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*********************************************** 
SHERI SPEER v. CITY OF NORWICH

(AC 45169)

Cradle, Suarez and Clark, Js.

Syllabus

The self-represented plaintiff appealed to this court from the judgment of

the trial court dismissing her action seeking to enjoin the defendant

city of Norwich from proceeding with a tax foreclosure sale of certain

real property she owned until the state lifted its COVID-19 restrictions.

The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that an auction of the property while

COVID-19 restrictions imposed by the state were in effect would bring

a lower sale price than would an auction when the COVID-19 restrictions

were not in place and, thus, result in an unconstitutional taking of her

property. At the hearing on the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the trial

court was informed that the property had been sold and that the foreclosure court had approved the sale. The trial court concluded that the

plaintiff’s case was moot and that the court therefore lacked subject

matter jurisdiction. Subsequent to the plaintiff’s filing of her appeal, and

after the COVID-19 restrictions had been lifted, the trial court was

informed that the successful bidder had failed to consummate the sale

and the court ordered his deposit forfeited, thereby leaving the property

unsold. Held that the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s action

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the sale of the property had

been approved by the court at the time of the hearing on the defendant’s

motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff’s appeal was moot, as there was no

practical relief this court could grant her because the next foreclosure

auction of the property would occur without any COVID-19 restrictions

in place; moreover, contrary to the plaintiff’s assertion, her case did not

fall within the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception to

the mootness doctrine, as this court was not convinced that her action

or its effect was of a limited duration such that it would become moot

before appellate litigation could be concluded, nor was this court persuaded that the questions posed were likely to arise in the future or

that issues of public importance were involved in the plaintiff’s appeal.

Submitted on briefs October 12—officially released December 13, 2022

Procedural History

Action, inter alia, to enjoin the defendant from proceeding with a foreclosure action against certain of the

plaintiff’s real property, and for other relief, brought to

the Superior Court in the judicial district of New London, where the court, Young, J., granted the defendant’s

motion to dismiss and rendered judgment thereon, from

which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed.

Sheri Speer, self-represented, filed a brief as the appellant (plaintiff).

Aimee L. Siefert filed a brief for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. In the underlying action, the self-represented plaintiff, Sheri Speer, sought injunctive relief

that would effectively prohibit the defendant, the city

of Norwich, from proceeding with a tax foreclosure

sale of real property she owned. The plaintiff appeals

from the trial court’s granting of a motion to dismiss

in favor of the defendant. The court determined that

the issues raised in the action were moot and, thus, it

lacked subject matter jurisdiction over her action. On

appeal, the plaintiff claims that (1) the court erred in

finding that the matter was moot, (2) even if the matter

was moot, the collateral consequences doctrine still

applies, and (3) the court ‘‘improperly den[ied] [her]

due process by not enjoining the tax sale proceedings

to which she was not a party and to which were subjected to the impaired functionality and limitations on

higher bids imposed [by] COVID-19 restrictions.’’ We

dismiss the appeal as moot.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. In a

prior tax foreclosure action brought by the defendant

against the Brenton Family Trust, the plaintiff moved

to intervene, asserting that she had become the owner

of record of the subject property. The trial court, Hon.

Emmet L. Cosgrove, judge trial referee, denied her

motion to intervene. After the court, Calmar, J., rendered judgment in the defendant’s favor, the plaintiff

appealed to this court, challenging the trial court’s

denial of her motion to intervene. This court affirmed

the judgment of foreclosure by sale and remanded the

case to the trial court for the purpose of setting a new

sale date. See Norwich v. Brenton Family Trust, 202

Conn. App. 905, 244 A.3d 186 (2021). After the subject

property was sold at a public auction on September 18,

2021, and the sale was approved by the trial court,

Calmar, J., on October 13, 2021, the plaintiff brought

a subsequent appeal in that action, which this court

dismissed on November 18, 2021. See Norwich v. Brenton Family Trust, Superior Court, judicial district of

New London, Docket No. CV-19-6041779-S (October 25,

2021), appeal dismissed, Connecticut Appellate Court,

Docket No. AC 45071 (November 18, 2021).

On June 15, 2021, while the foreclosure action was

still pending, the plaintiff filed the underlying action

against the defendant. The plaintiff alleged that, due to

COVID-19 restrictions imposed by the state of Connecticut, a tax foreclosure auction of property of which she

was the record owner would result in the land being

sold at a lower price than it otherwise would be without

the restrictions in place.1 The result, she alleged, would

be an unconstitutional taking of her property. The plaintiff sought a temporary and permanent injunction preventing the foreclosure sale of the property until the

state lifted its COVID-19 restrictions, as well as dam-
ages, costs, and other relief that the court deemed fair

and proper.

On June 23, 2021, the defendant filed a motion to

dismiss. In that motion, the defendant argued that the

plaintiff’s action was barred by the prior pending action

doctrine because the trial court had previously denied

the plaintiff’s motion to intervene in the foreclosure

action, which involved the same facts and issues. In

response, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law

opposing the motion to dismiss in which she argued that

the prior pending action doctrine did not bar her action.

On November 1, 2021, the court, Young, J., heard

arguments from the parties on the motion to dismiss.

At the hearing, the defendant informed the court that

the subject property had been sold and that the court

had approved the sale. The court ordered each party

to brief the issue of whether the matter had become

moot. The parties each filed briefs on the matter, and,

on November 29, 2021, the court issued a memorandum

of decision in which it granted the defendant’s motion

to dismiss. The court, rejecting the plaintiff’s reliance

on the existence of an appellate stay in connection with

appeals that she had filed as a nonparty in connection

with the foreclosure action, ruled that the matter was

moot because the property at issue had been sold and

the court had approved the sale. This appeal followed.

In her principal brief on appeal, the plaintiff argues

that the court had subject matter jurisdiction because

the matter was not moot, that the collateral consequences doctrine would apply even if the matter was

otherwise moot, and that she was denied due process

under the fifth amendment to the United States constitution. Thereafter, the defendant submitted its brief, noting therein that ‘‘the successful bidder [in the completed

and approved foreclosure sale had] . . . forfeited his

deposit, and the [trial] court has scheduled argument

to reset the sale date. In addition, [the plaintiff] has

also become a party to that pending action . . . .’’ On

October 14, 2022, this court ordered both parties to

submit supplemental briefs ‘‘addressing whether this

appeal should be dismissed as moot because (1) the

restrictions associated with the COVID-19 pandemic

that form the basis for the plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief in this action have expired, and (2) the particular tax foreclosure sale of which the plaintiff complains was not consummated and the successful

[bidder’s] deposit was ordered forfeited on May 26,

2022.’’

On October 24, 2022, the plaintiff filed her supplemental brief. Importantly, she does not appear to dispute

the facts about the failed sale or the fact that the restrictions of which she complained are no longer in effect.

She argues that the matter is reviewable, regardless of

mootness, under the capable of repetition, yet evading

review exception to the mootness doctrine.2 The defen-
dant, on November 4, 2022, filed its supplemental brief,

arguing therein that the matter is moot because ‘‘there

is no practical relief this court can order, the gathering

restrictions are lifted, and foreclosure sales can continue as they were [prior to the period of time during

which COVID-19 pandemic restrictions were in effect].’’

We are persuaded by the defendant.

‘‘Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be

determined as a threshold matter because it implicates

[this] court’s subject matter jurisdiction. . . . Because

courts are established to resolve actual controversies,

before a claimed controversy is entitled to a resolution

on the merits it must be justiciable . . . . Justiciability

requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between

or among the parties to the dispute . . . (2) that the

interests of the parties be adverse . . . (3) that the

matter in controversy [is] capable of being adjudicated

by judicial power . . . and (4) that the determination

of the controversy will result in practical relief to the

complainant. . . . A case is considered moot if [the

court] cannot grant the appellant any practical relief

through its disposition of the merits . . . . Because

mootness implicates this court’s subject matter jurisdiction, it raises a question of law over which we exercise

plenary review. . . .

‘‘It is a well-settled general rule that the existence

of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to

appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate

courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the

granting of actual relief or from the determination of

which no practical relief can follow. . . . An actual

controversy must exist not only at the time the appeal

is taken, but also throughout the pendency of the

appeal. . . . When, during the pendency of an appeal,

events have occurred that preclude an appellate court

from granting any practical relief through its disposition

of the merits, a case has become moot.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Martocchio v. Savoir, 156 Conn. App. 224, 230,

112 A.3d 211, cert. denied, 317 Conn. 922, 118 A.3d

63 (2015).

In her complaint, the plaintiff sought injunctive relief

preventing a foreclosure auction of the property until

the governor ended all COVID-19 restrictions. Since her

complaint was filed, the COVID-19 restrictions that she

complained of have been lifted. Additionally, since this

appeal was filed, the court ordered the successful bidder’s deposit forfeited, and, therefore, the subject property has not been sold. It is not disputed that, when

the property is put up for sale at the next foreclosure

auction, the auction will occur without any COVID-19

restrictions in place. As such, there is no practical relief

that this court can grant the plaintiff.

We are not persuaded by the plaintiff’s argument that,

even if the matter is otherwise moot, this court should
still adjudicate it because the capable of repetition, yet

evading review exception applies. For this exception

to the mootness doctrine to apply, the court must find

all three of the following: ‘‘First, the challenged action,

or the effect of the challenged action, by its very nature

must be of a limited duration so that there is a strong

likelihood that the substantial majority of cases raising

a question about its validity will become moot before

appellate litigation can be concluded. Second, there

must be a reasonable likelihood that the question presented in the pending case will arise again in the future,

and that it will affect either the same complaining party

or a reasonably identifiable group for whom that party

can be said to act as surrogate. Third, the question

must have some public importance. Unless all three

requirements are met, the appeal must be dismissed as

moot.’’ Loisel v. Rowe, 233 Conn. 370, 382–83, 660 A.2d

323 (1995).

In her brief, the plaintiff does not explain why the

issue raised in this action—COVID-19 restrictions

affecting a foreclosure sale—is, by its nature, of a limited duration such that there is a strong likelihood that

the majority of cases seeking to raise the issue in the

future will become moot before appellate litigation can

be concluded. Furthermore, she does not address why

there would be a reasonable likelihood of this question

arising in the future. She merely states in a conclusory

fashion that there could be ‘‘likely subsequent repeats of

the same fact patterns involving similar subject matter.’’

Finally, without stating what other questions of public

importance this issue raises, she argues in her brief

that ‘‘there does exist a substantial question—indeed,

several questions—of public importance.’’

We are not convinced that the present action or the

effect of it is, by its nature, of a limited duration so that

it would become moot before appellate litigation can

be concluded. Furthermore, because the restrictions

that were put in place in connection with the COVID-19

pandemic—itself an uncommon historic event—have

been lifted, we are not persuaded that the questions

posed in this appeal are likely to arise in the future.

Last, we are not persuaded by the plaintiff’s bald assertion that issues of public importance are involved in

this appeal. Accordingly, the capable of repetition, yet

evading review exception to the mootness doctrine is

not applicable to this case.

The appeal is dismissed.

1 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that state government mandates requiring the wearing of face masks, requiring social distancing, limiting crowds,

and imposing ‘‘rent holidays’’ resulted in artificially low real estate prices

at foreclosure auctions.

2 Additionally, in her supplemental brief, the plaintiff claims that ‘‘[t]he

effects of the sale constituted an unjust taking, even though the deposit

was forfeited.’’ Because her second claim is outside the scope of the issue

that this court ordered the parties to brief, we decline to review it. See,

e.g., Demarest v. Fire Dept., 76 Conn. App. 24, 27, 817 A.2d 1285 (2003)

(‘‘[o]rdinarily, an issue may not be raised for the first time in a supplemental
brief when the court has not ordered supplemental briefing on that issue’’).