Filed 5/22/19; Certified for Publication 6/12/19 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

UNITED GRAND CORPORATION,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

MALIBU HILLBILLIES, LLC, et al.,

Defendants and Respondents;

CYRUS SANAI,

Objector and Appellant.

B283833

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BC554172)

APPEAL from orders and a judgment of the Superior 

Court of Los Angeles County, Mark Borenstein, Edward B. 

Moreton, and David Sotelo, Judges. Orders dismissed, judgment 

affirmed.

Cyrus Sanai for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Cyrus Sanai, in. pro. per., for Objector and Appellant.

Cozen O’Connor, Erik L. Jackson and Nathan Dooley for 

Defendants and Respondents.

D. Joshua Staub, in. pro. per., for Real Party in Interest.

_________________________
2

INTRODUCTION

This is the fifth and presumably final appeal in a lawsuit 

which began in August 2014 as a garden variety commercial rent 

dispute. In brief, Malibu Hillbillies LLC did not pay rent to its 

landlord, appellant United Grand Corporation. United Grand 

filed a civil action to recover the overdue rent from Malibu 

Hillbillies and its guarantor, respondent Marcie Stollof. 

Although appellant United Grand Corporation sought less than 

$50,000 in unpaid rent and quickly obtained default judgments

against its tenant, Malibu Hillbillies LLC, and guarantor Stollof, 

in the year and a half following the default judgment, United 

Grand sought almost $2 million in attorney fees for its efforts to 

enforce the judgment against respondent Marcie Stollof.

Early on in the life of this lawsuit, the trial court vacated 

the default judgment against Stollof only and set the matter for 

trial as to Stollof only. Nonetheless, while awaiting trial on the 

complaint against her, she deposited the unpaid rent and accrued 

interest with the Los Angeles Superior Court. United Grand took 

the money. Upon learning of the payment, the trial court vacated 

the trial date, found that United Grand had engaged in extensive 

misconduct throughout the duration of this action and imposed a 

terminating sanction striking from the complaint United Grand’s 

prayer for attorney fees. This was, however, only a partial 

sanction, as the trial court also entered judgment in favor of 

United Grand and against Stollof in the amount of the unpaid 

rent and accrued interest she had already paid and United Grand 

had already received.

United Grand and its attorney Cyrus Sanai appeal from the 

judgment striking the prayer for attorney fees. They also state 

they are appealing from an order dissolving an injunction, 
3

sanctions orders against Sanai of less than $5000 and an order 

denying attorney fees on appeal. While United Grand’s 

statement of appealability is clear and supported by relevant 

legal citations, the same cannot be said for its discussion of those 

issues. 

“In order to demonstrate error, an appellant must supply 

the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by 

legal analysis and citation to the record.” (City of Santa Maria v. 

Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286–287.) United Grand has 

failed to meet this requirement for most of the issues it raises. 

As set out below, many of its claims are forfeited. (Ibid.) The few 

cognizable isolated claims of error are meritless. We affirm the 

judgment of dismissal, the order dissolving the injunction and the 

order denying attorney fees on appeal.

The sanctions identified in the statement of appealability 

are owed by United Grand’s attorney Cyrus Sanai to Stollof’s 

counsel Joshua Staub. Staub, who is a real party in interest as to 

the sanctions orders, has moved to dismiss the appeal from the 

sanctions orders under the disentitlement doctrine, as Sanai has 

been found in contempt of court for failing to pay those sanctions 

and he is the subject of an outstanding bench warrant. We 

dismiss the appeal from the sanctions orders. 

BACKGROUND

In August 2014, United Grand began this action by filing a 

form complaint alleging Malibu Hillbillies breached its 

commercial lease with United Grand and Stollof breached her 

guaranty agreement. United Grand sought unpaid rent in the 

amount of $46,395.86, attorney fees, and costs. United Grand

quickly obtained default judgments against Malibu Hillbillies 

and Stollof. On April 13, 2015, Judge Rosenblatt entered 
4

judgment in the amount of $67,852.55 against Malibu Hillbillies

and Stollof “jointly and severally.” The total amount of the 

amended judgment filed May 6, 2015, included $21,120 in 

attorney fees through February 11, 2015 and $955.00 in costs. 

The next three years of this action involved four appeals 

and one petition for writ of habeas corpus, but little discovery and 

no trial. Rather, almost all the proceedings involved disputes 

over attorney fees in one form or another. 

After entry of judgment United Grand focused its collection 

efforts on Stollof, who resided in Maryland. Despite the 

essentially uncontested nature of the case, United Grand’s 

attorney Cyrus Sanai continued to generate a large amount of 

attorney fees on the case. On April 29, 2015, United Grand 

executed a Memorandum of Costs seeking $25,380 for postjudgment attorney fees from February 11 to April 29, 2015. 

United Grand enrolled its judgment in Maryland on 

May 29, 2015. 

In a second memorandum of costs filed June 2, 2015, 

United Grand sought an additional $41,030.20 in attorney fees 

for a one-month period. Thus, within six weeks of the April 13 

judgment, United Grand sought $66,410.20 in post-judgment 

attorney fees for enforcement of a $67,852.55 judgment. 

In July 2015, Stollof tried to settle the case by offering to 

pay the amount of the April 13, 2015 judgment. United Grand

refused the offer. United Grand’s attorney Sanai explained his 

view of the litigation in the letter refusing the offer: “What your 

client did not realize was that once judgment was entered, 

unopposed requests for post-judgment attorney fees would be 

rubber-stamped, and that myself and Maryland counsel could, if 

we took post-judgment fees on contingency, obtain a multiplier on 
5

our lodestone rates.” United Grand’s counter-proposal was that 

Stollof pay $255,318.59. 

Concurrently with United Grand’s July 2015 settlement 

proposal, United Grand served a third memorandum of costs 

seeking $107,768.95 in attorney fees for the period June 3 

through July 14, 2015. Thus, in less than a year after filing this 

essentially uncontested lawsuit, United Grand sought 

$195,299.15 in attorney fees, which totaled four times the 

amount of the unpaid rent which the lawsuit has been brought to 

recover.

Faced with this disproportionately large demand for 

attorney fees, Stollof elected to move to set aside the default 

judgment against her. While her motion was pending, Stollof 

also moved to tax costs. By the time she filed the motion on 

August 13, 2015, United Grand had filed a fourth memorandum

of costs seeking $159,939.27 for a total of $355,238.42 in attorney 

fees for more than 125 hours of work. In November 2015, Judge 

Borenstein awarded reduced attorney fees of $7,000 for 14.5

hours of work and costs of $240. 

United Grand also pressed on with some post-judgment 

discovery, and in October 2015 it obtained discovery sanctions 

against Stollof in the amount of $2,500. Stollof promptly paid the 

sanctions. 

On December 24, 2015, Judge Rosenblatt granted Stollof’s 

motion to set aside the default judgment against her. Malibu 

Hillbillies also moved to set aside the default judgment against it, 

but that motion was denied. United Grand appealed the trial 

court’s order granting Stollof’s motion and Malibu Hillbillies

appealed the order denying its motion. (B268544 & B270076) 

Neither appeal was successful. The next step should have been 
6

to try the action against Stollof and to enforce the default 

judgment against Malibu Hillbillies. 

By March 2016, United Grand had not filed a “code 

compliant” acknowledgement of satisfaction of judgment for the 

discovery sanctions Stollof had paid in October 2015. Stollof filed 

a motion to compel United Grand to file such an 

acknowledgement. The trial court granted the motion and 

ordered United Grand to file a “code compliant” 

acknowledgement by May 6, 2016. The court also ordered United 

Grand’s attorney Sanai to pay Stollof’s counsel Joshua Staub 

attorney fees in the amount of $500 by June 1, 2016. This order 

was later amended nunc pro tunc to require United Grand, not 

Sanai, to pay the fees. 

On May 4, 2016, United Grand filed a noncompliant 

acknowledgement. Stollof filed a request to show cause initiating 

indirect contempt proceedings against United Grand. On May 

24, United Grand again filed a noncompliant acknowledgement. 

The court signed the order to show cause (OSC) and directed 

United Grand to explain why it should not be adjudged in 

contempt of court for failing to file a code-compliant 

acknowledgement.

While the dispute over the acknowledgement dragged on, 

Stollof again attempted to resolve the dispute with United Grand. 

Among other options, Stollof suggested transferring the funds she 

had deposited in the Maryland Court to the Los Angeles Superior 

Court. United Grand rejected Stollof’s April 2016 and May 2016 

offers. On August 1, 2016, Stollof filed a motion to deposit 

$56,705, representing the full amount of unpaid rent plus 

interest through May 2016, with the Los Angeles Superior Court. 

The court granted the motion and Stollof deposited the funds. 
7

United Grand remained focused on the contempt 

proceedings for the noncompliant acknowledgement. On August 

15, 2016, United Grand filed a motion to vacate the OSC re 

contempt and dismiss the contempt proceedings. The trial court 

denied the motion and set a trial date on the OSC of January 18, 

2017. On October 7, United Grand filed a notice of appeal in case 

No. B279215 purporting to appeal from the various orders related 

to the filing of the acknowledgement of satisfaction. Relying on 

the pendency of its appeal, United Grand filed a series of 

unsuccessful applications for stays of pending contempt 

proceedings in the trial court.1 On December 1, 2016, Judge 

Borenstein granted a stay of the contempt proceedings until 

January 5, 2017, to permit Stollof and Staub to seek dismissal of 

United Grand’s appeal from the Court of Appeal. (It was later 

dismissed on July 13, 2018 under the disentitlement doctrine.) 

In the midst of these attempts to stay the contempt trial, on 

November 23, 2016, United Grand withdrew the $56,705 Stollof 

had deposited with the Los Angeles Superior Court. United 

Grand’s withdrawal of the funds caught the attention of Judge 

Sotelo in Department 40, where the complaint against Stollof had 

been sent for trial. Judge Sotelo wondered if United Grand’s 

withdrawal of funds meant the case was “no longer at issue.” In 

mid-December, Judge Sotelo issued an OSC why the complaint 

should not be stricken as to Stollof. The hearing on the OSC was 

set for the morning of January 5, 2017. The trial court “vacated 

the trial date and asked counsel for suggestions on how to 

 

1 These attempts would ultimately result in new sanctions 

against Sanai and a finding of contempt related to his actions in 

seeking a stay.
8

proceed.” Judge Sotelo later stated he was unaware of the

pending contempt proceedings in Department 44. 

On December 30, 2016, we deferred the motion to dismiss 

the appeal in B279215 to the panel. That same day, United 

Grand gave e-mail notice that it intended to apply ex parte on 

January 5, 2017 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 44 for a stay of the 

contempt proceedings, the same date and time set for the hearing 

on Judge Sotelo’s order concerning dismissal of the complaint in 

Department 40. An ex parte application for a stay was filed; it 

included a request for sanctions. 

On January 5, Judge Lu, sitting temporarily in Department 

44 in Judge Borenstein’s absence, granted United Grand a stay of 

the contempt trial until January 11, and ordered United Grand to 

appear on that date and “address any further stay with the 

Honorable Mark Borenstein.” Activity proceeded in Department 

40 on January 5 as well: Judge Sotelo set a hearing date of

February 6, 2017 for the OSC re dismissal.

Upon his return to court, Judge Borenstein continued the 

ex parte application for a stay and sanctions to January 13, 2017. 

On January 12, 2017, Stollof filed an opposition to the January 5, 

2017 application, and she requested sanctions. On January 13, 

2017, Judge Borenstein issued an OSC directing attorney Sanai 

to appear on February 2, 2017 and show cause why he should not 

be ordered to pay “defendant’s reasonable attorney fees for the 

ex part[e] application and request for sanctions filed on January 

5, 2017.” 

At the hearing on the OSC on February 2, 2017, Judge 

Borenstein ordered Sanai to pay $3,600 in attorney fees to Staub, 

Stollof’s counsel, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 

128.5, subdivision (c), and to pay a “penalty” of $1,000 to the 
9

court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.7, 

subdivision (d). On February 22, 2017, Judge Borenstein issued 

an order which states: “The Court finds that no reasonable 

attorney would have sought over $48,000 of sanctions as Cyrus 

Mark Sanai did in the Ex Parte Application.” 

On February 6, 2017, Judge Sotelo held a hearing on the 

OSC re dismissal of the complaint and took the matter under 

submission. 

On March 8, 2017, United Grand filed a written motion to 

reconsider Judge Borenstein’s February 22, 2017 sanctions order. 

On March 17, 2017, Judge Sotelo issued his ruling on the 

OSC re dismissal of the complaint. The court noted that it had 

“attempted to understand what rational, reasonable, or common 

sense and legal reasons hinder the closure of this no longer ‘at 

issue’ litigation. Other than the typical post-judgment questions 

of costs, post-judgment interest, and reasonable attorney fees, 

there is nothing left to dispute. [¶] In reviewing the case files, 

what stands out, what appears most telling, is a [July 15, 2015] 

declaration Mr. Sanai submitted, stating that his ‘former client’ 

paid him for services rendered only up to obtaining a judgment 

and his handling of the ‘enforcement stage of the case’ was on 

contingency: ‘I have agreed that my compensation for attorney’s 

fees will be limited to the amounts awarded by this Court and 

actually recovered . . . .’ ” The court noted that United Grand and 

its counsel Sanai had sought “close to $2 million” in attorney fees 

by that point. 

Turning to the appropriate disposition of the case, the court 

noted “Defendant’s counsel [has] listed, in detail, dozens of 

actions taken by Plaintiff, Mr. Sanai, or both that constitute 

pervasive misconduct. Counsel [has] asked the court to exercise
10

[sic] its inherent powers of dismissal under [Code of Civil 

Procedure] section 581, subdivision (m).” The court considered 

“simply entering a judgment for Plaintiff against Stollof in the 

amount already collected by Plaintiff, then determining 

reasonable costs and attorney fees, as would be the ‘normal 

course.’ ” Ultimately, however, the court determined that 

through “Plaintiff’s and Mr. Sanai’s misconduct, [the case] has 

lost its essential character” and that “Mr. Sanai’s use of law and 

his abuse of court procedure has not been for the legitimate 

purpose of his client’s claim.” The court noted that it had the 

inherent authority to dismiss the case, but “[r]ather than 

terminate this litigation (as to Stollof) for the deliberate and 

egregious misconduct by Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s lawyer, or both, 

this court has come to the conclusion that it can adequately 

restore common sense and fairness in this clearly ‘extreme 

situation’ by imposing a significant sanction less than full or total 

dismissal, although full dismissal would not be [sic] improper.” 

The court entered “judgment in favor of Plaintiff United 

Grand Corporation, against Defendant Marcie Stollof, in the 

amount of $56,705.00.” The court also exercised “its inherent 

discretionary authority and strikes and dismisses Plaintiff’s 

request and prayer for attorney fees against Defendant Marcie 

Stollof based on the finding that Plaintiff and or Mr. Sanai 

engaged in pervasive misconduct.” The court concluded, “THIS 

ACTION THEN, IS A PARTIAL ‘TERMINATING SANCTION’ 

UNDER [CODE OF CIVL PROCEDURE] SECTION [581], 

SUBDIVISION (m). Since the court has the authority to strike or 

dismiss this matter in its entirety, it therefore has the authority 

to strike and dismiss Plaintiff’s attorney fees request.” 
11

On March 29, 2017, United Grand moved ex parte to stay 

the dismissal order. It was promptly denied on the merits. On 

April 11, 2017, Judge Sotelo filed an order and judgment of 

dismissal. United Grand moved for a new trial.

On May 3, 2017, a hearing was held on Sanai’s motion to 

reconsider the February sanctions order against him totaling 

$4,600. Judge Borenstein denied the motion on the ground that 

Sanai had failed to show new or different facts. On June 2, 2017 

Sanai filed a notice of appeal of the February 22, 2017 order in 

case No. B282942.

On June 8, 2017, Staub, to whom the $4,600 in sanctions 

was to be paid, began proceedings to enforce the February 

sanctions orders. He obtained an order for Sanai to appear at a 

judgment debtor examination set for August 14, 2017. 

On July 12, 2017, United Grand and Sanai filed a notice of 

appeal in this case, B283833, which challenges the final 

judgment and the February 2017 sanctions orders. Nonetheless 

proceedings related to the sanctions continued in the trial court.

Sanai failed to appear for his scheduled judgment debtor 

examination. The court issued a bench warrant which was held 

until September 29, 2017.

On September 28, 2017, United Grand filed a petition for 

writ of supersedeas and stay in this court seeking to stay 

enforcement of the February 22, 2017 sanctions orders and “the 

September 29, 2017 show cause and debtor proceedings.” We 

denied the petition/request for stay the next day, September 29, 

2017.

Judgment debtor proceedings in the trial court were then 

continued several times, until November 29, 2017. On that date, 

when the matter was called for hearing, Sanai refused to be 
12

sworn for the examination. “The court warns judgment debtor of 

direct contempt for refusal to move forward with the exam.” The 

matter was transferred to Judge Borenstein (then in Dept. 35). A 

December 7, 2017 hearing was set for an OSC “to determine 

whether actual cause will issue.” The OSC was continued to 

December 15, 2017. On December 18, 2017 the court issued an 

order for Sanai to appear on January 30, 2018 and show cause 

why he should not be held in contempt for failing to comply with 

the Court’s sanctions orders of February 2, 2017 and February 

22, 2107. The court issued a separate order on December 18 

ordering Sanai to show cause why he should not be sanctioned for 

failing to comply with the February 2017 orders.

On January 2, 2018, we issued an order dismissing the 

appeal in B282942 on the ground that the January and February 

2017 orders were not directly or separately appealable. We 

denied United Grand/Sanai’s motion to consolidate the appeal 

with the instant appeal.

On January 30, 2018, Judge Borenstein found “that Cyrus 

Sanai has willfully failed to pay by 3-1-2017, the sanctions under 

CCP 177.5 and attorney fees pursuant to the order dated 

February 22, 2017. [¶] The Court orders Cyrus Sanai to pay 

sanctions pursuant to CCP 177.5 in the amount of $1,500 to the 

clerk of the court no later than 2-28-2018. [¶] . . . [¶ The 

examination of Judgment Debtor Cyrus Sanai is continued to 

March 21, 2018.” The court arraigned Sanai on the contempt 

charge and set a contempt trial date of March 21, 2018.

The sanctions proceedings continued. On March 21, 2018, 

Judge Borenstein held a trial on the contempt charge and found 

Sanai guilty. Sentencing was set for March 26, 2018. Sanai was 

released on his own recognizance. 
13

On March 26, 2018, the court pronounced sentence on the 

contempt verdict: “Mr. Sanai shall be imprisoned in the 

Los Angeles County jail until he performs the acts specified in 

the Court’s orders dated February 2 and February 22, 2017; and 

[¶] 2. Pursuant to Civil Procedure Code §1218(a), Mr. Sanai shall 

pay to D. Joshua Staub reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs 

incurred in connection with the contempt proceedings. [¶] 

3. Execution of this sentence is stayed until 4 pm on April 13, 

2018, at which time Mr. Sanai shall surrender at the Inmate 

Reception Center at the Los Angeles County Jail, until a further 

stay is granted.” 

On April 12, 2018, in this court Sanai filed a “Petition for 

writ of mandate, habeas corpus or other appropriate relief.” 

(B289357) On April 23, 2018, we denied Sanai’s request to stay 

the trial court’s March 26, 2018 order sentencing Sanai for 

contempt of court. On March 4, 2019, under the disentitlement 

doctrine we denied the petition which challenged both the 

underlying February 2017 sanctions orders and the contempt 

proceedings. 

DISCUSSION

Throughout its opening and reply briefs, United Grand has 

repeatedly disparaged the trial court judges and the quality of 

their legal work. To give just one example, United Grand has 

characterized Judge Sotelo’s findings as “gibberish” and “legal 

nonsense.” Not only is such disparagement inappropriate, it is 

ineffective. Name-calling and ridicule are not cogent legal 

arguments. We do not repeat or consider these inappropriate and

irrelevant remarks.

The remainder of United Grand’s briefs are not sufficient to 

show error. United Grand has not provided the required 
14

separate headings for many of the points it raises in its brief, 

resulting in a disorganized and at times unintelligible legal 

discussion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [party’s brief 

must “[s]tate each point under a separate heading or 

subheading, . . . and support each point by argument and, if 

possible, by citation of authority”].) Appropriate headings require 

litigants to “ ‘present their cause systematically and so arranged 

that those upon whom the duty devolves of ascertaining the rule 

of law to apply may be advised, as they read, of the exact 

question under consideration, instead of being compelled to 

extricate it from the mass.’ [Citation.]” (Opdyk v. California 

Horse Racing Bd. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1830-1831, fn 4.) 

Although we exercise our discretion to consider those issues we 

can discern in United Grand’s unsystematic and often incoherent

arguments, there are times when it is simply not possible for us 

to understand what United Grand is arguing. Any arguments 

not discussed in this opinion are deemed forfeited. (Pizarro v. 

Reynoso (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 172, 179 [“Failure to provide 

proper headings forfeits issues that may be discussed in the brief 

but are not clearly identified by a heading.”].)

United Grand has also failed to support many of its points 

with cogent argument, legal authority or specific citations to the 

record on appeal. Further, parts of the briefs appear to consist of 

only partially successful attempts to cut and paste text from 

previous briefs. “In order to demonstrate error, an appellant 

must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument 

supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.” (City of 

Santa Maria v. Adam, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 286–287.)

Although we exercise our discretion to consider arguments for 

which we can discern a legal or factual basis in the briefs, there 
15

are many instances when no such basis is apparent. “We are not 

obliged to make other arguments for [appellant] [citation], nor 

are we obliged to speculate about which issues counsel intend to 

raise.” (Opdyk v. California Horse Racing Bd., supra,

34 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1830-1831, fn. 4; In re Marriage of Falcone 

& Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830 [“We are not bound to 

develop appellants’ arguments for them.”].) We may and do 

“disregard conclusory arguments that are not supported by 

pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by 

which the appellant reached the conclusions he wants us to 

adopt.” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam, supra, at p. 287.)

I. UNITED GRAND HAS NOT SHOWN THE TRIAL 

COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PRAYER FOR 

ATTORNEY FEES.

United Grand makes four arguments related to the 

propriety of Judge Sotelo’s order of dismissal. He contends 

(1) there is no “legal reason” for the order; (2) the court lacked 

jurisdiction to make the order; (3) the court failed to provide 

adequate notice it intended to strike the prayer for attorney fees; 

and (4) it was error to deny United Grand contractual attorney 

fees. United Grand has forfeited almost all these claims; those 

claims which are not forfeited are meritless.

A. United Grand Has Not Shown The Judgment Lacks 

Legal Support.

United Grand has entitled its first section: “This is The 

Unusual Situation Where a Trial Court Announced the Outcome 

it Wanted Without Having a Legal Reason for Getting There, 

Demonstrating Prejudice.” This heading gives no indication of the 

jumble of arguments that are contained in the section that 

follows. We can discern five possible arguments within this 
16

section: (1) there is insufficient evidence to support the trial 

court’s findings of misconduct; (2) the actions described are not 

misconduct; (3) the dismissal is improperly based on attorney 

misconduct alone; (4) the dismissal is improperly based on the 

trial court’s hostility to awarding contingent fees with a 

multiplier; (5) collateral estoppel and issue preclusion bar a 

judgment based only on the amount of unpaid rent and interest. 

We consider those arguments to the extent possible below. Any 

other arguments are deemed forfeited. (Pizarro v. Reynoso, 

supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 179.) We are not “obliged to speculate 

about which issues counsel intend to raise.” (Opdyk v. California 

Horse Racing Bd., supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1830-1831, fn. 4.)2

 

2 In the Statement of the Case section of its opening brief, 

United Grand argues that several of the statements in Judge 

Sotelo’s order(s) to show cause were factually inaccurate. 

Arguments of error do not belong in a section entitled “Statement 

of the Case” and subtitled “Procedural History,” particularly 

when a different section of the brief is labelled “Legal 

Discussion.” More importantly, an OSC “acts as a summons to 

appear in court on a certain day and, as its name suggests, to 

show cause why a certain thing should not be done.” (CedarsSinai Imaging Medical Group v. Superior Court (2000) 83 

Cal.App.4th 1281, 1286.) United Grand was free to argue the 

inaccuracy of the statements in the OSC at the hearing on the 

order. United Grand does not explain the relevance of 

statements which appear in the OSC but not in the court’s final 

order. We see none.
17

1. United Grand Ignores Most Of The Trial Court’s 

Findings Of Misconduct And Fails To Provide 

Adequate Citations To Support The Claims It 

Does Make.

United Grand contends the trial court’s findings of fact in 

support of dismissal are “totally unsupported by substantial 

evidence” or do not identify actions which constitute misconduct. 

United Grand addresses only a portion of the summary of

misconduct from the court’s order of dismissal, responding only to 

the findings in the following paragraph: “The Defendant’s list of 

misconduct includes the breach of the implied covenant of good 

faith through the outrageous demands of Plaintiff or Mr. Sanai, 

or both; Plaintiff or its lawyer’s unreasonable refusal to give 

effect to Stollof’s payment of funds into the Maryland Court; 

Plaintiff or its lawyer’s failure to give effect to the payment of 

funds and their withdrawal from this Court; Plaintiffs or

Plaintiffs lawyer’s failure to respect Judge Michelle Rosenblatt’s 

December 24, 2015 and January 18, 2016 orders vacating the 

judgment against Stollof and eight other failures to give notice 

when ordered; Plaintiffs or Plaintiff’s lawyer’s refusal to the 

immediate release of the $56,615 held in the Maryland Court, 

requiring Stollof [sic] to incur legal fees and cost to bring a 

motion; Plaintiff or Plaintiffs lawyer’s refusal to agree to the 

transfer of the $68,418 held in Maryland and deposit of an 

additional $12,000 into this Court, again, requiring Stollof to 

bring a motion for deposit.” 

United Grand ignores the trial court’s preface to this 

paragraph explaining that “In support of his motion, Defendant’s 

counsel listed, in detail, dozens of actions taken by Plaintiff, Mr. 

Sanai, or both that constitute pervasive misconduct. Counsel 
18

asked the court to exercise of its inherent powers of dismissal 

under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 581, subdivision (m).” 

United Grand also ignores the court’s additional findings given in 

subsequent paragraphs that “The list of suggested misconduct 

consists of many additional actions and inactions by Plaintiff or 

Plaintiff’s lawyer, or both, displaying contempt towards Judge 

Rosenblatt (who set aside the default), Judge Borenstein 

(assigned to the post-judgment collections processes of defaulted 

Defendant Malibu Hillbillies), and towards this Court. [¶] 

Additionally, Defendant identifies vexatious conduct by Plaintiff 

or Plaintiff’s lawyer, or both, including meritless statements of 

disqualification, petitions of writ of mandate, refusal to file 

acknowledgement of satisfaction, filing of motions when leave to 

file had been refused, as well as being cited for contempt and 

contemptuous courtroom conduct.” 

Even without the findings in the single paragraph 

identified and quoted by United Grand in his brief, there is ample 

evidence of misconduct in the paragraphs he ignores, particularly 

as set forth in detail in Stollof’s supporting brief and Staub’s 

declaration, both expressly incorporated by Judge Sotelo into his 

order.3 Thus, even if United Grand were correct in its criticisms 

of the findings in the single, summary paragraph it quotes and 

we disregarded those findings, reversal would not be warranted.

 

3 The court stated: “This court adopts the comprehensive 

summary of conduct by Plaintiff’s lawyer, as listed in detail in 

Defendant Stollof’s Brief in Support of Order Striking Complaint 

as to Defendant Marcie Stollof, filed January 27, 2017.” 
19

a. United Grand’s Sufficiency of the Evidence Claim 

Is Forfeited.

United Grand argues that the finding that it failed on eight 

occasions to give notice as ordered is “manifestly false” and that 

notice of all relevant order was given. The specific dates for nonnotice are found in defendant’s Brief In Support Of Order 

Striking Complaint As To Defendant Marcie Stollof and 

accompanying declaration. United Grand fails to provide record 

citations to support his claim that he gave notices on those dates, 

or that notice was not required. 

An appellant must “[s]upport any reference to a matter in 

the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the 

record where the matter appears.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.204(a)(1)(C).) “ ‘The appellate court is not required to search 

the record on its own seeking error.’ [Citation.] Thus, ‘[i]f a party 

fails to support an argument with the necessary citations to the 

record, . . . the argument [will be] deemed to have been waived. 

[Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 

1229, 1246.) United Grand has forfeited this claim.

b. United Grand’s Claim That Its Conduct Was Not 

Misconduct Is Forfeited.

United Grand identified four instances of misconduct in 

Judge Sotelo’s order which he claims are not improper conduct at 

all. United Grand has failed to adequately support these claims 

with cogent argument or appropriate legal or factual citations. 

Accordingly, they are all forfeited.

First, United Grand claims “the filing of an appeal 

challenging Judge Rosenblatt’s orders was a procedural right,” 

not misconduct. Judge Sotelo did not find the filing of an appeal 

to be misconduct. United Grand appears to be referring to Judge 
20

Sotelo’s finding that “Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs lawyer’s failure to 

respect Judge Michelle Rosenblatt’s December 24, 2015 and 

January 18, 2016 orders vacating the judgment against Stollof.” 

As United Grand should know, this refers to its claim on 

February 8, 2016 that “Plaintiff has on January 19, 2016, and 

continues to have today, a fully enforceable judgment, which is 

enforceable against Stollof.” United Grand made this claim in a 

declaration signed by Sanai and submitted to the Maryland 

court. United Grand does not explain how this claim made on 

February 8, 2016 was accurate in light of the trial court’s vacatur 

of the default against Stollof on December 24, 2015. “We are not 

obliged to make other arguments for [appellant] [citation], nor 

are we obliged to speculate about which issues counsel intend to 

raise.” (Opdyk v. California Horse Racing Bd., supra, 

34 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1830-1831, fn. 4; In re Marriage of Falcone 

& Fyke, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 830.)

Second, United Grand also claims that it was not 

misconduct or unreasonable to refuse “to give effect to Stollof’s 

payment of funds into the Maryland Court; Plaintiff or its 

lawyer’s failure to give effect to the payment of funds and their 

withdrawal from this Court.” United Grand contends the amount 

deposited in those courts was less than half the amount of its 

judgment and so it was not unreasonable to turn it down.4 The 

 

4 United Grand has claimed at various times to have 

obtained a judgement of $137,315.22 against Stollof and Malibu 

Hillbillies. On or about August 12, 2015, Judge Rosenblatt 

appears to have granted an ex parte request from United Grand 

to add amounts of the April 30 and June 2, 2015 Memorandum of 

Costs to the judgment. The order stated “The Clerk of this Court 

is ordered upon presentation of this order to immediately, 

without any delay, excuse or other intervening act, enter onto the 
21

quoted finding has no specific time reference, but Stollof clearly 

suggested disbursing the previously-deposited funds in the 

Maryland court after the judgment against her had been vacated. 

She deposited the funds in the California court after the 

judgment against her was vacated. Thus, United Grand’s factual 

premise is faulty. “We are not obliged to make other arguments 

for [appellant] [citation], nor are we obliged to speculate about 

which issues counsel intend to raise.” (Opdyk v. California Horse 

Racing Bd., supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1830-1831, fn. 4; In re 

Marriage of Falcone & Fyke, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 830.)

Next, United Grand similarly claims that it was not 

misconduct to oppose Stollof’s transfer of the funds in the 

Maryland court to a California court. United Grand did not 

 

operative judgment” the additional amounts of $25,380.00 and 

$41,030.20. It is far from clear whether or when Sanai presented 

the order to the clerk and obtained an amended judgment. Sanai 

has provided a copy of what he claims is the amended judgment 

in a late-filed volume 4 of the appellant’s appendix in this appeal. 

Disturbingly we have been unable to locate a reference to that 

document or the document itself in the trial court’s docket.

Assuming for the sake of argument that United Grand did 

obtain such a judgment, its existence makes no material 

difference to our analysis on this appeal. Judge Rosenblatt set 

aside the default judgment against Stollof four months later, 

including the part of the judgment finding her jointly and 

severally liable with Malibu Hillbillies. To the extent that 

United Grand relies on this judgment to rationalize its rejection 

of Stollof’s attempts to settle the case in the summer of 2015, that 

reliance is misplaced. In rejecting Stollof’s settlement proposal, 

United Grand’s counter-offer was for $255,000, almost twice the 

$137,315.22 judgment it claimed to possess.
22

provide any reason for opposing the transfer. United Grand

simply contends it was “standing on rights granted pursuant to 

an injunction issued by Judge Borenstein in 2015” which 

continued in effect. United Grand has not provided a record cite 

for this injunction and so this claim is waived. (Nwosu v. Uba,

supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246.)

Finally, in its reply brief, United Grand argues that Judge 

Sotelo’s statement that United Grand committed post-judgment 

misconduct by breaching the “the implied covenant of good faith” 

is contrary to settled law. Because United Grand makes its claim 

of error concerning the covenant of good faith for the first time in 

its reply brief, we do not consider it. 

“We will not ordinarily consider issues raised for the first

time in a reply brief. [Citation.] An issue is new if it does more 

than elaborate on issues raised in the opening brief or rebut 

arguments made by the respondent in respondent’s brief. 

Fairness militates against allowing an appellant to raise an issue

for the first time in a reply brief because consideration of the 

issue deprives the respondent of the opportunity to counter the 

appellant by raising opposing arguments about the new issue. 

[Citation.]” (American Indian Model Schools v. Oakland Unified 

School Dist. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 258, 275–276.)

2. United Grand Has Not Shown 

Misapportionment Of Blame

United Grand contends Judge Sotelo “laid the entire blame 

for the litigation conduct on appellant Sanai” and that dismissal 

of an action requires the fault to lie with the client alone. United 

Grand is incorrect both legally and factually.

United Grand relies on the following quote to support its 

claim: “Trial courts should only exercise this authority in extreme 
23

situations, such as when the conduct was clear and deliberate, 

where no lesser alternatives would remedy the situation 

[citation], the fault lies with the client and not the attorney

[citation], and when the court issues a directive that the party 

fails to obey.” (Del Junco v. Hufnagel (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 

789, 799, italics added.) This is simply a non-exclusive list of 

extreme situations which justify dismissal as a sanction. The 

court in Del Junco found both the party and her attorney were to 

blame: “When [Hufnagel] had counsel, things did not improve. . . . 

The actions of Hufnagel and her counsel were willful and 

deliberate, caused unnecessary delay, and wasted the trial court’s 

resources. The actions caused Dr. Del Junco to incur 

unnecessary expense. Under these circumstances the trial court 

had the jurisdiction to strike Hufnagel’s answer and enter 

default.” (Id. at p. 800.)

The court in this case made the same finding of joint 

misconduct. The court’s core reason for dismissal was that 

“Through Plaintiff’s and Mr. Sanai’s misconduct, [the case] has 

lost its essential character.” The court repeatedly stated that 

misconduct was committed by “Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s lawyer, or 

both.” United Grand points to nothing in the record showing that 

Sanai was solely responsible for the extensive misconduct in this 

case. Further, given the length of this case and the number of 

appeals involved, it would be more than reasonable to infer that 

United Grand was deliberately indifferent to whether its 

litigation conduct was appropriate and it failed to adequately 

discuss with its counsel the conduct of the litigation. (See 

Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 

736, 743-744, 768.) 
24

3. Sanai’s Legal Work Did Not Warrant A

Multiplier

United Grand contends generally that Judge Sotelo’s ruling 

“demonstrates an absolute hostility to Plaintiff obtaining 

contingent fees with a multiplier.” Based on the record before us, 

the only multiplier warranted in this case would be a negative 

one. (Rogel v. Lynwood Redevelopment Agency (2011) 194 

Cal.App.4th 1319, 1330 [affirming negative multiplier “where the 

record showed that the prevailing parties’ lawyer did little more 

than duplicate pleadings filed in related cases”]; Thayer v. Wells 

Fargo Bank, (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 834.)

To give just two examples of the quality of Sanai’s legal 

work, he misspelled Stollof’s name on a form complaint even 

though the correct spelling of her name appeared in documents 

attached as exhibits to the complaint. He later had to bring a 

motion to correct the judgment to reflect the correct spelling of 

her name. Sanai’s first default judgment package for Malibu 

Hillbillies was rejected because it listed two agents for service of 

process. In granting Stollof’s motion to tax costs, Judge 

Borenstein made it clear that he was unimpressed by not only the 

quality of Sanai’s post-judgment work, but also the number of 

hours of work claimed. Sanai sought more than 125 hours for the 

3.5 months after the entry of the default judgments; Judge 

Borenstein found only 14 hours were reasonable and necessary.

4. United Grand’s Collateral Estoppel Claim 

Based On Stollof’s Status As Guarantor Of 

Malibu Hillbillies Is Deemed Abandoned.

United Grand contends the dismissal of its prayer for 

attorney fees demonstrates a “fundamental misunderstanding of 

what was at issue.” United Grand argues because the default 
25

judgment against Malibu Hillbillies was never vacated, collateral 

estoppel and issue preclusion required that Stollof’s answer be 

stricken or that she be required to pay the amount of the 

judgment against Malibu Hillbillies to satisfy her obligation as 

guarantor. United Grand maintains that Stollof could not satisfy 

her obligation by simply paying the amount of unpaid rent plus 

interest.

As Stollof points out, she and Malibu Hillbillies were 

named separately as defendants in this action and were sued for 

breach of two different agreements. Malibu Hillbillies was sued 

for breach of the lease agreement and Stollof for breach of the 

guaranty agreement. (See Talbott v. Hustwit (2008) 

164 Cal.App.4th 148, 151 [“ ‘A contract of guaranty gives rise to a 

separate and independent obligation from that which binds the 

principal debtor.’ ”]; see also All Bay Mill & Lumber Co. v. Surety 

Co. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 11, 17-18; accord, National Technical 

Systems v. Superior Court (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 415, 421-422.)

In reply, United Grand contends it never claimed issue 

preclusion applied because Stollof was a guarantor of Malibu 

Hillbillies. United Grand clearly made this argument at page 34 

and pages 41 to 42 of its opening brief. In light of United Grand’s 

repudiation of the argument in its reply brief, we will treat the 

claim as abandoned.

United Grand does make a second and different issue 

preclusion claim near the end of its brief; there it claims that 

issue preclusion applies because Stollof is the sole member of 

Malibu Hillbillies and so was in privity with it. We discuss that 

claim post.
26

B. The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction To Strike The Prayer 

For Attorney Fees.

United Grand’s second major section is entitled: “The Judge 

Sotelo’s Orders Was Outside his Jurisdiction and An Improper 

Effort to Extort Settlement.” This section makes little sense. 

United Grand makes numerous references to documents in this 

case, but provides only one record cited in six pages. The section 

appears to have been cut and pasted from other documents. To 

give just one example, United Grand writes, “By finding that this 

is ‘misconduct’ this Court is collaterally attacking Judge 

Borenstein’s order, which it cannot amend, and directly attacking 

the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal.” Since “this 

Court” is the Court of Appeal, United Grand’s argument makes 

no sense. Further, the section is not presented in a logical or 

sequential order. To give just one example, United Grand writes: 

“Judge Sotelo’s judgment is void (and this ‘improper’, ‘irregular’ 

and an ‘abuse of discretion’) for three related reasons. Second, 

the Court’s order explicitly seeks to punish Plaintiff . . . .” 

We consider the three intelligible arguments United Grand

makes in this section.

First, United Grand appears to argue Judge Sotelo granted 

a new trial as to Malibu Hillbillies and when he did, his actions 

did not comply with statutory procedures for granting a new trial. 

Judge Sotelo did not grant a new trial, or alter or amend United 

Grand’s judgment against Malibu Hillbillies. The effect of his 

order and judgment of dismissal as to Stollof only has the effect of 

barring recovery against Stollof on the judgment against Malibu 

Hillbillies. United Grand has not cited any legal authority to 

support its argument that a bar to recovery from a guarantor 

amounts to an alteration or amendment of the judgment against 
27

the primary debtor. “In order to demonstrate error, an appellant 

must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument 

supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.” (City of 

Santa Maria v. Adam, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 286–287.) 

United Grand has failed to satisfy this requirement and its 

argument is forfeited.

Next, United Grand claims Judge Sotelo lacked jurisdiction 

to make the March 17, 2017 and April 11, 2017 orders because 

they were made during the pendency of United Grand’s appeal 

from Judge Rosenblatt’s order vacating the default judgment 

against Stollof.

As Stollof accurately points out in her brief, United Grand

acknowledged in the trial court that “The primary example of 

collateral matters not affected by a notice of appeal are awards of 

attorney fees or sanctions. See Bankes v. Lucas (1992) 9 

Cal.App.4th 365, 368 (‘Consequently, filing of a notice of appeal 

does not stay any proceedings to determine the matter of costs 

and does not prevent the trial court from determining a proper 

award of attorney fees claimed as costs’); Silver v. Gold (1989) 

211 Cal.App.3d 17, 26 (filing of notice of appeal of dismissal order 

does not divest court of jurisdiction to award sanctions.)” Relying 

on those cases, United Grand “filed a motion for ‘legal fees’ 

against David Cohen notwithstanding the pending appeal.” 

United Grand has offered no explanation for its change of 

position on this issue, and cites no law contrary to the cases it 

cited earlier, quoted above. Under the reasoning of those two 

cases, Judge Sotelo clearly had jurisdiction to issue his orders, 

which involved the denial of attorney fees as a sanction for 

misconduct.
28

Finally, United Grand argues “Judge Sotelo lacked 

jurisdiction to impose attorney fees or eliminate their entitlement 

without statutory authorization. Baugess v. Paine (1978) 

22 Cal.3d 626. Judge Sotelo’s so-called ‘inherent power’ does not 

include the power to impose monetary sanctions or deprive a 

party of their right to request them, let alone deprive a party 

from obtaining fees already authorized in a judgment affirmed by 

the Court of Appeal.” 

As a sanction, Judge Sotelo declined to award attorney fees. 

Baugess does not discuss striking attorney fees. Judge Sotelo did 

not impose monetary sanctions or deprive United Grand of its 

right to request sanctions. Post-judgment attorney fees sought as 

costs are not sanctions. Judge Sotelo’s order and judgment does 

not bar United Grand from enforcing its judgment against 

Malibu Hillbillies.

More generally, there can be no dispute that a trial court 

has power to dismiss an entire action in extreme situations. 

(Del Junco v. Hufnagel, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 799.) Judge 

Sotelo found ample grounds to dismiss the entire complaint due 

to United Grand’s and Sanai’s misconduct in prolonging the 

litigation and requesting over $2 million in attorney fees. Judge 

Sotelo’s limited dismissal of a portion of United Grand’s 

complaint was an act of leniency. It is difficult to comprehend 

United Grand is seriously arguing that Judge Sotelo could have 

dismissed the entire action as to Stollof, but erred in dismissing 

only a portion of it. 
29

C. United Grand Has Forfeited Its Claim Of Inadequate 

Notice Of The Trial Court’s Intent To Strike The Prayer 

For Attorney Fees.

United Grand has entitled the third section of its brief “The 

Trial Court Violated Due Process by Imposing Sanctions Without 

Notice.” This section simply asserts, without citation to the 

record, that no notice was given by Judge Sotelo. 

United Grand received extensive procedural safeguards: 

the trial court’s December 15, 2016 order informed United Grand

the court was setting a hearing for an OSC Why the Complaint as 

Stollof Should Not Be Stricken; United Grand had an opportunity 

to and did file a brief and it had an opportunity to be heard at the 

hearing on the OSC. The trial court’s subsequent order set forth 

in detail its basis for the terminating sanction. United Grand

makes no attempt to reconcile its bare claim of a due process 

violation with these extensive procedural safeguards. 

“In order to demonstrate error, an appellant must supply 

the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by 

legal analysis and citation to the record.” (City of Santa Maria v. 

Adam, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 286–287.) United Grand

cites one case in this section, but then fails to “explain how it 

applies in his case.” (See Hodjat v. State Farm Mutual 

Automobile Ins. Co. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1, 10 (Hodjat).) 

Accordingly, we treat the matter as forfeited.

II. UNITED GRAND HAS NOT SHOWN THE TRIAL 

COURT ERRED IN DENYING ATTORNEY FEES ON 

APPEAL OR IN DISSOLVING AN INJUNCTION.

In addition to appealing from the judgment of dismissal, 

United Grand appeals from an order denying attorney fees on 

appeal and an order dissolving an injunction. 
30

A. United Grand’s Argument Concerning Denial Of 

Attorney Fees By Judge Moreton Is Unintelligible And 

Is Forfeited.

United Grand entitled the fifth section of its brief: “It Was 

Error to Deny Contractual Attorney Fees to Plaintiff.” This 

section appears to consist of a mash-up of two claims: (1) Judge 

Sotelo lacked jurisdiction “to overturn the judgement” entered by 

Judge Rosenblatt, and (2) Judge Moreton erred in denying 

attorney fees at some unspecified time during the case. The 

argument concerning Judge Sotelo presumably relates to the 

judgment of dismissal. The reference to Judge Moreton may 

involve the order denying attorney fees on appeal which United 

Grand mentions in its statement of appealability. If so, these two 

arguments do not belong under the same general heading.

The argument concerning Judge Sotelo consists of two 

sentences, both of which assert that the judge overturned or 

vacated the judgment by striking a portion of the complaint. In 

fact, Judge Rosenblatt vacated the judgment as to Stollof long 

before Judge Sotelo became involved in this case. “In order to 

demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the reviewing court 

with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and 

citation to the record.” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam, supra,

211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 286–287.) United Grand has failed to 

meet this burden. We are not obliged to speculate about the 

arguments United Grand intended to raise. (Opdyk v. California

Horse Racing Bd., supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1830-1831, fn. 4.)

United Grand’s argument concerning Judge Moreton is less 

developed. United Grande asserts: “Judge Moreton’s order 

denying contractual attorney fees based on the rulings of the two 

other judges was void, because it relied upon the validity of a void 
31

order. It was also wrong, because the orders of these judges were 

void, voidable and erroneous.” United Grand provides no record 

cite for its argument concerning Judge Moreton, and so has 

forfeited this claim. (Nwosu v. Uba, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 

1246.)5

In addition to the lack of appropriate headings, record 

citations and fact-based arguments in this section, there is also a 

dearth of legal authority. United Grand cites one case in this 

section, but then fails to “explain how it applies in his case.” (See 

Hodjat, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p.10.) Accordingly, we treat 

the matter as forfeited.

B. United Grand Has Forfeited Its Claim Concerning The 

Injunction

At one point in the proceedings, the trial court issued an 

injunction prohibiting Stollof from withdrawing the funds she 

had deposited at the state court in Maryland. The trial court 

later dissolved the injunction once the funds were redeposited 

 

5 In United Grand’s statement of the case, United Grand 

mentions Judge Moreton in connection with a statement that 

United Grand was the prevailing party on the appeal in case No. 

B270076 and so entitled to attorney fees. United Grand was not 

the prevailing party in that appeal. United Grand sought 

reversal of the trial court’s order vacating the default judgment 

against Stollof. We affirmed that order. We found Stollof 

entitled to costs on appeal. United Grand’s argument “fail[s] to 

disclose the reasoning by which the appellant reached the 

conclusions he wants us to adopt.” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam,

supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 287.) Again, we are not required to 

speculate about the arguments United Grand intended to raise. 

(Opdyk v. California Horse Racing Bd., supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 1830-1831, fn. 4.)
32

with the Los Angeles County Superior Court. United Grand’s 

entire argument on this topic consists of the following statement: 

“Judge Sotelo vacated the injunction against removing money 

from the account in Maryland, presumably based on his finding 

that the [sic] order was wrong, and the injunction should be 

reimposed.” This argument is completely inadequate. “In order 

to demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the reviewing 

court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and 

citation to the record.” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam, supra, 211 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 286–287.) United Grand has failed to meet 

this burden. We are not obliged to speculate about the 

arguments United Grand intended to raise. (Opdyk v. California 

Horse Racing Bd., supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1830-1831, fn. 4.)

United Grand has forfeited this argument 

III. UNITED GRAND’S ATTEMPTS TO RAISE OTHER 

ISSUES ARE BARRED

A. United Grand Has Forfeited Its Argument That Claim 

Or Issue Preclusion Applies To Stollof Due To Privity.

United Grand literally repeats its argument, first made on 

appeal in case No. B270076, that claim or issue preclusion apply 

to Stollof as the “sole member” of Malibu Hillbillies, a limited 

liability corporation, including its no longer cognizable argument 

that vacating the default judgment against Stollof was improper. 

It again argues Stollof should not be permitted to file an answer 

denying allegations admitted by Malibu Hillbillies. It adds: “This 

is one of the issues which should have been litigated at trial, but 

which the trial court’s erroneous judgment prevented from being 

litigated. This Court declined in addressing the issue in the prior 

appeal, but it must permit Plaintiff the right to litigate at trial.” 
33

Appellant’s summary of our prior opinion is not quite 

accurate. We held in our prior opinion that “Appellant provides 

no authority for the proposition that respondent should be bound 

by the admissions of another party, based on ‘privity’ or 

otherwise.” (United Grand Corp. v. Stollof (July 6, 2017, 

B270076) [nonpub. opn.], at [p. 16].) Appellant has not remedied 

that defect in this appeal: it has simply cut and pasted the 

privity argument from its brief in the earlier appeal without any 

new authority. 

Were we to address this claim anew, we would find 

fundamental problems with United Grand’s argument that issue 

preclusion could play any role in this case at all. Collateral 

estoppel traditionally applies to second or successive actions 

between the same parties or parties in privity with them. 

(Border Business Park, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2006) 

142 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1563 [claim preclusion “operates as a bar 

to the maintenance of a second suit” while issue preclusion 

“ ‘ “precludes a party to an action from relitigating in a second 

proceeding matters litigated and determined in a prior 

proceeding.” ’ ” (internal quotation marks omitted)]; see also

People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 253.)6 This is not a 

 

6 This is not an absolute rule. “The California Supreme 

Court and Courts of Appeal have expressed doubt that the 

doctrine of collateral estoppel applies in further proceedings in 

the same litigation . . . . The issue, however, has not been 

resolved definitively.” (People v. Yokely (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 

1264, 1273; People v. Barragan, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 253 

[noting court has not yet decided whether collateral estoppel 

“ ‘even applies to further proceedings in the same litigation.’ ”].)
34

successive action; it is the original action. Further, United Grand

fails to provide legal authority to support its claim that the 

doctrine of privity should be applied to Stollof. Generally, the 

doctrine of privity is used to bind non-parties to the initial action.

(See Cal Sierra Development, Inc. v. George Reed, Inc. (2017) 14 

Cal.App.5th 663, 672–673.) Stollof has always been a party to 

this action.

B. Further Objections To The Appellate Decision B279215 

Are Stricken.

On July 13, 2018, while this appeal was pending, we issued 

our opinion in appeal No. B279215. In that opinion, we applied 

the disentitlement doctrine to dismiss United Grand’s appeal 

from the trial court’s April 29, 2016 order directing United Grand

to file a code-compliant acknowledgement of satisfaction of 

judgment and to pay certain attorney fees. United Grand filed a 

petition for rehearing, claiming inter alia that our dismissal was 

void. We denied the petition. United Grand filed a petition for 

review with the California Supreme Court, contending inter alia 

that our dismissal was void. On September 26, 2018, the Court 

denied review. (S250791.)

 

United Grand does not acknowledge the unsettled state of 

the law, or provide any argument to support a resolution of this 

open question. “[A]n appellant is required to not only cite to valid 

legal authority, but also explain how it applies in his case.” 

(Hodjat, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 10.) “[W]e may disregard 

conclusory arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal 

authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by which the appellant 

reached the conclusions he wants us to adopt.” (City of Santa 

Maria v. Adam, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 287.) We do so with 

United Grand’s claim of collateral estoppel. 
35

In his October 22, 2018 reply brief in this matter, United 

Grand again contends our dismissal of B279215 was void. There 

are many reasons this argument is improper. United Grand has 

already made the permitted procedural challenges to our 

decision, and those challenges have been denied. There is no 

legal basis for an appeal from a prior appeal in the same court. It 

is difficult to characterize this argument as anything other than 

frivolous. On our own motion, we order the argument stricken 

from United Grand’s reply brief.

IV. THE APPEAL OF THE FEBRUARY 2017 SANCTION 

ORDERS IS DISMISSED

United Grand’s counsel Cyrus Sanai appeals from Judge 

Borenstein’s February 2017 orders imposing sanctions. Stollof 

has moved to dismiss the appeal under the disentitlement 

doctrine. We agree disentitlement is warranted as to Sanai’s 

appeal from the sanctions orders. We dismiss his appeal of the 

sanctions orders.

“An appellate court has the inherent power, under the 

‘disentitlement doctrine,’ to dismiss an appeal by a party that 

refuses to comply with a lower court order.” (Stoltenberg v. 

Ampton Investments, Inc. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1229.) 

“ ‘Appellate disentitlement “is not a jurisdictional doctrine, but a 

discretionary tool that may be applied when the balance of the 

equitable concerns make it a proper sanction . . . .” [Citation.]’ 

[Citation.] No formal judgment of contempt is required; an 

appellate court ‘may dismiss an appeal where there has been 

willful disobedience or obstructive tactics. [Citation.]’ [Citation,

italics added.) The doctrine ‘is based upon fundamental equity 

and is not to be frustrated by technicalities.’ ” (Id. at p. 1230, 

internal quotation marks omitted.)
36

The “disentitlement doctrine ‘is particularly likely to be 

invoked where the appeal arises out of the very order (or orders) 

the party has disobeyed.’ ” (Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. 

ScripsAmerica, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 259, 265.) “[T]he 

merits of the appeal are irrelevant to the application of the 

doctrine.” (Ibid.)

Here, there has been a finding of contempt. On March 21, 

2018, Judge Borenstein held a trial on the contempt charge and 

found Sanai guilty. The matter was continued to March 26, 2018 

for sentencing. Sanai was released on his own recognizance. 

On March 26, 2018, the court ordered: “Mr. Sanai shall be 

imprisoned in the Los Angeles County jail until he performs the 

acts specified in the Court’s orders dated February 2 and 

February 22, 2017; and [¶] 2. Pursuant to Civil Procedure Code 

§1218(a), Mr. Sanai shall pay to D. Joshua Staub reasonable 

attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in connection with the 

contempt proceedings. [¶] 3. Execution of this sentence is stayed 

until 4 pm on April 13, 2018, at which time Mr. Sanai shall 

surrender at the Inmate Reception Center at the Los Angeles 

County Jail, until a further stay is granted.”

On April 12, 2018, Sanai filed a “Petition for writ of 

mandate; habeas corpus or other appropriate relief.” (B289357) 

On April 23, 2018, we denied Sanai’s request to stay the trial 

court’s March 26, 2018 order sentencing Sanai for contempt of 

court. On March 4, 2019, we denied the petition, which 

challenges both the underlying February 2017 sanctions orders

and the contempt proceedings.

Sanai did not report to jail and the trial court issued a 

bench warrant for his arrest. He is currently a fugitive from 

justice. He has willfully disobeyed the trial court’s order. Under 
37

the circumstances he is not entitled to challenge the sanctions 

orders on appeal.

DISPOSITION

Sanai’s appeal from the February 2017 sanctions orders is 

dismissed. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects. Stollof 

is entitled to recover her costs on appeal.

STRATTON, J.

We concur:

GRIMES, Acting P. J.

WILEY, J.
Filed 6/12/19

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

UNITED GRAND CORPORATION,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

MALIBU HILLBILLIES, LLC, et al.,

Defendants and Respondents;

CYRUS SANAI,

Objector and Appellant.

B283833

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BC554172)

ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION

FOR PUBLICATION

[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on May 22, 

2019, was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For 

good cause it now appears that the opinion should be published in 

the Official Reports and it is so ordered.

[There is no change in the Judgment.]

____________________________________________________________ 

GRIMES, Acting P. J. STRATTON, J. WILEY, J.