[Cite as State v. Alcorn , 2012-Ohio-5784.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY STATE OF OHIO : : Appellate Case No. 25065 Plaintiff-Appellee : : Trial Court Ca se No. 2011-CR-3353 v. : : DANNY W. ALCORN : (Criminal Appeal from : ( Common Pleas Court) Defendant-Appellant : :

. . . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 7th day of December, 2012.

. . . . . . . . . . . MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by MICHELE D. PHIPPS, Atty. Reg. #0069829, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appe llate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, P.O. Box 972, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee WILLIAM T. DALY, Atty. Reg. #0069300, Post Office Box 49054, Dayton, Ohio 45449 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

. . . . . . . . . . . . . HALL, J. {¶ 1} Danny W. Alcorn appeals from his c onviction and sentence on one count of aggravated arson.[Cite as State v. Alcorn , 2012-Ohio-5784.] {¶ 2} In his sole assignment of error, Alcorn challenges the legal sufficiency and manifest weight of the evid ence to support his conviction. 1 {¶ 3} The present appeal stems from Alcorn’s act of burning an abandoned couch in a grassy area between a carry-out store and a residence in Miamisburg. The State’s evidence at trial established that Alcorn lit the couch on fire because he be lieved it was infested with bed bugs. The fire destroyed the couch and caused so me vinyl siding on the carry-out building to melt. Firefighters arrived and doused the couch with an extinguisher. Police spoke to Alcorn, who admitted starting the fire. No one was injured in the incident. The owner of the carry-out, which was open at the time of the fire, testified that the cost to repair the melted siding was $578.54. {¶ 4} Based on the foregoing facts, a jury c onvicted Alcorn of a ggravated arson in violation of R.C. 2909.02(A)(2), which provides: “No person, by means of fire or explosion, shall knowingly * * * [c]ause physical harm to any occupied structure[.]” The trial court imposed a two-year prison sentence. This appeal followed.

1 Although Alcorn’s assignment of error raises only a manifest-weight issue, his brief addresses both weight and sufficiency. {¶ 5} When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, he is arguing that the State presented inadequate evidence on an element of the offense to sustain the verdict as a matter of law. State v. Hawn , 138 Ohio App.3d 449, 471, 741 N.E.2d 594 (2d Dist. 2000). “An appellate court’s f unction when reviewing the sufficien cy of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to de termine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the av erage mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inqui ry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most 3

 favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could ha ve found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks , 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragra ph two of the syllabus. {¶ 6} Our analysis is different when reviewing a manifest-weight argument. When a conviction is challenged on appeal as being agai nst the weight of the evidence, an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider witness credibility, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact “clearly lost its way and created such a ma nifest miscarriage of jus tice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins , 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541. A judgment should be reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence “only in the exceptiona l case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” State v. Martin , 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist. 1983). {¶ 7} With the foregoing standards in mind, we conclude that Alcorn’s conviction is supported by legally sufficient evidence and is not against the weight of the evidence. His only argument on appeal is that the State failed to prove he knowingly created a substantial risk of serious physical harm to any person other than himself, as required for an aggravated arson conviction under R.C. 2909.02(A)(1). But Alcorn wa s neither charged with nor convicted of violating R.C. 2909.02(A)(1). Instead, he was char ged with and convicted of violating R.C. 2909.02(A)(2), which prohibits knowingly causing phy sical harm to an o ccupied structure by means of fire. Alcorn makes no argument re garding R.C. 2909.02(A)(2). In any event, we conclude that the State presented legally suffi cient evidence and that Alcorn’s conviction is 4

 not against the weight of the evidence. The Stat e’s evidence established that he intentionally lit a couch on fire near an occupied, commercial building. The fire melted some of the vinyl siding on the building. This evidence supports the jury’s verdict that he knowingly caused physical harm to an occupied structure by means of fire. {¶ 8} The sole assignment of error is overruled, and the judgment of the Montgomery County Common Pl eas Court is affirmed.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

GRADY, P.J., and FROELICH, J., concur.

Copies mailed to: Mathias H. Heck Michele D. Phipps William T. Daly Hon. Mary K. Huffman