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U.S. BANK TRUST, N.A., TRUSTEE v.

LESLEY DALLAS ET AL.

(AC 45003)

Moll, Cradle and Eveleigh, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned

by the named defendant, D. D filed special defenses, asserting, inter

alia, that the plaintiff engaged in residential mortgage fraud and fraud

in the inducement. The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment as to liability against D, determining that the plaintiff

had established a prima facie case as to liability and that D failed to

submit any evidence to support her special defenses. Thereafter, the

trial court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of the

plaintiff, from which D appealed to this court. Held that the trial court

properly granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment; because

the trial court aptly addressed the arguments raised in this appeal in

its memorandum of decision, this court adopted the trial court’s thorough and well reasoned decision as a proper statement of the facts and

the applicable law on the issues.

Argued May 11—officially released June 28, 2022

Procedural History

Action to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the named defendant, and for other relief,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of

Litchfield, where the court, J. Moore, J., granted the

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability

against the named defendant and rendered judgment

of strict foreclosure, from which the named defendant

appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Gary L. Seymour, for the appellant (named defendant).

Frank B. Velardi, Jr., for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

EVELEIGH, J. The defendant Lesley Dallas1 appeals

following the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered

against her in favor of the plaintiff, U.S. Bank Trust,

N.A., as Trustee for LSF9 Master Participation Trust, in

this residential mortgage foreclosure action. On appeal,

the defendant claims that the court improperly granted

the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability only because it erred in determining that there were

no genuine issues of material fact as to the defendant’s

special defenses of residential mortgage fraud and fraud

in the inducement. We affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are

revealed by the record. On November 2, 2005, the defendant executed a promissory note in the amount of

$650,000 payable to the order of Chase Bank USA, N.A.,

and secured by a mortgage on the property located at

1 Skiff Mountain Road in Sharon. The mortgage and

the note eventually were assigned to the plaintiff before

it commenced this action.

On February 11, 2016, the plaintiff commenced the

present foreclosure action by way of a complaint alleging that the mortgage and promissory note executed

by the defendant are now in default by virtue of her

failure to pay the monthly installments of principal and

interest due on January 1, 2009, and on the first day

of each month thereafter. On October 25, 2017, the

defendant filed her operative revised special defenses,

which asserted, inter alia, that the plaintiff engaged in

residential mortgage fraud (first special defense) and

fraud in the inducement (fourth special defense).2 Both

of these special defenses generally allege that the plaintiff ‘‘forged, fabricated, and robo-signed’’ documents it

knew were untrue and made false representations to

the defendant during the mortgage process.

On June 10, 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion for

summary judgment as to liability only against the defendant. In support of its motion, the plaintiff attached a

series of documents evincing that it was the holder of

the note and mortgage, that the defendant was in

default, and that the defendant’s special defenses were

legally insufficient. On August 7, 2019, the defendant

filed an objection and a memorandum of law in opposition to the plaintiff’s motion in which she argued that

her first and fourth special defenses precluded judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant submitted

only her own affidavit in support of her objection.

On May 24, 2021, the court, J. Moore, J., after a hearing, issued an order and memorandum of decision granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to

liability only. In its memorandum of decision, the court

reviewed the plaintiff’s claims, the defendant’s special

defenses, and the relevant legal authority, followed by
a thorough analysis of the legal issues presented. The

court determined that the documents submitted by the

plaintiff established a prima facie case as to liability

and that there was nothing in the defendant’s affidavit

that negated or undermined the plaintiff’s prima facie

case. Ultimately, the court concluded that the defendant

failed to submit any evidence to support her special

defenses and, therefore, summary judgment was warranted as to the issue of liability. On September 13,

2021, the court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure against her in favor of the plaintiff. This appeal

followed.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court

improperly granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment as to liability only because it erred in

determining that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to the defendant’s special defenses of residential mortgage fraud and fraud in the inducement.

On the basis of our examination of the record on appeal,

and the briefs and arguments of the parties, we are

persuaded that the judgment of the trial court should be

affirmed. Because the court’s memorandum of decision

aptly addresses the arguments raised by the defendant,

we adopt its thorough and well reasoned decision as a

proper statement of the facts and applicable law on

these issues. See U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Dallas, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV16-6013346-S (May 24, 2021) (reprinted at 213 Conn.

App. , A.3d ). It would serve no useful purpose for us to repeat the discussion contained therein.

See, e.g., Ortiz v. Torres-Rodriguez, 205 Conn. App.

129, 132, 255 A.3d 941, cert. denied, 337 Conn. 910, 253

A.3d 43 (2021); Phadnis v. Great Expression Dental

Centers of Connecticut, P.C., 170 Conn. App. 79, 81,

153 A.3d 687 (2017).

The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded

for the purpose of setting new law days.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Additional defendants named in the action by virtue of an interest in

the real property subject to the mortgage are Norbert E. Mitchell Co., Inc.,

by virtue of a judgment lien from 2009; Midland Funding, LLC, by virtue of

a judgment lien from 2011; Beck & Beck, LLC, by virtue of a judgment lien

from 2011; and The Connecticut Light & Power Company, by virtue of

judgment liens from both 2011 and 2015. Because none of these parties is

a participant in this appeal, we refer to Dallas as the defendant throughout

this opinion.

2 The defendant alleged thirteen special defenses in total. On May 1, 2018,

the trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion to strike with respect to all but

the defendant’s first and fourth special defenses.