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REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN EGYPT,

PART I

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 15, 2012

Serial No. 112–126

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Robert Kagan, Ph.D., senior fellow, Brookings Institution .................................. 7

Michele Dunne, Ph.D., director of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle 

East, Atlantic Council .......................................................................................... 16

Mr. Eric Trager, Ira Weiner fellow, Washington Institute for Near East 

Policy ..................................................................................................................... 22

Tamara Wittes, Ph.D., former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near 

Eastern Affairs ..................................................................................................... 28

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Robert Kagan, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................ 9

Michele Dunne, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .......................................................... 18

Mr. Eric Trager: Prepared statement .................................................................... 24

Tamara Wittes, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .......................................................... 30

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 54

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 55

(1)

REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN 

EGYPT, PART I 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

AND SOUTH ASIA, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. CHABOT. Good afternoon. The subcommittee will come to 

order. 

I am Steve Chabot, the chairman of the subcommittee. I want to 

welcome all my colleagues to this hearing of the Subcommittee on 

the Middle East and South Asia. 

Just over 1 year ago, Hosni Mubarak resigned as President of 

Egypt in response to massive and sustained protests by the Egyptian people. Unfortunately, as the last year has illustrated far too 

well, freedom rarely marches steadily forward in a straight line. 

Over the past year, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, 

under the leadership of Field Marshal Tantawi, has ruled Egypt 

with the stated goal of turning power over to a civilian government 

as soon as possible. 

Recent developments, however, do not leave me optimistic about 

Egypt’s future. Over 1 year later, the Army is still in charge. 

Islamist groups hold a majority in the People’s Assembly, the lower 

house of the Egyptian Parliament. The Egyptian economy appears 

to be on the verge of collapse. And the recent raids on civil society 

NGOs call into question the current government’s commitment to 

democratic principles. 

With nearly 47 percent of the elected seats in the Egyptian Parliament going to the Muslim Brotherhood and nearly a quarter to 

other Islamist parties, it is clear that Islamists will dominate the 

Egyptian political landscape over the next year. And it will be a 

critical year. It is during this time that the Egyptian constitution 

will be drafted by a 100-person constitutional assembly which is to 

be elected by the newest Islamist-dominated Parliament. It will 

then be put before Egyptians as a referendum. 

Many question the Islamists’ commitments to democratic principles. Elections are a necessary but not sufficient addition for democracy, and as countries like Egypt build its structures of government, it is critical that Egyptians establish key institutions of liberal government, in the classic sense: Freedom of speech; freedom 

2

of assembly; equal rights for women, religious, and ethnic minorities; and a free press. 

I am deeply concerned that the recent violence against the Egyptian Christian community, as well as the lawsuit brought by 

Islamists against Naguib Sawiris, an Egyptian Coptic businessman 

and liberal politician, for having tweeted a cartoon making fun of 

Islamists, may be indicative of the direction Egypt is heading in. 

I am also concerned about the future of the Israeli-Egyptian relationship. The Muslim Brotherhood as well as other Islamist parties 

have made several troubling and contradictory statements regarding the future of the peace treaty with Israel. I would caution any 

future Government of Egypt to tread very, very carefully. The 

peace treaty between Israel and Egypt has helped secure peace in 

the Middle East for over three decades now. It represents an ironclad commitment between two sovereign states and should not be 

subject to political posturing. Any adverse alteration to it, its provisions, or its implementation will be taken as a sign that Egypt is 

no longer interested in being a force for peace and stability and 

would be met with tremendous opposition here in the Congress—

on both sides of the aisle, I might add. 

Perhaps the most urgent of the recent developments, however, 

are the raids on NGOs operating in Egypt. On December 29th, 

2011, Egyptian Government officials raided the offices of numerous 

civil society NGOs, including the International Republican Institute, IRI; National Democratic Institute, NDI; and Freedom House, 

FH, as part of a criminal investigation into foreign funding of 

NGOs commissioned by Minister of International Cooperation 

Faiza Abul Naga. 

Since these initial raids, the Government of Egypt has taken numerous actions which have directly escalated the situation. The 

Egyptian Government has barred at least six American NGO employees from leaving the country and, on February 6th, issued 

criminal charges against 43 people, including the Egypt country directors of NDI and IRI. Nineteen Americans have been charged, including Sam LaHood, the son of our former colleague in the House 

and current U.S. Transportation Secretary, Ray LaHood, and 

Charles Dunne, head of Middle East programs at Freedom House 

and the husband of Dr. Dunne, one of our witnesses today. 

Just yesterday, the Government of Egypt slapped another travel 

ban on an American student in Egypt, and a top Muslim Brotherhood official threatened that any alteration to U.S. aid in response 

to the NGO raids would force a reevaluation of the peace treaty 

with Israel. 

I cannot overstate the gravity of this situation, which seriously 

calls into question the Government of Egypt’s commitment to the 

principles of democratic governance. These NGOs pursued a singular goal: To assist the people of Egypt in advocating for the protection of their own human and civil rights at this critical time of 

transition. 

Decisions about assistance to Egypt must ultimately be shaped 

by the choices and policies made by the Egyptian Government. We 

have an interest in strongly supporting a democratic government 

that respects the rights of its citizens and rule of law, fosters greater economic opportunity, and observes international obligations. 

3

But we would clearly have to reevaluate our support of any government that does not respect the institutions of free government, discriminates against or represses its citizens, or which pursues policies which are destabilizing in the region. 

A refusal by the Government of Egypt to, in the immediate future, return all seized property, drop the travel ban it has instituted, drop all charges against both American and Egyptian NGO 

employees, and allow these organizations to operate free of constraints will certainly have a most negative effect on the broader 

U.S.-Egyptian relationship and will necessitate a reconsideration of 

U.S. assistance to Egypt. 

For decades, Egypt has been a critical ally of the United States 

in the global war on terror and in the pursuit of Arab-Israeli peace. 

Egypt has been and I hope will remain a leader in the Arab world 

and a force for peace in the region. I hope our witnesses here today 

can help us understand the current trajectory in Egypt and help 

guide U.S. policy to ensure that a democratic Egypt rises from the 

ash heap of authoritarianism. 

And I would now yield to the gentleman, the ranking member of 

this committee, Mr. Ackerman from New York, to make an opening 

statement. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank the chairman, especially for calling this 

very timely, important hearing. 

The Egyptian revolution of 2011 is still unfolding, and its ultimate form and significance will not be clear for some time to come. 

But we meet today to consider what has occurred, what events and 

trends are currently under way, and depending on our courage or, 

perhaps, fools that we are, we might venture some guesses about 

where Egypt is heading. 

In the midst of the macro-level crisis created by the revolution 

and the transition to a new government and a new form of government, there is also a very serious crisis that has developed relating 

to the operation of American-backed non-government organizations 

assisting Egyptians with the development of civil society and the 

non-governmental political infrastructure needed to sustain a 

healthy democracy. 

As a general rule when it comes to foreign assistance to nations, 

I tend to rely on the political wisdom of my favorite philosopher, 

my mother. She would always say, ‘‘If you want to help me, help 

me my way.’’ ‘‘Help me my way.’’ When I go abroad, I hear it over 

and over, even if the exact words are different and it is said in another language. ‘‘Help me my way’’ is a demand for dignity. It is 

an insistence that progress can be achieved by agreement and cooperation or not at all. Even if she was at the doctor’s office and 

being examined, she still wasn’t going to be poked and prodded and 

stuck and stickered like a piece of livestock. She wanted to be 

helped, but she wanted to be helped on her terms, her way. 

A non-negotiable demand for respect and dignity is at the very 

heart of what has been happening throughout the Arab world this 

year. So when we in the United States think about what our response should be to these amazing and unexpected changes, our 

first question should be: What is it that you want from us? 

I do not and will not excuse the shameful assault on the 17 

NGOs orchestrated by parts of the Egyptian Government. Naked 

4

ambition fueled by demagoguery is to blame, along with the shameful unwillingness of responsible Egyptians to contain the damage. 

U.S.-Egyptian relations have already been harmed by this crisis, 

and if it goes unresolved or, worse, spirals out of control, it could 

very quickly legally foreclose our ability to provide any bilateral assistance. I think such an outcome would be a disaster for both nations. 

I know that our diplomats are working hard to find a mutually 

acceptable solution that will de-escalate this problem and allow 

both sides to focus on the issues that matter most in our relationship. But our efforts have to be matched on the other side by their 

courage to act in Egypt’s own best interest. 

The problem is that Egypt today has a ‘‘sort of, kind of’’ government right now, and it is neither strong nor decisive, much less 

ambitious. Rather than having one powerful but increasingly sluggish, nearly dead hand on the switch, Egypt no longer has anyone 

clearly in charge. 

And I don’t say that as an insult to the men on the Supreme 

Council of the Armed Forces, or the SCAF. They are not, nor 

should they be, expected to be experts, politicians or domestic policymakers or elected officials. A certain hesitancy and caution regarding public policy in the administration of justice is highly appropriate for anyone in a custodial position. And, in general, the 

Egyptian military’s ambivalence about power is something we 

should admire and appreciate. 

There is a critical balance to be struck, and I will be the first to 

acknowledge that such a balance is hard to obtain. On the one 

hand, as unelected caretakers, the SCAF must be cognizant that it 

is operating without a popular mandate. And on the other, they 

have an obligation as patriots to govern in their nation’s best interest until they hand power over to a new government. 

I don’t envy their task, and having never stood in their shoes, I 

don’t wish to be too critical. The job they are attempting is far 

more difficult than many suspect. But I truly believe that we are 

approaching a precipice beyond which our bilateral relations could 

suffer terrible damage. The image of Americans being captured in 

a Middle Eastern country following a revolution brings up some 

very unpleasant memories in this country. If people here conclude 

that Egypt is not on a path to democracy but is instead on its way 

to becoming another Iran, our bilateral relationship will not survive. We are not at that point yet, but we are getting closer every 

day. 

When we ask the question, what does Egypt want from us, we 

may not be able to expect a strong, clear single answer. It won’t 

likely be coming for quite some time. Instead, we should expect a 

diversity of answers, sometimes contradictory, sometimes 

counterintuitive, sometimes self-destructive, and maybe often delivered in a tone of anger, frustration, and impatience. We should expect something along the lines of, ‘‘If you want to help me, help me 

my way.’’

That is understandable. But it means we have to have some clarity ourselves about what we are prepared to accept and what we 

are ready to push back on. We can’t and should not try to make 

Egypt’s choices. We can and should make choices ourselves about 

5

helping Egypt that respects Egypt’s sovereignty, choices that support a genuine democratic transition, and choices that prevent any 

long-term harm to our relations or to regional stability and security. 

Our interests and Egypt’s interest in the United States strongly 

include but are much larger than the operation of these NGOs. 

That does not at all make the issue trivial. It is not. Both sides 

need to recognize the danger that this issue poses and redouble 

their efforts to ensure that this hopefully enduring and critical 

strategic partnership is removed from the grave jeopardy that it 

currently faces. Each of us, and right now I would say especially 

Cairo, needs to accept responsibility for this relationship and to act 

accordingly and soon. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing from our 

distinguished panel, except for my homie, from whom I expect 

nothing because we grew up in the same ’hood, and that is Eric 

Trager, who I appreciate being here and his expertise as well. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Ackerman. 

And now the Chair would invite members if they would like to 

make a 1-minute statement to do so or to pass, either way. 

Mr. Turner, did you have any desire to make an opening statement? 

Mr. TURNER. I will submit one for the record. I am interested in 

hearing what the witnesses have to say. I hope they can disabuse 

me of my pessimism as we watch Egypt in the balance between 

some democratic forces and sinking into a theocracy, a totalitarian 

theocracy. 

I yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

And our distinguished colleague from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, is 

welcome to make an opening statement. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to echo the sentiments of our colleague, the ranking 

member, Mr. Ackerman. The Egyptian-U.S. relationship is very 

critical to Middle East peace. It has been a very important bilateral 

and multilateral relationship for many years, especially since 

Camp David. And the recent development with respect to the detaining of members of especially NDI and IRI, very troubling. I will 

give the Egyptians credit for doing one thing we can’t do very well 

here in Congress, and that is, they have managed to bring Democrats and Republicans together. 

But I would just cite, Mr. Chairman, the language of the Consolidated Appropriations Act that says, ‘‘Prior to the obligation of 

funds appropriated by this act under the heading Foreign Military 

Financing Program, the Secretary of State shall certify that the 

Government of Egypt is supporting the transition to civilian government, including holding free and fair elections, implementing 

policies to protect freedom of expression, association and religion, 

and due process of law.’’

Those are the goals this Congress set for this relationship and 

for the emerging Government of Egypt. I am all ears for the witnesses’ testimony as to how the recent detaining of NGO reps comports with that language. 

6

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

I would now like to introduce our very distinguished panel here 

this afternoon. 

We will start with Robert Kagan, who is a senior fellow at the 

Brookings Institution and is an expert and frequent commentator—

I must say, I just saw him on TV this morning on one of the programs—on Egypt, the Middle East, U.S. national security policy, 

and U.S.-European relations. He writes a monthly column on world 

affairs for the Washington Post and is a contributing editor at the 

Weekly Standard and the New Republic. He is also a member of 

the board of directors at the Foreign Policy Initiative. Prior to 

Brookings, Kagan spent 13 years as a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. From 1984 to 1988, he 

served as a member of the State Department’s Office of Policy 

Planning. On more than one occasion, Kagan has been named one 

of Foreign Policy magazine’s top 100 global thinkers. 

Our next witness will be Michele Dunne, who is director of the 

Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council of 

the United States. She was a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and editor of the Arab Reform 

Bulletin from 2006 until 2011. She is previously a Middle East specialist with the U.S. Department of State, where her assignments 

included serving on the National Security Council staff, on the Secretary of State’s policy planning staff, and the U.S. Embassy in 

Cairo, and the U.S. Consulate General in Jerusalem, and in the 

Bureau of Intelligence and Research. She holds a Ph.D. in Arabic 

language and logistics from Georgetown University, where she was 

a visiting professor from 2003 until 2006. 

Our next witness will be Eric Trager. Mr. Trager holds the Ira—

and I have consulted with both sides of the aisle here. Is it 

‘‘Weiner’’ or ‘‘Weiner’’? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Two Jews are wrong. 

Mr. TRAGER. ‘‘Weiner.’’

Mr. CHABOT. Well, we weren’t sure. And I have to say, Mr. Ackerman said the odds were it was probably ‘‘Weiner.’’ But, anyway, 

he was wrong as usual. No, actually, he is right quite often. 

In any event—at the Washington Institute as a Ph.D. candidate 

in political science at the University of Pennsylvania, where his research focuses on Egyptian opposition parties. He was in Egypt 

during the 2011 anti-Mubarak revolts, and his writings have appeared in Foreign Affairs, the Atlantic, and the New Republic, 

among other publications. From 2006 to 2007, Mr. Trager lived in 

Egypt as an Islamic civilizations Fulbright fellow, where he studied 

at the American University in Cairo and received his M.A. in Arabic studies with a concentration in Islamic studies. 

And our last witness will be Tamara Wittes, who served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs from November 9, 

2009, until January 31, 2012, and in this role oversaw the Middle 

East Partnership Initiative. She also served at State Department 

as Deputy Special Coordinator for Middle East Transitions. During 

her time in government, she was central to organizing the U.S. 

Government’s response to the Arab Awakening. Before joining the 

U.S. Government, Dr. Wittes was a senior fellow at the Saban CenVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:14 Apr 18, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\021512\72875 HFA PsN: SHIRL
7

ter for Middle East Policy, a Middle East specialist at the U.S. Institute of Peace, and the director of programs at the Middle East 

Institute in Washington. Dr. Wittes was one of the first recipients 

of the Rabin-Peres Peace Award established by President Bill Clinton in 1997. Dr. Wittes holds a Ph.D. in government from Georgetown University. 

And we want to thank all of our witnesses here this afternoon. 

We look forward to hearing their testimony. 

And we would remind them that we operate under the 5-minute 

rule and there is a lighting system. The green light will be on for 

4 minutes, the yellow light will come on telling you you have 1 

minute to wrap up, and the red light means you are supposed to 

stop. So we hope you will stay within those bounds, and we hold 

ourselves to those same standards when we are asking questions. 

So, Dr. Kagan, without further ado, we will be happy to hear 

your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT KAGAN, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, 

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 

Mr. KAGAN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and 

members of the committee, and thank you for holding this hearing 

on this very important and difficult subject. Thank you for inviting 

me to testify. 

There is a tremendous amount of expertise at this table, and it 

is all to the left of me. I am not an expert on Egypt. My involvement has come about as a result of the Egypt Working Group that 

Michele and I founded, which attempted to, beginning in February 

2010, urge greater democratic reforms in Mubarak’s Egypt. I am 

mostly a historian of American foreign policy, and I want to begin 

with just recounting a little recent history to dispel some of what 

I think are some myths that have grown up and may give us some 

guidance as we move forward. 

When Michele and I formed this working group on Egypt in February 2010, our main effort was to urge the U.S. Government to 

urge the Egyptian Government of Mubarak to make some modest 

reforms leading up to the parliamentary elections in the fall of that 

year. We were not calling and, more importantly, the Egyptian people were not at that time calling for revolution or the overthrow of 

Hosni Mubarak or anything like that. They were calling for a more 

level playing field so that opposition parties could run and gain 

perhaps a small representation in a Parliament that was utterly 

dominated by the President’s ruling party. 

It was obvious to us and it was obvious to, obviously, many Egyptians that Egypt was growing restive, partly because of the inability of opposition to take part in any part of the government; partly 

because Mubarak was ill, people were speculating that he might be 

succeeded by his son Gamal, and those raised the tensions even 

higher. And it was very clear that even some modest reforms leading up to the parliamentary election might have defused a lot of 

this tension that was growing. 

Unfortunately, Mubarak chose the opposite tack. He chose to 

tighten up. Not only did he not institute reforms, but he conducted 

the election in such a way as to assert even greater control over 

Parliament. Two months later, with the people amassing in Tahrir 

8

Square, he began to talk about some of the reforms that we had 

recommended and others recommended, but by then it was too late. 

Had he made the same proposals in November 2010 that he made 

in January 2011, it is quite possible he would still be in power 

today, for better or for worse. 

I am reviewing this history because I fear there is a myth growing about what happened in Egypt and what the U.S. role may 

have been. The U.S. did not throw Mubarak under the bus, as 

many autocrats in the region and some folks here in the United 

States seem to believe. Mubarak threw himself under the bus. And 

the only thing the U.S. did was not jump under the bus with him. 

The Obama administration actually was late, I think very late, 

reading the writing on the wall in Egypt, although, thankfully, 

made the right decision in the end. 

The question we face now is, are we continuing to repeat this 

mistake? We are faced with a similar situation that we were faced 

with Mubarak. We have an Egyptian military that is essentially 

saying, it is us or the radicals. And, of course, that was precisely 

how we got into the situation in the first place. We chose Mubarak 

and we got the Muslim Brotherhood that we have today in the position of power that they are in. 

So, as a result, we are left with less-than-ideal choices. There is 

an Egyptian military, which, although it has presided over free and 

fair elections, relatively, nevertheless shows constant worrying 

signs it is unwilling to relinquish power and allow an open and 

democratic Egypt to develop. Then there is the Muslim Brotherhood, which won those elections and whose own commitment to 

openness remains to be tested. 

Now we are also faced with a crisis regarding the NGOs. And, 

again, we need to be clear who the source of this crisis really is. 

It is not the Muslim Brotherhood. Unfortunately they have joined 

in, but it was not their decision to move in this direction. It was 

not public opinion in Egypt; this action is not the consequence of 

the revolution. 

And so, in that respect, I think comparisons with Iran are wrong. 

The NGOs were already being targeted under Mubarak’s Egypt. 

And this latest stage in Mubarakism without Mubarak is what we 

are facing right now. It is being carried out by holdovers from the 

old regime, backed and, by all evidence, encouraged by the military, which, by the way, despite what people seem to think, is trying to hold on to power, not relinquish power. 

And let me just say in conclusion that the issue here is not just 

these NGOs. If it were just the question of these NGOs, we might, 

you know, be looking for room for compromise. But this is just the 

beginning of the process. As Michele has brought to my attention 

and I think to the committee’s attention, there are other NGOs in 

Egypt that have not yet been targeted but who fear that they will 

be targeted. This effort to quash the NGOs is about quashing an 

open process in Egypt which the military feels threatened by. So 

I think we have to take it seriously as part of a broader problem, 

not just a specific issue. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Dr. Kagan. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kagan follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Dr. Dunne, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MICHELE DUNNE, PH.D., DIRECTOR OF THE 

RAFIK HARIRI CENTER FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, ATLANTIC 

COUNCIL 

Ms. DUNNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the honor of testifying before the committee. By agreement with my colleagues, I am 

going to focus on the economic issues of post-revolutionary Egypt. 

So, Egypt 1 year after the fall of Hosni Mubarak is a confused 

place in which the political transition is still disputed, insecurity 

is rampant, civil society is more harassed than ever, and an economic crisis is looming. Transitions from authoritarian government 

are typically difficult and lengthy, but in Egypt’s case the fact that 

much of the Mubarak-era state remains intact is really complicating matters. 

Egypt’s economy has been one of the victims of this situation, 

and an approaching economic crisis threatens to disrupt an already-troubled political process. Getting the economy back on its 

feet after the Egyptian revolution would have been a difficult task 

under any circumstances, but the Supreme Council of the Armed 

Forces, the SCAF, and the cabinet officials they have appointed 

have made it much harder than it needed to be. 

There are three things that the SCAF-led government has done 

and is doing that are particularly hurting prospects for an economic recovery. One of them is failing to reform police and internal 

security. The second is manipulating the political transition to 

serve military interests. And the third is mishandling offers of 

international assistance. 

On the first issue, on security, reforming the interior ministry, 

internal security forces, and getting regular uniformed police back 

on duty should have been a top priority for the SCAF. They certainly had the mandate to do that, but all they chose to do was to 

put the former interior minister on trial and to leave the rest of 

it more or less alone. 

We have seen the results of this. The lack of effective policing 

and the resulting rise in crime and insecurity were demonstrated 

quite horrifically on February 1st with the soccer riot in Port Said, 

as well as in many other instances, including of anti-Christian violence during the year. Tourists and investors will not return to 

Egypt until security does. 

Regarding the second factor, the political transition, 

businesspeople and investors always cite this as a problem. It is 

certainly a problem regarding the democratic transition itself, but 

it also inhibits economic recovery. There needs to be a clearer political timetable and one that is designed to serve the national interests, and not narrow interests of the military in protecting their 

prerogatives, so that investors can have the confidence to put capital in again. 

Regarding foreign assistance, the transitional government’s decisions have been very ill-advised. As I am sure you are aware, they 

turned down a $3.2 billion loan from the International Monetary 

Fund and a $4.5 billion loan from the World Bank in June of last 

year, deciding instead to hold out for cash assistance from Arab 

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tually arrived because all the donors, including the Arab donors, 

want to see a clear economic plan and sound policies. 

The Egyptian Government has now reengaged with the IMF and 

World Bank, but now it is going to be more complicated because 

of the existence now of an elected Parliament. And these institutions, such as the IMF, feel they now need the buy-in of the Parliament, which is dominated by Islamist forces that really don’t 

have any experience in handling these kind of issues. 

Moreover, the transitional government has put at risk the assistance from the United States, as has already been discussed at this 

hearing, through this unprecedented campaign against American 

as well as Egyptian NGOs. This crisis and the other decisions regarding foreign assistance stem from a common approach, and this 

is the insistence of the transitional government that foreign aid 

must be delivered as direct budget support—not project aid, not 

support to NGOs, not investment. They want direct budget support 

with no strings attached. 

Because of all of these missteps, an economic crisis is brewing. 

Foreign currency reserves have dropped by more than half and perhaps as much as 70 percent. The government now only has enough 

currency on hand to pay for needed food imports, particularly 

wheat, for a few months. Unemployment has grown greatly. Ranks 

of unemployed workers have swelled by 37 percent in the last year. 

So a collapse of the Egyptian pound, hyperinflation, and a food 

shortage as a result of dwindling reserves have all become real possibilities. 

What all this means for the United States is that we really are 

challenged in this situation to try to indicate clearly to Egyptians 

that we are ready to support them as long as they remain committed to a genuine democratic transition, and, in fact, we would 

like to increase our support. But we simply need—it needs to be 

clear where they are going. 

I think now is not the time to give up hope on Egypt, but I agree 

with what the members have said, that we have to be clear about 

what the United States is willing to support, and that is a real 

democratic transition. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Dr. Dunne. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dunne follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Trager, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ERIC TRAGER, IRA WEINER FELLOW, 

WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. TRAGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have submitted testimony for the record, so I would like to use 

my time to emphasize two key points. 

First, the current tension in American-Egyptian relations is entirely due to the acts of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, 

also known as the SCAF, which is the military junta that has ruled 

Egypt since Hosni Mubarak was forced from power just over a year 

ago. 

In December, the SCAF-appointed government raided 17 prodemocratic NGOs, including some of those that are supported by 

the United States, and it has recently referred 43 NGO workers to 

criminal court, including 16 Americans. As part of this inquisition, 

six Americans have been prevented from traveling, including the 

son of the Treasury Secretary. 

At any point during the past 2 months, the SCAF could have intervened to defuse the resulting tension with Washington. They 

could have intervened in small ways, such as by simply letting the 

American democracy workers leave the country, or it could have intervened in bigger ways, such as by firing the government minister 

who is most responsible for these investigations. But, instead, the 

SCAF has doubled down, accusing the NGOs and their mostly 

Egyptian staffers of aiding a nefarious foreign plot to destroy the 

country. Indeed, the top headline of yesterday’s Al-Ahram, Egypt’s 

state-run newspaper, read, ‘‘American Funding Aims to Spread 

Chaos in Egypt.’’

So we should have no illusions about the intentions of Egypt’s 

military leaders. They are telling the Egyptian people that the 

United States is evil, while cracking down on the handful of Egyptian activists who are favorably disposed toward Western democracy. 

Second, this situation is likely to worsen as the SCAF devolves 

power to the recently elected Parliament, which is dominated by 

the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood has overwhelmingly 

supported the crackdown on the NGOs and intends to appoint one 

of its senior political officials as Minister of International Cooperation so that it can monitor future contributions to pro-democratic 

NGOs. In its most recent statement, issued earlier today, the 

Brotherhood said that American funds had been used ‘‘for the demolition of Egypt and the destruction of society.’’

The Muslim Brotherhood holds similarly hostile views on other 

U.S. interests. Brotherhood leaders have repeatedly called for putting the Camp David Accords to a popular referendum, which the 

Brotherhood apparently sees as a viable strategy for sinking the 

Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty without being blamed for it directly. 

The Brotherhood’s rise also spells trouble for Egyptian Christians 

and secularists. When I visited Egypt in December, Muslim Brotherhood parliamentarians told me that they intend to criminalize 

criticism of the sharia. It should be noted that these kinds of theocratic prosecutions are already taking place. 

23

We should harbor no illusions about the Brotherhood’s ability or 

willingness to change. For starters, the Muslim Brotherhood is not 

like most other political parties. Becoming a full-fledged Muslim 

Brother is, in fact, a 5- to 8-year process during which a Muslim 

Brother’s commitment to the cause is tested repeatedly as they ascend through five tiers of membership. This is not an organization 

inclined toward rethinking its ideology, since every member has 

been indoctrinated in it. 

Perhaps more importantly, the very structure of Egyptian politics 

will likely encourage the Muslim Brotherhood toward more extreme, rather than moderate, positions. Its top political competitor 

is the Salafist Nour Party, which finished second to the Muslim 

Brotherhood and controls nearly a quarter of the Parliament. The 

Nour Party seeks to implement Islamic law as it was practiced in 

the time of the Prophet Muhammad. Non-Islamist parties, by contrast, are weak. They are deeply divided among far-left nationalists, socialists, and a smattering of liberals, and their support 

seems unlikely to grow. 

Egyptian domestic politics will, thus, be a competitive theocracy 

between two competing Islamist visions, that of the Muslim Brotherhood and that of the puritanical Salafists. Recognizing that the 

Brotherhood has proposed a coalition government in which 

Salafists will be given control over the education ministry, the 

prospect of Egypt’s next generation being educated in Salafist-run 

schools suggests that the U.S.’s current challenges in Egypt will 

likely grow more difficult in the future. 

For Congress, this unfortunate outlook means two things. First, 

in the short term, foreign military aid should be suspended until, 

at the very least, the American democracy workers are permitted 

to leave Egypt. American aid to Egypt is not an entitlement; it is 

one component of a broader partnership between Washington and 

Cairo. And the most basic aspect of that partnership, or any partnership between countries, is that citizens be permitted to travel 

safely within each other’s borders. 

Second, Congress should ensure that future aid to Egypt is conditioned on the achievement of narrow U.S. interests. These include 

protecting equal citizenship rights of religious minorities, abiding 

by Egypt’s 1979 peace treaty with Israel, and cooperating with the 

United States in combating violent extremism. 

Thank you for listening. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Trager follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Our final witness this afternoon will be Dr. Wittes. 

And you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF TAMARA WITTES, PH.D., FORMER DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS 

Ms. WITTES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Ackerman, distinguished committee members. With your permission, I 

would ask that my full statement be entered into the record. 

Mr. CHABOT. Without objection, so ordered. 

Ms. WITTES. Thank you. 

And I would like to emphasize that I represent only myself here 

today. I have no institutional affiliation. 

While the events of the past year have unsettled many observers, 

the fact remains that Egypt’s year-old revolution presents the 

United States with a strategic opportunity—an opportunity to advance our interests through a stronger partnership with the Egyptian people and with a democratic Egypt. But the next 6 months 

presents special challenges to seizing that opportunity for a new 

partnership in the years to come. 

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has committed to 

transfer executive authority to an elected President by June 30th. 

But right now the Egyptian people are facing a deteriorating economy, an interim government with questionable intentions, police 

and intelligence services who fail to provide basic security, and a 

set of political elites who have yet to adjust to having real responsibilities and real accountability. 

Dr. Dunne has outlined the risks of a crisis, and the Egyptian 

people need and deserve the support of the international community in facing all these challenges. But the behavior and choices of 

the current transitional government make it exceptionally complex 

to support Egypt during this crucial phase. 

Over the past year, the SCAF came to behave not so much as a 

caretaker but as a political actor seeking to shape the transition to 

accord with its own preferences. The crackdown on independent 

civil society groups in Egypt is part of a broader struggle taking 

place between those working to advance a transition to democracy 

and elected government and those who are seeking to preserve 

their own positions, power, and perks from the old system. The latter group are willing to manufacture crises and to blame outside 

forces and hidden conspiracies to advance their selfish cause. 

The goal of this manufactured crisis over NGOs is not primarily 

to tweak the nose of the United States. Dozens of NGOs have been 

caught up in this investigation; the vast majority of them are Egyptian. The goal is to demonize an entire sector of Egyptian society 

by associating them with an alleged foreign conspiracy and by 

making the current government the defender of Egyptian interests. 

America’s aid to Egyptian civil society is and has been an expression of our desire to move beyond a U.S.-Egyptian relationship that 

was largely defined by government-to-government interactions and 

to build a broader partnership with the Egyptian people. And, thus, 

the dispute over U.S. Government funding to NGOs working in 

Egypt is not about the law and it is not about money. It is about 

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ficiaries of American taxpayer funds, they are apparently now willing to risk that aid in an effort to deflect criticism of themselves 

at home. It is a very shortsighted and self-defeating approach. 

But the United States cannot afford to take a shortsighted approach to Egypt’s transition. It is in American interests to build a 

cooperative partnership with the Egyptian people, which can be 

stronger, more lasting, and more equitable than the one we had 

with Hosni Mubarak. A democratic Egypt will enhance regional 

stability, strike a blow against violent extremism, and improve the 

prospects for liberty elsewhere in the region and indeed around the 

world. 

To respond to this crisis by immediately terminating all financial 

assistance to Egypt would be a strategic error. This is the time to 

continue our outreach to the Egyptian people, to support their efforts at democratic development, to respond to their urgent economic needs, and to forge the basis for mutual understanding and 

a new partnership with a democratic Egypt. 

Mr. Chairman, I am confident in the Egyptian people’s determination to achieve a transparent, accountable government that respects their rights. And the United States has a keen interest in 

the outcome of their efforts. I am equally confident in the interests 

that Americans and Egyptians share as the basis for a renewed 

partnership between our two countries. We share interests with the 

Egyptian people in combating terrorism, in advancing regional 

peace and security, in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, 

and in promoting a dynamic Egyptian economy rooted in free markets and open to global trade. 

But that renewed partnership must be built with the Egyptian 

people and with the democratic government that answers to them. 

Right now what we must do is preserve the possibilities of partnership and avoid playing into the hands of those within Egypt who 

do not support those efforts to betray us as enemies of the Egyptian people and of Egypt’s national interests. It is simply not true. 

If we are respectful of Egyptians as they undertake their political 

process and if we are consistent and transparent in our continued 

outreach, I believe that we will find the basis for a stronger partnership moving forward. 

Thank you for the opportunity to share my views. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Wittes follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. We appreciate the testimony of all the witnesses 

here this afternoon. And I now recognize myself for 5 minutes to 

ask questions. 

One element of the NGO raids which has gotten considerable attention has been the central role of Egypt’s Minister of International Cooperation, Faiza Abul Naga. In an editorial, The Washington Post recently noted that, ‘‘The campaign against the Internation Republican Institute, National Democratic Institute, and 

Freedom House, along with a half-dozen Egyptian and European 

groups, is being led by Minister of International Cooperation Faiza 

Abul Naga, a civilian holdover from the Mubarak regime. Ms. Abul 

Naga is pursuing a well-worn path in Egypt’’—excuse me. I skipped 

something here. ‘‘Ms. Abul Naga, an ambitious demagogue’’—their 

words, not mine—‘‘is pursuing a well-worn path in Egyptian politics, whipping up nationalist sentiment against the United States 

as a way of attacking liberal opponents at home.’’

Referring to the U.S. funding of NGOs like IRI and NDI, she is 

reported to have said yesterday, and I quote again—this is her 

quote: ‘‘Evidence shows the existence of a clear and determined 

wish to abort any chance for Egypt to rise as a modern and democratic state with a strong economy since that will pose the biggest 

threat to American and Israeli interests, not only in Egypt but in 

the whole region.’’

It is my belief that, as the chief agent provocateur in this ordeal, 

Abul Naga has shown very clearly that she cannot be trusted as 

the custodian of American taxpayer dollars. And, accordingly, U.S. 

assistance should be conditioned on her removal as the administrator of foreign aid. 

What are the thoughts of the panel members here this afternoon? 

And we could go down the line, if you would like to start, Dr. 

Kagan. 

Mr. KAGAN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I really feel that we can’t begin our relationship with Egypt in 

a situation where they hold a gun to their heads and say, ‘‘If you 

don’t do what we say, we are going to blow ourselves up.’’ That is 

the kind of relationship we now have with Pakistan. Right now, 

they are basically saying they will destroy their economy unless we 

swallow everything that they want us to swallow. 

And I think this is a critical moment in our relationship with 

them. I think the Egyptian people need to be presented with the 

consequences of the decisions that their military and perhaps the 

leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood and this current government 

are taking. And if we, it seems to me—again, this isn’t just about 

a narrow issue. If we back down at this moment, we will be going 

back to where we were in the Mubarak days. We will be giving a 

blank check to a new group’s desire to quash any democratic principles and democratic behavior, which I think are profoundly in our 

interest. 

I mean, I believe that in these difficult times in Egypt, when 

things are complicated and hard to know where things are going, 

we need to stick to some basic principles about whether we are giving our aid to them or not, based on whether they are holding to 

promises to move in a more open direction, whether they are maintaining existing obligations, treaty obligations, to Israeli, et cetera. 

38

We need to be the ones, at least for our own sake, sticking to the 

principles that we think are essential. 

This aid is not—you know, we don’t give it for charity reasons, 

although I think the American people wish the Egyptian people 

well. We give it in our own interests, and we have to make sure 

that those interests are respected. 

Mr. CHABOT. So would you agree, then, that, you know, our tax 

dollars, for example, since she is the one that is overseeing this, 

should be conditioned, for example, on her removal? 

Mr. KAGAN. I would certainly—or reprogram the money in such 

a way that it doesn’t go through her, or something. There is certainly—she should be the one, since she started this—I wish I—it 

is obvious, however, this is not just her. 

Mr. CHABOT. Right. 

Mr. KAGAN. It is obvious, also, that the military is directly involved in this. I mean, I can’t believe when I have seen statements 

suggesting the military can’t do anything about it and doesn’t know 

how this happened. This is the military and others in the system—

I think Michele may talk to that, as well—who are pushing this 

same policy. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Dr. Dunne? 

Ms. DUNNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, there is a long history on this. Minister Abul Naga 

was in the government under Mubarak in a couple of different positions. And she has been involved in trying to oppose the democracy and governance assistance that the United States gives to 

Egypt and specifically in trying to prevent the United States from 

being able to give aid directly to NGOs without the Egyptian Government having a veto over that in advance. 

This has been a long struggle. So I quite agree with what Dr. 

Kagan said and with what the Post editorial said, that this goes 

back to the Mubarak era. This is not a result of the revolution. It 

is simply that she has the opportunity to push it more aggressively 

right now because Minister Abul Naga and others have tried to 

link the NGOs to the ongoing demonstrations, demonstrations 

against continued military rule, and have tried to tar NGOs with 

that, I think, and have created suspicion in the minds of the military leaders that somehow it is civil society that is opposing them 

and therefore civil society needs to be rolled back. 

So I agree that there needs to be new thinking in the Egyptian 

Government, there needs to be a recognition that a robust and free 

civil society is just as important to the democratization process as 

are free elections, and that these kind of NGOs are—they are trying to do the kind of work in Egypt that they do all over the world. 

There is nothing unusual or suspicious about the work that either 

American or Egyptian NGOs are doing. There needs to be a new 

understanding between the United States and Egypt about this 

issue. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

My time has expired. So, Mr. Trager and Dr. Wittes, if I could 

get a real quick response from both of you. 

Mr. TRAGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I mean, I agree with what has been said——

39

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, you have unanimous consent to 

continue. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. All right. We will make it quick anyway. 

Mr. TRAGER. No, I agree with what has been said. Faiza Abul 

Naga is a symptom of a much deeper problem. I think it is really 

important to emphasize that what she is doing regarding these 

NGOs she is doing because it is a political winner. A recent Gallup 

poll showed that 71 percent of Egyptians oppose Egypt receiving 

U.S. aid. 

And I think that that is really the crux of the problem that we 

face in Egypt. We should not focus exclusively on her. Removing 

her wouldn’t change the fact that, you know, as the other panelists 

have said, we are going to have to reframe our relationship with 

a new Egypt. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. But just to get this straight, we got this trillion-dollar-plus deficit each year, and we are sending money over 

there that 70 percent of the Egyptians don’t want, right? 

Mr. TRAGER. That is right. And, I mean, I think the most important thing we could do right now is make it very clear this is not 

an entitlement, this is part of a broader partnership. So I think 

that gets at your question. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Dr. Wittes? 

Ms. WITTES. Thank you. 

I think you have already heard from my colleagues that there is 

a danger to over-personalizing this, because there is a broader 

issue at stake inside Egypt. And I think, you know, we also, wisely, 

don’t govern by polls. And the opposition to American assistance I 

think reflects a concern about the nature of the relationship that 

existed previously between the U.S. Government and the government of Mubarak and a desire to have a more equitable relationship. 

So I think it is important that we not begin that new relationship with a set of ultimatums, just as Dr. Kagan said we shouldn’t 

begin that relationship by allowing them to lay out a set of ultimatums. We need to resolve this issue; we need to resolve it 

through dialogue. 

I also think it is worth remembering that if, indeed, as I think 

all of us still expect, we have a transition to civilian authority in 

the next 6 months or so, it is very likely that there is going to be 

a thorough overhaul of the cabinet at that time. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Thank you very much. 

My time has expired. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Ackerman, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think it is a little bit more complicated than has been generally 

indicated. I think if one looks at a family when people are very 

young and developing, there comes a time when they start asserting themselves and demanding their independence, but they don’t 

quite tell you not to give them their allowance. 

I think it is not that the Egyptians don’t want our money. I think 

it is anything but that. They want everybody’s money they can get, 

and understandably so. What they don’t want is the image of themselves facing their public, which is starting to develop a whole new 

40

sense of nationalism and outlook and self-definition, that they don’t 

want to be seen as being obligated to or pushed around by somebody that they have worked with but who their public sees as the 

enemy. 

An overlayer on top of that is that they understand the realities. 

There is a difference between people who can pontificate because 

they are in the general public and people who are actually making 

the decisions because the decisions have consequences. You can’t 

play chess and say, ‘‘That is my spot,’’ and move into it without 

thinking that the other guy has a move also. You can’t just say, 

‘‘Well, screw them because this and that and I don’t like the way 

they are behaving,’’ and expect that they don’t have a move to 

make also. ‘‘Let’s just walk away from Egypt if they don’t behave 

the way we want them to behave’’; it is easy to say that if the effect 

of one’s words don’t have any consequences because you are home 

free and able to say it. But we, as policymakers acting on behalf 

of the country, have to say, what do they do when we do X? 

And I think that it can’t be that we have to just hold our nose 

and breath until we turn blue and get them to do what we want, 

because the world doesn’t work that way in reality. They are facing 

their public. 

This is a government, I believe, that didn’t have too many consequences, historically, throughout the dictatorial years that they 

are now looking to change from. They said something, and as 

Egypt spoke, so it was said and so it was done. And that came 

down from the pharaoh, and the military followed and everybody 

else followed and, you know, people grumbled and did what they 

did. People are starting to feel their oats right now. They are looking for scapegoats because they—‘‘Huh? Me? I am not responsible.’’ 

And the military and the officials and the holdovers from the Mubarak regime are looking to point the finger at somebody. 

And in every country that we see this in, it is always the same. 

It is always pointing and saying, ‘‘These are outside figures. We 

have to find somebody responsible for the riots in the streets. 

Somebody paid 700,000 people to show up in the streets of our 

country.’’ And there are likely suspects; it is usually Israel and usually the United States. And when you find, you know, organizations 

that are acting with the purest of interests, usually, acting with all 

good intentions and are there because they want to be there and 

help the Egyptian people, they are the first ones to get blamed, you 

know. They are scapegoated. And now these young women and 

men are in some difficulty, and we have to try to get them out of 

it. 

But we can’t just turn our back on this very big relationship of 

80-plus million people, the largest country in the Arab world, and 

not expect bad things to happen. You know, we should have 

learned from September 11th that if you don’t visit bad neighborhoods, they will visit you. We don’t need 80 million people to turn 

into the same bad neighborhood that we see in a couple of other 

countries—that they have not been part of to this point. 

How do we keep them—the real question that we need to turn 

to our friends and academia to give us some gleanings and guidance is: How do we get them on track? not: How do we beat them 

41

into submission? So maybe with that kind of perspective, you know, 

you can give us some guidance. 

I thought I knew how to do this with my kids, but these aren’t 

kids, you know; these are adults, and they have the ability to move 

with us and move against us, and the popular thing is to move 

against us right now. That is how we all get elected, and that is 

how they all get elected, too, because they are looking at the prospect of getting elected now. 

Mr. KAGAN. Speaking for myself, although I think that others 

would agree, I don’t think we disagree about not wanting to sever 

our relations with Egypt. The question is how to manage that relationship effectively. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. That is the question. 

Mr. KAGAN. And, in fact, the question about——

Mr. ACKERMAN. The question is do you manage it effectively by 

threatening them back? 

Mr. KAGAN. It is not—I guess I would have to—first of all, I 

think I disagree somewhat with your analysis of what is going on 

in Egypt. This is not simply a public nationalist outcry. This specific issue with the NGOs, the Egyptian people didn’t think twice 

about this issue until it was raised by Fayza Abul-Naga. She was 

the one who created this issue, as it had been before. The Egyptian 

people now have been spun up on this issue, that is true, but the 

reason this issue was raised was not because of the resentment of 

the Egyptian people at the United States, it was raised as part of 

an internal power struggle for people who are holdovers and the 

military to stay in power. So this is not——

Mr. ACKERMAN. I would strongly disagree with you that this was 

orchestrated at all by the military. I think your first inclination as 

to who orchestrated it is true, and the military just can’t afford to 

sit by on the sidelines and being out—I won’t say what I thought, 

but being——

Mr. KAGAN. I know what you thought. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Looking less nationalistic without jumping in 

and saying, me, too, you know. Oh, yeah, you think you are a good 

whatever whatever it is? I am a better whatever whatever it is 

than you are. We see that in American politics all too much today, 

and you are seeing the same thing happening there. 

Mr. KAGAN. I have to say I disagree with that analysis of the 

Egyptian military. I don’t think they simply jumped on a bandwagon. I think that they—and Michele has made this point and 

others have made this point—they do want to quash these protests. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Oh, absolutely. They want to take the finger 

from being pointed to themselves. They need a scapegoat also. They 

were part of Mubarak. I mean, you know, they all got their papers 

signed by him. They worked for him. 

Mr. KAGAN. So the larger question, Mr. Congressman, is if—let 

us say we go down the route that you are suggesting. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I am not suggesting a route. 

Mr. KAGAN. Let us say that we don’t want to punish them by cutting off the aid, okay, as a hypothetical. At what point—I mean, 

how far can this go? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I am not saying that either. 

Mr. KAGAN. Yeah. 

42

Mr. ACKERMAN. Whether we want to or not, we may have to legally, as I indicated before. But the question is how to best use the 

aid if we can use it, and how to best use the situation, because we 

have to accomplish two things. We have to get those people out of 

the predicament that they are in, and we have to get ourselves and 

Egypt in a better position because they are important to us, as we 

are important to them, and how do we take advantage of that mutual dependency rather than just end it, which could be very, very 

disastrous in the overall region. 

Mr. KAGAN. Certainly. And I want to pass this on to others who 

I know have thoughts. What I would argue is it may be salutary 

for the Egyptian people to know that there can be a very high 

price, and I don’t know that we are doing them any favors if we 

try to pretend that there is no price for the kind of behavior that 

their military and their government is carrying out. But let me just 

let this——

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired, but if other panelists would like to comment, they can briefly. 

Ms. DUNNE. Thank you, yes. I would like to add something to the 

Congressman’s question of how do we get them back on track, or 

what can we do. I think, you know, the United States has to try 

to send a two-sided message here. I mean, the one side is that we 

really want to help Egypt in this transition. We want to do more 

for them. 

The administration has put forward—you know, has a debt-relief 

plan. I think we should be moving toward opening free trade talks. 

I mean, there are even new and expanded forms of assistance that 

we would like to offer to a democratizing Egypt, so somehow send 

them the message that we are not out here to beat you up, we are 

out here to help you and support you, and there are a lot of good 

things that we can do together. However——

Mr. ACKERMAN. It is hard for our Government to convince the 

American people of that sometimes. 

Ms. DUNNE. Right. This issue has to—this civil society issue has 

to be resolved, and I do think that—I agree that maybe it wasn’t 

the military who instigated this campaign against NGOs, but they 

have gone along with it, and they do hold executive authority. 

Until a President is elected, they are in charge, and they will have 

to be responsible. So maybe we can help them find a way out of 

this crisis, but they need to ultimately take responsibility. It really 

isn’t legitimate. They can’t do it. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. That is basically what I said in my statement. 

Other parties have to do what is in the real best interests of their 

country. 

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Trager, and then Dr. Wittes. 

Mr. TRAGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just sort of jumping off what Michele said, in terms of portraying 

the United States as wanting to help Egypt, I think it is important 

to emphasize that the NGOs were actually part of that transition. 

I mean, what these NGOs were doing to a limited extent, but were 

doing in Cairo is training people for, you know, to participate in 

the elections that the military insisted on organizing, and I think 

that point really needs to be put out there. I mean, the second 

thing——

43

Mr. ACKERMAN. If I could just add. 

Mr. TRAGER. Yeah. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Those NGOs were there before this military ever 

thought there was going to be a free and fair election. 

Mr. TRAGER. Yes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Okay. 

Mr. TRAGER. But what they were doing during—I mean, they 

had many more activities over the past year. They were traveling 

around the country; they were helping to build, you know, democratic support, teach people how to vote, how to organize for elections, things like that, which is why it is ironic that they have been 

targeted in this way. And I also want to reiterate what I was upset 

about, the military’s role in this. The state-run press has been very, 

very aggressive in going after these NGOs and portraying them as 

American pawns, and that is the Egyptian citizens. 

The second point that I think is worth making is we need to set 

clear red lines as to what kind of behavior we are willing to tolerate, because this aid should not be an entitlement, it should be 

something that is given to help certain ends. One of those ends 

may be the promotion of more democratic rule, one of them is the 

treaty with Israel, one of them, of course, is the safe travel of our 

citizens, and when they pass those red lines, we need some kind 

of response. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. You didn’t include the also important topic that 

we need them to do, and that is to cooperate with us on the international war on terrorism and not to join on the other side. 

Mr. TRAGER. You are right. I mean, on that, Egypt is heading in 

an especially worrying direction, given the rise of the Muslim 

Brotherhood, the likelihood they will control the next government, 

and their inclination toward inviting more radical Islamist parties 

into the coalition, particularly the Salafist al-Nour Party. But also 

there was an attempt to give al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya certain roles 

within the committees of the new Parliament. Al-Gama’a alIslamiyya is a U.S.-designated terrorist organization. 

So Egypt is moving in a worrying direction, and I think it is important to really make a statement now about what kind of behavior we will want to tolerate. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, but do you see the 

victory at the polls, to the extent that it was, of the Salafis as 

something that was a welcome occurrence in the eyes of the Brotherhood? 

Mr. TRAGER. No, no, I think it was something that surprised 

them. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I think it shocked them. I think they are more 

fearful of that than the democratic kids that were dancing in the 

streets and wanted, you know, to have an economic opportunity to 

be like the kids in Israel. 

Mr. CHABOT. Dr. Wittes, go ahead if you want to comment briefly. 

Ms. WITTES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, Congressman Ackerman, in your opening remarks you 

mentioned that the demand for dignity is behind a lot of the events 

of this past year, and I think that that really gets at the heart of 

what we are talking about here. It is dignity, but it is also opporVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:14 Apr 18, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\021512\72875 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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tunity. The young people of Egypt who made this revolution didn’t 

just want to overthrow their government, they wanted the opportunity for betterment that was denied to them, denied to their parents, and they know that that means they need to be connected to 

the world. They know that—and they want to be connected to the 

world, and they want to be connected to the West, and they want 

to be connected to the United States. 

So if the question is how can we help to create a structure, a 

broader structure, that can incentivize a transition that gets back 

on track, I think we have to pay attention to what it is they say 

they want, and as Michele was suggesting, I think we have tools 

at our disposal we can use to try and act as magnets. But I think 

this is really a case where we have to stay engaged, we have to do 

a lot of talking, and we can’t sort of lash out and cut off our own 

options as we engage in that dialogue. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from Virginia Mr. Connolly is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Just 5 minutes? 

Mr. CHABOT. 5 hours. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just an observation, Dr. Wittes. Everything you just described 

could have been said in 1979 about Iran. All they want is to better 

their lives, you know, and the old regime didn’t allow for it, and 

that is all they are really trying to do, and we need to keep the 

dialogue going, and, you know, we shouldn’t just, you know, lash 

out at them and so forth. I am not saying that what is going to 

happen in Egypt is necessarily analogous to what happened in 

Iran, but what you said, I was on the Hill in those days, was eerily 

reminiscent of things one could have heard back in 1979. 

Let me ask this question, and maybe I can start with you, Dr. 

Kagan, but what is different about this is somebody, whoever, the 

military, the transitional government, I don’t know, certain elements of the Muslim Brotherhood or the Salafists or somebody, 

somebody decided to pick a fight with the United States, deliberately, consciously pick a fight with the United States, on a bipartisan basis and knowing with the full knowledge, malice 

aforethought, we were their largest bilateral aid donor, we have 

trained their military since Camp David Accords, we have provided 

the equipment for their Air Force and everything else. It is a terribly important relationship, and they made a calculation either 

that it wasn’t really a real risk, or, if it was, it was still worth it, 

given what other agenda, domestic, political, whatever it might be. 

And that, to me, is what is troubling. 

I mean, putting aside all other considerations, I just wonder if 

you might comment on that, because, you know, just as they have 

domestic politics, so do we, and there is a limit to what we can explain to our own constituents about—in fact, the chairman, I think, 

gave voice to it, you know. We have this multibillion-dollar aid relationship, and 70 percent of the polls say they don’t really want 

it, and meanwhile they are sort of all but kidnapping, you know, 

NGO reps, U.S. NGO reps, who are hardly undermining democracy 

or established institutions in Egypt, they are there to help with the 

45

democratization, as they do in so many other countries around the 

world. 

Mr. KAGAN. It is an excellent question, Congressman. I think the 

answer is that the people who did this—and it was not the Muslim 

Brotherhood and the Salafists, it was this minister, I think, backed 

by the military—they do not, did not, and maybe even do not believe that the aid is really threatened. I have been struck in conversations with administration officials who have met with 

Tantawi and others, and every time they have a meeting with him, 

he is surprised that there was talk about cutting off the aid. And 

so I think where we are with the Egyptian military right now is 

they think our relationship with them is so vital that they can do 

this, and at the end of the day we still won’t cut off the aid. And 

it is that mentality that I am worried about going forward with in 

the relationship. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Dr. Dunne. 

Ms. DUNNE. Thank you. 

Yes, I agree with you, Congressman, that someone did pick a 

fight deliberately with the United States, and this has been deliberately escalated. That seems quite clear. It is partly to get at civil 

society and get at the liberals through the United States, you 

know, and I——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Trying to go after liberals is never a good thing, 

but go ahead. 

Ms. DUNNE. And I agree with what Dr. Kagan said, that I think 

the SCAF didn’t really believe that U.S. aid would be threatened. 

I also think that we don’t understand all the internal dynamics 

of this, and that there might be other parts of the Egyptian Government who wouldn’t be that sad to see the military lose its assistance from the United States. I don’t think all the dimensions 

of kind of, you know, the internal machinations behind this crisis 

are clear to us. 

Mr. TRAGER. I think that is right, but, I mean, I think, you know, 

one thing to think about in terms of framing our partnership with 

Egypt and moving forward—and certainly everyone here believes 

that we have to have a relationship with Egypt given its centrality 

in the region—is what does it say about the political intelligence 

of the military that would prevent these NGOs, these NGO workers, including the son of a Cabinet Secretary, from traveling? I 

mean, if this is our partner in Egypt and our key ally in Egypt, 

we are in big trouble. 

And I agree with what Bob Kagan said about the fact that the 

military really doesn’t think that this is on the line, thinks that 

America would never cut the aid because it views it as an entitlement, and when they are preventing Americans from traveling, 

when they are gratuitously cracking down on NGOs, when they are 

using the press to spread anti-Americanism in an environment that 

is already increasingly inclined toward extremism, that is a very 

worrying thing. And I think that now is the time to put them on 

notice because otherwise there will be bad behavior, more bad behavior. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman is granted an additional minute to 

yield if he would like to because his time is expired. 

46

Mr. CONNOLLY. I would, and I want to also, Mr. Chairman, with 

your indulgence allow Dr. Wittes also to have her chance to reply. 

Of course, Mr. Ackerman, I would yield. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. We will give the gentleman 2 minutes, 1 for 

Dr. Wittes to respond and the next for Mr. Ackerman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I just want to insert one notion into our thinking. We are looking at the action of one person motivated by whatever as the basis of the relationship between two countries. I mean, 

just think, if an American judge, presented with a formal accusation from an American person or a person in America, could stop 

a French citizen who maybe is an international financier from getting on a plane and leaving the country at the last minute, does 

that speak of America’s attitude toward France? 

I mean, I know Egypt is not the democracy that we think that 

we are, but nonetheless, when you have somebody presenting a 

case to a judge, and a judge orders a thing, and there is an order 

issued, I mean, this is something to think about. Of course, here 

we all wait and see because everybody is innocent until whatever 

whatever, but there everybody piled on, and there is different motivations. But it is just something to think about in the background 

as we ponder this through as far as is this the relationship. 

Mr. CHABOT. Dr. Wittes, if you want to respond to Mr. Connolly. 

Ms. WITTES. Thank you. 

Well, let me say in the uncertain environment that Egypt has 

faced over the past year, nationalism sells, and I think we have 

seen that, that it sells very effectively. But I don’t think it is in any 

way a foregone conclusion that Egypt is therefore destined to go 

down the same sort of reactionary rabbit hole that Iran went down 

after Khomeini took power; Khomeini, who went and purged everyone who disagreed with his plan for the establishment of an 

illiberal theocracy. 

That is not what we see in Egypt today. What we see in Egypt 

today is a very contested, very pluralistic environment, and a lot 

of people, notably those in civil society, but also many in Parliament, who are keenly committed to establishing the democratic 

institutions that are necessary to prevent that sort of theocratic 

takeover from occurring. And that is one of the reasons why continued support for civil society is so important, because it is civil society that will help hold these new institutions accountable. 

So I think what we really need to do is avoid playing into this 

cheap anti-Americanism and support those who are going to follow 

the constitution-making process, hold new democratic institutions 

accountable, and offer up this vision of what a relationship between 

the United States and a democratic Egypt would look like. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, if—I agree with you wholeheartedly, and I absolutely agree that the comparison is invidious. 

Having said that, I also believe we make a mistake if we look vacillating and weak on the issue of U.S. nationals being involuntarily 

detained in an allied country. That is not okay, and it must be 

dealt with, and frankly there have to be consequences if it is not. 

Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

The gentleman’s time has expired. We will go to a second round 

here, and we will try to keep it within the 5 minutes if anybody 

47

has any additional questions, at least we will up here. I will make 

sure that I don’t go over 5 minutes myself. So if you could keep 

your answers within my 5 minutes, I would appreciate that as well. 

First of all, Mr. Trager, you made a comment relative to U.S. aid 

not being an entitlement or shouldn’t be an entitlement, and I 

agree with you. I think that is one of the problems that this country has made over the years is that we tend to give a lot of aid to 

a lot of countries, and we oftentimes tend to accept, even though 

we may not like it, all kinds of behavior which is anathema to us 

or the principles that we stand by, and that we are afraid to withdraw that aid or cut it off or reduce it because we think we will 

get even worse out of this country, or somebody that we were at 

least working with will go completely off the deep end, and so we 

keep giving a lot of aid out. 

Now, if you look at it as a proportion of our budget, you know, 

people can argue, well, it is a relatively small percentage, et cetera, 

but, again, we are $1.3 trillion in deficit spending this 1 year alone, 

so it is a real problem. 

What would be your response to that, or what should we do? 

How should we handle that particular issue so that countries 

around the world take the United States seriously; that we give the 

money, but they do have to stick with certain principles that we 

as a Nation stand for, freedom, and not abusing your citizens, and 

not spitting in our face, which is done quite frequently around the 

world, and done without any consequences oftentimes? So if you 

would like to respond. 

Mr. TRAGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I mean, I think the key is reframing the aid, you know, as we 

agree, away from being an entitlement and toward being an exchange. I mean, it is true that the Egyptian revolution was about 

dignity and trying to reclaim dignity, and one of the ways to, you 

know, help them do that and to create a more equal partnership 

with them is to make an exchange in which aid is given because 

they satisfy or help satisfy certain very narrow American interests. 

There may also be certain areas of common interests on which 

we can work together. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood leaders that I spoke to are as concerned as we are about the instability 

in the Sinai and the possibility that that instability will create a 

crisis between Israel and Egypt, which they say they want to avoid. 

But the point is using the aid in such a way that we are focused 

on narrow interests and not on sustaining a long-term relationship 

with military leaders who, frankly, will soon be exiting power. 

America has a record of betting on the wrong horse far too frequently in the Middle East, and I think we need to use the aid to 

be more nimble. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

One follow-up, one more thing, and then if anybody would like 

to address that. I have 2 minutes left, and I am going to stick to 

it. 

Egypt has traditionally been looked at by much of the region as 

the leader in the Arab world because of population and history and 

all the rest, and I think rightfully so. With what they are going 

through right now, how does that look in the near and long-term 

48

future, and what can we do to make sure that if they are a leader, 

that it is a leader in the right direction? 

Dr. Wittes, if you would like to—we will go down this way real 

quickly this time. 

Ms. WITTES. Thank you, and I will try to be brief. 

You know, I think your question about assistance actually links 

to this very well, because one of the new items in the Fiscal Year 

2013 budget that the administration sent up this week is a new 

$770 million Middle East incentive fund, which is designed, I 

think, precisely to get at the issue that you raise and to say that 

for those governments that are willing to make decisions that advance human freedom, that advance dignity and opportunity for 

their people, that accord with the interests that we share in democratic development, there can be this funding available. And so 

rather than having a sort of bilateral entitlement or a very narrow, 

transactional, issue-by-issue kind of aid relationship, you can have 

something that is on the basis of a shared understanding, and I 

think that might go a good way to addressing your concern. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay, thank you. 

I have got 45 seconds left. Doctor, you have got 20 seconds, and, 

Doctor, you have got 20 seconds, too. 

Ms. DUNNE. Well, I would just add that I think that the bargain 

that we reached in Egypt in the—with Egypt in the 1970s needs 

reinventing. I mean, the Egyptians understood it as as long as we 

keep the peace with Israel, we get the aid, no other conditions. And 

clearly the United States, of course, wants Egypt to keep the peace 

with Israel, but also is, you know, increasingly interested in the development and the democratization of Egypt, and therefore, you 

know, we need to have a new understanding based on that. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Thank you. My time has expired. So thank 

you very much, and I yield now for a concluding 5 minutes to the 

gentleman from New York. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank the chairman again. 

The original aid package to both Egypt and Jordan was predicated in strong measure because of their willingness to be peaceful 

countries within the region, for signing a peace accord with Israel, 

for recognizing the international treaties and obligations that they 

had, and for sticking to that. I don’t know too many who would 

argue that a stable Israel in the region as a democratic ally of the 

United States is a narrow interest, and basically the money to 

Egypt way back when—and some of us were around almost when 

that happened—it was because they were willing to do that and to 

show other countries in the region that if they followed suit, good 

things can happen to them as well. 

That money is still important to Egypt, and the principle still 

makes a lot of sense to a lot of people. I think the last thing the 

military in Egypt would like to do is to be involved in an altercation with the Israelis. They are a lot smarter than that. They have 

affirmed, and it is important for us to hear that, that they want 

to keep all of their international obligations and will quite readily 

indicate that they understand what we are saying, and they will 

verbalize it, too, and certainly have. They are an important part 

and component of this. 

49

They are in a delicate situation. The judiciary is in a delicate situation. They are supposed to be an independent judiciary, not to 

be influenced by political considerations, because we want them to 

be a democracy, or so we say, but it seems to me that some want 

them—and I am not justifying anything they have done, God forbid, in this instance. Some seem to want them to be a democracy, 

and when the judiciary makes a decision that we don’t like to investigate a case, we say, oh, no, you can’t do that; you have to forget about whatever you think your law tells you to do and do what 

we tell you to do. How would we like it if some country we have 

a relationship with said, forget about what your court just did, we 

are too important to be subject to your law? 

I mean, we are in a predicament here. If we are insisting that 

they become a democracy with an independent judiciary, how do we 

start out with disagreeing with their judiciary? And I disagree with 

their judiciary; they are outright wrong. This was a political decision, and yada, yada, yada. But I think sometimes our Supreme 

Court makes those kind of things, too, but nonetheless we don’t abdicate all of our other responsibilities. We try to move on. 

This is a complicated issue, and, yes, we cannot be pushed 

around by anybody who decides to seize our citizens. This is, in 

part, how we are going to be viewed in the region, and that is what 

diplomats are for. We have to try to figure out a way, and some 

suggestions have been made to some parties over there, and they 

are being made by some of our diplomats right now, to try to get 

this resolved in a reasonable fashion. It is not without warrant that 

we have some hope that these things can happen. There are histories that show that there were tougher incidents than this all 

over the world that have been resolved. 

I just want you to respond to that, and maybe if the chairman 

likes, we can wrap it up. 

Mr. KAGAN. Just quickly, this is not a situation where a judge 

has brought, you know, charges against citizens of another country 

and the U.S. Government or any government has to deal with that 

problem. The analogy would be more appropriate to say that the 

U.S. Treasury Secretary ordered a court to start proceedings 

against a foreign national, and that is where we—that is much 

more like where we are right now. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. But the Justice Department has taken up the 

case, and they have brought charges. 

Mr. KAGAN. That is right, at the instigation of the government. 

I agree with that. That is where we are now. It is not——

Mr. ACKERMAN. As a matter of fact, members of the SCAF were 

here at the time during the week actually meeting with me when 

they got word from Cairo, and they were very surprised that 

charges were about to be brought, and their string was pulled, and 

they left their meetings that they were supposed to have the next 

day with the Senate and hightailed it back. They were caught very 

much by surprise that the formal charges were brought, it would 

seem. But nonetheless, formal charges were brought by the courts. 

There is an investigation going on. I mean, you know, it is not a 

pure analogy, but that is what has happened. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Dr. Dunne? 

50

Ms. DUNNE. Congressman Ackerman, I would like to draw your 

attention to a statement that was put out by 29 Egyptian NGOs 

today discussing exactly this issue, is this really a genuine, you 

know, judicial case, and they go in detail in that statement into all 

the things that indicate that this is a completely political case, the 

specific choice of judges who are known to have links to the state 

security courts, et cetera. This case has been thoroughly politicized, 

and before it ever became a Ministry of Justice investigation, there 

was an extensive——

Mr. ACKERMAN. I agree with that. I am not justifying it. I think 

this whole thing is a bunch of political overhyped hokum. There is 

no merit to this case whatsoever. This is rigged, but, you know, it 

is a rigged case within a rigged system, but it is a new rigged system that is just getting started. We don’t know what to expect from 

it if they are going to be a real democracy in the end. 

But the point is there is an enigma here, and what we think we 

can demand of a country that is just starting to exercise its own 

self-notion that they have been unfettered from dictatorial rule and 

want to exercise their own self-governments under their own system, and I think when that happens, people seem to lock in when 

they are dictated to by others, even though it is an enlightened 

other in our case, as to what they have to do and what they should 

do. 

Yeah, the system is rigged, I believe that 1,000 percent, and I 

haven’t seen the statement, but I am sure it is accurate. But, you 

know, what do you do about it, given all the givens that we have, 

and we have a lot of givens here. 

Mr. CHABOT. Dr. Dunne, did you want to finish your thought? 

Ms. DUNNE. Just briefly, Congressman. I would point out that 

there are a couple of previous cases; for example, the case against 

Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim and the case against Ayman Nour. These 

were political opponents of the regime. There were politically inspired judicial cases against them, and in both of those cases, when 

the Egyptian Government decided that it had gone far enough and 

the costs had gotten too high, they found a way out of it. They referred Dr. Saad Eddin’s case to a higher court that then acquitted 

him on all charges. In Ayman Nour’s case they decided to release 

him on health grounds. So they get themselves into these situations, and they can get themselves out of it once they have decided 

to do so. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Exactly, and we are looking for those grounds 

right now. 

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Trager and Dr. Wittes, did you want to comment? 

Mr. TRAGER. I would just echo what Michele said, that that actually shows the importance of taking this moment right now to send 

a clear message that there are red lines, and that our aid is conditional and not an entitlement. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay, thank you. 

Dr. Wittes, we will conclude with you. 

Ms. WITTES. Thank you. 

I think it is important to recognize that this is the result of contention inside Egypt, and what we have to ask ourselves is who is 

it that we are trying to partner with. So we can be outraged by and 

51

make demands of and have expectations of those who created this 

problem and those who are managing this problem, but we have to 

keep our eye on the ball of the relationship we need to build with 

those who will be running Egypt in the future, and I really thinks 

that is where we should be directing the focus of our attention. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

We would like to thank the whole panel this afternoon for their 

contribution to the understanding of this issue. I think it was very 

good testimony from all four of the witnesses, and, without objection, all members will have 5 days to revise and extend their remarks or submit questions or statements of any sort. 

And if there is no further business to come before the committee, 

we are adjourned. Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 4:11 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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