

me whether you are telling me that this study tells you that there 

are large costs associated with the move and whether you are telling us that this study also makes the point that there is risk in 

moving. Now, what are the facts with regard to this study? 

Mr. KNIGHT. I do not have a study to that effect. I replied to you, 

sir, that we had some experience on those logistical challenges. 

Mr. DINGELL. You have experience. I am asking for studies, not 

pious statements. I want to know what studies you have that will 

tell us. I don’t like people coming before this committee to say, oh, 

this is a great thing to do, and that is what I am hearing this afternoon about what a great thing this is to do and we have got a head 

of steam. Let me read to you something. I would like to have you 

hear what my friend Pat Roberts had to say in this, and he was 

referring to his experience, and this is in regard to an exercise 

where he played the President in something called Crimson Sky. 

181 

Now, Crimson Sky was a misnomer label of what would happen if 

Iraq had launched a hoof-and-mouth disease infestation in some 

seven States. He goes on to say this: ‘‘Now, that doesn’t sound like 

much on the surface of it but you have an infestation period of 6 

days and on the 7th you have got to make some decisions, and we 

didn’t do it very well. We ended up with 50 million head of livestock that had to be terminated. Now, how do you do that? Just 

on the surface of it, how on earth do you do that and what do you 

do with the carcasses? Well, obviously it was the National Guard, 

and then obviously the National Guard couldn’t handle it all, so it 

was active duty. And then we found we didn’t have enough ammunition and we found that you don’t burn the carcasses, because that 

we learned in Great Britain, that is not what you do. So we had 

to bury them, and there was a ditch 25 miles long and half a football field wide in Kansas alone just to handle the herds there.’’ And 

he goes on to say, ‘‘And then we had to put out a stop order on 

all shipments because you were having States and National Guards 

being activated by the governors to stop other States and transportation of livestock, all export stock. The markets went nuts and the 

people in the cities finally figured out that their food did come from 

farms and not from supermarkets, and they rioted in the streets 

and there was a mess. And it was not only for 1 year but for several years. Then add in the problem of food security, and if you put 

a little anthrax in some milk, then you have probably got a problem on your hands. Now, I want to know, I know that at that particular time when different events happen, that DOD will be there. 

They are going to have to be there because they are the only outfit 

that can do it. I prefer the National Guard because people know 

them and trust them. They are the home forces and they are working toward it.’’ 

This is what happens when anthrax, rather than foot-and-mouth 

disease, gets loose. So I want to be sure that you folks down there 

are protecting yourself. We had have had all kinds of releases from 

onshore facilities. You have had none at Plum Island, and I have 

got here a list of the instances where these kinds of things have 

gotten loose, but none has gotten loose at Plum Island. Plum Island 

became the place where we put things like foot-and-mouth because 

it is exquisitely dangerous. All there has to be is one contact and 

the disease moves from one animal to another and it goes like a 

wildfire across Kansas, and I don’t want to see the same thing 

going across Kansas because we have made a bad judgment, and 

I want to see—that is why this committee wants to see your environmental impact statement. 

You folks down at DHS have the idea that because you are 

charged with protecting the country, anything you do is right, and 

that you can go ahead and do whatever you want in whatever highhanded fashion you so choose. And I don’t see any sign that you 

have been cooperative with the Committee in enabling us to evaluate what is going on or in seeing to it that you are carrying out 

your responsibilities in a proper fashion. You have been high-handed and arrogant in your dealing with the Government Accountability Office, and you have been uncooperative in assisting this 

committee with the information that we have sought from you. 

This has to stop, and I will inform you that there are pleasant 

182 

ways to work with this committee and there are unpleasant ways. 

We will give you the choice but you, sir, are going to work with this 

committee and we are going to see to it that the people are safe 

from the Department of Homeland Security whether you people 

like it or not. Now, you have already got a fine record on Katrina 

and I want to see to it that you don’t have a fine record on footand-mouth disease. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COHEN. Chairman, may I have just a moment to respond, 

please? 

Mr. STUPAK. That is your choice. It is your risk. 

Mr. COHEN. And I thank you for that guidance. 

Mr. STUPAK. This is a risk assessment I am giving you. 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir, and I won’t ask you for it in writing, sir. 

Chairman, I believe you get more flies with honey than vinegar 

and I have enormous—— 

Mr. DINGELL. We have asked for stuff and we have done it in a 

nice way and we haven’t got it. So now we are going to use either 

the nice way or the nasty way. Your choice is before you. I must 

tell you, we are going to get the information. 

Mr. COHEN. And I vote for the nice way, sir. Having said that, 

I appreciate your sharing the Crimson Sky. I am familiar with 

that. I have read that and I have had long discussions with Senator Roberts on that, and I will stipulate that the release of footand-mouth in the United States would have a very significant effect, tens of billions of dollars and years of impact, and we take 

that very, very seriously. I hope that I am not hearing you presuming or believing that I as the deciding official have made a decision to select any of the six, five on the mainland or Plum Island. 

I have not, sir, and I am under oath and I will only take that decision when the appropriate information and analysis is done in consultation with the six committees as well as the agriculture committees and your committee as you desire and with the leadership 

of Department of Homeland Security, HHS and USDA, and that is 

how we got to the down-select. Everything I have done has been 

testified to in other committees and the appropriations committees, 

which fund me and USDA, have found it in their heart in a bipartisan way to provide the tens of millions of dollars necessary to do 

this important work. 

Mr. DINGELL. You are running around promising these facilities 

to a whole array of states. Every time I run over to the Floor, there 

is somebody saying to me, oh, we want this facility in our state. 

I have the governors of two states in to see me about this. They 

are saying oh, we want you to get out of the way so we can get 

this facility, and it sounds to me like what they are trying to do 

is to take a gamble on getting a lot of money or maybe foot-andmouth getting loose. So Mr. Secretary, you can do a lot for yourself 

and for the trust that this committee has in you and in the Department, and right now it is a rather low level—— 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL [continuing]. By seeing to it that your people cooperate with us in producing the information that this committee 

asked for. 

Mr. COHEN. And I will do my very best, sir. 

183 

Mr. DINGELL. That will be a remarkable improvement, and I 

thank you. 

Now, what are you going to do about this? GAO is reviewing 

these people. Are you going to make your decision before we have 

the GAO’s review of your decisions and review of the papers that 

they have been not receiving from your department? 

Mr. COHEN. They will receive them in a timely manner, as I indicated, when the Committee does and the public does. I have great 

respect for the Congressional Research Service and the GAO, and 

in fact, the GAO helped us significantly when they identified security and other problems previously at Plum Island, 24 areas that 

needed improvement. Eighteen have already been corrected and 

the other six are in process. So I respect the process. I respect the 

GAO. I would ask that they communicate a little bit more with me, 

but I respect the process and we will work with them, of course. 

Mr. DINGELL. So are you going to wait on your decision until we 

have had the GAO review this matter or are you going to go right 

on ahead and make the decision before that occurs? 

Mr. COHEN. We will share the information in a timely manner 

with the GAO but I will make the decision as I am authorized to 

either by the enabling legislation or by Secretary Chertoff and the 

secretary of the Department of Agriculture, and then of course the 

Congress controls all of this either by the Farm Bill, which I am 

very pleased to see you voted for, or by the appropriations, which 

the Founding Fathers gave you the power to stop whatever the Executive branch—— 

Mr. DINGELL. Your answer is yes or no? 

Mr. COHEN. I do not put the Government Accountability Office 

in my decisionmaking chain. I will share with them. 

Mr. DINGELL. I accept that as a no. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your courtesy. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Dingell. 

Mr. Pickering, questions? 

Mr. PICKERING. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Is there any statutory language requirement that GAO’s recommendation to you be considered in your decision? Is there any 

law, regulation or proceeding that GAO’s recommendation is binding or directive and a government’s decision authorized under law 

and in the Farm Bill that you are the deciding official? 

Mr. COHEN. I will have to take that for the record, sir. I think 

that is a question for the lawyers. 

Mr. PICKERING. I am not aware of any statutory language, and 

I have been on Senate staff and here for a long time. I have never 

seen GAO be given the decision. They are to report to agencies and 

to us and based on their information, we take that information and 

then make our best decisions upon that. The GAO is not the deciding entity here. Is that correct? As you consult with your lawyers, 

is GAO, have they been tasked by any act of Congress to make this 

decision? 

Mr. COHEN. Congressman, I am going to have to take that for 

the record. I am not a lawyer. 

Mr. PICKERING. I think the answer is clear. But the Department 

of Homeland Security is the deciding entity as designated by law. 

The GAO as well as communities across the country are making 

184 

public comment in a very open and transparent process, and you 

are doing studies, and I think that will all be part of the record 

of the draft EIS. Is that correct? 

Mr. COHEN. To the extent that we have completed those studies, 

yes, sir, and this process has been ongoing for several years. I have 

been personally involved now for nearly 2 years in a full and open 

manner around the country. 

Mr. PICKERING. Now, one of the questions here is cost-benefit. 

The other question, major question, is risk assessment. On a costbenefit basis, would it cost more to build and operate and maintain 

a new facility on Plum Island? 

Mr. COHEN. We would have to determine the exact differential, 

but as you heard from the second panel, an individual from—Mr. 

Voogt, I think, from Michigan indicated that his experience building on an island was 30 to 40 percent. Our best estimate is, it 

would be about a 25 percent premium to build on Plum Island. 

Having said that, we would save on the transition from Plum Island to a mainland facility. I don’t know what that differential 

would be. And then of course you have, as was indicated—— 

Mr. PICKERING. But that would be—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Would the gentleman yield on that point? 

Mr. PICKERING. But all that would be in the EIS, would it not? 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. Will the gentleman yield on that point? 

Mr. PICKERING. Yes, if it doesn’t take any of my time. 

Mr. STUPAK. I will give you back the time. How is that? 

You mentioned Mr. Voogt. You mentioned your estimation. 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. But you have your own report, your SAIC report 

there, that says it is only 17 percent, 140 versus 130, so which one 

are you going to use to make your determination, the report you 

commissioned, Mr. Voogt, or your own estimation? 

Mr. COHEN. Well, I am not making the decision at this hearing 

and I am not making the decision any time soon. I will make the 

decision—— 

Mr. STUPAK. In response to—— 

Mr. COHEN [continuing]. When I have all of the information in 

front of me and I can then come in front—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, in your answer, it sounded like you were relying on what Mr. Voogt said because he—— 

Mr. COHEN. Oh, no, I was using his—— 

Mr. STUPAK [continuing]. Has something to do with Beaver Island in Michigan and in your own judgment but—— 

Mr. COHEN. I apologize. The only reason I referenced that was 

to indicate that there is an additional cost to transporting building 

material, workers to an island. How much that it, we will find out. 

I also indicated—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Page 31 of tab 13, I would suggest you read it. It 

says 17 percent. 

Mr. COHEN. I don’t accept the 17 percent. I don’t accept the 40 

percent. I don’t accept the 26 percent that Dr. Barrett has given 

to me. I will accept the validated real-time 2008 number based on 

the facts as we know them. 

185 

Mr. STUPAK. That is why we hope you have GAO, Government 

Accountability Office, help you with that before you make the decision because they are more the experts on it since you seem to 

have some confusion what number we should use. 

Mr. COHEN. I think we have a number of experts available and 

I certainly welcome GAO to the process. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thanks to the gentleman for yielding. We will make 

sure you get the time there. 

Mr. PICKERING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Going to the GAO study, on page 6, and I realize this just came 

out, you probably didn’t have time to review it, and again, I don’t 

think anybody is saying that a decision has been made one way or 

the other. I think that we are getting upset about something that 

is really not time to be upset about or the anxiety is premature, 

and the reason I say that, and correct me if I am wrong, we are 

going through an EIS over the next months. You are supposed to 

make a decision in October. But even after the site selection, the 

research done on a new facility, whether Plum Island or on the 

mainland, does not begin until 2015. Is that correct? So the analysis of getting this right, we have—this is part of making sure that 

we get it right, but no decision has been made and the analysis will 

be done. 

But going back to the GAO study, it says previously DHS had 

stated categorically that the SAIC study allowed them to conclude 

that foot-and-mouth disease work can be done safely on the mainland, and they go on in the next sentence to say that the EIS analysis in supplementing are validating your studies will also be part 

of that. But for some reason GAO sees it in conflict. How do you 

interpret it? 

Mr. COHEN. Well, GAO has not contacted me personally. I have 

no knowledge of who or when the statement relative to the 2002 

SAIC USDA study was made and I stand by the testimony I have 

consistently made over the last year and a half before my committees and the testimony I am giving here today. 

Mr. PICKERING. When is the draft EIS scheduled to be released? 

Mr. COHEN. I would say about mid-June, sir. 

Mr. PICKERING. Mid-June? 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PICKERING. Are you providing the draft EIS to the Committee before the publication of the draft EIS? 

Mr. COHEN. It was my intent to provide it to the Committee 

similar to a contracting action with the release to the public. If 

there is law that indicates that I can provide it to the Committee 

in advance of public release, I welcome that input. I am not aware 

of that, sir. 

Mr. PICKERING. Is this the issue, the proprietary issue of whether 

you can—when you view it as a contracting issue that you can give 

it to this committee prior to release to the public? Is that what we 

are—— 

Mr. COHEN. Well, for instance in Department of Defense, we inform the Committee one hour before public release. The Appropriations Committee and Homeland Security requires 4 working days 

notice of all responsible committees before there is a commitment 

of funds because I have not previously dealt with the Energy and 

186 

Commerce Committee or Oversight Committee in this case, I don’t 

know if there is similar law. If the Committee can produce that, 

I will certainly comply with the law. 

Mr. PICKERING. So this is not a question of whether you are 

going to be fully open and transparent, it is a question of when you 

can release the information to the Committee and to the public. Is 

that correct? 

Mr. COHEN. That is exactly right, sir. 

Mr. PICKERING. The last thing, sometimes we have a failure to 

communicate with agencies, with interagency processes or from the 

Hill to the agencies. It seems to me a meeting with GAO may clarify some of the concerns and give them a fuller understanding so 

that everybody can have greater confidence in the process as well 

as in the outcome. Would you be willing to meet with anybody from 

GAO? 

Mr. COHEN. I am pleased to meet with anybody from GAO at any 

time, anywhere, and I will even host them, as I have hosted CRS 

investigators to lunch. 

Mr. PICKERING. Well, I think that that could go a long way to resolving some of the anxiety and the concerns, and I thank the 

chairman for my time. Thank you. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Pickering. 

Mr. Moran, did you have some questions? 

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much again for your 

courtesy extended to me as a non-member of this committee. I just 

wanted to explore with both under secretaries what are the deficiencies with Plum Island that you anticipate correcting with a different site or a new facility? 

Mr. COHEN. Well, again, as I said in my opening statement, I am 

very proud of the work that the people do at Plum Island, and our 

goal and my dream is that they will shortly develop an efficacious 

vaccine for foot-and-mouth disease because that is really what we 

are talking about, and we are investing over $50 million, have been 

over the last several years with the help of the Congress, we appreciate that very much, to expand the facility that exists at Plum Island for foot-and-mouth disease as well as making it more secure, 

but the goal is to be able to work on more than one vaccine at a 

time. Now, having said that, when the opportunity presented itself 

and the directions of HCPD 9 and 10 and working with the Congress, and also looking at other zoonotic diseases, foreign animal 

diseases, we have just focused—and I appreciate that, Chairman, 

so much. You focused on the foot-and-mouth, and I heard loud and 

clear your support and I know your committee feels that way about 

the need for the other developing potential diseases that go from 

animal to humans and cause a pandemic and great loss of life, as 

it has overseas. We need a BSL-4, this is where you don’t have a 

cure or vaccine, for those studies. We don’t need that for foot-andmouth disease. There we use BSL-3 agricultural standard and we 

think that that has been sufficient. That is the standard around 

the world. 

And so what we are looking to do to see if there are synergies, 

and we have made this very clear in the public in the offering by 

locating near veterinary schools, and I have learned there are only 

30 veterinary schools in the country. That was a surprise to me. 

187 

I thought there would be more. Locating near to medical research 

facilities, locating where the cost of living is such. In the five mainland sites, the median cost of a home is on the order of half to a 

third the median cost of a home on the tip of Long Island or Connecticut. Now, how does that affect us? Dr. Barrett has indicated 

that we are successful in getting world-class scientists, and we are 

because we are doing such exciting work. But I have to hire dozens 

of large-animal handlers. They can’t afford to live proximate to 

Plum Island, and if they are rushing to get home, will they make 

mistakes in their long commute, or they might be tired. So what 

we tried to do was see, could we in a holistic way come up with 

the best solution, be that on the mainland or on Plum Island. But 

that decision remains to be made. 

Mr. KNIGHT. If I could augment from the USDA perspective, the 

attractiveness of a new NBAF facility has to do with the ability to 

conduct more research, to stay ahead of zoonotic diseases. We are 

very constrained on space today, need the additional work regardless of where that facility would be located, to be able to handle 

more diseases. We are primarily focused on FMD, almost exclusively on that today. There needs to be the ability to respond very 

quickly in the event of another foreign animal disease outbreak or 

to do basic applied research on those particular things. 

The second thing that is highly important for us is the ability to 

have a state-of-the-art facility that we can go to for diagnostics because the frontline work that we do as it pertains to FMD or any 

foreign animal disease is when we have an accredited veterinarian, 

has a suspicious animal, be able to pull those samples and get that 

test run in a very quick manner so that we can contain the outbreak of any disease, whether it is a fast-acting disease like FMD 

or a low-acting disease like bovine tuberculosis. 

Mr. COHEN. Congressman, if I may just add, I was so pleased 

with the second panel, I don’t think you were here for it, but they 

indicated that in a terror world, and of course, before 9/11, we 

thought the United States was an island. I mean, we may have 

land borders on the north and the south but the blessings of geographically we thought protected us. We now understand that is 

not true. And so a comment that was made, and I think we have 

to reflect on this, is no matter where the site is, if a terrorist were 

to release FMD, it didn’t come from the facility but we then have 

to prove a negative, and I want to share with the Committee how 

easy it is to transmit FMD, and this does not have FMD in it, sir. 

But this handkerchief, if I were in a country where there was an 

FMD-infected animal and I put it under their nose and I put it in 

my pocket and I flew across any of the oceans and I went up to 

a susceptible animal, there is a very high probability that animal 

would now be infected. That is how easy it is and that is why 

whenever we come back to the United States on our declarations 

form, we state have you been on a farm, ranch or pasture, and because of the problems that have been well stated here in England, 

have you been in close proximity such as touching or handling of 

livestock? So the concerns that this committee have raised are very 

valid and, candidly, sir, keep me up at night. Thank you. 

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question, please? 

Mr. STUPAK. Yes, sir. 

188 

Mr. DINGELL. We have asked through the staff of both departments that we have made available to us any studies of costs of 

housing for employees at Plum Island or at any other facility. 

Again, those studies have not been made available to this committee. Do you have such studies? If so, where are they? And what 

do they say and when will they be made available to the Committee? 

Mr. COHEN. Chairman, by the end of the day, you will have 

whatever information I have. It comes from the Department of 

Housing, obviously, because that is not my lane, and if that is not 

satisfactory, I will see as part of our EIS that we have definitive 

studies and we will make those available. 

Mr. DINGELL. Now, let me ask you—you work for the Department, I gather. I sent a letter on September 20, 2007, almost 1 

year ago, requesting this kind of information. None has made been 

available to the Committee. How am I to assume that this committee you are making is any better than your refusal to deliver 

the information requested on September 20? 

Mr. COHEN. Well, Chairman, refusal is a very strong word. I actually have a picture in my office of me standing next to the cartons and cartons on pushcarts of the information that I have gladly 

provided—— 

Mr. DINGELL. Beloved friend—— 

Mr. COHEN [continuing]. To this committee. 

Mr. DINGELL [continuing]. Let me explain to you the volumes of 

papers and the wonderful pictures that you might have of them do 

not move me. 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. It is whether you are delivering to us those things 

which we are requesting. 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. There is a substantial difference. I don’t want a lot 

of your waste paper. I want the answers to the questions that the 

Committee asks you. You seem to have some difficulty in understanding that. If I am being unclear, please inform me so that we 

may be of greater assistance to you. 

Mr. COHEN. Chairman, I don’t believe there is anyone who does 

not understand your clarity, sir, and I do. 

Mr. DINGELL. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Dingell. 

Just so the record is clear, there is no law indicating there has 

to be an NBAF; is there? 

Mr. COHEN. Not to my knowledge, no, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. And there is no law that says we cannot keep Plum 

Island doing foot-and-mouth research on Plum Island but make 

your NBAF anywhere else; is there? 

Mr. COHEN. That is correct. 

Mr. STUPAK. In my opening statement, I said that the Department of Homeland Security had estimated it would cost approximately $450 million to build NBAF, and then I said the Committee 

has learned that your engineers, DHS engineers, have already 

raised that to between $600 and $750 million. Is that correct? 

189 

Mr. COHEN. I don’t know what their estimate is. I don’t know 

what the price of oil will be at the end of this hearing. This is going 

to be an expensive facility. You heard Under Secretary Knight talk 

about being world-class. This is one of the reasons why in our solicitation we have asked States and locals for offsets, incentives in 

kind and we are looking at if we were to move off Plum Island to 

utilize the sale of that land to save the taxpayers money to pay for 

the facility, but I assure you that in the end, this facility will cost 

less than a Navy destroyer. 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, that is not real reassuring. We are familiar 

with the cost of a Navy destroyer. It is quite a bit of money. 

Let me ask you this. It seems like this process started without 

giving a lot of thought to it. Wouldn’t it have been logical to say 

do we keep Plum Island or not,; do we renovate, build new, then 

start looking on the mainland? It seems like you starting looking 

to the mainland and then after objections from committee and elsewhere, you went back to Plum Island, throw that in the mix again. 

Did we sort of get off on the wrong foot on this process? 

Mr. COHEN. I can’t address all of the history. I can tell you that 

I was sworn in on the 10th of August 2006. That was a memorable 

day. You may remember, that was the day the liquid explosives 

plot with British Airways and no carry-ons and the impact it had 

on the airlines. I do remember that on Friday, 11 August, the Congress contacted me bipartisan as to why I had not solved the liquid 

explosives problem. Now, we have the 3-1-1 rule, which is risk 

mitigation. It is not the solution. So on day 2 of my tenure, I understood the responsibility I had to the American public and to the 

Congress. That is the same responsibility that I put in place for 

NBAF. On 10 August, I had 12 States and 18 sites. 

Mr. STUPAK. That is fine, August 10, 11, 12. My question didn’t 

ask about any of that. My question was, don’t you think we should 

have made the decision about what we were going to do with Plum 

Island before we move to the mainland? It appears from where we 

sit and the work we have done on this, this is our second hearing 

on biolabs and we are going to have more hearings on biolabs, that 

DHS received money to do biolabs and they didn’t start making 

biolabs without cost-benefit analysis, risk assessment, whether 

they are necessary. The more labs you have and the more harmful 

materials you deal with, the more chance of human error, which 

leads to more problems. It seems like a bunch of money was given 

to DHS and they just started spending money without knowing if 

it is even necessary, and that is sort of what my question is being 

asked. 

Mr. COHEN. Well, I think in the aftermath—and I think it is a 

very good question, Chairman. I think in the aftermath of 9/11, 

both the Administration and the Congress—I was in the Navy at 

the time but I watched this and I know going to New York right 

after 9/11, speaking with the police and dealing with Arlington police, there was a feeling that the major threats to us were nuclear, 

whether that was a dirty bomb or nuclear weapon, or biological, radiological. You know, right after 9/11, we were delivering death by 

the U.S. mail, anthrax. Now, while this facility won’t look at anthrax, because it is naturally occurring, the 9/11 Commission report said that we suffered from a lack of imagination. I can tell you 

190 

based on my 10 August story to you, sir, that while I am responsible, my component will not suffer from a lack of imagination. 

And so there is a focus on bio. What has issued from that is the 

NBAC, which is at Fort Dietrich. We are going to commission that 

this fall with the full support, bipartisan, of the Congress and in 

cooperation with the FBI. This is a CSI-like facility but it is a biological laboratory. If we had had that, I believe, in operation on 9/ 

11, we might very well know who was responsible for the anthrax. 

We are also partnered with the Department of Defense and others 

at Aberdeen for receipt facility—— 

Mr. STUPAK. What basis—— 

Mr. COHEN [continuing]. The third one—— 

Mr. STUPAK. What basis do you say if we would have had these 

labs available that we would have been able to trace the source of 

the anthrax? What this committee has shown through our hearings 

so far, and this is our second one, money was given to DHS. You 

started building labs before anyone even considers if it is necessary 

to build more labs, or can the work be done at the current labs we 

have in this country? Instead, we are building labs all over the 

place where the experts are warning us, the more labs you build, 

the more people handling it, whether it is the Ebola, whether it is 

foot-and-mouth disease, the more problems you are going to have. 

Mr. COHEN. First of all, I don’t have an unlimited number of labs 

that I am building. I have just shared with you the three laboratories—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, I know at least four or five you have built already, DHS has built, without even a benefit or if it is even necessary. It seems like we are throwing money and building labs and 

hoping the problems will come. It should be the other way around. 

We should identify the problems and then build the labs we need. 

Mr. COHEN. I am only knowledgeable of the labs which I have 

shared with you but I will tell you, as stated in the second panel, 

there is great concern that these laboratories might be terror targets, and for that reason, inherently governmental, we have a responsibility not only to make them efficacious but to make them secure, and that is why NBAC is on Fort Dietrich. 

Mr. STUPAK. And the second panel unanimously said to a question I asked each one of them, they would rather not have Department of Homeland Security deal with this. They would rather have 

USDA deal with it because they feel they have more expertise. 

Mr. COHEN. And Chairman, I agree with them. I am the tenant. 

I am the caretaker. I am the steward. Because the reason I believe 

we created the Department of Homeland Security, this incredible 

experiment in nuclear fusion of 22 very disparate agencies, was to 

eliminate or minimize seams. I am very pleased to be the steward 

for my tenant, USDA, who does the research at Plum Island. I 

think that has significant advantages in a terror-enabled world. 

Mr. STUPAK. And it also under H.R. 1717 which expands your 

authority in areas of agriculture. We think that, at least some of 

us feel, Ag. should do it, not DHS. 

Mr. KNIGHT. And from the Department of Agriculture, if I might 

add, we are very comfortable with the relationship that has evolved 

since the authorities were provided in the creation of DHS. This 

has worked very well with them as the landlord taking care of 

191 

many of those logistics. Adding the skills that DHS brings to the 

table has freed up our USDA folks to focus on the core research 

needs, especially on FMD. 

Mr. STUPAK. I am not arguing that. What we are arguing is, 

shouldn’t you have made the decision on Plum Island before you 

started going to mainland and everything? It seems like we got the 

cart before the horse, the disease before the animal, whatever it is. 

Mr. Shimkus. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Knight, you were here for all the other panels. I posed 

a question about the timeliness of information and the exponential 

risks that could occur. Can you speak to that or—am I right, or just 

kind of add to—— 

Mr. KNIGHT. We have had some real-life experiences in the last 

year that are worthy of consideration in this process. About a year 

ago, we had a potential concern that we may have had FMD at a 

packing facility. The hogs were found with lesions on their face. It 

had all the signs, the visible signs of FMD. We needed to extract 

samples, get those to a lab to be—for diagnosis. We can only do 

that at Plum Island, and so we then lost many hours in the effort 

it took to actually get those physical samples to Plum Island. If I 

recall correctly, we had fog at the airport, closure there. Then we 

had the logistics of getting it over there. So there are some legitimate concerns associated with that facility and its ability to get 

samples to and bring out the results very quickly. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The new facility will not be operational until at 

least 2015. What do you propose to do in the meantime to ensure 

that America is protected from foreign animal diseases? So that 

brings in a lot of options—renovate Plum Island, begin preliminary 

research elsewhere, and then the follow-up question is, why the immediate need for a new NBAF? Secretary Cohen? 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir. You know, terror doesn’t take a holiday and 

they don’t want for our building schedule, and this is why we have 

invested and are investing with the help of the Congress, and I appreciate that very much, over $50 million in Plum Island. We are 

doubling their capacity hopefully to get—and Dr. Barrett may want 

to address this more—possibly investigation for two efficacious vaccines and continue to build the workforce that is so critically important because it is about the people. 

In terms of other diseases, we will have to look hard at what 

BSL facilities exist, what authorities we have. As was indicated 

earlier in the testimony, some of the BSL-4 that are looking at 

smaller primates already exist at universities and elsewhere. CDC, 

NIH, HHS, of course, are focused on those but these would be responsibilities that we would pursue once we had the NBAF. 

Mr. KNIGHT. From a USDA perspective, certainly the potential of 

the disease risk is a constant. That is what keeps all of us in the 

Administration up at night and worried about that. Our first line 

of defense is generally border security, the work that is done. 

USDA provides an underlying information policy in support to Customs and Border Protection for that first line of defense. Then if 

there is a potential outbreak, we are building at USDA systems to 

be able to respond quickly, a national animal ID system that has 

been highly controversial but extremely important in being able to 

192 

build the baseline to be able to notify farmers and ranchers of a 

disease outbreak in a very quick manner. We also work in capacity 

building with our partners at the state level, the state veterinarians who are on the front line of making decisions with us, putting 

barriers up for movement of animals, each of those things. So we 

make that investment on a daily basis, on a weekly basis. That will 

continue to be there. That is one of the most important things we 

need. We need NBAF so that we can anticipate what are the next 

dangerous diseases out there that we need diagnostic tests for, be 

able to develop those tests. We need NBAF to be able to do the research for eradication of those diseases around the globe, not just 

in the United States. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Dr. Barrett, do you want to add to this? 

Dr. BARRETT. Well, I was just wanting to make a comment that 

this is going back to the question, is it safe to move this to the 

mainland, and I would just like to say that there is risk in any operation, but if you go to the GAO report and you look at the listings 

of the 15 or so laboratories where there has been release of FMD. 

They took that from the Pirbright report and they left out one column. The column that they left out was the column that identified 

that every one of those releases except the top two that occurred 

in 1960 were the result of the production of live virus vaccine for 

foot-and-mouth disease. We don’t even make live virus for foot-andmouth disease because of that. We don’t make foot-and-mouth disease vaccine in this country. So all of those were associated with 

the production of foot-and-mouth disease vaccine. In the new 

NBAF, we will not be producing foot-and-mouth disease vaccine. In 

fact, there will be a small vaccine capability in it, about 8 gallons, 

and that will be used for basically new vaccines going into development and then our scientists can test it there and then take them 

on into production. So the danger in these labs and the reason you 

had all these releases, because of making live virus vaccine with 

foot-and-mouth. In the future, we are not going to do that. Our new 

vaccine that we are producing right now and we are making in the 

United States, if it escapes, it doesn’t infect the cow; it doesn’t 

cause foot-and-mouth disease. 

So I feel that you can move this safely to the mainland, and the 

reason is it is just like Under Secretary Knight is saying, this laboratory is part of this nation’s emergency response system. If you 

see cattle out on the field and they have blisters on them, and as 

a veterinarian, you want to get that tested, you have to send it to 

this lab. I was in California working on the foot-and-mouth disease 

plan. I was at a meeting and the USDA veterinarian was there, 

and I had also, because I worked in public health, I was involved 

in developing our bioterrorism response plans. We can diagnose 

smallpox in California in 24 hours. In California, to get a diagnosis 

of foot-and-mouth disease, you have to send it to Plum Island 

across the country. We need to get the technology and the 

diagnostics out to these States so they can test it, but right now 

until we get that capability and that science, it exists at Plum Island. Plum Island is a great facility. As the director, I am proud 

to work there. My goal is to get a vaccine out and protect the livestock of this country. At the same time, to move this facility on the 

mainland provides a lot of protection too. 

193 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. The same would be true no matter where it is. 

There could be a hurricane in Texas or the Carolinas or wherever 

we are going to put it, right? 

Dr. BARRETT. Yes, there are always things that you have to take 

a risk. I mean, I basically took risk management off the Air Force 

flight line, put it in a model for food security that the FDA adopted 

and they use it for food security in this Nation. I am very well 

aware of risk assessment. 

Mr. STUPAK. So there is a guarantee against 103 different, 90 

percent being human errors. 

Dr. BARRETT. We had seven cross-contaminations in Plum Island. 

Those cross-contaminations were within our primary laboratory environment. That is a box in a box. To get out of that facility, our 

researchers who work in there, to leave that, they have to take a 

shower and they have to change their clothes and they have to 

blow their nose. Our animal caretakers get two showers a day and 

get to blow their nose twice. 

Mr. STUPAK. And that is no matter where they are located. 

Dr. BARRETT. Right, and one of the things I wanted to add in of 

why I am so—about this issue earlier when I was giving my testimony, when I go out and see my dad’s cattle, they are registered 

Herefords, and he tells me when he looks at those cows, I have to 

listen to him tell me the mother that was 20 years ago that was 

that cow, and so if you go in and you kill that herd off it is not 

coming back. You cannot—that is 50 years of genetic improvement. 

It is not coming back. We need to move forward in this country and 

develop a vaccine that we can effectively vaccinate our cattle to live 

with. Dr. Carpenter, who was sitting in this chair today, pointed 

out that in his paper, in his publication, he showed that if you vaccinate cattle, you can reduce this by 98 percent an outbreak. 

Mr. STUPAK. Sure. That is why maybe we should leave it at Plum 

Island and continue the good work we are doing there. 

Dr. BARRETT. I would love it to be at Plum Island. I just want 

a vaccine. 

Mr. COHEN. Chairman, if I may, I would just like to share with 

the Committee that we resource Dr. Carpenter’s research. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Pickering, questions? 

Mr. PICKERING. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Barrett, I just want to understand what you just said just a 

little bit back in your answer. GAO raised the question of outbreaks but in those cases, it dealt with the outbreaks related to an 

FMD vaccine or doing the research. Is that correct? 

Dr. BARRETT. Yes. What they left out, they left out one column 

in that report. They took that from the Pirbright report and they 

left out the one column. The column they left out was the one that 

showed that the outbreaks were related to live virus vaccine manufacturing release, which occurs. At Pirbright, the release didn’t 

occur from their laboratory. It occurred from Merial, who was producing vaccine there because it matched that strain, and if somebody takes and releases—— 

Mr. PICKERING. Dr. Barrett, would you say the GAO leaving that 

out or not understanding that and that distinctive difference and 

the fact that whether at Plum Island or any of the new sites, we 

194 

are not going to be doing vaccines, that is extremely significant in 

the GAO review? 

Dr. BARRETT. Yes. 

Mr. PICKERING. I think that is probably one of the most significant things that we have heard today, that the hype of the risk was 

really based on a misunderstanding of the causes of outbreaks in 

other cases that has nothing to do with the new NBAF, whether 

it is at Plum Island or another site. 

Mr. Knight, you talked about working with veterinarians and I 

know, Dr. Barrett, you are a veterinarian. The American Veterinary Medical Association has come out, and I would think that 

these are the most knowledgeable, the most involved, the ones with 

the most practical experience, the ones working with your father 

and building up his herd, and they are saying that you can do this 

site safely on the mainland. Dr. Barrett, what I hear from Mr. 

Cohen is that he is looking for the cost effectiveness of doing the 

research so that we can get to the vaccine that you hope for, and 

if we spend more money on facilities than in research, we are delaying that day of getting to the prize. 

Dr. BARRETT. And I would just like to add in that Dr. Ron De 

Haven, he used to be the administrator for APHIS, now works for 

AVMA. He is in charge of those programs that helped make that 

decision. 

Mr. PICKERING. Well, thank you, and I think it is extremely significant that GAO misunderstood and they increased their assessment of risk based on not knowing what the research is all about, 

and with that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. That is fine. What GAO missed, I guess we should 

let GAO speak for themselves on that one. 

Mr. Moran. 

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I have known since I arrived in Congress 12 years ago the desirability of serving on the 

Commerce Committee, and it has been highlighted for me today. I 

have missed something and probably too late in my time in Congress to start over in building up my seniority, but I understand 

the value of this committee and particularly this Oversight Subcommittee, and again I express my appreciation to you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to join you. I just had—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, let me interrupt you one minute. Back to Mr. 

Pickering’s point, GAO report, page 13, they didn’t leave it out. 

They didn’t miss it. Table 2 lists known and attributed releases of 

FMD viruses from laboratories worldwide including those that 

produce vaccines, so GAO did take it into consideration. I knew 

that wasn’t right. 

Mr. PICKERING. Would the chairman yield? 

Mr. STUPAK. You bet. 

Mr. PICKERING. Did they know that the new NBAF would not be 

doing the vaccine? 

Dr. BARRETT. We told Dr. Sharma and the GAO that when they 

visited us. 

Mr. PICKERING. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. STUPAK. Go ahead, Mr. Moran. 

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Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will now recognize that 

when I provide a compliment to you that you are not paying any 

attention, so I will forego any compliments. 

But I want to follow up, and in part it is in regard to questions 

that you were raising that caused me to think about this. Recently 

I had a member of my staff visit Plum Island to get an understanding of what transpires there, how it operates, and I hope to 

do that myself, but one of the things that my staff member reported upon his return was that the workers, the local folks that 

they visited with were unwilling or uninterested in having the facility at Plum Island upgraded or its abilities enhanced from the 

BSL-3 to BSL-4 and reported that their Members of Congress 

would oppose that kind of upgrade. Is that anything that is of the 

record or is that just speculation? And I can understand perhaps 

where that comes from with its location so close to New York City 

and Connecticut that there obviously—maybe it is not obvious— 

that there could be concern with that about increasing the nature 

of that facility. Is that something that is an accurate assessment 

of local sentiments and Members of Congress who represent that 

sentiment? 

Dr. BARRETT. We had recently a community forum as part of the 

NBAF process because Scott Russell, who is Southold Town Supervisor, wanted us to have it to speak to the community. When we 

spoke there, there were a lot of concerned citizens about having it 

there, and Congressman Bishop, I visited with him. He is concerned with his constituents having those concerns. One of the 

things that we are doing at Plum Island is we are having community day. 

Mr. STUPAK. But did you explain to them you don’t need a BSL4 lab to foot-and-mouth disease, you only need a level 3 lab? 

Dr. BARRETT. That is a concern that the community has is BSL4. 

Mr. STUPAK. And you don’t need 4 to do foot-and-mouth? 

Dr. BARRETT. No, we don’t need 4 to do foot-and-mouth. 

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, that was in a sense my follow-up 

question, which was that there is a consensus that we need a 4 laboratory. I mean, that is what this process is all about? 

Dr. BARRETT. We definitely need a biolevel-4 laboratory for this, 

yes, we do. We do not have one in this country for livestock. 

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, I thank both of you for sitting through this 

day, and you are always welcome at the Committee, so thanks. 

Let me just ask one last question. Zoonotics, who is in charge of 

that, DHS, HHS, CDC? Who is in charge? 

Dr. BARRETT. Two agencies, because zoonotic means communicable from animals to people. CDC will take care of the person. 

We take care of the animal side of it. 

Mr. STUPAK. By ‘‘we’’ do you mean USDA or DHS? 

Dr. BARRETT. Centers for Disease Control does the humans. 

USDA does the animals. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. 

Dr. BARRETT. But they have to work together as partners because these diseases like avian influenza, West Nile, you have to 

196 

work together and use the animal model. And basically zoonotic 

diseases, you prevent them by keeping it out of the animals. 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, Secretary Cohen had mentioned it, so I just 

wanted to make sure that was clear. I was a little confused on that 

one. OK. 

Any other questions? If not, I will thank and dismiss this panel. 

Thank you very much for being here. 

Mr. COHEN. And Chairman, we thank you for being part of this 

process. 

Mr. STUPAK. It is a process that is going to go on a little longer, 

I am afraid. 

That concludes all questioning. I want to thank all of our witnesses for coming today and for their testimony. I ask unanimous 

consent that the hearing record will remain open for 30 days for 

additional questions for the record. Without objection, the record 

will remain open. 

I ask unanimous consent that contents of our document binder 

be entered into the record. Without objection, the documents will 

be entered in the record. 

This concludes our hearing, and without objection, this meeting 

of the subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. GENE GREEN

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today on moving the study of 

foot and mouth disease from Plum Island, New York to the mainland US. 

Food and mouth disease is the most contagious animal infection. It can travel by 

the air, through saliva, and on a person. It affects cloven-hoofed animals such as 

cattle, pigs, sheep, goats, and deer. Food and mouth disease is not usually fatal, but 

it will cause severe weight loss, hoof deformation, breeding problems, and diabetes. 

When animals become infected with hoof and mouth disease, the usual course of 

action to stop the inevitable spread of the virus is to slaughter all of the animals 

in the infected area because it is almost guaranteed that all animals in the area 

will contract foot and mouth disease and it will spread at an alarming rate. 

For 60 years researchers have been studying food and mouth disease at Plum Island Animal Disease Center. Everyone agrees the facility is outdated and in need 

of updating. 

The Department of Homeland Security proposed opening a new National Bio and 

Agro Defense Facility (NBAF) on the mainland US instead of updating the Plum 

Island facility. 

Supporters of the move to the mainland cite increased costs in shipping supplies 

to an island, updated technology to contain the disease, and difficulty recruiting scientists to work on Plum Island. 

However, supporters of the Plum Island location cite the water barrier as the only 

way to keep foot and mouth disease safely contained. 

The proposed NBAF would be the world’s largest animal disease research center 

and have a Biosafety Level 4 Lab. Currently, 5 sites are being considered for the 

new NBAF lab including one associated with UT in San Antonio. 

I look forward to the testimony from our witnesses today so that we may gain 

a greater understanding of the risks and benefits associated locating an NBAF lab 

on the mainland US. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time. 

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