APHIS Evaluation of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza 

H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in the Czech Republic and Sweden

 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 

Veterinary Services 

July 2009 
APHIS Analysis of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in the Czech Republic 

and Sweden 

2 

ABBREVIATIONS

ADNS Animal Disease Notification System 

AI avian influenza 

APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 

AU Administrative Units 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations 

CRL Community Reference Laboratory 

CSF Classical Swine Fever 

EC European Commission 

END Exotic Newcastle Disease 

EU European Union 

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 

FVO Food and Veterinary Office of the European Commission 

H5N1 hemagluttin 5 neuraminidase 1 

HPAI highly pathogenic avian influenza 

LPAI low pathogenicity avian influenza 

MS Member State 

OIE World Organization for Animal Health 

PCR polymerase chain reaction 

TRACES Trade Control and Expert System 

SCFCAH Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health 

USDA United States Department of Agriculture 
APHIS Analysis of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in the Czech Republic 

and Sweden 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On March 17, 2006, the Swedish Board of Agriculture reported their first case of Highly 

Pathogenic Avian Influenza subtype H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in domestic poultry to the 

World Organization for Animal Health (OIE).The outbreak was confirmed on a game 

bird breeding farm of mallard ducks in the village of Gässhult, Oskarshamn in Kalmar 

Län (County). No further reports of HPAI H5N1 in wild or domestic birds have been 

reported in Sweden since that time. 

On June 22, 2007, the State Veterinary Administration of the Czech Republic reported 

the first occurrence of HPAI H5N1 in domestic poultry to the OIE. The outbreak was 

confirmed in a flock of 6,000 turkeys near the town of Tisova, Usti nad Orlici district, in 

the Pardubicky Region (kraj). Several other nearby commercial poultry farms were 

affected over the next several weeks. No further reports of HPAI H5N1 in domestic birds 

have been reported in the Czech Republic since that time. 

In this document, APHIS presents the results of its evaluation of the HPAI H5N1 status 

of the Czech Republic and Sweden based on information supplied to European 

Commission (EC), EC legislation, and reports to OIE. APHIS has maintained contact 

with EC veterinary authorities who kept APHIS apprised of animal disease conditions in 

the European Union (EU) and concludes that a document review is sufficient to meet the 

needs of this evaluation. In addition, because of the long history of trade between the 

United States and the EU, APHIS did not require a site visit to complete this evaluation. 

The documentation reviewed was consistent with the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health 

Code recommendation for reinstatement of trade with a region that has experienced an 

HPAI H5N1 outbreak. In brief, APHIS based this evaluation on the following critical 

factors: the Czech Republic and Sweden have been free of HPAI H5N1 for at least 3 

months as the result of effective control measures undertaken by the competent veterinary 

infrastructure; HPAI H5N1 was a notifiable disease in the EU; an ongoing awareness 

disease program was in place; all notified or suspect occurrences were investigated; an 

effective surveillance program for HPAI H5N1 existed that supported the detection and 

investigation of outbreaks; diagnostic and laboratory capabilities were adequate and 

effective; eradication and control measures and movement restrictions were appropriate 

to prevent further spread of disease; and procedures used for repopulation of affected 

premises included monitoring to demonstrate that HPAI H5N1 had been eradicated. 

AHPIS considers that the presence of HPAI H5N1 in wild birds presents the highest risk 

for the reintroduction of HPAI H5N1 into the Czech Republic and Sweden. Eradication 

of disease should mitigate the immediate risk from the outbreak that occurred but the 

reintroduction of disease into domestic poultry remains a concern whenever HPAI H5N1 

is present in wild or migratory bird populations. However, the ongoing surveillance 

programs for wild birds and domestic poultry in the Czech Republic and Sweden and the 

surrounding EU region have not indicated the reoccurrence or reintroduction of HPAI 

H5N1 in the Czech Republic or Sweden. The EC recognizes wild birds as the major 

pathway of introduction of HPAI and had in place an adequate and appropriate 

surveillance system for HPAI in wild birds. Extensive surveillance in wild birds and 

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APHIS Analysis of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in the Czech Republic 

and Sweden 

domestic poultry for HPAI H5N1 in the Czech Republic and Sweden since eradication of 

the outbreak indicates that it has not been reintroduced. APHIS considers that if there is 

a reintroduction of HPAI H5N1 into the Czech Republic or Sweden it would be rapidly 

detected and appropriate control and eradication measures would be applied. 

As a result of this evaluation, APHIS concludes that the Czech Republic and Sweden 

were able to effectively control and eradicate HPAI H5N1 in their domestic poultry 

population and that authorities in both countires have adequate control measures in place 

to rapidly identify, control and eradicate the disease should it be reintroduced in either 

wild birds or domestic poultry. The effectiveness of the eradication program was 

attributed to prompt actions taken by the veterinary authorities in the Czech Republic and 

Sweden with cooperation from backyard and commercial flock owners. Based on the 

results of the assessment, APHIS could identify no additional risk factors that would 

indicate that domestic poultry in the Czech Republic and Sweden continue to be affected 

with HPAI H5N1. Therefore, APHIS concludes that the likelihood of introducing HPAI 

H5N1 into the United States through the import of live birds, poultry carcasses, parts or 

products of poultry carcasses, and eggs of poultry, game birds or other birds from the 

Czech Republic and Sweden to be low. 

INTRODUCTION

On March 17, 2006, the Swedish Board of Agriculture reported their first case of Highly 

Pathogenic Avian Influenza subtype H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in domestic poultry to the 

World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) [20, 23]. The outbreak was confirmed in a 

mallard duck on a mixed species game bird breeding farm in the village of Gässhult, 

Oskarshamn, in Kalmar Län (County). The probable source of the infection was contact 

with infected wild birds. The affected farm was located in an area which was already 

under restriction since the end of February 2006 due to the detection of HPAI H5N1 in 

wild birds. Between February and April, 2006, 508 samples from wild birds and 3 minks 

were tested, of which 64 wild birds from 16 different places were positive for HPAI 

H5N1. No further reports of HPAI H5N1 in domestic or wild birds have been reported in 

Sweden since that time [1, 15-17, 20]. 

On June 22, 2007, the Director of the Department of Animal Health and Welfare in 

Ministry of Agriculture of the Czech Republic reported the first occurrence of HPAI 

H5N1 in domestic poultry to the OIE [20]. The outbreak was confirmed in a flock of 

6,000 turkeys near the town of Tisova, Usti nad Orlici district, in the Pardubicky Region 

(kraj). Over the next several weeks other nearby commercial poultry farms were also 

affected. Restrictions were removed on August 14, 2007, following depopulation of 

affected premises and extensive additional surveillance. No further detections of HPAI 

H5N1 in domestic birds have been reported in the Czech Republic since that time [1, 15-

17, 20] 

In this document, APHIS presents the results of its re-evaluation of the HPAI H5N1status 

of the Czech Republic and Sweden. APHIS is basing this review on the evaluation of 

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APHIS Analysis of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in the Czech Republic 

and Sweden 

documentation of the European Commission (EC) [15-17, 22], Food and Veterinary 

Office report [18, 19]], EC legislation [Appendix A], and reports to OIE [20]. 

Previously, APHIS has conducted reviews of the animal health control system of the 

European Union (EU) and has concluded that the Czech Republic and Sweden have in 

place an effective system to identify, control and eradicate animal disease [9, 11-14]. 

Several previous evaluations of the HPAI H5N1 status of regions within the EU 

concluded that the veterinary infrastructure was adequate to rapidly identify, control and 

eradicate the disease should it be reintroduced into their country in either wild birds or 

domestic poultry [2-8]. In the 2004 risk assessment for Classical Swine Fever (CSF), 

APHIS evaluated the veterinary infrastructure of 15 Member States (MS) of the EU with 

regard to the ability to apply the harmonized and binding animal health regulations 

imposed by the EC on all MS [13]. This region included Sweden and in 2007 the Czech 

Republic was added [9]. Important animal health requirements include compulsory 

notification of specific animal diseases to both the EC and OIE. CSF and HPAI are 

notifiable diseases in the EU. 

In 2005 APHIS identified and presented for public comment what it would consider to be 

the smallest sub-national jurisdictions or Administrative Units (AUs) in the 15 EU MS 

[12]. The AU was considered to have “effective oversight of normal animal movements 

into, out of, and within that jurisdiction, and that, in association with national authorities, 

if necessary, has effective control over animal movements and animal diseases locally.” 

APHIS recognized that local authorities in the individual MS have effective oversight and 

control of animal diseases locally within their respective AUs and in the event of future 

animal disease outbreaks in the EU, APHIS would regionalize Member States to the level 

of one or more of the identified AUs. Although the document specifically addressed CSF, 

the concept of regionalization to the AU level was considered to be more broadly 

applicable and not be disease-specific [2-8]. In the case of the Czech Republic the AU is 

the kraj or county [11]. For Sweden the AU is the Län or County [12].

APHIS’s evaluations of the veterinary infrastructure including laboratory capability and 

its ability to implement appropriate control measures, movement controls, and emergency 

measures apply equally to HPAI H5N1. The information available regarding HPAI 

H5N1, in addition to the information from previous evaluations of poultry, swine, and 

ruminant diseases provide a background that is consistent with the 11 factor approach in 

9 CFR 92.2. APHIS has maintained contact with EC veterinary authorities who kept 

APHIS advised of animal disease conditions in their country and concludes that a 

document review is sufficient to meet the needs of this risk analysis. In addition, because 

of the long history of trade between the United States and the EU, APHIS did not require 

a site visit to complete this evaluation. 

The information available to APHIS supporting the removal of these two regions from 

the APHIS list of H5N1 affected regions was consistent with recommendations outlined 

in Article 2.7.12.2 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code for information 

recommended for reinstatement of trade HPAI H5N1 free status from a region that has 

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APHIS Analysis of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in the Czech Republic 

and Sweden 

experienced an HPAI H5N1 outbreak [21]. APHIS conducted a risk analysis that is 

consistent with these recommendations, specifically: 

• The Czech Republic and Sweden have been HPAI H5N1 free for 3 months because of 

control measures undertaken by an effective veterinary infrastructure.

• HPAI (as defined in 9 CFR) was a notifiable disease in the Czech Republic and 

Sweden. An ongoing awareness program was in place for veterinary officials and the 

public, and all notified or suspect occurrences of HPAI H5N1 were subjected to field 

and laboratory investigations. 

• A surveillance program for HPAI H5N1 already existed that addressed needs of the 

Czech Republic and Sweden. This program supported the detection and investigation 

of outbreaks, including clinical inspection, active and passive surveillance (both 

serological and agent detection), and serological and virological testing in high-risk 

areas and of high-risk flocks. These actions were sufficient to detect disease 

effectively and quickly, even in the absence of clinical signs. 

• Under the surveillance program, all notified and/or suspected avian influenza cases 

were investigated, and officials took appropriate actions including collecting samples, 

transporting these samples in a manner that ensured their integrity for testing 

purposes, and documenting subsequent laboratory results. 

• The system for recording, managing, and analyzing diagnostic and surveillance data 

was sufficient to demonstrate the effectiveness of the disease control measures in the 

Czech Republic and Sweden. 

• Laboratory confirmation capabilities were effective, and testing procedures were 

documented and standardized. 

• The eradication program included the definition of appropriate quarantine and 

surveillance zones, monitoring of those zones, and implementation of movement 

restrictions. Measures taken by officials were able to contain and control the spread of 

disease from these zones due to effective program measures. Procedures for lifting 

quarantines were followed and were sufficient to prevent further spread of disease. 

• Documented standard operating procedures described procedures for depopulation, 

cleaning, disinfecting, and other applicable measures, such as carcass disposal. All 

relevant personnel were familiar with these standard procedures and followed them 

during the outbreak. These measures were effective in controlling the disease. 

• Premises repopulation, if applicable, was carried out according to documented 

procedures, including evidence that the disease did not recur and monitoring after 

repopulation to demonstrate that the disease was eradicated. 

As a result of this evaluation, APHIS concludes that the Czech Republic and Sweden 

were able to effectively control and to eradicate HPAI H5N1in their domestic poultry 

populations. The effectiveness of the eradication program was attributed to prompt 

actions taken by veterinary authorities in the Czech Republic and Sweden and the 

cooperation of backyard and commercial flock owners. Since these outbreaks, the Czech 

Republic and Sweden have conducted extensive surveillance for HPAI H5N1 and have 

not identified any new HPAI H5N1outbreaks in domestic poultry. 

OBJECTIVE 

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APHIS Analysis of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in the Czech Republic 

and Sweden 

The objective of this review is to evaluate the HPAI H5N1 status of the Czech Republic 

and Sweden following the outbreak in domestic poultry in Sweden (2006) and in the 

Czech Republic (2007) to serve as the basis to characterize the risk associated with the 

import of live birds (including hatching eggs), poultry carcasses, parts or products of 

poultry carcasses, and eggs (other than hatching eggs) of poultry, game birds, or other 

birds from the Czech Republic or Sweden. 

 

BACKGROUND

The Czech Republic and Sweden, as members of the EU, are obligated to comply with 

EC regulations. Council Directive 2005/94/EC describes the measures for the control of 

avian influenza (AI) and Commission Decision 2004/402/EC requires all EU-MS have 

AI contingency plans to ensure that the most appropriate measures are immediately 

implemented. These measures are harmonized and binding throughout the EU serving as 

an important means to prevent the spread of HPAI H5N1 within the EU as well as other 

countries through its export market. The EC has the authority to conduct periodic 

evaluations to verify individual MS compliance. 

The United States had a long history of trade of poultry and poultry products with the 

EU. The veterinary infrastructure of the Czech Republic [11] and Sweden [12, 13] were 

previously evaluated for other animal diseases as individual countries and as part of the 

EU. The EU system for animal disease control has been extensively evaluated by APHIS 

and provides a basis for understanding the EU system for control of HPAI in the Czech 

Republic and Sweden [2-14]. APHIS has maintained contact with EC veterinary 

authorities who kept APHIS advised of animal disease conditions in their region. 

Therefore, APHIS concludes that a document review is sufficient to meet the needs of 

this risk analysis. 

APHIS has concluded that the veterinary authorities in the Czech Republic and Sweden 

were able to effectively control and to eradicate disease in their domestic poultry 

population and that the EU system for animal disease control provides a basis for 

understanding the EC regulations and system for control of HPAI. Based on the results of 

the assessment, APHIS could identify no additional risk factors currently applicable to 

the Czech Republic or Sweden that would indicate that the Czech Republic or Sweden 

are currently affected with HPAI H5N1. 

HISTORY OF HPAI H5N1 IN SWEDEN AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

In 2005 the presence of HPAI H5N1 in wild birds and domestic poultry was detected in 

Europe, first in Russia, Croatia and then Romania (not yet an EU MS) [17]. In 2006, 

HPAI H5N1was widely reported in Europe in wild birds; Austria, Bulgaria (not yet an 

EU-MS), Greece, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the 

United Kingdom and in both wild birds and domestic poultry in the Czech Republic 

Denmark [7], France [8], Germany [2, 4], and Hungary [5]. In 2007, HPAI H5N1 was 

again reported in wild birds in Austria, the Czech Republic, France [8] and Slovenia, and 

domestic poultry in the Germany [2,4] Hungary [5], Poland [6] and the United Kingdom 

[3], [16]. 

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APHIS Analysis of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in the Czech Republic 

and Sweden 

In reviewing the HPAI H5N1situation in the EU during the 2006 – 2007 it was found that 

swans, especially mute swans (Cygnus olor) were most frequently involved. The 

exception was Germany in 2007, where grebes were the most frequently affected species 

and there was an incident with high mortality in which swans in the same area were not 

affected. In 2006, HPAI H5N1 was also isolated from grebes in Spain, Denmark and 

Sweden [22]. 

After the recognition of the spread of HPAI H5N1from Asia into Western Europe, the 

EU increased surveillance in wild and migratory birds. In mid-February 2006, HPAI 

H5N1 was found in wild birds in Rügen Germany, in early March in Sweden and 

Denmark. Increased surveillance of wild birds throughout the region was also 

undertaken, with special emphasis on costal regions and migratory waterfowl. 

Sweden [1, 15-17, 20, 23]

Between February and April, 2006, HPAI H5N1 was detected in 64 wild birds and 3 wild 

minks from a total of 508 samples tested from an area primarily along the south east coast 

of Sweden. HPAI H5N1 was first isolated on February 24, 2006, from two tufted ducks 

(Aythya fuligula) of 76 wild birds tested in Kalmar Län (County) [see Figures 1 and 2]. 

Positive isolations of HPAI H5N1 were also made in five other south eastern Län 

(Bleknge, Gotland, Skäne, Stockholm and Sädermanland). The isolations were primarily 

in tufted ducks (Aythya fuligula) (36 of 64); other waterfowl including greater scaups 

(Aythya marila), mute swans (Cygnus olor), goosanders (Mergus merganser), smews 

(Mergus albellus); as well as eagle owls (Bubu bubo), common buzzards (Buteo buteo), 

and gulls (Larus argentatus). One of three mink (small carnivous mammal of the 

Mustelidae family) tested in Blekinge Län was also positive. 

In compliance with Commission Decisions protections zones (3 km) and surveillance 

zoned (10 km) were established around these findings and additional surveillance was 

conducted. Passive surveillance was conducted throughout Sweden and active 

surveillance was conducted in regions on the flight lines of migratory species. 

On March 17, 2006, the Swedish Board of Agriculture (Jordbruksverket) reported their 

first case of HPAI H5N1 in domestic poultry to the OIE [20]. The outbreak was 

confirmed in a mallard ducks on mixed species game bird breeding farm in the village of 

Gässhult in Kalmar Län (County). The affected farm was within the restriction zone area 

already established under Commission Decision 2006/115/EC following the detection in 

wild birds [22]. Under Commission Decision 2006/293, in addition to the required 3 km 

protection and, 10 km surveillance zones, an extended 20 km surveillance zone was 

established. The probable source of the infection was contact with infected wild birds. No 

further outbreaks in domestic poultry have since been reported in Sweden, despite 

extensive surveillance in both the wild and domestic bird populations. 

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APHIS Analysis of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in the Czech Republic 

and Sweden 

Figure 1. Map of Sweden; source http://www.map-of-sweden.com/sweden-map-800.gif 

The Gässhult holding had approximately 500 mallard ducks, 150 pheasants, 25 pigeons, 

15 laying hens and 2 peacocks and all very in apparent good clinical condition. On March 

10 and 13, as part of the routine surveillance measures following the wild bird detection, 

cloacal swab samples were taken from 30 of the pheasants and 50 of the mallards. Two 

mallard samples were positive; one for HPAI and on for LPAI. The HPAI positive 

sample was further characterized by amino acid sequencing. 

On March 18, additional testing was done on this farm; 249 cloacal swab samples were 

collected (149 from mallards, 58 pheasants, 15 hens, 25 pigeons and 2 peacocks). Matrix 

PCR found 17 of the mallard samples to be positive but negative by conventional PCR. 

An additional 9 wild mallards found dead near the holding were tested; one of these was 

positive on Matrix PCR by negative to the H5 conventional PCR. Blood samples (156 

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APHIS Analysis of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in the Czech Republic 

and Sweden 

total; 96 mallards, 36 pheasants, 14 hens, and 2 peacocks) were also taken on March 18; 

84 samples were positive to H5 by hemagglutination inhibition test (82 mallards and 2 

hens). 

Figure 1. Restriction areas established on March 18, 2006 surrounding the Gässhult outbreak

The Gässhult holding was depopulated on March 18 and preliminary disinfection was 

done. New restrictions zones were established including the 3 km protection zone, 10 km 

surveillance zone; “A” zone of 20 km and “B” zone encompassing all of Kalmar Lan [see 

figure 1]. Movement controls were put in place with registration and inspection of all 

poultry holdings in the surveillance zone. No commercial poultry holdings were located 

within 30 km of the affected holding and there were no contacts with other farms. The 

restrictions of zone “A” and “B” were lifted on April 25, 2006. The veterinary authorities 

approved the final cleaning and disinfection of the affected holding on May 23, 2006; 

however, the Gässhult premises remained empty until July 24, 2006 and restrictions on 

the premises were lifted on July 24, 2006. Sweden declared itself free of HPAI H5N1 in 

compliance with OIE guidelines on August 23, 2006 [20-23]. 

Czech Republic 

On March 29, 2006, the Czech Republic reported the first identification of HPAI H5N1 

in wild birds following the detection of the virus in a wild swan (Cygnus olor) on the 

river Moldau in the Southern Bohemian region. Protection and surveillance zones 

established in accordance with EU Commission Decision 2006/115/EC. On March 30, in 

the same region a second HPAI H5N1 positive wild bird was detected in the city of 

Ceske Budejovice and additional protection and surveillance zones were established. 

Between January 1 and April 22, 2006, the Czech Republic tested 2,038 samples from 

wild birds of which several samples from wild swans (Cygnus olor) were positive. By 

April 8, 2006, 12 cases of HPAI H5N1 in wild birds were detected and a total of 5 

protection and surveillance zones had been established. On May 11, the Czech Republic 

imposed additional biosecurity measures to poultry farms [20, 22]. 

On June 22, 2007, the veterinary authorities in the Czech Republic reported the first 

occurrence of HPAI H5N1 in domestic poultry to the OIE. The outbreak was confirmed 

in a flock of production turkeys near the town of Tisova, Usti nad Orlici district, in the 

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APHIS Analysis of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in the Czech Republic 

and Sweden 

Pardubicky Region (kraj). Of the 6,000 turkeys on the farm, 1,800 died and 3,000 were 

affected. The farm was promptly depopulated and additional protection and surveillance 

zones were established around the farm. Samples were sent to the European Community 

Reference Laboratory (CRL) in Weybridge, England, for typing and further 

characterization. The results indicated a new independent introduction of HPAI of H5N1 

subtype unlike those detected previously within the EU. This was followed by additional 

testing in the restriction zones [CD 2007/434/EC] and surveillance of wild birds. 

On June 27, 2007, a second outbreak of the new HPAI H5N1 strain was detected in a 

flock of 27,800 30-day old broiler chickens. The flock presented no clinical signs. This 

farm was located in Nořín, 4 km north of the first outbreak within the restriction zone 

established around the first domestic outbreak. Additional testing of the flock on June 22, 

1,069 blood samples for antibody detection and 863 swabs for virological testing were 

negative; 168 wild bird samples were also negative. On June 25, the flocks were retested 

prior to moving to slaughter and several positive samples were found (9 positives of the 

60 samples tested). The flock was depopulated and preventive depopulation of local 

backyard poultry was completed. 

On July 9, 2007, within the 3 km protection zone established around the flock in Nořín a 

third flock in Choceň was determined to be positive for HPAI H5N1. This flock of 

54,000 breeding hens did not show clinical signs and was negative on surveillance testing 

done on both June 22 and 27. The flock was depopulated by July 13 and additional local 

backyard poultry were preventively depopulated. A fourth flock was confirmed to be 

positive for HPAI H5N1 in the municipality of České Heřmanice on July 9. This flock 

was located within the 3 km protection zone established around the Nořín. Again the 

flock of 17,000 breeding hens did not show any clinical signs and had 2 sets of negative 

test results before testing confirmed the presence of the virus on July 11. The flock and 

nearby backyard poultry were depopulated on July 12. 

Within the 3 km protection zones established for the third and fourth outbreaks there 

were two additional commercial poultry holdings; one with 3,000 fattening turkeys and 

another with 10,000 fattening turkeys and 55,000 broilers (see Figure 1). These flocks 

were depopulated as a preventative measure. Within the 10 km surveillance zone there 

were 7 holdings with a total of 350,000 birds, including 3 flocks of breeding poultry, 2 

flocks of laying hens, 1 broiler flock and a flock of pheasants. All flocks were tested at 

least once and all were found to be negative. The flocks of breeding poultry were tested 

three times and remained negative. Wild bird surveillance was done in the region as well. 

By July 14 a total of 271 birds were tested in the surrounding regions of Pardubický, 

Královéhradecký, and Jihomoravský. The restrictions zones were lifted in mid-August of 

2007. 

During this time HPAI H5N1 was isolated from a dead wild swan in the District of 

Břeclav in the Jihomoravský Region. Emergency veterinary measures and surveillance 

were implemented throughout the Czech Republic. On July 10, modifications were made 

to the restriction zoned in the Czech Republic to include the areas in Germany. 

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APHIS Analysis of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in the Czech Republic 

and Sweden 

Figure 1. map of the affected flocks in the Czech Republic [source: 16] 

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 

APHIS has identified several animal diseases listed by OIE that pose primary hazards 

associated with initiating trade in animals and animal products from foreign regions. The 

listed foreign animal diseases of primary concern are addressed specifically in APHIS 

regulations. One of these diseases, High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 (HPAI 

H5N1) is recognized by APHIS as a hazard of primary concern. In this regard, before 

resuming trade in poultry and poultry products with a region or country considered by 

APHIS to have been affected with HPAI H5N1, APHIS must conduct an import risk 

analysis to support this action. 

Avian influenza (AI) is caused by an orthomyxovirus virus that infects wild birds (such 

as ducks, gulls, and shorebirds) and domestic poultry (such as chickens, turkeys, ducks, 

and geese). AI viruses are classified by a combination of two groups of proteins: the 

hemagglutinin or H proteins, of which there are 16 (H1-H16), and neuraminidase or N 

proteins, of which there are 9 (N1-N9). AI strains also are divided into two groups based 

upon the ability of the virus to produce disease (pathogenicity): low pathogenic (LP) and 

highly pathogenic (HP). 

HPAI H5N1, often referred to as the "Asian" H5N1, is the subtype causing worldwide 

concern. HPAI H5N1 ("Asian" H5N1) spreads rapidly and is often fatal to chickens and 

turkeys. Millions of birds have died in countries where HPAI H5N1 has been detected. 

This virus has also infected people, most of whom have had direct contact with infected 

birds. “Asian” HPAI H5N1 has not been detected in the United States. 

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APHIS Analysis of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in the Czech Republic 

and Sweden 

Low pathogenicity (LPAI) H5N1, often referred to as the "North American" H5N1, is of 

less concern. LPAI H5N1 has been detected in wild birds in the United States, as recently 

as 2007. Other strains, specifically H5N2, of HPAI have been detected and eradicated 

three times in the United States: in 1924, 1983 and 2004. The 2004 H5N2 isolate did not 

cause clinical disease and inoculation studies showed it to be a low pathogenic strain, 

however, genetic sequencing was consistent with one of the OIE definitions for HPAI. 

No significant human illness resulted from these outbreaks. 

ANALYSIS OF THE STATUS OF HPAI H5N1 IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND SWEDEN

APHIS conducted this evaluation based on the information outlined in the OIE 

Terrestrial Animal Health Code Article 2.7.12.2, information recommended for 

reinstatement of trade HPAI free status from a region that has experienced an HPAI 

outbreak. For the purpose of this report, risk refers to the likelihood that HPAI H5N1 

exists in the Czech Republic or Sweden, and, if so, how likely it would be for the disease 

to be introduced into the United States through imports of live birds, poultry carcasses, 

parts or products of poultry carcasses, and eggs of poultry, game birds, or other birds 

from the Czech Republic or Sweden. The likelihood will depend on the effectiveness of 

the eradication and control measures undertaken by the Czech Republic or Sweden in 

response to the 2006 and 2007 outbreaks of HPAI H5N1 and the ability to identify the 

presence of HPAI H5N1 if it were to be re-introduced. 

Evidence that the Czech Republic or Sweden have been HPAI-free for 3 months

because of control measures undertaken by an effective veterinary infrastructure. 

The Czech Republic and Sweden have the legal authority to respond to HPAI through a 

comprehensive set of regulations, directives and decisions that are harmonized and 

regularly updated for all EU MS [Appendix A]. In addition to the fixed body of 

legislation laid down for avian influenza, the EC has adopted additional or emergency 

measures under the AI Directive, with other pieces of primary animal health legislation as 

their legal basis. The Commission, with backing of the individual MS, puts forward 

legislative measures through the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal 

Health (SCFCAH). Measures implemented include import bans, prevention and control 

measures, domestic and wild bird surveillance programs and defining risk areas around 

protection and surveillance zones. APHIS found the contingency plans, as required by EC 

regulations, adequately provided emergency funds, laboratory staff, equipment and 

infrastructure for animal disease outbreak control and eradication. 

Comprehensive avian influenza specific measures are provided in Council Directive 

2005/94/EC, replacing Council Directive 92/40/EEC, and are frequently updated by 

Commission Decisions. Council Directive 2005/94/EC established comprehensive 

provisions for the early detection of infection in poultry aimed at a quick reaction and the 

adoption of appropriate and proportionate control and eradication measures. This 

includes a system of active surveillance to be carried out by MS, control measures to be 

applied in the event of an outbreak of avian influenza in poultry or other captive birds. 

Compulsory notification of suspected cases of HPAI, depopulation of poultry on holdings 

13 
APHIS Analysis of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in the Czech Republic 

and Sweden 

where HPAI is confirmed, cleaning and disinfection of affected premises, repopulation, 

establishment of protection (3 kilometer radius) and surveillance (10 kilometer radius) 

zones around affected holdings to enforce movement controls, epidemiological 

investigations of all cases, the presence of a national laboratory in each MS and EC 

reference laboratory for HPAI diagnosis are also detailed in the Directive. 

Immediate notification of the competent authority is compulsory under Council Directive 

82/894/EEC for the suspected or confirmed presence of avian influenza. Notification of 

outbreaks of animal diseases to the EC is required by Council Directive 92/40/EC. 

Commission Decision 2004/402/EC requires that each MS have approved AI contingency 

plans and Commission Decision 2006/563/EC requires that all Member States establish 

the legal powers necessary for the implementation of the contingency plans. 

Commissions Decision 2004/450/EC established standard requirements for Community 

financing for programs for the eradication, monitoring and control of animal disease. 

AI surveillance in both domestic poultry and wild birds has been in place for many years 

in the EU and the programs have been regularly updated. Following the recognition of 

risks associated with the presence of HPAI H5N1 in wild birds, a number of specific 

measures related to surveillance and control measures following detection of HPAI H5N1 

in wild birds were implemented and are updated frequently (Appendix A). These 

measures establish control and monitoring areas for wild and domestic bird population 

where HPAI H5N1 is detected in wild birds to help prevent virus introduction into 

commercial and non-commercial poultry flocks. For example, Commission Decision 

2006/563/EC specifies the characteristics of the surveillance programs, required 

notification and describes the necessary epidemiological investigation to be done in all 

cases where the presence of HPAI H5N1 in wild birds is confirmed. This decision 

requires the establishment of protection, surveillance and restricted zones for domestic 

birds around the areas HPAI H5N1 was identified in wild birds. 

The EU Trade Control and Expert System (TRACES), established under Commission 

Decision 2003/623, maintains an internet-based service for the traceability of live animals 

that provides information on the intra-Community trade of live animals and certain types 

of animal products. TRACES, in place since 2004, replaced earlier databases with a 

single central database to track the movement of animals, including the importation of 

animals and products into the EU. The system also enables the immediate review of 

animal movements preceding the detection of an animal disease outbreak to allow for 

rapid emergency response and traceability. The system also allows the receiving MS to 

verify that the consignment arriving at the destination corresponds to that specified in the 

original accompanying veterinary certificate from the country of origin. The 

consignments of live poultry and hatching eggs must be appropriately identified ensuring 

that when they are shipped to another MS, they are accounted for on arrival at their 

destination. 

APHIS has previously evaluated the EC veterinary infrastructure and found it effective 

and able to implement adequate and timely animal health control and disease eradication 

14 
APHIS Analysis of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in the Czech Republic 

and Sweden 

measures. [9, 12-14]. APHIS has recently evaluated the HPAI H5N1 status of several 

regions in the EU and removed them from the list of affected regions [2-8]. 

Conclusion: The Czech Republic and Sweden have not reported the identification of 

HPAI H5N1 in domestic poultry since making their final reports to OIE; Sweden’s final 

report was on August 9, 2006 and the Czech Republic was on August 16, 2007. APHIS 

concludes that the Czech Republic and Sweden have an effective veterinary infrastructure 

able to carry out the appropriate control measures to keep the Czech Republic and 

Sweden free of HPAI H5N1 in domestic poultry for much longer than the established 

international standard of three months. 

Documentation that HPAI (as defined in 9 CFR) was a notifiable disease in the Czech 

Republic and Sweden and an ongoing awareness program was in place for veterinary 

officials and the public, and all notified or suspect occurrences of HPAI were subjected 

to field and laboratory investigations. 

HPAI H5N1 is a notifiable disease in the Czech Republic and Sweden. Council Directive 

2005/94/EC requires that all EU MS notify the EC within 24 hours of the confirmation of 

any primary outbreak or detection of avian influenza and of all suspected or confirmed 

incidents. All forms of avian influenza confirmed by the competent authority in 

slaughterhouses, means of transport, border inspection posts and other places at 

Community borders and quarantine facilities or centers operating in accordance with 

Community legislation on imports of poultry or other captive birds are considered to be 

notifiable under Council Directive 92/40/EC. Commission Decision 2004/402/EC 

requires that all Member States have AI contingency plans, reviewed and approved by 

EC, in place to ensure that the most appropriate measures are immediately implemented. 

Specific regulations in the Czech Republic and Sweden were also put into force 

following the identification of the HPAI H5N1 outbreaks. Outreach to the public and bird 

owners was made through announcements and information campaigns in the national and 

local press related to all findings of infected wild birds. 

In the Czech Republic and Sweden, a variety of disease awareness and outreach programs 

were used to ensure the awareness and cooperation by poultry owner and the general 

public. Posters in several languages were published and set up in all international airports 

and borders. Simulation exercises for avian influenza outbreaks have been conducted at 

the national and local level with the cooperation of veterinary and human health 

authorities. Avian influenza has been the topic of several courses arranged by the EC for 

emergency management training for personnel from the veterinary authorities and other 

personnel handling infectious animal disease outbreaks. 

Conclusion: In the Czech Republic and Sweden, HPAI H5N1 was and continues to be a 

notifiable disease and all notified or suspect occurrences of HPAI H5N1 are subject to 

immediate field and laboratory investigation. Awareness and educational outreach 

programs were in place and efforts were increased following the identification of the 

presence of HPAI H5N1 in wild birds. 

15 
APHIS Analysis of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in the Czech Republic 

and Sweden 

A surveillance program for HPAI already existed that addressed the needs of the Czech 

Republic and Sweden. This program supported the detection and investigation of 

outbreaks, including clinical inspection, active and passive surveillance (both 

serological and agent detection), and serological and virological testing in high-risk 

areas and of high-risk flocks. These actions were sufficient to detect disease effectively 

and quickly, even in the absence of clinical signs. 

The EU has long standing surveillance measures in place for H5 and H7 AI viruses and 

annual surveillance is conducted by all EU-MS. In 2002 the EU implemented 

surveillance for avian influenza in poultry and wild birds requiring the MS to pay 50% 

and the EC to pay 50%. For example, Sweden initiated a national screening program for 

AI in 2003 primarily to detect LPAI by using a combination of an early warning system 

(passive surveillance) and serologic screening of various poultry production types. The 

sampling strategy is based on a risk assessment using demographic data and biosecurity 

factors. 

The surveillance measures are updated annually and since 2005 include requirements for 

the surveillance of avian influenza in wild birds. The individual MS are required to 

submit their annual surveillance program plans to the EC annually and complete and 

report their findings by the target dates specified in the annual program. Commission 

Decision 2006/111 further expanded requirements for active and passive surveillance in 

wild birds and provided a list of higher risk wild bird species to focus sampling. The EC 

continues to enhance and target HPAI surveillance by expanding the list of the wild bird 

species that have been shown to present the highest risk and includes lists of birds living 

in proximity to domestic poultry, share farmland associated with poultry production or 

may share wetlands with domestic poultry; the species are also ranked by probability of 

contact with poultry (Commission Decision 2007/268/EC). 

HPAI H5N1 infection in wild birds spread from Asia to the European continent by the 

middle of January 2006. The potential for spread to the Czech Republic and Sweden was 

foreseen due to prior findings in neighboring regions and surveillance was intensified. 

During 2006 there were 748 positive identifications of HPAI H5N1 in wild birds in the 

entire EU; 200 in February, 362 in March, 162 in April and 18 in May [1]. 

In 2006 the Czech Republic surveillance measures, as reported in Animal Disease 

Notification System (ADNS) (see below), reported 14 incidents of HPAI H5N1 in wild 

birds, with the last one reported on May 22. In 2007, HPAI H5N1 was reported in wild 

birds as well as the four incidents in domestic poultry. In 2008 the Czech Republic 

reported no incidents of HPAI in either wild birds or domestic poultry. 

In 2006, Sweden reported the single occurrence of HPAI H5N1 in domestic poultry on a 

mixed species holding in Gässhult during March. Between February and April, 2006, 

HPAI H5N1 was detected in 64 wild birds and 3 wild minks in 16 locations from a total 

of 508 samples tested. Although surveillance was conducted throughout the country the 

positive isolations were primarily along the south east coast of Sweden. In 2007 and 2008 

16 
APHIS Analysis of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in the Czech Republic 

and Sweden 

there were no positive identifications of HPAI H5N1 in Sweden in either wild birds or 

domestic poultry. 

Conclusion: APHIS concludes that the existing surveillance program for HPAI H5N1 

was appropriate for the detection the presence of HPAI effectively and quickly, even in 

the absence of clinical signs. The surveillance was adequate to indicate that no additional 

outbreaks of HPAI H5N1 had occurred in domestic poultry in either the Czech Republic 

or Sweden. 

Under the surveillance program, all notified and/or suspected avian influenza cases 

were investigated, and officials took appropriate actions including collecting samples, 

transporting these samples in a manner that ensured their integrity for testing 

purposes, and documenting subsequent laboratory results. 

Council Directive 2005/94/EC requires the establishment of a protection zone following 

the identification of HPAI (H5 or H7) in domestic poultry. A census of all the poultry 

holdings in zone made as soon as possible and visits by the official veterinarian to all 

commercial holdings for clinical examination of the poultry and other captive birds with 

collection of samples for laboratory tests, as necessary. Non-commercial holdings in the 

protection zone are also visited by an official veterinarian before the lifting of the 

protection zone. Surveillance in the restriction zones is immediately implemented to 

identify any further spread to the holdings located in the protection zone. 

Commission Decisions 2006/115/EC and 2006/135/EC established EU-wide measures 

following the finding of HPAI H5NI in wild birds. This measure replaced the interim 

protection measures applied shortly after HPAI H5NI first entered the EU to apply the 

necessary protection measures appropriate to the epidemiological situation and to prevent 

that disease from spreading from wild birds to poultry. Commission Decision 

2006/115/EC requires the establishment of protection (3 km) and surveillance zones (10 

km) around the place where the disease was detected in wild birds to prevent virus 

introduction into commercial and noncommercial poultry flocks. These zones are based 

on geographical, administrative, ecological and epidemiological factors and may include 

the territory of adjacent MS. Housing or confinement of the poultry in these zones is 

required to prevent direct and indirect contact between wild birds and poultry or captive 

birds. 

Conclusion: APHIS concludes that the surveillance program implemented by the Czech 

Republic and Sweden following the identification of HPAI H5N1 in their domestic 

poultry were comprehensive and able to detect the presence of HPAI H5N1in domestic 

poultry. The system in place was able to investigate all notified and/or suspected avian 

influenza cases and provide the necessary diagnostic support to verify the eradication of 

HPAI H5NI in domestic poultry in both of these regions. The effectiveness of the 

eradication program was mainly due to the prompt actions taken by the veterinary 

authorities in the Czech Republic and Sweden with the cooperation of backyard and 

commercial flock owners. 

17 
APHIS Analysis of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in the Czech Republic 

and Sweden 

The system for recording, managing, and analyzing diagnostic and surveillance data 

was sufficient to demonstrate the effectiveness of the disease control measures in the 

Czech Republic and Sweden. 

The Czech Republic, Sweden and other EU MS have several mechanisms to record and 

manage surveillance data, including the Animal Disease Notification System (ADNS) 

and the Trade Control and Expert System (TRACES). ADNS was established by Council 

Directive 82/894/EC and updated by Commission Decision 2005/176/EC, records and 

reports outbreaks of notifiable animal diseases in the EU-MS and other participating 

countries including Turkey, Iceland, the Faroe Islands, Andorra, and Switzerland. ADNS 

provides a reporting system for documenting individual outbreaks of notifiable animal 

diseases which automatically forwards information on primary outbreaks to the EC 

within 24 hours of identification and weekly for secondary outbreaks. The information is 

posted on the internet with maps updated weekly showing the location of the outbreaks 

and summary data. In 2006, ADNS registered a total of 3787 notifications, 1005 in 2005, 

and 1850 notifications in 2004, covering all reportable animal diseases and species. 

TRACES is a centralized database to ensure the control and traceability of animals and 

animal products moving within the EU. The system provides electronic certification, data 

retrieval and central statistical information for imports of animals and animal products 

and allows for the issuance of central risk assessments and warnings. TRACES provides 

a platform for updated information on disease alerts to be instantly available. EC 

measures in place for the control of avian influenza in Council Directive 2005/94/EC 

requires maintaining records of all visits by the official veterinarians in protection zones 

which are specifically supported by Commission Decisions. 

Conclusion: APHIS concludes that the system in place in the Czech Republic, Sweden 

and the EU for recording, managing, and analyzing diagnostic and surveillance data was 

sufficient to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Czech Republic’s and Sweden’s HPAI 

H5NI disease control measures. 

Laboratory confirmation capabilities were effective, and testing procedures were 

documented and standardized. 

The EU has in place comprehensive requirements for the laboratory confirmation 

procedures for HPAI H5NI, put in place in Council Directive 92/40/EEC and updated in 

great detail in Council Directive 2005/94/EC. The National Reference Laboratory in the 

Czech Republic is the National Reference Laboratory for Newcastle Disease and Highly 

Pathogenic Avian Influenza (Statni veterinarni ustav, Praha) in Prague. The National 

Reference Laboratory in Sweden is National Veterinary Institue (Statens 

Veterinärmedicinska Anstalt (SVA)) in Uppsala. The laboratories perform the virological 

diagnostic analyses for AI, including HPAI H5NI in compliance with Council Directive 

2005/94/EC. The EU reference laboratory is the Weybridge laboratory in the United 

Kingdom, which also serves as an OIE reference laboratory for HPAI. 

18 
APHIS Analysis of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in the Czech Republic 

and Sweden 

Conclusion: APHIS concludes that the Czech Republic and Sweden have the laboratory 

capabilities to diagnose avian influenza as part of an effective local, national and EC 

laboratory system with appropriately standardized testing and documentation procedure. 

Emergency control, biosecurity procedures and eradication program: The eradication 

program included the definition of appropriate quarantine and surveillance zones, 

monitoring of those zones, and implementation of movement restrictions. Measures 

taken by officials were able to contain and control the spread of disease from these 

zones due to effective program measures. Procedures for lifting quarantines were 

followed and were sufficient to prevent further spread of disease. 

Commission Decision 2004/402/EC requires all MS to maintain approved contingency 

plans for the control of avian influenza and Newcastle disease. Under Council Directive 

2005/94/EC each Member State is required to develop and maintain a contingency plan 

which is periodically reviewed and updated at least every five years. The plan must 

specify the national measures to be implemented in the event of an outbreak including the 

establishment of a crisis centre at the national level to coordinate all control measures in 

the individual MS. 

Additional components of the contingency plan must include: establishment of local 

disease control centers with adequate staff, facilities and resource to coordinate local 

disease control measures; make available equipment and materials to effectively carry out 

the disease control measures; training programs for field and administrative personnel; 

ensuring that diagnostic laboratories have the necessary testing capacity and sample 

handling to ensure rapid diagnosis; maintain registration of commercial poultry holdings 

with identification of areas with a high density of poultry. The plan must also provide for 

diagnostic laboratory support and cooperation with the OIE and Food and Agriculture 

Organization of the United Nations (FAO) reference laboratories for avian influenza. The 

EC reviews and approves all contingency plans to determine that they are adequate and 

has the authority to suggest any necessary amendments required to ensure that they are 

compatible with those of the other MS. 

Protection and surveillance zones are established around areas where HPAI H5N1 is 

detected in wild birds in compliance with Commission Decision 2006/115/EC. The 

protection zone established due to findings of HPAI H5N1 in wild birds can be lifted no 

earlier than 21 days after the bird was received at the laboratory for analysis. Under EC 

regulation the earliest that protection zones can be lifted is 21 days after completing the 

cleaning and disinfection of the infected flock of domestic poultry. All poultry flocks 

within the zone, including backyard and hobby flocks, must be visited before lifting the 

protection zone. A surveillance zone can be lifted 30 days after the cleaning and 

disinfection of the infected flocks has been completed. 

No further outbreaks in domestic poultry have since been reported in the Czech Republic 

or Sweden, despite extensive surveillance in both the wild and domestic bird populations. 

Conclusion: APHIS concludes that the emergency controls, biosecurity procedures, and 

eradication procedures were adequate to contain and control the spread of disease. The 

Czech Republic and Sweden put in place appropriate quarantine and surveillance zones, 

19 
APHIS Analysis of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in the Czech Republic 

and Sweden 

with monitoring adequate to detect the presence of HPAI H5N1 if it were present. The 

measures taken by veterinary officials before lifting quarantines were sufficient to 

prevent further spread of disease. 

Documented standard operating procedures described procedures for depopulation, 

cleaning, disinfecting, and other applicable measures, such as carcass disposal. All 

relevant personnel were familiar with these standard procedures and followed them 

during the outbreak. These measures were effective in controlling the disease. 

Premises repopulation, if applicable, was carried out according to documented 

procedures, including evidence that the disease did not recur and monitoring after 

repopulation to demonstrate that the disease was eradicated. 

Measures for cleaning and disinfection of the HPAI H5N1 infected holdings are carried 

out under official supervision in compliance with Council Directives 92/40/EC and 

2006/563/EC. Council Directive 2005/94/EC provides a comprehensive set of criteria 

under which repopulation of holdings can occur. Repopulation can not take place for a 

period of 21 days following the date of completion of the final cleaning and disinfection. 

Poultry on the repopulated premises undergo at least one clinical examination by an 

official veterinarian with routine laboratory testing and mandatory testing of all poultry 

that die during the repopulation phase. The owner is required to keep records of 

production data, including morbidity and mortality data, immediately reporting any 

significant change or abnormalities to the competent authority. The newly repopulated 

facility is monitored for compliance with appropriate biosecurity measures. No 

commercial poultry can leave the holding without the authorization of the competent 

authority. 

Conclusion: Standard operating procedures for depopulation, cleaning, disinfecting, 

carcass disposal and repopulation were in place and would have been conducted under 

official supervision during the outbreak. APHIS concludes that these measures were 

effective in controlling the disease. 

RISK FACTORS APPLICABLE TO THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND SWEDEN

The occurrence of the HPAI H5N1 outbreaks the Czech Republic (2007) and Sweden 

(2006), posed a risk to the United States from export of live birds, poultry, parts or 

products of poultry carcasses, and eggs of poultry, game birds or other birds exported to 

the United States. While eradication of disease should mitigate immediate risk from the 

outbreaks that occurred, reintroduction of disease into domestic poultry remains a 

concern when HPAI H5N1 is present in wild or migratory bird populations. However, the 

response to these HPAI H5N1 outbreaks demonstrates that veterinary authorities in the 

Czech Republic and Sweden have adequate control measures in place to rapidly identify, 

control and eradicate the disease should it be reintroduced into the Czech Republic or 

Sweden in either wild birds or domestic poultry. 

APHIS cites the following factors as relevant to the situation in the Czech Republic and 

Sweden: 

20 
APHIS Analysis of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in the Czech Republic 

and Sweden 

• The presence of HPAI H5N1 in wild birds represents a high risk for the 

reoccurrence of the disease in domestic poultry. Ongoing surveillance programs 

n the EU for wild birds are in place to detect the present of the disease should it 

reoccur. The veterinary authorities in the Czech Republic and Sweden recognized 

wild birds as the major pathway of introduction of HPAI and had in place an 

adequate and appropriate surveillance system for the detection of the presence of 

HPAI in wild birds. 

• The veterinary authorities in the Czech Republic and Sweden were able to 

effectively control and eradicate the HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in domestic poultry 

as a result of an effective eradication program and prompt actions taken with the 

cooperation of backyard and commercial flock owners. . 

• From the time the presence of HPAI H5N1 was first confirmed in wild birds, the 

Czech Republic and Sweden authorities have conducted an extensive 

surveillance program in wild birds and domestic poultry. No other flocks of 

poultry were found to be infected with HPAI H5N1 and no restriction zones have 

been put in place for the presence of HPAI H5N1 since the last zones were lifted 

in the Czech Republic in 2007 and Sweden in 2006. 

With the successful eradication of HPAI H5N1 following the HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in 

Sweden and the Czech Republic, and the subsequent measures implemented in response 

to those outbreaks, APHIS could identify no additional risk factors currently applicable to 

the Czech Republic and Sweden that would justify not removing the regions in the Czech 

Republic and Sweden from the APHIS of Countries/Regions Affected with Highly 

Pathogenic Avian Influenza subtype H5N1. 

RISK ESTIMATION AND CONCLUSION 

With the successful eradication of HPAI H5N1 following the HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in 

Sweden and the Czech Republic, and the subsequent measures implemented in response 

to those outbreaks, APHIS could identify no additional risk factors currently applicable to 

the Czech Republic and Sweden that would justify not removing the regions in the Czech 

Republic and Sweden from the APHIS of Countries/Regions Affected with Highly 

Pathogenic Avian Influenza subtype H5N1. For the Czech Republic the specific regions 

(kraj) are Kralovehradecky and Pardubicky, and for Sweden the specified region is the 

Län (County) of Kalmar. 

The Czech Republic and Sweden were able to rapidly identify, control and successfully 

eradicate HPAI H5N1 following the outbreaks in domestic poultry. The Czech Republic 

and Sweden have in place adequate surveillance measures to indicate that the disease has 

not reoccurred in either wild or domestic bird population. In addition, APHIS considers 

that if there is a reintroduction, the Czech Republic and Sweden would be able to rapidly 

identify, control and eradicate the disease. 

APHIS concludes that there exists a likelihood of reintroduction of HPAI H5N1 into the 

Czech Republic’s or Sweden’s poultry population when HPAI H5N1 is present in the 

wild or migratory bird populations. However, in consideration of the quick and decisive 

action undertaken by the veterinary authorities of the Czech Republic and Sweden 

21 
APHIS Analysis of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in the Czech Republic 

and Sweden 

following the identification of HPAI H5N1 in wild birds in the Czech Republic and 

Sweden and its neighboring countries, the measures implemented, and the high level of 

awareness and cooperation from poultry keepers in the Czech Republic and Sweden, 

APHIS concludes that, if reintroduced, spread of HPAI in the Czech Republic or Sweden 

would be limited. 

APHIS considers the risk of introducing HPAI H5N1 into the United States from the 

import of live birds, poultry carcasses, parts or products of poultry carcasses, and eggs 

(other than hatching eggs) of poultry, game birds or other birds from the Czech Republic 

and Sweden to be low. 

REFERENCES

1. ADNS (2009). Animal Disease Notification System of the European Commission 

Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/diseases/adns/index_en.htm or 

http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/diseases/adns/adns_en.htm 

2. APHIS (2009) APHIS’ Evaluation of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian 

Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in Saxony, Germany. February 2009 Notice of 

Availability, published June 12, 2009; 74FR 28008, 

3. APHIS (2009) Evaluation of the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 Status 

of Suffolk and Norfolk Counties, England. January 2009. Notice of Availability 

published May 7, 2009; 74 FR 21312. 

4. APHIS (2008) APHIS’ Evaluation of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian 

Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in Germany. October 2008. Notice of Availability 

published January 2, 2009; 74 FR 69. Notice of Determination published June 5, 

2009; 74 FR 274. 

5. APHIS (2008) APHIS’ Evaluation of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian 

Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in Hungary. November 2008. Notice of 

Availability published June 15, 2009; 74 FR 28217. 

6. APHIS (2009) APHIS’ Evaluation of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian 

Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in Poland. October 2008. Notice of Availability 

published January 2, 2009; 74 FR 69. Notice of Determination published June 5, 

2009: 74 FR 274. 

7. APHIS (2007) APHIS Analysis of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian 

Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in Denmark. December 2007. Notice of 

Determination published July 21, 2008; 73FR 42313. Preceded by Notice of 

Availability published March 27, 2008; 73 FR 16245. 

22 
APHIS Analysis of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in the Czech Republic 

and Sweden 

8. APHIS (2007) APHIS Analysis of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian 

Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in France. December 2007. Notice of 

Determination published July 21, 2008; 73FR 42313. Preceded by Notice of 

Availability published March 27, 2008; 73 FR 16245. 

9. APHIS (2007) Importation of Live Swine, Swine Semen, Pork and Pork Products 

from the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Final Rule. Published 

November 28, 2007: 72 FR 67227. 

10. APHIS (2006) Add Kazakhstan, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine to List of 

Regions in Which Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Subtype H5N1 Is 

Considered To Exist. Interim rule and request for comments published February 

13, 2006: 71 FR 7401; affirmed on May 18, 2006 in 71 FR 28763. 

11. APHIS (2006) APHIS Evaluation of the Status of the Czech Republic Regarding 

Classical Swine Fever and Swine Vesicular Disease. April 2006. 

12. APHIS (2005). APHIS Considerations on the Identification of Administrative 

Units for (AU) Certain Member States of the European Union. June 2005 

13. APHIS (2004). APHIS risk considerations on the importation of classical swine 

fever (CSF) virus in breeding swine, swine semen, and fresh pork from a 

European Union region of fifteen Member States. September 2004. 

14. APHIS (2003). Recognition of Animal Disease Status of Regions in the European 

Union; Final Rule. Published April 7, 2003: 68 FR 16922 

15. European Commission (2009) Avian Influenza Chronology Situation as of 18 

May 2009 and List of Decisions Adopted by the European Commission 2008. DG 

Health and Consumer Protection, Unit D1: Animal Health and Standing 

Committees. 

16. European Commission (2007). Avian Influenza Extensive Chronology and List of 

Decisions Adopted by the European Commission 2007. DG Health and Consumer 

Protection, Unit D1: Animal Health and Standing Committees. 

17. European Commission (2006) Avian Influenza Extensive Chronology and List of 

Decisions Adopted by the European Commission in 2006; Part II - Including 

overview of events in 2004-2005 with Response to Outbreaks in Member States 

and third countries. DG Health and Consumer Protection, Unit D1: Animal Health 

and Standing Committees. 

18. FVO Report (2008). DG/SANCO/7705/2008. Country Profile of Sweden on food 

and feed safety, animal health, animal welfare and plant health. Available at: 

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/ir_search_en.cfm. 

23 
APHIS Analysis of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in the Czech Republic 

and Sweden 

19. FVO Report (2006). DG/SANCO/8207/2006. Country Profile of the Czech 

Republic on food and feed safety, animal health, animal welfare and plant health. 

Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/ir_search_en.cfm. 

20. OIE (2009) weekly disease information update archive; available at: 

http://www.oie.int/eng/info/hebdo/a_csum.htm 

21. OIE (2008). Terrestrial Animal Health Code, 14th edition. Paris, World 

Organization for Animal Health. Available at: 

http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/mcode/en_sommaire.htm 

22. SCOFCAH Animal Health and Animal Welfare meeting presentations, available 

at: 

http://ec.europa.eu/food/committees/regulatory/scfcah/animal_health/index_en.ht

m

23. Swedish Board of Agriculture (2009). Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HAPI) 

H5N1 status of Sweden; clarification of freedom regarding avian influenza (AI) in 

Sweden. Correspondence, dated July 13, 2009, from Dr. Leif Denneberg, 

Sweden’s Chief Veterinary Officer To Dr. John Clifford. 

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APHIS Analysis of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in the Czech Republic 

and Sweden 

Appendix A: Summary of selected EU Council Directives and Council Decisions 

applicable to avian influenza control. 

Council Directive Full Title 

Council Directive 

2005/94/EC 

Council Directive 2005/94/EC of 20 December 2005 on 

Community measures for the control of avian influenza and 

repealing Directive 92/40/EEC

Council Directive 

92/40/EEC 

Council Directive 92/40/EEC of 19 May 1992 introducing 

Community measures for the control of avian influenza, as 

amended for the accession of Norway, Austria, Finland and 

Sweden, Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, 

Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia 

Council Directive 

91/496/EEC 

Council Directive 91/496/EEC of 15 July 1991 laying down the 

principles governing the organization of veterinary checks on 

animals entering the Community from third countries and 

amending Directives 89/662/EEC, 90/425/EEC and 90/675/EEC 

Council Directive 

90/539/EEC 

Council Directive of 15 October 1990 on animal health conditions 

governing intra-Community trade in, and imports from third 

countries of, poultry and hatching eggs 

Council Directive 

90/425/EEC 

Council Directive 90/425/EEC of 26 June 1990 concerning 

veterinary and zootechnical checks applicable in intraCommunity trade in certain live animals and products with a view 

to the completion of the internal market 

Council Directive 

82/894/EEC 

Council Directive of 21 December 1982 on the notification of 

animal diseases within the Community. 

Commission 

Decision 

Full Title 

Commission 

Decision 

2007/598/EC 

Commission Decision of 28 August 2007 concerning measures to 

prevent the spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza to other 

captive birds kept in zoos and approved bodies, institutes or 

centres in the Member States 

Commission 

Decision 

2007/556/EC 

Commission Decision of 1 August 2007 amending Decision 

2006/415/EC concerning certain protection measures in relation to 

highly pathogenic avian influenza of the subtype H5N1 in poultry 

in the Community 

Commission 

Decision 

2007/434/EC 

Commission Decision of 21 June 2007 amending Decision 

2006/415/EC concerning certain protection measures in relation to 

highly pathogenic avian influenza of the subtype H5 in poultry in 

the Czech Republic 

Commission 

Decision 

2007/268/EC 

Commission Decision of 13 April 2007 on the implementation of 

surveillance programs for avian influenza in poultry and wild birds 

to be carried out in the Member States and amending Decision 

2004/450/EC 

Commission 

Decision 

2007/24/EC 

Commission Decision 2007/24/EC of 22 December 2006 

approving contingency plans for the control of avian influenza and 

Newcastle disease 

25 
APHIS Analysis of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in the Czech Republic 

and Sweden 

Commission 

Decision 

2006/293/EC 

Commission Decision of 12 April 2006 amending Commission 

Decision 2006/135/EC as regarding the establishment of areas A 

and B in certain Member States due to outbreaks of highly 

pathogenic avian influenza (Germany and Sweden). 

Commission 

Decision 

2006/574/EC 

Commission Decision of 18 August 2006 amending Decision 

2005/734/EC as regards certain additional risk mitigating 

measures against the spread of avian influenza 

Commission 

Decision 

2006/563/EC 

Commission Decision of 11 August 2006 concerning certain 

protection measures in relation to highly pathogenic avian 

influenza of subtype H5N1 in wild birds in the Community and 

repealing Decision 2006/115/EC 

Commission 

Decision 

2006/474/EC 

Commission Decision of 6 July 2006 concerning measures to 

prevent the spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza caused by 

influenza A virus of subtype H5N1 to birds kept in zoos and 

approved bodies, institutes and centres in the Member States and 

repealing Decision 2005/744/EC 

Commission 

Decision 

2006/405/EC 

Commission Decision of 7 June 2006 amending Decisions 

2005/710/EC, 2005/734/EC, 2005/758/EC, 2005/759/EC, 

2005/760/EC, 2006/247/EC and 2006/265/EC as regards certain 

protection measures in relation to highly pathogenic avian 

influenza 

Commission 

Decision 

2006/314/EC 

Commission Decision 2006/314/EC of 16 March 2006 approving 

the Member States' survey programs for avian influenza in poultry 

and wild birds during 2006. 

Commission 

Decision 

2006/293/EC 

Commission Decision of 12 April 2006 amending Commission 

Decision 2006/135/EC as regarding the establishment of areas A 

and B in certain Member States due to outbreaks of highly 

pathogenic avian influenza 

Commission 

Decision 

2006/135/EC 

Commission Decision of 22 February 2006 concerning certain 

protection measures in relation to highly pathogenic avian 

influenza in poultry in the Community; repealed by 2006/415/EC 

Commission 

Decision 

2006/115/EC

Commission Decision of 17 February 2006 concerning certain 

protection measures in relation to highly pathogenic avian 

influenza in wild birds in the Community and repealing Decisions 

2006/86/EC, 2006/90/EC, 2006/91/EC, 2006/94/EC, 2006/104/EC 

and 2006/105/EC 

Commission 

Decision 

2006/101/EC 

Commission Decision of 6 February 2006 on the implementation 

of survey programs for avian influenza in poultry and wild birds to 

be carried out in the Member States in 2006. 

Commission 

Decision 

2005/855/EC; 

Commission Decision of 30 November 2005 amending Decision 

2005/734/EC laying down biosecurity measures to reduce the risk 

of transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza caused by 

Influenza virus A subtype H5N1 from birds living in the wild to 

poultry and other captive birds and providing for an early 

detection system in areas at particular risk. 

26 
APHIS Analysis of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in the Czech Republic 

and Sweden 

Commission 

Decision 

2005/745/EC 

Commission Decision of 21 October 2005 amending Decision 

2005/734/EC laying down biosecurity measures to reduce the risk 

of transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza caused by 

influenza A virus of subtype H5N1 from birds living in the wild to 

poultry and other captive birds and providing for an early 

detection system in areas at particular risk 

Commission 

Decision 

2005/734/EC 

Commission Decision 2005/734/EC of 19 October 2005 

laying down biosecurity measures to reduce the risk of 

transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza caused 

by influenza virus A subtype H5N1 from birds living in 

the wild to poultry and other captive birds and providing 

for an early detection system in areas at particular risk (valid until 

December 31, 2009). 

Commission 

Decision 

2005/732/EC 

Commission Decision 2005/732/EC of 17 October 2005 approving 

the programs for the implementation of Member States' surveys 

for avian influenza in poultry and wild birds during 2005 and 

laying down reporting and eligibility rules for the Community 

financial contribution to the implementation costs of those 

programs. 

Commission 

Decision 

2005/731/EC 

Commission Decision 2005/731/EC of 17 October 2005 laying 

down additional requirements for the surveillance of avian 

influenza in wild birds 

Commission 

Decision 

2005/464/EC 

Commission Decision 2005/464/EC of 21 June 2005 on the 

implementation of survey programs for avian influenza in poultry 

and wild birds to be carried out in the Member States 

Commission 

Decision of 

2004/630/EC 

Commission Decision of 2004/630/EC of 27 July 2004 approving 

the programs for the implementation of Member States' surveys 

for avian influenza in poultry and wild birds during 2004 and 

laying down reporting and eligibility rules for the financial 

contribution from the Community to the implementation costs of 

those programs. [amended by 2004/679/EC on 5 October 2004] 

Commissions 

Decision 

2004/450/EC 

Commissions Decision of 29 April 2004 laying down standard 

requirements for the content of applications for Community 

financing for programs for the eradication, monitoring and control 

of animal disease 

Commission 

Decision 

2004/402/EC 

Commission Decision of 26 April 2004 approving contingency 

plans for the control of avian influenza and Newcastle disease.

Commission 

Decision 

2004/111/EC 

Commission Decision 2004/111/EC of 29 January 2004 on the 

implementation of surveys for avian influenza in poultry and wild 

birds in Member States, to be carried out during 2004. 

Commission 

Decision 

2003/623/EC 

Commission Decision 2003/623/EC of 19 August 2003 

concerning the development of an integrated computerized 

veterinary system known as Traces. 

27 
APHIS Analysis of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in the Czech Republic 

and Sweden 

28 

Commission 

Decision 

2002/673/EC 

Decision 2002/673/EC of 22 August 2002 approving the programs 

for the implementation of Member States' surveys for avian 

influenza in poultry and wild birds. 

Commission 

Decision 

2002/649/EC

Commission Decision 2002/649/EC of 5 August 2002 on the 

implementation of surveys for avian influenza in poultry and wild 

birds in the Member States.