Filed 5/14/24 Peters v. SDLA Courier Service CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

SAMANTHA PETERS,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SDLA COURIER SERVICE, 

INC.

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Civil No. B330142

(Super. Ct. No. 56-2023-

00574362-CU-OE-VTA)

(Ventura County)

Appellant SDLA Courier Service, Inc. appeals from an 

order denying its motion to compel respondent Samantha Peters 

to arbitrate wage and hour claims pursuant to an arbitration 

provision in her employment agreement. (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 1294, subd. (a).) SDLA contends the trial court erred in finding 

that the transportation worker exemption of section 1 of the 

Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) (9 U.S.C. § 1) applied, thereby 

precluding compelled arbitration. We affirm. 
2

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

SDLA is a delivery company in Southern California and 

“makes local-only deliveries in California for its clients.” One of 

its clients is Amazon Logistics, Inc. SDLA drivers pick up 

packages at Amazon warehouses in California and deliver them 

locally to customers. 

Peters worked for SDLA from September 2018 to July 

2019. She was hired as a delivery driver and also worked as a 

dispatcher.1 She, like other SDLA delivery drivers, only picked 

up and delivered packages within California. 

When Peters was hired, she signed a Mutual Agreement to 

Arbitrate Claims (Agreement). The Agreement requires that the 

employee and employer arbitrate all claims or controversies. It 

states: “[T]he Company is engaged in transactions involving 

interstate commerce and . . . my employment involves such 

commerce. As such, I acknowledge that this Agreement is subject 

to the Federal Arbitration Act.”

Peters filed a lawsuit against SDLA, asserting individual 

and putative class claims for alleged wage and hour violations. 

SDLA moved to compel arbitration of her individual claims.

2 

SDLA argued that the FAA applied to the Agreement and that 

the transportation worker exemption under section 1 of the FAA 

1 To the extent the parties dispute whether Peters was a 

delivery driver throughout her employment, the trial court found 

Peters was a driver. We defer to the trial court’s factual finding. 

(See Bell v. H.F. Cox, Inc. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 62, 80.) 

2 SDLA also moved to dismiss the putative class claims and 

stay the proceedings, but those orders are not challenged in this 

appeal.
3

was inapplicable. The trial court denied the motion, finding that 

the section 1 exemption to the FAA applied. The court found 

Peters to be a “last-leg Amazon delivery driver[]” who is 

“considered to be [a] transportation worker[] under the FAA 

exemption.” 

DISCUSSION

SDLA contends the trial court erred in finding that Peters, 

as a driver, was “engaged in . . . interstate commerce” and that

the transportation worker exemption (9 U.S.C. § 1) applied. We 

disagree. 

Because the trial court’s order denying the motion to 

compel arbitration was based on the legal question of whether 

the FAA applies, we review the order de novo. (Nieto v. Fresno 

Beverage Co., Inc. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 274, 279 (Nieto); 

Betancourt v. Transportation Brokerage Specialists, Inc. (2021) 62 

Cal.App.5th 552, 559 (Betancourt).) 

Section 2 of the FAA provides that contracts “evidencing a 

transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration” “shall be 

valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as 

exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” (9 

U.S.C. § 2.) Thus, in most cases, the FAA mandates arbitration 

when contracts involving interstate commerce contain an 

arbitration provision. 

But section 1 of the FAA provides an exemption from FAA 

coverage “to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad 

employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or 

interstate commerce.” (9 U.S.C. § 1.) In determining whether a 

class of workers are “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,” 

the inquiry focuses on the worker and the work they perform. 

(Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon (2022) 596 U.S. 450, 455-456 
4

(Saxon).) The United States Supreme Court in Circuit City 

Stores, Inc. v. Adams (2001) 532 U.S. 105, 119-121, interpreted 

the phrase “any other class of workers engaged in foreign or 

interstate commerce” to refer to “transportation workers” only,

and not employees generally. The Court did not “provide a 

complete definition of ‘transportation worker,’ [but it] indicated 

that any such worker must at least play a direct and ‘necessary 

role in the free flow of goods’ across borders” or be “actively 

‘engaged in transportation’ of those goods across borders via the 

channels of foreign or interstate commerce.” (Saxon, at p. 458.) 

The question here is whether delivery drivers such as 

Peters, who worked for an intrastate delivery company, are

exempt from the FAA coverage under the transportation worker 

exemption. Our colleagues in the First District decided a similar 

issue in Betancourt, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th 552. There, the

plaintiff was a delivery driver for a company that did the 

“ ‘last-mile delivery,’ ” primarily for its client, Amazon.com, Inc. 

(Id. at p. 560.) The drivers would pick up the Amazon packages 

from warehouses and deliver them to Amazon customers who 

lived locally. (Ibid.) The packages originated from various 

locations within the United States and even foreign countries, 

and there was nothing to indicate that the plaintiff was 

delivering only packages originating in California. (Id. at p. 561.) 

The court held that the plaintiff was exempt from FAA coverage 

under the transportation worker exemption because the 

deliveries “ ‘were essentially the last phase of a continuous 

journey of the interstate commerce’ ” for the out-of-state packages 

to reach their destination to the customer. (Id. at p. 559.) Thus, 

the plaintiff “was ‘engaged in interstate commerce through his 
5

participation in the continuation of the movement of interstate 

goods to their destinations.’ ” (Ibid.)

We agree with Betancourt and conclude that Peters was

also engaged in interstate commerce when she participated in the

last leg of the delivery of out-of-state packages. (Betancourt, 

supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 559, 561.) Contrary to SDLA’s 

argument, it is inconsequential that Peters and SDLA delivered

only within the state of California. An employee does not need to 

cross state lines for the exemption to apply. (See Saxon, supra, 

596 U.S. at 461 [concluding that airplane cargo loaders, who do 

not cross state or international boundaries, are exempt from the 

FAA]; Nieto, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 284 [holding that a 

delivery driver who only made intrastate deliveries fell within 

the transportation worker exemption because he delivered 

beverages originating from out of state].) Peters’s delivery of 

Amazon packages to its final destination played “a direct and 

‘necessary role in the free flow of goods’ across borders.” (Saxon,

at p. 458.) Without last-leg delivery drivers, such as Peters, the 

transportation of these packages would be incomplete.

Our conclusion is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s 

decision in Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc. (9th Cir. 2020) 971 

F.3d 904 (Rittmann). There, the Ninth Circuit held that a 

“last-mile” delivery driver contracted by Amazon was exempt 

from the FAA. (Rittmann, at p. 921.) The court interpreted the 

phrase “engaged in interstate or foreign commerce,” as used in 

section 1 of the FAA, to include transportation workers employed 

to deliver goods that originate out of state to an in-state 

destination. (Rittmann, at p. 910.) The court observed the 

packages do not come to rest at Amazon warehouses. (Id. at p. 

916.) Delivery providers, such as the plaintiff, pick up the 
6

packages from warehouses and transport them for the last leg to 

their destination. The interstate transaction does not conclude 

until the packages are delivered. (Id. at pp. 915-916.) Thus, the 

drivers are “engaged in the movement of interstate commerce” 

because their “transportation of goods wholly within a state are 

still a part of a continuous interstate transportation.” (Ibid.)

SDLA attempts to distinguish Rittmann by arguing that

SDLA is a purely intrastate delivery company and not engaged in 

interstate commerce. We are not persuaded. In our view, Peters 

and SDLA were engaged in interstate commerce. SDLA drivers 

performed the last-mile delivery of out-of-state packages to their 

final destination and were thus “still a part of a continuous 

interstate transportation.” (Rittmann, supra, 971 F.3d at p. 916.) 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover costs 

on appeal. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

YEGAN, J.
Benjamin F. Coats, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, Tim L. 

Johnson and Nikolas T. Djordjevski for Defendant and Appellant. 

Justice Law Corporation, Douglas Han, Shunt TatavosGharajeh, Lawrence W. Beall and Christopher Petersen for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.