U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

73–736 PDF 2012

INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND TERRORIST TRAVEL: 

HOW DHS ADDRESSES THE MISSION OF PROVIDING SECURITY, FACILITATING COMMERCE, 

AND PROTECTING PRIVACY FOR PASSENGERS 

ENGAGED IN INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COUNTERTERRORISM 

AND INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

OCTOBER 5, 2011 

Serial No. 112–49 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

ROBERT L. TURNER, New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JANICE HAHN, California 

MICHAEL J. RUSSELL, Staff Director/Chief Counsel 

KERRY ANN WATKINS, Senior Policy Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia, Vice Chair 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JANICE HAHN, California 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

KEVIN GUNDERSEN, Staff Director 

ALAN CARROLL, Subcommittee Clerk 

HOPE GOINS, Minority Subcommittee Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Patrick Meehan, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and 

Intelligence ........................................................................................................... 1 

The Honorable Jackie Speier, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism 

and Intelligence .................................................................................................... 3 

WITNESSES

Mr. David Heyman, Assistant Secretary for Policy, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 7 

Ms. Mary Ellen Callahan, Chief Privacy Officer, The Privacy Office, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 12 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 7 

Mr. Thomas Bush, Executive Director of Automation and Targeting Office 

of Intelligence and Investigative Liaison, Customs and Border Protection: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 14 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 7 

(1) 

INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND TERRORIST 

TRAVEL: HOW DHS ADDRESSES THE MISSION OF PROVIDING SECURITY, FACILITATING COMMERCE AND PROTECTING PRIVACY FOR PASSENGERS ENGAGED IN 

INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL 

Wednesday, October 5, 2011 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Patrick Meehan [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Meehan, Long, Speier, Hochul, and 

Hahn. 

Also present: Representative Jackson Lee. 

Mr. MEEHAN. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony regarding 

how the Department of Homeland Security addresses the mission 

of providing security, facilitating commerce, and protecting the privacy of passengers engaged in international travel. 

I would like to welcome everyone to today’s subcommittee on 

counterterrorism and intelligence hearing. I look forward to hearing from today’s witnesses on the value and efficacy of the Passenger Name Record program in our on-going mission to prevent 

terrorists and other dangerous criminals from entering the United 

States. 

I further look forward hearing and learning about the status of 

on-going negotiations with our partners in the European Union 

with regard to the 2007—I am going to refer to this from this point 

forward as PNR, the Passenger Name Record, so we don’t have to 

continue to do it, but the 2007 PNR record as well as the privacy 

concerns that David raised. 

But before I begin, I think especially on a committee like this it 

is so appropriate to take a moment to recognize the tremendous 

victory that was achieved by our U.S. military intelligence communities in locating and killing Anwar Al-Awlaki last Friday. 

Awlaki was one of the worst perpetrators of terrorism and one 

of the United States’ most real enemies. He was involved in multiple attacks against the U.S. homeland including the Fort Dix six 
2 

plot, which occurred in my backyard; the Fort Hood attack; the 

Christmas day 2009 attack over Detroit; and the UPS cargo bomb 

which again landed in my airport. Or the airport in my district, it 

is not my airport. 

The world is a safer place now that Awlaki is no longer a part 

of it. 

The achievement is a great testament to the U.S. intelligence capabilities. It will send a clear message to those who seek to harm 

us that you won’t hide, and you won’t escape justice. 

Now today’s hearing is aimed at educating our Members, and I 

think many at-large, about the ways in which the Department of 

Homeland Security collects, protects, and uses personal information 

on travelers attempting to come into the United States. 

Given the transnational nature of terrorism, and a desire of terrorist operatives to enter the United States from abroad, it is crucial that we act in partnership with other nationals around the 

world. We push it out a little bit further and make sure our skies 

and our ports are safe and secure from wrongful entry. 

In 2007 the United States and the European Union entered into 

an agreement to share with one another intelligence that would 

help all parties identify potentially dangerous individuals before 

they set foot on an aircraft, thus helping to disrupt the effort of terrorists and organized crime rings. 

Since 2007, the programs resulting from this agreement have 

proven to be an indispensible component in our strategy to thwart 

terrorists. In fact, in 2008 and 2009, PNR helped the United States 

identify individuals with potential ties to terrorism in more than 

3,000 cases. 

Among these was the Mumbai attack plotter, David Headley, 

who was arrested in Chicago after U.S. authorities accessed his 

PNR data from a flight he had booked from the United States to 

Germany. Headley since pled guilty to a separate plot to murder 

journalists from a Danish newspaper. 

PNR data also identified Faisal Shahzad, the perpetrator of the 

failed Times Square bombing in May 2010, who was caught with 

the help of PNR as he attempted to escape the United States at 

JFK Airport. 

In 2010, approximately one-quarter of those individuals denied 

entry into the United States for having ties with terrorism, were 

initially tied through PNR data. 

Now in 2009, the European Union member states adopted the 

Treaty of Lisbon, and that gave greater power to the European 

Parliament. Thereafter, this parliament sought, under its new authority, to reject this E.U.-U.S. PNR agreement because the United 

States had negotiated bilateral memorandums of understanding 

rather than establish uniform rules with the European Union as a 

representative body. 

In addition, some members of the E.U. Parliament have begun 

to criticize the agreement for not providing stricter privacy protections—and I hope that you will go in to the privacy protections that 

we have—even though no violation of privacy rates, or breach of security, had been reported. I hope you will develop that point as 

well. 
3 

The United States has been absolutely vigilant in assuring that 

individual privacy rights under both the U.S. and European law 

were respected. 

As many know, last month Attorney General Eric Holder traveled to Brussels to discuss with European lawmakers the collaborative efforts between the United States and the European Union 

to address mutual security concerns. Holder testified before the 

parliament’s committee on civil liberties to attempt to assuage 

their fears. 

He argued that the debate over data protection is a purely academic one. Despite differences between the U.S. and European 

legal structures, both protect civil liberties effectively. 

Still, DHS and other components have been involved in on-going 

negotiations with the European Union to amend the PNR agreement, and it has been on-going since 2009. 

We have been through four rounds of such discussions. In fact 

they continue on these terms which were supposed to remain in effect until 2014. 

Our main concern in Congress, and part of the reason we are 

holding this hearing today, is to ensure that negotiations with the 

United Nations and European Union do not impact the effectiveness of this agreement. The PNR programs have been invaluable 

tool in our gathering of actionable intelligence over the course of 

the 4 years. It is a tool we cannot do without. 

The United States was built upon principles of freedom and civil 

liberty. This country has always been a leader among nations of 

upholding the rights of the individual person, and it will continue 

to be. It is for this reason that we must maintain our ability to prevent those who would seek to take those freedoms from us from 

carrying out their plans. 

Privacy is a right, but so is security. One relies on the other. 

I look forward to hearing from today’s distinguished witnesses 

and on these matters. 

Now, the Chairman recognizes the Ranking Minority Member of 

the subcommittee, the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Speier, 

for any statements she may have. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding today’s hearing 

and having us focus on the PNR issue. 

I would like to associate myself with the comments you made 

about the successful efforts by the President, the military, and the 

CIA in actually putting al-Awlaki to his final demise. 

I would also like to welcome the witnesses here, and look forward 

to gaining insights into how the Department of Homeland Security 

uses the PNR, including how DHS protects travelers’ privacy. It 

has got to be a key component of the utilization of this information. 

It is, in fact, one of the most powerful tools that we have to combat terrorist travel. There is obviously a very important balancing 

that must go on. 

As we know, analyzing PNR can highlight high-risk travel patterns such as popular routes used by human smugglers and terrorist facilitators. This may be the only way to flag potentially unknown suspects who aren’t on any of the watch lists, and who on 

the surface appear like any other traveler. 
4 

PNR can be immensely important in terrorism investigations. Investigators can use a terrorist suspect’s past travel history to identify travel to terrorist-safe havens as well as co-travelers who may 

be associates, which can help to identify and disrupt the entire terrorism network. 

PNR has played a key role in many prominent terror investigations including that of the 2008 Mumbai attack plotter, David 

Headley, and the attempted Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad. 

But we almost missed Shahzad when he attempted to leave the 

country. So the question that we must ask is: What enhancements 

to the system have been put in place to address the vulnerabilities 

exposed by that near miss? 

Effectively combating terrorist travel hinges on the timely sharing of information which requires working with the airline companies to get the PNR data quickly and efficiently. Have these increased demands for timely information placed an undue burden on 

the airline companies or to the traveling public is a question that 

must be answered. 

Equally important to our cooperation with the airlines is our relationship with our foreign partners. How can we maintain lasting 

and mutually-beneficial agreements with our foreign partners to 

ensure the timely sharing of PNR data continues? 

One such agreement that has been the subject of public scrutiny 

and some controversy is the one we share with the European 

Union. 

Many European airports serve as the last point of departure to 

the United States for many high-risk areas of origin including the 

Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. So it is of the utmost importance that we maintain the robust sharing of information on travelers flying from Europe to the United States. 

‘‘How will proposed changes to the agreement affect our screening operations?’’ is yet another question we must ask. 

Many people, including privacy advocates both here and abroad, 

have expressed concern about the privacy implications that come 

with obtaining customers’ data from the airlines for counterterrorism purposes. 

Although independent reviews of the PNR information-sharing 

program have determined that the usage of PNR data by DHS has 

never unlawfully violated travelers’ privacy, we must be mindful of 

these privacy concerns and ensure that DHS continues to uphold 

stringent privacy restrictions. 

The traveling public has the right to a reasonable degree of privacy, and they have the right to be concerned. I think we need to 

do a better job of explaining to the public the parameters of the 

U.S. Government’s usage of PNR data—why we need it, for how 

long, and how is it applied. 

I am eager to learn more about the protections in place. How exactly do we ensure that a traveler’s personal information is protected? How might further future modifications to the agreement 

impact privacy? 

So I hope today that we can positively contribute to that discussion and clear up some misconceptions about how and why the 

Government uses PNR data. 
5 

I am also looking forward to learning more about how far DHS 

has come since 9/11 to effectively analyze data sources such as 

PNR to identify and mitigate potential threats. 

With the system CBP and DHS has at its disposal now, could we 

avoid past failures such as the Christmas day attack? 

How important is PNR data to these efforts, and what challenges 

remain? 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Ms. Speier. 

I want to have the other Members of the committee be reminded 

that any statements that they would like to make can be submitted 

for the record. 

We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before 

us today on this important topic. 

Let me first turn to Mr. David Heyman. 

He is the assistant secretary for policy at the Department of 

Homeland Security. Mr. Heyman is an expert on terrorism, critical 

infrastructure protection, bioterrorism, and risk-based security. 

Previously, Mr. Heyman has served as a senior fellow and director of the CSIS Homeland Security Program where he led the research and program activities for that section. 

Additionally, Mr. Heyman has held a number of Government positions, including as a senior adviser to the U.S. Secretary of Energy and at the White House Office of Science and Technology policy on National security and international affairs. 

Mr. Heyman has testified before several committees in Congress 

and authored numerous publications, and appeared in various 

media outlets. 

I now recognize Secretary Heyman for his testimony, and ask 

that you do your best to stay within the 5-minute parameters. 

Thank you, Mr. Heyman. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID HEYMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR 

POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. HEYMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, good morning Ranking 

Member Speier and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. 

We very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before you 

today to discuss how the Department of Homeland Security’s 

prescreening of passengers, and in particular the use of PNR data, 

plays an important role in our Nation’s work to prevent and 

counter terrorist and criminal threats to the homeland. 

Preventing terrorists from traveling to or remaining undetected 

in the United States remains a top priority of the Department, and 

I commend this committee for holding this hearing and for your 

support on the on-going efforts to renegotiate our agreement with 

Europe on the exchange of PNR data. 

Ten years ago screening passengers coming to the United States 

was limited to the Department of State’s visa process and the inspection of a person by an immigration officer at the port of entry, 

plus whatever processes were applied at foreign airports and by 

foreign governments. 

If you were a terrorist seeking to come to the United States you 

would for all intents and purposes apply for a visa, purchase a ticket, and board an aircraft to America. 
6 

There would most likely not have been checks to see if you were 

a known or suspected terrorist, no checks to see if you may be a 

risk to security based upon behavior, no checking to see if you were 

traveling on a lost or stolen passport, no screening of you or your 

luggage for explosives, little to no security on-board the aircraft, 

and no checking to see if you are even admissible to the United 

States. 

That has obviously all changed in the last 10 years. 

Back then provision of advance passenger information was voluntary, and even when provided by air carriers frequently contain 

inaccurate and inconsistent data. There was no biometric collection 

of visa applicants beyond photographs, nor for aliens seeking admission to the United States. There was very limited pre-departure 

screening of passengers seeking to fly to the United States. 

Today, a decade later, in response to both 9/11 and evolving 

threats and with the help and support of Congress, we have significantly adapted and enhanced our ability to detect and interdict 

travel threats at the earliest opportunity. PNR plays a central role 

in all of this. 

The term PNR refers to the data an airline receives from a traveler to book and manage travel plans, and may include the traveler’s itinerary, payment method, and contact information. 

Just as fingerprinting was first used and became an important 

tool in criminal investigations in the beginning of the 20th Century, so too at the start of the 21st Century has PNR analysis become a vital tool for helping to identify terrorists and criminals. 

DHS analyzes PNR provided by the airlines to help identify, detect, and thwart terrorists and criminals attempting to blend into 

the traveling public, and before they commit criminal acts against 

innocent peoples. 

Our analysis of PNR data helps the U.S. Government to identify—as the Chairman has noted—over 1,700 unique suspicious activities or suspicious cases every year, and it has been vital in almost every high-profile terrorist investigation since 9/11. 

PNR data analysis has been proven to be a critical tool in identifying nearly every human smuggling case involving air travel. 

My colleague, Tom Bush, executive director for targeting and 

analysis for our customs and border patrol, will elaborate on the 

use and protection of PNR data international targeting programs 

this morning. 

In addition to the Department’s PNR system being operationally 

effective, we also can be proud of our outstanding record of data 

privacy protection over the past decade. To ensure the protection 

of privacy and civil liberties, DHS use of PNR data is subject to 

oversight for multiple independent bodies including the Department’s chief privacy officer, the DHS inspector general, the GAO, 

and as well as the United States Congress. 

In addition, periodic joint reviews with E.U. officials have confirmed the value of PNR data in protecting the traveling public. 

These reviews have confirmed our adherence to the highest data 

protection and privacy standards. 

My colleague, Mary Ellen Callahan, the Department’s chief privacy officer, is here to elaborate further on our protection and privacy programs. 
7 

Let me close by saying, over the past decade the use of PNR has 

evolved into a critical tool for ensuring the security of the traveling 

public, but also for identifying and prosecuting terrorists and criminals. 

The Department has accomplished all this while also demonstrating its firm commitment to protecting the privacy of travelers. Of literally billions of passengers traveling to and from the 

United States over the past decade, there has not been a single 

breach of use of PNR and violation of established privacy protections. 

In fact, the PNR system we have put in place has become a 

model internationally for other countries seeking to implement 

similar programs of which there is nearly a dozen now. We are seeing more and more countries seeking to establish their own PNR 

systems, including the European Union who we are in negotiations 

with right now. 

So let me again, thank the committee for this opportunity to discuss this matter, and to helping us ensure the commitment is 

maintained to achieve a security with the traveling public in exchange of data to accomplish that. 

I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Heyman, Ms. Callahan, and 

Mr. Bush follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID HEYMAN, MARY ELLEN CALLAHAN, AND

THOMAS BUSH

OCTOBER 5, 2011 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss 

how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) works to prevent individuals that 

may pose a risk to our National security from entering the country—all while facilitating legitimate travel and commerce and protecting the privacy of individuals engaged in international travel. 

Specifically, I want to highlight the Department’s pre-screening of passengers, and 

in particular, the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data in our work to prevent 

and counter terrorist and criminal threats to the Homeland. PNR data and analysis 

play a unique role in enabling the U.S. Government to identify both known and unknown threats. Recent cases underscore the vital benefit of PNR and reflect its 

value today—a value that has grown in recent years as the Department has improved and expanded its data matching and processes. We have been able to advance the development, implementation, and use of this tool, while also protecting 

travelers’ data and privacy. 

Other countries, recognizing the utility of PNR, have expressed interest in developing their own PNR systems for screening travelers. Our on-going negotiation with 

the European Union over how PNR from flights with ties to the European Union 

is handled by DHS is one manifestation of our ability to advance security, data protection, and privacy together. I commend the subcommittee for holding this important hearing on this topic. 

Multiple Layers of Defense 

Since 9/11, we have learned that the exercise of immigration and border security 

authorities can be powerful resources used to identify and thwart terrorist operations at the earliest opportunity. We have significantly adapted and enhanced our 

ability to detect and interdict threats at the earliest opportunity by instituting a layered aviation and border security architecture, incorporating both seen and unseen 

assets. 

Accordingly, we have strengthened our security and screening at points: 

• During the travel planning phase, when a traveler seeks a visa or authorization 

to travel; 
8 

• Just prior to travel, when a person seeks to board an aircraft at a point of departure; and • During travel, when a person seeks to enter the United States. 

PNR is one of five automated systems that assist the Department in identifying 

travelers likely to pose a risk. The five reinforcing systems are: PNR; the visa application process (conducted by the Department of State and supported by DHS); the 

Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) for travel under the Visa Waiver 

Program; the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS), and; Secure Flight. 

These are the systems DHS uses to begin conducting screening before an aircraft’s 

departure and function in conjunction with physical security procedures such as 

checkpoint screening. 

PASSENGER NAME RECORD—PNR

The term PNR refers to the data an airline receives from a traveler to book and 

manage travel plans, and may include the traveler’s itinerary, payment method, and 

contact information. In light of the lessons learned from 9/11 about identifying and 

preventing terrorists traveling into and out of the United States, Congress mandated that carriers make PNR data available to the U.S. Government in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (ATSA, Pub. L. 107–71). Presently, all 

carriers flying to and from the United States provide DHS with PNR pursuant to 

ATSA and DHS implementing regulations. DHS analyzes PNR provided by the airlines to identify terrorists and criminals attempting to blend into the traveling public before committing criminal acts against innocent people. Our analysis of PNR 

data, reinforced through cooperation with Federal partners, has helped to identify 

approximately 1,750 unique suspicious cases every year, and has been vital in many 

of the United States’ most well-known terrorism investigations since 9/11. 

To ensure the protection of privacy and civil liberties, DHS’ use of PNR data is 

subject to oversight from multiple independent bodies, including the Department’s 

Chief Privacy Officer, the DHS Inspector General, and the Government Accountability Office, as well as the U.S. Congress. In addition, periodic joint reviews with 

E.U. officials have confirmed the value of PNR data and our adherence to the highest data protection and privacy standards. The findings of these joint reviews are 

available on-line on the DHS and E.U. websites. Over the last decade, the Department has demonstrated its firm commitment to protecting the privacy of travelers. 

Of the literally billions of passengers traveling to and from the United States during 

the past 10 years, there has not been a single data breach or privacy violation of 

the PNR data. 

CONTINUED THREAT/RISK OF TERRORIST TRAVEL

This year witnessed the deaths of both Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki, 

as well as the 10-year anniversary of the deadly terrorist attacks of 9/11. As we reflect on the past decade, it is important to remain cognizant of the continued, evolving threat of terrorism to the traveling public. Since 9/11, the threat has changed 

to include not only large-scale attacks but also smaller operations with potentially 

catastrophic effects, including the continued targeting of the aviation sector. One of 

the most important responsibilities of government is the protection of its citizens, 

a duty this Department well recognizes and takes seriously. Passengers have a right 

to privacy and protection of their civil liberties and personal information, but also 

have a right to know that their government is doing everything it can to ensure 

their safety and security when they board an airplane. It is necessary, therefore, 

to ensure the continued use of proven and effective security measures. PNR is a 

proven asset in the fight against terrorism and other transnational crimes. 

EVOLUTION OF U.S. PRESCREENING EFFORTS SINCE 9/11

Ten years ago, screening of passengers coming to the United States was limited 

to the Department of State visa process, if applicable; the inspection of a person by 

an immigration officer at the port of entry; and any processes applied at foreign airports by foreign governments. Provision of advance passenger information was voluntary. There was very limited pre-departure screening of passengers seeking to fly 

to the United States, and there was virtually no screening of any kind for domestic 

flights beyond airport checkpoints. 

Today, in response to both 9/11 and evolving threats, and with the help and support of Congress, DHS has significantly adapted and enhanced its ability to detect 

and interdict threats at the earliest opportunity, including through the access to and 

analysis of PNR data as mandated by Congress. PNR data are analyzed in conjunction with other screening tools such as visa applications, the Advance Passenger Information System, and the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA). DHS 
9 

analysis of PNR data is an indispensable layer in a comprehensive approach to security. Each tool plays a unique role in the screening process. ESTA and the visa 

issuance process (depending on the country and traveler) allow us to prevent a 

known criminal or terrorist from preparing to travel. Secure Flight and APIS help 

DHS decide how the carriers and CBP officers, respectively, should handle travelers 

as they prepare to board. PNR data further enable this decision with additional and 

earlier information. APIS and PNR then help DHS decide who warrants a secondary 

examination upon arrival. In all cases, trained DHS personnel review and analyze 

the results of these automated systems. 

As the 9/11 Commission pointed out, targeting terrorist travel is one of the most 

powerful weapons this country has to counter terrorist operations. Terrorists travel 

in order to: Identify and engage in surveillance of potential targets; plan attacks; 

receive training on tactics and operations; collect and transfer funds and documents; 

and communicate with other operatives. Every step along this pathway presents a 

vulnerability for would-be attackers, who must come out of the shadows and interact 

with the traveling public, the travel industry, and immigration and border security 

officials. At some point along the travel pathway, for example, many terrorists cross 

international borders—a step that often necessitates submitting advance passenger 

information, using a passport, and undergoing screening by immigration and border 

officials while at ports of entry. 

THE ROLE OF PNR DATA WITHIN THAT SYSTEM

PNR data analysis can help identify individuals up to 72 hours prior to departure, 

including watch-listed individuals, non-watch-listed co-travelers, and terrorists or 

criminals adopting known illicit travel patterns. DHS is able to link previously unknown terrorists and criminals to known terrorists or criminals by matching contact 

information, flight patterns, and other data. After this analysis is complete, DHS 

works with foreign and industry partners to interdict illicit travelers prior to boarding or prioritizes resources for their inspection at U.S. ports of entry. PNR data collection and analysis also support terrorist and criminal investigations, including the 

three most prominent U.S. terrorist investigations in 2009 and 2010. Further, PNR 

served as a critical tool in supporting United States Government efforts to investigate 9/11 threats over the tenth anniversary weekend. 

The retention of PNR data after a flight allows DHS to unravel more complex 

plots by looking at travel practices over time. Data that does not appear to be relevant at the time of travel can be critically important when tied to a specific case 

later. Remember that the 9/11 plot was originally conceived in the early 1990s; an 

attempt on the World Trade Center occurred in 1993, and the actual 9/11 plot planning and execution began in earnest in 1996. This included numerous dry runs and 

practice flights, as well as travel for recruitment and planning. Retained travel data 

was important in securing convictions by the Department of Justice in a number 

of recent counter-terrorism cases, including the conviction of Mumbai plotter David 

Headley. 

Identifying Unknowns 

Following 9/11, the United States Government collected intelligence on al-Qaeda 

and its affiliate networks and established the FBI’s consolidated Terrorist Screening 

Database (TSDB) of known or suspected terrorists. Today, we check travelers to the 

United States against the TSDB, no matter what mode of transportation they plan 

to use to come to the United States. 

As DHS has seen in recent cases, however, intelligence and law enforcement agencies may have limited or no derogatory information about individuals who pose a 

real risk to the United States. In fact, we know that some terrorist groups are deliberately looking to recruit individuals who are specifically unknown and can remain 

undetected by heightened security measures. Fortunately, PNR data analysis, particularly of historic records, allows us to help identify individuals who may be unknown to us as terrorists or criminals, but exhibit a pattern of behavior that is consistent with known or suspected terrorist or transnational criminal behavior. For example, a few years ago, two organized crime syndicates in Latin America devised 

a simple and effective way to smuggle kidnapped children into the United States 

for sale. They would pay women to fly to the United States with their own children’s 

legitimate passports but with kidnapped babies. The women would then return 

alone. By looking for such a pattern in PNR records over a number of years DHS 

arrested 11 smugglers, removed 10 criminals and identified 37 victims. The same 

technique of analyzing travel patterns has proven effective against a myriad of 

crimes and terrorism. 

At the same time, DHS realizes that sometimes innocent travelers may adopt 

what may appear to be suspicious patterns. As a result, DHS has established auto-
10 

mated procedures so if a traveler is repeatedly flagged for further inspection and 

found not to pose a risk, DHS will automatically ‘‘de-flag’’ the traveler in the future. 

Further, all pattern-based rules are evaluated quarterly by the DHS Chief Privacy 

and Civil Liberties Officers for effectiveness and appropriateness. A Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) officer, however, may still determine that a closer inspection is warranted, depending on the individual circumstances and travel. 

Early Identification—Activation of IAP Teams 

CBP stations Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) officers at certain foreign airports to work with airlines and foreign officials to identify high-risk and improperly 

documented travelers before they board aircraft bound for the United States. At the 

invitation of foreign partners, IAP officers make ‘‘no-board’’ recommendations to airlines on the basis of passenger data analysis and a review of individual travel documents. To be most effective, several hours before a flight is scheduled to depart, an 

IAP officer must know who will likely be on a flight and whether they warrant further exam prior to departure. Frequently, PNR data analysis is the first information 

IAP officers receive to assist in making these determinations. CBP’s National Targeting Center—Passenger (NTC–P) analyzes PNR data received up to 72 hours prior 

to departure and provides recommendations to the IAP officers. NTC–P later validates this analysis with APIS closer to departure. IAP officers are currently posted 

at 10 airports in 8 countries, and have recommended, in part based upon PNR data, 

a total of 2,875 no-boards in fiscal year 2011, including 9 No-Fly hits, 74 confirmed 

Terrorist Screening Database matches, and 109 cases of fraudulent document use. 

EXAMPLES OF PNR EFFECTIVENESS

Headley, Zazi, Shahzad 

I would like to take a little time to discuss some of the high-profile cases where 

PNR data analysis has been instrumental in critical National security investigations 

and prosecutions. As background, I mentioned earlier that analysis of PNR data 

have proven to be the critical tool for annually identifying around 1,750 suspicious 

cases. PNR data have also aided nearly every high-profile terrorist investigation, including: David Headley, who pled guilty for his role in the 2008 Mumbai terrorist 

attacks; Najibullah Zazi, who pled guilty to plotting to bomb New York City subways; and Faisal Shahzad, who pled guilty to attempting to detonate a car bomb 

in New York’s Times Square. Just as fingerprinting was first used and became an 

important tool in criminal investigations in the beginning of the 20th Century, so 

too at the start of the 21st Century has PNR analysis become a vital tool in terrorist 

and transnational criminal investigations. DHS has also relied on PNR data analysis in nearly every human smuggling case involving air travel. 

The case of Faisal Shahzad clearly demonstrates the effectiveness of DHS’s 

prescreening programs. Early in this investigation, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) learned of Shahzad’s cell phone number, but had little additional information. Through good interagency cooperation, the FBI asked DHS if it had encountered any individual who reported this phone number during border crossings. DHS 

searched its PNR database for the phone number, identified Shahzad, and learned 

other information he had provided to DHS. DHS then provided the additional data 

to the FBI. Later, Shahzad attempted to flee the United States, but DHS’s analysis 

of departing passenger data identified him before departure and DHS removed him 

from the aircraft. 

STRONG RECORD OF PRIVACY PROTECTION

DHS provides robust privacy protections and strict safeguards over PNR data. 

Through a combination of law, policy, and oversight, DHS ensures its compliance 

with stringent standards of privacy and security in the collection and use of PNR 

data. DHS applies fair information practice principles to its collection and use of 

PNR, including data integrity, data security, purpose specification, auditing and accountability, individual access, and redress. Moreover, the Department is firmly 

committed to transparency when it comes to informing our partners and the public 

about its mission, including how we use and safeguard personally identifiable information such as PNR data. 

By leveraging the Congressionally-mandated authorities of the DHS Chief Privacy 

Officer, DHS is working diligently to assure all U.S. and international travelers that 

the highest standards are being applied to the protection of their personal information. The Chief Privacy Officer has managed two internal audits of DHS’s use of 

PNR data and coordinated two joint reviews with the European Union since 2004. 

When preparing for the joint review that took place in February 2010, the DHS Privacy Office spent approximately 10 weeks of employee time analyzing and assessing 
11 

DHS collection and use of PNR data and published two public reports related to 

that assessment. The reports from these audits are publicly available on the 

websites of the DHS Privacy Office and the European Union. The DHS Privacy Office found, and the European Union acknowledged, that there has not been a single 

incident involving the unauthorized use of PNR data. 

Individual travelers have many opportunities to learn how DHS handles PNR 

data. The PNR data rule, System of Records Notice, and Privacy Impact Assessment 

are all available for public review and comment. In addition, individuals, both U.S. 

and non-U.S. citizens, have multiple opportunities for access and redress. The U.S. 

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) applies equally to U.S. citizens and non-U.S. citizens. Anyone can request his or her PNR data directly from DHS; DHS receives and 

answers these types of requests routinely. If the traveler seeks to change or delete 

information contained in his/her PNR, he or she can submit a request to DHS and 

changes deemed appropriate will be made. U.S. and non-U.S. citizens alike also 

have access to the DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP) to correct 

or amend records. More information on these programs can be found at 

www.dhs.gov/privacy. 

U.S.-E.U. PNR AGREEMENTS

Despite this operational and privacy success, last year, the European Union 

sought to re-negotiate our bilateral PNR Agreement to obtain further reassurance 

that data with ties to Europe is being handled properly by the United States. To 

protect U.S. industry partners from unreasonable lawsuits, as well as to reassure 

our allies, DHS has entered into these negotiations. 

The Agreement currently in force provisionally, negotiated in 2007, is not scheduled to sunset until 2014. The Agreement is operationally sound, but it is subject 

to ratification by the European Parliament, which instead directed the European 

Commission to renegotiate the Agreement. As a matter of good faith and out of respect for our E.U. partners and their evolving political structures following enactment of the Lisbon Treaty, Secretary Napolitano subsequently agreed to negotiate 

a new agreement only if the new text would not degrade the operational effectiveness of the 2007 Agreement and would permit additional security enhancements 

where necessary. We commenced the latest negotiations on December 4, 2010. As 

such, the United States is currently in its fourth negotiation over PNR with the European Union in 9 years—effectively a decade of negotiation. 

The Department is committed to concluding a new PNR agreement, first and foremost a security agreement, which upholds vital public interests in both security and 

privacy. We reached agreement with the European Commission for such a text on 

May 16, 2011. The text is an improvement over the 2007 Agreement, it protects 

both security and privacy and U.S. and European interests, it provides all relevant 

parties with legal certainty, and it is a reliable framework for an enduring deal. 

U.S. and E.U. negotiators worked to respond to the European Parliament’s criticism of the 2007 Agreement, to improve passenger security and to provide air carriers a legally certain operating environment. To build support for this approach, 

DHS has met repeatedly with not only the European Commission, which negotiates 

on behalf of the European Union, but also with key Committees and Members of 

the European Parliament and representatives of individual Member States. The new 

agreement is clear, detailed, and transparent—in ways that some critics in Europe 

felt the previous Agreement was not. The text of the draft agreement defines key 

terms such as ‘‘terrorism,’’ and ‘‘transnational crime’’ consistently with United 

States, European Union, and international norms. A data retention period acceptable for U.S. security purposes is maintained, with additional safeguards to ensure 

privacy and data protection. The new agreement will require travel information to 

be transmitted to DHS with greater lead time than provided for in the 2007 Agreement, and thus will provide for greater analysis earlier in the passenger travel lifecycle. It also provides for a new method of data transmission (‘‘real-time’’ push). By 

restricting data transmission to the minimum necessary while ensuring data accuracy, the real-time push method of sharing data will enhance security and privacy 

protection at the same time. Lastly, the new agreement will expand opportunities 

for police and judicial cooperation between the U.S. and E.U. authorities. 

I want to thank this committee for its interest and support in our negotiations 

with the European Union. With the conclusion of PNR negotiations with the European Commission and, we hope, forthcoming signature and then support from the 

European Parliament, the United States and European Union will have made 

progress in strengthening the previous PNR Agreement from a privacy and security 

perspective. Success will be the result of 9 months of intense negotiations and build 
12 

off 9 years of dialogue on how best to facilitate safe transatlantic travel and protect 

individual privacy. 

By all accounts, the new text is stronger than the 2007 Agreement; it addresses 

all E.U. concerns raised with the U.S. negotiating team, while also preserving and 

in some cases improving critical U.S. operational interests. We must build on our 

historic relationship, values, and interests, as we seek action by the European Commission, the European Council, and the European Parliament to finally conclude 

this PNR Agreement, which is without a doubt better for enhanced security, as well 

as for improved data and privacy protections. 

CONCLUSION

Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee, we look forward to working with you as we explore opportunities to 

advance our cooperation with our European partners to counter terrorism and 

transnational crime. Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. My colleagues 

and I are happy to answer your questions. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Heyman, for your testimony and 

for your good work and service in your current position. 

Next, the Chairman would like to recognize Ms. Mary Ellen Callahan, who was appointed the chief privacy officer and chief freedom of information officer by DHS Secretary Napolitano in March 

2009. 

In her role as chief privacy officer, Ms. Callahan is responsible 

for evaluating Department-wide programs, systems, technologies, 

and rulemakings for potential privacy impacts, and for providing 

mitigation strategies to reduce any privacy impact. 

She and her staff have extensive expertise in privacy laws both 

domestic and international that help inform privacy policy development both within the Department and in collaboration with the 

rest of the Federal Government. 

Prior to joining DHS, Ms. Callahan was a partner with the law 

firm of Hogan & Hartson where she specialized in privacy and data 

security law. 

In 2011, Ms. Callahan received the Federal 100 award which recognizes individuals in Government and industry that make significant contributions to the Federal I.T. community. 

I now recognize Ms. Callahan to testify for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MARY ELLEN CALLAHAN, CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER, THE PRIVACY OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Ms. CALLAHAN. Thank you very much. 

Good morning, Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, and 

distinguished Members of the subcommittee. 

My name is Mary Ellen Callahan. I am the chief privacy officer 

at the Department of Homeland Security. 

As the Chairman acknowledged in his introduction, I am responsible for evaluating Department-wide programs, systems, and technology for potential privacy impacts including the Department’s 

use of passenger name records—and I will take your cue and call 

it PNR—through Customs and Border Protection’s Automated Targeting System. I will also refer to this as ATS. 

DHS provides privacy protections and strict safeguards over PNR 

data. DHS ensures its compliance with stringent standards of privacy and security in the collection of use of PNR. 

DHS applies fair information practice principles to its collection 

and use of PNR including data integrity, data security, purpose 
13 

specification, auditing and accountability, individual access, and redress—the principles which I will detail in my testimony this 

morning. 

Moreover, the Department is firmly committed to transparency 

when it comes to informing our partners and the public about its 

mission, including how we use and safeguard personally identifiable information such as PNR data. 

My office has managed three internal audits of DHS’ use of PNR 

data and coordinated two joint reviews with the European Union 

since 2004. For example, when preparing for the joint review that 

took place in February 2010, the DHS privacy office spent approximately 10 weeks of employee time analyzing and assessing DHS 

collection and use of PNR data, and published two reports totaling 

65 pages related to that assessment. 

My staff conducted multiple interviews, reviewed the PNR data 

use in sharing audit trails, and SOPs for ATS. 

We also reviewed the logs in ATS associated with whether sensitive data had ever been accessed by DHS. It had never been 

accessed. 

Through these two joint PNR reviews, the DHS privacy office 

found, and the European Union acknowledged, that there has not 

been a single privacy incident or data breach involving the unauthorized use of PNR data. 

These public compliance reviews conducted by my office confirm 

the original intent of the data collection, and provide public assurance that the information is being used for the purposes for which 

it had been collected. The pattern-based rules that are referred to 

in our written testimony, that DHS employees are also subject to 

my review, as well as that of the officer for civil rights and civil 

liberties, and the Office of General Counsel. 

On a quarterly basis, we review these pattern-based rules, the 

underlying intelligence that supports the rules, and the impact effectiveness and efficacy of the rules themselves. 

This periodic oversight and review allows DHS to perform its 

border security task in a privacy-protective way. 

In addition to my statutory authorities related to privacy compliance, the DHS privacy office is involved in data governance and information sharing in the Department through the chief information 

officer and his counsels, departmental compliance with FISMA, I.T. 

budget review, and the information sharing and governance board. 

This type of integrated, ex-anti and ex-post assessment and review by the DHS privacy office is one of the virtues of the senior 

position my office has within the Department, with visibility and 

oversight through the data life-cycles of DHS programs, systems, 

and technologies. 

As the committee knows, I have had the pleasure of serving as 

the Department’s chief FOIA officer as well. One of the ways the 

Department supports the privacy fair information practice of individual participation is to provide travelers with multiple opportunities for access and redress. 

FOIA applies equally to U.S. citizens and non-U.S. citizens. Anyone can request their PNR directly from DHS. DHS receives and 

answers these types of requests routinely. Based on a recommenda-
14 

tion by the European Commission in the 2010 review, we now 

track that number discretely. 

Since April 2011, DHS has received approximately 220,000 FOIA 

requests from around the world. In that same time period, we have 

received 69 FOIA requests from travelers seeking their PNR 

records. 

If a traveler seeks to change or delete information contained in 

his or her PNR, they can submit a request to DHS and changes 

deemed appropriate will be made. The administrative appeals 

through my office are also available. 

This existing opportunity was strengthened through the Department record amendment policy that was released earlier this year. 

Furthermore, U.S. citizens and non-U.S. citizens alike have access to the DHS traveler redress inquiry program to resolve travelrelated inquiries such as the use of PNR. 

In sum, the DHS’ collection and use of PNR, and my office’s involvement throughout the PNR life-cycle, demonstrates the Department’s commitment to embedding privacy principles within the Department’s operations. 

I look forward to your questions, sir. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Ms. Callahan. 

Last, let me turn to Mr. Thomas Bush, the executive director of 

automation and targeting for the Customs and Border Protection 

Office of Intelligence and Investigative Liaison. 

Mr. Bush and his staff are responsible for assessing and reporting the threats that the United States Customs and Border Patrol 

faces through research, evaluation, and dissemination of trend 

analysis, intelligence alerts, and assessments. 

Mr. Bush began his career as a program analyst for the Department of Defense strategic defense initiative and entered the United 

States customs service in 1994. 

In 2006 Mr. Bush joined the Office of Antiterrorism where he 

acted as executive director prior to the establishment of the Office 

of Intelligence and Operations Coordination in 2007. 

His numerous honors include the 1998 Commissioner’s Unit Citation Award and the 2003 Commissioner’s Annual Award for Innovation, and the 2008 Secretary’s Award for Excellence. 

I now recognize Mr. Bush to testify for 5 minutes. 

Mr. Bush. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS BUSH, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF AUTOMATION AND TARGETING OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND 

INVESTIGATIVE LIAISON, CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION 

Mr. BUSH. Good morning Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member 

Speier, distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for 

this opportunity to provide background on PNR today. 

PNR is the data that an airline receives from travelers to book 

and manage their reservations. This can include the traveler’s 

itinerary, payment method, and contact information. 

It is one of our most important tools in the on-going fight against 

terrorism, as well as narcotics smuggling, human trafficking, and 

other transnational crime. 
15 

I will address how we get this data, how we use it, and how it 

has helped us in the past. 

CBPs predecessors, the U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, began receiving PNR data from 

commercial airlines on a voluntary basis in the early 1990s. The 

carriers recognize that working closely with U.S. law enforcement 

to intercept high-risk travelers would in turn yield benefit for enhanced security on their flights. 

Shortly after September 11, 2001, Congress began mandating 

that the airlines provide PNR to U.S. Customs Service, now CBP. 

Since then, CBP has had electronic access to the PNR data of every 

airline with an electronic reservation system operating international flights to and from the United States. 

I would also like to add that CBP works closely with our partners in the Department of Homeland Security’s oversight offices, 

the chief privacy officer, and the civil rights and civil liberties officer to ensure transparency in how we use PNR at CBP. 

We also have established clear guidelines for our officers and 

what they can and cannot do with the data. Not every employee 

in CBP needs to have access to PNR, but those that do respect 

PNR as a powerful tool in their decision-making process. 

CBP maintains PNR in our automated targeting system or ATS. 

The system parses the data into discrete elements, analyzing it in 

conjunction with other DHS traveler holdings. This allows CBP officers and analysts to use a variety of information, to identify those 

travelers posing the highest risk before they board airplanes overseas. 

CBP officers and analysts use PNR in conjunction with other 

data and law enforcement intelligence information to establish 

risk-based scenarios for the interception of previously unknown 

high-risk subjects—in other words, those not on the watch list. 

These scenarios, or pattern-based rules, allow officers to make faster and better-informed decisions about which travelers to interview 

and secondary examination. 

PNR data is also useful to trend analysis. It is unique and it allows CBP to see a traveler’s full itinerary and contact information 

such as phone numbers and e-mail address. This can be very powerful in establishing connections with other travelers who may arrive from different locations or different times, and who may appear to be otherwise unconnected. 

I will cover a few of our success stories. 

One important example of it is the case of Najibullah Zazi. You 

may recall Zazi as the al-Qaeda-trained operative who planned to 

explode improvised explosive devices in New York City’s subway 

system. 

Using PNR data, DHS and CBP worked closely with the FBI to 

cross-check the names of his co-travelers against open counterterrorism cases inside the United States, and determined his co-travelers were being trained during the same trips to Pakistan in the 

same training camps. 

Zazi was arrested on September 19, 2009 and the information 

from his PNR records were used in his questioning and his indictment. Zazi pled guilty in February 2010. 
16 

Another example of CBP’s ability to fully leverage PNR holdings—specifically about those we have very little information or 

those we call the unknowns. 

Law enforcement intelligence information implicated a specific 

person in the plotting of the 2008 Mumbai attacks as well as the 

possible attacks against a Danish newspaper office. Starting with 

the very common first name, David, a partial travel itinerary, and 

a very vague travel time frame, CBP was able to review its PNR 

data in connection with other DHS databases. 

Within 24 hours CBP was able to provide the FBI with the person’s full name, address, passport number, travel history, and other 

information useful to law enforcement pursuing him. You may 

know that person as David Headley who pled guilty in March 2010. 

A third example of how CBP’s use of PNR and has been successful also demonstrates when we receive the data. 

In the case of Faisal Shahzad, who attempted to use the car 

bomb in Times Square in May 2010, CBP used PNR in the first 

place to target him on his flight returning from Pakistan. It was 

also used to intercept him when he tried to flee the plot after it 

was unsuccessful. 

After a stay in Pakistan, in which was later determined Shahzad 

underwent terrorist training, Shahzad arrived in the United States 

and was flagged for screening based on information in his PNR. 

CBP conducted an examination and released him after finding no 

reason to further detain him. 

After the failed attack, the FBI, in coordination with DHS, 

learned of Shahzad’s identity from a phone number in his attempt 

to purchase the car that was linked to the PNR data, and our reporting on that examination. 

Based on previous information, CBP created travel lookouts on 

Shahzad which enabled us to intercept him before he hurriedly 

booked his PNR in an attempt to leave the United States on a 

flight out of JFK. 

Shahzad confessed and was sentenced to life prison in June 2010. 

Two other examples that are in human smuggling are cases in 

Korea of sex trade—they also were connected to Sri Lanka. PNR 

was used for us to target the travel routes and the travel agencies 

used by those perpetrators in November 2009. 

A separate human smuggling case working with Interpol, we 

were able to use PNR data to detect payment address information 

and e-mail information that connected to Eastern European human 

smuggling cases. This was in August 2009. 

PNR uniquely and solely provides CBP with the ability to identify the true point of origin for travel. Without it CBP often mistakes the origin of travel at that last point of departure to the 

United States—take an example for Heathrow versus an originating travel in Pakistan. 

PNR also allows CBP to see all the stops along the way. 

PNR also affords CBP the opportunity to determine suspicious 

booking and payment methods such as last-minute ticket purchase, 

cash tickets, or one-way tickets. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Bush, can I ask you—these are all good things 

and perhaps these are some of the things you can develop for us 

in your testimony. 
17 

Do you have a closing observation for your direct testimony? 

Mr. BUSH. Other than I just noticed I was over. I apologize. 

Mr. MEEHAN. I can see you—— 

Mr. BUSH. Part of the excitement. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. MEEHAN. It does. It is interesting stuff. 

Particularly, you are getting a chance to layout your trophy case 

and I think it is a significant record. 

I want to thank each of you for your testimony here. 

First, how inherently important it is because the record demonstrates the things that have been accomplished by virtue of the 

work that has been done with PNR. 

Second as you have testified here today, each of you in different 

parts there is a lot of work that has gone into protecting the integrity of this information, and the audits have shown that we haven’t 

had violations. 

With that premise, we really do want to find the balance of assuring privacy while protecting the safety of Americans traveling. 

So, Mr. Heyman, let me start with you because this is the kind 

of a thing that if you aren’t close to it and you drill down to it, you 

know, just the terminology can overwhelm you. 

Effectively, what kind of information are we using when we are 

engaged with PNR? 

Isn’t it in many ways the kind of information that the people 

should have an expectation that they are already currently sharing? It is just using that information in a more effective manner 

than we have in the past. 

Mr. HEYMAN. Thank you, Chairman. 

You are absolutely right. The balancing act that we have sought 

to accomplish, and I think frankly effectively have, is the balance 

that says passengers have a right to privacy and protection of their 

civil liberties and personal information. 

But when they get on the airplane they also have a right to know 

their Government is doing everything they can to make sure that 

that flight is going to be safe. We do that through a number of different things that I have outlined, but included and most important, the PNR record. 

The PNR record is basically the information that you provide an 

air carrier when you book a travel plan. So it is your seat number. 

It is your destination. It is your routing. 

It is perhaps how you purchased the ticket. There are about 19 

types of fields that are included and include personal information 

such as your name and—— 

Mr. MEEHAN. But not inherently private information per se, 

right? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Well, I will let my privacy officer speak to the specifics about how privacy is accounted for. But it is information that 

you share with the airlines and then they share it with the Government for the purposes of the evaluation about whether an individual presents a risk getting on that aircraft. 

We take that responsibility quite seriously. We have data protection for ensuring that only the information of those 19 fields are 

preserved. 
18 

The specifics about sensitive information that people are concerned about, we do not use that. It is our policy not to use sensitive information—— 

Mr. MEEHAN. Well, let me drill down to that for a moment because that is the essence of what we are really talking about, I 

think. 

We have demonstrated over a course of period of time the effectiveness of PNR and the importance that it plays. You have also 

been able to create a record in which it has withstood scrutiny up 

to this point in time. 

So what is really at play here with the European Union now 

coming back and challenging what has been a program which I am 

presuming has not only worked effectively, but my assumption is 

you developed more fields of information that its effectiveness only 

grows? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Well, that is a great question. 

What is at play? There is a lot of play here, some of it having 

to do with institutional reform in Europe post-Lisbon where the 

parliament now has a responsibility for approving agreement. 

Previously the pathway to an agreement with the United States 

would be the commission negotiates an agreement and member 

states sign off on it. Now, the parliament also must vote on it. 

Seven-hundred-plus members of the European parliament will vote 

thumbs up or thumbs down. 

Parliament for the last decade or so has made past resolutions 

in Europe requesting and urging the commission to provide more 

for data protection on these types of information-sharing agreements. 

Now that they have an opportunity to vote up or down in this 

past year, they requested that the commission come back to the 

United States and seek a renegotiation of the—— 

Mr. MEEHAN. The point of it is, individually many of these member nations have not only appreciated the significance of the protections afforded to safety, but they have agreed and participated with 

you in the zones of information that should be shared. Is that 

right? 

Mr. HEYMAN. In fact, yes. I believe it is 23 or 24 of the 27 member states ratified the 2007 or re-passed the 2007 agreement. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Do we share information with them in a return capacity because there are people that fly through airlines that either 

go through the United States or from the United States to their 

countries? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Yes. We may on a case-by-case basis share information. At this point the Europeans as a group don’t have a PNR 

system. They proposed one which may take several years to stand 

up. Some member states—the Brits in particular—have begun to 

stand up their own PNR system in which case we would have that 

type of exchange. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Well—— 

Mr. HEYMAN. Protected also—protected with the same data protection and privacy protections that we seek in our own agreements. 
19 

Mr. MEEHAN. My time has expired for now. But I know that 

there is an interest in the broad spectrum that all of us will—have 

to share. 

So I turn it over to the Ranking Member, Ms. Speier. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

So let me follow up on the Chairman’s questioning. 

Does the 2007 agreement stay in place pending the negotiations 

on the 2011 agreement? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Yes, it is provisionally in effect. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. We prefer the 2007 agreement to the 2011 

agreement? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Well, let me just give a little background on—Secretary Napolitano, when she agreed to renegotiate the agreement, 

agreed with two fundamental principles that we must adhere to. 

The members here are part of the negotiating team here—your witnesses. 

So No. 1, she directed us that we have to maintain the same 

operational effectiveness as 2007. So there is no degradation in existing operational capabilities. The 2007 agreement provides us 

with exceptional operational capability. 

No. 2, that a new text must permit additional security enhancements where necessary or appropriate, so we have been given 

guidelines or direction that we will have no degradation and operational—— 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Heyman, excuse me for interrupting. 

I am trying to get to what the crux of the issue is with the 2011 

agreement. 

Would you say that the expectation of the European Union to 

have greater privacy protections is what is stalling the negotiations? 

Mr. HEYMAN. The Europeans seek—what has stalled—the negotiations have proceeded as directly as we can. We concluded what 

we believe is a good text in May this past year. 

They have a number of institutional hoops that they must go 

through. The commission must now get the member states onboard. The member states then pass it, and they have to give it to 

the parliament. There are some institutional things that must get 

accomplished. 

But as far as we are concerned with perhaps a couple of other 

discussions, we are pretty much satisfied with the text as created 

in May 2011. 

Ms. SPEIER. So there are no disputes pending? 

Mr. HEYMAN. The Europeans have to go through their own institutional requirements, and so there is still discussions going on. 

Ms. SPEIER. Okay. Can you just tell me if there is anything outstanding? 

Mr. HEYMAN. From the European side there are, yes. 

Ms. SPEIER. Okay. What are they? 

Mr. HEYMAN. The Europeans have a legal opinion that has been 

put forward by the commission that says that the May text that 

was leaked to the public is not proportionate, which is a standard 

by which data protection and data use must be adhered to. 

So, they are working through that challenge right now. We are 

open to hearing their proposals for how to fix that problem. 
20 

But it is on the European side. 

Ms. SPEIER. What do you mean by proportional? 

Mr. HEYMAN. So—why don’t you—— 

Ms. CALLAHAN. The proportionality is a concept that is in the European law particularly vis-a ́-vis the member states to the European Union. It is one that has been incorporated into the data protection or privacy directive of 1995. 

Proportionality is actually a concept that has multiple meanings 

within Europe. One meaning is you should only take the information that you need in order to do your job. So the number of fields 

that you collect from the airline, the 19 fields that Mr. Heyman 

spoke about. 

Another concept of proportionality that we have heard discussed 

is that you only collect information from the people that you need 

to collect the information from. From, for example, the bad guys, 

from the criminals. 

Now that of course, as Mr. Bush elaborated on we don’t know 

who all the bad guys are. We have unknown terrorists out there, 

and so that is not necessarily possible. 

Then there is proportionality in terms of the scope of the enforcement and the application. 

Each time we talk about proportionality, we hear a different definition. So the definition in European Union law is quite broad, 

which is why to say that the, ‘‘agreement’’ is not proportionate is 

difficult to pin down in terms of how to—— 

Ms. SPEIER. Okay. 

What are the 19 fields? Can someone just rattle those off for us? 

Ms. CALLAHAN. Mr. Bush. 

Mr. BUSH. I can try to do most of them, ma’am, and get you—— 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. I have got 30 seconds so—— 

Mr. BUSH. Travel itinerary, which covers a few of the 19 fields: 

Name, date of birth, payment information, e-mail address, phone 

number. If you have associates, co-travelers on your ticket, you are 

sharing, travel agency, travel agency address. 

Ms. CALLAHAN. Co-chair. 

Mr. BUSH. Co-chair if it splits. So if United needs to share with 

another airline as an example. I think that covers—bags and seat 

assignment. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right, thank you. 

Mr. BUSH. We can get you the full details. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Ms. Speier. 

The Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady from California, 

Ms. Hahn. 

Ms. HAHN. Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Speier, this has 

been a very interesting hearing. Thank you for your testimony. 

It is certainly—and, you know, I have a statement that I can 

enter into the record. I won’t give it now. 

But clearly PNR is an important tool that I think we use in this 

country to clearly, as was stated, to connect the dots. I guess the 

key is making sure we have the right dots, and then the real work 

begins on connecting those dots. 

But we have certainly had some pretty impressive success stories 

to tell which I think is important. 
21 

You know, reading some of the background materials, I think the 

real problem is parliament. You know, when you read some of the 

quotes from the members of parliament, they are the ones that look 

like they could very well veto this or block it. 

It doesn’t seem like there is some real instances of abuse that 

they can point to after we have collected this information. But it 

is just a basic overall belief that data collection has sort of gotten 

to an extreme, and privacy, just on that basis, for them it sounds 

like to be violated. 

So I think that is going to be the real issue—is their parliament. 

You know, one of the things—you know, my district in California 

borders Los Angeles International Airport. It also borders the Port 

of Los Angeles. 

Now, I am wondering—you know, the airport police in many of 

our airports in this country, certainly are sort of a separate law enforcement agency. I am wondering how this information is communicated to our airport police and vice versa—our airport police, 

agencies across this country in an information-sharing loop with 

the Department? 

The other thing I was certainly wondering, it is always my concern is I think our real vulnerable points of entry into this country 

are our sea ports. 

Wondering, does this also include—does the PNR also include 

passengers who would be coming into this country through cruise 

ships, for instance? Is that an area of concern? 

Because it is for me, and wondering where we are in really looking at information for those who come into this country on, you 

know, some major cruise ships certainly from Europe—so just kind 

of two questions. 

Mr. HEYMAN. Thank you, Congresswoman. 

Let me say that first of all in the broader context, also to the 

Ranking Member’s question, that we are satisfied with the text as 

we have negotiated and look forward to the commission advancing 

that to the council for approval. We look forward to the council approving it and giving it to the parliament and voting positively on 

that. 

In terms of a law enforcement cooperation, we have added into 

the new text some ability to facilitate greater cooperation in law 

enforcement. But as it pertains to U.S. law enforcement, the provisions that would be most important really apply to our Federal law 

officials. 

When somebody gets off an airplane from another country they 

go through customs and borders. So the information PNR records 

are evaluated in advance of arrival, as is other information so that 

if there is additional screening that is required, our customs officials take that into account. 

Then the third point, on sea ports, we do look at PNR for people 

coming in to our ports. 

Ms. HAHN. Is it as extensive as—are we connecting the dots as 

much in that area, do you believe? 

Mr. BUSH. PNR as an industry tool is not as well-developed in 

the sea environment, but we do have the same ability to connect 

the dots and do run the same pattern-based rules and use the automated targeting system on cruise ships. 
22 

Ms. HAHN. I just want to go on record to say, again, my concern 

will always be on this committee as well as Homeland Security 

Committee—I mean, on the subcommittee, is that our sea ports, I 

believe are still an extremely vulnerable entry way into this country, both with cargo and with passengers. 

I just want to go on record saying that. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Ms. Hahn. 

The Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady from New York, 

Ms. Hochul. 

Ms. HOCHUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member. 

My district is on the border of Canada. What standards are in 

place with respect to airlines that come in from Europe, stop in Toronto and continue to the United States? 

We have a different set of standards for Canadian and Mexicanoriginated flights versus what is considered at the European Union 

or identical standards. 

You can just enlighten me a little bit on that before I ask my 

next question. 

Mr. HEYMAN. We have the same standards and requirements for 

all of those flights. The secure flight program that the Department 

of Homeland Security put in place also requires information are 

provided for all the flights. 

So, if a flight were to go to Canada but not to the United States, 

we would still be able to do the risk assessment for U.S. security. 

Ms. HOCHUL. Have any of our other partner nations outside the 

European Union raised any privacy concerns or any issues or is 

this it? 

Ms. CALLAHAN. With regard to privacy concerns and the use of 

passenger name records, it has exclusively been a conversation 

with the European Union. 

Mr. HEYMAN. Let me elaborate. 

Actually, there are 250 some-odd last points of departure where 

we require, because of Congressional law, passenger name records 

to be provided in advance of a flight. 

Some of those are in Europe, but the bulk of them are outside 

of Europe. The European agreement is the only one that we have 

for that. 

Ms. HOCHUL. If we are not successful in negotiating this agreement with the European Union, what is the effect? 

The 2007 agreement stays in effect until 2014? Is that how it is? 

Okay. So we are not bumping up against a wall just yet. You are 

just having these negotiations at the stage that we are not under 

the gun. We are not going to have this program suspended any 

time soon, correct? 

Mr. HEYMAN. That is correct. The Europeans have said that the 

agreement is provisionally in effect until negotiations are concluded. 

Ms. HOCHUL. I know that some have suggested that we suspend 

the visa waiver program for European countries if we are unable 

to negotiate, that. Given that about 16 million people come in from 

Europe to our country, do you think you could handle that additional workload if that would be the case? 

Yes. I didn’t think so. 

[Laughter.] 
23 

Ms. HOCHUL. What would be the effect? 

Would that compromise the program we have in place with the 

additional workload? What is your opinion? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Actually, first of all it would be terrific if we were 

to expand our trade-travel opportunity for people who come to the 

United States. I think it would be a good investment in America. 

So I think it is a positive step in the right direction. 

I don’t have the technical specifications in terms of our data 

analysis capabilities. That is why I was looking over to Tom. 

But I suspect first of all this would be ramped up over a period 

of time, and so we would in fact be able to match the increase if 

there was a need. 

But right now, I think we have the capacity for additional expansions. Is that right? 

Ms. HOCHUL. I am very pleased with how this program is working. But how often do you get the situation where you do get someone who is innocent or has the same name, who has to go through 

additional scrutiny. 

Are you able to quickly correct those? 

I know you talked about the people who can file the FOIA request and they can correct their record. Early stories were not that 

simple. 

I mean people from my district, it took a long time to get themselves off the list just because I have a community—the Yemenites 

in my community, others were getting more trouble. 

Again, I am supporting what you do. I don’t want to compromise 

the heart of your program. 

But I just want to make sure—you said you have made progress 

in having people removed from that list who have the same name, 

but have no other reason to be tracking them or giving them additional secondary or additional screening. 

Ms. CALLAHAN. DHS takes the issue of providing people appropriate redress and opportunities. The traveler redress inquiry program, I mentioned briefly in my oral statement, has really helped 

to assist to have a Department-wide process. 

For example, you may think that you had a problem at the border because it was a passenger name record issue. But indeed it 

was something unrelated, therefore they transitioned it. 

That has shown great improvement in that we do think that is 

effective in getting innocent people to have appropriate redress. 

Ms. HOCHUL. Okay. Thank you very much. 

I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to request unanimous 

consent that the gentlewoman from Texas, the Ranking Member on 

the subcommittee on transportation security, Congresswoman 

Jackson Lee, be allowed to participate in this hearing. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Without objection, so ordered. 

The Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. 

Jackson Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. First order of business is to thank you for 

your courtesies and to acknowledge the importance of this hearing 

to the Ranking Member and Chairman, and express my interest 

because of the subcommittee that I have been involved in as it relates to this important issue. 
24 

So, I would like to just—well, first of all welcome the witnesses 

and ask maybe a question that has already been asked. 

We know that—though may not be directly related but we know 

that travel has generated, by a number of culprits, incidences that 

have harmed the homeland, from the shoe bomber to the trial that 

is going on in Detroit as we speak that was a traveler and decided 

to use methods that we had not confronted in the past. 

So I guess I am going to ask this general question in helping us 

in transportation security—since we deal with the international 

travel as well. Focusing mainly on passenger travel—is the kind of 

framework that we see going forward in the 21st Century, and the 

climate that we are in, and where we are seeing individual actors— 

I consider terrorism now a franchise. 

There is no battalion that shows up at your doorstep, maybe just 

an individual. 

How do we pierce that? 

Do we pierce that veil with the human resource intelligence or 

do we need more armor? 

Do we need more armor and intelligence at the gateway? In this 

instance, I am talking about planes, though I know that trains are 

in the eye of the storm too. But is it more of a focus on human resource or human intelligence rather? 

If I could get that answer from all three of the witnesses, please. 

Mr. HEYMAN. Thank you, Congresswoman. That is really one of 

the most important questions, is: How do we look forward in the 

21st Century to securing air travel and travel in general? 

The Department of Homeland Security takes this issue very seriously. We have put in place over the last decade, I think, an approach which attempts to achieve exactly what you have set forth. 

No. 1, we have to have multiple layers from the authorization of 

travel visas, ESTAs, Advanced Electronics Travel Authorization. 

That needs to be scrutinized. 

From the decision to book travel, PNR records and the other pretravel engagement that a traveler makes, we can do scrutiny there. 

Checkpoints at the airports is another layer. When a person gets 

on an aircraft we have security on planes. Then before they get to 

the United States there is additional scrutiny. 

So we have a number of layers of defense that we have put in 

place to ensure that we prohibit, and prevent, and detect those who 

seek to do harm from even getting on a plane to begin with. That 

is with a system that Congress has helped put together through a 

number of laws and appropriations over the last decade. 

I think the PNR system that we have now have been discussing 

today plays a central role in that. 

It allows for us to do not just detection of those who are known 

or suspected terrorists by going up against the—matching against 

the watch list that we have, the terrorist database. But allows 

through certain analysis to detect those who may be unknown to 

us, but exhibit certain behavior that can allow us to then prevent 

them from getting on a plane or doing additional screening at a 

time, so a number of different layers. 

Information sharing is critical to that and so that is why we are 

having the negotiations and having relationships with third parties 
25 

and other countries to ensure that we have that information exchanged. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. There is only a little bit more time. Maybe in 

your answer you would also include whether we are invading a person’s privacy on the behavioral aspect, but I think you are talking 

about utilizing as well. 

Ms. CALLAHAN. So, I can take that one up, ma’am. 

With regard to information sharing, with regard to screening at 

the border, I think that we have done—the developments in the 

past decade have been extraordinary. 

But at the same time what has been important is the Department has included privacy protections as they develop these programs. I think that that is crucial for going forward. 

Mr. BUSH. Yes, ma’am. I think you hit it on—right away the difference between the intelligence and information sharing and the 

need for the armor. I think both have to come in. 

Obviously with the increasing attempted acts of terror by those 

not on the watch list really stresses the need for the intelligence 

information sharing within the Federal Government, but also with 

our foreign partners. 

But once we identified a likely suspect, how can we then detect 

if they have something on them or attempting to get on a plane are 

two equally challenging areas. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee. 

I have a couple of follow-up questions. I will certainly open the 

courtesy to the other Members of the committee who are here today 

if they would so like. 

But may I ask—well first, I want to follow up with what the 

gentlelady just said. The two important points, that aviation continues to be an area that is targeted to be sure, and the, you know, 

the concern we have that individuals will try to exploit that. 

But, Ms. Callahan, there has already been a great deal of work 

that has been done in terms of protecting the privacy of information as we move along. This has been part of the DHS mission. We 

constantly move forward and seek information. 

Oftentimes there is not enough attention paid to what we are 

doing with that information behind us or assuring that there are 

protections that are done. I think simply the fact that we are having this hearing identifies Congress’ appreciation and desire to participate in this. 

As I have researched this and looked at this particular issue, 

there is something called fair information practice principles and 

other standards that are in place. 

Could you explain to us just what they are and how they help 

to secure the privacy of individuals both within the United States 

and outside? 

Ms. CALLAHAN. Absolutely. 

Absolutely, sir, thank you for that question. 

The fair information practice principles are core elements of essentially all privacy laws throughout the world that has privacy 

laws. A basis of it was originally in the Privacy Act of 1974 which 

was the first National privacy act in the world. 
26 

It is also embedded in the OECD Privacy Principles of 1980 

which, of course, is the genesis for both the European privacy law 

as well as the U.S. law. 

The Department of Homeland Security embeds the Fair Information Practice Principles, or the FIPPs within each of its activities 

associated with programs, technologies, systems, and information 

sharing. That is what my office does. 

The Fair Information Practice Principles include transparency, 

individual participation, purpose limitation, data security, data 

usage, access auditing and accountability, and redress. 

All of those elements are important cornerstones that I tried to 

address in my oral testimony to explain how PNR is an example 

of the Fair Information Practice Principles as implemented. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Can you give me an example of one of those and 

how that serves as a check against the abuse of that information? 

Ms. CALLAHAN. Well, one of the points that the Ranking Member 

had said is wanting to be more clear with what we are doing with 

information. 

We have tried to be very transparent with the passenger name 

records and what we are doing. I look forward to any other opportunities to discuss it in order to do that. 

In addition, for example, the purpose limitation, to make sure 

that we are using passenger name records for terrorism, 

transnational serious crimes, as well as to identify individuals with 

whom we may want to have more border security to not have the 

potential for mission creep for example. 

Those are important elements and that is what my three audits 

that are available in my website all show that we are indeed adhering to the principles that we said we would when we first set 

up the program. That is a very important part of the Department. 

Mr. MEEHAN. One of the principles you identified was redress 

which allows an individual to challenge the information that is in 

there. So there is already, as I understand it under the FOIA, of 

the ability to obtain your own record and to request that there be 

changes in inaccurate information with respect to your own record. 

Did I understand your testimony correctly that there are some 

220,000 foreign requests for FOIA? 

Ms. CALLAHAN. Let me clarify. Two hundred and twenty thousand FOIA requests that we received from across the world. Of 

those we received them from 100-plus countries. But in terms of 

proportion, I can’t tell you the proportion whether they are U.S. 

citizens here in the United States or also overseas. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Oh, but that may include U.S. citizens—— 

Ms. CALLAHAN. It absolutely does include U.S. citizens. 

Mr. MEEHAN. But that would be an important thing. I mean, I 

don’t know that I need you to do this just to do it. 

But if there is some way to analyze and identify the breakdown 

that may be relevant to this question, I would like to know if we 

are seeing a disproportionate amount of requests from foreign nations. 

Ms. CALLAHAN. The majority—about 75 percent of the FOIAs 

that we receive actually go to citizenship and immigration services 

associated with alien files, with their immigration records to obtain 

information about that. 
27 

Mr. MEEHAN. That may be relevant to their interest in trying to 

obtain citizenship or other kinds of benefits. 

Ms. CALLAHAN. Exactly. 

So I can tell you that that is where the majority of the requests 

come in. But a lot of those people are also naturalized U.S. citizens 

or legal permanent residents who are seeking their information. 

With regard to PNR, I can give you the breakdown for the 69—— 

Mr. MEEHAN. I just wanted to see if there was a dramatic imbalance for some particular reason. 

This last issue—— 

Ms. CALLAHAN. There doesn’t appear to be—— 

Mr. MEEHAN. But the redress is sufficient. Or I am seeing some 

concerns that somehow we should open up the courts for further 

redress in some—what is your position on that? 

Ms. CALLAHAN. As I mentioned earlier, the traveler redress inquiry program that DHS has stood up is designed to be a one-stop 

shop available on-line to multiple individuals regardless of where 

you are and for free. 

I think it is a very efficient and effective process that 140,000 

people have already sought redress through. 

With that said, the European standard thinks that a judicial redress opportunity would be one that would be better. 

If you go through a TRIP, you actually have the opportunity to 

go to court to challenge it. So therefore, I think that to request judicial redress, particularly with the use of PNR, it is probably not 

necessary because it already is available in the U.S. system. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Right. 

Well, thank you. My time has expired. 

I will now turn it over to the Ranking Member for any further 

questions she may have. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Along those same lines, Ms. Callahan, of the 69 requests that 

you have had for redress, could you make the specifics of those 

cases or a handful of those cases available to the Chairman and the 

committee so that we can see what it is they are objecting—I would 

like to get a better sense of what the concern is. 

Because based on the 19 fields that you just listed—and I am a 

privacy queen. I mean, I have spent a good part of my career trying 

to protect people’s privacy. 

I am not seeing where there is a potential even for abuse based 

on the information that is being shared. 

So, either you are taking this information and using it with other 

information you get from other sources, which if you are you need 

to explain that to us, or I am missing something. 

Ms. CALLAHAN. If I could clarify what the 69 requests were. 

They are the request for FOIAs, so just to receive access to their 

information. Of those 69 FOIA requests—so we don’t know if there 

is a redress problem with it per se. 

Of those 69 requests, about half of them come from American 

citizens who were seeking their own access. About a quarter of 

them come from the European Union, Canada, and Mexico, and a 

quarter come from the rest of the world. So it is just an interesting 

breakdown to see how it evolved. 
28 

It originally was more heavily weighted towards Europeans, but 

now we are getting more from the rest of the world. 

With regard to the use and with regard to the access, as Mr. 

Heyman and Mr. Bush noted, the fields that are being provided are 

the fields that are being provided to an airline, and therefore they 

don’t inherently have sensitive information in it. 

With that said, it is commercial data that the United States is 

acquiring as part of this Federal border security. So I do think it 

is important to note that when the U.S. Government acquires commercial information, we need to treat it very carefully. 

I think that that may be some of the reservations that people 

think because it was originally a commercial information, that that 

is the problem with it. 

With that said, the protections that we had put in place, I think, 

are very robust, very sufficient, and helped to ameliorate that concern, but also help us protect our borders in the ways that Mr. 

Bush described. 

Ms. SPEIER. But do you take that information and overlay it with 

other information you have within a database you have internally? 

Ms. CALLAHAN. We do compare passenger name records with 

other datasets that Mr. Heyman talked about including ESTA, 

APIS—which is the Advanced Passenger Information System, the 

terrorist screening database, and a few other data fields—and 

criminal records as well. That is all disclosed in all of our public 

documents. 

Ms. SPEIER. A FOIA request by an individual would be able to 

access that information that you have? 

Ms. CALLAHAN. If they asked for their passenger name records, 

it would not have that because the information is overlaid, compared, and then they go back to their separate databases. 

It is not stored in a unique setting. So it is not a Federal record 

under FOIA. 

With that that said they could ask for the information that Customs and Border Protection utilizes in order to make the border decisions. That is a way of having a broader aperture on the FOIA. 

Ms. SPEIER. Now, let us go back to the Shahzad case. 

He went through a series of screenings, still got on the plane. It 

was about to leave before he was apprehended. 

So where were the failings in the existing system? What kinds 

of changes have been made to make sure that doesn’t happen 

again? 

Mr. BUSH. I think the first improvement, ma’am, was the increased watch list service out of the Terrorism Screening Center. 

It had previously taken up to 24 hours to get someone watch-listed. That has now been streamlined and is real-time. So the soonest 

he would have checked in his name would hit on the watch list and 

I think it would have stopped there. 

The second thing is the time of which PNR is being submitted 

to the United States has intervals. It is not real-time every time 

someone books a ticket or makes some changes. 

You had asked earlier, I believe—I apologize, if it wasn’t you 

ma’am—the differences between this agreement and the previous 

ones. 
29 

That is an example of an improvement. We are trying to get any 

change to the PNR in real time. We are trying to explain the value 

of that to the Europeans. 

Ms. SPEIER. So does the European Union object to that? 

Mr. BUSH. I don’t think they understand it yet to object to it. I 

think they are still trying to understand does that mean more data 

being provided, when we were saying if you originally purchased 

your ticket and you only change it one time, well then we don’t 

need to have continual submissions of the same PNR. 

They are trying to understand that. I shouldn’t say it is an objection at this point, but I can defer. 

Mr. HEYMAN. They are not objecting to it. I think they are just 

trying to understand it. 

It is a new concept, the idea of having real-time data. It is—for 

data minimization, so it is good for privacy. It is real-time accuracy, so it is good for data security—for National security. 

Ms. SPEIER. You know, for those in the European parliament 

that appear to be objecting to this negotiated agreement, I would 

argue that they are better served by this agreement than by the 

agreement that we are operating under, which to your perspective 

is broader and has less privacy protection. 

So I am kind of mystified by their logic. But, I will leave it at 

that. 

I yield back. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Heyman is not taking the bait. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. MEEHAN. Ms. Hahn, do you have any follow-up questions? 

All right, well, I want to express my deep appreciation. It is a 

remarkable topic. 

I don’t think most of America woke up this morning thinking 

that PNR was the first thing that was on their mind, but a few of 

us did. It does show the importance. You have identified the key 

role that this plays. 

I also really appreciate the interest of the committee in looking 

to assure that we are protecting the privacy interests as well. I 

think that is similarly a mission for this committee. 

I thank you for the work that you are doing on both. 

Just one following comment. Mr. Bush, we didn’t get into the 

work that you are doing not just with terrorism, but I am impressed by the work that is done with human smuggling and other 

kinds of things looking at the pattern activity, and do believe that 

that is an area that we ought to keep working on. 

So I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony, 

and the Members for their questions. 

The Members of the committee might have some additional questions for the witnesses, and we will ask that you respond to those 

in writing. The hearing record will be open for 10 days. 

So without objection, the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

Æ