Filed 4/26/17; pub. order 5/25/17 (see end of opn.)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE ex rel. KAMALA 

HARRIS, as Attorney General,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JESUS AGUAYO et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

 B262557

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. VC048452)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.

Ronald E. Wiksell; Law Offices of James T. Duff and James 

T. Duff for Defendants and Appellants.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Nicklas A. Akers, 

Assistant Attorney General, Michele Van Gelderen, Steven De 

Salvo, and William R. Pletcher, Deputy Attorneys General, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

Jesus and Sofia Aguayo (appellants) appeal from a 

judgment entered after a 22-day bench trial in this civil 

enforcement action brought by the State of California (the 

People) against appellants for violation of the unfair competition 

laws (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) (UCL).

1 The action 

arises out of a complex real estate scam through which appellants 

acquired and rented real estate belonging to others. This civil 

proceeding follows two criminal trials which resulted in 31 

criminal convictions related to the scheme, 29 of which were 

felonies.

The People proposed 1,574 violations of the UCL. The 

court subtracted 27 vandalism violations and two theft violations. 

The People also proposed 246 enhancements for violations 

against senior citizens, of which the court subtracted seven. The

court imposed a $750 penalty for each of the 1,784 total 

violations, resulting in a total fine of $1,338,000. The court then 

added restitution of $2,636,854.50 for a total of $3,974.854.50 in 

restitution and civil penalties. The court removed appellants’ 

legal and recorded claims to all 43 of the properties that were

subjects of the litigation. Finally, the court imposed an 

injunction permanently enjoining appellants from (1) prosecuting 

future adverse possession actions or quiet title actions; (2) 

recording wild deeds; and (3) bidding or buying at property tax 

sales (with one exception).

Appellants make six main arguments on appeal. First, 

they argue that their actions in obtaining properties under the 

law of adverse possession were immune from a UCL action under 

the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Second, they argue that the trial 

court’s finding that the “wild” deeds filed by Jesus Aguayo 

 

1 All further statutory references are to the Business & 

Professions Code unless otherwise noted.
3

purported to transfer a fictional interest between Jesus Aguayo 

and Sofia Aguayo was incorrect, as Jesus Aguayo had possession 

of those properties and thus an actual interest, albeit inferior to 

the record title holder’s interest. Third, appellants argue that 

they held an absolute, nondivestable interest in seven specific 

properties which they acquired by adverse possession. Fourth, 

they argue that the restitution award is not supported by the 

evidence or the law, as they were entitled to keep the rents they 

collected. Fifth, they argue that the penalties are excessive. And 

finally, they argue that the permanent injunction was beyond the 

court’s jurisdiction because it bars legally permitted conduct and 

constitutes punishment.

We find no reversible error and therefore affirm the 

judgment.

BACKGROUND

Appellants married in 1972 and raised two children. Jesus 

Aguayo worked at Security Pacific Bank, rising to the position of 

Assistant Vice President for the Credit Department. In 1979, 

Jesus Aguayo started purchasing homes for investment 

opportunities at tax sales, trustee sales, and from third parties. 

He obtained a real estate license and a contractor’s license in the 

1980’s.

The scheme

While studying for his real estate license, Jesus Aguayo 

learned about the laws of adverse possession. Beginning in 1988,

appellants began acquiring properties pursuant to the scheme 

which has resulted in this litigation. Appellants would locate 

distressed properties in the public records. Thus, their targets 

were often individuals in the midst of financial misfortune. Their 

victims included the elderly, the infirm and mentally ill, and 

heirs of recently deceased titleholders. For example, appellants 

fraudulently caused several elderly victims to sign grant deeds 
4

for zero dollars. In addition, appellants victimized individuals 

who were hospitalized or living in nursing homes. Other victims 

were in financial distress or incarcerated.

After locating a distressed property, appellants would go 

and take possession of the property. Thereafter, appellants 

would file false documents in an attempt to claim ownership of 

the property. They typically did this by creating and filing “wild 

deeds,” deeds signed by a grantor who is unconnected to the 

property. Through these fraudulent documents, Jesus Aguayo, 

using the name Jesus Duran to obscure his relationship to Sofia 

Aguayo, would purport to transfer title to Sofia Aguayo for 

valuable consideration. In fact, Jesus Aguayo had no 

transferable interest in the property and no money was 

exchanged. Appellants then filed false Preliminary Change of 

Ownership Reports (PCOR) to determine transfer taxes and to 

appraise properties after transfer. (People v. Aguayo (May 29, 

2013, B236827) [nonpub. opn.].) In the false PCOR’s, appellants 

misrepresented alleged arms-length sales, failed to disclose that 

they were married, and falsely claimed that money was paid for 

the properties.

In order to avoid alerting individuals who were legitimately 

interested in the properties, appellants would steal mail, divert 

mail and divert tax statements from the homeowners to 

themselves. For example, falsely claiming to be the property 

owner’s agent, appellants submitted change-of-address forms to 

Los Angeles County, requesting that property tax statements be

sent to their own post office box. Appellants’ strategy was 

evidenced by a handwritten note: “You do not want to wake up 

the dog.”

If appellants went to the property and found someone living 

there who was not the titleholder, appellants would fraudulently 

obtain a quitclaim deed from the victim by claiming it was 
5

necessary to clear up an alleged problem or to allow for payment 

of back taxes. In one case, appellants posed as government 

agents allegedly there to help the victim. Appellants encouraged 

people to sign deeds without explanation and without providing 

copies. When titleholders were living on these properties, 

appellants would fraudulently induce them to transfer their 

property in unconscionable transactions for little or no money. 

For example, appellants fraudulently induced one elderly victim 

who was behind on her taxes to transfer her home to appellants 

in a $0 grant deed, falsely representing that it was the only way 

she could keep her home.

In other cases where appellants found individuals living in 

the homes, appellants would force them out or bar them from the 

home. In one case, appellants falsely claimed to be the legal 

owners of a home and filed an unlawful detainer action to remove 

a family from the home. The family was not allowed to retrieve 

family pets. Appellants removed and threw away personal 

property from the homes, including clothing, furniture, family 

photos, and personal effects.

After fraudulently obtaining access to the homes, 

appellants would submit applications for building permits, falsely 

claiming that they were “owner-builder” and thus allowed to alter 

the properties. After doing unauthorized work on several 

properties, appellants rented them to unsuspecting third parties. 

Appellants conservatively estimated that they were receiving 

approximately $35,000 each month in rental income from the 

wrongful scheme.

In some cases, appellants filed quiet title actions to perfect 

their interest in the properties. To avoid a contested hearing, 

appellants served most of these actions by publication and 

deliberately failed to name people with an interest in the 

property, even when appellants knew who the titleholders or 
6

heirs were and where they lived. Appellants falsely represented 

to the courts that they did not know where the titleholders were, 

despite having reports from private investigators with title

holders’ addresses. Appellants falsely told the court that the 

property was “vacant” and “abandoned” when they took 

possession, even when they had recently evicted residents.

Through this scheme, appellants were able to claim title to 

over 100 properties in Southern California, and they became, as 

they put it, “very rich.”

Criminal and civil cases related to appellants’ scheme

On October 18, 2006, appellants were arrested following an 

investigation due to a complaint of elder abuse.

In the first criminal trial against appellants, they were 

convicted of theft from an elder or dependent adult, two counts of 

felony trespass of a dwelling, vandalism, and conspiracy. Each 

appellant was sentenced to three years probation.

In a second criminal trial, appellants were convicted of 19 

counts of filing false PCOR’s with the Los Angeles County 

Recorder’s Office, five counts of filing false tax returns, and 

related conspiracy counts. The convictions were affirmed by this 

court. (People v. Aguayo (June 10, 2010, B212334) [nonpub. opn.]

(Aguayo I); People v. Aguayo (May 29, 2013, B236827) [nonpub. 

opn.] (Aguayo II).) Appellants were sentenced to three years 

imprisonment. They completed their sentences.

In addition to the two criminal proceedings, the People 

brought this civil enforcement action under the UCL. The People 

produced evidence of appellants’ prior criminal convictions, but 

also produced evidence of more than 1,500 additional violations of 

the UCL, which covers a broader range of conduct than the 

criminal laws.

The People filed documentary evidence supporting the casein-chief on September 10, 2013. Beginning on March 4, 2014, the 
7

trial court heard live testimony. Twelve witnesses testified for 

the People. Three witnesses testified for the defense, but 

appellants presented most of their evidence through the 

testimony of Jesus Aguayo. The trial court found that Jesus 

Aguayo’s testimony was not credible. It specifically noted:

“Jesus Aguayo was questioned at tremendous 

length, and usually he was a patient, calm, charming, 

and articulate witness. But he also was willing to 

say whatever was convenient, even when it was 

obviously and knowingly false. There were many 

occasions when his duplicity was plain to the 

court. . . . [¶] This court finds that Jesus Aguayo lied 

under oath. He did so repeatedly, even on matters as 

apparently innocuous as whether he owned a truck.”

The statement of decision, final judgment and permanent 

injunction

A final statement of decision on the matter was issued on 

October 31, 2014. The court summed up the evidence on the 

Aguayo’s wrongful acts as follows: “Sometimes they took 

advantage of elderly and vulnerable people like Ella Kaspar, 

using sharp practices to get claims to land. Sometimes they 

abused the process of adverse possession to target land not theirs 

for the taking. And sometimes they filed devious quiet title suits 

to secure their ill-gotten gains, thus using the courts to defeat the 

cause of justice.” The court made it clear that a “variety of bad 

tactics” were used to claim title to all 43 properties at issue in 

this case. These bad tactics included the filing of wild deeds and 

“many other illegal, unfair, and fraudulent acts.” Such wrongful

tactics were used “for each of 43 properties.”

The trial court noted that although the recording of wild 

deeds was a “simple and obvious deceit,” Jesus Aguayo 

“continued to defend his deceitful tactic,” arguing that appellants 

performed this manipulation in order to achieve their ultimate 
8

goal of adverse possession. The court found that the Aguayos 

“used this specific deceit repeatedly, for many different 

properties.”

The trial court concluded that the People proved all three 

prongs of the UCL in that appellants’ actions were (1) unlawful,

(2) unfair, and (3) fraudulent. The court specified that where its 

ruling did not “mention a specific point or matter, the court 

accepts the evidence and arguments of the Attorney General, who 

was the prevailing party.”

The court expressly rejected appellants’ claims that the 

Noerr-Pennington doctrine immunized their actions. As to prelawsuit activity, like filing false PCOR’s, the trial court found 

that these were not petitions to the government, protected speech 

or requests for government redress. The court specified, 

“[appellants] cannot immunize misdeeds willy nilly by saying the 

misdeeds might culminate in litigation.” As for the lawsuits 

themselves, the trial court found that the Attorney General 

established that they were all shams. The court held: “The cases 

were objectively baseless. [Appellants] did trick some judges into 

signing some judgments, but this would not have happened (1) 

had [appellants] given proper notice to all interested parties and 

(2) had [appellants] revealed the full picture to the courts.”

By way of remedy, the court determined that it would 

“negate and remove by specific orders all [appellants’] legal and 

recorded claims to the 43 properties” that were the subject of the 

litigation. The court further imposed a fine of $3,974,854.50 as 

restitution and civil penalty. In discussing the restitution portion 

of the financial award, the court distinguished People v. 

Lapcheske (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 571 (Lapcheske), explaining 

that, “the defendant in that case was not violating the unfair 

competition law by running a corrupt enterprise that was large 

scale and long term.”
9

The court found that appellants had “no insight into their 

own wrongdoing. They are defiant and self-justifying rather than 

sincerely contrite.” Thus, the court concluded that there was 

reason to fear recidivism. To prevent future misconduct, the 

court imposed a specific injunction which forbade appellants 

from: “(1) prosecuting future adverse possession actions or quiet 

title actions, (2) recording wild deeds, and (3) bidding or buying 

at property tax sales (with [one] exception . . .).”

The court denied the Attorney General’s original request 

that “all of the 80 odd properties in the receivership be wrest 

from [appellants’] grasp.” However, the court agreed that all 

properties would remain in receivership until appellants paid the 

full amount of the restitution and penalty.

A final judgment and permanent injunction was filed on 

February 13, 2015.

On March 10, 2015, appellants filed their notice of appeal 

from the judgment.

DISCUSSION

I. Applicable law and standards of review

The UCL is a law enforcement tool designed to protect 

consumers and deter and punish wrongdoing. (Lavie v. Procter & 

Gamble Co. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 496, 503.) It prohibits any 

“unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” 

(§ 17200.) Each of the three types of wrongful conduct is 

recognized as distinct from the others. “‘“[A] practice is 

prohibited as ‘unfair’ or ‘deceptive’ even if it is not ‘unlawful’ or 

vice versa.”’ [Citations.]” (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. 

Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180.) 

The People may prove an unlawful act by showing virtually any 

violation of federal, state, or local law. (Ibid.) To show a

fraudulent act, the law requires a showing that members of the 

public are “‘“likely to be deceived.”’ [Citation.]” (Saunders v. 
10

Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 832, 839.) The fraudulent 

element may be proved even if there is no evidence that anyone

was “‘actually deceived, relied upon the fraudulent practice, or 

sustained any damage. [Citation.]’” (Prata v. Superior Court 

(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1146.)

Section 17203 confers on the trial court broad discretion to 

“make such orders or judgments . . . as may be necessary to 

prevent the use or employment by any person of any practice 

which constitutes unfair competition . . . or as may be necessary 

to restore to any person in interest any money or property, real or 

personal, which may have been acquired by means of such unfair 

competition.” Thus, the trial court’s imposition of restitution, 

civil penalties, and injunctive relief will not be disturbed absent 

an abuse of discretion. (People ex rel. Kennedy v. Beaumont 

Investment, Ltd. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 102, 135 (Beaumont).) 

To show an abuse of discretion, appellants must demonstrate 

that the trial court’s judgment “‘exceeded the bounds of reason.’” 

(People ex rel. Harris v. Sarpas (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1539, 

1552 (Sarpas).) Where “‘there is a [legal] basis for the trial 

court’s ruling and it is supported by the evidence, a reviewing 

court will not substitute its opinion for that of the trial court.’ 

[Citation.]” (Ibid.) “‘“[W]e accept the trial court’s credibility 

determinations and findings on questions of historical fact if 

supported by substantial evidence.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Avila 

(2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 726.)

Constitutional claims, such as those based on the NoerrPennington doctrine, are reviewed de novo, “but with deference to 

underlying factual findings, which we review for substantial 

evidence, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the 

ruling. [Citations.]” (City and County of San Francisco v. Sainez 

(2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1313.)
11

II. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine

A. Applicable law

The Noerr-Pennington doctrine immunizes legitimate 

efforts to influence a branch of government from virtually all 

forms of civil liability. (Tichinin v. City of Morgan Hill (2009) 177 

Cal.App.4th 1049, 1065 (Tichinin).) The doctrine originated in 

the context of federal anti-trust litigation. Stated generally, it 

was initially intended to ensure that “efforts to influence 

government action are not within the scope of the Sherman Act, 

regardless of anticompetitive purpose or effect. [Citations.]” 

(Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 320.) The NoerrPennington doctrine is reinforced by two constitutional 

considerations: “the First Amendment right to petition the 

government . . . and comity, i.e., noninterference on the part of 

the courts with governmental bodies that may validly cause 

otherwise anticompetitive effects and with efforts intended to 

influence such bodies. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 321.)

“The Noerr-Pennington doctrine has been extended to 

preclude virtually all civil liability for a defendant’s petitioning 

activities before not just courts, but also before administrative 

and other governmental agencies. [Citations.]” (People ex rel. 

Gallegos v. Pacific Lumber Co. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 950, 964 

(Gallegos).) “‘It is only when efforts to influence government 

action are a “sham” that they fall outside the protection of the 

Noerr-Pennington doctrine.’” (Id. at p. 965.) Efforts to influence 

governmental agencies “‘amount to a sham when though 

“ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, 

. . . [they are] actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere 

directly with the business relationships of a competitor . . . .” 

[Citation.] . . .’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) The United States Supreme 

Court has set forth a two-part test for determining whether a 

defendant’s petitioning activities fall within the so-called “sham 
12

exception” to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine: “first, it ‘must be 

objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could 

realistically expect success on the merits’; and second, the 

litigant’s subjective motivation must ‘conceal an attempt to 

interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor 

. . . through the use [of] the governmental process -- as opposed to 

the outcome of that process -- as an anticompetitive weapon.’ 

[Citation.]” (BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB (2002) 536 U.S. 516, 

526.)

Unlawful actions may not be subject to immunity under the 

Noerr-Pennington doctrine. (FTC v. Superior Court Trial 

Lawyers Ass’n. (1990) 493 U.S. 411, 421-425 [illegal boycott not 

immunized]; Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head (1988) 

486 U.S. 492, 503-504 (Allied) [refusing immunity for defendants’ 

alleged collusion].) Thus, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine does not

necessarily “immunize otherwise unlawful [activity] by pleading 

a subjective intent to seek favorable legislation or to influence 

governmental action.” (Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. 

Columbia Pictures Indus. (1993) 508 U.S. 49, 59.)

B. Appellants’ unlawful scheme is not entitled to 

immunity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine

Appellants argue that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine 

protects not only the filing of a lawsuit, but any conduct 

incidental to the filing of a lawsuit. Appellants argue that their 

conduct in filing quiet title lawsuits, and any conduct in 

anticipation of such lawsuits, was immunized under NoerrPennington. Appellants point out that they obtained judgments 

and settlements in the courts for seven specific properties, and 

that eight other properties were in litigation.

However, appellants assert that all of their conduct at issue 

in this lawsuit is protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, 

because all actions with respect to the properties at issue were
13

undertaken in anticipation of quiet title lawsuits. Appellants cite

Tichinin for the proposition that conduct incidental to protected 

petitioning activity is likewise protected by the Noerr-Pennington 

doctrine if the petition itself is protected.

Appellants’ argument is flawed because appellants 

admitted that they did not intend to file quiet title actions as to 

every property at issue in this case. However, even if appellants 

had intended to file quiet title actions for each property, we find 

that appellants’ wrongful actions do not fall within the scope of 

activity protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine because 

the actions at issue were not closely related to any legitimate 

petitioning activity.

1. The conduct at issue was not incidental to 

government petitioning

Appellants are correct that the filing of a lawsuit, and 

conduct closely related to the litigation, are generally protected 

under Noerr-Pennington. Tichinin, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at 

page 1067, confirms that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine extends 

“beyond the conduct specified in the First Amendment itself:”

“Thus, the right of free speech encompasses not 

only expressive speech and symbolic conduct but also 

nonexpressive conduct closely related to the full 

exercise of First Amendment rights, such as 

contributing money to a political campaign. 

[Citations.] In the context of the right to petition, 

collateral protection has been extended to a railroad’s 

public relations campaign aimed at influencing 

passage of favorable legislation [citation];

recommending or hiring specific lawyers to represent 

or advise union members [citations]; and, . . . 

discovery conduct, and the refusal to accept a 

settlement offer [citation].

(Tichinin, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 1067.)
14

In Tichinin, the prelitigation investigation into a possible 

conflict of interest due to an alleged inappropriate romantic 

relationship between public officials was held to be sufficiently 

closely related to the right to petition so as to be protected. 

(Tichinin, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 1067.) The court 

explained, “the prelitigation investigation of a potential claim is 

no less incidental or related to possible litigation than 

prelitigation demand letters and threats to sue, which are 

entitled to protection.” (Id. at p. 1069.) However, the Tichinin 

court noted that conduct which constitutes “a separate and 

distinct activity” from litigation is not protected. (Id. at p. 1065.)

Illegal rent skimming, trespass, theft, mail theft, fraud, 

misrepresentations to tenants, and recording false documents, 

among other things, are not protected petitioning activity under 

Noerr-Pennington and its progeny.2 Nor do these activities fall 

under the protected categories of “prelitigation investigation” or 

“prelitigation communications among parties” discussed in 

Tichinin. (Tichinin, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1068-1069.) 

Appellants present no case law suggesting that conduct so far 

removed from actual litigation is protected.3

 

2 The specific violations for which appellants were held liable 

fell into the following categories: trespass, vandalism, theft, mail 

theft, false deeds, false PCORs, diverted mail, false permits, 

illegal rents, lying to tenants, false tax returns, HOX 

(presumably homeowner’s exemptions), unconscionables, false 

deeds, no due process, and elder violations.

3 While appellants emphasize that they obtained certain 

properties through litigation, and other properties were in 

pending litigation, appellants ignore the trial court’s factual 

finding that wrongful tactics were used to acquire each of the 43 

properties at issue. The wrongful tactics, such as those listed 

above, were not reasonably related to litigation. Thus, those 
15

2. The conduct at issue was not undertaken for 

the primary purpose of influencing a government entity

Further, appellants’ wrongful actions were not undertaken 

for the primary purpose of influencing a governmental entity. 

Appellants’ wrongful actions were directed against private 

individuals and involved private properties. As explained by the 

Supreme Court in Allied, the question of whether an action will 

be granted immunity pursuant to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine 

depends on the “context and nature” of the activity. (Allied, 

supra, 486 U.S. at p. 504.) In declining to find immunity, the 

Allied court emphasized that the actions at issue took place in 

the context of a standard-setting process of a private association, 

not a governmental entity. (Ibid.) Thus, the wrongful actions 

were not undertaken for the primary purpose of influencing a 

governmental body. Similarly, here, appellants have wrongfully 

possessed private property, fraudulently obtained title to private 

property, and collected rents on private property to which they 

were not entitled. Appellants are not entitled to immunity in this 

civil restitution action simply because they intended to deceive 

the courts as well. As the Allied court explained, “[t]he ultimate 

 

properties that were the subjects of petitions before a court are no 

exception to the ruling that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is 

inapplicable. A trial court has the power to void judgments that 

were “founded upon or conceived in fraud, and [in which] the 

machinery of the law was resorted to for the purpose of enforcing 

what was known to be a fraudulent demand.” (Dunlap v. Steere 

(1891) 92 Cal. 344, 349; see also Carr v. Kamins (2007) 151 

Cal.App.4th 929, 936-937 [setting aside prior judgment where 

adverse possessor violated due process rights of titleholder by not 

giving notice of quiet title action].) Thus, where appellants’ 

wrongful actions resulted in an unjust court judgment, the trial 

court had the power to undo those judgments.
16

aim is not dispositive.” (Ibid.) Appellants’ actions are not 

immune under Noerr-Pennington.

3. Gallegos is distinguishable

Appellants rely on Gallegos. In Gallegos, the State filed a 

complaint against a lumber company alleging violations of the 

UCL. (Gallegos, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 954.) The 

allegations arose from an agreement between the State and the 

lumber company regarding the sale to the State of an ancient 

redwood forest in exchange for monetary compensation and other 

consideration, along with assurances that the lumber company 

would be permitted to harvest certain of its remaining 

timberlands in accordance with a habitat conservation plan. An 

intensive review of the agreement had occurred pursuant to the 

California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The State alleged 

in its complaint that the lumber company intentionally 

misrepresented and concealed crucial facts during the CEQA 

administrative proceedings, including submitting a report 

containing false data. (Id. at pp. 955-956.) The Gallegos court 

first determined that the lumber company’s actions were 

protected by the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47, 

subdivision (b). Although it did not need to reach the issue, the 

court then determined that appellants’ improper tactics during 

the administrative process were part of a genuine effort to secure 

approval of its plan, thus did not fall under the sham exception to 

Noerr-Pennington.

The court noted the concern for comity with respect to 

decision-making when it comes to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, 

stating that the lumber company’s “challenged activities were 

directed at the . . . independent state agencies engaged, pursuant 

to California law, in the CEQA process. We have already 

determined those activities were genuinely intended to influence 

government action, not mere sham activities intended to use 
17

governmental processes to interfere with a competitor’s business 

relationships.” (Gallegos, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 969.)

Appellants’ actions in defrauding people out of their homes 

are not akin to the fraudulent litigation tactics at issue in 

Gallegos, and we decline to expand the doctrine to encompass 

appellants’ fraudulent acts.4

III. The evidence supports the trial court’s findings 

regarding “wild deeds” 

Appellants argue that the trial court erred in finding that 

by filing wild deeds, Jesus Aguayo purported to convey to Sofia 

Aguayo a fictional interest in a piece of property that neither of 

them owned. Appellants argue that the trial court’s finding 

ignores Civil Code section 1006, which provides that:

“Occupancy for any period confers a title 

sufficient against all except the state and those who 

have title by prescription, accession, transfer, will, or 

succession; but the title conferred by occupancy is not 

a sufficient interest in real property to enable the 

occupant or the occupant’s privies to commence or 

 

4 The people did not seek UCL liability for appellants’ acts of 

filing quiet title lawsuits, and the court did not impose liability 

for appellants’ actions incidental to the filing of those lawsuits. 

Thus, we need not decide whether those lawsuits fall within the 

sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Nor are we 

required to affirm on the same basis as the trial court. (Shaw v. 

County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 269.) Instead, 

as explained above, illegal rent skimming, fraud, trespass, theft, 

mail theft, and misrepresentations to tenants, among other 

things, are not closely related to any petitioning activity under 

the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and thus fall outside of its 

protection. Further, as in Allied, supra, 486 U.S. at page 504, the 

context and nature of the conduct at issue in this proceeding 

shows that it was not undertaken for the primary purpose of 

influencing a governmental body.
18

maintain an action to quiet title, unless the 

occupancy has ripened into title by prescription.”

Appellants argue that Jesus Aguayo took possession of 

properties, and this possession gave him an occupancy interest 

which he transferred to his wife by quitclaim deed. Appellants 

cite City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 

232 (Manhattan Beach) for the proposition that a quitclaim deed 

does not require full title to be transferred. Appellants further 

cite 3 Mill & Starr, California Real Estate (3d ed. 2011) section

8.12 for the proposition that a quitclaim deed is a valid 

instrument even though the grantor does not have any estate or 

right to occupy the property.5

We assume, based on the trial court’s findings regarding 

the structure of appellants’ fraudulent scheme, that appellants 

occupied the property as set forth in Civil Code section 1006. 

However, the legal authority cited by appellants does not support 

their claim. Manhattan Beach does not suggest that a property 

occupant may transfer an interest by quitclaim deed. The case 

involves a strip of land that was conveyed to a railroad company, 

and a determination of whether the deed conveyed a fee simple or 

only an easement. (Manhattan Beach, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 

235-236.) The case provides no support for appellants’ position 

that their fraudulent quitclaim deeds conveyed any actual 

interest in the properties at issue.

Further, the treatise cited by appellants for the proposition 

that an individual need have no estate or right to occupy the 

property is not controlling authority in this court. Therefore we 

decline to consider it. Appellants have failed to show that the 

 

5

It appears that appellants intended to cite 3 Miller & Starr, 

California Real Estate (3d ed. 2011) section 8:13.
19

court erred in determining that the wild deeds, conveying a 

fictional interest in those properties, were “flagrant wrongs.”

People v. Denman (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 800 (Denman), 

supports the trial court’s determination that the wild deeds were 

unlawful. In Denman, the defendant, like appellants, targeted 

distressed properties and filed quitclaim deeds transferring the 

properties to himself despite having no right of ownership or title. 

(Id. at p. 802.) In addition, like appellants, defendant established 

renters on those properties. (Id. at pp. 805-806.) Defendant was 

found guilty of 20 counts of recording false documents within the 

meaning of Penal Code section 115, which makes it a felony to 

knowingly procure or offer any false or forged instrument for 

filing in a public office. In affirming the defendant’s convictions 

on appeal, the Denman court noted: “The documents themselves 

were false in that they transferred an interest that he did not 

have to himself and then he recorded the document, clouding the 

title of the true property owners.” (Id. at p. 809.) Similarly, here, 

Jesus Aguayo, under a false name, filed quitclaim deeds 

transferring an interest he did not have to his wife, Sofia Aguayo, 

and then recorded the document. The trial court did not err in 

finding this act to be unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent.

IV. Adverse possession is not a defense to UCL liability

Appellants contend that they have acquired seven 

properties by adverse possession, therefore they have an 

absolute, non-divestible interest in those properties under 

California law.6 Under the law of adverse possession, the 

 

6 A party may claim title to another’s land where the party 

can show: “(1) possession by actual occupation under 

circumstances sufficient to constitute reasonable notice to the 

owner’s title; (2) possession hostile to the owner’s title; (3) 

possession whereby the holder claims the property as his own 

under either color of title or claim of right; (4) continuous and 
20

possessor need not bring an action to perfect his or her claim of 

title. (Marriage v. Keener (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 186, 191 

(Marriage).) Instead, the record owner must bring an action 

within five years of the adverse possession. (Code Civ. Proc.,

§ 318.) Appellants argue that there are seven properties that 

they have adversely possessed for more than five years. Thus, 

appellants argue, the five year statute of limitation bars any 

challenge to their ownership interest in these properties. 

Appellants cite Marriage for the proposition that “‘[t]itle to 

property acquired by adverse possession matures into an absolute 

fee interest after the statutory prescriptive period has expired. 

Thus, adverse possession for the requisite period of time not only 

cuts off the true owner’s remedies but also divests him of his 

estate . . . .’” (Marriage, at p. 192.) Appellants assert that the 

running of the five-year statute of limitation bars any challenge 

to appellants’ ownership interest in these seven properties.

Appellants fail to cite any law suggesting that the laws of 

adverse possession bar a UCL claim where the adverse 

possession was based on unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent acts. 

The doctrine of adverse possession does not immunize an 

individual from criminal or civil liability for his acts. (See, e.g.,

Lapcheske, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at pp. 573-575 [adverse 

possessor may be guilty of trespass and rent skimming]; Denman, 

supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at pp. 817-819 [affirming conviction of 

adverse possessor for filing false quitclaim deeds].) In fact, an 

adverse possessor is, by definition, a trespasser. (Lapcheske, 

supra, at p. 575 [“one taking possession under color of right 

established by physical presence on the property as an occupant, 

 

uninterrupted possession for five years; [and] (5) the holder has 

paid all taxes levied on the property during those five years.” 

(Finley v. Yuba County Water Dist. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 691, 

697.)
21

is ‘in possession as a naked trespasser’”].) The adverse 

possession doctrine merely provides that a trespasser may 

eventually become a legitimate possessor under certain 

circumstances. (Ibid.)

The trial court held that each of the 43 properties at issue 

in this matter, including the seven appellants claim to have 

adversely possessed, were acquired through wrongful means. 

The wrongful acts, such as rent skimming, trespass, theft, mail 

theft, misrepresentations to tenants, and filing false documents, 

occurred before the five-year period ran.7 Because appellants 

acquired these properties through unlawful, unfair and 

fraudulent acts, it is irrelevant whether appellants eventually

met the requirements of adverse possession, and the doctrine 

does not immunize them from the penalties imposed by the court.

V. The restitution award is supported by the evidence 

and the law

The court ordered appellants to pay $2,636,854.50 in 

restitution. The restitution consists of three components: (1) 

rents collected by appellants; (2) rents collected by the court 

appointed receiver; and (3) $60,000 to Barron Fleming. 

Appellants challenge all three of the restitution awards. The 

awards are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. 

(Beaumont, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 135.)

 

7 Appellants do not cite to any specific evidence suggesting 

that the wrongful acts occurred after the properties were 

adversely possessed. Thus, we infer both due to the nature of the 

wrongs and the court’s finding that appellants “used a variety of 

bad tactics to claim title to 43 properties,” that appellants 

undertook such wrongful acts during the five-year period before 

they allegedly adversely possessed those properties.
22

A. The restitution order was not an abuse of 

discretion

Preliminarily, appellants argue that the trial court should 

not have awarded restitution of rents at all. Appellants point out 

that the trial court is not required to provide restitutionary relief 

when such an award does not accomplish justice. (Cortez v. 

Purolator Air Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 163, 180

(Cortez).) Instead, the court’s goal is to “accomplish complete 

justice between the parties, restoring if necessary the status quo 

ante as nearly as may be achieved. [Citations.]” (People v. 

Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 283, 286.) Appellants argue that 

the former position of each victim in this case was owning a “tax 

defaulted, uninhabitable, unrentable house, or vacant piece of 

land which [a]ppellants saved from tax sales and improved.” 

Here, appellants argue, because the properties will be returned to 

the rightful owners, the owners will be receiving back far more 

than what they had prior to the time appellants took over their 

properties. Upon return of these now improved properties, 

appellants argue, the victims will be receiving far more than the 

“status quo ante.” (People v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 286.) 

Any rent payments to these victims will be far in excess of a 

restoration of the status quo. In fact, appellants argue, such 

payments will be a windfall to the recipients since they will have 

already received back more than the status quo ante with the 

improved properties.

“[T]he trial court’s discretion to award restitution under the 

UCL is very broad. [Citation.]” (Beaumont, supra, 111 

Cal.App.4th at p. 135.) As set forth in section 17203, the court 

“may make such orders or judgments, . . . as may be necessary to 

restore to any person in interest any money or property, real or 

personal, which may have been acquired by means of such unfair 

competition.” The object is to return to the plaintiff “funds in 
23

which he or she has an ownership interest.” (Beaumont, at p. 

135.) The trial court’s decision to return rents to the rightful 

owners of property was in line with this goal.

Further, the court was not required to limit its award to 

returning the homes to the victims. “‘“[R]estitution, as used in 

the UCL, is not limited only to the return of money or property 

that was once in the possession of that person.” [Citation.] 

Instead, restitution is broad enough to allow a plaintiff to recover 

money or property in which he or she has a vested interest.’ 

[Citations.]” (Juarez v. Arcadia Financial, Ltd. (2007) 152 

Cal.App.4th 889, 915.) The property owners had a vested 

interest in the rents appellants collected on their properties.

Nor was the court required to find individualized harm to 

each victim by appellants’ fraudulent actions. “[T]he rule that 

restitution under the UCL may be ordered without individualized 

proof of harm is well settled. [Citations.]” (People ex rel. Bill 

Lockyer v. Fremont Life Ins. Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 508, 532

(Fremont).) The court was permitted to “‘order restitution . . . in 

order to deter future violations of the unfair trade practice 

statute and to foreclose retention by the violator of its ill-gotten 

gains.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 531.)

Finally, the trial court was not required to believe 

appellants’ evidence that they drastically improved each and 

every property after possessing such property. Some properties 

were declared public nuisances, and others were in seriously 

substandard condition. There was evidence that the condition of 

some properties deteriorated, including an admission by Jesus 

Aguayo that he kept certain properties in such bad condition that 

it was possible he could be considered a “slumlord.” The record 

shows that the trial court discounted much of appellants’ 

evidence, particularly the evidence based on the testimony of 

Jesus Aguayo. The court specifically noted that Jesus Aguayo 
24

had no independent recollection of money spent on improvements 

or the dates he allegedly possessed properties, but read from 

attorney prepared statements. The court also noted that 

appellants failed to support their claims of improvements with 

actual receipts.8

The court’s remedy is “based on appropriate factors, and it 

accomplishes the statutory objective of restoring to the victims 

sums acquired through [appellants’] unfair practices.” 

(Beaumont, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 135.) We find no abuse 

of discretion in the court’s decision to award rents wrongfully 

collected by appellants to the rightful owners of the properties.

B. The trial court did not err in determining that 

appellants were unjustly enriched by collecting rents

Next, appellants argue that they were not unjustly 

enriched by the rents because they were legally entitled to keep 

the rents. Appellants rely on Lapcheske for the proposition that 

an adverse possessor has the right to collect and retain rents. In 

Lapcheske, the defendant, who engaged in acts similar to 

appellants’ although on a lesser scale, was convicted of one count 

of rent skimming in violation of Civil Code section 890 and three 

counts of conspiracy: one to commit trespass, another to commit 

grand theft, and the third to commit rent skimming. The 

defendant asserted that he was not guilty because he entered the 

properties in question with the intent of ultimately acquiring 

them by adverse possession. The Lapcheske court reversed the 

judgment as to the conspiracy to commit grand theft, but

affirmed all other convictions. (Lapcheske, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th

at p. 576.) In discussing the reversal of the conspiracy to commit 

 

8 The court noted in its statement of decision that Jesus 

Aguayo lied about the receipts, referring to them as “the 

supposedly missing receipts that were not missing at all but 

merely nonexistent in the first place.”
25

grand theft conviction, the court noted that “an adverse possessor 

has a right equal to that of the actual title holder to place a 

tenant in possession of the property and collect rent from that 

tenant.” (Ibid.) The court concluded that the defendant “could 

not be guilty of grand theft as to the rent received because he was 

entitled to keep that rent, subject only to the obligation created 

under Civil Code section 890 . . . to apply that rent to the 

mortgage encumbrance.” (Ibid.)

Appellants’ reliance on Lapcheske for the purpose of 

reversing a restitution remedy under the UCL is misplaced. A 

conviction for grand theft is not at issue in this matter. Instead, 

appellants are liable for civil wrongs committed under the UCL, 

which condemns unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent actions. 

Appellants’ argument their actions were legal under Lapcheske 

does not address the unfair or fraudulent nature of their actions. 

Further, as the Lapcheske court noted, because the rent collection 

constituted rent skimming, it was not legal.

Two statutes are relevant to the trial court’s finding that 

appellants were guilty of unlawful activity, including unlawful 

occupation for the purpose of renting, and rent skimming. Penal 

Code section 602.9 provides that “any person who, without the 

owner’s or owner’s agent’s consent, claims ownership or claims or 

takes possession of a residential dwelling for the purpose of 

renting that dwelling to another is guilty of a misdemeanor.” In 

addition, Civil Code, section 890, subdivision (a)(2), provides that 

“rent skimming” constitutes the receipt of revenue from the 

unauthorized rental of a parcel of residential real property. Civil 

Code section 891, subdivision (f), provides that “[r]ent skimming 

is unlawful.”9

 

9 Appellants argue that under Civil Code section 890, 

subdivision (a)(1), the definition of “rent skimming” is restricted 
26

The trial court found that appellants’ acts of collecting rent 

on the properties at issue constituted criminal activity. Thus, the 

rent collection was unlawful, as well as unfair and fraudulent. 

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that 

appellants were unjustly enhanced by those rents and ordering 

their return.10

 

to using revenue within the first year of acquiring the property 

without applying it to the payments due on all mortgages or 

deeds of trust. This is incorrect. Civil Code section 890, 

subdivision (a)(1) provides: “‘Rent skimming’ means using 

revenue received from the rental of a parcel of residential real 

property at any time during the first year period after acquiring 

that property without first applying the revenue or an equivalent 

amount to the payments due on all mortgages and deeds of trust 

encumbering that property.”

Civil Code section 890, subdivision (a)(2), provides: “‘[R]ent 

skimming’ also means receiving revenue from the rental of a 

parcel of residential real property where the person receiving 

that revenue, without the consent of the owner or owner’s agent, 

asserted possession or ownership of the residential property, 

whether under a false claim of title, by trespass, or any other 

unauthorized means, rented the property to another, and 

collected rents from the other person for the rental of the 

property.” (Italics added.)

The word “also” encompasses the definition in subdivision 

(a)(2) of the statute, which is not limited to the first year after 

acquisition. Thus, it is irrelevant whether appellants engaged in 

wrongful rent collection during the first year of acquisition or in 

subsequent years.

10 Appellants also argue that the order to return rents should 

be reversed because “[a]ppellants spent $1,044,193.38 over 25 

years on the subject properties which expenses do not include 

their labor.” Appellants argue that they were not unjustly 

enriched by collecting rents because they paid more to improve 

the properties than they collected in rents. As discussed above, 
27

C. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

ordering rent money collected by the receiver to be paid as 

restitution

Appellants argue that the order requiring appellants to pay 

as restitution rents collected by the receiver should be reversed. 

Appellants argue that they did not benefit from the money 

collected by the receiver and, in fact, the money benefitted the 

properties ordered to be returned. However, a receiver “‘is an 

officer of the court whose possession of property is that of the 

court for the benefit of all persons who may show themselves to 

be entitled to it. [Citations.]’” (Pac. Indem. Co. v. Workers’ Comp.

Appeals Bd. (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 35, 40, fn. omitted.) The trial 

court determined that the victims in this case were entitled to 

those rents, and the evidence supports that determination.

D. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

awarding restitution of $60,000 to Barron Fleming

Appellants provide a brief argument, lacking in both 

factual and legal citations, regarding a victim named Barron 

Fleming. Appellants cite to two settlement agreements in the 

record. Without any explanation of the underlying issues in the 

prior lawsuits, appellants argue that because the property at 

issue was twice litigated and resolved with court approved 

settlements, they should not owe anything to Barron Fleming.

Appellants have not set forth any evidence or argument 

undermining the trial court’s findings that appellants engaged in 

conduct that was unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent as to each 

property at issue, including the property in which Barron 

Fleming had an interest. Nor have they explained why Barron 

Fleming received a different award from other victims, nor the

 

the trial court did not find appellants’ evidence regarding their 

improvement expenses to be credible. Therefore, we decline to 

disturb the judgment on this ground.
28

basis for that award. “We need not address points in appellate 

briefs that are unsupported by adequate factual or legal analysis. 

[Citations.]” (Placer County Local Agency Formation Com. v. 

Nevada County Local Agency Formation Com. (2006) 135 

Cal.App.4th 793, 814 (Placer County).)

Further, the court specifically held that the court 

judgments related to the properties were a result of fraud on the 

courts. Specifically, the court stated: “[Appellants] did trick 

some judges into signing some judgments, but this would not 

have happened (1) had [appellants] given proper notice to all 

interested parties and (2) had [appellants] revealed the full 

picture to the courts.” Appellants cite no evidence suggesting 

that the trial court was wrong in determining that the courts did 

not have the full picture when it approved the settlements 

related to the property in which Barron Fleming has an interest. 

Further, the fact that there were two lawsuits regarding the 

property in which Barron Fleming has an interest does not mean 

that he was compensated for wrongful acts that were not the 

subject of those lawsuits. We have no reason to disturb the trial 

court’s award of $60,000 as restitution to Barron Fleming for 

appellants’ wrongful acts in connection with that property.

VI. The civil penalties awarded are within the trial 

court’s discretion

Appellants challenge the trial court’s imposition of 

penalties, arguing that (1) they are being penalized for a 

legitimate activity; (2) there was no evidence of harm to the 

victims from any asserted violations; and (3) the penalties will 

leave appellants homeless and without any assets.

A. Background and applicable law

The trial court imposed $1,338,000 in civil penalties 

against appellants, consisting of 1,784 UCL violations at $750 per 

violation. The violations included 1,222 violations for collecting 
29

rents; 34 trespass violations; 42 violations for telling tenants they 

owned properties they did not own; 42 violations for rental 

agreements; 18 violations for not changing home owners’ 

exemptions; 18 tax violations, and assorted other violations.

The UCL provides that any person who engages in unfair 

competition “shall be liable” for up to $2,500 per violation. 

(§ 17206, subd. (a).) In addition, the court may impose an 

additional civil penalty of up to $2,500 for each violation 

perpetrated against a senior citizen or disabled person.

(§ 17206.1.) “‘[T]he amount of the penalty lies within the court’s 

discretion. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Beaumont, supra, 111 

Cal.App.4th at p. 127.) The trial court’s penalty is presumed 

correct. (People v. JTH Tax, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1219, 

1259). Under the abuse of discretion standard, “‘[w]here there is 

a [legal] basis for the trial court’s ruling and it is supported by 

the evidence, a reviewing court will not substitute its opinion for 

that of the trial court.’ [Citation.]” (Sarpas, supra, 225 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1552.)

“[E]quitable defenses may not be asserted to wholly defeat 

a UCL claim,” but equitable considerations may guide the court’s 

discretion in fashioning the remedies authorized by section 

17203. (Cortez, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 179.) “[C]onsideration of 

the equities between the parties is necessary to ensure an 

equitable result.” (Id. at p. 181.)

Viewing their arguments on civil penalties as a whole, 

appellants are essentially asking this court to revisit the trial 

court’s determination of the equities in this case. Appellants 

have a heavy burden, given that “[t]he court’s discretion is very 

broad.”11 (Cortez, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 180.)

 

11 Appellants provide a list of cases and corresponding UCL 

penalties. (People v. Toomey (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 1, 23
30

B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

determining the civil penalties

Appellants’ first argument is that the 1,222 rent collections 

were lawful under Lapcheske. In related arguments, they claim

that the violations for leasing the properties they did not own and 

lying to tenants about their ownership of the property was not 

improper, since they were entitled to rent the property under 

Lapcheske. As explained previously, this argument fails. 

Appellants’ rent collections constituted illegal activity under both 

 

[150,000 misleading sales solicitations resulting in penalty of 

$150,000 at $1.00 per violation]; People v. Dollar Rent-A-Car 

Systems, Inc. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 119, 132 [500,000 misleading 

and deceptive contracts, numerous oral representations and 

1,500 false repair invoices resulting in penalty of $100,000 or 

approximately $5 per violation]; People ex rel. Van de Kamp v. 

Cappuccio (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 750, 765 [592 violations of 

understating weight of purchased squid resulting in civil penalty 

of $73,528.05 or $124.20 per violation]; and People v. Bestline 

Products, Inc. (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 879, 923 [3,000 violations for 

false representation regarding income distributors could earn 

resulting in penalties of approximately $330 for each violation].) 

However, it is not our role to reverse a penalty award simply 

because other cases, decided over 25 years ago, made different 

decisions regarding penalties involving very different violations. 

The one exception is Beaumont, where the court found over 

14,000 separate violations for collecting monthly rents in excess 

of rent controls. The court imposed a fine of $525,000, or 

approximately $37 per violation. We note that in Beaumont, “the 

court’s assessment was ‘tempered’ by its finding that defendants’ 

conduct was not unfair or fraudulent but merely unlawful.” 

(Beaumont, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 130.) Here, the trial 

court’s assessment was based on violations of all three prongs of 

the UCL. Each act of the appellants was unlawful, unfair and 

fraudulent. Thus, Beaumont does not provide a flawless 

comparison, and we decline to reverse the trial court’s judgment 

because the Beaumont court made a different analysis.
31

Penal Code section 602.9 and Civil Code section 891. Appellants’ 

argument that they were entitled to the rents because they had 

physical possession of the property is incorrect. Thus, this

portion of the penalty will not be overturned.

Appellants next challenge the 34 trespass penalties, 

arguing that the trial court made no analysis of how the passage 

of time makes such a trespass lawful. (Citing Packard v. Moss 

(1885) 68 Cal. 123, 127 [“An adverse claimant of land is a wrongdoer, and as such is treated and known to the law, until, by the 

lapse of years, his acts, before tortious, are consecrated by time 

and dignified as lawful”].) The court was not required to make 

such an analysis. The trespass violations were part of appellants’ 

greater scheme to deprive individuals of their property and were 

properly considered as such. The doctrine of adverse possession 

does not immunize appellants from liability. (See Lapcheske, 

supra, 73 Cal.App.4th 571; Denman, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th 800.)

Appellants claim that they should not be penalized for 

failing to change the tax rates for the homeowner’s exemptions on 

18 homes. Appellants argue that, as non-record titleholders, they 

could not change the tax basis with the Assessor’s Office. 

Appellants cite no law in support of this argument, and it fails for 

this reason alone. Further, the People presented evidence 

suggesting that appellants could have taken steps to update the 

tax rate. The trial court was entitled to believe this evidence.

12

 

12 Appellants claim that they provided expert testimony from 

a property assessment specialist indicating that the Assessor’s 

Office would not update the Assessor’s records for an adverse 

possession until the Assessor’s Office received a court order. 

However, the people presented contrary evidence, including 

evidence of a form appellants could have used to alert the county 

to their claim and request a substitute tax statement.
32

Twenty-five penalties were assessed against appellants for 

filing wrongful quitclaim deeds on properties in which they had 

no interest. Appellants argue that they should not be penalized 

for these actions, as the deeds gave notice to the world of their 

adverse possessory interest. On the contrary, the trial court’s 

finding that the acts of filing these wild deeds were unlawful, 

unfair, and fraudulent is supported by the record. As in Denman, 

the documents were deceitful. Using a fake name, Jesus Aguayo 

transferred an interest that he did not possess. By recording the 

false documents, he clouded the title of the true property owners. 

Under Denman, these acts were illegal. (Denman, supra, 218 

Cal.App.4th at p. 809.) The penalties were therefore appropriate.

Appellants’ argument regarding the tax penalties consists 

of one sentence: “No evidence was presented that the tax 

convictions, which resulted in no tax loss, were UCL violations.” 

This argument is insufficient on its face, as it is utterly devoid of 

factual or legal support. “We need not address points in appellate 

briefs that are unsupported by adequate factual or legal analysis. 

[Citations.]” (Placer County, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 814.)

Further, appellants argue that there was no harm to the 

public resulting from their violations and that the equities weigh 

in their favor. Appellants argue that there is no evidence that 

anyone relied on the false PCORs or the wild deeds. Further, 

appellants argue, they expended thousands of hours of hard labor 

to improve properties and neighborhoods, and increased the 

values of the properties they took. Appellants argue that it was 

therefore an abuse of discretion for the court to award $1,338,000 

in penalties.

As set forth above, the people were not required to prove 

specific harm arising from appellants’ violations. (Fremont, 

supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 532.) Section 17206 mandates that 

a penalty must be assessed for every violation of the UCL. In 
33

assessing the penalty, the court must consider the circumstances, 

including, but not limited to: “the nature and seriousness of the

misconduct, the number of violations, the persistence of the 

misconduct, the length of time over which the misconduct 

occurred, the willfulness of the defendant’s misconduct, and the 

defendant’s assets, liabilities, and net worth.” (§ 17206, subd. 

(b).)

The court viewed the evidence differently from appellants. 

In contrast to appellants, the court determined that appellants 

had indeed caused harm. The court found that appellants took 

advantage of elderly and vulnerable people, using “sharp” 

practices and abusing the adverse possession process. They filed 

devious lawsuits and used the courts to defeat justice. In sum, 

they left a “long and wrongful trail” of misdeeds including 

creating false records and lying. These actions were not 

harmless. Further, the court discredited the testimony of Jesus 

Aguayo, including his testimony that he had largely improved the 

properties at issue. “‘We do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a 

witness’s credibility.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Brown (2014) 59 

Cal.4th 86, 106.)

Finally, appellants argue that the trial court did not 

properly take into consideration their financial situation. All of 

appellants’ assets have been in possession of the receiver since 

the commencement of this proceeding. Appellants state that the 

total value of the properties remaining in the receivership 

available to satisfy restitution and penalties is approximately 

$3,635,000, not taking into account the loss in value due to 

deterioration because of vacancy during receivership. Appellants 

assert that Jesus Aguayo testified that appellants’ liabilities 
34

totaled approximately $850,000.13 Appellants assert that since 

the time of that testimony, attorney fees increased by 

approximately $300,000. Appellants claim that, even putting 

aside the $1,150,000 of other debt, they do not have the assets to 

pay the restitution and penalties.

In reaching its decision, the trial court considered all of the 

equitable factors presented by the parties to this matter. This 

included consideration of appellants’ net worth. The court 

specifically found that appellants provided insufficient evidence 

regarding their net worth. The court stated: “[Appellants] have 

never submitted a net worth statement and counsel have been 

inventive with Zillow and all the rest in coming up with 

numerical figures. I’m regarding those as lawyer arguments 

rather than quantitative evidence backed claims.” Thus, the 

court did not find the referenced property values to be credible 

evidence of appellants’ net worth. In fact, Jesus Aguayo admitted 

that he undervalued some of the properties. In addition, Jesus 

Aguayo admitted that appellants hid assets from the court. 

Given the trial court’s overall assessment of Jesus Aguayo’s 

credibility, it was within the court’s discretion to disregard his 

evidence of appellants’ net worth.

Overall, appellants’ arguments simply ignore evidence to 

the contrary and the trial court’s findings. Despite the court’s 

determination that appellants ran a “corrupt enterprise that was 

large scale and long term,” the court noted that “[a] court 

imposing a penalty must strive for perspective.” Noting that we 

live in a society where courts routinely see far worse crimes, the 

court noted, “[Appellants] are culpable, but their 

 

13 In fact, Jesus Aguayo only testified to approximately 

$650,000 in liabilities, although he mentioned at least one 

mortgage on a property in receivership and did not specify the

amount owed.
35

blameworthiness is not at the top of the scale.” The trial court’s 

penalties of $750 per violation were well below the statutory 

maximum. Appellants have failed to show that the trial court 

abused its discretion in determining the appropriate amount of 

civil penalties.

VII. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

imposing the permanent injunction

Appellants argue that the permanent injunction is 

improper because it seeks to prevent appellants from engaging in 

legally protected activity and seeks to punish them. Appellants 

cite Brockey v. Moore (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 86, 103, for the 

proposition that “an injunction must seek to prevent harm, not to 

punish the wrongdoer.” Further, appellants assert that 

injunctions that “enjoin a person from engaging in activities 

which are constitutionally or statutorily authorized are beyond 

the jurisdiction of the court and are void. [Citations.]” (People v. 

Kelley (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 418, 422 (Kelley).)

The permanent injunction in this matter prevents 

appellants from doing the following:

“1. Attempting to use any form or variant of 

the doctrine of adverse possession to take any real 

property, including but not limited to initiating any 

new adverse possession claims or continuing to claim 

or prosecute any other claim of adverse possession;

“2. Attempting to prosecute, defend, negotiate, 

or settle any quiet title actions for any property;

“3. Taking any action to begin, renew, 

continue, or complete adverse possession of any real 

property in California;

“4. Transferring, purchasing, acquiring, 

swapping, disposing of, or otherwise performing any 
36

transaction involving any adverse possession 

interest, current, past, or future;

“5. Attempting to record any deeds that are out 

of the chain-of-title for any property, also known as 

‘wild deeds’;

“6. Attempting to bid on or buy, either on their 

own behalf or on behalf of any other person, or 

redeeming any unpaid taxes on, any real property 

listed at any tax sales auction in any jurisdiction in 

California, other than through a legal county tax 

auction process;

“7. Redeeming or paying any unpaid taxes on 

any real property, other than real properties in which 

[appellants] are the legal titleholder. 

“[¶] . . . [¶]

“9. Making or causing to be made any untrue 

or misleading statement in connection with any 

writing, deed, or instrument related to any

transaction involving real estate;

“10. Violating any other California law.”

Appellants assert that paragraphs 9 and 10 are sufficient 

to protect the public from any future wrongful acts by appellants 

in connection with real estate. They argue that paragraphs 1 

through 7 are improper because they bar appellants from 

engaging in legally permitted conduct.

Again, appellants face an uphill battle due to the broad 

nature of the trial court’s discretion in making any orders 

“necessary to prevent the use . . . of any practice which 

constitutes unfair competition.” (§ 17203.) This provision gives 
37

the trial court “great latitude in protecting the public.” (Brockey 

v. Moore, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at pp. 102-103.)

In this matter, court enjoined the acts which formed the 

basis for appellants’ wrongful scheme. Appellants have no 

protected right to engage in the process of adverse possession in 

the way that they did. As set forth above, the initial trespass is a 

crime, the collecting of rent on properties one does not own is a 

crime, as is the filing of false deeds. Filing quiet title actions, as 

well as redeeming taxes on properties, were also acts that formed 

the basis for appellants’ unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent 

schemes. The trial court’s decision to enjoin these activities was 

within its power and discretion.

The trial court noted its concern regarding possible future 

violations. Even before the conclusion of trial, appellants had 

made new false claims of adverse possession. The court 

emphasized that appellants “have no insight into their own 

wrongdoing. They are defiant and self-justifying rather than 

sincerely contrite. In their eyes, they are victims. There is 

reason to fear recidivism.”

Kelley is distinguishable. In Kelley, the defendants were 

individuals who had engaged in the practice of dentistry without 

a license. The injunction prohibited them from practicing 

dentistry without a license but also prohibited them from 

indicating that they would construct, alter, repair, or sell any 

bridge, crown, denture, or other prosthetic appliance or 

orthodontic appliance. (Kelley, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d at p. 421.) 

The Court of Appeal found the injunction unconstitutionally 

overbroad because the construction of bridges, crowns and 

dentures is exempt from the Dental Practices Act. Thus, the 

injunction prevented the individuals from engaging in lawful 

work activity. (Id. at p. 422.) Here, in contrast, the form of 

adverse possession undertaken by appellants is not lawful. The 
38

trial court properly enjoined each independent act in furtherance 

of appellants’ wrongful scheme.

Appellants assert that they know what they have done 

wrong, and will not “repeat mistakes of the past.” The trial court 

did not believe this, finding instead that they had no remorse or 

insight into their own wrongdoing. The trial court’s decision to 

enjoin each precise misdeed in appellants’ wrongful scheme was 

designed to ensure the protection of the public.

Further, the injunction is not as broad as initially proposed. 

The court noted that it “initially suggested the injunction also 

should bar [appellants] from obtaining real property (unless it is 

from people represented by independent counsel). [Appellants] 

have convinced the court this element is unnecessary and 

unwise.” Thus, appellants are not barred from obtaining real 

property in the future. In addition, the injunction expressly does 

not apply to any real estate of which the appellants owned a 100

percent fee simple share as of the date of the order. 

Thus, the injunction only bars appellants from obtaining 

property through adverse possession. The order is within the 

court’s power and discretion.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

_____________________, Acting P. J.

CHAVEZ

We concur:

_______________________, J. _________________________, J.*

HOFFSTADT GOODMAN

____________________________________________________________

* Retired Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by 

the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.
1

Filed 5/25/17

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF 

CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE ex rel. KAMALA 

HARRIS, as Attorney General,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JESUS AGUAYO et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

 B262557

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. VC048452)

 ORDER FOR PUBLICATION

THE COURT:*

The opinion in the above entitled matter filed on April 

26, 2017, was not certified for publication.

For good cause it now appears that the opinion should 

be published in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.
2

* CHAVEZ, Acting P. J., HOFFSTADT, J., GOODMAN, J.†

†Retired Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned 

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.