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S. HRG. 112–345 

MAKING OUR ROADS SAFER: REAUTHORIZATION 

OF THE MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY PROGRAMS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION 

AND MERCHANT MARINE INFRASTRUCTURE, 

SAFETY, AND SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 21, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

MARK WARNER, Virginia 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas, Ranking 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

PATRICK J. TOOMEY, Pennsylvania 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEAN HELLER, Nevada 

ELLEN L. DONESKI, Staff Director 

JAMES REID, Deputy Staff Director 

BRUCE H. ANDREWS, General Counsel 

TODD BERTOSON, Republican Staff Director 

JARROD THOMPSON, Republican Deputy Staff Director 

REBECCA SEIDEL, Republican General Counsel and Chief Investigator 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AND MERCHANT 

MARINE INFRASTRUCTURE, SAFETY, AND SECURITY 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey, 

Chairman 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

MARK WARNER, Virginia 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Ranking 

Member 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

PATRICK J. TOOMEY, Pennsylvania 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEAN HELLER, Nevada 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on July 21, 2011 ............................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Lautenberg .......................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Wicker .................................................................................. 2 

Statement of Senator Ayotte ................................................................................... 3 

Statement of Senator Pryor .................................................................................... 4 

Statement of Senator Boozman .............................................................................. 5 

Statement of Senator Snowe ................................................................................... 68 

WITNESSES

Hon. Anne S. Ferro, Administrator, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation ........................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7 

Hon. Christopher A. Hart, Vice Chairman, National Transportation Safety 

Board ..................................................................................................................... 13 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 15 

Daniel England, Vice Chairman, Board of Directors, National Trucking Associations and Chairman of the Board and President, C.R. England ................. 22 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 24 

Joe Rajkovacz, Director of Regulatory Affairs, Owner-Operator Independent 

Drivers Association .............................................................................................. 32 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 33 

Jacqueline S. Gillan, Vice President, Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety 

(Advocates) ............................................................................................................ 39 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 41 

APPENDIX

Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Anne S. Ferro by: 

Hon. Claire McCaskill ...................................................................................... 75 

Hon. Amy Klobuchar ........................................................................................ 75 

Hon. John Thune .............................................................................................. 76 

Hon. Roger F. Wicker ....................................................................................... 79 

Response to written questions submitted to Daniel England by: 

Hon. Claire McCaskill ...................................................................................... 79 

Hon. Roger F. Wicker ....................................................................................... 81 

Response to written questions submitted to Joe Rajkovacz by: 

Hon. Claire McCaskill ...................................................................................... 82 

Hon. Roger F. Wicker ....................................................................................... 83 

Response to written question submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to: 

Jacqueline S. Gillian ........................................................................................ 85 

(1) 

MAKING OUR ROADS SAFER: 

REAUTHORIZATION OF THE MOTOR CARRIER 

SAFETY PROGRAMS 

THURSDAY, JULY 21, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AND

MERCHANT MARINE INFRASTRUCTURE, SAFETY, AND SECURITY,

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m. in room 

SR–253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you. We’re going to bring this hearing to order. 

I welcome everyone to today’s hearing on reauthorizing the 

FMCSA—Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, which 

helps protect the public by making sure that commercial buses and 

trucks share our roads safely. 

In 2009, trucking companies transported more than 16 billion 

tons of freight, certainly making trucks a major part of our economy. Intercity buses represent an important mode of transportation. Motorcoaches provided more than $720 million in passenger 

trips in 2009. And while most drivers and companies put safety 

first, crashes are still happening, and when they do, the consequences can be devastating. 

In 2009, 70 people a week, on average, lost their lives; 3,600 people died in truck and bus-related accidents. Just this past weekend, 

a tour bus headed from Washington, D.C. to Niagara Falls crashed 

into a wood median in New York, killing two and injuring 35 people. 

This has been a bad year, one of the worst, for bus crashes, with 

7 major crashes that have killed 27 people. And the loss of these 

lives is unacceptable, and we’ve got to do something to stop that 

from occurring, and we’ve got to do more to help FMCSA protect 

Americans from dangers on our roadways. 

And that’s why I’m soon going to introduce a bill to strengthen 

safety regulations by making sure that only the safest motor carriers and drivers enter the industry, improving the laws and the 

regulations that govern drivers and vehicles, and giving the government the tools it needs to take unsafe drivers and carriers out 

2 

of the industry. My bill would require drivers to receive more training before they’re granted a license to drive a truck or bus, and it 

would require more companies to demonstrate that their drivers 

understand the rules before they hit the road. 

In addition, this bill would keep unsafe drivers from getting behind the wheel by requiring buses and trucks to have electronic onboard recorders to do better monitoring, and manage the amount 

of time that drivers spend on duty. We must not permit unqualified 

drivers, drivers that are not fully trained, qualified, and alert. They 

should not be on the road. 

And, finally, my bill would also give the FMCSA the tools it 

needs to kick out bad actors, and to identify and remove so-called 

reincarnated carriers that change their companies’ names but do 

nothing to improve their safety. 

The bottom line is that trucks and buses remain essential parts 

of our transportation network, but we must work harder to make 

sure that safety never takes a back seat. 

And I look forward to hearing from today’s witnesses about how 

we can work together to make our roads safer, not only for the 

drivers and the passengers aboard our trucks and buses, but for all 

the travelers who share the road with them. 

And, with that, I call on Senator Ayotte. Did I pronounce it 

right? 

Senator AYOTTE. Ayotte. But, it’s—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. It was, yes. Thank you. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I didn’t want to do it, well, the more we 

meet like this, the more familiar I’ll become. 

Senator AYOTTE. Exactly. Thank you, Chairman. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Please. 

Senator AYOTTE. I appreciate it. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. If you would. 

Senator AYOTTE. And, I think the Ranking Member is here, so 

I would defer to the Ranking Member. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. In his own—present. All right. 

Senator AYOTTE. Yes. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. That’s respect. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you. 

Ranking Member, Mr. Wicker. 

Senator WICKER. Are we in the—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG. We’re—— 

Senator WICKER.—opening statement phase? 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Yes. We haven’t heard yet from the witnesses. Yes. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER F. WICKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI 

Senator WICKER. Well, thank you very much. And I’m, I had sent 

word that I’d be a few moments late, but expected the hearing to 

go ahead. I don’t know if it’s respect on the part of Senator Ayotte, 

but I’ll take it, if it, indeed, amounted to that. 

Thank you for calling this hearing today, Senator. 

3 

This is my first hearing as Ranking Member of this subcommittee, and I look forward to examining a very important issue 

involving the safety of the Nation’s trucking industry. 

The trucking industry is vital to the health of the American economy. According to the American Trucking Association, there are 3 

million large trucks on the roads of the United States, and the industry employs 8.9 million workers. 

Trucks carry 69 percent of the total U.S. freight tonnage, and commercial trucking represents a staggering $645 billion industry. 

Without a well-functioning trucking industry, commerce in this 

country would suffer severe repercussions. 

The trucking industry is not only large, it is very diverse. Trucking companies range from multi-billion dollar international companies like FedEx and UPS, to small independently-owned businesses 

that may own only a single truck. New rules can have dramatically 

different impacts on each. And this dichotomy is important to bear 

in mind when we make changes to the regulatory framework. To 

that end, I’m glad we have representatives from both ends of the 

trucking industry spectrum to hear from today. 

Truck safety is important to everyone, because we all share the 

same roads. While we can always do more to prevent accidents, the 

trucking industry safety record is strong, and it continues to improve, with the incidents of fatalities falling to 1.64 per 100 million 

miles, as opposed to more than 4.5 per 100 million miles in the 

1970s—a major achievement. 

The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, which was created only a little more than a decade ago, has certainly helped keep 

the focus on safety, and extended the strong safety record. The 

Federal Government has an important and necessary role to play 

when it comes to promoting transportation safety, and truck safety 

deserves our attention. 

However, Congress must take great care when creating new regulatory frameworks to allow also for economic growth and productivity. Make no mistake—our actions as policymakers are felt 

across the economy, and that is why it is essential that we strike 

an appropriate balance between these dual goals. 

So, Chairman Lautenberg, again, thank you for holding this 

hearing, and I look forward to hearing from our distinguished 

panel. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you. 

Senator Ayotte. 

STATEMENT OF HON. KELLY AYOTTE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE 

Senator AYOTTE. I want to thank the Chairman, and certainly, 

the Ranking Member. It was out of respect, I want you to know. 

I appreciate the witnesses being here today. This is a very important topic, and certainly, motor carrier safety is extremely important to my constituents, and all of us. 

We have at least 3,000 small trucking businesses operating 

across New England, and I look forward to hearing, particularly, 

from the small truck operators today, as their expertise is critical 

when we look at Federal safety standards. I appreciate what the 

Ranking Member said in terms of the impact of regulations being 

4 

different based on the size of the carrier. And, representing over 93 

percent of the industry, small business motor carriers have a vested interest in highway safety. Any safety-related incidents could 

cost them not only their lives, but their entire livelihood, of course. 

And many of the Federal safety regulations, while well-intentioned, 

have been much more burdensome on the small trucking community. 

And an estimated 73 percent of the value of all freight shipped 

throughout our country is transported by trucks, and these trucks 

service 80 percent of our Nation’s communities. Economic strain on 

this delivery system can affect our entire economy, and so this is 

why it’s so important that we get the balance correct in terms of 

regulations that we pass. 

I also am concerned about a couple of proposals that have been 

brought forward. One of them would mandate both speed limiters 

and electronic onboard recorders. I think that there are issues that 

have to be addressed in terms of speed limiters having the potential to, in some instances, decrease safety on the road by taking 

away control from the driver, and also preventing the safe flow of 

traffic, in some instances. Electronic onboard recorders may cost a 

significant amount of money to install, and questions remain in 

terms of whether—in some instances—they provide more safety 

than traditional written records. I think these are very important 

issues. Before we mandate these types of products from Congress, 

these issues must be addressed. 

I’m also concerned about the proposed changes to the hours of 

service rules. Under current rules, truck-related injuries and fatalities have dropped more than 30 percent, to the lowest levels in recorded history. The proposed changes in the hours of service rules, 

in my view, fail the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration’s 

own cost-benefit analysis, and could result in significant productivity loss to the tune of $2 billion annually, according to the Department of Transportation. 

So, what I’m interested in hearing about today is, we all certainly support efforts for safety and responsibility, but we need to 

do so in a way that also allows a very important industry, the 

motor carrier industry, to be able to thrive, and particularly, that 

we don’t put an undue burden on our small businesses, which are 

very, very important in my state and, I know, across the country. 

So, thank you. I want to thank all the witnesses for being here 

today, and I look forward to hearing from you. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you. 

We’ll go side to side. 

So, Senator Pryor. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARK PRYOR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

holding this hearing. 

I would like to say that this is a very important and timely hearing here in Congress, to try to work on a multi-year surface transportation reauthorization bill. I look forward to reviewing the 

FMCSA and the industry’s efforts to improve commercial motor veVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:49 Apr 18, 2012 Jkt 073786 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\DOCS\73786.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
5 

hicle safety, the NTSB recommendations, and how states have assisted in motor carrier safety efforts. 

So, I’m just interested, and, all the things that we have talked 

about—we’ve been talking about a database for drug testing, which 

we think would be important, an important improvement, and we 

have some other ideas. 

So, I look forward to being part of this dialogue, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for doing this hearing today. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you. 

Senator Boozman. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN BOOZMAN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS 

Senator BOOZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator 

Wicker, for bringing us this important hearing today. 

I’d also like to thank our witnesses for being here and testifying. 

Motor carrier safety is an extremely important issue for Arkansas and for the Nation as a whole. Arkansas is home to several 

large trucking companies, and also many small owner-operators. 

One of these owner-operators, Michael Caswell, of Centerton, Arkansas, was recently recognized by one of the groups testifying 

today—the Owners-Operators Independent Drivers Association— 

for 18 years of safe, accident-free driving of a commercial tractortrailer. And so, I’d like to extend my congratulations, and I know 

Senator Pryor also would like to extend his congratulations for this 

feat. 

Senator Lautenberg, you and I listened to testimony this morning at the EPW committee hearing on highway funding and reauthorization issues, and I look forward to listening again this afternoon as we talk about reauthorization of the Motor Carrier Safety 

Program. 

I yield back. Thank you. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much. 

And now we turn to our witnesses. We have a distinguished 

group of witnesses here. 

And, now, Ms. Ferro, we’ll call on you first. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ANNE S. FERRO, ADMINISTRATOR, 

FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Ms. FERRO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Wicker, 

and members of the Committee, the Subcommittee. Thank you very 

much for inviting me to speak today. 

Eleven years ago, some of you noted, when Congress established 

the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, it recognized that 

our Nation needed a consistent and strong set of standards to bring 

commercial vehicle operations to the safest level possible. By design, FMCSA is not about Washington. It’s about the front lines in 

our states and hometown communities, where the overwhelming 

majority of our employees are boots-to-the-ground in partnerships 

with State and local law enforcement, because that’s where the 

commercial vehicle activity is. 

We take our safety-first mission with complete commitment, passion and enthusiasm, because we know that lives are on the line. 

6 

Death and injury from crashes with commercial motor vehicles 

come at a very high price—over $60 billion each year in costs that 

include health, medical, emergency services, lost wages and productivity, pain and suffering. And FMCSA does its best to leverage 

just under 1,100 employees nationwide to oversee an industry of 

more than 500,000 discrete companies, trucking companies, and 

12,000 bus companies, and more than 5 million commercial vehicle 

drivers. 

Given this challenge, as we look forward we must advance our 

partnerships with our state and local law enforcement agencies to 

achieve that highest level of safety. We also need enforcement tools 

that allow us to do our jobs as effectively as possible. And today, 

I respectfully urge you to consider key technical assistance that we 

submitted for the record for the next surface reauthorization bill. 

That technical assistance focuses on the biggest challenges facing 

commercial vehicle safety. It consists of recommendations built out 

of extensive discussions with our investigators nationwide, our program managers, stakeholders, over the course of several years, and 

analysis of cases against high-risk operators who continue to put 

the public at risk. 

The underlying purpose of that assistance, our technical recommendations, is to improve the tools we use to prevent and deter 

unsafe operators, drivers and carriers, and to better screen and remove the least safe from the roadways. 

It’s also about closing statutory gaps through which unsafe carriers and drivers are able to move out of our reach, and it’s about 

making sure our state grantees have access to grant programs that 

are more efficient and effective. 

Our purpose in recommending these changes is not to impede 

safe companies and safe drivers. The vast majority of the over 

500,000 companies we regulate make safety part of their operating 

values and practices every day. But it remains the fact that about 

10 percent of the carriers operating are high-risk. They have violation numbers and frequency out of the norm. And it’s that 10 percent that directly correlates, and has involvement in, over 40 percent of the serious and fatal crashes involving commercial vehicles. 

Again the focus is to get at those bad actors, not the vast majority of operators. When crafting these initiatives, we pay close attention to the principles that govern this agency—the essentiality of 

raising the bar to come into the industry, the importance of maintaining high safety standards if you’re operating as a commercial 

vehicle operator, and ensuring that we and our state partners, employers, the public at large, have the tools they need to get the bad 

actors off the road. 

So, Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, Ranking Member Wicker, again, we are a very relatively small agency. We are 

very much on the front lines working side-by-side with your states 

as our partners to improve truck and bus safety, and together we 

need the tools to get the critical job done. 

I speak for our employees nationwide when I say that we are 

looking forward to working with the subcommittee on the technical 

assistance in the reauthorization work you are doing. And we do 

believe that through this work we can significantly further reduce 

crashes and fatalities involving commercial vehicles. 

7 

I’ll be happy to answer any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ferro follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ANNE S. FERRO, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL MOTOR

CARRIER SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Wicker and Subcommittee Members. Thank you for this opportunity to speak to you today about reauthorization 

of the motor carrier safety program. I appreciate the Subcommittee’s steadfast dedication to making our Nation’s roads as safe as possible by ensuring that only the 

safest motor carriers and commercial motor vehicle (CMV) drivers operate over our 

roads, and providing enhanced enforcement tools to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) and its State partners. 

As Secretary Ray LaHood has said many times, ‘‘Safety is my number one priority. Nothing else even comes close.’’ FMCSA’s 2011–2014 Strategic Plan, for which 

we are now seeking public comment, is based on a strategic framework that is 

shaped by three core principles: raise the bar to enter the motor carrier industry; 

maintain high safety standards to remain in the industry; and remove high-risk carriers, drivers, and service providers from operation. In preparing technical assistance 

for legislative policy proposals for motor carrier safety, the Department paid close 

attention to suggested provisions that advance one or more of our three core principles. 

With the help of SAFETEA–LU, we have achieved significant success in reducing 

crashes, injuries, and fatalities over the past six years, but no one can dispute that 

additional efforts are necessary to achieve our paramount goal of safety in motor 

carrier transportation. The Agency must be strategic in its use of resources to target 

identified compliance weaknesses and correct them. Through the technical assistance, we strove to close statutory gaps that place unsafe carriers, drivers and vehicles outside our grasp. At the same time, our goal was to ensure a level playing field 

without over-regulating the industry. We believe that these changes, taken together, 

and increasing Agency efficiency and effectiveness, will dramatically increase motor 

carrier safety without unduly burdening States or industry. I would like next to discuss our key technical assistance for reauthorization policy proposals. 

CSA Proposals 

For nearly seven years, FMCSA has been working to develop a new enforcement 

business model, which we call Compliance, Safety, Accountability or CSA. We have 

undertaken this with an unprecedented level of stakeholder input, analysis, and 

planning, including public meetings, webinars, over 350 live presentations, numerous meetings with Congressional staff and the National Transportation Safety 

Board (NTSB), and a 30-month/9–State Operational Model Test. Through this process, FMCSA worked with our partners to develop a new and improved enforcement 

model. CSA allows FMCSA to more effectively and efficiently target poor safety performers and take the necessary steps to either improve that performance or get the 

carrier off the road. 

We have included in our technical assistance a number of statutory revisions and 

additional authorities needed to bring CSA to fruition. For example, we are requesting flexibility to allow an investigator’s credentials to be displayed in writing rather 

than in person. This will allow FMCSA and its investigators—with clear statutory 

authority to conduct enforcement interventions—to display credentials and formally 

demand that a motor carrier provide records, without traveling to the motor carrier’s business location. This is vital to expanding FMCSA’s and our State partners’ 

enforcement repertoire to include off-site reviews and investigations. 

We also provided language to update the requirement, adopted in SAFETEA–LU, 

that the Agency perform compliance reviews on motor carriers rated as category A 

or B for 2 consecutive months under the Agency’s old SafeStat measurement system. 

Under CSA, the Agency replaced SafeStat with a new, more accurate carrier safety 

metric and established our Safety Measurement System (SMS), which uses more 

data, and completes a more targeted assessment of the carrier. The Agency is committed to continuing to prioritize the carriers with the highest safety risk. However, 

we need to use the new, improved metrics rather than the category A or B system 

to identify problem carriers. 

As the centerpiece of CSA, the Agency is currently developing a proposed rule to 

revise its procedures for issuance of motor carrier safety fitness determinations. We 

anticipate issuing that proposed rule by the end of 2011. Longer term, FMCSA anticipates adopting comparable safety fitness determination procedures for individual 

drivers, and we have proposed a new statutory section to grant express authority 

8 

for that rule. This authority would strengthen FMCSA’s ability to identify high-risk 

commercial drivers and to remove them from service. 

The final CSA policy proposal would help ensure that the roadside enforcement 

data, which takes on heightened importance under CSA, is based on nationally uniform criteria for selecting vehicles for roadside inspections. Consistency in State-operated inspection selection systems is vital to preserving the integrity of the SMS. 

The FMCSA’s language would, therefore, authorize FMCSA to withhold a portion 

of a State’s Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP) grant funds if the 

State’s inspection selection system does not use a methodology FMCSA has approved. 

Reincarnated/Affiliate Carrier Proposals 

In recent years, FMCSA has witnessed a disturbing practice—carriers that commit safety violations and then slightly change their corporate identity or ‘‘reincarnate’’ to either continue operating after being placed out of service, avoid paying 

civil penalties, or to otherwise avoid the regulatory consequences of poor safety performance. More recently, unsafe carriers, particularly motorcoach companies, have 

attempted to avoid FMCSA enforcement by creating closely affiliated entities under 

common operational control. Our investigations have found that these companies 

quickly shift customers, vehicles, drivers, and other operational activities to an affiliated company when FMCSA places one of them out-of-service. These practices of 

‘‘reincarnating’’ as a supposedly new motor carrier or simultaneously operating affiliated companies to circumvent Agency enforcement actions result in the continued 

operation of high-risk carriers and create an unacceptable safety risk to the traveling public. 

Our policy proposals would confront this problem from a number of angles. First, 

the technical assistance would expressly authorize the Secretary to withhold, suspend, amend, or revoke a motor carrier’s registration if the carrier failed to disclose 

its adverse safety history or other material facts on its application, or if the Secretary found that the applicant was a successor or closely related to another company with a poor compliance history within the preceding 5 years. Another proposed 

section would amend existing law to authorize the Secretary to withhold, suspend, 

amend, or revoke the registration of a motor carrier, employer, or owner or operator 

if the Secretary determined that: (i) there was a common familial relationship to 

avoid compliance or to mask non-compliance; or (ii) the company engaged in a pattern or practice of avoiding compliance or masking non-compliance within the preceding 5 years. Both of these proposals would require that, before taking action on 

such carriers’ registration, the Secretary provide the carrier due process in the form 

of notice and an opportunity for a proceeding. 

Second, the Secretary would also be authorized to take steps, after notice and an 

opportunity for a proceeding, against individual officers, directors, owners, chief financial officers, safety directors, or other persons who exercise controlling influence 

over the operations of a motor carrier, if those persons intentionally, knowingly, or 

recklessly engage in a pattern or practice of violating CMV safety regulations or assist companies in avoiding compliance or concealing non-compliance. Sanctions 

against such individuals would include a prohibition on associating with other motor 

carrier companies, including temporary or permanent suspension of any individual 

registration and a temporary bar on association with any registered motor carrier. 

A related proposal would increase the current civil penalty ten-fold, up to $5,000 

per violation, for attempted evasion of motor carrier regulations. 

Third, FMCSA’s policy proposals would clarify that a uniform, Federal legal 

standard applies to determinations of whether one motor carrier is liable for the 

acts of a predecessor or closely related carrier. Under this Federal standard, the 

Secretary would be authorized to determine, after notice and an opportunity for a 

proceeding, that the officers, financial arrangements, equipment, drivers, and general operations of the company were closely related to those of another motor carrier. The Agency’s technical assistance lists 12 factors for consideration and includes 

a limited, express preemption of State law that is narrowly restricted to Federal 

motor carrier regulations. Application of the Federal standard would not affect State 

corporation laws, such as debtor/creditor rights, taxes, tort liability, director and officer liability or other rights between private parties. The Agency is very mindful 

that it is proposing a limited intrusion into what is traditionally State authority. 

However, without this Federal standard, the Secretary lacks clear authority to prevent unscrupulous motor carriers from using State corporation laws to avoid Federal 

penalties and out of service orders. 

Finally, some of the Agency’s registration proposals would also assist in identifying and tracking reincarnated carriers by authorizing the Secretary to refuse a 

USDOT number to applicants that are not fit, willing, and able to comply with apVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:49 Apr 18, 2012 Jkt 073786 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\73786.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
9 

plicable regulations. In addition to granting the Secretary new authority to deny 

operational licenses to private motor carriers, the USDOT number provision would 

grant the Secretary express authority to refuse to issue the USDOT number if the 

applicant company is, or was, a close affiliate or successor to a motor carrier that 

is not or was not fit, willing, and able to comply with the regulations. The Secretary 

would also be authorized to revoke or suspend the USDOT number on these 

grounds. Again, such a determination would require notice and an opportunity for 

a proceeding. The registration provision would also require motor carriers to update 

their registrations annually, as well as within 30 days of a change of certain essential information. 

Imminent Hazard Orders 

The FMCSA has current authority to place a motor carrier, vehicle or driver out 

of service immediately if the Agency determines that regulatory violations create an 

imminent hazard to safety. The Agency’s policy proposals include a number of modifications to this emergency authority. Currently, imminent hazard orders apply expressly to operations of CMVs in interstate commerce. The Agency’s proposal would 

clarify that such orders also apply to the intrastate operations of such interstate 

carriers. 

In addition, the technical assistance, if adopted, would require that the Secretary 

revoke the operating authority registration of any motor carrier determined to constitute an imminent hazard. Under current law, operating authority is revoked for 

only passenger carriers, not for property carriers, determined to constitute an imminent hazard. 

Finally, the proposal would partially harmonize the two Acts of Congress that 

granted the Secretary imminent hazard authority by redefining ‘‘imminent hazard’’ 

in one section of the United States Code to encompass hazards other than those 

dealing with hazardous materials. As a result, the Secretary will have the authority 

under section 31310 of title 49, United States Code, to disqualify any driver whose 

continued operation of a CMV substantially increases the likelihood of death, serious injury or illness, or a substantial endangerment to health, property, or the environment. 

Driver Penalty Provisions 

Through our work developing CSA, FMCSA confirmed that focusing on the motor 

carriers can advance safety only to a certain point. To take the next significant step, 

we need to focus on drivers. We want to make being an unsafe driver impossible. 

To this end, our proposal would require the State licensing agencies to take action 

against commercial driver’s license (CDL) holders based on a Federal disqualification, regardless of whether the same offenses would lead to action on the CDL under 

State traffic laws. This would result in unsafe CDL holders having their Stateissued licenses suspended or revoked by the State following a Federal disqualification. This change is necessary because States are not currently required to take certain actions against a driver’s CDL if the individual has been disqualified by 

FMCSA from operating a CMV. To assist the Agency, we need Congressional affirmation that disqualifications imposed by FMCSA must be reported in the CDL Information System (CDLIS). 

The proposal also includes a requirement to disqualify an individual from operating a CMV when that individual has not paid a civil penalty or complied with a 

settlement agreement resulting from a Federal enforcement action. This would 

apply to all drivers of CMVs, whether they hold a CDL or not. 

Currently, the Secretary is required to disqualify a driver for driving a CMV when 

the driver’s CDL is revoked, suspended or canceled. The Secretary is not authorized 

to disqualify such a driver, however, if the underlying offense that led to the revocation, suspension or cancellation occurred while the individual was operating a nonCMV. This means that a CDL holder whose license was suspended following a DUI 

in his personal vehicle, but who continued to operate a CMV during the suspension, 

would not be subject to disqualification. Our policy proposal would plug this regulatory hole. Under the proposal, we would disqualify an individual from operating 

a CMV for 1 year for the first violation, and for life for committing two or more such 

violations. 

The Secretary is required to establish programs to improve CMV driver safety and 

may access the safety data and driving records of drivers who hold a CDL. Drivers 

who drive CMVs that weigh less than 26,001 pounds or that transport less than 16 

passengers, however, do not need a CDL. To close an existing information gap, we 

need authority to access safety data and driving records of non-CDL holders who 

operate CMVs. We included such a proposal in our submission. 

10 

Penalty Provisions 

To ensure compliance with our regulations, the Agency needs to make penalties 

for non-compliance significant enough that they are not simply a cost of doing business. To this end, we recommend several increases to existing minimum penalties, 

including: 

• Raising the minimum penalty per day for general reporting and recordkeeping 

violations from $500 to $1,000. 

• Changing the minimum penalty for passenger carriers operating without the 

necessary registration from $2,000 per violation, and $2,000 for each subsequent day of violation, to a flat minimum penalty of $25,000. A $25,000 minimum penalty would be the same as the current minimum penalty for transporting household goods without operating authority registration, and certainly 

passengers are more important than cargo. 

• We also propose a new penalty of $10,000 per violation for operating without 

required registration. 

• The proposal also calls for an increase from $20,000 to $25,000 for transporting 

hazardous wastes without the necessary registration. 

Even in the face of the best regulations, there remain carriers that consciously 

choose to defy the requirements. As a result, we suggest that the maximum penalty 

for continuing to operate after an unfit safety rating be increased from $11,000 to 

$25,000. Our current authority applies to drivers and not the motor carriers. This 

loophole needs to be closed. 

In this same vein, we also propose raising the penalty for violating an imminent hazard out of service order from $16,000 to $25,000. These out of service orders are 

issued only where the continued transportation presents a substantially increased 

likelihood of serious injury or death, and a motor carrier’s violation of such orders 

obviously poses a grave safety risk. We need the authority for stronger penalties to 

ensure that these carriers do not continue to do business illegally and unsafely 

while under such a serious order. 

Under our current penalty structure, motor carriers with sufficient capital can 

take corrective action, pay their penalty and not otherwise be impacted by the enforcement action. We would like to see a greater impact to the operations of unsafe 

carriers. To that end, the proposal would prohibit carriers from operating for at 

least ten days if they receive an unfit or unsatisfactory safety rating. This provision 

would increase the consequences to motor carriers that allow their safety performance to deteriorate to the point of becoming unfit, and would encourage carriers to 

address safety problems earlier, to avoid this rating. 

In addition, as noted previously, we recommend increasing the penalty for evading 

compliance through reincarnation, and we would also expand the scope of the penalty to apply to evasion of the Hazardous Materials Regulations and statutes. This 

additional penalty is necessary to deter rogue motor carriers, and those who assist 

them, from, for example, re-registering under a different identity after issuance of 

hazardous materials and other safety violations and enforcement orders or imposition of civil penalties. 

Taking legal action against unsafe motor carriers is often complicated by the fact 

that they disobey subpoenas or requirements to produce witnesses or records. As a 

result, we have proposed that motor carriers that fail to provide access to records 

and equipment in response to investigators’ demands be placed out of service. Our 

proposal includes new authority for the Secretary to suspend, amend or revoke the 

registration of a motor carrier, broker or freight forwarder for failing to obey an administrative subpoena. 

However, despite our legal actions and penalties, some carriers continue operating 

unsafely, sometimes with unsafe drivers and/or unsafe vehicles. To combat this, we 

seek express authority for FMCSA and authorized State grant officials to impound 

or immobilize commercial motor vehicles. This provision would give the Agency an 

additional enforcement tool when motor carriers refuse to comply with out of service 

orders, and continue operating vehicles that are safety risks to the vehicle’s passengers, the traveling public, and the driver. 

While one of the Agency’s key goals is to remove unsafe carriers, drivers and vehicles from the roadways, we do recognize that some carriers or drivers make honest 

mistakes. Our proposal, therefore, includes clarifying language that would allow the 

Agency, even for violations relating to transportation of household goods, to accept 

lesser amounts of money, suspension of penalties, payment over time or investment 

in training or other activities or equipment to improve regulatory compliance. Such 

strategies are additional tools that can be used to improve motor carrier compliance 

with applicable rules, to promote the public interest and to respond with enforceVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:49 Apr 18, 2012 Jkt 073786 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\73786.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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ment flexibility as justice requires. We do not want to put a carrier out of business; 

we want them to comply. 

Registration 

As noted in my earlier remarks regarding reincarnated carriers, the Agency is 

proposing to revamp some of its motor carrier registration provisions. Under the jurisdictional structure FMCSA inherited from the Interstate Commerce Commission, 

only for-hire motor carriers are subject to a statutory requirement to register with 

the Secretary. Other motor carriers, including private carriers operating equally 

large motor vehicles, are not statutorily required to register. To enhance the Agency’s authority to ensure the safety of private motor carriers before they begin operating, we offered technical assistance that would require all motor carriers that operate CMVs subject to FMCSA’s safety jurisdiction to apply for and receive a 

USDOT number before beginning operations. 

As explained above, under FMCSA’s technical assistance proposal, the Secretary 

would be authorized to refuse a USDOT number to any carrier if the motor carrier 

is unfit, unwilling or unable to comply with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations or the Hazardous Material Regulations. The proposed language would also 

authorize the Secretary to revoke or suspend a USDOT number if the Secretary determines that a motor carrier is unfit, unwilling, or unable to comply with the requirements or refuses to submit to a new entrant safety audit. 

The Agency is completing its Unified Registration System rulemaking that would 

consolidate the existing operating authority registration (or MC Number) and its 

USDOT number systems. However, FMCSA is currently limited by statute to charging a maximum fee of $300 for registration. The costs associated with registering 

and vetting new carriers exceed the $300 cap. Our technical assistance would allow 

the Agency to increase this fee to cover the costs of processing the registration. 

Medical Programs 

The Agency has made significant strides in the past three years with rulemakings 

related its medical programs, including a proposed National Registry of Certified 

Medical Examiners and the requirement for medical certificate information on the 

CDL driver’s record. To make the next large step forward in this area, we offered 

assistance that would require States to develop and maintain the capacity to receive 

electronic copies of the medical certificates prepared by certified medical examiners 

for each CDL holder who intends to operate in interstate commerce. The availability 

in the State database of an electronic report prepared by the certified medical examiner will greatly reduce the incidence of fraudulent medical examination reports. 

The DOT policy proposal would make available up to $1,000,000 in each of Fiscal 

Years 2013 and 2014 to help the States pay for the information technology improvements needed to receive medical examiners’ reports. The funding is front-loaded to 

ensure that the States upgrade their driver information systems by the time the National Registry of Certified Medical Examiners and associated requirements become 

operational. 

The Agency receives several hundred applications for vision and diabetes exemptions each year. Medical exemption requests currently must be published in the 

Federal Register, but the number of these requests, and the requirement for not 

one, but two, publications in the Register creates administrative and financial burdens for FMCSA. As a result, we suggest publishing these notices on a dedicated 

FMCSA website. Using the Internet will be simpler and cheaper for the Agency, will 

produce quicker results for applicants and will improve public access to these exemption requests. A statutory change is needed to effect this program improvement. 

The FMCSA would also like to make improvements in the delivery of information 

regarding medical exemptions to roadside law enforcement. Our proposal would require MCSAP agencies to transmit exemption information to their roadside enforcement staff. This will ensure that enforcement officers have the means to verify any 

exemption claimed by a driver stopped at roadside and reduce the opportunities for 

fraud. 

Household Goods Provisions 

The Agency’s technical drafting assistance includes additional provisions relating 

to household goods transportation. One proposal would allow persons injured by unscrupulous moving companies to seek judicial relief to compel the companies to release household goods held hostage. A second proposal would authorize FMCSA to 

assign all or a portion of the penalties it receives from non-compliant moving companies to the aggrieved shipper. FMCSA also recommends that the Agency be authorized to order moving companies to return household goods held hostage. 

12 

Drug and Alcohol Clearinghouse 

Another significant set of Agency proposals would authorize the establishment of 

a national controlled substances and alcohol Clearinghouse. The provision would 

clarify the Secretary’s authority to conduct a rulemaking and authorize funding for 

an electronic repository for records on alcohol and controlled substances testing of 

CMV operators. This new Clearinghouse would improve both driver and employer 

compliance with DOT’s alcohol and controlled substances testing program and would 

provide employers important information about drivers before hiring them. 

Miscellaneous 

The DOT policy proposals include a variety of additional, miscellaneous recommendations including: 

• A representative from a nonprofit employee labor organization would be added 

to the Motor Carrier Safety Advisory Committee. 

• The Unified Carrier Registration Plan would be restructured to limit DOT’s participation and to operate as a not-for-profit corporation. 

• The current statutory provision allowing motor carriers to submit proof of qualification as a self-insurer in lieu of the bond, insurance policy or other security 

would be eliminated. FMCSA has determined that the self-insurance program 

does not further motor carrier safety, and administration of the program for the 

fewer than 50 motor carriers that participate is unreasonably burdensome and 

costly to taxpayers. 

• Existing authority under the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 to 

include a proficiency examination would be broadened to include tests on new 

entrant carriers’ knowledge not only of safety regulations, but of applicable commercial regulations and regulations relating to accessibility for disabled persons. By granting the Secretary authority to develop an examination covering 

these areas to administer to applicant motor carriers, knowledge of and compliance with these regulations will be increased. 

All of these changes will have significant impacts on the Agency’s resources and 

programs. 

Grant Program Changes 

We could not complete our safety mission without our State partners who are the 

boots on the roadways through our grant programs. In this policy proposal, FMCSA 

identified ways to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of our grant programs. 

We focused on streamlining the Agencies’ grant programs, improving the States’ 

flexibilities in applying for FMCSA financial assistance and increasing the Agency’s 

flexibilities in using funds to maximize their safety impact. Through reauthorization, FMCSA is seeking to consolidate 10 existing grants into 3 umbrella grant programs. These changes will not only improve the flexibility of the funding, but will 

also ease the administrative burden on States in applying for Federal financial assistance by allowing States to apply for multiple projects in one application, if they 

choose to do so. This structure will also allow the Agency to be responsive to new 

initiatives and priorities by allocating discretionary funds based on expected improvements to safety. 

The 3 umbrella grant programs set forth in our policy proposal on grant programs 

are: CSA Grants, Driver Safety Grants, and Safety Data and Technology Grants. 

The CSA Grants would provide funding primarily to State and local law enforcement agencies to continue successful enforcement programs and promote new motor 

carrier programs that improve the safety of the industry and protect consumers. The 

CSA umbrella grant program would continue to provide formula grants for the 

MCSAP Basic and Incentive grants so that the States would be confident that their 

cornerstone safety initiatives would be maintained. In addition, the proposal would 

allow the Agency to provide discretionary grants for New Entrant safety audits, border enforcement, safety data improvement and other high priority programs to address National safety priorities. The CSA program would also include new Agency 

funding priorities such as household goods enforcement and hazardous materials 

safety and security. The requested flexibility in these grants programs is essential 

because enforcement priorities can change due to national events, such as 9/11, 

which drove the need for increased security reviews, due to the development of new 

technologies, such as electronic on board recorders, or as the result of new safety 

initiatives, like distracted driving. The CSA program goals would allow the Agency 

to target the funding appropriately in a dynamic environment. 

The second umbrella grant program, Driver Safety Grants, is intended to 

prioritize driver issues by directing funds specifically to programs that impact comVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:49 Apr 18, 2012 Jkt 073786 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\73786.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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mercial drivers. Similar to CSA, Driver Safety would consist of existing program 

goals, such as continued funding for CDL programs and systems, including covert 

and overt fraud investigation, and CMV operator training. It would also include new 

initiatives, such as prioritized funding for CDL coordinators and funding for States 

to notify employers of their drivers’ CDL violations. 

The Safety Data and Technology grant program, the third umbrella grant program under our policy proposal, is intended to provide financial assistance to promote the efficient and effective exchange of CMV and CDL data among the States. 

Tying vehicle registration to carrier safety data and maintaining a consistent national IT infrastructure improves the quality and safety value of roadside inspections and assists law enforcement officers in targeting unsafe vehicles and drivers. 

The proposed changes to our grant programs will allow the States to request the 

funds they need for other initiatives based on where the State stands with its safety 

initiatives. In addition, this model rewards the best/safest States by allowing them 

to request funding for new initiatives that will make a difference in their State. 

To assist the States, we have suggested changes to the match requirements to create more consistency between the grant programs; we suggested that unused 

MCSAP formula grant funds be redistributed after August 1 to States that can use 

the funding; and we requested a change in the Maintenance of Effort requirements 

for MCSAP Basic and Incentive. Under SAFETEA–LU, the maintenance of effort 

level changed annually—creating an increasing obligation for the States in a time 

of economic duress. To this end, we suggest that the levels be established once at 

the start of the authorization period and remain constant. In addition, we have provided language that would provide the Agency authority to waive maintenance of 

effort requirements for a period of 1 year and in limited circumstances such as a 

natural disaster or economic hardship. 

To maximize the flexibility of the States, we have also suggested that the States 

be allowed to request redistribution of awarded funds under each umbrella grant 

program, provided that the State shows that it is unable to expend funds within 

12 months prior to expiration and the State has a plan to spend funds within the 

remaining period of expenditure on programs with comparable safety benefits. 

These changes will allow both the Agency and the States to be more responsive 

to safety issues and problems, while simplifying the administration of the grants. 

As a result, these changes make the programs more effective and allow them to be 

implemented more quickly. 

Closing 

As you can see, FMCSA has thoughtfully considered gaps in its statutory authorities and ways to enhance its enforcement efforts and program delivery capabilities. 

Mr. Chairman, we look forward to continuing to work closely with the Subcommittee 

in its reauthorization efforts to make significant strides to improve safety, reduce 

crashes and save lives. 

I thank you for the opportunity to discuss our policy proposals. I would gladly answer any questions at this time. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Forgive me for neglecting to remind the 

gather that Ms. Ferro is the Administrator of the Federal Motor 

Carrier Safety Administration. We had some significant conversations when you were up for appointment, and I’m pleased to say 

it’s worked very well. And we like what we see you doing. And 

thank you for your consciousness about the safety factor. It agrees 

totally with what we’re looking at. 

Mr. Hart. 

Mr. Hart is Vice Chairman of the National Transportation Safety 

Board. He’ll tell us, we believe, about the agency’s recommendations to improve safety after investigating recent truck and bus accidents. 

Mr. Hart. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. HART, VICE 

CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD 

Mr. HART. Thank you. 

14 

Good afternoon, Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Wicker, 

and members of the Subcommittee. Thank you very much for the 

opportunity to appear before you today. 

The National Transportation Safety Board has recently launched 

investigative teams to several major highway crashes involving 

both trucks and motorcoaches. 

Less than a month ago, on June 24, a tractor-trailer hauling two 

empty dump trailers collided with an Amtrak train near Marion, 

Nevada, resulting in the deaths of the truck driver, a train crew 

member, and four train passengers. 

On May 31, a motorcoach ran off the road and overturned on I– 

95 near Doswell, Virginia, causing four fatalities and numerous injuries. This accident closely followed three other motorcoach accidents that occurred in March in New York, New Jersey, and New 

Hampshire. 

In an effort to learn more about the issues specific to truck and 

bus safety, the NTSB hosted a two-day truck and bus forum in 

May during which many open recommendations and their underlying safety issues were discussed by witnesses from DOT, safety 

advocates, and the motor carrier industry. 

My written statement addresses a number of areas where we believe more effective FMCSA oversight could lead to crashes prevented and lives saved. But, for my oral statement today, I will 

focus on three issues that are especially important: new entrants, 

motor carrier oversight, and fatigue. 

With respect to the new entrant process, in 2003 the NTSB recommended that FMCSA require new motor carriers to demonstrate 

their safety fitness prior to obtaining new entrant operating authority. The recommendation came as a result of our investigation 

into the collision of a tractor-trailer with a Greyhound bus in which 

we found that the truck operator had falsified key information in 

order to obtain operating authority. In response to this recommendation, FMCSA developed the New Applicant Screening 

Program, which screens new applicants of prospective motor carriers before they receive operating authority. Unfortunately, unscrupulous motor carriers are still able to circumvent the New Applicant Screening Program. 

As a result of subsequent investigations, we have recommended 

that FMCSA develop a system to evaluate the effectiveness of the 

program and to seek additional authority to revoke the operating 

authority of those unscrupulous carriers. 

With respect to oversight, the NTSB has expressed its concerns 

for many years regarding the effectiveness of FMCSA’s motor carrier rating system. For example, the two most important factors related to safe motor carrier operations in FMCSA’s six-factor rating 

system are vehicle condition and driver performance. Except when 

found to be an imminent hazard, however, operators must be found 

to be unsatisfactory in at least two of the six rating factors in order 

to be disqualified. 

The NTSB has recommended that FMCSA emphasize both driver 

performance and vehicle condition as critical elements in its compliance reviews, and that an unsatisfactory rating in either the vehicle area or the driver area should disqualify the operator. To 

date, FMCSA has not completed action on this recommendation, 

15 

but they are in the process of completing their Compliance, Safety 

and Accountability, CSA Program, which may have some of these 

components. To make a final evaluation, the NTSB is waiting on 

FMCSA’s rulemaking on its safety fitness determination methodology. 

Finally, I would like to discuss some of the issues relating to fatigue. The slides you are seeing now show just a few of the commercial vehicle accidents that we have investigated over the years 

involving fatigued drivers. 

One of the issues related to fatigue is hours of service rules. 

FMCSA’s recent ANPRM proposed changing the hours of service 

rules for truck drivers, but not for bus drivers. The NTSB believes 

that hours of service rules must also be updated for bus drivers in 

order to reduce the potential risk to the passengers and to the driving public. 

Another issue is electric onboard recorders, EOBRs. EOBRs allow 

for better monitoring of hours of service and driver fatigue. The 

NTSB is encouraged that FMCSA’s most recent NPRM on EOBRs 

corrects many of the inadequacies, and expands the scope of the 

new role to cover most carriers. 

Fatigue management is another important component in the reduction of fatigue accidents. In 2008, the NTSB asked the FMCSA 

to develop a methodology to assess the effectiveness of fatigue management plans that are implemented by the motor carriers. In 

2010, the NTSB asked FMCSA to require that all motor carriers 

adopt a fee, fatigue management program, and create educational 

materials on fatigue and fatigue countermeasures and make them 

available in different formats. These safety issues and accidents 

are a reminder that there is much to be done to improve the safety 

of commercial highway operations. We need to do better. 

Again, thank you for this opportunity to appear. I would be 

pleased to take any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hart follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. HART, VICE CHAIRMAN, 

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Good morning, Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Wicker, and members of 

the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) regarding the reauthorization of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA). 

The NTSB is charged by Congress to investigate major transportation accidents 

to determine their probable cause and make recommendations to prevent similar accidents from happening again. Unfortunately, our highway investigators have been 

quite busy with a number of major highway tragedies. Less than a month ago, on 

June 24th, a truck tractor hauling two empty dump trailers collided with an Amtrak 

train near Miriam, Nevada, resulting in the deaths of the truck driver, a train crewmember, and four train passengers. 

In another accident, on May 31, a motorcoach ran off the road and overturned on 

I–95 near Doswell, Virginia, causing four fatalities and numerous injuries. This accident closely followed three similar motorcoach accidents that occurred in March. In 

the first of these, during the early morning hours of March 12, a motorcoach traveling southbound on I–95 toward New York City struck a guardrail, swerved, and 

rolled over on its side, cutting the bus in half as it struck a signpost. Fifteen people 

were killed in this accident and the other 18 occupants were injured. Within 3 

weeks of that accident, two other motorcoach accidents occurred: one in East Brunswick, New Jersey, on March 14 that killed two, and one in Littleton, New Hampshire, on March 21 that injured all 25 occupants. 

16 

1 H–99–6. To FMCSA: Change the safety fitness rating methodology so that adverse vehicle 

or driver performance based data alone are sufficient to result in an overall unsatisfactory rating for a carrier. 

The NTSB has also investigated highway accidents involving large trucks. In 

June 2009 in Miami, Oklahoma, the fatigued driver of a tractor-semitrailer failed 

to stop for a line of vehicles that had slowed and stopped behind a minor traffic accident, causing a multivehicle collision that killed 10 and injured 6. Just four months 

later, in October 2009, a truck with an 11,600-gallon cargo tank carrying liquefied 

petroleum gas (LPG) struck a guardrail while traveling south on Interstate 69 in 

Indianapolis, Indiana, resulting in the release of the LPG, which vaporized and ignited. The ensuing fires involved eight other vehicles and injured at least five people. 

In an effort to learn more about the issues specific to truck and bus safety, NTSB 

hosted a 2-day Truck and Bus Safety forum in May at which many open recommendations and their underlying safety issues were discussed by stakeholders 

from the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), safety advocates, and the motor 

carrier industry. Some of the safety issues examined included 

• Carrier oversight and the determination of carrier safety fitness by Federal, 

state, and industry organizations; 

• Aspects of carrier operations, including electronic onboard recorders, hours of 

service, safety culture, vehicle size and weight, and operating models; 

• Training and licensing of commercial drivers, including commercial learner’s 

permits, employer notification systems, graduated licensing, and data collection; 

• Driver safety; 

• Driver health and wellness programs and medical oversight for interstate commercial drivers; 

• Enhanced vehicle technologies, including electronic stability control and collision avoidance systems; 

• Advances in crash mitigation, such as passenger restraints, vehicle crashworthiness, vehicle compatibility, and highway barrier systems. 

Although the NTSB can investigate only a fraction of the tens of thousands of 

highway accidents that occur, we have made hundreds of recommendations over our 

42-year history to improve the safety of highway transportation. We currently have 

166 open highway safety recommendations issued to the DOT, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the FMCSA, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), the Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration 

(PHMSA), and the states. Fifty-five of those open recommendations are addressed 

to the FMCSA. 

Motor Carrier Safety Oversight 

Rating Methodology 

The FMCSA rates the safety of motor carriers in six areas. The two most important related to safe motor carrier operations are the condition of the vehicles and 

the performance of the drivers. Except when found to be an ‘‘imminent hazard,’’ operators must be found to be unsatisfactory in at least two of the six rating factors 

to be disqualified. In other words, they can be unsatisfactory in either the vehicle 

or driver areas and still be allowed to operate. 

A good illustration of how this system fails to protect the traveling public occurred 

in 1999 when a motorcoach rolled over in Indianapolis, Indiana, killing 2 passengers 

and injuring 13. The accident motorcoach had only 50-percent braking efficiency, 

and a post-accident compliance review of the operator by the FMCSA resulted in 

all 10 of the carrier’s vehicles being placed out of service. The company had been 

inspected nine times between 1987 and 1995. In 1994, even though fully 63 percent 

of the vehicles met the criteria for being placed out of service, the operator received 

a ‘‘conditional’’ rating for the vehicle factors. Because all the other factors were 

rated ‘‘satisfactory,’’ the operator was given an overall rating of ‘‘satisfactory’’ and 

was thus able to continue to operate with unsafe vehicles. As a result of our investigation of this accident, the NTSB recommended that the FMCSA emphasize both 

of these critical elements in its compliance reviews, and that an unsatisfactory rating in either the vehicle area or the driver area should disqualify the operator.1 To 

emphasize our concern over this issue, we added this recommendation to our Most 

Wanted List in 2000. 

In years following, we investigated additional motorcoach accidents that involved 

the same issue: a 5-fatality motor coach accident in Victor, New York, in 2002; a 

17 

2 H–03–2. To FMCSA: Require all new motor carriers seeking operating authority to demonstrate their safety fitness prior to obtaining new entrant operating authority by, at a minimum: (1) passing an examination demonstrating their knowledge of the Federal Motor Carrier 

Safety Regulations; (2) submitting a comprehensive plan documenting that the motor carrier has 

management systems in place to ensure compliance with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations; and (3) passing a Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration safety audit, including 

vehicle inspections. 3 H–09–21. To FMCSA: To Develop an evaluation component to determine the effectiveness 

of its New Applicant Screening Program. 4 H–09–34. To FMCSA: Seek statutory authority to deny or revoke operating authority for 

commercial interstate motor carriers found to have applications for operating authority in which 

the applicant failed to disclose any prior operating relationship with another motor carrier, operating as another motor carrier, or being previously assigned a U.S. Department of Transportation number. 

H–09–35. To FMCSA: Apply the evasion detection algorithm process against all interstate passenger carriers that obtained Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration operating authority, 

after the New Entrant Safety Assurance Program began in 2003 but before the program began 

Continued 

23-fatality motorcoach fire near Wilmer, Texas, in 2005; a 17-fatality motorcoach accident in Atlanta, Georgia, in 2007; and a motorcoach rollover accident in Victoria, 

Texas, in 2008. FMCSA says these concerns will be addressed with full implementation of its Compliance, Safety and Accountability (CSA) program. However, to date, 

action that would satisfy this recommendation has not been completed. 

New Entrants and Reincarnated Motor Carriers 

In 2002, the NTSB investigated an accident involving a tractor-semitrailer collision with a Greyhound bus in Loraine, Texas, which resulted in three deaths. Our 

investigation revealed that, when the trucking company owner submitted his application, he lied about his knowledge of regulations and his systems to comply with 

the regulations, and he failed to disclose a drug conviction for possession of large 

amounts of marijuana the year prior to his application. The owner also failed to 

maintain any records on his drivers or vehicles, to have a drug and alcohol program, 

and to conduct background checks of his drivers. Further, he dispatched the accident driver knowing that the driver had neither a commercial driver’s license nor 

a medical certificate. 

At that time, the owner of a truck or bus company needed merely to fill out an 

online form and pay a small fee to receive operating authority from the FMCSA and 

become a motor carrier. Further, the FMCSA conducted essentially no review or follow up of new entrant motor carriers. 

As a result, the NTSB recommended that the FMCSA require new motor carriers 

to demonstrate their safety fitness prior to obtaining new entrant operating authority.2 In response to this recommendation, the FMCSA developed the New Applicant 

Screening Program, under which a new motor carrier operating in interstate commerce is subject to an 18-month safety monitoring period and receives a safety audit 

sometime after its first 3 months of operation but before it completes the 18-month 

monitoring period. 

In 2008, the FMCSA began its New Entrant Safety Assurance Program, under 

which the agency identified 16 regulations that constitute essential, basic safety 

management controls necessary in interstate commerce. It made a carrier’s failure 

to comply with any of these 16 regulations an automatic failure of the safety audit. 

Additionally, if certain violations are discovered during a roadside inspection, the 

new entrant is subject to expedited actions to correct these deficiencies. 

Unfortunately, unscrupulous motor carriers still use the new entrant program to 

evade an enforcement action, or an out-of-service order, by going out of business and 

then reincarnating themselves as if they were a brand new motor carrier. The 

NTSB found that the motorcoach operator involved in the Sherman, Texas, accident 

had engaged in this subterfuge. After losing its authority to operate because of an 

unsatisfactory compliance review rating, the operator subsequently applied for new 

operating authority, as a new entrant, under a new name. The NTSB concluded that 

the FMCSA’s processes were inadequate to identify the operator as a company that 

was simply evading enforcement action. Thus, we recommended that the FMCSA 

evaluate the effectiveness of its New Applicant Screening Program.3

We found additional deficiencies with the FMCSA’s new entrant program during 

our investigation of a 2008 accident in which the driver fell asleep and the motorcoach overturned in Victoria, Texas, killing one person. The FMCSA failed to notice 

that the operator reincarnated into a new operator shortly after the accident. As a 

result, the NTSB issued recommendations to the FMCSA that asked the agency to 

develop methods to identify reincarnated carriers and seek authority to deny or revoke their operating authority.4 The FMCSA’s Motor Carrier Safety Advisory ComVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:49 Apr 18, 2012 Jkt 073786 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\73786.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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vetting those carriers, to verify that those new entrant carriers do not have a concealed history 

of poor safety management controls because they were able to reenter interstate commerce undetected as reincarnated carriers. 

H–09–36. To FMCSA: Establish a requirement to review all passenger carrier lease agreements during new entrant safety audits and compliance reviews to identify and take action 

against carriers that have lease agreements that result in a loss of operational control by the 

certificate holder. 5 (a) Fatigue, Alcohol, Drugs, and Medical Factors in Fatal-to-the-Driver Heavy Truck Crashes, 

Safety Study NTSB/SS–90/01 (Washington, D.C.: NTSB, 1990); (b) Factors that Affect Fatigue 

in Heavy Truck Accidents, Safety Study NTSB/SS–95–01 (Washington, D.C.: NTSB, 1995). 6 H–07–41. To FMCSA: Require all interstate commercial vehicle carriers to use electronic onboard recorders for hours of service. 

H–07–42. To FMCSA: As an interim measure, until industry-wide use of recorders is mandated, prevent log tampering by requiring motor carriers to create audit control systems for their 

paper logs. 7 H–08–13. to FMCSA: to develop and implement a plan to deploy technologies in commercial 

vehicles to reduce the occurrence of fatigue-related accidents. 8 H–08–14. To FMCSA: to develop and use a methodology that will continually assess the effectiveness of the fatigue management plans implemented by motor carriers. 9 H–10–9. To FMCSA: Require all motor carriers to adopt a fatigue management program 

based on the North American Fatigue Management Program guidelines for the management of 

fatigue in a motor carrier operating environment. 

mittee echoed the NTSB’s position that new entrants should be evaluated before 

being allowed to operate in a September 2, 2009, letter to the Acting Deputy Administrator of FMCSA. 

Drivers and Fatigue 

In the 1990s, the NTSB conducted two safety studies of commercial truck accidents 5 and found that fatigue was the most frequently cited probable cause or factor 

in investigated crashes that had been fatal to the driver. Based on these studies, 

the NTSB recommended that the FMCSA use science-based principles to revise the 

hours-of-service regulations for commercial drivers, ensure that the rule would enable drivers to obtain at least 8 hours of continuous sleep, and eliminate sleeper 

berth provisions that allow for the splitting of sleep periods. 

In December, 2010, the FMCSA issued an NPRM proposing to change the hoursof-service rule for truck drivers, but this proposed rule does not apply to passenger 

carriers. The NTSB supports those provisions that are scientifically based and 

would reduce continuous duty or driving time, encourage the taking of breaks, promote nighttime sleep, and foster scheduling patterns that are predictable and consistent with the normal human diurnal circadian rhythm. However, we are opposed 

to providing exceptions for buses, motorcoaches, and other groups because of the potential increased risk such exceptions pose to the passengers and the driving public. 

Of course, no hours-of-service rule is adequate unless it is enforceable. Since 1977, 

the NTSB has advocated the use of electronic on-board recorders (EOBRs) to allow 

better monitoring of hours of service and driver fatigue. Again in 2007, the NTSB 

asked the FMCSA to require EOBRs for hours-of-service monitoring for all interstate commercial carriers, following our investigation of a tractor-trailer accident 

that had occurred in Chelsea, Michigan.6 The NTSB believes that the FMCSA’s 

April 2010 final rule on EOBRs did not adequately address this safety issue, and 

we are encouraged that the FMCSA’s new NPRM, issued in January 2011, corrects 

many of the inadequacies and expands the scope of the new rule to cover most carriers, as originally recommended by the NTSB. 

In addressing the issue of fatigue, hours-of-service regulations are important, and 

tamperproof EOBRs will help enforce those rules. But fatigue management is another critical strategy. In 2008, following three fatigue-related bus accidents that occurred in Osseo, Wisconsin; Lake Butler, Florida; and Turrell, Arizona; in which a 

total of 27 people died and 60 were injured, the NTSB asked the FMCSA to develop 

a plan to deploy technologies in commercial vehicles to reduce fatigue related accidents 7 and to develop a methodology to assess the effectiveness of the fatigue management plans implemented by motor carriers.8 The Miami, Oklahoma, accident, 

which involved a fatigued truck driver, prompted the NTSB to reiterate these recommendations and make an additional recommendation to require all motor carriers 

to adopt a fatigue management program.9

A problematic and often undiagnosed sleep disorder that can exacerbate fatigue 

is obstructive sleep apnea (OSA). The NTSB has investigated several accidents in 

which OSA contributed to the fatigue of the driver, pilot, mariner, or train operator. 

As a result, the NTSB issued recommendations to the FMCSA in October 2009 addressing this safety problem. In particular, the NTSB recommended that the 

FMCSA (1) require drivers with a high risk for OSA to obtain medical certification 

19 

10 H–09–15. To FMCSA: Implement a program to identify commercial drivers at high risk for 

obstructive sleep apnea and require that those drivers provide evidence through the medical certification process of having been appropriately evaluated and, if treatment is needed, effectively 

treated for that disorder before being granted unrestricted medical certification 11 H–09–16. To FMCSA: Develop and disseminate guidance for commercial drivers, employers, 

and physicians regarding the identification and treatment of individuals at high risk of obstructive sleep apnea (OSA), emphasizing that drivers who have OSA that is effectively treated are 

routinely approved for continued medical certification. 12 H–01–19. To FMCSA: Ensure that medical certification regulations are updated periodically 

to permit trained examiners to clearly determine whether drivers with common medical conditions should be issued a medical certificate. 13 H–01–17. To FMCSA: Ensure that individuals performing medical examinations for drivers 

are qualified to do so and are educated about occupational issues for drivers. 

H–01–20. To FMCSA: Ensure that individuals performing examinations have specific guidance 

and a readily identifiable source of information for questions on such examinations. 14 H–01–18. To FMCSA: Develop a tracking mechanism be established that ensures that every 

prior application by an individual for medical certification is recorded and reviewed. 15 H–01–21. To FMCSA: Develop a review process prevents, or identifies and corrects, the inappropriate issuance of medical certification. 16 H–01–24. To FMCSA: Develop mechanisms for reporting medical conditions to the medical 

certification and reviewing authority and for evaluating these conditions between medical certification exams; individuals, health care providers, and employers are aware of these mechanisms. 17 H–01–25. To FMCSA: Develop a system that records all positive drug and alcohol test results and refusal determinations that are conducted under the U.S. Department of Transportation testing requirements, require prospective employers to query the system before making 

a hiring decision, and require certifying authorities to query the system before making a certification decision. 

that they have been appropriately evaluated and, if necessary, effectively treated for 

that disorder,10 and (2) provide guidance for commercial drivers, employers, and 

physicians about identifying and treating individuals at high risk of OSA.11 The 

NTSB is aware that the FMCSA continues to address this issue, consulting the expertise of various medical and industry groups, as well as its own Medical Review 

Board, to better understand OSA and its risks in order to develop appropriate guidance for medical examiners, motor carriers, and CDL drivers. 

Another problem for operators is overlooking or not detecting serious preexisting 

medical conditions in their drivers. The NTSB has seen this issue in many accident 

investigations, the most tragic example of which was the 1999 Mother’s Day motorcoach accident in New Orleans, Louisiana. A motorcoach driver lost consciousness 

while driving on an interstate highway and crashed into an embankment, killing 

22 passengers and injuring 21. At the time of the accident, the driver suffered from 

multiple previously known, serious medical conditions, including kidney failure and 

congestive heart failure, and he was receiving intravenous therapy for 3 to 4 hours, 

6 days a week. 

Although the FMCSA has taken important steps to address medical issues, including publishing a final rule on merging the commercial driver’s license with the 

medical certificate, much still remains to be done. For example, the FMCSA needs 

to ensure that medical certification regulations are updated periodically 12 and examiners both are qualified and know what to look for when conducting physical 

exams.13

FMCSA has published an NPRM proposing to create a national registry of certified medical examiners. We believe that the proposed registry needs to include a 

tracking mechanism for driver medical examinations.14 Such a registry and mechanism would reduce the current practice of drivers ‘‘doctor shopping’’ to find one who 

will sign their medical forms. Likewise, a second level of review is necessary to identify and correct the inappropriate issuance of medical certification.15 The FMCSA 

must establish a system for reporting medical conditions that develop between examinations.16 Finally, the FMCSA needs to develop a system that records all positive drug and alcohol test results and refusal determinations, and require prospective employers and certifying authorities to query the system before making hiring 

decisions.17

Also of concern is the lack of information available to commercial drivers about 

the side effects and interactions of various drugs, and the impact these drugs may 

have on driving ability. Such interactions can present serious problems for drivers 

with diagnosed medical conditions who are being treated with prescription or overthe-counter medications. For example, in 1998 a motorcoach driver and six passengers were killed when the driver drove into the back of a parked tractor-trailer 

near Burnt Cabins, Pennsylvania. The NTSB found that the accident had been 

caused, in part, by the driver’s use of an over-the-counter antihistamine, which negatively affected his alertness, performance, and judgment. As a result, the NTSB 

recommended that FMCSA help drivers understand which medications are approVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:49 Apr 18, 2012 Jkt 073786 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\73786.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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18 H–00–12. To FMCSA: Establish, with assistance from experts on the effects of pharmacological agents on human performance and alertness, procedures or criteria by which highway 

vehicle operators who medically require substances not on the U.S. Dept. of Transportation’s list 

of approved medications may be allowed, when appropriate, to use those medications when driving. 19 H–00–13. To FMCSA: Develop, then periodically publish, an easy-to-understand source of 

information for highway vehicle operators on the hazards of using specific medications when 

driving. 20 H–00–14. To FMCSA: Establish and implement an educational program targeting highway 

vehicle operators that, at a minimum, ensures that all operators are aware of the source of information described in Safety Recommendation H–00–13 regarding the hazards of using specific 

medications when driving. 21 H–00–15. To FMCSA: Establish, in coordination with the U.S. Department of Transportation, the Federal Railroad Administration, the Federal Transit Administration, and the U.S. 

Coast Guard, comprehensive toxicological testing requirements for an appropriate sample of 

fatal highway, railroad, transit, and marine accidents to ensure the identification of the role 

played by common prescription and over-the-counter medications. Review and analyze the results of such testing at intervals not to exceed every 5 years. 22 H–10–10. To FMCSA: Require all heavy commercial vehicles to be equipped with video event 

recorders that capture data in connection with the driver and the outside environment and roadway in the event of a crash or sudden deceleration event. The device should create recordings 

that are easily accessible for review when conducting efficiency testing and system-wide performance-monitoring programs. 23 H–10–11. To FMCSA: Require motor carriers to review and use video event recorder information in conjunction with other performance data to verify that driver actions are in accordance with company and regulatory rules and procedures essential to safety. 24 H–06–27. To FMCSA: Publish regulations prohibiting cellular telephone use by commercial 

driver’s license holders with a passenger-carrying or school bus endorsement, while driving 

under the authority of that endorsement, except in emergencies. 25 H–06–28. The National Transportation Safety Board makes the following recommendation 

to the 50 States and the District of Columbia: Enact legislation to prohibit cellular telephone 

use by commercial driver’s license holders with a passenger-carrying or school bus endorsement, 

while driving under the authority of that endorsement, except in emergencies. 

priate for use when driving,18 provide guidance to drivers on specific medications 

that may be hazardous,19 ensure that drivers are aware of the hazards of using specific medications,20 and establish toxicological testing requirements.21

The Miami, Oklahoma, accident investigation raised two other interesting aspects 

of fatigue-related accidents. First, because fatigue is very difficult to identify as a 

causal factor, fatigue-related accidents are likely underreported in accident statistics: There is no ‘‘blood test’’ for fatigue, as there is for alcohol. Second, motor carriers are increasingly installing video cameras that capture images both outside and 

inside the vehicle. These cameras are not only documenting drivers falling asleep, 

they are also documenting a number of unsafe driver behaviors and distractions. 

More importantly, some motor carriers are increasingly using these cameras as a 

training tool to coach their drivers about safe driving habits. In fact, the NTSB 

found that some companies have seen reductions in accidents by about 30 percent 

to as much as 50 percent when using these cameras as a coaching tool. 

Truck and bus driving are two occupations where it is nearly impossible for a supervisor to directly observe and supervise an employee’s behavior. Operators of 

trucks and buses have no copilots, additional engineers, or conductors that pilots 

and train engineers have. Therefore, to help prevent future fatigue accidents like 

the one that occurred in Miami, Oklahoma, or similar accidents involving bad driver 

behavior, the NTSB recommends the installation of video event recorders in commercial vehicles 22 and asks that motor carriers be required to use these tools to improve driver behavior.23

Cell Phone Use 

The NTSB issued its first recommendation about cell phone use by a commercial 

driver in 2004, following an accident in Alexandria, Virginia, in which an experienced motorcoach driver, engaged in a heated conversation on his hands-free cell 

phone, failed to move to the center lane to avoid striking the underside of an arched 

stone bridge on the George Washington Memorial Parkway. Our investigation found 

that the driver had been familiar with the route and had received numerous cues 

to change lanes at the appropriate time to have enough clearance for the height of 

the bus. In fact, not only was the driver familiar with the road, but he also was 

following another bus that had appropriately moved to the center lane. Yet, this 

driver did not notice the well-marked signage or any other cues as he approached 

the arched stone bridge. The accident was clearly caused by this driver’s cognitive 

distraction, caused by his use of a hands-free cell phone. 

The NTSB recommended that the FMCSA 24and 50 states 25 enact laws to prohibit cell phone use by commercial drivers while driving passenger-carrying comVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:49 Apr 18, 2012 Jkt 073786 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\73786.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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26 H–06–29. The National Transportation Safety Board makes the following recommendation 

to motorcoach industry, public bus, and school bus associations and unions: Develop formal policies prohibiting cellular telephone use by commercial driver’s license holders with a passengercarrying or school bus endorsement, while driving under the authority of that endorsement, except in emergencies. 27 H–05–04. To FMCSA: Conduct a study on the safety effectiveness of the self-inspection and 

certification process used by motor carriers to comply with annual vehicle inspection requirements and take corrective action, as necessary. 28 H–09–20. To FMCSA: Require those states that allow private garages to conduct Federal 

Motor Carrier Safety Administration inspections of commercial motor vehicles, to have a quality 

assurance and oversight program that evaluates the effectiveness and thoroughness of those inspections. 29 H–02–15. To FMCSA: Revise 49 Code of Federal Regulations 396.13, Driver Inspection, to 

require minimum pre-trip inspection procedures for determining brake adjustment. 30 H–02–17. To FMCSA: During compliance reviews, rate companies as unsatisfactory in the 

vehicle factor category if the mechanics and drivers responsible for maintaining brake systems 

are not qualified brake inspectors. 31 H–02–18. To FMCSA: Revise 49 Code of Federal Regulations 396.25, Qualifications of Brake 

Inspectors, to require certification after testing as a prerequisite for qualification and specify, 

at a minimum, formal training in brake maintenance and inspection. 32 H–06–02. To FMCSA: Require drivers of commercial vehicles that weigh less than 26,000 

pounds and are equipped with air brakes to undergo training and testing to demonstrate proficiency in the inspection and operation of air-braked vehicles; the training should emphasize 

that manually adjusting automatic slack adjusters is dangerous and should not be done, except 

during installation or in an emergency to move the vehicle to a repair facility. 33 H–05–03. To FMCSA: Revise the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations Appendix G to 

Subchapter B, Minimum Periodic Inspection Standards, Part 10: Tires, Sections A(5) and B(7), 

to include inspection criteria and specific language to address a tire’s speed rating to ensure 

that it is appropriate for a vehicles intended use. 34 H–09–22. To NHTSA: Require all new motor vehicles weighing over 10,000 pounds to be 

equipped with direct tire pressure monitoring systems to inform drivers of the actual tire pressures on their vehicles. 35 H–09–19. To FMCSA: Require that tire pressure be checked with a tire pressure gauge during pretrip inspections, vehicle inspections, and roadside inspections of motor vehicles. 

mercial vehicles or school buses. We also recommended that motorcoach associations, school bus organizations, and unions develop formal policies to prohibit cell 

phone use by commercial drivers, except in emergencies.26 Unfortunately, the current FMCSA NPRM, issued in December 2010, proposes to limit cell phone restrictions to only hand-held devices and does not address the cognitive distraction posed 

by the use of hands-free devices. 

Vehicles 

The NTSB has also taken issue with the FMCSA’s oversight of vehicle inspections. Following the eight-fatality Tallulah, Louisiana,27 motorcoach accident and 

the 17-fatality Sherman, Texas,28 motorcoach accident, the NTSB recommended 

that the FMCSA provide adequate oversight of private inspection garages. However, 

these recommendations remain open. 

In accidents involving a school bus in Mountainburg, Arizona, and another involving a dump truck in Glen Rock, Pennsylvania, the NTSB found that the FMCSA 

lacked adequate oversight of pre-trip brake inspections 29 and oversight of the qualifications of brake inspectors; 30 we also found a need for formal training of these inspectors.31 The Glen Rock, Pennsylvania, accident prompted the NTSB recommend 

in 2006 that the FMCSA require drivers to demonstrate proficiency in air-braked 

vehicles and to understand the dangers of adjusting automatic slack adjusters.32

The NTSB has also found problems with commercial vehicle tires. For example, 

some tires have a speed restriction because they are not meant for highway speeds. 

If a speed-restricted tire is used in service at speeds above 55 mph for extended periods, a catastrophic failure can result. Although the tires did not cause the motorcoach accident in Tallulah, LA, the inspection process had never identified the 

speed-restricted tires installed on this vehicle, even though it was being operated 

on major highways. The NTSB made recommendations to correct this deficiency.33

Following the Sherman, Texas, motorcoach accident, which had been caused by 

low air pressure on one of the front tires, the NTSB found that even small reductions in air pressure can cause commercial tires to be overloaded, to overheat, and 

to fail. This potential overloading problem is especially true for the front tires of 

motorcoaches where, even with proper air pressure, these tires may be close to their 

maximum load rating. Therefore, the NTSB made recommendations to NHTSA and 

the FMCSA to require tire pressure monitoring systems 34 and to require commercial drivers to check their tire pressure with a gauge.35

22 

36 H–09–37 & H–09–30. To FMCSA and NHTSA, respectively: Assist the National Highway 

Traffic Safety Administration in developing a Web-based database of FMVSS-compliant passenger-carrying commercial motor vehicles that can be utilized by federal, state, and local enforcement inspection personnel to identify non-FMVSS-compliant passenger-carrying commercial 

motor vehicles so that these vehicles (other than exempted vehicles) are placed out of service 

and cease operating in the United States. Implement a process to periodically update this database. 

H–09–38. To FMCSA: Require that Federal and state inspectors utilize the database requested 

in Safety Recommendation H–09–37 during both roadside and compliance review inspections of 

passenger-carrying commercial motor vehicles to identify and place out of service non-FMVSScompliant vehicles. 

H–09–31. To NHTSA: When the database requested in Safety Recommendation H–09–30 is 

completed, make the database known and accessible to state vehicle registration agencies and 

to Federal, state, and local enforcement inspection personnel for their use during roadside inspections and compliance reviews to identify non-FMVSS-compliant passenger-carrying commercial motor vehicles. 37 H–09–40. To FMCSA: Require that passenger motor carriers certify on their OP–1(P) 

forms—(Application for Motor Passenger Carrier Authority) and initial MCS–150 form (Motor 

Carrier Identification Report [Application for USDOT Number]) and subsequent required biennial submissions that all vehicles operated, owned, or leased per trip or per term met the 

FMVSSs in effect at the time of manufacture. 38 H–09–39. To FMCSA: Institute a requirement for Federal and state enforcement officials 

to obtain training on a procedure to physically inspect passenger-carrying commercial motor vehicles for an FMVSS compliance label, and work with the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance 

to develop and provide this training. 39 H–09–41. To FMCSA: Seek statutory authority to suspend, revoke, or withdraw a motor carrier’s operating authority upon discovering the carrier is operating any non-FMVSS-compliant— 

passenger-carrying commercial motor vehicles, a violation of the FMVSS-compliant certification 

requested in Safety Recommendation H–09–40. 

Illegal Motorcoaches 

The NTSB discovered another oversight issue as a result of the motorcoach accident in Victoria, Texas. This motorcoach had been imported from Mexico, and it repeatedly crossed the border into Texas. It should never have been allowed into the 

United States because it was not built to meet NHTSA’s Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS). Therefore, the NTSB made several recommendations to the 

FMCSA and NHTSA to develop a database of FMVSS-compliant buses 36 and verify 

that operators are using FMVSS-compliant vehicles.37 The NTSB also recommended 

that the FMCSA train law enforcement to detect non-FMVSS-compliant vehicles,38

and to obtain the authority to put operators out of service if they use such illegal 

vehicles.39

Closing 

The safety issues and accidents discussed today are a reminder that there is much 

to be done to improve the safety of commercial highway operations. Accidents—although often tragic and costly—provide a unique opportunity to identify real world 

issues and to learn from our mistakes. Frustrating to the NTSB is that many of 

the issues discussed today have been identified as causal to truck and bus accidents 

for a number of years, yet NTSB investigators continue to see these factors again 

and again. Transportation safety is too important for the well-being of our citizens, 

our industry, and our economy to continue to repeat past mistakes. We need to do 

better. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you. 

Now we have Mr. England. And, Mr. England is First Vice 

Chairman of the American Trucking Association. We look to hearing the industry’s views on improving the Federal Government’s 

truck safety programs. 

Thank you for being here. 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL ENGLAND, VICE CHAIRMAN, BOARD 

OF DIRECTORS, NATIONAL TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS AND 

CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD AND PRESIDENT, C.R. ENGLAND 

Mr. ENGLAND. Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Wicker, 

and members of the Subcommittee, I am Dan England. 

I am Chairman of the Board and President of C.R. England, a 

family owned and operated business headquartered in Salt Lake 

23 

City. It was founded in 1920. We have more than 5,500 drivers, 

4,000 tractors, and 6,000 trailers. 

Today I appear on behalf of ATA, where I currently serve as Vice 

Chairman of the Board. Thank you for the opportunity to testify 

today. 

First, I want to stress the need to strengthen the requirements 

for new carriers entering the industry, since they have significantly 

higher violation and crash rates. Regrettably, 41 percent of these 

carriers fail their initial safety audits, and 24 percent ultimately 

have their authority revoked. 

To address this problem, ATA urges that every new entrant be 

required to successfully complete comprehensive online training 

and an examination prior to initiating operations. Further, the initial safety audit should occur sooner—within 6 months of the carrier start date, not 18 months, the current standard. 

To prevent unsafe drivers from entering the industry, Congress 

should enact S. 754, legislation sponsored by Senator Pryor, to create a clearinghouse for drug and alcohol test results, which would 

help carriers identify and better screen applicants that have violated the drug and alcohol regulations. I would like to thank Senator Pryor, as well as cosponsors Boozman, Snowe, Vitter and 

Wicker, for their support of this important measure. 

Finally, the Federal Government should allow hair testing in 

order to meet the drug and alcohol testing requirements. Motor 

carriers are increasingly relying on hair testing as a means to identify unsafe drivers. 

Once drivers are permitted to enter the industry, both FMCSA 

and motor carriers need the tools to assure their continued safety. 

ATA fully supports improving safe operations through a Federal 

mandate for electronic logging devices, including S. 695, legislation 

sponsored by Senators Pryor and Alexander. An EOBR mandate 

should be coupled with retention of the current rules governing the 

hours of service of truck drivers. 

The industry safety record has improved dramatically since the 

current regulations were put into place in 2004, even though truck 

mileage has increased. Given these improvements, the most appropriate course of action is to mandate electronic logging devices to 

improve compliance with the current rules, rather than change 

them. 

Other tools to improve safety include a national system to 

promptly notify employers of drivers’ convictions for moving violations; two, a mandate that speed limiters on large trucks be set at 

65 miles per hour at time of manufacture; three, a national 65 

mile-per-hour speed limit for all vehicles; and, four, improvements 

to FMCSA’s new CSA program. 

ATA shares Congress’s strong desire to remove unsafe drivers 

and carriers from the industry. CSA represents an important 

means to this end. However, the system’s ability to reliably identify 

unsafe carriers and drivers is hindered by underlying data and 

methodology issues. To correct erroneous data, ATA strongly encourages Congress to expand motor carrier safety assistance program funding dedicated to adding State data correction personnel. 

Perhaps the most pressing area of improvement for the CSA program is how the system measures carriers’ crash involvement. CurVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:49 Apr 18, 2012 Jkt 073786 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\73786.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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rently, the system does so using all carrier-involved crashes, including those for which the motor carrier could not reasonably be 

held accountable. As a result, carrier scores in this are less meaningful and reliable. In order to more accurately identify unsafe carriers, FMCSA should only measure performance on crashes for 

which motor carriers can reasonably be held accountable. 

In closing, meaningful solutions to truck safety require a focus on 

the primary causes of crashes, and require an acknowledgment of 

the role that other motorists play in truck crashes. FMCSA should 

devote resources to programs that address the role of passenger vehicles in car-truck crashes. 

Truck safety regulations are important, and we support them. 

However, regulations alone are insufficient to achieve optimum results. Employing more creative solutions and tools to leverage the 

mutual interest of the industry and government to improve highway safety will bring about even greater safety gains. 

Thank you for the opportunity to offer ATA’s views on how best 

to collaboratively improve highway safety. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. England follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DANIEL ENGLAND, VICE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF DIRECTORS, 

NATIONAL TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS AND CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD AND PRESIDENT, 

C.R. ENGLAND

Introduction 

Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Wicker, and members of the Subcommittee, my name is Dan England, and I am the Chairman of the Board and 

President C.R. England, a nationwide transportation company specializing in the 

movement of temperature-controlled products. Founded in 1920, we are a familyowned business employing more than 4,600 drivers and operating 3,500 trucks. 

I also currently serve as Vice Chairman of the American Trucking Associations 

(ATA). ATA is the national trade association for the trucking industry, and is a federation of affiliated State trucking associations, conferences and organizations that 

together have more than 37,000 motor carrier members representing every type and 

class of motor carrier in the country. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before 

the Subcommittee today. 

Mr. Chairman, today I have been asked to speak about ways to ensure that only 

safe motor carriers and drivers are able to enter the industry; steps to strengthen 

laws and regulations governing drivers and vehicles that are permitted to operate; 

and the tools Federal and State authorities need to remove unfit drivers and carriers from the industry. I will also address a number of other opportunities to improve highway safety later in my testimony. 

The Industry’s Safety Record 

It is important to point out that the trucking industry has long supported sensible 

and effective measures to improve highway safety. Because the highway is our 

workplace, we are concerned whenever any motorist—professional truck driver or 

passenger vehicle operator—engages in risky behavior behind the wheel. ATA was 

an early advocate of mandatory drug and alcohol testing for drivers and the ban 

on radar detectors in trucks. More recently, we successfully petitioned the National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to initiate a rulemaking to mandate that speed limiters in all large trucks be set at time of manufacture to no more 

than 65 mph. In addition, we have published an 18-point Safety Agenda, a series 

of policy recommendations that, if implemented, would go a long way to further improving highway safety. 

We have seen a truly incredible improvement in truck safety, especially over the 

last decade. In fact, in 2009 the number of injuries and fatalities in truck-involved 

crashes reached its lowest level in recorded history. Some may try to discredit these 

accomplishments by attributing them to the recession. However, these crash reductions have occurred even though truck mileage has increased. As a result, the rate 

25 

1 Acute regulations those where a single violation is indicative of a breakdown in, or lack or, 

safety management controls. Critical violations are those a pattern of violations (e.g., more than 

10 percent of records check) is indicative of a breakdown in, or lack of, safety management controls. 2 Background to New Entrant Safety Fitness Assurance Process, John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, March 2000. 3Presentation at 2011 Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance Spring Workshop by Jack Van 

Steenburg, Director, Office of Enforcement and Compliance, FMCSA, April 2011. 

of trucks involved in fatal and injury crashes has also reached a record low level. 

Charts depicting these improvements can be found at the end of my testimony. 

Preventing Unsafe Motor Carriers and Drivers From Entering the Industry 

New Entrant Requirements 

In order to continue the positive trends in truck safety, FMCSA must further 

strengthen the requirements for new motor carriers entering the industry. As a 

study conducted by the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center) demonstrated, new motor carriers have significantly higher violation and crash 

rates. For instance, the violation rate of critical safety regulations for new entrants 

was 206.3 per 1,000 drivers compared to 11.8 per 1,000 drivers for experienced carriers. Similarly, the violation rate of acute safety regulations for new entrants was 

found to be 128.8 per 1,000 drivers versus 34.1 for experienced carriers.1 Not surprisingly, the rate of crashes for new carriers was found to be higher as well. The 

crash rate for carriers in their first year of operation was 0.505 per million vehicle 

miles traveled, compared to 0.411 for carriers with more than a year of operating 

experience.2

Despite these risks, FMCSA currently grants operating authority to new motor 

carriers without any demonstration of the carrier’s understanding of, or compliance 

with, Federal safety regulations. Instead, an initial new entrant safety audit occurs 

up to 18 months after a carrier has commenced operations. Regrettably, 41 percent 

of carriers fail these initial safety audits and 24 percent ultimately have their authority revoked.3

Clearly, more needs to be done to ensure the safety of new entrants before they 

begin operating, and new entrant safety audits must be done sooner. As the Subcommittee may be aware, the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act (MCSIA) of 

1999 directed the Secretary of Transportation to ‘‘consider the establishment of a 

proficiency examination for applicant motor carriers. . .to ensure such applicants 

understand applicable safety regulations before being granted operating authority’’. 

However, in implementing the new entrant program, the Federal Motor Carrier 

Safety Administration (FMCSA) opted not to require such an exam but instead created a self-certification process. Carriers merely had to answer ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ to a 

series of questions about whether they complied with Federal safety regulations. 

In March 2003, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) criticized the 

new entrant safety assurance process in its safety recommendations stemming from 

a tragic motorcoach accident. NTSB noted that the self-certification process ‘‘. . . 

does little more to screen new motor carrier applicants than the previous new entrant form requirements did. . . . In other countries and territories, the new applicant process is more stringent. . . . In all member countries of the European Union, 

a new motor carrier must take an examination to ensure that he knows the rules 

and regulations. . . . The Safety Board therefore concludes that FMCSA’s New Entrant Safety Assurance Process lacks meaningful safeguards to ensure that a motor 

carrier is aware of, understands, and has a safety management system in place to 

comply with the FMCSRs (Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations).’’ 

In a rulemaking completed in 2008, FMCSA subsequently eliminated the self-certification process, noting that ‘‘Many carriers were discovered to have falsely certified having such knowledge, and commenters urged the Agency to remove this requirement. The Agency concluded that enhanced educational materials and technical assistance materials would provide most carriers with sufficient knowledge of 

applicable regulations and of how to comply with such regulations. . . .’’ 

With the elimination of the self-certification process, there is now no means to effectively ensure knowledge and compliance with the regulations by new entrants before they begin operations. ATA recognizes that strengthening the new entrant safety assurance process is a large task for FMCSA to tackle. Over 40,000 new motor 

carriers file for authority to operate annually, but FMCSA must focus its limited 

resources on auditing existing carriers that present known safety risks. However, 

it is clear that the new entrant process must be improved. 

ATA urges mandatory minimum training requirements, pre-authority proficiency 

exams, and accelerated initial safety audits as components of highway reauthorizaVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:49 Apr 18, 2012 Jkt 073786 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\73786.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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4Predicting Truck Crash Involvement: A 2011 Update; American Transportation Research Institute, April 2011. 

tion legislation. Specifically, every new entrant should be required to successfully 

complete comprehensive on-line training on compliance with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations and an examination prior to initiating operations. Further, 

FMCSA should conduct the initial safety audits sooner, specifically, within 6 months 

of the carrier’s start date. 

Drug and Alcohol Clearinghouse 

There are also steps FMCSA can take to prevent unsafe drivers from entering the 

industry. In particular, FMCSA can leverage the industry’s shared desire to prevent 

these drivers from operating by providing motor carriers with tools to more effectively screen driver applicants. For instance, the creation of a clearinghouse for drug 

and alcohol test results would help carriers identify applicants that have violated the 

drug and alcohol regulations. The clearinghouse would represent a major step toward closing a known loophole that allows unsafe drivers to evade the consequences 

of their actions by simply failing to disclose to hiring carriers the names of motor 

carrier they worked for when they committed drug or alcohol violations. 

Driver Safety Measurement System Scores 

FMCSA could also leverage the power of the industry to remove unsafe operators 

from the industry by providing carriers with driver applicants’ Driver Safety Measurement System (DSMS) scores. These scores are generated by the agency’s new 

safety Measurement System and represent each driver’s safety performance reflected as a percentile ranking compared to all other drivers. Currently, these scores 

are only accessible by agency enforcement officials. 

Hair Testing For Drugs 

Finally, the Department of Transportation (DOT) should work with the Department of Health and Human Services to develop standards for the acceptance of hair 

testing as a component of the Federal Workplace Drug Testing program. Motor carriers are increasingly relying on hair testing as a means to identify unsafe drivers 

who make drug use part of their lifestyles. These carriers have found that hair is 

far superior to the only currently accepted specimen—urine—in its ability to detect 

drug use. Specifically, they have found that hair tests are up to 30 percent more 

likely to reveal drug use. Further, hair testing is less subject to subversion than 

urine and has a longer window of detection time—up to 30 days. 

However, carriers that employ hair testing must still conduct redundant urine 

tests. Also, they are prohibited from sharing positive hair test results with former 

drivers’ prospective employers. As a result, a driver who is terminated for testing 

positive on a hair test can merely apply for employment with another motor carrier 

without fear that the new employer will learn of his failed drug test. 

Improve Laws and Regulations that Govern Drivers and Vehicles 

Employer Notification System 

Once drivers are permitted to enter the industry, both FMCSA and motor carriers 

need the tools to assure their continued safety. One such tool that is desperately 

needed is a system to proactively notify employers of drivers’ convictions for moving 

violations and of other licensing actions (e.g., license suspensions). Such systems 

have been shown to function effectively in several states and could serve as models 

for a Federal program. 

Research has repeatedly shown the strong predictive value of moving violations. 

One such study, an April 2011 analysis published by the American Transportation 

Research Institute 4 (ATRI), showed that drivers convicted of moving violations are 

far more likely to be involved in future crashes. For instance, drivers convicted of 

improper passing, improper turns or improper/erratic lane changes are over 80 percent more likely to be involved in a future crash than those who have not. More 

timely notification of such violations would improve safety by revealing problem 

driving behavior promptly so that corrective action (e.g., training, progressive discipline) can be taken more quickly. 

Consistent with ATRI’s findings, a 2004 FMCSA study Driver Violation Notification Service Feasibility concluded that a national ENS could save approximately 15 

lives and avoid up to 373 injuries and 6,828 crashes per year. More recently, two 

States—Colorado and Minnesota—participated in an ENS pilot program mandated 

by Section 4022 of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA–21). 

Nearly 1,100 drivers participated in the pilot which generated 229 notifications to 

the drivers’ employers. In its final report on the pilot, FMCSA estimated that a naVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:49 Apr 18, 2012 Jkt 073786 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\73786.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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tional DRNS system would prevent between 2,500 and 3,500 crashes and generate 

$240.5 million in societal safety benefits annually. 

Under the current Federal process, motor carriers often do not learn of drivers’ 

convictions in a timely manner. Employers are required to check drivers’ records annually, however these records may reveal violations committed up to 11 months earlier. Similarly, CDL holders are required to notify their employers of violations within 30 days of a conviction, but are often reluctant to do so fearing repercussions. 

FMCSA estimates that at least 50 percent of drivers do not notify employers of convictions and licensing actions (e.g., suspensions, revocations) within the required 

time-frames. 

For these reasons, ATA strongly advocates swift development of a national employer notification system. DOT can deploy such a system relatively quickly and easily by endorsing a hybrid approach—combining the capabilities and expertise of a 

third parties with strong Federal guidance. 

Electronic Logging Devices 

FMCSA could also better ensure safe operation of commercial motor vehicles by 

moving forward with its proposed mandate for electronic logging devices. ATA supports mandating such devices as a means to improve compliance with the hours of 

service rules. FMCSA’s data generated in the context of its Compliance, Safety, Accountability (CSA) program, shows a very strong correlation between compliance 

with the current hours of service rules and safe operation. Hence, the proper course 

of action is to improve compliance with the rules, rather than change them. 

Moreover, FMCSA’s proposed changes to the hours of service rules are unnecessary and unjustified. Truck safety has improved to unprecedented levels since 2003 

when the basic framework for the current hours of service regulations was first published. The numbers of truck-related injuries and fatalities have both dropped more 

than 30 percent to their lowest levels in recorded history. 

Also, the productivity losses and other negative impacts of the proposed rule 

would be dramatic. Past estimates by DOT placed the net cost to society of similar 

changes at over $2 billion annually. In fact, FMCSA’s own cost benefit analysis acknowledges that the safety benefits of the proposed rule do not outweigh the costs. 

Only by applying creative ‘‘driver health’’ benefits can the agency justify making 

these changes. However, the agency mischaracterized the findings of the research 

upon which it makes this tenuous claim. 

Given these many reasons, the best course of action is for FMCSA to abandon its 

proposal, retain the current hours of service regulations, and devote attention to improving compliance with the rules by, among other things, mandating electronic logging devices. 

Speed Limiters 

Perhaps one of the most effective means to ensuring continued safe operation is 

to reduce the speed of vehicles. As the Subcommittee may know, in 2006 ATA petitioned FMCSA and NHTSA to require speed limiters be set at time of manufacture. 

Also, ATA subsequently recommended a maximum national speed limit to 65 milesper-hour for all vehicles. NHTSA recently agreed to grant ATA’s petition and will 

initiate a rulemaking on this matter. However, the agency has delayed its planned 

initiation of this rulemaking until the end of 2012. Including this mandate in the 

safety title of reauthorization would raise the visibility and priority of this issue 

causing NHTSA to begin its rulemaking process sooner. 

Tools to Remove Unsafe Drivers and Carriers From the Industry 

ATA shares Congress’ strong desire to remove unsafe drivers and carriers from 

the industry. Perhaps the most important part of that process is the accurate identification of bad actors. Fortunately, FMCSA’s new CSA program represents an important means to this end. By design, the system uses real-time performance data, 

measures relative crash risk, and creates scores of comparative performance. These 

scores are then used to identify the most unsafe actors (carriers and drivers) and 

prioritize them for enforcement intervention. 

Data Quality Issues 

ATA has supported CSA from the outset since it is generally performance-based, 

provides real time measurements, and has the potential to distinguish responsible 

carriers from those that may not share their commitment to safety. However, the 

integrity of the system is hindered by underlying data quality issues. As such, its 

use as a system to reliably identify unsafe carriers and drivers is somewhat limited. 

Given the heightened impact of safety data (roadside inspection results, crashes) 

on carriers’ performance measurements, carriers are increasingly scrutinizing their 

data and challenging erroneous records. These challenges are made through a proVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:49 Apr 18, 2012 Jkt 073786 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\73786.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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gram called DataQs, which channels correction requests to the appropriate state 

agencies. However, since the launch of CSA, DataQ correction requests have skyrocketed, challenging the states’ abilities to correct erroneous reports in a timely 

fashion. To help resolve this data crisis, ATA strongly encourages Congress to expand Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP) funding dedicated to State 

DataQ resources. At a minimum, each state will need to add a full time employee 

(or two) in order to keep pace with the increasing demand for data corrections. 

Scoring Methodology Improvements 

It is also necessary for FMCSA to make some changes to the methodology CSA uses 

to develop carriers’ scores. Most importantly, FMCSA should modify the severity 

weights or ‘‘points’’ assigned to violations so that they more accurately correspond to 

relative crash risk. Several, if not many, of the violation severity weights are illogical and inappropriate, in that they do not accurately reflect relative crash risk. As 

a result, the system targets the wrong carriers—those that may not present the 

greatest crash risk. 

For instance, a tire with less than 2/32nd tread on the trailer bears the same 

weight (8 points on a scale of 1—10) as a tire in the same condition mounted on 

the steering axle. Naturally, these two mounting positions present very different relative risks. Also, failing to have all four hazardous materials placards mounted horizontally bears the same weight (5 points) as having no placards mounted at all. 

To develop these severity weights, FMCSA initially relied on data generated 

through a crash risk analysis. However, the agency later modified the weights based 

on ‘‘subject matter expert input’’ and is now in the process of seeking recommendations for additional changes based on the opinions expressed by members of the 

agency’s Motor Carrier Safety Advisory Committee. In order to ensure that the system accurately identifies drivers and carriers that represent the greatest crash risk, 

FMCSA should carefully weight each violation on its statistical relationship to crashes. 

Crash Accountability 

Perhaps the most pressing area for improvement with the CSA program is with 

respect to how the system measures carriers’ crash involvement. Currently, the system measures carrier performance by considering all carrier involved crashes, including those for which the motor carrier could not reasonably be held accountable. 

Accordingly, a carrier involved in a number of crashes for which it was not responsible is seen as just as safe/unsafe as a like-sized carrier who was involved in the 

same number of crashes—but caused the majority of them. 

As a result, safe carriers are erroneously labeled as crash prone and targeted for 

interventions and roadside inspections. Conversely, unsafe carriers (those with a 

pattern of causing crashes) with slightly fewer crashes may appear safer by comparison and escape scrutiny. 

Undoubtedly, one of the best predictors of future crash involvement is a carrier’s 

past at-fault crash involvement. However, because the current system does not consider crash accountability, carriers’ scores in this area are less meaningful and reliable. Hence, in order to use the system to its fullest potential as a means to target 

unsafe drivers and carriers for intervention and potentially remove them from the industry, FMCSA should only measure carrier performance based on crashes for which 

they could reasonably be held accountable. 

Additional Opportunities to Improve Safety 

While dedicating attention to the enforcement and regulatory issues discussed 

above is important, doing so is restrictive and will yield limited results for two primary reasons. First, this approach focuses exclusively on motor carriers and drivers, 

despite the fact that the majority of car/truck crashes are initiated by actions committed by other motorists. Second, it emphasizes enforcement and compliance as the 

primary means to improve safety. Though enforcement programs are necessary and 

important, seeing them as the only avenue to improving highway safety is severely 

limiting and discounts the potential of other solutions that would leverage the power 

of the industry to achieve additional improvements. 

Focuses On A Small Part of the Problem 

As the Committee is well aware, FMCSA is primarily focused on regulating only 

part of the highway safety equation: motor carriers and commercial motor vehicles. 

Yet the single largest factor impacting truck safety is the behavior of other motorists. Hence, focusing almost exclusively on motor carriers and their drivers directs 

attention to a small part of the equation. 

FMCSA’s own research shows that in the majority of large truck/passenger vehicle 

crashes, the driver of a passenger vehicle was the sole party cited for a related facVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:49 Apr 18, 2012 Jkt 073786 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\73786.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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5Department of Transportation: Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Report to Congress on the Large Truck Crash Causation Study, (2006). 6 Virginia Tech Transportation Institute, A Descriptive Analysis of Light Vehicle-Heavy Vehicle 

Interactions Using In Situ Driving Data, (2006). 7 Ibid. 

tor (e.g., speeding, failure to yield).5 Numerous additional studies have analyzed 

crash data and arrived at similar conclusions. For instance, a University of Michigan Research Institute (UMTRI) study of 8,309 fatal-car truck crashes examined 

driver factors in these crashes and found that car drivers made errors in 81 percent 

of these crashes and trucks drivers 26 percent of them. In addition, two recent studies conducted by the Virginia Tech Transportation Institute (VTTI) collected data 

on 210 car/truck incidents using both video and non-video data. The evidence, much 

of it video, showed that 78 percent of these incidents were initiated by car drivers, 

while the remaining 22 percent were initiated by truck drivers.6 In fact, the VTTI 

study said: 

‘‘. . . the current study lends further credibility to the hypothesis that light vehicle drivers are responsible for a substantial proportion of the light vehicle/heavy 

vehicle interactions and that addressing this problem should include focusing on 

the light vehicle driver.’’ 7

Since meaningful solutions to commercial motor vehicle safety require a focus on 

the primary causes of crashes, FMCSA should devote its awareness and education 

resources and promote traffic enforcement programs to address the role of passenger 

vehicles in car/truck crashes. Due to the agency’s statutory limitation on regulating 

only commercial motor vehicles, the agency must continue find new and creative 

ways to address this part of the truck-involved crash problem. FMCSA’s Ticketing 

Aggressive Cars and Trucks (TACT) program is one such program, albeit a small 

one, aimed directly at the high risk behaviors—those that cause crashes—of both 

car and truck drivers. This program that has been evaluated and shown to be effective. As a result, FMCSA should work to implement it as part of each state’s motor 

carrier safety assistance program. 

Motor carriers recognize that the key to reducing crashes is finding ways to prevent them, regardless of fault. Congress and FMCSA must adopt this approach as 

well. In order to further reduce commercial motor vehicle crashes, we must acknowledge the primary causes of these crashes and accept the need to initiate programs 

that will address them. 

The Regulatory Compliance and Enforcement Model 

Again, ATA recognizes that truck safety regulations are important and we support 

them. However, regulations alone are insufficient to achieve optimum results. Employing more creative solutions and employing tools to leverage the mutual interest 

of the industry to improve highway safety will bring about even greater safety improvements. I have already mentioned a few of these tools such as a drug and alcohol clearinghouse, an employer notification system and access to DSMS scores. They 

represent good examples of ways to provide the industry with the means to help 

achieve our mutual goals. To achieve the fullest potential, Congress and FMCSA 

should explore additional tools that will bring about safety gains. 

Incentives for Safety Technologies 

Congress and FMCSA should consider tax and/or regulatory incentives for carriers 

to adopt systems and programs with potential safety benefits. For instance, FMCSA 

might consider providing positive credits in the CSA scoring methodology for carriers that voluntarily adopt emerging safety technologies. Also, ATA strongly supports passage of S. 1233/H.R. 1706, legislation that would provide a tax credit equal 

to 50 percent of the cost of qualified advanced safety systems, including brake 

stroke monitoring systems, lane departure warning systems, collision warning systems, and vehicle stability systems. These technologies are very promising, but their 

relative risks and benefits are not fully known. Hence, mandating their use on every 

truck in all segments of the industry would be premature. However, providing incentives for voluntary use would promote real world testing of the devices to provide 

data in support of a potential future mandate. Further, such incentives could driver 

carriers to adopt the devices sooner, since such voluntary incentives can be introduced more quickly than a regulatory mandate. 

More Productive Trucks 

ATA supports giving states more flexibility to adjust their truck size and weight 

regulations in order to address local needs. More productive vehicles would produce 

important environmental benefits by reducing vehicle miles traveled, fuel consumpVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:49 Apr 18, 2012 Jkt 073786 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\73786.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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8 American Transportation Research Institute, Energy and Emissions Impacts of Operating 

Higher Productivity Vehicles, March 2008. 9See for example: Campbell, K.L., et al., ‘‘Analysis of Accident Rates of Heavy-Duty Vehicles,’’ 

University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute (UMTRI), Report No. UMTRI–88–17, 

Ann Arbor, MI, 1988.; Transportation Research Board, National Research Council, ‘‘Truck 

Weight Limits,’’ Special Report 225, Washington, D.C., 1990; Cornell University School of Civil 

and Environmental Engineering, ‘‘Economic and Safety Consequences of Increased Truck 

Weights,’’ Dec. 1987; Scientex, ‘‘Accident Rates For Longer Combination Vehicles,’’ 1996; 

Woodrooffe and Assoc., ‘‘Longer Combination Vehicle Safety Performance in Alberta 1995 to 

1998,’’ March 2001. 10Though ATA expects truck traffic to increase as the economy grows, productivity increases 

will slow the rate of this growth. 

tion, and greenhouse gas emissions. Use of these vehicles could reduce fuel usage 

by up to 39 percent, with similar reductions in criteria and greenhouse gas emissions.8 More productive trucks can be as safe as or safer than existing configurations. Furthermore, because fewer truck trips will be needed to haul a set amount 

of freight, crash exposure—and therefore the number of crashes—will be reduced.9 10

In order to take advantage of the benefits that productivity increases can deliver, 

Congress must reform its laws to give states greater flexibility to change their size 

and weight regulations. 

Conclusion 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to offer ATA’s views on how best to 

collaboratively improve highway safety. The trucking industry is justifiably proud 

of its recent safety accomplishments, but recognizes there is much more that needs 

to be done. Please know we strongly support your desire to improve the safety of 

our workplace, as demonstrated by our broad safety agenda. We share your interest 

in preventing unsafe carriers and drivers from entering the industry and means to 

ensure that rogue operators are effectively identified and removed from the roadways. 

As I mentioned earlier, further meaningful improvements will require a departure 

from the traditional approach to truck safety. The government must acknowledge 

the role other motorists play in truck crashes and identify the programs we can put 

in place to prevent these crashes. Further, we must be more creative in our approach to improving driver and carrier safety. Providing carriers will safety tools 

will leverage the size and power of the industry to achieve the mutual objective of 

improving highway safety. 

Thank you and I would be happy to answer any questions you may have. 

31 

LARGE TRUCK FATALITY AND INJURY RATES—1998–2009 


721ENGL1.eps 721ENGL2.eps
32 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Rajkovacz, the Director of Regulatory Affairs for Owner Operator Independent Drivers Association, an international trade organization that represents truck drivers and independent truck operators. 

We’re looking forward to hearing from you. Please. 

STATEMENT OF JOE RAJKOVACZ, 

DIRECTOR OF REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 

OWNER-OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION 

Mr. RAJKOVACZ. Thank you. 

Good afternoon, Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Wicker, 

and members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity 

to testify this afternoon. 

As a former truck driver and current representative of the small 

business trucking community, I can tell you that matters discussed 

this afternoon are extraordinarily important to the thousands of 

men and women who work hard every day behind the wheels, of 

driving commercial vehicles. 

First, I would like to say that it is of the utmost importance that 

members of this committee and other policy decisionmakers recognize that one cannot simply divorce safe operations and safety compliance from the economic realities that truckers must face every 

day. 

With that said, the U.S. trucking industry has never been safer. 

From a peak of 6,702 fatal accidents involving commercial motor 

vehicle safety in 1979, the industry had a record low of 3,380 in 

2009. FMCSA statistics clearly show a continuous improving trend 

over the course of three plus decades. 

Additionally, it is important to recognize that interstate trucking 

is not at fault in the majority of the involved accidents. 

Many take credit for these dramatic improvements. Unfortunately, we rarely hear credit given to those most responsible—the 

men and women who actually drive trucks. 

Small business truckers dominate the industry; yet, their business model is under assault from larger motor carrier interests 

that have cleverly crafted and support initiatives, like EOBR speed 

limiters in heavier trucks, under well-sounding, but false, safety 

and environmental arguments. We hear the repeated mantra from 

large motor carriers that leveling the playing field is necessary. 

That is nothing more than sloganeering for initiatives designed to 

drive their competitors from the marketplace. 

It’s ironic that probably the most significant safety issue affecting compliance with hours of service regulations, which is the excessive amount of time drivers are detained at loading docks by 

shippers and receivers. It is viewed by larger motor carriers as 

something better off left to market forces alone to deal with. Yet, 

they think government mandating a wide array of onboard safety 

systems, from EOBRs to speed limiters, is necessary to level he 

playing field. Where is the logic in that? 

Here are some interesting safety statistics that have resulted 

from FMCSA’s new and more comprehensive Motor Carrier Safety 

Measurement System, which replaced the old SafeStat system, and 

33 

is a key component of CSA. Small business motor carriers look 

pretty good when compared to their big business counterparts. 

Under SafeStat, large motor carriers—those with more than 500 

trucks—showed up as deficient in one or more of the safety evaluation areas only 22.1 percent of the time. Within the new, more detailed system, the number of large motor carriers having an alert 

or warning in at least one category jumped to 51.4 percent. Conversely, under the increased scrutiny of the new system, for motor 

carriers with five trucks or less, safety deficiency only increased by 

three-tenths of a percentage, from 7.1 to 7.4; and for carriers with 

6 to 15 trucks, their safety record actually improved by 6 percent. 

Those small business motor carriers represent over 80 percent of 

all registered nationally. Clearly, owner-operator small business 

motor carriers and their drivers are doing something right. 

During the past 9 months, this industry has dealt with dozens 

of rulemakings from different Federal agencies, every one of them 

coming at additional cost to small businesses who are unable to get 

cost recovery in this economy. I hear constantly from owner-operators, drivers, and small business owners that they’ve had enough. 

Far too many are looking to exit the industry. 

Today’s significant safety gains can, and will be, lost if policies 

are implemented that cause a rush to the exits by veteran, experienced operators. We think today’s tremendous safety achievements 

can be improved upon, but not if safety is viewed through the same 

prism of only applying more screws to drivers out on the road. We 

should not be advancing regulations that reduce driver flexibility 

for no clear safety benefit, while ignoring those outside of trucking 

who share responsibility for compliance issues. 

Minimum driver training standards which are the most effective 

and least costly manner for improving safety should be given greater attention than simple reliance on mandating technological solutions. There is a real disconnect between the executive suite and 

the driver’s seat on how to improve highway safety, and we cannot 

afford to ignore the real-life experiences and opinions of the men 

and women who are on the road every day. 

Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Wicker, and members 

of the subcommittee, on behalf of small business truckers who live 

in every community in our nation, thank you for the opportunity 

to testify. And I look forward to responding to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rajkovacz follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOE RAJKOVACZ, DIRECTOR OF REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OWNER-OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION

Good morning, Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Wicker and distinguished 

members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to testify on matters 

which are extremely important to our Nation’s small business truckers and professional truck drivers. 

My name is Joe Rajkovacz. I am Director of Regulatory Affairs for the OwnerOperator Independent Drivers Association and serve on the association’s Board of 

Directors. Prior to my current position with OOIDA, I was an owner-operator for 

more than two decades operating my own equipment and leasing my services to a 

motor carrier. You have asked today for OOIDA’s input on reauthorizing highway 

safety programs and as someone who spent nearly thirty years behind the wheel 

of a truck, and spent the past decade listening to the safety concerns and complaints 

from active truckers, I am happy to provide you with my unique perspective. 

As you are most likely aware, OOIDA is a not-for-profit corporation established 

in 1973, with its principal place of business in Grain Valley, Missouri. OOIDA is 

34 

the national trade association representing the interests of independent owner-operators and professional drivers on all issues that affect small-business truckers. The 

more than 152,000 members of OOIDA are small-business men and women in all 

50 states who collectively own and operate more than 200,000 individual heavy-duty 

trucks. The Association actively promotes the views of small-business truckers 

through its interaction with state and Federal regulatory agencies, legislatures, the 

courts, other trade associations and private entities to advance an equitable business environment and safe working conditions for commercial drivers. 

The majority of trucking in this country are small-business, approximately 93 percent of all motor carriers have 20 or less trucks in their fleet and roughly 86 percent 

of carriers have fleets of just 6 or fewer trucks. In fact, one-truck motor carriers represent nearly half of the total number of registered motor carriers operating in the 

United States. These small-business motor carriers have an intensely personal and 

vested interest in highway safety as any safety related incident may not only affect 

their personal health, but also dramatically impact their livelihood. As such, OOIDA 

sincerely desires to see further improvements in highway safety and significant 

progress toward the highway safety goals of the Subcommittee and U.S. Department 

of Transportation. 

With that said, during this reauthorization process, Congress has the potential to 

accomplish great things with the drafting of a ‘‘Highway Bill’’. However, in light of 

the current economic conditions and the regulatory assault under which America’s 

small-business truckers are currently operating, some proposed legislation passed 

under the guise of safety could cause irrevocable harm to this significant portion of 

the industry and their contributions to the unprecedented levels of highway safety 

we are currently experiencing. 

Detention Time 

One cannot simply divorce safe operations and safety compliance from the economic realities that truckers must face every day. While truck drivers certainly 

should be held accountable for their actions, the same should be true for the stakeholders who often have more control over truckers’ schedules and activities than the 

drivers themselves. 

The excessive, uncompensated time truckers spend waiting to be loaded or unloaded at shipping and receiving facilities represents one of the greatest examples 

of how lacking regulatory enforcement and economic pressures within the industry 

can negatively impact a trucker’s ability to comply with safety regulations. Detention time has been a growing problem in the trucking industry for many years, according to a study performed by the FMCSA, detention representing more than 3 

billion dollars in waste to the industry and over 6 billion dollars to society. Unless 

and until the problem of excessively detaining drivers at loading/unloading facilities 

is addressed, most safety regulations pertaining to hours-of-service (HOS) of drivers 

will be undermined. 

Repeatedly, time spent waiting to be loaded or unloaded has been identified by 

drivers and small motor carriers in studies, as well as at FMCSA’s public listening 

sessions, as a major factor that must be addressed in order to have effective HOS 

regulations. The pressure to violate HOS regulations will not fade away even with 

an electronic on-board recorder mandate (EOBRs). 

Under current HOS regulations, the daily 14-hour clock begins to tick for a trucker when the driver performs any on-duty activity, including those duties related to 

loading and unloading. However, unlike other industrialized nations throughout the 

world, most U.S. based drivers are not compensated by the hour but rather based 

upon the number of miles driven. This translates into a drivers’ time having essentially no value, particularly to shippers and receiver which fall outside of FMCSA’s 

authority and are not held accountable for their actions related to HOS violations 

by drivers. 

Shippers and receivers routinely make truckers wait for considerable amounts of 

time before they allow them to load or unload their trucks and drivers routinely arrive at the same facilities with little or no idea how long they will be there. Known 

in the industry as ‘‘detention time,’’ most shippers and receivers do not pay for this 

time and have little financial or regulatory incentive to make more efficient use of 

drivers’ time. It is common for a driver to pull into shipping or receiving facilities 

with no idea of whether he or she will be there for 2 hours or for 10. In certain 

segments of our industry, it is not unusual for drivers to wait up to 24 hours before 

receiving a load. During this waiting time, it can be nearly impossible for a driver 

to rest. Often, the driver must wait in line or be ‘‘on call,’’ ready to take the load 

and make the ‘‘just-in-time’’ delivery. 

As a driver and owner-operator I contended with excessive detention time on a 

daily basis, for example: for over two decades I hauled refrigerated food products 

35 

between the Midwest and the west-coast—primarily California. The receivers I frequented most were grocery wholesalers. Appointments would be set, I’d show up ontime and the games would begin. I’d be lucky to be immediately assigned a door 

to begin unloading. There was always some excuse such as ‘‘we over-booked’’ appointments and ‘‘we’ll get to you when we can’’. Often, I had other scheduled appointments to make and this first delay caused a cascading effect that would cause 

every other appointment to be missed. Increasingly, the other receivers would assess 

non-negotiable ‘‘late fees’’ in order to unload the product they ordered. None of these 

receivers would compensate me for unwarranted detention time that was a result 

of their inefficiency but they were not shy about taking from me both my time and 

hard earned money in extortionate unloading fees. 

Once I was empty, I’d begin the return trip by loading produce. Contrary to what 

many people may believe, this is not a process where I’d simply go to one shipper, 

get loaded and hit the road. Most produce shipments involve multiple pick-ups. 

Each shipper could take anywhere from 1 hour to more than 24 hours to complete 

loading. As a driver, I’d have to constantly monitor my C.B. radio for the call from 

the shipper to head to the loading dock. If I had the misfortune to fall asleep and 

missed the call, I was marked as a ‘‘no-show’’ and the process would start all over. 

None of these massive delays were ever recorded against my available HOS. The 

hours were logged as ‘‘off-duty’’ time because it would have been financial suicide 

for me to burn as much as half my available weekly time for zero compensation (as 

an aside, EOBR’s will not change this dynamic). Nobody in the supply chain cared 

about how their actions complicated my ability to comply with the HOS regulations. 

From OOIDA’s perspective, if the time spent by drivers waiting to be loaded or 

unloaded is contemplated and if compensation for excessive detention time begins 

to be negotiated or if shippers and receivers are held accountable under FMCSA regulations, the trucking industry and the American public would benefit from more 

efficient freight movement and dramatically improved highway safety—because 

drivers will no longer be incentivized to hide their actual on-duty hours. Furthermore, if the compensation structure for drivers were to be changed from mileage 

based pay to a form of hourly compensation many safety concerns would be alleviated. 

We appreciate that within FMCSA’s draft Strategic Plan (2011–2016), the agency 

recognizes that in order to truly ‘‘raise the safety bar’’ for our industry, under Goal1, 

Strategy 1.1 the agency proposes to ‘‘Identify gaps in current legislative and regulatory authorities that prevent FMCSA from reaching certain elements of the CMV 

transportation life-cycle (e.g., entities touching roadway movement of passengers and 

freight: shippers, receivers, brokers, freight forwarders) who may have a deleterious 

effect on safety through their actions.’’ Without full supply chain accountability related to drivers HOS, many strategies designed to improve highway safety will find 

that achieving that goal remains elusive. 

Speed Limiters 

For years, many safety advocates and large corporate interests have been advocating for the government to impose restrictions on the engine speed of heavy-duty 

commercial vehicles despite the fact that the use of ‘‘speed limiters’’ is not widely 

researched or an act grounded in safety or sound scientific principle. Large motor 

carriers traditionally have opted to use speed limiters as a business decision and 

fleet management tool and as such support an industry wide mandate in an effort 

to level the playing field against small businesses which are perceived to have a 

competitive advantage because engaging a speed limiter is often not necessary of a 

small trucking operation. The limited research that has been conducted on speed 

limiters has demonstrated mixed and controversial results including results showing 

they are highly dangerous and offer very little economic or environmental benefit, 

particularly to small motor carriers despite the promoted misconception that they 

will improve upon fuel efficiency and highway safety. 

Speed limiters are costly, ineffective, easily tampered with, and dangerous as they 

can cause speed differentials and disrupt the on-going flow of traffic. Highway safety 

engineers have long recognized that highways are safest when all vehicles are traveling at the same speed regardless of the speed limit. This is clearly evidenced by 

the well documented fact that accident rates are lower on interstate highways than 

on other roads because of access control, wider lanes, shoulders and the steady 

movement of traffic. Indeed, notwithstanding higher speeds, the interstate highway 

system experiences accidents and fatality rates two to five times less than the primary road system it replaced. It is well established that deviations from the mean 

speed of traffic in the negative as well as positive direction contribute significantly 

to accidents. For example, it has been found that for every 1 kilometer per hour increase in speed differential the casualties increase by 270. 

36 

Forcing heavy-duty trucks to drive slower than the flow of traffic will lead to frequent lane changes, passing and weaving maneuvers as well as tailgating by other 

faster moving vehicles. Indeed, traffic safety statistics produced by NHTSA in 2011 

show that an average of 423 people die each year and 5000 are injured where the 

passenger vehicle rear ends the truck. In addition, other studies have shown that 

almost 1 in 5 fatal accidents involving a truck include a vehicle striking the rear 

end of truck. Removing trucks from the free flow movement of traffic exacerbates 

the potential for more passenger vehicles colliding with the back of slower moving 

trucks. 

Safety is compromised when drivers lack full control of their vehicles. A study 

produced in Great Britain found that drivers of vehicles with external speed controls 

had a tendency to travel as fast as the speed limiter would allow, even when speed 

was too fast for the driving conditions. Further, OOIDA’s research has shown that 

drivers have a tendency to drive over the speed limit in lower speed zones to make 

up for the effects of the speed limited truck. While prevailing highway research 

shows that one of the major contributors to truck accidents is driving too fast for 

conditions, there are situations where extra power and speed are essential. When 

a speed limited truck is trying to pass another truck efficiently, speeds higher than 

68 mph may be required to avoid what is known in our industry as an ‘‘elephant 

race.’’ In addition, truck drivers are trained to know that during a tire blow out, 

one must accelerate to attempt to maintain control of the truck with a speed limited 

truck a driver may have limited ability to have the control necessary to regain control. 

OOIDA believes that in order to ensure safety, efforts must be made to keep all 

traffic flowing at the same rate of speed and drivers must have the power and ability to maneuver around impediments on the road. The best way to keep traffic flowing smoothly and safely is through increased enforcement of existing speed limits. 

Any Highway Bill which seeks to compromise the safety and livelihood of small 

business trucking operations will face considerable opposition by our membership 

considering it is small-business truckers, who have their skin and bones on the line 

and should have the right to stay safe behind the wheel. 

Although, we are here to primarily discuss safety, I would be remiss if I didn’t 

mention at least some of the disproportionate impact speed limiters would have economically on small business trucking operations. Among the many illustrations two 

of the most frequent concerns by owner operators include: (1) the ability to spec the 

truck to the necessary business model and (2) the method of enforcement. As a 

small business owner, trucks are ‘‘speced’’ to match the demographics of the route, 

the weight, the loads being hauled etc. This often requires changing the gear ratio, 

tires, and other relevant equipment on a truck to obtain optimal performance. An 

operator forced to operate a speed limited truck may not be able to make these 

changes and as a consequence the truck may not be running as efficiently and 

therefore costing the operator money and compromised compliance. Also, many drivers have concerns about enforcement as the only way for law enforcement to monitor speed limited compliance is to port into the engine of a truck which, if done 

incorrectly can disable the entire vehicle. This is a problem OOIDA has already 

been experiencing with its membership in speed limited provinces in Canada. It is 

a problem that can cost small business truck operators thousands of dollars to fix. 

We would also like to point out that the FMCSA’s Large Truck Crash Causation 

Study (LTCCS) did not record a single truck involved fatality above 75 mph. Additionally, states have set speed limits within their borders based upon traffic engineering studies establishing the safest speeds for vehicles to operate upon their 

highways. Any Federal action to require speed limiters on commercial motor vehicles would act as a de facto national speed limit. 

Finally, not allowing trucks to operate at posted speed limits will reduce trucking 

productivity thus requiring MORE trucks to haul the same amount of freight as is 

currently hauled thus increasing car-truck interactions. From personal experience, 

I could legally drive from Salinas, California to Milwaukee, Wisconsin in 33 total 

hours of driving time—without violating posted speed limits. Arbitrarily speed limiting my truck to 62 mph would add 14.13 hours to the trip and one less day of 

shelf-life for perishable commodities. 

Large truckload motor carriers who are proponents of speed limiting trucks also 

historically experience triple digit turn-over rates among their drivers. Our average 

member spends over 200 nights away from their families. I personally averaged 280 

days away from my family for over 20 years. For an industry that has difficulty retaining drivers, further increasing the time they must spend away from their families through reduced productivity is simply counter-intuitive to encouraging good, 

safe drivers to remain in the industry. 

37 

Electronic On-Board Recorders 

The FMCSA is currently in the process of another effort to require truckers engaged in interstate commerce to install EOBRs on their trucks. If EOBRs could prevent the manipulation of a driver’s work schedule and respect drivers’ privacy 

rights, OOIDA would consider supporting their use for HOS reporting. But for now, 

OOIDA’s opposition to EOBRs remains unchanged. OOIDA remains convinced that 

EOBRs are no more a reliable or accurate record of a driver’s compliance with the 

HOS regulations than paper log books. In our collective mind there remains no rational basis for the economic burden and unreasonable imposition to personal privacy presented by requiring drivers to be monitored by EOBRs. 

The theory behind the use of EOBRs for HOS enforcement is that the devices will 

provide an accurate, tamper-proof record of a driver’s duty status and therefore ensure compliance with the HOS rules which in turn will make for a safer trucking 

industry. This theory is undermined by the fact that EOBRs cannot capture, without the driver’s input, data related to the time a driver spends conducting on-duty, 

non-driving activities. The HOS rules require a record to be kept of both driving 

time and all non-driving work activity (waiting to load and unload, inspecting/repairing the truck, performing the loading and unloading, looking for the next load, 

receiving a dispatch, doing paperwork, performing compensated work at another job, 

etc.). Even though an EOBR can record how long someone has operated a truck, if 

the driver does not manually enter his non-driving work time into the EOBR, the 

EOBR will show the driver as available to drive when he actually has no available 

time under the HOS rules. In fact, EOBRs will still permit someone to perform compensated work for the motor carrier to continue driving, without showing a violation. 

The EOBR’s reliance on driver input means they provide a no more accurate or 

tamper-proof record of a driver’s HOS compliance than paper log books. The substantial costs of EOBRs, costs that would be especially burdensome to small-business, cannot be justified by any perceived improvement in compliance. The costs 

also include those to personal privacy. The truck cab is the home away from home 

of most long-haul truck drivers. They sleep, eat and conduct personal business in 

the truck while not driving. They have a legitimate expectation of privacy that must 

be afforded to them. 

OOIDA is also certain that EOBRs will make it easier for motor carriers to harass 

drivers. Congress required FMCSA to ensure that such devices would not be used 

to harass truck drivers. Unfortunately, the EOBR rule that was recently issued 

seems to ignore this requirement. As the agency knows, it must ensure that its safety regulations do not have a deleterious effect on the physical condition of drivers. 

The only evidence on the record regarding the potential health effects of EOBRs are 

the studies that show that electronic monitoring of employees can increase the 

stress of workers. EOBRs can be used to exacerbate driver fatigue as carriers will 

be able to notice whenever a driver has stopped their truck during their on-duty 

time. Perhaps the driver has decided to take a break and get rest. Such breaks do 

not suspend the running of the 14-hour work-day under the HOS rules. The carrier 

will be able to instantly instruct the driver to return to the road and maximize his 

or her driving time. Carriers will also be able to instruct drivers, whenever they 

want, to log their on-duty, not-driving work as off-duty, thereby preserving their onduty driving time. Both practices remove what little discretion drivers have today 

to resist the economic pressure discussed above. 

OOIDA encourages lawmakers to seek solutions to motor carrier safety issues that 

are much less intrusive and much more effective such as mandating comprehensive 

driver training, resolving problems at the loading docks, revising methods of driver 

compensation, creating more flexible HOS rules, and providing adequate truck parking in those areas around the country where drivers who wish to rest cannot find 

such parking today. 

Driver Training 

An adequately trained driver is the key to any advances in safety goals. To this 

end, OOIDA has consistently been a strong proponent of Federal government efforts 

to develop and impose mandatory driver training and licensing requirements for 

entry-level truck drivers. During the recent HOS rulemaking process, the ATA published a whitepaper stating that ‘‘Finally, by restricting truck driver productivity 

and forcing the use of more inexperienced drivers, the revised rules are likely to result 

in more highway crashes—new drivers present more than 3 times the risk of crashes 

than their more experienced counterparts.’’ It is simply mystifying that we still have 

no meaningful training standards for entry-level drivers, but instead a continual 

push for more on-board safety technology. 

38 

At present, FMCSA regulations require entry-level drivers to be trained in only 

four subjects—driver qualifications, hours-of-service, driver wellness and whistle 

blower protection—all of them unrelated to the hands on operation of a commercial 

motor vehicle. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking published in 2008 would expand 

the required training for Class A drivers to include a minimum of 44 hours behind 

the wheel training in addition to 76 hours of classroom training, nearly all of it involving subjects pertaining directly to the safe operation of a commercial motor vehicle. The rulemaking also proposes the accreditation of driver training schools offering entry-level courses as well as the establishment of standards for ensuring that 

instructors at such schools are qualified to teach those courses. The goal of these 

regulatory revisions is to enhance the safety of commercial motor vehicle operations 

on the Nation’s highways. 

Based upon on our continuing, firm belief that minimum training requirements 

for entry-level drivers will improve highway safety for all motorists, private as well 

as commercial, OOIDA very much supports the FMCSA’s proposal to establish minimum training requirements that require a specified amount of behind-the-wheel 

training for entry-level drivers. OOIDA also believes that the effectiveness of such 

a training program can be ensured only if all facilities providing entry-level driver 

training programs are accredited by independent agencies and the instructors providing the training are required to meet relevant qualification standards. Accordingly, OOIDA also supports the agency’s proposal to regulate training providers. 

We sincerely hope FMCSA will soon move forward with its rulemaking on driver 

training. 

New Entrant Safety Assurance 

As a part of its Congressionally mandated efforts to beef up its New Entrant Safety Assurance efforts, FMCSA is conducting safety audits of new entrant motor carriers within 18 months of their being granted operating authority. OOIDA believes 

that instead of conducting safety audits well after the granting of operating authority, FMCSA should focus its limited resources on gathering information during the 

initial application process to determine an applicant’s ability to comply with regulations. Prior to granting operating authority, FMCSA can derive plenty of data regarding an applicant’s ability to perform safely and comply with regulations from 

evidence of work experience, training, and/or knowledge of the industry. FMCSA 

should also enhance current protest procedures to encourage industry stakeholders, 

including States, to provide data and other information that could lead to a more 

informed authorization process. This larger body of information could be checked 

against existing DOT databases to identify ‘‘chameleon’’ carriers and brokers as well 

as other problem applicants and to deny them new authority. 

OOIDA believes it is wrong to lump all new applicants together either for prequalification testing or later safety audit purposes. OOIDA’s experience assisting its 

members to obtain their operating authority has shown that the majority of these 

new applicants are experienced commercial motor vehicle drivers with excellent 

safety records. They are stable business owners who have for many years been driving a truck as an owner-operator or employee driver and have, throughout those 

years, learned much about applicable safety regulations and effective safety management procedures. 

There’s a strong correlation between a carrier’s future performance and its past 

accident record. Thus, FMCSA should expand the application form to collect information that will help the agency to identify those applicants with poor crash history 

records and safety practices. 

All owners (whether individuals, partners or shareholders) as well as key personnel, especially including, but not limited to, those who will be responsible for 

safety compliance and management should be identified. Their past training, experience, and work histories should be listed on the application. This information should 

go back at least 5 years, and should not be limited to trucking experience as all 

work experience will help determine whether the applicant possesses the character 

and integrity to conduct safe trucking operations. 

FMCSA could also enhance this pre-qualification review process by modifying current protest procedures to take full advantage of third-party information about applicants. FMCSA’s current practice is to post in the Federal Register a summary of 

the application (49 C.F.R. § 365.109(b)), which contains only the applicant’s name 

and address, its designated representative, assigned number, the date of filing, and 

the type of authority requested. Interested parties, including States who would have 

a direct interest in keeping applicants with poor driving and accident records from 

receiving new authority, then have only ten days to request the full application and 

file a formal protest. 

39 

It is our understanding that close to 40,000 applications for operating authority 

are filed with FMCSA each year. Thus, the ten-day review and protest period is far 

too short to allow stakeholders an opportunity to contribute in a meaningful way 

to the decision making process. 

All names, businesses, and equipment identified in an application or by protesters 

could then be checked against the substantial pool of information currently collected 

in DOT’s various computer databases, such as MCMIS, PRISM, and CDLIS, to confirm past performance and crash history. Certain types of information, such as evidence that the applicant is simply seeking to evade prior enforcement actions or outof-service orders, or has a history of the 16 types of violations that now result in 

denial of permanent authority when discovered in a new entrant safety audit, 

should result in automatic denial of authority. 

The proposed pre-qualification investigation is analogous to that currently conducted and effectively used by the Federal Maritime Commission in its licensing 

process for ocean transportation intermediaries. Applicants must demonstrate not 

only that they possess the ‘‘necessary experience’’ in related activities but the ‘‘necessary character’’ to render such services. 46 C.F.R. §§ 515.11(a)(1) and 515.14. Further, the Federal Maritime Commission investigates the accuracy of the information, the integrity and financial responsibility of the applicant, the character of the 

applicant and its qualifying individuals, and the length and nature of the applicant’s 

relevant experience, before granting a license. 

Such a thorough pre-qualification review process should eliminate problem applicants long before the current application and safety audit procedure might find 

them. 

Conclusion 

OOIDA firmly believes that it is in the best interest of the industry and highway 

safety for Congress to continue the practice of passing multi-year reauthorization 

Highway Bills. However, due to economic and regulatory uncertainty, Congress 

must be careful how the bill is funded and what legislative priorities are passed into 

law. Instituting a massive new private infrastructure funding configuration will result in additional taxation upon the traveling public and the shipment of goods, 

risking our economy even further. Costly mandates such as EOBRs and speed limiters are not in the best interest of the small-business trucking community. Moreover, mandates such as speed limiters will cause small business truckers to actively 

work to oppose the overall bill. Congress however has an opportunity to effectuate 

great and much needed change in the industry, and significantly help drivers and 

small-business truckers, through the pursuit of mandatory detention time, improved 

training, and most importantly, a refocused Federal investment that will improve 

the flow of interstate commerce and increase highway safety. 

Thank you again for this opportunity and I look forward to answering any questions that you may have. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you. 

Ms. Gillan is Vice President of Advocates for Highway and Auto 

Safety. She’s a tireless advocate that will discuss the importance of 

critical safety provisions to prevent tragic crashes. 

Ms. GILLAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Ms. Gillan. 

STATEMENT OF JACQUELINE S. GILLAN, VICE PRESIDENT, 

ADVOCATES FOR HIGHWAY AND AUTO SAFETY (ADVOCATES) 

Ms. GILLAN. Thank you, Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member 

Wicker, and members of the Subcommittee, for the opportunity to 

testify this afternoon on motor carrier safety issues. 

This subcommittee has a long history of advancing many important motor carrier safety laws that are preventing crashes, saving 

lives, and saving dollars, including recent committee action on the 

Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act. The FMCSA authorization bill 

presents a unique opportunity to build upon these achievements. 

In the past 10 years there have been more than 48,000 people 

killed in truck crashes—an average of 4,000 people annually. This 

is both unacceptable and unnecessary. 

40 

While Advocates welcomes the news that truck crash deaths 

have decreased these past 2 years, there is still an unfinished and 

overdue motor carrier safety agenda that needs to be adopted if we 

are serious about achieving significant and steady reductions in 

truck crash deaths and injuries. 

I have submitted to the record a very detailed statement identifying some of the most critical motor carrier safety issues we face 

and recommendations for action, but let me briefly highlight some 

of these. 

Large trucks are dramatically over-represented each year in severe crashes, especially fatal crashes. Large, overweight trucks are 

more dangerous for truck drivers and the public. They destroy our 

roads and bridges, and they undermine the national goal of a balanced intermodal freight transportation system. 

A major step forward in truck safety is to enact S. 876, the Safe 

Highways and Infrastructure Preservation Act, sponsored by Chairman Lautenberg. This bill will stop the deadly race in states for 

bigger, heavier and longer trucks, where the public and truck drivers are always the losers. Over 85 consumer health, safety, and law 

enforcement groups support this common sense bill. 

Driver fatigue remains a serious and deadly problem in the 

trucking industry. Two important strategies for addressing truck 

driver fatigue is an hours-of-service rule that advances safety and 

better enforcement by requiring electronic onboard recorders instead of paper log books. 

Advocates urges passage of S. 695, the Commercial Driver Compliance Improvement Act sponsored by Senator Pryor, to guarantee 

efforts by Congress and safety groups to require EOBRs will finally 

be completed and I also want to recognize the work of the Chairman in pushing for a universal requirement for electric onboard recorders. 

Keeping unsafe motor carriers and unsafe drivers off of our highways is essential to everyone’s safety. 

FMCSA has fallen short in meeting both of these goals. We recommend that FMCSA adopt a stronger requirement for motor carriers entering the industry, such as a preauthorization safety audit, 

or a proficiency exam for new entrants. We also urge FMCSA to 

issue a strong entry-level driver training requirement for commercials drivers of trucks as well as motorcoaches. 

Another bill that Advocates supports is S. 754, sponsored by two 

members of this subcommittee, Senator Pryor and Senator Boozman. This bill implements a GAO recommendation that DOT establish a national clearinghouse for records relating to alcohol and 

controlled substance testing of commercial drivers. 

One of the major challenges facing the agency is ensuring rigorous oversight of the motor carrier industry and enforcement of 

safety laws and regulations. FMCSA has recently implemented the 

CSA program to achieve this goal. Unfortunately, although it has 

the potential to improve monitoring and oversight of the industry, 

it is difficult at this point to accurately assess its effectiveness, and 

our testimony includes several key recommendations that echo 

NTSB concerns on driver and vehicle violations, as well as the need 

for additional evaluations by GAO, and continued oversight by Congress. 

41 

As Chairman Lautenberg stated, every week of the year the 

number of people killed in truck crashes is equivalent to a major 

airplane crash. Furthermore, driving a truck is one of the most 

dangerous occupations in the United States. 

There are several overdue actions we urge this subcommittee to 

consider. These include speed governors for trucks supported by 

safety groups and the ATA, stronger actions by the agency to identify and punish reincarnated motor carrier companies, as well as 

giving law enforcement the tools they need to inspect curbside motorcoach companies. 

Advocates is closely monitoring, and still has concerns outlined 

in our testimony about the implementation of the new cross-border 

pilot program to ensure the safety of Mexican trucks entering and 

traveling throughout the United States. 

Trucking is vital to our economy. But truck crashes extract an 

enormous financial and human cost in terms of deaths and injuries, 

and we can do better. We urge the subcommittee to continue its 

oversight and provide clear direction to the agency in the reauthorization legislation to continue our efforts to reduce truck crash 

deaths and injuries. Advocates looks forward to working with you 

on this lifesaving legislation. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Gillan follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JACQUELINE S. GILLAN, VICE PRESIDENT, 

ADVOCATES FOR HIGHWAY AND AUTO SAFETY (ADVOCATES) 


721JSG1.eps
42 

1Large Truck and Bus Crash Facts 2009, FMCSA–RRA–10–060, Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administration (FMCSA) (Oct. 2010). 2Traffic Safety Facts 2009, DOT HS 811 402, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 

(NHTSA) (2010), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pubs/811402ee.pdf. 

Introduction 

Good morning Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Wicker, and members of 

the Senate Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security. I am Jacqueline Gillan, Vice President of Advocates 

for Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates). Advocates is a coalition of public health, 

safety, and consumer organizations, and insurers and insurer agents that promotes 

highway safety through the adoption of safety policies and regulations, and the enactment of state and Federal traffic safety laws. Advocates is a unique coalition 

dedicated to improving traffic safety by addressing motor vehicle crashes as a public 

health issue. 

This Subcommittee has been responsible for many important motor carrier safety 

improvements that have been accomplished over the years, including establishment 

of a uniform commercial driver license (CDL) program, mandates for U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) action on numerous safety rulemakings, strong oversight of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) plans and programs and recently, full Committee approval of the Motorcoach Enhanced Safety 

Act, S. 453, a bipartisan bill that has now received the endorsement of safety 

groups, crash victims and their families, as well as Greyhound Lines, a leading national motorcoach operator. 

I welcome this opportunity to appear before you today to emphasize that there 

is still an unfinished safety agenda that needs your attention and your leadership. 

This Subcommittee and Congress will play a critical role in leading our Nation 

to a safer, more rational use of its transportation resources. It will take leadership 

by Congress to implement a national, uniform approach to truck size and weights 

on our federally-assisted National Highway System (NHS) in order to enhance safety and protect highway infrastructure; to stop enactment of piecemeal special interest exemptions from crucially important Federal safety requirements; and to ensure 

that the Federal regulatory safety agency, the FMCSA, which has rededicated its 

efforts to making safety its highest priority, issues regulations that improve motor 

carrier safety and implements strong enforcement policies. 

The Annual Death Toll from Large Truck Crashes Remains Unacceptable 

Over the decade from 2000 through 2009, there were 48,317 people killed in 

truck-involved crashes, averaging 4,832 fatalities each year.1 At the beginning of my 

testimony is a national map that indicates the fatalities in the last decade by state. 

In 2009, one of every 10 people killed in a traffic crash was a victim of a large truck 

crash.2 Annual deaths in large truck crashes are disproportionately represented in 


721JSG2.eps
43 

3Large Truck Fatality Facts 2009, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), http:// 

www.iihs.org/research/fatality_facts_2009/largetrucks.html. 4See, e.g., http://www.glgroup.com/News/Leading-Indicator_2008-North-America-FreightMarket_Truck-Build-Numbers-Down_2009-Predicted-To-Be-Worse-With-2010–30689.html, demonstrating 7 consecutive quarterly declines in truck freight tonnage through the third quarter 

of 2009. Also see, http://www.ttnews.com/articles/basetemplate.aspx?storyid=22609, ‘‘ATA’s Costello Hopeful Freight Levels Have Bottomed Out,’’ Transport Topics, Aug. 27, 2009, and a similar, earlier report in Transport Topics, March 2, 2009. 5Freight Tonnage Continues to Decline, Martin’s Logistics Blog, Aug. 3, 2009. http://logistics.about.com/b/2009/08/03/freight-tonnage-continues-to-decline.htm. Also see, e.g., http:// 

www.glgroup.com/News/Leading-Indicator_2008-North-America-Freight-Market_Truck-BuildNumbers-Down_2009-Predicted-To-Be-Worse-With-2010–30689.html, demonstrating 7 consecutive quarterly declines in truck freight tonnage through the third quarter of 2009. Also see, 

http://www.ttnews.com/articles/basetemplate.aspx?storyid=22609, ‘‘ATA’s Costello Hopeful 

Freight Levels Have Bottomed Out,’’ Transport Topics, Aug. 27, 2009, and a similar, earlier report in Transport Topics, March 2, 2009. 6 ‘‘January Truck Tonnage Hits 3–Year High,’’ Transport Topics., Feb. 23, 2011, available at 

http://www.ttnews.com/articles/basetemplate.aspx?storyid=26177. 7 U.S. Recession Periods and Motor Vehicle Fatalities, 1971–2009, Advocates for Highway and 

Auto Safety (2010). 8 ‘‘While these latest trends are encouraging, we do not expect them to continue once the country rebounds from its current economic hardships.’’ Administrator Strickland emphasized that 

with an improving economy, more driving will result with high crash risk exposure. Budget Estimates Fiscal Year 2011, Statement from the Administrator, at 1–2, National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration (Jan. 2010). 

our annual traffic fatality data, with large truck deaths still accounting for about 

11 percent of all annual highway fatalities, although large trucks are only about 

four percent of registered motor vehicles.3

Large, heavy trucks are dramatically overrepresented each year in severe crashes, 

especially fatal crashes. Although truck crash fatalities have declined in 2008 and 

2009, this reduced death toll is strongly linked with a major decrease in truck 

freight demand, including substantially reduced truck tonnage starting in the latter 

part of 2007 and continuing through 2009.4 Industry data verifies this decline in 

freight tonnage. According to published reports, for-hire tonnage fell in June 2009 

by 13.6 percent over the freight transported in 2008, and freight analysts did not 

believe that the decline would stop until the second half of 2010 at the earliest.5

This is consistent with previous tonnage declines associated with economic recessions. Recent data indicating that freight tonnage increased by 5.7 percent in 2010 6

as compared with 2009 may well be a harbinger of future increases in truck crash 

fatalities and injuries. 

In terms of annual fatalities, I have included a chart at the beginning of my testimony that shows the strong relationship between economic recessions and declines 

in total highway deaths since 1971.7 As pointed out by several authorities, including 

the Honorable David Strickland, Administrator of the National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration (NHTSA), which collects and analyzes national fatality data, 

the unprecedented decline in deaths and injuries among all types of motor vehicles 

over the last few years is strongly linked to the recent downturn in the economy.8

Just as personal travel will likely increase as the economy continues to improve, 

freight traffic will also resume its upward trend, which means more truck miles of 

travel each year that will likely translate into an increase in truck fatalities. 

While the safety community welcomes the news of recent declines in truck crash 

fatalities it is not a reason to delay, defer or discard pressing forward with a strong, 

life-saving motor carrier safety agenda. 

The Safe Highways and Infrastructure Protection Act (SHIPA) Will 

Improve Safety, Protect Infrastructure, Conserve the Environment, 

Enhance Intermodalism 

It is up to Congress to take action now that will improve safety, protect the longterm national investment in our crumbling highway and bridge infrastructure while 

also protecting the environment and providing a more level playing field for intermodal freight transportation. We are at a crucial juncture in highway and motor 

carrier safety in this Congress. The debate over future funding for road and bridge 

construction and repair make conservation and preservation of the existing highway 

infrastructure an essential part of any plan to protect taxpayer investment in continued surface transportation mobility and safety. 

A pending Senate bill, S. 876, the Safe Highways and Infrastructure Preservation 

Act, or SHIPA, sponsored by Chairman Lautenberg, has the potential, if enacted, 

to dramatically improve the safety landscape for all motorists, including truck drivers, and to protect our economic investment in highway and bridge infrastructure. 

SHIPA will stop the relentless cycle of demands and pressure imposed on the states 

44 

9 Companion bill in the House of Representatives is H.R. 1619, introduced by Rep. James 

McGovern (D–MA). 10Safe and Efficient Transportation Act of 2011, introduced by Rep. Michaud (D–ME). 11Title 23 U.S.C. § 127(d). 12P. L. No. 110–53. 13Title 23 U.S.C. § 127. 14 Id. 15For example, the states began to allow bigger, heavier trucks on their non-Interstate highways in the early 1970s. The Federal-Aid Highway Act in 1978, Pub. L. 95–599 (Nov. 6, 1978), 

authorized the states to allow substantial increases in truck weights on Interstate highways and 

bridges. Subsequently, the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (1982 STAA), Pub. L. 

97–424 (Jan. 6, 1983), pre-empted state size and weight restrictions both on and off the Interstate systems by enacting new, higher Federal size and weight limits. Those new limits applied 

to a designated National Network consisting of several hundred thousand miles of interconnected, primary highways, most of which had never had any Federal control on truck size 

and weight. Many states gave up fighting after this sweeping act of Federal pre-emption and 

simply extended the new, higher weight and size limits to all or most of their highways. Many 

other exemptions from the Interstate weight restrictions were enacted in the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 (STURAA), Pub. L. 100–17 (April 2, 1987); 

the Truck and Bus Safety and Regulatory Reform Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100–690 (Nov. 18, 1988); 

and the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1990, § 15, Sanitary Food Transportation Act of 1990, Pub. 

L. 101–500 (Nov. 3, 1990); and the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1991, Title IV, Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA), Pub. L. 102–240 (Dec. 18, 1991). 16Truck Inventory and Use Survey, U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1974, 1982, 1987. 

by the trucking interests for increased tractor-trailer lengths. If truck lengths are 

increased again beyond the industry ‘‘standard’’ of 53 feet, it would trigger a cascading effect of negative outcomes for safety, environmental protection, infrastructure preservation, fuel use, the Highway Trust Fund, and a balanced national transportation freight strategy.9

SHIPA is crucial for curtailing the growth of large trucks and their expansion to 

more and more highway miles off the Nation’s Interstate system, on the NHS. One 

of the two main objectives of the legislation is to freeze the length of truck trailers 

at a maximum of 53 feet. Promoters of much bigger, heavier trucks, such as supporters of current H.R. 763,10 would allow trucks weighing up to 97,000 pounds and 

more throughout the country and melt the 1991 freeze on longer combination vehicles (LCVs).11 The bill buys into the specious argument that trucking will become 

safer because bigger, heavier trucks will mean fewer trucks on the road. But increases in truck size and weights have never resulted in fewer trucks. In fact, allowing super-sized heavy trucks on more highways will make our roads and bridges 

more dangerous, not safer, and inevitably there will be more, not fewer, trucks than 

ever before. 

Since the enactment of the 1982 Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA) 12

Federal law mandates certain minimum truck sizes, weights, and configurations 

but, unfortunately, does not restrict the length of trailers and semi-trailers in truck 

combinations.13 This has had two particularly pernicious consequences. 

First, the states are pressured endlessly by the special interests to increase the 

length of the semi-trailers used in tractor-trailer combinations. This situation has 

resulted in repeated increases in the length of the standard semi-trailer from 45 feet 

in the 1960s and 1970s, to 48 feet by the time the 1982 STAA was enacted, to 53 

feet by the end of the 1990s, with many states now allowing trailers that are 57 

feet long and a few states even permitting 59- and 60-foot long trailers. 

Second, increasing trailer length and, therefore, volume leads to special interest 

demands for higher state and Federal weight limits in order to take advantage of 

the increased size of bigger, longer trailers. Since fully loaded trailers may not always exceed the Federal axle and gross weight limits on the Interstate highway system,14 or the even higher maximum weight limits allowed in many states on their 

non-Interstate highways, the trucking industry has persistently sought higher truck 

weight limits. This incessant drum beat to raise truck weight limits has been part 

of the strategy to simultaneously pressure lawmakers at both state and Federal levels raise weight limits. Truck weight increases adopted in one state put pressure 

on neighboring states to do likewise, and eventually special interests besiege Congress seeking higher, uniform national weight limits. This strategy to continually 

‘‘ratchet’’ upwards legal truck weight limits has been successfully practiced by special interests for decades. 

The main argument used by proponents of longer, heavier trucks is that it will 

result in fewer trucks. Nothing is further from the truth. Since 1974, every time 

truck sizes and weights have been increased by state or by Federal mandate, the 

result has been more trucks than before.15 In fact, from 1972 to 1987 alone, the number of for-hire trucks increased by nearly 100 percent.16 During this era an increasVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:49 Apr 18, 2012 Jkt 073786 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\73786.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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17This increasingly liberal interpretation of grandfather rights in many states was the result 

of a major amendment in the 1982 STAA that excluded the Federal Highway Administration 

from overseeing and enforcing state weight limits on the Interstate highway system. The 

amendment allowed the states to determine for themselves the force and effect of their grandfather rights to vary axle and gross weights, and bridge load formulas, from the requirements 

of 23 U.S.C. § 127. 18Truck Inventory and Use Survey, op. cit., 1992. 19 Vehicle Inventory and Use Survey (formerly the Truck Inventory and Use Survey), U.S. Bureau of the Census (1997). 20 Highway Statistics 2008, Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) (Jan. 5, 2010). 21Sections 194(a) and 194(d), Fiscal Year 2010 Transportation, Housing, and Urban Development Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2009, P.L. 111–117 (Dec. 16, 2009). 22Maine and Vermont Heavy Truck Interstate Pilot Program, 6 Month Report, p. 10 (FHWA). 

See also subsequent chart ‘‘Impacts to Sidney I–95 NB, Vassalboro Rte. 201 NB & So. China 

Rte 3/9/202 EB (Year 2010)’’ (FHWA). 23See, e.g., Transportation Efficiency Act for the 21st Century (TEA–21), P.L. 105–178 (June 

9, 1998) (eliminated major Federal safety regulations governing drivers of utility service vehicles); National Highway System Designation Act of 1995, P. L. 104–5 (Nov. 28, 1995) (exempted 

Continued 

ing number of states adopted longer, wider, heavier trucks and trailers on their 

state highways and also interpreted their Interstate grandfather rights broadly in 

order to grant more overweight permits to extra-heavy trucks.17

The result was predictable: trucks were bigger and heavier than ever before, and 

there were more of them than ever before. The total increase in the number of 

trucks by 1992 was 128 percent over the number of registered trucks on our highways in 1972.18 Longer, larger, heavier trucks have kept multiplying. By 1997, the 

number of large trucks had grown to 174 percent more than 1972, and by 2002, the 

number of for-hire trucks had increased by 228 percent over the 1972 figure.19 According to the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) the number of trucks on 

the road today is at least 250 percent higher than the comparable 1972 figure.20

Evidence of the negative effects of raising Interstate highway weight limits can 

be found in the data from the Maine pilot program that allowed trucks weighing 

up to 100,000 pounds to operate on the northern portion of I–95 that is normally 

subject to the Federal 80,000 pound limit for Interstate highways. Congress permitted the weight limit increase for a one-year period from late 2009 through late 

2010.21 About 600 six-axle trucks used the I–95 corridor in Maine each week before 

the higher weight limits were permitted, 400 of these trucks used I–95 (presumably 

loaded only to the 80,000 pound legal limit), and 200 trucks used a parallel state 

route (on which loads up to 100,000 pounds were legal). However, once the weight 

limit was raised on I–95 the increase in the number of trucks entering I–95 after 

the pilot program began was startling. More than 1,000 six-axle trucks used that 

route most weeks with more than 1,200 trucks using I–95 in some weeks.22 Thus, 

the number of heavy trucks using the Interstate route tripled from 400 to 1,200 and 

the total number of these heavy trucks using the corridor doubled from 600 to 1,200 

during the experiment with increased truck weight limits. This clearly shows that 

raising Federal weight limits increases the heavy truck traffic on Interstate highways. Moreover, assuming these trucks were loaded to 100,000 pounds, the gross 

weight loads on the highway also increased dramatically, placing greater stress on 

highway bridges and degrading roadway pavement at an even faster rate. 

The two actions of limiting truck lengths and freezing existing state weight practices for the entire NHS are complementary and both are crucial to achieving 

SHIPA’s goal. In order to protect the national investment in our highways and 

bridges, SHIPA extends the current state and Federal weight limits on the Interstate system to the non-Interstate highways on the NHS and prohibits any further 

increases. This not only puts a ceiling on truck weights at their current levels, but 

it also recognizes and protects the states’ existing grandfathered rights to allow certain differences in truck axle and gross weights from the maximum weight figure 

in Federal law. SHIPA restores FHWA to its traditional position as steward of Federal size and weight limits for public safety and infrastructure protection. 

Recommendation: 

• Congress should enact S. 876, the SHIPA bill. 

Special Interest Exemptions Jeopardize Safety and Compromise Enforcement 

Over the years, Congress has granted numerous statutory special interest exemptions from Federal safety regulations including exemptions from the maximum driving and on-duty limits, as well as the logbook requirements, for motor carriers 

under the hours of service regulations, and from commercial driver physical and 

medical qualifications.23 These exemptions pose safety issues because they are unVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:49 Apr 18, 2012 Jkt 073786 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\73786.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
46 

drivers transporting agricultural commodities and farm supplies from maximum driving time, 

maximum duty time, and minimum off-duty time hours of service requirements, and allowed 

drivers of ground water well drilling rigs, of construction materials and equipment, and of utility 

service vehicles to use a 24-hour restart for each new work week rather than the minimum required layover time after a tour of duty). 24 65 FR 22540 (May 2, 2000). See, e.g.: ‘‘The FMCSA has found no sleep or fatigue research 

that supports any of the current exceptions or exemptions, including the 24-hour restart provisions authorized by the NHS Act.’’ Id. at 25559. 25Western Uniformity Scenario Analysis, U. S. Department of Transportation (April 2004). 

In recent years a number of ad hoc, State-specific exemptions from Federal truck size and 

weight laws have been enacted. For instance, TEA–21 contained special exemptions from Federal size and weight limits in four States, Colorado, Louisiana, Maine, and New Hampshire. The 

Department does not support this kind of piecemeal approach to truck size and weight policy. 

It makes enforcement and compliance with truck size and weight laws more difficult, it often 

contributes little to overall productivity, it may have unintended consequences for safety and 

highway infrastructure, and it reduces the willingness to work for more comprehensive solutions 

that would have much greater benefits. 

Id. at XI–3. 26Sections 194(a) and 194(d), Fiscal Year 2010 Transportation, Housing, and Urban Development Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2009, P.L. 111–117 (Dec. 16, 2009). 27TEA–21, § 407, codified at 49 U.S.C. § 31315(b). 

tested and unproven deviations from established Federal safety requirements. Enactment of exemptions on a piecemeal basis bypasses careful investigation and findings on the impact of these exemptions on safety. In addition, it creates a patchwork 

quilt of disparate regulatory exemptions that makes it nearly impossible for enforcement authorities to determine the status of exempt drivers and vehicles and to effectively enforce Federal safety requirements. 

Advocates is gravely concerned that these exemptions, which deviate from established safety requirements, are not based on research and scientific analysis, and 

pose increased safety risks for commercial operators and the public. The FMCSA 

openly decried the exemptions practice concluding that the multiple existing exemptions were not compatible with reform of the drivers’ hours of service rule.24 These 

exemptions are also opposed by the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) 

which represents state law enforcement officials who are charged with ensuring 

compliance with Federal motor carrier safety rules. Because the exemptions were 

established by statute, rather than regulation, there has been no thorough examination of the safety consequences of these exemptions. It is time for the U.S. DOT to 

conduct a comprehensive evaluation of each statutory exemption from safety rules. 

Even U.S. DOT severely criticized the statutory adoption of exemptions only a few 

years ago because of the harm it does both to highway safety and infrastructure protection. In a massive 2004 study of the effects of overweight and extra-long tractortrailer trucks, DOT determined that LCVs damage bridges more severely than ‘‘18- 

wheelers’’ and could have substantially more serious safety consequences. U.S. DOT 

concluded that a patchwork quilt of size and weight exemptions for specific states 

undermined a coherent, national policy of size and weight limits.25

Congress has also granted similar special interest exemptions for truck size and 

weight limits. Most recently, Maine and Vermont were granted special legislative 

exemptions which, as already discussed, allowed the operation of 100,000-pound 

trucks on the northern section of Maine’s I–95 to the Canadian border, and of 

99,000-pound trucks on all of Vermont’s Interstate highways.26 These exemptions 

were adopted despite reams of reliable evidence concerning the adverse safety effects and increased infrastructure damage that such excessively heavy combination 

trucks inflict on roads and bridges. 

Safety organizations opposed these and other motor carrier safety exemptions. 

Granting special interest requests for specific exemptions from the Federal axle, and 

both gross weight and bridge formula weight limits in Federal law, as well as special interest exemptions to exceed limits on maximum driving and working hours, 

undermines national uniformity and constitutes a serious and unacceptable threat 

to the traveling public who must operate their small passenger cars next to these 

unstable, overweight combination trucks that are, in some cases, operated by tired 

truckers. 

Fortunately, the mechanism for review of these types of exemptions already exists 

in Federal law. In 1998, Congress required U.S. DOT to review regulatory exemptions from safety requirements using reasonable, recognized screening criteria.27

Under this provision, many special interest exemption requests addressing motor 

carrier safety regulations are reviewed using the expertise of DOT and FMCSA, 

rather than the lobbying clout of special interests. The process enacted by Congress 

allows the agency to carefully consider the safety requirements and implications of 

47 

28The Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 (MCSIA), P. L. 106–159 (Dec. 9, 1999), 

codified at 49 U.S.C. § 113(b). 29 Available at http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/mwl.html. The current, 2011 Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements for motor carriers include the following issues: 

• Addressing Human Fatigue 

• Bus Occupant Safety 

• Electronic Onboard Recorders 

• Addressing Alcohol-Impaired Driving for Commercial Motor Vehicles. 30Fatigue, Alcohol, Drugs, and Medical Factors in Fatal-to-the-Driver Heavy Truck Crashes, 

NTSB (1990). 31 National Transportation Safety Board Recommendation H–07–041 issued Dec. 2007. http:// 

www.ntsb.gov/safetyrecs/private/QueryPage.aspx. 

a proposed exemption and to determine if the exemption poses a problem for law 

enforcement. 

Recommendations: 

• U.S. DOT and FMCSA should be required to review all existing statutory 

exemptions from the Federal motor carrier safety regulations to determine whether they are safe and enforceable, have contributed to increased risk of deaths and injuries, and to make recommendations to 

Congress about exemptions that pose an increased public safety risk; 

and, 

• Congress should pass legislation similar to Section 49 U.S.C. § 31315 but 

that requires U.S. DOT to review requests for truck size and weight exemptions on an ongoing basis. 

Congressional Oversight and Direction Is Essential to Ensure Effective Safety Rules 

Let me turn now to an analysis of FMCSA’s performance and an appraisal of its 

first decade as a Federal agency. The agency was established in 2000 with motor 

carrier safety as its primary mission and highest priority.28 Over its first 10 years 

the agency compiled a poor track record that was at odds with its safety mission. 

Until recently, the FMCSA exhibited a stark failure of leadership and oversight of 

the motor carrier industry, an inability to issue effective safety regulations, and an 

inadequate enforcement policy. 

While we see clear signs that the current FMCSA leadership is finally taking 

truck safety regulation and enforcement more seriously, Advocates is closely watching for evidence that the initiatives and final rules it adopts will fulfill the agency’s 

mission to make safety its number one priority. While Secretary LaHood and the 

agency leadership team are headed in the right direction, Congressional oversight 

and guidance will continue to be needed in order to ensure that the performance 

of the agency remains on course. 

FMCSA Safety Oversight Issues 

Failure to Implement NTSB Safety Recommendations 

One strong indication of FMCSA’s job performance is whether the agency has implemented the numerous motor carrier safety recommendations issued by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). Since it began issuing recommendations 

in 1968, NTSB has repeatedly called for commonsense and urgent safety actions by 

FMCSA and its predecessor agency, FHWA. NTSB has issued dozens of recommendations that address vehicle operating systems, equipment, commercial drivers, and motor carrier company safety administration and oversight. However, many 

of the recommendations remain unfulfilled and others have been closed out in exasperation by NTSB because there was no agency response or the agency response 

was inadequate or unsatisfactory. 

The NTSB’s current list of ‘‘Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements’’ 

includes a number of safety recommendations for commercial motor vehicles.29

FMCSA’s failure to implement some recommendations has led the NTSB to formally 

categorize the agency’s actions as ‘‘Unacceptable Response’’. For example, in 1977, 

NTSB first issued its recommendation on the use of on-board recording devices for 

commercial vehicle hours of service compliance. NTSB then urged FHWA to mandate the use of on-board recorders in a 1990 safety study, after concluding that onboard recording devices could provide a tamper-proof mechanism to enforce the HOS 

regulations.30 That request for a mandate has been re-issued periodically by NTSB 

and the recommendation is currently listed as open but with an ‘‘Unacceptable Response’’ from FMCSA.31 The safety recommendation to require all interstate commercial vehicle carriers to use electronic on-board recorders is included on the 

48 

32 49 C.F.R. Part 396; MCSIA, § 210, codified at 49 U.S.C. § 31142. 33 73 FR 63040 (Oct. 22, 2008). See also, 66 FR 32863 (June 18, 2001); 63 FR 8516 (Feb. 19, 

1998). 34 49 U.S.C. § 31142. 35 R. Accetta, Motorcoach Run Off Bridge and Rollover Sherman, Texas, August 8, 2008, Power 

Point Presentation, Office of Highway Safety, NTSB, Oct. 30, 2009, available at http:// 

www.ntsb.gov/events/2009/sherman-tx/introduction.pdf. 

NTSB’s 2011 list of Most Wanted safety improvements. Only this year has FMCSA 

proposed a general EOBR requirement. 

Recommendation: 

• Congress should direct FMCSA to fulfill major NTSB safety recommendations on the current Most Wanted List and review and adopt 

previously issued NTSB motor carrier safety recommendations that have 

not yet been implemented. 

FMCSA Has Not Required Adequate State Vehicle Inspection Programs 

The Secretary of Transportation is required to prescribe standards for annual inspection of motorcoaches and of trucks greater than 10,000 pounds gross vehicle 

weight in interstate commerce, or approve state inspection programs that are equally effective.32 FMCSA last publicly addressed the state inspection system in a 2008 

Federal Register notice indicating that 23 states and the District of Columbia have 

approved periodic inspection programs for trucks.33

FMCSA has not issued reports that evaluate how comprehensive the commercial 

motor vehicle inspection programs are in each of the 23 states and the District of 

Columbia that have approved inspection programs. Audits of the state programs 

have not been performed and timely information on state truck and motorcoach inspection programs is not available to the public on FMCSA’s website. 

Furthermore, while FMCSA allows motor carriers to ‘‘self-inspect’’ and annually 

certify that the mechanical inspection has been performed, the agency does not conduct routine audits to evaluate a representative sample of these state self-inspection 

programs. 

It should be stressed that the minimum period for the required inspection is only 

once a year.34 Since it is well known that inspection of commercial motor vehicles 

needs to be much more intensive and frequent than for personal or light motor vehicles, a once-a-year inspection regime is clearly no guarantee of safe trucks and 

motorcoaches. While reputable carriers may conduct more frequent inspections, others do not. Many companies, even in states that have inspection programs, can come 

into compliance just for an annual inspection, only to allow major mechanical and 

safety features of their vehicles to fall into dangerous disrepair soon after passing 

the annual inspection. 

Although commercial motor vehicles are subject to random roadside inspections, 

trucks and motorcoaches can go for long periods of time without being stopped for 

inspection. Relying on roadside inspections to detect mechanical defects that pose 

threats to public safety and then place them out of service is simply too late—it allows vehicles that should never have been on the road from the start to operate on 

our highways. 

One example of the serious consequences that can occur as a result of weak oversight of state-run, state-approved, company self-inspection programs is the deadly 

2008 Sherman, Texas motorcoach crash in which 17 people died and 39 were injured. The motorcoach was operated by Angel Tours, Inc., which had been stopped 

from operating by FMCSA just weeks earlier, but continued to operate under anther 

name, Iguala Busmex. 

The NTSB’s investigation of the crash found, among other Federal violations, that 

the proximate cause of the crash was a failure of one of the retreaded tires on the 

front steering axle of the motorcoach. The retreaded tire failed, destabilizing the motorcoach, making it difficult to control, and facilitating its crash into the overpass 

guardrail. NTSB speculated that either the tire was not inspected properly by an 

extremely perfunctory pre-trip inspection, or that the tire was punctured during the 

trip prior to the crash. NTSB found that the motorcoach had been inspected by a 

Texas state government-certified private inspection company called ‘‘Five-Minute Inspection, Inc’’.35 The private inspection cost $62.00, but failed to detect a number 

of mechanical defects including the retreaded tires on the steer axle, under-inflated 

tag-axle tires, wrong tag-axle wheels mounted, and a grossly contaminated brake assembly. 

The Texas commercial motor vehicle state inspection program was approved federally in 1994. NTSB concluded that there was no quality control evaluations of agenVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:49 Apr 18, 2012 Jkt 073786 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\73786.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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36 49 U.S.C. § 31102(b)(X). 37Obama Administration Has Stepped Up Action Against Unsafe Motorcoach, Trucking Companies, News Release, DOT 90–11, July 19, 2011, available at http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/about/ 

news/news-releases/2011/Obama-Administration-Action-Against-Unsafe-Motorcoach-TruckingCompanies.aspx. 38Sec. 408 of the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995, P.L. 104–88 

(Dec. 29, 1995). 39 Electronic On-Board Recorders for Hours-of-Service Compliance, Final Rule, 64 FR 17208 

(Apr. 5, 2010). FMCSA’s remedial final rule will take effect in 2012 and will require only about 

5,700 motor carriers to install and use EOBRs—but only after an hours of service (HOS) violation is discovered in the course of a Compliance Review (CR). Because FMCSA annually conducts CRs on only two percent of motor carriers registered with the agency, the chances of being 

caught violating HOS requirements are very remote, and the detection of violations will be 

based on examination of logbooks recording duty status, which are widely known to be regularly 

falsified by a large percentage of commercial drivers to conceal violations. 

In addition, the remedial rule has numerous other shortcomings including the following: 

• The EOBR Global Positioning System (GPS) function will record only at 60 minute intervals 

rather than at one minute intervals—a serious problem that allows carriers to evade fixed 

weigh stations, use illegal hazardous materials routes, and traverse bridges posted for reduced loads, without detection. 

• Carriers required to install and use EOBRs will not have to provide certain supporting 

record of duty status (RODS) documents—which reduces the documentation that enforcement 

Continued 

cy-approved state programs, and no state oversight of the certified inspection companies. 

We commend the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee for 

approving S. 453, the ‘‘Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act of 2011,’’ introduced by Senators Brown (D–OH) and Hutchison (R–TX). This legislation, when enacted, will address some of the inspection oversight concerns with respect to motorcoaches. Similar action is needed regarding state inspection programs for trucks. 

Recommendations: 

• Congress should direct FMCSA to: 

» establish specific standards for state-authorized, state-operated inspection programs to determine how well they meet the requirements 

of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations; 

» conduct annual inspections of a sample of state-authorized or state-operated truck inspection programs to determine their effectiveness; and 

» audit motor carrier self-inspection programs in each state to determine how well trucks are being inspected and maintained for safe mechanical condition. 

En-Route Inspections of Motorcoaches 

Under current law, aside from imminent or obvious safety hazards, inter-city 

buses and motorcoaches cannot be regularly inspected except at planned stops and 

terminals along the bus route.36 This affords highly favorable treatment to motor 

carriers of passengers and insulates motorcoaches from routine roadside inspections 

required by law for other commercial motor vehicles. Recently, U.S. DOT conducted 

3,000 ‘‘surprise’’ passenger carrier safety inspections and placed 442 unsafe buses 

and drivers out-of-service.37 This represents 15 percent of the motorcoaches subject 

to the ‘‘surprise’’ inspections. This shows that motorcoaches need to be subject to 

more frequent and routine random roadside inspections at convenient locations but 

not just at bus terminals and planned stops along the scheduled route. 

Recommendation: 

• Congress should amend Federal law, Title 49 U.S.C. § 31102(b)(X), to 

allow roadside safety inspections of motorcoaches at more times and additional locations. 

FMCSA Regulatory Issues 

Electronic On-Board Recorders Are Needed To Reduce Fatigue and Fraud 

It has been more than 15 years since Congress in 1995 directed the Secretary of 

Transportation to address the issue of Electronic On-Board Recorders (EOBRs).38

After all this time, FMCSA has produced only a weak and ineffective remedial final 

rule that requires carriers that fail two consecutive compliance reviews (CR) to install EOBRs, a measure the agency itself admits will apply to less than one percent 

of motor carriers.39

50 

personnel need to determine whether drivers using sleeper berths complied with minimum offduty time. 

• The EOBRs default to ‘‘on-duty not driving status’’ when a commercial vehicle has been stationary for only five minutes. This allows time during intermittent vehicle movement in 

traffic congestion or while waiting in loading dock lines, to be recorded as non-driving time. 

As a result it will extend the drivers’ shift beyond the maximum 11 consecutive hours allowed by regulation. 

• EOBRs will not collect speed data thereby reducing the deterrent effect on speeding by commercial drivers and undermining the effectiveness of speed limit enforcement by public authorities.1 

• FMCSA thoroughly fails to address the need for specific fail-safe controls to ensure that 

EOBRs are tamper-proof, and are protected with adequate, security control measures to 

limit access only to appropriate users. 40 Electronic On-Board Recorders and Hours of Service Supporting Documents, 76 FR 5537 

(Feb. 1, 2011). 41 U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation. Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security. Electronic OnBoard Recorders (EOBR’s) and Truck Driver Fatigue Reduction. 110th Cong. Washington: May 

1, 2007. 42Sen. Lautenberg, Frank. Statement to the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science 

and Transportation. Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security. Electronic On-Board Recorders (EOBR’s) and Truck Driver Fatigue 

Reduction. 110th Cong. Washington: May 1, 2007. 43 ‘‘EOBR technology is proven. More than 50 countries have mandated Electronic Data Recorders for driving and standby time recording and/or speed and distance recording.’’ Captain 

John E. Harrison. Statement to the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security. Electronic On-Board Recorders (EOBR’s) and Truck Driver Fatigue Reduction. 

110th Cong. Washington: May 1, 2007. 44 Chairman Deborah Hersman, statement to the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Subcommittee on Highways and Transit, Motor Carrier Safety: The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration’s Oversight of High Risk Carriers, 110th Cong. Washington: July 11, 

2007. 45S. 453, § 12(a). 

The FMCSA has, however, earlier this year proposed a much broader requirement 

that would apply to all motor carriers of drivers that are required to maintain 

records of duty status (RODS), that is, driver logbooks.40 The pending proposed rule 

responds to numerous calls for an EOBR mandate. At a hearing before this Subcommittee held May 1, 2007, on the topic of EOBRs,41 Chairman Lautenberg said 

in his opening statement: ‘‘We need electronic on-board recorders in every truck on 

the road to ensure the safety of our truck drivers and our families who travel on 

the highways.’’ 42 Similar sentiments were expressed by the President of CVSA.43

The current Chair of NTSB, Deborah Hersman, has also repeatedly emphasized the 

need for a U.S. DOT requirement for EOBRs on all commercial motor vehicles.44

As noted above, NTSB is resolute in continuing to list an EOBR mandate on its 

Most Wanted list and still classifies the agency’s previous responses as ‘‘Unacceptable.’’ 

Moreover, pending legislation, the Commercial Driver Compliance Improvement 

Act, S. 695, introduced and cosponsored by Senators Pryor (D–AR) and Alexander 

(R–TN), would require the completion of the pending rulemaking within 18 months 

of enactment. Passage of this bill would ensure that the 16-year-long effort by Congress to adopt modern technology for truck safety enforcement would reach closure 

in the near future. Advocates supports S. 695 as do many safety organizations, law 

enforcement groups and leading segments of the trucking industry. 

It is time for Congress to act. As mentioned before, this Committee has approved 

the MESA safety bill that includes a mandatory requirement for EOBRs on all 

motorcoaches.45 Congress should mandate EOBRs for all interstate commercial vehicles operated by drivers who are required to maintain logbooks to ensure the 

FMCSA final rule is an effective rule. 

Recommendations: 

• Congress should pass: 

» S. 695, the Commercial Driver Compliance Improvement Act, to direct 

the FMCSA to issue a universal EOBR requirement for all commercial 

motor vehicles operated in interstate commerce by drivers who maintain records of duty status logbooks; and, 

» the Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act of 2011 mandating EOBRs on all 

passenger-carrying commercial motor vehicles under FMCSA jurisdiction. 

51 

46 Hours of Service of Drivers; Drivers Rest and Sleep for Safe Operations; Final Rule, 68 FR 

22455 (Apr. 28, 2003). 47Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Ass’n v. FMCSA, 494 F.3d 188 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Public 

Citizen v. FMCSA, 374 F.3d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 48Petition for Review, filed March 2009, Public Citizen et al., v. FMCSA, No. 09–1094 (D.C. 

Cir.) 

Truck Driver Hours of Service and Fatigue 

A revised Hours of Service (HOS) rule is nearing completion. The FMCSA has 

committed to issuing a new HOS rule by the end of October, 2011. While Advocates 

is hopeful that the agency will finally issue a safer rule, returning to the traditional 

limit of 10 consecutive hours of driving and restricting the use of the 34-hour restart, we await the final decision this fall. 

There are important reasons for the agency to revise the HOS rule. The current, 

unsafe HOS rule adopted in 2003 substantially increased maximum daily and weekly driving and working hours for truckers.46 Driving time for each shift was increased from 10 to 11 consecutive hours. Driver fatigue from this excessively long 

driving shift is increased further by allowing an additional three or more hours in 

each shift for other work including the loading and unloading of trucks. 

The danger posed by these provisions to the health and safety of truck drivers 

and the motoring public are made even worse by the weekly ‘‘restart’’ provision. The 

restart undermines what previously was a ‘‘hard number’’ 60-hour weekly driving 

cap (or 70 hours for drivers on an 8-day schedule). Instead, the rule permits drivers 

to reset their accumulated weekly driving hours to zero at any point during the 

work week after taking only a 34-hour off–duty break, and then start a new tour 

of duty. This permits drivers who use the restart provision to cram an extra 17 

hours of driving into a 7-day schedule, actually operating their trucks for a total 

of 77 hours in seven calendar days instead of the limit of 60 hours. Drivers operating on an 8-day schedule can drive an extra 18 hours in 8 days for a total of 88 

driving hours instead of the limit of 70-hours. 

The restart permits companies to squeeze these excessive ‘‘bonus’’ driving hours 

out of drivers. Instead of having a full weekend of 48 to 72 hours off duty for rest 

and recovery, which was required under the previous HOS rule, the restart permits 

motor carriers to compel drivers to cash in their rest time for extra driving hours. 

This dramatically increases truck driver crash risk exposure, yet FMCSA rationalized this dramatic increase in daily and weekly driving and work hours as being 

just as safe as the previous HOS rules, even though drivers had more end-of-week 

rest time under the previous rule. 

The current HOS rule was issued by FMCSA despite the findings of fact by the 

agency, and its predecessors, that crash risk significantly increases after eight consecutive hours of driving, and that long driving and work hours promote driver fatigue. FMCSA also failed to properly take into account driver health impacts and 

scientific findings showing that more driving and working hours are dangerous and 

lead to an increased risk of crashes, especially among workers in industries with 

long hours of shiftwork who have little opportunity for rest and recovery. Advocates 

meticulously documented the science showing that long periods of work and cumulative fatigue drastically effect driver performance. The agency’s selective use of research findings was designed to justify a predetermined regulatory outcome, and the 

agency cherry-picked research data in order to justify its expansion of driver working and driving hours. 

These concerns were echoed by the U.S. Court of Appeals in two separate, unanimous decisions that vacated the current HOS rule and remanded the rule to the 

agency for changes. In each case, the Court questioned the basis for the agency’s 

decision-making in allowing longer driving hours despite the safety threat, adverse 

health effects and the increased crash risk posed by the rule, indicating that the 

current HOS rule was not based on sound reasoning.47 Despite back-to-back judicial 

decisions overturning the rule in each case, FMCSA refused to make changes to the 

maximum daily and weekly driving and work hours allowed by the rule. 

On December 19, 2007, this Subcommittee held a hearing on the HOS rule. The 

record of that hearing documents the safety concerns about the HOS rule and its 

precarious legal status. In 2008, the FMCSA nevertheless defiantly reissued the 

same flawed HOS rule for a third time and, in 2009, Advocates, Public Citizen, the 

Truck Safety Coalition and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters filed a third 

lawsuit challenging the rule.48

In an effort to expedite the issuance of what safety advocates hope will be a new, 

safer HOS rule, and to allow the new Administration to determine the right course 

on this issue, safety and labor organizations agreed to hold the lawsuit in abeyance 

52 

49 Id., see Settlement Agreement dated Oct. 26, 2009 and Order dated March 3, 2010. 50 76 FR 26681 (May 9, 2011). 51P. L 106–159 (Dec. 9, 1999). 52Section 210 of MCSIA added 49 U.S.C. § 31144(g) which directed the establishment of regulations requiring each owner or operator with new operating authority to undergo a safety review within 18 months of starting operations. 53MCSIA, § 210(b). 54 73 FR 76472 (Dec. 16, 2008). 55 Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, Jan. 14, 2008, ‘‘Petition for Reconsideration Filed 

with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration Regarding the Order Issued on New Entrant Motor Carriers Safety Assurance Process, 49 CFR Parts 365, 385, 386, and 390, 73 Federal 

Register 76472 et seq., December 16, 2008.’’ 56 New Entrant Safety Assurance Process; Implementation of Section 210(b) of the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999, advance notice of proposed rulemaking, 74 FR 42833 (Aug. 

25, 2009). 57 Id. at 42834 (emphasis supplied). 

while FMCSA develops a revised HOS rule. Under the terms of the settlement 49

the agency has committed to issuing a final rule by October 31, 2011.50

Recommendation: 

• The Committee should continue rigorous oversight of the HOS rulemaking activity and efforts of FMCSA to comply with the HOS legal settlement and to issue a new rule that enhances the health and safety of 

truck drivers and the traveling public. 

FMCSA’s New Entrant Motor Carrier Program Lacks Critical Safeguards 

In the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 (MCSIA),51 the law that 

established the FMCSA, Congress directed the new agency to establish minimum 

requirements to ensure that new motor carriers are knowledgeable about the Federal motor carrier safety standards (FMCSRs).52 It also required consideration of 

the need to implement a proficiency examination.53 National safety organizations 

called on the agency to require, prior to making a grant of temporary operating authority, a proficiency examination to determine how well new entrant motor carriers 

understand and are capable of complying with the FMCSRs and Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMRs), and whether they can exercise sound safety management 

of their fleet, drivers, and operations. 

FMCSA’s new entrant final rule lacked many important aspects of appropriate 

agency oversight of new truck and motorcoach companies, especially the need to 

mandate an initial pre-authorization safety audit of new carriers before awarding 

them temporary operating authority, and performing a compliance review (CR) at 

the end of the 18 month probationary period of temporary operating authority along 

with assigning the carrier a safety fitness rating.54 Advocates and other safety organizations strongly urged FMCSA to adopt these and other stringent oversight and 

enforcement mechanisms as part of the new entrant program, but these suggestions 

were largely ignored or rejected. 

The pre-authorization safety audit and proficiency exam are intended to screen 

out carriers that are obviously not fit to start operating on our Nation’s highways. 

The CR inspection after 18 months is essential to evaluate whether actual carrier 

operations are unsafe in practice. Both types of inspections are needed to ensure 

public safety. 

Because the agency rule did not implement the statutory directives in the MCSIA, 

and rejected other reasonable safeguards for new entrants, Advocates filed a petition for reconsideration with the agency on January 14, 2008.55 The petition emphasized that the final rule contains no data or other information demonstrating that 

the new entrant review procedure adopted by FMCSA will improve the operating 

safety of new entrants through their knowledge about and compliance with the 

FMCSRs and HMRs. The petition also pointed out that the rule did not include an 

evaluation of the merits of a proficiency examination for new entrants, even though 

the MCSIA required the agency to consider the need for such an examination. 

FMCSA granted Advocates’ petition and issued an advance notice of proposed 

rulemaking (ANPRM) asking for preliminary data, views, and arguments on the 

need for a new entrant proficiency examination.56 While this is a positive step, 

FMCSA continues to insist that its efforts to determine the capabilities of new entrants are adequate, and that the agency has fulfilled the statutory direction to ensure that applicants for the new entrant program are ‘‘knowledgeable about applicable safety requirements before being granted New Entrant authority.’’ 57 In fact, the 

agency has no verification of a new entrant’s knowledge of or capability to comply 

with the FMCSR and HMR because it doesn’t ask for any demonstration by the applicant prior to starting operation. The only way to ensure that high-risk carriers 

53 

58 ISTEA, § 4007(a). 59See settlement agreement dated February, 2003, In Re Citizens for Reliable and Safe Highways v. Minetta, No. 02–1363 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 60 Advocates v. FMCSA, 429 F.3d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 61 Id. 62 73 FR 73226 (Dec. 26, 2008). 63Model Curriculum for Training Tractor-Trailer Drivers, FHWA 1985. 64The original legislation creating the commercial driver license (CDL) explicitly required that 

CDLs must be issued to both interstate and intrastate commercial drivers. FMCSA has no statutory basis for the unilateral exclusion of intrastate CDL holders from required entry-level driver 

training. In addition, Congress has specifically emphasized the need for greater uniformity in 

motor carrier safety regulation in Sec. 203 of the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984. 

are not allowed to start operating is to test their knowledge and check their equipment and drivers to prevent them from threatening public safety. 

In addition, careful safety evaluation of new entrant applicant motor carriers before the start of operations and prior to an award of temporary operating authority 

will help the agency screen for ‘‘chameleon’’ or ‘‘reincarnated’’ motor carriers. These 

are companies that, as discussed below, went out of business or were forced to cease 

operations, but return under the guise of being ‘‘new entrants.’’ These carriers conceal the fact that they are continuing operations with the same officers and equipment under a false identity. 

Recommendations: 

• Congress should: 

» explicitly require the FMCSA to adopt a proficiency examination to determine how well a new entrant knows the FMCSRs and HMRs, and 

how capable it is to conduct safe operations; and 

» mandate that FMCSA conduct a pre-authorization safety audit of new 

entrant motor carriers to determine the quality of their safety management, drivers, and equipment before awarding temporary operating 

authority. 

FMCSA Still Needs to Issue A Strong Entry-Level Driver Training Standard 

Congress originally directed the FHWA to establish training standards for entrylevel drivers in 1991.58 There followed a long and tortured history of intermittent 

rulemaking and two lawsuits, the first for failing to issue a rule,59 and the second 

for issuing an entirely inadequate, illegal final rule in 2004.60 In the second case, 

the U.S. Court of Appeals rendered a judgment against the FMCSA, taking the 

agency to task for issuing a training standard that did not include any on-the-road, 

behind-the-wheel training.61

FMCSA reopened rulemaking with a new proposed rule published on December 

26, 2007,62 16 years after the original deadline for agency action. While the proposed rule represents a minimal improvement over the unacceptable final rule, it 

is seriously flawed and fails to improve the knowledge and operating skills of entrylevel commercial motor vehicle drivers in several respects. 

First, without explanation the FMCSA reduced the minimum number of hours of 

instruction recommended in the 1985 Model Curriculum,63 developed for the FHWA, 

from the 320 hours or more of instruction to only 120 hours. Second, the agency provides no justification in the proposal of the content of the curriculum or the minimum number of hours of instruction that would be required by the proposed curriculum. Third, the agency requires the same curriculum for drivers of motorcoaches 

as for drivers of straight trucks. The mounting number of motorcoach crashes emphasizes the need for special training requirements for these buses which operate 

and handle differently than trucks. Moreover, all curriculum content is indexed to 

truck driving, with no specific training and skills for motorcoach operators such as 

responsibilities for passenger safety management including emergency evacuation 

and combating fires. 

Finally, FMCSA’s proposal impermissibly restricts the scope of the entry-level 

driver training in two ways. First, it restricts the mandatory training requirement 

only to operators of interstate trucks, buses, and motorcoaches that have commercial 

driver licenses (CDL). Nothing in the law itself or the legislative history indicates 

any intent by Congress to exempt entry-level CDL holders who operate exclusively 

in intrastate commerce from driver training.64 Second, the proposed rule applies 

only to entry-level CDL holders. Again, there is nothing in the law itself, or the statutory history, permitting FMCSA to exclude entry-level drivers of commercial vehiVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:49 Apr 18, 2012 Jkt 073786 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\73786.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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65The provision in the Intermodal Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 and accompanying 

legislative history cannot be construed to abbreviate the scope of required entry-level training 

only to drivers of commercial motor vehicles who also have CDLs. 66 ‘‘Motor Carrier Safety: Improvements to Drug Testing Programs Could Better Identify Illegal 

Drug Users and Keep them Off the Road,’’ Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters. GAO–08–600. May 2008. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08600.pdf. 67 Road Safe America Petition dated Sept. 8, 2006. A similar petition was later filed by the 

American Trucking Association dated Oct. 20, 2006. See 72 FR 3904 (Jan. 26, 2007). 68 76 FR 78 (Jan. 3, 2011). 

cles who do not have or need a CDL from the training required for other commercial 

drivers.65

Recommendation: 

• Congress should direct FMCSA to issue a final rule on driver training 

that requires a more comprehensive training curriculum and includes 

all entry-level commercial motor vehicle drivers regardless of whether 

they have CDLs or operate in interstate or intrastate commerce. 

Other Regulatory Issues 

Establish a Clearinghouse for Positive Controlled Substance and Alcohol Tests 

Establishment of a mandatory national clearinghouse for records relating to alcohol and controlled substance testing of commercial drivers is critical to ensuring 

highway safety. Today, drivers who have tested positive for drugs and alcohol are 

on the road operating commercial motor vehicles. Many applicants for CDLs fail to 

disclose previous drug or alcohol violations and motor carriers may conduct only 

partial background checks on new employees. This allows applicants with positive 

drug and alcohol tests in their background to be licensed and hired to operate commercial vehicles. 

Legislation introduced by Senators Mark Pryor (D–AR) and John Boozman (R– 

AR), the Safe Roads Act of 2011, S.754, would require the Secretary to establish a 

national clearinghouse for records relating to alcohol and controlled substances testing of commercial motor vehicle operators within two years of the date of enactment. 

The bill would prohibit employers from hiring individuals who have tested positive, 

unless they have subsequently completed the return-to-duty process. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) supported the creation of a national database for 

positive alcohol and drug test results and test refusals in a 2008 recommendation 

to Congress.66 The establishment of a national clearinghouse will make it easier for 

employers to ensure that they hire safe drivers and will prevent unsafe drivers from 

operating commercial motor vehicles on our Nation’s highways. Advocates supports 

the enactment of the Safe Roads Act of 2011. 

Recommendation: 

• Congress should enact S.754, the Safe Roads Act of 2011. 

The Need to Require Speed Limiters on Commercial Motor Vehicles 

Another action that will help reduce the severity and frequency of commercial 

motor vehicle crashes is requiring speed limiters on all class 7 and 8 trucks. In 

2006, Road Safe America and nine motor carriers petitioned the FMCSA and 

NHTSA to require devices to limit the speed of heavy trucks.67 Although this issue 

is in the jurisdiction of the NHTSA, the outcome will have a direct impact on the 

safety of motor carriers. Early this year the NHTSA granted the petition but a proposed rule is not expected before 2012 at the earliest.68 Advocates wants the Subcommittee to be aware of the fact that the petition has been granted and that action 

is expected on an issue that is closely related to the safety initiatives that are part 

of the Subcommittee’s jurisdiction. 

Event Data Recorders (EDRs) 

Likewise, the installation of Event Data Recorders (EDRs) on all commercial 

motor vehicles will provide long-term safety benefits for commercial motor vehicles. 

EDRs are devices that record several seconds of valuable vehicle information in the 

moments before and during a crash. In addition to the potential use of this date 

to provide immediate, accurate crash information to emergency medical responders 

through Automatic Crash Notification (ACN) systems, the objective data collected in 

EDRs is invaluable to ensure accurate crash reconstruction and provide research 

data that can be used to improve crash avoidance and crashworthiness countermeasures for commercial vehicles. Although this is also an issue within the jurisdiction of the NHTSA, the Subcommittee should be aware that progress on requiring 

EDRs on trucks is being pursued. I would also point out that the MESA bill on moVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:49 Apr 18, 2012 Jkt 073786 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\73786.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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69 76 FR 40420 (July 8, 2011); 76 FR 20807 (Apr. 13, 2011). 70Follow-Up Audit on the Implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement’s 

Cross-Border Trucking Provisions, p. 31, FMCSA, MH–2009–068, Office of the Inspector General, U.S. DOT (Aug. 17, 2009). 71 76 FR 40436. 72 Id. 

torcoach safety includes an EDR mandate to improve the safety of motorcoaches and 

their passengers. 

Pilot Program on NAFTA Long-Haul Trucking Provisions 

The Safety of Mexican Trucks Entering the U.S. Must Be Assured 

Despite the fact that the FMCSA has provided additional information and has 

made the new version of the NAFTA Long-Haul Trucking Provisions Pilot Program 69 more transparent, a number of serious safety concerns remain. For example, 

it is not at all clear whether all appropriate and pertinent violations data needed 

in the license database used by enforcement authorities will be available when the 

pilot program begins. The most recent report of the Department of Transportation 

(DOT) Office of Inspector General (OIG) cited the need to improve the monitoring 

of drivers with Mexican Federal licenses operating in the U.S., especially timely reporting and data inconsistencies among U.S. states, and the reporting and matching 

of different categories of traffic convictions, including convictions in non-commercial 

vehicles and convictions using various types of Mexican licenses by Mexican authorities.70 Under U.S. law, states are not currently required to report convictions of 

Mexican or Canadian drivers, so even FMCSA has noted that reporting of convictions by foreign drivers has been voluntary and inconsistent. Such reporting needs 

to be made mandatory before the pilot program begins. 

In addition, FMCSA has indicated that in order to document the prior violation 

records of Mexican drivers that participate in the pilot program to determine whether they have disqualifying violations in personal vehicles on their personal licenses, 

the drivers will be asked to voluntarily provide their personal licenses to FMCSA 

officials. This leads to several additional problems. First, each driver is asked to voluntarily provide their personal license or driving history, but it is not a mandatory 

part of the pilot program so drivers can refuse to cooperate. Second, drivers may 

have multiple personal licenses from one or more states in Mexico. The voluntary 

submission of a single or even several state licenses does not ensure that all personal licenses have been handed over. Third, the license databases of the 31 Mexican states have never previously been reviewed for accuracy and data quality. Only 

the database of the Mexican Federal license has been subject to scrutiny. Without 

a review and audit of these new databases there can be no certainty that the licenses voluntarily provided by drivers participating in the pilot program, or the resulting driving histories, are accurate and complete. 

Another as yet unresolved issue is the fact that Federal agencies in the U.S. do 

not have the authority to disqualify a driver licensed by a foreign jurisdiction. Currently, a foreign driver who commits violations in the U.S. can be placed out-of-service (OOS) but cannot be disqualified from driving by U.S. authorities. The driver can 

be disqualified by the foreign state or foreign Federal authority. But, if, the foreign 

jurisdiction refuses to disqualify the driver the U.S. has no power to disqualify the 

driver. This should be changed by statutory amendment to allow the FMCSA to disqualify a foreign driver before the commencement of the pilot program. 

One more issue has been raised by the FMCSA in terms of data collection in the 

pilot program. The agency states that ‘‘violation rates based on inspection data will 

be used to assess the safety performance of each participating motor carrier.’’ 71 This 

statement, however, does not indicate whether the agency will properly and fairly 

use the same type of inspection data for comparison purposes. First, there are three 

levels of commercial vehicle inspection intensity, Level 1 being the most intense and 

Level 3 being least intense. If the pilot program data is drawn largely from lowintensity level 3 inspections, that would not present a fair basis for comparison with 

trucks operated in the U.S. While the agency asserts that it ‘‘anticipates that inspections performed on the program participants’ trucks will be, on average, as thorough 

and rigorous as those performed on U.S. motor carriers[,]’’ 72 this is not the same 

as a commitment to using the same percentages of each level of inspection for comparison purposes between pilot program and U.S. trucks. 

Likewise, the location of the inspection matters a great deal in terms of credibility 

of the comparison between truck fleets. Pilot program trucks are expecting to be inspected at the U.S. border so the inclusion of port-of-entry border inspections should 

be eliminated from the data pool. Equally critical, inspection data should not be 

drawn from inspections conducted within the commercial border zones because the 

56 

73 U.S.-Mexico Cross-Border Trucking Demonstration Project, Independent Evaluation Panel 

Report to the U.S. Secretary of Transportation, p. 12 (Oct. 31, 2008). 74 CSA relies on the Safety Measurement System (SMS) which quantifies the on-road safety 

performance of carriers and drivers to identify candidates for interventions, determine the specific safety problems the a carrier or driver exhibits, and to monitor whether safety problems 

are improving or worsening. The SMS weighs the violation data collected in seven areas called 

the Behavior Analysis Safety Improvement Categories, or BASICs: unsafe driving; fatigued driving (hours of service); driver fitness; controlled substance/alcohol; vehicle maintenance; cargorelated; and crash indicators. 

pilot program vehicles in the border zones may have driven relatively few miles 

from their home base to get to the border zone. Inspections conducted in the border 

zones may be far less indicative of long-haul operating conditions than inspections 

conducted at locations throughout the 48 contiguous states and Alaska. Moreover, 

if the pilot program is truly a test of whether Mexican carriers can operate safely 

on long-haul trips throughout the U.S., then the inspection data must be drawn 

from roadside inspections conducted outside of the commercial border zones and, 

preferably, from inspections conducted in non-border states. Inspections conducted 

at a distance from the U.S.-Mexican border will provide the most accurate measure 

of the safety of drivers, vehicles and motor carrier operations on long-haul trips 

within the U.S. Since the overwhelming majority of trips taken by participating 

motor carriers in the previous cross-border pilot program were completed in the border zones (85 percent),73 reliance on similar data collected from border zone inspections in the proposed pilot program would not provide a valid basis for comparison. 

In addition, a large percentage of the trips beyond the border zone by participating 

carriers were completed in the four (4) border states. In order to obtain data that 

accurately compares long-haul operations of pilot program participants with longhaul operations in the U.S., only inspections conducted beyond the border zones, 

and typically after a trip of at least 250 miles, should be considered for inclusion 

in the data collection from the subject pilot program vehicles. 

Recommendations: 

• Congress should amend Federal law to: 

» require states to report violations by foreign commercial motor vehicle 

drivers to the Secretary of Transportation, and 

» include foreign commercial motor vehicle drivers among the listed disqualifications provided under 49 U.S.C. § 31310; 

• FMCSA should evaluate the NAFTA long-haul pilot program based on 

inspections: 

» which compare violations determined based on similar percentages of 

Level 1,2 and 3 inspections as are conducted on U.S. trucks; and 

» that are conducted outside the U.S. commercial border zones and do 

not include inspections conducted at ports of entry at the U.S. border. 

FMCSA Enforcement Issues 

Compliance, Safety, Accountability—Results Are Uncertain, Evaluation Is Needed 

FMCSA has argued that enforcement rigor will be substantially increased as the 

new enforcement methodology, Compliance, Safety, Accountability (CSA), is fully 

implemented. Because CSA for the first time will include roadside inspection data 

as part of the monitoring and oversight of motor carrier enforcement, there is reason 

to believe that this may improve the agency’s previously limited, bureaucratic approach to motor carrier enforcement interventions. 

However, since CSA was only implemented at the beginning of this year, the information needed to assess the effectiveness of the CSA program is incomplete and 

not available to the public. CSA is supposed to provide more data from roadside inspections and the new Safety Measurement System (SMS) uses crash reports and 

violations grouped into seven (7) safety-related categories, called BASICs (Behavior 

Analysis Safety Improvement Categories), to conduct its safety analysis.74 While 

more data is being collected and made available to the public in some of the seven 

safety categories of interest under CSA, many carriers have little or no data in some 

or a majority of these critical areas at this time. So the CSA program remains a 

potentially positive initiative but there is insufficient information available at this 

time to permit either the public to make reliable decisions based on the incomplete 

motor carrier safety information data, or for Advocates and other organizations to 

assess the impact of the CSA program on motor carrier safety. 

57 

75See, 71 FR 61131 (Oct. 17, 2006). Also see, www.csa2010.fmcsa.dot.gov. Primary data 

sources available to researchers and enforcement authorities contain very little information on 

vehicle mechanical condition, but lots of detailed information about driver condition and behavior. In addition, available crash data systems are not designed to support any analysis of how 

mechanical defects played a role in CMV crashes. All well-known crash data sets, such as the 

Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS), the General Estimates System (GES), and state 

crash files maintained and sent to FMCSA as part of each state’s requirements under its State 

Enforcement Plan to qualify for Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Program (MCSAP) funds, 

are based on police reports. These data sets, unsurprisingly, contain very low percentages of various mechanical defects as contributing to reported crashes. 

Officers on crash scenes do not engage in forensic work to detect mechanical failures. Police 

crash reports concentrate overwhelmingly on supposed driver errors or violations as the proximate reasons for the crash occurrences. If a report does contain mechanical or equipment failure 

information, it probably will involve an obvious, catastrophic failure and not deterioration of performance in key vehicle operating systems that cannot be detected at the crash scene. This disregard of mechanical defect involvement in CMV crashes is even more likely in injury or property-damage-only crashes. 

Empirical data highlights the paradox of the radical under-reporting of CMV mechanical defects: roadside inspections, such as the annual Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) 

Roadcheck repeatedly and consistently show high rates of mechanical defects and out-of-service 

(OOS) orders issued for such defects. For example, CVSA’s Roadcheck 2009 found an average 

of 1.12 vehicle violations in every roadside inspection, and 26.1 inspected trucks were placed 

OOS for mechanical/equipment violations. http://www.cvsa.org/news/2009_press.aspx. Severe 

under-reporting of mechanical defects that contribute to crashes has been borne out by several 

investigations. (Massie and Campbell 1996). Without special, in-depth studies keying on mechanical defects, crash data sets available for research cannot accurately gauge the role of mechanical problems in large truck crashes. 76 Roadside Inspections and Out-of-Service (OOS) Rates for Commercial Motor Vehicles, Commercial Motor Vehicle Facts, FMCSA (April, 2011) available at http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/documents/facts-research/CMV–Facts.pdf. 77See CSA BASICs website available at http://csa.fmcsa.dot.gov/about/basics.aspx. 78 A. McCartt, et al., ‘‘Use of LTCCS Data in Large Truck Underride Study,’’ Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Society of Automotive Engineers 2010 Government/Industry Meeting, 

Washington, D.C., Jan. 26–29, 2010. 79 NTSB Rec. H–99–6, issued Feb. 26, 1999. to FMCSA (‘‘Change the safety fitness rating 

methodology so that adverse vehicle and driver performance-based data alone are sufficient to 

result in an overall unsatisfactory rating for the carrier’’). 

It is important to note, however, there are several safety concerns regarding a 

bias that is built into the agency’s new methodology on which CSA relies that will 

skew the resulting enforcement efforts. The new system will still not ensure that 

mechanical problems will have parity with driver violations for stopping dangerous 

carriers from operating unsafe trucks or motorcoaches. FMCSA’s decision to place 

heavy emphasis on driver behavior as the core principle behind CSA 75 ignores the 

fact that mechanical defects are dramatically under-reported. Even though in 2010 

the OOS rate for vehicles (large trucks) was 20.3 percent, and the OOS rate for drivers (large trucks) was just 5.2 percent,76 the CSA BASICs includes four driver-related violation categories but only one category for vehicle maintenance violations.77

Studies 78 show that of the nearly 1,000 truck crashes investigated by FMCSA, 

fully 55 percent of them had one or more mechanical problems, and almost 30 percent had at least one condition that would trigger an OOS order, that is, a directive 

to the truck and driver to stop operating. It was also found that just a brake OOS 

violation increased the odds of a truck being assigned the critical reason for precipitating the crash by 1.8 times. For this reason, Advocates has criticized FMCSA’s 

policy of only issuing an OOS order when both driver and vehicle violations exceeded the required levels under the previous Safety Management System (SafeStat). 

Advocates believes that either driver or vehicle violations, if serious enough, should 

require the issuance of an OOS order. The NTSB likewise issued a safety recommendation calling for the same treatment of driver or vehicle safety violations.79

The implications are clear: FMCSA’s new approach under CSA, which includes four 

driver BASICs but only a single BASIC related to vehicle maintenance may well result in the same unbalanced, excessive emphasis on driver as opposed to vehicle violations. 

The over-emphasis on driver behavior over mechanical defects has another collateral consequence when it comes to hours of service enforcement. Because of the current necessity to rely on the use of driver logbooks that are so often falsified that 

they are known as ‘‘comic’’ books, violations of HOS rules are often missed in roadside inspections. A high percentage of drivers are able to repeatedly conceal hours 

of service violations by manipulating the entries in their logbooks. Even with supplementary documents available to law enforcement, such as toll and fuel receipts, 

truck drivers can still make their logbook entries appear to be valid. If the CSA BASICs are overly reliant on driver violations, and enforcement personnel remain unVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:49 Apr 18, 2012 Jkt 073786 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\73786.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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80MCSIA, § 3(2). 81 49 U.S.C. § 521(b). 82 Id. at § 521(b)(2)(A). 83MCSIA, § 222 states: 

(b) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary—* * * 

(2) shall assess the maximum civil penalty for each violation of a law referred to in subsection 

(a) by any person who is found to have committed a pattern of violations of critical or acute regulations issued to carry out such a law or to have previously committed the same or a related 

violation of critical or acute regulations issued to carry out such a law. 84Motor Carrier Safety: Federal Agency Identifies Many High-risk Carriers but Does not Assess 

Maximum Fines as often as Required by Law, GAO–07–584, Aug. 2007. 

able to accurately detect this major source of violations, then the data and accuracy 

of CSA will be questionable, and its capability to adequately address ongoing driver 

and carrier violations suspect. 

For this reason, Advocates reiterates the need for Congressional action to direct 

FMCSA adoption of a universal EOBR regulatory requirement. Only the use of 

EOBRs can address this potential problem in the CSA approach. 

Recommendations: 

• FMCSA should be directed to: 

» re-evaluate the imbalanced approach to motor carrier violations in 

CSA that relies too heavily on driver violations as part of the BASICs; 

and, 

» implement NTSB safety recommendation H–99–6 so that either driver 

or vehicle violations alone can trigger issuance of an out-of-service 

order. 

• Congress should direct the GAO to assess: 

» the accuracy and deterrent value of safety performance findings from 

the SMS; 

» the progress of CSA and whether the effort is proceeding in the right 

direction; 

» whether safety performance will be evaluated in a more timely and 

meaningful manner than the previous compliance review-oriented regime; and 

• whether the system will detect a significantly higher percentage of dangerous motor carriers that either need major, immediate reforms to their 

safety management or must stop operating. 

FMCSA Should Impose the Maximum Penalties Allowed by Law on Violators 

FMCSA has a history of avoiding the imposition of maximum penalties on serious 

motor carrier violators but we hope there will be a change under the new agency 

leadership. There has been no recent update on whether the agency has increased 

average penalties and is imposing sufficiently tough penalties in order to send a 

message to all truck and motorcoach companies that the agency means business. 

Congress indicated in the agency’s authorizing law that civil penalties had not been 

sufficiently used to deter violations.80 Stiffer penalties levied against offending 

motor carriers would provide a strong deterrence to prevent other companies from 

committing serious violations. 

FMCSA administers civil penalties allowed under the civil penalties section of the 

transportation code.81 Despite the fact that this section has been amended a number 

of times in an effort to strengthen the legally allowed penalties, the statute affords 

the agency considerable discretion in setting the amount of penalties to be imposed 

and the maximum penalties are set too low. Motor carriers—the trucking, motorcoach, and bus companies—are liable for a maximum penalty of $10,000 for each 

offense, while the motor carrier employees who are actually responsible for committing the violations are subject to no more than a fine of $2,500 per offense.82

In the past, the agency has through its policies and interpretations limited the 

penalties it has imposed. For example, Congress made it clear in the agency’s enabling legislation that FMCSA was supposed to assess maximum financial penalties 

for commission of certain acute or chronic motor carrier safety regulatory violations 

after the commission of two offenses or a pattern of violations.83 However, the GAO 

found that the agency did not assess maximum fines for a pattern of violations.84

The same GAO report also found that the agency misinterpreted the statutory basis 

for imposing maximum fines, assessing maximum fines only after a third violation 

rather than following a second violation. 

59 

85FMCSA states in its study of civil penalties: 

[I]t was determined during the original analysis that it is not possible to isolate the effects 

of the revisions to the civil penalty schedule on carrier behavior from other elements of the CR 

program or other FMCSA programs (e.g., the roadside inspection program). Other actions that 

could be taken against a carrier as a result of a CR include: placing a carrier OOS for reasons 

other than nonpayment of fines, and determining that a carrier is unfit to operate. Also, it is 

not possible to isolate the effects of TEA–21 penalty revisions from other civil penalty revisions 

that follow in later years. Therefore, the 2004 study focused primarily on the impact of the 

changes in the revised civil penalty schedule on the dollar amount of the fines assessed to the 

carrier and on the number of violations assessed. 

Analysis of FMCSA’s Revised Civil Penalties (1995–2006): A Follow-up Study, FMCSA, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Aug. 2009, at v. 86 Id., Table 4, at 11. 87Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration Safety Measurement System for Sky Express, 

USDOT# 1361588. 88 49 U.S.C. § 31144(e)(2). 89Safety Agency Rebuked in Deadly Bus Crash, USA Today, June 2, 2011, available at http:// 

www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2011–06–01-bus-crash-lahood_n.htm?loc=interstitialskip#. 90 ‘‘LaHood Ends Extended Appeals After Fatal Bus Crash,’’ AP/NBC. 1 Jun 2011. http:// 

www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/DC–Fed-Agency-Was-Set-to-Suspend-Bus-Company-BeforeCrash-122972973.html. 

FMCSA has conceded that it cannot determine whether the changed penalty 

structure and amounts of fines have a beneficial effect on motor carrier violation 

rates and on motor carrier safety.85 Part of the problem is that the agency has imposed substantially different amounts of fines from year to year. Even after the 

maximum penalty amount was increased, average non-recordkeeping penalties 

plummeted from $5,066 in 2000 to $2,938 in 2006.86 The latter figure is only a little 

more than 29 percent of the maximum permitted by law. It is clear that raising penalty ceilings in Federal legislation while allowing broad agency discretion in the 

amounts of penalties actually imposed does not ensure that violations trigger stiff 

penalties or promote deterrence. 

While FMCSA has recently announced the issuance of OOS orders to several 

motor carriers, prior recent failures by the FMCSA to impose stiff penalties has had 

deadly consequences. Just two months ago, on May 11, 2011, a horrific motorcoach 

crash occurred in Caroline County, Virginia in which four people were killed and 

over 50 injured when the fatigued driver ran off the side of the road and the motorcoach overturned and landed on its roof. The motorcoach operator, Sky Express, had 

46 violations for fatigued drivers, 17 violations for unsafe driving, and 24 violations 

for driver fitness in the past two years.87 The company was among the worst in the 

industry and FMCSA had proposed an ‘‘Unsatisfactory’’ safety rating for the company in April 2011. The rating meant that FMCSA could have shut down Sky Express after 30 days,88 three days before the crash occurred on May 28, but the agency chose to extend the carrier’s response and operating time for an additional 10 

days.89 Had FMCSA cracked down on Sky Express for its dozens of violations and 

poor fitness rating and shut the operator down, the crash could have been prevented. Secretary LaHood has stated that the practice of allowing additional time 

would not occur again.90 Advocates questions whether any motor carrier, especially 

a passenger-carrying operation, should be allowed to continue operations on public 

highways once the determination has been made that its operations are unsafe. 

Recommendations: 

• Congress should request a GAO study of FMCSA’s imposition of penalties 

for motor carrier safety violations to determine: 

» whether the current maximum penalty amounts are actually deterring 

motor carriers from committing violations; 

» the extent to which FMCSA has reduced or compromised penalty 

amounts in a manner that results in lower penalties per violation and 

per motor carrier; 

» the extent to which motor carriers regard current levels of imposed 

penalties as acceptable costs of doing business rather than as a deterrent; 

» whether setting statutory minimum required penalties is necessary 

and appropriate, and to recommend such minimum amounts; 

» whether motor carriers given ‘‘Unsatisfactory’’ safety ratings by 

FMCSA should be allowed to continue operations while challenging or 

trying to improve the safety fitness determination . 

60 

91 Highway Accident Report—Motorcoach Run-Off-The-Bridge and Rollover, Sherman Texas, 

Aug. 8, 2008, NTSB/HAR–09/02, http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2009/har0902.htm. 92Motor Carrier Safety: Reincarnating Commercial Vehicle Companies Pose Safety Threat to 

Motoring Public—Federal Safety Agency Has Initiated Efforts to Prevent Future Occurrences, 

GAO–09–924 (July 2009). 

FMCSA Lacks A Reliable Method to Detect ‘‘Reincarnated’’ Motor Carriers 

At present, it is simply unknown what is the number of illegally operating carriers that have restarted their trucking and motorcoach companies as new entrants 

to mask prior operations, and to avoid paying large fines and complying with OOS 

orders. 

It has become increasingly apparent that FMCSA’s methods of detecting whether 

a motor carrier is legitimately registered with the agency and has legal operating 

authority are unreliable and unsafe. Thousands of motor carriers subject to heavy 

fines from repeated, past violations and even given stop operation orders sink out 

of sight and then re-appear as new entrants seeking registration and initial operating authority from FMCSA. 

In 2008, the horrific crash of a motorcoach in Sherman, Texas, resulted in the 

deaths of 17 passengers and injuries to the driver and the other 38 passengers. As 

referenced previously in this testimony, the motorcoach was operated by Angel 

Tours, which had been stopped from operating by FMCSA just weeks prior to the 

crash but continued to operate under the new name Iguala Busmex. Angel Tours 

had an extremely poor safety record and had been ordered by the agency to cease 

operations.91

The NTSB investigation found that the numerous safety violations of the motorcoach and its drivers were a continuation of the company’s exceptionally poor safety 

record when it registered with FMCSA as a new company. NTSB determined that 

FMCSA processes for vetting new entrant carriers through the use of its New Applicant Screening Program were inadequate for identifying the motorcoach company as 

an operation that had deceptively re-incorporated—a ‘‘reincarnated’’ or ‘‘chameleon’’ 

carrier—to evade agency enforcement actions. That failed screening process had allowed hundreds of motorcoach and trucking companies to escape detection as illegal, 

new motor carriers. 

In a separate study, GAO tried to determine the number of motorcoach carriers 

registered with FMCSA as new entrants in FY2007 and FY2008 that are substantially related to previous companies or are, in fact, the same companies that have 

‘‘reincarnated’’ themselves as new operations. GAO found 20 motorcoach companies 

that had re-appeared as new companies from old companies, representing about 

nine percent of 220 interstate motorcoach companies that FMCSA placed out of 

service during those two Fiscal Years. (These 220 companies are part of the approximately 4,000 motorcoach companies registered with FMCSA in FY 2008.) According 

to GAO, this percentage is probably an underestimation of the number of ‘‘chameleon’’ carriers in operation that have disguised their prior, unsafe operations to hide 

their reincarnation from the agency. 

FMCSA officials admitted to GAO that until the 2008 motorcoach crash in Sherman, Texas, reincarnating was easy to do and hard to detect. In fact, five of the 

20 carriers identified by GAO were still operating in May 2009, and GAO referred 

them to the agency for investigation. GAO also found another 1,073 trucking companies that appeared to be reincarnated ‘‘chameleon’’ carriers, which FMCSA had not 

detected.92 FMCSA’s new process for detecting such carriers has not been evaluated 

by GAO. 

A follow-up study is needed to determine whether FMCSA’s new procedures for 

detecting ‘‘reincarnated’’ carriers has made substantial inroads on the number of illicit trucking and motorcoach companies currently operating as new companies. 

Recommendations: 

• Congress should direct: 

» FMCSA to require the principal officers of each new entrant motor 

carrier to declare, on the new entrant application, under penalties for 

perjury, that the new entrant is not a reincarnated or previously operating motor carrier with a different DOT registration number; and, 

» GAO to conduct a follow up investigation to assess whether the 

FMCSA’s new process for detecting ‘‘reincarnated’’ carriers is effective. 

Conclusion 

Creation of a new Federal agency to oversee motor carrier and motorcoach safety 

has not yet resulted in the rigorous oversight and enforcement that Congress diVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:49 Apr 18, 2012 Jkt 073786 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\73786.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
61 

rected and the public expected. In the past, safety goals had not been met but merely changed, rulemakings were routinely overturned in legal challenges because of 

faulty reasoning and illegal underpinnings, enforcement was sporadic and weak, 

and unsafe carriers and drivers operated with near impunity. Every year thousands 

are killed and over 100,000 injured in truck crashes, every month on average there 

is a serious motorcoach crash, and every day tough safety regulations to combat 

driver fatigue, improve enforcement and train new commercial drivers still go 

uncompleted. While the new leadership team at DOT has addressed some of these 

issues, and shows signs of revitalizing the FMCSA’s safety mission, it is still necessary for Congress to conduct constant oversight and provide clear direction to this 

agency if we expect any strong and sustained progress in reducing deaths and injuries. Advocates thanks you for your leadership and looks forward to working with 

you on advancing motor carrier safety. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much. 

Well, the one thing that is obvious here is that we all feel the 

responsibility to make it safer out there on the highways, and to 

make sure that companies and individuals are equipped to do their 

jobs with safety in mind. 

Now, Ms. Gillan and Mr. England, electric onboard recorders 

help prevent driver fatigue by ensuring that the drivers comply 

with our service requirements. FMCSA has a rule that goes into effect next year that only requires electronic onboard recorders for 

bus companies with a history of hours of service violations. 

Might not the safety be improved by expanding this rule to require EOBRs on all commercial vehicles? First, Mr. England? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Certainly I agree with you 100 percent, and that’s 

why the ATA supports electronic onboard recorders. We believe 

that a combination of the electronic onboard recorder, plus the current hours of service regulations, will prove to, will show that safety rates, the number of fatalities, will continue to decline. 

Now, we also believe that there are various kinds of technologies 

and solutions in meeting this EOBR need. There shouldn’t be just 

a one-size-fits-all. 

And finally, I’d just like to say, our company has been operating 

with electronic logs now for 2 years. And we have seen, gosh, our 

violations, 70 hours, 14 hours and so forth, literally drop off the 

chart. And drivers have accepted it well. Studies have shown that 

there is a strong correlation between compliance there as to service 

regulations and safety. And we believe that electronic logs are essential, really, to meeting that end. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you. 

Ms. Gillan, how do you see the need for the EOBRs, you know, 

recorders on all commercial vehicles? 

Ms. GILLAN. Well, we feel that electronic onboard recorders are 

about 10 or 15 years overdue. They’re already required in Western 

European countries, in South America. And we have a problem 

with enforcement of hours of service, and we know that fatigue is 

a factor in up to 30 percent of all crashes. Right now, law enforcement has to rely on paper log books which, even within the trucking industry are referred to as comic books. 

There’s no question that electronic onboard recorders are needed. 

This will not only help to ensure that truck drivers comply with 

hours of service, but it will also help law enforcement enforce those 

laws. And I think that electronic onboard recorders will actually 

help truck drivers, who are constantly being pushed by shippers 

and their employers to exceed hours of service. And the electronic 

62 

onboard recorders will monitor that. It will be an accurate representation of how many hours that truck has been on the road. 

And it will definitely improve safety, not only for the public, but 

for the truck drivers as well. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you. 

Ms. Ferro, NTSB found that fatigue is the primary factor in 30 

to 40 percent of large truck crashes. Is the latest fatigue research 

and safety data being incorporated in FMCSA’s hours-of-service 

rulemaking? 

Ms. FERRO. Mr. Chairman, yes. We certainly incorporated fatigue 

research, both workplace as well as other studies, into building the 

hours-of-service proposal that went through the public notice and 

comment period and is now under the final edits to submit through 

the rest of the process. So, the simple answer is yes. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Mr. Hart, a new motor carrier must selfcertify that it understands and will abide by Federal safety regulations. However, FMCSA does not verify the carrier, that the carrier’s capable of complying with regulations until its first safety 

audit, which can be up to 18 months after the motor carrier begins 

operation. 

What can we do to improve FMCSA’s registration process to ensure that new motor carriers comply with safety regulations? 

Mr. HART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The issue you have highlighted is the reason we made recommendations that were based on our recent investigation of a collision of a tractor-trailer with a Greyhound bus. In that accident, 

there was considerable falsification of the information by the 

owner, which led to our recommendation that the scrutiny and the 

examination of the carrier be completed before the carrier enters 

into service. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Ms. Ferro, 18 months is a long time to 

wait for a safety audit. What resources might FMCSA need to 

speed up these reviews? 

Ms. FERRO. Well, in today’s environment, we complete the new 

entry safety audits on all trucking company new entrants within 

12 months, as opposed to the 18, for the very reason that you and 

Member Hart just stated, and for motorcoach carriers within less 

than 5 months. We do feel the urgency, and it underscores the 

technical assistance we submitted which is recommending that motorcoach carriers go through a pre-authority safety audit—let’s not 

even wait for that new entrant audit. Let’s do it before they get 

their authority. 

And we continue to advance a knowledgeability proposal for any 

new entrant applicant, again, to get at the sense of that knowledge 

and fitness before they get their authority. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Mr. Rajkovacz, Federal law prohibits large 

trucks weighing more than 80,000 pounds, or that are longer than 

53 feet, from using interstate highways. What effect might allowing 

heavier trucks have on the safety of drivers and passengers on our 

highways who are already on our stretched infrastructure? 

Mr. RAJKOVACZ. We are not supporters of the longer and heavier 

combination vehicles. Currently, longer and heavier vehicles do selectively operate within this country. However, often the drivers 

have to receive special training by regulation. They are typically 

63 

the most experienced and veteran drivers in the industry. And they 

operate in primarily rural interstates away from major urban 

areas. And those areas they operate in typically have the lowest accident rates. 

We’ve been to this rodeo before. When you increase size and 

weight, one of the requirements, or one of the things that would 

have to happen is, you would end up having to go to a three-axle 

trailer. When we went from 45-footers to 48-footers it became the 

industry standard, even though it wasn’t mandated by Congress. 

But it went from 48-footers to 53-footers. That became the industry 

standard. You weren’t going to get loaded unless you showed up 

with a 53-footer. You increase the weight to 97,000 pounds, threeaxle configuration on the trailer. 

One of the arguments made by the proponents is that it’s going 

to be environmentally friendly. We’re going to save fuel. 

You’re going to have everybody dragging around a three-axle 

trailer not at 80,000 pounds. It’s significantly less. When all of that 

weight, if it is at 97,000 pounds, is sitting on a bridgedeck, the 

whole 97,000 pounds is on the bridgedeck. You can’t get around 

that. We have a crumbling infrastructure in this country; there’s 

not the money there; who knows when the money’s going to be 

there to replace it. That is sitting on the bridge. We saw it in Minneapolis. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much. 

Senator Wicker. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you. 

Mr. England, you represent ATA. But your own company also 

has some 4,600 drivers and 3,500 trucks. How many of those trucks 

have these electronic devices on them? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Just a small correction. We operate 4,000 trucks. 

Maybe we made an error in the report we gave you. But, yes, all 

of them do. 

Senator WICKER. OK. All of them do. And, as far as you are concerned, that’s working pretty well? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Yes. It’s been accepted well by drivers. We’ve seen 

a slight deterioration in productivity, but only slight. And we feel 

it’s more than offset by the comfort that it gives us that we are seeing greater compliance with the hours of service regulations. 

Senator WICKER. OK. And, do I take it, then, that if you had 

your druthers, we’d just keep those devices on there, and keep the 

hours of service rules as they are, rather than changing them as 

they’re proposed to be? Did I understand that correctly? 

Mr. ENGLAND. That is correct. 

Senator WICKER. Why is that? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Well—— 

Senator WICKER. Explain that to the Committee. 

Mr. ENGLAND.—the data speaks for itself in terms of improvement. Over a period of time, when mileage has increased, fatalities 

have continued to go down, as has the accident rate. Our concern 

is that if the proposed changes were made to the hours, such as 

an 11-hour driving period, the restart provision, and so forth, it 

would require us to put more trucks on the road and hire more 

drivers who would be less experienced. And we just think the net 

64 

effect would be a deterioration in highway safety, rather than an 

improvement as we’ve seen over recent years. 

Senator WICKER. OK. 

Now, Mr. Rajkovacz, I’m going to ask you to answer that question also. What is your feeling, and the feeling of your organization, 

about keeping the hours of service rules as they currently are, 

rather than moving to the changes? 

Mr. RAJKOVACZ. We do not believe there is any sound, rational 

scientific justification for altering the current hours of service. They 

have certainly proved, you know, in real-world use that the industry has gotten safer under the current hours of service that are in 

place. 

We do think that if you reduce the productivity of the industry 

by reducing the hours of service, you are likely to see a less safe 

industry, because you’re going to have to add more trucks, more 

drivers, to handle the same amount of freight that’s hauled today. 

You’re going to have a productivity issue. More trucks on the highway means more car-truck interactions. 

Senator WICKER. And then, let me ask both of you to explain to 

the subcommittee this problem with detention time, and comment 

about proposed solutions to this situation. 

Mr. England, you can go first. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Well, as recently as January of this year, the GAO 

issued a report showing there’s really no nexus between this issue 

of detention and safety. And so, we feel that if regulation were to 

take place, it would be nothing more than economic regulation. At 

our company, we pay our drivers detention regardless of whether 

we get paid by the customer. And we feel like these are transactions that should be handled through negotiations between our 

customer and us. We really don’t believe in a one-size-fits-all sort 

of scenario. 

Senator WICKER. So, do I understand—the proposals in the legislation that would require contracts between shippers and motor 

carriers, you’re not really very excited about having that included 

in the statute, are you? 

Mr. ENGLAND. We are not. 

Senator WICKER. How about you, Mr. Rajkovacz? 

Mr. RAJKOVACZ. The detention issue, delay of docks, is the 800- 

pound gorilla in any meaningful safety discussion in this country. 

In my written testimony, I gave an actual example that happened 

week after week, month after month, year after year. It’s not imagined. It’s real. I disagree with the characterization of the GAO report in saying that there’s not a nexus to highway safety. This is 

one of the reasons the Association’s not warm and fuzzy about 

EOBRs. There is a tremendous amount of driver time spent at 

these docks that’s not being recorded. The EOBRs will never capture that. It’s there. It’s for real. And if we don’t address that, if 

we ignore it, a lot of the rest of the safety discussion, really, in 

many respects, becomes somewhat shallow. 

Senator WICKER. Now, just to follow up, because my time is gone, 

do you think the requirement of a contract dealing with carrier detention time would be a good requirement to put in the new statute? 

65 

Mr. RAJKOVACZ. Something clearly has to be done. My answer to 

that’s going to be a qualified yes. And the reason for that is that 

small businesses do not have the economic power in the marketplace to insist on any equitable treatment from large shippers and 

receivers. It’s take it or leave it. And so, you face this coercion. I 

mean, within driver parlance, this coercion is an everyday, real, actionable thing that happens to small businesses and drivers. 

Senator WICKER. OK. Well, let me give you a little time on the 

record to supplemental your answer on behalf of your Association 

as to what the best statutory solution would be. 

Senator WICKER. And, thank you all. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Senator Pryor. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. England, let me start with you, if I may. You mentioned in 

your testimony a few moments ago about hair testing. Tell me the 

advantage of hair testing over other types of testing. 

Mr. ENGLAND. We found in our company that it’s much more reliable. Where we have a violation rate of, say, around 2 percent with 

urine testing, we find that, a violation of about 9 percent with hair 

testing. Where urine testing may be good for 2 weeks or 3 weeks 

or something like that, maybe not that long, but, really, hair testing is good for 60 to 90 days. 

There’s also a greater likelihood of subverting the system with 

urine testing than there is with hair testing. And that what, we 

just think it’s one more means of ensuring safe operations. 

Senator PRYOR. And, if the Congress is able to pass this database 

proposal that I’ve offered, would that help you in your hiring process, and how so? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Absolutely. I mean, we can buy all the technology 

in the world, and many in our industry are doing that. Weighing 

departure technology, roll stability systems. There’s just a whole 

array of technologies. It really comes down, for the most part, to 

the person behind the wheel of that truck. And if we don’t have 

knowledge that a person that we’re putting behind the wheel of a 

truck had a positive drug test or alcohol test somewhere back along 

the line that he or she didn’t report on their application, we’re obviously handicapped in knowing whether we’re putting a safe person 

behind the wheel. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

And, I’m sorry. Help me with how to pronounce your name. Is 

it Rajkovacz? 

Mr. RAJKOVACZ. Rajkovacz. 

Senator PRYOR. Rajkovacz. OK. Well, bear with me as I struggle 

with that. But, thank you. And I’m not sure in your opening statement if you really told us your thoughts on the data base, and 

whether that would help or hurt owner-operators, in your opinion. 

Mr. RAJKOVACZ. The drug and alcohol clearinghouse is something 

that the Association—we’ve been discussing it. We haven’t taken 

an official stance on it. But I can say from conversations I’ve had 

with small business owners, owner-operators, they’re very concerned about the placement of a database like that in the hands 

of a third party, an independent third party, not the government. 

We have seen way too often where, once a third party has data on 

drivers, it’s not used in a very ethical manner. 

66 

When it comes to drug and alcohol testing, the Association has, 

on numerous occasions in responses to the agency, suggested 

changes to how drug and alcohol testing are performed to be more 

effective. Right now, we as an industry test at a 50 percent rate 

on randoms, and, you know, you have drivers that have been driving for 30 years. And they’ve never tested positive. They’ll never 

test positive. But they’re caught up in the whole system. 

It seems to us to make more rational sense to allow those who 

have never tested positive to go into a lower rate, thus concentrating testing on those who haven’t achieved a certain level. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. 

Mr. Hart and Ms. Ferro, I don’t want you to feel like you’ve been 

left out of this conversation so, let me ask, if I may, a little bit 

about the data base, the drug and alcohol testing. But also, what 

I’d like to focus on is something that one of the witnesses said earlier about the idle time, the time of loading and unloading, and 

what impact that does have on safety, and how the current system 

handles that. I don’t want to call it downtime because that’s probably not accurate. It probably depends on what they’re doing. 

Mr. Hart, would you like to go first, or—— 

Mr. HART. Thank you, Senator Pryor. I’m not aware that we 

have any recommendations specific to that issue, because I’m not 

aware that we’ve ever addressed that as a causal factor in any of 

our accidents. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. 

Ms. FERRO. So, from FMCSA’s perspective on the detention time 

component, we had done some research in the past where we did 

identify the cost and correlation to safety. In addition, our Motor 

Carrier Safety Advisory Committee following some of the GAO 

work last year took it up as an issue and, under consideration. It’s 

a very broad-based advisory committee with stakeholders from 

every major interest group that has a stake in commercial vehicle 

safety. And the advisory committee recommended to the agency 

that they wanted to continue looking at the issue. 

The correlation is that uncompensated time at a dock, which is 

generally from our research, in many cases uncompensated time 

puts pressure—not just economic pressure—on a driver, but it also 

puts pressure on that driver’s restricted operating time. And by the 

time the driver may be released from that site, that driver is invariably inclined to push the limit, both on hours of driving—on 

hours of service, as well as the stress and fatigue related with waiting. So, we get two safety factors there. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I may have more questions for the record. 

But, thank you. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much. 

Senator Boozman. 

Senator BOOZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Ferro, what were the results of the cost-benefit analysis, of 

the safety benefit versus the cost of the proposed change in the 

hours of service rules? 

Ms. FERRO. Senator, that, we had several ranges based on the 

different assumptions of minimum amounts of sleep, moderate, and 

67 

maximum, and I do not have the numbers in front of me. I’d be 

pleased to submit them for the record. 

Senator BOOZMAN. Was it positive? 

Ms. FERRO. The overall cost-benefit analysis did come out positive in the context of both the tangible costs to industry, and offset 

by the savings of lives under the hours-of-service rules. So, yes, 

across the range of those options, it was a positive outcome in 

terms of beneficial. 

Senator BOOZMAN. OK. I’d like to have a copy of those—— 

Ms. FERRO. I’d be pleased to provide a copy. 

Senator BOOZMAN. For sure. 

Mr. Hart, you mentioned fatigue accidents. Those accidents— 

were the people that were fatigued, were they following in the current hours of service requirement? 

Mr. HART. I would have to get back to you with specifics. But in 

general, the answer is no. 

Senator BOOZMAN. OK. So, if you change the hours of service, 

those individuals were cheating anyway. 

Mr. HART. My understanding is that in most cases they were fatigued for a number of reasons. But one of the reasons was not following the hours of service. 

Senator BOOZMAN. Very good. Thank you. 

Ms. Ferro, in the IG report, they noted that there was an issue 

in the states, with the states stopping people, the Mexican truck 

drivers, and having violations, and then it wasn’t getting reported 

back to you so that you would have that on record and could do 

something about it. And I think they recommended that something 

be done about that. 

Can you tell us what has been done? 

Ms. FERRO. Absolutely. Through our relationship with the states 

as grantees in the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program, we 

encourage all states to post moving violation convictions of foreign 

drivers to the host record, so that driver would, in fact, have a violation and conviction posted and it would come through our Commercial Driver License Information System. It’s voluntary today. 

In the context of that recommendation and our own recognition 

of the importance of that data, we have proposed in our technical 

assistance that it be mandatory, that states be required to post 

those convictions. 

Senator BOOZMAN. Now, I’d very much like to encourage you to 

make this mandatory starting as soon, as quickly as possible. 

I had experience with an interesting thing early on, when meth 

was such a problem. Arkansas had a tremendous problem, and yet 

it was not on record because it took a long time to fill out the forms 

and send it to the government that there was a problem. And so 

the government, the Feds, looked at that and said, ‘‘Well, you don’t 

have a problem because it wasn’t reported.’’ And so, I really would 

encourage—in fact, I’d insist that we do that. 

Ms. FERRO. Good. 

Senator BOOZMAN. If not, it’s not going to get done, because those 

people, like your agency, are working very hard, and understaffed. 

And so, again, I think that’s very, very important. 

Ms. FERRO. I appreciate that support. 

68 

Senator BOOZMAN. So, will you follow up with that? And, I’d like 

two things. 

Ms. FERRO. Yes, sir. 

Senator BOOZMAN. The results of the cost analysis. 

Ms. FERRO. Mm-hm. 

Senator BOOZMAN. And then, two, will you follow up with a plan 

on getting the other implemented? 

Ms. FERRO. Oh, absolutely. In terms of the conviction reporting? 

Yes. 

Senator BOOZMAN. Yes. 

Ms. FERRO. And the value—— 

Senator BOOZMAN. Not just reporting, but—— 

Ms. FERRO. Mandatory. 

Senator BOOZMAN.—the, mandatory with teeth in it. 

Ms. FERRO. Yes. We’ll highlight that and forward that to your 

committee, to your staff. 

Senator BOOZMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. FERRO. Thank you. 

Senator BOOZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you. 

Senator Snowe. 

STATEMENT OF HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MAINE 

Senator SNOWE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 

allowing me to participate in this hearing, even though I am not 

a member of this subcommittee. I appreciate it very much. 

Ms. Gillan, I wanted to discuss comments raised in your testimony, because truck weights are a critical issue for my state, and 

presumably other states in this country. And it’s been a longstanding issue that is of paramount concern to our state, to truckers, to industry, and to State government officials, including the 

Governor and the Congressional delegation. And that’s why Maine 

had a pilot program, as you know, and it operated for a year, in 

2009. 

You indicated in your statement, and I’d like to know on what 

you based your assessment, of Maine’s pilot program that underscored concerns about safety. Because the Maine Department of 

Transportation report concluded otherwise. I know you do it on the 

basis of more trucks on the road. That may be true. But the question is, on which roads? And, unfortunately, for Maine, what’s happening is, all of these trucks are now ending up on secondary roads 

and it’s proven to be a real hazard. 

I’ve been fighting this issue for a long time in this committee. 

And I’ll tell you, it is an issue about which truckers in Maine feel 

very passionately, because it’s a very dangerous issue. We have had 

accidents in some of the communities back in the last few years because these trucks are present on secondary roads when they 

should be on the Interstate. 

To give you an example; in Maine we can have a truck traveling 

local roads, passing nine schools, more than 3,000 homes, through 

hundreds of intersections. A similar route on the Interstate would 

have a truck pass 32 controlled access ramps and exactly zero 

homes and schools. 

69 

Now, the Maine Department of Transportation said there were 

14 fewer crashes—a 10 percent improvement—involving six-axle 

trucks—because that’s what we’re talking about, six-axle trucks, 

which are even safer because of the weight dispersion and the 

extra brake system—on all Maine roads, due to increased truck 

traffic on the safer roads, which is the Interstate, there were 10 

fewer crashes on the Interstate involving six-axle trucks, possibly 

due to heightened safety awareness for both trucks and cars. There 

were four fewer total crashes on secondary roads, which is a positive result, because we’re seeing all of these trucks rumbling 

through some very small towns, on narrow roads, and it makes it 

very hazardous in these communities. 

Even with the increased truck traffic on Maine’s Interstate system, during the pilot project there were no fatalities on this safer 

road, either in 2009 or during the pilot in 2009–2010. 

Now, your comments reflected, you were referring to combination 

trucks. We don’t allow combination trucks in Maine. And we don’t 

allow them on State roads. Also, the fact that the 2000 Federal 

Highway Administration report entitled, ‘‘Comprehensive Truck 

Size and Weight Study’’ noted six-axle configurations have less impact on pavements, and trucks currently using five axles and distribute weight on fewer points cause greater fatigue. 

Those are some of the issues, among others. My concern is that 

we have 27 states that already have exemptions, and Maine desperately wants one above the 80,000-pound limit to travel the 

Interstate, because it’s safer. And somehow, we’ve conflated the notion of what is safe, and what isn’t. I would invite you to come to 

the State of Maine to watch these trucks coming through small 

towns. We have heavy industry. And our road systems are designed 

to accommodate that. We used to have Loring Air Force Base 

which housed B–52 bombers. We had numerous other military facilities. We have the pulp and paper industry. So, that’s important 

to us and our economy. 

So, I’m wondering, how we can reconcile some of these issues. 

Because it’s been going on for so long. I’ve introduced a bill that 

would allow the Secretary of Transportation to have a waiver authority based on a three-year pilot program within the state, to certify that it would be safe, so they could achieve a permanent exemption rather than coming to Congress. It’s not fair to our State 

of Maine not to be able to have this exemption. 

For example, just to give you an idea, if you’re driving a 100,000- 

pound truck from Gary, Indiana, just outside of Chicago to Portland, Maine, you’d be forced to unload the additional weight to continue on the Interstate in Maine, or travel through the state on 

local roads. Conversely, you can drive a truck weighing 90,000 

pounds all the way from Kansas City, Missouri to Seattle, Washington exclusively on the Interstate system. 

That’s our challenge. And I have had truckers down here multiple times for many years, and we’re trying to figure out, what is 

the best way we can work with you, as a safety advocate, to understand the challenge that we’re facing in our state in wanting that 

exemption? Our Department of Transportation wants it; they’ve 

certified it; we’ve got our documentation on the pilot program, and 

all of the evidence suggests it’s all moving in the right direction. 

70 

It’ll take 7.8 million vehicle miles off the roads with this exemption. It’ll save money—$300,000 in rehabilitation of bridges. It 

would save more than a million dollars in pavement costs. 

So, what could we do to sort through this, and figure out if we 

can get to a mutual agreement on what works, and what constitutes safety? 

Ms. GILLAN. Senator Snowe, I hate to be on the other side of a 

safety issue with you, because we have worked so closely on so 

many other issues, like the safety of 15-passenger vans, and SUV 

rollover. But, on this one, I think we may have to agree to disagree. 

Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety opposes 100,000-pound 

rigs on local roads, on the NHS system, and on the Interstate system. And there are really important safety reasons. 

First of all, 100,000-pound rigs take much longer to stop. Right 

now, an 80,000-pound rig takes the length of a football field to 

come to a complete stop. A 100,000-pound truck takes 25 percent 

longer than that. 

We also know the argument of the industry, that if we allow 

heavier trucks, there will be fewer trucks on the road. And that 

has never, ever occurred in the history of the United States, and 

it didn’t occur in Maine. When we, Daphne Izer, with Parents 

Against Tired Truckers, FOIA’d information from Maine DOT, we 

found out that there actually was a 300 percent increase in the 

number of heavy trucks that were using that portion of I–95. 

The other issue is that bigger trucks are more difficult to maneuver. They have a higher propensity to roll over, and they are unsafe. In fatal crashes involving a large truck and a passenger car, 

97 percent of the deaths are individuals in the passenger cars. 

And that’s why it’s not only Advocates, but we are joined by the 

Independent Owner-Operators, and the Teamsters, who are out 

there every day driving these big trucks. 

There are also infrastructure issues. In some of the documents 

that we were able to review, the Federal Highway Administration 

raised the issue that there were a significant number of bridges 

that will have their factor of safety reduced significantly with the 

additional weights. And the issue of heavy weights on bridges is 

really of paramount importance. We saw what happened in Minnesota when the bridge collapsed. 

So, there’s not only the safety of driving the vehicle, and its stopping distance, and the ability to maneuver, but it’s also the risk to 

the public when we allow these 100,000-pound rigs to be on the 

interstate, particularly, bridges, when we have such a tremendous 

backlog of bridge repair needs right now. 

So, again, we believe that these 100,000-pound trucks, they don’t 

have any business on the local roads. They don’t have any business 

on the NHS road. And they certainly shouldn’t be on the interstate. 

And the public doesn’t want them. The trucking interests are the 

only ones that want the big trucks. 

Recently, we, with the Truck Safety Coalition, did a public opinion poll. Three out of four respondents don’t want bigger trucks. 

And the American public will pay with their lives, and with their 

wallets by having to do the repair, if we allow these overweight 

trucks on all the roads. 

Senator SNOWE. Well, Ms. Gillan—— 

71 

Ms. GILLAN. And I’m happy to work with you—— 

Senator SNOWE. Well, yes. But, you referred in your remarks to 

trucks that are not operating in Maine. And that’s the point here, 

on the six-axle trucks, first of all. Second of all, it’s a matter of 

commerce, and when you have a pulp and paper industry, it does 

require large trucks. And the question is, which roads are safer? 

There are 27 states that have exemptions currently. And why is 

it fair that those 27 states have exemptions, and not the State of 

Maine, or any other state that chooses to? Maybe not every state 

chooses to. We would like the option, based on the certification, 

based on the experience of a pilot program, and certified by the engineers and other who are in a position to certify that. That’s how 

my legislation would be crafted. But, it’s a matter of commerce; it’s 

a matter of jobs; it’s a matter of industry. 

So, I just would hope that we could compare apples to apples, 

and oranges to oranges, when it comes to this issue, because it is 

a very important issue to our state. And, you sound like it’s a 

truckers interest. It’s our economic interests in our state, people 

desperately holding on to these jobs that depend on the trucking 

industry. There’s one mode of transportation. And being on the 

Interstate system that has been certified to be safer than on these 

local roads, that traverse small communities where we’ve already 

had fatalities as a result. That’s the point here. It is a huge safety 

issue for us, in the way we look at it and what’s happened on the 

thousands of miles of roads that we have in our state. 

So, I hope that we can continue to have this conversation. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Indeed. And we thank you for being with 

us, even if we might not quite agree on allowing these heavier 

trucks on the Interstate highway system. It’s my view that they’re 

not safe on these roads. And that’s, that we see, I think it’s fair 

to say, statistics that support that view. So, we’d like to not encourage that. And I regret there is any imposition on the industry that 

might use them. But the fact of the matter is that we are, in this 

committee and subcommittee, talking about safety and that’s our 

focus. 

Mr. Hart, a bus operator that crashed in New Jersey had a driver safety record worse than 99.6 percent of all U.S. bus companies, 

but FMCSA gave the company a satisfactory safety rating. 

Now, the NTSB has recommended that an adverse rating for either vehicle or driver safety should result in an overall unsatisfactory rating. Is that, if CSA makes sufficient progress on this recommendation? 

Mr. HART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We’re waiting to see 

whether the CSA has implemented—and this will be dependent on 

the rulemaking yet to be issued—we’re waiting to see how FMCSA 

addresses that issue. At this point we don’t have an answer. We 

don’t know how it’s going to be addressed. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. And, I’ll close with this. 

Ms. Ferro, the DOT Office of Inspector General found that 

FMCSA has chronic problems with data quality accuracy, timeliness that must be addressed as the compliance safety accountability initiative is implemented, or else it’s not going to be effective. 

72 

What’s your agency doing to correct these deficiencies? 

Ms. FERRO. In response to that Inspector General report several 

years ago, the FMCSA advanced, and Congress enacted, a Safety 

Data Quality Improvement Grant Program. It’s an annual $3 million-a-year grant program that we advanced. Through that program we set certain data quality standards on inspection reports, 

fatal crash reports, violation reports. And we rate states on the integrity of the accuracy, the timeliness of those reports. 

Over the course of this SaDIP program, which is the acronym for 

this grant program, the data quality on inspections and violation 

and crash reports has improved dramatically. And we continue to 

up the bar every year with our state partners. 

The, one of the, as, the CSA program that’s been referred to several times this year really is being rolled out in three components— 

a system, a process, and then the safety and fitness determination 

rule. 

The system is available today and the data, and basics or factors 

that directly correlate crash risk formulated through a carrier’s violation history, are available today. And we use them to prioritize 

who we look at. That data is driven from the violation and inspection data at the roadside. This is a second area through which we 

are continuing to improve the data quality, through SaDIP, but 

also through the visibility that the SMS system is giving to the inspection reports and the data inquiries—or Data Qs, we call 

them—that carriers and others are submitting on that data. 

So again, the vast majority of that data is looking very good. 

There is always room for improvement, and we have two core programs that help us advance improvement in that data. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I thank you. That’s an issue, too, that 

must be carefully implemented in order to, for all of us to be doing 

our jobs. 

There is one more question I’d like to ask Mr. Rajkovacz. 

Most truck drivers are paid by mile, not by the hour. If they’re 

delayed in loading their trucks, they have a strong incentive to stay 

on the road longer and then violate hours of service rules. How do 

we reduce this incentive for truckers to stay on the road longer, 

even when they may be fatigued? 

Mr. RAJKOVACZ. That’s a $64,000 question. That’s correct, that 

most truckers are paid basically piece work, by the load, by the 

mile; nothing by the hour. And that’s what ends up creating the 

reverse incentive that you hide a significant amount of your onduty not driving time. So often, when we have a conversation about 

hours of service and fatigue, everybody seems to one-dimensionally 

look at it as on-duty driving time. There’s this whole universe of 

on-duty not driving. And as long as the driver is paid nothing for 

that, he is not incentivized to ever report that. It is financial suicide. I said that in my written comments. 

That’s how I lived for decades. That’s a system that we’ve created 

in this country. Have some couriers dealt with that? Union carriers 

pay by the hour. They don’t have a problem with that. It is a significant issue that does compromise safety. EOBRs aren’t going to 

solve that problem. They’re not going to deal with it. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. They may not solve the problem. What, 

then, can be done about it? 

73 

Mr. RAJKOVACZ. There are those, certainly, hypothetically, that 

think that this is an area that perhaps the Federal Government actually should step into and regulate. But, obviously, there’s a significant amount of lack of interest in the Government getting involved in economic matters like contracting. 

It, in some respects, is a Catch-22, for everybody. How do you do 

something where, right now the supply chain’s getting something 

for nothing? The, you know, the free market emphasis is on the 

word ‘‘free’’ right now when it comes to drivers’ time. 

And, you know, I entered the industry in 1977, when we had a 

federally mandated detention policy. And there are those who 

didn’t think it worked real well. It worked real well for me, hauling 

beer out of the breweries in Milwaukee. And that expired, I believe, 

in 1982. Why is it the driver’s responsibility to eat that time? We 

have a very—as efficient as trucking is, this is one of the biggest 

inefficiencies in our supply chain. 

You know, just hypothetically, if somehow we dealt with it, imagine how many less trucks we’d even need in the highway to haul 

the existing amount of freight. I just talked with two of our members last week—for four pallets and six pallets, respectively, spent 

over 24 hours at a dock in Los Angeles after they showed up on 

time. Nobody cares. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Mr. England, do you want to comment? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Yes, I’d gladly respond to that. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I’d be surprised—— 

Mr. ENGLAND. I’m a fellow CDL holder, by the way. 

But here’s my contention. With the mandating of electronic logs, 

and with strenuous auditing of falsification, these issues can be 

overcome. When the DOT comes in and audits us, they look for falsification. They compare times at which a truck arrived at a loading facility, the times they left, and so forth. But the job of doing 

that becomes tremendously eased with the advent of the EOBR. 

And I think we all want the same thing here. We want that driver not being overworked. We want him to comply with the hours 

of service. And the electronic log is a tremendous tool in ensuring 

that that happens. 

Ms. GILLAN. Senator Lautenberg? 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Yes. 

Ms. GILLAN. I was wondering if I could just add something. Because earlier, in some of the question and answers, there was a lot 

of discussion about the hours of service rule, and I really feel compelled to state that the reason that the hours of service rule is 

being revised right now is not because of some frivolous exercise by 

the Department of Transportation. 

It’s because two U.S. Court of Appeals back-to-back unanimous 

decisions overruled that hours of service rule, because it was not 

based on science, and it was not based on the research that shows 

that truck drivers are tremendously fatigued, as well as all workers, when they’re putting in these extraordinary hours of work. 

And the research shows that after the eighth hour of driving, the 

risk of a truck crash increases dramatically. 

The Bush administration issued a rule that, even though truck 

driver fatigue was a major problem, would significantly increase 

74 

the number of hours that a truck driver could drive during the 

week. They increased it by 25 percent. 

So, this is the reason that revising this hours-of-service rule is 

so important. And I know that in the last Congress you chaired a 

hearing on this. But, this is really an important rule that will do 

a great job in advancing safety, as well as saving lives, if we look 

at that. And we have the research that shows that the current 

hours-of-service rule is really an invitation to fatigue for truck drivers around the country. 

Thank you. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you. 

Is this a battlefield of sorts between safety and driver income? 

Anyone want to pass an opinion on that? That is a challenge, obviously. I mean, if safety is our mission—it has to be our mission. 

What’s the consequence of that if the system was changed? I’m not 

talking about injecting about injecting the Federal Government 

into that part of the decisionmaking. But, what, is it a case of the 

seesaw being tipped one way, without giving respect or response to 

how would the drivers feel about this? 

Mr. ENGLAND. I’ll comment on that. I would just say that if these 

changes are implemented, the hours of service regulations, a driver 

is going to make less. And, in a word, to keep those drivers in our 

industry, we will need to pay them more. And that’s a cost, obviously, that will be passed on to the consumer ultimately. 

Do you want to say something? 

Senator LAUTENBERG. No. It’s just, to say, trying to keep our program focused. What’s the price of letting these hours be ever 

longer, and the consequences? We agree that driver fatigue is a significant factor in having a safe operation. So, it’s a dilemma. And 

how you resolve it is an important question that I’m sure your industry and—are qualified drivers easily available now, considering 

that the job market is as tough as it is? Does that say there are 

people lined up wanting to come in and—— 

Mr. ENGLAND. No. Absolutely not. It’s, obviously, as the economy 

continues to improve, then we have the ever-increasing problem of 

finding enough drivers to drive the trucks. One good thing about 

the fact that our economy has sort of, is ramping up rather slowly, 

is that that’s helped with that problem. But, ultimately, as the 

economy heats up again, we have a hard time getting and keeping 

enough drivers in the industry. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. So, well, I’ll leave you, with all of the experience that you have, to solve the problem. Our objective is a safer 

condition for the citizens in the country. 

Now, it’s said that, all right, if we make it tougher, make it more 

difficult to maintain reasonable conditions for drivers, that they’re 

going to make less money, and therefore, it follows that casualties 

might continue to stay at a higher level than they should be. 

Thanks, everybody. I’ll leave this question now to be resolved in 

future discussions. 

Thank each one of you for your excellent testimony. 

And with that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m. the hearing was adjourned.] 

(75) 

A P P E N D I X 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. CLAIRE MCCASKILL TO

HON. ANNE S. FERRO

Question 1. Concerns have been raised about the amount of time that truckers 

are sometimes detained and loading and unloading facilities. This can affect hours 

of service requirements and the timely movement of goods. Do we have any research 

indicating how much time truckers spend being detained at loading and unloading 

facilities? 

Answer. The FMCSA does not have research data concerning the time truck drivers are detained at loading and unloading facilities. However, the Agency is planning to initiate a study in FY 2012 in response to the United States Government 

Accountability Office’s (GAO) January 2011 report, ‘‘Commercial Motor Carriers: 

More Could Be Done to Determine Impact of Excessive Loading and Unloading Wait 

Times on Hours of Service Violations’’ (GAO–11–198). The report examines the impact of excessive detention time on the ability of drivers to comply with FMCSA’s 

hours of service (HOS) regulations. The FMCSA study could potentially help the 

Agency estimate the detention time at loading and unloading facilities. 

Question 2. I have previously stated that we should explore paying truck drivers 

by the hour rather than by the mile. I know that this would be a big change but 

it could eliminate some of the problems that are currently created by excessive detention time. Moreover, paying truckers by the hour could make the roads safer if 

drivers are not driving at excessive speeds to make up distances lost by detention 

time, traffic, or other issues. How would changing the compensation structure address detention time? If drivers are paid by the hour, will it bring about any other 

benefits within the industry? Conversely, what are the potential problems that could 

be created by changing the compensation structure? 

Answer. The FMCSA does not have research data concerning driver compensation 

and its impact on detention time and overall safety. Many drivers, and most overthe-road drivers employed in the long-haul industry, are compensated on a per-mile 

basis rather than a per-hour basis. In addition, compensation often extends to payment of a percentage of freight revenue, which is generally determined by a combination of market factors such as weight, distance, and commodity type. The University of Michigan Trucking Industry Program (UMTIP) conducted a truck driver 

survey and found that 67 percent of all over-the-road drivers earn mileage-based 

pay and 87 percent of these drivers earn either mileage-or percentage-based compensation. In early FY 2012, the Agency is initiating a study to evaluate the impact 

of compensation on commercial vehicle safety. This study will collect information regarding detention times and determine which drivers are compensated for detention 

time. The causes of detention time are, however, very complex and are likely highly 

influenced by the actions of shippers and receivers and whether they are required 

to provide the motor carrier detention pay. Once the research has been conducted 

the Agency will have a better understanding of the issue of driver compensation. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR TO

HON. ANNE S. FERRO

Question 1. Administrator Ferro, on the same day Jacy Good graduated from college in 2008 her car was struck by a tractor-trailer that had swerved to miss a teen 

driver running a red-light because he was distracted by his cell phone. Jacy Good 

survived, but her parents died that night. Jacy now speaks to high school students 

and recently joined you at an event to highlight the dangers of distracted driving 

among novice drivers. Tragic stories like this are why Senator Gillibrand and I introduced the STANDUP Act, which requires states to adopt graduated drivers license programs that limit cell phone use for novice drivers, preventing crashes like 

the one that killed Jacy’s parents. In December, FMCSA launched an effort to curb 

76 

hand-held use of cell phones for truck drivers. What has been the response by industry? 

Answer. The legislation you introduced would help to ensure that young drivers 

are more aware of the dangers of distracted driving. Upon implementation by the 

States, the legislation would provide a means for State and local enforcement officials and State licensing agencies to take action against the unsafe practice of distracted driving. 

Secretary LaHood’s campaign to raise awareness of this critical issue is producing 

results, not only among State legislatures but also with drivers of all kinds of vehicles. Federal legislative efforts would require the States to take action. 

With regard to FMCSA’s rulemaking concerning hand-held cell phones, motor carrier stakeholders (including truck drivers) generally support efforts to limit or restrict the use of handheld wireless telephones. FMCSA has reviewed the docket 

comments responding to its proposed rule and expects to issue a final rule later this 

year. 

Question 2. Administrator Ferro, motor carriers usually use large vehicles that 

are not responsive to quick changes in direction, and a novice distracted driver may 

not recognize a dangerous situation until it is too late. Will preventing hand held 

cell phone use of drivers in trucks and buses and passenger vehicles help prevent 

these types of situations? 

Answer. Prohibiting the use of hand-held wireless telephones would address an 

important source of distraction and help to prevent some of the crashes attributable 

to driver distraction. Coupled with increased public awareness on this issue, we believe Federal and State laws and regulations would have a highly beneficial effect. 

FMCSA has completed its review of the public comments to its proposal to ban the 

use of hand-held wireless telephones by truck and bus drivers and expects to issue 

a final rule later this year. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN THUNE TO

HON. ANNE S. FERRO

Question 1. As you know, in May the GAO released a report, Improper Motor Car- rier Grant Obligations, detailing $23 million in errors that occurred during 

FMCSA’s implementation of the Commercial Vehicle Information Systems & Networks (CVISN) program. Based on FMCSA’s approval, numerous states, including 

my home state of South Dakota, began implementation of the CVISN plan. For 

South Dakota this meant spending almost $1 million in funds that they believed 

would be reimbursed by FMCSA. I am now told that FMCSA is asking for states 

to ‘‘deobligate’’ these grants and take the loss even though the error was made by 

FMCSAs. 

• Can you explain how FMCSA incorrectly approved this $23 million in grants? 

• Do you think it is fair for states, many who are faced with serious budget shortfalls, to take the financial hit for a mistake that FMCSA made? 

• Will you pledge to fix the error impacting South Dakota? 

• What steps has FMCSA taken to ensure a similar situation does not occur in 

the future? 

Answer. Can you explain how FMCSA incorrectly approved this $23 million in 

grants? 

FMCSA violated its statutory authority in Section 4126, Commercial Vehicle Information Systems and Networks (CVISN) of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA–LU) by obligating 

funds in excess of the $2.5 million core deployment aggregate cap, obligating expanded funds in excess of the $1 million annual cap, and obligating expanded funds 

before the completion of core deployment. Additionally, FMCSA exceeded the Agency’s contract authority in FY 2007 by obligating CVISN funds in excess of CVISN’s 

annual contract authority of $25 million. Both the Agency’s internal review and externally conducted reviews of the CVISN program in 2010 identified two primary 

causes of the Agency’s CVISN violations: (1) the Agency’s failure to establish and 

maintain an accurate core deployment financial baseline and (2) the dissemination 

of an erroneous policy in 2008 encouraging States to apply for expanded deployment 

funding before completion of core deployment. There is no evidence of any personal 

gain or bad faith actions associated with these violations. 

I am now told that FMCSA is asking for states to ‘‘deobligate’’ these grants and 

take the loss even though the error was made by FMCSAs. 

After the release of the GAO report on the CVISN program, the FMCSA Administrator and Agency invited all CVISN States to participate in a teleconference reVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:49 Apr 18, 2012 Jkt 073786 PO 00000 Frm 00080 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\73786.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
77 

garding the GAO findings and potential resolutions of the Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA) 

violations. FMCSA emphasized that most of the resolutions were State-specific. As 

a result, the Agency held additional teleconferences with each of the affected States 

to discuss the findings and potential resolutions. These individual teleconferences 

were completed on June 15, 2011. During each State conference call, the States 

were presented with two options: (1) deobligate funds not already dispersed or (2) 

wait for possible legislative relief. FMCSA did not recommend one option over the 

other. 

Do you think it is fair for states, many who are faced with serious budget shortfalls, to take the financial hit for a mistake that FMCSA made? 

The FMCSA appreciates that there is a significant impact on the affected States. 

However, based on the findings and applicable legislation, there are limited legal 

options for resolving the violations. Although FMCSA was responsible for the errors, 

the Improper Payment Act requires states to reimburse funds they received inappropriately. States may deobligate unexpended balances that exceeded the statutory 

caps specified in Section 4126 of SAFETEA–LU. Additionally, FMCSA provided 

technical assistance to our House and Senate Appropriations and Authorizing committees that would provide a solution for the issues in all CVISN States. If Congress 

enacted it as proposed, the technical assistance language would hold the States 

harmless for FMCSA’s improper grant obligations and reimbursements, thus allowing the States to retain any obligations or improper payments awarded in violation 

of Section 4126 of SAFETEA–LU. Without this authority, any reimbursement of obligations in violation of Section 4126 of SAFETEA–LU would result in an improper 

payment. 

Will you pledge to fix the error impacting South Dakota? 

FMCSA recognizes that South Dakota has expended funds in excess of the statutory cap based on FMCSA’s improper obligations. FMCSA recognizes that there are 

no available funds left to deobligate in order to cure FMCSA’s violations. FMCSA 

is available to provide assistance on this issue to reach resolution to the extent allowable. 

What steps has FMCSA taken to ensure a similar situation does not occur in the 

future? 

FMCSA initiated a multi-year, multi-phased plan several years ago to address internal control gaps in its grant making processes. FMCSA consolidated management 

of its grant programs under the Agency’s Office of Safety Programs. FMCSA developed a comprehensive grants management process to include standard policies and 

procedures, implemented an electronic grants management system, initiated the development of comprehensive grants management training, and requested resources 

to create an FMCSA grants management office in its FY 2011 and FY 2012 budget 

requests. 

Question 2. Since the Hours of Service rules were last changed in 2003, the trucking industry has seen both the number and rate of fatal and injury accidents involving large trucks decline to their lowest levels in recorded history, even as truck 

mileage increased by almost 10 billion miles. 

• Why did the FMCSA feel that these hours of services rules needed to be 

changed? 

• When does FMCSA expect to have a final rule published? 

• When analyzing the rule does the FMCSA take into account the fact that more 

stringent rules will mean more trucks on the road to deliver the current amount 

of fright being transported? 

Answer. The FMCSA initiated the Hours of Service (HOS) rulemaking to seek 

public input on potential changes to reduce the prevalence of fatigue-related crashes 

involving drivers of property-carrying vehicles. While the existing rules represent a 

significant improvement over the requirements that were in effect prior to the Agency’s 2003 Final Rule, FMCSA determined that a new rulemaking was appropriate 

based on research data and information reviewed since the publication of the 2003 

Final Rule, and on input from the Agency’s Motor Carrier Safety Advisory Committee. The Agency anticipates issuing a final rule in October 2011. 

With regard to the question about the rulemaking’s impact of the trucking industry, the Agency’s regulatory analyses includes consideration of whether the proposed 

changes would result in carriers being forced to hire more drivers and purchase 

more trucks to deliver the current amount of freight being transported on the Nation’s highways. The preliminary analyses indicate the safety, health and economic 

benefits for the proposed rule exceed the economic costs. 

BACKGROUND: The regulation of hours of service for the motor carrier industry 

has been a controversial subject. Two final rules issued previously by FMCSA, purVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:49 Apr 18, 2012 Jkt 073786 PO 00000 Frm 00081 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\73786.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
78 

suant to Congressional direction, were challenged in litigation and overturned, at 

least in part. 

The first rule, issued in 2003, was vacated in its entirety by the U.S. Court of 

Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in 2004 because the Agency had not addressed the 

issue of driver health. Congress restored the vacated rule for a year, allowing 

FMCSA to produce a new rule in 2005, which discussed driver health at length. 

On July 24, 2007, the D.C. Circuit vacated portions of the second rule. Specifically, the Court indicated the Agency did not provide an opportunity for public comment on the methodology of its driver-fatigue model and failed to explain certain 

elements of the methodology. It vacated two features of the rule dependent on that 

methodology, as used in the cost-benefit analysis: a provision that retained the increase in the daily driving limit from 10 to 11 hours and a provision that retained 

drivers’ ability to restart the calculation of the 60-or 70-hour weekly on-duty period, 

in which driving is allowed by taking at least 34 consecutive hours off duty (the socalled 34-hour restart). Both provisions were established originally in the 2003 rule. 

The FMCSA responded with an interim final rule in December 2007 that addressed both of the deficiencies identified by the Court, while retaining the 11-and 

34-hour provisions. The Agency published a final rule in November 2008, making 

permanent the provisions of the interim final rule, effective January 19, 2009. Two 

significant petitions for reconsideration of the final rule were filed in December 

2008. One was submitted by the Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates), the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Public Citizen, and the Truck 

Safety Coalition, the other by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. The 

FMCSA denied both petitions in lengthy responses dated January 6, 2009. 

On March 9, 2009, Public Citizen, Advocates, the Teamsters, and the Truck Safety 

Coalition petitioned the D.C. Circuit to review the final rule. The American Trucking Associations filed a motion to intervene on March 12. 

On October 26, 2009, Public Citizen, et al., (the Petitioners) and FMCSA entered 

into a settlement agreement under which the petition for judicial review of the November 19, 2008, Final Rule on hours of service of drivers would be held in abeyance pending the publication a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). The settlement agreement states that FMCSA will publish a Final Rule within 21 months of 

the date of the settlement agreement. 

The settlement agreement did not include any guidance, directions, or restrictions 

on the scope and content of the NPRM that was published on December 29, 2010, 

or make any commitments on the outcome of the notice-and-comment rulemaking 

process. FMCSA may reconsider provisions of the August 25, 2005, Final Rule, if 

the Administrator determines reconsideration of those requirements may provide an 

opportunity to put into place a new HOS rule which promotes the safe operation 

of commercial motor vehicles without disrupting the delivery of goods and services 

to the American people. 

The NPRM proposed seven changes from current requirements. First, the proposed rule would limit drivers to either 10 or 11 hours of driving time following a 

period of at least 10 consecutive hours off duty; on the basis of all relevant considerations. Second, it would limit the standard ‘‘driving window’’ to 14 hours, while allowing that number to be extended to 16 hours twice a week. Third, actual duty 

time within the driving window would be limited to 13 hours. Fourth, drivers would 

be permitted to drive only if 7 hours or less have passed since their last off-duty 

or sleeper-berth period of at least 30 minutes. Fifth, the 34-hour restart for calculations of the maximum weekly on-duty time would be retained, subject to certain limits: the restart would have to include two periods between midnight and 6 a.m. and 

could be started no sooner than 168 hours (7 days) after the beginning of the previously designated restart. Sixth, the definition of ‘‘on-duty’’ would be revised to 

allow some time spent in or on the CMV to be logged as off duty. Seventh, the oilfield operations exception would be revised to clarify the language on waiting time 

and to state that waiting time would not be included in the calculation of the driving window. 

On February 17, 2011, FMCSA held a Public Listening Session to solicit comments regarding the HOS NPRM. The session was webcast for Internet participants, and telephone call-in opportunities were provided. On the same day, FMCSA 

conducted an Internet Question and Answer Forum to receive additional on-line 

comments. 

On May 9, 2011, FMCSA published a notice of availability of four additional research reports concerning fatigue and commercial vehicle drivers. These studies had 

not been completed at the time the NPRM was published in 2010. The Agency requested public comment on the research reports with a deadline of June 8 for the 

submission of comments. 

79 

On May 20, 2011, the settlement agreement was amended; FMCSA now intends 

to publish a final rule on or before October 28, 2011. The draft final rule is currently 

under review in the Office of the Secretary. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. ROGER F. WICKER TO

HON. ANNE S. FERRO

Question. FMCSA has issued a rulemaking that would require trucking companies 

in the United States to install Electronic On-Board Recorders, or EOBRs, on all of 

their vehicles. The cost of installation would be the responsibility of individual carriers. Yet at the same time the Federal government has agreed to finance EOBR 

installation on Mexican trucks operating in the United States. Isn’t such an arrangement unfair to U.S. carriers? 

Answer. Before initiating this program, Secretary LaHood engaged members of 

Congress and other stakeholders for ideas and input for an improved Cross-Border 

Long Haul Trucking program. FMCSA used that information to develop a more robust program that is built on the highest safety standards. As a result of the Congressional feedback, FMCSA included a provision requiring Mexican trucks to be 

equipped with electronic monitoring devices to allow DOT to track the vehicle and 

investigate any hours of service or cabotage concerns. Stakeholders felt strongly that 

we include this as an element of the new phased-in program. 

These devices are not currently required for United States carriers and are not 

a cost of doing business in the United States. The EOBRs are an additional safety 

measure specifically for the Cross-Border Long Haul Trucking program. In order to 

have access to the cabotage and hours of service information, therefore, DOT needs 

to own the electronic equipment. The estimated cost of this equipment equates to 

less than 0.1 percent of the annual tariffs that the Government of Mexico was legally entitled to affect under NAFTA. 

If the EOBR final rule is published and implemented during this pilot program 

and EOBRs are required for U.S. carriers, we will require the Mexican companies 

to provide their own equipment. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. CLAIRE MCCASKILL TO

DANIEL ENGLAND

Question 1. Concerns have been raised about the amount of time that truckers 

are sometimes detained and loading and unloading facilities. This can affect hours 

of service requirements and the timely movement of goods. Do we have any research 

indicating how much time truckers spend being detained at loading and unloading 

facilities? 

Answer. I share the concern about my drivers being detained unreasonably when 

loading or unloading. For shippers where that has been an issue or where we foresee that may be an issue, my company negotiates detention charges. As I testified, 

we compensate our drivers for detention time, regardless of whether the customer 

pays the detention charges or not. 

As you may be aware, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently published a report on its investigation into the impact of excessive loading and unloading wait times on hours of service violations. The January 2011 report generally 

concluded that FMCSA does not collect data to assess the extent to which detention 

time truly contributes to hours of service violations and that further research is necessary, noting that detention could be just one of many factors that contribute to 

these types of violations. Specifically, GAO stated, ‘‘[T]here are no data available 

that can provide any definitive information on how often [detention time] occurs, 

how long detention time lasts, or what types of carriers or facilities experience the 

most detention time.’’ In response to the GAO inquiry, FMCSA indicated that it 

planned further research in the area. 

With the increased implementation of technology, carriers have the capacity to 

better track the time their drivers spend waiting for loading and/or unloading. This 

data is helpful in negotiations with shippers and helps carriers identify problem 

shippers with whom they may not want to do business. 

ATA agrees with the GAO recommendation that obtaining a ‘‘clearer industrywide picture about how detention time contributes to hours of service violations 

[w]ould help FMCSA determine whether additional Federal action might be warranted.’’ ATA notes, however, that conducting a sound study is fraught with issues, 

such as agreeing upon what constitutes detention time (an issue identified by GAO) 

and determining the causal link to hours of service violations (as opposed to delays 

caused by weather, congestion or some other reason). ATA further agrees with 

80 

GAO’s cautionary note that ‘‘Any additional Federal actions to address issues associated with detention time beyond hours of service would require careful consideration 

to determine if any unintended consequences may flow from Federal action to regulate detention time.’’ 

Question 2. I have previously stated that we should explore paying truck drivers 

by the hour rather than by the mile. I know that this would be a big change but 

it could eliminate some of the problems that are currently created by excessive detention time. Moreover, paying truckers by the hour could make the roads safer if 

drivers are not driving at excessive speeds to make up distances lost by detention 

time, traffic, or other issues. How would changing the compensation structure address detention time? If drivers are paid by the hour, will it bring about any other 

benefits within the industry? Conversely, what are the potential problems that could 

be created by changing the compensation structure? 

Answer. As discussed in the answer to your first question, ATA agrees with the 

GAO conclusion that there currently is not sufficient information to reliably understand the problems that may be created by excessive detention time. Therefore, it 

seems premature to consider changing longstanding, well-settled compensation practices in the trucking industry as part of an effort, well-intentioned as it may be, to 

improve safety. In the absence of data demonstrating otherwise, ATA views detention time as an economic matter between a carrier and its customer(s) that is not 

amenable to a one-size-fits-all regulatory mandate. 

Trucking is a very competitive business with very narrow profit margins. Motor 

carriers generally must find ways to reward and encourage initiative and hard work 

by their employees, including drivers. In order to do so, motor carriers have employed a wide variety of compensation systems. It would not be fair to characterize 

today’s compensation structure for drivers as a binary choice between per hour or 

per mile. Attached, please find a chart summarizing some of the most prevalent 

methods carriers who participated in ATA’s Driver Compensation Study utilize to 

compensate drivers. Oftentimes, carriers utilize a combination of the approaches depicted. 

Over the years, payment by the mile and pay based on a percentage of the load 

revenue have become effective tools in getting drivers to understand the value of 

their time and to work as efficiently as possible. And, it’s important to add that over 

time, trucking has also become remarkably safer in its operations, no matter which 

compensation system has been employed. Truck driving also requires a significant 

amount of non-driving work (loading and unloading, fueling, equipment inspection, 

and handling of paperwork). A driver paid by the hour has no incentive to minimize 

those non-driving times and in fact, is rewarded by dragging them out and getting 

paid for additional hours. Consequently pay systems based on some indicia of actual 

work accomplished (miles driven or percent of load revenue) encourages efficiency 

and allows trucking company’s to pass along the benefits of these efficiencies to 

their shipping customers. 

Since detention time is an economic issue between the carrier and its customer(s), 

we do not see how changing the basis of compensation for drivers from per mile to 

by the hour would address detention time. Changing the compensation structure, by 

potentially adding more costs for the carrier, may further incentivize carriers to 

seek charges from shippers but the need to efficiently utilize a carrier’s assets provides incentive enough to address the issue where there is a detention problem. The 

current hours of service rules, which became effective in 2004, already provide an 

incentive. These rules addressed detention head-on by reducing the maximum allowable on-duty time from 15 non-consecutive hours to 14 consecutive hours, and requiring that all on-duty time count towards one’s hours of service. Under the old 

rules, drivers could extend their work day well beyond 15 hours to take into account 

time spent waiting at pick up and delivery locations, and other non-driving activity. 

This longer on-duty period under the old hours of service rules facilitated driver fatigue and safety problems. This is no longer the case today. Many shippers, recognizing that all of a driver’s time is now ‘‘on the clock,’’ have worked with their partner carriers to improve scheduling and loading and unloading procedures, thereby 

reducing detention times. These changes have also made it easier for many, if not 

most carriers, to negotiate charges for excessive detention time. 

There are a number of potential negative consequences to switching from per mile 

to an hourly compensation model. As mentioned above, there would no longer be an 

incentive for a driver to efficiently do the non-driving work. In fact, the incentive 

for a driver seeking to maximize his/her wages would be to extend the on-duty time 

to all 14 hours and utilize all 11 hours of permissible driving time on a routine 

basis. This would be a departure from current practice and could have a negative 

effect on safety. A driver with no incentive to be efficient would likely increase carriers costs—costs that would likely ultimately be borne by the consumer. 

81 

ATA’s members are committed to safety and compliance and invest significant dollars and time in training to instill a culture of adherence to the safety rules. Tougher driver training standards, rigorous enforcement of hours of service rules, and the 

development of a sincere safety culture within fleets have a far more direct impact 

than any one compensation model. Further, ATA supports deployment of speed governors on trucks set to limit speeds at 65 mph and, with some common sense protections, the use of electronic logging devices. These tools can better help ensure that 

carriers and drivers do not sacrifice safety in exchange for meeting customer-driven 

deadlines resulting from today’s just-in-time, low inventory environment. These approaches are proven to improve safety without taking from the trucking industry 

and our economy the efficiencies that are associated with various pay systems that 

reward work accomplished and not simply time spent employed—regardless of how 

efficiently. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. ROGER F. WICKER TO

DANIEL ENGLAND

Question. In the hearing, you noted that detention time is a tremendous problem. 

What is your recommendation for an ideal solution? 

Answer. First, I would like to clarify that I did not indicate that detention time 

is a ‘‘tremendous problem’’. In response to your question about detention at the 

hearing, I stated that the current understanding is detention is an economic issue— 

not a safety issue. As I responded, it is our policy at C.R. England to pay drivers 

for time detained regardless of whether our customer pays us a detention charge. 

I also indicated that I believe detention should be negotiated between the shipper 

and the carrier, not addressed through regulation. Detention is not a one-size-fitsall issue that can or should be dealt with through a regulatory mandate. 

This view is underscored by the findings of a January 2011 report on detention 

time by the Government Accountability Office (GAO). The report noted that FMCSA 

‘‘does not collect . . . information to assess the extent to which detention time contributed to [hours of service] violations,’’ and further noted that FMCSA’s ‘‘ability 

to assess the impact of detention time on hours of service violations, which may affect driver safety, is limited.’’ The GAO recommended obtaining a ‘‘clearer industrywide picture about how detention time contributes to hours of service violations 

[w]ould help FMCSA determine whether additional Federal action might be warranted.’’ We agree with the GAO report as well as its cautionary note that ‘‘Any additional Federal actions to address issues associated with detention time beyond 

hours of service would require careful consideration to determine if any unintended 

consequences may flow from Federal action to regulate detention time.’’ 

The current hours of service rules, which became effective in 2004, addressed detention head-on by reducing on-duty time from 15 non-consecutive hours to 14 consecutive hours, and requiring that all on-duty time count towards one’s hours of 

service. Under the old rules, drivers could extend their work day well beyond 15 

hours to take into account time spent waiting at pick-up and delivery locations, and 

other non-driving activity. This longer on-duty period under the old hours of service 

rules made for increased driver fatigue and safety problems. This is no longer the 

case. Many shippers, recognizing that all of a driver’s time is now ‘‘on the clock,’’ 

have worked to improve their scheduling and loading and unloading procedures. 

Unlike other factors that limit driver productivity over which the carrier has no 

control, such as the latest proposal to change the hours-of-service regulations and 

congestion on our nation’s deteriorating highway system, detention is an item carriers have some control over. Carriers can and do sit down with their shipper customers and negotiate charges for unreasonable detention time. Carriers are best positioned to determine what makes sense for them from a business standpoint, taking 

into account the frequency that unreasonable detention time occurs, the causes for 

such detention and other surrounding circumstances. 

While the solution may not be ‘‘ideal’’ to some, the consequences of the government re-regulating the economic relationship between shippers and carriers, particularly in the absence of research or data demonstrating a relationship with safety 

compliance or performance, will likely be far worse for carriers, the shipping community and ultimately for consumers. That said, if sound scientific studies determine there is a causal connection between unreasonable detention time and increased violations of the safety regulations, ATA would reconsider the appropriateness of government intervention. FMCSA has indicated plans to conduct relevant 

studies. Until the picture is clearer, a government mandate would be proffering a 

solution without knowing the problem, if any. 

82 

1 Commercial Motor Carriers: ‘‘More Could Be Done to Determine Impact of Excessive Loading 

and Unloading and Unloading Wait Times on Hours of Service Violations,’’ U.S. Government 

Accountability Office (January 2011). 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. CLAIRE MCCASKILL TO

JOE RAJKOVACZ

Question 1. Concerns have been raised about the amount of time that truckers 

are sometimes detained and loading and unloading facilities. This can affect hours 

of service requirements and the timely movement of goods. Do we have any research 

indicating how much time truckers spend being detained at loading and unloading 

facilities? 

Answer. Much of the larger motor carrier community opposes any Federal intervention attempting to address the complications associated with excessive detention 

because they believe the market place is capable of correcting the problem on its 

own. These same carriers openly support significant and costly regulatory mandates 

so that they can ‘‘level the playing field’’ to address the perceived competitive advantage small businesses often have over larger motor carriers. While OOIDA opposes 

the majority of these efforts, in the case of detention, we support Federal intervention because the marketplace cannot address this problem effectively. 

In part, although studies have repeatedly acknowledged that excessive detention 

is problematic, there is a reluctance to recognize that the problem exists and it is 

having a deleterious effect on safety. For example, during the hearing, ATA Vice 

Chairman, Dan England stated that a GAO study 1 on detention published earlier 

this year showed no nexus between detention issues and highway safety. This is inaccurate. In the ‘‘Highlights’’ (GAO–11–198) section of the study, the following paragraph shows that there is a possible correlation: 

The interstate commercial motor carrier industry moves thousands of truckloads 

of goods every day, and any disruption in one truckload’s delivery schedule can have 

a ripple effect on others. Some waiting time at shipping and receiving facilities—commonly referred to as detention time—is to be expected in this complex environment. 

However, excessive detention time could impact the ability of drivers to perform within Federal hours of service safety regulations, which limit duty 

hours and are enforced by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 

(FMCSA). Emphasis added. 

In addition to GAO’s recommendation for further study, the FMCSA has also 

promised to perform more analysis. Meanwhile, the majority of the industry (predominately comprised of small-businesses) is left to fend for itself in a market where 

they have little or no negotiating power to secure detention provisions in the contract from shippers, receivers, and brokers. In contrast, large motor carriers have 

considerable leverage in negotiating contracts simply because of their size and ability to engage in multi-faceted contracts utilizing more trucks and higher volumes. 

The marketplace is set up to benefit large carriers and with the support of technology mandates that would ‘‘level the playing field’’ between small and larger carriers, and clearly certain special interest groups are fighting to ensure it stays that 

way. The argument that the marketplace can correct this and government should 

not intrude in the interest of preserving private contracts shows a lack of understanding of how the trucking industry works. 

But, even if detention time is contemplated in a transportation contract, shippers 

will often ignore payment of charges and because of the hyper-competitive market 

for trucking services, motor carriers will not press the issue for fear of losing a shipper, therefore the driver loses out. Bloomberg News reported this dynamic in an article published on May 18, 2011, ‘‘Truckers’ $4 billion of Wasted Time Revives Penalty Push.’’ 

A Department of Transportation study that surveyed drivers showed that in cases 

even when shippers are working to reduce delays, detention can often run upwards 

of six to seven hours per day, with delays totaling upwards of 40 hours per week. 

The study went on to highlight cases where at certain locations, such as steel mills, 

drivers were routinely delayed from ten to 24 hours per day (Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, A Qualitative Assessment of the Role of 

Shippers and Others In Driver Compliance with Safety Regulations,’’). The GAO 

study highlighted that almost 90 percent of the 300 drivers they interviewed had 

been detained long enough for the detention to have impacted their ability to meet 

HOS requirements, which limit drivers to 14 hours on-duty and a maximum of 11 

hours driving. 

FMCSA issued a report to Congress as required by Section 5503(d) of the Safe, 

Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (P.L. 

109–59) (SAFETEA–LU) that estimated the annual loss to motor carriers from waitVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:49 Apr 18, 2012 Jkt 073786 PO 00000 Frm 00086 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\73786.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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ing in ports and time spent loading and unloading at $4 billion annually. The indirect cost and gain to society by dealing with these inefficiencies was estimated at 

$6.59 billion annually. Clearly the ability of the marketplace to self-police itself in 

a rational manner is absent; when something is free a market will use it to excess 

regardless of the ramifications. The most serious and hidden ramification is decreased highway safety. 

Question 2. I have previously stated that we should explore paying truck drivers 

by the hour rather than by the mile. I know that this would be a big change but 

it could eliminate some of the problems that are currently created by excessive detention time. Moreover, paying truckers by the hour could make the roads safer if 

drivers are not driving at excessive speeds to make up distances lost by detention 

time, traffic, or other issues. How would changing the compensation structure address detention time? If drivers are paid by the hour, will it bring about any other 

benefits within the industry? Conversely, what are the potential problems that could 

be created by changing the compensation structure? 

Answer. In Europe, drivers are paid either a salary (regardless of time worked) 

or hourly. Payment methods that could encourage unsafe driving behavior are not 

permitted. Clearly, if employee drivers in the U.S. were paid by the hour, they 

would feel less compelled to maximize most of their legally permissible hours for the 

single task of driving. 

In addition to providing FMCSA new authority to address detention’s impacts on 

safety, there are other steps that can be taken to remove legal distortions in the 

market that negatively impact highway safety. Currently, truck drivers routinely 

work 70 hour work weeks. This is in part because of the exemption for truckers 

from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). While this area of law falls outside the 

jurisdiction of the Commerce Committee, removal of that exemption would rationalize the marketplace by placing a premium on any time past 40 hours spent working by employee drivers. Drivers don’t chose to work 70 plus hours (when factoring 

the hidden time spent loading and unloading), it’s a result of market distorting policies such as the exemption from the FLSA. 

By affirmatively addressing this issue, the entire supply chain would be forced to 

become more efficient in how they utilize capital and labor. OOIDA’s preference for 

solving the problem of detention time, which is Federal legislation setting acceptable 

parameters for detention, would not necessarily represent any cost increase for shippers and receivers. They’d have every incentive to use transportation resources 

wisely thus avoiding incurring additional costs—exactly how a true marketplace 

should operate. 

OOIDA and its members are sensitive to arguments about government ‘‘over-regulation’’ of the trucking industry—in fact we are the leading, and sometimes only, 

voice in the industry objecting to unwarranted, counter-productive, and intrusive 

rulemakings that have nebulous links to improving highway safety. Paying drivers 

by the hour would very likely mitigate any need for many other regulatory mandates (e.g., reformed H.O.S. regulations, electronic-on-board-recorders, and speed 

limiters). 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. ROGER F. WICKER TO

JOE RAJKOVACZ

Question. In the hearing, you noted that detention time is a tremendous problem. 

What is your recommendation for an ideal solution? 

Answer. Arriving at the ideal solution will take an acknowledgement that a nexus 

does exist between highway safety and the wasted and uncompensated time truckers spend waiting to load and unload at shipping and receiving facilities. Dealing 

with the issue will necessitate some sort of Federal intervention, focused around setting meaningful but reasonable limits on the time shippers and receivers can detain 

drivers, since the supply-chain has proven unwilling to relinquish its addiction of 

abusing a truckers time. With few exceptions, truckers, both drivers and motor carriers, only earn revenue when the ‘‘wheels are turning.’’ 

There are many hidden direct and indirect costs to society from abusing trucker’s 

time, and all are negative. These delays at the dock cost our economy more than 

$6.5 billion each year in inefficiencies, but the safety costs are even greater. Fatigue 

increases as drivers are coerced into hiding untold hours of uncompensated time in 

order to save available hours for compensated activity. As a result of abuses built 

into the system, veteran drivers often decide they have had enough and leave the 

industry, increasing both driver turn-over and a reliance on inexperienced replaceVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:49 Apr 18, 2012 Jkt 073786 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\73786.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
84 

1 American Trucking Association’s White Paper on ‘‘Truck Driver Hours of Service Rules.’’ 

(Page two, first paragraph, enclosed). 2 Commercial Motor Carriers: ‘‘More Could Be Done to Determine Impact of Excessive Loading 

and Unloading and Unloading Wait Times on Hours of Service Violations,’’ U.S. Government 

Accountability Office (January 2011). 3 ‘‘Truckers’ $4 billion of Wasted Time Revives Penalty Push.’’ May 18, 2011. 

4Motor Carrier Efficiency Study, 2009 Annual Report to Congress. http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/ 

documents/congress-reports/MCES-Annual-Report-January-2011.pdf. 

ment drivers, who have three times the crash risk.1 Too often, a significant number 

of the trucks that should be on the road are sitting in a shipping or receiving yard, 

acting as 18-wheeled warehouses, forcing more trucks onto the road to take up the 

slack. Each of these examples has a negative effect on highway safety, and they all 

can be tied to the unaddressed inefficiency of detention time. 

It is important to note that this tie between detention and highway safety has 

been confirmed in the past. Importantly, the link was most recently confirmed by 

the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in its study on detention time released 

this year.2 The Vice Chairman of the American Trucking Associations stated during 

the hearing that the GAO study showed no nexus between detention issues and 

highway safety. This is not accurate. Most clearly, the study states that ‘‘excessive 

detention time could impact the ability of drivers to perform within Federal hours 

of service safety regulations.’’ OOIDA hears these complaints daily. It is a reality 

of the industry. 

OOIDA and its members are sensitive to arguments about government over-regulation of the trucking industry—in fact we are the leading, and sometimes only, 

voice in the industry objecting to unwarranted, counter-productive, and intrusive 

rule makings that have tenuous links to improving highway safety. However, we believe that government can play a role in certain areas. In this case, we believe that 

giving the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) the power to set 

minimum acceptable standards for detaining drivers would not only serve as an incentive to increase supply chain efficiency, but would also be the most cost-effective 

and productive way to reduce commercial motor vehicle (CMV) crashes and fatalities. Such an action, which should occur following significant engagement by 

FMCSA with all segments of the supply chain, represents a major step forward toward having effective HOS regulations. 

The majority of the industry, which is predominately comprised of small-businesses, has little negotiating power to insist on equitable treatment from shippers, 

receivers, and brokers in the contracting phase for transportation. Large motor carriers have leverage in their contracting simply because of their size. This is a tremendous benefit to them in the marketplace as they negotiate major, national transportation contracts with shippers. 

Even when detention time is contemplated in a transportation contract, shippers 

will often ignore payment of contractually mandated charges. Because of the hypercompetitive market for trucking services, smaller motor carriers will not press the 

issue for fear of losing shipping cliental. Many small carriers, especially one-truck 

operations, live load-to-load. If a carrier decides to push a shipper for payment of 

detention charges, the shipper will just move on to another carrier. Bloomberg News 

reported on this dynamic in an article published this spring.3

The ability of shippers and receivers to pass on the costs of their inefficiencies 

to truckers places significant costs on society. FMCSA estimates the annual loss to 

motor carriers from waiting in ports and time spent loading and unloading at $4 

billion annually. 4 The indirect cost and gain to society by dealing with these inefficiencies was estimated at $6.59 billion annually. Clearly the ability of the marketplace to self-police in a rational manner is absent; when something is free (e.g., a 

driver’s time) a market will use it to excess regardless of the ramifications. The 

most serious and hidden ramification is decreased highway safety, a cost that does 

not show up in the balance sheet of a shipper or a receiver but has significant impacts on the American public. 

By affirmatively addressing this issue through a measured increase in FMCSA’s 

safety-related authority, the entire supply chain would be forced to become more efficient in how they utilize capital and labor. OOIDA’s preference for solving the 

problem of detention time, which is Federal legislation setting reasonable parameters for detention, would not necessarily represent any cost increase for shippers 

and receivers. They would have every incentive to use transportation resources 

wisely thus avoiding incurring additional costs—exactly how a true marketplace 

should operate. OOIDA and its members would prefer to never see a dime in penalties or other costs related to detention paid out. We simply want the elimination 

of this inefficiency within the supply chain because of its impact on highway safety. 

85 

As highlighted above, many shippers and receivers and the associations representing them view detention not as a safety issue, but as a contractual issue alone 

with no highway safety implications. This shows a clear misunderstanding of the 

important role they play in ensuring highway safety. This misunderstanding is reinforced when examining extra contractual policies that encourage unsafe behavior by 

truck drivers. Many shippers and receivers across the country have instituted unilateral, non-contracted receiving policies that assess a wide assortment of fees on 

unsuspecting truckers once they arrive with goods in interstate commerce. 

Late arrival fees that amount to hundreds of dollars are commonplace in certain 

segments of the transportation industry. They cause an incredible amount of angst 

for drivers when they’ve been delayed over issues they have no control (roadside inspections, traffic accidents or road closures, and detention by another shipper or receiver are just examples), and serve as an incentive for drivers to engage in unsafe 

behaviors. Knowing one is facing a fine for ‘‘late delivery’’ or rescheduling to another 

day causes unsafe driving practices such as speeding. Yet, these same shippers and 

receivers who have instituted these types of receiving policies will not pay a single 

dime in detention fees for keeping a driver delayed for innumerable or take 

proactive steps to reduce or eliminate driver detention at their docks. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR TO

JACQUELINE S. GILLIAN

Question. Ms. Gillian, as we have discussed, ensuring that new drivers have the 

tools and knowledge necessary to be safe on the road is critically important. Would 

graduated drivers’ license programs, like those promoted in the STANDUP Act help 

prevent these kinds of situations? 

Answer. Yes, graduated driver licensing (GDL) programs allow teens to gain the 

skills and experience of operating a motor vehicle gradually by limiting distractions 

and giving them additional responsibility at each stage of the process. As a result, 

young drivers in GDL programs are less likely to practice unsafe driving behaviors 

and are less likely to be involved in fatal crashes. The STANDUP Act establishes 

a three-stage licensing process with minimum requirements, including prohibitions 

on nighttime driving, passenger restrictions, prohibitions on non-emergency cell 

phone use, and sets a minimum age of 16 for issuance of a learner’s permit and age 

18 for a full license. 

Research and experience show that these types of provisions are extremely effective in reducing the crash risk of new teen drivers, and the National Transportation 

Safety Board (NTSB) has placed teen driver safety on its Most Wanted List and has 

recommended many of the provisions in the STANDUP Act for years. For example: 

• Minimum Age of 16 Years for Learner’s Permit— 

» A study published in 2010 by Traffic Injury Prevention concluded that raising 

the learner permit age from 15 to 16 would reduce the fatal crash rate of 15- 

to 17-year old drivers by approximately 13 percent. 

• Nighttime Driving Prohibition— 

» While only about 15 percent of the total miles driven by 16-to 17-year-old 

drivers occurs between 9 p.m. and 6 a.m., about 40 percent of their fatal 

crashes take place during these hours, according to a 1997 study published 

in the Journal of Public Health Policy. 

» This provision is supported by NTSB Recommendation H–93–9. 

• Teen Passenger Restrictions— 

» A study published in the Journal of American Medicine in March 2000 found 

that driver death rates (per 10 million trips) increased with the number of 

passengers in the vehicle for drivers ages 16 and 17. The highest death rate 

(5.61 deaths per 10 million trips) was observed among drivers aged 16 years 

carrying 3 or more passengers. 

» This provision is supported by NTSB Recommendation H–02–32. 

• Cell Phone Use Prohibition During Learner’s and Intermediate Phases— 

» A study released in 2009 by the Virginia Tech Transportation Institute (VTTI) 

found that dialing a cell phone made the risk of a crash or near-crash event 

2.8 times as high as non-distracted driving. In addition, an Australian study 

published in the British Medical Journal in 2005 found that cell phone use 

while driving resulted in a fourfold increase in crashes. These findings are 

particularly dangerous for young drivers, who are both inexperienced and 

86 

have the highest reported level of cell phone use while driving, according to 

NHTSA. 

» This provision is supported by NTSB Recommendation H–03–08. 

• (Minimum) 6–Month Learner’s Permit and Intermediate Stages— 

» According to the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), an extended 

learner’s permit period is essential to provide the opportunity for extensive 

supervised on-road practice in a variety of conditions. The specified minimum 

length of time for the intermediate phase is 1 year in Newfoundland; 1 year, 

3 months in Manitoba; 1 year, 6 months in the Yukon; and 2 years in Nova 

Scotia. 

» The NTSB recommends that teen driver safety programs include learner’s 

permit and intermediate licensing stages with mandatory holding periods. 

• Maintaining Restrictions Until Age 18— 

» Drivers aged 16–17 years have markedly higher risks for fatal crashes than 

older drivers, according to a study in the Journal of American Medicine in 

March 2000. 

When these provisions are combined into comprehensive GDL laws, the benefits 

are outstanding. For example, in 2007, Illinois passed a comprehensive law that 

gave teens more time to gain driving experience while supervised and limited incar distractions. In the first full year that the GDL law was in effect, teen driving 

deaths in Illinois dropped by over 40 percent. 

Unfortunately, not all states have followed the example set by Illinois and, while 

most states have some elements of a GDL program, every state needs to have all 

key components. Enacting the STANDUP Act and encouraging state adoption of 

comprehensive GDL laws is a commonsense solution to preventing the number one 

killer of American teens—motor vehicle crashes. 

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