[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-12650

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

ROBERT A. HEGHMANN, 

BEATRICE M. HEGHMANN, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

DJAMEL HAFIANI, 

MARY HAFIANI, 

MIRIAM HAFIANI, 

JAMEL JOSEPH HAFIANI, 

JULIA SARAH HAFIANI, 

THE TOWN OF RYE, N.H., et al.,

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-12650

Defendants-Appellees,

THE HAFIANI FAMILY TRUST, et al.,

Defendants.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:20-cv-00670-BJD-JBT

____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

In 2020, Robert and Beatrice Heghmann (“the Heghmanns”) 

filed a civil action against the Hafiani family, the Town of Rye, New 

Hampshire, and John Does and Mary Roes 1 through 6,000, who 

were unknown residents of the Town of Rye (“the Residents”). 

The Heghmanns alleged that in 2003, these defendants violated 

automatic stays from Robert and Beatrice’s individual bankruptcy 

proceedings. The Heghmanns sought a declaratory judgment that 

the defendants violated the automatic stays, an award of 

compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs. 

The district court granted the Hafiani defendants’ motions to 

dismiss on the grounds that the Heghmanns failed to state a claim 

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21-12650 Opinion of the Court 3

against Miriam Hafiani, and that the Heghmanns’ claim against the 

other Hafianis was barred by res judicata. The district court also

granted the Town of Rye’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction. On appeal, the Heghmanns argue that the district 

court erred in dismissing their action for various reasons. After 

review, we affirm. 

I. Background 

According to the Heghmanns’ complaint, in late 2002, they 

rented a house in the Town of Rye, New Hampshire, from Djamel 

Hafiani. In January 2003, the Heghmanns fell behind on their 

rental payments. Djamel initiated an action in landlord tenant 

court, and a New Hampshire court ordered the Heghmanns to pay 

the past due rent, no later than March 3, 2003, and, if they did not 

do so, then a writ of possession would issue on March 17, 2003. 

The Heghmanns did not pay the past due rent. Instead, on 

March 13, 2003, Robert Heghmann filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy 

petition, which triggered an automatic stay.1 Robert Heghmann 

then informed Djamel’s counsel of the bankruptcy filing. 

However, no one notified the New Hampshire state court of the 

1 Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, “all legal or equitable interests of 

the debtor in property” as of the filing of the petition become part of the 

bankruptcy estate, with certain exceptions not applicable here. See 11 U.S.C. 

§ 541. And actions against a debtor or property of the bankruptcy estate 

become subject to an automatic stay when the bankruptcy petition is filed. Id. 

§ 362. 

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4 Opinion of the Court 21-12650

bankruptcy filing, and it issued a writ of possession. Nevertheless, 

the Town of Rye Sheriff’s Office delayed enforcement of the writ 

after being informed of the bankruptcy proceedings. 

Robert Heghmann’s bankruptcy proceeding was dismissed 

on May 21, 2003. Djamel Hafiani advised the New Hampshire 

court that the bankruptcy proceeding had been dismissed, and the 

court reissued a writ of possession based on its prior March 3, 2003 

order. Based on the writ of possession, the Sheriff’s Office issued a 

notice of eviction, which gave the Heghmanns 24 hours to vacate 

the residence. Robert Heghmann informed the Rye police 

executing the writ that the eviction was in violation of the 

automatic stay and was illegal, but he was ignored. The 

Heghmanns vacated the residence and took what belongings they 

could, but they had to leave a number of their possessions behind. 

Robert Heghmann then filed a motion to set aside the 

bankruptcy dismissal and a motion for contempt against Djamel 

and his counsel for alleged violations of the automatic stay in the 

bankruptcy court. Heghmann v. Town of Rye, No. 04-100-SM, 

2005 WL 637928, *2 (D.N.H. March 18, 2005). The bankruptcy 

court denied both motions, and Heghmann did not appeal. Id.

Meanwhile, Beatrice Heghmann filed a petition for Chapter 

13 bankruptcy, which triggered another automatic stay. However, 

despite her pending bankruptcy petition, after retaking possession 

of the residence, Djamel and his then minor children, Miriam, 

Jamal, and Julia sold a great deal of the Heghmanns belongings at 

yard sales to unknown residents of the Town of Rye. As a result,

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21-12650 Opinion of the Court 5

Beatrice Heghmann filed motions for implementation of the 

automatic stay—allowing her to return the residence and requiring 

Djamel to return their possessions—and a motion for contempt

seeking compensatory and punitive damages for Djamel’s 

violations of the automatic stay in Robert’s case and in her case.

See In re Heghmann, 316 B.R. 395, 399 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2004). 

The bankruptcy court refused to consider Beatrice’s 

arguments related to the alleged violations of the automatic stay in 

her husband’s prior bankruptcy proceeding, explaining that such 

violations “may not be prosecuted in a subsequent bankruptcy 

case.” Id. at 399 n.4. However, it determined that Djamel violated 

the automatic stay in Beatrice’s bankruptcy proceedings when he 

sold the Heghmanns’ belongings at the yard sales. Id. at 399–400. 

It ordered Djamel to pay $1,200 in actual damages for the sale of 

the Heghmanns’ property. Id. at 400, 405. It declined to award 

punitive damages. Id. at 406. A Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the 

First Circuit affirmed on appeal.2 Id. at 401–406. Notably, the 

Bankruptcy Appellate Panel rejected on the merits Beatrice’s 

claims concerning the violation of the automatic stay in Robert’s 

case, explaining that “the writ of possession and subsequent 

eviction did not violate the automatic stay as no stay was in place 

2 The judicial council of each circuit is authorized to establish a bankruptcy 

appellate panel composed of “bankruptcy judges of the districts in the circuit 

who are appointed by the judicial council” to hear appeals from the 

bankruptcy court. 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1). The First Circuit has established such 

a panel.

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at that time—Robert Heghmann’s case had been dismissed and 

Beatrice Heghmann’s case had not yet been filed.” Id. at 401. 

Thereafter, in March 2004, Robert Heghmann filed a 

complaint in the United States District Court for New Hampshire 

against Djamel Hafiani, the Town of Rye, and various others, 

alleging that the defendants violated the automatic stay in his 

bankruptcy proceedings when they (i) sought to enforce the writ 

of possession issued in March 2003, (ii) obtained a new writ of 

possession after his bankruptcy case was dismissed, and then (iii) 

enforced said writ. Heghmann v. Town of Rye, 326 F. Supp. 2d 

227, 232 (D.N.H. 2004). He also sought “an order requiring the 

defendants ‘to take immediate steps to undue [sic] the damage they 

have done by their past violations of the automatic stay.’” Id. The 

district court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 

hear claims involving alleged violations of the automatic stay. 

Heghmann v. Town of Rye, No. 04-100-SM, 2004 WL 2526417, at 

*4, 6 (D.N.H. Nov. 8, 2004). Rather, “the proper forum in which 

to advance claims involving alleged violations of the automatic stay 

[was in] the bankruptcy court.”3 Id. at *6. 

3 The district court also noted that:

Mr. Heghmann is an attorney, admitted to practice before the 

federal district courts in New York and Connecticut, the Court 

of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the United States 

Supreme Court. Heghmann v. Fermanian, 2000 WL 1742122 

at * 1, n. 1 (D.Me. Nov.27, 2000). He is no stranger to pro se 

litigation, at least some of which has been meritless. See id. at 

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Almost two decades later, in June 2020, the Heghmanns filed 

the underlying pro se complaint in the Middle District of Florida 

against Djamel Hafiani, his ex-wife Mary, and their now-adult 

children Miriam, Jamal, and Julia,4 as well as the Town of Rye, 

New Hampshire, and its residents for alleged violations of the 2003 

automatic stay in both of the Heghmanns’ bankruptcy 

proceedings.5 Specifically, the Heghmanns alleged that Djamel

Hafiani violated the automatic stay in Robert Heghmann’s 

bankruptcy proceeding when he (1) failed to advise the New 

*4 (awarding sanctions against Heghmann and concluding that 

his “claims in this action were without merit from the 

beginning and would have been perceived as such by any 

objectively reasonable attorney.”). Nor is this the first time 

that litigation has flowed from Heghmann’s failure to honor 

rent and/or mortgage obligations. See Connecticut Sav. Bank 

v. Heghmann, 193 Conn. 157, 474 A.2d 790 (1984).

Heghmann v. Town of Rye, No. 04-100-SM, 2004 WL 2526417, at *1 n.1 

(D.N.H. 2004). Because Robert Heghmann is a licensed attorney, his 

pleadings are not entitled to the liberal construction normally afforded pro se 

litigants. See Olivares v. Martin, 555 F.2d 1192, 1194 n.1 (5th Cir. 1977). 

4 The Hafianis now live in Florida. 

5 The Heghmanns explain in their brief before this Court that for eighteen 

years, they 

have been searching for a District Court where not only does 

the Circuit Court permit the exercise of subject matter 

jurisdiction in cases involving violations of the Automatic Stay 

but more importantly where state law procedures permit the 

exercise of quasi in rem garnishment of the New Hampshire 

defendants’ property without an onerous cash bond. 

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8 Opinion of the Court 21-12650

Hampshire court in March 2003 of the filing of Robert’s bankruptcy 

petition; (2) obtained a writ of possession; (3) attempted, albeit 

unsuccessfully, to have the Sheriff’s Office execute the writ; and 

(4) improperly obtained a new writ of possession following the 

dismissal of Robert’s bankruptcy proceedings (Counts 1–4). They 

alleged that Djamel, the Town of Rye, and its residents violated the 

automatic stay in Robert Heghmann’s bankruptcy case when the 

sheriff’s office executed the void writ of possession and evicted the 

Heghmanns (Count 5). Further, they alleged the Town of Rye and 

its residents violated the automatic stay in Robert’s bankruptcy 

proceeding when the town failed to have a procedure in place for 

all municipal officers to follow when a claim is made that the 

officers’ actions violate an automatic stay (Count 6). 

Next, the Heghmanns alleged that Djamel, his ex-wife Mary, 

and their children violated the automatic stay in Beatrice 

Heghmann’s bankruptcy proceeding when they improperly seized 

the Heghmanns’ property left at the residence (Count 7). They also 

alleged that the Hafiani family violated the automatic stay in 

Beatrice’s bankruptcy proceeding when they sold the Heghmanns’

property at yard sales, and the residents of the Town of Rye 

violated the stay when they bought the property at the yard sales 

(Count 8). Finally, the Heghmanns alleged that because the 

bankruptcy court found that the yard sales violated the stay, it 

triggered a duty on the defendants to undo the damage and restore 

the Heghmanns to “the status quo” prior to the violation. Thus, 

they claimed that the Hafianis and the Town of Rye and its 

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21-12650 Opinion of the Court 9

residents violated the automatic stay—and continue to do so—

because they have taken no action to fulfill this duty (Count 9). 

Miriam Hafiani moved to dismiss the complaint for failure 

to state a claim. She asserted that the Heghmanns failed to allege 

how she can be subject to a claim when she was a minor of 14 years 

old at the time of the actions at issue. Additionally, she alleged that 

the Heghmanns had failed to include any allegations linking her to 

the lease, the bankruptcy orders, or the automatic stays. In 

response, the Heghmanns argued that they were not suing for a 

violation of the automatic stay that happened when she was a 

minor in 2003, but rather, they were suing her for a continuing

violation because she had a duty to undo the damages caused by 

the violation and continued to take no action to do so. 

Djamel, Julia, Mary, and Jamal also moved to dismiss.6 

They argued, in relevant part, that the claims should be dismissed 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim

because the Heghmanns’ claims were barred by res judicata. In 

response, the Heghmanns argued that, under Eleventh Circuit 

precedent, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over 

the claims. They also argued that res judicata did not apply because 

they were seeking damages for the ongoing violation of the 

automatic stay based on the bankruptcy court’s findings that 

Djamel—and by extension his family members—violated the 

6 The Hafianis attached numerous records from the bankruptcy proceedings 

and prior district court proceedings to the motion to dismiss. 

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10 Opinion of the Court 21-12650

automatic stay when he sold the Heghmanns’ belongings, but the 

Hafianis continued to take no action to undo the damage.7 

Finally, the Town of Rye moved to dismiss, arguing that the 

district court lacked personal jurisdiction over it. It argued that all 

of the complained of actions took place in New Hampshire and the 

Heghmanns failed to allege any facts connecting it with Florida. It 

also argued that exercising jurisdiction would not comport with 

“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” because of 

the cost to Rye of litigating in Florida, the apparent 

forum-shopping of the Heghmanns, the lack of any nexus between 

the actual events and the State of Florida, and the fact that the 

Heghmanns had access to effective relief in New Hampshire. In 

response, the Heghmanns argued that they were not seeking to 

exercise in personam jurisdiction over the Town of Rye and its 

residents. Rather, they were seeking quasi in rem jurisdiction over 

the Town of Rye and its residents. 

7 The Heghmanns asserted that the bankruptcy court’s award of $1,200 in 

actual damages and denial of punitive damages for the violation of the 

automatic stay did not have preclusive effect because when Djamel and his 

family violated the stay they effectively committed the common law torts of 

conversion and intentional infliction of mental and emotional distress, 

entitling the Heghmanns to damages—issues which a bankruptcy Article I 

judge is without authority to decide. 

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After concluding that it had subject matter jurisdiction,8 the 

district court granted all three motions to dismiss. First, the district 

court concluded that the Heghmanns failed to state a plausible 

claim against Miriam Hafiani because they did not allege that she 

knew of the stay and intentionally violated it—and without such 

allegations, the district court could not “even consider the 

additional layer of allegations that [she] continued to violate the 

automatic stay for failing to ‘undo’ damage allegedly caused by the 

violation of the automatic stay.” Second, the district court 

concluded that the claims against Djamel were barred by res 

judicata. 

As to the remaining claims against Mary, Jamal, and Julia 

Hafiani (Counts 7–9), the district court found that these claims 

were due to be dismissed because (1) the Heghmanns made no 

specific allegations that Mary, Jamel, or Julia knew of the automatic 

stay and intentionally violated it, (2) res judicata barred these 

claims because they could have been brought in prior litigation, 

8 The district court concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction over 

claims for violation of an automatic stay. See Just. Cometh, Ltd. v. Lambert, 

426 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that “the explicit . . . grant of 

original jurisdiction” in 28 U.S.C. § 1334 over cases arising under Title 11 

“clearly forecloses a conclusion that the district court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction” over claims for damages caused by a violation of the automatic 

stay in a bankruptcy proceeding). Accordingly, we have subject matter 

jurisdiction to hear this appeal as well. Id.

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and (3) the pleading was deficient because it failed to afford those 

defendants notice of the specific allegations against them.9 

Finally, the district court dismissed the claims against the 

Town of Rye and its residents because it lacked in personam 

jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute and exercising 

jurisdiction would offend the traditional notions of fair play and 

justice. The Heghmanns timely appealed. 

II. Discussion 

A. Whether the district court erred in dismissing the 

claims against the Hafianis

The Heghmanns argue that the district court erred in 

dismissing the claims against the Hafianis for various reasons, 

including that the claims were not precluded by res judicata and 

that the defendants waived any claim that the complaint failed to 

state a claim because it did not allege that the defendants had 

knowledge of the stay. The Heghmanns maintain that the 

bankruptcy court’s finding of a violation of the automatic stay has

preclusive res judicata effect and triggered an ongoing duty upon 

Djamel and those in privity with him10 to take actions “to restore 

9 The district court also noted that although there was no statute of limitations 

for bringing a claim for violation of an automatic stay, the 17-year delay in 

bringing these claims was “concern[ing].” 

10 The Heghmanns argue that Djamel’s children were in privity with him 

because they were present during the yard sales and “had their pick” of the 

Heghmanns’ property. And they argue that Djamel’s ex-wife, Mary, was in 

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21-12650 Opinion of the Court 13

the status quo ante the violation,” and the defendants have taken 

no remedial action for the past 17 years. 

We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted, “accepting the allegations in the 

complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable 

to the plaintiff.” Leib v. Hillsborough Cnty. Pub. Transp. Comm’n,

558 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2009). 

i. Claims against Djamel 

The Heghmanns argue that the district court erred in its res 

judicata analysis as to the claims against Djamel. Additionally, they 

argue that the bankruptcy court did not have before it the claim for 

a continuing violation, as that claim did not arise until the 

bankruptcy court issued its judgment, and, therefore, it was not 

barred by res judicata. 

We review de novo the district court’s determination that a 

claim is barred by res judicata. See Jang v. United Tech. Corp., 206 

F.3d 1147, 1149 (11th Cir. 2000). Res judicata “bar[s] a subsequent 

action if: (1) the prior decision was rendered by a court of 

competent jurisdiction; (2) there was a final judgment on the 

privity because she was the legal guardian of the children and “responsible for 

their conversion of the property.” Finally, the Heghmanns maintain that the 

Town of Rye and its residents were in privity because but for the Town of 

Rye’s actions (via the execution of the writ of possession), the Hafianis would 

not have obtained possession of the Heghmanns’ property, and under New 

Hampshire law, the residents of a municipality “are liable for the 

transgressions of the town government.” 

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14 Opinion of the Court 21-12650

merits; (3) the parties were identical in both suits; and (4) the prior 

and present causes of action are the same.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

“[I]f a case arises out of the same nucleus of operative facts, or is 

based upon the same factual predicate, as a former action, . . . the 

two cases are really the same ‘claim’ or ‘cause of action’ for 

purposes of res judicata.” Griswold v. Cnty. of Hillsborough, 598 

F.3d 1289, 1293 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted) (alteration in 

original). 

The district court did not err in determining that res judicata

barred the claims against Djamel. Counts One through Five for 

Djamel’s alleged violations of the automatic stay in Robert’s case 

are precluded by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the First 

Circuit’s 2004 decision, which determined that “the writ of 

possession and subsequent eviction did not violate the automatic 

stay as no stay was in place at that time—Robert Heghmann’s case 

had been dismissed and Beatrice Heghmann’s case had not yet 

been filed.” In re Heghmann, 316 B.R. at 401–02. 

Similarly, Counts Seven and Eight for violations of the 

automatic stay in Beatrice’s case when Djamel sold the 

Heghmanns’ property at yard sales are also precluded by the same 

decision because the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the 

bankruptcy court’s order for Djamel to pay $1,200 in actual 

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21-12650 Opinion of the Court 15

damages for violating the automatic stay in Beatrice’s case.11 See

id. at 404–06. 

Finally, Count Nine is precluded because they could have 

alleged a continuing violation in Beatrice’s bankruptcy proceeding

through the filing of a contempt action in the past 17 years, but 

they did not.12 See Maldonado v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 664 F.3d 1369, 

1377 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “[r]es judicata acts as a bar 

not only to the precise legal theory presented in the previous 

11 The Heghmanns’ argument that their claims in the underlying complaint 

were for the common law tort of conversion, and, thus, were different from 

the claims in the prior bankruptcy proceeding is meritless. Each of the nine 

counts in the complaint were for “violation of the automatic stay,” citing 11 

U.S.C. § 362(a)—the same exact claims resolved in the prior bankruptcy 

decision in the First Circuit. 

12 Although Congress did not enact a statute of limitations for claims 

involving willful violations of an automatic stay, we agree with the district 

court that the Heghmanns’ 17-year delay in filing the underlying complaint 

while they admittedly forum shopped for a court that would hear their case is 

gravely concerning. Under these circumstances, we conclude that, even if the 

Heghmanns’ claims were not barred by res judicata, they would be barred by 

the doctrine of laches. See Thornton v. First State Bank of Joplin, 4 F.3d 650, 

653 (8th Cir. 1993) (explaining that “[w]hile delay alone does not automatically 

constitute laches, if a plaintiff's delay (1) is unreasonable and unexplained and 

(2) has disadvantaged the defendant, laches may apply,” and upholding 

application of the doctrine where the debtor waited four years after 

discovering the violation and two years after bankruptcy proceedings 

concluded to file his complaint, without explanation for the delay). In the 

Heghmanns’ case, the only reason for the delay in filing the underlying 

complaint was their admitted forum shopping, which further demonstrates 

why application of the doctrine of laches is appropriate. 

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16 Opinion of the Court 21-12650

litigation, but to all legal theories and claims arising out of the same 

operative nucleus of fact.” (quotation omitted)); see also In re 

Harrison, 599 B.R. 173, 183 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2019) (explaining that 

contempt is the “appropriate remedy” for willful violations of an 

automatic stay). Accordingly, the district court correctly 

determined that the Heghmanns’ claims against Djamel were 

barred by res judicata.

ii. Claims against the remaining Hafianis 

With regard to the claims against Miriam, Mary, Julia, and 

Jamal Hafiani, the Heghmanns argue that the Hafianis did not 

assert in their motions to dismiss that the complaint failed to allege 

that they knew of the automatic stay; therefore, they waived this 

defense and the district court erred in relying on it as a basis for the 

dismissal. However, the Heghmanns fail to challenge another 

ground on which the district court based its dismissal—that the 

complaint was “deficient in that the[] counts make assertions 

against these Defendants collectively and do not afford each 

Defendant notice as to the specific allegations made as to each 

Defendant.” “When an appellant fails to challenge properly on 

appeal one of the grounds on which the district court based its 

judgment, he is deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that 

ground, and it follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed.” 

Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 

2014). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the 

claims against the remaining Hafianis.

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B. Whether the district court erred in dismissing the 

complaint against the Town of Rye for lack of personal 

jurisdiction

The Heghmanns argue that the district court erred in 

dismissing the claims against the Town of Rye because the district 

court failed to recognize that “jurisdiction over the Town of Rye 

was never in personam, it was always quasi in rem.” The problem 

for the Heghmanns is that, even if they were proceeding under 

quasi in rem jurisdiction, the district court would lack jurisdiction 

because the Heghmanns did not allege that the Town of Rye has 

any property in Florida for purposes of quasi in rem jurisdiction. 

See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199 & n.17 (1977) (explaining 

that in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction are “based on the court’s 

power over property within its territory”); World Wide Supply OU 

v. Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt., 802 F.3d 1255, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 

2015) (explaining that quasi in rem jurisdiction involves an action 

“against a party who is not personally present in the district but 

whose property is present”). 

Furthermore, the Heghmanns do not challenge the district 

court’s determination that it lacked in personam personal 

jurisdiction. Accordingly, they abandoned any challenge of that 

ground, and we affirm the dismissal of claims against the Town of 

Rye for lack of personal jurisdiction. Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680. 

AFFIRMED. 

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