U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

i 

53–207 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–24] 

SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREAS 

OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THE U.S. 

SOUTHERN COMMAND, NORTHERN COMMAND, AFRICA COMMAND, AND JOINT 

FORCES COMMAND 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 18, 2009 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director 

PAUL OOSTBURG, General Counsel 

AILEEN ALEXANDER, Professional Staff Member 

CATERINA DUTTO, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, March 18, 2009, Security Developments in the Areas of Responsibility of the U.S. Southern Command, Northern Command, Africa Command, and Joint Forces Command ..................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, March 18, 2009 ................................................................................... 43 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 18, 2009 

SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF 

THE U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND, NORTHERN COMMAND, AFRICA 

COMMAND, AND JOINT FORCES COMMAND 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McHugh, Hon. John M., a Representative from New York, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Mattis, Gen. James N., USMC, Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command 

and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation for NATO ........................... 7 

Renuart, Gen. Victor Eugene ‘‘Gene,’’ Jr., USAF, Commander, U.S. Northern 

Command and Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command . 6 

Stavridis, Adm. James G., USN, Commander, U.S. Southern Command .......... 4 

Ward, Gen. William E. ‘‘Kip,’’ USA, Commander, U.S. Africa Command .......... 8 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Mattis, Gen. James N. ..................................................................................... 112 

Renuart, Gen. Victor Eugene ‘‘Gene,’’ Jr. ....................................................... 79 

Stavridis, Adm. James G. ................................................................................ 47 

Ward, Gen. William E. ‘‘Kip’’ ........................................................................... 135 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Larsen ........................................................................................................ 172 

Mr. LoBiondo .................................................................................................... 171 

Mr. Miller .......................................................................................................... 167 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 170 

(1) 

SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THE U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND, NORTHERN COMMAND, AFRICA COMMAND, AND JOINT 

FORCES COMMAND 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 18, 2009. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman 

of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Our committee comes to order. And today’s hearing is part of our annual series of posture hearings with combatant 

commanders. 

And I am pleased to welcome Admiral Stavridis of the U.S. 

Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), General Renuart of the U.S. 

Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace 

Defense Command (NORAD), General Mattis of the United States 

Joint Forces Command, and General Ward of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM). 

We are honored to have each of you with us today. We thank 

you. 

I also want to extend my appreciation to all the servicemen and 

women who work with you. They provide an invaluable service to 

our country. 

Every day, each of you enter intractable challenges that are not 

always part of the morning headlines, but are nevertheless vital to 

our national security. Let me mention a few. 

Latin America, narco-syndicates have stained the streets of 

Juarez, Tijuana, and elsewhere in Mexico with the blood of criminals and innocents alike, as drug lords struggle to survive against 

a Mexican government-led crackdown and inter-gang warfare. 

The impact of this violence on our borders concerns me very 

much in both the near term, as well as the long term regarding the 

state of Mexico. I would like to hear from General Mattis and General William Ward about the nature of the threat that we have 

been experiencing on our Mexican borders and in Mexico. 

Turning to the rest of the region, over much of the last decade, 

a growing number of countries seem to have removed their welcome mats, leaving our country with fewer allies with whom we 

can contain and continue to build strong military-to-military part-
2 

nerships. The implication of this trend for our ability to conduct 

counternarcotics and other operations merit careful monitoring. 

And, Admiral, I welcome your thoughts on this trend. 

General Ward, congratulations on your efforts so far. In short 

order, you have brought Africa Command from being a little more 

than a concept to becoming a fully operational combatant command, with robust interagency participation. We thank you for 

that. 

As AFRICOM continues to plan and execute its mission, it seems 

to me that improving the Combatant Command (COCOM) strategic 

communications is your primary challenge. Your task is to explain 

how working with our African partners to promote stability and security on the continent is consistent with our core national security 

interests. 

It is tough to draw the linkage from the work you do today to 

preventing the coups, the regional wars, and the manmade disasters that hopefully will never happen in the future, but that is precisely what you do. 

Beyond your strategic communication challenges, the work of 

AFRICOM has raised other concerns. A lot of the requirements inherent in promoting stability and security within the African continent do not at first glance appear to be military tasks. Your command must be careful that, by virtue of its size, it does not squeeze 

out efforts of our civilian agencies, such as the State Department 

and the United States Agency for International Development 

(USAID). 

With that, let me turn to my good friend, my colleague, John 

McHugh from New York, and, again, thank each of you for your excellent contributions to our country. We look forward to your testimony. 

Mr. McHugh. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM NEW YORK, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON 

ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Obviously, all of us welcome you gentlemen. We are in deep appreciation for the great leadership that you have shown. And 

please convey back to those brave men and women in uniform that 

you command ours and the nation’s most profound respect and 

words of thanks. 

Mr. Chairman, as always, you have kind of encapsulated this 

very important hearing. It is certainly, in my judgment, one of the 

more critical ones we hold on annual basis. We are always very 

happy that our great leaders can be here in person, join us to cover 

the broad range of items, some of which you have outlined, Mr. 

Chairman. 

I would ask that my entire statement be entered into the record 

in its entirety. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And beyond that, let me just underscore a couple of things that 

you said. We have very distinct areas of responsibility here, and 

each have their own significant challenges. 
3 

Like you, one of the most pressing, in my judgment, is the very 

disturbing situation on the U.S.-Mexico border. I share your concern, as I do many others in this nation, Mr. Chairman, regarding 

that widening drug war, the possible reach of cartels into America’s 

border towns. 

And it has gotten to the extent where even, just last week, the 

President has stated that he is at least considering deploying National Guard troops along that southern border and, like you, Mr. 

Chairman, I am very interested—and I hope we gather the opportunity today to discuss a bit about that circumstance and the way 

forward. 

NORTHCOM plays an important role in directing missile defense 

operations to protect the homeland. And given the nuclear and ballistic missile ambitions, and particularly in recent days of Iran and 

North Korea, we have the opportunity today to talk about 

NORTHCOM’s capabilities and force structure to defend the 

United States from ballistic missile attack. 

And, Admiral, as you know and we have had the chance to discuss, you have some very unique security challenges in your region. 

And just to cite one, over the last few years, Colombia has really 

risen as a democratic leader with successes against insurgent and 

paramilitary groups that is due in no small measure to the people 

under your command and the support of this nation in those efforts. 

But for all of that, the drug production and trafficking are still 

a very significant challenge for that nation. And I think it is important for us to hear what we need to do to best support what I 

would argue is one of our most stalwart allies in South America 

and, in fact, in this hemisphere. 

And, General Ward, I think the chairman summed it up very 

well. You have done yeoman’s work in setting up the command in 

one of the most complex and, I would argue, most misunderstood 

regions on the face of the Earth. And I think you have done an outstanding job. 

That has not been without challenges that no one knows more 

clearly than you, but whether it is questions of interagency presence and buy-ins, as well as the understandable delays in establishing certain offices, we need to hear today from you what kinds 

of areas still exist where you require the support of this Congress 

and this committee particularly. 

And, finally, General Mattis, as Joint Forces Command, amongst 

the many roles you play, that of providing mission-ready forces to 

all geographic commands is key amongst them. And, obviously, as 

we draw down troops out of Iraq and begin to build up into Afghanistan, the demand in increase of support functions and those kinds 

of mission personnel is going to be even more critical. 

And the challenge that you face in meeting that, as the supplier 

of forces, is so vital, obviously, to those missions, but to us, as well. 

And I hope you will be able to give us an idea of how you are going 

to meet that growing requirement for support functions in Afghanistan and still meet the enduring requirement, as it may exist, in 

Iraq. 

So a lot on our plate here, Mr. Chairman, as you and I both 

agree. Certainly we want to get to the testimony and for the ques-
4 

tion-and-answer period and a final word of appreciation to our witnesses, and particularly a word of deep thanks to those men and 

women who they have the honor of leading. 

I would yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. McHugh. 

We will ask our witnesses—before that, I must say that, at high 

noon, I have a conflict and someone else will be helping you finish 

the hearing. Please understand. 

If you wish to condense your statement, without objection, each 

of your written statements will be placed into the record. 

With that, we will start with Admiral James G. Stavridis. Admiral. 

STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN, 

COMMANDER, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, thank 

you very much for holding this hearing and allowing us to present 

to you some ideas. 

I will make the point that this is a real Goldwater-Nichols hearing. You have Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines seated here. You 

could almost call it the Chairman Skelton hearing, in the sense of 

all that he contributed to jointness in Armed Forces. 

Also, I do want to say, as an admiral, I am always—I feel a little 

safer in the company of generals, especially Marine generals, so I 

feel pretty safe today, all things considered. 

We have had a good and a challenging year down in Southern 

Command. I am just going to hit five quick, interesting things that 

have happened in the course of the last year that maybe will enlighten some of our discussions as we go along today. 

First, a very good thing. Last week, in my headquarters in 

Southern Command, we had the three U.S. hostages who were held 

by the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 

terrorists for five and one half years. Marc, Keith and Tom are 

their names, and they came to our headquarters to spend an afternoon with my command, talk about their experiences, and to be 

congratulated by my command for their performance under very arduous conditions. 

So it was a nice moment. And it kind of underscores what Representative McHugh was talking about, Colombia’s capabilities. I 

mean, this was a Colombian operation, but it was mounted after 

a great deal of partnership-building by the United States over a 

ten-year period of bipartisan effort with Plan Colombia. 

So I am glad we have our hostages back, and I think it is reflective of the good general trend of events in Colombia. 

Secondly, last summer, we had a couple of big Navy ships come 

down to do a great deal of medical engagement and training. It was 

a terrific deployment. We contributed to medical care for about 

200,000 people throughout the region. 

And we also had the opportunity as part of that deployment to 

have one of our Navy ships go to Haiti and respond to an enormous 

disaster there following the hurricane, a good indication of how our 

U.S. Navy’s Fourth Fleet is able to do its missions of engagement, 

training, disaster relief in this region. 
5 

Thirdly, we had a good year of military-to-military engagement, 

which is the heart of what we do. We had the largest exercise in 

the world, in terms of numbers of countries participating, 22 of 

them in and around the Panama Canal, an exercise called 

PANAMAX. Also did exercises in special forces, in disaster relief, 

in human rights training, in peacekeeping, a very robust schedule, 

and I appreciate the committee’s support that makes all of that 

possible. That military-to-military human contact trumps everything, in terms of moving ourselves forward in engagement in the 

region. 

Fourthly, we continue to struggle with the mission of detection 

and monitoring of the narcotic flows. And I am sure we will talk 

about that today. I continue to be concerned, as I have talked to 

this committee over the last couple of years, about the rise of the 

use of semi-submersible near submarine-like platforms by the drug 

cartels. 

We have captured several of these moving as much as seven tons 

of cocaine. The numbers we see are rising; it is a significant challenge for us. We did with international assistance and with interagency assistance participate in interdicting 230 tons of cocaine. 

There is a lot more flowing, and I believe that a fundamental 

part of the solution to this narcotic problem is on the demand side 

here in the United States. We can only go so far with interdiction 

and work on the supply side. So perhaps we can touch on those 

topics today. 

I understand the concerns in Mexico. I would make the point to 

the committee that it is not just Mexico. It is also Central America 

and parts of the Caribbean. There is a supply chain of narcotics 

and great difficulties—gangs, poverty—that run through the region. And we need to address it as a regional problem and not focus 

solely on our border. 

And General Renuart and I are in frequent discussion about 

that, and I think we have a good program to try and work together 

across Central America and Mexico in addressing these kinds of 

issues. 

Lastly, I want to close by thanking the committee very much for 

your support to our new headquarters building down in Miami. We 

have been in a rented facility for ten years since the command 

moved from Panama. Due to the work of this committee and the 

support you have provided, there is a new building going up which 

will bring together Southern Command for the first time all in one 

building in a modern facility that will allow us to do our mission 

properly. 

It comes on land that was donated from the state of Florida. It 

is a great savings to the taxpayer over time. And I thank the committee for that. 

With that, I will close simply by saying thank you for your support for the men and women of U.S. Southern Command. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis can be found in 

the Appendix on page 47.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much, Admiral. 

General Victor Eugene Renuart, Jr. You like that ‘‘Jr.’’? 
6 

STATEMENT OF GEN. VICTOR EUGENE ‘‘GENE’’ RENUART, JR., 

USAF, COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND 

General RENUART. And my mother does, too, as well, Chairman. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman Skelton and Congressman McHugh, members of the 

committee, good morning. And like Jim Stavridis, I want to echo 

the true heartfelt thanks from all the men and women who serve, 

for the support from Congress in general, and certainly this committee in particular. 

It is really an honor and privilege to be here today representing 

the men and women of North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command. 

And I want to point out, as I begin, I am pleased to be accompanied this morning by Command Sergeant Major Dan Wood, seated here behind me. Dan will be retiring in May after many years 

of service to the nation and tours in combat theaters in the recent 

years. And so I want to highlight Dan’s service to you to say thank 

you to him, but also he represents our children and, in some cases, 

our grandchildren that are out there wearing the uniform of our 

nation every day. 

As commander of NORTHCOM, I am assigned really two particular missions, very specific and important missions, one, to defend the homeland from attack and, two, to support the nation with 

unique Department of Defense (DOD) capabilities in times of crisis. 

And so this runs the gamut from capabilities like ground-based 

midcourse interceptors for ballistic missile defense, the execution of 

the air sovereignty mission within the borders of the United States, 

support to law enforcement in areas like along the border, and to 

support federal agencies, both before and after disaster strikes, as 

was evidenced with the California wildfires and the hurricanes 

along the southern coast this past year. 

But it is important to note we are members of a combined national response. We don’t do it alone. DOD does not and should not 

have the lead role in many of these events. 

We are part of a coordinated effort—international, federal, state 

partners, governors, the National Guard, all are keys to success for 

the nation, and DOD plays a role, in some cases, a very important 

role, in some cases, very much a small supporting role. 

It is also important to note that we have an excellent relationship with our international partners, Canada, Mexico, the—or Bermuda, the Bahamas, Turks and Caicos, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin 

Islands. All are part of our area of interest, and all play a key role, 

most notably our relationship with Mexico is as strong as it has 

ever been military-to-military, I think, in our history, and we continue to work closely with the leaders of Mexico, as they face some 

of the challenges in their home country. 

We train hard to execute our missions. We exercise those tasks 

routinely. I am pleased to say we now have a national exercise program that all the agencies of government participate in, and we 

have to ensure that we don’t let a sense of security that we have 

not had an attack or a major terrorist event in our country since 
7 

September 11th let us lower our guard. We have to be ready to ensure that we never let the country down. 

Those who wish us harm have not gone away. The threats still 

exist, and we have to be prepared. They only have to be lucky once; 

we have to be on guard 24 hours a day, 7 days a week to ensure 

that it never happens. We will keep the momentum going. We will 

remain alert. This mission is critically important to us, because it 

is to prepare for, to defend against, and to provide recovery for 

your families, your communities, our families and our nation. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to be 

here. I look forward to a number of questions this morning. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of General Renuart can be found in the 

Appendix on page 79.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General. 

General James N. Mattis, United States Marine Corps. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC, COMMANDER, 

U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION FOR NATO 

General MATTIS. Chairman Skelton, Congressman McHugh, 

members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify 

and to update you on Joint Forces Command. I request my written 

statement be accepted for the record, and I will speak for just a 

couple moments, Mr. Chairman, and leave most of the time for 

questions. 

As you know, sir, ladies and gentlemen, the command’s primary 

missions have both joint and coalition, current and future aspects. 

We support the current military operations by providing combatready forces to combatant commanders, and you are seeing now the 

reduced force levels in Iraq and the increase in Afghanistan. And 

that is well underway. 

We are also preparing for future conflicts, thinking ahead so that 

we are not caught flat-footed in the future. As you know, we are 

co-located with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 

Allied Command Transformation, which I also command. And that 

brings in a central coalition focus to Joint Forces Command. 

We recognize that we can never predict the future precisely, and 

we must expect to be surprised in matters of national security, but 

we must plan so that surprise is minimized and it is not lethal. We 

purposely set out to create a shock absorber in our force to withstand the shocks that we know will come. 

To this end, we have provided the committee with copies of the 

Joint Operating Environment, or what we call the JOE, and the 

Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, the CCJO. 

The JOE, the Joint Operating Environment, is our analysis, and 

it identifies the problem as best we can discern it about the future, 

a future of persistent conflict, of hybrid enemy threats, global instability, increasing access to weapons of mass destruction, the rise 

of regional state and non-state actors, and the unpredictability of 

security threats. 

The Capstone Concept is Admiral Mullen’s vision for how the 

joint force will operate in the future. That is our proposed solution 
8 

to the problem statement presented in the JOE, and it guides our 

force experimentation and, of course, guides our force development. 

One thing is clear: We must make irregular warfare a core competency, and this is Joint Forces Command’s top priority right now. 

By using the lessons learned from Iraq, Afghanistan, the second 

Lebanon war, and applying them to our efforts, we are going to do 

this. 

At the same time, we must have balance, as Secretary Gates has 

clearly articulated. And as we institutionalize irregular warfare capability, we must maintain our nuclear and conventional superiority, which brings great benefit to the international community. 

And we also have to bring together this whole-of-government approach that we have gotten great support from this committee and 

other committees on, because it is going to be vital to maintaining 

the nation’s security in the future when military means alone are 

not sufficient. 

I would like to stop at this point, Mr. Chairman, and leave the 

rest of the time for questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Mattis can be found in the 

Appendix on page 112.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

General William E. Ward, known as Kip Ward. General. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. WILLIAM E. ‘‘KIP’’ WARD, USA, 

COMMANDER, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND 

General WARD. Thank you, Chairman Skelton. 

Mr. McHugh, distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to provide this overview. 

With me today are Ms. Nory Fleffner from Department of Commerce and Mr. Jerry Lanier from the Department of State. And I 

am also honored to appear alongside my distinguished colleagues 

here. 

Last year, we discussed the plan to establish a headquarters. 

Today, United States Africa Command is executing our mission of 

conducting sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs and military-sponsored activities to promote a stable 

and secure African environment. 

We work in concert with other U.S. government agencies and 

international partners to ensure that our activities are harmonized. 

Our strategy is based on military-to-military efforts to enhance the 

security capability of our African partners. 

In many engagements with African leaders during my time as 

commander of United States Africa Command and previously as 

deputy commander, U.S. European Command, the consistent message they gave me is that, for their intent, for America—for African 

nations to provide for their own security. Most welcome our assistance in reaching their goals for security forces that are legitimate 

and professional, have the will and means to dissuade, deter and 

defeat transnational threats, perform with integrity, and increasingly able to support international peace efforts. 

We work as a part of the overall United States government effort. We work closely with the Department of State, the chiefs of 

mission and country teams, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, Homeland Se-
9 

curity, Agriculture, and others doing work on the continent. And 

like Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, I fully support enhancements to the capabilities of our interagency partners. 

Similarly, we reach out to international partners, including Europeans, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, 

private enterprise, and academia. Their perspectives on the situation in Africa are very valuable. 

U.S. Africa Command is involved in military training, education, 

sustainment, and logistics support, amongst other activities, 

throughout our area of responsibility. The Combined Joint Task 

Force-Horn of Africa, headquartered in Djibouti, conducts training, 

education, and civil military assistance that helps prevent conflict 

and promote regional cooperation among nations of Eastern Africa. 

Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara is a military component of the Department of State’s counterterrorism partnership 

with North and West African nations. Africa Endeavor is an annual communications interoperability exercise that this year will 

include 23 African nations. 

We support the State Department’s Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program that roughly trains 20 battalions of peacekeepers per year. The peacekeepers have been deployed on United Nations and African Union missions across the 

continent. Recently, we helped the Rwandans deploy some of their 

heavy equipment to the United Nations (U.N.) mission in Darfur. 

Continuing deployments of the Africa Partnership Station provide training to the navies and coast guards of maritime nations 

in the Gulf of Guinea and in Eastern Africa, helping them better 

secure their own territorial waters. 

Given the lack of infrastructure within Africa and the island nations, our sustainment infrastructure, forward operating sites, and 

en route infrastructure are vital. I endorse upgrade projects supporting these key infrastructure nodes. 

The enduring presence at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti makes possible our engagement in East Africa and other parts of the continent and supports our U.S. strategic goals in that area of the 

world. 

It is, indeed, my honor to serve with the uniformed and civilian 

men and women of the Department of Defense, as well as our 

interagency teammates, who are making a difference on the continent every day. Their dedicated efforts are a testament to the 

spirit and determination of the American people and our commitment to contributing to the well-being and security of our nation 

and the people of Africa. 

Again, thank you for this opportunity. Thank you for your support. And I stand ready to participate in the hearing. 

[The prepared statement of General Ward can be found in the 

Appendix on page 135.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General Ward. 

General Mattis, you said that irregular warfare should become a 

core competency for our military. History tells us that a country in 

particular, our country, prepares for the last war. How assured are 

you that irregular warfare will be with us in future conflicts? 

General MATTIS. Mr. Chairman, I am absolutely certain that irregular warfare will be with us in future conflicts. We need to only 
10 

look back to last summer’s Russian incursion into Georgia, where 

we saw many irregular aspects in that war. Their combat units 

even had irregular forces in front of them as they went into the 

breakaway republics. 

I think, too, that our study of the second Lebanon war shows 

how this hybrid threat in—it is being watched all around the 

world. And they recognize they cannot take us on at 15,000 feet 

right now; they cannot take us on, on the high seas; they don’t 

want to take on the U.S. Army in open desert, mechanized warfare. 

But there is an area where we are not superior. And we have 

seen the enemy play to those positions. 

I think that the paradox of war is that America at this point in 

history cannot abrogate any aspect of the conflict spectrum. By 

that, I mean the enemy will gravitate to the area that they perceive to be our weakness, so we cannot give up conventional capability. We cannot give up nuclear superiority. But we must develop 

irregular, if we want to checkmate the enemy. 

It is a balanced approach, as I think Secretary Gates has articulated very well, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Let me ask both Admiral Stavridis and General Renuart about 

Mexico. There is a great deal of concern in and out of the news 

media about that country and the drug-related violence that is 

there. Number one, describe how serious it is through each of your 

eyes. And, number two, what can America do to help? 

General RENUART. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think the media has 

given us many examples of how difficult that challenge is for the 

government of Mexico. President Calderon is courageously leading 

an effort. He has asked his military to play a principal role in that. 

And they are doing so. 

And I would use as an example the presence of thousands of 

military into Juarez, the city that we have seen so many of the 

murders recorded over the last year and certainly in these last couple months. That presence has made a difference. We began to see 

the violence settle, and I think that is an indicator of the seriousness that President Calderon takes with respect to action here. 

In terms of the drug challenges, Admiral Stavridis mentioned in 

his opening comments the challenge of the supply side. He leads— 

or hosts in his headquarters Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) 

South. I say in his headquarters, in his organization. They are located in Key West. That is an interagency process to get at the 

supply side. 

We participate directly with his staff. The Mexican government 

also participates directly with his staff. 

So I think the opportunity for us to share common operating pictures, share intelligence, share information not only between our 

headquarters, but with our Mexican friends is improving every day. 

Finally, I would say that there certainly is the potential, as we 

have seen in many reports, for some of that violence to spill over. 

There is a relationship between organized gangs in the United 

States and the drug cartels in Mexico. 

Our role in DOD is a small one, but it is to support law enforcement as they might need that along the border. I think the problem 

is real. Mexico is engaged. The United States is actively trying to 
11 

support and assist Mexico in any way that might be helpful. And 

we have a very good relationship with the Mexican military in that 

regard. 

Jim. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I would echo what General Renuart said. 

I would add, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I think there 

is a demand side component to this. If we ask what we can do to 

help Mexico, we could work on anything that reduces demand here 

in the United States, not really our lane in the Department of Defense, but I think we are mentioning the context. 

Secondly, sir, I would enlarge Gene’s comments to include Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. The Merida Initiative, which I support—I know Gene supports, as well—looks at 

all of those regions as a whole. 

In the end, this is a supply chain. We have to understand it, we 

have to reverse-engineer it, and we have to help kill it. Doing so 

will require international partners, as well as our interagency work 

together. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. General Ward, in your opinion, would you describe for us America’s national security interests in what you do 

in the Africa Command on the African continent, please? 

General WARD. Thank you, Chairman. 

The continent of Africa is an immense geographical domain, as 

well as huge water space along its borders and its territorial 

waters. Resources, population, globalization, stability all very firmly point to that part of the world being integrally linked to the security, as well as the continued development of our country. 

A stable continent of Africa with a population approaching 9 million, growing at a rate of 2.4 percent a year, expected to double by 

2050, if left unchecked with the issues of illegal immigration, trafficking of various commodities, from weapons to drugs to people, 

undeveloped so that immigration becomes issues for not just the 

nations of Africa, but Europe, as well as America, having today 

programs in effect that assist those nations to provide for their own 

security that will, in fact, enable development, enable the growth 

of effective institutions of government, clearly in our national interest in today’s globalized society. 

Nothing goes on in a part of the world, clearly the size, importance of Africa, that would not have an ultimate effect on us, our 

security, and our well-being. 

The CHAIRMAN. Does the activity of the United Nations help in 

regard to this? Or is it a paper tiger? 

General WARD. Sir, I think the United Nations and the role it 

plays in coalescing nations and reaching the sort of consensus that 

is important to move forward with these sovereign nations is an instrumental activity. 

I think we should look to ways to buttress those activities, because I think, in the end, it is that consensus, it is that degree of 

support that is, in fact, garnered by the world community that can 

be applied, that is what we need. 

And so I would say that the United Nations has a role, as do the 

continental organizations there in Africa. The African Union, as it 

attempts to get its feet under itself, moving ahead in the areas of 
12 

stability, as well as development, translates also to the regional 

communities there on the continent of Africa that are now five in 

number, as they also attempt to move ahead. 

Those activities that would coalesce, build, combine activity sets 

to address common shared problems I think can contribute to addressing those challenges. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Mr. Chairman, can I just add, from a 

SOUTHCOM perspective, on the United Nations question? The 

U.N. is doing a very good job in Haiti. The peacekeeping force there 

is 7,000 U.N. peacekeepers, 2,000 U.N. police, very, very small U.S. 

presence. They have done a very good job over the last three years 

in a security proposition there. 

Sixty percent of those peacekeepers come from other nations in 

the Americas. So it is an example of what General Ward’s talking 

about, that there is goodness in the United Nations’ efforts. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, General Ward. 

Mr. McHugh. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Renuart, I want to go back to you for a moment. As you 

heard in my opening comments, I greatly share the deep concerns 

that the chairman and many others have with respect to the drug 

situation in Mexico. Reports I have seen, more than 6,000 killed in 

those cartel wars. That is a pretty stunning figure in one year, 

when you consider the loss of those brave American lives in the 

now going on six years in Iraq, for example. 

But nevertheless, I think we have to keep reality in context. I 

have seen reports in recent days by organizations who claim they 

track these kinds of things who have listed Mexico as a potential 

failed state, along with Pakistan and such. 

How close might Mexico be or not be to being a failed state? How 

deep a concern do you have in that regard? 

General RENUART. Congressman, I certainly am not the expert at 

defining a failed state. I think there are certain characteristics, 

however, that, I guess I would say, Mexico does not exhibit. 

For example, they continue to have a democratically elected government, and they are actively taking on this problem so that the 

core of government does not seem to be jeopardized, if you will. 

Certainly, they have a strong trading relationship with the 

United States. They are our third-largest trading partner. That relationship continues, and it is important to both nations. 

The Mexican natural resources are significant. Certainly, their 

oil industry continues to help keep the government moving strongly. 

The economic decline that many of our nations have all suffered 

is not as significant at this point in Mexico. So many of the indicators of a very vibrant and active state continue. 

I think it is certainly a challenge for the law enforcement aspect 

of the government. The drug cartels are certainly involved in a 

great deal of violence. Much of the violent deaths that you have 

talked about have been cartel-on-cartel violence. And while it 

should not replace or eliminate our concern, it is an indicator that 

the cartels are fighting each other for turf and for, if you will, market share. 
13 

So I think President Calderon understands that clearly. He has 

engaged aggressively. He is in the process of re-vetting his police 

forces. We have seen successes in places like Juarez, where he has 

put federal troops on the ground. 

And I think, in our small role, we support the State Department 

and their efforts with the government. Certainly, the Merida Initiative is a huge, huge demonstration of American willingness to work 

with our Mexican friends to allow them to be successful in this effort. We need to continue that kind of support. 

Our role is a direct military-to-military relationship with the 

Mexican army and air force and navy, and we do that on a routine 

basis. So I am comfortable that this country is really working hard 

to deal with the challenge. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, sir. 

Admiral, you mentioned the variety of challenges in your area of 

responsibility (AOR). And clearly the drug component of that is not 

insignificant. But I want to talk a bit about Venezuela. 

I and many others have been deeply concerned about the reported arm purchases that Hugo Chavez has entered into, particularly with the Russians, reportedly 100,000 of the latest-generation 

AK–47, Russian fighter jets, et cetera, et cetera. 

And when you couple those with recent reports of both Venezuela 

and apparently Cuba offering to bed down Russian long-range strategic bombers and talks of Hezbollah fundraising in Caracas and 

elsewhere, we wonder what to make of this very murky soup. 

I wonder if you could just put your own perspective on the national security threats that Hugo Chavez’s arms purchases, coupled 

with his seeming friendship in places like Iran and the support of 

Hezbollah, or certainly the blind eye towards Hezbollah, might 

mean for this committee and for your AOR? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, thank you. 

Whenever I speak of Venezuela, I like to begin by pointing out 

that the United States and Venezuela have enjoyed an extremely 

good relationship for about 150 years. Over the recent past, there 

has been some political disagreement between the two countries, 

and to some degree that is the nature of democracy and in all the 

democracies in the Americas today, there is only one dictatorship, 

and that is in Cuba. 

So every other country is a democracy. And democracies have a 

tendency to disagree with each other about political direction, in 

many cases. 

In terms of a national security threat, I do not believe Venezuela 

poses a national security threat to the United States. You are absolutely correct: They have bought about $5 billion in weapons from 

the Russians over the last four years. They have contracts for at 

least $20 billion more high-performance jets, attack helicopters, 

AK–103s, the new generation of the AK–47, and so forth. 

I don’t believe that they, however, even with all of that armament, pose a significant threat, because I don’t see the commensurate investment in training, in people, in building capability to 

really employ those weapons in a way that would be a threat to 

the United States of America. 
14 

Mr. MCHUGH. How about the—if not the active support, certainly 

the forbearance of fundraising for terrorists, listed act organizations like Hezbollah. Is that at a high level or—— 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, I am concerned throughout the region 

of the activities of Hezbollah. And that really runs from the Southern Cone of South America to the Andean ridge to the Caribbean 

coast. We see Hezbollah acting throughout the region in proselytizing, fundraising, involved in the drug trade. 

There is a fair amount to be concerned about with Hezbollah. 

And I would like to provide that for the record and give you some 

specifics. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Yes. I would appreciate that. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield back, but I would say, 

for the record, this is an area that I know leaders, as we have here 

today, are focused on and concerned about, but I think it would behoove all of us on this committee if we had the opportunity to delve 

into that a bit more deeply, perhaps in closed session. 

But it is an important development that needs our urgent attention. And with that, I would yield back and thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, Mr. McHugh. 

Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to thank all these gentlemen for being here. 

Very quickly, General Mattis, your quote was something to the 

point of, ‘‘The enemy will gravitate to our weaknesses.’’ Would you 

say it is a fair assessment that the enemy gravitated to Improvised 

Explosive Devices (IEDs) and underbody explosions to flat-bottom 

Humvees in Iraq, as one example of that? 

General MATTIS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. And, therefore, again, using the media, using computers, told the whole world that we have a vulnerability to attack 

from underneath, from flat-bottom vehicles? 

General MATTIS. Sir, the attacks make even our heaviest tanks 

vulnerable. I would not confine it to the flat-bottoms. That is one 

aspect of it, but, in fact, war is a constant game of give-and-take. 

You know this, sir. I think as we adapt to the flat-bottom attack, 

they will adapt, and it is just the normal heave-and-ho of war. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Again, using your quote, using our experience in 

Iraq, I would certainly hope that you would weigh in, as we are 

making the decision on the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, that 

we, before we build it, make it resistant to mines, and not after the 

fact. And that is a very real debate going on right now, and I would 

hope, using your quote, that, you know, we could use that to our 

advantage. 

General Renuart, I happen to live in coastal Mississippi. 

NORTHCOM was nowhere to be found after Katrina. That is water 

under the bridge. 

But let’s take a similar circumstance. And, God forbid, I don’t 

want anything to happen to Pennsylvania, but I am only using 

them as an example, because a large percentage of their Guard is 

in Iraq right now. 

Two simultaneously horrible events happen in Pennsylvania, one 

in Pittsburgh, one in Philadelphia. They don’t have hospitals; they 
15 

don’t have electricity; they don’t have food distribution. What are 

the resources at your disposal now that we have learned the hard 

way—let’s start with Philadelphia. Could—are you in a position to 

contact the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and say, ‘‘I want an 

amphibious assault ship and that floating hospital as close to 

Philadelphia as you can get right now’’? 

General RENUART. Congressman, I will tell you a short answer: 

Absolutely, yes. 

Mr. TAYLOR. You have—okay, so you are the guy? 

General RENUART. I am the guy. And, in fact, today, I have an 

amphibious ready group that is available to me. It is—we keep one 

on the East Coast, one on the West. They are doing other training 

missions, but they are identified for homeland security and homeland defense response, should that be required. And I have the authority from the secretary to ask and move those. 

Similarly, the hospital ship—although she will be headed to 

Jim’s world here in the south to do some great humanitarian work, 

but if she is available, absolutely. But I will also tell you—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. If I may, sir—— 

General RENUART. Yes. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. One of the Seabee battalions is home. We 

won’t say which one. You are in a position to say, ‘‘I need you to 

go to Pittsburgh and start building places for people to berth in’’? 

General RENUART. Again, Congressman, absolutely. 

Mr. TAYLOR. And, General, the reason I am saying this is, I 

think yours is the most—we have the least understanding of your 

command. And I want to give you this opportunity to clear that up 

because, you know, again, I have sat in this room for a long time. 

I am convinced something bad is going to happen on American soil. 

As good a job as you do, somebody is going to get through. 

And I think the point that we need—the Americans need to know 

is that you are the guy who is going to respond. 

General RENUART. Congressman, I appreciate that. And I, too, 

share your view that we have to be prepared, because something 

untoward will happen, whether it is manmade or natural disaster. 

And we are the DOD command. We partner, as you know, with the 

National Guard. We are—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. Let’s get a clarification. What is your authority with 

the Guard? 

General RENUART. Congressman, the first authority with the 

Guard, as you know, is with—the governor will order those forces 

it needs into place. We have twice a day joint ops and planning 

meetings with the National Guard Bureau so that we integrate responses so that we don’t duplicate and we complement each other 

in each event. 

But certainly, in this case, the governor of Pennsylvania will 

want to have and should have access to those national guardsmen. 

As you said, many are deployed. Under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, additional guardsmen can come from 

other states. 

We will also be in a position to support. And we do that in conjunction with our friends in Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). And as you mentioned, an event occurs in one of those 

large cities that may be nuclear or biological or chemical, we have 
16 

a—today a fully equipped, fully trained, 4,000-plus-person consequence management and response force. It sits on a very short 

response notice. 

I have coordinated with Transportation Command for the lift it 

takes to move that. And if an event occurs in Philadelphia or in 

Pittsburgh, and that capability is needed for the particular unique 

nature of the circumstance, I can move them and the Secretary of 

Defense is fully supportive of moving them, at the direction of the 

President, in there and would be in within 48 hours. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General. 

General RENUART. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bartlett, please. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

General Mattis, I would like to join Chairman Taylor in his appeal to you that you take a look at the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. There are options that would provide enormously more protection for our troops there, and I would be happy to join you and 

Chairman Taylor in a discussion of this problem and these options. 

Admiral, I was impressed that twice you mentioned the need for 

reduction of demand on drugs. You mentioned it in your oral testimony, and you mentioned it in the answer to one of the questions. 

What we are doing relative to drugs kind of fits Albert Einstein’s 

definition of insanity, doing the same thing over and over again 

and hoping for a different result. We are really quite good at eradicating drugs and interdicting them, but it has had no effect on the 

availability of these drugs in our cities. 

As a matter of fact, in Philadelphia—I am sorry, in Baltimore, 

in my state, in Philadelphia, too, the quantity and quality of drugs 

was such that we have people dying from overdosing because the 

drugs no longer had to be cut for street sale. 

So, obviously, the roughly $3 billion that we spend a year in Colombia in eradication and interdiction has no effect on the availability of drugs in our country, and that is, of course, the reason 

we do that, to reduce drug use in our country. 

Now, I applaud, sir, your concern that we need to spend more effort on education, on reducing demand. If nobody bought drugs, nobody would be selling drugs, would they? And I think we need to 

have enormously more attention on reducing the demand for drugs, 

because obviously we are not going to reduce the availability of 

drugs. We have tried that over and over again, and it is not working. We just have to own up to that. 

General Mattis, you mentioned that the enemy gravitates to our 

weakness, and Chairman Taylor mentioned the potential weakness 

of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. There is another weakness 

that really concerns me, and it is a growing weakness. 

We continue to field weapons systems that have little or no Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) protection. And every one of our potential 

enemies in their open literature and in their war games mention 

the use of EMP as an early event in any conflict with us. 

The EMP Commission interviewed Russian generals who told us 

that the Soviets had developed—and they obviously have—EMP 

weapons, enhanced weapons, that would produce 200 kilovolts per 

meter at the center. That is 100 kilovolts per meter at the margins. 
17 

If that is true, sir, we never have built or tested anything to that 

level of EMP protection. 

Why do we keep fielding these weapons systems that will not be 

available to us when we really need them? We don’t need them for 

wars like Iraq and Afghanistan. We will really need them against 

a peer, and they won’t be useful to us because the first thing he 

will do is an EMP laydown. 

Why do we keep investing billions of dollars in these systems 

that have little or no EMP protection, therefore, little or no utility 

in a war with one of our peers? Why do we keep doing this? 

General MATTIS. I cannot give you a good answer, sir. I can speculate. I think, for some period of time, there was a hope that this 

nuclear issue was going to go away. I think we saw some turning 

away from keeping focused on it. I will add that any concern about 

that in the recent past has been taken care of by the U.S. forces, 

but not when it comes to the acquisition. 

I don’t have a good answer for you other than to say that I believe that now thinking the unthinkable is no longer off-limits. And 

we will work it. I don’t have a specifically satisfactory answer for 

you, sir. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Several years ago, I called my friend, Tom Clancy, 

who has done several events for me. He had an EMP scenario in 

one of his books, and I knew he did very good research, and I asked 

him about EMP. He said, ‘‘If you read my book, you know all I 

know.’’ 

Let me refer you to—in his words, to the smartest man hired by 

the U.S. government, and that was a Dr. Lowell Wood in Lawrence 

Livermore in California. In those days, we didn’t have cell phones, 

so I paged him. And I thought he was in California. An hour later, 

he was sitting at my desk in my office because he was here in 

Washington. 

Lowell says that the reason that we don’t address this is because 

it is just too hard. We don’t want to face it, and so we ignore it. 

Do you think that is true? 

General MATTIS. Sir, I will tell you, the physics of the problem 

probably make going to the moon look easy, so I think he has probably a good point. And when you talk about hard, you are talking 

about enormous cost. And in some cases—in, I think, most cases, 

we have not even done the Research & Development (R&D) that 

allows us to look at acquiring systems that have the capability— 

in other words, we still have to figure out how to do it. 

But we are going to have to get on with it, sir. Again, I will not 

defend where we are at right now. I cannot. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

And now we call on Dr. Snyder. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. 

General Ward, I am going to address my time with you. And, 

first, I want to just make a comment. I had to step out while you 

did your oral statement, but in your written statement, you referred to—have a brief discussion about the over-fishing off the 

coast of Africa. 
18 

And, you know, I applaud you for including that in a national security discussion about what is going on, because poverty and hunger and lack of economic vitality are huge national security threats. 

And I think probably most of us don’t realize what the potential 

degradation of the fish off the coast of Africa means for a lot of nations and a lot of people and for stability in Africa. 

On page four of your written statement, you say the following: 

‘‘The greatest security threats facing Africa include enduring conflicts, illicit trafficking, territorial disputes, rebel insurgencies, violent extremists, piracy, and illegal immigration.’’ 

The first one on that list was enduring conflicts. And would you 

describe for me, please, what you see the role of AFRICOM is in 

these enduring conflicts? 

And I want to mention two specifically as examples. We have 

this ongoing dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia on that border, 

that—while there has not been active military engagement for 

some time now of any major amount, none of us would be surprised 

if it were to flare up again at some point. It is an unresolved border 

and an unresolved war. 

The second one is the several—well, a couple decades long now 

dispute between the Polisario that are based on the Moroccan-Algerian border and the kingdom of Morocco. 

When you look at those two threats, what you have referred to 

as enduring conflicts, what do you see as the role of AFRICOM in 

disputes like those? 

General WARD. Thank you, sir. 

First, the acknowledgement of the threats to the environment, I 

appreciate your noting that. To be sure, these threats to those resources that could be made available to a people of a nation to increase their lot, to increase their well-being, critical, very, very important. And when it doesn’t occur where they are, then they will 

seek it elsewhere. 

With respect to the enduring conflicts, they range, as you have 

noted—they are the borders of Eritrea, Djibouti, the borders in 

North Africa, with respect to the Western Sahara, also the central 

part of the continent, there in the Congo. 

As it comes to the role that we play, the command, the military 

role, you know, where there are political agreement that talk to, 

one, creating stability, that talk to, two, the need to create a force, 

a security force that would, in fact, help the legitimate government 

of a nation provide that control or that stability, where there is a 

lack of training, a lack of equipment, a lack of interoperability, a 

lack of working effectively to some degree with its neighbors, 

where, again, there is the political will to do so, and a determination is made that we, in fact, can play a role in increasing the capacity to address those deficiencies, that is where we as a command, a military command come in to take a role to increase the 

capacity of those nations to do such. 

For example, as the situation in the Congo was occurring and 

interoperability deficiencies were noted, our ability to work with 

those nations—Uganda, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the 

Congo, Central African Republic to a degree—to help informationsharing, to help with equipment interoperability, providing sometimes needed logistics support and enhancement, to cause those 
19 

governments to be able to have a better sense of what goes on inside their borders against insurgencies or the rebel factions, and 

then be able to work in some degree of commonality to address 

them. 

But, again, those actions that we take, sir, come on the heels of 

a policy decision having been taken by the nations themselves, obviously, our national policy direction that supports the activities 

that we would, in fact, do to help in those instances. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Mattis, as someone who argued for the creation of Joint 

Forces Command 10, 12 years ago, I have become concerned over 

time that the command—that the focus on the future, which was 

part of the reason to create that command, has faded over time, 

and I recently read in a book by Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, where 

he said that, unfortunately, Joint Forces, established to identify 

emerging threats and support for the military’s transformation to 

address them, has progressively moved away from that mission 

since Millennium Challenge 2002. 

And, as you know, Millennium Challenge 2002 was a war game 

that was stopped in the middle because the good guys were losing. 

And they had to rearrange the deck in order to prevent an embarrassment. 

Dr. Krepinevich makes three suggestions to help refocus Joint 

Forces Command on the future. And I would like to get your reaction to them. 

One is, he thinks your—the tenure for your position needs to be 

lengthened, because nobody can occupy that job in the normal rotation and make the real difference with that futuristic orientation 

that you really need, because sometimes that goes countercultural 

to the services. 

Secondly, he says Joint Forces ought to have a seat on a Joint 

Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). And, thirdly, he says 

Joint Forces ought to have a seat on the defense acquisition board 

so that you are there with a voice when acquisition decisions are 

made. 

What is your reaction to those three suggestions? 

General MATTIS. Thank you, sir. 

In terms of our future focus, it is a balancing act. I will be the 

first to admit it. However, I will tell you that the joint training that 

goes on right now is critical to making the Goldwater-Nichols—the 

spirit of Goldwater-Nichols into reality. 

The providing of forces—of prepared joint forces going out is so 

smooth that I spend very little of my time on it. There is a small 

section of the command that, when the Secretary of Defense approves our request for forces from one of the geographic commanders, it goes very quickly. 

Not a lot of distraction there, is my point. Most of our effort, 

most of my effort with Joint Forces Command goes into the future. 

In regards to lengthening the commander’s tour, I think that 

there is a—if I remember right—around 50 percent of the total 

command, 27 percent of the command has got government contract 
20 

or contractors, civilian contractors. They provide continuity. There 

is also a fair amount of continuity from government civilians. 

So although the commander’s tenure is one consideration—and I 

wouldn’t necessarily refute or come up with an argument against 

it—I don’t think it is as bad as thinking that everything stops 

when a commander comes and goes. Some of us may think the 

world begins and ends with us, but I think the reality is, the command functions quite well. 

We do have to get some institutionalization of this focus on the 

future that perhaps disappeared under the urgency of the active 

operations overseas. I think we have that back, and we are going 

in the right direction, and we are open to any kind of assessment 

that wants to come down and look at us on that. 

On the JROC seat, I will tell you right now, sir, I can walk into 

the JROC any time, any combatant commander can, and I exercise 

that when necessary, but I do not feel inhibited. Plus, I can always 

do an end run on them, to put it bluntly, and walk into the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense’s office, where I have a very close working relationship. 

So I am not inhibited by not having a formal seat there. I can 

be in any meeting, and I can work with the deputy secretary and 

the vice chairman, if there is something I think is going off the rail. 

As far as the defense acquisition board, there is an awful lot of 

folks who get involved in acquisition today, almost to the point that 

we have paralyzed the process. If I can bring something—bring an 

advantage to it, I am more than willing to do so. 

Generally speaking, I would bring one more voice that is saying 

something that is already being considered, but if I think it is not 

being considered, I can always insert myself there. 

I am not, as some of you know, I am not shy about inserting myself where I think I need to be, although there are some points that 

have been made by Mr. Bartlett and Mr. Taylor that I recognize, 

too, that in the normal scheme of things—and this is what you are 

talking about—in the normal scheme of things, I may not be in the 

room. 

But if it comes down to command and control, I am in the room. 

That is my job. And on the other things, I somewhat defer to those 

who have the title 10 responsibilities, because I eventually—I hope 

that addresses your question, sir. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. It is helpful. And I am very grateful you are 

where you are, because I think you have a real chance to focus the 

command more where it needs to be focused. And I would hope to 

visit with you more about that. 

Just briefly, Admiral Stavridis, you talk about your mantra being 

joint, international, interagency, public, private. One of the suggestions is, as we grapple with this interagency issue, is that we ought 

to use the structure of the combatant commands to be the structure 

for the U.S. government in bringing all of these different agencies 

and instruments of power together. 

What—just briefly, what lessons have you learned in your command that might be useful as all of us try to figure out how to get 

all of the tools in the toolbox available for us in all parts of the 

world? 
21 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, first and foremost, I think it is important that we don’t militarize our foreign policy. That would be a 

tremendous mistake. 

State Department must do diplomacy. Agency for International 

Development (AID) must do development. Defense must do defense. 

But the trick is, how do we do all of that in a way that we are mutually supportive? 

And in general, in my region, I find that it is very much State 

in the lead on defense, AID in the lead on development, and where 

we can try and be helpful from defense, we try to be. 

I believe that it is vitally important that everything we do ought 

to go through a filter that says: Have we approached this in an 

international way? Have we avoided unilateralism? Have we taken 

the transnational approach? 

Because so many of the challenges we face in this region, in the 

Americas, in this home we share together are, in fact, 

transnational. 

Secondly, the interagency has to work together. I think we have 

come a fair way at doing that over the last five years, but I think 

we have a distance to go. 

I think there is a role for the private sector in all of this, and 

we are exploring how linkages can be established between government, private sector, in the defense arena, for example. 

The other part of the whole equation that is so important is strategic communications. It is communicating these ideas in ways— 

particularly in South America and the Caribbean, Central America, 

in ways that show respect for sovereignty, take an approach of 

equality with the other nations in the region, and don’t in any 

sense come at the problem with a sense that we have all the answers, because we don’t. 

So however we structure our organizations for national security 

in the future, those would be the points I would submit are the valuable ones that we have learned at Southern Command. I will 

leave it to others to decide what the best structure is. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to all of you for being here and certainly for your 

extraordinary service to our country. 

This really follows up on the question that you just answered, 

Admiral, and perhaps the rest of you would like to expand. The 

House Foreign Affairs Committee is holding a hearing today, as 

you may know, which is exploring the Department of Defense’s role 

in foreign assistance. 

And there are concerns, of course, that the military’s role has 

contributed in some way to the weakening of the State Department, its more traditional leadership role in managing U.S. foreign 

policy. 

And, you know, a lot of what you just responded to, sir, and I 

appreciate that, I wonder if there are—there is really more to say 

in this area, because to a certain extent, you know, it is not clear 

that military activities are always vetted through the country team 

or understood. 
22 

And how are we really on the ground getting it done? I understand the goals, but what more should we be doing? How should 

we focus on this in a different way? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. If I could quickly just add to what I said before, in a practical sense, we take all of the military-to-military engagement that we do—any activity that is done in Southern Command is always vetted through the country team. 

And then we take our larger, what we call theater security cooperation plan, and we bring that here to State, to AID. We show 

it to them. We have complete transparency. We take all of their 

changes. 

You are absolutely right: What happens on the ground in a country has to be the responsibility of the ambassador in that country. 

And I am very confident we are taking that approach fully at 

SOUTHCOM, and we will continue to do so. 

General RENUART. Ma’am, if I could, I would like to add, first, 

echo Jim. Our numbers of countries that we deal with are much 

smaller, but certainly Canada and Mexico are partners that we 

work with very actively. 

And, again, those—you have to have diplomacy in the lead when 

you talk about the relations with foreign nations that we deal with 

each day. 

It is critical to have a partnership there because so much—and 

I will speak from my experience with Mexico—so much of what is 

done within the country is done by the military. That is the nature 

of their structure. So there is a natural relationship mil-to-mil that 

complements the ambassador’s program in the country. And I think 

that is critical. 

I would like to add one twist here in the homeland, because we 

have a unique interagency process in our headquarters that is a little different, in that we deal with the 49 nations, 3 territories, and 

the district. And so that requires a bit of a different private-sector 

and interagency approach. 

We have 45 federal agencies that have assigned senior individuals to our headquarters. We incorporate them into our ops and 

our plans and our intelligence and that sort of thing. It allows a 

level of partnership and in an interagency way that I am very 

pleased and proud of. It allows us to be a contributing partner to 

each of those agencies. 

So the interagency approach, the whole-of-government approach 

has got to be the best way—is the best way, has got to be the way 

of the future for us. And I think there are some models that can 

be helpful in other places. 

Thank you. 

Mrs. DAVIS. When you were working with our country teams, 

what role does the military necessarily play? How would you assess 

the public opinion towards the United States in your areas? And 

how do you merge some of that understanding? And what effect 

does it have on your operations? 

General WARD. I think, Mrs. Davis, two things. First, I certainly 

echo all that has been said by Admiral Stavridis and General 

Renuart. We work very closely with the country teams, but not just 

in implementing the plans, also in developing the plans. 
23 

From the outset, the country teams are involved to include the 

public diplomacy aspect of those, because we rely on the public diplomacy section—what is inside the embassies—to help us assure 

that the effect that we want to create are understood by the populations with whom we are trying to serve. 

And so that relationship is absolutely critical. It is cradle to 

grave, from the beginning of a plan to its execution, fully including 

and, in fact, taking the lead from the embassies’ action plans, insofar as how what we do supports that overall process there within 

the country. 

Mrs. DAVIS. If I could shift really quickly just to Mexico for a second, because there is a great deal of concern that some of the weapons being smuggled into Mexico are coming from the U.S. To what 

extent is that true and a problem? And should there be greater restrictions so that we can get a better handle on that? 

General RENUART. Well, ma’am, it is for Congress to decide on 

restrictions, but I would say that, certainly, the quantity of weapons that have been captured or uncovered in Mexico that have been 

used by the cartels are predominantly either U.S.-made or trafficked through the United States dealers, not necessarily flowing 

through our borders, but there have been illicit dealers that have 

been working that. 

The experts in our law enforcement agencies really are working 

this very hard, not truly a military role to be involved in that, although, interestingly, we have worked with the military in Mexico 

to help share that information with our law enforcement folks. It 

is a real problem, and we have to pay attention to it. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

The gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Kline. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here and for your service. 

I want to continue with the discussion about Mexico, General 

Renuart, if I could for a minute. 

In the news, the President has announced that he is sending federal agents to the border for reinforcement. And as you have heard 

here—and I know you know very well—there is fear that the violence is spilling over from Ciudad Juarez and Nuevo Laredo and 

others into the United States, in both those cases into Texas. 

Periodically in this body, we debate and sometimes vote on 

whether or not we should be using U.S. military forces, to put the 

U.S. Army on the border. I wonder if you would address that very 

briefly to the wisdom of such a thing and—or the practicality of 

such a thing? 

General RENUART. Yes, sir, I would be happy to. I think, first, 

militarizing our border should not be our approach at this point. 

We have a number of agencies who have that role and responsibility. There certainly is some modest assistance that DOD might 

be able to provide, and I think we ought to be in a position to provide that, should it be requested. 

I do believe that there is a challenge with the—or the potential 

that violence south of the border could spill over. You have seen, 

I am sure, media reports of additional kidnappings or increased 

kidnappings in Arizona, for example. 
24 

But the military really has the role to provide assistance to law 

enforcement. Certainly, the National Guard has some legal authority to assist law enforcement in their role. But as the President has 

mentioned, Secretary Napolitano has mentioned, Secretary Gates 

has mentioned, we ought not to immediately move towards militarization of the border, but we ought to look at a collaborative effort. 

And I think the planning efforts are ongoing now to come up 

with that kind of a solution. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you. And I agree wholeheartedly. We should 

not be moving to militarize the border. There are other ways that 

we ought to address that. 

And, clearly, the military can and has provided assistance. But 

the notion of putting armed infantry on the border is probably not 

a good one. And I just wanted to get that from you, and I am delighted to see that you concur. 

General Ward, I want to pick up on two things, if the time allows. One, you talk about the value of United Nations forces and 

African Union forces. And I know you can reflect back to a number 

of years ago when we were much younger in—and, in fact, in Africa 

and looking at U.N. forces hunkered down in Mogadishu, for example, and not venturing off the airport. 

And so I trust that either in African Union or United Nations 

forces—and I know that you are involved in the training of forces— 

I gather from your earlier answer, you are saying that that is not 

the case now or at least that those forces are more useful and more 

effective than in those long years past. Is that correct? 

General WARD. Thank you for that, sir. Two things. First, it is 

a function of how well-trained and equipped they are and that they 

are clearly—even today, there are variances in that training and 

that equipment. And then, thirdly—correction, secondly—what authorities they then have to do a mission or not. 

So I think it is a combination of those two factors, their training 

and equipping, and then what authorities that they have. When 

those align, then their use, their role can, in fact, make a difference, and there are instances where that, in fact, is the case. 

It is not absolute, and so therefore, I think, to the degree that 

we can be of an assist in helping to provide trained and equipped 

forces from whatever contributing nation that would provide forces 

to those formations, either United Nations-sponsored formations or 

African Union-sponsored formations, then we have a role, I think, 

in helping those forces be better trained and equipped—clearly authorities commensurate with whatever mission they are assigned 

as they are employed. 

Mr. KLINE. All right. Thank you. 

I see my time is about to expire. I will yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TAYLOR [presiding]. The chair thanks the gentleman. 

The chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. 

Kissell. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. 

A couple questions real quickly. Admiral, you talked about we 

had this large joint force, 22 countries participated. Without nam-
25 

ing them all, four or five of the major countries that we would look 

at as being stronger allies with us and that participated there? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I will provide the entire list for the 

record, of course, but Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Panama. I 

could go on and on. It is literally every country that has a significant-sized military force in the Americas, with the exception of 

Venezuela and Cuba, obviously. 

Mr. KISSELL. Okay. And I was looking for, was it the larger countries or was it, you know, some of the smaller nations? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, it is both. It is both. And I will just make 

the point, last summer, we had a Brazilian admiral taking command of forces on one side of the Panama Canal and a Chilean admiral taking command of forces on the other side of the canal. It 

was extremely gratifying to see the nations working together. 

Mr. KISSELL. And, General Ward, along the same lines in Africa, 

the military-to-military contact we have, what are some of the nations of Africa that seem to be the strongest in working and willing 

to work with us? 

General WARD. Sir, I think, if we look at those nations that contribute forces to the peacekeeping missions, from Uganda to Rwanda, South Africa, Nigeria, there are several that, in fact, have a capability. 

They need assistance logistically predominantly to either deploy 

to one of these far-off places, to sustain themselves in one of those 

far-off places, but there is an increasing will that I see among 

many of the African nations to, in fact, do what many of them say 

they want to do, that is, provide for their own security. 

And so the level of nations—Burundi is another example. Small, 

out just from a very severe internal conflict, but realizing that it 

can play a role in the future and attempting to do so. 

So the range is quite broad, as Admiral Stavridis mentioned, but, 

again, most—many lack capacity, typically in logistics areas—manpower typically is not an issue. We work with them to help increase health situation within those nations, as an example, our 

program for HIV–AIDS to complement the President’s Emergency 

Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) through our defense HIV–AIDS 

prevention program, to help them get enough people that can, in 

fact, then be trained and then to deploy into a peacekeeping set, 

though those nations are, in fact, numbers are there. 

Mr. KISSELL. What would you say in terms of our outreach to the 

countries of Africa? What portion of Africa? Are we reaching half, 

three-quarters? How far out does that outreach go? 

General WARD. I think if I were to—and I will get a more precise 

number to you—but we are reaching nations throughout the continent, north, east, south, west, and central Africa. 

We have probably 35 nations—and I would just hazard that 

guess—of the 53 on the continent that we have active programs 

with to some degree, as we—as we work with them and the various 

either counterterror programs, programs developed in their transportation of their militaries, and also in just basic logistic support, 

as they participate in U.N.- or African Union (A.U.)-sponsored 

peacekeeping operations. 

Mr. KISSELL. And, General Renuart, I know I haven’t got much 

time left, and one of the first—I think it was the first hearing and 
26 

being a new congressman I came to was former Senator Gramm 

gave a report on weapons of mass destruction, proliferation, said 

we weren’t winning that fight, gave recommendations, had some 

predictions about what could happen within the borders of the 

United States in the next few years. 

Do you all have in any involvement in trying to implement the 

recommendations that commission made? 

General RENUART. Sir, I think—I will have to say I am not as 

familiar with the specific recommendations. However, I will tell you 

that we have taken a number of actions specifically regarding this 

challenge in the last three or four years to include growing and 

building and equipping a consequence management response force 

that can allow us to respond to a weapon of mass destruction. 

We have also increased our capability to help prevent loss of, for 

example, a nuclear weapon or a nuclear device. So I believe we are 

moving down the road in that direction. But if you have a specific 

area, I would be happy to mention that. 

Mr. KISSELL. Well, I would say, you know, the commission had 

some specific suggestions how we could, you know, avoid this happening and also towards the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. And I would simply that, you know, it would probably be 

good for everybody that has, you know, some time in this to really 

look at that commission’s report. 

Thank you, sir. 

General RENUART. And, Mr. Kissell, I will get the report and provide you an answer for the record. 

Mr. KISSELL. Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Mr. Wittman, please. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, gentlemen, thank you for joining us today and thank you 

so much for your service to our nation. 

Admiral, in January of 2009, the Navy announced its decision to 

homeport a nuclear aircraft carrier at Mayport Naval Station in 

Florida. And Mayport’s never homeported a nuclear-powered carrier and, based on previous Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 

decisions, no longer has the nearby air wing at Cecil Field to support carrier operations. 

And, Admiral, as the COCOM for this region, I wanted to know, 

were you consulted in this decision? And if so, when were you consulted? And what was your position? And if you are not, are you 

aware of anyone within Southern Command that was consulted to 

provide strategic input into this decision? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, as you know, it is a decision made by— 

well, a recommendation made by the Chief of Naval Operations, 

Gary Roughead, to the Secretary of the Navy. It goes to the Secretary of Defense. So I don’t in any way participate in those conversations in any formal sense, no. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Well, as a follow up, in April 2008, the CNO announced the re-establishment of the Fourth Fleet in Mayport. And 

the commander of the Fourth Fleet, as you know, also serves as the 

commander of U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command, the Navy’s 

component command of SOUTHCOM. 

And let me read you a recent statement from former Secretary 

of the Navy (SECNAV) Winter at the Current Strategy Forum in 
27 

June of 2008. And he said, ‘‘The Fourth Fleet demonstrates the 

Navy’s commitment to the region by creating presence in support 

of combined training operations, humanitarian operations, and disaster response, and this can be done without using a carrier battle 

group. 

‘‘We should also remember that it is sometimes more effective to 

have a smaller combatant that can access many of the littoral 

areas where we need to go. Smaller platforms are also more suitable for training, as they are more compatible with the navies with 

which we will be operating. We must balance our present requirements with the missions and threats we are likely to face in the 

given region.’’ 

And my question is this: Given the fact that we know many of 

the existing facilities at Mayport—excuse me, existing frigates at 

Mayport will be retired soon and given the unique types of missions we encounter in the Fourth Fleet’s operating areas, such as 

counterdrug operations, theater support cooperation, military-tomilitary exercises and training, do you agree with Secretary Winter’s assessment that the Fourth Fleet can accomplish its objectives 

without a carrier battle group? Or do you believe that homeporting 

a nuclear carrier at Mayport is necessary to provide the right mix 

of assets to support the U.S. Fourth Fleet? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, I am not going to address whether or 

not the Fourth Fleet—anything about homeporting, because I really don’t have anything to do with homeporting. 

And the way it works for a COCOM, sir, is, we just go to the 

Joint Staff and we tell them what kind of ships we need. And 

where they come from is really not my concern. They could come 

from Mayport. They can come from Norfolk. They could come from 

San Diego. A lot of the ships that work for me come from San 

Diego. So, in terms of where ships are homeported, that is really 

just not in my purview. 

In terms of, what kinds of ships do we use in Southern Command? We are far more likely to use frigates, large-deck amphibs, 

hospital ships, innovative high-speed ships. Those are what we are 

more likely to use, but I can’t rule out ever using any particular 

kind of ship. But I agree with Secretary Winter: It is more likely 

that we have used the type of ships he describes and I just mentioned. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay. Very good. 

And, finally, the Navy identified strategic dispersal considerations, consistencies with the Navy’s fleet response plan and operational readiness as the justification for its decision to homeport a 

carrier at Mayport. In the Navy’s decision document, the record of 

the decision, however, failed to provide any real detail on why strategic dispersal considerations and consistency with the Navy’s fleet 

response plan and operational readiness support moving a carrier. 

Can you comment on whether moving a carrier is necessary to 

accomplish these objectives and the Navy’s fleet response plan? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I really can’t. It is really not in my purview. I am a joint official. I could as equally be any one of these 

colored uniforms. I am not in the Navy chain of command at the 

moment, so I would really refer that question to Admiral 
28 

Roughead. I will take it to Admiral Roughead, and I will ask him 

to get back to you with an answer to that question. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you. 

I yield back the remainder of my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. 

Gentlemen, I joined the Army in 1993 and never had the opportunity to meet a four-star general, so to have four of you here at 

the same time is pretty awesome. And to spend the last hour-anda-half with you has been educational. 

I want to thank you for your service to our nation. We really do 

appreciate it. 

I wanted to kind of focus my remarks on AFRICOM. So to General Ward, my brother is a major in the Air Force. He just came 

back from a deployment to Djibouti. And, you know, appreciate 

what you are doing in the early stages of what is going on with 

AFRICOM and the balance on your mission between, obviously, 

short-term counterterrorism operations and then long-term political 

and economic development. 

I wanted to focus and get my arms around the fact that, when 

you look at Africa as a continent and your mission, you know, the 

United States, China, Russia, Europe, and India combined geographically is smaller than your mission in Africa. 

And you look at the fiscal year 2008 budget for your operation, $350 million, which is approximately what we spend in Iraq per 

day, is there one function, you know, when you say, given your balance and the multiple demands on your command, is there one 

function within your budget that you need more help, that you 

need more funding, and that you think that we should be focusing 

on as a Congress and as an Armed Services Committee? 

General WARD. Well, Mr. Murphy. I thank you very much. And 

thank you, too, for your service. 

I wish I had an opportunity to have met you during those early 

times in the 1990s there. So I appreciate what you have done and 

appreciate where you are now, as well, sir. 

I think, you know, my command, except for the work that we 

do—and we do accomplish counterterror work, to be sure—we do 

that as a part of a global counterterror effort—my command’s predominant role is in doing our activities to help our partner nations 

increase their capacity. 

It doesn’t take a lot to do that. What it takes is something we 

call persistent and sustained engagement from the standpoint of 

our training. Our best method of doing that is when our nation’s 

soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines can pair up with these nations who are attempting to transform and do things differently. 

Given the commitment of those resources in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, very difficult. What we do now is work very, very closely 

with other potential sources of that type of support, our National 

Guard, as well as, as was pointed out, submitting requirements 

through the Joint Staff for forces that may be in some period of 

outside of dwell, but not actively employed in the fight in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, to cause that relationship to go on. 
29 

Huge continent, so getting things around is a big requirement 

that we have. So our mobility requirements are clearly there as another requirement that we have. 

Resources to assist these nations and increasing their littoral— 

their maritime safety and security, so to the degree that we can— 

the sorts of vessels we have talked about here and, again, the 

range is a range that is quite wide, from frigates to large deck amphibian, we—the aircraft carrier—we just had an aircraft carrier 

visit South Africa, first time since apartheid, this past fall. 

So we take all of these as we can to help, one, build relationships, two, provide some sustained-level security engagement, that, 

three, leads to a capacity increase in our partner nations that is 

reflective of integrity, that is reflective of legitimacy, that is reflective of military performing as we would like them to perform, as 

they wish to perform, and societies where they respect their people, 

are protectors of their people, and are—contribute themselves or 

act—— 

Mr. MURPHY. Sure. 

General WARD [continuing]. As responsible members of that society. 

Mr. MURPHY. Sir, how was the population of South Africa—how 

were they toward the aircraft carrier being there? Were they—I 

mean, I think back when the USS John Kennedy was in Ireland. 

And, obviously, they loved it when our—that ship was there. But 

how about as far as, what was the local populace in South Africa? 

General WARD. The reaction was very positive. 

Mr. MURPHY. Perfect. Let me focus real quick, sir, on—you know, 

I also serve on the Intelligence Committee. You look at the real 

concern with Africa, with terrorist organizations, especially in Somalia, the Sudan, and I am trying to get a strong stranglehold. 

What about a potential widespread outbreak of a disease, really a 

continent-wide outbreak? And, obviously, that would—what would 

that do to the—you know, the spilling over to government and everything else? 

Is there a focus, is there a preparation that you need that we 

need to assist there to counter that possibility? 

General WARD. There are, sir. We pay attention to that. The 

threat of a pandemic disease is very real, and we do pay attention 

to it. And devoting resources to that is, I think, a very wise investment. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, sir. 

My time is done. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I certainly thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, generals, admiral. 

General Mattis, it is especially good to see you here. I am just 

very proud of you, sir, and what you have done. You are truly a 

warrior-leader. It was great serving under you in Iraq. 

Admiral, my first question is for you. Could you talk a little bit 

about China and Russia’s involvement in how the—maybe the Russian tentacles are back out there again where they were receded 

for quite a while and how China is there now, too, please? 
30 

General MATTIS. Yes, sir. In—thank you for your service, and 

thanks to all the veterans. I know there are a lot of veterans of the 

Armed Forces, the Coast Guard, and others who serve on this committee. And we are proud of that part of the relationship, as well. 

Congressman Hunter, as to China, I am not overly concerned 

about Chinese activities in the Americas. I believe they are here for 

economic reasons to find markets for their products, to obtain raw 

materials. I think it is part of the general pattern of global trade 

that is going on. 

I do not perceive geopolitical or geostrategic interest. And I don’t 

see a great deal of military-to-military activity between militaries 

of this region and the Chinese military. We watch it closely, but 

thus far I am comfortable with the Chinese engagement in the region. 

In terms of Russia, much has been made of this recently, I believe stemming from four Russian ships that operated in the Caribbean this past summer. They operated with the Venezuelan navy. 

They made some port visits in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and in Cuba, 

as well as some flights of Russian strategic bombers that came 

down. 

My friend, General Renuart, tracked them very assiduously. In 

all cases, as the Russian military forces were operating in this region, we kept track of them. That is our job. 

But I don’t perceive a military threat from Russia in this region. 

Nor do I become overly exercised by their deployments in the region, at least at this stage. They don’t pose, in my view, a military 

threat to the United States. 

And Secretary Gates said at his hearing when he was asked the 

question, ‘‘Hey, maybe next time, if they send ships, they will do 

a port visit in Miami.’’ 

I think there is an approach here which ought to be one of recognizing that the Russians have a global navy; it is going to operate 

around the globe. They have a global air force; it is going to operate 

around the globe. And in terms of Latin America and the Caribbean, I don’t see a military threat from them. 

Mr. HUNTER. That is good to hear. Thank you. 

In the interests of time, let me move on here. Do you see—for 

General Renuart, do you see them taking advantage—anybody taking advantage of the chaos in Mexico right now? Because the 

enemy does gravitate to our weakness, and right now Mexico is a 

weakness, whether or not it is a threat. 

But do you see other countries operating through Mexico in order 

to destabilize us? 

General RENUART. Mr. Hunter, I—again, I share Admiral 

Stavridis’ view that neither China nor Russia—and in my assessment, there is not another country that is actively working in Mexico to destabilize us. I think certainly there are—— 

Mr. HUNTER. Iranian influence in Mexico? You don’t see that? 

General RENUART. There is an Iranian presence in Mexico, for 

sure. The government of Mexico is working that themselves. We 

monitor it, but it is a relatively small presence. 

Mr. HUNTER. Do they have a stabilizing factor? 

General RENUART. I don’t see that at this point, no. 

Mr. HUNTER. So they have a destabilizing—— 
31 

General RENUART. I am sorry. I misunderstood what you said. 

Mr. HUNTER. Oh, I am sorry. 

General RENUART. They do not have a destabilizing effect that I 

have seen, at least at this point. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you very much. 

General Mattis, one last question for you, sir. Do you know that 

there is no golden hour in Afghanistan right now with the forces 

that you deploy to Afghanistan? 

General MATTIS. Say again, the question, sir? 

Mr. HUNTER. That there is no golden hour. That is the one hour 

that you have to get people up if they get hit back to a facility to 

get treated. 

General MATTIS. Sir, we are working the deployment of the sufficient helicopter assets to make certain we get it down a golden 

hour. There are—you know the size of the country. You have 

served there. It is a challenge. But that is our goal. And the Secretary of Defense, I believe, has approved the request for forces 

that will get us there. 

Mr. HUNTER. Will the—you realize that there aren’t any Ospreys 

in Afghanistan. Is that true, there is no Osprey squadron? 

General MATTIS. That is correct right now. 

Mr. HUNTER. Did you know that they just deployed an Osprey 

with a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)? 

General MATTIS. Yes, sir. I am aware of that. And that—— 

Mr. HUNTER. Would the Ospreys have made it so that there is 

a golden hour if they were deployed to Afghanistan—the MEU? 

General MATTIS. I would have to do the time-distance factor to 

give you a truly accurate statement. 

Mr. HUNTER. But let me say, I have done it for you. And they 

would have. And I was wondering if you had any say whatsoever 

in having the—do we not trust the Osprey? Do they not want it in 

combat? Or are we doing it purely to put it with the U.S. Navy? 

I understand that they might be going over there in the future, 

but they aren’t there now. And I was wondering if you had any say 

in that when it came to the deployment of the Osprey? 

General MATTIS. Sir, the commitment of the specific helicopter 

assets going into country will be part of the Marine contingent that 

the secretary has approved. I don’t know what percent of that is 

Osprey and what is CH–53, that sort of—I can get that answer for 

you, though. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Generals, Admiral. 

The CHAIRMAN. The members will notice that the public affairs— 

public relations—whatever you call it, the P.A. system is working 

much, much better. Complaining does help. You don’t have to ask 

the witnesses nor the members to repeat their questions or their 

answers. 

The gentlelady from New Hampshire, there are two votes pending. The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Davis, will assume the 

chair upon the return, and the hearing will continue. 

And, gentlemen, we appreciate your patience. 

But in the meantime, we will call Ms. Shea-Porter to finish up 

before the vote. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
32 

And thank you so much for being here and your service to the 

country. 

General Ward, I wanted to ask you about the humanitarian assistance programs on the continent of Africa. I wanted to know specifically how we are doing in comparison to other countries such as 

China. Are they more visible? Do we have a greater visibility? Is 

it enough? And what are your plans to make sure that the continent of Africa understands what our goals are there and our concerns for them? 

General WARD. Thank you, Madam Shea-Porter. 

Two things. First, the work that we do is work that complements 

the greater effort being done by our U.S. Agency for International 

Development, insofar as our humanitarian assistance effort is concerned. 

We, working in concert with the chiefs of mission, the ambassadors, determine those areas that, one, are not being met by any 

other aspect of our government and then, two, support the military 

capacity of our servicemen and women who have skill sets in those 

areas, as well. 

I think, from the standpoint of what others are doing—i.e., nations, China, India, and others—clearly, they are expending a great 

amount of resources in various humanitarian projects, programs, 

infrastructure construction, things that we are not matching, 

things that we are not doing. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Does that concern you? 

General WARD. It concerns me from the standpoint of what the 

effect of what is being done by others has in the environment and 

the influence that they have based on that and how that is influencing how those nations who receive that support react and respond to it. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Well, thank you, General. I am going to interrupt because of the time, but I think that is exactly the problem 

that we have so often, that we come late to the game. And so, if 

I am hearing you correctly, you are concerned, as I think most of 

us would be, that we might be losing a little bit of the edge that 

we could have right now if we were more active and the Africans 

understood that we were a generous, good people concerned about 

their welfare. 

So which country, can I ask you, concerns you in Africa? What 

other foreign countries do you feel is making greater gains than we 

are, in terms of winning hearts and minds? 

General WARD. I would have to take a close look at that and get 

back to you. I think in a general sense, the reaction occurs 

throughout the continent of Africa. In today’s economic situation, 

it is even exacerbated a bit because of the reaction or the reflection 

that what might have been already provided may be reduced—may 

not be as prevalent. 

And so I think that is a concern that is there. I think African 

nations are meeting in Europe in a prelude to the G–20, expressing 

the same thought of concern about their continued development 

based on the economic situation. 

But I am not sure I could name a single particular country that 

would concern me more than any other at this point in time. 
33 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. So looking at the economic instability and the 

long history of problems that they are enduring, this might be an 

opportune time for us to raise our visibility through these kinds of 

efforts? 

General WARD. I think anything that we do makes a difference. 

And I think it should be not episodic. If we can make it consistent, 

that is even better, ma’am. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. And one last question, thank you. 

Operation Objective Voice, getting our message, our ideology 

across, our goals for democracy, how strong a message are we delivering there right now? Is it—are you able to actually have an impact? Or is it still a challenge to communicate like that? 

General WARD. I think the assessment that we get and how we 

see those pieces of information that are transmitted through Operation Objective Voice, when those things appear in other media on 

the continent, it lets us know that people are paying attention, the 

Africans are paying attention. 

And then, as we get reactions from our embassies, because we do 

that in very close coordination with the embassies and the country 

teams, their public diplomacy sections, that we get the assessment 

that it is making a difference, they are listening, and it does cause 

them to see what goes on from a perspective that reflects that that 

we would intend our force to be. 

So I think it is making a difference. And our partners, the ambassadors, the country teams, as well as the nations, think is a 

very good program that we are involved in. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I thank you, and I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

We will go vote. We have two votes, and Mrs. Davis will assume 

the chair. And as I read the list, Mr. Larsen will be the first batter 

up. 

And, again, thank you, gentlemen, for your appearance. 

[Recess.] 

Mrs. DAVIS [presiding]. All right, everybody. Thank you so much 

for waiting. We appreciate your patience. 

I am going to turn to Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. And it looks like I am the only one left. 

Unless someone else shows up, I will just take about 30 minutes, 

if you don’t mind, Madam Chair. I will be very—try to be brief 

here. 

General Renuart, I want to chat with you about the other border, 

the U.S.-Canadian border, obviously, and specifically with regards 

to the 2010 Winter Olympics, which will be held in Vancouver, 

British Columbia, obviously in another country, but only about 10 

miles north of the U.S.-Canadian border and right across from 

what is my district. 

And I know U.S. NORTHCOM and DOD has had a supporting 

role in some of the preparation for security for the Olympics. And 

I just wanted to ask you what you see the role and function of U.S. 

NORTHCOM with regards to the Olympics and what role you have 

played and missions you have played? 

General RENUART. Thank you, sir. I appreciate that question. 

Actually, there are—I have roles in two hats. In my NORAD hat, 

as you know, we provide for air security and sovereignty for both 
34 

the U.S. and Canada, and we have had a very close relationship 

with the security, the integrated security unit formed by the governor of Canada—government of Canada, to ensure that we have 

the pieces in place to provide for a safe, secure monitoring of the 

airspace in and around not just Vancouver, but, as you know, Seattle and the traffic and transit across the border back and forth 

each day, not just with the Olympics, is substantial. 

And so we have been involved very actively through our Canadian air defense sector and my Canadian NORAD region to understand the challenges that the Canadian government feels it has 

with respect to a secure airspace. 

We are partnering with Transport Canada, with the Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA), with our NORAD regions both in 

the U.S. and in Canada to ensure that we have created procedures 

that will allow for safe transit flow of aircraft in and out of the 

area, and to monitor the area—the airspace around that area, low 

altitude to high, for any potential threat. 

In my NORTHCOM hat, as you may know, we have a civil assistance plan that we have agreed to between my counterpart in 

Canada, Canada Command, and Northern Command, to allow us 

to have a framework that could provide military support, should it 

be requested by either of the governments. 

And I would use a great example, Hurricane Gustav, where really the last evacuees we took out of New Orleans were on a Canadian C–17. So we have exercised that process already. 

With respect to NORTHCOM support, really, we sit in a situation where the Canadians clearly need to lead and manage and are 

managing their support to the Olympics. There may be some 

unique capabilities that don’t reside within the Canadian military. 

The Canadian government is considering those potential needs 

and will provide that through a diplomatic note from the ambassador to the U.S. government. And then we are in a position and 

be prepared to provide whatever support may be required. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thanks. 

General Mattis, good to see you again, sir. And hopefully the 

Zags will do a good job tomorrow night. We are all cheering for 

them and the Huskies. 

Can I ask you some questions about NATO, your role with NATO 

transformation, if that is all right. 

Last week, we had a hearing about the economic crisis and its 

impact on national security. One of the themes was that the economic recession globally would have an impact on our allies’ ability 

to meet their own defense budget needs. 

And are you running into a problem as your—with your NATO 

hat on, with our allies and their investment into their transformational capabilities? 

General MATTIS. Sir, I am, but it is not a late-breaking thing 

that I can attribute directly to the economic turndown. This was 

a big enough concern for me when I arrived there at Joint Forces 

Command (JFCOM) Allied Command Transformation a little over 

a year ago, that we started the multiple futures project, in an attempt to try to harvest from the best think-tanks in Europe and 

North America what are the threats to the populations and come 

to some agreement on what is the threat to Europe. 
35 

Because if we don’t come to an agreement on that, then to try 

and get them to perhaps carry a more equitable share of the load, 

I think, was going nowhere. And we continued to see declining defense budgets. 

So I think there is a larger issue at stake, frankly. And it is 

something that we are going to have to engage upon through the 

Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense—already going on, by the 

way—but we need to get the military appreciation of the situation 

sufficient that the political leadership know what we think is the 

threat. 

And I should report that out to my boss in Brussels, the Secretary General, within the next 30 days, right after the summit. 

Mr. LARSEN. Madam Chairman, just two questions for the record, 

and I will submit these for the record, one for General Mattis about 

perhaps a change in who is going to be sitting in as supreme allied 

commander transformation, the possibility—it is possible it might 

be the French, in their new role in NATO. 

And, second, I will have questions for the record for Generals 

Ward and Stavridis on 1206 and 1207. And we will give those to 

you all relatively soon. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

General Renuart, could you please provide an update on the security upgrades being made to building two at Peterson Air Force 

Base? 

General RENUART. Certainly, Mr. Lamborn. It is good to see you. 

And, Mr. Coffman, also, good to see the Colorado delegations almost the last two standing, so well done. 

With respect to—and, Congressman Lamborn, you know we have 

been involved in a number of improvements in to expand the security protection, if you will, of our operations in so-called building 

two, our NORAD–NORTHCOM command center. 

We have completed now about $4.5 million to $5 million worth 

of projects since we had the chance to chat last. They include improvements to the entry access procedures. We have created a dedicated Department of Defense security guard force now that is 

trained and equipped. 

We have added additional fencing, access control, vehicle control, 

vehicle inspections to our security procedures so that we would reduce the potential for someone with a threatening intent to gain 

access to the building. 

We have a couple projects that are just still underway, continuing to work. One involves the electrical access in the building. 

One involves the provision of electromagnetic hardening. I am 

sorry Mr. Bartlett’s not here, but we are improving that electromagnetic hardening in the building. 

And we continue to work with the wing to find additional security measures that the host wing can take to ensure that we don’t 

have that kind of access to the building that might cause us a 

threat. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. 

Now, what role do you envision for Cheyenne Mountain Air Force 

Base in the future? 
36 

General RENUART. Well, Congressman, as you know, we continue 

to use Cheyenne Mountain as our alternate command center. It has 

played an active role. As a matter of fact, while we were doing 

some minor construction in the primary command center, we 

moved our operation to the mountain and have conducted full-up 

operations out of the mountain, although, as you know, it is at a 

slightly smaller footprint. 

We continue to have a rotating presence of assessors and command-and-control capability in the mountain. And we will continue 

to do that for the foreseeable future. 

So I think Cheyenne Mountain will continue to have a principal 

role in our overall command structure, albeit principally as the alternate command site. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you for those answers. And I do look 

forward to continuing a dialogue with you on these important 

issues. 

General RENUART. Absolutely. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And thank you for the work that you do. 

General RENUART. Thank you. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

General Mattis, it is—we obviously use a pretty large, conventional footprint when it comes to regime change and then nationbuilding and used the counterinsurgency strategy. But we also 

have insurgency capability in special operations and our ability to 

go in and align ourselves with an indigenous peoples that share our 

strategic view in terms of regime change or trying to influence a 

political situation in a given region. 

Could you for us speak to an assessment of our capabilities, in 

terms of insurgents, on that side of insurgency? 

General MATTIS. Mr. Coffman, it would be best if Admiral Olson, 

my shipmate at special forces, Special Operations Command, gave 

it. However, I can perhaps address at least some of the edges of 

this. 

We have never had a more integrated special forces, general purpose forces effort in our history. They are so embedded now in each 

other, they have, in many cases, the same capabilities and, where 

they are not the same, the unique capabilities are used back and 

forth appropriately by the combatant commanders. 

The special forces are heavily used right now. And the result is, 

we have to come up with a better allocation of resources, of 

enablers, for example, from the general purpose forces that enable 

the special forces to operate. 

At the same time, we have a very well-defined division of labor, 

having sat down with Admiral Olson of Special Operations Command, chief of staff of the Army, commandant of the Marine Corps, 

myself, and we look at when we are going to try to do these things 

before we have to send in large footprints of general purpose forces, 

who should do it? 

And let me tell you what the breakout is, in general terms. If we 

are going to set long-term relationships with indigenous forces, 

with other nations, that is going to be special forces. It will remain 
37 

there. The Army A-teams, the kind of people who are trained to do 

this. 

Where it is going to be teaching skill sets—marching, marksmanship, first aid, basic infantry tactics—the general purpose forces 

will pick those up so that we free the special forces to do what they 

only alone can do best, if that gives you somewhat of an answer, 

I hope. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, General Mattis. 

General Ward, in AFRICOM, what is your role or the role of 

AFRICOM—is there a role in Darfur, indirect or direct, potentially 

direct, obviously, no direct role right now, but maybe you could 

speak to that? 

General WARD. Well, thank you, sir. 

Clearly, our role in Darfur today is that—of an indirect nature, 

as we support those African Union and United Nations forces that 

are there, that have been designated to go there, enabling them, 

training, equipping to a degree, as well as providing logistic support. 

I mentioned, you know, in January, February timeframe, we provided lift assistance to the government of Rwanda to move outsized 

cargo—essentially, trucks—that they would use in the mission they 

are in, in Darfur. 

And so we are involved with those nations. We are involved with 

the African Union, as they endeavor to put their plans in place for 

addressing the situation in Darfur. 

Clearly, you know, whatever we would do would be a result of 

a policy decision having been taken with respect to the role that 

we play. And, as you pointed out, to this point, that is purely a role 

from the military point of view of providing assistance to those 

peacekeeping forces that have been earmarked for peacekeeping activities in Darfur. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Would a correct assessment be that things have 

deteriorated recently in Darfur? 

General WARD. I think, from the standpoint of the indictment 

and the reduction in the nongovernmental organizations that are 

allowed to operate in Darfur, it would certainly indicate a degradation of what goes on there. 

Not been there, obviously, so I can’t speak to it directly, but 

clearly the indications are that is the case. 

I think, at this point in time, you know, the pipeline distribution 

issues are there, with respect to supplies, foodstuffs, water, et 

cetera. So I think it would be fair to say that there has been a degradation of the humanitarian relief efforts there in Darfur. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Admiral, I think it was expressed during the discussion about a Hezbollah presence in your battle space. Could you 

speak to that and assess the threat level? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir. I will afford myself, if it is appropriate, the opportunity to provide for the record classified portions 

of this. 

But as a general proposition, I am concerned about the presence 

of Hezbollah throughout the Americas, in the Southern Cone of 

South America, in the Andean ridge, and in the Caribbean. Their 

primary activities are proselytizing, recruiting, money laundering, 
38 

drug selling, and using the profits from that to conduct a variety 

of the other activities that I mentioned. 

It is of concern. I do not see operational terror cells in the region, 

but I do see that kind of support mechanism. It is of concern. And 

I will, again, provide some more detail to the committee on that. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Admiral. 

Madam Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

General Renuart, I have been hearing lately that you have been 

quoted—I think very accurately—as saying that our missile defense 

capability, as it is now, our present capability, is—that you have 

confidence that it is an effective defense against the present threat 

from North Korea. And it is a perspective that I share. 

One of the concerns that some of us have is that—I think, what, 

we have 26 Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) now in the inventory, and there is a question related to the 18 remaining that we 

are hoping to put in inventory soon. And because I am—like a lot 

of other people—concerned about the need to have as many GBIs 

in inventory as possible related to potentially, you know, a growing 

North Korean threat and even, at some point—I know it would be 

more for the East Coast for the time being, but if the Iranian missile threat continues to grow. 

And so just from a strategic perspective, what do you think the 

strategic implications are of not fulfilling the inventory or filling 

the inventory to a total, I believe, that would be of 44? What do 

you think are strategic implications of either delaying that or failing to follow through with those 18 additional GBIs? 

General RENUART. Well, thanks. I think it is—as you say, I have 

expressed confidence in the capabilities that we have today against 

the threat that we see. 

Mr. FRANKS. Right. 

General RENUART. I think it is important for us to continue the 

robust testing regimen that General O’Reilly has laid out. That will 

allow us to grow the level of confidence we have against a variety 

of capabilities that might develop in the future. 

I have been supportive of that—as you mentioned, the planned 

buy of 44 interceptors. I think that makes very good sense to allow 

us to not only maintain a capability against growing threats, but 

also to refresh missiles as they may need to be upgraded, in terms 

of software and the like. 

So I continue to be supportive of that initial plan. I think there 

is still quite a bit of discussion ongoing now with respect to European basing sites that I am really not in a position to have an expert opinion on. 

And so I would—my advocacy, if you will, is to keep the current 

testing program, the regimen on track, to continue to make it a 

complicated, sort of all-aspect testing program so that we continue 

to be comfortable that, as threats may develop, as other nations, 

rogue nations might expand their capability, we have an ability to 

answer to that. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, sir. I guess, you know, I had the 

privilege of being present last night at the Missile Defense Agency 
39 

when one of these tests was conducted, when we had—down in the 

Pacific, they shot a missile about 200-plus kilometers into the air, 

and they sent from our Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 

(THAAD) system two interceptors. The second one was not necessary. 

And I just thought it was a great moment for America, as so 

many of these things are, and yet a lot of times the Armed Forces 

don’t get the credit that they deserve, so—you know, so nobly deserve in these situations. 

Even when there is not a war going on, you guys are always out 

trying to make us stronger and more capable of defending this 

country. And I honor you for that with all of my heart. 

And I—again, you don’t get the credit. I think that should be all 

over the news today, that, you know, we no longer hit, as General 

Obering says, a bullet with a bullet. We hit a spot on the side of 

a bullet with a bullet on a consistent basis. And that is an accomplishment, and I think that that means that my two little babies 

are going to be safer. And I appreciate you for protecting them. 

So I got about one last shot at you here. 

General RENUART. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FRANKS. Given the fact that we have—essentially, our firing 

doctrine is three on one, related to the Korean threat, or at least 

we want to be prepared for that, that would give us, really, right 

now, a chance to only effectively engage eight missiles. And, again, 

that is, I know, a rough analyses. 

But is there anything else that you would say related to the strategic necessity of having additional interceptors? Do you think that 

that is important? What emphasis would you put on that? 

General RENUART. Well, Congressman, I am glad that you, first, 

had a chance to see that THAAD test. It really was a great success. 

And I think what that does is it also underlines the fact that missile defense is not just about the ground-based midcourse interceptors. It is a comprehensive approach, from the warning sensors 

that we must use, air-, sea-, space-based sensors, radars, if you 

like, in simple terms, to both a long-range and a theater capability 

to defend. 

And, certainly, the Navy’s SM–3 aboard our Aegis cruisers, the 

THAAD system that you saw tested so successfully, as well as the 

ground-based midcourse interceptors provide us a comprehensive 

capability. 

And I think it is important for us to continue that integrated approach. How that translates to numbers of missiles, I think we 

don’t know yet, because as the capabilities of each system mature, 

you may see trade space amongst each of those systems to allow 

you to have the most efficient capability to defend the nation. 

I think, as you said, the capability against the limited threat we 

see today, we are in good shape. I would not tie to a particular shot 

doctrine, because, as the system matures, the system will actually 

do some analysis to determine how best to intercept one of these 

incoming missiles. 

So I think, again, we have a good commitment to this production 

rate. My sense is the department is supportive of that, so I don’t— 

I am not worried about that at this point. But I think we need to 

let this testing regimen complete itself before we tie ourselves to 
40 

some number that may not actually be needed or maybe there is 

more. Hard to say. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, Madam Chair, thank you. 

I know that they don’t put four stars on the shoulders of these 

individuals casually. So I thank all of you for your—really, committing your whole life to the cause of human freedom. And I wish we 

could really see more of what you do sometimes. I think it would 

mean a lot to the country. 

Thank you. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Franks. 

And, as we wind up, and I want to thank you very much, as well. 

Can I just go back to a second—to comments earlier about irregular warfare? And I am wondering if you have any message to the 

Personnel Committee in what we should be focusing on, in terms 

of the recruiting, retention, and training of our military that will 

continue to support the goal of having a superiority in irregular 

warfare, as well as superiority in conventional and nuclear technology? 

Can you respond quickly? Anything—— 

General MATTIS. Yes, ma’am, just very quickly, none of us can 

predict the future, and we all have certain modest expectations 

about whether or not we will really know where the next threat 

comes from, but we know this. 

If we keep a very high-quality force, officer and enlisted, if we 

keep recruiting the kind of folks who can think on their feet, the 

kind of folks who can integrate high technology, but not lose sight 

of the fact that human factors in war remain the dominant reason 

for success or failure, then we will make the adaptations, for example, in language, training, cultural training, and these sorts of 

things. 

But it really comes down to one fundamental premise, and that 

is that we get the best and the brightest for their jobs. We are decentralizing decisionmaking. And as we look at the cyber threats, 

and the EMP note that was made earlier, we are going to have to 

continue to decentralize decisionmaking. 

That means we need, at the very youngest ages, young folks who 

can use initiative and exercise good judgment, both tactically and 

ethically, because of the nature of these fights. It is all about quality, ma’am. 

General RENUART. Ma’am, if I could add a point—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. Go ahead. 

General RENUART [continuing]. One of the keys to, if you will, 

preventing irregular war is the ability to build partnership capacity 

among our friends around the world. And while certainly Jim is 

right that today’s young men and women are eager to serve and 

they understand the technical nature of the business, I think it is 

important for us to continue that capability to build partnership capacity among our friends so that countries can manage those irregular threats that may develop without it requiring a large U.S. 

presence. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. And—oh, I am sorry, Kip, go ahead. 

General WARD. And just not to let that one—not go without another strike. In that whole regard of building the capacity of our 

partners, clearly our cultural understanding is critically important. 
41 

The language programs within my command, my director of intelligence and knowledge development, whereby we try to have our 

best understanding of our partners, their culture, environment, history, traditions, et cetera, et cetera, those things help with those 

relationships, helps with the partnerships that we build, increases 

the trust and confidence between us, and therefore helping—to get 

to the point that was made—create the type of environment that 

would, in fact, prevent the irregular requirements from even existing. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Admiral. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I will just close, if I could, by underlining 

language and culture very specifically. And I believe there are 

enormous second-order effects having 2 million people in the Department of Defense studying and learning language and culture. 

It is a ripple effect, both in the world and in our own country. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you very much. 

We will look forward to working with you, as we all face those 

difficult decisions and choices. And we hope to put more of our resources in that direction. 

Thank you very much for being here. Again, we applaud your 

service. And thank you for your time and attention today. Thank 

you. 

The meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:52 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 18, 2009 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 18, 2009 

(47) 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 
148 
149 
150 
151 
152 
153 
154 
155 
156 
157 
158 
159 
160 
161 
162 
163 
164 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 18, 2009 

(167) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MILLER 

Mr. MILLER. Do you support the Navy’s reasoning, as identified below, for re-establishing the 4th Fleet in Florida? ‘‘This is a significant change and presents us 

the opportunity to garner the right resources for the missions we run for Southern 

Command,’’ said Rear Adm. James W. Stevenson Jr., Commander, U.S. Naval 

Forces Southern Command (NAVSO). ‘‘As a numbered fleet, we will be in a better 

position to ensure the Combatant Commander has the right assets available when 

needed.’’ http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?storylid=36606 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The 4th Fleet has been very positive for USSOUTHCOM in 

our efforts. The ability of the planning staff in Mayport, Florida to reach back to 

the Navy and obtain assets has been a singular success. Our ability to bring Navy 

ships like the Boxer and the Kearsarge into the region to do medical activities, our 

disaster relief off of Haiti, our counter-narcotics interdictions of last summer and 

this past fall are just a few examples of the positive effect of the 4th Fleet. We’re 

very satisfied with the Navy’s decision to stand up the 4th Fleet. 

Mr. MILLER. As a Senate-confirmed 4 star flag officer, you have testified many 

times that when asked to provide your personal opinion to the Congress, you would 

do so. With that in mind, do you agree with the following statements made by the 

Navy to Senator Webb and his staff: ‘‘The decision to create the capacity to homeport a CVN at Naval Station Mayport represents the best military judgment of the 

Navy’s leadership regarding strategic considerations. The need to develop a hedge 

against the potentially crippling results of a catastrophic event was ultimately the 

determining factor in the decision to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in 

Mayport. The consolidation of CVN capabilities in the Hampton Roads area on the 

East Coast presents a unique set of risks. CVNs assigned to the West Coast are 

spread among three homeports. Maintenance and repair infrastructure exists at 

three locations as well. As a result, there are strategic options available to Pacific 

Fleet CVNs if a catastrophic event occurs. By contrast, Naval Station Norfolk is 

homeport to all five of the CVNs assigned to the Atlantic Fleet and the Hampton 

Roads area is the only East Coast location where CVN maintenance and repair infrastructure exists. It is the only location in the U.S. capable of CVN construction 

and refueling. The Hampton Roads area also houses all Atlantic Fleet trained crews 

and associated community support infrastructure. A second CVN homeport on the 

East Coast will provide additional CVN maintenance infrastructure and provide 

strategic options in case of a catastrophic event in the Hampton Roads area. It will 

also enhance distribution of CVN assets, thereby reducing the risks to CVNs and 

associated maintenance and repair infrastructure supporting those crucial assets.’’ 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The Navy’s objectives for homeporting a CVN in Mayport are 

independent of 4th Fleet operations in the SOUTHCOM Area of Focus. Homeporting 

decisions and policies are made by the Navy and they consider many factors. I have 

no reason to doubt the Navy’s reasons for this move. 

Mr. MILLER. ADM Stavridis: I’d like to ask you about President Obama’s Executive Order to close the detention facility at GITMO since it is in your Area of Responsibility (AOR). To what extent were you consulted by the Administration to get 

your military expertise on whether or not to close GITMO, the risks of closing 

GITMO and the practicality of closing GITMO? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Providing oversight of Joint Task Force Guantanamo, and the 

mission of safe and humane, transparent, legal care and custody of detainees in our 

charge, remains our focus. The Secretary of Defense has appointed a Detainee Task 

Force (DTF), co-chaired by Mr. Joseph Benkert (Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Global Security Affairs) and Major General Irving Halter (Vice Director for Operations, Joint Staff), to coordinate the Department of Defense decision-making and 

actions necessary to implement the 22 Jan 09 Executive Orders affecting detainees 

and detainee operations. This includes expediting the Department-wide responses to 

the President’s orders to review and determine the disposition of individuals detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This Command provides input to the DTF 

through a U.S. Southern Command representative, who participates in all planning 

efforts. I receive routine updates on the DTF progress and have opportunity to pro- 
168 

vide input. USSOUTHCOM also provided membership to the Admiral Walsh Compliance Team that visited Joint Task Force Guantanamo in February and reported 

back to the Secretary. 

Mr. MILLER. ADM Stavridis: In your testimony, you discuss the growing Islamic 

extremist threat in South and Central America. Please elaborate on this, particularly increased support for Hizbollah in Venezuela. To what extent is Islamic extremism’s reach in SOUTHCOM and what steps can we take to better combat this? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. MILLER. Strategic Communications is a vital part of ‘‘soft power.’’ I believe 

we as a nation must do a better job at unifying our themes and messages across 

the globe. For all COCOM commanders, What is your assessment of the strategic 

communication plans in your AORs? What are your shortfalls and what do you need 

to be more effective? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. At Southern Command, Strategic Communication is our main 

battery. Within our Area of Focus, there is no conventional country on country conflict, nor will there likely be in the foreseeable future. Instead, we face a market 

place of ideas. Strategic Communication at Southern Command enables our leaders 

to synchronize words, images and actions to reduce and ultimately eliminate what 

we call ‘the say-do gap.’ By ensuring our words, images and actions are in alignment, we build credibility with both our friends and adversaries. This creates the 

conditions necessary for our ideas to resonate most effectively in the market place. 

This approach can only improve with greater interagency integration. 

Mr. MILLER. Strategic Communications is a vital part of ‘‘soft power.’’ I believe 

we as a nation must do a better job at unifying our themes and messages across 

the globe. For all COCOM commanders, What is your assessment of the strategic 

communication plans in your AORs? What are your shortfalls and what do you need 

to be more effective? 

General RENUART. Mr. Miller, we agree that a better whole-of-government approach to unifying our words and deeds would be beneficial to the nation. I am confident that the President’s designation of the Department of State as the lead for 

the U.S. Government’s strategic communication efforts will ensure the needed unity 

of effort. As part of the Department of Defense, NORAD and USNORTHCOM represent the military elements of the U.S. Government’s strategic communication efforts in the United States, Canada, Mexico and the Caribbean. It is my responsibility to ensure our actions are consistent with the intent of the Secretary of Defense’s and Secretary of State’s larger vision. 

At NORAD and USNORTHCOM, our strategic communication efforts are centered 

on developing, executing, and assessing communication strategies that have been integrated across the Commands, as well as synchronized with interagency partners. 

These strategies are designed to support the strategic objectives of our military 

plans. In general, these objectives include dissuading and deterring external threats, 

providing timely and effective civil support, and enhancing unity of effort with our 

interagency, intergovernmental and international partners. 

To date, we have been remarkably successful in our strategic communication efforts for a very limited set of outcomes. However, more work needs to be done to 

appropriately scale this effort to address the whole of the Commands’ objectives. We 

are committed to resourcing this effort to ensure its success. 

Mr. MILLER. What is NORTHCOM’s readiness if and when there is a coordinated 

cyber attack on the United States? 

General RENUART. USNORTHCOM’s readiness in a coordinated cyber attack on 

the U.S. is at a moderate to high level for computer networks within DOD, and at 

a low to moderate level for support of civil authorities with respect to the cyber domain. On a day-to-day basis, USNORTHCOM’s focus is on cyber defense of those 

computer systems, networks, and related infrastructure required to execute our assigned missions. Defensive measures by DOD and non-DOD mission partners help 

to mitigate the adverse impact of cyber events on our mission performance. We believe that our cyber defensive posture will allow USNORTHCOM to operate effectively during major cyber incidents in order to ensure continuity of operations, but 

we recognize that more needs to be done. 

To improve the command’s readiness, USNORTHCOM is an active participant in 

National and DOD-level cyber exercises. We have participated in such exercises as 

Cyber Storm (Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-sponsored), Bulwark Defender (DOD-sponsored), and have integrated more cyber play into our Command’s 

exercise events. 

One of USNORTHCOM’s missions is civil support, to include Defense Support of 

Civil Authorities (DSCA), at U.S. Federal, tribal, State, and local levels, as directed. 
169 

The recent addition of cyber to USNORTHCOM’s role in DSCA has expanded our 

responsibilities and will require the Command to plan for and provide augmentation 

of DOD capability to DHS in an effort to mitigate cyber threats to the homeland. 

In February 2009, USNORTHCOM staff, with support from Department of Homeland Security, initiated a DSCA cyber mission analysis which helped define the 

cyber capabilities DHS might need from DOD. Operational planning that includes 

identifying/provisioning DOD force structure to address the DSCA cyber requirement is a task that will be completed during calendar year 2009. This includes planning for second and third order effects that may occur as a result of a coordinated 

cyber attack on the United States. 

Mr. MILLER. Strategic Communications is a vital part of ‘‘soft power.’’ I believe 

we as a nation must do a better job at unifying our themes and messages across 

the globe. For all COCOM commanders, What is your assessment of the strategic 

communication plans in your AORs? What are your shortfalls and what do you need 

to be more effective? 

General MATTIS. USJFCOM’s strategic communication effort focuses across a 

‘‘functional AOR,’’ providing joint forces that are well-trained in the subtleties of operating in complex public information environments. Defense and service schools, 

and Joint Professional Military Education venues provide basic knowledge on strategic communication, but USJFCOM is tasked with providing applied training for 

joint force commanders and staffs through participation in major exercises, seminars, and planning events. USJFCOM closes this cycle by encouraging dedicated improvement of joint capabilities across doctrine, training, education, and technologies 

through collaboration, concept development and experimentation. 

USJFCOM’s strategic communication training and capabilities development efforts continue to grow. The following items reflect some of the demands placed on 

USJFCOM strategic communication requirements during the past two years, and 

manifest as a summary of shortfalls. 

– Development of media analysis tools/capabilities to support the joint force 

– Development and integration of strategic communication education, language, 

cultural awareness in existing training mechanisms 

– Delivery of strategic communication training across COCOMs and applying it 

to exercise support requirements 

– Design and conduct of a study to determine what force structure is needed to 

properly conduct strategic communication processes across DoD at the joint 

force level 

– Study and design processes to integrate viable SC planning and execution 

across DoD and with other agencies 

– Developing access, understanding, and processes and procedures for dealing 

with social/emerging media 

– Resource (Man and equip) and operate the Joint Public Support Element 

(JPASE) to ensure quality connectivity at all classification levels 

– Completion of fourteen 2006 QDR SC Roadmap tasks 

So the needs focus on a lack of sufficient manpower and resources for adequate 

coverage of training requirements, and a lack of sufficient funding to address capabilities and requirements for joint strategic communication in the future. This is 

commensurate with the importance of USJFCOM’s strategic communication task at 

hand: developing innovative capabilities that enable contributing joint functions to 

perform strategic communication as well as they perform coordinated, joint kinetic 

operations. 

Mr. MILLER. Strategic Communications is a vital part of ‘‘soft power.’’ I believe 

we as a nation must do a better job at unifying our themes and messages across 

the globe. For all COCOM commanders, What is your assessment of the strategic 

communication plans in your AORs? What are your shortfalls and what do you need 

to be more effective? 

General WARD. Strategic Communication is a priority at U.S. Africa Command, 

and we have made it a consideration in all our programs, operations, and activities. 

The Command has developed Strategic Communication guidance that includes all 

appropriate audiences, encourages two-way communication, and ensures a consistent message in our area of responsibility. We have collaborated closely with the 

interagency community and CENTCOM on a Strategic Communication plan to support anti-piracy efforts. We still have work to do, of course, in improving interagency 

coordination and becoming more proactive than reactive in our Strategic Commu- 
170 

nication efforts. In order to be more effective, we currently are identifying the training and manpower resources that our component commands need to plan and execute Strategic Communication in support of our missions. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

Mr. WILSON. What is your response to the GAO report that eradication efforts 

have been offset by increased efficiencies of the cultivators of coca? Do you believe 

that it is time for new counter-narcotics strategy in the Hemisphere? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I am not significantly surprised to see new efficiencies in coca 

cultivation partially offsetting our collective efforts to reduce supply. Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) are well financed, adaptable and utilize the latest 

technology. The fact that DTOs must pursue new techniques indicates that we are 

having an impact, forcing them to adapt. This is also borne out by recent DEA statistics that show an approximately 104 percent increase in price and approximately 

35 percent decrease in purity in U.S. markets. 

Our overall hemispheric strategy includes efforts in the source, transit and arrival 

zones. As you know, DoD’s primary role is in supply reduction. Whereas DoD focuses on Detection and Monitoring and supports Law Enforcement in interdiction 

and apprehension, Department of State (DoS) is lead for eradication. Both missions 

are mutually supportive and overlap. We constantly strive to refine our strategy in 

order to counter a highly adaptive adversary. Again, changes in DTO practices 

across the drug spectrum; cultivation, production, transportation to markets, and 

distribution indicate that we are having an impact on DTO’s. We will continue to 

review our strategy to ensure it is the most effective possible and anticipates future 

shifts in DTO methodology. 

Mr. WILSON. Can you describe the current mix of U.S. military forces in 

SOUTHCOM’s AOR? What is the optimal mix of active and reserve forces to execute 

your mission? Do you have the right mix of force skills and capabilities? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I believe that there is a proper mix of reserve and active duty 

forces throughout the USSOUTHCOM AOR. At any one time, there are approximately 7,000 personnel assigned to 30 countries and the Services have determined 

the best fill for our requirements, whether from reserve or active duty forces. I recognize that there are some skill sets that exist primarily in the reserve component 

and we welcome their deployment to the USSOUTHCOM AOR. 

USSOUTHCOM utilizes forces from both the reserve and active component to accomplish Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) events, Counter Drug/Counter Narcoterrorism (CD/CNT) operations, detainee operations at Joint Task Force–Guantanamo (JTF–GTMO), Special Operations Forces (SOF) missions, exercises, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations as required. Capabilities required to 

successfully accomplish the missions outlined above reside in both the active and 

reserve components of the force providers. For example, JTF–GTMO utilizes reservist lawyers and doctors to provide safe and humane treatment of detainees. Our theater special operations command’s missions are augmented by the 20th Special 

Forces Group, which is regionally aligned for South and Central America, as well 

as Navy reserve Special Warfare operators that carry out missions throughout the 

region. The National Guard also provides security forces at Joint Task Force–Bravo 

in Honduras in the form of a 35 person security detachment. 

Exercises are another form of reserve support to the command and the Services 

provide reserve units to exercises as a means to accomplish key and critical training 

objectives to ensure unit readiness throughout the year. Additionally, reservists provide significant support for headquarters USSOUTHCOM and the military groups 

around the region. Virtually every office at headquarters USSOUTHCOM receives 

some reserve support and without their service, there would be an additional workload on the civilians and active duty forces assigned to the headquarters. 

Active duty forces provide a preponderance of the force at JTF–GTMO, for CD/ 

CNT operations, and disaster relief operations. There are currently more than 2,000 

personnel assigned to JTFGTMO and except for the lawyers and doctors mentioned 

above, most are active duty. CD/CNT operations are carried out by forces from the 

Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Army, and Coast Guard. The Navy sources approximately four guided missile frigates at any one time, the Marine Corps provides 

training teams that deploy to the region and teach small unit tactics for host nation 

counter drug forces, the Air Force provides base operating forces at Curacao in addition to flying AWACS sorties in support of the ongoing CD/CNT efforts, and the 

Army provides SOF assets to increase the capability of host nation SOF forces in 

an effort to reduce the flow of illicit narcotics and increase the capability of host 

nation forces. 
171 

Mr. WILSON. With the closing of SOUTHCOM’s access to the Manta Air Base this 

year, how will the counter-narcotic missions that were being staged out of Ecuador 

be executed? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. USSOUTHCOM is grateful for Ecuador’s assistance and support over the last ten years, and appreciates and commends the Ecuadorian Air 

Force for its hospitality and cooperation. Ecuador has fulfilled its commitment to the 

U.S., and we look forward to continued cooperation with Ecuador on counterdrug 

efforts. 

Some operations currently conducted from Manta can be conducted from other locations where we have access to facilities. For example, the Air Bridge Denial program can be conducted from Curacao, but at higher operational cost due to increased transit times to the operational area in Colombia. 

Additionally, JIATF–S is able to operate law enforcement aircraft in support of 

USSOUTHCOM’s Detection and Monitoring (D&M) mission from commercial locations in partner nations that are reluctant to allow U.S. military air operations. 

Military aircraft conducting D&M missions will continue to operate from existing facilities in El Salvador, and other locations where we currently have access. 

However, it is important to identify alternate locations in order to maintain the 

operational reach needed to monitor trafficking corridors that extend deep into the 

Pacific. We are in discussions with other governments to allow the U.S. to utilize 

their airfields and support facilities. These airfields must have runways of adequate 

length, sufficient fuel available and appropriate force protection. Additionally, they 

must be close enough to the threat vector to give aircraft as much on station time 

as possible. 

As we continue to analyze the available options to offset the loss of Manta, we 

will make the Committee aware of any additional resources that may be required 

in the National Defense Authorization Act. 

Mr. WILSON. What is your assessment of Venezuela’s relationship with Iran? How 

does this correspond with indications of increased support for Hizbollah in Venezuela? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Iran views Venezuela as a gateway to increased involvement 

in Latin American affairs, leveraging Venezuelan ties in Latin America to diminish 

the effectiveness of UN sanctions and U.S. influence. Venezuela benefits by increasing its international profile while continuing to push an anti-U.S. Agenda. Increased 

support for Hizbollah would add to this anti-U.S. agenda. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO 

Mr. LOBIONDO. What do you see as the future of the Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) 

mission in the future, both near term (one to five years) and long term (five years 

plus)? 

General RENUART. As long as we have population and infrastructure that our government deems necessary to protect, the requirement for the ASA mission will not 

diminish over both the near and long term. What will change are two things: (1) 

the asymmetric air threat, which likely will become increasingly sophisticated and 

(2) the ASA force structure, which will continue to evolve with modernized technologies and capabilities. Just as the September 11th attacks demonstrated a level 

of terrorist sophistication never before seen, we must be ready for the next level of 

asymmetric aerial attack. ASA aircraft will remain essential in getting eyes on unusual aerial activity, determining intent and ultimately defeating the aerial activity, 

if required. Our ASA force structure must remain technologically viable to counter 

future threat sophistication and of sufficient numbers to be postured to defend assets specified by our government. 

So, assuming the asymmetric threat will remain a reality, I believe the future of 

the ASA mission is a continued evolution to counter a more sophisticated air threat 

with the goal of protecting what we value most—our homeland and way of life. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Beginning in 2015, 80% of the Air National Guard ASA units 

begin losing aircraft due the planes running out of flying hours. How will this affect 

the ASA mission? Does the USAF and/or NORTHCOM have any plan to address 

this so-called Fighter Gap? And its effects on the ASA mission? What steps can this 

committee and Congress take to assist you in addressing the Fighter Gap issue? 

General RENUART. I have a requirement for a certain level of capacity to maintain 

the sovereignty of our nation’s airspace. As such, I work closely with the Chiefs of 

the Services, not just the Air Force but the Navy and Marine Corps, to ensure we 

have a robust, sustainable capacity to fulfill this requirement in the next 10–20 

years. The DoD is working very aggressively to look at bridge capabilities and I’m 
172 

comfortable with their approach. Congress can assist in addressing the ‘‘Fighter 

Gap’’ by fully funding the President’s current and future requests for fighter aircraft. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN 

Mr. LARSEN. I understand that both AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM have used funding from the 1206 and 1207 (train and equip) programs to provide training and 

equipment to partner militaries in both South America and Africa. Could you briefly 

give a couple of examples of how this money has been used in your areas of responsibility? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. USSOUTHCOM used Section 1206 funds, with DoS concurrence, to support two major partner nation capacity building programs addressing 

Counter Terrorism (CT) requirements: Enduring Friendship Maritime Security Program and the Operation Enduring Freedom-Caribbean/Central America (OEF–CCA) 

CT Units. 

Enduring Friendship, USSOUTHCOM’s key maritime security initiative, utilized 

1206 funds to achieve Initial Operating Capacity (IOC) crew training, command-control-communication (C3), and interceptor boats for Jamaica, Bahamas, Nicaragua, 

Belize, and Honduras. Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH) also utilized the funds to support Operation Enduring Freedom-Caribbean Central America 

(OEF–CCA) in an effort to equip elite partner nation Counter-Terrorism units in 

support of Operation Enduring Freedom—Caribbean Central America (OEF–CCA). 

Countries were: Belize, Colombia, Guyana, Honduras, Paraguay, and Suriname. 

USSOUTHCOM used 1207 funds in Colombia for the U.S. Embassy’s support to 

the Colombian government’s ‘Colombian Coordination Centers for Integrated Action’ 

(CCIA). The CCIA is a program designed to reestablish governance in previously 

ungoverned spaces of Colombia. It synchronizes the Colombian military’s operations 

with the operations of other Colombian ministries. 

In Haiti, 1207 funds were used to support the Haiti Stabilization Initiative (HSI) 

run by DoS/SCRS (State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization). This 

project was built around small projects that develop local leadership, train and 

equip local police, including ‘‘community oriented police programs’’, and provide justice system access to the residents of marginalized slums. 

Mr. LARSEN. What steps do you take to ensure that 1206 and 1207 money is being 

used to promote broader regional interests? To what extent is the State Department 

involved in formulating and approving funding plans? Has the State Department 

ever vetoed a DOD-formulated plan, or vice versa? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The initiatives purchased under both 1206 and 1207 were 

part of two major regional strategic and interagency programs: Enduring Friendship, USSOUTHCOM’s key maritime security initiative; and Operation Enduring 

Freedom-Caribbean/Central America (OEF–CCA), the theater supporting plan to 

combat violent extremism. These activities under Enduring Friendship and OEF– 

CCA were synchronized with SOCOM programs. The Department of State/PM has 

ultimate authority to approve or deny both programs. 

Section 1207 initiatives in Colombia and Haiti were integrated and synchronized 

with the U.S. Embassy Country Team effort to support each partner nation’s government plan to establish government presence and services in areas of the country 

taken over by armed illegal transnational groups. These programs are also synchronized with FMF to support sustainment in the out years for 1206 programs. 

Department of State has vetoed further funding of OEF–CCA initiatives due to 

the lack of compelling and credible evidence of an active Counter Terrorist threat 

presence in the Caribbean/Central America region. 

Mr. LARSEN. I understand that both AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM have used funding from the 1206 and 1207 (train and equip) programs to provide training and 

equipment to partner militaries in both South America and Africa. Could you briefly 

give a couple of examples of how this money has been used in your areas of responsibility? 

General WARD. One example of 1206 funding is the Regional Maritime Awareness 

Capability (RMAC) Project. This capability gives the Coast Guard of Sao Tome and 

Principe the ability to observe maritime traffic and potential threats in its territorial 

waters. This 1206 project served as the catalyst for other assistance projects including U.S. Navy Seabee construction of a pier next to the RMAC facility, mapping of 

the port, and Defense Institute of International Legal Studies’ assistance in developing maritime laws. 

1207 projects are in various stages of implementation and are proving to be successful. The Somalia Reconciliation and Stabilization program has made progress in 
173 

addressing tensions along the Somalia and Kenya border. For example, after a violent conflict between two clans, 1207 resources were used to establish dialogue 

among security personnel, high ranking government officials, and clan leaders. 

These accomplishments came about through interagency coordination and support, and through the use of critical 1206/1207 funding and flexible funding authorities. 

Mr. LARSEN. What steps do you take to ensure that 1206 and 1207 money is being 

used to promote broader regional interests? To what extent is the State Department 

involved in formulating and approving funding plans? Has the State Department 

ever vetoed a DOD-formulated plan, or vice versa? 

General WARD. The Department of Defense has a process in place for developing 

and prioritizing 1206 and 1207 requests. At the Africa Command level prior to submission to DoD, a board of Interagency experts consisting of representatives from 

USAID, Treasury Department, and U.S. Africa Command’s Strategy, Plans, and 

Programs Directorate, Legal Counsel, and the Foreign Policy Advisor meet to 

detemiine the most effective use of 1206 and 1207 funding. This board uses criteria 

that are linked to U.S. Africa Command’s theater strategy, long-term sustainability, 

how the project complements other programs already in place, and the current 

threat level within the area. 

The State Department is involved at the ground level in developing the 1206 and 

1207 projects. The Offices of Security Cooperation and Defense Attache ́ Offices work 

with their respective Country Teams to develop proposals supported by the Ambassador. U.S. Africa Command requires an Ambassador’s cable approving the proposal 

before it is forwarded to the Joint Staff for consideration. 

U.S. Africa Command works closely with the Department of State Africa Bureau 

through the entire process to ensure the State Department is involved in formulating and approving the programs. 

Mr. LARSEN. Given that the Commander of JFCOM has traditionally been ‘‘dualhatted’’ in his role as combatant commander and commander of the Allied Command 

Transformation, how would you view this recent development of splitting up the position? 

General MATTIS. If the political decision is made at NATO Headquarters to have 

a separate commander for Supreme Allied Command Transformation (SACT) I view 

this change as a positive development. Guiding the transformation and modernization of the twenty-eight NATO Nations and twenty-four Partner Nations is a full 

time job. It requires continuous interaction with NATO Headquarters leadership 

and National representatives. Likewise, interacting with Contact, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), and Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) countries as well as various 

International and Regional Organizations such as United Nations and European 

Union requires a considerable investment of time. Nurturing the special relationship NATO has with Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia also places demands on SACT’s 

time. By delinking the command of USJFCOM from ACT it will allow the Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command to focus his attention on transforming and 

modernizing the U.S. Joint Force. Similarly, it will allow Supreme Allied Commander Transformation to devote the time and energy necessary for transforming 

NATO’s military capabilities to meet the emerging challenges of the 21st Century. 

Since the two commands are co-located in Norfolk I foresee no degradation in the 

working relationship between USJFCOM and ACT. The existing procedures and 

command relationships that have been institutionalized over the years between the 

two commands will continue to produce world-class collaboration, coordination, and 

information sharing results as if they were led by a single commander. 

Mr. LARSEN. Recent reports state that a French officer may assume the position 

of Supreme Allied Commander-Transformation. How might this transform the relationship between NATO and U.S. forces? 

General MATTIS. If the decision is made to assign a French Officer to command 

Allied Command Transformation I see this as strengthening the Trans-Atlantic link. 

The French bring a great deal of experience and expertise to the table. They have 

a modern military force, vibrant and innovative industry, a mature lessons learned 

process, excellent working relationships with a variety of international agencies and 

Non Governmental Organizations, strong democratic institutions, competitive economy, and a great deal of military experience around the world. These are all characteristics and qualities that will enable the French to effectively lead and guide 

NATO’s military transformation. The French also have a solid understanding of 

whole of government approach to operations. They understand that to be effective 

at countering a wide variety of threats in the 21st Century a ‘‘Comprehensive Approach’’ to operations is necessary. This clear understanding of the future security 

environment will help NATO and the U.S. to better leverage best practices and 
174 

share lessons learned. Finally, the United States and France have a strong tradition 

of teamwork dating back to the Revolutionary War and extending through World 

War II. I see this same spirit of cooperation continuing if the French are assigned 

command of ACT. 

Æ