# United States **Court of Appeals**  **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________ CHANGZHOU TRINA SOLAR ENERGY CO., LTD., TRINA SOLAR (CHANGZHOU) SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD., TRINA SOLAR (U.S.) INC., Plaintiffs

- Appellees

v.

UNITED STATES, Defendant

- Appellee

v.

SOLARWORLD AMERICAS, INC., Defendant

- Appellant

______________________

2020

- 1004

______________________ Appeal from the United States Court of International Trade in No s . 1:17

- cv

- 00199

- CRK, 1:17

- cv

- 00217

- CRK, Judge Claire R. Kelly.

______________________
Decided: September 3, 2020

______________________

J ONATHAN F REED , Trade Pacific PLLC, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiffs

- appellees. Also represented by R OBERT G OSSELINK

. Case: 20-1004 Document: 64 Page: 1 Filed: 09/03/2020CHANGZHOU TRINA S OLAR ENERGY v. UNITED STATES 2

J O SHUA E. K URLAND , Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant

- appellee. Also represented by E THAN P. D AVIS , J EANNE D AVIDSON , R EGINALD T HOMAS B LADES , J R

. ; I AN A NDREW M C I NERNEY , Office of the Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement and Compliance, United States Department of Commerce , Washington, DC

.

T IMOTHY C. B RIGHTBILL , Wiley Rein, LLP, Washington, DC, argued for defendant

- appellant. Also represented by L AURA E L

- S ABAAWI , D OUGLAS C. D REIER , S TEPHEN J OSEPH O BERMEIER , J OHN A LLEN R IGGINS , E NBAR T OLEDANO

.

______________________

Before D YK , W ALLACH , and C HEN , Circuit Judges

. W ALLACH , Circuit Judge

. Appellee s Changzhou Trina Solar Energy Co., Ltd., Trina Solar (Changzhou) Science & Technology Co., Ltd., and Trina Solar (U.S.), Inc. (collectively, “Trina”) filed suit against Appellee the United States (“Government”) in the U.S. Court of International Trade (“CIT”), challenging the U.S. Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce”) final results in the first administrative review of the antidumping (“antidumping” or “AD”) duty order co vering certain crystalline silico n photovoltaic products from the People’s Republic of China (“ PRC ”). See Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Products F rom the People ’ s Republic of China

, 82 Fed. Reg. 32,170, 32

, 172 ( Dep’t of Commerce July 12, 2017 ) (final results ) (“ Final Results ”)

. Appellant SolarW orld Americas, Inc. (“S olar W orld”) , a domestic producer of like products, participated as petitioner and defendant

- intervenor. T he CIT remanded “ Commerce ’s decision not to offset” Trina’s export price by a countervailed export subsidy as

“ contrary to law ,” instructing Commerce “ to recalcu late Trina’ s [export] price[]” with the offset, while sustain ing

, inter alia, “Commerce’s surrogate value selection[] for Case: 20-1004 Document: 64 Page: 2 Filed: 09/03/2020CHANGZHOU TRINA SOLAR ENERGY v. UNITED STATES 3

valuing

. . . module glass

. ” Changzhou Trina Solar Energy Co. v. United States ( Trina I ), 359 F. Supp. 3d 1329, 1344 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2019). Commerce issued its remand redetermination , recalculating Trina’s export price in accordance with Trina I

, under protest. J .A. 6764

– 65; see J.A. 6764

– 70 (Remand Redetermination). The CIT sustained Commerce’s Remand R edetermination

. S ee Changzhou Trina Solar Energy Co. v. United States ( Trina II )

, 393 F. Supp. 3d 1245, 1251 (Ct. Int’ l Trade 2019) ; J.A. 16

– 17 ( Judgment)

. SolarW orld appeals . We hav e jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) . We affirm

. B ACKGROUND I. Legal Framework
Antidumping duties may be imposed on “foreign merchandise [ that ] is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at less than its fair value.” 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1)

. Domestic industries may seek “relief from [such] imports

, ” Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States , 287 F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002), by filing a petition with Commerceand the U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC”) to initiate an antidumping duty investigation, see 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673a(b), 1677(9)(C). Following investigation, if Commerce deter mines that imported merchandise “is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at less than its fair value,” id. § 1673(1), and the ITC determines that the importation or sale of that merchandise has “materially injured” or “threaten[s]” to “mate rially injur[e]” “ an industry in the United States, ” id. § 1673(2), then Commerce will “publish an antidumping duty order

. . . direct[ing] [U.S. Customs and Border Protection] to assess

. . . antidumping dut[ies]” on subject merchandise, id. § 1673e(a)(1)

. Each year after the order is published, “if [Commerce receives] a request for

. . . review” of that order from an interested party , Commerce will “review[] and determine

. . . the amount of any antidumping duty ” under the order. Id. Case: 20-1004 Document: 64 Page: 3 Filed: 09/03/2020CHANGZHOU TRINA S OLAR ENERGY v. UNITED STATES 4

§ 1675(a)(1 ) (B) (pr oviding for the “[p]eriodic review of [the] amount of duty”) ; see 19 C.F.R. § 351.213 ( b ) (providing for the “[a]dministrative review of orders” on the request of “an interested party ” ). 1

In the course an investigation or review, Commerce “determine[s] the estimated weighted average dumpingmargin for each exporter and producer individually investigated” or reviewed and “the estimated all

- others rate for all exporters and producers not individual ly investigated ” or reviewed. 19 U. S.C. § 1673d(c)(1)(B)(i) ; see id. § 1677f

1(c) (providing for the “ [ d ] etermination of dumping margin[s]” in investigations and reviews for “a reasonable number of exporters or producers” ). A dumping margin reflects the amount by which the “‘normal value’ (the price a producer charges in its home market) exceeds the ‘exportprice’ (the price of the product in the United States) or ‘constructed export price.’” U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States

,621 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (footnote omitted) (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(A)); see 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677b(a)(1) (defining “normal value” as “the price at which the [m erchandise] is first sold

. . . for consumption” in the home country or a third country), 1677a(b) (defining “constructedexport price” as “the price at which the subject merchandise is first sold

. . . in the United States” to “a purchaser not affiliated with the producer or exporter”). Where merchandise is subject to both ant idumping and countervailing duties (“countervailing duties” or “CVD”) , Commerce will increase the export price or constructed export price by “the

1 An “interested party” includes: “ a foreign manufacturer, producer, or exporter, or the United States importer, of subject merchandise ”; “ the government of a country in which such merchandise is produced or manufactured or from which such merchandise is exported ”; and, “ a manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler in the United States of a domestic like product

. ” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9)(A)

– (C). Case: 20-1004 Document: 64 Page: 4 Filed: 09/03/2020CHANGZHOU TRINA SOLAR ENERGY v. UNITED STATES 5

amount of any countervailing duty imposed on the subject merchandise

. . . to offset an export subsidy[.]”
1 9 U.S.C.§ 1677a(c)(1)(C) ; see id. § 1671 (a)(1) (providing that countervailing duties may be imposed on imported merchandise to coun tervail subsidies provided by, e.g., the government of the exporting country

, for “ the manufacture, production, or export of ” that merchandise )

. If Commerce finds that the exporting country is a “nonmarket economy” (“NME”) country 2 and “that available information does not permit the normal value of the subject merchandise to be determined under [§ 1677b(a)],” then Commerce cal culates the normal value using surrogate values for the “factors of production” in a comparable “market economy country.” Id. § 1677b(c)(1).
II. Procedural History

A. The AD and CVD Orders

In December 2013, SolarWorld, “a domestic producer of solar cells and panels,” filed “antidumping [and countervailing] duty

. . . petition [ s ] concerning imports of certain crystalline silicon photovoltaic products ” from the PRC

, then Commerce initiated antidumping and countervailing duty investigations in response. Certain Crystalline Silicon Photov oltaic Products Fr om the People’ s Republic of China and Taiwan , 79 F ed. R eg. 4
, 661 , 4,661 ( Dep’t of Commerce Jan. 29, 2014) ( i nitiation of a ntidump ing d uty

2 A n NME country is “any foreign country that [Commerce] determines does not operate on market principles of cost or pricing structures, so that sales of merchandise insuch country do not reflect the fair value of the merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A ). Comm erce considers the PRC to be an NME country. Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Products From the People’s Republic of China

, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,793, 12,795 ( Dep’t of Commerce Mar. 7, 2017) (preliminary results) (“ Preliminary Results ”). Case: 20-1004 Document: 64 Page: 5 Filed: 09/03/2020CHANGZHOU TRINA S OLAR ENERGY v. UNITED STATES 6

i nvestigations ); see Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Products F rom the People ’ s Republic of China , 79 F ed. R eg. 4
, 667 , 4,668 ( Dep’t of Commerce Jan. 29, 2014) ( i nitiation of c ountervailing d uty i nvestigation ) (similar). Trina was a manda tory respondent in the CVD inves tigation proceedings. See Countervailing Duty Investigation of Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Products From the People’ s Republic of China , 79 F ed. R eg. 76

, 962 , 76,963 ( Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 23, 2014) ( f inal a ffirmative c ountervailing d uty d etermination ) (“ Final CVD Determination ”)

. In calculating Trina’s countervailing duty rate, Commerce found various “[p]rograms

. . . to be countervailable,” Issues & Decisions Mem., Certain Crystalline Silicon Photov oltaic Products From the People’s Republic of China

, C

570

- 011, Investigation at 16 (Dec. 15, 2014 ), https://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/prc/2014

- 30071

- 1.pdf ( adopted in Final CVD Determination

, 79 F ed. R eg. 76

, 962 ) ( “ Final CVD I&D Mem

. ” ), among th em, “Export Buyer’s Credits, ” as “[e]xport [c]redit [s]ubsidies ” (“ Ex

- Im Bank Buyer’s Credit Program”) provided by the Export

- Impo rt Bank of China (“Ex

- Im Bank”), id. at 30. Commerce explained that

, “through this program, the [ Ex

- Im Bank ] provides loans a t preferential rates for the purchase of exported goods from the PRC.” Id. ; see id. at 94 (“[W] here we have found that such export buyer’s credits have been used [by buyers] , we have consistently found such financing to be countervailable as a subsidy ben efitting the exporter ”). While Trina had reported that it had not used the Ex

- Im Bank Buyer’ s Credit Program

, s ee id. at 94, Commerce “was not able to verify [Trina’s] reported non

- use

. . . during verification with the [Government of Chi na], ” id. at 30. Commerce , accordingly, “rel[ied] upon [adverse facts available (‘AFA’)] ” to determine that “Trina

. . . used [the] program during the [period of investigation].” Id. ; see 19 U.S.C. § § 1677e (a)(2)(A) (providing for “[d]eterminations [made] on [the] basis of facts available” where an “interested party

. . . withholds [requested] information” )

, Case: 20-1004 Document: 64 Page: 6 Filed: 09/03/2020CHANGZHOU TRINA SOLAR ENERGY v. UNITED STATES 7

1677e(b)(1) (providing for the use of “[a]dverse inferences” “in selecting from among the facts otherwise available” where Commerce “finds that an interested p arty has failed to cooperate

. . . to the best of its ability ”)

. Commerce concluded that Trina had “benefited from this program at [a] rate of 10.54 percent ad valorem , the highest rate determined for a similar program in a prior PRC proceeding.” Final C VD I&D Mem

. 16.

I n February 2015, Commerce issued antidumping andcountervailing duty orders covering “certain crystalline silicon photovoltaic products,” specifically, “modules, laminates and/or panels consisting of crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells, whether or not p artially or fully assembled into other products, including building integrated materials.” Certain Crystalline Silicon Photov oltaic Products From the People’ s Republic of China , 80 Fed. Reg. 8,592, 8,592 ( Dep’t of Commerce Feb. 18, 2015) (antidumping duty order and amended final affirmative countervailing duty determination and countervailing duty order) ( “ AD and CVD Orders ”). 3

3 The AD and C VD Orders discussed here are distinct from and in addition to the 2012 AD and CVD orders on “ crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells, whether or not assembled into modules , laminates, and/or panels, from the PRC.” AD and CVD Orders

, 80 Fed. Reg. at 8,593 ( footnote omitted); see Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled Into Module s, From the People’s Republic of China

, 77 F ed. R eg. 73

, 018 ( Dep’t of Commerce Dec

. 7, 2012) (a mended f inal d etermination of s ales at l ess t han f air v alue, and a ntidumping d uty o rder) ; Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled Into Modules, From the Peo ple’s Republic of China , 77 F ed. R eg. 73

, 017 ( Dep’t of Commerce Dec

. 7, 2012) (c ountervailing d uty o rder ). Case: 20-1004 Document: 64 Page: 7 Filed: 09/03/2020CHANGZHOU TRINA S OLAR ENERGY v. UNITED STATES 8

B. The First Administrative Review

In February 2016, Commerce filed notice of the opportunity to request administrative review of the AD and CVD Orders

. Opportunity to Request Administrative Review , 81 F ed. R eg. 5

, 712 , 5,713 ( Dep ’ t of Commerce Feb. 3, 2016);

see 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1) ; 19 C.F.R. § 351.213 . Commerce received multiple requests for review . J.A. 6562 (Preliminary I& D Mem

. ). Commerce initiated the AD O rder ’s first administrative review , covering the period of review of July 31, 2014

, through January 31, 2016

. Initiation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews , 81 Fed. Reg. 20,32 4, 20,324 ( Dep’t of Commerce Apr. 7, 2016). Commerce selected Trina as the sole mandatory respondent. J.A. 6562

. Having been the petitioner in the original AD and CVD investigations, Solar W orld participated as an interested party . J.A. 6563.

In March 2017 , Commerce issued its p reliminary results

. See Preliminary Results , 82 Fed. Reg. at 12,794 ; see J.A. 6561

– 87 (Preliminary I & D Mem

. ). Commerce declined to increase Trina’s export price “by the amount ofany countervailing duty imposed to offset an export subsidy.” J.A. 6586. Commerce explained that, “[a]s a result of noncooperation by the Government of China in the companion CVD invest igation, ” Commerce had relied on AFA to “determine[] that Trina benefited from the ExportBuyer’s Credits Program,” and, as such, “did not determine” whether “the program in question was export contingent.” J.A. 6586. “Without a determination in the companion CVD investigation that thi s program provides an export subsidy,” Commerce concluded it was inappropriate to offset Trina’s export price by the amount of the countervailing duty imposed. J.A. 6586

. Further, b ecause

“ [Commerce] considers the PRC to be an NME country,” J.A. 6567, Co mmerce selected Thailand as a surrogate market economy country to provide surro gate values to calculate Trina’s normal value , J.A. 6575 ; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1) (providing for the use of surrogate values to Case: 20-1004 Document: 64 Page: 8 Filed: 09/03/2020CHANGZHOU TRINA SOLAR ENERGY v. UNITED STATES 9

calculate normal value for NME responden ts). Commerce valued Trina’s module glass input using H armonized T ariff S chedule (“HTS”) Subh eading 7007.19.90000 (covering

“ Toughened (Tempered) Safety Glass, Not Suitable For Incorporation In Vehicles, Aircraft, Spacecraft Or Vessels; Other ” ) . J.A. 140 (Final I&D Mem

. ).
In July 2017 , Commerce issued its Final Results

. 82 Fed. Reg. at 32,170 ; see J. A. 113

– 56 (Final I& D Mem

. ). Commerce calculated a 9.61 percent weighted average dumping margin for Trina

. Final Results

, 82 Fed. Reg. at 32

, 171

. Consistent with the Preliminary Results

, Commerce decline d to offset Trina’s export price by any countervailed export subsidy. J.A. 121. Commerce explained that it “did not make a determination in the [c ompanion] CVD investigation

. . . that the [Ex

- Im B ank ] Buyer’s Credit Program was an export subsidy,” because it had relied on AFA to countervail the program. J.A. 121. For Trina’s normal value

, Commerce “continued to value Trina’s module glass using Thai imports of tempered glass classified under HTS [ Subh eading] 7007.19.90000 [

. ] ” J.A. 141. Commerce rejected SolarWorld ’s argument that “Trina’s module glass should be valued using HTS [ Subh eading] 7007.29.90 (i.e., Laminated safety glass: Other; Other),” because “laminated glass is ‘ made in sandwich form, with one or more interlayers of plastics between two or more sheets of glass

, ’ ” J.A. 141 (quoting WCO EN 7007.29.90), and there was “no record ev idence of additional working [of Trina’s module glass] that would result in glass comparable to laminated glass,” J.A. 14 2

. Both SolarW orld and Trina filed suit against the Government in the CIT, challenging Commerce’s Final Results as unsupported by subs tantial evidence and contrary to law

. Trina I , 359 F. Supp. 3d at 1331

. On the offset issue,
t he CIT remanded to Commerce, concluding that “Commerce’s decision to not offset the Ex

- Im Bank Buyer’s Credit Program [wa] s contrary to law [.] ” Id. at 1332. The CIT reasoned that , because AFA “ does not obviate the need Case: 20-1004 Document: 64 Page: 9 Filed: 09/03/2020CHANGZHOU TRINA S OLAR ENERGY v. UNITED STATES 10

for Commerce to affirmatively find that the elements of the statute have been satisfied,” Commerce must have “ necessarily found that the [Ex

- Im Bank ] [B] uyer’ s [C]redit [P] rogram was an e xport subsidy ,” and, therefore, “ Commerce’ s decision to deny an offset for the countervailing duties imposed ” as a result of the Ex

- Im Bank Buyer’s Credit Program “ is contra ry to law[

. ] ” Id. at 1339 . The CIT “directed [Commerce] to recalculate Trina’s [export] prices to account for the offset[.]” Id. at 1332. On the valuation of Trina’s inputs, t he CIT “sustain[ed] Commerce’s selection of surrogate values for,” inter alia, “module glass” as su pported by subs tantial evidence. Id

. The CIT explain ed that “Commerce [had] reasonably determined that [Thai] i mport data under HTS [S] ubheading 7007.19.90000 constitute [d] the best available information with which to value [that] input. ” I d. at 1336; see 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1)(providing that Commerce’s surrogate value determinations must “be based on the best available information regarding the values of [relevant] factors in a market economy country or countries”).

“In accordance with [ Trina I ] ,” Commerce, “under respectful protest, increased Trina’s [export] price[] by the amount countervailed” based on the Ex

- Im Bank Buyer’s Credit Program subsidy “in the most recently completed segment of the corresponding [CVD] proceeding.” J .A. 6764

– 65 (citing Final CVD Determination , 79 F ed. R eg. 76

, 962 ); see Viraj Grp

. , Ltd. v. United States

, 343 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ( explaining that Commerce may “adopt[] under protest a contrary position forced upon it by the [CIT]” and subsequently appeal that position to this court ). Commerce maintained that, while it had

“ properly det ermined not to grant Trina an offset to its [export] prices for the countervailed

. . . Ex

- Im Bank Buyer’s Credit Program,” it nonetheless “compl[ied] with the [CIT’s] direction” and “increa sed Trina’s [export] price[.]” J.A. 6769. As a result, Trina’s weighted average dumping margin was reduced to 3.42 percent. J.A. 6770. The CIT Case: 20-1004 Document: 64 Page: 10 Filed: 09/03/2020CHANGZHOU TRINA SOLAR ENERGY v. UNITED STATES 11

sustained Commerce’s Remand Redetermination. See Trina II , 393 F. Supp. 3d at 1251.

D ISCUSSION

SolarW orld ar gues that : (1) the CIT “erred in sustaining Commerce’s [Remand Redetermination]

— made under protest

— to offset Trina’s [export] price to account for the countervailed” Ex

- Im Bank Buyer’s Credit Program, Appellant’s Br. 19 (capitalization normalized) ; and (2) the CIT “improperly deferred ” to Commerce when it “ sustain [ed] Commerce’s decision to apply Thai HTS [ S ubheading] 7007.19.90000 to Trina’s solar [module] glass, ” id. at 31

. W e address each argument in turn.

I. Standard of Review

We “ apply

. . . the same standard ” of review as the CIT, Downhole Pipe & Equip., L.P. v. United States , 776 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) , upholding Commerce’s determinations if they are supported “by substantial evidence on the record” and otherwise “in accordance with law,” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). “Although we review the decisions ofthe CIT de novo, we give great weight to the informed opinion of the CIT and it is nearly always the starting point of our analysis.” Nan Ya Plastics Corp. v. United States , 810 F.3d 1333, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted).

We review Commerce’s “ statutory interpretations as to the appropriate methodology ” under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat

. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)

. Pesquera Mares Australes Ltda . v. United States

, 266 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2001)

. If “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue ,” then “ that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Wheatland Tube Co. v. United States, 495 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ( quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 84 2

– 4 3). “ In Case: 20-1004 Document: 64 Page: 11 Filed: 09/03/2020CHANGZHOU TRINA S OLAR ENERGY v. UNITED STATES 12

order to determine whether a statute clearly shows the intent of Congress

. . . , we employ traditional tools of stat utory construction and examine the statute’s text, structure, and l egislative history, and apply the rele vant canons of interpretation. ” Kyocera Solar, Inc. v. U .S. Int ’ l Trade Comm ’ n , 844 F.3d 1334, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). If, however, “ the statute is silent or ambiguous wit h respect to the specific issue, ” we evaluate whether Commerce’s interpretation is reasonable. Chevron

, 467 U.S. at 843. The agen cy’ s construction need not be the only reasonable interpretation or even the most reasonable interpretation. Se e Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States

, 437 U.S. 443, 450 (1978).
We review Commerce’s findings of fact for substantial evidence. See SolarWorld Ams., Inc. v. United States , 910 F.3d 1216, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2018)

. Substantial evidence is “more than a mere s cintilla”; rather it is such “evidencethat a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Downhole Pipe , 776 F.3d at 1374 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “We look to the record as a whole, including evidence that supports as well as evidence that fairly detracts from the substantiality of the evidence.” SolarWorld , 910 F.3d at 1222 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

II. Export Subsidy Offset
A. Legal Standard
If imported merchandise is subject to bot h antidumping and countervailing duties, Commerce “shall,” when calculating a respondent’s antidumping duty rate, “ increase []” the respondent’s “ export price ” or “ constructed export price ” by “the amount of any countervailing duty imposed

. . . to offset an export subsidy[.]” 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(1)(C). Commerce may impose countervailing duties when it “ determines that the government of a country or any public entity within the territory of a country is providing, directly or indirectly, a countervailable subsidy ” Case: 20-1004 Document: 64 Page: 12 Filed: 09/03/2020CHANGZHOU TRINA SOLAR ENERGY v. UNITED STATES 13

for “ the manufa cture, production, or export of” the subject merchandise. Id. § 1671(a)(1); see id. § 1677(5) (providing that a “countervailable subsidy” is a “financial contribution,” “income or price support,” or “funding mechanism”provided by “an authority,” such as a government, “to a person” with “a benefit

. . . thereby c onferred ” )

. To be countervailable, a subsidy must be “specific

. ” Id. § 1677(5)(A). To be “specific” a subsidy must be “an export subsidy,” “ an import substitution subsidy ,” or one of certain “domestic subsid [ies].” Id. § 1677(5A)(A). “An export subsidy is a subsidythat is, in law or in fact, contingent upon export performance, alone or as [ one] of [two] or more conditions. ” Id. § 1677(5A)(B); see 19 C.F.R. § 351.514 (a) ( explaining that

“ a subsidy ” is “ contingent upon export performance if the provision of the subsidy is, in law or in fact, tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings, alone or a s one of two or more conditions”)

. I f Commerce finds , in the course of an investigation or review, that “necessary information is not available on the record” or “an interested party or any other person

. . . withholds information th at has been requested by [Commerce],” “fails to provide such information by the deadlines

. . . or in the form and manner requested,”“significantly impedes a proceeding,” or “provides such information but the information cannot be verified,” then Commerce is permitted to use “facts otherwise available” in making its determinations. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a)(2)(A)

– (D); see 19 C.F.R. § 351.308 (providing for “[d]eterminations on the basis of facts available”). If Commerce further finds a respondent has “failed to cooperate by not acting tothe best of its ability to comply with a request for information,” then it “may use an inference that is adverse to the interests of that party in selecting from among the facts otherwise available” ( that is, AFA). 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b);

see 19 C.F.R. § 351.308 (a) (similar). In selecting AFA,Commerce may use information from the petition, investigation, prior administrative reviews, or “any other Case: 20-1004 Document: 64 Page: 13 Filed: 09/03/2020CHANGZHOU TRINA S OLAR ENERGY v. UNITED STATES 14

information placed on the record.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b); see id. § 1677 e (b)(2) (providing a list of “[p]otential sources of information for adverse inferences”); 19 C.F.R. § 351.308 (c) (similar); Gallant Ocean (Thail

. ) Co. v. United States , 602 F.3d 1319, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ( providing that, “ i n the case of uncooperative re spondents,” Com merce has discretion to “ select from a list of secondary sources as a basis for its adverse inferences” )

. W hen Commerce “relies on secondary information rather than on information obtained in the course of an investigation or review,” it “s hall, to theextent practicable, corroborate that information from independent sources that are reasonably at [its] disposal.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c); see 19 C.F.R. § 351.308 (d) (providing for the “[c]orrobo r ation of secondary information” “to the extent practicable” and providing a non

- exclusive list of “independent sources that are reasonably at [Commerce’s] disposal”).

B. Commerce’s Decision to Not Offset Trina’s Export Price I s Contrary to Law

In its Final Res ults , Commerce declined to increase Trina’s export price by the amount countervailed to offset the Ex

- Im Bank Buyer Credit Program. J.A. 121. Commerce explained that such an increase was improper because Commerce “did not make a determination in the [com panion] CVD investigation

. . . that the [Ex

- Im Bank] Buyer’s Credi t Program was an export subsidy ” because it had relied on AFA to countervail the program. J.A. 121.The CIT remanded to Commerce, concluding that “Commerce’s refusal to offset the CVDs im posed is contrary to law because Commerce necessarily d etermined that the [Ex

- Im Bank] [B]uyer’s [C]redit [P] rogram was an export subsidy in the [companion] CVD investigation .” Trina I

, 359 F. Supp. 3d at 1337. The CIT “directed [Commerce] torecalculate Trina’s [export] prices to account for the offset[.]” Id. at 1332. On re mand, Commerce, “under respectful protest, increased Trina’s [export] price[] by the amount countervailed ” as a result of the Ex

- Im Bank B uyer’s Credit Case: 20-1004 Document: 64 Page: 14 Filed: 09/03/2020CHANGZHOU TRINA SOLAR ENERGY v. UNITED STATES 15

Program

. J .A. 6764

– 65. The CIT sustained Commerce’s Remand Redetermination. Trina II , 393 F. Supp. 3d at 1251. SolarWorld asserts that “[t]he CIT erred in ordering Commerce to offset Trina’s [export] price to account for the countervailed Ex

- Im [Bank] Buyer’s Credit Pro gram,” Appellant’s Br. 17, and in “ sustaining Commerce’s decision [as] made under protest

, ” id. at 19. 4 We disagree with SolarWorld.

Commerce’s decision to not increase Trina’s export price by the amount countervailed for the Ex

- Im Bank Buyer’s Credit Program is contrary to law. Where, as here,merchandise is subject to both antidumping and countervailing duties during the period of review , Commerce “shall,” when calculating a respondent’s a ntidumping duty rate, “increase[]” the respondent’s “export price ” or “ constructed export price” by “the amount of any countervailing duty imposed

. . . to offset an export subsidy[.]” 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(1)(C); s ee AD and CVD Orders

, 80 Fed. Reg. at 8,5 92 (providing that Trina’s merchandise is subject to antidumping and countervailing duties). As such

, when calculating Trina’s antidumping duty rate, Commerce wa s required to increase Trina’s export price by any countervailing duty imposed in the companio n CVD investigation to offset an export subsidy. See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (explaining that “shall” generally creates “an obligation impervious to judicial discretion” ( citing Anderson v. Yungkau , 329 U.S. 482, 485 (1947) ) )

.

4 While Commerce issue d its Remand Redetermination under respectful protest, J.A. 6764

– 70 ; see Viraj

, 343 F.3d at 1376 (providing that the Government may appeal Commerce ’s determinations made under protest), the Government does “not appeal” the CIT’s reversal of this policy and “do[es] not address the issue substantively in [its] brief,” Gov’t’s Br. 7 n.1. Case: 20-1004 Document: 64 Page: 15 Filed: 09/03/2020CHANGZHOU TRINA S OLAR ENERGY v. UNITED STATES 16

Here, Commerce failed to increase Trina’s export price by a countervailing duty imposed to offset an export subsidy . I n the companion CVD investigation

, Commerce first determined that the Ex

- Im B ank Buyer’s Credit Pr ogram

was countervailable as an export subsidy. Commerce described the program as providing “[e]xport [c]redit [s]ubsidies

, ” explaining that “ [ t ] hrough th[e] program, the [Ex

- Im Bank] provides loans at preferential rates for the purchase of exported goods from the PRC

. ” Final CVD I&D Mem

. 30; see 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(B) (“An export subsidy is a subsidy that is, in law or in fact, contingent upon export performance, alone or as [one] of [two] or more conditions. ”). Next

, “[un]able to verify [Trina’s] reported non

use of [ the program ]

, ” Commerce resorted to AFA to determine that Trina had “used [the] program during the [period of investigation ].” Final CVD I&D Mem

. 30. Commerce,accordingly, imposed a countervailing duty on Trina’s merchandise to offset the Ex

- Im Bank Buyer’s Credit Program. See i d. at 16. H aving determined that the Ex

- Im Ban k Buyer’s Credit Program was an export subsidy and imposed a counterva iling duty on Trina’s merchandise as a result

, Commerce was required to increase Trina’s export price by the offset

. Commerce’s decision to do otherwise was contrary to law

. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(1)(C) ( providing that a respondent’s “export price shall be[] increased by

. . . the amount of any countervailing duty imposed on the subject merchandise

. . . to offset an export subsidy ” ) ; Kyocera Solar , 844 F.3d at 1338 (explaining tha t, where “‘Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue[,]’

. . . our inquiry ends, for we ‘ give effect to the unambiguousl y expressed intent of Congress.’” ( quoting Chevron , 467 U.S. at 842

– 43 ) ).

Commerce’s reasoning that

, because it s “d etermination to countervail the [Ex

- Im Bank Buyer’s Credit Program] was based on [AFA]

, ” it “ [had] not” actually “ma [d] e a determina tion that the program

. . . was [ an export subsidy ]” and

, therefore

, was not required to offset it

, J.A. 121

– 22, is Case: 20-1004 Document: 64 Page: 16 Filed: 09/03/2020CHANGZHOU TRINA SOLAR ENERGY v. UNITED STATES 17

incorrect

. AFA allows Commerce to “reach[]” a “determination” on an incomplete record. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a); see id. § 1677e(b)(2) (providing “[p]otential sources of information for adverse inferences”). I t does not obviate Commerce’s obligation to make “the applicable determination.” I

d. § 1677e(a) ; see id. § 1671 (a)(1) (providing that Commerce must “determine[] that” an export er or producer isreceiving “a countervailable subsidy” before imposing counter vailing duties) . Nor does it obviate Commerce’s obligation to support any such determinations “[with] substantial evidence .” Id. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) ; s ee id. § 1677e(c) (requiring that Commerce, “to the extent practicable, corroborate that information from independent sources that are reasonably at their disposal”) ; Gallant Ocean , 602 F.3d at 1325(vacating and remanding Commerce’s AFA duty rate calculation as unsupported by substantial evidence); Dongguan Sunrise Furniture Co. v. United Sta tes , 931 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1350 (Ct. Int’ l Trade 2013) (“[E] ven an AFA rate must be supported by substantial evidence. ” (citation omitted))

. Before imposing a countervailing duty, Commerce must necessarily determine that a subsidy is “specific”

— that it is an “export subsidy,” “ i mport substitution subsidy ,” or a “[d]omestic subsidy” meeting certain requirements , 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)

— e ven if it must use AFA to do

so, id. § 1677e (providing that Commerce may “ use the facts otherwise available in reaching the applicable determination ”). Otherwise, Commerce cannot impose a countervailing duty to offset that subsidy. Id. §§ 1671(a)(1)(providing that Commerce may impose countervailing duties only where it “ determines that the government of a country or any publ ic entity within the territory of a country is providing, directly or indirectly, a countervailable subsidy ”), 1677(5)(A) (providing that, to be countervailable, a subsidy must be “specific”). Accordingly, Commerce’s decision to not offset Trina’s export price

, based on its reliance on AFA to countervail the Ex

- Im Bank Buyer’s Credit Program, is contrary to law. Case: 20-1004 Document: 64 Page: 17 Filed: 09/03/2020CHANGZHOU TRINA S OLAR ENERGY v. UNITED STATES 18

SolarWorld ’s counterargument s are unpersuasive. First, SolarWorld argues that, because the term “export subsidy” in 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(1)(C) is ambiguous, the CIT should have deferred to Comme rce’s reasonable interpretation of that term

— that “export subsidy

. . . exclude[s] AFA determinations[.]” Appellant’s Br

. 26 (capita lization normalized)

. This argument is without merit

. The term “export subsidy” is not ambiguous as to whether it includes determinations made using AFA. On its face, it covers all export subsidy determinations. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(B) (defining “ e xport subsidy ” as “a subsidy that is, in law or in fact, contingent upon export performance, alone or as [one] of [two] or more conditions”). Moreover, Commerce did not offer an in terpretation of “export subsidy ” in either its Final Results

, see J.A. 121

– 22, or its Remand Redetermination, see J.A. 6764

– 70. Commerce concluded only that, by resorting to AFA, it “[had] not determine [ d ] ” whether “ the subsidies in question were export

s ubsidies ” with in the statutory definition and “ as required for an offse t under [19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(1)(C) ].” J.A. 121

– 22; see J.A. 12 2 n.1 6 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(B) without comment)

. At best

, SolarWorld’s argued interpretation of “export subsidy” comes from the Government’s briefing before the CIT. See Def. ’ s Resp . Br. Opp’n Rule 56 .2 Mots. J. Agency R. at 2 3

– 25, Changzhou Trina Solar Energy Co. v. United States

, CIT C onsol. N o. 17

- cv

- 00199

- CRK ( June 7, 2018 ) , ECF No. 38 (arguing that , because the term “export subsidy ” is ambiguous and “does not require thatTrina’s [export] price be adjusted,” Commerce’s “interpretation” of 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(1)(C) should be deferred to

as “reasonable” )

. Even if the term “export subsidy” were ambiguous, see 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(B) (expressly defining “export subsidy”), w e do not apply Chevron “to an agency counsel’ s interpretation of a statute ,” much less a defendant

- intervenor’s, “ where the agency itself has articulated no position on the question

, ” Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp. , 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988 )

. Case: 20-1004 Document: 64 Page: 18 Filed: 09/03/2020CHANGZHOU TRINA SOLAR ENERGY v. UNITED STATES 19

Second, SolarWorld argues that we should give Auer deference to Commerce’s interpretation of the Final CVD I&D Mem.

— erroneously calling it the “CVD Order”

— as “apply[ing ] AFA in finding the Ex

- Im [Bank] Buyer’s Credit Program was an export subsidy.” Appellant’s Br. 20 (citing Auer v. Robbins , 519 U.S. 452 , 461 (1997) ; Diamond Sawblades Mfrs. Coal. v. Hyosung D&P Co. , 809 F.3d 626

, 630 (Fed Cir. 2015) ) . This argument is irrelevant. Here

, as SolarWorld concedes, Commerce has determined that the Ex

- Im Bank Buyer’s Credit Program was an “[e]xport[]

. . . [s]ubsid[y],” because it “ provides loans at preferential rates for the purchase of exported goods from the PRC

. ” Final C VD I&D Mem

. 30; see Appellant’s Br. 20 (arguing that Commerce “f[ound] the Ex

- Im [Bank] Buyer’s Credit Program was an export subsidy” (capitalization normalized) ). As discussed above, whether Commerce used AFA to reach that determination is immaterial. See 19 U.S.C. § § 1671 (a)(1), 1677a(c)(1)(C) , 1677e(a).
Third, SolarWorld argues that “providing

. . . an offsetwould inappropriately reward noncompliance with Commerce’s request for information[]” from the Government of China in the CVD investigation, “el iminating any incentive for the [ Government of China ] to cooperate in future CVD investigations of this key subsidy program.” Appellant’s Br. 18. SolarWorld neglects the fact that AFA w as already applied to increase Trina’s countervailing duty rate. See Final CVD I&D Mem. 16, 94; s ee also Dupont Teijin Films USA, LP v. United States

, 273 F. Supp. 2d 1347

, 1349 n.4 (2003) (explaining that “[t] he basic economic theory behind[19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(1)(C)]” is that the any “export subsidy” received directly “ contribut e[s] to lower

- priced sales of subject mer chandise

. . . by the amount of [that] s ubsidy. The offset is designed to prevent the double application of duties when the subsidies and dumping are related. ”)

. Further, SolarWorld ’s argument m isapprehends the nature of AFA

. See F.lli De Cecco Di Filippo Fara S. Martino S.p.A. v. United States , 216 F.3d 1027, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2000) Case: 20-1004 Document: 64 Page: 19 Filed: 09/03/2020CHANGZHOU TRINA S OLAR ENERGY v. UNITED STATES 20

(explaining that AFA “ is to provide respondents with an incentive to cooperate, not to impose punitive, aberration a l, or uncorroborated margins”). Accordingly, Commerce’s decision to not offset Trina’s export price is contrary to law. S ee Wheatland Tube, 495 F.3d at 1359 (“ If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for thecourt, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” ( quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 84 2

– 4 3) ).

III. Surrogate Value Selection

A. Legal Stand ard
Where, as here, the exporting country ha s a non

- market economy, see Preliminary Results

, 82 Fed. Reg. at 12,795

, Commerce calculates the normal value for a respondent’s subject merchandise using surrogate values from a com parable mar ket economy country

, see 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1)

, (4)

. In selecting surrogate values, Commerce “attempts to construct a hypothetical market value of [the subject merchandise] in the [NME].” Downhole Pipe , 776 F.3d at 1375 (internal quotation marks, alterations , and citation omitted).
Commerce’s surrogate va lue determinations must “be based on the best available information regarding the values of [relevant] factors in a market economy country or countries.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1); see id. § 1677b(a) (providing that Commerce constructs the “normal value” “t o achieve a fair comparison with the export price”). “Commerce has broad discretion to determine” what constitutes“the best available information,” as this term “is not defined by statute.” QVD Food Co. v. United States, 658 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2 011). Commerce “generally selects, to the extent practicable, surrogate values that are publicly available, are product

- specific, reflect a broad market average, and are contemporaneous with the period of review.” Qingdao Sea

– Line Trading Co. v. United S tates, 766 F.3d 1378, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (footnote omitted). Case: 20-1004 Document: 64 Page: 20 Filed: 09/03/2020CHANGZHOU TRINA SOLAR ENERGY v. UNITED STATES 21

B. Commerce’s Surrogate Value Selection for Trina’s Module Glass I s Supported by Substantial Evidence

In its Final Results

, Commerce “ value [d] Trina’s module glass using Thai imports of tempered glass classified und er HTS [ Subh eading] 7007.19.90000,” J.A. 141; see J.A. 140 (providing that Thai HTS Subh eading 7007.19.90000 “ Toughened (Tempered) Safety Glass, Not Suitable For Incorporation In Vehi cles, Aircraft, Space craft Or Vessels; Other ” )

. Specifically, Commerce found, basedon “an examination of record information and Trina’s [submissions]” in the course of administrative review, that “Trina’s module glass” was “tempered.” J.A. 141. Present ed with Thai import data for HTS Subh eading 7007.19.90000 (“tempered/safety glass”), HTS Subh eading 7007.19.90001 (“float glass”), and HTS Subh eading 700 7 .29.90 (“laminated safety glass”), Commerce concluded that “Trina’s module glass [wa]s appropriately

v alued using Thai HTS [ Subh eading] 7007.19.90000.” J.A. 141. The CIT sustained this determination as supported by substantial evidence. See Trina I , 359 F. Supp. 3d at 133 6. SolarWorld argues that “Commerce’s determination to use Thai HTS [ Subh eading ] 7007.19.90000 to value Trina’s solar glass was not supported b y substantial evidence.” Appellant’s Br. 31 (capitalization normalized). SolarWorld asserts that “[ r ] ecord evidence

. . . makes clear that [,] in addition to being tempered, Trina’s sol ar module glass also undergoes additional processing ” that “ impart [s] extreme durability to the glass,” leaving “Thai HTS [ Subh eading ] 7007.29.90

. . . the only HTS number that reflects” that processing. Id. at 34

– 35; see J.A. 141 (providing that HTS Subh eading 7007.29.90 covers “Laminated safety glass: Other; Other”). We disagree with SolarWorld

. Substantial evidence supports Commerce’s decision to value Trina’s module glass using Thai i mports of tempered glass classified under HTS Subh eading 7007.19.90000. In its submissions to Commerce, Trina described its module glass as “tempered.” J.A. 46

– 47 (Trina’s Third Case: 20-1004 Document: 64 Page: 21 Filed: 09/03/2020CHANGZHOU TRINA S OLAR ENERGY v. UNITED STATES 22

Supplemental Questionnaire Response) (providing that “both [its] coated glas s and tempered glass” are “tempered”); see J.A. 55 50 (Trina’s Section A Questionnaire Response) (providing Trina advertising material describing Trina’s module glass as “[anti

- reflective] coated tempered glass”), 5713 (Trina’s First Supplemental Questionna ire Response) (explaining that Trina’s “tempered glass” is “float glass” rather than “rolled glass”). Further, Commerce, examining Trina’s publicly available data, found that the “only glass referred to there [was] tempered glass.” J.A. 46. E xamination of other producers ’ publicly available data indicated use of “tempered glass” with “antireflectionsurface treatment” and “extremely durable” “front glazing,” in some cases “us[ing] a polymer film (plastic) as the front sheet.” J.A. 46

– 47. Trina confirme d that there was no “significant difference between the glass referred to in” the publicly available information and “the glass Trina consumed during the [ period of review ] to produce the subject merchandise.” J.A. 47. On this basis, Commerce conclude th at “Trina’s module glass [wa]s appropriately valued” using data for “Thai imports of tempered glass classified under HTS [ Subh eading] 7007.19.90000.” J.A. 141; see Qingdao Sea

– Line , 766 F.3d at 1386 (providing that “Commerce generally selects, to the extent practicable, surrogate values that are,” inter alia, “product

- specific”). As such, Commerce’s use of Thai tempered glass data to value Trina’s tempered module glass is supported by substantial evidence. See Downhole Pipe , 776 F.3d at 1374 (providi ng that substantial evidence is such evidence as a “ reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclu sion ” (citing Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB , 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) )

. SolarWorld ’s counterargument s are unpersuasive. First, SolarWorl d argues that “Commerce failed to use the‘best available information’ to value Trina’s solar glass,” because “Commerce valued Trina’s coated, tempered glass using Thai imports of standard tempered glass[.]” Case: 20-1004 Document: 64 Page: 22 Filed: 09/03/2020CHANGZHOU TRINA SOLAR ENERGY v. UNITED STATES 23

Appellant’s Br. 31 (emphasis omitted)

. This ar gument misapprehends the “ best available evidence ” standard

. “The data on which Commerce relies to value inputs must be the ‘best available information,’ but there is no requirement that the data be perfect.” Home Meridian Int’l

, Inc. v. United States , 772 F. 3d 1289, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The fact t hat Trina’s tempered glass has a coating does not preclude the conclusion that Thai import data for tempered glass is the best available information on the record to value it

. See Na tion Ford Chem. Co. v. United States , 166 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 19 99) (“The ‘best available information’

. . . may constitute information from the surrogate country that is directly a nalogous to the production expe rience of the NME pro ducer

. . . or i t may not.”) ; see also SolarWorld , 910 F.3d at 1223 (explaining that, in selecting surrogate values, “Commerce is not required to engage in a classifi cation analysis but instead is required to determine which of the competing subheadings constituted the be st available infor mation ” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted ) ).
Second, SolarWorld argues that

, “ [ b ] ec ause Commerce did not consider evidence that detracts from its conclusion,” specifically, “ [record] evidence indicating that Trina’s glass [is laminated glass ],” Commerce’s decision is “ not su pported by substantial evidence

. ” Appellant’s Br. 35. This argument is premised on a misreading of Commerce’s determination. Commerce “disagree [ d ] with [ SolarWorld’s ] suggestion tha t Trina’s module glass should be valued” as

“ [ l ] aminated safety glass” using Thai “HTS [ Subh eading] 7007.29.90[.]” J.A. 141. Commerce explained that, while

“ laminated glass is ‘made in sandwich form, with one or more interlayers of plastics between two o r more sheets of glass, ’ ” J.A. 141 (quoting WCO EN 7007.29.90), SolarWorld could only point to evidence that “Trina’s module glass ” had potentially “ undergone additional working such as surface treatments and glazing,” not “additional working that would result in

. . . laminated glass

. . . made of multi ple Case: 20-1004 Document: 64 Page: 23 Filed: 09/03/2020CHANGZHOU TRINA S OLAR ENERGY v. UNITED STATES 24

layers of plastic and glass, ” J.A. 142. On appeal, SolarWorld does not challenge Commerce’s defini tion of laminated glass or point to missed evidence; rather, SolarWorld prof fers the same reject ed evidence, c ompare Appellant’s Br. 33

– 34 ( arguing that a “datasheet for glass on Trina’s website refers to

. . . [‘c]oated [t]empered [g]ass’” with “‘a polymer film (plastic) as the front sheet

. . . for arrays in high

- impact environments’” and “information from other module suppliers, indicating that their glass is ‘high

- transparency tempered glass with an antireflection surface treatment’” and “‘front glazing

. . . [that ] is extremely durable’” (quoting J.A. 46

– 47 ( Trina’s Third Supplemental Qu estionnaire Response) )

, with J.A. 140

– 42 (summarizing SolarWorld’s arguments before Commerce as relying on the same evidence )

, and “ invite [s] [us] to reweigh [it],” Downhole Pipe , 776 F.3d at 1376. We decline to do so

. S ee Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States , 750 F.2d 927, 936 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“ That [an appellant ] can point to evidence of record which detracts from the evidence which supports the [agency’s] decision and can hypothesize a reasonable basis for a contrary determination is neither surprising nor persuasive. ”). Accordingly, substantial evidence supports Commerce’s decision to value Trina’s module glass using Thai i mports of tempered glass classified under HTS Subh eading 7007.19.90000.

C ONCLUSION

We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, the Judgment of the U.S. Court of International Trade is

AFFIRMED Case: 20-1004 Document: 64 Page: 24 Filed: 09/03/2020