1

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 22, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

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No. 04-51183

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL CURTIS LEWIS, also known as Bones; CHARLES SAMSON, also

known as Killer; MALACHI DAVID WREN; VICTOR WESLEY TUCKER, also

known as Pokey; DONNIE THOMPSON; MICHAEL NORRIS MARTIN, also

known as Mikey; BUDDY FORD; LEONARD DUANE GRIFFITH, also known as

Radar; JERRY WAYNE BEASON; SHANE SAMSON, also known as Buffy 

Defendants-Appellants

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas 

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and REAVLEY and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PRADO, Circuit Judge:

Following a three-week trial, a jury convicted Donnie

Thompson (“Thompson”), Michael Norris Martin (“Martin”), Buddy

Ford (“Ford”), Leonard Duane Griffith (“Griffith”), Jerry Wayne

Beason (“Beason”), and Shane Samson of conspiracy to manufacture

and distribute over fifty grams of methamphetamine or 500 grams

of a substance or mixture containing methamphetamine, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The same jury convicted Michael
2

Curtis Lewis (“Lewis”), Charles Samson, Malachi David Wren

(“Wren”), and Victor Wesley Tucker (“Tucker”) of that offense and

of a continuing criminal enterprise involving more than 15,000

grams of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848. Now

these defendants appeal, raising various objections to their

convictions and sentences.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 17, 2004, the grand jury sitting in the MidlandOdessa Division of the Western District of Texas returned an

indictment against twenty-eight individuals for methamphetaminerelated offenses. Eighteen of these individuals pleaded guilty.

The ten defendants named above pleaded not guilty, and the case

proceeded to trial. Jury selection was held on June 28, 2004, and

the trial took place from June 28 to July 19, 2004. 

At trial, the government attempted to prove a large

methamphetamine conspiracy centered on the Aryan Circle gang. The

Aryan Circle is a prison-based organization with a whitesupremacist ideology. Its members are, in theory, ranked

according to a militaristic hierarchy; membership may be

maintained inside and outside prison, though rank does not

necessarily carry over from one realm into the other. Most,

though not all of the defendants were members of the Aryan

Circle. The government’s proof was designed to show that the

Aryan Circle, led by Lewis, Charles Samson, Wren, and Tucker,
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succeeded in dominating the methamphetamine trade in and around

Odessa, Texas. Law enforcement officers and the cooperating

witnesses testified to the methamphetamine-related activities of

the Aryan Circle members and their associates, including the

gathering by legal and illegal means of methamphetamine

“precursors,” such as cold medicines, batteries, and anhydrous

ammonia; the manufacture, or “cooking,” of methamphetamine; and

the sale and use of methamphetamine-containing substances.

The jury found each defendant guilty of the charges against

him. The defendants moved unsuccessfully for a judgment of

acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.

Lewis, Charles Samson, Wren, and Tucker were each sentenced to

life in prison, the mandatory term under the continuing criminal

enterprise conviction; the court ordered no sentence for these

defendants’ conspiracy convictions because conspiracy is a lesser

included offense of continuing criminal enterprise. The district

court sentenced Griffith to thirty years in prison, Martin to 210

months in prison, Beason to 130 months in prison (the sentence

was subsequently reduced to 120 months), Thompson to 189 months

in prison, Ford to 324 months in prison, and Shane Samson to 156

months in prison for their conspiracy convictions. 

II. JURISDICTION

These are direct appeals from a final judgment of the United

States District Court, which has jurisdiction over all offenses
1 The precise wording of the statute is “in concert with five

or more other persons with respect to whom [the defendant]

occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any

other position of management.” 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2)(A). 

4

against the United States. This court has jurisdiction pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Continuing Criminal Enterprise

Lewis, Charles Samson, Wren, and Tucker challenge their

convictions for a continuing criminal enterprise involving more

than 15,000 grams of a substance containing methamphetamine. To

establish a continuing criminal enterprise, the government must

prove that (1) the defendant organized, supervised, or managed at

least five persons1 (2) in a continuing series of drug violations

(3) from which the defendant received substantial income. See 21

U.S.C. § 848(c); United States v. Bass, 310 F.3d 321, 325-26 (5th

Cir. 2002). Section 848 is “designed to apply to leaders of

large-scale narcotics operations.” Bass, 310 F.3d at 326.

Most significant to these appeals is the first element: that

of organizing, supervising, or managing at least five persons in

the drug trade. This court has stated that “[t]he terms

‘organized,’ ‘supervised,’ and ‘managed’ are not words of art and

should be interpreted according to their every day meanings.”

United States v. Gonzales, 866 F.2d 781, 784 (5th Cir. 1989).

Several other circuits have held that the term “organizer” as
5

used in § 848 implies a person who exercises some degree of

managerial authority, rather than one who merely coordinates

various players. See, e.g., United States v. Lindsey, 123 F.3d

978, 986-87 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Williams-Davis, 90

F.3d 490, 508-09 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v. Witek, 61

F.3d 819, 822-24 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Jerome, 942

F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1991). This circuit has not had

occasion to decide this precise question. See United States v.

Garcia Abrego, 141 F.3d 142, 167 n.11 (5th Cir. 1998)

(acknowledging the law in these other circuits but stating that

the court need not then decide the question). This court has,

however, held that without additional indicia of control, a mere

buyer-seller relationship is insufficient to establish liability

under § 848. Bass, 310 F.3d at 327. We cited the Eleventh

Circuit’s explanation that “a contrary interpretation would do

violence to the common-sense meaning of the words ‘organizer’ and

‘supervisor’ and extend 848’s reach beyond the scope Congress

intended.” Id. at 327-28 (citing Witek, 61 F.3d at 822). We also

commented that our holding was consistent with the rule of lenity

applied where a criminal statute’s terms are ambiguous. Bass, 310

F.3d at 328 n.27. This holding in Bass supports the principle

that “organizer” within the meaning of § 848 requires indicia of

control or authority. 

Lewis, Charles Samson, Wren, and Tucker each argue that the

evidence at trial was legally insufficient to prove the elements
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of continuing criminal enterprise. This opinion examines in turn

the merits of their arguments.

1. Standard of Review

Where, as here, a defendant objected to the sufficiency of

the evidence at the trial level, the well-established standard of

review is whether a reasonable jury could find that the evidence

establishes the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Menesses, 962 F.2d 420, 426 (5th Cir. 1992). We

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government

and give the government the benefit of all reasonable inferences

and credibility choices. United States v. Harvard, 103 F.3d 412,

421 (5th Cir. 1997).

2. Lewis

Lewis contends that the government’s proof at trial failed

to demonstrate that he had sufficient control over any of the

participants on the Odessa drug trade so as to make him a leader,

organizer, or manager of a continuing criminal enterprise. We

agree that the government’s evidence falls short of satisfying

the first element of a continuing criminal enterprise: that the

defendant organized, supervised, or managed at least five persons

in the drug trade. The government appears to have capitalized on

the facts that Lewis co-founded the Aryan Circle Odessa Chapter

in 1997 and held the exalted title of “District Captain” within

that chapter. But these facts do not prove that Lewis was a
2 Specifically, he was incarcerated from April 2000 to April

2001, July 2001 to June 2003, September 2003 to November 2003,

and February 2004 to the time of trial.

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leader or organizer of the methamphetamine trade in which many

Aryan Circle members were, without question, involved. Lewis was

incarcerated throughout the majority of the period covered by the

indictment.2 With a few exceptions, references to Lewis in the

trial testimony relate only to his use of methamphetamine, not to

a role as an organizer of the methamphetamine trade.

The government points to several pieces of evidence as

satisfying the first element of continuing criminal enterprise.

First, the government claims that Curtis Perkins (“Perkins”)

testified at trial that Lewis recruited him to participate in the

methamphetamine trade in Odessa. The claim that Lewis “recruited”

Perkins to join the methamphetamine trade stems from a single

conversation that Lewis had with Perkins while both were in

prison and Perkins was preparing to leave. Lewis allegedly told

Perkins that Perkins could get involved with the methamphetamine

trade in Odessa, where the Aryan Circle had the trade “pretty

well locked up,” and that Perkins could parole to Lewis’s exwife’s home. This testimony does not establish that Lewis

supervised, managed or otherwise exerted control over Perkins,

merely that he gave him information and advice. 

The government also points to Perkins’ testimony that Lewis

later told him that Lewis had partnered with Tucker and that they
3 While the government need not prove that a defendant had

absolute control over the persons he is alleged to have

organized, supervised or managed, some evidence that when the

defendant gave instructions, they were on some occasions obeyed

is necessary to demonstrate indicia of control.

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were producing and selling ten ounces of methamphetamine per

week. Perkins did not say that he had observed Lewis working with

Tucker, and Perkins’ testimony was not corroborated. Jeff Jordan

(“Jordan”) testified that Lewis said that Tucker was cooking

methamphetamine every week and giving Lewis some for free, but

this does not suggest a business relationship between the two 

Moreover, Perkins’ statement does not indicate that Lewis was

managing Tucker, or anyone else Tucker was working with.

Johnny Hines, Jr. (“Hines, Jr.”), testified that he was

present at a meeting where Lewis advised members to slow down

their methamphetamine selling because it was generating too much

“heat” from law enforcement. He also testified that Lewis advised

people to stop dealing with Charles Samson if he continued to

“burn them” for methamphetamine or money. This testimony

similarly does not establish that Lewis had control or authority

over those people, especially given that Lewis’s advice was

thoroughly disregarded.3

Finally, the government points to testimony that Lewis told

two persons that there would be retaliation against anyone who

took the stand to testify in this case. Lewis’s alleged threats

that harm would come to Aryan Circle members who testified
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against other Aryan Circle members do not establish his

involvement in the methamphetamine trade, nor that he supervised,

managed or organized anyone in that trade.

This weak evidence of managerial control over individuals in

the methamphetamine trade may be contrasted with numerous witness

statements that Lewis was merely a methamphetamine user. In sum,

the evidence presented by the government was not nearly strong

enough to dispel in the mind of a reasonable jury a reasonable

doubt that Lewis organized, supervised, or managed at least five

persons in the methamphetamine trade. 

3. Charles Samson

Charles Samson argues that evidence at trial was legally

insufficient to prove that he was a leader, organizer, or manager

of a continuing criminal enterprise, or that he received

substantial income or resources from drug activities.

Evidence of leadership is strongest against Charles Samson.

Hines, Jr., testified with regard to Charles Samson’s role in

methamphetamine production and distribution that he was “was one

the key figures in it. He was the figure, really.” Hines, Jr.,

testified that Charles Samson “told us where to produce it, how

to produce it, you know, helped us produce it, helped us sell

it.” Hines, Jr., testified that he, Buddy Ford, and other cooks

were making methamphetamine for Charles Samson, and that Shane

Samson was getting pills for Charles Samson every day. Hines,
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Jr., named five other people as supplying pills and anhydrous

ammonia for Charles Samson. 

Jordan testified that “if we was told to do something, we

had to do it because [Charles Samson] was our district captain.

If he told us to cook and we didn’t cook, we’d get disciplined

for it.” Persons who were told to cook by Charles Samson were

said by Jordan to include Chris Barrandey (“Barrandey”), Hines,

Jr., and Timothy Bishop. Jordan testified that Samson would get a

quarter or a half share from most of the cooks that took place,

including cooks by Hines, Jr., Barrandey, and Wren. Jordan

testified that Samson and Johnny Hines, Sr., beat up Perkins

because Perkins refused to cook for Samson. 

Tony Wilkins (“Wilkins”) testified that if you cooked

methamphetamine in West Odessa, “Charlie Samson was going to get

his part” of the cook and further stated “he’d have people bring

me out there to his house to get his part, what he felt he was

owed.” Wilkins testified that he cooked numerous times at Charles

Samson’s house and that he attended meetings at Charles Samson’s

house where participants in the methamphetamine business

discussed obtaining supplies. He stated that Charles Samson was

“the boss or the leader” at those meetings.

There is more testimony regarding Charles Samson, but the

preceding excerpts suffice to establish that a reasonable jury

could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Charles Samson
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organized, supervised, or managed at least five people in the

drug trade.

Samson objects that there is not sufficient evidence to

prove that he received substantial income or resources from the

drug trade. Section 848 does not specify what level of income or

resources qualifies as “substantial income or resources.” As

Samson points out, in many cases where a continuing criminal

enterprise conviction was upheld, there was far more evidence of

wealth than exists in this case. See, e.g., United States v.

Wilson, 116 F.3d 1066, 1088 (5th Cir. 1997)(vacated in part on

other grounds by United States v. Brown, 161 F.3d 256 (5th Cir.

1998)) (defendant owned eleven cars); United States v. Chagra,

669 F.2d 241, 257 (5th Cir. 1982)(overruled on other grounds by

Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985))(appellant had

“lavish personal expenditures”). Here, the government did not

present evidence regarding cars, real estate, bank accounts, or

other items of value owned by Charles Samson. Yet this court has

also held that “[t]he requirement that a defendant obtain

substantial income from drug trafficking is satisfied by showing

that many thousands of dollars changed hands, and that some was

received by the defendant.” United States v. Gonzales, 866 F.2d

781, 784 (5th Cir. 1989). The evidence presented at trial leaves

no doubt that thousands of dollars of methamphetamine was

produced, and by taking a portion of most cooks, Charles Samson
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obtained a substantial share. The Second Circuit has stated that

the substantial income requirement is met where the defendant had

no legitimate income and was able to purchase drugs and finance

his living expenses. United States v. Joyner, 201 F.3d 61, 72 (2d

Cir. 2000). The record indicates that Charles Samson had no

legitimate source of income during the period covered by the

indictment, yet paid his living expenses and obtained a steady

supply of methamphetamine. A reasonable jury could have concluded

beyond a reasonable doubt that Charles Samson obtained

substantial income or resources from his drug violations. 

4. Wren

Wren argues that the government failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt each element of a continuing criminal

enterprise. We hold that the evidence of Wren’s organizing,

supervising, or managing five or more persons in the drug trade

was insufficient to support his conviction for continuing

criminal enterprise.

Evidence regarding Wren’s official status within the Aryan

Circle varied. Wren claims that he never became a “member” of the

Aryan Circle; as he never completed his nine-month probationary

period, during which he was a “recruit” or “prospect.” Others

testified that Wren achieved the rank of “sergeant at arms;”

others that this was only his “prison rank.” But Wren’s official

rank in the Aryan Circle is of secondary importance. The
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government points to Wren’s alleged role in “smashes,” or

assaults, which the government claims Wren organized to further

the methamphetamine conspiracy. Barrandey testified regarding one

“smash,” stating that after Leo McCarty (“McCarty”) sold him badsmelling anhydrous ammonia on several occasions, Wren suggested

that he, Barrandey, and Jordan go beat up McCarty, which they

did. This testimony does not indicate that Wren supervised,

organized, or managed Barrandey, Jordan, or McCarty. Barrandey’s

testimony makes clear that Wren was subordinate to him, for he

was Wren’s “prospector,” or sponsor into the Aryan Circle. Hines,

Jr., mentions a smash conducted by Wren, but then explains that

“it was over a girl, I believe, one of our prospects.” Jordan

testified that “Chris Barrandey and Malachi Wren told me” to rob

Randy Barnes. This could be construed as evidence that Wren was

an organizer or supervisor of Jordan, though more likely the

person doing the organizing in this instance was Barrandey.

Hines, Jr., offered somewhat confused testimony that Aryan

Circle “sergeants at arms” transmitted orders from Charles Samson

to certain cooks that they were required to sell their

methamphetamine to Aryan Circle members. Hines, Jr., also stated

that “Malachi Wren was a sergeant at arms at one time.” But this

testimony, while it might imply that Wren transmitted orders to

certain cooks, does not establish that they followed those

orders. Multiple witnesses testified that cooks sold to whoever
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was willing to buy, inside or outside of the Aryan Circle.

Most significantly, when asked which five persons Wren had

organized, managed, or supervised, Hines, Jr., stated “Jeff

Jordan, myself, Shane Samson. There was a bro named Redwood. Tony

Wilkins was supposed to be AC . . .” and also stated “Susan

Creel, Tony Rister.” When asked how Wren had organized or managed

Jordan, Hines, Jr., stated “[h]e took him to Floydada. They went

up there and got anhydrous and did a cook.” When asked how Wren

organized or managed him, Hines, Jr., stated “[t]here was a few

times he would come by my shop and get–-get valves or get pieces

for his tanks, and he would need to go up there when he would go

steal anhydrous.” When asked how Wren supervised, organized or

managed Shane Samson, Hines, Jr., testified “I’ve seen Shane

Samson giving pills before, and batteries, for a cook.” When

asked about what Wren did in regard to Redwood, Hines, Jr.,

stated “I just know he come down here a couple times and picked

up methamphetamine. I don’t know if he was bringing the pills or

if he was really in the picture with [Wren].” When asked how Wren

was organizing Wilkins, Hines, Jr., stated “Tony would have–-I

believe they would get pills, anhydrous. I mean, you know, you

just—-one day somebody might have the pills; somebody else might

have the anhydrous. You just get together. What one person has,

the other one might need.” When asked how Wren organized Creel or

Rister, Hines, Jr., responded “[h]e would tell them to go get the
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pills and then give them a percentage off the cook.” 

This testimony indicates sporadic cooperation or

coordination between Wren and other parties, but not control or

authority by Wren over five or more persons. Hines, Jr.’s

descriptions of the exchange of supplies between Wren and parties

such as Shane Samson and Hines, Jr., evidence only buyer-seller

relationships, without the other indicia of control required by

Bass. Section 848 is designed to reach the "top brass" in the

drug rings, not the lieutenants and foot soldiers. Garrett v.

United States, 471 U.S. 773, 781 (1985). In sum, the evidence

presented by the prosecution was not strong enough to eliminate a

reasonable doubt that Wren organized, supervised, or managed at

least five persons in the methamphetamine trade. 

5. Tucker

As an initial matter, Tucker argues that the district court

erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence that the police

obtained from a warrantless search of his hotel room. We review

the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its

Fourth Amendment conclusions de novo. United States v. Gonzalez,

328 F.3d 755, 758 (5th Cir. 2003). The following facts are

undisputed. Tucker and two women, Caldwell and Gillian, occupied

a hotel room at the Days Inn. While Tucker was absent, police and

hotel staff knocked on the door. Caldwell answered the door. When

she turned to retrieve her identification, a police officer

placed his foot in the door. Caldwell motioned for the officers
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to come in. After the officers asked if there were drugs present

and stated that a drug dog was on its way, Gillian told the

officers that there were drugs in a black bag located in the

room.

We conclude that Tucker’s Fourth Amendment claim is

meritless. As the district court stated, the officer’s “knock and

talk” strategy is a reasonable investigative tool. See United

States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 590 (5th Cir. 2004). The officers

reasonably interpreted Caldwell’s gesture as an invitation to

enter the room. See United States v. Cotnam, 88 F.3d 487, 490

(7th Cir. 1996). The officers did not search the room

immediately, but only after Gillian’s admission that there were

drugs in the room created probable cause. See United States v.

Jones, 239 F.3d 716, 720 (5th Cir. 2001) (after “knock and talk,”

plain view of gun justified search under exigent circumstances). 

The district court concluded that, after Gillian’s

admission, the officers’ search was justified by exigent

circumstances. Because the presence of exigent circumstances is

in essence a factual determination, we review only for clear

error. United States v. Howard, 106 F.3d 70, 74 (5th Cir. 1997).

In this case, the officers could have reasonably believed that

the contraband would be removed if they left to obtain a warrant.

See United States v. Blount, 123 F.3d 831, 837 (5th Cir. 1997)

(stating that factors indicating an exigent circumstance include

“the ready destructibility of the contraband and the knowledge
17

that efforts to dispose of narcotics and to escape are

characteristic behavior of persons engaged in the narcotics

traffic.”). The district court did not clearly err in finding

that exigent circumstances existed. We uphold the district

court’s decision to deny Tucker’s motion to suppress.

Tucker next argues that the evidence at trial was

insufficient to support his conviction for continuing criminal

enterprise. Like Lewis, Tucker was in prison for most of the

period covered by the indictment. When out of prison, however, he

was by all accounts a prolific cook of methamphetamine, the

dominant cook within the Aryan Circle group. Lance Morris

(“Morris”) testified that Tucker had used Morris’s house to cook

methamphetamine many times and was in general cooking

methamphetamine “every day, every other day.” Jordan testified

that Tucker told him that he was “cooking over, probably, a pound

a week.” 

Tucker argues that the overt acts in which he was named, if

they occurred at all, were only “indicative of a conspiracy on

that day for the benefit of the participants that day.” However,

based on evidence of Tucker’s very frequent methamphetamine cooks

and of the interlocking relationships of participants in the

Odessa, Texas drug trade, it was reasonable for the jury to

conclude that Tucker’s activities formed part of an ongoing

conspiracy. Whether a single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies

existed is not dispositive, so long as the elements of § 848 are
4 The government’s brief claims that Morris’s testimony

established that “other Aryan Circle members who gathered pills

and precursors for Appellant Tucker and Wilkins to cook the

methamphetamine” were Kevin Renfro, Charles Samson, and Michael

Lewis, but Morris’s testimony does not in fact contain this

information. 

18

satisfied.

Tucker claims that there is no evidence that he organized,

supervised, or managed anyone. The record suggests otherwise.

Morris testified that he gathered precursors for Tucker’s

methamphetamine cooks and received a portion of Tucker’s

methamphetamine cook in return. Morris also testified that he saw

Martin at Tucker’s house multiple times, preparing to cook

methamphetamine.4 Jordan testified that persons working with

Tucker in the methamphetamine business were Wilkins (“Tony

Wilkins and [Tucker] was cooking dope together and selling dope

together”), John Self (“John Self, I know, was selling his dope”)

Cindy Hines, and Tucker’s 15-year old nephew “Kid” (“[Kid] told

me he was cooking for [Tucker]”). 

Wilkins testified that the first methamphetamine cook he did

when out of prison was for the benefit of Tucker and Charles

Samson. He testified that he had wanted to get out of the drug

business, but felt compelled to begin cooking again.

Subsequently, Wilkins testified, he and Tucker cooked substantial

quantities of methamphetamine approximately every other day for a

two-to-three month period. Susan Creel (“Creel”) testified that
5 The statement in the government’s brief that Catoe

testified that he himself traded with Tucker is not found in the

record.

19

she regularly bought finished methamphetamine from Tucker and

would resell the methamphetamine. Patrick Daniel Catoe (“Catoe”)

testified that he once observed Tucker trade pills for

methamphetamine with a juvenile, Danny Hallbrook.5

It is not clear that Tucker’s relationship with each of the

above-named persons rose beyond the level of buyer-seller. Based

on her testimony, it appears that Creel had only a buyer-seller

relationship with Tucker–-whenever she wished, she traded the

cash she had on hand for his methamphetamine, which she resold,

retaining the profits herself. But the jury was entitled to infer

that in order to keep his large-scale methamphetamine production

operation running, Tucker needed to exercise a degree of control

or authority over many of the persons supplying him with

precursors and selling the finished product. An element of

control or authority is especially likely in the case of the two

juveniles who were seen trading or cooking with Tucker. Jury

members could also have concluded that Tucker was supervising or

otherwise exercising control over Morris, Martin, Cindy Hines,

and John Self. Finally, the jury could have reasonably concluded,

based on Wilkins’ testimony, that he was under the authority of

Tucker, although other testimony suggested that the two were

equal partners. It is not required that the jury agree
20

unanimously as to the identities of the five or more people being

organized, supervised, or managed. United States v. Short, 181

F.3d 620, 624 (5th Cir. 1999). There is sufficient evidence in

the record for the jury to have reasonably concluded beyond a

reasonable doubt that Tucker organized, supervised, or managed at

least five persons in the methamphetamine trade.

Tucker next argues that he did not receive substantial

income or resources from the sale of drugs. As with Charles

Samson, Tucker had no legitimate source of income during his

period out of prison, yet he managed to pay living expenses and

finance his extensive meth-cooking activities. Creel testified

that she paid Tucker approximately $150 nearly every day for

methamphetamine, and the record indicates that she was only one

of numerous sellers who bought their supply from Tucker. The

evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to have concluded

that Tucker obtained substantial income or resources from his

drug violations.

Finally, Tucker argues that the evidence is insufficient to

support a jury finding that he was responsible for more than

15,000 grams of a substance containing methamphetamine. FBI Agent

Espenshade testified that, conservatively estimated, Tucker and

Wilkins produced 10,080 grams of a substance containing

methamphetamine. The total amount attributed to the Aryan Circle

group was over thirty-one kilograms of a substance containing

methamphetamine. In accordance with ordinary principles of
21

conspiracy liability, not only methamphetamine produced by Tucker

but also methamphetamine produced or sold by his co-conspirators

may be attributed to Tucker. Even if the jury could not have

concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the testimony in this

case proved a single conspiracy, the jury could have reasonably

found that Tucker was linked by his relationships with Wilkins,

Martin, and Charles Samson to sufficient quantities of

methamphetamine that when these quantities were added to the more

than ten kilograms of methamphetamine that Tucker himself

produced, the total reached more than fifteen kilograms. 

B. Conspiracy

Defendants Wren, Thompson, Ford, Shane Samson, Griffith,

Beason, and Martin challenge their convictions for conspiracy to

distribute more than fifty grams of methamphetamine or 500 grams

of a substance containing methamphetamine. To establish a

conspiracy under § 846, “the government must prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that (1) an agreement existed between the

defendant and one or more persons to violate the applicable

narcotics laws; (2) each defendant knew of the conspiracy and

intended to join it; and (3) the defendant participated

voluntarily in the conspiracy.” United States v. Infante, 404

F.3d 376, 385 (5th Cir. 2005). “An express agreement is not

required; a tacit, mutual agreement with common purpose, design,

and understanding will suffice.” Id. Further, “[t]he government

need not prove an overt act to show participation in a
22

conspiracy.” United States v. Turner, 319 F.3d 716, 721 (5th Cir.

2003).

1. Motions for Severance

Thompson, Ford, Griffith, Beason, and Martin argue that the

trial court erred by denying their motions for a severance. We

review a grant or denial of severance for abuse of discretion.

United States v. Sudeen, 434 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 2005). A

severance is reversible only on a showing of specific compelling

prejudice. Id. “There is a preference in the federal system for

joint trials of defendants who are indicted together,”

particularly in conspiracy cases. Zafiro v. United States, 506

U.S. 534, 537 (1993); United States v. Scott, 796 F.2d 1245, 1250

(5th Cir. 1986). “When the risk of prejudice is high, a district

court is more likely to determine that separate trials are

necessary, but . . . less drastic measures, such as limiting

instructions, often will suffice to cure any risk of prejudice.” 

Id.

Historically, this court has been reluctant to vacate a

conviction because the district court refused to sever a trial.

See United States v. Bieganowski, 313 F.3d 264, 287 (5th Cir.

2002) (“A spillover effect, by itself, is an insufficient

predicate for a motion to sever.”); United States v. Peterson,

244 F.3d 385, 393 (5th Cir. 2001) (concluding that a limiting

instruction cured risk of prejudice of evidence used against a

codefendant); United States v. Rocha, 916 F.2d 219, 228-29 (5th
23

Cir. 1990) (“[S]everance is required on the basis of a disparity

in the evidence only in the most extreme cases.”). The defendant

must “isolate events occurring in the course of the trial and

then . . . demonstrate that such events caused substantial

prejudice.” United States v. Booker, 334 F.3d 406, 415 (5th Cir.

2003).

These defendants complain broadly of the volume of evidence,

the disparity of evidence between defendants, and a generalized

spillover effect. None point to any specific prejudice resulting

from their combined trial. The district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying their motions for severance.

2. Material Variance

Defendants Wren, Thompson, Ford, Shane Samson, Griffith,

Beason, and Martin each argue that there was a material variance

between the indictment and the government’s proof at trial that

prejudiced them. To prevail on a material variance claim, the

defendants “must prove that (1) a variance existed between the

indictment and the proof at trial, and (2) the variance affected

their substantial rights.” United States v. Pena-Rodriguez, 110

F.3d 1120, 1126 (5th Cir. 1997).

These defendants argue that the government did not proffer

sufficient evidence to prove that there was a single, overarching

methamphetamine conspiracy in the Odessa, Texas region. They

point to evidence suggesting that if the Aryan Circle attempted

to control the drug trade in this region, these efforts failed
24

because of disorganization, internal rivalries, and the

participants’ own drug addictions. These defendants argue that to

the extent that there was evidence presented at trial supporting

a conviction for conspiracy, this evidence could prove only small

conspiracies involving one or two other people. 

The evidence in this trial is strongly conflicting as to

whether there was a single conspiracy or multiple loose-knit,

frequently shifting circles. This court has held, however, that

“when the indictment alleges the conspiracy count as a single

conspiracy, but the government proves multiple conspiracies and a

defendant’s involvement in at least one of them, then clearly

there is no variance affecting that defendant’s substantial

rights.” United States v. Faulkner, 17 F.3d 745, 762 (5th Cir.

1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). This principle is

applicable to the case at hand if it was proved that each of the

defendants who raise this objection took part in a conspiracy

involving more than fifty grams of methamphetamine or 500 grams

of a substance containing methamphetamine. 

Wren: Multiple witnesses testified to Wren’s involvement in

methamphetamine cooking. Hines, Jr., testified that Wren had

obtained supplies for methamphetamine cooking from him, that

Shane Samson gave Wren pills and batteries for a cook, and that

Wren had cooked with Jordan. There was testimony that both Creel

and Rister had traded pills for finished methamphetamine with

Wren. Rister testified that Wren had cooked methamphetamine a few
25

times at Rister’s house. Moreover, Barrandey testified that Wren

was his “right-hand man,” and Barrandey had a significant role in

the methamphetamine trade. While not sufficient to demonstrate a

leadership role by Wren, this evidence does satisfy the elements

of conspiracy. A reasonable jury could have found that Wren was

part of a conspiracy to distribute more than fifty grams of a

methamphetamine.

Thompson: Thompson argues that “even if [he] was

manufacturing methamphetamine, it was not as part of the Aryan

Circle conspiracy.” Multiple witnesses described Thompson as a

methamphetamine cook who traded with members of the Aryan Circle.

Hines, Jr., testified that Thompson was a cook who also supplied

anhydrous ammonia to other cooks. Hines, Jr., testified that

Thompson sold methamphetamine to himself and to Charles Samson.

Paul Baumgardner (“Baumgardner”) testified that he learned to

cook methamphetamine from Thompson and that every day from May to

August 2002, he and Thompson would make an ounce of

methamphetamine. Brandon Verette testified that Thompson drove

him to the store to get pills between ten and twenty times, and

that Thompson would get a portion of the resulting

methamphetamine cook. Even if Thompson cannot beyond a reasonable

doubt be included in a larger Aryan Circle conspiracy, the

evidence was sufficient to convict Thompson of a conspiracy to

distribute more than fifty grams of methamphetamine. 

Ford: Testimony established that Ford was not a member of
26

the Aryan Circle, but that he was a highly productive

methamphetamine cook who regularly sold to the Aryan Circle

members. Hines, Jr., testified that in January 2002 he began to

buy a quarter ounce of methamphetamine per day from Ford. He

testified that he saw Ford cook two to five ounces of

methamphetamine on fifteen to twenty occasions at the houses of

Hines, Jr., and Charles Samson. Wilkins testified that in the

fall of 2002, he began to partner with Ford in cooking

methamphetamine every other day for two-and-a-half to three

months, approximately thirty-eight times in total. Each cook they

did included over 3000 pills, yielding at least seven ounces of

methamphetamine. Wilkins and Ford traded finished methamphetamine

for precursors with Charles Samson and Shane Samson, among

others. The evidence is clearly sufficient to establish that Ford

took part in a conspiracy to distribute over fifty grams of

methamphetamine.

Shane Samson: Hines, Jr., testified that Shane Samson

obtained pills and batteries for methamphetamine cooks on a daily

basis. Jordan testified that Shane Samson gathered pills and

other precursors for Charles Samson and sold methamphetamine.

Jordan and Wilkins testified that Shane Samson would receive a

quarter ounce of methamphetamine for a thousand pills. Other

witnesses testified that Shane Samson obtained pills for Wren,

Barrandey, Ford, and Wilkins. Roger Bidwell (“Bidwell”) and Catoe

each testified that they purchased methamphetamine from Shane
27

Samson. The evidence is clearly sufficient to establish that

Shane Samson took part in a conspiracy to distribute over 50

grams of a methamphetamine.

Griffith: It is undisputed that Griffith is a high-ranking

member of the Aryan Circle. It is also undisputed that Griffith

was incarcerated for the majority of the period covered by the

indictment: from July 2, 2000, to July 10, 2002, and from

September 21, 2002, through this trial. Multiple witnesses

testified that Griffith was opposed to the Aryan Circle’s

involvement in the methamphetamine trade. But several witnesses

also testified that Griffith sold methamphetamine during the two

months that he was out of prison. Hines, Jr., testified that

every day of the month-long period in which Griffith stayed at

his house, he gave Griffith methamphetamine to sell and Griffith

brought back money. Bidwell testified that Griffith sold

methamphetamine from Bidwell’s house on approximately five

occasions over a two-week period. Jordan testified that after

Griffith returned to prison, he told Jordan that he had sold and

cooked methamphetamine while out. Accordingly, a reasonable jury

could have concluded that Griffith took part in a conspiracy to

distribute over 50 grams of methamphetamine.

Beason: Testimony indicated that defendant Beason prospected

for thirty days with the Aryan Circle but was dropped. Evidence

linking Beason with the methamphetamine trade is not vast. Hines,

Jr., testified that Beason cooked methamphetamine on his property
28

three times, with yields of approximately half of an ounce of

methamphetamine. On cross-examination, Hines, Jr., conceded that

the first cook produced only about an eighth of an ounce. Bidwell

testified that Beason sold him an “eight-ball,” or an eighth of

an ounce, of methamphetamine on one occasion. Martin testified

that Beason once sold him a quart of anhydrous ammonia, which is

capable of producing an ounce of methamphetamine when combined

with other ingredients. Perkins testified that Charles Samson

told him that Beason was going to do a cook for Samson to pay

Samson the money he was owed, but there was no evidence presented

indicating that this cook took place or the quantity owed. Jerry

Witt testified that he once had a conversation with Beason about

a technique for cooking methamphetamine.

Beason’s involvement in the methamphetamine trade appears to

have been sporadic, and he is directly linked with only small

quantities of methamphetamine. Still, Beason’s three cooks with

Hines, Jr., who played a central role in the methamphetamine

trade, testified to having cooked up to sixty ounces of

methamphetamine, and was closely involved with Charles Samson,

are enough to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Beason was

part of a larger methamphetamine conspiracy. Accordingly, there

is sufficient evidence to link Beason with a conspiracy involving

more than fifty grams of methamphetamine.

Martin: Numerous persons testified to defendant Martin’s

involvement with multiple levels of the methamphetamine trade.
29

Jordan testified that Martin cooked methamphetamine with Gary

Martin and Rister and also sold methamphetamine. Barrandey

testified that Martin got pills for him, went with him to get

anhydrous, and helped him to cook. Hines, Jr., testified that

Martin was among the members of the Aryan Circle who sold

methamphetamine for Charles Samson. Perkins testified that Martin

sold methamphetamine for him. Morris testified that on at least

ten occasions, Martin gathered pills and other precursors for

Tucker and Wilkins. Gary Martin testified that he and Martin

cooked together on two or three occasions. Calvin Bailey

testified that Martin sold methamphetamine from his house. This

evidence is sufficient to link Martin with a conspiracy involving

over fifty grams of methamphetamine.

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendants Thompson, Shane Samson, Griffith, Beason and

Martin argue that the evidence at trial was legally and factually

insufficient to convict them of conspiracy to distribute more

than fifty grams of methamphetamine or 500 grams of a substance

containing methamphetamine. As the preceding section indicates in

some detail, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to

convict each of these defendants.

C. Denial of Continuance

Defendant Thompson argues that the district court erred in

denying his motion for continuance. Thompson argues that because

his counsel was appointed ten days before trial, he did not have
30

adequate time to prepare for trial. This court reviews the

district court’s decision to grant or deny a continuance for

abuse of discretion. United States v. Walters, 351 F.3d 159, 170

(5th Cir. 2003). Further, this court will order a new trial only

where the defendant can show that he has suffered serious

prejudice. United States v. Messervey, 317 F.3d 457, 462 (5th

Cir. 2002). Factors to be considered where a party complains of

inadequate preparation time include: (1) the amount of

preparation time available, (2) whether the defendant took

advantage of the time available, (3) the likelihood of prejudice

from a denial, (4) the availability of discovery from the

prosecution, and (5) the complexity of the case. United States v.

Scott, 48 F.3d 1389, 1393 (5th Cir. 1995).

This case was indeed complex: it involved ten defendants,

even more witnesses, and voluminous discovery. Ten days does

appear to be an excessively short length of time to prepare a

defense in such a case. Yet there is no evidence that Thompson

was seriously prejudiced by the denial of his request for a

continuance. Thompson’s attorney effectively challenged the

witnesses–-including Baumgardner, Max Mays, and Hines, Jr.–-who

implicated his client, made intelligent arguments in his opening

and closing statements minimizing Thompson’s role, and benefitted

from the arguments of other defense counsel challenging the

credibility of witnesses and portraying the participants in the

methamphetamine trade as fragmented and disorganized. We
31

therefore decline to order a new trial for Thompson.

D. Breach of Plea Bargain

Defendant Ford claims that by bringing against him the March

2004 indictment that lead to this trial, the government breached

its earlier plea agreement with him stemming from a January 2003

indictment. In the January 2003 indictment, Ford and his wife

were charged with one count of distributing methamphetamine on

May 13, 2002, one count of possession with intent to distribute

methamphetamine on May 16, 2002, multiple gun counts, and one

count for having maintained a place for manufacturing and

distributing methamphetamine from approximately May 13, 2002, to

June 10, 2002. In March 2003, Ford pled guilty to one gun count

pursuant to a plea agreement in which the government agreed to

dismiss the other counts against him.

This court reviews a claim of breach of a plea agreement de

novo, accepting the district court’s factual findings unless

clearly erroneous. United States v. Davis, 393 F.3d 540, 546 (5th

Cir. 2004)(internal citations omitted). We apply general

principles of contract law in order to interpret the terms of the

plea agreement. United States v. Cantu, 185 F.3d 298, 304 (5th

Cir. 1999). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating the

underlying facts that establish the breach by a preponderance of

the evidence. United States v. Wittie, 25 F.3d 250, 262 (5th Cir.

1994). To assess whether a plea agreement has been violated, this

court considers “whether the government’s conduct is consistent
32

with the defendant’s reasonable understanding of the agreement.”

United States v. Valencia, 985 F.2d 758, 761 (5th Cir. 1993).

The issue raised here by Ford is similar to that presented

in Cantu. There, the appellant argued that the government alleged

the same conduct in the possession count dismissed pursuant to

his plea agreement and in the subsequent RICO count filed against

him. 185 F.3d at 305. This court concluded that it was not

reasonable for Cantu to believe that his plea agreement barred

the government from bringing a different charge in a future

prosecution. Id. We explained that “[t]he language of the plea

agreement is narrowly worded, speaking only to the government’s

obligation to dismiss ‘Count II of the First Superseding

Indictment.’” Id. We further found that Cantu was not prejudiced,

because although conduct that was the basis of the dismissed

charge was incorporated into the later charge as an overt act, it

was only one of nine overt acts presented by the government. Id.

At trial, the government adduced sufficient evidence bearing upon

the other eight overt acts to justify Cantu’s conviction. Id.

Here Ford argues that his dismissed aiding and abetting

charge was so similar to the conspiracy charge made in the March

2004 indictment as to preclude prosecution for that later charge.

Ford also notes that count two of the March 2004 indictment

includes as an overt act Ford’s manufacture of methamphetamine on

May 13, 2002, the same act that was a basis for his dismissed

aiding and abetting charge. As in Cantu, however, Ford’s plea
33

agreement does not contain any promise by the government not to

prosecute Ford for a different crime arising out of facts from

the first indictment. There is a substantial difference between

Ford’s aiding and abetting charge, which included only Ford’s

cooperation with his wife, and the March 2004 indictment, which

alleged Ford’s manufacture of methamphetamine for the Aryan

Circle group over a much broader time span. Moreover, the

testimony at trial focused not on Ford’s manufacturing activities

on or around May 13, 2002, but on his manufacture for Hines, Jr.,

and Charles Samson in January 2002 and with Wilkins in late

November 2002 through mid January 2003. Consequently, there was

no prejudice to Ford, and his conviction must stand.

E. Challenges to Sentencing Enhancements

1. Griffith and Martin

The district judge enhanced the sentences of defendants

Griffith and Martin under U.S.S.G § 3B1.1 for leadership roles in

the methamphetamine conspiracy. Griffith and Martin now raise two

objections to their sentence enhancements: first, a Sixth

Amendment objection to the judge’s application of the mandatory

Sentencing Guidelines; and, second, an objection to the

sufficiency of the evidence underlying the enhancement.

At trial, both Griffith and Martin raised objections under

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), to the district

court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines, thus preserving

their Sixth Amendment challenge under United States v. Booker,
34

543 U.S. 220 (2005). See United States v. Saldana, 427 F.3d 298,

313-14 (5th Cir. 2005). Where the Booker objection is preserved

in the district court, we will vacate the sentence and remand,

unless we can say that the error is harmless under Rule 52(a) of

the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. United States v. Mares,

402 F.3d 511, 520 n.9 (5th Cir. 2005). The government bears the

burden of showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt. United States v. Pineiro, 410 F.3d 282, 285 (5th Cir.

2005). To show harmlessness, the government must demonstrate

beyond a reasonable doubt that the Sixth Amendment error did not

affect the sentence that the defendant received. Id.

At the sentencing hearings of both Griffith and Martin, the

district court declared that in the event that the Sentencing

Guidelines were declared unconstitutional, the court would award

Griffith and Martin the same sentences as it did applying the

Guidelines, 360 months and 210 months respectively. The

government therefore meets its burden of showing that the

district court’s Sixth Amendment error was harmless. See Saldana,

427 F.3d at 314-15. 

Griffith was given a four-level sentence enhancement under

U.S.S.G § 3B1.1(a) for being “an organizer or leader of a

criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was

otherwise extensive.” Griffith objected at trial that there was

insufficient evidence to support this enhancement, and now raises

this claim upon appeal. After Booker, we continue to review the
35

district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de

novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v.

Charon, 442 F.3d 881, 887 (5th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127

S.Ct. 260 (2006). The sentencing judge is entitled to find by a

preponderance of the evidence all the facts relevant to the

determination of a Guidelines sentencing range. United States v.

Johnson, 445 F.3d 793, 798 (5th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 126 S.

Ct. 2884 (2006).

Factors to be considered in identifying an organizer or

leader include “the exercise of decision making authority, the

nature of participation in the commission of the offense, the

recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share

of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation in

planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the

illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority

exercised over others.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4; United States

v. Valdez, 453 F.3d 252, 263 (5th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127

S.Ct. 456 (2006). Applying these factors, it is clear that the

evidence against Griffith falls short. While Griffith held a

leadership position in the Aryan Circle organization, the record

reveals that his involvement in the methamphetamine trade was

minor. As described above, the evidence regarding Griffith’s

methamphetamine participation indicated that he sold

methamphetamine fronted by Hines, Jr., for a month and sold

methamphetamine from Bidwell’s house on five occasions. There was
36

no evidence that Griffith exercised authority over either man in

these transactions. There is no evidence that Griffith recruited

accomplices or claimed a share of methamphetamine being produced

and sold by other members of the Aryan Circle. There is also no

evidence that Griffith took part in meetings at which

arrangements were made for gathering precursors and setting up

cooks. 

The government points to evidence that Griffith told Hines,

Jr., that he did not like Aryan Circle members diluting the

methamphetamine that they sold to each other, and that he told

Perkins that if Perkins was going to continue to sell

methamphetamine, he needed to do it with his Aryan Circle

brothers. The evidence strongly indicates, however, that this

advice or instruction was not heeded, suggesting that Griffith

did not exercise control or authority over these individuals with

regard to the methamphetamine trade. The government also points

to evidence that Griffith made threats against those members of

the Aryan Circle who had agreed to testify in this case. Evidence

implicating Griffith in threats of this kind is strong; however,

the record as a whole shows that these acts were done to protect

the Aryan Circle organization rather than to further the aims of

a methamphetamine conspiracy. Griffith received a two-level

sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice, so his conduct

in this regard did not go unpunished.

Martin received a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G.
37

§ 3B1.1(c) as an “organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor” in

any criminal activity other than one that involved five or more

participants or was otherwise extensive. Martin objected at trial

that there is insufficient evidence to support this enhancement,

and now renews this claim upon appeal. To qualify for an

adjustment under this section, the defendant must have been the

organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of at least one other

participant. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.2. Our sister circuit has

held that instructing others to obtain precursors used to produce

methamphetamine is evidence of a managerial or supervisory role

for the purposes of § 3B1.1. United States v. Mesner, 377 F.3d

849, 851 (8th Cir. 2004). 

Much of the testimony regarding Martin casts him in a

subordinate role: Martin accompanied Rister to collect a drug

debt; Martin obtained pills for Barrandey’s cook; Martin sold

methamphetamine for Charlie Samson and Perkins; Martin gathered

pills and precursors for Tucker and Wilkins. There was some

evidence that Martin was a methamphetamine cook. Gary Martin

testified that he and Martin cooked together a couple of times,

and Bidwell testified that he observed Gary Martin teaching

Martin how to cook methamphetamine. This evidence suggests that

Gary Martin, not Martin, took a managerial role in those cooks,

and it does not indicate that Martin had persons obtaining

precursors for those cooks. Jordan testified that he, Martin, and

Barrandey brought anhydrous ammonia to Perkins’ house, and that
6 At the sentencing hearing, the district court stated that

Hines, Jr., testified that Martin cooked methamphetamine, but we

have not found evidence of that testimony in the record. 

38

they all then began to cook. This testimony does not indicate

that Martin had a managerial role in that cook. Rister testified

that he once saw Martin cooking methamphetamine “way out west of

town.” This testimony does not indicate that Martin was managing

others in cooking or gathering precursors.6

In finding that Martin “did direct others to get precursors

for methamphetamine,” the district court appeared to rely on the

statement by the United States attorney at the sentencing hearing

that “Mr. Bailey testified extensively that . . . Mr. Martin

would have Mr. Bailey gather up precursors on a regular basis for

Mr. Martin.” This is not an accurate reflection of Calvin

Bailey’s testimony. Bailey testified that Martin and Bailey’s

mother brought precursors to Bailey’s house, cooked

methamphetamine elsewhere, and then returned with finished

methamphetamine. Bailey did not indicate that he or other persons

were gathering precursors for Martin. Accordingly, we conclude

that the district court clearly erred in enhancing Martin’s

sentence as an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor.

2. Ford

The district court enhanced Ford’s sentence on the basis

that Ford was responsible for between five and fifteen kilograms

of a substance containing methamphetamine. Citing Apprendi v. New
39

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), Ford objects that this enhancement

violates his Due Process Clause and Sixth Amendment rights

because it is based on facts not found by the jury. Here,

however, the district court’s determination did not increase

Ford’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum. 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(A) provides for a sentence of ten years to life for

defendants convicted of distributing more than fifty grams of

methamphetamine or 500 grams of a substance containing

methamphetamine. Ford’s sentence of 325 months in prison was thus

within the prescribed range of penalties for which Ford could be

held responsible based solely on the jury’s finding.

Consequently, there is no Apprendi error. Though Ford made a

Blakely objection at trial, any Booker error is harmless because

the district court stated that it would impose the same sentence

in the event that the Guidelines were declared unconstitutional.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the convictions of

Charles Samson and Victor Wesley Tucker of a continuing criminal

enterprise involving more than 15,000 grams of methamphetamine.

We REVERSE the conviction of Michael Curtis Lewis and Malachi

David Wren for continuing criminal enterprise on the basis of

insufficient evidence. We AFFIRM the convictions of Donnie

Thompson, Michael Norris Martin, Buddy Ford, Leonard Duane

Griffith, Shane Samson, and Jerry Wayne Beason for conspiracy to

manufacture and distribute over fifty grams of methamphetamine or
40

500 grams of a substance or mixture containing methamphetamine.

We REVERSE the enhancement of the sentences of Michael Norris

Martin and Leonard Duane Griffith for leadership roles in the

conspiracy on the basis of insufficient evidence but AFFIRM the

enhancement of the sentence of Buddy Ford for his responsibility

for between five and fifteen kilograms of a substance containing

methamphetamine.

AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. The sentences of

Lewis, Wren, Martin, and Griffith are VACATED and the cause is

REMANDED for their resentencing.