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October 27, 2014 Comments submitted by the BlueGreen Alliance in response to Federal Register Notice Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act, Section 112(r)(7); Rule Modernization Under Executive Order 13650; Reques t for Information (July 31,2014) Docket Number EPA

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This document provides the recommendations of the BlueGreen Alliance in respo nse to the Environmental Protection Agency’s request for comments on potential revisions to its Risk Management Program regulations and related programs. The BlueGreen Alliance is a strategic partnership of 10 large unions and five national environmental organizations collectively representing 16 million members and supp orters.

Our comments follow the same general order as EPA’s Request for Information , but not commenting on every section of the RFI. The BlueGreen Alliance and many of its partners are members of the Coalition to Prevent Chemical Disasters and strongly

s upport the comments submitted by that Coalition.

IIB. Potential Costs and Economic Effects of Regulatory and Policy Changes

The RFI asks for information on the potential costs of amending regulatory requirements. The BlueGreen Alliance recommends that EP A put more weight on the potential costs of not using the Executiv e Order to strengthen protections against

chemical hazard.

The story of Union Carbide’s methyl isocyanate gas tragedy in Bhopal, India is a warning against simple monetization of the costs of protective policies. T he liability settlement payments of Union Carbide would have cost more than 10 billion dollars if victims of the 1984 Bhopal Disaster had been paid at the same rate as asbestosis victimsCom ments of the BlueGreen Alliance on EPA

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October 27, 2014 in the United States

. 1 This sizable amount does not begin to cover the long

- term costs of

the 300,000 living victims of Bhopal nor the lasting damage to their respiratory, reproducti ve, ocular, genetic and neuro logical health. 2

Preventing these environmental health costs must be the first priority of the EPA. When prevention strategies are likely to impact a substantial number of small entities, funding mechanisms can be created to assure that small businesses don’t pose outsized risks for their workers and surrounding communities.

The U.S. chemic al industry stands to benefit from rules that encourage innovation and new approaches to product design and production. In 2011, the BlueGreen Alliance released a report that showed how additional regulation can support job creation in the

U.S. chemical in dustry while protecting public health and the environment. The study, produced by the Political Economy Research Institute (PERI) and commissioned by the BlueGreen Alliance, shows that innovation in sustainable chemistry can reverse the industry's job shed ding trend in a market that increasingly requires cleaner, safer production.

The report

- The Economic Benefits of a G reen Chemical Industry in the United States: Renewing Manufacturing Jobs While Protecting Health and the Environment

- demonstrated that the U.S. chemical industry shed 300,000 jobs since 1992, despite production increasing b y 4 percent per year. Under th at scenario, the industry stands to lose approximately 230,000 jobs in the next 20 years. But contrary t o arguments that regulatory reform will cost jobs and stifle innovation, the report demonstrates that innovation in sustainable chemistry presents new o pportunities to reverse the job shedding trend. For example, if 20 percent of current production were to shift from petrochemical

- based plastics to bio

- based plastics, 104,000 additional jobs could be created in the U.S. economy.

II C. Items in OSHA's RFI Relevant to EPA's RMP Regulation

1c. BlueGreen Alliance Comments on Adding Agricultural Grade Ammonium Nitrate (AN)

1 Castleman B PP. Appendix: the Bhopal disaster as a case study in doub le sta ndards. In: Ives J, editor. The e xport of

hazards: trans

- national corporations and environmental control issues. London , Routledge and Kegan Paul; 1985. pp. 213

– 222.

2 Dhara VR, Dhara R. The Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal: a review of health effect s. Arch Environ Health. 2002;57:391

– 404. [ PubMed ]Com ments of the BlueGreen Alliance on EPA

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October 27, 2014 We recommend that:

• EPA list AN as an RMP chemical and require that distribution facilities, to the
greatest extent feasible, substitute AN with inherently safer alternatives, or, as a minimum, conform to the requirements of the latest versio n of NFPA 400, Chapter 11 on AN.

• EPA and other agencies should systematically research the technical efficacy,
costs, and trade

- of fs of the several reported AN substitutes or alterations (e.g., physical form, mixing with other salts, substitution by other sources of desired minerals) including any environmental and lifecycle impacts of such changes.

• EPA should develop a vigorous comp liance assistance and education campaign to reach the newly regulated parties with the relevant guidance.

1d. BlueGreen Alliance Comments on Adding Reactive Substances

There are several actions that the agency should take towards this goal, as

fol lows:

• Implement the 2002 recommendations issued the US Chemical Safety Board,

followin g its study of reactive hazards (http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/ReactiveHazardInvestigationReport.pdf).

These recommendations were wide

- ranging, including the developmen t of a publicly available database of reactivity information, with the collaboration of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and relying on data that are now largely held by industry (with the appropriate controls to address potential

liabil ity and confidentiality); the adoption of a broader list of reactive substances; and the consideration of reactive chemistry potential for mixtures or specific process conditions. It may also be advisable to adopt requirements that would trigger reactivit y hazard analyses when certain conditions exist (e.g., certain mixtures of chemicals, the presence of certain potentially reactive chemical moieties, certain process conditions or other relevant factors that may suggest potential reactive chemistry risks).

• Investigate the effectiveness, and the possible adoption of all or parts of the approach towards the management of reactive hazards of the New Jersey Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act (http://www.nj.gov/dep/rpp/brp/tcpa/), which is based on the presence of certain reactive moieties in the substances in the process, as well as other factors. These or other factors could serve to trigger obligations for the conduct of reactivity hazard analyses with tools such as theCom ments of the BlueGreen Alliance on EPA

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October 27, 2014 Reactivity Evaluation Software Tool develo ped by the Cen ter for Chemical Process Safety

• (http://www.aiche.org/ccps/resources/chemeondemand/conference

presentations/ccps

- reactivity

- evaluation

- software

- tool), or the closely related

Chemic al Reactivity Worksheet of the National Oceanic and Atmospheri c Administration ( http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/oil

- and

- chemical

spills/chemical

- spills/respo nse

- tools/downloading

- chemical

- reactivity

worksheet.html ).

2. through 6

. Additional R isk Management Program Elements, RAGAGEP,

Mechan ical Integrity Requirements, MOCs and Third Party Audits

Approximately two decades have passed since OSHA’s PSM standard a nd EPA’s RMP rules went into effect, and a great deal of experience and knowledge have accumulated in that time. Yet neither rule has been materially updated. The evidence is abundant that best practices to prevent chemical accidents have evolved a great deal since the Clean Air Amendments that triggered these two standards as evidenced. Center for Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (http://www.aiche.org/ccps), to cite only one example, has published dozens of books

and other s pecialized publications that contain new best practices. Much has also been learned from the investigation of catastrophic incidents by the US Chemical Safety Board, the British Health Safety Executive and similar agencies, as well as from the

enforcement experience of OSHA and EPA. This experience needs to be incorporated into the modernized standards. Both rules are therefore due for major review and

modernization.

The following recommendations address twenty

- six major areas where the BlueGreen

Allia nce believes there should be fundamental changes made to the OSHA PSM

standard a nd the EPA’s RMP rules:

A. Explicitly inc lude the basic management system principle of continual improvement towards the goal of reducing risks associated with any process

to the greatest extent feasible . This principle is at the core of all management system standards, including ISO quality and environmental management system standards, as well as health and safety management system standards by AIHA/ANSI in the U.S., the Interna tional Labor Organizations (ILO), and the British Standards Institute (BSI).Com ments of the BlueGreen Alliance on EPA

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October 27, 2014 B. Explicitly require, to the greatest extent feasible, the maximum use of inherently safer chemicals, technologies and processes. As proposed in the California Process Safety Manag ement propos ed regulation (9/9/2014 draft) the revised RMP should require that:

i. Facility owners and operators i dentify, characterize and prioritize each

process safety risk against the objective of preventing major incidents and eliminating to the greates t extent feasible, health and safety risks to which employees or fenceline communities may be exposed.

ii. Owners and operators i dentify and evaluate relevant inherent safety

measures and safeguards (or where appropriate, combinations of measures and safeguard s) in an iterative manner to reduce each risk to the greatest

extent feasible.

iii. Where facility owners and operators do not implement a n inherent safety

measure, the employer shall document and justify in writing: (a) why that

measure is not feasible; and ( b) why the measures it has implemented are

the most protective alternative measures feasible

.

C. Strengthen the involvement of employees and their representatives. As proposed in the California Process Safety Management proposed regulation (9/9/ 2014 draft), facility owners and operators must be required to develop, implement and maintain a written plan to ensure employee participation in

Process Safety Management. The plan shall include provisions that provide

for the following:

i. Consultation with employees an d their representatives on the development, implementation and maintenance of all elements o f

Process Safety Management;

ii. Access by employees and their representatives to all information developed on process safety management including information that migh t be subject to protection as a trade secret.

iii. A requirement that a ll employees who serve on any committee or in an advisory capacity be selected by employees or employee representatives.

iv. The develop ment
, implement ation and mainte n ance of an effective Stop

Work Authority and Hazard Reporting Program that ensures at aCom ments of the BlueGreen Alliance on EPA

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October 27, 2014 minimum:

a. The right of all employees, including employees of contractors, to

refuse work based on safety or health concerns and anonymously report hazards

.

b. The right of all employees, includi ng employees of contractors, to

recommend to the operator in charge of a unit that an operation

or process be stopped or shut down based on safety or health

concerns; and

c. The authority of the operator in charge of a unit to stop or shut

down an operation o r process based on safety or health

concerns

.

D. T he EPA should investigate the possible establishment of one or more systems of anonymous reporting of safety problems similar to the Federal Aviation

Administration’s Aviation Safety Action Program ( http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/asap/ ). The system encourages the reporting of safety

- related events anonymously in the aviation industry, even when they may involve mistakes on the part of t he reporting employee.

E. The EPA and its Working Group partners should e stablish a publicly available database repository of proven, promising and experimental inherently safer alternatives to hazardous chemicals, technologies and processes, in

colla boration with private sector partners such as chemical industry trade and professional associations, labor, academia, and other interested stakeholders.

F. The BlueGreen Alliance recommends the initiation of two or more pilot projects to actively purs ue and obtain the implementation of IST in specific processes where the economic and technical feasibility are reasonably well established. Some candidate projects are the elimination of Hydrogen Fluoride (HF) from alkylation processes in refineries, th e substitution of chlorine by inherently safer substitutes in both municipal and industrial water treatment processes, and the substitution of the currently

- used forms of ammonium nitrate by less hazardous

substitutes.

G. We further suggest that EPA and the Working Group recommend the

establish ment and implement ation of economic incentives to encourage firms to discover, test, and commercially deploy inherently safer alternatives toCom ments of the BlueGreen Alliance on EPA

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October 27, 2014 hazardous chemical processes. These incentives may entail, for exam ple, tax
relief mechanisms, “rewards” for demonstrable risk reductions or others.

H. These incentives could be paid for by substantially increasing penalties for

serious violations so the fines reflect the true toll that chemical facilities take on

th e health and safety of the American people and their environment.

I. Requirements should be established to collect and publicly report normalized and standardized process safety performance indicators that would be reported by regulated parties and made publicly available by EPA for the site, corporate and national levels. Indicators are an indispensable element for any effective health and safety management system. As the saying goes, “if you don’t measure it, you can’t manage it.” While much attent ion has been given to the difference between “leading” and “lagging” indicators, we believe that the full range of this spectrum of indicators must be utilized, and that an excessive emphasis on the distinction between them can detract attention from th e essential characteristics of effective indicators, as follows:

i. Their primary goal and attribute must be their ability to continually drive improvements in safety performance. Indicators can drive improvements at the site, corporate, industry se ctor or national levels. Indicators will also help to target enforcement efforts to the worst hazards and worst violators, as well as permit the evaluation of the effectiveness of the regulatory and industry efforts to control chemical hazards.

ii. They must be predictive of the potential for serious incidents, so they can drive improved performance. Whether they are “leading” or “lagging” will depend on the time frame envisioned for the preventive actions. For example, a process failure that leads to an unplanned release which is in turn controlled by a properly

- functioning flare is nominally a “lagging” indicator, because the unwanted event (the release) has already occurred. It is also a “leading” indicator, however, in a long er and different time frame, in the sense that correcting the conditions that caused the unplanned flare event can prevent a future system disruption and potentially a more serious event.

iii. They must be frequent enough to possess sufficient statistical ability to be as quantitatively predictive as possible. For this purpose, indicators cannot rely on counts of major incidents alone (i.e., explosions, large fires, fatalities and serious injuries), because these events are too infrequent atCom ments of the BlueGreen Alliance on EPA

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October 27, 2014 the establishment and often even at the company level to yield large enough numbers for meaningful statistical analysis, and thus permit preventive actions likely to have widespread impact, rather than largely

“one

- off” improvements.

iv. T hey must be based primarily on the failures of: 1) any of the multiple layers of protection that are part of the hazard control mechanisms for high hazard chemicals, or, 2) the systems that monitor and maintain these layers in proper operating orde r. These multiple layers nearly always exist to protect against the complex chain of events that typically lead to serious incidents. To take the example above, any unwanted flaring incident reflects a process upset or failure, and should be “co unted” as an indicator event, even if the release is adequately controlled by a flare system and does not progress to a serious contaminant release. Another example would be the detection of thinning in piping in excess of predicted behavior u nder maintenance

- monitoring protocols, even if the thinning has not yet resulted in a leak. The thinning should be recorded and “counted” as an indicator event because it can be preventive of a major future pipe failure, as well as indicative of a shortcoming in the monitoring protocol (i.e., too infrequent or otherwise inadequate). Arguably, this is a “more lagging” indicator than the earlier example. Other and even “more lagging” indicators can and should also be employed, such as maintenance and safety requests made and completed (or not) on time, corrective actions taken or not taken, number and rate of “out of range” measures of process conditions or controls, and many others, depending on the nature of the hazardous proc esses and the layers of control. In a nutshell, the indicators must be linked causally to harmful outcomes, so that they have predictive power, and they must be frequent enough to be useful for statistically meaningful analysis.

v. The EPA , in collabo ration with other members of the Working Group, industry and labor should agree upon one basic set of standardized indicators to be used by all regulated parties, to permit the collection of meaningful national statistical data and benchmarking. This core set of indicators must not exclude the use of other and more specific indicators by individual industry sectors, companies or establishments.Com ments of the BlueGreen Alliance on EPA

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October 27, 2014 vi. They must be reported at the site, company and a ggregate (industry sector) levels to upper management, including Boards of Directors and owners/shareholders, to the workforce, and to the public, to permit benchmarking and encourage improvement. While the primary function of indicators is to drive continual improvement in performance; public reporting is a key tool to incentivize and help ensure that such improvements take place.

J. Revisio ns to the RMP should, as written in the California Draft Process Safety Management regulation, include a requirement that all covered facilities must develop, implement and main tain effective written procedures to ensure the ongoing integrity of process equipment, controls, safeguards and
appurtenances. These procedures should :

i. Include a method for employees to anonymously identify and report potentially faulty or uns afe equipment, controls, safeguards and
appurtenances;

ii. Include a method for employees to record and report their observations

and recommendations to the employer in writing; and

iii. Require facility management to respond in writing within 60 calendar days

to observations and recommendations recorded and reported in writing by employees pursuant to this subsection.

iv. The facility owners and operators shall develop and implement effective

written maintenance procedures, which shall pr ovide clear instructions for safely conducting maintenance activities on process equipment, controls, safeguards and appurtenances, consistent with the Process Safety

Information.

v. Facilit y owners and operators shall provide employees and their representatives access to the procedures developed and the inspection

documents generated by this process.

K. The revised RMP should include an explicit requirement defining the roles and accountabilities of upper management in a health and safet y management system (i.e., Board of Directors, owners of private businesses, etc.), as is the case in the United Kingdom, which has a “best practice” that applies to upperCom ments of the BlueGreen Alliance on EPA

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October 27, 2014 management roles and accountabilities in a management system ( http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/indg417.pdf ).

L. EPA should include a new requirement that process management systems

must inco rporate concrete incentives for middle and upper managers to address safety effectively. Th is may require, for example, that bonuses, advancement and other rewards for middle and senior managers in the regulated chemical industry depend to a material extent on demonstrable safety performance of the activities under their authority. The incent ives must be sufficient to balance the

ever

- present pressures for short

- term productivity that can often be harmful to safety.

M. Two essential elements of the Safety Case should be incorporated in modernizing the RMP rule :

a. The financial resources that allow for the addition and maintenance of enough highly skilled and experienced, well

- compensated government officials to engage on ongoing review of PSM and RMP plans and to engage and partner with employers and worker representatives in process safety.

b. A tripartite decision

- making structure in which employers, employees and the government equally share decision

- making power in making safety decisions. In aviation, the Event Review Committees (ERCs) made up of equal numbers of representatives from managem ent, labor and the FAA who review safety incident reports and recommend corrective actions, by consensus, provide one good model of such a structure. ( http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/asap

N. M odernization of the RMP should include new requirements that e nsure that contract labor who perform construction, maintenance and repair work have the necessary skills and health, safety and job protections and are properly

trained in Process Safety Man agement.

O. Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEPs)

should be extended to all the components of PSM , not only to the few areas that are now explicitly covered by the RAGAGEP requirements. A fundamental principle of effec tive management systems and performance

- oriented approaches to regulation is the need to continually improve performance, and this can only be done if regulated facilities employ recognized and up

- to

- date best practices for all elements of the required management system. RAGAGEPCom ments of the BlueGreen Alliance on EPA

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October 27, 2014 can be defined as engineering, operation, or maintenance activities based on established codes, standards, published technical reports or recommended practices or similar documents. RAGAGEP should not be limited to activites or practices in the United States.

P. The BlueGreen Alliance further recommends that a new requirement be added

so the RAGAGEPs that underpin all elements of the standard be updated periodically

. Best practices evolve with experience, and thus RAGAGEPs must not remain static. This would ensure, for example, that the most up

- to

- date best practices are serving as the basis for the 5

- year required revisions of Process Hazard Analyses. There may also be instances when the RAGAGEPs would need to be up dated more frequently, as when a major event or research reveals previously unknown or under

- appreciated catastrophic dangers. The standard should also be revised to require that employers continually keep abreast of developments in the RAGAGEPs that a re the basis of their process safety information and their process hazard analyses, by following developments in the consensus standard(s) and other activities from which their RAGAGEPs arise.

Q. Develop and implement funding mechanisms based on fees on the regulated parties to cover the costs of inspection and auditing functions, and to ensure an adequate regulatory workforce. Consider a system that rewards safety improvements and that ties fees to the extent of risk.

R. Ensure sufficient funding for the regulatory agency to sustain an adequate and competent cadre of field, scientific and technical experts, with competitive

salaries to ensure a reasonable rate of retention.

S. Add a required element to the PSM standard to address human factors such as fatigue, worker

- machine interactions (ergonomic design) and others.

T. Modify the PSM standard to require prompt corrective actions whenever shortcomings are identified under any element of the standard (e.g., through audits, inspections, MOC procedu res, PHA revisions , etc.). Corrective actions should always follow the hierarchy of controls.

U. Establish systems to collect and report to OSHA and EPA more information on process safety incidents especially coded information about the risk factors th at

lead to them . To this effect, EPA and OSHA should explore the potential adoption or adaptation of Storybuilder, a software developed in the Netherlands and tested to a significant extent both there and in the UnitedCom ments of the BlueGreen Alliance on EPA

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October 27, 2014 Kingdom as a tool to collect and analyze major hazard incidents and better focus prevention efforts on the most important risk factors (http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrpdf/rr778.pdf). The current information gathered through accidents currently reported to the RMP database provide o nly very crude and insufficient causal or risk factor information, and they need to be

enhanced.

V. Investigate the performance of PSM and RMP among small and medium establishments, and develop requirements, guidance and incentives to improve it. The chemical manufacturing sector includes a very large number of

small and medium

- sized establishments. These may be traditional manufacturers, but many are also “specialty” chemical firms, often operating

under toll or “toll

- like” arrangements (i.e., ma nufacturing for one or a very small number of customers) as part of a supply chain to larger firms that use their chemical products. Experience accumulated in the last decades strongly suggests that a sizable number of catastrophic incidents occur in su ch small and medium

size establishments, and that their management and even their professional staff

are often ill

- informed about process safety regulations or principles. This effort should not focus narrowly on “highly hazardous chemicals that are not their facility’s primary products,” because the lack of understanding of PSM principles often exists equally for precursor chemicals or their finished products.

W. Explore the use of possible mechanisms to apply principles from product stewardship “in reverse” to the supply chain in the chemical industry. These approaches would entail imposing responsibilities on purcha sers of chemicals in the supply chain to ensure that their suppliers are using effective process safety practices. Third

- party audi t mechanisms could play a role in such schemes, as is the case in the auto industry, which requires that their supply chains meet certain minimum quality and environmental performance standards, as measured by conformance to ISO management system standa rds.

X. Align PSM to the American National Standard for Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems (AIHA/ANSI Z10, 2013). The need for this alignment is twofold. First, the PSM modernization must be such that the required management system can be integrated not only with broader health and safety management systems, but also with business management systems (e.g., financial, quality). Z10 was developed with this type of integration very much in mind. Management systems focused narrowly on h ealth and safety aspects alone cannot be successful unless they are fully integrated and part of the overallCom ments of the BlueGreen Alliance on EPA

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October 27, 2014 business management systems of an establishment. Secondly, the alignment would help to identify relevant elements that are missing from PSM and help incorporate them explicitly (e.g., management commitment, adequate resourcing of the health and safety function, training on management system principles and operations, continual improvement, etc.).

Y. C onduct vigorous compliance assistance and e ducation campaigns for all changes th at are made to the RMP.

Z. In principle, the BlueGreen Alliance supports the use of third party systems to conduct PSM audits with some important caveats. Before implementing such a system the agency must design and test the efficacy of mechanisms to ensure:

i. The competency and qualification or “certification” of the third

- party auditors;

ii. The adequacy and uniformity of auditing criteria; and,

iii. The prevention of any potential conflicts of interest affecting the

individ uals or firms conducting the audits (e.g., conflicts between auditing and consulting functions by the same parties).

Moreover, before engaging in any widespread use of third

- party audits, we also recommend that the agency carefully research the successes and failures of comparable existing mechanisms in the private sector, including those in the chemical industry (e.g., Responsible Care and ChemStewards), as well as those in place for the supply industry to the major US automobile manufacturers, which are based on auditing against ISO quality and environmental management system standards.

Additional Items for Which EPA Requests Information

BlueGreen Alliance recommendations for the implementation of safer technology and alternatives analysis are disc ussed above.

We further support a requirement for facility owner and operators to provide all the relevant information to local emergency response authorities in order to permit them to plan responses, ideally in c oordination with those owners and operat ors , as well as the creation of mechanisms so that the establishments that create the catastrophic hazard risks bear the financial burden of planning, rehearsing, and conductin g emergency response activities.Com ments of the BlueGreen Alliance on EPA

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October 27, 2014 The revised RMP should r equire improved coordin ation between fire brigades and facility fire departments including training and incident pre

- planning including quarterly reporting to the public fire agency on all incidents that occurred on

- site but were handled by plant personnel alone. This informati on should also be available to the public in a format that is easy

- to

- access and evaluate. Chemical facilities should provide financial support for public fire agencies, inclu ding for training purposes. Strategies should be evaluated to “pre

- pay” public fi re agencies for emergency response and equipment costs, including payments for overtime to back

- fill positions for the duration

of an incident, if necessary.

In addition, a me chanism to measure the costs incurred for both immediate and long

term medical services for affected surrounding communities as a result of a chemical facility incident , and to transfer the burden of those costs to the facilities responsible for

them . To do this, a system is needed to track and document both the short and longer

term health status of affected individuals, beginning with those who seek medical attention during

— and in the immediate aftermath of

— an incident.

We support new requirements for system s to effectively monitor air contaminants during unusual events and to comm unicate this information to health care providers, emergency responders and the public through the full range of potential channels and

media , as appropriate . Chemical facilities should bear the costs for the purchase and

maintenance of state

- of

- the

- art, r eal

- time air monitoring equipment and communications systems.

The modernized regulations should require an annual Clean Air and other environmental regulation compliance audit to be submitted to relevant state and federal agencies with easy to understand summary documents posted on the facility’s website and those of the relevant state and federal agencies. The EPA should develop user applications and other electronic tools to make data more accessible.

And last, to maximize scarce resources, A system mec hanism should be developed so

OSHA and EPA can conduct joint inspections of high hazard facilities, including joint prior review of RMPs submitted by those facilities under EPA rules.