IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

SANDRA LYNNE DOWNING, 

individually and as Personal 

Representative of The Estate of Brian 

Downing, Deceased, and on behalf of 

KRISTYL DOWNING and JAMES 

DOWNING, Death Beneficiaries of The 

Estate of Brian Downing,

Respondents,

v.

BLAIR LOSVAR, Personal 

Representative of THE ESTATE OF 

ALBERT E. LOSVAR. Deceased,

Respondent,

LYCOMING, A DIVISION OF AVCO 

CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation 

and subsidiary of TEXTRON AVIATION, 

INC., a foreign corporation; and JOHN 

DOES 1-20,

Defendants,

TEXTRON AVIATION, INC., a

Kansas corporation formerly CESSNA, 

AIRCRAFT COMPANY,

Petitioner.

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No. 36298-1-III

PUBLISHED OPINION

FEARING, J. —

“[T]his exact fact pattern (a resident-plaintiff sues a global [aviation] 

company, extensively serving the state market . . . for an in-state accident)’

FILED

April, 14, 2022

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals Division III
No. 36298-1-III

Downing. v. Losvar

2

also effectively functions ‘as an illustration—even a paradigm example—of 

how specific jurisdiction works.” Cohen v. Continental Motors, Inc., 2021-

NCCOA-449, 864 S.E.2d 816, 827 (N.C. 2021), review denied, 868 S.E.2d 

859 (N.C. 2022) (alterations in original) (quoting Ford Motor Company v. 

Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, ___U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 1017,

1028, 209 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2021)). 

We’re not [only] in Kansas anymore. Paraphrase of Dorothy, in The 

Wizard of Oz. 

This appeal presents the first opportunity for a Washington appellate court to 

review and apply the United States Supreme Court’s recent ruling, in Ford Motor Co. v. 

Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021), explicating the basis for 

personal jurisdiction over a nonresident manufacturer. Textron Aviation Inc., the 

successor corporation to Cessna Aircraft Company, challenges the superior court’s ruling 

that Washington courts possess personal jurisdiction over the aviation company in this 

lawsuit brought as the result of a crash of a Cessna airplane in Okanogan County. In so 

arguing, Textron Aviation takes flight in order to dissociate and distance itself from the 

company’s promotional material that boasts of its manufacturing planes for a worldwide 

market and brags about its far ranging and quick service throughout the nation. Because 

the owner of the Cessna plane resided in Washington State, because the crash occurred in 

Washington State, because Cessna Aircraft Company possessed extensive contacts with 

Washington State, and because this lawsuit relates in part to those contacts, we affirm the 

superior court’s finding of personal jurisdiction under Washington’s long-arm statute and 
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3

the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 

Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court compels our ruling. 

FACTS

This lawsuit arises from the crash of a Cessna T182T Skylane, four-seat light 

piston-engine aircraft. The impact killed pilot Albert Losvar and passenger Brian 

Downing. The estate of Brian Downing initiated this suit against the estate of Albert 

Losvar on the theory of pilot error and failure to maintain the aircraft. After some 

discovery, Downing’s estate concluded that the plane likely malfunctioned, and the estate 

added Textron Aviation Inc., the successor corporation to the manufacturer of the plane, 

Cessna Aircraft Company, as a defendant. The estate of Albert Losvar cross claimed 

against Textron Aviation. 

We purloin our facts from the complaint of the estate of Brian Downing, the cross

claim of the estate of Albert Losvar, and affidavits filed by the parties in support of and in 

opposition to Textron Aviation’s motion to dismiss. These facts extend to the nature and 

extent of Cessna Aircraft Company’s and Textron Aviation’s business, Cessna’s 

activities in Washington State, the provenance of the Cessna T182T involved in the 

Okanogan County crash, and the few facts known about the crash. We refer to Textron 

Aviation Inc. as “Textron Aviation” and its parent company Textron Inc. as “Textron.” 

We refer to Cessna Aircraft Company as “Cessna.” We refer to the respective estates 
No. 36298-1-III

Downing. v. Losvar

4

simply as Downing and Losvar. For purposes of this appeal, Downing and Losvar hold 

the same interests and forward the same arguments. 

Cessna designed and manufactured the T182T model aircraft in Kansas. In 2008, 

Cessna, not Textron Aviation, sold the Cessna T182T craft at issue to an authorized 

Cessna dealer in Napa, California. The Napa dealer retrieved the plane from 

Independence, Kansas, and the dealer later sold the plane to a customer in San Francisco. 

In 2012, Albert Losvar purchased the plane from the San Francisco owner. 

Cessna received notice of Albert Losvar’s purchase of the used plane and Losvar’s 

Washington address. Between August 2012 and October 2014, Cessna sent Losvar, in 

Washington State, six notices or service bulletins concerning the Cessna T182T. For 

example, in March 2014, Cessna sent a service letter to Losvar explaining that a suspect 

fuel pump might have been installed on his plane. This service letter advised Losvar to 

inspect his plane’s paperwork or the plane’s fuel pump to determine if the suspect pump 

had been installed. As required by law, Textron Aviation mails service bulletins to all 

registered owners of aircraft covered by the given service bulletin. 

On August 13, 2015, the Cessna T182T plane owned by Albert Losvar departed 

the airport in Oroville, Washington. Fifteen minutes after taking off, the plane crashed, 

killing pilot Losvar and passenger Brian Downing. 

Following the crash, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) examined 

the fuel selector valve from Losvar’s plane. The NTSB found “[a] black, rigid solid” 
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Downing. v. Losvar

5

material inside the valve. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 722. Nevertheless, the Board could not 

determine the nature of the material because it had “decomposed to elemental carbon and 

water” when exposed to high temperatures. CP at 722. 

After the NTSB’s examination, an independent aviation accident investigator and 

reconstructionist, Mark Pottinger, concluded that the black, rigid solid substance, found 

in the fuel selector valve, contained glass fibers. Pottinger, a man prouder of his aviation 

engineering background than his law degree, teaches engineering at University of 

Southern California. Pottinger opined that the glass fibers likely entered the fuel system 

during manufacturing, and the fibers migrated through the fuel system until they

completely obstructed the fuel selector valve. Textron Aviation denies any 

manufacturing defect and contends the material found inside the valve was deposited in 

the selector valve only because of the heat immediately following the crash. 

Although Downing and Losvar sue Textron Aviation, we first review the 

background of Cessna, a predecessor company of Textron Aviation. Tinkerer Clyde

Cessna built his first plane in 1911 on the Oklahoma salt plains. By 1927, Cessna, then a 

car dealer in Enid, Oklahoma, moved his upstart plane construction operation from Enid

to Wichita, Kansas, because Enid bankers refused to lend him money. That same year, 

Cessna formed the Cessna Aircraft Company, which in the mid-to-late twentieth century, 

functioned as one of the highest volume and most diverse producers of general aviation 
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Downing. v. Losvar

6

aircraft. With Cessna and other plane works, Wichita vied with Seattle as Air Capital of 

the World. 

General Dynamics purchased Cessna in 1985. In 1992, Textron Inc. purchased 

Cessna from General Dynamics, and Cessna for the next twelve years functioned as a 

subsidiary of Textron. In March 2014, Textron purchased plane manufacturers 

Beechcraft and Hawker Aircraft. Cessna then ceased operations as a subsidiary company 

of Textron and joined the two other manufacturers as one of three distinct brands 

produced by Textron Aviation Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Textron. At first 

Textron Aviation was the sole shareholder of Cessna. As a result of a merger in 2017, 

Textron Aviation became the successor corporation to Cessna. LNS Enterprise LLC v. 

Continental Motors, Inc., 22 F.4th 852, 857 (9th Cir. 2022). 

Textron Aviation, a Delaware corporation, is registered as a foreign corporation in 

Washington. Its headquarters lies at One Cessna Boulevard, in Wichita, Kansas. Textron 

Aviation continues to design and manufacture Cessna and other planes in Kansas. 

In support of its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, Textron 

Aviation submitted the Textron Inc. 2017 Fact Book (Fact Book), a book concerning the 

parent company’s operations. Textron, the parent company, is a $14.2 billion multiindustry company with 37,000 employees. According to the Fact Book, the Company 

leverages its global network of aircraft, defense, industrial, and finance businesses to 

provide customers with innovative products and services. The world-wide public knows 
No. 36298-1-III

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7

Textron “for its powerful brands” such as Bell Helicopters, Cessna, Beechcraft, Hawker, 

Jacobsen, Kautex, Lycoming, E-Z-GO, Greenlee, Textron Off-Road, Arctic Cat, Textron 

Systems, and TRU Simulation + Training. According to Textron’s 2017 Annual Report, 

the company provides its customers with “groundbreaking technologies, innovative 

solutions, and first-class service.” CP at 299. Textron’s stock trades on the New York 

Stock Exchange. Textron garners revenue from the United States, Canada, Mexico, Latin 

America, Europe, Asia Pacific, the Middle East, and Africa. 

According to Textron’s 2017 Fact Book, Textron Aviation serves as an important 

subsidiary. The Fact Book reads: 

Textron Aviation is home to Beechcraft, Cessna, and Hawker 

aircraft brands and continues to lead general aviation through two principal 

lines of business: aircraft and aftermarket. Aircraft includes sales of 

business jet, turboprop and piston aircraft, as well as special mission and 

military aircraft. Aftermarket includes parts sales, maintenance, inspection, 

and repair services.

 

CP at 300. “Textron Aviation markets its products worldwide through its own sales 

force, as well as through a network of authorized independent sales representatives.” CP 

at 311. Textron Aviation represented one-third of Textron’s revenue in 2017. 

Textron’s 2017 Annual Report recounted the activities of Textron Aviation for 

2017. 

In November, Textron Aviation introduced the Cessna SkyCourier, a 

new twin-engine, large-utility turboprop. Textron Aviation collaborated 

with FedEx Express to develop the performance specifications for the cargo 
No. 36298-1-III

Downing. v. Losvar

8

version of the SkyCourier and signed on as its launch customer with an 

initial order for 50 aircraft and an option to order 50 more. 

Textron Aviation also continued development of the single-engine 

Cessna Denali turboprop. These new aircraft, together with the King Air 

and Caravan product lines, will represent the most comprehensive 

turboprop product lineup in the market and provide our customers with 

solutions to their aircraft needs for years to come. 

On the military side at Textron Aviation, our Scorpion jet and AT-6 

Wolverine both performed extremely well during August’s U.S. Air Force 

(USAF) OA-X light attack demonstration program at Holloman Air Force 

Base in New Mexico. This exercise represented an important step in the 

USAF’s evaluation of its needs for a future light attack jet. 

CP at 301-02. 

According to Textron’s 2017 annual report:

On December 30, 2017, we operated a total of 63 plants located 

throughout the U.S. and 52 plants outside the U.S. We own 61 plants and 

lease the remainder for a total manufacturing space of approximately 24.6 

million square feet. . . . We also own or lease offices, warehouses, training 

and service centers and other space at various locations. 

CP at 322. This entry in the annual report does not distinguish between plants and 

facilities operated by Textron Aviation and other subsidiaries of Textron Inc. or identify 

the states in which the plants are located. Near the conclusion of the annual report, 

Textron boasted:

With a strong lineup of products and a local presence around the 

world, we captured new business in highly competitive market segments. 

CP at 303 (emphasis added). Textron’s board of directors includes one retired secretary 

of the Air Force and a retired general in the Marine Corps. 
No. 36298-1-III

Downing. v. Losvar

9

On its website, Textron Aviation maintains a page that poses the question: “WHY 

TEXTRON AVIATION SERVICE?” CP at 681. The page answers the question with 

the phrases: “Global AOG [Aircraft-On-Ground] Support,” “Knowledge,” and “Quality 

Parts.” The webpage pictures a globe with a hand holding a wrench extending from the 

globe above each of the three terse answers. The page reads:

No one knows your aircraft like the people who built it, and our 

expertise is just beginning. We offer general aviation’s farthest reaching 

service network, which includes company-owned facilities throughout the 

world, mobile and airborne service during AOG events, and parts that ship 

the day you order them. 

CP at 681 (emphasis added). The webpage lists a phone number to call for service or 

parts. We do not know the date this webpage was accessed. The site lists a mobile 

service unit located at Boeing Field in Seattle. 

Also on a Textron Aviation website, the company writes:

Ever wish you had a maintenance director to watch over your 

aircraft? With the new Customer Portal, maintenance management is 

transformed into a fast, easy-to-manage process you can oversee—and 

control—from anywhere. 

Designed to function as a virtual director of maintenance, the portal 

provides a clear view into the service hangar and beyond. . . . 

. . . .

TEXTRON AVIATION SERVICE: KEEPING YOU FLYING 

From service on your terms to unique modifications and upgrades, 

our customer service is equipped to handle all your service needs.

. . . .

Global Service Network 

Our goal at Textron Aviation is to be there for you when and where 

you need us. If one of our 19 world-wide company owned service facilities 

is not convenient, we’ll dispatch one of our 60 Mobile Service Units to 
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Downing. v. Losvar

10

come to you. Additionally with just 1CALL (+ 1.316.517.2090) our 

technical experts can provide immediate aircraft support and also assist you 

with any requests regarding maintenance, inspections, parts, repairs, 

avionics upgrades, equipment installations, part services, and much more.

. . . .

MOBILE SERVICE UNITS

. . . .

Textron Aviation set the standard in the mobile service industry and 

now dispatches more than 60 mobile units around the world. Our Mobile 

Service Units are equipped to respond to AOG, unscheduled and scheduled 

aircraft service. These vehicles are ready to perform limited inspections, 

engine, tire, and brake service on your aircraft—all at your location. Save 

time, lower costs, and reduce flight cycles with our MSU program. 

Air Response Services

Textron Aviation support aircraft are used to rush technicians and 

parts in response to AOG situations. Available 18 hours a day, 7 days a 

week including most holidays, with a 5 hour reach.

. . . .

Service Engineers and Mechanics

Textron Aviation deploys necessary personnel that bring expertise, 

diagnostic support and parts to your location to quickly return your aircraft 

to flight status. 

CP at 689-98 (emphases added) (boldface omitted). The website lists seven authorized 

Cessna service centers in Washington State: Everett, Kenmore, Renton, Pullman, Gig 

Harbor, Seattle, and Vancouver. 

Textron’s Fact Book and annual report recognize a financing arm of Textron that 

helps to finance purchases of Textron Aviation planes. Textron Financial Corporation’s 

address is Two Cessna Boulevard, Suite 100, Wichita, next door to Textron Aviation’s 

headquarters. According to the Fact Book, 

Our finance segment operated by Textron Financial Corporation 

(TFC), is a commercial finance business that provides financing solutions 
No. 36298-1-III

Downing. v. Losvar

11

for purchasers of Textron products, primarily Textron Aviation aircraft and 

Bell helicopters. For more than five decades, TFC has played a key role for 

Textron customers around the globe. 

CP at 300 (emphasis added). 

Cessna Finance Corporation, presumably a forerunner to Textron Financial 

Corporation, has brought lawsuits in Pierce County and King County Superior Court. 

Cessna Aircraft Company was a third-party plaintiff in a wrongful death suit brought in 

Pierce County. 

According to a declaration signed by an officer of Textron Aviation, at the time of 

the Okanogan County crash in 2015, the airplane manufacturer, of which Cessna is a part,

employed 8,400 individuals, with four employees in Washington State. Textron 

Aviation’s four Washington employees consisted of two sales employees and two 

mechanics. These four employees worked from an office space that Textron Aviation 

sublet from another company in Seattle. Textron Aviation does not own any real estate in 

Washington. Textron Aviation does not publish advertisements specifically targeted to 

Washington residents. In 2015, Textron Aviation’s Washington revenue accounted for 

less than one percent of the company’s total revenue. 

In 2016, one year after the crash in Okanogan County, Textron Aviation ended its 

dealer network for Cessna aircraft and switched to a direct sales model in the contiguous 

United States. The company replaced dealers with regional sales representatives. 
No. 36298-1-III

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In opposition to Textron Aviation’s motion to dismiss, a former Cessna aviation 

mechanic and customer solutions manager, Keryan Walsh, declared that Washington 

maintains a strong market for Cessna aircraft. Eastern Washington’s flat terrain with 

access to landing strips renders the area a popular venue for Cessna planes. As of 2018, 

3,040 Cessna planes were registered in Washington. 

From experience, Keryan Walsh knows that Cessna maintains a mobile response 

team in Washington State and that Cessna only places mobile response teams in states

with a significant market. The mobile response team functions in part as advertising for 

Cessna. The name “Cessna” is written on the highly equipped mobile response truck, and 

the truck operates as a mobile billboard for the airplane manufacturer. Cessna personnel 

in Washington State wear uniforms with “Cessna” written thereon. 

According to Keryan Walsh, when a purchaser buys a Cessna aircraft, Cessna 

informs the purchaser about the mobile response teams’ locations. Additionally, through 

Textron Aviation’s website, the company provides owners with access to information 

about pilot centers and service locations. According to Walsh, an individual will more 

likely purchase a Cessna with the peace of mind knowing that he or she can obtain 

product support in his or her home state. Cessna prides itself in “excellent customer 

support.” CP at 726. 
No. 36298-1-III

Downing. v. Losvar

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PROCEDURE

In 2017, Sandra Downing, on behalf of herself and her children and as personal 

representative of Brian Downing’s estate, filed a complaint for injuries and wrongful 

death against Blair Losvar in his capacity as the personal representative of Albert 

Losvar’s estate. Downing, through a stipulation with Losvar, amended her complaint to 

add Lycoming, the manufacturer of the Cessna T182T’s engine, and Textron Aviation as 

additional defendants. Lycoming is an operating division of AVCO Corporation, also a 

wholly owned subsidiary of Textron Inc. When answering the complaint of Downing, 

Losvar asserted a cross claim against Lycoming and Textron Aviation. Both Losvar and 

Downing allege claims of negligence, violation of the Washington product liability act, 

strict liability, and breach of warranty. The allegations include a claim of a failure to 

warn about the dangerous aircraft and its constituent parts. Downing and Losvar allege 

that Washington courts possess jurisdiction over Lycoming and Textron Aviation because 

both companies regularly conduct business in Washington State. 

In July 2018, Textron Aviation moved to dismiss Downing’s complaint and 

Losvar’s cross claim due to lack of personal jurisdiction. Lycoming did not join in the 

motion. The superior court denied the motion. 

This court accepted Textron Aviation’s petition for discretionary review. In 

January 2020, we stayed the appellate proceedings until the United States Supreme Court 
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issued its opinion in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 S. 

Ct. 1017 (2021). 

LAW AND ANALYSIS

The sole issue on appeal is whether Washington courts possess personal 

jurisdiction over Textron Aviation for purposes of the claims asserted by Downing and 

Losvar. We answer in the affirmative. 

Procedure

This court reviews de novo a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of 

personal jurisdiction. State v. LG Electronics, Inc., 186 Wn.2d 169, 176, 375 P.3d 1035 

(2016). The Okanogan County Superior Court resolved the motion to dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction without entertaining live testimony and cross-examination. When a trial 

court decides a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without an evidentiary 

hearing, the plaintiff’s burden is a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. State v. LG 

Electronics, Inc., 186 Wn.2d 169, 176 (2016). 

Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “prima facie” case as sufficient to establish a 

fact or raise a presumption, unless disproved or rebutted, based on what seems true on 

first examination, even though it may later be proved to be untrue. BLACK’S LAW 

DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Washington cases variously define the term. The phrase 

“prima facie” denotes evidence of sufficient circumstances which would support a logical 

and reasonable inference of the facts sought to be proved. State v. Vangerpen, 125 
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15

Wn.2d 782, 796, 888 P.2d 1177 (1995). This court has referred to prima facie evidence 

as sufficient foundational facts when assuming the truth of the evidence presented by the 

party carrying the burden of proof and all reasonable inferences from that evidence in a 

light most favorable to the party. State v. Brown, 145 Wn. App. 62, 69, 184 P.3d 1284 

(2008). A prima facie case relies on evidence to be weighed, but not necessarily accepted 

by a jury or other trier of the fact. Nopson v. City of Seattle, 33 Wn.2d 772, 811-12, 207 

P.2d 674 (1949). When the trial court enters no findings of fact, we imply all relevant 

facts necessary to support the trial court’s order affirming jurisdiction to the extent 

supported by evidence. Cirrus Design Corp. v. Berra, 633 S.W.3d 640, 649 (Tex. App. 

2021). 

Based on the burden of proof and our standard of review, we focus on Downing’s 

and Losvar’s evidence and view their evidence in the light most favorable to them. This 

standard echoes the test for summary judgment proceedings. CTVC of Hawaii, Co. v. 

Shinawatra, 82 Wn. App. 699, 708, 919 P.2d 1243 (1996). We go further and also treat 

the allegations in the complaint as established. CTVC of Hawaii, Co. v. Shinawatra, 82 

Wn. App. 699, 708 (1996). 

Concept of Personal Jurisdiction 

Personal jurisdiction refers to the power of a court over the person of the 

defendant. State v. Fassero, 256 S.W.3d 109, 117 (Mo. 2008). Personal jurisdiction 

affords a tribunal the prerogative to subject and bind a particular person or entity to its 
No. 36298-1-III

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decisions. RFD-TV, LLC v. WildOpenWest Finance, LLC, 288 Neb. 318, 325, 849 

N.W.2d 107 (2014); Cagle v. Clark, 401 S.W.3d 379, 389 (Tex. App. 2013).

A court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant requires 

compliance with both the relevant state long-arm statute and the Fourteenth 

Amendment’s due process clause. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125, 134 S. Ct. 

746, 187 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2014). Some states ignore the language of their respective longarm statute and simply assume personal jurisdiction over a defendant if federal 

constitutional principles allow jurisdiction. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125

(2014) (applying California law); LNS Enterprises LLC v. Continental Motors, Inc., 22 

F.4th 852, 858 (9th Cir. 2022) (applying Arizona law); Cirrus Design Corp. v. Berra, 633 

S.W.3d 640, 647 (Tex. App. 2021). In such cases, the statutory assessment of 

jurisdiction collapses into a constitutional one, and the court does not examine the 

language of the statute. Carty v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 679 F.2d 1051, 1058 (3d Cir.

1982) (referencing Pennsylvania law). Some state statutes even expressly extend 

personal jurisdiction to the full extent as allowed by the United States Constitution. CAL.

CIV. PROC. CODE, § 410.10 (California); LA. REV. STAT. § 13:3201(B) (Louisiana); 

OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(F) (Oklahoma); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5322(b) 

(Pennsylvania).

Relevant to this case, Washington’s long-arm statute permits jurisdiction over:
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(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who 

in person or through an agent does any of the acts in this section 

enumerated, thereby submits said person, and, if an individual, his or her 

personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to 

any cause of action arising from the doing of any of said acts:

(a) The transaction of any business within this state;

(b) The commission of a tortious act within this state.

RCW 4.28.185. Despite the existence of the statute, the Washington Supreme Court has 

consistently ruled that the state long-arm statute permits jurisdiction over nonresident

individuals and foreign corporations to the extent permitted by the due process clause of 

the United States Constitution. Noll v. American Biltrite, Inc., 188 Wn.2d 402, 411, 395 

P.3d 1021 (2017); Pruczinski v. Ashby, 185 Wn.2d 492, 500, 374 P.3d 102 (2016); Shute 

v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 113 Wn.2d 763, 766-67, 783 P.2d 78 (1989); Deutsch v. West 

Coast Machinery Co., 80 Wn.2d 707, 711, 497 P.2d 1311 (1972). 

Textron Aviation does not argue that Washington’s long-arm statute fails to afford 

jurisdiction over it. Presumably, the plane manufacturer either transacted business in 

Washington State or committed a tort herein within the meaning of RCW 4.28.185. 

When determining whether a tortious act occurred in Washington, the court identifies the 

last event necessary to render the defendant liable, which, in this appeal, would be the 

crash in Washington State. CTVC of Hawaii, Co. v. Shinawatra, 82 Wn. App. 699, 717-

18 (1996). 

We concentrate on constitutional limitations, rather than RCW 4.28.185 strictures. 

In our analysis, we spotlight United States Supreme Court decisions. 
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The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution limits the power of a state court to assert personal jurisdiction over 

nonresidents of the state. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, ___ U.S. ___, 137 

S. Ct. 1773, 1779, 198 L. Ed. 2d 395 (2017). Because a state court’s assertion of 

jurisdiction exposes defendants to the state’s coercive power, personal jurisdiction falls 

within the parameters of the clause. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. 

Ct. 1773, 1779 (2017). The due process clause not only requires the fulfillment of fair 

procedural rules when overseeing litigation, but also denies the prerogative of imposing 

judicial process altogether in some instances. 

The United States Supreme Court justifies limits to personal jurisdiction under the 

due process clause on various interests and policies. Sometimes the Court promotes 

states’ rights or federalism as the reason for restricting personal jurisdiction. According 

to the Court, the States retain many essential attributes of sovereignty, including the 

sovereign power to try causes in their courts. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior 

Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017). The sovereignty of each state implies a limitation 

on the sovereignty of all sister states. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 

U.S. 286, 293, 100 S. Ct. 559, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1980). Even if the defendant would 

suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of 

another state, even if the forum state holds a strong interest in applying its law to the 

controversy, and even if the forum state serves as the most convenient location for 
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litigation, the due process clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may 

sometimes act to divest the state of its power to render a valid judgment. Bristol-Myers 

Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780-81 (2017). 

In other decisions, the United States Supreme Court spurns state sovereignty as a 

rationalization for constraints on personal jurisdiction and instead forwards jurisdictional

constraints as a matter of individual liberty. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 

462, 471-72, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985). Due process protects the 

individual’s right to be subject only to lawful power. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. 

Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 877, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 180 L. Ed. 2d 765 (2011). Apparently, the 

notion of individual liberty, in this context, extends to corporations. 

Under former practice, a state gained jurisdiction over a person only if the person 

was served with process in the state or, in some instances, owned property, inside the 

state, that could be seized. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 714, 733, 24 L. Ed. 565

(1877). In the canonical decision, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 

66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945), if not before, the United States Supreme Court 

abandoned this rule. The Court instead asked whether a defendant had “minimum 

contacts” with the forum state such that a suit does not offend traditional notions of fair 

play and substantial justice. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 

(1945). Since International Shoe, the primary focus of a personal jurisdiction inquiry has 

been the defendant’s relationship to the forum state. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283-
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84, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 188 L. Ed. 2d 12 (2014). Under the minimum contacts test, no 

binding judgment may be rendered against a person unless the person has meaningful 

contacts, ties, or relations with the forum jurisdiction. International Shoe Co. v. 

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). 

Courts acknowledge two types of personal jurisdiction: general or all-purpose 

jurisdiction, and specific or case-linked jurisdiction. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. 

Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779-80 (2017). Both forms of jurisdiction require 

minimum contacts. The due process clause mentions no categories of personal 

jurisdiction, let alone any reference to jurisdiction. No case has explained why notions of 

fairness underpinning the due process clause dictate any boundary between specific and 

general personal jurisdiction. 

A company subjects itself to general jurisdiction when its activities are so 

continuous and systematic as to render itself at home in the forum state. A company is at 

home in its state of incorporation, in the location of its principal place of business, and in

any other state where its activities are substantial, continuous, and systematic as to make 

the state “a home.” Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 S. 

Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, SA v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 

919, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 180 L. Ed. 2d 796 (2011). A court with general personal

jurisdiction may hear any claim against the defendant, even if all the incidents underlying 

the claim occurred in a different state. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 
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21

S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017). In such an instance, the court may address events and conduct 

occurring anywhere in the world. Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District 

Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021). Downing and Losvar do not claim Washington 

courts hold general jurisdiction over Textron Aviation. 

Specific jurisdiction covers a narrower class of claims when a defendant maintains 

a less intimate connection with a State. Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial 

District Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021). For specific personal jurisdiction over a 

nonresident defendant, the plaintiff’s claims must “‘arise out of or relate to’” the 

defendant’s contacts with the forum state. Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial 

District Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1025 (2021) (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. 

Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017)); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 

U.S. 462, 472-73 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, SA v. Hall, 466 U.S. 

408, 414, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984). Specific jurisdiction is confined to 

adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that 

establishes jurisdiction. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 

1780 (2017). 

The minimum contacts test is not a mechanical or quantitative test but a question 

of reasonableness. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). The 

test is flexible. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 319. The court 

reviews both the quantity and quality of the contacts. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 
No. 36298-1-III

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22

471 U.S. 462, 474-75 (1985). The facts of each case must be examined carefully and 

weighed to determine whether the requisite contacts exist, and courts look to the totality 

of defendant’s contacts with the forum state. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92,

98 S. Ct. 1690, 56 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1978). Relevant caselaw involves extended discussion 

of the facts as related to the nonresident defendant’s contacts with the forum state. Many 

personal jurisdiction questions arise in product liability cases. 

A concurrence in International Shoe Co. v. Washington suggested a loose, 

undefined, and noncategorical standard of fair play and substantial justice to determine 

personal jurisdiction particularly because of the abstract temperament of due process. 

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 325-26 (1945) (Black, J.,

concurring). Nevertheless, based on factors discussed by the majority in International 

Shoe Co., later decisions have applied an ephemeral three-part test for assessing specific 

personal jurisdiction over a defendant, who does not reside in the forum state. First, the 

defendant must have “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting 

activities within the forum State.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 

2 L. Ed. 2d 1283 (1958). Second, the plaintiff’s claims or claims must “‘arise out of or 

relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.’” Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth 

Judicial District Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1025 (2021) (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. 

v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017)). Third, the assertion of personal 
No. 36298-1-III

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23

jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice. Burger King Corp. v. 

Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985). 

None of the three constituent elements for specific personal jurisdiction 

specifically mention the need for minimum contacts. Some courts suggest the first prong 

addresses minimum contacts. Cirrus Design Corp. v. Berra, 633 S.W.3d 640, 647 (Tex. 

App. 2021). But the notion of minimum contacts hovers over each of the trio of 

elements. In turn, factors considered important for one element bear relevance to the 

other two elements. 

The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs of the specific 

personal jurisdiction test. LNS Enterprises LLC v. Continental Motors, Inc., 22 F.4th

852, 859 (9th Cir. 2022). One court has stated that, when considering the first two 

prongs, a strong showing on one axis will permit a lesser showing on the other. LNS 

Enterprises LLC v. Continental Motors, Inc., 22 F.4th at 859.

Before addressing the three-part test, we must decide the nature and extent of the 

contacts with Washington State that we attribute to defendant Textron Aviation. Neither

party suggests we encompass within our sweep of contacts the interactions that Textron 

Aviation’s parent company, Textron Inc., has maintained with Washington State, even 

though Textron Aviation submitted significant data about its parent company. We 

decline to decide whether to include Textron Inc.’s contacts, because we may rule in 

favor of Downing and Losvar regardless. 
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The parties presume that we include the contacts that the predecessor company, 

Cessna, maintained with the Evergreen State. Based on case law, we agree with this 

assumption. When two companies act together, one company is the alter ego of the other, 

or one company is the successor to the other, the court assesses the contacts of each 

company. Jackson v. Tanfoglio Giuseppe, S.R.L., 615 F.3d 579, 586 (5th Cir. 2010); 

Frito-Lay North America, Inc. v. Medallion Foods, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 2d 859, 868 (E.D.

Tex. 2012); In re Commodity Exchange, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 3d 631, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 2016);

Jordan v. Maxfield & Oberton Holdings LLC, 173 F. Supp. 3d 355, 361-62 (S.D. Miss.

2016); Bridge Street Automotive, Inc. v. Green Valley Oil, LLC, 985 F. Supp. 2d 96, 112-

14 (D. Mass. 2013); RMS Titanic, Inc. v. Zaller, 978 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1301-02 (N.D.

Ga. 2013); Hunter v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 863 F. Supp. 2d 190, 199 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); 

Idaho v. M.A. Hanna Co., 819 F. Supp. 1464, 1477 (D. Idaho 1993); Bridges v. Mosaic 

Global Holdings, Inc., 2008-0113 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/24/08); 23 So. 3d 305, 316-17;

Jeffrey v. Rapid American Corp., 448 Mich. 178, 190-91, 529 N.W.2d 644 (1995). While 

recognizing that a successor corporation by merger or consolidation embodies the 

predecessor, decisions have imputed the forum contacts of the predecessor to prevent 

formalistic changes from immunizing the successor from suit in the forum when its 

predecessor would have been subject to personal jurisdiction. Duris v. Erato Shipping, 

Inc., 684 F.2d 352, 356 (6th Cir. 1982), aff’d sub nom. Pallas Shipping Agency, Ltd. v. 

Duris, 461 U.S. 529, 103 S. Ct. 1991, 76 L. Ed. 2d 120 (1983). States share an interest in 
No. 36298-1-III

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preventing corporations from escaping jurisdiction by mergers and in making businesses 

bear the burden of placing defective products in commerce. Jeffrey v. Rapid America 

Corp., 448 Mich. 178, 204-05 (1995). 

At the time of Albert Losvar’s purchase of the Cessna T182T in 2012, Cessna 

Aircraft Company functioned as a subsidiary of Textron. In 2015, at the time of the 

crash, Cessna ceased operations as an independent subsidiary, but functioned as a wholly 

owned company of Textron Aviation. Therefore, we principally analyze Cessna’s, not 

Textron Aviation’s, contacts with Washington. 

Textron Aviation argues that we should assess its contacts with Washington State 

by limiting our review only to the model of airplane relevant to this suit, the Cessna 

T182T Skylane. In other words, Textron Aviation advocates a product specific test. We 

reject such a test. 

In Bader v. Avon Products, Inc., 55 Cal. App. 5th 186, 269 Cal. Rptr. 3d 318 

(2020) conflicts with Textron Aviation’s product specific test. The estate of Patricia 

Schmitz sued Avon Products in California. The estate claimed that Schmitz’s use of 

Avon talc powder products containing asbestos caused Schmitz’s mesothelioma and 

death. Avon Products sought to dismiss the suit based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. 

According to Avon Products, it marketed two distinct product lines, talc with asbestos 

and talc without asbestos. The trial court dismissed the suit because, although Avon 

Products marketed goods in all fifty states, the estate failed to show that the claim arose 
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from talc powder that contained asbestos as opposed to talc powder without asbestos. 

Therefore, according to the trial court, the estate failed to show that its claims “were 

related to or arose” from Avon’s contacts. Bader v. Avon Products, Inc., 269 Cal. Rptr. 

3d 318, 320 (2020). Thus, the trial court analyzed jurisdiction based on the specificity of 

not only the Avon product but a subcategory of the product. On appeal, the appellate 

court ruled that the estate need not prove that the products used by Schmitz contained 

asbestos. At the jurisdictional stage, courts reference “allegedly defective products.” 

Bader v. Avon Products, Inc., 269 Cal. Rptr. 3d 318, 327 (2020). Thus, whether the 

plaintiff, at the jurisdictional stage, may establish a specific product caused her injury 

lacks relevance as long as the defendant has engaged in those activities that should lead 

the manufacturer to anticipate being summoned into the forum court. Because Avon 

Products sent its Avon ladies marching from door to door throughout California, the 

California courts held personal jurisdiction over the company regardless of the specific 

product at issue. 

Textron Aviation contends that the United States Supreme Court, in Ford Motor 

Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, adopted and applied a specific product or 

“kind of product” test. The Supreme Court sometimes referred to the marketing of a 

product, i.e., a single product line, but the Court did not base its ruling on whether Ford 

marketed the model of car involved in the accidents in the respective states. 
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We wonder where Textron Aviation’s product-specific test would end. 

Presumably, the colors of its planes would make no difference for purposes of minimum 

contact analysis. But Textron Aviation might argue that we should only include the 

presence of a particular year’s model when assessing contacts. Regardless, in its 

promotion of sales and service, Textron Aviation did not distinguish between the various 

models of planes. Textron Aviation promoted itself holistically as a worldwide 

manufacturer and servicer of aircraft. 

Textron Aviation contends that its sales representatives in Washington State

currently market only expensive business jets and that Textron Aviation mechanics,

working from Seattle, currently fix only big-ticket business jets, not piston engine planes. 

Nevertheless, during summary judgment proceedings, Textron Aviation presented no 

testimony establishing this limitation of product sales and service. The promotional 

material presented by Textron Aviation boasts of excellent service at the location of the 

customer’s plane. Textron Aviation does not deny that it sold and serviced scores of 

Cessna T182T Skylanes in Washington State at the time Albert Losvar purchased his 

Cessna aircraft. Keryan Walsh testified, without distinguishing between models of 

planes, that Washington Cessna owners purchased their planes in part because of the 

service provided in this state. We must draw all reasonable inferences from the facts in 

favor of Downing and Losvar. 
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Purposeful Availment

We begin the three-step analysis with a discussion of purposeful availment. For a 

state to gain personal jurisdiction over a corporation, a defendant must take some act by 

which it purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the 

forum state. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284-85 (2014). A defendant purposefully 

avails itself when it reaches out beyond its home state and into another in order to

“‘deliberately exploi[t]’ a market in the forum State.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 

285 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 

770, 781 104 S. Ct. 1473, 79 L. Ed. 2d 790 (1984)). In contrast, a defendant’s contacts 

with a forum state do not support purposeful availment when those contacts are 

“‘random, isolated, or fortuitous.’” Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District 

Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1025 (2021) (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 

770, 774 (1984)). Because the contacts with the forum state must be purposeful, the 

relationship must arise out of the contacts that the defendant itself creates with the forum 

and not the acts between the plaintiff or third parties and the forum state. Walden v. 

Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284-85 (2014). 

The United States Supreme Court employs the purposeful availment element so 

that a corporation can choose whether to conduct business in a particular state before 

subjecting itself to jurisdiction there. The company can avoid sending products to a state 

in order to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 
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29

471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 

(1980). Nevertheless, no reported decision suggests any corporation has commenced

steps to avoid being sued in a state. Corporations relish marketing products in as many 

states as possible. Textron Aviation does not contend it or Cessna Aircraft Company 

took any steps to avoid jurisdiction in Washington State. 

Even one action or contact with the forum state may justify personal jurisdiction 

over a corporation when that contact creates a substantial connection with the forum. 

McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S. Ct. 199, 2 L. Ed. 2d 

223 (1957). Because of a significant amount of business being conducted by mail and 

wire communications across state lines, physical presence is not necessary to satisfy the 

constitutionally-mandated requirement of minimum contacts. Burger King Corp. v. 

Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985). Nevertheless, physical entry into the state, either 

by the defendant in person or through an agent, goods, mail, or some other means, is a 

relevant contact. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014). 

Generally, when the defendant circulates products throughout the nation and a 

product causes damage in a targeted state, that state gains jurisdiction. Keeton v. Hustler 

Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984). Stated differently, when a corporation 

delivers products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that consumers will 

purchase the goods in the forum state, that state gains personal jurisdiction over the 

corporation. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980). 
No. 36298-1-III

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Designing the product for the market in the forum state, advertising in the forum state, 

establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum state, or 

marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in 

the forum state entail purposeful availment. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 

480 U.S. 102, 112, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1987) (plurality opinion). 

Nevertheless, the mobility of a product, such as a car, does not control. World-Wide 

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980). 

In a products liability action, a nonresident manufacturer, who sells its products 

under circumstances such that it knows or should reasonably anticipate that the products 

will ultimately be resold in a particular state, has purposefully availed itself of the market 

for its products in that state. Weight v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 604 F. Supp. 968, 

970-71 (E.D. Va. 1985). Therefore, when a products liability claim arises from the 

manufacture of products presumably sold in contemplation of use in the forum state, 

personal jurisdiction can be exercised over the nonresident manufacturer even though the 

purchase was made from an independent middleman or someone other than the defendant 

shipped the product into the forum state. Le Manufacture Francaise Des Pneumatiques 

Michelin v. District Court, 620 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Colo. 1980); Bush v. BASF Wyandotte 

Corp., 64 N.C. App. 41, 46-51, 306 S.E.2d 562 (1983). The fact that the manufacturer 

deals with the residents of the state indirectly rather than directly is not determinative. 

Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc., 75 Ill. 2d 393, 405, 389 N.E.2d 155, 27 Ill. Dec. 343 (1979). 
No. 36298-1-III

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The continuing conduct of a nonresident defendant intended to preserve and enlarge an 

active market in the forum state constitutes purposeful activity in the forum state and 

indicates that the presence of the defendant’s products in the forum state is not fortuitous, 

but the result of deliberate sales efforts. Ruckstuhl v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 

98-1126 (La. 4/13/99), 731 So.2d 881, 889-90. 

Modern commerce demands personal jurisdiction throughout the United States of 

large manufacturers. The framers of the United States Constitution, when drafting the 

commerce clause, desired a common market with the states debarred from acting as 

separable economic entities. In fulfillment of Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton’s 

vision of this nation as monolithic manufacturing engine, the United States developed 

and now maintains the strongest, unified industrial economy in the world. 

The vast expansion of our national economy during the past several 

decades has provided the primary rationale for expanding the permissible 

reach of a State’s jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. By 

broadening the type and amount of business opportunities available to 

participants in interstate and foreign commerce, our economy has increased 

the frequency with which foreign corporations actively pursue commercial 

transactions throughout the various States. In turn, it has become both 

necessary and, in my view, desirable to allow the States more leeway in 

bringing the activities of these nonresident corporations within the scope of 

their respective jurisdictions.

This is neither a unique nor a novel idea. As the Court first noted in 

1957:

“[M]any commercial transactions touch two or more 

States and may involve parties separated by the full continent. 

With this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a 

great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail 
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32

across state lines. At the same time modern transportation 

and communication have made it much less burdensome for a 

party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in 

economic activity.” 

. . . “[T]he historical developments noted in McGee . . . have only 

accelerated in the generation since that case was decided.” 

Moreover, this “trend . . . toward expanding the permissible scope of 

state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents,” is 

entirely consistent with the “traditional notions of fair play and substantial 

justice,” that control our inquiry under the Due Process Clause. As active 

participants in interstate and foreign commerce take advantage of the 

economic benefits and opportunities offered by the various States, it is only 

fair and reasonable to subject them to the obligations that may be imposed 

by those jurisdictions. And chief among the obligations that a nonresident 

corporation should expect to fulfill is amenability to suit in any forum that 

is significantly affected by the corporation’s commercial activities.

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, SA v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 422-23 (1984) 

(Brennan, J., dissenting) (most alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting McGee 

v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957); International Shoe Co. 

v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 

As active participants in interstate and foreign commerce take advantage of the 

economic benefits and opportunities offered by the various states, those states may fairly 

and reasonably subject the participants to jurisdiction. A nonresident corporation should 

expect amenability to suit in any forum that is significantly affected by the corporation’s 

commercial activities. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, SA v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 

423 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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The United States Supreme Court recently revisited the concept of purposeful 

availment, in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017 

(2021), and determined that the Ford Motor Company had purposefully availed itself of 

the markets of Montana and Minnesota. The Court wrote: 

By every means imaginable—among them, billboards, TV and radio 

spots, print ads, and direct mail—Ford urges Montanans and Minnesotans 

to buy its vehicles, including (at all relevant times) Explorers and Crown 

Victorias. Ford cars—again including those two models—are available for 

sale, whether new or used, throughout the States, at 36 dealerships in 

Montana and 84 in Minnesota. And apart from sales, Ford works hard to 

foster ongoing connections to its cars’ owners. The company’s dealers in 

Montana and Minnesota (as elsewhere) regularly maintain and repair Ford 

cars, including those whose warranties have long since expired. And the 

company distributes replacement parts both to its own dealers and to 

independent auto shops in the two States. Those activities, too, make Ford 

money. And by making it easier to own a Ford, they encourage Montanans 

and Minnesotans to become lifelong Ford drivers.

Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 S. Ct. at 1028. 

In contrast to Ford Motor Co. is World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 

U.S. 286 (1980), relied on by Textron Aviation. The United States Supreme Court 

examined whether World-Wide Volkswagen had deliberately availed itself of the 

Oklahoma market. World-Wide Volkswagen was incorporated and headquartered in 

New York. It distributed vehicles, parts, and accessories to retail dealers in New York, 

New Jersey, and Connecticut. One of the retail dealers sold an automobile in New York. 

The vehicle purchaser drove the car through the State of Oklahoma when another vehicle 

struck it, causing a fire that severely burned the purchaser and her two children. The 
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34

injured family brought a products-liability action against World-Wide Volkswagen in 

Oklahoma and alleged that their burn injuries resulted from defective design and 

placement of the vehicle’s gas tank and fuel system. The Court found no circumstances 

demonstrating that World-Wide Volkswagen had purposefully availed itself of the 

Oklahoma market:

[World-Wide Volkswagen] carr[ies] on no activity whatsoever in 

Oklahoma. They close no sales and perform no services there. They avail 

themselves of none of the privileges and benefits of Oklahoma law. They 

solicit no business there either through salespersons or through advertising 

reasonably calculated to reach the State. Nor does the record show that 

they regularly sell cars at wholesale or retail to Oklahoma customers or 

residents or that they indirectly, through others, serve or seek to serve the 

Oklahoma market. In short, respondents seek to base jurisdiction on one, 

isolated occurrence and whatever inferences can be drawn therefrom: the 

fortuitous circumstance that a single Audi automobile, sold in New York to 

New York residents, happened to suffer an accident while passing through 

Oklahoma.

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 295. Thus, the Court found a 

purchaser’s transfer of a vehicle from one state to another, without more, too random, 

isolated, or fortuitous to establish jurisdiction over a foreign seller. Notably, the 

Volkswagen manufacturer did not challenge jurisdiction. 

Textron Aviation and Cessna Aircraft Company probably lack the extensive 

contacts in Washington State that Ford Motor Company maintains with Minnesota and 

Montana. But the plane manufacturer’s contacts exceed the contacts that World-Wide 

Volkswagen maintained in Oklahoma. A defendant need not have Ford’s staggering 
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Downing. v. Losvar

35

number of contacts with the forum state to sustain the requirement of purposeful 

availment. LNS Enterprises LLC v. Continental Motors, Inc., 22 F.4th 852, 861 (9th Cir. 

2022). More importantly, the quality of Textron Aviation’s contacts with Washington 

echoes the quality of contacts that Ford maintains with all states. 

Textron Aviation, and its predecessor Cessna, actively and purposefully pursued 

and continue to pursue the Washington State aircraft market. Washington houses 3,040 

Cessna aircraft. Cessna communicates with these customers and boasts that it will 

quickly and competently service the planes in the Evergreen State. Textron Aviation’s 

Washington activities encourage pilots to fly, land, maintain, and resell their Cessna 

planes within the forum. 

Textron Aviation maintains a Washington mobile response team that travels 

throughout the state to perform maintenance and repairs. Textron Aviation’s website lists 

six authorized service centers in Washington that perform maintenance on planes. 

At some varying date in the last decade, Textron Aviation switched from a 

dealership model to a direct sales model for Cessna aircraft. As a result, Textron 

Aviation contends that, assuming Cessna once had minimum contacts, those contacts no 

longer exist. It contends that a direct sales model limits its contacts with Washington 

State. We disagree. Under Textron Aviation’s current model of marketing, Washington 

residents deal directly with Textron Aviation in order to purchase new and used planes. 

Although Textron Aviation implies that buyers of their aircraft travel to Kansas to accept 
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36

delivery, Textron Aviation does not deny it knowingly sells planes to Washington State 

residents. Textron Aviation does not deny knowledge that scores of its new planes go to 

Washington State each year in addition to the thousands of planes already present. 

Anyway, at the time of the sale of the relevant Cessna T182T to its first buyer, Cessna 

marketed the plane through an authorized Washington dealer. 

The parties did not engage in any jurisdictional discovery. Thus, the record does 

not indicate the extent of Textron Aviation sales and advertising in Washington or the 

past sales of Cessna craft in the state. A Textron Aviation corporate officer avers that, as 

of 2015, Washington represented less than one percent of the company’s total revenue 

and that advertising does not specifically target Washington residents. Still, with fifty 

states and on the assumption of no world-wide sales, the average state would only 

provide Textron Aviation with two percent of its sales. Textron Aviation has not 

disclosed the amount of income it gains each year from Washington residents or the 

annual sales to Washington residents. 

Like Ford being a quintessential American auto manufacturer, Cessna is a classic 

small plane producer. Textron Aviation markets its Cessna planes and other aircraft with 

the boast of being a worldwide leader in general aviation. Clyde Cessna would be proud 

of Cessna’s presence throughout Washington State. 

An illustrative decision involving a plane is Cirrus Design Corporation v. Berra, 

633 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. App. 2021). Cirrus manufactured aircraft in Minnesota. The 
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37

corporation was incorporated in Wisconsin. Lee Berra died in a Texas crash of an 

airplane manufactured by Cirrus. Berra owned the plane, but did not purchase it from 

Cirrus. He purchased the plane from third parties. Two weeks before the crash, he took 

the plane to a Cirrus-authorized service center in San Antonio for maintenance and repair. 

The center replaced the aircraft’s flap system with parts sent by Cirrus from Minnesota. 

An expert concluded that the flap system contributed to the crash. The trial court denied 

Cirrus’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

On appeal, Cirrus Design Corporation contended that the Texas courts lacked both 

general personal jurisdiction and specific personal jurisdiction over it. The Texas Court 

of Appeals avoided addressing general jurisdiction because it agreed the state courts 

possessed specific jurisdiction. Cirrus marketed its products in Texas. Cirrus maintained 

thirty facilities and affiliates in the forum state. Cirrus channeled advice to customers in 

Texas. The existence of sales directors and service providers in Texas and the sending of 

advice to customers in the forum state sufficed to create the contacts needed for specific 

personal jurisdiction. The contacts were purposeful and not random or fortuitous. The 

crash occurred in and may have resulted from parts shipped to the Lone Star State such 

that the claims arose from or were related to activity conducted in Texas. 

We recognize that the parts that allegedly caused the crash of Lee Berra’s plane 

had been shipped to Texas, but we do not deem this fact necessary to the ruling in Cirrus 
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Design Corporation. The Texas court emphasized that Cirrus had allegedly 

manufactured a defective plane that crashed in its jurisdiction. 

In Cohen v. Continental Motors, Inc., 2021-NCCOA-449, 864 S.E.2d 816 (N.C.

2021), the appellate court ruled that North Carolina courts possessed jurisdiction over the 

manufacturer of a plane’s engine when the plane crashed in the Tar Heel State. 

Continental Motors was a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in 

Alabama. The particular engine at issue had been manufactured in Alabama and installed 

by the airplane manufacturer in Bend, Oregon. Continental Motors sold airplane parts in 

all fifty states and internationally. The company maintained no sales force in North 

Carolina, but sold its parts to distributors within the state. Service centers in North 

Carolina could access the company’s service links. Based on Ford Motor Co. v. 

Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, the North Carolina court ruled that Continental 

Motors maintained sufficient contacts with the forum state to gain jurisdiction. The court 

ruled that the plaintiff need not show proof that the claim arose because of the 

defendant’s in-state conduct, as long as the product malfunctioned in the forum state. 

Textron Aviation relies heavily on LNS Enterprises LLC v. Continental Motors, 

Inc., 22 F.4th 852 (9th Cir. 2022), in which the federal appellate court ruled that Arizona 

courts lacked personal jurisdiction over both Textron Aviation and Continental Motors 

because of a lack of sufficient minimum contacts. The plaintiff purchased a used Cessna 

aircraft, equipped with a Continental engine. The plane was damaged in a crash 
No. 36298-1-III

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39

occurring in Arizona. Continental shipped the engine to Oregon, where Columbia 

Aircraft Manufacturing installed it into the plane. Shortly thereafter, Cessna acquired the 

assets of Columbia. As we know, Cessna later became a subsidiary of Textron, and, in 

2017, Cessna and Textron Aviation merged. In response to Textron’s motion to dismiss, 

the plaintiff filed no countering affidavits. Textron Aviation did not manufacture, design, 

or service the plaintiff’s aircraft, let alone do any of these acts in Arizona. Textron 

Aviation acknowledged one service center in Arizona, but the court deemed this limited 

presence unimportant because of a lack of relationship with the lawsuit to this contact. 

According to the Ninth Circuit, the United States Supreme Court in Ford Motor Co.

cabined its analysis of personal jurisdiction to the same model of the product at issue, 

which was advertised, sold, and serviced in the forum states. The Ninth Circuit also 

emphasized that Cessna acquired the assets of the manufacturer, Columbia Aircraft. The 

two companies did not merge. 

LNS Enterprises lacks persuasiveness for at least three reasons. First, the plaintiff 

failed to present any facts countering Textron Aviation’s motion to dismiss. Second, the 

manufacturer did not merge with Cessna or Textron Aviation. Third, as we next analyze, 

we adjudge the Ninth Circuit view of a relationship between the lawsuit and the forum 

state as too narrow and contrary to Ford Motor Co. 
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Arises From or Relates To

We move to the second element of the tripartite test. In order for a court to 

exercise specific jurisdiction over a claim, an affiliation must exist between the forum 

and the underlying controversy, principally an activity or an occurrence that takes place 

in the forum state. Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, SA v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 

(2011). Without this affiliation, the forum state lacks specific personal jurisdiction 

regardless of the extent of a defendant’s unconnected activities in the state. BristolMyers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017). Even regularly 

occurring sales of a product in a state do not justify the exercise of jurisdiction over a 

claim unrelated to those sales. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. at 

1781. 

The United States Supreme Court clarified the “arising out of or relating to” 

requirement in its most recent personal jurisdiction decision, Ford Motor Co. v. Montana 

Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021). The case combined two suits in 

which Minnesota and Montana state courts asserted personal jurisdiction over the Ford 

Motor Company in products-liability claims stemming from car accidents. In both cases, 

Ford had sold the crashed vehicles outside the forum states, and the initial purchasers 

then resold the vehicles to forum residents, where collisions occurred. 

Despite this complication, the Court wrote: 
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[T]he owners of these cars might never have bought them, and so 

these suits might never have arisen, except for Ford’s contacts with their 

home States. Those contacts might turn any resident of Montana or 

Minnesota into a Ford owner—even when he buys his car from out of state. 

He may make that purchase because he saw ads for the car in local media. 

And he may take into account a raft of Ford’s in-state activities designed to

make driving a Ford convenient there: that Ford dealers stand ready to 

service the car; that other auto shops have ample supplies of Ford parts; and 

that Ford fosters an active resale market for its old models.

Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 S. Ct. at 1029. Similarly, 

Textron Aviation serves a market of Cessna plane owners in Washington, offering mobile 

maintenance and repair services designed to make flying a plane convenient here. 

Washington residents purchase Cessna planes knowing that service is readily available

anywhere within the Evergreen State. 

Textron Aviation argues that this court should apply a causation-only analysis in 

deciding whether this case arises out of or relates to its contacts with Washington. 

According to Textron Aviation, its maintenance services, replacement parts, or flight 

training support did not cause the accident. 

Ford Motor Company also argued that its activities did not connect it to Montana 

and Minnesota because it did not manufacture the vehicles in the respective states. Nor 

did it deliver to or sell the subject cars in the forum states. Ford argued in support of a 

strict causal relationship and a “but for” test of specific personal jurisdiction. Ford 

contended that the plaintiffs could not show that, “but for” Ford’s in-state activities, the 
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plaintiffs would have suffered injury. The United States Supreme Court rejected this 

approach:

[O]ur most common formulation of the rule demands that the suit 

“arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” The first 

half of that standard asks about causation; but the back half, after the “or,” 

contemplates that some relationships will support jurisdiction without a 

causal showing. That does not mean anything goes. In the sphere of 

specific jurisdiction, the phrase “relate to” incorporates real limits, as it 

must to adequately protect defendants foreign to a forum. But again, we 

have never framed the specific jurisdiction inquiry as always requiring 

proof of causation—i.e., proof that the plaintiff’s claim came about because 

of the defendant’s in-state conduct.

Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 S. Ct. at 1026 (quoting 

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017)). Thus, while 

a direct causal relationship will satisfy the “arising under” prong of the inquiry, such a 

causal relationship is not needed under the “relating to” prong. 

In Ford Motor Co., the United States Supreme Court also clarified its prior 

decision on personal jurisdiction in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. 

Ct. 1773 (2017), which Textron Aviation repeatedly cites. In the latter case, over 600 

plaintiffs, most of whom were not California residents, filed a civil action in a California 

State court against Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, alleging various state law claims 

based on injuries arising from the drug, Plavix. Bristol-Myers Squibb sold and marketed 

Plavix in California, but did not develop the drug in California, create a marketing 

strategy for the drug in California, manufacture, label, or package the drug in California, 
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or work on the regulatory approval of the product in California. The nonresident 

plaintiffs did not allege they obtained Plavix through California sources nor claim that 

their injuries or treatment occurred in California. The California Supreme Court found 

specific jurisdiction as to the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims based on Bristol-Myers 

Squibb’s extensive contacts with California, which that court held required “‘a less direct 

connection between [Bristol-Myers Squibb’s] forum activities and plaintiff’s claims than 

might otherwise be required.’” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. at 

1779 (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 5th 783, 377 P.3d 874, 

889, 206 Cal. Rptr. 3d 636 (2016)). The United States Supreme Court reversed. The 

Court noted that a corporation’s continuous activity within a state does not suffice to 

support the demand that the corporation be amenable to suits unrelated to that activity. 

The Court declared:

The [California] Supreme Court found that specific jurisdiction was 

present without identifying any adequate link between the State and the 

nonresidents’ claims. As noted, the nonresidents were not prescribed 

Plavix in California, did not purchase Plavix in California, did not ingest 

Plavix in California, and were not injured by Plavix in California. The 

mere fact that other plaintiffs were prescribed, obtained, and ingested 

Plavix in California—and allegedly sustained the same injuries as did the 

nonresidents—does not allow the State to assert specific jurisdiction over 

the nonresidents’ claims.

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. at 1781.

In Ford Motor Co., Ford argued to the United States Supreme Court that BristolMyers foreclosed jurisdiction because the particular vehicles at issue had been initially 
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sold outside of the relevant forum states. The Court rejected Ford’s reading of BristolMyers:

We found jurisdiction improper in Bristol-Myers because the forum 

State, and the defendant’s activities there, lacked any connection to the 

plaintiffs’ claims. The plaintiffs, the Court explained, were not residents of 

California. They had not been prescribed Plavix in California. They had 

not ingested Plavix in California. And they had not sustained their injuries 

in California. In short, the plaintiffs were engaged in forum-shopping—

suing in California because it was thought plaintiff-friendly, even though 

their cases had no tie to the State. That is not true of the cases before us. 

Yes, Ford sold the specific products in other States, as Bristol-Myers 

Squibb had. But here, the plaintiffs are residents of the forum States. They 

used the allegedly defective products in the forum States. And they 

suffered injuries when those products malfunctioned in the forum States. In 

sum, each of the plaintiffs brought suit in the most natural State—based on 

an “affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, 

principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that t[ook] place” there.

Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 S. Ct. at 1031 (alterations 

in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 

S. Ct. 1773, 1780-81 (2017)). 

The United States Supreme Court, in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial 

District Court, explicitly rejected a “but for” causation test as the sole means of satisfying 

the “arising out of or relating to” requirement for personal jurisdiction. The Court found 

that personal jurisdiction arose under the “relating to” prong even when plaintiffs “did 

not in fact establish, or even allege . . . causal links.” Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth 

Judicial District Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1029 (2021). The Court reasoned that 

jurisdiction should not “ride on the exact reasons for an individual plaintiff’s purchase, or 
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on his ability to present persuasive evidence about them.” Ford Motor Co. v. Montana 

Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 S. Ct. at 1029. In a footnote, the Court further 

expounded:

It should, for example, make no difference if a plaintiff had recently 

moved to the forum State with his car, and had not made his purchasing 

decision with that move in mind—so had not considered any of Ford’s 

activities in his new home State.

Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 S. Ct. at 1029 n.5. 

Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s recent holding in Ford Motor Co., the 

Washington Supreme Court adopted a “but for” test for the second prong of specific 

personal jurisdiction analysis in Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 113 Wn.2d 763, 772

(1989). Division One of this court has twice applied the “but for” test in denying 

personal jurisdiction in cases involving international contracts claims. SeaHAVN, Ltd. v. 

Glitner Bank, 154 Wn. App. 550, 570-71, 226 P.3d 141 (2010); CTVC of Hawaii, Co. v. 

Shinawatra, 82 Wn. App. 699, 719-20 (1996). 

Since deciding Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, the Washington Supreme Court has 

eschewed “but for” analysis. Although the state Supreme Court relies on the “Shute 

factors” to guide personal jurisdiction analysis, “but for” causation has played no role in 

the high court’s subsequent decisions. Noll v. American Biltrite Inc., 188 Wn.2d 402, 

411-16 (2017); FutureSelect Portfolio Management, Inc. v. Tremont Group Holdings, 
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Inc., 180 Wn.2d 954, 963-66, 331 P.3d 29 (2014); Failla v. FixtureOne Corp., 181 

Wn.2d 642, 649-55, 336 P.3d 1112 (2014). 

In many decisions, the Washington Supreme Court has folded the state long-arm 

statute analysis with the requirements of the U.S. Constitution, while emphasizing that 

the statute is coextensive with the federal due process clause. State v. LG Electronics, 

Inc., 186 Wn.2d 169, 176 (2016); Pruczinski v. Ashby, 185 Wn.2d 492, 500 (2016). The 

state high court reconsiders its precedent when the legal underpinnings of the precedent 

have changed or disappeared. W.G. Clark Construction Co. v. Pacific Northwest 

Regional Council of Carpenters, 180 Wn.2d 54, 66, 322 P.3d 1207 (2014); accord Chong 

Yim v. City of Seattle, 194 Wn.2d 682, 692, 451 P.3d 694 (2019); Deggs v. Asbestos 

Corp. Ltd., 186 Wn.2d 716, 729-30, 381 P.3d 32 (2016). Thus, we conclude that the state 

Supreme Court will follow the Ford Motor Co. causation analysis and abandon the “but 

for” causation test. 

The instant case involves substantial similarities to Ford Motor Co. The Cessna 

plane was originally sold out-of-state and then resold to Albert Losvar, who brought the 

plane into Washington. The plane crashed in the State of Washington, killing the pilot 

and his passenger. The present suit alleges a theory of products liability against the plane 

manufacturer. 
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Fairness

The last part of the due process test centers around the fairness and reasonableness 

of the assertion of jurisdiction by the forum state. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 

925 (9th Cir. 2001). Once the plaintiff meets the burden of proving minimum contacts, a 

presumption of reasonableness of jurisdiction arises and the burden shifts to the 

defendant to prove the assertion of jurisdiction would be so unreasonable in light of 

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice as to overcome the presumption of 

reasonableness. Bridges v. Mosaic Global Holdings, Inc., 2008-0113 (La. App. 1 Cir. 

10/24/08), 23 So.3d 305, 315. The defendant must present a compelling case that other 

considerations render jurisdiction unreasonable. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 

U.S. 462, 477 (1985). 

Once the plaintiff establishes minimum contacts, the court may consider these 

contacts in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal 

jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice. Burger King Corp. v. 

Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 

310, 320 (1945). In determining fundamental fairness, the relevant considerations are: 

(1) the defendant’s burden in responding to the lawsuit in the forum state, (2) the forum 

state’s interest in applying its law and providing a forum, (3) the plaintiff’s interest 

in convenient and effective relief, (4) the judicial system’s interest in efficient resolution 

of controversies, and (5) the state’s interest in furthering fundamental social policies.
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Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985). A state possesses a 

“manifest interest” in providing its residents with a convenient forum for redressing 

injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 

473 (1985). 

The due process clause may not be wielded as a territorial shield to avoid interstate 

obligations voluntarily assumed. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 

(1985). Because modern transportation and communications render defending oneself in 

another state less burdensome, a party will generally not suffer unfairness by litigating in 

another forum. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 474. Only in rare cases will 

the exercise of jurisdiction not comport with fair play and substantial justice when the 

nonresident defendant has purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum 

state. Asshauer v. Farallon Capital Partners, LP, 319 S.W.3d 1, 8 n.7 (Tex. App. 2008). 

Textron Aviation argues that, because Downing and Losvar are also pursuing their 

claims in Kansas, whose courts have uncontested general jurisdiction over the company, 

Washington should not exercise jurisdiction. Textron Aviation identifies no case in 

which personal jurisdiction has been denied on this basis. Washington holds a significant 

legitimate interest in providing a forum for suit involving a plane crash within the state. 

Washington State should be free to regulate planes that crash in Washington State and 

kill Washington residents. 
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Fairness works in favor of Washington State gaining personal jurisdiction, not in 

Textron Aviation avoiding jurisdiction. Textron Aviation enjoys the benefit of 

Washington’s laws in enforcing contracts, defending property, and selling its goods to 

Washington State consumers. Textron Aviation’s finance arm has brought suits in 

Washington State courts. To Textron Aviation’s benefit, Washington State does not 

afford punitive damages. Barr v. Interbay Citizens Bank of Tampa, Fla., 96 Wn.2d 692,

697, 635 P.2d 441, 649 P.2d 827 (1981). 

Washington possesses an interest in providing its residents with a convenient 

forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors. The survivors of Downing 

and Losvar would suffer inconvenience in litigating halfway across the country in 

Kansas, when compared to a worldwide leader in aviation defending a lawsuit in 

Washington. Textron Aviation representatives can even fly in one of the company’s 

Cessna planes or posh business jets to Okanogan County. 

Textron Aviation also argues that exercise of jurisdiction would be unfair because 

respondents advance a “failure to warn” theory, basing jurisdiction on an omission rather 

than affirmative action by company. According to Textron Aviation, any failure to warn 

would relate only to Textron Aviation’s headquarters. Textron Aviation cites to several 

nonbinding cases in support of this argument. We reject this argument. While Downing 

and Losvar allege a lack of warning as a cause of action against Textron Aviation, they 

also allege defective design and breach of warranty. The United States Supreme Court 
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approved jurisdiction over foreign defendants in suits alleging design defect, failure to 

warn, negligence, products-liability, and breach of warranty. Ford Motor Co. v. Montana 

Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1023 (2021). 

CONCLUSION

We affirm the superior court’s ruling that it possesses personal jurisdiction over 

Textron Aviation for purposes of the claims asserted by Downing and Losvar. We 

remand for further proceedings. 

_________________________________

Fearing, J.

WE CONCUR:

______________________________

Siddoway, C.J.

______________________________

Pennell, J.