COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Annunziata, Bumgardner and Senior Judge Hodges 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

MELVIN IRVIN SHIFFLETT, S/K/A 

 MELVIN IRVING SHIFFLETT 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2481-97-4 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA 

 APRIL 20, 1999 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY 

James H. Chamblin, Judge 

 Carla Blake Hook (E. William Chapman; 

Hazel & Thomas, on briefs), for appellant. 

 Richard B. Campbell, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 Melvin I. Shifflett (“appellant”) was convicted by jury 

trial of the first degree murder of Patricia E. Smith and 

sentenced to life imprisonment. In this appeal, appellant 

contends the trial court erred by: (1) admitting the testimony 

of Diane Kruger concerning appellant’s commission of a prior 

crime; and (2) admitting irrelevant testimony of John Howard. 

We disagree and affirm appellant’s conviction. 

 I. 

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

 The facts stated in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, the prevailing party, establish that on the night 

of October 29, 1978, Smith met a group of friends at a 
restaurant. Appellant joined the group later that evening. In 

the early morning of October 30, the group decided to relocate 

to a local hotel to listen to a band. Appellant gave Smith a 

ride in his car. Before leaving for the hotel, Emilio Hernandez 

pulled his car up to appellant’s car to confirm Smith’s plans. 

Smith told Hernandez that she would see him at the hotel and 

asked him to order drinks for appellant and her. Neither 

appellant nor Smith arrived at the hotel that night. On October 

31, 1978, appellant told Hernandez that he parted company with 

Smith when she drove off with a man in a gray Cadillac. 

 On November 20, 1978, Smith’s body was found lying face 

down on the ground in Loudoun County, Virginia. With the 

exception of socks on her feet, Smith’s body was nude from the 

waist down with a blue jean jacket tied around her neck. The 

cause of Smith’s death was determined to be “strangulation by 

ligature.” No evidence of sexual assault was found on Smith’s 

body. David R. Simpson, an evidence technician for the Loudoun 

County Sheriff’s Department at that time, noticed lividity marks 

on Smith’s back, which indicated to him that she had died while 

lying on her back and had subsequently been flipped over. 

Simpson also noticed animal markings on the decomposing body. 

 On October 15, 1996, a grand jury charged appellant with 

the murder of Smith. On March 6, 1997, the Commonwealth filed a 

“Notice of Intention to Offer Evidence of Other Crimes.” The 

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notice indicated the Commonwealth’s intent to introduce evidence 

of appellant’s assault on Diane Kruger as evidence of his guilt 

in the current prosecution. By order of August 4, 1997, the 

court ruled that evidence regarding crimes committed by 

appellant against Kruger “may be admitted to show malice, 

premeditation, intent, motive, conduct or feelings” of appellant 

towards Smith, but not to show identity. The court noted 

appellant’s objection in its order and his renewed objection 

made immediately before Kruger’s testimony at trial. 

A. BREW’S TESTIMONY 

 At trial, Donald Brew testified about the content of 

multiple conversations he had with appellant while the two men 

were confined within the Prince William County Adult Detention 

Center. Appellant told Brew that in August 1978 he met Kruger 

in a bar and offered to help her repair a problem with her 

vehicle. After appellant and Kruger left the bar and took the 

vehicle for a test-drive, appellant attacked her with a knife. 

Appellant stuffed a roll of toilet paper in Kruger’s mouth and 

blocked her nose, intending not to kill her immediately. 

Appellant stated he “just wanted her to get the feeling of 

death.” Appellant repeatedly blocked Kruger’s airways and then 

relented, stating that he enjoyed the power he exercised over 

Kruger by bringing her close to death. During the attack, 

appellant forced Kruger to perform oral sex on him but could not 

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sustain an erection long enough to rape her. Appellant told 

Brew he became fully aroused only when he had blocked Kruger’s 

air passages with the toilet paper. Appellant acknowledged 

stabbing Kruger numerous times before she was able to escape by 

striking appellant’s head with a bottle and fleeing the car. 

 Brew also testified that appellant admitted killing Smith 

in 1978 while he was free on bond for the charge of attacking 

Kruger. According to Brew, appellant met Smith around Halloween 

when she came to the service station where he worked. One 

evening, appellant met Smith again at a bar and arranged to give 

her a ride home. While sitting in appellant’s car, Smith saw a 

Cadillac salesman she knew, went over to his vehicle for several 

minutes, and returned to appellant’s vehicle. According to 

Brew, appellant drove Smith to a location near Leesburg, knowing 

even before he left the bar’s parking lot that he was going to 

kill her. After parking beside a road, appellant forced Smith 

to perform oral sex on him and strangled her to death by 

wrapping her jacket around her neck. Appellant told Brew that, 

while he was forcing Smith to perform oral sex on him, he could 

only become fully aroused “when he was strangling her with the 

fatigue jacket.” 

 Appellant put Smith’s body in his trunk and drove to a site 

where he had previously delivered heavy equipment with his 

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brother-in-law.1 Appellant abandoned his plan to bury the body 

there when he saw lights that he had not previously noticed 

during his earlier daytime visit. Brew also described 

appellant’s efforts to conceal his involvement in Smith’s 

murder, indicating that he cleaned his car twice and attempted 

to divert police attention to the Cadillac salesman who Smith 

encountered on the night of her death. 

 Brew also testified that “a couple of weeks later” 

appellant returned to the site where he had left the body to 

ensure that the body was still covered. At that time, appellant 

noticed that “animals had been at the body.” Brew recalled 

appellant referring to both Kruger and Smith as “bitch[es],” 

“slut[s],” and “whore[s].” 

B. KRUGER’S TESTIMONY 

 The Commonwealth subsequently called Diane Kruger as a 

witness. Kruger testified that appellant approached her in a 

bar on August 1, 1978 and offered to help fix some problems she 

had with her car and which she had discussed with him at their 

first meeting several days earlier. Appellant convinced Kruger 

to permit him to take the car for a test-drive. Entering the 

passenger side of Kruger’s vehicle, appellant instructed Kruger 

to follow a car which he claimed contained some friends on their 

 

 1Appellant's brother-in-law worked for a company that moved 

construction equipment between job sites.

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way to a party. Appellant told Kruger to pull off the road and 

turn off the car while they waited to meet some of his friends. 

When Kruger reached to start her car again, appellant produced a 

knife and threatened Kruger with it. After forcing her to 

perform oral sex on him, appellant tied Kruger’s hands and began 

stuffing toilet paper in her mouth. Kruger recalled that 

appellant repeatedly stuffed the paper into her mouth, nearly 

blocking her air passage, and then released the pressure. 

Kruger also testified that appellant was unable to maintain an 

erection during this two-hour assault. Once she covertly freed 

her hands, Kruger escaped from the car by striking appellant in 

the head with a bottle. While in the process of fleeing, Kruger 

sustained multiple stab wounds in her abdomen and in the area of 

her heart, lung, and side. Appellant’s objection to Kruger’s 

testimony was overruled. 

C. HOWARD’S TESTIMONY 

 John Howard testified that he was at his parents’ house in 

early November 1978. The Howards’ residence is approximately 

two-tenths of a mile from the spot where Smith’s body was found. 

Howard recalled a round-faced white man in his mid-to-late 

twenties with reddish brown hair, large ears, and freckles 

coming to the door. Howard described the man as resembling 

“Alfred E. Newman,” a character of MAD magazine. The man asked 

Howard “what [he] thought of the body down at the bottom of the 

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hill . . . down near the culvert . . . right off the road in 

plain view for everyone to see.” When Howard replied that he 

knew nothing about the body, the visitor told Howard that it was 

laying face down and that it was only a mannequin with a blond 

wig that local children had placed there as a Halloween prank. 

The man told Howard one could not “tell that it wasn’t a woman 

until you rolled the body over.” The visitor continued, saying 

that people had already reported seeing the body to the police 

and that “the police didn’t even respond anymore.” 

Approximately two weeks later, Smith’s body was found in the 

vicinity of the Howard residence. Appellant objected to this 

evidence after Howard testified. The court overruled the 

objection. 

 II. 

ADMISSION OF KRUGER’S TESTIMONY 

 Under settled Virginia law, evidence of other crimes or bad 

acts is inadmissible to prove the accused is guilty of the crime 

charged. See Guill v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 134, 138, 495 

S.E.2d 489, 491 (1998). “Such evidence implicating an accused 

in other crimes unrelated to the charged offense is inadmissible 

because it may confuse the issues being tried and cause undue 

prejudice to the defendant.” Id.

 As an exception to the general rule of exclusion, however, 

evidence of other crimes or bad acts is admissible “if relevant 

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to a material issue or element of consequence in the case.” 

Foster v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 316, 319, 362 S.E.2d 745, 747 

(1987). Among the permissible uses of “other crimes” evidence, 

such evidence may be admitted: (1) to prove any element of the 

offense charged, (2) to show the motive, intent, or knowledge of 

the accused, (3) to show the conduct and feeling of the accused 

toward his or her victim, or (4) to show premeditation or 

malice. See Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 230, 421 

S.E.2d 821, 828 (1992); Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 34, 

393 S.E.2d 599, 603 (1990). Such evidence is also admissible to 

establish the perpetrator’s identity when “some aspects of the 

prior crime are so distinctive or idiosyncratic that the fact 

finder reasonably could infer that the same person committed 

both crimes.” Guill, 255 Va. at 138-39, 495 S.E.2d at 491. 

 Before “other crimes” evidence will be admitted, however, 

the prior crime or bad act must be shown to have a causal 

relation or logical and natural connection with the crime 

charged or, alternately, the two acts must form parts of the 

same transaction. See id. at 140, 495 S.E.2d at 492-93. 

Furthermore, evidence whose prejudicial impact outweighs its 

probative value will not be admitted. See Woodfin v. 

Commonwealth, 236 Va. 89, 95, 372 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1988). The 

trial court is charged with balancing prejudicial impact and 

probative value and the court’s decision is subject to reversal 

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only for an abuse of discretion. See Pavlick v. Commonwealth, 

27 Va. App. 219, 226, 497 S.E.2d 920, 923-24 (1998) (en banc). 

 Appellant contends Kruger’s testimony had no causal 

relationship to or logical connection with the crime charged and 

was, therefore, not admissible under any exception to the 

general rule against admitting “other crimes” evidence. We 

disagree. The logical connection which exists between the two 

incidents is provided by the idiosyncratic characteristics they 

manifest. 

 Generally referred to as evidence of modus operandi, under 

the holding of Spencer v. Commonwealth, the test for the 

admission of such evidence is satisfied “where the other 

incidents are ‘sufficiently idiosyncratic to permit an inference 

of pattern for purposes of proof.’” 240 Va. 78, 90, 393 S.E.2d 

609, 616 (1990) (quoting United States v. Hudson, 884 F.2d 1016, 

1021 (7th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted)). The crimes need not 

be so similar as to constitute a signature or carbon copy of the 

case on trial. See Spencer, 240 Va. at 89-90, 393 S.E.2d at 

616. “Rather, it is sufficient if the [evidence of] other 

crimes bear ‘a singular strong resemblance to the pattern of the 

offense charged.’” Id. at 90, 393 S.E.2d at 616 (quoting 

Hudson, 884 F.2d at 1021). 

 Although the admissibility of evidence showing modus

operandi has generally been viewed as a means of proving the 

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identity of a crime’s perpetrator, see Chichester v. 

Commonwealth, 248 Va. 311, 326-28, 448 S.E.2d 638, 648-49 

(1994); Foster, 5 Va. App. at 320, 362 S.E.2d at 747, the 

evidence challenged in this case was not admitted to establish 

identity, and the jury was instructed that they could not 

consider the evidence on that issue.2 We see no reason, however, 

to limit the admissibility of evidence showing modus operandi to 

the purpose of proving identity. When evidence of idiosyncratic 

similarities in an accused’s mode of attack exists and 

constitutes a logical connection with the crime charged, such 

evidence may be admitted for the purpose of establishing, by 

inference, the accused’s intent, motive, malice, premeditation, 

or the accused’s feelings toward the victim, as well as the 

perpetrator’s identity. See Lafon v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 

411, 418-19, 438 S.E.2d 279, 284 (1993) (affirming the trial 

court’s admission of modus operandi evidence, which consisted of 

prior bad acts and planning, for the purpose of proving the 

accused’s intent and premeditation during the crime charged); 

Witt v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 215, 219, 422 S.E.2d 465, 468 

(1992) (affirming the admission of evidence that an accused 

 

 2The trial court instructed the jury that it could “consider 

evidence that the defendant committed offenses other than the 

offense for which he is on trial only to show malice, 

premeditation, intent, motive, or conduct and feeling of the 

defendant towards the victim in connection with the offense for 

which he’s on trial and for no other purpose.” The jury is 

presumed to have followed the court’s instruction of law. 

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committed prior burglaries in a manner similar to the crime 

charged for the purpose of proving, inter alia, the accused’s 

knowledge and intent). See also Guill, 255 Va. at 141, 495 

S.E.2d at 493 (assuming without deciding that the test of 

Spencer, which permits the admission of “other crimes” evidence 

on the issue of identity when the prior crimes manifest 

idiosyncratic similarities with the crime charged, may support 

the admission of “other crimes” evidence even when the identity 

of the perpetrator of the crime charged is known). 

 Assuming without deciding that modus operandi evidence must 

meet the test of admissibility established in Spencer

irrespective of the purpose for which it is admitted, we find 

that the similarities between appellant’s assault on Kruger and 

the instant offense are sufficiently idiosyncratic to justify 

admission of the challenged “other crimes” evidence. The 

similarities include the following: 1) each victim was a white 

woman in her twenties; 2) each victim encountered appellant in a 

bar and had been drinking; 3) each victim left with appellant in 

a car; 4) appellant exploited the car problems experienced by 

each victim; 5) appellant referred to each victim as a “slut,” a 

“bitch,” and a “whore”; 6) Kruger was almost asphyxiated with 

toilet paper crammed in her mouth, while Smith was murdered by 

strangulation; 7) appellant forced each victim to perform oral 

 

LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 589, 304 S.E.2d 644, 657 

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(1983).

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sex; and 8) in each case appellant said he could not reach full 

sexual arousal until he prevented his victim from breathing. We 

also note that the offenses occurred within ninety days of each 

other, a time interval of sufficient duration to withstand 

appellant’s challenge on the ground of remoteness. See Moore v. 

Commonwealth 222 Va. 72, 77, 278 S.E.2d 822, 825 (1981); Lafon, 

17 Va. App. at 419-20, 438 S.E.2d at 284-85. 

 Given the striking similarities between appellant’s attack 

on Kruger and the evidence inculpating appellant in the instant 

offense, we find that Kruger’s testimony bears a logical 

connection to the crime charged, as required in Guill, and 

provides a sound basis from which the trier of fact could infer 

motive, criminal intent, premeditation, malice, and the feelings 

of appellant toward the victim, which were at issue in the 

prosecution of the crime charged. As such, the evidence was 

relevant and properly admitted. 

 We further believe that the probative value of Kruger’s 

testimony was not outweighed by its incidental prejudicial 

impact on the accused. See Woodfin, 236 Va. at 95, 372 S.E.2d 

at 381. The probative value of this evidence tends to establish 

not only appellant’s intent to sexually assault and then maim or 

murder Smith but also his commission of Smith’s murder with 

premeditation and malice, as evidenced by the methods of attack 

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and control appellant used to overcome the victim. Further, 

Kruger’s testimony establishes the animus appellant felt toward 

his victim in the present case. 

 In short, we hold the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in balancing the probative value of Kruger’s 

testimony relative to any prejudicial impact on appellant and 

will not disturb its admission of this “other crimes” evidence. 

 III. 

ADMISSION OF HOWARD’S TESTIMONY 

 Appellant next contends that the testimony provided by John 

Howard was irrelevant and thus improperly admitted. He argues 

that because Howard could not identify appellant as the man who 

appeared at his door a few weeks after the murder, his testimony 

was collateral to the issues being tried. We disagree. 

 “Evidence is admissible if it is both relevant and 

material.” Evans-Smith v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 188, 196, 

361 S.E.2d 436, 441 (1987). “‘Evidence is relevant if it has 

any logical tendency, however slight, to establish a fact at 

issue in the case.’” Braxton v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 176, 

186, 493 S.E.2d 688, 692 (1997) (quoting Ragland v. 

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 913, 918, 434 S.E.2d 675, 678 (1993)). 

 In this case, the identity of Smith’s murderer was a fact 

at issue. Evidence tending to show appellant’s presence near 

Smith’s body in November 1978 was probative on the issue of the 

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perpetrator’s identity and corroborated the testimony of Brew, 

who testified that appellant murdered Smith, dumped her body 

near Howard’s house, and later returned to the site to cover up 

the body. At trial, Howard gave a detailed description of the 

man who appeared at his door in November 1978 but could not 

identify appellant as that individual. As the trier of fact, 

the jury was entitled to weigh Howard’s testimony in light of 

its own observations of the physical characteristics of 

appellant, taking into consideration Howard’s inability to 

identify the appellant, and to draw reasonable inferences 

regarding the identity of the man who came to Howard’s door to 

inquire about a woman’s body that was lying in a nearby culvert. 

See Peterson v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 289, 295, 302 S.E.2d 520, 

524 (1983) (stating that the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight to be given identification testimony is a matter for the 

jury). See also McDonnough v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 120, 

132, 486 S.E.2d 570, 576 (1997) (finding that a witness’ 

description of the perpetrator of the crime charged was 

probative identification evidence). 

 For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm 

appellant’s conviction. 

 Affirmed.

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