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U.S.–JAPAN RELATIONS: ENDURING TIES, RECENT

DEVELOPMENTS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC AND 

THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 17, 2010

Serial No. 111–116

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

VACANT 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa, Chairman 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Joseph R. Donovan, Jr., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau 

of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State ........................... 14

Mr. Michael Schiffer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian & 

Pacific, Security Affairs (East Asia), U.S. Department of Defense .................. 23

Sheila A. Smith, Ph.D., Senior Fellow for Japan Studies, Council on Foreign 

Relations ............................................................................................................... 49

Michael Auslin, Ph.D., Director of Japan Studies, The American Enterprise 

Institute ................................................................................................................ 62

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress from 

American Samoa, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and 

the Global Environment: Prepared statement ................................................... 4

The Honorable Donald A. Manzullo, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Illinois: Prepared statement ................................................................. 8

The Honorable Diane E. Watson, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California: Prepared statement ............................................................ 13

Mr. Joseph R. Donovan, Jr.: Prepared statement ................................................. 17

Mr. Michael Schiffer: Prepared statement ............................................................ 26

Sheila A. Smith, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ......................................................... 54

Michael Auslin, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .......................................................... 64

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 78

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 79

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey: Statement/questions .................................................. 80

(1)

U.S.–JAPAN RELATIONS: ENDURING TIES, 

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 17, 2010

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC

AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:41 p.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Eni F. H. 

Faleomavaega, (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. The subcommittee will come to order. My 

apologies to our witnesses for being a little late this afternoon, but 

we do welcome them. And without any objection, all the statements 

of our witnesses will be made part of the record. 

I will begin by giving my opening statement. Then my good 

friend, the ranking member of our subcommittee, Mr. Manzullo, 

will give his opening statement, and then we will proceed from 

there. 

This is a hearing on United States-Japan relations. I believe this 

is the first time that we have had the hearing. Hopefully there will 

be more to come. 

This year marks the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the 

United States. That treaty forms the bedrock of our bilateral relationship, which in turn plays an indispensable role in ensuring security and prosperity for the United States and Japan as well as 

the broader Asia-Pacific region and throughout the world. As Article 6 of the treaty notes, one of its major purposes is to ‘‘contribute 

to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far 

East.’’

The advent of new governments in both countries offers us a 

unique opportunity to expand and invigorate both the security alliance and our close economic, diplomatic and political ties in the 

face of new regional and global challenges. Our two government 

witnesses today are involved in senior-level discussions with their 

Japanese counterparts on deepening and expanding the alliance to 

encompass greater cooperation in disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, climate change, cyber security, terrorism, proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction and other issues. In this important 

dialogue both sides are guided by a shared respect for democracy 

and freedom, by a mutual interest in successfully adapting to the 

realignment of the region’s great powers and by the enduring ties 

we have forged over the last 65 years. 

2

Clearly, we have encountered some difficulties in relations since 

the election of the Democratic Party of Japan last August. But we 

should be mindful that the Democratic Party of Japan never governed previously, as with one brief interruption, the Liberal Democratic Party ruled Japan for more than half a century. 

As those of us in Washington should be acutely aware, getting 

a new administration up to speed can take time. More to the point, 

most of the issues on which the press has reported so breathlessly 

are relatively minor when viewed in the context of the breadth and 

depth of our bilateral relationship. The fact that certain Toyota 

models sometimes accelerate unexpectedly is a mechanical problem, not a diplomatic issue. And last week’s acknowledgment by 

Japan’s foreign minister of the existence of secret cold war agreements was a welcome fulfillment of the Democratic Party of Japan’s campaign pledge to promote greater governmental transparency. In my opinion, secret agreements that would allow military operations by U.S. forces based in Japan in case of an emergency on the Korean Peninsula, and to have Tokyo spend some $20 

million to help restore former U.S. military areas in Okinawa to 

farmland should have been made public decades ago. 

The more problematic secret agreement that gave tacit permission for U.S. nuclear-armed warships to make calls at Japanese 

ports and transit through Japanese territorial waters—which 

would appear to have contravened Japan’s three non-nuclear principles not to make, own or allow entry of nuclear weapons—was 

made public decades ago. Edwin Reischauer, our Ambassador to 

Japan in the mid-1960s, discussed those port calls in an open press 

conference in 1980. Ten years later, President Bush, Bush 41, announced the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from U.S. 

naval ships, rendering the secret pact moot. 

I believe both the United States and Japan should welcome Tokyo’s new willingness to acknowledge historical truths and indeed 

encourage the Hatoyama government to do so in other areas. 

In any case, the most significant issue between our two countries 

is Japan’s decision to reexamine the agreement to relocate the U.S. 

Marine Corps Air Station from Futenma to a less populated part 

of Okinawa. 

Two months ago I signed a letter with the chairman and ranking 

members of the House Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees expressing our continued support for the Guam International Agreement of February 2009. In our view any concerns regarding the Futenma Replacement Facility should be addressed 

through that accord. 

As the agreement notes, it is the intent of both parties to reduce 

the burden on local communities, including those in Okinawa, 

thereby providing the basis for enhanced public support for the security alliance. It further states, and I quote,

‘‘The relocation of some 8,000 marines and their 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam shall be dependent on tangible 

progress made by the Government of Japan toward completion 

of the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the 

United States-Japan road map for realignment implementation 

of 2006.’’

3

I believe all of us who signed the letter recognized that during 

the campaign, the Democratic Party of Japan pledged to review the 

base issue. And since the Social Democratic Party, one of the 

Democratic Party’s coalition partners, adamantly opposes the existing relocation plans and insists that the base be moved outside of 

Japan. The decision by the Prime Minister to put the realignment 

process on hold after taking office should not have come as a surprise. 

After the January Nago mayoral election resulting in the victory 

of a first-time candidate opposed to the planned relocation, the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly’s unanimous approval of a written 

statement demanding that the base be moved outside the prefecture. The governor of Okinawa’s recent hints that he may take a 

similar position when he campaigns for reelection later this year—

the issue has clearly become more volatile locally. 

The burdens the Okinawan people have shouldered on behalf of 

the alliance should not be underestimated. With less than 1 percent of Japan’s land area, Okinawa is host to two-thirds of the 

American forces based in Japan. We should also remember that 

Okinawa was the sovereign Ryuku Kingdom until it was foreceably 

annexed by Japan in 1872, and that during the battle of Okinawa, 

one-third of its inhabitants died. To this day Okinawa remains a 

vestige of imperialism as it languishes behind the rest of the country economically and educationally, and its people face discrimination throughout Japan. 

In dealing with the Futenma relocation issue, we must not neglect this history. Politically we must also recognize that Prime 

Minister Hatoyama’s approval ratings have deteriorated steeply 

from almost 80 percent when he took office to somewhere between 

30 to 40 percent now, largely as a result of financial scandals and 

uneven leadership. Even worse for the Democratic Party of Japan, 

only one-quarter of voters say they plan to cast their ballots for the 

party in July’s Upper House elections. 

At the same time we must not lose sight of the strategic importance of United States-Japan alliance or allow the Futenma issue 

to define the bilateral relationship. Japan remains America’s most 

important ally in the Asia-Pacific. Japan is the world’s second largest economy if one uses an alternative metric system. Just a few 

weeks ago it is my understanding that Japan has regained its position as the largest holder of American treasuries, now somewhere 

around $769 billion to China’s $755 billion. Japan shares our democratic values and our interest in a prosperous, peaceful, stable and 

sustainable world. The United States-Japan alliance should and 

will remain a pivotal strength for both of our countries so long as 

we address the issues of the day with patience, persistence, flexibility, and understanding between both countries. 

That ends my opening statement, and I would now like to turn 

the time over to my good friend, our ranking member, for his opening statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Faleomavaega follows:]

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Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this important hearing concerning the critical relationship between the 

United States and Japan. I want to underscore my deep appreciation for this longstanding friendship and alliance that we share 

with Japan where I had the opportunity a few years ago to visit 

Nagoya, went to the Toyota factory there, the Mitsubishi rocket 

factory, and got to ride the bullet train from Nagoya to Tokyo and 

I got to sit right up in front. It was almost like a video game. Mr. 

Chairman, you ought to try that sometime. I wasn’t at the controls, 

I want to let you know that. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. If the gentleman would yield, I did ride the 

bullet train, and the fact of the matter is Japan is about 100 years 

in advance as far as mass transit systems compared to ours. They 

were able to have trains that could go up to speeds of 125 miles 

an hour some 50 years ago. And what are we doing? We haven’t 

solved our own mass transit system. Thank you. 

Mr. MANZULLO. I am delighted to announce that Ambassador 

Fujisaki of Japan has graciously agreed to visit Rockford College, 

which is located in the northwest Illinois congressional district that 

I have the honor to represent. This will be the second time that Japan’s chief envoy to the United States has traveled to Illinois; the 

first was in 2007, the former Ambassador Kato, we presented him 

with a Cubs jacket, and he went on to graduate from diplomatic 

service and is in charge of major league baseball in Japan. He must 

have got a good background here in the United States, huh, Chairman? 

Thus, I want to publicly thank the good folks of Japan for sending such able and distinguished scholars and statesmen, such as 

Ambassador Fujisaki and Kato to America. Their contributions to 

the relationship between our two countries cannot be overstated. 

Our congressional district has a lot of thanks to give to the good 

folks in Japan. Union Specialties in Union, Illinois, is the last manufacturing of sewing machines in this country, and who came along 

to pick up the pieces and keep it going but the Japanese with direct foreign investment, and when two fellows from the United 

States decided to make Japanese rice crackers in the United 

States, they soon realized that they had to have direct Tokyo influence, and Mitsubishi factories now own in Rockford, Illinois, TD 

Foods, which is the only domestic manufacturer of delicious Japanese rice crackers. So the Japanese foreign direct investment is responsible for Nissan Forklift in Maringo, Illinois, thus we have a 

very, very close working relationship with the Japanese, and we 

are very much appreciative of their investment in our congressional 

district, their tireless and effortless willingness to stay involved in 

manufacturing, and we are very much indebted to the Japanese 

people and continue to draw closer and closer relationships with 

our direct investment in Japan and vice-versa. 

So we look forward to even stronger ties as we get through these 

challenges regarding Okinawa. Both sides are very mature at our 

diplomatic relations. We have a lot of respect for each other, and 

we will obviously work through it. 

So, Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this meeting and I look 

forward to the testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Manzullo follows:]

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Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I thank my good friend for his statement. 

The gentleman from California has an opening statement. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling this 

important hearing, and I thank our witnesses for attending. 

There has been a lot of coverage in the press lately about U.S.-

Japanese disputes, but when you look at the depth of the partnership that exists between the United States and Japan, I think it 

is one that transcends parties. It is certainly one that transcends 

personalities. We are the two largest economies in the world, and 

our security alliance has lasted for 50 years. The alliance has been 

a force for stability in a very tough neighborhood, but there is 

cause for concern. 

Japan’s Government is inexperienced. Some Japanese leaders 

would like to see Tokyo tilt more toward Beijing. The dispute over 

the relocation of U.S. Marines on Okinawa has been badly handled. 

I think most Japanese would agree with that statement. There is 

a threat that this issue could spill into the functional operations of 

our alliance, but this is not just an issue for U.S.-Japan relations. 

Our alliance provides the oxygen for many in the region. It is part 

of the security network throughout East Asia. U.S. allies Singapore, Australia, South Korea, the Philippines, are all concerned. 

The good news is that the Japanese public maintains its support 

for United States-Japan alliance at about 75 percent. However, 

about two-thirds of the Japanese think that the alliance has been 

poorly handled by the new government. 

The U.S. security guarantee in Asia has allowed the region’s 

countries to link themselves together, not with military pacts, but 

with trade. We provide the stability for free trade to flow, yet we 

are on the sidelines when it comes to trade in the region. As I 

noted the other week with Assistant Secretary Campbell, we are 

party to just two of the 168 trade agreements in force in Asia. That 

is not nearly good enough. 

I would also just on another subject make the point that Japan’s 

population, its density, its geography make it entirely different 

when discussing public transportation than with respect to the 

United States. We look at economic merit when addressing infrastructure or at least we should. The Japanese situation with respect to density makes the development of their public transit system there a very rational thing for Japan to have done. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it is vitally 

important that we reaffirm to both the people of Japan and the 

people of the United States that the relationship with Japan is of 

utmost importance to our future, and to the present—not just the 

future, but the present. Japan, to some degree, has been taken for 

granted by the people of the United States. It has been off our 

radar screen, and that is not good, and without this incredible partnership between Japan and the United States the history of the 

world would be a lot different. The history of the cold war certainly 

would have been a lot different, and it would have been more costly 

to contain communism, it would have been, frankly, the threat to 

11

the Western World would probably still have been upon that we 

faced 30 or 40 years ago. 

But the partnership with Japan enabled us to have a prosperous 

and a secure region of the world, and a partner that would be with 

us, maybe not by sending armed might, but be with us in every 

other way as we went into conflicts throughout the world. 

Well, as I say, unfortunately some Americans, because there 

wasn’t a not of controversy at that time, just took that for granted. 

Well, unfortunately, I think a lot of people in Japan have taken 

America for granted the same way the Japanese were taken for 

granted by Americans, and that is, the people of Japan have to 

know that they will not have the peace and stability in their region, in their country, and the prosperity in their country without 

this continued close relationship with the United States. It will not 

happen—you know, somebody said that—I remember it was Ronald 

Reagan who said this first, I believe—that people take the air for 

granted because it is there, and they just think, well, let us just 

take that for granted. But if you cut off the air for even a millisecond, maybe within 30 seconds of cutting of somebody’s air they 

realize how important that factor is. 

And I think that right now as Japanese-American relations are 

being reexamined and some strains that are very evident, that we 

must make sure that we do not take the air for granted. We do not 

take the reality, the wonderful reality we have had for 50 years 

that just happened, it didn’t just happen, it happened because the 

dynamic was created between the Japanese people and the American people that led to that prosperity and peace and stability, and 

yes, freedom and democracy. 

This is the worse possible moment for our countries to be focusing on our differences rather than our similarities. This is the 

worst possible moment we have an emerging and ever stronger dictatorship in China that will, if it senses weakness, will become an 

offensive force in the region that will disrupt the stability and the 

prosperity that we have enjoyed. 

So, Mr. Chairman, we need to make sure that we have these 

kinds of hearings and reach out to our fellows in Japan because I 

believe that whether it is Okinawa or some of these other issues 

that are strained right now and that are questioned and are pulling at our relationship, those things are so minuscule in importance as compared to maintaining the overall alliance that we have 

had with Japan because, as I say, this is happening at the moment 

when China can become a huge threat to the status quo in a very 

negative way. 

Let me just make one note. We have territorial claims by China 

in the South China Sea that would put Japan at risk almost immediately. You cannot have Beijing having territorial control or that 

cannot be—cannot recognize that they have these rights that go 

right out into the sea without it having a severe impact on Japanese shipping lanes, and that is their lifeblood, and like our country, those shipping lanes are their lifeblood. So let us get on with 

the hearing, and again appreciate you bringing the issues up today. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I thank the gentleman for his comments, 

and now I would like to turn the time over to my good friend, the 

gentlelady from California, Dr. Watson. 

12

Ms. WATSON. Konbanwa. Thank you for holding this timely hearing about growing U.S.-Japan relations. The August 2009 elections 

led to a landslide victory for the Democratic Party of Japan, and 

for the first time in nearly 50 years there is a change in the governing party in Japan. 

I lived in Okinawa in the early seventies as American teacher at 

Kadina Air Force Base, and at that time, of course, we were so 

compatible and we had our bases there where families chose to live 

after our military would be relocated. Some of them after retiring 

came back to live there because it was a wonderful environment, 

and that is how I remember Japan, Okinawa, Japan, now. 

And so I would hope that these kinds of hearings will keep us 

informed as how our relationships are, and I do know we, as Americans, do falter in the behavior of some of our people in various 

places around the world, but as my colleague just said, these are 

minuscule compared to the very strong and healthy relationships 

that we have had in the immediate aftermath of the second World 

War, and the time that I was in that part of the world. 

Now, the DPJ has slowly begun to alter Japanese foreign policy, 

choosing to better relationships with Japan’s neighboring nations, 

and increasing the efficacy and transparency of their government. 

Though Japan’s involving interactions with China and North Korea 

should be monitored, greater interaction among Asian nations will 

hopefully lead to a more stability in the region. 

The new DPJ government offers us an opportunity to expand our 

already strong relationship which we have had and the Asia-Pacific 

region, and I know some people feel that our intent in many places 

in the world is to occupy. It is not to occupy. It is to remain partners and collaborators together as we retain the peace and help 

these nations grow, and I would say that Japan has grown to be 

a strong and important leader globally, and I would hope that as 

we continue our relationship there that we continue to strengthen 

our relationships with Japan and the other Asia-Pacific areas in 

that region. 

So thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will yield back the remainder 

of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Watson follows:]

13

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I thank the gentlelady for her comments, 

and I am sure all of us here as members of the subcommittee have 

had very positive experiences in dealing with this important ally, 

the country of Japan. 

We have with us this afternoon some very key witnesses. I deeply appreciate their taking the time from their busy schedules to 

come and testify before us. We have our principal deputy assistant 

secretary from the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs from 

the State Department, a Senior Foreign Officer, Mr. Joseph Donovan. 

Previous to his appointment as principal deputy assistant secretary, he served as counsel general in Hong Kong, and also held 

important points in our embassy in Tokyo as well as in Taiwan; political counselor as well as chief of military affairs in our embassy 

in Tokyo; also in Beijing, as well as in Kaohsuing in Taiwan. 

Deputy Assistant Secretary Donovan is a graduate of Georgetown University with a degree in foreign service, and also received 

his master’s degree with distinction in national security affairs at 

the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey. 

Also with us this afternoon is deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asian & Pacific affairs, Mr. Michael Schiffer. Before his 

appointment as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for East 

Asian & Pacific affairs, he was also with the Secretary of Defense 

in 2009 and was involved with the Stanley Foundation—I don’t 

know what is the matter with my voice this afternoon. Secretary 

Schiffer also worked as a senior staff member for Diane Feinstein, 

and was senior advisor to Senator Feinstein on national security 

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sity where he received his—well, his undergraduate studies at 

Georgetown University and has graduate degrees from the London 

School of Economics, and also New York University. 

We generally have a 5-minute rule, gentlemen, and give us all 

the good things, if you could share that with us so we could also 

have an opportunity to raise some questions. 

I am sorry, just one more delay. I would like to turn the time 

over to my friend from New Jersey, Mr. Smith, if he has an opening statement. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. If you don’t 

mind, I will wait until questions, and I thank you for that courtesy. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. All right. Secretary Donovan. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JOSEPH R. DONOVAN, JR., PRINCIPAL 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN 

AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Manzullo, and 

members of the subcommittee. It is a privilege to appear before you 

today. 

As the chairman has just mentioned, in 2010, the United States 

and Japan are celebrating the 50th anniversary of our treaty of 

mutual cooperation and security, a historic milestone that is both 

an opportunity to reflect on the successes of the past half-century, 

and also an opportunity to look ahead. 

Today, Japan is among our most important trading partners and 

a staunch and important ally. We work together on a broad range 

of critical issues from the United Nations and the Six-Party Talks 

to increasing regional economic integration, promoting democracy 

and human rights, climate change, nuclear nonproliferation and 

disarmament, and coordinating humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Japan continues to be an increasingly active partner in 

global affairs and our bilateral and multilateral cooperation transcends the Asia-Pacific region. 

Japan is working with us and others on post-earthquake recovery 

in Haiti and Chile. It is a vital international supporter of reconstruction, reintegration and development in Afghanistan, and it is 

combatting piracy off the Horn of Africa. 

Like the United States, Japan experienced historic political 

change in the last year. At the end of August 2009 Japan held an 

election for the Lower House of the Diet. In that election the Democratic Party of Japan won a dramatic victory, ending 55 years of 

almost unbroken rule by the Liberal Democratic Party. 

United States congratulated Japan on this historic election and 

joined the people of Japan in reaffirming the strong democratic tradition that we share. We also welcomed the opportunity to work 

with the new government in Tokyo on a broad range of global, regional, and bilateral issues. Since August, President Obama has 

met twice with Prime Minister Hatoyama. Secretary Clinton has 

met several times with her counterpart, Foreign Minister Okada, 

most recently, in January, in Hawaii. 

As President Clinton said in his Tokyo speech last November, 

United States-Japan alliance is not a historic relic from a bygone 

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Japan alliance has played an indispensable role in ensuring the security and prosperity of both United States and Japan as well as 

regional peace and stability, and we are committed to ensuring 

that it continues to be effective in meeting the challenges of the 

twenty-first century. 

Since the end of the cold war the United States and Japan have 

worked together to update our alliance through efforts ranging 

from the force posture realignment to the review of roles, missions 

and capabilities. The alliance has grown in scope with cooperation 

on everything from missile defense to information security. 

Through the Defense Policy Review Initiative, the United States 

and Japan have made a landmark alliance commitment to implement a coherent package of force posture realignments that will 

have far-reaching benefits for the alliance. These changes will help 

strengthen the flexibility and deterrent capability of U.S. forces 

while creating the conditions for more sustainable U.S. miliary 

presence in the region. 

The transformation includes the relocation of approximately 

8,000 marines from Okinawa to Guam, force posture relocations 

and land returns on Okinawa and other realignments and combined capability changes on mainland Japan. This realignment will 

strengthen both countries’ ability to meet current responsibilities 

and create an alliance that is more flexible, capable, and better 

able to work together to address common security concerns. 

The Futenma Replacement Facility, a linchpin of the realignment road map, is currently being review by the new Japanese 

Government. The Government of Japan has stated that its review 

of the relocation issue will conclude by May. As Secretary Clinton 

has said, we are respectful of the Japanese Government’s process, 

at the same time our position remains that in terms of both the 

security arrangements needed to protect Japan and fulfill our treaty commitments, and to limit the impact of bases on local communities, particularly on Okinawa, that the realignment road map 

presents the best way forward. 

Mr. Chairman, the United States and Japan together generate 

over a third of global output. We are global leaders and we are 

finding more and more that our engagement is global in scope as 

we tackle issues like energy security and climate change, protect 

intellectual property right, deepen and strengthen the Asia-Pacific 

economic community, and address critical development needs in 

Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa, and elsewhere. 

As important as our global economic relationship has become, we 

also need to continue our efforts to expand trade and investment 

between us. We continue to urge Japan to make meaningful market access commitments in the Doha development round negotiations. We are working hard to further open the Japanese market 

to U.S. beef, consistent with science and international standards, 

and to improve market access to U.S. automobiles. 

We are also pressing Japan to establish a level playing field between Japan post and private companies in the insurance, banking 

and express delivery sectors in accordance with Japan’s international obligations. 

On December 11, 2009, we concluded a U.J.-Japan Open Skies 

Civil Aviation Agreement. Upon its entry into force, the new agreeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:53 Nov 10, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\APGE\031710\55515 HFA PsN: SHIRL
16

ment will represent a market-oriented approach to civil aviation relations. Airlines, not governments, will decide which cities to serve 

the frequency of flights, the equipment used, and the prices 

charged. 

Japan today is playing an increasing active role in the world 

stage, aiding in reconstruction activities in Iraq and anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa. Active in Afghanistan’s reconstruction since 2002 under its new government, Japan has become the 

second largest international contributor to Afghanistan. Japan also 

continues to provide strong leadership and encouraging additional 

international support for Pakistan. We welcome these efforts. 

We also are working to enhance our global cooperation on development efforts as well. Japan has been a strong supporter of the 

global nonproliferation regime, and last December in Copenhagen 

Japanese leadership played a vital role in helping the international 

community take a meaningful step toward addressing the global 

challenge of climate change. 

Japan and the United States have a great opportunity to advance regional prosperity during our back-to-back host years in 

2010 and 2011, respectively. Together we are working with our 

APEC partners to build resilient economies by preparing the region 

for natural disasters, bolstering public health capabilities, and ensuring an abundant and affordable food supply. 

Whatever the challenges we may face in the next half-century I 

am confident that our relationship with Japan will be an important 

element of our success. Our relation continues to develop and 

evolve, and continues to contribute to peace, prosperity and security throughout the region and the globe. 

Thank you very much for inviting me to testify and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Donovan follows:]

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Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Secretary Donovan. Secretary 

Schiffer. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL SCHIFFER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ASIAN & PACIFIC, SECURITY 

AFFAIRS (EAST ASIA), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. SCHIFFER. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Manzullo, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the privilege of appearing before you 

today to discuss United States-Japan security relationship. 

The relationship between the United States and Japan has provided the foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic 

prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region for more than 60 years. It is 

a relationship that has adapted an continues to evolve to address 

changes in the security environment, in our political systems, and 

in our respective capacities and capabilities. 

As has already been noted here t his afternoon, the alliance has 

been in the news recently in connection with the Government of Japan’s decision to reevaluate the plans for the relocation of Marine 

Corps Air Station Futenma, the termination of Japan’s Indian 

Ocean fueling operations and the so-called secret agreements, 

among other issues. These new stories have led to understandable 

concerns in certain quarters about the state of the relationship, but 

I think it is important to put these concerns in perspective in light 

of the much more difficult trials our alliance has endured in the 

past, emerging stronger each time; in light of the rich agenda of cooperation currently underway; and in light of the even more active 

agenda for deeper and broader cooperation that lies ahead. 

When we consider our partnership on such issues as missile defense, information security, extended deterrence, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, to give just a few example, the foundation for an evermore robust alliance is clearly evident. For example, 

U.S. missile defense cooperation with Japan has become a central 

element in the defense relationship. Japan’s investment in four 

BMD-capable Aegis destroyers and the upgrade of its Patriot battalions to pack-3 capability represents a significant augmentation 

and strengthening of the missile defense capability that protects 

Japan and our forces stationed there. 

As part of the 50th anniversary agenda, this year we have begun 

a formal dialogue with the Japanese to address information and 

cyber security, space and ballistic missile defense, all of which are 

central strategic issues for the twenty-first century. We believe that 


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it is critical to be able to hold confidential discussions with the Japanese Government on a range of sensitive strategic issues and we 

look forward to doing so. 

One additional area where we have seen an especially rich agenda for partnership is humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, 

peacekeeping operations and maritime security. Just this past 

month we agreed to start up a working group with Japan that will 

give particular focus to seeking bilateral agreement to enhance 

U.S.-Japanese cooperation and embody new operational initiatives 

in this area. 

In the here and now, however, public focus has been on the implementation of the 2006 bilateral realignment road map, specifically the relocation of the Futenma station. The Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Swab is one component of a larger plan to 

consolidate the U.S. presence on Okinawa onto existing bases, and 

move away from the densely populated portion of the island. The 

Futenma realignment package will allow us to reposition more 

than 8,000 marines from Japan to Guam and return nearly 70 percent of land south of Kadina Air Base to the Okinawan people, all 

while addressing noise, safety, environmental concerns, and creating a lighter footprint and a much more sustainable presence for 

U.S. forces on Okinawa. 

For reasons you highlighted in your opening statement, Mr. 

Chairman, we believe these are important goals. 

Beyond the realignment road map and base-specific questions, 

however, I also think it is important to keep in mind the larger 

strategic issues in play. Futenma may be but one base in one part 

of a larger alliance relationship, but peace and stability in the region depend in no small part of the enduring presence of forwarddeployed U.S. forces in Japan. The only readily deplorable U.S. 

ground forces between Hawaii and India are the U.S. Marines on 

Okinawa. The United States cannot meet its treaty obligation to 

defend Japan, cannot respond to humanitarian crisis or natural 

disaster, cannot meet its commitments for regional peace and stability without forward-deployed ground forces in Japan with the 

appropriate capabilities and training. 

In this broader context, the goal of the road map is to provide 

the alliance, not just the United States, not just Japan, but the alliance, Japan and the United States together, with the posture and 

the capabilities necessary to be able to meet our commitments in 

the defense of Japan, to respond to challenges in the region and 

around the globe, and to continue to underwrite peace, stability, 

and economic prosperity in the region for decades to come. 

The second issue I would like to briefly highlight today is the negotiations that we will soon undertake with Japan on host nation 

support. 

In addition to providing bases, Japan’s host nation support, or 

HNS, is a strategic pillar of the alliance. We view HNS as a mutual 

investment in our commitment to regional stability. Japan provides 

financial and logistical support. The United States provides resources and manpower capabilities. Through HNS each side complements the other and together we create a robust alliance capacity. We look forward to working with Japan and with this committee and Congress as these negotiations get underway. 

25

Let me now turn my attention briefly to our broader security 

partnership with Japan on the global stage. Despite its constitutional limitations, Japan is playing an ever greater role and shouldering ever greater responsibility in addressing regional and global 

security challenges. Japan’s maritime self-defense forces remain active in counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa, an operation that has contributed to regional security and the freedom of 

global commerce. 

Japan is also sending its defense force into more areas than ever 

before for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, 

most recently a deployment of 350 ground self-defense force personnel to Haiti to assist in reconstruction efforts there, and has 

been noted, Japan is also the second largest contributor of reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, 

having pledged some $6 billion to these efforts. 

We remain grateful to Japan for its leadership in these efforts 

in the region and globally, and look forward to continued partnership with our Japanese ally in addressing these and other global 

challenges. 

Closer to home, the Democratic Party of Japan since they have 

come into power have sought to strengthen Japan’s ties with other 

countries in the region. We welcome these initiatives. In particular, 

United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea share values, interests, and a common view on the dangers posed by North Korea’s 

missile and nuclear weapons development programs, and we have 

worked together to deepen these ties through the Defense Trilateral Talks. 

A strong U.S.-Japan alliance is also critical to the success of the 

multilateral security cooperation in the region, and we are committed to working with Japan to assure that Asia’s evolving multilateral organizations are inclusive, transparent, and solution-oriented. 

As equal partners, Japan and the United States share a commitment to regional and global peace, security and stability. As President Obama said in Tokyo last year, the 50th anniversary of 

United States-Japan alliance represents an important opportunity 

to step back and reflect on what we have achieved, celebrate our 

friendship, but also find ways to renew this alliance to refresh it 

for the twenty-first century. 

We look forward to the next 50 years of an alliance that will continue to be indispensable to the peace and prosperity of the United 

States, of Japan, and of the entire Asia-Pacific region, and we look 

forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, and the committee as 

we chart a way forward. Thank you and I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schiffer follows:]

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Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Secretary Schiffer. 

The gentlelady from California for her questions. 

Ms. WATSON. First, Mr. Donovan, in your testimony you mentioned the need to expand trade and invest between the United 

States and Japan, and you also mentioned that the Department of 

State is urging Japan to make meaningful market access commitments in the Doha development round negotiations, and to further 

open the Japanese market to American beef. 

Can you expand on Japan’s position in the Doha development 

round negotiations, and what are the Japanese main concerns? 

Now, I know what happened up in South Korea around beef, but 

can you explain what happened in Japan, please? 

Mr. DONOVAN. Dr. Watson, I believe the Japanese concerns 

revolve around the treatment of services and also agricultural products. 

With regard to the beef issue, this has been an issue that I was 

involve very heavily on for my 3 years, my most recent 3 years in 

Tokyo, and we continue to urge Japan to adopt a scientificallybased approach to the issue and one based on international standards, and we are confident that if Japan was to do that its market 

would be reopened to what I regard as not only safe and delicious 

but inexpensive American beef of all qualities, and we are going to 

continue to do that. As part of that effort we have worked very 

closely with the Meat Export Federation as well to expand Japan’s 

market. 

Ms. WATSON. I remember back in, I guess, mid-late nineties they 

were concerned about our fruits, particularly strawberries and so 

on, and they found that by the time they got to their shores they 

had all kinds of varmints in them, and they were very strict. Has 

our exporting of this fruit gotten any better and have they relaxed 

their restrictions on—this is specifically from California? Strawberries were the concern back them. 

Mr. DONOVAN. I believe Japan still takes a very, very strict approach to its agricultural inspection activities, and this is one area 

where our Department of Agriculture, particularly in Tokyo, works 

very, very closely with Japanese officials. Japan is worried about 

not only insecticides but also other residuals on American fruit, 

One of the things that Japan does if they find a shipment that 

is in question, they have a tendency to close down at least temporarily all shipments from that particular area, and this is something that we continue to work with Japan on, to open up the market more for U.S. fruits. 

Ms. WATSON. Thank you. With respect to trade and the recent 

Toyota recalls, will Japan’s Diet play a role in reassuring American 

consumers’ concern about Japanese autos and what legislative action might they consider? 

Mr. DONOVAN. As I look at the Toyota issue, the chairman mentioned it in his remarks, this is essentially a safety issues and I 

understand our Department of Transportation is playing a leading 

role in this. I don’t anticipate that this will be an issue in our foreign relations with Japan. 

Ms. WATSON. It won’t rise to that level. 

Mr. DONOVAN. But certainly it is a safety issue that we will be 

dealing with here in the United States. 

36

Ms. WATSON. All right, Mr. Schiffer, much of the discussion 

around Japan’s newly elected government has focused on the relocation of the Futenma base, and the relocation is proposed by the 

locals and thus is a politically-sensitive issue, and in your testimony you mention that the relocation of this base is just one part 

of a broader realignment process. 

Is there room for United States to compromise to make it politically easier for the Democratic Party of Japan to agree to relocate 

that base? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. Well, we have been consulting closely ever since 

the new government in Japan was reelected on the Futenma relocation issue. As was discussed earlier, Prime Minister Hatoyama 

has publicly reaffirmed that his government will make a decision 

by the end of May based on a thorough review of the options, and 

that process internal to the Japanese Government is now underway, and we very much respect Japan’s right to conduct that review. 

There has been no change, in our view, that the realignment 

road map remains the best plan for reducing the impact on Okinawa while maintaining our alliances capabilities. We are awaiting 

the outcome of the process that the Japanese Government has undertaken with the three ruling parties to conduct its review of the 

plan to relocate the Futenma Marine Air Station. We have seen reports in the media, as I am sure you have as well, on any number 

of alternatives and a great deal of discussion about different options in addition to the current Futenma plan. 

We are awaiting the Government of Japan to come to us with 

any conclusions that they reach in their review and to present any 

options and alternatives on the table that they think are viable, 

and when they do so we will certainly continue to discuss with 

them what we think the best way to go forward is. 

Ms. WATSON. Do we still have white beach and I know Kadina 

is a pretty large air base way back in prehistoric times. I want to 

know have we reduced the number of forces that we have throughout the island? What about the bases we had way up in the north 

and southern part of the island? Naha is a big city now, but there 

were a few bases around there. Have we shifted those around and 

reduced the size? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. Well, part of the goal for the realignment road 

map overall is to be able to come up with a lighter base footprint 

both in Okinawa and throughout Japan so that we can adopt to the 

new situation and the new environment that we find ourselves in. 

It is a major challenge for us and for the people of Okinawa that 

we have such heavy population densities in the southern part of 

the island where many of our bases are located, and that was the 

starting premise of this process when we started to try to work 

through these issues with the Japanese Government 10–15 years 

ago, was the need to figure out ways in which we could relocate 

bases so that we would have a more sustainable presence on Okinawa. 

Ms. WATSON. This will be my last question, Mr. Chairman, if you 

will allow me the time. 

The Riukin Islands themselves, has there been any consideration 

because I did hear mention that it was a matter of really being 

37

able to grow rice and so on? Were any of the outer islands ever considered for agriculture purposes, to expand to those? I mean, Japan 

to expand to those islands for agricultural purposes? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. You know, I am not familiar if it was, but we will 

be happy to get back to you. 

Ms. WATSON. Well, you know, I understand there are over 600 

of those islands, but I don’t know if any of them are large enough 

for agricultural purposes, but I was just curious about that in 

terms of relocation. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I thank the gentlelady. The gentleman from 

California, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to follow up 

on the questions that preceded me. 

How many troops are there or how many American personnel are 

now in Japan, and what is our eventual goal through the efforts 

that you are making right now? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. Well, our eventual goal is the goal that we have 

right now, which is to assure that we have the capabilities in 

Japan and in the alliance to be able to, first and foremost, extend 

credible deterrent capabilities throughout the region. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And how many people have you determined 

are necessary for that? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. Well, in part, it is, and I have to be evasive here, 

but in part it is a question of a very dynamic and evolving security 

environment as you yourself noted. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We don’t have a goal in mind? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. And this is one of the reasons why we want to be 

able to continue with our shift to Guam. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me suggest that if you are not able to tell 

the United States Congress what your goal is, then you shouldn’t 

be in negotiations with a foreign country, and the bottom line is 

you should let us know what that is. You are obviously not willing 

to say. 

How many marines would be left in Okinawa? We are taking out 

8,000. How many marines are going to be left there? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. There will be approximately 8,000 marines that 

will be left in Okinawa. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay, so that is about 50 percent. The other 

8,000 are going to Guam. 

Either one of the witnesses, do you believe that Japan should feel 

threatened by this massive or this incredible rise in both strength 

and wealth of mainland China? 

Mr. DONOVAN. Yes, sir. First of all, we have welcomed Japan’s 

efforts to improve its relations with all its neighbors, and we are 

very confident that this will not come at the expense of our own 

relations or our own interests. Japan has taken some steps in increased frequency of its contacts with China. Japan has a major 

trading relationship with China has well. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So is your answer no or yes? 

Mr. DONOVAN. My answer is no. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Is what? 

Mr. DONOVAN. No. 

38

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So Japan is not being threatened by this expansion of China’s military and its massive increase in financial 

power that we have seen in the last decade. 

How about you, do you think Japan should feel a little threatened by that or if we just—All American troops are leaving, China 

is ever becoming ever stronger, Japan should never worry about 

that? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. Well, I thin clearly the rise of China is one of the 

great challenges that the world faces in the twenty-first century, 

and what kind of China we see emerge as a player on the global 

stage is obviously going to be one of the most important strategic 

facts that will determine what sort of century——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Mr. SCHIFFER [continuing]. Our children and grandchildren will 

live with. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So you would rather use the word ‘‘challenge’’ 

rather than ‘‘threat’’? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. Well, I think that it is extraordinarily unclear 

right now what sort of China is ultimately going to merge on the 

world stage. We are extraordinarily cognizant and we pay very 

close attention, as you know, to China’s military modernization 

programs, and there are areas that we consider to be of great concern when it comes to anti-access and area denial and——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So the administration is unwilling to suggest 

that Japan even has to worry about an increased threat, it is an 

increased challenge, or there is a challenge there. You don’t think 

it is a threat that the Chinese—you don’t think it is a threat to 

Japan that the Chinese are claiming that it is part of their territorial waters way out in the Chinese Sea? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. I think we have made it very, very clear to China 

that we have different views on the international maritime law and 

their territorial claims. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Well, you are not willing to do it but 

I will and say this. Japan better pay attention. There is a threat 

that is emerging and as long as they have been close to the United 

States they haven’t had to worry about it. Japan has to worry 

about an ever-more powerful China that is being controlled by a 

dictatorship. If they are willing to oppress their own people and 

commit violations of the rights of their own people, Japan has to 

understand they are not going to worry about the rights of Japanese people. 

Do you see that China has played any role in, for example, the 

development of missiles in Korean? Didn’t the Koreans get—North 

Korea, get any of their technology from China? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. I wouldn’t claim to be expertise on the genealogy 

of all of the North Korean——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Donovan, how about you, is it your understanding that China may have played some role in the development of North Korean missiles? 

Mr. DONOVAN. I am sorry, sir. I don’t have any information on 

that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Well, if we are trying to assess, you 

know, a relationship with Japan, we have got to make sure that 

we are able to understand what Japan’s challenges are and what 

39

their threats are, and maybe it would behoove us, especially when 

we are trying to negotiate what type of military relationship we are 

going to have, it might be important for us to fully appreciate what 

the emergence of a strong and powerful China is going to have in 

that part of the world, and yes, perhaps the entire world. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your leadership and to 

directing your attention here. This is a great challenge. You don’t 

want to use the word ‘‘threat,’’ but I will, there is a great threat 

there to both Japan and the United States. Let us not take for 

granted this relationship that we have had that has preserved the 

peace all of these years because if we take it for granted at a time 

when China, this dictatorship in China is emerging, we will all pay 

a dear price for taking these things for granted. Thank you very 

much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I thank the gentleman from California. The 

gentleman from New Jersey for his questions. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Faleomavaega, and I appreciate you letting me sit on your panel, and I thank my friend. 

Mr. Chairman, as you know the United States has had a long 

and important relationship with the Japanese on many levels, and 

both of your distinguished witnesses have pointed it out in their 

testimonies today. 

I was disturbed, however, not to hear either of you mention one 

of the most pressing issues confronting our bilateral relationship 

with Japan and that is international child abduction. The State Department and your office, Mr. Donovan, has been contacted by 

scores of left behind parents. It is difficult to get an exact count as 

to how many children have disappeared into Japan, but I am told 

by State Department records show well over 100 American children 

are currently being held in Japan and have been deprived of love 

and the protection of their American parent. 

Sadly, in the last half century Japan has never once issued and 

enforced a legal decision to return a single abducted child to the 

United States. Left behind dads like Patrick Braden, whose daughter Melissa was abducted in 2006 by her mother to Japan, in violation of a Los Angeles Superior Court order giving both parents access to the child, and prohibiting international travel with the child 

by either parent, has been denied any contact with his daughter. 

I would note parenthetically last year I joined Patrick Braden 

and a group of other left behind parents in a very silent but dignified protest over at the Japanese Embassy. It happened to be 

Melissa’s birthday. They brought a birthday cake. We sang happy 

birthday to her, knowing that halfway around the world she had 

no clue that her father was there grieving outside the Embassy of 

Japan. He is worried sick as well as he believed that they are residing within abusive grandparent, whose abuse has been documented in the court in Los Angeles. 

So many other left behind parents, mothers and dads, have contacted my office and wandered the halls of this Congress asking for 

government help in what has become a diplomatic issue. 

I know Japan has been a recipient of at least two demarches 

from the G–7 nations on international child abductions. Prime Minister Hatoyama himself mentioned before his election that child abductions must be resolved, and I understand that as of December 

40

2009, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs created a new parental rights 

of children office staffed by nine officials in charge of Europe and 

America, and hopefully that will yield some results in the coming 

weeks and months. 

We also know, and I would ask you if you would answer this, 

what have we done in every forum, in every contact with our Japanese interlocutors to raise the issue of abducted children? I mean, 

this is kidnapping and unfortunately, unless this becomes a government-to-government issue, people like Patrick Braden cannot 

fight City Hall, just like David Goldman was up against a goliath 

in Brazil 5 years and counting for him until he finally got his beloved Sean back—and they are now back in New Jersey and doing 

quite well. 

I understand that there is talk of signing the Hague Convention, 

but as you know, Mr. Donovan, that would do nothing apparently 

for those people who have already abducted those children and 

those left behind parents. 

Secondly, to Mr. Schiffer, the international movements of our 

servicemen and women make them especially vulnerable to the 

risks of international child abduction. Attorneys familiar with this 

phenomena estimate that there are approximately 25 to 30 new 

cases of international child abductions affecting our servicemen and 

women every year. 

I am personally acquainted with a few of those victims as well. 

One victim, Commander Paul Tolland, had his infant daughter abducted by his estranged wife from our military base in Yokohama, 

Japan, 6 years ago. He claims, and there is no reason not to doubt 

this, he got very poor advice from the JAG which led to a disastrous outcome in the court. His ex-wife committed suicide well over 

a year ago, and he still can’t get his daughter back from the grandmother. 

Another victim, Michael Elias, a marine, is waiting for his two 

children, Jade and Michael, to return to him from Japan. He met 

his Japanese wife while stationed in Japan. They later married in 

United States where both of his children were born. At the end of 

2008, his wife abducted their two young children from U.S. soil to 

Japan in contravention of U.S. court orders and the surrender of 

the children’s passports. 

Finally, last year I sponsored an amendment to the Department 

of Defense Reauthorization, which was signed into law last year, 

that requires the department to report to Congress by the end of 

next month, 180 days from October 28, on the number of intra-familial child abductions affecting our service members in the last 

several years, as well as what the Department of Defense is doing 

to assist those service members who have suffered an abduction. 

The report also covers preventative actions taken by the department to stop these child abductions from happening in the first 

place. 

So Mr. Schiffer, if I could ask you, would you tell us what the 

Department of Defense is doing now on child abduction cases when 

the left behind parent happens to be a service member, and will 

the report be delivered on time, and are there any preliminary indications as to what the report has found that you can share us 

this afternoon? 

41

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. If the gentleman would yield to add onto 

your question and statement. I am curious about Japanese citizens 

who are being abducted by the North Koreans. So the feeling can 

be the same in terms of what they do to our children. But when 

their citizens are involved, how is the feeling? It is very emotional, 

and I think they have taken this issue to the highest levels. Even 

being at the Six-Party Talks, this issue was raised. I just wanted 

to add that onto the gentleman’s question to both of you. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you. I agree with you that this is a very 

important issue that we need to deal with. We have been approaching this on two fronts. The first front, as you mentioned, is in urging the Government of Japan to sign the Hague Convention on 

International Parental Child Abduction, and Secretary Clinton has 

raised this in her meetings. Assistant Secretary Campbell has 

raised it, and Assistant Secretary Janice Jacobs has raised this in 

her meetings, as well as Ambassador Roos and others, including 

myself, in visits to Japan, and we are going to continue to press 

Japan to sign up to the Hague Convention. That is the first part 

of it. 

On the second front, though, as you mentioned, what about the 

parents, the left behind parents today, what are we doing about 

them? 

We are approaching this on several fronts. First of all, we asked 

the U.S. Embassy or Consulate where we believe the children are 

located to attempt to conduct a welfare and whereabouts visit with 

their children and report back to the left behind parents on their 

welfare. However, unfortunately, a welfare visit can only take place 

with permission of the other parent. 

We also cooperate with the Office of Children’s Issues and works 

very closely with law enforcement, including the FBI, Interpol, 

International Center for Missing and Exploited Children. We often 

reach out to these offices to ensure that they understand the 

unique circumstances of international parental child abduction and 

the steps they can take to assist left behind parents and add leverage to their cases. 

I might add that recently the State Department has held a series 

of town hall style meetings for left behind parents here in Washington, DC. These gatherings provide a small group of left behind 

parents with the opportunity to discuss international parental child 

abduction in Japan, and to receive updated information on our efforts. 

Finally, the embassy in Tokyo has been regularly meeting with 

left behind parents who aren’t able to have access to their children 

in Tokyo and Japan as well, and we are going to continue these efforts. 

Mr. SCHIFFER. Sure. I would just note for our part that more vulnerable or less vulnerable, even one case of a serviceman facing 

this sort of tragic incident is too many. 

As Mr. Donovan noted, we are committed to working with the 

Government of Japan to address this issue, and the department is 

likewise committed to ensuring that the service members who face 

these tragic circumstances have the support that they need. 

As far as the report, I will have to check what its status is. As 

you know, we make every effort to be timely in our responses to 

42

Congress, but I am not sure exactly where that report or any preliminary findings may stand, but we will get back to you on that. 

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. MICHAEL SCHIFFER TO QUESTION ASKED

DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

We anticipate that the report will come out in late May, at which time it will be 

released in full. There are no preliminary findings.

Mr. SMITH. If I could, Mr. Chairman. I do hope the report is as 

comprehensive as it was intended by me and others who backed it, 

and I also hope that there will be a very proactive response because we do believe that this is an issue that absolutely needs attending to in an aggressive way. There is just too many—I mean, 

I have met some of these individuals now, and the agony that they 

face, including some of the members that I know and friends who 

are worried about an abusive situation, they have nightmares at 

night wondering what is happening to their little girl while they 

are halfway around the world. 

If you could, Mr. Donovan, you mentioned that these issues have 

been raised. What has been the response from our Japanese interlocutors? 

And secondly, on the welfare and whereabouts visits, do you have 

a breakdown as to how many of those have succeed and how many 

of the parents in Japan have blocked such a visit? 

Mr. DONOVAN. With regard to your first point, I believe the Japanese Government has stated that they are considering signing up 

to the Hague Convention but no more than that. 

With regard to your second question, I don’t have statistics. I am 

aware of my time in Tokyo where at least one or two of these occurred, but I would say the vast majority of these are declined. 

Mr. SMITH. If you could, if it is possible——

Mr. SCHIFFER. Sure. 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. Either get some kind of really clear accounting on that because it would be really helpful to know. In 

some countries where we have a miserable record of returning 

those abducted children our embassy personnel at least have had 

the ability, as in David Goldman’s and Sean Goldman’s case where 

the counselor personnel were able to do at least welfare and whereabouts checks, which at least bring some reassurance, and maybe 

a chilling effect on any abuse or other kind of moving around the 

country or perhaps even leaving the country. 

Again, when our officials, including Secretary Clinton, meet with 

the Japanese, yes, if they sign the Hague Convention, that is a first 

step, but that is all it is because as we know many countries certainly do not adhere even after signing on, or even after a MOU 

with ourselves, but what have they—have they raised specific cases 

like here is Patrick Braden, here is the situation, here are, you 

know, some of the others that I mentioned including Michael Elias 

and Commander Tolland? Do they raise those names and other 

names because the human rights laws—and as you know I have 

been doing this for 30 years, I wrote the Trafficking Victims Protection Act—unless you are specific very often everyone deals in generalities, and everybody is with you until they are against you on 

individual cases. Do they raise the cases? 

43

Mr. SCHIFFER. I believe that they have but I will have to get 

back to you on that. 

Mr. SMITH. Could you please for the record so we know clearly? 

And if not, I would hope that would change and names would be 

tendered each time with the background because that does make 

a difference because these are American parents whose human 

rights are being grossly violated. 

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. JOSEPH R. DONOVAN, JR. TO QUESTION

ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

Due to the sensitivity of the information and our effort to protect the privacy of 

American citizens, the State Department will submit this information under separate cover.

Mr. SMITH. Finally, and with your indulgence, Mr. Chairman, I 

have introduced legislation called the International Child Abduction Prevention Act which closely parallels legislation that Frank 

Wolf and I did in 1998 called The International Religious Freedom 

Act. I held all the hearings on that. Sadly the State Department 

was dead set against it until it was law, and then came around, 

and I think IRFA has been a model of trying to promote religious 

freedom and to mitigate persecution, and the same goes for the 

Trafficking Victims Protection Act, of which I was the prime sponsor. It took 2 years to get it enacted into law, and that legislation 

also was opposed. It was welcomed in theory, in concept, but bitterly opposed because we named names and we had specific penalties for those countries that engage in, as we call it, Tier 1, Tier 

2 or Tier 3 egregious abuses. 

So this bill is patterned very closely after those two bills. It takes 

the ambassador-at-large concept. It says a special office would be 

dedicated, working, God willing, 24/7 to resolve these child abduction cases, and thirdly, would take the exact penalties prescribe 

under IRFA and apply it to those countries that are showing a 

‘‘pattern of noncooperation,’’ a term of art that we put into the bill, 

for child abduction cases. With 2,800 of our children abducted, kidnapped and, you know, about 1,800 or 1,900 parents, of course sibling groups sometimes get abducted, it seems to me the time has 

come for that legislation. I would hope, you might want to speak 

to it now, but I would hope the administration would look at that 

bill and support it and earnestly embrace it. 

You know, working on human rights, and Mr. Faleomavaega and 

I, when I sat there and he was over here, we always worked the 

human rights issues. Without some kind of penalty phase—our own 

civil rights laws are testimony to that as well—without a penalty 

phase we will get agreement in concept every day of the week, but 

not in actual enforcement, and I think it would give as many additional tools to the Department of State and Defense to effectuate 

the release of our abducted children. 

So with respect, I ask you to take a good look at it and I hope 

you can support it. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I thank the gentleman for his participation. 

As I have said, I want to note for the record if there is anyone that 

I would like to commend and thank as our advocate, our champion 

as far as human rights are concerned, it is my good friend, the genVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:53 Nov 10, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\APGE\031710\55515 HFA PsN: SHIRL
44

tleman from New Jersey. And you deserve that commendation, Mr. 

Smith. 

I have got a couple of questions if I may. You know, at the height 

of the campaign between the Liberal Democratic Party and the 

Democratic Party of Japan the media was somewhat in a frenzy because there was concern that the Hatoyama administration is 

going to turn almost a 180-degree turnaround from what has been 

the practicing policy of the Liberal Democratic Party for the past 

50 years. 

Of course, Prime Minister Hatoyama has restated basically the 

fundamental policy, which is as far as our security alliance is concerned between Japan and the United States, it is in no way undermined by this new administration. 

However, I note with interest, and correct me, Secretary Donovan, that there seems to be a tremendous interest on the part of 

the new administration in Japan to reach out to other Asian countries, particularly China. And I was wondering if perhaps the new 

interest demonstrated by Prime Minister Hatoyama and his administration was due to the fact that it is no longer relying just on the 

United States for its interests. And I was wondering if there is any 

truth in media reports that Japan is turning a new leaf, it is a new 

administration, and it is not going to play ball with the United 

States, and that it wants to play ball with all the other countries 

in Asia, especially China. Can you comment on that? 

Mr. DONOVAN. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As I said previously, United States welcomes Japan’s efforts to 

improve its relations with all of its neighbors. We think that this 

is a very good thing, and we are very confident that this will not 

come at the expense of our own relations with Japan or our own 

interests. 

In addition to that, I would call your attention to several statements the Japanese officials have made about the importance that 

they attach to our alliance. At the time of the signing of the Mutual 

Security Treaty, the anniversary on January 19th, Prime Minister 

Hatoyama made a very strong statement in support of our alliance 

and the value that he places on it. Likewise, Foreign Minister 

Okada has also said that he attaches great importance to the alliance as we do. For us, of course, it is the cornerstone of our entire 

engagement, and I think that we are very reassured by the statements that they have made about the importance that they attach 

to the relationship. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. If the media reports were accurate concerning Secretary Gate’s initial visit to Japan, somewhat badgering 

the Japanese Government leaders about executing or implementing 

the provisions of the 2006 realignment agreement that was made 

by the previous administration, by the Liberal Democratic Party, is 

that still in place in terms of our demanding that Japan honor this 

commitment or this agreement that was signed in 2006? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. It is still our position that the best way forward 

on this set of issues and the realignment road map is to implement 

the realignment road map. It was negotiated, as you pointed out, 

by the previous administration in Japan and also by the previous 

administration in the United States. 

45

When the Obama administration came into office, we reviewed 

the Guam International Agreement, and concluded that the agreement, the logic of the realignment road map was sound, and that 

is why Secretary Clinton signed the Guam International Agreement and made that part of her first trip to Asia. We were hopeful 

that the new government in Japan would also come to understand 

the logic of the Guam International Agreement, but they have, as 

you know and as we have discussed previously, started a process 

where they are reviewing that agreement, reviewing different options for the Futenma Replacement Facility, and we await the decision that the Government of Japan may choose to arrive at the options and alternatives that they may put on the table. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Let us discuss the broader perspective. 

When you talk about realignment, this goes back to Bush 41 about 

all our military forces around the world. You know, World War II 

is over, the cold war is over, we still have 50,000 soldiers in Germany, I believe. Correct me if I am wrong on that, and currently 

we have 48,000 military in Japan alone, and then 27,000 in Korea, 

and then under the command of Admiral Willard, some 240,000 

marines and sailors under the Pacific Command with some 200 

ships. 

My point, I wanted to ask Secretary Schiffer, with all due respect 

to my good friend from California, about the threat that China is 

imposing. And I don’t know if the media reports are accurate, to 

the effect that China actually is reducing its military budget, while 

on the contrary, we are increasing our military budget from $650 

billion now to some $760 billion. 

And in addition to that, Secretary Schiffer, and please help me 

on this, we have a total of 737 military installations both in the 

United States and outside the United States. Is that true? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. I would have to get back to you on the exact number. 

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. MICHAEL SCHIFFER TO QUESTION ASKED

DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA

On March 4, 2010, Beijing announced a 7.5 percent increase in its military budget 

to approximately $78.6 billion. This increase continues more than two decades of 

sustained annual increases in China’s announced military budget. However, the Department of Defense estimates China’s total military-related spending to be much 

higher ($150 billion in 2009 using 2009 prices and exchange rates). Estimating actual People’s Liberation Army military expenditures is a difficult process due to the 

lack of accounting transparency and China’s still incomplete transition from a command economy. Moreover, China’s published military budget does not include major 

categories of expenditures. The United States and other countries have urged China 

to increase transparency in military spending. 

The Department operates 507 fixed installations in the U.S. and overseas.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Can you please provide that for the record? 

I got this from my staff, and they better be right. 

Mr. SCHIFFER. I am sure they are. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I was told we have 737 military installations both in the United States and around the world. And do you 

know how many military bases China has outside of China? Zero. 

Nada. So my question basically is about security interests that we 

are having here, which raises the next question about Okinawa. I 

have been to Okinawa. One-point-three million people live there in 

46

Okinawa, and it has become a very sensitive and volatile issue in 

Japan at this point in time. 

It seems that the Okinawans feel like they have always been the 

whipping boy for the last 50 years where we just put our military 

people there and not have to worry about it. Is it true that Okinawa is very, very strategically important to our national security 

interests? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. Yes. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Why? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. The simple fact of the matter relates to what we 

consider to be the——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Can you be a little louder? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. My apologies. The simple fact of the matter relates to what we consider to be the tyranny of distance. Okinawa 

provides us with a strategic location that allows us to take necessary actions for a range of scenarios. Forces that are based back 

in the constitution United States, or even in Hawaii, would take a 

much, much longer time to be able to arrive at a situation be it humanitarian assistance and natural disaster relief, or be it something more severe. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I didn’t mean to interrupt you there, Secretary Schiffer, but I think we have already proven during the tsunami in Aceh, Indonesia, we were able to mobilize quickly. 

Mr. SCHIFFER. And in part the response to that is from our marines in Okinawa. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. By having all these military when we are 

not at war, I was just trying to figure, it is costing us—for every 

1,000 soldiers we put out there, we have to spend $1 billion; 30,000 

soldiers, that is over $30 billion; 68,000 soldiers, that is $68 billion. 

That is a lot of money. 

In your honest opinion, Secretary Schiffer, why do we have to 

spend $760-some-billion for our defense? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. Well, just speaking about the Asia-Pacific region, 

as I said in my testimony it is my belief that regional peace, stability, and prosperity is underwritten by the forward deployed presence of U.S. forces in the region, and I think that there would be 

gravely destabilizing effects if we were to be precipitously pulling 

out. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Some of the officials in Beijing were very 

concerned when we had proposed selling some $6.4 billion worth of 

military arms to Taiwan. I turn around and suggested to my 

friends in China, it is no big thing, but it is just somebody out 

there trying to make money, and I recall, I think the very thing 

that President Eisenhower has always given this warning in the 

1950s about beware, the military industrial complex that we have 

in our country where the reason is not so much our defense or our 

security but it is so that these big military contractors, big companies that make tanks and bullets and guns. Let me ask you this, 

Mr. Schiffer: Are we the biggest exporter of military arms in the 

world right now? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. I would have to get back to you on exactly what 

the——

[The information referred to follows:]

47

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. MICHAEL SCHIFFER TO QUESTION ASKED

DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA

According to the Conventional Arms to Developing Nations 2001-2008 report, the 

U.S. ranked first for arms deliveries worldwide, with $12.232 billion in 2008.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Can you? Can you provide that for the 

record? I am very curious. Please, I am not trying to suggest that 

I am against defense. Absolutely. I want to make absolutely certain 

that our security is firm. Can you provide the dollar value of the 

48,000 soldiers that we currently have in Japan? How much is it 

costing us to have all this military hardware and soldiers and sailors and all of them being stationed in Japan? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. We can get back to the committee with those figures. 

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. MICHAEL SCHIFFER TO QUESTION ASKED

DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA

It is difficult to produce the exact dollar value of maintaining the Marines in 

Japan due to a number of indeterminable factors that impact total cost. However, 

based on Fiscal Year 2009 data, the total approximated U.S. cost of maintaining the 

Marines in Japan is $1.4 billion. This figure comprises operations and maintenance 

(O&M) costs, civilian pay, foreign national indirect hire pay, and military personnel 

costs. Military personnel costs include basic allowance for subsistence, cost of living 

allowance, basic allowance for housing, and overseas housing allowance (OHA). 

These figures represent the U.S. appropriated portion of these costs only and do 

not account for any other additional factors, beyond those listed above, that might 

impact the overall cost. They do not include investment costs in the Marine force 

structure stationed in Japan.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Can you also provide the figure, the dollar 

figure of how much Japan is spending on its military defense? I understand it is in the top three in the world, but I may be wrong. 

Correct me if I am wrong on that. 

Mr. SCHIFFER. Well, part of the challenge here, and again I will 

get back to you with definitive figures, is that depending upon how 

you account for spending, different countries rank in different 

places. But as you know Japan spends less than 1 percent of it 

GDP on its defense. 

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. MICHAEL SCHIFFER TO QUESTION ASKED

DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA

According to the Japan Ministry of Defense ‘‘Outline of Defense-Related Expenditures FY 2010’’ and ‘‘Japan’s Defense and Budget’’ briefings given to U.S. diplomats 

earlier this year, Japan’s 2010 defense budget is $50.88 billion. This number does 

not include some items, such as realignment costs for U.S. forces, which are funded 

elsewhere.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Well, I keep hearing that but I hear that 

that 1 percent happens to be also the top three in the world as far 

as actual dollar value and how much they spend on their bullets 

and guns and soldiers and sailors. So it may be 1 percent out of 

what? Ten trillion dollar GDP? How much is Japan’s GDP, by the 

way? 

Mr. DONOVAN. I don’t have exact figure for you on that. Sorry. 

I will get back to you. 

[The information referred to follows:]

48

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. MICHAEL SCHIFFER TO QUESTION ASKED

DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA

It is difficult to produce the exact dollar value of maintaining the Marines abroad 

due to a number of indeterminable factors that impact total cost. However, based 

on Fiscal Year 2009 data, the total approximated U.S. cost of maintaining the Marines abroad, including Japan, is $4.3 billion. This figure comprises operations and 

maintenance (O&M) costs, civilian pay, foreign national indirect hire pay, and military personnel costs. Military personnel costs include basic allowance for subsistence, cost of living allowance, basic allowance for housing, and overseas housing allowance (OHA). 

These figures represent the U.S. appropriated portion of these costs only and do 

not account for any other additional factors, beyond those listed above, that might 

impact the overall cost.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Well, right now we are at about $14 trillion, 

our own GDP in our country, so I suspect that if Japan is number 

two—this is just one thing that I have nothing but highest praise 

and respect for the Japanese people. No natural resources, no oil, 

no minerals, and yet just by the sheer industry of its people currently now is the second most powerful economy in the world. That 

to me is a miracle, with only 120 million people living on those islands. I think you have to give credit to the Japanese people and 

their industry, how they were able to come up with such an economic miracle as far as other countries are concerned. And I think 

we played a very, very important part in building Japan’s economy 

to where it is now. 

Gentlemen, if this thing with the Okinawa situation does not 

come through say after May, I realize I am being hypothetical 

about it, Secretary Schiffer, but do we have an option B in place 

if it doesn’t come through? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. Well, the only thing that I can really tell you because I would prefer not to speculate on hypotheticals is that we 

are waiting for the Japanese Government to conclude its review 

and to come to the table with whatever proposals and ideas that 

they may have, and then we will sit down with them at that point 

in time and see what where we end up. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I believe Japan is also one of the biggest investors in China. Secretary Donovan, are you aware of that? 

Mr. DONOVAN. Yes, it is. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. How much has Japan invested in China currently? 

Mr. DONOVAN. Mr. Chairman, I don’t have the amount that 

Japan has invested in China. I do know, however, that Japan is a 

very large investor in the United States with about $259 billion invested in the United States, which is about a third of their outward 

investment. Likewise, the United States has about—I think it is 

$79 billion invested in Japan too, so our investment total bilaterally are quite large. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Well, I think I noted earlier not only are 

they a big exporter to our country, but they also hold some $769 

billion of our debt, so we owe Japan $769 billion. China is not very 

far off with $755 billion and that is over $1.4 trillion that we are 

in debt just to these two countries. Is that a good economic picture 

to feel comfortable with in terms of our economic security? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. With regard to Japan, I know that we have a surplus in terms of our service trade with them while I believe in 2008 

49

it was about $16.8 billion, and this somewhat offset the goods trade 

deficit that we run with them which is about $44.8 billion. 

Last year I believe we exported about $51.2 billion in goods to 

Japan, and that figure is growing and our overall deficit, I believe, 

is slowly reducing; however, we need to do a better job on it. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Well, I will say for the record I had the 

privilege of meeting with Prime Minister Hatoyama along with my 

colleagues, Congressman Honda from California, and also Congressman Gao, a Stanford graduate. I think that was his biggest 

mistake. He should have gone to UC Berkeley, where I graduated, 

but that is okay. I forgive him for that. 

Gentlemen, thank you for coming. Appreciate very much your 

participation. Do you have any closing statements you want to 

give? 

Mr. DONOVAN. No, sir. Thank you very much. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Secretary Schiffer? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. No, sir. Thank you. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. All right, thank you. 

On our next panel we have two distinguished scholars, Dr. Sheila 

Smith and Dr. Michael Auslin to join us this afternoon. 

Dr. Smith is an expert on Japanese politics and foreign policy. 

She is currently a senior fellow for Japan studies at the Council of 

Foreign Relations, and Dr. Smith directed the Council of Foreign 

Relations Regional Security Architecture for the Asia Program. Dr. 

Smith is also from the East-West Center where in 2007 she specialized in Asia-Pacific international relations and U.S. policy towards 

Asia. She was also recently affiliated with Keio University in Tokyo 

where she researched and wrote on Japan’s foreign policy toward 

China and the Northeast Asian region on an Abe Fellowship. She 

is a member of the faculty at Boston University and received her 

master’s and doctorate from Columbia University in New York. She 

has written extensively and I am very, very happy to have her join 

us this afternoon. 

Also with us we have Dr. Michael Auslin, the director of Japan 

studies with the American Enterprise Institute. He was an associate professor of history, senior research fellow at the McMillan 

Center for International and Area Studies at Yale University before joining the American Enterprise Institute. Dr. Auslin graduated with a bachelor’s in foreign service at Georgetown University, a master’s at Indiana University and a doctorate at the University of Illinois. 

Thank you so much for your patience. I deeply appreciate your 

taking the time to come and share with us your sense of understanding of what is happening now in Japan and the current relationship existing between Japan and the United States. 

Dr. Smith, would you like to proceed? 

STATEMENT OF SHEILA A. SMITH, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW FOR 

JAPAN STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Ms. SMITH. Chairman Faleomavaega, and other members of the 

committee, I am delighted to have the privilege to appear before 

you to discuss United States-Japan relationship. 

Japan’s historic Lower House election last August is part of the 

ongoing structural shift in Japan’s alternating party responsibility 

50

for governance. This shift in Japanese politics creates new questions for our alliance as well as new demands on policymakers responsible for our alliance management. 

The arrival of a viable second party on the electoral scene suggests that Japan’s foreign policy will be subject to new types of 

scrutiny, and perhaps a significant challenge in the legislature. In 

short, we should expect that Japanese choices for the alliance will 

need to demonstrate greater salience domestically. 

This should not be cause for alarm, however. Good public policies 

should survive public scrutiny and legislative debate, and the opportunity to engage in Japanese public in our conversation over the 

future of the alliance agenda is welcome. For too long in the postwar years, Japan’s citizens had little access to or understanding of 

the debates that shape government choices in the alliance with the 

United States. Moreover, opposition party resistance to a debate 

over national security made construction legislative oversight on 

policy difficult. 

Today, we live in a different era and the time for a more direct 

debate in Japan over its security choices and over the requirements 

of implementing alliance cooperation has come. Given the complexity and the scope of the security challenges we share with 

Japan today, we need a direct and informed conversation about 

where the United States and Japan can cooperate and perhaps 

where we cannot. 

On August 30, 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan won a fully 

majority in the Lower House election, ousting the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) from a nearly half-century of dominance in Japanese politics. With 308 of the 480 seats in the Japanese Parliament the DPJ won a 4-year stint as Japan’s ruling party, and 

is poised to implement its own electoral manifesto, which called for 

changing the governance practices in Japan. 

This summer’s Upper House election will reveal how successful 

this first year of DPJ governance has been in the eyes of the Japanese people. But it is neither foreign policy nor even the relationship with the United States that most concerns Japanese voters. 

The Democratic Party of Japan campaigned primarily on a domestic policy agenda, including the need for wholesale reform of Japan’s public finances and its social insurance infrastructure. 

Like the United States, Japan’s political leaders are grappling 

with the consequence of the global economic downturn. The new 

government will be judged harshly if it cannot attend to the need 

to boost economic growth and relieve unemployment. From its first 

weeks in office, the Hatoyama Cabinet actively sought to articulate 

a new approach to Japan’s foreign policy. The Prime Minister’s first 

speech in public in fact was at the U.N. Climate Change Summit 

where he put forward a forceful statement on Japan’s commitment 

to global efforts to reduce carbon emissions. 

Likewise, he spent another day in New York emphasizing his 

country’s embrace of the goal of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. From there he traveled to the G–20 meeting to reiterate 

his government’s support for the collective effort to stabilize the 

global economy. This is a government, in other words, that believes 

Japan’s agenda is global. 

51

During the election campaign, the DPJ advocated an ‘‘equal relationship’’ with the United States and an emphasis on Japan’s Asian 

diplomacy as a member of the East Asian Community. Yet the impression is that this government seeks to advance its Asian diplomacy at the expense of its bilateral alliance with the United States, 

and this sensitivity here in Washington has led to concerns over 

the longer term future of United States-Japan alliance. 

But this zero sum understanding of what motivates Japan’s new 

government underestimates broader social and political currents in 

Northeast Asia. While building on the deep ties that come from a 

half-century of security cooperation with Japan, we must also be 

mindful of the need for new approaches to our alliance cooperation. 

We cannot afford to assume that our old habits of alliance management will continue to serve a changing Japan. 

Let me offer five significant opportunities ahead that if embraced 

could strengthen and focus our security cooperation with Japan. 

First and foremost, we must find an acceptable relocation facility 

for the U.S. Marine Corps and close Futenma Marine Air Station. 

Today the issue of Futenma relocation seems all consuming, and 

this has led many to assume that Japan’s new government seeks 

to undermine our military cooperation. This is, I believe, a 

misreading of the sentiments both of the new government toward 

the alliance but also the Okinawan sentiments regarding the U.S. 

military presence there. 

The complexity and the difficulty of Futenma relocation has been 

with us for over a decade. Perhaps forgotten today in our focus on 

the DPJ is that our two governments in 1996 made a promise at 

the very highest levels to the people of Okinawa. In the aftermath 

of prefectural outrage of the rape of a 12-year-old child, the United 

States and Japan moved quickly to reduce the footprint of U.S. 

forces on this small island. Closing Futenma was an integral part 

of this response, and the announcement by Prime Minister 

Hashimoto and the U.S. Ambassador Walter Mondale that this 

base would be closed met with broad Japanese approval. 

As we seek in these coming months to find a compromise solution, I urge our two governments to reflect on the promises made 

at a time of deep distress. We cannot continue to risk an accident 

where civilian lives could be at risk, but as importantly, we should 

not risk the credibility of our promises in the eyes of the Japanese 

public at a time when the value and the need for our alliance is 

so immense. 

No matter what the politics of the moment look like, United 

States and Japanese Governments both must remember that the 

integrity of United States-Japanese alliance will be judged not only 

on the potential to meet crises from within, but also on the capacity 

to fulfill promises to the citizens it claims to protect. 

Second, and more broadly, the two governments will also need to 

assess some of the oversight mechanism for managing the U.S. 

troop presence in Japan. The demand for greater transparency and 

accountability is part of any democratic nation’s politics. Support 

for United States-Japan alliance remains strong in Japan, but it is 

the policy management practices of maintaining 40-some-thousand 

troops on the ground that needs adjustment. 

52

Japan’s governors, for example, articulate the need for a better 

set of guidelines for managing the environment on and around U.S. 

military bases. A bilateral discussion on best basing practices could 

provide the opportunity to strengthen the relationship between 

U.S. commanders and local communities and satisfying the growing 

desire for greater government accountability that is part and parcel 

of Japanese democracy. 

Third, and equally important, Tokyo and Washington must review and reconfirm their understanding of the alliance’s strategic 

goals and priorities. The current initiative begun by Secretary of 

State Clinton and Foreign Minister Okada at their meeting in January provides an excellent venue for exploring assumptions about 

contemporary security challenges. This would be a good moment to 

reflect on the strategic goals for United States-Japan alliance set 

forth in February 2005, and to update our common priorities for alliance cooperation. 

The Asia-Pacific region is changing quickly and our security cooperation must attend to these changes. Coupled with this expert 

review of our alliance agenda, we must also consider carefully the 

opportunity for President Obama to reach out to the Japanese public in November 2010. A new generation of Japanese is coming into 

positions of leadership, a generation that has a different understanding both of the past and of the current relationship with the 

United States. There is a new opportunity here and indeed a new 

need to revisit our shared histories and re-commit to a shared future. 

As we look forward, we should address our past, including an acknowledgement of the painful costs of World War II to both our 

countries. The President’s second visit to Tokyo should be one 

where he spends time with the Japanese public explaining the importance of the treaty commitments but also highlighting the 

American commitment to crafting a common future for our two people. 

Fourth, to meet the growing demand for collective action in the 

Asia-Pacific region, United States and Japan must identify ways to 

strengthen multilateral security cooperation with a broad array of 

regional partners. 

In the past decade, we can see now challenges for governments 

and for the collective capacity of the countries of the region to cope 

with significant security challenges. United States, South Korea 

and Japan have intensified their cooperation on how to cope with 

the belligerence of North Korea, and this ought to be continued, including our collaboration of ballistic missile defense. 

Other opportunities can be found in working closely with Japan 

and other regional powers on building capacity for disaster relief 

and humanitarian assistance efforts. Our military’s expertise has 

been amply demonstrated in the region but this can better be integrated into a standing regional capacity that can bring quicker and 

more focused response efforts. 

Finally, and perhaps the most critical task of 2010, we should 

work closely with the Japanese Government to articulate a common understanding of our respective strategies for global nuclear 

nonproliferation. 

53

Both Washington and Tokyo would benefit from the development 

of a U.S.-Japan action plan for supporting global nuclear nonproliferation efforts. As President Obama has noted, the goal of ridding the world of nuclear weapons may not be attained easily or 

soon, but the path to that goal requires the shared energies and 

technological superiority of our two societies. 

As the only country to have used nuclear weapons and the only 

country to have experienced their use, the United States and Japan 

together could offer a powerful partnership in the global effort to 

ensure our security against those who would proliferate and in 

mapping out a secure path to reducing our dependence on these 

weapons. 

In other words, the United States and Japan must integrate our 

nonproliferation goals with our force posture consultations so that 

the next decades of security cooperation between the United States 

and Japan reflect our shared vision for working toward a nuclear 

free world. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Smith follows:]

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Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Dr. Smith. Dr. Auslin. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL AUSLIN, PH.D., DIRECTOR OF JAPAN 

STUDIES, THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 

Mr. AUSLIN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify 

today on the state of U.S.-Japan relations. 

This past January Washington and Tokyo observed the 50th anniversary of United States-Japan alliance, one of the most successful bilateral agreements in recent history. Yet this time of celebration has been clouded by short-term political strain between Tokyo 

and Washington, and longer term concern over the strength of our 

transpacific relationship. 

The state of U.S.-Japan ties directly influences the larger strategic position of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region; hence, 

any substantive change in United States-Japan alliance or in the 

political relationship that undergirds it would present challenging 

questions for U.S. policymakers. 

We face today a new and unfamiliar situation in Japan, one 

which offers great opportunities, yet also engenders difficulties and 

anxieties. Last August Japanese voters ousted the Liberal Democratic Party after a half-century of nearly continuous power. The 

electoral victory of the Democratic Party of Japan was the reflection of trends that have been reshaping Japanese society for decades and leading to deep currents of unease. Yet the DPJ has 

found governing more difficult than electioneering, and has unexpectedly found itself in a tussle in Washington over 2006 agreement to move Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to a more remote 

location on Okinawa. 

The DPJ itself is an uneasy coalition of ideological opposites, 

from former socialists to pro-alliance realists, and Washington 

should be prepared for continuous debates within the DPJ in coming months over foreign and domestic policy as well as the likelihood of leadership changes in the party that may push it in different directions. 

I believe the doubts about Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s 

overall commitment to U.S.-Japan relations are overstated, but Mr. 

Hatoyama clearly sees a different future for United States-Japan 

relationship than his predecessors did. We should take seriously 

his desire for Japan to pay a more expansive global role, craft a 

closer relationship with the nations of East Asia, and take a lead 

in birthing a new East Asian Community. 

Japan today is working through a daunting mounting of problems from economic reform to the continuing North Korean nuclear 

and missile threat, and the new government has yet to come up 

with concrete policies to deal with many of them. I would suggest, 

however, that the Hatoyama administration is following many previous LDP policies, including attempting to play a leading role on 

climate change issues, participating in Asian multilateral initiatives, and continuing its anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa. 

There is little in these policies that indicate a turning away from 

the United States, and indeed may portend greater cooperation 

with Washington on shared global issues. None of this, however, 

should come at the expense of the continued close security and poVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:53 Nov 10, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\APGE\031710\55515 HFA PsN: SHIRL
63

litical relations we share with Japan. Many have noted statements 

by Prime Minister Hatoyama about the decline of American power 

in the world in the rise of China as well as his criticisms of 

globalization and market-based economics. 

Fears that Mr. Hatoyama plans on drawing closer to China at 

the expense of the United States may worry some American observers, and I would share those concerns if in coming days indeed saw 

a downgrading of the working relationship between Tokyo and 

Washington, and any indication that Tokyo saw increasing benefit 

in moving closer to China on issues ranging from trade to security. 

Yet we must also respect the choices of a democratically-elected 

government and recognize that current trends and Japanese policymaking, including Japan’s recent outreach to China, reflect a return to a more traditional Japanese position of attempting to maintain some level of balance in its foreign policy. 

Japanese opinion leaders and policymakers continue to worry 

that the United States will over time decrease its military presence 

in the Asia-Pacific and that Washington will consider China in 

coming decades as the indispensable partner for solving problems 

both regional and global. 

Despite such problems, United States-Japan alliance remains the 

keystone of U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific region. America and 

Japan share certain core liberal values that tie us together and 

which should properly inform and inspire our policies abroad. Further, within the continued Japanese hosting of U.S. forces, our forward-based posture in the Western Pacific is untenable. Maintaining this presence is a full-time job for officials on both sides of the 

Pacific, and we will see continued, sometimes difficult negotiations 

on alliance issues in the years ahead. 

It is clear, however, that our friends and allies in the area are 

keenly attuned to our forward-based posture and any indications 

that the United States was reducing its presence might be interpreted by both friends and competitors as a weakening of our longstanding commitment to maintain stability in the Pacific. We 

should not underestimate the influence of our alliance with Japan 

on the plans and perceptions of other nations in the region. 

As we look to the kind of Asia that we hope develops in the future, the role of a democratic Japan should become increasingly important, and United States-Japan alliance, although under strain 

today and still in need of further restructuring, will be indispensable in ensuring our country’s commitment to the Asia-Pacific and 

in providing a necessary stabilizing force to the powerful tides of 

nationalism, competition, and distrust in that region. 

Our relationship with Japan is indeed a cornerstone of the liberal international order that has marked the six decades since the 

end of World War II as among the most prosperous and generally 

peaceful in world history. For that reason, among others, we should 

look forward to maintaining it for years to come. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Auslin follows:]

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Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Dr. Auslin. Thank both of you 

for your most eloquent statements. Just wanted to ask a couple of 

questions. 

On your statement, Dr. Smith, you mentioned that with the 

whole advent of the campaign that took place between the Democratic Party of Japan and the Liberals, as you mentioned, the focus 

really was on the issues that were local and not foreign policy or 

international economics. And I suspect one of them was the economy and the other was corruption, and it was so astoundingly 

strong as a result of the campaign that took place. 

You had mentioned also something about Prime Minister 

Hatoyama’s views concerning nonproliferation. What is your understanding of Japan’s position on this? Either of you can comment on 

that. 

Ms. SMITH. I would be delighted to, Mr. Chairman. 

I think, first of all, on the campaign, those of us who are Japanese politics watchers, we have been anticipating the election of 

last August for several years now, and so sooner or later this election was going to happen. The question was a question of timing. 

As we watched the campaign unfold it was very, very clear that the 

huge agenda that the DPJ wanted to challenge the LDP on was domestic, and in particular, as I am sure you are aware, Japan’s 

aging society, the future fiscal burdens of that on the Japanese 

state, and how its policies differed from that of the Liberal Democrats in managing things like medical care, pensions, tax policies, 

et cetera. 

So there was very little, and we all looked to the manifestos put 

out by the DPJ, in fact there was very little on there about foreign 

policy, very cursory statements, as I alluded to in my testimony, 

but not a fully developed policy platform that we would expect from 

a leading contending party in an election. 

So I think many of us were holding our breath and waiting to 

see. There was some clarification in the summer before the election 

in August, but we still didn’t understand what the language of 

‘‘equal relationship with Washington’’ meant. We didn’t understand 

what ‘‘embracing East Asian Community’’ meant, and I think the 

party is working out in its own mind some of the choices and pragmatic decisions it will have to make in accordance with that rhetoric as it has had to govern. 

On your second question about nonproliferation, I think Prime 

Minister Hatoyama’s speech at the United Nation lays out very 

clearly some very long-held aspirations of the Japanese people, to 

be a force for nonproliferation, to work actively with other partners 

on the global stage through the MPT and in other venues to eliminate nuclear weapons. This has been a goal of the Japanese people 

throughout the half-century of the post-war people, and I think 

they continue to feel strongly about this. 

We have two venues now in United States-Japan Alliance to 

work with Japan on this whole nonproliferation. One clearly is 

North Korea and the Six-Party Talks, there is another emerging, 

a conversation to be had in Iran, I believe, in the United Nations 

Security Council, and I think Japan’s role in that conversation will 

be very, very important. So there is a place, I think, for the United 

72

States and Japan to overlap in terms of working toward a common 

goal. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Which adds another question, and I will get 

to Dr. Auslin. How do you denuclearize a country like North Korea 

when it already has nuclear bombs? I mean, where we are constantly on Iran because Iran still has not yet developed a nuclear 

weapon, but North Korea already has. Is it something of a contradiction, Dr. Smith? 

Ms. SMITH. No, and I am sure Dr. Auslin would like to jump in 

here. No, it is not. I think part of our challenge here is the instruments that we try to use to persuade Pyongyang. I am not sure at 

the moment whether the Six-Party venue and that persuasive context of regional diplomacy will yield results. Clearly, the Bush administration and then the Obama administration felt that the SixParty regional framework was one particular place to work with 

other countries of north East Asia, but the reality is containment 

of the proliferation of North Korea is also on the agenda, and working with our allies, South Korea and Japan, has been a very important part of that aspect of trying to deal with North Korea. 

It is not denuclearization, it is containment at the stage that we 

are at right now. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Well, I will have Dr. Auslin jump in just for 

a minute, but I have been following the nonproliferation issue for 

a number of years. I call it full of contradictions, somewhat hypocritical too in the fact that it is okay for the five permanent members of the Security Council to continue to hold onto thousands of 

nuclear weapons, but it is not okay for the rest of the world to have 

possession of nuclear bombs. 

India went outside of the basket, is it called a basket? Went outside of this idea that you are not supposed to have bombs, or they 

went ahead and exploded one in 1974, and then Pakistan followed, 

all this outside of the nonproliferation pressure from the United 

Nations and the five permanent members. 

Do you see any sense of imbalance here in how we advocate as 

members of the United Nations that we should do everything we 

can to get rid of nuclear weapons altogether and yet—and yet this 

is since 1974? I remember the Prime Minister of India, Rajiv 

Ghandi, made an appeal before the General Assembly of the United 

Nations saying, hey, look, we can explode one too, and then asked 

the United Nations, particularly the five permanent members, our 

country included, are we serious about getting rid of nuclear weapons all together, because we are willing to do it? Well, guess what? 

Total silence since 1974, and we are still faced with this problem 

of nuclear weapons. 

How serious are we really about nonproliferation? Because now, 

even in our own country, a tremendous debate going on about the 

validity of deterrence. We need to continue to have the bomb just 

in case. I think we should take on President Reagan’s adage ‘‘trust 

but verify.’’

Dr. Auslin, you must have all the answers to my questions. 

Mr. AUSLIN. Mr. Chairman, I think you have actually raised a 

key point in relation to Japan’s own tensions within its policy, 

which is, as Dr. Smith indicated, the aspirational goal of a world 

73

without nuclear weapons and certainly before that to have a robust 

and effective nonproliferation regime. 

With what Japan and Japanese policymakers have long recognized is the reality of the U.S. nuclear umbrella that Japan understands the world that it lives in, the neighborhood that it lives in. 

Certainly it has watched with at least some alarm the growth over 

the past several decades of Chinese capabilities in medium- and 

long-range ballistic missiles and its nuclear forces. 

Japanese officials, I know, Mr. Chairman, as you are well aware, 

continually ask U.S. counterparts about the credibility of our nuclear umbrella, and so the attempt to square those two issues, how 

you can work for a world and hope for a world in which there are 

no nuclear weapons, but in the short term recognize that in some 

way your existence is tied to a credible deterrent is one that as of 

this point they have found no answer to. 

I think that Prime Minister Hatoyama is very sincere in his beliefs, but my own feeling on this is that in coming decades, as it 

seems certain that more countries around the world will get their 

hands on nuclear weapons as the nonproliferation regime breaks 

down, what you will probably see in Japan is the maintenance of 

this aspiration but a much more hard-hearted approach and realistic approach to working with the U.S. on maintaining a credible 

deterrent, and that, I think, was actually reflected in the secret 

agreements that we had back in the 1970s, in a very unstable period as well. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Dr. Smith, you mentioned something about 

Okinawa. I have some questions about Okinawa, and I think it is 

going to become a very volatile issue in the coming months or 

weeks, depending which way the Hatoyama administration is going 

to turn on this issue. 

As I had asked Secretary Schiffer, suppose that Japan does decide that we are to leave Okinawa, and I mean not just continue 

having the other 8,000 marines, but just take our total military 

presence out of Okinawa. I know that is a hypothetical question, 

but suppose it does happen. Suppose that the 1.3 million people in 

Okinawa are sick and tired of having a military presence in their 

land, and the leaders themselves agree. Of course, that does raise 

a problem for Prime Minister Hatoyama. But what would this 

mean for us in terms of our options, and is that really going to 

compromise our own security if the Okinawa situation turns not so 

much to our expectations? 

Ms. SMITH. Well, Mr. Chairman, it is a very important question, 

and I think we can go back for a bit of a prelude to 1995 and the 

prefectual outrage at that point, I mentioned the rape of the child. 

It was a very intense opposition to the U.S. military presence. It 

was a very intense opposition to the management of that presence, 

particularly in Okinawa, to the Status of Forces Agreement, everything about the U.S. military presence in Okinawa was up for 

grabs. 

I think what both of our governments understood at that moment was that it needed the highest level of political attention. 

What pains me somewhat a decade or so later is that we have 

somehow lost the immediacy of the need to deal with the promises 

made to the Okinawa people. 

74

I don’t believe right now in the prefecture there is antagonisms 

toward U.S. military or anti-Americanism per se, but I think there 

is an expectation that both of our governments will live up to the 

promise that was made such a long time ago. 

The question of the relocation of Futenma has been very, very focused on the relocation site, and what I wanted to remind the committee and others listening is there is another end of that, and that 

is to close this marine air station in a densely populated part of 

Okinawa. My understanding of the politics at the moment in Okinawa is that is also the sentiment. Futenma needs to be closed. A 

relocation site needs to be found. 

There are some difference in the prefecture about the acceptability of some of the options being put forward. I believe that 

Henacal, the current option that the U.S. Government feels is the 

best compromise solution may no longer be politically viable, but 

again I do think we have to watch the political process in Tokyo 

and Okinawa unfold somewhat before we can make a judgment. 

U.S. forces serve in host societies at the request of the government and the people of those societies. So to get back to your very 

original question, if the U.S. Marine Corps is asked to leave, the 

U.S. Marine Corps will need to leave, but I do not believe that this 

government in Tokyo or even the Okinawan people at this particular moment want all of the U.S. forces to leave. But I think we 

are in very difficult waters if we are not able to solve this problem 

effectively and with due attention to the sensitivities in Okinawa. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And you can join in, Dr. Auslin. But I want 

to add the 48,000 presence of the military in Japan for the defense 

of Japan, and I was just wondering if this is somewhat a relic from 

World War II and the cold war. Do we still need 50,000 soldiers 

stations in Japan? 

This is an entirely new situation there, and I think Secretary 

Schiffer and I may have a little difference of opinion here about 

how quickly we were able to mobilize when we had that tsunami 

in Aceh, Indonesia. In a matter of hours we have capabilities in C–

17s, and C–5s, in a matter of hours we can mobilize, but just the 

fact that 48,000 soldiers live there, is the issue really more economic than it is security or military? 

I mean the host country really is the beneficiary for us paying. 

Of course, there is burden sharing involved here with Japan. I 

don’t know how it is in Germany, but I am still wondering if 50,000 

soldiers in Japan are needed for the defense of Japan or whether 

1 million soldiers in China. How do you defend Japan against a totally imbalanced view as far as—I am not a genius in military 

strategy and all of that, but can you help us on this, Dr. Auslin? 

Mr. AUSLIN. You have raised a number of important questions, 

Mr. Chairman. I would say first on the burden-sharing issue, 

Japan does pay host nation support, something on the order of $3 

billion a year, and as Secretary Schiffer’s testimony pointed out, it 

is not to be seen in simply payment terms but as an investment 

in the overall nature of the relationship. So the cost that we do 

have by having our 48,000 service members over there is offset to 

a large degree, I would say, by host nation support. 

But I think the questions that you raise, the strategic questions, 

are the truly important ones. Dr. Smith mentioned, going back to 

75

1995, I would go back to 1990–91 I think it was when the Government of the Philippines asked us to close our bases there, both 

Clark and Subic, our naval and air bases. And so the first answer 

to your question, what would happen is I presume what happened——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And you know the reasons why the Filipinos 

kicked us out of Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base, right? 

Mr. AUSLIN. Well, some of what was reported I certainly know. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Well, the reason was that as far as the Filipinos were concerned our presence in the Philippines wasn’t to protect the Filipinos, it was to protect Japan. That was the debate in 

the Philippines Senate, and that was the reason why we were told 

to leave. 

Mr. AUSLIN. Well, I think the views in the Philippines have certainly evolved over the years, and in my understanding, and clearly 

we left at that point in time. So the first answer to your question 

is we would undoubtedly respect the wishes of the Government of 

Japan. 

The question is what happens after that. I think that is the easy 

part of this is leaving. What happens after that, and that is what 

you indicated. In the Philippines there are many voices today that 

talk about what type of expanded cooperation they can have with 

United States because the issue of the presence of U.S. forces is not 

merely, and I think you point out correctly, what can 48,000 troops 

do against 2.4 million Chinese troops, the issue is perception and 

the issue is the effect on the calculations of other actors. 

What we saw in Southeast Asia in that period was a steady increase in Chinese claims over territories and what came up earlier 

in this hearing, South China Sea areas, in the bilateral problems 

that nations in Southeast Asia had with each other once the United 

States was not there as a southern anchor, which is not to say we 

solved every problem, but it does change the geo-political calculation. 

So in answer to your question what would happen if we left 

Northeast Asia, the resolution of issues would fall solely upon the 

nations in the region who have an unfortunate and long history of 

distrust, of continued use of the history to obstruct future progress, 

and in which undoubtedly due to our general position we would be 

drawn back in anyway, but without the resources and the means 

to have the same level of effectiveness as we do if we are there in 

the region as we are now. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And also the understanding if we do leave 

our presence out of Southeast Asia it will leave a vacuum, it will 

probably force Japan and China then to compete to an extent 

where all other Asian countries are going to be living in fear in 

terms of what exactly—who would you rather be partnership with 

than the United States if that be the case; at least that is what 

I understand as to why many Asian countries really would like to 

continue to have U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific region. 

You heard earlier the comments made by Secretary Schiffer and 

Secretary Donovan. Nothing like having the foreign policy and the 

military both at one time so we can kind of get an idea what is 

going on. 

76

In both of your opinions, and understanding the situation in 

Japan, do you see any real serious breakdown or division between 

our two countries, between Japan and the United States? 

Ms. SMITH. No, sir, I don’t. But that being said I think how we 

manage the Futenma issue I think will set the tone of our relationship for years to come, and that is where I worry. I think the deep 

interests on both sides, both economic and security, and our common democracies won’t ensure that we have a very strong partnership, but I think the way we handle the Futenma location issue I 

think has to respect the democratic process in Japan, and has to 

respect also our ability to work effectively with Japan on a broad 

range of security-related issues. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Dr. Auslin? 

Mr. AUSLIN. I would second that, Mr. Chairman. The only thing 

I would add is my concern that if we do not handle it well, as Dr. 

Smith indicated, that it will be, I think, a natural result that certainly on our end we may choose to put this relationship somewhat 

on the back burner. The government and Secretary Schiffer and 

Donovan have other areas that they are concerned with. They have 

an enormous portfolio. Everyone in the government is overloaded 

with keeping up with their responsibilities, and to enter into a situation where you do not feel that the return on investment of time 

and effort is adequately repaid, despite the longstanding and remaining interests between the two countries as there are, nonetheless I think would potentially lead to a situation of benign neglect 

where we may just allow the relationship to settle down to a lower 

level of importance and ultimately we would be faced with other 

problems arising out of that, and that is the key concern that I 

have. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Some of the members of our committee have 

expressed that concern, and if history serves as the basis of letting 

us know that that has happened a couple of times where we seem 

to have neglected Japan, not only input advice, or to counsel. The 

one thing I would say, that this administration is very, very strong 

in dealing with the Asia-Pacific region. At least we can say that 

this President—I always say he is the first President that at least 

knows where the Pacific Ocean is. 

But I will say to both of you I deeply appreciate your coming 

here to testify, and sincerely hope that we will have other occasions 

that we can do this. Thank you very much for both of you coming. 

Did you have any closing statements you would like to make? 

Mr. AUSLIN. No, sir. 

Ms. SMITH. No, sir, other than to share with you the importance 

of the Asia-Pacific region for the United States and for us to continue working hard to understand the dynamics there. Thank you 

for having us. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon at 4:53 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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