59750 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 213 / Tuesday, November 4, 1997 / Notices

enactment and every six months

thereafter relating to the development of

procurement regulations.

Accordingly, OFPP has prepared this

report, which is designed to satisfy all

aspects of subsections 25(g) (1) and (2)

of the OFPP Act, and includes

information on the status of each

regulation; a description of those

regulations required by statute; a

description of the methods by which

public comment was sought;

regulations, policies, procedures, and

forms under review by the OFPP;

whether the regulations have paperwork

requirements; the progress made in

promulgating and implementing the

Federal Acquisition Regulation; and

such other matters as the Administrator

determines to be useful.

ADDRESSES: Those persons interested in

obtaining a copy of the Procurement

Regulatory Activity Report may contact

the Executive Office of the President

Publications Service, Room 2200, 725

17th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20503,

or call 202–395–7332.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: For additional

information write the Office of Federal

Procurement Policy, 725 17th Street,

NW, Washington, DC 20503 or call 202–

395–6803.

Allan E. Brown,

Acting Administrator.

[FR Doc. 97–29157 Filed 11–3–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3110–01–P

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION

SAFETY BOARD

Public Hearing on Trans World Airlines

(TWA) Flight 800 Accident

In connection with its investigation of

the accident involving Trans World

Airlines (TWA) flight 800, a Boeing

747–100, N93119, in the Atlantic Ocean

near East Moriches, NY, July 17, 1996,

the National Transportation Safety

Board will convene a public hearing

beginning at 9:00 a.m., on Monday,

December 8, 1997, at the Baltimore

Convention Center, Halls A and B, One

West Pratt Street, Baltimore, MD. For

more information, contact Shelly Hazle,

Office of Public Affairs, Washington,

D.C. 20594, telephone (202) 314–6100.

Dated: October 30, 1997.

Ray Smith,

Alternate Federal Register Liaison Officer.

[FR Doc. 97–29145 Filed 11–3–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7533–01–M

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–302]

Florida Power Corporation; Crystal

River Nuclear Generating Plant Unit 3,

Exemption

I.

Florida Power Corporation (the

licensee) is the holder of Facility

Operating License No. DPR–72, which

authorizes operation of the Crystal River

Nuclear Generating Plant Unit 3 (CR3).

The license provides, among other

things, that the licensee is subject to all

rules, regulations, and orders of the

Commission now or hereafter in effect.

The facility is of a pressurized water

reactor type and is located in Citrus

County, Florida.

II.

In its letter dated June 21, as

supplemented November 22, 1996, the

licensee requested an exemption from

the Commission’s regulations.

Title 10 of the Code of Federal

Regulations, part 50, Appendix A,

‘‘General Design Criteria for Nuclear

Power Plants,’’ Criterion 3, ‘‘Fire

Protection,’’ specifies that ‘‘Structures,

systems, and components important to

safety shall be designed and located to

minimize, consistent with other safety

requirements, the probability and effect

of fires and explosions.’’ 10 CFR part 50,

Appendix R sets forth the fire protection

features required to satisfy the general

design Criterion 3 of the Commission’s

regulations. Pursuant to 10 CFR part 50,

Appendix R, Section III, Paragraph G,

design features shall be established that

are capable of limiting fire damage so

that one train of systems necessary to

achieve and maintain hot shutdown

conditions is free of fire damage.

Specifically, 10 CFR part 50, Appendix

R, Paragraph III.G.2.c requires (if

Paragraphs III.G.2.a or b are not

applicable) enclosure of cable and

equipment and associated non-safety

circuits of one redundant train in a fire

barrier having a 1-hour rating; in

addition, fire detectors and an automatic

fire suppression system shall be

installed in the fire area.

The current CR3 design includes

Thermo-Lag fire barriers which do not

provide the level of fire resistance

required by NRC regulations. As part of

its program for resolving Thermo-Lag

issues, the licensee has determined that

the Thermo-Lag material used as a fire

barrier for the protection of certain safe

shutdown cables located in certain

elevations of the auxiliary and

intermediate buildings does not qualify

as 1-hour fire rated barriers. In lieu of

upgrading the existing Thermo-Lag fire

barriers to satisfy the 1-hour fire rating

requirement, the licensee proposes to

implement an enhanced automatic fire

suppression system coverage for these

specific fire zones. The licensee

indicates that its proposed enhanced

automatic fire suppression system

coverage coupled with the existing

Thermo-Lag barriers and other defensein-depth features will ensure that one

train of equipment necessary to achieve

hot shutdown remains free of fire

damage. An exemption from 10 CFR

Part 50, Appendix R, Section III,

Paragraph G.2.c., is required to allow

the use of the existing Thermo-Lag

material that has less than a 1-hour fire

rating, for the specific cables and

equipment located in certain elevations

of the auxiliary and intermediate

buildings. By letter dated June 21, as

supplemented November 22, 1996, the

licensee submitted the exemption

request.

This exemption does not address the

licensee’s request relating to the

requirements for battery powered

lighting in areas for the operation of safe

shutdown equipment.

III.

Discussion

The exemption request is for the

following fire zones: auxiliary building

fire area AB–95–3B and G, AB–119–6A

(elevations 95 and 119) and the

intermediate building fire area IB–119–

201A (elevation 119). Automatic

sprinkler protection and automatic fire

detection designed and installed in

accordance with the applicable National

Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

codes and standards are provided in

these fire zones. The licensee, in its

response to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) staff’s request for

additional information (RAI) dated

September 24, 1996, identified no

significant deviations from the

applicable NFPA codes and standards

that would adversely affect system

performance. The licensee has proposed

upgrading the existing automatic

sprinkler protection in each of these

zones to compensate for the existing

Thermo-Lag fire barriers. The licensee

has determined that the existing

Thermo-Lag fire barriers, coupled with

the enhanced sprinkler protection and

administrative controls, provide an

adequate level of fire protection. The

staff’s evaluation of the licensee’s

exemption request is discussed below.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 213 / Tuesday, November 4, 1997 / Notices 59751

Auxiliary Building Hallway AB–95–

3BA

This zone is the main east/west

corridor for this elevation of the

auxiliary building. The corridor is

approximately 9 feet wide and the

ceiling is approximately 26 feet above

the floor level. An open stairway at the

east end of this fire zone leads up to

elevation 119 of the auxiliary building

(AB 119–6A) and is open to adjacent fire

zones at each end. The remainder of the

zone is bounded by 3-hour fire walls on

the north, east, and west. The ceiling

and floor are also 3-hour fire rated

barriers. The south wall is a non-fire

rated concrete barrier with unsealed

penetrations. The fire hazards in this

zone include cables, electrical cabinets

and an air conditioning unit. The safe

shutdown circuits located in this zone

are associated with the makeup system

and battery charging. The unprotected

redundant circuits are within 5 feet of

the Thermo-Lag protected cables. The

fire protection features provided for this

zone include a wet pipe sprinkler

system, hose station, and smoke

detection. The licensee has performed

an engineering evaluation that

concluded that the Thermo-Lag fire

barriers in this zone have an equivalent

fire rating of 23 to 48 minutes.

Auxiliary Building Hallway AB–95–3G

This is a north/south corridor

providing access to the make-up pump

cubicles. This zone is enclosed by nonfire rated concrete walls ranging from 24

to 36 inches thick. The floor and ceiling

are 3-hour rated fire barriers. The fire

hazards in this zone include cables and

electrical cabinets. The safe shutdown

circuits located in this zone are

associated with the makeup system and

battery charging. The unprotected

redundant circuits are within 1 foot of

the Thermo-Lag protected cables. The

fire protection features provided for this

zone include a wet pipe sprinkler

system, hose station, and smoke

detection. The licensee has performed

an engineering evaluation that

concluded that the Thermo-Lag fire

barriers in this zone have an equivalent

fire rating of 23 to 48 minutes.

Auxiliary Building Hallway AB–95–3G

This zone is the main east/west

corridor for this elevation of the

auxiliary building. The corridor is

approximately 9 feet wide and 40 feet

high. An open stairway at the east end

of this fire zone leads down to elevation

95 of the auxiliary building (AB–95–3B)

and is open to adjacent fire zones at

each end. The remainder of the zone is

enclosed by 3-hour fire walls on the

north, east and west side, a 3-hour fire

rated floor and a 36-inch thick concrete

non-fire rated ceiling and south wall.

The fire hazards in this zone include

cables and fan motors. The safe

shutdown circuits located in this area

are associated with the makeup system,

heating ventilation and air conditioning

(HVAC), instrumentation, battery

charging and essential power supplies.

The unprotected redundant circuits are

greater than 20 feet from the ThermoLag protected cables; however,

intervening combustibles are present.

The fire protection features provided for

this zone include a wet pipe sprinkler

system, hose station, and smoke

detection. The licensee has performed

an engineering evaluation that

concluded that the Thermo-Lag fire

barriers in this zone have an equivalent

fire rating of 23 to 39 minutes.

Intermediate Building Industrial Cooler

Room IB–119–201A

This zone connects the industrial

room cooler to the auxiliary building

and is located between the turbine

building and the reactor building. The

corridor is a narrow hallway with a

ceiling approximately 26 feet high. This

zone is separated from the turbine

building by a 3-hour rated wall. The

zone is also separated from the reactor

building by a non-fire rated concrete

wall approximately 42 inches thick. The

east side of this zone is adjacent to fire

zone IB–119–201B, separated by a

‘‘jailbar’’ door. The fire hazards in this

zone include cables and electrical

cabinets. The safe shutdown circuits

located in this zone are associated with

instrumentation. The unprotected

redundant circuits are within 3 feet of

the Thermo-Lag protected cables. The

fire protection features provided for this

zone include a wet pipe sprinkler

system, hose station, and smoke

detection. The licensee has performed

an engineering evaluation that

concluded that the Thermo-Lag fire

barriers in this zone have an equivalent

fire rating of 22 to 36 minutes.

Intermediate Building Personnel Hatch

IB–119–201B

This zone connects the industrial

cooler room with the auxiliary building.

The floor area is approximately 1100

square feet. The north, east and part of

the south wall have a 3-hour fire rating.

The remaining portion of the south wall

is the reactor building non-fire rated

concrete wall approximately 42 inches

thick. The fire hazards in this zone are

cables and protective clothing storage.

The safe shutdown circuits located in

this zone are associated with

instrumentation. The unprotected

redundant circuits are within 20 feet of

the Thermo-Lag protected cables. The

fire protection features provided for this

zone include a wet pipe sprinkler

system, hose station, and smoke

detection. The licensee has performed

an engineering evaluation that

concluded that the Thermo-Lag fire

barriers in this zone have an equivalent

fire rating of 22 to 36 minutes.

IV.

Evaluation

A fire on the 95 or 119 elevations of

the auxiliary building could cause the

loss of the redundant divisions of the

makeup system, HVAC,

instrumentation, battery charging or

essential power supplies. A fire on the

119 elevation of the intermediate

building could cause the loss of

redundant divisions of instrumentation

needed to achieve and maintain safe

shutdown following a fire.

The licensee has committed to

upgrade the existing sprinkler

protection on elevations 95 and 119 of

the auxiliary building and on elevation

119 of the intermediate building in the

vicinity of the Thermo-Lag fire barriers

that are the subject of this exemption

request. The additional sprinkler

protection, coupled with the existing

automatic detection and suppression,

and manual fire suppression capability

provided in these fire zones, would

provide reasonable assurance that an

exposure fire from in situ or transient

combustible materials in the vicinity of

the Thermo-Lag fire barriers will not

challenge the barriers, such that damage

to redundant divisions of systems and

instrumentation needed to achieve and

maintain safe shutdown following a fire

will not occur. Due to variations in the

important parameters of the installed

Thermo-Lag barriers from the tested

barriers, and deviations in the conduct

of the industry-sponsored fire

endurance tests from the guidance

provided in Supplement 1 to Generic

Letter 86–10, the equivalent fire

resistance rating of the Thermo-Lag fire

barriers at Crystal River Unit 3, that are

the subject of this exemption request, is

indeterminate. However, based on data

obtained from industry-sponsored fire

test programs, the staff estimates that

the existing Thermo-Lag barriers would

provide a minimum of 20 minutes of

fire resistance. The licensee has

committed to maintain the Thermo-Lag

fire barriers that are the subject of this

request in place. Automatic wet pipe

sprinkler protection that is designed,

installed and maintained in accordance

with NFPA 13, ‘‘Installation of Sprinkler

Systems,’’ have historically
59752 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 213 / Tuesday, November 4, 1997 / Notices

demonstrated a high reliability in

controlling fires during the incipient

stage, thereby limiting fire damage and

propagation until extinguishment can be

achieved through manual actions. The

licensee has stated that an upgrade of

the existing Thermo-Lag fire barriers to

achieve literal compliance with the

regulation is not feasible due to the

locations of the raceways; however, the

protection provided by the existing

Thermo-Lag and supplemented with fire

suppression capability by the additional

sprinkler heads would protect one train

of safe shutdown cables and satisfy the

underlying purpose of the rule. On the

basis of its review and evaluation of the

technical information provided in the

licensee’s exemption request and the

licensee’s response to the request for

additional information, the NRC staff

concludes that the licensee’s proposed

alternative means of protection coupling

the existing barriers with enhanced

suppression capability provides a level

of safety equivalent to that prescribed by

the regulation.

V.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the

Commission may, upon application by

any interested person or upon its own

initiative, grant exemptions from the

requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when (1)

the exemptions are authorized by law,

will not present an undue risk to public

health or safety, and are consistent with

the common defense and security; and

(2) when special circumstances are

present. Special circumstances are

present whenever, according to 10 CFR

50.12(a)(2)(ii), ‘‘Application of the

regulation in the particular

circumstances would not serve the

underlying purpose of the rule or is not

necessary to achieve the underlying

purpose of the rule.’’

The underlying purpose of 10 CFR

part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G, Fire

Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability,

is to ensure the capability to achieve

and maintain safe shutdown conditions

during and after any postulated fire in

the plant. The staff has concluded that

the licensee’s proposed alternative

means of protection, as described in its

request for exemption from the

technical requirements of Section

III.G.2.c for auxiliary building fire area

AB–95–3B and G, AB–119–6A

(elevations 95 and 119) and the

intermediate building fire area IB–119–

201A (elevation 119), would provide

reasonable assurance that a level of

safety equivalent to that specified by the

regulation would be met. Therefore,

application of the one hour barrier

requirement under the above

circumstances is not necessary to

achieve the underlying purpose of the

rule.

VI.

In consideration of the foregoing, the

NRC staff has concluded that the

licensee’s proposed use of an enhanced

automatic fire suppression system

coverage for these specific areas in lieu

of upgrading the existing Thermo-Lag

fire barriers to satisfy the 1-hour fire

rating requirement, is authorized by

law, will not present an undue risk to

public health and safety and is

consistent with the common defense

and security. The NRC staff has

determined that there are special

circumstances present, as specified in

10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), in that

application of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R,

Section III G.2.c, is not necessary in

order to achieve the underlying purpose

of this regulation.

Accordingly, the Commission hereby

grants, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a), the

requested exemption. The granting of

this exemption is contingent upon (1)

the installation of the enhanced fire

suppression capability as described in

the licensee’s request, and (2)

maintaining in place the existing fire

barriers that are the subject of this

exemption.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the

Commission has determined that the

granting of this exemption will not have

a significant effect on the quality of the

human environment (62 FR 56207).

This exemption is effective upon

issuance.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 29th day

of October 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samuel J. Collins,

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 97–29140 Filed 11–3–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–302]

Florida Power Corporation;

Environmental Assessment and

Finding of No Significant Impact

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission or NRC)

is considering issuance of an exemption

from certain requirements of its

regulations to Florida Power

Corporation (the licensee), holder of

Facility Operating License No. DPR–72

for operation of the Crystal River Unit

3 Nuclear Generating Plant (CR3)

located in Citrus County, Florida.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of Proposed

The proposed action is in accordance

with the licensee’s application dated

September 5, 1997, for exemption from

certain requirements of Appendix R,

‘‘Fire Protection Program for Nuclear

Power Facilities Operating Prior to

January 1, 1979,’’ to Title 10 of the Code

of Federal Regulations part 50 (10 CFR

part 50), Section III, Paragraph O, ‘‘Oil

Collection System for Reactor Coolant

Pump.’’ Specifically, the licensee

requests an exemption from the

Appendix R, Section III.O technical

requirements for an oil collection

system capable of collecting all

potential leakage for the CR3 Reactor

Coolant (RCP) Motor Remote Oil

Addition Lines (ROALs).

The Need for the Proposed

10 CFR part 50, Appendix A,

‘‘General Design Criteria for Nuclear

Power Plants,’’ Criterion 3 ‘‘Fire

Protection,’’ specifies that ‘‘Structures,

systems, and components important to

safety shall be designed and located to

minimize, consistent with other safety

requirements, the probability and effect

of fires and explosions.’’ 10 CFR part 50,

Appendix R, sets forth the fire

protection features required to satisfy

the General Design Criterion 3 of the

Commission’s regulations. Pursuant to

10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III,

Paragraph O, ‘‘Oil Collection System for

Reactor Coolant Pump,’’ the RCP shall

be equipped with an oil collection

system which ‘‘* * * shall be capable

of collecting lube oil from all potential

pressurized and unpressurized leakage

sites in the reactor coolant pump lube

oil systems.’’

In 1985, CR3 added ROALs to the

original RCP oil fill lines in order to

eliminate the need to shutdown the

reactor, and to reduce personnel

radiation and heat stress exposure

during periodic RCP oil additions. At

that time, the licensee did not consider

the ROALs as a part of the RCP lube oil

systems and as a result, did not provide

a lube oil collection system to collect

potential leakages. As part of its current

Appendix R design review project, the

licensee has now determined the ROALs

to be a part of the RCP lube oil systems,

therefore, requiring a lube oil collection

system.

The licensee states that because the

ROALs are of a rugged leak tight design

and used only periodically in

accordance with controlled plant

procedures, the ROALs do not impact

post fire safe shutdown capability. As a

result, the licensee believes that a lube

oil collection system for the ROALs is