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PROTECTING U.S. SOVEREIGNTY: 

COAST GUARD OPERATIONS IN THE ARCTIC 

(112–63) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

DECEMBER 1, 2011 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

Available online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/ 

committee.action?chamber=house&committee=transportation 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas 

JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington 

FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD L. HANNA, New York 

JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana 

STEVE SOUTHERLAND II, Florida 

JEFF DENHAM, California 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

CHARLES J. ‘‘CHUCK’’ FLEISCHMANN, 

Tennessee 

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana, 

Vice Chair 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida (Ex Officio) 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia 

(Ex Officio) 

(III) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... iv 

TESTIMONY 

PANEL ONE

Papp, Admiral Robert, Commandant, United States Coast Guard ..................... 6 

Treadwell, Hon. Mead, Lieutenant Governor, State of Alaska ............................ 6 

PANEL TWO

Caldwell, Stephen L., Director, Homeland Security and Justice, Government 

Accountability Office ............................................................................................ 27 

Falkner, Dr. Kelly, Deputy Director, Office of Polar Programs, National 

Science Foundation .............................................................................................. 27 

Garrett, Rear Admiral Jeffrey M., United States Coast Guard (Retired) ........... 27 

Whitcomb, Dave, Chief Operating Officer, Vigor Industrial, on behalf of the 

Shipbuilders Council of America ......................................................................... 27 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Caldwell, Stephen L., Director, Homeland Security and Justice, Government 

Accountability Office ............................................................................................ 38 

Falkner, Dr. Kelly, Deputy Director, Office of Polar Programs, National 

Science Foundation .............................................................................................. 79 

Garrett, Rear Admiral Jeffrey M., United States Coast Guard (Retired) ........... 84 

Papp, Admiral Robert, Commandant, United States Coast Guard ..................... 86 

Treadwell, Hon. Mead, Lieutenant Governor, State Of Alaska ........................... 92 

Whitcomb, Dave, Chief Operating Officer, Vigor Industrial, on behalf of the 

Shipbuilders Council of America ......................................................................... 103 

SUBMISSION FOR THE RECORD 

Caldwell, Stephen L., Director, Homeland Security and Justice, Government 

Accountability Office, responses to questions from Hon. Rick Larsen, a 

Representative in Congress from the State of Washington .............................. 68 

ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD 

Edison Chouest Offshore, Inc., written statement ................................................ 108 

Philemonoff, Ron, Chief Executive Officer, Tanadgusix Corporation, written 

statement .............................................................................................................. 113 

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(1) 

PROTECTING U.S. SOVEREIGNTY: 

COAST GUARD OPERATIONS IN THE ARCTIC 

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 1, 2011 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND

MARITIME TRANSPORTATION, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:00 a.m. in Room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Frank LoBiondo 

(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. The subcommittee will come to order. The subcommittee is meeting this morning to review Coast Guard operations in the Arctic. As we all know, the ice caps are shrinking in 

the Arctic, effectively creating new coastline and navigable waters 

where the Coast Guard will be required to operate. 

This opening is already providing significant economic opportunities for the energy and maritime transportation sectors, but also 

has exposed a new set of risks and challenges to our national security and sovereignty. The subcommittee has been talking about the 

Arctic for years, and has continuously advocated for increased polar 

capabilities. However, the Coast Guard’s ability to respond to 

emerging threats and emergencies in the Arctic is less today than 

it has been at any point in the last 50 years. 

Neither of the Polar Icebreakers is currently operational, though 

the taxpayer is spending millions of dollars a year to maintain 

those ships in a caretaker status. It is time that we stop wasting 

money on old, ineffective assets, and focus instead on acquiring assets that will provide the capabilities we need to continue to increase our foothold in the Arctic. 

What we really need is to have an honest national conversation 

about what we want our involvement in the Arctic to be, and what 

we need to do to maintain that presence. We will continue to ask 

for, beg for, plead for, wait for a coherent Arctic vision from the administration and a subsequent resource proposal, because having a 

vision and having a proposal without the resources is not going to 

go very far. 

Again, I firmly believe that we need to be protecting our national 

interest in the Arctic, and hope that the subcommittee’s actions 

will draw light to this increasingly important and urgent issue. 

I would like to thank Admiral Papp and Mr. Treadwell for being 

here today. But first I would like to turn it over to Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for scheduling this morning’s hearing to assess the capabilities of the U.S. 

2 

Coast Guard’s ability to maintain and protect the sovereign interests of the United States in the Arctic. 

Before I begin my remarks, I want to take a moment to welcome, 

actually, three of our witnesses who have traveled quite some ways 

to get here. The first two from Washington State, Rear Admiral 

Jeff Garrett, who will be on the second panel, U.S. Coast Guard 

(retired), served with distinction as the CO of the Coast Guard icebreakers Polar Sea and Healy, and was involved in polar 

icebreaking deployments throughout the eastern and western Arctic and Antarctica. So, we welcome Admiral Garrett. And, I am 

sure his many years of experience will shed some helpful insights 

on our issue. 

Also, I want to thank and welcome Mr. David Whitcomb, vice 

president for production support of Vigor Industrial. Vigor Industrial recently acquired the former Todd Pacific Shipyards in Seattle, which for years maintained the Coast Guard’s fleet of icebreakers. I want to thank Mr. Whitcomb for participating, and I 

look forward to an update from him on the status and pace of repairs to the Polar Star. Also, just an added note here to my comments, I want to thank 

Lieutenant Governor Treadwell here. And if you could, pass on my 

greetings to my former resident assistant at Pacific Lutheran University known only then as Sean Parnell, who is now Governor 

Sean Parnell of Alaska. Please express my greetings to the Governor. I appreciate that very much. 

Mr. Chairman, in reflecting on this morning’s topic, it is hard for 

me to recall another instance where the solution to a policy problem has been so apparent, yet the reaction of the Congress is so 

contrary or unresponsive. I may not know the precise definition of 

the word ‘‘irony,’’ but scheduling a hearing to discuss the Coast 

Guard capabilities in the Arctic less than 3 weeks after the House 

passed legislation that would decommission the Coast Guard’s two 

heavy icebreakers seems ironic to me. 

It has been the policy of the U.S. since 1965 for the U.S. Coast 

Guard to develop, establish, maintain, and operate the U.S. 

icebreaking fleet in each polar region. Anyone who has looked at 

this issue over the years has come to the same conclusion: we need 

to invest now in new heavy icebreakers, or face a sharply diminished presence in the Arctic and Antarctic. 

As our Nation’s primary Federal maritime agency, the Coast 

Guard has played and will continue to play a significant role in 

Arctic policy implementation and enforcement, while also fulfilling 

its other mission responsibilities for search and rescue operations, 

maritime safety, scientific research, and environmental protection. 

I want to commend Commandant Papp for his efforts to stay the 

Service and to maintain and enhance the Coast Guard’s operational capabilities in these very challenging budgetary times. 

Due to the extreme operating environments found at high latitudes, the Coast Guard icebreakers serve as a mobile, multimission 

operating platform. This has enabled the Coast Guard to project 

U.S. global leadership and to protect our national security and economic interests in the Arctic and Antarctic. And, by all accounts, 

the Coast Guard’s use of icebreakers has served the Nation very 

well, until recently. 

3 

As far back as October 1990, Polar Icebreaker requirements report the handwriting has been on the wall. If we are going to maintain a reliable presence in the high north, we must make the necessary investments to sustain an icebreaker fleet. Fortunately, the 

Coast Guard responded positively to this report, and provided the 

appropriations necessary to build and launch the Coast Guard icebreaker Healy in 1999. Regrettably, the declining condition of both 

Coast Guard heavy icebreakers, the Sea and the Star, each of 

which have exceeded their 30-year life expectancies, has failed to 

generate a similar response from Congress, and no new funding for 

recapitalization of icebreakers is on the horizon. 

Instead, over the past several years the Congress has received 

multiple reports from the Government Accountability Office, the 

Department of Homeland Security’s inspector general, the National 

Research Council, the Coast Guard, and other agencies that make 

basically the same recommendations as in the 1990 report: We 

need to invest now in new heavy icebreakers, or lose our capabilities to operate in the Arctic and Antarctic. 

What I find especially frustrating is that this comes at precisely 

the same time other nations, including Russia, China, Norway, 

Korea are rushing to build new icebreakers to stake their claims 

in this emerging area in the Arctic. It is absurd for us in Congress 

to maintain that Coast Guard can do more with less when the best 

minds in our Nation have, for years, recommended, if not admonished, the Congress to do one thing to protect our national interests 

in the Arctic: invest in new heavy icebreakers. 

Instead, as I mentioned earlier, we have passed legislation to decommission our two heavier icebreakers within the next 3 years, an 

idea which I believe is misguided, for which the administration has 

forcefully and rightfully stated its strong opposition. However, I 

also note the administration has not provided us a plan for how to 

fund new icebreakers. 

The bottom line is that we can’t afford to outsource the Coast 

Guard’s icebreaking mission to any country. Considering that it 

will take anywhere between 8 to 10 years to plan, design, and build 

a new heavy icebreaker, we had best initiate a discussion now with 

our colleagues in the Senate, the administration, the Coast Guard, 

and other Federal agencies to reach agreement on a long-term 

strategy to provide not only new heavy icebreakers, but also the 

other infrastructure investments that are going to be absolutely 

necessary to support Coast Guard operations above the Arctic Circle. 

We either choose to address this challenge or we risk losing a 

critical foothold necessary to maintain U.S. sovereignty in an Arctic 

frontier of emerging global economic importance. Too much is at 

stake to remain complacent, and we need to act. 

With that, I yield back. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Larsen. I would just like to say 

I—trying to find the right word to say for your comment of ironic, 

which I guess it is. But maybe more so, sad. And I welcome your 

efforts to use your considerable influence and power with the administration to get some articulated, you know, view of policy and, 

maybe more importantly, the resources to go with it. 

4 

I think we are more in agreement on this issue than in disagreement. But I would have loved to have had something substantive 

to move with. And I appreciate your concern and interest. You have 

got, I think, a unique perspective on it. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You will note my comments here, as well as my comments on the floor during the debate 

on the Coast Guard bill, that not only did the administration oppose the Coast Guard bill because of the decommissioning language, but I also noted on the floor as well, as I noted here today, 

that they have as well failed to provide a funding plan about—with 

regards to icebreakers. 

So, I do think we have a—we are pretty close in agreement on 

this, but we need to flush these things out, which is the importance 

of this hearing today, and I appreciate you scheduling this. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. And now to give us the answer to put it over the 

top, Mr. Young of Alaska. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I can’t really top what’s 

been said. But I am the only real representative of the Arctic in 

Congress. I say this with a great deal of pride. I live above the Arctic Circle. And Alaska has made the United States an Arctic nation. I think that is crucially important. 

What has been said here is—by both you and the ranking member, that this is our waters, 200 miles out for sure. And then it becomes international waters, and there is where the interests of 

China and Russia and—actually, there are five nations involved, 

and we are fifth of the five being, you know, involved. 

And as far as Admiral Papp—this is not your fault, it is Congress’ fault. It is hard to get Congress to concentrate on what is 

necessary for the future. They have no vision, as far as the need 

and the necessity of the Coast Guard involvement because of the 

Arctic. The shipping route was mentioned, the icebreaker necessity. 

And we will be able to, I believe—in the near future be able to ship 

things much cheaper with that route than you would with the Panama Canal. We look at cost of fuel, et cetera. 

But we sit here—and we can argue about the Coast Guard capability. I was involved in the funding of the first—the three Coast 

Guard icebreakers we had. And they’re wore out. And they are 

really not heavy icebreakers. They are—I call medium icebreakers, 

not heavy icebreakers. I think we have to look at all aspects of getting icebreaking capability, including leasing, and I will say that 

again and again. Buy-in, if we can get this Congress to recognize 

it. But this Congress has to come to the plate. We would like to 

get a recommendation from this administration and future administrations. And the past administrations failed us, too. 

And so, this is very, very important. We are supposedly the most 

powerful country in the world. And yet we are neglecting the one, 

I think, bright spot, because I know in my State we have tremendous potential for minerals and necessary things that we are importing now that have been locked up because of the ice. And then, 

consequently, now it will be free. But we need the navigation capability. 

5 

Admiral, you know, because of the closeness to the Pole a lot of 

GPSs don’t work correctly. There is a lot of other problems of navigation. And we have to start looking at the whole program. 

And as far as I know, there is no oil spill that knows borders. 

And China is involved, Russia is involved, Canada is involved, Iceland is involved. And they are drilling in the Arctic—which in fact, 

if they had a spill—with no safeguards at all. And that could—and 

it will cross into our borders, and potentially do us great damage. 

So, I think we should be more aggressive, Mr. Chairman. I compliment you and the ranking member on the interest not only in 

the Arctic, but the Coast Guard. But that Congress, as a whole— 

you mention Coast Guard, and they roll their eyes. And I think 

that is so very, very unfortunate. Because the Arctic is the future 

of this Nation. 

So I look forward to the witnesses today, and get some reports 

from them and urge both the admirals and the Coast Guard to 

come out with a program. 

And if you can’t do it, we should be able to do it as a Congress, 

and I expect the chairman to help us do this, and get our leadership to understand if we are going to go ahead and cut back on the 

military, let’s not be cutting back on the Coast Guard. Because that 

will be—as they have been in the past—an active unit of our military that is working constantly, not only for search and rescue, but 

for the development of our resources. 

And with that, I yield back my time. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Landry? 

Mr. LANDRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, Lieutenant 

Governor, thank you for being here. I know it seems odd that a 

congressman from South Louisiana who probably sees water freeze 

maybe once every 5 years would be interested in this particular 

topic, but you know, I grew up at a time when America and Congress did big things, and the people that served in Congress were 

titans. We led. Frontiers were things that challenged us. 

And, you know, we sent a man to the moon, we built an interstate system, we brought Alaska into the union. We built a fleet 

of space shuttles. We did big things. And, you know, we can still 

do big things. Under this current fiscal environment we still are required to lead. We still should be challenged by those frontiers. But 

we must have an eye on fiscal management. 

And so, we have worked on legislation in this Congress that 

would allow us to continue to have icebreaking presence, even after 

the decommissioning of the Polar Sea and Polar Star, by directing 

the Coast Guard to use private leases to supply these vessels. This 

isn’t a foreign idea. I mean how many times has—you know, that 

is why we have—in this country have a long history of supporting 

our maritime industry, because we recognize that the Government 

could not always supply the needs on a constant basis. And so we 

supported our private maritime fleet. 

And so, I look forward to trying to come up with a solution to 

increase our icebreaking capabilities. And I know, Admiral Papp, 

that with your guidance and some input from this Congress from 

both sides of the aisle, we can come up with a solution, even under 

the fiscal environment that we find ourselves in. 

6 

And so, I look forward to hearing the questions that the Members have, and answers that you will provide. And with that, Mr. 

Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you. Admiral Papp, thank you for joining 

us today. The floor is yours. 

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL ROBERT PAPP, COMMANDANT, 

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD; AND HON. MEAD 

TREADWELL, LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR, STATE OF ALASKA 

Admiral PAPP. Thank you, Chairman LoBiondo and Ranking 

Member Larsen, and all the other distinguished members of the 

subcommittee. Thanks for the opportunity to appear here today, 

and for your continued support of our Coast Guard, especially our 

hard-working Coast Guard men and women. 

As you have noted, America is a maritime nation. The United 

States relies upon the sea for our prosperity, our trade, our transportation, and security. And, as also was noted, we are an Arctic 

nation. The Arctic region, including the Beaufort, Chukchi, and 

Bering Seas, and the Arctic Ocean, is truly an emerging maritime 

frontier. 

Although the northern part of the Arctic has remained frozen 

much of our lifetimes, change is clearly occurring. Arctic ice is 

gradually diminishing. And in the summer months, an entire new 

ocean is emerging. This accessibility is spurring an increase in 

human activities such as natural resource exploration, shipping, 

and eco-tourism. 

Similar to the rest of U.S. waters, the safety, security, and stewardship of the Arctic region impacts every American. Indeed, the 

Arctic contains an estimated 22 percent of the world’s technically 

recoverable oil and natural gas. The Shell Exploration and Production Company plans to drill exploratory wells in the Chukchi Sea 

and Beaufort Sea beginning in 2012. Other companies will likely 

follow. 

For more than 221 years, our Nation has relied upon the U.S. 

Coast Guard to protect those on the sea, to protect the country 

against threats delivered by the sea, and even to protect the sea, 

itself. Our challenge today is to ensure we are working to develop 

a Coast Guard capable of meeting our new and emerging responsibilities in the Arctic region as capably as we have performed our 

long-established missions in existing areas of operation. 

As with any new endeavor, posturing our forces to do so presents 

challenges, risks, but perhaps a few opportunities, as well. Today, 

based upon what we have learned, I am pleased to offer you my 

best military advice on our Arctic operational needs. Before I do so, 

however, I must tell you that I am concerned by the recent authorization language passed by the House that ties my hands in some 

ways and limits my ability to move the Coast Guard forward on all 

mission fronts, including those emerging in the Arctic. 

My first concern is the mandate to decommission Polar Star. 

This provision would eliminate the Nation’s only existing heavy 

icebreaking capability as soon as 2 years after the Polar Star’s reactivation in 2013, and after Congress has invested over $60 million to extend the Cutter’s service life. Admittedly, keeping this 30- 

plus-year-old ship running is a challenge for all of us, and it is not 

7 

a long-term solution for our Nation’s heavy icebreaking needs. But 

while I can understand the desire to accelerate a solution, I don’t 

see an alternative source of U.S. heavy icebreaking capability that 

could be made available within the next 3 years. Thus, this mandate puts us in a position of confronting expanding Arctic missions 

without a heavy icebreaker. 

We have weathered the last couple of years without an active 

heavy icebreaker, but I strongly recommend against making this a 

permanent solution. And I urge reconsideration of this provision in 

conference. 

My second concern is the authorization’s bill mandates constraining our ability to procure the National Security Cutters, just 

as we have stabilize costs and matured their design. While I understand and share the committee’s desire to deliver the most capable 

and effective replacement for the 12 High Endurance Cutters, I 

cannot see how technically challenging and disruptive performance 

milestones help us to achieve that. 

The National Security Cutter is a stable and successful acquisition program now managed by some of the best acquisition professionals in the Federal Government. This legislation risks disrupting the production schedule, raising costs, and jeopardizing the 

entire national security project. And I will state here today that the 

National Security Cutter is more important to me, in terms of carrying out Coast Guard missions in Alaska, than an icebreaker. But 

we still need an icebreaker, as well. 

In sum, it is my judgement and advice to you that the Polar Star 

must be kept as part of the heavy icebreaker bridging strategy for 

the next 5 to 10 years, and that the National Security Cutter shipbuilding program momentum must be maintained. 

Now, the Coast Guard is no stranger to Arctic waters, and we 

have operated in the Arctic for most of our history. The majority 

of our Arctic operations are concentrated in the southern Arctic, or 

Bering Sea, where we protect the fish stocks and fisherman. Protecting one of our Nation’s most richest biomasses, those who make 

their living harvesting it, and other shippers who transit through 

its often treacherous waters creates a persistent demand for Coast 

Guard services. We understand and we have the experience to 

meet these challenging maritime missions. Resourcing them will be 

another story. 

But we have also been actively gathering information about operating above the Arctic Circle and the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas 

as we prepare for a gradual northerly expansion in demand for our 

services in ice-diminished Arctic waters. For the past 3 years we 

have conducted seasonal cutter, small-boat, and helicopter operations, along with biweekly Arctic Ocean flights. 

This year we are organizing a major operation in the 17th Coast 

Guard District in anticipation of drilling in the Chukchi Sea. This 

operation will feature a mixture of flight deck-equipped cutters, 

sea-going buoy tenders, fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, and 

communications support infrastructure. I have made it a priority to 

personally travel to Alaska the past two summers with DHS leaders and interagency leaders like the Department of Interior Secretary Salazar, Deputy Secretary David Hayes. And we have met 

with local and State partners, including Governor Parnell and 

8 

Lieutenant Governor Treadwell, who is here today. Also, with the 

Alaska native tribes and industry, to see the challenges that we are 

confronting firsthand. 

In the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas we are now seeing a gradual 

transition from very limited episodic demand into a more sustained 

seasonal demand. At some point these demands may involve— 

evolve into a full-fledged seasonal operation. Therefore, our present 

operational concept is largely an extension of our current posture, 

mobilization of sea-based command and control forward operating 

bases from which we will conduct operations with gradually increasing support from our shore-based aircraft. 

Should a national incident arise in the Arctic, we will mobilize 

the entire inventory of Coast Guard assets. We will accomplish the 

mission, just as we always have during our 200-century—our two 

centuries of service to the Nation. But to fulfill this promise to 

America, our heroic Coast Guard men and women need—and, 

frankly, they deserve—the modern assets to get the job done. 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify, and I look forward to 

your questions, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. [presiding.] Thank you, Admiral. And you notice, in 

respect for your rank, I let you go over for a couple minutes. 

Admiral PAPP. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. You are quite welcome. And now, Mr. Treadwell. 

And I am going to watch you real close, but I will even let you go 

over 2 minutes, if you want to. Go ahead. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. YOUNG. That was Lieutenant Governor, I am sorry. 

Mr. TREADWELL. No problem. 

Mr. TREADWELL. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, for 

the record I am Mead Treadwell, Lieutenant Governor of Alaska. 

And thank you for having me here. Or, I should say, back here 

today. Admiral Papp and I sat next to each other in 2006 on this 

issue, and it is about time we get some action. 

The purchase of Alaska in 1867 made America an Arctic nation. 

Yet after 150 years, the myth of Seward’s Folly still lingers. It is 

time to quite arguing whether investment in the north is worth it, 

and recognize the valuable people, resources, and location we 

gained as a Nation. 

We ask this committee—and, by extension, Congress and the executive branch—to look at the bigger picture in the global Arctic, 

and recognize three imminent needs. First, Alaskans have said it 

before, Governor Sean Parnell testified on this in 2009, we will say 

it again. It is time for Congress and the administration to act, and 

to act now, to add new Polar Class Icebreakers in the United 

States Coast Guard’s fleet. The need is more urgent than ever. The 

changing Arctic will bring—it is bringing historic changes in global 

shipping patterns. 

Secondly, Congress and the administration need to recognize that 

their own mandates and policies, including a significant mandate 

passed just last year, have directed that we maintain icebreaking 

operations, and neither the intent nor the letter of these mandates 

are being met. 

And third, in addition to icebreakers, we need legal measures to 

protect our shores from the dangers of unregulated itinerant vesVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:55 May 03, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\CG\2011\12-1-1~1\71416.TXT JEAN
9 

sels that are now carrying hazardous cargoes near our coast 

through the Bering Strait, which Admiral Papp’s predecessor has 

described as the Bering Gate. And it is the only way in and out 

of the Arctic Ocean from the Pacific. 

First, let me emphasize to you that changes in the Arctic are creating tremendous game-changing opportunities. We know ice covers at historic minimums, multiyear ice is decreasing. We know 

that icebreaking technology has made—has advanced, bringing significant new efficiencies. Northern sea routes sought for hundreds 

of years are now a reality. 

What that means is that international shipping of oil and gas resources and other potentially hazardous cargoes through the Bering Strait is growing rapidly, as foreign shippers set their sites on 

Asian markets. Other Arctic and non-Arctic nations are seeing this 

potential, but America is missing the boat. 

I was in Arctic forum in September in Arkhangelsk, Russia, in 

a room about this size with Vladimir Putin, where he announced 

Russia intends to make the northern sea route as important to 

global commerce as the Suez Canal. Russia is putting its money 

where its mouth is; they are building nine new icebreakers, discounting tariffs on their icebreaker escorts, so shippers can use the 

northern sea route for a savings of about 40 percent. Sweden, Finland, and Canada, even the European Union, China, Korea, and 

Japan are beefing up their icebreaker fleets and paying attention 

to the historic opportunities. The United States must plan for an 

Arctic shipping future that could be like a new Suez Canal. 

My second point today is that we are failing to meet our own national mandates, goals, and policies. President Franklin Roosevelt’s 

1936 Executive Order 7521 to keep channels and harbors open to 

navigation by means of icebreaking operation has not been implemented in the West. This article from the Anchorage Daily News 

today shows that there is a fuel problem in Nome. They can’t get 

the gasoline they need to Nome for the winter. The article reports 

that the shippers canvassed the Nation looking for icebreakers and 

ice class tugs and barges to get fuel there, but so far it has had 

no success. If this were the Great Lakes or New England, it is 

standard practice, has been since the Roosevelt Executive order, to 

have icebreakers there to support commerce. 

The Arctic Research and Policy Act directs the Office of Management and Budget to build and deploy icebreakers, and allocate 

funds necessary to support icebreaking operations. 

Last year’s authorization act mandates the Coast Guard to promote safe maritime navigation by means of icebreaking where necessary, feasible, and effective, and that makes President Roosevelt’s order the law of the land. The act also directed the committee on marine transportation system to develop an integrated 

shipping regime. I met with CMTS leaders on my last trip to 

Washington, and urged them to be far more ambitious about thinking about Alaska’s—America’s role in this shipping route. 

Last May, Secretary of State Clinton joined seven Arctic nations 

on a search and rescue agreement. We had the first search and rescue exercise in October in Whitehorse, Mr. Chairman. That binding 

agreement to provide search and rescue operations in our sector of 

the Arctic is compromised by our lack of icebreakers in this region. 

10 

Perhaps the recent decision of the U.S. House to retire the Nation’s only heavy icebreaking ships without replacements will force 

a legitimate conversation about the need for icebreakers. But we 

should, however, be cautious. It is a risky game of chicken. And if 

this game, if it fails it fails Americans, and Alaskans, most of all. 

Under our current economic situation some question whether we 

can afford icebreakers. Mr. Chairman, I would argue we can’t afford to go without them. It has been argued we should charge for 

icebreaker escort services, like the Russians. Or ship owners might 

pay for services like they do in the Panama and the Suez Canal. 

U.S. vessels pay for oil spill escort vessels’ preparedness and insurance. A bill pending in this Congress would have the U.S. lease, 

rather than own, icebreakers it needs in the Arctic. And some have 

suggested perhaps instead of scrapping our current infrastructure 

entirely, you might consider selling the icebreakers to the private 

sector for refurbishment, creating jobs and lowering Government 

costs. 

But how will we work out our finances America and its trading 

partners could reap, and we could miss the boat as others reap 

huge economic opportunities from these shipping routes? 

And this brings me into my last point. Congress needs to understand there are two classes of ships operating the Bering Strait region right now, and in the Aleutians. There are those that are 

under contingency planning requirements for oil spills and those 

that are not. U.S. vessels are highly regulated. In fact, over 120 

laws control the use of the coastal zone and offshore areas. But 

ships originating outside of the U.S. and passing though the Bering 

Strait are not required to have a contingency plan. My formal testimony has a list of about six potential options that we could use to 

bring these ships under regulation. But having an icebreaker is 

necessary to help enforce it. 

The State of Alaska, I should report, is doing its part. The State 

actively supports the marine safety, life safety, and pending Arctic 

and marine aviation infrastructure work at the Arctic Council. We 

support and we have offered funds to help the U.S. Coast Guard’s 

efforts to bring forward basing to Alaska’s north coast. We participate extensively in research fostered by the U.S. Arctic Research 

Commission and the University of Alaska. Our legislature has the 

Northern Waters Task Force, making recommendations on mitigation strategies and infrastructure and regulatory needs. We have 

got a port study going on with the Army Corps of Engineers. We 

support the marine exchange of Alaska that has put a network of 

automatic identification system receivers to let us know what kind 

of ships are passing through. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, Alaska has and will 

continue to work hard on an Arctic policy, because we are America’s Arctic. It is our home, our heritage, and our future. And we 

work hard with high hopes for outcomes. But first we need icebreakers. Without action on this, America is putting its national security on the line, and we are going to miss the historic gamechanging opportunities of the Arctic, while watching other nations 

advance. 

Second, Congress and this administration must fill its established mandates, goals, and policies for the Arctic. 

11 

And third, we need to take legal action to protect our coast and 

prevent spills in the Arctic and the Aleutians. We have been an 

Arctic nation for 150 years. It is time to set aside that myth of 

Stewards Folly, and realize, yes, the investment is worth it, and 

the payoffs for America are huge. Thank you. 

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Governor—I mean Lieutenant Governor; 

I better not get the Governor excited. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. YOUNG. I want to thank both the witnesses. And with this 

I will turn to the ranking member, Mr. Larsen, to ask some questions. I run this a little different than other chairmen; I always ask 

the alternating sides to ask questions first, and I will close out. So, 

Mr. Larsen? 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will start with Admiral 

Papp. 

One of the debates we are having here is the lease versus own 

plans. And I am curious, first off, about the Coast Guard’s assessment of the worldwide availability of leased heavy icebreakers. Second, what would be the—what is the difference, in your estimation, 

of heavy icebreakers versus non-heavy icebreakers, and their capability to operate in the Arctic? Can you start there? 

Admiral PAPP. Yes, sir. Interestingly enough, last week I was in 

London at the International Maritime Organization. Given my concern and interest in the Arctic, I hosted a lunch for the other seven 

countries that comprise the Arctic, and of course, most importantly, 

the five of us that are interested in operating on the waters of the 

Arctic. 

I took great interest in sitting next to the minister of the interior 

for Sweden. She was very apologetic to me that they had to call 

Oden home, because they need every icebreaker they can have, and 

her own government put pressure on her to break the commitment 

to send Oden to break out Antarctica this year. 

Each one of the countries said that they are short on icebreakers. 

They are trying to build them as quickly as possible, but there is 

no surplus right now. So anything, in terms specifically for heavy 

icebreakers, in my estimation, has to be new construction. 

As far as leasing, I don’t believe there are any others that are 

available for lease, at least not readily. I think the National 

Science Foundation, in a solution to replacing the Oden, is getting 

an icebreaker from Russia, but I haven’t confirmed that. 

Mr. LARSEN. OK. But the—so the other part was the difference 

between a heavy icebreaker and one—and a medium icebreaker, or 

something that is not a heavy icebreaker. 

Admiral PAPP. Well, the—— 

Mr. LARSEN. In terms of operating and capability and so on. 

Admiral PAPP. Right. Are you looking for the specifics, in terms 

of how much ice—— 

Mr. LARSEN. I am looking for you to answer my question about 

where there are differences—can they operate in the Arctic or not? 

Admiral PAPP. Oh, yes, sir. We have Polar Class one, two, and 

three, Polar Class one being the most heavy of the icebreakers. We 

consider Healy—what we call our medium icebreaker—to be somewhere in Polar Class two or Polar Class three. Shell is building two 

that are capable of Polar Class three, as well. 

12 

And I think generally they can operate. They could probably operate down in Antarctica, depending upon the conditions of any 

particular season. But there are seasons where the ice will be very 

heavy, and you need a heavy icebreaker. The reason we are pushing for a heavy icebreaker is because we also have a responsibility 

to break out—in the Antarctic to break into McMurdo for the resupply. So we have to have that versatility to both be able to operate in the Arctic and Antarctic. 

Mr. LARSEN. So, the other question about ownership versus leasing—and I don’t want to steal anyone’s thunder, because we are 

having this debate, but the availability of leasing icebreakers that 

are here in the United States, so private leasing—leasing from private companies in the United States, as opposed to leasing from 

one of these other countries. 

Admiral PAPP. As far as we can determine, there are no icebreakers available—no heavy icebreakers available for leasing 

right now. They would have to be constructed. If we were to lease 

an icebreaker, I am sure that a company building an icebreaker 

outside of the Government does not have to contend with the same 

Federal acquisition rules that we have to if we were to construct 

an icebreaker. It could probably be done quicker. 

Personally, I am ambivalent, in terms of how we get an icebreaker for the Coast Guard. We have done the legal research. If 

we lease an icebreaker, we can put a Coast Guard crew on it and 

still have it as a U.S. vessel supporting U.S. sovereignty. But they 

aren’t available right now. 

And the other challenge that we face is Federal acquisition rules 

and A–11 requirements that score the money for leasing. We would 

have to put up a significant amount of upfront money, even with 

a lease, that we don’t have room for within our budget, currently. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. Regarding—am I on a clock, here? I don’t want 

to take a lot of time, but—— 

Mr. YOUNG. I didn’t put you on a clock, but I am about ready to 

do that. So you go ahead, about two more questions, and we will 

come back to you, OK? 

Mr. LARSEN. I will make them multipart questions, then. 

Mr. YOUNG. OK. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. LARSEN. With regards to the infrastructure side of the Coast 

Guard’s plan for high-latitude operations, you mentioned in your 

testimony as an example, if you had to respond to a disaster in the 

Arctic you would use onshore basing for fixed wing and operations. 

But where would you—where would that be? And what would be 

the response time? 

Admiral PAPP. Well, I can tell you right now that we are already 

developing a plan—I have been briefed by the district commander 

preliminary, we are going to be briefing the deputy secretaries of 

Interior and Homeland Security next week. We will base in Barrow. We have actually been able to find a hangar where, from time 

to time, they will allow us to move our helicopters in to do maintenance. But we don’t have a permanent hangar to put them in. But 

we have got a good, modern air strip there with proper instrumentation. And we are accustomed to flying in and out of Barrow, it 

13 

is just that there is not much infrastructure there, in terms of 

doing long-term support and maintenance. 

Additionally, as I—I have had that visit up there since I last reported to you—we went in with a travel party of 12 and couldn’t 

find enough rooms to take care of us. We ended up sleeping overnight in dorm rooms at the old DEW Line facility that is there in 

Barrow. 

So, to sustain a large presence during this season, we would be 

up there. We are going to have to find some sort of lodging for 

those on shore. But in reality, most of our plan is based upon having ships up there. The ships have flight decks. They have long endurance. They have got enough fuel to stay up there. And most of 

our work will be done from afloat. That is also where we have superior command and control capabilities, communications, navigation, et cetera, on the cutters, both icebreakers and High Endurance Cutters. 

Mr. LARSEN. And my final question would be with regards to 

ships. Where would those be home-ported? Where would those actually be? 

Admiral PAPP. Well, one of the ships is coming out of Kodiak. 

That is its home port. The Alex Haley and—will deploy Alex Haley 

up there for most of the summer. The other ships that will go up 

there will probably come out of West Coast ports. Bertholf, one of 

the new National Security Cutters, is the other primary ship we 

will be using. That is in Alameda, but will deploy, refuel either in 

Kodiak or Dutch Harbor, and then deploy up there for probably a 

couple of months. We may put one of our High Endurance—older 

High Endurance Cutters up there from time to time, and we also 

will probably take a couple of our 225-foot sea-going buoy tenders, 

which have pretty good long-range sustainability, and have light 

icebreaking capability. 

Mr. LARSEN. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. YOUNG. I thank the ranking member. Mr. Coble? 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, good to have 

you and the Lieutenant Governor with us this morning. 

Over the last decade, the issue of icebreaking capability in the 

polar region has been studied, it seems, endlessly. There has been 

a naval operations concept, the National Research Council report, 

the U.S. Arctic Research Commission report, a DHS inspector general report, a Coast Guard report to the Congress, a high-altitude 

mission need analysis. And the list goes on. Each one has come to 

the same conclusion, and that is what is the—that the U.S. Coast 

Guard needs new Polar Icebreakers. 

Admiral, if you know, does the administration and the Department support the need for new icebreakers? 

Admiral PAPP. I believe right now that I am getting questions 

from the administration and from the Department which indicate 

that they recognize that the need is developing for us to have icebreaker capability up there. It hasn’t gone much beyond that. 

I would agree with you. We have studied it a lot. They all seem 

to come to the same conclusion. But I think because it is such a 

large investment, we just haven’t proceeded beyond that. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you. Beyond the 2009 Presidential directive 

on the Arctic, it seems to me there has been little guidance from 

14 

the administration on what the United States should be doing in 

the Arctic. There have been several reports and plans that mention 

a need for a presence there, but they have all fallen short, it seems 

to me, of a concrete mission statement for the Arctic. 

And I guess my question is twofold. What will the administration—when will the administration provide a plan for the proper 

role of our Nation in the Arctic, and what should the national presence be in the Arctic, and what should the Coast Guard’s presence 

be in the Arctic? 

Admiral PAPP. Sir, I have no timeline on an administration plan 

for the Arctic. In the absence of that, I feel a strong responsibility 

for Coast Guard equities that are involved up there. And, as I said, 

in the short term, with the drillings starting in the Chukchi Sea, 

we have had to come up with a plan for Coast Guard operations 

up there for next summer. But it is also coordinated with the Department of Interior, as well. 

So, we are very hopeful that, between the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Interior, that we will start 

with our short-term plans, in terms of how we are acting up there, 

which will gain momentum into developing those long-term plans. 

And this has the support of Secretary Napolitano. I just came 

from a meeting with her on Tuesday, informed her of the progress 

we are making, and she is very interested in getting the briefing 

after we do it to both the deputy secretaries for Interior and Homeland Security. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Admiral. Gentlemen, let me ask you this. 

Does it concern you that other Arctic nations, and even some nonArctic nations, such as China, are, I am told, years ahead of the 

United States in terms of Arctic planning? 

How do we best protect our sovereignty and national interest in 

the Arctic? 

Admiral PAPP. Well, I would say, sir, a persistent presence in the 

Arctic. First of all, another more strategic issue is accession to the 

Law of the Sea Treaty, which gives us a venue and standing with 

all the other Arctic countries that have already signed on to that. 

We can make plans, we can map, we can talk about what we think 

is our extended outer continental shelf claim, which expands our 

exclusive economic zone. But until we have the status or the standing of being part of that convention, we cannot make legitimate 

claims. 

So, in the absence of that, we have been sending Healy up there 

to do mapping of the area. Healy provides a sovereign presence in 

those waters. And, of course, as we start drilling this next year, we 

will have an increased Coast Guard presence up there asserting 

our sovereignty. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Admiral. Lieutenant Governor, you want 

to weigh in on that, as well? 

Mr. TREADWELL. I think what I would like to say is we do support Accession Law of the Sea. There is a provision in the law of 

the sea, article 234, that allows us to help protect against these 

itinerant vessels. 

And besides the oil drilling that we fully support and we hope 

will happen this summer, we just have to pay attention to the fact 

that people are already shipping crude oil, iron ore, gas condensate, 

15 

aviation fuel, and other cargos right through the Bering Strait. And 

if there is a spill, we don’t—that is not the American oil companies’ 

responsibility. These are cargos going from Norway to Japan, from 

Russia to Thailand, from Russia to China. And this is happening 

right through this narrow spot in the ocean. 

And it helps us to have that capability of icebreakers to protect 

our own interests. So there is the sovereign interest. I am not too 

worried that somebody is going to take our land. It is important 

that we do the mapping, but the sovereign interest of being able 

to protect our shore and our coast line is missed when we don’t 

have that maritime capability. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, I have got a judiciary hearing I have got to attend. I will try to come back. 

Mr. YOUNG. I thank the gentleman for his questions. Mr. 

Landry? 

Mr. LANDRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, I find it just 

fascinating, the comment you made speaking to Mr. Larsen, in 

that—the comments that were made around that table from other 

countries saying that there is a shortage of icebreakers. 

And so, as a business owner and someone, you know, who tries 

to live the American Dream, I recognize that we have an opportunity, of course, if we help and promote our private sector maritime industry, where we could be a leader in having a private 

icebreaking fleet. So, you know, again it is an interesting twist. Because it would be great to see those countries and say, ‘‘You know, 

Admiral, boy, I will tell you, Americans just are making first class 

icebreakers and we would like to lease from you all, as well.’’ 

Do you agree that 10 icebreakers, based upon the 2010 ‘‘High 

Latitude Study,’’ is what you all need, 6 heavy and 4 medium icebreakers? Do you agree with that? 

Admiral PAPP. Well, sir, we could certainly put those to use. You 

would need that many to do a persistent presence—in other words, 

keeping an icebreaker up in the Arctic at all times of the year, and 

also having the ability to be down at the Antarctic as well. The 

‘‘High Latitude Study’’ looked at that, and you are really looking 

at both those areas. 

Mr. LANDRY. So—and of course I think we can all agree that we 

probably, in the current fiscal condition we are in, would never be 

able to appropriate the money to build 10. So would you prefer to 

have 5 icebreakers you own, or 10 you lease? 

Admiral PAPP. I would have to think about that. That sounds 

like an intriguing deal, but I am just not sure. 

Mr. LANDRY. OK. I mean I think I know what the answer is, but 

I appreciate it. I mean because I certainly would like you to have 

what the study would recommend that we would have, and that 

would be the maximum amount of vessels that we could put up 

there. 

I know that a recent Coast Guard study projected that the cost— 

a cost of $859 million to design and construct a new heavy icebreaker. Is that the total cost of the icebreaker? 

Admiral PAPP. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LANDRY. So that would include the cost for regularly scheduled overhauls? 

16 

Admiral PAPP. No, that is the price for constructing the icebreaker itself. And then you would have to put annual budgetary 

authority and our operating expenses to then maintain it and, of 

course, money for periodic overhaul. 

Mr. LANDRY. And then, of course, eventual decommissioning 

costs as well, I would assume. 

Well, let me ask you this. If it is going to cost us $859 million 

to build 1 new heavy icebreaker, would the Coast Guard be putting 

all of the cost of that build in the first year of the appropriation, 

or would it spread it out in multiple years? 

Admiral PAPP. Sir, that is speculation. Because I would make the 

case that this is something that should not be a burden solely upon 

the Coast Guard budget. Icebreakers are used across—to support 

across the Government operations—— 

Mr. LANDRY. And I agree with you as well, Admiral. I am just 

trying to understand, from a budgetary perspective, how we would 

attack this in recognizing how CBO would score it. 

In other words, when you would make the request, regardless of 

whether you would go to other agencies to put in their pot of 

money, would we take that $859 million and just add that into the 

first year, or would we try to spread it out, based upon the construction time of the vessel? 

Admiral PAPP. No, you would start out with certain smaller 

amounts of money to take you through the acquisition process, in 

terms of design specifications and then down-select of designs from 

multiple companies. And then you would not put the bulk of that 

money in until you are ready—you have down-selected and ready 

to start construction. 

We are going—— 

Mr. LANDRY. Mr. Chairman, I find this fascinating, because when 

we try to score the lease, the CBO puts it all up in the first year. 

And so we are not comparing—we are not able to compare apples 

to apples. It is like an apple to an orange. I mean the admiral just 

said—and I think he is right—in that if we would budget a new 

heavy icebreaker, they would spread the cost of that appropriation 

over a time period. But yet, when we try to score the leasing, CBO 

puts the entire lease for the 20 years in—and penalizes us in that 

first year—— 

Admiral PAPP. I need to clarify that, sir. Because, I mean, what 

we are required to do is there is certain money for design, but once 

you start construction—in fact, we are going through this now with 

the National Security Cutter—one of the challenges we find in 

terms of trying to fit the National Security Cutter in our budget 

is that OMB, under the requirements of A–11, requires us to put 

long lead materials, construction costs, and then post-construction 

costs all in the same budget year, whereas in the past we might 

be able to put long lead materials in a given year and then followon construction costs. 

And following strict A–11 guidance has required us to put all 

that money in 1 year. Hence, the reason they do it with leases, in 

terms of scoring upfront, as well. 

Mr. LANDRY. Right. But I still don’t think it is an apples-to-apples example. I mean at the end of the day, the Federal Government is not going to outlay the entire cost of the lease in 1 year. 

17 

And the problem we have up here—and, look, Admiral, it is our 

problem, and it is not your fault—this Federal Government doesn’t 

understand cash flow. You know, and that is my point, is that we 

are being penalized, and we are not able to truly assess a leaseversus-build option. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. YOUNG. I thank the gentleman. And, you know, Admiral, I 

don’t know whether you should do it or whether we should do it, 

but somebody should be able to lay out a plan. Which is more economical, owning, maintaining, manning a ship by the Coast Guard 

after going through all the other Federal requirements, or leasing 

from a company that would build the appropriate vessel that you 

put the covenants in? 

And I think there has to be a plan. Maybe we should do it. You 

know, I hear these different stories. I don’t know whether leasing 

is cheaper. But I do know they don’t have to go through the programs that you have to go through, under the Federal laws. It may 

be cheaper. Is maintenance cheaper? Maybe. Probably. So that is 

the answer we get. Because what we want are the vessels in the 

Arctic. And I hope that you would be working with us so we can 

come down with a program. 

And, you know, I appreciate your support for the completion of 

the eight National Security Cutters. You know, the criteria included in the recently House-passed Coast Guard bill set by the 

Coast Guard when funds now more than $3 billion are requested 

to acquire the National Security Cutters. It is truly unfortunate the 

Coast Guard now feels meeting its own requirements are disruptive. Now that is sort of strange to me. I am not being hostile. I— 

we use those in that bill. Now they are disruptive? Why? 

Admiral PAPP. Well, for instance, sir, one of the things is demonstrating 225 days underway. In order to do 225 days underway, 

we need to do a multiple crewing concept, which—we don’t have 

the money right now to buy the additional crew, nor do we have 

the—all the ships online yet. I mean we just have three. The third 

has been delivered. And we are operating them and testing them. 

When you have the full build-out, and you have the additional 

crews to be able to do the crew rotation and swap, you can get to 

those extra days. 

I think one of the other provisions was demonstrating UAV capability. We are continuing to do that, but the Coast Guard can’t afford to do that all on our own, because what we need is the support 

of Navy, which is developing unmanned systems. And we are 

leveraging off them spending the money and doing the testing. 

And, in fact, this next summer we will be testing one of their 

smaller systems. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, Admiral, all I can say is those recommendations came from your department. They are not—we didn’t make 

those up. And either they were given to us accidentally or inappropriately, but you know, I would like to see you follow through and 

if you tell us why—I guess you just did, to some degree—why you 

can’t do it. 

You mentioned another thing that interested me, where you 

would be staging—the areas. And you mentioned Kodiak. I believe 

that is where the Healy is, is that correct? 

Admiral PAPP. That is where the Alex Haley is. 

18 

Mr. YOUNG. Alex Haley. I sponsored language in the last bill 

about your study and the look at locations that are ice free or nearly ice free that would serve as year-round bases for the vessels and 

aircraft to support operation in the Arctic region. While I recognize 

it is important to have base facilities in the far north, that is awful 

shallow water, as you know. That is going to be our biggest challenge. 

But are you looking into any other bases, other than Kodiak? Are 

you looking at the—any of the islands, or Nome, or Platinum, or 

anything like that, or are you just settled now on Barrow? 

Admiral PAPP. Well, Barrow is the place that we are looking at 

that has probably the most—the best infrastructure that is in existence for the shore side of what we are doing. 

Mr. YOUNG. What I am leading up to, Admiral, is when you say 

there is going to be vessels stationed in the lower 48, that bothers 

me. And I am not being selfish about this, but this is an Arctic region, not Hawaii or not San Diego, or not San Francisco, or not Seattle. 

Mr. LARSEN. Nothing in Seattle. 

Mr. YOUNG. Nothing in Seattle. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. YOUNG. But, you know, just—I mean have you—are you 

looking at other areas for basing? 

Admiral PAPP. No, sir. As a matter of fact, we are going to have 

fewer ships to base, and we will need fewer ports. 

But you know, the history of us going into Alaska, even in our 

days as the Revenue Cutter Service, when Alaska was a territory, 

we have always had bases primarily in Seattle, where we deployed 

the ships from. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, you know why that was. Be very careful. You 

know why that was. Because Alaska was a—you know, a foreign 

territory, and all the money was in Seattle. And that is where the 

pressure went. 

Now, I am just suggesting respectfully, because we have the largest Coast Guard operation in the United States in Alaska. But if 

you are going to station vessels like the Gates and those things, 

they ought to be stationed in Alaska, not down in the lower 48. It 

saves fuel. Housing can be a problem, we can solve that problem. 

I want to talk to Mr. Treadwell about that a little later. But keep 

that in mind. 

And if I can go back to the concept of the cutters again, we are 

talking about the cutters, all the time about the cutters. Are we 

planning enough other support, infrastructure? Is there a plan? 

Have you got a plan about what we need up there, other than the 

cutters? 

Admiral PAPP. Well, yes, sir. We don’t have a plan right now, but 

what we are doing is we have been evaluating the last 4 years, and 

going up there and testing our equipment that we currently have 

and looking at the locations. We have exercised out of Barrow, out 

of Kotzebue, and out of Nome, to look at those three locations. 

Mr. YOUNG. Have you looked at St. George and St. Paul? 

Admiral PAPP. Well, we operate out of there from time to time. 

As you probably know, when we get into the crabbing season and 

the fishing season, we forward deploy helicopters and C–130s first 

19 

of all to Cold Bay and then up to St. Paul. And what we are looking at is just actually an extension of what we have done in the 

past, except this year we will take those aircraft and move them 

further north, up to Barrow, to operate during the—— 

Mr. YOUNG. What about docking ships in either one of those 

areas? They are the only ice-free areas in the Arctic that I know 

of. 

Admiral PAPP. Well, therein lies the challenge. And I am trying 

to answer your question on basing up there. Kodiak has limited capacity. 

I started my career up there. I was stationed on a ship out at 

Adak. I lived at Adak for 2 years. And of course Adak is closed 

down now. You can go in there and occasionally get fuel. 

If we go back to the Revenue Cutter Service days, we based out 

of Dutch Harbor. And I have been into Dutch Harbor many times. 

And there is, in fact, where Shell is going to muster all its forces 

before they start to proceed up to the Chukchi. We will be there. 

We will refuel in Dutch Harbor, as we have probably for over 100 

years, and then proceed up north towards the Arctic. 

Nome is the only one, in my estimation, that has potential right 

now. I know since my days of sailing around the Bering Sea they 

have finally built a pier there. But the pier—I think the depth of 

the pier was only about 22 feet of water, which doesn’t accommodate a lot. 

Mr. YOUNG. That is a problem. And looking at the—I believe it 

is Platinum, or down in that area, there is a deep harbor there, but 

it is quite a ways out. See, I am trying to get you closer to the Arctic. 

Admiral PAPP. Right. 

Mr. YOUNG. And, you know, that saves fuel and it saves response 

time which is, I think, crucial. 

Admiral PAPP. Right. 

Mr. YOUNG. And we will get back on this icebreaker thing, because I am not—I am trying to figure out a way that shows the 

tax payer which is the best way to put those icebreakers in the 

Arctic. You know, Russia has got, I think, five atomic-driven icebreakers. I know they have got one big one. And that is crucially 

important, to make sure that works. 

But Mr. Treadwell, you mentioned what the State is doing, all 

the good things. Why don’t you propose to the Governor that we 

buy those two decommissioned icebreakers and refurbish them, and 

then we will lease them back to the Coast Guard? 

Mr. TREADWELL. As I said in my testimony, Mr. Chairman, that 

suggestion has been made. It was yesterday with Senator Lesil 

McGuire, who published an op ed piece on this, and is going to be 

sending the committee a letter suggesting the State get involved in 

financing the icebreakers, as well as the port efforts. 

At this point we have told—and when the commandant and I last 

met and the Governor and he last met, we talked about ways the 

State can support forward basing. And we are putting money and 

lots of effort into this western Alaska port study, to understand 

where we have got deepwater capability, where we might focus on 

having ports. 

20 

And obviously a capability would be a harbor refuge for this 

international shipping coming by, as well as supporting oil field development and fisheries. Some of the fisheries, fleets are moving 

north from Seattle. And any Coast Guard vessels are all part of 

that calculus. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, instead of getting those decommissioned vessels, maybe we just ought to have the State contract to build two 

big new icebreakers. And Admiral Papp, you would be more than 

willing to lease from the only Arctic nation or only Arctic State, 

from the State of Alaska, to do the work for you up there, and then 

you would have your icebreakers. And the solution would be solved, 

we don’t have to get it out of the Congress, and we would have a 

little control over our own destiny. I want you to start thinking 

about that. It is outside the box. 

Mr. Larsen, you have some more questions? 

Mr. LARSEN. My first one is for the chairman. What do you have 

against the Pacific Northwest? 

Mr. YOUNG. I have nothing against it, but we were treated as a 

colony for so long, and we are finally getting control of our fisheries. Now we want to be in control of the Arctic. I think that is 

important. 

Mr. LARSEN. Well, we can—one day—when we get this solved, we 

can actually have a debate about where things—let’s be sure we 

get things built, then we can debate about where they go. 

Actually, the chairman’s questions about infrastructure and 

where things go and what kind of support infrastructure is necessary is important. But what I am gathering, Admiral, is that we 

are still notional. We are not in a position where the Coast Guard 

is ready to put anything into an 2013 or an 2014 request. Is that 

about right? 

Admiral PAPP. That is right, because we already have a number 

of acquisition projects that we are working that we are having a 

lot of difficulty fitting within the limits of the budget right now. So 

adding new assets for emerging needs is a real challenge for us to 

accomplish. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. Is there—I think from my perspective—and the 

chairman is sort of getting at this—but from my perspective, sort 

of getting an idea of what that looks like for—you know, what 

would a deployed—what would the footprint look like? What would 

the infrastructure look like? What would it be? 

Not so much on the map, but to kind of—what is it that you need 

that would be specific to this set of missions in the Arctic? Having 

that in a more organized form would be helpful to me so that I can 

envision it better—— 

Admiral PAPP. Right. 

Mr. LARSEN [continuing]. And then maybe be able to act on it. 

Admiral PAPP. Well, we still have a winter season up there 

where it is iced in, and there will be little to no commercial activity 

going on. 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 

Admiral PAPP. So I am reluctant to put a permanent footprint— 

I don’t have the room within my budget to appropriate a permanent footprint up there. So, in the absence of that, we do what we 

have done in numerous areas for many years, is the strength of the 

21 

Coast Guard is having substantial ships with good command and 

control capabilities that can stay out there in a sustained basis, 

which we have been doing in the Alaska territory and in the State 

of Alaska, in the Bering Sea, in the Arctic for well over 100 years. 

Yes, they deploy from down south. But that is because sometimes 

we need them to do other jobs, as well. And we have been now— 

for 45 years we have had 12 High Endurance Cutters that we could 

call upon to get this job done. 

In the current limits of the budget and the projects that we have 

got going on, they are going to be replaced by eight ships. And operating in the Bering Sea isn’t the only responsibility I have. I have 

worldwide responsibilities for those ships. And with fewer of them 

it becomes more difficult. 

But those are what we need right now, because we are not going 

to be able to do a year-round presence up there. So what we need 

is icebreakers, which will get up there at the beginning of the season, when the ice starts breaking up, and then it can come back 

in there as the ice starts forming again. 

But during the summer months, when there is going to be this 

increase of activity, either because of ships coming through the 

North Sea route or the drilling that is going on, we need substantial ships that have the command and control capabilities, that can 

do search and rescue, that can launch and recover helicopters, that 

have substantial fuel reserves so they can stay up there on a sustained basis. And that is what the National Security Cutter provides for us. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. Lieutenant Governor Treadwell, I want to be 

careful about getting into Alaska’s business. 

Mr. TREADWELL. Sure, good idea. 

Mr. LARSEN. As much as I don’t appreciate folks getting into 

Washington State’s business. 

However, this gets at the chairman’s questions. Has Alaska— 

have you all done—walked through sort of what your vision of that 

footprint might look like? You talk about the western Alaska port 

study and so on and kind of where you all would fit into this picture as a State and—— 

Mr. TREADWELL. Yes. To respond, a couple things. First off, we 

did push and we are working with the Corps of Engineers on the 

western Alaska port study right now. But as you heard in my testimony, we put a lot of stock in what you told the Committee on Marine Transportation Services—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Sure. 

Mr. TREADWELL [continuing]. To do last year. And I went and 

met with the leadership of that group and said, ‘‘You have got to 

be much more ambitious.’’ 

And the disconnect here is that I will sit here, and we are wondering whether or not we can eke one icebreaker out of this—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 

Mr. TREADWELL [continuing]. When I have been in Russia, I have 

been in China, I sit down with the Arctic nations, as I did with Secretary Clinton in May, and you know, we brought all eight nations 

together to do this Arctic marine shipping report. This report said 

that there is an Arctic-wide infrastructure that needs to be done. 

There is a project pending at the Arctic Council on that now. 

22 

And, you know, 10 percent of Alaska’s workforce services the airplanes that carry most of the air cargo between Asia and Europe, 

between Asia and North America. A ship landing with cargo from 

China in your district may have stopped for fuel in our district. 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 

Mr. TREADWELL. And the point of it is we may be ending up playing that global role on global shipping, as we take a look at that. 

And that is where we have been hoping that the Federal Government would look at the whole picture. 

And when the ‘‘High Latitude Study’’—which I only learned this 

morning was fully available—says that you need 10 icebreakers, 

part of it is we need to think about our role in commerce. Last year 

you not only told CMTS to think about the big picture, but you also 

told him that he has a mandate to—you took Franklin Roosevelt’s 

Executive order and you put it in the law. 

And you hear from the Great Lakes folks all the time how important icebreaking is to commerce there. They shut down for the first 

3 months of the year, usually. We have got a situation where from 

the middle of the summer through the first month of the year you 

are going to have Arctic commerce for the decades to come, at least. 

And we think it is important to have that presence. 

I should say one other thing about Washington versus Alaska. A 

lot of these ships that are transiting the Bering Strait have been 

for many years—start in Seattle. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. 

Mr. TREADWELL. Bring goods to—there have been times when 

you’ve seen tugs and barges or heavy draft ships leaving ports in 

Washington State, going through the Bering Strait to serve markets in Russia, Alaska, or Canada. 

Mr. LARSEN. I was just going to note. It is a lot more of Washington and Alaska, as opposed to Washington versus Alaska. 

Mr. TREADWELL. Yes, sir—— 

Mr. YOUNG. No, you don’t understand. It is not versus. We just 

want to be treated, you know, like part of the United States, not 

as a colony any more, you know. 

Mr. TREADWELL. Well, you know, just to add one more thing, and 

it can—the discussions I have had with the chairman. You know, 

if you were trying to expand the Panama Canal $1 billion, the price 

of one of these icebreakers, $859 million, would barely move a mile 

of dirt. And yet you have got something happening here at the beginning of this century which is as significant for global commerce 

as what happened at the beginning of the last century, with this 

waterway opening up. And we have to think—— 

Mr. YOUNG. I am going to ask one question and go to Mr. 

Landry. 

Admiral, you have been speaking about the Arctic. What is your 

feeling about the Shell activity, as far as in the Chukchi, and the 

Beaufort, as far as oil spill response, the availability of ships? What 

is going on up there, as far as you know, as a Coast Guard involver? 

Admiral PAPP. Well, I was very interested in that. In fact, I went 

to Shell headquarters in Anchorage, while I was up there. And they 

gave me a very thorough briefing on their plans. And I have to tell 

you I was impressed. Last time I—we had the hearing on the ArcVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:55 May 03, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\CG\2011\12-1-1~1\71416.TXT JEAN
23 

tic, I was concerned because I had not seen Shell’s plans. I know 

what we had available. But I am feeling much more comfortable, 

now that we have come up with our operation plan for next summer. And I have had a chance to view Shell’s plans, as well. 

And once again, I have taken a superficial look at them, but the 

17th District Commander, Admiral Ostebo, has reviewed it thorough with his staff. And we have been providing our input to the 

Department of Interior, who will approve their response plans. 

But they truly did their homework, I believe. And I think they 

are going to be well prepared for next summer. 

Mr. YOUNG. Now, they have purchased or leased vessels, or— 

what kind of vessel support are they going to have? 

Admiral PAPP. Well, I know—in fact, I got an article yesterday 

about one of the—one of their icebreakers happens to be being built 

in Louisiana, surprisingly enough. 

But it—I saw the plans for them when I was up in Anchorage, 

and so I was interested in seeing this article yesterday that popped 

up. It is actually probably about as capable for breaking ice as 

Healy is. Doesn’t have the scientific capabilities that Healy does, 

because when we build an icebreaker it has got to serve multiple 

communities and departments and responsibilities, but—— 

Mr. YOUNG. Is that the Nanuq? 

Admiral PAPP. Actually, this one they said is unnamed. They are 

going to use a competition of Alaska school children to come up 

with a name for the vessel. 

Mr. YOUNG. OK. But are those anchor ships or are they drill 

ships or are they oil spill ships? What are they? 

Admiral PAPP. They are oil spill response fleet and it is icebreaker capable, and also set so—it can set the anchors for the 

platform. 

Mr. YOUNG. It is really an anchor ship is what I—sets the anchors for the drill rigs and—— 

Admiral PAPP. Yes, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG [continuing]. Everything else. I was just curious what 

you thought of it, because that is very important to the State of 

Alaska and this Nation. 

Admiral PAPP. Well, my expectations were low when I went to 

Anchorage, and I was very impressed, coming away from Anchorage, when I spoke to Shell. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Treadwell, you got any comments on that same 

line? 

Mr. TREADWELL. I have reviewed what Shell is doing in a cursory 

manner. I have also looked at the Coast Guard’s plans for next 

summer. I think we are well prepared for a drilling season next 

summer. 

Mr. YOUNG. Good. 

Mr. TREADWELL. The issue of the ships, the company that is 

building these ships for Shell has visited with me and other State 

officials, and that is why you heard us say in our testimony that 

we think the leasing option should be considered. We don’t have a 

way to judge the relative cost. But if it—on the face of it, it seems 

like it may be a way to get us the capability that the admiral 

needs. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Landry, excuse me. 

24 

Mr. LANDRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We would love to build 

you an icebreaker, but I would much rather you lease it—in Louisiana. 

Admiral, what is it that—I mean other than—do you just believe 

that going on a leasing option is a slippery slope for you all? 

Admiral PAPP. I don’t know how to characterize it. We have 

looked at various business case scenarios, each and every time. 

Looking at—once again, from our normal perspective, Coast Guard 

perspective, which has been owning ships forever—and generally 

we keep ships 30 to 40 years or beyond—there is a point where 

leasing becomes more expensive. It is out at about the 20- to 25- 

year timeline. I just don’t have the experience with leasing to be 

able to give you a good opinion on it. 

And once again, I am ambivalent. We just need the icebreaking 

capability. I think it is for people who can do the analysis, the 

proper analysis. But they also have to take into account the capabilities required, and we need to get about the business of determining the exact capabilities that we need, which would take into 

account National Science Foundation requirements, Coast Guard 

requirements, the requirements to break into McMurdo, to come up 

with a capable-enough ship. 

Mr. LANDRY. Well, are those the requirements that they are 

mandating on the vessels that they are leasing from foreign sources 

right now? 

Admiral PAPP. I have not—the Coast Guard has not been involved with their leasing process for other countries. Presumably, 

and as I understand it, what they are doing is they are looking at 

a ship that is capable enough—— 

Mr. LANDRY. To break the ice. 

Admiral PAPP [continuing]. Breaking in. But that was only because they were hiring it to break out for the resupply of McMurdo. 

Clearly, they—when they were doing science deployments in the 

Arctic, Healy has been perfect for them. In fact, I visited Healy 

while I was up in my Alaska visit, and National Science Foundation was aboard. They love that ship, in terms of its accommodations, its labs, et cetera, that were built pretty much to their specifications. 

Mr. LANDRY. Now the U.S. Navy leases vessels that are not involved directly in combat activities. Do you envision these icebreakers playing a direct combat role in the missions that you all 

have up there? 

Admiral PAPP. Oh, it could, potentially, depending—I mean I 

don’t foresee a scenario right now where we are going to be warfighting in the Arctic. But who knows what—it is an uncertain future. 

Mr. LANDRY. But would you be designing those vessels in a design that would implement them into that combat role? 

Admiral PAPP. Well, we would prefer to have a design that would 

accommodate a combat role, and that would be up to our manning 

standards, fire-fighting damage control standards that we expect 

on all our Coast Guard cutters. 

Mr. LANDRY. And so that is what I am trying to understand. 

I mean I still think—you know, it is just—look. If Shell is leasing 

their icebreakers and their vessels, and all of the majors lease the 

25 

vessels that they utilize in their maritime offshore—in their offshore operations, and we certainly know that those majors are perfectly capable of owning and fleeting their own vessels—and they 

did at one time, actually, a long, long time ago they used to do 

that, and then they got away from it—I just think that when you 

look at—from a holistic standpoint, when you look at it and say, 

‘‘OK, the cost of construction, the cost of design, the timeframe involved, the maintenance’’—because if you blow a rod on a leased 

vessel, it is not—you don’t have to come back to us to appropriate 

that amount. You don’t have to decommission it. 

In fact, the other thing is that if you lease it on a 20-year lease, 

or a 20-, 25-year lease span, that means you get a newer, up to 

dated, more sophisticated icebreaker after that timeframe, where 

before, here we are—example in case with the Polar Star and the 

Polar Sea—in that we have got to patch up a much older ship. And 

so, instead of looking at it in a 30- or 40-year lifespan, we could 

actually get you two icebreakers you could utilize over that lifespan, if we lease it. 

So, again, I only say that just to—for food for thought. 

Admiral PAPP. Well, as I said, sir, I am truly ambivalent to this, 

except from what experience I do have. 

Now, two points. Yes, the Navy leases some ships, but we have 

got a Navy that has well over 300 ships. So if they lose a leased 

vessel or if something is pulled back or something happens, they 

have plenty of other ships they can fall back upon. Right now all 

I am falling back on is the Coast Guard cutter Healy. And it feels 

good to know that we own that and that is our ship for 30 or 40 

years, and we can rely upon it. 

In terms of leasing, my personal experience is I lease one of my 

two cars. And I pay a lot of money leasing my car, but at the end 

of the lease period I have no car and I have spent a lot of money. 

So I don’t know if that is directly applicable to ships as well. But 

right now I have got—half my garage is empty, because I just 

turned one in. And I—— 

Mr. LANDRY. But you are getting ready to get a brand new one, 

I am sure. I don’t think you are going to stay as a one-car garage. 

Admiral PAPP. I was really considering buying the next car, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. Now we are going to ships and cars. It is time to cut 

this off. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Cravaack? 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Can I change it to trains now? 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Well, first off, Admiral, thank you for all the 

great men and women in the United States Coast Guard. I apologize for being late, I was in another committee meeting. But all the 

great things that the Coast Guard do on a daily basis that none 

of us know about. So thank you to the United States Coast Guard. 

And as our strategic interests increase in the Arctic region, so 

must the responsibilities of the United States Coast Guard, as well. 

And I find it difficult to understand the wealthiest Nation in the 

world relying on one single vessel to do icebreaking up in the Arctic. Hopefully the Polar Star will be able to be reconditioned to a 

satisfactory point where we will be able to engage that as well. 

26 

But I truly believe in your mission. And being a Navy guy, I understand about maintaining our own vessels. And my—one of my 

questions I had when we were—my colleague here—when you are 

leasing a vessel, say for example an icebreaker, can you take that 

into a war zone? 

Admiral PAPP. Yes, sir. We have looked through the legal considerations on this. As long as we have a Coast Guard crew—in fact, 

you can even make a mixed crew of civilians and Coast Guard people. But as long as it is commanded by a commissioned officer, you 

can assert sovereignty, you can take it into war zones. And, in fact, 

the Navy does that, as well. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. OK. That is a—I wasn’t aware of that. 

But I am with you. I think it should be our vessel and manned 

by our crews, and with—flying a United States flag that is a Navy 

vessel, so—or a Coast Guard vessel. So I am with you on that 

point. 

And I would just like to support—undying support for the United 

States Coast Guard and their mission and what they do, and I 

think we should give them the resources they need to complete 

their mission. 

So, with that, I yield back. 

Mr. YOUNG. I thank the gentleman. And I don’t have a question, 

but I have been informed that Nanuq is a 4,500 gross ton vessel, 

and it stands offshore for 25 miles. The Aiviq—called ‘‘the Walrus’’—is an anchor hammer, platform supply, search and rescue, ice 

management, and supplemental search and rescue unit, and 

weighs 8,500 gross tons, and it stays up there all season in the ice. 

So I just want to get that straight. 

I want to thank the admiral and thank you, Lieutenant Governor. We are going to try to solve this problem with the help of 

everybody cooperating, and making sure the Arctic is recognized. 

And we might come up with a—I call it an Arctic policy for solving 

these problems. 

I happen to agree with both the ranking member and Mr. Landry 

on the necessity of this. Because if we are just sitting still, all the 

rest of the countries are all actively involved, it is not good for us. 

And I think we ought to see the big picture. This is equal to sending a man to the moon, probably more important. That was more 

exciting, but this is more important to the future of the Nation. 

Thanks to both of you for being before the committee. You are 

dismissed. 

Next panel. Dr. Kelly Falkner, deputy director, office of polar 

programs, National Science Foundation; Mr. Stephen Caldwell, director of homeland security and justice, Government Accountability 

Office; Mr. Dave Whitcomb, chief operating officer of Vigor Industrial on behalf of the Shipbuilders Council of America; and Rear 

Admiral Jeffrey Garrett, United States Coast Guard (retired). 

And we will go down the line as we were introduced. Dr. 

Falkner, as soon as you take your seat, we will get busy. That is 

a good idea. Doctor? 

27 

TESTIMONY OF DR. KELLY FALKNER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF POLAR PROGRAMS, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION; STEPHEN L. CALDWELL, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; DAVE WHITCOMB, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, VIGOR 

INDUSTRIAL, ON BEHALF OF THE SHIPBUILDERS COUNCIL 

OF AMERICA; AND REAR ADMIRAL JEFFREY M. GARRETT, 

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD (RETIRED) 

Dr. FALKNER. Chairman, Ranking Member Larsen, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I appreciate this opportunity to discuss how the National Science Foundation is meeting 

its icebreaking needs for research in the Arctic, as well as for research and operations in the U.S. Antarctic program that NSF coordinates on behalf of the U.S. Government. 

To promote scientific progress, NSF bears a critical responsibility 

for providing scientists with access to the oceans. And, in particular, to the polar oceans. These waters comprise only 10 percent 

of the global ocean area, but have a disproportionate influence on 

our climate. In recent decades, the polar oceans have undergone 

wide-ranging physical, chemical, and biological changes, which scientists are eager to study. Moreover, they are among the least-explored parts of our planet and are ripe for new discoveries. 

My oral testimony will focus on the needs of the U.S. research 

community for polar ocean access from NSF’s perspective. I will 

then offer brief comments on the recently passed House version of 

the U.S. Coast Guard’s authorization bill, H.R. 2838. 

Mr. Chairman, ice capable research platforms are essential to 

keeping the U.S. at the forefront of polar research. A number of nations have recently constructed—as you have heard this morning 

already—or are in the process of constructing new ice capable 

ships. Absent the U.S. Polar Class Icebreakers, only Russia currently has the heavy icebreaking capability to access the Arctic 

Ocean in winter. Only Russia and Sweden currently have proven 

capability to provide access for resupply of two of our Nation’s 

three year-round Antarctic research stations. 

NSF is providing funding for the Sikuliaq, a light-duty icebreaker that will launch in 2014. This vessel will be used to study 

the vital ecosystems and ocean processes in the resource-rich waters of the Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea. The only other U.S. Government-owned research icebreaker is the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter 

Healy, a 12-year-old vessel that can routinely operate in ice up to 

about 5 feet thick, and on which we sponsor Arctic marine research. 

For ice capable platforms in the southern ocean, NSF-supported 

scientists rely on two leased vessels, Nathaniel B. Palmer, and the 

Lawrence M. Gould, both owned by Edison Chouest Offshore. These 

U.S. research ships cannot reach some scientifically important 

areas in the ice on their own. Joint expeditions with the Swedish 

heavy icebreaker Oden allowed this access in recent times. However, earlier this year Sweden concluded that it needed Oden at 

home. Our only domestic alternative would require the Coast 

Guard to redeploy Healy from the Arctic, where it is in heavy demand by scientists. My Coast Guard colleagues can speak more 

28 

knowledgeably about how an Antarctic redeployment of Healy 

would affect their missions. 

So, as you can see, NSF relies on icebreakers to keep us active 

at the frontiers of polar marine research. NSF also relies on heavy 

icebreakers to maintain a viable Antarctic research program for the 

Nation. As articulated in Presidential Memorandum 664, and subsequently reaffirmed in a series of Presidential decision directives, 

U.S. policy calls for year-round U.S. presence at three research stations in Antarctica. Maintaining this presence is essential to U.S. 

geopolitical, diplomatic, and scientific interests. Our presence also 

ensures the U.S. a leading role in governance through the Antarctic 

Treaty. NSF support is relied upon by other Federal science agencies to carry out Antarctic research. 

For many years, the U.S. Coast Guard annually opened a vital 

supply channel in the sea ice to McMurdo Station, which serves as 

NSF’s logistics hub. Without resupply, both McMurdo and South 

Pole Station would have to close. When the Polar Star and Polar 

Sea approached the end of their design lives, NSF began contracting for support from other countries. Our current contract with 

Russia’s Murmansk shipping company will continue for 3 years. 

But as you might imagine, Mr. Chairman, NSF would prefer to rely 

on U.S. assets for such a vital mission. 

Thus, NSF was disappointed to learn that the House-passed 

Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2011 called for 

decommissioning of Polar Star within 3 years. We have been hoping that Polar Star would be available for 7 to 10 years for 

icebreaking services, once the ongoing renovations were completed. 

So, Mr. Chairman, committee members, U.S. researchers have 

led the world in polar science. I refer you to my written statement 

that highlights polar marine science objectives of global relevance. 

U.S. scientific preeminence can only continue with appropriate 

research and logistical support. NSF will continue to work with the 

Coast Guard and other Government agencies to develop a longer 

term solution to the Nation’s icebreaker needs. 

Thank you for your time. 

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Doctor. Stephen Caldwell. 

Mr. CALDWELL. Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Larsen, 

other members of the committee, thank you for having GAO up 

here to talk about Coast Guard Arctic operations. 

My statement today is based on a report we did in September 

2010 with recent updates. There will be three areas of focus. First 

will be Coast Guard efforts to determine the requirements, second 

about icebreakers, and then third about interagency coordination. 

Our 2010 report described a lot of activities the Coast Guard had 

to identify its requirements. These included deploying assets up to 

the Arctic. It also included seasonal forward operating locations, 

which we have already talked about. Then, after the publication of 

our report, the ‘‘High Latitude Study’’ was released. The ‘‘High 

Latitude Study’’ had much more details, in terms of Coast Guard’s 

options and plans for the future. This study is contractor-written, 

the Coast Guard has not necessarily made decisions on which options are best. 

In my written statement, in appendix two and three, we summarize some of the key points of the ‘‘High Latitude Study.’’ The 

29 

‘‘High Latitude Study’’ identified some of the most important missions in the Arctic, and which ones were most impacted by some 

of the deficiencies and gaps in Coast Guard capabilities. 

The study then looked at a variety of force mixes. It looked at 

a current baseline, as well as six different force mixes, and looked 

at the ability of those force mixes to actually reduce risk in the Arctic. And it also looked at some of the costs associated with those 

different force mixes. 

Regarding icebreakers, there has been three recent studies to 

look at the icebreakers, including the ‘‘High Latitude Study.’’ There 

was also a recent Coast Guard icebreaker recapitalization report, 

again done by a contractor. And it has already been mentioned 

there was a DHS IG report last year on icebreakers. 

All three of these reports discuss the current state of Polar Icebreakers. Only one of our three Polar Icebreakers is currently operational. The two contractor studies, both the recapitalization report 

and the ‘‘High Latitude Study,’’ called for new icebreakers to be 

built, with options ranging from 2 new icebreakers, heavy class, up 

to 10 new icebreakers, with 6 of those being heavy class, and 4 of 

those being the medium class, which would be needed to meet the 

complete suite of U.S. Government requirements, including those of 

the Department of Defense. 

Obviously, new icebreakers will cost a lot of money. Even a single icebreaker currently doesn’t fit within the Coast Guard budget 

framework, as we have talked about. The estimated cost of some 

of the options I have talked about from the 2 to 10 icebreakers, 

range from $2 billion to $7 billion. 

For a number of years, GAO has been helping this committee 

and other committees look at Coast Guard’s funding for acquisitions, including the Deepwater Program, and talked about how 

those programs are really crowding out some of the other important acquisition needs, as well as polar and domestic icebreaking. 

The recapitalization report that was recently done came to the 

same conclusion, that the funding was not available within Coast 

Guard’s budget, and made some other suggestions, such as having 

DOD fund the new icebreakers. That is how the most recent icebreaker, the Healy, was funded, out of the Department of Defense’s 

U.S. Navy shipbuilding budget. 

Regarding interagency coordination, our 2010 report had quite a 

lot of detail on Coast Guard efforts to coordinate with not only 

other Federal agencies, but the State, local, private sector, native 

groups, as well as the international organizations. Our assessment 

was generally pretty positive on the level of that coordination. 

Since publication of that report, Coast Guard is in a new coordination effort with the Navy. This is called the Capabilities Assessment Working Group. And this group is looking at for both the 

Navy and the Coast Guard together, what are some of their shortterm investment priorities. That group is planning to put a white 

paper out later this year. 

As part of other work we are doing for the Armed Services Committee, we are looking more at that group, and we will report on 

that early next year. 

And, in closing, I will be happy to respond to any questions. 

Thank you. 

30 

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Caldwell. Mr. Whitcomb. 

Mr. WHITCOMB. Chairman Young, Ranking Member Larsen, distinguished members of the subcommittee, my name is Dave 

Whitcomb, I am the chief operating officer at Vigor Industrial, the 

largest private sector construction, repair, and maintenance company in the Pacific Northwest. 

Through top Pacific shipyards in Seattle which Vigor acquired 

earlier this year, our shipyards have been closely involved with the 

maintenance and repair of the Coast Guard icebreakers Polar Star 

and Polar Sea, since they were commissioned in the late 1970s. We 

have also maintained the medium Coast Guard cutter icebreaker, 

The Healy. In my testimony today I want to describe the condition 

of the existing ships, what can be done economically to ensure that 

those assets continue to perform their missions, and what the alternative of constructing new heavy Polar Icebreakers would entail 

and cost. 

Let me begin with the single most important point of my testimony: the hulls and frames of the Polar Star and the Polar Sea 

are perfectly sound and capable of continuing to perform 

icebreaking for the foreseeable future. 

To fully appreciate why this matters, and what the unique value 

of these ships truly is, it helps to understand what goes into building them. The internal frames of the ships are comparable to the 

studs or the girders on a building. On the Polar Sea and the Polar 

Star the frames of the vessel are about 16 inches apart. On a National Security Cutter—let me back up. 

Those are—they are 30 inches deep, they have a 4-inch face 

frame at the top of the frame, and that leaves an effective space 

between them of 12 inches. By comparison, a National Security 

Cutter spacing of the frames is 27 inches in the extreme bow of the 

vessel, and 49 inches in the rest of the ship. It gives you an idea 

of the difference in the build of the two vessels. 

On the Polar Sea and the Polar Star, the steel plating in the ice 

belt of the hull is 13⁄4 inches thick, compared to 5⁄16 and 3⁄8 inches 

thick on a National Security Cutter. I have two pieces of steel that 

I would like to pass forward to the committee afterwards, to give 

you an idea of the difference of those two vessels. 

Consider what it takes to fabricate and bend steel that is 13⁄4

inches thick. Also consider that to weld the framing to the hull 

plating, the steel plating has to be heated to high temperatures, 

then highly skilled welders have to go in to those heated and confined spaces and weld that steel together. It is arduous, difficult, 

and expensive work. Indeed, on the initial build at Lockheed, some 

of the most experienced workers simply walked off the job because 

the conditions were so challenging. 

What all this means is that it is extremely expensive and demanding to build heavy Polar Icebreakers, something our Nation 

has not done now for more than 30 years. That is why the existing 

ships are unique and hard to replace. 

I want to emphasize that we do believe there is a need to build 

new heavy icebreakers, and we urge the Congress and the administration to work together to quickly authorize and fund such a 

project. This position is also held by the Shipbuilders Council of 

31 

America, which represents more than 50 companies and 120 shipyards across America. 

But as members of this committee can appreciate, if even the 

Congress immediately began the process of authorizing and funding new heavy icebreakers, fully functioning replacements would 

not likely be mission ready for 10 years or longer. What is more, 

realistic estimates indicate that the cost of a new heavy icebreaker 

would likely be at least $1 billion. 

Until Congress and the administration provide for such funding, 

and the replacements are actually in the water, we must have the 

capability to complete the vital missions of our Polar Icebreakers— 

that our Polar Icebreakers have performed for decades. 

The good news is that the Coast Guard cutter, Polar Star, is now 

nearing completion of its reactivation, which will prepare it to function effectively for at least a decade or more, assuming regular 

maintenance. The other good news is that the Polar Sea also can 

be restored to full mission readiness with a comparable longevity 

at relatively modest cost, and in a reasonably short period of time. 

Vigor Industrial estimates that bringing the Polar Sea up to an operationally capable condition would require approximately $11 

million. We base this on the fact that we have done comparable 

work on the Polar Star already, and are well aware of what is required. My written statement also includes details of that estimate. 

This work would require approximately 2 years to complete, and 

might well be finished sooner, dependent upon the availability of 

key components. 

The take-home message is that for just over 1 percent of the cost 

of a new vessel, and at a 2-year versus 10-year minimum time horizon, the United States of America would have a second fully functioning heavy icebreaker able to complete vital missions under our 

own flag for at least a decade. 

Others today have spoken of the dangers inherent in relinquishing our icebreaking capacity to former adversaries or economic competitors. Our message today, from a shipbuilding and repair perspective, is simple: there is an affordable, proven, prompt, 

and practical alternative that should not be squandered. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today. I have 

provided additional information in my written testimony, and 

would be glad to answer your questions. 

Mr. YOUNG. Rear Admiral Garrett. 

Admiral GARRETT. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Larsen, and distinguished members of the committee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing. 

As a Coast Guard officer, I spent much of my career serving in 

the Nation’s multimission Polar Icebreaker fleet, operating in both 

polar regions, as well as supporting these operations in staff assignments ashore. For most of my career, polar operations were 

usually conducted for defense support and science programs sponsored by other agencies. But transformational changes occurring in 

the Arctic now extensively affect most of the Coast Guard’s statutory responsibilities. 

The Coast Guard has made a valiant effort, as Admiral Papp described, to project an Arctic presence deploying cutters, boats, aircraft, and specialized teams to Arctic Alaska to test equipment caVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:55 May 03, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\CG\2011\12-1-1~1\71416.TXT JEAN
32 

pabilities and procedures, and enhance Arctic operational experience. Unfortunately, the most critical and effective capability that 

the Coast Guard could apply to its increasing Arctic responsibilities 

is largely missing from the scene. At a time of growing need, our 

Polar Icebreaker capabilities are steadily drifting into obsolescence. 

With only the icebreaker Healy in operational condition during 

the upcoming year, consequences of icebreaker disinvestment are 

beginning to emerge. The Coast Guard has been unable to deploy 

an icebreaker for Arctic multimission purposes for over 2 years, 

and planned science missions for Polar Sea have had to be canceled. Perhaps most ominously, a Coast Guard icebreaker will not 

be available for critical U.S. Antarctic program support 2 months 

from now. 

When Healy is engaged in dedicated science support or undergoing maintenance, the Coast Guard has no Polar Icebreakers for 

other Arctic or Antarctic contingencies or missions. These mission 

gaps will be somewhat mitigated in 2013, at least for the short 

term, when Polar Star is scheduled to return to service. 

Although I was privileged to serve in both Polar Class ships, and 

am very proud of the 70 years they have collectively served the Nation, the Coast Guard will nevertheless be depending on 1960s 

technology that is expensive to operate and subject to the risk of 

additional failure. 

During the ‘‘High Latitude Study,’’ as we considered present and 

future Arctic demands on the Coast Guard, it became evident to me 

that the Coast Guard’s lower 48 footprint—that is geographically 

distributed logistics bases, boat stations, air stations, and sector offices—would be an extremely expensive and inappropriate blueprint for needs in Arctic Alaska. 

Moving sea ice, shallow coastal waters, and permafrost make 

vessel mooring facilities, as one example, very difficult to engineer. 

Moreover, the seasonality of operational demand and long distances would also make fixed installations less efficient. Instead, 

again, as Admiral Papp mentioned, a Polar Icebreaker patrolling 

offshore provides an ideal arctic mobile base. With helicopters, 

boats, cargo space, heavy lift cranes, extra berthing, configurable 

mission spaces, and command control and communications facilities, an icebreaker can respond to contingencies and be augmented 

with special teams and equipment, as needed. 

This is not to deny that some shore infrastructure would be needed, but an icebreaker can move to where the action is, carry out 

Coast Guard missions, engage with local communities and other 

Federal, State, and local agencies, exercise response plans, and simultaneously provide a visible national presence. 

What is clearly called for is a continued level of icebreaker capability to accommodate the developing Arctic demand for Coast 

Guard services, as well as to fulfill the need for broader national 

sovereignty and presence. We must maintain near-term capabilities, keeping Polar Star and Polar Sea available for polar operations, and move forward to build two new icebreakers that can 

meet future needs more effectively and more efficiently. 

These are among the recommendations of the National Research 

Council’s 2007 report on icebreaker capability. The subsequent 

‘‘High Latitude Study’’ and icebreaker recapitalization analysis furVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:55 May 03, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\CG\2011\12-1-1~1\71416.TXT JEAN
33 

ther inform the issue and provide a sound basis for an icebreaker 

acquisition effort. 

A review of U.S. requirements would not be complete without examining how other nations are confronting developments in the 

Arctic. Our declining polar capabilities place us distinctly in the 

minority, as has been mentioned earlier. The other Arctic nations 

are actively acquiring new ice capable assets, most notably the 

multivessel building programs of Russia and our Canadian allies. 

Non-Arctic nations, most notably China, are building icebreaking 

ships and have announced plans for increased Arctic involvement. 

Even smaller nations, such as South Korea, South Africa, and 

Chile have recently acquired or are planning new polar ships. 

In summary, I believe that if the United States is to protect its 

Arctic interests and retain its leadership role in both polar regions, 

the Coast Guard must have the ability to be present in those places 

today and in the future. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for 

considering these important issues, and for the opportunity to be 

here today. 

Mr. YOUNG. I thank the panel. Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Garrett, can 

you talk a little bit about your assessment of the pros and cons of 

leasing versus owning? 

Admiral GARRETT. Yes, sir. The perspective I could offer was 

when I was a member of the Commandant’s staff back in the late 

1980s here in Washington. We were directed to pursue exactly the 

same sort of lease versus buy analysis. And, in fact, the Coast 

Guard had a two-track procurement strategy to compare leasing a 

new Polar Icebreaker or buying it. 

After over a year of analysis, studies, discussion with other agencies, looking around, what became clear was: number one, there 

was no off-the-shelf asset readily available; and secondly, that in 

the long run when you cost it all out and calculate the value of the 

stream of payments—leasing would actually cost more. 

And when we did the recapitalization analysis recently we also 

reviewed leasing again. I think the findings in that report indicate 

leasing is more expensive, over the life of the vessel, by about 12 

percent. 

Mr. LARSEN. Why is that? Or why did you find that? 

Admiral GARRETT. A couple of technical things. First of all, whoever builds the ship—and again, this would have to be a ship built 

for the Coast Guard, since there is not something off the shelf out 

there that you could lease—whoever builds it has to raise capital. 

And nobody can raise capital more inexpensively than the Federal 

Government. 

Secondly, whoever leases the ship is obviously going to want to 

make a profit on that lease. As Admiral Papp referred to leasing 

a car, you know, there is going to be a profit involved. And so, if 

you take the net present value of all those payments, you come out 

with a more expensive package if you are comparing the same vessel. 

The other issue I think is more intangible, and that is just the 

fact that we are really not talking about an auxiliary, like the Navy 

leases, a supply ship or something like that. We are talking about 

34 

a frontline Coast Guard capital asset, if you will, a capital ship 

that is going to be doing frontline Government missions, projecting 

U.S. sovereignty. And, as you know, the Navy doesn’t lease those 

kind of ships for its frontline fleet, and the Coast Guard doesn’t 

lease those kind of ships for its basic mission capabilities, and that 

is what we are really talking about, in terms of the ship we need 

here. 

So, while a lease may look attractive, I think there are several 

things that indicate it may not be the right way to go. And I think 

that is what we came down to in the recent analysis. And again, 

this was all documented in the past. That late 1980s analysis was 

resummarized in the President’s 1990 report to Congress, which 

basically says leasing is more expensive and is not the way to go 

for a new ship. And that report cleared the way for the ship that 

actually became the Healy. 

Mr. LARSEN. OK. One final question for you, and then Mr. 

Caldwell, I want you to answer it as well. But it has—I think in 

your testimony or in the report that you are associated with you 

did conclude—I don’t know if it is a conclusion, but you did note 

that it is expensive to have basing in the lower 48, relative to Arctic Alaska, and that is a cost of operation for us thinking about how 

to think about a footprint up there. Is that about right? 

Admiral GARRETT. Yes, sir. As we did the ‘‘High Latitude Study’’ 

and looked at how can the Coast Guard carry out its responsibilities and provide the services to the people that live in Arctic Alaska, that lower 48 footprint where we build lots of little stations and 

air stations and have lots of physical infrastructure, is going to be 

very hard to reproduce up there. Very shallow coastal waters, ice 

that moves in and out seasonally, permafrost, all those kind of 

things, and then just expensive building costs make some kind of 

a permanent footprint very expensive. 

As Admiral Papp mentioned, having a mobile way of coming in 

and carrying out those seasonal missions as you need to do them 

may be a more cost-effective way of doing it, over the long term. 

This is not to say you don’t need some infrastructure like communications and perhaps some aircraft support, things like that. 

Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Caldwell, did you all look at that in this GAO 

study? I don’t recall—— 

Mr. CALDWELL. We haven’t done an independent look at the different footprint options. We did look pretty closely at the ‘‘High 

Latitude Study’’ and what they laid out. I think that the Corps of 

Engineers or people with that kind of expertise would be the ones 

to look at it, in terms of the actual cost of a deepwater port that 

you could use year-round. You have very shallow waters once you 

get up to the Arctic Circle and the northern slope of Alaska. Because of the very shallow draft there, building a deepwater port is 

a challenge. 

The ‘‘High Latitude Study’’ did provide some options. Some of 

those are seasonal. As Admiral Papp said, there is a seasonal nature to the risks up there, and the activity up there, and we don’t 

foresee that as changing for some time. The oil exploration is the 

one aspect, once you get into the production phase, which would 

presumably go year-round. 

35 

Finally, you need to think about what kind of Coast Guard presence is needed. You can provide a search and rescue presence with 

some kind of aircraft assets. But for more serious or prolonged operations up there, you are going to need surface assets. And there 

would be some advantages to those being mobile. The ‘‘High Latitude Study’’ actually looked at where you would post those assets. 

Some would be in the Beaufort Sea, some would be toward Barrow 

and the opening of the Bering Sea. Some would be in the Chukchi 

Sea. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. One final question right now—I am sure the 

chairman has a few questions and I will defer to him after this last 

question. But for Mr. Whitcomb, this $11 million number caught us—you 

know, it is a very surprising number that you are making the 

point, that for $11 million you can get the ship out and running. 

But does that only include making it operational to be on the water 

and functioning? Because it has to be outfitted with the systems to, 

you know, be integrated in communications systems with the Coast 

Guard, its—are you just looking at it from a strictly shipbuilding 

perspective, a ship that can get out in the water and go from point 

A to point B? Because there is more cost to—for a cutter, there is 

more cost to that, from our perspective. 

Mr. WHITCOMB. The $11 million number is based on the work 

that we are currently doing on the Polar Star. So, as it relates to 

the communications or electronics of the vessel, it is not specific to 

those items. But the numbers are—the similar numbers that we 

are using currently to put the Polar Star back into service. 

Mr. LARSEN. So—— 

Mr. WHITCOMB. So it is the—it is mechanical-type systems. 

Mr. LARSEN. OK. Right, OK. That is clear. I note that you have 

an estimate as part of your written testimony. Probably want to get 

a little more flesh on that for us to consider. 

Mr. WHITCOMB. I can get you that and forward it to you. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, that would be great. And I probably have some 

more questions, but I will defer to the chairman. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Whitcomb, I am anxious to see that, too, because 

what I have been told, $11 million basically gets the ship reengined, and that is all it does. You don’t put in new air conditioning or—that is an old ship. And it might be floatable, it might 

be able to do the duty, but I am not sure I would want to put the 

crew back on it. 

That is something we might want to consider, because if we can 

do that, we have to look at that aspect. Because we are not going 

to build any new ships very soon in this Congress, and we should 

do it. But we do need that capability. Heating breaks down, what 

have we got? So my question to you is that $11 million is—you may be doing 

it to Polar Star, but are you upgrading anything? The galley, or 

anything else? 

Mr. WHITCOMB. Sir, the $11 million, if you want me—would you like me to go through the highlights of that $11 million? 

Mr. YOUNG. Yes, yes. 

Mr. WHITCOMB. It is $5 million for the engine overall, it is—there 

is a chunk of it in there for replacing the obsolete cranes that are 

36 

on there. And there is $3 million for completing the modifications 

to the controllable pitch propellers. A prototype was already done 

on the Polar Sea, and that modification is currently being done on 

the Polar Star. And those are the key components. 

The Polar Sea went through a refit in 2006, or finished a refit 

in 2006. So some—I don’t know the overall condition of things like 

heating and air conditioning and some of the inhabitability pieces. 

We could look at that, if you would like further information on it. 

Mr. YOUNG. I think we ought to, because I wasn’t excited about 

decommissioning that ship. I think it probably came from the Department of Homeland Security, which is not one of my favorite 

agencies, I have to say that. And to take and have a backup is crucially important. We are going to have the Polar Star and the 

Healy, and we should have the other one, because things do happen. 

Admiral, do you want to—— 

Admiral GARRETT. Yes, Mr. Chairman, could I comment on that? 

Mr. YOUNG. Yes. 

Admiral GARRETT. The Polar Sea, when it came up with the engine cylinder problems a year-and-a-half ago or so, was fully operational. And, in fact, it had undergone, as Mr. Whitcomb said, $35 

million to $40 million worth of upgrades. So it was a substantially 

upgraded ship at the time the engine problems laid it up. And it 

was fully operational and actually doing Arctic missions while the 

Polar Star was in a layup condition at the pier. 

Just before the Polar Sea’s engine problems were discovered, the 

Polar Star had gone into the yard to begin this full refurbishment 

work. But the Polar Sea has already had a substantial amount of 

that. And the items that Mr. Whitcomb identifies are the last remaining increments of those upgrades. 

So it is not like you have an old ship that you have got to start 

from scratch with. You basically have a fully operational ship that 

is lacking some engine overhauls and a couple of other items that 

the Star is getting in her refit. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, I am happy to hear that. I mean we may 

relook at this issue, because like I say, if we have to have that 

backup and all it takes is $11 million, that is not even a spit drop. 

And make an operational vessel, as long as it has got refitting to 

take place to do it. I mean that—this is new to me, and I do thank 

both of you for that, because that is something that can be done, 

you know. 

Mr. Larsen, I am about ready to get out of here. You got any 

more questions? 

Mr. LARSEN. For Mr. Caldwell, in your testimony, in the last part 

of it, you consider the interagency cooperation and you mention 

some studies or—not even studies, white papers—that might come 

up in the next year, early next year. Could you review those for the 

subcommittee, and what we should expect to see? 

Mr. CALDWELL. The Capabilities Assessment Working Group 

white paper is not done yet, so we have—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. 

Mr. CALDWELL [continuing]. Not reviewed it. We expect, since it 

was supposed to be out late this year, that by the time myself and 

37 

my colleagues on GAO’s defense team do that report in January, 

we will have a better picture of what that might be. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, could you just review what that is, again, for 

us? 

Mr. CALDWELL. It is called the Capabilities Assessment Working 

Group, and it is a group of the Department of Defense and Coast 

Guard, trying to identify what are the most critical short-term investment needs. I don’t know whether they will make recommendations as specific as which budget year, and which agency’s budget 

will pay for such investments. 

But obviously, those are the key questions. I think we know what 

needs to be done, in the short term—or in the longer term. It is 

just, at this point, a question of figuring out how we are going to 

pay for it, and under what mode of ownership. 

Mr. LARSEN. All right. Thank you. 

Mr. YOUNG. I want to thank the panel. You have been informative, and we have got a problem; we will try to solve it. 

This meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:53 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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