COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elde r, Frank and Humphreys Argued at Richmond, Virginia

RICKIE ANDREW BINNS MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 1340-04-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER APRIL 19, 2005 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND Robert W. Duling, Judge Designate Gregory W. Franklin, Senior Ap pellate Defender (Office of the Public Defender, on brief), for appellant. John H. McLees, Senior Assi stant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General; Alice T. Armstrong, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Rickie Andrew Binns (appellant) appeals from his jury trial convict ions for burglary and grand larceny. On appeal, he contends the ev idence was insufficient to support his convictions because it failed to prove he was the criminal agent. We hold appellant’s own testimony, coupled with other evidence, was sufficient to identify him as the perpetrator. Thus, we affirm. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, we examine the record in the light most favorable to the Commonwea lth, granting to the evidence all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Martin v. Commonwealth , 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). The judgment will be disturbed only if pl ainly wrong or without ev idence to support it. Id.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - Circumstantial evidence is as competent as di rect evidence to prove the elements of a crime as long as the evidence as a whole excludes all reasonable hypotheses of innocence flowing from it. See, e.g. , Tucker v. Commonwealth , 18 Va. App. 141, 143, 442 S.E.2d 419, 420 (1994). Where “[t]he circumstances . . . all concur to form an unbroken chain which links the defendant to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. Bishop v. Commonwealth , 227 Va. 164, 169, 313 S.E.2d 390, 393 (1984). Unless we conclude a witness’ testimony must be rejected as a matter of law based on its inherent incredibility, we must defer to the credib ility determinations of “the fact finder[,] who has the opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses.” Schneider v. Commonwealth , 230 Va. 379, 382, 337 S.E.2d 735, 736-37 (1985). In its role of judging witness cr edibility, the fact finder is entitled to disbelieve the self-serving testimony of the accu sed, in whole or in part, and to conclude that the accused is lying to conceal his guilt. Speight v. Commonwealth , 4 Va. App. 83, 88, 354 S.E.2d 95, 98 (1987) (en banc). A trial cour t’s conclusion that the accused has lied is not substantive evidence of guilt, Tarpley v. Commonwealth , 261 Va. 251, 256-57, 542 S.E.2d 761, 764 (2001), but is “a circumstance, similar to f light from a crime scene, that a fact-finder may properly consider as evidence of guilty knowledge,” Covil v. Commonwealth , 268 Va. 692, 696, 604 S.E.2d 79, 82 (2004). “Larceny is the taking and carryi ng away of the goods and chatte ls of another with intent to deprive the owner of th e possession thereof permanently.” Lund v. Commonwealth , 217 Va. 688, 691, 232 S.E.2d 745, 748 (1977). Under well- settled principles, the exclusive “[u]nexplained or falsely explaine d possession of recently stolen goods is a fact sufficient for the judge or jury to infer that the person in posse ssion of the stolen goods was the thief.” Lew v. Commonwealth , 20 Va. App. 353, 358, 457 S.E.2d 392, 394-95 (1995); see Winston v.- 3 - Commonwealth , 26 Va. App. 746, 757, 497 S.E.2d 141, 147 (1998). This evidentiary device is known as “the ‘larceny inference.’” Winston , 26 Va. App. at 757, 497 S.E.2d at 148. A similar inference is available in a pros ecution for burglary. It is equally well established that: upon proof of a breaking and enteri ng and a theft of goods, and if the evidence warrants an inferen ce that the breaking and entering and the theft were committed at th e same time by the same person and as part of the same trans action, “the exclusive possession of the stolen goods shortly thereafter, unexplained or falsely denied, has the same efficiency to give rise to an inference that the possessor is guilty of the breaking and entering as to an inference that he is guilty of the larceny.” Sullivan v. Commonwealth , 210 Va. 201, 203, 169 S.E.2d 577, 579 (1969) (quoting Drinkard v. Commonwealth , 163 Va. 1074, 1083, 178 S.E. 25, 28 (1935)). Here, the evidence, viewed in the light mo st favorable to the Co mmonwealth, established that appellant possessed Haley H opson’s jar of coins, taken from the dresser in Bridget Branch’s bedroom at 300 South Boulevard, within minutes after Branch and Hopson awoke to find an unidentified intruder stan ding over the dresser with a flashlight. The trier of fact was entitled to accept Hopson’s testimony that the ja r appellant broke on the street as appellant fled and Hopson gave chase was Hopson’s jar, and to reject appellant’s conflicti ng claim that he obtained the jar from his friend Sheila as she attempted to purchase drugs from Hopson. See, e.g. , Montgomery v. Commonwealth , 221 Va. 188, 190, 269 S.E.2d 352, 353 (1980) (involving claim of accused that he found goods at trash dump ne ar burglarized residence); see also Covil , 268 Va. at 695-96, 604 S.E.2d at 82 (“In cases of this kind, when a de fendant’s ‘hypothesis of innocence’ is rejected as unreasonable, evidence of hi s possession of recently stolen goods is su fficient to support a conviction.”). Appellant’s exclusive, falsely explained posse ssion of the recently stolen jar, standing alone, permitted the jury to conclude that appell ant was the thief. However, additional evidence- 4 - supported this conclusio n. When Hopson awoke and saw the uni dentified intruder flee from his location beside the dresser where Hopson kept the coin jar, Hopson heard change rattling. When Hopson ran outside after hurriedly pulling on his clothes, he saw only appellant as he walked along the street. When Hopson called out to appe llant to inquire whethe r appellant had seen anyone running away, Hopson again heard th e sound of change rattling, and appellant immediately took flight and fell on the jar Hopson wa s later able to identify as his. Appellant’s statements to police and testimony at trial unequivocally established that he was the person who fell on the jar, fled from Hopson, and left a trail of blood around the ab andoned building at 303 South Boulevard. Finally, when the police trac ed the blood trail appellant left when he abandoned the broken jar and continued his flight from Hopson, they found four coats that had also been taken from Branch’s apartment during the burglary. This evidence provided additional proof that appellant was the thief of the coin jar, the coats, and the other items missing from Branch’s apartment but never recovered. This same evidence supported invocation of the inference that appellant committed burglary. Branch and Hopson testified that the d oors to the apartment were locked when they went to bed but that they left their screened windows open because it was hot. No one else had permission to be in the apartment, and immediat ely after Hopson chased the intruder out of the apartment, they discovered that one of the screens had been lifted up. Thus, the evidence established a breaking and entering and theft of goods committed at the same time by the same person or persons as part of th e same transaction, and appellant’ s falsely explained possession of some of the stolen goods shortly thereafter permitted the inferen ce that he committed burglary as well as larceny. We hold the evidence was sufficient to suppor t appellant’s convicti ons, and we affirm. Affirmed

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