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S. HRG. 112–368 

IMPROVING GOVERNANCE IN THE 

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

DECEMBER 15, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

WILLIAM C. DANVERS, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

——————

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware, Chairman

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Carson, Hon. Johnnie, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, U.S. 

Department of State, Washington, DC ............................................................... 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Barbara 

Boxer .............................................................................................................. 44 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Richard 

J. Durbin ........................................................................................................ 45 

Coons, Hon. Christopher A., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement . 1 

Dizolele, Mvemba Phezo, fellow, Hoover Institution, Washington, DC .............. 30 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 32 

Gambino, Anthony W., fellow, Eastern Congo Initiative, Bethesda, MD ........... 24 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 26 

Isakson, Hon. Johnny, U.S. Senator from Georgia, opening statement .............. 3 

Schneider, Mark, senior vice president, International Crisis Group, Washington, DC ............................................................................................................. 16 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 19 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

ECI Paper ‘‘Technical Issues Threaten Free, Fair, and Transparent Elections 

in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Urgent Steps Required’’ submitted 

for the record by Anthony W. Gambino ............................................................. 47 

(III)

(1) 

IMPROVING GOVERNANCE IN THE 

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 15, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:25 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher A. 

Coons (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Coons and Isakson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE 

Senator COONS. I am pleased to call to order today’s hearing of 

the African Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee, and I am honored to, once again, serve with my friend 

and colleague, Senator Isakson. I would like to welcome the other 

members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who will be 

joining us later and thank our distinguished witnesses: On the first 

panel, Ambassador Johnnie Carson, the Assistant Secretary of 

State for African Affairs; and on the second panel, Mark Schneider, 

Senior Vice President of the International Crisis Group; Mvemba 

Dizolele, fellow at the Hoover Institution; and Anthony Gambino, 

a fellow at the Eastern Congo Initiative. 

Today’s hearing on the elections and governance of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is both timely and important. Last 

month’s elections have been marred by reports of widespread irregularities that are symptomatic of greater challenges of governance. 

Today we will consider steps that can and should be taken to improve governance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We will 

look at U.S. policy toward this country that has been tragically 

plagued by decades of conflict, poverty, and insecurity. 

The recent Presidential and legislative elections in the Congo 

have become the subject of intense international scrutiny. Election 

observers from the European Union and the Carter Center have 

both recently concluded that the results are lacking credibility. 

Reports have detailed mismanagement of the tabulation process, 

restricted access for international observers, missing ballots, and 

voter turnout in some districts allegedly greater than 100 percent. 

This was clearly not a well-run election, and I insist that Congolese 

authorities must now engage in a thorough and transparent review 

of the results to address important unanswered questions. 

2 

Now that the Congolese Independent National Election Commission, known as CENI, has released data from all polling stations, 

there should be a thorough review of the results taking into 

account reports of irregularities from the many observer missions. 

As the U.S. State Department said last night, the United States 

stands ready to provide technical assistance for such a review that 

will shed light on whether these irregularities were caused by a 

lack of organization or by outright fraud. 

New questions surrounding the election are emerging each day 

this week, and I have received a steady flow of both information 

and phone calls from concerned Congolese Americans reporting 

fraud and concerns about post-election violence. Today I call on 

both President Kabila and Mr. Tshisekedi to urge their supporters 

to resolve their disagreements peacefully and avoid an escalation 

of violence. The unresolved issues surrounding this election cannot 

be answered through violence in the streets. Instead, all sides 

should engage in dialogue about the best next steps and consider 

establishing a formal mediation process with the active support of 

the United States and the international community. 

It has been the hope of many in the DRC and around the world 

that these elections would help move the Congo further toward 

peace and stability after a terrible civil war that left, by some estimates, 5 million people dead between 1998 and 2003. The United 

States and many in the international community have invested significant resources and diplomatic capital into improving governance 

and human rights in the DRC, including more than $13 million to 

support free and fair elections in this election cycle alone. 

A stable and democratic Congo is in America’s interest because 

of its critical role in the region, its large population, and its vast 

natural resources, but also because it is in our interest to promote 

fundamental values, human rights, transparency, freedom of expression, and rule of law. These values we hold dear have been 

sadly routinely trampled on in the DRC where in some instances 

gender violence and rape has been used as a weapon of war to punish and silence civilians, especially women and children. 

As I said earlier, the problems with this election are indicative 

of far greater problems facing the DRC, rooted in a lack of strong, 

democratic, and transparent governance which we hope, in partnership, to move the Congo toward over time. Without government 

control over its territory and security forces, armed soldiers and 

militia members will continue to prey on Congolese civilians. Weak 

institutions prevent the DRC from upholding human rights and the 

rule of law and successfully addressing complex issues surrounding 

conflict minerals and sexual violence. The recent elections presented a great opportunity to further strengthen the foundation of 

a more effective and credible government, and I am concerned that 

this goal has not been achieved. 

I look forward to hearing from our experienced and talented witnesses about what concrete actions the United States can and 

should take to help resolve the pressing and difficult questions both 

about the conduct of the recent elections in order to improve governance, but also how best to mitigate post-election violence and 

strengthen the rule of law and human rights in the Congo. We 

3 

stand with the Congolese people in their attempt to advance 

democracy and hope it can be achieved peacefully. 

I would now like to turn to Senator Isakson for his opening statement. 

Senator. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, thank you, Chairman Coons. 

First of all, I want to recognize my friend, Johnnie Carson, the 

Under Secretary of State. He and I are the only two guys over 50 

named ‘‘Johnnie’’ in Washington, DC, and I am proud to be one of 

the two. [Laughter.] 

I also want to thank Chairman Coons for calling this hearing. I 

was thinking, as I heard his opening statement, he and I traveled 

to Nigeria earlier this year where they had just completed their 

first really successful democratic election with the election of 

Goodluck Jonathan. And we later went to Ghana where President 

Mills has a great country, a great, free, open, transparent democracy, and the benefits that are coming to them. 

So we think this is a particularly important time to focus on the 

elections in the DRC, some of the alleged difficulties with those 

elections, and hopefully find ways we can lead the DRC to have 

more transparent, secure elections in the future and be a role 

model democracy in that part of Africa. As Chairman Coons has 

said, it is a critical country and a critical continent to the United 

States of America, and we appreciate our relationship and friendship with the DRC. And we understand the problems with the 

Lords Resistance Army, with lots of other things, but we also know 

there is a long way we can go in terms of democracy, ending gender-based violence, and having a more civil society. 

So I commend you today on calling this year. I look forward to 

hearing from my buddy, Johnnie Carson, and our other witnesses 

who are here today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator. 

I join you in welcoming Ambassador Carson, a real leader in 

United States-Africa policy and someone to whom we both look for 

a close and effective partnership between this committee and the 

committee and the United States Department of State. So I will 

now turn it to Ambassador Johnnie Carson for your opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador CARSON. Thank you very much. Good afternoon, 

Chairman Coons, and also good afternoon, Ranking Member 

Isakson. It is an honor and a pleasure to appear before this committee this afternoon to testify before you about United States 

policy toward the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

The DRC is the largest country in sub-Saharan Africa with a 

population of over 71 million people. It is bordered by nine other 

countries and is connected regionally and geographically with east 

4 

Africa, southern Africa, and central Africa. It is also a country with 

enormous natural resources, valuable minerals, and abundant 

water sources. But despite its great potential, the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo is one of the poorest countries in Africa. The 

DRC’s turbulent pre- and post-independence history has never 

allowed it to live up to its economic promise. Nor has it been able 

to achieve the peace and stability its people desperately need and 

seek. 

The Congo’s problems are centered around a lack of functioning 

state authority throughout much of the country. The state is unable to provide basic services such as health care, education, and 

an infrastructure. The bureaucracy is weak and sometimes dysfunctional and lacking in power. The security forces are frequently 

undisciplined and certainly ill-equipped and poorly trained and 

irregularly paid. Corruption is widespread and the problems go on 

from there. 

The United States, nevertheless, is the DRC’s largest donor, hav- ing committed over $900 million this past year bilaterally and 

through multilateral organizations for peacekeeping, humanitarian 

and development assistance projects. We have supported the DRC’s 

efforts to emerge from conflict and realize a just and lasting peace 

that is based on democratic principles, the rule of law, and respect 

for human rights. The top priorities for the United States and the 

DRC are promoting credible elections, strengthening capacity to 

govern and protect, improving economic governance, and reducing 

violence and conflict in the eastern DRC. My statement will focus 

this afternoon on our immediate concern in the DRC, the stability 

of the country after the current elections. 

On November 28, the DRC held its second democratic election 

since the end of the Mobutu era. Eleven candidates vied for the 

Presidency and almost 19,000 candidates competed for 500 seats in 

Parliament. The independent electoral commission, known frequently as CENI, announced the provisional results on December 

9, declaring the incumbent, President Joseph Kabila, the winner 

with approximately 49 percent of the vote. Second place went to 

the leading opposition candidate, Etienne Tshisekedi, with 32 percent of the vote, and a distant third the CENI’s provisional results 

accorded Vital Kamerhe with 7.5 percent of the vote. 

Both national and international observer missions, including the 

U.S.-funded Carter Center observer mission, identified flaws with 

the vote tabulation process, as well as other problems that occurred 

ahead of the actual vote. 

On December 10, the Carter Center released a public statement 

on its assessment that the CENI’s provisional results ‘‘lack credibility’’ noting ‘‘the vote tabulation process has varied across the 

country ranging from the proper application of procedure to serious 

irregularities.’’ 

The statement goes on to say, however, that, ‘‘this assessment 

does not propose the final order of candidates necessarily different 

than announced by the CENI, only that the results process is not 

credible.’’ 

We share these deep concerns expressed in the Carter Center’s 

assessment over the execution of the election and the vote tallying 

process. It is clear that the elections were deficient. The CENI did 

5 

not meet internationally accepted standards in the vote counting 

process. 

We have been watching the electoral process for months. I have 

met with and spoken with all of the major candidates on numerous 

occasions. Last week I spoke with Mr. Tshisekedi and also with the 

CENI chair, Pastor Mulunda. The State Department has found the 

management and technical aspect of these elections to be seriously 

flawed, the vote tabulation to be lacking in transparency, and not 

on a par with positive gains in the democratic process that we have 

seen in other recent African elections. 

However, it is important to note that we do not know and it 

might not be possible to determine with any certainty whether the 

final order of candidates would have been different from the provisional results had the management of the process been better. Further assessments by election experts could determine whether the 

numerous shortcomings identified were due to incompetence, mismanagement, willful manipulation, or a combination of all three. 

President Kabila has publicly acknowledged that there were 

‘‘mistakes’’ in the process, but has reportedly rejected any assessment that the results were not creditable. An opposition candidate 

has formally filed a petition with the DRC Supreme Court which 

is presently reviewing the results and has until December 19 to 

issue its ruling. 

We continue to advocate that all Congolese political leaders and 

their supporters act responsibly, renounce violence, and resolve any 

disagreements through peaceful, constructive dialogue, and existing 

legal remedies. We believe that a rapid technical review of the electoral process by the Congolese authorities may determine ways to 

provide more creditable results, shed light on whether irregularities caused by lack of organization or fraud or whether they will 

provide guidance for future elections. The United States stands 

ready to provide technical assistance for such a review. 

It is important that the relevant Congolese authorities complete 

the remaining steps in the electoral process with maximum openness and transparency. We are urging them to put forward greater 

efforts for improved tabulation throughout the rest of the Congolese election cycle. This is especially important as the tabulation 

process is ongoing for 500 national assembly seats where, unlike 

the Presidential election, a small number of votes could determine 

the winner. 

We are also engaging with other governments at the highest levels, particularly in the region, asking them to reach out to President Kabila and Etienne Tshisekedi and other relevant actors to 

embrace a peaceful solution to this potential impasse. We have 

called on all Congolese political leaders to renounce violence and 

resolve any disagreements through peaceful dialogue and existing 

legal mechanisms. 

Although there are major challenges with these elections, I want 

to note a few accomplishments. Unlike in 2006, the Government of 

the DRC was principally responsible for the organization and for 

much of the financing of these elections. This was an important 

first step. The CENI was able to register over 32 million Congolese 

voters, and over 18 million voters endured admittedly difficult conditions to cast their votes. The voter turnout and enthusiasm for 

6 

these elections broadly reflected the determination of the Congolese 

people to have their voices heard through the democratic process. 

The United States played an active role in assisting in the electoral process. We committed approximately $15 million from multiyear bilateral funding in election assistance through USAID. The 

funding supported the Carter Center’s 4 million dollars’ worth of 

projects, and we also supported the International Foundation for 

Electoral Systems, known as IFES, with an additional $11 million. 

This funding was used for civic and voter education, for national 

election observer training, and capacity-building of human rights 

organizations. In addition, we deployed mission observer teams in 

each of the 10 provinces and Kinshasa, enabling wide coverage and 

observation of the elections. 

On the public diplomacy side, VOA and Embassy Kinshasa conducted a program to strengthen democratic and social institutions. 

Our involvement and observation of the elections was indeed 

extensive. 

Moving beyond the recent elections, I would like just to take a 

few minutes to state that the United States strongly supports the 

United Nations stabilization mission in the Democratic Republic of 

the Congo and its efforts to help the Congolese Government bring 

peace and stability to the DRC. Although MONUSCO cannot be in 

the Congo forever, any decision on the mission’s drawdown or eventual withdrawal must be condition-based to avoid triggering a 

relapse into broader insecurity. We recognize that sustainable 

peace and stability in eastern Congo will require professional and 

accountable Congolese security forces and a strong and independent judicial system, and we are working with other nations to 

promote these. 

The United States also wants to help the Government of the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo to counter the threat of rebel 

armed groups and to help the DRC establish sustainable security, 

something that has eluded the country for decades. We continue 

to work closely with the people and Government of the DRC on 

countering the LRA and enhancing the protection of its civilian 

population. 

We are also concerned about the illicit trade in the DRC’s natural resources. Unregulated exploitation and illicit trade in minerals have exacerbated the climate of insecurity in the eastern 

DRC as armed groups have used profits from such trade to fund 

their illegal activities. We currently have approximately $11 million in funds specifically aimed at increasing the transparency and 

regulation of the illegal trade in key minerals in the eastern DRC. 

The United States also has other major objectives in the Congo. 

We want to help to strengthen good governance, promote economic 

development, improve human rights, support judicial reform, and 

end the cycle of impunity. We recognize that there are great challenges across the DRC. However, the DRC and the United States 

have a solid and positive relationship, and our governments continue to engage at the highest level on a number of issues. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Carson follows:] 

7 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNNIE CARSON

Good afternoon, Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, honorable members 

of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you on the United 

States policy toward the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the DRC. 

The DRC is the largest country in sub-Saharan Africa. With a population of over 

71 million, it lies at the core of Central Africa and is bordered by nine other countries. It is also a country of enormous economic potential, with vast natural resources and large mineral deposits. This economic wealth has contributed to the 

DRC’s turbulent history and the current complex political situation. This is the site 

of what has been dubbed Africa’s World War—a series of conflicts that devastated 

the country for some 7 years and led to continued violence in the eastern provinces 

even after a peace agreement concluded in 2003. Rebuilding the DRC, establishing 

security, and helping its people to improve governance are some of our highest priorities on the continent. It is critical for us to stay engaged in the DRC, because 

the DRC’s trajectory is pivotal to security and stability in the region. 

The United States is the DRC’s largest donor, having committed over $900 million 

this past fiscal year bilaterally and through multilateral organizations for peacekeeping, humanitarian and development assistance. We have supported the DRC’s 

efforts to emerge from conflict and realize a just and lasting peace that is based on 

democratic principles, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. The top priorities for the United States in the DRC are promoting credible elections, strengthening capacity to govern and protect, improving economic governance and reducing 

violence and conflict in the eastern DRC. My statement will focus on our immediate 

concern in the DRC—the stability of the country and the current election cycle. 

ELECTIONS

On November 28, the DRC held its second democratic election since the end of 

the Mobutu era. Eleven candidates vied for the Presidency, and almost 19,000 candidates competed for 500 seats in Parliament. The Independent National Electoral 

Commission (known by its French acronym—CENI) announced the provisional election results on December 9 declaring the incumbent, President Joseph Kabila, the 

winner with approximately 49 percent of the vote. Second place went to leading opposition candidate, Etienne Tshisekedi, with 32 percent of the vote. In a distant 

third place, per the CENI’s provisional results, was Vital Kamerhe with 7.7 percent 

of the vote. Both national and international observer missions (including the U.S.- 

funded Carter Center observer mission) identified flaws with the vote tabulation 

process as well as other problems that occurred ahead of the actual vote. Mr. 

Tshisekedi responded to the announced results by calling them a ‘‘provocation of the 

Congolese people’’ and declaring himself President. He has also called on the international community to help address the problems in the electoral process. 

On December 10, the Carter Center released a public statement on its assessment 

that the CENI’s provisional results ‘‘lack credibility,’’ noting that ‘‘the vote tabulation process has varied across the country, ranging from the proper application of 

procedure to serious irregularities.’’ The statement goes on to say, however, that 

‘‘this assessment does not propose the final order of candidates is necessarily different than announced by the CENI, only that the results process is not credible.’’ 

Other observer groups, including the EU, have since issued similar assessments. 

We share the deep concerns expressed in the assessments of the Carter Center 

and others over the execution of the election and the vote tallying process. It is clear 

that the elections were deficient in many ways. The CENI did not meet internationally accepted standards in the vote counting process. The U.S. Government along 

with some of our international partners has found the management and technical 

aspect of these elections to be seriously flawed, the vote tabulation to be lacking in 

transparency, and not on par with positive gains in the democratic process that we 

have seen in other recent African elections. However, it is important to note that 

we do not know—and it might not be possible to determine with any certainty 

whether the final order of candidates would have been different from the provisional 

results had the management of the process been better. Further assessments by 

elections experts could determine whether the numerous shortcomings identified 

were due to incompetence, mismanagement, willful manipulation, or a combination 

of all three. 

President Kabila has publicly acknowledged that there were ‘‘mistakes’’ in the 

process but has reportedly rejected any assessment that the results were not credible. An opposition candidate has formally filed a petition with the DRC Supreme 

Court which is presently reviewing the results and has until December 19 to issue 

its ruling, which is just one day before the inauguration planned for December 20. 

8 

We have been watching the electoral process for months. I have met and spoken 

with all of the major candidates numerous times. Last week, I spoke with Mr. 

Tshisekedi and CENI Chair Pastor Mulunda. We continue to advocate that all Congolese political leaders and their supporters act responsibly, renounce violence, and 

resolve any disagreements through peaceful constructive dialogue and existing legal 

remedies. We believe that a rapid technical review of the electoral process by the 

Congolese authorities may shed light on the cause of the irregularities, suggest 

ways in which governance could be structured to give better effect to the will of the 

Congolese people, and provide guidance for future elections. The United States 

stands ready to provide technical assistance for such a review and will encourage 

other countries to contribute as well. 

It is important that the relevant Congolese authorities complete the remaining 

steps in the electoral process with maximum openness and transparency. We are 

urging them to put forward greater efforts for an improved tabulation process 

throughout the rest of the Congolese election cycle. This is especially important as 

the tabulation process is ongoing for 500 National Assembly seats where, unlike 

with the Presidential election, a small number of votes could determine the winners. 

We are also engaging with other governments at the highest levels, particularly 

in the region, asking them to reach out to President Kabila and Etienne Tshisekedi 

and other relevant actors to embrace a peaceful solution to this potential impasse. 

We have called on all Congolese political leaders to renounce violence and resolve 

any disagreements through peaceful dialogue and existing legal mechanisms. 

Although there are major challenges with these elections, I want to emphasize 

that these elections demonstrated important and positive attributes of a democracy—the election was competitive, and the voters who turned out in large numbers 

were committed to selecting their government through peaceful, democratic means. 

Unlike in 2006, the Government of the DRC was principally responsible for the organization and, conduct for much of the financing of these elections. This was an 

important step forward. The CENI was able to register over 32 million Congolese 

voters, and over 18 million voters endured admittedly difficult conditions to cast 

their votes. 

The United States played an active role in assisting in the elections process. We 

committed approximately $15 million from multiyear bilateral and multilateral 

funding in election assistance through USAID. The funding supported The Carter 

Center ($4 million) and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) 

($11 million) projects on civic and voter education, national election observer training, and capacity-building of human rights organizations. In addition, we deployed 

mission observer teams in each of the 10 provinces and Kinshasa enabling wide coverage and observance of the elections. 

On the Public Diplomacy side, VOA and Embassy Kinshasa conducted a program 

to strengthen democratic and social institutions. VOA spear-headed a ‘‘citizen journalist’’ training of key opinionmakers (nonjournalists) in local communities to report 

on important domestic issues, including elections. By using inexpensive mobile 

phones, the citizen journalists posted texts, videos, photographs and audio directly 

to the ‘‘100 Journalistes’’ Facebook page. 

CONTINUING INSECURITY

Both in the context of the elections, and more broadly across many of our key 

objectives, the United States strongly supports the United Nations Stabilization 

Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and its efforts to help 

the Congolese Government bring peace and stability to the DRC. The mission is essential to the international community’s efforts to promote the protection of civilians, which remains its number-one objective, as outlined in U.N. Security Council 

Resolution 1991 (2011). It has undertaken new initiatives in the last few years— 

including the deployment of Joint Protection Teams, Community Liaison Assistants, 

and Community Alert Networks—that have made it more responsive to the vast 

needs of the eastern provinces. We continue to believe MONUSCO must remain in 

the DRC until the government can effectively take over protecting civilians and 

legitimately take over the security function. Any decision on the mission’s drawdown 

or eventual withdrawal must be conditions-based to avoid triggering a relapse into 

broader insecurity. 

At the same time, MONUSCO cannot be in the Congo forever. Sustainable peace 

and stability in eastern Congo will require professional and accountable Congolese 

security forces and a strong and independent judicial system. The Congolese Armed 

forces (FARDC) is faced with numerous challenges partly due to integrated former 

armed groups who continue to maintain parallel command structures. The FARDC 

remains a force that is continuously trying to integrate former rebels into a force 

9 

structure that is itself oversized, unprofessional, and lacking training on almost all 

levels. The DRC Government has no real command and control over many of these 

forces, particularly the ex-CNDP forces that remain under the command of the ICCindicted Jean Bosco Ntaganda, whose forces continue to commit human rights 

abuses and engage in illegal minerals trafficking and whose arrest we continue to 

call for. In many cases, the Government of the DRC is unable to properly provide 

its forces with the necessary logistical support. Helping the DRC develop professional forces that are able and disciplined enough to protect civilians is essential to 

ending sexual and gender-based violence and other serious human rights abuses. 

U.S. Government assistance attempts to address some of these underlying problems by providing military and police professionalization training with an emphasis 

on rule of law, respect for human rights and developing leadership skills that set 

a high moral bar for subordinates to emulate. For FY 2011, the State Department 

funded approximately $30 million in bilateral security assistance to support peace 

and security in the DRC. One critical component of this support is our training and 

assistance to the Congolese military justice sector. Effective and independent military judges and prosecutors helped prosecute and convict the officers accused of 

responsibility for the January 1 mass rapes in the town of Fizi. We continue to urge 

the DRC Government to take vigorous and effective actions in investigating and 

prosecuting security force officials accused of rape or other crimes. 

Helping the governments of the region, including the DRC Government, to 

counter the threat of rebel armed groups is another key element of our approach 

to help the DRC establish sustainable security. As this committee knows, countering 

the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) continues to be a particular priority for us. The 

LRA’s continued atrocities are an affront to human dignity and a threat to regional 

stability. In line with the legislation passed by Congress last year, we are pursuing 

a comprehensive, multiyear strategy to help our partners in the region to better 

mitigate and ultimately the threat posed by the LRA. 

As part of developing that strategy, we reviewed how we could improve our support to national militaries in the region to increase the likelihood of apprehending 

or eliminating the LRA’s leaders. In October, President Obama reported to Congress 

that he had authorized a small number of U.S. forces to deploy to the LRA-affected 

region, in consultation with the region’s national governments, to act as advisors to 

the militaries that are pursuing the LRA. Starting this month, advisor teams are 

beginning to deploy forward to certain LRA-affected areas, subject to the consent of 

the host governments. Let me also stress that although these advisors are equipped 

to defend themselves if the need arises, the U.S. forces in this operation are there 

to play only an advising role to the militaries pursuing the LRA. 

We continue to work closely with the people and government of the DRC on countering the LRA and enhancing the protection of civilians. With our encouragement, 

earlier this year, the Government of DRC deployed a U.S.-trained and -equipped 

battalion to participate in counter-LRA efforts in the LRA’s areas of operations in 

the DRC. We continue to work with this battalion. We are also working to help 

MONUSCO augment its protection efforts in LRA-affected areas. At MONUSCO’s 

request, the United States has embedded two U.S. military personnel into 

MONUSCO’s Joint Intelligence and Operations Center in Dungu. These personnel 

are working with MONUSCO, FARDC, and UPDF representatives there to enhance 

information-sharing, analysis, and planning with regard to the LRA threat. Finally, 

we are also funding projects to expand existing early warning networks and to increase telecommunications in the LRA-affected areas of the DRC. In addition to the 

LRA, we are also working with the DRC Government to address other violent armed 

groups that continue to destabilize the country’s eastern region. 

ILLICIT MINERALS TRADE

We are also concerned about the illicit trade in the DRC’s natural resources. 

Unregulated exploitation and illicit trade in minerals have exacerbated the climate 

of insecurity in the eastern DRC as armed groups have used profits from such trade 

to fund their activities. It has also denied the Congolese population opportunities 

for livelihoods in the mineral trade market. Consistent with the provisions of the 

Dodd-Frank Act, the Department has updated its strategy to break the links 

between the illicit minerals trade and abusive soldiers and armed groups. Using a 

variety of tools and programs, our strategy aims to help end the commercial role 

of DRC security forces in the minerals trade; enhance civilian regulation of the DRC 

minerals trade; protect mining communities; promote corporate due diligence; support regional and international efforts to develop credible due diligence mechanisms, 

particularly the certification scheme of the International Conference on the Great 

Lakes Region; and, contribute to establishing secure trade routes for legal mining. 

10 

We currently have approximately $11 million in funds specifically aimed at increasing the transparency and regulation of the illegal trade in key minerals in the 

eastern DRC. 

These efforts, as well as the Public-Private Alliance (PPA) that we recently 

launched with our private and civil society partners, are aimed at supporting the 

creation of pilot conflict-free supply chains. These are intended to demonstrate that 

minerals can be ‘‘cleanly’’ sourced from the DRC and that the legitimate, conflictfree trade in minerals can continue even as companies begin to apply internationally 

agreed principles of due diligence. The PPA has already received commitment from 

more than 20 companies, trade associations, and NGOs prepared to contribute their 

funds or expertise to these efforts. More notably, the Secretariat of the International 

Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), a group comprised of representatives of each of the Great Lakes countries, is a participant demonstrating that the 

initiative has regional buy-in to support the intended pilot supply chain efforts. 

We recognize that there are great challenges in the DRC. However, the DRC and 

the United States have a solid and positive relationship, and our governments continue to engage at the highest levels on all of these issues. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Assistant Secretary Carson. 

Let me begin, if I might, what will be a 7-minute first round. 

Please, if you would, describe the technical assistance that the 

United States is prepared to offer the Congolese authorities to 

facilitate their conducting a transparent and thorough review of 

the election process. And what steps can be taken by CENI and by 

other Congolese institutions to improve the credibility of both the 

outcomes and the process and create stronger institutions both as 

the next steps of the tabulation of the national assembly elections 

are moving forward and in advance of future elections? 

Ambassador CARSON. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that excellent 

question. 

First, let me say that we pushed very hard for CENI to release 

all of the numbers that are currently being reviewed, contested, 

and disputed. I spoke with the chairman of the CENI, Pastor 

Mulunda, and encouraged him not just to release the aggregate 

totals, but to release all of the numbers from the 63,478 polling stations across the country, as well as the 169 compilation centers. It 

was our nudging and pushing that resulted in all of these numbers 

coming out. 

We have said to the authorities, in response to your question, 

Mr. Chairman, that we are prepared to help come up with resources to fund a technical assessment of the elections. We are prepared to look for resources, in conjunction with others, to have 

groups such as IFES, the Carter Center, and other respectable and 

internationally acknowledged election organizations go into an indepth audit of exactly what occurred. This would permit an examination of the logistical, the administrative, and the management 

processes that are part of the election, as well as any irregularities 

that would also be discovered in such an audit. 

We think that this is important to do in order to develop an understanding of what went wrong in the loss of ballots and votes by 

individuals, but most importantly, it would provide a foundation on 

which to improve the next set of elections for that country. We all 

know that this is not a one-only process. Our desire is to see better 

elections in the future. The only way that can happen is to be able 

to identify the reasons why this election did not live up to the expectations of the people of the Congo, as well as many in the international community who support democracy. 

11 

So it would be an audit. We would not attempt to do it with our 

own individual resources, but would go out and contract groups 

that are election experts to do this to provide a foundation to find 

out what went wrong and to provide a basis and a roadmap for improvements as we move ahead. 

Senator COONS. Let me ask a next question, if I might, about 

post-election violence. Given how quickly developments may unfold 

in the DRC, both the Supreme Court ruling and the scheduled inauguration, how quickly can the international community, the 

U.N., the AU, SADC, other partners of ours, get engaged with the 

United States, get engaged with the Congolese Government and 

conduct this audit? And what impact might this have on postelection violence, and what do you think the international community and the United States can and should do to minimize the risks 

of widespread violence? 

Ambassador CARSON. Mr. Chairman, we have been sending a 

very loud and clear signal to all of the candidates to not engage in 

violence. We have said repeatedly that violence has no part in the 

electoral process or in democracy. We have encouraged them to resolve any differences that they have had or might have with the 

process through legal means. 

We have reached out to a number of key leaders around the region to ask them to reinforce this message as well. I myself spoke 

this past weekend to the chairman of the African Union and 

encouraged him to convey the same message to officials there. 

I think that with respect to the issue of violence, all violence is 

unacceptable and should not be tolerated, but the reality thus far, 

Mr. Chairman, is that there is significantly less violence following 

this election so far than there was after the second round of the 

2006 election in which President Kabila beat his closest rival, Mr. 

Bemba. Following the elections in 2006, there were armed battles 

in the streets of Kinshasa and in a number of other major towns 

between rival armies of the two contending candidates. That had 

to be eventually put down over several weeks by the Congolese 

military, supported by the U.N. I am not saying that the prospect 

for violence does not exist going forward, but thus far, we have not 

seen anywhere near the level of violence that we saw in 2006. 

We continue to encourage all candidates to act responsibly. We 

have encouraged neighboring state leaders to enforce that message 

as well, and we will continue to do so. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Secretary Carson, when the chairman and I 

were in Nigeria, we had an interesting, if I remember correctly, 

21⁄2-hour meeting with Mr. Yaeger who is the head of the election 

commission that was put together in Nigeria to conduct the election that was so successful. And one of the things that they used, 

which was impressive to both of us, is cell technology to communicate from the polling place to Lagos—Abuja what the count was 

at the polling place, so if it got to Abuja and it was different, they 

had some idea there was some fooling around. And evidently it was 

the key cog in having transparency and accountability in the vote 

process. 

12 

I know we have talked about—you used the term ‘‘improved tabulation process.’’ That was an improved tabulation process in Nigeria. Could we recommend or ask the Nigerian Government if they 

would invite Mr. Yaeger in to consult with them on reforms like 

that that could help to have more transparent and fair elections? 

Ambassador CARSON. Senator Isakson, the answer is ‘‘Yes,’’ and 

I hope that as we go out and try to put together an effort to have 

a technical assessment made, that those who might win the contract to do this would, in fact, invite in people like the Nigerian 

election commissioner. I think he did an extraordinarily good job 

also in very difficult circumstances. 

You are absolutely right about the importance of cell phone communication there where people were able to send their results in 

telephonically so that there was a way to double and triple track 

the numbers that were being received at the central compilation 

centers. 

But something else was also there that was missing from the 

DRC process which I think is useful in many elections across 

Africa, and that is a parallel vote count in which there is a system 

put in place to have a very good, legitimate counting and tabulation that runs parallel to that of the government’s or the electoral 

commission. So that is an important thing. 

One of the other things I might add too is that there were enormous logistical and technical complications with this election, but 

this election also took place in the worst time of the year for the 

DRC, right in the middle of their rainy season, and that also 

helped to add complications on top of very serious additional shortcomings, which have already been mentioned. 

Senator ISAKSON. In your testimony, you talked about a lack of 

functioning authority in a good area of the DRC. And as I understand it, there are places in the DRC that are really under good 

control and have good functioning authority, but there are some 

pockets that are pretty lawless, ungoverned, and hard to reach. 

In the election tabulations, was there any correlation between 

the problems with the election as to those that did not have functioning authority and those that did? 

Ambassador CARSON. I have not been able to make that kind of 

assessment myself, but I do know that it was, in fact, very difficult 

to carry out the elections in the south Kivu area, which is an area 

where armed groups continue to operate quite widely. But I know 

that the problems that were experienced in this election were widespread. They occurred in Kinshasa. They occurred in Katanga. 

They occurred in Equator. So I am not able to say whether they 

were better or worse in places where government authority was or 

was not effective. 

Senator ISAKSON. Were any of the 100 advisors that the President sent to Uganda positioned also in the DRC? 

Ambassador CARSON. At this point, there are only several there 

in the DRC, and they are located up in the far northeastern part 

of the country. 

Senator ISAKSON. And that is part of the effort to go after the 

Lords Resistance Army? 

Ambassador CARSON. It is, indeed. As we have indicated, the 

President authorized a mission of approximately 100 military adviVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:32 May 02, 2012 Jkt 072394 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\2011 ISSUE TEXT HEARINGS\73921.TXT M
13 

sors who will help provide information and better training for the 

forces in the region to effectively track down the remnants of 

Kony’s organization and Kony himself. We hope that over time that 

these advisors will be located in Uganda, in parts of the northeastern corner of the DRC, as well as the CAR, and in South 

Sudan. 

Senator ISAKSON. Based on my mail and based on being a member of the Vietnam generation, there is a lot of concern about loaning those advisors because it is kind of an unknown mission in the 

public. And so I would encourage you and Secretary Clinton, in 

whatever way is appropriate given security, national security, and 

also the security of those personnel, to have a periodic reporting 

back to us over the progress of what they are doing in their stated 

mission and also what their rules of engagement are because, quite 

frankly, most of us between 65 and 70 remember what happened 

in the 1960s with a handful of advisors that actually President 

Eisenhower sent in to Southeast Asia that later became a major deployment. I am not suggesting that is either the intent or possible, 

but I think the transparency that people look for in elections I 

think they are also going to be looking for in terms of this assignment of personnel. And I would appreciate it, to the extent you can 

and it meets our national security and the interest of those advisors, that we be periodically advised of their progress, the rules of 

engagement they operate under, and their mission. 

Ambassador CARSON. Yes, sir. I actually agree and I think there 

is probably no reason, Senator Isakson, that we cannot in fact do 

this. And I will make sure, when I go back to the building, that 

we have no problems with doing so, but I have no problem with 

giving you a periodic update. If I do not do it, I will make sure that 

my colleagues over in the Department of Defense are aware of this 

request and transmit it for them to make sure that it happens. But 

I think that is certainly a suggestion that we can follow through 

on. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you. My suggestion is not just for myself and Senator Coons, but we could be the conduit to ensure that 

the Senate understands that issue because if it were to bubble up, 

a lack of knowledge can be a real threat to the mission. I have not 

talked to the chairman about this, but I would be happy to be a 

part of a conduit to periodically give that report to the Members 

of the Senate. 

Ambassador CARSON. Absolutely. 

Senator COONS. I would like to follow up, if I might, on that 

same line of questioning. During the runup to the elections, the 

idea of having Ugandan troops on DRC soil pursuing the LRA was 

increasingly controversial. Now that the elections have passed, is 

there any confidence in your part that there will be improved collaboration between the DRC, Uganda, and other regional players 

in pursuing Kony and the LRA? And what do you see as the scale 

of the ongoing—the scope and the nature of the ongoing threat that 

the LRA poses to civilians in the DRC and the region? 

Ambassador CARSON. The LRA continues to pose a serious threat 

to civilians in a wide area, extending from the northeastern part 

of the Congo into the Central African Republic and all the way to 

the South Sudan border. They continue to kidnap young men for 

14 

conscription into their ranks and women to be sex slaves and porters. We believe that the total strength of the LRA probably does 

not exceed any more than approximately 250 individuals, but these 

250 individuals are known to be killers and to be extraordinarily 

ruthless. They are dispersed in a number of groups fanning out 

over a very, very large and heavily treed and forested area. So they 

do continue to be a threat in the area, and we think that it is 

important to continue to help the countries in the region go after 

them. 

The DRC Government did ask for a reduction in the number of 

Ugandans on their soil in the runup to the elections. We hope that 

following the conclusion of these elections that we will see a return 

to the stepped-up cooperation that has led to the degrading of the 

LRA over the last year/year and a half. 

I note that the DRC has committed one battalion, the 391st 

Battalion, to operations in the northeast in the Gorompa forest. It 

is a battalion of soldiers trained by DOD and AFRICOM. They remain very much engaged in the search and the fight against the 

LRA. They are using information that is shared among Uganda, 

the DRC, and the United States. And that information-sharing 

between the countries has not ceased, and we know that those who 

are sharing this information from both armies in the DRC and 

Uganda work together across the border. 

Senator COONS. What is the likely role of the new special 

advisor? 

First, let me commend the administration for appointing Ambassador Walkley as the Special Advisor for DRC and Great Lakes 

Region. 

Help us understand, if you would, how he is going to focus and 

elevate U.S. policy in the region around LRA, around conflict minerals, around improving governance, and resolving ongoing disputes in the region. What will his role be? 

Ambassador CARSON. Well, first of all, we are extremely pleased 

with the presence and selection of Ambassador Walkley. He is an 

enormously experienced diplomat, having served a great deal in 

Francophone Africa, as Ambassador to Gabon, Ambassador to 

Guinea Conakry, and about a decade ago/decade and a half ago, 

was deputy chief of mission in Kinshasa. He was most recently our 

consul general and charge ́ d’affaires in Juba. He is a highly skilled 

diplomat. 

We hope that Ambassador Walkley’s appointment will signal to 

all who are concerned about the DRC that the United States 

remains serious and deeply interested in the issues of the Great 

Lakes region and the DRC in particular. We hope that Ambassador 

Walkley will be able to effectively strengthen coordination of our 

policy in Washington within the interagency and within the State 

Department among the various offices that are responsible and 

have an interest in Great Lakes issues. 

We also hope that he will be able to work with the governments 

in the region to promote greater security collaboration and information-sharing, help them work together on strengthening common 

economic ties that are important across the border, help them to 

address the issues of conflict minerals and the movement of conflict 

minerals illegally across one border into another state for export. 

15 

And we hope that he will be our conduit and liaison with the 

international community and those in the international community 

who are also concerned about issues in the Great Lakes. 

So we see essentially a three-part role for him in his obligations 

for us. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. I do not really have another question. I just 

want to thank Secretary Carson for his active engagement in the 

entire continent and for his keeping Senator Coons and I so well 

informed. I think the successes of the last year have been quite remarkable if you look at the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in the 

Sudan and the potential for what is happening there, the positive 

potential there, and some of the other things that have happened 

in large measure have been because of your diplomacy and your engagement. And I personally acknowledge that and appreciate it 

very much. 

Ambassador CARSON. Senator, thank you very much. And thank 

you for your support as well and the chairman’s support in addition. I think that both of you have been strong supporters of 

strengthening our engagement with Africa and developing a positive and strong relationship with the continent. 

Senator COONS. Let me, if I might, just ask one or two more 

questions. I had understood Senator Durbin was making his best 

efforts to join us and now may have been unavoidably detained. So 

I am going to leave the record at the end of this hearing open for 

longer than usual. I believe he may have some questions about conflict minerals or the LRA or other topics that would be of interest. 

I also wanted to just add a question about leaders like President 

Kabila who have made constitutional changes right before elections 

and the implications of such actions in the democratic process. I 

have heard from a number of constituents real concern about Cameroon and President Biya who modified the Cameroonian Constitution to run for a sixth term and is now beginning his fourth decade 

in office after their recent elections. 

What more can the United States and the international community do to ensure in Cameroon that the political opposition is not 

silenced and to discourage other leaders in the region, including, 

for example, as we spoke about the other day, President Wade in 

Senegal, from forcing similar constitutional challenges or extending 

their terms of office beyond what might be positive and reasonable 

in the interest of their people and the democratic process? 

Ambassador CARSON. Mr. Chairman, a very good question. 

The decision by the President and the Government of Cameroon 

to end term limitations was deeply, deeply unfortunate. I think 

that the elimination of terms helps to fuel some of the difficulties 

that arise when leaders have an opportunity to extend themselves 

in office indefinitely. 

We are clearly opposed to the extension or we are clearly opposed 

to the reduction and elimination of term limits. We have voiced our 

concern about this issue to President Paul Biya. I hope that he and 

others in his government will see the value of reinstating term limits. I think that it helps to create an opportunity for political mobility by the most senior political officials in any country. But the 

16 

elimination of term limits in the Cameroon, as around other parts 

of Africa, is regrettable. 

Senator COONS. My last question. The Democratic Republic of 

the Congo is at the bottom in terms of the human index. The international community has contributed $2 billion. We are, as you 

mentioned, the single largest donor. 

Given the outcome of these elections so far, given the very real 

challenges facing the DRC going forward, what aspects of our 

assistance and of international engagement do you think have the 

best prospects for improving human conditions, improving governance, making the DRC a more just and positive place for its 

residents in the years ahead? What can we be doing to improve 

governance that will have a lasting impact? 

Ambassador CARSON. Well, we are working to improve the judicial system. We are working with civil society organizations. We 

are working with the legislature. We have to continue to do all of 

these things. We are working with civil society to fight corruption. 

We are working to improve the capacity of the judicial system as 

well. These are things that do take an enormous amount of time. 

But I would like to say that a lot of our resources going into the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo are there to address human 

needs, sexual and gender-based violence, ending the cycle of impunity that has led to enormous human rights violations against 

women and others across the country, improving health care as 

well. So it is across a wide area that we are working. 

Senator COONS. Well, thank you. I would like to offer our sincere 

appreciation, Ambassador Carson, for your leadership, and we 

would like to now move to our second panel today, if we could. 

Thank you so much for your testimony, Assistant Secretary Carson. 

Ambassador CARSON. Thank you. 

Senator COONS. We would like to welcome our second panel, and 

we are going to begin, if we might, with Mr. Mark Schneider, proceed to Mr. Anthony Gambino, and then conclude with Mr. 

Mvemba Dizolele. We are grateful for your willingness to join us 

today and to testify. 

In the interest of time, I have dispensed with a recitation of the 

biographies of each of our witnesses today. They are accessible 

through the committee Web site and online. But all three of you 

bring a great range and depth of experience in the challenges facing the DRC, and we are grateful for your making yourselves available to the committee today. 

Mr. Schneider. 

STATEMENT OF MARK SCHNEIDER, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, 

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator 

Isakson, to you both for holding this hearing at a watershed 

moment in the history of the Congo. 

As you know, Crisis Group is an independent, nonpartisan, nongovernmental organization, and our mission is to seek to prevent 

and to help resolve deadly conflict. 

I do not think there is any question that this second election, 

since the end of a brutal civil war which produced some 5 million 

victims, had seemed to be a moment for the Congo to move forward 

17 

on a democratic journey. Instead, we meet at a time of desperation, 

enormous frustration, and a great degree of fear. 

There are estimates now that a total of several million voters 

who courageously went to vote, cast their ballots and then those 

votes were not counted or the results were never even transmitted 

to the central tabulation centers. And in some cases, it now 

appears that some of the original tally sheets and the ballots may 

not have been preserved. So the issue of auditing is going to be 

very difficult. 

I should add that the reports that we have received, which echo 

the findings of the Carter Center, the European Union, and the 

more than 30,000 Congolese that the Catholic Church deployed as 

observers is, as the Carter Center stated, that these preliminary 

results issued by the CENI lacked credibility. 

And let me just emphasize at the outset and I will then go into 

some detail. While I also have the highest regard for Assistant 

Secretary Carson, we do not believe this is a technical issue. This 

is a political issue. There are technical problems, but it is a fundamental political issue. 

[Applause.] 

Senator COONS. Mr. Schneider, let me be clear. We are not going 

to allow demonstrations, comments, or conversations during this 

hearing. I will have people removed. Please allow us to conduct the 

hearing in some peace and order. Thank you. 

Mr. Schneider. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. You made the point about the question about 

the implications of the absence of functioning authority in different 

places in the country, and I think it is important to recognize that 

the initial reports that we have indicate, as Assistant Secretary 

Carson mentioned, that among the worst situations were in 

Kinshasa where the Carter Center found some 2,000 polling stations in Kinshasa where the results simply were not counted in the 

final tally sheets and another thousand around the country. They 

estimate 850,000 votes were affected. 

The EU, in its detailed report that came out yesterday, now estimates 1.6 million votes that were not counted. 

And I think the fundamental issue here is about the disenfranchisement of Congolese voters. This was their right. This is a right 

that clearly seems to have been denied to a substantial degree. 

I should also add that we have now heard—and there is a report 

again in the EU report—that there were some polling stations 

where there were more votes tabulated than voters registered 

where close to 100 percent of the votes from those stations reported 

by CENI were for President Joseph Kabila. Yet, in some of those 

very instances, observers were able to be there through the end of 

the tallying and in fact they found very different results. In some 

cases, the results were more balanced; in other cases, the second 

place finisher, Etienne Tshisekedi, actually came in first. 

In a sense, these results show that our worst nightmare in the 

preelectoral period has come to pass; that is, the results are so 

marred by widespread charges of fraud and dishonesty that the 

credibility of the entire election may be fatally impaired and so too 

the legitimacy of the government that follows. 

18 

But our major concern right now is that we are deeply disturbed 

by the loss of life that has already occurred and, unfortunately, the 

potential for ever-widening regional domestic conflict and upheaval. 

And that is where we argue that this has to be the central focus 

right now. We believe there is an overriding responsibility of the 

international community from the MONUSCO peacekeeping mission, the United States, and others, particularly the African leadership and the African Union, to join with the Catholic Church and 

others to find a path away from a return to national violence in the 

Congo. That is really where we see the gravest danger. 

And I should add that while the international community now 

has indicated that it believes these results were fatally flawed, 

there must be a mechanism proposed, beyond the question of technical experts, in order to participate in the verification of these initial results and to provide some degree of mediation in the Congo. 

And we believe that that is crucial. The African Union, the United 

Nations, the European Union, and the United States should immediately be focused on what is the mechanism that can help lead the 

Congo in a different direction. 

And I should add that ultimately the goal should be to permit 

that those voters who were not able to vote or whose votes were 

not counted to revote in those areas in order to ensure that their 

right is recognized. And that ultimately is the only way that you 

will ever really know who won this election. Essentially, what 

we are asking is that this be done at a time when the country is 

poised on whether or not there is going to be additional conflict or 

whether it is going to move forward in a democratic fashion. 

And remember that we have not yet had even the preliminary 

results with respect to legislative voting. Again, that verification 

will need some participation of an independent international body, 

along with the Congolese, because of the immense amount of suspicion that has occurred. 

Just let me give you four examples and the preliminary issues. 

One, the constitutional amendment that changed the playing field. 

Two was that the voter registration rolls were challenged. The 

political parties, the opposition parties, never had a chance to audit 

them. Three was the nature of the membership of the CENI with 

a clear bias toward the current government. And fourth was the 

naming in early November of a Supreme Court which is ultimately 

going to preside over the dispute resolution, again with a heavy 

partisan cast to it. These are essential questions. 

And I will stop by simply noting that there are two other issues 

that have been raised, and I think they are crucial in terms of the 

future of the Congo. One is security sector reform and reform particularly within the army, and the second is the noncorrupt management of the country’s natural resources. 

And I should add that we agree with Assistant Secretary Carson 

on the need for the action that was taken with respect to the LRA, 

but there is far more that needs to be done with respect to the 

nature of the integration of militias into the armed forces of the 

Congo that must be changed if you are going to have an end to the 

kind of violations that we have seen in the past. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schneider follows:] 

19 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARK SCHNEIDER

The International Crisis Group appreciates the opportunity to testify today and 

I would like to thank Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, and the members 

of this subcommittee for holding this important hearing during a precarious moment 

for the people of the DRC. 

Crisis Group is an independent, nonpartisan, nongovernmental organization that 

provides field-based analysis, policy advice and advocacy to governments, the United 

Nations, and other multilateral organizations on the prevention and resolution of 

deadly conflict. Crisis Group was founded in 1995 as an international nongovernmental organisation by distinguished diplomats, statesmen, and opinion leaders 

including Career Ambassador Mort Abramowitz; Nobel Prize winner and former 

Finland President; Martti Ahtisaari, the late Congressman, Stephen Solarz; and 

former U.N. and British diplomat, Mark Malloch Brown, who were deeply concerned 

at the international community’s failure to anticipate and respond effectively to 

mass atrocities in Rwanda and Bosnia. Senator George Mitchell was our first chairman; Ambassador Thomas Pickering is our current chairman. Louise Arbour, former 

chief prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and at the 

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and former U.N. High 

Commissioner for Human Rights is our current president. In 2011, Crisis Group was 

awarded the Eisenhower Medal for Leadership and Service. 

Crisis Group publishes annually around 80 reports and briefing papers, as well 

as the monthly CrisisWatch bulletin. Our staff are located on the ground in 10 

regional offices and 16 other locations covering between them over 60 countries 

focused on conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilization. We maintain advocacy 

and research offices in Brussels (the global headquarters), Washington and New 

York and liaison and research presences in London, Moscow, and Beijing. 

Crisis Group’s Africa program oversees four projects covering Central, Southern, 

and West Africa, and the Horn of Africa, reporting on 21 different countries within 

these regions. We have produced 34 reports/briefings on the DRC and circulated an 

urgent statement on 8 December. 

CURRENT CONTEXT

Crisis Group’s DRC reporting, in particular over the last 18 months, raised alarm 

bells regarding the coming elections and their implications for future governance in 

a country which was barely 8 years removed from a state of anarchy resulting from 

a civil conflict and the military interventions of neighbors directly and through militia proxies. Our recent reports questioned the consequences of a hasty constitutional 

change in January 2011, flawed voter registration and voter roll issues, minimal 

outreach by Congo’s Independent National Election Commission (CENI) to the political parties, the lack of transparency, a sharp increase of political tension, incidents 

of violence, the general inadequate preparation of the elections, and the late design 

of an integrated electoral security plan. And we especially pressed unsuccessfully, 

given all of these suspect issues, on the CENI, the government, opposition parties, 

MONUSCO and the larger international community, including the United States 

and the European Union, to insist on development of a consensual Plan B if, despite 

all good faith efforts, the outlook for decent elections appeared grim well before 28 

November. Otherwise, we warned that without concerted and unified action by the 

DRC and committed international diplomacy, the November general elections, the 

second since the end to the Congo conflict, would result in irregularities if not massive fraud with the potential for widespread violence and the undermining of the 

legitimacy of any pronounced elections winner. 

We recognize the international and U.S. diplomatic engagement leading up to the 

28 November elections and welcome the new appointment of Ambassador Barrie 

Walkley as Special Advisor for the Great Lakes and the Democratic Republic of 

Congo to coordinate and respond to the myriad challenges for the region over the 

coming weeks and months. Unfortunately that engagement was not enough. The 

Democratic Republic of Congo faces a political crisis that already has resulted in 

loss of life. Every diplomatic measure needs to be exerted to avoid a return to national violence. The 9 December provisional results were announced by the electoral 

commission, with Kabila declared by the CENI to have won the Presidential election 

(49 percent of the votes) by 17 percentage points. The longtime opposition leader 

Tshisekedi came in second place with 32 percent and Kamerhe came in third with 

7.7 percent. Both opposition candidates have rejected the results. Scheduled on 28 

November, it was extended for 2 days as materials arrived late and many names 

were missing from voter lists. Estimated voter turnout was reported at 58 percent 

which reflects the courageous commitment of millions of Congolese voters to democracy. However, they along with the international community are living through 

20 

their worst nightmare, an electoral result marred by such widespread charges of 

fraud, deceit, and dishonesty that the credibility of the process may be fatally impaired and so too the legitimacy of the government that follows. 

Tallying of the legislative elections results is not going to be concluded for many 

weeks and the preservation of those ballots to avoid further ‘‘losses’’ and the transparent verification of that vote tabulation is essential. 

The Carter Center, which maintained 26 teams of international, impartial observers deployed in Kinshasa and the 10 provinces for the counting and tabulation, 

issued this statement: ‘‘Carter Center observers reported that the quality and integrity of the vote tabulation process has varied across the country, ranging from the 

proper application of procedures to serious irregularities, including the loss of nearly 

2,000 polling station results in Kinshasa. Based on the detailed results released by 

CENI, it is also evident that multiple locations, notably several Katanga province 

constituencies, reported impossibly high rates of 99 to 100 percent voter turnout 

with all, or nearly all, votes going to incumbent President Joseph Kabila. These and 

other observations point to mismanagement of the results process and compromise 

the integrity of the Presidential election. Candidates and parties have a limited time 

to submit any complaints to the Supreme Court, and tabulation for the legislative 

elections is ongoing. The problems observed in the tabulation and announced results 

are compounded by inadequate access for observers at multiple compilation centers 

around the country and no official access to the national results center in Kinshasa. 

The Carter Center is therefore unable to provide independent verification of the 

accuracy of the overall results or the degree to which they reflect the will of the 

Congolese people.’’ 

The responses from other key organizations: 

• ‘‘After analyzing the results that were made public by the (election commission) 

this past Friday, December 9, 2011, we could not help but conclude that the results are not founded on truth or justice,’’ said Cardinal Laurent Monsengwo, 

the head of the influential Catholic Church in Congo. The Catholic Church deployed 30,000 observers, more than any other group, nationwide. 

• In a 12 December MONUSCO press release: ‘‘MONUSCO notes with deep concern the findings of these observer missions relating to the significant irregularities in the management of the results process, in particular the counting and 

tabulation of the votes.’’ It went on to recommend, as we have that CENI ‘‘undertake a timely and rigorous review of the issues identified by observer missions with the full participation of witnesses and observers, including foreign 

observer groups . . .’’ 

• In the EU Electoral Monitoring Mission (EUOM) preliminary statement: ‘‘a 

strong mobilization of the electorate in a process inadequately controlled’’ and 

noted that ‘‘poor communication between INEC and the actors of the process 

has had a negative impact on transparency and trust.’’ 

The lack of credibility of the preliminary results already has sparked opposition 

protests that, in turn, prompted heavy-handed repression by Congolese security 

forces in Kinshasa and could lead to wider disorder. To avert further violence, Congolese authorities must make possible the in-depth verification of the counting process. The United Nations, African Union, and European Union must work together 

to impress on Congolese leaders the need for immediate action to allow transparent, 

independent verification of the initial results and full participation of international 

observers as an essential first step to find a way out of the crisis. 

The vote marked the culmination of a troubled year of preparations, with the 

playing field increasingly skewed toward incumbent President Joseph Kabila. Constitutional changes dropped the requirement for a runoff, which, with opposition 

leaders failing to unite behind a candidate, effectively split their vote. Kabila loyalists were appointed to the election commission at the beginning of the year and to 

the Supreme Court on 9 November, which settles electoral disputes. Despite discrepancies in registration figures, opposition parties and observers were unable to audit 

voter rolls. The state-run media drummed up support for the President. Nonetheless, considerably less popular than when he won the 2006 polls, Kabila faced stiff 

competition, especially from veteran opposition leader Tshisekedi. With another candidate, Vital Kamerhe, threatening to sap Kabila’s votes in the Kivus—vital to his 

win 5 years ago—the President’s reelection was far from secure. 

As requested by the international community, the electoral commission published 

results by polling station, which in theory would permit their verification by opposition parties and observers. However, the Carter Center noted that the tabulation 

process lacks transparency, the votes of the results of 2,000 voting stations in 

Kinshasa and 1,000 voting stations in the rest of the country were lost or at least 

never made it to the final compilation, indicate that at least 850,000 voters who 

21 

reached the polls and voted were effectively disenfranchised. This is all the more 

disconcerting as the criteria for disqualifying ballots are unclear, with Kinshasa— 

an opposition stronghold—disproportionately affected and Katanga—a Presidential 

stronghold—overestimated. Results returned from Katanga—a Presidential stronghold—show, on the other hand, an extraordinarily high turnout, as noted by the 

Carter Center, suggesting skewed representation. Moreover, electoral material is 

now at risk of being lost because of poor storage conditions. 

Election day flaws were bad enough; but perceptions that results are fiddled behind closed doors remain. Congo’s electoral woes reflect the country’s broader lack 

of democratic and institutional development since 2006. But they also stem from 

weak international and continental engagement, from MONUSCO and the AU to 

donors—especially the EU and the U.K., who partly funded the polls, and the U.S. 

All have been largely ineffective in preventing Kabila’s consolidation of power and 

stacking the decks. 

A sense of foreboding now hangs over Kinshasa. The fierce crackdown by the security forces against opposition protesters on the eve of election, according to Human 

Rights Watch, which left 18 dead and more than 100 injured, has been followed by 

violence on the day of elections and repression the days after. Thousands of Congolese reportedly crossed into neighbouring Congo-Brazzaville, fearing violence. 

Rumours of machetes distributed, gangs mobilizing and a heavy security presence 

risk spreading panic in the capital where all activities are suspended since Thursday evening. The International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor, meanwhile, has 

stated that the DRC situation was under watch. 

Given the electoral commission’s partisanship and the widespread irregularities, 

the preliminary results cannot inspire much confidence. Opposition politicians have 

already rejected them out of hand and Vital Kamerhe lodged a complaint to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court should resolve disputes, but with that body also 

dominated with Kabila loyalists, some additional support may be needed to avoid 

losers taking their grievances to the streets. To this point, the opposition leaders 

have shown some restraint in that respect. 

While the focus is on Presidential election, legislative elections are forgotten. In 

the absence of international observers to ensure results counting and compilation 

are transparent, frauds and irregularities are to be expected. The Carter Center and 

the EU mission either have left or are planning to soon leave the country and the 

legislative results will not be under watch. Already governmental security forces are 

threatening opposition MP candidates from Kasai Occidental, Bas-Congo, North 

Kivu, and the U.N. is providing them with temporary protection. 

NEXT STEPS?

The key problem now is how to get a peaceful outcome out of a messy, polarized, 

and fraudulent electoral process. The management of the electoral process has been 

extremely difficult and the management of the coming weeks will be much more difficult. The preliminary electoral results have already been rejected by Etienne 

Tshisekedi and Vital Kamerhe and most of the Congolese voters have a firsthand 

experience of the bad performance of the electoral commission (general lack of confidence in the electoral commission, the 2011 elections are a step back compared to 

2006 elections). In addition, President Kabila has been reelected with what appears 

to be a much lower turnout this year (70 percent turnout in 2006 at the first round 

and 58 percent this year). The key issue is to avoid more post-electoral violence and 

to design a government that will provide stability for the next 5 years. The publishing on CENI’s Web site of the detailed results by polling station, as called for 

by the United States and others, now requires in-depth verification and the monitoring of the dispute resolution. If not, the electoral process cannot be regarded as 

credible. 

Election Recommendations 

• The published results polling station by polling station must now be verified by 

the political parties and independent observers from civil society and international organizations in order to ensure the transparency of the tabulation 

process. 

• Electoral authorities must explain clearly how political parties and observers 

can contest the results of any polling station and provide free access to the relevant information and explanations about the lost results of several thousands 

of voting stations. Those stations that returned suspicious results or where observers report irregularities should be subject to rigorous investigation—again 

in the presence of observers—with clear criteria applied when disqualifying ballots. Voters in areas where polling did not take place or where the results have 

been lost should be given the opportunity to vote. 

22 

• The rules of the Supreme Court must be revised, notably the proceedings must 

not be in camera. • The tabulation process for the legislative results must urgently be corrected on 

the basis of the errors and problems encountered during the tabulation process 

of the Presidential results and the electoral material secured. Given the poor 

work done by the electoral commission and the failure to secure voting results 

from more than 3,000 polling stations covering some 850,000 votes demonstrates the absolute requirement for independent monitoring of the tabulation 

process for the parliamentary election. • All Congolese leaders must avoid inflammatory language. Given that protests 

will almost certainly turn violent, opposition politicians should appeal to their 

supporters to stay off the streets. 

• If protests do occur, security forces must refrain from heavy handed responses— 

with clear instructions along those lines given by military and police commanders and by the President. Violence that happened since the end of the electoral campaign should be subject to investigation by Congolese and international human rights groups, as well as the ICC, if appropriate. 

• The U.N., AU and EU should urgently dispatch a high-level team, perhaps comprised of distinguished African leaders, to mediate between factions. Mediators 

should explore options as part of the verification process for alternative dispute 

resolution, modifications of the Supreme Court’s rules or independent oversight 

of existing mechanisms—possibly under AU auspices and with international 

support—given distrust in the responsible Congolese institutions. The mediators 

should also engage the factions on the long-term stability of the country and 

the necessity of an inclusive government. 

• In the meantime, the U.N., donors and regional leaders must make clear that 

any interethnic violence between Kasaians and Katangans will be condemned 

as such as harassment of opposition candidates. They must avoid statements 

that could legitimise a badly flawed vote and destroy what is left of their credibility in the Congo. They cannot paper over electoral flaws. No leader should 

be congratulated until all disputes are resolved. 

• The U.N. should deploy additional peacekeepers to the Western provinces and 

Kinshasa and should increase its surveillance in Katanga where anti-Kasaian 

feeling is presently on the rise. The return of ethnic violence in Katanga or/and 

a bloodbath in the capital of a country hosting the world’s largest U.N. peace 

operation are unthinkable. 

In addition to resolving the current electoral crisis, there are other serious questions affecting DRC’s future stability. 

We believe that two critical challenges to development, governance, and civilian 

protection in the Congo are army reform and more competent and noncorrupt management of the country’s natural resources—both of which are conspicuous failures 

at the moment. The result has been participation by an array of militias as well 

as FARDC units in rape and marauding in the Eastern Congo and an unending 

competition over conflict minerals that sows the seeds of violence throughout the 

region. 

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Leading the agenda for stability in the aftermath of the elections remains the 

question of army reform. The army is undisciplined and too often, unpaid. The ineffective integration of militias into the army and military operations against armed 

groups combined to increase the insecurity of communities throughout the Kivus. 

It also produced militarization of mineral production sites during the last 2 years. 

The consequence of this is violence against civilians and the emergence of mafia behavior by mine operators. Corruption in the natural resources sector overwhelms attempts to police and regulate the sector. Altogether, these problems indicate that 

there must be major reform of the army and general reform of the security sector 

as a whole. 

Also, there has been an almost grotesque incapacity to manage the demobilization 

and integration of former armed militias into the FARDC. Too many former militia 

members have not been vetted; too many have not been paid or trained; and too 

many have not been held accountable for past crimes against humanity. 

A critical mistake was made by allowing the militias to operate as an army within 

an army by not dissolving militia command structures after integration. Violent outbreaks persist throughout the country, particularly in the Kivu provinces, which will 

likely only intensify with growing tensions. As well, the justice system, plagued with 

corruption and limited resources from the DRC Government, has to be fundamentally reformed with an emphasis placed on holding accountable those who are 

23 

accused of vicious crimes such as rape and sexual violence. Until prosecution and 

conviction become the norm for violators of fundamental principles, it will be very 

difficult for national development to take place. 

It also tends to underscore the rising unhappiness of sectors of the military over 

nonpayment of salaries, and the failure of integration of various armed groups (Mai 

Mai, FRF, PARECO and CNDP) in the FARDC. With respect to the CNDP, it once 

again shows that the failure to dismantle CNDP units as they were integrated into 

the FARDC harmed international efforts, including those of the EUSEC, to restructure the national army. 

With respect to army reform, the critical steps—regardless who ultimately is 

sworn in—are the following: 

• Comprehensive review of the chain of payment in the army; 

• Vetting of officers and investigation of suspected involvement into natural resources trade by a special commission of inquiry; 

• Design of a pension plan and retirement for the soldiers; 

• Restoring and reforming the military justice (revision of the military code, 

training, screening of military magistrates, appointment of ‘‘clean military 

judges,’’ etc.) 

SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

DRC has made little if no progress on sexual and gender-based violence. Suspected rapists among FARDC are almost never charged or arrested. Impunity is still 

the norm concerning FARDC. DRC Government and MONUSCO publicized the very 

few FARDC officers who were tried but prosecutions are usually cosmetic. 

The National Strategy against SGBV has been elaborated without deep civil society involvement and lacks ownership. There is no genuine political commitment by 

the Congolese Government. There is very little coordination between the various national civil society actors, international organizations, United Nations Agencies and 

local authorities. 

LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY

The LRA legislation that President Obama signed into law in May 2010, which 

received broad bipartisan support in Congress, was an enormous step forward and 

reflected steps that Crisis Group had recommended, including: increased institutional capacity, enhanced coordinated DDR alongside greater military pressure 

which would include greater shared intelligence resources by UN/EU/US, and 

greater humanitarian support to LRA victims. 

On 14 October, 2011, the Obama administration announced the deployment of 100 

military advisors to the region, making the clear point that they will be there in 

an advisory capacity, helping the UPDF, and are not authorized for combat unless 

in self-defense. A majority of the military advisors will stay in Kampala, with the 

rest to advise in the field. The move is part of a broader ramping up of its political 

and military engagement against the LRA. It has also offered to train more Congolese soldiers and has given equipment to the CAR army in order to win the operation political space. The few score field advisers should be able to improve the 

Ugandans’ performance. The deployment, the Obama administration has made 

clear, will be short term. 

Uganda, with U.S. advice and support, should, therefore, lose no time in launching a reinvigorated attack on the LRA, if possible while most of the group’s senior 

commanders and fighters are still in the CAR and before they can return to the 

DRC’s more restrictive operational environment. A key part of the advice the United 

States should press on the Ugandan army is the need to prioritise protecting civilians, provide access to humanitarian agencies and accept stricter accountability for 

its actions. At the same time, full coordination with the AU is essential, particularly 

if it is able to oversee a multidimensional regional initiative, continuing after Kony’s 

death or capture. Greater cooperation from Kinshasa with combined effort to put an 

end to Kony is essential. 

CONFLICT MINERALS

We still have a long way to go to halt illegal trade of conflict minerals in the 

Great Lakes Region. On 10 September 2010, Kabila appeared to have banned the 

production and trade of minerals in the Kivus and Maniema and ordered the demilitarization of the mining zones. However, that declaration neither ended the mineral 

smuggling nor militarization of the mining zones, and the ban was lifted on 10 

March 2011. 

24 

International actors responded by attempting to preemptively resolve the illegal 

trade problem by developing regulations aimed to prevent the flow of conflict minerals into the raw materials market, such as with the Dodd-Frank Act passed by 

Congress in July 2010. 

The provision mandates identifying the mines under the control of armed groups, 

introducing traceability and certification mechanisms to cover transfer from the 

mines to the trading counters, and encouraging importers to only buy certified minerals. The delay in the final SEC regulations (due in April, 2011 and now expected 

by the end of December, 2011) and the resulting required annual report submissions 

have stalled the full implementation of the Dodd-Frank measure. 

CONCLUSION

DRC faces enormous challenges: Only one 1 of 10 Congolese has access to electricity; three-fourths of the population is undernourished according to the Global 

Hunger Index; less than a third of the rural population has access to clean water, 

less than half in the cities. The DRC ranks last, 187 out of 187 in the Human Development Index in 2011. 

During this tense and uncertain time in the DRC’s history, it is imperative that 

the United States and the international community remain engaged. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Mr. Schneider. 

Mr. Gambino. 

STATEMENT OF ANTHONY W. GAMBINO, FELLOW, EASTERN 

CONGO INITIATIVE, BETHESDA, MD 

Mr. GAMBINO. Thank you very much, Chairman Coons, Ranking 

Member Isakson. Thanks for the opportunity to testify before you 

at this historic, crucial moment for the Congo. 

I am a fellow at the Eastern Congo Initiative, but the views in 

this statement are mine alone. 

The Congo’s recent election was clearly fraudulent. The way in 

which the aftermath of these fraudulent elections is managed will 

affect every issue of interest to the United States in the Congo. The 

outcome will decide whether Congo, after badly stumbling, can 

regain a democratic path. But the outcome also will have a determinative effect on U.S. efforts on sexual and gender-based violence, 

on broader respect for human rights, on security sector reform, on 

conflict minerals, on general development prospects, and on all 

other issues of interest to the United States regarding the Congo. 

If this crisis is not successfully resolved, it will not be possible to 

improve governance in meaningful ways, and Congo could descend 

into a deeper humanitarian disaster becoming unstable once again, 

affecting all of Central Africa and beyond. 

In 2006, the Congo held relatively good, free, and fair elections. 

Mvemba Dizolele and I were election monitors in 2006. We saw 

this. The elections had flaws, but ultimately and most importantly 

it was clear that the person announced as the winner in the Presidential election, Joseph Kabila, indeed had won. 

How did Congo so rapidly descend from successful 2006 elections 

to chaotic, brazenly fraudulent elections last month? 

As these elections approached, alarming signs grew that the Congolese electoral commission was fumbling badly in its role to plan 

and manage the elections. 

Just within Eastern Congo Initiative, we have been working all 

year for good elections, and an ECI delegation, headed by Cindy 

McCain, wife of Senator McCain, and ECI CEO Whitney Williams, 

was in Congo for the elections. A little earlier, in September of this 

25 

year, my good friend, Mvemba Dizolele, and I published a paper in 

which we recommended greater engagement by the United States. 

Our paper’s title was not particularly terse, but it certainly was 

clear: ‘‘Technical Issues Threaten Free, Fair, and Transparent Elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Urgent Steps 

Required.’’ Mr. Chairman, I respectfully request that this ECI 

paper be included in the record. 

Senator COONS. Without objection. 

Mr. GAMBINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Even earlier, in March, ECI’s founder, Ben Affleck, sounded the 

alarm. This is what he said. ‘‘The United States must do more to 

support the 2011 elections. Once these elections occur, the free and 

fair nature of the results should be above reproach. A finding of 

anything less risks Congo’s stability and democratic progress.’’ He 

then provided a long list of concrete recommendations for U.S. policymakers. I am sad to say every one of those recommendations 

was ignored. He said ‘‘if we continue to place the Congo on the 

back burner of U.S. policy, it will come back to haunt us.’’ That is 

precisely where we are today. 

Let us be clear about the facts. The election results lacked credibility for two central reasons. First, the head of the electoral commission, Reverend Mulunda, badly botched preparations for the 

elections and was complicit in the preparation and reporting of 

clearly fraudulent results. Second, there has been a massive attempt by other supporters of President Kabila to steal the election. 

One clear implication of these facts is that Reverend Mulunda 

should immediately be replaced. No reasonable person can have 

any confidence in his ability to play a useful role in this process 

from this point on. 

A second implication is that the United States needs to think 

through what it means that supporters of a sitting head of state 

just organized a massive effort across multiple provinces to fraudulently alter and manipulate election results. And right now, it is 

clear that President Kabila’s security forces are working hard to 

suppress, harass, and intimidate opposition supporters through the 

threat and in some instances the use of violence. 

Intense discussions are underway around the world to consider 

what to do next. Many different scenarios and options are under 

discussion. Whichever specific route is taken, the required end 

point is clear. The Congolese people must see the man they have 

democratically chosen as their next President as the man who 

takes office for the next 5 years. And I want to emphasize that as 

of today, it is simply not possible to know whether Joseph Kabila 

or Etienne Tshisekedi is that man, the legitimate democratically 

elected President of the Congo, based on a credible electoral 

victory. 

Absent a reasonable process, if President Kabila continues to 

function as head of the Congo, he governs without a shred of democratic legitimacy. That is not a formula for stability in the Congo 

or in Central Africa as a whole. Such an outcome would be deeply 

counter to both the interests and the values of the United States 

and would risk another humanitarian crisis and greater prolonged 

conflict and instability in Central Africa. 

26 

Secretary Clinton and President Obama need to state now, both 

publicly and privately, that the United States is engaged both to 

help diffuse this crisis and to find a way forward that respects and 

honors the democratic aspirations of the Congolese people. They 

should communicate this directly to a number of people, including 

President Kabila and Mr. Tshisekedi. 

Thank you very much. I am happy to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gambino follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANTHONY W. GAMBINO

Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, members of the Subcommittee on 

African Affairs, thank you very much for the opportunity to testify before you at this 

historic, crucial moment for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). I am a 

Fellow at the Eastern Congo Initiative (ECI), but today I am not here representing 

ECI; the views in this statement are mine alone. 

The Congo’s recent election clearly was fraudulent. The way in which the aftermath of these fraudulent elections is managed will affect every issue of interest to 

the United States in the Congo. It is apparent that the outcome will show whether 

Congo, after badly stumbling, can regain a democratic path. But the outcome also 

will have a determinative effect on U.S. efforts on conflict minerals, on sexual and 

gender-based violence, on broader respect for human rights, on general development 

prospects, on security sector reform, and on all other issues of interest to the United 

States. If this crisis is not successfully resolved, it will not be possible to improve 

governance in the Congo in meaningful ways. If the present situation is not 

managed successfully, Congo could descend once again into a deeper humanitarian 

disaster. 

I first went to the Congo in 1979 as a Peace Corps Volunteer and have followed 

it ever since. Please allow me to emphasize what a great, important program the 

Peace Corps is. I wouldn’t be doing what I am doing now—I wouldn’t be before you 

today—if the Peace Corps had not given me the opportunity to spend 3 years as 

a teacher in a country then called Zaire. I left Zaire with the clear sense that my 

Congolese students, colleagues, and many new friends had given me so much more 

than I was able to give them. 

I continued to look for ways to work on the Congo after my Peace Corps service, 

and, in 1997, after Mobutu fell, I moved from the State Department to USAID to 

coordinate USAID’s reengagement. In 2001, I was given the honor to return to 

Congo to run the USAID mission, which I did from 2001–2004. Despite the many 

difficulties in governance in the Congo, USAID supported programs that had great 

success in many areas, including improving the health of Congolese and fighting 

corruption. 

During my 3 years in Zaire as a Peace Corps Volunteer, I saw the life-diminishing, debilitating effects that a corrupt dictatorship had on the citizens of a country. During my 3 years in Congo with USAID, I witnessed something positive and 

life-affirming: the ending of a horrible war and the start of a transition to democracy. President Joseph Kabila deserves tremendous credit for leading his country 

away from the path of war, division, and destruction taken by his father, Laurent, 

and toward reconciliation, unity, and peace. And the United States deserves credit 

for supporting the move to peace and reconciliation. I was in Congo when the transition began in mid-2003, and saw firsthand all the work that our able diplomats did 

to support this fragile, complex process. 

In 2006, at the end of the transition period, the people of the Congo voted for their 

national leaders. I returned to the Congo then as an elections observer for the 

Carter Center. I saw what can happen when a government and its citizens are 

strongly, effectively supported by the international community. The 2006 elections 

had flaws, but, ultimately and most importantly, it was clear that the person announced as the winner in the Presidential election—Joseph Kabila—indeed had 

won. Following these elections, the Carter Center noted: ‘‘The Carter Center election 

observation mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo is confident the results 

announced by the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) are consistent with the 

results obtained in the polling stations. The provision of original tally sheets to candidate witnesses, combined with the publication of results by polling station, introduced a strong measure of transparency that virtually eliminated the possibility of 

significant fraud after the ballots were counted.’’ 

The Congo has just held its next national election. Here is what the Carter Center 

published on December 10: ‘‘The Carter Center finds the provisional Presidential 

27 

election results announced by the Independent National Election Commission 

(CENI) on December 9 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to lack credibility.’’ 

The head of the Catholic Church in Congo, Cardinal Laurent Monsengwo, said on 

December 12 that ‘‘after analyzing the results made public by the CENI on Friday, 

December 9, 2011, it is appropriate to conclude that these results do not conform 

to the truth, nor to justice.’’ 

What happened? How did the Congo backtrack from relatively good elections in 

2006 to the brazenly fraudulent elections of last month? What role did U.S. actions 

play? 

The United States saw the 2006 national elections as an exit strategy from heavy 

political/diplomatic involvement in the Congo. In 2006, the United States and others 

felt that the situation finally was good enough in the Congo because successful elections had taken place. This conclusion was reached despite evidence to the contrary 

both from the Congo itself and from careful international research on the trajectory 

of conflicts. After years of serious diplomacy to help the Congolese transition succeed, key international actors succumbed to wishful thinking, reducing their levels 

of political engagement with the new Congolese Government. 

Research on fragile states like the Congo strongly suggests that these states become more, not less, fragile after elections, and are acutely vulnerable in the period 

following elections. Such elections are not an exit strategy; rather, successful democratic elections require maximum support and engagement from the United States 

in the months and years immediately afterward. Instead of doing this, the United 

States did the precise opposite. 

In the runup to the 2011 elections, the United States, the U.N. Mission in the 

Congo, known as MONUSCO, and other international actors chose not to engage 

adequately to support free, fair, transparent, and credible elections in the Congo. 

As the 2011 elections approached, alarming signs grew that the Congolese Electoral 

Commission (known by its French acronym as the CENI) was fumbling badly in its 

role to plan and manage the elections. 

In a Special Election Report released by the Eastern Congo Initiative in September of this year, Mvemba Dizolele and I recommended greater engagement by 

the United States and others in the international community. The paper’s title was 

not terse, but it certainly was clear: ‘‘Technical Issues Threaten Free, Fair, and 

Transparent Election in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Urgent Steps 

Required.’’ I respectfully request that this ECI report be included in the record. 

Even earlier this year, in March, Eastern Congo Initiative’s founder, Ben Affleck, 

sounded the alarm loudly in a hearing on the other side of Capitol Hill. He said 

then that ‘‘the U.S. must do more to support the 2011 elections. . . . Once the elections occur, the free and fair nature of the results should be above reproach. A finding of anything less risks Congo’s stability and democratic progress.’’ He provided 

a long list of concrete recommendations for U.S. policymakers, all of which were 

ignored. 

He ended his testimony by stating his belief ‘‘that if we continue to place the 

Congo on the back burner of U.S. policy it will come back to haunt us.’’ 

That is precisely where we are today. 

Now that the Congo has held clearly fraudulent elections, the United States faces 

another crisis in the Congo. To move forward, the United States must come to terms 

with a series of uncomfortable facts. First, as the Catholic Church, the Carter Center, the European Union Observer Mission, and others have said, these election results lack basic credibility. Second, they lack credibility because of disorganization 

on the part of the CENI, and also because of a massive attempt by supporters of 

President Kabila to steal the election. Third, the present head of the Congolese Electoral Commission, Reverend Mulunda, not only badly botched preparations for the 

election, he was complicit in the preparation and reporting of clearly fraudulent 

results. 

One clear, immediate implication of these three facts is that Reverend Mulunda 

should immediately be replaced. No reasonable person can have any confidence in 

his ability to manage this process from this point on. A second implication is that 

all of us need to think through what it means that supporters of the sitting Head 

of State just organized a massive effort, across multiple provinces, to fraudulently 

alter and manipulate election results. 

Inside and outside the Congo, inside and outside the U.N. and governments like 

our own, intense international efforts are under way to help the Congolese avert disaster. Many different scenarios and options are under discussion. Whichever path 

is taken, the end point is clear: The Congolese people deserve the leader that they 

have democratically chosen as their next President. As of today, it is not clear who 

that man is. A way must be found to do so. 

28 

The way in which the aftermath of these fraudulent elections is managed will 

affect every issue of interest to the United States in the Congo. It is apparent that 

the outcome will show whether Congo, after badly stumbling, can regain a democratic path. But the outcome also will have a determinative effect on U.S. efforts 

on conflict minerals, on sexual and gender-based violence, on broader respect for 

human rights, on general development prospects, on security sector reform, and on 

all other issues of interest to the United States. If the crisis is not successfully resolved, it will not be possible to improve governance in the Congo in meaningful 

ways. If the present situation is not managed successfully, Congo could descend once 

again into a deeper humanitarian disaster. 

A new development in the State Department is the recent appointment of a Special Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs for the Great 

Lakes and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. ECI and other organizations have 

long bemoaned problems of coherence within the U.S. Government—that the United 

States has many people working on many different issues relating to the Congo, but 

not in a well-coordinated fashion. This was a central reason that ECI and other organizations called for the appointment of a special envoy. The newly appointed 

Special Advisor to Assistant Secretary Carson, Barrie Walkley, should be given the 

authority within the State Department and elsewhere within the U.S. Government 

to forge much better coordination across issues. Of course, his ability to be effective 

will depend on actions by senior U.S. officials, including President Obama and Secretary Clinton, to successfully resolve the present crisis. 

Why has the United States encountered so much difficulty in wrestling with problems like conflict minerals and continued high levels of sexual and gender-based violence in eastern Congo? Will the appointment of a Special Advisor fix the problem? 

On one level, the answer is simple: When senior officials in the Congolese state are, 

at best, uninterested and, at worst, complicit in the abuses, how much progress can 

outside actors make? When a government is unresponsive to the suffering of its own 

people, how much progress can outside actors make? 

After the 2006 elections, the Congolese national government continued to struggle 

to exercise the essential functions of an effective state. Instead of focusing on key 

development priorities, the Congolese state took a different path. The dominant ruling party moved to further concentrate and centralize its power. This was done despite strong decentralization provisions in the Congolese Constitution and general 

agreement that effective decentralization is essential for improved governance the 

Congo. 

These governance problems are so daunting, in fact, that some argue that in the 

face of so little political will, the right decision is withdrawal. I utterly reject that 

option. Withdrawal by the United States and others is not a plausible option since 

it necessarily leads backward to catastrophic collapse, humanitarian disaster, regional instability, and renewed warfare. Disengagement runs counter to both the interests and values of the United States. 

The dilemma of engagement, however, remains: What should international actors 

do when the state is not fulfilling its basic functions? There is a straightforward set 

of actions that, if followed, provide a coherent framework of action to improve governance in the Congo. The heart of this proposal, which I call ‘‘TPA,’’ is that successful programs to improve governance require consideration of and, if necessary, action on three specific elements: 

• Effective Training, 

• Adequate Pay, and 

• Accountability for actions. 

First, the ‘‘T.’’ Training is a staple of U.S. activities, but training is normally done 

as a stand-alone intervention, with the regularly unrealistic assumption that somehow disparate, scattershot, uncoordinated training will lead to better performance 

and on-the-job results. Facts on the ground from around the world, including in the 

Congo, amply prove otherwise. Even assuming well-coordinated and effective training (far from today’s reality), training alone, while necessary, remains insufficient. 

The key is the ‘‘P.’’ Pay affects performance: When trained officials return to their 

horribly paid positions, they revert to poor performance. Adequate salaries, with salaries paid on time every month, to both civil servants, police, and soldiers, is essential to improve governance in fragile states like the Congo. 

However, efforts to accomplish salary reform at a national level almost always fail 

in states like the DRC. To pay adequate, sustainable salaries to all civil servants 

requires fundamental civil service and budget reform. In the Congo, the government 

is presently unwilling to do this. Under TPA, the donors do not have to choose between the equally unpalatable options of pushing the government toward politically 

dangerous comprehensive civil service reform or doing nothing. 

29 

The optimal approach is for the Congolese Government to provide all the necessary resources, including salaries that are at least minimally adequate, using its 

own funds. Determining the actual capacity of the Congolese state to do so should 

be done by the IMF and the World Bank. If the IMF and Bank believe that the Congolese Government does not possess sufficient resources, or if the Congolese Government is unwilling to do so, donors must engage in a frank dialogue with the Government regarding the provision of these resources. 

Of course, adequate pay is only one of the necessary requirements to create incentives for acceptable on-the-job performance. Officials require adequate resources in 

a variety of areas relating to the conditions of their service in order for them to perform their functions effectively. 

The United States present approach to providing these resources, including paying salaries or salary supplements, is incoherent. In lower priority countries, U.S. 

officials say that they cannot pay salaries because it is not sustainable. Yet, the ‘‘T’’ 

and ‘‘P’’ part of TPA describes the way the United States does business in countries 

of particular interest. For example, in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States has 

trained and paid enormous numbers of officials. The United States has paid police 

salaries in Liberia and elsewhere. 

My point is not that the United States should be paying salaries everywhere; 

rather, it is that the United States must recognize the key importance of this issue 

and think through coherent, sensible, workable approaches. Too often in countries 

like the Congo—I made this mistake myself when serving as the USAID Mission 

Director—U.S. officials just refuse to think carefully through these issues, because 

they raise difficult, uncomfortable questions both for U.S. and Congolese policymakers. 

Finally, the ‘‘A’’ of accountability. It is particularly in the context of accountability 

that Congolese civil society has a crucial role to play. The United States should support civil society’s role in monitoring and evaluating the government’s implementation. This is an essential part of a durable solution. 

Assuming that Congo emerges from its present electoral crisis and regains a 

democratic path, TPA can help guide the U.S. Government toward a more effective 

approach to improve governance. 

If the Congolese military and police continue to be ill-paid and unaccountable for 

their actions, no amount of training will change that, and the Congolese security 

forces’ role in committing sexual crimes will continue. 

If the Congolese justice sector continues to be severely underfunded and staffed 

by unqualified, untrained personnel who are poorly paid and receive few incentives 

for good performance, do we think that impunity will be reduced through legal action and occasional aid projects? If so, we, too, are engaging in wishful thinking. 

If customs officials and others responsible for maintaining a responsible chain of 

supply from the mines are ill-paid and subject to harassment from armed men who 

act with impunity because the legal system is dysfunctional, do we believe that the 

conflict minerals problem will diminish? 

The US needs to work with Congolese actors and a wide spectrum of international 

agencies, from the IMF to USAID-funded NGOs, to attack the fundamental deficiencies underlying poor governance. 

Following the 2006 elections, the United States based its actions in the Congo on 

President Kabila’s new legitimacy, gained through reasonably free and fair elections. Last month, millions of Congolese turned out to vote for their leaders at the 

national level. The vast majority of Congolese want peace and development. They 

want a better life for their children. Human aspirations are the same, whether you 

live in Bukavu or in Bethesda. 

As of today, it is not possible to know whether Joseph Kabila or Etienne 

Tshisekedi is the legitimate President of the Congo based on a credible electoral victory. Absent a reasonable process, the next person who declares himself head of the 

Congo would govern minus democratic legitimacy. This is not a formula for stability 

in the Congo or in central Africa as a whole. Such a result would be deeply counter 

to both the interests and values of the United States and risks another humanitarian crisis and greater, prolonged conflict. The United States must dramatically 

ratchet up its efforts to find a way to defuse this crisis and find a way forward that 

respects and honors the democratic aspirations of the Congolese people. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Mr. Gambino. 

Mr. Dizolele. 

30 

STATEMENT OF MVEMBA PHEZO DIZOLELE, FELLOW, HOOVER 

INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. DIZOLELE. Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, 

thank you for the invitation and honor to testify before your committee today. I greet you on behalf of the millions of Congolese in 

the homeland who look up to the United States as a beacon of 

democracy. I would also like to thank you on behalf of the Congolese community of the United States for your interest in the alarming developments in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Thank you. 

My name is Mvemba Phezo Dizolele. I am a native Congolese 

and a naturalized U.S. citizen. I would like to note that I received 

my American citizenship through service in the United States 

Marine Corps Reserve where I was a noncommissioned officer and 

served in infantry, intelligence, training and operations, and public 

affairs positions. 

I recently returned from Congo where I observed the contentious 

Presidential and legislative elections that have led to the current 

legitimacy crisis between President Joseph Kabila and his main 

challenger, Etienne Tshisekedi. 

I am neither a member of the opposition nor a supporter of the 

Presidential majority. I speak on behalf of the Congolese people. 

While I do not represent all 70 million Congolese, I am confident 

that I speak for a good many of them. Still, my views are my own 

today. 

I would just like to put a little bit of context in this. The most 

widely accepted narrative of U.S. Congo policy defines the predicament of the country as a humanitarian crisis through the binary 

prism of sexual violence and the so-called conflict minerals. This 

narrative has now become the standard perspective through which 

Americans view Congo, and most NGOs, activists, academics, and 

policymakers like yourselves build your work around this prism. 

Not only is this narrative wrong, it has led to misguided initiatives 

such as the Dodd-Frank Act which contains an important resolution on Congo’s conflict minerals, effectively turning U.S. Congo 

policy into a Kivu policy. This narrative oversimplifies the problem 

and makes American taxpayers believe that if only the challenges 

of sexual violence and conflict minerals were solved, then Congo 

will get back on track and peace will follow. Nothing, however, is 

farther from the truth. The Congo crisis is first and foremost political and requires political solutions. 

The disproportionate attention that policymakers directed to sexual violence and conflict minerals distracted them from the many 

other important core issues, such as governance, security sector 

reform, mining sector reform, decentralization, and the elections. 

The result has been catastrophic for the Congolese. 

The crisis, as we know it and as we discussed today, started, of 

course, on December 9 when Daniel Ngoy Mulunda, chairman of 

the electoral commission, declared President Kabila winner of the 

contentious election with 49 percent of the vote. Tshisekedi who 

placed second has rejected the results, called Mulunda’s statement 

a ‘‘provocation of the people’’ and declared himself President-elect. 

The main opposition parties have rallied behind Tshisekedi and are 

calling on the international community to help solve the impasse. 

31 

Meanwhile, the government has reacted swiftly and forcefully 

unleashing armed antiriot policemen, and elements of the elite 

Presidential guard, into the streets of Kinshasa to confront 

Tshisekedi’s partisans. Several people have been killed in clashes 

between state security agents and the protesters. An unconfirmed 

number of young men have been abducted from their homes by the 

same agents and driven to undisclosed locations. 

The government has cut off text messaging services and Internet 

access is now limited, slow, and intermittent. The diplomatic community has exhorted Tshisekedi supporters to refrain from violence, but has not condemned abuses by state security agents. As 

of this writing, the Limete neighborhood where Tshisekedi’s residence and party headquarters are located is under heavy police 

siege. The movement and activities of his supporters are curtailed 

by state security agents who harass and manhandle them at checkpoints, provoking them into more violence. 

But the real genesis of the crisis goes back to December 2010 

when Tshisekedi, who had been sick and seeking treatment in 

Europe, returned unexpectedly to Congo and announced his candidacy for the Presidency. Kabila’s advisors panicked and the President’s parliamentary majority passed a hasty constitutional revision in January 2011 that scrapped the two-round voting process 

in favor of a one-round, all within 1 week. 

Opposition parties, along with civil society groups, denounced the 

constitutional revision calling it irresponsible and dangerous for 

the security and stability of the country. Major powers in the West, 

however, especially the United States, France, and Belgium, wrote 

off the power play as an internal affair. Throughout all of this, 

Western embassies appeared content to look the other way. Diplomats from the United States, France, Britain, and Belgium 

praised the CENI for enrolling 32 million voters, no doubt an 

impressive feat considering the enormous logistical challenges. But 

voter enrollment was the first step of an electoral process, not the 

end. 

These same international actors remained silent about the allegations of fraud and irregularities, even as Congolese and international human rights organizations denounced violence and 

abuses. Their silence has helped spawn the crisis that could have 

easily been averted. 

At stake is nothing less than the stability of the country of 70 

million people. Unless the international community takes its responsibility to help protect the Congolese from conflict seriously, 

Congo will slide into greater post-election violence. If this fits with 

the mandate of your committee, the U.S. Senate should investigate 

this electoral disaster. A mixed panel of highly respected Congolese 

and outside negotiators should be selected with the full support of 

the United States, France, Belgium, and other relevant powers to 

review and address inconsistencies that have caused this crisis. 

The alternative is to let the Supreme Court certify Kabila’s provisional victory and hand him another 5-year term, in which case we 

better watch out. The opposition will reject this victory, but an 

emboldened Kabila with questionable legitimacy will assert his 

power with greater popular repression, triggering a cycle of violence with untold ramifications. 

32 

After decades of mismanagement and chronic conflict in Congo, 

this election presented the people with a chance to rebuild their 

country. With its vast natural and human resources, Congo has the 

potential to be a regional power, as it once was, providing stability 

and leadership in an area known for turmoil. But if the Congolese 

are robbed of a fair and honest say in their national politics, such 

potential will remain but an illusion. 

I thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dizolele follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MVEMBA PHEZO DIZOLELE

Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, and members of the Subcommittee 

on African Affairs, thank you for the invitation and honor to testify before your committee today. I greet you on behalf of the millions of Congolese in the homeland who 

look up to the United States of America as a beacon of democracy. I would also like 

to thank you on behalf of the Congolese community of the United States for your 

interest in the alarming developments in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Thank 

you. 

My name is Mvemba Phezo Dizolele, a native Congolese and a naturalized U.S. 

citizen. Let me note that I received my American citizenship through service in the 

United States Marine Corps Reserve, where I was a noncommissioned officer and 

served in infantry, intelligence, training and public affairs positions. I am a writer, 

foreign policy analyst, independent journalist, and a Visiting Fellow at the Hoover 

Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University. 

Over the last decade, I have returned to Congo several times as a journalist, researcher, businessman, vacationer, and election monitor. In 2006, I was embedded 

with United Nations peacekeepers in Ituri, Lake Albert, and South Kivu as a reporter. I also covered the first round of the election that summer and returned in 

the fall to serve as an election monitor with the Carter Center. In March 2007, I 

was stranded at the Grand Hotel in Kinshasa for 4 days while troops and militiamen loyal to President Joseph Kabila and Jean-Pierre Bemba fought each other in 

the city streets and around the hotel. I recently returned from Congo where I observed the contentious Presidential and legislative elections that have led to the current legitimacy crisis between Joseph Kabila and his main challenger, Etienne 

Tshisekedi. 

Today, however, I represent neither the Marine Corps nor the Hoover Institution. 

I speak on behalf of the Congolese people. While I do not represent all 70 million 

Congolese, I am confident that I speak for a good many of them. Still, the views 

expressed in this statement are my own. 

The most widely accepted narrative of U.S. Congo policy defines the predicament 

as a humanitarian crisis through the binary prism of sexual violence and the socalled conflict minerals. This narrative has now become the standard perspective 

through which Americans view Congo, and most NGOs, activists, academics, and 

policymakers build their efforts around this prism. Not only is this narrative wrong, 

it has led to misguided initiatives, which have effectively turned U.S. Congo policy 

into a Kivu policy. 

Tremendous efforts have been devoted to sexual violence and Congress passed the 

Dodd-Frank Act, which contains an important resolution on Congo’s conflict minerals. This narrative oversimplifies the problem and makes American taxpayers believe that if only the challenges of sexual violence and conflict minerals were solved, 

then Congo will get back on track and peace will follow. 

Nothing, however, is farther from the truth. The Congo crisis is first and foremost 

political and requires political solutions. Sexual violence and the looting of natural 

resources are ramifications and symptoms, not the causes of the political crisis. 

Focusing U.S. Congo policy primarily in the eastern province, particularly the 

Kivus, which are but a fraction of the country, has not helped the people of Congo 

solve the bigger problem. This would be akin to designing a U.S.-India or U.S.-Pakistan policy based on the conflict in Kashmir. 

The disproportionate attention that policymakers directed to sexual violence and 

conflict minerals distracted them from the many other important core issues, such 

as governance, security sector reform, mining sector reform, decentralization, and 

the elections. 

The result has been catastrophic for the Congolese. For instance, nowadays, nowhere are crises more predictable than in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

And yet, when they unfold as anticipated, Western policymakers and diplomats 

33 

always seem caught off guard—raising questions about the competence, willingness, 

and commitment of the Kinshasa-based diplomatic corps and the United Nations 

mission to discharge their responsibilities. 

Nothing underscores the apathy and inconsistency that characterize Western 

diplomacy in Congo more than the current impasse between incumbent President 

Joseph Kabila and veteran opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi, each of whom has 

claimed victory in the November 28 Presidential polls. The legitimacy crisis threatens to trigger another round of civil war in a country that has already lost over 6 

million of its people to the repercussions from a long and senseless conflict. 

On December 9, Daniel Ngoy Mulunda, chairman of Congo’s Independent National Electoral Commission, declared President Kabila winner of the contentious 

election, with 49 percent of the votes. Tshisekedi, the main challenger, placed a distant second with 32 percent. Tshisekedi has rejected the results, called Mulunda’s 

statement a ‘‘provocation of the people’’ and declared himself President-elect. The 

main opposition parties have rallied behind Tshisekedi and are calling on the international community to help solve the impasse. 

The opposition has a strong case. A day after Mulunda declared Kabila the winner, the Carter Center’s election monitoring mission issued an unequivocal statement charging that the results announced by the electoral commission lacked credibility. The observers noted that the mismanagement of the vote tabulation process 

compromised the integrity of the election, which was fraught with damning legal, 

technical, and logical deficiencies from the outset. The Carter Center cited serious 

irregularities, including the loss of nearly 2,000 polling station results in Kinshasa, 

a Tshisekedi stronghold, representing as many as 350,000 voters. Another 1,000 

polling station results were mysteriously lost elsewhere in Congo, representing 

500,000 voters. 

Meanwhile, according to the Carter Center, multiple locations in Katanga province, a bastion of Kabila supporters, reported impossibly high rates of 99 to over 

100 percent voter turnout, with all or nearly all votes going to the incumbent. The 

observers also noted that a review of locations with similar high percentage votes 

for Tshisekedi did not reveal the same coincidence of perfect collection of polling station results and extremely high voter turnout—meaning that voter turnout in 

Tshisekedi’s strongholds was within expected norms. The Catholic Church, arguably 

Congo’s most influential institution, which deployed 30,000 election observers across 

the country, backed the Carter Center’s statement. Cardinal Laurent Monsengwo, 

Archibishop of Kinshasa, told journalists the electoral commission’s results conformed with neither truth nor justice. ‘‘These observations pose a serious credibility 

problem for the election,’’ the cardinal said. 

Kabila waited nearly 3 days to hold a news conference and react to the Carter 

Center’s statement and Tshisekedi’s rejection of the results. He conceded that there 

had been problems with the process, but dismissed the mission’s conclusion that the 

results were not credible. ‘‘The credibility of these elections cannot be put in doubt,’’ 

the President insisted, as he accused the Carter Center of going beyond what was 

expected. Throughout the process, the electoral commission had maintained that the 

role of monitors was only to observe, not to ask questions. 

While Kabila remained silent, his government was reacting swiftly and forcefully, 

unleashing armed antiriot policemen and elements of the elite Presidential guard 

into the streets of Kinshasa to confront Tshisekedi’s partisans. Several people have 

been killed in clashes between state security agents and the protesters, and an 

unconfirmed number of young men have been abducted from their homes by these 

same agents and driven to undisclosed locations. 

The bustling capital of nearly 10 million has turned into a ghost city, as the people are afraid to venture out of their homes. The government has cut off textmessaging services, and Internet access is now limited, slow and intermittent. The 

diplomatic community has exhorted Tshisekedi’s supporters to refrain from violence, 

but has not condemned abuses by state security agents. As of this writing, the 

Limete neighborhood where Tshisekedi’s residence and party headquarters are 

located is under heavy police siege. The movement and activities of his supporters 

are curtailed by state security agents who harass and manhandle them at checkpoints, provoking them into violence. 

In the meantime, Tshisekedi is threatening to appoint his ministerial cabinet and 

Congolese diaspora communities have taken to the streets in Pretoria, Brussels, 

Washington DC, and Toronto to protest these abuses and demand that the international community respect the will of the people as expressed through their vote. 

Some exiled groups, however, are speaking of potential armed insurrection. 

How did we get here? The root cause of the crisis can be traced back to bad policymaking by the pro-Kabila Presidential majority in Parliament. After Jean-Pierre 

Bemba, former Presidential hopeful and Kabila’s main challenger in the 2006 elecVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:32 May 02, 2012 Jkt 072394 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\2011 ISSUE TEXT HEARINGS\73921.TXT M
34 

tion, was arrested by the International Criminal Court in 2008 for crimes committed 

by his soldiers in Central African Republic, Kabila’s reelection in 2011 seemed all 

but certain. Tshisekedi, who had boycotted the 2006 election, was old, sick, and 

seeking medical care in Europe. No other potential candidate had either the stature 

or the funds to compete with Kabila. 

All that changed when Tshisekedi decided to return home in December 2010 and 

announced that he would run for President. With thousands of supporters turning 

out to greet him at the airport, his cortege took 8 hours to travel 10 miles to his 

party’s headquarters in Limete. Kabila’s advisers panicked, and the President’s parliamentary majority passed a hasty constitutional revision in January that scrapped 

the two-round voting process in favor of one round within 1 week. 

Without the possibility of a runoff, Kabila—with his 10 years in office, an organized network of parties, and substantial government funds not available to the opposition—gained a disproportionate advantage as the incumbent. The constitutional 

revision meant that the President only needed to garner the most votes of all 11 

candidates, rather than a majority. 

Opposition parties along with civil-society groups denounced the constitutional revision, calling it irresponsible and dangerous for the security and stability of the 

country. Major powers in the West, however, especially the United States, France, 

and Belgium, wrote off the power play as an internal affair. 

For reasons that elude Congolese analysts, Western diplomats feel more comfortable with Kabila, whom they see as the defender of stability and peace in Congo. 

It is true that the government in Kinshasa has recently made economic gains. The 

country coasted through the global financial crisis relatively unscathed. In 2010, the 

International Monetary Fund and the World Bank approved a $12.3 billion debt relief package to help alleviate Kinshasa’s financial burden, which was part of the 

Mobutu legacy. And largely because of investment in the country’s extractive sector, 

particularly copper, the World Bank expects Congo’s economy to grow over the next 

several years at around 7 percent annually, one of the fastest economic growth rates 

in Africa. But over the last decade of Kabila leadership, little has changed for the 

average Congolese—who is worse off than he or she was in the previous decade. 

With a chronically weak state, Congo has consistently performed poorly on human 

development rankings and continues to place at the bottom of most indexes. 

These same diplomats view Tshisekedi as intransigent and difficult, and often dismiss him as irrational. In private, they point to his uncompromising positions and 

the statements he made last month in South Africa (declaring himself President) 

as signs of an unsuitable personality for the nation’s highest office. But many Congolese see him as the father of the modern democratic movement. His partisans revere him as a messiah—in part, no doubt, because he is everything that Kabila is 

not: He has no money, no militia, and no state machinery behind him. 

A former close associate of the late President Mobutu, Sese Seko, Tshisekedi 

broke off with the strongman to fight for democracy in 1982 when he cofounded the 

Union pour la De ́mocratie et le Progre`s Social (UDPS). He has built a loyal and 

committed base over three decades. Over the years, Tshisekedi was imprisoned, tortured, and deported to his native village by both the Mobutu and Kabila regimes. 

But he never relented. 

Western diplomats’ bias notwithstanding, the crisis also stems from the inadequate performance of Congolese leaders, who waited until March 2011 to set up 

the electoral commission, known as the CENI, to carry out the vote. The delay— 

the law mandated that it be established in 2007—undermined the complex operations ahead. Just days before the election, ballots and boxes had still not made 

their way to all of the country’s polling places. 

Tshisekedi’s Democratic Union for Social Progress sounded the alarm in July 

about potential problems with the process and filed an official complaint with the 

CENI about what it called massive fraud and corruption of the voter registry. UDPS 

alleged that the CENI had been stocking voter rolls with potential Kabila supporters. They also alleged that more than 2 million voters listed in areas favorable 

to Kabila were either redundancies or phony names. For its part, the CENI has repeatedly rejected UDPS’s call for a transparent, independent audit of voter lists. 

As grievances and disputes over electoral law arose, the CENI failed to provide 

an adequate forum for dialogue with the opposition, holding meetings on an ad hoc 

basis, driven by events or crises, not by a set schedule. As a result, UDPS staged 

weekly street protests in Kinshasa to demand that the integrity of the electoral 

process be reinstated through an independent audit of the voter registry. Police and 

security services cracked down on the protests and intimidated members of the 

opposition. 

The CENI consists of four members from the majority, including Chairman Daniel 

Ngoy Mulunda, and three representatives of the opposition. But, the independence 

35 

of these commissioners has been called into question as the CENI has regularly 

shown bias against the opposition. Mulunda is very close to President Kabila and 

the other commissioners rarely took a public stance on the electoral debate to assert 

their independence. The media landscape also tilted heavily in the President’s favor. 

In its preliminary report on the election, the European Union Election Observation Mission noted that state-run radio and television channels did not grant opposition parties equal access to programming time as required by law. During the news 

slot, Kabila received 86 percent of the time consecrated to Presidential candidates, 

Kengo Wa Dondo received 7 percent, Vital Kamerhe received 3 percent, and Etienne 

Tshisekedi received 1 percent. Indeed, the state media made no effort to hide its 

bias: Gigantic posters of a smiling Kabila hung (and still hang) on the two facades 

of the national radio and television headquarters. In Kinshasa, the road from the 

airport to downtown was (and is still) saturated with billboards of Kabila. All of 

these violations were ignored. 

Throughout all of this, Western embassies appeared content to look the other way. 

Diplomats from the United States, France, Britain, and Belgium have praised the 

CENI for enrolling 32 million voters, no doubt an impressive feat considering the 

enormous logistical challenges. But voter enrollment was the first step of an electoral process—not the end. These same international actors remained silent about 

the allegations of fraud and irregularities, even as Congolese and international 

human rights organizations denounced violence and abuses. Their silence has 

helped spawn a crisis that could have easily been averted. 

Inexplicably, even with the strong statements by the Carter Center and the 

Catholic Church, Western diplomats—from the U.S. State Department to the 

French and Belgian ministries of foreign affairs to the United Nations—remain 

ambivalent. They continue to hedge their positions, hesitant to speak in the strongest of terms in favor of a transparent, credible, and fair process. They further 

worsen the crisis by consistently blaming street violence on the opposition even as 

they ignore the massive human rights abuses by state security agents. This blatant 

bias in favor of perpetrators of gross human rights violations erodes the fig leaf of 

credibility the international community has in the eyes of the Congolese voters and 

opposition. 

At stake is nothing less than the stability of a country of 70 million people. Unless 

the international community takes its responsibility to protect the Congolese from 

conflict seriously, Congo will slide into greater post-election violence. A mixed panel 

of highly respected Congolese and outside negotiators should be selected with the 

full support of the United States, France, Belgium, and other relevant powers to review and address the inconsistencies that have caused this crisis. The alternative 

is to let the Supreme Court certify Kabila’s provisional victory and hand him another 5-year term. In which case, watch out: The opposition will reject this victory, 

but an emboldened Kabila, with questionable legitimacy, will assert his power with 

greater popular repression, triggering a cycle of violence with untold ramifications. 

After decades of mismanagement and chronic conflict in Congo, this election presented the people with a chance to rebuild their country. With its vast natural and 

human resources, Congo has the potential to be a regional power, as it once was, 

providing stability and leadership in an area known for turmoil. But if the Congolese are robbed of a fair and honest say in their national politics, such potential will 

remain but an illusion. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Mr. Dizolele. 

All three of you have made direct reference to what is our primary focus today which is our grave concern about the legitimacy 

crisis that is produced by the widespread concerns and questions 

about not just the technical mechanics, but the actual outcome of 

the elections. And I have a question for all of you, if I could. 

You have all referred, either in your written testimony or your 

spoken testimony, to a reasonable process, to a plan B, to an active 

engagement by relevant powers in the multinational community to 

opportunities missed in the runup to the elections to insist on constitutional changes, or to push back on constitutional changes, to 

insist on better preparations of a technical and logistical nature. 

The Assistant Secretary spoke of the United States having offered 

active, prompt engagement in an audit and review, and several of 

you have spoken of that as insufficient. I agree with you that this 

36 

is fundamentally a political problem and no matter what the outcome is here in the short term of the review of the election, there 

is a real risk of Congo slipping back into the tragic violence that 

caused what has been referred to as Africa’s world war. 

If you would for our benefit review more concretely exactly what 

it is you think the United States or at least this committee can and 

should do to engage the international community to deploy the 

moral authority and resources of the United States in a way that 

will make a positive contribution to airing the real challenges of 

this election and to moving forward toward a productive and peaceful future for Congo. What exactly would you urge us to do? 

Mr. Schneider. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think the point that you made is very important in terms of lessons learned. There were moments in the preelectoral process when, at that point, a combined international diplomatic message strongly to President Kabila that he was going 

down the wrong path and this would result in the country being 

isolated—that was not done. The kind of effort that was done on 

Nigeria was not done early enough here. That is one. 

Second, now it seems to us that there is an essential need to use, 

as you stated, all of the moral and political suasion of the international community. You have the largest United Nations peacekeeping force currently in the Congo. They also have political capabilities. The Secretary General should be engaged on this. The 

African Union has a major stake in the Congo moving in the direction of stability, and we believe that the United States can help to 

generate engagement by the African Union and the United Nations 

in a concerted and unified message to the Government of the Congo 

to permit independent, international verification of the process, 

either with the current government and CENI or parallel to it. 

There needs to be full international involvement and engagement 

at a very high diplomatic level. That, thus far, is not satisfied by 

contracting with electoral experts. That is No. 1. 

No. 2 is the Catholic Church which took a leading role in the 

observation with civil society in the Congo. They need to be a very 

strong dialogue partner in how to move forward. Similarly, civil 

society in the Congo is very active. They too need to be engaged 

fully in this process. And here again, the United States does have 

a record of dealing with civil society and it should be part of what 

we do moving forward in order to, in a sense, give them some of 

the resources necessary to engage in this process. 

But the fundamental issue is independent international verification and with the purpose, as I said earlier, of enfranchising 

those who were disenfranchised in order to try and move to a position that you do know who won the election and initially aiming 

at preventing the country from slipping down the path into regional and ethnic violence. And we already see in Katanga some of 

that taking place. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Mr. Schneider. 

Mr. Gambino. 

Mr. GAMBINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You certainly have asked a question that all of us are thinking 

about a lot and talking to people in the Congo and around the 

world about what are appropriate, very concrete steps to take. 

37 

In addition to agreeing strongly with the points that Mark just 

made, let me just add two. Then, I would like to comment specifically on some of the points that Assistant Secretary Carson made, 

because what we can see is movement in the policy of the United 

States. 

At the beginning of this year, when the constitutional changes 

were made by President Kabila, moving from a two-round system 

to a one-round system, the only comment on this came from our 

Ambassador in Kinshasa, who referred to the change as an internal 

matter. He made no criticism whatsoever of the change. 

Many of us urged much greater involvement and concern; we 

kept getting replies that things were on track, that the electoral 

commission was really doing a good job, that the elections, with the 

support from the U.N. mission known as MONUSCO, would work 

out fine. We were looking at it closely. It really did not look that 

way to us. We kept saying please think about it more. It did not 

happen. 

Now we have this deeply flawed election and we are starting to 

see some movement in United States policy in a statement released 

yesterday by the State Department spokesperson. 

But here are the two points that I want to make. We still talk 

about working within existing legal remedies, but let us look at the 

electoral commission. Does one really think, given that the personnel of this electoral commission that were responsible for this 

charade in front of us, that we should expect the people of the 

Congo to rely upon them and have faith in anything they do? I do 

not see how one can credibly assert that. You keep the institution, 

but you certainly have to change the personnel. That seems to me 

very fundamental. I spoke about that in my testimony. 

The Supreme Court is to make a ruling, and in the present system there, they are supposedly the ultimate arbiters. On that 

point, I would defer to the head of the Catholic Church in Congo, 

Cardinal Monsenguo, who in a superb statement of just a few days 

ago urged the Congolese Supreme Court to do the right thing. But 

reading between the lines, if you will, there is the sense that for 

the Cardinal the Court is not the end of this process unless it does 

the right thing. So let us see what the Court does. If they do the 

right thing, whatever that might be, then we move in one direction. 

If, on the other hand, they reach a decision that looks as flawed 

as some of the actions we have seen from the electoral commission, 

then we are going to have to look very seriously at other activities 

like the ones talked about by Mark Schneider. 

The final point on that is that Assistant Secretary Carson in his 

testimony before you, in addition to using the phrase ‘‘existing legal 

remedies,’’ also used the word ‘‘rapid,’’ that we need to work on 

these things rapidly. Now, I recognize that one wants to get out of 

this crisis as quickly as possible. But if you look at the mess that 

has been created by all these irregularities and vote manipulation 

and everything around this country with 18 million votes cast and 

all the myriad problems, it is not going to be sorted through in a 

matter of a few days or a few hours. It is just not possible given 

the scale of this. 

So we have to start to be reasonable about two things. 

38 

One, how long is it going to take? And then if it is going to take 

a period of time, which I strongly suspect it will, what are the implications for maintaining short-term stability in the Congo in 

terms of governance structures, and for the support that comes 

from us and others around the world? 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Mr. Gambino. 

Mr. Dizolele. 

Mr. DIZOLELE. Thank you very much, Chairman. 

I think the first step is really the message of the United States. 

Our message has been, frankly, pathetic. I mean, at a time when 

Secretary Clinton is urging the Russians to march in the streets 

and reclaim their rights, we are getting the message that is very 

rosy when it comes to the DRC. Between the two countries, we 

know which country has suffered more calamities and which country needs this more than the other. You can answer that yourself. 

But it is ridiculous that for the entire process my colleagues have 

mentioned, the United States has given a nod to the process when 

everybody knows it has been really despicable, and I think we need 

to change that, if your committee can start sending a strong message that the United States stands for something. We should not 

be sounding like the Chinese. And so far in Congo, the United 

States diplomacy is not different from the Chinese. We cannot continue like that. 

So I think we need to put pressure. So like my friend Tony has 

just said, we should put pressure so that the process is not expedited. There is no point to expedite the process if this is going to 

unravel not maybe in 6 months, but maybe in a year. As things 

are, this is a ticking bomb. So we need to insist. Congo depends on 

us. I know that it is a sovereign country. It is my homeland but 

it is also a sick country that depends on us. We have tremendous 

leverage on the Government of DRC. The State Department does 

not like to acknowledge this, but I am sure they know that they 

have tremendous leverage that is not being used. We should use 

those levers and insist on a delay on the certification of results, 

and then we will follow what both Tony and Mark have just recommended, to start looking beyond the technical review, the politics of it so that disenfranchised Congolese voters finally will get 

their voice heard. This may mean that Kabila is proclaimed President, but people will have confidence in the process. 

And also, I think more importantly—this is something that has 

not been discussed often—is the crisis of personalities, as we look 

at this. Mr. Tshisekedi and his group of opposition leaders have a 

terrible relationship with the diplomatic community, and in the 

process, the diplomatic community loses sight of what really is at 

stake and start shortcutting people. But that is not really the issue 

here. The issue is beyond President Kabila and beyond Tshisekedi. 

So we need to look at the process, keeping that in mind. 

Thank you. 

Senator COONS. Let me, if I might, Mr. Dizolele, seek a clarification of your earlier testimony because you spoke in fairly stark 

terms as if the United-States-focused efforts by the Congress to 

make some impact on conflict minerals or on sexual violence were 

misplaced or misguided or ineffective or wasteful. What I think you 

were trying to convey to us was that these are important and vital 

39 

issues that deserve attention, but that they exist within the larger 

context of a country whose politics and whose governance are the 

main enduring problem, and if we do not fix political legitimacy 

and we do not, on behalf of the United States, engage in governance questions, then we can do all the work we want to through 

Dodd-Frank and conflict minerals and so forth, and we will not 

have addressed the real driver. Was that your point? 

Mr. DIZOLELE. Very much so, Mr. Chairman. And I will just illustrate a little bit. 

Congo is the size of Western Europe. So for us in the United 

States, it is one-third of the United States from the Canadian border to Florida. If we look at Vermont as eastern Congo, what is 

happening in Vermont is important for the country, but to claim 

that solving the problem in Vermont would solve the larger crisis 

in the country would not be correct. Part of the problem is that 

women that are being raped need help. There is no doubt about the 

fact they needed help yesterday, urgently. But the Kivus are part 

of the greater country. What is happening in the Kivus is happening because of what is not happening in the rest of the country, 

not the other way around. If women are being raped in the Kivus— 

there are about three questions that anybody asks whether you are 

a Tibetan or Chilean or Congolese. Why—pardon my French—the 

hell are these women being raped. Where is the government? Is 

anybody protecting them? We have lost sight of that when we look 

at these issues. 

Or if we look at the conflict minerals issue, then the issue is like, 

hey, why is this looting happening. Is anyone responsible? Is there 

any adult in the house, and where is this adult in the house? We 

should be starting putting pressure on the adult in the house and 

not create a set of schemes that keep on perpetrating the problems. 

The main problem with Dodd-Frank is that the legislation builds 

on the false premise that cleaning the mineral supply chain will 

cut militias’ funding, reduce their access to weapons, and therefore 

bring peace. But even before it is implemented, this legislation has 

already put hundreds of thousands of Congolese out of work. In the 

meantime, mineral smuggling across the border, particularly with 

Rwanda, has increased. This smuggling is run by militia leaders 

who continue to benefit greatly from the illicit trade. More importantly, however, militias have other sources of income, as they tax 

all business activities in the territories that they control. In the 

end, with or without minerals, the conflict in eastern Congo will 

continue as long as we ignore the bigger context of the Congolese 

crisis. As such, if or when the legislation is implemented, DoddFrank will effectively certify the looting of DRC’s mineral resources 

to everyone else’s benefit but at the expense of the Congolese 

people. 

I will just finish with a story. I once visited Panzi hospital in 

Bukavu, and Dr. Denis Mukwege told me a story of a young 

woman. I will name her Sifa. Sifa was about 13 years old. She 

came from Shabunda, a few hours by road from Bukavu, where she 

had been raped. She came to Panzi. For those of you who have 

been to Panzi, Panzi is a small hospital. It is famous but it is very 

small. While this young woman was being treated, she used to do 

her makeup every morning and talk to the doctor and say, ‘‘Papa, 

40 

you see how beautiful I am. Whatever happens, do not send me 

back to Shabunda.’’ 

Six months later after she was fully healed, Dr. Mukwege 

against his own judgment and against the will of the woman, but 

because of capacity problems, sent her back to Shabunda. She came 

back about 6 months later. She had been raped again and this time 

it was worse. The surgery did not take and they ran further testing 

on her only to find out that she was HIV-positive. 

So this woman, this Shabunda girl—she does not want the 

United States to just give $17 million, as Secretary Clinton promised when she did the tour of the area. She wants this sexual violence to stop. And in order for it to stop, we, the international community and humanity, have to have the courage and say this has 

to stop, start arresting people, start putting pressure on the adult 

in the house, which is the Congolese Government, not just on the 

U.N. because often we displace the discourse. Then we blame the 

U.N. We blame everybody else and we give a free ride to the Government of DRC. That is not the kind of policymaking that the 

Congolese people want. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Mr. Schneider, you said that there was obvious 

fraud in certain regions or provinces and there ought to be a revote 

in those provinces. 

And then, Mr. Gambino, you said the whole election was clearly 

fraudulent. Do you think there should be a revote in the entire 

country? 

Mr. GAMBINO. Senator Isakson, that is an extraordinarily important issue. I think the Congolese themselves are going to have to 

think that through, with help from international actors, experts, 

and others to think through a way to get to a reasonable democratic outcome. 

As I look at it—and I have looked pretty closely at the results 

around the country—we see obviously fraudulent results in 

Katanga. You have three large areas amounting to about threequarters of a million votes where in two of them the results are 100 

percent of the voters voted for President Kabila. So you can go 

through—and I have done this—hundreds of pages of results for 

each voting station where there were roughly 400 or 500 Congolese 

voting. Every single voter, we are to believe, went and cast his or 

her ballot for President Kabila in these polling places in each of 

these areas. That is one example. 

In certain areas of north Kivu, there are very clear reports of 

intimidation and extremely troubling results as you start looking 

at specific areas. 

Others have referred to the Kinshasa results. There were votes 

lost, perhaps as many as a million—and Mark Schneider has 

talked about this—where they know people voted and then the 

votes disappeared. So we have this as well. 

Are you going to be able to sort all that through and somehow 

come out to something and say we are absolutely confident that 

either Joseph Kabila or Etienne Tshisekedi did? If you can, fanVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:32 May 02, 2012 Jkt 072394 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\2011 ISSUE TEXT HEARINGS\73921.TXT M
41 

tastic. I am a little skeptical, frankly, given the scale that one sees. 

I would defer to experts. 

If we do not do it, then we have quite a problem. If you can 

revote in certain areas, OK. But if those areas amount to most of 

the province of Katanga, which is the size of Texas and which 

where over 3 million people voted, a lot of Kinshasa, a city of 10 

million people and millions of voters, and substantial portions of 

other provinces—you know, you see where I am going. That starts 

to look like another full round of voting. 

I will just put out one more question for you to consider, and I 

do not have the answer. 

The Congolese had a system in 2006 which was a two-round system. You had over 30 candidates for President in 2006. If no one 

got over 50 percent, you went to a second round with the top two 

candidates. That is what happened. You had a second round 

against the top two candidates. President Kabila beat Jean Pierre 

Bemba 58 to 42. 

It seems to me that as you look at these horribly complex and 

flawed results right now, there are probably two things that we can 

all agree on. Nobody won more than 50 percent and the two top 

vote-getters are Joseph Kabila and Etienne Tshisekedi. It may be 

cleaner to think about some kind of competition that way. One can 

organize such an election relatively quickly. The Congo is slated to 

have its next round of elections nationwide in March. So we do 

have something coming forward. So as you think it through—I am 

certainly not making a proposal. I am just trying to think through 

with you some of the options that people are discussing right now 

to work through what is a mess without a clear, clean, rapid outcome right now that most of us see. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, the reason I asked the question is from 

listening to all three of you, in particular Mr. Dizolele and his comments, I do not think a revote right now is really possible or would 

bring a result that would be any different without fundamental 

change in the process. Do you agree with that, Mr. Dizolele? 

Mr. DIZOLELE. I am sorry. I missed—— 

Senator ISAKSON. I really do not think a revote would be possible 

to create any other change in the result immediately because of the 

given corruption that exists today. Is that correct? 

Mr. DIZOLELE. I think there is a lot of truth to that in the sense 

that Tony just mentioned that there are so many things that have 

to change. I mean, if we are going to have a revote, does that 

revote happen with the same team that we have in place? And if 

it does, then what does that mean? 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, let me interrupt you because you made 

the statement parenthetically. You said, well, maybe we ought to 

just let the President stay in for another year, but then charge 

them to have another election and structure the vote better. I think 

that is what you said. 

Mr. DIZOLELE. No; I did not make that statement. 

Senator ISAKSON. You did not make that statement? 

Mr. DIZOLELE. No. That was not me. 

Senator ISAKSON. OK. Somebody said that. 

42 

Mr. GAMBINO. I did not say it, Senator, but I think what you 

asked is so important. But I am actually more optimistic about this 

than perhaps some others. 

We sometimes get a false dichotomy between the 2006 and the 

2011 elections. People pretend that in 2006 the international community did everything, and so the elections went reasonably well, 

and that in 2011 the Congolese did most everything and the results 

have turned out poorly. That is actually not true. 

In 2006, yes, the international community did more, played a 

better role, was more engaged. But there was a huge role played 

by a much better Congolese electoral commission and a much 

cleaner election all around. The Congolese did a fantastic job in 

2006. 

I think this time around, as I have said and the others have said, 

one should make some changes in personnel, obviously, but also get 

the kind of heightened international engagement that Mark 

Schneider and others are talking about. If you came to a second 

round early next year, for example, Senator, surely you should 

have some people placed in some of those areas, Congolese observers, where we got the highly dubious reports that 100 percent of 

the voters were for Kabila. You know, some of these can be done. 

The Catholic Church had 30,000 observers at this election. Some 

of these things can be done to get us to the kinds of credible outcomes that must be attained. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, more transparency brings about a lot 

more accountability. There is no question about that. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. If I could, it does seem to me that while we can 

come up with a variety of scenarios to get to an end, that has to 

be the result of negotiation in the DRC. And that is where I think 

you need to have a combined, unified international view, high-level, 

former Presidents from African countries that are authorized by 

the African Union, in a sense blessed by the United Nations and 

supported in terms of trying to bring about a mediation that says, 

OK, we believe there should be a second round for those two or 

revoting for these areas and we will have essentially a parallel 

process to determine the outcome. 

But there needs to be—and here is where I guess I disagree a 

little bit. I do think we need immediate international engagement 

in this effort at this time because I am very concerned that December 19—you heard the Supreme Court. That is the last date. Well, 

the Supreme Court decides on these disputes in-camera, closed 

sessions. Given what we have had thus far and what we know, it 

issues a result that says the preliminary results stand. Then you 

have essentially lit a match. And it just seems to me that between 

now and then you need to engage the international community to 

try and bring about some process of discussion aimed at a 

compromise. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, my time is up and we are about to have 

a vote I think. 

But let me just add a comment to our Marine. Mr. Dizolele, when 

you made your comment, I reflected back 2 years ago when I was 

on the USS Eisenhower in a NATO exercise in the Atlantic and 

went down to the mess hall and sat at the Congolese table. There 

were 10 Congolese volunteers in the United States Navy serving 

43 

our country on a fast track to citizenship basis. And I want to 

thank you for doing that and thank you on behalf of the American 

people. 

Mr. DIZOLELE. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator COONS. Senator Isakson was referring to—we had a 

scheduled 4 o’clock vote on the authorization for the Defense 

Department. 

Senator ISAKSON. Actually Senator Isakson was trying to make 

an excuse to make an exit because I have one other stop I gave got 

to make. [Laughter.] 

Thank you all for your testimony. 

Senator COONS. Well, then let me thank Senator Isakson for his 

good nature, his disciplined and steady contributions to the work 

of this subcommittee, and for the honor of serving with him. 

You have presented focused and concrete concerns about this 

election. I am sorry we have not gotten into more detail about the 

many other issues and challenges that face the DRC, the role of the 

newly appointed special representative to the DRC and the Great 

Lakes, the role that the U.N. peacekeeping mission can and should 

play in security sector reform, whether it is reasonably possible to 

certify conflict minerals as being conflict-free and whether that is 

relevant to improving future governance and outcomes in the east 

and northeast, what if anything more we can and should be doing 

to promote civil society and transparency, what we can do to 

ensure a more effective electoral commission and Supreme Court. 

These are all questions that I think are valued and important. 

Let me first say that I—and I suspect all the other members of 

this subcommittee—welcome your ongoing input as this very fluid 

situation continues to evolve. It is my hope to put out a statement 

promptly, possibly jointly with Senator Isakson, that reaches our 

conclusions from this hearing, from all the input that we have gotten. And our offices have gotten quite a bit of input from the Congolese community in the United States, for which we are grateful. 

And it is my hope that the United States will take an active and 

engaged role in convening the international community to try and 

ensure that we do not miss an opportunity. We may well have 

missed them in the runup to this election. And as I said in my 

opening statement, many of us have really hoped that this election 

would secure steady forward progress for the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo toward a sustained democracy. 

I agree with you that this is a moment of great risk and that 

there is a real possibility that it will slip as Cote d’Ivoire did after 

a challenging contested election into enormous difficulty. There is 

a moment here, I think, for the faith community, for NGOs, for 

Congolese civil society, and for the international community to 

negotiate an appropriate resolution of what is a flawed election 

that could produce a political crisis. 

I am grateful for your testimony today. I look forward to your 

continued input, and as we move to a vote on an equally important 

issue for our Nation, I am grateful for your passion about improving the lives of the people of the Congo and about continuing America’s role as one of the leaders in advancing democracy around the 

world. Thank you very much. 

44 

We will leave the record open for 1 week from today given the 

number of other members of this subcommittee who had expressed 

strong interest but were unable to join us today. 

Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNNIE CARSON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR BARBARA BOXER

Question. In late November, elections were held in the DRC, and all signs suggest 

that they were anything but free and fair. The Carter Center stated that it found 

‘‘the provisional Presidential elections results . . . to lack credibility.’’ And the head 

of the Catholic Church in the DRC said that the ‘‘results are not founded in truth 

or justice.’’ 

The State Department’s Web site describes our relations with the DRC government as ‘‘very strong.’’ The United States is also the largest donor to the DRC. For 

example: 

The United States provided more than $300 million in bilateral foreign aid to the 

DRC last year alone. 

The United States is the largest contributor to the U.N. Stabilization Mission in 

the DRC, contributing to almost one-third of its annual $1 billion budget. 

The U.S. military has trained a Congolese Army battalion, to which it is providing 

ongoing support. 

• How is the United States using its ‘‘very strong’’ relationship with the DRC government to help prevent a widespread outbreak of post-election violence? 

• Can we use our influence to help explore a negotiated solution to the current 

election? 

Answer. The United States has been working hard to prevent post-election violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Our Ambassador to the DRC 

and I have been in constant contact with the Congolese authorities, key opposition 

leaders, the U.N. Special Representative in the DRC Roger Meece, other donors, and 

regional leaders to forestall violence resulting from the elections. Our message has 

been that all Congolese political leaders and their supporters act responsibly, 

renounce violence, and resolve any disagreements through peaceful constructive 

dialogue. 

At this time, we do not see a need for international negotiation; however. A rapid 

technical review of the electoral process by the Congolese authorities and outside 

experts may determine ways to provide more credible results, minimize irregularities, and generally provide guidance that will improve future elections. 

Question. Far too often, the perpetrators of sexual violence in the DRC are members of the Congolese Army, or FARDC. 

The FARDC is made up of ill-trained and ill-equipped soldiers, many of whom are 

former member of militias. Few are regularly paid or fed by the DRC Government. 

In turn, many prey on the communities that they are ostensibly responsible for 

protecting. 

A story told to Human Rights Watch by a 15-year-old-girl illustrates the devastation of the problem: ‘‘There were six soldiers who came into my house. They first 

raped my 3-year-old sister, and then two of them raped me while the other looted 

our house. They threw my newborn baby onto the ground . . . the soldiers were 

wearing military uniforms . . . after they raped me, they took my mother away 

with them. She hasn’t come back yet, and I think she must be dead. Five other 

houses . . . were visited the same night by the soldiers.’’ 

• How is this outrage [Congolese Armed Forces committing sexual and genderbased violence] allowed to continue? 

• What pressure can the international community bring to bear on President 

Kabila to reform the military? 

• Has the Congolese Government made any significant efforts to pay members of 

the FARDC and remove those responsible for past crimes? 

• What, specifically, is the U.S. Government doing on this front? 

Answer. The perpetrators of this horrific sexual and gender-based in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) include the Democratic Forces for the Liberation 

of Rwanda (known by its French acronym—FDLR), various Mai Mai groups and 

45 

some elements of the Congolese Army (FARDC). This abuse is inexcusable and 

occurs largely because the state security forces—the police and military forces are 

largely unprofessional and in need of significant training and reform. The DRC has 

also been slow to remove those in its military who abuse human rights including 

Bosco Ntaganda and senior commanders such as Innocent Zimurinda. We have 

called on the DRC and regional states to honor their international obligations and 

arrest those for whom international arrest warrants have been issued. In addition, 

we have called on the DRC to arrest other senior commanders. We have pressed 

the DRC Government to make security sector reform a greater priority and more 

diligently pursue and prosecute perpetrators. The United States and the international community also are assisting the DRC Government to establish institutional structures and processes to support stabilization, including security sector reform, as well as to develop a professional military that will allow for an eventual 

drawdown and withdrawal of the U.N. Organization Stabilization Mission in the 

DRC (MONUSCO). With our and other international assistance, the DRC Government has begun paying the members of its armed forces more systematically. The 

European Union has helped the government implement a census of soldiers and a 

biometric database that is linked to the armed forces’ payment system. As a result, 

more soldiers are receiving their regular salaries—though these salaries are often 

meager, and some elements of the armed forces have attempted to remain outside 

the biometric system. We insist that elements receiving U.S. training be paid on 

time. 

We also have assisted the DRC’s judiciary and the investigations and prosecutions 

of a growing number of cases, including the high-profile conviction in early 2011 of 

a colonel and several other officers for rape. The DRC Government is taking legal 

action against three of the so-called ‘‘FARDC five’’ officers whom the U.N. Security 

Council in 2009 alleged raped civilians. But tackling the problem effectively requires 

further prosecutions, which we and the international community continue to press 

for at the highest level. 

Question. In May of this year, I spearheaded a letter with Senator Moran and 12 

of our colleagues to President Obama calling for the appointment of a Special Representative to the Great Lakes Region of Africa. 

In the letter, we noted the multitude of challenges facing the Great Lakes Region, 

including those in the DRC where ‘‘extrajudicial killings and the systemic and 

pervasive use of rape and sexual violence, has destroyed the lives of countless 

civilians.’’ 

In particular, we stressed how helpful the appointment of a Great Lakes Special 

Representative could be, noting that such a position could help build upon the work 

of the ambassadors in the region and would send an important message that the 

Great Lakes Region is a high priority for the Obama administration. 

That is why I was so pleased to see the recent appointment by Secretary Clinton 

of Ambassador Barrie Walkley as the Special Advisor to the Great Lakes and the 

DRC. 

• Will Ambassador Walkley be fully empowered to negotiate with regional governments, the Kabila government and international entities, particularly at this 

critical time in the DRC. What role will he play? Will there be any limitations 

placed on his position? 

Answer. Yes, Ambassador Barrie Walkley will be negotiating with regional governments, the DRC Government and with others in the international community on 

Great Lakes issues. As Special Advisor, Ambassador Walkley will work closely with 

Secretary Clinton, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Johnnie Carson, our ambassadors and missions in the field, and other State Department officials to devise, 

shape, and coordinate U.S. policy on cross-border security, political, economic, and 

social issues arising in the Great Lakes and the DRC. He will also coordinate with 

the interagency, the U.S. Congress and other nongovernmental organizations, and 

the private sector to address issues that cut across borders and bureaucratic divisions, including conflict minerals and sexual and gender-based violence. 

RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNNIE CARSON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RICHARD J. DURBIN

Question. According to some estimates, more than 1,100 women and girls are 

raped every day in the Congo. That is nearly one woman every minute. That is the 

worst record of sexual violence of any nation on Earth. During my most recent visit 

to Eastern Congo, I had the chance to return to Heal Africa, a hospital in Goma 

that specializes, in part, in treating victims of sexual violence. The scene of these 

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women lining up in the dust to be treated for obstetric fistula and other horrific consequences of sexual violence is one I will never forget. I know Secretary Clinton had 

a chance to visit the hospital as well during her visit. 

• What steps are State and USAID taking to help reduce the level of genderbased violence in the DRC? 

Answer. The U.S. Department of State shares your concern and sense of urgency 

about the continuing sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) waged against 

women and children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In FY 2011, 

USAID’s SGBV programs helped 1,286,595 people gain access to critical SGBV care 

and treatment services. In order to prevent SGBV, USAID’s programs engage both 

men and women at the community and provincial levels through targeted advocacy 

campaigns. We are working with the DRC Government, the United Nations, and our 

international and regional partners to empower women, including increasing their 

involvement in the political process and their role in economic development. 

In addition, to make inroads on SGBV prevention, more needs to be done on security sector reform and strengthening the judicial sector. The absence of professionalism in the police and military forces is a key driver of many instances of this 

violence, and we have pressed the DRC Government to prosecute perpetrators and 

provided assistance to better enable them to do so. Our support to Congolese 

military justice institutions and the American Bar Association has enabled investigations and prosecutions of a growing number of cases, including the high-profile 

conviction in early 2011 of a colonel and several other officers for rape. The DRC 

Government is also prosecuting several of the so-called ‘‘FARDC five’’ officers identified in 2009 by the Security Council, who are alleged to have committed direct rape. 

The progress in these cases is welcome, but grossly insufficient and requires that 

the Congolese develop an independent and robust mechanism to try politically sensitive cases of high ranking officers. For this reason, we supported the Minister of 

Justice’s legislative proposal to establish specialized mixed courts to address atrocity 

crimes, which would include international personnel on a temporary basis. Parliament recommended that the legislation needed to be modified to address constitutional issues, and we look forward to reengaging with the government, Parliament, 

and civil society on this issue. At the same time, we urge the GDRC to arrest known 

perpetrators, such as ICC-indictee Bosco Ntaganda, in accordance with their international obligations. We will continue to press for these reforms at the highest level. 

Question. One of the problems mentioned to me in Congo by very brave and dedicated human rights NGOs was the impunity with which known human rights violators operated in Congo, notably in the ranks of the Congolese military. I spoke last 

year with then-U.N. Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping, Alain LeRoy, about 

ensuring that the important and sizeable U.N. peacekeeping forces in eastern Congo 

did not cooperate or assist any Congolese military units with known human rights 

violators in their ranks. 

• Can State comment on the Congolese Government’s seeming inability to go 

after these known criminals—is it a matter of capacity or political will? 

• Can you also comment on the Congolese warlord, Bosco Ntaganda, who is 

wanted by the International Criminal Court but seems to operate and live with 

impunity in Goma? 

Answer. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) does not 

currently have sufficient political will or security and judicial capacity to arrest, 

prosecute, and imprison known or suspected criminals. The military and police require professionalization and the capacity and independence of the judicial system 

must be bolstered. To do so will require significantly more commitment on the part 

of senior Congolese leaders including the President, the Ministry of Defense, the 

Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Justice. 

The National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), the ex-armed group 

led by ICC-indictee Bosco Ntaganda, and formerly backed by Rwanda, has been 

poorly integrated in the Congolese Armed Forces and maintains its own parallel 

command structure in eastern Congo where the Government of the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo (DRC) has little control or influence. Ntaganda surrounds 

himself with CNDP soldiers loyal to him and has threatened that if any of his men 

are investigated or prosecuted, he will pull the CNDP out of the Congolese Army 

and return to fighting the government. Nonetheless, it is the obligation of the DRC 

to arrest Bosco. We continue to urge the DRC Government to ensure that perpetrators of serious human rights and international humanitarian law are brought to justice in accordance with the DRC’s international obligations. We also continue to call 

on regional states including Rwanda, to support Bosco’s arrest. This support is key 

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to the GDRC’s willingness to arrest Bosco, as well as mitigating any potential violent fallout. 

ECI PAPER ‘‘TECHNICAL ISSUES THREATEN FREE, FAIR, AND TRANSPARENT ELECTIONS

IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: URGENT STEPS REQUIRED’’ SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY ANTHONY W. GAMBINO

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