J-A09018-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

PLUM HOLLOW HUNTING CLUB, INC. 

AND DOUGLAS HENRY

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JANET M. FRAKER

APPEAL OF: MARK J. HALE, CHERRY D. 

HALE, STEVEN L. GRISSINGER & KAREN 

J. GRISSINGER, SUCCESSORS

No. 1210 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered June 17, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Fulton County

Civil Division at No(s): 40 OF 2009 - C

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED AUGUST 10, 2016

In this land dispute, Mark J. Hale, Cherry D. Hale, Steven L. Grissinger 

& Karen J. Grissinger, as successors in interest of Janet L. Fraker 

(collectively, “Appellants” or “Successors”), appeal the Fulton County Court 

of Common Pleas’ June 17, 2015 order entering final judgment in favor of 

Plum Hollow Hunting Club, Inc. and Douglas Henry (collectively, “PHHC”). 

After careful review, we affirm.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A09018-16

- 2 -

In its February 6, 2014 Interim Non-Appealable Order and Opinion 

(“Interim Opinion”), its January 28, 2015 Order and Opinion (“AP Opinion”),1

and its October 22, 2015 Opinion sur Pa. R. App. P. 1925(a) (“1925(a) 

Opinion”), the trial court fully and correctly set forth the relevant facts and 

procedural history of this case; therefore, we have no reason to restate 

them. See Interim Opinion, pp. 2-26; AP Opinion, pp. 1-3; 1925(a) 

Opinion, pp. 1-4.2

Appellants/Successors raise the following two (2) claims for review:

[1.] Whether the [c]ourt erred in refusing to find that Janet 

Fraker established the Larsen boundary with [PHHC] as a 

consentable boundary with substantial evidence and testimony, 

none of which was rebutted by Appellees, such that Appellants 

established ownership of the subject land[?]

2. Whether the [c]ourt erred in not recognizing the recording 

statutes mandate that any interest in real property be recorded 

in the county deed records and any interest not recorded is 

deemed void as to a bona fide purchaser, which Appellant and 

their predecessors in title clearly are[?]

Appellants’ Brief, p. 8.

Appellants challenge the trial court’s entry of final judgment in favor of 

PHHC. Specifically, Appellants claim the trial court erred by not applying the 

____________________________________________

1 We follow the trial court’s designation of its January 28, 2015 Order and 

Opinion as the “AP Opinion”.

2 The AP Opinion incorporates by reference the Interim Opinion. See AP 

Opinion, p. 3. The 1925(a) Opinion repeatedly incorporates both prior 

opinions. See 1925(a) Opinion, pp. 5, 6, 7.
J-A09018-16

- 3 -

doctrine of consentable boundaries and by not recognizing their status as 

bona fide purchasers. We disagree.

When reviewing a trial court’s decision regarding an action to 

quiet title, [the appellate court is] limited to determining 

whether the findings of fact that led to the trial court’s 

conclusions of law are supported by competent evidence. 

Ordinarily, an appellate court will not reverse a determination of 

the trial court in a quiet title action absent an error of law or 

capricious disregard of the evidence.

Birdsboro Mun. Auth. v. Reading Co. & Wilmington & N. R.R., 758 A.2d 

222, 225 (Pa.Super.2000) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the well-reasoned and thorough opinions of the 

Honorable Douglas W. Herman, we conclude Appellants’ issues merit no 

relief. The trial court opinions comprehensively discuss and properly dispose 

of the questions presented. See Interim Opinion, pp. 26-74; AP Opinion, 

pp. 3-9; 1925(a) Opinion, pp. 4-7 (finding: PHHC sufficiently demonstrated 

the location of the Mary Trotter Patent, which controls; PHHC sufficiently 

demonstrated its chain of title back through the Mary Trotter Patent; 

Appellants acquired title to all property intersecting the Mary Trotter Patent, 

as set forth in their respective deeds, by adverse possession; no consentable 

boundary exists regarding the woodlands where (1) no pre-existing dispute 

existed that a compromised boundary resolved, and (2) no evidence of 

fence, physical barrier, or visible boundary line introduced into evidence; 

Appellants not bona fide purchasers where they did not conduct a thorough 
J-A09018-16

- 4 -

title search to discover mistakes in title). Accordingly, we affirm on the 

basis of the trial court opinions.

Order affirmed.

President Judge Emeritus Ford Elliott joins the memorandum.

Judge Platt concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/10/2016
AND NOW, ber 2015, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of this --->.L--- 

Appellate Procedure 1931(c), 

Janet M. Fraker Judge Douglas W. Herman 

Defendant 

vs. 

Plum Hollow Hunting Club, Inc., and Civil Action 

Douglas Henry, 

Plaintiffs 

Defendants 

Judge Douglas W. Herman 

Larry J. Dillman and Tina M. 

Dillman, his wife, Bonnie M. Miller, 

widow, and Duaine A. Ramsey, 

single, 

vs. No. 274-2006 

Plum Hollow Hunting Club, Inc., Civil Action 

Plaintiff 

Judge Douglas W. Herman 

No. 376-2008 

Civil Action 

'''.'. .... 

. .... iiHfllitirtg Club, Inc., and 

:H'.enry, . 

·· Plaintiffs 

• - SCANNED ''fhk)/. . ' -. . . ' 

\.,; ;cobRTOF COMMON PLEAS OF THE 39th JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

.,.,.})}' . OFJ.1ENNSYL VANIA -FULTON COUNTY BRANCH 

.'.tJ.r:·:/:-\),if( .· .. ,.·-, :' · .. \ .. . 

vs. 

::-~ldFraker, Dulce Burger Hall, 

. f{M, Miller, Michael R. · 

;:7;;{iWi~v:er and Rhonda R. Weaver his · 

:.0;:? ::'o/ifi,Duaine A. Ramsey, single: arid 

~t~iJ.fiI,if/ );J!:~,~n:ai:e~d Tina M .. 

:y;~/?>···:.-::··. :<<··:· .. : Defendants 

Circulated 07/14/2016 01:45 PM
The Prothonotary shall give notice to: 

J. McDowell Sharpe, Esq. 

William C. Cramer, Esq. 

Donald L. Kornfield, Esq. 

Michael R. Weaver and Rhonda R. Weaver 

Duaine A. Ramsey 

Larry J. Dillman and Tina M. Dillman 

Bonnie M. Miller 

PROTHONOT ARY,., CLERNKSOCF oii~RTS, CLERK OF Or1PHA . b ofl o· Er;OQ REGISTER OF WILLS, RECORDEr1 r : i;. · ,J 

r;··. 

;~ _· 

;.-·· 

FULTON COUNTY 

PENNSYLVANIA 

FILED 

OCT 2 2 2015 

=~- r: 

Pursuant to the requirements of Pa. R. Civ. P. 236 (a)(2), (b) and (d), the Prothonotary shall 

give written notice of the entry of this Order of Court, including a copy of this Opinion and 

Order of Court, to each party's attorney of record and shall note in the docket the giving of such 

notice and the time and manner thereof. 

t ,SS 

~' 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Prothonotary of Fulton County shall promptly 

transmit to the Prothonotary of the Superior Court the records inthese matters, along with the 

attached Opinion sur Pa. R. App. P. 1925( a). 
("Hunting Club") and Douglas Henry ("Henry") (collectively referred to as "Plaintiffs"), and 

This is a boundary dispute case involving Plaintiffs, Plum Hollow Hunting Club 

Opinion sur Pa. R. App. P. 1925(a) 

Janet M. Fraker Judge Douglas W. Herman 

Defendant 

vs. 

No. 40-2009 

Plum Hollow Hunting Club, Inc .• and Civil Action 

Douglas Henry, 

Plaintiffs 

Defendants 

Judge Douglas W. Herman 

Larry J. Dillman and Tina M. 

Dillman, his wife, Bonnie M. Miller, 

widow, and Duaine A. Ramsey, 

single, 

vs. No. 274-2006 

PROTHONOTARY. CLER!( OF COURTS 

CLERK OF ORPHANS COURT I 

REGISTER OF WILLS. RECORDER Ot DEEDS 

Plum Hollow Hunting Club, Inc., Civil Action· Plaintiff 

FULTON COUNTY r ( 

PENNSYLVANIA -~ 

FILED \;~ 

OCT 2 2 2915 v: 

Judge Douglas W. Herman 

{ 

J. Ronald Fraker, Pulce Burger Hall, 

Bonnie M. Miller, Michael R. 

Weaver and Rhonda R. Weaver, his 

'wife, Duaine A. Ramsey, single, and 

Larry J. Dillman and Tina M. 

Dillman, his wife, 

Defendants 

vs. 

No. 376-2008 

Plum Hollow Hunting Club, Inc., and Civil Action 

Douglas Henry, 

Plaintiffs 

THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OFT$ 39th JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

OF PENNSYLVANIA -FULTON COUNTY BRANCH 
2 

possession of any unenclosed woodland adjoining the properties, the Court issued a subsequent 

Order and Opinion setting forth the boundary lines between the Defendants' and Plaintiffs' 

respective properties. The parties now appeal our decisions. For the reasons set forth below and 

throughout the issued opinions, we suggest the Superior Court affirm our decisions. 

PROCEDURAL IDSTORY 

On September 12, 2006 (no. 274 of2006), November 14, 2008 (no. 376 of2008), and 

February 5, 2009 '(no. 40 of2009) the Plaintiffs filed complaints. Answers were subsequently 

filed by the Defendants in the three cases. 

The Court convened a bench trial on May 18 to May 20, 2011, July 26, 20~ 1, July 29, 

2011 and August 25, 2011. After consideration of the evidence of record and the arguments of 

counsel, the Court issued an Interim Non-Appealable Order and Opinion on February 6, 2014 

("Interim Opinion"). In that Opinion we concluded that pursuant to the Mary Trotter Patent the 

Plaintiffs hold legal title to those portions of land that overlap with the land described in the 

Defendants' deeds. Furthermore, we concluded that the Defendants' were entitled to ownership 

of the intersecting property by way of adverse possession of any improved land. The Court 

Defendants, J. Ronald Fraker ("Fraker''), Bonnie M. Miller(Miller"), Dulce Burger Hall 

("Hall"), Michael R. Weaver and Rhonda R. Weaver ("the Weavers"), Duaine A. Ramsey 

(''Ramsey"), and Larry J. Dillman and Tina M. Dillman ("the Dillmans") (collectively referred to 

as "Defendants"). After a bench trial in the above-captioned cases, this Court issued an Interim 

Non-Appealable Order and Opinion which decided that pursuant to the Mary Trotter Patent the 

Plaintiffs hold legal title to those portions ofland that overlap with the land described in the 

Defendants' deeds and concluded that the Defendants satisfied their burden of proving adverse 

possession for the land that has been improved. As questions remained regarding adverse 
3 

1 The Mary Trotter Patent is more fully described in the Interim Opinion. 

2 "When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or 

third-party claim or when multiple parties are involved, the trial court or other governmental unit may enter a final 

order as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims and parties only upon an express determination that an 

immediate appeal would facilitate resolution of the entire case. Such an order becomes appealable when entered. In 

the absence of such a determination and entry of a final order, any order or other form of decision that adjudicates 

fewer than all the claims and parties shall not constitute a final order," Pa. R.A.P. 34l(c). 

, 

by a Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal on July 31, 2015. At docket no. 

On July 15, 2015 at docket no. 274 of 2006, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal followed 

final judgment at docket no. 40 of 2009 and an Order entering verdict in favor of all Defendants. 

On June 17, 2015 the Court issued an Order certifying the case at docket no. 2 7 4 of 2006 

for appeal pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 341(c).2 On that same date the Court issued an Order entering 

2015. The Court subsequently denied all post-trial motions. 

in interest to Janet M. Fraker ("Janet Fraker Successors"), filed a post-trial motion on February 9, 

2015. Mark J. Hale, Cherry D. Hale, Steven.L. Grissinger and Karen J. Grissinger, as successors 

February 18, 2015. At docket no. 40 of 2009, Plaintiffs filed a post-trial motion on February 18, 

motion on February 17, 2015. Ramsey, the Dillmans, Miller, and Hall filed post-trial motions on 

376 of 2008, Plaintiffs filed a post-trial motion on February 9, 2015. Fraker filed a post-trial 

Several post-trial motions were filed in the three cases. At docket nos. 274 of 2006 and 

deeds that intersects with the Mary Trotter Patent by adverse possession. 1 

Miller, Hall, Ramsey, and the Dillmans acquired title to all land described within their respective 

boundary lines between the Defendants' and Plaintiffs' respective properties, finding that Fraker, 

and Opinion on January 28, 2015 ("AP Opinion"), In the AP Opinion, this Court set forth the 

properties. As the parties failed to come to an agreement the Court issued a subsequent Order 

whether the Defendants were entitled to ownership of any unenclosed woodland adjoining their 

possession to allow the parties to come to an agreement. Specifically, the Court did not decide 

purposely left undecided the location of the boundaries of the propertiesobtained by adverse, 

.,...-" .. ""'\ 

... , 
4 

that the southern and eastern deed boundaries of [the Dillmans' property] in common with the 

a residence or fencing the area of the boundary of their actual legal title; and (4) "determining 

in finding that the Dillmans possessed adversely that encroachment area without construction of 

property adjoining Plum Hollow Hunting Club's real estate was unenclosed woodland and erred 

possession by way of tacking from their predecessor-in-title; (3) failing to find that the Dillmans' 

for the statutory period of 21 years; (2) determining that the Dillmans established adverse 

Dillmans proved all necessary elements of adverse possession by clear and convincing evidence 

adverse possession. The Hunting Club asserts that the Court erred in: (1) determining that the 

At docket no. 274 of2006 the Hunting Club raises four issues on appeal, all pertaining to 

direction as to the location where the Superior Court will find the reasoning for our decision. 

AP Opinion. We will delineate the issues raised by each party for each distinct case, followed by 

raised by the parties were discussed in our two prior opinions, i.e., the Interim Opinion and the 

l 925(a) opinion encompassing the five collective appeals filed by the parties. All of the issues 

The instant cases all involve similar factual and legal issues and thus we issue this 

DISCUSSION 

2015. 

13, 2015 followed by a Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal on August 5, 

Appeal. At docket no. 40 of2009 the Janet Fraker Successors filed a Notice of Appeal on July 

Appeal; however, the Dillmans failed to file a Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on 

Complained of on Appeal on August 14, 2015. On July 27, 2015 the Dillmans filed a Notice of 

followed by a Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal on July 23, 2015. On 

July 23, 2015 Fraker filed a Notice of Appeal followed by a Concise Statement of Matters 

376 of 2008, three appeals were filed. On July 15, 2015 Plaintiffs filed a: Notice of Appeal , 
5 

AP Opinion, and therefore we direct the Superior Court's attention to those Opinions. 

granting Miller and Hall adverse possession in the Interim Opinion at pages 63 to 70 and in the 

of the boundary of their actual legal title. The Court previously discussed its reasoning for 

possessed that encroachment area without construction of a residence or fencing the area outside 

intersected Henry's real estate, and erred in finding that the Dillmans and Ramsey adversely 

estate of the Dillmans and Ramsey was unenclosed woodland in the area of their front yards that 

purposes of establishing adverse possession; and ( 4) failing to find as a material fact that the real 

years; (3) determining that the Dillmans or Ramsey could tack from their predecessor-in-title for 

elements of adverse possession by clear and convincing evidence for the statutory period of21 

evidence; (2) determining that the Dillmans, Ramsey, Miller and Hall proved all necessary 

Hall who never raised the issue of adverse possession through testimony or submission of other 

possession. Plaintiffs assert that the Court erred in: (1) granting adverse possession to Miller and 

At docket no. 376 of2008 Plaintiffs raise four issues on appeal, all dealing with adverse 

Opinions. 

.;!"· 

Opinion issued on January 28, 2015. Thus, we direct the Superior Court's attention to 'those 

previous opinions issued, i.e., February 6, 2014 Interim Opinion at pages 63 to 70 and AP · 

The Court's reasoning as to the issues the Hunting Club now complains of was set forth in its 

portion of their deed included within the yellow depiction on Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 126 ... " 

colored green on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 126 ... whereas [the Dillmans] only had legal title to that 

Club] had superior title to [the Dillman's property] along these common boundaries in the area 

when there was no showing of adverse possession along those boundaries, and [the Hunting 

[Hunting Club property] were established by survey reconstruction of Thomas Michael Englerth, 
6 

that Opinion at pages 32 to 56, in addition to the Court's findings of fact on pages 3 to 26. In his 

its reasoning as to these issues throughout the Interim Opinion and directs the Superior Court to 

and a trial court lacks jurisdiction to correct errors within a patent. The Court has fully discussed 

Plaintiffs' expert did not use the required surveying techniques to reconstruct the King patent; 

the King patent was not recorded among the deed records of Bedford or Fulton County; 

Court erred in accepting into evidence the Mary Trotter patent and/or the King patent because: 

addition to the findings of fact outlined on pages 3 to 26. In his fourth issue, Fraker claims the 

relating to Plaintiffs' legal title are delineated in the Interim Opinion at pages 32 to 56, in 

failed to submit any proof of ownership. The Court's findings of fact and conclusions oflaw 

who owns any alleged residue and the property lines encompassing the alleged residue; and 

describe the location of any alleged residue of ground; failed to identify the particular Plaintiff 

specifically described within their title deeds ofrecord because Plaintiffs: failed to specifically 

the Court erred in concluding that Plaintiffs hold any legal title outside of the ground as 

63, and therefore we direct the Superior Court to that Opinion. In his third issue, Fraker asserts 

previously discussed issues relating to bona fide purchasers in its Interim Opinion at pages 56 to 

Weavers were bona fide purchasers for value of the ground they acquired. This Courthas 

land described in the Defendants' deeds because Fraker, the Dillmans, Ramsey, Miller and the 

Mary Trotter Patent the Plaintiffs hold legal title to those portions ofland that overlap with the 

Opinion at pages 32 to 56. Second, Fraker claims the Court erred in finding that pursuant to the 

deeds." The reasoning for the Court's conclusion is stated at length in the Court's Interim 

legal title to those portions of land that overlap with the land described in the Defendants' 

Court erred in its conclusion " ... that pursuant to the Mary Trotter Patent the Plaintiffs hold 

At docket no. 376 of2008 Fraker raises six issues on appeal. First, Fraker asserts the. 
7 

finding in its Interim Opinion that the Janet Fraker Successors did not satisfy their burden of 

establishing the doctrine of consentable lines because they did not establish a boundary. For a 

full discussion of this issue we direct the Superior Court's attention to the Interim Opinion at 

pages 70 to 72. The Janet Fraker Successors also claim that the Court erred in not recognizing 

the recording statute mandate that any interest in real property be recorded in the county deed 

records and any interest not recorded is deemed void as to a bona fide purchaser, which the Janet 

Fraker Successors claim they were. This Court has previously discussed issues relating to bona 

fide purchasers in its Interim Opinion at pages 56 to 63, and therefore we direct the.Superior 

Court to that Opinion. 

The Dillmans have failed to file a Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on appeal 

at docket no. 40 of 2009, thus preventing this Court from addressing any specific issues. 

Therefore, they have waived any issues on appeal. 

fifth issue, Fraker asserts the Court erred in not concluding that all Plaintiffs' claims for 

reformation of their title deeds, to include ground outside of that as described within their title 

deeds of record, are tolled by the 21 year statute of repose. Assuming that Fraker intended to use 

the word "barred" rather than "tolled," we direct the Superior Court's attention to the Interim 

Opinion at pages 32 to 56. Lastly, Fraker asserts that the Court erred in 'not dismissing Plaintiffs' 

cause of action because all necessary and indispensable parties have not been included in the 

litigation. Having already discussed this issue we direct the Superior Court's attention to the 

Interim Opinion at pages 73 to 74. 

At docket no. 40 of 2009, the Janet Fraker Successors allege that the Court erred in 
8 

Therefore, this Court respectfully requests the Superior Court affirm this Court's decisions. 

We submit that no errors were committed in this Court's decisions in these cases. 

CONCLUSION 
SCANNED 

adverse possession for the land that has been improved. However, questions remain regarding 

Opinion") which, in part, qecjped that the Defendants have satisfied their burden of proving 

On February 6, 2014 this Court issued an Interim Non-Appealable Order and Opinion ("Interim 

Duaine A. Ramsey ("Ramsey"), and Larry J. Dillman and Tina M. Dillman ("the Dillmans"). 

Bonnie M. Miller ("Miller''), Michael R. Weaver and Rhonda R. Weaver (''the Weavers"), 

("Hunting Club") and Douglas Henry ("Henry''), and Defendants, J. Ronald Fraker ("Fraker"),· 

This is a boundary dispute case involving Plaintiffs, Plum Hollow Hunting Club 

OPINION 

Defendants 

Judge Douglas W. Herman 

Larry J. Dillman and Tina M. 

Dillman, his wife, Bonnie M. Miller, 

widow,and Duaine A. Ramsey, 

single, 

vs. ~o. 274-2006 

Plum Hollow Hunting Club, Inc., Civil Action 

Plaintiff 

J. Ronald Fraker, Dulce Burger Hall, Judge Douglas W. H~~- Bonnie M. Miller, Michael R. 

Weaver and Rhonda R. Weaver, his 

wife, Duaine A. Ramsey, single, and 

Larry J. Dillman and Tina M. 

Dillman, his wife, 

Defendants 

vs. f 

FULTON COUNTY t 

PEN1f et~ANIA ~· . 

JAN 2 8 2015 

PROTHONOTARY. CLERK OF COURTS, 

CLERK OF ORPHANS COURl 

REGISTER OF WILLS, RECORDER OF DEEDS 

No. 376-2008 

Plum Hollow Hunting Club, Inc., and Civil Action 

Douglas Henry, 

Plaintiffs 

THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF THE 39th JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

OF PENNSYLVANIA- FULTON COUNTY BRANCH 

) 

. Circulated 07/14/2016 01:45 PM
2 

I Regarding Fraker and his grantees' title the Court stated: "Except for the adverse possession and the doctrine of 

consentable lines, any interference between the Survey of 1976 and the Mary Trotter patent is resolved in favor of 

those holding title through Mary Trotter." Interim Opinion at 54. 

The parties have failed to come to an agreement and therefore the issue is now before the Court. 

Defendants were entitled to ownership of any unenclosed woodland adjoining their properties. 

allow the parties to come to an agreement.1 Specifically, the Court did not decide whether the 

undecided where the boundaries of the properties obtained by adverse possession would lie to 

property by way of adverse possession of any improved land but the Court purposely left 

Furthermore, we concluded that the Defendants' were entitled to ownership of the intersecting 

to those portions of land that overlap With the land described in the Defendants' deeds. 

that Opinion we concluded that pursuant to the Mary Trotter Patent the Plaintiffs hold legal title 

counsel the Court issued an Interim Non-Appealable Order and Opinion on February 6,2014. In 

2011 and August 25, 2011. After consideration of the evidence of record and the arguments of 

The Court convened a bench trial on May 18 to May 20, 2011, July 26, 2011, July 29, 

case no. 40 of 2009. 

2008. On March 18, 2009 the Defendants filed an Answer with New Matter and Counterclaim in 

in case no. 274 of 2006. On January 20, 2009 the Defendants filed an Answer in case no. 376 of 

the Plaintiffs filed complaints. On November 2, 2006 the Defendants Dillmans filed an Answer 

(no. 274 of 2006), November 14, 2008 (no. 376 of2008), and February 5, 2009 (no. 40 of2009) 

This Opinion relates to case nos. 274 of2006 and 376 of 2008. On September 12, 2006 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

issue is now before the Court. 

to reach an agreement as to those terms. The parties have failed to reach an agreement and so the 

ruling on where the boundaries between the parties' respective properties lie to allow the parties 

adverse possession of any unenclosed woodland adjoining the properties. The Court deferred 

. ) 
DISCUSSION 

For purposes of this Opinion we incorporate all findings of fact and conclusions of law 

delineated in the Court's Interim Opinion.2 In the Interim Opinion we found that the Dillmans, 

· Ramsey, Miller, and Dulce Burger Hall ("Fraker Defendants") have satisfied their burden of 

proving adverse possession for the land that has been improved. In order to decide the 

boundaries of the properties we now must decide whether the Defendants have obtained title to 

any adjoining unenclosed woodland within the Mary Trotter patent ("Encroachment Area") by 

adverse possession. 

As we expounded upon in the Court's Interim Opinion, adverse possession is defined as 

"dominion over the property." Bride v. Robwood Lodge, 713 A.2d 109, 112 (Pa. Super. Ct. 

1998). To establish adverse possession, the person asserting it must prove actual, continuous, 

exclusive, visible, notorious; distinct and hostile possession of the land which it seeks title to for 

a period of 21 years. Moore v. Duran, 687 A.2d 822, 828 (Pa. Super. Ct 1996). 

· "Actual possession of property may be established in connection with the maintenance 

of a residence, by cultivation of the land, by [ e]nclosure of the land, or by making improvements 

to the land and paying property taxes." Moore, 687 A.2d at 828; see also Parks v. Pennsylvania 

R.R. Co., 152 A. 682, 684 (Pa. 1930) (''temporary acts on the land, without an intention to seat it 

for residence and cultivation or other permanent use consistent with the nature of the property 

are riot the actμal possession required"). Proof of "actual possession" is not to be mistaken for 

2 Pages 63 to 70 ef'the Interim Opinion discuss adverse possession. 

3 

The instant Opinion pertains only to case nos. 274 of2006 and 376 of2008 and focuses on the 

issue remaining from the Interim Opinion, i.e., the boundaries between the parties' respective 

properties in the context of ownership by adverse possession. This matter is now ready for a· 

decision. 
4 

woodlands in connection with their residence or the part of the woodlands that is cultivated. 

belongs. A property owner can satisfy this requirement by making ordinary use of the 

woodland by residence or cultivation of a part of the tract of land to which the woodland 

Super. Ct. 2009). In "dealing with a woodland, a person must establish actual possession of the 

strict standard for proving adverse possession." Shaffer v. O'Toole, 964 A.2d 420, 424 (Pa. 

When the claimed property is woodland, Pennsylvania courts have adopted "a rather 

Id. (quoting Inn Le'Daerd~ 360 A.2d at 213-14). 

[ and where one party] enters upon unoccupied land, under a deed or title, and holds 

adversely, his possession is construed to be coextensive with his deed or title, and the true 

owner will be deemed to be disseised to the extent of the boundaries described in that 

title. Still, his possession beyond the limits of his actual occupancy is only constructive. 

If the true owner be·at the same time in actual possession of part of the land, claiming 

title to the whole, he has the constructive possession of all the land not in the actual 

possession of the intruder, and this though the owner's actual possession is not within the 

limits of the defective title. 

in the absence of any actual possession by the true owner." Arcadi~ 576 A.2d at 1117. 

colorable title is co-extensive with the boundaries of the instrument under which he claims only 

entry was by color of title"). It must be noted however, ''the possession of one who has a 

(i.e., for twenty-one years), may thereby hold constructive possession of the whole tract ifhis 

possession, id., a disseisor who enters upon and cultivates part of a tract for the limitations period 

· ("[a]lthough it contributes nothing to the fiber of title as affecting the adverse character of 

Super. Ct. 1994); see also Arcadia Co .. v. Peles, 576 A.2d 1114, 1117 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) 

constructive possession of entire tract described therein." Beck v. Beck, 648 A.2d 341, 343 (Pa. 

: . . 

period, of a portion of property described in the invalid instrument, may thereby establish 

enters under 'color of title' and demonstrates actual possession for the requisite twenty-one year 

360 A.2d 209, 214 (Pa. Super. Ct 1976). However, importantly for this case, "a disseisor who 

proof of constructive possession under the guise of color of title. Inn Le'Daerda, Inc. v. Davis, 

) ) 
5 

Olewine v. Messmore, 18 A. 495, 496 (Pa. 1889); see also Bride v. Robwood Lodge, 713 A.2d 

109, 112 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) ("[s]ince the disputed parcel is undeveloped woodland, actual 

possession is established by either erecting a residence or by enclosing and cultivating the 

.' property"); Moore, 687 A.2d at 828 ("[a]ctual possession may thus be established by enclosing 

arid cultivating the tract ofland of which the woodland is a part without erecting a residence; or 

possession may be established by erecting a residence where there is a clear designation of the 

boundaries of the land surrounding such residence"); Hole v. Rittenhouse, 37 Pa. 116, 117 

(1860) ("actual possession may be a residence without cultivation, or by enclosure and 

cultivation without residence; and where either these is, the use of adjoining woodland by the 

disseisor, as farmers generally use woodland adjoining their farms, is actual and not constructive 

possession of such woodland"). 

In determining whether a claimant has established the requisite 21 years of possession the 

concept of tacking may be applicable. Inn Le'Daerda, 360 A.2d at 214. Tacking consists of 

combining the possession of a claimant with that of his predecessor in title and it is permitted 

where the possessions are continuous. Id. Furthermore, "[ e Jach predecessor must have claimed 

title to the property in dispute, and in transferring to his successor must have purported to include 

it. Id. That is, the deed to the· successor must contain a description of the land claimed. See id. 

.In the Interim Opinion we stated "[t]he Court agrees with the Defendants that adverse 

possession has been satisfied for the land that has been improved.v' and stated our reasons why, 

citing testimony by Allen Henry and Fraker as well as other photographic evidence presented in 

Exhibits 1-2 through 1-9. Such improvements on the property of the Fraker Defendants land 

include dwellings and structures on theland, driveways, and neatly groomed front and back 

yards. Thus, the Fraker Defendants have established the requisite elements of adverse 

3 Interim Opinion at 67. 

) 
6 

possession for improved land. We now discuss purported improvements to any unenclosed 

woodland adjoining the Fraker Defendants' properties to determine whether the Fraker 

Defendants have obtained title to that property by adverse possession and to set boundaries 

between the properties. 

Plaintiffs did not actually possess the portions of land where the Encroachment Area 

intersects with the Fraker Defendants' properties from the time Fraker acquired the property. 

Nor do the disputed areas consist of unenclosed woodland. Therefore, Fraker's and the Fraker 

Defendants' actual and constructive possession of the disputed land that is described within their 

deeds is sufficient to establish adverse possession of the land, as set forth more fully below. 

Beck, 648 A.2d at 343; Arcadia, 576 A.2d at 1117. 

I. Bonnie Miller 

Fraker acquired his property by deed dated June 28, 1976. On May 9, 1985 Fraker 

conveyed the property to Miller by deed ("Miller Deed"). Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit on 

November 17, 2008. Therefore, Miller was in possession of her property for over 21 years prior 

to the commencement of the action. Exhibit 124, a reconstruction of the. Mary Trotter Patent, 

shows that a small portion of Miller's front yard is within the Encroachment Area. As we 

alluded to in the Interim Opinion, Miller has established adverse possession of all improved land 

by way of photographic evidence in Exhibits I-2 through I-9 and the testimony of Fraker and 

Allen Henry. The small portion of the front yard that is within Encroachment Area consists of 

land that has been improved: That is, there is no unenclosed woodland within the perimeter 

described in the Miller Deed that overlaps with the Encroachment Area. Plaintiffs expert 

witness, Mr. Witter testified that Miller's trailer, outbuildings, and other improved areas of her 

property are the portions of property that are within the Encroachment Area. 
7 

III. Duaine Ramsey 

On January 27, 1989 Fraker conveyed the Ramsey property to Ubertie and Geraldine 

Shockey and on October 23, 2001 Shockey conveyed this lot to Ramsey. Plaintiff's expert 

witness Mr. Witter testified that the improved areas of Ramsey's property lie within the 

Encroachment Area. Mr. Witter did not testify to the exact location of the intersection of the 

Encroachment Area and Ramsey's property, as he testified that "we have no exact distance per 

se." Based on the testimony of Allen Henry pertaining to the location of the Mary Trotter line 

Plaintiff argues that Inn Le'Daerda stands for the proposition that Miller did not establish 

adverse possession. We disagree. In that case the Superior Court noted thattrailers were 

installed by Marshall's predecessors in title on a disputed strip of land, they remained there, and 

the property was maintained, The Court ruled that adverse possession was established by tacking· 

Marshall's possession with that of his predecessors in title which equated to more than 21 years. 

Like Inn Le'Daerda, Fraker installed a trailer in the Encroachment Area and Miller maintained it 

when she acquired the property from Fraker and therefore Fraker's possession tacks onto 

Miller's possession for over 21 years. As such, Miller has acquired title to all land described 

within the Miller Deed by adverse possession. 

II. Dulce Hall 

On May 15~ 2003 Dulce Hall acquired his property from Miller who conveyed part of the 

property that she acquired form Fraker; Hall's property is comprised of the property that Miller 

acquired from Fraker. Just as Fraker's possession tacked onto Miller's possession of the 

property, Hall's possession will tack onto Miller's possession, as the deeds purport to convey the 

same property. By way of tacking, Hall has acquired title to all land described within the Miller 

Deed by adverse possession. 

',) ) 
8 

the house (Fraker Exhibit 1-3) and asked where the Dillmans' property intersected with the Mary 

and garage (Fraker Exhibit 1-1), the Dillmans' side yard (Fraker Exhibit 1-2), and a front view of 

front yard is within the Encroachment Area. When shown photographs of the Dillmans' house 

would lie within the Encroachment Area. Exhibit 124 shows that only a portion of the Dillmans' 

that the house was there prior to the Dillmans acquisition of the property. Aside from the 

Dillmans' driveway, Mr. Witter did not identify any other portion of the Dillmans' property that 

physical possession of any land within the Encroachment area. His testimony also establishes 

N.T. May 19, 2011 at 116. Allen Henry, a plaintiff witness, believes that the Dillmans were in 

Q. Before we move on, who was in actual physical possession of the Dillman property 

when this action was filed by the plaintiffs in 2009? 

A. Dillman was in actual physical possession of whatever is inside the Mary Trotter 

boundary in my opinion, 

He occupied-it's my understanding he occupied the house and so he was also in 

physical possession of that house, but at the time he purchased [it] I understand the title 

was still in someone through Mary Trotter because the house was on the property that 

was conveyed to him by Fraker. The house is on that property. 

to the following: 

Interim Opinion, establishes that the Dillmans own all of the property described in their deed that 

intersects with with the Encroachment Area by way of adverse possession. Allen Henry testified 

· testimony of Allen Henry, along with the photographic evidence which we discussed in the 

Fraker conveyed the Dillmans property to the Dillmans on September 26, 1986. The 

IV. The Dillmans 

title to all land described within the Miller Deed by adverse possession. 

that Fraker owned it as we concluded in the Interim Opinion: Therefore, Ramsey has acquired 

property that is within the Encroachment Area is improved and has been improved since the time 

and Ramsey's house, being parallel to Plum Hollow Road. Thus, the portion of the Ramsey 

and Exhibit 124, the Mary Trotter line crosses the Ramsey property between Plum Hollow Road 

) 

•" 
9 

pursuant to Fraker Exhibit A-1. 

property that lies outside of the Encroachment Area, the boundary is established by the black line 

by adverse possession. As to the boundary line between the Dillmans and the Hunting Club's 

acquired title to all land described within their Deed that intersects with the· Encroachment Area 

Encroachment Area is the black line on Fraker Exhibit A-1. Accordingly, the Dlllmans have 

establishes that the boundary between the Hunting Club and the Dillmans that lies outside the 

is displayed as the black line on Fraker Exhibit A-1. Mr. Englerth's undisputed testimony 

Dillmans' deed. He concluded that the property line between the Hunting Club and the Dillmans 

monuments corresponding to the property lines described in the Hunting Club deed and the 

Mr. Witter. Mr. Englerth testified that in constructing the exhibit he found numerous field 

construction of the line and his testimony was not challenged by the Plaintiffs' expert witness, 

deeds of the Plaintiffs and Defendants in the case, and he further testified in detail regarding his 

this boundary line. Mr. Englerth testified that he constructed Fraker Exhibit A-1 based upon the 

Hunting Club's property that is not within the Encroachment Area. Mr. Englerth testified as to 

There is also a question relating to the boundary of the Dillmans' property and the 

possession of that property tacks onto the possession of their predecessor in title, Fraker. 

purported to convey property within the Encroachment Area and therefore the Dillmans' 

possessed the land. As with the other deeds the deed conveying the property to the Dillmans 

intersects with the Encroachment Area is improved and therefore the Dillmans have adversely 

N.T. May 19, 2011 at 115. Thus, the Court concludes that the area of the Dillman's property that 

Trotter line, Allen Henry testified that "it is clear I think it is between the garage and the road." 

. 

' 

) 
10 

The boundaries of the parties' respective properties will be set according to the foregoing 

discussion. An Order consistent with this Opinion is attached. 

CONCLUSION 

. . ' 

) 

~ 1 , J 
" " i 

j 

1------ 

EXHIBIT 

l 

INTERIM NON-APPEALABLE ORDER 

Y/J 

NOW TffiS . {, day of February 2014, the Court hereby aiders that the attached 

Judge: Douglas W. Heiman 

Larry J. Dillman and Tina M. Dillman,' 

His wifo, Bonnie M, Mllfo1·, widow and 

Dualne A. Ramsey, single 

Defendants 

vs. No. 274-2006 C 

. 

Plum Hollow Hunting Club, Inc., Civil Action -Law 

Pfointiff 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PiEAS OF THE 39TH JlJ'DlCIAL DISTRJCT 

· OF PENNSYLVANIA ~ FULTON COlJNTY :BRANCH 

Judge: Douglas W. Herman 

vs. 

J. Ronald Fraker, Dulce Burger Hall, 

Bonnie M. Miller, Dualne A. Ramsay, single 

Ramsey, single, and Larry J. Dillman and 

Tina M. Dillman, hts wife, 

Defendants 

No. 376~2008 ~C ) 

Plaintiffli 

Plum Hollow Hunting Club, Inc., Civil Action -Law 

And Douglas Henry, 

lN 'l'HE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF THE 39TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

OF PENNSYLVANIA M FULTON COUNTY BRANCH 

Defendant Judge: Douglas W. Herman 

Janot M. Fraker, 

vs. No. 40 of2009 C 

Plaintiffs 

Plum Hollow Hunting Club, Inc., Civil Action - Law 

And Douglas Henry> 

IN THE COURT OF OOMMON PLEAS O}i' THE ;39TI-I ronrcnr, DISTRlCT 

OF PENNSYLVANIA - FULTON COUNTY BRANCH 

•I 

Circulated 07/14/2016 01:45 PM
2 

The Prothonotary shall give notice to: 

J. McDowell Sharpe, Esquire 

William C. Cramer, Esquire 

Joseph A. Macaluso, Esquire 

David A. Ody, Esquire, for Tina M. Dillman 

Pro Se Defendant Larry J. Dillman 

Pro Se Defendant Bonnie M. Miller 

Matthew Sembach, Esquire 

By the Court, 

Pursuant to the requirements of Pa.R.C.P. 236 (a)(2},(b),(d), the Prothonotary shall give 

written notice of the entry of this Order, including a copy of this Order, to each parties' attorney 

of record and shall note in the docket the giving of such notice and the time and manner thereof. 

Pennsylvania. 

o'clock, p,m, in the Courtroom of the Fulton County Courthouse, McConnellsburg, 

appear before the Court for a settlement conference on Tuesday, February 25, 2014 at 2:30 

TRE COURT HEREBY directs that counsel for the parties and the prose defendants will 

remaining boundaries. 

possession the Court request that the parties attempt to reach a mutual agreements to .the 

not decide all the issues raised by the parties. Specifically, with regard to the issue of adverse 

Opinion be filed of record. This is not a final appealable Order for the reason that the Court did 

) 

) 
PPINJON 

Honorable Douglas W. Herman 

Larry J. Dillman and Tina M. Dillman, 

his wife, Bonnie M. Miller, widow, and 

Duiane A. Ramsey, single 

Defendants 

v. No, 274 of2006-C 

Plum Hollow Hunting Club, Inc., and, Civil Action - Law 

Plaintiff 

lN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF THE 39TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT . 

OF PENNSYLV.ANfA..:::FULTON COUNTY .BRANCH 

Honorable Douglas W. Herman' 

J. Ronald Fraker, Duke Burger Hall, · 

Bonnie M. Miller, Michael R. Weaver and 

Rhonda R. Weaver, his wife, Duaine'A. 

Ramsey, single, and Larry J. Dillman and . 

Tina NI\ Dillman, his wife, 

Defendants 

v. No. 376 of 2008-C 

Plum Hollow Hunting Club, Inc., and, Civil Action .; Law 

Douglas A. H~ 

Plaintiffs 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF THE 39TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

OF PENNSYLVANIA'- FUl,TON COUNTY BRANCH: 

Honorable Douglas W. Herman 

Janet M. Fraker 

Defendant . 

v. 

Plum Hollow Hunting Ch1b, Inc., and, Civil Action - Law 

Douglas A. Hem,y 

Plaintiffs 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF THE 39TM JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

OF PENNSYLVANIA-FULTON COUNTY BRANCH 

, · 
2. 

I As more fully discussed irfra, the Defendants have done nothing to rebut the foregoing conclusions of 

fact. 

Findings of l?act1 

law: 

the arguments of counsel, the Court enters the following findings of fact and conclusions 

not appear or present any testimony. Upon consideration of all evidence of record and 

131 for Defendant Duaine Ramsey. The remaining defendants, despite proper notice, did 

to 114 for Defendant Larry J, Dillman and Notes of Testimony) July 29, 2011, p, 114 to 

own, they did testify on their own behalf, See Notes of Testimony, July 29, 2011, p, 74 

actively participate in tho cross examination of witnesses or present any witnesses of their 

Sharpe and Sharpe, LLP. Defendant Janet M, Fraker was represented by Joseph A· 

Macaluso, Esqulre and Defendant J. Ronald Fraker was represented by William C. 

Cramer, Esquire. While Defendants, Larry J. Dillman and Duaine Ramsey did not 

Inc. and Douglas A. Henry were represented by J. McDowell, Sharpe and the law firm of 

18! 2009. In No. 376-2008 Defendant's Answer was filed on January 2(), 2009. In No. 

200~-274 Defendant Larry Dlllman's Answer was filed November 2, 2006. 

The Court convened a bench trial on May 18 to May 2012011, July 26, 2011, July 

29, 2011 and August 25, 2011. Throughout trial Plaintiffs, Plum Hollow Hunting Club, 

Defendant's Answer with New Matter and Counterclaim in No. 40~2009 was filed March 

2008), and February 5, 2009 (No. 40-2009) the Plaintiffs filed Complaints, The 

simultaneously. On September 12, 2006 (No. ~006-274)1 November 14, 2008 (No, 376- 

Before the Court are three separate causes of action that are being considered 

Procedural Histocr 

) 

) 
3 

Exhibit 22. 

County, completed a survey of the Mary Trotter Warrant on March 12, 1794. Plainftffe' 

Register under :fue heading "Bedford County". Plaintiffs' Exhibit 24. 

7. · George Woods Jr., in his capacity as Deputy Surveyor for Bedford 

6. The Trotter-Fish warrants were indexed and registered in the Warrant 

County. Plaintiffs' Exhibit JOO. 

land adjoining land granted to Mary Trotter the same day in Dublin Township, Bedford 

5. The warrant issued to Elwin Fish on March 1, 1794, was for 400 acres of 

County. Plaintifft' Exhibit 2 3. 

land adjoining land granted to John Trotter the same day in Dublin Township, Bedford 

4. The warrant issued to Mary Trotter on March 1, 1794 was for 400 acres of 

County. Plaintiffs, Exhibit 42. 

3, The warrant issued to John Trotter on March 1, 1794 was for 409 acres of 

land adjoining land granted to William Rhea the same day in Dublin Township, Bedford 

Fulton County), Pennsylvania. 

each secured a warrant for 400 ecres of land in Dublin Township, Bedford County (now 

2. John Trotter, Mary Trotter, and Elwin Fish (hereinafter "Irotter-Fish'') 

Exhibit 25. 

.. 

Trotter, and Elwin Fish was processed by the Land Office on March 1, 1794 and resulted · 

in the issuance of a warrant for John Trotter, Mary Trotter, and Elwin Fish. Plaintiffs I 

I. An application for thirty (30) warrants, including John Trotter, Mary 
4 

8. The Mary Trotter Warrant was patented for 440 acres plus a six percent 

(6%) allowance for roads, Said patent was enrolled on June 261\ 1805. Plaintiffs' 

Exhibit 20. 

9. George Woods Jr., in his capacity as Deputy Surveyor for Bedford 

County, completed a survey of the John Trotter Warrant on Match 12, 1794. Plaintiffs' 

Exhibit 41. 

10. The John Trotter Wan-ant was patented for 425 acres plus a six percent 

(6%) allowance for roads. Said patent was entered on September 30th, 1805. Plaintiffe' 

Exhibtt40. 

11. George Woods Jr., in his capacity as Deputy Surveyor for Bedford 

County, completed a survey of the Elwin Fish Warrant on March 12, 1794. Platntiffs' 

) · Exhibit 100, p. 2. · 

12. The Elwin Fish Warrant was patented tor 436 acres and 34 perches plus a 

six percent (6%) allowance for roads. Said patent was enrolled on June 25th, 1805. 

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 100, p. 1. 

· 13. The Trotter-Fish patents were indexed and entered into the Patent 

Register. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 21, p. 1-2. 

14. The description in the patent of the M1:11y Trotter Warrant to Ezekiel King 

contains. errors such that the patent does not close. All calls, courses and distances in the 

Mary Trotter survey are the same as those in the Mary Trotter patent. Plaintiffs 'Exhibits 

20, 22. 

15. The Mary Trotter survey and the John Trotter survey share a part of a 

common boundary with the bearing in the John Trotter survey calling for North 56 West. 
5 

21. By making the adjustments in the courses and adjusting for the closure 

error, the Mary Trotter patent description closes, the survey is minored, and the plotted 

acreage of the patent is 467.67 acres. Plainli/fe' Bxhibit 146. 

Notes of Testimony, July 26, 2011, p. 15. 

20. After the course is corrected to match the John Trotter bearing and the 

course is transposed to mirror the angle on the survey, there is an error of closure of 

25.77 perches along the eastern boundary of the Mary Trotter boundary. Plaintiffs' 

Exhibit 121. 

16, On the depiction shown on the Mary Trotter survey, the angle between the 

line with bearing North 25 East and the line with bearing North 46 West is nearly right 

angle in the official survey. Plaintiffi' Exhibits 22J 121. 

17. A plot of the Mary Trotter patent using North 46 West shows an angle that 

is not a right angle but rather an obtuse angle. Holding that course to North 46 West 

moves the property lines on the adjacent boundary between Mary Trotter and Elwin Fish 

to the error and changing the course to North 64 West makes the line match the historical 

and existing property lines. Plaintiffs' Bxhibit 146. 

18. The Thomas Stinson Patent, which Hes to the south of this course and 

bearing, as more tuily described Infra, made the transposition from North 46 West to 

North 64 West. The Deed. of 1827 and the Deed of 1865 make a similar change. 

l 9. Transposition of digits in a number is a common error in drafting a survey. 

The bearing in the MaryTrotter survey calls for South 56 West Plaintiffs' Bxhibtts 39, 

40. 

) 
6 

l Referred to as tho "Hom" 

Relating to the-location of the Mary Trotter Patent 

23. George Woods Jr. in his capacity as Deputy Surveyor for Bedford County, 

completed the surveys on March 12, ·1794 upon 1:he "Trotter-Fish" warrants issued on 

March I> 1794, with the Mary Trotter warrant depending on the John Trotter warrant and 

the Elwin Fish depending on the Mary 'Irotterwerrant; the John Trotter warrant calls for 

the Mary Trotter warrant and the Mary Trotter warrant calls for the Elwin Fish warrant. 

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 121. 

24. Plaintiff's expert, Timothy Witter, was able to locate sufficient points to 

) locate the Mary Trotter patent, and the John Trotter and Elwin Fish patents, which he 

used to locate the Mary Trotter patent. More specifically: 

a. He located a point at a common comer, referred to as the "Four 

Corners" in which the northwest corner of the Mary Trotter patent and the southwest 

comer of the Elwin Fish patent meet the northeastern comer of the Thomas Stinson 

patent and the southeastern comer of the Charles Sewell patent. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 123. 

b. He located a planted stone in the western boundary of the Elwin 

Fish patent. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 122. 

c. The existence of fence fragments adjacent to the area described by 

too Deed of 18652• Plaintiffs' Exhlbtts 124,_ 127, 13 3 

d, The location of the Survey of 1865, P latntiffs 'Exhibits 60, 123. 

22. The Mary Trotter Patent is the final link in the chain of title for Plaintiff 

Plum Hollow Hunting Club, Inc., Plaintiff Douglas A. Henry and Defendant Janet M. 

Fraker. 

) 
7 

(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 22) and as still exists on the ground now provides a physical limitation 

27. The existence of the stream as shown on the Survey of Mary Trotter 

in the chain oftitl~ referred to as the "Henry Farm". 

Exhibit 58. On Febt.t:1ary 26, 1869, Ramsey conveyed to William, Peters the parcel north 

of the road ~th a- description using adloiners, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 59. This parcel is now 

Littleton Road to :tl;.omas Walkeu_ln the Deed of 1865 as demonstrated by Plaintiff's 

common boundary 'between the two tracts. Ramsey conveyed the parcel south of the 

(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 60) subdivided a parcel ;of land out of the Thomas Stinson survey into 

a tract with three (:3~·courses in the· Littleton Road as a new monument, operating as the 

Elwln Fish and the uorthem boundary of'the Mary Trotter patent runs along the southern 

boundary of the Elwin Fish patent. Plaintiffs' Bxhibit 131. 

. 26. · A survey made for Ephraim Ramsey by A.J. Fot~ on November 24, l 865 

25. Mary Trotter's northwest comer ls the same as the southwest comer of 

I ) ' 

I 

oak. Plaintiffs' ExhfbJt 123. · ,, 

h. · The comer agreed on, with Defendant J ... Ronald Fraker at a white 

and :r. 

g, The location of the Holland tract. Plaintiffs' Bxhibits 54, 123, JI 7; 

Exhibtt 124 ,. 

Trotter patent at the Horn on the South 25 W~st (North 25 East).16 perch line, Plaintiffs' 

and was able ~o establish the location of that boundary line. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 125 

· f. · His location of the tributary of the f.lum Run in the area that would 

cross the eastern boundary of the Thomas Stinson patent/westeni boundary of the Mazy 

e. He surveyed along the southern border of the John Trotter patent 
I t 

8 

a second tract to the north conveyed to James Appleby (hereinafter "Appleby Traer) in 

(hereinafter ''A.G. Kerlin Tract") in 1917, containing ninety (90) acres, more or less, and 

made by Owen H. Anderson and Opal, his wife, with one tract conveyed to A.G. Kerlin 

Hollow") can be traced to two (2) adjoining tracts of land first described by a subdivision 

32. The record title for Plum Hollow Hunting Club, Inc, (hereinafter "Plum 

discussed irfra.. 

Relating to Plum.Hollow Hunting Club, Inc. 's Chain of!ltle to Owen Anderson 

Trotter patent as discussed i:iffea and the northern portion of'theAppleby Tract of Plum 

Hollow's real estate is also located within the boundary of the Mary Trotter patent as 

3 I. All of Defendant-Janet M. Fraker's real estate ls located within the Mary 

Testimony, July 26, 2011, p. 148. · 

30. · The location of.the Mary Trotter patent is fixed as set forth on Exhibit A 

of Plaihtiffe' Exhibit J 21 and supported by Platntiffs 'Bxhibits 1'22~ 125. 

: ~ . 

recent metes and bounds description of Defendant J. Ronald Fraker' s title; See Notes of 

29. Defendants' expert Thomas Englerth> specifically agreed to the Plaintiffs' 

expert location.of the Deed of 1865 which constitutes, until ths Survey of 1916, the most 

Stinson 's survey which also failed ta include the road frontage. 

regarding the road in the Hom area thereby concurring with his processor Thomas 

those in the western boundary of the Mary Trotter survey. Plaintljfs' &hibit J 33. The 

Walker descriptiot1 includes the Littleton Road as a monument on the north but is silent 

28. The courses describing the eastern boundary of the Walker tract match 

that requirea the stream to intersect the western boundary of the Hom of Mary Trotter, 

Platntiffe J E.thibJi 124. 

) 

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9 

Harrison Grove Adm. CTA of Ephraim Anderson by deed dated June 25, 1911, 

These two (2) tracts were combined and subdivided using a different common boundary 

into the Appleby Tract and the A.G. Kerlin 'Iract as dis~ / ,j ~ 

2, 

36. Celia Anderson acquired title to the real estate described supra from 

(formerly Celia Anderson), The Garland deed called for the Elliott Fleming heirs as an 

adjoiner who is in the JRF grantee chain and Elijah Baldwin who is in the JRM chain. 

(Platntiffe 'Exhibit 9), containing 180 acres, more or less, sold as the land of Celia Sipes 

from Job L. Garland, High Sheriff of Fulton County (hereinafter "Garland Deed,') 

deed, containing 140 acres, more or less, and a second deed for an adjoining tract of land 

of Owen Anderson (later the Appleby Tract) on the north. Plaintiffs I Exhibit 34. 

,Relating to Plum Hollow Hunting Club. Inc:s Chain of Title from Owen Anderson 

through James Kerlin 

35. Owen H. Anderson acquired title from his mother Celia Anderson by 

call for any adj oiner in Defendants' chains of title. The deed does not call for other lands 

subsequent deed in an unbroken chain of title (hereinafter "A.G. Kerlin Chain") does not 

(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 34), dated May 29, 1917, calls for Elijah Baldwin on the east, but each 

34. The deed for the A.G. Kerlin Tract (hereinafter "A.G. Kerlin Deed") 

the JMF chain of title (hereinafter "JMF chain"). See Platnttffs I Exhibit 8. 

grantees chain of title (hereinafter "JRF grantee chain"), and also calls for an adjoin er In 

chain of title (hereafter "Appleby Chain"), calls for adjoiner found in the J. Ronald Fraker 

Exhibit 8), dated Match 22, 1919, and each subsequent deed thereafter, in an unbroken 

33. The deed for the Appleby Tract (hereinafter "Appleby Tract") (Plaintiffs·· 

more or less, as discussed trfra. 

· 1919, containing 180 acres, more or less. The Appleby Tract actually contains 230 acres, 

• t 

) 
10 

containing 286 acres, more 01· less, and consisting of two (2) adjoining parcels, See 

Plaintiffs' Exhibit I J. The Grove deed called for T,B. Fleming heirs or devisees as 

adjoiners to the north in the JRF grantee chain and for Elijah Baldwin as adjoiner on the 

east in the JRM chain. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 11. 

37, No deed of record was found into Ephraim Anderson, but the following 

recitals found in the respective deeds reference the deed(s) from James Kerlin to Ephraim 

Anderson for the two (2) adjoining tracts in the Grove Deed. 

a. The Anderson deed, identified as Plaintiff's Exhibit Number I 0, 

recites, "being the same land which was conveyed by Samuel Kelso, Executor of John P. 

Baker to James Kerlin by deed dated April 6, AD., 1869 and conveyed by James Kerlin 

to Ephraim Anderson and the said Anderson died seized of the same land after having 

made his last wi1I and testament." Plaintiffs' Exhibit Number 10 .. 

b, The Appleby Deed, labeled as Plaintiff's Exhibit 8, recites that it is 

identified as Plaintiffs Exhibit 8, "part of the same land which James Kerlin died seized 

and afterwards becoming the property of Celia Anderson and later Celia Sipes." 

Plaintiffs' Exhibit Number 8, p. 2. 

c. The A.G. Kerlin Deed, labeled as Plaintiffs Exhibit 34, recites that 

it is "part of the same land which was conveyed by James Kerlin To Ephraim Anderson 

by deed dated April ·6, 1869 and the said Ephraim Anderson having died testate the same 

lands became vested in Celia Anderson." Plaintiffs' Exhibtt Number 34. 

38. Celia Anderson', who is a remote granter for all of Plum Hollow's real 

estate, was the daughter of James Kerlin and the mother of Owen Anderson. See 

Plaintiffs' Exhibtt Number 9, p. 4 and Plaintiffs' Exhibit Number 12, p. 3. 

) 

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11 

bounds, and quantity. The description for the Deed of 1827 started with the northern 

42. The Deed of l 827 contains a description using adjoiners, metes and 

Relating to What and Where the Boundary of the Deed of 1827 is a Matter of Law 

Mary Trotter by Dennis O'Connor. 

page 68-3. Plaintiff's Exhibit 18. There is no record of any other conveyance of lands of 

28, 1827 (hereinafter "Deed of 1827") as recorded in the Bedford County Deed Book R, 

(Dennis of James O'Conner and Dennis of Bernard O'Conner), by deed dated December 

Trotter tract to two (2) of his sons, Bernard and James, in trust for his two (2) grandsons 

41. Prior to his death, Dennis O'Connor conveyed 315 acres of the Mary 

Dublin Towship, Fulton County. Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19. 

his estate conveyed all his remaining intereat in those two tracts lying within what is now 

estate surveyed in the name of John Trotter and that Purpart No. 1 and Purpart No. 3 in 

40. Dennis O'Conner had an unbroken chain of title back to a patented tract of. 

real estate surveyed in the name of Mary Trotter and to an adjacent patented tract of real 

from the JRM chain, as the adjoiner to the east. 

grantee chain, as an adjoiner on the north and for Mary Trotter, now George Chestnut, 

time of his death. The O'Connor partition called for Thomas Stinson> from the JRF 

from him during his lifetime and that there was no record that he owned these tracts at the 

page 53. Plaintiffs' Exhibtt Number I 7, p. 4. There are no recorded deeds for these tracts 

Bedford County, Pennsylvania, as contained in Bedford County Orphans Court Book 8, 

Purpart No. 1 and Purpart No. 3 in the partition of the estate of Dennis O 'Conner in 

Relating to Plum Hollow Hunting Club. Inc.' s Chain of Title from Kerlin to Mary Trotte~ 

· and John Trotter 

39. James Kerlin had an unbroken chain of title to real estate designated as 

I I' 

} 
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12 

boundary; then the eastern boundary, followed by the southern boundary, and finally 

western boundary. A plot of that description does not close. Plaintiffs' Exhibit Number 

106, p. 1. 

43. The habendum clause in the Deed of 1827 recites inter alia, "To have and 

to hold the said part of Mary Trotter containing three hundred and fifteen acres of land .. 

.U Plaintiffs' Exhibi; ]06, p. 1. The plot includes only 194.4018 acres, This is part of the 

tract situated on the eastern side of Clear Ridge, Dublin Township, Bedford County. 

44. The description in the McDowell Mortgage, the oldest record in JMF's 

chain bears distinct similarities in its courses and distances to the Deed of 1827 from 

Dennis O'Conner, so that JMF's boundary encompasses the portion of the Deed of 1827 

along its eastern boundary which had conveyed· a total of 315 acres of the Mary Trotter 

tract, less the portions in the northwest corner which were occupied by Simpson C. 

Carmack, Plaintifft' Exhibit Numbers 18, 75, 116. 

45. The description in the Deed of 1827 recites, "Beginning at a white oak, 

thence by land of Elwin Fish South Sixty degrees East three hundred and sixteen perches 

to a white oak." Plaintiffs' Exhibit 18. This length is the same length as the Elwin Fish 

patent and represents the total division line between the Mary Trotter Warrant and the 

Elwin Fish Warrant. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 116, p. I. 

46. The description of the Deed of 1827 goes outside of the eastern boundary 

of the Mary Trotter patent but does not end at the land of Robert Lodge which is the 

purported owner of the junior patent to the south oftbe Mary Trotter patent. Thus, the 

eastern boundary of the Deed of 1827 runs the entire length of the eastern boundary of 

the Mary Trotter patent. Platntiffs' Exhibit 116, p. 2. 

.. ) 
13 

47, The northern boundary of Robert Lodge has a bearing ofN 56 W, 

however, the description in the Deed of 1827 does not contain a boundary line with this 

bearing, but instead contains as its next course, "North twenty five and one half degrees 

East one hundred and thirty perches to a Chestnut Oak, thence by the residue of Land of 

Mary Trotter North fifty six degrees West sixty nine perches to a white oak , , •. " 

48. The next course is "North twenty five degrees East sixteen perches to a 

white oak, thence by land of William Justice dec'd, ... " 

49. The last three (3) courses in the Deed of 1827 match three of the courses 

in the Mary Trotter survey calling "along William Justice." The boundary lines that call 

for William Justice dec'd are N 64 W 36 perches (594 feet) N 15 W 38 perches (627 

feet). and N 8 E 110 perches (1815 feet), Plaintiffs· Exhibit Number 18. 

Relating to the extent of Plum Hollow Hunting Club, Inc. 's Chain of Title 

50. The deed from Anderson to Appleby (hereinafter "Appleby Deed") 

contains 'a description that includes monuments, adjoiner, metes and bounds, and 

quantity, See Plaint{ffe' Exhibit 8, 105. This.description encompasses Clear-Ridge Road, 

. The plot of the description in the deed, calculates a quantity of230.0716 acres as opposed 

to the quantity stated in the deed as 180 acres, more or less. Plaintiffs' Exhtblt l 05, p. 4. 

Neither the metes and bounds given for the boundary in common with the Elliot Fleming 

heirs, from JRF'8 chain of title, nor the metes and bounds given for the boundary in 

common with Elijah Baldwin, from JMF's chain of title match. 

51. The recitals in each deed in the chain of title subsequent to the Appleby 

Deed recite that each granter conveyed the same land as the granter had acquired. 

Platntifft 'Exhibits J .:7. 

) 

I 11 
. I 

No. 3. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 17, p. 4. 

. . 

57. Purpart No. I contains the entire residue of the Mary Trotter p~tent, except 

for a small triangle of uncertain and undefined size at the north eastern comer of Pnrpart 

105,p.12. 

controlling instead of the lines of the Mary Trotter patent. Plaintiffe' Exhibits 17, p. 4, 

56. The partition survey adopted the lines of the Thomas Stinson patent as 

the John Trotter patent. 

boundary of the Mary Trotter patent by 40 perches and is outside the eastern boundary of 

the east-west boundary line on the eastern boundary of the partition breaches the southern 

and the partition of his real estate in his Estate. Plaintiffs 'Exhibit 17, p. 4. On its face, 

55. The partition survey does not accurately depict the boundaries of the 

) residue of the Mary Trotter patent as owned by Dennis O'Conner at the time of his death 

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 17, p. 4. 

14 

O'Connor (elder) owned in what is now Dublin Township, Fulton County, Pennsylvania. 

54. Purpart No. 1 and Purpart No. 3 comprise all the land that Dennis 

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 17, p. 4. 

well as all real estate he still owned from the John Trotter patent, as part of his estate. 

the real estate he still owned from the Mary Trotter patent (hereinafter the "Residue") as 

· 53. At the time of Dennis O'Connor's death, the Orphan's Court portioned all 

northern portion of PurpartNo. 3 from the Estate of Dennis O'Connor (elder) through the 

Appleby chain.' Plain tiffs' Exhibit 105, p. 11. 

52, Plum Hollow's deed description encompasses all of Purpart No. 1 and the 
15 

58. The Deed of 1865, identified as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 58, from JRF's chain of 

title calls for James Kerlin as at least a southern adjoiner and the deed of 1868 from 

Foster M. Bergstresser to Elijah Baldwin Jr. in the JMF chain of title calls for James 

Kerlin as an adjoiner on its western boundary establishing the relative historical boundary 

position of Plum Hollow as successor to James Kerlin. 

59. The most recent survey for the real estate to which Plum Hollow has 

record title, the survey of 1969 by Albert Larserr' (hereinafter "Survey of 1969") shows 

JRF's granter, JMF,s predecessor in title, and Henry's predecessor in title as adjoiners, 

but also locates part of Plum Hollow's southern and eastern boundary with its corner at a 

stone pile in land outside the boundaries of both the Mary Trotter patent and John Trotter 

patent to which Plum Hollow has no known evidence of title. Plaintiffs' Exhibits 121, 

125, 130. 

60. The location of Plum Hollow's real estate through the Appleby Deed is 

fixed by the location of the Clear Ridge Road on the west, real estate of Plum Hollow 

through Barnhart as we all Dale Henry on the south, the common boundary of the Mary 

Trotter patent and the Thomas Stinson patent on the north (as articulated by the Deed of 

186.5), and the boundary established by the Deed of 1827 on the east and northeast, 

6 I. The actual eastern boundary is dependent upon the location of the western 

boundary of JMF. 

Relating to the acreage o:ymed by: Plum Hollow Hunting Club1 Inc., s from Mary Trotter 

62. The southwestern corner of the Mary Trotter patent, as defined by the plot 

is bounded on the north by lands of JRF and his grantees as defined by the Deed of 1865, 

on the east by a line extending from the 16 perch line on the edge of the Hom a dis~ce 

3 The survey Is identitled as Plaintiffs Number 105, p. 2. 

• Jl 
16 

of 1688 feet, on a bearing of S011th 25 Y2 degl'ees West; and then on the south by the 

southern boundary of the Mary Trotter patent a distance of 2951 feet and contains 

49.9414 acres. This land is located within Plum Hollow's boundary as part of the 

Residue. 

63. At the time of his death, Dennis O'Conner (elder) of Bedford County. 

owned 152 acres more or less in the southwestern corner of Mary Trotter, being the 

residue after the conveyance in the Deed of 1827. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 18. 

64. The partition in the Estate of Dennis O'Connor (elder) of Bedford County 

failed to account fol' 01· adequately describe the residue he owned within the Mary Trotter 

patent by metes and bounds. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 17. p. 4. 

Relatill_g to Douglas Henry's Title 

65. The record title for Douglas Henry (hereinafter "Henry") Isfor a parcel of 

land (hereinafter "Henry Parcel") first described in a deed from Collins M. Shade and 

Julia A. Shade, his wife, dated November 13, 1970, and was part of a larger tract of land 

(hereinafter "Shade Tract"). Plaint(fls 'Exhibit 44. 

66. The description for the Shade Tract can be traced through Lavada Kerlin 

to a deed (hereinafter "Myers Deed"), dated October 2, 1903, from George .w. Myers and 

Jennie Myers, his wife, to A.G. Kerlin. Plainttffs' Exhibit 48. 

67, The Myers Deed recites, "[cjontaining twenty nine acres and seventy three 

perches (29 A 73 P) and allowances. This being a partof a tract of land conveyed by 

deed to Benjamin F. Myers and Barbara Myers by Mary A. Carmack the thirteenth day of 

Dec AD 1871 and properly acknowledged before James Fields, a Justice of the Peace 

and conveyed to George W. Myers party hereto by the last wil1 and testament of his 

) 
17 

grantees' chain of title, but does not call for owners of the Appleby Tract as an adjoiner 

72. The Survey of 1965) calls for "Fleming Land), which is in the JRF 

Myers Deed. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 117, p. 2. 

1965. The courses and distances in this survey do not match the legal description of the 

unrecorded survey by Albert M. Larsen (hereinafter "Survey of 19651') on November 2, 

71. The Shade Tract was subdivided into two adjoining parcels based on an 

Carmack as an adjoiner, 

known as S.B. Carmack, the southern boundary oftpJ~ tract would lie along either the 

Fleming Tract, as defined in paragraph 72 below, or the Appleby Tract. The Deed of 

1865 in the JRF grantee chainthrough Fleming specifically calls-for Simpson B. 

70. AB part of the real estate formerly occupied by Simpson B. Carmack, also 

B. Carmack also known as S.B. Carmack. Platnttffs' Exhibit 50. 

Relating to the Extent of Douglas Hew.'s Title 

69. The Mary A. Carmack listed in Paragraph 65 was the widow of Simpson 

include the Buildings [sic] on my farm." -Plaintiffi:' &htbit 49. 

Thomas B. Fleming and running back to the line between me and Elijah Baldwin so as to 

land off of the South end of my farm commencing at a point on the line between me and 

inter alia, "[fjirst I bequeath to my son George W. Myers Twenty-nine and 1/3 acres of 

. . will of Barbara J. Myers, as found in Fulton County Will Book 2, page 58 that recites 

68. The original description of the Myers Tract is established in the aforesaid 

wife as shown by this deed." Plaintiffs' Exhibit 48, 

McConnellsburg Pa. in the deed book then from George W. Myers.and Jennie Myers his 

mother Mrs. Barbara J. Myers by deed dated May,25, A.D. 1880 and recorded in 

• to 
18 

two and three hundred acres be the same more or less excepting the tract or part of a tract 

Mortgage") contains a metes and bounds .description and recites, "containing between 

from John S. McDowell to John James, dated October 2, 1865 (hereinafter "McDowell 

77. . The earliest record of ownership of the JMF Chain, namely the mortgage 

P laint{ffe 'Exhihtt 120, p. 3. 

incorrectly on theplot as northeast) corner of Mary Trotter that contains 53.4468 acres. 

76, The description in the Baldwin Deed excluded the northwest (labeled . 

Exhibit 117, and the rest was owned by Simpson B. Carmack, also known as S .B. 

owned 11.6057 (11.60) acres as calculated in the plot of his deed, identified as PlatntJ.jfs' 

contained 53.4468 (53.45) acres. Plaintfffe' Exhibit Number 120, p. 3. John Holland 

75. The northwest comer, labeled incorrectly as northeast, of Mary Trotter 

is now included in lands of JMF as the last of the four chains identified in Paragraph 93. 

which is now owned by Lonnie D. Henry. The parcel south of the road was retained and 

parcel north of the Plum Hollow Road, which was first conveyed to Angelo Kaleyias 

the Plum Holiow Road as the common boundary. By a regular chain of conveyances, the 

74. Cecil Fraker subsequently subdivided his parcel into two parcels and used 

Cecil Fraker dated November 13, 1965. Plaintiffs' Exhibit Number 117, p, 2. 

of land (hereinafter "Cecil Fraker Parcel") as shown on the Survey of 1965, by deed to 

73. Collins M. Shade and Julia A. Shade, his wife, conveyed aspeciflc parcel 

performed or supervised both surveys. 

Shade as an adjoiner of the Appleby Tract. The same surveyor, Albert Larsen P.E., 

of Shade. The Survey of 1969, identified as Plaintiffs' Exhibit Number J OS, p, 2, shows 

\ 

j 

' j 

) 

) 
19 

Plaintiffs' Exhibit Number 52. 

Fleming, deceased, was sold at public sale by her estate (hereinafter "Fleming Tract"). 

made in 1976 (hereinafter "Survey of 1976") after the real property of Zelpha G. 

he later conveyed to his grantees, is first described as a result of an unrecorded survey 

for which J. Ronald Fraker (hereinafter,~ JRF'')' held record title, and subsequently which 

82. The description of the real estate, and the plot thereof with adjoiners listed, 

Relating to J. Ronald Fraker and his Grantees' Title 

O'Connor's partitioned real estate and the Mary Trotter patent boundary confirmed by the 

Deed of I 865 which conveyed the lands of Thomas Stinson, Henry owns all lands not 

owned by Plum Hollow. 

81. To the extent that the there is a gap between the lands of the Dennis 

80. The call in Mary Trotter is for 34 perches; the call of Thomas Stinson is 

for .41 perches and Larsen extends the call of Shade to 60 perches. 

and cannot be defined through the existing descriptions, monuments or adjoiners. 

79 The precise boundary between Plum Hollow and Henry has never been 

description. 

corner, giving Carmack and his grantees approximately 103.45 acres in the Northwest 

corner of Mary Trotter outside the scope of the Mcllowell Mortgage metes and bounds 

is in addition to the real estate already possessed by S.B. Carmack in the Northwest 

78. The fifty (50) acre reservation to Simpson B. Carmack, as denoted supra; 

conveyed by Geo. Chestnut & wife to Thos, Hust~(~~-;-in the possession of Simpson 

B. Carmak containing about fifty acres," Plaintiffs' Bxhibt: Number 75. 

I 

) 

) 

t ,, 
20 

83. AU conveyances with the Zelpha G. Fleming chain of title back to the 

deed from Robert J. Fleming, Executor of Thomas E. Fleming, dated January 13, 1912, 

recite that they were conveying the same tract of land as the prior deed and used a . 

description by adjoiners only, and called the tract the "old mansion farm,'. Plaintifft' 

&hibft Numbers 52~55. 

84. Thomas E. Fleming acquired his title by will of Thomas Welker, also 

known as Thomas Walker as found in Fulton County Will Book 1, page 457 and recites 

inter alia, "Item i. Bequeath unto my beloved friend Thomas E. Fleming the mansion 

property that I now live on to have and bold it and to be his own property." Plaintiffs' 

Exhibit 56. 

85. By deed dated December 16, 1865, a~ found in Fulton County Deed Book 

4, page 506 (hereinafter "Deed of 1865"), Ephraim Ramsey conveyed all that tract or 

parcel of land situate in Dublin Township, County of Fulton, Pennsylvania to Thomas 

Walker. A plot of the Deed of 1865 with the designated adjoiners represents the 

shape/configuration of the description in the deed. Plainttffs' Exhibi; 58. 

86. Ephraim Ramsey obtained his tract from the real estate patented in the 

name of Thomas Stinson. The warrant issued to Thomas Stinson on September 12, 1839 

was for 155 acres of land acljoining lands of John Holland on the North, Dennis 

O'Connor Jr, on the west, Dennis O'Connor Sr. on the South, and the heirs of Patrick 

Coulter on the East in Dublin Township, Bedford County. Plaintiffs Exhibit Number 66. 

The survey for the "Thomas Stinson warrant" was completed by Michael Reed, Deputy 

Surveyor, Bedford County on November 21 & 22, 1839. The Draft of Survey appears in 

the Pennsylvania State Archives, Copied Survey Book C20~. page 226 as containing 168 

) 

) 
21 

91. The description in the Deed of 18 65, was made more than 70 YeEU's after 

the Mary Trotter survey and Its eastern boundary conforms to the western boundary of 

Mary natter around the Hom with the exception of a monument being a white oak 

acres and 138 perches with percent allowance for roads. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 65. Tho 

"Thomas Stinson Wan·ant''was patented by Thomas Stinson on January 13, 1845. A 

copy of the patent appears in Pennsylvania State Archives Patent Book H45, page 285. 

Plaintiffs I Exhibit 64. 

Relating to the extent ofJ. Ronald Fraker's Title 

87. The Survey of 1976 upon which the boundary claimed by JRF and his 

grantees is based does not use the monuments from the Survey of 1969 which is used to 

describe the real estate of Plum Hollow. Likewise, Plum Hollow's deed descriptions 

have never used the monuments from the Survey 1976. The Survey of 1976 does not 

conform to the description of the real estate set forth in the Deed of 186.5. 

88. The adjoiners in the Fleming Deed are consistent with the actual adjoiners. 

A plot of the Surveyof 1976 with the designated adjoiners represents the 

shape/configuration of the description for the survey, Plalntifft I Exhibit 108. 

89. Defendants failed to show how the record title held by Zelpha G, Fleming 

at the time of her death produced the description established by the Survey of 1976. 

90. The common source of title between JRF grantees and Plaintiffs is the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the title for the JRF grantees can be traced through 

the Thomas Stinson patent and Plaintiffs title can be traced through the Mary Trotter 

· patent. 

. ,. 

) 
22 

to Cecil Fraker by Deed dated November 13, I 965, recorded in Fulton County Deed 

Being a portion of the lands conveyed by Collins M. Shade and Julia A. Shade, his wife, 

recorded in Fulton County Deed Book 89, page 218 (hereinafter "Scouts Deed"); and 

Scouts of America to Cecil F. Fraker and Kenneth L. Fraker by Deed dated 1978, 

"Stevens Deed"); Being all the same lands conveyed by Mason-Dixon Council, Inc., Boy 

Tl'act#l in the Deed from Lois Stevens, widow, to Kenneth L. Fraker and Cecil F. Fraker 

dated June 28, 197.5, recorded in Fulton County Deed Book 81, page 384 (hereinafter 

Fulton County Deed Book 64, page 189 (hereinafter "Baldwin Deed"); Being a portion of 

.. 

wife, to Cecil F. Fraker and Kenneth L. Fraker dated September 12, I 957, recorded in 

portion of Tract #1 in the Deed from John Jere Baldwin and Margaret L. Baldwin, his 

from four (4) different chains of title more explicitly recited in the deed as "Being a 

94. The deed with the description taken from the Survey of 1984 (hereinafter 

'~JMF Deed"), labeled as Plaintifft' Exhibit 67, represents that the source of title comes 

jointly owned property. Platntlffs 'Exhibit 67. 

(hereinafter "Survey of 1984") when Kenneth L. Fraker and Cecil F. Fraker divided their 

(hereinafter "JMF") is first described as a result of an unrecorded survey made in 1984 

93. The record title for Janet M. Fraker, also known as Janet L. Fraker 

Relating to Janet M. Fraker's Title 

to JRF or his grantees to lands that come from the patent of Mary Trotter. 

92. There is no record or documentary evidence of record that shows any title 

133. 

instead of a dogwood and a bearing of S 64 E instead of S 46 E. Plairutffs' Exhibits ·127, 
23 

4 Identified as Plain,t(fft' Exhibit 75 

containing about fifty acres. The whole having been conveyed by Geo. Chestnut & wife 

Geo. Chestnut & wife to Thos. Huston, now in the possession of Simpson B. Carmack 

hundred acres be [ sic J same more or Jess excepting the tract or part of a tract conveyed by 

. . 

18654 (heremafter=Mclfowell Mortgage") recites> "containing between two and three 

Mortgage as set forth supra. See Plr.,intiffi' Exhibits 68-74. 

98. A mortgage from John S. McDowell to John James, dated October 2, 

remote granter of Henry, is referred to as Simpson B. Carmack in the McDowell 

to Thomas Huston, now occupied by S.B. Carmack (2 tracts)." S.B. Carmack, who is the 

tract, a tract of fifty acres more or less, which was conveyed by Geo. Chestnut and wife 

recites, "containing between two and three hundred- acres, There is reserved from this 

April 2~ 1866. See Platntiffi 'Exhibit 74. The deed from McDowell to Berkstresser 

of conveyances back to the deed from John S. McDowell to F.M. Berkstresser dated 

97. JMF' s record title for the Baldwin Deed can be traced by a regular chain 

this litigation is the Baldwin Deed. Platntijfs 'Exhibit Number 68. 

litigation. Likewise, the tract of land from Shad is not affected by this litigation, although 

it does lie within the bounds of the Mary Trotter patent. The only title impacted through 

Scouts Deed include lands within the Mary Trotter survey, and are not affected by this 

96. Neither the chain of title for the Stevens Deed nor the chain of title for the 

by the Survey of 1984, 

JMF Deed explained in the preceeding paragraph, produced the description established. 

95. Defendant JMF did not show how the four (4) chains of title cited in the 

Henry's chain. 

Book 71, page 52." The last deed listed is accounted for in Paragraph 72 above as part of 

' I 
24 

5 Identified as Pla/nt(ffe' Exhibit 18. 

6 Identifled as Plalnt!ffe' Exhibit I 16, p. S. 

Road as a common boundary. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 116, p. S. 

JMF Deed 2 describes a tract of land adjacent to the JMP Deed with the Plum Hollow 

Baldwin, his wife, to Cecil F. Fraker and KennthL. Fraker." Plaintiffs' Exhibit 68. The 

"Being a portion ofTract#l in the Deed from John Jere Baldwin and Margaret L. 

101. The deed from Kenneth L. Fraker-and Daphne Fraker, husband and wife, 

and Cecil F. Fraker and JMF, husband and wife to Cecil F. Fraker (now deceased) and 

JMF, husband and wife, dated September 4, 19846 (hereinafter 'fJMF Deed 2'') recites, 

Relating to the extent of Janet M. Fraker's TitJe · 

Hollow. 

100. Dennis O'Conner is the common source of title of JMF as well as Plum 

315 acres of the Mary Trotter tract. Plainttffs' Exhibit 116, p. 10. 

distances to the Deed of 1827 from Dennis O'Conner, so that this title encompasses the 

portion of'the Deed of 18275 along its eastern boundary which had conveyed a total of 

the description in the McDowell Mortgage bears striking similarities in its c~urses and 

99, There is no record evidence showing any title into George Chestnut, but 

.Exhibit 75. 

the deed from Chestnut to Cessna, or a deed from O'Conner to Chestnut. Plaintiffs' 

There is no recordof'the deed from James to McDowell, the deed from Cessna to James, 

to the within named mortgagor, and being part of a survey in the name of Mary Trotter." 

September 1859, conveyed the same to John James, who this day hath conveyed the same 

to John Cessna Esq. by deed dated 13th Sept. 1859, who by deed dated the 19th of 
25 

Relating to Adverse Possession of JMF 

..,..,. 

title from John Jere Baldwin or his predecessors, and further, like the record boundary of 

Plum Hollow, encroaches into land outside the southern boundary of the Mary Trotter 

patent without any evidence of a grant from anyone other than John Jere Baldwin. 

105. Notwithstanding any contrary record boundary, the actual legal boundary 

of JMF on the west as shown in the JMF Deed 2 is limited to the boundary of the Deed of 

1827, less that land in the northwest portion of the Deed (?f 1827 of approximately 103 

acres that became possessed and later owned by Simpson B. Carmack as set forth supra. 

106. The northwest boundary of the Baldwin Deed, after accounting for the 

fifty (50) acre exception in favor of S .B. Carmack, north of the Plum Hollow Road, is 

fixed by the current boundary between Karen S. Grissinger, et al. and Lonnie D. Henry. 

107. JMF owned not more than approximately 212 acres in the 'eastern portion 

of the Mary Trotter patent, which is part of the tract acquired in the Baldwin Deed. 

Plcrintiffs' Exhibit 68. 

102. The descriptions in the McDowell Mortgage and the Baldwin Deed are 

identical after adjusting for different units of measurement (i.e. rods versus perches) and 

the call for a red oak instead of a rock oak. 

I 03. The description· in the Baldwin Deed chain remain fixed for more than 

ninety years, before the Survey of 1984 distorted the configuration produced by the 

description and substantially increased the number of acres without resolving the issues 

associated with the ambiguities found in the Deed of 1827. 

104. The Survey of 1984, which establishes JMF's record boundary, bears no 

semblance to the legal description set forth in the deeds of conveyance in JMF's chain of 

I ' 

) 
I I 

26 

-Coneluslons of Law and Diseussion 

Historical Perspectives 

The matter before the Court is a boundary dispute and the Court will use 

boundary dispute principles to resolve this case. See Hermansen, Knud Everett, 

Boundary Retracement Principles and Procedures for Pennsylvania, (1986) 7, p. 5~2 

("Fl'om the surveyor's viewpoint, evidence has two purposes: (1) to help determine the 

position of the boundary and (2) to explain any ambiguity in the boundary location 

information or field data. The focus of all the information is to determine the location of 

the original boundary.") The Plaintiffs concisely state the nature of this case when they. 

write, ''this case involves the proper legal title [ of] boundaries befuddled by more than a 

1 All books cited in the opinion were obtained from the Widener University Schoo! of Law library system. 

108. There is 110 residence on the real estate owned or claimed by JMF which 

was acquired by her predecessors in the Baldwin Deed. There is no evidence that a 

residence ever existedon this tract of real estate. 

109. The real estate owned or claimed by J1'4F which was acquired by her 

predecessors in the Baldwin Deed is not and has never been fenced. 

110. The real estate owned or claimed by JMF which was acquired by her 

predecessors in the Baldwin Deed is woodlands. 

I 11. Until the genesis of this action, there is no evidence of a boundary dispute 

between JMF or her precessors and Plum Hollow or its predecessors along the common 

boundary, 

112. The common source of title among JMF (Deed of I 827), Plum Hollow 

(Estate of'Dennis O''Conner, the elder), and Henry (Deed of 1827).is Dennis O'Conner 

(the elder). 

) 
27 

century of errors in description and survey. '1 Plaintiffs' Proposed Finding of Fact and 

Conclusions of Law, p. 42. Defendant J.R. Fraker frames the case as simply "that he and 

his successors in title (Dillman, Ramsey, and Miller) are bona fide purchasers who paid a 

valuable consideration for the ground specifically described (by bearings, distances, 

monuments and surveys) within their title deeds of record, after title searches conducted 

by attorneys, and in reliance upon the property descriptions specifically set forth within 

the Fulton County deed records for some sixty (60) years and more." J.R. Fraker's 

Proposed Ftndtngs of Pact and Conclusions of Law, p. 3. 

Prior to getting into the specifics of the c~se, it ls important to understand the 

evolution of boundary dispute law from the beginning. On March 4, 1681, William Penn 

was granted 47,000,000 acres by King Charles II in satisfaction a I 6,000 pound debt 

owed to Penn's father, Admiral Penn. Nicholson, Vincent D., A Treatise on the Law 

Relating to Real Estate in Pennsylvania (1929), p. 4. Following the grant, Penn began to 

sell the land to settlers. Hermansen, p. 3-1. To effectuate the land transfers, Penn 

established the Land Office. Id. 

Under the Divesting Act of 1779 title to the 47,000,000 acres was transferred 

from William Penn's heirs to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in exchange for 

130,000 pounds. Nicholson, p. 5, 10; See also Hermansen, p. 3M2. The Divesting Act 

was passed because following the Revolutionary War Hit was considered incompatible 

with the democratic institutions of the new country for such vast real estate holdings to 

remain in the Penn family." Nicholson, p. 10. 

On April 3rdi 1792, the legislature passed an Act ('~1792 Act") which sold those 

remaining lands owned by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Commonwealth v. 

) 
28 

In Coxe, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained the process of the' 1792 Act. 

First the land was surveyed, and then) in exchange for paying money to the 

Commonwealth and the submission of an appropriate survey, a land purchaser was issued 

a warrant by the land office. Id. at 199, 196, The warrant was considered to be a "sales 

agreement between the proprietors or the Commonwealth on one hand and the citizen 

(applicant) on the other. It also served as an order or authorization for the deputy 

surveyor to perform a survey on behalf of the applicant (warrantee)." Hermansen, 3w9 

( citing Tryon v. Munson, 77 Pa. 250 (1874)). 

At the county level, a "public and official record" was made of all of the 

submitted surveys. Reilly v. Mountain Coal Co., 54 A. 29, 30 (Pa. 1903). The role of the 

land office was merely to act as the local agent for the Commonwealth because the land 

was owned by the Commonwealth. Kelly v, Graham, 9 Watts 116, 117 (Pa. I 839) ('1'he 

officers of the land office are not the proprietors of the lands granted by them, that they 

can grant them without regard to quantity or price. The lands belong to the state; and the 

land officers act only as the agents of the state in disposing of them; and are limited in 

Coxe, 4 U.S. 170 (Pa. 1800). The purpose of the 1792 Act was to encourage settlement 

of rural areas and to fend off hostilities from Native American tribes who, being a threat 

to the land owners, were also deemed a threat to the development and cultivation of rural 

lands. Coxe, 4 U.S. at 196, 199. To accomplish this purpose, the proceeds from the 

wan-ant were used to pay for the militaryto fend off the Native Americans. ~ at 19~. 

The Act further provided that the land purchaser, with limited exceptions, was required to 

make improvement to the land within two (2) years from the date of the warrant. Id. at 

196. 
29 

held that if the patent contains land not em braced by the survey, the patent must be 

Commonwealth had the authority to order a resurvey of the warrant, 14:. Case law hes 

However, if the disparity between the survey and the warrant was so great, the 

of land upon the issuance of the patent. Hagerty v, Mathers, 31 Pa. 348, 355 {1858), 

than what was called for in the warrant, the Commonwealth was paid the excess amount 

If the· survey, following the distances and calls, was found to contain more land 

[t]he patent purports to convey the interests of the Commonwealth or the 

proprietors (granters) to the applicant or his vendee. The patent is evidence to all 

other applicants that the land is no longer vacant and no longer part of the public 

domain. To receive a patent, an applicant was judged by the Commonwealth to 

have complied with all the requirements for appropriating vacant land. The patent 

stands as a resolution regarding the previous proceedings and a dis so Iution of the 

Commonwealth's interest in the land described by the patent. It bars the 

Commonwealth from intervening into future proceedings questioning the title. As 

such, it operates as a quitclaim deed. 

Hermansen, 3-15, 3~17. 

495, 495 (Pa. 1889). Stated another way, 

whose tights, if any, accrued a-ft~r the date of the patent," Olewine v, Messmor~, 18 A. 

of title, especially against one who relies on possession alone, who shows no title> and 

Following the warrant, a patent was issued by ~e Governor of the 

<;ommonwealth. Coxe, 4 U.S. at 196. The patent served as prtmafacle evidence of title 

to the patent holder and "the patent conveys the full legal title of the state, and is evidence 

Benefit of O'Reill}'., 5 A.3d 246, 257 (Pa. 2010). 

what is commonly referred to as the "incorporeal burden," In re Opening Private Rd for 

purchaser obtained via the survey and warrant process, all property owners were given an 

additional six percent (6%) of land free of charge to allow for the construction of roads in ,,,_. 

their action by the authority granted to them in this behalf."), In addition to the land a 

•• 

) 

) 
30 

8 Hereinafter "N.T. May 20, 2011 ". 

20 I1, p. 14. Likewise, Hermansen notes, 

required to move the chain, re-read the compass and then extend the line. N.T. May 20, 

have a long enough chain to reach end to end so the surveyor and his crew would be 

3-6, Timothy Witter, who testified on behalf of the Plaintiffs, testified that the surveying 

methods used in the 181h century had inherent problems because if the surveyor had metal 

in his pockets or there was metal in the ground this could affect the reading of the 

compass. Notes of Testimony, May 20, 20118, p. 12. Frequently the surveyor did not 

surveyors were hampered by "Indian harassment and battles with nature." Hermansen, p. 

progress on all of the survey requests. Hermansen, p, 3-5. In addition to speed, the 

' ·. . 

surveyors were known to sacrifice precision in exchange for haste in an effort to maintain 

From the beginning, the first surveys had problems. Many of the deputy 

Nicholson, p. 8-9. 

A warrant was issued calling for a certain amount of land. If the warrant gave the 

exact location, no further documents were necessary. If the description were 

lacking 01· insufficient, a survey was made by a deputy of the Surveyor General's 

Office. Upon a return of the survey a patent (i.e., a deed) was issued to the 

purchaser, provided the purchase price had been paid in full. The purchase price 

theoretically was due when the warrant was issued, but the eagerness of the 

proprietors to have the colony settled, and thepoverty of most of the settlers led to 

the sale of most of the land on credit. In such cases the warrant gave an equitable 

title which wasconflrmed as against all persons excepting the proprietors by 

seven years actual residence. The prices and the conditions varied greatly. 

Quit-rents were usually reserved in addition to the purchase price, but discharged 

by the Divesting Act ofl 779, Section 9, except as to the Proprietary Manors. Six 

per cent of the amount ofland purchased was often added on account of roads to 

be opened later. Most warrants contained a provision that there must be an actual 

settlement by residence within two years. 

process is as follows: 

considered void. Kelly, 9 Watts at 117. In sum, as concisely stated by Nicholson the 
31 

Plaintiff has the burden of proving by a "fair preponderance of the evidence" they have 

In modem day jurisprudence, the correct method of resolving a land dispute is 

through an action to quiet title pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 1061 et. seq: In such an action, the 

Modem day jurisprudence 

[b Jy the mid-I BO Os, much of the public domain had been sold to private 

individuals. At times, small, unappropriated tracts are still uncovered by survey 

and title search. These tracts, when found, are available for appropriation 

provided the Department of Forests and Waters (Department of Environmental 

Resources) waives their first-purchase option. 

Today, the Land Records Division, Pennsylvania Historical andMuseum 

Commission (formerly the Land Office) is-responsible for maintaining the 

original records and disposing of vacant land found unclaimed. It has also been 

delegated the responsibility to make connected drafts of all the original surveys. 

Hermansen, p. 3-3, 3-4. 

Hermansen notes 

There is no survey of ordinary size, the lines of which will measure exactly to the 

corners, or to the places where they once stood; hence every surveyor in tracing 

old surveys expects to find and does find the length of every line differing more 

01· less from his draft. 

again since 1792. As stated in Martz v. Harlex, 4 Watts 261, 263 (Pa. 1835) 

As a. result of the problematic surveys, this issue has been litigated time and time 

· [t]he deputy surveyor ( or assistant) worked with two or more chain-carriers and 

axmen. Many times the chain-carriers and axmen were supplied by the applicant 

requesting the survey, Frequently, they were people from the local neighborhood 

or drifters passing through 'the area. Although the tasks performed by the survey 

crew did not require much survey knowledge, the measurements did require some 

care and diligence. From prior experience, it was generally proven that poor 

chain-carriers meant poor surveys. Therefore, deputy surveyors were instructed 

to choose their chain-carriers carefully from men of good standing. In 1803, the 

legislature required all chain-carriers to take oaths to ensure that they would 

perform measurements diligently and carefully .... 

However, it is general knowledge that the work of the early chain-carriers left 

much to be desired. 'It is a well-known fact that but few of the recorded distances 

of the early surveys were often found correct, when run between the monuments 

on the ground.' 

Hermansen, 3" 7 quoting Prlngle v. Rogers, 44 A. 275 (1899) .. 

, I 
32 

to be "reformed". Defendant J.R. Fraker's first two arguments; consisting of seventeen 

There is a significant amount of dispute as to whether the deeds in question need 

The Deeds do not need to be Refonned 

the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs have complied with Pa, R.C.P. 1065 because as 

~ discussed tnfia, the Plaintiffs, through the testimony of their expert, have sufficiently. 

described the lands to which they seek to quiet title. 

"which requires that they describe the lands to which they seek to quiet title." However, 

The Defendants argue the Plaintiffs have failed to comply with Pa. R.C.P. 1'065 

Pa, Super. 543, 544 (1904). 

require the citation of authority that in ejectment the plaintiff must recover upon the 

strength of his own ai1d not upon the weakness of his adversary's title," Crist v. Boust, 26 

A.2d 83, 89 (Pa. Super. 1991)). "It is too clear for argument and too well settled to 

exclusive possession vis-a-vis proof of paramount title.!") (quoting Sutton v. Miller, 592 

1997) ("'Ejectment is a possessory action wherein a plaintiff must prove the right to 

104, l 08 (Pa. Super. 1991); See also Roberts v. Pursley, 700 A.2d475, 480 (Pa. Super. 

Unlike an action to quiet title, in an ejectment action, a plaintiff has the burden to 

establish "the right to immediate exclusive possession." Doman v. Brogan, 592 A.2d 

demonstrated they have better title. 

See also Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Game Commission, 565 A.2d 859, 861 (Pa. 

Commw, 1989). Upon this showing, the Plaintiff is deemed to have title to. the land until 

a better title is shown by an adverse party, Poffenberger, 776 A.2d at 1021. The Court 

,} finds that the Plaintiffs have'satisfied their burden and the Defendants have not 

title to the land. Poffenberger v. Goldstein, 776 A.2d 1037, 1021 (Pa. Cmwlth, 2001 ); 
33 

9 In Regions the court refused to reform a mortgage where the mortgage company unilaterally and 

mistakenly removed a spouse's name from the mortgage because there was evidence that the mortgagors 

committed any type of bed faith or fraud, Rather, It was the bank, as the mortgagee who made the mistake. 

Dudash. 460 A.2d 323 (Pa. Super, 1983)). 

Regions Mortgage, Inc, v. Muthler, 889 A.2d 39, 42 (Pa. 2005)9 (guoting Dudash Y, 

had '" such knowledge of the mistake as to justify an inference of fraud or bad faith.?' 

justify reformation of a deed or mortgage only when the party opposing the reformation 

of Ford City v. Guffey, 200 A. 160, 163 (Pa. Super. 1938). A unilateral mistake may 

22'1 but in fact was conveying "lot No: 21."); Armstrong·County Building and Loan Assn 

of a deed when a land company thought it was conveying a parcel described as "lot No. 

. 

Savings & Loan Co. v. Alicia Land Co., 13 A.2d 65, 66' (Pa. 1940) (allowing reformation 

As a general rule, for a court to allow reformation of a deed, there rnu~t be a 

mutual mistake in the description of the landed intended to be conveyed, See Uniontown 

lands. In reality, if the Court were to re-draw any of the boundaries of PHH C's lands as . 

set forth in its deeds, it would constitute a deed reformation." Proposed Findings of Fact 

and Conclusions of Law of Defendant Janet M Fraker, p. 31. For the foregoing reasons, 

the Court concludes that what the Plaintiffs demand does not constitute a "reformation", r" 

reformation, however, they do seek for the Court to re-draw the boundaries of PHHC's 

the Defendant Janet M. Fraker argues> "Plaintiffs maintain that they do not seek a deed 

Platnttjfs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 43. On the contrary, 

specifically, the Plaintiffs aver, "[rJ~fonnation is an equitable remedy reserved for cases · 

of mutual mistake 01· fraud where the court re-writes the parties' agreement or deed." 

to this single Issue, The Plaintiffs do not dispute the requirements of reformation. More 

(17) pages, and Defendant JanetM. Fraker's fourth, eighth and tenth arguments all relate 

,I' 

) 

) 
34 

' [ wJhere the return has Iain for years in the office undisturbed, without any 

opposing claim or possession, more particularly where the owner has paid the 

public taxes, the presumption is a "violent>' one, and so ought always to be left to 

-the jury, of the survey being a regular one, though all the marked lines are not, at 

Rittenhouse and Kell}". have noted, 

the weight of evidence, taking into consideration judicial preference."), Courts following 

survey, a 'preponderance' or majority of evidence is required to reestablish a boundary. 

Given several possible locations for a boundary, the correct location is determined from 

correspond with it as to quantity and boundary."); Hermansen, 5-3 ('~For a retraeement 

not the case, the patent must be corrected and reformed by the survey, and made to 

(Kelly, 9 Watts at 117) ("And wherever it happens, from mistake or otherwise, that this is 

making a second and illegal survey, deserve no favorable consideration whatever."); 

, J • 

. . . 

returned into the land office, The parties who ~ttempt to violate the right of property, by 

and vendees are bound to take notice of a valid survey marked upon the ground and 

Hole v. Rittenhouse. 25 Pa. 491, 497 (Pa. i 855) (''The Commonwealth and her agents 

Since 1839, cases have repeatedly held that the survey must match the patent. See 

(Pa. 1907)), 

agreement.": Bosler, 190 A. at 721 (quoting Graham v. Carnelri.e Steel Co,, 66 A. 103 

remember the facts that a mistake was made and that the writing does not express the 

establish mistake wit must clearly appear by the testimony of witnesses who distinctly 

[ defendant]' s part existed. Therefore, a case for reformation was not made out."). To 

(Plaintiff "wholly failed to produce clear and positive proof that a mistake on 

Bosler v. Sun Oil Co., 190 A. 718, 719~20 (Pa. 1937); See also Bosler, 190 A. at 721 

Where a Plaintiff is relying on reformation of the deeds based on the grantee's 

intention of the quantity of land conveyed, the Plaintiff must demonstrate mutual mistake. 

) 

) 
35 

Dougherty family took title. 

determined that no title was shown in Anthony Sharp, the original grantor from which the 

taxes on the property since at least 1870. However, the dispute arose because it was later 

family timbered on, installed fences, cultivated rye, made a small clearing! and paid the 

demonstrated that the property was a wild uncultivated mountain that the Dougherty 

deeded to different Dougherty family members in an unbroken chain. The evidence 

specifically, in 1857 the Dougherty family purchased the property and the property was 

Sharp's debts. The sale was ordered in 1849 and Mathias Baier purchased the property. 

Thereafter, for a sixty (60) year period, there remained an unbroken chain of title. More 

administrator of his estate petitioned the orphans' court to sell the real estate to pay for 

purportedly owned real estate in Schuylkill County. When Sharp died 184 7, the 

Both parties rely heavily on Dougherty and argue that both the case and 

presumptive grant-doctrine support their respective positions. In that case Anthony Sharp 

Presumptive G1-ant 

Northumberland Coru Company y. Clement, 95 Pa. 126, 137 (1880). 

not where it should or might have been located, but where it actually was located." 

survey." Other courts have noted, "[i]n ascertaining the location of a tract the inquiry is 

surveyors original marks and further held "[tjitles would be insecure, indeed, if, after 

such a period, the absence of visible marks were held sufficient to invalidate a returned 

a distant day, to be found on the ground; and after twenty-one years, by analogy 

to all presumptions, I would consider it a presumption of law; and, like livery of 

seisin, it ought to be pres urned.' 

Onnsbv v. Ihmsen, 34 Pa, 462, 470 (1859) (quoting Mock v. Astley, 13 Serg. & Rawle 

3 82 (Pa. 1825) ). The Ormsby court noted the difficulty of attempting to find the 

) 

.I 

' ) 
36 

dispute, 1911, a period of over sixty (60) years. kh During that time period Baier or 

unbroken chain of title existed from the date of the sale in 1849 to the current date of the 

original patent in 1795. Jd. at 1001. The court also placed emphasis on the fact that an 

fact that Baier, as the purchaser of the real estate from Sharp was taking title from the 

In applying the doctrine to the facts of the case the court placed emphasis on the 

Doughtery, 81 A at 1001. 

[i]n the present case the facts all point in one direction> and not a single fact 

indicates anything to the contrary. Anthony Sharp at the time of his death 

claimed this land. It was sold for the payment of his debts. Record notice was 

given that the purchaser at that sale took title from the estate of Sharp who held 

under claim of title from Kantner by sundry conveyances. That purchase and 

those holding under him have had the constructive or actual possession since 

1849. The Dougherties [sic] have paid the taxes assessed against it for a period of 

forty years at least. They have exercised dominion over it fol' more than fifty 

years. During all these years no one asserted an adverse claim of title under John 

Kantner, and no one asserts such a claim in the present case -, There is a break in 

the chain of title from Kantner to Anthony Sharp, but from the time his title 

passed to Mathias Baier to the present, the successors in title have stood upon this 

ancient title unchallenged by any adverse claimaint. If anyone else ever claimed 

adverse title under John Kantner, and there is nothing to even remotely indicate 

that such a claim was ever made, he hauled down his flag and fled the field long 

ago. 

of remedy.!" Doughort.y y. Welshans, 81 A. 997, 1000 (Pa. 1911) (quoting Rittenhouse, 

25 Pa. at 491 ). The court then analyzed the foundation of the presumptive grant doctrine 

and then applied the doctrine to the specific facts to hold 

draws to it the possession, and that this possession is to be deemed actual, for all purposes 

argument and authority, it is that which affirms that the legal title to uncultivated lands 

. acquired the property did not preclude Dougherty from asserting title. In ruling the court 

noted, m [i]f any principle in the law of Pennsylvania can be regarded as well settled 'by 

The Dou@erty court held that the missing deed demonstrating how Sharp 

I l 

) 

) 

) 
37 

reversing the lower court, held that the 1794 warrant must be used as the starting point 

unless the 1794 official distances and calls "were greatly overrun," The Court, in 

between the 17 84 and 1 793 warrants were too far for the 1794 warrant to fit in between 

recorded. The Court was able to conclude purely on "conjecture" that the distances 

on the 1784 and 1793 warrants, which, as previously mentioned, were never properly 

(hereinafter "the 1 794 warrants"). In locating the 1794 warrants, the 1794 warrants relied 

warrants in question in the case, were obtained by Mary Niel and Thomas Maston 

block of thirteen (13) warrants were obtained (hereinafter "the 1793 warrants'.'). Again 

however, the 1793 warrants were never properly recorded. In 1794 two (2) warrants, the 

warrants"). However, the 1784 warrants were not recorded properly. In 1793 another 

elder." In the case, a block of warrsnts were obtained in 1784 (hereinafter "the 1784 

. . 

found to interfere with tracts belonging to the older blocks, the younger gives way to the 

office in blocks, they are to be located on the ground in blocks. If, then, any of them ate 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court held "where surveys were made and returned into the land 

Pennsylvania jurisprudence. In Hageijy y. Mathers, 31 Pa. 348, 355 (1858) the 

In a similar vein, the concept of "block warrants" has a strong foundation in 

Block Warrants 

Defendant Janet M. Fraker, p. 29. 

owner of her entire lands." Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of 

. 

doctrine of presumptive grant, defendant Janet M. Fraker must be presumed to be the 

In the present case, Defendant Janet M. Fraker argues, "[ajccording to the 

Dougherty owned the property unchallenged by any other claimalnt, Both Baier and 

Dougherty were paying taxes on the property. 

, I 

) 
38 

. 

did not close. N.T. May 18, 2011, p. 27. Allen Henry did some more investigation and 

<,\,, 

However, upon closer inspection. Doug Henry realized that Barnhart's deed description 

purchase approximately 90 acres or 90 plus acres ... " N.T. May 18, 2011, p. 27i 

was 120 acres. He wanted to keep·20 acres which meant the club would be able to 

testified, "Mr. B arnhart thought he owned 120 acres. That's what his deed said, that it 

acquire additional property from Gene Barnhart. N.T, May 18, 2011, p'. 25. Allen Henry 

In the present case, this dispute began when Plum Hollow was in negotiations to 

senior survey will control."). 

controlling, and where the lines of senior and junior surveys conflict, the lines of the 

boundaries in the grants from a common granter conflict, the grant :first executed is 

block, and therefore of each tract therein"); 6 P.L.B. BOUNDARIES§ 15 ("When 

show the location of any tract in the block is some evidence of the location of the whole 

proved by proving the location of the block .... Every mark on the ground tending to 

and returned as a block into the land office, the location of each tract therein may be 

block."); Northumberland Coal, 95 Pa. at 137 CWhen original surveys have been made 

arbitrarily located in disregard of the lines and corners found upon other parts of the 

and so returned, must be located upon the ground as a block; that neither of them can be 

the instruction of the trial court "that the thirteen tracts having been surveyed in a block, 

remains cogent today. See Pruner v. Brisbi~ 98 Pa. 202, 210 (1881) (Finding no error in 

Cases since Hagerty have followed the concept of block warrants and the concept 

Mhat 357. 

quantity are fixed, finally and for ever, as between her owner and the Commonwealth." 

for the 1784 and 1793 surveys because the 1794 survey was patented and "her lines and 

) 
39 

10 Pages 24 through t 82 on the first day of trial, and pages 5 through 52 on the second day of trial. This 

does not include cross examination. 

11 The Court uses the terms "reformation" or "correction" witn a tremendous amount of trepidation, The 

definition as used in this oplnlon fs simply interpreting what the parties thought they were obtaining had a 

thorough title search been performed. 

The Court therefore concludes that correcting Mary Trotter warrant is proper. 

Accordingly, the Court corrects Mary Trotter warrant so that final boundary line is 

the Mary Trotter warrant is incorrect, a fact no one disputes, the Mary Trotter warrant 

must be corrected 11 to reflect the correct block. Kelly1 9 Watts at 116. 

surveys of the John Trotter, Elwin Fish and Mary Trotter warrants, Accordingly, since 

a block, all of the deeds now in question, as junior surveys, must give way to the senior 

Additionally, all of the warrants were for 400 acres. Id. Since the surveys are considered 

1794, the warrants must be considered as a block. See Plaintiffs Exhibits 23, 42, 100. 

Fish warrant or Mary Trotter warrant and all of the warrants were returned on March 1, 

Since all of the lands now in dispute are derived from the John Trotter warrant, the Elwin 

. ' . 

principles of deed construction, is merely construing what the deeds intended to convey. 

boundary dispute case. The Court is not re-writing any deeds. The Court, using 

From the beginning of this opinion, the Court has stated that this case is a 

title back to the Mary Trotter warrant consists of, with limited objections from the parties, 

205 pages o{testimony10• 

N.T. May 18, 2011, p. 27. Allen Henry's testimony about his research and the tracing of 

four or five years, I eventually concluded that there is, in fact, land that is in this are~ of 

Plum Hollow that currently remains titled in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. , .. " 

testified that this fact "got me thinking about how can someone not have the acreage to 

find their deed, and in my investigation to make a long story short, it took me the next 

concluded that Barnhart had only ninety-three (93) acres. As a result Allen Henry 

) 

' ) 
40 

13 The Court notes that this was used in the past. See fug11te y, Coxe, 4 Serg, & Rawle 293, 294 ("It has 

been usual for surveyors not to make an actual running of the closing line; they leave that open In order to 

enable them to correct the survey, if necessary, when they have calculated the quantity of land included in 

the lines; they then close the survey on paper, and sometimes shorten or lengthen one of the lines in order 

to make the quantity correspond with the warrant. This practice ts very convenient and has been 

sanctioned by long usage." 

effectuate the intent of the parties at the time of the original subdivision!' See also Pencil 

"[t]he primary function of a court faced with a boundary dispute is to ascertain and 

Marks v. Ligonier Borough. 82 A. 477, 479 (Pa. Super. 1912). 

In RQth v. Halberstadt 392 A.2d 855, 857 (Pa. Super. 1978) the court stated, 

sufficiently precise for the purpose of identification and to enable a surveyor to locate it," 

identify the land conveyed. and need not necessarily be technically accurate, but must be 

Brogan, 592 A.2d 104, (Pa. Super. 1964), "The object of a description in a deed is to 

Murrer v. American Oil Co., 359 A.2d 817, 819 (Pa. Super. 1976); See also Doman v. 

) owned by the litigants now? "The question of what is a boundary line is a matter of law, 

but where a boundary line, or comer, is actually located is a question for the trier of fact," 

rudimentary-where is the Mary Trotter Patent located with respect to the property 

boundary so that the boundary closes 12• Once the Court makes these changes. the Mary 

Trotter warrant is left with approxi~ately467.6 acres, 

Pl~tiffs' have satisfied their . 

l bJn:den oflocating the ,...- 

. \Mary Trotter Patent/·· ,;;;::. ,., 

Once the Court makes the charrges.discussed' above the question becomes rather · 

West. This change allows the plot of the patent to match the survey exactly. Plaintiffs 

Exhibits 146, 147. Finally, the Court will add an additional 25.77 perches to the eastern 

warrant. Secondly, the Court will change the course from North 46 West to North 64 . 

warrant to close such that the Mary Trotter tract is now adjacent to the John Trotter 

changed from South 56 West to North 56 West. This change allows the Mary Trotter 
41 

v ~J3uchait 551 A.2d 302, 305~06 (Pa. Super. 1988) (11Initially, we note that the primary 

function of the trial court resolving a boundary dispute is to ascertain the intent of the 

grantor at the time of the original subdivision."); Appeals of Dallas, 82 A.2d 676, 679 

(Pa Super. 1951); (The object of the interpretation rules is to "ascertain the actual 

location of the boundary as made at the time,"). "The question of what is a boundary line 

is a matter of law, but where a boundary line, or comer, is actually located is a question 

for the trier of fact." Murrer, 359 A.2d at 819; See also Schimp v. Allaman, 659 A.2d 

1012, 1034 (Pa, Super. 1995). 

Pennsylvania courts have repeatedly utilized the same general rules in interpreting 

deeds. Notably, '"where there is a conflict between courses and distances or quantity of 

land and natural or artificial monuments, the monuments prevail. m Dom@, 592 A.id at 

110 (quoting Roth, 392 A.2d at 857); See also Merlino v. Eannotti et ux., 110 A2d 7831 

787 (Pa, Super. 1955). If a beginning comer is known, "the calls ought not to be 

reversed except in order to make the survey close." Merlino, 110 A.2d at 787. 

Additionally, "[e]vidence of the acreage of land, especially where ... the number of acres 

is followed by the words 'more or less' has little weight against specific boundaries and 

is in its nature an uncertain method of description and often a mere estimate." Dawson v. 

Coulter, 106 A. 187) 188 (Pa. 1919). However) if'fhere is a mistake in the description, 

•Hthe call adopted as the controlling one should be that most consistent with the apparent 

intention of the grantor.?' Murrer, 359 A.2d at 820 (gypting Baker v. Roslyg Swim Club, 

213 A.2d 145, 149 (Pa. Super. 1965)). Generally, if a map ls referred to in a grant or 

conveyance, the map is deemedto be incorporated into the instrument and therefore 

1) 
42 

"given considerable weight" in determining the true description of the land. Appeals of 

Dallas, 82 A.2d at 680. 

Additionally.v'the nature and quantity of the interest conveyed must be 

ascertained from the instrument itself and cannot be orally shown in the absence of fraud, 

accident or mistake and we seek to ascertain not what the parties may have intended by 

the language but what is the meaning of the words," Yuscavage v. Hamlin, 137 A,2d 

242, 244 (Pa. 1958). Second, "effect must be given to all language of the instrument and 

no part shall be rejected if it can be given a meaning," liL. (emphasis supplied). Lastly, 

"the language of the deed shall be interpreted in the light of the subject matter, the 

apparent object 01• purpose of the parties and the-conditions-existing when it was 

executed." 

The description of the property by courses and distances controls over the 

quantity of land. Bosler y. Sun Oil Co., 190 A. 718, 719 (Pa. 1937); See also Deppen v. 

Bogar, 7 Pa. Super. 434, 445 (1898) (mQuantity is a circumstance of slight, often of no. 

weight in a question of title, but it may have a marked effect where the question is one of 

boundary. If there be two lines, one corresponding with the quantity of land in the deed, 

and the other largely in excess the interference would have weight in determining the true 

· line, especially when strongly assisted by other evidence.:" (quoting Kennedy v. Lu bold, 

88 Pa. 246, 247 (1879)); See also 6 P.l.E. § 14 (A "statement inserted in a conveyance, 

of the quantity of land supposed to be conveyed must yield to courses and distances 

) 

) 
43 

13 The writer notes that Defendant J, Ronald Fraker's expert, Thomas M, Englerth, explained these general 

prlnclples as he was describing what he typically does when trying to locate a survey. More speclfically, . 

Englerth testified 

Well, first and foremost ls trying to find rnonumentatlon, and then the second I would think would 

does the monumenratlon fit or come close to fitting any deed calls that you may have. And then 

after that, you find other things that will lend credence to the location of the lines, 

For example, blaze lines running between two found monuments, You may find fence Jines. You 

may find stone rows and you may find people have posted the ground, 

Notes of Testimony, July 26, 2011, p. 1$-16. 

"all kinds of property surveys, subdivisions for land developments ... topographic surveys" 

University in 1978 with an associate's degree in land surveying and has been surveying 

credentials, Notes of Testimony, May 19, 2011, p. 129. He graduated from Penn State 

court proceedings op. numerous occasions and, in this Court's opinion, impressive· 

Mr. Witter has been a licensed professional surveyor since 1985, has testified before in 

Maly Trotter warrant, through the credible testimony of Timothy Witter andAllen Henry, 

The Court finds the Plaintiffs have sufficiently demonstrated the location of the 

Location ofMalj' Trotter I 

I 

southern. edge of the property, 

control,"), In Duncan v. Madara, 106 Pa. 562 (1884) the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

held that using the total size of the lot was proper Where a deed for property did not 

properly close on the northern edge even. though the parties knew the location of the 

referred to a stated area as the southern end and remaining part of a certain tract will 

distances, however, and where no lines are found actually marked out, a description by 

See 6 P .LE. Boundaries § 14 ('•where it is impossible to close a survey by courses and 

However; where the property description cannot close based on the courses and 

descriptions found in the property deed, a description of the quantity of area will control. 

less.:" 13). 

especially where the reference to quantity of land is qualified by the words 'more or 

I 

, I 
44 

14 Notes ofTestimony May 19, 2011, p, 131-169 and Notes of Testimony May 20, 2011, p. 4-46 

See Plaintiffs' Exhibits 97, 60. Tract No. 2(b) in the Remy Deed can be traced by an 

associated draft that established the northeastern comer of the Thomas Stinson Patent. 

an unbroken, regular chain of conveyances to a deed, dated February 26, 1869, from 

Ephraim Ramsey to William Peters that contained a description taken from a survey and 

The evidence 'demonstrates that Tract No. 2(a) in the Henry Deed can be traced by 

credible and accurate. 

testimony. Accordingly, this Court must accept Allen Henry's testimony and research as 

Again however, the Defendants have done nothing to rebut the accuracy of Allen Henry's 

relationship with Plaintiff Plum Hollow since the late 1970s. N.T. May 18, 2011, p. 20. 

property now in dispute. N.T. May 18, 2011, p. 19. Allen Henry has also had a 

brother, Plaintiff Douglas Henry, another brother and four (4) sisters have title to the 

The Court recognizes that the testimony of Allen Henry is biased because his 

position. 

introduced. N.T. May 18, 2011, p. 7. The Defendants have done nothing to rebut this 

credible. Additionally, the Plaintiffs introduced 148 exhibits in support of their position. 

At the outset of the trial, the Defendants stipulated to the authenticity of all exhibits 

the chain of title from the Mary Trotter Patent through the present day was extensive and 

of title back through the Mary Trotter Patent, The testimony from Allen Henry detailing . 

The Court further finds that Plum Hollow has sufficiently demonstrated its chain 

evidence. 

presented noevidenceto contradict, discredit, or otherwise question the Plaintiffs' 

ever since. Id. Mr. Wltter's testimony about the location of the Mary Trotter warrant 

consists of 80 pages'" of transcript and relies on countless exhibits. The Defendants have 

) 
45 

unbroken) regular chain of corrveyances to a deed, dated December i 7, 1862, from 

Rob~rt Ramsey and Wife, to Jacob Wible that describes, based upon a survey and 

associated draft, a parcel of land that Hes within and forms the southwestern corner of the 

Elwin Fish patent. See P!alntl/fs 'Exhibits 97. 

Tract No. 3 in the Henry Deed can be traced by an unbroken, regular chain of 

conveyances to a deed, dated September 12, 1867, from John Hollard Sr. and his wife to 

George W. Hollard to a tract of land (hereinafter "Holland Tract"), that established the 

northwestern corner of the Mary Trotter patent, and the western boundary of the Holland 

Tract is part of the western boundary of the Mary Trotter patent. Plainttffs' Exhibit 98. 

The Holland Deed contains the accurate description of Tract No: 3 in the Henry Deed, 

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 117, p. 1. 

Next> Tract No. 1 of the Henry Deed as reflected on Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 123 to 

Timothy C. Witter's testimony shows this tract as the southeastern corner of the Charles 

Sewell Tract mid the final corner needed to establish the Four Comers. By locating the 

Four Comer.'>, the Mary Trotter patent can be anchored to the Elwin Fish patent and its 

location determined, 

The location of the Mary Trotter patent by determining Four Comers at the 

northwestern corner of the Mary Trotter patent is confirmed by the work that was done to 

the south where Timothy Witter' a survey Work allowed it to establish the southern line of 

the John Trotter patent as depicted in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 125. Since the John Trotter 

patent is senior and part of a block with the Mary Trotter patent its location is paramount 

and the location of the southern line fixes the location of the Mary Trotter patent with 

greater precision as this line is fixed by the ad joiner of Patrick Neeley to the south. 

I j 
46 

Further confirmation of the location of the Mary Trotter arises from finding a planted 

stone on the Elwin Fish western boundary at a corner in common with Charles Sewell 

and J runes Justice which is a recognized monument of that comer. Pla/.nttffs 'Exhibit 

122. This planted stone helps pinpoint the Elwin Fish patent location and narrows the 

parameters for the Mary Trotter patent location, 

Looking at the evidence peculiar to the Mary Trotter patent confirms the location. 

A comer in common with defendant Bonnie Miller, Henry, and defendant Dulce Burger 

Hall (Hereinafter "Henry-Hall-Miller-Corner") is a comer that is also a Mary Trotter 

comer. The comer is identified as point" A" in the Survey of 1965. The corner was 

identified as an iron pln in the Survey of 1976> a "white oak stump (gone)" in the Henry 

deed as well as a "w.o, stump (gone)" in the Survey of 1965. This suggests that the 

. comer was never properly surveyed and marked by monument. 

Another corner in common with Henry, and defendant Dulce Burger Hall 

(hereinafter "Henry-Hall-Comer #1.") is also a Mary Trotter corner. The corner is 

identified as point "B" in the Survey of 1965. The comer is shown as a twenty-two (22) 

inch white oak in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 123. The corner was identified as a twenty-~our (24) 

inch oak in the Survey of 1976, as agreed to by Henry and J._ Ronald Fraker based on 

Henry' s uncontradicted testimony. The Henry deed calls it a white oak and it is marked 

"w,o." in the Survey of 1965. This suggests that this comer also has never been properly 

surveyed and marked by monument. 

A second corner in common with Henry and defendant Dulce Burger Hall 

(hereinafter "Henry-Hall-Corner f/!2.") is a comer shared by Henry and Hall, located on 

the Fleming/Trotter line as first mentioned in the Will of Barbara Myers. The comer is 
l 47 

identified as point "C" in the Survey of. I 965. The comer is identified as "Existing Post 

in Stones" in JRF Exhibit A-1. The Survey of 1976 and the Henry deed call for a stone 

as a monument, and a "stake in atones" on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 123. TI1e Survey of 1965 

calls for a "w.o, '', suggesting that the corner has never been properly survey and arced 

with monuments. 

The boundary line that connects the Henry-Hall-Miller-Comer and the HenryHall-Corner #1 was identified as line "AB" on the Survey of 1965 but was not retraced. 

It is not identified in J.R. Fraker Exhibit A-1. Plaintiffs' expert failed to retrace the line 

but identified it as line "P6,' (hereinafter "P6 line") in his testimony and on his Exhibits. 

The boundary line that connects the Henry-Hall-Corner s I and the Henry-HallComer #2 was identified as line <1BC' in the Survey of 1965 and it too was never 

retraced, That line was not identified in JRF Exhibit A-1; it was retraced by Plaintiffs' 

expert and is an area where he found remnants of the fenceas discussed below. 

The course in the Mary Trotter patent is "N 8 E 110 perches" and consists of the 

following four (4) segments on Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 123: Henry-Hall-Corner #1 to 

Henry-Hall-Corner #2; Henry-Hall-Corner #2 to Hall-Holland-Comer, which is the 

boundary line between the two tracts currently owned by defendant Dulce Burger Hall; 

Hall-Holland-Comer to the Plum Hollow Road, whom Plaintiffs' expert identified as the 

two acre out sale from the Fleming Tract owned by Twila. M. Long; and the Plum Hollow 

Road to the Foux Corners, currently on the Henry Farm. 

In addition to the evidence from the location of the adioiners and use lines, 

Timothy C. Witter also documented physical evidence offence remnants in the area he 

identified as the Mary Trotter patent boundary. Although this is not conclusive, it 

I j 

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48 

Location of Deed of 1827 

Mary Trotter patent. 

circumstantial evidence such that the Plaintiffs are able to properly trace title back to the 

Kerlin. Again, however> the Plaintiffs have demonstrated through sufficient 

There is a second break in the chain of title between Dennis O'Conner (elder) and James 

no recorded deeds, became vested in Owen Anderson, See DoughertY, 81 A. at 1001. 

confirms that fee simple title of the two tracts owned by James Kerlin, for which there are 

Appleby Deed and the A.G. Kerlin Deed, give rise to a presumption of grant that 

Celia Anderson, This conflrmation, combined with the recitals in the Anderson Deed, the 

confirmed the deed of conveyance for this land from the Estate of Ephraim Ramsey to 

Anderson, title was confirmed by this Court, when in 1910, sitting as an Orphan's Court 

While there is a break in the chain title between James Kerlin and Ephraim 

Henry and a plot of the partition. See Platmiff's Exhibit 105,· N. T. May 18, 2011, p. 158, 

County. Plaintiffs sufficiently demonstrated this through the testimony of Allen K. 

legal description to the partition in the Estate of Dennis O > Conner ( elder) .in Bedford 

unbroken chain of title back to Celia Anderson and that chain· contains the same basic 

roadbed on the southern side of the Hom. 

,Relating to Plum Hollow Hunting Club, Jue. 's 

Chain of Title to 

the Mal'y Trotter Patent 

Plum Hollow's chain of title back to the Mary Trotter patent is supported by an 

the remaining courses of the Mary Trotter patent on the old fence and ·along the old 

that the N 64 WIS 64 E line identified on Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 124 as line "PS" places 

supports his overall conclusion as to the location of the boundary. Mr. Witter testified 
49 

and distances around the northwest boundary of the Mary Trotter patent to the beginning. 

the Mary Trotter survey and patent, The description then continues the last three courses 

Justice, dec'd, which was the reputed owner of the Thomas Stinson patent at the time of 

East sixteen perches to a white oak" reaches a point described as at lands of William 

Residue, now owned by-Plum Hollow. The next course, "[njorth twenty five degrees 

a white oak .... " These lines mark the beginning of the common boundary with the 

by the residue of Land of Mary Trotter North fifty six degrees West sixty nine perches to 

five and one half degrees Bast one hundred and thirty perches to a Chestnut Oak, thence 

without creating a southern boundary in common with Robert Lodge, "[n [orth twenty 

of that eastern boundary to lands of Ro bert Lodge, The description then continues 

outside the eastern boundary of the Mary Trotter patent, but it does run the entire distance 

boundary, and then finally the western boundary with the habendum clause stating that 

) the property contains 315 acres, The eastern boundary must be adjusted because it goes 

with the northern boundary, then the eastern boundary, followed by the southern 

and quantity, but no natural monuments were ever found. The deed description started 

I 

The known parameters of the Deed of 1827 contain ad joiners, metes and bounds, 

Hollow. 

remaining acreage from the Mary Trotter patent with the Deed of 1827 setting the 

boundary along tho southwestern comer of the Mary Trotter patent that is titled in Plum 

Janet M. Fraker's land is derived entirely from the Deed of 1827. Plum Hollow owns the 

In addition to the errors in the Mary Trotter warrant, there are errors in the Deed 

of 1827 ~at prevent the Deed from closing. The location of this Dee? is critical to the 

outcome-ofthis case because, except for adverse possession discussed irfia, Defendant 

I ,I 
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50 

Closing these two gaps will result in the Residue having about 152.6 acres and the 

outside boundary of the Deed of 1827 having 315 acres. However; the Court takes the 

Plaintiffs' suggestion and will allow the par.ties the opportunity to negotiate a line. ~ 

The extent and acreage of Plum Hollow Hunting Club, Inc. ,s Title 

determine the boundary for the Second Gap to meet the northeastern corner of the Hom. 

boundary a distance of sixty-nine (69) perches. The final adjustment must be to 

Residue when the boundary follows a parallel line to the Mary Trotter patent southern 

Hollow, and determine the location of the 130 perch line to the northeast corner of the 

.the Mary Trotter patent to set the southeast corner of the Residue, now owned by Plum 

parties. Accordingly, the Court will adjust the First Gap along the southern boundary of 

repeatedly held that acreage is the only factor which can determine the intention of the 

551 A.2d at 30? (quoting Dawson v. Coulter, 106 A. 187, 188 (Pa. 1919); See also 

Jedlicka v. Clemmer, 677 A.2d 1232, 1234 (Pa. Super. 1996). However, courts ha~e 

becomes a material factor in the determination of the intention of the parties.:" Pencil, 

line by either metes and bounds or monuments on the ground, .. eyidence of the acrea~ 

the actual location of the boundary and the writing contains no words to definitely fix the 

method of description and often a mere estimate. Where, however, a doubt exists as to 

or less', has little weight as against specific boundaries and is in its nature an uncertain 

the acreage of land, especially where the number of acres is followed by the words 'more 

To ascertain this intent, courts use certain rules of construction-notably '"1 f e]vidence of 

intent of the granter at the time of the original subdivision. See Pencil, 551 A.2d at 306. 

boundary as the acreage in the tract. The primary function of this Court is to ascertain the 

The errors in the description leave the major determining factor of setting the 

) 

I 

·' 
I 51 

Once the Court has determined that Plum Hollow has legal title to the residue of 

the Mary Trotter patent, the question still remains+what is the extent of Plum Hollow's 

- ---- -·-iitle? The-inete~rand bounds description in the deeds and surveys in-its chain of title do 

not match the metes and bounds descriptions of its adjoiners, The hlstorical description 

for its property is rife with error in acreage and consistent courses and distances. The one 

consistent element of its title has been the consistency of its called adjoiners and the 

consistency with which its adjoiners have called for the predecessors in title of Plum 

Hollow as adjoiners. 

Since the Appleby Deed, each deed has recited that it conveys the same real estate 

as its predecessor deed. Despite the repeated inaccuracies, the basic shape of the tract 

. owned by Plum Hollow has been stable since the survey_ for the partition in the Dennis 

O'Connor (elder) Estate as well as having adjoiners in the JRF chain of title on the north 

and the JMF chain of title to the east. The pm-titian survey is defective, but claims to 

divide and convey all of the land of Dennis O'Conner (elder) that he had at his death in 

what is now Dublin Township, Fulton County, which includes all the Residue of the 

Mary Trotter patent. Subsequent errors of description do not diminish Plum Hollows 

title or the extent of that title. Likewise, recent surveys cannot replace the ancient 

boundary lines with modern monuments that do not tie in to the ancient monuments. See 

Reilly v. Mountain Coal Co,7 54 A. 29, 33 (Pa. 1903). 

The location of Plum Hollow's real estate through the Appleby Deed is fixed by 

the location of the Clear Ridge Road on the west, real estate of Plum Hollow through 

Barnhart as well as Dale Henry .on the south, the common boundary of the Mary Trotter 
. 8 

I.. 

52 

line between me and Thomas E. Fleming and running back to the line between and Elijah 

1/3 acre tract described as "off of the South end of my farm commencing at a point on the 

to Barbara Myers who devised the real estate to her son George Myers when it was a 29 

the Mary Trotter patent. His title is traced back through Collins Shade and Lovada Kerlin 

estate owned by the widow of Simpson B. Carmack that lies in the northwestern corner of 

Henry has legal title to a portion of the property judicially determined to be real 

Relating to Douglas Henry's Title and the Extent of that Title 

Residue, now owned by Plum Hollow. 

set so as toprovide 315 acres in the Deed of 1827 and to leave 152.67 acres in the 

of the latent ambiguities in the Deed of1827. The boundary of the Deed of 1827 must be 

upon the placement of the 130 perch line and the resolution of the Second Gap in the 

Deed of 1827 which prevails as a prior conveyance, but which has never been set because 

Plum Hollow's eastern boundary and the northeastern boundary is dependent 

grantees is fixed by the location of the Mary Trotter patent boundary. 

affected by it."). Accordingly, the line between Plum Hollow, Henry and JRF and his 

marked line of the proper age for its own survey inclosing, but the senior will not be 

between two adjoining surveys, the junior must always give way. It may have a wellManuf g Co. v. Cross, 18.A. 519, 519 (Pa. l 889) C'It is very clear, that in a contest 

change, alter, or affect a senior one if they come into conflict. See Tyrone Min. and 

Thi-s-Court has previously ruled that the Thomas $.tinson patentisjuniorto the 

Mary Patent and therefore must yield. Accordingly, the lines of a junior survey cannot 

Deed of 1827 as fixed by this Court on the east and northeast. 

patent and the Thomas Stinson patent on the north and the boundary established by the 
53 

as the plaintiff obliged to content for, but on the contrary this court was willing, so long 

calls or surveys. Quinn v. &m:!1 43 Pa. 337, 341 (1862) ("Not only is there no such rule 

adjoiners control the limits of his boundary, instead of inconsistent metes and bounds 

along bis southern boundary, but that line has been resolved through other means. The 

Fleming chain. It appears he might also have a common boundary with Plum Hollow 

' 

south of the Plum Hollow Road along the Horn adjacent to JRF and his grantees from the 

Thus, the record shows that Henry owns everything once owned by Simpson B. Carmack 

. . 

an adjoiner of the Appleby Tract on the north. See Plai11ti.ffe' Exhibit No. 105, p. 2. 

boundary. The Survey of 1969 of land now owned by Plum Hollow does show Shade as 

58. The Survey of 1965 calls for c~J?leming Land" which is in the JRF grantees' chain of 

) title. but does not call for owners of the Appleby Tract as an adjoiner of Sha~e. See 

Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1 l'!i p. 4,, The survey does not show any adjoiner on the southern 

.. . 

the Deed of 1865 in the JRF grantee chain through Fleming, See Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 

Simpson B. Carmack ls listed as an adjoiner on the northern side of the Horn in 

JMF. 

estate as the "residue" of Collin Shade from the Survey of 1965 are made part of Herny' s 

deed. Cecil Fraker subsequently subdivided this into the tract now owned by Lonnie 

Henry and a smaller tract to the east south of the Plum Hollow Road, now owned by 

Collins Shade subdivided the parcel and conveyed the Cecil Fraker Parcel along the 

- · northern side of-the Plum Hollow Road in the area of the Hom to Cecil Fraker using the 

Survey of 1965. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 117, p, 2. The adjoincrs and description of the real 

Baldwin. Platntiffs' Exhibit No. 49. Henry owns the residue of land that existed after 

) 

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,, 

54 

of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p, 63. 

JMF owns any real estate north.of Plum Hollow Road. See Plaintiffs' Proposed Finding 

The dispute between Henry, Plum Hollow and JMF concerns the real estate she 

still owns within the bounds of the Mary Trotter patent. The Plaintiffs acknowledge that 

Relating to Janet M. Fraker's Title and its Extent 

holding title through Mary Trotter, 

between the Survey of 1976 and the Macy Trotter patent is resolved in favor of those 

Except for the adverse possession and the doctrine of consentable lines, any interference 

patent boundary is determined, the lines between the plaintiffs and JRF are determined. 

1865 in conformity with the Macy Trotter patent. Therefore, once the Mary Trotter 

. grantees comes through the Thomas Stinson patent which is described in the Deed of 

Relating to J, Ronald Fraker and his Grantees' Title and the extent of that Title 

This Court has previously ruled that both the source of title for JRF and his 

Pl um Hollow Road. 

Henry, as the owner of the residue of Lovada Kerlin, owns title between the Hom and 

is no evidence of any conveyance from the Lovada Kerlin chain into the Fleming chain, 

and the scope of legal title which the Estate of Zelpha Fleming could convey. Since there 

Area claimed by JRF under the Fleming Deed and Survey of 197 6 lying outside the 

description of the Deed of 1865 which set the true legal boundary for the Fleming Tract 

The Defendant's expert concluded that Lovada Kerlin owned the Encroachment 

as 1835, to disregard lines actually run· on the ground in order to carry a survey to the 

adjoiners called for."). 

) 

) 
55 

JMF1s total acreage is 212 acres. 

line is the same as the modem boundary between JMF and Lonnie D. Henry, Therefore, 

that was occupied and later owned by Simpson B. Carmack a.k.a. S.B. Carmack. This 

less all that land in the northwest portion of the Deed of 182 7 of approximately l 03 acres 

boundary, the actual legal title of JMF is limited to the boundary of the Deed of 1827, 

this tract remained the same until the Survey of 1984. Thus, despite a contrary record 

(elder) tho common source of title of JMF, Herny, and Plum Hollow. The description for 

1827 along its eastern boundary and part of its 315 acres. This makes Dennis O'Connor 

distances to the Deed of 1827 so that this title encompasses the portion of the Deed of 

. 

description in the McDowell Mortgage bears striking similarities in its courses and 

There is no record evidence showing any title into George Chestnut, but the 

named mortgagor, and being part of survey in the name of Mary Trotter." 

conveyed the same to John James, who this day hath conveyed the same to the within 

acres. The whole having been conveyed by Geo, Chestnut & wife to J ohn Cessna 

Esquire by deed dated 13th Sept. 1859, who by deed dated the 19th of September 18591 

to Thos. Huston, now in the possession of Simpson B. Carmack containing about fifty 

same more or less excepting the tract or part of a tract conveyed by Geo. Chestnut & wife 

Mortgage which is described as "containing between two and three hundred acres be the 

to F,M. Berkstresser dated April 2, 1866. This deed is linked to the 1865 McDowell 

can be traced by a regularchain of conveyances back to the deed from John S, McDowell 

and concerns the tract conveyed in the Baldwin '.Deed. JMF1s record title for this tract 

JMF's real estate is flrst described as a result of the unrecorded Survey of 1984 

• JI 
56 

good faith paid valuable consideration for property without notice of adverse claims." 

notice of another's claim to the item or of any defects in the seller's ~itle; one who has in 

A bona fide purchaser is defined as "[o]ne who buys something fol' value without 

Law.p. 42. 

estate that came from the Mary Trotter chain of title, they cannot claim BFP status as 

purchasers from that chain." Platnttffs 'Proposed Finding of Fact and Conclusion of 

Proposed Findings of Fdct and Conclusions of Law, p. 76. However, the Plaintiffs' 

argue the BFP argument is irrelevant "[sjince neither JRF nor his grantees purchased real 

interest claimed outside of those set forth within the property records." J.R. Fraker 's · 

any unrecorded interest in land is deemed void as to a BFP without actual notice of any 

Law, p. 75~84. The Defendants conclude by arguing "[pjeraons who do not properly 

record their title deeds or any other interest they claim risk the loss of their property, as 

Janet M Fraker, p. 35; J.R Fraker 's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 

breaks in the chain of title to the Plum Hollow, Plaintiffs could have traced their 

respective deeds back to 1794 and the circumstantial evidence deduced by the Plaintiffs 

is insufficient. See Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Defendant 

All Defendants argue they are bona fide purchasers for value because of the 

Defendants are not Bona Fide Purchasers 

negotiate a-mutually agreeable line between the parties. 

JMF's legal title: The Court will-allow an opportunity for Plum Hollow and JMF to 

The Court takes the Plaintiffs' suggestion-and holds that this is the extent of 

l 

) 
57 

"21 P.S. § 351 entitled, "Failure to record conveyance" provides 

All deeds, conveyances, contracts, and other instruments ofwritlng whereln it shall be the 

Intention of the parties executing the same to grant, bargain, sell, and convey any lands, tenements, 

or hereditaments situate In this Commonwealth, upon being acknowledged by the parties 

executing the same or proved In the manner provided by the laws ofthis Commonwealth, shall be 

recorded in the office for tho recording of deeds In the county where such lands, tenements, and 

heredltaments are situate. Every such deed, conveyance, contract, or other Instrument ofwr!tlng 

which shall not be acknowledged or proved and recorded, as aforesaid, shall be adjudged 

fraudulent and void as to any subsequent bona fide purchaser or mortgagee or holder of any 

judgment, duly entered in the prothonotary's office ofthe county In which the lands, tenements, or 

hereditaments are situate, without actual or constructive notice unless such deed, conveyance, 

contract, or Instrument of writing shall be recorded, as aforesaid, before the recording of the deed 

or conveyance or the entry of the judgment under which such subsequent purchaser, mortgagee, or 

judgment creditor shall claim. Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to repeal or modify 

any law providing for the lien of purchase money mortgages. 

le Section 444 entitled, "All deeds made in tho state to be acknowledged and recorded within ninety days" 

provides, 

Aii deeds and conveyances, which, from and after the passage of thJs act; shall be made and 

executed Within this commonwealth of or concerning any lands, tenements or hereditaments in 

this commonwealth, or whereby the title to the same may be In any way affected In law or equity, 

shall be acknowledged by the granter, or granters, bargeinor or bargainers, or proved by one or 

more of the subscribing witnesses thereto, before one of the judges of the supreme court, or before 

one of the Judges of the court of common pleas, or recorder of deeds, prothonotary, or clork of any 

court ofrecord, Justice of the peace, or notary public of the county wherein said conveyed lands 

Ho, and shall be recorded in the office for the recording of deeds where such lands, tenements or 

heredltaments are lying and being, within ninety day:i after tho execution of such deeds or 

conveyance, and every such deed and conveyance that shall at any time after the passage of this 

act be made and executed in this commonwealth, and which shall not be proved and recorded as 

aforesaid, shall be adjudged fraudulent and void. against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee 

for a valid consideration, or any creditor of the granter or bergaincr In said deed of conveyance, 

and all deeds or conveyances that may have been made and executed prior to the passage of this 

act, having been duly proved and acknowledged as now directed by law, which shall not be 

recorded In the office for recording of deeds in the county where said lends and tenements and 

heredltarnents are tying and being, within ninety days after the date of the passage of this act, shall 

be aqjudged fraudulent and void as to any subsequent purchaser for a valid consideration, or 

mortgagee, 01• creditor of the granter, or bargalnor therein. 

Additionally, a bona fide purchaser must also act in good faith. Poffenberger v. 

purchaser, the subsequent buyer must be without notice of a prior equitable Interest."). 

property, See also In re Wagner, 353 B.R. I 06 (Bkrtcy. W,D, Pa. 2006); Roberts v. 

Pul's1ey, 718 A.2d 837, 841 (Pa. Super. 1998) ("In order to qualify as a bona fide 

acquire the property without actual or constructive no1ice of a prior interest in the 

"purchaser", p. 1249, Black's Law Dictionary, ih Ed., 1999. The statutory framework 

for bona :fide purchasers is established in 21 P .S. §§ 35115 and 44416• 

To be ·a bona fide purchaser under § 351, a purchaser of real property -must · 

) 

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58 

17 The case involved numerous parties and the procedural history in the case was extensive. Kehoe was one 

of the parties involved In the original action who filed an appeal. 

resulting from a flawed conveyance in 1901. Although the opinion is not clear who 

Keating/Willing warrant as well. However, there was an error in the chain of title 

840. One of the opposing parties, Roberts, was able to trace the chain of title back to the 

"Keating/Willing Warrant", as the original warrant, was completed. Roberts, 718 A.2d at 

was a bona fide purchaser even though the landowner's predecessor did not have legal 

title. In the case. Kehoe 17 owned property that he traced back to 185 4 when the 

fide purchaser statutes to conclude that a landowner had legal title because the landowner 

In Roberts, the Superior Court held that a trial court properly applied the bona 

directly on point. 

587, 589 (Pa. 1969). The case of'Roberts v. Pursle)!, 718 A.2d 837, (Pa. Super. 1998) is 

constructive notice of the deed. 21 P.S. §357; FirstN~tionttl Bank v. Sherwood, 879 

A.2d 178, 181 (Pa. 2005). "Equity protects innocent purchasers by providing that a bona 

fide purchaser for value and without notice has a perfect defense in a suite brought by a 

holder of a prior equitable claim." MacKubbin y. Rosedale Memorial P.mk, 257 A.2d 

recorded, subsequent purchasers, mortgagees or creditors are deemed to have 

notice in whom the title resides. Poffenburger, 776 A.2d at 1042. Once a deed is 

The statute, which has been In effect since January I, 1926, reflects the purpose of 

the recording statutes which is to protect bona fide purchasers and provide the public with 

others, and acts in good faith."), 

-- --- defined as one who pays valuable consideration. has no notice of outstanding rights of 

Goldstein. 776 A.2d 1037, 1042 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001); See also Camegie NatUl'al Gas 

ComP.any v, Braddocki 597 A.2d 285, 287 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991) ("A bona fide purchaser is 
59 

18 The Kaiser court held, "'the bona fide purchaser concept applies only to purchasers of legal title." 

Roberts, 718 A.2d at 841 (quoting Kaiser, 535 A.2d at 1258). 

The Roberts court reasoned, 

fide purchaser, the subsequent buyer must be without notice of a prior equitable interest." 

Commonwealth." The Roberts court therefore concluded, "[i]n order to qualify as a bona 

the bona fide purchaser concept contained withln the recording statute of this 

the Robe1'ts court noted, "we find the Commonwealth Court's argument inconsistent with 

granter did not possess legal title," Robe1ts, 535 A.2d at 841. In rejecting this argument 

fide purchaser concept does not apply to the facts of the present ease because Appellees' 

Kaiser Energy Inc, v. Commonwealth of Pennsvlvania. Department of Environmental 

Resource§, 535 A.2d 1255 (Pa. Commw, 1998)18 argued unsuccessfully-that vthe bona 

applying the Pennsylvania recording statute to the facts of this case." Kehoe, relying 

both intended to provide the same protections to bona fide purchasers, and in light of the 

) fact that the sections must be read together, we hold that the trial court was correct in 

On appeal the Superior Court held "[bjecause (21 P.S.] sections 351 and 444 are 

preponderance of the evidence," Robet1s, 718 A.2d at 840. 

Pennsylvania recording statute, [Kehoe] established their claim. to title by a 

718 A.2d at 840. The trial court still found for Roberts by writing, "but for the 

. . 

"predecessors ever acquired title to the acreage contained within said Warrant." Robeiis, 

Kelius' s transferred the property to Roberts. The trial court, found for Roberts by 

'concluding that while Kehoe was able to trace the property back to 1854, Roberts was 

able to trace title back to 1901 and that Roberts was unable to demonstrate that his 

Kelius and Mary Kelius acquired and properly recorded the property. In 1975, the 

owned the Roberts property between 1901 and 1964, it is clear that in 1964 Milton S. 

) 

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60 

that may affect his title by inquiry of persons in possession or others who the purchaser 

agreement may be found where the subsequent purchaser could have learned of the facts · 

Fiore, 3 86 A2d 569, 573. (Pa. Super, 1978). Constructive notice of a prior unrecorded 

Crnwlth, 1991). Notice may be either actual or constructive. Long John Silvers, Inc. v. 

the property. Carnegie Natural Gas Company v. Braddock, 597 A.2d 2851 287 (Pa. 

The burden of proving no notice is on the party asserting the unrecorded rights in 

of the litigation over the years. 

· at the heart of this case. Not surprisingly, th~e elements have been the subject of most 

without either constructive or actual notice of the defect in title, are interrelated and strike 

The secorid and third elements, the person must have act in good faith and be 

parties involved, 

Since there appears to be little dispute about this element, this element is satisfied for all 

to have purchased their respective properties with good and valuable consideration. 

The first element is valuable consideration. In the present case all parties appear 

R~berts, 718 A.2d at 841 (citations omitted). Given that there are three (3) elements, 

each element shall be taken in turn. 

If c legal title/ within [Kehoe's] definition, were required for a subsequent 

purchaser to qualify as a bona fide purchaser, the recording statute would not 

further its intended goals, For instance, in the typical recording statute situation, a 

grantor sells land to a grantee who does not record the deed; then, a subsequent 

buyer purchases the same land from the same granror as the original grantee and 

this subsequent grantee records his deed before the first grantee. The subsequent 

grantee does not have 'legal title' within [Kehoe's] definition because at the time 

the land was sold to him, the grantor did not have legal title to give such a right. 

Yet, notwithstanding the fact that he does not have 'legal title,' he is a bona fide 

purchaser if at the time of the sale he was without notice of fill adverse interest 

and value was given for a purchase of the land. As evidenced here, imposing a · 

requirement of' legal title 1 to the definition of bona purchaser would nearly render 

the recording statute useless, 

) 

··,, 

} 
61 

19 21 P.S. § 357 entitled "Constructive Notice as to Recordatlon" provides 

The legal effect of the recording of such agreements shall be to give constructive notice to 

subsequent purchasers, mortgagees, and/or Judgment creditors of the parties to said agreements of 

the fact of the granting of such rights or privileges and/or of the execution of said releases, and the 

rights of the subsequent purchasers, mortgagees, and/or judgment creditors of the parties to said 

agreements shall be limited thereby with the same force and effect es Jfsald subsequent 

purchasers, mortgagees, and/or judgment creditors had actually Joined In the execution of the 

agreement or agreements aforesaid. 

[i]f the records are not computerized or are riot easily accessible, then the finder 

of fact may conclude a search of the index is sufficient. If, on the other hand, the 

records are easily accessible, then a diligent search may require review of these 

records. We hold that if the fact finder concludes under an objective standard of 

reasonableness that a diligent search has been made. then the result of that search 

shall constitute notice. 

elaborated by writing, 

longer be considered because of the ease of retrieving computerized information relevant 

to encumbrances on the property." Sherwood, 817 A.2d at 505, The court further 

of the property indexes "[wjhet may have been considered a diligent search may no 

Sherwood, 817 A.2d at 505. The court noted that 'With the advent of the computerization 

the subsequent purchaser is a factual question to be determined on a case by case basis. 

determination of whether an incorrectly indexed mortgage provided sufficient notice to 

constructive notice of a mortgage lien where the mortgage lien was improperly indexed 

in the Recorder of Deeds office. The court, relying on 21 P .S, § 3'5719, held that the 

The issue in Sherwood was whether a subsequent purchaser of real estate had 

according to the amount of prior records for the property that must be examined."). 

(Pa. Super. 2003); See also Hermansen, p. 6w20 C'The depth of research is measured 

at the time of the search." First Citizens National Bank v, She1'Wood~ 817 A.2d 501, 502 

question· of diligence is a factual one to· be determined by the accessibility of the records 

1951). "Proper notice requires a diligent search on the part of the purchaser, and that the 

reasonably believes know such facts. Overly v. HiXBon, 82 A.2d 573, 575 (Pa. Super. 

) 

' J 
62 

Sherwood, 817 A.2d at 505; See also Hermansen, 6~20 ("The depth of'research is 

measured according to the amount of prior records for the property that must be 

examined."). 

Defendant J ,R, Fraker argues, "[t]he main purpose-if not the sole purpose-of 

the recording statutes is to provide notice to all persons purchasing real estate or 

extending mortgage loans of the existence of all property interests affecting the real estate 

involved in the purchase or use O as collateral for a loan." J. R. Fraker 's Propose 

Findings ofFacr and Conclusions of Law, p. 75-76. The Courtagrees with this 

statement. However, the Court disagrees that the Defendants did not have notice. As the 

case law indicates, the extent of the search required to be a BFP is a matter of degree. As 

the Plaintiffs correctly point out, "[ajlthough JRF claims that he was represented by an 

unnamed attorney, we do not know the scope of the search, the extent of the attorney 

certification or what qualifications were made to any opinion of title," Plaintiffs' 

Rebuttal to J.R. Fraker 's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 16. 

Defendant JRF argues, "these parties: (1) derived theirtitle deeds from different 

granters; and, (2) the title deed of record held by each party very specifically describes 

the property conveyed to them, including the specific acreage they were to receive; and, 

(3) at the TIME each party acquired their property an examination of the deed records 

would NOT have disclosed any ownership interest (or 'overlap') by an adjoining owner." 

J. R. Fraker 's Proposed Findings of Facr and Conclusions of Law. p. 82 (emphasis 

supplied). 

The Court is not in a position to speculate about the extent of a title search that 

was done years ago, At the very least, as the Court has already concluded, sufficient 

\ 

' " 
63 

the elements .. Com1eaut Lake, 66 A.2d at 829. 

1996). The burden is on the person asserting adverse possession to establish each one of 

the land fol' twenty-one (21) years. Moore v. Duran, 687 A.2d 822, 828 (Pa. Super, 

prove actual, continuous, exclusive, visible, notorious, distinct and hostile possession of 

The elements for adverse possession have been well established-a claimant must 

title." ~ 

possession "extinguishes all prior claims, including those asserted under color of paper 

671, 678 (Pa. Super. 1995). Stated another way, a party who successfully asserts adverse 

marketable title, with the attendant right of possession." f lauohak y. Boling, 653 A,2d 

.. 

possession for the prescribed period of time, the adverse possessor gains an "absolute, 

possession." Hermansen, 4~20. If a party is able to satisfy the requirements of adverse 

possession "was to clarify ('quief) uncertain title rather than to serve as a reward for 

Robwood Lodget 713 A.2d 109, 112 (Pa. Super. 1998). The original purpose of adverse 

Adverse possession is defined as "dominion over the property," Bride v, 

Adverse Posses§io.t\ 

Defendants argument relating to BFP must fail. 

. . 

defendants conducted a thorough title search, they would have found the mistakes. 

Further, it is the Defendants as the party asserting the unrecorded rights ln the property> 

who have the burden of establishing their unrecorded rights. Accordingly, the 

property was derived from the Mary Trotter patent. The simple fact remains that if the 

derived title deeds from different granters is unpersuasive because all 'of his claimed 

providing constructive notice to the Defendants. Defendant JRF's argument that he 

circumstantial evidence existed to explain the breaks in the chains of title thereby 

r ·• 

) 

) 
64 

Pennsylvania jurisprudence has adopted 'Ha rather strict standard for proving 

adverse possession of woodland. m Shaffer v. O>Toole, 964 A.2d 420, 424 (Pa. Super. 

2009) (quoting Rec.Land.Corp. v. Hartzfeld 947 ;\.2d 771, 774 (Pa. Super. 2008). The 

strict standard is required because adverse possession is an "'extraordinary doctrine'" and 

an 1''extraordinaryprivilege."' Recreation Land Corporation v, Hartzfeld, 947 A.2d 771, 

774 (Pa, Super, 2007) (quoting Flannery v. Stlllll.12, 786 A.2d 255, 258 (Pa. Super. 2001)). 

Each adverse possession claim is a fact specific inquiry. Bride y. Robwood ·Lodge, 713 

. A.2d 109, 112 (Pa. Super. 1998). · 

Niles v. Fall Creek Hunting Club. Inc., 545 A,2d 926, 929 (Pa. Super. 1988) is 

directly on point and provides an excellent discussion of the differences between adverse 

possession and the doctrine of consentable lines; a similar yet distinct concept to adverse 

possession. In the case, Fall Creek Hunting Club acquired approximately 1,560 acres of 

unimproved woodlands. The deed to Fall Creek provided that the western boundary was 

defined as "the line dividing the Townships of Liberty and Morris." Niles, 545 A.2d at 

928. This deed was executed in 1940. Niles owned the property to the west of the Fall 

Creek property. Niles traced the chain of title back to 19 52 when there was. a survey 

done. Niles learned that beginning in 1952, there were concerns with the exact location 

of the boundary line separating the Fall Creek and Niles properties. To separate the 

properties) a single strand of wire was placed between the properties and no trespassing 

signs were placed. Niles then used his portion of the property for timbering. In 1982, 

Fall Creek commissioned its own surveyor who concluded that the 1952 survey was 

incorrect and the correct line was 700 feet to the west of the 1952 survey. Fall Creek 
65 

20 It must be noted that the Superior Court reversed the trial court on the basis of other errors the trial court 

commltted such as a evidentiary rulings and Jury Instructions. The court concluded, "ft]hls Is a dlftfoult 

case. Whether Fall Creek's record title to the disputed land must yield to Niles because ofa boundary fixed 

by consentable line is a closequestion, Because the jury's verdlct may have been influenced by misleading 

instructions on adverse possession and erroneous evidentlary l'Ulings, a new trial is required." Niles. 545 

A.2d at 934. · · 

property may be established in connection with the maintenance of a residence, by 

Le'Daerda. Inc. v. Davis, 360 A.2d 209, 214 (Pa. Super. 1976). "Actual possession of 

and proof of constructive possession under the guise of color of title is insufficient. !Im 

The first element, actual possession> is as it states=-actual possession is required 

Niles, 545 A.2d at 931. The writer shall take each element for adverse possession in tum. 

the court noted that "it was not essential an express agreement to recognize the line." 

language was subsequently incorporated into the later deeds. The court held that this 

language, if believed by the jury would become a binding, consentable Une2°. In ruling 

which is verbally agreeable to the adjacent landowners." Niles, 545 A.2d at 931. This 

boundary was uncertain, and, therefore the parties included the language "the location of 

The court noted that when the 1952 survey was done, the exact location of the western 

possession." Niles, 545 A.2d at 930. A party may prevail under either theory. ML at 931. 

noted, "emerged as a separate and distinct theory from that of traditional adverse 

The Niles court then discussed the doctrine of consentable lines, which, the court 

The land had been partially enclosed by a single strand of'wire which had broken 

and fallen to the ground in several places. The evidence was insufficient to show 

an lnclosure [sio] of a substantial character. There was neither.the establishment 

of a residence nor cultivation within designated boundaries. Therefore, the 

evidence failed to satisfy the requisites for proving that Niles had acquired title to 

the woodland by adverse possession. 

Id. at 930. 

action to quiet title and trespass against Fall Creek. The court on appeal held 

then moved the no trespassing signs to reflect the new survey. Niles then commenced an 

' f 

) 
66 

interference, becomes actual possession of the whole." .ilL, at 121. 

"[tjhe customary use of the woodland, in connection with such a possession, within the 

constructive possession of such woodland."). The Rittenhouse court further explained, 

disseisor, as farmers generally use woodland adjoining to their farms, is actual and not 

without residence; and whore either these is, the use of adjoining woodland by the 

possession may be by residence without cultivation, orby enclosure and cultivation 

established by erecting a residence wh~~·e there is a clear designation of the boundaries of 

the land surrounding such residence."); Rittenhouse, 3 7 Pa. at 117 ("That actual 

land-of which the woodland is a part without erecting a residence; or possession may be 

828 ("Actual possession may thus be established by enclosing and cultivating the tract of 

erecting a residence or by enclosing and cultivating the property."); Moore, 687 A.2d at 

the disputed parcel is undeveloped woodland, actual possession is established by either 

1889); See also Bride)!, Robwood Lagge, 713 A.2d 109, 112 (Pa. Super. 1998) ('1Since 

or the part of the woodlands that is cultivated. Olewine v. Messmore, 18 A. 495, 496 (Pa. 

requirement by making ordinary use of the woodlands in connection with their residence 

part of the tract of land to which the woodland belongs. A property owner can satisfy this 

person must establish actual possession of the woodland by residence or cultivation of a 

of the property are not the actual possession required."). In "dealing with a woodland, a 

to seat it for residence and cultivation or other permanent use consistent with the nature 

R.R. Co., 152 A. 682, 684 (Pa. 1930) ("temporary acts on the land, without an intention 

and paying property taxes." Moore, 687 A.2d at 828; See also Parks y. Pennsylvania 

cultivation of the land, by [e'[nclosure of the land, or by making improvements to the land 

\\ 
67 

Q. Before we move on, who was in actual physical possession of the Dillman 

property when this action was filed by the plaintiffs in 2009? 

A. Dillman was In actual physical possession of whatever is inside the Mary 

Trotter boundary in my opinion. 

He occupied-s-it' s my understanding he occupied the house and so he was 

also in physical possession of that house, but at the time he purchased [it] I 

understand the title was still in someone through Mary Trotter because the house 

was on the property that was conveyed to him by Fraker. The house is on that 

property, 

Q. Well, let me ask you this. did the hunting club ever down and plow out 

Dillman ts driveway? 

A. No they didn't. 

owned by Defendants Lany J. and Tina M. Dillman. N.T. May 191 2011, p. 1-17. The 

following exchange between Attorney Cramer and Allen Henry is instrumental: 

for the land that has been improved. More specifically, Attorney Cramer deduced 

testimony that Plum Hollow never plowed or put shale down on a road purportedly 

The Court agrees with the Defendants that adverse possession has been satisfied 

sufficient where the use(s) is "extensive and apparent as where systematically conducted 

for commercial purposes!' Seven SprJngs; 344 A.2d at 645. 

purposes such as hunting and fishing does not constitute actual possession, It may be 

Bride. 713 A.2d at 112. It must be noted that although using a land for recreational 

pJantlng saplings many years ago was insufficient to demonstrate actual possession. 

"substantial" and the fence must "define and enclose the acreage to whloh po~session is 

asserted." Seven Springs. 344 A.2d at 644~45. Likewise in Bride, th.e court held that 

using the property sporadically for hunting, picking berries, removing timber and 

Springs, court noted that a fence to satisfy the requirements of actual possession must be 

facilitate the timbering did not satisfy the actual possession requirement. The Seven 

However in ~even Springs Farm. Inc. v. Ring, 344 A.2d 641 (Pa. Super. 1975) 

the court held that timbering from an unenclosed woodland and constructing roads to 

'f' 
68 

road with a double yellow line down the middle and a mobile home in the front. There is 

also a red shed off on the right side of the picture. All structures- appear to be well 

home .. The American flag is not tattered or faded in any way. Exhibit I-6 depicts a state 

American flag flying from the garage and there is a trampoline in the backyard of the 

of which appears to be a home and the other appears to be a garage. There is an. 

maintained. Exhibit I-5 depicts a gravel road leading up to two (~) large structures, one . 

Ramsey" on the mailbox. Both the mailbox and the mailbox post appear to be well 

Exhibit I-4 shows a gravel road and in the center there is a mailbox with the name ''D, 

three (3) vehicles parked in front of the home and another larger structure on the right 

side of the photograph. Again, all structures and vehicles appear to be well maintained. 

home that was on the tight side of the photograph in I-2 is now in the center. There are 

bears from rummaging through the trash. There is a wooded area behind the home and 

structures. All structures appear to be well maintained and the grass is neatly trimmed. 

) Exhibit 1"3 is a picture that appears to be taken immediately adjacentto Exhibit I-2 as. the 

one of which looks like a storage shed and a secure place to put out trash so as to prevent 

' 

a home on the right side of the picture. There are two (2) small structures in the picture 

specifically, Exhibit I-2 shows a gravel road in the middle of the photograph and there is 

. Attorney Cramer introduced several photographs of the property allegedly owned 

by Defendants Dillman, Ramsey and Miller. See Exhibits I-2 through I-9. More 

Q, Did the hunting club ever down and put shale on the Dillman's driveway 

as depicted on Exhibit I-17 

A. No they didn't. 

Q. And the hunting club never maintained any portion of Dillman's front 

yard, did it? 

A. No they didn't 

N.T. May 19,2011,p.116 . 

) 
I 

69 

maintained. Bxhibit l-? depicts several homes on the right side of the photograph and a 

road running' parallel to the homes on the left side of the photo graph. All of the yards are 

neatly trimmed and there is a sign in the front yard of one of the homes that say "Mobile 

Home for Rent". The sign and all homes appear to be well maintained. Exhibit I-8 

depicts several mobile homes with neatly groomed yards. Exhibit IH9 depicts a mobile 

home and single family home on the property. Accordingly, the Court believes that the 

Defendants have satisfied the actual possession element for those areas that are Improved, 

JRF likewise testified about his use actual use of the land. More specifically, JRF 

explained how he worked with his son to subdivide the land that he bought in 1976. N.T. 

July 291 2011, p. 14. JRF also testified that he cleared brush away from the property and 

timbered on the property so that the property could be marketed and sold. N.T. July 29, 

2011, p. 15. JRF further testified that he put "For Sale" signs up on the parcels of land 

that he was attempting to sell. N.T. July 29, 2011, p. 15. JRF also rented mobile homes 

to people on the property, N.T. July 29, 2011, p. 16. Although JRF never personally 

lived in the homes, Bonnie Miller resided in the trailer continuously. N.T. July 29, 2011, 

p. 37, Again, the Court is convinced that Defendant JRF has satisfied his burden of 

demonstrating actual possession for these areas. 

However, the question remains about the unenclosed woodlands. It is not clear 

that the Defendants have satisfied this element from the evidence deduced regarding the 

woodlands portion oftbe land they occupy. Rittenhouse case would allow for 

satisfaction of this element by proof of residence and use of the woodland. There is no 

evidence that the Defendants ever attempted to define and enclose the acreage to which 

possession is esserted, See Seye? Springs. The Court notes that there appears to be little 

) 

) 

) 
70 

at 1034~ Inn LeDaerda Inc., 360 A.2d at 214-215; But see Plauchak, 653 A.2d at 676 

involved a dispute over the location of a fence or other boundary, See Schimp, 659 A.2d 

Most of the cases read by the Court discussing the doctrine of consentable lines 

parol evidence. Plauchak, 653 A.2d at 675. 

within the purview of the Statute of'Limitations and) thus, must be demonstrated through 

resolve land disputes. Plauchak, 653 A.2d at 676. The doctrine is not a conveyance 

consentable line is a rule of repose for the purpose of quieting title and discouraging 

confusing and vexatious litigation."). Not surprisingly courts favor this doctrine to 

See also Plauchak v; Boling, 653 A.2d 671, 675 (Pa. Super. 1995) (uThe doctrine of 

resolve their differences peacefully in recognition of abandonment of their rights. Id.; · 

A.2d at 215. The doctrine was created to allow the parties to a boundary dispute, to 

compromise as to the boundary using the principles of estoppel. Inn Le'Paerda lnc., 360 

distinct theory from that of traditional adverse possession."), 

Under the doctrine of consentable lines, adjoining landowners may reach a 

(Pa. Super. l 988) ("the doctrine of consentable line[s] has emerged as a separate and 

Plauchaky. Boling~ 653 A2d 671, 675 (Pa. Super. 1995); P1ottv. Cole, 547 A.2d 1216 

discouraging confusing and vexatious litigation." Schimp, 659 A.2d at 1034; See also 

consent able lines which "is a rule of repose for the purpose of quieting title and 

· A similar, yet distinctly related topic to adverse possession is the doctrine of 

Doctrine of Consentable Lines 

agreement regarding the exact.placement of the boundary lines. 

dispute regarding the remaining elements fur the improved areas presently occupied by 

the Defendants. Accordingly, the Court will allow the parties an opportunity to reach an 

/ 
I 

I 

71 

consent of both parties to that line and the giving up of their respective claims which are 

"establishment of a line in compromise of the dispute". Id. Lastly there must be mthe 

common boundary line." Inn Le'Daerda Inc., 360 A.2d at 215. Second there must be an 

elements must be satisfied. First, there must be a "dispute with regard to the location of a 

The Court will first discuss the dispute and compromise method. For the Court to 

find that this doctrine is applicable under the dispute and compromise method, three (3) 

Jedlicka v. Clemmer, 677 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Pa. Super. 1995). 

1034. Under either theory it is not necessary that the boundary line be substantial. 

Broadly speaking, there are two (2) ways to pr~ve the doctrine-first, by dispute 

and compromise, and, secondly by recognition and acquiescence. Schimp, 659 A.2d at 

establish a boundary line). Additionally, there is no requirement _that the activities be 

conducted on the entire property for a party toprevail. furrg, 687 A.2d at 849. 

Sorg y, Cunningham, 687 A.2d 846, 849 (Pa. Super. 1997) (row of pine 'trees sufficient to 

It cannot be disputed that occupation up to a fence on each side by a party or two 

parties for more than twenty-one years, each party claiming the land on his side as 

his 0W11, gives to each an incontestable right up to the fence, and equally whether 

the fence i~ precisely on the right line or not. Our courts have always favored the 

settlement of disputes of this character by recognizing consentable lines 

established by the parties themselves, and without regard to whether the line 

agreed upon conforms tothe exact courses, distances and bounds of the original 

surveys. . 

Plott. 547 A.2d at 1221 (quoting Dimura Y: William§, 286 A.2d 370 (Pa. 1972)); See also 

. 

supplied). More specifically, 

"specifically" consent to the location of the line. Plott, 547 A.2d at 1221 (wi;,hasis 

in half of a double frame house). However, forthe doctrine to apply, the parties need not 

v. Cole, 547 A.2d 1216 (Pa. Super. 1988) (Dispute over the location of a screening wall 

(Doctrine established when a row of hedges was in place for twenty-one (21) years); Plott 

, • A' 

) 
[ s ]tarting in 198 L when PHHC acquired its property from the Kerns, the Hunting 

club posted its property line essentially along the survey line established by P.E. 

Larsen for all parties, as evidenced by the blaze tree line and other monuments of 

record to which Surveyor Englerth testified. The facts also established that both 

parties stayed on their respective sides of this line, even refusing requests, each to 

the other, to hunt or park on the other's property. 

I"~ J.R. Fraker's Proposed Findings ?f Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 98~99, However, the 

1~t1 (J vr jfDefendants failed to satisfy their burden when they failed to produce any photographs or 

.. {lf 

/ (, other documentation to support this argument. . 

t._1 \ 11 ~ ri @ ~ 1..-:i~ ~J' !?) ,~ ,ftflv ~ 11 &:l g jT; • (~I ..//72 OM 

f·"( 1~~ ~ yr 

boundary. Defendant JRF argues, 

the Doctrine of Consentable Lines because the Defendants have not established a 

Conclusions of Law, p. 39. 

J The Court finds that the Defendants have not satisfied their burden of establishing 

between JMF and Plum Hollow or Henry," Plaintiffs' Proposed Finding of Fact and 

no controversy as to the location of the line ever existed and there is boundary fence 

4 7 of their brief, "[t]here is no consentable line between JMF and Plum Hollow because 

be applicable, there must a boundary. As the Plaintiffs correctly point out on Page 39, 1 

Based on the foregoing discussion, one thing becomes clear-for the doctrine to 

360 A.2d at 216. 

a boundary by adjoining land owners.~: Niles, 545 A.2d at 930 (gnoting Inn Le'Daerdg, 

appear that for the requisite twenty-one years a line was recognized and acquiesced in as 

parties need not have specifically consented to the line but rather ~'[iJt must nevertheless 

The second method is recognition and acquiescence. Unlike the first method, the. 

·· twenty-one (21) years. Schimp, 659 A.2d at 1034. 

Finally, like adverse possession, the party asserting the doctrine must be in possession for 

inconsistent therewith?" Id. (quoting Newton v. Smith, 40 Pa. Super. 615, 616 (1909)). 

11; ., • 
73 

wherein the court held that ~ defendant bank was an indispensable party to the action, 

However, as the Plaintiffs correctly point out. the Ramsey mortgage is not a part of the 

Savings & Loan Assn, v. Freedman161 Pa. D. & C.2d487, 490 (Lawrence Cty. 1972) 

Ramsey's property, In support of this proposition Defendant JRF cites Concord Libert~ 

land transfers. Defendant JRF mentions the mortgagee holding a lien upon Defendant 

located outside the litigation or their rights have been extinguished through voluntary 

action as all of "indispensible parties" mentioned by the Defendants either own properties · 

1. Do the absent parties have a right or interest related to the claim? 

2. If so, what is the nature of the right or interest? 

3. Is that right or interest essential to the merits of the issue? 

4. Canjustice be afforded without violating due processes rights of absent 

parties? 

The Court finds that all of the Indispensable parties have been included in this 

956 (Pa. 1981): 

be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience." Id. Courts are guided by four 

( 4) criteria established in Mechgnicsburg A;teg School District v. Kline, 431 A.2d 953, 

affecting it, or leaving the controversy in such a condition that a final determination may 

is indispensable "when he has such an interest that a final decree cannot be made without 

Parks. Inc. v. Philadelphia Parking Auth .• 521 A.2d 71. 73 (Pa. Commw. 1987). A patty 

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 59; Proposed Findings of Fact and 

Conclusions of Law of Defendant Janet M. Fraker, p. 32w33. 

The failure t~ join an indispensable party deprives the court of jurisdiction. E-Z 

indispensable parties have not been joined in this action. See J.R. Fraker's Proposed 

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' action must be dismissed because all 

Failure to Join Indispensible Parties 

... , ' 
\ . 

:,1· . 

74 

Accordingly, the following is entered: 

in recent memory. 

did not close, This case has been the largest and most comprehensive case for this Court 

time to perform a detailed title search and realized that the original Mary Trotter patent 

This entire case could have been resolved many years ago had someone taken the 

One of the most important reasons is to isolate omissions in boundary 

information., There are an untold number of records that, as a result ofrecopying 

copies have omitted important boundary Informatlon, ... A second reason a 

surveyor should research past records is to uncover errors in subsequent surveys. 

Third, when omissions and errors are· found, in-depth research is frequently 

necessary to correct them .... In addition to omissions, en-ors, and corrections, 

the sequence of conveyancing must sometimes be determined, 

Hermansen, p. 6~20 to 6~21. 

four (4) major reasons for a title search: 

value of a proper title search cannot be underscored. As stated by Hermansen, there are 

This case demonstrates the importance of conducting a thorough title search. The 

Conclusion 

Ne):, 917 A.2d 863, 866 (Pa. Super. 200?), 

record. Accordingly, this Court is prohibited from considering this mortgage. See~