### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE O ct obe r 25, 200 5 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. JAM ES N . H AR REL L
Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Warre n Coun ty No. F -9808 Larry B. Stanley, Jr., Judge

No. M2005- 01074-CCA -R9-C O - F iled March 6, 2006

Def endant, James N. Har

rell, see ks interlocutory

revie w of the W arren County Circuit Court’s
a ff ir ma nc e of

the Sta te ’s de nial of

his app lic a tio n f

or pr e tr ia l di ve rs ion . D e fe nd a nt i s c ha rg e d w ith vehicular homicide by

rec klessness, four c ounts of rec kless ag g ravated assault, under ag e possession and consumption of alc ohol, and under ag e driving while impaire d. After unsucce ssfully

reque sting pretria l diversion, Def

endant a ppeale d to the trial court, who de termi n ed t h at t he district attorne y g ener al had not abuse d his discr etion when deny ing Def endant’ s reque st. After

a thoroug h revie w of the re c or d a ndapp lic able la w, we a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 9; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court is Aff irm ed

T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J ., joined. J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., filed a dissenting opinion.

Mic ha e l G a lli g a n, a ndJohn Part in, Mc Min nv ill e , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, Jame s N . H arr e ll.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Pr e sto n Shi pp , As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; D a le Potter, District Attorney

Gene ral; and L ar ry Bry ant, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appellee , State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

On the a ft e rn oo n o f Jun e 8, 20 03 , De fe nd a nt, wh o wa s 1 7- y e ars -o ld, a ndtw o o f h is f ri e nd s, C.J . Holmes, and Matt Br o wn , met up with three g irls, Katie Hillis, Brooke Gre en, and Shannon Gre en, in the par

king lot of the Manche ster F ood L ion. The g roup g ot into De fe n d an t ’s pi ck-up truck, a n d Def

endant dr ove to the Par F our Mar ket wher e he, Matt, and Br ooke ente red the store wher e De fenda nt purcha sed a 12- pack of Bud Light be er. D efe ndant ca rried it back to his vehicle. Once in the vehicle, the three boy s beg an drinking beer

. Def endant drank a beer while driving . The g roup then drove to a dee r stand on De fendant’s farm where they stay ed for

approximately

15 to 45 min ute s, drinking be e r andta lki ng . T he g ro up the n le ft the fi e ld t o d ri ve aro un d a nd , a c c or din g to some witnesses, “jump h ills.” I t beg an raining lig htly , and De fendant’s vehicle’ s back e nd beg an-2-

to s we rv e . H e ov e rc or

re c te d, a nd his ve hic le sw e rv e d off the ro a d, hittin g a tr e e
. Up on imp a c t, a ll of t h e o cc u p an t s , none of w hom were wea ring seat be lts, were e

jected f rom the vehic le and we re re n d er ed u n conscious. One occupant, Shannon Gree n, died as a result of the a ccide nt. The
re ma ini ng oc c up a nts su ff e re d v ari ou s in

jurie s.
De fe nd a nt

w a s c h ar g e d a s a

j u v e n i l e , a n d t h e s t a t e s u c c e s s f u l l y s o u g h tt o h a v e h im transfe rre d and tried in adult criminal court. At his transfe r hea ring , the surviving occupants of the
ve hic le , in c lud ing Defendan t, testif ie d a bo ut the e ve nts that tr a ns pir e d le a din g up to the a c c ide nt. Those witnesses e stimated Defe ndant’s spee d to be any wher e fr om 95 miles per hour to 60 miles per hour. Additionally , various occ upants testified that they saw Def endant consume three to f our ca ns of be e r; ho we ve r, De fe nd a nt s tated that wh ile he dr a nk

fr om thr e e dif

fe re nt b e e r c a ns , h e on ly consumed a

total amount of one a nd a half beer s.
The acc ident occur

red at approximately 4:30 p.m., and at 7:07 p.m., Def endant had a blood alcohol leve l of .0205. His blood a lcohol level was rete sted at 7:45 p.m., at which time it was .0092,
w h i c h , a c c o r d i n g t o a T e n n e s s e e B u r e a u o f In v e s t i g a t i o n ( T B I) s p e c i a l a g e n t , i s t e c h n i c a l l y a neg ative blood alcohol reading . Ex pert witnesse s for both the state and defe nse testified a bout extrapolating D efe ndant’s blood alcoho l l ev el at the tim e of the acc ident from his blood alcohol l ev el s s ev er al h o u r s a ft ert h e a cc i d en t

. T BI S p ec i al Age n tM i ch ae l L i t t l e t es t i fi ed t h at b y u s i n g a f o r mu la w h ic h a ll o w s h im to e xtr ap o late b a c k to th e ti me o f th e a c c id e n t, h e e stimates that Def endant had betwee n a .04 and .07 blood a lcohol level at the time of the cra sh. Medica l examiner Dr. B ruce L evy

also testified that t

h r o ug h his ex trapolation methods, he e stimates that Defe ndant had a .06 blood alcohol leve l at the time of the c rash, whic h is consistent with someone consuming three to four beers. Charles W arr en Harlan, a noted tox icolog y expert who has testified in thousands of
c a se s, te sti fi e d tha t gi ve n the kn ow n lo w l e ve ls o f D e fe nd a nt’ s b loo d a lc oh ol, a n e xtra po la tio n to Def endant’ s blood alcohol level at the time of the ac cident wa s neither f easible nor

reliable

. Ad dit ion a lly , tw o a c c i d e n t r e c o n s t r u c ti o ne xp e rt s te sti fi e d at th e he ari ng . T he state ’s wi tne ss, a cra sh rec onstructionist with the Tenne ssee Hig hway Patrol, testified that he observe d “sca llop marks” ma de by

Def endant’ s vehicle’ s tires at the c rash sc ene an d that these mar ks indicated that Def endant’ s vehicle w as airborne. The state’s e x pert further testified that Defe ndant was tra veling at a minimum of 79 miles per hour whe n h is vehicle c rashe d. Def endant’ s expert witness, an
emeritus professor of

the Univer sityof Tenne ssee, testified that his a n al y s i s of the a ccide nt scene reve aled that De fenda nt’s vehicle w as not airborne and that the vehicle was traveling betwee n 68 and 81 mil e s p e r h ou r at th e tim e of the a c c ide nt.

D e f e n d a n tt e s t i f

i e d t h a th e d i d n o tb r ak e w h e n h e s t ar t e d t o l o s e c o n tr o l o f h i s v e h i c le beca use he believed braking would cause him to wre ck his new truc k. He testified that he has be en haunted by this accide nt and would do anything to chang e history . At the time of the tra nsfer hearing Def endant wa s working 1 2 -h o u r d ay s. His two employ ers, his g randmother and Da vid Bry an, testified that Def

endant wa s hard- working and depe ndable a nd that they believe that Def endant ha s been g reatly

aff ecte d by the ac cident and de ath of Shannon Gr een.-3-

After the ca se wa s transfe rre d to criminal court, De fe n d an t filed a pe tition for pretrial diversion, which the prosec utor’s office subsequently denied. Def endant then a

ppeale d the denial to the War

re n Coun ty Cir c uit Cou rt

. Af te r co nd uc tin g a he ari ng in w hic h th e c ou rt he ardarg ume nts by counsel, the c ourt conc luded that the prose cutor had not abused his discre tion when denying Def endant’ s reque st for pre trial diversi o n
. S pecif ically , the court found that the prose cutor’s response deny ing Def

endant’ s reque st de monstrated that he had considere d all rele v an t cr iteria, including the events c omprising De fendant’s crime, his cha rac ter, his educ ation, his employ ment history , his demonstration of re morse, and his a dmission of culpabilityor lac k there of.

I n o rd e r t o b e e lig ibl e fo r p re tr ia l di ve rsio n, a de fe nd a nt mus t no t ha ve be e n p re vio us ly g rante d pretria l or judicial diversion; must not have a pr i o r misdemeanor c onviction in which Def endant se rved a

sentenc e of c onfinement or a prior fe lony

conviction within a five- y ear period afte r completing the sentenc e or pr obationary period for

the prior c onviction; an d m u s t n o t be seeking d i v er s i on for a

Class A or B felony , a sexual offe nse, driving under the influence , or ve hic ula r a ssa ult . T e nn . Co de An n. § 40 -1 5- 10 5( B )( i) (a )- (c ) (2 00 3) . “ A p e rs on wh o is statut orily elig ible for pretrial diversion is not presumptively entitled to diversion.” State v. Y ancey , 69 S.W .3d 5 5 3 , 5 5 7 (T en n
. 2 0 0 2 ) ( ci t i n g Sta te v . Cu rry , 988 S.W .2d 153, 157 (Tenn. 1999) ).

The de cision wh et h er t o g rant pre trial diversion re sts within t he discre tion of the district attorney g ener al. See Te nn
. Cod e An n. § 40 -1 5- 10 5( b) (3 ) (2 00 3) ; State v. Hamm ersley , 650 S.W .2d 352, 355 (Tenn. 1983). The proce ss of apply ing for, adjudicating , and revie wing pretria l diversion is attended by

formulaic r

ules.

The burde n is upon the def endant, “ in the first instance, to pr ovide the prose cuting attorney with sufficient ba ckg round information and data to enable that office r t o make a rea soned dec ision to gr ant or de ny

the re lief soug ht.” State v. He rron , 767 S.W .2d 151, 156 (Tenn. 1989) , overruled on other grounds by Y

ancey , 69 S.W .3d at 559. To ca rry the burde n, an applicant should provide the prosec utor with “as c omplete an application as circ umstances war rant.” Sta te v . W

ins e tt , 882 S.W .2d 806, 810 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)

. Ev e n th ou g h th e de fe nd a nt h a s the bu rd e n to de mon str a te his or he r e lig ibi lit y

a ndsu ita bil ity for pr etrial diversion, the prosecutor has specific obligations, espec ially when he or she de nies the application. Sta te v . Cu rry , 988 S.W .2d 153, 157 (Tenn. 1999) . Our a ppellate c ourts have f

org ed the following g uidelines for prosecutors’ use when considering applications for pretria l diversion:
(1 ) T he pr os e c uto r s ho uldfo c us on the de fe ndant’s a me na bil ity to corr ection. Id. at 156. (2) The prosec utor must consider (a) the circ umstances of the offe nse, ( b ) t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s c r i m i n a l r e c o r d , ( c ) t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s s o c i a l h i s t o r y, (d) t h e p h y sical and me ntal condition of a de fendant where appropriate, a nd (e) the likelihood that pretrial diver sion will serve the ends of justice and the best interests of both the public and the-4- d e f e n d a n t. Id. ; Hamme rsley , 6 50 S.W. 2da t 35 5; see also State v. W ashington , 866 S.W .2d 950, 951 (Tenn. 1993)

. (3) “ [T] he cir cumstance s of the off ense and the nee d for de terre nce may alone justify

a de n i al of diversion, but onlyif [(a)] all of the rele vant fa ctors have been c onsidered as we ll,” Cur ry , 988 S.W .2d at 158 and (b) only

when the c ircumstance s are of such ove rwhe lming sig nif ic a nc e that th e y

ne c e ssa ri ly ou tw e ig h a ll o the r factors, W ashington , 866 S.W .2d at 951. (4) Althoug h this court has af firmed the denial of pr etrial diver sion wher e the f

ailure to a dmit the c rime and/or e x press re morse re veale d that the defe ndant had be en less than truthful with the c ourt, se e Sta te v. Karen Sue Ke lsey , No. 03C01-9603-CC-00117, slip op. at 7 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knox vil l e, Oc t. 29, 1997), perm. app. de nied (Tenn. 1 9 9 8 ); S tate v. Martha Je an Frasier , No. 01C01-9601-CC-00012, sli p op. a t 12- 13 (T e nn . Crim . App ., Na sh vil le , De c . 13, 19 96 ); Sta te
v . Ne as e , 7 1 3 S. W. 2 d 9 0 , 9 2 ( T e n n
. Crim

. A p p
. 1 9 8 6 ) , r e mo r s e per se has be en held to be immaterial in determining su i t ab ilityfor pretria l diversion, see State v . Stoney Ge ne Golden , N o
. 8 8

- 1 4 6

- III , slip op. at 3 (Tenn. Crim. App., Na shville, Apr. 12, 1989), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 1989)

. On the other hand, the failure of the def endant to admi t guilt is not, in and of itself, a pr oper ba sis for denying diversion. Se e Sta te v . D e wey L. Cl ar k , No. 03C01-9706-CR-00227, sli p o p. a t 7 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. , K no x vi ll e, July 16 , 1 99 8) ; State v. Christ ie Quick , N o
. 0 1 C0 1

- 9 5 1 0

- CC

- 0 0 3 2 3 , s li p o p
. a t 5

- 6 (Tenn. Cr im. Ap p. , Na sh vil le , F e b. 20 , 1 99 7) ; State v. Carl Capps , No. 47, sli p o p. a t 1 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. , K no xvill e , Jun e 13 , 1 98 9) ; c f. S tat e v. King , 640 S.W .2d 30, 33 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982) (pre trial diversion cannot be conditioned upon entry of g uiltyplea) , overruled
o n o th e r g ro u n d

s by State v. Sutton , 668 S.W .2d 678, 680 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984). (5 ) Ade nia l of

the app lic a tio n ( a ) mus t be writt e n a nd(b ) mus t contain not only an enumer ation of the e vidence the prosec utor considere d but also a discussion of the we i gh t g iven to eac h fac tor, State v. Pinkham , 95 5 S.W. 2d95 6, 96 0 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) ; se e Cur ry , 988 S.W .2d at 157 (explaining importance of detailed, written d en ial); W ins e tt , 8 8 2 S

. W

. 2 d at 8 1 0 , an d o f wh y u n fa v o ra b l e f ac t o rs o u t we i gh favor able one s, Herron , 767 S.W .2d at 156.
(6 ) “ I n a dd iti on to the fo re g oin g i tems wh ic h th e pr os e c uto r s ho uld include in a written rec ord, he or she shoul d also identify

‘any fac tual-5- disputes betwee n the evidenc e re lied upon and the pe titioner’s application.’” Pinkham , 95 5 S.W. 2d a t 96 0; se e W ins e tt , 882 S.W .2d at 810.

I f t he application is denied, the defe ndant may seek a writ of ce rtiorari in the trial court. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-15-105( b)(3) (2003). The Code and the appellate courts have prescribed t he proc edure for the pe titioner to follow:

(1) The compiled re cord should be attache d to the petition. W ins e tt , 882 S.W .2d at 810.
(2 ) In th e pe tit ion, the de fe nd a nt s ho uldide nti fy a ny dis pu te d f

a c ts which the prosec utor has not identified. State v. Lane , 56 S.W .3d 20, 26 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000)

. (3) The defe ndant has the burden of proving that the district attorney abused his or he r discre tion in deny ing dive rs i on, State v. W atkins , 6 0 7 S. W. 2 d 4 8 6 , 4 8 8 ( T e n n
. Crim

. A p p
. 1 9 8 0 ) , a p r o c e s s th at may e n tail s h o w in g a n ab s e n c e o f a n y s u b s tan ti a l e v id e n c e in th e r e c o rd to support the prosec utors’s denial of pretria l di v er s i o n, Lane , 56 S.W. 3da t 26 ; see State v . Houston , 900 S

. W.2d 712, 714 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Upon re ceiving a petition for certiorari filed by an ag g rieve d applicant for pr etrial diver sion, the trial court must follow a pre scribed pr ocedur e:

(1) The trial court limit s its c onsideration to the evide nce w hich was be fo re the pr os e c uto r andto the re a so ns g ive n b y the prose c uto r i n deny ing dive rsion. Sta te v . B ro wn , 700 S.W .2d 568, 5 7 0 (Tenn. Cr im. Ap p. 19 85 ); W

ins e tt , 882 S.W .2d at 809. (2) The trial court may conduct a hearing only to resolve a ny

fac tual disputes raised by

the prosecutor or the defe ndant; the court may not hear additional evidenc e. Cur ry , 988 S.W .2d at 157-58.
(3 ) T he tr ia l c ou rt

mus t a lso a dh e re to the sa me ca se -b y -c a se balanc ing pr ocedur e that is impos ed upon the prosecutor. Herron , 767 S.W .2d at 156. (4) The trial court must state its findings in writing. Id.

I f th e tria l c o u r t d e c li n e s to r e v e r s e th e p r o s e c u to r ’ s d e n ia l o f d iv e r s io n , th e d e f e n d a n t mayseek interlocutory

revie w in this court. See ge nerally T e n n
. R

. A p p
. P

. 9 , 1 0 ; T e n n
. R

. C r i m
. P

. 3 8

. If-6-

revie w is g rante d by

this court, our re view is co n fi ned to deter mining whe ther the trial court’s determination is supported by a pre ponderance of

the evidenc e. Cur ry , 988 S.W .2d at 158.

We f irst note that the state does not dispute that Def endant is an e ligible c andidate f or pre trial diversion. Thus, the resolution of Defenda nt’s appea l turns on our determination of whethe r the trial court prope rly

found that the district atto rn ey gen er al di d not abuse his discre tion when denying Def endant’ s reque st for pre trial diversion.

Def endant a rg ues that in his le t t er deny ing D efe ndant’s petition for pr etrial diver sion, the district attorney g ener al m ere ly g ave pe rfunc tory consideration to several f actor s weig hing in f

avor of pre trial diversion, including Def endant’ s attainment of a G.E.D. and his c onsistent and impressive employ ment history . The dist ri ct attorne y g ener al eve ntually

conclude d that these fa ctors we re favor able to a g rant of pr etrial divers i o n ; h oweve r, De fendant complains that the district attorney g ener al failed to articulate how these factors were weig hed. Def endant f urther c omplains that the dis tr ic t a tto rn e y

g e ne ra l f a ile d to c lari fy wh e the r t wo fa c tor s d isc us se d inhis le tte r w e re ult imate ly deeme d to be fa vorable or unfavorable to a grant of pre trial diversion: (1) D efe ndant’s stability of residenc e base d on his consistent residenc e with his pare nts and (2) his neg ligible prior involvement with the criminal justice sy stem based on juvenile tr uancy char g es filed h i s s enior y ear and an unchar g ed ac t of purcha sing a lcohol as a minor.

Def endant a rg ues that the district attorne y g ene ra l erroneously

conclude d that Def

endant d e m o n s tr a t e d l i t t l e r e m o r s e f o r h i s a c t i o n s a n d f

a i l e d t o t ak e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e m
. S p e c i f

i c a l l y, Def endant disag ree s with the district attorney g ener al’s conc lusion t h at De fendant’s protestations of re morse and sor

row are insincere

. Def

endant notes that the prosec utor’s conclusion is based on Def endant’ s testimonyat his transfe r hea ring that he did not brake when his vehicle beg an to swer ve beca use he did not wa nt to wrec k his new pick-up tr uck. How ev er , Def

endant a rg ues that the sincerity of his remorse is unrelated to his thoug hts about avoiding the ac cident befor e the ac cident
occur red. Mor eover , afte r ex plaining his motivation for not bra king, the district attorney g ener al asked D efe ndant whethe r his vehicle w as more importa nt than his pa sseng ers’ lives, and De fendant responde d that it was not. Finally , Def endant contends that the di strict attorney g ener al’s re liance
on De fe nd a nt’ s a lle g e d f

a ilu re to t ake re sp on sib ili ty fo r h is a c tio ns is i mpe rm iss ib le bec a us e thi s court ha s stated that a g rant of pr etrial diver sion cannot be c onditioned upon a def endant’ s admission of criminal conduct. See, e .g., King , 640 S.W .2d at 33.

The state asserts that the district attorne y g ener al elucidated more tha n adequate re asons for deny ing pr etrial diver sion: (1) De fendant failed to fully acknow ledg e his g uilt, (2) he demonstrated a lac k of g enuine r emorse, and (3) g ranting pretria l di v er s i o n wo u ld fail to proper ly deter future
s im il ar c r im e s
. Sp e c if

ic a ll y , th e d is tric t a tt o r n e y g e n e r a l n o te d th a t D e f

e n d a n t s o u g h t t o mi n im iz e his wrong doing by

testify ing that he was tra veling approx i m ately60 miles per hour at the time of the ac cident whe n expert and ey e witness testimony ref lected that his actual spee d was somewhe re be tw e e n 7 9 a nd95 mil e s p e r h our; he cla ime d to ha ve c on su me d o ne a nda ha lf be e rs wh ile witnesses saw him consume three or four beer s and expert testimony ref lected that his blood alcohol le ve l w a s c on sis te nt w ith c on su min g thr e e to f ou r b e e rs ; a ndhe te sti fi e d th at he didno t a c tua lly-7-

pu rc ha se the 12 pa c k of be e r al tho ug h all wi tne sse s tes tif ie d tha t he didind e e d p ur c ha se it. Ne xt, the district attorney

g ener al noted that Defendant’s expressions of re morse see med insincere when considering his testimonythat he deliberately did not brake during the ac cident to avoid wr ecking his new pick-up tr

uck. F inally , the district attorney g ener al conc luded that g ranting pretria l diversion would undermine the seriousness of D efe n d an t’ s o f f e n s ean d c o nvey a messag e that no conse quence s would result from r eckle ss behavior. We note that in his five-pag e letter , the district attorney g ener al ca

ref u l l yconsidere d and thoroug hly

discussed all criteria re levant to his pretri al d i version dete rmination, and the compre hensivene ss of his letter has g reatly aided our appellate revie w.
The c ircumst ances of the of fense (s) a nd the nee d for de terre nce may justify the denial of pretria l di v er s i o n if all rele vant fa ctors have been c onsidered, a s was done in this ca se. State v. Cur ry , 988 S.W .2d 153, 158 (Tenn. 1999). Whil e the pr osecutor in the c ase sub judice didno t us e the spec ific words of

“cir cumstance s of the offense,” he did spec ifically detail the various facts of the o f f e n s e s in h is le tt e r d e n y in g p r e tria l d iv e r s io n
. H o w e v e r , th e p r o s e c u to r ’ s r e f e r e n c e to “the pu bli c int e re st and ho w j us tic e [wo uldno t be ] se rv e d b y g ranti ng pr e -t

ri a l [sic ] div e rs ion in this
case ” is a ref ere nce to the c ircumstance s of the off enses. The prosec utor outlined Defe ndant’s illeg al pu rc ha se of

be e r a s a

se ve nte e n- y e ar- old , h is s ha ri ng of th e be e r w ith tw o o the r j uv e nil e s, consumption of beer by Def endant, and extremely rec kless driving on a narrow, hilly road at speeds up to 9 4 mi le s p e r h ou r. De fe nd a nt’ s pe tit ion fo r writ of c e rt ior ari to the tr ia l c ou rt do e s n ot c on te st any of the fa cts relied upon by the p ro s ec u t or in denying pr e-tria l diversion. I n fac t, the petition
mere ly rec ites the cha

rg es broug ht ag ainst Defe ndant, states that De fendant falls within the categ ory of statutorily

elig ible offe nders to be pla ced on p retria l diversion, and make s the bare conclusory statement that “[t] he District Attorne y Gene ral ha s abused his prose cutorial discr etion by ref using to ag ree to gr ant [Defendant] pretria l diversion.”

Def endant in this case had the burden in the tria l court of pr oving that the prosec utor abused his discr etion in deny ing pr etrial diver sion. State v. W atkins , 6 07 S.W. 2d48 6, 48 8- 89 (T e nn . Crim. App. 1980). This entails a showing t hat there is an absenc e of any substantial evidence to support the prosecutor’s decision to deny diversion. Cur ry , 9 8 8 S

. W

. 2 d at1 5 8 (c i t i n g State v. Pinkham , 955 S.W .2d 956, 960 (Tenn. 1997) ) (e mphasis added)

. Th e pe tit ion fo r w ri t of c e rt ior ari fails to s e t f orth f a c ts c on ta ine d in the re c or d w hic h w ou ld show that the prosecutor abused his discretion by deny ing diversion. The tra nscript of the c ertiora ri proce eding s in the trial court c ontains only statements by counsel for Def endant a nd the prosec utor a n d s t a t e m e n t s b y

t h e tr i a l j u d g e
. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e f a c tt h a td e f

e n s e c o u n s e l s e tf

o r t h c e r t a in disputes in the fac ts as related by the prosecutor i n his letter deny ing dive rsion, statements of c ounsel
are not evidence

. Sta te v . R ob e rts , 7 55 S.W. 2d83 3, 83 6 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 88 ); State v. Dobbins , 754 S.W .2d 637, 640 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988) . I ntere stingly , defe nse counse l did emphasize at the
certiorari hea

ring , on more than one instance, that the prosec utor failed to f ocus upon De fenda nt’s

“ a me na bil ity fo r c or re c tio n. ” Th is wa s, in fa c t, c on sid e re d by the pr os e c uto r in pa ra g ra ph 8 o f h is letter, thoug h ref

err ed to as Def

endant’ s “ame nability for rehabilitation.” The prose cutor did include-8-

Def endant’ s failure to “re cog nize” his fault in the offe nses. Howeve r, the prose cutor a lso included in his letter that: ( 1) Def

endant first stated he w as driving approximately 45 miles per hour, the n later said 60-62 m i l es p er h o u r, while expert testimony put the speed at 79 to 94 mil es per hour; (2) Def endant de nied purc hasing the bee r and state d that Matt Br own purch ased the beer , while the store’s c lerk a nd Matt Br own both stated Def endant pur chase d the bee r; (3) D efe ndant stated that he on ly dr a nk on e to one a nd on e -h a lf be e rs wh ile a ll oth e r oc c up a nts of the ve hic le wh o w e re wi th Def endant state d that he drank three to four be ers a nd expert testimony corr oborate d the testimony of hig her c onsumption; and (4) Def endant state d in his application for pretria l dive rsion that “ther e was no e vidence that he wa s under the influence of alcohol at the time of the offe nse[s] ” despite the fa c t th a t e xpe rt

a ndla y te sti mon y

sh ow e d th a t he ha d c on su me d at le a st thr e e to fo ur be e rs . Wh ile no testimonyplace d Def

endant at or above the “leg al” limit of intox ication of a n “adult,” 0.08, see T.C.A. § 55-10-401( a)( 2) and 55-10-408, clear leg islative intent establishes “impaire d” driving of a per son betwee n the ag es of 16 a nd 21 at 0.02. See T.C.A. § 55-10-415. De fendant chec ked the
answe r “no ” t o q u es t ion number 29 in the pre trial diversion application, which is “[w] as there
e v i d e n c e t h e d e f

e n d a n tw a s u n d e r

t h e i n f l u e n c e o f a l c o h o l t h a ta c t u a l l y c o n tr i b u t e d t o t h e o f

f e n s e ?”

These obse rvations ar e particularly important in light of Defenda nt’s failure to put on proof contesting the fa cts relied upon by the prosec utor. At least implicitly , the prosec utor found that Def endant’ s lack of c andor on the subjects weig hed ag ainst Defe ndant’s amenability for c orre ction. This is a permissible co n cl u s i o n by the prosec utor. See State v . Dowdy , 894 S.W .2d 301, 305-06 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)

. Re g ard ing de te rr e nc e a s a ba sis to d e ny pr e tr ia l di ve rs ion , th e pr os e c uto r d id n ot s pe c if ic a lly state that the offe nses of ve hicular homicide , rec kless ag g ravated assault, under ag e possession and consumption of alcohol, and unde rage d ri v i n g while impaired w ere crimes that ne cessitated the gen er al need for de terre nce in his jurisdiction or the state a s a whole. S e e S ta te v . Hooper , 29 S.W .3d 1, 10 (Tenn. 2000) . Howeve r, a f air re ading of Hooper , reve als that the issue was the proof
nece ssary to establish deter

renc e when deter

renc e was the s ole reason for deny ing pr obation. Id . at 3, 4, 6. De te rr e nc e in a

pr e tr ia l di ve rs ion c a se is g uid e d by the sa me c on sid e ratio ns a s d e te rr e nc e in probation ca ses. Id. at 8 , n
. 9 (c i t i n g State v. Hamm ersley , 650 S.W .2d 352, 354 (Tenn. 1983) ).

As stated above , the prosec utor properly considere d the particular c ircumstance s o f the
o f f e n s e s , a s w e ll a s D e f

e n d a n t’ s s e r io u s la c k

o f a me n ab il it y

to c o rr e c ti o n ind e n y in g p r etrial div e rs ion . T hu s, de te rr e nc e is an a dd iti on a l, not a so le , fa c tor to de ny pr e tr ia l di ve rs ion . T he re is no question that the prosec utor identified a fa ct u al b asis to deny pretria l diversion based on de te rr e nc e :
10. The State ha s considere d the deter ren t ef fect that g ranting pre- trial [si c] diversion may

have on othe rs. This wre ck to o k t h e li fe of Shannon Gre en a ndre su lte d in se ri ou s in

jurie s to fo ur

(4 ) oth e r oc c up a nts . T he tw o f e ma le survivors, B rook Gre en and K atie Hillis, have had to underg o psy cholog ical counsel a nd one has attempted suicide as a re s u lt of this incident. The defe ndant was consuming alcohol and driving well above the spee d limit on-9- a n arr o w , h il ly , tw o
- lan e r o a d

. H e n e v e r a tt e mp te d to b r ak e a f

te r lo sing
c on tr ol o f the ve hic le , v a lui ng his ne w t ruck mo re than th e sa fe ty of his pa sse ng e rs . To rewa

rdsu c h b e ha vio r w ith pr e -t ri a l [sic ] div e rs ionwo uld ha ve no de te rr e nt e ff

e c t a ndma y

we ll s e nda

me ssa g e that th e re is l itt le conseque nces to be had for driving and spee d ing r eckle ssly resulting in the d e a t h o f a n i n n o c e n tp ar t y. Parag raph 10, pr osecutor’ s letter denying dive rsion.

Ta ke n in c on te xt, th e pr os e c uto r c on sid e re d a ll o f th eo f f e n s e s an d the ir int e rr e la tio ns hip wi th
eac h other, whic h culminated in the ultimate re sults of the offe nses. I n other wor ds, deterr ence m i gh t n o t b e ap p l icable only to a cha rg e of ve hicular homicide in this case, or only to four (4)
c ha rg e s o f r e c kle ss a g g ra vate d a s sault , o r t o th e re maini ng of fe ns e s if the y ha d o nly be e n in div idu a lly committed and individually considere d. Howeve r, combining the illeg al purc hase, distribution, and consumption of beer , with rec kless driving (jumping hills) and w ith ex cessive spe ed (up to 94 miles per hour ), re sulting in the cra sh of a vehicle containing six (6) teena g ers with the death of one and serious injuries to the re maining oc cupants, a fac tual basis for de terre nce w as established.

The fa cts relied upon by

the prosec utor wer e, in ef fec t, totallyundisputed. The prose cutor c on sid e re d a ll re le va nt crite ri a
. Con sid e ri ng the pr os e c uto r’ s let te r i n it s e nti re ty , a ndno t pi e c e me a l, it is clear that ther e is substantial evidenc e to support the prosec utor’s determination to deny pretria l diversion.

The trial c ourt’s dec ision deny ing relief to D efe ndant is supported by a pre ponderance of

the evidenc e. Sta te v . Cu rry , 988 S.W .2d 153, 158 (Tenn. 1999). Acc ording ly , Def endant is not entitled to r e lie f i n th is a

pp e a l.
CO NC LU SION

Ba sed on the for eg oing r eview and analy sis, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

___________________________________ THOMAS T. WOODAL

L , J UDGE