Th e Ho no ra ble Sand ra Da y O’ Conno r, As so c iate Justi c e of the Un ite d St a te s Su

pr e me * Court (Ret.), sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0827n.06 No. 09-5193 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
AHMED HA SSAN NEJ AT, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. COMMI SSI ONER OF SOCI AL SECURI TY, Def endant- Appellee
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE MI DDL E DI STRI CT OF TEN NESSEE

Be fore : O’CONNOR, Assoc iate Just ice ( Ret.); MOORE and COOK, Circ uit J udg es. * COOK, Circuit J udg e. Ahmad Hassan Nejat appea ls the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”) de nial of his application for Supplemental Security

I nc o me( “ SS I ” ) b e n e f

it s , c o nte n d in g

that it s d e c is io nv io late d

th e tr e a ti n g s o u r c e r e g u lati o n an d la c k e d s u b s ta n ti a l e v id e n ti ar

y s u p p o rt. We dis a g re e wi th t

he se c on te nti on s and

a ff ir m.
I. Nejat is a K

urdish immigra

nt from Iran. D uring the 1980s, when I raq invaded I ran, he took up arm s a g a ins t th e inv a din g I ra qis
. Af te r su sta ini ng mul tip le g un sh ot wo un ds , Ne jat f le d w ithhis family to Turkey and then emig rate d to the United States in 1996. J ust a few months after a

rrivingNo. 09-5193

Nejat v. Comm’r

-2- in the United States, Nejat applied for SSIbenef its, identify ing multiple medica l problems, including g un sh ot wo un ds to his arm s, le g s, and c he st, de pr e ssi on , fatigue , an d a ner vo us c on dit ion . T he SSA de nie d h is c la im.
Th e n, fo llo wi nga

wr ist injury on th e job a t a

Na sh vil le ho te l, N e

jat a g a in a

pp lie d f or SSI benef its, citing the date of his wrist injury as t he onset of di sability
. The inst ant appeal arises out of this second application for bene fits that alleg ed disability based on Nejat’ s work injury in addition to the same pre -existi ng war injuries listed in his prior application.
After the SSA denied Nejat’s second claim for benef its both initi ally

and on re consideration, Nejat a ppear ed bef

ore a n AL J for a

n appea l hear ing. A t the h ea ri n g, t h e AL J revie wed medic al
rec ords and r esidual func tional capa city (“RF C”) asse ssments from treating phy s i ci an s as well as both e x amining and non-examining consultative phy sicians, and hear d testimony from Ne jat and a vocational e x pert. Eva luating that evidence in the five-ste p context re quired by 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920, the AL J denied Nejat’ s claim, concluding Nejat reta ined an ability to perfor m jobs ex isting in signif

icant number s in the economy
. The Appeals C ouncil’s denial of Nejat’s reque st for review of the AL J ’s dec ision ex hausted his administrative remedie s and finalized the dec ision of the Commi ssioner of Social Sec urity . Nejat then sued in district court unde r 42 U.S .C. § 405(g ). The Magistrate J udg e re commended a ffirming the Commi s s i o n er’ s decision and the district c ourt adopted the Mag istrate’s Repor t and Re c omm e nd a tio n. Ne

jat no w a pp e a ls.No. 09-5193

Nejat v. Comm’r

-3- II.
We r eview the decision of the district cour t de novo, W

hite v. Comm’r of Soc . Sec ., 572 F.3d 272, 281 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted), but will aff irm the C ommissi oner’ s conclusions absent a dete rmination that the AL J failed to a pply the cor rec t leg al standar d or made fi ndings of fac t unsupported by

substantial evidence
. Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Se c. , 486 F.3d 234, 241 ( 6th Cir. 2007) (c iting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ). Courts define substantial evidence as “suc h rele vant evidenc e as
a rea sonable mind mig ht a cce pt a s adequate to support a conc lusion.” Richardson v. Pe rales , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (inter nal quotation marks and c itation omi t t ed ). “The substantial evidence standard pr esupposes that ther e is a ‘zone of choice ’ within whic h the Secre tary may proce ed without interfe renc e fr om the courts.” Felisky v. Bowen , 3 5 F. 3 d 1 0 2 7 , 1 0 3 5 (6 t hC i r. 1 9 9 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Mullen v. Bowen , 800 F .2 d 5 35 , 5 45 (6 th C ir . 1 98 6) (e n b anc )) . T hu s, wh e re su bs tanti a l e vid e nc e su

pp or ts the AL J ’s dec ision, we defe r to that finding , even if the re cord c ontains “substantial evidenc e . . . that would have suppor

ted an opposite c onclusion.” Key v . Callahan , 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997).
III
. To be c on sid e re d “ dis a

ble d” un de r t

he Soc ia l Se c ur ity

Ac t, a pe rs on mus t be “u nab le to eng ag e in a

ny substantial g ainful activity by rea son of any medically

deter minable phy sical or menta l imp a ir me nt whic h c an b e e xpe c te d to re su lt i n d e a th or wh ic h h a s la ste d o r c an b e e xpe c te d to la st for a continuous period of not less than twe lve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1 3 8 2c(a )(3) (A). T he Ac t fu rt he r p ro vid e s th a t:No. 09-5193

Nejat v. Comm’r

-4- [a] n individual shal l b e d et er m i n ed to be unde r a disability only if his phy sical or menta l impairment or impairments ar e of suc h sever ity that he is not only

unable to do his previous work but ca

nnot, consideringhis ag e, educ ation, and wor k experience , eng ag e in a ny other kin d o f s u

b s ta n ti a l g a in f

u l w o r k w h ic h e xis ts in th e n a ti o n a l e c o n o my . 4 2 U
. S.C. § 423(d)( 2)(A)
. I n applying the above sta ndard, a n AL J must follow the five-step a naly sis set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 40 4. 15 20 (a )( 4) and

summa ri zed by thi s c ourt a s f oll ow s:
1. I f cla imant is doing substantial g ainful ac tivity , he is not disabled. 2. I f cla imant is not doi ng substantial ga inful activity , his impairm en t must be sever e befor e he c an be f

ound to be disabled. 3. I f cla imant is not doi ng s u b s t an t i al gainful a ctivity and is suffe ring from a se vere imp a ir me nt t hat ha s l asted

or is e xpe c te d to la st f

or a c on tin uo us pe ri od

of a t le a st tw e lve months , a

nd his imp a ir

me nt m e e ts o r e qu a ls a lis te d im pa ir me nt, c la ima

nt i s presumed disa

bled without further

inquiry
. 4. I f cla imant’s impairment does not pre vent hi m from doinghis past releva nt work, he is not disabled. 5. Even if c laimant’s impairment does pr event him from doing hi s past rele vant work, if other wor

k exis ts in the national economy that acc ommodates his residual function al capacity

and vocational fac tors (ag e, educ ation, skills, etc.), he is not disabled.
W alters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec ., 127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 1997)
. The claimant bear s the burde n of proof at steps one throug h four. Id. Th e burd e n th e n s hif ts t o th e Com mis sio ne r a

t st e p f ive to “ide n t ify a sig nificant number

of jobs in the economy

that acc ommodate the cla imant’s residual functional capa city (dete rmined at step four) and voca tional profile.” Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec

. , 336 F.3d 469, 474 ( 6th Cir. 2003).No. 09-5193

Nejat v. Comm’r

I n 2002, the SSA issued a new r uling on obe sity , SSR02-1p, which supe rsede d SSR00- 1 3p. -5- A.
N e j a tf i r s tf i n d s e r r o r i nt h e A LJ ’ s s t e p t w o s e v e r i t y f i n d i n g s , ar g u i n g t h a tt h e A LJ incorre ctly

classified se vera l o f his impairments as non-se vere and fa iled to comply with Social Se c ur ity Rul ing02 -1 p wh e n e va luatin g Ne jat’ s a lle g e d o be sity . We fi nd bo th c la ims me ri tle ss. 1 At step two, the Commissi oner must deter m i n e wh ether the claimant ha s a seve re imp a ir me nt. See20 C.F .R. § 4 04 .1 52 0( a )( 4) (i i) . T his c ir cui t con st rues the ste p tw o s e ve ri ty
r e g u lati o n a s a “ de m ini mi s hurdle,” Roge rs , 486 F.3d at 243 n.2 (internal quotation mar ks and
c it a ti o n o mi tt e d ) , inte n d e d to “ s c r e e n o u t to ta ll y g r o u n d le s s c la im s .” Farris v. Sec’ y of Health & Hu ma n S e rv s. , 773 F.2d 85, 89 ( 6th Cir. 1985)
. Thus, if an impairment ha s “more tha n a minimal eff ect” on the claimant’s ability to do basic work activities, the AL J must tre at it as “seve re.” Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-3p, 1996 WL 374181 at *1 (1996). A fter a n AL J makes a

finding of seve rity

as to eve n
o n e i mp a i r

m e n t , t h e A L J “ m u s tc o n s i d e r l i m i t a t i o n s an d

r e s t r i c t i o n s i m

p o s e d b y all of an individual’s impairments, even those that are not ‘sever e.’” Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-8p, 1996 WL374184, at *5 (e mphasis added) . And when a n AL J considers a ll of a cla im an t ’s i m p ai rm ents in the
rema ini n g steps of the disability deter mination, an AL J ’s fa ilure to find additional seve re impairments at step two does “ not constitute rever sible err or.” Maziarz v. Sec ’y of He alth & Human Se rv s. , 837 F.2d 240, 244 ( 6th Cir. 1987)No. 09-5193

Nejat v. Comm’r

-6- Al tho ug h th e AL J cla ssi fi e d s e ve ral of Ne ja t’ s im pa ir me nts —d y sthy mic dis or de r, po sttraumatic stre ss disorder (“ PTSD”), and obe sity —as non-sev er e, he conc luded that other i m p airments—arthritis of the rig ht wrist and shoulder a nd hy perte nsion—qualified as seve re. Substantial evidenc e supports t he AL J ’s seve rity deter minations. Moreover, e ven if the A L J err ed at step two, the AL J ’s consideration of the cumulative e ffe ct of Ne jat’s impairments (both seve re a nd
non-seve re) throug hout the rema ining steps of the ana ly sis render ed any err or har mless. Id. Nejat’ s contention that the AL J ’s fa ilure t o co nsider his alleg ed obesity violated Social Security Ruling 02-1p, 2000 WL628049, simil arly lack s me r it. “Social Security Ruling 02-01p doe s not mandate a

particula r mode of a

naly sis,” but merely

direc ts an AL J t o co n s i der the claimant’s obesity , in combination with other impairments, at all stag es of the se quential eva luation. Bledsoe
v . B ar nh ar t , 165 F. App’ x 408, 411–12 (6th Cir. 2006). Nejat’ s obesity claim re sts entirely on the

“ C l a s s 1 o b e s i t y” d i a g n o s i s o f D r . D a v i s , t h e o n l y

o b e s i t y d i a g n o s i s i nt h e r e c o r d
. T h e A LJ acknow ledg ed Dr . Davis’s diag nosis in his decision, but adjudg ed it unreliable in light of the conflictingfinding s of other phy sicians. Given Nejat’s failure to list obesity in his application and the sca nt evidence of obesity

in the rec ord, the AL J proper ly evaluated t his alleg ed condition. See Pena v . Chater , 76 F.3d 906, 909 ( 8th Cir. 1996).
B. Nejat ne x t argues that the AL J violated the SSA’s “ treating source ” re g ulation, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)( 2), by

failing to provide “g ood rea sons” for a ccor ding diminished we ight to tre atingNo. 09-5193

Nejat v. Comm’r

-7- phy sician Dr. A ttoussi ’s opi nion—an opinion he contends w ould have supporte d a findingof

“ d i s a b l e d
. ” A r e v i e w o f

t h e r e c o r d , h o w e v e r , r e f u t e s N e j a t ’ s c l a i m , c o n f

i r m i n g t h a tt h e A LJ appropr iately

considere d Dr. Attoussi’s medica l findings a nd adequately explained the weig ht give n to t he m.
The tre ating sou rc e re gu l ation require s an AL J to acc ord controlling weig ht to a treating ph y sic ian’ s o pin ion

if i t i s “ w e l l

- s u

p p o r t e d b y m e d i c a l ly a c c e pta ble c lin ic a l and

la bo ra tor y dia g no sti c techniques a

nd is not inconsist ent with the ot h er s u b s t an tial evidence in [ the] case r ecor d.” 20 C.F .R. § 404 .1 52 7( d) (2 ). An AL J a c c or ds mor e we ig ht to opi nio ns fr om t re a tin g so ur c e s b e c a

us e “these source s are likely

to be the medica l professionals most able to provide a deta iled, longitudinal picture of [t he claimant’s] medical impairment(s) . . . .” Id. I n decliningto assign c ontrolling we ight to a tre a tin g ph y sic ian’ s opin ion , a n A L J must

have c on sid e re d “ c e rt a in f a c tor s— name ly , th e le ng th of the tre atment re lationship and the fre quency of examination, the nature a nd extent of the treatment relationship, supportabili ty of the opinion, consistency of t he opini on with the record as a whole, a nd the spec ialization of the treatingsource —in determining what [ other] weig ht to give the opinion.” W il s o n v . Co m m ’ r o

f Soc . Sec. , 378 F.3d 541, 544 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (d)( 2)). Thus, a

decision deny

ing be nefits “must contain spec ific re asons for the weig ht give n to the treating sourc e’s medic al opinion.” Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-2p, 1996 WL374188, at *5 (1996). Nejat identifie s an opinion offe red by Dr. Attoussi that the VE int erpr eted a s limi ting Ne jat to “basic ally
. . . sedenta

ry work” — and the AL J viewed similarly —as re stricting N ejat “to a limit edNo. 09-5193

Nejat v. Comm’r

Whil e Dr . Attoussi’s RFC assessment fails to specify exactly how long he believe d Nejat 2 could stand or wa lk, it does not preclude lig ht work exertion. -8- rang e of sede ntary

work.” Nejat maintains that ha d the AL J adopted this sedenta ry RFC view fr om Dr. Attoussi, the g rid sy stem would have dire cted a finding of “disable d.” See 20 C.F.R
. P t . 404, Subpt. P , App.2, Table 1, Rule 201.17.
Butin st ead o f as si gnin g Nej at a sed ent ary RFC , the A L J con clu dedth at h e ret ain ed an RFC for lig ht work with “ rig ht uppe r extremity limit ations.” Although phy sicians opine on a c laimant’s resid u al functional c apac ity to work, ultimate responsibility for c apac ity -to-wor

k deter minations belong s to the Commi ssioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e) (1). And AL J variations from a tr eating
source ’s medica l opinion require “ g ood rea sons.”
I na s s i g n i n g a

l i g h t - w o r k R F C , t h e A L J acce

pted all aspec ts of Dr. Attoussi’s opinion other tha n h is s tand ing/w a lki ngre str ic tio n. Dr . A tto us si o pin e d th a t N e jat c ou ld s tand

and /or wa lk at le a st two hours of a

n eig ht-hour workday
. By rule, howe ver, the full rang e of lig ht work re quires standing and/or walking for approximately six hours of a n eig ht-hour wor

kday
. See Soc. Sec. Rul. 83-10p, 1983 WL 31251, at *6. I nsofar as the AL J discounted Attoussi ’s standing /walking restric tion —cre diting the opinions of other phy sicians who asse ssed Nejat as beingable to stand 2 and/or wa lk for six hours of a n ei gh t -h o ur workda

y —he provide d sufficie nt rea sons, calling treatment “minimal” and chara cter izi ng Dr. Attouss i’s sedenta ry -work limi tation as “too re strictive
c on sid e ri ngthe lim ite d n a tur e of his tr e a tme nt re c or ds .” Th ou g h b ri e f, the se ob se rv a tio ns a dd re ssNo. 09-5193

Nejat v. Comm’r

-9- sever al of the f

actor s an AL J must consider whe n decidingto affor d non-controllin g we i gh t to an opinion by

a treating source , including: the “[l] eng th of the treatment relationship and fr equenc y of examination,” § 404.1527(d)(2) (i), the “ [n] atur e an d extent of the treatment r elationship, § 404.1527(d)( 2)(ii), a

nd the supportability

of the opinion, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)( 3). Given that the AL J ac c e pte d ma

ny of Dr . A tto us si’ s f

ind ing s a nd pr ov ide d “ g oo d r e a so ns ” fo r c ho osingno t to wholly adopt the tre ati n g p h y s ician’s standing/walking restric tion, we re ject this challeng e to the decision.
C. Nejat also contends that the Commiss ioner fa iled to car ry his burden of e stablishing that jobs exis t in signific ant num bers in the national economy that Nejat can perform. S ubstantial evidenc e supporting the AL J ’s finding defe ats Nejat’s contention.
At ste p f ive of the e va luatio n, an AL J must de c ide wh e the r a

sig nif ic ant n umb e r o f j ob s e xist that will accommodate the claimant’s RFC and vocational pr ofile. Jones , 336 F.3d at 474. Using the medica l-vocational gr id in conjunction with a “Voc ational Specialist Comments Form” and VE testimony , the AL J conclude d that a sig nificant number of j obs exi sted in the national ec onomy that Nejat c ould perfor

m. I n rea ching this conclusion, t he AL J relied on the VE form to find that Ne jat could per form re p re s entative lig ht jobs such as form pre sser, g luer, or ha nd cutter, a

nd on VE testimony to find that he could perf o rm 8 0 0 inspector jobs, 2000 asse mbly jobs, and 2000 hand packe r jobs. Nejat c ounters that both the VE f orm and the V E testimony upon which the AL J reliedNo. 09-5193

Nejat v. Comm’r

-10- are “def ective” and “[do] not consti tute substantial evidence .” First, Ne jat criticizes the AL J ’s re liance on the VE for m that id entified thre e examples of
un sk ill e d li g ht j ob s h e c ou ld p e rf or m, b ut o mitte d th e numbe r of the se job s ava ila ble . Ne jat r ig htl y
no te s th a t th is e vid e nc e a lon e c ou ld n ot s up po rt the AL J’s f

ind ing
. We fi nd the omi ssi on ha rm le ss, ho we ve r, be c a

us e the VE ’s testimony pr ov ide s su bs tanti a l e vid e nc e tha

t si g nif ic ant j ob s e xist. Turning to the VE testimony , Nejat insists that his phy sical limitati o n s prec lude him from perf orming hand packer jobs and his limit ed langua g e ski lls prec lude hi m from per forminginspector jobs, thus, eliminating two out of t he three j obs that the VE testified he could perfor m. Accor ding to Nejat, the r emaining assembly jobs do not constitute a si g nificant number. Even if we ag ree that the AL J ’s findi ng included jobs prec luded by Nejat’ s exertional and non-e x ertional limitations, the AL J ’s count of 2000 jobs ava ilable in the third categ ory withstands Nejat’s c halleng e.
This court addr essed “ the difficult task of enumer ating exactly what constitutes a ‘sig nificant number’ [of jobs]” in Hall v. Bowen , 837 F.2d 272, 275 ( 6th Cir. 1988). Refusing to “set for th one specia l number [as] t he boundar y betwee n a ‘sig nificant number’ and a n insignifica

nt number of jobs,” Ha ll c ouns e le d that c ourt s a dd re ss the de te rm inatio n on

a c a se -b y -c a se ba sis
. Id
. I n this case,
we c on c lud e tha

t the VE ’s te sti mony de mon str a te s si g nif ic ant j ob op po rt

un iti e s ava ila

ble to N e jat. S ee, e.g. , Mick

elson-W urm v. Comm’r , 2 8 5 F
. Ap p ’ x 4 8 2 , 4 8 6

– 8 7 ( 9 t h C i r . 2 0 0 8 ) ( 2 0 0 0 jo bs a sig nif ic ant n umb e r) ; Born v. Sec ’y o

f Health & Human Serv

s ., 923 F.2d 1168, 1174–75 ( 6th Cir. 1990 ) ( 25 00 job s) ; Barker v . Sec’ y of Health &Human Serv s . , 8 8 2 F
. 2 d 1 4 7 4 , 1 4 7 8

– 7 9 (9th Cir.No. 09-5193

Nejat v. Comm’r

-11- 19 89 ) ( 12 00 job s) ; Ha ll , 8 37 F .2 d at 27 5 ( 13 50 job s) ; Jenk ins v . Bowen , 8 61 F .2 d 1 08 3, 10 87 (8 th Cir. 1988) (500 jobs).
D.
F ina lly , N e

jat a c c us e s th e AL J of f

a ili ng“ to f

oll owa pp lic a ble re g ulatio ns , r

uli ng s, and

c a se law r e g ard ingthe e va luatio n o f [h is] s y mpt oms , in c lud ingpa in. ” B ut t he dis tr ic t c ourt

pr op e rl y deeme d Neja t ’s o n e- s en t en ce , co n cl u s o ry o b j ec t i o nt o t h e m agi s t ra t e’ s re p o rt i n s u ff i ci en tt o p re s erve this iss ue for

appea l. Se e Sp e nc e r v . B ou c ha rd , 449 F.3d 721, 725 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (filing g ener al or
c on c lus or y ob je c tio ns ta

nta mou nt t o a c omp le te fa ilure to o bje c t) ; se e als o Th om as v . A rn , 4 74 U. S. 140, 155 (1985) ( failure to object to a mag istrate’s r eport g ener ally forf eits appellate revie w).
I V.
We a ff ir m.